,transcriber's ,note3 ,the text is that of the first edition1 with the errata incorporated4 ,because there are no page breaks1 footnotes are placed under the paragraphs or quotations to which they relate1 and renumbered accordingly4 ,page numbers have been inserted into the text in braces4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,by ,,bernard ,,bosanquet ,c'est le peuple qui compose le genre humain2 ce qui n'est pas peuple est si peu de chose que ce n'est pas la peine de le compter4 7mile1 livre #d47 ,,london ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited ,,new ,,york ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company #ahii ,all rights reserved ,,glasgow3 ,,printed ,,at ,,the ,,university ,,press ,,by ,,robert ,,maclehose ,,and ,,co4 ,to3 ,,charles ,,stewart ,,loch vii ,,preface4 ,the present work is an attempt to express what ,i take to be the fundamental ideas of a true social philosophy4 ,i have criticised and interpreted the doctrines of certain well-known thinkers only with the view of setting these ideas in the clearest light4 ,this is the whole purpose of the book2 and ,i have intentionally abstained from practical applications1 except by way of illustration4 ,it is my conviction1 indeed1 that a better understanding of fundamental principles would very greatly contribute to the more rational handling of practical problems4 ,but this better understanding is only to be attained1 as it seems to me1 by a thorough examination of ideas1 apart from the associations of practical issues about which a fierce party spirit has been aroused4 ,and1 moreover1 it is my belief that the influence of the ideas here maintained upon practical discussion1 would be1 in a certain sense1 to detach it from philosophical theory4 ,the principles which ,i advocate would destroy so many party prejudices1 would put the mind in possession of so many clues to fact1 that practical 8social0 issues would in consequence be considered as problems of life and mind1 to be treated only with intimate experience1 and by methods adequate to their subtlety4 ,the viii result would be that such discussions would be regarded1 if one may use the expression1 more respectfully1 and would acquire an independence and completeness worthy of their importance4 ,the work of the social reformer should no more be regarded as a mere appendix to social theory than that of the doctor is regarded as a mere appendix to physiology4 ,such a division of labour is1 of course1 no hindrance to the interchange of facts and ideas between theory and practice4 ,on the contrary1 it tends to promote such an interchange1 by increasing the supply on either side1 and improving the intellectual communication between them4 ,it will occur to philosophical readers that the essence of the theory here presented is to be found not merely in ,plato and in ,aristotle1 but in very many modern writers1 more especially in ,hegel1 ,t4,h4 ,green1 ,bradley1 #a and ,wallace4 #b ,and they may be inclined to doubt the justification for a further work on the same lines by one who can hardly expect to improve upon the writings of such predecessors4 #a ,see especially the chapter in ,ethical ,studies entitled 8,my ,station and its ,duties40 #b ,see ,lectures and ,essays by the late ,professor ,wallace1 especially p4 #bac1 8,our ,natural ,rights10 and p4 #dbg1 8,the ,relation of ,fichte and ,hegel to ,socialism40 ,on this point ,i should like to make a brief explanation4 ,to begin with1 it is a truism that every generation needs to be addressed in its own language2 and ,i might even plead that the greatness of a tradition justifies some urgency in calling attention to it4 ,but further1 as regards ,t4,h4 ,green in particular1 whom in many points ,i follow very closely1 ,i had two special reasons for desiring ix to express myself independently4 ,one of these is to be found in my attempt to apply the conceptions of recent psychology to the theory of ,state coercion and of the ,real or ,general ,will1 and to explain the relation of ,social ,philosophy to ,sociological ,psychology4 ,for a short discussion of the ,imitation ,theory1 which the purpose of the present work would not permit me to include in it1 ,i may refer to a paper which will shortly appear in ,mind4 ,my other reason lay in the conviction that the time has gone by for the scrupulous caution which ,green displayed in estimating the value of the ,state to its members4 ,i have referred to this subject in the body of my work 7ch4 x472 but ,i desire to emphasise my belief that our growing experience of all social 8classes0 proves the essentials of happiness and character to be the same throughout the social whole4 ,scepticism on this point is the product1 ,i am convinced1 of defective social experience4 ,indeed1 it seems worth while to observe that the attention which is now rightly paid to such disadvantages1 affecting the poorer classes of citizens1 as it may be possible to remedy1 has given rise to a serious confusion4 ,the zeal of the advocate has led him to slander his client4 ,in proving that under such and such conditions it would be no wonder if 8the poor0 were bad1 he forgets to observe that in fact they are generally just as good as other people4 ,the all-important distinction between a poor home and a bad home is neglected4 ,and yet it seems probable that1 omitting the definitely criminal quarters1 there is no larger proportion of bad homes among the poor than among the rich4 ,such terms as 8den0 and 8slum0 x are too freely used1 with an affectation of intimacy1 for homes in which thousands of respectable citizens reside4 ,our democratic age will be remarkable to posterity for having dimmed the time-honoured belief in the virtues of the poor4 ,there was cant1 no doubt1 in the older doctrine1 but it was not so far from the fact as the opposite cant of today1 and it is time that the truth in it should be revived4 ,i must repeat that these remarks are not intended to be controversial4 ,there is nothing in them which serious men of all schools may not accept4 ,they are meant to defend my attitude in treating the ,real ,will1 and ,freedom in the greater ,self1 as matters of universal concern1 and not merely as hopes and fancies cherished by 8educated0 persons4 ,indeed1 although it would be churlish for a student to disparage literary education1 it must never be forgotten that1 as things are today1 the citizens who live by handicraft possess a valuable element of brain-culture1 which is on the whole denied to the literary class4 ,whatever1 therefore1 may be wanting in the following pages1 it is not1 ,i think1 the relation of their subject-matter to the general life of peoples4 ,the social student should shun mere optimism2 but he should not be afraid to make the most of that which he studies4 ,it is an unfortunate result of the semi-practical aims which naturally influence social philosophers1 that they are apt throughout to take up an indifferent1 if not a hostile1 attitude to their given object4 ,they hardly believe in actual society as a botanist believes in plants1 or a biologist believes in vital processes4 ,and hence1 social theory comes off badly4 ,no student can really appreciate an object for which he is always apologising4 ,there is a xi touch of this attitude in all the principal writers1 except ,hegel and ,bradley1 and therefore1 as ,i venture to think1 they partly fail to seize the greatness and ideality of life in its commonest actual phases4 ,it is in no spirit of obscurantism1 and with no thought of resisting the march of a true social logic1 that some take up a different position4 ,they are convinced that an actual living society is an infinitely higher creature than a steam-engine1 a plant or an animal2 and that the best of their ideas are not too good to be employed in analysing it4 ,those who cannot be enthusiastic in the study of society as it is1 would not be so in the study of a better society if they had it4 8,here or nowhere is your ,america40 ,bernard ,bosanquet ,caterham1 ,march1 #ahii4 xiii ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i ,,rise ,,and ,,conditions ,,of ,,the ,,philosophical ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,state #a-af #a4 ,meaning of 8,philosophical ,theory0 #a #b4 ,philosophy and the 8,state10 #c a4 ,the ,greek ,city-,state #d b4 ,type of mind implied in it #e c4 ,type of political philosophy suggested by it #e #c4 ,transition from ,city-,state to ,nation-,state4 ,law of ,nature #i #d4 ,rise of ,nation-,states and of modern political philosophy4 ,rousseau #aa ,,chapter ,,ii ,,sociological ,,compared ,,with ,,philosophical ,,theory #ag-eb #a4 ,problems of ,social ,physics and of ,idealism #ag #b4 ,social ,theory as influenced by special sciences #ai 7i7 ,mathematics #ai 7ii7 ,biology #ba 7iii7 ,economics #bg 7iv7 ,jurisprudence and the theory of ,right #cd 7a7 ,law as 8ideal fact0 #cd 7b7 ,sociological analysis of ,law #cf 7v7 ,idea of the 8spirit of laws0 or mind of peoples2 ,anthropology in widest sense #ci 7vi7 ,psychology #db 7vii7 ,connection of points of view and kinds of fact #dg #c4 ,comparison of ,psychological ,sociology and ,social ,philosophy #dh ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,paradox ,,of ,,political ,,obligation2 ,,self-,,government #ec-gh #a4 ,the conception of self-government #ec #b4 ,law and ,liberty in ,bentham #ef #c4 ,examination of ,mill's 8,liberty0 #fj 7i7 ,mill's idea of ,individuality #fj 7ii7 ,his view of the authority of ,society over the ,individual #fa 7iii7 ,his applications of his principle #ff #d4 ,views of ,herbert ,spencer #fi 7i7 ,spencer and ,bentham on ,natural ,right #gj 7ii7 ,liberty and restraint in ,spencer and ,huxley #ga #e4 ,mill's criticism of ,self-,government #gc ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,political ,,obligation ,,more ,,radically ,,treated #gi-ajb #a4 ,nature of above theories not expressed by term ,individualism4 8,theories of the first look0 #gi #b4 ,rousseau's earlier ,essays #hd #c4 ,problem of the ,contrat ,social #hg #d4 ,conflict of ideas in ,rousseau's statement #hi #e4 ,nature of his solution #ia #f4 ,reality of the 8,moral ,person0 and conception of ,civil ,liberty #id ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,a 8,,real0 ,,will #ajc-abc #a4 ,the ,supreme ,will in ,hobbes and ,locke #ajc #b4 ,meaning of the ,general ,will for ,rousseau #ajg #c- ,the ,general ,will contrasted with the ,will of ,all #aaa #d- ,the ,general ,will and the work of the ,legislator #aag ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,liberty ,,as ,,illustrated ,,by ,,the ,,foregoing ,,suggestions #aah-aed #a4 ,liberty as the condition of our being ourselves #aah #b4 ,illustrated by the idea of ,nature and ,natural #abh #c4 ,phases of idea of ,liberty #acc 7a7 ,juristic phase 8absence of restraint0 #acd 7b7 ,political phase 8rights of citizenship0 #ace 7c7 ,positive connection of 7a7 and 7b7 #acf 7d7 ,philosophical phase 8being oneself in fullest sense0 #acg 7e7 ,danger and justification of using same term for 7a7 and 7d7 #adb #d4 ,liberty as attribute of the will that wills itself #adf #e4 ,this 8real0 will identified with ,state #adi 7a7 ,state in this sense is social life as a whole #aej 7b7 ,how ,state is force as extension of 8individual0 mind #aeb ,,chapter ,,vii ,,psychological ,,illustration ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,real ,,or ,,general ,,will #aee-agi #a4 ,object of the ,chapter #aee #b4 ,connection between social and mental groupings #aef 7#a7 ,analogy between them #aef 7i7 ,associations of persons and of ideas #aef 7ii7 ,organisation of social groups and of ideas #aei 7#b7 ,identity of social and mental groupings #agj 7i7 ,social groups as an aspect of mental systems #agj 7ii7 ,individual minds as structures of appercipient systems #agc 7iii7 ,social whole as a system of mental systems #age ,,chapter ,,viii ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,end ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,and ,,consequent ,,limit ,,of ,,state ,,action #ahj-bcd #a4 ,distinction between ,individual and ,society irrelevant to question of ,social ,means and ,end #ahj #b4 ,true contrast3 ,automatism and ,consciousness #aha #c4 ,end of ,state1 and ,means at its disposal qua ,state #ahd #d4 ,state can only secure 8external0 actions #ahf #e4 ,principle of the hindrance of hindrances #aij #f4 ,state action as the maintenance of rights #bja 7a7 ,system of rights from standpoint of community #bjc 7b7 ,from standpoint of individuals4 8,position0 #bjd 7i7 ,as ,rights or recognised claims #bjf 7ii7 ,as ,obligations or recognised debts #bjf 7c7 ,rights as implying ,duties #bjh 7i7 ,when ,duty ,obligation #bjh 7ii7 ,when ,duty ,purpose1 which is source of ,right #bji 7d7 ,rights1 why recognised claims8 #baj 7i7 ,a 8,position0 involves recognition #baj 7ii7 ,no right based on individual caprice #bab #g4 ,state action as punishment #baf 7i7 ,punishment as reformatory #bba 7ii7 ,punishment as retributory #bbc 7iii7 ,punishment as deterrent #bbh ,conclusion4 ,state ,action as exercise of a ,general ,will #bcb ,,chapter ,,ix ,,rousseau',s ,,theory ,,as ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,modern ,,state3 ,,kant1 ,,fichte1 ,,hegel #bce-bee #a4 ,rousseau's literary influence in ,germany #bce #b4 ,freedom and ,social ,contract in ,kant #bch #c4 ,freedom and ,social ,contract in ,fichte #bdd #d4 ,freedom in ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,right #bdg 7a7 ,supposed reactionary tendency in ,hegel #bdh 7b7 ,relation of analysis and idealisation #bij #e4 ,the ,philosophy of ,right as a chapter in the ,philosophy of ,mind #beb ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,a ,,modern ,,state4 ,,hegel',s 8,,philosophy ,,of ,,right0 #bef-bie #a4 ,logic of ,society as an ideal fact #bef #b4 ,sphere of ,right or ,law and its sub-divisions #beh #c4 ,the ,letter of the ,law #bfj #d4 ,the ,morality of ,conscience #bfb #e4 ,social ,ethics #bff 7i7 ,social ,ethics as an actual world #bff 7ii7 ,social ,ethics as the nature of self-consciousness #bfg #f4 ,sub-divisions of ,social ,ethics4 ,the ,family #bfi 7a7 ,depends on natural fact #bfi 7b7 ,is factor in the ,state #bgj 7c7 ,ethical and ,monogamous ,household #bga 7d7 ,relation to ,property #bgb #g4 ,bourgeois ,society4 ,justice1 ,state ,regulation1 and ,trade ,societies #bgb #h4 ,the ,state proper1 or ,political ,constitution #bhj #i4 ,public discussion and public opinion #bhe #aj4 ,criticism of such an analysis of the ,modern ,state #bhg ,,chapter ,,xi ,,institutions ,,considered ,,as ,,ethical ,,ideas #bif-ccd #a4 ,the individual soul and the social mind #bif #b4 ,institutions as common substance of minds #big #c4 ,the ,family and ,property as elements of mind #bii #d4 ,the ,district or ,neighbourhood as an element of mind #cjd #e4 ,class as an element of mind4 8,the ,poor0 as an ethical idea #caj #f4 ,the ,nation-,state as an element of mind #cbj #g4 ,morality of public and private action #cbb #h4 ,humanity as an element of mind #cbh 7a7 ,humanity not predicable of mankind as a whole #cbh 7b7 ,humanity does not mankind as a true community #cbi 7c7 ,dichotomous expressions for humanity and mankind #ccj 7d7 ,the self beyond any actual society2 ,art1 ,philosophy1 ,religion #ccb ,,index #cce #a ,,chapter ,i4 ,,rise ,,and ,,conditions ,,of ,,the ,,philosophical ,,theory ,,of ,,the ,,state #a4 ,first1 it will be well to indicate1 in a very few words1 what is implied in a 8philosophical theory10 as distinguished from theories which make no claim to be philosophical4 ,the primary difference is1 that a philosophical treatment is the study of some thing as a whole and for its own sake4 ,in a certain sense it may be compared to the gaze of a child or of an artist4 ,it deals1 that is1 with the total and unbroken effect of its object4 ,it desires to ascertain what a thing is1 what is its full characteristic and being1 its achievement in the general act of the world4 ,history1 explanation1 analysis into cause and conditions1 have value for it only in so far as they contribute to the intelligent estimation of the fullest nature and capabilities of the real individual whole which is under investigation4 ,we all know that a flower is one thing for the geometrician1 another for the chemist1 another for #b the botanist1 and another1 again1 for the artist4 ,now1 philosophy can of course make no pretension to cope with any one of the specialists on his own ground4 ,but the general nature of the task imposed upon it is this3 aiding itself1 so far as possible1 by the trained vision of all specialists1 to make some attempt to see the full significance of the flower as a word or letter in the great book of the world4 ,and this we call studying it1 as it is1 and for its own sake1 without reservation or presupposition4 ,it is assumed1 then1 for the purpose of a philosophical treatment1 that everything1 and more particularly in this case the political life of man1 has a nature of its own1 which is worthy of investigation on its own merits and for its own sake4 ,how its phases come into being1 or what causes or conditions have played a part in its growth1 are other questions well worthy of investigation4 ,but the philosophical problem is rather to see our object as it is and to learn what it is1 to estimate1 so to speak1 its kind and degree of self-maintenance in the world1 than to trace its history or to analyse its causation4 ,yet such phrases as 8what it is0 and 8for its own sake0 must not mislead us4 ,they do not mean that the nature of any reality which we experience can be appreciated in isolation from the general world of life and knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 they imply that when fully and fairly considered from the most thoroughly adequate point of view1 our subject matter will reveal its true position and relations with reference to all else that man can do and can know4 ,this position and these relations constitute its rank or significance in the totality #c of experience1 and this value or significance--in the present case1 what the form of life in question enables man to do and to become--is just what we mean by its nature 8in itself10 or its full and complete nature1 or its significance when thoroughly studied 8for its own sake0 from an adequate point of view4 ,further illustrations of the distinction between an adequate point of view and partial or limited modes of consideration1 and of the relations between the former and the latter1 will be found in the following chapter4 #b4 ,in a certain sense it would be true to say that wherever men have lived1 there has always been a 8,state40 ,that is to say1 there has been some association or corporation1 larger than the family1 and acknowledging no power superior to itself4 ,but it is obvious that the experience of a ,state in this general sense of the word is not co-extensive with true political experience1 and that something much more definite than this is necessary to awaken curiosity as to the nature and value of the community in which man finds himself to be a member4 ,such curiosity has been awakened and sustained principally if not exclusively by two kindred types of associated life--the ,city-state of ancient ,greece1 and the ,nation-state of the modern world4 ,it will throw light on the nature of our subject if we glance rapidly at the characteristics to which it is due that political philosophy began in connection with the former1 and revived in connection with the latter4 ,in considering the ,greek city-states in connection with the birth of political philosophy1 there are three points which press upon our attention3#d a4 the type of experience which they presented2 b4 the type of mind which that experience implied2 and c4 the type of interpretation which such a mind elicited from such an experience4 a4 ,a ,greek city-state presented a marked contrast to the modes of human association which prevailed in the non-,greek world4 ,it differed from them above all things by its distinct individuality4 ,no doubt there was a recognisable character in the life and conduct of ,egypt or of ,assyria1 of ,phoenicia or of ,israel4 ,but the community which has a youth1 a maturity1 and a decadence1 as distinct as those of a single human being1 and very nearly as self-conscious2 which has a tone and spirit as recognisable in the words and bearing of its members as those of a character in a play2 and which expresses its mind in the various regions of human action and endurance much as an artist expresses his individuality in the creations of his genius--such a community had existed1 before the beginnings of the modern world1 in the ,greek city-state1 and in the ,greek city-state alone4 ,a political consciousness in the strict sense was a necessary factor in the experience of such a commonwealth4 ,the demand for 8autonomy0--government by one's own law1--and for 8isonomy0--government according to equal law--though far from being always satisfied1 was inherent in the ,greek nature2 and its strenuousness was evinced by the throes of revolution and the labours of legislation which were shaking the world of ,greece at the dawn of history4 ,the very instrument of all political action was invented1 so far as we can see1 by the ,greeks4 ,the simple device by which an orderly vote is #e taken1 and the minority acquiesce in the will of the majority as if it had been their own--an invention no less definite than that of the lever or the wheel--is found for the first time as an everyday method of decision in ,greek political life4 b4 ,such a type of experience implies a corresponding type of mind4 ,it is not surprising that science and philosophy should owe their birth to the genius from which politics sprang4 ,for politics is the expression of reason in the relations that bind man to man1 as science and philosophy are the expression of it in the relations which link together man's whole experience4 ,the mind which can recognise itself practically in the order of the commonwealth1 can recognise itself theoretically in the order of nature4 ,and ultimately1 though not at first 7for curiosity is awakened by objects perceived in space and time1 before attention is turned to the very hinge and centre of man's own being71 science passes into philosophy2 and mind1 and conduct1 and the political consciousness1 are themselves made objects of speculation4 ,it has become a commonplace that this transference of curiosity from the outer to the inner--really1 that is1 from the partial to the total world--took shape in the work of ,socrates1 who invested with the greatness of his own intelligence and character a movement which the needs of the age had rendered inevitable4 ,and thus there arose the ethical and political philosophy of ,plato and ,aristotle1 the successors of ,socrates1 just at the time when the distinctive political life of ,greece was beginning to decay4 c4 ,this philosophy1 like all genuine philosophy1 #f was an interpretation of the experience presented to it2 and in this case the interpretation was due to minds which were themselves a part of the phenomena on which they reflected4 ,such minds1 hostile as they may feel themselves to the spirit of the age1 and however passionately they may cry out for reform or for revolution1 are none the less its representatives2 and their interpretation1 though it may modify and even mutilate the phenomena1 will nevertheless be found to throw the central forces and principles of the time into the clearest light4 ,so ,plato's negative treatment of the family1 and of other elements which seem essential to ,greek civilisation1 was no bar to his grasping1 and representing with unequalled force1 the central principle of the life around him4 ,the fundamental idea of ,greek political philosophy1 as we find it in ,plato and ,aristotle1 is that the human mind can only attain its full and proper life in a community of minds1 or more strictly in a community pervaded by a single mind1 uttering itself consistently though differently in the life and action of every member of the community4 ,this conception is otherwise expressed by such phrases as 8the ,state is natural10 i4e4 is a growth or evolution1 apart from which the end implied in man's origin cannot be attained2 8the ,state is prior to the individual10 i4e4 there is a principle or condition underlying the life of the human individual1 which will not admit of that life becoming what it has in it to be1 unless the full sphere or arena which is constituted by the life of the ,state is realised in fact4 ,the whole is summed up in the famous expression of ,aristotle1 8,man is a creature formed for the life of the ,city-state40 ,the #g working out of this idea1 as we find it in ,plato's commonwealth1 is bizarre to our minds2 but its difficulty really lies in its simplicity and directness2 and there is no sound political philosophy which is not an embodiment of ,plato's conception4 ,the central idea is this3 that every class of persons in the community--the statesman1 the soldier1 the workman--has a certain distinctive type of mind which fits its members for their functions1 and that the community essentially consists in the working of these types of mind in their connection with one another1 which connection constitutes their subordination to the common good4 ,this working or adjustment obviously depends in the last resort on the qualities present in the innermost souls of the members of the community2 and thus the outward organisation of society is really as it were a body which at every point and in every movement expresses the characteristics of a mind4 ,we must not pause here to follow up the consequences of such a conception2 but it will be seen at once1 by those who reflect upon it1 to imply that every individual mind must have its qualities drawn out in various ways to answer to--in fact1 to constitute--the relations and functions which make up the community2 and that in this sense every mind is a mirror or impression of the whole community from its own peculiar point of view4 ,the ethical assumption or principle of ,plato's conception is1 that a healthy organisation of the commonwealth will involve1 by a necessary connection1 a healthy balance and adjustment of qualities in the individual soul1 and vice versa4 ,an attempt will be made to illustrate this principle further in the latter portion #h of the present work4 ,the general nature of ,plato's conception--the characteristic conception of ,greek political philosophy--is all that concerns us here4 ,it is important to observe that during the very genesis of this philosophical conception of society1 an antagonistic view was powerfully represented4 ,the individual could not freely find himself in the community unless he was capable of repudiating it2 the possibility of negation1 as a logician might express it1 is necessary to a really significant affirmation4 ,thus we find in the very age of ,plato and ,aristotle the most startling anticipations of those modern ideas which seem diametrically opposed to theirs4 ,we find the idea of nature identified not with the mature fulness1 but with the empty starting point of life2 we meet with the phenomena of vegetarianism1 water-drinking1 the reduction of dress to its minimum1 in short1 the familiar symptoms of the longing for the 8return to nature10 with all that it implies2 we find law and political unity treated as a tissue of artifice and convention1 and the individual disdaining to identify himself with the citizenship of a single state1 but claiming to be a stranger in the city and a citizen of the world4 ,to prove that these ideas were not without their justification1 it is enough to point out that in some instances they were accompanied by a polemic against slavery1 which1 as a form of solidarity1 was upheld in a qualified sense at least by ,aristotle4 ,the existence of this negative criticism is enough to show how distinctly the ,greek intellect set before itself the fundamental problem of the relation between the individual and society1 and of how high a quality was the bond of union which #i maintained this relation in such intimacy among minds of a temper so analytic4 #c4 ,many writers have told the story of the change which came over the mind of ,greece when the independent sovereignty of its ,city-states became a thing of the past4 ,for our purpose it is enough to draw attention to the fact that with this change the political or social philosophy of the great ,greek time not only lost its supremacy1 but almost ceased to be understood4 ,from this period forward1 till the rise of the modern ,nation-states1 men's thoughts about life and conduct were cast in the mould of moral theory1 of religious mysticism and theology1 or of jurisprudence4 ,the individual demanded in the sphere of ethics and religion to be shown a life sufficing to himself apart from any determinate human society--a problem which ,plato and ,aristotle had assumed to be insoluble4 ,stoicism and ,epicureanism1 the earliest non-national creeds of the western world1 triumphantly developed the ideas which at first1 as we saw1 were little more than a rebellion against the central ,socratic philosophy4 ,cosmopolitanism1 the conception of humanity1 the ideal of a 8,society of ,friends0--the ,epicurean league--from which women were not excluded1 and the precept of 8not expecting from life more than it has to give10 take the place of the highly individualised commonwealth1 with its strenuous masculine life of war and politics1 and its passionate temper which felt that nothing had been accomplished so long as anything remained undone4 ,with this change of temper in the civilised world there is brought into prominence a great deal of #aj human nature which had not found expression through the immediate successors of ,socrates4 ,in the period between ,aristotle and ,cicero there is more than a whisper of the sound which meets us like a trumpet blast in the ,new ,testament1 8neither ,jew nor ,greek1 barbarian nor ,scythian1 bond nor free40 ,but the unworldliness which took final shape in ,christianity was destined to undergo a long transmigration through shapes of other-worldliness before it should return in modern thought to the unity from which it started2 and the history of ethics and religion has little bearing upon true political theory between the death of ,aristotle and the awakening of the modern consciousness in the ,reformation4 ,in so far as the political ideas of antiquity were preserved to modern times otherwise than in the manuscripts of ,plato and ,aristotle1 the influence which preserved them was that of ,roman ,jurisprudence4 ,the ,roman rule1 though it stereotyped the state of things in which genuine political function and the spur of freedom were unknown1 had one peculiar gift by which it handed to posterity the germs of a great conception of human life4 ,this is not the place to describe at length the origin of that vast practical induction from the working of the 8foreigners' court0 at ,rome which obtained for itself the name of the ,law of ,nations1 and which1 as tinged with ideal theory1 was known as the ,law of ,nature4 ,whatever fallacies may be near at hand when 8natural right0 is named1 the conception that there is in man1 as such1 something which must be respected1 a law of life which is his 8nature10 being indeed another name #aa for his reason1 and in some sense or other a 8freedom0 and an 8equality0 which are his birthright--this conception was not merely a legacy from ,stoic ideas1 which had almost a religious inspiration1 but was solidly founded on the judicial experience of the most practical race that the world has ever seen4 #d4 ,in order that the forces which lay hidden in the conception of ,natural ,right and ,freedom1 like the powers of vegetation in a seed1 might unfold themselves in the modern world1 it was necessary that conditions should recur analogous to those which had first elicited them4 ,and these earlier conditions were those of the ,greek ,city-state2 for it was here1 as we have seen1 that the conception of man's nature had flourished1 as the idea of a purposive evolution into a full and many-sided social life1 while in ,stoic philosophy and ,roman juristic theory it had become more and more a shibboleth and a formula which lost in depth of meaning what it gained in range of application4 ,to restore their ancient significance1 expanded in conformity with a larger order of things1 to the traditional formulae1 demanded just the type of experience which was furnished by the modern ,nation-state4 ,the growth of ,nation-states in modern ,europe was in progress1 we are told1 from the ninth to the fifteenth century4 ,and it is towards and after the close of this period1 and especially in the seventeenth century when the national consciousness of the ,english people1 as of others1 had become thoroughly awakened1 that political speculation in the strict sense begins again1 #ab after an interval extending back to the ,politics of ,aristotle4 ,to let one example serve for many2 when we read ,john of ,gaunt's praises of ,england in ,shakespeare's ,richard ,,ii41 we feel ourselves at once in contact with the mind of a social unity1 such as necessarily to raise in any inquiring intelligence all those problems which were raised for ,plato and ,aristotle by the individuality of ,athens and ,sparta4 ,and so we see the earliest political speculation of the modern world groping1 as it were1 for ideas by help of which to explain the experience of an individual self-governing sovereign society4 ,and for the most part the ideas that offer themselves are those of ,roman ,jurisprudence1 but distorted by political applications and by the rhetoric of ,protestant fanaticism4 ,as ,mr4 ,ritchie #a points out1 the conception of natural right and a law of nature makes a strange but effective coalition with the temper of the ,wycliffite cry 8,when ,adam dalf1 and ,eve span1 ,who was then the gentleman80 ,the notions of contract1 of force1 of representation in a single legal 8person10 are now applied separately or together to the phenomenon of the self-governing individual community4 ,but the solution remains imperfect1 and the fundamental fact of self-government refuses to be construed either as the association of individuals1 originally free and equal1 for certain limited purposes1 or as the absolute absorption of their wills in the 8person0 of a despotic sovereign4 #a ,natural ,rights1 p4 #h4 ,the revival of a true philosophical meaning #ac within the abstract terms of juristic tradition was the work of the eighteenth century as a whole4 ,for the sake of clearness1 and with as much historical justice as ever attaches to an attribution of the kind1 we may connect it with the name of a single man--,jean ,jacques ,rousseau4 ,for it is ,rousseau who stands midway between ,hobbes and ,locke on the one hand1 and ,kant and ,hegel on the other1 and in whose writings the actual revival of the full idea of human nature may be watched from paragraph to paragraph as it struggles to throw off the husk of an effete tradition4 ,between ,locke and ,rousseau the genius of ,vico and of ,montesquieu had given a new meaning to the dry formulae of law by showing the sap of society circulating within them4 ,moreover the revived experience of the ,greeks came in the nick of time4 ,it was influential with ,rousseau himself1 and little as he grasped the political possibilities of a modern society1 in matters of sheer principle this influence led him on the whole in the right direction4 ,his insight was just1 when it showed him that every political whole presented the same problem which had been presented by the ,greek ,city-state1 and involved the same principles4 ,and he bequeathed to his successors the task of substituting for the mere words and fictions of contract1 nature1 and original freedom1 the idea of the common life of an essentially social being1 expressing and sustaining the human will at its best4 ,according to the view here indicated1 the resurrection of true political philosophy out of the dead body of juristic abstractions was inaugurated by #ad ,vico and ,montesquieu1 and decisively declared itself in ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau4 ,the idea which most of us have formed of 8the new ,evangel of a ,contrat ,social0 is not in harmony with this representation of the matter4 ,was it1 we may be asked1 a genuine political philosophy which inspired the leaders of the ,french ,revolution8 ,and the question cannot be evaded by denying all connection between the theory and the practice of that age4 ,the phraseology of the revolutionary declarations #a--which will strike the reader accustomed to nineteenth century socialism as exceedingly moderate and even conservative in tone--is undoubtedly to a great extent borrowed from ,rousseau's writings4 #a ,see the very interesting collection of documents in the ,appendix to ,professor ,ritchie's ,natural ,rights4 ,perhaps the truth of the matter may be approached as follows4 ,the popular rendering of a great man's views is singularly liable to run straight into the pit-falls against which he more particularly warned the world4 ,this could be proved true in an extraordinary degree of such men as ,plato and ,spinoza1 and still more astonishingly1 perhaps1 of the founder of the ,christian religion4 ,the reason is obvious4 ,a great man works with the ideas of his age1 and regenerates them4 ,but in as far as he regenerates them1 he gets beyond the ordinary mind2 while in as far as he operates with them1 he remains accessible to it4 ,and his own mind has its ordinary side2 the regeneration of ideas which he is able to effect is not complete1 and the notions of the day not only limit his entire range of achievement--where the strongest runner will get to must depend on where he starts--but float about unassimilated #ae within his living stream of thought4 ,now all this ordinary side of his mind will partake of the strength and splendour of his whole nature4 ,and thus he will seem to have preached the very superstitions which he combated4 ,for in part he has done so1 being himself infected2 in part the overwhelming bias of his interpreters has reversed the meaning of his very warnings1 by transferring the importance1 due to his central thought1 to some detail or metaphor which belongs to the lower level of his mind4 ,it is an old story how ,spinoza1 8the ,god-intoxicated man10 was held to be an 8atheist10 when in truth he was rather an 8acosmist02 and in the same way1 on a lower plane1 the writer who struggled through to the idea that true sovereignty lay in the dominion of a common social good as expressed through law and institutions1 is held to have ascribed absolute supremacy to that chance combination of individual voices in a majority1 which he expressly pointed out to have1 in itself1 no authority at all4 ,but there is something more to be said of cases1 like that under discussion1 where a great man's ideas touch the practical world4 ,if the complete and positive idea becomes narrow and negative as it impinges upon every-day life1 this may be not only a consequence of its transmission through every-day minds1 but a qualification for the work it has to do4 ,the narrower truth may be1 so to speak1 the cutting edge of the more complete1 as the negation is of the affirmation4 ,and the vulgar notion of popular sovereignty and of natural right may have been necessary to do a work which a more organic social theory would have been too delicate to achieve4 #af ,like the faith in a speedy second coming of ,christ among the early ,christians1 the gospel according to ,jean ,jacques may have taken for the minds of ,revolutionary ,france a form which was serviceable as well as inevitable at the moment4 ,if1 as we said above1 the great man is always misunderstood1 it seems to follow that when his germinal ideas have been sown they must assert themselves first in lower phases if they are ever to bear fruit at all4 ,and therefore1 while not denying the influence of ,rousseau on the ,revolution1 we shall attempt to show that he had another and a later influence1 more adequate to the true reach of his genius4 #ag ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,sociological ,,compared ,,with ,,philosophical ,,theory4 #a4 ,there is no doubt that ,sociology and ,social ,philosophy have started1 historically speaking1 from different points of view4 ,the object of the present chapter is to ascertain the nature and estimate the importance and probable permanence of the difference between them4 ,i propose first to explain the difference in general2 then to review the sources of social experience1 which in other words are facets or aspects of social life1 by which social theory has been influenced1 and with which it has to deal2 and1 finally1 to form some idea of the distinctive services which may be rendered by sociology and social philosophy respectively in view of the range of experience which it is the function of social theory to organize4 ,beginning with ,vico's #a ,new ,science1 there has been more than one attempt in modern ,europe to inaugurate the ,science of ,society as a new departure4 ,but the distinctive and modern spirit of what is known as ,sociology1 and under that #ah name has had a continuous growth of half a century at least1 first found unmistakable expression in ,auguste ,comte4 ,the conception which he impressed upon the science to which he first gave the name of sociology or social physics1 was a characteristically modern conception4 ,its essence was the inclusion of human society among the objects of natural science2 its watchwords were law and cause in the sense in which alone ,positivism allowed causes to be thought of--and scientific prediction4 #b ,it is true that the large conception of unity which ,comte embodied in his philosophy had very much in common with the principles insisted on by the ,greek social philosophers4 ,the close interdependence of all social phenomena among each other1 the unity of man with nature1 and the consequent correlation of moral and political theory with the organised hierarchy of mathematical and physical sciences1 are ideas which ,comte might have borrowed directly from ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,nevertheless the modern starting-point is wholly different from that of antiquity4 ,the modern enquirer--the sociologist as such--was to ask himself1 according to ,comte1 in the language of physical science1 what are the laws and causes operative among aggregations of human beings1 and what are their predictable effects8 ,the ancient philosopher--the ethical and metaphysical theorist--had before him primarily the problem1 8what is the completest and most real life of the human soul80 ,the work of the latter has been revived by modern idealist philosophy dating from ,rousseau and ,hegel1 and finding a second #ai home in ,great ,britain1 as that of the former has developed itself within the peculiar limits and traditions of sociological research1 flourishing more especially upon ,french and ,american soil4 ,the continuance of these two streams of thought in independent courses1 though not without signs of convergence1 is a remarkable phenomenon of nineteenth century culture2 and it will be one of the problems which the present chapter1 and in a larger sense the whole of the present work1 must deal with1 to consider how far it is necessary or desirable that they should blend4 #a ,j4 ,d4 ,rogers in ,palgrave's ,dict4 of ,pol4 ,econ41 art4 8,social ,science40 #b ,see ,gidding's ,sociology1 p4 #f4 #b4 ,every science1 no doubt1 is to some extent1 the playground of analogies2 but the complexity and the unmateriality of human relations has forced this character upon social theory in an extraordinary degree4 ,it is impossible to account for the tendencies of sociological as well as of philosophical thought without making some attempt to pursue the line of investigation suggested by ,mr4 ,bagehot in his ,physics and ,politics4 ,predominant modes and types of experience necessarily colour the whole activity of the mind1 and1 as indicated above1 this influence more especially affects a province of research which is not prima facie accessible to direct experiment or sensuous observation4 ,i must1 therefore1 endeavour to review1 in a brief outline1 the principal branches of experience which have furnished ideas for application to social theory1 and to indicate the leanings in speculation upon society1 which have been due to preoccupation with one or another special analogy4 i4 ,the ,newtonian theory of gravitation is the entrance gate to the modern world of science4 #bj 8,when the ,newton of this subject shall be seated in his place0 #a is the aspiration of the modern investigator in every matter capable of being known4 ,it is not surprising1 therefore1 that the inclusion of human society within the range of matters capable of being definitely understood1 should have been symbolized by demanding for social science a completeness of explanation and a power of prediction analogous to those displayed by astronomy or by mathematical physics4 ,representative of this conception is the title1 ,social ,physics--for ,comte the alternative and equivalent to the name ,sociology4 ,it is easy to see both the merits and the dangers of such an ideal1 which1 as the embodiment of perfection in a natural science1 is presupposed by the attitude of sociology down to the present day4 ,is a science necessarily a natural science1 and is a natural science necessarily an exact science8--these are the fundamental questions involved in the adoption of a mathematical ideal for the study of society4 ,no fault can be found with it on the ground of its implying the highest degree of harmony and precision2 the only question is whether an adequate type of comparison is afforded for1 let us say1 the growth of an institution1 by the law of a curve4 ,the general conception1 indeed1 of a continuity between human relations and the laws of the cosmic order is thoroughly in the spirit of ,plato1 and betokens a scientific enthusiasm worthy to be the parent of great things4 ,and especially in the sphere of economic science1 where certain relatively simple hypotheses have proved on the whole to be effective instruments #ba of explanation1 an analysis of intricate phenomena has been effected1 which in some degree justifies the aspiration after the ideal of an exact science4 #a ,de ,morgan1 ,budget of ,paradoxes1 p4 #cee4 ii4 ,but it has been recognised from the earliest days of political speculation that1 within the general ideal of a perfect natural science1 the more special analogy of the living organism had a peculiar bearing upon social phenomena4 ,beginning in the ancient world with the comparison between individuals as 8members0 of a social whole1 and the parts or organs of a living body1 or even the constituent elements of a mind1 this analogy has been extended and reinforced in modern times by what amounts to the new creation of the biological and anthropological sciences4 ,the sense of continuity thus intensified and implying all that is understood by the modern term evolution1 has brought an immense material of suggestions to sociological research1 but has imposed upon it at the same time a characteristic bias from which it is just1 perhaps1 beginning to shake itself free4 ,this characteristic may be roughly stated as the explanation of the higher1 by which ,i mean the more distinctly human phenomena1 by the lower1 or those more readily observed1 or inferred1 among savage nations1 or in the animal world4 ,any one familiar with logic will be aware that there is a subtle and natural prejudice which tends to strengthen such a bias by claiming a higher degree of reality for that which1 as coming earlier in temporal succession1 ,i presents itself in the light of what is called a ,i 8cause40 ,so strong has been this bias among sociologists1 that the student1 primarily interested in the features and achievements of civilised society1 is #bb tempted to say in his haste that the sociologist #a as such seldom deals seriously with true social phenomena at all2 but devotes his main attention to primitive man and to the lower animals1 occasionally illustrating his studies in these regions by allusions1 showing no great insight or mastery1 to the facts of civilized society4 ,such a complaint becomes less and less justified as the years go by1 and sociology recovers its balance as against the overwhelming influence of the sciences of lower life4 ,how far the approach from this 8lower0 or more purely natural side will remain in the end characteristic of sociological science1 is an integral part of the main problem concerning its nature and destiny with which we have to deal in the present work4 ,but it remains true to say and very important to observe1 that no such serious successes have as yet been won in the name and by the special methods of sociology as have been achieved by many investigators approaching their problems directly and with an immediate interest2 whether in the sphere of political economy proper1 or in dealing with various questions of social and ethical importance1 such as pauperism1 charity1 sanitation1 education1 the condition of the people1 the comparative study of politics1 or the analysis of material and geographical conditions in their reaction upon social and artistic development4 #a ,by a 8sociologist as such0 ,i mean a writer who is professedly dealing with sociology as such4 ,any independent researches1 such as ,mr4 and ,mrs4 ,webb's ,industrial ,democracy1 may of course be ranked under the heading 8,sociology40 ,but works of this kind do not1 as a rule1 attach themselves to the peculiar method and language of sociological writers4 ,on the other hand1 there is no doubt that the #bc epoch and influence of which we speak has bequeathed a legacy of imperishable value to the theory of society4 ,in a word1 it has made us sensitive to the continuity of things1 and therefore also to their unity4 ,it has shown us the crowning achievements of the human race1 their ,states1 their ,religion1 their ,fine ,art1 and their ,science1 as the high-water mark of tendencies that have their beginnings far back in the primitive organic world1 and in their original sources have also a connection with each other--as in the practical aspects of religion1--which too easily escapes notice in their highest individual development4 ,the 8return to nature0 and the 8noble savage0 have been invested with a significance which can never be forgotten1 and which criticism can never set aside4 ,this is the sum and substance of the general contribution which the latter half of the eighteenth century and the greater part of the nineteenth have made to sociology through the science of life and of man4 ,more particularly1 it is necessary to notice the double operation of biological influence on sociology1 according to the unit from which the analogy is drawn4 a4 ,the idea which still bulks most largely in the popular mind1 as contributed by biology to social theory1 is unquestionably that of the struggle for life or the survival of the fittest4 ,it should be noticed that the social application of this analogy rests entirely on the comparison of a human society1 not to the individual animal organism1 and still less to the individual mind2 but to a whole animal species or even to the aggregate of all animal species1 so far as they or their members are in competition with one another4 ,one whole side of the sociological #bd doctrine1 which ,mr4 ,spencer has advocated with unwearied persistence1 is founded upon this application of the biological analogy1 and the paradox which he has made his principle professes to be borrowed directly from the dealings of nature with the individuals of the animal species4 ,this paradox1 that benefits should be assigned inversely as services in infancy but directly as services among adults1 is his ultimate sociological basis2 the modification of which1 to suit human society1 by the introduction of benevolence or altruism1 so to speak1 on the top of it1 only serves to display its inadequacy4 ,but we may take it that the analogy of the struggle for life has made it clear that1 in any given position1 life can be maintained only in virtue of definite qualities adapted to that position4 ,and formal as this principle is when taken by itself1 its application in human society can never be unnecessary4 b4 ,a more recent school has insisted on the complementary analogy1 which might be taken as resting upon the comparison of a society with an individual organism4 ,here1 it must be remembered1 lay the resemblance which1 in this region of ideas1 first caught the eye of social philosophers in antiquity4 ,but it is alleged that the aspect of co-operation can be traced as between individual members of the animal world no less than between the parts of a single organism1 and it is affirmed that the view which sees nothing but internecine competition in the animal kingdom has been too rough and too superficial in its reading of the facts4 ,and therefore it is suggested that the phenomena of social fellowship1 no less than those of individual competition1 have their source #be and root in the world of lower nature2 and perhaps sociology is now not far from the recognition that competition and co-operation are simply the negative and positive aspect of the same general fact--the fact of the division of labour1 of essentiality of function1 and of uniqueness of true individual service4 ,if it is suggested by the one organic analogy that life depends upon qualities adequate to the position which is to be filled1 it is made obvious by the other that the qualities which satisfy the claims of a certain position are those1 in general and in principle1 by which a function is discharged in the service of the whole4 ,in ,mr4 ,spencer's doctrine the two sides above indicated have been brought into very marked relation by a suggestive criticism1 #a which he has taken special pains to answer4 ,if human society corresponds to an individual organism--as is1 in many ways1 ,mr4 ,spencer's well-known doctrine--how is it that the absolute central control in which the perfection of an organism consists is1 for ,mr4 ,spencer1 a note of imperfection when it appears in a human society8 ,and the answer is in effect that human society corresponds in many of its features rather to a local variety of a species than to an individual organism4 ,it is essentially discrete1 not individual1 and at this point1 therefore1 the analogy of the individual organism gives way to that of the group or species4 #a ,sociology1 i4 #ehf4 ,but ,mr4 ,spencer does not really mean that a human society has no more intrinsic bond between its members than the local group of an animal species4 ,to indicate its true nature he #bf gives us a good word--but a word only--the word 8super-organic40 #a ,it is a significant term1 and brings us perhaps to the limit of what biological sociology is able to suggest with regard to the unity of a human commonwealth1 and points us to something beyond4 ,it is remarkable that when the facts of true human society are more thoroughly realised than by ,mr4 ,spencer1 but the clue of the individual organism and the co-operative side of animal life is not followed up1 there is a tendency to sever the links which unite man to 8lower0 nature1 and to represent the ethical and cosmic processes as absolutely opposed4 ,we see this point of view decidedly adopted by ,mr4 ,huxley1 #b and its adoption perhaps indicates the inception of an epoch in which sociology will cut itself free from a good deal of pseudo-scientific lumber4 ,nevertheless1 a patient and careful study will continue to recognise the elements both of competition and of co-operation as ineradicable and inseparable moments in human society as in the animal world2 the essential meaning of competition in its higher forms being the rejection and suppression of members who are unable to meet the ever advancing demand for co-operative character and capacity2 and the study of parasitism #c and of regressive selection will continue to #bg be a warning against the attempt to emancipate mankind from the sterner general conditions of the cosmic order4 ,it will be recognised that there is an adaptation to conditions which consists in degradation2 but the failure will be understood by comparison with the only true 8survival of the fittest10 #d being that which reveals the full unity and significance of organism and environment4 ,it is important to observe that1 at least in the two eminent biologists just alluded to1 the doctrine of the individual self--of the relation between self-assertion and self-restraint--is altogether of an uncivilised and anti-social type4 ,biological categories do not1 in their case at least1 appear to have afforded any suggestion for the treatment of the social self as more and greater1 in a positive sense1 than the self which is less bound up with social obligations4 ,as for the denying spirits in ,plato's ,republic1 so for both ,mr4 ,spencer and ,mr4 ,huxley1 8nature0 is essentially self-assertion1 and 8society0 self-restraint4 #e ,here again we touch the same limitation which met us in ,mr4 ,spencer's term 8super-organic10 and we feel that a different point of view must be brought to bear4 #a ,sociology1 vol4 ,i41 ch4 i4 #b ,evolution and ,ethics1 p4 #hb4 #c ,geddes1 in ,encyclo4 ,brit41 vol4 xviii4 #bec;a3 8,further details of the process of retrograde metamorphosis and of the enormously important phenomena of degeneration cannot here be attempted2 it must suffice if the general dependence of such changes upon simplification of environment--freedom from danger1 abundant alimentation and complete repose1 etc4 7in short1 the conditions commonly considered those of complete material well-being7--has been rendered clearer40 #d ,cf4 ,sutherland1 ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct1 vol4 ,i41 pp4 #bh1 #bi4 #e ,huxley1 ,evolution and ,ethics1 p4 #ca2 ,spencer1 ,man v4 ,state1 p4 #ih4 iii4 ,political ,economy existed before modern ,sociology was born1 and is still the only part of it which is obviously and indisputably successful as a science of explanation4 ,the triumphant development of this theory reacted even upon ,hegel's political philosophy1 by suggesting to him the distinction between 8,bourgeois ,society0 and 8,the #bh ,state40 ,a fortiori1 it could not but have a serious influence on the growing science of sociology itself1 the ideal of which might not unfairly be regarded as the extension to society as a whole of that type of investigation which had proved so successful in economic matter4 ,from this influence has arisen the tendency in sociological research which has been called by the name of the economic or materialist view of history and consequently of society4 ,primarily connected with the name of ,marx1 it may also be illustrated by many contentions of ,buckle and ,le ,play1 and has become1 indeed1 the formula of a school4 ,in sum1 the point of view amounts to this3 that the fundamental structure of civilisation1 the type of the family1 for example1 and the order relations and development of classes in society1 have been and must be determined by the primary necessities of human existence1 and the conditions of climate and nutrition under which these necessities are met4 ,economic facts alone1 it is suggested1 are real and causal2 everything else is an appearance and an effect4 ,before saying a word as to the true importance of this point of view1 we may profitably correct the commonplace idea of its nature4 ,materialism1 in a strict philosophical sense1 means the conviction that nothing is real but that which is solid1 or1 perhaps1 which gravitates4 ,by a not very convincing analogy from this idea1 all those passions and necessities which we speak of in a quite loose and popular way as connected with the body1 may be and often are regarded as 8material0 in opposition to energies which it seems pleasanter #bi to ascribe to incorporeal mind4 ,but it should be noted that this secondary usage1 especially in a time when no one denies the physical correlation of all psychical activity1 has no important ethical implication4 ,like the 8flesh0 or the 8body0 of ,st4 ,paul's religious language1 the 8bodily0 or 8material0 needs and appetites of man are an element of mind1 the rank and value of which must be determined on other grounds than the notion that they are connected in some peculiar degree with 8physical0 conditions4 ,the economic view of history has been called and has called itself materialist partly because of the commonplace usage1 which ,i have just described1 by which certain passions and necessities1 which it takes to be fundamental1 are apt to be called material as opposed to ethical or ideal--a wholly unjustified opposition--and partly from the notion1 which ,i referred to at the beginning of this chapter1 that the success of political economy was in some way analogous to that of the mathematical science of abstract matter4 ,stripping off1 then1 the unjustified suggestion of philosophical materialism1 #a what we have in the economic view of history1 amounts pretty much to what is expressed in the saying that while statesmen are arguing1 love and hunger are governing mankind4 ,climate and natural resources make a #cj difference to history2 occupations determine the type of the family2 an agricultural and an industrial society will never exhibit the same relations between classes1 and very vast commercial operations cannot be carried on by the same methods or by the same minds which sufficed for the retail trade of a petty shop4 ,but when it is clearly seen that economic needs and devices are no detached1 nor1 so to speak1 absolutely antecedent department of human life #b--;a fact which the epithet 8materialist0 has done something to obscure1 for1 in truth1 in economics there is no question of genuine material causation--then it becomes obvious that we have not here any prior determining framework of social existence1 but simply certain important aspects of the operations of the human mind1 rather narrowly regarded in their isolation from all others4 ,if we seriously consider the import of such an economic conception as the 8standard of life10 it becomes plain that the contrast too commonly accepted #c between the mechanical pressure of economic facts and the influence of ideas #d stands in need of a completely fresh criticism and of entire restatement4 ,discounting1 however1 the exaggerations which have arisen from confused notions of materialism1 and from the genuine achievements of economic science1 we have remaining1 in the point of view under consideration1 a thoroughly just assertion of man's continuity with #ca the world around him4 ,undoubtedly man lives the life of his planet1 his climate1 and his locality1 and is the utterance1 so to speak1 of the conditions under which his race and his nation have evolved4 ,the only difficulty arises if1 by some arbitrary line between man and his environment1 the conditions which are the very material of his life come to be treated as alien influences upon it1 with the result of representing him as being the slave of his surroundings rather than their concentrated idea and articulate expression4 ,do we think that ,homer1 ,dante1 and ,shakespeare would have been greater or more free in their genius if one had not been the voice of ,greece1 another that of ,italy1 and the third that of ,england8 ,the world in which man lives is himself1 but is constituted1 of course1 by presentation to a mind and not by strictly physical causation2 and even where strictly physical causation plays a part1 as in the bodily effects of a hot climate or of a certain kind of nutrition1 still it cannot determine a type of human life except by passing into the world which a human being presents to himself4 #a ,quite probably there may be in the ,marxian view an echo of true materialism--the idea that will and consciousness are 8epiphenomena0 i4e4 are effects which are not causes generated by molecular movements4 ,such a view cannot be criticised here1 only it may be pointed out that1 on such a basis1 the 8bodily0 passions1 etc41 are in no way more 8material0 than1 e4g41 the moral 8categorical imperative10 and therefore no more causal4 #b ,see note #d4 #b ,cf4 e4g4 ,durkheim1 ,annee ,sociologique1 #ahig1 p4 #aei4 #d ,i4e4 as if economic conditions were a sort of iron girders put up to begin with and civilisation was the embellishment of them4 ,it is the old story of forgetting that the skeleton is later than the body1 and is deposited and moulded by it4 ,the exclusive importance which has been attached to considerations of this kind in recent social theory is partly due to an unfounded opinion of their novelty4 ,it is somewhat striking1 though following naturally enough from the sort of schism in the world of letters which modern sociology and ancient social philosophy represent1 that the firm and well balanced handling of these problems which we owe to ,plato and ,aristotle is for the most part ignored by modern sociologists4 #cb ,the entire social conception of those writers is a continued application of the principle1 fundamental in their whole philosophy1 that 8form0 is the inherent organising life of 8matter10 so that the better life of a commonwealth can be nothing but the flower and crown of the possibilities inherent in its material conditions and industrial and economic organisation4 ,the law which is ultimately to reveal itself as the spring of all righteousness in the ,state1 has its most obvious and external symbol--so ,plato tells us--in the economic exchange of services2 and every circumstance of site1 and industry1 and trade1 and the racial type of the citizen1 helps to constitute1 both for him and for ,aristotle1 the living organic possibility from which1 in some appropriate individual form1 the higher life is to spring4 ,if we ask ourselves what then is the difference between the ancient view of economic causation1 and that of the 8materialist0 historical school1 we shall find the answer in the absence1 from the former1 of that unreal isolation upon which we observed above4 ,the relation of 8matter0 or 8conditions0 to 8form0 or 8purpose0 is not1 for the ,greek thinker1 the pressure of an alien necessity1 of a hostile environment1 but the upspringing of a life1 continuous in principle through all its phases4 ,the thought of the legislator fixes in the shape of distinct consciousness and will1 what the assemblage of conditions embodies as a physical or instinctive tendency1 as the artist1 to use an ancient simile1 finds the statue in the marble4 ,working with this idea1 the connection is far more thoroughly1 because more sympathetically1 traced than it can be when we think that our science is but laying bare the fetters of humanity4 ,and following #cc in the spirit of the ,greek thinkers themselves1 modern students of antiquity have devoted themselves to eliciting the positive connection of conditions with history1 up to a point of success of which the common run of modern sociologists appear to have no conception4 ,when we reflect how typical and1 comparatively speaking1 how readily isolated and exhausted is the history of ,ancient ,greece in the greatest age1 it seems extraordinary that the considerable and minute researches which have been bestowed upon its geographical1 commercial1 and economic conditions should not be commonly drawn into account with a view to the illustration of the relations between natural resources1 commercial and economic development1 and historical greatness4 #a #a ,i have never1 for example1 seen the great work of ,ernst ,curtius1 on the geography of the ,peloponnese in connection with its historical development1 referred to in any sociological treatise2 nor1 again1 ,duncker1 nor ,bchsenschtz1 nor ,mr4 ,newman's edition of ,aristotle's ,politics4 ,boeckh's ,treatise on the ,public ,economy of ,athens receives only a word of contemptuous notice in ,m',culloch's ,literature of ,political ,economy4 ,however this may be1 here at any rate1 in the analysis of economic and quasi-economic conditions in their bearing upon the life of peoples1 we get a real subject-matter which is perhaps1 so far as can yet be seen1 the territory least disputably belonging to the pure sociologist4 ,it is not really a sphere of natural causation1 but it is a sphere of certain simple and general conditions in psychical life1 corresponding to external facts which admit of more or less precise statement1 and1 we may hope1 of reduction to fairly trustworthy uniformities4 ,such for instance are ,m4 ,durkheim's investigations on the effect of #cd density of population upon the division of labour1 #a or ,professor ,gidding's observations upon the causes and limiting conditions of the aggregation of populations4 #b ,we now proceed to a branch of experience which seriously strains the working conceptions of the sociologist4 #a ,de la ,division du ,travail ,social1 ,alcan1 #ahic4 #b ,principles of ,sociology1 bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 i4 ,few things are more interesting in this respect than ,mr4 ,poore's observations in ,rural ,hygiene on the mechanical conditions of modern city life1 as regards drainage and water supply1 with their results in encouraging an overcrowded and insanitary mode of living4 iv4 ,a completely new vista reveals itself to the student of social theory when he turns from biological analogies and economic conditions to consider the wealth of experience and of ideas which is furnished to him by ,jurisprudence and the ,science of ,right4 ,he knows1 indeed1 by this time1 that the obvious aspect of a province of fact will not be the only one1 and that a unity will certainly be traceable between all the facets of social existence4 ,but none the less1 he will be able to restrain the itch to explain things away1 and he will fairly and candidly give weight to the significance and suggestiveness of the mass of history and of reflection which is now brought before him4 a4 ,for here1 as the plainest and most unmistakable data of experience1 we are confronted with ideal facts4 ,the vast mass of documents which form the basis of the ,science of ,right--a more complete and comprehensive set of records1 perhaps1 than any other branch of social science can boast--bears witness in every case to one social phenomenon at least1 to a formal act of mind and will1 aimed at maintaining some relative right or #ce hindering some relative wrong1 and stamped with what in some sense and in some degree amounts to a social recognition4 ,theorists have said too hastily1 though with a sound meaning1 that right is independent of fact4 ,it would be as true to say that reason is independent of civilisation1 or the soul independent of culture4 ,right is not exhausted in the facts of past history2 but it is at every moment embodied in facts2 and to comprehend that the social phenomena which are among the most solid and unyielding of our experiences1 are nevertheless ideal in their nature1 and consist of conscious recognitions1 by intelligent beings1 of the relations in which they stand1 is to make a great step towards grasping the essential task of science in dealing with society4 ,from the beginning of social theory the facts of law have been set in opposition to the idea of a natural growth4 ,it has been observed that1 as a definite institution maintained by formal acts of will1 society is artificial1 conventional1 contractual4 ,we all know to-day that there is much more than this to be said about the nature and principles of social growth4 ,nevertheless1 it remains true that the social whole has an artificial aspect1 an aspect of will and of design1 of the agreement and mutual recognition of free conscious beings4 ,and in so far as the history of law has resulted in the conception of natural right1 this in no way derogates from the artificial or ideal character of society as above understood4 ,for 8natural0 right belongs to a 8nature0 which includes and does not exclude that action of intelligence in virtue of which society may be termed artificial2 and is #cf merely the revelation of the principle towards which the social will is working1 and which in some degree it has always embodied4 ,therefore the facts of ,jurisprudence and the ,science of ,right1 or of 8,natural ,right10 as the issue and outcome of ,jurisprudence1 necessarily counterbalance