,introductions to ,books ,i and ,,ii of ,david ,hume's ,treatise of ,human ,nature ,thomas ,hill ,green ,a ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 being an attempt to introduce the ,experimental ,method of ,reasoning into ,moral ,subjects and ,dialogues ,concerning ,natural ,religion by ,david ,hume1 ,edited1 with preliminary dissertation and ,notes1 by ,t4,h4 ,green and ,t4,h4 ,grose ,london1 ,longmans ,green ,co1 #ahgd ,transcriber's ,note3 ,the ,introduction to ,book ,i is taken from an #ahih reprint2 that to ,book ,,ii from an #ahhb reprint1 both by ,longmans4 ,the tables of contents have been changed to refer to paragraphs instead of pages1 as was done by ,r4,l4 ,nettleship in his edition of ,green's ,philosophical ,works4 ,the paragraph numbers are the same as in the originals1 and as in ,nettleship's edition4 ,the ,notes which were printed in the margins of the originals have been placed as captions above the relevant paragraphs4 ,green's footnotes have been placed below the paragraphs to which they relate4 ,because this book does not contain ,hume's text1 where ,green cites ,hume by page number1 a reference to the relevant section has been added in square brackets4 ,greek phrases are translated in footnotes marked ,tr4 ,,preface4 ,in this edition we have sought to avoid the inconveniences which are apt to attend commentaries on philosophical writers1 by the plan of putting together1 in the form of continuous introductions1 such explanation and criticism as we had to offer1 and confining the footnotes almost entirely to references1 which have been carefully distinguished from ,hume's own notes4 ,for the introductions to the first and second volumes ,mr4 ,green alone is responsible4 ,the introduction to the third is the work of ,mr4 ,grose1 who also has undertaken the revision of ,hume's text4 ,throughout the introductions to ,volumes ,i4 and ,,ii41 except where the contrary is stated1 #8,hume' must be understood to mean ,hume as represented by the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature4' ,in taking this as intrinsically the best representation of his philosophy1 we may be thought to have overlooked the well-known advertisement which 7in an edition posthumously published7 he prefixed to the volume containing his #8,inquiries concerning the ,human ,understanding and the ,principles of ,morals4' ,in it1 after stating that the volume1 is mainly a reproduction of what he had previously published in the #8,treatise1' he expresses a hope that #8some negligences in his former reasoning1 and more in the expression1' have been corrected1 and desires #8that the following ,pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles4' ,was not ,hume himself then1 it may be asked1 the best judge of what was an adequate expression of his thoughts1 and is there not an unbecoming assurance in disregarding such a voice from his tomb8 ,our answer is that if we had been treating of ,hume as a great literary character1 or exhibiting the history of his individual mind1 due account must have been taken of it4 ,such1 however1 has not been the object which1 in the ,introductions to ,volumes ,i4 and ,,ii41 we have presented to ourselves1 7,see ,introd4 to ,vol4 ,i4 #d47 ,our concern has been with him as the exponent of a philosophical system1 and therefore specially with that statement of his system which alone purports to be complete1 and which was written when philosophy was still his chief interest1 without alloy from the disappointment of literary ambition4 ,anyone who will be at the pains to read the #8,inquiries' alongside of the original #8,treatise' will find that their only essential difference from it is in the way of omission4 ,they consist in the main of excerpts from the #8,treatise1' re-written in a lighter style1 and with the more difficult parts of it left out4 ,it is not that the difficulties which logically arise out of ,hume's system are met1 but that the passages which most obviously suggest them have disappeared without anything to take their place4 ,thus in the #8,inquiry concerning the ,human ,understanding' there is nothing whatever corresponding to ,parts ,,ii4 and ,,iv4 of the first ,book of the #8,treatise4' ,the effect of this omission on a hasty reader is1 no doubt1 a feeling of great relief4 ,common-sense is no longer actively repelled by a doctrine which seems to undermine the real world1 and can more easily put a construction on the account of the law of causation1 which remains1 compatible with the #8objective validity' of the law--such a construction as in fact forms the basis of ,mr4 ,mill's ,logic4 ,how inconsistent this construction is with the principles from which ,hume started1 and which he never gave up2 how impossible it would be to anyone who had assimilated his system as a whole2 how close is the organic connection between all the parts of this as he originally conceived it--we must trust to the following introductions to show4 7,see1 in particular1 ,introd4 to ,vol4 ,i4 #cja and #cba47 ,the only discussion in the #8,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1' to which nothing in his earlier publication corresponds1 is that on ,miracles4 ,on the relation in which this stands to his general theory some remarks will be found in the ,introduction to ,vol4 ,i4 7 #cbd1 note74 ,the chief variations1 other than in the way of omission1 between the later redaction of his ethical doctrine and the earlier1 are noticed in the ,introduction to ,vol4 ,,ii4 7 #ca1 #dc1 and #df1 and notes74 ,,summary ,,of ,,the ,,contents of the ,,general ,,introduction ,,to ,,vol4 ,i #a4 ,how the history of philosophy should be studied4 #b4 ,hume the last great ,english philosopher4 #c4 ,kant his true successor4 #d4 ,distinction between literary history and the history of philosophical systems4 #e4 ,object of the present enquiry4 #f4 ,locke's problem and method4 #g4 ,his notion of the #8thinking thing'4 #h4 ,this he will passively observe4 #i4 ,is such observation possible8 #aj4 ,why it seems so4 #aa4 ,locke's account of origin of ideas4 #ab4 ,its ambiguities 7a7 ,in regard to sensation4 #ac4 7b7 ,in regard to ideas of reflection4 #ad4 ,what is the #8tablet' impressed8 #ae4 ,does the mind make impressions on itself8 #af4 ,source of these difficulties4 ,the #8simple' idea1 as ,locke describes it1 is a complex idea of substance and relation4 #ag4 ,how this contradiction is disguised4 #ah4 ,locke's way of interchanging #8idea' and #8quality' and its effects4 #ai4 ,primary and secondary qualities of bodies4 #bj4 #8,simple idea' represented as involving a theory of its own cause4 #ba4 ,phrases in which this is implied4 #bb4 ,feeling and felt thing confused4 #bc4 ,the simple idea as #8ectype' other than mere sensation4 #bd4 ,it involves a judgment in which mind and thing are distinguished4 #be4 ,and is equivalent to what he afterwards calls #8knowledge of identity'4 ,only as such can it be named4 #bf4 ,the same implied in calling it an idea of an object4 #bg4 made for1 not by1 us1 and therefore according to ,locke really existent4 #bh4 ,what did he mean by this8 #cj4 ,existence as the mere presence of a feeling4 #ca4 ,existence as reality4 #cb4 ,by confusion of these two meanings1 reality and its conditions are represented as given in simple feeling4 #cc4 ,yet reality involves complex ideas which are made by the mind4 #cd4 ,such are substance and relation which must be found in every object of knowledge4 #ce4 ,abstract idea of substance and complex ideas of particular sorts of substance4 #cf4 ,the abstract idea according to ,locke at once precedes and follows the complex4 #cg4 ,reference of ideas to nature or ,god1 the same as reference to substance4 #ch4 ,but it is explicitly to substance that ,locke makes them refer themselves4 #ci4 ,in the process by which we are supposed to arrive at complex ideas of substances the beginning is the same as the end4 #dj4 ,doctrine of abstraction inconsistent with doctrine of complex ideas4 #da4 ,the confusion covered by use of #8particulars'4 #db4 ,locke's account of abstract general ideas4 #dc4 #8,things not general4' #dd4 ,generality an invention of the mind4 #de4 ,the result is1 that the feeling of each moment is alone real4 #df4 ,how ,locke avoids this result4 #dg4 ,the #8particular' was to him the individual qualified by general relations4 #dh4 ,this is the real thing from which abstraction is supposed to start4 #di4 ,yet1 according to the doctrine of relation1 a creation of thought4 #ej4 ,summary of the above contradictions4 #ea4 ,they cannot be overcome without violence to ,locke's fundamental principles4 #eb4 ,as real existence1 the simple idea carries with it #8invented' relation of cause4 #ec4 ,correlativity of cause and substance4 #ed4 ,how do we know that ideas correspond to reality of things8 ,locke's answer4 #ee4 ,it assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things that cause them4 #ef4 ,lively ideas real1 because they must be effects of things4 #eg4 ,present sensation gives knowledge of existence4 #eh4 ,reasons why its testimony must be trusted4 #ei4 ,how does this account fit ,locke's definition of knowledge8 #fj4 ,locke's account of the testimony of sense renders his question as to its veracity superfluous4 #fa4 ,confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction between #8impression' and #8idea'4 #fb4 ,they depend on language which pre-supposes the ascription of sensation to an outward cause4 #fc4 ,this ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented relations4 #fd4 ,what is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to present existence8 #fe4 ,such restriction1 if maintained1 would render the testimony unmeaning4 #ff4 ,but it is not maintained3 the testimony is to operation of permanent identical things4 #fg4 ,locke's treatment of relations of cause and identity4 #fh4 ,that from which he derives idea of cause pre-supposes it4 #fi4 ,rationale of this #8petitio principii'4 #gj4 ,relation of cause has to be put into sensitive experience in order to be got from it4 #ga4 ,origin of the idea of identity according to ,locke4 #gb4 ,relation of identity not to be distinguished from idea of it4 #gc4 ,this #8invented' relation forms the #8very being of things'4 #gd4 ,locke fails to distinguish between identity and mere unity4 #ge4 ,feelings are the real1 and do not admit of identity4 ,how then can identity be real8 #gf4 ,yet it is from reality that the idea of it is derived4 #gg4 ,transition to ,locke's doctrine of essence4 #gh4 ,this repeats the inconsistency found in his doctrine of substance4 #gi4 ,plan to be followed4 #hj4 ,what ,locke understood by essence4 #ha4 ,only to nominal essences that general propositions relate1 i4e4 only to abstract ideas having no real existence4 #hb4 ,an abstract idea may be a simple one4 #hc4 ,how then is science of nature possible8 #hd4 ,no #8uniformities of phenomena' can be known4 #he4 ,locke not aware of the full effect of his own doctrine 444 #hf4 444 which is to make the real an abstract residuum of consciousness4 #hg4 ,ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in the mind is itself a thing of the mind4 #hh4 ,two meanings of real essence4 #hi4 ,according to one1 it is a collection of ideas as qualities of a thing3 #ij4 444 about real essence in this sense there may be general knowledge4 #ia4 ,but such real essence a creature of thought4 #ib4 ,hence another view of real essence as unknown qualities of unknown body4 #ic4 ,how ,locke mixes up these two meanings in ambiguity about body4 #id4 ,body as #8parcel of matter' without essence4 #ie4 ,in this sense body is the mere individuum4 #if4 ,body as qualified by circumstances of time and place4 #ig4 ,such body ,locke held to be subject of #8primary qualities'3 but are these compatible with particularity in time8 #ih4 ,how ,locke avoids this question4 #ii4 ,body and its qualities supposed to be outside consciousness4 #ajj4 ,how can primary qualities be outside consciousness1 and yet knowable8 #aja4 ,locke answers that they copy themselves in ideas--,berkeley's rejoinder4 ,locke gets out of the difficulty by his doctrine of solidity4 #ajb4 ,in which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite of mind and body as a #8nominal essence'4 #ajc4 ,rationale of these contradictions4 #ajd4 ,what knowledge can feeling1 even as referred to a #8solid' body1 convey8 #aje4 ,only the knowledge that something is1 not what it is4 #ajf4 ,how it is that the real essence of things1 according to ,locke1 perishes with them1 yet is immutable4 #ajg4 ,only about qualities of matter1 as distinct from matter itself1 that ,locke feels any difficulty4 #ajh4 ,these1 as knowable1 must be our ideas1 and therefore not a #8real essence'4 #aji4 ,are the #8primary qualities' then1 a #8nominal essence'8 #aaj4 ,according to ,locke's account they are relations1 and thus inventions of the mind4 #aaa4 ,body is the complex in which they are found4 ,do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities1 or the primary qualities from idea of body8 #aab4 ,mathematical ideas1 though ideas of #8primary qualities of body1' have #8barely an ideal existence'4 #aac4 ,summary view of ,locke's difficulties in regard to the real4 #aad4 ,why they do not trouble him more4 #aae4 ,they re-appear in his doctrine of propositions4 #aaf4 ,the knowledge expressed by a proposition1 though certain1 may not be real 444 #aag4 444 when the knowledge concerns substances4 ,in this case general truth must be merely verbal4 ,mathematical truths1 since they concern not substances1 may be both general and real4 #aah4 ,significance of this doctrine4 #aai4 ,fatal to the notion that mathematical truths1 though general1 are got from experience3 #abj4 444 and to received views of natural science3 but ,locke not so clear about this4 #aba4 ,ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science of nature4 ,particular experiment cannot afford general knowledge4 #abb4 ,what knowledge it can afford1 according to ,locke4 #abc4 ,not the knowledge which is now supposed to be got by induction4 ,yet more than ,locke was entitled to suppose it could give4 #abd4 ,with ,locke mathematical truths1 though ideal1 true also of nature4 #abe4 ,two lines of thought in ,locke1 between which a follower would have to choose4 #abf4 ,transition to doctrine of ,god and the soul4 #abg4 ,thinking substance--source of the same ideas as outer substance4 #abh4 ,of which substance is perception the effect8 #abi4 ,that which is the source of substantiation cannot be itself a substance4 #acj4 ,to get rid of the inner source of ideas in favour of the outer would be false to ,locke4 #aca4 ,the mind1 which ,locke opposes to matter1 perpetually shifting4 #acb4 ,two ways out of such difficulties4 #8,matter' and #8mind' have the same source in self-consciousness4 #acc4 ,difficulties in the way of ascribing reality to substance as matter1 re-appear in regard to substance as mind4 #acd4 ,we think not always1 yet thought constitutes the self4 #ace4 ,locke neither disguises these contradictions1 nor attempts to overcome them4 #acf4 ,is the idea of ,god possible to a consciousness given in time8 #acg4 ,locke's account of this idea4 #ach4 #8,infinity1' according to ,locke's account of it1 only applicable to ,god1 if ,god has parts4 #aci4 ,can it be applied to him #8figuratively' in virtue of the indefinite number of ,his acts8 #adj4 ,an act1 finite in its nature1 remains so1 however often repeated4 #ada4 ,god only infinite in a sense in which time is not infinite1 and which ,locke could not recognize #adb4 --the same sense in which the self is infinite4 #adc4 ,how do ,i know my own real existence8--,locke's answer4 #add4 ,it cannot be known consistently with ,locke's doctrine of real existence4 #ade4 ,but he ignores this in treating of the self4 #adf4 ,sense in which the self is truly real4 #adg4 ,locke's proof of the real existence of ,god4 ,there must have been something from eternity to cause what now is4 #adh4 ,how #8eternity' must be understood if this argument is to be valid3 #adi4 444 and how #8cause'4 #aej4 ,the world which is to prove an eternal ,god must be itself eternal4 #aea4 ,but will the ,god1 whose existence is so proven1 be a thinking being8 #aeb4 ,yes1 according to the true notion of the relation between thought and matter4 #aec4 ,locke's antinomies--,hume takes one side of them as true4 #aed4 ,hume's scepticism fatal to his own premises4 ,this derived from ,berkeley4 #aee4 ,berkeley's religious interest in making ,locke consistent4 #aef4 ,what is meant by relation of mind and matter8 #aeg4 ,confusions involved in ,locke's materialism4 #aeh4 ,two ways of dealing with it4 ,berkeley chooses the most obvious4 #aei4 ,his account of the relation between visible and tangible extension4 ,we do not see bodies without the mind 444 #afj4 444 nor yet feel them4 ,the #8esse' of body is the #8percipi'4 #agj4 ,what then becomes of distinction between reality and fancy8 #aga4 ,the real ideas that ,god causes4 #agb4 ,is it then a succession of feelings8 #agc4 ,berkeley goes wrong from confusion between thought and feeling4 #agd4 ,which1 if idea feeling1 does away with space and body4 #age4 ,he does not even retain them as #8abstract ideas'4 #agf4 ,on the same principle all permanent relations should disappear4 #agg4 ,by making colour relations of coloured points1 ,berkeley represents relation as seen4 #agh4 ,still he admits that space is constituted by a succession of feelings4 #agi4 ,if so1 it is not space at all2 but ,berkeley thinks it is only not #8pure' space4 ,space and pure space stand or fall together4 #ahj4 ,berkeley disposes of space for fear of limiting ,god4 #aha4 ,how he deals with possibility of general knowledge4 #ahb4 ,his theory of universals 444 #ahc4 444 of value1 as implying that universality of ideas lies in relation4 #ahd4 ,but he fancies that each idea has a positive nature apart from relation4 #ahe4 ,traces of progress in his idealism4 #ahf4 ,his way of dealing with physical truths4 #ahg4 ,if they imply permanent relations1 his theory properly excludes them4 ,he supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another4 #ahh4 ,locke had explained reality by relation of ideas to outward body4 ,liveliness in the idea evidence of this relation4 #ahi4 ,berkeley retains this notion1 only substituting #8,god' for #8body'4 #aij4 ,not regarding the world as a system of intelligible relations1 he could not regard ,god as the subject of it4 #aia4 ,his view of the soul as #8naturally immortal'4 #aib4 ,endless succession of feelings is not immortality in true sense4 ,berkeley's doctrine of matter fatal to a true spiritualism3 #aic4 444 as well as to a true ,theism4 ,his inference to ,god from necessity of a power to produce ideas2 #aid4 444 a necessity which ,hume does not see4 ,a different turn should have been given to his idealism1 if it was to serve his purpose4 #aie4 ,hume's mission4 ,his account of impressions and ideas4 ,ideas are fainter impressions4 #aif4 #8,ideas' that cannot be so represented must be explained as mere words4 #aig4 ,hume1 taken strictly1 leaves no distinction between impressions of reflection and of sensation4 #aih4 ,locke's theory of sensation disappears4 ,physiology won't answer the question that ,locke asked4 #aii4 ,those who think it will don't understand the question4 #bjj4 ,hume's psychology will not answer it either4 #bja4 ,it only seems to do so by assuming the #8fiction' it has to account for2 by assuming that impression represents a real world4 #bjb4 ,so the #8,positivist' juggles with #8phenomena'4 #bjc4 ,essential difference1 however1 between ,hume and the #8,positivist'4 #bjd4 ,he adopts ,berkeley's doctrine of ideas1 but without ,berkeley's saving suppositions1 #bje4 444 in regard to #8spirit'1 #bjf4 444 in regard to relations4 ,his account of these4 #bjg4 ,it corresponds to ,locke's account of the sorts of agreement between ideas4 #bjh4 ,could ,hume consistently admit idea of relation at all8 #baj4 ,only in regard to identity and causation that he sees any difficulty4 ,these he treats as fictions resulting from #8natural relations' of ideas3 i4e4 from resemblance and contiguity4 #bab4 ,is resemblance then an impression8 #bac4 ,distinction between resembling feelings and idea of resemblance4 #bad4 ,substances collections of ideas4 #bae4 ,how can ideas #8in flux' be collected8 #baf4 ,are there general ideas8 ,berkeley said1 #8yes and no'4 #bag4 ,hume #8no' simply4 ,how he accounts for the appearance of there being such4 #bai4 ,his account implies that #8ideas' are conceptions1 not feelings4 #bbj4 ,he virtually yields the point in regard to the predicate of propositions4 #bba4 ,as to the subject1 he equivocates between singleness of feeling and individuality of conception4 #bbb4 ,result is a theory which admits predication1 but only as singular4 #bbc4 ,all propositions restricted in same way as ,locke's propositions about real existence4 #bbd4 ,the question1 how the singular proposition is possible1 the vital one4 #bbe4 ,not relations of resemblance only1 but those of quantity also1 treated by ,hume as feelings4 #bbf4 ,he draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point as ,locke2 but is more definite as to probability1 #bbg4 444 and does not admit opposition of mathematical to physical certainty--here following ,berkeley4 #bbh4 ,his criticisms of the doctrine of primary qualities4 #bbi4 ,it will not do to oppose bodies to our feeling when only feeling can give idea of body4 #bcj4 ,locke's shuffle of #8body1' #8solidity1' and #8touch1' fairly exposed4 #bca4 ,true rationale of ,locke's doctrine4 #bcb4 ,with ,hume #8body' logically disappears4 ,what then8 #bcc4 ,can space survive body8 ,hume derives idea of it from sight and feeling4 ,significance with him of such derivation4 #bcd4 ,it means1 in effect1 that colour and space are the same1 and that feeling may be extended4 #bce4 ,the parts of space are parts of a perception4 #bcf4 ,yet the parts of space are co-existent not successive4 #bcg4 ,hume cannot make space a #8perception' without being false to his own account of perception2 #bch4 444 as appears if we put #8feeling' for #8perception' in the passages in question4 #bci4 ,to make sense of them1 we must take perception to mean perceived thing1 #bdj4 444 which it can only mean as the result of certain #8fictions'4 #bda4 ,if felt thing is no more than feeling1 how can it have qualities8 #bdb4 ,the thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be4 #bdc4 ,hume equivocates by putting #8coloured points' for colour4 #bde4 ,can a #8disposition of coloured points' be an impression8 #bdf4 ,the points must be themselves impressions1 and therefore not co-existent4 #bdg4 ,a #8compound impression' excluded by ,hume's doctrine of time4 #bdh4 ,the fact that colours mix1 not to the purpose4 #bdi4 ,how ,hume avoids appearance of identifying space with colour1 and accounts for the abstraction of space4 #bej4 ,in so doing1 he implies that space is a relation1 and a relation which is not a possible impression4 #bea4 ,no logical alternative between identifying space with colour1 and admitting an idea not copied from an impression4 #beb4 ,in his account of the idea as abstract1 ,hume really introduces distinction between feeling and conception2 #bec4 444 yet avoids appearance of doing so1 by treating #8consideration' of the relations of a felt thing as if it were itself the feeling4 #bed4 ,summary of contradictions in his account of extension4 #bee4 ,he gives no account of quantity as such4 #bef4 ,his account of the relation between ,time and ,number4 #beg4 ,what does it come to8 #beh4 ,unites alone really exist3 number a #8fictitious denomination'4 ,yet #8unites' and #8number' are correlative2 and the supposed fiction unaccountable4 #bei4 ,idea of time even more unaccountable on ,hume's principles4 #bfj4 ,his ostensible explanation of it4 #bfa4 ,it turns upon equivocation between feeling and conception of relations between felt things4 #bfb4 ,he fails to assign any impression or compound of impressions from which idea of time is copied4 #bfc4 ,how can he adjust the exact sciences to his theory of space and time8 #bfd4 ,in order to seem to do so1 he must get rid of #8,infinite ,divisibility'4 #bfe4 ,quantity made up of impressions1 and there must be a least possible impression4 #bff4 ,yet it is admitted that there is an idea of number not made up of impressions4 ,a finite division into impressions no more possible than an infinite one4 #bfg4 ,in ,hume's instances it is not really a feeling1 but a conceived thing1 that appears as finitely divisible4 #bfh4 ,upon true notion of quantity infinite divisibility follows of course4 #bfi4 ,what are the ultimate elements of extension8 ,if not extended1 what are they8 #bgj4 ,colours or coloured points8 ,what is the difference8 #bga4 ,true way of dealing with the question4 #bgb4 #8,if the point were divisible1 it would be no termination of a line4' ,answer to this4 #bgc4 ,what becomes of the exactness of mathematics according to ,hume8 #bgd4 ,the universal propositions of geometry either untrue or unmeaning4 #bge4 ,distinction between ,hume's doctrine and that of the hypothetical nature of mathematics4 #bgf4 ,the admission that no relations of quantity are data of sense removes difficulty as to general propositions about them4 #bgg4 ,hume does virtually admit this in regard to numbers4 #bgh4 ,with ,hume idea of vacuum impossible1 but logically not more so than that of space4 #bgi4 ,how it is that we talk as if we had idea of vacuum according to ,hume4 #bhj4 ,his explanation implies that we have an idea virtually the same4 #bha4 ,by a like device that he is able to explain the appearance of our having such ideas as ,causation and ,identity4 #bhc4 ,knowledge of relation in way of ,identity and ,causation excluded by ,locke's definition of knowledge4 #bhd4 ,inference a transition from an object perceived or remembered to one that is not so4 #bhe4 ,relation of cause and effect the same as this transition4 #bhf4 ,yet seems other than this4 ,how this appearance is to be explained4 #bhg4 ,inference1 resting on supposition of necessary connection1 to be explained before that connection4 #bhh4 ,account of the inference given by ,locke and ,clarke rejected4 #bhi4 ,three points to be explained in the inference according to ,hume4 #bij4 a4 ,the original impression from which the transition is made b4 ,the transition to inferred idea #bia4 c4 ,the qualities of this idea4 #bib4 ,it results that necessary connection is an impression of reflection1 i4e41 a propensity to the transition described4 #bic4 ,the transition not to anything beyond sense4 #bid4 ,nor determined by any objective relation4 #bie4 ,definitions of cause3 a4 ,as a #8philosophical' relation4 #bif4 ,is ,hume entitled to retain #8philosophical' relations as distinct from #8natural'8 #big4 ,examination of ,hume's language about them4 #bih4 ,philosophical relation consists in a comparison1 but no comparison between cause and effect4 #bii4 ,the comparison is between present and past experience of succession of objects4 #cjj4 ,observation of succession already goes beyond sense4 #cja4 ,as also does the #8observation concerning identity1' which the comparison involves4 #cjb4 ,identity of objects an unavoidable crux for ,hume4 ,his account of it4 #cjc4 ,properly with him it is a fiction1 in the sense that we have no such idea4 ,yet he implies that we have such idea1 in saying that we mistake something else for it4 #cjd4 ,succession of like feelings mistaken for an identical object3 but the feelings1 as described1 are already such objects4 #cje4 ,fiction of identity thus implied as source of the propensity which is to account for it4 #cjf4 ,with ,hume continued existence of perceptions a fiction different from their identity4 ,can perceptions exist when not perceived8 #cjg4 ,existence of objects1 distinct from perceptions1 a further fiction still4 #cjh4 ,are these several #8fictions' really different from each other8 #cji4 ,are they not all involved in the simplest perception8 #caj4 ,yet they are not possible ideas1 because copied from no impressions4 #caa4 ,comparison of present experience with past1 which yields relation of cause and effect1 pre-supposes judgment of identity2 #cab4 444 without which there could be no recognition of an object as one observed before4 #cac4 ,hume makes conceptions of identity and cause each come before the other4 ,their true correlativity4 #cad4 ,hume quite right in saying that we do not go more beyond sense in reasoning than in perception4 #cae4 ,how his doctrine might have been developed4 ,its actual outcome4 #caf4 ,no philosophical relation admissible with ,hume that is not derived from a natural one4 #cag4 ,examination of his account of cause and effect as #8natural relation'4 #cah4 ,double meaning of natural relation4 ,how ,hume turns it to account4 #cai4 ,if an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence1 how can an event be an effect the first time it is observed8 ,hume evades this question2 #cbj4 ,still1 he is a long way off the ,inductive ,logic1 which supposes an objective sequence4 #cba4 ,can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived from sequence of feelings8 #cbb4 ,with ,hume the only uniformity is in expectation1 as determined by habit2 but strength of such expectation must vary indefinitely4 #cbc4 ,it could not serve the same purpose as the conception of uniformity of nature4 #cbd4 ,hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account of the #8remembrance' which determines it4 ,bearing of his doctrine of necessary connexion upon his argument against miracles4 ,this remembrance1 as he describes it1 supposes conception of a system of nature4 #cbf4 ,this explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objective character to causation4 #cbg4 ,reality of remembered #8system' transferred to #8system of judgment'4 #cbh4 ,reality of the former #8system' other than vivacity of impressions4 #cbi4 ,it is constituted by relations1 which are not impressions at all2 and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to #8system of judgment'4 #ccj4 ,not seeing this1 ,hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit4 #cca4 ,but if so1 #8system of judgment' must consist of feelings constantly experienced2 #ccb4 444 which only differ from remembered feelings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded4 ,but how can it have faded1 if they have been constantly repeated8 #ccc4 ,inference then can give no new knowledge4 #ccd4 ,nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new phenomena1 while it can prove relations1 previously unknown1 between phenomena4 ,such a distinction inadmissible with ,hume4 #cce4 ,his distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature1 as determining inference4 #ccf4 ,but this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away4 #ccg4 ,laws of nature are unqualified habits of expectation4 #cch4 ,experience1 according to his account of it1 cannot be a parent of knowledge4 #cci4 ,his attitude towards doctrine of thinking substance4 #cdj4 ,as to ,immateriality of the ,soul1 he plays off ,locke and ,berkeley against each other1 and proves ,berkeley a ,spinozist4 #cda4 ,causality of spirit treated in the same way4 #cdb4 ,disposes of #8personal' identity by showing contradictions in ,locke's account of it4 #cdc4 ,yet can only account for it as a #8fiction' by supposing ideas which with him are impossible4 #cdd4 ,in origin this #8fiction' the same as that of #8,body'4 #cde4 ,possibility of such fictitious ideas implies refutation of ,hume's doctrine4 ,,summary ,,of ,,the ,,contents of the ,,general ,,introduction ,,to ,,vol4 ,,ii4 #a4 ,hume's doctrine of morals parallel to his doctrine of nature4 #b4 ,its relation to ,locke3 ,locke's account of freedom1 will1 and desire4 #c4 ,two questions3 ,does man always act from the strongest motive8 and1 ,what constitutes his motive8 ,the latter the important question4 ,distinction between desires that are1 and those that are not1 determined by the conception of self4 #d4 ,effect of this conception on the objects of human desire4 #e4 ,objects so constituted ,locke should consistently exclude3 ,but he finds room for them by treating every desire for an object1 of which the attainment gives pleasure1 as a desire for pleasure4 #f4 ,confusion covered by calling #8happiness' the general object of desire4 #g4 #8,greatest sum of pleasure' and #8,pleasure in general' unmeaning expressions4 #h4 ,in what sense of happiness is it true that it #8is really just as it appears8' ,in what sense that it is every one's object8 #i4 ,no real object of human desire can ever be just as it appears4 #aj4 ,can ,locke consistently allow the distinction between true happiness and false8 ,or responsibility8 #aa4 ,objections to the ,utilitarian answer to these questions4 #ab4 ,according to ,locke present pleasures may be compared with future1 and desire suspended till comparison has been made4 #ac4 ,what is meant by #8present' and #8future' pleasure8 ,by the supposed comparison ,locke ought only to have meant the competition of pleasures equally present in imagination3 #ad4444 and this could give no ground for responsibility4 ,in order to do so1 it must be understood as implying determination by conception of self4 #ae4 ,locke finds moral freedom in necessity of pursuing happiness4 #af4 ,if an action is moved by desire for an object1 ,locke asks no questions about origin of the object4 ,but what is to be said of actions1 which we only do because we ought8 #ag4 ,their object is pleasure1 but pleasure given not by nature but by law4 #ah4 ,conformity to law not the moral good1 but a means to it4 #ai4 ,hume has to derive from #8impressions' the objects which ,locke took for granted4 #bj4 ,questions which he found at issue1 a4 ,is virtue interested8 b4 ,what is conscience8 #ba4 ,hobbes' answer to first question4 #bb4 ,counter-doctrine of ,shaftesbury4 ,vice is selfishness2 but no clear account of selfishness4 #bc4 ,confusion in his notions of self-good and public good2 ,is all living for pleasure1 or only too much of it1 selfish8 #bd4 ,what have ,butler and ,hutcheson to say about it8 ,chiefly that affections terminate upon their objects2 but this does not exclude the view that all desire is for pleasure4 #be4 ,of moral goodness ,butler's account circular4 ,hutcheson's inconsistent with his doctrine that reason gives no end4 #bf4 ,source of the moral judgment3 received notion of reason incompatible with true view4 ,shaftesbury's doctrine of rational affection2 spoilt by doctrine of #8moral sense'4 #bg4 ,consequences of the latter4 #bh4 ,is an act done for #8virtue's sake' done for pleasure of moral sense8 #bi4 ,hume excludes every object of desire but pleasure4 #cj4 ,his account of #8direct passions'3 all desire is for pleasure4 #ca4 ,yet he admits #8passions' which produce pleasure1 but proceed not from it4 #cb4 ,desire for objects1 as he understands it1 excluded by his theory of impressions and ideas4 #cc4 ,pride determined by reference to self4 #cd4 ,this means that it takes its character from that which is not a possible #8impression'4 #ce4 ,hume's attempt to represent idea of self as derived from impression4 #cf4 ,another device is to suggest a physiological account of pride4 #cg4 ,fallacy of this3 it does not tell us what pride is to the subject of it4 #ch4 ,account of love involves the same difficulties2 and a further one as to nature of sympathy4 #ci4 ,hume's account of sympathy4 #dj4 ,it implies a self-consciousness not reducible to impressions4 #da4 ,ambiguity in his account of benevolence3 it is a desire and therefore has pleasure for its object4 ,what pleasure8 #db4 ,pleasure of sympathy with the pleasure of another4 #dc4 ,all #8passions' equally interested or disinterested4 ,confusion arises from use of #8passion' alike for desire and emotion4 ,of this ,hume avails himself in his account of active pity4 #dd4 ,explanation of apparent conflict between reason and passion4 #de4 ,a #8reasonable' desire means one that excites little emotion4 ,enumeration of possible motives4 #df4 ,if pleasure sole motive1 what is the distinction of self-love8 ,its opposition to disinterested desires1 as commonly understood1 disappears4 ,it is desire for pleasure in general4 #dg4 ,how ,hume gives meaning to this otherwise unmeaning definition4 #8,interest1' like other motives described1 implies determination by reason4 #dh4 ,thus ,hume1 having degraded morality for the sake of consistency1 after all is not consistent4 #di4 ,if all good is pleasure1 what is moral good8 ,ambiguity in ,locke's view4 #ej4 ,development of it by ,clarke1 which breaks down for want of true view of reason4 #ea4 ,with ,hume1 moral good is pleasure excited in a particular way1 viz42 in the spectator of the #8good' act and by the view of its tendency to produce pleasure4 #ec4 ,moral sense is thus sympathy with pleasure qualified by consideration of general tendencies4 #ed4 ,in order to account for the facts it has to become sympathy with unfelt feelings4 #ee4 ,can the distinction between the #8moral' and #8natural' be maintained by ,hume8 ,what is #8artificial virtue'8 #ef4 ,no ground for such distinction in relation between motive and act4 #eg4 ,motive to artificial virtues4 #eh4 ,how artificial virtues become moral4 #ei4 ,interest and sympathy account for all obligations civil and moral4 #fj4 ,what is meant by an action which ought to be done4 #fa4 ,sense of morality no motive3 when it seems so the motive is really pride4 #fb4 ,distinction between virtuous and vicious motive does not exist for person moved4 #fc4 #8,consciousness of sin' disappears4 #fd4 ,only respectability remains3 and even this not consistently accounted for4 ,,general ,,introduction ,,to ,,vol4 ,i4 ,how the history of philosophy should be studied4 #a4 ,there is a view of the history of mankind1 by this time familiarised to ,englishmen1 which detaches from the chaos of events a connected series of ruling actions and beliefs--the achievement of great men and great epochs1 and assigns to these in a special sense the term #8historical4' ,according to this theory--which indeed1 if there is to be a theory of ,history at all1 alone gives the needful simplification--the mass of nations must be regarded as left in swamps and shallows outside the main stream of human development4 ,they have either never come within the reach of the hopes and institutions which make history a progress instead of a cycle1 or they have stiffened these into a dead body of ceremony and caste1 or at some great epoch they have failed to discern the sign of the times and rejected the counsel of ,god against themselves4 ,thus permanently or for generations1 with no principle of motion but unsatisfied want1 without the assimilative ideas which from the strife of passions elicit moral results1 they have trodden the old round of war1 trade1 and faction1 adding nothing to the spiritual heritage of man4 ,it would seem that the historian need not trouble himself with them1 except so far as relation to them determines the activity of the progressive nations4 ,hume the last great ,english philosopher4 #b4 ,a corresponding theory may with some confidence be applied to simplify the history of philosophical opinion4 ,the common plan of seeking this history in compendia of the systems of philosophical writers1 taken in the gross or with no discrimination except in regard to time and popularity1 is mainly to blame for the common notion that metaphysical enquiry is an endless process of threshing old straw4 ,such enquiry is really progressive1 and has a real history1 but it is a history represented by a few great names4 ,at rare epochs there appear men1 or sets of men1 with the true speculative impulse to begin at the beginning and go to the end1 and with the faculty of discerning the true point of departure which previous speculation has fixed for them4 ,the intervals are occupied by commentators and exponents of the last true philosopher1 if it has been his mission to construct2 if it has been sceptical1 by writers who cannot understand the fatal question that he has asked1 and thus still dig in the old vein which he had exhausted1 and of which his final dilemma had shown the bottom4 ,such an interval was that which in the growth of continental philosophy followed on the epoch of ,leibnitz2 an interval of academic exposition or formulation1 in which the system1 that had been to the master an incomplete enquiry1 became in the hands of his disciples a one-sided dogmatism4 ,in the line of speculation more distinctively ,english1 a like rgime of #8strenua inertia' has prevailed since the time of ,hume4 ,in the manner of its unprofitableness1 indeed1 it has differed from the ,wolfian period in ,germany1 just as the disinterested scepticism of ,hume differed from the system-making for purposes of edification to which ,leibnitz applied himself4 ,it has been unprofitable1 because its representatives have persisted in philosophising upon principles which ,hume had pursued to their legitimate issue and had shown1 not as their enemy but as their advocate1 to render all philosophy futile4 ,adopting the premises and method of ,locke1 he cleared them of all illogical adaptations to popular belief1 and experimented with them on the body of professed knowledge1 as one only could do who had neither any twist of vice nor any bias for doing good1 but was a philosopher because he could not help it4 ,kant his true successor4 #c4 ,as the result of the experiment1 the method1 which began with professing to explain knowledge1 showed knowledge to be impossible4 ,hume himself was perfectly cognisant of this result1 but his successors in ,england and ,scotland would seem so far to have been unable to look it in the face4 ,they have either thrust their heads again into the bush of uncriticised belief1 or they have gone on elaborating ,hume's doctrine of association1 in apparent forgetfulness of ,hume's own proof of its insufficiency to account for an intelligent1 as opposed to a merely instinctive or habitual1 experience4 ,an enquiry1 however1 so thorough and passionless as the #8,treatise of ,human ,nature1' could not be in vain2 and if no ,english athlete had strength to carry on the torch1 it was transferred to a more vigorous line in ,germany4 ,it awoke ,kant1 as he used to say1 from his #8dogmatic slumber1' to put him into that state of mind by some called wonder1 by others doubt1 in which all true philosophy begins4 ,this state1 with less ambiguity of terms1 may be described as that of freedom from presuppositions4 ,it was because ,kant1 reading ,hume with the eyes of ,leibnitz and ,leibnitz with the eyes of ,hume1 was able to a great extent to rid himself of the presuppositions of both1 that he started that new method of philosophy which1 as elaborated by ,hegel1 claims to set man free from the artificial impotence of his own false logic1 and thus qualify him for a complete interpretation of his own achievement in knowledge and morality4 ,thus the #8,treatise of ,human ,nature' and the #8,critic of ,pure ,reason1' taken together1 form the real bridge between the old world of philosophy and the new4 ,they are the essential #8,propaedeutik1' without which no one is a qualified student of modern philosophy4 ,the close correspondence between the two works becomes more apparent the more each is studied4 ,it is such as to give a strong presumption that ,kant had studied ,hume's doctrine in its original and complete expression1 and not merely as it was made easy in the #8,essays4' ,the one with full and reasoned articulation asks the question1 which the other with equal fulness seeks to answer4 ,it is probably because the question in its complete statement has been so little studied among us1 that the intellectual necessity of the ,kantian answer has been so little appreciated4 ,to trace the origin and bring out the points of the question1 in order to the exhibition of that necessity1 will be the object of the following treatise4 ,to do this thoroughly1 indeed1 would carry us back through ,hobbes to ,bacon4 ,but as present limits do not allow of so long a journey1 we must be content with showing ,hume's direct filiation to ,locke1 who1 indeed1 sufficiently gathered up the results of the #8empirical' philosophy of his predecessors4 ,distinction between literary history and the history of philosophical systems4 #d4 ,such a task is very different from an ordinary undertaking in literary history1 and requires different treatment4 ,to the historian of literature a philosopher is interesting1 if at all1 on account of the personal qualities which make a great writer1 and have a permanent effect on letters and general culture4 ,locke and ,hume undoubtedly had these qualities and produced such an effect--an effect in ,locke's case more intense upon the immediately following generations1 but in ,hume's more remarkable as having reappeared after near a century of apparent forgetfulness4 ,each1 indeed1 like every true philosopher1 was the mouth-piece of a certain system of thought determined for him by the stage at which he found the dialectic movement that constitutes the progress of philosophy1 but each gave to this system the stamp of that personal power which persuades men4 ,their mode of expression had none of that academic or #8ex cathedra' character1 which has made ,german philosophy almost a foreign literature in the country of its birth4 ,they wrote as citizens and men of the world1 anxious 7in no bad sense7 for effect2 and even when their conclusions were remote from popular belief1 still presented them in the flesh and blood of current terms used in the current senses4 ,it is not1 however1 in their human individuality and its effects upon literature1 but as the vehicles of a system of thought1 that it is proposed here to treat them2 and this purpose will best be fulfilled if we follow the line of their speculation without divergence into literary criticism or history1 without remarks either on the peculiarities of their genius or on any of the secondary influences which affected their writings or arose out of them4 ,for a method of this sort1 it would seem1 there is some need among us4 ,we have been learning of late to know much more about philosophers1 but it is possible for knowledge about philosophers to flourish inversely as the knowledge of philosophy4 ,the revived interest which is noticeable in the history of philosophy may be an indication either of philosophical vigour or of philosophical decay4 ,in those whom intellectual indolence1 or a misunderstood and disavowed metaphysic1 has landed in scepticism there often survives a curiosity about the literary history of philosophy1 and the writings which this curiosity produces tend further to spread the notion that philosophy is a matter about which there has been much guessing by great intellects1 but no definite truth is to be attained4 ,it is otherwise with those who see in philosophy a progressive effort towards a fully-articulated conception of the world as rational4 ,to them its past history is of interest as representing steps in this progress which have already been taken for us1 and which1 if we will make them our own1 carry us so far on our way towards the freedom of perfect understanding2 while to ignore them is not to return to the simplicity of a pre-philosopic age1 but to condemn ourselves to grope in the maze of #8cultivated opinion1' itself the confused result of those past systems of thought which we will not trouble ourselves to think out4 ,object of the present enquiry4 #e4 ,the value of that system of thought1 which found its clearest expression in ,hume1 lies in its being an effort to think to their logical issue certain notions which since then have become commonplaces with educated ,englishmen1 but which1 for that reason1 we must detach ourselves from popular controversy to appreciate rightly4 ,we are familiar enough with these in the form to which adaptation to the needs of plausibility has gradually reduced them1 but because we do not think them out with the consistency of their original exponents1 we miss their true value4 ,they do not carry us1 as they will do if we restore their original significance1 by an intellectual necessity to those truer notions which1 in fact1 have been their sequel in the development of philosophy1 but have not yet found their way into the #8culture' of our time4 ,an attempt to restore their value1 however1 if this be the right view of its nature1 cannot but seem at first sight invidious4 ,it will seem as if1 while we talk of their value1 we were impertinently trying to #8pull them to pieces4' ,but those who understand the difference between philosophical failures1 which are so because they are anachronisms1 and those which in their failure have brought out a new truth and compelled a step forward in the progress of thought1 will understand that a process1 which looks like pulling a great philosopher to pieces1 may be the true way of showing reverence for his greatness4 ,it is a ,pharisaical way of building the sepulchres of philosophers to profess their doctrine or extol their genius without making their spirit our own4 ,the genius of ,locke and ,hume was their readiness to follow the lead of ,ideas3 their spirit was the spirit of ,rationalism--the spirit which1 however baffled and forced into inconsistent admissions1 is still governed by the faith that all things may ultimately be understood4 ,we best do reverence to their genius1 we most truly appropriate their spirit1 in so exploring the difficulties to which their enquiry led1 as to find in them the suggestion of a theory which may help us to walk firmly where they stumbled and fell4 ,locke's problem and method4 #f4 ,about ,locke1 as about every other philosopher1 the essential questions are1 ,what was his problem1 and what was his method8 ,locke1 as a man of business1 gives us the answers at starting4 ,his problem was the origin of #8ideas' in the individual man1 and their connection as constituting knowledge3 his method that of simply #8looking into his own understanding and seeing how it wrought4' ,these answers commend themselves to common sense1 and still form the text of popular psychology4 ,if its confidence in their value1 as explained by ,locke1 is at all beginning to be shaken1 this is not because1 according to a strict logical development1 they issued in ,hume's unanswered scepticism1 which was too subtle for popular effect1 but because they are now open to a rougher battery from the physiologists4 ,our concern at present is merely to show their precise meaning1 and the difficulties which according to this meaning they involve4 ,his notion of the #8thinking thing'4 #g4 ,there are two propositions on which ,locke is constantly insisting3 one1 that the object of his investigation is his own mind2 the other1 that his attitude towards this object is that of mere observation4 ,he speaks of his own mind1 it is to be noticed1 just as he might of his own body4 ,it meant something born with1 and dependent on1 the particular animal organism that first saw the light at ,wrington on a particular day in #afcb4 ,it was as exclusive of other minds as his body of other bodies1 and he could only infer a resemblance between them and it4 ,with all his animosity to the coarse spiritualism of the doctrine of innate ideas1 he was the victim of the same notion which gave that doctrine its falsehood and grotesqueness4 ,he1 just as much as the untutored ,cartesian1 regarded the #8minds' of different men as so many different things2 and his refutation of the objectionable hypothesis proceeds wholly from this view4 ,whether the mind is put complete into the body1 or is born and grows with it2 whether it has certain characters stamped upon it to begin with1 or receives all its ideas through the senses2 whether it is simple and therefore indiscerptible1 or compound and therefore perishable--all these questions to ,locke1 as to his opponents1 concern a multitude of #8thinking things' in him and them1 merely individual1 but happening to be pretty much alike4 ,this he will passively observe4 #h4 ,this #8thinking thing1' then1 as he finds it in himself1 the