,transcriber's ,note ,this book uses footnote anchors at the beginning of some quoted text to refer to footnotes crediting the sources of those quotes4 ,it also uses mid-paragraph footnote anchors to refer to other kinds of footnotes4 ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,illustration3 ,,major-,,general ,,hugh ,,elles1 ,c4 ,b41 ,d4 ,s4 ,o4 ,,from ,a ,,portrait ,,by ,,sir ,,william ,,orpen1 ,a4 ,r4 ,a4 ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,,by ,,major ,,clough ,,williams-,,ellis1 ,m4,c4 ,,and ,a4 ,,williams-,,ellis ,,with ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,,major-,,general ,h4 ,j4 ,,elles1 ,c4,b41 ,d4,s4,o4 ,,commander ,,of ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,,illustrated ,illustration3 7publisher's logo7 ,,new ,,york ,,george ,h4 ,,doran ,,company ,,copyright1 #aiai1 ,,by ,,george ,h4 ,,doran ,,company ,,printed ,,in ,,the ,,united ,,states ,,of ,,america ,,introduction ,,my ,,dear ,,williams-,,ellis1 ,you ask me for a foreword to your history1 and invite me1 too1 to agree to1 criticise1 or even refute the conclusions of your ,epilogue4 ,the first task ,i undertake with pleasure1 though ,i feel it would be more justly and more skilfully done either by one of the pioneers who sowed that we might reap1 or by the rare thinker who in our own time has contributed so much to keep us on the lines of clear understanding and progress4 ,as to the second task ,i must decline a direct reply1 and for many reasons ,i can no more than touch generally upon the questions you have dealt with in so interesting a way4 ,i find them1 however1 not yet sufficiently remote in time1 either to be clear themselves1 or to be distinctly placed in a picture itself still obscure4 99 99 99 99 99 ,of the early days of the ,tanks1 and of the early struggles1 difficulties and hopes of the pioneers1 ,i have no first-hand knowledge--to comment at any length upon them would be out of place4 ,they do1 however1 represent a remarkable effort of persistent and courageous faith1 of determination to succeed in the face of lukewarmness and even scepticism1 of the overcoming of many practical difficulties4 ,above all1 they present a great clearness of vision on the part of three men in particular--,swinton1 ,stern and d',eyncourt4 ,it is remarkable that one of the first official papers on the tactical use of ,tanks1 written by ,general ,swinton early in #aiae1 should have been almost literally translated into action on ,august #h1 #aiah4 ,to ,general ,swinton1 too1 is due the implanting1 into all ranks1 of the fundamental idea of the ,tank as a weapon for saving the lives of infantry4 ,this idea was indeed the foundation of the moral of the ,tank ,corps1 for it spread from the fighting personnel to the depots and workshops1 and even to the factories4 ,more than anything else1 it was this sentiment which kept men ploughing through the mud of #aiag1 in the dark days when often the chance of reaching an objective had fallen to ten per cent42 which kept workshops in full swing all round the clock on ten and eleven hour shifts for weeks and1 once1 for months on end2 which1 finally1 secured from the factories an intensive and remarkable output4 ,sir ,albert ,stern brought to his labours a whole-hearted energy and enthusiasm unsurpassed4 ,but more practical than this alone1 he ensured initial production by a contempt for routine and material difficulties and a resilience to rebuff as fortunate as they were courageous4 ,to ,sir ,eustace d',eyncourt1 the only member of the original ,committee still officially connected with us1 a great debt is due4 ,we have been fortunate to have had at our disposal an engineer of his wide practical experience1 who devoted much of his scanty leisure to our guidance both in policy and in detail1 whose sagacious counsels have more than once checked the impetuosity of some of his associates4 99 99 99 99 99 ,before passing to the aspects of ,tank history with which ,i have been directly concerned1 ,i wish to make reference to two organisations vital to the ,tank ,corps in the field4 ,for if that represented the point of the spear1 they combined to form a most solid and dependable shaft4 ,the first of these two was the ,training ,organisations set up in ,england to produce the men2 second1 the manufactories which produced the machines4 ,the task of the ,training ,centre and the cadet schools was particularly onerous4 ,the organisation of any new instructional centre in the haste and pressure of the time was no easy task--its work was often thankless and subject to much ill-informed and light-hearted criticism4 ,the ,training ,centre of the ,tank ,corps had additional difficulties4 ,there was no guidance as to training--the entire system had to be thought out from the beginning1 and continually modified by the experience of the battlefield--instructors had not only to be found but trained--esprit de corps and discipline had to be built up2 and all this against time4 ,it may perhaps be a compensation to the many officers and men who lived laborious days1 and were not rewarded by seeing the results of their work in the field1 to know that 8,france0 has never been under any illusion as to the great thoroughness of their work4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the work carried through in the munitions factories1 and the ingenuity and solid labour that backed the efforts of the soldier in the field1 are perhaps not yet fully appreciated by the fighting men4 ,in ,france one might hear of sporadic unrest1 but till one met with it1 one realised nothing of the genuine faithful grind at production of objects of whose destination the worker often knew nothing1 of the blind patience under duress of shortage1 and of crowded accommodation2 of hope deferred4 ,the ,tank ,corps was fortunate indeed in having established at an early date close relations with its workers1 and more fortunate still at a critical time in being able to declare a substantial dividend on the capital of wealth1 labour and brains entrusted to it by its section of industrial ,britain4 ,once touch was obtained with the worker himself1 the interest taken by ,j4 ,bull in the factory1 in ,t4 ,atkins in the field1 was more than fully proved1 not only by the demand for copies of accounts of ,tank actions1 but by the steadily increased output that was maintained4 ,the thing is only natural4 ,put a man or a woman to turn out bolts from a machine for eight hours a day1 and you will get a certain result4 ,tell her or him that the bolts will go into a ,tank that will fight probably in six weeks' time2 that the ,tank will save lives and slay ,huns2 that yesterday ,tanks did so-and-so2 that last week ,no4 #ajefg1 made in ,birmingham1 and commanded by ,sergeant ,jones of ,cardiff1 rounded up five machine-guns 444 you will get quite a different result2 moreover1 it is ,john ,bull's right and due to be told these things4 ,we had not got quite a complete result in this direction1 but we were getting near it1 and perhaps our co-operation of the back and the front was as nearly a microcosm of an ideal national co-operation in war as has been achieved4 ,we aimed at ,team ,work4 99 99 99 99 99 ,you who have coped in a short compass with the whole story of ,tanks can well realise the difficulties of dealing concisely1 even by comment1 with the kaleidoscopic events of two and a half crowded years--with the questions of organisation1 training1 personnel1 design1 supply1 fighting1 reorganisation1 workshops1 experiments1 salvage1 transportation1 maintenance4 ,i shall attempt no more than to supplement your admirably drawn narrative as to one or two points which appear to me to be of major importance or interest4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the employment of ,tanks in the field was one long conflict between policy and expediency4 ,policy seemed always to demand that we should wait until all was prepared1 until sufficient masses of machines should be ready to use in one great attack that would break the ,german defensive system4 ,expediency necessitated the employment of all available forces at dates predetermined1 and in localities fixed for reasons other than their suitability as ,tank country4 ,battles are not won with ,tanks alone1 and in early #aiag1 for example1 the ,tank was still a comparatively untested machine4 ,indeed1 the later issues of the ,mark ,i4 developed weaknesses in detail so alarming as to preclude anything more than a short-lived effort in battle4 ,not until the ,mark ,,iv4 machine was well into delivery could a guarantee as to its degree of mechanical reliability be given1 and by that time the trend of the year's campaigning was unalterably fixed4 ,and so it was that it was our fate up to the first ,cambrai battle to 8chip in when we could0 in conditions entirely unfavourable4 ,the employment of ,tanks in ,flanders has often been criticised1 without intelligent appreciation of the fact that had they not fought in ,flanders they would have probably fought nowhere4 ,better1 therefore1 that they should fight and pull less than half their weight1 and still save lives1 than that they should stand idle while tremendous issues were at stake4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if employment in the field was a struggle between policy and expediency1 the principles of production and design represented a direct conflict of opposing policies1 resulting happily in compromise4 ,the fighting man1 conscious of the weaknesses of the earlier weapons1 and visualising development which he believed to be obtainable1 and knew to be necessary1 and the soldier-engineer overburdened with difficulties of maintenance and cursed with the nightmare of ,spares and ,spares and more ,spares--both cried aloud from ,france for rapid progress in design4 ,in ,england the other side of the picture was presented with equal force4 ,the process of bulk production necessitates orders placed long in advance1 materials were difficult to obtain1 plans of track work and workshop organisation are not susceptible of change without delay1 change1 too1 entailing irritation of factory staffs and workmen4 ,production once agreed to and embarked upon1 a very complicated machinery is with difficulty set in motion4 ,to stop or change this machinery results often in a loss of output which is in no way compensated by the improvements ultimately obtained4 ,the same problem must have occurred in many branches of war production4 ,the best1 however1 is only the enemy of the good1 if the good is good enough4 ,you have portrayed the difficulties arising from these conditions in ,chapter ,v4 ,the picture you draw belongs to the earlier stages1 when the two sides worked rather upon regulation than upon formula4 ,the later stages of the war saw a very full appreciation of each other's point of view and the growth of a very sturdy spirit of co-operation1 which carried us over more than one difficulty to meet which special appliances or special construction were necessary4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the ,tank1 as a weapon1 has been threatened with several crises4 ,some have been averted by intelligent forecast in specification4 ,some have been dealt with by the improvisations of the engineers both in ,france and in ,england4 ,some have disappeared before a general improvement in design4 ,you1 ,i think1 have touched on one crisis only--the mud crisis4 ,the mud crisis was defeated at long last1 but the swamp crisis1 never4 ,although none of the other troubles was of long duration1 any one of them1 unless cured1 would have caused a permanent disappearance of the arm4 ,failure of rollers was succeeded by failure of sprockets4 ,sprockets and rollers were hardly cured when the ,germans produced a very reliable armour-piercing bullet4 ,this after a very short innings was defeated by the arrival of the ,mark ,,iv4 ,tank4 ,the ,mark ,,iv4 ,tank was barely rescued from the mud of ,flanders by the invention of the unditching beam1 when we discovered that the ,hindenburg trenches were about one foot too wide to cross without some form of help to the ,tank4 ,this difficulty was overcome1 but about this time the effect of concentrated machine-gun fire upon ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks must have become known to the ,germans1 as also their vulnerability to the ordinary field gun4 ,the position with regard to both splash and casualties from guns firing over the sights1 was becoming serious when the arrival of ,mark ,v4 ,tank1 with its increased handiness and speed1 put an end to the splash difficulty for ever1 and defeated the field gun for a good long time4 ,so on to the last days of the war1 when we were able to look forward to #aiai with a certain knowledge that we had much in hand against any measure of opposition--short of a superior ,tank--that the enemy could produce4 ,the idea undoubtedly exists still in the minds of certain people that the particular form of ,tank which they have seen or fought with represents the latest word in design4 ,it does not4 ,the latest ,tank produced in any bulk was the type that marched through ,london on ,july #ai4 ,it has never fought1 and it represents the last word only of the elementary series of ,tanks of which ,mark ,i4 was the original4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if finality in design has by no means been approached in the war1 the same may be said as regards the employment of the then existing types4 ,this depended1 after due consideration of their limitations and powers1 on the training of personnel1 not only of the ,tank ,corps1 but essentially of infantry too4 ,lack of time1 lack of opportunity1 and wastage of trained personnel were the great difficulties which confronted commanders of every arm and formation in their efforts to reach even average standards of skill in only a few of the commoner phases of warfare4 ,with the ,tank ,corps the additional difficulties of mechanical training were no more than balanced by freedom from the trench routine of troops employed for defence4 ,for the infantry ,tank1 the training of ,tank personnel alone is not sufficient4 ,in the assault1 ,tanks are no more than a part of infantry1 an integral part of the troupes d'assaut4 ,for real success1 i4e41 cheap success1 not only must the two arms train and re-train together1 but they should live together1 feed together1 and drink together4 ,much was attempted and much was done to supplement the lack of opportunity by demonstration1 lectures1 attachments4 ,but by reason of the incomplete military education of our hastily-trained troops it was necessary to limit manuvre and tactics on the battlefield to the simplest elements4 ,anything in the nature of finesse had to be avoided4 ,skilful use of ground and mutual fire support were things hoped for more often than achieved4 ,it was a question of bulk production against time1 but the results obtained only prove how much more could be achieved with the same material had conditions of training been those of peace time with its long service and rigorous and plentiful supervision4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the preceding paragraph may seem ungracious from one who has had the privilege of commanding a great force of citizen soldiers4 ,it is nevertheless true that soldiering1 like any other trade1 takes time and experience to learn--that though there may be many who1 being engineers1 or advocates1 or business men1 or farmers1 learn soldiering with great aptitude1 the great bulk of any body of men1 call them regular soldiers or citizen soldiers1 require a deal of training under the best instructors1 if they are to draw the full advantage from the ever varying conditions of the battlefield4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i have alluded above to the ,tank ,corps as a citizen force4 ,it was1 indeed1 peculiarly so1 for of the #bj1jjj odd souls that went to compose it1 perhaps not more than two or three per cent4 were professional soldiers2 and1 while the ,general ,staff officers on ,h4,qs4 were almost without exception regulars1 the whole of the ,administrative and ,engineering staffs with one solitary exception were drawn from various civil vocations4 ,moreover1 units as they came into being were built up1 not on any old-time tradition of a parent regiment1 but each one very much around the personality of its own commanding officer4 ,and it has indeed been interesting to watch the development of particular idiosyncrasies of whole battalions and companies from the characters of their leaders4 ,your record has faithfully set forth what has been accomplished by these troops4 ,they are well able to sustain criticism in the light of their achievements4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i have alluded before to the esprit de corps1 founded as it was upon the sentiment of saving of life--a sentiment to which appeal has never failed4 ,other factors went to strengthen it4 ,it was braced by a high standard of results demanded1 by the determination to make good in spite of partial first successes4 ,but the strongest element in it was the faith in our weapon--the machine necessary to supplement the other machines of war1 in order to break the stalemate produced by the great ,german weapon1 the machine-gun--our mobile offensive answer to the immobile defensive man-killer4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is indeed a curious reflection that the ,germans before committing themselves to their great final offensive1 should not have followed to their logical conclusion the preparations which they made for the preceding phases of the war with such meticulous forethought4 ,in #aiad1 they removed from the path of their attacking infantry the prepared obstacles of permanent fortification by means of specially-constructed machines--siege cannon of unprecedented size4 ,later1 they developed the machine-gun in bulk1 and so modified the preconceived course of warfare to their own advantage for defence4 ,it is astonishing that for their final offensive effort1 they should not have equipped their men with armament for overcoming the very defence in depth supported by the very machine-guns from which they had reaped so much advantage in the previous years4 ,and yet we see them in ,march1 #aiah1 reverting after an initial attack1 powerfully covered by artillery fire1 to the same attempt to break through with men that had failed in #aiad4 ,although machine-gun support was stronger1 there was little help from the other arms beyond scanty artillery support and considerable frightfulness of day and night bombing and long-range bombardment4 ,the ,german infantry was well1 often magnificently1 led1 whether in ,picardy or ,flanders2 and one could not watch the work of the strong offensive patrols without intense admiration of their skill and courage4 ,the ,germans failed against defence in depth4 ,the elements that were wanting were those of continuous mobility necessary to overcome such defence1 against which infantry without powerful support and plentiful supply sooner or later become powerless4 ,the ,germans lacked the means to move and to supply their guns rapidly4 ,they lacked ,tanks to produce surprise or to carry forward the battle as an alternative to guns4 ,they lacked lorries1 they lacked cross-country vehicles4 ,with us1 when the tide turned1 the converse was the case1 and it was at least a part reason of success against an enemy who fought bravely and often bitterly almost to the end4 99 99 99 99 99 ,whether you justly appraise the contribution of the ,tank ,corps towards the final victory is for history to declare--at some interval yet--but ,i am hardy enough to give you a parable in the terms of a great national pastime4 ,rugby football of all games affords the closest analogy to war--to warfare on the ,western ,front the parallel1 without labouring the detail1 is remarkable4 ,in the early nineties the accepted tactics of the game demanded a distribution of the team into nine forwards and six backs4 ,the orthodox believed in forward play1 and in emergency sometimes even a tenth forward would be added at the expense of one back4 ,at this time there occurred in the annual matches between two countries an uninterrupted series of defeats for one4 ,as a measure of resource or despair1 ,i do not know which1 a new distribution was made in its forces4 ,instead of nine1 eight forwards were played1 one back was added--the fourth three-quarter4 ,the tactics were for the forwards to hold the opposing attack and for the backs to play offensively4 ,the game is historic4 ,for three-quarters of the match the nine forwards pressed the eight heavily1 and these were very hard put to it to maintain their lines4 ,in the last phase of the game one of the four three-quarters got away unmarked1 the game was won and lost4 ,that was twenty-five years ago4 ,the rules of the game remain unchanged1 but the distribution of the players has been modified and the tactics of teams have developed on the lines of that historic match and beyond4 ,whether the parallel of the ,tank ,corps to the extra three-quarter is a completely true one history will record in due season4 ,what1 however1 we may claim is that the fourth three-quarter after a nervous start1 in which perhaps he was sometimes out of his place1 nevertheless on more than one occasion got away unmarked2 that he ran straight even when he was being heavily tackled and drew the opposition for his side2 that he went down well to the rushes of the ,german forwards2 and that1 finally1 he more than once handled the ball in the great combined run which took his team from within its own twenty-five over the opponents' goal line4 ,yours sincerely1 ,illustration3 ,hugh ,ellis 7signature7 ,united ,service ,club1 ,july #bh1 #aiai4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,,page ,,introduction v ,i ,a ,,brief ,,account ,,of ,,the ,,tank1 ,,its ,,crew ,,and ,,its ,,tactical ,,functions1 ,,as ,,they ,,were ,,at ,,the ,,date ,,of ,,the ,,armistice #be ,,ii ,,the ,,earliest ,,tanks1 ,,general ,,swinton1 ,,admiral ,,bacon1--,,the ,,holt ,,tractor ,,and ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,the 8,,land ,,cruiser0 #ca ,,iii ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,,in ,,embryo #df ,,iv ,,the ,,first ,,tank ,,battles--,,the ,,attack ,,on ,,morval1 ,,flers1 ,,the ,,quadrilateral1 ,,thiepval1 ,,and ,,beaumont-,,hamel #eg ,v ,,winter ,,training1 ,,expansion ,,and ,,readjustments #gg ,,vi ,,the ,,battles ,,of ,,arras ,,and ,,bullecourt #hi ,,vii ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,messines ,,and ,,the 8,,hush0 ,,operation #aaj ,,viii ,,the ,,flanders ,,campaign--,,preparations ,,for ,,the ,,third ,,battle ,,of ,,ypres #abd ,,ix ,,the ,,third ,,battle ,,of ,,ypres #ach ,x ,,the ,,first ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai #afj ,,xi ,,three ,,new ,,types ,,of ,,tank--,,the ,,depot--,,central ,,workshops #aij ,,xii ,,the ,,french ,,tank ,,corps--,,american ,,tanks ,,and ,,british ,,tanks ,,in ,,egypt #bji ,,xiii ,,suspense--,,the 8,,savage ,,rabbits0 ,,episode--,,the ,,enemy',s ,,intentions #bce ,,xiv ,,the ,,march ,,retreat #bdc ,,xv ,,the ,,equilibrium--,,minor ,,actions--,,hamel--,,the ,,ballon ,d',,essai #bfe ,,xvi ,,with ,,the ,,french--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,moreuil #bhj ,,xvii ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,amiens1 ,,or ,,battle ,,of ,,august #h #bhh ,,xviii ,,the ,,german ,,attitude--8,,man-,,traps ,,and ,,gins0--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,bapaume #cbc ,,xix ,,breaking ,,the ,,drocourt-,,qu,,ant ,,line--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,epehy #cda ,,xx ,,the ,,second ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai1 ,,or ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai-,,st4 ,,quentin #cfa ,,xxi ,,the ,,second ,,battle ,,of ,,le ,,cateau--,,the ,,running ,,fight #chj ,,xxii ,,the ,,rout--,,mormal ,,forest--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,the ,,sambre--,,the ,,armistice #cib ,,epilogue #djb ,,index #dag ,,illustrations ,,major-,,general ,,hugh ,,elles1 ,c4,b41 ,d4,s4,o4 ,from a portrait by ,sir ,william ,orpen1 ,a4,r4,a4 ,frontispiece ,,facing ,,page ,,general ,,arrangements ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,front ,,view #bh ,,general ,,arrangement ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,sectional ,,elevation #bh ,,general ,,arrangement ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,sectional ,,plan #bi ,,diagram ,,showing ,,adaptation ,,to ,,the 8,,large-,,wheeled ,,tractor0 ,,idea #bi ,,the ,,original ,,thiepval ,,mark ,i4 ,,tank ,,with ,,anti-,,bomb ,,roof ,,and 8,,tail0 #fd ,,field ,,camouflage #fd ,a ,,derelict4 ,,valley ,,of ,,the ,,scarpe #if ,a ,,burning ,,tank #if 8,,direct ,,hits0 #ig ,,bellied ,,on ,a ,,tree-,,stump ,,and ,,subsequently ,,hit #ig ,a ,,flanders ,,pill-,,box #acb ,,the ,,unditching ,,beam ,,in ,,action #acb ,,the ,,steenbeek ,,valley ,,before ,,the ,,battle #acc ,,the ,,steenbeek ,,valley ,,after ,,bombardment #acc ,a ,,deadly ,,swamp 7,,the ,,wrecks ,,of ,,six ,,tanks ,,may ,,be ,,counted7 #add 8,,clapham ,,junction0 ,,near ,,sanctuary ,,wood #ade 8,,the ,,salient0 #ade ,,preparing ,,for ,,cambrai4 ,a ,,train ,,of ,,tanks ,,with ,,fascines ,,in ,,position #agf ,,the ,,bapaume-,,cambrai ,,road #agg ,a ,,tank ,,crushing ,,down ,,the ,,enemy',s ,,wire #agg ,,sledge ,,towing ,,tank ,,taking ,,up ,,supplies #bjj ,,bermicourt ,,chateau ,,near ,,st4 ,,pol4 ,,tank ,,corps ,,main ,,headquarters #bjj ,,gun-,,carrying ,,tank ,,taking ,,up ,a ,,howitzer #bja ,a ,,whippet ,,going ,,in #bja ,,smoke ,,screen ,,and ,,semaphore #cjd ,a ,,tankadrome #cjd ,,moving ,,up4 ,,battle ,,of ,,amiens #cje ,,the ,,armoured ,,cars ,,going ,,up #cje ,,german ,,anti-,,tank ,,gunners4 7,from a photograph found on a prisoner7 #ccf ,,an ,,anti-,,tank ,,gun ,,in ,a ,,steel ,,cupola 7,,ypres7 #ccf ,a ,,captured ,,german ,,tank #ccg ,a ,,german ,,anti-,,tank ,,rifle #ccg ,,infantry ,,advancing ,,behind ,,tanks4 ,a ,,practice ,,attack ,,at ,,bermicourt #cfh ,,the ,,st4 ,,quentin ,,canal ,,tunnel1 ,,bellicourt #cfi ,,carrier ,,pigeon ,,being ,,released #cfi ,,his ,,majesty ,,the ,,colonel-,,in-,,chief ,,and ,,general ,,elles #chd ,,manufacture #che ,,the ,,western ,,edge ,,of ,,mormal ,,forest #cif ,a 8,,wireless0 ,,tank #cig ,,map ,,of ,,tank ,,operations1 ,,august-,,november1 #aiah #daf ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,,chapter ,i ,a ,,brief ,,account ,,of ,,the ,,tank1 ,,its ,,crew ,,and ,,its ,,tactical ,,functions1 ,,as ,,they ,,were ,,at ,,the ,,date ,,of ,,the ,,armistice ,i ,the secrets of the ,tank ,corps have been so well kept that there are few civilians who even now know anything of ,tanks or their crews beyond what might be learned from photographs1 or a distant view of 8,egbert0 or some other ,war ,bond or ,olympian ,tank4 ,the ,censorship has seen to it that the civilian has had no opportunity of making himself familiar with the tactical opportunities and problems that the use of ,tanks has introduced or with the conditions under which ,tank crews fight4 ,it is for the civilian reader that the present chapter is intended4 ,he is to be given some idea of the oak tree before he is invited to dissect the acorn4 ,if he has no idea of the appearance and habits of the ,tanks that fought at the ,canal du ,nord or that pushed back the enemy at ,mormal1 he cannot be expected to thrill as he should over the vicissitudes of the first converted ,holt ,tractor4 ,for to one who had never seen the engine of a through express the history of 8,puffing ,billy0 would almost certainly prove insufferably tedious4 ,the authors1 therefore1 propose to deal1 very briefly1 with the modern ,tank before plunging the reader into the dark ages of #aiad1 where1 to pursue our analogy1 ,watt's kettle-lid and the 8,rocket0 dwell obscurely4 ,,ii ,every detail of ,tank ,corps' training1 equipment1 and tactics has been modified in view of some limitation or opportunity arising from the structure of the ,tank itself4 ,therefore1 though this book is principally concerned with the development of the ,tank ,corps rather than with the intricate evolution of the ,tanks themselves1 the reader will find it necessary to have a general idea of the construction and workings of the different types of machine4 ,it would indeed be as idle to describe the anatomy of a snail or a lobster without mention of its shell1 as to endeavour to separate the story of the ,tank ,corps from that of its ,tanks4 ,when the ,war ended in ,november1 #aiah1 there were1 besides obsolete types which were still used for such work as carrying and the towing of supply sledges1 three main types of ,tank4 ,first1 the ,mark ,v41 which was #bf ft4 long1 #h ft4 #d in4 wide1 weighed #bg tons1 and had a horse-power of #aej4 ,the ,male ,tanks carried two #f-pounder guns1 and one ,hotchkiss gun4 ,the ,female carried five ,hotchkiss machine-guns and no #f-pounder guns4 ,the ,mark ,v4 ,star4--,this ,tank resembled the ,mark ,v41 except that it had a length of #cb ft4 #f in41 and was designed for the transport of infantry and for the traversing of trenches too wide for the ,mark ,v4 ,each had a normal speed of about five miles an hour1 and was protected by armour up to five-eights of an inch thick4 ,they were both so designed as to turn easily at their maximum speed1 and carried attachments for use on soft ground1 which increased the grip of the tracks4 ,each was fought by a crew consisting of a subaltern and seven men1 three drivers 7two of whom normally fought the ,hotchkiss guns71 and three gunners4 ,the third type was the ,whippet4 ,the tracks were nearly as long as those of a heavy ,tank1 but the body had been reduced to a small cab perched at the back1 rather as an urchin rides a donkey4 ,it was armed with two machine-guns1 managed by a crew of three men1 and developed a speed of seven miles an hour4 ,whippets were designed for use as raiders and in conjunction with cavalry4 ,in practice1 however1 the cavalry was seldom able to act with them4 ,partly in consequence of this1 partly owing to the state of open warfare being of such short duration1 the ,whippets1 though having brilliant feats to their credit 7see the exploits of 8,musical ,box10 ,chapter ,,xiii71 remained creatures of promise rather than of achievement4 ,,iii ,as a rule ,male ,mark ,v4 ,tanks were used against ,pill-,boxes and other 8strong points10 while the special work of ,female ,tanks was to deal with hostile infantry 7for example1 by sitting astride and thus enfilading their trenches71 and then to finish the process of flattening the enemy's wire which the ,male ,tanks had begun4 ,all three types of ,tank were capable of going across country4 ,that is to say they could1 for example1 follow a pack of hounds anywhere1 except perhaps in the ,fens4 ,ditches1 heavy plough1 banks1 walls1 hedges1 or fences could all be negotiated4 ,tanks could also go over many obstacles--notably over wire--where the ,field1 even were they willing 8to take a windmill in the harbour of the chase10 must go round4 ,but as a moment's reflection will show1 there must remain in every country certain features which will prove absolute barriers to the progress of ,tanks4 ,chief among these are canals and deep rivers 7unless spanned by strong bridges71 very steep railway cuttings1 railway embankments1 marsh1 or woods in which the trees are too strong to be pushed over1 and too dense-set to be steered through4 ,besides these natural1 or at least civilian1 obstacles1 there will be inevitable military obstacles in any country that has been fought over4 ,for example1 old half-blown-in trench systems make ground 8awkward10 and ,tanks operate at extreme disadvantage in country like that round ,ypres1 which was by #aiag a continuous network of water-logged shell and mine craters1 with no original ground left at all4 ,again1 by the close of hostilities the number of anti-,tank devices employed by the ,germans was very considerable4 ,they paid the new arm the compliment of an intricate system of defence and counter-offence which included concealed ,tank traps made on the model of elephant-pits1 formidable double-traversed trenches1 a branch of special anti-,tank artillery1 heavily reinforced concrete stockades1 and an elaborate system of land mines4 ,with so many obstacles to avoid or to negotiate1 with their fate often hanging upon a prompt and accurate use of their guns1 the crew inside the ,tank were doomed by the conditions under which they fought to an almost incredibly limited view of the surrounding world4 ,illustration3 ,,general ,,arrangement ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,front ,,view ,illustration3 ,,general ,,arrangement ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,sectional ,,elevation ,when the flaps were closed 7see diagram showing interior of a ,mark ,v4 ,tank71 as they had to be directly the ,tank came under close fire1 the crew were in almost complete darkness1 and had to rely upon their periscope or1 alternatively1 upon minute eye-holes 7about the size of the capital ,o's used in this text7 bored through the armour-plating4 ,if the fire was at all heavy the periscope was usually quickly put out of action1 and the officer and gunners had only the extremely limited view afforded by these holes4 ,illustration3 ,,general ,,arrangement ,,of ,,mark ,v4 ,,tank--,,sectional ,,plan ,illustration3 ,,diagram ,,showing ,,how ,,the ,,caterpillar ,,method ,,of ,,traction ,,carried ,,out ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,the 8,,large-,,wheeled ,,tractor40 ,,see ,,note ,,at ,,end ,,of ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,they were thus almost entirely dependent upon their maps1 the special ,tank compass1 and upon the information which a preliminary reconnaissance of the ground had given them4 ,this circumstance not only profoundly modified the training of the officers and crews1 but also necessitated the organisation of what was almost a new service4 ,this service was the 8,reconnaissance0 branch of the ,intelligence4 ,when the ,tank ,corps was ordered to take part in an attack1 the ,reconnaissance ,staff was responsible for the preliminary survey of the proposed battle site for a report as to where and how ,tanks could best operate1 and finally for a series of detailed maps and sketches4 ,in these maps and sketches the route of every individual ,tank was set forth from landmark to landmark1 together with the assigned objectives of each machine and the obstacles which it was likely to encounter4 ,these maps and sketches were compiled from aerial surveys1 captured ,german maps and documents1 information gained from local inhabitants1 accounts given by prisoners1 the original ,ordnance survey1 and from personal reconnaissance4 ,by #aiah this system had been so developed that the infantry came to rely almost entirely upon their accompanying ,tanks for direction4 ,this added greatly to the importance and responsibility of the work both of ,tank ,reconnaissance officers and of commanders4 ,,iv ,topographical information can only be adequately conveyed to a more or less trained receiver1 and it was therefore found necessary to add an elementary course on ,reconnaissance to the already long list of subjects in which the members of every ,tank crew must train4 ,the crew were an assemblage of experts4 ,an average of about a month was spent by every soldier at the training depots and battle-practice grounds4 ,here each man did about ten days' course as a driver or gunner1 learned revolver-shooting1 signalling1 and the management of carrier pigeons1 and went through a gas course4 ,in view of the probability of casualties1 each man was also given a working knowledge of every other man's job4 ,but most vital of all--the conditions under which ,tank crews fought being out of the common trying and arduous--the scheme of training aimed at creating a high sense of discipline2 that esprit de corps and that tradition of valour which teaches men to endure the unendurable4 ,this supreme end it achieved1 as a perusal of the ,tank ,corps ,honours ,list will show4 ,such1 then1 were the ,tanks and their crews in the autumn of #aiah4 ,in the pages which follow1 the reader will see from how crude an embryo the ,tank sprang1 and through what hair-breadth escapes alike from official overlaying and annihilation by the enemy1 it passed in the four years of which we are about to relate the history4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,earliest ,,tanks--,,general ,,swinton--,,admiral ,,bacon--,,the ,,holt ,,tractor ,,and ,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,the 8,,land ,,cruiser0 ,i ,the ,war had only been in progress for a few weeks when the first idea of the first ,tank was born almost simultaneously in the minds of ,general ,e4 ,d4 ,swinton1 ,major ,tulloch1 ,captain ,hetherington and ,mr4 ,diplock1 and--if we are to believe rumour and their own account of the affair--of several hundreds of other gentlemen4 8,born0 is perhaps not quite the appropriate word4 ,at any rate it is to be understood1 if not in a ,pickwickian1 at least in a ,pythagorean sense4 ,for by #aiad the ,tank had successively passed through several tentative and inconclusive incarnations4 ,in #adhb ,leonardo da ,vinci invented a kind of ,tank2#a a wooden 8,war ,cart0 was used by the ,scottish in the fifteenth century4#b ,there were designs for a ,tank for the ,crimea1 but the project of this weapon was abandoned as being barbarous4 ,lastly1 a really practical design for a kind of 8,caterpillar0 to be driven by steam was made in #ahhh4 ,a trial machine was even constructed4 ,but ,fate decreed that all trace of design and model should be instantly lost1 only apparently to be rediscovered after the modern ,tank had been thought out afresh4 ,why1 if the ,tank was constantly being invented1 did it as constantly disappear8 ,the reason appears to have been that1 like the early aeroplanes1 all these abortive machines had failed in one particular4 ,the engine was not powerful enough4 ,the steam ,tank had not in the least answered the riddle4 ,the horse-power could1 it is true1 be almost indefinitely increased1 but1 like a kind of ,old ,man of the ,sea1 the engine weight would have increased proportionately and the 8free0 power have been no more4 ,indeed till the invention of the petrol engine the ,tank was doomed to be unpractical4 ,its three essentials--armour-plating1 guns1 and ability to surmount obstacles and traverse open country--demanded a large amount of this 8free0 power4 ,only1 therefore1 when an engine was produced whose proportion of power to weight was about #ajj ,h4,p4 to every ten hundredweight1 did the ,tank become a possible and effective engine of war4 ,thus1 till the time was ripe the ,tank had been doomed to enjoy very brief excursions into the actual1 and to sojourn1 long forgotten1 beyond the waters of ,lethe4 ,does memory survive transmigration8 ,were ,general ,swinton and his co-inventors aware of the ,crimea ,tank and the #ahhh ,tractor8 ,in any case the matter is not one of great importance1 for--to put it briefly--ultimately their ,tank went1 and the others did not4 ,by ,october1 #aiad1 ,colonel ,swinton and ,captain ,tulloch had independently worked out the details of an engine of war4 ,like the other early inventors1 they imagined a machine that was to 8arise0 out of a cross between an armoured car and an agricultural tractor4 ,it was to be slower1 more formidable and far heavier than any armoured car that had yet been seen1 a kind of 8,land ,cruiser0 capable of plodding on its caterpillar feet across country right up to the enemy's gun positions4 ,like the other early 8mobile machine-gun destroyers10 it was to be strongly armed with guns and machine-guns1 and so heavily steel-plated as to be impervious to shrapnel1 ,h4-,e4 fragments and rifle bullets4 ,it was to cross trenches with ease1 and was to be capable either of cutting or of flattening the enemy's wire in the mere act of its progress4 ,by ,november ,colonel ,swinton and ,captain ,tulloch were in close touch with one another1 and the child of their fancy descended from the clear regions of pure thought to battle its slow way forward amid the fogs and thornbrakes of actual experiment and official memoranda4 ,well-informed readers will perhaps wonder why the present authors have singled out ,captain ,tulloch and ,colonel ,swinton from amid 8the press of knights40 ,do they intend to lay the laurel on their brows8 ,to declare that they alone invented the ,tank8 ,the chroniclers pretend to no such judicial powers4 ,be theirs rather the genial rle of the ,dodo in ,alice in ,wonderland1 who at the end of the ,caucus-race allotted one of ,alice's comfits to each of the competitors4 ,as far1 however1 as they can disentangle the complexities of the evidence1 it does appear to have been through these two enthusiasts that the ,tank idea first took tangible shape4 ,the notion was in the air1 perhaps it took unsubstantial form in other minds before ,october1 #aiad1--;it seems probable that it did in ,mr4 ,diplock's and ,mr4 ,mc,fee's1 for example4 ,perhaps1 too1 in other minds it was later to take clearer and more practical shape4 ,but it does seem to have been ,colonel ,swinton and ,captain ,tulloch who1 first of the band of pioneers1 had the courage and the practical energy to forward a somewhat startling notion in official quarters4 ,for ,mr4 ,diplock's first 8,pedrail0 machine1 whose plans he laid before ,lord ,kitchener and ,mr4 ,winston ,churchill in ,november1 #aiad1 was a ,gun ,tractor1 not a fighting machine4 ,it was not till ,february #aiae that ,mr4 ,diplock 7in conjunction with a ,committee appointed by ,mr4 ,churchill7 officially so much as contemplated the building of a 8,land ,cruiser40 ,fortunately one of the first of the ,swinton memoranda was submitted through ,colonel ,sir ,maurice ,hankey1 ,secretary to the ,committee of ,imperial ,defence1 who was an early and active friend to the idea of the new arm4 ,difficulties1 however1 abounded4 ,many were actual1 some were imaginary4 ,for example1 it was urged that to design and build such machines would take over a year4 ,surely the war would be over6 ,then when the counsels of those kill-joys prevailed who believed that the war would 8hold10 and it was decided to experiment with the 8mobile machine-gun destroyers10 various technical difficulties arose4 ,it was difficult to procure some of the essentials without elaborate manufacture and the making of special tools1 and makeshift parts were1 therefore1 substituted4 ,fitted with these makeshifts1 the ,land ,cruisers were a disappointment4 ,the first tests were carried out in ,february #aiae1 when ,captain ,tulloch's adaptation of the ,holt ,tractor was given a trial4 ,it did not prove a complete failure1 and much was learned from the experiment4 ,for example1 the machine was unexpectedly effective in rolling in the wire which it had been originally intended that its automatic 8lobster-claw0 wire-cutters should alone deal with4 ,in ,june ,admiral ,bacon's ,forster-,daimler ,tractor of #aee ,h4,p41 fitted with a self-bridging apparatus1 was experimented with4 ,this1 too1 proved disappointing1 in so far as the device was to fulfil the proposed functions of a ,land ,cruiser4 ,it refused to cross trenches1 though it proved a practical ,tractor1 and it was later used in 8trams0 of eight machines for the transport of #ae-;in4 guns4 ,the position1 therefore1 in ,june #aiae1 as far as the ,war ,office was concerned1 was as follows3 ,proposals had been put forward by ,colonel ,swinton1 ,admiral ,bacon1 and ,captain ,tulloch1 and submitted to the ,war ,office2 certain trials had been made1 the result of which was1 in the view of the authorities1 to emphasise the engineering and other difficulties4 ,it was only in ,june that the ,war ,office ascertained that investigations on similar lines were being carried out by the ,admiralty4 ,for the ,admiralty1 with a large land force at its disposal1 had been for some time casting about for means whereby the men of that force might go into battle more in ,navy fashion1 that is 7to misquote the 8heroic ,spanish gunners07 with something better than serge1 8joined to their own invincible courage10 between them and the enemy's bullets4 ,mr4 ,churchill had1 as early as ,january #aiae1 written a letter to the ,prime ,minister expressing his entire agreement with ,colonel ,hankey's remarks 8on the subject of special mechanical devices for taking trenches40 ,the idea of employing a large armoured shield on wheels1 or of using ordinary steam tractors on which a small bullet-proof shelter had been fitted1 had been considered4 ,mr4 ,churchill interested himself personally in the scheme1 and he and his expert1 ,major ,hetherington of the ,r4,n4,a4,s4--the third independent inventor--worked hard to evolve and then 8push0 a practical machine4 ,in the early spring of #aiae a ,committee1 called the ,land ,ship ,committee1 was appointed1#c and many designs of wheel and caterpillar tractors were submitted to it4 ,one of these designs was especially interesting not only for its astonishing appearance1 but for the influence which it exerted upon the 8profile0 of the future ,tank4 ,the curious will find a brief account of it in the ,note at the end of the chapter4 ,it was ,mr4 ,churchill's ,committee who called in ,major ,wilson1 ,mr4 ,tritton1 and ,mr4 ,tennyson d',eyncourt as consultants1 8when a design was evolved which embodied the form finally adopted for ,tanks40 ,thus1 while the honour of the first designs and experiments belongs to the ,war ,office1 it was to the enterprise of this ,admiralty ,committee that most of the credit of the evolution of the ,mark ,i4 ,tank was due4 ,it was1 as we have said1 apparently not until the ,admiralty ,committee had been at work for some time that the ,director of ,fortifications and ,works1 on behalf of the ,war ,office1 ascertained that the ,admiralty had designs for a 8,land ,cruiser0 in hand4 ,the two ,departments met at ,wormwood ,scrubs to witness the ,admiralty's trials of a ,killen-,straight tractor4 ,it was a remarkable occasion1 for a number of men who were destined profoundly to influence the history of the ,tanks now saw a foreshadowing of such an engine for the first time4 ,among them were ,lord ,kitchener1 ,mr4 ,lloyd ,george1 ,mr4 ,balfour1 and ,mr4 ,mc,kenna4 ,mr4 ,winston ,churchill was also there1 but to him an armoured tractor was no novelty4 ,after this gathering the ,tank enthusiasts of the two ,departments fell upon each other's necks1 swore eternal friendship1 and in the middle of ,june formed a ,joint ,committee1 of which ,lieutenant ,stern was ,secretary4 ,tanks--when any existed which would work--were to be a military service in the ,department of the ,master-,general of ,ordnance4 ,the ,admiralty was to continue its work of designing1 was to provide cash for experiments1 and ,mr4 ,churchill1 its late ,first ,lord1 was to continue his invaluable work as a propellant4 ,all seemed prosperous1 for the representatives of the two ,services appear to have worked pretty harmoniously1 and the better informed and more progressive heads of ,departments on both sides showed an interested benevolence4 ,but unfortunately--especially at the ,war ,office--there appear to have been a certain number of obstructionists4 ,one senior ,officer1 fearing1 one supposes1 to be diverted from his ideal of the official attitude by the sight of these ungodly engines1 refused so much as to attend the trials4 ,the ,adjutant-,general 7then no doubt1 poor man1 sufficiently harassed7 rigidly refused a single man for the new arm4 ,fortunately1 the ,joint ,committee was resourceful1 and1 after a preliminary appeal to ,mrs4 ,pankhurst for militant suffragists1#d they induced the ,admiralty to turn over to them the #bjth ,squadron of the ,armoured ,car ,reserve1 and to increase the strength of this unit from #ej to #fjj men4 ,by ,july ,colonel ,swinton--another of the ,tank's best sources of power--had returned to ,france4 ,g4,h4,q4 was later to be more propitious1 but now the taste of those inconclusive experiments was still in its mouth1 and their chief technical adviser had begun to have horrid doubts about the whole affair4 8,caterpillars10 he remarked1 that he had lately seen 8could only go at the rate of #a miles an hour on roads1 were very slow in turning1 and nearly every bridge in the country would require strengthening to carry them40 8,it was necessary to descend from the realms of imagination to solid fact40 ,colonel ,swinton explained and exhorted and expostulated4 ,,ii ,meanwhile the ,joint ,war ,office and ,admiralty ,committee system was too simple to last4 ,from ,august #aiae to ,august #aiag1 when the 8,new0 ,tank ,committee was formed1 the control and administration of ,tank manufacture and design were extraordinarily tentative and shifting4 ,necessarily so4 ,the home organisation had to expand very rapidly1 and constantly to adapt itself to changed conditions of ,tank tactics abroad and ,tank manufacture at home4 ,even the multiplicity of the authorities concerned seems to have been to a great extent inevitable4 ,the ,tank had1 of course1 initially complicated its early history by starting life in ,infantry puttees and a south-wester4 ,at the point we have reached1 its story plunges into a whirling quicksand of departments1 branches1 committees1 and conferences1 which were reorganised and rearranged--changed hats and functions with bewildering frequency4 ,this tangle of activity ,colonel ,swinton throughout made it his hobby to understand and his business to co-ordinate4 ,the present historians1 on the contrary1 feel tempted to adopt the simple method of their ,hebrew predecessor1 who1 having picked out one plum1 so often blandly continues3 8,and the rest of the acts of the ,trench ,warfare ,department and all that they did1 are they not written in the book of the archives of the ,war ,office80 ,however1 it is possible that the ,hebrew historian honestly believed that the lost books of the ,chronicles were really available to the inquiring reader4 ,the present authors have no such illusion about ,war ,office papers1 and therefore propose to give at least an outline of the vicissitudes and fluctuations of early ,tank control4 ,the chief persons of the ,drama remain throughout3 ,the ,war ,office3 7#a7 ,in its capacity as ,ordnance1 and 7#b7 in its capacity as ,general ,staff4 ,later 7#c7 as the ,tank ,department1 ,war ,office4 ,g4,h4,q43 7#a7 ,in its main capacity1 and as 7#b7 ,the ,experiments ,committee4 ,later1 the ,h4,b4,m4,g4,c4 ,finally1 the ,tank ,corps4 ,the ,admiralty3 7#a7 ,in its capacity as the ,land ,ship ,committee1 and 7#b7 as ,squadron #bj of the ,r4,n4,a4,s4 ,the ,ministry of ,munitions3 7#a7 ,in its capacity as the ,trench ,warfare ,department2 7#b7 in its capacity as the ,inventions ,department4 7#c7 ,later1 as the ,mechanical ,warfare ,supply ,department 7really another ,tank ,committee74 7#d7 ,later still1 as the ,tank ,supply ,department4 ,the successive ,main ,tank ,committees3 7#a7 ,the ,joint ,naval and ,military ,committee 7which did not survive ,act ,i474 7#b7 ,the ,tank ,supply ,committee1 afterwards called the ,advisory ,committee of the ,tank ,supply ,department1 and divided into a main committee and a sub-committee4 7,it was this sub-committee which afterwards formed the backbone of the very active and occasionally criticised ,m4,w4,s4,d41 before referred to74 ,later1 7#c7 after a gap1 the ,first ,tank ,committee2 7#d7 the ,second reconstructed ,tank ,committee4 ,grand ,chorus of ,directors ,general1 ,interdepartmental ,conferences1 ,manufacturers1 and ,workshop ,personnel4 ,,iii ,we find that the period from ,august #aiae to ,february #aiaf constitutes a kind of ,act ,i4 in the history of ,tank administration and manufacture1 for the #aiad and early #aiae period is too dim and legendary to serve as anything but prologue4 ,during the whole of the ,act ,i4 period it was the ,admiralty and the ,joint ,land ,ship ,committee which played the 8leads40 ,it was the ,admiralty which defrayed the whole cost of the extensive experimental work and provided the necessary personnel1 and it was by members of the ,joint ,committee in consultation that the ,mark ,i4 ,tank1 8,mother10 was ultimately designed4 ,on ,september #aa1 two months after ,colonel ,swinton's visit1 the ,experiments ,committee1 ,g4,h4,q41 laid down in an excellent and far-sighted memorandum what were the qualities which they desired should be aimed at in designs for the caterpillar cruiser and what were the tactical purposes which it must serve4 ,by ,september #bh the ,joint ,committee had so far perfected the design of 8,mother0 as to have had a wooden dummy 7officially described as a 8mock-up07 made1 and on that day her counterfeit was inspected at ,wembley by an ,interdepartmental ,conference1 and approved4 ,some weeks elapsed while the ,joint ,committee worked out the further details of their machine1 and about ,december #c ,mr4 ,churchill wrote a ,memorandum entitled 8,variants of the ,offensive10 in which he paradoxically accentuated the value of defensive armour as a preservative of mobility4 ,there was to be a new form of attack4 ,it was to be launched at night under the guidance of searchlights4 ,caterpillar ,tractors were to breach the enemy's line1 and then turn right and left4 ,the ,infantry were to follow them closely under cover of bullet-proof shields4 ,on ,christmas ,day ,sir ,douglas ,haig 7who had lately taken over from ,sir ,john ,french1 and who as yet 8knew not ,joseph07 read the paper with interest1 and pinned a pencil slip upon it1 8,is anything known about the ,caterpillar referred to in para4 #d1 page #c80 ,no time was lost in finding out1 and a few days later ,g4,h4,q4 sent an officer to ,england to inquire into the matter4 ,this officer was ,lieutenant-,colonel ,hugh ,elles1 who was afterwards to be the first ,tank ,general4 ,by the end of ,january #aiaf the experimental machine--no pasteboard simulation1 but 8,mother0 herself--was complete1 and on ,february #b the official trial was held at ,hatfield1 before the ,army ,council and a representative of ,g4,h4,q4 8,mother0 made good1 and ,g4,h4,q4 asked to be supplied with a certain number of the ,land ,cruisers4 ,a small ,executive ,tank ,supply ,committee with much fuller powers than the old ,joint ,committee1 was formed under the ,presidency of ,lieutenant 7now ,colonel ,sir ,albert7 ,stern1 and orders were at once given to begin manufacture4 ,so ended ,act ,i4 ,,iv ,the first scene of ,act ,,ii4 7,march to mid-,august7 was occupied with one of the most dramatic achievements of the ,war4 ,this was the manufacture at ,lincoln of the first #aej 8,land ,ships0 ordered by the ,government1 in the space of six months1 and in absolute secrecy4 ,the public discussed the phantom ,russians who travelled through ,england by night4 ,it discussed the ,germans who nightly signalled to each other throughout the inland counties4 ,but it did not discuss the large water-tanks or cisterns that were being made for ,petrograd1 ,egypt1 or ,mesopotamia1 or some such place4 ,that this vital secrecy was kept for months by hundreds of people was chiefly due to the happy effect of copious and imaginative lying4 ,there was no mystery about these grotesque armour-plated creatures6 ,they were not really for ,mesopotamia at all4 ,every one knew that4 ,the ,russian ,government had ordered them4 ,they were ridiculous things8 ,of course they were4 ,it was a ,russian design4 ,was there not even an inscription in ,russian characters on them8 ,at least they might frighten the ,germans if they served no other useful purpose4 ,tradition relates that when the first drawings were brought to the manager's office of the factory which had been selected for the manufacture of the 8water-carriers10 the manager and his staff expressed themselves as being seriously concerned for the sanity of the designers1 and of those who submitted such drawings to practical men like themselves4 ,they were1 however1 let into the secret of the real part which ,tanks were to play1 and though still profoundly incredulous1 decided1 like good citizens1 to carry out whatever work was asked of them4 ,the vital necessity of secrecy having been impressed upon them1 they were asked--tradition continues--what arrangements they would like made about sentries and the isolation of their workpeople4 ,after a little consideration they answered that they would only guarantee that the secret should be kept on condition that they were given a completely free hand and not interfered with4 ,they proposed to have no sentries1 no 8isolated area0 to proclaim trumpet-tongued1 8,here is a secret60 ,they desired merely to propound a satisfactory system of lies1 to give an 8alternative explanation0--to put it more delicately--and to carry out their work with a disarming publicity4 ,after some hesitation the authorities consented to this strange system4 ,we shall see how1 on ,september #ae1 8wisdom was justified of her children40 ,the factory where these curious interviews are reported to have taken place was that of ,messrs4 ,forsters1 ,agricultural ,implement ,manufacturers of ,lincoln4 ,we almost literally beat our ploughshares into swords4 ,in ,london1 changes in ,tank administration were going on as usual4 ,the trend as far as supply and manufacture were concerned was towards centralisation4 ,a ,tank ,supply ,department was created at the ,ministry of ,munitions1 and the ,tank ,supply ,committee changed its name to 8,advisory ,committee of the ,tank ,supply ,department40 ,in ,august this ,committee--gradually1 as it were--turned into the ,mechanical ,warfare ,supply ,department before alluded to4 ,lieutenant 7by now ,colonel ,stern was at its head47 ,in the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 were now concentrated three separate functions3 ,they were ,tank designers2 they were responsible for supply2 they were responsible for the final inspection of machines4 ,the future was to show that such concentration had some drawbacks as well as many obvious advantages4 ,note4--,the genesis of the 8large-wheeled tractor0 was as follows3 ,trenches with a parados and parapet about #d ft4 high were being constructed by the enemy in ,flanders4 ,the engineers consulted by the ,land ,ship ,committee gave it as their considered opinion that if these obstacles were to be crossed1 a wheel of not less than #ae ft4 diameter would be necessary4 ,machines with these gigantic wheels were actually ordered1 but the wooden model that was knocked together as a preliminary at once convinced even its best friends that the design was fantastic1 and that any machine of the kind would be little better than useless on account of its conspicuousness and vulnerability4 ,however1 the 8big wheel0 idea did not utterly die1 for in the upturned snout of the ,mark ,i4 ,tank we have1 as it were1 its 8toe0 preserved1 the track turning sharply back at about axle level1 instead of mounting uselessly skyward1 as would have been the case had not the old wheel idea been supplanted by that of the sliding track4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,tank ,,corps ,,in ,,embryo ,,part ,i ,i ,not till ,act ,,iii4 do we get the opening of the main plot of our drama4 ,for it was only at the end of ,march1 #aiaf that recruiting for the new arm began1 and therefore that 8,the ,fighting ,side0 first appeared4 #e8;,at the end of ,march certain officer cadets with engineering experience and drawn from the #ahth1 #aith1 and #bast ,royal ,fusiliers1 were asked to volunteer their services for what they were given to understand was an experimental armoured car unit4 7,the ,armoured ,car ,section of the ,motor ,machine ,gun ,corps47 8,those who decided to throw in their lot with the new ,service were interviewed by ,colonel ,swinton and ,colonel ,bradley1 who1 in the course of their examination1 threw out no hints as to further details relative to the new unit4 ,results of these interviews were communicated on the ,thursday before ,easter ,friday1 when successful volunteers were informed that they were to be granted temporary commissions in the ,m4,m4,g4,c41 and were despatched the same morning to report to the ,m4,m4,g4,c4 ,headquarters at ,bisley4 ,upon arrival further information was received from the ,adjutant that short leave would be granted for the purpose of obtaining kit1 and that all officers would report their return with kit1 on the following ,tuesday evening4 8,during the week that followed ,easter the two first selected ,companies1 i4e41 #8,k' and #8,l1' were formed1 officers being posted to one or other of the ,companies40 ,specially selected officers and men of the original ,m4,m4,g4,c4 formed the nucleus of these ,companies1 and the ,companies were formed into a ,battalion as further reinforcements arrived4 ,on the ,monday after ,easter ,bank ,holiday training began1 instructions being given in the use of the ,vickers and ,hotchkiss 4#cjc ,machine ,guns and later in the ,hotchkiss #f-pounder ,naval gun4 ,an officer who arrived in about the second batch tells how he and another man from the same regiment were sent down to ,bisley after the usual brief but formidable interview with ,colonel ,swinton4 ,they arrived at ,brookwood ,station only to be told that the ever mysterious ,motor ,machine ,gun ,corps had left two days before for ,siberia4 ,tableau6 8,siberia0 proved1 however1 to be a camp not so far from ,bisley as to be beyond the radius of the station cab in which they both presently set off4 ,no ,tanks were1 of course1 yet available for training1 and therefore instruction was concentrated upon the use of the three guns1 8each officer1 ,n4,c4,o4 and man being required to pass out at the examination40 #f8,with the above exception1 physical drill and an occasional route march1 no further training of military character was imposed2 thus in the early summer of #aiaf practically all the personnel of the new branch of the service were efficient in the manipulation of the three guns in question4 ,during the whole of the foregoing period no further information other than widely different rumours could be obtained by the junior personnel of the ,unit as to the purposes for which they1 or the experimental armoured car1 would be used40 ,about ,june it became increasingly evident that if the ,land ,cruisers were to be fought that year1 production must be accelerated4 8,a very limited number of officers1 ,n4,c4,o4's and men1 totalling about one dozen1 were despatched to ,lincoln and other centres1 where they were employed in connection with what they later understood to be ,tank production40 ,meanwhile1 a very carefully chosen and elaborately prepared training area had been organised on ,lord ,iveagh's estate near ,thetford1 and as soon as information came that the first machines would soon be available for training1 the ,battalion was again moved4 ,this time the still mystified companies found themselves in a camp more ringed about than was the palace of the ,sleeping ,beauty1 and more zealously guarded than the ,paradise of a ,shah4 ,three rows of plantations and shelter belts guarded them from the eyes of the profane1 and the intruder or the breaker of camp must pass six lines of sentries assisted by cavalry patrols4 ,a highroad which ran through the training ground was closed1 and all inhabited farms within the area were evacuated4 ,no civilians were allowed under any pretext to pass the guard1 nor were troops allowed to leave the area except on production of special passes which were very difficult to get4 ,once an aeroplane from a neighbouring aerodrome flew over1 moved by a friendly spirit of inquiry4 ,it was immediately greeted with a hail of machine-gun bullets and was obliged to depart in some haste4 ,for now the ,tanks had to appear in their true character as fighting machines1 and needed a better screen than ,russian ,fairy ,tales4 ,the machines had been long expected4 ,almost daily some one in the camp had 8heard0 an unfamiliar engine throb1 and when this happened the entire camp would rush out to see if 8they0 had come4 ,the wildest rumours were afoot4 ,the car could climb trees6 ,it could swim6 ,it could jump like a flea6 ,any one who has lived in an ordinary camp where there were no secrets and remembers what rumours flourished on the most ethereal food1 can imagine their growth in a camp where there was a real mystery4 ,but at last1 towards the beginning of ,june1 a limited number of ,mark ,i4 machines were detrained at a special railhead within the area4#g ,the training of the ,battalion now began in earnest4 ,machines and men were destined to be launched in little over six weeks' time into the then newly begun ,somme offensive4 ,two types of ,tank were detrained1 8,big ,willie0 and 8,little ,willie40 ,the ,mark ,i4 7,big ,willie7 was very different from the ,mark ,v4 machine described in ,chapter ,i4 ,it took four men to drive it4 ,it had an unwieldly two-wheeled tail1 or to give this appendage its official name1 a 8,hydraulic ,stabiliser40 ,by this device it could let itself down gently over a drop of over #e ft41 and partly with the aid of it1 the machine was steered4 ,in practice1 compared with the handy ,mark ,v41 the whole steering arrangement of the ,mark ,i4 was extraordinarily clumsy and laborious4 ,she would not turn sharply at all on rough ground1 and had to be coaxed to any change of direction4 ,her engine and tracks also needed constant adjustment1 the rollers being an everlasting source of trouble4 ,drivers and mechanics who have handled both machines1 seem to regard the running of a ,mark ,v4 as child's-play after struggling with the caprices of 8,mother40 8,little ,willie0 was used only as a training ,tank1 as in practice he was found to have a defective balance4 ,his centre of gravity was misplaced1 and he was1 besides1 too short for the work of crossing trenches4 ,,ii ,but there were other than technical problems awaiting solution4 ,it would be difficult to over-estimate the difficulties which confronted those officers who were responsible for the preliminary training of the ,heavy ,section of the ,machine ,gun ,corps2 no one had ever actually fought inside a ,tank1 and it was1 therefore1 upon the spirit of prophecy alone that they must rely in their preparations4 ,there was no manual to help them4 ,they had1 however1 one very excellent official document1 the secret ,notes on the ,employment of ,tanks1 which was issued in ,february #aiaf 7signed 8,e4 ,d4 ,s40#h71 which gave an extraordinarily good forecast of what the rle of ,tanks would probably be when in action4 ,but the paper was very short and very objective1 and was more concerned with an analysis of the place of the ,tanks in the orchestra of battle than with the difficulties presented by their individual score4 ,this was where the training of the first ,tank crew fell short--almost inevitably4 ,their teachers had a rather hazy mental picture of the actuality of battle4 ,they did not squarely face the essential question upon whose answer all specific training and all specific preparation depend1 the question1 that is1 8,what is it going to be like80 ,thus1 though they did teach most of the essentials1 they left out half a dozen subjects of which an accurate knowledge was1 as we shall see1 ever afterwards held to be absolutely necessary4 ,one of their difficulties was the shortness of the time4 ,what must the crews know8 ,would physical fitness or map reading prove more important when the day came8 ,signalling or esprit de corps8 ,visual training or revolver drill8 ,there was no time for everything4 ,there were1 however1 obviously three or four essentials4 ,most of the officers and men were already first-rate engineers or mechanics1 but they must be trained exactly in the strange machine they were to use4 ,they must understand the peculiarities of ,tanks1 and1 if possible1 of their individual ,tank1 the monster which they had to render animate4 ,they must be thoroughly at home with their ,vickers guns1 be accurate shots with them1 be able to remedy all stoppages1 and to strip their weapons with speed and accuracy4 ,above all1 crews must train together1 be accustomed to work under their officer1 each with his special work as brakeman1 gearsman1 driver or gunner1 but each still part of an organic whole4 ,they must also attain to a certain physical level1 must undergo some visual training1 and must know how to fire a revolver4 ,all this and more was achieved1 for the men were picked individuals of more than ordinary intelligence1 and soon became extraordinarily keen on their work4 #i8;,if anything went wrong with the ,tank1 they used to look upon it not as a bore but as a pleasure to put it right4444 ,we felt a terrific pride in our ,company and ,section1 and also as a ,tank crew against other crews4 ,there was always healthy competition1 and this competition carried us right out to ,france4444 ,besides that1 ,tank ,commanders had the very great advantage of training their crews themselves4444 ,we knew our men thoroughly40 ,but1 as another ,tank ,commander wrote afterwards3 8,the first ,company to go out had to work at tremendous speed4 ,the ,tanks did not arrive till the last minute1 and ,i and my crew did not have a ,tank of our own the whole time we were in ,england 444 as our ,tank went wrong the day it arrived4444 ,again we had no reconnaissance or map reading 444 no practices or lectures on the compass4444 ,we had no signalling 444 and no practice in considering orders4 ,this was a thing ,i very much missed when ,i got out to ,france4 ,when you work with a ,division you get very long orders1 and you have to analyse these orders to discover what concerns you and what does not4444 ,we had no knowledge of where to look for information that would be necessary for us as ,tank ,commanders1 nor did we know what information we should be likely to require40 ,no one1 in short1 had sat down to imagine a ,tank in action from within4 ,we had official painters in ,france1 but alas6 we had no official writers of prophetic fiction4 ,the history of the attack on ,morval shows that this probably inevitable lack of1 say1 an official clairvoyant1 this dependence upon methods of trial and error1 though it ultimately did little to hurt the development of ,tanks1 did very much to prevent the ,tank personnel from feeling satisfied by their dbut4 ,,part ,,ii ,i ,it must have been with some sense of having taken a momentous step that the authorities sanctioned the manufacture of #aej ,tanks after witnessing the trials at ,hatfield4 ,we were short of men and short of steel1 and to divert steel from shells and men from the infantry was a grave decision4 ,our rulers were for a moment1 perhaps1 granted the gift of prevision4 ,they saw that the new weapon might prove the sword that was ultimately to tip the level balance1 and to break the intolerable equilibrium which had settled on the line from the ,alps to the sea4 ,this prophetic mood did fitfully visit the authorities4 ,for a few months they would1 as it were1 have faith1 and personnel would be granted and machines would be ordered4 ,then perhaps for half a precious year they would relapse and backslide and revert1 till ,colonel ,swinton1 the ,fighting ,side1 and all the other missionaries and preachers of the ,tank ,corps almost despaired4 ,but in ,february #aiaf there was much to uphold them4 ,the situation demanded some desperate remedy4 ,the balance hung deadly level4 ,we could hold the ,germans now1 but for how long8 ,the race for the coast had been a draw1 and the ,first ,battle of ,ypres had ended open warfare on the ,western ,front4 #aj8,quick-firing field guns and the machine-guns used defensively1 proved too strong for the endurance of the attackers1 who were forced to seek safety by means of their spades rather than through their rifles4 ,whole fronts were entrenched1 and1 except for a few small breaks1 a man could have walked by trench1 had he wished to1 from ,nieuport almost into ,switzerland40 ,the ,germans were dug in4 #aa8;,and with the trench came wire entanglements--the horror of the attack--and the trinity of trench1 machine-gun1 and wire made the defence so strong that each offensive operation was brought to a standstill4 8,the problem which then confronted us was a two-fold one3 8,firstly1 how could the soldier in the attack be protected against shrapnel1 shell-splinters and bullets8 ,helmets were reintroduced1 armour was tried1 shields were invented1 but all to no great purpose4 8,secondly1 even if bullet-proof armour could be invented1 which it certainly could1 how were men laden down with it going to get through the wire entanglements which protected every position80 ,it was1 in fact1 impossible for infantry alone to attack such positions without the most extensive artillery preparation4 ,the enemy and his trenches and his wire must be blown out of the ground4 ,this was the accepted answer to the problem of the deadlock4 ,but as yet we had not got the shells4 ,we were straining every nerve to reach the solution by bombardment1 but in ,february #aiaf we had not got the necessary ammunition4 ,was there no other answer to the problem8 ,nothing that could be done meanwhile8 ,this was the mood in which the missionaries of the 8mobile machine-gun destroyer0 found the ,high ,command4 ,had we had shells in ,february #aiaf we should not have had the ,tank4 ,we must have waited another year for it1 till1 in fact1 we had found out the defects of the hoped-for solution by bombardment4 ,the ,german1 who was full fed with ammunition1 felt at this early date no urging to go out and seek any such fantastic remedy4 ,his ,high ,command would have laughed at the idea of ,tanks as ,dives may have laughed at hungry ,lazarus' antics over broken victuals4 ,,ii ,so1 while our shells were making1 we built ,tanks4 ,and ,fate1 whose taste in humour is not ours1 and who knew what we did not1 namely1 that the ,tank and prolonged artillery preparation are alternative weapons1 decreed that both shells and ,tanks should be ready for the ,somme offensive4 ,it was thus upon a 8substructure0 of the new artillery preparation that we gaily imposed the ,tank4 ,we were to take fourteen months in working out the proposition that they could never be effectively used together4 ,the ,tanks had been designed for the sort of conditions which had prevailed at ,loos4 ,their training grounds had been carefully modelled on the 8,loos0 pattern4 ,by the time ,tanks could be put into the field1 a year later1 our artillery superiority had completely changed the nature of the fighting4 ,at ,beaumont-,hamel in ,november #aiaf1 for example1 we fired off as much ammunition as was expended in three weeks at the ,battle of ,loos4 ,on the ,somme--owing to our having advanced--four miles of churned-up1 shell-pitted ground had to be crossed before the front line could be reached4 ,it had also--to state the case after the manner of the author of ,erewhon--become the fashion1 just before the day of battle1 for the attacking side to blast the ground which they were about to cross to the condition of plum pudding on stir-up ,sunday4 ,this blasting process1 moreover1 necessarily gave the enemy several days' warning of any proposed attack4 ,it had also incidentally had another effect upon the industrious ,german4 ,when we were bombarded our chief idea was retaliation2 when the ,german was shelled he dug4 ,so it had come about that on the ,somme1 everywhere behind the ,german lines1 were great electrically-lit and comfortably warmed dug-outs1 where a company or so could lie secure thirty or forty feet below ground and there wait for the bombardment to 8blow over40 ,then they would emerge ready to welcome our infantry4 ,thus the system of the1 say1 six days' artillery preparation1 though it did very much to raise our moral and depress that of the enemy in time resulted in an almost complete system of enemy counter-measures1 and in a state of the battle-ground which caused attackers and attacked to be almost immobile4 ,the system1 necessary as had been our adoption of it1 had not solved the problem of the deadlock4 ,the ,tank1 as we have said1 had been intended for use on reasonably sound ground4 ,it was also to be a surprise weapon4 ,not once for the next fourteen months did we omit to give the enemy at least five days' notice of our proposed attacks1 nor did we decline to co-operate with his artillery in reducing the intended battle-ground to a morass4 ,it was1 therefore1 not till the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai1 when we did adopt other tactics1 that ,tanks came by their own4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,first ,,tank ,,battles--,,the ,,attack ,,on ,,morval1 ,,flers1 ,,the ,,quadrilateral1 ,,thiepval ,,and ,,beaumont-,,hamel ,i ,it was not till the ,somme offensive1 which was launched on ,july #a1 #aiaf1 had been in progress for two months and a half1 that it was found possible for the new arm to take its place in the fighting4 ,we have seen how1 secretly1 urgently1 behind a rich curtain of ingenious and circumstantial lies1 the manufacture of the ,tanks had been going on4 ,how1 secretly1 urgently1 the crews had been training for their unknown job4 ,of the fifty ,tanks which were destined to take part in the battle of ,september #ae1 about thirteen left ,england on ,august #ae1 and the rest followed at intervals and in driblets as the limited transport allowed4 ,the last batch arrived on ,august #cj and1 like its fellows1 proceeded to the training centre at ,yvrench4 ,here trenches had been dug and wire entanglements erected1 and machine-gun and #f-pounder practice could be carried out after a fashion4 ,but there was no staff of instructors1 the ranges were too short1 and the conditions for battle practice quite unlike those which prevailed on the ,somme4 ,but it had to suffice4 ,the ,tanks were wanted at once1 and by ,september #aj 8,c0 and 8,d0 ,companies had arrived in the forward area1 their ,h4,q4 being established at the ,loop4 ,it was thus within a week of their arrival forward that ,tanks were called upon to take part in the attack4 ,the battle had now been in progress for nearly ten weeks4 ,we had advanced and occupied a depth of four miles of devastated country4 ,most of the men and many of the officers had not been to ,france before4 ,they found themselves in a strange world4 ,endless lines of transport crawled over incredibly bad roads bordered by gaunt stumps of trees and by a sordid and tragic litter of dead men and horses1 rags1 tin cans1 rotting equipment1 and derelict transport4 ,the enemy was counter-attacking over the whole of the thirty-mile front1 and the sound of our guns was everywhere4 ,at night the stream of lorries never ceased1 and at some point or other in our line1 far away1 a star shell could always be seen sailing up from behind a rise of ground1 giving some fringe of shattered wood1 or ruined sugar factory1 a fleeting silhouette against its cold white light4 ,all ranks were desperately busy1 from the mechanics who had new spare engine parts to adjust1 to those in command who had their own minds and those of several ,major-,generals to make up4 ,colonel ,brough had commanded when the ,tanks disembarked1 but had now handed over to ,colonel ,bradley1 and he and the ,army ,corps1 and ,divisional ,commanders with whom he conferred on the #acth seem1 perhaps inevitably1 to have been as uncertain how to wield the new weapon as were the ,tank ,commanders of such details as how to fit their new camouflage covers or anti-bombing nets4 ,in an advance when ought a ,tank to start8 ,if it started too soon it would draw the enemy barrage2 if it started too late the infantry would reach the first objective before it1 and it would be of no use4 ,this and other similar dilemmas darkened their counsels1 and it was finally decided that the ,tanks' start should be so timed that they reached the first objective five minutes before the infantry1 and1 further that ,tanks should be used in twos and threes against strong points4 ,no special or detailed reconnaissance work had been done1 and a somewhat indigestible mass of aerial photographs was presented by the ,divisional ,staff to the bewildered ,tank ,commanders1 many of whom had never seen such things before4#ab ,much more useful were a series of maps with routes marked out and annotated with the necessary compass bearings1 and a detailed time-table with full barrage and other particulars4 ,at least they would have been more useful had not all orders been changed in such a way at the last moment as to invalidate almost every route and hour which they showed4 ,meanwhile the ,tank crews and commanders had been enjoying three or four days of almost comically complete nightmare4 ,in the first place1 they had all manner of mechanical preoccupations--newly arrived spare engine parts to test1 new guns to adjust1 box respirators to struggle with1 and an astounding amount of 8battle luggage0 to stow away4 ,but worst of all1 they found themselves regarded as the star variety-turn of the ,western ,front4 ,already1 before leaving ,thetford1 they had given a demonstration before the ,king and several members of the ,cabinet4 ,at ,yvrench they had performed before ,general ,joffre1 ,sir ,douglas ,haig1 and the greater part of the ,g4,h4,q4 ,staffs1#ac but on reaching the ,loop they found to their horror that it was to be 8,roses1 roses1 all the way40 ,a ,tank ,commander wrote bitterly3 8,it rather reminded me of ,hampstead ,heath4 ,when we got there we found that the ,infantry ,brigades had been notified that the ,tanks were to perform daily from #i to #aj and from #b to #c1 and every officer within a large radius and an enormous number of the ,staff came to inspect us4 ,we were an object of interest to every one4 ,this did not help on one's work40 ,on the #acth they were to move the ,loop to the point of assembly1 and the problems of 8housekeeping0 became acute4 #ad8,the officer and each man carried two gas helmets and one pair of goggles1 and in addition to their ordinary service caps1 a leather #8anti-bruise' helmet2 we also had a large field dressing as well as an ordinary first-aid dressing4 ,the usual equipment consisted of revolver1 haversack1 water-bottles and iron rations4 ,there are eight people in a ,tank1 and as soon as they get in they naturally take off all these things1 which lie about on the floor1 unless you devise some method of packing all your equipment4444 ,we carried1 in addition to iron rations1 sixteen loaves and about thirty tins of food1 cheese1 tea1 sugar and milk4 ,these took up a lot of room4 ,we also had one spare drum of engine oil and one of gear oil1 two small drums of grease1 three water-cans and two boxes of revolver ammunition 444 four spare ,vickers barrels1 one spare ,vickers gun1 a spare barrel for the ,hotchkiss and two wire-cutters4 ,we also had three flags for signalling purposes1 which unfortunately proved to have been lost when they were really wanted40 ,but ,captain ,henriques' list was1 even so1 not complete4 ,many ,tanks also carried two carrier pigeons1 #cc1jjj rounds of ,s4,a4 ammunition for their machine-guns1 a lamp-signalling set1 and a telephonic contrivance consisting of an instrument and one hundred yards of cable wound upon a drum4 ,the second instrument was to be left at the 8jumping-off place10 and the ,tank was to unwind the cable as it advanced1 relating its experiences the while to the telephone operator or other interested person in the rear4 ,what was to happen when the ,tank began to traverse the hundred and first yard we do not know4 ,in practice the device was not used4 ,but that was not all4 ,the orders1 time-tables and maps upon which the ,tank ,commanders depended1 proved to have been issued in insufficient quantities4 8,for every three ,tanks only one set of orders had been issued1 and only one map supplied3 consequently we had to grasp these orders