the extreme ideas of continuous growth and natural causation which social science derives from other analogies4 ,we are reminded that1 after all1 we are dealing with a self-conscious purposive organism1 which is aware of a better and a worse1 and has members bound together by conscious intelligence1 though1 it may be1 not by conscious intelligence alone4 ,at one time the ideas of ,jurisprudence1 such as ,sovereignty or ,contract1 were considered sufficient by themselves to equip a social theory4 ,and if they are now seen to need completion from both sides1--from the side of lower nature1 and from the side of the national spirit and culture1--this should not make us neglectful of the important truths which the facts of law and recognised obligation1 more than any others1 establish on solid ground4 b4 ,it is of course the case that ,law has been treated from the standpoint of economic history in the same way as the other phenomena of civilised life4 ,it may be taken simply as the form into which substantive relations crystallise1 under the influence of economic conditions or of other elementary social forces4 ,and obviously such a view has its truth4 ,the social will1 like the will of any one of us from day to day1 is formed not in vacuo1 but as the focus of all the influences which penetrate our being4 ,it is a fair object of #cg research to ascertain the economic or other social meaning of the statutes which we find on the statute book2 and it is because they have so much meaning that they are excellent object-lessons in the play of the social consciousness and sense of right4 ,but this focussing of social influences makes the laws not less acts of social will1 but more4 ,to suppose the contrary would be like supposing that nothing is a true act of will which embodies an individual's distinctive purposes in life4 ,i will explain by an illustration the relative value of sociological analysis in dealing with the facts of positive law4 ,i am indebted for it to ,m4 ,durkheim1 whose writings appear to me among the most original and suggestive works of modern sociology4 ,i regret that my immediate purpose does not justify me in stating and appreciating the whole very interesting theory of repressive and contractual law from which the point in question is selected4 ,an act is a crime1 #a we are told1 for the pure sociologist1 when it offends the strong and definite collective sentiments of society4 ,this is the strictly causal view of the matter4 ,the act is a crime because it offends2 it does not offend because it is a crime4 ,and the corollaries are valuable4 ,it is idle to distinguish1 on such a basis1 between the reformatory1 the retributive1 and the deterrent views of the reaction which is punishment4 #b ,an offensive act is in itself at once an exhibition of character1 an injury1 and a menace4 ,if a man #ch assaults me in the street1 and ,i knock him down2 how futile to ask if my action is meant to cure him of his insolence1 to punish him for having hit me1 or to prevent him from hitting me again6 ,the real fact is that ,i am offended1 and ,i react by way of injury and negation against that which offends me4 ,now1 this view1 ,i think1 illuminates the subject4 ,by going back to the simple operative cause1 as it may be supposed to exist especially in the mind of a tribe in an early stage of development 7,m4 ,durkheim is chiefly referring to religious offences71 we have got a plain type of mental reaction1 easy to imagine and to understand4 ,in this type we see at once the unity of aspects which the forms of law1 and legal or philosophical theory1 tend later to dissociate in a fictitious degree4 ,and moreover we are reminded that a law must have something behind it2 some positive sentiment or conviction1 without which it would be unaccountable and unmeaning4 #a ,durkheim1 ,op4 cit41 livre ,i41 ch4 ii4 #b ,see ch4 viii4 below4 ,but when all this is said1 it must not be supposed that penal law has been reduced to the level of a strong and definite collective sentiment1 or a crime to the level of an annoyance4 ,the simplest penal law of a self-existent social group is different from the anger of a crowd or mob4 ,there is in it some sense of permanence1 and permanence means responsibility and generality--a distinction of right and wrong4 ,the fact of formally constituting a crime1 i4e4 of announcing a law1 implies that mere distaste is no ground of punishment4 ,the law means that there is something worth maintaining1 and that this is recognised1 and that to violate this recognition is not merely to be unpopular1 but to #ci sin against the common good1 and to break an obligation4 ,with less than this there is no true crime4 ,thus1 if ,i am right1 the relation of pure 8sociological0 causation to juristic facts is the well-known relation of the more abstract to the more concrete sciences1 usually illustrated in logic by the relation of the physical and the musical account of musical sound4 ,for the pure physicist1 a harmony and a discord are only two different combinations of shakings4 ,for the musician they are not only opposite effects1 but are causes of divergent consequences4 ,so with the relation between a strong collective sentiment and a true law4 ,a strong sentiment1 as such1 is a mere fact1 a mere force2 and as such the sociologist regards it4 ,a law involves the pretension to will what is just1 and is therefore a sentiment and something more1 viz41 the point of view of social good4 ,it aims at a right and implies a wrong1 and demands to be apprehended and judged on this ground4 ,a mere force cannot by its reaction constitute a crime2 for that a law is necessary4 ,the ideal aspect of law as recognition of right is no less actual1 no less solid and verifiable1 than the facts of sentiment or necessity which may have suggested and sustained it4 ,in this way the relation of sociological causation to the facts of ,jurisprudence is typical of the whole relation of ,sociology conceived as a natural science1 to the larger facts with which social theory has to deal4 v4 ,but the ideas involved in mere legality1 though they bear emphatic testimony to the conscious and artificial aspect of the social whole1 have always #dj been regarded with some justice as the type of what is empty and formal4 ,to treat a law as a command with a penalty annexed1 or to enunciate the tendency of social progress as being from status to contract1 may convey important meanings1 but is obviously very far short of the whole truth4 ,and1 indeed1 generalisations of this kind1 though characteristic of a certain class of reflective ,jurisprudence1 do not at all represent the highest level which has been reached within the science of right itself4 ,but yet1 as we pass beyond these everyday working conceptions1 we are beginning to leave the central ground of ,jurisprudence1 and to move towards a point of view which deals more completely with life and culture4 ,the need and occasion for such a point of view may be measured by that revival of national individuality which was referred to in the last chapter as constituting the true ground and occasion for the rebirth of genuine political philosophy in modern times4 ,montesquieu's investigation into the 8spirit of laws10 and his treatment of a law as something deeper than a command1 following upon the similar endeavours of ,vico1 was in fact a recognition of the fundamental unity of a national civilisation1 which1 on its political side1 even ,hobbes and ,locke had already attempted to explain by help of the inadequate instruments furnished to them by legal theory4 ,montesquieu's and ,vico's conceptions were only the forerunners of the many-sided study of civilisation which characterised the latter part of the eighteenth century1 following up the problem which was enunciated in ,rousseau's paradox1 that 8law itself must be created by the social spirit which it aims at creating40 ,to recognise the social spirit #da of a people1 as the central unity behind its law and culture and politics1 was the principle of the various researches dealing with formative art1 poetry1 language1 religion1 and the state1 which marked the close of the eighteenth century 7compare ,wolf's theory of ,homer as the utterance of a racial mind71 and laid the foundation of nineteenth century idealism4 ,the true ,greek renaissance1 initiated in the age of ,winckelmann1 forcing modern minds into contact with ,hellenic ideas in their original form1 and no longer through ,latin intermediaries1 furnished a type and focus for these researches by bringing before the thoughts of students the brilliant individuality of the ancient city-state1 the crude traditions of which had already exercised the most powerful influence on ,rousseau1 and through him on the ,revolution4 ,at the same time the organic sciences were full of activity4 ,the life-work of ,goethe marks the parallelism of the two movements4 ,it is plain that the doctrines of ,comte were no more than a very one-sided attempt to formulate the significance of the fermentation around him1 and that deeply as he felt the unity of the social being1 his expression of it ignored half the lesson of the times4 ,thus the generalities of ,jurisprudence are vitalised and completed by the work of the sciences of culture2 and the conception of a national mind and character takes its unquestioned place in modern social theory4 ,it may be well at this point also to call attention to the researches which later historians have directed to what may be called 8,comparative ,politics02 the relations1 that is1 of communities under government with respect to the #db mode in which they are governed4 #a ,for this branch of inquiry once more1 though narrow and empty by itself1 yet does aid in bringing to light the purposive and conscious character of society1 and in correcting the tendency to treat it altogether as a 8natural0 phenomenon4 #a ,freeman's ,comparative ,politics1 and ,seeley's ,introduction to ,political ,science4 vi4 8,and so the whirligig of ,time brings about his revenges40 ,french ,sociology to-day is a psychological science1 though its founder banished psychology from his sociological method4 ,nothing is more instructive than to watch the gradual pressure of the various points of view which are emphasised by the various departments of social experience1 as they reveal1 under criticism1 their tendency to complete themselves and one another by suggesting the only category which is adequate to them as a whole4 ,as every serious student of social matters knows by his own experience1 it is impossible to touch a physical fact1 or a statistical datum1 or a legal enactment1 in reference to its social bearing1 without its at once1 so to speak1 coming alive in his hands1 and attaching itself to an underlying relation of mind as the only unity which will make it intelligible1 and correlate it with other experiences1 by themselves no less fragmentary4 ,in statistics1 for example1 you touch a moving creature1 as if through the holes in a wall1 at this point and the other1 and write down where you have touched him4 #a ,but to see the creature as he is1 and combine your information of all kinds in a just and complete idea1 you #dc must get him into the open4 ,and that1 when the question is of a life1 you can only do by reconstructing his mind1 for even to see a social unit with your eyes gives you a fragment only1 and not a whole4 ,on ,fridays1 we are told1 the passenger traffic returns of ,french railways1 omnibuses1 and steamers show a decline4 #b ,what dumb fact is this8 ,people do not like to travel on ,fridays1 or prefer to travel upon other days4 ,what is this preference8 ,the only unity that can really afford an explanation1 that can correlate this irregular fragment of fact with the whole to which it belongs1 is the living mind and will of the society in which the phenomenon occurs4 ,explanation aims at referring things to a whole2 and there is no true whole but mind4 ,necessarily1 therefore1 with widening experience and deepening criticism1 mind has become the centre of the experiences focussed by sociology4 #a ,cf4 ,aspects of the ,social ,problem 7,macmillan1 #ahie71 ,c4,s4 ,loch on 8,returns in ,social ,science10 p4 #bhg4 #b ,tarde1 ,les ,lois de l',imitation1 p4 #aae4 ,we may note some significant points in this development1 although1 indeed1 the whole course of modern sociology is one single illustration of what has just been said4 ,discussions of the problem in what the differentia of society consists1 no longer deal with organic or economic conceptions1 but with such ideas as the 8,consciousness of kind10 #a the 8,mind of a ,crowd10 #b 8,imitation0 and 8,invention10 #c similarities and differences in the social consciousness1 #d 8,social logic0 and society considered as a syllogism1 #e and the imitative and #dd inventive person4 #f ,the work of ,m4 ,tarde in particular is typical of the whole movement1 and his phrases have largely been adopted whether in agreement or in controversy4 ,for him the one fact coextensive with the social character is 8,imitation0--the means by which ideas and practices spread throughout groups and masses of intelligent beings4 ,for the characteristic of knowable phenomena1 in his view1 is ,repetition1 and ,imitation is the means and vehicle of ,repetition in social matters4 ,here1 however1 we have accounted only for generalisation1 and differentiation needs a separate origin4 ,this will be supplied by the idea of 8,invention20 ,invention and ,imitation1 therefore1 are the general form of all social process1 the matter on the other hand being analysable as ,belief and ,desire4 ,every institution is a belief1 #g every activity is a want or desire4 ,in the ,logique ,sociale these conceptions of the general medium and process of social life are pushed home into the actual formative operation of the social mind and will4 ,society1 we are told1 may be compared not indeed to an organism1 but rather to a brain2 it is a cooperative mind1 a syllogism1 in which the principles held by one part are modified and applied by another4 ,m4 ,tarde's extreme illustrative hypothesis corresponds strangely with one thrown out by ,mr4 ,sidgwick4 ,mr4 ,sidgwick #h has simplified an ethical question by supposing only a single sentient conscious being in the universe2 for ,m4 #de ,tarde there is1 we might say1 no single being at all2 the typical social man is a hypnotical creature1 a somnambulist acting under suggestions from others1 though he does not know it1 and is under the illusion that he is himself4 #i ,nothing could be of higher interest than to see the necessities of social science thus working themselves out1 on slippery and unfamiliar ground1 by the sheer force of facts and experience4 ,that a science of man must be a science of mind seems no longer disputable4 #a ,giddings1 p4 #ag4 #b ,le ,bon1 ,psychologie des ,foules4 #c ,tarde1 ,les ,lois de l',imitation4 #d ,durkheim1 ,la ,division du ,travail ,social4 #e ,tarde1 ,la ,logique ,sociale4 #f ,baldwin1 ,social and ,ethical ,interpretations in ,mental ,development4 #g ,perhaps this expression originates with ,fustel de ,coulanges in ,la ,cit ,antique4 #h ,methods of ,ethics1 p4 #cgd4 #i ,les ,lois de l',imitation1 p4 #hc4 ,on the substance of this development there is one observation which inevitably suggests itself to any critic who approaches the problem from the philosophical side4 ,necessarily1 as the relation of the individual to society is the root of every social problem1 psychological sociology consists to a great extent in exercises upon the theme of identity and difference4 ,these exercises have hitherto been for the most part unconscious and involuntary4 ,and the high degree of substantial truth which is attained by inquirers who have not thought the logic of identity worthy of a single glance1 is the strongest possible confirmation of the common experience that it is safer to neglect theory than to be careless of facts4 ,nevertheless1 it has now become apparent1 that a point has been attained at which logical criticism is absolutely essential1 or if not logical criticism1 at least some reference to the familiar and well-established results of ancient or modern social philosophy4 ,for it is a universal characteristic of the #df sociological movement before us1 that identity and difference are referred to different spheres1 and the 8one0 and the 8other0 are regarded as reciprocally exclusive atoms4 #a ,the difficulties and fallacies which thus arise are innumerable4 ,thus we have the contagious common feeling of a crowd #b taken as the true type of a collective mind1 obviously because it is not understood how an identical structure can include the differences1 the rational distinctions and relations1 which really constitute the working mind of any society4 ,so again we have one type of law marked off as corresponding to social similitude1 #c while a different type corresponds to the social division of labour2 simply because the category of resemblance has been substituted for that of identity1 and is treated as exclusive of differentiation2 with the result of a really terrible distortion of facts in the attempt to separate the whole sphere of penal enactment from that which deals with industrial organisation4 ,so with the entire set of notions of 8,imitation10 8,repetition0 and 8,invention40 #d ,the separation of ,imitation and ,invention is simply the popular exclusion of ,difference from ,identity2 while the treatment of ,repetition as the characteristic of knowable phenomena and the mode of utterance of social ,imitation means the restriction of rational ,identity to its barest form1 and the exclusion from #dg social theory of absolutely every case of true cooperative structure4 ,for true cooperative structure is never characterised by repetition1 but always by identity in difference2 it is the relation not of a screw to an exactly similar screw1 but of the screw to the nut into which it fastens4 #a ,m4 ,tarde's view just mentioned might seem to conflict with this4 ,but note that he regards the man influenced by others as under an illusion in thinking that he is himself3 i4e41 with ,spencer and ,huxley1 he regards the 8self0 and the 8other0 as irreconcilable factors4 #b ,le ,bon1 ,op4 cit4 #c ,durkheim1 ,op4 cit4 #d ,tarde and ,baldwin1 ,op4 cit4 ,in the discussions of ,egoism and ,altruism the difficulty comes to a head4 ,some writers think ,egoism prior to ,altruism2 others--the more wary and enlightened--incline to treat ,altruism as a phase earlier than ,egoism2 ,m4 ,durkheim1 whose eye for a fact is very keen1 seeing the absurdity of both these suppositions1 is determined to include the two characters in question from the very beginning in the human consciousness1 #a but1 of course1 as contents belonging to different spheres and consisting of contrasted elements4 ,the conception of a whole held together by its differences1 its identity consisting in and being measured by their very profoundness and individuality1 is not at the command of any of these writers1 although the greater part of ,m4 ,durkheim's theory seems imperatively to demand such a conception4 #a ,division du ,travail1 #baf4 vii4 ,before considering1 in conclusion1 the relation of ,sociology as influenced by the above-mentioned sources and points of view1 to social philosophy proper1 it will be well to devote a few words to emphasising the way in which these 8sources0 ought to be regarded4 ,every 8source0 of sociological science is at once a category1 or point of view1 and also a certain group of actual social conditions4 ,this relation is effectively illustrated by the study of any social #dh unity which is such as to invite a thorough conspectus of its life from top to bottom of the social growth and underlying conditions4 ,i repeat that the history and life of ancient ,greece1 a singularly complete working model of society on a very small scale1 analysed with remarkable thoroughness1 and individual throughout1 is the prerogative example of such a treatment2 but next to this1 or in addition to it1 a thoroughly careful study of local history1 life1 and conditions1 in a limited region1 #a with which we are familiar from top to toe1 is an essential propaedeutic to true social theory4 ,to focus a number of groups of fact1 and coordinate the points of view which they substantiate1 into the conception of a living being1 with its individual character and spiritual utterance1 needs more than a merely literary or statistical study4 ,but by making this effort we shall learn1 as no economic charts or general scientific works can teach us1 what a social life is1 and in what sense it is true that all partial facts and experiences within it demand ultimate coordination in the category of mind4 ,it is not meant that consciousness can make the weather hold up1 but it is meant that no fact has a true social bearing except in as far as1 sooner or later1 it comes to form part of the world which a being capable of sociality and therefore intelligent1 presents to himself as his theatre of action4 #a ,cf4 ,professor ,geddes' idea of a 8,regional ,survey10 with which visitors to his delightful 8,summer ,school0 become acquainted4 #c4 ,thus it may seem that by mere force of facts a necessary solution has been arrived at1 and that psychological sociology must be one and the same science with social philosophy4 #di ,but this is not quite the case4 ,up to the present time these two sciences continue to approach their object-matter1 as it were1 from different ends1 and whether the two views will ultimately amalgamate is perhaps mainly a problem of the personal division of labour4 ,but a question of principle1 with reference to the true nature of psychology1 is indirectly involved4 ,only there seems no reason why two kinds of psychology should not exist4 ,psychology1 as at present conceived by its best working representatives1 is a positive1 though not a physical science4 8,for 7the psychologist7 the crude superstitions of ,australian aborigines have as much interest and value as the developed and accurate knowledge of a ,newton or a ,faraday40 #a ,its aim is 8the establishment of continuity among observed facts1 by interpolating among them intermediate links which elude observation40 #b ,if not a 8physical0 science1 then1 it is1 in a common sense of the term1 a 8natural0 science4 ,it has the impartiality1 and uses the watchwords--law1 process1 genesis--which belong to a natural science4 ,and like every impartial science1 to which process and genesis are watchwords1 it tends to explain the higher by the lower4 ,this springs from no malice aforethought1 but from the conditions of the case4 ,the lower is simpler1 and usually comes first in time4 ,it is naturally dwelt upon1 as that into which it is hoped to resolve the more complex1 and the explanation which is more adequate for the simple1 is less adequate for the complex4 ,no difference of higher #ej and lower is recognised by the impartial science1 and its ideal1 as a science1 is inevitably the expression of the complex in terms of the simple2 while1 as far as genesis in time is insisted on1 the bias towards temporal causation is pretty sure to operate by attaching a quasi-causal significance to the earlier phases4 #a ,stout1 ,analytic ,psychology1 ,introduction4 #b ,ib4 ,from a logical point of view this idea of explanation seems seriously defective4 ,see ,bradley's ,principles of ,logic1 p4 #dia4 ,in all these characteristics psychology is at one with sociology4 ,and1 therefore1 though it is a gain that other points of view should be resolved into the point of view of mind1 yet the positive bias of sociology is not transcended simply by this resolution4 ,philosophy starts1 we have said1 as it were1 from the other end4 ,it is critical throughout2 it desires to establish degrees of value1 degrees of reality1 degrees of completeness and coherence4 ,its purpose might be termed 8,ethical10 but for the extreme narrowness of the meaning of that term4 ,society1 for it1 is an achievement or utterance of human nature--of course not divorced from nature in general--having a certain degree of solidity1 so to speak2 that is to say1 being able1 up to a certain point1 to endure the tests and answer the questionings which are suggested by the scrutiny of human life from the point of view of value and completeness4 ,is the social life the best1 or the only life for a human soul8 ,in what way through society1 and in what characteristics of society1 does the soul lay hold upon its truest self1 or become1 in short1 the most that it has in it to be8 ,how does the social life at its best compare with the life of art1 of knowledge1 or of religion1 and can the same principle be shown to be active in all of them8 ,and what have #ea they in common1 or peculiar to each1 which has an imperative claim on the mind of man8 ,now it was hinted above that there might be two kinds of psychology1 or two tendencies within it4 ,and if psychology were to be impelled1 as it has been more than once in the past1 by the recognition that where there is more of its object--of mind--its interest is greater and the rank of its object-matter is higher1 then there would not be much to choose between the temper of psychology and that of philosophy4 ,and as sociology has found itself driven forward into the territory of social 8logic10 a name which at once suggests a critical and philosophical science1 it may well be that sociological psychology will not remain wholly 8positive0 and impartial1 but will assume1 as in the hands of ,professor ,giddings1 for example1 it seems inclined to1 at least a teleological attitude1 testing social phenomena by the quantity and quality of life which they display4 ,but1 at any rate1 the points of view of sociology1 and of social philosophy as above described1 will continue to supplement each other4 ,philosophy gives a significance to sociology2 sociology vitalises philosophy4 ,the idea of mind is deepened and extended by the unity and continuity which sociological analysis1 throughout all its many-sided sources1 vindicates for the principle of growth and order down to the roots and in all the fibres of the world4 ,every natural resource and condition must be thought of as drawing forth or constituting some new element in the mind which is the universal focus2 just as every shape and colour of the trees in the landscape or every note of a melody finds its #eb definite and individual response in the contemplative consciousness4 ,the error lies1 not in identifying the mind and the environment1 but in first uncritically separating them1 and then substituting not merely the one for the other1 but wretched fragments of the one for the whole in which alone either can be complete4 ,philosophy1 on the other hand1 in treating of society1 has to deal with the problems which arise out of the nature of a whole and its parts1 the relation of the individual to the universal1 and the transformation by which the particular self is lost1 to be found again in a more individual1 and yet more universal form4 ,in all these respects its view is what might be called teleological2 that is to say1 it recognises a difference of level or of degree in the completeness and reality of life1 and endeavours to point out when and how1 and how far by social aid1 the human soul attains the most and best that it has in it to become4 ,as long as these two points of view are clearly recognised1 it is a matter of the mere personal division of labour whether they are brought to bear by the same thinkers and within the same treatises4 #ec ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,paradox ,,of ,,political ,,obligation3 ,,self-,,government4 #a4 ,to every-day common sense there is something paradoxical in the phenomena of political obligation2 however it may acquiesce in what1 although not satisfactorily explicable1 is plainly seen to be necessary4 ,where1 indeed1 we meet with any form of absolutely despotic government1 we have not so much a paradox as a defect2 for1 although government may exist in such a shape1 it is open to question how far true political obligation can be said to arise under such a system4 ,in as far as it does so1 we shall find that the fact is due to unacknowledged conditions and relations1 which we shall more easily analyse as they appear in free or constitutional states4 ,it would then be easy to show1 if we were interested in doing so1 that the principles which will have been recognised as operative in the freest states known to history1 are and have been1 in various degrees1 at the root of the common life of every state or community which has held together effectively enough to be treated as in any sense a political whole4 ,but this would be a historical investigation1 unnecessary for the purpose of pure #ed social theory4 ,in this we may fairly start from the highest form of political experience1 in which1 as we shall see1 the mere defects of political immaturity being outgrown1 the paradox of political obligation emerges with intensified emphasis4 ,let us take as our starting point1 then1 the conception of 8self-government10 to which1 it will be admitted on all hands1 the thought and feeling of mature communities has clung both in ancient and modern times1 as in some way containing the true root and ground of political obligation4 ,we shall find in it a striking illustration of the strength and weakness of wide-spread popular notions4 ,a universal popular notion cannot but have a hold of some essential truth1 otherwise it could not survive and spread1 and form a working theory for an immense area of experience4 ,on the other hand1 a popular notion1 as such1 cannot be critical of itself and aware of its own foundations2 and so in defending and applying itself it is pretty sure to plunge deep into fallacy4 8,self-government0 is an idea which will be found1 as has been said1 to contain the true ground and nature of political obligation4 ,but the rough and ready application of it which1 for example1 represents the individual as simply one with the community1 and the community therefore as infallible in its action affecting him1 is a pure example of fallacy1 and may be justly characterised as a confusion pretending to be a synthesis4 ,of this idea as of so many we must say that those who have pronounced it to be self-contradictory have understood it much better than most of those who accept it as self-evident4 ,in the conception of self-government then we #ee have the paradox of obligation in its purest form4 ,as applied to the individual himself1 it gives the paradox of ,ethical ,obligation4 ,as applied to the individuals who compose a society1 it gives the paradox of ,political ,obligation4 ,this must be the preliminary distinction by which we approach the subject2 but we shall find that the two problems and the two cases cannot be ultimately separated1 although they are to be distinguished in a certain respect4 ,the paradox of ,ethical ,obligation starts from what is accepted as a 8self10 and asks how it can exercise authority or coercion over itself2 how1 in short1 a metaphor drawn from the relations of some persons to others can find application within what we take to be the limits of an individual mind4 #a #a ,on this problem1 see below1 p4 #aci4 ,the paradox of ,political ,obligation starts from what is accepted as authority or social coercion1 and asks in what way the term 8self10 derived from the 8individual0 mind1 can be applicable at once to the agent and patient in such coercion1 exercised prima facie by some persons over others4 ,both relations and their connection have been pointed out by ,plato4 #a #a ,republic1 #dcj1 #dca4 ,our object in the present chapter is to enforce the reality of the difficulties which attach to the idea of political self-government1 so long as current assumptions as to the union of individuals in society are maintained4 ,and for this purpose we are to examine the views of some very distinguished philosophers to whom the paradox has appeared irreconcilable1 and law or government has seemed #ef essentially antagonistic to the self or true individuality of man2 while the term self1 if applied to the collective group by or within which government is undoubtedly exercised1 appears to them an empty and misleading expression4 ,the curious and significant point1 to which we shall call attention1 is1 in brief1 that while maintaining law and government to be in their nature antagonistic to the self of man--whether as pain to pleasure or as fetters to individuality--they nevertheless admit with one voice that a certain minimum of this antagonistic element is necessary to the development of the sentient or rational self4 ,we have here a dualism which challenges examination4 #b4 ,the attitude towards law and government which ,bentham adopted 7#agdh-ahcb7 was in a great degree that of the philanthropic reformer4 ,his principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number is said #a to have been derived from ,beccaria1 whose work on 8,crimes and ,penalties0 had great influence throughout ,europe4 ,and ,howard1 8the philanthropist10 who was just twenty-two years ,bentham's senior 7#agbf-agij71 represented a revolt against the abuses of the treatment of criminals at that time1 by which ,bentham1 who eulogised him as 8a martyr and apostle10 was strongly affected4 ,the movement which ,bentham led was1 in short1 markedly hostile to the existing system of law1 and to the reasonings of its advocates4 ,and substantial as his knowledge and constructive genius proved to be1 it never lost the character which the direction of his approach to the subject had marked upon it1 a character of suspicion and antagonism1 which is #eg expressed in his description of law as a necessary evil1 and government as a choice of evils4 #b #a ,professor ,holland in ,encycl4 ,brit41 art42 ,bentham40 #b ,bentham1 ,principles of ,legislation1 p4 #dh4 ,pain being the ultimate evil1 it is clear why1 on ,bentham's principles1 every law is an evil4 ,for every law1 for him1 is contrary to liberty2 and every infraction of liberty is followed by a natural sentiment of pain4 #a ,against those who would deny the proposition that every law is contrary to liberty he brings a charge of perversion of language1 in that they restrict liberty to the right of doing what is not injurious to others4 ,they give the term1 that is to say1 a partly positive implication4 ,for him then liberty has the simplest and apparently widest meaning1 #b which includes liberty to do evil1 and is defined1 we must suppose1 purely as the absence of restraint4 ,and he therefore has no doubt whatever that the citizen can acquire rights only by sacrificing part of his liberty4 ,and in this there is an appearance of truth1 if we forget that in saying that a part of one's liberty is sacrificed it is implied that one had1 to begin with1 a certain area of liberty1 of which a portion is abandoned to save the rest4 ,but the idea of any such antecedent liberty is just such a fiction as ,bentham himself delighted to expose4 ,it is true1 however1 that some degree of restraint on what we can now easily imagine ourselves free to do1 is involved in political society4 ,the point on which we have to fix our attention1 for the purposes of social theory1 is the remarkable representation of this state of things under the figure1 as it were1 of an amount of general liberty1 #eh which is increased by subtraction1 or which can only attain its maximum by the conversion of a certain edge or border of it1 so to speak1 into constraint4 ,this border of constraint is implied to be capable of a minimum1 such as to condition a maximum of liberty1 or possible individual initiative2 a relation which1 being at first sight contradictory1 demands further analysis4 ,for it would appear that if the sacrifice of some liberty is to be instrumental to the increase of the whole amount1 that whole can hardly be a homogeneous given quantity1 like1 for instance1 a piece of land2 for such a one must surely be diminished by the subtraction of any part of it4 ,it must1 one would infer1 be something which has a complex nature like that of a living plant1 such that certain restrictions or negations which are essential to its prosperity are dictated by its individual characteristics 7which must be positive71 and express the same principle with them2 and therefore are wholly relative to the positive type and phase of the plant to be cultivated4 ,only in some such sense can it be intelligible how constraint is instrumental to effective self-assertion4 #a ,bentham1 ,principles of ,legislation1 p4 #id4 #b ,it is not really the widest1 as will appear in the sequel4 ,but if this is so1 the restrictive influences of law and government1 which are the measure of the constraint imposed1 cannot be alien to the human nature which they restrict1 and ought not to be set down as in their own nature antagonistic to liberty or to the making the most of the human self4 ,the root of the difficulty obviously lies in assuming that the pressure of the claims of 8others0 in society is a mere general curtailment of the liberty of the 8one10 while acknowledging1 not #ei contrary to fact1 but contrary to the hypothesis of that curtailment1 that the one1 so far from surrendering some of his capacity for life through his fellowship with others1 acquires and extends that capacity wholly in and through such fellowship4 ,on the above assumption the terms of the paradox of self-government become irreconcilable1 and government is made an evil of which it is impossible to explain how it ministers to the self which stands for the good4 ,so long as to every individual1 taken as the true self1 the restraint enforced by the impact of others is alien and a diminution of the self1 this result is inevitable4 ,it is instructive1 therefore1 to note ,bentham's uncompromising hostility to all the theories of philosophical jurists4 ,the common point of all their theories1 from ,hobbes and ,grotius to ,montesquieu and ,rousseau1 not to mention ,kant and his successors1 has lain in the fact that their authors divined under the forms of power and command1 exercised by some over others1 a substantive and general element of positive human nature1 which they attempted to drag to light by one analogy after another4 ,but neither ,montesquieu's 8eternal relations10 nor the 8,social ,contract10 nor 8,general ,will10 nor 8,natural ,rights0 of other thinkers find favour in ,bentham's eyes4 ,one and all they are to him fiction and fallacy4 ,he can understand nothing in law but the character of a command2 he can see no positive relation of it to human nature beyond the degree in which it dispenses with the pain of restraint while increasing the pleasure of liberty4 ,to describe the magnificent success which #fj attended the use of this rule of thumb in the practical work of reform does not fall within our immediate subject4 ,our purpose was merely to illustrate the paradox implied in the conception of self-government1 by pointing out how fundamentally hostile to one another ,bentham took its constituent elements to be4 #c4 ,the same point may be further insisted on by examining the main ideas of ,mill's 8,liberty10 without by any means professing to give a full account of ,mill's opinions on the relation of individuals to society4 ,what indeed is instructive in his position1 for our immediate purpose1 is that1 having so deep a sense1 as he has1 of social solidarity1 he nevertheless treats the central life of the individual as something to be carefully fenced round against the impact of social forces4 i4 ,mill's idea of ,individuality is plainly biassed by the ,benthamite tradition that law is an evil4 ,it is to be remembered that ,anarchism of a speculative kind1 the inevitable complement of a hide-bound ,conservatism1 was current in the beginning of this century1 as in ,godwin and ,shelley4 ,thus we find concentrated in a few pages of the 8,liberty0 #a all those ideas on the nature of ,individuality1 ,originality1 and ,eccentricity1 which are most opposed to the teaching derived by later generations in ,england from the revival of philosophy and criticism4 ,it is worth while1 after reading ,mill's observations upon the relation of individuality to the ,calvinistic theory of life1 #b to turn to the estimate expressed by ,mark ,pattison #c of the force of individual character generated by #fa the rule of ,calvin at ,geneva4 ,that the individuality1 or genius1 the fulness of life and completeness of development which ,mill so justly appreciates1 is not nourished and evoked by the varied play of relations and obligations in society1 but lies in a sort of inner self1 to be cherished by enclosing it1 as it were1 in an impervious globe1 is a notion which neither modern logic #d nor modern art criticism will admit4 ,in the same way1 the connection of originality and eccentricity1 on which ,mill insists1 appears to us to-day to be a fallacious track of thought2 and in general1 in all these matters1 we tend to accept the principle that1 in order to go beyond a point of progress1 it is necessary to have reached it2 and in order to destroy a law1 it is necessary to have fulfilled it4 ,here1 however1 is the heart of the point on which we are insisting4 ,if individuality and originality mean or depend upon the absence of law and of obligation2 if eccentricity is the type of the fully developed self1 and if the community1 penetrated by a sense of universal relations1 is therefore a prey to monotony and uniformity1 then it needs no further words to show that law is a curtailment of human nature1 the necessity of which remains inexplicable1 so that self-government is a contradiction in terms4 #a pp4 #ce-i4 #b ,ib41 p4 #ce4 #c ,essays1 vol4 ,i41 8,calvin40 #d ,see below1 p4 #gi4 ii4 ,how then does ,mill bring the two terms into relation8 ,how does he represent the phenomenon that1 in the life of every society1 the factors of self and of government have to be reconciled1 or at anyrate to coexist8 ,to find the answer to this question1 the whole #fb of the chapter1 8,of the limits of the authority of society over the individual10 #a should be carefully studied4 ,a few characteristic sentences may be quoted here4 #a ,on ,liberty1 ch4 iv4 8,what1 then1 is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself8 ,where does the authority of society begin8 ,how much of human life should be assigned to individuality1 and how much to society8 8,each will receives its proper share1 if each has that which more particularly concerns it4 ,to individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested2 to society1 the part which chiefly interests society40 ,every one who lives in society1 he continues in effect1 is bound not to interfere with certain interests of others 7explicitly or implicitly constituted as 8rights071 and is bound to take his fair share of the sacrifices incurred for the defence of society and its members4 ,these conditions society may enforce1 at all costs to recalcitrants4 ,further1 it may punish by opinion1 though not by law1 acts hurtful to others1 but not going so far as to violate their rights4 ,but acts which affect only the agent1 or need not affect others unless they like1 may be punished1 we are given to understand1 neither by law nor by opinion4 ,mill expects his conclusions to be disputed1 and the following is the conclusion of the passage in which he explains and re-affirms it3 8444 when a person disables himself1 by conduct purely self-regarding1 from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public1 he is guilty of a social #fc offence4 ,no person ought to be punished simply for being drunk2 but a soldier or policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty4 ,wherever1 in short1 there is a definite damage1 or a definite risk of damage either to an individual or to the public1 the case is taken out of the province of liberty1 and placed in that of morality or law40 #a #a ,italics are mine4 ,it will probably occur at once to the reader that1 considered as a practical rule1 the view here maintained would by no means curtail unduly the province of social interference4 ,we should rather anticipate that it would leave an easy opening for a transition from administrative nihilism to administrative absolutism2 and some such transition seems to have taken place in ,mill's later views4 ,this tendency to a complete bouleversement is the characteristic of all conceptions which proceed by assigning different areas to the several factors of an inseparable whole1 which then reasserts itself in its wholeness within the area of either factor to which we may happen to attend4 ,indeed1 even in the passage before us1 the defence of individuality has already well-nigh turned round into its annihilation4 ,every act that carries a definite damage to any other person belongs to the sphere of law1 and every act that can be supposed likely to cause such a damage1 to that of morality2 and individuality has what is left4 ,the extraordinary demarcation between the sphere of morality and that of liberty is to be accounted for1 no doubt1 by the ,benthamite tradition which identified the moral and social sanctions2 so that in this usage the sphere of morality means much the same as what1 #fd in the first passage referred to1 was indicated as the sphere of opinion4 ,now1 it is obvious that the distinction which ,mill is attempting to describe and explain is one practically recognised by every society4 ,the question is whether it can be rightly described and explained by a demarcation which1 if strictly pressed1 excludes individuality from every act of life that has an important social bearing2 while1 owing to the two-sided nature of all action1 it becomes perfectly arbitrary in its practical working as a criterion4 ,for every act of mine affects both myself and others2 and it is a matter of mood and momentary urgency which aspect may be pronounced characteristic and essential4 ,it may safely be said that no demarcation between self-regarding and other-regarding action can possibly hold good4 ,what may hold good1 and what ,mill's examples show to be present to his mind1 is a distinction between the moral and the 8external0 aspects of action1 on the ground of their respective accessibility to the means of coercion which are at the disposal of society4 ,the peculiar sense in which the term 8external0 is here employed will explain itself below4 #a #a ,see ch4 viii4 below4 ,for our present purpose1 however1 what we have to observe is merely that the demarcation between individuality and society1 contrived in defence of the former1 has pretty nearly annihilated it4 ,and thus we see once more how overwhelming is the prima facie appearance that1 in the idea of self-government1 the factors of self and government are alien and opposed2 and yet how hopeless it remains #fe to explain the part played by these factors in actual society1 so long as we aim at a demarcation between them as opposites1 rather than at a relative distinction between them as manifestations of the same principle in different media4 iii4 ,a few words may here be said on the applications by which ,mill illustrates his doctrine1 in order to point out what confusion results from relying on a demarcation which cannot strictly be made4 ,it will be noted in the first place that he objects altogether to the attempt to prevent by punishment either immorality or irreligion as such4 #a ,this objection a sound social theory must uphold4 ,but if we look at ,mill's reason for it1 we find it simply to be that such an attempt infringes liberty1 by interfering with action which is purely self-regarding4 ,without entering further upon the endless argument whether this or any action is indeed purely self-regarding1 we may observe that by taking such ground1 ,mill causes the above objection1 which is substantially sound1 to appear as on all fours with others which are at any rate very much more doubtful4 ,such is the objection on principle to all restrictions imposed upon trade with a distinct view to protecting the consumer1 not from fraud1 but from opportunities of consumption injurious to himself4 ,the regulation or prohibition of the traffic in alcoholic liquors is of course the main question here at issue2 and it may be admitted that ,mill's discussion1 with the many distinctions which he lays down1 is full of shrewdness and suggestiveness4 ,but the ultimate ground which he takes1 as above stated1 is quite different from the genuine reasons which exist #ff against attempting to enforce morality by law and penalty1 and introduces confusion into the whole question of ,state interference by ranking the two objections together4 ,closely analogous are his objections to the statutes respecting unlawful games1 #b which1 whether wise or unwise1 are quite a different thing from an attempt to punish personal immorality as such4 ,and lastly1 the same principle is illustrated by his whole attitude to the strong feeling and the various legal obligations which determine and support the monogamous family4 ,in maintaining the general indissolubility of marriage1 and supporting the parental power1 the ,state is interfering1 for him1 with the freedom of parties to a contract1 and conferring power over individuals1 the children1 who have a right to be separately considered4 ,such interference is for him ipso facto of a suspected nature4 ,it is an interference hostile to liberty2 and whether it is or is not an external condition of good life1 which the ,state is able effectively to maintain1 is a question which he does not discuss4 ,throughout all these objections to authoritative interference we trace the peculiar prejudice that the criterion of its justifiability lies in the boundary line between self and others1 rather than in the nature of what coercive authority is and is not able to do towards the promotion of good life4 ,on many points indeed1 when the simple protection of 8others0 is concerned1 ,mill's doctrine leads to sound conclusions4 ,such1 for example1 is the problem of legislation after the pattern of the ,factory ,acts4 #a ,pp4 #dh and #ej4 #b ,p4 #ei4 ,but yet a strange nemesis attaches to grounds #fg alleged with insufficient discrimination4 ,just as1 by ranking inner morality and outer action alike under the name of freedom1 ,mill is led to object to interference which may be perfectly justified and effectual2 so by the same confusion he is led to advocate coercive treatment in impossibly stringent forms1 and in cases where it runs extreme risk of thwarting a true moral development4 ,we are amazed when he strongly implies1 in respect to the education of children and the prospect of supporting a family1 that moral obligations #a ought to be enforced by law4 ,the proposal of universal ,state-enacted examinations by way of enforcing the parental duty of educating children1 to the exclusion of the task of providing education by public authority1 in which ,mill sees danger to individuality1 opens a prospect of a ,chinese type of society1 from which1 happily1 the good sense of ,englishmen has recoiled4 ,and just the reverse of his proposal has come to pass under the influence of the logic of experience4 ,the ,state has taken care that the external conditions of an elementary education are provided1 and1 while doing this1 has no doubt exercised compulsion in order that these conditions may be a reality4 ,but the individual inquisition by examination is tending to drop out of the system2 and the practical working of the public education is more and more coming to be that the ,state sees to it that certain conditions are maintained1 of which the parents' interest and public spirit leads them to take advantage4 ,sheer compulsion is not the way to enforce a moral obligation4 #a ,pp4 #fb and #fd4 #fh ,still more startling is the suggestion that it might be just to interdict marriage to those unable to show the means of supporting a family1 on the ground of possible evil both to the children themselves through poverty1 and to others through over-population4 ,this is a case in which authoritative interference 7except on account of very definite physical or mental defects7 must inevitably defeat its object4 ,no foresight of others can gauge the latent powers to meet and deal with a future indefinite responsibility2 and the result of scrupulous timidity1 in view of such responsibilities1 is seen in the tendency to depopulation which affects that very country from which ,mill probably drew his argument4 ,to leave the responsibility as fully as possible where it has been assumed is the best that law can do1 and appeals to a spring of energy deeper than compulsion can reach4 ,thus we have seen that by discriminating the spheres of non-interference and interference1 according to a supposed demarcation between the sphere of 8self0 and of 8others10 a hopelessly confused classification has been introduced4 ,sometimes the maintenance of external conditions of good life1 well within the power of the ,state1 is forbidden on the same grounds as the direct promotion of morality1 which is impossible to it4 ,in other cases the enforcement of moral obligations is taken to lie within the functions of the ,state1 although not only is the enforcement of moral obligations per se a contradiction in terms1 but almost always1 as in the cases in question1 the attempt to effect it is sure to frustrate itself1 by destroying the springs on which moral action depends4 #fi ,it is worth noticing1 in conclusion1 that in two examples1 #a the one trivial1 the other that of slavery1 both theoretically and practically very important1 ,mill recognises a principle wholly at variance with his own4 ,here he is aware that it may be right1 according to the principle of liberty1 to restrain a man1 for reasons affecting himself alone1 from doing what at the moment he proposes to do4 ,for we are entitled to argue from the essential nature of freedom to what freedom really demands1 as opposed to what the man momentarily seems to wish4 8,it is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom10 as it is not freedom to be allowed to walk over a bridge which is certain to break down and cause his death4 ,here we have in germ the doctrine of the 8real0 will1 and a conception analogous to that of ,rousseau when he speaks of a man 8being forced to be free40 #a ,pp4 #eg and #fa4 #d4 ,before referring to ,mill's explicit utterances on the problem of self-government1 which are of the same general character as those of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer1 it will be well to note some instructive points in the views of the latter thinker4 ,the study of ,mr4 ,spencer's writings1 and more especially of those which appear most directly opposed to the popular conceptions of the day1 cannot be too strongly urged upon the sociological student4 ,and this for two reasons4 ,in the first place1 no other writer has exhibited with equal vividness the fatal possibilities of a collective governmental stupidity4 ,that in practice these possibilities are continually tending to become facts1 just as in theory they are #gj represented by recurrent fallacies1 #a is a proof of the extreme arduousness of the demands made by the task of self-government upon the people which undertakes it4 ,and no theorist is fitted to discuss the problem of social unity who has not realised the arduousness of these demands in all its intensity4 ,and1 in the second place1 the student will observe an instructive meeting of extremes between elements of ,mr4 ,spencer's ideas and popular social theories of an opposite cast4 ,the revival of doctrines of the natural rights of man on a biological foundation #b is a case in point4 ,an uncriticised individualism is always in danger of transformation into an uncritical collectivism4 ,the basis of the two is in fact the same4 #a ,as1 for example1 in ,rousseau's attempts to explain the action of a collective mind1 in which he constantly falls into the advocacy of a soulless rgime of mass-meetings4 #b ,man v4 ,state1 p4 #ie4 i4 ,a comparison of the conception of 8right0 as entertained by ,bentham and by ,herbert ,spencer forms a striking commentary on ideas in which 8government0 is antagonistic to 8self40 ,bentham1 seeing clearly that the claims of the actual individual1 taken as he happens to be1 are casual and unregulated1 fulminates against the idea of natural right as representing those claims4 ,right is for him a creation of the ,state1 and there can be no right which is not constituted by law4 ,and the truth of the contention seems obvious4 ,how1 in fact1 could individual claims or wishes constitute a right1 except as in some way ratified by a more general recognition8 ,but to ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer the contrary proposition is absolutely convincing1 and1 indeed1 on #ga their common premises1 with equal reason4 #a ,it is ridiculous1 he points out1 to think of a people as creating rights1 which it had not before1 by the process of creating a government in order to create them4 ,it is absurd to treat an individual as having a share of rights qua member of the people1 while in his private capacity he has no rights at all4 #a ,ib41 p4 #hh4 ,we need not labour this point further4 ,it is obvious that ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer is simply preferring the opposite extreme1 in the antithesis of 8self0 and 8government10 to that which commended itself to ,bentham4 ,if it is a plain fact that 8a right0 can only be recognised by a society1 it is no less plain that it can only be real in an individual4 ,if individual claims1 apart from social adjustment1 are arbitrary1 yet social recognitions1 apart from individual qualities and relations1 are meaningless4 ,as long as the self and the law are alien and hostile1 it is hopeless to do more than choose at random in which of the two we are to locate the essence of right4 ii4 ,and how alien and hostile the self and the law may seem we see even more crudely enunciated in ,herbert ,spencer than in ,bentham or ,mill1 as the fundamental principle of the tradition has worked itself more definitely to the front4 8,the liberty #a which a citizen enjoys is to be #gb measured1 not by the nature of the governmental machinery he lives under1 whether representative or other1 but by the relative paucity of the restraints it imposes on him40 ,and so we are astounded to find it maintained that the positive and active element in the right to carry on self-sustaining activities is of a non-social character1 depending only on the laws of life1 #b and if the matter were pushed home1 would have to be identified1 one must suppose1 with the more strictly animal element of the mind2 while only the negative element arises from social aggregation1 and it is this negative element alone which gives ethical character to the right to live4 ,though these distinctions apply primarily to the ground of the right to live1 yet it appears inevitable that they represent the point of view from which the active self or individuality must be regarded on the principle we are pursuing4 ,the ground of the right to live1 as here stated1 is simply the recognition that life is a good2 and if the positive element of this good is non-social and only the negative is of social origin1 and this alone is ethical1 it seems clearly to follow that the making the most of life--its positive expansion and intensification--is excluded from the ethical aspects of individuality1 and1 indeed1 that individuality has no ethical aspect at all4 ,here is the ultimate result of accepting as irreducible the distinction between the self and government1 or the negative relation of individuality and law4 ,liberty and self are divorced from the moral end1 a tendency which we noted even in ,mill4 ,selves in society are regarded as if they #gc were bees building their cells1 and their ethical character becomes comparable to the absence of encroachment by which the workers maintain the hexagonal outline due to their equal impact on each other as they progress evenly from equidistant centres4 ,the self1 which has ranked through out these views as the end1 to whose liberty all is to be sacrificed1 turns out to be the non-ethical element of life4 #a ,man v4 ,state1 p4 #ae4 ,cf4 ,seeley1 ,introd4 to ,political ,science1 p4 #aai3 8,perfect liberty is equivalent to total absence of government40 ,i have attempted to point out the fallacy of this in a way applying to its practical and everyday meaning in my essay on 8,liberty and ,legislation10 in the volume of essays called ,the ,civilisation of ,christendom4 #b ,man v4 ,state1 p4 #ih4 ,thus1 when ,professor ,huxley speaks of 8self-restraint as the essence of the ethical process10 #a while 8natural liberty0 consists in 8the free play of self-assertion10 we see how the whole method of approaching social and ethical phenomena is turned upside down unless the paradox of self-government is conquered once for all4 ,the idea that assertion and maximisation of the self and of the individuality first become possible and real in and through society1 and that affirmation and not negation is its main characteristic2 these fundamental conceptions of genuine social philosophy #b can only be reached through a destructive criticism of the assumptions which erect that paradox into an insoluble contradiction4 #a ,evolution and ,ethics2 pp4 #bg and #ca4 #b ,for the ,greek1 it is society which is natural1 positive1 and promotive of man's individuality4 ,see ch4 ii4 above4 #e4 ,we may now restate the essence of the problem of self-government as it presents itself to the thinkers whom we have been reviewing4 ,on the assumptions which they accept1 the annihilating criticism of self-government in the first chapter of ,mill's ,liberty is indeed irresistible4 ,he begins by pointing out that in times of political immaturity1 #gd the conception of political liberty consisted in setting limits to the power which the ruler1 considered as an independent force opposed in interest #a to his subjects1 should be suffered to exercise over the community4 ,but as it was found possible1 in a greater and greater degree1 to make the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled1 8some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself4 ,that1 it might seem1 was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people4 ,what was now wanted was1 that the rulers should be identified with the people2 that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation4 ,the nation did not need to be protected against its own will4 ,there was no fear of its tyrannising over itself40 ,rousseau in some moods is the victim of this fallacy1 and it is widely triumphant to-day4 #a ,so early an analysis of government as that made by ,plato in the ,republic shows indeed that this was never the sole theory1 as it is not the truest1 of the cohesive forces of any community whatever4 ,but it has a certain validity1 proportioned to the degree of political imperfection4 ,but with the success of the democratic principle1 8elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact4 ,it was now observed that such phrases as #8self-government'1 and #8the power of the people over themselves'1 do not express the true state of the case4 ,the #8people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised2 and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself1 but of each by all the rest4 ,the #ge will of the people1 moreover1 practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people2 the majority1 or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority 444 and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power4 ,the limitation1 therefore1 of the power of government loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community1 that is1 to the strongest party therein4 444 ,in political speculations1 the #8tyranny of the majority' is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard40 ,the paradox of self-government then1 so far from being theoretically solved by the development of political institutions to their highest known maturity1 is simply intensified by this development4 ,when the arbitrary and irrational powers of classes or of individuals have been swept away1 we are left face to face1 it would seem1 with the coercion of some by others as a necessity in the nature of things4 ,and1 indeed1 however perfectly 8self-government0 has been substituted for despotism1 it is flying in the face of experience to suggest that the average individual self1 as he exists in you or me1 is ipso facto satisfied1 and at home1 in all the acts of the public power which is supposed to represent him4 ,if he were so1 the paradox of self-government would be resolved by the annihilation of one of its factors4 ,the self would remain1 but 8government0 would be superfluous2 or else 8government0 would be everything1 and the self annihilated4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we understand the 8self0 in 8self-government0 to stand for the whole sovereign group or #gf community1 which is usually called a 8self-governing10 as opposed to a subject1 state1 then we have before us the task of showing that this self is a reality in any sense which justifies the acceptance of what is done by the public power as an act of the whole community4 ,but on the ground where we stand in the theories reviewed in the present chapter1 no such self can be shown4 ,government1 in fact and in principle1 reveals itself as coercion exercised by 8the others0 over 8the one40 ,and so long as this is the case1 and as the government is alien to the self1 not only do the rights of majorities remain without explanation1 but no less is it impossible to say on what rational ground an entire community can apply coercion to a single recalcitrant member4 ,we have seen that ,mill would solve the problem by a demarcation1 according to which the aim and ground of government is to protect the self from the impact of others1 and leave it in its isolated purity4 ,herbert ,spencer1 it may be noted1 #a has recourse to one of those hypotheses of tacit consent which would reduce a community to the level of a joint-stock company1 #b minus a written instrument of association2 which in the case of the ,state has to be replaced by ,mr4 ,spencer's estimate of purposes1 which would probably be accepted with unanimity if the question were asked6 ,bentham alone1 founding #gg himself on the actual nature of social life1 genially overrides the whole question of individual right1 and while maintaining law to be a necessary evil1 and pouring scorn on all attempts to exhibit a positive unity throughout the selves which compose a society1 makes the promotion of a free and happy life the sole criterion of governmental interference4 #a ,man v4 ,state1 p4 #hc sq4 #b ,it is a remarkable testimony to the inherent vitality of associations of human beings that even a joint-stock company often finds its work and aims so developing on its hands that it has to obtain additional powers from ,parliament4 ,it transcends1 therefore1 the limits of the shareholders original contract1 and ,herbert ,spencer's loud complaints of this procedure show how little he recognises the nature of social necessity4 ,on the basis of every-day reflection1 then1 we are brought to an absolute deadlock in the theory of political obligation4 ,if1 as popular instinct maintains1 and as common sense seems somehow to insist1 there is a theory and a justification of social coercion latent in the term 8self-government10 we cannot find a clue to it in the reasoning of our most recent and popular political thinkers4 ,nor should we find a comprehensive theory1 though we might find suggestions towards one1 if we recurred to our more philosophical teachers1 such as ,hobbes and ,locke1 who are further from popular modes of thought4 ,if there is anything satisfactory in the conception of self-government1 every interpretation of it is at once condemned which does not give the fullest force to both terms of the paradox1 at the same time that it exhibits their reconciliation4 ,what this fullest force is1 and the antagonism which it involves1 we have seen in the present chapter4 ,we must start from an actual self1 which is capable of rebelling against law and government2 and from an actual 8government10 which is capable of tyrannising over the individual self4 ,we must not treat the self as ipso facto annihilated by government2 nor must we treat government as a pale reflection1 pliable to all the vagaries of the actual self4 ,nor1 again1 must we divide the inseparable #gh content of life1 and endeavour to assign part to the assertion of the individual as belonging to self1 and part to his impact on others1 as belonging to government4 ,we must take the two factors of the working idea of self-government in their full antagonism1 and exhibit1 through and because of this1 the fundamental unity at their root1 and the necessity and conditions of their coherence4 ,we must show1 in short1 how man1 the actual man of flesh and blood1 demands to be governed2 and how a government1 which puts real force upon him1 is essential1 as he is aware1 to his becoming what he has it in him to be4 ,and if we fail to destroy the assumptions which hinder us from doing this1 we shall have to admit that the maturity of democratic institutions has only liberated us from arbitrary despotism to subject us to necessary tyranny2 and though1 in spite of such a failure1 we might still acquiesce in 8counting heads to save breaking them10 we should have to agree that this may indeed be the shrewdest device of political expediency1 but that the difference between the two processes corresponds to no real capacity of the human individual for partaking1 by the exercise of will and intelligence1 in a peacefully organised and yet effectually governed whole4 ,we shall then1 in short1 be compelled to agree with ,bentham and ,mill and ,spencer that 8self-government0 and 8the general will0 are meaningless phantoms1 combinations of hostile factors1 incapable of being united in a real experience4 #gi ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,political ,,obligation ,,more ,,radically ,,treated4 #a4 ,the reader will no doubt have observed that the theory dealt with in the last chapter belongs to the general type of what is currently known as ,individualism4 ,for several reasons ,i have preferred not to make use of this hackneyed word4 ,in the first place1 it is very hackneyed2 and the employment of such terms takes all life and expressiveness out of philosophy4 ,and1 in the next place1 ,individualism may mean many things1 and in its fullest1 which is surely1 for the student of philosophy1 its truest meaning1 it is far too good for the theories under discussion4 ,an 8,individual0 may be 8individual0 or indivisible because he has so little in him1 that you cannot imagine it possible to break him up into lesser parts2 or because1 however full and great his nature1 it is so thoroughly one1 so vital and so true to itself1 that1 like a work of art1 the whole of his being cannot be separated into parts without ceasing to be what it essentially is4 ,in the former case the 8individual0 is an 8atom02 in the latter he is 8a great individuality40 #a ,the sense in which we shall make #hj use of the notion of the individual1 so far as we use it at all1 will be the latter and not the former4 ,and1 therefore1 we shall as far as possible discard the hackneyed term 8,individualism10 which embodies the former meaning only4 #a ,see ,nettleship's ,remains1 i4 #afj4 ,if then we are to coin an expression which will indicate the common features of the theories outlined in the previous chapter1 we may venture upon some such phrase as 8prima facie theories10 or 8theories of the first look40 ,by this ,i do not mean that they stand in the same rank with the views of the ,greek thinkers1 who1 undisturbed by previous speculation1 saw the great facts of social experience with a freshness and wholeness of vision with which they can never be seen again4 ,the 8first look0 of our own day is of a different kind4 ,it is the first look of the man in the street or of the traveller1 struggling at a railway station1 to whom the compact self-containedness and self-direction of the swarming human beings before him seems an obvious fact1 while the social logic and spiritual history which lie behind the scene fail to impress themselves on his perceptive imagination4 ,we see then that these theories of the first appearance are