philosopher1 according to ,locke1 has merely and passively to observe1 in order to understand the nature of knowledge4 #8,i could look into nobody's understanding but my own to see how it wrought1' he says1 but #8,i think the intellectual faculties are made and operate alike in most men4 ,but if it should happen not to be so1 ,i can only make it my humble request1 in my own name and in the name of those that are of my size1 who find their minds work1 reason1 and know in the same low way that mine does1 that the men of a more happy genius will show us the way of their nobler flights4' 7,second ,letter to ,bishop of ,worcester47 ,as will appear in the sequel1 it is from this imaginary method of ascertaining the origin and nature of knowledge by passive observation of what goes on in one's own mind that the embarrassments of ,locke's system flow4 ,it was the function of ,hume to exhibit the radical flaw in his master's method by following it with more than his master's rigour4 ,is such observation possible8 #i4 ,as an observation of the #8thinking thing1' the #8philosophy of mind' seems to assume the character of a natural science1 and thus at once acquires definiteness1 and if not certainty1 at least plausibility4 ,to deny the possibility of such observation1 in any proper sense of the word1 is for most men to tamper with the unquestioned heritage of all educated intelligence4 ,hence the unpalatability of a consistent ,positivism2 hence1 too1 on the other side1 the general conviction that the ,hegelian reduction of ,psychology to ,metaphysics is either an intellectual juggle1 or a wilful return of the philosophy1 which psychologists had washed1 to the mire of scholasticism4 ,it is the more important to ascertain what the observation in question precisely means4 ,what observes1 and what is observed8 ,according to ,locke 7and empirical psychology has never substantially varied the answer7 the matter to be observed consists for each man firstly in certain impressions of his own individual mind1 by which this mind from being a mere blank has become furnished--by which1 in other words1 his mind has become actually a mind2 and1 secondly1 in certain operations1 which the mind1 thus constituted1 performs upon the materials which constitute it4 ,the observer1 all the while1 is the constituted mind itself4 ,the question at once arises1 how the developed man can observe in himself 7and it is only to himself1 according to ,locke1 that he can look7 that primitive state in which his mind was a #8tabula rasa4' ,in the first place1 that only can be observed which is present2 and the state in question to the supposed observer is past4 ,if it be replied that it is recalled by memory1 there is the farther objection that memory only recalls what has been previously known1 and how is a man's own primitive consciousness1 as yet void of the content which is supposed to come to it through impressions1 originally known to him8 ,how can the #8tabula rasa' be cognisant of itself8 ,why it seems so4 #aj4 ,the cover under which this difficulty was hidden from ,locke1 as from popular psychologists ever since1 consists in the implicit assumption of certain ideas1 either as possessed by or acting upon the mind in the supposed primitive state1 which are yet held to be arrived at by a gradual process of comparison1 abstraction1 and generalisation4 ,this assumption1 which renders the whole system resting upon the interrogation of consciousness a paralogism1 is yet the condition of its apparent possibility4 ,it is only as already charged with a content which is yet 7and for the individual1 truly7 maintained to be the gradual acquisition of experience1 that the primitive consciousness has any answer to give to its interrogator4 ,locke's account of origin of ideas4 #aa4 ,let us consider the passage where ,locke sums up his theory of the #8original of our ideas4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #bc1 #bd47 #8,since there appear not to be any ideas in the mind1 before the senses have conveyed any in1 ,i conceive that ideas in the understanding are coeval with sensation2 which is such an impression1 made in some part of the body1 as produces some perception in the understanding4 ,it is about these impressions made on our senses by outward objects1 that the mind seems first to employ itself in such operations as we call perception1 remembering1 consideration1 reasoning1 c4 ,in time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation1 and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas1 which ,i call ideas of reflection4 ,these impressions that are made on our senses by outward objects1 that are extrinsical to the mind2 and its own operations1 proceeding from powers intrinsical and proper to itself1 which1 when reflected on by itself1 become also objects of its contemplation1 are1 as ,i have said1 the original of all knowledge4' ,its ambiguities 7a7 ,in regard to sensation4 #ab4 ,can we from this passage elicit a distinct account of the beginning of intelligence8 ,in the first place it consists in an #8idea1' and an idea is elsewhere 7,introduction1 sec4 #h7 stated to be #8whatsoever is the object of the understanding1 when a man thinks4' ,but the primary idea is an #8idea of sensation4' ,does this mean that the primary idea is a sensation1 or is a distinction to be made between the sensation and the idea thereof8 ,the passage before us would seem to imply such a distinction4 ,looking merely to it1 we should probably say that by sensation ,locke meant #8an impression or motion in some part of the body2' by the idea of sensation #8a perception in the understanding1' which this impression produces4 ,the account of perception itself gives a different result4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #c47 #8,whatever impressions are made on the outward parts1 if they are not taken notice of within1 there is no perception4 ,fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet1 unless the motion be continued to the brain1 and there the sense of heat or idea of pain be produced in the mind1 wherein consists actual perception4' ,here sensation is identified at once with the idea and with perception1 as opposed to the impression on the bodily organs4 #a ,to confound the confusion still farther1 in a passage immediately preceding the above1 #8,perception1' here identified with the idea of sensation1 has been distinguished from it1 as #8exercised about it4' #8,perception1 as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas1 so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection4' ,taking ,locke at his word1 then1 we find the beginning of intelligence to consist in having an idea of sensation4 ,this idea1 however1 we perceive1 and to perceive is to have an idea2 i4e4 to have an idea of an idea of sensation4 ,but of perception again we have a simple or primitive idea4 ,therefore the beginning of intelligence consists in having an idea of an idea of an idea of sensation4 #a ,cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xix4 sec4 #a4 #8,the perception1 which actually accompanies and is annexed to any impression on the body1 made by an external object1 being distinct from all other modifications of thinking1 furnishes the mind with a distinct idea which we call sensation2 which is1 as it were1 the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses4' 7b7 ,in regard to ideas of reflection4 #ac4 ,by insisting on ,locke's account of the relation between the ideas of sensation and those of reflection we might be brought to a different but not more luminous conclusion4 ,in the passages quoted above1 where this relation is most fully spoken of1 it appears that the latter are essentially sequent to those of sensation4 #8,in time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations1 about the ideas got by sensation1 and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas1 which ,i call ideas of reflection4' ,of these only two are primary and original 7,book ,,ii4 c4 xxi4 sec4 #gc71 viz4 motivity or power of moving1 with which we are not at present concerned1 and perceptivity or power of perception4 ,but according to ,locke1 as we have seen1 there cannot be any1 the simplest1 idea of sensation without perception4 ,if1 then1 the idea of perception is only given later and upon reflection1 we must suppose perception to take place without any idea of it4 ,but with ,locke to have an idea and to perceive are equivalent terms4 ,we must thus conclude that the beginning of knowledge is an unperceived perception1 which is against his express statement elsewhere 7,book ,,ii4 c4 xxvii4 sec4 #i71 that it is #8impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive4' ,what is the #8tablet' impressed8 #ad4 ,meanwhile a perpetual equivocation is kept up between a supposed impression on the #8outward parts1' and a supposed impression on the #8tablet of the mind4' ,it is not the impression upon1 or a motion in1 the outward parts1 as ,locke admits1 that constitutes the idea of sensation4 ,it is not an agitation in the tympanum of the ear1 or a picture on the retina of the eye1 that we are conscious of when we see a sight or hear a sound4 #a ,the motion or impression1 however1 has only1 as he seems to suppose1 to be #8continued to the brain1' and it becomes an idea of sensation4 ,notwithstanding the rough line of distinction between soul and body1 which he draws elsewhere1 his theory was practically governed by the supposition of a cerebral something1 in which1 as in a third equivocal tablet1 the imaginary mental and bodily tablets are blended4 ,if1 however1 the idea of sensation1 as an object of the understanding when a man thinks1 differs absolutely from #8a motion of the outward parts1' it does so no less absolutely1 however language and metaphor may disguise the difference1 from such motion as #8continued to the brain4' ,an instructed man1 doubtless1 may come to think about a motion in his brain1 as about a motion of the earth round the sun1 but to speak of such motion as an idea of sensation or an immediate object of intelligent sense1 is to confuse between the object of consciousness and a possible physical theory of the conditions of that consciousness4 ,it is only1 however1 by such an equivocation that any idea1 according to ,locke's account of the idea1 can be described as an #8impression' at all1 or that the representation of the mind as a tablet1 whether born blank or with characters stamped on it1 has even an apparent meaning4 ,a metaphor1 interpreted as a fact1 becomes the basis of his philosophical system4 #a ,cf4 ,locke's own statement 7,book ,,iii4 c4 iv4 sec4 #aj74 #8,the cause of any sensation1 and the sensation itself1 in all the simple ideas of one sense1 are two ideas2 and two ideas so different and distant one from another1 that no two can be more so4' ,does the mind make impressions on itself8 #ae4 ,as applied to the ideas of reflection1 indeed1 the metaphor loses even its plausibility4 ,in its application to the ideas of sensation it gains popular acceptance from the ready confusion of thought and matter in the imaginary cerebral tablet1 and the supposition of actual impact upon this by #8outward things4' ,but in the case of ideas of reflection1 it is the mind that at once gives and takes the impression4 ,it must be supposed1 that is1 to make impressions on itself4 ,there is the further difficulty that as perception is necessary in order to give an idea of sensation1 the impress of perception must be taken by the mind in its earliest receptivity2 or1 in other words1 it must impress itself while still a blank1 still void of any #8furniture' wherewith to make the impression4 ,there is no escape from this result unless we suppose perception to precede the idea of it by some interval of time1 which lands us1 as we have seen1 in the counter difficulty of supposing an unperceived perception4 ,locke disguises the difficulty from himself and his reader by constantly shifting both the receptive subject and the impressive matter4 ,we find the #8tablet' perpetually receding4 ,first it is the #8outward part' or bodily organ4 ,then it is the brain1 to which the impression received by the outward part must somehow be continued1 in order to produce sensation4 ,then it is the perceptive mind1 which takes an impression of the sensation or has an idea of it4 ,finally1 it is the reflective mind1 upon which in turn the perceptive mind makes impressions4 ,but the hasty reader1 when he is told that the mind is passively impressed with ideas of reflection1 is apt to forget that the matter which thus impresses it is1 according to ,locke's showing1 simply its perceptive1 i4e4 its passive1 self4 ,source of these difficulties4 ,the #8simple' idea1 as ,locke describes it1 is a complex idea of substance and relation4 #af4 ,the real source of these embarrassments in ,locke's theory1 it must be noted1 lies in the attempt to make the individual consciousness give an answer to its interrogator as to the beginning of knowledge4 ,the individual looking back on an imaginary earliest experience pronounces himself in that experience to have been simply sensitive and passive4 ,but by this he means consciously sensitive of something and consciously passive in relation to something4 ,that is1 he supposes the primitive experience to have involved consciousness of a self on the one hand and of a thing on the other1 as well as of a relation between the two4 ,in the #8idea of sensation' as ,locke conceived it1 such a consciousness is clearly implied1 notwithstanding his confusion of terms4 ,the idea is a perception1 or consciousness of a thing1 as opposed to a sensation proper or affection of the bodily organs4 ,of the perception1 again1 there is an idea1 i4e4 a consciousness by the man1 in the perception1 of himself in negative relation to the thing that is his object1 and this consciousness 7if we would make ,locke consistent in excluding an unperceived perception7 must be taken to go along with the perceptive act itself4 ,no less than this indeed can be involved in any act that is to be the beginning of knowledge at all4 ,it is the minimum of possible thought or intelligence1 and the thinking man1 looking for this beginning in the earliest experience of the individual human animal1 must needs find it there4 ,but this means no less than that he is finding there already the conceptions of substance and relation4 ,hence a double contradiction3 firstly1 a contradiction between the primariness of self-conscious cognisance of a thing1 as the beginning of possible knowledge1 on the one hand1 and the primariness of animal sensation in the history of the individual man on the other2 secondly1 a contradiction between the primariness in knowledge of the ideas of substance and relation1 and the seemingly gradual attainment of those #8abstractions' by the individual intellect4 ,the former of these contradictions is blurred by ,locke in the two main confusions which we have so far noticed3 7a7 the confusion between sensation proper and perception1 which is covered under the phrase #8idea of sensation2' a phrase which1 if sensation means the first act of intelligence1 is pleonastic1 and if it means the #8motion of the outward parts continued to the brain1' is unmeaning2 and 7b7 the confusion between the physical affection of the brain and the act of the self-conscious subject1 covered under the equivocal metaphor of impression4 ,the latter contradiction1 that concerning the ideas of substance and relation1 has to be further considered4 ,how this contradiction is disguised4 #ag4 ,it is not difficult to show that to have a simple idea1 according to ,locke's account of it1 means to have already the conception of substance and relation1 which are yet according to him #8complex and derived ideas1' #8the workmanship of the mind' in opposition to its original material1 the result of its action in opposition to what is given it as passive4 ,the equivocation in terms under which this contradiction is generally covered is that between #8idea' and #8quality4' #8,whatever the mind perceives in itself1 or is the immediate object of perception1 thought1 or understanding1 that ,i call idea2 and the power to produce that idea ,i call quality of the subject wherein that power is4 ,thus a snowball having power to produce in us the ideas of white1 cold1 and round1 the powers to produce these ideas in us1 as they are in the snowball1 ,i call qualities2 and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings1 ,i call them ideas2 which ideas1 if ,i speak of sometimes as in the things themselves1 ,i would be understood to mean those qualities in the object which produce them in us4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #h47 ,locke's way of interchanging #8idea' and #8quality' and its effects4 #ah4 ,an equivocation is not the less so because it is announced4 ,it is just because ,locke allows himself at his convenience to interchange the terms #8idea' and #8quality' that his doctrine is at once so plausible and so hollow4 ,the essential question is whether the #8simple idea1' as the original of knowledge1 is on the one hand a mere feeling1 or on the other a thing or quality of a thing4 ,this question is the crux of empirical psychology4 ,adopting the one alternative1 we have to face the difficulty of the genesis of knowledge1 as an apprehension of the real1 out of mere feeling2 adopting the other1 we virtually endow the nascent intelligence with the conception of substance4 ,by playing fast and loose with #8idea' and #8quality1' ,locke disguised the dilemma from himself4 ,here again the metaphor of ,impression did him yeoman's service4 ,the idea1 or #8immediate object of thought1' being confused with the affection of the sensitive organs1 and this again being accounted for as the result of actual impact1 it was easy to represent the idea itself as caused by the action of an outward body on the #8mental tablet4' ,thus ,locke speaks of the #8objects of our senses obtruding their particular ideas on our minds1 whether we will or no4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #be47 ,this sentence holds in solution an assumption and two fallacies4 ,the assumption 7with which we have no further concern here7 is the physical theory that matter affects the sensitive organs in the way of actual impact4 ,of the fallacies1 one is the confusion between this affection and the idea of which it is the occasion to the individual2 the other is the implication that this idea1 as such1 in its prime simplicity1 recognises itself as the result of1 and refers itself as a quality to1 the matter supposed to cause it4 ,this recognition and reference1 it is clearly implied1 are involved in the idea itself1 not merely made by the philosopher theorising it4 ,otherwise the #8obtrusion' would be described as of a property or effect1 not of an idea1 which means1 it must be remembered1 the object of consciousness just as the object of consciousness4 ,of the same purport is the statement that #8the mind is furnished with simple ideas as they are found in exterior things4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #a47 ,it only requires a moment's consideration1 indeed1 to see that the beginning of consciousness cannot be a physical theory1 which1 however true it may be and however natural it may have become to us1 involves not only the complex conception of material impact1 but the application of this to a case having no palpable likeness to it4 ,but the #8interrogator of consciousness' finds in its primitive state just what he puts there1 and thus ,locke1 with all his pains #8to set his mind at a distance from itself1' involuntarily supposes it1 in the first element of intelligence1 to #8report' that action of matter upon itself1 which1 as the result of a familiar theory--involving not merely the conceptions of substance1 power1 and relation1 but special qualifications of these--it reports to the educated man4 ,primary and secondary qualities of bodies4 #ai4 ,this will appear more clearly upon an examination of his doctrine of #8the ideas of primary and secondary qualities of bodies4' ,the distinction between them he states as follows4 ,the primary qualities of bodies are #8the bulk1 figure1 number1 situation1 motion1 and rest of their solid parts2 these are in them1 whether we perceive them or no2 and when they are of that size that we can discover them1 we have by these an idea of the thing as it is in itself4' 444 ,thus #8the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them1 and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves4 ,but the ideas produced in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblance of them at all4 ,there is nothing like them existing in the bodies themselves4 ,they are in the bodies1 we denominate from them1 only a power to produce these sensations in us2 and what is sweet1 blue1 or warm in idea is but the certain bulk1 figure1 and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves which we call so4' ,this power is then explained to be of two sorts3 7a7 #8,the power that is in any body1 by reason of its insensible primary qualities1 to operate after a peculiar manner on any of our senses1 and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours1 sounds1 smells1 tastes1 c4 ,these are usually called sensible qualities1 7b7 ,the power that is in any body1 by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities1 to make such a change in the bulk1 figure1 texture1 and motion of another body1 as to make it operate differently on our senses from what it did before4 ,thus the sun has a power to make wax white1 and fire to make lead fluid4 ,these are usually called powers4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #ae1 #bc47 #8,simple idea' represented as involving a theory of its own cause4 #bj4 ,what we have here is a theory of the causes of simple ideas2 but we shall find ,locke constantly representing this theory as a simple idea itself1 or the simple idea as involving this theory4 ,by this unconscious device he is enabled readily to exhibit the genesis of knowledge out of #8simple ideas1' but it is at the cost of converting these into #8creations of the mind1' which with him are the antitheses of #8facts' or #8reality4' ,the process of conversion takes a different form as applied respectively to the ideas of primary and to those of secondary qualities4 ,we propose to follow it in the latter application first4 ,phrases in which this is implied4 #ba4 ,the simple idea caused by a quality he calls the idea of that quality4 ,under cover of this phrase1 he not only identifies the idea of a primary quality with the quality itself of which he supposes it to be a copy1 but he also habitually regards the idea of a secondary quality as the consciousness of a quality of a thing1 though under warning that the quality as it is to consciousness is not as it is in the thing4 ,this reservation rather adds to the confusion4 ,there are in fact1 according to ,locke1 as appears from his distinction between the #8nominal' and #8real essence1' two different things denoted by every common noun2 the thing as it is in itself or in nature1 and the thing as it is for consciousness4 ,the former is the thing as constituted by a certain configuration of particles1 which is only an object for the physical philosopher1 and never fully cognisable even by him2 #a the latter is the thing as we see and hear and smell it4 ,now to a thing in this latter sense1 according to ,locke1 such a simple idea as to the philosopher is one of a secondary quality 7i4e4 not a copy1 but an effect1 of something in a body71 is already in the origin of knowledge referred as a quality1 though without distinction of primary and secondary4 ,he does not indeed state this in so many words4 ,to have done so might have forced him to reconsider his doctrine of the mere passivity of the mind in respect of simple ideas4 ,but it is implied in his constant use of such phrases as #8reports of the senses1' #8inlet through the senses'--which have no meaning unless something is reported1 something let in--and in the familiar comparison of the understanding to a #8closet1 wholly shut from light1 with only some little opening left1 to let in external visible resemblances1 or ideas1 of things without4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #ag47 #a ,this distinction is more fully treated below1 paragraphs #hh1 c4 ,feeling and felt thing confused4 #bb4 ,phraseology of this kind1 the standing heritage of the philosophy which seeks the origin of knowledge in sensation1 assumes that the individual sensation is from the first consciously representative2 that it is more than what it is simply in itself--fleeting1 momentary1 unnameable 7because1 while we name it1 it has become another71 and for the same reason unknowable1 the very negation of knowability2 that it shows the presence of something1 whether this be a #8body' to which it is referred as a quality1 or a mind of which it is a modification1 or be ultimately reduced to the permanent conditions of its own possibility4 ,this assumption for the present has merely to be pointed out2 its legitimacy need not be discussed4 ,nor need we now discuss the attempts that have been made since ,locke to show that mere sensations1 dumb to begin with1 may yet become articulate upon repetition and combination2 which in fact endow them with a faculty of inference1 and suppose that though primarily they report nothing beyond themselves1 they yet somehow come to do so as an explanation of their own recurrence4 ,the sensational theory in ,locke is still1 so to speak1 unsophisticated4 ,it is true that1 in concert with that #8thinking gentleman1' ,mr4 ,molyneux1 he had satisfied himself that what we reckon simple ideas are often really inferences from such ideas which by habit have become instinctive2 but his account of this habitual process presupposes the reference of sensation to a thing4 #8,when we set before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour1 it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle1 variously shadowed with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes4 ,but we having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us1 what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figures of bodies2 the judgment presently1 by an habitual custom1 alters the appearances into their causes4 ,so that from that which truly is variety of colour or shadow1 collecting the figure1 it makes it pass for a mark of figure1 and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure1 and an uniform colour4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #h47 ,the theory here stated involves two assumptions1 each inconsistent with the simplicity of the simple idea4 7a7 ,the actual impression of the #8plane variously coloured' is supposed to pronounce itself to be of something outward4 ,once call the sensation an #8impression1' indeed1 or call it anything1 and this or an analogous substantiation of it is implied4 ,it is only as thus reporting something #8objective' that the simple idea of the plane variously coloured gives anything to be corrected by the #8perception of the kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us1' i4e4 #8of the alterations made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figure of bodies4' ,this perception1 indeed1 as described1 is already itself just the instinctive judgment which has to be accounted for1 and though this objection might be met by a better statement1 yet no statement could serve ,locke's purpose which did not make assumption 7b7 that sensations of light and colour--#8simple ideas of secondary qualities'--are in the very beginning of knowledge appearances1 if not of convex bodies1 yet of bodies2 if not of bodies1 yet of something which they reveal1 which remains there while they pass away4 ,the simple idea as #8ectype' other than mere sensation4 #bc4 ,the same assumption is patent in ,locke's account of the distinction between #8real and fantastic1' #8adequate and inadequate1' ideas4 ,this distinction rests upon that between the thing as archetype1 and the idea as the corresponding ectype4 ,simple ideas he holds to be necessarily #8real' and #8adequate1' because necessarily answering to their archetypes4 #8,not that they are all of them images or representations of what does exist3 444 whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is3 444 yet are they real ideas in us1 whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves4 ,for these several appearances being designed to be the marks whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with1 our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose1 and are as real distinguishing characters1 whether they be only constant effects1 or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxx4 sec4 #b47 ,the simple idea1 then1 is a #8mark' or #8distinguishing character1' either as a copy or as an effect1 of something other than itself4 ,only as thus regarded1 does the distinction between real and fantastic possibly apply to it4 ,so too with the distinction between true and false ideas4 ,as ,locke himself points out1 the simple idea in itself is neither true nor false4 ,it can become so only as #8referred to something extraneous to it4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxxii4 sec4 #d47 ,for all that1 he speaks of simple ideas as true and necessarily true1 because #8being barely such perceptions as ,god has fitted us to receive1 and given power to external objects to produce in us by established laws and ways 444 their truth consists in nothing else but in such appearances as are produced in us1 and must be suitable to those powers ,he has placed in external objects1 or else they could not be produced in us4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxxii4 sec4 #ad47 ,here again we are brought to the same point4 ,the idea is an #8appearance' of something1 necessarily true when it cannot seem to be the appearance of anything else than that of which it is the appearance4 ,we thus come to the following dilemma4 ,either the simple idea is referred to a thing1 as its pattern or its cause1 or it cannot be regarded as either real or true4 ,if it is still objected that it need not be so referred in the beginning of knowledge1 though it comes to be so in the developed intelligence1 the answer is the further question1 how can that be knowledge even in its most elementary phase--the phase of the reception of simple ideas --which is not a capacity of distinction between real and apparent1 between true and false8 ,if its beginning is a mode of consciousness1 such as mere sensation would be--which1 because excluding all reference1 excludes that reference of itself to something else without which there could be no consciousness of a distinction between an #8is' and an #8is not1' and therefore no true judgment at all--how can any repetition of such modes give such a judgment8 #a #a ,cf4 the ground of distinction between clearness and obscurity of ideas2 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxix4 sec4 #b7 #8,our simple ideas are clear when they are such as the objects themselves1 whence they are taken1 did or might in a well-ordered sensation or perception1 present them4' ,as ,locke always assumes that immediate consciousness can tell whether an idea is clear or not1 it follows that immediate consciousness must tell of #8the object itself1 whence the idea is taken4' ,it involves a judgment in which mind and thing are distinguished4 #bd4 ,the fact is that the #8simple idea' with ,locke1 as the beginning of knowledge1 is already1 at its minimum1 the judgment1 #8,i have an idea different from other ideas1 which ,i did not make for myself4' ,his confusion of this judgment with sensation is merely the fundamental confusion1 on which all empirical psychology rests1 between two essentially distinct questions--one metaphysical1 ,what is the simplest element of knowledge8 the other physiological1 ,what are the conditions in the individual human organism in virtue of which it becomes a vehicle of knowledge8 ,though he failed1 however1 to distinguish these questions1 their difference made itself appear in a certain divergence between the second and fourth books of his ,essay4 ,so far we have limited our consideration to passages in the second book1 in which he treats eo nomine of ideas2 of simple ideas as the original of knowledge1 of complex ones as formed in its process4 ,here the physical theory is predominant4 ,the beginning of knowledge is that without which the animal is incapable of it1 viz4 sensation regarded as an impression through #8animal spirits' on the brain4 ,but it can only be so represented because sensation is identified with that which later psychology distinguished from it as ,perception1 and for which no physical theory can account4 ,as we have seen1 the whole theory of this 7the second7 book turns upon the supposition that the simple idea of sensation is in every case an idea of a sensible quality1 and that it is so1 not merely for us1 considering it ex parte post1 but consciously for the individual subject1 which can mean nothing else than that it distinguishes itself from1 and refers itself to1 a thing4 ,locke himself1 indeed1 according to his plan of bringing in a #8faculty of the mind' whenever it is convenient1 would perhaps rather have said that it is so distinguished and referred #8by the mind4' ,he considers the simple idea not1 as it truly is1 the mind itself in a certain relation1 but a datum or material of the mind1 upon which it performs certain operations as upon something other than itself1 though all the while it is constituted1 at least in its actuality1 by this material4 ,between the reference of the simple idea to the thing1 however1 by itself and #8by the mind1' there is no essential difference4 ,in either case the reference is inconsistent with the simplicity of the simple idea2 and if the latter expression avoids the seeming awkwardness of ascribing activity to the idea1 it yet ascribes it to the mind in that elementary stage in which1 according to ,locke1 it is merely receptive4 ,and is equivalent to what he afterwards calls #8knowledge of identity'4 ,only as such can it be named4 #be4 ,so much for the theory #8of ideas4' ,as if1 however1 in treating of ideas he had been treating of anything else than knowledge1 he afterwards considers #8knowledge' in a book by itself 7the fourth7 under that title1 and here the question as to the relation between idea and thing comes before him in a somewhat different shape4 ,according to his well-known definition1 knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas4 ,the agreement or disagreement may be of four sorts4 ,it may be in the way 7#a7 of identity1 7#b7 of relation1 7#c7 of co-existence1 7#d7 of real existence4 ,in his account of the last sort of agreement1 it may be remarked by the way1 he departs at once and openly from his definition1 making it an agreement1 not of idea with idea1 but of an idea with #8actual real existence4' ,the fatal but connatural wound in his system1 which this inconsistency marks1 will appear more fully below4 ,for the present1 our concern is for the adjustment of the definition of knowledge to the doctrine of the simple idea as the beginning of knowledge4 ,according to the definition1 it cannot be the simple idea1 as such1 that constitutes this beginning1 but only the perception of agreement or disagreement between simple ideas4 #8,there could be no room1' says ,locke distinctly1 #8for any positive knowledge at all1 if we could not distinguish any relation between our ideas4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 i4 sec4 #e47 ,yet in the very context where he makes this statement1 the perception of relation is put as a distinct kind of knowledge apart from others4 ,in his account of the other kinds1 however1 he is faithful to his definition1 and treats each as a perception 7i4e4 a judgment7 of a relation in the way of agreement or disagreement4 ,the primary knowledge is that of identity--the knowledge of an idea as identical with itself4 #8,a man infallibly knows1 as soon as ever he has them in his mind1 that the ideas he calls white and round1 are the very ideas they are1 and not other ideas which he calls red and square4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 i4 sec4 #d47 ,now1 as ,hume afterwards pointed out1 identity is not simple unity4 ,it cannot be predicated of the #8idea' as merely single1 but only as a manifold in singleness4 ,to speak of an idea as the #8same with itself' is unmeaning unless it mean #8same with itself in its manifold appearances' i4e4 unless the idea is distinguished1 as an object existing continuously1 from its present appearance4 ,thus #8the infallible knowledge1' which ,locke describes in the above passage1 consists in this1 that on the occurrence of a certain #8idea' the man recognises it as one1 which at other times of its occurrence he has called #8white4' ,such a #8synthesis of recognition1' however1 expressed by the application of a common term1 implies the reference of a present sensation to a permanent object of thought1 in this case the object thought under the term #8white1' so that the sensation becomes an idea of that object4 ,were there no such objects1 there would be no significant names1 but only noises2 and were the present sensation not so referred1 it would not be named4 ,it may be said indeed that the #8permanent object of thought' is merely the instinctive result of a series of past resembling sensations1 and that the common name is merely the register of this result4 ,but the question is thus merely thrown further back4 ,unless the single fleeting sensation was1 to begin with1 fixed and defined by relation to and distinction from something permanent--in other words1 unless it ceased to be a mere sensation--how did it happen that other sensations were referred to it1 as different cases of an identical phenomenon1 to which the noise suggested by it might be applied as a sign8 ,the same implied in calling it an idea of an object4 #bf4 ,this primary distinction and relation of the simple idea ,locke implicitly acknowledges when he substitutes for the simple idea1 as in the passage last quoted1 the man's knowledge that he has the idea2 for such knowledge implies the distinction of the idea from its permanent conscious subject1 and its determination by that negative relation4 #a ,thus determined1 it becomes itself a permanent object1 or 7which comes to the same7 an idea of an object2 a phrase which ,locke at his convenience substitutes for the mere idea1 whenever it is wanted for making his theory of knowledge square with knowledge itself4 ,once become such an object1 it is a basis to which other sensations1 like and unlike1 may be referred as differentiating attributes4 ,its identity becomes a definite identity4 #a ,cf4 the passage in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #g4 #8,when ideas are in our minds1 we consider them as being actually there4' ,the mere #8idea' is in fact essentially different from the #8consideration of it as actually there1' as sensation is different from thought4 ,the #8consideration1 c41' really means the thought of the #8idea' 7sensation7 as determined by relation to the conscious subject4 ,made for1 not by1 us1 and therefore according to ,locke really existent4 #bg4 ,upon analysis1 then1 of ,locke's account of the most elementary knowledge1 the perception of identity or agreement of an idea with itself1 we find that like the #8simple idea1' which he elsewhere makes the beginning of knowledge1 it really means the reference of a sensation to a conception of a permanent object or subject1 #a either in such a judgment as #8this is white' 7sc4 a white thing71 or in the more elementary one1 #8this is an object to me4' ,in the latter form the judgment represents what ,locke puts as the consciousness1 #8,i have an idea1' or as the #8consideration that the idea is actually there2' in the former it represents what he calls #8the knowledge that the idea which ,i have in my mind and which ,i call white is the very idea it is1 and not the idea which ,i call red4' ,it is only because referred1 as above1 that the sensation is in ,locke's phraseology #8a testimony' or #8report' of something4 ,as we said above1 his notion of the beginning of knowledge is expressed not merely in the formula #8,i have an idea different from other ideas1' but with the addition1 #8which ,i did not make for myself4' #b ,the simple idea is supposed to testify to something without that caused it1 and it is this interpretation of it which makes it with him the ultimate criterion of reality4 ,but unless it were at once distinguished from and referred to both a thing of which it is an effect and a subject of which it is an experience1 it could not in the first place testify to anything1 nor secondly to a thing as made for1 not by1 the subject4 ,this brings us1 however1 upon ,locke's whole theory of #8real existence1' which requires fuller consideration4 #a ,for a recognition by ,locke of the correlativity of these 7of which more will have to be said below7 cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxiii4 sec4 #ae4 #8,whilst ,i know by seeing or hearing1 c41 that there is some corporeal being without me1 the object of that sensation1 ,i do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears4' #b ,cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #a4 ,what did he mean by this8 #bh4 ,it is a theory1 we must premise1 which is nowhere explicitly stated4 ,it has to be gathered chiefly from those passages of the second book in which he treats of #8complex' or #8artificial' ideas in distinction from simple ones1 which are necessarily real1 and from the discussion in the fourth book of the #8extent' and #8reality' of knowledge4 ,we have1 however1 to begin with1 in the enumeration of simple ideas1 a mention of #8existence1' as one of those #8received alike through all the ways of sensation and reflection4' ,it is an idea #8suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within4 ,when ideas are in our minds1 we consider them as being actually there1 as well as we consider things to be actually without us2 which is1 that they exist1 or have existence4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #g47 #bi4 ,the two considerations here mentioned1 of #8ideas as actually in our minds1' of #8things as actually without us1' are meant severally to represent the two ways of reflection and sensation1 by which the idea of existence is supposed to be suggested4 ,but sensation1 according to ,locke1 is an organ of #8ideas1' just as much as reflection4 ,taking his doctrine strictly1 there are no #8objects' but #8ideas' to suggest the idea of existence1 whether by the way of sensation or by that of reflection1 and no ideas that are not #8in the mind4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #c1 c47 ,existence as the mere presence of a feeling4 #cj4 ,the designation of the idea of existence1 then1 as #8suggested by every idea within1' covers every possible suggestion4 ,it can mean nothing else than that it is given in every act and mode of consciousness2 that it is inseparable from feeling as such1 being itself at the same time a distinct simple idea4 ,this1 we may remark by the way1 involves the conclusion that every idea is composite1 made up of whatever distinguishes it from other ideas together with the idea of existence4 ,of this idea of existence itself1 however1 it will be impossible to say anything distinctive2 for1 as it accompanies all possible objects of consciousness1 there will be no cases where it is absent to be distinguished from those where it is present4 ,not merely will it be undefinable1 as every simple idea is2 it will be impossible #8to send a man to his senses' 7according to ,locke's favourite subterfuge7 in order to know what it is1 since it is neither given in one sense as distinct from another1 nor in all senses as distinct from any other modification of consciousness4 ,thus regarded1 to treat it as a simple idea alongside of other simple ideas is a palpable contradiction4 ,it is the mere #8,it is felt1' the abstraction of consciousness1 no more to be reckoned as one among other ideas than colour in general is to be co-ordinated with red1 white1 and blue4 ,whether ,i smell a rose in the summer or recall the smell in winter2 whether ,i see a horse or a ghost1 or imagine a centaur or think of gravitation or the philosopher's stone--in every case alike the idea or #8immediate object of the mind' exists4 ,yet we find ,locke distinguishing between real ideas1 as those that #8have a conformity with the existence of things1' and fantastic ideas1 as those which have no such conformity 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxx4 sec4 #a72 and again in the fourth book 7chap4 i4 sec4 #g1 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ba1 c47 he makes the perception of the agreement of an idea with existence a special kind of knowledge1 different from that of agreement of idea with idea2 and having done so1 raises the question whether we have such a knowledge of existence at all1 and decides that our knowledge of it is very narrow4 ,existence as reality4 #ca4 ,how are such a distinction and such a question to be reconciled with the attribution of existence to every idea8 ,the answer of course will be1 that when he speaks of ideas as not conforming to existence1 and makes knowledge or the agreement of ideas with each other something different from their agreement with existence1 he means and generally says #8real actual existence1' or the #8existence of things1' i4e4 an existence1 whatever it be1 which is opposed to mere existence in consciousness4 ,doubtless he so means1 but this implies that upon mere consciousness1 or the simple presence of ideas1 there has supervened a distinction1 which has to be accounted for1 of ideas from things which they represent on the one hand1 and from a mind of which they are affections on the other4 ,even in the passage first quoted 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #g71 where existence is ascribed to every idea1 on looking closely we find this distinction obtruding itself1 though without explicit acknowledgment4 ,in the very same breath1 so to speak1 in which the idea of existence is said to be suggested by every idea1 it is further described as being either of two considerations--either the consideration of an idea as actually in our mind1 or of a thing as actually without us4 ,such considerations at once imply the supervention of that distinction between #8mind' and #8thing1' which gives a wholly new meaning to #8existence4' ,they are not1 in truth1 as ,locke supposed1 two separate considerations1 one or other of which1 as the case may be1 is interchangeable with the #8idea of existence4' ,one is correlative with the other1 and neither is the same as simple feeling4 ,considered as actually in the mind1 the feeling is distinguished from the mind as an affection from the subject thereof1 and just in virtue of this distinction is referred to a thing as the cause of the affection1 or becomes representative of a thing4 ,but for such consideration there would for us1 if the doctrine of ideas means anything1 be no #8thing without us' at all4 ,to #8consider things as actually without us' is to consider them as causes of the ideas in our mind1 and this is to have an idea of existence quite different from mere consciousness4 ,it is to have an idea of it which at once suggests the question whether the existence is real or apparent2 in other words1 whether the thing1 to which an affection of the mind is referred as its cause1 is really its cause or no4 ,by confusion of these two meanings1 reality and its conditions are represented as given in simple feeling4 #cb4 ,between these two meanings of existence--its meaning as interchangeable with simple consciousness1 and its meaning as reality--,locke failed to distinguish4 ,just as1 having announced #8ideas' to be the sole #8materials of knowledge1' he allows himself at his convenience to put #8things' in the place of ideas2 so having identified existence with momentary consciousness or the simple idea1 he substitutes for existence in this sense reality1 and in consequence finds reality given solely in the simple idea4 ,thus when the conceptions of cause or substance1 or relations of any kind1 come under view1 since these cannot be represented as given in momentary consciousness1 they have to be pronounced not to exist1 and since existence is reality1 to be unreal or #8fictions of the mind4' ,but without these unreal relations there could be no knowledge1 and if they are not given in the elements of knowledge1 it is difficult to see how they are introduced1 or to avoid the appearance of constructing knowledge out of the unknown4 ,given in the elements of knowledge1 however1 they cannot be1 if these are simple ideas or momentary recurrences of the #8it is felt4' ,but by help of ,locke's equivocation between the two meanings of existence1 they can be covertly introduced as the real4 ,existence is given in the simple idea1 existence equals the real1 therefore the real is given in the simple idea4 ,but think or speak of the real as we will1 we find that it exhibits itself as substance1 as cause1 and as related2 i4e4 according to ,locke as a #8complex' or #8invented' or #8superinduced' idea4 ,yet reality involves complex ideas which are made by the mind4 #cc4 ,in the second book of his ,essay1 which treats of ideas1 he makes the grand distinction between #8the simple ideas which are all from things themselves1 and of which the mind can have no more or other than what are suggested to it1' and the #8complex ideas which are the workmanship of the mind4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii47 ,in his account of the latter there are some curious cross-divisions1 but he finally enumerates them as ideas either of modes1 substances1 or relations4 ,the character of these ideas he then proceeds to explain in the order given1 one after the other1 and as if each were independent of the rest2 though according to his own statement the idea of mode presupposes that of substance1 and the idea of substance involves that of relation4 #8,modes ,i call such complex ideas1 which1 however compounded1 contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves1 but are considered as dependencies on1 or affections of1 substances2 such are the ideas signified by the words #8triangle1' #8gratitude1' #8murder1' c4 ,of these there are two sorts4 ,first1 there are some which are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea without the mixture of any other--as a dozen1 or score--which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together2 and these ,i call simple modes1 as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea4 ,secondly1 there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds1 put together to make one complex one2 e4 g4 beauty1 444 and these ,i call mixed modes4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 secs4 #d1 #e47 ,so soon as he comes to speak more in detail of simple modes1 he falls into apparent contradiction with his doctrine that1 as complex ideas1 they are the mere workmanship of the mind4 ,all particular sounds and colours are simple modes of the simple ideas of sound and colour4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xviii4 sees4 #c1 #d47 ,again1 the ideas of figure1 place1 distance1 as of all particular figures1 places1 and distances1 are simple modes of the simple idea of space4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xiii47 ,to maintain1 however1 that the ideas of space1 sound1 or colour in general 7as simple ideas7 were taken from things themselves1 while those of particular spaces1 sounds1 and colours 7as complex ideas7 were #8made by the mind1' was for ,locke impossible4 ,thus in the very next chapter after that in which he has opposed all complex ideas1 those of simple modes included1 as made by the mind to all simple ones as taken from things themselves1 he speaks of simple modes #8either as found in things