before we passed them on to the other two officers40 ,however1 at #e p4m4 on the day before the battle1 these written orders were cancelled and new verbal instructions substituted4 ,roughly1 the ,tanks were to operate as follows3-- ,on the right with the #adth ,corps1 ten ,tanks were to work with the ,guards ,division1 and seven with the #fth and #efth ,divisions1 their objectives being ,ginchy and the ,quadrilateral4 ,on the left eight ,tanks were allotted to the #crd ,corps1 operating through ,high ,wood and ,east of ,martinpuich4 ,the #aeth ,corps had seventeen ,tanks attached1 and the ,reserve 7#eth7 ,army--fighting between ,pozires and ,martinpuich--had six tanks4 ,with all these groups of ,tanks the preliminary moving up into the first-line positions--in the pitch dark1 through the mud and in and out of the shell-holes of badly crumped ground--proved most arduous1 and a good many ,tanks broke down in the process4 ,one ,tank ,commander who struck a narrow sunken road remarks3 8,it was full of the bodies of dead ,boches1 and my driver did not like going along it40 ,for the ,tanks' crews the remainder of the night passed in a final tightening of loose tracks and adjustment of the engines1 and in listening to the steadily increasing crash and roar of the ,british bombardment4 ,the strain on men and officers had been tremendous4 ,most of them seem to have started the battle having had no sleep for over twenty-four hours4 ,they were desperately anxious1 too1 that ,tanks should prove their worth1 and the ,mark ,i4 machine was too capricious to give them much assurance4 ,to this list of discomforts must be added that most of the men had never heard guns before1 and that the lying-up places were close to our batteries4 ,,ii ,the morning of the #aeth was fine with a thin ground mist1 and at six o'clock the thunder of the ,british artillery rose to a final hurricane4 ,the barrage crept forward1 and our ,tanks and infantry crossed the parapets4 ,the ,germans seemed to have heard no breath of the nature of the new arm which was to be used against them1 and the light haze added greatly to the looming mystery of the approaching ,tanks4 ,official documents that were later on captured from the enemy revealed something of the deep psychological effect that our ,tanks had had on the ,german infantry4 ,these significant admissions might have done more to convince our own ,high ,command of the great potentialities of the new weapon than they actually did4 ,one of the best known individual ,tank exploits was that of the machine belonging to 8,c0 ,company1 which helped a ,new ,zealand and an ,english division in their assault upon ,flers4 ,this was the furthest penetration achieved by any ,tank that day4 ,this machine led its infantry1 and these had their first taste of entering a village which they knew bristled with enemy machine-guns without suffering a single casualty4 ,the adventure had all the exhilaration of surprise1 and the men1 who had nerved themselves for the usual ordeal of house-to-house fighting1 laughed at the astonishing anticlimax presented by their own and the ,tanks' stately progress down an almost empty street4 8,all dressed up and no one to fight40 ,it was on this occasion that the airmen's now famous message was sent back1 a message whose repetition rather galled the ,tank ,corps in the days of ill-rewarded effort that still lay between it and its final triumphs3 8,a ,tank is walking up the ,high ,street of ,flers with the ,british ,army cheering behind40 ,of two other ,tanks which did particularly well1 the first1 a male1 entered ,gueudecourt1 where it attacked a ,german ,battery and destroyed a field gun2 the other gave great assistance to attacking infantry which was held up by wire and machine-guns4 ,the ,tank ,commander placed his machine astride the trench and enfiladed it2 the ,tank then travelled along behind the trench and #cjj ,germans surrendered and were taken prisoners4 ,the following is a short summary of the returns of ,tanks engaged4 ,the casualties among ,tank personnel were insignificant1 though one officer of great promise was lost3 #di ,tanks were employed4 #cb reached their starting-points4 #i pushed ahead of the infantry and caused considerable loss to the enemy4 #i others did not catch up the infantry but did good work in 8clearing up40 #e became ditched4 #i broke down from mechanical trouble4 ,of these last fourteen1 some served as useful rallying-points for the infantry after they had become immobile1 and several could have been extricated in time to render some service if they had not been knocked out by indirect hits4 ,crews who had been obliged to abandon their ,tanks either got out their machine-guns and continued fighting or helped the wounded4 ,,iii ,the battle had been essentially experimental4 ,what opinion had been formed of the ,tanks8 ,we now know what was the opinion of the ,german infantry4 ,the ,german ,high ,command seems in public to have ignored the new arm4 ,in a secret 8,instruction0 the ,chief of the ,staff of the #crd ,army ,group1 however1 reminds units that they must 8hold ground at whatever cost0 and 8defend every inch of ground to the last man40 8,the enemy in the latest fighting have employed new engines of war as cruel as effective40 ,illustration3 ,,the ,,original ,,thiepval ,,mark ,i4 ,,tank ,,with ,,anti-,,bomb ,,roof ,,and 8,,tail0 ,illustration3 ,,field ,,camouflage ,every possible counter-measure is to be used against these 8monstrous engines10 which will probably be adopted on an extensive scale by the ,british4 ,to our own infantry the ,tank appeared as a lusty friend1 who had at last found a convenient way of dealing with the hitherto deadly partnership of wire and machine-gun--a friend1 too1 who had a grotesqueness of gait and appearance which was intrinsically endearing4 ,a wounded ,london ,territorial said3 8#8,old ,mother ,hubbard' they called her and lots of other funny names as well4 ,she looked like a pantomime animal or a walking ship with iron sides moving along1 very slow1 apparently all on her own1 and with none of her crew visible4 ,there she was1 groanin' and gruntin' along1 pokin' her nose here and there1 stopping now and then as if she was not sure of the road1 and then going on--very slow1 but over everything4 8,it was her slowness that scared us as much as anything1 and the way she shook her wicked old head and stopped to cough4 ,it was a circus--my word6 ,i only saw her for about ten minutes4 ,she came humping out of the fog at one end of the line and humped into it again at the other4 ,the last ,i saw of her was when she was nosing down a shell crater like a great big hippopotamus with a crowd of ,tommies cheering behind40 ,to the ,british ,high ,command the ,tanks appeared as engines of war which showed considerable promise4 ,they must overcome certain mechanical weaknesses1 and tactics must be further modified to suit their peculiarities4 ,the ,g4,h4,q4 attitude was1 in short1 that of men satisfied1 though not enthusiastic1 and was well expressed by ,sir ,douglas ,haig in his ,somme ,despatch3 8,our new heavily armoured cars1 known as #8,tanks1' now brought into action for the first time1 successfully co-operated with the infantry1 and coming as a surprise to the enemy rank and file1 gave valuable help in breaking down their resistance40 ,the despatch goes on to mention the taking of ,flers4 ,the delight of the ,british and ,french ,press knew no bounds4 ,the correspondents threw up their hats and set to ransack their dictionaries for octosyllables in which to describe the new 8,all ,british0 destroyer of ,germans4 ,it was 8,diplodocus ,galumphant10 it was a 8,polychromatic ,toad40 ,it was a 8flat-footed monster0 which 8performed the most astonishing feats of agility as it advanced1 spouting flames from every side40 8,it #8leant' against a wall until it fell and then crawled over the fallen dbris4 8,it went irresistibly through ,high ,wood1 the trees smashing like matchwood before it4 8,it went up to machine-gun emplacements1 #8crushed the gun under its ribs1' and passed on1 spitting death at the demoralised ,germans4 8,it #8stamped' down a dug-out as though it were a wasps' nest4 8,it crashed through broken barns and houses1 #8straddled' a dug-out and fired enfilading shot down ,german trenches4 8,it put a battery and a half of guns out of action at ,flers40 ,reuter added a cow-catcher to its equipment4 ,the ,french ,press was enthusiastic3 8,at the precise moment when the bombardment stopped1 the ,germans had the surprise of seeing advance in front of the waves of assaulting troops1 enormous steel monsters from which spurted a continuous fire of great violence4 ,one would have described them as gigantic infernal machines4 ,their front1 which was shaped like a ram1 smashed down every obstacle4 ,the heavy automobiles bounded across the overturned and uneven ground1 breaking through the barbed wire and jumping the trenches4 ,in the ,german ranks there was a really mad terror4 ,a prey to panic1 the soldiers of the ,german ,emperor fell back in haste1 abandoning their arms1 ammunition and equipment40 ,and how did the ,tank personnel itself view the events of the day8 ,half choked with the engine fumes1 boxed up for many hours without respite in the intolerable clamour and shaking of their machines1 or1 worse1 having wrestled for hours under heavy shelling with a broken-down ,tank1 they were inclined to see the exasperations of the battle rather than its successes4 ,it is indeed curious to note the difference in tone between the accounts of those who saw the ,tanks dispassionately from without and those who had weltered within1 between those who saw what the ,tanks did and those whose view of achievement was obscured by a knowledge of what might have been4 ,the ,tank ,corps was too keen to be in the least satisfied by the measure of success which it had achieved4 ,only the ,press and the ,germans perceived that a new 8,excalibur0 had been forged in ,england4 8,out of the mouths44440 ,,iv ,after the battle1 such of the ,tanks as could go under their own power rallied1 and steps were at once taken to salve as many as possible of those which had become incapacitated4 ,from this point1 till all available ,tanks had been used up and till the ground became finally impossible in mid-,november1 ,tanks were to be constantly employed in insignificant numbers in a series of small experimental actions4 ,this method of fighting by twos and threes against special strong points was afterwards discarded1 as it proved unsatisfactory4 ,several of these small actions were nevertheless very successful1 and showed in miniature some special purpose which ,tanks could serve1 or illustrated the importance of some special ,tank organisation4 ,for example1 ,thiepval showed how ,tanks could be used without artillery preparation1 and ,beaumont-,hamel showed the importance of a good ,reconnaissance ,branch4 ,these small actions were therefore important1 not in themselves1 but because they were microcosms4 ,in one or two unsuccessful actions it was rather the state of the ground which spoiled the battle than mistaken tactics4 ,for as the campaign drew on conditions became worse and worse4 ,by the beginning of ,october the ,army in general1 and particularly the ,tanks1 had a foretaste of the miseries of ,flanders4 ,the general conditions of this part of the campaign are admirably described by ,colonel ,buchan in his ,history of the ,war3 8,october was one long succession of tempestuous gales and drenching rains4 8,to understand the difficulties which untoward weather imposed on the ,allied advance1 it is necessary to grasp the nature of the fifty square miles of tortured ground which three months' fighting had given them1 and over which lay the communications between their fighting line and the rear4444 ,not the biggest mining camp or the vastest engineering undertaking had ever produced one tithe of the activity which existed behind each section of the battle line4 ,there were places like ,crewe1 places like the outskirts of ,birmingham1 places like ,aldershot or ,salisbury ,plain4444 8,there were now two ,no ,man's ,lands4 ,one was between the front lines2 the other lay between the old enemy front and the front we had won4 ,the second was the bigger problem1 for across it must be brought the supplies of a great army4444 8,the problem was hard enough in fine weather2 but let the rain come and soak the churned-up soil1 and the whole land became a morass4 ,there was no pav1 as in ,flanders1 to make a firm causeway4 ,every road became a water-course1 and in the hollows the mud was as deep as a man's thighs4444 8,the expected fine weather of ,october did not come4 ,on the contrary1 the month provided a record in wet1 spells of drenching rain being varied by dull1 misty days1 so that the sodden land had no chance of drying4 ,the carrying of the lower spurs--meant as a preliminary step to a general attack--proved an operation so full of difficulties that it occupied all our efforts during the month1 and with it all was not completed4 ,the story of these weeks is one of minor operations1 local actions with strictly limited objectives undertaken by only a few battalions4 ,in the face of every conceivable difficulty we moved gradually up the intervening slopes40 ,such was the setting of this batch of experimental actions4 ,the first of them took place on ,september #be1 when two small parties of ,tanks were employed in two distinct actions2 the first with the #crd ,corps1 and the second on ,september #be and #bf with the #aeth ,corps near ,gueudecourt4 ,the first was a failure4 ,only two ,tanks had been allotted2 one was ditched on the way to the starting-point1 and the other machine was caught in the enemy barrage and knocked out4 ,very different is the story of the ,tanks operating with the #aeth ,corps at ,gird ,trench near ,gueudecourt1 when with the help of a low-flying aeroplane #aejj yards of trench and #cgj prisoners were taken by one ,tank at a cost to us of five casualties4 ,the story is told in the ,somme ,despatch3 8,in the early morning a ,tank started down the portion of the trench held by the enemy from the north-west1 firing its machine-guns and followed by bombers4 ,the enemy could not escape1 as we held the trench at its southern end4 ,at the same time an aeroplane flew down the length of the trench1 also firing a machine-gun at the enemy holding it4 ,these then waved white handkerchiefs in token of surrender1 and when this was reported by the aeroplane the infantry accepted the surrender of the garrison4 ,by #h4cj a4m4 the whole trench had been cleared1 great numbers of the enemy had been killed1 and eight officers and #cfb other ranks made prisoners4 ,our total casualties amounted to five40 ,at noon on ,september #bf an attack was launched by ,general ,gough's reserve army on ,thiepval4 ,eight ,tanks co-operated4 ,it was the second attack that we had made on ,thiepval1 of which the ,germans had made a most formidable fortress4 ,the ground had been blasted into the familiar alternation of crumbling mounds and water-logged holes1 and the shattered houses and splintered trees--particularly a certain row of apple trees--stood up forlornly amid the general desolation4 ,from the point of view of the ,tanks1 however1 the action was important1 because here for the first time ,tanks were employed in a surprise attack4 ,no artillery preparation was used1 and 8our men were over the ,german parapets and into the dug-outs before machine-guns could be got up to repel them40 ,a large number of prisoners were taken1 and in the ,somme ,despatch the attack was noted as 8highly successful10 and the ,tanks as having given 8valuable assistance40 ,by the middle of ,october #aiaf when ,tanks were next in action1 the ground was hopelessly sodden1 and the story of the month which ensued might1 with an alteration of place names1 be taken for a narrative of the campaign in ,flanders4 ,than this there is no greater condemnation4 ,it would be tedious to particularise the five or six minor actions in which ,tanks played1 or more often endeavoured to play1 a part between ,october #ag and ,november #ah4 ,excepting in the interesting little action which took place at ,beaumont-,hamel1 to which we have alluded before1 no further light was to be thrown upon the uses and capabilities of the new arm4 ,the following account of the ,beaumont-,hamel fighting was given to the authors by a ,tank ,officer who was present3 8,at the end of ,september it became clear that the ,somme battle was fizzling out4 ,the ratio of #8cost' to #8results' became more and more unsatisfactory2 every advance1 too1 made the devastated and almost roadless area an ever greater problem4 8,it was decided that an attack1 if possible a surprise attack1 should be launched on the flank of the ,somme battle4 ,the position selected was roughly from about ,serre to the high ground some half a mile south of the river ,ancre4 ,this sector had1 of course1 been attacked at the beginning of the ,somme battle in ,july1 but the attack had been a complete failure1 and this front had relapsed into comparative quiet4 8,tanks were collected and again entrained1 the new detraining station being ,acheux4 ,this was the first of the many flank moves carried out with ,tanks in order that a fresh front might be engaged4 8,on arrival at ,acheux1 however1 at the beginning of ,october1 very bad weather set in and the preparations for the attack were delayed4 ,day after day the rain continued1 and the ground in the battle zone became steadily worse and worse4 ,it was a trying time for the officers and men of #8,c' and #8,d' ,companies1 as they were not in very good accommodation just outside ,acheux1 expecting daily to move up to battle4 ,it was not until the beginning of ,november1 however1 that a move was made by night via ,beausart to ,auchonvillers and ,la ,signy ,farm4 ,the ,tanks having reached these lying-up places1 the rain came down even faster than before1 and a study of aeroplane photographs of the proposed battle sector showed that all the old shell-holes and many of the old trenches had filled up with water1 and that the greater part of the front was in a hopeless condition for that type of ,tank 7i4e41 ,mark ,i474 8,just before the day of the ,battle1 ,november #ac1 it was decided to send back nearly all the ,tanks from ,la ,signy ,farm1 and some of those from ,auchonvillers1 only a few being held in readiness in case the infantry advance should give scope for their use further ahead on better ground4 8,three ,tanks of #8,a' ,company were due to attack with the main assault on ,november #ac2 and one of them succeeded in penetrating into the enemy's position and advancing for some distance along the enemy's support line and nearly reaching the ,ancre before it became #8ditched4' 8,further north the attack had met with considerable success1 except that the village of ,beaumont-,hamel had held out for some hours4 ,tanks had been called upon to assist1 and two of them had advanced along the road to ,beaumont-,hamel2 just about the time that they reached the village the remainder of the ,german garrison capitulated4 ,between ,beaumont-,hamel and the river ,ancre a considerable body of ,germans were holding out in the enemy front and support trenches2 although troops of the #fcrd ,division had reached the outskirts of ,beaucourt well in the rear of this body of men1 they continued to hold out throughout the day4 ,tanks were again called upon to deal with this situation4 ,they reached the position the next morning1 being led up by a trench mortar officer of the ,division concerned4 ,one ,tank succeeded in crossing the very large ,german front trench1 but1 unfortunately1 became stuck soon afterwards2 the second ,tank came to grief just before it reached the enemy front trench4 ,it appeared that a deadlock had again been reached1 and the crews of the ,tanks were in a precarious position4 ,on examining the ground about them the ,officer ,commanding the leading ,tank 7which incidentally was leading no longer1 since it was stuck and all too stationary7 noticed that the whole area appeared to be shimmering with white4 ,on opening the front flap of the ,tank and obtaining a better view1 it was seen that all the ,german garrison1 some #djj in number1 appeared to have found something white to wave in token of surrender2 those who could not produce anything better were waving lumps of chalk about or bits of board or rifle-stocks which they had rapidly chalked white4 ,the situation was rather an embarrassing one for so small a number as the crew of ,two ,tanks to deal with2 fortunately1 however1 it was possible by signs1 and with the assistance of the infantry1 to #8mop up' these #djj prisoners before they realised that both the ,tanks were stuck and out of action4 8,some of the worst of the ground was now in our line1 and an effort was made to get the ,tanks through this bad zone in order that they might continue to attack in the neighbourhood of ,beaucourt4 ,efforts were made to prepare a track for the ,tanks by means of a considerable digging party1 but when the ,tanks reached the very broken ground just north of the ,ancre1 they became one after another firmly stuck2 with enormous efforts they were dug out1 and succeeded in getting a few yards further1 only to stick again4 ,it was heart-breaking work1 which would undoubtedly have been rendered far easier if the ,tanks had then had the unditching beams which were only introduced some time later4 8,finally1 on the evening of the #agth1 only one ,tank had succeeded in getting through this bad zone and reaching the comparatively good ground beyond4 ,the crew1 to whom great credit is due1 had already been working continuously for some days and night1 and were not only exhausted1 but had had no time to carry out any reconnaissance of the position which was to be attacked at dawn the next day4 ,there being1 however1 only one ,tank1 made it of greater importance than ever that it should be made the most of4 ,it was decided that it should be used against the very strong position known as the ,triangle1 which was a redoubt on the high ground1 roughly midway between ,beaumont-,hamel and ,beaucourt4 ,the ground about this redoubt was1 unfortunately1 also very heavily shelled1 and a frontal approach with the infantry was impossible1 and it was necessary for the ,tank to go in on the flank while the infantry attacked the position frontally4 ,it was realised that the first necessity was that the ,tank should reach this redoubt as rapidly as possible1 and during the night a route was taped slightly beyond our front line and directing the ,tank straight for the ,triangle4 ,the weather was now much colder1 and the frost rendered the ground less hopelessly outside the capacity of the ,tank4 8,just before dawn1 however1 a fresh difficulty arose1 and tried still further the already severely tried expedition4 ,it began to snow1 and the white tape which was to guide the ,tank was obliterated40 ,captain ,hotblack 7now ,major1 ,d4,s4,o41 ,m4,c471 the ,reconnaissance ,officer who had done the taping1 was the only man who had reconnoitred this piece of ground1 and he immediately volunteered to lead the ,tank upon which so much depended4 ,taking what little cover he could in shell-holes full of ice and water1 he walked in front of the ,tank past our front line close up to the ,triangle4 ,marvellously enough1 not one among the hail of bullets which greeted him and the ,tank found its mark4 ,having succeeded in this arduous enterprise and having guided the machine to its position1 he returned to report on the progress of the action4 ,the light was now improving1 and the ,tank started its 8rolling up0 movement along the ,german trenches4 ,the machine was now so much in the midst of the enemy that the ,german artillery did not dare to open upon it1 and the ,tank poured in a devastating fire from its machine-guns not only upon the men in the trenches1 but also upon some horse transport behind the enemy lines4 ,but1 meanwhile1 the infantry was hung up in another part of the field1 and the ,tank was urgently needed4 ,at that time signal communication to the ,tanks was very imperfect1 and there seemed no way of letting the ,tank ,commander know of the new development4 ,again ,major ,hotblack came forward and again he crossed the fire-swept zone undeterred4 ,he reached the ,tank and piloted it back behind our lines1 where a renewed attack was planned4 ,but before the tired crew could be sent out again1 the wind changed and it began to thaw4 ,the ground over which the ,tank had passed with difficulty when it was hard became impassable1 and the project was abandoned4 ,it was for this remarkable piece of work that ,major ,hotblack was awarded his ,d4,s4,o4 ,the incident naturally had far-reaching results4 ,an inspiring deed1 especially if it be one demanding skill as well as courage1 will influence and 8set the tone0 of a new unit or a new branch of an old service4 ,it is far more effectual than the most convincing arguments as to the necessity for a high standard of conduct and of competence4 ,much of the subsequent efficiency of the ,reconnaissance ,branch of the ,tank ,corps may be traced to this incident4 ,reconnaissance took its proper place1 it was recognised as a fighting service1 and its work was seen to be a necessary preliminary to every action4 ,of the total of about ten ,tanks engaged in other small actions which took place at this period1 hardly one machine had satisfactory records to look back upon4 ,on ,november #ah ended the ,tanks' first short campaign4 ,if it did not close in a blaze of glory1 at least it had been sufficiently successful for the authorities to decided not upon doubling but on quadrupling their establishment4 ,,chapter ,v ,,winter ,,training1 ,,expansion ,,and ,,readjustments ,i ,though plans for expansion and the complete reorganisation of the unit on a large scale had been begun directly after the results of the action of ,september #ae were known1 little of the actual work of training could be started till the end of ,november1 when the 8veteran0 ,tank personnel were at last available as instructors4 ,they were1 as we have said1 withdrawn on ,november #ai and moved to the ,bermicourt area1 which had been already prepared for them4 ,they were the leaven--less than one 8old0 ,company to each new ,battalion--who must impart their knowledge and experience to the new men4 ,a subaltern who had seen any fighting with the ,tanks would suddenly find himself regarded as the greatest living expert on some obscure technical point1 and the newly joined who had never seen a ,tank 8looked with awe upon these battle-tried warriors40 ,men and officers were allowed to volunteer for the ,tank ,corps from other units either in ,france or at home4 ,the notion of fighting in a ,tank was popular1 for on many of the men of the old arms--especially the infantry--the ordinary battle routine had--to put it conservatively--begun to pall4 ,therefore1 there was no difficulty as to supplies of men whenever the authorities turned the tap4 #ae8,we came from the infantry1 from the cavalry1 from the artillery1 from the ,machine ,gun ,corps1 the ,motor ,machine ,gun ,corps1 the ,flying ,corps1 the ,army ,service ,corps1 and even from the ,navy40 ,at first each individual wore the dress of his original unit1 so that there was a strange collection of uniforms at ,bermicourt--,scottish bonnets and kilts1 riding breeches1 and bandoleers1 every conceivable dress1 even to naval blue4 #ae8,the spirit of adventure called us to the ,tanks 444 and so the call for volunteers found us ready1 and when the word of acceptance came1 our hearts beat quickly and our hopes were high 444 some of us were selected because we were machine-gunners1 and others because we were motor drivers4 ,but there were many of us to whom the machine-gun and the motor were incomprehensible things4 ,but in the end we did not find this lack of knowledge any handicap2 for the ,army authorities1 who were wiser than we1 knew that to men of average intelligence these things were easy to learn2 and to our very great amazement we found that a week was all that was necessary thoroughly to master any machine-gun 444 and that it only took us two weeks to grasp the principle of the internal combustion engine and the mechanism of the ,tank40 ,at ,bermicourt and at ,wool the deficiencies of the old ,thetford training were realised4 ,the experience gained on the ,somme had been assimilated4 ,instructors now knew exactly what they must teach1 and this time the spirit of the course of training was definite and businesslike4 ,the whole scheme was most carefully planned to ensure a proper balance1 and the right amount of time was allotted to the different courses4 ,at first the work consisted chiefly in the training of more instructors1 for the expansion of the ,corps was to be rapid4 ,the 8settings0 of all the courses showed great advances on the ,thetford model1 for at last the practice grounds could be made to resemble the actuality4 ,there were old trenches and shell and mine craters1 and the men were at once taken over bad ground1 until the conditions of this curious progress became things of custom4 #af8,there is not one of us who will ever forget his first ride--the crawling in at the sides1 the discovery that the height did not permit a man of medium stature to stand erect1 the sudden starting of the engine1 the roar of it all when the throttle opened1 the jolt forward1 and the sliding through the mud that followed1 until at last we came to the #8jump' which had been prepared4 ,then came the downward motion1 which suddenly threw us off our feet and caused us to stretch trusting hands toward the nearest object--usually1 at first1 a hot pipe through which the water from the cylinder jackets flowed to the radiator4 ,so1 down and down and down1 the throttle almost closed1 the engine just #8ticking over1' until at last the bottom was reached1 and as the power was turned full on1 the ,tank raised herself to the incline1 like a ship rising on a wave1 and we were all jolted the other way1 only to clutch again frantically for things which were hot and burned1 until at last1 with a swing over the top1 we gained level ground4 ,and in that moment we discovered that the trenches and the mud and the rain and the shells and the daily curse of bully beef had not killed everything within1 for there came to us a thrill of happiness in that we were to sail over stranger seas than man had ever crossed1 and set out on a great adventure40 ,the necessity of regularising and systematising the ,reconnaissance ,branch had not been forgotten1 and a separate ,reconnaissance ,service--really a specially adapted branch of 8,intelligence0--was set up1 under ,major ,hotblack4 ,the first organised work of the ,branch was to be done in the preparations for the ,battle of ,arras1 and it is at that period that we shall see the tentative beginnings of the very special system which was later on developed4 ,for the present 8,reconnaissance0 spent its time lecturing and being lectured1 and in preparing maps or training areas for theoretical or practical exercises in the new art of ,tank warfare4 ,,ii ,by ,february #aiag1 when individual courses came to an end and unit training began1 the ,h4,b4,m4,g4,c4 was about #ijjj strong4 ,warmed by the sun of official approval1 and watered with a kindly dew of ,memoranda and official 8definitions10 ,companies had budded into ,battalions and later ,battalions were to burgeon into ,brigades4 ,even by this early date the authorities had decided that ultimately three ,brigades of three ,battalions each should be formed4 ,each ,battalion was to be equipped with seventy-two machines and to consist of four fighting sections1 a ,headquarters ,section and a ,battalion ,workshop1 besides that curious collection of miscellaneous individuals1 tailors1 barbers1 shoemakers and clerks1 which is necessary in every unit4 ,general ,elles was to command in ,france1 and took over on ,september #bi with the rank of ,colonel4 ,his 8charter0 was as follows3 8,the ,headquarters in ,france is to command the ,heavy ,branch ,m4,g4,c4 in the field1 to be responsible for the advanced training and for the ,tactical employment of the ,corps under the command of the ,c4-in-,c40 ,he was also to have a large ,central ,depot and ,repairing ,shop in his charge4 ,in ,england there was to be a ,headquarters directly under the ,war ,office and which was to administer the ,corps as a whole4 ,the home ,headquarters was to be responsible for the provision of men1 for supplies of 8technical material10 the preliminary training of units1 and the maintenance of units in ,france as regards men1 machines1 material and spare parts4 ,the experienced reader will perceive in this system of dual control a very promising sowing of dragon's teeth4 ,no one who has had an inside knowledge of the growth of any unit or of any institution whatsoever during the ,war will be surprised at the fact that the ,tank ,corps did not escape the common lot4 ,it suffered from growing pains4 ,is there a new ,ministry1 a new ,hospital1 a new ,factory1 a new ,battalion1 nay1 a single new ,committee1 the tiniest ,association of ,allotment ,holders1 the smallest ,village ,ladies' ,work ,depot1 that did not8 ,among such organisations there are but two categories--those who have the candour to acknowledge that they went through such a period1 and those who still dare not trust themselves to allude to it4 ,perhaps if we consider the examples that come within our own experience1 we shall find that the stronger and more vital the new unit1 the more capable and full of character the men who moved it1 the more marked was that initial stage of uncomfortable adolescence4 ,the settling down1 before responsibilities and prerogatives had been properly paired and allotted to the right individuals4 ,the time when one department was still irritable from overwork and another exasperated by not being given enough responsibility4 ,we have all of us known such a time1 and most of us now look back upon its very real miseries with a kind of mingled wonder and amusement4 ,not otherwise do the pioneers of the ,tanks look back upon their awkward age4 ,as soon as the programme of expansion had been decided upon#ag the question of how ,tank production could be increased became an exceedingly important one4 ,owing to the inevitable loss in battle1 and still more to the unfortunate defects of the type of the track roller then supplied1 there were not enough ,tanks even for the training scheme proposed for ,france1 where there were in ,december #aiaf only sixteen machines in working order4 ,the needs of the big training centre which was setting up at ,wool could not at present be met at all1 and the accumulation of any adequate reserve of fighting ,tanks was1 for the moment1 impossible4 ,the ,mechanical ,warfare ,supply ,department was now responsible for ,tank production1 and they had the task of arranging for the building of the #ajjj ,tanks which had been sanctioned on ,september #bi4 ,in ,november the ,m4,w4,s4 ,department made an unofficial forecast of the probable rate of production4 ,this forecast they confirmed officially on ,february #a4 ,the total output of ,tanks was to be roughly as follows3 #aiag ,january #ej ,february #ej ,march #abj ,april #abj ,may #adj ,june #bjj ,july #bdj ,august #bfj ,september #bhj ,of these1 after ,march at least eighty per month were to be of the ,mark ,,iv4 type1 of which1 with the ,mark ,,iv4a1 there was to be a total of over #ajjj4 ,in ,august or ,september1 a proportion of the output was to be of the greatly improved ,mark ,v4 type4 ,actually at the end of ,march only sixty ,tanks could be scraped together for the ,battle of ,arras1 and most of these were machines that had been repaired after the ,somme4 ,not a single ,mark ,,iv4 machine arrived in ,france until ,april #bb1 after the ,battle of ,arras had been fought and won1 and no ,mark ,v4 machines until ,march #bc1 #aiah4 ,the entire programme was1 in short1 many months late4 ,the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 were1 however1 not altogether blameable for the occasionally somewhat astonishing discrepancy between their promises and performance4 ,it is1 in fact1 related for the defence that even the airy promises had their purpose--that the very discrepancies which the ,fighting ,side viewed aghast were deliberately created by the wily ,m4,w4,s4,d4 as bogies with which to scare supine manufacturers or reluctant ,government ,departments4 8,what60 the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 would say4 8,you can't do better than that6 ,but look what we've actually promised6 ,and just see what sort of names our partners the ,fighting ,side are calling us already6 ,you must do better40 ,a duly enraged ,fighting ,side must have made an unsurpassable ,jorkins4 ,in any case1 however1 it was usually only the ,m4,w4,s4,d4's promises which could even be called in question4 ,considering the means at their disposal and the difficulties which surrounded them1 their practical efforts were praiseworthy4 ,their troubles came chiefly from three sources4 ,some of the difficulties from each were inevitable1 and some were not4 ,first there were the physical difficulties of manufacture4 ,the shortage both of labour and material was acute1 and at the period with which we are now concerned1 ,tanks came low in the ,ministry of ,munitions' priority list4 ,shells1 guns1 aeroplanes and even transport lorries all took precedence of ,tanks4 ,a second difficulty was the habit which the ,authorities had of blowing alternately hot and cold1 according as ,tanks momentarily did well or ill in the field4 ,this resulted in a tendency towards a see-saw of alternate periods of slackness and overwhelming hurry in the factories4 ,tradition relates that ,sir ,albert ,stern 7the ,director-,general of the ,m4,w4,s4,d47 here played a most useful part4 ,he used his whole influence to maintain a steady output1 acting1 in fact1 as a kind of stabiliser4 ,the third set of difficulties came from the ,m4,w4,s4,d4's own ,tank designers1 and from technical experts of the ,fighting ,side in ,france4 ,both constantly asked for small alterations in design4 ,often these alterations were necessary2 frequently they were more or less frivolous even when they came from what might be considered the best source1 that is1 from those who fought the ,tanks4 ,if the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 was sometimes accused of adopting an academic attitude towards the results of the 8acid test0 of battle1 it may as truly be said of the ,fighting ,side that they often underrated the difficulties and problems of manufacture and failed to appreciate how often quality could only be obtained by a disproportionate sacrifice of quantity4 ,,iii ,about the end of ,december #aiaf1 when the dual control of ,tank affairs had been working for nearly three months1 it became obvious that the system was not one that would easily stand the strain of active operations4 ,the ,tank ,corps had outgrown it1 and the shoe would soon begin to pinch4 ,general ,elles thus summarised the position in his report of ,december #ca3 8,in ,france4 ,the fighting organisation is under a junior officer who faute de mieux has become responsible for initiating all important questions of policy1 design1 organisation and personnel through ,g4,h4,q41 ,france1 and thence through five different branches at the ,war ,office4 8,in ,england4 ,administrative and training organisation are under a senior officer1 located #acj miles from the ,war ,office1 with a junior ,staff ,officer 7,staff-,captain7 in ,london to deal with the five branches above mentioned4 8,the system is working now because ,headquarters in ,france have been free from the questions of operations for most of the last six weeks1 and have1 therefore1 been in a position to deal imperfectly and at a distance with the larger aspects of the whole matter4 8,this will not be possible when operations become a more pressing obligation1 as they are now doing4 8,then1 this duty must devolve either on the five ,war ,office branches1 not one of which1 ,i submit with all respect1 can have any comprehensive grip of the subject1 or on the ,g4,o4,c41 ,administrative ,centre1 who is out of continued personal touch either with the ,war ,office or the requirements in this country1 and is1 moreover1 debarred by his charter from really having any control or direction except at the instance of his ,junior4 8,in actual fact1 the ,director-,general of ,mechanical ,warfare ,supply1 an official of the ,ministry of ,munitions1 at the head of a very energetic body1 becomes the head of the whole organisation4 ,this officer1 owing to his lack of military knowledge1 requires and desires guidance1 which none of the five departments at the ,war ,office can1 and which the ,g4,o4,c41 ,administrative ,centre1 is not in a position to1 give him4 8,in effect the tail in ,france is trying to wag a very distant and headless dog in ,england4 ,we have had one check already in the matter of the increased weight of ,mark ,,iv4 which it is possible may have serious results as regards transportation4 8,in view of the inevitable expansion and great possibilities of this arm of the ,service1 ,i wish to urge most strongly that a ,directorate 7however small to begin with7 be formed at the ,war ,office on the lines of the ,directorate of ,aeronautics4 ,its functions to be to study possibilities of development1 to watch design and supply1 to co-ordinate training and administer the ,corps as a whole4 ,the officer in charge to be a senior officer1 free to travel and empowered to issue definite instructions and decisions as to requirements to the ,ministry of ,munitions40 ,as a result of this remonstrance1 ,general ,capper was appointed to the ,war ,office1 and the first ,tank ,committee was set up in the following ,may4 ,this ,committee was commissioned 8to systematise and strengthen liaison between the ,army and the ,ministry of ,munitions40 ,but when we consider the list of its members we do not find a single representative of the still drooping 8tail40#ah ,however1 the appointment of the ,committee proved to be a step in the right direction1 and an improvement began to be felt immediately4 ,officers of the ,tank ,corps now took charge of the final running trials of all ,tanks4 ,the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 submitted their designs to the ,committee1 and in several other small particulars the control exercised by the ,military side was increased4 ,but in ,august the ,committee was rent asunder4 ,a ,memorandum was submitted by the two military members1 calling attention to the long and serious delays that were still occurring in the preparation of new kinds of ,tanks1 after the execution of the designs had been approved by the ,tank ,committee4 ,the delays1 it stated1 were largely due to the absence of direct intercourse between the ,committee as a body and the actual designer1 and they recommended that the designer should be ex officio a member of the ,committee4 ,sir ,albert ,stern and ,sir ,eustace ,tennyson d',eyncourt dissented strongly from this ,memorandum--we are not told upon what grounds--and in ,october a new ,tank ,committee was formed4 ,at last--upon this new ,committee--the 8tail0 was fully represented1 and the ,committee met fortnightly alternately in ,france and in ,england1 so keeping in touch with both factors in its work4 ,a satisfactory organisation seems1 in fact1 to have been found1 and the interests of all the departments involved in manufacturing and fighting these complex machines seem at last to have been adequately represented4 ,after ,october difficulties appear to have been halved4 ,but this happier era did not dawn till after the ,battle of ,arras had been won1 and the long misery of the ,flemish campaign had somehow been endured4 ,meanwhile1 as far as ,tank control was concerned1 things went on much as before4 ,the reader is to imagine that just such 8growing pains0 and just such difficulties1 correspondences and memoranda filled in the background for the next six months1 while the fighting at ,arras1 at ,messines and in ,flanders1 whose story we are about to relate1 was in progress4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,the ,,battles ,,of ,,arras ,,and ,,bullecourt ,i ,the ,reconnaissance ,officers were the first of the ,junior personnel to learn that operations were contemplated for early ,april1 and that the new battle was to be fought before the town of ,arras on the banks of the river ,scarpe4 ,by the beginning of ,march1 the first small parties of ,battalion and ,company ,reconnaissance ,officers had begun to leave ,bermicourt4 ,it was rumoured that this offensive was going to be the blooding of the #ast ,brigade2 it was to be on a much larger scale than any the ,tanks had taken part in on the ,somme4 ,it was said that sixty machines would be thrown in in one action4 ,the ,tanks were going to have an opportunity of making a name for themselves1 and of justifying all the embarrassingly pleasant things that the newspapers had said of them in the previous ,september4 ,for this lavish praise had spread a gloom over the ,tank ,corps2 they had been unmercifully twitted by unfeeling gunners and infantrymen who knew the real facts4 ,the newspapers had succeeded in making their intercourse with any but battalions fresh from ,england one unbearable round of facile jest4 ,never had any unit1 save1 perhaps1 the ,london ,scottish1 been so unmercifully hailed as 8,mother's blue-eyed boy40 ,by ,march they lusted for blood1 and the first whispers of battle were listened to with a satisfied expectancy4 ,the new #ast ,brigade of the ,heavy ,branch ,machine ,gun ,corps was a very much more assured body than the little band of pioneers who had waited so anxiously for the dawn on ,september #ae1 #aiaf4 ,owing to delays in manufacture1 they were still only equipped with #fj ,mark ,i4 ,tanks instead of about #abj ,mark ,i4's and ,mark ,,iv4's1 as had been hoped4 ,still1 the ,march #aiag ,mark ,i4 was very different from the ,september #aiaf ,mark ,i4 ,the most striking improvement was the shedding of the cumbersome and ineffectual 8,tail0 or hydraulic stabiliser4 ,most of the machines had also undergone a most careful overhauling at the hands of the indefatigable vulcan1 at the ,battalion workshops1 and those innumerable tiny adjustments1 repairs and improvements which constitute 8tuning up0 had been made4 ,the machine-gun armament1 too1 had been modified1 the ,hotchkiss being replaced by the ,lewis gun4 ,a new contrivance for use on soft ground had also been fitted1 consisting of stout little cigar-shaped splinter-bars1 a yard or so in length1 attached to the track by means of chains4 ,but more particularly crews had had proper time to train and they knew that they knew their work4 ,their officers1 too1 were sure that they would this time be properly supplied with maps and detailed orders4 ,therefore1 officers and crews got on with their own battle preparations1 or1 later1 rehearsed the coming action with the infantry1 with a good heart4 ,,ii ,in the front line active preparations had begun4 ,the ,reconnaissance ,officers1 several of whom took up their quarters in the half-deserted town of ,arras1 had each had his area allotted to him1 and they were busy helping 8,q0 side to find suitable positions for the supply dumps1 for at this time there was no system of supply ,tanks4 ,every tin of petrol1 every round of ammunition1 had1 therefore1 to be carried by hand from the railhead1 and the task was one which took weeks to complete4 ,it was calculated that had supply ,tanks been available each machine would have saved a carrying party of #cjj men4 ,the real work of the ,reconnaissance ,officers1 however1 was to observe the enemy's lines and the country which lay beyond them4 ,much of this country1 even within our own lines1 was practically unknown to us1 as the greater part of the sector selected for attack had only just been 8uncovered0 by the sudden and unforeseen ,german retirement4 ,on this portion of the line the retirement had occurred about a month before the battle was due4 ,as in other parts of the line1 and as the enemy had intended1 the retirement had proved extremely embarrassing4 ,we had carefully selected a site for our battle1 and the chosen ground had been thoroughly studied4 ,the sudden change to a piece of imperfectly known country involved an enormous amount of extra photographing1 map-making1 sketching and reconnaissance generally4 ,this was merely troublesome2 more uncomfortable was the element of uncertainty which the retirement introduced4 ,would the enemy stand8 ,and1 if so1 where8 ,was there some trap being prepared for us8 ,it was uncanny1 for it was contrary to the tradition of more than two years of trench warfare4 ,the final scheme of the attack was1 however1 planned on the assumption that the enemy would give battle4 ,for he now held a line of great natural strength which he had improved with extraordinary skill and energy4 ,the scheme1 as it affected the ,tanks1 was shortly this4 ,the general object of the action was to achieve a rapid success4 ,that is1 to inflict a wound in the first twenty-four hours1 severe enough to force the enemy to bring up his reserves1 thus depleting his line near ,soissons and ,reims1 where the ,french offensive was to be launched immediately afterwards4 ,a proportion of ,tanks was allotted to each of the ,armies taking part4 #a4 ,with the ,first ,army 78,d0 ,battalion7 to the ,north3 ,eight ,tanks were to operate against ,vimy ,heights and the village and heights of ,thlus1 considered amongst the most formidable enemy positions in ,france4 ,tanks were to play a subsidiary part1 as the soil here was a soft heavy loam1 highly unfavourable to ,tanks4 #b4 ,with the ,third ,army 78,c0 ,battalion73 ,forty ,tanks were to operate1 some north1 some south of the river ,scarpe4 ,this sector contained several notorious strong points1 such as the ,harp and ,telegraph ,hill4 ,the ground here was hard and chalky and afforded good going for ,tanks1 though it was intersected by old trench lines and had been heavily crumped4 #c4 ,with the ,fifth ,army 78,d0 ,battalion73 ,twelve ,tanks were to operate in the region of ,lagnicourt4 ,here the ground conditions were bad4 ,the roads especially had been destroyed1 and it was found impossible to bring up sufficient artillery for a preliminary bombardment4 ,therefore1 on this sector ,tanks were to play a leading part1 preceding the infantry and largely replacing the barrage4 ,this action was not to be launched till about forty-eight hours after that on the other two sectors4 ,zero day was to be ,april #i1 and the attack was to be made at dawn4 ,,iii ,till the night before the battle the work of preparation had gone smoothly4 ,maps had been issued1 stores stood ready1 pack animals and limbers were at hand to form advanced dumps4 ,the ,reconnaissance ,officers had taken little parties of ,tank ,commanders to the best observation posts in their sectors1 and had there shown them the ground they must cross and expounded their maps to them4 ,all the ,tanks had been brought safely to their railheads and successfully detrained1 and now they lay waiting in their tankodromes4 8,c0 7afterwards ,no4 #c7 ,battalion lay in ,arras itself4 ,the town had been most carefully prepared for troops to assemble and wait in4 ,great chalk quarries underlay it1 and these had been linked up and lit with electricity1 and here two divisions could lie thirty feet underground secure from the heaviest shelling4 ,the ,tanks had chosen the ,citadel as their assembly place4 ,there in the great grassy ditch of the old ,vauban ,fort they lay1 nosing for cover into the re-entrant angles of the tall cliff of mellow brickwork that towered above them4 ,as soon as it was dark1 on the night of ,april #h-i1 the ,tanks set off on their journey up the line4 ,there had been a question as to the route which these ,tanks were to follow4 ,the alternatives were a long detour round the head of a shallow valley or a short cut over ground of questionable soundness4 ,the short cut had finally been decided upon1 and1 on the ,reconnaissance ,officer's report1 the ,battalion had applied for enough brushwood and sleepers to build a rough causeway4 ,owing to transport misunderstandings and difficulties1 only a very small proportion of this material arrived in time4 ,it was1 however1 decided still to chance the short cut4 ,brushwood had been laid in some of the worst places and the ground had a firm top4 ,it was thought probable that this would1 after all1 bear the weight of the ,tanks4 ,alas1 the hope was vain6 ,the smooth turf proved to be no more than a crust1 covering a veritable bog1 and it broke through when the column was about halfway across4 ,in the darkness six ,tanks floundered one after another into the morass4 ,the scene which followed is described by an officer who was present3 8,never shall ,i forget the scene at ,achicourt on the eve of the battle4 ,it was round about midnight when ,i got there and pitch dark save for the fitful light from the still burning village#ai near by and the flashes of the guns4 8,we had got word of #8trouble near the railway crossing1' and trouble indeed there was4 8,there1 sunk and wallowing in a bog of black mud1 were some half-dozen ,tanks--,tanks that should by then have been miles ahead and getting into their battle position for the attack at dawn4 8,instead1 here were the machines on which so much depended1 lying helpless and silent at all sorts of ominous angles1 and turned this way and that in their vain struggles to churn their way out of the morass4 8,about them were great weals and hummocks of mud and ragged holes brimming with black slime4 ,the crews1 sweating and filthy1 were staggering about and trying to help their machines out by digging away the soil from under their bellies and by thrusting planks and brushwood under their tracks4 ,now and again an engine would be started up and some half-submerged ,tank would heave its bulk up and out in unsteady floundering fashion1 little by little and in wrenching jerks as the engine was raced and the clutch released4 8,then the tracks of a sudden would cease biting and would rattle round ineffectively1 the ground would give way afresh on one side1 and the ,tank would slowly heave over and settle down again with a perilous list1 the black water awash in her lower sponson4 ,no lights could be shown on account of enemy observation1 and at any time he might reopen with his heavy artillery1 which had already been blasting the immediate neighbourhood earlier in the night4 8,altogether it was a desperate and discouraging business for those of us who knew that there were infantry already assembled for the morning's assault who had practised with us1 who looked to us for a lead across the ,german wire1 and who must now do as best they might without us40 ,in the event1 however1 it did not turn out as blackly as those at the ,achicourt slough had feared4 ,had the approach march of the ,tanks been run to time1 the column would almost certainly have come in for the blowing up of the ammunition dump at ,achicourt1 which was hit and exploded by a ,german shell soon after nightfall4 ,also1 the half-dozen ,tanks that were extricated from the bog too late to join in that morning's attack1 provided a small local reserve that later proved of the utmost value and had an appreciable effect on the course and ultimate issue of the battle4 ,the ruins of ,achicourt continued to smoulder through the night4 #bj8;,it had just been very badly shelled by the enemy4 ,two sides of the square were burned and blasted away 7it had been all right1 nearly1 when ,i passed through it a few days before74 ,the ruins still smoked and glowed1 and shadowy working parties shovelled rubbish into shell craters to make them passable for transport and cleared a way through the sorry wreck4 ,smashed limbers1 strings of dead mules1 burnt-out and buckled motor lorries1 transport wagons1 and the like1 all rather weird and depressing1 the red glow of some other conflagration as a background1 and this stabbed with the flicker of white light from our guns1 little and great--thousands of them 7actually71 a throbbing roar in the distance1 and fit to deafen you anywhere near4 ,the great thing is to go about with an open mouth4 ,it equalises the pressure on your ear-drums4 ,i am acquiring a permanent droop of the lower jaw4 ,anyway1 a discouraged1 shell-shaken sentry told me that one could not go through for the shells1 mostly our own1 exploding in the fire1 and refused to let me take the car in4 ,it did not look anything like as bad as he tried to make out--from the danger point of view--and indeed when ,i walked through there were the working parties stolidly filling up the craters by the light of the glowing ruins4 ,having fulfilled my mission1 ,i got back to report at ,brigade ,headquarters about #d a4m41 and then set out again at #d4cj to follow the battle and note and report the doings of our ,willies40 ,illustration3 ,a ,,derelict4 ,,valley ,,of ,,the ,,scarpe ,illustration3 ,a ,,burning ,,tank ,illustration3 8,,direct ,,hits0 ,illustration3 ,,bellied ,,on ,a ,,tree-,,stump ,,and ,,subsequently ,,hit ,,iv ,at about #c4cj a4m4 heavy rain had begun to fall1 and all day the armies fought amid intermittent storms of sleet and drenching rain4 #ba8,our bombardment was quite unimaginable--all that could possibly be desired1 ,i should think1 for accuracy1 evenness and intensity4 ,the final barrage was a really wonderful sight2 just at dawn the grey sky ablaze with star shells and coloured rockets all along the line1 nothing else to be seen4 8,then when it got a little lighter and the barrage had crept on1 we could see thousands of our men popping up from their barely visible #8assembly slits' in the ground and pouring up the slope in a slow-moving1 loose sort of crowd with no discernible formation1 and with and among them1 the ,tanks4 8,they had previously come up across an apparently deserted valley over the heads of our waiting infantry in their shelter trenches4 ,they appeared breasting the hill and disappeared over the brow together with the attacking waves of troops4 ,the enemy's shrapnel and high explosives that came back were almost laughable in comparison with what we put over them1 and our casualties were1 on the whole1 unusually light4 ,where ,i was watching was reported to be the hardest nut on the whole line4#bb 8,what with the barrage and the ,tanks the defence appears to have just collapsed1 and a few minutes and a few casualties gave us possession of a wonderful redoubt that the enemy had lavished extraordinary ingenuity and industry in preparing for many months past4 8,i saw it all from a hedge in a hillside about #ajjj yards away4 ,i had determined on the spot1 and1 as luck would have it1 ,i found when ,i got there that there was a half-finished observation post with a lovely little pit to jump down into if things got hot4 ,however1 there was no need to use it4 ,it was only getting into it that was rather exciting4 ,i got spattered with dbris time and again1 but by tacking1 waiting1 and using the country1 ,i got through without any real unpleasantness4 8,it's been a real thoroughgoing victory so far as we can see and hear--or rather hear1 for ,i only saw the first phase4 ,good old ,willies1 it's partly their victory1 too1 as all can see4 ,wonderful messages come in1 a dozen or more to the hour1 reports1 telegrams1 telephone messages1 kite balloons1 aeroplanes1 pigeon letters1 etc41 and nearly all good1 awfully good4 8#8,we have reached ,z4#bb4;,b4#fd and are going strong4' 8#8,have taken ,tilloy ,village4' 8#8,over #bjjj prisoners in our ,corps cages already1 including thirty officers and a ,battalion ,commander4' 8#8,nine hundred prisoners1 scared and starved1 moral rotten4' 8#8,have reached the ,blue ,line1' ,signed ,daphne1 #8,consolidated at ,y4#ac4;,c4#fh to #ae4;,d4 ,central1' only we don't consolidate1 we just hammer on line after line exactly to programme and as never before4 8#8,tanks seen zero plus #e hours #ae minutes in the 8,howitzer ,valley0 accompanied by infantry4 ,guns still in position1 gunners not4' 8,and so on2 and our blue cardboard slips representing infantry and little red flags1 denoting ,tanks1 march on and on and on40 ,partly owing to the weather conditions and partly because the sixty ,tanks were strung out along so wide a front1 ,tank ,commanders had been told to act more or less independently against the strong points which had been allotted to them4 ,once zero had struck1 therefore1 the history of the battle becomes1 from the ,tank point of view1 chiefly that of the exploits of individual machines4 ,the only exception is the history of the eight ,tanks operating with the ,canadians at ,vimy4 ,alas6 their story is easily summarised4 ,it had been originally decided that if the weather was wet no ,tanks were to operate on this sector at all1 as the condition of the ground was already exceptionally bad4 ,the eight were to be sent down to reinforce the #eth ,army where the going was good4 ,as luck would have it1 ,april #g and #h were fine1 and it was determined that the ,tanks should not be sent down1 but should go in on the ridge4 ,when a drenching rain set in two hours before zero it was too late to alter the plan of attack4 ,the result was as had been expected4 ,every ,tank without exception ditched or got stuck in ,no ,man's ,land or in the enemy front line4 ,therefore1 the ,tanks claim no share in the ,canadians' brilliant and historic taking of the ridge4 ,so great was the ,canadians' lan1 and so successful was our barrage1 that by the time the ,tanks were extricated there was happily no rle for them to play4 ,they were1 therefore1 withdrawn as quickly as possible1 and were1 after all1 sent down to reinforce the #eth ,army4 ,with the #crd ,army1 several ,tanks performed interesting exploits4 ,second ,lieutenant ,weber's ,tank1 8,lusitania10 for example1 spent an exciting and profitable two days4 ,this machine was some three hours late in starting owing to trouble with the secondary gear4 ,just as it was getting off1 word was brought that the infantry was held up4 ,the arrival of the ,tank effected an entire change in the situation1 and a machine-gun placed in a wood north of the railway having been silenced by the ,tank's #f-pounder fire1 it proceeded towards the ,blue ,line4 ,the infantry advanced at the same time1 and both reached the next enemy trench together4 ,the movement was carried out in such close alignment that the ,tank was prevented from making use of its guns and enfilading the trench1 but the ,germans1 unable to face the combined attack1 held up their hands and surrendered4 ,the ,tank then cruised along the railway towards ,fleury ,redoubt1 firing as it went with its #f-pounder and ,lewis guns4 ,the ,germans made haste to evacuate the ,redoubt1 and could be seen to take refuge in a dug-out close to a railway arch4 ,the ,tank drew on towards the arch1 firing in its progress at any object suggesting a machine-gun emplacement4 ,near the arch it found itself under our own barrage and also shelled by an anti-,tank gun4 ,it accordingly wheeled about1 reclimbed the slope it had just descended1 and signalled to the infantry to come on4 ,then1 returning to the arch1 it mounted guard while the infantry unearthed the ,germans who had taken refuge in the dug-out4 ,this point disposed of and a steep bank hindering further advance1 it was found necessary to take a southerly course to find a more possible place for climbing1 the engine having become badly overheated4 ,indeed1 so hot was it that the machine now jibbed at the easiest exit from the valley that could be found1 and there was nothing for it but to wait until the engine should cool down4 ,on the instant that the ,tank ,commander announced his decision to lie-up1 down dropped each man of the crew where he sat or stood1 overcome by heat and the cumulative exhaustion of days and nights of almost ceaseless preparation4 ,shells whined and droned overhead1 and would now and again pitch in the valley on this or that side of the ,tank1 throwing up a brown cascade of earth with a reverberating crash4 ,along the western bank of the valley were the excavated and concreted pits that had sheltered the enemy's guns for two and a half years4 ,from some the pieces had been withdrawn1 in others our fire had caught the gunners and their teams in the very act1 and the valley bottom was strewn with tragic heaps--guns1 limbers1 men and horses1 huddled together in shapeless tangles of brown and grey1 or tossed apart to lie singed and torn amongst the short grass and the shell-holes4 ,down near the railway arch through which the valley track led to the river ,scarpe1 one diminutive ,highlander had paraded a drove of some #bjj prisoners who had somehow come under his sole charge4 ,they were neatly lined up in fours1 each man with his hands above his head1 and as they drooped from weariness or fidgeted from fear of the shells that continued to fall haphazardly about them1 their small and solitary escort would flourish1 and more than flourish his bayonet4 ,up would go the #djj hands once more and the parade be restored to order4 ,not for nothing had one young ,scotsman been taught the value of discipline4 ,by the time the engine had cooled down1 the crew been roused1 and the far bank surmounted1 the infantry were well on their way to their objective4 ,dropping into third gear the ,tank gradually gained on them1 and its commander1 observing that they had entered the ,german trench1 swung half right and took a course through the barbed wire parallel to it4 ,on the flank of the #aeth ,division1 the trench was seen to be still in ,german hands4 ,the ,tank opened fire accordingly with #f-pounders and machine-guns1 doing what damage it could4 ,it caused a redoubt to be evacuated1 it searched out and caused two snipers to surrender1 and later in the evening1 in answer to an urgent request from a ,colonel of infantry1 it approached within fifty yards of a trench and silenced two out of four machine-guns4 ,then1 the already defective magneto giving out altogether and the ,tank being brought to a standstill1 it opened a heavy fire along the trench with ,lewis and #f-pounder guns4 ,having thus killed many ,germans1 and the engine refusing to restart1 the commander at #i4cj p4m4 decided to abandon the ,tank1 after a full twelve hours in action4 ,it had then been dark for some time1 and the ,germans had kept up a lively fire on the stranded ,tank with rifles and machine-guns1 taking aim at the chinks and loopholes through which the lights shone out in tell-tale beams4 ,for hour after hour1 those within had striven laboriously yet vainly to set their engines going1 and so to bring their ,tank safely back out of its gallant maiden action4 ,but nothing availed1 and1 the enemy fire becoming more intense and accurate1 the lights were switched off and the preparations for evacuation made in total darkness4 ,it was first necessary to find out where our own line lay and to warn our infantry that the crew would be coming in4 ,sergeant ,latham at once volunteered for this reconnaissance1 and crawled out of the ,tank into the lesser blackness of the night4 ,rifles spat and stray bullets cracked and whined impartially around1 and ,british and ,german rifles and bullets sound very much alike4 ,however1 partly by judgment and partly by luck1 ,sergeant ,latham stumbled into our own lines and warned the garrison of the trench to fire high as the crew from the derelict ,tank would soon be coming in4 ,it was as well that the sergeant succeeded in delivering his message1 as a relief had taken place under cover of the night1 and the new garrison had been told nothing of the ,tank out in front1 and would certainly have greeted the returning crew as enemy raiders4 ,next day1 having procured a new magneto1 the ,tank ,commander and some of his crew set out for their machine with better hope of salving her4 ,they were approaching the battle front when an agitated battery commander hailed them and sought information as to the ,tank out to his front4 ,hearing that it was a derelict that they were on their way to try to bring in1 he exclaimed1 8,thank ,god for that6 ,i've been blasting that part this morning4 ,i didn't know about the ,tank1 and ,i've just got a direct hit on it that's crumpled it up4 ,i feared it might have been manned40 ,so ended the short but valiant career of the avenging 8,lusitania40 ,for his very gallant command1 ,second ,lieutenant ,weber received an immediate award of the ,military ,cross1 and ,sergeant ,latham the ,military ,medal4 ,the specific action for which the latter was decorated is officially described as follows3 8#gfdda ,sgt4 ,f4 ,latham1 #8,c' ,batt41 awarded ,m4,m4 for conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty4 ,during the ,battle of ,arras on ,april #i1 #aiag1 whilst passing through a severe enemy barrage1 lengths of barbed wire were caught up by the tracks of his ,tank which pulled the camouflage cover over the exhaust openings1 and caused the whole mass to catch fire4 ,without waiting for orders ,sergeant ,latham climbed on top of the ,tank and removed the burning material4 ,later on this ,n4,c4,o4 displayed the greatest courage whilst attempting to dig out his ,tank under heavy fire40 ,another ,tank1 commanded by ,second ,lieutenant ,s4 ,s4 ,ching1 in this sector was late in starting1 and had barely caught up its infantry when it became ditched4 ,it held out1 however1 for no less than three days while the fighting eddied about it4 ,it made most active use of its #f-pounders1 thereby effectively protecting the right flank of its infantry4 ,another ,tank fell bodily into an old gun emplacement near ,neuville-,vitasse which had been carefully turfed over4 ,v ,,bullecourt ,by the night of the #ith the force of the first wave was spent1 and though1 as we have seen1 many units were continuously in action for the next three days1 for the bulk both of ,tanks and infantry ,april #aj was spent in consolidating positions or digging out and repairing ,tanks4 ,on ,april #aa the attack on ,bullecourt and two other lesser actions were fought4 ,one of the two minor attacks was that on ,monchy1 in which six ,tanks took part4 ,it was highly successful owing chiefly to the extremely gallant way in which the machines were fought4 ,the ,tanks took the village practically unassisted and held it for two hours till the infantry came up4 ,unfortunately1 there were no further supplies of ,tanks to exploit the success or more might have been achieved4 ,the second attack was made from ,neuville-,vitasse down the ,siegfried ,line4 ,four ,tanks took part and did great execution1 all the machines returning safely4 ,the stars in their courses seem to have fought against the success of the attack against ,bullecourt in which eleven ,tanks co-operated with the ,australians4 ,it will be remembered that the #eth ,army attack was not to be launched till some time after that in the other sectors4 ,also that the state of the roads was such that it was impossible to bring up enough artillery for a preliminary bombardment4 ,therefore the ,battle of ,bullecourt was to have been a first wave attack in which a small number of ,tanks were to play the lead4 ,the eleven ,tanks were to have advanced in line upon the ,siegfried defences east of ,bullecourt4 ,some were then to have wheeled west to attack ,bullecourt itself1 while others were to move east down the ,german trench system1 a third party pushing straight ahead to ,riencourt and ,hedecourt4 ,the attack was to have been made at dawn on ,april #aj1 and at nightfall on the #ith the ,tanks began their move up to their battle positions behind the railway embankment4 ,all day the weather had been cold and stormy1 and the ,tanks had not gone half a mile before a violent snow blizzard came on1 blotting out every landmark4 ,most of the troops who had moves to make that night were confounded in the swirling darkness1 and though the eleven ,tanks did not stray far1 their pace had to be reduced to a crawl and at dawn they were still far from their battle stations4 ,the ,australian infantry1 who had already assembled at the railway embankment1 had to be withdrawn under heavy shelling1 the whole attack postponed1 and the manner of it much modified4 ,all next night the snow fell4 ,when the attack did take place on the #aath1 it proved1 both for ,tanks and infantry1 a costly little failure4 ,the day dawned clear and against the whiteness of the snow every advancing ,tank and its broad double track1 stood out sharply4 ,further1 the ,australian infantry wading through the snow1 found the path made by the ,tanks irresistible and followed in long lines strung out along their tracks4 ,thus ,tanks and infantry provided the ,germans with the most perfect artillery targets imaginable4 ,of the eleven ,tanks1 nine were knocked out by direct hits before their work was half accomplished4 ,worst of all1 two ,tanks which1 with about #bjj ,australians1 pressed on nearly five miles to ,riencourt and ,hedecourt1 found their right unprotected owing to our failure to advance the other part of our line4 ,the ,germans organised a sweeping counter-attack1 and the two villages1 the infantry and the ,tanks1 were surrounded and taken4 #bc 8,the ,first ,battle of ,bullecourt was a minor disaster--the three brigades of infantry lost very heavily indeed--and the company of ,tanks had been apparently nothing but a broken reed4 8,for many months after1 the ,australians distrusted ,tanks--#8the ,tanks had failed them'--#8the ,tanks had let them down4'0 ,we shall see that it was not till after the ,battle of ,hamel that their confidence was restored4 ,not a single ,tank survived to rally after the battle4 ,but our worst loss was that of the two ,tanks which were 8taken alive10 for examination of the captured machines revealed to the enemy how effective a weapon was their armour-piercing bullet against the ,mark ,i4 ,after this action a ,german ,order was issued that every man should be provided with five rounds of the 8,k0 7armour-piercing7 ammunition1 and every machine-gun with several hundred4 ,as long as the ,mark ,i4 was used1 these bullets were to cause heavy casualties among ,tanks and their crews4 ,for the next ten days ,tanks were busy refitting4 ,by the #bjth thirty of the original sixty ,tanks were fit again for action1 and on ,april #bc eleven ,tanks were employed in two and threes to help on the infantry advance on the line of ,monchy-,rux-,gavrelle4 ,again the feature of the day was the fine individual work4 ,the story of a ,tank which worked opposite ,rux is told in the ,honours and ,awards ,list in the note on ,sergeant ,j4 ,noel's ,d4,c4,m43 8,during the battle of ,arras on ,april #bc this ,n4,c4,o4 took command of his ,tank after his officer had been wounded4 ,he fought his ,tank with the greatest gallantry and skill1 putting out of action many machine-guns and killing numbers of the enemy1 besides taking fifty prisoners4 ,his action enabled the infantry to gain possession of the ,chemical ,works4 ,he brought his ,tank back safely to its starting-point4 ,his skill and gallantry were beyond all praise4 ,he was continuously in action for nine hours40 ,this was the first time a ,tank was commanded in action by an ,n4,c4,o4 ,another pause followed the actions of the #bcrd4 ,of the sixty ,tanks which had gone in on the #ith1 not many machines remained that could soon be repaired4 ,however1 twelve ,tanks were somehow made 8battle-worthy10 and on ,may #c were sent in for the last time before the ,brigade was withdrawn to rest and to be re-equipped at ,wailly1 their new training ground4 ,a party of four operated between ,croisilles and ,st4 ,lger and became heavily engaged in a fight at close quarters against bombs and trench mortars4 ,the second group of eight ,tanks made another assault upon ,bullecourt4 ,though individuals did extremely well1 the attack was once more unsuccessful1 as1 though ,tanks reached their objective1 they were obliged to retire again4 ,no less than ten ,military ,medals and a ,d4,c4,m4 were awarded to men and ,n4,c4,o4's of the ,tanks who took part in this little action4 ,the ,germans had learnt their lesson1 and ,tanks and crews suffered heavily from armour-piercing bullets4 ,several of the decorations were given to drivers who had brought their ,tanks safely out of action when themselves severely wounded4 ,with this second attack on ,bullecourt ended1 as far as the ,tanks were concerned1 the ,battle of ,arras4 ,there were not many #ast ,brigade ,tanks to withdraw to ,wailly nor many unwounded men to man them4 ,it was1 however1 with feelings very different from those of the 8veterans0 of the ,somme that officers and men left the battle4 ,the careful training at ,bermicourt with its well-planned courses1 its boxing1 and its games was justified4 ,men and officers could not have displayed a finer fighting spirit4 ,the value of their work was recognised by all the units with whom they fought4 ,major-,general ,williams1 commanding the #cgth division1 wrote of 8,c0 ,battalion's work in the attack on ,monchy3 8,it was a great achievement1 and in itself more than justifies the existence of the ,tanks4 ,officers and men concerned deserve the highest credit40 ,lieut4-,general ,aylmer ,haldane1 commanding the #fth ,corps1 wrote to ,colonel ,baker-,carr1 commanding the #ast ,brigade1 on ,april #ac3 8444 ,i am really most grateful for all the ,tanks and their commanders have done1 and the great success of this ,corps is only attributable to the help you have given us4 ,this has been my first experience of the co-operation of ,tanks1 and ,i certainly never again want to be without them1 when so well commanded and led40 ,not only had the personnel done extraordinarily well1 their conduct being 8a triumph of moral over technical difficulties10 but on the whole the general work of the ,tanks had been a success4 ,these were briefly the technical lessons of the battle3 ,tanks should be used in masses4 ,they should be concentrated4 ,a large reserve should always be kept in hand4 ,mark ,i4 machines are not suitable for use on very wet or very heavily shelled ground4 ,signal and supply ,tanks are essential4 ,in fine1 the chief obstacle to a still fuller measure of success had been that there were #fj1 and not #bfj1 ,tanks available4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,messines ,,and ,,the 8,,hush0 ,,operation 8,and little would'st thou grudge them ,their greater depth of soul4 ,thy partners in the torch race1 ,though nearer to the goal40--,,ionica4 ,i ,in many battles in which ,tanks later took part1 two or more ,tank ,brigades would be associated4 ,but the ,battles of ,arras and ,messines belong1 the former to the #ast and the latter to the #bnd ,brigade exclusively4 ,the #bnd ,brigade had been formed exactly like the #ast4 ,that is to say1 a nucleus of ,somme 8,tank ,veterans0 had been reinforced by picked volunteers from the other branches of the ,service4 ,like the #ast ,brigade they trained in ,france1 in the ,bermicourt area4 ,the unknown author of the #bnd ,battalion history gives an amusing account of this training in which sports of all kinds1 rugger1 soccer1 snow fights1 boxing and swimming1 helped in the 8edification0 as well as the more serious courses4 ,one feature of the period was1 as usual1 a shortage of instructional machines4 ,dummy ,tanks were therefore used for several practice attacks4 ,the dummies were made of wood and canvas and were carried from within by their crew of seven4 8,they looked for all the world like some drab-coloured prehistoric monster with as many legs as a centipede4 ,a high wind blew during a certain #8action' in ,march1 and made things most difficult4 ,by the time the final objective was reached many of the ,tanks were in a state of collapse1 the torn canvas revealing the perspiring machinery to the amused gaze of the onlookers4 ,the remains of the ,tanks were1 however1 most useful for firewood and the renovation of beds40 ,the account goes on to relate the delightful keenness of the men1 and how their interest in their training was so great that such serious contretemps as getting in late for tea 8were regarded as nothing40 ,the #bnd ,brigade was to be equipped with ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks as soon as a supply was available4 ,the first batch of machines arrived in ,france towards the end of ,april4 ,the ,mark ,,iv4 ,tank was an improved ,mark ,i41 and did not differ very materially from its predecessor in design4 ,these were1 briefly1 the principal improvements3 ,first1 its armour was of a special steel which was impervious to the ,german armour-piercing bullet4 ,secondly1 the sponsons were of a better pattern4 ,in the ,mark ,i4 they had to be completely unshipped whenever the ,tank was moved by rail2 in the ,mark ,,iv4 they were so constructed that they could be 8pushed in0 sufficiently for railway transport4 ,thirdly1 a new and heavier design of track rollers and links was introduced4 ,fourthly1 danger from fire was reduced by the petrol tank 7protected1 of course1 by special armour-plates7 being outside and at the back of the machine4 ,there were also other minor improvements in armament1 and the total weight of the ,tank was slightly reduced4 ,such was the weapon which was to be first tried at ,messines1 and such was the unit which was at the same time to make its dbut4 ,,ii ,the ,battle of ,messines did not prove one in which ,tanks were able to show to any particular advantage2 this not because of adverse conditions1 but because of the battle's very success4 ,it was throughout an extremely well-planned little action1 and would probably have been perfectly successful even without the co-operation of ,tanks4 ,an expert military critic has said of it3 8,the ,battle of ,messines1 one of the shortest and best mounted limited operations of the ,war1 was in no sense a ,tank battle40 ,it was perhaps a little hard on the #bnd ,brigade1 who fought throughout with particular gallantry1 that more of the laurel could not fall to them4 ,for not only was the #bnd ,brigade's maiden battle notable for gallantry in the field1 but also for the very high standard of the ,staff work--the administrative arrangements indeed long remaining the model for subsequent ,tank operations4 ,so inspiring a little action was it1 so well planned and executed in every stage1 that the #bnd ,brigade themselves felt that they had been privileged in playing even a relatively minor part in such an assault4 ,though ,tanks proved useful in several phases of the battle1 ,tank ,commanders are the first to attribute the successes of the day to the artillery1 the tunnelling companies and the infantry4 ,they had early established particularly cordial relations with the infantry1 and it is said that a ,maori ,unit of the #bnd ,anzac ,corps gave expert help to the #bnd ,tank ,battalion in camouflaging its machines4 ,messines was to be a prelude to a more considerable attack in the ,ypres ,salient4 ,the village of ,messines itself and the ,wytschaete ,ridge were to be taken1 thus securing the ,british ,right for the ,ypres attack1 and depriving the enemy of dominating ground4 ,the advance was to be a very short one1 and the rle of the ,tanks was to be subsidiary to that of gunners1 sappers and infantry4 ,land ,mines were to be a special feature of the action4 ,the explosion of twenty of these containing over a million pounds of ammonal was to be the signal for attack on the morning of ,june #g4 ,some of the mines had been ready for more than a year1 and we had constructed nearly five miles of galleries4 ,the ,germans too had not been idle4 ,at the time of our attack we knew that the enemy was driving a gallery leading to our ,hill #fj mine4 ,by careful listening we judged that if our