mainly guided by this impression of the natural separateness of the human unit4 ,for this reason1 as we noted1 the experience of self-government is to them an enigma1 with which they have to compromise in various ways4 ,and because their explanations of it are not true explanations but only compromises1 they rest on no principle1 and dictate no consistent attitude4 ,for ,bentham all solid right is actually in the ,state1 #ha though conceived by himself as a means to individual ends2 for ,mill1 it is divided between the ,state and the individual1 by a boundary which cannot be traced and therefore cannot be respected2 for ,herbert ,spencer all right is in the individual1 and the ,state has become little more than a record office of his contracts and consents4 ,the assumption common to the theories in question is dictated by their very nature4 ,it is not precisely1 as is often supposed to be the case1 that the individual is the end to which ,society is a means4 ,such a definition fails to assign a character which is distinctive for any social theories whatever4 ,for ,society1 being1 at the lowest rate1 a plurality of individuals1 whatever we say of the individual may be construed as true of ,society and vice versa1 so long as all individuals are understood in the same sense as one4 ,thus the 8means0 and the 8ends0 are liable to change places1 as1 for practical purposes1 we saw that they did in ,bentham4 ,the ethical term 8altruism0 illustrates this principle4 ,it shows that by taking 8the individual0 as the 8end10 nothing is determined as to the relation between each individual and all1 and it remains a matter of chance how far it is required of 8each0 individual1 in the name of the welfare of 8the individual10 to sacrifice himself to 8all40 ,the fact is that the decisive issue is not whether we call the 8individual0 or 8society0 the 8end02 but what we take to be the nature at once of individuals and of society4 ,this is the question of principle2 and views which are at one in this have nothing which can in principle keep them apart1 #hb although they may diverge to the seemingly opposite poles of the liberty of each and the welfare of all4 ,we have observed this sliding from one narrowness to its opposite1 as between ,bentham1 ,mill1 and ,herbert ,spencer4 ,the root idea then1 of the views which we have been discussing1 is simply that the individual or society--it makes no difference which we take--is what it prima facie appears to be4 ,this is why we have called them 8prima facie0 theories1 or 8theories of the first look40 ,it would be a long story to explain how a first look can be possible in the eighteenth or nineteenth century ,a4,d4 ,but in brief1 the history of thought shows certain leaps or breaks in culture2 when the human mind seems to open its eyes afresh1 or to emerge on a new platform1 from which new point of view all its adjustments have to be re-made and its perceptions re-analysed4 ,in these new stages a great advance is involved2 but the advance is potential1 and the possible insight has to be paid for by an initial blindness4 ,such an occasion it was on which the legislator or economist or natural philosopher of the modern world turned his gaze upon man in society4 ,he saw him as 8one of millions enjoying the protection of the law10 #a and society as the millions of which he is one4 ,such an onlooker inevitably proceeds to treat the social whole as composed of units ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 etc41 who1 as they stand1 and just as they seem to us when we rub against them in daily intercourse1 are taken to be the organs and centres of human life4 ,from this assumption all #hc the rest follows4 ,each of us1 ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and all the others1 seems to be1 and to a great extent in the routine of life actually is1 self-complete1 self-satisfied1 and self-willed4 ,to each of us1 ,a1 ,b1 or ,c1 all the rest are 8others40 ,they are 8like0 him2 they are 8repetitions0 of him1 but they are not himself4 ,he knows that they are something to himself2 but this 8something0 is still 8something else10 and even in ethical reflection he is apt to call his recognition of it 8altruism0--an indefinite claim and feeling1 touching his being at its margin of contact with neighbouring circles1 the centres of which are isolated4 #a ,b4 ,jowett1 in conversation1 to author4 ,to the individual and society thus conceived--,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and the rest--it is plain that government can be nothing but self-protection4 ,it is1 in fact1 a form of the impact of 8others10 scientifically minimised1 and accepted because it is minimised4 ,for this reason it is1 as we saw throughout1 alien to the self1 and incapable of being recognised as springing from a common root with the spontaneous life which we pretend to be aware of only within our private magic circle4 ,then the forcible impact of ,b and ,c upon the circle of ,a is a necessary evil1 a diminution1 pro tanto1 of ,a4 ,and the more altruistic ,a is1 the more he will recognise this1 as affecting not himself only1 but ,b and ,c also4 ,it is for this reason that1 on the views in question1 all law and government necessarily remain formal and negative as compared with the substantive and positive ends of the self4 ,the maintenance of 8liberty10 of the circular or hexagonal #a fences round ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 and the rest1 is #hd conceived as involving no determinate type of life1 no relation to the ends which the units pursue within their hexagons4 ,if in any way the self went beyond itself1 and ,a recognised a positive end and nature which peremptorily bound him to ,b and the others1 it would be impossible to keep this nature and end from reflecting themselves in the determinate content of the conditions of association between them4 ,the assumption would be destroyed which keeps 8government0 alien to 8self10 and it would be possible to consider in what sense and for what reason the nature of a spiritual animal turns against itself with the dualism which the paradox of self-government embodies1 and that in pursuit of its true unity4 #a ,see ,p4 #gc #b4 ,we will now discuss ,rousseau's treatment of the paradox of 8self-government40 ,and we discuss it1 not because it is complete or self-consistent1 but rather because1 while breaking through to the root of the whole matter1 it is as incomplete and as inconsistent as are the efforts of our own minds to lay hold of any profound truth4 ,it displays1 in fact1 on the great stage of the history of philosophy1 precisely the struggle which each of us has to go through if he tries to pierce the surface of commonplace fiction and tradition which persistently weaves itself about social facts4 ,on almost every page there is relapse and vacillation4 ,the fictions which are being cast aside continually reassert themselves2 the embodiment of the principle which the author's genius has discerned is sought for in expedients essentially opposite to its nature1 while the instruments which it has developed for itself are contemptuously rejected4 #he ,we are going to examine the main thesis of ,rousseau's ,contrat ,social4 ,the reader who is surprised to find in our account little or nothing of the 8return to nature10 8natural equality10 and the 8natural rights of the individual10 may refer for these to ,rousseau's earlier essays on theses propounded by the ,academy of ,dijon4 ,the first of the theses 7#agej7 ran1 8,whether the re-establishment of the sciences and the arts contributed to purify morals02 and ,rousseau's discourse1 which won the prize1 following the lead of the thesis1 started from the later ,renaissance1 and dealt in general with the phenomena of decadence--a very real problem4 ,the notable feature of this brief essay is its constant vacillation between the attack on science1 art1 and education as such1 and the criticism1 by no means an undiscerning criticism1 of their abuses4 ,rousseau's head is full1 not of primitive man1 but of ,socrates and ,cato1 of ,sparta and republican ,rome4 ,a writer who speaks of ,newton and ,verulam as preceptors of the human race can hardly be hostile to true intellectual achievement4 #a ,it is noteworthy that his zeal for educational reform is already apparent in this first published work4 #a ,the whole piece breathes a spirit of prize essay paradox1 and though1 if sympathetically read1 it is seen to be most characteristic of the author1 no serious conclusion should be drawn from it as to his hostility to civilisation4 ,a comic instance of his vacillation is produced by the necessity he felt himself under1 of excepting1 from his general dispraise of modern letters1 such ,academies as that of ,dijon1 which was to judge his essay4 ,for an excellent appreciation of these earlier works1 and of ,rousseau in general1 see the essay on 8,our ,natural ,rights10 in the ,lectures and ,essays of the late ,professor ,w4 ,wallace1 ,clarendon ,press1 #ahih4 ,the second essay 7#aged71 a much longer and #hf more serious piece1 is on the thesis1 8,what is the origin of ,inequality among mankind1 and is it justified by natural law80 ,it was dedicated1 with expressions of extravagant laudation1 to ,rousseau's native state1 the ,republic of ,geneva4 ,his enthusiasm for this community1 as for the ancient city-states1 is a far truer guide to his genuine social ideas than any of his paradoxes about the state of nature and the bondage of social man4 ,his genius1 in fact1 is very much under-rated by those who suppose him at any time to have believed the primitive state of nature1 or earliest imaginable condition of the human race1 to be capable of furnishing an ideal of life4 ,he is perfectly aware that a state of nature1 which is to furnish an ideal1 must be selected at least from among the higher phases of man's evolution1 after morality and the family have begun to form themselves1 and language and property have made some advance4 ,here1 again1 his vacillation is strikingly observable1 and we can see that it arises from his profound insight4 ,the vices of civilisation tend to force the desirable state of man down the scale of evolution1 but the value of morality and respect for human nature tend to force it up1 and ,rousseau's argument embodies the struggle4 ,for ,rousseau is far too critical and clear-sighted to ascribe true morality or strictly human nature to a state of animal innocence1 and he knows that virtue involves potential vice2 #a and therefore it is with hesitation and regret that he selects a middle state as #hg representing his ideal1 fully aware that it has forfeited animal innocence without having attained human morality4 ,even the famous declamation against the first founder of property in land seems to pass away in an admission that this was an inevitable stage in the growth of human capacities1 which the author would not seriously desire to remain undeveloped4 ,two further points may be noted2 first1 the fundamental contention that men are by nature not equal but unequal1 the evil of civilisation lying just in the replacement of natural by political inequality4 ,if this political inequality were considered as modifiable1 it is plain that the view would point to an advantage in the way of equality #b possessed by society over nature4 ,secondly1 the view here taken of natural liberty in relation to the social pact should be compared with that of the ,contrat ,social4 ,in the essay1 8natural liberty0 is on the whole preferred2 in the ,contrat1 another kind of liberty is held a truer good1 although much of the tone and language associated with the preference of natural liberty continues by the side of the later view4 ,it is plain that we are dealing1 not with an unconsidering fanatical enthusiasm for one or another state of man1 but with a struggling insight1 which sees evil but also good in all1 and1 with hesitation and reluctance1 depresses the scale first in favour of the one1 and then in favour of the other condition of human beings4 #a ,he seems to regard the beginnings of industrial co-operation as the end of the 8state of nature0 in the widest sense4 ,the remark that 8iron and corn civilised man and ruined the human race10 anticipates much in later speculations4 #b ,we find ,rousseau actually drawing attention to this in the ,contrat ,social4 ,see ,cont4 ,soc41 ,i4 ix4 fin41 where observe 7i7 that he half believes himself to have spoken of natural equality1 and not of natural inequality1 in the 8,essay02 and 7#b7 the 8hedging0 footnote on the illusoriness of social equality4 #c4 ,the famous opening words of chap4 i4 of the #hh ,contrat ,social 7published #agfb7 sound like the beginning of a tirade against civilisation and the ,state4 8,man is born free1 and everywhere he is in chains4 ,one thinks himself the master of others1 who does not fail to be more of a slave than they40 ,here we might well suppose ourselves to be reading the preface to a demonstration that all social constraint is slavery1 and that man1 in a state of nature1 possessed a liberty which he has now lost4 ,we expect such an opening to be followed by a denunciation of the fetters of society1 and a panegyric on the pre-social life4 ,and there can hardly be a doubt that these sentences1 along with a few similar phrases which stick in the memory1 are the ground of the popular idea of ,rousseau1 shared by too many scholars4 #a ,but how does ,rousseau go on8 ,here are the succeeding sentences4 8,how did this change take place8 ,i do not know4 ,what can render it legitimate8 ,i think ,i can tell40 ,here1 as previously in the discourse on 8,equality10 he 7#a7 cuts himself loose in principle from the historical fiction of a social pact succeeding a state of nature2 and 7#b7 he promises to furnish a justification for the change 7or1 striking out the quasi-historical term 8change10 for the condition of man71 which is expressed by the words1 8is everywhere in chains40 #a ,professor ,henry ,sidgwick and ,professor ,ritchie are notable exceptions4 ,see also1 and pre-eminently1 the essay of the late ,professor ,wallace referred to above4 ,this then is the task which he has set himself4 ,the sentences last cited show that his answer will1 in some degree1 turn its back on his question1 and that really man had little natural freedom to lose1 and is not everywhere in chains4 ,but the fact that #hi the problem first struck ,rousseau's mind through a feeling of rebellion against social slavery1 and a loathing for the civilisation of his day1 sets him at the very beginning of the path which social theory has to traverse1 and ensures that the difficulties which we all feel at times will be met in their sharpest form4 ,he knows1 in short1 that something1 which can look like utter bondage1 is a fact2 and he knows that this fact has to be justified4 ,after some chapters devoted to clearing away inadequate solutions of the problem1 he re-states it as follows1 in terms of that form of the supposed social contract in which it was regarded as a compact of all with all for the constitution of a community3 8,to find a form of association which shall defend and protect1 with the entire common force1 the person and the goods of each associate1 and by which1 each1 uniting himself to all1 may nevertheless obey only himself1 and remain as free as before40 #a #a ,contrat ,social1 bk4 i41 ch4 vi4 #d4 ,before proceeding to examine the true meaning of this formula and its answer1 we will briefly notice the conflict of ideas suggested by it4 ,man's freedom1 it is implied1 remains at the same level4 ,even his power is not increased2 it is only that individuals combine their forces1 previously isolated4 ,these implications suit neither the view he starts from1 nor the view he arrives at4 ,if man had a natural freedom1 and then submitted to society1 though merely to increase his force of action1 some of his freedom must be lost1 and he cannot remain as free as he was before4 ,but if man in society #ij has a nature1 which he could not have out of society1 such that his individuality is maximised by the organisation of a social whole1 then it is plain that he is not merely as free 8as he was before10 but very much more free2 free1 indeed1 strictly speaking1 under social conditions alone4 ,the notion which ,rousseau started from1 that man has surrendered some part of a previous freedom in order to make the most of the remainder1 appears1 as here1 in the language of compromise1 frequently through the ,contrat ,social4 ,but it is not effectively relied on1 for ,rousseau is too acute to attempt a demarcation theory1 and while he assumes1 for example1 according to the literal notion of a compact1 that man only surrenders as much of his liberty as is necessary to the community1 he sees that the sovereign is sole judge of this proportion and consequently is absolute4 #a ,in the same way he first deduces the sovereign's right of inflicting capital punishment from the individual's pre-existing right to risk his life in order to save it1 in virtue of which he has transferred to the sovereign a right to demand his life when necessary to the public safety1 which includes his own4 ,and then1 feeling this to be a fiction1 he ekes it out by the precisely contrary suggestion that a criminal has broken the social treaty1 has ceased to be a member of the community1 and is dealt with as an enemy on terms of war4 #b ,this supplementation shows that ,rousseau is aware of the weakness of his other account of the matter1 based on non-social individual right4 ,his constant failure1 entire or partial1 to free himself from the language of 8first appearance #ia theories10 as we have ventured to call them1 is just what makes him so instructive1 in view of the similar inclination which besets us all4 #a ,contrat ,social1 bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 v4 #b ,bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 v4 #e4 ,we will now examine the real nature of his solution4 ,for the historical fiction of a social contract1 he substitutes1 in answer to the problem formulated above 7see section #c1 end71 the conditions which constitute a 8people0 or commonwealth4 ,he speaks1 indeed1 of the 8act0 or 8contract0 which constitutes it--a survival of the language which belongs to the fiction4 #a ,but it is plain1 even if he had not said so distinctly in the first chapter1 that he is dealing not with an act in historical time1 but with the essential nature of a social body4 ,the 8clauses of the contract10 he explains1 are dependent on 8the nature of the act02 they are implicit and universal--that is to say1 not capable of being affected by any actual or supposed agreement in contravention of what the essence of a body politic requires4 ,he is1 as he has clearly said in the previous chapter1 analysing the 8act0 8by which a people is a people10 i4e4 the conditions of political unity4 #a ,contrat ,social1 bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 v4 ,the 8clauses of the contract0 then reduce themselves to a single one1 8the total alienation of each associated member1 with all his rights1 7the language is moulded by the fiction of an actual contract and pre-social rights17 to the community as a whole40 ,the community as a whole is therefore absolute4 ,the subsequent passage1 referred to above1 #a in which he speaks as if individual rights were retained1 is a case of the vacillation on which we have remarked4 #a ,p4 #ij4 #ib ,the essence of this 8social pact0 is further reducible to the following formula3 8,each of us puts into the common stock his person and his entire powers under the supreme direction of the general will3 and we further receive each individual as an indivisible member of the whole40 8,instantaneously1 in place of the particular person of each contracting party1 this act of association produces a moral and collective body1 composed of as many members as the assembly has voices1 which receives from this same act its unity1 its common self 7son moi commun71 its life1 and its will4 ,this public person which thus forms itself1 by the union of all the others1 used to take the name of city1 #a and now takes that of republic or body politic1 which is called by its members ,state when it is passive1 ,sovereign when it is active1 ,power when comparing it with others40 #a ,rousseau's footnote in loc4 8,the true sense of this word is almost entirely effaced among the moderns2 most of them take a town for a city1 and a townsman for a citizen4 ,they are not aware that the houses make the town1 but the citizens make the city40 ,in this passage the formula of association1 and much of the commentary upon it1 imply the 8contract0 to have been an event in history4 ,such is the bearing of the words 8act of association10 8produces10 8receives10 8forms itself40 ,it is admitted that ,rousseau's thoughts are always more or less struggling with this conception1 which1 it must however be remembered1 he explicitly refuses to rely on2 and henceforward1 having sufficiently called attention to it1 we shall not encumber ourselves with observing upon it in every instance4 ,putting aside then the defective terminology1 and #ic bearing in mind that ,rousseau considers himself to be analysing the essence of that act or character 8by which a people is a people10 we find in this passage very far-reaching ideas4 ,we find that the essence of human society consists in a common self1 a life and a will1 which belong to and are exercised by the society as such1 or by the individuals in society as such2 it makes no difference which expression we choose4 ,the reality of this common self1 in the action of the political whole1 receives the name of the 8general will10 and we shall examine its nature and attributes in the following chapter4 ,the primary point which it is necessary to make clear1 however1 is whether the whole set of ideas is to be seriously pressed1 or whether the unity which they indicate is merely formal and superficial4 ,for phrases of the kind here employed may be found in many earlier writers4 ,the term 8person10 for example1 comes through ,hobbes from the ,roman law4 8,persona10 in ,roman law1 we are told1 #a means either a complex of rights or the possessor of those rights1 whether an individual or a corporate body4 8,unus homo sustinet plures personas40 ,thus a man may devolve his 8persona0 on another man4 ,a corporation has a single 8persona40 ,it is in this sense that for ,hobbes1 the ,state is a 8real unity in one person10 which person has been devolved by all the individuals of a multitude upon one man or a definite assembly of men1 whose acts therefore are1 politically speaking1 the acts of the whole multitude so united in one 8person40 #a ,see1 e4g41 ,green's ,lectures on the ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #fa4 #id ,this use of the term 8person0 is one of the cases alluded to in ch4 ,i41 where an abstraction of law has preserved the seed of a philosophical idea of unity4 ,how far the unity thus indicated is an empty fiction1 or how far it is grasped as something vital1 into which the individual mind goes out and in which it finds what its nature demands1 is what we now have to consider further4 #f4 ,chapters vii4 and viii4 of book ,i4 of the ,contrat ,social show the outcome of ,rousseau's conflicting ideas in a very few remarkable propositions4 ,the question is whether the unity of a body politic is an arbitrary abstraction or a fundamental force and reality4 ,rousseau is discussing in chapter vii4 the guarantees which exist for a fulfilment of obligations by the sovereign 7or whole7 to its members and by the members to the sovereign respectively4 ,as regards the obligation of the sovereign to its members1 he runs straight into the fallacy referred to in ch4 ,i4 ,he contends1 that is to say1 that the whole is necessarily1 by its constitution1 that which it ought to be1 and being composed of all the individuals can have no interest opposite to theirs as a whole1 while1 qua sovereign1 it is debarred from any such special #a action as might be hurtful to any single individual4 ,this presupposes that the whole always acts according to its idea as a whole1 and neither is 8captured0 by individual interests nor transgresses the limits set to its action by restriction to true public concerns4 ,but if this were so1 the ,state would be perfectly wise and #ie good2 and we do not need to be told that a ,state1 qua wise and good1 could do no injustice to its members4 ,the whole is of course liable to vices correlative to those which ,rousseau is about to guard against when they arise in the individual4 #a ,see below1 p4 #aab4 ,and his view of individual disloyalty is decisive as to the vitality of his conception of political unity4 8,indeed10 he says1 8each individual may1 as a man1 have a particular will contrary to or unlike the general will which he has as citizen2 his particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest2 his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution1 the loss of which would be less injurious to others than its payment is burdensome to himself2 and considering the moral person which constitutes the ,state as an abstraction 7tre de raison7 because it is not a man1 he would enjoy the rights of the citizen without consenting to fulfil the duties of the subject--an injustice the progress of which would cause the ruin of the body politic40 8,in order1 then1 that the social pact may not be a vain formula1 it tacitly includes the covenant1 which alone can confer binding force on the others1 that whoever shall refuse to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the whole body1 which means nothing else than that he will be forced to be free40 ,in this passage ,rousseau lays bare the very heart of what some would call political faith1 and others political superstition4 ,this lies in the #if conviction that the 8moral person #a which constitutes the state0 is a reality1 as opposed to the natural idea that it is an abstraction or fiction of the reflective mind 7an 8ens rationis10 tre de raison71 because it is not an actual individual human being4 ,the theories of the first appearance1 as we have called them1 are characterised by accepting as ultimate 8the absolute and naturally independent existence0 of the physical individual1 and therefore regarding government as an encroachment on the self1 and force as oppression4 ,whereas1 if the social person is taken as the reality1 it follows1 as ,rousseau points out1 that force against the physical individual may become a condition of freedom4 ,we saw even in ,mill how extreme cases bring out the necessity for assuming a 8real0 will at variance with the individual's immediate desire4 #b ,there is more to be said1 of course1 as to the limits within which force can be so applied4 #c #a ,for the meaning of 8person10 see account above1 p4 #ic4 ,note on the meaning of 8moral0 as here used that it is determined by a general opposition to physical1 as in 8moral certainty40 ,none the less1 this use of 8moral person0 forms an interesting stage in the advance from the physical individual through the legal 8person0 towards the notion of a higher or greater self4 #b ,the trivial case which he takes1 of its being no curtailment to freedom to keep a man off an untrustworthy bridge1 as he certainly does not want to be drowned1 has received terrible illustration of late 7,june1 #ahih7 by the disaster at the launch of the 8,albion40 ,the disaster occurred because not enough force was used against the passionate momentary eagerness of individuals1 and in favour of what it is fair to presume their real will would be4 #c ,see below1 ch4 ,,viii4 ,it is worth while to cite here the whole of the short chapter viii41 which draws out the #ig consequences of the above conception of a social pact and of sovereignty4 8,of the ,civil ,condition4--,this passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change by replacing1 in his conduct1 instinct by justice1 and giving to his actions the morality which they lacked before4 ,it is then alone that1 the voice of duty succeeding to physical impulse1 and right to appetite1 man1 who till then had only considered himself1 sees himself compelled to act on other principles1 and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations4 ,although he deprives himself in this state of several advantages which he holds from nature1 he gains such great ones in their place1 his faculties exercise and develop themselves1 his ideas expand1 his sentiments are ennobled1 his whole soul is exalted to such a degree1 that1 if the abuses of his new condition did not often degrade him below that from which he has emerged1 #a it would be his duty to bless without ceasing the happy instant which tore him from it for ever1 and1 from a stupid and narrow animal1 made him an intelligent being and human4 8,let us reduce these pros and cons to terms easy to compare4 ,what man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to all which attracts him and which he can obtain2 what he gains is civil liberty and the #ih property of what he possesses4 ,to avoid error in these reckonings we must carefully distinguish natural liberty1 which has no bounds but the powers of the individual1 from the civil liberty which is limited by the general will2 and possession1 which is only the effect of force or the right of the first occupant1 from property1 which can only be founded on a positive title4 8,we might1 in view of the preceding1 add to the gains of the civil state the moral freedom which alone makes man master of himself2 for the impulsion of appetite alone is slavery1 and obedience to the law which we have prescribed to ourselves is liberty4 ,but ,i have already said too much on this head1 and the philosophical sense of the word liberty is not my subject here40 #a ,cf4 the well-known lines of ,faust3 8,ein wenig besser wrd er leben1 ,htt'st ,dur ihm nicht den ,schein des ,himmelslichts gegeben2 ,er nennt's ,vernunft1 und braucht's allein ,nur thierischer als jedes ,thier zu seyn40 ,besides the terminology of the historical fiction this curious passage shows in the strongest light the struggle by which ,rousseau passed from the position of the 8,discourse on the ,origin of ,inequality0 to that of the 8,contrat ,social40 ,the 8hedging0 of the sentence1 8,although he deprives himself10 etc41 represents a loathing of the decadent society of his day1 which was deep-seated in ,rousseau's mind1 and which his life enables us thoroughly to understand4 ,the son of a ,genevese artisan1 with a touch of vagabond impulses1 and more than a touch of ,wordsworthian genius1 he was the first1 perhaps1 of great modern writers to feel the true democratic passion1 #a and to see his artificial age as ,plato or as ,ruskin might #ii have seen it4 ,it was no small feat of insight to subdue his just repugnance so far as to estimate1 in the language of the chapter before us1 the use1 as distinct from the abuse1 of law and society4 #a ,note the sentence in mile1 8,c'est le peuple qui compose le genre humain2 ce qui n'est pas peuple est si peu de chose que ce n'est pas la peine de le compter40 7,bk4 iv41 #crd maxim47 ,as a feature of this conflict of ideas1 we may observe more especially the notion of original individual right1 ascribed to a condition of man in which1 according to the previous paragraph1 right could not exist4 ,the phrase is merely taken up from previous writers1 as is also the so-called 8right of the first occupant40 ,and the antithesis with true right and property1 recognised by the social mind1 in which this chapter presents them1 has the effect of a destructive analysis of these uncritical conceptions4 #a #a ,rousseau's brilliant criticism1 bk4 ,i41 ch4 iii41 has finally destroyed the conception of a right1 whether natural or social1 founded merely on force4 ,true right1 then1 begins with that social unity 8by which a people is a people10 figured by ,rousseau under the image of the social compact4 ,this unity is one aspect of the rule of reason1 the sense of duty1 and the essence of humanity4 ,the quality of man is liberty1 #a and we here see that this fundamental principle which ,rousseau has above laid down in an undetermined sense1 must1 in the course of his reasoning1 take on the higher meaning demanded by the conceptions of this chapter4 #a ,bk4 i41 ch4 iv4 ,and the import of the term 8liberty0 in this chapter is a measure of the modification of ideas which has been brought about in the process of 8justifying0 the 8bondage0 of man4 #a ,the famous #ajj sentence1 8,man is born free1 and everywhere he is in chains10 now turns out to mean1 8,man is born in natural liberty 7which1 if it refers to any actual condition at all1 implies1 in animal isolation71 and by subservience to social law1 he attains the civil liberty through which alone he becomes truly man40 ,of course1 however1 the phrase 8born free0 has the under current of meaning1 8is born for the truest freedom10 but in order that this import may be elicited the rhetorical antithesis1 8and everywhere is in chains10 must be abandoned4 #a ,see bk4 i41 ch4 i4 ,the final paragraph of chapter viii4 makes it clear that ,rousseau considers the civil state as an embodiment of moral liberty1 while he is rightly anxious not to seem to cut the knot of his problem by appealing to the merely ethical or philosophical sense of the term freedom4 ,for this latter conception1 taken by itself1 is apt to be understood as the establishment of unity in the self by the path of renunciation4 ,now1 the freedom of the true civil state is1 on the one hand1 only a stage in the ascent towards perfect ethical freedom or unity1 for it involves rather the recognition of such freedom as the imperative end of social law1 than the actual attainment of it2 and1 on the other hand1 it is something broader and more substantial than ethical freedom is apt to be conceived as implying1 because of that outgrowth of the self into an organised social content which the civil condition involves4 ,the distinction between the civil state and ethical freedom is therefore a sound one1 but yet does not prevent their juxta-position in this passage from throwing #aja important light on ,rousseau's conception of the former4 ,the expansion of old conceptions in ,rousseau's hands1 and the direction in which his views are advancing1 are well illustrated by the paragraph before us in comparison with ,locke's idea of consent4 ,a recent editor of the ,contrat #a cites in illustration of the words1 8,obedience to the law which we have prescribed to ourselves is liberty0 ,locke's sentence1 8,the liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but that established by consent in the commonwealth40 #b ,but ,locke is speaking1 according to his theory1 of the actual or tacit consent of individuals to the establishment of a governing power2 a consent which1 for him1 is conditional and revocable1 and therefore fails to meet the full difficulty of self-government4 ,rousseau1 borrowing very likely his actual phrases from ,locke1 is speaking of something quite different1 viz41 the recognition of a law and a will1 with which one's everyday self may be at odds1 as nevertheless one's truer and fuller self1 and imperative as against the commonplace trivial moods which constitute one's inferior existence4 #a ,m4 ,dreyfus-,brisac4 #b ,civil ,government1 ii4 #bb4 ,thus far1 then1 we have seen how the problem of self-government is transformed by a deeper insight4 7a7 ,the negative relation of the self to other selves begins to dissolve away before the conception of the common self2 and 7b7 the negative relation of the self to law and government begins to disappear in the idea of a law which expresses our real will1 as opposed to our trivial and rebellious moods4 ,the whole notion of man as one among #ajb others tends to break down2 and we begin to see something in the one which actually identifies him with the others1 and at the same time tends to make him what he admits that he ought to be4 ,we have now to follow these ideas to their application4 #ajc ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,a 8,,real0 ,,will4 #a4 ,we saw in the course of the last chapter that for ,rousseau's political theory everything turns on the reality of the 8moral person0 which constitutes the ,state4 ,when active1 this 8moral0 or 8public person10 or common self1 is called sovereign2 #a and sovereignty for ,rousseau consists in the exercise of the ,general ,will2 #b and it is in this characteristic of political society that he finds that justification for the use of force upon individuals #c which he set out to seek4 ,at the close of the last chapter we noted the transformation in the problem of 8self-government0 which such a conception tends to produce4 ,in face of it1 the opposition between self and others1 and between self and law or government1 will have to be interpreted altogether afresh4 ,the present chapter will be devoted to explaining the idea of a ,general ,will with reference to ,rousseau's presentation of it1 and the rest of the work will develop and apply it more freely4 #a ,bk4 ,i41 ch4 vi4 #b ,bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 i4 #c ,bk4 i41 ch4 vii42 cf4 ,i41 ch4 i4 ,a few words may be said upon ,rousseau's relation to ,hobbes #a and ,locke1 simply to #ajd illustrate the process by which deepening political experience awakened the ancient meaning within abstractions which had preserved it in a latent form4 #a ,see also p4 #ic above4 ,both ,hobbes and ,locke use expressions1 in treating of the government and unity of a commonwealth1 which closely resemble ,rousseau's phrases respecting the ,general ,will1 the moral person1 and the real unity4 ,hobbes1 for example1 insisted that sovereignty must lie in a will1 and that this will must be real and must be taken as representing or standing for the will of the community4 8,this is more than consent or concord2 it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person40 #a ,only1 interpreting 8real0 as implying inherence in tangible determinate individuals1 he in fact substituted the will 7taking the word in its ordinary sense7 of a certain individual or certain individuals for the will of the community or moral person as such4 ,his temperament was emphatically one of those described by ,rousseau as treating the 8moral person0 as a fiction4 ,but so far from abandoning for that reason all idea of actual effective unity1 he replaces the fictitious or abstract unity of the 8person0 by the 8real unity0 of an actual human being or a determinate group of human beings1 to be taken as the unity of the ,commonwealth as such4 ,thus1 for instance1 with a logic which is irresistible on the basis which he adopts1 he denies all possibility of other representation of the people where there is already a sovereign power4 ,for the one and only representative of the people is for him the #aje sovereign1 on whom the 8person0 of the community is1 by the very fact of his sovereignty1 assumed to be conferred4 ,we may say then1 in short1 that ,hobbes places the unity of political society in a will1 and that1 in his sense1 a real or actual will1 but emphatically not in a general will4 ,he inherits the language which enables him to predicate unity and personality of the state1 but in his mouth the terms have not recovered a true political meaning1 and the social right1 which they are intended to account for1 remains a mere name4 #a ,leviathan1 pt4 ,,ii41 ch4 xvii4 ,italics mine4 ,locke brings to bear a truer political experience1 but a far less coherent logic4 ,he feels that actual government is a trust1 and that the ultimate supreme power remains in the community as a whole4 ,the difficulty in his case is to understand how the will or interest of the community as such obtains determinate expression4 ,generally1 and apart from particular causes of dissent1 it is to be taken as one with the will of the governing body to which1 according to the constitution1 the work of government is given in trust4 ,but the trust is conditional1 and theoretically revocable2 the ultimate supreme power is in the community at large1 which may withdraw the trust if its conditions are violated4 ,of course1 no determinate means of doing this in a lawful manner is1 or can be1 suggested1 #a and therefore the will of the people is not expressed by ,locke as a real or actual will4 ,and so the right1 which was to be displayed as social1 remains #ajf a latent right in individuals to assent or to dissent1 and society is not represented as a genuine unity4 #a ,the referendum is not really such a means4 ,it can only work within a well organised constitution1 and could not be used to re-make the whole constitution--the forms and conditions of sovereignty--at a blow4 ,for ,hobbes1 then1 we might venture to say1 political unity lies in a will which is actual1 but not general2 while for ,locke it lies in a will which is general1 but not actual4 ,if the two are pressed to extremes1 the former theory annihilates 8self10 and the latter annihilates 8government40 ,for the former there is no true right1 because the will of the state is related as mere force to the actual individual will2 for the latter there is no true right1 because the individual's will remains a mere natural claim1 which is never thoroughly transformed by social recognition and adjustment4 ,but if it were possible to inspire a logic as coherent as that of ,hobbes1 with a political content as large as that which animates ,locke1 a new ground would be won4 ,and this is what ,rousseau has attempted in his conception of a will at once actual and general2 on the one hand1 an absolute and determinate adjustment and recognition of rights2 on the other hand1 embodying in its recognitions all individual claims which represent a true individuality4 ,here1 if such a theory were workable1 we should have a genuine account of self-government1 political obligation1 and social right4 ,it may be admitted that the theory is not workable in the form which ,rousseau gave it4 ,as ,bentham contemptuously said1 his doctrine would make all laws invalid1 excepting1 perhaps1 those of the ,republic of ,san ,marino4 ,but we shall see that these difficulties arise just where ,rousseau failed to be true to his own best insight2 and we shall find indications in his writings which suggest a different conclusion4 #ajg #b4 ,what ,rousseau means to indicate by his expression1 8the ,general ,will10 may seem to many persons1 as he clearly saw1 to have no actual existence4 ,it is of the nature of a principle operating among and underneath a great variety of confusing and disguising factors1 and can only be defined by the help of an 8as such0 or 8in so far as40 ,it is1 we might say1 the will of the whole society 8as such0 or the wills of all individuals 8in so far as0 they aim at the common good4 ,it is expressed in law1 8in so far as0 law is what it ought to be2 and sovereignty1 8as such10 i4e4 when truly itself because rightly acting for the common interest1 is the exercise of the ,general ,will4 ,in its idea1 as the key to the whole problem of self-government and freedom under law1 it is that identity between my particular will and the wills of all my associates in the body politic which makes it possible to say that in all social co-operation1 and in submitting even to forcible constraint1 when imposed by society in the true common interest1 ,i am obeying only myself1 and am actually attaining my freedom4 ,it embodies indeed the same factors as the conception of self-government1 but in a shape which is a stage nearer to reconciliation4 ,it postulates a will which in some sense transcends the individual whose will it is1 and is directed upon an object of wider concern4 ,and in one way or other1 we know that this may be1 and indeed always is the case1 for our will is always directed to something which we are not4 ,we may1 perhaps1 approach ,rousseau's thought more successfully by starting from the idea of what is implied in the nature of will1 as a characteristic #ajh of an intelligent being4 ,we may then find ground for conceiving that my will or yours1 as we exercise it in the trivial routine of daily life1 does not fulfil all that it implies or suggests4 ,it is narrow1 arbitrary1 self-contradictory4 ,it implies a 8true0 or 8real0 or 8rational0 will1 which would be completely1 or more completely1 what ours attempts to be1 and fails4 ,thus1 it has been said that what ,rousseau really aimed at1 with his conception of the ,general ,will1 was the will 8in itself10 or the will as it would be if it carried out what its nature implies and demands4 ,we can see that some notion of this kind floats before ,rousseau's mind from the predicates which he assigns to ,sovereignty and the ,general ,will1 which are for him nearly convertible terms4 ,sovereignty1 for example1 is inalienable and indivisible2 #a that is to say1 it is a simple consequence of the nature of a body politic1 8that by which a people is a people40 ,you can no more alienate or break it into parts than you can alienate or break into parts the use of your own judgment4 ,to be capable of sovereignty means to be a people 8as such0 or 8as a whole10 that is a living and choosing people4 ,the people may of course give general orders to subordinates to hold good till revoked1 as ,i may give a power of attorney for more or less specified purposes to another man4 ,but that is the delegation 8of power1 not of will40 #a ,bk4 ,,ii41 chs4 i4 and ii4 ,here ,rousseau is following ,hobbes very closely4 ,we see the author's intention still more clearly when he maintains that the ,general ,will is always #aji right1 #a and is indestructible4 #b ,though it is always right1 as ,will1 yet the people may be misled in their knowledge and judgment of details2 though it is indestructible in the human breast1 yet a man may vote at the polling booth on another issue than that which he would have before him if he consulted the ,general ,will4 ,he may answer by his vote not the question1 8,is this for the public good80 but the question1 8,is this for my private good80 ,if so1 he does not indeed extinguish the ,general ,will in himself1 but he evades it4 ,or1 as we might say1 the man does not altogether cease1 however ignorant or interested1 to possess a man's leaning towards making the real best of himself1 though his private interest may at times so master his mind as to throw the higher or common good into the second place4 ,thus1 the relation of the general will to a community is plainly apprehended by ,rousseau much in the spirit of the doctrine that man always aims at something which he takes to be good4 ,and so the ,general ,will is as much implied in the life of a society as some sort of will for good in the life of an individual4 ,the two1 in fact1 are not merely analogous but to a great extent identical4 ,the ,general ,will seems to be1 in the last resort1 the ineradicable impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself1 in as far as that good takes the form of a common good4 ,though this impulse may be mastered or cheated in a degree1 yet1 if it were extinct1 human life would have ceased4 #a ,bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 iii4 #b ,bk4 iv41 ch4 i4 ,we need not enter at length upon the question whether the good which extends beyond oneself #aaj is adequately described as the good which is general or common to oneself and others4 ,it is plain that the unity of myself with others in a common good is the same in principle as the unity of myself with myself which ,i aim at in aiming at my own good4 ,thought and language1 we should bear in mind1 unite me to myself just as they unite me to others1 and they expand my being by binding my own life into a whole no less than by making intercourse possible between my fellow men and myself4 ,just so1 the good at which ,i aim extends beyond my trivial or momentary self--that is to say1 is universal as against myself as particular--in ways which are not prima facie exhausted by saying that they include the good of others4 ,but again1 just like thought and language1 the good which enables me to enter deeper into communion with myself or with the world must always have an aspect of extending that communion to others2 and therefore1 for the purposes of social philosophy1 we may treat the universal good or self as also in its nature a general or common good or self4 ,it is that at least1 though it may be more1 in accordance with the logical relation between the rational universal1 and the numerical generality4 ,this indestructible impulse towards the ,good1 which is necessarily a common good1 the substantial unity and filling of life by the interests through which man is human1 is what ,rousseau plainly has before him in his account of the ,general ,will4 ,but it has rightly been observed #a that he did not really distinguish this conception1 analogous as it is to what ,plato or ,aristotle might have said #aaa of the 8divine reason which is the source of the laws and discipline of the ideal polity10 from the legal idea of the sovereign 8in the sense of some power of which it could reasonably be asked how it was established in the part where it resides1 when and by whom and in what way it is exercised40 ,we will point out1 however1 the negative and positive indications which he furnishes as to where it is not and where it is to be looked for4 ,that he fails to emancipate himself from the fallacies which he acutely indicates is a phenomenon for which the reader is1 ,i trust1 sufficiently prepared4 #a ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #hb4 #c4 ,rousseau develops his idea of a ,general ,will by the contrast which he draws between the ,general ,will and the ,will of ,all4 #a ,the ,general ,will aims at a common interest2 and it is this community of interest1 and not the number of votes in which it may find expression1 which in truth 8generalises the will40 #b ,the ,will of ,all aims at private interest as such 78l'intrt priv07 and is only a sum of particular wills4 ,only1 ,rousseau fancies1 if you let the particular wills fight it out freely1 their differences are likely to cancel each other1 and the ,general ,will to make itself felt1 like any pervading factor through a chaos of indefinite variations4 #a ,contrat ,social1 ,,ii4 iii4 #b ,ib4 ,,ii4 iv42 cf4 above4 ,the important point in the idea of the ,will of ,all0 lies in its being 8a sum0 of 8particulars10 as opposed to something common or general in its nature4 ,thus1 in the limiting case1 you may have a unanimous vote in favour of a certain course of action1 and yet the voters may severally have been determined by aims and considerations which #aab ,rousseau would not admit to be capable of entering at all into a determination of the ,general ,will4 ,for a private affair as such is incapable in ,rousseau's view of being made the subject of law1 that is of an act of the ,general ,will4 ,such an act must be general1 not only in the number of votes 7which1 as we have seen1 is the less important factor71 but in the nature of its subject-matter1 which must be1 as we should say1 a question of genuine public interest4 #a ,now1 when men's minds leave out of sight the public or truly general aspect of a question1 and are determined1 each of them severally1 by the expected consequences to himself as a private individual2 then1 though all may practically agree in the decision which is arrived at1 yet such a decision is founded on no view of truly public interest1 but is what ,rousseau calls 8a sum of particular wills40 ,the distinction between such a sum of wills1 and a will that aims at a truly common interest or good1 rests upon that fundamental contrast between a mere aggregate and an organic unity1 which is embodied in the opposing views of society which we have been discussing4 ,pushed to extremes1 it might raise a difficulty for those who are not familiar with the logical distinction between a ,judgment of ,allness and a true ,universal ,judgment4 #b ,what harm can there be1 it may be asked1 in my voting according to the effect a measure will have upon my affairs1 if everyone else is allowed to vote according to the effect it will have upon his affairs1 especially as in the extreme case suggested1 the result is that we are all agreed8 ,what can be more for the general #aac interest than a decision in which every particular interest is satisfied8 ,on the mere basis of comparative generality1 as estimated by number1 there is plainly no answer to this objection4 ,we meet here with another instance of the difficulties which arise from working with the notion of society as 8self and others10 and of the good as an altruistic aim4 ,for in the case supposed1 the others are all satisfied as much as myself2 and so ,i should give weight to no higher aim by considering their interest than by considering my own1 unless ,i considered it on different grounds from those which ,i admitted in judging of my own advantage4 ,but any different1 higher1 or deeper grounds might just as well present themselves to me with reference to my own advantage as with reference to theirs2 and would differ from motives of private interest1 not by bringing about a more unanimous adhesion1 but by belonging to a deeper appreciation of the common good1 and therefore producing a less superficial unity of resolve4 ,the real difference between ,allness and true ,universality is that a 8universal0 characteristic goes more deeply into the nature of that which it characterises than does a mark or attribute which1 like the owner's name in the books of a library1 simply happens to be attached ab extra to all the objects in question4 ,so here1 the supposed accordant decisions of all the voters1 as guided each by his strictly private interest1 are not really or completely accordant4 ,they happen to come together in one point which has to be settled at the moment2 but beyond that they express no oneness of life or principle2 still less can they give voice to any demand of the greater or rational #aad self in which the real common good resides4 ,this is what ,rousseau means by saying that it is the community of the interest or the nature of the object1 and not the number of voices1 which distinguishes the ,general ,will from the ,will of ,all4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the private interest as such1 which in the case supposed determines the individual voter1 is not ultimately his true interest2 and it may be said1 8,but if each followed his own true interest the ,will of ,all would be right40 ,but a true interest1 as opposed to an apparent interest1 necessarily has just the characters which the true ,universal has as against the collection of particulars1 or the ,general ,will against the ,will of ,all4 ,so that to say1 8,if everyone pursued his own true private interest the ,will of ,all would be right10 is merely to say1 8,if everyone pursued his true private interest he would pursue the common interest02 or1 8,the ,will of ,all1 if directed to the common good1 would be one with the ,general ,will40 ,the reason why it is necessary to insist upon the distinction between true and apparent interest1 universal and aggregate of particulars1 ,general ,will and ,will of ,all1 is just that a true interest generally requires some degree of energy or effort1 perhaps of self-sacrifice2 while the purely private or apparent interest1 the interest of each of us in his routine frame of mind1 is that by which many are always determined1 and a whole community is only too likely to be guided4 ,that is why it is worth while to distinguish the ,will of ,all from the ,general ,will4 ,let us suppose that ,themistocles had been beaten in the ,athenian assembly when he proposed that1 instead of dividing the revenue #aae from the silver mines among all the citizens1 they should devote this revenue annually to building a fleet--the fleet which fought at ,salamis4 ,it is easy to see that in such a case a relatively ideal end1 demanding a certain self-denial1 might appear less attractive to all the individuals--each keeping before himself his own separate share of profit--than the accustomed distribution of money4 ,and if such a view had gained the day1 history would never have told1 and no free ,europe would have existed to understand1 by what decision the true general will and common interest of ,athens might have transcended the aggregate private interests of all her citizens4 ,no doubt1 it may be added1 a true universal end is usually more powerful than a limited interest even in the mere area of its operation2 and we may ultimately find1 in the benefits conferred by ,athens on the world1 a justification of her courage and self-denial1 even by the rough and unreliable standard of the number of individuals beneficially affected4 #a ,contrat ,social1 ,,ii4 iv4 #b ,cf4 p4 #aaj above4 ,if such a theory as that just stated were to be literally pressed1 it would lead to the conclusion that a law which was not really for the general interest was not binding on the subjects of a state4 ,for1 by the definition1 such a law could not be a true act of sovereignty4 ,no political theorist1 however visionary1 could accept such a conclusion as this1 and ,rousseau1 seeing that the decision of the recognised sovereign must be final1 attempts to show how and when it comes nearest to a true ,general ,will4 ,the decisive point of his doctrine on this subject is his hostility to representative government1 #a #aaf and his consequent demand of a primary assembly and a small community as the only guarantees for the genuine expression of a will for the common good4 8,the ,english people10 according to his well-known saying1 8is only free during a general election40 ,further1 it is a sign that the ,will of ,all is1 on the whole1 coinciding with the ,general ,will1 when unanimity prevails in the assembly4 ,but long discussions and the organisation of minor 8interests0 and associations within the state1 in short1 all the phenomena of mature political life1 are signs and conditions of failure to express the ,general ,will1 which is most likely to make itself felt when particular wills neutralise one another in the way explained above4 #b #a ,bk4 ,,iii4 xv42 cf4 ,,iv4 ii4 #b ,p4 #aaa ,now all this makes it clear that in endeavouring to point out the signs of the ,general ,will1 ,rousseau is really enthroning the ,will of ,all4 ,he aims at eliciting a direct opinion1 uncontaminated by external influence or interest1 from each and every member of the citizen body4 ,in this aim1 what is present to his mind is of course the popular idea of the ancient ,city-,state4 ,but the actual working even of ,athenian or of ,roman institutions was far more subtle and complex than this4 ,and more especially1 the very core of the common good represented by the life of a modern ,nation-,state is its profound and complex organisation1 which makes it greater than the conscious momentary will of any individual4 ,by reducing the machinery for the expression of the common good to the isolated and unassisted judgment of the members of the whole body of citizens1 ,rousseau is ensuring the #aag exact reverse of what he professes to aim at4 ,he is appealing from the organised life1 institutions1 and selected capacity of a nation to that nation regarded as an aggregate of isolated individuals4 ,and1 therefore1 he is enthroning as sovereign1 not the national mind1 but that aggregate of private interests and ideas which he has himself described as the ,will of ,all4 ,he is so far aware of this that1 as we have seen1 he refuses to contemplate a great modern nation as a political whole1 because he fails to conceive how1 for such a community1 the ,general ,will can satisfactorily find expression4 ,but in as far as he commits himself to the view that the sovereign1 constituted as he would have it1 8necessarily is what it ought to be10 or 8is incapable of injustice to any of its members10 so far he has forgotten the dangers of the ,will of ,all1 and has affirmed the absolute supremacy of the popular will in the very sense against which his conception of the ,will of ,all is a protest4 ,the notion of primary assemblies and of direct participation in citizen life has no doubt a real lesson for the political theorist2 but it does not point to reducing the whole political system of a great state to a model which never1 perhaps1 thoroughly fulfilled its idea except under very special conditions4 #d4 ,the other and more fruitful direction of ,rousseau's speculations upon the ,general ,will is to be found in his remarks on the function of the ,legislator4 ,we will approach them by help of a short restatement of the problem as it now stands4 ,it was observed above that what ,rousseau had before him in his notion of the ,general ,will might #aah be described as the 8,will in itself10 or the ,real ,will4 ,any such conception involves a contrast between the ,real ,will and the ,actual ,will1 which may seem to be meaningless4 ,how can there be a ,will which is no one's ,will8 and how can anything be my ,will which ,i am not fully aware of1 or which ,i am even averse to8 ,this question will be treated more fully on psychological grounds in a later chapter4 ,for the present1 it is enough to call attention to the plain fact that often when people do not know what they mean1 they yet mean something of very great importance2 or that1 as has commonly been said1 8what people demand is seldom what would satisfy them if they got it40 ,we may recall the instances #a in which even ,mill admitted that it is legitimate to infer1 from the inherent nature of will1 that people do not really 8will0 something which they desire to do at a given moment4 ,the example of slavery is a striking one4 ,a man may contract to become a slave1 but no civilised government will enforce his contract at law1 and the ultimate reason for the refusal is1 as ,mill in effect points out1 that man's nature is to exercise will--to have liberty--and a resolution to divest himself of this capacity must be taken as ipso facto void1 by contradicting the very essence of humanity4 #b #a ,p4 #fi above4 #b 8,liberty is the quality of man40 7,rousseau1 ,contrat ,social74 ,now the contradiction1 which here appears in an ultimate form1 pervades the 8actual0 will1 which we exert from moment to moment as conscious individuals1 through and through4 ,a comparison of our acts of will through a month or a year is #aai enough to show that no one object of action1 as we conceive it when acting1 exhausts all that our will demands4 ,even the life which we wish to live1 and which on the average we do live1 is never before us as a whole in the motive of any particular volition4 ,in order to obtain a full statement of what we will1 what we want at any moment must at least be corrected and amended by what we want at all other moments2 and this cannot be done without also correcting and amending it so as to harmonise it with what others want1 which involves an application of the same process to them4 ,but when any considerable degree of such correction and amendment had been gone through1 our own will would return to us in a shape in which we should not know it again1 although every detail would be a necessary inference from the whole of wishes and resolutions which we actually cherish4 ,and if it were to be supplemented and readjusted so as to stand not merely for the life which on the whole we manage to live1 but for a life ideally without contradiction1 it would appear to us quite remote from anything which we know4 ,such a process of harmonising and readjusting a mass of data to bring them into a rational shape is what is meant by criticism4 ,and criticism1 when applied to our actual will1 shows that it is not our real will2 or1 in the plainest language1 that what we really want is something more and other than at any given moment we are aware that we will1 although the wants which we are aware of lead up to it at every point4 ,to obtain something which approximates to a real will1 then1 involves a process of criticism and #abj interpretation1 which may be either natural or intellectual2 that is to say1 it may proceed by 8natural selection10 through the method of trial and error1 or it may be rapidly advanced at favourable moments by the insight of a great mind4 ,but some forwardness in this criticism and interpretation1 bringing with it some deposit1 so to speak1 of objects of volition in which the private will1 so far as it is distinguished at all1 finds harmony and expansion1 must be coeval with social life1 and1 in short1 with humanity4 ,it is such a process of interpretation that ,rousseau ascribes to the legislator4 ,he fathers on him the whole labour of history and social logic in moulding the customs and institutions of mankind4 ,and in agreement with our general attitude to ,rousseau's historical imagination1 we may take what he says of legislation and the legislator as an expression of his views on the function of customs and ordinances in the constitution of will4 ,it is very remarkable1 considering the other aspect of his views1 that he should have conceived so distinctly1 as the following passage shows that he did1 the immense contrast between a real will and anything which could be presented as a whole in the momentary consciousness of human beings4 ,here is his statement of the problem4 8,laws are1 strictly speaking1 only the conditions of civil association4 ,the people which submits to the laws ought to be their author4 ,only the associates can have the right to regulate the conditions of the society4 ,but how are they to regulate them8 ,can #aba it be done by a common agreement1 by a sudden inspiration8 ,has the body politic an organ for pronouncing its acts of will8 ,who will give it the necessary foresight to form such acts and to publish them before they are needed8 ,or how is it to pronounce them at the moment when they are required8 ,how is a blind multitude1 which often does not know what it wills1 because it rarely knows what is good for it1 to execute for itself so great and difficult an enterprise as a system of legislation8 ,of itself1 the people always wills the good1 but it does not always see it4 ,the general will is always right1 but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened4 ,it must be made to see objects such as they are1 and1 sometimes1 such as they ought to appear to it2 it must be shown the right road which it seeks1 must be protected from the allurements of private will2 places and times must be brought close to its eyes1 and the attractions of present and visible advantages counterbalanced by the danger of remote and latent evils4 ,private persons see the good which they reject2 the public wills the good which it does not see4 ,all alike need guidance4 ,the former must be obliged to conform their will to their reason2 the latter must be taught to know what it wills4 #b ,then1 from the public enlightenment there results the union of understanding and of will in the social body2 and hence the precise co-operation of the parts and the greatest power #abb of the whole4 ,hence springs the necessity of a legislator40 #a #a ,contrat ,social1 bk4 ,,ii41 ch4 vi4 #b ,there is a prima facie contradiction in this rhetorical antithesis2 if all private individuals were enlightened1 but selfishly interested1 there could be no public good will4 ,the contrast must lie between different classes of persons1 if it is to have a meaning4 ,in the following chapter #a ,rousseau touches the essence of laws and institutions in a few words1 which only embody a contradiction or a miracle because he is thinking of the legislator's work as a creation accomplished at one blow4 8,in order that a people at its birth should have the capacity to appreciate the sound maxims of policy and follow the fundamental rules of political reason1 it would be necessary for the effect to become the cause2 for the social spirit1 which is meant to be the work of the legislation1 to preside over the legislation itself1 and for men to be1 before laws are made1 what they are meant to become by their means40 ,the legislator then1 in face of this contradiction1 must have recourse to supernatural sanctions4 #a ,contrat ,social1 ,,ii4 vii4 ,but the paradox precisely expresses the fact4 ,laws and institutions are only possible because man is already1 what they gradually make more and more explicit2 because he has a general will1 that is1 because the good which he presents to himself as his own is necessarily in some degree a good which extends beyond himself1 or a common good4 ,the criticism or interpretation which elicits the general will or actual social spirit1 by removal of contradictions1 and embodiment in permanent form1 is essentially one with the work which ,rousseau ascribes to the legislator4 ,and his paradox is removed when we understand that the legislator is merely one of the organs of the social spirit itself1 as it carries out its self-criticism and self-interpretation1 in part by trial and error #abc and in part by conscious insight and adjustment4 ,the habits and institutions of any community are1 so to speak1 the standing interpretation of all the private wills which compose it1 and it is thus possible to assign to the ,general ,will an actual and concrete meaning as something different at once from every private will1 and from the vote of any given assembly1 and yet as standing1 on the whole1 for what both the one and the other necessarily aim at sustaining as the framework of their life4 ,it is needless to observe that such a representation of the ,real ,will is imperfect1 since every set of institutions is an incomplete embodiment of life2 and any given system of life is itself also incomplete4 ,it is more important to remember that1 though always incomplete1 just as the system of sciences is an incomplete expression of truth1 the complex of social institutions is1 as we have seen1 very much more complete than the explicit ideas which at any given instant move any individual mind in volition4 #abd ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,liberty1 ,,as ,,illustrated ,,by ,,the ,,foregoing ,,suggestions4 #a4 ,we have now seen that the problem of ,self-,government may be regarded from a point of view other than that which presented it as a contradiction in terms4 ,the contradiction depended on the absolute opposition between self and others which was embodied in the prima facie idea of society2 the result of which was that all increase of individuality and all assertion of self were at the first view hostile as regarded others1 and liberty1 the condition of individuality1 became a negative idea1 prescribing as it were a maximum of empty space1 to be preserved against all trespassers1 round every unit of the social whole4 ,we saw that notions of this kind were pushed so far as to endanger the fundamental principle1 according to which self-affirmation is the root of morality1 and it was maintained that the ethical attitude essentially lay in the negation and limitation imposed by social life upon the natural tendency to self-assertion4 #a ,according to these ideas1 the self in society is something less than1 if it could so exist1 it would #abe be out of society1 and liberty is the arrangement by which1 at a sacrifice of some of its activities1 it is enabled to disport itself in vacuo with the remainder4 #a ,pp4 #bg and #gc4 ,but if we may give weight to the suggestions of the two previous chapters1 the assumptions which we work with are transformed4 ,the difference of principle is that the average individual1 such as each of us takes himself to be in his ordinary #a trivial moods1 when he sees1 or thinks he sees1 nothing in life but his own private interest and amusement1--this average individual is no longer accepted as the real self or individuality4 ,the centre of gravity of existence is thrown outside him4 ,even his personality1 his unique and personal being1 the innermost shrine of what he is and likes to be1 is not admitted to lie where a careless scrutiny1 backed by theoretical prejudice1 is apt to locate it4 ,it is not in the nooks and recesses of the sensitive self1 when the man is most withdrawn from things and persons and wrapped up in the intimacies of his feeling1 that he enjoys and asserts his individual self to the full4 ,this idea is a caricature of the genuine experience of individuality4 ,it is true that to feel your individuality is to feel something distinctive1 which gives you a hold and substance in yourself