existing1 or as made by the mind within itself4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #a47 ,it was not for ,locke to get over this confusion by denying the antithesis between that which the mind #8makes' and that which it #8takes from existing things' and for the present we must leave it as it stands4 ,we must further note that a mode being considered #8as an affection of a substance1' space must be to the particular spaces which are its simple modes1 as a substance to its modifications4 ,so too colour to particular colours1 c41 c4 ,but the idea of a substance is a complex idea #8framed by the mind4' ,therefore the idea of space--at any rate such an idea as we have of it when we think of distances1 places1 or figures1 and when else do we think of it at all8--must be a complex and artificial idea4 ,but according to ,locke the idea of space is emphatically a simple idea1 given immediately both by sight and touch1 concerning which if a man enquire1 he #8sends him to his senses4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 v47 ,such are substance and relation which must be found in every object of knowledge4 #cd4 ,these contradictions are not avoidable blunders1 due to carelessness or want of a clear head in the individual writer1 #8,the complex idea of substance' will not be exorcised2 the mind will show its workmanship in the very elements of knowledge towards which its relation seems most passive--in the #8existing things' which are the conditions of its experience no less than in the individual's conscious reaction upon them4 ,the interrogator of the individual consciousness seeks to know that consciousness1 and just for that reason must find in it at every stage those formal conceptions1 such as substance and cause1 without which there can be no object of knowledge at all4 ,he thus substantiates sensation1 while he thinks that he merely observes it1 and calls it a sensible thing4 ,sensations1 thus unconsciously transformed1 are for him the real1 the actually existent4 ,whatever is not given by immediate sense1 outer or inner1 he reckons a mere #8thing of the mind4' ,the ideas of substance and relation1 then1 not being given by sense1 must in his eyes be things of the mind1 in distinction from1 really existent things4 ,but speech bewrayeth him4 ,he cannot state anything that he knows save in terms which imply that substance and relation are in the things known2 and hence an inevitable obtrusion of #8things of the mind' in the place of real existence1 just where the opposition between them is being insisted on4 ,again1 as a man seems to observe consciousness in himself and others1 it has nothing that it has not received4 ,it is a blank to begin with1 but passive of that which is without1 and through its passivity it becomes informed4 ,if the #8mind1' then1 means this or that individual consciousness1 the things of the mind must be gradually developed from an original passivity4 ,on the other hand1 let anyone try to know this original passive consciousness1 and in it1 as in every other known object-matter1 he must find these things of the mind1 substance and relations4 ,if nature is the object1 he must find them in nature2 if his own self-consciousness1 he must find them in that consciousness4 ,but while nature knows not what is in herself1 self-consciousness1 it would seem1 ex vi termini1 does know4 ,therefore not merely substance and relation must be found in the original consciousness1 but the knowledge1 the ideas1 of them4 ,abstract idea of substance and complex ideas of particular sorts of substance4 #ce4 ,as we follow ,locke's treatment of these ideas more in detail1 we shall find the logical see-saw1 here accounted for1 appearing with scarcely a disguise4 ,his account of the origin of the #8complex ideas of substances' is as follows4 #8,the mind being furnished with a great number of the simple ideas1 conveyed in by the senses1 as they are found in exterior things1 or by reflection on its own operations1 takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together2 which being presumed to belong to one thing1 and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick despatch1 are called1 so united in one subject1 by one name2 which by inadvertency we are apt afterwards to talk of and consider as one simple idea1 which indeed is a complication of many ideas together2 because1 as ,i have said1 not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves1 we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum1 wherein they do subsist1 and from which they do result2 which therefore we call substance4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #a47 ,in the controversy with ,stillingfleet1 which arose out of this chapter1 ,locke was constrained further to distinguish 7as he certainly did not do in the original text7 between the #8ideas of distinct substances1 such as man1 horse1' and the #8general idea of substance4' ,it is to ideas of the former sort that he must be taken to refer in the above passage1 when he speaks of them as formed by #8complication of many ideas together1' and these alone are complex in the strict sense4 ,the general idea of substance on the other hand1 which like all general ideas 7according to ,locke7 is made by abstraction1 means the idea of a #8substratum which we accustom ourselves to suppose' as that wherein the complicated ideas #8do subsist1 and from which they do result4' ,this1 however1 he regards as itself one1 #8the first and chief1' among the ideas which make up any of the #8distinct substances4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #f47 ,nor is he faithful to the distinction between the general and the complex4 ,in one passage of the first letter to ,stillingfleet1 he distinctly speaks of the general idea of substance as a #8complex idea made up of the idea of something plus that of relation to qualities4' #a ,notwithstanding this confusion of terms1 however1 he no doubt had before him what seemed a clear distinction between the #8abstract general idea' of substance1 as such1 i4e4 of #8something related as a support to accidents1' but which does not include ideas of any particular accidents1 and the composite idea of a substance1 made up of a multitude of simple ideas plus that of the something related to them as a support4 ,we shall find each of these ideas1 according to ,locke's statement1 presupposing the other4 #a ,upon a reference to the chapter on #8complex ideas' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xii471 it will appear that the term is used in a stricter and a looser sense4 ,in the looser sense it is not confined to compound ideas1 but in opposition to simple ones includes those of relation and even #8abstract general ideas4' ,when ,locke thinks of the general idea of substance apart from the complication of accidents referred to it1 he opposes it to the complex idea1 according to the stricter sense of that term4 ,on the other hand1 when he thinks of it as #8made up' of the idea of something plus that of relation to qualities 7as if there could be an idea of something apart from such relation71 it seems to him to have two elements1 and therefore to be complex4 ,the abstract idea according to ,locke at once precedes and follows the complex4 #cf4 ,in the passage above quoted1 our aptness to consider a complication of simple ideas1 which we notice to go constantly together1 as one simple idea1 is accounted for as the result of a presumption that they belong to one thing4 ,this presumption is again described in the words that #8we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum1 wherein they do subsist1 and from which they do result2 which therefore we call substance4' ,here it is implied that the idea of substance1 i4e4 #8the general idea of something related as a support to accidents1' is one gradually formed upon observation of the regular coincidence of certain simple ideas4 ,in the sequel 7sec4 #c of the same chapter ,i4 xxiii47 we are told that such an idea--#8an obscure and relative idea of substance in general--being thus made1 we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are1 by experience and observation of men's senses1 taken notice of to exist together4' ,thus a general idea of substance having been formed by one gradual process1 ideas of particular sorts of substances are formed by another and later one4 ,but then the very same #8collection of such combinations of simple ideas as are taken notice of to exist together1' which 7according to sec4 #c7 constitutes the later process and follows upon the formation of the general idea of substance1 has been previously described as preceding and conditioning that formation4 ,it is the complication of simple ideas1 noticed to go constantly together1 that 7according to sec4 #a7 leads to the #8idea of substance in general4' ,to this see-saw between the process preceding and that following the formation of the idea in question must be added the difficulty1 that ,locke's account makes the general idea precede the particular1 which is against the whole tenor of his doctrine of abstraction as an operation whereby #8the mind makes the particular ideas1 received from particular objects1 to become general4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #i47 ,reference of ideas to nature or ,god1 the same as reference to substance4 #cg4 ,it may be said perhaps that ,locke's self-contradiction in this regard is more apparent than real2 that the two processes of combining simple ideas are essentially different1 just because in the later process they are combined by a conscious act of the mind as accidents of a #8something1' of which the general idea has been previously formed1 whereas in the earlier one they are merely presented together #8by nature1' and1 ex hypothesi1 though they gradually suggest1 do not carry with them any reference to a #8substratum4' ,but upon this we must remark that the presentation of ideas #8by nature' or #8by ,god1' though a mode of speech of which ,locke in his account of the origin of knowledge freely avails himself1 means nothing else than their relation to a #8substratum1' if not #8wherein they do subsist1' yet #8from which they do result4' ,if then it is for consciousness that ideas are presented together by nature1 they already carry with them that reference to a substratum which is supposed gradually to result from their concurrence4 ,if it is not for consciousness that they are so presented1 if they do not severally carry with them a reference to #8something1' how is it they come to do so in the gross8 ,if a single sensation of heat is not referred to a hot thing1 why should it be so referred on the thousandth recurrence8 ,because perhaps1 recurring constantly in the same relations1 it compels the inference of permanent antecedents8 ,but the #8same relations' mean relations to the same things1 and the observation of these relations presupposes just that conception of the thing which it is sought to account for1 ,but it is explicitly to substance that ,locke makes them refer themselves4 #ch4 ,we are estopped1 however1 from any such explanation of ,locke as would suggest these ulterior questions by his explicit statement that #8all simple ideas1 all sensible qualities1 carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist in1 and of a substance wherein they inhere4' ,the vindication of himself against the pathetic complaint of ,stillingfleet1 that he had #8almost discarded substance out of the reasonable part of the world1' in which this statement occurs1 was certainly not needed4 ,already in the original text the simple ideas1 of which the association suggests the idea of substance1 are such as #8the mind finds in exterior things or by reflection on its own operations4' ,but to find them in an exterior thing is to find them in a substance1 a #8something it knows not what1' regarded as outward1 just as to find them by reflection on its own operations1 as its own1 is to find them in such a substance regarded as inward4 ,the process then by which1 according to ,locke1 the general idea of substance is arrived at1 presupposes this idea just as much as the process1 by which ideas of particular sorts of substances are got1 presupposes it1 and the distinction between the two processes1 as he puts it1 disappears4 ,in the process by which we are supposed to arrive at complex ideas of substances the beginning is the same as the end4 #ci4 ,the same paralogism appears under a slightly altered form when it is stated 7in the first letter to ,stillingfleet7 that the idea of substance as the #8general indetermined idea of something is by the abstraction of the mind derived from the simple ideas of sensation and reflection4' ,now #8abstraction' with ,locke means the #8separation of an idea from all other ideas that accompany it in its real existence4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #a47 ,it is clear then that it is impossible to abstract an idea which is not there1 in real existence1 to be abstracted4 ,accordingly1 if the #8general idea of something' is derived by abstraction from simple ideas of sensation and reflection1 it must be originally given with these ideas1 or it would not afterwards be separated from them4 ,conversely they must carry this idea with them1 and cannot be simple ideas at all1 but compound ones1 each made up of #8the general idea of something or being1' and of an accident which this something supports4 ,how then does the general idea of substance or #8something1' as derived1 differ from the idea of #8something1' as given in the original ideas of sensation and reflection from which the supposed process of abstraction starts8 ,what can be said of the one that cannot be said of the other8 ,if the derived general idea is of something related to qualities1 what1 according to ,locke1 are the original ideas but those of qualities related to something8 ,it is true that the general idea is of something1 of which nothing further is known1 related to qualities in general1 not to any particular qualities4 ,but the #8simple idea' in like manner can only be of an indeterminate quality1 for in order to any determination of it1 the idea must be put together with another idea1 and so cease to be simple2 and the #8something1' to which it is referred1 must for the same reason be a purely indeterminate something4 ,if1 in order to avoid concluding that ,locke thus unwittingly identified the abstract general idea of substance with any simple idea1 we say that the simple idea1 because not abstract1 is not indeterminate but of a real quality1 defined by manifold relations1 we fall upon the new difficulty that1 if so1 not only does the simple idea become manifoldly complex1 but just such an #8idea of a particular sort of substance' as1 according to ,locke1 is derived from the derived idea of substance in general4 ,as an idea of a quality1 it is also necessarily an idea of a correlative #8something2' and if it is an idea of a quality in its reality1 i4e4 as determined by various relations1 it must be an idea of a variously qualified something1 i4e4 of a particular substance4 ,then not merely the middle of the twofold process by which we are supposed to get at #8complex ideas of substances'--i4e4 the abstract something2 but its end--i4e4 the particular something--turns out to be the same as its beginning4 ,doctrine of abstraction inconsistent with doctrine of complex ideas4 #dj4 ,the fact is1 that in making the general idea of substance precede particular ideas of sorts of substances 7as he certainly however confusedly does1 in the #bcrd chapter of the ,second ,book1 #a as well as by implication in his doctrine of modes4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #d71 ,locke stumbled upon a truth which he was not aware of1 and which will not fit into his ordinary doctrine of general ideas3 the truth that knowledge is a process from the more abstract to the more concrete1 not the reverse1 as is commonly supposed1 and as ,locke's definition of abstraction implies4 ,throughout his prolix discussion of #8substance' and #8essence' we find two opposite notions perpetually cross each other3 one that knowledge begins with the simple idea1 the other that it begins with the real thing as particularized by manifold relations4 ,according to the former notion1 simple ideas being given1 void of relation1 as the real1 the mind of its own act proceeds to bring them into relation and compound them3 according to the latter1 a thing of various properties 7i4e4 relations #b7 being given as the real1 the mind proceeds to separate these from each other4 ,according to the one notion the intellectual process1 as one of complication1 ends just where1 according to the other notion1 as one of abstraction1 it began4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ce4 #b ,cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #cg4 ,most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances are only powers 444 e4g4 the greater part of the ideas which make up our complex idea of gold 444 are nothing else but so many relations to other substances4' ,the confusion covered by use of #8particulars'4 #da4 ,the chief verbal equivocation1 under which ,locke disguises the confusion of these two notions1 is to be found in the use of the word #8particular1' which is sometimes used for the mere individual having no community with anything else1 sometimes for the thing qualified by relation to a multitude of other things4 ,the simple idea or sensation2 the #8something' which the simple idea is supposed to #8report1' and which ,locke at his pleasure identifies with it2 the complex idea2 and the thing as the collection of the properties which the simple idea #8reports1' all are merged by ,locke under the one term #8particulars4' ,as the only consistency in his use of the term seems to lie in its opposition to #8generals1' we naturally turn to the passage where this opposition is spoken of most at large4 ,locke's account of abstract general ideas4 #db4 #8,general and universal belong not to the real existence of things1 but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding1 made by it for its own use1 and concern only signs1 whether words or ideas4 ,words are general when used for signs of general ideas1 and so are applicable indifferently to many particular things2 and ideas are general1 when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things2 but universality belongs not to things themselves1 which are all of them particular in their existence1 even those words and ideas which in their signification are general4 ,when therefore we quit particulars1 the generals that rest are only creatures of our own making1 their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding1 of signifying or representing many particulars4 ,for the signification they have is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them4 444 ,the sorting of things under names is the workmanship of the understanding1 taking occasion from the similitude it observes among them to make abstract general ideas1 and set them up in the mind1 with names annexed to them1 as patterns or forms 7for in that sense the word form has a very proper signification71 to which as particular things are found to agree1 so they come to be of that species1 have that denomination1 or are put into that classis4 ,for when we say this is a man1 that a horse2 this justice1 that cruelty1 what do we else but rank things under different specific names1 as agreeing to those abstract ideas1 of which we have made those names the signs8 ,and what are the essences of those species1 set out and marked by names1 but those abstract ideas in the mind2 which are1 as it were1 the bonds between particular things that exist1 and the names they are to be ranked under8' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 secs4 #aa and #ac47 #8,things not general4' #dc4 ,in the first of these remarkable passages we begin with the familiar opposition between ideas as #8the creatures of the mind' and real things4 ,ideas1 and the words which express them1 may be general1 but things cannot4 #8,they are all of them particular in their existence4' ,then the ideas and words themselves appear as things1 and as such #8in their existence' can only be particular4 ,it is only in its signification1 i4e4 in its relation to other ideas which it represents1 that an idea1 particular itself1 becomes general1 and this relation does not belong to the #8existence' of the idea or to the idea in itself1 but #8by the mind of man is added to it4' ,the relation being thus a fictitious addition to reality1 #8general and universal are mere inventions and creatures of the understanding4' ,the next passage1 in spite of the warning that all ideas are particular in their existence1 still speaks of general ideas1 but only as #8set up in the mind4' ,to these #8particular things existing are found to agree1' and the agreement is expressed in such judgments as #8this is a man1 that a horse2 this is justice1 that cruelty2' the #8this' and #8that' representing #8particular existing things1' #8horse' and #8cruelty' abstract general ideas to which these are found to agree4 ,generality an invention of the mind4 #dd4 ,one antithesis is certainly maintained throughout these passages--that between #8real existence which is always particular1 and the workmanship of the mind1' which #8invents' generality4 ,real existence1 however1 is ascribed 7a7 to things themselves1 7b7 to words and ideas1 even those which become of general signification1 7c7 to mixed modes1 for in the proposition #8this is justice1' the #8this' must represent a mixed mode4 7,cf4 ,,ii4 xii4 #e47 ,the characteristic of the #8really existent1' which distinguishes it from the workmanship of the mind1 would seem to be mere individuality1 exclusive of all relation4 ,the simple #8this' and #8that1' apart from the relation expressed in the judgment1 being mere individuals1 are really existent2 and conversely1 ideas1 which in themselves have real existence1 when a relation1 in virtue of which they become significant1 has been #8added to them by the mind1' become #8inventions of the understanding4' ,this consists with the express statement in the chapter on #8relation' 7,,ii4 xxv4 #h71 that it is #8not contained in the existence of things1 but is something extraneous and superinduced4' ,thus generality1 as a relation between any one of a multitude of single 7not necessarily simple7 ideas1 e4g4 single ideas of horses1 and all the rest--a relation which belongs not to any one of them singly--is superinduced by the understanding upon their real1 i4e4 their single existence4 ,apart from this relation1 it would seem1 or in their mere singleness1 even ideas of mixed modes1 e4g4 this act of justice1 may have real existence4 ,the result is1 that the feeling of each moment is alone real4 #de4 ,the result of ,locke's statement1 thus examined1 clearly is that real existence belongs to the present momentary act of consciousness1 and to that alone4 ,ascribed as it is to the #8thing itself1' to the idea which1 as general1 has it not1 and to the mixed mode1 it is in each case the momentary presence to consciousness that constitutes it4 ,to a thing itself1 as distinct from the presentation to consciousness1 it cannot belong1 for such a #8thing' means that which remains identical with itself under manifold appearances1 and both identity and appearance imply relation1 i4e4 #8an invention of the mind4' ,as little can it belong to the content of any idea1 since this is in all cases constituted by relation to other ideas4 ,thus if ,i judge #8this is sweet1' the real existence lies in the simple #8this1' in the mere form of presentation at an individual now1 not in the relation of this to other flavours which constitutes the determinate sweetness1 or to a sweetness at other times tasted4 ,if ,i judge #8this is a horse1' a present vision really exists1 but not so its relation to other sensations of sight or touch1 closely precedent or sequent1 which make up the #8total impression2' much less its relation to other like impressions thought of1 in consideration of which a common name is applied to it4 ,if1 again1 ,i judge #8this is an act of justice1' the present thought of the act1 as present1 really exists2 not so those relations of the act which either make it just1 or make me apply the name to it4 ,it is true that according to this doctrine the #8really existent' is the unmeaning1 and that any statement about it is impossible4 ,we cannot judge of it without bringing it into relation1 in which it ceases to be what in its mere singleness it is1 and thus loses its reality1 overlaid by the #8invention of the understanding4' ,nay1 if we say that it is the mere #8this' or #8that1' as such--the simple #8here' and #8now'--the very #8this1' in being mentioned or judged of1 becomes related to other things which we have called #8this1' and the #8now' to other #8nows4' ,thus each acquires a generality1 and with it becomes fictitious4 ,as ,plato long ago taught--though the lesson seems to require to be taught anew to each generation of philosophers--a consistent sensationalism must be speechless4 ,locke1 himself1 in one of the passages quoted1 implicitly admits this by indicating that only through relations or in their generality are ideas #8significant4' ,how ,locke avoids this result4 #df4 ,he was not the man1 however1 to become speechless out of sheer consistency4 ,he has a redundancy of terms and tropes for disguising from himself and his reader the real import of his doctrine4 ,in the latter part of the passage quoted we find that the relation or community between ideas1 which the understanding invents1 is occasioned by a #8similitude which it observes among things4' ,the general idea having been thus invented1 #8things are found to agree with it'--as is natural since they suggested it4 ,hereupon we are forced to ask how1 if all relation is superinduced upon real existence by the understanding1 an observed relation of similitude among things can occasion the superinduction2 and again how it happens1 if all generality of ideas is a fiction of the mind1 that #8things are found to agree with general ideas4' ,how can the real existence called #8this' or #8that1' which only really exists so far as nothing can be said of it but that it is #8this' or #8that1' agree with anything whatever8 ,agreement implies some content1 some determination by properties1 i4e4 by relations1 in the things agreeing1 whereas the really existent excludes relation4 ,how then can it agree with the abstract general idea1 the import of which1 according to ,locke's own showing1 depends solely on relation8 ,the #8particular' was to him the individual qualified by general relations4 #dg4 ,such questions did not occur to ,locke1 because while asserting the mere individuality of things existent1 and the simplicity of all ideas as given1 i4e4 as real1 he never fully recognised the meaning of his own assertion4 ,under the shelter of the ambiguous #8particular' he could at any time substitute for the mere individual the determinate individual1 or individual qualified by community with other things2 just as1 again1 under covering of the #8simple idea' he could substitute for the mere momentary consciousness the perception of a definite thing4 ,thus when he speaks of the judgment #8this is gold' as expressing the agreement of a real 7i4e4 individual7 thing with a general idea1 he thinks of #8this' a already having1 apart from the judgment1 the determination which it first receives in the judgment4 ,he thinks of it1 in other words1 not as the mere #8perishing' sensation #a or individual void of relation1 but as a sensation symbolical of other possibilities of sensation which1 as so many relations of a thing to us or to other things1 are connoted by the common noun #8gold4' ,it thus #8agrees' with the abstract idea or conception of qualities1 i4e4 because it is already the #8creature of the understanding1' determined by relations which constitute a generality and community between it and other things4 ,such a notion of the really existent thing--wholly inconsistent with his doctrine of relation and of the general--,locke has before him when he speaks of general ideas as formed by abstraction of certain qualities from real things1 or of certain ideas from other ideas that accompany them in real existence4 #8,when some one first lit on a parcel of that sort of substance we denote by the word gold1 444 its peculiar colour1 perhaps1 and weight were the first he abstracted from it1 to make the complex idea of that species 444 another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness 444 another its ductility and solubility in aqua regia4 ,these1 or part of these1 put together1 usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call gold4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #i47 ,here the supposition is that a thing1 multitudinously qualified1 is given apart from any action of the understanding1 which then proceeds to act in the way of successively detaching 7#8abstracting'7 these qualities and recombining them as the idea of a species4 ,such a recombination1 indeed1 would seem but wasted labour4 ,the qualities are assumed to be already found by the understanding and found as in a thing2 otherwise the understanding could not abstract them from it4 ,why should it then painfully put together in imperfect combination what has been previously given to it complete8 ,of the complex idea which results from the work of abstraction1 nothing can be said but a small part of what is predicable of the known thing which the possibility of such abstraction presupposes4 #a #8,all impressions are perishing existences4'--,hume4 ,see below1 paragraph #bjh4 ,this is the real thing from which abstraction is supposed to start4 #dh4 #8,the complex idea of a species1' spoken of in the passage last quoted1 corresponds to what1 in ,locke's theory of substance1 is called the #8idea of a particular sort of substance4' ,in considering that theory we saw that1 according to his account1 the beginning of the process by which the #8abstract idea of substance' was formed1 was either that abstract idea itself1 the mere #8something1' or by a double contradiction the #8complex idea of a particular sort of substance' which yet we only come to have after the abstract idea has been formed4 ,in the passage now before us there is no direct mention of the abstraction of the #8substratum1' as such1 but only of the quality1 and hence there is no ambiguity about the paralogism4 ,it is not a mere #8something' that the man #8lights upon1' and thus it is not this that holds the place at once of the given and the derived but a something having manifold qualities to be abstracted4 ,in other words1 it is the #8idea of a particular sort of substance' that he starts from1 and it is just this again to which as a #8complex idea of a species1' his understanding is supposed gradually to lead him4 ,the understanding1 indeed1 according to ,locke1 is never adequate to nature1 and accordingly the qualities abstracted and recombined in the complex idea always fall vastly short of the fulness of those given in the real thing2 or as he states it in terms of the multiplication table 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #aj71 #8some who have examined this species more accurately could1 ,i believe1 enumerate ten times as many properties in gold1 all of them as inseparable from its internal constitution1 as its colour or weight2 and it is probable if any one knew all the properties that are by divers men known of this metal1 there would an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold1 as any one man has yet in his2 and yet perhaps that would not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it4' ,these two million properties1 and upwards1 which await abstraction in gold1 are all1 it must be noted1 according to ,locke's statement elsewhere 7,book ,,ii4 chap xxiii4 sec4 #cg71 #8nothing but so many relations to other substances4' ,it is just on account of these multitudinous relations of the real thing that the understanding is inadequate to its comprehension4 ,yet according to ,locke's doctrine of relation these must all be themselves #8superinductions of the mind1' and the greater the fulness which they constitute1 the further is the distance from the mere individuality which elsewhere1 in contrast with the fictitiousness of #8generals1' appears as the equivalent of real existence4 ,yet1 according to the doctrine of relation1 a creation of thought4 #di4 ,the real thing and the creation of the understanding thus change places4 ,that which is given to the understanding as the real1 which it finds and does not make1 is not now the bare atom upon which relations have to be artificially superinduced4 ,nor is it the mere present feeling1 which has #8by the mind of man' to be made #8significant1' or representative of past experience4 ,it is itself an inexhaustible complex of relations1 whether they are considered as subsisting between it and other things1 or between the sensations which it is #8fitted to produce in us4' ,these are the real1 which is thus a system1 a community2 and if the #8general1' as ,locke says1 is that which #8has the capacity of representing many particulars1' the real thing itself is general1 for it represents--nay1 is constituted by--the manifold particular feelings which1 mediately or immediately1 it excites in us4 ,on the other hand1 the invention of the understanding1 instead of giving #8significance' or content to the mere individuality of the real1 as it does according to ,locke's theory of #8generals1' now appears as detaching fragments from the fulness of the real to recombine them in an #8abstract essence' of its own4 ,instead of adding complexity to the simple1 it subtracts from the complex4 ,summary of the above contradictions4 #ej4 ,to gather up1 then1 the lines of contradiction which traverse ,locke's doctrine of real existence as it appears in his account of general and complex ideas3--,the idea of substance is an abstract general idea1 not given directly in sensation or reflection1 but #8invented by the understanding1' as by consequence must be ideas of particular sorts of substances which presuppose the abstract idea4 ,on the other hand1 the ideas of sensation and reflection1 from which the idea of substance is abstracted1 and to which as real it as an invention is opposed1 are ideas of #8something1' and are only real as representative of something4 ,but this idea of something the idea of substance4 ,therefore the idea of substance is the presupposition1 and the condition of the reality1 of the very ideas from which it is said to be derived4 ,again1 if the general idea of substance is got by abstraction1 it must be originally given in conjunction with the ideas of sensation or reflection from which it is afterwards abstracted1 i4e4 separated4 ,but in such conjunction it constitutes the ideas of particular sorts of substances4 ,therefore these latter ideas1 which yet we #8come to have' after the general idea of substance1 form the prior experience from which this general idea is abstracted4 ,further1 this original experience1 from which abstraction starts1 being of #8sorts of substances1' and these sorts being constituted by relations1 it follows that relation is given in the original experience4 ,but that which is so given is #8real existence' in opposition to the invention of the understanding4 ,therefore these relations1 and the community which they constitute1 really exist4 ,on the other hand1 mere individuals alone really exist1 while relations between them are superinduced by the mind4 ,once more1 the simple idea given in sensation or reflection1 as it is made for not by us1 has or results from real existence1 whereas general and complex ideas are the workmanship of the mind4 ,but this workmanship consists in the abstraction of ideas from each other1 and from that to which they are related as qualities4 ,it thus presupposes at once the general idea of #8something' or substance1 and the complex idea of qualities of the something4 ,therefore it must be general and complex ideas that are real1 as made for and not by us1 and that afford the inventive understanding its material4 ,yet if so--if they are given--why make them over again by abstraction and recomplication8 ,they cannot be overcome without violence to ,locke's fundamental principles4 #ea4 ,we may get over the last difficulty1 indeed1 by distinguishing between the complex and confused1 between abstraction and analysis4 ,we may say that what is originally given in experience is the confused1 which to us is simple1 or in other words has no definite content1 because1 till it has been analysed1 nothing can be said of it1 though in itself it is infinitely complex2 that thus the process1 which ,locke roughly calls abstraction1 and which1 as he describes it1 consists merely in taking grains from the big heap that is given in order to make a little heap of one's own1 is yet1 rightly understood1 the true process of knowledge--a process which may be said at once to begin with the complex and to end with it1 to take from the concrete and to constitute it1 because it begins with that which is in itself the fulness of reality1 but which only becomes so for us as it is gradually spelt out by our analysis4 ,to put the case thus1 however1 is not to correct ,locke's statement1 but wholly to change his doctrine4 ,it renders futile his easy method of #8sending a man to his senses' for the discovery of reality1 and destroys the supposition that the elements of knowledge can be ascertained by the interrogation of the individual consciousness4 ,such consciousness can tell nothing of its own beginning1 if of this beginning1 as of the purely indefinite1 nothing can be said2 if it only becomes defined through relations1 which in its state of primitive potentiality are not actually in it4 ,the senses again1 so far from being1 in that mere passivity which ,locke ascribes to them1 organs of ready-made reality1 can have nothing to tell1 if it is only through the active processes of #8discerning1 comparing1 and compounding1' that they acquire a definite content4 ,but to admit this is nothing else than1 in order to avoid a contradiction of which ,locke was not aware1 to efface just that characteristic of his doctrine which commends it to #8common sense'--the supposition1 namely1 that the simple datum of sense1 as it is for sense or in its mere individuality1 is the real1 in opposition to the #8invention of the mind4' ,that this supposition is to make the real the unmeaning1 the empty1 of which nothing can be said1 he did not see because1 under an unconscious delusion of words1 even while asserting that the names of simple ideas are undefinable 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #d71 which means that nothing can be said of such ideas1 and while admitting that the processes of discerning1 comparing1 and compounding ideas1 which mean nothing else than the bringing them into relation #a or the superinduction upon them of fictions of the mind1 are necessary to constitute even the beginnings of knowledge1 he yet allows himself to invest the simple idea1 as the real1 with those definite qualities which can only accrue to it1 according to his showing1 from the #8inventive' action of the understanding4 #a ,locke only states this explicitly of comparison1 #8an operation of the mind about its ideas1 upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas1 comprehended under relation4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #d47 ,it is clear1 however1 that the same remark must apply to the #8discernment of ideas1' which is strictly correlative to comparison1 and to their composition1 which means that they are brought into relation as constituents of a whole4 ,that these three processes are necessary to constitute the beginnings of knowledge1 according to ,locke1 appears from ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #ae1 taken in connection with what precedes in that chapter4 ,as real existence1 the simple idea carries with it #8invented' relation of cause4 #eb4 ,thus invested1 it is already substance or symbolical of substance1 not a mere feeling but a felt thing1 recognised either under that minimum of qualification which enables us merely to say that it is #8something1' or 7in ,locke's language7 abstract substance1 or under the greater complication of qualities which constitutes a #8particular sort of substance'--gold1 horse1 water1 c4 ,real existence thus means substance4 ,it is not the simple idea or sensation by itself that is real1 but this idea as caused by a thing4 ,it is the thing that is primarily the real2 the idea only secondarily so1 because it results from a power in the thing4 ,as we have seen1 ,locke's doctrine of the necessary adequacy1 reality1 and truth of the simple idea turns upon the supposition that it is1 and announces itself as1 an #8ectype' of an #8archetype4' ,but there is not a different archetype to each sensation2 if there were1 in #8reporting' it the sensation would do no more than report itself4 ,it is the supposed single cause of manifold different sensations or simple ideas1 to which a single name is applied4 #8,if sugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and sweetness1 we are sure there is a power in sugar to produce those ideas in our minds4 444 ,and so each sensation answering the power that operates on any of our senses1 the idea so produced is a real idea 7and not a fiction of the mind1 which has no power to produce any single idea71 and cannot but be adequate 444 and so all simple ideas are adequate4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #b47 ,the sugar1 which is here the #8archetype' and the source of reality in the idea1 is just what ,locke elsewhere calls #8a particular sort of substance1' as the #8something' from which a certain set of sensations result1 and in which1 as sensible qualities1 they inhere4 ,strictly speaking1 however1 according to ,locke1 that which inheres in the thing is not the quality1 as it is to us1 but a power to produce it4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #bh1 and c4 xxiii4 #cg47 ,correlativity of cause and substance4 #ec4 ,in calling a sensation or idea the product of a power1 substance is presupposed just as much as in calling it a sensible quality2 only that with ,locke #8quality' conveyed the notion of inherence in the substance1 power that of relation to an effect not in the substance itself4 #8,secondary qualities are nothing but the powers which substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses1 which ideas are not in the things themselves1 otherwise than as anything is in its cause4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #i47 #8,most of the simple ideas1 that make up our complex ideas of substances1 are only powers 444 or relations to other substances 7or1 as he explains elsewhere1 #8relations to our perceptions1' #a71 and are not really in the substance considered barely in itself4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #cg1 and xxxi4 #h47 ,that this implies the inclusion of the idea of cause in that of substance1 appears from ,locke's statement that #8whatever is considered by us to operate to the producing any particular simple idea which did not before exist1 hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvi4 sec4 #a47 ,thus to be conscious of the reality of a simple idea1 as that which is not made by the subject of the idea1 but results from a power in a thing1 is to have the idea of substance as cause4 ,this latter idea must be the condition of the consciousness of reality4 ,if the consciousness of reality is implied in the beginning of knowledge1 so must the correlative ideas be of cause and substance4 #a ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 sec4 #c4 ,how do we know that ideas correspond to reality of things8 ,locke's answer4 #ed4 ,on examining ,locke's second rehearsal of his theory in the fourth book of the ,essay--that #8,on ,knowledge'--we are led to this result quite as inevitably as in the book #8,on ,ideas4' ,he has a special chapter on the #8reality of human knowledge1' where he puts the problem thus3--#8,it is evident the mind knows not things immediately1 but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them4 ,our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things4 ,but what shall be here the criterion8 ,how shall the mind1 when it perceives nothing but its own ideas1 know that they agree with things themselves8' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #c47 ,it knows this1 he proceeds to show1 in the case of simple ideas1 because #8since the mind can by no means make them to itself1 they must be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way4 444 ,simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies1 but the natural and regular productions of things without us1 really operating upon us2 and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended1 or which our state requires1 for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us2 whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances1' c4 c4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #d47 ,the whole force of this passage depends on the notion that simple ideas are already to the subject of them not his own making1 but the product of a thing1 which in its relation to these ideas is a #8particular sort of substance4' ,it is the reception of such ideas1 so related1 that ,locke calls #8sensitive knowledge of particular existence1' or a #8perception of the mind1 employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 sec4 #ad47 ,this1 however1 he distinguishes from two other #8degrees of knowledge or certainty1' #8intuition' and #8demonstration1' of which the former is attained when the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is perceived immediately1 the latter when it is perceived mediately through the intervention of certain other agreements or disagreements 7less or more71 each of which must in turn be perceived immediately4 ,demonstration1 being thus really but a series of intuitions1 carries the same certainty as intuition1 only it is a certainty which it requires more or less pains and attention to apprehend4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 sec4 #d47 ,of the #8other perception of the mind1 employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us1' which #8passes under the name of knowledge1' he explains that although #8going beyond bare probability1 it reaches not perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty4' #8,there can be nothing more certain1' he proceeds1 #8than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds2 this is intuitive knowledge4 ,but whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds1 whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which corresponds to that idea1 is that whereof some men think there may be a question made2 because men may have such ideas in their minds1 when no such thing exists1 no such object affects their senses4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 sec4 #ad47 ,it assumes that simple ideas are consciously referred to things that cause them4 #ee4 ,it is clear that here in his very statement of the question ,locke begs the answer4 ,if the intuitive certainty is that #8the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds1' #a how is it possible to doubt whether such an object exists and affects our senses8 ,this impossibility of speaking of the simple idea1 except as received from an object1 may account for ,locke's apparent inconsistency in finding the assurance of the reality of knowledge 7under the phrase #8evidence of the senses'7 just in that #8perception' which reaches not to intuitive or demonstrative certainty1 and only #8passes under the name of knowledge4' ,in the passage just quoted he shows that he is cognizant of the distinction between the simple idea and the perception of an existence corresponding to it1 and in consequence distinguishes this perception from proper intuition1 but in the very statement of the distinction it eludes him4 ,the simple idea1 as he speaks of it1 becomes itself1 as consciously #8received from an external object1' the perception of existence2 just as we have previously seen it become the judgment of identity or perception of the #8agreement of an idea with itself1' which is his first kind of knowledge4 #a ,i do not now raise the question1 ,what are here the ideas1 which must be immediately perceived to agree or disagree in order to make it a case of #8intuitive certainty' or knowledge according to ,locke's definition4 ,see below1 paragraphs #ei1 #aja1 and #adg4 ,lively ideas real1 because they must be effects of things4 #ef4 ,in short1 with ,locke the simple idea1 the perception of existence corresponding to the idea1 and the judgment of identity1 are absolutely merged1 and in mutual involution1 sometimes under one designation1 sometimes under another1 are alike presented as the beginning of knowledge4 ,as occasion requires1 each does duty for the other4 ,thus1 if the #8reality of knowledge' be in question1 the simple idea1 which is given1 is treated as involving the perception of existence1 and the reality is established4 ,if in turn this perception is distinguished from the simple idea1 and it is asked whether the correspondence between idea and existence is properly matter of knowledge1 the simple idea has only to be treated as involving the judgment of identity1 which again involves that of existence1 and the question is answered4 ,so in the context under consideration 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 sec4 #ad71 after raising the question as to the existence of a thing corresponding to the idea1 he answers it by the counter question1 #8whether anyone is not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception1 when he looks on the sun by day1 and thinks on it by night2 when he actually tastes wormwood1 or smells a rose1 or only thinks on that savour or odour8 ,we as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory1 and actually coming into our minds by our senses1 as we do between any two distinct ideas4' ,the force of the above lies in its appeal to the perception of identity1 or--to apply the language in which ,locke describes this perception--the knowledge that the idea which a man calls the smell of a rose is the very idea it is4 #a ,the mere difference in liveliness between the present and the recalled idea1 which1 as ,berkeley and ,hume rightly maintained1 is the only difference between them as mere ideas1 cannot by itself constitute the difference between the knowledge of the presence of a thing answering to the idea and the knowledge of its absence4 ,it can only do this if the more lively idea is identified with past lively ideas as a representation of one and the same thing which #8agrees with itself' in contrast to the multiplicity of the sensations1 its signs4 ,only in virtue of this identification can either the liveliness of the idea show that the thing--the sun or the rose--is there1 or the want of liveliness that it is not1 for without it there would be no thing to be there or not to be there4 ,it is because this identification is what ,locke understands by the first sort of perception of agreement between ideas1 and because he virtually finds this perception again in the simple idea1 that the simple idea is to him the index of reality4 ,but if so1 the idea in its primitive simplicity is the sign of a thing that is ever the same in the same relations1 and we find the #8workmanship of the mind1' its inventions of substance1 cause1 and relation1 in the very rudiments of knowledge4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #be4 ,present sensation gives knowledge of existence4 #eg4 ,with that curious tendency to reduplication1 which is one of his characteristics1 ,locke1 after devoting a chapter to the #8reality of human knowledge1' of which the salient passage as to simple ideas has been already quoted1 has another upon our #8knowledge of existence4' ,here again it is the