offensive were launched on the date arranged the enemy's counter-mine would just fail to reach us4 ,he was1 therefore1 allowed to proceed4 ,altogether seventy-two ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks were to be employed1 and1 the lesson of ,arras having been learnt1 twelve ,mark ,i4 and ,mark ,,ii4 ,tanks had been converted into supply machines4 ,each of these was able to bring up sufficient petrol1 ammunition and other stores to replenish five fighting ,tanks4 ,forty ,tanks were to cross the parapet at zero hour and the rest of the ,tanks were to be held in reserve4 ,they were to be distributed as follows3-- ,to the ,north3 twelve ,tanks were to work with the #ajth ,corps1 whose objective was the ,oosttaverne line4 ,in the ,centre3 sixteen ,tanks were attached to the #ith ,corps1 who were to capture ,wytschaete4 ,to the ,south3 twenty ,tanks were to fight with the #bnd ,corps1 who were to take ,messines and a strong point named ,fanny's ,farm1 the reserves pushing on to capture the ,oosttaverne line in the second phase of the attack4 ,the weather had been fine and hot for nearly three weeks before the battle1 and a heavy thunder shower which fell on ,june #f hardly laid the dust which had hung for weeks in a hazy curtain over the approach roads4 ,the ,tanks were as usual moved up during the night before the action4 ,it was very dark1 with heavy thunder clouds hiding the moon4 #bd8,the last part of the approach march will never be forgotten by those who took part in it4 8,the enemy took it into his head to bombard with lachrymatory and other gas shells1 and the night was so black that it was impossible to keep gas-masks on the whole time4 8,so with streaming eyes1 with no sort of light1 with ,tank ,commanders and drivers coughing and spluttering1 the ,tanks forged ahead over this area of unseen trenches1 barbed wire and shell-holes1 the men buoyed up by the knowledge of the shock the ,hun would receive in an hour or so40 ,zero hour was to be at dawn4 ,somewhere north of ,wytschaete a ,german dump had caught fire1 and the red flames streamed up against the pale summer sky4 ,it grew lighter1 and our aeroplanes and balloons began to go up1 dark against the dawn4 ,our unusual activity in the air did not escape the watchful enemy1 and his suspicions were soon thoroughly aroused4 ,he began to send up rockets calling for barrage fire1 and soon his guns were responding with growing emphasis4 ,at seven minutes past three our artillery stopped1 and the rattle of machine-guns stood out in the comparative silence4 ,there was a pause4 ,a low rumbling was heard4 ,the earth rocked and quivered until with a prolonged and rending crash a screen of fire rose where the ,german front lines had been4 ,masses of earth were hurled skywards1 and as they rose gleamed for a moment purple and gold in the first rays of the sun4 ,they writhed and shifted1 fantastically swaying1 and shot through with flames4 ,balls of fire were hurled in every direction1 and the air quivered and vibrated with the shock4 ,before the tortured earth could fall again1 down came the stunning roar and crash of the ,british barrage2 and ,tanks and infantry were over the parapet4 ,by #g a4m4 the ,anzacs were in ,messines1 and both ,tanks and infantry had reached ,fanny's ,farm by noon1 their day's objective gained4 ,one ,tank working with the #bnd ,corps reached its final objective 7at a distance of about two miles7 in an hour and forty minutes4 ,a ,tank led the ,ulstermen and the ,southern ,irish of the #ith ,division into ,wytschaete4 ,by about three o'clock three ,tanks had reached ,oosttaverne1 and they patrolled the ground beyond the village till their accompanying ,welsh and ,west ,country troops came up4 ,by nightfall we held our final objective everywhere1 and had besides captured #gcjj prisoners and #fg guns1 #id trench mortars and a very large number of machine-guns4 ,all through the night of the #gth-#hth the ,germans launched small hastily organised counter-attacks1 and in repelling one of these1 chance enabled three ,tanks to play a curious and useful part4 ,three of the ,tanks1 which had helped in the capture of ,oosttaverne1 had ultimately got ditched near a place named ,joye ,farm4 ,it was impossible to extricate them in the darkness1 and the crews stood by1 hoping to get them out as soon as it was light again4 ,meanwhile towards morning word came that the ,germans were going to counter-attack4 ,in the position in which the ,tanks lay1 the crews were able to train their #f-pounders against the enemy1 who had been seen massing in the ,wanbeke ,valley4 ,as the ,lewis guns could not be brought to bear1 they were dismounted1 and the rest of the crews operated them from neighbouring shell-holes4 #be8,word was sent to the infantry to warn them of the coming attack1 and to ask for co-operation4 ,they replied that they had run short of ammunition for their ,lewis gun1 and some was supplied to them from the ,tanks40 ,the attack did not develop as early as had been expected1 but when it came it was in force4 ,from about #f4cj onwards the enemy repeatedly attempted to advance1 raking the ,tanks with a hail of armour-piercing bullets1 which1 however1 failed to penetrate4 ,they were driven off every time with heavy loss1 until at #aa4cj a4m4 our artillery opened and dispersed them with barrage fire4 ,,iii ,the failure of their armour-piercing bullets against the ,mark ,,iv4 must have proved something of a disappointment to the enemy4 ,it is curious to trace the effort which the ,germans made to keep up with our development of the ,tank4 ,for once1 we had moved first1 and the enemy was always to be a lap behind4 ,no sooner had he discovered how effective was his 8,k0 bullet against the ,mark ,i4 ,tank1 than we confronted him with the ,mark ,,iv41 against which it was powerless4 ,the ,germans always had rather hazy ideas as to the capabilities and habits of our current ,tank4 ,they had had ample opportunity of examining two ,tanks which lay derelict in their lines on the ,somme1 yet until the ,battle of ,arras they believed that ,tanks were largely dependent on the use of roads1 and that therefore pits and other obstacles in roads must form a useful anti-,tank defence4 #bf8;,it was also not till the later stages of the ,battle of ,arras that the enemy realised from some captured ,tanks near ,bullecourt that the #8,k' bullet was effective against the type of ,tank that had been in use against them since ,september #aiaf4 8,by the time the enemy had fully realised this1 however1 the old ,tanks were used up1 and at ,messines the ,mark ,,iv4 had made its appearance and the chance of the armour-piercing bullet was over4444 8,after ,messines the ,germans began to realise the importance of artillery as a defence against ,tanks1 and #8the chief rle allotted to the infantry was to keep its head' and leave the rest to the guns4444 8,prominence was given to indirect fire#bg of guns of both heavy and light calibres on approaching ,tanks4 ,in spite of several dawn attacks the enemy laid great stress on what he called #8,distant ,defence1' and a few special anti-,tank guns1 about two per divisional front1 were placed in specially covered positions40 ,it was not till the ,battle of ,cambrai in ,november #aiag that he was to discover by chance the one effective weapon against ,tanks4 ,that is to say1 ,direct ,fire by field guns4 ,,the 8,,hush0 ,,operation ,i ,before it was decided to fight the enemy at ,messines there had been an idea of an attack near ,lens1 and most of the reconnaissance for such a battle had been carried out4 ,like many another battle of the ,war1 it was never fought1 and remained only the shadow of an operation4 ,of all these shadows and projected attacks1 the one which had attracted more interest than any other was in active preparation while the #bnd ,brigade was fighting at ,messines4 ,this was the revised and abridged version of the famous 8,hush0 operation1 that is1 of the projected attack on the ,belgian coast4 ,the first time such a notion had been suggested was in the spring of #aiaf1 and elaborate plans were then made for a surprise landing in and near ,ostend4 ,but we were obliged to co-operate with the ,french1 and to fight instead on the ,somme4 ,the ,first ,battle of the ,somme1 however1 developed into a 8slogging match0 and lasted through the rest of that campaigning season4 ,next year the idea was again brought up4 ,this time ,tanks were to take part4 ,the scheme was a less ambitious one1 and the landing was to be effected between ,ostend and the ,allied line about ,nieuport4 ,a special detachment of ,tanks was located at ,erin1 and started training for the difficult manuvre of climbing the sea wall which here protects the coast4 ,this training was carried out as secretly as possible1 and it was given out that its object was the surmounting of some of the ,lille fortifications1 a figment which for long satisfied the minds of the curious4 ,the problem to be solved was an exceedingly complex one4 ,the mere landing of ,tanks on an open beach is no light matter4 ,when that beach is heavily defended by an alert and resourceful enemy1 when it is commanded and enfiladed by a concentration of artillery of all calibres concealed amongst the dunes1 and when in addition the shelving beach is crowned by a steep sea wall of concrete1 a landing would seem to have but small chance of success4 ,still1 there was a chance1 and the stake at hazard being a big one1 big risks might be cheerfully accepted4 ,the general plans for the enterprise having been approved in the highest quarters1 were then very carefully worked out down to the smallest details by a little band of experts1 prominent amongst whom were ,admiral ,bacon1 ,lieut4-,colonel ,philip ,johnson1 and ,major ,hotblack4 ,the whole of the projected landing was elaborately staged1 and long and patiently rehearsed--the ,tanks playing the lead in what the whole various cast hoped was to be a really notable success4 ,immense pontoons #fjj ft4 in length were specially built to carry the landing parties--armies in little with representatives almost of every arm and branch except the cavalry4 ,these strange craft were to be lashed between a couple of monitors1 and so pushed across the channel and up the beach at certain selected points1 points that exhaustive air reconnaissance and photography at all states of the tide had indicated as most suitable4 ,actual trials of the pontoons and their monitor escorts were made in the secret waters of the ,thames1 and officers of the ,tank ,corps would suddenly disappear on unknown missions1 to reappear as suddenly with no memory as to where they had been or what they had seen in the interval4 ,the sea wall itself might well have been designed as a special defence against sea-borne hostile ,tanks1 its smooth concave face and projecting coping making it absolutely unscalable by an honest ,tank4 ,the wall was of recent construction1 and by a fortunate chance the ,belgian architect who had designed it had escaped to ,france with all his drawings4 ,from his plans an exact reproduction of a length of the wall was made4 ,there in the experimental ground it stood1 perfectly smooth1 and worst of all1 ending at the top in a curl-over coping4 ,at least1 however1 the engineers now knew the extent of their problem4 ,in the first place1 the ,tanks had to get up somehow1 and in the second place1 when they were up they had to help haul up guns and transport lorries4 ,after 8trying on0 various devices1 the ,tanks at last adopted what was practically a portable ramp for the occasion4 ,the ,tank1 until it reached the sea wall1 carried it well in the air on a long spar supported by wire hawsers4 ,then the ramp was lowered on to the pair of little wheels with which it was fitted4 ,on these the ,tank pushed it up the incline1 wheelbarrow fashion1 until further progress was stopped by the coping4 ,the two wheels were then immediately shed1 and steel spikes on the under side of the work were driven into the concrete by the weight of the ,tank1 which now1 disengaging itself1 proceeded to climb up its own scaling ladder which it had thus placed in position4 ,but the lorries and guns had still to be provided for4 ,the angle formed by the inclined plane and the level ground above the retaining wall was a sharp one4 ,besides1 it must be understood that the inclined plane used by the ,tanks fitted in under the concrete lip4 ,at the point of junction between the ground and the inclined plane there was1 therefore1 a considerable bump4 ,both the acuteness of the angle and this 8bump0 made it necessary to adopt some less back-breaking device for the four-wheeled vehicles4 ,a strong gangway1 like a see-saw1 was therefore employed1 and up this they were hauled1 the weight of the gun or lorry gently tipping the board down when it passed the balancing point4 ,but the landing was never made1 and for this many elaborate explanations have been put forward4 ,two circumstances seem1 however1 sufficient to explain the apparent withdrawal of our hands from the plough4 ,the first was what seemed a trivial attack which the ,germans made on ,july #aj4 ,it will be remembered that the ,belgian inundations stretched inland opposite ,nieuport1 almost from the mile-wide belt of dry ground next the sea which was formed by the sand dunes4 ,through these dunes cut the river ,yser1 and near the coast we held both banks of the river4 ,when the time came1 ,general ,rawlinson could have moved his troops forward freely over the numerous bridges which had been made1 to join hands with the landing party for whom he had so long been waiting4 ,in the dune and polder country trenches were impossible1 and our defence here consisted of breastworks built in the sand4 ,now it had been abundantly and constantly proved throughout #aiae and #aiaf that any advanced trench system could be taken at any time by the side which was prepared to mass sufficient troops and guns for the purpose4 ,the ,germans could have stretched out their hands at any moment for this bit of coast4 ,they chose not to grasp it until they imagined that our plans1 whatever they might be1 were complete1 and when their attack would probably cause us the maximum of inconvenience4 ,therefore1 it was on ,july #aj that1 after a tremendous bombardment1 they attacked the position in overwhelming force4 ,our defence was gallant but vain1 and by the evening the ,germans had captured the northern part of our bridgeheads4 ,it is true that we succeeded in holding ,nieuport itself1 but the loss of even the small strip of ground to the north of it rendered the assembly of troops in that area for our own attack1 which was to co-operate with the coast landing1 almost impossible4 ,the second and more weighty circumstance was the fatal slowness of our main advance at ,ypres4 ,in the next chapters we shall consider these tragic months1 whose slow passage swept away so many schemes and hopes1 and made unfruitful so much thought and labour4 ,enough that the 8,hush0 operation was swept silently away with the rest4 ,as late as the beginning of ,october1 however1 the men who had planned so cunningly1 whose minds had surmounted so many difficulties1 still hoped that their work might not prove barren4 ,but by the middle of the month it had become clear that the landing could not take place1 and the end of ,october the special ,tank detachment was finally disbanded4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,flanders ,,campaign--,,preparations ,,for ,,the ,,third ,,battle ,,of ,,ypres ,the ,third ,battle of ,ypres represented the remaining fragment of what was to have been a great and extensive campaign4 ,it was the stump of a tree shorn down to shoulder height and bare of leaves and branches4 ,one circumstance after another had postponed the execution of the large design4 ,troops which had been earmarked for it had had to be diverted to other parts of the front4 ,we had had to put it off to co-operate more closely with the ,french1 and certain other obstacles had arisen1 the full story of which has not even yet been told4 ,the ,battle of ,messines was over by ,june #ab1 but it was considered that if an attack in the strongly fortified ,ypres ,salient was to have a real chance of success1 it must be an attack in force1 a regular full-dress battle1 for which the preparations were then held to be necessarily extremely elaborate4 ,about six weeks were therefore to elapse before the attack was launched4 ,once launched1 however1 the attackers must gain their objectives rapidly4 ,that was essential to the plan4 ,the ,russian front was crumbling4 ,germany was bringing troops and guns westward4 ,we should soon be face to face with an enemy so strongly reinforced that our chance of victory in an attack would be slight4 #bh8;,it was in some degree a race against time4 ,if a true strategic purpose was to be effected before winter1 the first stages must be quickly passed4 ,the high ground east of the ,salient must be won in a fortnight1 to enable the ,british to move against the ,german bases in ,west ,flanders and clear the coastline40 ,not only must we hasten because we faced an enemy whose strength would be increasing daily1 but because we were to attack in ,flanders1 and the summer would be far spent before we could complete our preparations4 ,the enemy's lines lay on the slopes of the semicircle of low hills that overlook ,ypres4 ,behind him lay another swampy valley1 which rose again to another slightly higher crescent of hills4 ,in the inner arena lay the ruins of ,ypres1 and1 set in the marshy levels and immediately overlooked by the first semicircle of hillocks and more distantly by the second1 lay our lines4 #bi8,the territory lying within the crescent was practically all reclaimed swamp land including ,ypres and as far back as to ,st4 ,omer1 both of which1 a few hundred years ago1 were seaports4 ,all agriculture in this area depended on careful drainage1 the water being carried away in innumerable dykes4 ,so important was the maintenance of this drainage system considered1 that in normal times a ,belgian farmer who allowed his dykes to fall into disrepair was heavily fined40 ,across this terrain two great armies had faced each other for nearly three years4 ,the ,salient was1 after ,verdun1 the most tortured of the ,western battlefields4 ,constant shelling of the low ground west of the ridges had blocked or diverted the streams and the natural drainage1 and turned it into a sodden wilderness4 ,if ,august was a wet month1 as it had been the year before for the ,battle of the ,somme1 our chance of success was scanty4 #cj8,much rain would make a morass of the ,salient where ,tanks could not be used1 transport could scarcely move1 and troops would be exposed to the last degree of misery40 ,however1 the previous shelling of the ground was as nothing compared with the bombardment which we now intended to inflict4 ,every corner of the enemy's ground was to be drenched with our fire4 #ca8,the present battle was to be preceded by the longest bombardment ever carried out by the ,british ,army1 eight days' counter-battery work 7begun on ,july #g7 being followed by sixteen days' intense bombardment4 ,the effect of this cannonade was to destroy the drainage system and to produce water in the shell-holes formed1 even before the rain fell40 ,,ii ,the enemy had for long been in no doubt of our intentions4 ,the coming battle was much discussed in ,germany4 ,general von ,armin 7,commander of the ,german #dth ,army7 was to remain strictly on the defensive4 ,he was to 8put in time10 to 8poke10 in fact1 until the big movement of troops from the ,east should have thoroughly reconstituted the ,western ,front4 ,we were to be allowed to waste our time and our forces in petty gains of unimportant territory1 and to eat our hearts out in the slough4 ,to this end1 and because the waterlogged soil of ,flanders did not allow of the making of another ,siegfried ,line1 the enemy had devised a new tactical method4 ,directly the theory of this method is understood1 many of the once puzzling circumstances of this battle become comprehensible4 ,it involved the use of but one comparatively new contrivance1 the 8pill-box40 ,the 8pill-box10 first seen at ,messines1 was a small concrete fort4 ,sometimes it only stood up a yard or two above the ground4 ,more often it stood well up1 concealed within the ruins of a derelict farm4 ,it held a garrison of anything up to thirty or forty men1 and bristled with machine-guns4 ,the tactics themselves in which the pill-boxes figured are admirably described by ,mr4 ,buchan3 8,the enemy's plan was to hold his first line--which was often a mere string of shell-craters linked by a trench--with a few men1 who would fall back before an assault4 ,he had his guns well behind1 so that they should not be captured in the first rush1 and would be available for a barrage when his opponents were entangled in the #8pill-box' zone4 ,finally1 he had his reserves in the second line1 ready for the counterstroke before the assault could secure the ground won4444 ,any attack would be allowed to make some advance2 but if the ,german plan worked well1 this advance would be short-lived1 and would be dearly paid for4 ,instead of the cast-iron front of the ,siegfried area1 the ,flanders line would be highly elastic1 but would spring back into position after pressure with a deadly rebound40 ,the thoroughness and success with which this plan was carried out may be read in the story of ,glencorse ,wood1 of ,st4 ,julien1 and of many another bitterly fought 8,minor ,action40 ,in the meantime1 the enemy watched us from his vantage ground1 and day and night harassed us with his shelling1 his aerial bombing1 and his gas4 ,,iii ,on our side the preparations for a formidable attack continued steadily4 #cb8,the various problems inseparable from the mounting of a great offensive1 the improvement and construction of roads and railways1 the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommodation for troops1 the formation of dumps1 the digging of dug-outs1 subways and trenches1 and the assembling and registering of guns1 had all to be met and overcome in the new theatre of battle1 under conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage4 8,on no previous occasion1 not excepting the attack on the ,messines-,wytschaete ,ridge1 had the whole of the ground from which we had to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy's observation4 ,even after the enemy had been driven from the ,messines-,wytschaete ,ridge1 he still possessed excellent direct observations over the ,salient from the east and south-east1 as well as from the ,pilckem ,ridge to the north4 ,nothing existed at ,ypres to correspond with the vast caves and cellars which proved of such value in the days prior to the ,arras battle1 and the provision of shelter for the troops presented a very serious problem40 ,it was a problem which in some sectors proved insoluble1 and troops and working parties had to come up night by night into the forward area1 going back far behind the lines at dawn4 ,like their fellows of every other arm1 members of the ,tank ,corps carried out their battle preparations under conditions of peculiar difficulty4 ,but the #ast ,brigade of ,tanks had something more than indiscriminate harassing fire and 8area shoots0 to trouble them4 ,the enemy had obtained information of our tankodrome in ,oosthoek ,wood from a ,british prisoner1 who was either a garrulous fool or a very treacherous knave4 ,a soldier belonging to a certain infantry regiment1 had betrayed every detail of the whereabouts of the ,tanks of the #ast ,brigade1 and of the programme of their movements4 ,a ,german document was captured setting forth the whole of this creature's evidence and explaining its value and significance4 ,the official account of this murderous piece of treachery was periodically read out on parade to all ,tank units1 and formed the text of many discourses on the vital importance of strict secrecy and high moral4 ,the name of this man will for ever have a sinister sound for all who served in the ,tank ,corps4 ,fortunately for us1 the ,germans seem to have but half believed his story--at any rate1 the shelling to which they thereafter periodically subjected the secret tankodrome was1 though accurate1 never so heavy as such an important target would have seemed to warrant4 ,perhaps the ,germans1 having no illusions as to what fighting in ,flanders meant1 and being reasonably alive to the natural limitations of ,tanks1 scouted the idea of a ,tank attack being possible or being even seriously contemplated4 ,be that as it may1 they certainly failed to act on the very valuable information given them in anything like an adequate way4 ,still1 after some days of well-directed shelling and bombing1 it was decided to withdraw the whole of the personnel from ,oosthoek ,wood1 and to lodge them in camps in the plantations just north of ,chteau ,lovie1 where the ,headquarters of the #ast ,brigade was already established4 ,hither1 too1 had come the ,advanced ,headquarters of the ,tank ,corps1 the original intention of occupying a most eligible house in the town of ,poperinghe being given up1 in view of the inconvenience caused by the periodic shelling of the place and the consequent interruption of communications4 ,the advance ,reconnaissance party had spent some weeks in the town1 and had been considerably annoyed by frequent and accurate high-velocity shelling4 ,the concentration of personnel which thus came about seemed inconvenient enough at first1 but turned out most usefully1 and liaison between the ,brigade and its battalions had never been so good4 ,there were forward dumps to be established with the aid of the supply ,tanks4#cc ,very special preparations had to be made in order to bring the ,tanks within striking distance of the enemy4 ,the roads were reserved for lighter traffic4 ,the enemy shelling was too heavy for railway making to be possible beyond the detraining camps at ,oosthoek ,wood4 ,tentative attempts to push the line further on were constantly made1 and as constantly detected and discouraged by the enemy4 ,the ,tanks must have some sort of independent routes of their own over the innumerable small waterways that must be crossed4 ,the ,kemmelbeke1 the ,lambardtheke1 and in some places the ,yser ,canal1 all lay in the way4 ,miles of rough causeways over the marshes had to be built2 splinter-proof shelters for the various advanced ,headquarters1 and1 further back1 camps1 ,tank 8stables10 storage sheds1 kitchens and so forth1 had all to be constructed4 ,such a programme of work was beyond the unaided power of the ,tank ,corps1 and therefore the #ahdth ,tunnelling ,company was allotted to the ,corps1 one section to each ,brigade4 ,much of the canal bridging and of the track making was done under fire1 shrapnel1 gas and ,h4,e4 ,often a series of shells1 bursting on the newly laid causeway would undo a day's work in a few minutes4 ,half the time the men had to wear gas-masks1 and almost always they worked knee-deep in liquid mud or in the oozy bed of some little 8beke40 ,yet in no instance did the #ahdth ,tunnelling ,company fail to carry out the work allotted to it4 ,one very ingenious piece of mechanism for use on the ,tank itself had been evolved at ,central ,workshops in view of the ,flanders mud4 ,this was the 8,unditching ,beam40 ,it was a massive baulk of teak1 iron shod at the ends1 and having heavy chains whereby it might be secured to the tracks when it was needed4 ,its length was somewhat greater than the width of the ,tank over its tracks1 and therefore ordinarily it was carried lengthwise along the back of the machine4 ,its battle position was across the ,tank1 where it rested on the raised guide-rails which served to lift it clear of the conning-tower1 the silencer and the other excrescences above the armoured back4 ,to these guide-rails it was secured by special holdfasts to prevent it from breaking adrift when the ,tank pitched or rolled amongst the shell-holes4 ,when the ,tank got 8bellied10 these holdfasts had to be released and the drag-chains attached to the tracks by one of the crew climbing out on to the roof--the feat being one of some danger when in the near presence of the enemy4 ,the beam having been duly attached1 the differential gear would be locked and the clutch released1 when the revolving tracks would carry the beam over the nose of the ,tank1 from which it would dangle by its two track-chains until dragged beneath the ,tank itself4 ,if the ground proved loose and boggy beyond a certain point1 the beam would merely be dragged under the ,tank to come up again behind1 clogged and dripping with mud and leaving the 8ditched0 ,tank still wallowing on its belly4 ,sometimes ,tanks would thrash away with their unditching beams until their vain efforts to struggle out of some quaking quagmire on to better ground overheated the engines or caused the machine to settle down so hopelessly in the oozing mud as to be flooded out4 ,save on the very worst ground1 however1 the unditching beam proved a most effective contrivance1 and but little could have been done in the ,ypres fighting without it4 ,illustration3 ,a ,,flanders ,,pill-,,box ,illustration3 ,,the ,,unditching ,,beam ,,in ,,action ,illustration3 ,,the ,,steenbeck ,,valley ,,before ,,the ,,battle ,illustration3 ,,the ,,steenbeck ,,valley ,,after ,,bombardment ,,iv ,the ,reconnaissance ,side had also been busy during the weeks of preparation4 ,to facilitate the movement of ,tanks over the battlefield a new system was made use of1 by which a list of compass bearings from well-defined points to a number of features in the enemy's territory was prepared1 thus enabling direction to be picked up4 ,this system was to prove invaluable when1 later1 the tides of battle had obliterated all the nearer landmarks1 and men wandered hopelessly lost in the increasing desolation4 ,the ,reconnaissance ,officers' methods of observation did not differ from those they had employed at ,arras4 ,they used artillery ,o4,p4's1 they flew over the enemy lines1 a 8supply of prisoners0 for special examination was allotted to them1 they talked to refugees1 they observed1 made and annotated maps1 and drew many panoramas1 and made detailed raised maps in plasticine4 ,by early ,july they had collected a great mass of information that was not only vitally important to the ,tank ,corps1 but also of great use to the other arms4 ,very carefully constructed from information collected from all sources1 a huge sand model was laid out by the #aith ,corps in ,oosthoek ,wood4 ,every hillock or depression1 every road1 railway1 trench1 stream1 ruin1 spinney1 or other landmark1 was faithfully reproduced to scale4 ,the miniature trenches were formed in lengths of cast concrete1 the trees were represented by little evergreen bushes1 and real water lay in the pools and shallows of the ,lilliputian ,steenbeek4 ,the model covered nearly an acre--a man to the same scale would have been about the size of a normal mouse4 ,at one side of the model was a high wooden platform raised on a scaffolding and reached by a ladder1 and from this point of vantage this ,ypres ,salient in little could be overlooked and memorised as from a kite balloon4 ,for several weeks before the day appointed for the battle1 the platform was almost constantly occupied by groups of officers4 ,indeed1 it was seldom unoccupied during daylight from the time it was erected to the eve of the great attack1 and round and across the model perpetually wandered little groups of officers and ,n4,c4,o4's with maps and notebooks and orders--discussing1 pointing1 explaining4 ,generals personally conducted their immediate subordinates over the mimic battlefield1 whilst ,n4,c4,o4's were coached by their ,company ,commanders4 ,from a liaison point of view the model was invaluable4 ,individual ,tank ,commanders there met the infantry officers with whom they were actually to fight1 and would walk and talk over 8the ground0 together1 until they were perfectly clear about their own and each other's rles1 routes1 objectives and time-tables1 after which mutual esteem and confidence would be cemented and reinforced at the dinner table4 ,in this and similar ways a close and cordial entente was established between the ,tanks and their partners the infantry1 and there were many battlefield incidents that showed vividly how much success depended on this personal liaison and good fellowship4 ,v ,there was to be nothing novel in our general plan of assault4 #cd 8,the #eth ,army attack was to be carried out on well-recognised lines2 namely1 a lengthy artillery preparation followed by an infantry attack on a large scale and infantry exploitation until resistance became severe1 when the advance would be halted and a further organised attack prepared on the same scale4 ,this methodical progression was to be continued until the exhaustion of the ,german reserves and moral created a situation which would enable a complete break through to be effected40 ,tanks were everywhere to be auxiliary1 and were to be employed to deal with strong points and for 8mopping up0 behind the infantry4 ,there was1 however1 one great improvement in the method of using them4 ,they were to be used in definite 8waves40 ,that is to say1 supposing thirty-six ,tanks were to be employed on a sector where the ,germans had established the usual three lines of defence1 twelve ,tanks would start at zero and be used to take the first objective4 ,meanwhile1 the second wave would have been advancing1 and as soon as the first objective had been taken by the first wave1 the second wave would pass through them and on to the second objective4 ,the third party of twelve would advance in the same way--a wave to each objective4 ,the method did not1 as a matter of fact1 have a good trial on this occasion1 for1 in the first place1 the ,tanks' first objective was only the infantry second objective2 and as we have seen1 the enemy did not this time employ his usual method of three set lines at all4 ,altogether three ,brigades of ,tanks were to be employed with the #eth ,army4 ,tank ,brigade ,commanders were to keep in touch with ,corps ,commanders1 ,tank ,battalions were to act with ,divisions1 ,tank ,companies 7twelve fighting ,tanks7 with ,brigades1 and individual ,tanks with ,battalions4 ,the three ,brigades were to be distributed as follows3-- ,a4 #bnd ,corps 7consisting of the #bdth1 #cjth1 #ahth1 #hth and #beth ,divisions74 #bnd ,tank ,brigade 78,a0 and 8,b0 ,battalions74 #gb ,tanks to be allotted as follows3-- #ast ,objective #af #bnd 0 #bd #crd 0 #bd ,the remainder to be held in reserve4 ,the main objective was to be the ,broodseinde ,ridge4 ,the ground in this area was broken by swamps and woods2 only three approaches were possible for ,tanks1 and these formed dangerous defiles4 ,b4 #aith ,corps 7consisting of the #aeth1 #eeth1 #afth and #cfth ,divisions74 #crd ,tank ,brigade 78,c0 and 8,f0 ,battalions74 #gb ,tanks to be arranged as follows3-- #ast ,objective #bd #bnd 0 #bd ,reserve #bd ,the main objective was to be a section of the ,gheluvelt-,langemarck line4 ,on the #aith ,corps front the valley of the ,steenbeek was in a terrible condition1 innumerable shell-holes and pools of water existed1 the drainage of the ,steenbeek having been seriously affected by the shelling4 ,c4 #ahth ,corps 7consisting of the #cith1 #east1 #aath and #dhth ,divisions74 #ast ,tank ,brigade 78,d0 and 8,g0 ,battalions74 #cf ,tanks to be allotted thus3-- #ast ,objective #ab #bnd 0 #ab ,corps ,reserve #ab ,they were to seize the crossings of the ,steenbeek and establish posts beyond it4 ,on the #ahth ,corps front the ground between our front line and ,steenbeek was cut up and sodden4 ,the ,steenbeek itself was a difficult obstacle1 and the only good crossing was at ,st4 ,julien1 thus forming a dangerous defile4 ,thirty-six ,tanks belonging to the #ast ,brigade were held in ,army ,reserve4 ,such was the battle order of the ,tanks4 ,zero was fixed for #c4cj a4m4 on ,july #ca4 ,by the last week in ,july misty weather with often a drizzle of rain at night had set in4 ,our preparations were complete1 but it was perhaps not without a certain anxiety that our commanders awaited the issues of the engagement4 ,by none might such an uneasiness have been felt with better reason than by ,general ,elles4 ,the ,army had staked much upon a gamble1 but at least it had not been forced to stake its prestige4 ,general ,elles must have been conscious that the very existence of the ,tank ,corps might hang upon the fortunes of the coming attack4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,the ,,third ,,battle ,,of ,,ypres 8,quenched in a boggy ,syrtis1 neither sea ,nor good dry land--nigh foundered1 on he fares1 ,treading the crude consistence2 half on foot40 ,paradise ,lost4 ,the night of ,july #cj was dark and wet1 and towards morning a fine mizzling rain blurred the outlines of the star shells that lit up the lines4 ,along fifteen miles of front the ,english and ,german guns had roared against each other all night4 ,the waiting men shivered in their wet assembly trenches4 ,about three o'clock on the morning of the #cast there was a lull in the firing4 ,a low soaking blanket of ,scotch mist had crept up and lay heavily enfolding the opposing armies4 ,zero hour was drawing near4 ,all along the front1 men were feeling for the little footholds above the fire-step4 ,at #c4ej the streaming darkness was rent along the seven miles of attack4 ,thermite and blazing oil flared out1 and such a barrage as had not yet been crashed upon the enemy's line1 and infantry and ,tanks scrambled and lurched in the darkness in and out of shell-holes over the torn and slimy ground4 ,the ,german front line fell at once along the whole seven miles4 ,until nearly eight o'clock men and ,tanks could hardly get through the mud fast enough to come to grips with the enemy4 ,on each ,corps front there were many machines that got ditched on the enemy front line as they nosed about here and there1 seeking to mop up lurking machine-gun nests and snipers4 ,there some of them remained stuck fast1 not having seen the main body of the enemy at all1 so immediate had been his retreat4 ,his artillery was1 however1 active enough1 and as the ,tanks floundered or stuck utterly in the mud1 his guns and his low-flying aeroplanes took steady toll4 ,all morning we pressed on1 the enemy ,command patiently conserving the power of its armies4 ,the doings of a group of ,tanks belonging to the #crd ,brigade give an extraordinarily good idea of this part of the action4 ,they were fighting on the #aith ,corps front4 #ce8;,at #aa4cj a4m4 message was received that a ,battalion of ,argyll and ,sutherland ,highlanders were held up on the right4 ,tank #8,canada' moved in this direction and silenced enemy machine-guns in the ,railway ,embankment1 assisted by the ,tank #8,cuidich'n ,rich4' ,when patrolling in front of the infantry whilst they were consolidating1 ,tank bellied4 8,at the same time enemy barrage came down1 and both ,tank #8,canada' and ,tank #8,cuidich'n ,rich' received direct hits4 ,five of the crew remained with the infantry1 and assisted in repelling a counter-attack1 two of the men being wounded4 8444 ,tank #8,cape ,colony' arrived at ,low ,farm and proceeded in front of the infantry4 ,came under heavy shell-fire and bellied4 ,whilst unditching1 ,tanks #8,cyprus' and #8,culloden' were observed under heavy fire from anti-,tank guns1 which were in position on the high ground beyond4 ,both #8,cyprus' and #8,culloden' were seen to be hit4 8#8,cape ,colony' then came under heavy ,m4,g4 fire from both flanks4 ,on request of infantry #8,cape ,colony' proceeded to a wood on right flank1 where they were held up4 8,although not fired upon from the ,tank1 several enemy machine-gunners surrendered to the infantry1 on seeing the ,tank approach4 #8,cape ,colony' now turned ,n4,e4 towards ,beck ,house1 where a good view of anti-,tank guns1 which had been shelling #8,cyprus' and #8,culloden1' was obtained4 ,whilst manuvring to take these guns in flank or rear1 the ,tank sank in a swamp1 water rising to the engine cover4 ,boche aeroplanes circled low overhead whilst unsuccessful attempts were made to unditch4 ,enemy shelling then became very heavy1 so ,lewis guns were taken out and ,tank locked up4 8444 ,flag ,tank #8,cumbrae' was delayed half an hour by bellying in a trench near ,bill ,cottage1 went in front of the infantry towards second objective4 ,opened fire on enemy who were disappearing in direction of ,delva ,farm4 ,ground was quite water-logged1 and ,tank bellied in a borrow pit4 ,whilst digging out was fired at by a sniper1 and by an aeroplane flying low overhead4 ,time was then zero plus #i hours 7i4e41 #ab4ej p4m474 8444 ,tank #8,caithness' came under sniper and machine-gun fire near ,beck ,house4 ,no bullets penetrated armour-plating4 ,proceeded in company with ,tank #8,carstairs1' which silenced enemy ,m4,g4 fire4 ,cameron ,highlanders then advanced1 and ,tank followed1 bellied near ,zonnebeke ,stream4 ,mud was up to floor level and door of sponson was pushed off its hinges4 ,enemy aeroplane circled overhead1 and fired on them whilst attempting to unditch4 ,eventually ,tank #8,carstairs' came to the rescue1 and ,tank was got clear4 8444 ,tank #8,culloden' had her unditching gear carried away by barbed wire near ,hill ,cottage4 ,unditching beam was recovered1 but again broke lose1 until secured with rope4 ,just west of ,frost ,house shell burst under front of ,tank4 ,whilst crossing light railway half-way between ,frost ,house and ,square ,farm1 a second shell hit roof door and killed one gunner4 ,tank stopped1 and it was found petrol pressure pipe was cut4 ,time #i4ae a4m4 ,a third shell struck behind right sponson4 ,crew were withdrawn from ,tank1 and took up a position in shell-holes near ,square ,farm4 ,tank was still being shelled1 undoubtedly by an anti-,tank gun1 about ten shells being fired at it in five minutes1 six of which hit the ,tank4 8,tank #8,cyprus' was then seen to be hit by the same anti-,tank gun4 ,at #aj4ae a4m4 survivors of ,tanks #8,culloden' and #8,cyprus1' together with undamaged ,lewis guns1 withdrew to ,battalion ,rallying ,point1 after pigeon messages had been despatched reporting the situation4 8444 ,tank #8,carstairs' arrived at ,black ,line near ,beck ,house1 but infantry had not then arrived4 8,tank soon bellied in boggy ground1 but was unditched successfully4 ,just west of ,borry ,farm ,tank #8,caithness' was found badly bellied1 and with unditching gear lost4 8,having been informed by #fth ,cameron ,highlanders that the second objective had been captured1 ,tank #8,carstairs' hitched on to ,tank #8,caithness' and towed it out4 ,enemy shell-fire was extremely heavy1 and an aeroplane flew over1 firing at crew with machine-guns during the operation4 8,instructions were then received to return to ,battalion ,rallying ,point40 ,another very gallant action was fought by a ,tank crew also belonging to this ,battalion4 ,they started the battle in a ,tank named 8,ca' ,canny0 under command of ,lieutenant ,h4 ,p4 ,m4 ,jones1 who was killed near ,wilde ,wood4 ,the crew carried on under command of ,corporal ,jenkins until about #aa p4m41 when the ,tank 8bellied0 hopelessly4 ,corporal ,jenkins withdrew his ,lewis guns and crew1 and1 placing some of them on the top of the ,tank and some on the ground1 kept up an effective fire on the enemy1 who were then attempting a small counter-attack4 ,he then transferred his men to another ,tank1 8,clyde10 whose crew had all been wounded4 ,they fought this ,tank for a further two hours1 but at about three o'clock 8,clyde10 too1 stuck in the mud and proved inextricable4 ,he and his crew then returned on foot to their ,battalion ,rallying ,point4 ,with the #ahth ,corps1 the #ast ,brigade ,tanks were on several occasions signalled for by fairly distant parties of infantry1 who proceeded to 8set0 them at strong points that were giving trouble4 ,this system worked extremely well1 and had a particularly impressive moral effect on the enemy4 ,several occasions are recorded on which enemy garrisons did not wait for the ,tank which had been thus 8whistled up0 to get near enough to fire1 but surrendered as soon as they saw it coming4 ,our advance had continued for about ten hours1 that is1 till nearly three in the afternoon1 when our enterprise seemed to have succeeded4 ,as early as nine in the morning we held the whole of our second objective north of ,westhoek4 ,by the afternoon we had entered ,st4 ,julien1 ,frezenberg and the ,pommern ,redoubt1 and had taken the crossings of the ,steenbeek and ,stirling ,castle4 ,glencorse ,wood and ,inverness ,copse had proved more difficult1 but even here we held a footing on the ridge4 ,we had 8riven the oak10 we were now to feel the force of the rebound4 ,that afternoon in a downpour of rain the enemy counter-attacked along the fronts of all three ,corps4 ,there was a fierce struggle1 in which in many instances ,tanks were able to do a good deal of execution4 ,we were shelled out of ,st4 ,julien4 ,north of it we withdrew to the line of the ,steenbeek1 and we were obliged to fall back from all but the western outskirts of ,westhoek4 ,all afternoon we slowly lost ground1 yet when night fell we could still boast a battle well begun4 ,it was1 after all1 never meant to be a one-day attack1 and to-morrow we should start well4 ,we had everywhere taken and held our first objective1 that is1 the low muddy ridge from which the enemy had so closely threatened the original ,ypres arena4 ,the second flat valley and the higher ridge from ,passchendaele to ,staden now lay before us4 ,at least we were in a good position for to-morrow's attack4 ,mr4 ,buchan thus in effect analyses our gains3 ,along two-thirds of our line of attack we held our first objectives4 ,on half of the remaining third we had only fallen just short of our final objective4 ,on the remaining sixth we had even slightly exceeded our final objective4 ,we had besides taken #fjjj prisoners and a quantity of machine-guns4 ,,ii ,all that night the enemy counter-attacked us doggedly1 resolved upon driving us down again4 ,all night we fought to keep what we had won1 and prepared the redoubled blow that we meant to deliver next day4 ,that blow was destined never to be struck4 ,the wind that brought the rain blew out our hopes of victory4 #cf 8,the weather had been threatening throughout the first day1 and had rendered the work of our aeroplanes very difficult from the commencement of the battle4 ,during the afternoon1 while fighting was still in progress1 rain began1 and fell steadily all night4 8,thereafter1 for four days1 the rain continued without cessation4444 ,the low-lying1 clayey soil1 torn by shells and sodden with rain1 turned to a succession of vast muddy pools4 ,the valleys of the choked and overflowing streams were speedily transformed into long stretches of bog1 impassable except by a few well-defined tracks1 which became marks for the enemy's artillery4 ,to leave these tracks was to risk death by drowning1 and in the course of the subsequent fighting on several occasions both men and pack animals were lost in this way4 ,in these conditions operations of any magnitude became impossible1 and the resumption of our offensive was necessarily postponed until a period of fine weather should allow the ground to recover4 ,as had been the case in the ,arras battle1 this unavoidable delay in the development of our offensive was of the greatest service to the enemy4 ,valuable time was lost1 the troops opposed to us were able to recover from the disorganisation produced by our first attack1 and the enemy was given the opportunity to bring up reinforcements40 ,it was nearly a fortnight before the #eth ,army could again attack4 ,the disappointment of the ,higher ,command was acute2 acute1 too1 were the physical and mental miseries suffered during that fortnight by the ,tank ,corps and all the other arms engaged4 ,their magnificent efforts1 their sacrifices1 were of no avail4 ,there they lay day after day1 drenched by the inexorable rain1 those in the forward area half choked in the rising streams of liquid mud4 ,it was in no sunny frame of mind that the #eth ,army ,headquarters ,staff read the verdict of the three ,corps upon the day's work done by the ,tanks4 ,the three ,summaries were agreed that the courage and perseverance shown by ,tank personnel had been admirable4 ,illustration3 ,a ,,deadly ,,swamp 7,,the ,,wrecks ,,of ,,six ,,tanks ,,may ,,be ,,counted7 ,illustration3 8,,clapham ,,junction0 ,,near ,,sanctuary ,,wood ,illustration3 8,,the ,,salient0 ,one ,corps1 however1 had given way thoroughly to the spirit of the time4 ,they practically reported that ,tanks had been of no use to any one1 and moreover that they were never likely to be4 ,with the #cjth ,division they had been unable to deal with certain machine-gun emplacement2 with the #bdth they had been late1 they always drew enemy shell-fire2 and with the #hth ,division one ,tank had even lost direction and been reported as firing on our own men4 ,another ,corps had found ,tanks helpful1 and said all they could for them4 ,tanks had greatly assisted the ,gordons and ,black ,watch at ,frezenberg1 they had dealt effectively with concrete dug-outs2 with the #eeth ,division they had broken the wave of an enemy counter-attack at ,winnipeg1 and everywhere their moral effect on the enemy had been of great assistance4 ,twenty-four ,tanks had been put out of action by bad going or shell-fire4 ,a third ,corps with fewer machines had in many cases reached their objective without being held up4 ,the ,tanks had in these cases merely followed the infantry1 but they reported that without ,tanks the capture of the strongly wired position of ,alberta would have cost the #cith ,division dear1 and that on the ,steenbeek near ,ferdinand ,farm the enemy1 who had bolted at the mere sight of a ,tank1 had been 8dealt with0 at ease with a machine-gun by infantry of the #east ,division4 ,upon these ,summaries and upon later failures the ,commander of the #eth ,army was subsequently to base a generally unfavourable report upon ,tanks4 ,the report may be condensed into a simple syllogism3-- #a4 ,tanks were unable to negotiate bad ground4 #b4 ,the ground on a battlefield will always be bad4 #c4 ,therefore ,tanks are no good on a battlefield4 ,he added to this1 that being no longer a surprise to the enemy1 he considered that ,tanks had lost their moral effect1 and had no value used in masses4 ,this report was not officially presented for some weeks1 but the ,higher ,tank ,command must early have perceived the drift of affairs4 ,the events of the first day and the manner in which those events were interpreted gave only too much data to the prophetic spirit4 ,the junior ,tank personnel knew little of what was going on4 ,like ,burns's mouse1 they were only touched by the present1 the throwing away of what had cost them so many weeks of toil4 ,to the ,higher ,tank ,command was reserved ,burns's own fate3 8,but1 och6 ,i backward cast my ee ,on prospects drear6 ,and forward1 tho' ,i canna see1 ,i guess and fear40 ,what would be the results of the initial ill-success of the battle1 and of the further ,tank failures which seemed only too probable when an advance which had begun so ill was continued1 after perhaps two or three inches more rain8 ,how were the final arbiters1 ,g4,h4,q4 and the ,war ,cabinet1 going to regard such failures8 ,tanks had been employed under grotesque conditions1 and after all1 they had failed in common with every other arm4 ,were the events of the next few weeks to be disastrous enough to consign them irrevocably to ,bottomless ,perdition8 ,at best their hopes of expansion would most probably be nipped4 ,their establishment would be reduced1 and ,tanks would be used in petits paquets again1 by ones and twos as they had been in the past1 because1 once more1 there would never be enough machines for an effective action4 ,as the days wore on1 and the rain continued 7at the rate often of an inch a day71 one of these alternative fates seemed inevitable4 ,the gloomy surmises of the ,tank ,headquarters ,staff were only too well founded4 ,the authorities were in fact suffering from one of the worst cold fits which the pilots of the ,tank ,corps at home and abroad ever endured4 ,tank ,corps ,headquarters heard it all4 ,they knew well enough that in well-informed but irresponsible ,london circles the remark1 8,i hear the ,tanks are going to be abolished10 was a common one2 that often in such gossip circumstances of person and date would be added4 ,for all this they had no certain refutation4 ,if only ,tanks could even now do something that would catch the eye of authority4 ,some little 8show0 exploit4 ,something that would at least make a summary condemnation unlikely4 ,the battle would have to be continued some day4 ,tanks would have to play their part1 but in that intolerable swamp was it likely that they would do anything except engulf themselves--literally and metaphorically--yet deeper than before8 ,there1 however1 lay the ,tanks' best hope4 ,chance and their own exertions might bring them a success even in ,flanders4 ,,iii ,thirty-six ,tanks belonging to the #ast ,brigade had remained in ,army ,reserve4 ,on ,august #af1 the weather having been less wet for a day or two1 the first and most considerable of a series of renewed attacks was to be made4 ,twelve ,tanks were to co-operate with the infantry on the ,langemarck-,st4 ,julien front4 ,on the night of the #acth the ,tanks began to move up4 ,the roads were already congested with other traffic1 and the ,tanks were not to be allowed to make use of them4 #cg8,the country they had to traverse was all very deep in mud1 and the ,tanks wallowed on their bellies in ground too soft for the tracks to hold4 ,the approach was continued during the following night1 but in spite of the repeated use of unditching beams1 the mutual help of ,tanks in towing each other1 and the valuable assistance of a ,tunnelling ,company1 it was recognised on the #aeth that none but the four leading ,tanks could hope to reach the line in time to take part in the battle4 ,these four made strenuous efforts to complete the journey the next night1 but without success4 ,none of them could overcome the difficulties of the ground1 and the infantry had to go into attack without them40 ,the infantry attacked1 and after the action a nest of pill-box strongholds north-east of ,st4 ,julien still remained untaken4 ,like most of these little fortresses1 they had been extremely skilfully placed4 ,an unwary advance would be trapped in their wire just within convenient range of their machine-guns4 ,they were so small1 scattered1 and well concealed as to be almost impossible targets for heavy guns1 and as they were built of reinforced concrete at least three feet thick1 the ordinary high-explosive shell thrown by a field gun had no effect upon them4 ,this particular nest consisted of four pill-boxes of more than average size4 ,three of them were hidden in the ruins of farmsteads4 ,that in the ,mont du ,hibou was manned by a garrison of about eighty men1 and the ,cockcroft was still more strongly held4 ,triangle ,farm and ,hillock ,farm were slightly smaller4 ,it was essential that they should be taken1 and ,general ,sir ,ivor ,maxse1 commanding the #ahth ,corps1 was informed by the ,brigadiers concerned that their capture would probably cost us #fjj to #ajjj casualties4 ,he and ,colonel ,baker-,carr 7commanding #ast ,brigade of ,tanks7 then considered the possibility of a ,tank attack4 ,colonel ,baker-,carr1 admirably undismayed by the dismal events of the #afth1 optimistically guaranteed the fortresses at half the estimated cost to the infantry1 and the attack was arranged4 ,one innovation he specially asked for4 ,there was to be no shelling1 but he was to be granted the concealment of a smoke barrage4 ,having once decided to entrust the affair to the ,tanks1 ,general ,maxse was zealous to give them every possible chance of success and did not hesitate to modify his orders to suit their considered demands4 ,only twelve ,tanks were to be employed1 and they and their infantry were to use the roads for as far as these served them4 ,colonel ,baker-,carr decided to form a composite ,company from 8,g0 7#gth7 ,battalion under the command of ,major ,broome4 ,the resulting action1 small as were the numbers engaged1 will ever find a place in the annals of the ,tank ,corps4 #ch8;,in spite of the appalling condition of the ground1 for it had now been raining steadily for three weeks1 a very memorable feat of arms was achieved40 ,the four strong points were triumphantly captured4 #ci8,phenomenal results were obtained at very little cost1 for instead of #fjj to #ajjj casualties1 the infantry following the ,tanks only sustained fifteen60 ,at #d4de a4m4 on the morning of ,august #ai1 the artillery isolated the doomed strongholds in clouds of dense smoke4 ,the action had been carefully rehearsed4 ,two ,tanks were to be used against each pill-box1 and they were to take them in rear1 so striking where the forts were most vulnerable1 and at the same time cutting off the garrison's retreat4 ,just before six o'clock the enveloping manuvre was complete1 and the first pill-box--,hillock ,farm--fell1 nearly all its garrison having fled4 ,at #f4ae two ,tanks reached the ,mont du ,hibou1 and fired forty rounds from their #f-pounder guns into the back door of the stronghold4 ,sixty of the garrison fled1 of whom about half escaped or were shot down1 and the rest surrendered to the infantry as soon as it came up4 ,triangle ,farm fell ten minutes afterwards4 ,the garrison had put up a fight against the ,tanks and our infantry killed them all1 mostly with the bayonet4 ,at the ,cockcroft the attacking ,tank#dj got ditched within fifty yards of its victim4 ,but at sight of it the garrison of over #ajj 8withdrew40 ,the ,tank and its infantry immediately opened fire with their ,lewis guns1 and more than half the fugitives fell4 #da8,our infantry then consolidated the ,cockcroft4 ,this completed the capture of all objectives4 8,the ,tanks waited till consolidation was well forward before returning4 8,casualties--,infantry3 no killed1 #ae wounded4 8,tank ,personnel--,killed3 ,officers1 none2 other ,ranks1 #b4 ,wounded3 ,officers1 #b2 other ,ranks1 #aj40 ,in one of the strong points we found a ,german officer who had been hanged by his men4 ,the ,st4 ,julien attack1 as it was afterwards called1 proved a sufficient counterblast to the #eth ,army report4 ,the friends of the ,tank ,corps made the most of it4 ,it was a brilliant little exploit1 and once brought to notice1 the casualty figures pleaded too loudly to be ignored4 ,it is probably no exaggeration to say that it was in some measure to the ,tanks which won the little ,battle of ,st4 ,julien that the ,tank ,corps owed the opportunity of winning the ,battle of ,cambrai4 ,,iv ,from ,august #bb till ,october #i1 by which time hope of ,british success at ,ypres had been more or less abandoned1 the ,tanks fought in about a dozen minor actions4 ,they made almost as many more unavailing attempts to fight4 ,like the rest of the ,army1 they spent much vain labour and knew the weariness of much frustrated effort4 ,they made elaborate and toilsome movements in preparation for attacks which were never launched4 ,they struggled night after night to get up to some battle which eventually had to take place without them4 ,tanks had now invariably to move upon the roads1 as the ground between had finally and definitely been reduced to impassable swamp4 ,the roads naturally formed standing targets for the ,german gunners4 ,we lost heavily in men and machines4 ,general ,elles had originally estimated that one machine in two would get into effective action4 ,now1 in view of the appalling ground conditions1 he revised this1 only reckoning on one machine in ten getting into effective contact with the enemy4 ,this modest estimate was as a matter of fact seldom exceeded4 ,whenever ,tanks did get into action1 however1 they usually did well1 though rarely decisively1 in spite of the standard of extraordinary courage which was steadfastly maintained by the crews4 ,the briefest review of most of these depressing little engagements is all that need be given4 ,they were remarkable for nothing except the heroic patience shown day after day by every arm of our attacking forces4 ,on ,august #bb a minor attack was launched by all three ,corps4 ,small parties of ,tanks fought with each4 ,with the #bnd ,corps in ,glencorse ,wood four ,tanks of the #bnd ,brigade were of some service1 and did considerable execution4 ,with the #aith ,corps eighteen ,tanks of the #crd ,brigade were used on the off-chance of their being able to reach the objectives4 ,the going was more than ordinarily atrocious1 the whole of the ,frezenberg-,zonnebeke road having been shot away4 ,one ,tank fought a very remarkable action1 engaging the enemy near 8,gallipoli0 for sixty-eight hours4 ,with the #ahth ,corps twelve ,tanks of the #ast ,brigade headed an attack on ,blow ,farm1 ,vancouver1 ,winnipeg1 and other strong points4 ,they proved useful1 and several ,tanks were in action for longish periods4 ,two things are remarkable about this operation3 first1 that every ,tank which ventured to leave the road instantly bellied4 ,one was 8drowned0 in six or seven feet of water4 ,secondly1 the remarkable way in which they affected enemy moral4 ,in several instances parties of the enemy surrendered at the sight of them4 ,prisoners in their examination said that they could have held up infantry1 but 8felt helpless against ,tanks40 ,next day1 on ,august #bc1 four #bnd ,brigade ,tanks went into action near ,inverness ,copse4 ,the operation had had to be undertaken in a hurry1 liaison was bad1 and the attack a failure4 ,on ,august #bf four ,tanks fought with the #ccrd ,division in the neighbourhood of ,jerk ,house 7near ,glencorse ,wood74 ,the morning was misty1 and an enemy shell unfortunately exploded a dump of smoke bombs just behind our lines4 ,the attack was a failure4 ,that night an inch of rain fell1 and four ,tanks which were to have operated with the #adth ,division next day1 ,august #bgth1 never reached their starting-point4 ,thirteen men were wounded and an officer killed on the way up4 ,nearly three weeks elapsed before ,tanks were again in action1 and several battalions from the #bnd and #crd ,brigades were moved back to a new training area near ,arras4 ,a certain number of 8,replacement ,tanks0 were issued to remaining battalions4 ,the #ast ,brigade stood ready in case they should be wanted at short notice1 but no attacks of any sort were launched1 probably partly on account of weather1 and partly because a section of the #eth ,army front was in process of transfer to the #bnd ,army4 ,by the middle of ,september the relief had been completed1 and again we endeavoured to press on4 ,on ,september #bj a fairly successful assault was made along the whole line4 #bnd ,brigade ,tanks took part near ,inverness ,copse1 and #ast ,brigade ,tanks near ,triangle and ,wurst ,farms4 ,but the ground being known to be unusually appalling in both areas1 they had been given minor parts4 ,these parts they played with fair success1 and they undoubtedly scared the enemy a good deal4 ,on the #ahth ,corps front #crd ,battalion ,tanks had rather better luck4 ,the efforts made by the crews to get to the battle at all were superhuman4 ,trees had been felled across the road by the enemy1 resting breast high on their branches and the tall stumps from which they were not completely severed4 ,at ,wurst ,farm also this kind of obstacle had been opposed to the ,tanks--the butts of the trees lying obliquely and at a slope1 forming a barrier very difficult to surmount4 ,if one leading machine got into difficulties struggling in the dark through or over these obstacles1 the whole string of ,tanks behind would be hung up1 the deep swamps on either hand making it impossible to leave the road4 ,the ,tanks1 however1 arrived1 and are reported to have 8inflicted many casualties40 ,on ,september #bf fifteen ,tanks operated near ,zonnebeke ,village4 ,the attack was not a success1 though the ,tanks did a great deal of good work4 ,on ,october #d took place the last two actions of this battle in which ,tanks succeeded in playing a part4 ,the first was fought by twelve ,tanks of the #ast ,brigade1 who had the honour of taking part in the capture of ,poelcapelle4 ,it was a most successful little attack1 and after reducing three strong points which guarded the outskirts1 the ,tanks hunted through the main street and out beyond the village4 ,in the other action four ,tanks of the #ast ,battalion were to take part in an attack upon ,juniper ,cottage on the line of the ,reutelbeek4 ,not only was this1 like the other1 a successful little action1 it was ennobled by affording the background to one of the most patiently courageous actions of the ,war4 ,it was on ,october #d that ,captain ,robertson fell upon completing a service for which he was posthumously awarded the ,v4,c4 ,tanks and infantry were to endeavour to cross the ,reutelbeek and drive the enemy from the positions which they held on the further bank4 ,there was only one bridge over the marshy stream4 ,if1 in the half-light of the early morning and in the confusion of battle1 they missed this crossing-place1 their one chance of success was gone4 ,captain ,robertson1 the officer commanding the section of ,tanks1 early realised that here lay the crux of the little operation for whose success he was responsible4 ,for three days and nights he and his servant1 ,private ,allen 7subsequently awarded the ,d4,c4,m471 went carefully backwards and forwards over the ground under heavy fire1 taping the routes for the ,tanks4 ,working without a break1 this task took him until half-past nine on the night before the action4 ,it was time to get the machines up4 ,he started out at once again with his ,tanks4 ,the weather was dark and misty1 and from inside a ,tank it was impossible to see the way over the heavily shelled ground4 ,captain ,robertson therefore walked ahead2 they reached the assembly point in good time1 and at #f a4m4 on ,october #d he led them into action4 ,in imagining the rest of the story we are to remember that ,captain ,robertson had already been continuously under fire and without sleep for three days and nights4 ,the roads and every other landmark had all been wiped out by the shelling1 but the bridge still stood4 ,captain ,robertson still led his ,tanks on foot1 facing besides the shells an intense close-range machine-gun and rifle fire4 ,he must have known that to go forward on foot means certain death4 ,he and his convoy were by now well ahead of the infantry4 ,still he led his ,tanks on1 carefully and patiently guiding them at a foot's pace towards their objective4 ,they reached the bridge1 and one by one the ,tanks crossed over4 ,he led them on towards a road that would take them straight up to the enemy positions1 the machine-gun fire growing more and more intense as they advanced4 ,they reached the road1 and as they reached it1 ,captain ,robertson at last fell1 shot through the head4 ,but the ,tanks went on1 and succeeded in their mission4 ,the object for which ,captain ,robertson had so deliberately sacrificed his life was achieved4 ,the #bnd and #crd ,brigades had by now gone back to ,arras to refit their machines1 and to replenish their ranks4 ,the #ast ,brigade1 however1 made two more efforts to take part in the fighting4 ,the battle was by now recognised as a serious ,british check4 ,the ,germans' 8elastic tactics0 and the weather had together delayed us for so long that they had defeated us4 ,we had inflicted heavy losses on the enemy1 and had in the act suffered still more severely ourselves4 ,our hopes of clearing the coast were gone4 ,at the end of ten weeks we had achieved gains which had been on the programme for the first fortnight4 ,the whole plan of campaign had to be reconsidered1 and to take ,passchendaele must now be our ultimate ambition4 ,on ,october #g two ,tanks were to operate ahead of their infantry and endeavour to capture two fortified farms4 ,halfway to their objective a derelict ,tank blocked the way1 and the two advancing machines became ditched on trying to make a dtour4 ,by the time they had been unditched it was too late to go on4 ,on the #ith eight ,tanks were to have attacked strong points on the ,poelcapelle ,road4 ,at midnight on the night of the #hth-#ith they started for their objectives4 ,the road was everywhere encumbered with blown-up limbers and the bodies of dead teams4 ,large shell-holes had been blown in it4 ,the ,tanks managed to get on as far as the ,poelcapelle cross-roads1 but the enemy then began to shell the road heavily4 ,the leading ,tank ditched in a new shell-hole1 the second ,tank as it waited to pass was set on fire by a direct hit4 ,these two wrecks formed a complete barrier to the advance of the rest of the column4 ,no way being found by which the surviving ,tanks could circumvent the obstacle1 and the shelling having grown hotter1 it was decided to return4 ,but they had not gone far on the return journey when they discovered that on the way up the last machine of the column had somehow fouled an old derelict ,tank4 ,the remaining machines were trapped1 and could neither go forward nor back4 ,the efforts of their crews proved vain1 and they were all five lost1 some being hit by enemy shells and the crews killed or wounded1 and some ditched in vain efforts to make their escape across country4 ,the enemy continued to shell the road1 which was one we were obliged to use1 and it was a work of extreme hazard and difficulty to clear it of the wrecks by which it was completely blocked4 ,the work was1 however1 performed4 ,every night for a week ,major ,g4 ,l4 ,wilkes1#db the #ast ,brigade ,engineer1 used to go up the road as far as he could in a ,tank4 ,then he would get out and work till morning4 ,most of the wrecks he blew up1 some he and his small party of men were able to tip over into the swamp4 ,the scene on the first of these expeditions is thus described by an engineer officer who accompanied him3 8,i left ,st4 ,julien in the dark1 having been informed that our guns were not going to fire4 ,i waded up the road1 which was swimming in a foot or two of slush2 frequently ,i would stumble into a shell-hole hidden by the mud4 ,the road was a complete shambles and strewn with dbris1 broken vehicles1 dead and dying horses and men2 ,i must have passed hundreds of them as well as bits of men and animals littered everywhere4 ,as ,i neared ,poelcapelle our guns started to fire2 at once the ,germans replied1 pouring shells on and around the road2 the flashes of the bursting shells were all round me4 ,i cannot describe what it felt like2 the nearest approach to a picture ,i can give is that it was like standing in the centre of the flame of a gigantic ,primus stove4 ,as ,i neared the derelict ,tanks1 the scene became truly appalling3 wounded men lay drowned in the mud1 others were stumbling and falling through exhaustion1 others crawled and rested themselves up against the dead to raise themselves a little above the mud4 ,on reaching the ,tanks ,i found them surrounded by the dead and dying2 men had crawled to them for what shelter they would afford4 ,the nearest ,tank was a ,female4 ,her left sponson doors were open4 ,out of these protruded four pairs of legs2 exhausted and wounded men had sought refuge in this machine and dead and dying lay in a jumbled heap inside40 ,so ended the tragedy of ,october #i1 the last of a series of hopeless adventures4 ,a few ,tanks were later moved up to a new railhead1 with the hope that better weather might enable them to take part in the final attack on ,passchendaele1 the attack which was to end the ,flanders offensive4 ,but the weather did not mend1 and it was without the help of ,tanks that by a final effort the heights of ,passchendaele were stormed and taken in the first week of ,november4 ,we held our gains4 ,the high ground was ours1 the weary armies might rest1 and the tragic nightmare of the ,third ,battle of ,ypres was over at last4 ,when time brought the verdict of the ,official ,despatch upon the work of the ,tanks1 it was neither an unjust nor an unkindly one3-- #dc8;,although throughout the major part of the ,ypres battle1 and especially in its later stages1 the condition of the ground made the use of ,tanks difficult or impossible1 yet whenever circumstances were in any way favourable1 and even when they were not1 very gallant and valuable work has been accomplished by ,tank ,commanders and crews on a great number of occasions4 ,long before the conclusion of the ,flanders offensive these new instruments had proved their worth1 and amply justified the labour1 material and personnel diverted to their construction and development40 ,it was not to be long before the ,corps had an opportunity of proving their worth indeed4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,first ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai 8,on they move ,indissolubly firm2 nor obvious hill ,nor straightening vale1 nor wood nor stream divides ,their perfect ranks40 ,paradise ,lost4 ,,part ,i ,i ,all through the later part of the ,ypres struggle the ,tank ,corps had turned their eyes towards certain other parts of the line with a longing as for ,the ,delectable ,mountains4 ,they imagined places in dry rolling chalk country where a ,tank could travel on the surface of the ground4 ,they dreamed of battles in which the artillery had neither given the enemy weeks of warning nor helped him to reduce the ground to a swamp or the likeness of an ash heap4 ,a starving man does not picture every circumstance of a meal1 a drowning man the sensations of warmth and solidity1 more vividly than did the ,tank ,corps call up their dream battle4 ,general ,elles and his ,staff had several places in mind in which such a battle might be fought4 ,perhaps they dwelt most affectionately on the thoughts of some sector of the ,hindenburg line1 some high rolling chalk plateau anywhere south of ,arras4 ,several such delightful spots lay in the domain of ,general ,sir ,julian ,byng's #crd ,army4 ,perhaps he had some sort of operation in view already6 ,in ,september ,general ,elles hopefully paid him a visit as he lay at ,albert4 ,they conferred4 ,the ,army ,commander had1 indeed1 an idea of attacking4 ,more1 he had already independently worked out the place1 and many of the details1 of just such an attack as the ,tank ,corps had been sighing for4 ,together the two ,generals worked at the scheme and a draft plan was forwarded to ,g4,h4,q4 ,g4,h4,q41 however1 could not allow the attack for the present4 ,the ,ypres affair must first be thrashed out1 but when that was ended1 say by early ,november1 then such an attack would have their blessing4 ,meanwhile the two conspirators waited eagerly1 all the while working out and perfecting their plans4 ,at last1 on ,october #bj1 the scheme was finally sanctioned1 and ,z day was fixed for ,november #bj4 ,still only four members of the ,tank ,corps ,staff knew of the project1 and these four immediately stole off to our lines near ,havrincourt to make a preliminary survey of the new site4 ,,ii ,the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai was to be a single-minded battle4 ,it was to fulfil in the simplest way the prime function of war1 that is1 to destroy the forces of the enemy4 ,to attain this end it was to rely upon surprise1 audacity1 and rapidity of movement4 ,its main action was to be completed in about twenty-four hours1 during which time it was proposed to penetrate the ,hindenburg ,line1 which here consisted of four systems of trenches4 ,territorial gains were not to be so much considered as were the destruction and capture of enemy personnel and material4 ,in other words1 we were out to kill and chivvy ,germans4 ,the system of attack was to be one completely new for a full-dress battle4 ,there was to be no artillery preparation whatever4 ,to all appearance the front line was to be perfectly normal up to the very moment of attack1 when two ,army ,corps and three ,brigades of ,tanks were suddenly to hurl their whole weight against the enemy4 ,such tactics demanded that the most complete secrecy should be maintained up to zero hour itself1 and for the second time in the history of the ,tanks a vital secret was successfully kept4 ,the area to be raided lay just south of ,cambrai4 ,it was an open rolling chalk plateau1 which had lain uncultivated for two years1 and was now covered with a thin growth of wan grey grass4 ,from north-west to south-east the low ridges ran1 save where the dominating hump of ,bourlon's wood-crowned ,hill ran across the grain of the country4 ,on either flank of this area1 sometimes at right angles to the curve of our lines1 sometimes running parallel to the ,german lines1 ran the ,canal du ,nord and the ,canal de l',escaut4 ,the slopes were nowhere very steep1 but the levels were everywhere varied by spurs and--so-called--8ravines40 ,one of these1 which lay just within the ,german lines1 and parallel to our front1 for some time gave grave concern both to the ,tanks and to other arms1 who apparently coupled it in their minds with the ,grand ,caon of ,colorado4 ,its name sounded so formidable1 and it was marked so large on the map6 ,it might well prove a serious obstacle to the progress of ,tanks4 ,a series of exhaustive reconnaissances carried out by the ,tank ,corps1 however1 dispelled this alarming legend and the 8,grand ,ravine0 stood revealed as being no more than a shallow dry field ditch which could be jumped by any rabbit of reasonable activity4 ,the ,german defences1 the famous ,hindenburg ,line1 lay wide and strong across the spurs4 ,the main line of resistance had been everywhere well placed on the reverse slopes of the main ridges1 and was invisible from our lines4 ,only from the air and from rare posts of vantage could we see a length of it4 ,there were three lines of trenches1 each trench anything up to #ae ft4 wide1 with an outpost line thrown forward to screen these main defences4 ,in front of the main line lay band upon band and acre upon acre of dense wire2 nowhere was it less than #ej yards deep1 and here and there it jutted out in great salients flanked by batteries of machine-guns4 ,never had we before been faced with such a wilderness of wire4 ,it was calculated that to cut it with artillery would have taken five weeks and cost twenty millions of money4 ,not only was the actual 8ditch0 of the trench believed to be in most places some #ab ft4 wide and #ah ft4 deep1 but at either side1 the parados and parapet 7each about #b ft4 #f in4 high7 were1 we had reason to believe1 so sloped as to increase the effective width to about #af to #ah ft4 ,these were the dimensions of some trenches captured by us at ,arras1 and for such trenches we had to be prepared4 ,the space to be cleared was too wide for a ,tank4 ,a special means of crossing was1 however1 devised by the ,staff of the ,central ,workshops at ,erin4 ,this was a special huge fascine made of about seventy-five ordinary bundles of brushwood1 strongly compressed and bound by heavy chains4 ,it was carried on the nose of the machine1 and could be released by a touch from inside the ,tank by a specially ingenious releasing gear1 and dropped neatly into the trench4 ,the manufacture of the #cej fascines and the fitting of the ,tanks with the releasing gear was a piece of work of which the ,central ,workshops have reason to be proud4 ,they received the order for #cej fascines and #aaj ,tank sledges on ,october #bd1 when they had already for some months been working at high pressure1 chiefly upon ,tanks salved from the ,salient4 ,to fulfil the new order the shops worked day and night for three weeks4 ,to make the fascines1 #ba1jjj ordinary stout bundles of brushwood1 such as are used for road repairing1 were unloaded at the ,central ,workshops4 ,here eighteen ,tanks had been specially fitted up1 for binding and fastening these into bundles of sixty or seventy4 ,the ,tanks acted in pairs1 pulling in opposite directions at steel chains which had been previously wound round and round the bundles4 ,so great was the pressure thus exerted that1 months afterwards1 an infantryman in search of firewood1 who found one of these fascines and gaily filed through its binding chain1 was killed by the sudden springing open of the bundle4 ,when they were ready1 each bundle weighed a ton and a half1 and it took twenty of the ,chinese coolies employed at the ,central ,workshops to roll one of them through the mud4 ,on one occasion #add fascines had to be loaded on to trucks within twenty-four hours4 ,concurrently with the fascines the ,central ,workshops achieved the making of the #aaj ,tank sledges4 ,the whole of the timber needed for this work had to be sawn out of logs4 ,besides this they repaired and issued #abg ,tanks4 ,,iii ,each ,tank could only carry one fascine1 and once it had dropped it into a trench had no means of picking it up again4 ,there were1 however1 three broad trenches to be crossed4 ,this circumstance had to be taken into account in the general scheme of attack4 ,every detail of this plan had been most ably worked out either by ,lieut-,colonel ,fuller himself 7,g4,s4,o4,i4 to the ,tank ,corps71 or by the ,staff whom he inspired4 ,every movement and formation which we are going to describe had been reduced to an exact drill1 several special exercises being evolved for the occasion4 ,one of them1 a simple platoon drill for the infantry1 was1 we are told by an official historian1 based upon a drill described by ,xenophon in the ,cyropdia1 and attributed by him to ,cyrus of ,persia 7circa #ejj ,b4,c474 ,very briefly the main plan was as follows3-- ,the whole line of attack was divided into areas for three ,tanks who formed a section and worked together4 ,of these one was an 8,advance ,guard ,tank10 and the other two were 8,infantry ,tanks40 ,the advance guard ,tank was to go straight forward through the enemy's wire1 and1 turning to the left without crossing it1 to shoot along the fire trench which lay in front of it4 ,its object was to keep down the enemy and protect the two infantry ,tanks4 ,these the while both made for one selected spot in the trench2 the left-hand one cast in its fascine1 crossed the trench on it1 turned to the left and worked down the fire trench2 the right-hand ,tank crossed the fire trench on the first ,tank's fascine1 and made for the second trench1 dropped in its fascine1 and crossing1 worked down this second trench4 ,meanwhile the advance guard ,tank had swung round and crossed over the first and second trenches on the fascines of the two infantry ,tanks1 and it therefore moved forward with its own fascine still in position for the third line4 ,the infantry were also divided into three forces and worked in single file4 ,the first force were 8,trench ,clearers40 ,they worked with the ,tanks1 and helped to clear up trenches and dug-outs4 ,they carried small red flags with which they marked the paths which the ,tanks had made through the wire4 ,the second were the 8,trench ,stops10 who1 as it were1 played the net over the rabbit hole to the ,tank's ferret4 ,the third force were the 8,trench ,garrisons10 who took over the trenches as they were captured4 ,one feature of the combined ,tank and infantry training for this battle was particularly interesting4 ,they had not very long to work together1 yet it was essential that the infantry should have confidence in the trench-spanning and wire-cutting power of the ,tanks4 ,infantry units were therefore invited by the ,tank ,corps to build their own defences and entanglements1 the ,tanks guaranteeing to cross the trenches and chew up the wire of their best efforts4 ,some very formidable and ingenious defences were made4 ,the ,tanks1 however1 everywhere carried out their guarantee1 to the