and a definite position among others1 and1 it may be1 against them4 ,but on a careful consideration1 it will be found that this substance and position are always sustained by some kind #abf of determinate achievement or expansion on the part of the self4 ,it always comes from taking hold of the world in some definite way2 which1 just because it is definite and affirmative1 is at once a distinct assertion of the self1 and a transition from the private self into the great communion of reality4 ,the simplest machine will show us that it is the differences of the parts which enable them to make a whole4 ,and so1 we are now suggesting1 it is in the difference which contributes to the whole that the self feels itself at home and possesses its individuality4 #a ,there is a difficulty in stating this point without confusion1 just because the 8ordinary0 individual1 being at the bottom different from what he seems1 is actually determined in all sorts of ways1 consciously and unconsciously1 by demands and ideas which go far beyond what he would admit to determine him4 ,following up such thoughts as these1 we see that there is a meaning in the suggestion that our real self or individuality may be something which in one sense we are not1 but which we recognise as imperative upon us4 ,as ,rousseau has said of the social self1 we say more generally of the self or life which extends beyond our average private existence1 that it is more real than we are1 and we only feel ourselves real in proportion as we identify ourselves with it4 ,with such suggestions in our minds1 we see the problem of liberty in a new light4 ,liberty1 no doubt1 is as ,rousseau has told us1 so far agreeing with ,mill1 the essential quality of human life4 ,it is so1 we understood1 because it is the condition of our being ourselves4 ,but now that it has occurred to us that in order to be ourselves we must be always becoming something which we are not1 or in other words1 we must always recognise that we are something more than we have become1 liberty1 as the condition of our being ourselves1 cannot simply be something which #abg we have1 still less something which we have always had--a status quo to be maintained4 ,it must be a condition relevant to our continued struggle to assert the control of something in us1 which we recognise as imperative upon us or as our real self1 but which we only obey in a very imperfect degree4 ,thus it is that we can speak1 without a contradiction1 of being forced to be free4 #a ,it is possible for us to acquiesce1 as rational beings1 in a law and order which on the whole makes for the possibility of asserting our true or universal selves1 at the very moment when this law and order is constraining our particular private wills in a way which we resent1 or even condemn4 ,such a law and order1 maintained by force1 which we recognise as on the whole the instrument of our greatest self-affirmation1 is a system of rights2 and our liberty1 or to use a good old expression1 our liberties1 may be identified with such a system considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we have it in us to be1 that is1 of becoming ourselves4 ,and because such an order is the embodiment up to a certain point of a self or system of will which we recognise as what ought to be1 as against the indolence1 ignorance1 or rebellion of our casual private selves1 we may rightly call it a system of self-government or free government2 a system1 that is to say1 in which ourselves1 in one sense1 govern ourselves in another sense2 not as ,mill has said1 by each one of us being subject to all the 8others0 7taking 8others0 in the same sense in which each of us is 8one071 #abh but by all of us1 as casual private units1 being subject to an order which expresses1 up to a certain point1 the rational self or will which1 as rational beings1 we may be assumed #b to recognise as imperative4 #a ,for limitations see ch4 viii4 below4 #b ,in principle1 actual individual assent is not needed4 ,the question when the assumption breaks down belongs to the subject of the duty of rebellion and the significance of punishment4 #b4 ,before proceeding to develop the idea of liberty1 we may consider for a moment the closely analogous idea of 8nature0 and what is 8natural40 ,like the notion of 8liberty0 which is that of 8being able to be yourself10 the notion of nature1 which is that of 8coming to be of yourself1 or of itself10 has always1 however imperfectly apprehended1 exercised immense power over the mind4 ,it is felt that you have touch with reality when you have found something which can grow of itself4 ,but again1 like the notion of liberty1 the notion of nature is apt to be apprehended in a form so partial as to be practically negative1 and in this form1 to be given a hostile bearing against what are1 in fact1 completer phases of the same idea4 ,that which is natural1 or by nature1 in the most obvious sense--what most plainly appears to have 8come of itself0--is what comes first in time1 and what comes with the least putting together the primitive and the simple as against the late and the complex4 ,and so in the theoretical inquiry after what is solid and can be relied upon1 there constantly recurs in all ages the tendency to story-telling2 to the narration of what is supposed to have come first1 as the simple #abi spontaneous beginning out of which the world as we know it has emerged with greatly altered attributes4 ,the note of story-telling is unmistakable in this nave theory1 whether we find it in poets who portray the ,golden ,age1 from ,hesiod downwards1 #a or represented as a fallacy of social compact by ,plato in the second book of the ,republic #b or adopted as a juristic theory by ,tacitus #c and the writers who relied on the idea of a 8state of nature10 down to ,rousseau4 #a ,the resemblance between ,hesiod's dream of the ,golden ,age and modern doctrines of intensive culture is startling1 and there is probably a true historical continuity between them4 ,this does not involve the assertion that there can be no truth in the latter1 but it does suggest that the disproportionate emphasis laid upon it 7e4g4 by ,fourier and in ,merrie ,england7 indicates an element of the old 8,nature0 fallacy4 #b ,rep41 #ceh ,e4 #c ,annals1 iii4 #bf2 cf4 ,germania1 ch4 xix4 #bj1 8,neque corrumpere et corrumpi #8seculum' vocatur4 4440 ,note the identification of 8our age0 with corruption2 cp4 use of fin de sicle4 ,it may be observed at this point that the conception of a 8law of nature0 made a very valuable middle term between the conception of a purely primitive condition of the world and the ideal of a complete society4 ,the logical reason is plain4 ,the instinct of getting at something solid and permanent1 which first reveals itself by going back to the supposed original or simple1 soon attaches itself also to what is generally found to exist1 understanding generality as a mark of that tendency to come of itself which it feels to attach to what is real and able to stand in its own right4 ,but generality is a clue which leads a long way2 and the mind passes from saying 8,fire burns #a by nature1 #acj for it burns everywhere2 but law is variable0 #b to observing that there are features of law which have their own generality1 and there thus appears to be a 8natural0 element in law1 which may mean the right of the strongest1 #c but may again amount to a tendency to come out of the 8state of nature40 ,just in the same way1 the conception of ,liberty has always drawn from experience a certain positive tendency to progress1 and has never perhaps1 even in the most fanatical theory1 maintained the full demand for isolation which its negative bearing might seem to imply4 #a ,argument cited by ,aristotle1 ,eth41 v4 #aj4 #b ,just so1 in strict science1 from the ,atomists downward1 the primary qualities 7spatial7 are real1 the secondary 7colours7 conventional 7or1 as we say1 8subjective072 the former meaning holds good more generally than the latter4 #c ,plato1 ,gorgias1 p4 #dhd4 ,but again1 the instinct which1 in looking for what has power to grow or come of itself1 lays hold of what is merely primitive or merely general1 has in all great epochs of thought been met by a deeper insight4 ,it is not merely what we are born as1 or what the world begins with1 that comes of itself4 ,the most ordinary conception of growth involves maturity1 and the term nature in ,greek and ,latin1 as in ,english1 can indicate not only what we are born as1 but what we are born for1 our true1 or real1 or complete nature4 ,thus the great thinkers of every age have been led to something like ,aristotle's conception1 8what a thing is when its growth is completed1 that is what we call its nature #a 7growth or evolution702 and so1 if we are to think of 8nature0 as a whole1 it will not be1 #aca as when we speak of 8natural0 science1 an outward world1 whether of atoms or of organisms1 contrasted both with ,god and with ,man1 8for nature in ,aristotle is not the outward world of created things2 it is the creative force1 the productive principle of the universe40 #b ,to us1 inclined to contrast the natural at once with the human and the divine1 there is something startling in the vivid reality with which the ,greek thinkers hold the three ideas together4 ,the creative activity of the divine principle seems for ,plato to be actually one with growth1 or nature1 or evolution4 #c ,it may be of interest to cite the great passage in which ,plato lays his finger on the common fallacy4 #d 8,many learned men say that the elements and inorganic and organic world below man came by nature and chance1 but that law and justice and man's works and social institutions and religion are merely conventional1 variable1 and untrue4 ,but we must maintain that law and religion and man's works exist by nature1 or are not lower than nature1 being the products of mind according to right reason40 444 8,for they give the name of nature to the origin of the earliest things2 #e but if really mind is earliest of all things1 then it may rightly be said to be superlatively natural40 #a ,aristotle1 ,pol41 i4 i4 #b ,butcher1 ,aristotle's ,theory of ,poetry and ,fine ,art1 p4 #aaf4 #c ,republic1 x4 #eig4 #d ,laws1 #hhi ff4 abridged4 #e ,we are not dealing here with ,platonic interpretation1 but it seems necessary to point out that1 literally taken1 this passage accepts the principle that nature primary genesis1 and sets out to prove mind to be natural in this sense4 ,we might rather reject the appeal to succession in ,time altogether1 as at bottom ,plato means to4 ,but we see how emphatically mind is for ,plato the superlatively natural4 ,and so1 as the universe is for the great thinkers #acb at once natural and divine1 the same applies to human society4 ,not only in ,aristotle's trenchant expressions to the effect that the ,city ,state is a natural growth1 but in the whole of ,plato's careful analysis of moral and social life1 we find society depicted as a living and growing creature1 in which man's nature expands itself from more to more1 having its own essence progressively communicated to it4 ,and so we find that the peculiar naturalness of the primitive and the simple is only an illusion1 caused by the greater difficulty of recognising the larger individuality which comes both of and to itself in the later and more complex phases of life4 ,but whatever it was that was real and that came of itself in the primitive and simple is there to a greater degree--with more reality and as the same self1 only more complete--in the later and complex4 ,the idea of a diminution of being as we pass from the simpler to the more developed self is a fallacy of non-recognition4 ,rousseau1 as we saw1 maintains in words the traditional opposition between the natural and the civil or moral condition of man4 ,from the tendency of his views1 however1 we might have expected that in his philosophy the wheel would come full circle1 and the term 8nature0 would revert to its ,greek meaning4 ,but this is not the case1 though in mile there is a compromise which points in some such direction4 ,yet a remarkable passage #a from ,burlamaqui1 a ,genevese jurist1 the earlier contemporary of ,rousseau1 shows the reversion to the ,greek view of social nature completed in principle4 8,la libert civile l'emporte de #acc beaucoup sur la libert naturelle1 et1 par consquent1 l'tat civil qui l'a produit est de tous les tats de l'homme le plus parfait1 et1 parler exactement1 le veritable tat naturel de l'homme4 ,l'tablissement d'un gouvernement et d'une puissance souveraine1 ramenant les hommes l'observation des lois naturelles1 #b et par consquent dans la route de bonheur1 les fait rentrer dans leur tat naturel1 duquel ils taient sortis par le mauvais usage qu'ils faisaient de leur libert40 #a ,cited in ,dreyfus-,brisac's edition of the ,contrat ,social1 p4 #ci4 #b ,note the value of 8natural law0 as a middle term equivalent to the general and rational features of positive law1 and forming a step by which the 8natural0 is carried beyond the supposed 8state of nature40 ,upon this reversion to ancient usage there followed the movement of the age of romantic genius and of organic science1 and with ,goethe's ,erdgeist and ,wordsworth's religion of ,nature the restriction of the natural to the primitive and simple was destroyed4 ,nature still remains a point of view under which we regard what relatively speaking 8comes of itself10 but it has ceased to exist as a question-begging predicate1 attached to pre-social or extra-social conditions of man4 #c4 ,liberty1 as understood by the writers who were discussed in ch4 iii4 of the present work1 is related to the ,state much as ,nature1 in the mouth of story-telling theory1 is related to civilised society4 ,we saw that ,seeley in his ,introduction to ,political ,science #a lays it down that 8perfect liberty is equivalent to total absence of government40 ,and this no doubt fairly represents our first notion of the matter1 when cleared of the limitations imposed upon it by practical life1 which #acd limitations--really a first hint of the truth--we are apt to mistake for mere sophistications and imperfections4 ,we noted in ,rousseau the surviving contrast between natural liberty on the one hand and civil or moral liberty on the other1 and we observed that the expanding idea of what was natural could not be prevented from covering the ground of the civil or moral life4 ,the thread of connection1 or rather the ferment of expansion1 we found to be1 in the case of nature1 the idea of self-origination4 ,that was natural which came of itself4 #a ,seeley1 quoted p4 #ia above4 7a7 ,in the simple ideal of liberty1 as equivalent to the absence of all government--for we must not forget that it is an ideal1 obtained by neglecting the facts of life which run counter to it--there is clearly embodied a claim which commands our respect4 ,the claim is so self-evident and so convincing to average human feeling--,mr4 ,spencer would indeed say1 with some truth1 to animal feeling in general--that its precise nature is seldom stated in distinct language4 ,we have assumed above that the root of it lies in the claim to be ourselves4 ,but it is safer to take it in the shape which it actually has for the average consciousness1 and this is the negative shape1 as a claim to be free from constraint4 #a ,if we ask1 8,what is constraint80 the answer is founded on the current distinction between myself and others as different minds attached to different bodies4 ,it is constraint when my mind is interfered with in its control of my body either by actual or by threatening physical #ace violence under the direction of another mind4 ,a permanent and settled condition of such constraint1 by which ,i become in effect the instrument of another mind1 is slavery4 ,and it will not lead us far wrong if we assume that the value put upon liberty and its erection into something like an ideal comes from the contrast with slavery4 ,the ideal of positive political freedom presupposes more complex experiences4 ,but ,homer already knows that 8,zeus deprives a man of half his manhood when he becomes a slave40 #a ,we must assume1 ,i suppose1 that in ,seeley's sentence 8,government0 8,constraint10 or its vraisemblance is lost4 ,this1 then1 we may take as the practical starting point in the notion of freedom4 ,it is what1 with reference to a formed society1 we may call a status2 the position of a freeman as opposed to a slave2 that is1 of one who1 whatever oppression he may meet with de facto from time to time1 or whatever specified services he may be bound to render1 normally regards himself and is regarded by others as1 on the whole1 at his own disposal1 and not the mere instrument of another mind4 ,thus the juristic meaning of the term liberty1 based on the normal distinction between one self-determining person and another1 we may set down as its literal meaning1 and so far the ,english writers1 of whom ,seeley is the latest type1 are on solid ground when they define liberty as the absence of restraint1 or perfect liberty as the absence of all government 7in the sense of habitual constraint by others74 7b7 ,it is obvious that the above definition would be wholly inadequate to the simplest facts respecting the demands which have through all history been asserted and achieved under the name of political #acf liberty4 ,a man may be a long way more than a slave and yet a long way less than a citizen4 ,if1 as ,seeley says1 the ,english writer of the verses1 8,ah1 ,freedom is a noble thing10 only meant by ,freedom1 being out of prison1 it is certain that he meant much less than the ,greek historian who two thousand years before used almost the same words4 8,the right of equal speech10 he wrote1 8demonstrates itself in every way as a noble thing40 #a ,by this1 as his words and their occasion make plain1 he meant a certain determinate security for the positive exercise of activities affecting the welfare of the social whole1 and some such security is always understood to be involved in the notion of political liberty4 ,but we will content ourselves at this point with noting the distinction and connection between the negative or juristic1 and the varyingly positive or political conception of liberty4 ,for the latter is1 in its degree1 a case of that fuller freedom which we are about to trace to its embodiment in the state2 and the phenomena of political liberty are covered1 of course1 by the point of view which we shall take in indicating the state as the main organ and condition of the fuller liberty4 #a ,hdt41 v4 #gh4 7c7 ,the connection1 we said1 between juristic and political liberty should be observed at this point4 ,it is merely an example of what we shall find throughout1 that the apparently negative has its roots and its meaning in the positive1 and1 in proportion as its true nature becomes evident1 its positive aspects become explicit4 ,there is no true security for juristic liberty apart from political #acg liberty2 and it has constantly been the infraction of juristic liberty that has been the origin of the demand for a share in highly positive political duties and functions4 ,mere protection for person and property may seem an easy thing to define and maintain with just a little goodwill2 but the questions when1 how1 and in what sense it is to be maintained involve the positive character of the political system1 and there is no ultimate security unless that system is moulded by the whole compass of individuality which society contains4 7d7 ,recurring then to the literal or elementary sense of liberty1 as the absence of constraint exercised by one upon others1 we may admit that1 in going beyond it1 we are more or less making use of a metaphor4 #a ,we are passing from the idea of non-constraint pure and simple to the idea of more or less moulding and selection within the powers and activities of the self4 ,it is true1 indeed1 and must be maintained as a fundamental principle1 that the 8higher0 liberty is also in fact the 8larger0 liberty1 presenting the greater area to activity and the more extensive choice to self-determination4 #b ,but this larger development remains within a positive general character1 and if more alternatives are open1 there are also1 by that very fact1 more which are closed4 ,we cannot wholly exhaust the new meaning of liberty as applied to the law-abiding and moral life of a #ach conscientious citizen even by changing the negative into the positive1 and saying that1 whereas mere juristic freedom was only freedom from constraint1 political freedom means freedom to act4 ,the higher sense of liberty1 like the lower1 involves freedom from some things as well as freedom to others4 ,and that which we are freed from is1 in this case1 not the constraint of those whom we commonly regard as others1 but the constraint of what we commonly regard as a part of ourself4 ,here is the reason for saying that1 when we speak of liberty in the higher sense1 we must be admitted to be speaking metaphorically4 #c #a ,in this and the following section ,i have made great use of ,green's discussion in the first chapter of the ,principles of ,political ,obligation4 #b ,perhaps ,i may refer on this head to 8,liberty and ,legislation0 in my ,civilisation of ,christendom 7,sonnenschein74 #c ,but see below1 p4 #ade4 ,in the straightforward sense of the word1 we saw1 ,i am free when ,i am not made the instrument of another person's will through physical violence or the threat of it4 ,the subtle questions which may arise with regard to due or undue degrees of influence1 by which ,i may become the instrument of another's mind1 with more or less willingness on the part of my own1 are here disregarded4 ,i am assumed to be acting freely so long as ,i follow the inclination of my mind1 apart from any painful conflict forced upon it by the prospect of physical interference with its belongings4 ,but from the earliest ages of ethical reflection1 a further sense has been ascribed to the term liberty4 ,it has been pointed out by moralists and philosophers--first1 perhaps by ,socrates and ,plato--that the condition of man as to being himself is fundamentally affected not only by the power to do what he likes without constraint1 but by the nature of that which he likes to do4 ,the human #aci mind1 it is explained1 is never wholly at one with itself1 and the common phrases 8self-mastery0 or 8self-control0 are adduced by way of presenting what we spoke of above as the ethical paradox of self-government4 #a ,the mind1 then1 is treated by a metaphor as if it were two or more persons2 and the term liberty1 which applies prima facie to the non-constraint of one person by another1 is applied to the non-constraint of something within an individual mind by something else within it4 ,now1 apart from further scrutiny1 it does not appear why the term liberty1 when thus applied1 should mean anything of ethical value4 ,as ,plato observed1 in a passage #b from which the current use of all these phrases is probably derived1 it seems absurd at first sight to speak of self-control as a distinctive predicate of certain states of mind4 ,for surely1 within the mind1 that which is controlled must be of the nature of self no less than that which controls it1 so that1 in saying that ,i have self-control1 ,i am saying that ,i am self-indulgent2 in saying that my mind is free1 ,i am at the same time saying that it is a slave4 ,within certain limits this paradox represents a truth1 and the ethical rank of the elements which coerce and are coerced may be quite oppositely estimated4 ,we may think fit to call ourselves free either when love conquers reason or when reason triumphs over love4 ,still1 as ,plato proceeds to point out1 the general adoption of the metaphor1 the fact that we think and call ourselves 8free0 or 8self-controlled0 or 8fully ourselves0 in some cases and not in others2 and that we do not in each of #adj these cases regard the opposite attribution 8slave10 8self-indulgent10 8not ourselves0 as equally true with the former1 indicates that some substantial fact is forcing itself upon us through the metaphor in question4 ,it is the same problem as that which ,professor ,james has wittily stated when he points out that 8the sluggard1 the drunkard1 the coward never talk of their conduct in that way 7i4e4 as conquering their impulses and temptations7 or say they resist their energy1 overcome their sobriety1 conquer their courage1 and so forth40 #c #a ,p4 #ee4 #b ,republic1 #dcj ,e4 #c ,principles of ,psychology1 ii4 #edh4 ,it is most important1 we may venture to observe in passing1 not to understand the substantive fact1 or ,plato's presentation of it1 as if it lay in an alternative between two psychological factors1 say intelligence and desire1 the one of which was to be preferred and the other to be repudiated1 through some quasi-ethical conception of rank1 such as the supposed affinity of the one factor with divine or of the other with animal life4 ,we are speaking of the sense in which it can be asserted that the human self is1 comparatively speaking1 free in one kind of life and unfree in another1 both being assumed to be chosen1 in the absence of constraint by an external will4 ,it is plain that the only ground on which such an assertion can really be sustained is that the one life more than the other gives effect to the self as a whole1 or removes its contradictions and so makes it most fully what it is able to be1 or what1 by the implied nature of each and all of its wants1 it may be said really to want to be4 ,the claims of intelligence and desire in their various phases must be #ada criticised according to this principle1 and not advocated upon presuppositions drawn from external comparisons4 ,but our question at the present moment is not as to the deeper nature of that which we call the self par excellence1 but as to the bearing of the metaphor by which the assertion of such a self is identified with liberty or absence of constraint4 ,and the point is plainly this2 #a that in the conflict between that which stands for the self par excellence and that which1 at any time1 stands opposed to it1 we have the clear experience that we are capable of being determined by a will within our minds which nevertheless we repudiate and disown1 #b and therefore we feel ourselves to be like a slave as compared with a freeman if we yield1 but like a freeman compared with a slave if we conquer4 ,we may be determined by something which not only is not ourself--for in the greatest moments of life1 when our being touches its maximum1 we1 in a sense1 feel an impulse which is not ourself--but it is not ourself as something which has got hold of us by force1 and operates upon us by conflict and violence1 without having the kind of power needed to carry us away and sweep our whole self harmoniously into its current4 ,that we can be determined by a will in us which neither is ourself nor represents it at a higher level1 and which we loathe and disown1 is the experience on which the metaphor of freedom and slavery is #adb based1 when applied to the life of man considered apart from external constraint4 #c #a ,see ,green's ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 i4 #b ,this remains substantially true1 even if we agree with ,socrates that it is impossible to know the better and prefer the worse at a given moment4 ,our normal self will repudiate the view we took at some moment4 #c ,there is something worthy of ,dante in ,rousseau's observation 7,contrat ,social1 ,bk4 iv4 ch4 #b1 note7 that the convicts in the galleys at ,genoa had 8,liberty0 stamped on their chains4 ,the fetters of the bad self are the symbol of freedom4 ,rousseau turns his remark to commonplace1 after his fashion1 by referring it to the mere liberation of society from malefactors4 7e7 ,the metaphorical application of the term ,liberty to a state of the individual mind has both its danger and its justification4 ,the state of mind in question1 we repeat1 is that in which the impulse towards self-satisfaction sets itself upon an object which represents the nature of the self as a whole1 as free from contradiction or as at its maximum of being1 and triumphs over the alien and partial will1 the tendency to narrower tracks of indulgence1 when entangled in which it feels itself oppressed and constrained by a foreign influence4 ,when the mind does what1 as a whole1 it wills1 as ,plato implies1 #a it feels free4 ,when it cannot be said to will anything as a whole1 but is distracted among aims which cannot satisfy it1 then there is no sense in which it can be said to do what it wills1 and it feels itself under constraint and a slave4 #a ,republic1 ix4 #egg ,e4 ,the metaphor has this danger4 ,the contrast between whole and part is too readily transformed1 in popular theory1 into the contrast between an empty generality and everything in particular4 ,the claim to be free then involves the separation between mind as a general faculty of volition1 and every particular object4 ,mind is then said to be free as an undetermined faculty1 but as filled and #adc moulded by any object or idea1 7the passive participles 8filled0 and 8moulded0 imply a relation which is not real1 but1 as assumed1 is the ground of the fallacy in question7 it has lost its freedom and become a slave4 ,but if we retain the conception that mind has reality only as a whole of determinate character1 self-determined through its power of being a self1 but not through any power of creating particulars out of nothing1 we shall avoid this caricature of the higher freedom4 ,but it is far more important to note the justification of the metaphor4 ,we saw that1 from ,homer downwards1 the conviction has been ineradicable that liberty is the true nature of man4 ,and we now observe that the metaphor1 through which the deepest sense of this quality has expressed itself1 depends upon the same principle as the literal usage from which it is drawn4 ,in the case of ,liberty1 conceived as a condition of the mind1 just as in the case of ,liberty1 conceived as the absence of physical menace or coercion on the part of other persons1 the root of the matter is the claim to be determined only by ourself4 ,but1 in the literal case1 what we mean by ourself is the given self1 the group of will and wishes1 of feelings and ideas1 associated from time to time with my particular body2 in short1 the actual uncriticised 8mind10 as we experience it all day and every day4 ,in the metaphorical case1 we have made so much progress in self-criticism as to know at least that our 8self0 is something of a problem4 ,we know that the given self1 the mind from day to day1 #a is not satisfactory2 and #add we throw the centre of gravity outside it1 and place the true self in something which we rather want to be than actually are2 although1 at the same time1 it is clear that to some extent we are this something or we should not want to be it4 ,we realise1 indeed1 that to be ourselves is a principle at once of distinction or position among others1 and of thorough transition into and unity with the life which is at the root of theirs4 ,and it is for this reason that we feel so confident1 in proportion as we at all lay hold upon a life which can thus distinguish and identify us1 that we have here the grasp of what is in its nature our true self4 ,here then1 as in the literal case of liberty from personal constraint1 we are putting in act the principle of 8being determined only by ourself40 #a ,see1 however1 note on p4 #abe above4 ,and thus ,liberty as understood by 8theorists of the first look10 or by those who in all ages have resisted arbitrary tyranny1 belongs after all to the same principle with the civil or moral liberty of the philosopher4 ,the claim to obey only yourself is a claim essential to humanity2 and the further significance of it rests upon what you mean by 8yourself40 ,now if it is true that resistance to arbitrary aggression is a condition of obeying only ourselves1 it is more deeply true1 when man is in any degree civilised1 that1 in order to obey yourself as you want to be1 you must obey some thing very different from yourself as you are4 ,and it has been well pointed out #a that the consciousness of civilised peoples is deeply alive to this significance of liberty1 so that any work of self-improvement may be most effectively #ade presented to a popular audience as an effort to attain freedom by breaking the bondage of drink1 for example1 or of ignorance1 or of pauperism4 ,in spite of the objection that ,freedom as thus represented is a mere metaphor1 8the feeling #b of oppression1 which always goes with the consciousness of unfulfilled possibilities1 will always give meaning to the representation of the effort after any kind of self-improvement as a demand for freedom40 ,we have followed the usual course of ,english thought1 and the example of a writer whose caution equalled his enthusiasm1 in admitting that the lower sense of the term ,liberty is the literal sense1 and that the deeper meaning may be treated as metaphorical4 ,it is worth while to observe that the justice of this way of looking at the matter is very doubtful4 ,it is because we know1 however indefinitely1 that our self has a reach beyond its daily needs1 that arbitrary oppression becomes a thing to be resisted at the price of life itself4 ,herbert ,spencer draws attention to the struggles of an animal which we try to confine1 as a proof of the innate feeling of liberty4 ,but the domesticated animal is the highest animal1 or at anyrate not the lowest2 while the man domesticated on similar terms is what we call a slave1 because he has sold his liberty for his life4 ,it is therefore in truth the sense of the higher liberty--the greatness and unity of life--that has communicated uncontrollable force to the claim for the lower2 and if the fuller meaning is the reality and the lesser the symbol1 it would be nearer the truth to say that the reality is the liberty of #adf a moral being whose will finds adequate expression in its life1 of which liberty the absence of external constraint is only an elementary type or symbol4 ,the claim of the dictionary-maker that the earliest or the average meaning is also the truest or the 8proper0 meaning of words has no foundation4 #c #a ,green's ,principles p4 #ah4 #b ,loc4 cit4 #c ,nettleship's ,remains1 i4 #bg and #cj4 #d4 ,liberty1 then1 throughout1 is the being ourselves1 and the fullest condition of liberty is that in which we are ourselves most completely4 ,the ideal thus implied may be further explained by help of the philosophical expression1 8,the free will is the will that wills itself40 ,we have already seen1 by implication1 the meaning of this4 ,if we are asked1 8,but does not our will always will itself80 we have the answer ready1 that in one sense it does1 but in another it does not4 ,we always want what we will1 but what we will is not always what would satisfy our want4 ,a will that willed itself would be a will that in willing had before it an object that would satisfy its whole want1 and nothing but its want4 ,its desires would not be narrow and partial desires1 in the fulfilment of which a man feels choked and oppressed like one lost in a blind alley which grows narrower and narrower4 ,they would not be artificial desires stimulated and elaborated into a tyranny of the machinery of life by the self which gropes for more and cannot find the 8more0 which it needs4 ,that is to say1 the volitions of the self would have undergone a process just such as is undergone by a casual sensuous observation as it passes into a great scientific theory4 ,as the observation stands it is inadequate to itself2 for it poses as a truth1 and is manifestly a false #adg connection4 ,so it is supplemented on the one hand and purged away on the other2 conditions and qualifications are inserted into it to harmonise it with other knowledge1 until it makes some approach to being an expression of experience fit to occupy a permanent place in man's conception of the world4 ,this1 the adjustment of a partial element to unity with the whole1 is the essence of criticism4 ,and it is just such another process by which the experience of life fills up and purifies the objects presented to the casual volition4 ,that is to say1 the nature of the process may be represented by considering it as having an effect of this kind on an unharmonised will2 and relatively at any given moment such a process is in some degree going on4 ,but we must bear in mind that we are not to think of the sensuous individual as totally prior in time to the social consciousness1 and as a pre-existing matter1 upon which such an effect is to be thought of as super-induced4 ,that would be precisely the fallacy with which ,rousseau struggles so hard1 and the escape from which we are attempting to illustrate2 none the worse1 perhaps1 if our own language betrays how very difficult it is to throw it off altogether4 ,we really know the sensuous individual as such1 the will in its impure and uncriticised form1 only in our experience1 constant as that is1 of failure1 error1 and forgetfulness1 in adhering to the rational life1 which1 on the whole1 is inherent in the very nature of our rational being1 and which we only desert in the same way and to the same extent as we make mistakes in intellectual matters4 ,we go wrong by narrowness and confusion1 by erroneous abstractions out of the whole1 in a way only possible #adh for a social and intellectual being1 and not prior to our entire social and intellectual character4 ,understanding then that we are dealing with narrowness and confusion and their opposites within a social intelligence already existing and predominant on the whole1 we may note the sort of relation in which the more adequate will is analogous to the more adequate piece of knowledge4 ,take1 as we said above1 the actual casual will of any individual at any given moment1 especially if it is of a nature which1 within the context of civilised life1 we commonly pronounce to be wrong4 ,let it be1 for example1 an impulse of sensual passion4 ,it is a commonplace that in such impulses the self can find no abiding satisfaction4 ,they pass and leave him empty4 ,they bring with them no opening out of fresh possibilities1 no greater stability to the mind4 ,yet they have their meaning1 and belong to human nature4 ,they imply a need for union1 and an attraction outside the immediate self4 ,if we compare them with the objects and affections of a happy and devoted family1 we see the difference between a less adequate and a more adequate will4 ,the impulse1 in passing into family affection1 has become both less and more4 ,it is both disciplined and expanded4 ,the object presented to the will is transformed in character4 ,lawlessness is excluded2 but1 in place of a passing pleasure1 a whole world of affections and interests1 extending beyond the individual life1 is offered as a purpose and a stimulus to the self4 ,in short--for it is idle to expatiate upon what everybody recognises at once--you can make a life out of the one1 and you cannot out of the other4 ,in the family at its best the will has an #adi object which is real and stable1 and which corresponds to a great part of its own possibilities and capacities4 ,in willing this object1 it is1 relatively speaking1 willing itself4 ,we might compare in the same way the mere will to earn our daily bread1 with the horizon of a great intellectual profession2 or the routine of an industry or profession vacantly and formally pursued with the very same routine conscientiously followed in a spirit of enlightenment4 ,in every case we are led up to the contrast of the actual indolent or selfish will1 and the will1 in as far as it comes to be what its nature implies1 namely1 that which we have spoken of as the real or rational will1 embodied in objects which have power to make a life worth living for the self that wills them4 ,now1 our nature as rational beings implies the imperative claim upon us of a will which is thus real or rational4 ,recognised or unrecognised1 it is rooted in our own wills1 as the claim to be true is rooted in our assertions4 ,any system of institutions which represents to us1 on the whole1 the conditions essential to affirming such a will1 in objects of action such as to constitute a tolerably complete life1 has an imperative claim upon our loyalty and obedience as the embodiment of our liberty4 ,the only question that can arise is whether the system is that which it pretends to be4 ,but even if rebellion is a duty1 it can only be so because the imperative obligation1 as we recognise it1 is irreconcilable with the particular system which claims our obedience in its name4 ,the imperative claim of the will that wills itself is our own inmost nature1 and we cannot throw it off4 ,this is the ultimate root of political obligation4 #e4 ,it is such a 8real0 or rational will that #aej thinkers after ,rousseau have identified with the ,state4 ,in this theory they are following the principles of ,plato and ,aristotle1 no less than the indications which ,rousseau furnished1 by his theory of the general will in connection with the work of the legislator4 ,the ,state1 when thus regarded1 is to the general life of the individual much as we saw the family to be with regard to certain of his impulses4 ,the idea is that in it1 or by its help1 we find at once discipline and expansion1 the transfiguration of partial impulses1 and something to do and to care for1 such as the nature of a human self demands4 ,if1 that is to say1 you start with a human being as he is in fact1 and try to devise what will furnish him with an outlet and a stable purpose capable of doing justice to his capacities--a satisfying object of life--you will be driven on by the necessity of the facts at least as far as the ,state1 and perhaps further4 ,two points may be insisted on to make this conception less paradoxical to the ,english mind4 7a7 ,the ,state1 as thus conceived1 is not merely the political fabric4 ,the term ,state accents indeed the political aspect of the whole1 and is opposed to the notion of an anarchical society4 ,but it includes the entire hierarchy of institutions by which life is determined1 from the family to the trade1 and from the trade to the ,church and the ,university4 ,it includes all of them1 not as the mere collection of the growths of the country2 but as the structure which gives life and meaning to the political whole1 while receiving from it mutual adjustment1 and therefore expansion and a more liberal air4 ,the ,state1 it might be said1 is thus conceived as the operative criticism of all #aea institutions the modification and adjustment by which they are capable of playing a rational part in the object of human will4 ,and criticism1 in this sense1 is the life of institutions4 ,as exclusive objects1 they are a prey to stagnation and disease--think of the temper which lives solely for the family or solely for the ,church2 it is only as taken up into the movement and circulation of the ,state that they are living spiritual beings4 ,it follows that the ,state1 in this sense1 is1 above all things1 not a number of persons1 but a working conception of life4 ,it is the conception by the guidance of which every living member of the commonwealth is enabled to perform his function1 as ,plato has taught us4 ,if we ask whether this means that a complete conception of the aims and possibilities of the common life exists even in the minds of statesmen1 not to speak of ordinary citizens1 the question answers itself in the negative4 ,and yet the ,state can only live and work in as far as such a conception1 in however fragmentary1 one-sided shapes1 pervades the general mind4 ,it is not there mostly in reflective shape2 and in so far as it is in reflective shape it is according to ultimate standards contradictory and incomplete4 ,but everyone who has a fair judgment of what his own place demands from him1 has1 at his own angle1 so to speak1 a working insight into the end of the ,state2 and1 of course1 practical contradictions would be fewer if such conceptions were completer and more covered by each other4 ,but a complete reflective conception of the end of the ,state1 comprehensive and free from contradiction1 would mean a complete idea of the realisation of all human #aeb capacity1 without waste or failure4 ,such a conception is impossible owing to the gradual character of the process by which the end of life1 the nature of the good1 is determined for man4 ,the ,real ,will1 as represented by the ,state1 is only a partial embodiment of it4 7b7 ,the ,state1 as the operative criticism of all institutions1 is necessarily force2 and in the last resort1 it is the only recognised and justified force4 ,it seems important to observe that force is inherent in the ,state1 and no true ideal points in the direction of destroying it4 ,for the force of the ,state proceeds essentially from its character of being our own mind extended1 so to speak1 beyond our immediate consciousness4 ,not only is the conduct of life as a whole beyond the powers of the average individual at his average level1 but it is beyond the powers of all the average individuals in a society taken together at their average level4 ,we make a great mistake in thinking of the force exercised by the ,state as limited to the restraint of disorderly persons by the police and the punishment of intentional law-breakers4 ,the ,state is the fly-wheel of our life4 ,its system is constantly reminding us of duties1 from sanitation to the incidents of trusteeship1 which we have not the least desire to neglect1 but which we are either too ignorant or too indolent to carry out apart from instruction and authoritative suggestion4 ,we profit at every turn by institutions1 rules1 traditions1 researches1 made by minds at their best1 which1 through ,state action1 are now in a form to operate as extensions of our own minds4 ,it is not merely the contrast #aec between the limited activity of one individual and the greater achievement of millions put together4 ,it is the contrast between individuals working in the order and armed with the laws1 customs1 writings1 and institutions devised by ages1 and the same individuals considered as their daily average selves1 with a varying but always limited range of immediate consciousness4 ,for at any given moment1 no judge knows all the law2 no author knows all his own books1 not to mention those of others2 no official of an institution has the whole logic and meaning of the institution before his mind4 ,all individuals are continually reinforced and carried on1 beyond their average immediate consciousness1 by the knowledge1 resources1 and energy which surround them in the social order1 with its inheritance1 of which the order itself is the greatest part4 ,and the return of this greater self1 forming a system adjusted to unity1 upon their isolated minds1 as an expansion and stimulus to them1 necessarily takes the shape of force1 in as far as their minds are inert4 ,and this must always be the case1 not merely so long as wills are straightforwardly rebellious against the common good1 but so long as the knowledge and energy of the average mind are unequal to dealing1 on its own initiative and out of its own resources1 with all possible conjunctions in which necessary conditions of the common good are to be maintained4 ,in other words1 there must be inertia to overcome1 as long as the limitations of our animal nature #a exist at all4 ,the ,state is1 as #aed ,plato told us1 the individual mind writ large1 or1 as we have said1 our mind reinforced by capacities which are of its own nature1 but which supplement its defects4 ,and this being so1 the less complete must clearly submit to find itself in the more complete1 and be carried along with it so far as the latter is able to advance4 ,it is very important to note1 however1 that our mind at its best is very different from our mind at its average2 and it has understood and approved1 when at its best1 a great deal which in its average moments comes upon it as force or custom from the outside4 ,thus1 there is no abrupt division between our conscious mind and the social system of suggestion1 custom1 and force1 which supports and extends and amends it4 ,the two are related much as the focus of consciousness is related to the sub-conscious and automatic habits by which daily life is rendered possible4 ,it is no more conceivable that social life should go on without force and authoritative custom1 because the end of social life is reflected in the varying intelligence of individuals1 than that individual life should go on without sub-consciousness and automatism1 because it is ultimately relative to the ends which appear as ideas in the shifting focus of the mind4 ,the inherent limitations of ,state action will be dealt with in a later chapter4 ,we have thus far been attempting to make clear what is meant by the identification of the ,state with the ,real ,will of the ,individual in which he wills his own nature as a rational being2 in which identification we find the only true account of political obligation4 #a ,not 8of our individuality40 ,individuality is not1 in principle1 a limitation which makes us unequal to our part in the whole4 #aee ,,chapter ,,vii ,,psychological ,,illustration ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,real ,,or ,,general ,,will4 #a4 ,the object of the present chapter is to assist the reader in bringing together the conception of the ,state or the ,community on the one hand1 and that of an actual personal will1 existing in an individual mind1 on the other4 #a ,we have seen that ,self-,government can only be explained if the centre of gravity of the self is thrown outside what we are continually tempted to reckon as our individuality1 and1 if we recognise as our real being1 and therefore as imperative upon us1 a self and a good which are but slightly represented in our explicit consciousness1 at its ordinary level4 ,we have seen that all sound theory and all good practice are founded on the insight or on the faith #b that the common self or moral person of society is more real than the apparent individual2 and we have followed ,rousseau's clue in criticising as defective and contradictory the actual will of #aef given persons1 and in looking for its interpretation and completion in law and institutions as the embodiment of the social spirit4 #a ,cf4 ch4 ii41 p4 #dc4 #b ,the faith may of course exist in minds which would absolutely repudiate the theoretical form here propounded for it4 ,no one could have had a more ardent actual faith in the reality of the greater self than ,bentham and ,mill4 ,but ,society and the ,state present themselves at first sight as indefinite multitudes of persons4 ,institutions are many-sided facts2 and an unreflective citizen could hardly say of what he takes them to be composed4 ,and though law and custom approach more nearly to what we commonly understand by a 8will10 yet they again are apt to be regarded as a sort of dead external weight with which the living volition of the ordinary man has little or nothing to do4 ,our purpose1 therefore1 is to explain what is meant by saying that 8a will0 can be embodied in the ,state1 in society1 in law and institutions2 and how it is possible for the individual1 as we know him1 to be in an identity with this will1 such as continually to vary1 but never wholly to disappear4 ,how can a man's real self lie in a great degree outside his normal self1 and be something which he only now and then gets hold of distinctly1 and never completely8 #b4 ,we will begin 7#a7 by pointing out the analogy between the groups or systems of which our intelligence is composed1 and the groups or systems which make up the fabric of society1 and we will then go on 7#b7 to exhibit them as up to a certain point aspects of the same fact4 7#a7 ,we may note two degrees of connection between the members of a whole1 which we may call 8,association0 and 8,organisation40 7i47 ,when two individuals are so connected that where you find the one you expect to find the #aeg other1 they may be called associates4 ,and any kind of habitual grouping1 from a gang of thieves to a scientific or philanthropic institution1 may be called an ,association4 ,owing probably to the verbal force which it borrows from the verb 8to associate10 the term 8association0 implies the intentional coming together of units which have been separate1 and which may become separate again4 ,the word 8,society10 on the other hand1 has not this verbal force1 and although an 8association0 may call itself 8a society10 yet 8,society0 as such is not spoken of as an 8,association40 ,when we speak of 8,society0 we do not emphasise the aspect of being put together out of elements which exist apart1 and therefore we habitually apply the word to that natural grouping1 which1 at any rate1 we do not normally think of as purposely put together and liable to be dissolved again4 ,when the ,state is treated as an ,association1 a definite theory of its nature is implied1 such as is involved in ,herbert ,spencer's comparison between it and a joint stock company4 ,now this same term 8,association0 is the most familiar expression for a connection between elements of mind1 analogous to that between persons who are called associates4 ,if two elements of mind are so connected that1 where we find the one we expect to find the other1 they are said to be 8associated40 ,if the engine's whistle makes me think the train is going to start1 then it would be said that the idea 8train starting0 is associated in my mind with the idea 8engine whistling40 ,they have before entered into the same mental group or whole1 and so1 where we find the one1 #aeh we expect to find the other1 just as1 where my friend ,x is1 his comrade ,y is probably not far off4 ,we may here note the analogy between these two modes of association--that of persons and that of mental elements4 ,in both cases1 according to the plain man's view of the matter1 we are dealing with wholly casual conjunctions of units naturally independent4 ,the associates in either case need no better reason for now being together than that they had been together before4 ,their connection expresses nothing intimate or essential in their natures1 and1 if they fall apart again1 they will not be seriously affected by the separation4 ,now1 of course1 this idea of mere conjunction is not strictly true even of the connections between the most casual associates4 ,every association1 whether of comrades or of ideas1 is a connection between qualities1 and therefore a general connection between the natures of the related terms4 ,people are not really companions for no reason at all2 and ideas are not really units or atoms which stick together by mere juxtaposition1 so that when one is pulled up out of the ,hades of oblivion it drags the other with it4 ,both the association of companions and the association of ideas are tendencies in which some general connection of qualities is at work1 and expresses itself through the detail of the actual surroundings1 so far as an opening is left to it4 ,when the association is made explicit by both members being present together1 there is an outlet or utterance of the nature of the associates which there is not when they are separated4 #aei ,but though all this is true1 and can be detected in cases of association by careful analysis1 it is1 relatively speaking1 the fact that commonplace association depends upon qualities which are so superficial that they may set up a tendency to connection between any units which are members of the same world4 ,and1 therefore1 as compared with any more thorough-going kind of connection1 such association may be set down as casual1 and as determined by the mere chance of juxtaposition4 7ii47 ,let us compare the kind of connection just described as association with that which we have agreed to call organisation4 ,associates1 #a we saw1 were together1 as might roughly be said1 simply because they found themselves together4 ,that is to say1 they were1 after their association1 what they were before it1 and would not be seriously affected if they were to be separated4 ,connections of this kind are essentially between unit and unit4 ,they fall short of the nature of a plan which determines a great range of elements1 variously but with reference to an identical operation4 #a ,an 8,association10 it may be urged1 generally has a definite purpose1 and so far1 as indeed we said above1 the associates come together1 and do not merely find themselves together4 ,but this is only an apparent difficulty4 ,in comparison with the whole compass of their nature1 associates who come together for some limited purpose--,bimetallism1 ,philanthropy1 a political cause--do merely find themselves together4 ,they form1 as the cynic will say1 an extraordinary menagerie1 and their association may break up without any apparent effect upon their nature4 ,obviously1 however1 there are some purposes which go deeper into men's characters1 and others which are shallower2 and this merely illustrates our point that the most casual association is a universal connection of qualities in disguise4 ,beginning1 as before1 with the connection between #afj persons1 we may illustrate the difference by the comparison between a crowd and an army4 ,the mind of a crowd has indeed been taken as the type of a true social mind4 ,but it is really something quite different4 ,it is merely the superficial connection between unit and unit on an extended and intensified scale4 ,as unit joins unit in the street1 each determines his immediate neighbours1 and is determined by them through the contagion of excitement1 and with reference to the most passing ideas and emotions4 ,what acts upon them in common is necessarily what there is in common between persons meeting1 as it were1 for no reason1 and not knowing what they share beyond what they immediately see and feel4 ,the crowd may indeed 8act as one man02 but if it does so1 its level of intelligence and responsibility will1 as a rule1 be extraordinarily low4 ,it has nothing in common beyond what unit can infect unit with in a moment4 ,concerted action1 much more reasoning and criticism1 are out of the question4 ,the doing or thinking of a different thing by each unit with reference to a single end is impossible4 ,the crowd moves as a mere mass1 because its parts are connected merely as unit with unit4 ,any form of connection which could effect an organisation in the whole would make a demand on the nature of every unit1 which1 where their conjunction is merely casual1 could not possibly be met4 ,an army1 #a no less than a crowd1 consists of a multitude of men1 who are associated1 unit to unit4 ,influences must pass and repass between every one #afa of the men and those men with whom he is standing in the ranks1 or with whom he passes his leisure time4 ,we may note1 by the way1 that these influences are themselves of a more permanent nature than those which pass between members of a crowd1 and that they must necessarily be modified by that other connection of which we are about to speak4 ,for the links of 8association0 between man and man are not the determining force in the operations of the army as such4 ,the army is a machine1 or an organisation1 which is bound together by operative ideas embodied on the one hand in the officers1 and on the other hand in the habit of obedience and the trained capacity which make every unit willing and able to be determined not by the impulse of his neighbours1 but by the orders of his officers4 ,what the army does is determined by the general's plan1 and not by influences communicating themselves from man to man1 as in a crowd4 ,in other words1 every unit moves with reference to the movements of a great whole1 with most parts of which he is not in direct touch at all4 ,he is not determined by simple reference to the movements of his immediate neighbours4 ,the army1 that is1 is a system or organised group1 the nature of which1 or the predominant idea embodied in its structure1 determines the movements and relations of its parts or members4 ,the difference of the two modes of determination is plainly visible on a review day1 if we first watch the compact regiments marching off the ground1 and then the crowd streaming away irregularly in search of rest or refreshment4 ,by organisation then1 as opposed to association1 we mean determination of #afb particulars by the scheme or general nature of a systematic group to which they belong1 as opposed to their determination by immediate links uniting them with what1 relatively speaking1 are other particulars in casual juxtaposition with them4 #b #a ,the illustration was suggested to me by a passage in ,mr4 ,stout's ,analytic ,psychology4 #b ,ultimately1 of course1 the distinction is one of degree4 ,what operates is always a general connection between members of a whole2 the only question is what kind of whole1 and1 therefore1 what kind of connection4 ,in the working and composition of mind the same difference is observable between association and organisation4 ,mere association means that any perception or idea may suggest absolutely any mental element whatever with which it has developed a connection by entering into the same mental whole4 ,a study of the purely associative mind is sometimes said to be found in the character of ,miss ,bates in 8,emma40 ,perhaps1 as really uncontrolled association can hardly be found in a sane intellect1 we may say that the character in question is something more subtle and more true to nature2 and that is1 a study of the tendency to pure association continually breaking out1 and as continually repressed1 or 8herded back0 to the main subject1 to use the expression which ,walter ,scott applies to the way in which just such an associative talker #a is brought back to his point by his hearer4 #a ,claude ,halcro in the ,pirate4 ,in mind1 as in the external world1 the higher stage of association is organisation4 ,the characteristic of organisation is control by a general scheme #a as opposed to influence by juxtaposition #afc of units4 ,the zigzag course of thought which is represented in such a character as ,miss ,bates is due to the absence of control by any general scheme4 ,every idea--every significant word--has practically innumerable connections in the mind4 ,if the course of thought has no general direction impressed upon it1 no selective control operative within it1 it may change its line altogether at every principal word4 #b ,the possibilities of the ideas at our command make them like a complex of railways1 wholly consisting of turn-tables1 so that1 on any one of these component parts1 the train may swing round and go off in a wholly new direction4 ,this is notably illustrated by the sense of context in interpretation4 ,for anyone who has no such sense1 possible errors are endless1 beyond the hope of correction4 #a ,for the psychological theory of such control see ,stout1 ,analytic ,psych4 ii4 #c4 #b ,if it has not enough control to complete a significant sentence1 of course there is insanity or idiocy4 ,the opposite of such a zigzag course is a train of thought such as an argument4 ,in a train of thought1 one general idea prescribes the direction1 or forms the 8subject10 or limits what has been called the universe of discourse4 ,attention is wholly guided by the general idea1 and refuses to be distracted by any interest or suggestion which does not bear upon it4 ,let the general idea be1 for example1 the relation of wealth to the best life4 ,experience shows that it is most difficult to resist the varied interests and distractions which present themselves in the attempt to keep this relation in view4 ,easy and attractive modes of acquisition1 easy and attractive modes of expenditure1 force themselves upon the mind as isolated #afd suggestions1 and divert it from the question3 8,shall ,i1 or will any one else1 be the better for it1 as ,i understand better80 ,the effort of control1 needed to keep in view the general nature of our conception of what is best in life1 and to attend to suggestions which offer themselves as to acquisition and expenditure1 only in so far as they seem likely to promote that conception1 means the predominance of a scheme or general idea through all the varied circumstances of economic possibility4 ,it makes no difference whether we are speaking of reasoning or of practice4 ,the nature of the control which insists on relevancy1 and of the intellectual system in which it exhibits itself1 is the same in both cases4 ,every mind1 in fact1 is more or less organised under the control of dominant ideas1 which belong to its habitual preoccupations and determine the constant bias of its thoughts4 ,there is a well-known story how a traveller in a railway carriage undertook to detect the vocation of each of his fellow travellers from their respective answers to a single question4 ,the question was3 8,what is that which destroys what it has itself produced80 and a naturalist1 so the story runs1 revealed himself by the answer1 8vital force10 a soldier replied 8war10 a scholar 8,kronos10 a journalist 8revolution10 and a farmer 8a boar40 #a ,each answer was determined by the dominant bias or idea which selected out of the possible answers to the riddle that which would harmonise with the general mental system under its control4 ,selection1 it must be remembered1 is at the same time creation4 ,in every situation1 #afe theoretical or practical1 the surroundings as a whole are new1 and the rule or scheme has to assert itself in conditions which are not precisely repeated from any former case4 ,in so asserting itself it does not simply reproduce something old1 any more than a batsman recalls a former movement when he plays a ball1 but it produces that thought or deed which expresses its nature with reference to the new surroundings in which it has to act4 #b ,for it is a universal tendency1 a scheme partly defined1 and in process of further defining itself by moulding the material presented to it4 #a ,steinthal1 in ,james' ,psychology1 ,,ii41 #ajh4 #b ,see ,mr4 ,stout on 8,proportional ,systems10 ,analytic ,psychology1 ii4 #afg4 ,there is one more essential point4 ,a mind has its dominant nature1 but is no single system equally organised throughout4 ,it is rather a construction of such systems1 which may be in all degrees of alliance1 indifference1 and opposition to one another4 ,each of such systems1 or groups of ideas and experiences1 has its own dominant scheme1 and its own tendency in controlling thought or action4 ,and1 as a general rule1 in proportion as one system is active1 all the others are quiescent2 in proportion as we are intent or engaged upon one train of thought or one pursuit1 we are not alive to suggestions belonging to any other4 ,every system1 or group of this kind1 is called in psychology an 8,appercipient mass10 because it is a set of ideas1 bound together by a common rule or scheme1 which dictates the point of view from which perception will take place1 so far as the system in question is active4 ,and without some 8apperception10 some point of view in the mind which enables the #aff newcomer to be classed1 there cannot be perception at all4 ,the eye only sees what it brings with it the power of seeing4 ,hence some of the most striking instances of apperception are drawn from elementary cases in which a really remote system is active in default of a better1 just because the action of some system is necessary and the nearest responds4 ,a child calls an orange 8a ball02 a ,polynesian calls a horse 8a pig40 ,these are the nearest 8heads0 or rules of apperception under which the new perception can be brought4 ,every scientific idea we apply1 every set of relations in which we stand1 and every pursuit with which the mind is familiar1 is a case of such an appercipient mass1 or rule or scheme of attention4 ,and we know by common experience how entirely quiescent is one such factor of the mind while we are absorbed in the activity of another2 how utterly1 for example1 we disregard the botanical character of wild flowers when we are clearing them out of the garden as weeds1 and how wholly we neglect the question whether they are 8flowers0 or 8weeds0 when we are occupied in studying their botanical character4 ,and in the action of every appercipient mass1 in as far as it determines thought by the general nature of a systematic whole1 rather than through the isolated attraction exercised by unit upon unit1 we have an example of organisation as opposed to association2 or1 if we like1 of systematic connection or association between whole and part1 as opposed to the same principle operating casually and superficially between unit and unit4 ,the scheme or systematic connection1 it must be added1 may work unconsciously4 ,not all ideas #afg which control our thought and action are explicit ideas in abstract form2 and perhaps the general nature and limits of a man's mind are something of which he can never be reflectively conscious1 though he is aware of what he takes to be his leading ideas4 ,it is well known that principles which are not presented to reflection may be intellectually operative1 and embodied in a train of results4 ,thus our appercipient masses may have very different degrees of explicit system4 ,but their action is always systematic--the nature of the whole modifying what it comes in contact with1 and being modified by it4 ,with this conception of psychical systems before us1 let us cast one more glance at the organisation of society and the ,state4 ,we refused to take a crowd as a true type of society1 and we looked to the example of an army for the leading features of organisation as opposed to casual 8association40 ,the characteristic of an army on which we insisted was the determination of every unit in it1 not by the movements and impulses of his immediate neighbours1 but by the scheme or idea of the whole4 ,now1 on looking closer1 we see that society as such is a vast tissue of systems of this type1 each of them a relatively1 though not absolutely1 closed and self-complete organisation4 ,there are wheels within wheels1 systems within systems1 groups within groups4 ,but1 speaking generally1 the business and pleasure of society is carried on by persons arranged in groups1 which exhibit the characteristic of organisation that the capacity of every person is determined by the general nature and principle of the group considered as a whole1 and not by his relations to the units who happen to be next him4 #afh ,such groups1 for example1 are the trades and professions4 ,their structure may be very different4 ,in some the workshop is again a subordinate self-organised group4 ,in others the professional man works alone1 and to all appearances goes his own way4 ,it is common to all of them1 however1 that they form groupings of members1 within each of which groupings all members are determined in a certain way by the common nature of the group4 ,within his trade or profession1 a man acts1 as it is said1 in a definite 8capacity40 ,he regards himself and is regarded from a definite point of view1 and all other points of view tend to be neglected while and in so far as he is acting in the capacity corresponding to his membership of a certain group4 #a #a ,the group to which he belongs1 as bound together by differences1 is often rather that of his clients or customers than of his colleagues in his vocation4 ,but there is generally a differentiation within the vocation-group also4 ,prima facie1 there may be1 as with systems which compose the mind1 all degrees of alliance1 indifference1 or opposition between these groupings of persons2 and the same person1 belonging to many different groups1 may find his diverse 8capacities0 apparently at variance with one another4 ,a conscientious ,trade ,unionist may find his capacity as a member of the ,union1 interpreted as binding him to do his utmost for the amelioration of working class conditions in general1 apparently at variance with his capacity as the head of a family bound to provide immediately for those whom he has brought into the world4 ,or a judge or magistrate1 obliged to #afi enforce what he conceives to be a bad law1 may find his official capacity apparently at variance with his duty as a conscientious citizen4 ,it is plain that unless1 on the whole1 a working harmony were maintained between the different groups which form society1 life could not go on4 ,and it is for this reason that the ,state1 as the widest grouping whose members are effectively united by a common experience1 is necessarily the one community which has absolute power to ensure1 by force1 if need be1 at least sufficient adjustment of the claims of all other groupings to make life possible4 ,assuming1 indeed1 that all the groupings are organs of a single pervading life1 we find it incredible that there should ultimately be irreconcilable opposition between them4 ,that they should contradict one another is not more nor less possible than that human nature should be at variance with itself4 ,thus1 we have seen that the mind1 and society or the ,state1 are identical in the characteristic of being organisations1 each composed of a system of organisations1 every superior and subordinate grouping having its own nature and principle which determines its members as such1 and every one1 consequently1 tending to impose upon its members a peculiar capacity or point of view1 which1 in so far as a given system is active1 tends to put all other systems out of sight4 ,the connection between these systems is of very different kinds1 and very unequal in degree2 but in as far as the mind and the community are actual working wholes1 it is to be presumed that in each there is an ultimate or pervading adjustment which hinders #agj contradiction from proceeding to destructive extremes4 ,and neither the mind nor the community1 as working organisations1 can be accounted for on the principle of mere association4 7#b7 ,after pointing out the analogy between the organised structure of minds and the organised structure of society1 we now go on to show that minds and society are really the same fabric regarded from different points of view4 ,the explanation may be divided into three parts4 7i47 ,every social group is the external aspect of a set of corresponding mental systems in individual minds4 7ii47 ,every individual mind is a system of such systems corresponding to the totality of social groups as seen from a particular position4 7iii47 ,the social whole1 though implied in every mind1 only has reality in the totality of minds in a given community considered as an identical working system4 7i47 ,society and the ,state and every institution present themselves to us at first sight as a number of persons1 together1 perhaps1 with certain buildings and other external apparatus1 and certain kinds of work carried on and tangible results produced--so many children 8educated10 so many workmen 8employed10 so many ships built or fields tilled4 ,but if we could bring before ourselves the complete reality of any social group or institution1 we should find ourselves considering a very different order of facts4 ,let us think for a moment of a rate-supported elementary school4 ,we imagine it as a heap of buildings and a mass of children with a percentage of teachers scattered among #aga them4 ,but in what does its actual working really consist1 and on what does it depend8 ,the actual reality of the school lies in the fact that certain living minds are connected in a certain way4 ,teachers1 pupils1 managers1 parents1 and the public must all of them have certain operative ideas1 and must be guided according to these ideas in certain portions of their lives1 if the school is to be a school4 ,now1 the being guided by certain operative ideas is1 in other words1 the activity of certain appercipient masses dictating a certain point of view1 in so far as those particular masses are awake4 ,and it must be noted that the connection or identity in which the school exists presupposes a different activity1 that is1 a different appercipient system1 in every mind1 and more especially in every class of mind concerned4 ,it is the same as in our old example of the screw and the nut4 ,no school could be made of teachers alone or of pupils alone2 nor1 again1 could a school be made with teachers who were all the same1 or with pupils who were all the same4 ,so1 if we could visualise the reality of the school--the institution--what we should see would be an identical connection running through a number of minds1 various and variously conditioned4 ,but within each mind the connection would take a particular shape1 such as to play into the connections with all other minds1 as a cogwheel plays into the other cogwheels of a machine4 ,the pupil must be prepared to learn in his particular way and the teacher to teach in his particular way4 ,the parents and the public also have their #agb own relations to the work of teaching1 and whether for good or for evil they take up some attitude to it1 and their attitude modifies it4 ,thus the connection1 as it is within any one mind1 is useless and meaningless if you take it wholly apart from what corresponds to it in the others4 ,it is like a wheel without an axle or a pump handle without a pump4 ,and it is because of this nature of the elements which make up the institution that it is possible for the institution itself to be an identity1 or connection1 or meeting point1 by which many minds are bound together in a single system4 ,it may seem as if this way of analysing an institution was reducing a solid fact into mere thoughts4 ,but it is not really so4 ,taking the ideas of all concerned as they really are1 we have the facts in space and time--buildings1 appliances1 hours of work and attendance1 and so on--included in them4 ,it is impossible to state the idea fully and correctly without including the environment on which it rests1 and the activities in which it is realised4 ,we are not to omit the facts in space and time from what we mean by an institution2 the only thing is that we have not known them as they really are till we have known them as bound into unity by the mental systems of which they are the context or the expression4 ,the child and the teacher alike must think of their work with reference to particular times and places1 or they would not do it at those times and places2 and it is only in actually doing it at those times and places that the idea1 or point of view1 which stands for the school in each of their minds1 is able to assert itself without frustration4 #agc ,thus we may fairly say that every social group1 or institution1 is the aspect in space and time of a set of corresponding mental systems in individual minds4 ,we may draw corollaries from this conception1 both as to the nature of the individual will1 or active mind1 and as to the nature of the social and political whole4 7ii47 ,every individual mind1 in so far as it thinks and acts in definite schemes or contexts1 is a structure of appercipient systems or organised dispositions4 ,now1 we do not suggest at present that all appercipient systems can be represented as social groups1 though there are few1 if any1 such systems which do not involve some relations with persons connected in time and space4 ,but it is clear1 from the explanations of the last section1 that every social group or institution involves a system of appercipient systems1 by which the minds that take part in it are kept in correspondence4 ,every individual mind1 then1 so far as it takes part in social groupings or institutions1 is a structure of appercipient systems1 answering1 each to each1 to the different capacities in which it enters into each grouping respectively4 ,we have already remarked on the way in which the distinction between different 8capacities0 answers to the psychological tendency for the activity of one appercipient system to obstruct the activity of all others4 ,it is hardly necessary to point out that1 partly for this reason1 though the mind must be an actual structure of systems1 it is very far from being a rational system of systems4 ,the fact that1 when one system is active1 all others1 as a rule1 are inert1 conceals the contradictions which #agd underlie the entire fabric1 and protects them from criticism and correction4 ,but though the mind is thus implicitly self-contradictory in various degrees1 this does not alter the fact that its general nature is to be a unity of organised ideas answering to the actual set of parts which the individual plays in the world of space and time4 ,thus each individual mind1 if we consider it as a whole1 is an expression or reflection of society as a whole from a point of view which is distinctive and unique4 ,every social factor or relation1 to which it in any way corresponds1 or in which it in any way plays its part1 is represented in some feature of its appercipient organism4 ,and probably1 just as1 in any man's idea of ,london1 there is hardly any factor of ,london life which does not at least colour the background1 so1 in every individual impression of the social whole1 there is no social feature that does not1 in one way or another1 contribute to the total effect4 ,in the dispositions of every mind the entire social structure is reflected in a unique form1 and it is on this reflection in every mind1 and on the uniqueness of the form in which it is reflected1 that the working of the social whole1 by means of differences which play into one another1 depends4 ,if1 so to speak1 we lay a mind on the dissecting table1 we find it to consist for the most part of a fabric of organised dispositions1 each disposition corresponding to a unique point of view or special angle #a from which it plays a part in some human function4 ,about the precise relation of a human function to the fact that1 as a #age rule1 it connects together a plurality of human beings1 we shall have more to say in the following chapter4 ,it is enough for the present that whatever does connect a plurality of human beings depends on the operation of appercipient systems in their minds1 and therefore every individual mind is1 as ,plato has told us1 so far as it goes1 for good or evil1 the true effective reality of the social whole4 ,and it is easy to see when we consider the working of organised apperception1 how it is possible actually to will more or less of our own volitional system4 ,there is first the contrast between appercipient systems which are at any time active and those which are not active1 and then there is the contrast between our actual volitional nature at its actual fullest1 and the demands implied by the nature of the whole1 from which it is inseparable4 ,these demands are always appearing more or less in every act of willing our own will4 #a ,i owe this comparison to a lecture by ,prof4 ,s4 ,alexander4 7iii47 ,the social whole1 regarded from a corresponding point of view1 would be a whole consisting of psychical dispositions and their activities1 answering to one another in determinate ways4 ,it would therefore be of the nature of a continuous or self-identical being1 pervading a system of differences and realised only in them4 ,it differs from a machine1 or from what is called an 8organism0 pure and simple1 by the presence of the whole in every part1 not merely for the inference of the observer1 but1 in some degree1 for the part itself1 through the action of consciousness4 ,but it would be a mistake1 we should observe at this point1 to identify the presence of #agf the whole for the part by means of consciousness1 with the consciousness of the part that the whole is present to it4 ,the latter is a speculative idea1 the former is a fact which embodies this idea for the observing theorist1 but not necessarily or usually for the working consciousness itself4 ,in the shape of our minds and their adjustment to our work1 of which we are unconscious1 there is an irreducible analogy between human society and the lower organisms4 ,the consciousness which guides our lives is a consciousness of something1 but not as a rule a consciousness of the place of that something in the whole of life4 ,we live in our objects1 but we do not know how or how far our objects identify us with the whole to which we ultimately belong4 ,it is plain that the social whole can1 in practice1 only be complete in a plurality of individuals4 ,we know that in the development of human nature1 which we take as the ultimate standard of life1 no one individual can cover the whole ground4 ,as in the natural world in space and time1 so1 in the world of human beings which on one side belongs to it1 differentiation implies dispersion into a plurality of centres4 ,the same man1 according to what seems to be the limit of physical and psychical possibility1 could not be both ,plato and ,aristotle1 nor both ,greek and ,jew1 not even both ,spartan and ,athenian1 not to say both man and woman4 ,we are on less secure ground when we say that he could not1 effectively and as a rule1 be both statesman and shoemaker1 or soldier and clergyman4 ,it is plain that in some cases capacities may be united which in other cases are found apart4 #agg ,the same man may be a good architect and a good workman1 or again1 the architect and the workman may be different persons1 though suited to work together4 ,we may reply1 of course1 that whatever abilities lie within one personality1 effective work demands the division of labour4 ,this is true1 but is obviously a matter of degree4 ,the man who does only one thing does not always do it best1 and it is not easy to say what 8one thing0 means4 ,the point of these suggestions is to make it clear that1 while plurality of human beings is necessary to enable society to cover the ground1 as it were1 which human nature is capable of covering1 yet actual individuals are not ultimate or equal embodiments of the true particulars of the social universal4 ,we thus see once more that the given individual is only in making1 and that his reality may lie largely outside him4 ,his will is not a whole1 but implies and rests upon a whole1 which is therefore the true nature of his will4 ,we also gain some light on the unity of the social mind4 ,for it seems plain that one actual human being may cover the ground1 which1 in other instances1 it takes many men to occupy4 ,and in some such examples--not1 or not obviously1 in those where a high intensity of genius is the essential quality--there seems little reason to distinguish the correlation of dispositions within the one person from the correlation of the same dispositions if dispersed among different persons4 ,if ,i am my own gardener1 or my own critic1 or my own doctor1 does the relation of the answering dispositions within my being differ absolutely and altogether from what #agh takes place when gardener and master1 critic and author1 patient and doctor1 are different persons8 ,my instructions to my gardener are conveyed in language1 it will be said1 while ,i know my own wishes directly4 ,and this is not the place to press the problem home either psychologically or metaphysically4 ,but1 just to induce reflection1 it may be asked whether my instructions to myself are not as a rule conveyed and remembered in language4 ,if we consider my unity with myself at different times as the limiting case1 #a we shall find it very hard to establish a difference of principle between the unity of what we call one mind and that of all the 8minds0 which enter into a single social experience4 #a ,cp4 p4 #aaj above4 ,in any case1 we have said enough to suggest that ,society prima facie exists in the correlated dispositions by which a plurality of individual minds meets the need for covering the ground open to human nature1 by division of labour in the fullest sense4 ,but we have further pointed out that the true particularisation of the human universal does not necessarily coincide with the distinction between different persons1 and that the correlation of differences and the identity which they constitute remain much the same whether they chance to fall within a single human being1 or to be dispersed over several4 ,the stress seems1 therefore1 to lie on the attainment of the true particularisation which does justice to the maximum of human capacity1 rather than on the mere relations which arise between the members of a de facto plurality4 ,not that the presence of human nature in any #agi individual does not constitute a claim that it shall be perfected in him1 but that its perfecting must be judged by a criticism addressed to determining real capacities1 and not by the accidental standard of a given plurality4 ,we shall pursue these ideas further in the following chapter4 #ahj ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,end ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,and ,,consequent ,,limit ,,of ,,state ,,action4 #a4 ,according to the course of thought which we have been pursuing1 the distinction between the individual on the one hand1 and the social or political whole on the other1 is not relevant to the question where the 8end0 of man in ,society is to be sought4 ,for the conceptions of ,society and the ,individual are correlative conceptions through and through2 at whatever level1 therefore1 we take the one1 we are bound to construe the other as at the same level2 so that1 to distinguish the one element from the other as superior from inferior1 or as means from end1 becomes a contradiction in terms4 ,if we begin by drawing boundaries round the individual1 the boundaries which we draw reproduce themselves in society conceived as a total of such individuals1 and the question of means and end1 as we saw in ,bentham's case1 #a takes the form whether 8each0 is the means to the welfare of 8all10 or 8all0 to the welfare of 8each02 the distinction thus becoming purely verbal4 ,while1 if we set no limit to individuality1 except the limit of the nature #aha which makes it contributory to the social universal1 then we find that the advancements of the universal and of its differences vary together1 and are indeed one and the same thing4 ,it is idle to think of dissociating them as means and end4 #a ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the only way in which the idea of means and end can be applied to the social whole and its parts1 is to take ,society when at its lower level1 being dealt with under the aspect of mere plurality1 as a means to what it is at its higher level1 when realised as a communion of individualities at their best4 ,but from this point of view we get no distinction of means and end as between ,individuals and ,society4 ,what we get is ,individuals and ,society alike1 as understood and partly existing at one level 7that of commonplace ,individualism and ,collectivism71 taken as a means to both ,individuals and ,society at a higher level4 ,as we have seen1 the only true explanation of self-government is to throw the reality of the self outside what passes for its average nature1 and in this sense the average nature may be treated as a means to the truer or fuller self--as something1 that is to say1 which is instrumental to the latter1 and has no rights against it4 #b4 ,for us1 then1 the ultimate end of ,society and the ,state as of the individual is the realisation of the best life4 ,the difficulty of defining the best life does not trouble us1 because we rely throughout on the fundamental logic of human nature qua rational4 ,we think ourselves no more called upon to specify in advance what will be the details of the life which satisfies an intelligent being as such1 than we are called upon to specify in advance #ahb what will be the details of the knowledge which satisfies an intelligent being as such4 ,wherever a human being touches practice1 as wherever he touches theory1 we find him driven on by his intolerance of contradictions towards shaping his life as a whole4 ,what we mean by 8good0 and 8truth0 is practical and theoretical experience in so far as the logic which underlies man's whole nature permits him to repose in it4 ,and the best life is the life which has most of this general character--the character which1 so far as realised1 satisfies the fundamental logic of man's capacities4 ,now1 it is plain that this best life can only be realised in consciousness1 that being the medium of all satisfaction and the only true type of a whole in experience4 ,and all consciousness1 as experienced by man1 is on one side particular1 attached to bodies1 and exclusive of consciousnesses attached to other bodies4 ,in a sense1 it is true that no one consciousness can partake of or actually enter into another4 ,thus1 it is apt to be held1 as we have amply seen1 that the essential danger of ,state interference lies in the intrusion of something originated by 8others0 upon a distinct particular consciousness1 whose distinction and particularity--its freedom--are thus impaired4 ,it is all-important to our point of view that this prejudice should be dispelled4 ,force or automatic custom or authoritative tradition or 8suggestion0 are not hostile to one individuality because they come from 8others10 but because their nature is contradictory to the nature of the highest self-assertion of mind1 because they are1 so to speak1 in a medium incompatible with its medium4 ,they #ahc are just as hostile to this self-assertion1 just as alien1 if they emanate1 as they constantly do1 from conflicting elements in our complex private experience1 as if they come to us1 as we say1 8from without40 ,the question is of their 8nature0 and tendency1 not of their centre of origin4 ,individuals are limited and isolated in many ways4 ,but their true individuality does not lie in their isolation1 but in that distinctive act or service by which they pass into unique contributions to the universal4 ,true individuality1 as we have said1 is not in the minimisation which forbids further subdivision1 but in the maximisation which includes the greatest possible being in an inviolable unity4 ,it is not1 therefore1 the intrusion upon isolation1 as such1 that interferes with individuality2 it is the intrusion1 upon a growing unity of consciousness1 of a medium hostile to its growth4 ,but we have seen that force1 automatism1 and suggestion1 are in some ways necessary to the support and maintenance of the human consciousness1 owing to its animal limitations4 ,they are1 indeed1 as is well known1 the condition of its progress4 ,therefore1 in promoting the best life1 these aids must be employed by society as exercising absolute power--viz41 by the ,state4 ,and the problem presented by their employment is not a question of the 8interference of the ,state with the ,individual0--an antithesis which is strictly meaningless2 but it is a question how far and in what way the use of force and the like by the ,state is a hindrance to the end for which the ,state itself exists4 ,in other words1 it is to be ascertained how far the fullest self-assertion of the social #ahd universal in its differences--the best life--can be promoted or is likely to be endangered by means which are of a different order1 and so in some circumstances opposed to it4 ,the point is not that ,i and some thousands more break in by force upon you in particular and violate your isolation2 but that such breaking in by force1 whoever does it and whoever suffers by it1 and even if through passion or obsession you do it to yourself and ,i to myself1 is hostile prima facie to the living logic of the will1 which alone can create a unity and realise a best4 ,how then1 and under what reservations1 in the complicated conflict of the fuller and narrower self1 can this dangerous drug of violence be administered1 so to speak1 as a counter-poison to tendencies which would otherwise give no chance to the logical will8 ,with this difficulty in our minds1 we will endeavour to determine the general principle on which force and menace should be used by the ,state1 and a routine be mechanically maintained by it4 #c4 ,we have hitherto spoken of the ,state and ,society as almost convertible terms4 #a ,and in fact it is part of our argument that the influences of ,society differ only in degree from the powers of the ,state1 and that the explanation of both is ultimately the same4 ,but on the other hand1 it is also part of our argument that the ,state as such is a necessary factor in civilised life2 and that no true ideal lies in the direction of minimising its individuality or restricting its absolute power4 ,by the ,state1 then1 we mean ,society as a unit1 recognised as rightly exercising control over its members #ahe through absolute physical power4 ,the limits of the unit are1 of course1 determined by what looks like historical accident2 but there is logic underneath the apparent accident1 and the most tremendous political questions turn upon the delimitation of political units4 ,a principle1 so to speak1 of political parsimony--entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem1 8two organisations will not survive when one can do the work0--is always tending to expand the political unit4 ,the limits of the common experience necessary for effective self-government are always operating to control this expansion4 ,we might therefore suggest1 as a principle determining the area of states1 8the widest territorial area compatible with the unity of experience which is demanded by effective self-government40 ,but the ,state de facto 7which is also de jure7 is the ,society which is recognised as exercising compulsory power over its members1 and as presenting itself qua a single independent corporation among other independent corporations4 ,without such power1 or where1 if anywhere1 it does not exist1 there can be no ultimate and effective adjustment of the claims of individuals1 and of the various social groups in which individuals are involved4 ,it is the need for this ultimate effective adjustment which constitutes the need that every individual in civilised life should belong to one state1 and to one only4 ,otherwise his 8real0 will might have no working representative at all1 but all be sheer conflict4 ,that ,society1 then1 is a ,state1 which is habitually recognised as a unit lawfully exercising force4 ,we saw that the characteristics of ,society pass gradually into those of the ,state4 ,it would not be true that #aif ,society is a ,state only as actually exercising force2 but it would perhaps be true to say that ,state action as such1 though far from being limited to the downright exercise of force1 yet consists of all that side of social action which depends on the character of ultimate arbiter and regulator1 maintainer of mechanical routine1 and source of authoritative suggestion1 a character which is one with the right to exercise force in the last resort4 #a ,see1 however1 p4 #aej ff4 ,the end of the ,state1 then1 is the end of ,society and of the ,individual--the best life1 as determined by the fundamental logic of the will4 ,the means at its disposal1 qua ,state1 always partake of the nature of force1 though this does not exclude their having other aspects as well4 ,taxation may have the most reasonable and even the most popular purpose1 yet the generality and justice of its incidence1 and the certainty of its productiveness1 can only be secured by compulsion4 ,no ,state could undertake its work on the basis of voluntary contributions4 ,a universal end1 we might say1 is indeed not a mere general rule2 but you cannot carry out a universal end in a plurality of units--and a set of human individuals is always in one aspect a plurality of units--without enforcing general rules4 #d4 ,here1 then1 we have our problem more closely determined than in the previous chapters4 ,there we saw1 in general1 that self-government can have no meaning unless we can 8really0 will something which we do not always 8actually0 will4 ,and we were led to look for a clue to our real or implied will in the social spirit as incorporated in laws and institutions1 that is to say in ,society as a #ahg working whole reflected in the full system of the consciousnesses which composed it4 ,we supposed ourselves prepared1 then1 it would seem1 to do and suffer anything which would promote the best life of the whole--that maximisation of our being which1 from the nature of our real will1 we saw to be imperative upon us--a demand implied in every volition and from which we could never escape4 ,but now we are face to face with the question what we are called upon to do or to suffer1 as members of a ,state1 in promotion of the best life4 ,we have here to renew1 from another standpoint1 the discussions of chapter iii4 ,the governing fact of the situation is that the means of action at our disposal as members of a ,state are not1 on their distinctive side1 in pari materia with the end4 ,it is true that the ,state1 as an intelligent system1 can appeal by reasoning and persuasion to the logical will as such4 ,it constantly does so in various forms1 and a ,state which did nothing of the kind either directly or indirectly would not possess the recognition which is necessary to its very existence4 ,so far its work is in pari materia with the end1 being a direct element in the expansion of mind and character in their own spiritual medium of thought and will4 ,but this side of its work is not distinctive of the ,state1 and1 therefore1 is not that for which more particularly it exists4 ,its distinctive attribute is to be ultimate arbiter and regulator of claims1 the guarantor of life as at least a workable system in the bodily world4 ,it is in its ultimateness de facto that the differentia lies which separates it from the innumerable #ahh other groupings and associations which go to make up our complex life4 ,this is shown in the fact that each of us1 as we have said1 must belong to a ,state1 and can belong to one only4 ,for an ultimate authority must be single4 ,now1 authority which is to be ultimate in a sphere including the world of bodily action1 must be an authority which can use force4 ,and it is for this reason that1 as we said1 force is involved in the distinctive attributes of the ,state4 ,but force is not in pari materia with the expansion of mind and character in their spiritual medium4 ,and1 thus1 there at once appears an inadequacy of means to end as between the distinctive modus operandi of the ,state and the end in virtue of which it claims to represent the 8real0 will4 ,what is the bearing of this inadequacy8 ,what is the most that the ,state1 in its distinctive capacity1 can do towards promoting a form of life which it recognises as desirable8 ,its direct power is limited to securing the performance of external #a actions4 ,this does not mean merely the performance of outward bodily movements1 such as might be brought to pass by actual physical force4 ,it is remarkable that actual physical force plays a very small part in the work of any decently ordered ,state4 ,when we say that the ,state can do no more than secure the performance of external actions1 we do not exclude from the action the intention to act in a certain way4 ,with out such an intention there is no action in the sense of human action at all1 but merely a muscular movement4 ,it is necessary for the ,state to attach #ahi importance to intention1 which is involved in the idea of human action1 and is the only medium through which the muscular movements of human beings can be determined with any degree of certainty4 ,the ,state1 then1 through its authority1 backed ultimately by physical force1 can produce1 with a fair degree of certainty1 the intention to act in a certain way1 and therefore the actions themselves4 ,why do we call intentional actions1 so produced1 external actions only8 #a ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 pp4 #cd1 #ce4 ,it is because the ,state is unable to determine that the action shall be done from the ground or motive which alone would give it immediate value or durable certainty as an element in the best life4 ,on the contrary1 in so far as the doing of the action is due to the distinctive mode of operation which belongs to the ,state1 due1 that is to say1 to the hope of reward or the fear of punishment1 its value as an element in the best life is ipso facto destroyed1 except in so far as its ulterior effects are concerned4 ,an action performed in this sense under compulsion is not a true part of the will4 #a ,it is an intention adopted from submissiveness or selfishness1 and lacks not only the moral value1 but what is partly the same thing1 the reliable constancy of principle1 displayed in an action which arises out of the permanent purposes of a life4 #a ,the theory of punishment will modify this proposition in some degree4 ,the ,state1 then1 as such1 can only secure the performance of external actions4 ,that is to say1 it can only enforce as much intention #a as is #aij necessary to ensure1 on the whole1 compliance with requirements stated in terms of movements affecting the outer world4 ,so far from promoting the performance of actions which enter into the best life1 its operations1 where effective1 must directly narrow the area of such actions by stimulating lower motives as regards some portion of it4 #a ,on this question vide ,green's very thorough discussion4 ,it is true1 of course1 that the law takes account of intention1 and does not1 e4g41 treat accidental homicide as murder1 the difference between them being a difference of intention4 ,but it is obvious that1 in attempting to influence human action at all1 so much account as this must be taken of intention2 for intention is necessary to constitute a human action4 ,an unintentional movement of the muscles cannot be guarded against by laws and penalties2 it is only through the intention that deterrent or other motives can get at the action1 and a constant law-abiding disposition is the best security for law-abiding action4 ,on the importance of intention and disposition as affording a certainty of action1 ,bentham1 who wholly rejects judgment according to moral motive1 is as emphatic as possible4 #e4 ,the ,state1 then1 in its distinctive capacity1 has no agency at its command for influencing conduct1 but such as may be used to produce an external course of behaviour by the injunction or prohibition of external acts1 in enforcing which acts the ,state will take note of intentions1 so far as it can infer them1 because it is only through them that its influence can be exerted4 ,the relation of such a means to the imperative end1 on which we have seen that political obligation depends1 must be in a certain sense negative4 ,the means is one which cannot directly promote the end1 and which even tends to narrow its sphere4 ,what it can effect is to remove obstacles1 to destroy conditions hostile to the realisation of the end4 ,this brings us back to a principle laid down by ,kant1 #a and in its bare statement strongly resembling ,mill's contention4 ,when force is opposed to #aia freedom1 a force that repels that force is right4 ,here1 of course1 all depends upon what we mean by freedom1 and in what sense we think that force can hinder hindrances to it4 ,if freedom meant for us the empty hexagon #b round each individual1 the principle would take us back to ,mill's ,liberty4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we failed to grasp the discrepancy between force of any kind and the positive nature of the common good which we take to be freedom1 the principle would lead us straight to a machine-made ,utopia4 ,for its negative character cannot restrain it from some degree of positive action4 ,it is only through positive operation that a negation or opposition can find reality in the world4 ,and the limits of its positive action must depend on the precise bearings of the negation which it puts in force4 #a ,w41 ix4 #cd4 ,fichte remarked on the pregnancy of this principle4 #b ,see p4 #gb1 above4 ,now1 for us1 after the explanations which have been given1 the negative nature of our principle is to be seriously pressed1 although its action has to take positive form4 ,the ,state is in its right when it forcibly hinders hindrance to the best life or common good4 ,in hindering such hindrances it will indeed do positive acts4 ,it may try to hinder illiteracy and intemperance by compelling education and by municipalising the liquor traffic4 ,why not1 it will be asked1 hinder also unemployment by universal employment1 over-crowding by universal house-building1 and immorality by punishing immoral and rewarding moral actions8 ,here comes the value of remembering that1 according to our principle1 ,state action is negative in its immediate bearing1 though positive both in its #aib actual doings and its ultimate purpose4 ,on every problem the question must recur1 8,is the proposed measure bona fide confined to hindering a hindrance1 or is it attempting direct promotion of the common good by force80 ,for it is to be borne in mind throughout that whatever acts are enforced are1 so far as the force operates1 withdrawn from the higher life4 ,the promotion of morality by force1 for instance1 is an absolute self-contradiction4 #a ,no general principle will tell us how in particular to solve this subtle question1 apart from common sense and special experience4 ,but there is perhaps more to be learned from this principle1 if approached with bona fides #b than from most generalities of philosophy on social or ethical topics4 ,it is well1 ,i think1 constantly to apply the idea of removing hindrances1 in criticism of our efforts to promote the best life by means involving compulsion4 ,we ought1 as a rule1 when we propose action involving compulsion1 to be able to show a definite tendency to growth1 or a definite reserve of capacity1 which is frustrated by a known impediment1 the removal of which is a small matter compared to the capacities to be set free4 #c ,for it should be remarked that #aic every act done by the public power has one aspect of encroachment1 however slight1 on the sphere of character and intelligence1 if only by using funds raised by taxation1 or by introducing an automatic arrangement into life4 ,it can1 therefore1 only be justified if it liberates resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment which it involves4 ,this relation is altogether perversely presented1 as we saw above1 if it is treated as an encroachment of society upon individuals4 ,all this is beside the mark4 ,the serious point is1 that it is an interference1 so far as compulsion operates in it1 of one type of action with another and higher type of action2 of automatism1 so to speak1 with intelligent volition4 ,the higher type of action1 the embodiment of the common good in logical growth1 is so far from being merely individual as opposed to social1 that it is the whole end and purpose in the name of which allegiance to society can be demanded from any individual4 ,as in the private so in the general life1 every encroachment of automatism must be justified by opening new possibilities to self-conscious development1 if it is not to mean degeneration and senility4 #a 8,you will admit10 it was once said1 8that compulsory religion is better than no religion40 8,i fail to see the distinction0 was the reply4 #b ,among true students bona fides is presupposed4 ,the range opened to sophistry by a principle of this kind1 which commends positive action with a negative bearing for a positive end1 is1 of course1 immeasurable4 ,practically1 ,i believe that bona fides is about the first and last necessity for the application of political ideas4 #c ,perhaps ,i may adduce an instance of real interest4 ,it has been argued that ship-masters should be induced by a premium to ship boys as apprentices to the trade of seamanship1 and that training for this trade should be fostered by local authorities like any other form of technical education4 ,the argument which really told in the discussion1 consisted of statistics which seemed to prove a wide-spread eagerness on the part of boys and their parents that they should enter a maritime life1 and the existence of a hindrance simply in the absence of adequate training for a few years during boyhood4 ,it is the same principle in other words which ,green lays down when he says in effect #a that only such acts 7or omissions7 should be enforced by the public power as it is better should take place #aid from any motive whatever than not take place at all4 ,when1 that is1 we enforce an act 7or omission7 by law1 we should be prepared to say1 8granting that this act1 which might conceivably have come to be done from a sense of duty1 now may come to be done for the most part from a fear of punishment1 or from a mechanical tendency to submit to external rules 7attended by the practical inconveniences of insensibility1 half-heartedness1 and evasion which attach to acts so enforced71 still so much depends1 for the higher life of the people1 upon the external conditions at stake1 that we think it worth while to enforce the act 7or omission7 though our eyes are fully open to the risk of extended automatism40 #a ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #ch4 ,here we may have to meet our own arguments against ,mill4 8,you said it was a contradiction10 we shall be told1 8to admit coercion as a means to liberty4 ,but here you are advocating coercion as a means to something as incompatible with it1 in so far as it is operative1 as our #8liberty1' viz41 a certain state of mind and will4 ,if the area of coercion is necessarily subtracted from the area of liberty1 as you argued above1 is not the area of coercion necessarily subtracted from that to be occupied by the desired growth of will and character80 ,the answer depends1 as we indicated in ch4 iii41 on the difference between bare liberty and a determinate growth4 ,if your liberty is wholly indeterminate1 then every restraint is a reduction of it4 ,you cannot increase a quantity which is all of one kind by taking away a part of it4 ,and1 in fact1 the idea that there was or could have #aie been a previous general liberty1 of which a part was given up in exchange for more1 is a mere illusion4 ,liberty has grown up within the positive determinations of life1 as they have expanded and come to fit mankind better4 ,but if the quantity to be increased is a determinate growth1 of a type whose general character is known1 the problem is transformed4 ,it is the commonest of experiences that hindrances can be removed and favourable conditions maintained1 if this has to be done1 not with a view to every conceivable and inconceivable development1 but for a growth the general line of which is known4 ,in this case1 as the whole expands1 the restraints and the liberty1 the room for action1 may even increase together4 #a ,this is not only true in universal theory1 but much more important than is always remembered in special theory or practice4 ,the possibility of promoting freedom or well-being by compulsion depends very greatly indeed on the unity of habit and experience which binds together a single community4 ,the more the life has in common1 the more definite and automatic arrangements you may safely make in promotion of it4 ,the rules of my household1 which inconvenience its members no more than their clothes do1 would produce a rebellion if they were enforced by law even throughout our village4 #a ,see the author's essay1 8,liberty and ,legislation10 in ,civilisation of ,christendom 7,sonnenschein74 ,thus1 then1 we may maintain our principle of the limits of distinctive ,state action4 ,the peculiarity of it is that it allows of positive acts and interferences1 motived by an ultimate positive #aif purpose1 but with a bearing on that purpose which is primarily negative or indirect4 ,however positive1 as actual facts1 are the conditions which it may become advisable to maintain1 they may always1 on the side which is distinctively due to ,state compulsion1 be regarded as the hindrance of hindrances4 ,and the bona-fide application of this principle will really be1 when aided by special experience1 in some degree a valuable clue to what ought to be done4 ,it is only putting in other words the rule of action followed by all practical men in matters of which they have genuine experience4 ,we may think1 for instance1 of the problem involved in ,state maintenance of universities4 ,it is easy to vote money1 to build buildings1 and to pass statutes4 ,but none of these things will secure the objects of a university4 ,money and buildings and statutes may throw open an arena1 so to speak1 for the work of willing minds in learning and education4 ,but the work itself is in a different medium from anything which can be produced by compulsion1 and is so far less vital as it is conditioned by the operation of force upon minds which demand no work of the kind4 ,but here we meet a difficulty of principle4 ,do we say that no external conditions are more than hindrances of hindrances to the best life8 ,do we deny that the best life can be positively promoted by external conditions2 or if we admit this1 do we still deny that it can be positively promoted by the work of the ,state8 ,the answer has already been implied1 but may be explicitly restated4 ,we refused #a to separate mind from its embodiment in #aig material things1 and so to be drawn into a purely inward theory of morality1 ,it would be exaggeration to call such external conditions as1 e4g41 first-rate educational apparatus1 #b mere negative conditions of the best life4 ,but then1 we are now asked1 cannot the ,state supply such external conditions by expenditure compulsorily provided for1 and if so1 is not our principle destroyed1 viz41 the limitation of ,state action to the hindrance of hindrances8 #a ,page #ca4 #b ,see ,thring on the importance of this1 in ,parkin's life of him4 ,note1 however1 also the modification of his view by the adventure of ,uppingham on the ,sea4 ,the difficulty springs from the fact1 that the ,state1 as using compulsion1 is only one side of ,society1 and its action is only one side of social action4 ,if first-rate educational apparatus is called into existence by a ,state endowment1 the first-rateness of the apparatus is not due to the compulsion applied to taxpayers1 which rather1 so far1 negatives the action of intelligent will as such4 ,but it must be due1 in one way or another1 to the fact that first-rate ability in the way of devising apparatus was somewhere pressing for an outlet1 which1 by a stroke of the pickaxe1 so to speak1 the public power was able to provide for it4 ,we must not confuse the element of compulsion1 which is the side of social action distinctly belonging to ,state interference1 with the whole of the material results which liberated intelligence produces4 ,when we say1 then1 that the ,state as such can do nothing for the best life but hinder hindrances to it1 the principle applies in the strictest sense only to the compulsory or automatic side of ,state action1 which #aih must1 so to speak1 be reckoned against it #a in comparing its products with those which are spontaneous social growths throughout4 #a ,subject to what will be said on the theory of rights and punishment4 ,but it is further true that material conditions which come close to life1 such as houses1 wages1 educational apparatus1 do not wholly escape our principle4 ,they occupy a very interesting middle region between mere hindrances of hindrances and the actual stimulation of mind and will4 ,on the one side they are charged with mind and character1 and so far are actual elements in the best life4 ,on the other side they depend on external actions1 and therefore seem accessible to ,state compulsion1 which extends to all external doings and omissions4 ,but what we have to observe is1 and it is in practice most important1 that1 as charged with mind and will1 these material facts may not be accessible to ,state compulsion1 while1 as accessible to ,state compulsion pure and simple1 they may forfeit their character of being charged with mind and will4 ,this shows itself in two ways4 ,first1 just because they are facts of a kind which come so close to life 7in other words depend so greatly upon being charged with mind and will71 ,state compulsion cannot with certainty secure even their apparent existence4 ,they fail bodily1 like human beings1 if there is no spirit to keep them alive4 ,the relation of wages to the standard of life illustrates this point4 ,secondly1 supposing that for a time1 by herculean efforts of compulsion1 which must call active intelligence to its aid1 such facts are made to present a satisfactory appearance of existence1 none the less1 #aii so far as they are characterised by compulsion1 they may lose their character as elements in the best life4 ,that is to say1 they may fail to benefit those whom they are meant to benefit4 ,the fact may fail to be absorbed in the life4 ,the principle of the hindrance of hindrances is most valuable and luminous when rightly grasped1 just in these middle cases4 ,a pretty and healthy house1 which its inhabitant is fond of1 is an element in the best life4 ,who could doubt it who knows what home-life is8 ,but in order that putting a family out of a bad house into a good one should give rise to such an element of the best life1 it is strictly and precisely necessary that the case or policy should come under our principle4 ,that is to say1 unless there was a better life struggling to utter itself1 and the deadlift of interference just removed an obstacle which bound it down1 the good house will not be an element in a better life1 and the encroachment on the ground of volition will have been made with out compensation--a fact which may show itself in many fatal ways4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the struggling tendency to a better life has power #a to effect the change without the deadlift from outside1 then the result is certain and wholly to the good4 #a ,many forms of social co-operation1 it must be remembered1 need no deadlift from the ,state as such4 ,we are not setting self-help against co-operation1 but will against automatism4 ,thus we may say that every law and institution1 every external fact maintained by the public power1 must be judged by the degree in which it sets at liberty a growth of mind and spirit4 ,it is a #bjj problem partly of removing obstacles to growth1 and partly of the division of labour between consciousness and automatism4 ,it ought to occur to the reader that the ground here assigned for the limitation of ,state action--that is1 of social action through the public power--is not prima facie in harmony with the account of political obligation1 according to which laws and institutions represented a real self or general will1 recognised by individuals as implied in the common good which was imperative upon them4 ,we spoke1 for example1 of being forced to be free1 and of the system of law and order as representing the higher self4 ,and yet we are now saying that1 in as far as force is operative through compulsion and authoritative suggestion1 it is a means which can only reach its end through a negation4 ,but this prima-facie contradiction is really a proof of the vitality of our principle4 ,it follows from the fact that we accept self-government in the full strength of both its factors1 and can deal with it on this basis4 ,the social system under which we live1 taking it as one which does not demand immediate revolution1 represents the general will and higher self as a whole to the community as a whole1 and can only stand by virtue of that representation being recognised4 ,our loyalty to it makes us men and citizens1 and is the main spiritualising force of our lives4 ,but something in all of us1 and much in some of us1 is recalcitrant through rebellion1 indolence1 incompetence1 or ignorance4 ,and it is only on these elements that the public power operates as power1 through compulsion #bja or authoritative suggestion4 ,thus1 the general will when it meets us as force1 and authority resting on force1 and not as a social obligation which we spontaneously rise to accept1 comes to us ex hypothesi as something which claims to be ourself1 but which1 for the moment1 we more or less fail to recognise4 ,and1 according to the adjustment between it and our complex and largely unintelligent self1 it may abandon us to automatism1 or stir in us rebellion or recognition1 and so may hinder the fuller life in us or remove hindrances to it4 ,it seems worth while to distinguish two main cases of the relation between the ordinary self and the general will4 ,one of these cases covers the whole of our every-day law-abiding life1 in its grades of active loyalty1 acceptance of suggestion1 and automatic acquiescence2 and consists of the relation of our ordinary self to the general system of rights maintained by the ,state as ultimate regulator and arbiter4 ,the other is confined to more exceptional situations1 and has to do with collision between the particular and the general will1 as treated in the theory of punishment4 ,the subject of reward may be mentioned at the same time1 if only to show why it is almost an empty heading in political theory4 ,we will end this chapter1 therefore1 with a general account of the system of rights and of reward and punishment4 #f4 ,the idea of individual rights comes down to us from the doctrine of natural right1 and has generally been discussed with reference to it4 ,we need not now go back upon the illusions connected with the notion of natural right4 ,it is enough if we bear in mind that we inherit from it the important #bjb idea of a positive law which is what it ought to be4 ,a right1 #a then1 has both a legal and a moral reference4 ,it is a claim which can be enforced at law1 which no moral imperative can be2 but it is also recognised to be a claim which ought to be capable of enforcement at law1 and thus it has a moral aspect4 ,the case in which positive enactment and the moral 8ought0 appear to diverge will be considered below4 ,but a typical 8right0 unites the two sides4 ,it both is1 and ought to be1 capable of being enforced at law4 #a ,this is a right in the fullest sense4 ,the nature of a merely legal or merely moral right will be illustrated below4 ,its peculiar position follows from what we have seen to be the end of the ,state1 and the means at its disposal4 ,the end of the ,state is a moral purpose1 imperative on its members4 ,but its distinctive action is restricted to removing hindrances to the end1 that is1 to lending its force to overcome--both in mind and in externals essential to mind--obstacles which otherwise would obstruct the realisation of the end4 ,the whole of the conditions thus enforced is the whole of 8rights0 attaching to the selves1 who1 standing in definite relations1 constitute the community4 ,for it is in these selves that the end of the ,state is real1 and it is by maintaining and regulating their claims to the removal of obstructions that the ,state is able to promote the end for which it exists4 ,rights then are claims recognised by the ,state1 i4e4 by ,society acting as ultimate authority1 to the maintenance of conditions favourable to the best life4 ,and if we ask in general for a definition and limitation of ,state action as such1 the answer is1 in a simple #bjc phrase1 that ,state action is coincident with the maintenance of rights4 ,the system of rights which the ,state maintains may be regarded from different points of view4 ,first1 7a7 from the point of view of the whole community1 that is1 as the general result in the promotion of good life obtained by the working of a free ,society1 as a statesman or outside critic might regard it4 ,thus looked at1 the system of rights may be described as 8the organic whole of the outward conditions necessary to the rational life10 or 8that which is really necessary to the maintenance of material conditions essential to the existence and perfection of human personality40 #a ,this point of view is essential as a full contradiction of that uncritical conception by which rights are regarded as something with which the individual is invested in his aspect of isolation1 and independently of his relation to the end4 ,it forces us away from this false particularisation1 and compels us to consider the whole ,state-maintained order in its connectedness as a single expression of a common good or will1 in so far as such a good can find utterance in a system of external acts and habits4 ,and it enables us to weigh the value which belongs to the maintenance of any tolerable social order1 simply because it is an order1 and so far enables life to be lived1 and a determinate1 if limited1 common good to be realised4 ,from other points of view we are apt to neglect this characteristic1 and to forget #bjd how great is the effect1 for the possibilities of life throughout1 of the mere fact that a social order exists4 ,hegel observes that a man thinks it a matter of course that he goes back to his house after night-fall in security4 ,he does not reflect to what he owes it4 ,yet this very naturalness1 so to speak1 of living in a social order is perhaps the most important foundation which the ,state can furnish to the better life4 8,si monumentum quaeris1 circumspice0 ,if we ask how it affects our will1 the answer is that it forms our world4 ,speaking broadly1 the members of a civilised community have seen nothing but order in their lives1 and could not accommodate their action to anything else4 #a ,krause and ,henrici1 cit4 by ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #ce4 ,cp4 8,the system of right is the realm of realised freedom1 the world of the mind produced by the mind as a second nature0 7,hegel1 ,philosophie d4 ,rechts1 sect4 #d74 ,it should be mentioned as a danger of this point of view that1 fascinated by the spectacle of the social fabric as a whole1 we may fail to distinguish what in it is the mere maintenance of rights1 and what is the growth which such maintenance can promote but cannot constitute4 ,thus we may lose all idea of the true limits of ,state action4 7b7 ,we may regard this complex of rights from the standpoint of the selves or persons who compose the community4 ,it is in these selves1 as we have seen1 that the social good is actual1 and it is to their differentiated functions1 #a which constitute their life and the end of the community1 that the sub-groupings of rights1 or conditions of good life1 have to be adjusted each to each like suits of clothes4 ,the rights are1 from this point of view1 primarily the external incidents1 so far as maintained by law--the authoritative vesture as it were--of a #bje person's position in the world of his community4 ,and we shall do well to regard the nature of rights1 as attaching to selves or persons1 from this point of view of a place or position in the order determined by law4 ,it has been argued1 ,i do not know with what justice1 that1 in considering the relations of particles in space1 the proper course would be to regard their positions or distances from each other as the primary fact1 and to treat attributions of attractive and repulsive forces as modes of expressing the maintenance of the necessary positions rather than as descriptive of real causes which bring it about4 ,at least1 it appears to me1 such a conception may well be applied to the relative ideas of right and obligation4 ,what comes first1 we may say1 is the position1 the place or places1 function or functions1 determined by the nature of the best life as displayed in a certain community1 and the capacity of the individual self for a unique contribution to that best life4 ,such places and functions are imperative2 they are the fuller self in the particular person1 and make up the particular person as he passes into the fuller self4 ,his hold on this is his true will1 in other words1 his apprehension of the general will4 ,such a way of speaking may seem unreally simplified when we look at the myriad relations of modern life and the sort of abstraction by which the individual is apt to become a rolling stone with no assignable place--indeed 8gathering no moss0--and to pass through his positions and relations as if they were stations on a railway journey4 ,but in truth it is only simplified and not falsified4 ,if we look with care we shall see that it1 or nothing1 is true of all lives4 #a ,i do not say merely social functions1 i4e4 functions dealing directly with 8others0 as such4 #bjf ,the ,position1 then1 is the real fact--the vocation1 place or function1 which is simply one reading of the person's actual self and relations in the world in which he lives4 ,having thoroughly grasped this primary fact1 we can readily deal with the points of view which present the position or its incidents in the partial aspects of rights or obligations4 7i47 ,a right1 we said1 is a claim recognised by society and enforced by the ,state4 ,my place or position1 then1 and its incidents1 so far as sanctioned by the ,state1 constitute my rights1 when thought of as something which ,i claim1 or regard as powers instrumental to my purposes4 ,a right thus regarded is not anything primary4 ,it is a way of looking at certain conditions1 which1 by reason of their relation to the end of the whole as manifested in me1 are imperative alike for me and for others4 ,it is1 further1 the particular way of looking at these conditions which is in question when ,i claim them or am presumed to claim them1 as powers secured to me with a view to an end which ,i accept as mine4 ,i have the rights no less in virtue of my presumed capacity for the end1 if ,i am in fact indifferent to the end4 ,but1 in this case1 though attributed ab extra as rights1 they tend to pass into obligations4 7ii47 ,if rights are an imperative 8position0 or function1 when looked at as a group of ,state-secured powers claimed by a person for a certain end1 obligations are the opposite aspect of such a position or group of powers4 ,that is to say1 the conditions of a 8position0 are regarded as obligations in as far as they are thought of as #bjg requiring enforcement1 and therefore1 primarily1 from the point of view of persons not directly identified with the 8position0 or end to which they are instrumental4 ,rights are claimed1 obligations are owed4 ,and prima-facie rights are claimed by a person1 and obligations are owed to a person1 being his rights as regarded by those against whom they are enforceable4 ,thus1 the distinction of self and others1 which we refused to take as the basis of society1 makes itself prominent in the region of compulsion4 ,the reason is that compulsion is confined to hindering or producing external acts1 and is excluded from producing an act in its relation to a moral end1 that is1 the exercise of a right in its true sense2 though it can enforce an act which in fact favours the possibility of acting towards a moral end that is1 an obligation4 ,this is the same thing as saying that normally a right is what ,i claim1 and the obligation relative to it is what you owe2 as an obligation is that which can be enforced1 and that is an act or omission apart from the willing of an end2 and a right involves what cannot be enforced1 viz41 the relation of an act to an end in a person's will4 ,but even here the distinction of self and others is hardly ultimate4 ,the obligation on me to maintain my parents becomes almost a right #a if ,i claim the task as #bjh a privilege4 ,and many rights of my position may actually be erected into1 or more commonly may give rise to1 obligations incumbent on me for the sake of my position or function4 ,if the exercise of the franchise were made compulsory that would be a right treated also as an obligation2 but it might be urged that qua obligation it was held due to the position of others1 and only qua right to my own 8position40 ,but if the law interferes with my poisoning myself #b either by drains or with alcohol1 that1 ,i presume1 is the enforcement of an obligation arising out of my own position and function as a man and a citizen1 which makes reasonable care for my life imperative upon me4 #a ,i do not know that ,i can compel my parents to be maintained by me1 and therefore it is not my legal right to maintain them2 but at least the obligation1 if ,i claim it1 ceases to depend on force4 ,an ,east-,end ,londoner will say1 8,he had a right to maintain his father10 meaning that he was bound to do so2 and ,jeannie ,deans says1 8,i have no right to have stories told about my family without my consent10 representing her own claim as an obligation on herself as well as on others4 ,she represents the thought1 8,i have a right that you should not tell stories1 etc410 in a form which puts it as a case of the thought1 8,you have no right to tell stories10 disregarding the distinction between herself and others as accidental4 #b ,the law used to interfere with bad sanitation only as a 8nuisance10 i4e4 as an annoyance to 8others40 ,it now interferes with any state of things dangerous to life as such1 which probably means that a change of theory has unconsciously set in4 ,legislation for dangerous trades almost proves the point1 though here it is possible to urge that the employer is put under obligation for the sake of his workers1 and not the workers for their own sake4 ,but the distinction is hardly real4 7c7 ,it is commonly said that every right implies a duty4 ,this has two meanings1 which should be distinguished4 ,in the one case1 7i47 for 8duty0 should be read 8obligation10 i4e4 a demand enforceable by law4 ,this simply means that every 8position0 may be regarded as involving either powers secured or conditions enforced1 which are one and the same thing differently looked at4 ,roughly speaking1 they are the same thing as differently looked at by one person1 and by other persons4 ,my right #bji to walk along the high road involves an obligation upon all other persons not to obstruct me1 and in the last resort the ,state will send horse1 foot and artillery rather than let me be causelessly obstructed in walking along the high road4 ,it is also true that every position which can be the source of obligations enforceable in favour of my rights is likewise a link with obligations enforceable on me in favour of the rights of others4 ,by claiming a right in virtue of my position ,i recognise and testify to the general system of law according to which ,i am reciprocally under obligation to respect the rights1 or rather the function and position1 of others4 ,my rights then imply obligations both in others1 and perhaps in myself1 correlative to these rights1 and in me correlative to the rights of others4 ,but it cannot strictly be said that the obligations are the source of the rights1 or the rights of the obligations4 ,both are the varied external conditions of 8positions0 as regarded from different points of view4 ,but 7ii47 there is a different sense in which every right implies a duty4 ,and this1 the true meaning of the phrase1 is involved in what we have said of the nature of a 8position40 ,all rights1 as claims which both are and ought to be enforceable by law1 derive their imperative authority from their relation to an end which enters into the better life4 ,all rights1 then1 are powers instrumental to making the best of human capacities1 and can only be recognised or exercised upon this ground4 ,in this sense1 the duty is the purpose with a view to which the right is secured1 and not merely #baj a corresponding obligation equally derived from a common ground2 and the right and duty are not distinguished as something claimed by self and something owed to others1 but the duty as an imperative purpose1 and the right as a power secured because instrumental to it4 7d7 ,we have treated rights throughout as claims1 the enforcement of which by the ,state is merely the climax of their recognition by society4 ,why do we thus demand recognition for rights8 ,if we deny that there can be unrecognised rights1 do we not surrender human freedom to despotism or to popular caprice8 7i47 ,in dealing with the general question why recognition is demanded as an essential of rights1 we must remember what we took to be the nature of society and the source of obligation4 ,we conceived a society to be a structure of intelligences so related as to co-operate with and to imply one another4 ,we took the source of obligation to lie in the fact that the logic of the whole is operative in every part1 and consequently that every part has a reality which goes beyond its average self1 and identifies it with the whole1 making demands upon it in doing so4 ,now1 we are said to 8recognise0 anything when it comes to us with a consciousness of familiarity1 as something in which we feel at home4 ,and this is our general attitude to the demands which the logic of the whole1 implied in our every act1 is continuously making upon us4 ,it is involved in the interdependence of minds1 which has been explained to constitute the mind of which the visible community is the body4 ,a teacher's #baa behaviour towards his pupils1 for example1 implies a certain special kind of interdependence between their minds4 ,what he can do for them is conditioned by what they expect of him and are ready to do for him1 and vice versa4 ,the relation of each to the other is a special form of 8recognition40 ,that is to say1 the mind of each has a definite and positive attitude towards that of the other1 which is based on1 or rather1 so far as it goes1 simply is1 the relation of their 8positions0 to each other4 ,thus1 social positions or vocations actually have their being in the medium of recognition4 ,they are the attitudes of minds towards one another1 through which their several distinct characteristics are instrumental to a common good4 ,thus1 then1 a right1 being a power secured in order to fill a position1 is simply a part of the fact that such a position is recognised as instrumental to the common good4 ,it is impossible to argue that the position may exist1 and not be recognised4 ,for we are speaking of a relation of minds1 and1 in so far as minds are united into a single system by their attitudes towards each other1 their 8positions0 and the recognition of them are one and the same thing4 ,their attitude1 receptive1 co-operative1 tolerant1 and the like1 is so far a recognition1 though not necessarily a reflective recognition4 ,probably this is what is intended by those who speak of imitation or other analogous principles as the ultimate social fact4 ,they do not mean the repetition of another person's conduct1 though that may enter in part into the relation of interdependence4 ,they mean the #bab conscious adoption #a of an attitude towards others1 embodying the relations between the 8positions0 which social logic assigns to each4 #a ,to call this imitation is something like calling fine art imitation4 ,really1 in both cases1 we find a re-arrangement and modification of material1 incident to a new expression4 ,the process1 if we must name it1 is 8relative suggestion0 rather than imitation4 7ii47 ,but then the question of page #baj presses upon us 8,if we deny that there can be unrecognised rights1 do we not surrender human freedom to despotism or to popular caprice80 ,the sting of this suggestion is taken out when we thoroughly grasp the idea that recognition is a matter of logic1 working on and through experience1 and not of choice or fancy4 ,if my mind has no attitude to yours1 there is no interdependence and ,i cannot be a party to securing you rights4 ,you are not1 for me1 a sharer in a capacity for a common good1 which each of us inevitably respects4 ,a dog or a tree may be an instrument to the good life1 and it may therefore be right to treat it in a certain way1 but it cannot be a subject of rights4 ,if my mind has an attitude to yours1 then there is certainly a recognition between us1 and the nature of that recognition and what it involves are matters for reasoning and for the appeal to experience4 ,it is idle for me1 for instance1 to communicate with you by language or to buy and sell with you1 perhaps even idle to go to war with you1 #a and still to say that ,i recognise no capacity in you for a common good4 ,my behaviour is then inconsistent with itself1 and the question takes the form what rights are involved #bac in the recognition of you which experience demonstrates4 ,no person and no society is consistent with itself1 and the proof and amendment of their inconsistency is always possible4 ,and1 one inconsistency being amended1 the path is opened to progress by the emergence of another4 ,if slaves come to be recognised as free but not as citizens1 this of itself opens a road by which the new freeman may make good his claim that it is an inconsistency not to recognise him as a citizen4 #a ,as distinct from hunting4 ,we do not go to war with lions and tigers4 ,but no right can be founded on my mere desire to do what ,i like4 #a ,the wish for this is the sting of the claim to unrecognised rights1 and this wish is to be met1 as the fear that our view might lead to despotism was met4 ,the matter is one of fact and logic1 not of fancies and wishes4 ,if ,i desire to assert an unrecognised right1 ,i must show what 8position0 involves it1 and how that position asserts itself in the system of recognitions which is the social mind1 and my point can only be established universally with regard to a certain type of position1 and not merely for myself as a particular ,a or ,b4 ,in other words1 ,i must show that the alleged right is a requirement of the realisation of capacities for good1 and1 further1 that it does not demand a sacrifice of capacities now being realised1 out of proportion to the capacities which it would enable to assert themselves4 ,i must show1 in short1 that in so far as the claim in question is not secured by the ,state1 ,society is inconsistent with itself1 and falls short of being what it professes to be1 an organ of good life4 ,and all my showing gives no right1 till it has #bad modified the law4 ,to maintain a right against the ,state by force or disobedience is rebellion1 and1 in considering the duty of rebellion1 we have to set the whole value of the existence of social order against the importance of the matter in which we think ,society defective4 ,there can hardly be a duty to rebellion in a ,state in which law can be altered by constitutional process4 #a ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #adi4 ,the ,state-maintained system of rights1 then1 in its relation to the normal self and will of ordinary citizens with their varying moods of enthusiasm and indolence1 may be compared to the automatic action of a human body4 ,automatic actions are such as we perform in walking1 eating1 dressing1 playing the piano or riding the bicycle4 ,they have been formed by consciousness1 and are of a character subservient to its purposes1 and obedient to its signals4 ,as a rule1 they demand no effort of attention1 and in this way attention is economised and enabled to devote itself to problems which demand its intenser efforts4 ,they are relegated to automatism because they are uniform1 necessary1 and external--8external0 in the sense explained above1 that the way in which they are required makes it enough if they are done1 whatever their motives1 or with no motives at all4 ,by far the greater bulk of the system of rights is related in this way to normal consciousness4 ,we may pay taxes1 abstain from fraud and assault1 use the roads and the post-office1 and enjoy our general security1 without knowing that we are doing or enjoying anything that demands special attention4 ,partly1 of course1 attention is being given by other consciousnesses to maintaining the securities and #bae facilities of our life4 ,even so1 the arrangement is automatic in so far as there is no reason for arousing the general attention in respect to it2 but to a varying extent it is automatic throughout1 and engrained in the system and habits of the whole people4 ,we are all supposed to know the whole law4 ,not even a judge has it all in his knowledge at any one time2 but the meaning is that it roughly expresses our habits1 and we live according to it without great difficulty1 and expect each other to do so4 ,this automatism is not harmful1 but absolutely right and necessary1 so long as we relegate to it only 8external0 matters2 i4e4 such as are necessary to be done1 motive or no motive1 in some way which can be generally laid down4 ,thus used1 it is an indispensable condition of progress4 ,it represents the ground won and settled by our civilisation1 and leaves us free to think and will such matters as have their value in and through being thought and willed rightly4 ,if we try to relegate these to automatism1 then moral and intellectual death has set in4 ,but if the system of rights is automatic1 how can it rest on recognition8 ,automatic actions1 we must remember1 are still of a texture1 so to speak1 continuous with consciousness4 8,recognition0 expresses very fairly our habitual attitude towards them in ourselves and others4 ,we might think1 for example1 of the system of habits and expectations which forms our household routine4 ,we go through it for the most part automatically1 while 8recognising0 the 8position0 of those who share it with us1 and respecting the life which is its end4 ,at points here and there in which it #baf affects the deeper possibilities of our being1 our attention becomes active1 and we assert our position with enthusiasm and conscientiousness4 ,our attitude to the social system of rights is something like this4 ,the whole order has our habitual recognition2 we are aware of and respect more or less the imperative end on which it rests--the claim of a common good upon us all4 ,within the framework of this order there is room for all degrees of laxity and conscientiousness2 but1 in any case1 it is only at certain points1 which either concern our special capacity or demand readjustment in the general interest1 that intense active attention is possible or desirable4 ,the view here taken of automatism and attention in the social whole impairs neither the unity of intelligence throughout society nor the individual's recognition of this unity as a self liable to be opposed to his usual self4 ,as to the former point1 every individual mind shows exactly the same phenomena1 of a continuum largely automatic1 and thoroughly alive only in certain regions1 connected1 but not thoroughly coherent4 ,as to the latter point1 permeation of the individual by the habits of social automatism does not prevent1 but rather gives material for1 his tendency to abstract himself from the whole1 and to frame an attitude for himself inconsistent with his true 8position10 against which tendency the imperative recognition of his true self has constantly to be exerted4 #g4 ,we have finally to deal with the actual application by the ,state of its ultimate resource for the maintenance of rights1 viz41 force4 ,superior force may be exercised upon human nature both #bag by rewards and by punishments4 ,in both respects its exercise by the ,state would fall generally within the lines of automatism2 that is to say1 it would be a case of the promotion of an end by means other than the influence of an idea of that end upon the will4 ,but1 owing to the subtle continuity of human nature throughout all its phases1 we shall find that there is something more than this to be said1 and that the idea of the end is operative in a peculiar way just where the agencies that promote it appear to be most alien and mechanical4 ,in so far as this is the case1 the general theory of the negative character of ,state action has to be modified1 as we foresaw1 #a by the theory of punishment4 ,prima facie1 however1 it is true that reward and punishment belong to the automatic element of social life4 ,they arise in no direct relation of the will to the end4 ,they are a reaction of the automatic system1 instrumental to the end1 against a friction or obstacle which intrudes upon it1 or 7in the case of rewards7 upon the opposite of a friction or obstacle4 ,there is no object in pressing a comparison into every detail2 but perhaps1 as social and individual automatism do really bear the same kind of relation to consciousness1 it may be pointed out that reward and punishment correspond in some degree to the pleasures and pains of a high-class secondary automatism1 say of riding or of reading1 i4e4 of something specially conducive to enhanced life4 ,such activities bring pleasure when unimpeded1 and pain when sharply interrupted by a start or blunder which jars upon us4 ,putting this latter case in language which #bah carries out the analogy to punishment1 we might say that the formed habit of action1 unconsciously or semi-consciously relevant to the end or fuller life1 is obstructed by some partial start of mind1 and their conflict is accompanied with recognition1 pain1 and vexation4 8,what a fool ,i was10 we exclaim1 8to ride carelessly at that corner10 or 8to let that plan for a holiday interrupt me in my morning's reading40 #a ,p4 #ahi4 ,it may seem remarkable that reward plays a small and apparently decreasing part in the self-management of society by the public power4 ,to the nave ,athenian1 #a it seemed a natural instrument for the encouragement of public spirit1 probably rather by a want of discrimination between motives than by a real belief in political selfishness4 ,in ,european countries honours still appear to play a considerable part1 but on analysis it would be found less than it seems4 ,partly they are recognitions of important functions1 and thus conditions rather than rewards4 ,to a great extent1 again1 they recognise existing facts1 and are rather consequences of the respect which society feels for certain types of life 7with very curious results in regions where the general mind is inexperienced1 e4g4 in fine art7 than means employed to regulate the conduct of citizens4 ,we should think a soldier mean whose aim was a peerage1 still more a poet or an artist4 ,i hardly know that rewards adjudged by the ,state1 as distinct from compensations1 exist #bai in the ,united ,states of ,america4 #b ,rewards then fill no place correlative to that of punishments1 and the reason seems plain4 ,punishment corresponds much better to the negative method which alone is open to the ,state for the maintenance of rights4 ,for ,punishment proclaims its negative character1 and no one can suppose it laudable simply to be deterred from wrong-doing by fear of punishment4 ,but though precisely the same principle applies to meritorious actions done with a view to reward1 an illusion is almost certain to arise which will hide the principle in this case4 ,for1 if reward is largely used as an inducement to actions conducive to the best life1 it is almost certain that it will be used as an inducement to actions1 the value and certainty of which depend on the state of will to which they are due4 ,and then the distinction between getting them done1 motive or no motive1 which is the true region of ,state action1 and their being done with a certain motive1 which is necessary to give them either practical or moral value1 is pretty sure to be obliterated1 and the range of the moral will trenched upon in its higher portion and with a constant tendency to self-deception4 #c #bbj ,it is the same truth in other words when we point out that taking reward and punishment1 as interferences1 only to deal with exceptional cases1 reward would deal with the exceptionally good4 ,therefore1 again1 reward must either make an impossible attempt to deal with all the normal as good1 which involves the danger of de-moralising the whole of normal life1 or must take the line of specially promoting what is exceptionally conducive to good life2 in which case confusion is certain to arise from interference with the delicate middle class of external actions analysed above4 #d ,and thus it is only what we should expect when we find that ,states having no damnosa hereditas of a craving for personal honours are hardly acquainted with the bestowal of rewards by the public power4 #a 8,speech of ,pericles10 ,thucyd41 ii4 #df3 8,where there are the greatest rewards of merit1 there will be the best men to do the work of the ,state40 ,contrast ,plato's principle that there can be no sound government while public service is done with a view to reward4 #b ,the precise theory of the grants in money made to soldiers or sailors1 for distinguished service1 is not easy to state4 ,but it seems clear that they are not intended to act as motives4 ,they are essentially a recognition after the act1 not an inducement held out before it4 #c ,it is perhaps permissible to observe in general1 what is very well known to all who have much experience of what is called philanthropy1 that the tendency to distinguish it by public honours is exceedingly dangerous to its quality1 which depends entirely on that energy and purity of intelligence which can only accompany the deepest and highest motives4 ,mere vulgar self-seeking is not the danger 7though it does occur7 so much as obfuscation of intelligence through a mixture of aims and ideas4 #d ,p4 #aii4 ,it will be sufficient1 then1 to complete the account of ,state action in maintenance of rights by some account of the nature and principles of punishment4 ,and we may profitably begin by recalling ,m4 ,durkheim's suggestion1 which was mentioned in a former chapter4 #a ,punishment1 he observes1 from the simplest and most actual point of view1 includes in itself all those sides which theory has tended to regard as incompatible4 ,it is1 in essence1 simply the reaction of a strong and determinate collective sentiment against an act which offends it4 ,it is idle to include such a reaction entirely under the head either of reformation1 or of retaliation1 or of prevention4 ,an aggression is ipso facto a sign of character1 an injury1 and a menace2 and the reaction against it is equally ipso facto an attempt #bba to affect character1 a retaliation against an injury1 and a deterrent or preventive against a menace4 ,when we fire up at aggression it is pretty much a chance whether we say 8,i am going to teach him better manners10 or 8,i am going to serve him out10 or 8,i am going to see that he doesn't do that again40 ,a consideration of each of these aspects is necessary to do justice both to the theories and to the facts4 #a ,p4 #cg4 i4 ,an obvious point of view1 and the first perhaps to appear in philosophy1 though strongly opposed to early law1 is that the aim of punishment is to make the offender good4 ,as test of the adequacy of this doctrine by itself1 the question may be put1 8,if pleasures would cure the offender1 ought he to be given pleasures80 ,the doctrine1 however1 does not1 by any means1 altogether incline to leniency4 ,for it carries as a corollary the extirpation of the incurable1 which ,plato proposes in a passage of singularly modern quality1 when he suggests the co-operation of judges and physicians in maintaining the moral and physical health of society4 #a #a ,republic1 #dji1 #daj4 ,the first comment that occurs to us is1 that by a mere medical treatment of the offender1 including or consisting of pleasant conditions1 if helpful to his cure1 the interest of society seems to be disregarded4 ,what is to become of the maintenance of rights1 if aggressors have to anticipate a pleasant or lenient 8cure08 ,it may be true that brutal punishments stimulate a criminal temper in the people rather than check it2 but it is a long way from this to laying down that there is no need #bbb for terror to be associated with crime4 ,to suppose that pleasures may simply act throughout as pains1 is playing with words and throws no light on the question4 ,if we leave words their meaning1 we must say that punishment must be deterrent for others as well as reformatory for the offender1 and therefore in some degree painful4 ,it is true1 however1 that the offender1 as a human being1 and presumably capable of a common good1 has1 as ,green puts it1 8reversionary rights0 of humanity1 and these1 punishment must so far as possible respect4 ,but there is a deeper difficulty4 ,if the reformation theory is to be seriously distinguished from the other theories of punishment1 it has a meaning which is unjust to the offender himself4 ,it implies that his offence is a merely natural evil1 like disease1 and can be cured by therapeutic treatment directed to removing its causes4 ,but this is to treat him not as a human being2 to treat him as a 8patient10 not as an agent2 to exclude him from the general recognition that makes us men4 7,if the therapeutic treatment includes a recognition and chastisement of the offender's bad will #a--the form of which chastisement may1 of course1 be very variously modified--then there is no longer anything to distinguish the reformatory theory from other theories of punishment47 ,it has been lately pointed out #b what a confusion is involved in the claim that beings1 who are irresponsible and so incapable of guilt1 are therefore in the strict sense innocent4 ,here are the true objects #bbc for a pure reformatory theory4 ,here that may freely be done1 as to creatures incapable of rights1 which is kindest for them and safest for society1 from quasi-medical treatment to extirpation4 ,there is no guilt in them to demand punishment1 but there is no human will in them to have the rights of innocence4 #a ,plato's reformatory theory seems to involve this4 #b ,mr4 ,bradley1 in the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,april1 #ahid4 ,but1 applied to responsible human beings1 such a theory1 if really kept to its distinctive contention1 is an insult4 ,it leads to the notion that the ,state may take hold of any man1 whose life or ideas are thought capable of improvement1 and set to work to ameliorate them by forcible treatment4 ,there is no true punishment except where one is an offender against a system of rights which he shares1 and therefore against himself4 ,and such an offender has a right to the recognition of his hostile will2 it is inhuman to treat him as a wild animal or a child1 whom we simply mould to our aims4 ,without such a recognition1 to be punished is not1 according to the old ,scotch phrase1 to be 8justified40 ii4 ,the idea of retaliation or retribution1 though in history the oldest conception of punishment1 #a may be taken in theory as a protest against the conception that punishment is only a means for making a man better4 ,its strong point is its definite idea of the offender4 ,the offender is a responsible person1 belonging to a certain order which he recognises as entering into him and as entered into by him1 and he has made actual an intention hostile to this order4 ,he has1 #bbd as ,plato's ,socrates insists in the ,crito1 destroyed the order so far as in him lies4 ,in other words1 he has violated the system of rights which the ,state exists to maintain1 and by which alone he and others are secured in the exercise of any capacity for good1 this security consisting in their reciprocal respect for the system4 ,his hostile will stands up and defies the right1 in so far as his personality is asserted1 through a tangible deed which embodies the wrong4 ,it is necessary1 then1 that the power which maintains the system of rights should not merely1 if possible1 undo the external harm which has been done1 but should strike down the hostile will which has defied the right by doing that harm4 ,the end or true self is in the medium of mind and will1 and is contradicted and nullified so far as a hostile will is permitted to triumph4 #a ,we saw that1 even in its earliest forms1 it cannot really be taken to exclude the other aspects4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that the means by which the hostile will can be negatived fall prima facie within the region of automatism4 ,the recalcitrant element of consciousness is not susceptible to the end as an idea1 or it would not be recalcitrant4 ,the end can here assert itself1 agreeably to the general principle of ,state action1 only through external action the mental effects of which cannot be precisely estimated4 ,it might1 therefore1 seem that the pain produced by the reaction of the automatic system on the aberrant consciousness--the punishment--was simply a natural pain1 which might act as a deterrent from aberration1 but had no visible connection with the true whole or end for the mind of the offender4 ,we shall speak below of the sense in which #bbe punishment is deterrent or preventive4 ,but it is to be noted at this point that a high-class secondary automatism1 with which all along we have compared the system of rights as engrained in the habits of a people1 retains a very close connection with consciousness4 ,we do not indeed will every step that we walk1 but we only walk while we will to walk1 and so with the whole system of routine automatism which is the method and organ of our daily life4 ,at any interruption1 any hindrance or failure1 consciousness starts up1 and the end of the whole routine comes sharply back upon us through our aberration4 ,so it is with punishment4 ,primarily1 no doubt1 chastisement by pain1 and the appeal to fear and to submissiveness1 is effective through our lower nature1 and1 in as far as operative1 substitutes selfish motives for the will that wills the good1 and so narrows its sphere4 ,but there is more behind4 ,the automatic system is pulsing with the vitality of the end to which it is instrumental2 and when we kick against the pricks1 and it reacts upon us in pain1 this pain has subtle connections throughout the whole of our being4 ,it brings us to our senses1 as we say2 that is1 it suggests1 more or less1 a consciousness of what the habitual system means1 and of what we have committed in offending against it4 ,when one stumbles and hurts his foot1 he may look up and see that he is off the path4 ,if a man is told that the way he works his factory or keeps his tenement houses is rendering him liable to fine or imprisonment1 then1 if he is an ordinary1 careless1 but respectable citizen1 he will feel some thing of a shock1 and recognise that he was getting #bbf too neglectful of the rights of others1 and that1 in being pulled up1 he is brought back to himself4 ,his citizen honour will be touched4 ,he will not like to be below the average which the common conscience had embodied in law4 ,when we come to the actual criminal consciousness1 the form which the recognition may take in fact may vary greatly2 and as an extreme there may be a furious hostility against the whole recognised system of law1 either involving self-outlawry through a despair of reconciliation1 or arising through some sort of habitual conspiracy in which the man finds his chosen law and order as against that recognised by the ,state4 #a ,but after all1 we are dealing with a question of social logic and not of empirical psychology4 ,and it must be laid down that1 in as far as any sane man fails altogether to recognise in any form the assertion of something which he normally respects in the law which punishes him 7putting aside what he takes to be miscarriage of justice71 he is outlawed by himself and the essentials of citizenship are not in him4 ,doubtless1 if an uneducated man were told1 in theoretical language1 that in being punished for an assault he was realising his own will1 he would think it cruel nonsense4 ,but this is a mere question of language1 and has really nothing to do with the essential state of his consciousness4 ,he would understand perfectly well that he was being served as he would say anyone should be served1 whom he saw acting as he had done1 in a case where his own #bbg passions were not engaged4 ,and this recognition1 in whatever form it is admitted1 carries the consequence which we affirm4 #a ,see the account of the ,mafia in ,marion ,crawford's ,corleone4 ,accepting this as described1 it simply is the social will in which the population of a certain region find their substitute for the ,state4 ,in short1 then1 compulsion through punishment and the fear of it1 though primarily acting on the lower self1 does tend1 when the conditions of true punishment exist 7i4e4 the reaction of a system of rights violated by one who shares in it71 to a recognition of the end by the person punished1 and may so far be regarded as his own will1 implied in the maintenance of a system to which he is a party1 returning upon himself in the form of pain4 ,and this is the theory of punishment as retributive4 ,the test doctrine of the theory may be found in ,kant's saying that1 even though a society were about to be dissolved by agreement1 the last murderer in prison must be executed before it breaks up4 ,the punishment is1 so to speak1 his right1 of which he must not be defrauded4 ,there are two natural perversions of this theory4 ,the first is to confuse the necessary retribution or reaction of the general self1 through the ,state1 with personal vengeance4 #a ,even in the vulgar form1 when a brutal murder evokes a general desire to have the offender served out1 #b the general or social indignation is not the same as the selfish desire for revenge4 ,it is the offspring of a rough notion of law and humanity1 and of the feeling that a striking aggression upon them demands to be strikingly put down4 ,such a sentiment is a part #bbh of the consciousness which maintains the system of rights1 and can hardly be absent where that consciousness is strong4 #a ,it may be noted that ,durkheim1 relying chiefly on early religious sentiment1 denies ,maine's view that criminal law arises out of private feud4 #b ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #ahd4 ,the second perversion consists in the superstition that punishment should be 8equivalent0 to offence4 ,in a sense1 we have seen1 it is identical2 i4e4 it is a return of the offender's act upon himself by a connection inevitable in a moral organism4 ,but as for equivalence of pain inflicted1 either with the pain caused by the offence or with its guilt1 the ,state knows nothing of it and has no means of securing it4 ,it cannot estimate either pain or moral guilt4 ,punishment cannot be adapted to factors which cannot be known4 ,and further1 the attempt to punish for immorality has evils of its own4 #a ,the graduation of punishments must depend on wholly different principles1 which we will consider in speaking of punishment as preventive or deterrent4 #a ,see above1 p4 #aib4 iii4 ,the graduation of punishments must be almost entirely determined by experience of their operation as deterrents4 ,it is to be borne in mind1 indeed1 7i47 that the 8reversionary rights0 of humanity in the offender are not to be needlessly sacrificed1 and 7ii47 that the true essence of punishment1 as punishment1 the negation of the offender's anti-social will1 is in some way to be secured4 ,but these conditions are included in the preventive or deterrent theory of punishment1 if completely understood2 if1 that is to say1 it is made clear precisely what it is that is to be prevented4 ,if we speak of punishment1 then1 as having for #bbi its aim to be deterrent or preventive1 we must not understand this to mean that a majority1 or any persons in power1 may rightly prevent1 by the threat of penalties1 any acts that seem to them to be inconvenient4 ,that which is to be prevented by punishment is a violation of the ,state-maintained system of rights by a person who is a party to that system1 and therefore the above-mentioned conditions1 implied in a true understanding of the reformatory and retributive aspects of punishment1 are also involved in it as deterrent4 ,but1 this being admitted1 we may add to them the distinctive principle on which a deterrent theory insists4 ,if a lighter punishment deter as effectively as a heavier1 it is wrong to impose the heavier4 ,for the precise aim of ,state action is the maintenance of rights2 and if rights are effectively maintained without the heavier punishment1 the aim of the ,state does not justify its imposition4 ,it is well known that success in the maintenance of rights depends not only on the severity of punishments1 but also on the true adjustment of the rights themselves to human ends1 and on that certainty of detecting crime which is a result of efficient government4 ,and it must always be considered1 in dealing with a relative failure of the deterrent power of punishment in regard to certain offences1 whether a better adjustment of rights or a greater certainty of detection will not meet the end more effectively than increased seventy of punishment4 ,we have seen that the equivalence of punishment and offence is really a meaningless superstition4 ,and there is no principle on which #bcj punishment can be rationally graduated1 except its deterrent power as learned by experience4 ,this view corresponds to the true limits of ,state action as determined by the means at its disposal compared with the end which is its justification1 and is therefore1 when grasped in its full meaning as not denying the nature of punishment1 the true theory of it4 ,we saw1 in speaking of punishment as retributive1 in what sense it can and cannot rest upon a judgment imputing moral guilt4 ,of degrees of moral guilt as manifested in the particular acts of individuals1 the ,state1 like all of us1 is necessarily ignorant4 ,but this is not to say that punishment is wholly divorced from a just moral sentiment4 ,undoubtedly it implies and rests upon a disapproval of that hostile attitude to the system of rights which is implied in the realised intention constituting the violation of right4 ,though in practice the distinction between civil and criminal law in ,england carries out no thoroughly logical demarcation1 yet it is true on the whole to say with ,hegel that1 in the matter of a civil action1 there is no violation of right as such1 but only a question in whom a certain right resides2 while in a matter of criminal law there is involved an infraction of right as such1 which by implication is a denial of the whole sphere of law and order4 ,this infraction the general conscience disapproves1 and its disapproval is embodied in a forcible dealing with the offender1 however that dealing may be graduated by other considerations4 ,i may touch here on an interesting point of detail1 following ,green4 ,if punishment is essentially #bca graduated according to its deterrent power1 and not according to moral guilt1 how does it come to pass that 8extenuating circumstances0 are allowed to influence sentences8 ,that they do so really1 if not nominally1 even in ,england1 there can be no doubt4 ,is it not that they indicate a less degree of wickedness in the offender than the offence in question would normally presuppose8 ,it would seem that judges themselves are sometimes under this impression4 ,but it may well be that they act under a right instinct and assign a wrong reason4 ,for it is impossible to get over the fact that moral iniquity is something which cannot be really estimated4 ,the true reason for allowing circumstances which change the character of the act to influence the sentence is that1 in changing its character1 they may take it out of the class of offences from which men need to be deterred by a recognised amount of severity4 ,if a man is starving and steals a turnip1 his offence1 being so exceptionally conditioned1 does not threaten the general right of property1 and does not need to be associated with any high degree of terror in order to protect that right4 ,a man who steals under no extraordinary pressure of need does what might become a common practice if not associated with as much terror as is found by experience to deter men from theft4 ,it may be said1 in some exceptional emergency1 8but many men are now starving2 ought not the theft of food1 on the principle of prevention1 to be now punished with extreme severity1 as other wise it is likely to become common80 ,or in general1 ought not severity to increase with #bca temptation or provocation1 as a greater deterrent is needed to counterbalance this8 ,the case in which the temptation or provocation is exceptional has just been dealt with4 ,but if abnormal temptation or provocation becomes common1 as in a famine1 or in some excited condition of public feeling1 then it must be remembered that not one right only1 but the system of rights as such1 is what the ,state has to maintain4 ,if starvation is common1 some readjustment of rights1 or at least some temporary protection of the right to live1 is the remedy indicated1 and not1 or not solely1 increased severity in dealing with theft4 #a ,if provocation becomes common1 then the rights of those provoked must be remembered1 and the provocation itself perhaps made punishable1 like the singing of faction songs in ,ireland4 ,punishment is to protect rights1 not to encourage wrongs4 #a ,though for the sake of all parties1 and to avoid temptation1 a strong policing of threatened districts may be desirable in such circumstances4 ,thus1 we have seen the true nature and aims of punishment as following from the aim of the ,state in maintaining the system of rights instrumental to the fullest life4 ,the three main aspects of punishment which we have considered are really inseparable1 and each1 if properly explained1 expands so as to include the others4 ,we may1 in conclusion1 sum up the whole theory of ,state action in the formula which we inherit from ,rousseau--that ,sovereignty is the exercise of the ,general ,will4 ,first4 ,all ,state action is ,general in its bearing and justification1 even if particular1 or rather #bcb concrete1 in its details4 ,it is embodied in a system of rights1 and there is no element of it which is not determined by a bearing upon a public interest4 ,the verification of this truth1 throughout1 for example1 our ,english system of public and private ,acts of ,parliament1 would run parallel to the logical theory of the ,universal ,judgment as it passes into ,judgments whose subjects are proper names4 ,but the immediate point is that no rights are absolute1 or detached from the whole1 but all have their warrant in the aim of the whole1 which at the same time implies their adjustment and regulation according to general principles4 ,this generality of law is practically an immense protection to individuals against arbitrary interference4 ,it makes every regulation strike a class and not a single person4 ,and1 secondly4 ,all ,state action is at bottom the exercise of a ,will2 the real ,will1 or the ,will as logically implied in intelligences as such1 and more or less recognised as imperative upon them4 ,and1 therefore1 though in the form of force it acts through automatism1 that is1 not directly as conscious ,will1 but through a system which gives rise to acts by influences apparently alien1 yet the root and source of the whole structure is of the nature of ,will1 and its end1 like that of organic automatism1 is to clear the road for true volition2 it is 8forcing men to be free40 ,and in so far as by misdirection of the automatic #a process it #bcd encroaches on the region of living ,will the region where the good realises itself directly by its own force as a motive it is 8sawing off the branch on which it sits10 and superseding the aim by the instrument4 #a ,it must not be forgotten that the ,state is1 by its nature1 under a constant temptation to throw its weight on the side of the automatic process4 ,a most striking example is its adoption of the automatic water-carriage system in drainage1 with far-reaching economic consequences4 ,see ,poore's ,rural ,hygiene and ,the ,dwelling ,house4 #bce ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,rousseau',s ,,theory ,,as ,,applied ,,to ,,the ,,modern ,,state3 ,,kant1 ,,fichte1 ,,hegel4 #a4 ,probably no other philosophical movement has ever focussed in itself so much human nature as the post-,kantian ,idealism4 ,it has fallen to the present writer to show elsewhere #a how the 8finding of ,greek art10 which it owed to ,winckelmann1 gave it unrivalled insight into mind as embodied in objects of sense4 ,here we have to deal with another source of its ideas4 ,as we pointed out in the first chapter1 the ethical and political theory of ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,hegel springs from the same ,evangel of ,jean ,jacques from which the ,french ,revolution drew its formulae4 ,it would not be true to say that it springs from this alone4 ,great philosophers know how to fuse the materials they work in2 and particularly the modern abstraction of 8freedom0 was blended1 for ,hegel1 with the idea of concrete life through the tradition of the ,greek city1 with its affinity for autonomy on the one hand and for beauty on the other4 ,nevertheless1 few lines of affiliation are better established in the history of philosophy than that between ,rousseau's #bcf declaration that liberty is the quality of man and the philosophy of ,right as it developed from ,kant to ,hegel4 #a ,history of ,aesthetic 7,sonnenschein74 ,it has been suggested that the literary intercourse of ,france1 ,england1 and ,germany was far closer in the eighteenth century than it is to-day1 in spite of the immense mechanical development of communication in the interval4 ,national self-consciousness and the divergent growth of national minds have1 it is urged1 raised a barrier between peoples1 which existed in the last century to a far smaller degree4 #a ,this question of literary history lies beyond my subject2 but at least it seems probable that ,rousseau had a power in ,germany which no ,french writer of to-day could possibly exercise outside his own country4 ,his educational influence #b alone forms a considerable chapter in the history of ,pdagogik1 and touches closely on philosophy4 ,our psychologists of childhood are his spiritual descendants1 and indeed the question of the development of the human being is closely akin to the question of liberty4 #a ,see ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl1 8,de l',influence de ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau en ,allemagne10 ,annales de l'cole libre des ,sciences ,politiques1 ,juillet1 #ahig4 #b ,cf4 ,kant et ,fichte et la ,problme de l',education1 ,duproix1 ,alcan41 #ahig2 and on ,rousseau's varied initiative1 see ,amiel1 ,journal ,intime ,e4 tr4 ,i4 #bjb1 8,j4,j4 ,rousseau is an ancestor in all things4 ,it was he who founded travelling on foot before ,tpffer1 reverie before ,ren1 literary botany before ,george ,sand1 the worship of nature before ,bernardin de ,st4 ,pierre1 the democratic theory before the ,revolution of #agig1 political discussion and theological discussion before ,mirabeau and ,rnan1 the science of teaching before ,pestalozzi1 and ,alpine description before ,de ,saussure40 ,his literary influence1 as the prophet of nature and feeling1 and the champion of sentimental #bcg religion against the ,philosophes1 carried everything before it4 ,he struck into the path which had been opened in ,germany by the translation of ,thomson's ,seasons before #agej1 and followed by the ,swiss critics and the idyllic poets1 who were opponents of the dominant pseudo-classicism4 #a ,jacobi1 who passed some years of his youth at ,geneva1 owed his doctrine of feeling as the faculty of religious truth in part at least to ,rousseau4 ,klinger1 whose drama1 ,sturm und ,drang1 gave its name to the romantic and naturalist revolution1 marked by ,goethe's ,gtz von ,berlichingen 7#aggc7 and ,schiller's ,ruber 7#agha71 was responsible1 we are told1 in later years1 for the surprising judgment that ,rousseau 7in ,emile7 is the young man's best guide through life4 #b ,even ,schiller and ,herder passed through a period of enthusiastic admiration for ,rousseau4 ,it is exceedingly significant that ,schiller's ,letters on the ,aesthetic ,education of ,humanity are addressed expressly to the problem of reconciling the claims of ,nature #c and of the ,state upon individual man4 ,for1 when ,schiller suggests that the clue to the required reconciliation between ,nature and the ,state lies in the union of feeling and intelligence which is found in ,beauty1 we have before us in a single focus three main types of experience1 from the fusion of which a new idealism was to emerge4 #a ,see author's ,history of ,aesthetic1 p4 #bad4 #b ,lvy-,bruhl1 ,loc4 cit4 p4 #ccj4 ,the citation appears to be from a romance1 and ,i have not seen the context4 #c ,letter #c contains a profound criticism of the supposed actual 8state of nature10 and it might be said with truth that the whole subject of the letters is the problem 8how man is to be free without ceasing to be sensuous40 #bch #b4 ,returning to our immediate subject1 the ,philosophy of ,right1 we will consider for a moment the specific relation of ,rousseau's idea of ,freedom to ,kantian or post-,kantian thought4 ,it is permissible1 perhaps1 to embody the chief part of what has to be said in extracts from works of great original value and not very generally accessible4 ,not only the poets and sentimentalists of ,germany1 but also the great philosophers1 distinctly recognised the debt of the ,german genius to the ideas of ,rousseau4 ,the conception of the 8,social ,contract0 has an importance which surprises the modern reader in the political philosophy of ,kant and more especially of ,fichte1 and it is not till we come to ,hegel that the literal interpretation of the 8,social ,contract0 is completely discriminated from the truth conveyed by the doctrine of the ,general ,will4 ,apart from all questions about the literal meaning of the 8,social ,contract10 it is simple fact that the whole political philosophy of ,kant1 ,hegel1 and ,fichte is founded on the idea of freedom as the essence of man1 first announced--such was ,hegel's distinct judgment--by ,rousseau4 ,i begin by citing the crucial passage from ,hegel's ,history of ,philosophy1 which gives in a few lines the basis of his own theory of ,right1 as well as his view of ,rousseau's position4 #a #a ,hegel's ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 iii4 #dgg4 ,after explaining that ,rousseau treated the right of ,government as on one side1 in its historical aspect1 resting #a on force and compulsion1 ,hegel #bci continues1 8,but the principle of this justification 7the absolute justification of the ,state7 ,rousseau makes the free will1 and1 disregarding the positive right 7or law7 of ,states1 he answers to the above question #b 7as to the justification or basis of the ,state7 that man has free will1 seeing that #8,freedom is the distinctive quality of man4 #c ,to renounce one's freedom1 means to renounce one's humanity4 ,not to be free is therefore a renunciation of one's human rights1 and even of one's duties4' ,the slave has neither rights nor duties4 ,rousseau says1 therefore1 #d ,the fundamental problem #e is to find a form of association which shall protect and defend at once the person and the property of every member with the whole common force1 and in which each individual1 inasmuch as he attaches himself to this association1 obeys only himself1 and remains as free as before #e ,the solution is given by the ,social ,contract2 #e it 7,rousseau says7 is this combination1 to which each belongs through his will4 ,these principles1 thus set up in the abstract1 we cannot but take as correct2 yet ambiguity begins at once4 ,man is free2 this is no doubt the substantive nature of man2 and in the ,state it is not only not abandoned1 but in fact it is therein first established4 ,the freedom of nature1 the capacity of freedom1 is not the actual freedom2 #bdj for nothing short of the ,state is the actualisation of freedom4 ,but the misunderstanding about the 8,general ,will0 begins at the following point4 ,the notion of ,freedom must not be taken in the sense of the casual free-will of each individual1 but in the sense of the reasonable will1 the will in and for itself4 #f ,the general will is not to be regarded as compounded of the expressed individual wills1 #g so that these remain absolute2 else the proposition would be true1 8where the minority has to obey the majority1 there is no freedom40 ,rather the general will must be the rational will1 even though people are not aware of it2 the ,state1 therefore1 is no such association as is determined upon by individuals4 ,the false apprehension of these principles does not matter to us4 ,what matters to us is that by their means it comes as a content into consciousness1 that man has in his mind ,freedom as the downright absolute1 that the free will is the notion of man4 ,it is just freedom that is the self of thought2 one who repudiates thought and talks of freedom knows not what he is saying4 ,the oneness of thought with itself #h is freedom1 the free will4 ,thought1 only taken in the form of will1 is the impulse to break through #i one's mere subjectivity1 is relation to definite being1 realisation of one's #bda self1 inasmuch as ,i will to make myself as an existent adequate to myself as thinking4 ,the will is free only as that which thinks4 ,the principle of freedom dawned on the world in ,rousseau1 and gave infinite strength to man1 who thus apprehended himself as infinite4 ,this furnishes the transition to the ,kantian philosophy1 which1 from a theoretical point of view1 took this principle as its basis4 ,knowledge #aj was thus directed upon its own freedom1 and upon a concrete content1 #aj which it possesses in its consciousness40 #a ,in the place referred to1 ,contrat ,social1 ,bk4 ,i4 chs4 iii41 iv41 ,rousseau points out clearly that force gives no right4 ,so when ,hegel describes him as saying that the right of rule rested on force1 etc41 in its historical aspect1 this is incorrect unless it means that1 this 8historical0 aspect giving no explanation of right1 the term 8right0 is a mere name so far as it is concerned4 #b ,cont4 ,social1 ,bk4 ,i41 iv4 #c ,i retain ,hegel's paraphrastic rendering of ,rousseau's words4 #d ,cont4 ,social1 ,bk4 ,i41 iv41 cf4 p4 #hi above4 #e ,hegel's italics4 #f ,anything is 8in and for itself0 when it has become 8for itself10 i4e4 consciously and explicitly what it is 8in itself10 i4e4 in its latent or potential nature4 #g ,rousseau's ,will of ,all4 #h i4e4 ,anything is free1 in as far as it is able to be itself4 ,thought1 as the embodiment of the return upon oneself or being with oneself1 is for ,hegel the strongest case of this4 #i i4e4 ,by going beyond it4 #aj ,i4e4 ,philosophy1 by basing itself on the idea of freedom1 is led to scrutinise the life in which mind realises itself1 before it becomes1 and on the way to becoming1 reflectively philosophical2 and which is therefore 8its own freedom0--as one texture with knowledge--and also a 8concrete content10 i4e4 an actual system of living1 as an object in which mind can find itself expressed--a relation which freedom4 ,everyone is familiar1 in general terms1 with the part played by the idea of freedom in ,kant's philosophy4 ,it may1 however1 be of interest to point out how definitely it comes to him in the form given it by ,rousseau4 ,omitting the whole subject of ,kant's educational interest1 #a ,i will refer to two passages from ,kant's early notes #b in connection with the tract on the ,feelings of the ,sublime and the ,beautiful1 and two from the ,philosophy of ,right1 which first appeared in the autumn of #agif4 #a ,see ,duproix1 ,loc4 cit4 #b ,between #agfe and #agge4 ,first1 then1 to establish the definite impulse communicated to ,kant in his earlier years by ,rousseau in particular4 8,i am myself10 he writes1 #a 8a student by inclination4 ,i feel the whole thirst for knowledge1 and the covetous restlessness that demands to advance in it1 and again the satisfaction of every #bdb step of progress4 ,there was a time when ,i believed that all this might constitute the honour of humanity1 and ,i despised the crowd that knows nothing4 ,it was ,rousseau who set me right4 ,that dazzling privilege disappeared2 and ,i should think myself far less useful than common artisans if ,i did not believe that my line of study might impart value to all others in the way of establishing the rights of humanity40 #a ,kant's ,werke 7,rosenkrantz71 xi41 p4 #bdj4 ,cf4 p4 #bah4 ,kant seems1 from the context1 to be foreshadowing the idea of his critical philosophy1 as putting man in his place in the order of creation4 8,if there is any science10 he says just below1 8which man really needs1 it is that which ,i teach1 to fill properly that place which is assigned to man in creation2 a science from which he can learn what one must be in order to be human40 ,this throws light on the curious passage in the same set of notes1 #a where1 in a discussion of the idea of ,providence1 ,kant first refers to ,newton's discovery of order in the multiplicity of the planetary motions1 and then proceeds1 8,rousseau first discovered1 beneath the multiplicity of the forms assumed by man1 the deeply latent nature of humanity1 and the hidden law1 according to which ,providence is justified by his observations4 ,before that the objection of ,alphonsus and of ,manes #b held the field4 ,after ,newton and ,rousseau1 ,god is justified1 and henceforwards ,pope's doctrine is true40 #a ,ib1 p4 #bdh4 #b ,the ,manichean doctrine4 8,pope's doctrine0 is no doubt his ,leibnitzian optimism1 founded on a supposed insight into man's true place in creation4 #a ,rousseau's #bdc 8discovery10 which ,kant here connects with this doctrine1 must be his assertion of man's natural goodness and freedom1 which he tends to forfeit by departing in civilisation from the place assigned him by nature4 ,it is clear that ,rousseau's impeachment of literature and civilisation had at this time made a considerable impression upon ,kant4 ,it is all the more interesting to see ,kant retracing1 on a very different scale1 the development which ,rousseau had initiated1 from natural to social and ethical freedom4 #a ,see passage cited from ,kant1 just above4 ,i subjoin two passages from the ,philosophy of ,right 7#agif71 which exhibit this later development1 still in its connection with ,rousseau's phraseology4 8,the innate ,right is one only4--,freedom 7independence of the constraining will of another71 in as far as it can co-exist with the freedom of every other according to a universal law1 is this unique original right1 belonging to every human being by reason of his humanity40 #a #a ,kant's ,werke 7,rosenkrantz71 ix4 #db4 ,an indication of the embodiment of this freedom in the ,state may be given as follows3 8,all those three powers in the ,state 7,sovereignty or the ,legislative1 the ,executive1 and the ,judicial71 are offices2 and1 as essential1 and necessarily proceeding from the idea of a ,state in general with reference to the establishment 7,constitution7 of one1 are offices of ,state4 ,they contain the relation of a universal supreme ,power 7which1 considered according to laws of freedom1 can be no other than the united people71 to the crowd of individuals which compose it qua the governed2 that is1 of the ruler 7imperans7 to the #bdd subject 7subditus74 ,the act whereby the people constitutes itself into a ,state1 or strictly speaking only the idea of that ,act1 according to which idea alone the justice of the ,act can be conceived1 #a is the original contract1 #b according to which all 7omnes et singuli7 of the people surrender their external freedom1 in order at once to receive it back again as members of a commonwealth1 that is1 of the people regarded as a ,state 7universi74 ,and one cannot say1 ,the ,state1 or man in the ,state1 has sacrificed a part of its innate outward freedom for a certain end2 but rather1 he has totally abandoned his wild lawless freedom in order to find his entire freedom again undiminished in a lawful dependence1 that is1 in a condition of right or law2 7undiminished71 because this dependence springs from his own legislative will40 #c #a ,the italics are mine4 #b ,kant's italics4 #c ,ib41 #afj ,it is remarkable1 in face of these general views1 that both ,kant and ,fichte follow ,rousseau1 for reasons which ,kant explains from the political conditions of the time1 in distrusting representative government4 #a #a ,ib41 #aff 7the deputies are practically dependent on the ,ministry74 ,but cf4 p4 #aic1 which shows that in a true ,republic the representative system might1 according to ,kant1 be a reality1 and then would be the ideal form4 ,the whole discussion is full of reference to ,rousseau4 ,the passage just cited is of course a reproduction of ,rousseau's view modified by interpretation very much in the sense in which we interpreted it above4 #c4 ,when we pass to ,fichte 7whose earlier work upon ,natural ,right was published actually before that of ,kant71 we observe the idea of contract in the act of transmuting itself1 though #bde by an imperfect transition1 into the idea of an organic whole4 ,for ,fichte1 the ,state is a necessary implication of the human self2 for a self involves a society of selves1 and law or right is the relation between selves in a bodily world4 ,and the 8contract0 on which citizenship rests1 by the fact that it is general1 #a forges an indiscernible unity of the social whole4 ,in this connection1 ,fichte makes the remarkable claim to be first to apply the simile of an organism to the whole civic relation4 ,i cite an important passage3 8,as far as ,i know1 the idea of the whole of the ,state has so far only been established through the ideal combination of individuals1 and thereby the true insight into the nature of this relation has been cut off40 #b #a ,fichte 7,werke1 iii4 #bjc ff47 says1 8,indeterminate02 viz4 ,i undertake to aid in protecting whoever is injured4 ,now1 ,i can never know 7he argues7 who in particular is to be benefited by this undertaking2 many are invisibly benefited by it through the suppression of the injurious will before it comes to be manifest4 ,therefore the relation is really organic2 every part strives to conserve every part1 because injury to any part may concern any part4 ,it is the general as indeterminate1 really less of a unity than ,rousseau's 8moi commun04 #b ,werke1 iii4 #bjg4 ,the 8ideal combination0 the imaginary contract4 ,you must1 he urges1 not merely have an idea of combination2 you must show a bond of union beyond the idea1 or making the idea necessary4 8,in our account this has been achieved4 ,in the notion of that which is to be protected1 in accordance with the necessary uncertainty which individual will need the visible protection1 and still further1 which it will have advantaged invisibly in the case of a wrongful will suppressed by the law before its outbreak1 all individuals are forced into unity4 #bdf 8,the most fitting simile to elucidate this notion is that of an organised natural product1 which has often been employed in modern times to describe the different branches of the public power as a unity1 but not1 so far as ,i know1 to throw light on the whole civic relation4 ,just as1 in the natural product1 every part can be what it is only in this combination1 and out of this combination simply would not be this 7indeed outside all organic combination there would simply be nothing 44473 just so it is only in the combination of the ,state that man attains a definite position in the series of things1 a point of rest in nature2 and each attains this determinate position towards others1 and towards ,nature1 only through the fact that he is in this determinate combination4 444 ,in the organic body every part continually maintains the whole1 and while it maintains it1 is itself maintained thereby2 just such is the citizen's relation to the ,state40 ,here we seem to be back with ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,we are in fact too near to ,plato2 for the distinction between maintenance of the citizen's determinate activity1 and maintenance of the general conditions of such activity1 being destroyed by ,fichte in his desire to make ,state action positive and not negative1 the conclusion necessarily arises that the citizen must be secured and maintained in his definite activity or occupation1 and from this springs the notion of the closed commercial ,state2 8closed0 against foreign trade in order that the government may be able to determine prices and assign occupations4 ,in other words1 the basis of the ,state is still the ,ego conceived as the individual self2 it is not the social good operating by its own #bdg power on intelligent will4 ,and1 arising from this individualism1 the precautions which seem necessary to protect and sustain the individual in his fixed relation to the whole1 make ,fichte's 8,closed ,commercial ,state0 perhaps the earliest document of a rigorous ,state ,socialism4 ,freedom1 as he himself recognises to be prima facie the case1 is annihilated by the provisions for its protection4 #a ,it is curious to see ,rousseau's phrase 8forced to be free10 #b which refers in him to the supremacy of law1 reappearing as a defence of the enforcement of leisure time1 #c as though freedom were not realised in labour and in loyalty4 ,here is ,hegel's judgment of the transition we have just been considering4 8,kant began to found right on freedom1 and ,fichte too in his ,natural ,right made freedom his principle2 but it is1 as in ,rousseau1 the freedom of the particular individual4 ,this is a great beginning2 but in order to get to particular results they were obliged to accept presuppositions4 ,the universal 7for them7 is not the spirit1 the substance of the whole1 but the external mechanical negative power against individuals4 444 ,the individuals remain always hard and negative against one another2 the prison-house1 the bonds1 become ever more oppressive1 instead of the ,state being apprehended as the realisation of freedom40 #d #a ,fichte1 ,nachgelassene ,werke1 ii4 #ece4 #b ,ibid41 #ecg4 #c ,of course such enforcement may have justification4 #d ,hegel1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 iii4 #egf4 ,the idea of organism was thus mechanically apprehended4 #d4 ,to apprehend the ,state as the realisation of freedom was the aim of ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,right1 which has perhaps been more grossly misrepresented #bdg than any work of a great political philosopher1 excepting ,plato's ,republic4 ,popular criticism will tell us that ,hegel found his ideal in the ,prussian bureaucracy1 and will further hint that his doing so was to his advantage4 ,such suggestions imply two misapprehensions1 for one of which ,hegel's tactlessness was responsible1 while the other depends on a genuine difficulty attending any philosophical analysis of society4 ,i will try to throw light on each of these misapprehensions4 7a7 ,if ,hegel had wished to have a partisan tendency attributed to his book1 he could not have timed it better nor written a preface more certain to mislead4 ,in #ahbj1 when the book was published1 the minds both of governments and of peoples were full of irritation4 ,the anti-constitutional reaction had recently declared itself4 #a ,the demonstration at the ,wartburg1 celebrating the anniversary of the ,reformation1 and of the ,battle of ,leipzig1 took place in ,october1 #ahag4 ,the unaccountable change in the ideas of the ,czar from ,liberalism to reaction took place1 we are assured1 #b in ,june1 #ahah4 ,the murder of ,kotzebue1 a ,russian agent1 reactionary journalist1 and decayed dramatist1 took place in ,march1 #ahai4 ,kotzebue seems to have been popularly credited with perverting the views of the ,czar4 ,his assassination had an effect in no way related to his real importance4 ,hardenberg1 the ,prussian minister1 exclaimed on hearing of it that a ,prussian constitution had now become impossible4 ,innocent persons #bdi were arrested in ,prussia at ,metternich's instigation1 and private papers were seized and published in a garbled form4 ,the publication of ,hegel's book with a preface attacking ,fries for some expressions used by him at the ,wartburg festival1 took place1 as we said1 in #ahbj1 and ,hegel had moved from ,heidelberg to ,berlin1 having obtained the honour of a ,berlin professorship1 in #ahah4 ,small wonder that 8it was pointed out that the new professor was a favourite of the leading minister1 that his influence was dominant in scholastic appointments1 and that occasional gratuities from the ,crown proved his acceptability10 or that ,fries remarked that ,hegel's theory of the ,state had grown1 8not in the garden of science1 but on the dunghill of servility40 #c ,hegel himself 8was aware that he had planted a blow in the face of a shallow and pretentious sect1 and that his book had given great offence to the demagogic folk40 #d #a ,see ,fyffe's ,history of ,modern ,europe1 vol4 ,,ii41 ch4 ii4 #b ,fyffe1 ,loc4 cit4 #c ,wallace1 ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind1 p4 clxxix4 #d ,wallace1 ,loc4 cit4 ,and yet1 so far as the essence of ,hegel's political philosophy is concerned1 there is nothing in all this4 ,the first sketch of the ,philosophy of ,right was published in the ,encyclopaedia of the ,philosophical ,sciences in #ahag1 before ,hegel left ,heidelberg4 ,his political interest1 in its gradual development1 can be traced back in unpublished writings to #ahjb4 #a ,he started from the conception of the ,greek ,state1 on which his early sketch of the ethical system 7#ahjb1 unpublished in his lifetime7 was founded4 ,and his subsequent development consisted in enlarging this conception by drawing out its framework to include the more #bej accented freedom of modern life1 as he divined it from the attentive study both of ,english and of ,german politics4 ,his substantive political theory never changed1 except by development1 in accordance with his general attitude towards the differences between ,greek and modern life4 #a ,see ,wallace1 ,op4 cit41 clxxx4 and clxxxvii4 7b7 8,but10 popular criticism will rejoin1 8here we have ,hegel's ideal ,state1 depicted by his own hand1 and it is pretty much the ,prussian ,state of his time1 tempered by a few references to ,english politics4 ,is not this a narrow horizon and a low ideal80 ,this criticism is of value1 because it leads up to an important feature of true political theory4 ,to depict what most people call 8an ideal ,state0 is no more the object of political philosophy than it is the object1 say1 of ,carpenter's ,human ,physiology to depict an 8ideal0 man or an angel4 ,the object of political philosophy is to understand what a ,state is1 and it is not necessary for this purpose that the ,state which is analysed should be 8ideal10 but only that it should be a ,state2 just as the nature of life is represented pretty nearly as well by one living man as by another4 8,every ,state10 #a ,hegel says1 8even if your principles lead you to pronounce it bad1 even if you detect this or that deficiency in it1 always has 7especially if it belongs to the more developed ,states of our time7 the essential moments of its existence in it4 ,but because it is easier to discover defects than to grasp the affirmative1 people easily fall into the error of allowing particular aspects to lead them to forget the inner organism #bea of the ,state4 ,the ,state is no work of art1 it stands in the world1 that is1 in the sphere of caprice1 accident1 and error2 evil behaviour is able to mar it in many respects4 ,but the ugliest human being1 a criminal1 a sick man1 or a cripple1 is all the same a living human being2 the affirmative1 his life1 persists in spite of the defect1 and this affirmative is what we are concerned with here40 #a ,phil4 d4 ,rechts1 p4 #cac4 ,of course1 no comparison is quite precise1 and it may be urged that the ,state is more artificial than a human body4 ,however this may be1 #a we shall at least understand ,hegel's attitude better1 and1 as ,i venture to think1 adopt by far the most fruitful standpoint for ourselves1 if we look at political philosophy like one who is trying to ascertain what is the nature of human life as he observes it in any or every human body4 ,if the life is there1 its essentials are there1 and his aim is to understand them4 ,no doubt a door is here opened to argument with regard to what logicians call a 8pure case40 ,in understanding life 8as such10 you must1 it would seem1 purge out its mere defects1 in regard to which it is not 8life10 and the remainder1 what you pledge yourself to as essential1 must be ex hypothesi your 8ideal0 of life4 ,and perhaps there is no reason to reject this responsibility if confined to the emphasis of elements and interconnection of facts4 ,it cannot apply to more4 #a ,the comment will probably betray the type of pessimism indicated by ,rousseau4 ,see p4 #ie above4 ,we cannot construct an ideal body by reducing life1 nor an ideal polity by reducing mind1 to its pure case or essentials1 since we cannot construct #beb organisms #a or history at all4 ,and it is because this is always being forgotten that the duty of understanding rather than constructing has to be insisted upon4 ,it is true that in understanding1 as in constructing1 we imply essential relations1 and so incur responsibility1 and are liable to betray a bias2 but still1 life can be understood by help of any creature that is alive1 and therefore it is not the example with which the student works1 but the insight which he shows1 that is the decisive point4 #a 8,no human mind has ever conceived a new animal40 ,ruskin1 ,modern ,painters1 ii4 #adh4 #d4 ,we have to begin by realising what is involved in the fact that we are about to treat the analysis of a ,modern ,state as a chapter in the ,philosophy of ,mind4 ,for ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,right 7or of ,law71 though published by him as an independent work1 is essentially an expansion of paragraphs which form one sub-division of his ,philosophy of ,mind1 itself the third and concluding portion of the ,encyclopaedia of ,philosophy1 of which the two earlier portions are the ,logic and the ,philosophy of ,nature4 ,we saw in the second chapter of the present work that the mere force of facts has driven modern sociologists to handle their science in a more or less intimate connection with ,psychology4 ,the differentia of society1 we saw1 has been stated in various formulae of a psychological character4 ,but it seemed to us that1 owing to a neglect of the logic of identity1 the nature of mind was broken up by such unreal distinctions as that between invention and imitation1 varied by the unreal #bec reduction of the one to the other1 #a and also that an unexplained separation and parallelism survived as between the individual and the social mind1 bearing witness to the vitality of the superstition which ,rousseau's insight picked out for condemnation4 #b ,we do not deny that mind may be more than social2 but in as far as it is social it is still real mind1 and that means that it is not something other than what we know as individual lives1 #c a pale and unreal reflection of them1 but it is a characteristic which belongs to their most intimate constitution4 ,this was ,plato's analysis of moral autonomy1 and his work remains classically valid1 needing only expansion and interpretation in applying it to modern free intelligence and social self-government4 #a ,prof4 ,baldwin1 ,social and ,ethical ,interpretation1 p4 #aje1 at least suggests this unreal reduction4 #b ,see p4 #ie above4 #c 8,lives10 and not merely 8consciousnesses10 as objective mind is largely in the form of habit4 ,the position of the analysis of a ,state in the ,philosophy of ,mind may be briefly indicated as follows4 ,when we embark on the study of ordinary ,psychology1 we take the individual human being as we find him to-day4 ,we accept him as a formed individual1 distinguishing himself from external things1 and possessing what we call a will--a capacity of seeking his own satisfaction1 which he represents to himself in general ideas by the help of language4 ,we analyse the self and will with their aspects of memory1 attention1 association1 impulse1 and emotion4 ,but all modern psychologists are aware that this formed self and will has much history behind it1 and presupposes a long genesis connecting it with simpler forms of #bed soul-life4 ,hegel1 indeed1 was among the first in modern times to see how far back the story of mind must be taken4 ,the human intelligence1 as the psychologist assumes it1 is for him a middle phase in the romance of which mind is the hero4 ,before it come the chapters of ,anthropology1 which treat of the fixation of a soul in the disciplined powers and habits of a human body1 and then the account #a of a consciousness which gradually rises from a struggling perception of objects around it to a moral and scientific certainty of being at home in the world4 #a ,for this account1 to which he has devoted perhaps the greatest of his works1 ,hegel has coined the term 8,phenomenology of the ,mind40 ,it is the history of the emergence of the free or modern spirit from the undeveloped consciousness of the ancient world1 to which1 for instance1 slavery seemed a natural thing4 ,the story of mind1 then1 begins long before the free mind1 the object of ,psychology to-day1 has appeared on the scene4 ,and as to this there would be no great difference of opinion4 ,the peculiarity of ,hegel's treatment is that his romance of the intelligence not only begins long before the phase of free mind is reached1 but continues long after4 ,investigation can no more stop at the individual of to-day than it can begin with him4 ,his 8mind0 is not a separable entity1 and throughout the story no such entity has appeared4 ,it has been convenient for ,hegel to treat the earlier division of the ,philosophy of ,mind1 comprising the ,anthropology1 ,phenomenology1 #a and ,psychology1 as dealing par excellence with ,mind ,subjective4 ,this is because its main purpose was to trace the growth of 8subjectivity10 the emergence of the man of full mental #bee stature1 aware of himself1 of his ideas and purposes1 and confident in his 8subjectivity0 his self-hood against all comers4 #a ,see previous note4 ,but the following division of the work1 under the title of ,mind ,objective1 deals with a necessary implication which might have been noted at any point of the entire history of consciousness1 though at any earlier point it could have been treated as referring to mind only by anticipation4 ,here1 however1 the problem can no longer be deferred4 ,the 8free mind0 does not explain itself and cannot stand alone4 ,its impulses cannot be ordered1 or1 in other words1 its purposes cannot be made determinate1 except in an actual system of selves4 ,except by expressing itself in relation to an ordered life1 which implies others1 it cannot exist4 ,and1 therefore1 not something additional and parallel to it1 which might or might not exist1 but a necessary form of its own action as real and determinate1 is the actual fabric in which it utters itself as ,society and the ,state4 ,this is what ,hegel treats in the second division of the ,philosophy of ,mind under the name of ,mind ,objective4 ,it is not for him ultimate4 ,a particular society stands in time1 and is open to criticism and to destruction4 ,beyond it lies the reality1 continuous with mind as known in the ,state1 but eternal as the former is perishable1 which as ,absolute ,mind is open to human experience in ,art1 ,religion1 and ,philosophy4 ,we will pursue in the following chapter ,hegel's analysis of the modern ,state as ,mind ,objective1 a magnified edition1 so to speak1 of ,plato's ,republic1 bringing before the eye in full detail distinctions and articulations which were there invisible4 #bef ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,a ,,modern ,,state4 ,,hegel',s 8,,philosophy ,,of ,,right40 #a4 ,we are about to analyse a modern ,state into groups of facts which are also ways of thinking4 ,and a question may arise in what sense the connection is to be understood which will be alleged to bind together these groups of facts or points of view4 ,when it is urged that group b or view b is suggested and made necessary by the shortcomings of group a or view a1 does this imply that group a or its idea came into existence first1 and group b or the notion of it sprang up subsequently or as an effect of the former8 ,and could such a relation be reasonably maintained as between the component parts of a unity like the ,state8 ,an answer may be indicated as follows4 ,we are dealing1 in society and in the ,state1 with an ideal fact4 ,as a fact1 a form of life1 society has always been a many-sided creature1 meeting the varied needs of human nature by functions no less varied4 ,as an ideal fact1 however1 its advance has partaken of the nature of theoretical progress4 ,in the continuous attempt to deal satisfactorily #beg with the needs of intelligent beings1 the mind1 the intelligent will1 has thrown itself with predominant interest now into one of its functions and now into another4 ,and this has not been a chance order of march4 ,obviously1 what it has emphasised and modified in the second place has depended both positively and negatively on what it had emphasised and modified in the first place4 ,positively1 because when one step is thoroughly secured the next may be definitely attempted4 ,negatively1 because the definite attainment of one step exposes the limitations of what has been achieved1 and the need for another4 ,at every stage the will is dissatisfied with the expression of itself which it has created4 ,till some public order has been established1 morality can hardly find expression2 but when a legal system is thoroughly in force it becomes apparent how far the letter may