sensitive knowledge of things actually present to our senses1 which with him is merely a synonym for the simple idea1 that is the prime criterion4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 secs4 #e and #b1 and chap4 ii4 sec4 #b47 ,after speaking of the knowledge of our own being and of the existence of a ,god 7about which more will be said below71 he proceeds1 #8,no particular man can know the existence of any other being1 but only when1 by actually operating upon him1 it makes itself perceived by him4 ,for the having the idea of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that thing1 than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world1 or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history4 ,it is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without1 that gives us notice of the existence of other things1 and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us1 which causes that idea in us1 though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it2 for it takes not from the certainty of our senses and the ideas we receive by them1 that we know not the manner wherein they are produced2 e4g4 whilst ,i write this1 ,i have1 by the paper affecting my eyes1 that idea produced in my mind1 which1 whatever object causes1 ,i call white2 by which ,i know that the quality or accident 7i4e4 whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea7 doth really exist1 and hath a being without me4 ,and of this the greatest assurance4 ,i can possibly have1 and to which my faculties can attain1 is the testimony of my eyes1 which are the proper and sole judges of this thing1 whose testimony ,i have reason to rely on1 as so certain1 that ,i can no more doubt whilst ,i write this1 that ,i see white and black1 and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me1 than that ,i write and move my hand4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 secs4 #a1 #b47 ,reasons why its testimony must be trusted4 #eh4 ,reasons are afterwards given for the assurance that the #8perceptions' in question are produced in us by #8exterior causes affecting our senses4' ,the first 7a7 is1 that #8those that want the organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their mind4' ,the next 7b71 that whereas #8if ,i turn my eyes at noon toward the sun1 ,i cannot avoid the ideas which the light or the sun then produces in me2' on the other hand1 #8when my eyes are shut or windows fast1 as ,i can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun1 which former sensations had lodged in my memory1 so ,i can at pleasure lay them by4' ,again 7c71 #8many of those ideas are produced in us with pain which afterwards we remember without the least offence4 ,thus the pain of heat or cold1 when the idea of it is revived in our minds1 gives us no disturbance2 which1 when felt1 was very troublesome1 and is again1 when actually repeated2 which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our body1 when applied to it4' ,finally 7d71 #8our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report1 concerning the existence of sensible things without us4 ,he that sees a fire may1 if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy1 feel it too4' ,then comes the conclusion1 dangerously qualified3 #8,when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea1 we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us1 which doth affect our senses1 and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties1 and actually produce that idea which we then perceive2 and we cannot so far distrust their testimony as to doubt that such collections of simple ideas1 as we have observed by our senses to be united together1 actually exist together4 ,but this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses1 employed about particular objects1 that do then affect them1 and no farther4 ,for if ,i saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man1 existing together one minute since1 and am now alone2 ,i cannot be certain that the same man exists now1 since there is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since with his existence now4 ,by a thousand ways he may cease to be1 since ,i had the testimony of my senses for his existence4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #i47 ,how does this account fit ,locke's definition of knowledge8 #ei4 ,upon the #8knowledge of the existence of things1' thus established1 it has to be remarked in the first place that1 after all1 according to ,locke's explicit statement1 it is not properly knowledge4 ,it is #8an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 sec4 #ad1 and xi4 sec4 #c71 yet being neither itself an intuition of agreement between ideas1 nor resoluble into a series of such intuitions1 the definition of knowledge excludes it4 ,only if existence were itself an #8idea1' would the consciousness of the agreement of the idea with it be a case of knowledge2 but to make existence an idea is to make the whole question about the agreement of ideas1 as such1 with existence1 as such1 unmeaning4 ,to seek escape from this dilemma by calling the consciousness of the agreement in question an #8assurance' instead of knowledge is a mere verbal subterfuge4 ,there can be no assurance of agreement between an idea and that which is no object of consciousness at all4 ,if1 however1 existence is an object of consciousness1 it can1 according to ,locke1 be nothing but an idea1 and the question as to the assurance of agreement is no less unmeaning than the question as to the knowledge of it4 ,the raising of the question in fact1 as ,locke puts it1 implies the impossibility of answering it4 ,it cannot be raised with any significance1 unless existence is external to and other than an idea4 ,it cannot be answered unless existence is1 or is given in1 an object of consciousness1 i4e4 an idea4 ,locke's account of the testimony of sense renders his question as to its veracity superfluous4 #fj4 ,as usual1 ,locke disguises this difficulty from himself1 because in answering the question he alters it4 ,the question1 as he asks it1 is whether1 given the idea1 we can have posterior assurance of something else corresponding to it4 ,the question1 as he answers it1 is whether the idea includes the consciousness of a real thing as a constituent2 and the answer consists in the simple assertion1 variously repeated1 that it does4 ,it is clear1 however1 that this answer to the latter question does not answer1 but renders unmeaning1 the question as it is originally asked4 ,if1 according to ,locke's own showing1 there is nowhere for anything to be found by us but in our #8ideas' or our consciousness--if the thing is given in and with the idea1 so that the idea is merely the thing ex parte nostr--then to ask if the idea agrees with the thing is as futile as to ask whether hearing agrees with sound1 or the voice with the words it utters4 ,that the thing is so given is implied throughout ,locke's statement of the #8assurance we have of the existence of material beings1' as well as of the confirmations of this assurance4 ,if the #8idea which ,i call white' means the knowledge that #8the property or accident 7i4e4 whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea7 doth really exist and hath a being without me1' then consciousness of existence--outward1 permanent1 substantive1 and causative existence--is involved in the idea1 and no ulterior question of agreement between idea and existence can properly arise4 ,but unless the simple idea is so interpreted1 the senses have no testimony to give4 ,if it is so interpreted1 no extraneous #8reason to rely upon the testimony' can be discovered1 for such reason can only be a repetition of the testimony itself4 ,confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction between #8impression' and #8idea'4 #fa4 ,this becomes clearer upon a view of the confirmations of the testimony1 as ,locke gives them4 ,they all1 we may remark by the way1 presuppose a distinction between the simple idea as originally represented and the same as recalled or revived4 ,this distinction1 fixed by the verbal one between #8impression' and #8idea1' we shall find constantly maintained and all-important in ,hume's system2 but in ,locke1 though upon it 7as we shall see7 rests his distinction between real and nominal essence and his confinement of general knowledge to the latter1 it seems only to turn up as an afterthought4 ,in the account of the reality and adequacy of ideas it does not appear at all4 ,there the distinction is merely between the simple idea1 as such1 and the complex1 as such1 without any further discrimination of the simple idea as originally produced from the same as recalled4 ,so1 too1 in the opening account of the reception of simple ideas 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #a71 #8,perception1' #8,retention1' and #8,discerning' are all reckoned together as alike forms of the passivity of the mind1 in contrast with its activity in combination and abstraction1 though retention and discerning have been previously described in terms which imply activity4 ,in the #8confirmations' before us1 however1 the distinction between the originally produced and the revived is essential4 ,they depend on language which presupposes the ascription of sensation to an outward cause4 #fb4 ,the first turns upon the impossibility of producing an idea de novo without the action of sensitive organs2 the two next upon the difference between the idea as produced through these organs and the like idea as revived at the will of the individual4 ,it is hence inferred that the idea as originally produced is the work of a thing1 which must exist in rerum natur1 and by way of a fourth #8confirmation' the man who doubts this in the case of one sensation is invited to try it in another4 ,if1 on seeing a fire1 he thinks it #8bare fancy1' i4e4 doubts whether his idea is caused by a thing1 let him put his hand into it4 ,this last #8confirmation' need not be further noticed here1 since the operation of a producing thing is as certain or as doubtful for one sensation as for another4 #a ,two certainties are not more sure than one1 nor can two doubts make a certainty4 ,the other #8confirmations' alike lie in the words #8product' and #8organ4' ,a man has a certain #8idea3' afterwards he has another like it1 but differing in liveliness and in the accompanying pleasure or pain4 ,if he already has1 or if the ideas severally bring with them1 the idea of a producing outward thing to which parts of his body are organs1 on the one hand1 and of a self #8having power' on the other1 then the liveliness1 and the accompanying pleasure or pain1 may become indications of the action of the thing1 as their absence may be so of the action of the man's self2 but not otherwise4 ,locke throughout1 in speaking of the simple ideas as produced or recalled1 implies that they carry with them the consciousness of a cause1 either an outward thing or the self1 and only by so doing can he find in them the needful #8confirmations' of the #8testimony of the senses4' ,this testimony is confirmed just because it distinguishes of itself between the work of #8nature1' which is real1 and the work of the man1 which is a fiction4 ,in other words1 the confirmation is nothing else than the testimony itself--a testimony which1 as we have seen1 since it supposes consciousness1 as such1 to be consciousness of a thing1 eliminates by anticipation the question as to the agreement of consciousness with things1 as with the extraneous4 #a ,to feel the object1 in the sense of touching it1 had a special significance for ,locke1 since touch with him was the primary #8revelation' of body1 as the solid4 ,more will be said of this when we come to consider his doctrine of #8real essence1' as constituted by primary qualities of body4 ,see below1 paragraph #aja4 ,this ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented relations4 #fc4 ,the distinction between the real and the fantastic1 according to the passages under consideration1 thus depends upon that between the work of nature and the work of man4 ,it is the confusion between the two works that renders the fantastic possible1 while it is the consciousness of the distinction that sets us upon correcting it4 ,where all is the work of man and professes to be no more1 as in the case of #8mixed modes1' there is no room for the fantastic 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxx4 sec4 #d1 and ,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #g72 and where there is ever so much of the fantastic1 it would not be so for us1 unless we were conscious of a #8work of nature1' to which to oppose it4 ,but on looking a little closer we find that to be conscious of an idea as the work of nature1 in opposition to the work of man1 is to be conscious of it under relations which1 according to ,locke1 are the inventions of man4 ,it is nothing else than to be conscious of it as the result of #8something having power to produce it' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #b71 i4e4 of a substance1 to which it is related as a quality4 #8,nature' is just the #8something we know not what1' which is substance according to the #8abstract idea' thereof4 ,producing ideas1 it exercises powers1 as it essentially belongs to substance to do1 according to our complex idea of it4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 secs4 #i1 #aj47 ,but substance1 according to ,locke1 whether as abstract or complex idea1 is the #8workmanship of the mind1' and power1 as a relation 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 sec4 #c1 and chap4 xxv4 sec4 #h71 #8is not contained in the real existence of things4' ,again1 the idea of substance1 as a source of power1 is the same as the idea of cause4 #8,whatever is considered by us to operate to the producing any particular simple idea1 which did not before exist1 hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvi4 sec4 #a47 ,but the idea of cause is not one #8that the mind has of things as they are in themselves1' but one that it gets by its own act in #8bringing things to1 and setting them by1 one another4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxv4 sec4 #a47 ,thus it is with the very ideas1 which are the workmanship of man1 that the simple idea has to be clothed upon1 in order to #8testify' to its being real1 i4e4 7in ,locke's sense7 not the work of man4 ,what is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to present existence8 #fd4 ,thus invested1 the simple idea has clearly lost its simplicity4 ,it is not the momentary1 isolated consciousness1 but the representation of a thing determined by relations to other things in an order of nature1 and causing an infinite series of resembling sensations to which a common name is applied4 ,thus in all the instances of sensuous testimony mentioned in the chapter before us1 it is not really a simple sensation that is spoken of1 but a sensation referred to a thing--not a mere smell1 or taste1 or sight1 or feeling1 but the smell of a rose1 the taste of a pine-apple1 the sight of the sun1 the feeling of fire4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 secs4 #d-g47 ,immediately afterwards1 however1 reverting or attempting to revert to his strict doctrine of the mere individuality of the simple idea1 he says that the testimony of the senses is a #8present testimony employed about particular objects1 that do then affect them1' and that sensitive knowledge extends no farther than such testimony4 ,this statement1 taken by itself1 is ambiguous4 ,does it mean that sensation testifies to the momentary presence to the individual of a continuous existence1 or is the existence itself as momentary as its presence to sense8 ,the instance that follows does not remove the doubt4 #8,if ,i saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man1 existing together one minute since1 and am now alone2 ,i cannot be certain that the same man exists now1 since there is no necessary connection of his existence a minute since with his existence now4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #i47 ,at first sight1 these words might seem to decide that the existence is merely coincident with the presence of the sensation--a decision fatal to the distinction between the real and fantastic1 since1 if the thing is only present with the sensation1 there can be no combination of qualities in reality other than the momentary coincidence of sensations in us4 ,memory or imagination1 indeed1 might recall these in a different order from that in which they originally occurred2 but1 if this original order had no being after the occurrence1 there could be no ground for contrasting it with the order of reproduction as the real with the merely apparent4 ,such restriction1 if maintained1 would render the testimony unmeaning4 #fe4 ,in the very sentence1 however1 where ,locke restricts the testimony of sensation to existence present along with it1 he uses language inconsistent with this restriction4 ,the particular existence which he instances as #8testified to' is that of #8such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man4' ,but these ideas can only be present in succession4 7,see ,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #i1 and chap4 xiv4 sec4 #c47 ,even the surface of the man's body can only be taken in by successive acts of vision2 and1 more obviously1 the states of consciousness in which his qualities of motion and action are presented occupy separate times4 ,if then sensation only testifies to an existence present along with it1 how can it testify to the co-existence 7say7 of an erect attitude1 of which ,i have a present sight1 with the risibility which ,i saw a minute ago8 ,how can the #8collection of ideas wont to be called man1' as co-existing1 be formed at all8 and1 if it cannot1 how can the present existence of an object so-called be testified to by sense any more than the past8 ,the same doctrine1 which is fatal to the supposition of #8a necessary connexion between the man's existence a minute since and his existence now1' is in fact fatal to the supposition of his existence as a complex of qualities at all4 ,it does not merely mean that1 for anything we know1 the man may have died4 ,of course he may1 and yet there may be continuity of existence according to natural laws1 though not one for which we have the testimony of present sense1 between the living body and the dead4 ,what ,locke had in his mind was the notion that1 as existence is testified to only by present sensation1 and each sensation is merely individual and momentary1 there could be no testimony to the continued existence of anything4 ,he could not1 however1 do such violence to the actual fabric of knowledge as would have been implied in the logical development of this doctrine1 and thus he allowed himself to speak of sense as testifying to the co-existence of sensible qualities in a thing1 though the individual sensation could only testify to the presence of one at a time1 and could never testify to their nexus in a common cause at all4 ,this testimony to co-existence in a present thing once admitted1 he naturally allowed himself in the further assumption that the testimony1 on its recurrence1 is a testimony to the same co-existence and the same thing4 ,the existence of the same man 7he evidently supposes71 to which sensation testified an hour ago1 may be testified to by a like sensation now4 ,this means that resemblance of sensation becomes identity of a thing--that like sensations occurring at different times are interpreted as representing the same thing1 which continuously exists1 though not testified to by sense1 between the times4 ,but it is not maintained3 the testimony is to operation of permanent identical things4 #ff4 ,in short1 as we have seen the simple idea of sensation emerge from ,locke's inquiry as to the beginning of knowledge transformed into the judgment1 #8,i have an idea different from other ideas which ,i did not make for myself1' so now from the inquiry as to the correspondence between knowledge and reality it emerges as the consciousness of a thing now acting upon me1 which has continued to exist since it acted on me before1 and in which1 as in a common cause1 have existed together powers to affect me which have never affected me together4 ,if in the one form the operation of thought in sense1 the #8creation of the understanding' within the simple idea1 is only latent or potential1 in the other it is actual and explicit4 ,the relations of substance and quality1 of cause and effect1 and of identity--all #8inventions of the mind'--are necessarily involved in the immediate1 spontaneous testimony of passive sense4 ,locke's treatment of relations of cause and identity4 #fg4 ,it will be noticed that it is upon the first of these1 the relation of substance and quality1 that our examination of ,locke's ,essay has so far chiefly gathered4 ,in this it follows the course taken by ,locke himself4 ,of the idea of substance1 eo nomine1 he treats at large3 of cause and identity 7apart from the special question of personal identity7 he says little4 ,so1 too1 the #8report of the senses' is commonly exhibited as announcing the sensible qualities of a thing rather than the agency of a cause or continuity of existence4 ,the difference1 of course1 is mainly verbal4 ,sensible qualities being1 as ,locke constantly insists1 nothing but #8powers to operate on our senses' directly or indirectly1 the substance or thing1 as the source of these1 takes the character of a cause4 ,again1 as the sensible quality is supposed to be one and the same in manifold separate cases of being felt1 it has identity in contrast with the variety of these cases1 even as the thing has1 on its part1 in contrast with the variety of its qualities4 ,something1 however1 remains to be said of ,locke's treatment of the ideas of cause and identity in the short passages where he treats of them expressly4 ,here1 too1 we shall find the same contrast between the given and the invented1 tacitly contradicted by an account of the given in terms of the invented4 ,that from which he derives idea of cause pre-supposes it4 #fh4 ,the relation of cause and effect1 according to ,locke's general statement as to relation1 must be something #8not contained in the real existence of things1 but extraneous and superinduced4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxv4 sec4 #h47 ,it is a #8complex idea1' not belonging to things as they are in themselves1 which the mind makes by its own act4 7,book ,,ii4 chap xii4 secs4 #a1 #g1 and chap4 xxv4 sec4 #a47 ,its origin1 however1 is thus described3--#8,in the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things1 we cannot but observe that several particular1 both qualities and substances1 begin to exist2 and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being4 ,from this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect4 ,that which produces any simple or complex idea we denote by the general name cause2 and that which is produced1 effect4 ,thus1 finding that in that substance which we call wax1 fluidity1 which is a simple idea that was not in it before1 is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat1 we call the simple idea of heat1 in relation to fluidity in wax1 the cause of it1 and fluidity the effect4 ,so1 also1 finding that the substance1 wood1 which is a certain collection of simple ideas so-called1 by the application of fire is turned into another substance called ashes1 i4e4 another complex idea1 consisting of a collection of simple ideas1 quite different from that complex idea which we call wood2 we consider fire1 in relation to ashes1 as cause1 and the ashes as effect4' ,here we find that the #8given1' upon which the relation of cause and effect is #8superinduced' or from which the #8idea of it is got' 7to give ,locke the benefit of both expressions71 professedly1 according to the first sentence of the passage quoted1 involves the complex or derived idea of substance4 ,the sentence1 indeed1 is a remarkable instance of the double refraction which arises from redundant phraseology4 ,our senses are supposed to #8take notice of a constant vicissitude of things1' or substances4 ,thereupon we observe1 what is necessarily implied in this vicissitude1 a beginning of existence in substances or their qualities1 #8received from the due application or operation of some other being4' ,thereupon we infer1 what is simply another name for existence thus given and received1 a relation of cause and effect4 ,thus not only does the datum of the process of #8invention' in question1 i4e4 the observation of change in a thing1 involve a derived idea1 but a derived idea which presupposes just this process of invention4 ,rationale of this #8petitio principii'4 #fi4 ,here again it is necessary to guard against the notion that ,locke's obvious petitio principii might be avoided by a better statement without essential change in his doctrine of ideas4 ,it is true that #8a notice of the vicissitude of things' includes that #8invention of the understanding' which it is supposed to suggest1 but state the primary knowledge otherwise--reduce the vicissitude of things1 as it ought to be reduced1 in order to make ,locke consistent1 to the mere multiplicity of sensations--and the appearance of suggestion ceases4 ,change or #8vicissitude' is quite other than mere diversity4 ,it is diversity relative to something which maintains an identity4 ,this identity1 which ulterior analysis may find in a #8law of nature1' ,locke found in #8things' or #8substances4' ,by the same unconscious subreption1 by which with him a sensible thing takes the place of sensation1 #8vicissitude of things' takes the place of multiplicity of sensations1 carrying with it the observation that the changed state of the thing is due to something else4 ,the mere multiplicity of sensations could convey no such #8observation1' any more than the sight of counters in a row would convey the notion that one #8received its existence' from the other4 ,only so far as the manifold appearances are referred1 as its vicissitudes1 to something which remains one1 does any need of accounting for their diverse existence1 or in consequence any observation of its derivation #8from some other being1' arise4 ,locke1 it is true1 after stating that it is upon a notice of the vicissitude of things that the observation in question rests1 goes on to speak as if an origination of substances1 which is just the opposite of their vicissitude1 might be observed2 and the second instance of production which he gives--that of ashes upon the burning of wood--seems intended for an instance of the production of a substance1 as distinct from the production of a quality4 ,he is here1 however1 as he often does1 using the term #8substance' loosely1 for #8a certain collection of simple ideas1' without reference to the #8substratum wherein they do subsist1' which he would have admitted to be ultimately the same for the wood and for the ashes4 ,the conception1 indeed1 of such a substratum1 whether vaguely as #8nature1' or more precisely as a #8real constitution of insensible parts' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 secs4 #ah1 c471 governed all his speculation1 and rendered to him what he here calls substance virtually a mode1 and its production properly a #8vicissitude4' ,relation of cause has to be put into sensitive experience in order to be got from it4 #gj4 ,we thus find that it is only so far as simple ideas are referred to things--only so far as each in turn1 to use ,locke's instance1 is regarded as an appearance #8in a substance which was not in it before'--that our sensitive experience1 the supposed datum of knowledge1 is an experience of the vicissitudes of things2 and again1 that only as an experience of such vicissitude does it furnish the #8observation from which we get our ideas of cause and effect4' ,but the reference of a sensation to a sensible thing means its reference to a cause4 ,in other words1 the invented relation of cause and effect must be found in the primary experience in order that it may be got from it4 #a #a ,locke's contradiction of himself in regard to this relation might be exhibited in a still more striking light by putting side by side with his account of it his account of the idea of power4 ,the two are precisely similar1 the idea of power being represented as got by a notice of the alteration of simple ideas in things without 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 sec4 #a71 just as the idea of cause and effect is4 ,power1 too1 he expressly says1 is a relation4 ,yet1 although the idea of it1 both as derived and as of a relation1 ought to be complex1 he reckons it a simple and original one1 and by using it interchangeably with #8sensible quality' makes it a primary datum of sense4 ,origin of the idea of identity according to ,locke4 #ga4 ,the same holds of that other #8product of the mind1' the relation of identity4 ,this #8idea' according to ,locke1 is formed when1 #8considering anything as existing at any determined time and place1 we compare it with itself existing at another time4' #8,in this consists identity1' he adds1 #8when the ideas it is attributed to1 vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we consider their former existence1 and to which we compare the present2 for we never finding nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same kind should exist in the same place at the same time1 we rightly conclude that whatever exists anywhere1 at any time1 excludes all of the same kind1 and is there itself alone4 ,when1 therefore1 we demand whether anything be the same or no8 it refers always to something that existed such a time in such a place1 which it was certain at that instant was the same with itself1 and no other2 from whence it follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence1 nor two things one beginning2 it being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant in the very same place1 or one and the same thing in different places4 ,that1 therefore1 that had one beginning1 is the same thing2 and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that is not the same1 but diverse4' ,he goes on to inquire about the principium individuationis1 which he decides is #8existence itself1 which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place1 incommunicable to two beings of the same kind 444 for being at that instant what it is and nothing else1 it is the same1 and so must continue as long as its existence is continued2 for so long it will be the same1 and no other4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxvii4 secs4 #a-c74 ,relation of identity not to be distinguished from idea of it4 #gb4 ,it is essential to bear in mind with regard to identity1 as with regard to cause and effect1 that no distinction according to ,locke can legitimately be made between the relation and the idea of the relation4 ,as to substance1 it is true1 he was driven in his controversy with ,stillingfleet to distinguish between #8the being and the idea thereof1' but in dealing with relation he does not attempt any such violence to his proper system4 ,between the #8idea' as such and #8being' as such1 his #8new way of ideas1' as ,stillingfleet plaintively called it1 left no fair room for distinction4 ,in this indeed lay its permanent value for speculative thought4 ,the distinction by which alone it could consistently seek to replace the old one1 so as to meet the exigencies of language and knowledge1 was that between simple ideas1 as given and necessarily real1 and the reproductions or combinations in which the mind may alter them4 ,but since every relation implies a putting together of ideas1 and is thus always1 as ,locke avows1 a complex idea or the work of the mind1 a distinction between its being and the idea thereof1 in that sense of the distinction in which alone it can ever be consistently admitted by ,locke1 was clearly inadmissible4 ,thus in the passages before us the relation of identity is not explicitly treated as an original #8being' or #8existence1' ,it is an idea formed by the mind upon a certain #8consideration of things' being or existent4 ,but on looking closely at ,locke's account1 we find that it is only so far as it already belongs to1 nay constitutes1 the things1 that it is formed upon consideration of them4 ,this #8invented' relation forms the #8very being of things'4 #gc4 ,when it is said that the idea of identity1 or of any other relation1 is formed upon consideration of things as existing in a certain way1 this is naturally understood to mean--indeed1 otherwise it is unmeaning--that the things are first known as existing1 and that afterwards the idea of the relation in question is formed4 ,but according to ,locke1 as we have seen1 #a the first and simplest act of knowledge possible is the perception of identity between ideas4 ,either then the #8things1' upon consideration of which the idea of identity is formed1 are not known at all1 or the knowledge of them involves the very idea afterwards formed on consideration of them4 ,locke1 having at whatever cost of self-contradiction to make his theory fit the exigencies of language1 virtually adopts the latter alternative1 though with an ambiguity of expression which makes a definite meaning difficult to elicit4 ,we have1 however1 the positive statement to begin with1 that the comparison in which the relation originates1 is of a thing with itself as existing at another time4 ,again1 the #8ideas' 7used interchangeably with #8things'71 to which identity is attributed1 #8vary not at all from what they were at that moment wherein we consider their former existence4' ,it is here clearly implied that #8things' or #8ideas' exist1 i4e4 are given to us in the spontaneous consciousness which we do not make1 as each one and the same throughout a multiplicity of times4 ,this1 again1 means that the relation of identity or sameness1 i4e4 unity of thing under multiplicity of appearance1 belongs to or consists in the #8very being' of those given objects of consciousness1 which are in ,locke's sense the real1 and upon which according to him all relation is superinduced by an after-act of thought4 ,so long as each such object #8continues to exist1' so long its #8sameness with itself must continue1' and this sameness is the complex idea1 the relation1 of identity4 ,just as before1 following ,locke's lead1 we found the simple idea1 as the element of knowledge1 become complex--a perceived identity of ideas2 so now mere existence1 the #8very being of things' 7which with ,locke is only another name for the simple idea71 resolves itself into a relation1 which it requires #8consideration by the mind' to constitute4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #be4 ,locke fails to distinguish between identity and mere unity4 #gd4 ,the process of self-contradiction1 by which a #8creation of the mind' finds its way into the real or given1 must also appear in a contradictory conception of the real itself4 ,kept pure of all that ,locke reckons intellectual fiction1 it can be nothing but a simple chaos of individual units3 only by the superinduction of relation can there be sameness1 or continuity of existence1 in the minutest of these for successive moments4 ,locke presents it arbitrarily under the conception of mere individuality or of continuity1 according as its distinction from the work of the mind1 or its intelligible content1 happens to be before him4 ,a like see-saw in his account of the individuality and generality of ideas has already been noticed4 #a ,in his discussion of identity the contradiction is partly disguised by a confusion between mere unity on the one hand1 and sameness or unity in difference1 on the other4 ,thus1 after starting with an account of identity as belonging to ideas which are the same at different times1 he goes on to speak of a thing as the same with itself1 at a single instant4 ,so1 too1 by the principium individuationis1 he understands #8existence itself1 which determines a being of any sort to a particular time and place4' ,as it is clear from the context that by the principium individuationis he meant the source of identity or sameness1 it will follow that by #8sameness' he understood singleness of a thing in a single time and place4 ,whence then the plurality1 without which #8sameness' is unmeaning8 ,in fact1 ,locke1 having excluded it in his definition1 covertly brings it back again in his instance1 which is that of #8an atom1 i4e4 a continued body under one immutable superficies1 existing in a determined time and place4' ,this1 #8considered in any instant of its existence1 is in that instant the same with itself4' ,but it is so because--and1 if we suppose the consideration of plurality of times excluded1 only because--it is a #8continued' body1 which implies1 though its place be determined1 that it exists in a plurality of parts of space4 ,either this plurality1 or that of instants of its existence1 must be recognised in contrast with the unity of body1 if this unity is to become #8sameness with itself4' ,in adding that not only at the supposed instant is the atom the same1 but #8so must continue as long as its existence continues1' ,locke shows that he really thought of the identical body under a plurality of times ex parte post1 if not ex parte ante4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #dc1 and the following4 ,feelings are the real1 and do not admit of identity4 ,how then can identity be real8 #ge4 ,but how is this continuity1 or sameness of existence in plurality of times or spaces1 compatible with the constitution of #8real existence' by mere individua8 ,the difficulty is the same1 according to ,locke's premisses1 whether the simple ideas by themselves are taken for the real individua1 or whether each is taken to represent a single separate thing4 ,in his chapter on identity he expressly says that #8things whose existence is in succession' do not admit of identity4 ,such1 he adds1 are motion and thought2 #8because1 each perishing the moment it begins1 they cannot exist in different times or in different places as permanent beings can at different times exist in distant places4' 7,book ,i4 chap1 xxvii4 sec4 #b47 ,what he here calls #8thought' clearly includes the passive consciousness in which alone1 according to his strict doctrine1 reality is given4 ,so elsewhere 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #i71 in accounting for the #8simple idea of succession1' he says generally that #8if we look immediately into ourselves we shall find our ideas always1 whilst we have any thought1 passing in train1 one going and another coming1 without intermission4' #a ,no statement of the #8perpetual flux' of ideas1 as each having a separate beginning and end1 and ending in the very moment when it begins1 can be stronger than the above4 ,if #8ideas' of any sort1 according to this account of them1 are to constitute real existence1 no sameness can be found in reality4 ,it must indeed be a relation #8invented by the mind4' #a ,it is true that in this place ,locke distinguishes between the #8suggestion by our senses' of the idea of succession1 and that which passes in our #8minds1' by which it is #8more constantly offered us4' ,but since1 according to him1 the idea of sensation must be #8produced in the mind' if there is to be any either sensation or idea at all 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 ix4 secs4 #c and #d71 the distinction between the #8suggestion by our senses' and what passes in our minds' cannot be maintained4 ,yet it is from reality that the idea of it is derived4 #gf4 ,this1 it may be said1 is just the conclusion that was wanted in order to make ,locke's doctrine of the particular relation of identity correspond with his general doctrine of the fictitiousness of relations4 ,to complete the consistency1 however1 his whole account of the origin of the relation 7or of the idea in which it consists7 must be changed1 since it supposes it to be derived from an observation of things or existence1 which again is to suppose sameness to be in the things or to be real4 ,this change made1 philosophy would have to start anew with the problem of accounting for the origin of the fictitious idea4 ,it would have to explain how it comes to pass that the mind1 if its function consists solely in reproducing and combining given ideas1 or again in #8abstracting' combined ideas from each other1 should be able to invent a relation which is neither a given idea1 nor a reproduction1 combination1 or abstract residuum of given ideas4 ,this is the great problem which we shall find ,hume attempting4 ,locke really never saw its necessity1 because the dominion of language--a dominion which1 as he did not recognise it1 he had no need to account for--always1 in spite of his assertion that simple ideas are the sole data of consciousness1 held him to the belief in another datum of which ideas are the appearances1 viz41 a thing having identity1 because the same with itself in the manifold times of its appearance4 ,this datum1 under various guises1 but in each demonstrably1 according to ,locke's showing1 a #8creation of thought1' has met us in all the modes of his theory1 as the condition of knowledge4 ,as the #8abstract idea' of substance it renders #8perishing' ideas into qualities by which objects may be discerned4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #a47 ,as the relative idea of cause1 it makes them #8affections' to be accounted for4 ,as the fiction of a universal1 it is the condition of their mutual qualification as constituents of a whole4 ,finally1 as the #8superinduced' relation of sameness1 the direct negative of the perpetual beginning and ending of #8ideas1' it constitutes the #8very being of things4' ,transition to ,locke's doctrine of essence4 #gg4 #8,the very being of things1' let it be noticed1 according to what ,locke reckoned their #8real1' as distinct from their #8nominal1' essence4 ,the consideration of this distinction has been hitherto postponed2 but the discussion of the relation of identity1 as subsisting between the parts of a #8continued body1' brings us upon the doctrine of matter and its #8primary qualities1' which cannot be properly treated except in connection with the other doctrine 7which ,locke unhappily kept apart7 of the two sorts of #8essence4' ,so far1 it will be remembered1 the #8facts' or given ideas1 which we have found him unawares converting into theories or #8invented' ideas1 have been those of the #8secondary qualities of body4' #a ,it is these which are united into things or substances1 having been already #8found in them3' it is from these that we #8infer' the relation of cause and effect1 because as #8vicissitudes of things' or #8affections of sense' they presuppose it3 it is these again which1 as #8received from without1' testify the present existence of something1 because in being so received they are already interpreted as #8appearances of something4' ,that the #8thing1' by reference to which these ideas are judged to be #8real1' #8adequate1' and #8true'--or1 in other words1 become elements of a knowledge--is yet itself according to ,locke's doctrine of substance and relation a #8fiction of thought1' has been sufficiently shown4 ,that it is so no less according to his doctrine of essence will also appear4 ,the question will then be1 whether by the same showing the ideas of body1 of the self1 and of ,god1 can be other than fictions1 and the way will be cleared for ,hume's philosophic adventure of accounting for them as such4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #bj4 ,this repeats the inconsistency found in his doctrine of substance4 #gh4 ,in ,locke's doctrine of #8ideas of substances1' the #8thing' appeared in two inconsistent positions3 on the one hand1 as that in which they #8are found2' on the other1 as that which results from their concretion1 or which1 such concretion having been made1 we accustom ourselves to suppose as its basis4 ,this inconsistency1 latent to ,locke himself in the theory of substance1 comes to the surface in the theory of essence1 where it is 7as he thought7 overcome1 but in truth only made more definite1 by a distinction of terms4 ,plan to be followed4 #gi4 ,this latter theory has so far become part and parcel of the #8common sense' of educated men1 that it might seem scarcely to need restatement4 ,it is generally regarded as completing the work1 which ,bacon had begun1 of transferring philosophy from the scholastic bondage of words to the fruitful discipline of facts4 ,in the process of transmission and popular adaptation1 however1 its true significance has been lost sight of1 and it has been forgotten that to its original exponent implicitly--explicitly to his more logical disciple--though it did indeed distinguish effectively between things and the meaning of words1 it was the analysis of the latter only1 and not the understanding of things1 that it left as the possible function of knowledge4 ,it will be well1 then1 in what follows1 first briefly to restate the theory in its general form2 then to show how it conflicts with the actual knowledge which mankind supposes itself to have attained2 and finally to exhibit at once the necessity of this conflict as a result of ,locke's governing ideas1 and the ambiguities by which he disguised it from himself4 ,what ,locke understood by essence4 #hj4 ,the essence of a thing with ,locke1 in the only sense in which we can know or intelligibly speak of it1 is the meaning of its name4 ,this1 again1 is an #8abstract or general idea1' which means that it is an idea #8separated from the circumstances of time and place1 and any other ideas that may determine it to this or that particular existence4 ,by this way of abstraction it is made capable of representing more individuals than one2 each of which1 having in it a conformity to that abstract idea1 is 7as we call it7 of that sort4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #f47 ,that which is given in immediate experience1 as he proceeds to explain1 is this or that #8particular existence1' ,peter or ,james1 ,mary or ,jane1 such particular existence being already a complex idea4 #a ,that it should be so is indeed in direct contradiction to his doctrine of the primariness of the simple idea1 but is necessary to his doctrine of abstraction4 ,some part of the complex idea 7it is supposed7--less or more--we proceed to leave out4 ,the minimum of subtraction would seem to be that of the #8circumstances of time and place1' in which the particular existence is given4 ,this is the #8separation of ideas1' first made1 and alone suffices to constitute an #8abstract idea1' even though1 as is the case with the idea of the sun1 there is only one #8particular substance' to agree with it4 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #a47 ,in proportion as the particular substances compared are more various1 the subtraction of ideas is larger1 but1 be it less or more1 the remainder is the abstract idea1 to which a name--e4g4 man--is annexed1 and to which as a #8species' or #8standard' other particular existences1 on being #8found to agree with it1' may be referred1 so as to be called by the same name4 ,these ideas then1 #8tied together by a name1' form the essence of each particular existence1 to which the same name is applied 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 secs4 #ab and the following47 ,such essence1 however1 according to ,locke1 is #8nominal1' not #8real4' ,it is a complex--fuller or emptier--of ideas in us1 which1 though it is a #8uniting medium between a general name and particular beings1' #b in no way represents the qualities of the latter4 ,these1 consisting in an #8internal constitution of insensible parts1' form the #8real essence' of the particular beings2 an essence1 however1 of which we can know nothing4 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #ba1 and ix4 sec4 #ab47 #a ,book ,,iii4 chap1 iii1 sec4 #g1 at the end4 #b ,book ,,iii chap4 iii4 sec4 #ac4 ,only to nominal essences that general propositions relate1 i4e4 only to abstract ideas having no real existence4 #ha4 ,it is the formation of #8nominal essences' that renders general propositions possible4 #8,general certainty1' says ,locke1 #8is never to be found but in our ideas4 ,whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiment or observation without us1 our knowledge goes not beyond particulars4 ,it is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas1 that alone is able to afford us general knowledge4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #af47 #8,general knowledge1' he says again1 #8lies only in our own thoughts4' #a ,this use of #8our ideas' and #8our own thoughts' as equivalent phrases1 each antithetical to #8real existence1' tells the old tale of a deviation from #8the new way of ideas' into easier paths4 ,according to this new way in its strictness1 as we have sufficiently seen1 there is nowhere for anything to be found but #8in our ideas4' ,it therefore in no way distinguishes general knowledge or certainty that it cannot be found elsewhere4 ,locke1 however1 having allowed himself in the supposition that simple ideas report a real existence1 other than themselves1 but to which they are related as ectype to archetype1 tacitly proceeds to convert them into real existences1 to which ideas in general1 as mere thoughts of our own1 may be opposed4 ,along with this conversion1 there supervenes upon the original distinction between simple and complex ideas1 which alone does duty in the ,second ,book of the ,essay1 another distinction1 essential to ,locke's doctrine of the #8reality' of knowledge--that between the idea1 whether simple or complex1 as originally given in sensation1 and the same as retained or reproduced in the mind4 ,it is only in the former form that the idea1 however simple1 reports1 and thus 7with ,locke7 itself is1 a real existence4 ,such real existence is a #8particular' existence1 and our knowledge of it a #8particular' knowledge4 ,in other words1 according to the only consistent doctrine that we have been able to elicit from ,locke1 #b #8it is a knowledge which consists in a consciousness1 upon occasion of a present sensation--say1 a sensation of redness--that some object is present here and now causing the sensation2 an object which1 accordingly1 must be #8particular' or transitory as the sensation4 ,the #8here and now1' as in such a case they constitute the particularity of the object of consciousness1 so also render it a real existence4 ,separate these 7#8the circumstances of time and place' #c7 from it1 and it at once loses its real existence and becomes an #8abstract idea1' one of #8our own thoughts1' of which as #8in the mind' agreement or disagreement with some other abstract idea can be asserted in a general proposition2 e4g4 #8red is not blue4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #d47 #d #a ,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #ac1 cf4 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ca4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #ef4 #c ,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #f4 #d ,in case there should be any doubt as to ,locke's meaning in this passage1 it may be well to compare ,book ,,iv4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #a4 ,there he distinctly opposes the consideration of ideas in the understanding to the knowledge of real existence4 ,here 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #d7 he distinctly speaks of the proposition #8red is not blue' as expressing a consideration of ideas in the understanding4 ,it follows that it is not a proposition as to real existence4 ,an abstract idea may be a simple one4 #hb4 ,it is between simple ideas1 it will be noticed1 that a relation is here asserted1 and in this respect the proposition differs from such an one as may be formed when simple ideas have been compounded into the nominal essence of a thing1 and in which some one of these may be asserted of the thing1 being already included within the meaning of its name2 e4g4 #8a rose has leaves4' ,but as expressing a relation between ideas #8abstract' or #8in the mind1' in distinction from present sensations received from without1 the two sorts of proposition1 according to the doctrine of ,locke's ,fourth ,book1 stand on the same footing4' #a ,it is a nominal essence with which both alike are concerned1 and on this depends the general certainty or self-evidence1 by which they are distinguished from #8experiment or observation without us4' ,these can never #8reach with certainty farther than the bare instance' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #g73 i4e41 though the only channels by which we can reach real existence1 they can never tell more than the presence of this or that sensation as caused by an unknown thing without1 or the present disagreement of such present sensations with each other4 ,as to the recurrence of such sensations1 or any permanently real relation between them1 they can tell us nothing4 ,nothing as to their recurrence1 because1 though in each case they show the presence of something causing the sensations1 they show nothing of the real essence upon which their recurrence depends4 #b ,nothing as to any permanently real relation between them1 because1 although the disagreement between ideas of blue and red1 and the agreement between one idea of red and another1 as in the mind1 is self-evident1 yet as thus in the mind they are not #8actual sensations' at all 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #f71 nor do they convey that #8sensitive knowledge of particular existence1' which is the only possible knowledge of it4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ba47 ,as actual sensations and indices of reality1 they do indeed differ in this or that #8bare instance1' but can convey no certainty that the real thing or #8parcel of matter' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ah71 which now causes the sensation of 7and thus is7 red1 may not at another time cause the sensation of 7and thus be7 blue4' #c #a ,already in ,book ,,ii4 7chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #ab71 the simple idea1 as abstract1 is spoken of as a nominal essence4 #b ,cf4 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #e4 #8,if we could certainly know 7which is impossible7 where a real essence1 which we know not1 is--e4g4 in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is2 yet could we not be sure1 that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold2 since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence1 of which we have no idea at all4' ,several passages1 of course1 can be adduced from ,locke which are inconsistent with the statement in the text3 e4g4 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #ab4 #8,to make knowledge real concerning substances1 the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things4 ,whatever simple ideas have been found to coexist in any substance1 these we may with confidence join together again1 and so make abstract ideas of substances4 ,for whatever have once had an union in nature1 may be united again4' ,in all such passages1 however1 as will appear below1 the strict opposition between the real and the mental is lost sight of1 the #8nature' or #8substance1' in which ideas #8have a union1' or are #8found to coexist1' being a system of relations which1 according to ,locke1 it requires a mind to constitute1 and thus itself a #8nominal essence4' #c ,cf4 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #bi2 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #ad2 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #aa4 ,how then is science of nature possible8 #hc4 ,we thus come upon the crucial antithesis between relations of ideas and matters of fact1 with the exclusion of general certainty as to the latter1 which was to prove such a potent weapon of scepticism in the hands of ,hume4 ,of its incompatibility with recognized science we can have no stronger sign than the fact that1 after more than a century has elapsed since ,locke's premisses were pushed to their legitimate conclusion1 the received system of logic among us is one which1 while professing to accept ,locke's doctrine of essence1 and with it the antithesis in question1 throughout assumes the possibility of general propositions as to matters of fact1 and seeks in their methodical discovery and proof that science of nature which ,locke already #8suspected' to be impossible4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #aj47 ,no #8uniformities of phenomena' can be known4 #hd4 ,that1 so far as any inference from past to future uniformities is necessary to the science of nature1 his doctrine does more than justify such #8suspicion1' is plain enough4 ,does it1 however1 leave room for so much as a knowledge of past uniformities of fact1 in which the natural philosopher1 accepting the doctrine1 might probably seek refuge8 ,at first sight1 it might seem to do so4 #8,as1 when our senses are actually employed about any object1 we do know that it does exist2 so by our memory we may be assured that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed--and thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things1 whereof our senses having informed us1 our memories still retain the ideas4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #aa47 ,let us see1 however1 how this knowledge is restricted4 #8,seeing water at this instant1 it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist2 and remembering that ,i saw it yesterday1 it will also be always true1 and as long as my memory retains it1 always an undoubted proposition to me1 that water did exist the #ahth of ,july1 #afhh2 as it will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did exist1 which at the same time ,i saw on a bubble of that water2 but being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too1 it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist1 than that the bubbles and colours therein do so2 it being no more necessary that water should exist to-day because it existed yesterday1 than that the colours or bubbles exist to-day because they existed yesterday4' 7,ibid47 ,locke not aware of the full effect of his own doctrine 444 #he4 ,the result is that though ,i may enumerate a multitude of past matters-of-fact about water1 ,i cannot gather them up in any general statement about it as a real existence4 ,so soon as ,i do so1 ,i pass from water as a real existence to its #8nominal essence1' i4e41 to the ideas retained in my mind and put together in a fictitious substance1 to which ,i have annexed the name #8water4' ,if we proceed to apply this doctrine to the supposed past matters-of-fact themselves1 we shall find these too attenuating themselves to nonentity4 ,subtract in every case from the #8particular existence' of which we have #8sensitive knowledge' the qualification by ideas which1 as retained in the mind1 do not testify to a present real existence1 and what remains8 ,there is a certainty1 according to ,locke 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #aa71 not1 indeed1 that water exists to-day because it existed yesterday--this is only #8probable'--but that it has1 as a past matter-of-fact1 at this time and that #8continued long in existence1' because this has been #8observed2' which must mean 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ii4 secs4 #a1 #e1 and #i71 because there has been a continued #8actual sensation' of it4 #8,water1' however1 is a complex idea of a substance1 and of the elements of this complex idea those only which at any moment are given in #8actual sensation' may be accounted to #8really exist4' ,first1 then1 must disappear from reality the #8something1' that unknown substratum of ideas1 of which the idea is emphatically #8abstract4' ,this gone1 we naturally fall back upon a fact of co-existence between ideas1 as being a reality1 though the #8thing' be a fiction4 ,but if this co-existence is to be real or to represent a reality1 the ideas between which it obtains must be #8actual sensations4' ,these1 whatever they may be1 are at least opposed by ,locke to ideas retained in the mind1 which only form a nominal essence4 ,but it is the association of such nominal essence1 in the supposed observation of water1 with the actual sensation that alone gives the latter a meaning4 ,set this aside as unreal1 and the reality1 which the sensation reveals1 is at any rate one of which nothing can be said4 ,it cannot be a relation between sensations1 for such relation implies a consideration of them by the mind1 whereby1 according to ,locke1 they must cease to be #8real existences4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxv4 sec4 #a47 ,it cannot even be a single sensation as continuously observed1 for every present moment of such observation has at the next become a past1 and thus the sensation observed in it has lost its #8actuality1' and cannot1 as a #8real existence1' qualify the sensation observed in the next4 ,restrict the #8real existence1' in short1 as ,locke does1 to an #8actual present sensation1' which can only be defined by opposition to an idea retained in the mind1 and at every instant of its existence it has passed into the mind and thus ceased really to exist4 ,reality is in perpetual process of disappearing into the unreality of thought4 ,no point can be fixed either in the flux of time or in the imaginary process from #8without' to #8within' the mind1 on the one side of which can be placed #8real existence1' on the other the #8mere idea4' ,it is only because ,locke unawares defines to himself the #8actual sensation' as representative of a real essence1 of which1 however1 according to him1 as itself unknown1 the presence is merely inferred from the sensation1 that the #8actual sensation' itself is saved from the limbo of nominal essence1 to which ideas1 as abstract or in the mind1 are consigned4 ,only1 again1 so far as it is thus illogically saved1 are we entitled to that distinction between #8facts' and #8things of the mind1' which ,locke once for all fixed for ,english philosophy4 444 which is to make the real an abstract residuum of consciousness4 #hf4 ,by this time we are familiar with the difficulties which this antithesis has in store for a philosophy which yet admits that it is only in the mind or in relation to consciousness--in one word1 as #8ideas'--that facts are to be found at all1 while by the #8mind' it understands an abstract generalization from the many minds which severally are born and grow1 sleep and wake1 with each of us4 ,the antithesis itself1 like every other form in which the impulse after true knowledge finds expression1 implies a distinction between the seeming and the real2 or between that which exists for the consciousness of the individual and that which really exists4 ,but outside itself consciousness cannot get4 ,it is there that the real must1 at any rate1 manifest itself1 if it is to be found at all4 ,yet the original antithesis between the mind and its unknown opposite still prevails1 and in consequence that alone which1 though indeed in the mind1 is yet given to it by no act of its own1 is held to represent the real4 ,this is the notion which dominates ,locke4 ,he strips from the formed content of consciousness all that the mind seems to have done for itself1 and the abstract residuum1 that of which the individual cannot help being conscious at each moment of his existence1 is or #8reports' the real1 in opposition to the mind's creation4 ,this is ,feeling2 or more strictly--since it exists1 and whatever does so must exist as one in a number 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #g7--;it is the multitude of single feelings1 #8each perishing the moment it begins' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxvii4 sec4 #b71 from which all the definiteness that comes of composition and relation must be supposed absent4 ,thus1 in trying to get at what shall be the mere fact in detachment from mental accretions1 ,locke comes to what is still consciousness1 but the merely indefinite in consciousness4 ,he seeks the real and finds the void4 ,of the real as outside consciousness nothing can be said2 and of that again within consciousness1 which is supposed to represent it1 nothing can be said4 ,ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in the mind is itself a thing of the mind4 #hg4 ,we have already seen how ,locke1 in his doctrine of secondary qualities of substances1 practically gets over this difficulty2 how he first projects out of the simple ideas1 under relations which it requires a mind to constitute1 a cognisable system of things1 and then gives content and definiteness to the simple ideas in us by treating them as manifestations of this system of things4 ,in the doctrine of propositions1 the proper correlative to the reduction of the real to the present simple idea1 as that of which we cannot get rid1 would be the reduction of the #8real proposition' to the mere #8it is now felt4' ,if the matter-of-fact is to be that in consciousness which is independent of the #8work of the mind' in comparing and compounding1 this is the only possible expression for it4 ,it states the only possible #8real essence1' which yet is an essence of nothing1 for any reference of it to a thing1 if the thing is outside consciousness1 is an impossibility2 and if it is within consciousness1 implies an #8invention of the mind' both in the creation of a thing1 #8always the same with itself1' out of perishing feelings1 and in the reference of the feelings to such a thing4 ,thus carried out1 the antithesis between #8fact' and #8creation of the mind' becomes self-destructive1 for1 one feeling being as real as another1 it leaves no room for that distinction between the real and fantastic1 to the uncritical sense of which it owes its birth4 ,to avoid this fusion of dream-land and the waking world1 ,locke avails himself of the distinction between the idea 7i4e4 feeling7 as in the mind1 which is not convertible with reality1 and the idea as somewhere else1 no one can say where--#8the actual sensation'--which is so convertible4 ,the distinction1 however1 must either consist in degrees of liveliness1 in which case there must be a corresponding infinity of degrees of reality or unreality1 or else must presuppose a real existence from which the feeling1 if #8actual sensation1' is--if merely #8in the mind' is not--derived4 ,such a real existence either is an object of consciousness1 or is not4 ,if it is not1 no distinction between one kind of feeling and another can for consciousness be derived from it4 ,if it is1 then1 granted the distinction between given feelings and creations of the mind1 it must fall to the latter1 and a #8thing of the mind' turns out to be the ground upon which #8fact' is opposed to #8things of the mind4' ,two meanings of real essence4 #hh4 ,it remains to exhibit briefly the disguises under which these inherent difficulties of his theory of essence appear in ,locke4 ,throughout1 instead of treating #8essence' altogether as a fiction of the mind--as it must be if feelings in simplicity and singleness are alone the real--he treats indeed as a merely #8nominal essence' every possible combination of ideas of which we can speak1 but still supposes another essence which is #8real4' ,but a real essence of what8 ,clearly1 according to his statements1 of the same #8thing' of which the combination of ideas in the mind is the nominal essence4 ,indeed1 there is no meaning in the antithesis unless the #8something1' of which the latter essence is so nominally1 is that of which it is not so really4 ,so says ,locke1 #8the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for2 let it be1 for instance1 a body yellow1 of a certain weight1 malleable1 fusible1 and fixed4 ,but the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body1 on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #b47 ,here the notion clearly is that of one and the same thing1 of which we can only say that it is a #8body1' a certain complex of ideas--yellowness1 fusibility1 c4--is the nominal1 a certain constitution of insensible parts the real1 essence4 ,it is on the real essence1 moreover1 that the ideas which constitute the nominal depend4 ,yet while they are known1 the real essence 7as appears from the context7 is wholly unknown4 ,in this case1 it would seem1 the cause is not known from its effects4 ,according to one1 it is a collection of ideas as qualities of a thing3 #hi4 ,there are lurking here two opposite views of the relation between the nominal essence and the real thing4 ,according to one view1 which prevails in the later chapters of the ,second ,book and in certain passages of the third1 the relation between them is that with which we have already become familiar in the doctrine of substance--that1 namely1 between ideas as in us and the same as in the thing4 7,book ,,ii1 chap4 xxiii4 secs4 #i and #aj47 ,no distinction is made between the #8idea in the mind' and the #8actual sensation4' ,the ideas in the mind are also in the thing1 and thus are called its qualities1 though for the most part they are so only secondarily1 i4e4 as effects of other qualities1 which1 as copied directly in our ideas1 are called primary1 and relatively to these effects are called powers4 ,these powers have yet innumerable effects to produce in us which they have not yet produced4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #aj47 ,those which have been so far produced1 being gathered up in a complex idea to which a name is annexed1 form the #8nominal essence' of the thing4 ,some of them are of primary qualities1 more are of secondary4 ,the originals of the former1 the powers to produce the latter1 together with powers to produce an indefinite multitude more1 will constitute the #8real essence1' which is thus #8a standard made by nature1' to which the nominal essence is opposed merely as the inadequate to the adequate4 ,the ideas1 that is to say1 which are indicated by the name of a thing1 have been really #8found in it' or #8produced by it1' but are only a part of those that remain to be found in it or produced by it4 ,it is in this sense that ,locke opposes the adequacy between nominal and real essence in the case of mixed modes to their perpetual inadequacy in the case of ideas of substances4 ,the combination in the one case is artificially made1 in the other is found and being perpetually enlarged4 ,this he illustrates by imagining the processes which led ,adam severally to the idea of the mixed mode #8jealousy' and that of the substance #8gold4' ,in the former process ,adam #8put ideas together only by his own imagination1 not taken from the existence of anything 444 the standard there was of his own making4' ,in the latter1 #8he has a standard made by nature2 and therefore being to represent that to himself by the idea he has of it1 even when it is absent1 he puts no simple idea into his complex one1 but what he has the perception of from the thing itself4 ,he takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 secs4 #df1 #dg47 #8,it is plain1' however1 #8that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype will be always inadequate4' 444 about real essence in this sense there may be general knowledge4 #ij4 ,the nominal essence of a thing1 then1 according to this view1 being no other than the #8complex idea of a substance1' is a copy of reality1 just as the simple idea is4 ,it is a picture or representation in the mind of a thing that does exist by ideas of those qualities that are discoverable in it4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 secs4 #f1 #h47 ,it only differs from the simple idea 7which is itself1 as abstract1 a nominal essence7 #a in respect of reality1 because the latter is a copy or effect produced singly and involuntarily1 whereas we may put ideas together1 as if in a thing1 which have never been so presented together1 and1 on the other hand1 never can put together all that exist together4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxx4 sec4 #e1 and xxxi4 #aj47 ,so far as ,locke maintains this view1 the difficulty about general propositions concerning real existence need not arise4 ,a statement which affirmed of gold one of the qualities included in the complex idea of that substance1 would not express merely an analysis of an idea in the mind1 but would represent a relation of qualities in the existing thing from which the idea #8has been taken4' ,these qualities1 as in the thing1 doubtless would not be1 as in us1 feelings 7or1 as ,locke should rather have said in more recent phraseology1 possibilities of feeling71 but powers to produce feeling1 nor could any relation between these1 as in the thing1 be affirmed but such as had produced its copy or effect in actual experience4 ,no coexistence of qualities could be truly affirmed1 which had not been found2 but1 once found--being a coexistence of qualities and not simply a momentary coincidence of feelings--it could be affirmed as permanent in a general proposition4 ,that a relation can be stated universally between ideas collected in the mind1 no one denies1 and if such collection #8is taken from a combination of simple ideas existing together constantly in things' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxxii4 sec4 #ah71 the statement will hold equally of such existence4 ,thus ,locke contrasts mixed modes1 which1 for the most part1 #8being actions which perish in the birth1 are not capable of a lasting duration1' with #8substances1 which are the actors2 and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #db47 #a ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #ab4 ,but such real essence a creature of thought4 #ia4 ,in such a doctrine ,locke1 starting whence he did1 could not remain at rest4 ,we need not here repeat what has been said of it above in the consideration of his doctrine of substance4 ,taken strictly1 it implies that #8real existence' consists in a permanent relation of ideas1 said to be of secondary qualities1 to each other in dependence on other ideas1 said to be of primary qualities4 ,in other words1 in order to constitute reality1 it takes ideas out of that particularity in time and place1 which is yet pronounced the condition of reality1 to give them an #8abstract generality' which is fictitious1 and then treats them as constituents of a system of which the #8invented' relations of cause and effect and of identity are the framework4 ,in short1 it brings reality wholly within the region of thought1 distinguishing it from the system of complex ideas or nominal essences which constitute our knowledge1 not as the unknown opposite of all possible thought1 but only as the complete from the incomplete4 ,to one who logically carried out this view1 the ground of distinction between fact and fancy would have to be found in the relation between thought as #8objective1' or in the world1 and thought as so far communicated to us4 ,here1 however1 it could scarcely be found by ,locke1 with whom #8thought' meant simply a faculty of the #8thinking thing1' called a #8soul1' which might ride in a coach with him from ,oxford to ,london4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #bj47 ,was the distinction then to disappear altogether8 ,hence another view of real essence as unknown qualities of unknown body4 #ib4 ,it is saved1 though at the cost of abandoning the #8new way of ideas1' as it had been followed in the ,second ,book1 by the transfer of real existence from the thing in which ideas are found1 and whose qualities the complex of ideas in us1 though inadequate1 represents1 to something called #8body1' necessarily unknown1 because no ideas in us are in any way representative of it4 ,to such an unknown body unknown qualities are supposed to belong under the designation #8real essence4' ,the subject of the nominal essence1 just because its qualities1 being matter of knowledge1 are ideas in our minds1 is a wholly different and a fictitious thing4 ,how ,locke mixes up these two meanings in ambiguity about body4 #ic4 ,this change of ground is of course not recognized by ,locke himself4 ,it is the perpetual crossing of the inconsistent doctrines that renders his #8immortal ,third ,book' a web of contradictions4 ,as was said above1 he constantly speaks as if the subject of the real essence were the same with that of the nominal1 and never explicitly allows it to be different4 ,the equivocation under which the difference is disguised lies in the use of the term #8body4' ,a #8particular body' is the subject both of the nominal and real essence #8gold' ,but #8body1' as that in which #8ideas are found1' and in which they permanently coexist according to a natural law1 is one thing2 #8body1' as the abstraction of the unknown1 is quite another4 ,it is body in the former sense that is the real thing when nominal essence 7the complex of ideas in us7 is treated as representative1 though inadequately so1 of the real thing2 it is body in the latter sense that is the real thing when this is treated as wholly outside possible consciousness1 and its essence as wholly unrepresented by possible ideas4 ,by a jumble of the two meanings ,locke obtains an amphibious entity which is at once independent of relation to ideas1 as is body in the latter sense1 and a source of ideas representative of it1 as is body in the former sense--which thus carries with it that opposition to the mental which is supposed necessary to the real1 while yet it seems to manifest itself in ideas4 ,meanwhile a third conception of the real keeps thrusting itself upon the other two--the view1 namely1 that body in both senses is a fiction of thought1 and that the mere present feeling is alone the real4 ,body as #8parcel of matter' without essence4 #id4 ,where ,locke is insisting on the opposition between the real essence and any essence that can be known1 the former is generally ascribed either to a #8particular being' or to a #8parcel of matter4' ,the passage which brings the opposition into the strongest relief is perhaps the following3--#8,i would ask any one1 what is sufficient to make an essential difference in nature between any two particular beings1 without any regard had to some abstract idea1 which is looked upon as the essence and standard of a species8 ,all such patterns and standards being quite laid aside1 particular beings1 considered barely in themselves1 will be found to have all their qualities equally essential2 and everything1 in each individual1 will be essential to it1 or1 which is more1 nothing at all4 ,for though it may be reasonable to ask whether obeying the magnet be essential to iron2 yet ,i think it is very improper and insignificant to ask whether it be essential to the particular parcel of matter ,i cut my pen with1 without considering it under the name iron1 or as being of a certain species4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #e47 #a ,here1 it will be seen1 the exclusion of the abstract idea from reality carries with it the exclusion of that #8standard made by nature1' which according to the passages already quoted1 is the #8thing itself from which the abstract idea is taken1 and from which1 if correctly taken1 it derives reality4 ,this exclusion1 again1 means nothing else than the disappearance from #8nature' 7which with ,locke is interchangeable with #8reality'7 of all essential difference4 ,there remain1 however1 as the #8real1' #8particular beings1' or #8individuals1' or #8parcels of matter4' ,in each of these1 #8considered barely in itself1 everything will be essential to it1 or1 which is more1 nothing at all4' #a ,to the same purpose is a passage in ,book ,,iii4 chap4 x4 sec4 #ai1 towards the end4 ,in this sense body is the mere individuum4 #ie4 ,we have already seen1 #a that if by a #8particular being' is meant the mere individuum1 as it would be upon abstraction of all relations which according to ,locke are fictitious1 and constitute a community or generality1 it certainly can have no essential qualities1 since it has no qualities at all4 ,it is a something which equals nothing4 ,the notion of this bare individuum being the real is the #8protoplasm' of ,locke's philosophy to which1 though he never quite recognized it himself1 after the removal of a certain number of accretions we may always penetrate4 ,it is so because his unacknowledged method of finding the real consisted in abstracting from the formed content of consciousness till he came to that which could not be got rid of4 ,this is the momentarily present relation of subject and object1 which1 considered on the side of the object1 gives the mere atom1 and on the side of the subject1 the mere #8it is felt4' ,even in this ultimate abstraction the #8fiction of thought' still survives1 for the atom is determined to its mere individuality by relation to other individuals1 and the feeling is determined to the present moment or #8the now' by relation to other #8nows4' #a ,see above1 paragraph #de4 ,body as qualified by circumstances of time and place4 #if4 ,to this ultimate abstraction1 however1 ,locke1 though constantly on the road to it1 never quite penetrates4 ,he is farthest from it--indeed1 as far from it as possible--where he is most acceptable to common sense1 as in his ordinary doctrine of abstraction1 where the real1 from which the process of abstraction is supposed to begin1 is already the individual in the fullness of its qualities1 ,james and ,john1 this man or this gold4 ,he is nearest to it when the only qualification of the #8particular being1' which has to be removed by thought in order to its losing its reality and becoming an abstract idea1 is supposed to consist in #8circumstances of time and place4' ,such body ,locke held to be subject of #8primary qualities'3 but are these compatible with particularity in time8 #ig4 ,it is of these circumstances1 as the constituents of the real1 that he is thinking in the passage last quoted4 ,as qualified by #8circumstances of place' the real is a parcel of matter1 and under this designation ,locke thought of it as a subject of #8primary qualities of body4' #a ,these1 indeed1 as he enumerates them1 may be shown to imply relations going far beyond that of simple distinctness between atoms1 and thus to involve much more of the creative action of thought2 but we need be the less concerned for this usurpation on the part of the particular being1 since that which he illegitimately conveys to it as derived from #8circumstances of place1' he virtually takes away from it again by limitation in time4 ,the #8particular being' has indeed on the one hand a real essence1 consisting of certain primary qualities1 but on the other it has no continued identity4 ,it is only real as present to feeling at this or that time4 ,the particular being of one moment is not the particular being of the next4 ,thus the primary qualities which are a real essence1 i4e4 an essence of a particular being1 at one moment1 are not its real essence at the next1 because1 while they as represented in the mind remain the same1 the #8it1' the particular being is different4 ,an immutable essence for that very reason cannot be real4 ,the immutability can only lie in a relation between a certain abstract 7i4e4 unreal7 idea and a certain sound4 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ai47 #8,the real constitution of things1' on the other hand1 #8begin and perish with them4 ,all things that exist are liable to change4' 7,ibid47 ,locke1 it is true 7as is implied in the term change #b7 never quite drops the notion of there being a real identity in some unknown background1 but this makes no difference in the bearing of his doctrine upon the possibility of #8real' knowledge4 ,it only means that for an indefinite particularity of #8beings' there is substituted one #8being' under an indefinite peculiarity of forms4 ,though the reality of the thing in itself be immutable1 yet its reality for us is in perpetual flux4 #8,in itself' it is a substance without an essence1 a #8something we know not what' without any ideas to #8support2' a #8parcel of matter1' indeed1 but one in which no quality is really essential1 because its real essence1 consisting in its momentary presentation to sense1 changes with the moments4 #c #a ,according to ,locke's ordinary usage of the terms1 no distinction appears between #8matter' and #8body4' ,in ,book ,,iii4 chap4 ,x4 sec4 #ae1 however1 he distinguishes matter from body as the less determinate conception from the more4 ,the one implies solidity merely1 the other extension and figure also1 so that we may talk of the #8matter of bodies1' but not of the #8body of matters4' ,but since solidity1 according to ,locke's definition1 involves the other #8primary qualities1' this distinction does not avail him much4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #fi4 #c ,cf4 ,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #d3 #8,take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals and rank them under common names1 and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes1' c4 ,how ,locke avoids this question4 #ih4 ,we have previously noticed #a ,locke's pregnant remark1 that #8things whose existence is in succession' do not admit of identity4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxvii4 sec4 #b47 ,so far1 then1 as the #8real1' in distinction from the #8abstract1' is constituted by particularity in time1 or has its existence in succession1 it excludes the relation of identity4 #8,it perishes in every moment that it begins4' ,had ,locke been master of this notion1 instead of being irregularly mastered by it1 he might have anticipated all that ,hume had to say4 ,as it is1 even in passages such as those to which reference has just been made1 where he follows its lead the farthest1 he is still pulled up by inconsistent conceptions with which common sense1 acting through common language1 restrains the most adventurous philosophy4 ,thus1 even from his illustration of the liability of all existence to change--#8that which was grass to-day is to-morrow the flesh of a sheep1 and within a few days after will become part of a man' #b--we find that1 just as he does not pursue the individualization of the real in space so far but that it still remains #8a constitution of parts1' so he does not pursue it in time so far but that a coexistence of real elements over a certain duration is possible4 ,to a more thorough analysis1 indeed1 there is no alternative between finding reality in relations of thought1 which1 because relations of thought1 are not in time and therefore are immutable1 and submitting it to such subdivision of time as excludes all real coexistence because what is real1 as present1 at one moment is unreal1 as past1 at the next4 ,this alternative could not present itself in its clearness to ,locke1 because1 according to his method of interrogating consciousness1 he inevitably found in its supposed beginning1 which he identified with the real1 those products of thought which he opposed to the real1 and thus read into the simple feeling of the moment that which1 if it were the simple feeling of the moment1 it could not contain4 ,thus throughout the ,second ,book of the ,essay the simple idea is supposed to represent either as copy or as effect a permanent reality1 whether body or mind3 and in the later books1 even where the representation of such reality in knowledge comes in question1 its existence as constituted by #8primary qualities of body' is throughout assumed1 though general propositions with regard to it are declared impossible4 ,it is a feeling referred to body1 or1 in the language of subsequent psychology1 a feeling of the outward sense1 #c that ,locke means by an #8actual present sensation1' and it is properly in virtue of this reference that such sensation is supposed to be1 or to report1 the real4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ge4 #b ,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #aj4 #c ,for the germs of the distinction between outer and inner sense1 see ,locke's ,essay1 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #ad3 #8,this source of ideas 7the perception of the operations of the mind7 every man has wholly in himself2 and though it be not sense1 as having nothing to do with external objects1 yet it is very like it1 and might properly enough be called internal sense4' ,for the notion of outer sense cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #f1 where he is distinguishing the ideas of hunger and warmth1 which he supposes children to receive in the womb from the #8innate principles which some contend for4' #8,these 7the ideas of hunger and warmth7 being the effects of sensation1 are only from some affections of the body which happen to them there1 and so depend on something exterior to the mind1 not otherwise differing in their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense1 but only in the precedency of time4' ,body and its qualities supposed to be outside consciousness4 #ii4 ,according to the doctrine of primary qualities1 as originally stated1 the antithesis lies between body as it is in itself and body as it is for us1 not between body as it is for us in #8actual sensation1' and body as it is for us according to #8ideas in the mind4' ,the primary qualities #8are in bodies whether we perceive them or no4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #bc47 ,as he puts it elsewhere 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #b71 it is just because #8solidity and extension and the termination of it1 figure1 with motion and rest1 whereof we have the ideas1 would be really in the world as they are whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or no1' that they are to be looked on as the real modifications of matter4 ,a change in them1 unlike one in the secondary qualities1 or such as is relative to sense1 is a real alteration in body4 #8,pound an almond1 and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one1 and the sweet taste into an oily one4 ,what alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body1 but an alteration of the texture of it8' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #bj47 ,it is implied then in the notion of the real as body that it should be outside consciousness4 ,it is that which seems to remain when everything belonging to consciousness has been thought away4 ,yet it is brought within consciousness again by the supposition that it has qualities which copy themselves in our ideas and are #8the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #c47 ,again1 however1 the antithesis between the real and consciousness prevails1 and the qualities of matter or body having been brought within the latter1 are opposed to a #8substance of body'--otherwise spoken of as #8the nature1 cause1 or manner of producing the ideas of primary qualities'--which remains outside it1 unknown and unknowable4 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #cj1 c47 ,how can primary qualities be outside consciousness1 and yet knowable8 #ajj4 ,the doctrine of primary qualities was naturally the one upon which the criticism of ,berkeley and ,hume first fastened1 as the most obvious aberration from the #8new way of ideas4' ,that the very notion of the senses as #8reporting' anything1 under secondary no less than under primary qualities1 implies the presence of #8fictions of thought' in the primitive consciousness1 may become clear upon analysis2 but it lies on the surface and is avowed by ,locke himself 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 secs4 #b1 #g71 that the conception of primary qualities is only possible upon distinction being made between ideas as in our minds1 and the #8nature of things existing without us1' which cannot be given in the simple feeling itself4 ,this admitted1 the distinction might either be traced to the presence within intelligent consciousness of another factor than simple ideas1 or be accounted for as a gradual #8invention of the mind4' ,in neither way1 however1 could ,locke regard it and yet retain his distinction between fact and fancy1 as resting upon that between the nature of things and the mind of man4 ,the way of escape lay in a figure of speech1 the figure of the wax or the mirror4 #8,the ideas of primary qualities are resemblances of them4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 viii4 sec4 #ae47 ,these qualities then may be treated1 according to occasion1 either as primitive data of consciousness1 or as the essence of that which is the unknown opposite of consciousness--in the latter way when the antithesis between nature and mind is in view1 in the former when nature has yet to be represented as knowable4 ,locke answers that they copy themselves in ideas--,berkeley's rejoinder4 ,locke gets out of the difficulty by his doctrine of solidity4 #aja4 ,how1 asked ,berkeley1 can an idea be like anything that is not an idea8 ,put the question in its proper strength--,how can an idea be like that of which the sole and simple determination is just that it is not an idea 7and such with ,locke is body #8in itself' or as the real7--and it is clearly unanswerable4 ,the process by which ,locke was prevented from putting it to himself is not difficult to trace4 #8,body' and #8the solid' are with him virtually convertible terms4 ,each indifferently holds the place of the substance1 of which the primary qualities are so many determinations4 #a ,it is true that where solidity has to be defined1 it is defined as an attribute of body1 but conversely body itself is treated as a #8texture of solid parts1' i4e4 as a mode of the solid4 ,body1 in short1 so soon as thought of1 resolves itself into a relation of bodies1 and the solid into a relation of solids1 but ,locke1 by a shuffle of the two terms--representing body as a relation between solids and the solid as a relation between bodies--gains the appearance of explaining each in turn by relation to a simpler idea4 ,body1 as the unknown1 is revealed to us by the idea of solidity1 which sense conveys to us2 while solidity is explained by reference to the idea of body4 ,the idea of solidity1 we are told1 is a simple idea which comes into the mind solely by the sense of touch4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #a47 ,but no sooner has he thus identified it with an immediate feeling than1 in disregard of his own doctrine1 that #8an idea which has no composition' is undefinable 7see ,book ,,iii4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #g471 he converts it into a theory of the cause of that feeling4 #8,it arises from the resistance which we find in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses till it has left it2' and he at once proceeds to treat it as the consciousness of such resistance4 #8,whether we move or rest1 in what posture soever we are1 we always feel something under us that supports us1 and hinders our farther sinking downwards3 and the bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that whilst they remain between them1 they do by an insurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them4 ,that which then hinders the approach of two bodies1 when they are moving one towards another1 ,i call solidity4' #b #a ,see ,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #bc3 ,the primary #8qualities that are in bodies1 are the bulk1 figure1 number1 situation1 and motion or rest1 of their solid parts4' ,cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #aa3 #8,solidity is so inseparable an idea from body1 that upon that depends its filling of space1 its contact1 impulse1 and communication of motion upon impulse4' #b ,book ,,ii4 chap4 iv4 sec #g4 ,in which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite of mind and body as a #8nominal essence'4 #ajb4 ,now #8body' in this theory is by no means outside consciousness4 ,it is emphatically #8in the mind1' a #8nominal essence1' determined by the relation which the theory assigns to it1 and which1 like every relation according to ,locke1 is a #8thing of the mind4' ,this relation is that of outwardness to other bodies1 and among these to the sensitive body through which we receive #8ideas of sensation'--a body which1 on its side1 as determined by the relation1 has its essence from the mind4 ,it is1 then1 not as the unknown opposite of the mind1 but as determined by an intelligible relation which the mind constitutes1 and of which the members are each #8nominal essences1' that body is outward to the sensitive subject4 ,but to ,locke1 substituting for body as a nominal essence body as the unknown thing in itself1 and identifying the sensitive subject with the mind1 outwardness in the above sense--an outwardness constituted by the mind--becomes outwardness to the mind of an unknown opposite of the mind4 ,solidity1 then1 and the properties which its definition involves 7and it involves all the #8primary qualities'71 become something wholly alien to the mind1 which #8would exist without any sensible being to perceive them4' ,as such1 they do duty as a real essence1 when the opposition of this to everything in the mind has to be asserted4 ,yet must they be in some sort ideas1 for of these alone 7as ,locke fully admits7 can we think and speak2 and if ideas1 in the mind4 ,how is this contradiction to be overcome8 ,by the notion that though not in or of the mind1 they yet copy themselves upon it in virtue of an impulse in body1 correlative to that resistance of which touch conveys the idea4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #aa74 #a ,this explanation1 however1 is derived from the equivocation between the two meanings of mind and body respectively4 ,the problem to be explained is the relation between the mind and that which is only qualified as the negation of mind2 and the explanation is found in a relation1 only existing for the mind1 between a sensitive and a non-sensitive body4 #a ,cf4 also the passage from ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #aa1 quoted above1 paragraph #aja1 note #a4 ,rationale of these contradictions4 #ajc4 ,the case then stands as follows4 ,all that ,locke says of body as the real thing-in-itself1 and of its qualities as the essence of such thing1 comes according to his own showing of an action of the mind which he reckons the source of fictions4 #8,body in itself' is a substratum of ideas which the mind #8accustoms itself to suppose4' ,it perpetually recedes1 as what was at first a substance becomes in turn a complex of qualities for which a more remote substratum has to be supposed--a #8substance of body1' a productive cause of matter4 ,but the substance1 however remote1 is determined by the qualities to which it is correlative1 as the cause by its effects2 and every one of these--whether the most primary1 solidity1 or those which #8the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter1' i4e4 from the #8solid parts of a body1' #a--;as defined by ,locke1 is a relation such as the mind1 #8bringing one thing to and setting it by another' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxv4 sec4 #a71 can alone constitute4 ,to ,locke1 however1 overcome by the necessity of intelligence1 as gradually developing itself in each of us1 to regard the intelligible world as there before it is known1 the real must be something which would be what it is if thought were not4 ,strictly taken1 this must mean that it is that of which nothing can be said1 and some expression must be found by means of which it may do double duty as at once apart from consciousness and in it4 ,this is done by converting #8the primary qualities of body1 though obviously complex ideas of relation1 into simple feelings of touch1' #b and supposing the subject of this sensation to be related to its object as wax to the seal4 ,if we suppose this relation1 again1 which is really within the mind and constituted by it1 to be one between the mind itself1 as passive1 and the real1 we obtain a #8real' which exists apart from the mind1 yet copies itself upon it4 ,the mind1 then1 so far as it takes such a copy1 becomes an #8outer sense1' as to which it may be conveniently forgotten that it is a mode of mind at all4 ,thus every modification of it1 as an #8actual present sensation1' comes to be opposed to every idea of memory or imagination1 as that which is not of the mind to that which is2 though there is no assignable difference between one and the other1 except an indefinite one in degree of vivacity1 that is not derived from the action of the mind in referring the one to an object1 constituted by itself1 to which it does not refer the other4 #a ,cf ,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #i4 ,the primary qualities of body are #8such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter1 which has bulk enough to be perceived1 and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter1 though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses4' #b ,i write advisedly #8touch' only1 not #8sight and touch1' because1 though ,locke 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 v47 speaks of the ideas of extension1 figure1 motion1 and rest of bodies1 as received both by sight and touch1 these are all involved in the previous definition of solidity1 of which the idea is ascribed to touch only4 ,what knowledge can feeling1 even as referred to a #8solid' body1 convey8 #ajd4 ,let us now consider whether by this reference to body1 feeling becomes any the more a source of general knowledge concerning matters of fact4 ,as we have seen1 if we identify the real with feeling simply1 its distinction from #8bare vision' disappears4 ,this difficulty it is sought to overcome by distinguishing feeling as merely in the mind from actually present sensation4 ,but on reflection we find that sensation after all is feeling1 and that one feeling is as much present as another1 though present only to become at the next moment past1 and thus1 if it is the presence that is the condition of reality1 unreal4 ,the distinction then must lie in the actuality of the sensation4 ,but does not this actuality mean simply derivation from the real1 i4e4 derivation from the idea which has to be derived from it8 ,if1 in the spirit of ,locke1 we answer1 #8,no1 it means that the feeling belongs to the outer sense'2 the rejoinder will be that this means either that it is a feeling of touch--and what should give the feeling of touch this singular privilege over other feelings of not being in the mind while they are in it8--or that it is a feeling referred to body1 which still implies the presupposition of the real1 only under the special relations of resistance and impulse4 ,the latter alternative is the one which ,locke virtually adopts1 and in adopting it he makes the actuality1 by which sensation is distinguished from #8feelings in the mind1' itself a creation of the mind4 ,but though it is by an intellectual interpretation of the feeling of touch1 not by the feeling itself1 that there is given that idea of body1 by reference to which actual sensation is distinguished from the mere idea1 still with ,locke the feeling of touch is necessary to the interpretation4 ,thus1 supposing his notion to be carried out consistently1 the actual present sensation1 as reporting the real1 must either be a feeling of touch1 or1 if of another sort1 e4g41 sight or hearing1 must be referable to an object of touch4 ,in other words1 the real will exist for us so long only as it is touched1 and ideas in us will constitute a real essence so long only as they may be referred to an object now touched4 ,let the object cease to be touched1 and the ideas become a nominal essence in the mind1 the knowledge which they constitute ceases to be real1 and the proposition which expresses it ceases to concern matter of fact4 ,truth as to matters of fact or bodies1 then1 must be confined to singular propositions such as #8this is touched now1' #8that was touched then2' #8what is touched now is bitter1' #8what was then touched was red4' #a #a ,thus the conviction that an object seen is not #8bare fancy1' which is gained by #8putting the hand to it' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 l#g71 as it conveys the idea of solidity1 is properly1 according to ,locke's doctrine1 not one among other #8confirmations of the testimony of the senses1' but the