great edification of the infantry4 ,the following table gives briefly the allocation of ,tanks and infantry to the various objectives3 ,,allocation ,,of ,,fighting ,,tanks #ast ,brigade ,battalions4 ,tanks 7,no47 #crd ,corps ,divisions4 ,d 7#d7 #db ,on ,right3 #east4 ,e 7#e7 #db #east and #fbnd4 ,g 7#g7 #db ,on ,left3 #fbnd4 ,objectives3 ,havrincourt1 ,flesquires4 ,of each battalion3 thirty-six ,tanks for #ast1 #ab 7plus survivors7 for #bnd ,objective4 ,exploitation towards ,fontaine1 ,bourlon ,wood1 the ,bapaume-,cambrai ,road1 ,bourlon ,village and ,graincourt4 ,bridges over ,canal du ,nord4 #bnd ,brigade ,battalions4 ,tanks 7,no47 #dth ,corps ,divisions4 ,b 7#b7 #db on ,right4 #fth4 ,h 7#h7 #db on ,left4 #fth4 ,objectives3 ,beaucamp1 ,villers1 ,plouich ,road4 ,exploitation towards ,marcoing1 ,preny ,chapel1 and ,nine ,wood4 #crd ,brigade ,battalions4 ,tanks 7,no47 #dth ,corps ,divisions4 ,c 7#c7 #db #abth4 ,f 7#f7 #db 0 ,i 7#i7 #db #bjth4 ,a#dd 7#a7 #db 0 ,objective3 ,la ,vacquerie4 ,exploitation towards ,crvecur1 ,masnires1 and ,marcoing4 ,the part to be played by the artillery was carefully worked out4 ,there was to be no preliminary bombardment1 but as soon as the attack was launched the heavy guns were to begin counter-battery work and were to shrapnel the bridges along the ,canal4 ,at the same time a jumping barrage of smoke shells and ,h4,e4 was to cover the advance of the ,tanks and infantry4 ,the secrecy of the attack made it impossible for any registering shots to be fired1 and the ranges could be worked out in theory only4 ,several squadrons of the ,r4,a4,f4 were to co-operate1 flying low2 their especial work being to bomb enemy ,headquarters4 ,the cavalry were also billed to co-operate4 ,special wire-pulling ,tanks fitted with grapnels were employed to clear convenient broad lanes through the wire for them1 and their needs were throughout carefully considered4 ,for one reason and another1 however1 the cavalry did not1 after all1 find it possible to take much part in the fighting4 ,the preparations for the battle were of the thorough and laborious kind always requisite for a 8full-dress0 attack4 ,an immense amount of railway movement was necessary in order to bring up the three ,tank ,brigades1 whose component parts were a good deal scattered4 ,thirty-six trainloads of twelve ,tanks each had to be dealt with1 and their stores besides4 ,for the sake of secrecy all this movement was done after dark4 ,there were only two minor accidents1 otherwise the whole scheme was worked out exactly to programme4 ,the usual huge dumps of petrol and grease and special stores had to be formed4 ,most of them were made in neighbouring woods1 where the ,tanks also lay up4 ,havrincourt ,wood and ,desert ,wood were1 for instance1 used for main dumps1 and as lying-up places for the #ast and #bnd ,brigades1 for in these woods the hornbeam undergrowth had not yet shed its leaves and the ,tanks and their stores could lie in perfect secrecy4 ,for the #crd ,brigade1 however1 there was no wood conveniently near1 and the ,tanks lay out in a village with camouflage clothes thrown over them1 painted to represent bricks and tiles4 ,for the forward dumps splendid work was done by the #crd ,army's light railways1 who handled astonishing masses of stores2 for example1 #afe1jjj gallons of petrol1 #eda1jjj rounds of #f-pounder ammunition1 and #e1jjj1jjj rounds of ,s4,a4,a4 ,beyond the light railways the ,tank fills were transported by supply ,tanks4 ,all these preparations had to be carried out as secretly as possible4 ,moves were made after dark4 ,no new wheel tracks must be made4 ,there must be no reference to the battle over the telephone4 ,there must be no extra horse or mechanical transport seen about in daylight4 ,the concentration of ,tanks in the background was explained by the establishment of an alleged new training area4 ,tank ,corps ,headquarters established with the army at ,albert was disguised under the plausible alias of 8,the ,tank ,corps ,training ,office40 ,there must be no increase in aeroplane activity for reconnaissance purposes4 ,the same troops were to continue to hold the line1 the attacking forces passing through them1 and those in the line were as far as possible to be kept in the dark as to the new operations4 ,there was always a danger of men in the trenches being taken prisoner in some raid1 and the less they knew the better4 ,oosthoek ,wood had not been forgotten4 ,all the ,reconnaissance ,officers and the ,tank ,staff who had to frequent the line wore non-committal burberries and discreet tin hats2 one well-known ,staff ,officer even went to the length of affecting blue glasses2 in fact1 in the matter of disguise the line was only drawn at ginger whiskers4 ,the cars they came in had their distinguishing badges taken off1 and their drivers were carefully primed with cock-and-bull stories with which to explain their presence4 ,staff and ,reconnaissance ,officers slunk about1 above all avoiding ,headquarters and those other social centres which etiquette enjoins must be first called upon by all who visit other people's trenches4 ,friends were stealthily avoided1 and a curious jumble of assorted and obvious lies was gradually put into circulation4 ,at the ,lyceum the villain conducts his affairs in this sort of way without arousing the least suspicion in any one1 but in real life1 and particularly in the line where a look-out must constantly be kept for spies1 such conduct is apt to cause remark4 ,before ,cambrai embarrassing situations frequently arose which could be elucidated only by the drawing aside of some justly indignant ,commanding ,officer for a few minutes' whispered conversation4 ,at the #ast ,brigade ,headquarters in ,arras there was a locked room with 8,no admittance0 written large upon the door4 ,here were ostentatiously hung spoof maps of other topical districts and a profusion of plans lay spread about4 ,the ,reconnaissance ,officer always hoped that this room was duly ransacked by the 8unauthorised person10 for whose visit he had taken such pains to prepare4 ,one more precaution was most carefully observed in the line itself4 ,exactly the amount of artillery fire to which the enemy was accustomed must be continued1 and from guns of the calibre which he expected4 ,it was considered that more or less shooting1 or the use of guns to which he was not accustomed1 would be sure to alarm him4 ,for more than a week before the battle there was no rain4 ,low1 creeping mists screened our movements and made it almost impossible that the enemy should have seen us from the air4 ,but the time was1 nevertheless1 an anxious one4 ,on the night of the #ahth-#aith the enemy raided our line and captured some of our men4 ,we were uncertain how much these men knew1 and how much information they would give under examination4 ,if under prompt examination they gave away the gist of our plans the enemy would have twenty-four hours in which to bring up reserves4 ,there was1 however1 nothing to be done except to await the event4 ,there was yet one other particular in which the ,battle of ,cambrai was to differ from other battles4 ,in modern warfare the place of the ,general commanding any considerable body of troops is almost invariably in the rear at some point where communications are good and whence he can effectively control his reserves4 ,his leadership is more a matter of the spirit and moral which he can infuse into his troops1 than of his actual presence in the forefront of the battle4 ,but ,general ,elles had determined to lead his ,tanks in person4 ,all the available machines were to be used1 there would be no reserves for him to handle4 ,he would be best placed1 he argued1 in his ,flag ,tank where he could keep his hand on the pulse of the battle4 ,it must have been with great satisfaction that he perceived that he would here once more be able to indulge his remarkable penchant for battles1 a penchant from whose gratification his responsibilities as a commander had now long 7officially7 debarred him4 ,on the evening before the attack he issued his ,special ,order to the ,tank ,corps4 ,it was not the incitement to 8do their damnedest0 which the contemporary ,press fathered upon him4 ,that spurious fosterling he hated the worse1 the more he perceived its popularity4 ,his authentic ,order was as follows3-- 8,special ,order1 ,no4 #f 8#a4 ,to-morrow the ,tank ,corps will have the chance for which it has been waiting for many months1 to operate on good going in the van of the battle4 8#b4 ,all that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the way of preparation4 8#c4 ,it remains for unit commanders and for ,tank crews to complete the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself4 8#d4 ,in the light of past experience ,i leave the good name of the ,corps with great confidence in your hands4 8#e4 ,i propose leading the attack of the ,centre ,division4 ,november #ai1 #aiag4 7,signed7 ,,hugh ,,elles1 8,b4-,g4 ,commanding ,tank ,corps40 ,the statement that the ,g4,o4,c4 was to lead the attack came as a great surprise to every one2 it was probably a greater surprise to some of the authorities than it was even to the ,tank ,corps themselves4 ,this decision was generally accepted with pleasure by the fighting troops1 but many of the more thoughtful were filled with very great anxiety4 ,it was clear that the ,general's ,tank1 the 8,hilda10 was going to be thrust close behind the barrage in a conspicuous position flying the flag2 the dangers that it ran were1 therefore1 greater than those run by any of the other ,tanks4 ,on the other hand1 it was generally realised that the ,tank ,corps had1 in this action1 a very great deal at stake2 it risked not merely machines and the lives of its officers and men1 but its very existence4 ,if the ,tanks failed to make good this time there is little doubt that this type of mechanical warfare would have been abandoned for some time at least4 ,on ,november #bj1 therefore1 the ,tank ,corps was 8all in0 in every sense of the word4 ,,iv ,at #d4cj on the morning of the #bjth a heavy burst of firing from the enemy made us fear for the integrity of our secret1 but to our great relief it died away1 and for an hour before zero 7#f a4m47 quiet reigned along almost the whole front of attack4 ,from documents captured during the battle we found that up to the #ahth the ,germans had issued such reports as 8,the enemy's work is confined to the improvement of his trenches and wire40 ,but the prisoners whom the ,germans had taken on the night of the #ahth had yielded more interesting information4 ,on the strength only of their preliminary examination the ,germans moved reserve machine-guns up to ,flesquires4 ,at the last moment a higher enemy authority seems to have again examined the prisoners1 and1 too late1 an urgent warning was sent down to all units in the line to maintain a sharp lookout and to issue armour-piercing bullets immediately4 ,this message we found half transcribed in a front-line signal dug-out4 ,six o'clock had struck4 ,under cover of the mist the whole line of #cej ,tanks moved forward1 led by ,general ,elles' ,flag ,tank1 the 8,hilda40 ,as they moved a thousand concealed guns hailed down their fire upon the ,german line4 ,even through the din of the barrage and the clamour of their own engines the ,tank crews could hear1 as they advanced1 the tearing and snapping of the ,german wire as they trampled it under them4 ,the bewildered enemy was overwhelmed4 ,he had only one last hope4 ,perhaps the wide trenches themselves would hold back this inexorable company6 ,but when each of the second line of ,tanks stopped1 ducked its head1 laid its 8stepping stone0 in the trench and crawled easily over it1 the enemy completely lost his balance4 ,all along the line men fled in panic4 ,only at a few tactical points did our onrush meet with any real opposition4 ,the surprise1 the novel tactics1 the crushing onrush of the ,tanks proved too much in those first confounding minutes for one of the best fighting armies the world had ever seen4 ,the 8,hilda0 reached the outposts line in the van of the battle2 the resistance here was only slight1 but ,general ,elles succeeded in picking up a few targets which he pointed out to the gunners4 ,it is reported that he did most of his observing with his head thrust up through the hatch in the roof of the ,tank1 using his feet in the gunner's ribs to indicate targets4 ,once the ,tanks were astride the enormous ,hindenburg ditch1 the enemy only offered resistance in a few places4 ,the 8,hilda10 still carrying the flag which had been several times hit but not brought down1 went on to her first objective line1 which included the main ,hindenburg front1 and support lines4 ,but the ,general's holiday was over4 ,the great problem had been triumphantly solved4 ,the next most pressing need would be for reorganisation4 ,if any of the ,tanks were required to operate again the next day1 that reorganisation must be begun at once4 ,so reluctantly leaving the 8,hilda0 to carry on to further objectives1 the ,general came back on foot1 somewhat impeded by various parties of 8unmopped up0 ,germans who insisted on surrendering to him4 ,by the afternoon1 ,general ,elles was back at his ,headquarters1 functioning by telephone and shorthand-typist in the manner usual to ,generals4 ,here and there1 after the first rush1 a desperate handful of the enemy would be rallied by their officers to defend some point of vantage4 ,at ,lateau ,wood on the right of the attack heavy fighting took place1 including a duel between a ,tank and a #e4i in4 howitzer4 ,turning on the ,tank the howitzer fired1 shattering and tearing off most of the right-hand sponson of the approaching machine1 but fortunately not injuring its vitals2 before the ,german gunners could reload1 the ,tank was upon them1 and in a few seconds the great gun was crushed in a jumbled mass amongst the brushwood surrounding it4 ,a little to the west of this wood the ,tanks of 8,f0 7the #fth7 ,battalion1 which had topped the ridge1 were speeding down on ,masnires4 ,one approached the bridge1 the key to the ,rumilly-,seranvillers ridge1 upon the capture of which so much depended4 ,the bridge had1 as the ,tank ,commander knew1 been damaged either by shell-fire or by the ,german sappers4 ,it was1 however1 most important that he should cross1 and he very pluckily1 therefore1 went for it4 ,as the ,tank neared the centre of the bridge1 there was a rending of steel girders--the bridge had broken1 and as it collapsed the ,tank disappeared into the waters of the canal4 ,other ,tanks arriving1 and not being able to cross1 assisted the infantry to do so by opening a heavy covering fire4 ,the ,tank that had fallen into the canal had been let down quite gradually into the water as the bridge slowly subsided4 ,there was but one loss4 ,the wig of one of the crew got knocked off as his head emerged from the manhole1 and it floated away down the canal and was never seen again4 ,lost to view1 its memory was kept green for many months by its injured owner's claims for compensation4 ,the dilemma which most cruelly racked the official mind was the question whether a wig came under the heading of 8,field ,equipment10 8,loss of a ,limb10 8,medical ,comfort10 8,clothing10 8,personal ,effects10 or 8,special ,tank ,stores40 ,finally1 however1 its owner did receive monetary compensation for his loss4 ,but the genius of ,comedy had not done with the ,tanks4 #de8,the town had been evacuated so suddenly by the enemy that some civilian population still remained4 8,two cows belonging to the ,german ,town ,major were solemnly presented by their ,french civilian keeper to ,major ,hammond as a token of the joy that the inhabitants felt at their liberation40 ,these absurd camp followers remained for long the most cherished possessions of the ,battalion1 and accompanied them wherever they went4 ,illustration3 ,,preparing ,,for ,,the ,,cambral4 ,a ,,train ,,of ,,tanks ,,with ,,fascines ,,in ,,position ,illustration3 ,,the ,,bapaume-,,cambrai ,,road ,illustration3 ,a ,,tank ,,crushing ,,down ,,the ,,enemy',s ,,wire ,at ,flesquires the #east ,highland ,division1 which was using an attack formation of its own1 was held up2 it appears that the ,tanks outdistanced the infantry1 or that the tactics adopted did not permit of the infantry keeping close enough up to the ,tanks4 ,as the ,tanks topped the crest1 they came under direct artillery fire at short range and suffered heavy casualties4 ,no less than sixteen ,tanks were knocked out by a single field gun4 ,this gun was at the west end of the village1 and from its position the ,tanks were each outlined against the sky as they topped the ridge4 ,its story is told in ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch1 with a generosity which might well have encouraged what the ,tank crews considered a most undesirable spirit in enemy gunners3 8,many of the hits upon our tanks at ,flesquires were obtained by a ,german artillery officer who1 remaining alone at his battery1 served a field gun single-handed until killed at his gun4 ,the great bravery of this officer aroused the admiration of all ranks40 ,there was stiff fighting at ,havrincourt1 and before nightfall the #fbnd ,division and its ,tanks had captured ,graincourt4 ,several ,tanks even pushed on beyond towards ,bourlon ,wood and the ,cambrai road1 but by this time the infantry were too exhausted to follow4 ,by #d p4m4 on ,november #bj one of the most astonishing battles in all history had been won1 and as far as the ,tank ,corps was concerned1 tactically finished4 ,there were no reserves of ,tanks1 and the crews that had fought all day were now very spent and weary4 ,the infantry were still more exhausted and a further advance was impossible4 ,the night was spent by ,tank crews and infantry in resting1 and by the ,staff in planning a renewed attack for the next day4 ,a letter home from a ,tank officer describes a typical scene3 8,we had captured the village of ,havrincourt that morning1 or rather its ruins1 and it was in the one remaining room of the once magnificent ,chteau that ,general ,john ,ponsonby1 commanding the #djth ,division1 established his ,headquarters and convened a conference for ten o'clock in the evening4 8,the road thither had already been sufficiently restored to permit of cars getting through1 granted skilful driving and good luck4 8,felled trees1 wire1 breastworks1 and other barriers had been cleared aside1 trenches and craters on both sides of ,no ,man's ,land had been roughly filled in1 whilst the notorious #8,grand ,ravine' had been made passable for carriage folk by the judicious placing of a few fascines4 8,there were a round dozen of us at the conference1 a muddy1 rather blear-eyed party1 some in tin hats and trench coats1 revolver girt--some in honorific red and gold--all with slung gas-masks4 8,general ,ponsonby and his ,g4,s4,o4,i4 sat on an old packing-case with a map spread out before them on another1 lit by the dancing flicker of two guttering candles stuck into ,german beer bottles4 ,general ,elles and ,colonel ,baker-,carr were there with a chorus of ,commanding ,officers1 ,company ,commanders and ,reconnaissance ,officers from the #ast ,tank ,brigade4 8,an armed sentry stood at the breach in the wall that served for doorway--signallers and orderlies entered and left the little circle of yellow light1 stirring up the dust from the fallen dbris on the broken floor4 8,one felt uneasily conscious of forming part of a ,graphic picture entitled #8,advanced ,headquarters1' or #8,planning the ,battle4' 8,anyway1 the battle was eventually planned and to the satisfaction of all parties present4 ,the ,g4,s4,o4,i4 finished writing his operation orders for the morning's attack1 the conference dissolved1 and we stumbled out once more into the night1 each of us with some job to get done before the dawn4 8,to me it fell to push on to the advanced ,headquarters of the ,infantry ,brigades concerned to explain the plans for the morrow's battles and to deliver certain necessary maps to the ,tank ,commanders who would be co-operating4 8,i slung the maps for easier porterage along a pole that ,i and my orderly shouldered and from which they dangled in swaying white packages to the great interest and mystification of passing troops1 to whom the bearers and the pole were invisible in the inky dark4 8,it was a weary way up to ,graincourt with nothing but gun flashes and infrequent star-shells to light the way1 but at last we reached it4 8,two of the ,infantry ,brigades had1 we found1 established their ,headquarters in a sort of catacomb underneath the ruined church--a wonderful place1 part medival and part the work of the industrious ,hun4 8,down and down you went--the old vaulted brickwork giving place to stout ,german timbering--until at the very bottom1 some hundred feet below the floor of the church1 the steep stairway ended in a gallery off which opened a whole street of little chambers4 8,the place was insufferably hot and stuffy to one fresh in from the cold of the outer night2 there was haze and reek of tobacco smoke and cooking1 half drowning the stale dank smell1 inseparable from a deep dug-out that has been long occupied--especially by ,germans4 8,graincourt had been taken by surprise and had changed hands so quickly that we had taken over these very eligible ,headquarters as a going concern #8ready furnished for immediate occupation4' 8,so sudden1 indeed1 had been the change of tenancy that the two ,boche engineers whose job it was to run the electric lighting plant had been captured in their own subterranean engine-room and were even now stolidly carrying on their old duties1 seemingly but little concerned by the fact that they were now #8under entirely new management4' 8,as it turned out1 it was very well for us that we did capture and retain this precious pair1 for when they found that they were going to be kept on to run the lighting as before1 they quite shamelessly said3 8#8,well1 if that's the case1 there's just one little point we ought to warn you about1 and that is1 if any one moves what looks like the main switch--as any one would who didn't know1 when starting up the plant--the demolition charges would be blown4 ,if you would like these removed in case of accidents1 we can show you where to dig for them--we know exactly where to find them1 as it was our job to lay them4' 8,even whilst ,i was there1 ,i saw these ruffians superintending the removal of case after case of high-explosive from cunningly concealed chambers behind the timber linings and under floors4 8,the cramped stairways1 galleries and cubby-holes were crowded with odd specimens of all ranks and arms1 some eating or talking1 others huddled uneasily asleep1 with the constant tide of traffic pouring over their sprawling limbs4 8,electric lights burned brilliantly1 and the engine sent a steady shiver through the timbered walls like the vibrations of a steamer4 8,like a ship breasting the waves1 too1 were the intermittent thud and tremor of bursting shells in the village high overhead1 or the replies of our own artillery4 8,telephones buzzed1 a typewriter rattled away1 and the clatter of plates being washed in a bucket made one wonder wistfully whether it would occur to any one to suggest that you might be hungry4 8,one ,brigadier1 presumably the first come1 sat in the utmost pomp and luxury in a sumptuous arm-chair of crimson plush1 a ci-devant drawing-room table before him1 on which was spread a large-scale detailed map of ,bourlon ,wood--a very valuable legacy left behind by the over-hasty ,boches4 8,on the walls were framed oleographs of ,hindenburg and the ,kaiser1 whilst a gilt clock still kept ,german time as it ticked above the door4 8,two tiers of wire rabbit-net bunks lined one side of the little chamber1 and a smart little stove surmounted by a fine old mirror adorned the other4 8,they are pretty sound on ,home ,comforts are the ,boches1 and they don't think twice about pinching anything they fancy from the unfortunate natives4 8,like another much advertised system of furnishing1 #8,it's so simple'6 #8,deferred ,payment1' if they will have it so--deferred1 but payment at the last--payment good and plenty or ,i'll eat my tin hat--including visor and lining40 ,v ,the next day 7,november #ba7 saw composite companies of ,tanks fighting in co-operation with new infantry4 ,but though the infantry was new1 it was unfortunately not fresh4 ,sir ,julian ,byng had no rested troops at all at his disposal4 ,it may be said that the whole of the subsequent history of the battle and its sequel hinges upon these two points4 ,all our infantry was weary in the extreme1 and most of it had never co-operated with ,tanks before4 ,consequently many strong points1 though they were finally captured1 gave us more trouble than they should4 ,on the #bast1 ,tanks attacked several villages and strong points with success4 ,thirteen ,tanks of 8,b0 7#bnd7 ,battalion surrounded the village of ,cantaing4 ,they met with a stubborn resistance as they closed in upon it4 ,to this they replied vigorously with machine-gun and #f-pounder fire1 and by noon the enemy had been driven out4 ,two ,tanks also1 of 8,b0 ,battalion1 were sent for by the infantry1 who were held up by heavy machine-gun fire outside ,noyelles4 ,in half an hour they succeeded in crushing all resistance1 setting fire to an ammunition dump and patrolling the village till the infantry took over4 ,neither ,tank was in the least hurt1 and there were no casualties among the crews4 ,twelve ,tanks of 8,h0 7#hth7 ,battalion received orders soon after #h a4m4 to attack ,fontaine-,notre-,dame4 ,the village was six miles distant1 and the ,tanks came in for severe fighting on the way there4 ,they reached their objective at about #d4cj4 ,by #e4cj they had captured it and were withdrawn after handing it over to the infantry4 ,but next day a furious ,german counter-attack dislodged our garrison4 ,we were determined to possess it1 and on the #bcrd attacked again in force4 ,the enemy was prepared1 and a desperate battle ensued among the houses4 ,twenty-four ,tanks from 8,b0 and 8,h0 ,battalions had entered the village first1 whereupon the enemy retired to the tops of the houses and rained down bombs and bullets upon the roofs of the machines4 ,the ,germans were in force1 and in the narrow streets it was difficult for the ,tanks to bring an effective fire to bear upon them4 ,the infantry was too weary to clear the place1 and after patrolling the streets the ,tanks withdrew1 as soon as darkness covered their retreat4 ,on the same day thirty-four ,tanks of the #ast ,brigade supported a brilliant attack made by the #djth ,division upon ,bourlon ,wood4 ,the wood was captured after a sharp struggle4 ,the ,tanks then pressed on towards the village1 but as at ,fontaine1 the infantry1 who had suffered severe casualties in the taking of the wood1 was too exhausted to follow up4 ,on ,november #be and #bf we renewed our attack upon ,fontaine-,notre-,dame and again tried to capture ,bourlon ,village4 ,in the end1 however1 both these important points remained in enemy hands4 ,a week had now elapsed since the launching of the battle4 ,according to the original scheme1 the action should not have been continued for more than three days1 but in spite of our original 8,self-,denying ,ordinance0 as to ground1 when desirable posts of vantage were actually in our hands1 we had fallen a prey to 8land hunger10 and had still fought on and continued to advance in order to consolidate these new and delightful possessions4 ,but now we held the extremely important tactical point formed by the heights of ,bourlon ,wood1 and it was plain that to take ,fontaine and ,bourlon ,village would cost us more than they were worth to us4 ,we had done all and more than all we set out to do4 ,the troops urgently needed resting4 ,they had had no proper rest before the battle1 and now despite their sense of victory they were extraordinarily spent4 ,the ,tanks' crews1 too1 were almost fought to a standstill1 and owing to the constant daily necessity there had been for hurrying composite companies into action1 their units had become inconveniently disorganised4 ,so on ,november #bg we rested from our labours and counted the spoil4 #df8,whatever may be the future historian's dictum as to its value1 the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai must always rank as one of the most remarkable battles ever fought4 ,on ,november #bj1 from a base of some #ac1jjj yards in width1 a penetration of no less than #aj1jjj yards was effected in twelve hours 7at the ,third ,battle of ,ypres a similar penetration took three months71 #hjjj prisoners and #ajj guns were captured1 and these prisoners alone were nearly double the casualties suffered by the #crd and #dth ,armies during the first day of the battle4 ,it is an interesting point to remember that in this battle the attacking infantry were assisted by #fij officers and #cejj other ranks of the ,tank ,corps1 a little over #djjj men1 or the strength of a strong brigade1 and that these men replaced artillery for wire-cutting1 and rendered unnecessary the old preliminary bombardment4 ,more than this1 by keeping close to the infantry1 they effected a much higher co-operation than had ever before been attainable with artillery4 ,when on ,november #ba the bells of ,london pealed forth in celebration of the victory of ,cambrai1 consciously or unconsciously to their listeners they tolled out an old tactics and rang in a new--,cambrai had become the ,valmy of a new epoch in war1 the epoch of the mechanical engineer40 ,it was a weary but satisfied body of men that ,general ,elles inspected at ,havrincourt on ,november #bi when the party broke up4 ,the #ast and #crd ,brigades were entraining immediately for ,mult and ,bray respectively1 and the #bnd was to follow them in a few days' time4 ,good-byes were exchanged1 and1 as every one thought1 the curtain rung down upon the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai4 ,part ,,ii 7,november #cj7 ,in order to understand the events that followed1 we have to imagine a victorious but very weary ,british ,army holding a newly consolidated salient against an enemy whom they have just roused to a revengeful fury by a sudden stinging slap in the face4 ,the enemy had been horribly frightened1 and now that he had recovered he realised how urgently his prestige demanded signal vindication4 ,we were1 it would seem1 half expecting in a tired unimaginative sort of way that he might hit at us on the new ,bourlon ,wood flank of our salient4 ,on the ,gouzeaucourt side were old-established defences4 ,these we held thinly--it never entering our heads apparently that he would attack an old piece of the line4 ,but the ,german ,army ,commander1 ,general von der ,marwitz1 had an ambitious scheme in his mind4 ,he meant to pinch off our salient and1 if possible1 to capture the entire third and fourth ,corps1 who held it4 ,his right wing was to operate from ,bourlon southward1 and his left from ,masnires westwards1 the two attacks converging on ,havrincourt and ,metz4 ,the attack was launched shortly after daylight on ,november #cj1 and failed completely on the right against ,bourlon ,wood2 here the enemy was caught by our artillery and machine-guns and mown down by hundreds4 ,on the left1 however1 the attack succeeded2 first1 it came as a surprise2 secondly1 the ,germans heralded their assault by lines of low-flying aeroplanes1 which made our men keep down and so lose observation4 ,under the protection of this aeroplane barrage and a very heavy trench mortar bombardment the ,german infantry advanced and speedily captured ,villers ,guislain and ,gouzeaucourt4 ,it was not till nearly ten o'clock on ,november #cj that ,brigadier-,general ,courage of the #bnd ,tank ,brigade received a telephone message warning him of the attack4 ,the ,tanks had been definitely 8dismissed10 and were busy refitting1 and at that moment every machine was in complete dshabill4 ,many of the engines were in process of being tinkered with1 and not a single ,tank was filled up or contained its battle equipment4 ,those whom some emergency has obliged to get out an ordinary car on a cold winter's morning when it has neither petrol1 oil1 nor water in it1 and has half its engine strewn about the garage1 will understand the difficulties that faced the ,tank ,corps4 ,they will realise that when no less than twenty-two ,tanks of 8,b0 7#bnd7 ,battalion had started for the battle by #ab4dj1 a very smart piece of work had been done4 ,very soon fourteen ,tanks of 8,a0 7#ast7 ,battalion followed them1 and by two o'clock twenty ,tanks of 8,h0 7#hth7 ,battalion were able to move up in support4 ,in the words of ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch1 8,great credit is due to the officers and men of the 7#bnd7 ,tank ,brigade for the speed with which they brought their ,tanks into action40 ,by the time the first twenty ,tanks reached ,gouzeaucourt1 however1 the ,guards1 who had been hurried up with all speed1 had managed to retake it1 and the ,tanks were therefore pushed out as a screen to cover their consolidation4 ,here they remained all day1 beating off enemy counter-attacks4 ,all day along both sides of the salient the enemy hammered fiercely at our lines4 ,here and there he penetrated them4 ,cooks1 servants1 and signallers1 every available man1 was given a rifle and put into the line1 and the ,despatch tells of wonderful individual deeds that were done as the battle surged and eddied confusedly4 ,we did not propose to allow the ,germans to hold their new possessions1 the points of vantage out of which they had hustled us4 ,on ,december #a1 ,tanks1 ,guards1 and dismounted ,indian cavalry hit back against ,villers ,guislain and ,gauche ,wood4 8,tanks were10 the ,despatch notes1 8in great measure responsible for the capture of the wood4 ,heavy fighting took place for this position1 which it is clear that the enemy had decided to hold at all costs4 ,when the infantry and cavalry finally took possession of the wood1 great numbers of ,german dead and smashed machine-guns were found4 ,in one spot four ,german machine-guns1 with dead crews lying round1 were discovered within a radius of twenty yards4 ,three ,german field guns1 complete with teams1 were also captured in this wood4 8,other ,tanks proceeded to ,villers ,guislain1 and in spite of heavy direct artillery fire three reached the outskirts of the village1 but the fire of the enemy's machine-guns prevented our troops advancing from the south from supporting them1 and the ,tanks ultimately withdrew40 ,for two more days the enemy pressed on against us1 and the battle raged round ,bourlon1 ,fontaine1 ,marcoing1 and ,la ,vacquerie4 ,everywhere he dented in our line1 and by ,december #d the outline of our front showed an impossible series of irregularities4 ,we must either renew the attack on a big scale1 or make up our minds #dg8to withdraw to a more compact line on the ,flesquires ,ridge4 8,although this decision involved giving up important positions most gallantly won1 ,i had no doubt as to the correct course under the conditions4 ,accordingly1 on the night of ,december #d-e the evacuation of the positions held by us north of the ,flesquires ,ridge was commenced4 ,on the morning of ,december #g this withdrawal was completed successfully without interference from the enemy40 ,it is as well that the enemy did not 8interfere10 for through some oversight the ,tanks did not receive due notice of the intended withdrawal1 and certain salvage parties1 busily at work on disabled ,tanks1 in forward positions1 knew nothing of the evacuation until1 to their astonishment1 they found our infantry streaming back past them in the darkness4 ,there was then nothing for it but to abandon the wrecks and to get back themselves with such gear as they could carry4 ,so ended the second phase of the battle4 ,it had been an exceedingly vexatious business4 ,putting the best construction we could upon it1 we had to admit to having been caught napping4 ,the ,german attack had thrown us into complete1 if momentary1 confusion4 ,but afterwards1 when the situation could be calmly reviewed1 contemporary criticism was unanimously agreed that we had1 after all1 suffered little but moral damage4 ,and from that sort of damage the ,british have the art of deriving wholesome instruction in a unique degree4 ,we braced ourselves up1 and determined that this sharp rap over the knuckles should do us good4 ,but to the ,tank ,corps the exploits of the #bnd ,brigade were more directly advantageous4 ,amid the hubbub and confusion the ,tank crews1 like the ,guards and the #bnd ,cavalry ,division1 had known but one impulse--they had gone straight east against the enemy4 ,that was the pole to which their compass pointed4 ,while everything had been doubt and hesitation they had had but one thought1 to fill and adjust their machines and hurry them forward4 ,at #i a4m4 the ,tank crews had been peacefully preparing to break camp and leave for their training area4 ,by four in the afternoon seventy-three ,tanks had been launched with decisive effect against the enemy4 ,to many ,high ,commanders who had believed that ,tanks could only be used in a 8full-dress0 attack after weeks of preparation1 the events of ,november #cj came as a joyful revelation4 ,so for the ,tanks ended the #aiag campaign4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,three ,,new ,,types ,,of ,,tank--,,the ,,depot--,,central ,,workshops ,i ,the 8,fighting ,side0 had now been for many months almost exclusively engaged with 8operations10 and having fought themselves nearly to a standstill at the ,battle of ,cambrai1 were now in as urgent need of reorganisation as were their machines of overhaul and repair4 ,the present chronicle has also for long followed their fortunes1 with not a glance to spare for the activities of the manufacturing and other organisations which played the supporting parts 8,aaron and ,hur0 to the ,fighting ,side's 8,moses40 ,at the period we have reached it is high time to pick up the dropped histories of the other persons of the drama4 ,for while the ,tank ,corps had been fighting1 manufacturers had been busy1 and a huge network of auxiliary services and organisations had grown up1 by means of which the whole ,corps was to rise rejuvenated from its ashes4 ,before the ,tanks fought their next pitched battle the ,mark ,v4 had come into being1 ,whippet ,tanks had been issued1 a heavy type of infantry-carrying ,tank had been designed1 and for fast work on good roads a ,battalion of ,armoured ,cars had grown up4 ,besides this1 a complete system of ,supply ,tanks and ,field ,maintenance ,companies for salvage and supplies had been gradually evolved during the course of the last campaign4 ,the ,tank ,corps ,depot had been enormously enlarged1 and had moved to its final 8location0 on the coast near ,le ,trport4 ,the ,home ,depot at ,wool had also increased1 and there had been changes and developments at the ,ministry of ,munitions and in the ,tank production side generally4 ,it is in fact impossible in a single chapter to give more than a brief indication of this universal and increasing 8back area0 activity4 ,to begin with the changes in the home organisation and in the production of ,tanks4 ,the 8,new0 ,tank ,committee was1 as we have already related1 a success4 ,in ,december #aiag and ,january #aiah it saw a rather interesting new phase1 when ,majors ,drain and ,alden1 of the ,u4,s4 ,tank ,corps1 attended certain of its meetings1 and when the manufacture for the ,british and ,american ,armies of the ,mark ,,viii4 or 8,allied ,tank0 was decided upon4 ,this ,tank was never fought1 but its projection is perhaps interesting as an example of inter-,allied solidarity4 ,by ,january #aiah proposals for an expansion from nine to eighteen ,battalions and for a reorganisation of ,tank control had been put forward4 ,these proposals were eventually 7in ,april #aiah7 discussed by the ,inter-,allied ,tank ,committee1 a sort of sub-committee of the ,versailles ,conference1 on which the ,british1 ,french and ,american ,tank ,corps were represented4 ,but neither men nor really constructive thought could then be spared from the immediate needs of meeting the ,german onrush1 and nothing was done to realise their proposals until that onrush was finally stemmed4 ,but in ,july #aiah the business was taken up again4 ,it was decided to expand the ,tank ,corps to thirty-four ,battalions armed with about six thousand machines4 ,,ii ,in ,december #aiag the manufacturing situation was not particularly satisfactory4 ,as late as ,august #bj the ,commander-in-,chief had1 it will be remembered1 laid down1 in an official letter1 an order of priority in which there were four categories preferred to ,tanks4 8,the manufacture of ,tanks should not be allowed to interfere in any way with3 87#a7 ,the output of aeroplanes4 87#b7 ,the output of guns and ammunition4 87#c7 ,the provision of mechanical transport1 spare parts therefor1 and petrol tractors up to the scale demanded4 87#d7 ,the provision of locomotives up to the scale demanded4 ,and though by ,december the views of the authorities had changed considerably1 the sudden expansion of the ,tank building programme was not easy4 ,in ,october #aiag1 #gjj ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks had already been delivered in ,france1 and a balance of about #ejj was still due4 ,but the ,fighting ,side was anxious that these should not all be of the unimproved ,mark ,,iv4 pattern4 ,for up to now no change in the design had been made since the first ,mark ,,iv4 had been delivered4 ,it was decided1 therefore1 that some of the #ejj should be given ,ricardo engines and ,epicyclic gears1 and that others should be fitted as ,supply ,tanks4 ,the ,m4,w4,s4,d4 hoped to build about #afjj new ,heavy ,tanks1 #hjj of which were to be of the ,mark ,v4 type and ready by ,may #a1 and the others to be of other heavy types1 probably ,mark ,v4 star and ,mark ,,vi41 while #che ,whippet 78,medium ,a07 ,tanks were also to be ready by ,may #aiah4 ,further1 there was to be a small cadre of ,salvage ,tanks and of special infantry ,supply ,tanks1 two of the latter being able to carry complete supplies for an infantry ,brigade for one day4 ,a large number of these ,tanks were as before to be built by the ,metropolitan ,carriage and ,wagon ,company4 ,a very brief account of most of these new types of ,tank has already been given in ,chapter ,i41 and it is not necessary to repeat here the details of their speeds1 armament1 and so forth4 ,salvage ,tanks were usually ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks on which special gear1 such as winches and small cranes1 had been fitted for hoisting wrecks out of the mud1 or for towing4 ,the ,supply ,tank was a ,mark ,,iv4 fitted with very capacious sponsons4 ,in order to save weight these carriers were not made as fully armoured as the fighting ,tanks4 ,the ,gun ,carrier ,tank was a machine with an elongated tail which formed a platform whence it was intended that a #fj-pounder gun or a #f-;in4 howitzer could be fired4 ,the ,tank ,corps ,armoured ,cars were of the usual turreted pattern1 and were armed with machine-guns4 ,but more important than any other new development was the improvement in the main issue of heavy ,tanks1 an improvement which is very well described by the historian of the #acth ,battalion3 8,the old ,mark ,,iv4 type had serious disadvantages4 ,its engine power on bad ground was insufficient1 and the clumsy secondary gears made turning slow and difficult as well as requiring the services of at least two members of the crew in addition to the driver4 ,this1 in battle1 became a heavy handicap upon the fighting powers of the ,tank4 ,the officer was hampered by the need to attend to brakes1 and a gunner called upon suddenly to help alter gears would lose the fleeting chance of firing at favourable targets4 ,in the new ,mark ,v4 ,tank these troubles largely disappeared4 ,an engine of new design gave both greater speed and greater turning power1 while a system of epicyclic gears made turning easy and under the sole control of the driver4 ,the officer was free to supervise his crew1 the gunner was free to use his weapons to the best advantage4 ,add that a greatly increased field of view was obtained by the addition of an observer's turret1 and it will be understood that an immense advance in type had been secured40 ,the ,mark ,v4 had1 however1 one serious drawback4 ,its ventilation was extremely faulty4 ,we shall see later how serious a disadvantage this was to prove4 ,,iii ,there were also to be changes in the technical and mechanical engineering side of the ,tank ,corps itself1 by which an economy of man-power was to be effected4 ,when the ,tank ,corps was first formed each ,company had its own workshops1 and this system lasted to the end of #aiaf4 ,then in the course of the winter reorganisation1 ,company ,workshops were abolished and ,battalion ,workshops were substituted4 ,by the autumn of #aiag the experiment was tried of centralising still further and merging ,battalion into ,brigade ,workshops1 and early in #aiah it was decided to take the last step and to concentrate all repairs in the ,central ,workshops4 ,this system1 which achieved a great economy of skilled men1 was made possible by a very clear line of demarcation being drawn between ,repairs and ,maintenance1 a principle which had been laid down by ,colonel ,f4 ,searle1 ,d4,s4,o41 the chief engineer of the ,corps and the head of the whole mechanical side of the ,tanks4 ,no damaged part was ever to be repaired on the field2 mechanical efficiency was to be maintained by the broken bit of mechanism being immediately replaced by a complete new part4 ,this replacement was carried out by the crew1 whose efficiency as mechanics was enormously increased by being thus made responsible for their own machines4 ,one point had1 of course1 to be carefully attended to in carrying out this system4 ,there had to be a very efficient supply organisation by which the necessary spares were quickly available in the field4 ,when the crew had removed the damaged part from the ,tank1 it was sent back to the ,central ,workshops to be repaired4 ,here a specially skilled man would be always employed upon damages to one particular part4 #dh8;,for example1 broken unions of petrol pipes commonly occur in all petrol engines1 and if a small unit workshop exists1 the brazing out and repair of such broken unions can be carried out there4 ,but in order to do this a coppersmith must be kept at the unit workshop1 and only part of his time will be employed in this work of brazing petrol unions4 ,if now1 however1 all broken unions1 from every unit1 are sent back to a ,central ,workshop for repair1 there is a sufficient amount of work of this description to keep one man1 or possibly two or three men fully employed all their time4 8,these men become absolute experts in brazing broken unions1 and before very long can do in a few minutes a job which would take a coppersmith with the unit workshop an hour or two to carry out40 ,it is interesting to trace what might have been the itinerary of a ,tank from the time it left the manufacturers in about ,midsummer #aiag1 till after going into action in1 say1 the ,third ,battle of ,ypres4 ,on completion every ,tank was first sent to testing grounds at ,newbury1 where it was manned by ,no4 #bj ,squadron ,r4,n4,a4,s4 ,from here it was forwarded to ,richborough1 whence it was shipped by the ,channel ferry and received at ,le ,havre by another detachment of ,squadron #bj4 ,thence it went to ,bermicourt1 was again tested1 this time by ,tank ,corps personnel1 and then handed on to the ,central ,stores at ,erin4 ,these stores were first established in #aiag1 and eventually consisted of over seven acres of railway siding and six acres of buildings4 ,the ,central ,workshops were at one time also installed here1 but as more accommodation became necessary they were moved to ,teneur1 about a mile and a half away4 ,from the ,central ,stores the ,tanks would be issued to ,battalions as needed4 ,for example1 during the ,third ,battle of ,ypres a large number of ,tanks were supplied to ,companies actually in the line4 ,we will suppose that a particular ,tank was so supplied1 and received a bullet through its carburettor during one of the small actions of the end of ,october4 ,the crew would immediately draw a new carburettor from the neighbouring mobile advanced store1 which was run by one of the two ,tank ,salvage or ,field ,companies4 ,thus re-equipped the ,tank would again go into action1 perhaps within a day of being damaged4 ,this time we will suppose that the ,tank got knocked out between the first and second objective by a direct hit1 the unwounded members of the crew going forward with their ,lewis guns and leaving the ,tank stranded and immovable4 ,the position of the derelict having been reported1 men from a ,tank ,salvage ,company would go up that night1 probably under shell-fire1 and possibly in full view of the enemy whenever a ,vry light went up4 ,the experts would arrive at the wreck with their favourite set of repairing tools1 possibly consisting of the specially designed ,tank-repairing outfit1 but more probably of a few pet spanners1 some odd lengths of tubing and a coil of copper wire4 ,they would toil at the ,tank till dawn4 ,sometimes after one or more nights spent like this they would induce the ,tank to go4 ,in the ,ypres area ,tanks were sometimes salved that had completely disappeared into the mud4 ,sometimes it was possible to tow a machine away1 particularly after the special salvage ,tanks with their hoisting gear came into use4 ,sometimes only disjecta membra1 such as engine parts1 #f-pounders1 or parts of the gears or transmissions1 could be saved4 ,during the two years of their existence the ,field ,companies1 at the lowest computation1 saved two or three million pounds' worth of stores1 a work which they did not accomplish without heavy cost to themselves4 ,we will suppose that the ,tank whose history we have followed was salved whole4 ,the next step would be that it would be entrained by the ,field ,company and sent back to the ,central ,workshops at ,teneur4 ,this was really a vast engineering works covering about twenty acres of ground1 where1 besides a very large number of trained and expert mechanics1 more than a thousand ,chinese coolies worked4 ,these coolies often became very dexterous artisans4 ,here1 in endless ranks down the long shops1 they would toil indefatigably1 in the summer stripped to the waist1 their brown bodies gleaming in the white light of the arc lamps or in the glow of the forges1 or in the winter dressed in their loose blue quilted jackets and close caps with curious rabbits' fur ear-lappets4 ,possibly the shattered or burnt-out ,tank would have to be almost entirely rebuilt1 two wrecked ,tanks providing1 perhaps1 parts enough to make one good one4 ,here1 finally1 the reconstructed ,tank would be tested and sent back to the ,central ,stores4 ,possibly it would have been reduced to a sort of 8,c4 ,,iii40 category1 and made into a ,supply ,tank4 ,possibly it would have been fitted with all the latest gadgets1 and come out from its reforging a better weapon than it was originally4 ,for the activities of the ,central ,workshops were not confined to mere repair4 ,it will be remembered how they distinguished themselves in the matter of the lightning delivery of fascines1 releasing gear1 and supply sledges for the ,battle of ,cambrai4 ,a large proportion1 too1 of the experiments which led to improvements in the design of ,tanks were carried out here2 for example1 the long ,tank and the unditching beam were of ,central ,workshops origin1 and here the officers who fought the ,tanks could have their ideas for gadgets sympathetically reviewed and put to practical proof by the band of expert engineers that ,lieut4-,colonel ,brocklebank had brought together4 ,but they were more than mere experts2 they were enthusiasts whose unflagging zeal had created the marvel of ,central ,workshops where there had been bare ploughland so short a time before4 ,,iv ,we have traced a ,tank from its setting forth from home with unscratched paint through the vicissitudes of battle to its remoulding as a greatly improved machine or to its relegation to 8,permanent ,base40 ,how would the military history run of a member of a ,tank crew which had fought1 say1 at the ,battle of ,cambrai8 ,we have already related how the ,tank ,corps was chiefly recruited in early days1 that is1 either from among mechanical experts or from volunteers from other branches of the ,service4 ,later men with no special qualifications were taken by direct enlistment4 ,we will suppose1 however1 that #abcd ,pte4 ,john ,smith got his transfer from the ,west ,surreys when in the line in about ,june #aiag1 and that at that moment the training schools in ,france had no vacancies4 ,to their great joy1 therefore1 ,pte4 ,smith and his batch would be sent home for training to the ,tank ,depot at ,wool4 ,here was a huge camp where men like themselves1 who had seen fighting1 and also men fresh from the ,recruiting ,depots1 were being formed into the new ,tank ,battalions4 ,by ,july about nine of these new ,battalions were in training4 ,the men went through the usual recruits' curriculum4 ,first of all1 drill1 discipline and physical training2 then individual courses in ,tank ,gunnery1 ,driving and ,maintenance4 ,then they would go through the ,signalling1 ,revolver and ,compass ,schools1 the ,gas and ,reconnaissance ,schools4 ,there was also here an ,officer ,cadet ,preliminary ,training ,company where the same sort of instruction was given4 ,gunners at this time did all their firing practice with #f-pounders at the ,naval ,school of ,gunnery1 ,chatham1 or rather1 to be exact1 on 8,h4,m4,s4 ,excellent10 ,whale ,island4 ,all the other courses were gone through in and around the camp4 ,practically1 only individual instruction was given at ,wool1 and their collective and tactical training was done by the men at ,bermicourt1 after their arrival in ,france4 ,at ,wool it was reckoned that1 with this important omission1 nearly four months would usually be occupied in raising and training a ,tank ,battalion4 ,it would1 therefore1 be towards the end of ,september that ,pte4 ,smith found himself in ,france4 ,he was1 he found1 to be detailed to one of the old ,battalions1 and was1 therefore1 despatched to the ,training and ,reinforcement ,depot1 then established at ,erin1 and later to be moved to ,le ,trport4 ,here he was attached to a ,reception ,company1 put through a kind of examination in the subjects he had studied at ,wool1 but passing satisfactorily and his records being duly completed1 he was issued with his kit and equipment and posted to his ,company4 ,he was soon sent to join it at an improvised training area where it was at this moment 8resting0 from the ,battle of ,ypres4 ,it was not actually having a particularly restful time1 as tactical training with the infantry was in progress1 and there was more than enough night work in the programme4 ,illustration3 ,,sledge-,,towing ,,tank ,,taking ,,up ,,supplies ,illustration3 ,,bermicourt ,,chateau ,,near ,,st4 ,,pol4 ,,tank ,,corps ,,main ,,headquarters ,illustration3 ,,gun-,,carrying ,,tank ,,taking ,,up ,a ,,howitzer ,illustration3 ,a ,,whippet ,,going ,,in ,this phase did not last long1 however1 for the ,company was soon sent back to join its ,battalion in the ,salient1 where they executed an astonishing number of moves and were considerably shelled1 but never succeeded in getting into action4 ,after that they were hurried off to do intensive training for ,cambrai4 ,then came the battle1 in the last three days of which a very much exhausted #bnd ,driver ,smith was wounded in the face by a bullet splash4 ,the trouble was not serious enough to get him to ,england1 and on his return from an all too brief stay in a ,hospital in ,france1 he again found himself at the ,depot4 ,this time1 after only a day in the ,reception ,company and after a medical examination1 he was posted for fourteen days to the ,seaside ,rest ,camp at ,merlimont4 ,this ,rest ,camp consisted of rows and rows of rather pretty bungalows built among the sand dunes4 ,here both men and officers were given a very pleasant time1 though they were still under military discipline and had a certain number of parades to keep4 ,for the officers there was a comfortable club1 and for the men an exceedingly well-run ,y4,m4,c4,a4 hut1 where there were concerts or pierrot shows almost nightly--either home-grown or imported4 ,games and1 in summer1 swimming and bathing were great features4 ,there is no doubt1 first1 that the ,camp was immensely popular1 and1 secondly1 that the ,tank ,corps owed a good deal of its cheerful spirit and high moral to the refreshment which the ,camp afforded to many a weary body and mind4 ,after this fortnight by the sea ,smith rejoined his ,battalion1 and was1 with the rest of the ,tank world1 plunged into winter training4 ,v ,the general organisation of the #aiag-ah training1 though1 of course1 on a much larger scale1 was very much like that of the previous winter4 ,new training centres had been established and old centres extended4 ,but perhaps a chronicle of the numbers who passed through these courses of instruction at ,wailly1 ,le ,trport1 ,bermicourt and ,merlimont1 and of the sequence in which the different ,brigades took their turns at the different areas1 might prove less interesting than a brief account of what was actually taught and of the sort of way a syllabus would be carried out4 ,in the official 8,instructions for the ,training of the ,tank ,corps in ,france0 these are the sort of general principles we find laid down3 8,all work must be carried out at high pressure4 ,every exercise and movement should1 if possible1 be reduced to a precise drill4 8,games will be organised as a definite part of training 7see ,s4,s4 #acg1 #8,recreational ,training'74 8,order is best cultivated by carrying out all work on a fixed plan4 ,order is the foundation of discipline4 ,small things like marching men always at attention to and from work1 making them stand to attention before dismissing them1 assist in cultivating steadiness and discipline4 ,each day should commence with a careful inspection of the billets and the men1 or some similar formal parade4 ,strict march discipline to and from the training grounds must be insisted upon4 8,it is an essential part of training for war that the men are taught to care for themselves1 so as to maintain their physical fitness4 ,to this end the necessity for taking the most scrupulous care of their clothing1 equipment and accoutrements will be explained to them40 ,the following is the syllabus 7slightly condensed7 of a ,maintenance ,course for ,tank ,commanders3 ,how to drive a ,tank4 ,how to set a magneto4 ,when an engine is misfiring or overheating4 ,when an engine is knocking too badly to continue working or is not pulling4 ,when carburation is bad4 ,when a ,tank is at such an angle that it is dangerous to run the engine4 ,the causes of engine failures and how to correct them4 ,how the autovac works4 ,the correct tension for fan belts4 ,when an engine bed is loose4 ,how much petrol1 oil1 grease1 and water should be used during average hour's run4 ,when road chain sprocket wheels or pinions should be changed4 ,how long it takes to change a set of sprocket wheels and pinions4 ,when a track or the ,coventry driving chains are too slack4 ,when a clutch is too fierce1 and how to correct it4 ,when a clutch is slipping1 and how to adjust it4 ,when secondary gears are too much worn for further service1 and what is the effect of their not being fully in mesh4 ,how long it takes to change such gears4 ,when tracks or secondary gears are over or under lubricated4 ,when brakes are operative or not4 ,how long it takes to prepare a ,tank for a day's run4 ,how long it takes thoroughly to clean and adjust a ,tank after a day's work4 ,how long it takes to detrain ,tanks and adjust sponsons4 ,how the equipment of a ,tank should be stowed4 ,the appliances which are necessary to dismantle various sections of a ,tank1 and how it should be done4 ,that it is just as necessary for a ,company ,commander to inspect ,tanks daily as it is for a ,cavalry ,squadron ,commander to inspect his horses4 ,for an interesting 8,immediate ,action ,course10 i4e41 first aid to the engine1 the following directions are given to instructors3 8,in order to inspire confidence at the outset1 particular stress should be laid upon the fact that in a ,tank there are practically only three causes of engine failure--,valves--,ignition--,petrol4 8,if this is borne in mind1 a very little experience in the simple operations connected with these three functions1 coupled with a little training in diagnosis1 will enable students to deal very easily with troubles as they occur4 8,drivers should know by the #8feel' of their engine whether it is firing correctly or not1 and any member of a crew ought to be able to detect and report at once any irregularity in the sound of an exhaust from outside the machine4 8,when the students have been through a course 7using the book7 of what to do when3 8#a4 ,the ,engine won't start1 8#b4 ,engine starts and stops after a few ,revs1 8#c4 ,irregular sound of exhaust--machine will not climb1 8#d4 ,popping back of ,carburettor1 8#e4 ,overheating and knocking1 the ,instructor is to set up faults for the students to remedy40 ,he is given ideas for nearly fifteen ways of producing the symptom 8,engine won't start40 8,it is suggested that the ,instructor should insert a piece of paper between the platinum points in the little magneto1 or fit a faulty contact breaker with a stiff rocker in the big magneto1 or smear segments and outside of the distributor with a little dirty oil2 if he desires to queer the plugs1 he may insert one with its gap closed up or bridged with dirt or with a cracked insulation4 ,to produce symptom ,no4 #b1 he may insert a punctured float in the ,carburettor or insert a piece of rag in the passage between the float chamber and the jets1 or block a cock under the ,autovac4 ,or in order to produce an irregular sound in the exhaust and to make the machine refuse to climb1 he may remove the roller and pin from one or more inlet valves2 or place two faulty plugs in the engine4 ,to make the engine overheat1 he is to insert an extra link in the ,radiator ,fan ,bolt1 open the ,air ,slide1 or start a leak in one or more of the water outlet elbows4 ,he may make the engine tap and rattle by adjusting the valves with abnormal clearances1 and so on with the number of other defects1 which each student in turn is to be called upon to diagnose and remedy40 ,for the conduct of a 8,refresher0 ,battle ,practice ,course the following points are suggested for the guidance of instructors3 8,the ammunition required for each man firing will be #bj rounds of shell1 #e rounds of case shot1 and #bej rounds of ,s4,a4,a4 8,before beginning a ,battle ,practice1 the following points must be seen to3 8,that each practice or scheme is of a practical nature1 i4e41 that it should bring out certain lessons under as near battle conditions as possible4 8,all ports1 etc41 in the ,tanks will be closed during the practice4 ,targets should represent as nearly as possible those met with in action4 ,the practice must not be hurried and the ,tank must never contain more than the normal crew4 ,students should be allowed to ride on the top of the ,tanks1 in order to observe the fire effect4 ,in this way1 by observing the faults of others1 they should be able to avoid committing the same errors themselves1 when their turn comes to fire4 8,battle ,practice exercises must be regarded by the ,tank ,crews as what the ,field firing practices are to the ,infantry4 8,vizors and ,gas-,masks must frequently be worn during a ,battle ,practice ,course4 8,before the ,battle ,practice begins1 ,crews and ,gunners will form up outside the ,tanks and the scheme of attack will be explained to them2 also how it is intended to carry out the attack and what are their objectives4 ,all drivers and gunners must fully understand the scheme of attack and what is expected of them2 they must be told to ask their ,tank ,commander to explain any point that does not appear clear to them4 ,positions where ,anti-,tank guns are expected must be pointed out to them on a map1 and other information of this type may be given4 ,this will add to the keenness and interest of the men4 8,drivers must be reminded that the goodness or badness of the shooting will probably depend upon their driving4 8,the ,gunnery ,officer must see that the targets are sited properly2 he should always go over the ,course in a ,tank previous to the practice to satisfy himself on these points4 8,if flashes are to be used1 or moving targets employed1 he must see that the fatigue men know their work1 and the ,gunnery ,officer should always give these fatigue men one rehearsal before a ,battle ,practice ,course1 as it is most important for everything to go smoothly on the day4 8,n4,c4,o4 ,instructors must be told off1 one to each gun in the ,tank which is firing1 and their duty will be to see that points taught in the elementary training are brought into play and that the necessary safety precautions are adhered to4 8,there will always be a conference at the end of each ,battle ,practice exercise4 ,all members of the crews1 students1 instructors1 etc41 will attend4 ,constructive criticism and encouragement should be the tone of the conference4 ,faults brought to light should be carefully explained so that all can hear1 learn and correct1 in the future4 ,the ,gunner is as anxious to learn and to improve his shooting as is the ,instructor to have a pupil who will do him credit40 ,very excellent courses were also arranged in the ,reconnaissance ,schools4 ,but almost the most interesting of the ,reconnaissance ,side's activities was the series of improvised courses--outdoor schemes1 indoor practices and lectures which they arranged during the weary time while the ,tank ,corps 8stood to quarters0 through ,january1 ,february and early ,march #aiah4 ,the events of this time we propose to chronicle in the next chapter but one4 ,there had by this time been many other ,tank activities which we have not at present chronicled at all4 ,the ,french had trained and equipped a ,tank ,corps4 ,the ,americans were busy with ,tanks1 and a ,detachment of our own ,corps had fought in two engagements in ,palestine4 ,note to ,chapter ,,xi ,stories of the early days of ,wool are related in the #fth ,battalion ,history4 ,when the first few consignments of ,tanks were sent to the ,camp at ,bovington from ,wool ,station the most elaborate precautions were taken to secure the machines from the eyes of the profane4 ,the route was guarded by military policemen marshalled by ,a4,p4,m4's4 ,all civilian traffic was stopped1 and--as if the ,tanks had been so many ,lady ,godivas--all the blinds in the front rooms of the farms and cottages which bordered the roads had to be drawn1 and all the inhabitants were relegated to the back rooms4 ,this ritual was observed every time a batch of ,tanks arrived4 ,one farmer remarked that he was delighted to help keep the secret in any manner that seemed good to the authorities1 but he thought they might like to know that a day or two before a ,tank had broken down and that he and his horses had helped to tow it into his yard1 where it had remained for forty-eight hours4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,the ,,french ,,tank ,,corps--,,american ,,tanks ,,and ,,british ,,tanks ,,in ,,egypt ,it is said that there is something in the ,anglo-,saxon mind which has a special affinity for committees4 8,enough10 said the logical ,asiatic when the doctrine of the ,trinity was being explained to him by the ,english missionary1 8,i understand you perfectly4 ,it is a ,committee of three40 ,at least1 there is no doubt that the ,british ,tank sprang from committees1 and was matured and licked into shape entirely by a large assortment of these excellent bodies4 ,so with the ,american ,tank ,corps4 ,three or four names are equally illustrious in its early annals4 ,but with the ,french1 one man1 and one man only1 stands out as the ,father and ,mother of ,tanks4 ,he was the ,general ,swinton1 the ,sir ,albert ,stern1 and the ,general ,elles of the ,french ,tanks4 ,that is to say1 he was first the principal independent inventor1 deriving his inspiration 7in early #aiae7 from ,holt ,tractors which he saw at work with the ,british4 ,then he was for long the principal 8propellant0 of the ,tank idea in official quarters1 and was the ,commander-in-,chief's delegate to the ,ministry of ,munitions in the matter of ,tanks4 ,finally1 on ,september #cj1 #aiaf1 he was gazetted 8,commandant de l',artillerie d',assaut#di aux ,armes40 ,so much did the personality of this remarkable man permeate and vitalise the ,french ,tank ,corps that we offer no apology to the reader in setting forth the following delightful miniature biography of ,general ,estienne by the hand of ,major ,robert ,spencer1 the ,british ,liaison ,officer to the ,french ,tank ,corps3 8,jean ,baptiste ,eugne ,estienne was born at ,cond en ,barrois 7,lorraine7 on ,november #g1 #ahfj4 ,owing to the trend of events during the ,franco-,prussian ,war of #ahgj-ga his school1 the ,lyce of ,bar le ,duc1 was forced to shut1 and it was whilst enjoying an enforced holiday at the age of ten years at ,cond with his parents that his idea of embracing a military career was born4 ,he was one day an interested spectator of the passage of a column of ,prussian artillery through the paved streets of his native town1 and was lost in youthful admiration of this display of military power4 ,he hastened back to tell his parents of his decision one day to enter as a conqueror into a town with his guns clattering behind him4 8,from this hour he became wedded to an artillery-man's life1 and in due course passed in and out of the famous cole ,polytechnique1 where his mathematical ability enjoyed full scope4 8,in due course1 too1 he passed through the artillery school of ,fontainebleau1 and in #ahhd entered the garrison town of ,vannes as a ,second ,lieutenant4 8,promoted ,captain in #ahia1 he completed his studies in the use of the collimateur#ej and became the apostle of the use of direct fire for field artillery1 which he eventually succeeded in introducing in the ,french ,army4 ,in #aiji he was summoned to ,vincennes with a view to determining if any use could be made of aeroplanes in conjunction with field artillery1 and succeeded in establishing a part for ,f4,a4 aircraft service4 ,this1 however1 was transferred to the ,r4,e4 and ,lieut4-,colonel ,estienne consequently asked to be returned to regimental duty4 8,in #aiac he was again summoned to ,vincennes to continue his research1 and was here at the outbreak of war1 when he obtained command of the #bbnd ,regiment of ,artillery4 ,this he commanded in ,belgium and throughout the retreat from ,charleroi to the ,seine4 ,he had with him his two experimental aeroplanes1 which rendered invaluable service during the ,battle of the ,marne1 where he served under ,general ,ptain4 8,it was during the retreat that ,colonel ,estienne first spoke to members of his ,staff of the future which would attend a machine capable of crossing ploughed fields and trenches1 transporting arms and men4 ,with this thought in his mind he was wont to invite his casual visitors and members of his ,staff to assume all manner of peculiar attitudes under tables1 etc41 with a view to determining how many human beings could conveniently be crammed in a certain cubic area4 8,his last command before being selected to father the future ,chars d',assaut was at ,verdun1 when he did not hesitate to employ a barrage of his heavy guns to break up a threatening ,german attack4 8,as a man he appears to enjoy perpetual youth4 ,he is short of stature1 with no neck and a large round head4 ,his hair is white1 plentiful and worn en brosse1 and he appears to be clean-shaven1 so short is his clipped white moustache4 8,two things strike one immediately1 the charm of his perennial smile and the quick brilliance of his brown eyes4 8,as a raconteur he is inimitable1 whilst as a lecturer his marvellous power of expression1 his command of vocabulary and his convincing use of simile make it possible for him to communicate to his less erudite audiences a certain measure of his vast knowledge4 ,this is by no means confined to military subjects1 and his power of quotation from the classics is marked1 whilst he has at least once published a lengthy poem in a volume dealing with the mathematics of gunnery4 8,as an ardent philologist1 he bristles all over at the sound of the word #8,tancque' from ,french lips1 and opens a violent crusade against the use of foreign words as a substitute for good ,french equivalents4 8,his voice is loud and resonant and his speech accompanied by frequent gestures1 his favourite being the placing of his left hand flat upon his chest as if he implies that his utterances emanate from his heart4 8,he possesses many characteristic attitudes1 and when in conversation is often to be seen tossing his kpi from one side of his head to the other4 ,in fact it is scarcely ever to be seen except jauntily tilted over one ear4 8,his admiration for the cavalryman at the head of a triumphal entry into a town is reduced to nothingness by his conviction that he is useless in modern war4 ,he would prefer to see a victorious ,general enter a town on foot1 escorted by a section of ,chars d',assaut1 as being more typical of the present-day battlefield4 8,he is himself a great walker1 and may frequently be seen alone1 wearing1 as is his wont1 a pair of pale blue spats or gaiters1 a relic of the ,empire uniform1 and in summer no socks4 8,this latter habit was recommended to him by a friend1 and its adoption by him is typical of the man in that he is always prepared to give careful thought and personal trial to any scheme laid before him4 8,to this quality1 added to his immense personal charm and vast experience1 is due his undoubted right to rank amongst the big men of this war1 a successful issue to which has ever been the dream of his life40 ,on ,december #a1 #aiae1 ,colonel ,estienne wrote an official letter to the ,commander-in-,chief of the ,french ,armies in which he outlined the idea of a new engine of war exactly as ,colonel ,swinton had done earlier in the year to our own ,war ,office4 ,a few days later he was given an interview at ,french ,general ,headquarters1 when he was able to enlarge upon his theories as to the new arm4 ,here he must1 one conjectures1 have received some encouragement1 for about a week afterwards he visited the ,schneider ,engineering ,works in ,paris and discussed mechanical details with the management4 ,but the good seed which ,colonel ,estienne had sown at ,headquarters would1 he knew1 take some time to germinate4 ,he returned to his command1 now the artillery of the #crd ,corps1 at that time before ,verdun4 ,all the while he kept unofficially in touch with the ,schneider ,works4 ,at last1 about ,february #be1 #aiaf1 he learned that the ,under-,secretary's ,department for ,artillery had decided to place an order for #djj armoured vehicles with ,schneider's4 ,but about two months later1 at the end of ,april1 he heard a more surprising piece of news4 ,the ,under-,secretary's ,department had1 without the approval of the ,commander-in-,chief or any notice to him1 ,estienne1 placed an order for a further #djj vehicles of a different and heavier type1 driven by a petrol-electric motor4 ,curious as was their parentage1 these #djj machines were actually made and were known as the ,st4 ,chamond ,tanks4 ,it is said to have been upon stolen drawings of this type that the ,germans afterwards based their still heavier1 8,hagens0 and 8,schultzes40 ,in the course of the summer1 the new ,french ,ministry of ,munitions formed an experimental and instructional area at ,marly-le-,roi1 and in the early autumn1 ,colonel ,estienne was gazetted to the command of the ,french ,tanks1 and1 as we have said1 to be delegate1 as far as this arm was concerned1 from the ,commander-in-,chief to the ,ministry of ,munitions4 ,like the ,british1 the ,french were beginning to need a name for their new engine of war4 ,but more logical than we1 instead of an absurd1 if pleasant1 nickname1 they chose 8,artillerie d',assaut10 which they contracted into the letters 8,a4,s410 as being more agreeable to the ear than 8,a4,a40 ,apparently ,colonel ,estienne had no preliminary inkling of what our activities had been in the 8,land ,cruiser0 direction4 ,it is interesting to conjecture how eagerly he must have read of what was happening on the ,somme during the fortnight before he was finally gazetted to his new post4 ,his 8heart0 must1 indeed1 have been 8at our festival0 when the ,british ,tanks were everywhere acclaimed by the public1 and when even the most conservative soldiers had to admit that the new weapon had at least earned a right to further trial4 ,in ,october #aiaf a training centre for personnel was established at ,champlieu1 on the southern edge of the ,forest of ,compigne1 and here in ,december the first lot of sixteen ,schneider ,tanks were delivered1 other batches both of ,schneiders and ,st4 ,chamonds following them during the succeeding months1 until1 in ,april #aiag1 nine ,schneider ,companies and one ,st4 ,chamond ,company and their crews were ready for action4 ,on ,april #af1 #aiag1 ,french ,tanks took part in their first battle1 fighting with the #eth ,french ,army in the attempted penetration of the ,chemin des ,dames4 ,of the eight ,schneider ,companies employed1 five succeeded in reaching their third and final objectives1 but owing to lack of previous training with the infantry1 the attack as a whole was not very successful1 and the ,tanks1 though they played an exceedingly gallant part1 suffered severely4 ,a week or two later1 one ,st4 ,chamond and two ,schneider ,companies took part in a hurriedly prepared operation with the #fth ,army4 ,the ,schneiders did extremely well1 but of sixteen ,st4 ,chamond machines1 only one managed to cross the ,german trenches4 ,all through the summer months1 the #fth ,french ,army was preparing another attack on the west of the ,chemin des ,dames1 and for this battle1 warned by their previous experiences1 infantry and ,tanks trained diligently together1 special detachments known as troupes d'accompagnement being taught how to help the ,tanks over trenches4 ,but the agile mind of ,colonel ,estienne was not content4 ,he had had another idea4 ,this time his mind had worked at the idea of the armoured attacking force from a slightly different standpoint4 ,he envisaged waves of armoured skirmishers attacking in open order1 each man possessing besides his armour a quick-firing weapon with which he could shoot as he advanced4 ,now1 armour which will protect from machine-gun and rifle fire is too heavy for human legs4 ,the armour must be independently propelled4 ,more1 if its occupant is to fire as he advances1 it must carry him as well as itself4 ,this postulates an engine1 and if there is an engine1 there must be a second man to look after it4 ,this set of propositions he laid before the ,rnault firm in ,july #aiaf1 and the design of the famous ,rnault ,tank was evolved4 ,but the ,ministry would have none of it4 ,however1 the designs were worked out in greater detail1 and at the end of ,november #aiaf ,colonel ,estienne proposed to the ,commander-in-,chief that a number of such machines should be constructed4 ,a few1 he explained1 had already been ordered to act as 8,command0 ,tanks for the heavy ,battalions4 ,the ,commander-in-,chief consented to a trial4 ,this1 however1 was not held until ,march #aiag1 and when it had been held1 the ,ministry were still not convinced4 ,therefore1 still further demonstrations were arranged in ,may1 when at last they ceased to doubt1 and finally1 in ,june #aiag1 ordered #cejj of the new machines4 ,in ,october the five ,companies of heavy ,tanks1 which had been in training all summer1 were launched when the #fth ,army delivered its blow at ,malmaison4 ,as before1 the ,schneider ,companies were successful1 and again the ,st4 ,chamond ,tanks were nearly all unable so much as to get into action4 ,still1 at the end of ,october the general verdict was that the ,french heavies had justified themselves1 though many soldiers of the old school still doubted their utility4 ,but in ,november the ,british ,tanks fought the ,battle of ,cambrai1 and all doubts were finally dispelled from the ,french mind4 ,it is to be imagined that ,colonel ,estienne did not fail to rub in the facts proved by that engagement4 ,they were facts which it was impossible to deny or to overlook4 ,the ,ministry removed its hold from the brakes1 and from that moment life behind the scenes of the ,french ,tank ,corps became happy4 ,it was decided to form thirty light ,tank ,battalions1 each ,battalion to consist of seventy-five machines1 and the firms of ,schneider1 ,rnault and ,berliet were all set to work upon their manufacture1 while over a thousand machines were ordered in ,america4 ,all the winter of #aiag-ah1 the ,french ,tank ,corps1 like the ,british1 continued to train and to organise4 ,for the future of the ,french ,tanks was to be a brilliant one4 ,those matchless givers of 8unsolicited testimonials10 the ,german ,general ,staff1 attributed the great victories which the late summer of #aiah brought to the ,french arms1 chiefly to the employment of 8masses of ,tanks40 ,naturally the annals of the ,french ,tank ,corps are full of stories of individual deeds of gallantry4 ,chevrel1 ,r4 ,c41 ,brigadier1 #ejeth ,regt41 ,chars ,lgers4 8,in the course of an attack he refused to abandon his ,tank1 which remained isolated in the ,german lines4 ,protected by his turret1 he ceaselessly opened machine-gun fire on the surrounding enemy1 and shot down with his revolver those who succeeded in approaching the ,tank and who called upon him to surrender4 ,for thirty-six hours he never slackened4 ,finally rescued by our advancing troops1 he immediately undertook the unditching of his ,tank and volunteered to support the further advance of the infantry1 and then brought his ,tank to the rallying point4 ,mdaille militaire and ,croix de ,guerre with ,palm40--,official ,gazette1 dated ,october #bf1 #aiah4 ,cellier1 ,pierre1 ,brigadier in #ceth ,co41 #aath ,heavy ,battery4 8,this soldier1 on ,july #ah1 when his ,tank had been hit by a shell1 placed himself at the head of fifteen ,american soldiers and stalked a position whence the ,germans were using many machine-guns to resist the attack4 ,these he engaged with an automatic rifle and forced the ,germans to surrender after an hour's struggle4 ,this act resulted in the capture of fifteen officers1 including one ,colonel1 guns and numerous machine-guns4 ,chevalier de la ,lgion d',honneur and ,croix de ,guerre with ,palm40--,official ,gazette4 ,dr4 ,gilles1 ,raoul ,jules ,gustave1 ,cte4 in the #ejfth ,regt41 ,chars ,lgers4 8,although blinded by wounds1 brought his ,tank back into ,french lines guided 7by signals tapped on his shoulders7 by the ,tank ,commander ,marchal de logis ,joseph1 who was himself wounded in the stomach4 ,mdaille militaire and ,croix de ,guerre with ,palm40--,official ,gazette1 ,no4 #babg 8,d10 ,july #bf1 #aiah4 ,colonel ,estienne was promoted to the rank of ,general of ,division and received the ,cravat de la ,lgion d',honneur1 and the ,commander-in-,chief of the ,french ,armies issued the following special ,order of the ,day to the ,french ,tank ,corps3 8,vous avez bien mrite 7de7 la ,patrie40 ,,american ,,tanks ,by the time the ,united ,states of ,america declared ,war 7,april #aiag7 the value of ,tanks had already been demonstrated in battle by the ,british in the ,somme ,offensive1 and