fall short of the spirit4 ,we see the same action of intelligence in pure theory4 ,every conquest of science leads to a new departure4 ,it suggests it by its success1 and demands it by its failure4 ,now1 in science it may or may not be the case that the connection which has led to a discovery enters permanently as a discernible factor into the structure of knowledge4 ,the re-organisation of experience may sweep away the steps which led to it4 ,but in the living fact of society this is not so4 ,its many sides are actual and persist1 and the emphasis laid from time to time on the principle of each--e4g4 on positive law1 on family ties1 on economic bonds--merely serves to accent an element which has its permanent place in the whole4 ,thus1 there must always be family ties and economic bonds4 ,but at one time everything tends to be construed #beh in terms of kinship1 at another time in terms of exchange4 ,and the tendency means a difference of actual balance between the functions as well as a different theory4 ,the positive and negative connection of elements like these1 the true place and limit of each1 is permanently rooted in human nature1 but may be elucidated by the explicit logic of their attempt and failure to give the tone to the whole social fabric4 ,it follows that the social whole grows1 like a great theory1 in adequacy to the needs which are its facts2 and the dissatisfaction of the will with its own expression1 in other words1 the contradictions which practical intelligence is continually attempting to remove1 becomes more like suggestion than flat contradiction--or change1 as we say1 becomes less revolutionary4 ,it may seem to be a difference between the social whole and a scientific theory that the former1 as it grows1 creates new difficulties1 by creating new and freshly contradictory matter1 as in the social problems of civilisation2 while the latter1 as we imagine1 deals with an unchanging experience4 ,but this distinction is less true than it appears1 and the comparison with the growth of a theory will always throw light on the true nature of the will and its continuous effort to satisfy itself4 #b4 ,right or ,law may be taken in the widest sense as including the whole manifestation of ,will in an actual world--8the actual body of all the conditions of freedom10 #a 8the realm of realised freedom1 the world of mind produced out of itself1 as a second nature40 #b ,it is a merit of the ,german #bei term 8,recht0 #c that it maintains the connection between the law and the spirit of law1 #d and almost of itself prohibits the separation between positive law1 and will1 custom or sentiment1 which underlies such a theory as ,austin's4 #a ,hegel1 ,philos4 of ,mind 7,e4 ,tr471 p4 #ajd4 ,cf4 defs4 quoted from ,green1 p4 #bjc above4 #b ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #d4 #c ,cf4 the ,greek's idea of 8nomos40 #d ,see ch4 ii4 above on ,montesquieu and ,rousseau4 ,this whole sphere of ,right or ,law1 the mind as actualised in ,society and the ,state1 naturally divides itself on the principle which has just been explained1 into three connected groups of ideal facts or points of view4 ,the first1 or simplest and most inevitable1 of these1 may be called the 8letter of the law0 as we come upon it most especially in the law of property--,shylock's law--the sheer fact1 as it seems1 that the world is appropriated by legal 8persons40 ,the second1 obviously conditioned by the first both positively and negatively1 may be described as the morality of conscience2 the revolt of the will against the letter of the law1 though this was its own direct expression of itself 7e4g4 in taking things as property72 and its demand to recognise as right nothing but what springs from itself as the good will4 ,and thirdly1 there is the reality or concrete experience in which the two former sets of facts1 or ideas1 find their true place and justification--the completed theory1 so to speak1 which adjusts and explains the narrower views founded on one-sided contact with life4 ,this is indicated to consist in 8social observance10 or 8ethical use and wont02 the system of working mind where the true will appears as incarnate in a way of living4 ,this1 #bfj like the others1 it must be remembered1 is a fact1 though akin to a theory4 ,not only does it explain and justify the other factors1 but its existence has enabled them to exist1 as theirs has also been essential to it4 ,and yet each of the three1 as one aspect of society which under certain influences may catch the eye1 has at times claimed--is1 indeed1 constantly claiming--predominance1 and has thus brought into relief its own defects and the need of the complementary ideas4 ,we will speak of these moods of mind or kinds of experience in their order1 expecting a further sub-division when we come to treat of the third4 #c4 8,law10 then1 in the directest possible sense--the minimum sense1 so to speak--is the hard literal fact that it is a rule of the world we live in for things to be appropriated by persons4 ,this is the first or minimum change of the world from mere matter into the instruments of mind1 and it is a necessary change4 ,things have no will of their own1 and it is by having a will asserted upon them that they become organs of life4 ,in the same way1 it is by assertion in external things that the will first becomes a fact in the material world4 ,property is 8the first reality of freedom40 #a ,it is not the mere provision for wants1 but the material counterpart of will4 ,contract belongs to this sphere1 the sphere of property4 ,it is an agreement of persons about an external thing--a 8common will10 but not one 8general0 or 8universal0 in its own nature like that involved in the ,state4 #a ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #da4 ,not1 in its developed form1 the first in time4 ,hegel lays stress on the fact that true1 free1 property was hardly realised even in his own day4 #bfa ,thus1 it is a confusion of spheres to apply the idea of contract to the ,state1 for the ,state is an imperative necessity of man's nature as rational1 while contract is a mere agreement of certain free persons about certain external things4 ,the idea of the social contract is a confusion of the same type as that by which public rights and functions were treated as private property in the middle age4 ,the attributes of private property are nothing more than the conditions of 8personal0 existence1 and absurdity results if they are transferred to functions of the ,state4 ,this phase or view of law as1 in its letter1 an ultimate and absolute rule1 may be illustrated1 ,hegel says1 by the ,stoic notion that there is only one virtue and one vice2 by the ,draconic conception that every offence demands the extreme penalty2 and by 8the barbarity of the formal code of honour1 which found in every injury an unpardonable insult40 ,it might also be illustrated by ,austin's theory of law as a command enforced by a penalty2 or by the theories which account for property simply by the fact of occupancy or of labour mixed with the thing4 ,the common point of all these views is that they treat the law1 not as a part of a living system1 #a ultimately resting on the will to maintain a certain type of life1 but as something absolute in its separateness1 and equally sacred in all its accidents and inequalities4 #a ,see e4g4 above1 p4 #bcb1 how the idea of a system of rights may modify punishment4 ,now1 this emphasis and idea of law1 being the exaggeration of a single and direct necessity1 the #bfb necessity of order and property1 may be called 8primitive0 or barbarous1 but it cannot of course be identified with the earliest state of social authority known to history or to anthropology4 ,there we should probably find law undifferentiated from custom and from religious sentiment1 and consequently1 though rigid enough1 not in any such one-sided absoluteness as we have been describing4 ,all we can say is that this is the way in which law must come to be regarded whenever its living spirit is forgotten1 and an unreal absoluteness is assigned to it2 and this connection of principle verifies itself as a fact in recurrent historical phenomena1 and in fallacies which perpetually reappear4 #d4 ,within the whole fabric of right or realised will1 the element which naturally asserts itself by antagonism to the letter of the law is the morality of conscience1 conscientiousness1 or the idea of the ,good ,will4 ,it is connected with the letter of the law1 as ,hegel puts it1 by the various degrees of wrong4 ,the will1 that is to say1 finds itself at variance in or with #a the order of law and property which it has created as its direct and necessary step to freedom4 ,its realised theory1 so to speak1 is found to break down at a certain point1 by being in contradiction with the needs which it was created to meet4 8,summum jus1 summa injuria04 ,we may object that the anti-legal will is simply wrong4 ,this may be so1 and again it may not be so4 ,what the will has awakened to1 whether right or wrong1 is #bfc that it can acquiesce in nothing which does not come home to it as fulfilling its own principle4 ,what so comes home to it is what it calls 8good10 and it cannot accept any order or necessity which it cannot will as good1 i4e4 as satisfying its own idea4 #a 8,in it10 when my will does not conflict with right as such1 but claims the right in an object ,a to be mine and not yours--a civil dispute4 8,with it10 when my will rebels1 and by its act1 so far as in it lies1 denies and destroys the whole fabric of right1 e4g4 takes the object ,a1 without alleging a right to it--theft1 a criminal offence1 cf4 p4 #bcj4 ,when this phase of reaction is pushed to its logical extreme1 we have the modern doctrine of my conscience and my pure will4 ,it is the conflict of the inner self with the outer world1 expressed in history through the ,stoic and through some forms of the ,christian consciousness 7especially the ,protestant consciousness71 and in philosophy through the ,kantian doctrine of the good will1 uttered in the famous sentence1 8,nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or out of it which can be called good without qualification except a good will40 #a ,nothing is worth doing but what one ought1 and because one ought4 #a ,kant1 ,grundlegung zur ,metaphysik d4 ,sitten1 sect4 ,i4 ,the criticism to which this principle has been subjected is familiar to students of ethics4 ,its point is1 in brief1 that there is no way of connecting any particular action with the mere idea of a pure will4 ,the forms assumed by evasions of this difficulty1 which we fall into when we desire wholly to separate the inner from the outer1 or the 8ought0 from the 8is10 are treated by ,hegel with unsurpassable vigour and subtlety1 as indeed the annihilating criticism of this conception is primarily due to him4 ,the essence of the matter is that the pure will directed towards good for the sake of good1 having no real connection with any detailed conduct1 may be alleged by self-deception in support of any behaviour whatever1 and out of this may spring the #bfd whole sophistry and hypocrisy of 8pure intention40 ,he makes the shrewd observation1 #a which is still of interest1 that the extreme ,protestant doctrine of conscience may take the form of ethical vacuity or instability1 and that this had in his time been the cause of many ,protestants going over to ,rome1 to secure some sort of moorings1 if not precisely the stability of thought4 #a ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #ada4 ,still1 out of all this one-sidedness1 there survives the permanent necessity that an intelligent being can acquiesce only in what enters into the object of his will4 ,it is his will which affirms the aim to which his nature draws him1 and he is absolutely debarred from reposing in anything which does not appeal to his will4 ,the subjective will is the only soil on which freedom can be a reality4 ,so1 within the general organism of ,right or realised ,free-will1 we have found two opposite groups of facts--for the aspirations of intelligent beings are facts--or tendencies or theories1 which are connected by opposition1 and yet are necessary to the expression of the same underlying need--the letter of the law1 and the freedom of conscience4 #e4 ,hegel's name for the third term1 which1 as he puts it1 expresses the 8truth0 of these extremes1 may be rendered 8the ,ethical ,system10 or 8the ,moral ,life10 or 8,social ,ethics40 ,it expresses 8the truth0 of the extremes1 as a good theory may express the truth of two one-sided views4 ,only1 as we have said1 it is a fact as well as a theory1 and therefore is something which actually contains what these two views demand1 and does the work which they1 and the facts they rely on1 #bfe exhibit as necessary to be done4 ,this relation is not obscure or unprecedented4 ,every institution1 every life1 works as a theory1 and either masters its facts or fails to master them2 though not every theory is a life or an institution4 ,the ,german word which the above-mentioned phrases attempt to render is 8,sittlichkeit0 ,the word takes its meaning from 8,sitte0 which in common usage is equivalent to 8custom40 ,hegel's use of the term1 in his later writings1 as opposed to 8,moralitt0 and as indicating1 in comparison with it1 a fuller and truer phase of life1 is an intentional declaration of war against the ,kantian principle of the pure good will1 and is the gist of ,hegel's ethico-political view in a nutshell4 ,the word would most naturally apply to the life of a community in which law1 custom1 and sentiment were not yet very sharply distinguished4 ,according to accepted views1 the communities of ancient ,greece1 before they were stirred by the reflective movement which is associated with the names of ,socrates and the ,sophists1 would be examples of a disposition and order of life which the word 8,sittlichkeit0 might denote4 ,and it was in the ,greek communities1 as is shown by the work which he sketched as early as #ahjb1 #a that ,hegel found this suggestion of a whole in which law and custom1 duty and disposition1 were absolutely at one4 ,he subsequently modified the conception in accordance with the modern idea of freedom1 by allowing a greater emphasis and relief to its #bff component parts1 and insisting 7against ,plato's ,republic for instance17 on the principle of individual choice1 initiative1 and property1 as necessary to the complete communion of intelligent beings4 ,as we have just seen1 indeed1 he introduces reflective morality or conscientiousness into the sphere of ,right1 to represent the full nature of mind1 which is only exhibited in a consciousness which pursues its aims of its own choice and for their own sake4 #a ,the ,system d4 ,sittlichkeit4 ,the ,rechtsphil4 was not published till #ahag1 in its earliest form4 ,see ,wallace1 ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind1 p4 #ahg4 ,the ,ethical ,system1 then1 or ,social ,ethics1 is put forward as the ideal fact which includes1 and does the work of both the literal law and the moral will1 alike in practice and as a theory4 ,it is the idea of freedom developed 7i47 into a present world1 and 7ii47 into the nature of self-consciousness4 ,for 7i471 in the first place1 the ethical system1 or the ways of acting which make up social ethics1 constitute a present and actual world4 ,so far it partakes of the nature of the literal law and order1 the system of property-holding1 which1 as we have seen1 is all but a natural fact4 ,social ,ethic1 we might say1 is a physical fact4 ,the bodily habits and external actions of a people incorporate it4 ,it transforms the face of a country1 8domesticating the untamed earth40 #a ,each individual has his own bodily existence in a determinate mode as a part of the ethical life of society4 ,the rules and traditions of ethical living are1 as has been said1 8the nature of things40 ,they are as hard1 as 8objective0 an order as 8sun1 moon1 mountains1 rivers1 and all objects of nature40 #b ,man lives according to them before he knows that he #bfg does so1 and always1 in a great degree1 independently of knowing that he does so4 ,as this group of facts1 or considered from this point of view1 the ethical system is the body of the moral world4 #a ,aeschylus1 ,eumenides1 ,i4 #ad4 #b ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #adf4 7ii47 ,but it is also and no less the very nature of self-consciousness4 ,it is as much a demand of man's intelligence or an inner and universal law as the 8pure will0 itself4 #a ,the difference between them is that the ,ethical ,system is a system1 a world1 though from the point of view of will regarded as inner1 that is to say1 as something which is the motive and fulfills the demand of consciousness4 ,thus1 it bears the character of a thoroughly systematised theory1 as contrasted with the idea of a good will1 which is a mere general point of view4 ,and it is because of this systematic character that it is enabled to connect the individual or particular will with the universal spirit of the community4 ,it is only in a system that a particular fact can be connected with a universal law1 as the planetary motions are with the law of gravitation4 ,the particular will1 as we have explained above1 is universalised by its relation to a systematic purpose which it partly implies and partly realises4 ,a man wishes for this thing or that thing1 but not at any price4 ,the reservations to which his wish is subject1 by reason of other purposes and postulates of life1 are known to him only in part2 but if they could be stated in full1 they would constitute the system of his life as realised in the universal life of the community4 ,it is precisely #bfh analogous to the process which a common judgment of perception has to go through in becoming a scientific truth--the implications have to be stated in full1 and the perception modified in accordance with them4 ,and when this is done1 we have no longer a fact1 but a science4 #a ,on all this portion of the subject1 see ,mr4 ,bradley's ,essay1 8,my ,station and its ,duties10 in ,ethical ,studies4 ,regarded from this point of view1 as the substance of the individual ,will1 the ,ethical ,system is the ,soul of the moral world4 ,in analysing the ,ethical ,system1 we shall say nothing of 8duties0 or 8virtues40 ,duty is in each case what the relation requires--the attachment of the universal system of will to the individual life4 ,virtue is a habit of such action1 considered as embodied in the nature of an individual4 ,the idea of virtue and virtuousness is not1 in ,hegel's view1 altogether suitable to the members of an ethical commonwealth4 ,it belongs rather to a time of undeveloped social life1 when ethical principles and the realisation of them are ascribed to the nature of peculiarly gifted individuals4 ,virtue or excellence1 to the ,greek moralist1 for instance1 suggested doing something better than the average1 or being in some way specially gifted1 and it is still apt to indicate the desire to be some thing exceptional1 and not simply to find yourself in genuine service4 ,the meaning of the words to-day tends to narrow itself to certain special relations1 and does not indicate that life of the member in the whole1 which is the essence of what we really value4 ,the ,ethical ,system1 or the ,order of ,social ,ethics1 then--the mind and conduct of the citizen in ,christendom--may be regarded as affirming freedom #bfi in three principal aspects1 necessarily connected1 and supplementing one another4 ,outwardly these aspects are different groups of facts--different institutions2 inwardly they are different moods or dispositions of the one and indivisible human mind4 ,thus1 ,hegel's analysis regards the social whole or system of social ethics from three points of view4 ,first1 in respect of the ,family2 secondly1 in respect of what he has entitled ,bourgeois ,society2 and thirdly1 in respect of the ,political ,organism1 or the ,state in the strict sense4 ,it is to be borne in mind that1 like the three principal divisions in the sphere of ,right1 these headings represent explicit theories of society1 as well as groups of facts4 #f4 ,beginning once more1 within an ordered social sphere1 at the ethical factor which stands nearest to the natural world1 and has taken1 so to speak1 the minimum step into the realm of purpose and consciousness1 we start from the family4 ,as the family exists in a modern civilised community1 it is something necessary to society and the ,state1 but absolutely distinct from both4 ,it first 7a7 represents the fact of the natural basis of social relations1 being the embodiment of natural feeling in the form of love1 both as between the parents1 and as embodied for them in the children4 ,it is in accordance with ,hegel's general views of the meaning of a system that he sees this element of mind primarily represented by the family1 as an organ preserved and differentiated ad hoc1 and not1 or not merely1 distributed indefinitely throughout the community4 ,thus1 the modern family represents for him a higher stage #bgj of civilisation--an organ to a fuller embodiment of mind--than the clan or tribe1 or1 in short1 than any form of community in which the whole bond of union rests on merely natural feeling1 kindness1 generosity1 or affection4 ,in the nation1 indeed1 a tinge of natural affection1 a colouring of unity by kinship1 survives1 just as feeling runs through the experience of the individual mind4 ,but the distinctive character of the ,state is clear intelligence1 explicit law and system1 and so the natural basis of feeling1 though necessary to be preserved and spiritualised1 achieves these needs in the family as a special organ1 and not in the ,state as such4 ,all those theories1 therefore1 which tend to assimilate the ,state to a family by a sort of levelling down of the former or levelling up of the latter 7,plato's ,republic1 the phalanstery1 paternal government1 and the like7 involve for ,hegel a mere confusion of relations4 ,they recognise an element which is essential to society1 and may truly be said to be even its foundation4 ,but they do not see its right place in the whole1 and do not understand that in order to attain a stronger and deeper unity 7which is1 in short1 a stronger and deeper mind7 the different elements must be allowed a greater emphasis and relief1 and their respective characteristics must not be slurred or scamped4 ,but 7b7 in the second place1 the family is a factor in the rational whole1 the ,state1 though its function par excellence is that of the natural basis of society4 ,hence its nature and sanction is ethical--it rests neither on mere feeling on #bga the one hand1 nor on mere contract on the other4 ,it has a public side1 and the acceptance of a universal obligation by a declaration in explicit language 7language being the stamp of the universal71 in face of the community1 is an essential part of marriage1 and not a mere accident or accessory1 as the votaries of feeling have urged4 ,this view is aimed against the confusion which finds the sole essence of marriage in feeling4 ,this is a perpetually recurring contention1 represented in ,hegel's day by ,friedrich von ,schlegel's ,lucinde1 which argues that the form of marriage destroys the value of passion4 ,hegel's analyses are everywhere directed against this inability to grasp the distinct sides of a many-sided fact4 7c7 ,the ethical aspect of the family #a shows itself in the nature and organisation of the household1 as an institution embodying permanent interests and relations of the two persons who are its head1 and as an organ of public duties in the bodily and spiritual nurture of the children4 ,the permanent and equal relation of the heads of the household1 involved in its nature as the ethical aspect of the family1 implies monogamy1 and it is the monogamous family alone which can count as a true element of the ethical order4 #a ,cf4 ,green's ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #bce4 7d7 ,the household1 being the true and operative ethical organ which makes parentage into family1 is the unit which demands to be respected and protected by the ,state against the less differentiated forms of consanguinity1 such as the clan4 ,the true family starts from marriage and the foundation of a household1 and in the early #bgb development of law we find the ,state1 with a just instinct1 protecting the household against the clan1 e4g4 by conferring the power of bequest4 ,this power1 though now it may imply a discretion mainly hostile to the family1 presented itself in early law rather as a means of perpetuating the separate household as against the pretensions of the clan to interfere with its property4 ,thus1 the monogamous family is naturally and necessarily1 to some extent1 a unit in respect of property2 the children1 at least1 being inevitably under tutelage and incapable of self-support1 even if economic equality asserts itself as between husband and wife4 ,this peculiar relation in respect of property is rooted in the unique nature of the household1 as an organ for the guardianship of immature lives1 and as a unity of feeling rather than of explicit thought4 ,it is noticeable that progress tends to introduce the distinctions of property within its unity #a 7though for children this can never go very far71 and very slightly to introduce the relations of the family into the outside world4 ,in as far as such distinctions come to be made1 the nature and functions of the household being undisturbed1 a somewhat higher intensity of ethical union is rendered necessary1 and will no doubt assert itself4 #a ,married ,women's ,property1 ,protection of ,earnings of ,children1 ,property assigned by understanding within household to young children4 #g4 ,when the man 7or woman #a7 arrives at maturity and leaves the safe harbour of the family1 he finds himself1 prima facie1 isolated in a world #bgc of conflicting self-interests4 ,he has his living to make1 or his property to administer4 ,he is tied to others1 in appearance1 only by the system of wants and work1 with the elementary function which is necessary to it1 viz4 its police functions and the administration of justice4 #a ,hegel would say only or chiefly the man1 who is for him the natural earner and chief of the household4 ,it is this phase of social life1 and the temper or disposition corresponding to it1 which ,hegel indicates by the expression ,bourgeois ,society4 #a ,it presents itself to him as the opposite extreme of life and mind to that embodied in the family4 ,it is an aggregate of families--for the units of the ,bourgeois ,society are heads of households--as seen from the outside1 in the great system of industry and business1 where a man has to find his work and do it4 ,it is1 in mind1 the presence of definite though limited aims1 calculation and self-interest4 #b #a ,brgerliche ,gesellschaft4 8,society10 ,wallace points out1 is here opposed to 8community10 and indicates a looser phase of union4 #b ,cf4 the merchant in ,wilhelm ,meister's ,lehrjahre1 viii4 #b4 8,i can assure you that ,i never reflected on the ,state in my life4 ,my tolls1 charges1 and dues ,i have paid for no other reason than that it was established usage0 7cited from ,wallace1 ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind1 p4 cci474 ,bourgeois ,society is the aspect of the social whole insisted on by the classical political economy1 by which1 as an achievement in the way of reducing complex appearances to principles1 ,hegel was much impressed4 ,it is1 again1 the view of society embodied in the conception of the purely police ,state1 and its principle is confused with that of the ,state proper by one set of theorists1 as that of the family is by another4 ,it is the peculiarity of ,hegel's view--probably #bgd the most definitely original1 as it is the most famous1 of all his political ideas--to contend that this aspect of society1 with the form of consciousness belonging to it1 is necessary to a modern ,state4 ,according to his logic1 indeed1 it is inevitable that every true whole shall have an aspect of 8difference10 of breaking up into particulars4 ,the principle of the ancient ,state1 as concentratedly expressed in ,plato's ,republic1 was weak and undeveloped1 and fell short of the true claims of intelligence1 #a just because it dared not really let the individual go--let him assert himself as himself4 8,subjectivity0 was a principle fatal to it4 ,not that there was an iron oppression in the ,states of antiquity4 ,the individual was1 for an onlooker1 magnificently developed4 ,his limitations were in him1 and did not oppress him2 but for all that1 free choice and the career open to talents were not for him4 #a 8,was not ideal enough0 7,hegel1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ii4 #bed74 ,the 8notion0 for him necessarily involves identity1 differentiation1 and re-integration2 and in this respect the ancient ,state falls short of a true notion1 while the modern realises it4 ,the modern demand--such is ,hegel's conception--is harder and higher4 ,the individual's life is not predetermined by his birth1 but he is thrown face to face with economic necessity1 which is a form of the universal end4 ,he has to strip off his crudeness and vanity1 and1 of himself1 mould himself into something which fulfils a want4 ,this is a step without which there can be no true freedom--the giving one's self by one's own act a definite place in the region of external necessity1 the 8becoming something0 or attaching oneself to #bge a definite class of service renderers4 ,thus1 we are startled to find culture or education treated in general1 and in respect of its indispensableness1 under the head of the ,bourgeois ,society4 ,for culture is the liberation from one's own caprices1 and the acceptance of a universal task4 ,it is a severe process1 and therefore unpopular1 but it is a necessary one if we are to have true freedom4 ,the criticism that such a world and temper is the world and temper of self-interest does not appeal strongly to ,hegel4 ,we shall have to treat of it more fully below4 #a #a ,see p4 #bia4 ,it may be noted in passing that the insecurity of life1 which may seem to attach to dependence on the vast system of wants and work1 is more and more seen1 as modern economic relations develop1 not to be insecurity at all1 except in as far as 8culture0 in the form of industrial training is absent4 ,there is1 indeed1 in modern life1 nowhere any absolute and oyster-like stability4 ,the highest stability to be anywhere attained is that due to fitness for service in the interdependent system of needs4 #a #a ,i may refer to ,the ,standard of ,life1 by ,h4 ,bosanquet1 essay on 8,klassenkampf04 ,therefore1 as ,hegel saw1 but in more ways than he saw1 the system of ,bourgeois ,society--the economic and industrial world--is not a separate reality1 but only an appearance within a larger system4 ,the member of it is not so detached as he may seem1 or think4 ,he is within1 and sustained by1 the general life of the ,state1 as the aims which are his motives in 8business0 or industry are within #bgf and inseparable from the whole structure of his intelligence4 ,thus1 the world of ,bourgeois ,society--a world1 on the whole1 of cash nexus and mere protection by the ,state--has a structure or tendency of its own which brings it back by necessary steps to connection with the ,state proper or explicit and determinate social unity4 ,it is1 we must observe1 posterior to the ,state in time4 ,it is only within the ,state proper1 and resting on its solid power1 that such a world as that of ,bourgeois ,society could arise or be conceivable4 ,its priority to the ,state is1 like that of the family1 the priority of comparative narrowness or simplicity1 of dealing with fewer factors1 and of representing human nature in a more special1 though necessary1 aspect4 ,and for this very reason it could not exist by itself4 ,it has not the many-sided vitality indispensable to anything which is to hold its own in the actual world4 ,the working of the ,bourgeois ,society1 then1 exhibits an inevitable connection with the ,state proper1 and1 so to speak1 leads up to it4 ,in the first place1 the economic world implies the administration of justice4 ,in this1 as involving a developed system of civilised law1 there is an advance on the 8letter of the law0 in its crudest and most barbarous acceptation4 ,the system of law of a modern ,state is1 and still more ought to be1 #a a fairly reasonable and intelligible definition of the rights and relations of persons4 ,by this determination the economic system of particular wants and services enters upon a first #bgg approximation1 as it were1 to a unity of principle4 ,the law only professes1 indeed1 to protect property and exchange1 but in doing so it unavoidably recognises that the particular want has a general bearing2 for the developed system of law only comes into existence to enable wants to be supplied1 and takes its definite shape according to the system of wants4 ,we may illustrate this first approximation to universality1 which law confers upon the particulars of private interest1 by a suggestive view which ,m4 ,durkheim has propounded4 #b ,he has pointed out that the current formula for social change1 8from status to contract10 has a subtler significance than is apt to be recognised4 ,for contract is not really indeterminate1 as if it arose in vacuo without a precedent4 ,it runs in forms determined by social experience through law and custom2 and thus the law1 which professedly aims at protecting property and exchange1 necessarily regulates them by the modes in which it chooses to protect them4 #a ,hegel pleads strongly for codification4 #b ,de la ,division du ,travail ,social1 #bbe ff4 ,a more intimate relation to the ,state proper--to a definite principle1 as we might say1 of common good--grows out of the interests of ,bourgeois ,society which take the shape of what a ,german calls 8,police and ,corporation10 i4e4 ,state regulation and ,trade ,societies4 ,the basis of ,state regulation is the emergence of aspects of common interest in the system of particular interests4 ,the region of particular interests 7supply and demand7 has an accidental side1 and the ,state has a right and a duty to protect the general good against accidental #bgh hindrances4 ,on the whole1 no doubt1 the right relation between producer and consumer arises of itself1 but miscarriages may occur which call for interference on behalf of the explicit #a principle of the general good4 ,the general possibility of the individual's obtaining what he wants is a public interest1 and the ,state has a right to intervene with this end in view1 both by execution of necessary public works1 by sanitary inspection and the like1 and by inspection and control of fraud in the case of necessary commodities offered for sale to the general public4 ,for the public offer of goods in daily use is not a purely private concern1 but a matter of the general interest4 ,if indeed there was complete official regulation1 there would be a risk of getting work like the ,pyramids1 that represented no private want at all2 but yet1 in the system of private wants1 there is a public interest that demands vigilance4 #a ,the explicit idea of common good always belongs in ,hegel to the ,state proper4 ,a similar approximation of ,bourgeois ,society to the ,state is constituted by the 8,corporation10 which rests on the facts of class4 ,every member of the ,bourgeois ,society belongs by his vocation to a class1 and this breaking up into classes is a consequence of the division of labour which prevails in the economic sphere1 disguising the common good as private interest or necessity4 ,but in the formation of classes society begins as it were to recover from the dispersion which private interest has occasioned4 ,as a member of his class #a or #bgi 8estate10 the citizen acquires solidarity with his fellows1 and his particular interest becomes ipso facto a common one4 ,as a member of the class1 again1 he is1 or ought to be1 a member of his 8trade society0 or 8corporation40 ,in this he finds his honour or recognition1 #b a definite standard of life 7apart from which he is apt to assert himself by aimless extravagance1 for want of a recognised respectability71 a standard of work1 insurance against misfortune1 and 7as a candidate for admission7 the means of technical education4 #a ,the term 8,stnde0 it must be remembered1 has for a ,german the association of elements of the representative assembly2 8tats01 estates of the realm4 #b ,cf4 the ,english workman's phrase1 8a good tradesman10 i4e4 a competent member of his trade4 ,if the family is the first basis of the ,state1 the classes or estates are the second4 ,the ,corporation or ,trade ,society is a second family to its members4 ,it is the very root of ethical connection between the private and the general #a interest1 and the ,state should see to it that this root holds as strongly as possible4 #b #a 8,we can only say that these men1 if they leave us1 will bitterly regret it4 444 ,the man who is so unselfish as to care nothing for himself or his fellow-men will soon find himself1 as years creep over him1 and grey hairs and glasses1 completely cut out40--8,branch ,trade ,report 7,birmingham7 to ,national ,union of ,boot and ,shoe ,operatives1 ,january1 #ahif40 #b ,sects4 #bja and #bee4 ,i omit ,hegel's characterisation of the classes1 which has a good deal in common with theories which represent occupations as determining character4 ,the contrast between agricultural and industrial or commercial life1 between country and town1 is of great importance in his view4 ,he almost seems to confine ,bourgeois industrialism as such to the life of town-dwellers2 though1 again1 ultimately the whole division into classes is characteristic of ,bourgeois ,society 7cf4 sects4 #bef and #cje74 8,if10 ,hegel writes1 #a 8in recent days the 8,corporation has been abolished1 this has the significance #bhj that the individual ought to provide for himself4 ,this may be admitted2 but the corporation did not alter the individual's obligation to earn his livelihood4 ,in our modern ,states the citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the ,state2 but it is necessary to permit the ethical human being a universal activity over and above his private end4 ,this universal1 which the modern ,state does not always provide for him1 he finds in the ,corporation4 ,we saw before that the individual providing for himself in the ,bourgeois ,society also acts for others4 ,but this unconscious necessity is not enough2 it needs the ,corporation to bring it to a conscious and thoughtful social ethics4 ,of course the ,corporation needs the higher superintendence of the ,state1 or it would ossify1 shrink into its shell1 and be degraded into a wretched guild4 ,but in and for itself the ,corporation is no closed guild2 it is rather the bringing of an isolated trade into an ethical connection1 and its admission into a sphere in which it wins strength and honour40 #b #a ,sect4 #bee4 #b ,it is obvious that this treatment of associations arising among classes in industry and commerce does not apply in principle exclusively to trade or professional societies4 ,it would include1 e4g41 ,friendly ,societies and ,co-operative ,societies1 by which members of the economic world bind themselves together for help1 recognition1 and the assertion of their general interests4 #h4 ,the ,state proper1 or political constitution1 presents itself to ,hegel as the system in which the family and the ,bourgeois ,society find their completion and their security4 ,he was early impressed1 as we have seen1 with the beautiful unity of the ancient ,greek commonwealths4 ,and the first and last idea which governs his representations of the modern ,state is that of the ,greek commonwealth enlarged as it was from a sun to a solar #bha system4 ,the family feeling and the individual interest are in the modern ,state let go1 accented1 intensified to their uttermost power2 and it is out of and because of this immense orbit of its elements that the modern ,state has its 8enormous strength and depth40 ,it is the typical mind1 the very essence of reason1 whose completeness is directly as the completeness of each of its terms or sides or factors2 and secure in the logical confidence that feeling and self-consciousness1 the more they attain their fulness1 must return the more certainly to their place in the reasonable system which is their very nature4 ,as ultimate power1 the ,state maintains on one side the attitude of an external necessity towards the spheres of private life1 of the family1 and of the economic world4 ,it may intervene by force to remove hindrances in the path of the common good1 which accident and immaturity may have placed there4 ,but1 in its essence1 the ,state is the indwelling and explicit end of these modes of living1 and is strong in its union of the universal purpose with the particular interests of mankind4 ,it is1 in short1 the incarnation of the general or ,real ,will4 ,it has the ethical habit and temper of the family as a pervading basis1 combined with the explicit consciousness and purpose of the business world4 ,in the organism of the ,state1 i4e4 in as far as we feel and think as citizens1 feeling becomes affectionate loyalty1 and explicit consciousness becomes political insight4 ,as citizens we both feel and see that the ,state includes and secures the objects of our affections and our interests2 not as separate items1 thrown together by chance1 but as purposes transformed by their relation to the common good1 into #bhb which1 as we are more or less aware1 they necessarily pass4 ,this feeling and insight are the true essence of patriotism4 ,it is easier to be magnanimous than to be merely right1 and people prefer to think of patriotism as a readiness to make great sacrifices which are never demanded4 ,but true patriotism is the every-day habit of looking on the commonwealth as our substantive purpose and the foundation of our lives4 ,the division of functions in the ,state is a necessary condition of its rational organisation4 ,but1 as ,rousseau had insisted1 it is altogether false to regard these separate functions as independent1 or as checks on one another4 ,there could be no living unity1 if the functions of the ,state were ultimately independent and negative towards each other4 ,their differentiation is simply the rational division of labour4 ,the ,state is an image of a rational conception2 it is 8a hieroglyph of reason40 ,sovereignty1 therefore1 resides in no one element4 ,it is1 essentially1 the relation in which each factor of the constitution stands to the whole4 ,that is to say1 it resides only in the organised whole acting qua organised whole4 ,if1 for example1 we speak of the 8,sovereignty of the ,people0 in a sense opposed to the ,sovereignty of the ,state--as if there were such a thing as 8the people0 over and above the organised means of expressing and adjusting the will of the community--we are saying what is1 strictly speaking1 meaningless4 ,it is just the point of difference between ,rousseau's two views4 ,we saw that ,rousseau clearly explained the impossibility of expressing the general #bhc will except by a determinate system of law4 ,but what he seemed to suggest1 and was taken to mean1 by popular ,sovereignty1 was no doubt just the view which ,hegel condemns4 ,it is essentially the same question as how a constitution can be made4 ,strictly1 a constitution cannot be made except by modification of an existing constitution4 ,if1 to put a case1 you have a multitude new to each other in some extra-political colony1 they must assume a constitution1 so to speak1 before they can make one4 ,law and constitution are utterances of the spirit of a nation4 ,the form of ,state which ,hegel analyses is a modern constitutional monarchy1 with an executive 7ministers sitting in the chambers1 as he is careful to urge7 and ,chambers or ,estates representing the classes developed in the civic community4 ,representation1 he urges1 is of bodies or interests rather than of masses of individuals1 and the ,corporations or ,trade ,societies have also an important place directly1 by their touch with the departments of the executive government4 #a ,the general principle is1 as indicated above1 that the problems of connection between considerable particular interests and the universal interests of the community are1 so to speak1 prepared on the ground of the ,corporation and ,bourgeois ,society for a solution in the interest of the common good by the ,legislative and the ,executive ,government4 #a ,much as through inspectors and commissions the opinion of ,trade ,unions1 ,friendly ,societies1 and ,co-operators is elicited by our ,government ,departments with a view to legislation1 independently of the ,house of ,commons4 ,the logical division of power1 in his language1 #bhd is that the ,legislature has to establish universal principles1 the executive has to apply these principles to particular cases1 and the prince has to bring to a point the acts of the ,state by giving them1 8like the dot on the i10 the final shape of individual volition4 ,the distinction of ,states into ,monarchy1 ,aristocracy1 and ,democracy1 ,hegel refuses to regard as applicable to the modern world4 ,at best1 it could only apply to the undeveloped communities of antiquity4 ,the modern ,state is a concrete1 and1 according to its principle1 all the elements of a people's life are represented in it as an indivisible unity4 ,a curious point is ,hegel's insistence on the function of the personal ,head of the ,state4 ,by a junction of the extremes1 he connects it with the recognition of free individuality1 which is usually regarded as the democratic principle of the modern world4 ,there is no act1 we may say in illustration1 according to the modern idea of an act1 if it is not done in the end by an individual1 though in a developed political system the monarch's action may only consist in signing his name4 ,it is at least remarkable to compare this view with the tendency to one-man government in the administration of the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,the ,state1 then1 is on one side the external force and automatic machinery implied in the maintenance and adjustment of the rights and purposes of the family and the ,bourgeois ,society as an actual life4 ,on the other side1 and most essentially1 it is that connection of feeling and insight1 working throughout the consciousnesses of #bhe individuals as parts in a connected structure1 which unite in willing a certain type of life as a common good in which they find their own4 ,it has the same content as that of ,religion2 but in an explicit and rationalised form as contrasted with the form of feeling4 ,only the separation of ,church and ,state1 and the division of the ,churches against one another1 have made it possible for the ,state to exhibit its own free and ethical character in true fulness1 apart from both dogmatic authority and anarchic fanaticism4 #i4 ,publicity of discussion in the assembly of the classes or estates is the great means of civic education4 ,it is not in the least true that every one knows what is for the good of the ,state1 and has only to go down to the ,house and utter it4 ,it is in the work of expression #a and discussion that the good takes form by adjustment of private views to facts and needs brought to bear by criticism4 8,the views a man plumes himself on when he is at home with his wife and friends are one thing2 it is quite another thing what happens in a great assembly1 where one shrewd idea devours the other40 #b #a ,it is a remarkable point in ,english politics to-day that legislation is practically in the hands of the ,government departments4 ,bills are rejected or 8knocked about in ,committee02 but the mass of organised knowledge necessary to initiate legislation in a complex society can hardly be found outside the gathered experience of an office which has continuity in dealing with the same problems4 ,this tendency more than justifies ,hegel's point of view4 ,an act of the 8,general ,will0 has not only1 as he said1 to be moulded by running the gauntlet of public and critical discussion1 but has even to be first drafted by the help of immense piles of experience1 which the general mind does not possess1 and could not deal with1 but which1 nevertheless1 enable its typical wish and intention to be embodied in effective form4 #b ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #cae4 #bhf ,the free judgment of individuals based on the publicity of political discussion is 8public opinion40 ,in public opinion we have an actual existent contradiction4 ,as public1 it is sound and true1 and contains the ethical spirit of the ,state4 ,as expressed by individuals in their particular judgments1 on which they plume themselves1 it is full of falsehood and vanity4 ,it is the bad which is peculiar1 and which people pride themselves on2 the rational is universal in its nature1 though not necessarily common4 ,public opinion is a contradictory appearance1 in which the true exists as false4 ,it is no accident1 but inevitable insight1 that leads both of these characters to be proverbially expressed1 as in 8,vox populi1 vox ,dei10 contrasted with ,ariosto's 8,che'l ,volgare ignorante ogn'un' riprenda ,e parli plu di qual che meno intenda02 #a or ,goethe's 8,zuschlagen kann die ,masse ,da ist sie respektabel2 ,urtheilen gelingt ihr miserabel40 #b or the 8mostly fools0 of ,carlyle4 #a 8,that the ignorant vulgar reproves everyone1 and talks most of what it understands least40 #b 8,the masses are respectable hands at fighting1 but miserable hands at judging40 ,now1 as public opinion thus combines truth and falsehood1 the public cannot be in earnest with both1 i4e4 both cannot be its real will4 ,but if we restrict ourselves to its express utterance1 we cannot possibly tell what it is in earnest with--because it does not know4 ,therefore1 the degree of passion #bhg with which a given opinion is maintained throws no light on the question1 on what points the public is really in earnest1 in the sense of the 8real will40 ,this can only be known from the substantive reality1 which is the 8true inwardness0 of public opinion4 ,this substantive reality1 the true merits of any case1 is not to be got by the study of mere public opinion as expressed1 but when it is successfully divined and asserted1 public opinion will always come round to it4 ,if we ask how it is to be divined or known1 we must go back to the analogy of a theory4 ,the solution must be constructed so as to satisfy the real facts or needs1 and the real facts or needs only become known in proportion as it is constructed1 just as in scientific discovery4 ,the man who can see and do what his age wills and demands is the great man of the age4 ,public opinion1 then1 demands to be at once esteemed and contemned2 esteemed in its essential basis1 contemned in its conscious expression4 ,it is1 however1 the principle of the modern world that every one is allowed to contribute his opinion4 ,when he has contributed it1 and so far satisfied the impulse of self-assertion1 he is likely to acquiesce in what is done1 to which1 he can feel1 he has thrown in some element of suggestion or criticism4 #aj4 ,in concluding this chapter1 we will attempt to estimate the nearness of such an analysis of the ,state to the actual facts of life1 admitting certain appearances against it1 but rejecting pessimistic views which rest on false abstractions4 ,i will state the difficulties as they appeared to ,t4,h4 ,green1 a cautious and practical ,englishman1 #bhh well experienced in local politics1 and acquainted with different classes of men4 #a 8,to an ,athenian slave1 who might be used to gratify a master's lust1 it would have been a mockery to speak of the ,state as a realisation of freedom2 and perhaps it would not be much less to speak of it as such to an untaught and under-fed denizen of a ,london yard with gin shops on the right hand and on the left40 8,it is true that the necessity which the ,state lays on the individual is for the most part one to which he is so accustomed that he no longer kicks against it2 but what is it1 we may ask1 but an external necessity1 which he no more lays on himself than he does the weight of the atmosphere or the pressure of summer heat and winter frosts1 that compels the ordinary citizen to pay rates and taxes1 to serve in the army1 to abstain from walking over the ,squire's fields1 snaring his hares1 or fishing his preserved streams1 to pay his rent1 to respect those artificial rights of property which only the possessors of them have any obvious interest in maintaining1 or even 7if he is one of the proletariate7 to keep his hands off the superfluous wealth of his neighbour when he has none of his own to lose80 8,a conception does not float in the air4 ,it must be somebody's conception4 ,whose conception1 then1 of general good is it that these institutions represent80 8,is it not seriously misleading1 when the requirements of the ,state have so largely arisen out of force directed by selfish motives1 and when the motive of obedience to these requirements is determined by fear1 to #bhi speak of them as having a common source with the morality of which it is admitted that the essence is to be disinterested and spontaneous80 #a ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 p4 #h2 cf4 p4 #abg ff4 ,i have quoted these passages--the whole section should be carefully read--in order to state plainly a paradox which affects the theory of society from beginning to end4 ,it continually shows itself in the pessimistic criticism of economic motive1 political motive1 and of every-day social motive4 ,the whole question really depends on our understanding of the relation of abstract and concrete4 ,it is plain1 as ,green says1 that the idea of a common good has never been the sole influence operative in the formation or maintenance of ,states4 ,and1 in as far as it has operated at all1 it has only done so in very imperfect forms4 ,green goes so far as to say that ,hegel's account of freedom as realised in the ,state does not seem to correspond to the facts of society as it is1 or even as1 under the unalterable conditions of human nature1 it ever could be2 though1 no doubt1 there is a work of moral liberation1 which society1 through its various agencies1 is constantly carrying on for the individual4 ,now1 the truth of these criticisms may be granted in the same sense in which we grant the imperfection of knowledge 7as currently conceived7 or of morality--imperfections not accidental1 but inherent in each particular form of human experience4 ,the conflict of interests1 the failure to reconcile rights1 and the weight and opaqueness1 so to speak1 of law and custom to the individual mind1 are contradictions of the same type and #bij due to causes of the same kind as those which arise in the world of ethics and of theory4 ,and1 though the new relations which spring up in society are perpetually resulting in new contradictions1 there is no reason to compare the ,state unfavourably1 in this respect1 with ,morality or with ,science4 ,the contradictions1 in fact1 are the material of organisation4 #a #a ,take1 for instance1 the chaos of the medical charities of ,london4 ,it consists of endeavours to adjust help to needs1 which endeavours are themselves unadjusted to each other4 ,thus1 precisely as in the theoretical progress1 the unadjustment of adjustments brings out ever new contradictions which demand readjustment4 ,without differing profoundly from ,green in theory1 therefore1 we venture to assign a greatly diminished importance to his criticisms4 ,this is due in part to the growth of a more intimate experience1 owing in some measure to his initiative1 which seems to show the essentials of life to be far more identical throughout the so-called classes of society than is admitted by such a passage as that cited above about the dweller in a ,london yard4 #a ,it is due1 further1 and in connection with such experience1 to the psychological conceptions developed in previous chapters1 according to which the place of actual fear of punishment in maintaining the social system is really very small1 while #bia the place of a habituation1 which is essentially ethical1 is comparatively large4 ,these suggestions1 which lead us to lay decreasing stress on ,green's criticism of ,hegel1 point wholly in the general direction of his own convictions1 and we may finally meet the general difficulty1 which expresses itself in pessimism1 by considerations such as ,green himself alleges in mitigation of his own criticism4 #a ,not much stress should be laid on an isolated expression of this kind1 used in making clear the difficulties of a theory which on the whole he supported1 and putting these difficulties1 as was his custom1 as high as possible4 ,but it is worth noting that no one1 who really knows the class thus rhetorically alluded to1 fails to experience in them the same great relations and recognitions which make life worth living for more fortunate persons1 and1 as they feel very keenly1 the experience is often more emphatic there than in the richer class4 ,probably1 in fundamental matters1 there is as large a proportion of persons untaught and bred up between temptations among the rich as among the poor4 ,we may approach the matter in this way4 ,the paradox is1 that if you scrutinise the acts which have made ,states1 and which carry them on1 or which go on under and within them1 you will every where be able to urge that they spring from self-interest and ambition--not from a desire for the common good4 ,how then can we say that the ,state exists for a common good8 ,hegel's large conception of a social fabric and the temper of mind which maintains it should have done some thing to meet this problem4 ,but we may come a little closer to the precise difficulty4 ,nothing is so fallacious as mere psychological analysis applied to the estimation of the purposes which rule a mind4 ,in every act there is necessarily an aspect of the agent's particular self4 ,one way or another he is satisfied in it4 ,so the pessimistic or superficial psychologist can always--not in some acts merely1 but in all--discover a form of self-seeking4 ,life is a whole made up of particulars1 and the universal is a connection within them1 not another particular outside them2 it is a mistake of principle to suppose that any act can be outside the tissue of aims1 impulses1 and emotions which affect the sensitive self4 ,great purposes work through these affections and transform them1 but #bib cannot obliterate them without obliterating life4 8,there is nothing degrading in being alive40 #a ,but there is a kind of eye which sees all these particulars apart from the substantive aims which give them their character1 and treats them as if they were the sole determining motives of the agent4 ,hegel calls such a critic--he is thinking especially of historians--8the psychological valet1 for whom there are no heroes1 not because they are no heroes1 but because he is only a valet40 ,on the whole1 a man is what he does4 ,if his series of actions has the root of the matter in it1 it is wrong either for him to be deterred1 or for a critic to carp1 because they bring him gain or glory1 or gratify him by activity and excitement4 ,to shrink from particular occasions of action because one's self may find satisfaction in them is to fall back into the mere general willing of the abstract good4 ,and 8the laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never have been green40 #a ,rechtsphil41 sect4 #abc4 ,we may illustrate these ideas from the life of the ordinary members of ,states1 and from the career of a great ruler or conqueror4 #a #a ,green1 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 sects4 #aba and #abh4 ,the life of an ,english labourer1 for example1 may concern itself with no such abstract ideas #a as are expressed by the words 8,state0 or 8common good40 ,but1 to begin with1 he is a law-abiding citizen4 ,he keeps his hands off others and their belongings by the same rule by which he expects others to keep their hands off him and his belongings4 #bic #b ,he recognises fairness of bargaining1 and is prepared to treat others fairly1 as he expects them to treat him4 ,he is aware of his claims1 that is to say1 as depending on something in common between himself and others2 and if he does not practically admit any such community1 8he is one of the dangerous classes1 virtually outlawed by himself40 #c #a ,although the literary class are liable very seriously to under-rate the significance of forms of thought unfamiliar to them4 #b ,habits1 such as our habit of relying on security of life and property1 are secondarily automatic1 i4e4 are very intimately connected with ideas4 ,see chap4 viii4 #c ,green1 ,loc4 cit4 ,so far he is a loyal subject only4 ,if he is to have a fuller sense of a social good1 he must either take part in the work of the ,state1 or at least be familiar with such work1 through interest in his fellows share of it1 and in the organisations which connect his class interests with the public good4 ,his mind must not merely work in its place in the social mind1 but must be in some degree aware of the connection between its place and the whole--of the appercipient structure to which it belongs4 ,he must1 in short1 have touch with the connection which ,hegel represents as that between the ,bourgeois ,society and the ,state proper4 ,and this1 in modern ,states1 is in principle open to him4 ,and1 further1 he must have the feeling for his ,state1 which is connected with the idea of home and fatherland4 ,in a modern nation the atmosphere of the family is not confined to the actual family4 ,the common dwelling-place1 history1 and tradition1 the common language and common literature1 give a colour of affection to the every-day citizen-consciousness1 which is to the nation what family affection is in the home circle4 #bid ,thus1 it is not true that either the feeling or the insight which constitute a consciousness of a common good are wanting to the every-day life of an average citizen in a modern ,state4 ,it may seem full of selfish care1 but this is only a narrow view4 ,if we look at the spirit of the whole life we shall see that it is substantially dependent on the recognition of a good1 and feels that dependence in concrete form4 ,and1 secondly1 to take the paradox in its extreme shape1 in which the order of the ,state appears to arise out of the selfish ambition of the most unscrupulous of men4 ,the contradiction may be stated in the form that the actions of bad men are 8over-ruled0 for good4 ,but this would mean that the 8psychological0 critic or historian had first misstated the cause1 and then had rectified his mis-statement by a meaningless phrase4 ,the great ideas and causes which were advanced1 for example1 by the career of ,napoleon1 owed neither their nature nor their existence to his selfish ambition4 ,they did not1 however1 owe them to any non-human cause2 to any operation of ideas otherwise than in the minds of men4 ,they came into existence through the working of innumerable minds towards objective ends by the inherent logic of social growth1 with various degrees of moral insight1 and they were promoted by ,napoleon's career in virtue of the common character which united his aims1 in so far as they had a reasonable side1 with the movement shaped by the ideal forces of the age4 ,there is no reason to doubt1 if we do not wilfully narrow our view of the situation1 that a conception of good was as much operative in the cause as it is present in #bie the effect--say1 in the unity of ,italy4 ,we cannot attempt to deal with the problem of the existence of evil1 on the ground of ethical and political philosophy2 and we are not concerned to deny or to minimise the presence of greed and selfishness as distorting forces in the minds of men1 or in the organisation of ,states4 ,all that we needed to show1 was that what makes and maintains #a ,states as ,states is will and not force1 the idea of a common good1 and not greed or ambition2 and that this principle cannot be overthrown by the facts of self-interest in ordinary citizens1 or of selfishness in those who mould the destinies of nations4 #a ,aristotle's saying of the ,state1 that it 8comes to be for the sake of life1 but is for the sake of good life10 expresses in the first instance an apparent contrast between origin and purpose of ,states4 ,but its real point is that the purpose is implied in the origin1 for the ,state is natural1 and in every 8natural0 genesis its purpose is implied2 and the origin is implied in the purpose1 for the ,state1 in the processes which maintain it1 8originates10 i4e4 renews its material basis1 daily1 and must do so in order to 8be40 #bif ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,institutions ,,considered ,,as ,,ethical ,,ideas4 #a4 ,we have been guided throughout our argument by the idea that the relation of a given mind to the mind of society #a is comparable to the relation between our apprehension of a single object and our view of nature as a whole4 ,the former term1 in each case1 we cannot but suppose to be an individualised case of the latter4 ,the latter seems inevitably to imply a universal principle corresponding to every feature of the former4 ,we can never see through the connections1 and the connections of the connections--e4g4 of gravitation and of colour--in every part4 ,but our ideal as theorists would be to analyse the physical object into features1 every one of which should be a case of a natural law1 and the whole taken together a case of the whole system of natural law1 which would be our scientific view of the world4 #a ,i neglect1 for the moment1 the difference between the mind of society and mind at its best4 ,the difference is practically considerable1 but ,i shall attempt to make it appear1 in the course of the present chapter1 to be a difference of progress but not of direction4 ,in treating of a human mind in its relation to #big ,society and the ,state1 our ideal is comparable to this4 ,we should like to analyse any given mind into features each of which should be an individual case of a universal principle1 and the whole of which1 taken together1 should be a case of the whole system of principles incarnate in the world1 and proximately in the social world4 ,plato1 simplifying for the sake of elucidation the ,city-state1 which to our minds was already simple1 represented a community1 in diagrammatic form1 as consisting in a threefold structure of classes1 in which were incarnate the three main features which he discriminated in the individual soul--the desires necessary to living1 the spirit of action1 and the power of seeing things as a whole4 #b4 ,the principles which constitute a society are facts as well as ideas1 and purposes as well as facts4 ,this threefold character is united in what we describe by the general term 8institutions10 a term which would apply perfectly well to ,plato's 8classes0 in virtue of the definite relations with which he invests them4 ,it is unnecessary to insist on the external aspect of institutions as facts in the material world2 but it will be worth while to gather up the leading conceptions of our analysis by tracing the nature of some prominent 8institutions10 as ideas1 constituent elements of the mind1 which are also purposes2 that is1 as ethical ideas4 ,an institution may have grown up without special ordinance1 or may have been called into existence by an act of public will4 ,but it has always the character of being recognised as if it had been 8instituted0 or established to fulfil some public or quasi-public #bih purpose4 #a ,an old servant is sometimes said to be 8quite an institution0--he is characterised by the function of keeping alive certain common traditions of a school1 perhaps1 or a family--an annual custom may be an institution in virtue of the same kind of recognition2 ,sunday is an institution2 the word is indeed very vaguely applied1 for obviously almost every object or event can have a significance of this kind attached to it in jest or earnest4 ,but for all that1 we can see pretty plainly what usage is driving at4 ,an institution implies a purpose or sentiment of more minds than one1 and a more or less permanent embodiment of it4 8,of more minds than one10 because it is to fix the meeting points of minds that the external embodiment is necessary4 #a ,why is not a memorial statue or building1 which expresses a public idea1 an 8institution0 apart from its uses8 ,apparently because it has not the notion of bringing persons together or inducing persons to act in some definite way4 ,an 8institution10 then1 belongs to the level of society1 as such1 conceived as a number of persons4 ,thus1 a work of art is hardly an institution1 though it expresses the 8universal0 of many minds2 but a weekly concert is an institution1 because many persons act together in giving and attending it4 ,in institutions1 then1 we have that meeting point of the individual minds which is the social mind4 ,but 8meeting point0 is an unhappy term1 suggesting objects in space that touch at certain spots4 ,rather let us say1 we have here the ideal substance1 which1 as a universal structure1 is the social1 but in its differentiated cases is the individual mind4 ,and it is necessary to observe that the material of this fabric has determinate sources4 ,mind is not an empty point4 ,it is the world as experienced4 ,the institutions1 which as ethical #bii ideas constitute mind1 are1 like a theory1 attempts at unity in face of needs1 pressures1 facts1 and suggestions which arise in what we call our surroundings1 and to each of which mind reveals a different quality2 as every tone of a landscape elicits its peculiar shade of feeling1 which but for it might have remained latent for ever4 ,it takes the whole world to call out the whole mind4 ,but it will be enough if we can trace1 in some prominent examples1 the nature of an institution as at once a dealing with surroundings1 #a an ethical idea1 and a social principle4 #a ,there are1 of course1 no absolute surroundings4 ,at every point experience rests on mind4 ,but at any point at which we are observing1 we must take some facts as1 comparatively speaking1 given4 #c4 ,the family starts from the universal physical fact of parentage1 but takes its ethical value mainly from the special phase of parental relation which leads to the formation of a household4 ,the association of parents and children in a household1 which is permanent until broken up into other households1 is due to economic conditions4 ,calling to mind the original meaning of words1 we see that we are asserting the formation of a house hold to be due to 8household0 #a conditions4 ,and this is something more than a pun4 ,whatever the surroundings may be which favour the formation of households1 whether the difficulty of procuring livelihood1 which makes the father's continued care essential1 #b or the chances offered by agriculture to a stable group1 they operate as elements in a human world1 in a world which is constituted by #cjj the focussing of 8surroundings0 7circumstances7 in a whole4 ,conditions which have become 8economic0 have ceased to be material4 ,they are motives1 interests1 means to ends4 ,they bring the world into the mind1 but in doing so they become factors in the purposiveness and re-adjustment1 which the mind1 as unity asserting itself throughout varied suggestions1 is busied in bringing to pass4 ,by demanding permanence1 for instance1 economic conditions elicit in the relation of parent and child the simplest form of universality necessary to an ethical idea4 #a 8,economy0 household management4 #b ,it is said that the household does not readily form itself in very easy conditions of life4 ,we will not venture upon the history of phases of the family life1 but will attempt at once to sketch its position and value in the typical civilisation of a modern ,state4 ,only it must be insisted on once more1 #a that the family or household as an ethical structure is not anterior to the ,state1 but is rather a growth dependent on the spirit and protection of the ,state1 and intentionally fostered by it as against forms of kinship which do less justice to the ethical possibilities of parentage4 #a ,cf4 p4 #bgb4 ,as an ethical idea1 then1 the monogamous family1 