source of all such testimony1 as a testimony to the real1 i4e4 to body4 ,see above1 paragraph #fb4 ,only the knowledge that something is1 not what it is4 #aje4 ,all that is gained1 then1 by the conversion of the feeling of touch1 pure and simple1 into the idea of a body touched1 is the supposition that there is a real existence which does not come and go with the sensations4 ,as to what this existence is1 as to its real essence1 we can have no knowledge but such as is given in a present sensation4 #a ,any essence of it1 otherwise known1 could only be a nominal essence1 a relation of ideas in our minds3 it would lack the condition in virtue of which alone a datum of consciousness can claim to be representative of reality1 that of being an impression made by a body now operating upon us4 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 v4 sec4 #b1 and ,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #a47 ,the memory of such impression1 however faithful1 will still only report a past reality4 ,it will itself be merely #8an idea in the mind4' ,neither it nor its relation to any present sensation result from the immediate impact of body1 and in consequence neither #8really exists4' ,all that can be known1 then1 of the real1 in other words1 the whole real essence of body1 as it is for us1 reduces itself to that which can at any moment be #8revealed' in a single sensation apart from all relation to past sensations2 and this1 as we have seen1 is nothing at all4 #a ,cf4 ,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #f3 #8,as to the real essences of substances1 we only suppose their being1 without precisely knowing what they are4' ,the appearance of the qualification #8precisely1' as we shall see below1 marks an oscillation from the view1 according to which #8real essence' is the negation of the knowable to the view according to which our knowledge of it is merely inadequate4 ,how it is that the real essence of things1 according to ,locke1 perishes with them1 yet is immutable4 #ajf4 ,thus that reduction of reality to that of which nothing can be said1 which follows from its identification with particularity in time1 follows equally from its identification with the resistance of body1 or 7which comes to the same7 from the notion of an #8outer sense' being its organ2 since it is only that which now resists1 not a general possibility of resistance nor a relation between the resistances of different times1 that can be regarded as outside the mind4 ,in ,locke's language1 it is only a particular parcel of matter that can be so regarded4 ,of such a parcel1 as he rightly says1 it is absurd to ask what is its essence1 for it can have none at all4 7,see above1 paragraph #id47 ,as real1 it has no quality save that of being a body or of being now touched--a quality1 which as all things real have it and have none other1 cannot be a differentia of it4 ,when we consider that this quality may be regarded equally as immutable and as changing from moment to moment1 we shall see the ground of ,locke's contradiction of himself in speaking of the real thing sometimes as indestructible1 sometimes as in continual dissolution4 #8,the real constitutions of things begin and perish with them4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ai47 ,that is1 the thing at one moment makes an impact on the sensitive tablet--in the fact that it does so lie at once its existence and its essence--but the next moment the impact is over1 and with it thing and essence1 as real1 have disappeared4 ,another impact1 and thus another thing1 has taken its place4 ,but of this the real essence is just the same as that of the previous thing1 namely1 that it may be touched1 or is solid1 or a body1 or a parcel of matter2 nor can this essence be really lost1 since than it there is no other reality1 all difference of essence1 as ,locke expressly says1 #a being constituted by abstract ideas and the work of the mind4 ,it follows that real change is impossible4 ,a parcel of matter at one time is a parcel of matter at all times4 ,thus we have only to forget that the relation of continuity between the parcels1 not being an idea caused by impact1 should properly fall to the unreal--though only on the same principle as should that of distinctness between the times--and we find the real in a continuity of matter1 unchangeable because it has no qualities to change4 ,it may seem strange that when this notion of the formless continuity of the real being gets the better of ,locke1 a man should be the real being which he takes as his instance4 #8,nothing ,i have is essential to me4 ,an accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape2 a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory1 or both2 and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding1 no1 nor life4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #d47 ,but as the sequel shows1 the man or the #8,i' is here considered simply as #8a particular corporeal being1' i4e4 as the #8parcel of matter' which alone 7according to the doctrine of reality now in view7 can be the real in man1 and upon which all qualities are #8superinductions of the mind4' #b #a ,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #d3 #8,take but away the abstract ideas by which we sort individuals1 and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes4' #b ,see a few lines below the passage quoted3 #8,so that if it be asked1 whether it be essential to me1 or any other particular corporeal being1 to have reason8 ,i say1 no2 no more than it is essential to this white thing ,i write on to have words in it4' ,only about qualities of matter1 as distinct from matter itself1 that ,locke feels any difficulty4 #ajg4 ,we may now discern the precise point where the qualm as to clothing reality with such superinductions commonly returns upon ,locke4 ,the conversion of feeling into body felt and of the particular time of the feeling into an individuality of the body1 and1 further1 the fusion of the individual bodies1 manifold as the times of sensation1 into one continued body1 he passes without scruple4 ,so long as these are all the traces of mental fiction which #8matter1' or #8body1' or #8nature' bears upon it1 he regards it undoubtingly as the pure #8privation' of whatever belongs to the mind4 ,but so soon as cognisable qualities1 forming an essence1 come to be ascribed to body1 the reflection arises that these qualities are on our side ideas1 and that so far as they are permanent or continuous they are not ideas of the sort which can alone represent body as the #8real' opposite of mind2 they are not the result of momentary impact2 they are not #8actually present sensations4' ,suppose them1 however1 to have no permanence--suppose their reality to be confined to the fleeting #8now'--and they are no qualities1 no essence1 at all4 ,there is then for us no real essence of body or nature2 what we call so is a creation of the mind4 ,these1 as knowable1 must be our ideas1 and therefore not a #8real essence'4 #ajh4 ,this implies the degradation of the #8primary qualities of body' from the position which they hold in the ,second ,book of the ,essay1 as the real1 par excellence1 to that of a nominal essence4 ,in the ,second ,book1 just as the complex of ideas1 received and to be received from a substance1 is taken for the real thing without disturbance from the antithesis between reality and #8ideas in the mind1' so the primary qualities of body are taken not only as real1 but as the sources of all other reality4 ,body1 the real thing1 copying itself upon the mind in an idea of sensation 7that of solidity71 carries with it from reality into the mind those qualities which #8the mind finds inseparable from it1' with all their modes4 #8,a piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure1 and1 by being removed from one place to another1 the idea of motion4 ,this idea of motion represents it1 as it really is in the manna1 moving2 a circle or square are the same1 whether in idea or existence1 in the mind or in the manna2 and this both motion and figure are really in the manna1 whether we take notice of them or no4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #ah47 ,to the unsophisticated man1 taking for granted that the #8sensible bulk' of the manna is a #8real essence1' this statement will raise no difficulties4 ,but when he has learnt from ,locke himself that the #8sensible bulk1' so far as we can think and speak of it1 must consist in the ideas which it is said to produce1 the question as to the real existence of these must arise4 ,it turns out that they #8really exist1' so far as they represent the impact of a body copying itself in actually present sensation1 and that from their reality1 accordingly1 must be excluded all qualities that accrue to the present sensation from its relation to the past4 ,can the #8primary qualities' escape this exclusion8 ,are the #8primary qualities' then1 a #8nominal essence'8 #aji4 ,to obtain a direct and compendious answer to this question from ,locke's own mouth is not easy1 owing to the want of adjustment between the several passages where he treats of the primary qualities4 ,they are originally enumerated as the #8bulk1 figure1 number1 situation1 and motion or rest of the solid parts of bodies' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #bc71 and1 as we have seen1 are treated as all involved in that idea of solidity which is given in the sensation of touch4 ,we have no further account of them till we come to the chapters on #8simple modes of space and duration' 7,book ,,ii4 chaps4 xiii4 c471 which are introduced by the remark1 that in the previous part of the book simple ideas have been treated #8rather in the way that they come into the mind than as distinguished from others more compounded4' ,as the simple idea1 according to ,locke1 is that which comes first into the mind1 the two ways of treatment ought to coincide2 but there follows an explanation of the simple modes in question1 of which to a critical reader the plain result is that the idea of body1 which1 according to the imaginary theory of #8the way that it came into the mind' is simple and equivalent to the sensation of touch1 turns out to be a complex of relations of which the simplest is called space4 ,according to ,locke's account they are relations1 and thus inventions of the mind4 #aaj4 ,to know what space itself is1 #8we are sent to our senses' of sight and touch4 ,it is #8as needless to go to prove that men perceive by their sight a distance between bodies of different colours1 or between the parts of the same body1 as that they see colours themselves2 nor is it less obvious that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #b47 ,space being thus explained by reference to distance1 and distance between bodies1 it might be supposed that distance and body were simpler ideas4 ,in the next paragraph1 however1 distance is itself explained to be a mode of space4 ,it is #8space considered barely in length between any two beings1' and is distinguished 7a7 from #8capacity' or #8space considered in length1 breadth1 and thickness2' 7b7 from #8figure1 which is nothing but the relation which the parts of the termination of extension1 or circumscribed space1 have among themselves2' 7c7 from #8place1 which is the relation of distance between anything and any two or more points which are considered as keeping the same distance one with another1 and so as at rest4' ,it is then shown at large 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #aa71 as against the ,cartesians1 that extension1 which is #8space in whatsoever manner considered1' is a #8distinct idea from body4' ,the ground of the distinction plainly lies in the greater complexity of the idea of body4 ,throughout the definition just given #8space' is presupposed as the simpler idea of which capacity1 figure1 and place are severally modifications2 and these again1 as #8primary qualities1' though with a slight difference of designation1 #a are not only all declared inseparable from body1 but are involved in it under a further modification as #8qualities of its solid parts' i4e41 of parts so related to each other that each will change its place sooner than admit another into it4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #b1 and chap4 viii4 sec4 #bc47 ,yet1 though body is thus a complex of relations--all1 according to ,locke's doctrine of relation1 inventions of the mind--and though it must be proportionately remote from the simple idea which #8comes first into the mind1' yet1 on the other hand1 it is in body1 as an object previously given1 that these relations are said to be found1 and found by the senses4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 secs4 #b1 #bg47 #b #a ,in the enumeration of primary qualities1 #8capacity' is represented by #8bulk1' #8place' by #8situation4' #b ,in the second of the passages referred to1 it will be seen that #8matter' is used interchangeably with #8body4' ,body is the complex in which they are found4 ,do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities1 or the primary qualities from idea of body8 #aaa4 ,it will readily be seen that #8body' here is a mode of the idea of substance1 and1 like it1 #a appears in two inconsistent positions as at once the beginning and the end of the process of knowledge--as on the one hand that in which ideas are found and from which they are abstracted1 and on the other hand that which results from their complication4 ,as the attempt either to treat particular qualities as given and substance as an abstraction gradually made1 or conversely to treat the #8thing' as given1 and relations as gradually superinduced1 necessarily fails for the simple reason that substance and relations each presuppose the other1 so body presupposes the primary qualities as so many relations which form its essence or make it what it is1 while these again presuppose body as the matter which they determine1 ,it is because ,locke substitutes for this intellectual order of mutual presupposition a succession of sensations in time1 that he finds himself in the confusion we have noticed--now giving the priority to sensations in which the idea of body is supposed to be conveyed1 and from it deriving the ideas of the primary qualities1 now giving it to these ideas themselves1 and deriving the idea of body from their complication4 ,this is just such a contradiction as it would be to put to-day before yesterday4 ,we may escape it by the consideration that in the case before us it is not a succession of sensations in time that we have to do with at all2 that #8the real' is an intellectual order1 or mind1 in which every element1 being correlative to every other1 at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other2 but that this order communicates itself to us piecemeal1 in a process of which the first condition on our part is the conception that there is an order1 or something related to something else2 and that thus the conception of qualified substance1 which in its definite articulation is the end of all our knowledge1 is yet in another form1 that may be called indifferently either abstract or confused1 #b its beginning4 ,this way of escape1 however1 was not open to ,locke1 because with him it was the condition of reality in the idea of the body and its qualities that they should be #8actually present sensations4' ,the priority then of body to the relations of extension1 distance1 c41 as of that in which these relations are found1 must1 if body and extension are to be more than nominal essences1 be a priority of sensations in time4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the priority of the idea of space to the ideas of its several modes1 and of these again to the idea of body1 as of the simpler to the more complex1 must no less than the other1 if the ideas in question are to be real1 be one in time4 ,locke's contradiction1 then1 is that of supposing that of two sensations each is actually present1 of two impacts on the sensitive tablet each is actually made1 before the other4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ci4 #b #8,indifferently either abstract or confused1' because of the conception that is most confused the least can be said2 and it is thus most abstract4 ,mathematical ideas1 though ideas of #8primary qualities of body1' have #8barely an ideal existence'4 #aab4 ,from such a contradiction1 even though he was not distinctly aware of it1 he could not but seek a way of escape1 ,from his point of view two ways might at first sight seem to be open--the priority in sensitive experience1 and with it reality1 might be assigned exclusively either to the idea of body or to that of space4 ,to whichever of the two it is assigned1 the other must become a nominal essence4 ,if it is the idea of body that is conveyed to the mind directly from without through sensation1 then it must be by a process in the mind that the spatial relations are abstracted from it2 and conversely1 if it is the latter that are given in sensation1 it must be by a mental operation of compounding that the idea of body is obtained from them4 ,now1 according to ,locke's fundamental notion1 that the reality of an idea depends upon its being in consciousness a copy through impact of that which is not in consciousness1 any attempt to retain it in the idea of space while sacrificing it in that of body would be obviously self-destructive4 ,nor1 however we might re-write his account of the relations of space as #8found in bodies1' could we avoid speaking of them as relations of some sort2 and if relations1 then derived from the #8mind's carrying its view from one thing to another1' and not #8actually present sensations4' ,we shall not1 then1 be surprised to find ,locke tending to the other alternative1 and gradually forgetting his assertion that #8a circle or a square are the same whether in idea or in existence1' and his elaborate maintenance of the #8real existence' of a vacuum1 i4e41 extension without body4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 secs4 #ba and the following1 and xvii4 #d47 ,in the ,fourth ,book it is body alone that has real existence1 an existence revealed by actually present sensation1 while all mathematical ideas1 the ideas of the circle and the square1 have #8barely an ideal existence' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #f72 and this means nothing else than the reduction of the primary qualities of body to a nominal essence4 ,our ideas of them are general 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #bd71 or merely in the mind4 #8,there is no individual parcel of matter1 to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #f47 ,how should there be1 when the #8individual parcel' means that which copies itself by impact in the present sensation1 while the qualities in question are relations which cannot be so copied8 ,yet1 except as attaching to such a parcel1 they have no #8real existence2' and1 conversely1 the #8body1' from which they are inseparable1 not being an individual parcel of matter in the above sense1 must itself be unreal and belong merely to the mind4 ,the #8body' which is real has for us no qualities1 and that reference to it of the #8actually present sensation' by which such sensation is distinguished from other feeling1 is a reference to something of which nothing can be said4 ,it is a reference which cannot be stated in any proposition really true2 and the difference which it constitutes between #8bare vision' and the feeling to which reality corresponds1 must be either itself unreal or unintelligible4 ,summary view of ,locke's difficulties in regard to the real4 #aac4 ,we have now pursued the antithesis between reality and the work of the mind along all the lines which ,locke indicates1 and find that it everywhere eludes us4 ,the distinction1 which only appeared incidentally in the doctrine of substance1 between #8the being and the idea thereof--between substance as #8found' and substance as that which #8we accustom ourselves to suppose'--becomes definite and explicit as that between real and nominal essence1 but it does so only that the essence1 which is merely real1 may disappear4 ,whether we suppose it the quality of a mere sensation1 as such1 or of mere body1 as such1 we find that we are unawares defining it by relations which are themselves the work of the mind1 and that after abstraction of these nothing remains to give the antithesis to the work of the mind any meaning4 ,meanwhile the attitude of thought1 when it has cleared the antithesis of disguise1 but has not yet found that each of the opposites derives itself from thought as much as the other1 is so awkward and painful that an instinctive reluctance to make the clearance is not to be wondered at4 ,over against the world of knowledge1 which is the work of the mind1 stands a real world of which we can say nothing but that it is there1 that it makes us aware of its presence in every sensation1 while our interpretation of what it is1 the system of relations which we read into it1 is our own invention4 ,the interpretation is not even to be called a shadow1 for a shadow1 however dim1 still reflects the reality2 it is an arbitrary fiction1 and a fiction of which the possibility is as unaccountable as the inducement to make it4 ,it is commonly presented as consisting in abstraction from the concrete4 ,but the concrete1 just so far as concrete1 i4e41 a complex world of relations1 cannot be the real if the separation of the real from the work of the mind is to be maintained4 ,it must itself be the work of the compounding mind1 which must be supposed again in #8abstraction' to decompose what it has previously compounded4 ,now1 it is of the essence of the doctrine in question that it denies all power of origination to the mind except in the way of compounding and abstracting given impressions4 ,its supposition is1 that whatever precedes the work of composition and abstraction must be real #a because the mind passively receives it3 a supposition which1 if the mind could originate1 would not hold4 ,how1 then1 does it come to pass that a #8nominal essence1' consisting of definite qualities1 is constructed by a mind1 which originates nothing1 out of a #8real' matter1 which1 apart from such construction1 has no qualities at all8 ,and why1 granted the construction1 should the mind in #8abstraction' go through the ,penelopean exercise of perpetually unweaving the web which it has just woven8 #a #8,simple ideas1 since the mind can by no means make them to itself1 must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 v4 sec4 #d47 ,why they do not trouble him more4 #aad4 ,it is ,hume's more logical version of ,locke's doctrine that first forces these questions to the front4 ,in ,locke himself they are kept back by inconsistencies1 which we have already dwelt upon4 ,for the real1 absolutely void of intelligible qualities1 because these are relative to the mind1 he is perpetually substituting a real constituted by such qualities1 only with a complexity which we cannot exhaust4 ,by so doing1 though at the cost of sacrificing the opposition between the real and the mental1 he avoids the necessity of admitting that the system of the sciences is a mere language1 well-or ill-constructed1 but unaccountably and without reference to things4 ,finally1 he so far forgets the opposition altogether as to find the reality of #8moral and mathematical' knowledge in their #8bare ideality' itself4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #f1 c47 ,thus with him the divorce between knowledge and reality is never complete1 and sometimes they appear in perfect fusion4 ,a consideration of his doctrine of propositions will show finally how the case between them stands1 as he left it4 ,they re-appear in his doctrine of propositions4 #aae4 ,in the ,fourth ,book of the ,essay the same ground has to be thrice traversed under the several titles of #8knowledge1' #8truth1' and #8propositions4' ,knowledge being the perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas1 the proposition is the putting together or separation of words1 as the signs of ideas1 in affirmative or negative sentences 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 v4 sec4 #e71 and truth--the expression of certainty #a--;consists in the correspondence between the conjunction or separation of the signs and the agreement or disagreement of the ideas4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 v4 sec4 #b47 ,thus1 the question between the real and the mental affects all these4 ,does this or that perception of agreement between ideas represent an agreement in real existence8 ,is its certainty a real certainty8 ,does such or such a proposition1 being a correct expression of an agreement between ideas1 also through this express an agreement between things8 ,is its truth real1 or merely verbal8 #a ,all knowledge is certain according to ,locke 7,cf4 ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #ac1 #8certainty is requisite to knowledge'71 though the knowledge must be expressed before the term #8certainty' is naturally applied to it4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #c47 #8,certainty of knowledge' is thus a pleonastic phrase1 which only seems not to be so because we conceive knowledge to have a relation to things which ,locke's definition denies it1 and by #8certainty1' in distinction from this1 understand its relation to the subject4 #8,certainty of truth' is1 in like manner1 a pleonastic phrase1 there being no difference between the definition of it 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #c7 and that of #8truth' simply1 given in ,book ,,iv4 chap4 ,v4 sec4 #b4 ,the knowledge expressed by a proposition1 though certain1 may not be real 444 #aaf4 ,to answer these questions1 according to ,locke1 we must consider whether the knowledge1 or the proposition which expresses it1 concerns substances1 i4e41 #8the co-existence of ideas in nature1' on the one hand2 or1 on the other1 either the properties of a mathematical figure or #8moral ideas4' ,if it is of the latter sort1 the agreement of the ideas in the mind is itself their agreement in reality1 since the ideas themselves are archetypes4 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 secs4 #f1 #g47 ,it is only when the ideas are ectypes1 as is the case when the proposition concerns substances1 that the doubt arises whether the agreement between them represents an agreement in reality4 ,the distinction made here virtually corresponds to that which appears in the chapters on the reality and adequacy of ideas in the ,second ,book1 and again in those on #8names' in the ,third4 ,there the #8complex ideas of modes and relation' are pronounced necessarily real adequate and true1 because1 #8being themselves archetypes1 they cannot differ from their archetypes4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 ,,xxx4 sec4 #d47 #a ,with them are contrasted simple ideas and complex ideas of substances1 which are alike ectypes1 but with this difference from each other1 that the simple ideas cannot but be faithful copies of their archetypes1 while the ideas of substances cannot but be otherwise4 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 secs4 #b1 #aa1 c47 ,thus1 #8the names of simple ideas and substances1 with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify1 intimate also some real existence1 from which was derived their original pattern4 ,but the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind4' 7,book ,,iii4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #b47 #8,the names of simple ideas and modes1' it is added1 #8signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their species'--a statement which1 if it is to express ,locke's doctrine strictly1 must be confined to names of simple ideas1 while in respect of modes it should run1 that #8the nominal essence which the names of these signify is itself the real4' #a cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxxi4 sec4 #c1 and xxxii4 sec4 #ag4 444 when the knowledge concerns substances4 ,in this case general truth must be merely verbal4 ,mathematical truths1 since they concern not substances1 may be both general and real4 #aag4 ,but though the distinction between different kinds of knowledge in regard to reality cannot but rest on the same principle as that drawn between different kinds of ideas in the same regard1 it is to be noticed that in the doctrine of the ,fourth ,book #8knowledge concerning substances1' in contrast with that in which #8our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas1' has by itself to cover the ground which1 in the ,second and ,third ,book1 simple ideas and complex ideas of substances cover together4 ,this is to be explained by the observation1 already set forth at large1 #a that the simple idea has in ,locke's ,fourth ,book become explicitly what in the previous books it was implicitly1 not a feeling proper1 but the conscious reference of a feeling to a thing or substance4 ,only because it is thus converted1 as we have seen1 can it constitute the beginning of a knowledge which is not a simple idea but a conscious relation between ideas1 or have 7what yet it must have if it can be expressed in a proposition7 that capacity of being true or false1 which implies #8the reference by the mind of an idea to something extraneous to it4' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxxii4 sec4 #d47 ,thus1 what is said of the #8simple idea' in the ,second and ,third ,books1 is in the ,fourth transferred to one form of knowledge concerning substances1 to that1 namely1 which consists in #8particular experiment and observation1' and is expressed in singular propositions1 such as #8this is yellow1' #8this gold is now solved in aqua regia4' ,such knowledge cannot but be real1 the proposition which expresses it cannot but have real certainty1 because it is the effect of a #8body actually operating upon us' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #a71 just as the simple idea is an ectype directly made by an archetype4 ,it is otherwise with complex ideas of substances and with general knowledge or propositions about them4 ,a group of ideas1 each of which1 when first produced by a #8body1' has been real1 when retained in the mind as representing the body1 becomes unreal4 ,the complex idea of gold is only a nominal essence or the signification of a name2 the qualities which compose it are merely ideas in the mind1 and that general truth which consists in a correct statement of the relation between one of them and another or the whole--e4g41 #8gold is soluble in aqua regia'--holds merely for the mind2 #b but it is not therefore to be classed with those other mental truths1 which constitute mathematical and moral knowledge1 and which1 just because #8merely ideal1' are therefore real4 ,its merely mental character renders it in ,locke's language a #8trifling proposition1' but does not therefore save it from being really untrue4 ,it is a #8trifling proposition1' for1 unless solubility in aqua regia is included in the complex idea which the sound #8gold' stands for1 the proposition which asserts it of gold is not certain1 not a truth at all4 ,if it is so included1 then the proposition is but #8playing with sounds4' ,it may serve to remind an opponent of a definition which he has made but is forgetting1 but #8carries no knowledge with it but of the signification of a word1 however certain it be4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 viii4 secs4 #e #i47 ,yet there is a real gold1 outside the mind1 of which the complex idea of gold in the mind must needs try to be a copy1 though the conditions of real existence are such that no #8complex idea in the mind' can possibly be a copy of it4 ,thus the verbal truth1 which general propositions concerning substances express1 is under a perpetual doom of being really untrue4 ,the exemption of mathematical and moral knowledge from this doom remains an unexplained mercy4 ,because merely mental1 such knowledge is real--there being no reality for it to misrepresent--and yet not trifling4 ,the proposition that #8the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles1' has that general certainty which is never to be found but in our ideas1 yet #8conveys instructive real knowledge1' the predicate being #8a necessary consequence of precise complex idea' which forms the subject1 yet #8not contained in it4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #h47 #c ,the same might be said apparently1 according to ,locke's judgment 7though he is not so explicit about this71 of a proposition in morals1 such as #8,god is to be feared and obeyed by man4' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #ac47 #d ,but how are such propositions1 at once abstract and real1 general and instructive1 to be accounted for8 ,there is no #8workmanship of the mind' recognised by ,locke but that which consists in compounding and abstracting 7i4e41 separating7 ideas of which #8it cannot originate one4' ,the #8abstract ideas' of mathematics1 the #8mixed modes' of morals1 just as much as the ideas of substances1 must be derived by such mental artifice from a material given in simple feeling1 and #8real' because so given4 ,yet1 while this derivation renders ideas of substances unreal in contrast with their real #8originals1' and general propositions about them #8trifling1' because1 while #8intimating an existence1' they tell nothing about it1 on the other hand it actually constitutes the reality of moral and mathematical ideas4 ,their relation to an original disappears2 they are themselves archetypes1 from which the mind1 by its own act1 can elicit other ideas not already involved in the meaning of their names4 ,but this can only mean that the mind has some other function than that of uniting what it has #8found' in separation1 and separating again what it has thus united--that it can itself originate4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #be4 #b ,book ,,iv4 chap4 xi4 sec4 #ac1 xii4 #i1 c4 #c ,just as according to ,kant such a proposition expresses a judgment #8synthetical1' yet #8-priori4' #d ,cf4 ,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #ah1 and ,book ,,iii4 chap1 xi4 sec4 #af4 ,significance of this doctrine4 #aah4 ,a genius of such native force as ,locke's could not be applied to philosophy without determining the lines of future speculation1 even though to itself they remained obscure4 ,he stumbles upon truths when he is not looking for them1 and the inconsistencies or accidents of his system are its most valuable part4 ,thus1 in a certain sense1 he may claim the authorship at once of the popular empiricism of the modern world1 and of its refutation4 ,he fixed the prime article of its creed1 that thought has nothing to do with the constitution of facts1 but only with the representation of them by signs and the rehearsal to itself of what its signs have signified--in brief1 that its function is merely the analytical judgment2 yet his admissions about mathematical knowledge rendered inevitable the ,kantian question1 #8,how are synthetic judgments -priori possible8'--which was to lead to the recognition of thought as constituting the objective world1 and thus to get rid of the antithesis between thought and reality4 ,in his separation of the datum of experience from the work of thought he was merely following the ,syllogistic ,logic1 which really assigns no work to the thought1 whose office it professes to magnify1 but the analysis of given ideas4 ,taking the work as that ,logic conceived it 7and as it must be conceived if the separation is to be maintained7 he showed--conclusively as against ,scholasticism-- the #8trifling' character of the necessary and universal truths with which it dealt4 ,experience1 the manifestation of the real1 regarded as a series of events which to us are sensations1 can only yield propositions singular as the events1 and having a truth like them contingent4 ,by consequence1 necessity and universality of connection can only be found in what the mind does for itself1 without reference to reality1 when it analyses the complex idea which it retains as the memorandum of its past single experiences2 i4e41 in a relation between ideas or propositions of which one explicitly includes the other4 ,upon this relation syllogistic reasoning rests1 and1 except so far as it may be of use for convicting an opponent 7or oneself7 of inconsistency1 it has nothing to say against such nominalism as the above4 ,hence1 with those followers of ,locke who have been most faithful to their master1 it has remained the standing rule to make the generality of a truth consist in its being analytical of the meaning of a name1 and its necessity in its being included in one previously conceded4 ,yet if such were the true account of the generality and necessity of mathematical propositions1 their truth according to ,locke's explicit statement would be #8verbal and trifling1' not1 as it is1 #8real and instructive4' ,fatal to the notion that mathematical truths1 though general1 are got from experience3 #aai4 ,the point of this1 the most obvious1 contradiction inherent in ,locke's empiricism1 is more or less striking according to the fidelity with which the notion of matter-of-fact1 or of the reality that is not of the mind1 proper to that system1 is adhered to4 ,when the popular ,logic derived from ,locke has so far forgotten the pit whence it was digged as to hold that propositions of a certainty at once real and general can be derived from experience1 and to speak without question of #8general matters-of-fact' in a sense which to ,locke almost1 to ,hume altogether1 would have been a contradiction in terms1 it naturally finds no disturbance in regarding mathematical certainty as different not in kind1 but only in degree1 from that of any other #8generalisation from experience4' ,not aware that the distinction of mathematical from empirical generality is the condition upon which1 according to ,locke1 the former escapes condemnation as #8trifling1' it does not see any need for distinguishing the sources from which the two are derived1 and hence goes on asserting against imaginary or insignificant opponents that mathematical truth is derived from #8experience2' which1 if #8experience' be so changed from what ,locke understood by it as to yield general propositions concerning matters-of-fact of other than analytical purport1 no one need care to deny4 ,that it can yield such propositions is1 doubtless1 the supposition of the physical sciences2 nor1 we must repeat1 is it the correctness of this supposition that is in question1 but the validity1 upon its admission1 of that antithesis between experience and the work of thought1 which is the #8be-all and end-all' of the popular ,logic4 444 and to received views of natural science3 but ,locke not so clear about this4 #abj4 ,locke1 as we have seen1 after all the encroachments made unawares by thought within the limits of that experience which he opposes to it--or1 to put it conversely1 after all that he allows #8nature' to take without acknowledgment from #8mind'--is still so far faithful to the opposition as to #8suspect a science of nature to be impossible4' ,this suspicion1 which is but a hesitating expression of the doctrine that general propositions concerning substances are merely verbal1 is the exact counterpart of the doctrine pronounced without hesitation that mathematical truths1 being at once real and general1 do not concern nature at all4 ,real knowledge concerning nature being given by single impressions of bodies at single times operating upon us1 and by consequence being expressible only in singular propositions1 any reality which general propositions state must belong merely to the mind1 and a mind which can originate a reality other than nature's cannot be a passive receptacle of natural impressions4 ,locke admits the real generality of mathematical truths1 but does not face its consequences4 ,hume1 seeing the difficulty1 will not admit the real generality4 ,the modern ,logic1 founded on ,locke1 believing in the possibility of propositions at once real and general concerning nature4 does not see the difficulty at all4 ,it reckons mathematical to be the same in kind with natural knowledge1 each alike being real notwithstanding its generality2 not aware that by so doing1 instead of getting rid1 as it fancies1 of the originative function of thought in respect of mathematical knowledge1 it only necessitates the supposition of its being originative in respect of the knowledge of nature as well4 ,ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science of nature4 ,particular experiment cannot afford general knowledge4 #aba4 ,it may find some excuse for itself in the hesitation with which ,locke pronounces the impossibility of real generality in the knowledge of nature--an hesitation which necessarily results from the ambiguities1 already noticed1 in his doctrine of real and nominal essence4 ,so far as the opposition between the nominal and real essences of substances is maintained in its absoluteness1 as that between every possible collection of ideas on the one side1 and something wholly apart from thought on the other1 this impossibility follows of necessity4 ,but so far as the notion is admitted of the nominal essence being in some way1 however inadequately1 representative of the real1 there is an opening1 however indefinite1 for general propositions concerning the latter4 ,on the one hand we have the express statement that #8universal propositions1 of whose truth and falsehood we can have certain knowledge1 concern not existence' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #a74 ,they are founded only on the #8relations and habitudes of abstract ideas' 7,book ,,iv4 chap xii4 sec4 #g72 and since it is the proper operation of the mind in abstraction to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understanding1 they represent no knowledge of real existence at all 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #a74 ,here ,locke is consistently following his doctrine that the #8particularity in time1' of which abstraction is made when we consider ideas as in the understanding1 is what specially distinguishes the real2 which thus can only be represented by #8actually present sensation4' ,it properly results from this doctrine that the proposition representing particular experiment and observation is only true of real existence so long as the sensation1 in which the experiment consists1 continues present4 ,not only is the possibility excluded of such experiment yielding a certainty which shall be general as well as real1 but the particular proposition itself can only be really true so far as the qualities1 whose co-existence it asserts1 are present sensations4 ,the former of these limitations to real truth we find ,locke generally recognising1 and consequently suspecting a science of nature to be impossible2 but the latter1 which would be fatal to the supposition of there being a real nature at all1 even when he carries furthest the reduction of reality to present feeling1 he virtually ignores4 ,on the other hand1 there keeps appearing the notion that1 inasmuch as the combination of ideas which make up the nominal essence of a substance is taken from a combination in nature or reality1 whenever the connexion between any of these is necessary1 it warrants a proposition universally true in virtue of the necessary connexion between the ideas1 and really true in virtue of the ideas being taken from reality4 ,according to this notion1 though #8the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty1' it is yet possible 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #ac74 ,it is not recognised as involving that contradiction which it must involve if the antithesis between reality and ideas in the mind is absolutely adhered to4 ,nay1 inasmuch as certain ideas of primary qualities1 e4g4 those of solidity and of the receiving or communicating motion upon impulse1 are necessarily connected1 it is supposed actually to exist 7,book ,,iv4 chap iii4 sec4 #ad74 ,it is only because1 as a matter of fact1 our knowledge of the relation between secondary qualities and primary is so limited that it cannot be carried further4 ,that they are related as effects and causes1 it would seem1 we know2 and that the #8causes work steadily1 and effects constantly flow from them1' we know also2 but #8their connexions and dependencies are not discoverable in our ideas' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #bi74 ,that1 if discoverable in our ideas1 just because there discovered1 the connexion would not be a real co-existence1 ,locke never expressly says4 ,he does not so clearly articulate the antithesis between relations of ideas and matters of fact4 ,if he had done so1 he must also have excluded from real existence those abstract ideas of body which constitute the scanty knowledge of it that according to him we do possess 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #bd74 ,he is more disposed to sigh for discoveries that would make physics capable of the same general certainty as mathematics1 than to purge the former of those mathematical propositions--really true only because having no reference to reality--which to him formed the only scientific element in them4 ,what knowledge it can afford1 according to ,locke4 #abb4 ,the ambiguity of his position will become clearer if we resort to his favourite #8instances in gold4' ,the proposition1 #8all gold is soluble in aqua regia1' is certainly true1 if such solubility is included in the complex idea which the word #8gold' stands for1 and if such inclusion is all that the proposition purports to state4 ,it is equally certain and equally trifling with the proposition1 #8a centaur is four-footed4' ,but1 in fact1 as a proposition concerning substance1 it purports to state more than this1 viz4 that a #8body whose complex idea is made up of yellow1 very weighty1 ductile1 fusible1 and fixed1' is always soluble in aqua regia4 ,in other words1 it states the invariable co-existence in a body of the complex idea1 #8solubility in aqua regia1' with the group of ideas indicated by #8gold4' ,thus understood--as instructive or synthetical--it has not the certainty which would belong to it if it were #8trifling1' or analytical1 #8since we can never1 from the consideration of the ideas themselves1 with certainty affirm' their co-existence 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec #i74 ,if we see the solution actually going on1 or can recall the sight of it by memory1 we can affirm its co-existence with the ideas in question in that #8bare instance2' and thus1 on the principle that #8whatever ideas have once been united in nature may be so united again' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #ab71 infer a capacity of co-existence between the ideas1 but that is all4 #8,constant observation may assist our judgments in guessing' an invariable actual co-existence 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 viii4 sec4 #i72 but beyond guessing we cannot get4 ,if our instructive proposition concerning co-existence is to be general it must remain problematical4 ,it is otherwise with mathematical propositions4 #8,if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right angles1 it is certain that they always will be so2' but only because such a proposition concerns merely #8the habitudes and relations of ideas4' #8,if the perception that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations be not a sufficient ground of knowledge1 there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics2 for no mathematical demonstration could be other than particular3 and when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one triangle and circle1 his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 i4 sec4 #i74 ,not the knowledge which is now supposed to be got by induction4 ,yet more than ,locke was entitled to suppose it could give4 #abc4 ,to a reader1 fresh from our popular treatises on ,logic1 such language would probably at first present no difficulty4 ,he would merely lament that ,locke1 as a successor of ,bacon1 was not better acquainted with the #8,inductive methods1' and thus did not understand how an observation of co-existence in the bare instance1 if the instance be of the right sort1 may warrant a universal affirmation4 ,or he may take the other side1 and regard ,locke's restriction upon general certainty as conveying1 not any doubt as to the validity of the inference from an observed case to all cases where the conditions are ascertainably the same1 but a true sense of the difficulty of ascertaining in any other case that the conditions are the same4 ,on looking closer1 however1 he will see that1 so far from ,locke's doctrine legitimately allowing of such an adaptation to the exigencies of science1 it is inconsistent with itself in admitting the reality of most of the conditions in the case supposed to be observed1 and thus in allowing the real truth even of the singular proposition4 ,this purports to state1 according to ,locke's terminology1 that certain #8ideas' do now or did once co-exist in a body4 ,but the ideas1 thus stated to co-exist1 according to ,locke's doctrine that real existence is only testified to by actual present sensation1 differ from each other as that which really exists from that which does not4 ,in the particular experiment of gold being solved in aqua regia1 from the complex idea of solubility an indefinite deduction would have to be made for qualification by ideas retained in the understanding before we could reach the present sensation2 and not only so1 but the group of ideas indicated by #8gold1' to whose co-existence with solubility the experiment is said to testify1 as ,locke himself says1 form merely a nominal essence1 while the body to which we ascribe this essence is something which we #8accustom ourselves to suppose1' not any #8parcel of matter' having a real existence in nature4 #a ,in asserting the co-existence of the ideas forming such a nominal essence with the actual sensation supposed to be given in the experiment1 we change the meaning of #8existence1' between the beginning and end of the assertion1 from that according to which all ideas exist to that according to which existence has no #8connexion with any other of our ideas but those of ourselves and ,god1' but is testified to by present sensation4 #b ,this paralogism escapes ,locke just as his equivocal use of the term #8idea' escapes him4 ,the distinction1 fixed in ,hume's terminology as that between impression and idea1 forces itself upon him1 as we have seen1 in the ,fourth book of the ,essay1 where the whole doctrine of real existence turns upon it1 but alongside of it survives the notion that ideas1 though #8in the mind' and forming a nominal essence1 are yet1 if rightly taken from things1 ectypes of reality4 ,thus he does not see that the co-existence of ideas1 to which the particular experiment1 as he describes it1 testifies1 is nothing else than the co-existence of an event with a conception--of that which is in a particular time1 and 7according to him7 only for that reason real1 with that which is not in time at all but is an unreal abstraction of the mind's making4 #c ,the reality given in the actual sensation cannot1 as a matter of fact1 be discovered to have a necessary connexion with the ideas that form the nominal essence1 and therefore cannot be asserted universally to co-exist with them2 but with better faculties1 he thinks1 the discovery might be made 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 sec4 #af74 ,it does not to him imply such a contradiction as it must have done if he had steadily kept in view his doctrine that of particular 7i4e4 real7 existence our #8knowledge' is not properly knowledge at all1 but simply sensation--such a contradiction as was to ,hume involved in the notion of deducing a matter of fact4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #ce1 #id1 c4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #cj and the following4 #c ,see above1 paragraphs #de1 #hj1 #he1 #ig4 ,with ,locke mathematical truths1 