by the end of ,october #aiaf the ,french were already training with their first machines4 ,it is not1 therefore1 surprising that the ,americans1 with their great experience of ,tractors 7it was1 the reader will remember1 an ,american ,tractor that was the chief ingredient in the make-up of the ,mark ,i47 had a strong desire to include this new arm in their ,expeditionary ,force4 ,colonel ,rockenbach1 who was later to command the ,american ,tank ,corps in the field1 was detailed to initiate preliminaries4 ,he arrived in ,france in ,june #aiag1 and followed ,general ,pershing to ,chaumont1 the ,united ,states ,general ,headquarters1 where he immediately occupied himself with the future organisation of the ,corps4 ,by ,september #bc1 #aiag1 the provisional ,american ,tank ,corps establishment had been approved4 ,it was to be of a size to match the original ,expeditionary ,force1 which was to be limited to twenty ,divisions and ten replacement ,divisions--that is to say1 to one ,army4 ,the ,american ,tank ,corps in ,france was to consist of five ,heavy and twenty ,light ,battalions1 with the usual complement of ,headquarters ,units1 ,depot ,companies1 instructors and ,workshops2 and1 in the ,united ,states1 a ,training ,centre1 accommodating two ,heavy and two ,light ,battalions1 was to be maintained4 ,when the ,american ,expeditionary ,force was increased to three ,armies1 a new ,tank ,establishment was authorised to match it4 ,there were to be five ,brigades per ,army4 ,these ,brigades were to consist of one ,heavy and two ,light ,battalions4 ,the ,light ,tanks were to be of the ,french ,rnault type1 and the ,heavy were to be of the ,british pattern4 ,the first ,tanks with which the ,americans were equipped were1 in fact1 actually of ,french or ,british manufacture1 but as soon as an establishment was sanctioned1 ,tank manufacture was pushed forward in ,america1 and by the time the ,armistice was signed1 there were several thousand ,american-made machines ready for shipment4 ,so keen on the ,tanks were ,americans1 that private enterprise was not idle1 and early in ,october #aiah a three-and-a-half-ton ,ford ,tank arrived in ,france4 ,this tank1 indeed1 had the honour to be the first ,american-made ,tank to appear in ,france4 ,but though it was extremely agile and handy1 its designers had not quite succeeded in producing a genuine fighting machine4 ,it could1 however1 be turned out quickly and in great quantities1 and in spite of its defects1 it was thought in ,america that it would be worth while to continue its construction1 and tradition has it that no less than #aj1jjj of these little ,ford ,tanks were ordered4 ,in the autumn of #aiag1 a number of ,american officers who were later on to have charge of the organising and training of the new ,tank ,corps were sent on visits to the ,british and ,french ,brigades1 to learn as much as they could1 both from the mistakes and successes of the two older ,corps4 ,by ,february #aiah1 there were a large number of volunteers for the ,american ,tank ,corps1 some in ,england at ,wool1 who were to form the ,american ,heavy ,section1 and others 7about #ejj7 at ,burg in ,france1 where a ,training ,centre was being formed for instruction in the ,light ,french ,rnault machines4 ,at ,burg were ten ,french ,tanks which were used for training purposes1 and in the course of the summer1 as the personnel to be trained increased1 this number was added to1 and at the end of ,august #abd ,rnault ,tanks were delivered to the ,training ,centre for impending operations4 ,two ,light ,battalions were formed into a ,brigade under ,colonel ,g4 ,s4 ,patton1 ,junr41 and they proceeded to the ,st4 ,mihiel ,salient4 ,here they went into action with the ,first ,american ,army on ,september #ab1 the first occasion on which ,united ,states ,forces fought independently4 ,but1 alas1 it was our ,first ,battle of the ,somme over again6 ,nobody quite understood the habits of the new beasts1 and unfortunately both ,battalions were called upon to trek over twenty kilometres to their lying-up places from the railhead1 and1 the ground in the back area being very difficult1 they did not succeed in catching up the infantry at all on the first day4 ,the enemy resistance was1 however1 very feeble1 as they had already decided to give up the ,salient1 but misfortune still dogged the unhappy ,tanks4 ,they had run out of petrol1 and no supplies being immediately available1 they were not able to get into action on the second day4 ,on the third day1 however1 they did get into the fight1 but by this time the enemy had been thoroughly demoralised by the ,american infantry1 and there was little more for them to do than to receive the surrender of a number of prisoners4 ,the two ,battalions suffered hardly at all in casualties and were withdrawn practically intact4 ,the ,american ,light ,tanks next appeared at the beginning of ,october in the ,argonne1 in operations where they fought side by side with ,french ,tank ,units4 ,this time the two ,battalions had much better luck1 and though they must have been a good deal handicapped by the fact that they and the infantry with whom they were to co-operate had had no opportunity of training together1 the ,tanks rendered good service4 ,all the machines were launched on the first day1 although in the original plan of the battle1 it had been proposed to hold back a reserve for the second day2 but the infantry had been held up1 and the reserve ,tanks had1 instead1 to go to the rescue in the afternoon of the first day4 ,from this time to ,october #ac these two ,battalions were continuously at the disposal of the infantry4 ,but1 as with us in the early days1 the infantry do not seem to have had a very clear idea of the uses and limitations of the ,tanks1 and the ,battalions were frequently called upon to traverse many weary miles--much to the detriment of their machines--without finally being ordered into action4 ,on one or two occasions they were used for independent reconnaissance and for unsupported assaults upon positions which the infantry had failed to capture4 ,by the middle of ,october the long distance covered and losses in battle had caused the numbers of the two ,battalions to dwindle exceedingly1 and they were formed into a provisional ,company1 which accompanied the advance of the ,american ,forces right up to the ,armistice4 ,a ,third ,light ,battalion had also been mobilised and supplied by the ,french with seventy-two ,tanks4 ,recruiting1 too1 had been continued and there were no less than #gjjj officers and men awaiting admission to the ,corps at ,burg alone4 ,meanwhile1 on ,august #bd1 #aiah1 the #cjast ,u4 ,s4 ,heavy ,battalion had left ,wool for ,france1 and was almost immediately sent to the forward area1 where it was attached to begin with to the #ast and later to the #dth and #bnd ,british ,tank ,brigades4 ,with the #dth ,brigade and still later with the #bnd ,tank ,brigade the #cjast was1 as we shall see in ,chapters ,,xx and ,,xxi1 destined to take part in several successful actions4 ,the #cjast had based its methods of training almost entirely upon ,british lines1 and though the ,american ,tank ,corps would undoubtedly have struck out improvements and methods of its own had the war gone on1 the #cjast1 being throughout its active service brigaded with ,british ,tanks1 very wisely adopted a battle organisation practically uniform with the ,british4 ,only in minor details did their habits vary4 ,their reconnaissance procedure1 for instance1 was almost exactly like ours1 except for one improvement4 ,special ,reconnaissance ,n4,c4,o4's relieved ,reconnaissance ,officers1 ,tank ,commanders and ,section ,commanders from the work of guiding the machines on approach marches4 ,from the tankodromes to the lining-up points the ,tanks were in charge of these ,n4,c4,o4's1 who were directly under the orders of the ,battalion ,reconnaissance ,officer4 ,this system worked out extremely well4 ,in later chapters we shall see how worthy a representative both of the arms of the ,united ,states and of the best traditions of the ,british ,tank ,corps the #cjast ,battalion proved themselves in the supreme test of battle4 ,in ,february #aiai1 to the regret of their ,british colleagues1 the men of the #cjast sailed for ,america1 when ,general ,elles expressed the sentiments of all ranks of his ,corps in a special order4 8,february #ae1 #aiai4 8#a4 ,on the departure of the #cjast ,american ,tank ,battalion1 ,i wish to place on record my appreciation of the services it has rendered4 #b4 ,the ,battalion has practically formed part of the ,british ,tank ,corps since ,april #aiah1 and while fully maintaining its national identity1 has co-operated with ,british troops and adapted itself to ,british methods with a spirit that deserves fullest recognition4 #c4 ,in the field the #cjast ,battalion1 after experiencing heavy casualties in its first engagement at ,bony1 which might have deterred less determined troops1 volunteered for the next action1 in which1 as in subsequent ones1 it inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy at ,brancourt1 the ,selle and ,catillon4 #d4 ,i feel ,i am voicing the opinion of all commanders and troops who have been associated with them1 in expressing sincere regret at the departure of our ,american comrades and in wishing them all good fortune in the future4 7,signed7 ,h4 ,j4 ,,elles1 ,major-,general1 ,commanding ,tank ,corps in the ,field40 ,,tanks ,,in ,,palestine ,the ,second and ,third ,battles of ,gaza1 ,april and ,november #aiag 8,gaza yet stands1 but all her sons are fallen1 ,all in a moment overwhelmed and fallen40 ,samson ,agonistes4 ,the ,tanks that had fought in the ,battle of the ,somme1 in the autumn of #aiaf1 had proved successful enough for the authorities to consider that a test ought to be made of their capabilities in some other theatre of war4 ,accordingly a small--a very small--detachment of ,tanks was sent to 8assist our troops in the ,sinai ,peninsula40 ,unfortunately only eight ,tanks were ultimately sent1 and further1#ea8through an unfortunate error1 old experimental machines were sent out instead of new ones as intended40 ,the experiment was thus upon so extremely miniature a scale that it cannot be said to have proved anything save what was already clear1 that is1 the general proposition that with a few mechanical modifications ,tanks are perfectly suitable to desert warfare4 ,the ,tanks were1 of course1 too few to exert any influence upon the fortunes of war in ,palestine1 and the two actions in which they fought amid palms and cactuses and lay up in groves of fig trees1 form a curious1 rather than an important1 little incident in their history4 ,the field on which they fought was like the plain of ,flanders1 one of those ominous lands which seem predestined for ever to witness the strife of men4 #eb8,the land from the ,wadi el ,arish--the ancient #8,river of ,egypt'--to the ,philistian plain had for twenty-six hundred years been a cockpit of war4 ,sometimes a conqueror from the north like ,nebuchadnezzar1 ,napoleon and ,mehemet ,ali1 or from the south like ,ali ,bey1 met the enemy in ,egypt or ,syria1 but more often the decisive fight was fought in the gates4 ,ascalon1 ,gaza1 ,rafa1 ,el ,arish1 are all names famous in history4 ,up and down the strip of seaward levels marched the great armies of ,egypt and ,assyria1 while the ,jews looked fearfully on from their barren hills4444 ,in this gate of ancient feuds it had now fallen to ,turkey's lot to speak with her enemy40 ,in ,december #aiaf a little company of #bb officers and #bbf other ranks1 under ,major ,nutt1 embarked with their eight ,tanks at ,devonport and ,avonmouth and landed in ,egypt in ,january4 ,the first business was to show the ,staffs of the various fighting units1 with whom they were to co-operate1 exactly what ,tanks could and could not do4 ,demonstrations were therefore given among the sand dunes near ,kilban1 a village which lies between ,port ,said and ,el ,kantara on the ,suez ,canal4 ,one day in ,february--the exact date seems uncertain#ec--the detachment received orders to entrain immediately for the fighting zone1 and within three hours of receiving the message1 the whole little force with its ,tanks and accessories was travelling towards the forward area4 ,a delay occurred half-way1 at ,el ,arish1 which had only recently been captured1 but next morning the ,tank ,train arrived at its destination1 ,khan ,yunus1 an old ,crusaders' stronghold1 surrounded by fig groves and lying inland about fifteen miles south-west of ,gaza4 ,here the detachment remained for about ten days4 ,during these ten days the ,first ,battle of ,gaza had come to an end4 ,gaza had not been captured1 as1 though we had fought in its streets1 we had just not been able to keep up the attack long enough to keep what we had gained owing to lack of water4 ,in his despatch1 ,general ,murray1 the ,commander-in-,chief of the ,egyptian ,expeditionary ,force1 characterised it as a most successful operation which only the waterless nature of the country had prevented from being 8a complete disaster to the enemy40 ,we had been obliged to withdraw again to our water supplies1 but we immediately began to prepare a second attack in greater force4 ,this time great cisterns were set up forward1 and filled with rail-borne water4 ,three weeks of careful preparation were allowed for what was to prove one of the most hotly contested actions fought in the ,eastern theatre4 ,we were to attack a ,turkish force of about #cj1jjj men which lay upon a front of some sixteen miles1 between ,gaza on the north and ,hereira and ,sheria to the south-east4 ,two ridges1 ,sheikh ,abbas and ,mansura1 run almost at right angles to the coast and command the town of ,gaza from the south1 and the capture of these heights was allotted to the #ebnd1 #ecrd1 and #edth ,divisions4 ,on their left flank was the sea1 and their right1 on the ,hereira front1 was protected by the ,desert ,column1 consisting of cavalry units and of the ,imperial ,camel ,corps which was manned by ,australian1 ,new ,zealand1 and ,british personnel4 ,the eight ,tanks were to be widely spaced along the crucial five miles of attack4 ,the #ecrd ,division nearest to the sea was to have two ,tanks1 which were to be held in reserve until the infantry had taken their first objective4 ,next to them the #ebnd ,division was to have four ,tanks1 which were to support the infantry in the attack on the ,mansura ,ridge4 ,with the #edth ,division1 two ,tanks were to support the attack on the ,sheikh ,abbas ,ridge4 ,the battle was to be in two phases2 the ,turkish outer defences were to be taken in the first phase1 and in the second his inner ring was to be broken through and ,gaza itself taken4 ,it was a country of sand dunes1 deep nullahs1 and criss-cross ridges1 a labyrinth admirably adapted to defence and containing endless natural machine-gun positions4 ,between ,gaza and the sea the enemy had built a double line of trenches and redoubts#ed8strongly held by infantry and machine-guns well placed and concealed in impenetrable cactus hedges built on high mud banks and enclosing orchards and gardens on the outskirts of the town40 ,the ,tank ,detachment had been able to do little or no reconnaissance2 routes had been arranged to the starting-places1 and petrol and ammunition dumps had been formed in convenient places1 but no forward preparations had been possible4 ,all eight ,tanks reached their assembly places before daybreak on ,april #ag1 and at zero hour1 the dawn of what promised to be a day of scorching heat1 the first phase of the attack was successfully launched4 ,the advance of the #ecrd and #ebnd ,divisions came as a complete surprise to the ,turks1 and the six ,tanks did not come into action at all on the first day1 as the enemy fled from his trenches and strongholds in complete confusion1 and the slow ,mark ,i4's and ,mark ,,ii4's had no chance of getting in at him4 ,the outer defence line had fallen by seven that morning4 ,the two ,tanks1 however1 on the #edth ,division's front saw a good deal of fighting4 ,one received a direct hit and was destroyed1 but the other did admirable work in clearing the enemy out of his trenches1 north-west of the ,abbas ,ridge4 ,the ,tank inflicted heavy casualties1 and our infantry had only to come up and occupy the defences which the ,turks had abandoned4 ,by the evening the three attacking ,divisions found themselves in satisfactory positions on high ground1 and proceeded to entrench themselves and to prepare for the second phase4 ,on the morning of ,april #ai we again attacked1 this time upon a wider front1 a ,french man-of-war and two ,british monitors supporting on the left1 and the ,australians on the right4 ,the three original ,divisions were1 however1 once more to deliver the main blow4 ,a very stiff programme was outlined for the seven surviving ,tanks4 ,the four with the #ebnd in the centre had finally four lines of defence to attack1 and their orders were changed during the night before the action4 ,with the #ecrd ,division two ,tanks were to work separately1 each having a succession of objectives1 while with the #edth the single ,tank had only one redoubt allotted to it4 ,this time the ,turks were ready for us4 ,one of the ,tanks with the #ecrd ,division1 the 8,tiger10 led the infantry advance on its sector4 ,the enemy was quickly driven from our first objective1 ,samson ,ridge4 ,the ,tank went on to the second objective1 the ,el ,arish redoubt1 but the infantry being unable to follow1 after being in action for six hours and having fired #bg1jjj rounds from its machine-guns1 the ,tank withdrew1 all its crew being wounded4 ,on the front of the #ebnd ,division1 our advance was hotly contested4 ,the ,turks had massed hundreds of machine-guns along their entire front1 but on this sector their fire was particularly intense4 ,one tank was able to do good service at ,outpost ,hill1 which it helped to clear before receiving a direct hit4 ,of the other three ,tanks1 one fell into a gully1 the sides of which unexpectedly crumbled under its weight2 another was put out of action by a direct hit1 while the third eventually rallied4 ,the objective of the ,tank fighting with the #edth ,division was a particularly strong redoubt4 ,the work was held in force1 but the garrison soon surrendered on the advance of the ,tank4 ,our infantry immediately took over the position1 which the ,turks forthwith proceeded to shell4 ,it was not long before the ,tank was hit and one of its tracks broken1 and the ,turks1 counter-attacking1 eventually captured ,tank1 infantry and redoubt4 ,by nightfall our position all along the line was unfavourable4 ,the left of the #edth ,division was more or less in the air4 ,we had1 in several parts of the line1 been forced off the lately won main ridges4 ,we had lost #gjjj men1 and our troops were worn out by the dust and heat1 and were once more short of water4 ,the battle had to be admitted as a failure4 ,the ,tanks had been too few and of too old a type for the work they had been given4 ,their co-operation was1 however1 much appreciated1 and they were considered to have given a good deal of protection to the infantry4 ,it is interesting to note that by the time the battle was over these antiquated machines are said1 on an average1 each to have covered forty miles of country4 ,the ,third ,battle of ,gaza ,the ,second ,battle of ,gaza had been so completely unsuccessful that the troops who had been engaged in it had to be withdrawn from their advanced positions4 ,the ,tanks were concentrated in a fig grove to the rear4 ,here1 no work being found for them1 they stayed till ,october1 being reinforced by three ,mark ,,iv4 machines4 ,general ,allenby had now succeeded to the command1 and there was to be another attack upon ,gaza1 for the town and its defences effectually barred our further advance along the coast or towards ,jerusalem4 ,we were this time to operate upon a still wider front4 ,the usual shock troops1 the same three ,divisions and their eight ,tanks1 were to attack nearest the coast4 ,next to them1 a mixed force of ,french1 ,italian and ,west ,indian troops were to make feint raids near ,outpost ,hill4 ,opposite ,gaza itself several cavalry ,divisions1 mounted and dismounted1 were to attack1 and from ,hereira to ,beersheba a synchronised assault was to be made by the ,australians4 ,the position was1 in fact1 to be turned by an extensive flanking movement4 ,on ,october #bc1 #aiag1 the ,tanks moved up to a new station on the beach4 ,from here1 on horseback and by boat1 the new area was thoroughly reconnoitred4 ,this was the special country of cactus hedge and strong mud bank1 and in it had been dug a veritable labyrinth of trenches4 ,it had been a country of small fig groves and of little irrigated gardens1 and its close boundaries afforded unending cover to the enemy4 ,however1 it was divided into ,tank sectors1 and by dint of patient toil1 the ,tank ,commanders at last formed a more or less coherent picture of the intricacies4 ,tank ,officers and ,n4,c4,o4's were attached to each ,brigade with which they were to work1 for ten days before the battle4 ,most of the ,tanks were detailed to bring up ,r4,e4 stores1 such as wire1 pickets1 shovels and sandbags for their infantry4 ,these things they were to carry on their roofs4 ,the first phase of the attack1 timed in consideration of a full moon for an hour before midnight1 was to be independent of ,tanks1 and was to consist of an infantry attack protected by a creeping barrage4 ,while this attack was going on1 six of the ,tanks were to move to their starting-points1 in order to be ready to advance at #c a4m4 ,two ,tanks were held in reserve4 ,it will be observed that the plans1 preparations and liaison were in general much more complete than for the ,second ,battle of ,gaza1 but unfortunately one mistake of that battle was repeated4 ,the six first-line ,tanks were given among them no less than twenty-nine objectives to attack4 ,at eleven o'clock on the night of ,november #a-b1 the first phase of the battle began4 ,the #aefth ,infantry ,brigade attacked ,umbrella ,hill1 the first objective4 ,the ,turks were taken completely by surprise1 there was little resistance1 and even their artillery seemed too startled to fire4 ,unfortunately1 however1 the smoke of the battle and a dense haze made so thick an atmosphere that not a ray of the expected moonlight reached the combatants1 and the infantry had to fight and the ,tanks to manage their approach march in profound darkness4 ,also1 when the enemy's artillery at last woke up1 it was to open a heavy fire on our back areas1 where the second wave was gathering4 ,all the ,tanks1 however1 came safely through and were at their stations half an hour before the second zero at #c a4m4 ,the ,turkish resistance had by now stiffened1 and when the ,tanks and the fresh infantry advanced behind a heavy barrage it was to meet with dogged opposition4 ,the two ,tanks detailed to the ,el ,arish redoubt were1 after a stiff fight1 successful in driving the enemy out of the enclosed stronghold1 and were making their way through the maze of trenches1 cactus hedges and gardens beyond1 when one received a direct hit and the other got ditched in the darkness4 ,both crews at once joined the infantry4 ,slowly1 scrambling up the mud banks1 often fighting hand to hand in the darkness1 we advanced4 ,the ,turks were fighting stubbornly1 but inch by inch we pushed them back4 ,the remaining ,tanks lumbered slowly on4 ,at last all along the coast all the objectives were taken4 ,no4 #f ,tank captured ,sea ,post1 and1 followed by the infantry1 moved along the enemy's trenches1 crushing down the wire as far as ,beach ,post4 ,it successively attacked three other strong points and deposited its ,r4,e4 stores at the appointed place4 ,it was again moving forward to attack a certain isolated ,turkish trench when one track broke1 so ending a brilliant innings4 ,the crew went on1 but the ,tank had to be temporarily abandoned4 ,the two reserve ,tanks both caught fire through the empty sandbags with which their roofs were loaded being set ablaze by the heat of their exhaust pipes4 ,the coastal attack had done its work1 and the ,turks' hold upon ,gaza had been loosened4 ,the other attackers1 the troops who had advanced from ,beersheba1 broke through the enemy's resistance completely1 and drove them back for nine miles on an eight-mile front4 ,the battle was decisive1 and after about three days' fighting our troops at last entered ,gaza4 ,our persistency in attack was well rewarded4 ,the ,spectator1 commenting on the battle1 said1 8,samson took away the gates of ,gaza1 but ,general ,allenby has secured the gates of ,palestine40 ,on the whole the ,tanks had been a success4 ,all machines except one reached their first objectives2 four reached their second1 third1 and fourth1 and one ,tank reached its fifth4 ,all five damaged machines were afterwards salved4 ,this was the last ,tank action fought with the ,army of ,palestine1 for1 for some reason or other1 the repaired and renovated ,tanks were never used again4 ,later1 however1 during the ,turkish retreat1 we had great trouble in rounding up the tattered and wandering ,turkish rearguard4 ,we felt the need of some sort of sheep-dog1 so a mission was sent to ,france to ask for a number of ,whippet ,tanks4 ,by an ironical chance1 this mission reached ,tank ,headquarters in ,france on ,march #ba1 the very day the ,german offensive was launched4 ,it need not be added that no ,whippets were sent4 ,there seemed no work left for the heavies1 and the ,tank ,detachment1 therefore1 handed over their machines to the ,ordnance ,department at ,alexandria1 and returned to ,england4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,suspense--,,the 8,,savage ,,rabbits0 ,,episode--,,the ,,enemy',s ,,intentions ,the story of the ,tank ,corps from the beginning of ,february to nearly the end of ,march #aiah is one of waiting and expectancy1 of strategic moves to unexpected places1 of diligent rehearsal for first nights upon which the curtain never rose1 of endless preparations for events which never happened4 ,and through all the moves1 in all the odd billets1 or in the open fields1 when--in hourly expectation of the ,german attack--,tanks and their crews lay ready under the hedges1 run the ,tank ,corps' ,pinkerton-like efforts at self-improvement1 its determination to finish its winter training4 ,from before the middle of ,january we had been perfectly aware that the enemy meant to strike and to strike hard4 ,he held a wasting security4 ,we were waxing and he was waning4 ,he was still our superior1 still had more men available1 but by ,midsummer he knew that the ,allies would outnumber him4 ,he had troubles1 we knew1 at home too1 troubles for which the only salve was victory4 ,we had besides long known that before the war ended1 whenever and however that end might come1 we must expect a last desperate struggle4 ,it would be the last spring of the wounded beast in which he might still find our throats1 the last staggering blast of the hurricane by which the ship might still be confounded and overwhelmed4 ,every sign spoke of the coming storm1 but none told from which quarter we must expect it4 ,the ,germans were concentrating in such a way--at the base of the great salient formed by their line--that they could plant their blow wherever it might at the last moment seem good to them4 ,for better or worse1 it was decided that our available forces were to be impartially distributed all along the line4 ,not that we had very much choice1 as with our limited resources a concentration at any one strategic point must imply virtual gaps in our defence elsewhere4 ,for we had in ,january taken over an additional forty miles of line1 and the men for whom the ,high ,command in ,france had so frequently pleaded had not been sent out to them4 ,we were in for a lean three months1 and to hold the extended line was as much as we could hope to accomplish4 ,the ,british and ,french ,spring ,campaign must be a defensive one4 ,there was no longer a ,russian front1 and till the ,americans were ready--which could not be till ,midsummer at earliest--the ,germans would have a numerical preponderance of nearly a quarter of a million men4 ,besides this1 their position on interior lines and their superior lateral railway communications could at any moment give them an overwhelming local superiority4 ,however1 we had faced worse odds before4 ,we could form a strong line and cunning schemes of defence against which the enemy would hammer in vain4 ,our first defence was a deep forward zone4 ,it consisted first of an outpost line and second of a 8line of resistance40 ,the line of resistance was extremely carefully laid out4 ,about every mile redoubts of special strength were so arranged that on this sector an attack would be entrapped into our wire and held exposed to a cross-fire from our machine-guns4 ,the line was1 in fact1 to offer 8patches0 of resistance1 and so break up the ordered advance of the enemy1 who was to arrive at the next line1 the 8battle zone10 weakened and disorganised4 ,here the main fight was to take place1 and upon this zone we lavished all our skill and industry1 and1 having faith1 we prepared no serious positions in rear of it4 ,the ,tanks were spaced out all along a sixty-mile front4 ,near ,lens in the #ast ,army area was the #ast ,tank ,brigade4 ,the #bnd ,brigade was in #crd ,army ,reserve at ,haplincourt1 near ,bapaume4 ,the #crd ,brigade--which was in process of being equipped with ,whippet ,tanks--was also in #crd ,army ,reserve4 ,the #dth ,brigade was attached to the #eth ,army and established itself in camps near ,pronne4 ,the #eth ,brigade was in process of forming1 and therefore had no definite task allotted to it1 though1 as we shall see1 the #acth 7its nucleus7 ,battalion actually saw a considerable amount of fighting4 ,each ,tank ,brigade got out a defence scheme in conjunction with the ,army to which it was attached4 ,as a rule the ,tanks--which had been moved up as secretly as possible--were to lie in ambush till the last moment1 and then1 emerging--as ,general ,elles described it--8like ,savage ,rabbits from their holes10 were to fall upon the ,germans in flank or rear4 ,his phrase struck the fancy of the ,tank ,corps1 and the whole of this period is frequently referred to tout court as 8,savage ,rabbits10 somewhat to the bewilderment of the uninitiated4 ,,ii ,their schemes prepared1 their ,tanks in position1 after an exhaustive reconnaissance1 the ,tank ,corps waited1 a process which all troops find both tedious and demoralising1 unless some really profitable means can be found of employing their time4 ,for the ,tank ,corps the need of the moment was further training4 ,several of the ,battalions had been dragged untimely from half-finished courses1 several were almost fresh from ,wool1 and had still most of their tactical training to do4 ,everywhere there were units and individuals who had lost 8school attendances0 to make up4 ,the great difficulty was that ,battalions and even ,companies were so spread out and scattered that it was almost impossible to collect the students for instruction4 ,the regular curriculums were out of the question1 so the directors of ,tank training immediately set to work to evolve new courses that would fit the altered circumstances4 ,in some ways the ,reconnaissance ,side fared best4 ,their chief instructional material--the actual country to be fought over--was there for their students to study1 and even when the pupils were so scattered that a sufficient audience could not be collected for a formal lecture1 many ingenious little practical schemes could be carried out and written work could always be done4 ,they had a fairly definite standard to aim at4 ,had the battalions remained in the training areas1 every officer and man would have been put through a five days' course in ,reconnaissance4 ,under normal conditions such courses were arranged more or less as follows3 ,on the first day1 the students heard an introductory lecture1 practised chalk layering1 heard a short discourse on map reading1 did a practical comparison of map and country upon which they had to answer questions4 ,on the second day1 visualising country from a map was taught1 and practice indoors was gone through with a model4 ,in the afternoon panorama sketching was practised1 a short lecture heard1 some visualising was done and the characterisation of landmarks was practised1 the day being finished up by night guiding4 ,on the third morning1 close observation of a certain sector1 involving sketches and notes1 was undertaken1 and visibility practices carried out4 ,later1 the students were taken for an 8observation march10 and having described the features of the country they had traversed1 they had to write a report upon the new sector which they had observed in the morning1 and upon this report they were later questioned4 ,on the fourth day1 a new sector was visited1 upon which they had previously made notes from a map4 ,these notes they had to compare with reality1 and to notice whether their imagination had been faulty4 ,a lecture on obstacles commonly found on approach marches followed1 and one on aerial photographs with practical work4 ,night work followed1 with special reference to the study of the stars4 ,on the fifth day1 oblique and other aerial photographs were compared with the actual ground1 and a lecture was delivered summing up the special points of the course4 ,sometimes1 however1 during the 8,savage ,rabbit0 period1 lectures were possible1 and for these occasions a rather new type of discourse was evolved1 in which the broader aspects of ,reconnaissance and of the study of country were dealt with4 ,local history was recalled3--how men had lived and fought in the villages and cornfields that lay immediately about them2 how that great abbey church that stood alone was erected by a group of pious merchants as a thankoffering for their town's escape from the plague2 how to this little town the ,revolution had brought a ,committee of ,public ,safety1 and how it had held its red assize in the coffee-room of the ,htel de l',europe1 or how ,bonaparte had lain at this or that chteau on his way to the ,camp at ,boulogne4 ,or again1 the lecture might be more strictly military and concern the place of ,reconnaissance amongst the arts of war1 and the action and reaction of one arm of the ,service upon another--the ever-present trilogy of wire1 trench and machine-gun1 new theories of artillery work1 the latest fashions in tactics or the effects of the latest poison-gas4 ,then1 where some isolated ,tank ,company or even section lay ready day and night by its machines and lectures were impossible1 an itinerant instructor would set the exiles little schemes to carry out4 ,the two following exercises are typical3-- 8,two small parties of officers go at different times to positions from which a good view is obtainable4 ,they pick out landmarks1 etc41 and their peculiarities1 taking notes or making sketches4 ,from these notes or sketches each party writes out three or four questions on landmarks1 general observation1 routes taken1 etc4 ,on their return the two parties exchange their questions1 answers are written1 and these answers returned to the writers of the questioners to correct4 8,catch questions1 such as #8,how many windows had such and such a house8' will1 of course1 be discountenanced1 and only useful tests permitted4 8,exercise ,,ii4--,the student was asked to sketch the outline of a cottage from about #hjj yards distant4 ,he then had to consider from the position of the house on the map1 and the contour lines of the ground1 what the appearance of that cottage would be likely to be from a different point of view4 ,of this hypothetical elevation he had then to make an outline sketch1 and finally to walk over the ground and compare his imaginings with actuality40 ,practices for approach marches were also given by means of an exercise on tape laying and the taking of compass bearings4 ,,iii ,and still the ,germans stayed their hands1 and still we waited and speculated upon what the coming campaign might hold for us4 ,for the ,tank ,corps it seemed certainly to portend a new form of warfare--the ,tank duel4 ,all sorts of things were rumoured concerning the ,german preparations1 and the sheets of the ,tank ,corps ,intelligence ,summary for late ,february are full of little items of information of a perfectly new kind4 ,tanks of some sort were certainly being made at ,krupp's4 ,prisoners had been caught who described them as larger and heavier than the ,british machines4 ,we had reason to believe that men were being withdrawn from certain other units to form ,tank crews4 ,then1 in the next day's ,summary1 it would be reported that airmen had found out that in certain ,regimental1 ,brigade1 and ,divisional training schemes which were being carried out by the enemy1 horses and wagons were being used1 representing ,tanks4 ,combined infantry and ,tank attacks of all sorts appeared to be being rehearsed4 ,again1 some recently captured prisoners said that a few derelict ,tanks1 which the ,germans had taken at ,cambrai1 were being put into order1 they seemed to think1 as training rather than as fighting machines4 ,it is to be imagined that the notion of the new warfare1 of meeting their kind in combat for the first time1 was exceedingly interesting to all ranks of the ,tank ,corps2 and there was not a single hut in a single camp where wonderful new ideas for tactics and manuvres wherewith to annihilate the new enemy1 were not really elaborated4 ,we did not know that the bitterness and anxiety of a long retreat lay before us2 a retreat whose gall and wormwood were to enter into our very souls1 and of whose confused events it is even now almost impossible to write either with accuracy or impartiality4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,the ,,march ,,retreat 8,a mile around the city1 ,the throng stopped up the ways2 ,a fearful sight it was to see ,through two long nights and days4 8,for aged folks on crutches1 ,and women great with child1 ,and mothers sobbing over babes ,that clung to them and smiled1 ,and sick men borne in litters ,high on the necks of slaves1 ,and troops of sun-burned husbandmen ,with reaping-hooks and staves4 8,and droves of mules and asses ,laden with skins of wine1 ,and endless flocks of goats and sheep1 ,and endless herds of kine1 ,and endless trains of waggons ,that creaked beneath the weight ,of corn-sacks and of household goods1 ,choked every roaring gate4 8,now1 from the rock ,tarpeian1 ,could the wan burghers spy ,the line of blazing villages ,red in the midnight sky4 ,the ,fathers of the ,city1 ,they sat all night and day1 ,for every hour some horseman came ,with tidings of dismay40 ,,lord ,,macaulay4 ,i ,about ,march #ad the #crd and #eth ,armies were warned by their aerial reconnaissance that a new and ominous concentration was taking place behind the enemy's lines4 ,these two ,armies1 to which the #bnd1 #crd1 and #dth ,tank ,brigades were1 it will be remembered1 attached1 held the line which lay between ,bullecourt to the north and ,st4 ,quentin to the south4 ,behind them lay the old ,somme battlefields1 and about them was a dry1 rather bare1 downland country with few woods and divided up by broad valleys that ran east and west across it4 ,it was a part of the line upon which we had long considered the blow might probably fall4 ,the #crd and #eth ,armies1 now on the alert1 immediately set about raiding the enemy and1 having captured the desired prisoners and examined them1 were consistently told the same story4 ,thursday1 ,march #ba1 was to be the day of attack4 ,the weather1 which had been clear and bright for a week or two1 broke on ,tuesday1 the #aith1 and all day it rained heavily4 ,on the night of the #bjth a thick mist came up and lay densely over the downs4 ,such weather conditions only made an attack the more certain1 and all along the line ,tanks were moved forward into their allotted positions4 ,at two o'clock in the morning of the #bast the ,british line was warned to expect an attack4 ,the forward zone was already fully manned1 but at #d4cj an order was sent out to man the battle zone4 ,nor was the order premature4 ,the mist still lay heavily over the lines1 and under its cover the ,germans had secretly pushed up their troops until all along the front between ,bullecourt and ,la ,fre1 they had massed thirty-seven divisions on a line little more than a mile from our outposts4 ,the drama was about to begin4 ,at a quarter to five every ,german battery from the ,marne to ,dunkirk opened fire4 ,such a bombardment had never been known before1 and it reached its zenith on the fronts of the #crd and #eth ,armies4 ,torrents of gas shells and high explosives were poured out upon our forward and battle lines1 upon our ,headquarters1 upon our artillery positions1 and upon all our lines of communication4 ,the batteries of the #crd and #eth ,armies replied as best they could1 but owing to the mist our artillery observers were helpless4 ,it was impossible to see fifty yards ahead1 and the ,german fire seemed to crash upon us out of some alien planet4 ,by #h or #i o'clock the first parties of ,germans had begun to advance1 to cut our wire here and there along the front of attack1 and to filter unobtrusively through our outpost line4 ,we began to perceive that the enemy was behaving in a most unaccountable way4 ,even by #aj o'clock--as far as we could learn in the confusion--he seemed in some places to have made no attempt at an infantry attack at all4 ,in others compact but apparently isolated little parties of ,guards or ,cockchafers1 or men from some other picked regiment1 had pushed right through our forward zone and were away beyond the places where the cross-fire from our machine-guns was to have checked them1 before the men in the redoubts1 half-blind amid the clouds of gas1 had realised that any ,germans had crossed ,no ,man's ,land4 ,again and again the garrisons were overwhelmed from the rear before they could send back any warning to the men behind in the battle zone4 ,when they did endeavour to signal1 the ,s4,o4,s4 would be blanketed in the mist4 ,only too often the first news of the attack to reach our batteries was the appearance of ,german infantry on their flank and rear4 ,there would be nothing left but to mow down the enemy at point-blank range1 till finally the gun crews were overwhelmed by the in-flooding tide4 ,as at ,ypres1 we had begun amazedly to feel that we were up against a type of tactics against which we had never fought before4 ,our conjecture was perfectly right4 ,it was a system of surprise1 and of the theory of ,sturmtruppen carried to its extreme conclusion4 ,mr4 ,buchan has likened the new method to the advance of a hand whose finger-tips are shod with steel pushing its way into a soft substance4 ,in practice the assault was conducted as follows3 ,the infantry attack was preceded by a short but extremely intense bombardment in which a large proportion of gas was used4 ,this was followed by the advance at irregular intervals of clusters of highly trained assault troops1 carrying light trench mortars or machine-guns 7each cluster really constituting a kind of human ,tank4 ,it was well1 indeed1 for us that they were no more than mere flesh and blood1 and neither armoured nor engined47 ,these clusters1 which were closely followed and supported by the field batteries1 made gaps through which the line troops poured1 guided by an elaborate system of flares and rockets4 ,each section of the defence might thus find itself caught between the 8fingers0--outflanked and encircled4 ,each body of the advancing enemy was under the command of a specially trained officer1 whose leadership generally proved a model of skill and initiative2 each detachment was instructed to push on as far as its strength allowed1 and every man carried iron rations for several days4 ,when a regiment had advanced as far as it was able1 another took its place1 the waves of the advance thus leapfrogging over each other in an endless chain4 ,the dangers of such tactics are obvious1 but on ,march #ba the system was portentously successful4 ,,ii ,as in all disasters1 events seemed to move with a terrible rapidity4 ,a moment before the motor accident you are a free man2 a moment after and you are involved in an endless line of consequences which have sprung up while you could hold your breath1 and amid whose mushroom growth you may wander for the rest of your life4 ,five hours after the opening of the ,german cannonade the world seemed to have changed for the two armies which had stood in the path of the hurricane4 ,in the course of the next fourteen days the ,germans were to sweep forward for forty miles1 and their advance was even then to be checked1 not by the ,british ,army1 but by the gradual attenuation of their supply system4 ,the whole fourteen days of the retreat were completely confused4 ,units were inextricably mixed1 and communications were impossible4 ,some sort of immediate action was always having to be taken by junior ,commanders on information which they justly believed to be untrustworthy4 ,there were often more ,germans to the flank of any given body than to its front4 ,when we try to form any general conception of the events of this period1 we seem to see the actors moving in a kind of mist from which they emerge for a moment1 perform some action which may or may not appear relevant1 and then disappear again into the confusion1 leaving us to guess at the meaning of the play4 ,as far as the events of such a time can be chronicled1 we propose for this fortnight to follow separately the doings of the three ,tank ,battalions chiefly involved1 and to make no effort to present a coherent picture of this return to the reign 8of ,chaos and old ,night40 ,the #dth and #eth ,battalions 7#dth ,brigade7 lay near ,cartigny 7south of ,pronne74 ,on the morning of the #bast the two ,battalions of ,tanks were moved up into the line1 two ,tanks of the #dth ,battalion counter-attacking at ,peizire and clearing a railway cutting of the enemy4 ,on the #bbnd all the ,tanks were ordered into action4 ,the infantry were retreating1 and their chief duty was to gain time and to cover that retreat4 ,twelve ,tanks of the #eth ,battalion attacked the enemy at ,hervilly ,wood1 and several from the #dth ,battalion near ,epehy4 ,both detachments suffered rather severely4 ,at this point the two ,battalions seem to have more or less parted company4 ,seventeen ,tanks belonging to the #eth ,battalion rallied at ,cartigny that night1 and next day 7the #bcrd7 were ordered to retire over the ,somme4 ,the only available crossing place was the bridge at ,brie1 a few miles to the south4 ,they set off immediately1 but the enemy advance was too rapid for them4 ,they were unable to cross the bridge1 and1 lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy1 all the machines were destroyed by their crews4 ,the story of one of these ,tanks is told in the #eth ,battalion ,history3 8,second ,lieutenant ,t4 ,e4 ,van ,zeller's ,tank was covering the withdrawal of the infantry across the ,somme1 moving from ,cartigny to ,brie on the east side of the river4 ,he inflicted severe casualties on the enemy1 and was under heavy and continuous shell-fire4 ,on arriving at ,brie late in the afternoon of the #bcrd1 he found that the bridge was about to be blown up1 and that his ,tank could not cross4 ,he accordingly destroyed his ,tank1 and then directed his crew in assisting to carry wounded across the bridge4 ,finding two men seriously wounded who had been left behind1 he decided1 with three of his crew1 to make an effort to rescue them at the last moment4 8,when half-way across1 the bridge was blown up in front and behind them4 ,second ,lieutenant ,van ,zeller1 however1 succeeded in getting the whole party across the dbris under heavy shell-fire1 and finally brought them back behind our lines on the west side of the river4 8,for this he was awarded the ,m4,c41 and the three members of his crew who assisted in the last plucky effort were each awarded the ,military ,medal40 ,there were other places where the now 8dismounted0 ,tank crews could cross the river4 ,but they had no means of transport1 and were1 therefore1 obliged to burn or otherwise destroy most of their stores and kit4 ,indeed1 as a rule1 the ,lewis guns from the ,tanks were their only salvage4 ,one ,staff ,sergeant1 however1 hid away or buried a number of his tools1 and six months later1 when the ,british advance swept back again1 they were recovered4 ,by ,march #bd the ,battalion had lost all its ,tanks4 ,but in almost every case the ,lewis guns had been salved4 ,as the crews fell back they were immediately organised as ,lewis gun detachments1 and distributed along the line wherever their help was most needed4 ,colonel ,o',kelly1 ,commanding the #eth ,tank ,battalion1 had to use his own initiative in the matter1 as communications were by this time hopelessly disorganised and the need was instant4 ,once1 too1 a detachment had been sent off1 as it were disappeared1 and each party had to rely upon its individual ,commander4 ,tank crews had had no training in this kind of warfare1 but the strange dilemmas in which a ,tank frequently finds itself had accustomed them to the unexpected1 and thus left alone they displayed plenty of initiative4 ,the chief work which fell to them was that of forming rearguards and of protecting the retreat of the infantry4 ,food and ammunition were both short1 and they1 like the other troops1 suffered many hardships4 ,each of these ,lewis gun detachments was made up of about four officers and forty men1 and they ordinarily had twelve ,lewis guns with them4 ,three such detachments fought near ,masvillers and ,merlaincourt1 others near ,villers ,bretonneux1 ,caix1 ,harbonnires and ,marcourt1 the general retreat carrying them back almost to ,amiens4 ,again and again small parties failed to get the orders to retire in time1 and had to fight their way back after being surrounded and cut off by the enemy4 ,sometimes they fought with ,french infantry1 but chiefly with the ,sherwoods1 ,queen's and ,royal ,fusiliers of the #aith ,corps4 ,extraordinarily good individual work was done1 as the list of honours shows4 ,the story of a #eth ,battalion detachment gives a typical picture3 #ee8,the #eth detachment under the command of ,lieutenant ,pitt1 consisted of ,second ,lieutenants ,whyte and ,storm1 forty-one men and seven guns4 ,on ,march #bh this detachment was attached to #8,carey's ,force' and ordered to hold the line on each side of the ,villers ,bretonneux--,warfuse--,abancourt ,road1 a position which was to be held for two days at all costs4 8,while placing his guns1 ,lieutenant ,pitt was wounded and ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte took over the command4 8,a ,vickers gun section was in position north of the road1 so ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte posted his guns on the south side4 ,the infantry holding the line at this point were all low category men and convalescents1 and not more than twenty men had any experience of holding a rifle4 8,at #f p4m4 on the #bhth1 word was received that the enemy were about to attack and1 at close range1 machine-gun fire was opened on them4 8,the infantry began to fall back1 but were rallied by ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte and ,captain ,bingham1 ,m4,c41 and taken back to their former position4 8,second ,lieutenant ,whyte then assumed command of this section4 ,at #aj p4m4 the enemy again attacked1 but were again driven back by the ,lewis gun fire4 8,on the following day 7#bith7 the enemy launched an attack on the right1 but it was completely broken up by enfilade fire from ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte's guns1 the enemy suffering extremely heavy casualties4 ,some relief was afforded on the night of #bith-#cjth by cavalry1 who came up on the right of this sector4 8,enemy machine-guns and snipers were very active1 but two of the former and three snipers were accounted for by ,lewis gun fire4 ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte held the line until #aj4cj p4m4 on the #cast1 when he was relieved by ,australian troops4 8,for his gallant defence of this position ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte was awarded the ,m4,c4 8,corporal ,s4 ,archbold working under ,second ,lieutenant ,whyte showed conspicuous gallantry throughout these trying days4 ,single-handed he worked his ,lewis gun1 carrying it and its ammunition to a new position1 firing it and loading his magazines without assistance for twenty-four hours4 ,during this period he helped in breaking two enemy attacks4 8,on the #cjth he was wounded in the head by a sniper1 but continued to work his gun all day until he was ordered by his officer to the dressing-station4 ,this devotion to duty gained for him the ,d4,c4,m4 ,another member of this party1 ,pte4 ,w4 ,lyon1 was awarded the ,m4,m4 for carrying important messages in broad daylight across the open under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire at #bjj yards range40 ,between ,march #bd and ,april #b the #eth ,battalion had sent a total of eighty-four ,lewis guns and crews into the line4 ,every available man had gone1 cooks1 officers' servants1 clerks and orderlies4 ,they had suffered heavy casualties1 and on ,april #d the ,battalion1 or what was left of it1 was taken to ,auchy by lorry4 ,here they drew ,hotchkiss guns1 and began to train again4 ,but they were not to be left long in peace4 ,on ,april #ab they had orders to form again as a ,lewis gun ,battalion1 and next day found them once more in the forward area1 this time at ,meteren1 not far from ,hazebrouck1 where they relieved an infantry ,battalion which had held a switch line through the village and an isolated point near ,meteren ,church4 ,on ,april #ae they got news that the enemy had captured high ground between ,neuve ,eglise and ,bailleul1 and on the #afth the enemy advanced on ,meteren4 8,breaking through a section of trench which had been left unmanned1 they forced back the infantry on the right and also #8,b' ,company1 and got behind the latter4 ,no4 #h section was entirely cut off and lost4 8,second ,lieutenant ,carter showed great presence of mind at this juncture4 ,he was ,reconnaissance ,officer of his ,company4 ,on seeing the position caused by the enemy break-through1 he immediately rallied and reorganised the various parties as they fell back and took up a line in rear4 ,he was all the time under heavy shell-fire4 8,the position of #8,c' ,company had then become precarious4 8,second ,lieutenant ,dawson1 assisted by ,second ,lieutenant ,bayliss1 immediately placed four of his guns in the open1 covered the now exposed flank and held up the attack4 ,during the night of the #bgth-#bhth he dug a trench1 connecting these isolated posts with our original line1 and posted his guns in this new trench4 ,the enemy mounted two guns behind a hedge about #bjj yards in front of the position4 ,these two guns1 however1 were knocked out before firing a shot4 ,the ,germans also tried to assemble behind this same hedge for an attack2 but they were driven back with heavy casualties4 ,this well-thought-out defence performed throughout under frontal and enfiladed fire1 saved the company from an attack which would have endangered the entire position40 ,on ,april #ag the ,battalion1 except for twenty guns1 was relieved by the ,argyll and ,sutherland ,highlanders4 ,after helping to hold back one more serious attack1 the remaining gun crews were finally withdrawn and joined the rest of the ,battalion at the ,mont des ,cats4 ,on ,april #bd detachments of the #eth ,battalion1 which were helping to man the line before ,kemmel1 were heavily in action4 ,the enemy attacked after a fierce bombardment1 and ,kemmel ,hill was taken4 ,on the #bith the enemy opened a heavy gas and ,h4,e4 barrage and attacked ,mont ,rouge in force4 ,they were driven away1 but returned again and again1 always being beaten off4 ,at last in the first days of ,may the ,battalion was relieved1 and was sent back to the training and rest area at ,blangy1 the ,divisional ,general having complimented the gun crews upon their conduct in the field4 ,the story of the #dth ,battalion is very like that of the #eth4 ,all through the last days of ,march there was the same heartbreaking destruction of machines that had run out of petrol or grease1 or were suffering from some slight defect which there was no time to rectify4 ,again kits and orderly-room material had to be burnt1 and again the ,lewis guns were salved4 ,the usual ,lewis gun detachments were formed1 but this time did not have quite so much fighting1 their chief battle being on ,march #bf1 on the ,bray-,albert road1 where they did exceedingly well4 ,the #bnd ,battalion was near ,maricourt when the crash came1 and twenty-five of their ,tanks went into action on the afternoon of ,march #bb4 #ef8,the ,tanks had to come into view when they crossed the ,bapaume-,cambrai road1 and as soon as the enemy spotted them coming into action1 very heavy machine-gun fire was brought to bear upon them1 to be followed in a few minutes by heavy direct artillery fire4 ,several ,tanks were knocked out by shells almost as soon as they arrived amongst the enemy infantry1 who were found to be very numerous1 as if massing for a further advance4 8,the appearance of the ,tanks seems to have been a complete surprise to the enemy infantry1 who became disorganised and retired some distance in confusion4 8,the ,tanks carried out the attack without any infantry1 and practically no artillery1 co-operation4 8,the casualties both in ,tanks and personnel were heavy1 but the attack achieved its object1 in that it upset the plans of the enemy and delayed any further attack on their part for nearly twenty-four hours4 ,it was known at the time by the ,staff that the enemy was massing for an attack at once1 and the appearance of the ,tanks rendered this impossible4 8,the first ,tanks came out of action about #g4cj p4m40 ,of the twenty-five ,tanks which went into action only six came out undamaged1 and the ,battalion was not really in a fit state to fight again without reorganisation4 ,but the enemy were still advancing1 and the ,albert-,bapaume road had to be defended at all costs4 ,so on the #bdth the surviving ,tanks were manned and sent forward again1 and the ,tankless crews were formed into ,lewis gun detachments4 ,they waited all through the night of the #bdth expecting to be sent forward4 ,no orders came till midday on ,march #be1 when they were sent to the #crd ,tank ,brigade ,camp near ,bray1 which they later in the day were ordered to burn to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy4 ,all next day the infantry fell back1 and with them the ,lewis gun teams4 ,some idea of the confusion may be gathered from the fact that at this moment the #bnd ,battalion was separated into no less than eight parts1 none of which could communicate quickly enough with its fellows to make any combined action possible4 ,the #hth and #ajth ,battalions still had some ,tanks in going order1 and1 on the day when the #crd ,army was forced across the old ,somme battlefield1 they fought an exceedingly good rearguard action on either side of the ,albert-,bapaume road4 ,the ,tanks received a special message of commendation from the ,general ,commanding the #crd ,army4 ,another incident--of which the authors have not been able to obtain many particulars--was the action fought by a scratch ,tank force formed out of all the fighting ,tanks from the driving school1 ,aveluy4 ,the #gth ,battalion was one of several which were not in the path of the hurricane1 and consequently lost no ,tanks4 ,a certain number of its men were1 however1 organised as ,lewis gun detachments1 and by mid-,april saw a considerable amount of fighting4 ,one such detachment was attached to the #fast ,division near ,nieppe ,forest1 and with them manned a line of fortified shell-holes4 ,there were no trenches and the country was absolutely flat4 ,the whereabouts of the enemy was extremely uncertain4 ,the ,tank ,lewis gunners held about a mile and a half of improvised line1 their headquarters being a little farmhouse not far from ,merville4 ,hardly had the detachment taken over than the enemy put down a hot barrage4 ,a ,reconnaissance ,officer who was present described the events that followed in a letter home3 8,i went out of the northern door of the farm4 ,a beastly sniper's bullet whizzed past my head1 and then another and another4 ,the bullets were all coming from the north1 and it seemed as though ,fritz had made his way through the town and would get us from the rear4 ,this is what he did do4 ,a sergeant was killed next to me1 and ,norton#eg told me to go back to ,divisional ,headquarters and report the situation4 ,after ,i had been there about an hour1 a runner came back to say ,norton had been wounded1 and soon after we heard that the enemy had broken through to the north of the ,canal4 ,just at that moment ,general ,elles came up and asked what the situation was1 and having heard that there were some ,tanks and men of another ,battalion on the northern side of the ,canal1 said he would go up and see for himself4 ,he had his ,a4,d4,c4 with him1 and took me along as well4 ,we motored right up to where we came in touch with our men1 who were being pushed back on the north of the ,canal4 ,we then got out of the car and went forward on foot4 ,the ,general had not even his tin hat on1 but his red and gold4 ,he went out beyond the withdrawing infantry and taking out his map1 held a council of war1 a council not uninterrupted by machine-gun bullets4 8,he then sent me back a couple of hundred yards and told me to stop every man on a certain cross-road1 reorganise them and make them take up fresh positions4 ,this ,i did1 and we thus re-established a line4 ,the ,general took command and made his ,headquarters in a small house until shelled out of it and into a neighbouring ditch4 ,i was sent back to ,divisional ,headquarters to report and get some more ammunition4 ,when ,i returned the situation was pretty well the same1 and we were holding on all right4 ,the ,general then suggested that we might see in which houses the enemy really were4 ,during these investigations ,ian ,stewart went forward by himself on our flank1 and had a private battle with a company of ,germans1 killing1 amongst others1 one who was on a bicycle1 and himself returning on the captured machine1 the original rider's papers in his pocket4 8,we were relieved about #g p4m4 by a new ,division1 and ,i got back to ,divisional ,headquarters about #i4 ,the next morning the ,c4,o4 turned up with the rest of the ,battalion40 ,the #crd ,tank ,battalion1 whose camp at ,bray had been destroyed1 were now a fully fledged ,whippet unit4 ,during the first few days the ,whippets saw no actual fighting but were subject to plenty of alarms1 and made a great number of fruitless excursions from place to place4 ,at the ,bray ,camp there had been1 unfortunately1 a certain number of ,whippet machines which were temporarily laid up with engine trouble4 ,but there were no spare parts and no time for repairs1 and a good many machines had to be blown up 8unblooded40 ,on ,march #bf two ,companies of the #crd ,battalion were moved to ,mailly-,maillet ,wood4 ,as soon as the machines had arrived the ,company ,commanders went out to reconnoitre the position near the village 7,mailly-,maillet74 ,the result of their investigations is typical of the whole retreat3 #eh8,the position on the front between ,beaumont-,hamel and ,hbuterne proved to be very obscure1 a gap in our line appearing to exist between these two places4 ,the only troops of ours to be found consisted of two small posts of about one platoon each on the outskirts of ,colincamps1 the ground to the front and between them being occupied by enemy patrols and machine-gunners40 ,about noon the ,whippets arrived at the village4 ,the situation was explained to the ,section ,commanders1 and half the ,tanks proceeded down the main street while the rest guarded the two flanks4 ,a small body of our infantry which was holding the village had been on the point of falling back before the rapidly advancing enemy when the ,tanks arrived4 ,the ,tanks had gone forward almost beyond the village1 when suddenly1 round the edge of the wood1 they met #cjj of the enemy advancing in close formation4 ,the ,germans were too much surprised to attempt to resist1 and fled in disorder4 ,a number of them were shot down by the ,whippet's machine-guns1 and many surrendered to the infantry who had by now arrived4 ,the remnant scattered1 and were pursued by the ,tanks right on to the outskirts of ,auchonvillers4 ,the two ,whippets remained out on patrol for about an hour1 but no further attack was attempted1 and they returned to the village about #c p4m4 ,later in the afternoon the gap in our lines was filled by the arrival of a ,new ,zealand ,division4 ,this successful little action is interesting as the first ever fought by the ,whippets4 ,there were several other sections of ,whippets and heavy ,tanks out on patrol on this and the following days4 ,several ,tanks of the #ajth ,battalion fought in ,rossignol ,wood on two occasions1 and ,whippets of the #bnd ,battalion were in action near ,bouzencourt in a blinding rainstorm4 ,everywhere it was the same story of villages the question of whose ownership was 8obscure0 of gaps in the line which the ,tanks had to bridge for a critical hour or two1 often firing their machine-guns into the advancing waves of the enemy until the guns grew hot and jammed and the ,tanks had to retreat4 ,often they would go back till their petrol gave out1 and the crews had to blow up their machines4 ,the new ,medium ,a machines 7the ,whippets7 acquitted themselves extremely well1 and there were astonishingly few cases of mechanical trouble4 ,the ,battalion histories describe many pitiful scenes which took place during the retreat1 the fate of the inhabitants1 for whom our withdrawal meant complete ruin1 striking the eye-witnesses as the most distressing feature of the whole business4 #ei8;,during the withdrawal the condition of the villagers was pitiful4 ,women and children and old men crazed with fright with liveliest memories of the conduct of the ,germans in the area occupied by them1 were to be seen streaming westwards from their homes1 pushing their meagre possessions before them in hand-carts and alternately invoking the aid of their ,saints and calling down their wrath upon the hated ,boche40 ,nor was the retreat only tragic to those of the ,tank ,corps who had to witness the supreme misery of these processions of the ,cross4 ,there was a lesser unhappiness for the tacticians of the ,tank ,corps in the contemplation of the appalling waste of ,tank machines and men4 ,the ,tanks had been far too scattered ever to pull their weight4 #fj8,to hit with them as they were distributed on ,march #ba was like hitting out with an open hand instead of with a clenched fist4 8,when the ,german blow fell there was no time to hit and simultaneously to close the fingers40 ,out of #cgj ,tanks which were fit to fight1 only #ahj saw any action1 a great many machines running out of supplies or being incapacitated by some temporary mechanical trouble1 and so lost without having fired a shot4 ,the fault lay in the fact that the infantry ,commanders under whom they were acting did not fully understand the functions and limitations of the ,tank1 or realise that as the final loss of a good many ,mark ,,iv4 machines in such a retreat was inevitable1 it would have been much better to give the ,tanks a run for their money4 ,,iii ,villers ,bretonneux ,it was not till the ,german offensive had lasted for more than a month that opposing ,tanks at last met in battle4 ,the enemy had pushed us back to within six or seven miles of ,amiens1 and he now planned a more or less full-dress attack upon positions on high ground1 which were1 in fact1 the outer defences not only of the town1 but of the vital ,amiens-,paris railway4 ,a break through on this sector would be a serious disaster1 and the situation was an anxious one4 ,the weather was unsettled1 and the mornings often still misty in the ,somme country4 ,at #f4cj on ,april #bc the river fog lay thick1 and under cover of this mist the ,germans attacked the whole of the line south of the ,somme after a short and particularly intense bombardment4 ,a company of heavy ,tanks of the #ast and seven ,whippets of the #crd ,battalion had been hastily moved up into the domain of the #crd ,corps1 north and south of ,villers ,bretonneux1 where it was rumoured that the ,germans were going to use ,tanks1 and1 in fact1 when at last the first little knots of ,german infantry appeared through the fog1 three huge forms accompanied them4 ,it was over ,tanks of this type1 the 8,schultz0 and the 8,hagan10 that the little boys of ,london scrambled so delightedly on the ,horse ,guards ,parade in the spring of #aiai4 ,now all we could see of them1 as they lumbered slowly through the fog1 was that they were a good deal larger and heavier than the heavy ,british ,tanks1 and that they were rather tortoise shaped1 the armoured 8shell0 everywhere coming down over the tracks like a sort of crinoline4 ,they broke right through our line1 opening a way for the infantry which was following them4 ,but three of our ,tanks1 under ,captain ,f4 ,c4 ,brown1 ,m4,c41 happened to be on their way to the very spot 7,cachy7 where the ,german ,tanks had attacked4 ,unfortunately two of the three were females1 whose machine-guns were not of much use against the new thick-skinned enemy4 ,however1 they went on1 hoping for chinks in their opponents' armour1 but in spite of their superior power of manuvre both the females were soon knocked out by shells from the ,german ,tanks4 ,the one male ,tank1 under ,lieutenant ,mitchell1 was now opposed to three undamaged enemy machines1 each more heavily armoured than the ,british ,tank4 ,lieutenant ,mitchell1 however1 immediately engaged them and1 after some dodging of the salvos of his three antagonists1 who seemed to be trying to close upon him1 he managed to obtain a direct hit with one of his six-pounders upon the leading ,german4 ,twice again he fired1 each time hitting the same machine4 ,the third shot completed its discomfiture2 in its efforts to get away it fell into a sandpit1 where it lay on its side1 its tracks still rattling round ineffectively4 ,with its first enemy definitely out of action1 the ,british ,tank turned upon the other two4 ,but they had not waited1 and had already discreetly turned tail1 leaving ,lieutenant ,mitchell master of the situation4 ,such was the rather inglorious end of the ,germans' first endeavour to meet the ,british ,tank ,corps with its own weapons4 ,it was not far from the scene of this strange encounter that about half an hour later seven ,whippets came into action1 debouching from north of ,cachy1 attacking the enemy on the ridge between ,villers ,bretonneux and ,hangard ,wood4 ,the ridge was held by machine-gun groups concealed in shell-holes1 while on the eastern slopes two ,german ,battalions were forming up in the open ready to attack4 ,the ,whippets moved from shell-hole to shell-hole1 destroying the machine-gun groups1 and then proceeded to deal with the infantry4 ,their success was terrible4 ,they got right in among the enemy1 who had absolutely no cover1 and mowed the unhappy ,germans down in ranks as they stood4 ,at least #djj of the enemy are estimated to have been killed1 and the rest at last fled in confusion1 the threatened attack being completely broken up4 ,not only were these two ,battalions disposed of1 but by nightfall it was clear that for the time being at least some circumstance had definitely held up the ,german advance4 ,we did not know it1 but our defences had withstood and survived the last hungry lickings of the great spring tide4 ,its impulse was too far spent to overflow the frail dam of our ,villers ,bretonneux positions4 ,the ,german advance had reached slack water4 ,there had been one incident which had genuinely cheered the hard pressed men of the ,tank ,corps4 ,at the very blackest moment of the retreat1 when machines were being sacrificed by the dozen1 and when the grey waves of the ,german infantry seemed to pursue our weary men with endless1 tireless iteration1 ,general ,elles received a telegram from ,mr4 ,docker1 the chairman of the ,metropolitan ,carriage ,company of ,birmingham3-- 8,a resolution has been passed unanimously by the ,works people of the ,metropolitan ,carriage ,company to forgo any holidays1 and to do their utmost to expedite delivery of ,tanks to assist their comrades in the ,field40 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,the ,,equilibrium--,,minor ,,actions--,,hamel--,,the ,,ballon ,d',,essai ,it is not perhaps too fanciful to envisage the battles of ,april #bd1 #be and #bf1 though they were by no means uniformly satisfactory little actions1 as belonging to a different and a happier era than the action of ,villers ,bretonneux itself4 ,on the #bcrd we had been fighting for our lives4 ,through the three subsequent days' fighting1 it began to be more and more obvious that a change had taken place4 ,either through our desperate efforts to save ,amiens1 or by the workings of some deeper cause1 spent and disorganised as we were1 we had begun to pull level with the ,germans again4 ,the change was slight1 but none the less palpable4 ,on the #beth1 a few ,tanks of the #ast and #crd ,battalions fought with the #crd ,corps in a counter-attack against the most advanced of the new ,german positions in the ,bois d',aquenne4 ,the ,tanks did a good deal of execution1 and we succeeded in driving in some of the forward ,german posts4 ,on the #bfth1 four ,tanks of the #ast ,brigade had an interesting experience4 ,the ,allied forces on this part of the line consisted of a most curious mixture of arms and races4 ,the scene1 for example1 in a neighbouring wood about ten days before is thus described by the historian of the #ast ,battalion3 8,the ,bois d',abb presented a most picturesque spectacle1 and any one taking the trouble to walk through it could have had the unique experience of seeing practically every branch of both the ,british and ,french ,armies represented4 ,in this wood were to be found ,tanks of all descriptions1 ,mark ,,iv4's1 ,v's1 ,whippets and ,french ,rnaults1 heavy and light artillery1 ,british infantry1 ,australians1 ,french cavalry and infantry1 ,moroccans1 and lastly a detachment of the ,legion of ,frontiersmen mounted on little ,arab ponies1 which presented a strange contrast to the heavy ,percherons of the artillery40 ,on ,april #bf1 it was in company with the ,moroccan ,division that the #ast ,battalion fought4 ,the enemy had launched a strong attack against the ,front held by these troops at #f a4m4 on the morning of the #bfth1 under cover of the usual heavy mist4 ,very soon1 however1 a section of ,tanks under ,captain ,groves got right in amongst the advancing ,germans and inflicted heavy casualties upon them4 ,the ,french ,colonial infantry1 who had been obliged to fall back1 immediately rallied and brought the ,german assault to a standstill4 ,in the course of the action ,second ,lieutenant ,wilson's ,tank found itself among some ,german heavy guns1 which it attacked with case shot#fa and machine-gun fire1 wounding most of their crews and killing the rest4 ,mr4 ,wilson then patrolled up and down some trenches held by the enemy and cost them very heavy losses by his enfilading fire4 ,eventually1 having fired every round of ammunition in his ,tank1 he decided to go back1 but while he was on his way1 his magneto broke down4 ,however1 he sent back a messenger to fetch a new magneto1 and after this had been fitted1 he returned to the rallying point1 his ,tank having suffered the total casualties of two men slightly wounded4 ,on the #bhth1 another ,company of the same ,battalion again co-operated with the ,moroccan ,division4 ,this time it was the ,allies who were the attackers1 their objective being the ,hangard ,wood4 ,owing to a mistake1 the four ,tanks did not get into action until rather late4 ,second ,lieutenant ,jones' ,tank1 however1 fought a very good action1 clearing out a great number of machine-gun nests in the ,wood1 and generally giving a great deal of help to the ,moroccan infantry in their advance4 ,the ,tank stayed in the ,wood1 until all its ammunition had been expended1 and then1 the infantry deciding not to make a further attack1 it was withdrawn and rejoined its ,company4 ,except a small action of the #ast ,battalion on ,may #b1 the ,tank ,corps saw no fighting for the next six weeks1 and it was not till ,july #d that they fought again in any considerable action4 ,,ii ,the general situation in ,may was still such as to cause our ,high ,command a certain anxiety4 ,it is easy to be wise after the event and say that the ,germans must obviously have outrun their transport and overtaxed the limited road capacity of the devastated area which lay behind them4 ,in early ,may this1 though true1 was not obvious4 ,meanwhile1 we had been too much weakened by the disasters of the last six weeks to be able to counter-attack4 ,consequently1 the enemy had the same opportunities for reconstruction as we had ourselves1 and although we felt confident that after such a hurricane of battles there must be a breathing space for both ,armies1 we were by no means certain what would be the respective rles of the two opposing sides when the struggle came to be resumed4 ,our most pressing need was the filling of the gaps in our ,divisions and the closing of the huge breaches which the ,german advance had made in our defensive systems4 ,the greatest need was for men4 ,we had1 it is true1 to lay out new trench lines and reconstruct such old systems as already existed1 but it was not likely that the enemy would afford us time to establish new defences comparable with those which he had already proved his power of overrunning4 ,therefore it was to procuring new and well-trained troops that our chief efforts must be directed4 ,the men procured1 there must be railways upon which to move them4 #fb8,the depth to which the enemy had penetrated in the ,somme and ,lys valleys had disrupted important lateral lines of railway1 and had created a situation of extreme gravity with regard to the maintenance of communications in ,northern ,france4 ,at ,amiens1 ,bthune1 and ,hazebrouck1 much-used railway junctions had been brought under the effective fire of the enemy's guns1 while the railway centre at ,st4 ,pol was threatened4 ,to relieve the situation a comprehensive programme of railway construction was undertaken40 ,some #bjj miles of broad-gauge track was laid between ,april and ,july and a complete series of new defences were built1 involving1 incredible as it may seem1 #ejjj miles of trench4 ,nor were ,tanks left out of the scheme of reorganisation4 ,but1 alas6 owing to the extreme need of infantry reinforcements1 and the difficulty of immediately re-arming ,battalions which had lost their ,tanks during the ,retreat1 this 8reconstruction0 all but took the form1 not of augmentation1 but of diminution4 ,it was proposed to reduce the number of ,tank ,brigades from six to four4 ,the appearance of enemy ,tanks1 however1 soon quashed this project4 ,not only had the ,corps lost heavily in machines1 but the fighting done by the ,lewis gun ,units had been of a particularly strenuous kind1 and several ,battalions had sustained such casualties in trained and experienced men as to cause great anxiety at ,tank ,headquarters4 ,however1 the ,tank ,corps were only in the same predicament as the rest of the ,british ,army1 and there was nothing for it but to gather up the bits with as much grace as possible and to start away as quickly as might be on the work of reconstruction4 ,all through ,may1 ,mark ,v4 machines were arriving in ,france at the rate of about sixty a week4 ,some of the ,battalions which had not taken any part in the ,retreat had been left in their original areas1 in case the ,germans should attack1 so that we find ,battalions 7for example of the #ast ,brigade7 doing 8,savage ,rabbit0 as late as the middle of ,may4 ,for the most part1 however1 the ,corps was gathered together undergoing intensive training in the ,bermicourt area4 ,all ,tank ,units were to be ready for action--re-armed1 re-equipped and re-trained--by ,august #a4 ,the ,central ,workshops set to work in early ,june to prepare sledges for supply haulage1 bridges upon which the ,whippets could cross wide obstacles1 and 8,cribs0 for the heavy ,tanks4 ,there 8,cribs0 were big hexagonal oaken crates1 reinforced with steel1 which were an improved and lighter version of the fascines which were improvised for the ,battle of ,cambrai4 ,training grounds and workshops hummed with the preparations1 and when1 in the last days of ,july1 the call came1 it was1 as we shall see1 found possible to launch #djj ,tanks at little over a week's notice4 ,it was while the ,corps was training at ,bermicourt that the foundation of the excellent relations which ever afterwards existed between ,tanks and the ,french infantry was laid4 ,a great number of ,french troops happened to be billeted in and around the ,tank ,corps area1 and their keenness to learn all they could about our machines and their tactics afforded great pleasure to the men of the ,british ,tank ,corps4 ,general ,le ,maistre1 commanding the #ajth ,french ,army1 particularly asked that ,tank demonstrations should be held for the ,units of his command4 ,this was done1 and all through ,may and ,june two or three of these demonstrations were given weekly4 ,besides ,french troops1 representatives from a number of ,british and ,colonial ,corps1 and the ,canadian and ,australian ,corps1 also came to watch1 to their great edification4 ,,iii ,we have said that only a few minor ,tank actions were fought during the last part of ,may and the month of ,june4 ,two of these small encounters1 however1 were rather interesting4 ,to begin with1 the #agth ,armoured ,car ,battalion fought its first action in company with the ,french on ,june #aa4 ,at #i4cj on the morning of ,june #aj orders were received by ,colonel ,carter1 commanding the ,battalion1 to report to the #ast ,french ,army at ,contay4 ,at ,contay instructions were issued for the ,battalion to proceed to ,ravenel1 near ,st4 ,just4 ,the ,battalion got this order by telephone1 and although the night was very dark and wet1 and the roads crowded with traffic1 it reached ,ravenel after a sixty miles' journey by five in the morning of ,june #aa4 ,that same day it went into action with the #ajth ,french ,army in its counter-attack at ,belloy4 ,two sections of the ,armoured ,cars engaged the enemy with machine-gun fire1 but unfortunately the roads here were piled high with every sort of dbris4 ,this prevented the cars from being as active as they were to prove themselves later4 ,the second small action was a night raid1 interesting as the first in which ,tanks had ever been engaged4 ,here the #ajth ,battalion fought in conjunction with the #dth ,corps4 ,we were endeavouring to capture a series of posts near ,bucquoy1 only five ,platoons of infantry and five female ,tanks being employed4 ,the raid began at about half-past eleven at night4 ,we were met with a heavy barrage from trench mortars and machine-guns1 and the infantry were held up4 ,the ,tanks1 however1 managed to push forward1 and carried on the attack in the pitch dark by themselves4 ,as they advanced they met with a number of large parties of ,germans1 into the 8brown0 of which they fired4 ,the ,tanks certainly accounted for a great many of the enemy1 though it being1 as we have said1 extremely dark1 it was impossible to make a very exact computation of the 8bag40 ,curiously enough1 not a single ,tank