which is in the normal case also a household1 has a unique place in the structure of the citizen mind4 ,its peculiarity is in being a natural union of feeling with ideal purpose4 ,that is to say1 the ideal purpose1 a permanent interest in a comparatively permanent and external life1 attaches itself by imperceptible links to the most universal incident of animal existence4 ,the mere remaining together of the units1 a demand of their physical needs1 is almost enough of itself to transform their inevitable #cja mutual dependence into a relation of intentional service1 rooted in affection1 and tinged with some degree of forethought4 ,and1 being thus 8natural10 the idea of the family has a hold like no other upon the whole man4 ,in this respect it anticipates the powers which have been claimed for the love of beauty4 ,the very animal roots of life1 and every detail of man's appetitive being1 are made1 without conscious effort or moralising interference1 factors in a round of social service4 ,the meal of a lonely individual #a is perhaps1 at best1 a refined and lawful pleasure4 ,but the family meal1 quite apart from over-strained religionism1 has in it1 as a plain matter of fact1 the fundamental elements of a sacrament1 none the less effective that they are not thought of by that name4 ,and both through maintaining the fitness of the parents for their life work1 and through the training of the children to the same end1 the natural ethics of the family have an indispensable logical hold upon the more explicit common good known to the social will4 #a ,note1 however1 what is said below of the secondary or transferred idea of the family4 ,the solitary may partake of the family sacrament1 so to speak1 8by faith40 ,and1 in the last place1 it should be noted that a feeling and atmosphere of this kind is not confined to members actually living in households formed by families4 ,there is no race1 it has been said1 that parts with its children so readily1 or retains their affections so permanently1 as the ,anglo-,saxon race4 ,when the type and spirit are once formed1 they are contagious and persistent2 they #cjb affect all who have seen or known them1 and even those who have never formed part of a household bound by kinship4 ,if we contrast the idea of the household with monasticism as its repudiation1 and with the tribal state or phalanstery as its exaggeration1 we shall see its uniqueness in the strongest light4 ,the naturalness of its foundation1 and the completeness of the reciprocal interest 7involving monogamy7 on which its idea rests1 distinguish it from all other forms of union or disunion in which the sexes are concerned4 ,it may be added that the family1 and it alone1 has the right adjustment of population in its power4 ,the fully trained and equipped human being can never be superfluous in the world4 ,and the production of the fully trained and equipped human being depends on the capacity of forming a true family and meeting its requirements1 and when this capacity and idea regulate the union of the sexes no growth nor apparent decrease of population need cause anxiety4 ,it seems as idle to discuss whether civilisation is conceivable without the family as whether human nature can change4 ,all that we can attempt1 as philosophers1 is to ascertain the distinctive part which its idea plays in human life as such4 ,there must be1 we can see1 some such idea--an ethical idea covering some such sides of life--while man is a spiritual animal4 ,but by what precise 8institution0 such an idea might come to be represented in circumstances which we do not know1 it would be beyond the modesty of philosophy to predict4 ,the institution of ,property may be mentioned #cjc as a corollary to the household-family4 ,its natural basis and ethical value are very markedly correlative to those of the latter4 ,the outlook upon life which it essentially implies is co-extensive with that demanded by the household1 although in the relations of acquisition and exchange many further rights and duties may attach to it4 ,it depends on the fact that1 in order to express a will in an individual life 7which is incomplete except as the life of a household71 there must be a power of moulding the material world in the service of ideas1 which is conditioned by free acquisition and utilisation4 ,the institution of property1 then1 as an ethical idea1 consists in the conception of individual 7properly speaking1 household7 life as a unity in respect to its dealings with the material instruments of living4 ,it is not merely the idea of provision for the future2 still less the certainty of satisfying wants as they arise from day to day4 ,it is the idea that all dealings with the material conditions of life form part of a connected system1 in which our conceptions and our abilities express themselves4 ,it binds together the necessary care for food and clothing with ideas of making the most of our life and of the lives dependent upon us4 ,a being which has no will has so far no property--a child has in practice1 and a slave had by ,roman law1 property in a secondary sense--and a being which has no property has so far no actual will4 ,the 8person10 or responsible head 7or heads71 of a household1 is the true unit to whom the idea of property attaches1 because he is the unit to which we normally ascribe an individualised will1 a single #cjd distinctive shape of the social mind4 ,a child has not yet such a will2 a group of mature persons has more than one4 ,the change which is passing over the household in consequence of the recognition of married women as individual wills is highly instructive on this point4 ,they can hold and manage their own property1 because it is admitted that they can have their own view of life4 ,it is not proposed that young children should hold and manage property1 because every one knows that they have no mature individualised view of life4 ,the corporate person of the household is so far dissolved by legal recognition of its more individual components2 and it is most important1 theoretically1 to note that its unity is not diminished by the recognition1 but is raised to a higher power4 #d4 ,it might seem fanciful to say that our district is to our family as space to time2 but it would suggest something of the point of view from which it is well to look at the structure of our ethical ideas4 ,it is desirable to realise how the simplest characters of our surroundings and their necessary connections are ethically important1 not because they impose anything upon us1 but because they respond to something within us1 or rather1 to a possibility which is to be realised by the world1 as in us its variety strives towards unity4 ,parentage1 we saw1 was a universal animal fact1 and from it1 in an experience capable of unity and permanence1 springs the family household and all that it implies for our lives4 ,one's district1 as an element of life1 implies1 of course1 some stability--a home1 not merely permanent as a #cje home1 like the ,scythian's waggon1 but located on some spot of earth4 ,the nomad1 we must suppose1 to a great extent carries his neighbourhood--his tribe--along with him1 and for that very reason the fact of neighbourhood has not its full effect on him4 ,but when a permanent home is fixed on some spot of earth1 presumably with the beginnings of agriculture1 a new condition begins to operate--the 8indifference0 of space4 ,perhaps we are surprised that 8indifference0 should be an ethical stimulus4 ,but nothing is more instructive than to note how qualities of our surroundings1 which by themselves seem negative or the barest natural necessities1 spring into significance when taken up into the unity of life4 ,locality means a potential neighbourhood4 ,it may be long before any one comes near you except your own cousinhood1 your tribe or clan4 ,but the indifference of space is a standing invitation1 and it is pretty certain that some day strangers will become your neighbours1 and that you will have to take up some mental attitude towards them4 ,historians and jurists have described to us the struggle between the principle of kinship and the principle of neighbourhood4 ,when we read that a plebeian1 in the eyes of a ,roman patrician1 simply could not make a real marriage any more than the beasts of the field1 this is not1 as it may have become by survival1 intentional arrogance on the patrician's part4 ,it was rather the state of mind of ,mrs4 ,transome towards ,rufus ,lyon1 8sheer inability to consider him40 ,a proof of what a struggle it involved to reach a new attitude of mind as regarded the resident alien is given by #cjf the half-way house at which it was found necessary to pause in the process4 ,the recognition of kinship on the ground of residence was the fiction1 we are told1 by which the mind assisted itself to a positive attitude towards those whom the indifference of space insisted on bringing within its range4 ,and the positive attitude towards which it was groping its way was of course the recognition of humanity1 the equality of man in the truest sense which that ambiguous phrase will bear4 ,in modern ,states1 in which this struggle is on the whole behind us1 our district or locality asserts its full indifference4 ,its 8negative0 here becomes a 8positive40 ,that is to say1 on the whole1 #a and under some reasonable reservations as to evidence of intention to accept duties1 and to renounce incompatible ones1 men are full members of the district to which they choose to belong4 ,the challenge thrown down by the indifference of space has resulted in a recognition of universal humanity4 ,our district is our neighbourhood4 ,we will look a little more closely at the ethical idea implied4 ,we notice at once1 at least in ,english experience1 that each of us belongs to a variety of districts which are concentric as regards him4 ,each of these districts represents a different purpose1 and we are told that for practical purposes great confusion results4 ,but it is a useful training to be made aware of the distinct purpose of each #cjg organised locality which surrounds us--to have the care of our health1 of public order1 of education1 of the relief of the destitute1 and of religion according to our view of it1 represented by different1 or possibly different1 boundary lines on the map4 ,each of these boundaries indicates some common element of thought and feeling--some common interest--in the mind of the neighbourhood1 and the difference of the boundaries1 where they differ--the difference1 e4g41 between the civil and ecclesiastical parish--may have a long growth of ideas behind it4 ,at any rate1 all these are moral or physical needs1 which1 like our household necessities1 draw us out of ourselves1 and reveal us to ourselves as cases of a larger mind4 #a ,settlement1 scholarships1 fellowships1 and charities generally1 8close0 to localities1 and perhaps domicile1 maintain qualifications in contradiction with actual residence1 and in case of allegiance even depending in part on birth4 ,but some fixity is1 of course1 convenient2 and ,i believe that intention plus residence will cancel almost any opposing qualification4 ,every locality1 then1 is1 however imperfectly and unconsciously1 a body which has a mind4 ,it is1 as an idea which enters into us1 the spiritual reflection of our adjacent surroundings1 both human and natural1 as the family is of our animal parentage4 ,the neighbourhood is for the mind its immediate picture of the world1 the frame into which its further vista of society as a whole must be fitted1 or1 in other words1 its sphere of direct relations4 ,the family is a group of natural relations2 but the neighbourhood consists of relations which are as natural in a different way1 not through blood1 but through contact4 ,it is not a selection1 but rather a specimen of life as a whole1 for it must include as a rule all the necessary elements of the social fabric4 ,it includes all that comes to us by direct sense-perception from day to day2 all our chance meetings and dealings with those outside our household1 and probably the nearer #cjh and more reliable illustrations of all social and political problems4 ,for it is a context of life which we know and feel in its total working1 which is impossible with what we only gather from writings or from hearsay4 ,as such a reflection of our direct surroundings1 it colours our whole basis of feeling1 ,a peculiar tinge of happiness1 anxiety1 depression1 or resolution attaches to the streets or fields which we pass through day by day1 and the faces which we meet4 ,how far these feelings are true interpretations of what we see1 and how far they spring from superficial or sentimental associations1 is one of the greatest tests of the mind and heart4 ,do we see the body of a soul1 the symbols of character and happiness1 in the houses1 the streets1 the tillage1 the workshops1 or the gardens8 ,no other element of mind can be the substitute for the neighbourhood4 ,it is the faith in which we live1 so far as embodied in our contact with a sensuous world4 ,it is a microcosm of humanity1 in which1 by the very indifference of space1 we are liable to the direct impact of all possible factors4 ,it is particularly the sphere of charity and courtesy1 of the right behaviour in immediate human relations of all possible kinds4 ,the ,district or ,neighbourhood1 in short1 as an ethical idea1 is the unity of the region with which we are in sensuous contact1 as the family is that of the world bound to us by blood or daily needs4 ,local self-government1 for example1 acquires a peculiar character from the possibilities of intimate knowledge of each other among those who carry it on4 ,a man's whole way of living #cji is in question when he sets up to be locally prominent1 and though the result may often be corruption or vulgarity1 #a these are only the failure of what1 at its best1 is a true type of the relation of fellow-citizens4 #a ,the recriminations or interested intimacies of a vestry or parish council rest at bottom on the personal knowledge which1 rightly used1 gives security to local life4 ,as with the family1 we may illustrate the significance of ,neighbourhood by the case in which it fails to be duly recognised1 and that in which nothing else is recognised4 ,to a great extent1 in the life of modern cities1 especially when supplemented by suburban residence1 the principle is disregarded4 ,in a great city1 the actual neighbourhood is more than can be dealt with1 and has often no distinctive physical character--at least no attractiveness--and the idea of a special relation to it falls away4 ,the fact1 indeed1 is less universal than is often asserted1 and nearness in space1 together with local government1 retain and will retain a certain predominance over the mind4 ,the total disregard of an ethical purpose connecting us with the surroundings nearest to us in bodily presence1 tends to deprive the general life of its vitality1 its sensuous health1 strength1 and beauty4 ,in many ways1 circuitous perhaps1 but ultimately effective1 it may be that this factor of immediacy will regain a proper place in the national mind4 ,we may observe that in as far as electoral districts are treated as mere circumscriptions of such and such numbers of electors1 the life of a neighbourhood is disregarded4 ,to make the constituency a mere #caj number 7,hare's scheme7 would be the climax of this tendency4 ,in the ancient ,city-state1 on the other hand1 the district was all powerful4 ,the ,state was almost a sensuous fact4 ,the members of the ,state were essentially friends and neighbours1 who for business or pleasure were meeting all day long4 ,when the district thus absorbs the ,state1 there is a want of what we call freedom1 though there may be enough of sensuous unconstraint4 ,the ,state and its ideal purposes are not clearly set above all flesh and blood4 ,a great legal system is not created till the ,state ceases to be a neighbourhood4 ,individual intimacy #a and the 8hard case0 obscure the idea of universal law4 ,the possibility of representative government1 of a political faith which does not work by sight1 is not conceived4 ,the district1 as a natural fact1 was at first only a degree more liberating than the natural fact of kinship4 #b ,it was not conceived that man1 as man1 belonged 8neither to this place nor to ,jerusalem40 ,with the ideal unity of a modern nation such conceptions harmonise much more readily1 and the neighbourhood can lend them flesh and blood without hiding them4 #a ,imagine a ,roman or ,english judge being addressed as ,demosthenes1 in his speech against ,pantaenetus1 addressed 7in his client's name7 the ,athenian jury3 8,i know ,i have a hurried gait and a loud voice1 and it annoys people2 but ,i am as ,i was made1 and ,i have a right to justice all the same40 ,it sounds like a speech to a jury of schoolboys4 #b ,p4 #cjj above4 #e4 8,class0 is in democratic countries no longer a political institution4 ,a man's vote is secured to him on a minimum qualification1 and his practical influence and acceptance depend neither on #caa birth nor on occupation1 but on the power which he can exercise by his qualities or his possessions4 ,this is a consequence of the recognition of humanity as such1 and has its bad side and its good side according to the baseness and nobility of the influences which tell de facto upon human nature4 ,it is horrible1 we may say1 that influence should belong to wealth without any security whatever for a discharge of social function4 ,but this1 given human nature as it is to-day1 is a result of the same causes which enable us to boast1 with some truth1 that a man ranks in the general world by his powers1 character1 and behaviour1 and that we do not know or care whether his livelihood comes to him as a miner or as a duke4 ,wealth has weight because people give it weight2 but no one need give weight to wealth in politics or social intercourse unless he likes4 ,it is a consequence1 then1 of the recognition of free humanity that 8class0 no longer is an institution in political right as such1 while in social intercourse1 though it practically exists as an institution1 it claims to be an expression of what people are in character and behaviour1 and its differences are not annexed by any iron bond to differences of occupation4 #a #a ,it may be taken as proved that a 8gentleman0 can make his living as a labourer or mechanic--at least in the ,u4,s4,a41 where irrational tradition is weaker than in ,england--and remain a gentleman in the drawing-room sense of the term as well as in essentials4 ,this being so1 there can be no inherent impossibility in men born and bred as labourers or mechanics realising the same qualities4 ,it would be cant1 ,i think1 to say that full equality of social class1 full pleasantness and freedom of intercourse1 could be attained without those qualities4 ,but though occupation no longer determines either social or political class1 in the sense of #cab gradation by any formal bond1 yet it remains and must always remain a determinant of class in a narrower sense1 and one of the main ideas which constitute the ethical structure of the mind4 ,the necessities which we compared roughly to time and space--the proximate permanent group and the adjacent locality--give a value to man's animal routine1 and a significance to the area of his every-day perceptions4 ,it is when the division of labour1 the requital of one service by a different one1 becomes prominent in a community1 that a further grasp is laid upon the distinctive capacities of the individual consciousness1 in which must be reckoned the surroundings which constitute its horizon of possibilities4 ,we still answer the general question1 8,what is he80 by naming a man's industry or profession4 ,the family and the neighbourhood sustain and colour the individual life1 but the vocation stamps and moulds it4 ,the more definite and articulate summons of the organising world--in which of course intelligence is active1 ever discerning new purposes in old routine--elicits a deeper response from1 or takes a more concrete shape in1 the particular centre of consciousness4 ,the individual has his own nature communicated to him as he is summoned to fit himself for rendering a distinctive service to the common good4 ,he becomes 8something02 an incarnation of a factor in the social idea4 ,the ,roman word 8class10 which the ,english language has adopted1 not for every separate employment1 but for the character and position roughly connected with a whole group of employments1 has an origin worth recalling4 ,plato's classes #cac were 8genera0 clans1 extended families4 ,the ,german classes were 8,stnde0 statuses1 positions1 estates 7compare the ,french 8tat10 which practically trade74 ,but the ,roman 8classis0 was 8a summoning0 to public service2 the first and second classes were the first and second summonings2 #a then indeed to military service in an order based on wealth4 ,but the idea may survive4 ,our 8class0 may be thought of as the group or body in which we are called out for distinctive service4 #a ,mommsen ,rom4 ,hist41 i4 #aja1 ,e4 tr4 ,the 8classicus0 was the trumpet4 ,one's class1 then1 in the sense in which it indicates the type of position and service involved in one's occupation1 approaches very near the centre of one's individuality4 ,in principle1 as an ethical idea1 it takes the man or woman beyond the family and the neighbourhood2 and for the same reason takes him deeper into himself4 ,he acquires in it a complex of qualities and capacities which put a special point upon the general need of making a livelihood for the support of his household4 ,in principle1 his individual service is the social mind1 as it takes1 in his consciousness1 the shape demanded by the logic of the social whole4 ,he is 8a public worker0 #a by doing the service which society demands of him4 ,and just because the service is in principle something particular1 unique1 and distinctive1 he feels himself in it to be a member of a unity held together by differences4 ,and in this sense the bond of social union is not in similarity1 but in the highest degree of individuality or specialisation1 the ultimate point of which would be to feel that ,i am rendering #cad to society a service which is necessary1 and which no one but me can render--the closest conceivable tie1 and yet one1 which in a sense1 really exists in every case4 ,your special powers and functions supply my need1 and my special powers and functions supply your need1 and each of us recognises this and rejoices in it4 ,this ethical idea of unique service1 or the service of a unique class1 involves of course a more or less conscious identity in difference4 ,that is to say1 the individual's mind is not reduced to his special service1 or he would be a machine4 ,rather1 the whole social consciousness is present in him1 but present in a modified form1 according to the point of view from which it is looking4 ,the problem is simply put by ,plato's diagrammatic scheme of classes4 ,the statesman's function is to be wise for the community2 the carpenter's to carpenter for the community4 ,but plainly the community for which the statesman knows that he has to be wise1 must include the carpenter's life and the conditions of his work1 and the community for which the carpenter knows that he has to work must include some of the order and organisation which belong to it in the statesman's vision4 ,the individual1 in short1 is unique1 or belongs to a unique class1 not as an atom1 but as a case of a law1 or term of a connection4 ,this is what is meant by individuality in the true sense2 the character of a unit which has a great deal that1 being his very self1 cannot be divided from him2 not one which has so little that there is nothing by subtraction of which he can be imagined less4 ,such individuality is in a sense the whole ethical idea1 but more particularly is embodied in #cae the idea of a vocation4 ,our vocation1 like our neighbourhood1 and usually of course in connection with it1 stamps both mind and body2 and what we consider most intimately ourself is really the structure of ethical ideas which we are describing1 with the feelings and habits in which they are rooted1 but none of which are unmodified by them4 #a ,greek demiourgos1 8artisan40 ,homer speaks of 8those who are public workers--the soothsayer1 the doctor1 and the carpenter40 ,like the other ideas of which we have spoken1 the idea of class or specialised function may be illustrated both by the extreme in which it is nothing1 and the extreme in which it is everything4 ,the less a society is differentiated--the less that1 considered as a mind1 it has developed intense and determinate capacities--the more its structure repeats itself from household to household1 #a and fails to exhibit lines of formation pervading the community as a whole4 ,dicey's ,the ,peasant ,state #b gives an idea of a social mind thus undifferentiated1 without classes1 without ambitions1 and without interests4 ,both in this case and in that of the ,boers of the ,transvaal it would be rash for an outsider to pronounce dogmatically on the value of the life which is achieved4 ,but as cases of social formation and of social minds1 they illustrate our present theme4 ,to say that there is no specialised function1 is the same as to say that there is no developed intelligence4 #a ,durkheim's 8,segmentary ,structure10 ,de la ,division1 p4 #aij4 #b ,see also ,h4 ,bosanquet1 ,standard of ,life1 p4 #h4 8,class0 appears to be everything1 an absolute and inflexible rule of precedence and privilege1 when it has lost or has not gained the power of accommodating itself to function1 and function to social logic4 ,such denials of free adjustment1 of #caf the career open to talents1 may take the form of a confusion of the principle of class with that of birth1 or even with that of private property4 ,in the former case function and position are inherited1 in the latter they are bought and sold4 ,the two confusions may even be combined1 as when public functions are inherited like or with a house or an estate4 #a ,such a 8class0 system may be an oppression to its members1 #b or to the community1 or to both4 ,but the essence of the evil is that a function of mind is divorced from its characteristic of free logical adaptation within the social system4 ,the institution has become ossified2 and instead of moulding itself1 like a theory or a living organism1 to the facts and needs which it is there to meet1 it nails itself to an alien principle1 and becomes a fallacy in social logic1 or a dead organ in the social body4 #a ,as in the judicial privileges of the ,baron of ,bradwardine and his likes4 #b ,the hereditary executioner in ,maurus ,jokai's novel1 ,die schne ,michal4 ,in both of these extreme cases individuality is minimised4 ,in the former the individual does not pretend to any high capacity4 ,in the latter he pretends to a considerable capacity1 but this being cut apart from the principle of the whole1 and pretending to be everything in itself to exist absolutely or for its own sake has lost the connection which gave it value1 and becomes a mere pretension4 ,there is a strange and sad institution in which1 it may be suggested1 the two extremes of error are combined4 ,this is the institution of 8the #cag poor0 as a class1 representing1 as an ethical idea in the modern mind1 a permanent object of compassion and self-sacrifice4 8,poverty10 it has been said1 8has become a status40 ,the 8dclasss0 have become a social class1 with the passive social function of stimulating the goodness of others4 #a ,let any one consider carefully1 from the point of view which regards ethical ideas as an embodiment of human or social purposes1 the offertory sentences of the ,church of ,england4 ,it is needless to press the criticism1 for no one would be likely to deny that here we have ideas gathered from other soils and climates1 and rightly applicable only in the spirit1 but not in the letter4 8,give alms of thy goods1 and never turn thy face from any poor man2 and then the face of the ,lord shall not be turned away from thee40 8,he that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the ,lord1 and look1 what he layeth out it shall be paid him again40 ,the victims of misfortune in a small community1 under strict regulations1 as were the ,jews1 for the promotion of industry1 are one thing4 ,the recognition of a class marked by the function of dependence--to use a contradictory expression--in a vast community whose industrial organisation rests on the individual will1 is another thing4 ,the idea of pity and self-denial1 inherited1 ,i presume1 largely from the ,jewish scriptures as also from the ,new ,testament1 has tended1 in the modern world1 to become mechanical1 and combine with a false class-conception4 ,all who know the inner life of evangelical ,christians a #cah generation ago will admit that1 among earnest persons of this type1 the notion of the tithe--the devotion of one tenth or more of the income to purposes of religion or benevolence--had been inherited as a guiding idea1 representing an end valuable per se1 almost according to the letter of the offertory4 ,i am not suggesting any vulgar charge of other-worldliness1 but recalling a genuine conviction that the surrender of a portion of income to a less fortunate class of the community was in itself desirable and a religious duty4 #a ,the incurably sick and helpless in all ranks of society do1 no doubt1 rightly fulfil such a passive function4 ,it would not be difficult to show that the true and highest idea of ,christian charity is remote from this conception of a dependent status as inherent in a certain portion of society4 ,what seems to be needed here1 as in so many aspects of morality and religion1 is to combine the inspiration and abandon of the modern mind with the definiteness of purpose and lucidity of plan that characterised the ancient ,city-state4 ,socialism1 at its best1 #a unites with recent political economy and with those who try to 8organise0 or rationalise charity1 in challenging the preconception that poverty must be recognised as a permanent class-function4 ,and this brave denial may remain written to its credit when the controversies of immediate method are forgotten4 #a ,i cannot think that in detail its advocates are consistent with their principles on this point4 ,but controversy is not my object here4 ,we may attempt to indicate in a few words the direction in which the ethical idea incarnate in the institution of the 8poor0 is tending to supplement and modify itself as clearer notions of a commonwealth arise4 ,it may be observed1 by #cai way of introduction1 that we cruelly misconceive the ,greek mind when we ascribe to it a want of love and compassion1 because we miss in its utterances the religious note of devotion to the poor4 #a ,to a great extent the truest idea of charity was presupposed in the very axioms of a ,greek commonwealth4 ,the ,greek spoke little of 8the poor10 because he recognised no such status4 #b ,it would have meant to him a functionless class1 a dislocation of the body politic4 ,this1 in fact1 is what it did mean when pauperism began to press upon the ,greeks1 and the philosopher #c at once diagnoses the evil1 and uses the term1 8people without means10 i4e4 without ways of supporting themselves1 instead of the older word1 which rather suggests the 8object of #8charity'04 ,to get them back into a function1 8a means10 is the course which ipso facto rises before him2 not to create a new ethical idea for their sake qua dclasss4 #a ,not altogether true1 of course4 ,in ,homer 8all strangers and poor men come from ,zeus40 #b ,it is a mistake to treat all these problems as automatically solved for the ancients by slavery4 ,the citizen population had enough dependence on industrial life to be liable to disaster from its dislocation1 and that this happened so little was a true success while it lasted4 #c ,aristotle1 ,politics1 #acbj1 d4 #bi4 ,the older word is ptochos1 8one who crouches or cringes1 a beggar02 it always had a bad sense till it was ennobled in the ,gospels 7,liddell and ,scott74 ,aristotle's word is aporos1 8without ways and means40 ,different from both is penes1 for which we have no proper word1 having spoilt 8poor0 by the idea of dependence4 ,it means a poor man in the sense of one who is not rich enough to live without working4 ,the speeches in which ,poverty penia defends her merits against ,wealth1 and in distinction from ,beggary ptocheia1 in ,aristophanes' ,plutus1 are fine1 though mixed with fallacies4 ,the full modern conception of the 8poor0 as #cbj an institution1 if they must be an institution1 ought at least to avoid the pitfall of acquiescence4 ,granting the fire and love of the ,christian mind to be a gain1 yet its object must be brought into relation with the true meaning of a mind or a commonwealth4 ,devotion to man at his weakest must not be separated from devotion to the possibilities of man at his strongest--possibilities either existent or at least symbolised in the most unhappy of the functionless poor4 ,self-sacrifice for the poor should not mean a tribute to the maintenance of a vicious status1 but an abiding and pervading sense of the claims which the weaker humanity has to be made strong4 #f4 ,the ,nation-,state1 we have already suggested1 is the widest organisation which has the common experience necessary to found a common life4 ,this is why it is recognised as absolute in power over the individual1 and as his representative and champion in the affairs of the world outside4 ,it is obvious that there can be but one such absolute power in relation to any one person2 and that1 so far as the world is organised1 there must be one2 and1 in fact1 his discharge from one allegiance can only be effected by his acceptance of another4 ,the analysis of the previous chapter releases us from the task of setting out the elements which combine in the ,nation-,state1 as the conception of sovereign and ultimate adjustment between the spheres which realise the elements of our ethical life4 ,it should be noted1 however1 that the principles of the family1 the district1 and the class1 not only enter into the nation in these definite shapes1 but affect the general fabric of #cba the national ,state through the sense of race1 of country1 and of a pervading standard of life and culture4 ,the reaction of ideal unity on the natural conditions of a state is exemplified by the tendency to substitute ideal frontiers--a meridian or a parallel #a--;for frontiers determined by natural boundaries4 #a ,see1 e4g41 the map of ,north ,america4 ,the ,nation-,state as an ethical idea is1 then1 a faith or a purpose--we might say a mission1 were not the word too narrow and too aggressive4 ,it seems to be less to its inhabitant than the ,city-state to its citizens2 but that is greatly because1 as happens with the higher achievements of mind1 it includes too much to be readily apprehended4 ,the modern nation is a history and a religion rather than a clear cut idea4 ,its power as an idea-force is not known till it is tried4 ,how little the outsider1 and even members of the community concerned1 were able to gauge beforehand the strength of the sentiment and conception that pervaded the ,united ,states through the war of secession4 #a ,the place of the idea of the ,nation-,state in the whole of ethical ideas may be illustrated by the ,greek conception of ,happiness1 as that organisation of aims1 whatever it may be which permits the fullest harmony to life4 ,the ,state1 as such1 we saw1 is limited to the office of maintaining the external conditions of a good life2 but the conditions cannot be conceived without reference to the life for which they exist1 and #cbb it is true1 therefore1 to say that the conception of the ,nation-,state involves at least an outline of the life to which1 as a power1 it is instrumental4 ,the ,state1 in short1 cannot be understood apart from the nation1 nor the conditions from the life1 although in exerting political force it is important to distinguish them4 ,as an ethical idea1 the idea of a purpose1 it is essential to hold the two sides together1 if we are not to walk blindly4 #b ,the dangers besetting the ,french ,republic to-day 7,december1 #ahih7 are1 in essence1 tests applied to the strength of a national idea4 ,if the idea cannot maintain itself1 we must reluctantly suppose that it ought not--that the common life has not the necessary depth4 #g4 ,our analysis of the ,nation-,state suggests a point of view which may be applied to the vexed question of whether ,state action is to be judged by the same moral tests as private action4 ,the first step is to get a clear idea of the nature of ,state action4 ,it must be confined1 one would think1 to what is done in the name of the ,state1 and by something approaching to an act of will on its part as a ,state4 ,we only pass moral judgment on individuals in respect of their acts of will1 and we ought to extend the same justice to a ,state4 ,the question is complicated by the fact that a ,state has1 as its accredited agents1 individuals whose acts it must normally avow4 ,but it can hardly be saddled with moral responsibility for their personal misdoings1 except under circumstances which are barely conceivable4 #a ,the ,state1 as such1 can have no ends but public ends2 and in practice it has none but what its organs conceive to be public ends4 ,if an agent1 even under the order of his executive superior1 commits a breach of morality1 bona fide in order to what he conceives to be a public end desired by the ,state1 he and his superior are certainly #cbc blamable1 but the immorality can hardly be laid at the door of the public will4 #a i4e4 ,that it should actually order a theft1 murder1 or the like4 ,indeed1 a strict definition of ,state action might raise a difficulty like that of defining the ,general ,will--if the act was immoral1 can the ,state1 as such1 really have willed it8 ,and waiving this as a mere refinement1 it still seems clear that the selfishness or sensuality1 which has at least a good deal to do with the immorality of private actions1 can hardly be present in an act of the public will1 in the same sense as in a private volition4 ,the ,state1 as such1 certainly cannot be guilty of personal immorality1 and it is hard to see how it can commit theft or murder in the sense in which these are moral offences4 ,to speak of the question as if it concerned the conduct of statesmen and their agents1 instead of the volition of a ,state as such1 seems to introduce confusion4 ,we are discussing the parallel between public and private acts1 and we are asked to begin by treating the public acts as private4 ,it may be said that this distinction between public and private acts leads to the casuistry of pure intention4 ,we are saying1 it will be urged1 that the ,state remains pure1 because its will is on the whole towards a public interest1 whatever crimes its agents may commit4 ,and1 no doubt1 this line is often taken in practice4 ,a successful agent finds his evil deeds are winked at2 an unsuccessful one is disavowed4 ,in either case the ,state pleads innocence4 ,but this danger cannot alter the conditions of a moral action1 and we cannot impute that as an action to the ,state1 of which it knew no particulars1 which it never #cbd willed1 and which can hardly indeed be the object of a public will4 ,it has a duty to see to the character of its agents and punish their excesses2 but the conditions under which it is true that qui facit per alium facit per se1 can seldom apply to a public body with regard to actions of its agent which are not of a nature to embody public ends4 ,promises and treaties1 however1 are acts which embody public ends4 ,and here the ,state1 on its side1 is bound to maintain good faith2 but still its agent is likely to go wrong if he mixes up the obligations of the ,state with his private honour4 ,the question for him1 if he has to keep or break a public undertaking1 is1 to what is the ,state substantially bound1 not to what extent would he be bound if he had made the promise or engagement in question in his private capacity8 ,he1 or the power which is to act1 must consider the obligations and aims of the ,state1 as a whole1 and work for the best fulfilment of them as a whole4 ,the question may be parallel to that of a private case of honour1 but it is not his honour nor his promise that is in question4 ,just so1 if he introduces his private conscience about religion or morality into his public acts on behalf of the ,state1 he may cause frightful persecutions or disasters4 ,the religious persecutions1 and our position in ,india1 supply examples4 ,the ,state1 then1 exists to promote good life1 and what it does cannot be morally indifferent2 but its actions cannot be identified with the deeds of its agents1 or morally judged as private volitions are judged4 ,its acts proper are always public acts1 #cbe and it cannot1 as a ,state1 act within the relations of private life in which organised morality exists4 ,it has no determinate function in a larger community1 but is itself the supreme community2 the guardian of a whole moral world1 but not a factor within an organised moral world4 ,moral relations presuppose an organised life2 but such a life is only within the ,state1 not in relations between the ,state and other communities4 ,but all this1 it may be urged1 is beside the question4 ,the question is not1 can a ,state be a moral individual 7though this is certainly one question78 but1 does an interest of ,state justify what would otherwise be immorality or wrong-doing on the part of an officer of ,state8 ,again1 ,i think1 we must distinguish between acts essentially private and acts essentially public4 ,to steal or murder1 to lie1 or to commit personal immorality1 for instance1 as we said1 cannot be a public act4 ,such acts cannot embody a general interest willed by the public will4 ,a ,state agent who commits them in pursuit of information or to secure a diplomatic result cannot be justified on the ground that they are not his acts but the ,state's2 and they are as immoral in him as in anyone else4 ,ultimately1 indeed1 it may be true that there is no act which is incapable of justification1 supposing some extreme alternative2 and in this sense1 but in this sense only1 it might be that1 treating the interest of a commonwealth like any other ethically imperative interest1 such acts might be relatively capable of justification4 ,but this justification would only mean that some supreme interest was subserved by them1 and would have #cbf no special relation to the supposed public character of the interest4 ,it is then a case of the conflict of duties4 ,and the commoner occurrence1 which results in doubtful acts1 probably is that an agent1 charged with some public service1 finds it easiest to promote it by some act of rascality1 and acts on his idea4 ,but over readiness to make capital out of an apparent conflict of duties is neither made worse nor better by the fact that one of the duties is the service of the ,state4 #a #a ,cruelty1 it has been said1 is a good deal owing to laziness4 ,it is more comfortable to sit in the shade rubbing red pepper into a man's eyes to make him confess than to run about in the sun collecting evidence4 ,i quote from memory1 from a lecture1 ,i think1 by ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen4 ,a public act which inflicts loss1 such as war1 confiscation1 the repudiation of a debt1 is wholly different from murder or theft4 ,it is not the act of a private person4 ,it is not a violation of law4 #a ,it can hardly be motived by private malice or cupidity in the strict sense1 and it is not a breach of an established moral order by a being within it and dependent upon it for the organisation and protection of his daily life4 ,it is the act of a supreme power1 which has ultimate responsibility for protecting the form of life of which it is the guardian1 and which is not itself protected by any scheme of functions or relations1 such as prescribes a course for the reconciliation of rights and secures its effectiveness4 ,the means adopted by such a supreme power to discharge its responsibilities as a whole1 are of course subject to criticism as respects the conception of good which they #cbg imply and their appropriateness to the task of realising it4 ,but it is mere confusion to apply to them names borrowed from analogous acts of individuals within communities1 to impute them1 as it were1 to individuals under dyslogistic predicates and to pass moral judgment upon them in the same sense as on private acts4 ,the nearest approach which we can imagine to public immorality would be when the organs which act for the ,state1 as such1 exhibit in their public action1 on its behalf1 a narrow1 selfish or brutal #b conception of the interest of the ,state as a whole1 in which1 so far as can be judged1 public opinion at the time agrees4 ,in such a case the ,state1 as such1 may really be said to be acting immorally1 i4e4 in contravention of its main duty to sustain the conditions of as much good life as possible4 ,this case must be distinguished1 if ,i am right1 from the case in which the individuals1 acting as the public authority1 are corrupted in their own private interests #c not shared with the public4 ,for then the case would rather be that the ,state1 the organ of the public good1 had not been given a chance to speak1 but had simply been defrauded by those who spoke in its name4 #a ,an act which violates its own law is not an act of the ,state4 ,and the ,state is not subject to the law of any other ,state4 #b e4g4 ,if1 with the knowledge of ,parliament1 and without a protest from it1 a price were offered for the killing of a hostile statesman or general4 #c e4g4 ,bribed by a foreign potentate1 or pursuing ,stock ,exchange interests4 ,we do not suggest1 then1 that the action of ,states is beyond moral criticism1 nor that action of individuals in their interest is above or below morality1 except in the sense in which one moral claim has constantly to be postponed to another4 ,but we #cbh deny that ,states can be treated as the actors in private immoralities which their agents permit themselves in the alleged interest of the ,state2 or1 again1 can be bound by the private honour and conscience of such agents2 and we deny1 moreover1 that the avowed public acts of sovereign powers1 which cause loss or injury1 can be imputed to individuals under the names of private offences2 that someone is guilty of murder when a country carries on war1 or of theft when it adopts the policy of repudiation1 confiscation1 or annexation4 #h4 ,it is obvious that the idea of humanity1 of the world of intelligent beings on the surface of our earth1 conceived as a unity1 must hold such a place in any tolerably complete philosophical thinking1 as in some way to control the idea of particular ,states1 and to sum up the purposes and possibilities of human life4 ,the idea of humanity is universal1 and whatever limits we have tacitly in mind--whatever limits the ,greek thinker had in mind while he based his ethics on the distinction between man and beast--yet1 when we rely on the idea of man as man1 we are committed to treat in some way of the world of mankind4 7a7 ,the first point which forces itself upon our attention is1 that the idea which we tacitly entertain when we refer to humanity1 is not true of the greater part of mankind4 ,no doubt1 we are quite aware of imperfection and inconsistency in the family and the ,state4 ,but here1 in the case of mankind1 the problem reaches an acuter form4 ,according to the current ideas of our civilisation1 a great part of the lives which #cbi are being lived and have been lived by mankind are not lives worth living1 in the sense of embodying qualities for which life seems valuable to us4 #a ,it is true that1 in all to whom we give the name of man1 we suppose a possibility of such living1 in the sense that they have an intelligence distinguishable from that of animals4 ,but it is a possibility which1 for the most part1 has been very slightly realised1 and which involves no conscious connection1 so far as we can see1 with any realisation4 ,our idea of man is not formed by simple enumeration1 but by framing a law which explains the less perfect and consistent facts with reference to the more perfect and more consistent facts4 #a ,this idea is embodied in the doctrine of ,salvation confined to the few1 and contains perhaps a similar error4 ,but it has a prima facie truth4 7b7 ,this being so1 it seems to follow that the object of our ethical idea of humanity is not really mankind as a single community4 ,putting aside the impossibilities arising from succession in time1 we see that no such identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a general will4 ,it does not follow from this that there can be no general recognition of the rights arising from the capacities for good life which belong to man as man4 ,though insufficient1 as variously and imperfectly realised1 to be the basis of an effective community1 they may1 as far as realised1 be a common element or tissue of connection1 running through the more concrete experience on which effective communities #ccj rest4 ,such a relation as that of ,england and ,india brings the matter home4 ,englishmen cannot make one effective self-governed community with the ,indian populations4 ,it would be misery and inefficiency to both sides4 ,but our ,state can recognise the primary rights of humanity as determined in the life of its ,indian subjects1 and enforce or respect these rights1 whether ,india be a dependency or an independent community4 ,the problem is not unlike that raised by the idea of a universal language4 ,as a substitute for national languages1 it would mean a dead level of intelligence unsuited to every actual national mind1 the destruction of literature and poetry4 ,as an addition to existing languages1 or more simply1 if it became customary for every people to be acquainted with the tongues of other nations1 there would be a common understanding no less firm1 and a vast gain of appreciation and enjoyment1 a levelling up instead of levelling down4 ,the recognition of human rights through communities founded on organic unity of experience may be compared in just these terms to the idea of a universal society including the entire human race4 7c7 ,the contrast between humanity and mankind has always uttered itself through a dichotomous mode of expression--,jew and ,gentile1 ,greek #a and barbarian1 ,mussulman and infidel1 ,christian #cca and heathen1 white civilisations and the black and yellow races4 ,it will be noted at once that some of these divisions contradict each other1 and this fact may suggest the probability that to every people its own life has seemed the crown of things1 and the remainder of mankind only the remainder4 ,such a suggestion may have a real bearing on our problem1 and we will return to it4 ,in the meantime1 however1 it is plain that humanity #b as an ethical idea is a type or a problem rather than a fact4 ,it means certain qualities1 at once realised in what we take to be the crown of the race1 and including a sensibility to the claims of the race as such4 ,sensibility to the claims of the race as such1 is least of all qualities common to the race as such4 ,the respect of ,states and individuals for humanity is then1 after all1 in its essence1 a duty to maintain a type of life1 not general1 but the best we know1 which we call the most human1 and in accordance with it to recognise and deal with the rights of alien individuals and communities4 ,this conception is opposed to the treatment of all individual human beings as members of an identical community having identical capacities and rights4 ,it follows our general conviction that not numbers but qualities determine the value of life4 ,but qualities1 of course1 become self-contradictory if they fail to meet the demands imposed on them by numbers4 ,and thus we recur to a suggestion noted #ccb above4 ,every people1 as a rule1 seems to find contentment in its own type of life4 ,this cannot contradict1 for us1 the imperativeness of our own sense of the best4 ,but it may make us cautious as to the general theory of progress1 and ready to admit that one type of humanity cannot cover the whole ground of the possibilities of human nature4 ,our action must1 no doubt1 be guided by what we can understand of human needs1 and this must depend ultimately on our own type of life4 ,but it makes a difference whether we start from the hypothesis that our civilisation as such stands for the goal of progress1 or admit that there is a necessity for covering the whole ground of human nature4 ,and it may be that1 as the ground is covered1 our ,states may go the way which others have gone1 without1 however1 leaving things as they are4 ,if the ,state1 moreover1 is not ultimate nor above criticism1 no more is any given idea of humanity2 and reference to 8the interests of mankind0 only names the problem1 which is to find out what those interests are1 in terms of human qualities to be realised4 #a ,it is remarkable that a limitation of the earth's surface1 raising an idea of unity1 has always1 ,i believe1 been presupposed4 ,for the ,greeks1 ,delphi was the centre of the earth2 for us1 the earth being a sphere and returning into itself1 gives a certainty that it does not stretch away to infinity1 so making unity of its inhabitants inconceivable4 ,the remark1 ,i think1 is ,kant's4 #b 8,humanity0 8humaneness40 ,scotch 8,humanities0 ,greek and ,latin4 ,oxford 8,literae humaniores0 classics and philosophy4 ,greek philanthropon1 a sense of what is due to man1 e4g4 of poetical justice4 7d7 ,neither the ,state1 however1 nor the idea of humanity1 nor the interests of mankind1 are the last word of theory4 ,and even political theory must so far point ahead as to show that it knows where to look for its continuation4 ,we have taken ,society and the ,state throughout to have their value in the human capacities which they are the means of realising1 in which realisation their social aspect is an inevitable condition 7for human nature is not complete in solitude71 but is not by itself1 in its form of multitudes1 the end4 #ccc ,there is1 therefore1 no breach of continuity when the immediate participation of numbers1 the direct moulding of life by the claims and relations of selves1 falls away1 and the human mind1 consolidated and sustained by society1 goes further on its path in removing contradictions and shaping its world and itself into unity4 ,art1 philosophy1 and religion1 though in a sense the very life-blood of society1 are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude1 and their aim is not in that sense 8social40 ,they should rather be regarded as a continuation1 within and founded upon the commonwealth1 of the work which the commonwealth begins in realising human nature2 as fuller utterances of the same universal self which the 8general will0 reveals in more precarious forms2 and as in the same sense implicit in the consciousness of all1 being an inheritance which is theirs so far as they can take possession of it4 ,we have thus attempted to trace in outline the content of the self1 implied1 but imperfectly and variously reached1 in the actual individual consciousness4 ,it is because of this implication1 carrying the sense that something more than we are is imperative upon us1 that self-government has a meaning1 and that freedom--the non-obstruction of capacities--is to be found in a system which lays burdens on the untamed self and 8forces us to be free40 ,what we feel as mere force cannot as such be freedom2 but in our subtle and complex natures the recognition of a force may1 as we have tried to explain1 sustain1 regularise1 and reawaken the operation of #ccd a consciousness of good1 which we rejoice to see maintained1 if our intelligence fails of itself to maintain it1 against indolence1 incompetence1 and rebellion1 even if they are our own4 ,this is the root of self-government1 and true political government is self-government4 ,,index4 ,a4 ,absolutism1 ,administrative1 #fc4 ,actual ,will1 contrast ,real ,will1 #aah4 ,albion1 ,launch of1 #if note4 ,alexander1 ,prof41 #agd n4 ,all and each1 as ,society and ,individual1 #ha1 #ahj4 ,will of ,all dist4 ,general ,will1 #aaa4 ,allness1 ,judgment of1 #aab4 ,altruism in ,h4 ,spencer1 #bd4 and ,egoism1 #dg1 #ha1 #hc4 ,amiel1 cit1 #bcf note4 ,analysis of motive1 fallacy of1 #bia ff4 ,anglo-,saxon race1 #cja4 ,anthropology in ,hegel1 #bed4 ,appercipient masses1 #afe ff4 cpd4 social groups1 #afi4 ,aristocracy1 ,monarchy and ,democracy1 #bhd4 ,aristotle1 #e ff41 #cb1 #abi ff41 #bie note4 on the poor1 #cai note4 ,army1 opp4 crowd1 #afj ff4 ,art1 how far a social good1 #ccc4 ,artisan or public worker1 #cac note4 ,association1 of persons and of ideas1 #aef ff4 see ,,organisation4 ,athens1 #aae4 ,attention1 #baf1 see ,,automatism1 ,,appercipient4 ,austin1 theory of ,law1 #bfa4 ,authority of ,society over ,individual in ,mill1 #fb4 ,automatism in society1 #ahc1 ch4 viii4 ,autonomy1 in ,greece1 #d4 moral1 in ,plato1 #bec4 ,b4 ,bagehot1 ,physics and ,politics1 #ai4 ,baldwin1 ,prof41 ,social and ,ethical ,interpretations1 #dd1 #bec4 ,baron of ,bradwardine1 #caf4 ,beauty1 reconciliation of ,nature and ,state 7,schiller71 #bcg4 ,beccaria1 #ef4 ,bentham1 #ef ff41 #hb1 #ahj4 ,bequest1 power of1 #bgb4 ,biology and ,sociology1 #ba ff4 double influence on ,sociology1 #bc ff4 ,birth1 surviving as qualification1 #cjf note4 ,boeckh1 #cc note4 ,bona fides1 in political theory1 #aib4 ,bourgeois ,society 7in ,hegel71 #bg1 #bfi1 #bgc ff4 ,boot and ,shoe ,operatives1 ,trade ,report1 #bgi note4 ,bradley1 ,f4,h41 ,principles of ,logic1 #di note4 on ,punishment1 #bbb4 ,ethical ,studies1 #bfg note4 ,bchsenschtz1 #cc note4 ,buckle1 #bh1 ,burlamaqui1 #acb4 ,butcher1 ,prof1 7on ,nature71 ,aristotle's ,theory of ,poetry and ,fine ,art #aca4 ,c4 ,calvin at ,geneva1 #fa4 ,capacities1 social1 distinction of1 #afh1 #agc4 ,cash nexus1 #bgf4 ,causation1 physical1 in human life1 #ca4 ,cause1 idea of1 in ,sociology1 #ba4 ,charity ,organisers1 #cah4 ,christian consciousness1 #bfc4 ,church of ,england1 offertory1 #cag4 ,church and ,state1 #bhe4 ,cicero1 #aj4 ,citizen of the ,world1 #h4 ,city and town1 distinguished in1 ,rousseau1 #ib note4 ,city-,state1 #cf1 #aaf4 as a district1 #caj4 ,civil condition1 in ,rousseau1 #ig1 #ajj4 ,civil ,dispute1 #bfb note4 ,civil ,government ,locke1 #aja4 ,civil ,liberty1 in ,rousseau1 #ig4 ,civilisation of ,christendom1 #acg1 #aie4 ,class1 #bgh1 #caj ff4 derivation1 #cab4 its absence1 #cae4 ,classes in community1 #g1 #cj4 ,clan v4 ,family1 #bgb4 ,closed ,commercial ,state1 ,fichte1 #bdf4 ,codification1 #bgf note4 ,collectivism1 uncritical1 #gj1 #aha4 ,commonwealth and ,soul1 #f4 ,comparative ,politics1 #da4 ,competition and ,co-operation1 #bd ff4 ,compulsion ch4 viii41 in elementary education1 #fg4 ,comte1 #ah ff41 #da4 ,conditions and purpose1 in ,greek thinkers1 #cb4 which come close to life1 #aih4 ,conditions1 man and his1 #ca4 ,conscience1 morality of1 #bei4 in public acts1 #cbd4 ,consciousness of ,kind1 #dc4 ,consent1 in ,locke1 #aja4 ,constituencies1 of mere numbers1 #cji4 ,constraint and self-assertion1 #eh4 ,continuity1 idea of1 #bc4 ,contract1 true province of1 #bfj1 see ,,status4 ,contrat ,social1 see ,,rousseau4 in ,kant1 #bdd4 in ,fichte1 #bde4 in ,hegel1 #bci1 #bfa4 ,convention1 ,law treated as1 #h4 ,co-operative ,societies1 #bhj note4 ,corporation1 or ,trade ,society1 #bgh41 ,cosmopolitanism1 #i4 ,crawford1 ,marion1 ,corleone1 #bbf note4 ,crime1 sociological analysis of1 #cg4 ,criminal offence1 #bfb note4 ,crowd1 #afj ff4 mind of a1 #dc4 ,culture1 #bge4 ,curtius1 ,e41 on ,peloponnese1 #cc note4 ,czar1 the 7in #ahah71 #bdh4 ,d4 ,dante1 #ca4 ,decadence in ,rousseau1 #he4 ,dclasss as a class1 #cag4 ,de ,coulanges1 ,la ,cit ,antique1 #dd4 ,demarcation between self-regarding and other regarding action1 #fd1 #fh1 #gf4 ,democracy1 see ,,aristocracy4 ,democratic principle1 #gd1 #bhd4 true d4 passion1 #ih4 ,de ,morgan1 ,prof41 ,budget of ,paradoxes1 #bj4 ,despotic ,government1 #ec4 ,deterrent1 see ,,punishment4 ,dicey1 ,the ,peasant ,state1 #cae4 ,difference and ,identity compared with ,invention and ,imitation1 #df4 ,dijon1 ,academy of1 #he4 ,district1 the1 as ,ethical ,idea1 #cjd ff41 ,division of ,labour1 #bgh4 ,dress1 #h4 ,dreyfus-,brisac1 ,m41 editor of ,contrat ,social1 #aja4 ,duncker1 #cc note4 ,duproix1 ,kant et ,fichte1 #bcf ff4 ,durkheim1 ,e41 ,annee ,sociologique1 #cj ,de la ,division du ,travail ,social1 #cd1 #cg ff41 #dc1 #bbj ff41 #bbg note1 #cae4 ,duty1 dist4 right and obligation1 #bjh ff4 ,e4 ,each1 see ,,all4 ,economic view of ,history1 #bh4 facts1 pressure of1 #cj4 world1 the1 #bge4 ,egoism1 see ,,altruism4 mile1 ,rousseau's1 #ih note4 ,emma1 ,jane ,austen's1 #afb4 ,end and means in society1 #ha1 #ahj ff4 of ,society and the ,state1 #aha4 ,english people1 the1 #aaf4 ,epicureanism1 #i4 ,epiphenomena1 #bi4 ,equality and ,inequality1 natural in ,rousseau1 #hg4 ,equivalence of punishment and offence1 #bbh4 tats1 #bgh note4 ,eternal ,relations1 in ,montesquieu1 #ei4 ,ethical purpose of ,philosophy1 #ej4 obligation1 paradox of1 #ee1 #aci4 aspect negative in ,spencer and ,huxley1 #gb-c1 cp4 #abd4 use and wont1 #bei4 ideas1 ch4 xi4 tre de raison1 ,state is not1 #ie4 8,evangel of a ,contrat ,social0 #ad4 ,examination in ,elementary ,education1 #fg4 ,extenuating circumstances1 #bca4 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,principles of ,sociology1 #ah1 #ea4 ,goethe1 #da4 ,gtz1 #bcg4 ,golden ,age1 the1 #abi4 ,good1 meaning of1 #ahb4 ,good ,will1 see ,,conscience1 ,,morality4 ,government ,departments1 legislation by1 #bhe4 ,graduation of ,punishment1 #bbh4 ,gravitation1 #ai4 ,green1 ,t4,h41 ,principles of ,political ,obligation1 #ic1 #aaj1 #acg1 #ada1 #add1 #ahh ff41 #bjc1 #bac1 #bbg4 principle of ,state interference1 #aic4 criticism of ,hegel1 #bhh ff4 ,greeks1 poor among1 #cai4 ,grotius1 #ei4 ,h4 ,happiness1 ,greek idea of1 #cba4 ,hardenberg1 #bdh4 ,hare's scheme1 #caj4 ,hegel1 #ac1 #bg1 #bjc1 chs4 ix4 and x4 ,henrici cit4 by ,green1 #bjc4 ,herder1 #bcg4 ,herodotus1 #acf4 ,hesiod1 #abi4 ,hindrance of hindrances1 in ,state action1 #aib ff41 #aii4 ,history of ,aesthetic1 #bce4 ,hobbes1 #ac1 #ei1 #gg1 #ic1 #ajd ff4 ,holland1 ,prof41 #ef4 ,homer1 #ca1 #ace4 ,honour1 private1 in public acts1 #cbd4 ,household1 #bga4 ,housing of poor1 #aih-i4 ,howard1 8the ,philanthropist10 #ef4 ,humanity1 and man1 #cbh ff4 compared with idea of universal language1 #ccj4 dichotomous appellations for1 #ccj4 ,huxley1 ,prof41 ,evolution and ,ethics1 #bf ff41 #gc4 ,i4 ,ideal1 #bgd4 ,ideas1 influence of1 in economic sphere1 #cj4 and community1 #g4 ,identity1 see ,,difference4 ,imitation and ,invention1 #dc1 #baa1 #beb ff4 ,immorality1 prevention of1 by law1 #fe4 ,indifference of space1 #cje4 ,individual1 fuller and narrower meaning of term1 #gi4 independent existence of1 #ie4 ,individualism1 #gj1 #gi1 #hj1 #aha4 ,individuality1 in ,mill1 #fa1 cp4 #gi1 #abe4 limits of1 #agf4 highest point of1 #cac ff4 ,individual ,mind1 see ,,mind4 ,industrial world1 the1 #bge4 ,inequality1 see ,,equality4 ,influence1 ,rousseau's double1 #af4 ,insanity1 as loss of systematic control1 #afc4 ,institutions1 ch4 xi41 real nature of1 #agj ff4 ,intention1 in theory of ,state coercion1 #ahh ff4 ,interference by ,state1 ch4 viii4 ,irreligion1 prevention of1 by law1 #fe4 ,isonomy1 in ,greece1 #d4 ,j4 ,jacobi1 at ,geneva1 #bcg4 ,james1 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#aja4 on convicts chains1 #adb note4 bare and determinate ,liberty contrasted1 #aid ff4 ,life1 human1 some of its elements1 #ca4 ,limitation of earth's surface1 ,kant on1 #ccj note4 ,locality1 mind of1 #cjg4 ,loch1 ,c4,s41 #adb note4 ,locke1 #ac1 #aja1 #ajd ff4 ,logic of social progress1 #beh4 ,lucinde1 ,schlegel's1 #bga4 ,m4 ,mafia1 the1 #bbf4 ,maine1 origin of penal law1 #bbg note4 ,majority1 will of1 #d1 #e4 8tyranny of10 #ge1 #bdj4 ,marriage1 prohibition suggested by ,mill1 #fh1 #bga4 ,married ,women's ,property1 #bgb4 ,marx1 #bh1 #bi note4 ,materialism1 #bh ff4 ,matter and form1 in life of peoples1 #cb4 ,maximisation1 #ahg4 ,means1 see ,,end4 ,medical ,charities of ,london1 #bij note4 ,merrie ,england1 #abi note4 ,metternich1 #bdi4 ,mill1 ,j4,s41 #fj ff41 #hb1 #aah1 #aij1 #aid4 ,mind and body of community1 #g4 as a structure of systems1 #agc4 as a reflection of society1 #agd4 see ,,association1 ,,organisation1 ,,appercipient ,,masses4 subjective and objective1 #bed-e4 absolute1 #bee4 of ,society1 #bif4 ,minority1 see ,,majority4 ,mommsen1 #cac note4 ,monarchy1 #bhd4 see ,,aristocracy4 ,monasticism1 #cjb4 ,montesquieu1 #ac1 #dj1 #ei4 ,moral freedom in ,rousseau1 #ih1 #ajj4 ,morality1 province of1 in ,mill1 #fc4 of conscience1 #bei4 of ,state action1 #cbb4 ,moralitt1 #bfe4 ,n4 ,napoleon1 #bid4 ,nation-,state1 #c1 n1 #aaf1 #cba ff4 ,natural ,law1 #acc note4 ,natural ,liberty in ,rousseau1 #ig4 ,natural ,right1 #aj ff41 #ei4 on biological basis1 #gj4 ,nature1 #abh ff4 in ,aristotle1 #acj ff4 as self-assertion1 #bg4 ,state of1 in ,rousseau1 #hf4 in ,burlamaqui1 #acb4 ,neighbourhood1 see ,,kinship1 #cjh4 ,nettleship1 ,r4,l41 #gi note1 #adf4 ,newman1 ,w4,l41 edition of ,aristotle's ,politics1 #cc note4 ,new ,testament1 #aj4 ,newton1 ,sir ,isaac1 #bj4 ,nihilism1 ,administrative1 see ,,absolutism4 ,o4 ,obligation1 ethical and political1 #ee4 enforcement of moral1 #fg ff4 dist4 right1 #bjf4 ,offer for ,sale1 a public matter1 #bgh4 ,organisation of ideas or persons opp4 ,association1 #aef ff41 #afb4 ,organism1 comparison of society to1 in ,fichte1 #bde4 ,origin of ,inequality 7,rousseau's ,discourse71 #hf4 8,others10 in ,society1 #eh1 #ff1 #hc1 #aac1 #ahb1 #bjg4 see ,,interference4 ,p4 ,parsimony1 political1 #ahe4 ,paternal ,government1 #bgj4 ,pattison1 ,rev4 ,mark1 on ,calvin1 #fj4 ,person or ,persona in ,law and ,politics1 #ab1 #ic1 #ajd4 ,phenomenology1 #bed note4 ,philanthropy and public honours1 #bai note4 ,philosopher1 ancient1 compared with ,sociologist1 #ah4 ,philosophical ,theory described1 #a4 ,philosophy1 purpose of1 #ej4 relation to social good1 #ccc4 of ,right 7or ,law7 of ,kant1 #bdc4 of ,hegel1 #bdg ff4 its position in ,philosophy of ,mind1 #ebb ff4 of ,fichte1 #bdd4 ,pirate1 the 7,scott71 #afb4 ,plato1 #e ff41 #bj1 #bg1 #cb1 #ee1 #gd note1 #aca1 #aci1 #adb1 #bah note1 #bba1 #bec1 #big4 ,police ,state1 #bgc4 ,political ,economy1 #bg1 #bgc4 ,political ,obligation1 paradox of1 #ee4 ,political ,speculation1 in #agth century1 ,politics and ,science1 relations of1 #e4 ,poor1 the1 as a class1 #caf1 #cbj4 ,poore1 ,g4,v41 ,rural ,hygiene1 #cd note4 ,dwelling ,house1 #bcc note4 ,position in society1 dist4 ,right and ,obligation1 #bje4 ,property1 #bfj1 #cjb4 ,proportional systems1 ,stout on1 #afe4 ,protection1 mere1 as function of the ,state1 #bgf4 of children's earnings1 #bgb4 ,protestant consciousness1 #bfc4 ,psychology1 a natural science1 #di4 two tendencies in1 #ea4 ,public or ,state action1 dist4 private1 #cbb4 ,public opinion1 #bhg4 ,publicity of discussion1 #bhe4 ,punishment1 ch4 viii41 #cg ff41 #bbj ff4 right of capital1 in ,rousseau1 #ij4 ,purposes and conditions in ,greek philosophers1 #cb4 ,pyramids1 #bgh4 ,r4 8,real0 ,will1 ch4 v41 and ,actual1 contrasted1 #aah4 ,rebellion1 duty of1 #bac-d4 ,re-establishment of ,sciences and ,arts 7,rousseau's ,discourse71 #he4 ,referendum1 #aje note4 ,reformation of offenders1 see ,,punishment4 ,religion and ,state1 #bhe1 #ccc4 ,repetition1 #dd4 ,representation of the ,people1 #ajd4 ,representative ,government1 #aae1 #bdd4 ,republic of ,plato criticised1 #bgd4 ,republic of ,san ,marino1 #ajf4 ,retribution1 see ,,punishment4 ,return to ,nature1 #h1 #bc4 ,returns in ,social ,science1 #db note4 ,revolution1 ,french1 #ad4 ,reward1 #bag ff4 ,richard the ,second1 ,shakespeare's1 #ab4 ,right1 science of1 #cd ff4 see ,,philosophy ,,of ,,right4 of first occupant1 #ii4 dist4 obligation1 #bjf4 unrecognized1 #baj4 ,rights1 natural1 #ce ff4 in ,bentham and ,spencer1 #gj ff4 in ,rousseau1 #ii4 system of1 #abg1 #bja ff4 negative basis of1 #aia4 sphere of1 #beh-i4 ,ritchie1 ,prof41 ,natural ,rights1 #ab1 #ad note1 #hh4 ,rogers1 ,j4,d41 #ag note4 ,roman ,jurisprudence1 #aj4 ,roman ,rule1 #aj4 ,rousseau1 #ac #dj1 #ei1 #gj note1 #gd1 chs4 iv4 and v41 #adb note4 his idea of freedom1 #bcg-h4 on force and right1 #bch n41 #bhb4 ,ruskin 7quoted7 #beb n4 ,s4 ,st4 ,paul1 #bi4 ,salamis1 #aae4 ,scheme1 general1 in thought and in society1 #afb ff4 unconscious operation of1 #aff4 ,schiller1 ,rauber and ,letters on ,aesthetic ,education1 #bcg4 ,scott1 ,sir ,walter1 #afb4 ,seamanship1 ,technical training in1 #aib note4 ,seeley1 ,j41 #db note1 #acc4 ,self1 the given1 #adc4 ,self-assertion and self-restraint1 #bg1 #gb4 ,self-government1 ch4 iii41 #aja1 #aci1 #aee1 #acd1 #ccd ,self-improvement as freedom1 #add ff4 ,self-mastery1 ,plato's account of1 #aci4 ,self-regarding conduct1 #fb ff4 ,shakespeare1 #ca4 ,sidgwick1 ,prof41 #dd1 #hh4 ,similarities1 etc41 in social consciousness1 #dc4 ,sittlichkeit1 see ,moralitt4 ,slavery1 #h1 #fi4 ,social contract1 #ei1 ch4 vi4 see 8,contrat ,social8 groups compared with appercipient masses1 #afi4 ,logic1 #dc4 observance ethical use and wont1 #bei4 ,physics1 #bj4 ,spirit1 #dj1 #abb4 ,science1 ch4 ii4 ,socialism1 #cah4 ,society as self-restraint1 #bg1 #gc4 for ,greeks implies self-assertion1 #gc note4 as a psychical whole1 #age1 #agh4 and ,individual1 demarcation between1 #fb1 #fd4 relation to plurality of individuals1 #agf4 dist4 ,state1 #ahd4 as restraint1 #bg4 compared with animal species1 #bc4 compared with individual organism1 #bd4 as viewed by ,philosophy1 #ej4 ,sociologists1 criticism of1 #ba ff4 ,sociology1 ch4 ii4 ,socrates1 #e ff41 #bfe4 ,sophists1 #bfe4 ,soul and ,commonwealth1 #f1 see ,,mind4 ,sources in ,sociology1 #dg4 ,sovereign1 fallacy respecting1 in ,rousseau1 #id ff4 nature of1 #ajc1 #ajh4 ,sovereignty1 as exercise of ,general ,will1 #bcb ff4 of people1 #bhb4 ,spencer1 ,herbert1 #bd ff41 #fi ff41 #hb1 #ade4 ,spinoza1 #ad ff4 ,standard of ,life1 #cj4 ,stnde1 #bgh note4 ,state1 see ,,city-,,state ,,and ,,nation-,,state4 dist4 ,bourgeois ,society1 #bg1 #ic1 #bgc4 not an abstraction1 #ie4 inclusive notion of1 #aej ff4 interference by1 ch4 viii4 analysis of1 ch4 x4 dist4 ,society1 #ahd4 v4 ,nature1 #bcg4 actual and ideal1 #bej4 political organism1 #bfi1 #bhj ff4 and ,religion1 #bhe4 ,regulation1 #bgg4 ,statistics1 #db4 ,status to ,contract1 ,durkheim1 #bgg4 ,steinthal1 #afd4 ,stephen1 ,mr4 ,leslie1 on cruelty1 #cbf note4 ,stoicism1 #i1 #bfc4 ,stout1 ,g4,f41 ,analytic ,psychology1 #di1 #afb note1 #afe note4 ,struggle for life1 #bc4 ,subjectivity1 #bgd4 ,successes in social research1 not due to ,sociology1 #bb4 ,suggestion in ,society1 #de1 #ahc4 ,super-organic1 #bf4 ,supply and ,demand1 #bgg ff4 ,survival of fittest1 see ,,struggle ,,for ,,life4 ,sutherland1 ,a41 ,origin and ,growth of the ,moral ,instinct1 #bg note4 ,t4 ,tacitus1 ,annals and ,germania1 #abi4 ,tarde1 ,g41 #dc note1 #dd ff4 ,teleological character of ,philosophy1 #eb4 ,themistocles1 #aad4 ,theories of the first look1 #hj1 #hb1 #if1 #add4 ,theory1 society compared to1 #beh4 ,thomson's ,seasons1 #bcg4 ,thring1 ,life of1 #aig note4 ,thucydides1 #bah note4 ,tithe1 the1 #cah4 ,trade ,societies1 #bgg1 #bgi ff41 #bhc4 ,traffic returns1 ,french1 #dc4 ,training for ,seamanship1 #aib note4 ,transvaal1 #cae4 ,truth1 meaning of1 #ahb4 ,u4 ,uniqueness of service1 #be1 #cad4 ,united ,states of ,america1 #bhd1 #cba4 ,units1 ,delimitation of political1 #ahe4 ,unity of ,social ,mind1 #agg4 ,universal good and common good1 #aaj4 ,judgment dist4 ,judgment of ,allness1 #aab ff4 ,self1 realised not solely in ,state1 #ccb ff4 ,universe of ,discourse1 #afc4 ,unlawful ,games1 ,statutes respecting1 #ff4 ,v4 ,valet1 the psychological1 #bib4 ,vegetarianism1 #h4 ,vengeance dist4 retribution1 #bbg4 ,vico1 ,new ,science1 #ac1 #ag1 #dj4 ,virtue1 #bfh4 ,w4 ,wallace1 ,prof4 ,w41 ,lectures and ,essays1 #he4 ,hegel's ,philosophy of ,mind1 #bdi1 #bfe4 ,war1 dist4 hunting1 #bab4 ,wartburg1 demonstration at1 #bdh4 ,water-drinking1 #h4 ,webb1 ,mr4 and ,mrs41 #bb note4 ,wilhelm ,meister's ,lehrjahre cit41 #bgc note4 ,will1 ,real or ,general1 #if1 ch4 v4 in ,hobbes and ,locke contrasted1 #ajf4 of ,all contrasted with ,general1 #aaa4 ,real with ,actual1 #aah4 that wills itself1 #adf4 implies a whole1 #agg4 particular1 how universalised1 #bfg4 see ,,sovereignty1 ,,social ,,observance4 ,wycliffite cry1 #ab4