though ideal1 true also of nature4 #abd4 ,it results that those followers of ,locke1 who hold the distinction between propositions of mathematical certainty and those concerning real existence to be one rather of degree than of kind1 though they have the express words of their master against them1 can find much in his way of thinking on their side4 ,this1 however1 does not mean that he in any case drops the antithesis between matters of fact and relations of ideas in favour of matters of fact1 so as to admit that mathematical propositions concern matters of fact1 but that he sometimes drops it in favour of relations of ideas1 so as to represent real existence as consisting in such relations4 ,if the matter of fact1 or real existence1 is to be found only in the event constituted or reported by present feeling1 such a relation of ideas1 by no manner of means reducible to an event1 as the mathematical proposition states1 can have no sort of connection with it4 ,but if real existence is such that the relations of ideas1 called primary qualities of matter1 constitute it1 and the qualities included in our nominal essences are its copies or effects1 then1 as on the one side our complex ideas of substances only fail of reality through want of fulness1 or through mistakes in the process by which they are #8taken from things1' so1 on the other side1 the mental truth of mathematical propositions need only fail to be real because the ideas1 whose relations they state1 are considered in abstraction from conditions which qualify them in real existence4 #8,if it is true of the idea of a triangle that its three angles equal two right ones1 it is true also of a triangle1 wherever it really exists' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #f74 ,there is1 then1 no incompatibility between the idea and real existence4 ,mathematical ideas might fairly be reckoned1 like those of substances1 to be taken from real existence2 but though1 like these1 inadequate to its complexity1 to be saved from the necessary infirmities which attach to ideas of substances because not considered as so taken1 but merely as in the mind4 ,there is language about mathematics in ,locke that may be interpreted in this direction1 though his most explicit statements are on the other side4 ,it is not our business to adjust them1 but merely to point out the opposite tendencies between which a clear-sighted operator on the material given by ,locke would find that he had to choose4 ,two lines of thought in ,locke1 between which a follower would have to choose4 #abe4 ,on the one hand there is the identification of real existence with the momentary sensible event4 ,this view1 of which the proper result is the exclusion of predication concerning real existence altogether1 appears in ,locke's restriction of such predication to the singular proposition1 and in his converse assertion that propositions of mathematical certainty #8concern not existence' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 iv4 sec4 #h74 ,the embarrassment resulting from such a doctrine is that it leads round to the admission of the originativeness of thought and of the reality of its originations1 with the denial of which it starts4 #a ,it leads ,locke himself along a track1 which his later followers scarcely seem to have noticed1 when he treats the #8never enough to be admired discoveries of ,mr4 ,newton' as having to do merely with the relations of ideas in distinction from things1 and looks for a true extension of knowledge--neither in syllogism which can yield no instructive1 nor in experiment which can yield no general1 certainty--but only in a further process of #8singling out and laying in order intermediate ideas1' which are #8real as well as nominal essences of their species1' because they have no reference to archetypes elsewhere than in the mind 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #aa1 and ,book ,,iv4 chap4 xii4 sec4 #g74 ,on the other hand there is the notion that ideas1 without distinction between #8actual sensation' and #8idea in the mind1' are taken from permanent things1 and are real if correctly so taken4 ,from this it results that propositions1 universally true as representing a necessary relation between ideas of primary qualities1 are true also of real existence2 and that an extension of such real certainty through the discovery of a necessary connexion between ideas of primary and those of secondary qualities1 though scarcely to be hoped for1 has no inherent impossibility4 ,it is this notion1 again1 that unwittingly gives even that limited significance to the particular experiment which ,locke assigns to it1 as indicating a co-existence between ideas present as sensations and those which can only be regarded as in the mind4 ,nor is it the intrinsic import so much as the expression of this notion that is altered when ,locke substitutes an order of nature for substance as that in which the ideas co-exist4 ,in his ,fourth ,book he so far departs from the doctrine implied in his chapters on the reality and adequacy of ideas and on the names of substances1 as to treat the notion of several single subjects in which ideas co-exist 7which he still holds to be the proper notion of substances71 as a fiction of thought4 ,there are no such single subjects4 ,what we deem so are really #8retainers to other parts of nature4' #8,their observable qualities1 actions1 and powers are owing to something without them2 and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature1 which does not owe the being it has1 and the excellencies of it1 to its neighbours' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #aa74 ,as thus conceived of1 the #8objective order' which our experience represents is doubtless other than that collection of fixed separate #8things1' implied in the language about substances which ,locke found in vogue1 but it remains an objective order still--an order of #8qualities1 actions1 and powers' which no multitude of sensible events could constitute1 but apart from which no sensible event could have such significance as to render even a singular proposition of real truth possible4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #aag1 sub4 fin4 ,transition to doctrine of ,god and the soul4 #abf4 ,it remains to inquire how1 with ,locke1 the ideas of self and ,god escape subjection to those solvents of reality which1 with more or less of consistency and consciousness1 he applied to the conceptions on which the science of nature rests4 ,such an enquiry forms the natural transition to the next stage in the history of his philosophy4 ,it was ,berkeley's practical interest in these ideas that held him back from a development of his master's principles1 in which he would have anticipated ,hume1 and finally brought him to attach that other meaning to the #8new way of ideas' faintly adumbrated in the later sections of his #8,siris1' which gives to ,reason the functions that ,locke had assigned to ,sense4 ,thinking substance--source of the same ideas as outer substance4 #abg4 ,the dominant notion of the self in ,locke is that of the inward substance1 or #8substratum of ideas1' co-ordinate with the outward1 #8wherein they do subsist1 and from which they do result4' #8,sensation convinces that there are solid extended substances1 and reflection that there are thinking ones' 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #bi74 ,we have already seen how1 without disturbance from his doctrine of the fictitiousness of universals1 he treats the simple idea as carrying with it the distinction of outward and inward1 or relations severally to a #8thing' and to a #8mind4' ,it reports itself ambiguously as a quality of each of these separate substances4 ,it is now1 or was to begin with1 the result of an outward thing #8actually operating upon us2' for #8of simple ideas the mind cannot make one to itself3' on the other hand1 it is a #8perception1' and perception is an #8operation of the mind4' ,in other words it is at once a modification of the mind by something of which it is consciously not conscious1 and a modification of the mind by itself--the two sources of one and the same modification being each determined only as the contradictory of the other4 ,thus1 when we come to probe the familiar metaphors under which ,locke describes ,reflection1 as a #8fountain of ideas' other than sensation1 we find that the confusions which we have already explored in dealing with the ideas of sensation recur under added circumstances of embarrassment4 ,not only does the simple idea of reflection1 like that of sensation1 turn out to be already complicated in its simplicity with the superinduced ideas of cause and relation1 but the causal substance in question turns out to be one which1 from being actually nothing1 becomes something by acting upon itself2 while all the time the result of this action is indistinguishable from that ascribed to the opposite1 the external1 cause4 ,of which substance is perception the effect8 #abh4 ,to a reader to whom ,locke's language has always seemed to be--as indeed it is--simply that of common sense and life1 in writing the above we shall seem to be creating a difficulty where none is to be found4 ,let us turn1 then1 to one of the less prolix passages1 in which the distinction between the two sources of ideas is expressed3 #8,external objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities1 which are all those different perceptions they produce in us2 and the mind furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #e74 ,we have seen already that with ,locke perception and idea are equivalent terms4 ,it only needs further to be pointed out that no distinction can be maintained between his usage of #8mind' and of #8understanding1' #a and that the simple ideas of the mind's own operations are those of perception and power1 which must be given in and with every idea of a sensible quality4' #b ,avoiding synonyms1 then1 and recalling the results of our examination of the terms involved in the first clause of the passage before us1 we may re-write the whole thus3 #8,creations of the mind1 which yet are external to it1 produce in it those perceptions of their qualities which they do produce2 and the mind produces in itself the perception of these1 its own1 perceptions4' #a ,as becomes apparent on examination of such passages1 as ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #a1 sub4 fin42 and ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #bc4 #b ,see above1 paragraphs #aa1 #ab1 #af4 ,that which is the source of substantiation cannot be itself a substance4 #abi4 ,this attempt to present ,locke's doctrine of the relation between the mind and the world1 as it would be without phraseological disguises1 must not be ascribed to any polemical interest in making a great writer seem to talk nonsense1 ,the greatest writer must fall into confusions when he brings under the conceptions of cause and substance the self-conscious thought which is their source2 and nothing else than this is involved in ,locke's avowed enterprise of knowing that which renders knowledge possible as he might know any other object4 ,the enterprise naturally falls into two parts1 corresponding to that distinction of subject and object which self-consciousness involves4 ,hitherto we have been dealing with it on the objective side--with the attempt to know knowledge as a result of experience received through the senses--and have found the supposed source of thought already charged with its creations2 with the relations of inner and outer1 of substance and attribute1 of cause and effect1 of appearance and reality4 ,the supposed #8outward' turns out to have its outwardness constituted by thought1 and thus to be inward4 ,the #8outer sense' is only an outer sense at all so far as feelings1 by themselves neither outward nor inward1 are by the mind referred to a thing or cause which #8the mind supposes2' and only thus have its reports a prerogative of reality over the #8fantasies1' supposed merely of the mind4 ,meanwhile1 unable to ignore the subjective side of self-consciousness1 ,locke has to put an inward experience as a separate1 but co-ordinate1 source of knowledge alongside of the outer4 ,but this inward experience1 simply as a succession of feelings1 does not differ from the outer3 it only so differs as referred to that very #8thinking thing1' called the mind1 which by its supposition of causal substance has converted feeling into an experience of an outer thing4 #8,mind' thus1 by the relations which it #8invents1' constitutes both the inner and outer1 and yet is treated as itself the inner #8substratum which it accustoms itself to suppose4' ,it thus becomes the creature of its own suppositions4 ,nor is this all4 ,this1 indeed1 is no more than the fate which it must suffer at the hands of every philosopher who1 in ,kantian language1 brings the source of the ,categories under the ,categories4 ,but with ,locke the constitution of the outer world by mental supposition1 however uniformly implied1 is always ignored2 and thus mind1 as the inward substance1 is not only the creature of its own suppositions1 but stands over against a real existence1 of which the reality is held to consist just in its being the opposite of all such suppositions3 while1 after all1 the effect of these mutually exclusive causes is one and the same experience1 one and the same system of sequent and co-existent ideas4 ,to get rid of the inner source of ideas in favour of the outer would be false to ,locke4 #acj4 ,is it then a case of joint-effect8 ,do the outer and inner substances combine1 like mechanical forces1 to produce the psychical result8 ,against such a supposition a follower of ,locke would find not only the language of his master1 with whom perception appears indifferently as the result of the outer or inner cause1 but the inherent impossibility of analysing the effect into separate elements4 ,the #8,law of ,parsimony1' then1 will dictate to him that one or other of the causes must be dispensed with2 nor1 so long as he takes ,locke's identification of the outward with the real for granted1 will he have much doubt as to which of the two must go4 ,to get rid of the causality of mind1 however1 though it might not be untrue to the tendency of ,locke1 would be to lose sight of his essential merit as a formulator of what everyone thinks1 which is that1 at whatever cost of confusion or contradiction1 he at least formulates it fully4 ,in him the #8,dialectic1' which popular belief implicitly involves1 goes on under our eyes4 ,if the primacy of self-conscious thought is never recognized1 if it remains the victim of its own misunderstood creations1 there is at least no attempt to disguise the unrest which attaches to it in this self-imposed subjection4 ,the mind1 which ,locke opposes to matter1 perpetually shifting4 #aca4 ,we have already noticed how the inner #8tablet1' on which the outer thing is supposed to act1 is with ,locke perpetually receding4 #a ,it is first the brain1 to which the #8motion of the outward parts' must be continued in order to constitute sensation 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #c74 ,then perception is distinguished from sensation1 and the brain itself1 as the subject of sensation1 becomes the outward in contrast with the understanding as the subject of perception4 #b ,then perception1 from being simply a reception1 is converted into an #8operation1' and thus into an efficient of ideas4 ,the #8understanding' itself1 as perceptive1 is now the outward which makes on the #8mind1' as the inner #8tablet1' that impression of its own operation in perception which is called an idea of reflection4 #c ,nor does the regressive process--the process of finding a mind within the mind--stop here1 though the distinction of inner and outer is not any further so explicitly employed in it4 ,from mind1 as receptive of1 and operative about1 ideas1 i4e4 consciousness1 is distinguished mind as the #8substance within us' of which consciousness is an #8operation' that it sometimes exercises1 sometimes 7e4g4 when it sleeps7 does not 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 secs4 #aj-ab72 and from this thinking substance again is distinguished the man who #8finds it in himself and carries it about with him in a coach or on horseback 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #bj7--the person1 #8consisting of soul and body1' who is prone to sleep and in sound sleep is unconscious1 but whose personal identity strangely consists in sameness of consciousness1 sameness of an occasional operation of part of himself4 #c #a ,see above1 paragraph #ad4 #b ,book ,,ii41 chap4 i4 sec4 #bc4 #8,sensation is such an impression made in some part of the body1 as produces some perception in the understanding4' #c ,locke speaks indifferently of the mind impressing the understanding1 and of the understanding impressing the mind1 with ideas of reflection1 but as he specially defines #8understanding' as the #8perceptive power' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 sec4 #be471 ,i have written as above4 #d ,cf4 ,,ii4 chap4 i4 secs4 #aa and #ad1 with ,,ii4 chap1 xxvii4 sec4 #i4 ,it is difficult to see what ingenuity could reconcile the doctrine stated in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvii4 sec4 #i1 that personal identity is identity of consciousness1 with the doctrine implied in ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #aa1 that the waking ,socrates is the same person with ,socrates asleep1 i4e4 7according to ,locke7 not conscious at all4 ,two ways out of such difficulties4 #8,matter' and #8mind' have the same source in self-consciousness4 #acb4 ,in the history of subsequent philosophy two typical methods have appeared of dealing with this chaos of antinomies4 ,one1 which we shall have to treat at large in writing of ,hume1 affects to dispose of both the outward and the inward synthesis--both of the unity of feelings in a subject matter and of their unity in a subject mind--as #8fictions of thought4' ,this method at once suggests the vital question whether a mind which thus invents has been effectively suppressed--whether1 indeed1 the theory can be so much as stated without a covert assumption of that which it claims to have destroyed4 ,the other method1 of which ,kant is the parent1 does not attempt to efface the apparent contradictions which beset the #8relation between mind and matter2' but regarding them as in a certain sense inevitable1 traces them to their source in the application to the thinking ,ego itself of conceptions1 which it does indeed constitute in virtue of its presence to phenomena given under conditions of time1 but under which for that very reason it cannot itself be known4 ,it is in virtue of the presence of the self-conscious unit to the manifold of feeling1 according to this doctrine1 that the latter becomes an order of definite things1 each external to the other2 and it is only by a false inclusion within this order of that which constitutes it that the ,ego itself becomes a #8thinking thing' with other things outside it4 ,the result of such inclusion is that the real world1 which it in the proper sense makes1 becomes a reality external to it1 yet apart from which it would not be actually anything4 ,thus with ,locke1 though the mind has a potential existence of its own1 it is experience of #8things without it' that #8furnishes' it or makes it what it actually is4 ,but the relation of such outer things to the mind cannot be spoken of without contradiction4 ,if supposed outward as bodies1 they have to be brought within consciousness as objects of sensation2 if supposed outward as sensation1 they have to be brought within consciousness--to find a home in the understanding--as ideas of sensation4 ,meanwhile the consideration returns that after all the #8thinking thing' contributes something to that which it thinks about2 and1 this once admitted1 it is as impossible to limit its work on one side as that of the outer thing on the other4 ,each usurps the place of its opposite4 ,thus with ,locke the understanding produces effects on itself1 but the product is one and the same #8perception' otherwise treated as an effect of the outer world4 ,one and the same self-consciousness1 in short1 #a involving the correlation of subject and object1 becomes the result of two separate #8things1' each exclusive of the other1 into which the opposite poles of this relation have been converted--the extended thing or #8body' on the one side1 and the thinking thing or #8mind' on the other4 #a ,for the equivalence of perception with self-consciousness in ,locke1 see above1 paragraph #bd1 et infra4 ,difficulties in the way of ascribing reality to substance as matter1 re-appear in regard to substance as mind4 #acc4 ,to each of these supposed #8things' thought transfers its own unity and self-containedness1 and thereupon finds itself in new difficulties4 ,these1 so far as they concern the outward thing1 have already been sufficiently noticed4 ,we have seen how the single self-contained thing on the one hand attenuates itself to the bare atom1 presented in a moment of time1 which in its exclusiveness is actually nothing3 #a how1 on the other1 it spreads itself1 as everything which for one moment we regard as independent turns out in the next to be a #8retainer' to something else1 into a series that cannot be summed4 #b ,a like consequence follows when the individual man1 conceiving of the thought1 which is not mine but me1 and which is no less the world without which ,i am not ,i1 as a thinking thing within him1 limited by the limitations of his animal nature1 seeks in this thinking thing1 exclusive of other things1 that unity and self-containedness1 which only belong to the universal #8,i4' ,he finds that he #8thinks not always2' that during a fourth part of his time he neither thinks nor perceives at all2 and that even in his waking hours his consciousness consists of a succession of separate feelings1 whose recurrence he cannot command4 #c ,thought being thus broken and dependent1 substantiality is not to be found in it4 ,it is next sought in the #8thing' of which thought is an occasional operation--a thing of which it may readily be admitted that its nature cannot be known 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxiii4 sec4 #bi1 etc471 since it has no nature1 being merely that which remains of the thinking thing upon abstraction of its sole determination4 ,it is in principle nothing else than the supposed basis of sensible qualities remaining after these have been abstracted--the #8parcel of matter' which has no essence--with which accordingly ,locke sometimes himself tends to identify it4 #d ,but meanwhile1 behind this unknown substance1 whether of spirit or of body1 the self-consciousness1 which has been treated as its occasional unessential operation1 re-asserts itself as the self which claims both body and spirit1 the immaterial no less than the material substance1 as its own1 and throughout whatever diversity in these maintains its own identity4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #id and the following4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #abe4 #c ,locke1 ,essay ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #aj1 etc4 #d ,see above1 paragraph #ajf1 near the end4 ,we think not always1 yet thought constitutes the self4 #acd4 ,just1 then1 as ,locke's conception of outward reality grows under his hands into a conception of nature as a system of relations which breaks through the limitations of reality as constituted by mere individua1 so it is with the self1 as he conceived it4 ,it is not a simple idea4 ,it is not one of the train that is for ever passing1 #8one going and another coming1' for it looks on this succession as that which it experiences1 being itself the same throughout the successive differences 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vii4 sec4 #i1 and chap4 xxvii4 sec4 #i74 ,as little can it be adjusted to any of the conditions of real #8things1' thinking or unthinking1 which he ordinarily recognises4 ,it has no #8particularity in space and time4' ,that which is past in #8reality' is to it present4 ,it is #8in its nature indifferent to any parcel of matter4' ,it is the same with itself yesterday and to-day1 here and there4 ,that #8with which its consciousness can join itself is one self with it1' and it can so join itself with substances apart in space and remote in time 7,book ,,ii4 chap1 xxvii4 secs4 #i1 #ac1 #ad1 #ag74 ,for speaking of it as eternal1 indeed1 we could find no warrant in ,locke4 ,he does not so clearly distinguish it from the #8thinking thing' supposed to be within each man1 that has #8had its determinate time and place of beginning to exist1 relation to which determines its identity so long as it exists' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvii4 sec4 #b74 ,hence he supposed an actual limit to the past which it could make present--a limit seemingly fixed for each man at the farthest by the date of his birth--though he talks vaguely of the possibility of its range being extended 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvii4 sec4 #af74 ,in the discussion of personal identity1 however1 the distinction gradually forces itself upon him1 and he at last expressly says 7sec4 #af71 that if the same ,socrates1 sleeping and waking1 do not partake of the same consciousness 7as according to ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 sec4 #aa he certainly does not71 #8,socrates sleeping and waking is not the same person2' whereas the #8thinking thing'--the substance of which consciousness is a power sometimes exercised1 sometimes not--is the same in the sleeping as in the waking ,socrates4 ,this is a pregnant admission1 but it brings nothing to the birth in ,locke himself4 ,the inference which it suggests to his reader1 that a self which does not slumber or sleep is not one which is born or dies1 does not seem to have occurred to him4 ,taking for his method the imaginary process of #8looking into his own breast1' instead of the analysis of knowledge and morality1 he could not find the eternal self which knowledge and morality pre-suppose1 but only the contradiction of a person whose consciousness is not the same for two moments together1 and often ceases altogether1 but who yet1 in virtue of an identity of this very consciousness1 is the same in childhood and in old age4 ,locke neither disguises these contradictions1 nor attempts to overcome them4 #ace4 ,here as elsewhere we have to be thankful that the contradiction had not been brought home so strongly to ,locke as to make him seek the suppression of either of its alternatives4 ,he was aware neither of the burden which his philosophy tended to put upon the self which #8can consider itself as itself in different times and places'--the burden of replacing the stable world1 when #8the new way of ideas' should have resolved the outward thing into a succession of feelings--nor of the hopelessness of such a burden being borne by a #8perishing' consciousness1 #8of which no two parts exist together1 but follow each other in succession4' #a ,when he #8looked into himself1' he found consciousness to consist in the succession of ideas1 #8one coming and another going3' he also found that #8consciousness alone makes what we call self1' and that he was the same self at any different points in the succession4 ,he noted the two #8facts of consciousness' at different stages of his enquiry1 and was apparently not struck by their contradiction4 ,he could describe them both1 and whatever he could describe seemed to him to be explained4 ,hence they did not suggest to him any question either as to the nature of the observed object or as to the possibility of observing it1 such as might have diverted philosophy from the method of self-observation4 ,he left them side by side1 and1 far from disguising either1 put alongside of them another fact--the presence among the perpetually perishing ideas of that of a consciousness identical with itself1 not merely in different times and places1 but in all times and places4 ,such an idea1 under the designation of an eternal wise ,being1 he was #8sure he had' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xvii4 sec4 #ad74 #a ,cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiv4 sec4 #cb--#8;by observing what passes in our minds1 how our ideas there in train constantly some vanish and others begin to appear1 we come by the idea of succession2 and by observing a distance in the parts of this succession1 we get the idea of duration'--with chap4 xv4 sec4 #ab4 #8,duration is the idea we have of perishing distance1 of which no two parts exist together1 but follow each other in succession4' ,is the idea of ,god possible to a consciousness given in time8 #acf4 ,the remark will at once occur that the question concerning the relation between our consciousness1 as in succession1 and the idea of ,god1 is essentially different from that concerning the relation between this consciousness and the self identical throughout it1 inasmuch as the relation in the one case is between a fact and an idea1 in the other between conflicting facts4 ,the identity of the self1 which ,locke asserts1 is one of #8real being1' and this is found to lie in consciousness1 in apparent conflict with the fact that consciousness is a succession1 of which #8no two parts exist together4' ,there is no such conflict1 it will be said1 between the idea of a conscious being1 who is the same yesterday1 to-day1 and for ever--the correspondence to which of any reality is a farther question--and the fact of our consciousness being in succession4 ,allowing for the moment the validity of this distinction1 we will consider first the difficulties that attach to ,locke's account of the idea of ,god1 as an idea4 ,locke's account of this idea4 #acg4 ,this idea1 with him1 is a #8complex idea of substance4' ,it is the idea each man has of the #8thinking thing within him1 enlarged to infinity4' ,it is beset then in the first place with all the difficulties which we have found to belong to his doctrine of substance generally and of the thinking substance in particular4 #a ,these need not be recalled in detail4 ,when ,god is the thinking substance they become more obvious4 ,it is the antithesis to #8material substance1' as the source of ideas of sensation1 that alone with ,locke gives a meaning to #8thinking substance1' as the source of ideas of reflection3 and if1 as we have seen1 the antithesis is untenable when it is merely the source of human ideas that is in question1 much more must it be so in regard to ,god1 to whom any opposition of material substance must be a limitation of his perfect nature4 ,of the generic element in the above definition1 then1 no more need here be said4 ,it is the qualification of #8enlargement to infinity1' by which the idea of man as a thinking substance is represented as becoming the idea of ,god1 that is the special difficulty now before us4 ,of this ,locke writes as follows3--#8,the complex idea we have of ,god is made up of the simple ones we receive from reflection4 ,if ,i find that ,i know some few things1 and some of them1 or all perhaps1 imperfectly1 ,i can frame an idea of knowing twice as many3 which ,i can double again as often as ,i can add to number1 and thus enlarge my ideas of knowledge by extending its comprehension to all things existing or possible4 ,the same ,i can do of knowing them more perfectly1 i4e4 all their qualities1 powers1 causes1 consequences1 and relations2 and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge4 ,the same also may be done of power till we come to that we call infinite2 and also of the duration of existence without beginning or end2 and so frame the idea of an eternal being4 444 ,all which is done by enlarging the simple ideas we have taken from the operation of our own minds by reflection1 or by our senses from exterior things1 to that vastness to which infinity can extend them4 ,for it is infinity which joined to our ideas of existence1 power1 knowledge1 c41 makes that complex idea whereby we represent to ourselves the supreme being' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxiii4 sec4 #cc--ce74 ,what is meant by this #8joining of infinity' to our ideas8 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ce and the following1 and #abg and the following4 #8,infinity1' according to ,locke's account of it1 only applicable to ,god1 if ,god has parts4 #ach4 #8,finite and infinite1' says ,locke1 #8are looked upon by the mind as the modes of quantity1 and are to be attributed primarily only to those things that have parts and are capable of increase by the addition of any the least part' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xvii4 sec4 #a74 ,such are #8duration and expansion4' ,the applicability then of the term #8infinite' in its proper sense to ,god implies that he has expansion or duration2 and it is characteristic of ,locke that though he was clear about the divisibility of expansion and duration1 as the above passage shows1 he has no scruple about speaking of them as attributes of ,god1 of whom as being #8in his own essence simple and uncompounded' he would never have spoken as #8having parts4' #8,duration is the idea we have of perishing distance1 of which no parts exist together but follow each other in succession2 as expansion is the idea of lasting distance1 all whose parts exist together4' ,yet of duration and expansion1 thus defined1 he says that #8in their full extent' 7i4e4 as severally #8eternity and immensity'7 #8they belong only to the ,deity' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xv4 secs4 #h and #ab74 #8,a full extent' of them1 however1 is in the nature of the case impossible4 ,with a last moment duration would cease to be duration2 without another space beyond it space would not be space4 ,locke is quite aware of this4 ,when his conception of infinity is not embarrassed by reference to ,god1 it is simply that of unlimited #8addibility'--a juxtaposition of space to space1 a succession of time upon time1 to which we can suppose no limit so long as we consider space and time #8as having parts1 and thus capable of increase by the addition of parts1' and which therefore excludes the very possibility of a totality or #8full extent' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xvi4 sec4 #h1 and xvii4 sec4 #ac74 ,the question1 then1 whether infinity of expansion and duration in this1 its only proper1 sense can be predicated of the perfect ,god1 has only to be asked in order to be answered in the negative4 ,nor do we mend the matter if1 instead of ascribing such infinity to ,god1 we substitute another phrase of ,locke's1 and say that ,he #8fills eternity and immensity' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xv4 sec4 #h74 ,put for eternity and immensity their proper equivalents according to ,locke1 viz4 unlimited #8addibility' of times and spaces1 and the essential unmeaningness of the phrase becomes apparent4 ,can it be applied to him #8figuratively' in virtue of the indefinite number of ,his acts8 #aci4 ,in regard to any other attributes of ,god than those of his duration and expansion1 #a ,locke admits that the term #8infinite' is applied #8figuratively' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xvii4 sec4 #a74 #8,when we call them 7e4g4 ,his power1 wisdom1 and goodness7 infinite1 we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on1 or intimation of1 that number or extent of the acts or objects of ,god's wisdom1 c41 which can never be supposed so great or so many which these attributes will not always surmount1 let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can with all the infinity of endless number4' ,what determination1 then1 according to this passage1 of our conception of ,god's goodness is represented by calling it infinite8 ,simply its relation to a number of acts and objects of which the sum can always be increased1 and which1 just for that reason1 cannot represent the perfect ,god4 ,is it then1 it may be asked1 of mere perversity that when thinking of ,god under attributes that are not quantitative1 and therefore do not carry with them the necessity of incompleteness1 we yet go out of our way by this epithet #8infinite' to subject them to the conditions of quantity and its #8progressus ad infinitum8' #a ,in the passages referred to1 ,locke speaks of #8duration and ubiquity4' ,the proper counterpart1 however1 of #8duration' according to him is #8expansion'--this being to space what duration is to time4 ,under the embarrassment1 however1 which necessarily attends the ascription of expansion to ,god1 he tacitly substitutes for it #8ubiquity1' a term which does not match #8duration1' and can only mean presence throughout the whole of expansion1 presence throughout the whole of that which does not admit of a whole4 ,an act1 finite in its nature1 remains so1 however often repeated4 #adj4 ,retaining ,locke's point of view1 our answer of course must be that our ideas of the ,divine attributes1 being primarily our own ideas of reflection1 are either ideas of the single successive acts that constitute our inward experience or formed from these by abstraction and combination4 ,in parts our experience is given1 in parts only can we recall it4 ,our complex or abstract ideas are symbols which only take a meaning so far as we resolve them into the detached impressions which in the sum they represent1 or recall the objects1 each with its own before and after1 from which they were originally taken4 ,so it is with the ideas of wisdom1 power1 and goodness1 which from ourselves we transfer to ,god4 ,they represent an experience given in succession and piece-meal--a numerable series of acts and events1 which like every other number is already infinite in the only sense of the word of which ,locke can give a clear account1 as susceptible of indefinite repetition 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #h47 ,when we #8join infinity' to these ideas1 then1 unless some other meaning is given to infinity1 we merely state explicitly what was originally predicable of the experience they embody4 ,nor will it avail us much to shift the meaning of infinite1 as ,locke does when he applies it to the divine attributes1 from that of indefinite #8addibility' to that of exceeding any sum which indefinite multiplication can yield us4 ,let us suppose an act of consciousness1 from which we have taken an abstract idea of an attribute--say of wisdom--to be a million times repeated2 our idea of the attribute will not vary with the repetition4 ,nor if1 having supposed a limit to the repetition1 we then suppose the act indefinitely repeated beyond this limit and accordingly speak of the attribute as infinite1 will our idea of the attribute vary at all from what it was to begin with4 ,its content will be the same4 ,there will be nothing to be said of it which could not have been said of the experience from which it was originally abstracted1 and of which the essential characteristic--that it is one of a series of events of which no two can be present together--is incompatible with divine perfection4 ,god only infinite in a sense in which time is not infinite1 and which ,locke could not recognize 444 #ada4 ,it appears then that it is the subjection of our experience to the form of time which unfits the ideas derived from it for any combination into an idea of ,god2 nor by being #8joined with an infinity1' which itself merely means the absence of limit to succession in time1 is their unfitness in any way modified4 ,on the contrary1 by such conjunction from being latent it becomes patent4 ,in one important passage ,locke becomes so far aware of this that1 though continuing to ascribe infinite duration to ,god1 he does it under qualifications inconsistent with the very notion of duration4 #8,though we cannot conceive any duration without succession1 nor put it together in our thoughts that any being does now exist to-morrow or possess at once more than the present moment of duration2 yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the ,almighty far different from that of man1 or any other finite being3 because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things 444 what is once past he can never recall1 and what is yet to come he cannot make present4 444 ,god's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and power1 he sees all things past and to come' 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xv4 sec #ab74 ,it is clear that in this passage #8infinite' changes its meaning2 that it is used in one sense--the proper sense according to ,locke--when applied to duration1 and in some wholly different sense1 not a figurative one derived from the former1 when applied to knowledge and power2 and that the infinite duration of ,god1 as #8accompanied by infinite power and knowledge1' is no longer in any intelligible sense duration at all4 ,it is no longer #8the idea we have of perishing distance1' derived from our fleeting consciousness in which #8what is once past can never be recalled1' but the attribute of a consciousness of which1 if it is to be described in terms of time at all1 in virtue of its #8seeing all things past and to come' at once1 it can only be said that it #8does now exist to-morrow4' ,if it be asked1 ,what meaning can we have in speaking of such a consciousness8 into what simple ideas can it be resolved when all our ideas are determined by a before and after8--the answer must be1 ,just as much or as little meaning as we have when1 in like contradiction to the successive presentation of ideas1 we speak of a self1 constituted by consciousness1 as identical with itself throughout the years of our life4 444 the same sense in which the self is infinite4 #adb4 ,a more positive answer it is not our present business to give4 ,our concern is to show that #8eternity and immensity1' according to any meaning that ,locke recognises1 or that the observation of our ideas could justify1 do not express any conception that can carry us beyond the perpetual incompleteness of our experience2 but that in his doctrine of personal identity he does admit a conception which no observation of our ideas of reflection--since these are in succession and could not be observed if they were not--can account for2 and that it is just this conception1 the conception of a constant presence of consciousness to itself incompatible with conditions of space and time1 that can alone give such meaning to #8eternal and infinite' as can render them significant epithets of ,god4 ,such a conception 7we say it with respect7 ,locke admits when it is wanted without knowing it4 ,it must indeed always underlie the idea of ,god1 however alien to it may be attempted adaptations of the other #8infinite'--the progressus ad indefinitum in space and time--by which1 as with ,locke1 the idea is explained4 ,but it is one for which the psychological method of observing what happens in oneself cannot account1 and which therefore this method1 just so far as it is thoroughly carried out1 must tend to discard4 ,that which happens1 whether we reckon it an inward or an outward1 a physical or a psychical event--and nothing but an event can1 properly speaking1 be observed--is as such in time4 ,but the presence of consciousness to itself1 though1 as the true #8punctum stans1' #a it is the condition of the observation of events in time1 is not such an event itself4 ,in the ordinary and proper sense of #8fact1' it is not a fact at all1 nor yet a possible abstraction from facts4 ,to the method1 then1 which deals with phrases about the mind by ascertaining the observable #8mental phenomena' which they represent1 it must remain a mere phrase1 to be explained as the offspring of other phrases whose real import has been misunderstood4 ,it can only recover a significance when this method1 as with ,hume1 has done its worst1 and is found to leave the possibility of knowledge1 without such #8punctum stans1' still unaccounted for4 #a ,locke1 ,essay ,,ii4 chap4 xvii4 sec4 #af4 ,how do ,i know my own real existence8--,locke's answer4 #adc4 ,we have finally to notice the way in which ,locke maintains our knowledge of the #8real existence' of thinking substance1 both as that which #8we call our mind1' and as ,god4 ,of the former first4 #8,experience convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence4444 ,if ,i know ,i feel pain1 it is evident ,i have as certain perception of my own existence as of the pain ,i feel4 ,if ,i know ,i doubt1 ,i have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting as of that thought which ,i call doubt' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 ix4 sec4 #c74 ,upon this the remark must occur that the existence of a painful feeling is one thing2 the existence of a permanent subject1 remaining the same with itself1 when the feeling is over1 and through the succession of other feelings1 quite another4 ,the latter is what is meant by my own existence1 of which undoubtedly there is a #8certain perception1' if the feeling of pain has become the #8knowledge that ,i feel pain1' and if by the #8,i' is understood such a permanent subject4 ,that the feeling1 as #8simple idea1' is taken to begin with by ,locke for the knowledge that ,i feel something1 we have sufficiently seen4 #a ,just as1 in virtue of this conversion1 it gives us #8assurance' of the real existence of the outer thing or material substance on the one side1 so of the thinking substance on the other4 ,it carries with it the certainty at once that ,i have a feeling1 and that something makes me feel4 ,but whereas1 after the conversion of feeling into a felt thing has been throughout assumed--as indeed otherwise feeling could not be spoken of--a further question is raised1 which causes much embarrassment1 as to the real existence of such thing2 on the contrary1 the reference of the feeling to the thinking thing is taken as carrying with it the real existence of such thing4 ,the question whether it really exists or no is only once raised1 and then summarily settled by the sentence we have quoted1 while the reality whether of existence or of essence on the part of the outward thing1 as we have found to our cost1 is the main burden of the ,third and ,fourth ,books4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #bf and following1 and #ei and following4 ,it cannot be known consistently with ,locke's doctrine of real existence4 #add4 ,in principle1 indeed1 the answer to both questions1 as given by ,locke1 is the same3 for the reasons which he alleges for being assured of the #8existence of a thing without us corresponding to the idea of sensation' reduce themselves1 as we have seen1 to the reiteration of that reference of the idea to a thing1 which according to him is originally involved in it1 and which is but the correlative of its reference to a subject4 ,this1 however1 is what he was not himself aware of4 ,to him the outer and the inner substance were separate and independent things1 for each of which the question of real existence had to be separately settled4 ,to us1 according to the view already indicated1 it is the presence of self-consciousness1 or thought as an object-to-itself1 to feeling that converts it into a relation between feeling thing and felt thing1 between #8cogitative and incogitative substance4' ,the source of substantiation upon each side being the same1 the question as to the real existence of either substance must be the same1 and equally so the answer to it4 ,it is an answer that must be preceded by a counter question4--,does real existence mean existence independent of thought8 ,to suppose such existence is to suppose an impossibility--one which is not the less so though the existence be supposed material1 if #8material' means in #8space' and space itself is a relation constituted by the mind1 #8bringing things to and setting them by one another4' ,yet is the supposition itself but a mode of the logical substantiation we have explained1 followed by an imaginary abstraction of the work of the mind from this1 its own creation4 ,does real existence mean a possible feeling8 ,if so1 it is as clear that what converts feeling into a relation between felt thing and feeling subject cannot in this sense be real1 as it is that without such conversion no distinction between real and fantastic would be possible4 ,does it1 finally1 mean individuality1 in such a sense that unless ,i can say this or that is substance1 thinking or material1 substance does not really exist8 ,if it does1 the answer is that substance1 being constituted by a relation by which self-conscious thought is for ever determining feelings1 and which every predication represents1 cannot be identified with any #8this or that1' though without it there could be no #8this or that' at all4 ,but he ignores this in treating of the self4 #ade4 ,we have already found that ,locke accepts each of the above as determinations of real existence1 and that1 though in spite of them he labours to maintain the real existence of outward things1 he is so far faithful to them as to declare real essence unknowable4 ,in answering the question as to #8his own existence' he wholly ignores them4 ,he does not ask how the real existence of the thinking ,ego sorts with his ordinary doctrine that the real is what would be in the world whether there were a mind or no2 or its real identity1 present throughout the particulars of experience1 with his ordinary doctrine of the fictitiousness of #8generals4' ,a real existence of the mind1 however1 founded on the logical necessity of substantiation1 rests on a shifting basis1 so long as by the mind is understood a thinking thing1 different in each man1 to which his inner experience is referred as accidents to a substance4 ,the same law of thought which compels such reference requires that the thinking thing in its turn1 as that which is born grows and dies1 be referred as an accident to some ulterior substance4 #8,a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory1 or both2 and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor understanding1 no1 nor life4' #a ,just as each outer thing turns out to be a #8retainer to something else1' so is it with the inner thing4 ,such a dependent being cannot be an ultimate substance2 nor can any natural agents to which we may trace its dependence really be so either4 ,the logical necessity of further substantiation would affect them equally1 appearing in the supposition of an unknown something beyond1 which makes them what they are4 ,it is under such logical necessity that ,locke1 in regard to all the substances which he commonly speaks of as ultimate--,god1 spirit1 body--from time to time gives warning of something still ulterior and unknowable1 whether under the designation of substance or real essence 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxiii4 secs4 #cj and #cf74 ,if1 then1 it will be said1 substance is but the constantly-shifting result of a necessity of thought--so shifting that there is nothing of which we can finally say1 #8,this is substance1 not accident'--there can be no evidence of the #8real existence' of a permanent ,ego in the necessary substantiation therein of my inner experience4 #a ,locke1 ,book ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 sec4 #d4 ,sense in which the self is truly real4 #adf4 ,the first result of such a consideration in a reader of ,locke will naturally be an attempt to treat the inner synthesis as a fiction of thought or figure of speech1 and to confine real existence to single feelings in the moments of their occurrence4 ,this1 it will seem1 is to be faithful to ,locke's own clearer mind1 as it frequently emerges from the still-returning cloud of scholasticism4 ,the final result will rather be the discovery that the single feeling is nothing real1 but that the synthesis of appearances1 which alone for us constitutes reality1 is never final or complete3 that thus absolute reality1 like ultimate substance1 is never to be found by us--in a thinking as little as in a material thing--belonging as it does only to that divine self-consciousness1 