was damaged by the trench mortar barrage1 which was extremely heavy4 ,one ,tank was swarmed over by a particularly bold party of the enemy and the crew shot them down with their revolvers4 ,later on this same ,tank managed to rescue a wounded infantry officer who had earlier been taken prisoner by the ,germans4 ,the raid is interesting as it demonstrated the possibility of manuvring ,tanks in the dark through the enemy's lines--not a single machine lost direction--and also showed how much protection was afforded to the machines by their invisibility4 ,,iv ,by the middle of ,june the ,british ,high ,command had grown anxious to make some test of the position of things on the enemy's side of the line4 ,this they proposed to do by a more or less limited and tentative attack1 an attack which might1 if it was successful1 be utilised as a dress rehearsal for larger ventures1 or which1 if it failed1 would not commit us too deeply4 ,the ,australians had been constantly harassing their vis vis on the ,villers ,bretonneux ,front1 and the ,high ,command gave out that for this and other reasons they considered that a better place than the sector opposite ,villers ,bretonneux could hardly be found from which to launch our ballon d'essai4 ,what those 8other reasons0 were did not appear for nearly a month after the battle had been fought4 ,it was proposed that between sixty and seventy ,tanks belonging to the #eth ,brigade should be employed4 ,our attack was to have a strictly limited objective1 its ostensible purpose being to capture the spur running from the main ,villers ,bretonneux plateau towards the ,somme1 on the east side of ,hamel1 and thus to gain important observation and incidentally a useful jumping-off place for any subsequent advance4 8,z0 day was to be on ,july #d4 ,directly the attack had been decided upon1 ,tanks and ,australians began their combined training in the area of the #eth ,tank ,brigade4 ,tank units were at once permanently affiliated to corresponding ,australian infantry units with whom they were to fight1 and by this means a very close comradeship was cultivated4 ,it was 7tradition relates71 most necessary that some special steps should be taken to ensure the confidence of the ,australian infantry in the ,tank ,corps1 for1 in the absence of artillery preparation1 upon the ,tanks would almost entirely depend the success and prestige of the ,australians in this first ,allied offensive since the ,march disaster4 ,now the ,australians1 though having1 as it were1 a natural affinity for the activity and surprise of a ,tank as against a prepared artillery attack1 were not inclined to bestow their approval on the ,tanks without due cause being given4 ,they still had vivid memories of the tragedy of errors of the ,bullecourt incident in #aiag4 ,they were1 however1 very open-minded1 and the battle partners had not long been in training together before their relations were particularly cordial4 ,coy and hard to please as were the ,australians in the beginning1 the triumphant success of their partnership in battle left them no memory of their earlier shyness1 and made them vociferous in their praises of a combination that the ,tanks had long felt would prove notably effective4 ,the plan of the attack soon took exact shape4 ,it is worth more or less detailed consideration1 as it was upon the lines of the ,battles of ,cambrai and ,hamel that all set ,tank attacks were afterwards based4 #fc8,the operation was to be conducted as a direct advance of infantry and ,tanks in two waves1 under cover of a rolling artillery barrage4 ,from a ,brigade point of view1 the points of chief interest lay1 first1 in the preliminary arrangements with the ,australian ,corps and the infantry concerned2 secondly1 in the somewhat intricate plans for assembling ,tanks at their start lines with due provision for concealment2 and1 thirdly1 in the methods devised for bringing up large quantities of infantry supplies to the final objective4 ,at a conference held by the ,australian ,corps three days prior to the action the plans were finally settled and no alteration in these was permitted after that date4 ,thus infantry and ,tank officers were able to confer in perfect faith that their mutual arrangements would be carried out without change1 and this method was adhered to in all subsequent operations of a prepared type with the ,australian ,corps4 ,tanks were employed on a scale that was large in proportion to the front attacked1 the saving of casualties to the infantry being made the most important factor in the plan40 ,the main tactical features of the attack were the strongholds of ,vaire ,wood1 ,hamel ,wood1 ,pear-shaped ,trench and ,hamel ,village4 ,there was no defined system of trench1 except the old ,british lines just east of ,hamel which the enemy now occupied1 and which had1 of course1 been originally sited to face east4 ,for the rest1 the ,german defensive consisted in machine-gun nests4 ,the attacking forces were the #dth ,australian ,division and four companies of ,american infantry4 ,the ,artillery was to provide a rolling barrage1 behind which the infantry were to advance1 followed by the ,tanks1 which were only to pass ahead of them when resistance was encountered4 ,this last arrangement did not prove a good one4 ,the going was good1 and the fertile country lay still and smiling in its ,midsummer pride4 ,the camp allotted to the ,tanks lay five miles behind the line in the angle formed by the meeting of the ,somme and the ,luce4 #fd8;,it was an ideal spot in which to spend the summer months4 ,in the cool of the evening1 looking toward the west over the uncut cornfields1 we could obtain a wonderful view of the old city of ,amiens1 its large cathedral1 with the numbers of smaller church spires and smokeless chimneys clustering around it1 being outlined against the setting sun4 ,toward the east one saw the ruined village of ,villers ,bretonneux standing on ,hill #ajd1 its chteau dominating the surrounding wreck of houses4 ,it was hard to believe that the line was so close until the view was suddenly obliterated by the familiar sight of bursting shrapnel and the heavy smoke of the gas shells40 ,the sixty fighting ,tanks which were employed in the attack were divided into two waves1 the first of forty-eight1 and the second of twelve machines4 ,as the advance intended was but a short one1 the usual gigantic system of supply dumps was not necessary4 ,on the contrary1 each fighting ,tank carried forward ammunition and water for the infantry1 and the four supply ,tanks were detailed to carry up ,r4,e4 supplies and other stores4 #fe8;,each of these four machines eventually delivered a load of about #ab1ejj lbs4 within #ejj yards of the final objective and within half an hour of its capture4 ,the total amount of supplies delivered on ,july #d at #dj lbs4 per man represented the loads of a carrying party #a1bej men strong4 ,the number of men used in the supply ,tanks was twenty-four40 ,no precise information as to time and place had been given to the ,tank ,corps till just a week before the battle2 but as the area had been carefully reconnoitred for the last two months1 very little had to be done to complete this side of the preparations4 ,on the night of ,july #a-b1 the ,tanks were moved up to the assembly point1 an early move which was the result of the ,australians' last lingering doubts as to the capacity of the ,tanks for arriving in time at rendezvous4 ,no chance was thus given to any ,tank of being late in the starting line4 ,machines of 8,c0 flight of ,no4 #h ,squadron of aeroplanes were to make their dbut as honorary members of the ,tank ,corps on the morrow1 for the wonderful potentialities of aeroplane and ,tank co-operation were now fully realised1 and the ,tank ,corps had been allotted a squadron of its own4 ,,vi ,at three o'clock on the morning of ,july #d1 almost before the sky had begun to lighten1 the ,tank engines were swung up all along our line1 and at two minutes past the hour sixty graceful ,mark ,v4's slid forward after their infantry1 two low-flying aeroplanes escorting them4 ,as the ,tanks moved along1 the crew's blessed the sweet running of their new machines1 for there had not been a single mechanical hitch of any sort1 and they knew that the shrewd eyes of the ,australians had been fixed like gimlets upon them4 ,but the whole day was to be one long triumph for the ,mark ,v4 ,here and there as the attack surged forward the ,tanks were leading1 following close behind the bursting shells4 ,here and there the ,australians were ahead4 ,the enemy's infantry put up little or no fight1 but their machine-gunners resisted us with the tenacious courage which we had learned to expect4 ,but our onrush was inexorable4 ,the new ,tanks were possessed1 the ,germans found1 of a deadly power of manuvre which they used to the full1 expending little ammunition upon machine-gun nests1 but1 even when they had passed an emplacement by in the first rush1 swinging swiftly round on the wretched gunners and crushing guns and crews beneath them4 ,as a ,tank chronicler somewhat grimly remarks3 8,this method eliminated all chance of the enemy coming to life again after the attack had passed by40 ,over #bjj machine-guns were accounted for during the day4 ,there were also other and rarer little groups of picked men which the ,tanks here and there routed out of the standing crops4 ,these little parties1 generally consisting of three men1 were armed with a special rifle of gigantic size designed to be fired--like our ,lewis gun--from a bipod4 ,its projectile was a heavy steel-cored armour-piercing bullet4 ,it was a new anti-,tank weapon1 a weapon from which the ,germans hoped great things4 ,with the #acth ,battalion1 a ,tank which had advanced ahead of the infantry1 came upon some enemy dug-outs1 on the far side of a trench too broad for their machine to cross4 ,from these dug-outs the enemy were keeping up a hot fire4 ,the ,tank ,commander1 ,second ,lieutenant ,edwards1 and ,private ,benns1 immediately got out of their ,tank and attacked the garrison on foot4 ,between them the two killed seven of the enemy with their revolvers1 and the rest they took prisoners1 and handed over to the infantry at the first opportunity4 ,there were many fine pieces of individual work1 especially instances of ,tanks helping each other under heavy fire1 and there is little doubt that it was to this friendly co-operation1 this towing of lame ,tanks out of hot corners1 the astonishingly low casualties in machines were partly due4 ,the despatch tells how the battle fared all along the line4 8,moving up and down behind the barrage1 the ,tanks either killed the enemy or forced him to take shelter in dug-outs1 where he became an easy prey to the infantry4 ,hamel was taken by envelopment from the flanks and rear1 the enemy was driven from ,vaire ,wood1 and at the end of the day our troops had gained all their objectives and over #aejj prisoners40 ,our little success had been complete and triumphant4 ,no less than fifty-seven of the sixty fighting ,tanks came through the day without a scratch1 the infantry killed and wounded amounted to less than half the ,german prisoners who passed through our cages2 and as we have seen1 the battle between ,tanks and machine-guns being l'outrance1 the proportion of ,germans killed to those made prisoners had been unusually high4 ,as for the ,tank crews1 they suffered only thirteen men wounded4 ,to our great satisfaction also1 the five damaged machines were all salved1 and thus the armament of the ,mark ,v4's could not be investigated by the enemy4 ,but at first almost the most striking characteristic of the victory seemed the perfect co-operation between ,tanks and infantry4 ,the ,tanks and the ,australians were equally enthusiastic over one another's performances4 ,the ,australians were surprised and delighted at the weight and solidity which the sixty ,tanks had lent their impact1 and at the sense of support and comradeship which their men had experienced4 ,the ,tank ,corps were equally impressed by the superb moral of the ,australians1#ff 8who never considered that the presence of ,tanks exonerated them from fighting1 and who took instant advantage of any opportunity created by the ,tanks40 ,a generous and lasting friendship had been established4 ,the #eth ,tank ,brigade and their ,australians were destined throughout their coming partnership to prove an almost invincible combination4 ,but it was not alone the battle partners who were pleased and surprised4 ,the whole ,allied front rang with the news of victory4 ,we had sent up our tentative ballon d'essai1 and behold it had sailed up1 high above our highest expectations and now hung1 a token in the sky4 ,all men might know that though ,apollyon had straddled all across the way1 we had beaten him and were at last come out of the ,valley of ,humiliation4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,with ,,the ,,french--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,moreuil ,the #eth ,brigade and the ,australians had sworn eternal friendship with a refreshing enthusiasm4 ,they were like two schoolgirl friends1 not to be separated1 and at ,vaux1 whither they had retired for combined training1 metaphorically went about all day with their arms round each other's waists4 ,therefore1 when on ,july #ag orders reached the #eth ,tank ,brigade that they were to send a ,battalion south to fight with the ,french1 consternation reigned4 ,if anybody went it would have to be the #bnd ,battalion1 which had not fought at ,hamel at all4 ,but surely some way out could be found by which the ,australians' own ,brigade of ,tanks should not be thus cruelly dismembered8 ,and the authorities1 with positively avuncular benevolence--after a little humming and hahing--were actually induced to make another arrangement2 as the friends firmly believed1 solely upon their representations4 ,there were1 however1 other more military considerations4 ,the attack was still to be under ,brigadier-,general ,courage1 but an extra ,battalion1 the #ith1 should be added to the ,brigade for the occasion4 ,this apparently whimsical outcry of the new-found affinities1 and the yielding of the authorities1 were to be justified thrice over in the events of the next few months4 ,for at this early period a little thing might upset the forging of a weapon which was to prove the two-edged sword with which we were to 8smite ,amalek hip and thigh40 ,as soon as it had been decided that the #ith ,battalion was to go1 preparations were at once begun4 ,the ,french plans were already well advanced before the ,tanks came upon the scene at all4 ,the attacking troops had indeed been in the area since ,april1 but the ,tanks felt that they would be eternally disgraced if they were obliged so much as to hint that they would like even a day's postponement of this1 their first battle with the ,french4 ,indeed in this battle we see the first instance of the wonderful 8speeding up0 which the ,allied ,army underwent almost as soon as the joint command was concentrated in the hands of ,marshal ,foch4 ,an officer who was present throughout the battle and its preliminaries writes3 8,on a certain ,wednesday ,general ,elles and ,general ,courage had an interview at #c p4m4 with the #dth ,army ,commander and were consulted as to the project4 8,at #d4cj they saw ,general ,debeney 7the ,french ,army ,commander7 and the ,french ,corps ,commander1 when railheads and a general scheme of movement were decided upon4 8,that night the #ith ,battalion was warned1 and the battle took place at dawn on the following ,tuesday40 ,practice makes perfect1 and we gradually discovered that the kind of full-dress attacks for which we had always1 as a matter of course1 allowed a month of preparation1 could1 in fact1 be staged in half that time4 ,we see in the huge ,battle of ,amiens1 of which only ten days' notice was given to the troops who took part1 how great a reform we managed to accomplish4 ,,ii ,the attack was to be at dawn on ,july #bc1 and was to be--like ,hamel--a more or less limited and experimental battle4 ,its immediate object was to seize ,st4 ,ribert ,wood in order to outflank ,mailly ,raineval from the south1 to abolish certain highly objectionable ,german batteries which lay near ,st4 ,ribert1 and to advance the ,french field guns eastward in such a way that they would bear upon the high ridges which dominate the right bank of the river ,avre4 ,the country here was undulating and the soil well drained1 and1 except for a number of large and very dense woods1 there were very few ,tank obstacles4 ,there were to be three objectives4 ,the first was a line which ran through the ,bois des ,sauvillers1 ,adelpare ,farm1 and ,les-,trois-,boqueleaux4 ,twelve ,tanks and four ,battalions of ,french infantry were detailed for its capture4 ,the second objective included the clearing of the plateau to the north of the ,bois des ,sauvillers1 and the capture of a corner of the ,bois de ,harpan4 ,twenty-four ,tanks were allotted to this objective and four infantry ,battalions4 ,the third was a line of ,german posts1 known as the 8,blue ,line10 covering the second objective1 and was to be attacked by a strong force of infantry and all the surviving ,tanks4 ,the whole attack was to be preceded by a short intense bombardment1 including heavy counter-battery work1 and the creeping barrage was to consist of a mixture of high explosive and smoke4 ,the ,tanks were to attack in sections of three1 two in front and one in immediate support1 the infantry advancing in small groups close behind the ,tanks4 ,three days before the battle the officers of the #ith ,battalion and some of the ,staff of the #eth ,brigade came down to the battle site1 and1 helped by the ,staff of the ,french #crd ,division1 made a pretty thorough reconnaissance of the ground4 ,that same evening the ,tanks detrained at ,contay4 ,the #ith ,battalion had been busy doing such tactical training as was possible with its new colleagues on the #eth ,brigade training ground4 ,the time was short and the difficulties of language great1 but in spite of this a very friendly understanding had been come to4 ,besides this1 it had had an unusual amount of trekking to do4 ,it had had over eight miles to travel across country to its place of entrainment4 ,from ,contay1 the rail terminus1 the ,tanks moved in all over another eight miles before they got into action4 ,at ten o'clock on the night before the battle the ,tanks were informed that the attack1 which was to have been at dawn1 was postponed until #e4cj4 ,by this time it would1 the ,tank crews somewhat ruefully reflected1 be broad daylight4 ,however1 there was nothing to be done but to hope that the wind would help our smoke screens4 ,the weather had for some time been fine1 but on the morning of attack heavy rain began to fall1 driven up by a south wind4 ,the prospect of a really effective smoke cloud did not seem very great4 ,however1 it was in the best of fighting spirits that the ,tanks and their infantry went forward at zero hour--indeed1 though it was no walk-over and all arms suffered fairly heavily1 high spirits seem to have particularly characterised both ,french and ,british in this battle4 ,a member of the ,tank ,corps testifies navely to the way in which the ,tanks had got their tails up4 8,brigadier-,general ,courage1 who was much in evidence1 was continually visiting the ,battalion and conversing with the officers4 ,from the nature of his suggestions and advice1 a very ordinary thinker could easily come to the conclusion that he did not care for the ,germans40 ,as the first wave ,tanks and infantry advanced1 they found that the enemy was putting down a fairly heavy barrage in many places4 ,however1 moving ahead of the infantry1 the ,tanks cleared ,arrachis ,wood1 destroying a number of machine-guns1 and after a slight resistance1 captured the first objective--,sauvillers ,village1 ,adelpare ,farm and ,les-,trois-,boqueleaux--fifteen minutes before the infantry arrived4 ,two ,tanks were knocked out by shells4 ,in the second phase1 the ,tanks of 8,b0 and 8,c0 ,companies moved forward in support of their infantry on either side of ,sauvillers ,wood4 ,as they swept forward1 they outstripped the ,french patrols1 but after a while turned back to maintain touch4 ,it was by now about #i4cj a4m4 ,the ,tanks could not immediately find their partners1 and unfortunately1 as they were thus cruising about1 no less than six ,tanks were put out of action1 one after another1 by a single battery1 apparently one of those lurking to the south of ,st4 ,ribert ,wood1 and whose destruction was one of the objects of the attack4 ,in another sector a ,battalion ,commander in the #east ,regiment of ,french ,infantry1 which was moving up in support1 determined that if possible he would attack ,harpon ,wood1 and asked the officer commanding 8,b0 ,company of ,tanks for assistance4 ,the ,company ,commander immediately entered into the scheme with alacrity and between them a plan of attack for the ,french infantry and the seven ,tanks was rapidly arranged4 ,this little improvised action was a great success1 ,tanks and infantry duly capturing the ,wood and at least one hostile battery4 ,only two ,tanks were damaged4 ,it was not far from ,harpon that ,captain ,dalton's ,tank1 in the confusion due to the smoke1 got some distance ahead of its infantry4 ,near the ,wood1 ,captain ,dalton located an enemy battery4 ,after a little manuvring he managed to get a direct hit upon one of the guns and drove off the crews of the other pieces with machine-gun fire1 thus silencing the whole battery4 ,he then manuvred his ,tank into position to tow back one of the enemy guns1 but at this moment his machine received a direct hit1 and shortly after1 a second shell added to the damage4 ,captain ,dalton evacuated his crew1 and1 having done so1 made every effort to get back to the derelict ,tank1 for it must be remembered that as yet no ,mark ,v4 had ever fallen into ,german hands4 ,he was under intense machine-gun fire and in direct view of the enemy1 but1 realising the importance of blowing up the remains of his ,tank1 he still attempted the adventure4 ,but it was in vain1 for as he was thus trying to crawl up1 he was severely wounded in the thigh4 ,he managed1 however1 to drag himself back into the ,french lines4 ,nor was ,second ,lieutenant ,c4 ,mecredy1 a ,section ,commander1 less anxious that his knocked-out ,tank should be completely destroyed rather than fall into the hands of the enemy4 ,he had been advancing ahead of his infantry1 when a shell from a concealed field gun hit the ,tank in which he was leading the attack4 ,at once seizing up a number of smoke bombs1 he got out of his machine1 went back1 and1 throwing down his bombs1 put up a smoke curtain to cover the ,tanks that were following him1 lest they should share the fate of his own machine4 ,his manuvre was perfectly successful1 for under cover of the smoke the other ,tanks changed their direction and escaped the guns4 ,with some difficulty ,mr4 ,mecredy managed to dodge his way back to his ,tank1 under heavy hostile shelling and machine-gun fire1 successfully blew it up1 and was preparing to go back when he discovered that one of his crew was lying wounded in the leg in a very exposed place4 ,this man he managed to bring back with him to safety4 ,by the evening all the three objectives had been gained1 and the ,french ,command were very well satisfied with the success of the action4 ,especially delighted was the ,general ,commanding the #crd ,division--,general ,bourgon--who was a great friend of the ,british ,tank ,corps1 and who had been as anxious as we that no hitch should mar this first combined battle4 ,both ,french and ,british had suffered rather heavy casualties1 the ,french #crd ,division1 with whom we had acted1 losing over seven hundred officers and men4 ,fifteen ,tanks out of thirty-six had been knocked out by direct hits1 and of the fifteen rather a large proportion were beyond salving4 ,however1 the enemy's losses were also heavy4 ,the prisoners totalled over eighteen hundred1 and we took #e field guns1 #de trench mortars and #bge machine-guns4 ,before the #ith ,battalion went back to the training area it had the honour of being inspected by ,general ,debeney1 commanding the #ast ,french ,army4 ,he was kind enough to express extreme pleasure at the way in which the ,tanks fought1 and in his special ,order of the ,day gave the ,battalion praise of which they will ever be proud4 8,finally1 ,i owe a special tribute of thanks to the ,battalion of ,british ,tanks1 whose powerful and devoted assistance has aided and assured our success4 8,commanded by an experienced and skilful leader1 the ,tanks have again added to that rich harvest of laurels which this new arm has not ceased to gather since its first appearance in ,september #aiaf4 ,they have given to the ,division the finest example of bravery1 of energy1 of comradeship in action1 and of training for war carried to the highest degree of perfection4 ,their assistance has enabled the infantry to gain a brilliant victory in which they themselves share largely40 ,finally1 as a token of comradeship between the ,french troops of the #crd ,division and the #ith ,tank ,battalion1 this ,battalion had the honour of being presented with the badge of the #crd ,french ,division4 ,since that day they have worn it proudly on their left sleeve4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,amiens1 ,,or ,,battle ,,of ,,august #h ,i ,the ambitious offensive which the ,germans had launched on ,july #ae had collapsed4 ,our somewhat tentative counter-offensive at ,hamel had been surprisingly successful1 and there had been a complete change in the general military situation4 ,the ,german reserves were1 it would seem1 nearly used up1 while ours--fresh troops which had become available during the spring and early summer--had now been incorporated and trained4 ,better still1 the ,american ,army was growing rapidly4 ,we were at last ready again to take the offensive on a grand scale4 ,on ,july #bc1 when the success of the battles of the #ahth was well assured1 a conference was held in which ,general ,foch asked that the ,british1 ,french1 and ,american ,armies should each simultaneously take the offensive4 ,their assaults were to be immediate4 ,on the ,british front1 after some consideration of the rival merits of various battle sites1 it was decided that the attack was to be delivered to the east of ,amiens on a front extending from ,albert to ,montdidier1 and was to have for its immediate object the freeing of the ,paris-,amiens railway1 whose proximity to the ,german lines had proved so exceedingly hampering to our transport arrangements4 ,if the battle was successful1 our advance could be exploited in a second attack directed towards the ,st4 ,quentin-,cambrai line4 ,this line was one whose integrity was of vital importance to the enemy1 as he had long ago confessed in the labour and money which he had poured out upon the vast elaborations of the ,hindenburg defences4 ,for1 twenty miles behind the ,hindenburg ,line lay the great railway centres round ,maubeuge1 the key position of his whole system of lateral communication4 ,if we could once penetrate so far1 we should cut the only communications by which the ,german forces to the south in ,champagne could be supplied and maintained1 and should sever these troops completely from the group of ,german ,armies operating in ,flanders4 ,of this great enterprise the first step was the ever memorable ,battle of ,amiens4 ,,ii ,preparations for the great attack were instantly begun4 ,the battle plans were first made known in the last days of ,july to the commanders who were to take part1 8,z0 day being fixed for ,august #h4 ,the three ,brigades of ,tanks which were to fight1 7the #eth1 #crd1 and #dth7 had their first intimation of what was afoot on ,july #bg1 and their orders were confirmed on ,august #d4 ,briefly1 these were the general lines on which the battle was to be fought4 ,preparations were to be rushed through4 ,they were to be as secret as brief4 ,the battle itself was to be in two phases4 ,first1 an attack without artillery preparation1 but under the protection of a creeping barrage4 ,the whole action was to be very much on the lines of the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai1 save that this time 7#a7 an even larger number of ,tanks--about #dcj including ,whippets--were to head the battle2 7#b7 that light skirmishing lines of infantry were to be used2 and that 7#c7 as at ,hamel we were this time attacking a more or less improvised defence line4 ,the second phase of the attack1 which was to be made by a fresh wave of troops1 was to start about four hours after zero1 that is1 after the first objective had been taken4 ,during this second phase1 the artillery was to be moved up and we were to advance without a barrage4 ,on the right was to be the ,canadian ,corps1 and with them the #dth ,brigade#fg of ,tanks was to fight4 ,in the centre1 with the ,australian ,corps its usual battle partner1 the #eth ,tank ,brigade1#fh was again to operate4 ,on the left1 north of the ,somme1 two ,divisions of the #crd ,corps were to have the #ajth ,tank ,battalion attached to them4 ,behind these three bodies three cavalry ,divisions1 the #crd ,brigade of ,whippet ,tanks1 and the #agth ,battalion of ,armoured ,cars1 were to be concentrated4 ,their work was chiefly the exploitation of the second phase4 ,the ,armoured ,car ,battalion had only just returned from operations with the ,french4 #fi8,when the #fth ,french ,cavalry ,division was withdrawn to rest1 the #agth ,battalion proceeded to ,senlis1 and at #i a4m41 having just entered this town1 it received orders to proceed forthwith to ,amiens and report to the ,headquarters of the ,australian ,corps4 ,amiens1 which was nearly #ajj miles distant1 was reached the same night4 8,on arriving1 ,lieut4-,colonel ,carter was informed that his unit was to take part in the projected attack east of that town4 ,the chief difficulty foreseen in an armoured car action in this neighbourhood was the crossing of the trenches4 ,although only one day was available wherein to find a solution to this difficulty1 it was accomplished by attaching a small force of ,tanks to the ,battalion4 ,these ,tanks were used to tow the armoured cars over the obstacles1 or rather along the tracks the ,tanks formed through them4 ,this solution proved eminently successful40 ,short as was the time for preparations1 an elaborate deceptive scheme was planned and carried out1 to make it seem that we intended to fight in ,flanders4 ,canadians were put into the line on the ,kemmel front1 where in due course the enemy identified them4 ,ostentatious ,headquarters and ,casualty ,clearing ,stations were conspicuously disposed about the area4 ,throughout the #ast ,army sector our wireless stations hummed with messages about the concentration of troops1 and arrangements were made to make it seem that a great assembling of ,tanks was taking place near ,st4 ,pol4 ,here1 indeed1 ,tanks elaborately trained with infantry on fine days--days1 that is to say1 on which the enemy's long-distance reconnaissance and photographic aeroplanes were likely to be at work behind our lines4 ,the ruse was perfectly successful and--as we found out afterwards--the news of our 8great projected attack in ,flanders0 soon spread1 and by the time we were ready to strike on the ,somme the enemy was momentarily expecting to be attacked in force in the north4 ,,iii ,meanwhile1 hectic days and still more hectic nights were being passed near ,amiens4 ,the reader is to imagine that elaborate preparations such as were described as the preliminaries to ,cambrai and which took a month to carry out1 had now to be executed in a little over a week4 ,reconnaissance had to be carried out1 details of plans and liaison arranged1 and dumps had to be made1 the last on an unprecedentedly large scale1 so great a number of ,tanks never having gone into action together before4 ,in the centre 7the ,australian sector7 certain units in the #eth ,brigade had been newly equipped with ,mark ,v4 star infantry-carrying ,tanks4 ,no one was very familiar with these machines1 and so1 in addition to other preparations1 such units had infantry-carrying to practise with their ,australians4 ,one circumstance greatly added to the fraternal feeling of the #eth ,brigade towards their familiar battle partners4 ,as soon as the final conference was ended1 ,general ,monash laid down the principle that on no consideration should any alteration be allowed in the plans as then approved4 ,it was therefore possible for all the ,tank units to work out the details of their schemes in perfect confidence4 ,the battlefield lay on either bank of the river ,somme1 which ran to the north of the area of attack1 and as far as ,pronne1 almost at right angles to the lines of the two armies4 ,south of it1 a number of gullies1 roughly parallel to the battle front1 ran down to the river from high ground which formed the watershed between the ,somme and the small river ,luce4 ,two of these steep gullies1 the ,crisy ,valley1 and another which ran from ,morcourt almost to ,harbonnires1 were to be great features in the battle1 forming as they did admirable cover for the concealment of batteries or for the assembling of troops for a counter-attack4 ,the following notes on the ,luce were given to the author by ,major ,hotblack3-- 8,the river ,luce1 though only a small marshy stream1 formed the great difficulty of the plan of operations4 8,part of it was in the ,french lines1 and as to put up fresh bridges would have attracted the enemy's attention1 the attacking troops had to cross it in a few places and deploy afterwards in the dark4 8,in that sector where the ,luce flowed within the enemy's lines1 it ran diagonally across the front of attack of the ,canadian ,division4 8,a great deal of trouble was taken in finding out all possible details of this little river1 and it caused anxiety to every one concerned from the ,field-,marshal himself downwards4 8,the ,luce sector of the front lay within the lines then held by the ,french1 and in addition to various ,reconnaissance ,officers1 ,major-,general ,lipsett1 commanding the #crd ,canadian ,division1 and ,brig4-,general ,hankey1 commanding the #dth ,tank ,brigade1 carried out personal reconnaissance of the river in general and ,domarat ,bridge in particular4 8,both these ,general ,officers had great reputations for personal gallantry1 and always endeavoured to see for themselves what the conditions really were before committing their troops4 8,the ,french troops then holding the line1 knowing nothing beyond the fact that they were to be relieved by the ,british1 expressed the greatest astonishment and admiration for our thoroughness and for the remarkable conscientiousness and pertinacity of our ,generals and ,general ,staff ,officers1 in so frequently visiting the forward positions of an unhealthy sector4 ,we had no choice but blandly to assure them that this was their unvarying practice whenever a relief of any sort was contemplated40 ,as another result of the great secrecy that had been imposed1 no officer knew who else was in the secret1 and on one occasion ,major ,hotblack and another ,british officer met on the banks of the ,luce and each made lengthy explanations which explained everything except the real reason why they were there4 ,two days later these officers met at a conference on the operations1 and congratulated each other on the plausibility of their several explanations4 ,it had been no easy matter to pretend that it was quite a normal thing for them to paddle in the ,luce in close proximity to the enemy4 ,on the day all went well1 however1 and the information about the river proved to be correct to the last detail1 and as had been anticipated1 though the bridges in the enemy lines had been blown up1 the gaps were sufficiently small for ,tanks to cross on the abutments4 ,generally speaking1 the going was good1 and the fact that the weather had been reasonably fine for some time before the day of attack made our preparations the easier4 ,all night1 for four or five nights before the battle1 the carrying ,tanks had plied up and down1 forming dumps of tens of thousands of gallons of petrol and water and millions of rounds of ammunition4 ,at last the time came for the final moving up of both the fighting and supply ,tanks to their assembly positions1 about two miles behind the lines4 ,no4 #a ,gun ,carrier ,company of ,tanks had been allotted to the #eth ,australian ,division1 and lay up in an orchard north of ,villers-,bretonneux4 ,all went well till the late afternoon of ,august #g1 when a chance shot from the enemy set one of these ,tanks blazing4 ,the enemy promptly began to shell the area heavily1 and destroyed nearly the whole ,company of ,tanks and their loads4 ,it was on this occasion that ,second ,lieutenant ,henderson ,smith was awarded the ,military ,cross4 ,the following account of his action appears in the list of 8,honours and ,awards03-- 8,as soon as the first ,tank was hit1 ,second ,lieutenant ,smith rushed to the scene and collected men to aid him1 and so initiated the work of rescuing the ,tanks4 ,he showed the utmost skill in organising the withdrawal of ,tanks from the blaze4 8,although several of his helpers were men from other units and inexperienced in ,tank work1 this gallant officer succeeded in moving two ,tanks away from the heart of the fire4 ,this bold action undoubtedly enabled the people on his right to save three ,tanks4 ,unfortunately these two ,tanks were hit and set on fire by the explosions on other ,tanks4 ,on each occasion ,second ,lieutenant ,smith was the last to leave the blazing machine4 ,the ,tanks were loaded with explosives for the infantry1 gun-cotton1 bombs1 trench mortars1 etc41 besides two fills of petrol each40 ,the shelling was an uncomfortable incident1 not only because of the loss at the last moment of the machines and of the masses of stores which they carried1 but because such a bombardment might be an indication that the enemy suspected the presence of ,tanks4 ,however1 as at ,cambrai1 there was nothing to be done1 and it remained only to try to hurry forward more stores to replace those which had been burnt4 ,this was successfully accomplished4 ,final lying-up places for the #cjj heavy ,tanks had been arranged all along the front at about #djjj yards from the front line4 ,at about the time when the ,tanks were moving up to these 8jumping-off places0 the enemy may have been somewhat puzzled to observe that a number of large aeroplanes with exceedingly noisy engines kept flying about between the lines4 ,in any case1 what he did not observe was the noise made by #cjj advancing ,tanks4 ,,iv ,the night of the #gth-#hth was damp and still1 and at about four o'clock on the #hth a dense ground mist had begun to drift up the river valley4 ,soon the whole air was one silent white sea of vapour4 ,so thick was it that the assaulting infantry and ,tanks had immediately to prepare to move entirely by compass1 for it was impossible to see a yard ahead through the dense silent blanket4 ,nothing1 it would seem1 was further from the ,germans' thoughts than that the steaming quiet of the early autumn morning was to be so terribly broken4 ,at a quarter past four his lines were perfectly silent4 ,he was far from being in a truculent mood in this sector1 and for a week his attitude had been unobtrusive4 ,here and there a ,german sentry1 his grey greatcoat silvered like gossamer by the pearls of the mist1 would cough1 stamping his feet as he peered listlessly through the fog for stray trespassers in ,no ,man's ,land4 ,suddenly at #d4bj our massed artillery opened an intense fire along the eleven miles of front4 ,the ,german front line was drenched in a hurricane of shells1 and behind1 his unprepared batteries were for some time completely smothered by the violence of our fire4 ,before the ,germans had had time to recover their wits1 all along the line the ,tanks emerged by tens and twenties upon them out of the fog4 ,the forward positions were completely overwhelmed1 the ,tanks not so much destroying the enemy with their fire as simply running down his machine-gun emplacements and crushing crews and guns beneath them4 ,our first wave was soon out beyond the enemy's lightly held front-trench system1 and the survivors and the second wave were fighting their way through his scattered machine-gun emplacements towards the first phase objective4 ,with the ,australians in the centre1 a ,company of the #acth ,battalion advanced rapidly over undulating country1 apparently 8swallowing the ground0 of both first and second phases at a run4 #gj8,the method of attack was adapted to suit the ground2 leaving the infantry established on a crest1 ,tanks would go forward across the valley1 maintaining fire on isolated machine-gun posts1 and gain positions on the forward ridge4 ,in all cases this induced the enemy to give themselves up1 and enabled the infantry to advance to the next crest4 ,on the right of this sector #8,b' ,company quickly placed their infantry in their final first phase objective north of the main road4 #8,c' ,company on the left had more trouble2 a field gun placed on the high ground across the river near ,chipilly was in position to enfilade the advance1 and knocked out three ,tanks4 ,this for some time caused a withdrawal by the infantry4 ,by noon1 however1 the remaining ,tanks had placed their infantry in the required final positions1 and all active opposition had ceased4 ,throughout the operation there was abundant evidence of the hasty retreat of the enemy4 ,in the gully south-east of ,morcourt a transport-park1 complete with wagons and harness1 was left behind1 and at the southern end of the same gully a field canteen was found well stocked with light wines and ,german beer40 ,with the ,canadians also the advance was rapid1 but here the mist was so thick that ,tank sections got completely mixed up and fought cheerfully all over each other's areas4 ,the carefully planned and methodical assault had to give place to a more or less primitive mle in which each ,tank generally sought out and slew ,germans wherever they might happen to find them4 ,though far from scientific1 this method when allied with the lan of the ,canadian infantry proved highly successful4 ,with the #crd ,corps the fighting was heavier1 and more difficulty was experienced in advancing4 ,the heavy ,tanks and infantry1 however1 soon everywhere held the line whose capture was to mark the end of the first phase 7i4e41 ,marcelcave1 and the ,crisy ,valley to south of ,morlancourt74 ,v ,the second phase of the attack1 which started four hours after zero1 was very different from the first4 ,the mist which had hampered but concealed our approach had now given place to brilliant sunshine4 ,the enemy had had ample warning and had time to dispose his 8stout-hearted artillery and machine-gunners0 to meet the advance4 ,in these conditions his resistance stiffened4 ,with the ,australians1#ga 8,enemy field batteries firing over open sights engaged and knocked out ,tanks1 some in the neighbourhood of ,bayonvillers and near ,crisy ,village4 ,the crews were1 however1 in many cases able to move forward with their ,hotchkiss guns and put the hostile batteries out of action4 ,the surviving ,tanks pressed on to the final objective1 the ,australian infantry being quick to seize the openings that had been made40 ,the final objective allotted to the #bnd ,tank ,battalion was ,harbonnires ,village4 ,the machine-gun and artillery fire had been heavy4 ,however1 the first-wave ,tanks rallied at the ,crisy ,valley and with the rest of the ,battalion launched the attack on the second objective4 ,lieut4-,colonel ,bryce led his ,tanks triumphantly to the successive capture of all the objectives allotted to them--,warfuse1 ,lamotte1 ,bayonvillers1 and a number of other villages4 ,at last they reached ,harbonnires1 their last objective1 and1 still on foot1 ,colonel ,bryce entered the place with his leading ,tanks and ran up an ,australian flag over the village4 ,in the nave words of 8,honours and ,awards10 8,this had a most stimulating effect on every one40 ,in the same sector1 ,lieutenant ,percy ,eade and his ,tank 7of the #bnd ,battalion7 appear to have captured a village single-handed1 and1 best of all1 to have solemnly demanded a receipt upon handing it over to the ,australians4 #gb8;,during the attack on the #hth inst4 this officer showed great initiative1 skill and bravery in dealing with unexpected resistance by the enemy4 8,on being informed by the infantry that ,marcelcave was still holding out and was endangering their right flank1 he arranged a scheme of attack with the infantry commander and proceeded to quell the opposition4 ,he destroyed at least six machine-guns with their crews1 besides taking many prisoners4 ,he then handed over the village to the infantry1 from whom he took a receipt4 ,after regaining his position and during the second phase of the attack1 he heard opposition coming from ,bayonvillers1 so he proceeded towards that village4 ,as he was approaching it from the south-west he discovered a group of three light field guns1 two of which were firing at him at short range4 ,these guns had already knocked out several ,tanks4 ,with great gallantry and determination he manuvred his ,tank in their direction1 and so directed the fire of his own guns that he dispersed the gunners4 ,after running over one of the field guns1 he proceeded into the village1 where his ,tank was directly responsible for capturing at least forty of the enemy4 8,throughout the whole of the operation1 this ,tank ,commander set his crew a magnificent example of courage and determination4 7,immediate ,reward470 ,the #acth ,battalion ,history is particularly full of allusions to the excellence of their relations with their battle partners1 the ,australians4 ,all ,tanks of this ,battalion displayed on a painted board the colours of their own infantry1 of whom one ,n4,c4,o4 stayed with each crew and rode as an observer in the ,tank on the day of battle4 ,it may here be noted that these ,australian ,n4,c4,o4's were of the greatest use in keeping touch with the infantry1 and incidentally returned to their units with a largely enhanced opinion of the courage and endurance of the ,tank ,corps personnel4 ,in the second phase one ,tank was of service in keeping touch between two ,companies of infantry1 until a gap in the line could be closed4 ,with the ,canadians1 the second phase was equally hot4 ,a typical action was fought by a machine belonging to the #adth ,battalion4 #gc8,second ,lieutenant ,gould's ,tank was pushing on towards the ,red ,line1 which overlooked the valley running south4 ,here the enemy were found to be organising for a counter-attack4 ,enemy transport with a large number of stragglers1 estimated at #ajjj1 was in full retreat up the road1 and in the valley itself a force estimated at half a battalion was forming up and being reinforced by other parties coming over the hill in rear4 ,all the time this ,tank was under heavy fire from machine-guns and snipers from the left flank and rear4 ,fire was opened with #f-pounders on the transport and direct hits observed4 ,m4,g4 fire was also directed with good effect on the excellent targets in the valley1 causing confusion and disorganisation in the enemy ranks4 ,with the prolonged running at high speed the interior of the ,tank rapidly became unbearable through heat and petrol fumes1 and the crew were forced to evacuate it and to take cover underneath4 ,at this moment two of the crew were wounded1 one was sick1 one fainted and one was delirious4 ,fortunately1 before the enemy could take advantage of the lull1 two ,whippet ,tanks and a body of cavalry came up1 and the enemy in the valley began to retreat over the hill40 ,the #ast ,tank ,battalion1 with the ,canadians1 suffered extremely severely4 #gd8,owing to the ,french having been held up1 the ,british were subjected to a heavy enfilade fire from the villages of ,beaucourt and ,le ,quesneu and nine of the eleven ,tanks belonging to #8,a' ,company received direct hits from a field battery firing over open sights from ,le ,quesneu4 ,the majority caught fire and were burnt out1 and very severe casualties resulted1 three out of the four ,section ,commanders being killed and the remaining one wounded and captured4 ,this disaster was followed by a particularly heroic action on the part of ,second ,lieutenant ,cassell1 who observed the destructive fire of the battery1 and1 passing through the burning victims of its shells1 steered straight on to it1 in an attempt to avenge the destruction of his comrades4 ,his heroism was in vain1 for before he had proceeded many yards he received a shell through the front of his ,tank which put it out of action and killed ,second ,lieutenant ,cassell and most of his crew40 ,meanwhile1 the ,whippets and the cavalry had pushed forward4 ,they and the armoured cars were to press on beyond the limits of the infantry and heavy ,tank attack4 ,generally the ,whippets were to precede the cavalry1 in order to silence machine-guns1 deal with wire1 if any1 and generally to pave the way4 ,in practice1 however3 #ge8;,difficulty was found in maintaining touch with cavalry owing to the impossibility of keeping up with galloping horsemen on the one hand1 and to the impossibility of a mounted advance in the face of heavy machine-gun fire on the other hand4 ,thus1 two sections of #8,c' ,company1 #crd ,battalion lost touch with their cavalry in climbing a steep hill out of ,ignaucourt ,valley40 ,there were1 in fact1 innumerable instances of liaison difficulties4 8,another ,company was ordered to obtain touch with #crd ,cavalry ,brigade1 but on reporting to the rendezvous1 no cavalry was seen4 8,zero hour had been postponed three hours1 but this was not known till later4 8,being unable to obtain touch with the cavalry1 assistance was rendered about noon to ,canadian infantry attacking ,beaufort and ,warvillers4 ,this attack was successful and ,whippets rendered great assistance40 ,far happier was the lot of certain ,whippets which played an independent part4 ,the following is a first-hand account of the adventures of one such machine1 the ever-to-be-remembered ,whippet1 8,musical ,box40 ,illustration3 ,,smoke ,,screen ,,and ,,semaphore ,illustration3 ,a ,,tankadrome ,as the story will show1 for many months no news was obtained of the fate of the machine or of her crew of one officer1 ,lieutenant ,c4 ,b4 ,arnold1 and two men1 ,gunner ,ribbans and ,driver ,carney1 and it was not till ,january #aiai that the following amazing tale appeared in ,weekly ,tank ,notes3-- 8,on ,august #h1 #aiah1 ,i commanded ,whippet #8,musical ,box' in #8,b' ,company1 #fth ,battalion4 ,we left the lying-up point at zero 7#d4bj p4m47 and proceeded across country to the south side of the railway at ,villers-,bretonneux4 ,we crossed the railway1 in column of sections1 by the bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town4 ,i reached the ,british front line and passed through the ,australian infantry and some of our heavy ,tanks 7,mark ,v471 in company with the remainder of the ,whippets of #8,b' ,company4 ,four sections of #8,b' ,company proceeded parallel with the railway 7,amiens-,ham7 across country due east4 ,after proceeding about #bjjj yards in this direction ,i found myself to be the leading machine1 owing to the others having become ditched1 etc4 ,to my immediate front ,i could see more ,mark ,v4 ,tanks being followed very closely by ,australian infantry4 ,about this time we came under direct shell-fire from a #d-;gun field battery1 of which ,i could see the flashes1 between ,abancourt and ,bayonvillers4 ,two ,mark ,v4 ,tanks1 on my right1 were knocked out4 ,i saw clouds of smoke coming out of these machines and the crews evacuate them4 ,the infantry following the heavy machines were suffering casualties from this battery4 ,i turned half-left and ran diagonally across the front of the battery1 at a distance of about #fjj yards4 ,both my guns were able to fire on the battery1 in spite of which they got off about eight rounds at me without damage1 but sufficiently close to be audible inside the cab1 and ,i could see the flash of each gun as it fired4 ,by this time ,i had passed behind a belt of trees running along a roadside4 ,i ran along this belt until level with the battery1 when ,i turned full-right and engaged the battery in rear4 ,on observing our appearance from the belt of trees1 the gunners1 some thirty in number1 abandoned their guns and tried to get away4 ,gunner ,ribbans and ,i accounted for the whole lot4 ,i cruised forward1 making a detour to the left1 and shot a number of the enemy1 who appeared to be demoralised1 and were moving about the country in all directions4 ,this detour brought me back to the railway siding ,n4,n4,w4 of ,guillaucourt4 ,i could now see other ,whippets coming up and a few ,mark ,v4's also4 ,the ,australian infantry1 who followed magnificently1 had now passed through the battery position which we had accounted for and were lying in a sunken road about #djj yards past the battery and slightly to the left of it4 ,i got out of my machine and went to an ,australian full ,lieutenant and asked if he wanted any help4 ,whilst talking to him1 he received a bullet which struck the metal shoulder title1 a piece of the bullet-casing entering his shoulder4 ,while he was being dressed1 ,major ,rycroft 7horse7 and ,lieutenant ,waterhouse 7,tanks7 and ,captain ,strachan of #8,b' ,company1 #fth ,battalion1 arrived and received confirmation from the ,australian officer of our having knocked out the field battery4 ,i told ,major ,rycroft what we had done1 and then moved off again at once1 as it appeared to be unwise for four machines 7,lieutenant ,watkins had also arrived7 to remain stationary at one spot4 ,i proceeded parallel with the railway embankment in an easterly direction1 passing through two cavalry patrols of about twelve men each4 ,the first patrol was receiving casualties from a party of enemy in a field of corn4 ,i dealt with this1 killing three or four1 the remainder escaping out of sight into the corn4 ,proceeding further east1 ,i saw the second patrol pursuing six enemy4 ,the leading horse was so tired that he was not gaining appreciably on the rearmost ,hun4 ,some of the leading fugitives turned about and fired at the cavalryman when his sword was stretched out and practically touching the back of the last ,hun4 ,horse and rider were brought down on the left of the road4 ,the remainder of the cavalrymen deployed to right1 coming in close under the railway embankment1 where they dismounted and came under fire from the enemy1 who had now taken up a position on the railway bridge1 and were firing over the parapet1 inflicting one or two casualties4 ,i ran the machine up until we had a clear view of the bridge1 and killed four of the enemy with one long burst1 the other two running across the bridge and on down the opposite slope out of sight4 ,on our left ,i could see1 about three-quarters of a mile away1 a train on fire being towed by an engine4 ,i proceeded further east1 still parallel to the railway1 and approached carefully a small valley marked on my map as containing ,boche hutments4 ,as ,i entered the valley 7between ,bayonvillers and ,harbonnires7 at right angles1 many enemy were visible packing kits and others retiring4 ,on our opening fire on the nearest1 many others appeared from huts1 making for the end of the valley1 their object being to get over the embankment and so out of our sight4 ,we accounted for many of these4 ,i cruised round1 ,ribbans went into one of the huts and returned1 and we counted about sixty dead and wounded4 ,there were evidences of shell-fire amongst the huts1 but we certainly accounted for most of the casualties counted there4 ,i turned left from the railway and cruised across country1 as lines of enemy infantry could be seen retiring4 ,we fired at these many times at ranges of #bjj yards to #fjj yards4 ,these targets were fleeting1 owing to the enemy getting down into the corn when fired on4 ,in spite of this1 many casualties must have been inflicted1 as we cruised up and down for at least an hour4 ,i did not see any more of our troops or machines after leaving the cavalry patrols already referred to4 ,during the cruising1 being the only machine to get through1 we invariably received intense rifle and machine-gun fire4 ,i would here beg to suggest that no petrol be carried on the outside of the machine1 as under orders we were carrying nine tins of petrol on the roof1 for refilling purposes when well into the enemy lines 7should opportunity occur74 ,the perforated tins allowed the petrol to run all over the cab4 ,these fumes1 combined with the intense bullet splash and the great heat after being in action 7by this time7 nine to ten hours1 made it necessary at this point to breathe through the mouth-piece of the box respirator1 without actually wearing the mask4 ,illustration3 ,,moving ,,up4 ,,battle ,,of ,,amiens ,illustration3 ,,the ,,armoured ,,cars ,,going ,,up 8,at #b p4m4 or thereabouts ,i again proceeded east1 parallel to the railway and about #ajj yards north of it4 ,i could see a large aerodrome and also an observation balloon at a height of about #bjj ft4 ,i could also see great quantities of motor and horse transport moving in all directions4 ,over the top of another ridge on my left ,i could see the cover of a lorry coming in my direction2 ,i moved up out of sight and waited until he topped the bridge1 when ,i shot the driver4 ,the lorry ran into a right-hand ditch4 ,the railway had now come out of the cutting in which it had rested all the while1 and ,i could see both sides of it4 ,i could see a long line of men retiring on both sides of the railway1 and fired at these at ranges of #djj to #ejj yards1 inflicting heavy casualties4 ,i passed through these and also accounted for one horse and the driver of a two-horse canvas-covered wagon on the far side of the railway4 ,we now crossed a small road which crossed the main railway1 and came in view of large horse and wagon lines--which ran across the railway and close to it4 ,gunner ,ribbans 7,r4,h4 gun7 here had a view of south side of railway and fired continuously into motor and horse transport moving on three roads 7one north and south1 one almost parallel to the railway1 and one diagonally between these two74 ,i fired many bursts at #fjj to #hjj yards at transport blocking roads on my left1 causing great confusion4 ,rifle and machine-gun fire was not heavy at this time1 owing to our sudden appearance1 as the roads were all banked up in order to cross the railway4 ,there were about twelve men in the middle aisle of these lines4 ,i fired a long burst at these4 ,some went down and others got in amongst the wheels and undergrowth4 ,i turned quarter-left towards a small copse1 where there were more horses and men1 about #bjj yards away4 ,on the way across we met the most intense rifle and machine-gun fire imaginable from all sides4 ,when at all possible1 we returned the fire1 until the ,l4,h4 revolver port cover was shot away4 ,i withdrew the forward gun1 locked the mounting and held the body of the gun against the hole4 ,petrol was still running down the inside of the back door4 ,fumes and heat combined were very bad4 ,we were still moving forward and ,i was shouting to ,driver ,carney to turn about1 as it was impossible to continue the action1 when two heavy concussions closely followed one another and the cab burst into flames4 ,carney and ,ribbans got to the door and collapsed4 ,i was almost overcome1 but managed to get the door open and fell out on to the ground1 and was able to drag out the other two men4 ,burning petrol was running on to the ground where we were lying4 ,the fresh air revived us1 and we all got up and made a short rush to get away from the burning petrol4 ,we were all on fire4 ,in this rush ,carney was shot in the stomach and killed4 ,we rolled over and over to try to extinguish the fumes4 ,i saw numbers of the enemy approaching from all round4 ,the first arrival came for me with a rifle and bayonet4 ,i got hold of this1 and the point of the bayonet entered my right forearm4 ,the second man struck at my head with the butt end of his rifle1 hit my shoulder and neck1 and knocked me down4 ,when ,i came to1 there were dozens all round me1 and any one who could reach me did so and ,i was well kicked4 ,they were furious4 ,ribbans and ,i were taken away and stood by ourselves about twenty yards clear of the crowd4 ,an argument ensued1 and we were eventually marched to a dug-out where paper bandages were put on our hands4 ,our faces were left as they were4 ,we were then marched down the road to the main railway4 ,there we joined a party of about eight enemy1 and marched past a field kitchen1 where ,i made signs for food4 ,we had had nothing since #h4cj p4m4 on the night previous to the action1 and it was #c4cj p4m4 when we were set on fire4 ,we went on to a village where1 on my intelligence map1 a ,divisional ,headquarters had been marked4 ,an elderly stout officer interrogated me1 asking if ,i was an officer4 ,i said #8,yes4' ,he then asked various other questions1 to which ,i replied1 #8,i do not know4' ,he said1 #8,do you mean you do not know or you will not tell me8' ,i said1 #8,you can take it whichever way you wish4' ,he then struck me in the face1 and went away4 ,we went on to ,chaulone to a canvas hospital1 on the right side of the railway1 where ,i was injected with anti-tetanus4 ,later ,i was again interrogated1 with the same result as above1 except that instead of being struck1 ,i received five days' solitary confinement in a room with no window1 and only a small piece of bread and a bowl of soup each day4 ,on the fifth day ,i was again interrogated1 and said the same as before4 ,i said that he had no right to give me solitary confinement1 and that unless ,i were released1 ,i should1 at first opportunity1 report him to the highest possible authority4 ,the next day ,i was sent away1 and eventually reached the camp at ,freiburg1 when ,i found my brother1 ,captain ,a4 ,e4 ,arnold1 ,m4,c41 ,tank ,corps4 ,the conduct of ,gunner ,ribbans and ,driver ,carney was beyond all praise throughout4 ,driver ,carney drove from ,villers-,bretonneux onwards4 87,signed7 ,c4 ,b4 ,,arnold1 ,lieut41 8#fth ,tank ,battalion4 8,january #a1 #aiai40 ,the ,tank was found close to the small railway on the eastern side of the ,harbonnires-,rosires ,road4 ,,vi ,the final stage of the day's battle had been reached by early afternoon4 ,the armoured cars1 moving rapidly east along the main roads1 did much to complete the demoralisation of the enemy4 #gf8,the enemy1 once in retreat1 became completely demoralised4 ,one heard from the commanders of the armoured cars which were returning on the main ,villers-,bretonneux road1 how they chased excited ,german ,staff cars and officers through the ruined village of ,faucourt1 and eventually had been held up1 because the enemy's traffic was so congested on the roads behind his lines that they could penetrate no further4 ,the ,air ,force were then reported to have completed this confusion1 by obtaining some excellent results in flying low over these roads4444 8,the cars which had turned northwards entered ,proyart and ,chuignolles1 two moving up to the river ,somme4 ,at ,proyart the cars found the ,german troops at dinner2 these they shot down and scattered in all directions1 and then moving westwards met masses of the enemy driven from their trenches by the ,australians4 ,in order to surprise these men who were moving eastwards1 the cars hid in the outskirts of ,proyart and only advanced when the enemy was between fifty and one hundred yards distant1 when they moved forward1 rapidly shooting down great numbers4 ,scattering from before the cars at ,proyart1 the enemy made across country towards ,chuignolles1 only to be met by the cars which had proceeded to this village1 and they were once again fired on and dispersed4 ,near ,chuignolles one armoured car obtained #8running practice' with its machine-guns at a lorry full of troops1 and kept up fire until the lorry ran into the ditch4 ,there were also several cases of armoured cars following ,german transport vehicles1 without anything unusual being suspected1 until fire was opened at point-blank range4 8,although more than half the cars were out of action by the evening of the #hth1 there were no casualties amongst their personnel sufficiently serious to require evacuation40 ,the ,mark ,v4 star ,tanks successfully reached the day's final objective and delivered their infantry machine-gunners on the line which was to be the limit of our advance4 ,that they were duly 8delivered0 is1 however1 about as much as can be said of many of these unfortunates4 ,the motion1 the heat1 and the fumes of the inside of a ,tank closed for action1 almost invariably proved too much for all but the ,tank's own well-salted crew4 ,consequently where little fire had been met with1 the machine-gunners had come up either riding or walking behind it4 ,where the fire had been heavy and they had been sternly ordered in and the ,tank closed up1 they had been delivered flushed1 feverish1 and either vomiting or extremely faint and quite unfit for duty until they had been given at least a couple of hours' rest4 ,the ,australian ,corps and their ,tanks had alone taken about #gijj prisoners1 and our total captures amounted to over #ac1jjj prisoners1 and more than #cjj guns1 besides all kinds of stores and ammunition4 ,along the eleven miles of attack we had advanced to a depth of nearly seven miles1 and 7except ,le ,quesnoy1 which we captured before dawn on the #ith7 the whole of the outer defences of ,amiens had been taken4 ,the armoured cars and some of the cavalry had1 as we have seen1 been in action far beyond4 ,it was north of the ,somme that our advance had been most hotly contested1 but even here we had pushed forward considerably and the enemy's casualties had been particularly heavy4 ,the ,paris-,amiens railway was completely disengaged1 and the ,despatch characterises the first day's fighting as a 8sweeping success40 ,,vii ,all night1 to the east beyond the limit of our advance1 we could hear the enemy blowing up his ammunition dumps4 ,all night his transport and limbers streamed eastwards1 and all night our airmen hung upon his retreating columns4 ,next morning we attacked again along the whole line1 no less than #aee ,tanks being actually engaged4 ,the ,australians advanced upon ,lihons1 ,framerville and ,vauxvillers1 while on their right the ,canadians continued the attack south of the ,amiens-,chaulnes railway4 ,in the attack on ,framerville1 out of thirteen ,tanks engaged1 only one was hit4 ,this fact was attributable to the admirable co-operation between the infantry and ,tanks4 #gg8,riflemen working hand in hand with the machines picking off the enemy's field gunners1 as soon as the ,tanks came into observation4 ,at ,vauxvillers1 seven ,tanks went into action just before noon1 unaccompanied by infantry and without artillery support4 ,after the ,tanks had gone forward a little way1 the #eth ,australian ,division followed up and not only captured the high ground1 but the village itself1 which was not included in their original objective40 ,near ,rosires the opposition stiffened1 and here no less than eight ,tanks were knocked out by a ,german battery which came into action near ,lihons4 ,it was not until #e p4m4 that this battery was silenced1 and we did not reach ,lihons that night4 #gh8,the day's operations were especially interesting through the rapidity with which the enemy got his field batteries into action from commanding positions against ,tanks advancing in broad daylight4 ,he also employed a number of low-flying aeroplanes against the infantry1 but as these did not carry bombs their fire had no effect upon the ,tanks4 ,the resistance put up by his riflemen and machine-gunners was feeble1 and showed clearly the moral effect of the victorious advance of the previous day40 ,with the ,canadians as many ,tanks as possible were rallied and about fifty-five went into action4 ,they went forward1 as before1 in waves1 the same ,tank ,battalions working with the same ,infantry ,divisions as on the previous day4 ,north of the ,somme1 with the #crd ,corps 7which included the #ccrd ,american ,division7 the #ajth ,tank ,battalion put sixteen ,tanks into action4 ,they had a hard task round ,chipilly1 where the enemy had a large number of machine-guns cleverly concealed in woods and gullies4 ,by the early evening1 however1 all the objectives were taken1 and our positions advanced in line with those which we held south of the river1 an advance achieved at a cost of five casualties to the sixteen machines engaged4 ,the ,whippets' action1 in as far as they were billed to act with the cavalry1 was disappointing4 ,by some fault of liaison they were kept too long at ,brigade ,headquarters4 ,at ,beaufort and ,warvillers1 however1 they were able to give great help to the infantry by chasing hostile machine-gunners out of the standing corn and shooting them down as they fled4 ,on the whole ,august #ith was a successful day1 for we continued to push forward steadily all along our line4 ,,viii ,we had1 in fact1 pushed forward so far that all along the line during the next day's fighting we reached the old trench systems of the ,first ,battle of the ,somme4 ,and it was this fact1 combined with the usual and inevitable petering out of all attacks which are not supported by immense reserves1 that now slowed our rate of advance down to nothing4 ,two days later we left off hammering4 ,the #ajth proved an unfortunate day for the ,tanks1 for though we advanced1 the eighty-five ,tanks engaged suffered heavily in every sector4 ,with the ,canadians1 owing to orders having been issued late1 the hour of attack had to be altered1 and it finally took place in daylight without smoke4 ,a stubborn resistance was encountered1 and of the forty-three ,tanks engaged no less than twenty-three received direct hits4 ,before ,warvillers the cavalry and ,whippets had a particularly poor time of it1 the old trench systems and the old shelled area1 of which the enemy had taken ingenious and thorough advantage1 proving too much for both arms4 ,with the ,australians a rather remarkable night attack was arranged4 ,during the three previous days' fighting it had been found very inconvenient to have the ,somme ,valley as an inter-corps boundary1 and ,general ,monash was allowed to extend his territory northward in such a way that the ,australians should hold both sides of the valley4 ,an encircling movement was1 therefore1 undertaken1 of which ,captain ,denny1 ,m4,c41 ,m4,p41 gives the following account in his article on the work of the ,australians which appeared in the ,daily ,telegraph of ,april #aiai3 8,the #crd and #dth ,australian ,divisions were ordered to carry out an encircling operation on the night of ,august #aj-aa in order to cut off the ,etinehem spur north of the ,somme and the ridge east of ,proyart1 south of the ,somme4 ,the general lines of the operation both to the north and the south of the river were similar4 ,columns were to move along defined roads leaving the objectives well to the flanks1 and then encircle the enemy positions4 ,each column was accompanied by ,tanks1 and was to move in an easterly direction1 and then to wheel inwards towards the ,somme4 ,it was recognised that this action involved certain risks1 as ,tanks had never been tried by night in this way1 but in view of the condition of the enemy's moral at this stage it was considered that the effect of the advance of the ,tanks and infantry would lead immediately to the collapse of the defence4 8,the action north of the river was entirely successful4 ,south of the river the enemy bombed the forward area heavily early in the night1 causing considerable delay in the preparations for the attack4 ,progress was at first slow owing to heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire and the disorganisation caused by the bombing4 ,two of the ,tanks allotted for the operations were destroyed or put out of action very soon after zero hour40 ,almost from the outset of the attack heavy enemy machine-gun fire was encountered from the large enemy dump by the side of the main road4 ,tanks were unable in the dark to locate these machine-guns1 and could not do much to assist the infantry4 ,it was therefore decided to abandon the operation and withdraw the infantry under cover of unaimed fire from the ,tanks1 who were themselves recalled when the infantry had got clear away4 ,it was not till the evening of ,august #ab that ,tanks and infantry were able to advance in this sector1 and that we gained the positions east of ,proyart4 ,by ,august #aa the ,tank ,corps reserves were used up1 and the ,tanks and their crews were almost fought to a standstill4 ,they had had three days of continuous fighting and marching1 and of the thirty-eight ,tanks which went into action on the #aath there was not one but badly needed overhauling4 ,the crews were completely exhausted4 ,we have already described the conditions under which the men fought in the ,mark ,v4 ,tank1 and how after an average of three hours in a closed ,tank whose guns are in action1 all men begin to suffer from severe headache and giddiness1 and most from sickness1 a high temperature and heart disturbance4 ,after the ,battle of ,amiens the crews of most of the surviving ,tanks had fought for three days1 not three hours1 and #ej per cent4 of them were on the verge of collapse4 ,however1 as we have said1 thirty-eight machines and crews were scraped together1 and on ,august #aa ten ,tanks of the #bnd ,battalion helped in the taking of ,lihons by the ,australians4 ,these ,tanks had an approach march of eight miles before they reached their jumping-off places4 ,with the ,canadians1 ,tanks attacked ,domeny and twice entered the village1 but the #dth ,canadian ,division could not get forward to consolidate1 owing to lack of support on the right4 ,on the #abth1 while six ,tanks were still thrashing out the ,proyart affair north of the ,somme1 the #dth and #eth ,brigades were withdrawn1 to be followed next day by the remainder of the ,tanks4 ,,ix ,we called a halt1 and the ,battle of ,amiens was at an end1 for it was again at last the ,allies who chose the time and the place where they would offer battle4 ,commanders who had the bitter taste of the forced actions of the ,march retreat in their mouths1 must have savoured this easy choice extraordinarily4 ,there is something thrilling in the assured words of the ,despatch4 ,we did not care for the new battle site6 ,we would change it and fight elsewhere6 8,the derelict battle area which now lay before our troops1 seared by old trench lines1 pitted with shell-holes1 and crossed in all directions with tangled belts of wire1 the whole covered by the wild vegetation of two years1 presented unrivalled opportunities for stubborn machine-gun defences4444 8,i therefore determined to break off the battle on this front1 and transferred the front of attack from the #dth ,army to the sector north of the ,somme1 where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy4 ,my intention was for the #crd ,army to operate in the direction of ,bapaume so as to turn the line of the old ,somme defences from the north40 ,we struck at once4 ,only four days were given to the ,tanks for overhauling machines and patching up the crews1 for on ,august #ba we opened the new battle4 ,meanwhile it was hard to realise how great was the moral and physical blow which we had dealt the ,germans4 ,the ,july attacks had been tentative1 but the ,battle of ,amiens was the decisive victory1 the sure proof that the ,germans had lost all hope of winning the ,war by force of arms4 ,but at the time we could not read the thundering sign of our deliverance with certainty4 ,we could see only what were the more immediate results of the battle4 #gi8,within the space of five days the town of ,amiens and the railway centring upon it had been disengaged4 ,twenty ,german ,divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen ,british ,infantry ,divisions and three ,cavalry ,divisions1 assisted by a regiment of the #ccrd ,american ,division and supported by some #djj ,tanks4 ,nearly #bb1jjj prisoners and over #djj guns had been taken by us1 and our line had been pushed forward to a depth of some twelve miles in a vital sector4 ,further1 our deep advance1 combined with the attacks of the ,french ,armies on our right1 had compelled the enemy to evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the south of us4 8,the effect of this victory--following so closely after the ,allied victory on the ,marne--upon the moral both of the ,german and ,british troops was very great4 ,buoyed up by the hope of immediate and decisive victory1 to be followed by an early and favourable peace1 constantly assured that the ,allied reserves were exhausted1 the ,german soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two fronts and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important portions of their earlier gains4 ,the reaction was inevitable and of a deep and lasting character4 8,on the other hand1 our own troops felt that at last their opportunity had come1 and that1 supported by a superior artillery and numerous ,tanks they could now press forward resolutely to reap the reward of their patient1 dauntless1 and successful defence in ,march and ,april40 ,we knew1 however1 that we had still hard fighting before us1 and we were careful to analyse every phase of the action to see if we could not learn some practical lesson from it that should help us in the coming months4 ,the ,tank ,command noted several points 8for reference40 ,in the first place1 the battle would have been ended the quicker if the ,tanks had had a larger general reserve4 ,then neither the ,mark ,v4 nor the ,whippet was fast enough for open warfare4 ,had we then possessed machines such as we have now1#hj of double the speed of the ,mark ,v41 and having a radius of action of #ajj miles and more1 we should1 at a modest estimate1 have finished the battle on the first day4 ,last1 we had not used our ,whippets to the best advantage4 ,the #crd 7,light7 ,brigade ,commander1 ,brig4-,general ,hardress-,lloyd1 thus admirably summarised the lessons of the battle1 and laid down alternative principles upon which the light machines might be used3 8,i do not think it advisable to attempt to use the present ,whippet in conjunction with cavalry4 ,better results would have been obtained during these operations if ,whippets had been working in close liaison with ,mark ,v4 ,tanks and infantry4 8,the ,whippet is not fast enough to conform to cavalry tactics in the early stages of a battle4 8,the ,whippets' rle should be to push on amongst the retreating enemy and prevent him from reorganising1 engage reinforcements coming up1 eventually enabling the infantry to make a further advance1 capture prisoners1 guns1 etc4 8444 ,they must move forward in close touch with the heavy ,tanks so as to be near enough up to go though when required4 ,if kept back with the cavalry the speed of the ,whippet is not sufficient to enable the machine to be in the forward position at the required moment1 and its offensive power will be seriously diminished40 ,but it was not for us that the battle of ,august #h had its chief lessons4 ,the ,german ,high ,command waxed eloquent with indignant exhortation1 and demanded passionately that the experiences of the ,german ,army should be utilised1 and that such things as had occurred on the #hth should never happen again4 ,on ,august #aa ,general ,ludendorff issued a secret ,order3 8,troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a mass attack of ,tanks1 and lost all cohesion when the ,tanks suddenly appeared behind them1 having broken through under cover of a mist1 natural and artificial4 ,the defensive organisation1 both of the first line and in the rear1 was insufficient to permit of a systematic defence4444 ,as a weapon against ,tanks1 the prepared defence of the ground must play a larger part than ever1 and the aversion of the men to the pick and shovel must be overcome at all hazards4444 ,especially there must be defences against ,tanks4 ,it was absolutely inadmissible that the ,tanks1 having penetrated into our advance line without meeting with obstacles or anything1 should be able to push on along the roads or beside them for miles4444 ,the principle that a body of troops even when surrounded must defend their ground1 unless otherwise ordered1 to the last man and the last cartridge1 seems to have fallen into oblivion 444 a large proportion of our ranks fight unskilfully against ,tanks4 ,a ,tank is an easy prey for artillery of all calibres44440 ,an account follows of measures for the proper disposition of artillery against ,tanks1 and the rest of the ,order is occupied with directions to the infantry concerning the question at what range the anti-,tank rifle and gun are most effective4 ,the consideration of these points is long and exhaustive4 ,ludendorff further hopes much from 8the active and inventive genius of the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers to arrange ,tank traps1 and demands that every encouragement should be shown to those who show any inventive talent40 ,these were but peddling remedies4 ,when1 as at ,amiens1 the understanding between infantry and ,tanks is almost perfect1 and when the magnificent lan of an assault by ,australians and ,canadians is supported by the weight of #djj ,tanks1 not even the troops of what was the best-trained ,army in the world can stand the concerted shock of their attack4 ,a ,special ,order was issued on ,august #af by ,general ,sir ,henry ,rawlinson1 the #dth ,army ,commander3 8,tank ,corps4--,the success of the operations of ,august #h and succeeding days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by the #crd1 #dth and #eth ,brigades of the ,tank ,corps1 and ,i desire to place on record my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services rendered both by the ,mark ,v4 and the ,mark ,v4 star and the ,whippets4 8,the task of secretly assembling so large a number of ,tanks entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or five nights previous to the battle4 8,the tactical handling of the ,tanks in action made calls on the skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met with a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise4 8,i desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid success that they achieved1 and to heartily congratulate the ,tank ,corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this occasion4 ,there are many vitally important lessons to be learned from their experiences4 ,these will1 ,i trust1 be taken to heart by all concerned and made full use of when next the ,tank ,corps is called upon to go into battle4 8,the part played by the ,tanks and ,whippets in the battle on ,august #h was in all respects a very fine performance4 87,signed7 ,h4 ,,rawlinson1 ,general1 8,commanding #dth ,army4 8,headquarters1 #dth ,army1 8,august #af1 #aiah40 ,nor were the ,australians less generous4 ,the following message is typical of many4 ,it was sent to ,brig4-,general ,courage 7commanding #eth ,tank ,brigade7 by the #dth ,australian ,divisional ,commander3 8,g4,o4,c4 #eth ,tank ,brigade4 8,i wish to express to you and the command associated with us on ,august #h and following days1 on behalf of the #dth ,australian ,division1 our deep appreciation of the most gallant service rendered during our offensive operations by the ,tank ,corps4 ,the consistent skill and gallantry with which the ,tanks1 individually and collectively1 were handled during the battle1 was the admiration of all ranks of the infantry with whom they were so intimately associated1 and our success was due in a very large measure to your efforts4 8,we hope sincerely1 that in future offensive operations in which we may take part1 we shall have the honour to be associated with the same units of the ,tank ,corps as during the operations on ,august #h and following days4 87,signed7 ,e4 ,g4 ,,sinclair ,,mclagan1 8,major-,general1 8,commanding #dth ,australian ,division40 ,finally1 in a congratulatory telegram after the battle1 the ,commander-in-,chief paid a high tribute to the skill and bravery displayed by the ,tank ,corps in the gaining of this signal victory4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,the ,,german ,,attitude--8,,man-,,traps ,,and ,,gins0--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,bapaume ,i ,we had1 as we have said1 called a halt to the ,battle of ,amiens4 ,but the pause was to be only one of a few days4 ,the new battle was to be fought in the area which lay between the rivers ,somme and ,scarpe1 and for his selection of this particular place ,sir ,douglas ,haig in his ,despatch gives two reasons4 8,the enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack in this direction1 and1 owing to the success of the ,fourth ,army1 he occupied a salient1 the left flank of which was already threatened from the south4 ,a further reason for my decision was that the ground north of the ,ancre ,river was not greatly damaged by shell-fire1 and was suitable for the use of ,tanks4 ,a successful attack between ,albert and ,arras in a south-easterly direction would turn the line of the ,somme south of ,pronne1 and gave every promise of producing far-reaching results4 ,it would be a step forward towards the strategic objective ,st4 ,quentin-,cambrai40 ,it is interesting to see how high a place ,tanks now held in the estimation of the ,general ,staff1 and how carefully their peculiarities were considered4 ,but it was not only the ,british ,high ,command which had begun to busy itself with the natural history of the ,tank4 ,since the lesser battles of ,july and the greater battle of ,august #h1 the attitude of the ,german ,g4,h4,q4 had entirely changed4 ,when we first began to use ,tanks it will be remembered that the ,germans1 though perfunctorily alluding to them as 8cruel and detestable10 had in effect sneered at them as makeshifts by which we hoped to supplement our scanty supply of more legitimate munitions of war4 ,besides1 their contempt for all we did being sincere1 the ,tanks' ,british parentage damned them without further investigation4 8,search and see1 for out of ,galilee cometh no good thing40 ,the ,germans themselves made their attitude perfectly clear4 8,the use of #cjj ,british ,tanks at ,cambrai 7#aiag7 was a #8battle of material1' and the ,german ,higher ,command decided from the very outset not to fight a #8battle of material4'0 ,their policy was masses of men rather than mechanism1 quantity rather than quality4 ,the best men went to machine-gun units and to assault troops4 ,in many cases the remainder of the infantry were of little fighting value1 though many of the men might have been otherwise usefully employed in a war which1 if not one of material1 was at least one in which economic factors played a large part4 ,the ,german ,higher ,command was able1 however1 to look at an order of battle1 showing some #bej ,divisions on paper4 ,but the ,germans were thus naturally not in a position to find the labour for the construction of additional material1 such as ,tanks2 they were1 besides1 concentrating any labour and any suitable material they possessed upon the work of submarine making4 ,it seems clear that the whole policy1 at least as far as ,tanks was concerned1 was regretted before the end of the ,war4 ,the following now well known extracts from ,german documents indicate the effect of our ,tanks on the ,german ,army3 8,staff officers sent from ,g4,h4,q4 report that the reasons for the defeat of the ,second ,army#ha are as follows3 8#a4 ,the fact that the troops were surprised by the massed attack of ,tanks1 and lost their heads when the ,tanks suddenly appeared behind them1 having broken through under cover of natural and artificial fog4 8#b4 ,lack of organised defences4 8#c4 ,the fact that the artillery allotted to reserve infantry units at the disposal of the ,higher ,command was wholly insufficient to establish fresh resistance with artillery support against the enemy who had broken through and against his ,tanks4 8,,ludendorff1 #aa4 #h4 #ah40 8,crown ,prince's ,group of ,armies4 8#ab4 #h4 #ah4 8,g4,h4,q4 reports that during the recent fighting on the fronts of the #bnd and #ahth ,armies1 large numbers of ,tanks broke through on narrow fronts and pushing straight forward1 rapidly attacked battery positions and the headquarters of divisions4 8,in many cases no defence could be made in time against the ,tanks1 which attacked them from all sides4 8,anti-,tank defence must now be developed to deal with such situations40 ,signal ,communication-- 8,messages concerning ,tanks will have priority over all other messages or calls whatsoever40 8,order dated #h4 #i4 #ah40 ,,ii ,the first efforts at combating ,tanks made by the ,german ,high ,command were half contemptuously instituted chiefly to reassure their infantry1 who seemed to them1 for no particular reason1 liable to extraordinary fits of nerves and panic upon the approach of their new assailants4 ,the measures of defence were ill devised and carelessly used4 ,in the autumn of #aiag1 it will be remembered that the ,germans had captured a number of our ,mark ,,iv4 machines4 ,these they used for the purposes of propaganda1 parading them in the streets of ,berlin and showing them to the ,army1 as a man might demonstrate the harmless nature of snakes by the aid of a tame cobra4 ,the infantry were lectured to about the miseries endured by the crews who manned ,tanks1 as to their mechanical defects1 their vulnerability and general worthlessness4 ,for example1 the following passage appeared in an ,order issued to the #gth ,german ,cavalry ,division4 ,it will be gathered from the text that the ,order was illustrated by detailed drawings4 8#gth ,cavalry #8,schtzen' ,div4 ,div4 ,h4,q4 #bf4i4ah4 8,subject3--,anti-,tank ,defence4 8,divisional ,order 8#a4 ,general4 8,the infantry must not let itself be frightened by ,tanks4 ,the fighting capacity of the ,tank is small owing to the bad visibility1 and the shooting of the machine-guns and guns is cramped and inaccurate as the result of the motion4 8,it has been proved that the ,tank crews are nervous and are inclined to turn back1 or leave the ,tank1 even in the case of limited fire effects1 such as a light ,t4,m4 7,trench ,mortar7 barrage at #hjj-ajjj yards4 ,in order to make it more difficult for the artillery1 the ,tanks pursue a zigzag course towards their objective4 8,the hostile infantry follows ,tanks only half-heartedly4 ,experience shows that hostile attacks are soon checked by aimed machine-gun and artillery fire4 ,co-operation between the ,tanks and their infantry detachments must be hindered as much as possible4 ,the arms should be separated and destroyed in detail4 ,all projectiles which do not hit the armour-plating at right angles ricochet off instead of penetrating4 ,artillery1 light trench mortar and anti-,tank rifle fire is effective against all portions of the ,tank1 especially against the broadside and the cab 7framed in red in the illustrations74 ,machine-gun and rifle fire with ,a4,p4 bullets1 on the other hand1 should be aimed especially at the observation and machine-gun loopholes 7framed in green and blue in the illustrations740 ,but the enemy was not content with a merely dialectical defence4 ,among other practical measures the ,germans1 with curious inconsequence1 decided to form a small ,tank ,corps of their own1 partly armed with new ,tanks of ,german manufacture and partly with captured ,british machines4 ,but here a little unexpected awkwardness arose4 ,the infantry from whom they now wished to recruit their ,tank crews1 had unfortunately been completely convinced by the unanswerable arguments which they had just heard1 and now thoroughly believed in the perfect uselessness1 the extreme vulnerability1 of ,tanks4 ,thus it came about that the ,german ,tank ,corps was made up of a quite astonishingly reluctant and half-hearted body of men4 ,altogether1 only fifteen ,german ,tanks were ever manufactured1 and only twenty-five captured ,british ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks were repaired1 so that the whole affair amounted to but little4 ,the ,german ,tanks were1 as we have said1 much heavier and larger than the ,british or ,french heavy ,tanks1 though1 as we have noted1 they rather resembled the ,french ,st4 ,chamond4 ,they could not cross large trenches or heavily shelled ground1 owing to their shape1 and the lack of clearance between the ground and the body4 ,on smooth ground1 their speed was good--being about eight miles an hour4 ,their armour was thick and tough1 capable of withstanding armour-piercing bullets1 and1 at a long range1 even direct hits from field guns not firing armour-piercing shells4 ,only the front of the ,tank was1 however1 sufficiently strong for this1 and the roof was scarcely armoured at all4 ,they were very vulnerable to the splash of ordinary small arms ammunition1 owing to the numerous crevices and joints left in the armour-plate4 ,the most interesting feature of these otherwise exceedingly bad machines was the fact that they ran on a spring track4 ,the use of springs for so heavy a ,tank was the one progressive departure in the ,german design4 ,their crew consisted of an officer and no less than fifteen other ranks4 ,this huge crew1 twice that of a heavy ,british ,tank1 actually went into action in a ,tank #bd feet long by #aj feet wide4 ,however1 the close association of the crew was merely physical1 for they were composed of no less than three distinct arms1 and appear to have done little or no training together as a crew4 ,there were the drivers who were mechanics1 there were the gunners who were artillerymen1 and the machine-gunners who were infantrymen4 ,members of the ,british ,tank ,corps were at one time much puzzled by ,german ,tank prisoners' statements1 that on such or such an occasion the infantry had spoiled their shooting1 or that the artillery had not backed them up1 in circumstances when there was no particular question of co-operation with other arms4 ,they came afterwards to understand that the anathema'd representatives of rival arms were inside the machine1 not out4 ,but in reality rival machines constituted but a small part of the ,german anti-,tank measures1 for1 as we have said1 after the victories of ,july and early ,august1 these begin to be panic-stricken in their elaboration1 and after the ,battle of ,amiens1 we find ,ludendorff himself pouring out his soul on the subject4 ,he obviously realised that anti-,tank defences had been neglected1 and he probably saw also that this neglect was going to be difficult to explain to an ,army and a public which1 as the result of failures1 were about to become extremely critical of their leaders4 ,after the ,battle of ,amiens1 therefore1 the ,germans began feverishly to set their house in order1 and we find special ,staff ,officers appointed at the ,army1 ,corps1 ,divisional and ,brigade ,headquarters1 whose sole duty it was to organise the anti-,tank defences within their formation4 ,a special artillery was told off and divided into two sections4 ,the first was to provide a few forward silent guns in each divisional sector4 ,they were to remain hidden till the moment of our attack1 and then to concentrate upon our ,tanks4 ,these guns1 however1 proved apt to be smothered by our barrage1 or not to be able to distinguish their prey in the half-light of our dawn attacks4 ,secondly1 there were to be reserve guns whose duty it was to go forward and take up previously reconnoitred positions after the ,tank attack had been launched4 ,it was generally from these pieces that the ,tanks had most to fear4 ,finally1 all ,german batteries1 including howitzers1 had general instructions to plan their positions in such a way that advancing ,tanks would be subject to a direct fire at about #ejj or #fjj yards range4 ,in the event of a ,tank attack1 the engagement of our machines was now to be the first call upon the artillery1 to the exclusion of counter-battery or any other work4 ,as for the infantry1 the chief rle allotted to them was 8to keep their heads10 and 8to keep calm40 ,other ,orders instructed them to move to a flank in the event of a ,tank attack4 8,no advice was given1 however1 as to how this was to be done when ,tanks were attacking on a frontage of twenty or thirty miles40 ,a large armoury of special anti-,tank weapons arose1 and of these the most important was the anti-,tank rifle1 of which we have spoken before4 #hb 8,the weapon weighed #cf lb4 and was #e feet long4 ,it had no magazine and fired single shots1 using ,a4,p4 ammunition of 4#ecj calibre4 ,it was obviously too conspicuous and too slow a weapon to be really effective against ,tanks1 though the steel core could penetrate the armour of ,british ,tanks at several hundred yards range4 8,the chief disadvantage of the anti-,tank rifle1 however1 was that the ,german soldier would not use it4 ,he was untrained in its use1 afraid of its kick1 and still more afraid of the ,tanks themselves4 ,it is doubtful if one per cent4 of the ,a4,t4 rifles captured in our ,tank attacks had ever been fired40 ,road obstacles1 such as carts full of stones1 linked up with wire cables1 concrete stockades and mines1 provided a good deal of the rest of the enemy anti-,tank stock-in-trade4 ,of mines there was a considerable variety4 ,they ranged from elaborate specially made pieces of apparatus to high explosive shells1 buried and hastily fitted with a device by which the weight of the ,tank exploded them4 ,they were sometimes buried in lines across roads1 and sometimes extensive minefields were laid4 ,their singular ineffectiveness always seemed somewhat mysterious to members of the ,tank ,corps1 the proportion of effort to result seeming always many tons of mine to each ,tank damaged4 ,however1 we always thought we might some day encounter a really effective type of mine1 and possibly the ,germans were satisfied if their efforts so much as made our monsters walk delicately1 for in an elaborate document1 giving every kind of anti-,tank defence instructions1 they somewhat pathetically conclude3 8,every obstacle1 even if it only checks the hostile ,tank temporarily1 is of value40 ,but there was one form of weapon which was1 we felt sure1 bound to be evolved by the ,germans4 ,it was one which we were not at all anxious to encounter4 ,we imagined a weapon which should practically be the machine-gun version of the anti-,tank rifle2 that is to say1 a weapon which could pour out a stream of high-velocity1 large-calibre bullets at the rate of two hundred a minute4 ,actually it was almost precisely such an engine that the ,germans had got in their 8,tuf0 machine-gun1 of which an interesting account is given in ,weekly ,tank ,notes4 ,the name was an abbreviation for 8,tank und ,flieger0 7tank and aeroplane71 for it was against these enemies that this machine-gun was intended4 ,it was to consist of no less than #bej pieces1 which were made by sixty different factories1 of which the ,maschinen ,fabrik ,augsburg ,nrnberg1 was the only one entrusted with the assembling and mounting4 ,the projectile fired was to be #ac millimetres in diameter4 ,from experiments made with captured ,tanks1 the ,germans ascertained that these bullets could pierce steel plates of #cj millimetres in thickness4 ,no less than six thousand of these guns were to be in the field by ,april #aiai1 and delivery was to begin early in the previous ,december--just a month too late4 ,however1 when the ,armistice was signed1 the firms were already in possession of the greater part of the stores and raw material for the manufacture of the guns1 a quantity of which were by then well on the way to completion4 ,immediately after the signing of the ,armistice1 all the factories were instructed by telephone to continue manufacturing the 8,tuf10 and about ,november #bj they received confirmation in writing of this order1 and were instructed to keep on their workmen at all costs4 ,our occupation of the left bank of the ,rhine proved a serious drawback to a continuation of the manufacture1 as it completely interrupted communication between several of the factories4 ,the ,pfaff ,works of ,kaiserlautern 7,palatinate7 and the great ,becker steel works of ,frefeld1 which played an important part in the manufacture of the guns1 had to close down1 both being on the left bank of the ,rhine4 ,the ,minister of ,war throughout the period of its manufacture asked for daily and minute reports as to the progress of the 8,tuf10 and it was given priority over both submarines and aeroplanes4 ,but once more1 as ever in all that concerned ,tanks1 the ,germans were several months too late4 ,we were never destined to face this particular weapon with the ,mark ,v4 ,the modern ,tank fears it not at all4 ,,iii ,our chronicle has now reached the three last1 and the decisive months of the war4 ,it was a period of continuous fighting1 in which a battle begun in any particular sector would spread along the front on either hand1 until at last1 by the middle of ,october1 the whole line was in roaring conflagration2 and by the second week in ,november the blaze had swept on almost to the borders of ,germany1 and the forces of the enemy had withered and shrivelled before it4 ,at first we made a series of more or less set attacks4 ,then came the break through the ,hindenburg ,line after the ,second ,battle of ,cambrai1 and the hastily-organised running fights of ,october1 which culminated in the complete overthrow of ,german arms4 ,the whole period is at the moment of writing exceedingly difficult to dissect and to classify into definite battles1 it being usually a matter of opinion when one engagement can be said to have ended and another to have begun4 ,the nomenclature even is still fluid4 ,take1 for example1 the vast inchoate battle which raged from ,august #ba and #bc and culminated on ,september #b4 ,it was fought by three separate armies4 ,there were at least three principle 8,z0 days1 and the battle seems to be indifferently known as the ,battle of ,bapaume1 the ,second ,battle of ,arras1 or even as the ,battle of ,amiens4 ,nor if the historian were to attempt to name it by date would it be clearly more proper to call it the ,battle of ,august #bc or #ba4 ,there is a good deal to be said for the ,german plan of christening their battles by some fancy name1 or dubbing them 8,kaiserchlact0 or 8,clarence10 according to one's taste4 ,a campaign of nameless battles is apt to defy ,clio's efforts at dissection and tidy arrangement1 and to defeat her longing to see a neat row of actions dried1 classified1 and labelled in her ,hortus ,siccus4 ,we have indicated the changes which had taken place in the attitude of our own and the ,german ,high ,commands toward ,tanks4 ,much had been learnt by the ,tank ,corps themselves1 and much had been regularised and systematised in their methods4 ,we find that by ,august1 ,tank ,corps preparation for a battle had been so completely reduced to a routine that to attempt to chronicle the preparation for any of our set attacks would be to make a mere cento1 whose pieces might be culled from particulars already recorded for ,cambrai1 for ,hamel and for ,amiens4 ,we therefore trust that the reader1 without hearing any enumeration of gallons of petrol1 tons of grease1 or acres of maps1 will understand that each of these 8formal0 battles was preceded by the usual herculean tasks of preparation4 ,,iv ,the ,battle of ,bapaume was1 as we have already said1 to constitute a sequel to the ,battle of ,amiens 7,august #h74 ,on ,august #ba the #crd ,army was to launch an attack to the north of the ,ancre with the general object of pushing the enemy back towards ,bapaume4 ,meanwhile the #dth ,army was to continue its pressure on the enemy south of the river4 ,august #bb was to be a 8slack0 day and was to be used to get troops and guns into position on the #crd ,army front4 ,the principal attack was to be delivered on the #bcrd by the #crd ,army1 and those divisions of the #dth ,army which lay to the north of the ,somme1 the rest of the #dth ,army fighting a covering action on the flank of the main operation4 ,afterwards1 if our efforts were successful1 the whole of both ,armies were to press forward with their utmost vigour and exploit any advantage we might have gained4 ,if our success was such as to force the enemy back from the high ground he held1 thus securing our southern flank1 the #ast ,army was further to make another attack immediately to the north4 ,this gradual extension of the front of assault was intended to mislead the enemy as to where the main blow would fall and cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal4 ,a large number of ,tanks were to be concentrated in the #crd ,army area4 ,they were to attack between ,moyenneville and ,bucquoy with the #dth and #fth ,corps4 ,with them the #ast and #bnd ,brigades were to operate4 ,with the #dth ,army the #crd ,corps was to attack on ,august #bc1 between ,bray and ,albert1 and the #dth ,tank ,brigade was to assist in this assault4 ,then1 with the portion of the #dth ,army which operated south of the ,somme1 namely1 the ,australians1 the #eth ,tank ,brigade was as usual to co-operate1 their action also taking place on the #bcrd4 ,in the course of the two days' operations the #crd1 #fth1 #gth1 #adth1 #aeth1 #aath1 #abth1 #ajth and #agth ,battalions were to be employed4 ,the total of #bhj machines seems at first sight a curiously small one1 considering the number of battalions involved1 but it must be remembered that most units had been hotly in action at ,amiens ten days before1 and that some battalions could not muster more than sixteen fighting ,tanks1 pending repairs and a fresh issue of machines4 ,supply ,tanks and aeroplanes were to co-operate as usual1 the latter in greater strength than before2 for just before the battle ,no4 #gc ,squadron1 armed with ,sopwith ,camels1 was attached to the ,tank ,corps1 in addition to ,no4 #h ,squadron for counter-gun work4 ,one of the most prominent features of the whole sector of attack was the ,albert-,arras railway1 which lay some distance behind the enemy's front line4 ,it proved to have been carefully prepared for defence by the enemy1 being commanded at point-blank range by a large number of field guns1 which had been specially and secretly withdrawn from more forward positions1 and all the sections of the line where it would be possible for the ,tanks to cross--that is to say1 the 8neutral0 portions where the line was neither embanked nor in a cutting--were not only carefully registered1 but were blocked by concrete and iron anti-,tank stockades4 ,the attack was to be opened at #d4ee a4m4 on the #bast by the #dth and #fth ,corps and their ,tanks4 ,v ,the morning dawned in the inevitable white blanket of mist which now always seemed to accompany our attacks4 ,till nearly #aa a4m4 it was impossible to see more than a few yards ahead1 and it was with the greatest difficulty that the ,tanks kept their direction4 ,if1 however1 the mist was confusing to us1 it was doubly so to the enemy4 ,the ,germans were completely taken by surprise2 we even found candles still burning in the trenches when we crossed them1 and papers and equipments were scattered broadcast1 bearing witness to a hurried flight4 ,illustration3 ,,german ,,anti-,,tank ,,gunners 7,,from ,a ,,photograph ,,found ,,on ,a ,,prisoner7 ,illustration3 ,,an ,,anti-,,tank ,,gun ,,in ,a ,,steel ,,cupola 7,,vpres7 ,illustration3 ,a ,,captured ,,german ,,tank ,illustration3 ,a ,,german ,,anti-,,tank ,,rifle ,we carried the front line so easily that we soon realised we must be up against a system of defence rather like that which the ,germans had adopted at ,ypres4 ,he was keeping his reserves well in rear of a lightly-held outpost line1 and1 as we have said1 unknown to us1 his guns had been withdrawn in such a way as to cover the railway4 ,the ,armoured ,cars and the ,whippets both took an active part in the attack on ,bucquoy4 ,at the entrance of the village a large crater had been blown in the road over which the armoured cars were hauled1 after a smooth path had been beaten down across it by a ,whippet4 ,the cars then sped on through the enemy's lines1 reaching ,achiet-le-,petit ahead of our infantry1 and silenced a number of machine-guns4 ,two of the cars received direct hits1 one of them being burnt and completely destroyed4 ,during the attack on ,courcelles1 ,captain ,richard ,annesley ,west of the #fth ,battalion took charge of some infantry who had lost their bearings in the dense fog4 ,he gathered up all the scattered men he could find4 ,he was mounted1 and in the course of the morning he had two horses shot under him2 but after the second horse had been shot he went on with his work on foot4 ,having rallied the infantry1 he continued his original task of leading forward his ,tanks1 and our capture of ,courcelles was chiefly due to his individual initiative and gallantry4 ,he was awarded a bar to his ,d4,s4,o4 ,about eleven o'clock the greater number both of ,mark ,v4 ,tanks and ,whippets had reached the line of the railway4 ,a few leading ,tanks had even crossed it1 when all in a moment the mist lifted with the suddenness of a withdrawn curtain4 ,a blazing sun appeared1 and each advancing ,tank stood out clearly under its bright light4 ,the ,german artillery1 which was covering the railway1 immediately directed a deadly fire on the ,tanks1 and each individual machine became the centre of a zone of bullets and bursting shells4 ,the infantry as they advanced had to avoid these little whirlwinds of fire4 ,it was at this time that most of the thirty-seven ,tanks which were hit by shells during the day were accounted for4 ,it was a good day for the enemy from an anti-,tank point of view1 such a day indeed as they were never to repeat4 ,second ,lieutenant ,hickson of the #crd ,tank ,battalion was one of the few who had got his ,tank across the line just before the mist lifted4 ,as the sun came out he found himself right in front of the enemy's batteries at point-blank range4 ,his ,whippet was immediately hit1 but he managed to get his two men away in safety4 ,the artillery and machine-gun fire was extremely heavy1 but without any thought of his own safety1 he at once went back on foot to warn a number of other ,tanks which were about to cross the railway at the same place4 ,in this he was successful and undoubtedly saved a large number of machines from being knocked out4 ,later1 though the spot was still under heavy fire1 he made several ineffectual efforts to salve his ,tank4 ,the weather could hardly have done us a worse turn4 ,had the mist lasted for half an hour longer the ,tanks would have been able to overrun the artillery positions without being seen4 ,however1 the lifting of the fog at least enabled the aeroplanes attached to the ,tanks to go up4 ,the counter-gun machines at once flew out to attack the hostile batteries1 and a good deal of execution was done4 ,all the rest of the day we fought under a blazing sun4 ,the ,german resistance was curiously patchy2 here and there we found every inch of our advance disputed1 the machine-gunners and artillerymen fighting their weapons till the last moment1 and the reserves launching small counter-attacks whenever opportunity offered4 ,here and there large parties1 a hundred and more strong1 would surrender before the ,tanks had time to open fire4 ,the ,tank crews1--especially of the ,mark ,v4's and the ,whippets1 whose ventilation was less adequate than the old ,mark ,,iv4's--suffered greatly from the terrific heat4 ,in one or two instances the whole crew of a ,mark ,v4 seems to have become unconscious through the appalling heat1 the fumes from their own engines1 and the gas used by the enemy1 the unconsciousness being followed by temporarily complete loss of memory and extreme prostration4 ,inside the ,whippets1 though the men fared slightly better1 the lack of ventilation was equally fatal to efficiency4 #hc8,the heat temporarily put several ,whippets out of action as fighting weapons4 8,on a hot summer's day one hour's running with door closed renders a ,whippet weaponless except for revolver fire4 8,the heat generated is so intense that it not only causes ammunition to swell so that it jams the gun1 but actually in several cases caused rounds to explode inside the ,tank4 8,guns became too hot to hold1 and in one case the temperature of the steering wheel became unbearable40 ,but evening came at last1 and with the darkness the two armies disengaged4 ,we had suffered more casualties than we had quite bargained for--chiefly owing to the accident of the mist--but upon the whole we were well satisfied with the events of the day4 ,we had reached the general line of the railway practically along the whole front of attack4 ,we had captured ,achiet-le-,petit and ,longeast ,wood1 ,courcelles and ,moyenneville4 ,most important of all1 the position we needed for the launching of our principal attack had been successfully gained and we had taken over #bjjj prisoners4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,breaking ,,the ,,drocourt-,,qu,,ant ,,line--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,epehy ,i ,we have said that ,august #bb had1 in the original plan1 been devoted to consolidation and to the moving up of guns4 ,only the #crd ,corps in the #dth ,army area1 with its twenty-four ,tanks of the #dth and #eth ,battalions1 launched an interim attack on the ,bray-,albert front4 ,we gained all our objectives4 ,the #ahth ,division crossed the river ,ancre1 captured ,albert by an enveloping movement from the south-east1 and our line between the ,somme and the ,ancre was now advanced well to the east of the ,bray-,albert road4 ,the left of the #dth ,army was taken forward in conformity with the rest of our line4 ,the way had now been cleared for what was really the main attack1 though it was not the attack in which the greatest number of ,tanks were employed4 ,the assault opened on ,august #bc by a series of attacks on the whole of a thirty-three-mile front1 that is to say1 from our junction with the ,french1 north of ,lihons1 to the spot near ,mercatel1 where the ,hindenburg ,line from ,quant and ,bullecourt joined the old ,arras-,vimy defence of #aiaf4 ,the hundred ,tanks which went into action on this day were nearly all fresh machines which had not fought on the #bast4 ,they were distributed in groups along the fronts of both the #crd and #dth ,armies4 ,south of the ,somme1 with the ,australians near ,chuignolles1 the largest group of nearly sixty ,tanks went into action4 ,they were machines belonging to the #bnd1 #hth and #acth ,battalions4 ,the enemy had withdrawn their anti-,tank guns to the top of the ridge1 which it was impossible for ,tanks to climb except at one spot4 ,upon this one crossing-place they had trained their guns1 and here several ,tanks suffered direct hits4 ,we attacked as usual without a preliminary bombardment and met with a desperate resistance1 the ,german machine-gunners defending their posts with extraordinary heroism1 and often firing their guns till the very moment when they and their weapons were crushed to the earth by an attacking ,tank4 ,a particularly interesting account of the action is given in the #acth ,battalion ,history-- 8,it was soon evident that the enemy were prepared to make a stout resistance2 there was no definite trench system1 but nests of machine-guns were encountered in organised shell-holes almost from the start2 while ,saint ,martin's ,wood and the gully to the east of this1 ,herleville ,wood1 and the quarry at its southern end1 were all strongly held by machine-guns in prepared emplacements4 ,as before1 the ,german gunners fought with magnificent pertinacity and courage2 one ,tank ,commander claimed to have knocked out over thirty machine-guns1 and this claim was supported by the infantry with him2 the estimates of several other ,tanks were almost as high4 ,these machine-guns were provided with armour-piercing bullets1 and ,tanks were pitted all over and in many places penetrated by these4 ,there is no doubt that by themselves becoming the targets for these batteries1 the ,tanks saved many casualties among the infantry4 ,with the machine-guns well in hand1 the ,australian infantry were quick to seize the chances of advance1 and by #f4cj a4m4 were all established in their final objectives4 ,after sunrise the heat of the day became oppressive in the open air1 and in the ,tanks intolerable4 ,several cases were reported of men becoming delirious during the action4 ,the cause appears to be three-fold3 the weather conditions were trying even to fresh men2 in many cases the composite crew had recently endured the strain of action without a complete rest to follow2 and a third disadvantage1 which was inherent in the design of the ,mark ,v4 ,tank1 was now for the first time becoming evident4 ,in these engines the heat generated by the explosion of the propelling gases is very great1 and the exhaust pipes speedily become red1 and even white hot4 ,in a new engine this is merely an inconvenience1 but after a certain period of use the joints of the exhaust pipes tend to warp1 and thus to release into the inner air the carbon gases of the explosion4 ,these gases1 if breathed continuously1 even in small quantities1 produce exhaustion1 mental confusion and finally unconsciousness4 ,further1 the effect is cumulative1 and a man once poisoned by the fumes becomes more quickly affected by further exposure to them4 ,the study of these conditions and the remedy for them became henceforward a matter of the first importance4 8,of the twelve ,tanks of the #acth ,battalion which started in this action1 seven reached their final objectives4 ,five ,tanks received direct hits from enemy field guns1 the crews in these cases going on with their ,hotchkiss guns and assisting the infantry forward4 8,eventually nine ,tanks rallied to ,company ,headquarters1 two of these being towed out of action by their friends40 ,altogether in this part of the battle #bjjj prisoners and the important villages of ,chuignolles1 ,herleville and ,chuignes had fallen to us before nightfall4 ,it was the same story all along the line4 ,in the #crd ,army area1 where altogether sixty-five ,tanks fought in several fairly widely separated groups1 the battle was opened rather earlier by a moonlight attack1 which began just before #d a4m4 against the village of ,gomicourt4 ,in the #fth ,corps' domain1 the #crd ,division was supported by ten ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks of the #abth ,battalion4 ,they attacked ,gomicourt1 carried it triumphantly and captured #ejj prisoners4 ,to the north of them1 in the second phase1 the ,guards ,division1 with four ,mark ,,iv4's1 captured the village of ,hamelincourt4 ,at ,bihucourt1 just beyond ,achiet-le-,grand1 #cjj of the enemy were forced by ,tanks to surrender to the infantry4 ,in one ,whippet ,tank1 the officer and the sergeant were both killed1 and the private drove his ,tank into action by himself1 when a target presented itself1 locking his back axle and firing his ,hotchkiss gun4 ,later in the morning1 some of the ,whippets of the #fth ,battalion were operating with the infantry of the #dth ,corps to the east of ,courcelles4 ,it was suddenly noticed that the artillery barrage table had been altered1 and that the rate of progress of the barrage was now #ajj yards in four minutes1 that is to say1 considerably slower than it had been originally intended4 ,the ,tanks were therefore obliged to manuvre and wheel about1 in order to let the barrage keep ahead4 ,they were constantly under anti-,tank gun fire at this time4 ,seven of the ,whippets1 however1 did not wait1 but passed through our barrage1 and getting beyond it1 surprised and scattered large numbers of the enemy who had taken cover4 ,as the ,germans ran1 the ,whippet machine-gunners were able to inflict heavy casualties upon them4 ,meanwhile1 these seven ,tanks were played upon by a perfect hail of machine-gun fire1 especially from the direction of ,achiet-le-,grand4 ,changing their direction1 they advanced upon the troublesome machine-guns and succeeded in cutting off several hundred of the enemy north of the village1 who had been holding up an attack by our infantry4 ,the ,whippets headed and drove them neatly towards our lines1 where the ,king's ,royal ,rifles immediately took them prisoners4 ,achiet-le-,grand was captured with extraordinary small losses4 ,owing to the better weather conditions1 aeroplane co-operation was much more successful throughout the day than it had been on ,august #ba4 ,messages dropped by aeroplanes were invaluable in keeping the whole straggling action in hand1 and in giving information1 by means of which commanders could send up reserves where they were wanted4 ,the following will give the reader an idea of the sort of information that the aeroplanes were constantly furnishing4 8,messages dropped on ,h4,q41 #ast ,brigade4 8,lieutenant ,wittal 7pilot74 ,lieutenant ,mitchell 7observer74 #ab noon4 8,four ,whippets seen in ,g4 #ba1 two ,mark ,,iv4 and several ,whippets seen in ,g4 #ae;d1 all moving ,s4,e4 8,several ,whippets and ,mark ,v4 seen in ,g4 #af;a1 ,g4 #aj and #aa;d1 proceeding ,s4,e4 8,we do not hold ,bihucourt40 ,the counter-,tank gun work done on this day was also exceedingly successful1 the following is the report of an action fought by a counter ,gun ,machine3 8,no4 #gc ,squadron4 8,at #a4ae p4m4 batteries were observed unlimbering and coming into action near ,bhagnies4 ,twenty-four bombs were dropped and nearly #bjjj rounds fired at these batteries1 causing the greatest confusion4 ,several limbers were overturned1 and horses stampeded1 and the personnel scattered in all directions40 ,altogether we had every reason to be satisfied by the events of the day1 and we prepared to continue the action with all possible vigour on the morrow4 ,,ii ,but by ,august #bd1 there were only fifty-three ,tanks of the #ast1 #crd and #dth ,brigades fit for action1 and nearly all the units which went in on this day were motley collections from various ,battalions4 ,one composite unit of the #aath ,battalion fought a very successful action in conjunction with the #dth ,corps1 in spite of the fact that their orders reached them late and that they had an approach march of six or seven miles4 ,they managed to catch up the infantry and all their objectives were taken4 ,in the course of the afternoon1 ,tanks belonging to the #ith ,battalion attacked and met with very stubborn resistance opposite ,mory ,copse1 where the ,hindenburg ,line was strongly held4 ,here more than one enemy garrison refused to surrender and had all to be killed4 ,one party of about sixty was accounted for by four rounds of #f-pounder case shot4 ,one machine1 which was doing a piece of reconnaissance work near ,croisilles later in the day1 had a particularly exciting experience4 ,the crew was forced to evacuate the ,tank on account of the phosphorus bombs with which the enemy had drenched it4 ,before leaving it1 the officer in command turned the head of his machine towards home and started the ,tank on its lonely way2 then1 almost choked with the fumes1 he got out and walked between the front horns of the moving machine till the inside of the ,tank was clear of phosphorus4 ,all the while1 he and the machine were completely surrounded by the enemy4 ,in the end1 he got his ,tank home in safety4 ,on the #dth ,army front1 five ,tanks of the #ast ,battalion attacked at dawn with the #dgth ,division in an effort to recapture ,happy ,valley1 which had been lost by us on the previous afternoon4 ,the attack was exceedingly successful1 and besides our original objective1 the large village of ,bray was added to our gains4 ,for the next week1 the fighting consisted of a series of small local engagements for the most part improvised on the spot by the ,divisions concerned4 ,tanks fought every day in one part of the line or another1 and every day we forced a stubbornly resisting enemy further and further back4 ,we propose only to give a short account of most of the actions of this period4 ,on ,august #be1 about forty-two ,tanks were again in action in little 8blobs10 strung out on the fronts of the #dth and #fth ,corps4 ,tanks from the #crd1 #gth1 and #ajth ,battalions went into action1 the #ith ,battalion attacking with the ,guards ,division1 north of ,mory4 ,owing to the dense mist1 co-operation between ,tanks and infantry was phenomenally difficult and the attack was not very successful4 ,during the engagement one ,tank had five of its crew wounded by anti-,tank rifle bullets4 ,on the ,canadian ,corps front an attack was carried out on ,august #bf1 near ,fampoux and ,neuville-,vitasse1 with the help of ,tanks of the #ith and #aath ,battalions4 ,near ,monchy several ,tanks were knocked out1 the crews joining the infantry to repel a local counter-attack4 ,the sergeant of one crew hearing that the enemy had captured his ,tank1 collected his men and charged forward to recover it1 arriving at one sponson door of the machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one4 ,the ,tank ,corps records characterise ,august #bg as 8an uneventful day40 ,fourteen ,tanks of the #ith and #aath ,battalions were used for mopping up points of resistance4 ,on the #bhth no ,tanks went into action at all4 ,but the #bith was more memorable1 for on this day the enemy evacuated ,bapaume1 and in a minor attack on ,frmicourt ,lieutenant ,c4 ,h4 ,sewell won the ,v4,c4 ,it was a very small engagement south-west of ,beugntre1 in which only four ,whippet ,tanks took part4 ,the following is extracted from the report of the engagement sent in by ,lieutenant ,sewell's ,commanding ,officer3 8,at about #b p4m4 on the afternoon of ,august #bi1 #8,whippets' of the #crd 7,light7 ,tank ,battalion reached the ,quarry near the #8,monument ,commoratif1' south-west of ,favreuil4 ,acting under instructions received from the ,new ,zealand ,division1 one ,section of #8,whippets' under ,lieutenant ,c4 ,h4 ,sewell was ordered forward to clear up the situation on the front of the #crd ,new ,zealand ,rifle ,brigade before ,frmicourt and the ,bapaume-,cambrai road1 where the infantry were reported to be held up by machine-gun fire4 8,on reaching the railway line south-east of ,beugntre in advance of our infantry1 enemy batteries and machine-guns opened heavy fire on the ,section of #8,whippets4' ,in manuvring to avoid the fire and to retain formation1 ,car ,no4 ,a4#bcc1 commanded by ,lieutenant ,o4 ,l4 ,rees-,williams1 side-slipped in a deep shell crater and turned completely upside down1 catching fire at the same time4 8,lieutenant ,sewell1 in the leading #8,whippet1' on seeing the plight of ,lieutenant ,rees-,williams' car1 immediately got out of his own #8,whippet' and came to the rescue2 with a shovel he dug an entrance to the door of the cab1 which was firmly jammed and embedded in the side of the shell-hole1 forced the door open and liberated the crew4 8,had it not been for ,lieutenant ,sewell's prompt and gallant action1 the imprisoned crew might have been burnt to death1 as they were helpless to extricate themselves without outside assistance4 8,during the whole of this time #8,whippets' were being very heavily shelled and the ground swept by machine-gun fire at close range4 ,on endeavouring to return to his own car1 ,lieutenant ,sewell was unfortunately hit several times1 his body being subsequently found lying beside that of his driver1 ,gunner ,knox4 ,w41 also killed1 just outside the ,tank1 which at that time was within short range of several machine-guns and infantry gun-pits40 ,the rescued men were emphatic in their praise of the gallant manner in which ,lieutenant ,sewell had saved them from a peculiarly horrible form of death4 ,on the #cjth1 the #crd ,division was to undertake operations designing to seize the villages of ,ecoust and ,longtte with the trench system beyond4 ,six ,tanks of the #abth ,battalion were to operate1 and in anticipation of their orders had already moved forward to the head of the ,sense ,valley4 ,unfortunately their orders did not reach the ,battalion till #i p4m4 on the night before the battle4 ,the night was intensely dark1 and as luck would have it1 the ,reconnaissance ,officer who alone knew the ground had been recalled to ,england that day1 and there still remained nearly four miles by the shortest route before the ,tanks reached the jumping-off place4 ,it was clear the machines would have their work cut out if they were to reach the place in time4 ,the whole operation was dogged by misfortune4 ,the taping party took the wrong direction in the pitch dark1 and when at last the ,tanks reached the point where the infantry guides were to lead them the rest of the way1 the guide for the left-hand section lost himself and the ,tanks completely before they had gone half the distance4 ,for an hour the ,tanks and their conductor wandered about the devastated wastes about ,ecoust4 ,the guide could not even point out on the map where the infantry were formed up4 ,at last the ,section ,commander went forward by himself and managed to discover the whereabouts of the front line and his own position1 but only to find he was nearly a mile away and it wanted five minutes to 8zero40 ,it was impossible that he should reach the battle in time1 and he withdrew his ,section according to instructions as he was in an exposed position4 ,thus the unfortunate infantry went over the top unaccompanied by a single ,tank4 ,the assault was a complete failure and the infantry suffered heavy casualties4 #hd8,on ,august #ca a further action took place4 #8,c' ,company of the #aeth ,battalion under ,captain ,g4 ,a4 ,smith assisting the #aheth ,brigade in attacking ,vaulx-,vraucourt from the south4 8,five ,tanks reached their objectives1 one failing owing to mechanical trouble2 these ,tanks did considerable execution and rendered great assistance to the infantry4 ,again heavy machine-gun and anti-,tank rifle fire were encountered4 ,after the show the ,tanks themselves bore mute witness to what they had been through4 ,in particular the ,tank #8,opossum1' commanded by ,lieutenant ,c4 ,f4 ,uzielli1 had very little paint left on its sides because of bullet marks4 ,the infantry suffered heavily4 ,in one case the strength of a platoon on reaching its objective was only three men40 ,,iii ,but we had reached a stage of the battle when it was clear that another considerable effort on our part would be well worth the making4 ,the enemy's resistance showed him passionately anxious to gain time4 ,he retreated with extreme reluctance4 ,it was the moment to redouble our blows4 ,the actual small operations carried out by the ,tanks during these last few days were only a minor consideration4 ,tanks and infantry were busy preparing for a considerable attack which was to take place on ,september #b4 ,on this day1 the whole vast battle reached its zenith and we broke the famous ,drocourt-,quant ,line which we had failed to reach in ,april #aiag4 ,this line was a switch which joined on to the ,hindenburg system4 ,though we had had scant time for elaborate preparation1 the attack was to be practically a full-dress affair1 eighty-one ,tanks being put in on a comparatively small area4 ,we were expecting a heavy resistance and our dispositions were very carefully made4 ,the order of our attack was as follows1 starting from the south3 ,with the #dth ,corps near ,villers-au-,flos the #gth ,tank ,battalion4 ,with the #fth ,corps near ,lagnicourt and ,moreuil the #abth and #fth ,battalions of the #ast ,brigade1 and against the actual ,drocourt-,quant ,line with the ,canadians and the #agth ,corps as many ,tanks as the #ith1 #aath and #adth ,battalions of the #crd ,brigade could muster 7about forty in all74 ,the battle was to be fought in the intricate country of the ,sense ,valley1 and active operations were taking place throughout the time of preparation for the renewed battle4 ,it was1 therefore1 under conditions of exceptional difficulty that the ,tanks assembled1 some of them being obliged to travel along our front across areas which were far from healthy4 ,the enemy's defences had been built in the ,spring of #aiag4 ,they were remarkable for extremely strong belts of wire1 and we expected that every effort would be made by the ,germans to hold these defences at all cost4 ,zero was at #e4cj a4m4 and a clear dawn was just breaking when we launched our attack4 ,on the ,lagnicourt sector1 ,tanks of the #abth ,battalion immediately came under tremendous fire from field guns and anti-,tank rifles4 ,as it grew lighter1 we discovered that a number of the heavy rifles were being fired with great effect from a derelict ,whippet4 ,this nest was soon dealt with by a male ,tank4 ,one female ,tank in this sector fired over #djjj rounds of ,s4,a4,a41 until1 having all its ,lewis guns except one disabled1 and five of its crew severely wounded1 it endeavoured to return1 its ,commander1 ,lieutenant ,saunders1 alternately driving1 working the brakes and firing the remaining gun4 ,as the ,tank was thus being successfully withdrawn1 a direct hit set it on fire and the wounded men were rescued with great difficulty4 ,it was not far from ,lagnicourt that the ,whippets of the #fth ,battalion operated4 ,they were commanded by ,lieut4-,colonel ,west1 of whose action on ,august #ba we have already told the story3 #he8,on the night of ,september #a-b1 nine ,whippets1 under ,captain ,c4 ,h4 ,strachan1 left ,gomicourt to attack in the direction of ,lagnicourt4 ,owing to the pressure at which the ,tanks had been working for the last five weeks1 little time had been available for overhauling1 and as the ,tanks were running badly1 it was impossible to get them up in time for zero hour4 ,the ,commanding ,officer1 ,lieut4-,colonel ,r4 ,a4 ,west1 ,d4,s4,o41 ,m4,c41 left camp early on the morning of ,september #b1 with two mounted orderlies4 ,it was his intention to get up with the ,whippets before they went into action1 by ,lagnicourt4 ,he went as far as the infantry on horseback1 in order to watch the progress of the battle1 and to ascertain when to send the ,whippets forward4 ,he arrived at the front line when the enemy were in process of delivering a strong local counter-attack4 ,the infantry battalion had suffered heavy officer casualties1 and its flanks were exposed4 ,realising that there was a danger of the ,battalion giving way1 he at once rode in front of them1 under extremely heavy machine-gun and rifle fire1 and rallied the men4 ,in spite of the fact that the enemy were now close upon him1 he took charge of the situation1 and detailed ,n4,c4,o4's to replace officer casualties4 ,he then rode up and down in front of the men1 in face of certain death1 encouraging all1 and calling upon them to #8,stick it1 men and show them fight4' ,his last words were #8,for ,god's sake put up a good fight4' ,he fell1 riddled by machine-gun bullets40 ,the infantry had been inspired to redoubled efforts by ,colonel ,west's example and the hostile attack was defeated4 ,he had originally come to the ,battalion as a ,company ,commander1 and had been awarded the ,d4,s4,o4 for his work in the ,arras battle4 ,between ,august #h and ,september #b1 he was awarded the ,m4,c41 a bar to his ,d4,s4,o41 and1 for his last action1 the ,v4,c4 ,elsewhere the fighting was not so heavy1 and on the whole we met with less opposition than we had expected4 ,in the ,canadian sector1 the armoured cars were working in close conjunction with ,tank ,corps aeroplanes4 ,at one moment a number of cars were going along a road1 when four machines were hit by shells from hidden batteries4 ,their accompanying aeroplanes1 however1 immediately attacked the ,german guns so vigorously that the crews of the disabled cars1 though completely surrounded by the enemy1 were able to escape capture4 ,by noon1 on the ,canadian section1 the whole elaborate maze of wire1 trenches and strong points1 which constituted the ,drocourt-,quant ,line1 was in our hands1 but elsewhere there was hard fighting until dusk1 especially on the reverse slopes of ,dury ,ridge4 ,dury itself we took1 capturing the ,town ,major4 ,our task had not1 however1 we considered1 been quite completed that day1 and next morning ,tanks and infantry prepared to 8tidy up0 the line1 especially ,maricourt ,wood4 ,but long before zero hour1 at #e4bj1 a glare of burning dumps in the east seemed to show that the enemy were already withdrawing1 and1 in fact1 when the ,tanks went over just after dawn1 they encountered scarcely any opposition at all1 save a perfunctory fire from rearguard machine-gunners4 ,small parties of the enemy were found in dug-outs1 waiting to be captured4 ,his infantry and guns were already well on their way back to the ,canal du ,nord4 ,,iv ,the ,second ,battle of ,arras was over and we had pierced the renowned ,drocourt-,quant ,line and had delivered a blow from which the enemy's moral never quite recovered4 ,since ,august #ba1 in all1 some #ejj ,tanks had been in action1 and except for one or two minor failures every attack had culminated in a cheap success4 ,we had pushed forward for fifteen or twenty miles along about thirty miles of front4 #hf8;,during the night of ,september #b-c1 the enemy fell back rapidly on the whole front of the #crd ,army and the right of the #ast ,army4 ,by the end of the day1 he had taken up positions along the general line of the ,canal du ,nord1 from ,pronne to ,ypres1 and thence east of ,hermies1 ,inchy-en-,artois and ,ecoust ,st4 ,quentin to the ,sense1 east of ,lecluse4 ,on the following day he commenced to withdraw also from the east bank of the ,somme1 south of ,pronne1 and by the night of ,september #h was holding the general line ,vermand--,epehy--,havrincourt1 and thence along the east bank of the ,canal du ,nord4 8,the withdrawal was continued on the front of the ,french forces on our right4 8,throughout this hasty retreat our troops followed up the enemy closely4 ,many of his rearguards were cut off and taken prisoner2 on numerous occasions our forward guns did great execution among his retiring columns1 while our airmen took full advantage of the remarkable targets offered them4 ,great quantities of material and many guns fell into our hands40 ,but the ,tank ,brigades were1 all of them1 in such urgent need of refitting1 of new machines and of fresh crews1 that after the #crd they had to be withdrawn into ,g4,h4,q4 reserve1 and1 8faint with pursuing10 were unable to take any further part in the battle for just over a fortnight4 ,even so1 that fortnight was spent1 not in rest1 but in feverish preparation of the most arduous kind4 ,we had begun to practise the fitting of ,cribs1 for we were getting back to the ,hindenburg ,line4 ,the other dogs of war were in full cry4 ,the ,tanks did not propose to waste time4 ,by ,september #ah1 the #eth ,brigade was able to put a few machines into the field4 ,they belonged to the #bnd ,battalion1 which had not fought since the earlier stages of the last battle4 ,v ,this time the ,tanks were to be put in the south1 in the #dth ,army area4 ,there were to be about twenty ,tanks1 and they were to work with the ,australians and the #ith and #crd ,corps on a wide front between ,epehy and ,villeret4 #hg8,the operations about to be undertaken by the #dth ,army aimed at the capture of the ,hindenburg ,outpost ,line in order 7#a7 to secure direct observation over the main ,hindenburg ,line1 and 7#b7 to allow our artillery positions to be advanced in preparation for the assault on the main positions40 ,the area attacked had a front of about fourteen miles1 thus a ,battalion of twenty ,tanks could merely be employed against certain known strong points4 ,eight ,tanks were allotted to the #crd ,corps on the left1 eight ,tanks in the centre were to work with the #ast and #dth ,divisions of the ,australian ,corps4 ,on the #ith ,corps sector on the right1 four ,tanks were allotted to the #fth ,division4 ,the night had been fine1 but when zero hour came 7#e4bj7 it was raining heavily1 and all day the weather was dull and cloudy1 visibility being often bad enough to make the ,tank ,commanders glad of their compasses4 #hh8,the company operating with the #crd ,corps had for their two main objectives the villages of ,epehy and ,ronssoy4 ,the former place was taken with no great resistance1 the enemy surrendering in numbers on the appearance of the ,tanks4 ,ronssoy was more stoutly defended2 here machine-gun fire with armour-piercing bullets was very heavy1 and anti-,tank rifles were also freely used4 ,two ,tanks had for their objective the very strong organisation of trenches and fortified cottages known as the ,quadrilateral1 which formed the key to the ,german ,defensive ,system between ,fresnoy and ,selency40 ,during the attack two ,tanks belonging to 8,c0 ,company fought an extremely gallant action4 #hi8;,fresnoy was the line of the first objective1 but in going forward1 the infantry came under heavy machine-gun fire from the ,quadrilateral on their right flank4 ,both officers1 unseen by one another in the mist and smoke1 headed their ,tanks straight for the thickest of the fire4 ,second ,lieutenant ,g4 ,f4 ,smallwood arrived first and encountered terrific resistance1 with which he was successfully dealing when his ,tank became ditched while crossing a sunken road1 all guns but one being covered4 ,it was impossible to use the unditching beam owing to the intense fire from short range4 ,at this moment ,second ,lieutenant ,w4 ,r4 ,hedges1 driving his own ,tank1 as the driver had been killed and the second driver badly wounded1 appeared from the mist heading for the ,quadrilateral with all guns firing4 ,captain ,hamlet1 the ,section ,commander1 was also inside this ,tank4 ,just as ,second ,lieutenant ,hedges was appearing to get the upper hand of the enemy his ,tank burst into flames4 ,desperate efforts were apparently made to put these out1 but after five minutes ,captain ,hamlet and the crew jumped out of the ,tank on the right-hand side straight into the arms of the ,huns1 who had surrounded the ,tank4 ,second ,lieutenant ,hedges1 however1 sprang out from the other side and darted through them though subject to a heavy fire4 ,though hit two or three times he reached the shelter of the sunken road about fifty yards from ,second ,lieutenant ,smallwood's ,tank4 ,the latter left the ,tank and brought ,second ,lieutenant ,hedges back with him4 ,heavy shelling all round the ,tank compelled its evacuation1 and ,second ,lieutenant ,smallwood and crew took up a position with their machine-guns and successfully held off the enemy4 ,later on1 the infantry1 who had been held up some #bjj yards behind1 were able to come up and take over the post4 ,meanwhile ,second ,lieutenant ,hedges had been sent to a ,dressing ,station1 but he never arrived there4 ,this very gallant officer's fate is still unknown40 ,on the #ith ,corps front progress was slow1 but by the end of the day we held ,ronssoy and ,hargicourt4 ,a good idea is given of the minor mechanical difficulties of this part of the campaign in the #bnd ,battalion ,history3 8,liaison1 reconnaissance and ,tank maintenance were rendered far more difficult than usual owing to the lack of transport1 which was in such a state that no car1 box-body1 lorry or motor-cycle could be relied upon4 ,the nearest ,m4,t4 ,park for repairs was twenty-five miles away4 ,long treks by night meant work on ,tanks by day4 ,reconnaissance and liaison had often to be carried out on foot with consequent loss of time4 ,there was very little rest or sleep for any one between ,september #ac and #ah40 ,we did not renew the advance till the #bast1 when nine ,tanks helped the attack on the #crd ,corps front against the ,knoll and ,guillemont and ,quennemont ,farms4 ,two of these ,tanks were of the ,mark ,v4 ,star pattern and carried forward infantry machine-gunners4 ,but we were up against a desperate enemy resistance1 machine-guns firing armour-piercing bullets1 anti-,tank rifles1 field guns and land mines all being used against us4 ,the attack did not succeed in gaining us the coveted positions1 and we were to pay dearly for this failure4 ,again two days elapsed1 and meanwhile 7on the #bjth7 the #hth1 #afth and #acth ,battalions1 and the #eth ,supply ,co4 had been brought forward4 ,there was a big enterprise in view4 ,this hitherto more or less isolated sector of attack was to be 8federated0 with the new vast projected attack which was to be made by no fewer than three ,armies1 their blows timed to fall in rapid succession4 ,meanwhile a piece of ground which we coveted remained in enemy hands4 ,we were anxious to hold the high ground north of ,selency and to clear up the formidable ,quadrilateral south of ,fresnoy4 ,the #ith ,corps1 therefore1 was to attack on a two-division front with the aid of twenty ,tanks of the newly arrived #acth ,battalion4 ,the plans were discussed at a conference held on ,september #bb1 and the ,tanks brought up to the assembly points by skeleton crews that same night4 ,the fighting crews were brought up by lorry the following afternoon1 according to the wise practice which was now beginning to be generally employed1 whenever there was enough personnel to make it possible4 ,the final approach march was begun at #h4cj p4m4 the night of the #bcrd4 #ij8;,after ,clearing ,st4 ,quentin ,wood1 in which some delay was caused by overhead signal wires1 which had to be passed from hand to hand to avoid catching the semaphore standards1 ,tanks had to pass through a heavy harassing fire in which gas shell was largely employed4 ,thus the latter part of the march was made with ,tanks closed and gas masks often worn2 in consequence the crews1 especially of the company working on the left1 suffered greatly from gas and petrol fumes4 ,while waiting on the ,start ,lines1 ,tanks were heavily shelled1 and enemy 'planes twice during the night dropped flares exactly over the sections with the #fth ,division on the right40 ,anti-,tank guns were extremely active throughout the operation4 ,three ,tanks1 which with their infantry penetrated right into the ,quadrilateral1 were all put out of action by a single gun4 ,altogether1 the ,tanks suffered a #ej per cent4 loss of machines in this action4 ,however1 we won some of the points of observation that were needed for the next attack1 and though we failed to hold the ,quadrilateral we had practically outflanked and sterilised it by the end of the day4 ,so ended the little ,battle of ,epehy4 ,our advance had not been a long one1 for the enemy had contested every yard with a desperate valour4 ,his losses had been enormous1 and this minor battle added no less than #ab1jjj prisoners and #ajj guns to the ,allied 8bag40 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,the ,,second ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai1 ,,or ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,cambrai-,,st4 ,,quentin ,the enemy was in full retreat1 but we had every reason to suppose that once he had got 8home10 back to the ,hindenburg ,line1 he would resist our further attempts to advance with all his strength4 ,if we attacked the line and our assault was successful1 and we could break his defences1 the way1 as we have said1 lay clear to the heart of his great system of lateral railway communications4 ,we could cut his forces completely in two4 ,but besides this1 if we could beat him here on his chosen battleground1 if we could wound him1 even behind the rampart upon which he had for years spent such an infinity of toil1 where1 in the open unprepared country behind1 could he hope to withstand us8 ,the lists were set for a struggle outrance1 the two forces faced each other grimly1 for upon the fortunes of the champions in this combat hung the fate of the ,german nation4 ,it was to be a ,tank attack4 ,we were to make the assault on a very wide front1 and were to continue our system of hitting in rapid succession in alternate ,army areas4 ,the last blow had been delivered by the #dth ,army on ,september #ah4 ,the new battle was to be begun by the #ast and #crd ,armies4 #ia8,on the #ast and #crd ,army fronts1 strong positions covering the approaches to ,cambrai between the ,nord and ,schelde ,canals1 including the section of the ,hindenburg ,line itself north of ,gouzeaucourt1 were still in the enemy's possession4 ,his trenches in this sector faced south-west1 and it was desirable that they should be taken in the early stages of the operation1 so as to render it easier for the artillery of the #dth ,army to get into position40 ,to the south1 as soon as certain points of vantage1 ,quennemont ,farm1 the ,knoll and ,bellicourt1 were in our hands1 there was to be a lull1 and the #dth ,army was to attack in strength on the #bith1 two days later--as soon1 that is1 as the ,germans had had time thoroughly to involve their reserves in the first mle4 ,meanwhile the ,tank ,brigades had to be rapidly reorganised and redistributed1 the ,battalions being almost all reshuffled4 ,about one-third of the available machines were to be put in on the northern part of the front1 and the other two-thirds were to fight with the #dth ,army on the #bith4 ,for the sake of clarity1 it is simpler to treat the two halves of the battle separately1 for though they were completely interdependent and formed part of one strategic conception1 each offered very distinct tactical problems of its own4 ,in each the ground had very marked topographical features1 features that gave to each half a special character4 ,,part ,i ,i ,we have said that the #ast and #crd ,armies were to strike first4 ,tanks belonging to the #gth and #aath ,battalions of the #ast ,brigade were to fight with the ,canadians and the #dth ,corps opposite ,bourlon and ,gouzeaucourt1 and the #bnd ,brigade was to contribute the #aeth ,battalion1 which was to co-operate with the #agth ,corps opposite ,graincourt and ,flesquires4 ,altogether fifty-three fighting ,tanks were to be employed4 ,as in the #dth ,army sector1 the peculiar lie of the country was the chief influence which shaped our battle tactics1 as in the #dth ,army area a canal was the central feature of the attack4 ,in the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai the ,tanks had all attacked from south of the northward bend of the ,canal du ,nord near ,havrincourt1 and so worked up the enemy's side of this great obstacle4 ,now we were in a better position to force a direct crossing1 both strategically and mechanically1 and the hazardous venture was to be attempted4 ,direct ground reconnaissance of the ,canal itself was impossible1 as the enemy held the hither bank in strength1 but every conceivable source of information was exhaustively exploited in the endeavour to find crossing-places for the ,tanks1 that might offer at least a possibility of success4 ,daring flights were made by special observers in low-flying aeroplanes1 and a wonderful mosaic was pieced together from successive sets of air-photographs4 ,this was annotated1 re-photographed1 enlarged1 and circulated to all concerned for further amplification and annotation as additional information was collected2 ,major ,macavity of the ,canadian ,corps ,intelligence1 and ,captain ,oswald ,birly of #ast ,army ,headquarters1 being largely responsible for the thoroughness of this1 as well as of several previous 8over-the-line0 surveys4 ,in addition1 the ,garde ,champtre1 the ,ponts et ,chausses service1 and the engineers' working drawings for the ,canal1 were all laid under contribution1 as well as the evidence of a number of prisoners1 refugees and repatris4 ,from such sources and on such evidence the requisite number of crossings were at length determined on1 and the ,tanks definitely and severally allotted to them1 for good or ill4 ,but when all had been done1 there were one or two points about which there still remained a disquieting element of doubt4 ,at one of these1 where aerial photographs showed a breach through the retaining banks of the dry ,canal that just might1 or that just might not1 allow sufficient width for ,tanks to cross1 a crossing was imperative for the local success of the attack4 ,somehow1 a passage had to be positively assured--and there seemed but one sure way of keeping our contract with the infantry1 who were to storm the ,canal at that place4 ,a bridge was to be formed of three old and obsolete ,tanks1 upon the broad backs of which their juniors and betters might scramble across and get to close quarters with the enemy4 ,four elderly machines1 warranted unsound1 were accordingly sought out1 specially stiffened up with internal timber struts1 and allotted the self-sacrificing task of slithering down into the ,canal bed1 and there swinging and shunting until they lay side by side ready for the fighters to crawl over them4 ,under the heading 8,a ,,bridge ,,of ,,tanks10 the actual crossing was very vividly described in the ,press4 8,paris1 ,september #bh4 8,a ,french correspondent relates the following interesting episode which happened in the battle yesterday4 8,it had been decided that a ,tank detachment of the older types should lead the attack1 expose themselves to the enemy fire1 and1 on arriving at the brink of the ,canal1 drop themselves into the bed so as to form an improvised bridge from one ,tank to the other4 ,the fast ,tanks were to follow1 and this new rapid type was to pass over the backs of their older comrades1 opening out a path for the infantry4 ,volunteers were asked for this post of danger1 and for one crew wanted ten crews offered themselves4 ,lots had to be drawn finally to choose the heroic winners of this contest of honour4 ,the wonderful feat was accomplished4 ,the old scarred ,tanks1 covered with ancient gashes and wounds proudly gained in the fighting on the ,somme1 and in the fighting of over a year ago before ,cambrai1 took for the last time their slow and massive way1 and plunged with noble abnegation over the edge4 ,over their bodies the new strong ,tanks passed with giant strides1 our soldiers followed them to victory1 and shortly after eight o'clock they penetrated ,flesquires40 ,as a matter of fact1 the actuality fell somewhat short of this description4 ,the veteran machines found themselves quite unequal to the long trek1 and even the least decrepit of the four finally doddered to a standstill whilst yet miles away from the ,canal4 ,so there was no 8,bridge of ,tanks0 after all1 though1 as things turned out1 its absence embarrassed no one1 with the possible though unlikely exception of the 8close-up0 correspondent4 ,most fortunately the doubtful crossing proved practicable1 and all machines1 save one that struck a land-mine1 passed safely over4 ,,ii ,the attack was1 as usual1 at dawn1 and1 as the first-wave ,tanks and infantry went over the top1 they met with fierce resistance4 ,on the right we encountered particularly strong opposition near ,beaucamp ,ridge4 ,the #aath ,battalion ,history remarks upon the extraordinarily gallant fighting of the enemy on this sector4 8,in some cases they even attempted to pull the machine-guns and #f-pounders out of the ,tanks4 ,we inflicted many casualties by actually running over machine-guns and infantry1 as well as by our fire40 ,indeed1 the ,germans here constantly counter-attacked throughout the day1 so important did they deem the position4 ,in spite of them1 however1 we successfully established our right flank4 ,just to the north of them the ,guards and the #crd ,division forced a crossing of the ,canal in face of their heavy machine and field gun fire1 captured ,ribecourt and ,flesquires1 the ,guards taking ,arival ,wood and pushing north of ,premy ,chapel1 where the #bnd ,division took up the advance4 ,the #aeth ,battalion ,history tells the story of four ,tanks which were co-operating with the ,guards ,division4 ,it is typical of this part of the battle4 ,on the northern outskirts of ,flesquires they awaited the arrival of the #ast ,grenadiers1 filling in the interval by helping the ,gordons in their occupation of the village4 ,when the ,guards arrived the situation was still somewhat obscure1 and ,major ,skeggs1 commanding the ,tanks1 made a daring forward reconnaissance from ,flesquires towards ,premy ,chapel4 ,the ,tanks were brought round north of the village immediately1 engaging a number of machine and field guns1 which were firing from ,arival ,wood4 ,in order to cover the advance of the infantry1 the ,tanks had to come up over a bare stretch of country1 exposed to direct fire from a number of field pieces4 ,two ,tanks1 8,orchid0 and 8,othello10 were soon knocked out1 and #bnd ,lieutenant ,riddle's 8,orestes0 and ,sergeant ,whatley's 8,oribi0 only were left4 ,but it was in the centre that the ,tanks fought their chief battle4 ,under cover of darkness1 the ,canadians and the #fcrd ,division had moved down the west bank of the ,canal near ,muvres and ,sains-lez-,marquion4 ,in the half light of dawn they stormed the ,canal itself4 ,the resistance here was far from well organised4 #ib8,silkem ,chapel and ,wood ,switch were packed with enemy infantry1 who were in great confusion1 unable to move one way or the other4 ,the ,tank #8,odetta1' commanded by ,second ,lieutenant ,c4 ,w4 ,luck1 did great execution there1 bringing all his guns to bear on the enemy1 and using case shot at point-blank range40 ,all day the #aeth ,battalion fought4 8,about #d4cj p4m4 the ,g4,s4,o4#c1 #fcrd ,division1 brought up a ,brigadier-,general 7brigade not ascertained71 who asked if ,tanks could go forward with his ,brigade1 who were then about to resume the advance4 ,he was informed that they had very little petrol left1 but would go on if he 7the ,brigadier-,general7 would accept responsibility for ,tanks being stranded right forward without petrol4 ,the ,brigadier-,general agreed to this1 and said he wanted to get his ,brigade on to the ,marquion ,line4 8,the two ,tanks went forward and picked up the infantry north of ,graincourt4 ,from this point they preceded the infantry1 encountering practically no opposition4 8,beyond ,anneux1 the ,tanks came under a lot of machine-gun fire from the direction of ,fontaine-,notre-,dame4 ,both ,tanks were turned broadside on1 and fire was brought to bear on the ,german machine-guns in order to support the infantry advancing on the left4 ,parties of the enemy1 who were seen coming over the crest towards the ,marquion ,line1 were engaged by all ,tank guns which could be brought to bear4 ,the enemy ran away and many casualties were caused4 8,soon after this some heavy shells1 believed to have been fired from trench mortars1 fell very close to the ,tanks4 ,these two ,tanks reached a point about #ajjj yards from ,cantaing before completing their work4 8,petrol was then almost finished1 crews were much exhausted1 having left the final lying-up place at about twelve midnight1 on ,september #bf-bg4 ,the work required of the ,tanks was completed1 so they were withdrawn to a point well east of the ,canal40 ,meanwhile our line had been pushed on east of ,anneux to ,fontaine-,notre-,dame4 ,bourlon ,village had been carried by the #gth ,tank ,battalion and the ,canadians4 ,we had passed through ,bourlon ,wood1 which was now wholly in our possession4 ,on the extreme left a ,division of the #bbnd ,corps had also crossed the ,canal1 cleared ,sauchy-,lestre and had moved on northward4 ,the air co-operation had been particularly effective throughout the day4 ,the work of the #hth ,squadron had1 however1 been a good deal hampered1 as they had concentrated on the #dth ,army front for the recent fighting there1 and therefore had a long flight and difficult signal communications when ordered to work with the #crd and #ast ,armies4 ,however1 their arrangements with their ,tank partners were1 as usual1 admirable4 ,with the #gth ,battalion1 who1 with the ,canadians1 had been set the task of crossing the ,canal du ,nord opposite ,inchy1 and then taking ,bourlon ,village1 co-operation was particularly good2 not only were vital messages dropped at ,battalion ,headquarters1 but a gun which was firing on three of our ,tanks from ,bourlon ,wood was effectively bombed1 and twice the airman chased its crew away with his machine-gun4 ,illustration3 ,,infantry ,,advancing ,,behind ,,tanks4 ,a ,,practice ,,attack ,,at ,,bermicourt ,illustration3 ,,the ,,st4 ,,quentin ,,canal ,,tunnel1 ,,bellicourt ,illustration3 ,,carrier ,,pigeon ,,being ,,released ,on ,september #bh ,tanks of the #gth and #aath ,battalions fought again at ,baillencourt4 ,seven ,tanks of the #aath ,battalion with the #eth ,corps captured ,villers ,guislain and ,gonnelieu4 ,by the evening of the #bhth we had taken all our objectives1 and had advanced beyond our old high-water line of the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai4 ,fontaine-,notre-,dame1 ,bourlon ,village1 ,epinoy and ,haynecourt were all ours1 and we had captured over #aj1jjj prisoners and #bjj guns4 ,the ,tanks had suffered heavy casualties1 but they had not suffered them in vain4 ,,part ,,ii ,i ,we have said that in the original battle scheme1 certain points of vantage1 ,quennemont1 the ,knoll1 and ,bellicourt1 were assumed to be in our hands a day or so before the main attack on the #dth ,army front was launched4 ,these fortified heights were of importance owing to the singular geography of this sector of the line4 ,all along this piece of the front1 more or less parallel to the lines of the armies1 runs--deep and broad--the ,st4 ,quentin ,canal4 ,for three and a half miles1 however1 between ,bellicourt and ,vendhuille it runs underground through a tunnel4 ,we have seen how1 in the northern part of the line1 the enemy had relied upon the ,canal du ,nord to form the principal obstacle to an attack4 ,in ,august we had captured a document which proved that he realised that if we attacked at all in the south1 and whether we attacked with ,tanks or not1 it would be in that three-and-a-half-mile gap that our heaviest blow would fall4 ,the photograph gives an excellent notion why we had to avoid certain sectors of the ,canal at all costs1 and ,sir ,douglas ,haig1 in his ,despatch1 gives an admirable idea of some of the complex features which the topography here possessed4 8,the general configuration of the ground through which this sector of the ,canal runs1 produces deep cuttings of a depth in places of some sixty feet2 while between ,bellicourt and the neighbourhood of ,vendhuille the ,canal passes through a tunnel for a distance of #fjjj yards4 ,in the sides of the cuttings the enemy had constructed numerous tunnelled dug-outs and concrete shelters4 ,along the top edge of them he had concealed well-sited concrete or armoured machine-gun emplacements4 ,the tunnel itself was used to provide living accommodation for troops1 and was connected by shafts with the trenches above4 ,south of ,bellicourt the ,canal cutting gradually becomes shallow1 till at ,bellenglise the ,canal lies almost at ground level4 ,south of ,bellenglise the ,canal is dry4 8,on the western side of the ,canal1 south of ,bellicourt1 two thoroughly organised and extremely heavily wired lines of continuous trench run roughly parallel to the ,canal1 at average distances from it of #bjjj and #ajjj yards respectively4 ,the whole series of defences1 with the numerous defended villages contained in it1 formed a belt of country varying from #gjjj to #aj1jjj yards in depth1 organised by the employment of every available means into a most powerful system1 well meriting the great reputation attached to it40 ,on the three and a half miles of front1 where alone ,tanks and artillery could cross the line of the ,canal1 the outpost system which everywhere protected the ,hindenburg ,line1 was doubly reinforced1 and gained a natural strength from its position on the heights1 beneath which the ,canal had burrowed4 ,only a very 8full dress0 attack on so highly organised a system as the ,hindenburg ,line was likely to be successful1 and in order to launch such an attack it was essential that we should already hold the ,knoll and ,guillemont and ,quennemont ,farms4 ,we have seen how in the last day or two of the battle of ,epehy we assaulted the line again and again1 duly captured the sector opposite ,bellicourt1 but how1 two days before the main attack was to be launched1 the ,knoll and ,quennemont were still in the hands of the enemy4 ,this state of affairs caused grave anxiety1 as the whole set-piece attack was based on the idea of using this line as a 8jumping-off0 position4 ,it had been intended that the two ,american ,divisions1 which were to fight on this sector1 should only be put in when this line had been secured4 ,it was now decided that they must themselves make a final effort to capture the outpost line before the main assault1 which was due for dawn on ,september #bi4 ,therefore1 at dawn on the #bgth1 the #bgth ,american ,division1 assisted by twelve ,tanks of the #dth ,battalion1 again attacked under cover of a creeping barrage4 #ic8,the attack met with strong opposition1 and the final position reached was the subject of conflicting reports from the troops engaged and from the air observers4 ,subsequent events showed that small parties of ,americans and ,tanks had reached the vicinity of their objective1 and had very gallantly maintained themselves there2 but the line as a whole was not materially advanced by the day's operations4444 ,the barrage could not now be brought back on this flank owing to the knowledge that parties of ,american troops1 as well as a number of ,american wounded1 would be exposed to our own fire4 ,also any alteration in the barrage plans1 which had already been issued1 would inevitably lead to confusion40 ,either1 therefore1 the whole main attack must be delayed1 or the ,american divisions and some of the ,british troops north of them must start some #ajjj yards behind their barrage1 and from a very indefinite jumping-off line4 ,the latter course was decided upon4 #id8,the artillery start line1 as originally planned1 was to hold good1 and the troops of the #bgth ,american ,division would form up for the attack on a line as far forward as possible1 and would be assisted by an additional number of ,tanks4 ,the strength in ,tanks was augmented to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the enemy resistance west of the start line4 ,it was thought that this1 with the slow rate of barrage1 would enable the ,americans to carry out their task40 ,but there was yet one more difficulty1 a serious obstacle of which we were serenely unaware4 ,a ,british anti-,tank minefield1 consisting of rows of buried heavy trench-mortar bombs1 each holding #ej lb4 of ammonal1 had been put down just prior to our loss of the area in ,march #aiah1 and of this minefield no information had reached the ,tanks4 ,it will thus be seen that the dice were very heavily loaded against success on this part of the front before day dawned on the eventful #bith of ,september1 #aiah4 ,the whole attack was to be on a twelve-mile front4 ,the infantry were to take advantage of a number of foot-bridges1 which our bombardment had prevented the enemy from getting out to destroy1 and in some places our men were prepared to wade or swim through the water4 ,it was expected1 however1 that the chief resistance would be offered on the famous three and a half miles4 ,altogether about #age ,tanks1 including the new ,american ,battalion1 were to be launched1 and four ,corps were to be involved4 ,to the #ith ,corps on the right1 the #eth1 #fth and #gth ,tank ,battalions of the #crd ,brigade were allotted4 ,in the centre1 with the ,australian and ,american ,corps1 the #ast1 #dth and #cjast ,american ,battalions of the #dth ,brigade were to fight4#ie ,the #hth1 #acth and #afth ,battalions of the #eth ,tank ,brigade were to be held in #dth ,army ,reserve4 ,almost up to zero hour on the #bith we still hoped to get news that we held the ,knoll and ,quennemont4 ,but no reassuring message came through4 ,it was thus in a very singular world that the #cjath ,american ,tank ,battalion was destined to make its debut4 #if8,the #cjast's reconnaissance before the battle was very efficiently carried out in spite of many disadvantages4 ,the taping especially was a classic example of pluck and efficiency4 ,it must be borne in mind that this was no quiet front1 and that the attempts to take his outpost line had made the ,boche exceedingly nervous and alert4 ,in consequence1 the nights preceding the battle were some of the dirtiest ,i've experienced4 ,the ,battalion ,r4,o4 7,i've forgotten his name71 one ,company ,r4,o4 7,lieutenant ,t4 ,c4 ,naedale7 and a sergeant were knocked out whilst supervising the taping4 ,lieutenant ,naedale got his wounds dressed and continued his work up till zero hour4 ,it is worthy of mention1 in connection with this incident1 that each ,american ,tank had its own tape laid out over our front line towards the ,boche by the ,company ,r4,o4's4 ,tank ,commanders told me afterwards that they had to start fighting before the end of their tape was reached40 ,,ii ,when the dawn broke the usual mist lay thick and added its quota of confusion to the uncertainties of the morning4 ,all along the line1 the battle swayed confusedly1 developing into what was perhaps the most complete 8mix-up0 of any battle of the ,war4 ,to the north1 the fighting was extremely heavy4 ,owing to the employment of an effective barrage having been impossible1 the ,american #bgth ,division suffered severely from the fire of massed hostile machine-guns from the moment the attack began4 ,just as the ,tanks of the #cjast were moving up in support1 ready to deal with the machine-guns which were1 as an eye-witness describes it1 by now 8mowing down the other ,americans in swathes10 no less than ten machines struck upon the forgotten minefield4 ,the ,american ,tanks experienced the bitterest of war's accidents1 useless destruction at the hands of their own colleagues4 ,the explosions were terrific1 the whole bottom of many machines being torn out and a large proportion of the crews being killed4 ,a little further to the south our attack was progressing well4 ,tanks of the #dth and #eth ,battalions and their infantry had pushed forward4 ,the intricate trench system and the confusion of wire and dug-outs1 however1 were responsible for a certain loss of cohesion1 so that by the time the village of ,bellicourt had been reached the attacking troops were some distance behind the barrage1 and a good deal of the weight had gone out of the assault4 ,but though several large parties of the enemy still held out1 we had1 on this sector1 actually penetrated the ,hindenburg ,line before noon4 ,but now the mist began to lift4 ,the enemy still held ,quennemont ,farm and the land to the north of it in great strength1 and from that high ground they were now beginning to be able to see well enough to pour a devastating fire into the backs of the troops who were advancing in the ,bellicourt ,sector4 ,the situation was critical and called for immediate action4 ,major ,hotblack1 the ,head of the ,tank ,corps ,intelligence1 who was watching the progress of the battle near this point1 luckily realised the situation before the enemy and rushed to try to improvise a diversion4 ,he fortunately found two ,tanks#ig which were waiting1 ready to take part in a later stage of the attack4 ,with the permission of the ,battalion ,commander1 the two machines were hastily set going1 and ,major ,hotblack jumped into the leading ,tank4 ,the machines were driven rapidly towards ,quennemont ,ridge4 ,there was no body of infantry immediately available1 and with the weather in its present mood1 there was no time to wait2 so the two ,tanks without artillery or infantry support attacked what afterwards proved to be an unbroken sector of the enemy's front4 ,but if confusion reigned in the ,british line1 there is no doubt that the ,germans1 though fighting exceedingly well1 were far from clear about the actual position4 ,in the confusion1 they appear to have mistaken the two isolated machines for a considerable force4 ,the two ,tanks successfully made their way on to the heretofore impregnable ,ridge1 and actually succeeded in driving the enemy off it1 killing large numbers of the defenders and capturing a quantity of machine-guns4 ,then at last the ,german field gunners awoke to the situation1 and being otherwise unharassed1 opened a devastating fire upon the two presumptuous machines4 ,they succeeded in hitting and setting fire to both of them1 the crews being obliged to evacuate1 having suffered considerable casualties4 ,major ,hotblack1 though partially blinded1 was able to carry on1 but the only other officer was severely wounded1 and a derisory little force--one officer and five or six men1 was thus left to hold the ,ridge4 ,quite undaunted1 they immediately set to work to prepare for the ,german counter-attack which1 now that the ,tanks were out of action and ablaze1 seemed imminent4 ,there was an abundance of enemy machine-guns lying about1 and some of these were got ready for action1 for the ,tanks' own guns had been destroyed when the machines were knocked out4 ,while these guns were being turned round ready for their late owners1 the tiny garrison was joined1 first by an ,australian and then by an ,american officer1 each with an orderly1 who had each separately come out to try and find out the position of affairs4 ,the situation was rapidly explained to them1 and was soon made clearer still by the expected counter-attack from the ,germans4 ,twice during the previous week's fighting1 the enemy had regained this ,ridge when it was held in force4 ,this time less than a dozen men successfully held it against them1 and although almost every one of the defenders was wounded1 they held out until relief came1 several hours later4 ,for his part in this action ,major ,hotblack was awarded a bar to his ,military ,cross4 ,this was his last action in the war1 as the wounds he received on this occasion incapacitated him till the ,armistice had been signed4 ,it is rather interesting to note that this officer was wounded five times during the course of the war--on four occasions in the head2 but so admirable is our hospital system that he is now practically none the worse for his experiences4 ,on the extreme right of the battle the attack of the #ith ,corps was a complete success1 the #dfth ,division particularly distinguishing itself in the capture of ,bellenglise4 #ih8;,equipped with lifebelts1 and carrying mats and rafts1 the #dfth ,division stormed the western arm of the ,canal at ,bellenglise and to the north of it1 some crossing the ,canal on foot bridges1 which the enemy was given no time to destroy1 others dropping down the sheer sides of the ,canal wall1 and1 having swum or waded to the far side1 climbing up the farther wall to the ,german trench lines on the eastern bank40 ,the ,tanks were1 of course1 unable to cross with their infantry4 ,they moved on ,bellicourt1 crossed over the tunnel at the nearest point1 and swung south1 working down the further bank of the ,canal and arriving just in time to take part in the attack on ,monchy4 ,our success here was so complete that one division alone captured #djjj prisoners and seventy guns4 ,many of these batteries were taken from the rear by ,tanks and infantry while they were still in action1 the enemy not realising in the least that they had been outflanked4 ,,iii ,at the end of the day it was pretty clear what must be the ultimate result of the battle4 ,but our front was extremely ragged and the breaches we had driven in the ,hindenburg ,line but narrow4 ,so for some days our attacks continued on all fronts2 from north of ,cambrai1 where the #gth ,battalion ,tanks and the ,canadians met with a desperate resistance1 right down to our junction with the ,french #ast ,army south of ,st4 ,quentin4 ,with the exception of a party of six machines belonging to the #ast ,brigade1 who helped in an attack just north of ,cambrai1 all the ,tank actions of this period were fought in the #dth ,army area1 where we were busied in driving in the wedge whose thin end we had inserted with so much effort on ,september #bi4 ,on the #cjth1 twenty ,tanks belonging to the #eth1 #fth1 #acth and #gth ,battalions fought in different groups1 none with striking success1 in one or two cases owing to the fact that the fresh infantry who had been brought up were unaccustomed to ,tanks1 and that liaison was therefore defective4 ,the village of ,bony1 which had just been entered by the ,armoured ,cars on the #bith1 still held out stubbornly4 ,on ,october #a1 ,tanks of the #ith ,battalion were engaged with the #cbnd ,division in an attack on a part of the line near ,joncourt4 ,in this action the ,tanks made very successful use of smoke screens4 ,on the #bnd no ,tanks fought1 but on ,october #c about forty machines went into action4 ,as on the previous days1 we met with stubborn resistance1 and as on the previous days1 foot by foot1 inch by inch1 we pushed our line forward1 always patiently enlarging the width of the holes we had pierced4 ,a new attack on a large scale was now contemplated1 and for this assault the ,tank ,corps had to furnish between eighty and ninety machines1 some on the #crd1 some on the #dth ,army front4 ,preparations were immediately begun1 and no ,tanks fought on the #dth4 ,our line1 however1 had just reached the outskirts of two large villages1 ,montbrehain and ,beaurevoir1 and we were anxious not to begin the day of our new attack with street fighting--of all forms of warfare the most incalculable4 ,therefore1 the ,australians and the #afth ,tank ,battalion attacked ,montbrehain1 and after fighting a strenuous but brilliant little action1 captured it4 ,the last phase of the ,cambrai-,st4 ,quentin battle was at hand2 nay more1 the last phase of the warfare we had known for nearly four years4 ,the next day we were to match our strength against that torn and breached1 but still formidable ruin1 that had once been the ,hindenburg ,line4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,the ,,second ,,battle ,,of ,,le ,,cateau--,,the ,,running ,,fight ,i 8,,tank ,,corps ,,intelligence ,,summary1 ,,october #h,,th0 8,an attack was launched this morning between ,cambrai and ,st4 ,quentin on a front of eighteen miles1 which was entirely successful--all objectives being gained--in spite of obstinate machine-gun defence4 8,heavy ,tanks and ,whippets co-operated4 8,the line now runs ,n4 and ,e4 of ,niergnies--,e4 of ,seranvillers and ,la ,targette--,esnes ,mill--,e4 edge of ,esnes--through ,briseux ,wood--,walincourt--,audigny trench line to ,walincourt ,wood--,w4 of ,walincourt--,n4 and ,e4 of ,serain--,e4 of ,prmont--,e4 of ,brancourt--,e4 of ,beauregard4 8,depth of penetration varies1 the maximum being #fjjj yards4 8,the ,french continued the attack on the southern portion of the battle front and made progress in the vicinity of ,fontaine ,utetre and ,essigny le ,petit4 8,a large number of prisoners have been taken1 but the actual numbers are not yet known4 8,the enemy made a heavy counter-attack from the direction of ,awoingt against our line between ,niergnies and ,seranvillers1 and the situation at ,forenville is not quite clear4 8,in this counter-attack the enemy used captured ,british ,tanks4 ,seven appeared in the sunken road ,n4,e4 of ,niergnies without any infantry support4 ,our infantry used enemy anti-,tank rifles1 and four or five enemy ,tanks are reported to have been put out of action40 ,this was the form in which the news of what proved the last set action of the war reached resting ,tank ,battalions1 and the great ,tank organisation behind the lines4 ,the whole action had somehow seemed unusually dramatic4 ,there was now everywhere a sense of momentousness of events4 ,we knew in our hearts that the hour had come4 ,still1 the enemy had so often revealed unexpected strengths1 we had so often been tricked into optimism1 and now we fought with a sort of surprised joy in thrusting home1 of feeling the ,german resistance really crumble under our blows4 ,every time we struck we were feverishly impatient at our own weariness1 a weariness which delayed the next blow4 ,we longed to be sure1 to strike again and again1 no matter how1 and so end the long nightmare4 ,all through that last month we hurried on1 blind with fatigue1 too eager for the next battle to have been fought1 too deeply concerned with the culmination of the great drama1 to care what had been the details of our achievements in the last action4 ,it is difficult in attempting any chronicle of this period not to feel again the impatience of the hour1 or to achieve enough detachment to describe the individual threads out of which the great pattern of victory was woven4 ,,ii ,to return to the attack of ,october #h4 ,besides the very good action fought by ,whippets of the #crd and #fth ,battalions near ,serain and ,prmont1 there were two particularly interesting features in the attack3 first1 the action fought by the #cjast ,american and #ast ,tank ,battalions2 and1 second1 the ,german counter-attack with ,tanks which is mentioned in the ,summary4 ,nineteen ,tanks of the #cjast went into action opposite ,serain1 doing great execution4 #ii8;,in one railway cutting near ,brancourt1 which was a mass of machine-guns1 ,i counted nearly fifty mangled ,boches who had been caught in enfilade with case shot as the ,tanks crossed the line4 ,the infantry casualties were very low1 and all agreed on the masterly way the ,american ,tank gunners had dealt with ,m4,g4 opposition4 8,the pice de rsistance of the battle was the performance of ,major ,sasse1 ,d4,s4,o41 for which he received his decoration4 8,as on a former occasion1 he went into action in the ,wireless ,tank4 ,after the capture of ,brancourt he left his ,tank this side of the village and went forward to reconnoitre4 ,he eventually ascended the church tower in order to get a forward view of the battle4 ,while doing this a very heavy bombardment of the village commenced1 and ,major ,sasse noticed that the infantry had begun to retire4 ,he accordingly descended and tried to find the officer in charge of the troops on the spot4 ,not being able to do this he assumed command himself1 stopped the retirement and organised the troops as a defensive force round the outskirts of the village4 ,lewis guns were posted and the men ordered to resist any attempt on the part of the ,boche to retake the village1 should this be made4 ,as was expected1 a determined counter-attack developed1 which was successfully beaten off by ,major ,sasse's detachment4 ,this occurred a second time1 and ,major ,sasse sent off a wireless message for help4 ,he was rescued some hours later from a somewhat precarious position by ,american reinforcements40 ,it was to ,tanks of the #abth ,battalion that the interesting lot fell of meeting captured ,british ,mark ,,iv4 ,tanks in action4 ,four ,tanks belonging to 8,a0 ,company were in the neighbourhood of ,niergnies when the enemy launched a strong counter-attack4 ,the battlefield was thick with smoke and it was not yet fully light1 and when in the half-dark the ,tank crews and infantry saw four ,tanks advancing to meet them1 they supposed that the strangers belonged to 8,c0 ,company1 who had been sent to execute an encircling movement1 and who had1 they imagined1 somehow been able to outflank the enemy with extraordinary speed4 8,l #af10 commanded by ,captain ,rowe1 was near a farm named ,mont ,st4 ,meuve when the ,tanks appeared in sight1 and the foremost was within fifty yards before ,captain ,rowe realised that it was an enemy machine4 ,he immediately fired a #f-pounder shot at it which disabled it1 but almost at the same time 8,l #af0 was hit by two shells1 one of which came through the cab1 wounding ,captain ,rowe and killing his driver4 ,the ,tank ,commander immediately got his crew out and crossed over to 8,l #ai10 which was near at hand1 and led it forward towards the ,german machines1 of whose presence it was still unaware4 8,l #ai0 had already had five men wounded1 had been on fire1 and having no gunners left1 could not use its #f-pounders4 ,its ,commander1 ,second ,lieutenant ,worsap1 however1 nothing daunted1 immediately engaged the enemy with his ,lewis guns until the ,tank received a direct hit which set it on fire a second time4 ,there was nothing now to be done but to evacuate the machine1 and as the ,german counter-attack seemed to be succeeding1 ,mr4 ,worsap blew up the wreck of his ,tank4 8,l #ab10 the third ,tank1 a male1 was hit and finally disabled before its ,commander and crew had discovered that the strange ,tanks did not belong to 8,c0 ,company4 ,there remained 8,l #h0 under ,lieutenant ,martell1 but this ,tank had a leaky radiator and was almost out of water4 ,it1 too1 had been hit1 and three of its ,lewis guns put out of action4 ,lieutenant ,martell1 however1 sent his crew back1 and he and an artillery officer managed to get up to a captured ,german field gun1 which the two turned round and used against the enemy's ,tanks1 almost immediately obtaining a direct hit on one of them4 ,two of the ,german machines were now accounted for4 ,and now at last a genuine 8,c0 ,company ,tank--a female--appeared and finally drove or scared away the two remaining ,german machines4 ,the situation was restored1 and the infantry1 who had retired before the counter-attack1 went forward again and reoccupied the ridge beyond ,niergnies4 ,a comparison of the ,british and ,german accounts of this action is not unentertaining4 ,german ,wireless ,news 8,during the heavy fighting south of ,cambrai on ,october #h1 ,german 444 ,tanks and a column of infantry advanced 444 behind a wall of artificial fog4 ,the ,german ,tanks1 which were feeling their way forward1 surprised a large number of ,englishmen who were standing in disordered groups4 ,by means of machine-gun fire and ,tank gunfire the ,english were driven back4 ,the ,english troops on the eastern outskirts of ,niergnies took to flight and evacuated4 ,on the ,cambrai-,crvecur ,road there were five ,english ,tanks advancing in support of their own infantry4 ,as they came into sight of the ,german ,tanks the ,english ,tanks stopped1 and they were set on fire by their own crews40 ,by the end of the day we had advanced and widened our line along the whole front of the attack1 and the next day was devoted to exploitation4 ,illustration3 ,,his ,,majesty ,,the ,,colonel-,,in-,,chief ,,and ,,general ,,elles ,,special ,,order ,,no4 #ah4 ,by ,major-,general ,h4 ,j4 ,elles1 ,c4,b41 ,d4,s4,o41 ,commanding ,,tank ,,corps in the ,field4 #ahth ,october1 #aiah4 #a4 ,his ,majesty the ,king was graciously pleased to become ,,colonel-,,in-,,chief of the ,tank ,corps on the #agth instant4 #b4 ,the following telegram was sent on behalf of the ,,tank ,,corps3 8,to ,h4 ,m4 the ,king1 8,the news that your ,majesty has graciously consented to become ,colonel-in-,chief of the ,tank ,corps has just been received here4 ,all ranks are deeply sensible of this signal honour conferred upon the ,corps and are determined to continue worthy of it4 ,,general ,,elles4 8,advanced ,h4 ,q4 ,tank ,corps4 ,in the ,field4 #agth ,october40 #c4 ,the following reply has been received3 8,to ,,major-,,general ,h4 ,j4 ,,elles4 ,h4 ,q4 ,tank ,corps1 ,in the ,field4 8,i sincerely thank you for the message which you have conveyed to me in the name of all ranks of the ,tank ,corps4 8,i am indeed proud to be ,colonel-in-,chief of this great ,british organization invented by us which has played so prominent a part in our recent victories4 8,i wish you all every possible good luck4 ,,george ,r4 ,i41 ,colonel-in-,chief4 ,buckingham ,palace4 ,,london1 #ahth ,october40 7,signed7 ,h4 ,j4 ,,elles1 ,major-,general4 ,commanding ,tank ,corps in the ,field4 ,the enemy was in full retreat and a rapid advance met with the feeblest opposition4 ,the contemporary record in the ,tank ,corps ,intelligence ,summary remarks this feature4 ,illustration3 ,,manufacture 8,october #i4 8,a penetration of over six miles has been made towards ,le ,cateau1 and in the area gained1 twenty-six villages have been occupied4 8,tanks again co-operated4 8,shortly after midnight our troops commenced the attack ,n4 of ,cambrai1 capturing ,ramillies and securing a bridgehead over the ,escaut ,canal at ,pont ,d',aire4 8,the whole of ,cambrai was occupied this morning4444 8,air reports state that there is great confusion on roads ,n4,e4 and ,s4,e4 of ,le ,cateau1 and that our low-flying scouts have been shooting at record targets4444 8,the number of prisoners taken in yesterday's attack by the ,british ,armies amounted to #fcjj1 and by the ,french in the ,st4 ,quentin area #abjj4 ,no detail yet received of captures to-day40 ,the ,battle of ,cambrai-,st4 ,quentin was at an end1 and the ,hindenburg ,line had now to all intents and purposes ceased to exist1 broken as it was on a front of nearly thirty miles4 ,before the whole ,british forces in ,france1 from north of ,menin to ,bohain1 seven miles north-west of ,guise1 open country stretched1 uncut by trench1 unhung by wire4 ,the time for exploitation had arrived4 ,considering our comparative numerical weakness1 the lateness of the season and the nature of the country1 to have fought their way so far had been a notable performance4 ,now to carry out a rapid pursuit was beyond even the endeavours of the infantry4 ,for the ,german ,army1 though beaten1 was not yet broken4 #ajj8;,a pursuit by cavalry was unthinkable1 for the ,german rearguards possessed many thousands of machine-guns1 and as long as these weapons existed1 pursuit1 as cavalry dream it to be1 was utterly impossible4 ,one arm alone could have turned the present defeat into a rout--the ,tank1 but few of these remained1 for since ,august #h no less than #hai machines had been handed over to salvage by the ,tank ,battalions1 and these ,battalions themselves had lost in personnel #eej officers and #beeg other ranks1 out of a fighting state of some #iejj40 ,the #crd1 #dth1 #eth1 #gth and #aeth ,battalions--or what was left of them--had all to be withdrawn into ,g4,h4,q4 reserve on ,october #ab4 ,,iii ,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,the ,,selle ,as fast1 however1 as the weariness of our infantry and the fewness of our ,tanks allowed1 we pursued the flying but still coherent ,german ,divisions4 ,again and again the enemy tried to turn1 to stand just so long behind some natural defence as should enable him to organise his retreat4 ,he still had a hope that a shortened line might enable him to make a final rally1 if only1 meantime1 too headlong a flight had not reduced his army to a mob1 and if the advance of the ,allies could be stemmed for a little before the vital centre of ,maubeuge4 ,seven ,tanks of the #eth ,battalion had advanced with the ,french and the #ith ,corps near ,riquerval ,wood2 but the first action of this new type1 in which any considerable number of machines took part1 was the ,battle of the ,selle ,river1 which began in the #dth ,army area on ,october #ag4 #aja8,our operations were opened on ,october #ag by an attack by the #dth ,army on a front of about ten miles from ,le ,cateau southwards1 in conjunction with the ,french #ast ,army operating west of the ,sambre and ,oise ,canal4 ,the assault1 launched at #e4bj a4m41 was delivered by the #ith1 #bnd ,american and #acth ,corps4444 ,the enemy was holding the difficult wooded country east of ,bohain1 and the line of the ,selle north of it1 in great strength1 his infantry being well supported by artillery40 ,the #dth was the ,tank ,brigade concerned4 ,the #ast ,battalion was allotted to the #ith ,corps on the right4 ,the #bnd ,american ,corps in the centre fought as usual with the #cjast ,american ,battalion4 ,on the left the #acth ,corps had the #afth ,battalion1 while the #fth ,tank ,battalion was in ,army reserve4 ,the ,germans had chosen their battle ground with great skill4 ,they held the right bank of the ,selle1 and the river itself1 therefore1 threaded ,no-,man's-,land4 ,this particular choice of a defence was undoubtedly dictated by a fear of ,tanks4 ,there had been heavy rain1 and the river was in flood4 #ajb8,very little was known of the stream1 except that it varied every few yards in nature1 breadth and depth2 and the only way of establishing safe crossing-places for the ,tanks1 was by personal reconnaissance4 8,this work was done successfully by the ,r4,o4's of the #ast and #cjast ,battalions1 which were fighting alongside each other4 8,the reconnaissance necessary on the front of the #cjast promised to be extremely dangerous and the success rather doubtful1 owing to the presence of several unlocated ,boche posts on our side of the stream4 ,it was a question of slipping through these unobserved1 gaining the necessary information1 and coming back again through their lines4 8,lieutenant ,t4 ,c4 ,naedale1 ,battalion ,r4,o41 undertook to do this in the company of an infantry guide from the sector4 ,this officer walked down the stream #ejj yards1 literally under the noses of the ,boche posts1 and returned to our lines with the requisite intelligence4 ,he was thus able to pick safe crossings for all his ,tanks40 ,at #e4cj a4m4 on ,october #ag1 the fog was so thick that ,tanks had to move forward on compass bearings4 ,the infantry could see nothing1 and had1 in many cases1 to rely almost entirely on the ,tanks as guides4 ,every ,tank of the forty-eight carried a crib1 and with their help1 north of ,st4 ,souplet and of ,molain1 both ,tank ,battalions crossed the river in safety at the previously selected fords4 ,the ,germans had clearly relied almost entirely upon the flooded river for their defence1 and it was only here and there that we met with any opposition4 ,isolated posts would1 however1 occasionally hold out with great vigour1 and what with the fog and the irregular speed of our advance1 the whole battle was an exceedingly confused one4 ,the enemy was well supplied with artillery1 and wherever the fog permitted made good use of it4 ,at about #aj a4m4 the infantry1 who were badly held up by machine-guns near ,demilieue1 summoned ,whippets of the #fth ,battalion to their help4 ,a number of machines immediately hurried up1 but even then1 so heavy was the machine-gun fire1 that it was only with great difficulty that the infantry could advance even under cover of the ,whippets4 ,just as they were approaching the village1 three ,whippets were knocked out in rapid succession by a single field gun4 ,deprived of the cover of these machines1 the infantry had to retire again4 ,it was not till considerably later that the village was taken4 ,on the #ahth and #aith the infantry managed to make good progress1 and at #b p4m4 on the #bjth we made another attack1 still on the line of the ,selle1 north of ,le ,cateau4 ,only four ,tanks of the #aath ,battalion were employed4 ,the enemy's resistance was serious1 for he had been able to erect strong wire entanglements along the greater part of the line4 ,this time1 there being no available fords1 the ,tanks successfully crossed the river by means of an under-water sleeper bridge1 which the ,sappers had secretly constructed at night1 the enemy being quite unaware of its existence1 until1 to their dismay1 they saw the ,tanks crossing over it4 ,there was severe fighting round ,neuvilly1 ,solesmes and ,haspres1 but we gained all our objectives on the high ground east of the ,selle1 all the four ,tanks successfully reaching their final goal4 ,our capture of these positions on the river ,selle was immediately followed up by a larger bid1 this time for the general line running from the ,sambre ,canal along the edge of ,mormal ,forest to the neighbourhood of ,valenciennes4 ,we were to make a night attack on a fifteen-mile line in the #dth ,army area1 the #ith1 #eth and #acth ,corps being supported by thirty-seven ,tanks from the #ajth1 #aath1 #abth and #cjast 7,american7 ,battalions4 ,zero hour was #a4cj a4m4 ,unfortunately the hoped-for moonlight was shrouded1 and the night misty and dark4 ,to add to our difficulties1 the enemy was shelling freely with gas4 ,gas-masks had to be worn1 and through them it was impossible to see anything4 ,consequently we did not make much progress until dawn4 ,but directly it was light we went ahead1 the ,tanks had fine shooting at 8ground game10 and a great amount of case shot was fired1 and both ,tanks and infantry ultimately won through to their objectives4 ,next day the #agth ,corps took up the attack in the #ast ,army area1 so extending our line of assault a further five miles north to the ,schele4 ,no ,tanks1 however1 operated at this stage of the #ast ,army's offensive1 but six machines belonging to the #ajth ,battalion attacked near ,robewsart4 ,one of these ,tanks managed to explode a ,german ammunition dump with a lucky shot from one of its #f-pounders4 ,this threw the enemy into great confusion1 whilst the explosion of his own shells helped us considerably with the killing4 ,,iv ,we had now reached another--the last--stage of the battle4 ,the nature of the terrain had begun to change1 for we were travelling at last4 #ajc8;,despite the unfavourable weather and the determined opposition at many points from the ,german machine-gunners1 in two days our infantry and ,tanks had realised an advance of five or six miles over difficult country40 ,we had now reached the half wooded1 half pasture and orchard country which lay on the outskirts of the ,forest of ,mormal1 8like fringe upon a petticoat10 and the last of our battles had been fought amid the trees of the ,bois ,l',evque and of ,pommereuil4 ,we were within a mile of ,le ,quesnoy1 which lay in a clearing in the ,forest4 ,there was no chance of giving our machines an overhaul4 ,it was therefore in a state of mechanical 8efficiency10 which a little while before we should have said made any sort of fighting out of the question1 that most of the remaining ,tanks gaily tackled this difficult piece of the advance4 ,,chapter ,,xxii ,,the ,,rout--,,mormal ,,forest--,,the ,,battle ,,of ,,the ,,sambre--,,the ,,armistice ,i 8,some greater issue was at stake1 some mightier cause1 than ever before the sword had pleaded or the trumpet had proclaimed40 ,,de ,,quincey4 ,on ,november #d1 the #ast1 #crd and #dth ,armies were to deliver an attack on a combined front of about thirty miles1 from the ,sambre to the north of ,oisy and ,valenciennes4 ,the country across which our advance was to be made was exceedingly difficult3 in the south1 the river ,sambre had to be crossed almost at the outset4 ,in the centre the great ,forest of ,mormal1 though here and there thinned by ,german foresters1 still presented a formidable obstacle4 ,in the north lay the strongly fortified town of ,le ,quesnoy1 which was defended naturally by several streams which ran parallel to the line of our advance1 offering the enemy repeated opportunities for a successful defence4 ,on ,november #b1 we fought a small action west of ,landrecies4 ,we were anxious to improve our position near ,happegarbes before the big attack on the #dth4 ,only three ,tanks of the #ajth ,battalion took part4 ,unfortunately1 although we took all our objectives1 the ,germans suddenly plucked up heart1 launched a surprise attack1 and we lost them again before nightfall4 ,the ,battle of ,mormal ,forest was the last set ,tank attack of the ,war1 and for it we could only scrape together just thirty-seven machines4 ,tank units were bled almost white4 ,sections took the place of companies1 companies of battalions1 and ,tanks were parcelled out in such a way that the very most might be made of their scanty numbers4 ,at dawn1 after an intense bombardment1 ,tanks and infantry moved forward to the assault under a heavy barrage1 and it was not long before they had penetrated the enemy's positions on the whole battle front4 ,on the right of the attack1 zero was at #e4de4 ,the #ith ,corps1 which1 it will be remembered1 was supported by four sections of the #ajth ,tank ,battalion1 pushed forward and captured ,catillon1 where the ,tanks fought a particularly good action4 ,the infantry were able to cross the ,sambre at this place1 capturing a lock some two miles to the south of it4 ,by two hours after zero two battalions of infantry were east of the river4 ,the ,tanks with the #acth ,corps were also extremely successful1 especially in the neighbourhood of ,hecq1 ,preux and the north-western edge of the ,forest of ,mormal4 ,an account of the fighting on this central part of the line is given in the ,tank ,corps ,intelligence ,summary4 8,the early morning was fine and clear1 but a dense mist came up with the dawn and persisted until about #h4cj4 ,in addition1 the country ,s4,w4 of ,mormal ,forest is peculiarly enclosed with thick orchards1 quick-set fences and hedgerow trees1 confining visibility to no more than fifty yards or so1 under the best conditions4 ,the infantry largely depended on the ,tanks to give them their direction1 and many of the latter had to steer exclusively by compass4 ,by this means they were able to keep approximately to their allotted routes1 and were of considerable help to the infantry in breaking through the dense hedges 7some wired7 and in dealing with machine-guns4 ,in places the enemy barrage came down heavily with a high proportion of gas1 whilst elsewhere it was inconsiderable4 ,resistance also was unusually #8patchy1' some few ,m4,g4 posts holding out well1 whilst many others1 though well sited and camouflaged1 were found not to have fired a round4 ,a show of resistance was put up at ,landrecies bridge by some #cjj ,german infantry and machine-gunners1 but they gave in when outflanked by the crossing of the canal on rafts further to the south4 ,the enemy had lined some of the hedges with deep and very well camouflaged rifle-pits1 which here and there were held in strength4 ,the main body of the enemy1 however1 appears to have been withdrawn a kilometre or so in rear of his forward positions just prior to our attack4 ,french inhabitants of the most forward villages state that he started withdrawing at five o'clock this morning4 ,in a number of instances the enemy was found hiding1 unarmed1 awaiting an opportunity to surrender4 ,in one village over fifty ,germans emerged from the house cellars where they had been hiding together with the inhabitants4 ,other ,germans attempted to hide themselves in trees and were dealt with with case shot4 ,a number of anti-,tank rifles were found in rifle-pits1 etc41 but appear to have been made little or no use of4 ,there were instances of detached field guns being sited to enfilade hedges and cover crests1 but so far no reports have come in as to their effect--if any4 ,one ,brigade operating with ,tanks is reported to have had over #cej prisoners through its cage before #aa a4m41 including a ,regimental ,commander and part of his ,staff1 whilst one ,division reported over #ajjj prisoners by #ab4cj4 ,a ,german pigeon loft 7complete with birds7 was captured in ,landrecies4 ,air visibility was nil until after #i a4m41 and communication therefore difficult4 8,later4--,prisoners now reported #aj1jjj with #bjj guns40 ,it was at ,landrecies that three supply ,tanks managed1 despite their almost complete lack of arms or armour1 to take a most gallant and effective part in the battle4 ,these three ,tanks were working for the #beth ,division1 and were carrying up material to rebuild one of the numerous bridges that the ,germans had destroyed2 as they drew near their rendezvous they found that the enemy was still holding the place in some strength1 and had succeeded in stopping the advance of our infantry4 ,as the ,tanks approached they began to draw fire and their situation became precarious4 ,with great pluck and resource the ,tanks decided to go on1 and rely on their appearance 7which was similar to that of the fighting ,tanks7 to drive the enemy from his position4 ,one ,tank became a casualty1 but the other two went straight for the enemy4 ,even when the ,tanks got close up1 the ,germans were still under the impression that they were being faced by fighters1 and part of the garrison put up their hands1 whilst the remainder fled4 ,with the #eth ,corps1 the #ast ,company of the #ith ,battalion encountered stiff resistance1 but nevertheless they pushed forward far into the ,forest of ,mormal4 ,the ,tanks were particularly active in the attack on ,jolimetz1 just south of ,le ,quesnoy1 when they and the #cgth ,division took upwards of #ajjj prisoners1 and later in the afternoon and evening pushed on into the heart of the ,forest4 ,north of them the ,new ,zealanders had surrounded ,le ,quesnoy by #h a4m4 ,here also ,tanks were operating4 ,by the end of the day we had made a five-mile advance1 reaching the general line ,fesny-,landrecies--centre of ,mormal ,forest--and five miles beyond ,valenciennes4 #ajd8;,in these operations and their developments twenty ,british ,divisions utterly defeated thirty-two ,german ,divisions1 and captured #ai1jjj prisoners and more than #dej guns4 ,on our right the ,french #ast ,army1 which had continued the line of attack southwards to the neighbourhood of ,guise1 kept pace with our advance1 taking #ejjj prisoners and a number of guns4 8,by this great victory the enemy's resistance was definitely broken4 ,on the night of ,november #d-e his troops began to fall back on practically the whole battle front40 ,,ii ,but the ,tank ,corps was at last at an end of its resources both in machines and in men4 ,pending reinforcements from ,england1 they could at the moment muster but eight machines that could be sent after the flying enemy1 and therefore1 though the ,armoured ,cars went on1 it was on ,november #e that the last ,tank action of the ,war was fought1 when eight ,whippets of the #fth ,battalion took part in an attack of the #crd ,guards ,brigade1 on the northern outskirts of the ,forest of ,mormal4 ,the weather was atrocious and the country most difficult for a combined operation1 for it was intersected by numerous ditches and fences1 which rendered it ideal for the rearguard actions which the ,germans were now fighting all along their front4 #aje8;,at #aj a4m4 on the morning of ,november #e the #crd ,guards ,brigade1 having pushed through the #ast and #bnd ,brigades1 were ordered to continue the advance by bounds40 ,illustration3 ,,the ,,western ,,edge ,,of ,,mormal ,,forest ,illustration3 ,a 8,,wireless0 ,,tank ,no definite orders had reached the ,whippets' ,company ,commander as to what part--if any--his machines were to play4 ,he and the ,general commanding the #crd ,guards ,brigade1 however1 came to the conclusion that in view of the nature of the ground and the fact that the ,bultiaux ,river would have to be crossed in the first stage of the battle1 the ,whippets should lead the attack upon the second1 third and final objectives only4 ,two ,tanks proved unfit for action1 owing to mechanical trouble4 ,the three ,tanks which covered the advance of the ,grenadiers found themselves in a country of small orchards divided by extremely high hedges1 where it was most difficult to locate the enemy machine-guns whose fire was here considerable4 ,the ,whippets therefore worked up and down the hedges like ratting terriers1 being ordered to#ajf8;fire short bursts along them for moral effect even when no enemy were visible40 ,this they did1 and found a few fleeting targets before returning to get in touch with the infantry4 ,two ,whippets which were co-operating with the ,scots ,guards met with a good deal of opposition4 ,twice had they and the infantry attempted to capture and consolidate high ground beyond the village of ,buvignies4 ,the driver of the first ,tank was hit as he was endeavouring to put right a minor mechanical trouble1 and the second ,tank went on alone4 ,in attempting to run over an enemy rifle-pit1 it ran on to a jagged tree stump and was damaged1 finally breaking down in the enemy's lines beyond ,buvignies4 #ajg ,from accounts of civilians1 who were behind the enemy's lines1 it appears that the crew held out till midnight1 the ,tank being then blown up4 8,they also reported that after the ,tanks had been through ,buvignies the enemy hurriedly departed1 and also vacated the railway1 which had been holding up the ,grenadiers40 ,the #crd ,guards ,brigade pushed forward unopposed for a mile and a half during the night1 but when darkness came the four remaining ,whippets were ordered to rally4 8,it was decided not to use these four on the following day1 and work was concentrated on getting fit the six ,whippets which might be made available to trek or fight40 ,for1 though that through all this period we knew well enough that the end had come1 in these last few days of the ,war we acquired a new tradition4 ,it became the magnificent custom of the ,british ,army to act as though the ,war would go on for ever4 ,the spirit that says1 8,i've been lucky so far4 ,why tempt ,providence with the ,war won1 anyway80 must have reared its head in every man4 ,but it was rigorously kept down1 and never among the attacking troops in these last tense days was there found any inclination to spare themselves or to spoil our victory by undue chariness of life and limb4 ,not only in the racking circumstances of the battlefield1 but also behind the lines1 this new tradition was manifest1 and after the #eth the ,tank crews were everywhere feverishly engaged1 day and night1 in refitting and furbishing up their machines on the complete assumption that they would surely be called upon to fight again4 ,everywhere1 too1 the ,staffs were busy endeavouring to build up an organised fighting force from the scarred1 battle-weary remnants of the ,corps4 ,the ,tank ,corps' record since ,august #h was indeed a remarkable one4 ,there had been ninety-six days of almost continuous battle since that great ,tank attack1 and in these ninety-six days about two thousand ,tanks and ,armoured ,cars had been engaged4 ,nearly half this number of machines had been handed over to salvage4 ,of these1 #cac had been sufficiently badly damaged to be sent to ,central ,workshops1 who had repaired no less than #bjd of them and reissued them to battalions4 ,of the whole #hhg1 only fifteen machines had been struck off the strength as beyond repair4 ,the personnel1 too1 had been lamentably reduced4 ,however1 the total strength of the ,tank ,corps on ,august #g1 #aiah1 had been considerably under that of a single infantry division1 and in the old days of the artillery battles1 such as the ,first ,battle of the ,somme1 an infantry division often sustained #djjj casualties in twelve hours4 ,in comparison1 the ,tanks' losses of just #cjjj in three months1 out of a fighting strength of under #aj1jjj1 seem comparatively light4 ,they were heavy enough1 however1 effectually to cripple the ,corps for several weeks4 ,,iii ,meanwhile the last act of the great drama was being played out4 ,though there were for the moment no ,tanks to share in the culminating glories1 our forces were pushing forward along the whole front4 ,on ,november #f and #g the enemy's resistance had very much weakened4 ,early on the morning of the #gth the ,guards entered ,bavay2 next day ,avesnes fell4 ,six cars of the ,tank #agth ,armoured ,car ,battalion here did excellent service in conjunction with 8,bethell's ,force10 the cars1 8full out10 putting roadside machine-guns out of action and in many cases preventing the flying enemy from blowing up the crossroads behind his rearguards4 ,hautmont was captured1 and our troops reached the outskirts of ,maubeuge1 the goal upon which our eyes had for so long been fixed4 ,to the north of ,mons the enemy was now rapidly withdrawing4 ,all through the night of ,november #g-h we could see the glare of burning dumps behind the ,german lines1 and could hear the irregular clamour of their detonations4 ,at ,tournai the enemy abandoned his bridgehead without a fight4 ,on the #ith the enemy was in full retreat on the whole front2 the ,guards entered ,maubeuge at the moment when the ,canadians were approaching ,mons4 ,the whole of our #bnd ,army crossed the ,schelde1 and next day all five ,british ,armies advanced in line1 preceded by cavalry1 cyclists and ,armoured ,cars4 ,only round ,mons was any opposition met with1 and at dawn on ,november #aa the ,third ,canadian ,division captured the town1 killing or taking prisoner the whole of the ,german garrison4 ,it was the last of the tasks of slaughter to which our hands were to be forced4 ,for four days there had been a coming and going of envoys and of messages4 ,for four days men and women in ,england had listened and waited1 restless and sick with expectancy1 with a sudden realisation of their longing to emerge from the long nightmare4 ,on ,november #aa1 just after eleven in the morning1 the church bells were rung in every town and village at home2 and in ,france the expected message was quietly passed from mouth to mouth4 ,there is no need to describe a moment which no reader of this book will ever forget4 ,,epilogue ,i ,and what1 the reader will ask1 is the conclusion of the whole matter8 ,first1 how far did ,tanks really contribute to our overthrow of the ,germans8 ,secondly1 what would be the place of the ,tank if another war broke out within the next generation2 and1 thirdly1 what place are ,tanks going to be given in the reconstituted ,british ,army8 ,as far as they can be answered1 we will reply to these questions in order4 ,for upon the performances of the ,tanks in this war1 will be--or should be--based the answers to the other questions1 and on this point we propose to call the evidence of three or four expert witnesses4 ,for the rest1 the reader has had an opportunity of studying a large mass of evidence for himself4 ,he has seen how1 when the line from ,switzerland to the sea had been formed1 both armies sought some means of putting an end to the stalemate4 ,how to both the ,allies and the ,germans the solution by artillery was the first to occur4 ,how1 secondly1 we and the ,germans each according to our national habits of mind1 thought of another solution4 ,the ,germans--who were chemists--of gas1 used treacherously in despite of signed undertakings to the contrary2 we1 who were mechanics1 of a self-propelled shield1 from behind which we could direct an effective fire4 ,he knows how gas was countered1 after the first surprise1 by means of various air-filtering devices2 but how the ,tank gradually revolutionised warfare1 because there was no particular specific or antidote to the ,tank1 which depended not so much upon surprise as on the simple factors of its enormous fire power1 and its ability to surmount obstacles4 ,for whether the troops attacked had fought against ,tanks before or no1 the ,tank crushed down wire and smothered machine-gun fire just the same4 ,marshal ,foch is the first of our witnesses4 ,he sketches the evolution of the ,tank1 and describes the circumstances which called it into being1 in his foreword to the ,english translation of his republished ,principles of ,war4 ,he has dealt with the old slowness of 8digging in40 ,we translate his words literally3 8,the machine-gun and the barbed-wire entanglement have permitted defences to be organised with indisputable rapidity4 ,these have endowed the trench1 or natural obstacle1 with a strength which has permitted offensive fronts to be extended over areas quite impracticable until this time4444 ,the offensive for the time was powerless1 new weapons were sought for1 and1 after a formidable artillery had been produced ,tanks were invented--i4e4 machine-guns or guns protected by armour1 and rendered mobile by petrol1 capable1 over all types of ground1 to master the enemy's entanglements and his machine-guns4444 8,thus it is the industrial power of nations that has alone permitted armies to attack1 or the want of this power has reduced them to the defensive40 ,monsieur ,loucheur--in ,january #aiai ,french ,minister of ,munitions--was a strong advocate for ,tanks in the ,french ,army4 8,there are two kinds of infantry3 men who have gone into action with ,tanks1 and men who have not2 and the former never want to go into action without ,tanks again40 ,sir ,douglas ,haig's summing up in his ,despatch1 though necessarily conservative1 is not therefore the less significant3 8,since the opening of our offensive on ,august #h ,tanks have been employed in every battle1 and the importance of the part played by them in breaking the resistance of the ,german infantry can scarcely be exaggerated4 ,the whole scheme of the attack of ,august #h was dependent upon ,tanks1 and ever since that date on numberless occasions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted or confirmed by their timely arrival4 ,so great has been the effect produced upon the ,german infantry by the appearance of ,british ,tanks that in more than one instance1 when for various reasons real ,tanks were not available in sufficient numbers1 valuable results have been obtained by the use of dummy ,tanks painted on frames of wood and canvas4 8,it is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry or of the skill and devotion of our artillery1 to say that the achievements of those essential arms would have fallen short of the full measure of success achieved by our armies had it not been for the very gallant and devoted work of the ,tank ,corps1 under the command of ,major-,general ,h4 ,j4 ,elles40 ,lastly1 what is the opinion of the enemy8 ,herr ,maximilian ,harden in a speech upon the causes of the ,german defeat1 gave first place to the 8physical shock of the ,tank10 at which 8,ludendorff had laughed40 ,speaking for the ,minister of ,war in the ,reichstag1 ,general ,wrisberg said3 8,the attack on ,august #h between the ,avre and the ,ancre was not unexpected by our leaders4 ,when1 nevertheless1 the ,english succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought in the massed employment of ,tanks and surprise under the protection of fog4444 8,the ,american ,armies should not terrify us4444 ,more momentous for us is the question of ,tanks40 ,the ,g4,o4,c4 of the #east ,german ,corps1 in an ,order dated ,july #bc1 #aiah1 remarks3 8,as soon as the ,tanks are destroyed the whole attack fails40 ,on ,october #bc the ,german ,wireless published the following statement by ,general ,scheuch1 ,minister of ,war3 8,germany will never need to make peace owing to a shortage of war material4 8,the superiority of the enemy at present is principally due to their use of ,tanks4 8,we have been actively engaged for a long period in working at producing this weapon 7which is recognised as important71 in adequate numbers4 8,we shall thus have an additional means for the successful continuance of the war1 if we are compelled to continue it40 ,the following passage occurred in a ,german ,order issued on ,august #ab1 #aiah3 8,it has been found that the enemy's attacks have been successful solely because the ,tanks surprised our infantry1 broke through our ranks1 and the infantry thought itself outflanked40 ,the ,german ,press was also very generally inclined to attribute the ,german failure to the ,allied use of ,tanks1 and their attitude is well illustrated by the following paragraph which appeared early in ,october1 a time when ,german journalists seem to have been most carefully instructed from official quarters4 ,it was their task to prepare the ,german people for surrender4 8,the successes which the ,allies have gained since the ,first ,battle of ,cambrai do not rest on any superior strategy on the part of ,foch or on superiority in numbers1 although the latter has undoubtedly contributed to it4 ,the real reason has been the massed use of ,tanks4 ,whereas the artillery can only cut wire and blot out trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition1 the ,tank takes all these obstacles with the greatest of ease1 and will make broad paths in which the advancing infantry can follow4 ,they are the most dangerous foe to hostile machine-guns4 ,they can approach machine-gun nests and destroy them at close range4 ,the great danger of the ,tank is obvious when one considers that the defence of the front battle zone chiefly relies on the defensive value of the machine-guns1 and that the armour of the ,tank renders it invulnerable to rifle fire1 and that only seldom and in exceptional cases is machine-gun fire effective4 ,the infantry is therefore opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no harm40 ,,ii ,the question of the place of ,tanks in the next war has been answered with the greatest emphasis by some enthusiastic advocates of this arm4 ,the possession of a superior weapon1 they say1 ensures victory to the army which possesses it4 ,in war1 any army1 even if led by a mediocre ,general1 can safely meet an army of the previous century1 though the old force be led by the greatest military genius of his age4 #ajh8,napoleon was an infinitely greater general than ,lord ,raglan1 yet ,lord ,raglan would1 in #ahee1 have beaten any army ,napoleon could have brought against him1 because ,lord ,raglan's men were armed with the ,minie rifle4 8,eleven years after ,inkerman ,moltke would have beaten ,lord ,raglan's army hollow1 not because he was a greater soldier than ,lord ,raglan1 but because his men were armed with the needle gun4 8,had ,napoleon1 at ,waterloo1 possessed a company of ,vickers machine-guns1 he would have beaten ,wellington1 ,blcher1 and ,schwartzenburg combined1 as completely as ,lord ,kitchener beat the ,soudanese at ,omdurman4 ,it would have been another #8massacre of the innocents4'0 ,in every case1 they say1 the superior weapon would have defeated the great tactician before he had had time to show his mettle4 ,to repeat the words of the ,german journalist3 8,their infantry would be opposed to an enemy to whom it could do little or no harm40 ,we shall not discuss here the materialistic argument1 except to say that if it were entirely true1 savages and badly-equipped ,tribesmen would never have completely beaten well-armed civilised troops4 ,yet they have done so on frequent occasions4 ,witness the ,first ,afghan ,war1 the ,zulu ,wars1 the ,american-,indian ,wars1 and a host of minor actions4 ,material only wins hands down when the moral of the side possessing it is at least fairly comparable to that of its opponents4 ,otherwise ,byzantium with its 8,greek ,fire0 would have ruled the world4 ,according to this 8material0 school of thought1 we have in ,tanks our superior weapon4 ,they will be developed upon more than one line1 and we shall have cross-country equivalents for all arms and services except heavy artillery1 the ,navy and the ,air ,force4 ,mr4 ,hugh ,pollard1 writing in the ,english ,review of ,january #aiai states the case of the mechanical warfare and ,tank enthusiasts1 with great vigour and ingenuity4 8,even at present there is no effective answer to ,tanks but possibly other ,tanks1 and in the ,tank we have rediscovered a modern application of a very old principle4 ,the ,tank is the most economical method of using man-power in war1 and it also affords the highest possible percentage of invulnerability to the soldiers engaged4 8,the armament problems of the future will be limited to three fleets of armoured machines1 in which a very limited highly specialised number of men operate the largest possible number of weapons in the most effective way4 ,armoured fleets at sea1 armoured aeroplanes1 and armoured landships1 or ,tanks--these will be our forces for war40 ,tanks of various speeds and carrying various weapons1 will replace both infantry and cavalry1 for one full size modern heavy ,tank holding eight men has the aggressive power of a hundred infantry with rifles1 bayonets1 bombs and ,lewis guns4 ,the ,whippet has about the same speed and radius as cavalry1 and one ,whippet holding two men 8could withstand the onslaught of a cavalry regiment and kill it off to the last man and the last horse without being exposed to the least danger or inconvenience40 ,we shall soon regard the heroic tale of how men once exposed their defenceless bodies to machine-gun fire and shells1 and depended for the lan of their assault upon the weight of human limbs and the endurance of human muscles as almost legendary4 8,most people think of a ,tank as a rather ludicrous but effective engine of war4 ,they look upon it as a mechanical novelty1 and are content to assume that the ,tank of to-day is not much of an improvement upon the earliest ,tanks of the ,somme battle1 and that it is a war implement of indifferent importance4 ,the real facts are entirely different1 for the ,tank of to-day is simply an infant1 a lusty two-year-old1 and there is no mechanical limit to its future4 ,this may seem the remark of a fanatic1 but it is perfectly true4444 8,the ,tank of to-day is a little thing compared with the obvious developments which will result in the ,tank of the future1 but even as it stands to-day it is the most economical fighting machine yet devised4 ,a ,tank uses petrol instead of muscle1 and it extracts the highest possible fighting or killing value out of the men inside it2 they can give their blows without being exposed to injury in return1 and1 above all things1 they can fight while moving--a thing outside the powers of the infantry or guns of the land forces40 ,the arguments of those who maintain that the ,tank must always be dependent upon the older arms are nearly all based upon the assumption that the ,tank is already limited4 8,it is pointed out that they cannot cross rivers1 that they are not proof against shell-fire1 against mines1 against special forms of attack4 ,the answer is that the ,tank of to-day may be subject to casualties1 but all the skill and resources of the ,german nation have failed to produce an effective answer to ,tanks1 that river after river has been crossed1 that line after line of #8impregnable' defences have fallen1 that deeply cheloned artillery particularly arranged to fight ,tanks has failed before ,tank and aeroplane attack4 ,we come to a war of sea1 air1 and land fleets acting in co-operation4 ,anti-,tank artillery is vulnerable to armoured planes4 ,the big commercial freight-carrying planes of the future might even fly light ,tanks into the heart of hostile territory4 ,the unprotected men and arms of the present day must disappear40 ,and here another question is suggested--a question upon which the civilian ought to satisfy himself4 ,let us for the moment assume that it is superiority in weapons1 not better generalship1 not a more stubborn 8will to win10 that decides the fate of war4 ,what reason have we to suppose that it will be superiority in ,tanks and not in some other weapon1 in aeroplanes for example1 that will decide the next conflict8 ,at present1 when we try to imagine war upon a foreign army waged on one side by air alone1 we encounter a dozen mechanical difficulties even in our attempted picture of the first stages3 the enormous paraphernalia of bases1 the ground-staff1 fuel1 weather conditions1 difficulties of landing1 and finally1 what is perhaps the fundamental difficulty4 ,the aeroplane alone1 like the big gun1 is not an engine by whose means it is possible to come into decisive contact with an enemy who chooses to remain on the ground4 ,the rabbits can always go to earth when they see the gliding shadow of the hawk4 ,till both sides are equipped solely for air combat1 ,tanks or infantry will still be needed to play the part of ferret4 ,but these difficulties will almost certainly some day be overcome4 ,when they have been solved1 then the day of the comparatively cumbersome ,tank1 with its dependence upon shipping and rail transport will be over4 ,but that will not be in our time we are assured4 ,to us1 therefore1 8,war in the ,air0 remains of a somewhat academic interest4 ,we have got to see to it that we survive the present4 ,for can the most optimistic of us truthfully declare1 as he casts his eye over the world1 as he looks from ,middle ,europe to the ,far ,east1 from ,russia to ,mexico1 from the ,balkans to ,egypt1 or from ,asia ,minor to the confines of ,india1 that we need not even consider the possibility of a war within his own generation8 ,alas1 no6 ,now having for the moment dismissed the purely air war from our calculations1 we can be pretty certain that a war between civilised countries fought within that period would not differ utterly from the war which is just over1 and that a war between a civilised and an uncivilised country would differ from it only along well-known lines4 ,we have heard a good deal of evidence which makes it appear certain that1 every other factor having cancelled out1 the fact that the ,french and ,british possessed ,tanks and the ,germans did not1 was just enough to win the last war for the ,allies4 ,let us then sedulously cultivate the grub of the present that we may survive to see the more glorious butterfly of the future--perhaps the aerial ,tank4 ,shall we neglect the ,tank because it seems likely that in this 7as please ,heaven in most other affairs7 our sons will go one better8 ,the ,british and ,french led1 and in #aiai still lead1 absolutely with ,tanks4 ,if we like to carry on1 we have such a start both in design and manufacturing experience1 that we could easily make it impossible for any other nation to draw abreast of us during the period after which we are assuming the 8,tank ,age0 in military evolution may conceivably be over4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to be too discreet as to the new machines which have already been made and tested1 or as to the new projects which exist4 ,perhaps the position can be best indicated by saying that progress has been so rapid of late that those who know1 would probably be delighted to sell any number of ,mark ,v4 ,tanks to a prospective enemy4 ,,iii ,the present writers are ignorant whether we have determined to keep our lead or no4 ,shall we have the foresight1 when it comes to the remodelling of the ,army1 to give to ,tanks the place they ought to hold in it8 ,shall we be willing to spend money on experiments1 money which we must spend if we want to keep that lead8 ,will the ,tanks be given the facilities for both mechanical and tactical training that they ought to have8 ,we may so easily slide back into our old groove4 ,it is always hard to turn to new ways1 and to give a preponderating place in the 8,new ,model0 to ,tanks1 would certainly be to effect a very radical change4 ,there does seem to be a certain fear that the ,army and the public may feel that the ,tanks are all right for ,war1 but hardly the thing for soldiering4 ,and yet how well the requirements of a strong force of ,tanks would in reality fit the kind of framework which the wisest minds seem agreed should be our ,army of the future4 ,we ought to have1 they say1 a small and highly specialised ,standing ,army1 and behind that a vast ,citizen ,army on the basis of the ,territorial system4 ,what weapon could be more suitably added to the gun and the aeroplane than the ,tank in the ,regular ,army8 ,our ,standing ,army would thus consist of a nucleus of mechanical experts4 ,nor need the question of finance ever rise spectre-like between us and the idea of a strong force of ,tanks1 for the ,tank is an absurdly cheap weapon compared with its co-efficient of infantry4 ,but there is another direction in which1 if it claim any considerable place in our ,standing ,army1 the ,tank must make good4 ,that army may at any moment be called upon to undertake police work in any part of the world4 ,the ,tank1 even the old ,mark ,i41 is1 as we saw at ,gaza1 suitable for desert warfare4 ,the ,mark ,v4 and ,whippets with ,general ,denikin's force in ,russia have been prodigiously successful1 and there are probably few species of campaign against a semi-civilised enemy in which the newer 8,medium0 ,tanks would not do admirably4 ,another point is that 8minor wars0 are fought by us with as much avoidance of bloodshed as is compatible with the bringing of our opponents to reason4 ,a weapon which admittedly affected the moral even of admirably disciplined troops like the ,germans to a phenomenal degree1 is particularly well adapted to this purpose4 ,it is infinitely more humane to appal a rioter or a savage by showing him a ,tank than to shoot him down with an inoffensive looking machine-gun4#aji ,there is yet one final consideration4 ,the reader may still very properly object3 8,though the ,tank may1 as it rather begins to appear1 have been the decisive factor in the last ,war1 and though it might be very convenient to use it again1 before we put our money on it1 literally and metaphorically1 for the future1 are we sure that it is a weapon which suits the ,british soldier8 ,time was when at the direction of ,military ,experts we spent a great deal of money upon the building of forts at home and abroad which were never of the slightest use to any one1 because they did not suit our style of fighting4 ,what reason have we to suppose that we shall like the ,tank as a permanent addition on a large scale to the equipment of our ,army80 ,the present authors consider this line of criticism a very proper one4 ,they differ from the 8hardshell0 advocates of the superior weapon in considering it of the greatest importance that the balance and poise of the broadsword should suit the hand that is to wield it4 ,but they believe that the ,tank1 like the ship and the aeroplane1 is a weapon peculiarly suited to the ,british temperament1 and that fundamentally it was for that reason that we1 and not some other nation1 first evolved it4 ,for good or ill1 our ,commanders both on land and sea have certain peculiarities4 ,our men dislike standing on the defensive4 ,they hate digging1 and in the present ,war were beaten by the ,germans every time at this particularly unpopular form of activity4 ,also1 almost worse than digging1 do they hate carrying things on their backs1 and we are noted among all nations as the least tolerant of burdens4 ,all these peculiarities have filled the ranks of the ,navy and of the ,cavalry1 and all these peculiarities are suited by the aeroplanes and the ,land ,ships4 ,our ,commanders1 like their men1 prefer to be the attackers1 and like a war of movement4 ,almost the whole creed of ,nelson1 our most popular fighting-hero1 was expressed in his assertion that the first and last duty of an ,admiral was to find out the enemy's fleet and to attack it1 and in his famous signal1 8,engage the enemy more closely40 ,further1 our leaders particularly and temperamentally dislike a large butcher's bill4 ,it was1 indeed1 their extreme reluctance to send unprotected men to meet the hail of bullets from ,german machine-guns1 that lay behind most of the ostensible reasons for which the ,tanks were first given a trial4 ,it was a deciding factor4 ,we may even perhaps say without seeming fantastic that it was their inhumanity which cost the ,germans the ,war4 ,they had no bowels of compassion1 and were just as ready to send the 8infantry equivalent0 7say seventy unprotected men7 over the top as they were to put in seven men enclosed in armour4 ,to them it was the coldest question of military expediency4 ,purely upon military considerations they decided against the seven clad in armour4 ,our ,commanders1 though in theory they were inclined to agree with the ,german ,higher ,command1 though they recognised the ultimate cruelty of the policy of 8cheap war10 and knew1 with ,nelson1 that they had not come to the ,western ,front to preserve their lives1 were yet tempted by the idea of using steel and petrol in place of flesh and blood4 ,more than once in the course of the chequered career of the ,tanks it was this consideration which saved the ,corps from extinction4 ,but it is not1 of course1 enough that the ,tank offers protection to those who fight in it4 ,a trench or a hole in the ground will do the same4 ,but the ,tank is essentially a mobile weapon of offence4 ,it is the weapon for the nation which does not fight willingly1 but when it fights1 fights to win1 and to win quickly with as little bloodshed as possible4 ,it is the weapon for men who1 if they must fight1 like to fight like intelligent beings still subjecting the material world to their will1 and who are most unwillingly reduced to the rles of mere marching automata1 bearers of burdens and diggers of the soil1 rles from which the patient ,german did not seem averse4 ,,iv ,the creed of the present writers can be very briefly summarised4 ,a considerable amount of evidence points to the conclusion that in the phase at which military science has arrived1 and at which it will probably remain for at least a generation1 a superior force of ,tanks can always tip the scales of the military balance of power4 ,within the period of a generation1 a time may again come when we shall have to defend our lives and our liberties4 ,we lead the world in the design and manufacture of ,tanks4 ,let us not abandon that lead in the production and use of a vital weapon4 ,we know too well the tragic cost of one day of war1 and it has been said that had we been visibly prepared the ,germans would not have attacked4 ,obviously we cannot be going to fall again so quickly into an old error4 ,we certainly intend to be armed1 but who can say that through sheer absence of mind it will not be with arquebuses8 ,surely not for the sake of ,army precedent1 for the sake of emphasising our pacific intentions1 for the sake of saving a little money1 or even--dearest of all--for the luxury of 8not bothering0 about our ,army1 must we lose our present unparalleled position of advantage4 ,this advantage is not only a material one4 ,the ,tanks are accustomed to win4 ,do not let us throw away a fine tradition of victory4 ,of all that1 in our agony of striving we gained by the way1 let us lose nothing4 ,illustration3 ,,tank ,,operations4 ,,august1 ,,september1 ,,october ,,november1 #aiah4 ,,note4 ,thick black lines indicate position of ,british line on dates noted4 ,red wash indicates areas in which ,tanks operated1 with numbers of ,tanks operating and date4 ,red lines indicate the ground gained on day of ,tank operations4 ,thick black dotted lines indicate army boundaries4 ,headquarters ,tank ,corps ,,index ,acheux1 #gb ,achicourt1 #id ,achiet-le-,grand1 #cdd ,achiet-le-,petit1 #ccg1 #cdj ,adelpare ,farm1 #bhb1 #bhd ,albert1 #bee1 #bhh1 #cda ,allenby1 ,general1 #bcj ,american ,tanks1 #aia1 #bah-bbc in ,second ,battle of ,cambrai1 #cga-cgd in ,battle of the ,selle1 #chf-cij ,amiens1 ,battle of1 #bhh-cbb the town1 #bfa1 #bfe1 #bfh ,anneux1 #cfg ,archbald1 ,corporal1 ,s41 ,d4,c4,m41 #beb ,arival ,wood1 #cff ,armin1 ,general von1 #abf ,arnold1 ,lieutenant ,c4 ,b41 #cjc-cji ,arrachis ,wood1 #bhd ,arras1 ,battle of1 #hi-aji ,auchonvillers1 #gb1 #bei ,auchy1 #beb ,australians1 and the ,tanks1 #ajf1 #bgb-bhi1 #big-cjj1 #caj-cad ,australian co-operation with the ,french1 #bhj ,aveluy ,driving ,school1 #bef ,avesnes1 #djj ,bacon1 ,admiral1 #ce1 #abj ,bailleul1 #beb ,baker-,carr1 ,colonel1 #ajh1 #adi1 #agh ,ballon d',essai1 #bgb ,bapaume1 ,battle of1 #ccd-cdj the town1 #bed1 #cdh ,battalion ,histories1 quotations from3 8,b0 #crd ,battalion1 #aad2 #crd ,battalion1 #aci1 #beh1 #cjb1 #cci2 #gth ,battalion1 #adh2 8,f0 #fth ,battalion1 #agf2 #acth ,battalion1 #aid2 #eth ,battalion1 #bea2 #bnd ,battalion1 #bed2 #ast ,battalion1 #bfj1 #bff2 #hth ,battalion1 #bgd2 #acth ,battalion1 #big2 #adth and #ast ,battalions1 #cja1 ,a ,battalion ,history1 #caa2 #acth ,battalion1 #cdb2 #aeth ,battalion1 #cej2 #fth ,battalion1 #cec1 #cif-cig2 #aath ,battalion1 #cff2 #aeth ,battalion1 #cfg4 7,see also ,brigade and ,unit ,histories47 ,bavay1 #djj ,bayliss1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #bec ,bayonvillers1 #bii ,beaucamp ,ridge1 #cfe ,beaucourt1 #gc1 #cja ,beaufort1 #cjc1 #cac ,beaumont-,hamel1 #ee1 #fh1 #ga1 #gd1 #beh ,beaurevoir1 #cgi ,bellenglise1 #cgj1 #cgg ,bellicourt1 #cfb1 #cgj1 #cga1 #cge ,belloy1 #bga ,bermicourt1 #gg1 #ajh1 #aaj1 #aif1 #bjj1 #bfi ,bthune1 #bfh ,beugntre1 #cdh ,bihucourt1 #cdd ,bingham1 ,captain1 ,m4,c41 #bea ,birly1 ,captain1 ,oswald1 #cfc ,blangy1 #bed ,bohain1 #che ,bois d',abb1 #bff ,bois d',aquenne1 #bfe ,bois de ,harpon1 #bhb ,bony1 #cgh ,bourgon1 ,general1 #bhf ,bourlon1 ,wood and ,village1 #afb1 #agg1 #ahc-ahe1 #ahg1 #cfb1 #cfh ,bouzencourt1 #bei ,bradley1 ,colonel1 #df-ei ,brancourt1 #chb ,bray1 #bee1 #cda1 #cdg 8,bridge of ,tanks10 #cfd ,brie1 #bdi ,brigade ,histories1 quotations from3 #eth ,brigade1 #bgc1 #bih2 ,a ,brigade1 #cef1 #ceg-cfj4 7,see also ,battalion and ,unit ,histories47 ,broome1 ,general1 #adi ,brough1 ,colonel1 #eh ,brown1 ,captain ,f4 ,c41 ,m4,c41 #bfb ,bryce1 ,lieut4-,colonel1 #bii ,buchan1 ,colonel3 ,history of the ,war1 quotations from1 #fh1 #abe-abg1 #bbe1 #bdf4 ,bucquoy1 #bga1 #cce ,bullecourt1 #aje-ajh1 #bdd ,bultiaux ,river1 #cig ,buvignies1 #cih ,bung1 ,general ,sir ,julian1 #afj1 #aha ,cachy1 #bfb ,caix1 #bej ,cambrai1 ,first ,battle of1 #afj-ahd ,german ,counter-attack at1 #ahe-ahi ,second ,battle of1 #cfa-cgi ,canal du ,nord1 #afb1 #cfc-cfh ,cantaing1 #aha ,capper1 ,general1 #hf ,carney1 driver1 #cjc-cjh ,carter1 ,colonel1 #bgj1 #bij ,carter1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #bec ,cartigny1 #bdh ,cassell1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #cjb ,crisy ,valley1 #bib1 #bih ,ching1 ,second ,lieut4 ,s4 ,s41 #ajc ,chipilly1 #cab ,chuignies1 #cdc ,chuignolles1 #cji1 #cdb1 #cdc ,churchill1 ,mr41 #cd-cf1 #ch ,cockcroft1 #adi ,colincamps1 #beh ,contay1 #bgj1 #bhc ,courage1 ,brigadier-,general1 #ahf1 #bhj-bhc ,courcelles1 #ccg1 #cdd ,croisilles1 #ajg1 #cdf ,dalton1 ,captain1 #bhe ,dawson1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #bec ,debeney1 ,general1 #bha1 #bhg ,demilieue1 #chh ,deniken1 ,general1 #dac ,denny1 ,colonel1 ,m4 ,c41 ,m4 ,p41 #cad1 #cga ,desert ,wood1 #afh ,diplock1 ,mr41 #ca-cd ,domeny1 #cae ,drocourt-,quant ,line1 breaking1 #cda-cee ,duel between ,tanks1 ,first1 #bfc ,dummy ,tanks1 #aaj ,dury ,ridge1 #ced ,eade1 ,lieutenant ,percy1 #bii ,ecoust1 #cej ,edwards1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #bgg ,elles1 ,general1 #hj1 #he1 #acg1 #afj1 #aga-age1 #agh1 #ahd1 #bbc1 #bcg #beg1 #bfd1 #bha1 #djd ,epehy1 ,battle of1 #cef-cfj the ,town1 #bdh1 #cef ,epinoy1 #cfi ,erin1 #aai1 #aif ,estienne1 ,general1 #baj-bah ,etinehem1 #cad ,exploits of ,individual ,tanks1 #fc1 #ii1 #ajc1 #aci-adb1 #bdh1 #bhe1 #bii1 #cja-cjh1 #cdh1 #cfg ,fampoux1 #cdg ,fanny's ,farm1 #aad ,faucourt1 #cji ,favreuil1 #cdh ,fesny1 #cie ,fifth ,army ,headquarters1 adverse report of1 #ade-adf ,fighting ,side1 #df1 #aij ,flers1 #fc ,flesquires1 #agc1 #agg1 #ahh1 #cfc1 #cfe ,fleury ,redobut1 #ii ,foch1 ,marshal1 on the ,tanks1 #djc ,fontaine-,notre-,dame1 #ahb1 #ahg1 #cfg ,forsyth-,major1 ,major1 #bbe ,framerville1 #caa ,frmicourt1 #cdh ,french ,tanks ,corps1 #bji-bah ,fresnoy1 #ceg1 #cei ,frezenberg1 #adb1 #ade1 #aeb ,fuller1 ,lieut4-,colonel1 #afe ,gauche ,wood1 #ahg ,gaza1 ,second and ,third ,battles of1 #bbd-bcd ,german ,press1 and the ,tanks1 #dje ,german ,tanks1 fights with1 #bfa1 #chc ,germans and the ,tanks1 #ee1 #fd1 #ajf1 #aag1 #cbc-ccc ,ginchy1 #fa ,glencorse ,wood1 #adb1 #aeb ,gomicourt1 #cdd ,gonnelieu1 #cfi ,gould1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #cja ,gouzeaucourt1 #ahe1 #cfb ,graincourt1 #agg1 #agi1 #cfc ,groves1 ,captain1 #bff 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#hg ,thetford1 #dh ,thiepval1 #fh ,tournai1 #djj ,triangle ,farm1 #adi1 #aec ,tritton1 ,mr41 #cf ,tulloch1 ,major1 #ca-ce ,tunnelling ,company 7#ahdth71 work of1 #aca 8,unditching ,beam10 #aca ,unit ,histories1 quotations from1 #ceg-cfj 7,see also ,battalion and ,brigade ,histories47 ,uzielli1 ,lieutenant1 ,c4 ,f41 #cej ,vaire ,wood1 #bgd1 #bgh ,valenciennes1 #chi1 #cib1 #cie ,van ,zeller1 ,second ,lieutenant1 ,t4 ,e41 ,m4,c41 #bdi ,vaulx-,vraucourt1 #cej ,vauvillers1 #caa ,vaux1 #bhj ,vendhuille1 #cgj ,villeret1 #cef ,villers ,bretonneux1 #bea1 #bfa-bfe1 #bgb1 #bie ,villers ,guislain1 #ahg1 #cfi ,vimy1 the village1 #ih ,canadians at1 #ih ,wailly1 the town1 #ajh1 #bjb training ground at1 #ajh ,wanbeke1 #aaf ,warfuse1 #bea1 #bii ,warvillers1 #cjc1 #cac ,watson1 ,major1 on ,battle of ,bullecourt1 #ajf ,weber1 ,second lieutenant1 #ii ,weekly ,tank ,notes1 quotations from1 #ed1 #abe1 #abf1 #ace1 #adi1 #ahd1 #bfj1 #bge1 #bgh1 #bic1 #cjc-cji1 #ccj1 #chf1 #djf ,west1 ,captain ,richard ,annesley1 ,d4,s4,o4 #ccg ,west1 ,lieut4-,colonel ,r4 ,a41 ,d4,s4,o41 ,m4,c41 #ceb ,westhoek1 #adc ,whatley1 ,sergeant1 #cfg ,whyte1 ,second ,lieutenant1 ,m4,c41 #bea ,wig1 ,comedy of a1 #agf ,wilkes1 ,major ,g4 ,l41 ,d4,s4,o41 #aeh ,williams1 ,major-,general1 #ajh ,wilson1 ,lieutenant1 #bff ,wilson1 ,major1 #cf ,wool1 #aii1 #bjg1 #bch ,worsap1 ,second ,lieutenant1 #chc ,wrisberg1 ,general1 on the ,tanks1 #djd-dje ,wurst ,farm1 #aed ,wytschaete1 #aad1 #abh ,ypres ,salient1 sand model of1 #acd ,ypres1 ,third ,battle of1 #abd-aei ,yvrench1 training center at1 #eg ,zonnebeke1 #aeb ,,footnotes #a 8,i am building secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable1 and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even the largest enemy masses must retreat1 and behind them the infantry can follow in safety and without opposition40 #b ,it differed from an ordinary chariot in that the two little fat hollow-backed horses1 which are depicted as providing the motive power1 were like the crew1 enclosed within the wooden armour4 #c ,it appears to have been the ,committee which investigated ,mr4 ,diplock's machine1 with some additional members4 #d ,although the appeal was necessarily tentative and unofficial1 and no details of the nature of the work could be given1 sixty women immediately volunteered4 #e ,major ,renouf4 #f ,major ,renouf4 #g ,most of these ,tanks were training machines1 in the sense that their 8armour0 was boiler-plate instead of hardened steel4 #h ,colonel ,swinton4 #i ,captain ,henriques4 #aj ,from ,weekly ,tank ,notes1 a confidential official periodical for private circulation4 #aa ,w4,t4,n4 #ab ,see ,plate1 ,chapter ,,viii4 7,an unannotated air photograph of badly crumped ground47 #ac ,among other ,army ,commanders was ,general ,sir ,h4 ,s4 ,rawlinson1 who was later to be so good a friend to the ,tanks4 ,on this occasion1 however1 it is said that their performances left him completely cold and unconvinced4 #ad ,captain ,henriques4 #ae ,sergeant ,littledale of the ,tank ,corps writing in the ,atlantic ,monthly4 #af ,sergeant ,littledale of the ,tank ,corps writing in the ,atlantic ,monthly4 #ag ,the progress of this decision has been slightly telescoped1 the 8operative0 resolutions only being recorded1 and the story of a good deal of proposal and counter-proposal omitted4 #ah ,the list was as follows3 ,chairman4--,major-,general ,sir ,j4 ,capper4 ,war ,office4--,lieut4-,colonel ,sir ,j4 ,keane4 ,lieut4-,colonel ,mathew-,lannaw4 ,ministry of ,munitions4--,lieut4-,colonel ,stern4 ,sir ,eustace ,tennyson d',eyncourt4 #ai ,achicourt4 #bj ,letter from a ,tank officer dated 8,april #i1 evening40 #ba ,letter from an eye-witness written on the evening of ,april #i4 #bb ,the ,harp4 #bc ,major ,watson1 the ,tank ,company ,commander1 writing in ,blackwood's ,magazine4 #bd 8,b0 7#b7 ,battalion ,history4 #be ,w4,t4,n4 #bf ,official paper4 #bg ,indirect fire may be defined as fire directed towards the spot where you believe the enemy to be4 ,fire is called 8direct0 when the target can be seen4 #bh ,mr4 ,buchan's ,history of the ,war4 #bi ,w4,t4,n4 #cj ,mr4 ,buchan's ,history of the ,war4 #ca ,w4,t4,n4 #cb ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #cc ,the size of these dumps was now always computed in 8,tank ,fills40 #a fill consisting of3 #fj galls4 of ,petrol4 #aj galls4 of ,oil4 #bj galls4 of ,water4 #aj lb4 of ,grease4 #aj1jjj rounds of ,s4,a4 ,ammunition for a ,female ,tank1 or #bjj rounds of #f-pdr4 ,ammunition and #fjjj rounds of ,s4,a4 ,ammunition for a ,male4 #cd ,w4,t4,n4 #ce #crd ,battalion ,history4 #cf ,from ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #cg ,from the ,history of #gth ,battalion4 #ch ,w4,t4,n4 #ci ,w4,t4,n4 #dj ,the second ,tank detailed for this strong point had--in common with the two reserve ,tanks--bellied or become ditched on the way up4 #da ,official ,summary4 #db ,major ,wilkes was awarded the ,d4,s4,o4 for this piece of work4 #dc ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #dd 8,a0 ,battalion was borrowed from #bnd ,brigade4 #de ,from 8,f0 7#fth7 ,battalion ,history4 #df ,w4,t4,n4 #dg ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #dh ,w4,t4,n4 #di ,artillery of ,assault1 i4e41 ,tanks4 #ej ,an aiming instrument4 #ea ,w4,t4,n4 #eb ,mr4 ,buchanan's ,history of the ,war4 #ec ,major ,forsyth-,major 7the ,second in ,command of the ,e4,t4,d471 on whose report through ,colonel ,fuller this summary is largely based1 was torpedoed on his return to ,england in #aiah and all his maps and documents were lost4 #ed ,general ,murray's ,despatch4 #ee #eth ,battalion ,history4 #ef #bnd ,battalion ,history4 #eg ,major ,norton1 commanding the ,lewis gun detachment4 #eh #crd ,battalion ,history4 #ei #ast ,battalion ,history4 #fj ,w4,t4,n4 #fa ,case shot3 bullets not enclosed in a shell1 but fired direct from a #f-pounder and scattering like the charge of a shot gun4 #fb ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #fc #eth ,brigade ,history4 #fd #hth ,battalion ,history4 #fe ,w4,t4,n4 #ff ,w4,t4,n4 #fg ,the #ast1 #dth1 #eth1 and #adth ,battalions4 #fh ,the #hth1 #acth1 #bnd1 and #aeth ,battalions4 #fi ,from ,w4,t4,n4 #gj #acth ,battalion ,history4 #ga ,from the #eth ,brigade ,history4 #gb ,honours and ,awards4 #gc ,from #adth ,battalion ,history4 #gd ,from #ast ,battalion ,history4 #ge ,from #crd ,battalion ,history4 #gf ,from #hth ,battalion ,history #gg ,from a ,battalion ,history4 #gh ,from a ,battalion ,history4 #gi ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #hj ,summer1 #aiai4 #ha i4e41 ,in the ,battle of ,amiens1 #h4h4ah4 #hb ,w4,t4,n4 #hc #crd ,battalion ,history4 #hd #aeth ,battalion ,history4 #he #fth ,battalion ,history and 8,honours and ,awards40 #hf ,despatch4 #hg ,a ,brigade ,history4 #hh ,unit ,history4 #hi ,ibid4 #ij ,unit ,history4 #ia ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #ib #aeth ,battalion ,tank ,history4 #ic ,captain ,denny1 ,daily ,telegraph1 ,april #a1 #aiai4 #id ,captain ,denny1 ,daily ,telegraph1 ,april #a1 #aiai4 #ie ,the #cjast was attached to the #bgth ,american ,division4 #if ,from information specially given to the author by ,captain ,hatton-,hall1 ,reconnaissance ,officer of the ,brigade4 #ig #afth ,battalion4 #ih ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #ii ,captain ,hatton-,hall4 #ajj ,w4,t4,n4 #aja ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #ajb ,captain ,hatton-,hall4 #ajc ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #ajd ,sir ,douglas ,haig's ,despatch4 #aje #fth ,battalion ,history4 #ajf #fth ,battalion ,history4 #ajg ,ibid4 #ajh ,w4,t4,n4 #aji ,tradition relates that had ,general ,swinton had his way1 the ,tanks for ,palestine would have had hideous faces and minatory texts from the ,koran painted upon them4 ,transcriber's ,notes ,punctuation1 hyphenation1 and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in the original book2 otherwise they were not changed4 ,simple typographical errors were corrected2 unbalanced quotation marks were remedied when the change was obvious1 and otherwise left unbalanced4 ,illustrations in this e,book have been positioned between paragraphs and outside quotations4 ,in versions of this e,book that support hyperlinks1 the page references in the ,list of ,illustrations lead to the corresponding illustrations4 ,the text always uses 8moral01 not 8morale04 ,the index was not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references4 ,chapter ,,xv does not have a ,section 8,v02 the section after 8,,iv0 is 8,,vi02 no pages or text are missing4