of which the presence in us is the source and bond of the ever-growing synthesis called knowledge1 but which1 because it is the source of that synthesis and not one of its partial results1 is neither real nor knowable in the same sense as is any other object4 ,it is this presence which alone gives meaning to #8proofs of the being of ,god2' to ,locke's among the rest4 ,for it is in a sense true1 as he held1 that #8my own real existence' is evidence of the existence of ,god1 since the self1 in the only sense in which it is absolutely real or an ultimate subject1 is already ,god4 #a #a ,see below1 paragraph #aeb4 ,locke's proof of the real existence of ,god4 ,there must have been something from eternity to cause what now is4 #adg4 ,our knowledge of ,god's existence1 according to him1 is #8demonstrative1' based on the #8intuitive' knowledge of our own4 ,strictly taken1 according to his definitions1 this must mean that the agreement of the idea of ,god with existence is perceived mediately through the agreement of the idea of self with existence1 which is perceived immediately2 that thus the idea of ,god and the idea of self #8agree'4 #a ,we need not1 however1 further dwell either on the contradiction implied in the knowledge of real existence1 if knowledge is a perception of agreement between ideas and if real existence is the antithesis of ideas2 or on the embarrassments which follow when a definition of reasoning1 only really applicable to the comparison of quantities1 is extended to other regions of knowledge4 ,locke virtually ignores his definitions in the passage before us4 #8,if we know there is some real being' 7as we do know in the knowledge of our own existence7 #8and that non-entity cannot produce any real being1 it is an evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something2 since what was not from eternity had a beginning1 and what had a beginning must be produced by something else' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 x4 sec4 #c74 ,next as to the qualities of this something else4 #8,what had its being and beginning from another must also have all that which is in1 and belongs to1 its being from another too' 7,ibid1 sec4 #d474 ,from this is deduced the supreme power and perfect knowledge of the eternal being upon the principle that whatever is in the effect must also be in the cause--a principle1 however1 which has to be subjected to awkward limitations in order that1 while proving enough1 it may not prove too much1 it might seem that1 according to it1 since the real being1 from which as effect the eternal being as cause is demonstrated1 is #8both material and cogitative' or #8made up of body and spirit1' matter as well as thought must belong to the eternal being too4 ,that thought must belong to him1 ,locke is quite clear4 ,it is as impossible1 he holds1 that thought should be derived from matter1 or from matter and motion together1 as that something should be derived from nothing4 #8,if we will suppose nothing first or eternal1 matter can never begin to be3 if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal1 motion can never begin to be3 if we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal1 thought can never begin to be' 7,book ,,iv4 chap4 x4 sec4 #aj74 ,the objection which is sure to occur1 that it must be equally impossible for matter to be derived from thought1 he can scarcely be said to face4 ,he takes refuge in the supreme power of the eternal being1 as that which is able to create matter out of nothing4 ,he does not anticipate the rejoinder to which he thus lays himself open1 that this power in the eternal being to produce one effect not homogeneous with itself1 viz4 matter1 may extend to another effect1 viz4 thought1 and that thus the argument from thought in the effect to thought in the cause becomes invalid1 and nothing but blind power1 we know not what1 remains as the attribute of the eternal being4 ,nor does he remember1 when he meets the objection drawn from the inconceivability of matter being made out of nothing by saying that what is inconceivable is not therefore impossible 7ibid4 sec4 #ai71 that it is simply the inconceivability of a sequence of something upon nothing that has given him his #8evident demonstration' of an eternal being4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #be and #bd4 ,how #8eternity' must be understood if this argument is to be valid3 #adh4 ,the value of the first step in ,locke's argument--the inference1 namely1 from there being something now to there having been something from eternity--must be differently estimated according to the meaning attached to #8something' and #8from eternity4' ,if the existence of something means the occurrence of an event1 of this undoubtedly it can always be said that it follows another event1 nor to this sequence can any limit be supposed1 for a first event would not be an event at all4 ,it would be a contingency contingent upon nothing4 ,thus understood1 the argument from a something now to a something from eternity is merely a statement of the infinity of time according to that notion of infinity1 as a #8progressus ad indefinitum1' which we have already seen to be ,locke's4 #a ,it is the exact reverse of an argument to a creation or a first cause4 ,if we try to change its character by a supplementary consideration that infinity in the series of events is inconceivable1 the rejoinder will be that a first event is not for that reason any less of a contradiction1 and that the infinity which ,locke speaks of only professes to be a negative idea1 representing the impossibility of conceiving a first event 7,book ,,ii4 chap4 xvii4 sec4 #ac1 c474 ,in truth1 however1 when ,locke speaks of #8something from eternity' he does not mean--what would clearly be no ,god at all--a series of events to which1 because of events1 and therefore in time1 no limit can be supposed2 but a being which is neither event nor series of events1 to which there is no before or after4 ,the inference to such a being is not of a kind with the transition from one event to another habitually associated with it2 and if this be the true account of reasoning from effect to cause1 no such reasoning can yield the result which ,locke requires4 ,as we have seen1 however1 this is not his account of it1 #b however legitimately it may follow from his general doctrine4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ach4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #fh4 444 and how #8cause'4 #adi4 ,the inference of cause with him is the inference from a change to something having power to produce it4 #a ,the value of this definition lies not in the notion of efficient power1 but in that of an order of nature1 which it involves4 ,if instead of #8something having power to produce it' we read #8something that accounts for the change1' it expresses the inference on which all science rests1 but which is as far as possible from being merely a transition from one event to another that usually precedes it4 ,an event1 interpreted as a change of something that remains constant1 is no longer a mere event4 ,it is no longer merely in time1 a present which next moment becomes a past4 ,it takes its character from relation to the thing or system of things of which it is an altered appearance1 but which in itself is always the same4 ,only in virtue of such a relation does it require to be accounted for1 to be referred to a #8cause' which is in truth the conception that holds together or reconciles the endless flux of events with eternal unity4 ,the cause of a #8phenomenon1' even according to the authoritative exponent of the ,logic which believes itself to follow ,hume1 is the #8sum total of its conditions4' ,in its fulness1 that is1 it is simply that system of things1 conceived explicitly1 of which there must already have been an implicit conception in order that the event might be regarded as a change and thus start the search for a cause4 ,an event in time1 apart from reference to something not in time1 could suggest no enquiry into the sum of its conditions4 ,upon occurrence of a certain feeling there might indeed be spontaneous recollection of a feeling usually precedent1 spontaneous expectation of another usually sequent4 ,but such association of feelings can never explain that conception of cause in virtue of which1 when accounting for a phenomenon1 we set aside the event which in our actual experience has usually preceded it1 for one which we only find to precede it in the single case of a crucial experiment4 ,that we do so shows that it is not because of antecedence in time1 however apparently uniform1 that an educated man reckons a certain event to be the cause of another1 but that1 because of its sole sufficiency under the sum of known conditions to account for the given event1 he decides it to be its uniform antecedent1 however much ordinary appearances may tell to the contrary4 ,thus1 though he may still strangely define cause as a uniformly antecedent event 7in spite of its being a definition that would prevent him from speaking of gravity as the cause of the fall of a stone71 it is clear that by such event he means one determined by a complex of conditions in an unchanging universe4 ,these conditions1 again1 he may speak of as contingencies1 i4e4 as events contingent upon other events in endless series1 but he must add #8contingent in accordance with the uniformity of nature'--in other words1 he must determine the contingencies by relation to what is not contingent2 he must suppose nature unchanging1 though our experience of it through sensation be a #8progressus ad indefinitum'--if he is to allow a possibility of knowledge at all4 ,in short1 if events were merely events1 feelings that happen to me now and next moment are over1 no #8law of causation' and therefore no knowledge would be possible4 ,if the knowledge founded on this law actually exists1 then the #8argumentum a contingenti mundi' rightly understood--the #8inference' from nature to a being neither in time nor contingent but self-dependent and eternal1 that constant reality of which events are the changing appearances--is valid because the conception of nature1 of a world to be known1 already implies such a being4 ,to the rejoinder that implication in the conception of nature does not prove real existence1 the answer must be the question4 ,what meaning has real existence1 the antithesis of illusion1 except such as is equivalent to this conception8 #a cf4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xxvi4 sec4 #a1 and chap4 xxi4 sec4 #a4 ,the world which is to prove an eternal ,god must be itself eternal4 #aej4 ,the value1 then1 of ,locke's demonstration of the existence of ,god1 as an argument from there being something now to an eternal being from which the real existence that we know #8has all which is in and belongs to it1' depends on our converting it into the #8argumentum a contingenti mundi1' stated as above4 ,in other words1 it depends on our interpreting it in a manner which may be warranted by his rough account of causation1 and by one of the incompatible views of the real that we have found in him1 #a but which is inconsistent with his opposition of reality to the work of the mind1 and his reduction of it to #8particular existence1' as well as with his ordinary view that #8infinite' and #8eternal' can represent only a #8progressus ad indefinitum4' ,if by #8real existence corresponding to an idea' is meant its presentation in a particular #8here and now1' an attempt to find a real existence of ,god can bring us to nothing but such a contradiction in terms as a first event4 ,to prove it from the real existence of the self is to prove one impossibility from another4 ,if1 on the other hand1 real existence implies the determination of our ideas by an order of nature--if it means ideas #8in ordine ad universum' 7to use a ,baconian phrase71 in distinction from #8in ordine ad nos'--then the argument from a present to an eternal real existence is valid1 but simply in the sense that the present is already real1 and #8has all that is in and belongs to it1' only in virtue of the relation to the eternal4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #di and #ia4 ,but will the ,god1 whose existence is so proven1 be a thinking being8 #aea4 ,this1 it may be said1 is to vindicate ,locke's #8proof' only by making it ,pantheistic4 ,it gives us an eternity of nature1 but not ,god4 ,our present concern1 however1 is not with the distinction between ,pantheism and true ,theism1 but with the exposition of ,locke's doctrine according to the only development by which it can be made to show the real existence of an eternal being at all4 ,it is only by making the most of certain ,cartesian elements that appear in his doctrine1 irreconcileable with its general purport1 that we can find fair room in it for such a being1 even as the system of nature4 ,any attempt to exhibit 7in ,hegelian phrase7 #8,spirit as the truth of nature1' would be to go wholly beyond our record2 yet without this the #8ens realissimum' cannot be the ,god whose existence ,locke believes himself to prove--a thinking being from whom matter and motion are derived1 but in whom they are not4 ,it is true that1 according to the context1 it is the real existence of the self from which that of the eternal being is proved4 ,this is because1 in the ,fourth ,book1 where the #8proof' occurs1 following the new train of enquiry started by the definition of knowledge1 ,locke has for the time left in abeyance his fundamental doctrine that all simple ideas are types of reality1 and is writing as if #8my own real existence' were the only one known with intuitive certainty4 ,this1 however1 makes no essential difference in the effect of his argument4 ,the given existence1 from which the divine is proved1 is treated expressly as both #8material and cogitative3' nor1 since according to ,locke the world is both and man is both1 and even the #8thinking thing' takes its content from impressions made by matter1 could it be otherwise4 ,to have taken thought by itself as the basis of the proof would have been to leave the other part of the world1 as he conceived it1 to be referred to another ,god4 ,the difficulty then arises1 either that there is no inference possible from the nature of the effect to the nature of the eternal being1 its cause2 in which case no attribute whatever can be asserted of the latter3 or that to it too1 like the effect1 matter as well as thought must belong4 ,yes1 according to the true notion of the relation between thought and matter4 #aeb4 ,as we have seen1 neither of these alternative views is really met by ,locke4 ,to the former we may reply that the relation between two events1 of which neither has anything in common with the other1 but which we improperly speak of as effect and cause 7e4g4 death and a sunstroke71 has no likeness to that which we have explained between the world in its contingency and the world as an eternal system--a relation according to which the cause is the effect in unity4 ,whatever is part of the reality of the world must belong1 it would seem1 to the #8ens realissimum1' its cause4 ,we are thus thrown back on the other horn of the dilemma4 ,is not matter part of the reality of the world8 ,this is a question to which the method of observing the individual consciousness can give none but a delusive answer4 ,a true answer cannot be given till for this method has been substituted the enquiry1 ,how knowledge is possible1 and it has been found that it is only possible as the progressive actualisation in us of a self-consciousness in itself complete1 and which in its completeness includes the world as its object4 ,from the point of view thus attained the question as to matter will be1 ,how is it related to this self-consciousness8--a question to which the answer must vary according to what is understood by #8matter4' ,if it means the abstract opposite of thought--that which is supposed void of all determination that comes of thinking--we must pronounce it simply a delusion1 the creation of self-consciousness in one stage of its communication to us4 ,if it means the world as in space and time1 this we may allow to be real enough as a stage in the process by which self-consciousness constitutes reality4 ,thus understood1 we may speak of it roughly as part of the #8ens realissimum' which the complete self-consciousness1 or ,god1 includes as its object1 without any limitation of the divine perfectness4 ,the limitation only seems to arise so far as we1 being ourselves 7as our knowledge and morality testify71 though formally self-conscious1 yet parts of this partial world1 interpret it amiss and ascribe to it a reality1 in abstraction from the self-conscious subject1 which it only derives from relation to it4 ,thus while on the one hand it is the presence in us of ,god1 as the self-conscious source of reality1 that at once gives us the idea of ,god and of an eternal self1 and renders superfluous the further question as to their real existence2 on the other hand it is because1 for all this presence1 we are but emerging from nature1 of which as animals we are parts1 that to us there must seem an incompatibility of existence between ,god and matter1 between the self and the flux of events which makes our life4 ,this necessary illusion is our bondage1 but when the source of illusion is known1 the bondage is already being broken4 ,locke's antinomies--,hume takes one side of them as true4 #aec4 ,we have now sufficiently explored the system which it was ,hume's mission to try to make consistent with itself4 ,we have found that it is governed throughout by the antithesis between what is given to consciousness--that in regard to which the mind is passive--as the supposed real on the one side1 and what is #8invented1' #8created1' #8superinduced' by the mind on the other3 while yet this #8real' in all its forms1 as described by ,locke1 has turned out to be constituted by such ideas as1 according to him1 are not given but invented4 ,stripped of these superinductions1 nothing has been found to remain of it but that of which nothing can be said--a chaos of unrelated1 and therefore unmeaning1 individua4 ,turning to the theory of the mind itself1 the source of the superinduction1 we have found this to be a reduplication of the prolonged inconsistency which forms the theory of the #8real4' ,it impresses itself with that which1 according to the other theory1 is the impress of matter1 and it really exists as that which it itself invents4 ,the value of ,hume's philosophy lies in its being an attempt to carry out the antithesis more rigorously--to clear the real1 whether under the designation of mind or of its object1 of all that could not be reckoned as given in feelings which occur to us #8whether we will or no4' ,the consequence is a splendid failure1 a failure which it might have been hoped would have been taken as a sufficient proof that a theory1 which starts from that antithesis1 cannot even be stated without implicitly contradicting itself4 ,hume's scepticism fatal to his own premises4 ,this derived from ,berkeley4 #aed4 ,such a doctrine--a doctrine founded on the testimony of the senses1 which ends by showing that the senses testify to nothing--cannot be criticised step by step according to the order in which its author puts it1 for its characteristic is that1 in order to state itself1 it has to take for granted popular notions which it afterwards shows to be unmeaning4 ,its power over ordinary thinkers lies just in this1 that it arrives at its destructive result by means of propositions which every one believes1 but to the validity of which its result is really fatal4 ,an account of our primitive consciousness1 which derives its plausibility from availing itself of the conceptions of cause and substance1 is the basis of the argument which reduces these conceptions to words misunderstood4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be treated by itself1 as it stands in the first part of the ,treatise on the ,understanding1 but must be taken in connection with ,part ,,iv41 especially with the section on #8,scepticism with regard to the ,senses2' not upon the plan of discrediting a principle by reference to the #8dangerous' nature of its consequences1 but because the final doctrine brings out the inconsistencies lurking in that assumed to begin with4 ,on this side of his scepticism ,hume mainly followed the orthodox ,berkeley1 of whose criticism of ,locke1 made with a very different purpose1 some account must first be given4 ,the connection between the two authors is instructive in many ways2 not least as showing that when the most pious theological purpose expresses itself in a doctrine resting on an inadequate philosophical principle1 it is the principle and not the purpose that will regulate the permanent effect of the doctrine4 ,berkeley's religious interest in making ,locke consistent4 #aee4 ,berkeley's treatises1 we must remember1 though professedly philosophical1 really form a theological polemic4 ,he wrote as the champion of orthodox ,christianity against #8mathematical atheism1' and1 like others of his order1 content with the demolition of the rival stronghold1 did not stay to enquire whether his own untempered mortar could really hold together the fabric of knowledge and rational religion which he sought to maintain4 ,he found practical ungodliness and immorality excusing themselves by a theory of #8materialism'--a theory which made the whole conscious experience of man dependent upon #8unperceiving matter4' ,this1 whatever it might be1 was not an object which man could love or reverence1 or to which he could think of himself as accountable4 ,berkeley1 full of devout zeal for ,god and man1 and not without a tincture of clerical party-spirit 7as appears in his heat against ,shaftesbury1 whom he ought to have regarded as a philosophical yoke-fellow71 felt that it must be got rid of4 ,he saw1 or thought he saw1 that the #8new way of ideas' had only to be made consistent with itself1 and the oppressive shadow must vanish4 ,ideas1 according to that new way 7or1 to speak less ambiguously1 feelings7 make up our experience1 and they are not matter4 ,let us get rid1 then1 of the self-contradictory assumption that they are either copies of matter--copies of that1 of which it is the sole and simple differentia that it is not an idea1 or its effects--effects of that which can only be described as the unknown opposite of the only efficient power with which we are acquainted--and what becomes of the philosopher's blind and dead substitute for the living and knowing ,god8 ,it was one thing1 however1 to show the contradictions involved in ,locke's doctrine of matter1 another effectively to replace it4 ,to the latter end ,berkeley cannot be said to have made any permanent contribution4 ,that explicit reduction of ideas to feelings #8particular in time1' which was his great weapon of destruction1 was incompatible with his doing so4 ,he adds nothing to the philosophy1 which he makes consistent with itself1 while by making it consistent he empties it of three parts of its suggestiveness4 ,his doctrine1 in short1 is merely ,locke purged1 and ,locke purged is no ,locke4 ,what is meant by relation of mind and matter8 #aef4 ,the question which he mainly dealt with may be stated in general terms as that of the relation between the mind and the external world4 ,under this general statement1 however1 are covered several distinct questions1 the confusion between which has been a great snare for philosophers--questions as to the relations 7a7 between a sensitive and non-sensitive body1 7b7 between thought and its object1 7c7 between thought and something only qualified as the negation of thought4 ,the last question1 it will be observed1 is what the second becomes upon a certain notion being formed of what the object of thought must be4 ,upon this notion being discarded a further question 7d71 also covered by the above general statement1 must still remain as to the relation between thought1 as in each man1 and the world which he does not make1 but which1 in some sort1 makes him what he is4 ,in what follows1 these questions1 for the sake of brevity1 will be referred to symbolically4 ,confusions involved in ,locke's materialism4 #aeg4 ,locke's doctrine of matter1 as we have seen1 involves a confusion between 7a7 and 7b74 ,the feeling of touch in virtue of an intellectual interpretation--intellectual because implying the action of the mind as 7according to ,locke7 the source of ideas of relation--becomes the idea of solidity1 i4e4 the idea of a relation between bodies in the way of impulse and resistance4 ,but the function of the intellect in constituting the relation is ignored4 ,under cover of the ambiguous #8idea1' which stands alike for a nervous irritation and the intellectual interpretation thereof1 the feeling of touch and conception of solidity are treated as one and the same4 ,thus the true conceived outwardness of body to body--an outwardness which thought1 as the source of relations1 can alone constitute--becomes first an imaginary felt outwardness of body to the organs of touch1 and then1 by a further fallacy--these organs being confused with the mind--an outwardness of body to mind1 which we need only kick a stone to be sure of4 ,meanwhile the consideration of question 7d7 necessitates the belief that the real world does not come and go with each man's fleeting consciousness1 and no distinction being recognised between consciousness as fleeting and consciousness as permanent1 or between feeling and thought1 the real world comes to be regarded as the absolute opposite of thought and its work4 ,this opposition combines with the supposed externality of body to mind to give the notion that body is the real4 ,the qualities which #8the mind finds inseparable from body' thus become qualities which would exist all the same #8whether there were a perceiving mind or no1' and are primarily real2 while such as consist in our feelings1 though real in so far as1 #8not being of our own making1 they imply the action of things without us1' are yet only secondarily so because this action is relative to something which is not body4 ,then1 finally1 by a renewed confusion of the relation between thought and its object with that between body and body1 qualities1 which are credited with a primary reality as independent of and antithetical to the mind1 are brought within it again as ideas4 ,they are supposed to copy themselves upon it by impact and impression2 and that not in touch merely1 but 7visual feelings being interpreted by help of the same conception7 in sight also4 ,two ways of dealing with it4 ,berkeley chooses the most obvious4 #aeh4 ,such #8materialism' invites two different methods of attack4 ,on the one hand its recognised principle1 that all intellectual #8superinduction' upon simple feeling is a departure from the real1 may be insisted on1 and it may be shown that it is only by such superinduction that simple feeling becomes a feeling of body4 ,matter1 then1 with all its qualities1 is a fiction except so far as these can be reduced to simple feelings4 ,such in substance was ,berkeley's short method with the materialists4 ,in his early life it seemed to him sufficient for the purposes of orthodox #8spiritualism1' because1 having posed the materialist1 he took the moral and spiritual attributes of ,god as #8revealed1' without enquiring into the possibility of such revelation to a merely sensitive consciousness4 ,as he advanced1 other questions1 fatal to the constructive value of his original method1 began to force themselves upon him4 ,granting that intellectual superinduction fiction1 how is the fiction possible to a mind which cannot originate8 ,exclude from reality all that such fiction constitutes1 and what remains to be real8 ,these questions1 however1 though their effect on his mind appears in the later sections of his #8,siris1' he never systematically pursued4 ,he thus missed the true method of attack on materialism--the only one that does not build again that which it destroys--the method which allows that matter is real but only so in virtue of that intellectual superinduction upon feeling without which there could be for us no reality at all3 that thus it is indeed opposed to thought1 but only by a position which is thought's own act4 ,for the development of such views ,berkeley had not patience in his youth nor leisure in his middle life4 ,whatever he may have suggested1 all that he logically achieved was an exposure of the equivocation between feeling and felt body2 and of this the next result1 as appears in ,hume1 was a doctrine which indeed delivers mind from dependence on matter1 but only by reducing it in effect to a succession of feelings which cannot know themselves4 ,his account of the relation between visible and tangible extension4 ,we do not see bodies without the mind 444 #aei4 ,it was upon the extension of the metaphor of impression to sight as well as touch1 and the consequent notion that body1 with its inseparable qualities1 revealed itself through both senses1 that ,berkeley first fastened4 ,is it evident1 as ,locke supposed it to be1 that men #8perceive by their sight' not colours merely1 but #8a distance between bodies of different colours and between parts of the same body'2 #a in other words1 situation and magnitude8 ,to show that they do not is the purpose of ,berkeley's #8,essay towards a new ,theory of ,vision4' ,he starts from two principles which he takes as recognised3 one1 that the #8proper and immediate object of sight is colour'2 the other1 that distance from the eye1 or distance in the line of vision1 is not immediately seen4 ,if1 then1 situation and magnitude are #8properly and immediately' seen1 they must be qualities of colour4 ,now in one sense1 according to ,berkeley1 they are so3 in other words1 there is such a thing as visible extension4 ,we see lights and colours in #8sundry situations' as well as #8in degrees of faintness and clearness1 confusion and distinctness4' 7,theory of ,vision1 sec4 #gg47 ,we also see objects as made up of certain #8quantities of coloured points1' i4e4 as having visible magnitude4 7,ibid4 sec4 #ed47 ,but situation and magnitude as visible are not external1 not #8qualities of body1' nor do they represent by any necessary connection the situation and magnitude that are truly qualities of body1 the mind1 #8without the mind and at a distance4' ,these are tangible4 ,distance in all its forms--as distance from the eye2 as distance between parts of the same body1 or magnitude2 and as distance of body from body1 or situation--is tangible4 ,what a man means when he says that #8he sees this or that thing at a distance' is that #8what he sees suggests to his understanding that after having passed a certain distance1 to be measured by the motion of his body which is perceivable by touch1 he shall come to perceive such and such tangible ideas which have been usually connected with such and such visible ideas' 7,ibid4 sec4 #de74 ,on the same principle we are said to see the magnitude and situation of bodies4 ,owing to long experience of the connection of these tangible ideas with visible ones1 the magnitude of the latter and their degrees of faintness and clearness1 of confusion and distinctness1 enable us to form a #8sudden and true' estimate of the magnitude of the former 7i4e4 of bodies72 even as visible situation enables us to form a like estimate of the #8situation of things outward and tangible' 7,ibid4 secs4 #ef and #ii74 ,the connection1 however1 between the two sets of ideas1 ,berkeley insists1 is habitual only1 not necessary4 ,as ,hume afterwards said of the relation of cause and effect1 it is not constituted by the nature of the ideas related4 #b ,the visible ideas1 that as a matter of fact #8suggest to us the various magnitudes of external objects before we touch them1 might have suggested no such thing4' ,that would really have been the case had our eyes been so framed as that the maximum visibile should be less than the minimum tangibile2 and1 as a matter of constant experience1 the greater visible extension suggests sometimes a greater1 sometimes a less1 tangible extension according to the degree of its strength or faintness1 #8being in its own nature equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of small or great or no size at all1 just as the words of a language are in their own nature indifferent to signify this or that thing1 or nothing at all4' 7,ibid4 secs4 #fb-fd47 #a ,locke1 ,essay ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 sec4 #b4 #b ,see below1 paragraph #bhc 444 nor yet feel them4 ,the #8esse' of body is the #8percipi'4 #afj4 ,so far1 then1 the conclusion merely is that body as external1 and space as a relation between bodies or parts of a body1 are not both seen and felt1 but felt only2 in other words1 that it is only through the organs of touch that we receive1 strictly speaking1 impressions from without4 ,this is all that the ,essay on ,vision goes to show2 but according to the #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge' this conclusion was merely provisional4 ,the object of touch does not1 any more than the object of sight1 #8exist without the mind1' nor is it #8the image of an external thing4' #8,in strict truth the ideas of sight1 when by them we apprehend distance and things placed at a distance1 do not suggest or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance1 but only admonish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time1 and in consequence of such and such actions' 7#8,principles of ,h4 ,k4' sec4 #dd74 ,whether1 then1 we speak of visible or tangible objects1 the object is the idea1 its #8esse is the percipi4' ,body is not a thing separate from the idea of touch1 yet revealed by it2 so far as it exists at all1 it must either be that idea or be a succession of ideas of which that idea is suggestive4 ,it follows that the notion of the real which identifies it with matter1 as something external to and independent of consciousness1 and which derives the reality of ideas from their relation to body as thus outward1 must disappear4 ,must not1 then1 the distinction between the real and fantastic1 between dreams and facts1 disappear with it8 ,what meaning is there in asking whether any given idea is real or not1 unless a reference is implied to something other than the idea itself8 ,there are no paragraphs #afa-afi in any edition or reprint4 ,tr ,what then becomes of distinction between reality and fancy8 #agj4 ,berkeley's theory1 no less than ,locke's1 requires such reference4 ,he insists1 as much as ,locke does1 on the difference between ideas of imagination which do1 and those of sense which do not1 depend on our own will4 #8,it is no more than willing1 and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy2 and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another4' ,but #8when in broad daylight ,i open my eyes1 it is not in my power to choose whether ,i shall see or no1 or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view4' ,moreover #8the ideas of sense are more strong1 lively and distinct than those of the imagination2 they have likewise a steadiness1 order1 and coherence1 and are not excited at random as those which are the effects of human wills often are1 but in a regular train and series' 7,ibid4 secs4 #bh-cj74 ,these characteristics of ideas of sense1 however1 do not with ,berkeley1 any more than with ,locke1 properly speaking1 constitute their reality4 ,this lies in their relation to something else1 of which these characteristics are the tests4 ,the difference between the two writers lies in their several views as to what this #8something else' is4 ,with ,locke it was body or matter1 as proximately1 though in subordination to the ,divine ,will1 the #8imprinter' of those most lively ideas which we cannot make for ourselves4 ,his followers insisted on the proximate1 while they ignored the ultimate1 reference4 ,hence1 as ,berkeley conceived1 their ,atheism1 which he could cut from under their feet by the simple plan of eliminating the proximate reference altogether1 and thus showing that ,god1 not matter1 is the immediate #8imprinter' of ideas on the senses and the suggester of such ideas of imagination as the ideas of sense1 in virtue of habitual association1 constantly introduce 7,ibid4 sec4 #cc74 ,the real ideas that ,god causes4 #aga4 ,to eliminate the reference to matter might seem to be more easy than to substitute for it a reference to ,god4 ,if the object of the idea is only the idea itself1 does not all determination by relation logically disappear from the idea1 except 7perhaps7 such as consists in the fact of its sequence or antecedence to other ideas8 ,this issue was afterwards to be tried by ,hume--with what consequences to science and religion we shall see4 ,berkeley avoids it by insisting that the #8percipi1' to which #8esse' is equivalent1 implies reference to a mind4 ,at first sight this reference1 as common to all ideas alike1 would not seem to avail much as a basis either for a distinction between the real and fantastic or for any ,theism except such as would #8entitle ,god to all our fancies4' ,if it is to serve ,berkeley's purpose1 we must suppose the idea to carry with it not merely a relation to mind but a relation to it as its effect1 and the conscious subject to carry with him such a distinction between his own mind and ,god's as leads him to refer his ideas to ,god's mind as their cause when they are lively1 distinct and coherent1 but when they are otherwise1 to his own4 ,and this1 in substance1 is ,berkeley's supposition4 ,to show the efficient power of mind he appeals to our consciousness of ability to produce at will ideas of imagination2 to show that there is a divine mind1 distinct from our own1 he appeals to our consciousness of inability to produce ideas of sense4 ,is it then a succession of feelings8 #agb4 ,even those least disposed to #8vanquish ,berkeley with a grin' have found his doctrine of the real1 which is also his doctrine of ,god1 #8unsatisfactory4' ,by the real world they are accustomed to understand something which--at least in respect of its #8elements' or #8conditions' or #8laws'--permanently is2 though the combinations of the elements1 the events which flow from the conditions1 the manifestations of the laws1 may never be at one time what they will be at the next4 ,but according to the ,berkeleian doctrine the permanent seems to disappear3 the #8is' gives place to a #8has been' and #8will be4' ,if ,i say 77 #a #8there is a body1' ,i must mean according to it that a feeling has just occurred to me1 which has been so constantly followed by certain other feelings that it suggests a lively expectation of these4 ,the suggestive feeling alone is1 and it is ceasing to be4 ,if this is the true account of propositions suggested by everyone's constantly-recurrent experience1 what are we to make of scientific truths1 e4g4 #8a body will change its place sooner than let another enter it1' #8planets move in ellipses1' #8the square on the hypotheneuse is equal to the squares on the sides4' ,in these cases1 too1 does the present reality lie merely in a feeling experienced by this or that scientific man1 and to him suggestive of other feelings8 ,does the proposition that #8planets move in ellipses' mean that to some watcher of the skies1 who understands ,kepler's laws1 a certain perception of #8visible extension' 7i4e4 of colour or light and shade7 not only suggests1 as to others1 a particular expectation of other feelings1 which expectation is called a planet1 but a further expectation1 not shared by the multitude1 of feelings suggesting successive situations of the visible extension1 which further expectation is called elliptical motion8 ,such an explanation of general propositions would be a form of the doctrine conveniently named after ,protagoras--#8 ' #b--;a doctrine which the vindicators of ,berkeley are careful to tell us we must not confound with his4 ,the question1 however1 is not whether ,berkeley himself admits the doctrine1 but whether or no it is the logical consequence of the method which he uses for the overthrow of materialists and #8mathematical ,atheists'8 #a ,greek 7deiktikos7 8affirmatively0 or 8capable of being proven0 i4e4 not merely hypothetically4 ,tr4 #b ,greek 7alethes ho hekasto hekastote dokei7 the truth for each man is as it appears to him4 ,tr4 ,berkeley goes wrong from confusion between thought and feeling4 ,for ,locke's #8idea of a thing' he substitutes #8idea' simply4 #agc4 ,his purpose was the maintenance of ,theism1 and a true instinct told him that pure ,theism1 as distinct from nature-worship and daemonism1 has no philosophical foundation1 unless it can be shown that there is nothing real apart from thought4 ,but in the hurry of theological advocacy1 and under the influence of a misleading terminology1 he failed to distinguish this true proposition--there is nothing real apart from thought--from this false one1 its virtual contradictory--there is nothing other than feeling4 ,the confusion was covered1 if not caused1 by the ambiguity1 often noticed1 in the use of the term #8idea4' ,this to ,berkeley's generation stood alike for feeling proper1 which to the subject that merely feels is neither outer nor inner1 because not referring itself to either mind or thing1 and for conception1 or an object thought of under relations4 ,according to ,locke1 pain1 colour1 solidity1 are all ideas equally with each other and equally with the idea of pain1 idea of colour1 idea of solidity4 ,if all alike1 however1 were feelings proper1 there would be no world either to exist or be spoken of4 ,locke virtually saves it by two suppositions1 each incompatible with the equivalence of idea to feeling1 and implying the conversion of it into conception as above defined4 ,one is that there are abstract ideas2 the other that there are primary qualities of which ideas are copies1 but which do not come and go with our feelings4 ,the latter supposition gives a world that #8really exists1' the former a world that may be known and spoken of2 but neither can maintain itself without a theory of conception which is not forthcoming in ,locke himself4 ,we need not traverse again the contradictions which according to his statement they involve--contradictions which1 under whatever disguise1 must attach to every philosophy that admits a reality either in things as apart from thought or in thought as apart from things1 and only disappear when the thing as thought of1 and through thought individualised by the relations which constitute its community with the universe1 is recognised as alone the real4 ,misled by the phrase #8idea of a thing1' we fancy that idea and thing have each a separate reality of their own1 and then puzzle ourselves with questions as to how the idea can represent the thing--how the ideas of primary qualities can be copies of them1 and how1 if the real thing of experience be merely individual1 a general idea can be abstracted from it4 ,these questions ,berkeley asked and found unanswerable4 ,there were then two ways of dealing with them before him4 ,one was to supersede them by a truer view of thought and its object1 as together in essential correlation constituting the real2 but this way he did not take4 ,the other was to avoid them by merging both thing and idea in the indifference of simple feeling4 ,for a merely sentient being1 it is true--for one who did not think upon his feelings--the oppositions of inner and outer1 of subjective and objective1 of fantastic and real1 would not exist2 but neither would knowledge or a world to be known4 ,that such oppositions1 misunderstood1 may be a heavy burden on the human spirit1 the experience of current controversy and its spiritual effects might alone suffice to convince us2 but the philosophical deliverance can only lie in the recognition of thought as their author1 not in the attempt to obliterate them by the reduction of thought and its world to feeling--an attempt which contradicts itself1 since it virtually admits their existence while it renders them unaccountable4 ,which1 if idea feeling1 does away with space and body4 #agd4 ,that ,berkeley's was such an attempt1 looking merely to his treatment of primary qualities and abstract ideas1 we certainly could not doubt3 though1 since language does not allow of its consistent statement1 and ,berkeley was quite ready to turn the exigencies of language to account1 passages logically incompatible with it may easily be found in him4 ,the hasty reader1 when he is told that body or distance are suggested by feelings of sight and touch rather than immediately seen1 accepts the doctrine without scruple1 because he supposes that which is suggested to be a present reality1 though not at present felt4 ,but if not at present felt it is not according to ,berkeley an idea1 therefore #8without the mind1' therefore an impossibility4 #a ,that which is suggested1 then1 must itself be a feeling which consists in the expectation of other feelings4 ,distance1 and body1 as suggested1 can be no more than such an expectation2 and as actually existing1 no more than the actual succession of the expected feelings--a succession of which1 as of every succession1 #8no two parts exist together4' #b ,there is no time1 then1 at which it can be said that distance and body exist4 #a ,reference is here merely made to the doctrine by which ,berkeley disposes of #8matter1' the consideration of its reconcilability with his doctrine of #8spirits' and #8relations' as objects of knowledge being postponed4 #b ,locke1 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xv4 sec4 #a4 ,he does not even retain them as #8abstract ideas'4 #age4 ,this1 it may seem1 however inconsistent with the doctrine of primary qualities1 is little more than the result which ,locke himself comes to in his ,fourth ,book2 since1 if #8actual present succession' forms our only knowledge of real existence1 there could be no time at which distance and body might be known as really existing4 ,but ,locke1 as we have seen1 is able to save mathematical1 though not physical1 knowledge from the consequences of this admission by his doctrine of abstract ideas--#8ideas removed in our thoughts from particular existence'--whose agreement or disagreement is stated in propositions which #8concern not existence1' and for that reason may be general without becoming either uncertain or uninstructive4 ,this doctrine ,berkeley expressly rejects on the ground that he could not perceive separately that which could not exist separately 7#8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' ,introduction1 sec4 #aj72 a ground which to the ordinary reader seems satisfactory because he has no doubt1 and ,berkeley's instances do not suggest a doubt1 as to the present existence of #8individual objects'--this man1 this horse1 this body4 ,but with ,berkeley to exist means to be felt 7#8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #c71 and the feelings1 which ,i name a body1 being successive1 its existence must be in succession likewise4 ,the limitation1 then1 of possibility of #8conception' by possibility of existence1 means that #8conception1' too1 is reduced to a succession of feelings4 ,on the same principle all permanent relations should disappear4 #agf4 ,berkeley1 then1 as a consequence of the methods by which he disposes at once of the #8real existence' and #8abstract idea of matter1' has to meet the following questions3--,how are either reality or knowledge possible without permanent relations8 and1 ,how can feelings1 of which one is over before the next begins1 constitute or represent a world of permanent relations8 ,the difficulty becomes more obvious1 though not more serious1 when the relations in question are not merely themselves permanent1 as are those between natural phenomena1 but are relations between permanent parts like those of space4 ,it is for this reason that its doctrine of geometry is the most easily assailable point of the #8sensational' philosophy4 ,locke distinguishes the ideas of space and of duration as got1 the one from the permanent parts of space1 the other #8from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession4' #a ,he afterwards prefers to oppose the term #8expansion' to #8duration1' as bringing out more clearly than #8space' the opposition of relation between permanent facts to that between #8fleeting successive facts which never exist together4' ,how1 then1 can a consciousness1 consisting simply of #8fleeting successive facts1' either be or represent that of which the differentia is that its facts are permanent and co-exist8 #a ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiv4 sec4 #a4 ,by making colour relations of coloured points1 ,berkeley represents relation as seen4 #agg4 ,this crucial question in regard to extension does not seem even to have suggested itself to ,berkeley4 ,the reason why is not far to seek4 ,professor ,fraser1 in his valuable edition1 represents him as meaning by visible extension #8coloured experience in sense1' and by tangible extension #8resistent experience in sense4' #a ,no fault can be found with this interpretation1 but the essential question1 which ,berkeley does not fairly meet1 is whether the experience in each case is complete in a single feeling or consists in a succession of feelings4 ,if in a single feeling1 it clearly is not extension1 as a relation between parts1 at all2 if in a succession of feelings1 it is only extension because a synthetic principle1 which is not itself one of the feelings1 but equally present to them all1 transforms them into permanent parts of which each qualifies the other by outwardness to it4 ,berkeley does not see the necessity of such a principle1 because he allows himself to suppose extension--at any rate visible extension--to be constituted by a single feeling4 ,having first pronounced that the proper object of sight is colour1 he quietly substitutes for this situations of colour1 degrees of strength and faintness in colour1 and quantities of coloured points1 as if these1 interchangeably with mere colour1 were properly objects of sight and perceived in single acts of vision4 ,now if by object of sight were meant something other than the sensation itself--something which to a thinking being it suggests as its cause--there would be no harm in this language1 but neither would there be any ground for saying that the proper object of sight is colour1 for distinguishing visible from tangible extension1 or for denying that the outwardness of body to body is seen4 ,such restrictions and distinctions have no meaning1 unless by sight is meant the nervous irritation1 the affection of the visual organ1 as it is to a merely feeling subject2 yet in the very passages where he makes them1 by saying that we see situations and degrees of colour1 and quantities of coloured points1 ,berkeley converts sight into a judgment of extensive and intensive quantity4 ,he thus fails to discern that the transition from colour to coloured extension cannot be made without on the one hand either the presentation of successive pictures or 7which comes to the same7 successive acts of attention to a single picture1 and on the other hand a synthesis of the successive presentations as mutually qualified parts of a whole4 ,in other words1 he ignores the work of thought involved in the constitution alike of coloured and tangible extension1 and in virtue of which alone either is extension at all4 #a ,see ,fraser's ,berkeley1 #8,theory of ,vision1' note #db4 ,i may here say that ,i have gone into less detail in my account of ,berkeley's system than ,i should otherwise have thought necessary1 because ,professor ,fraser has supplied1 in the way of explanation of it1 all that a student can require4 ,still he admits that space is constituted by a succession of feelings4 #agh4 ,but though he does not scruple to substitute for colour situations and quantities of coloured points1 these do not with him constitute space1 which he takes according to ,locke's account of it to be #8distance between bodies or parts of the same body4' ,this1 according to his #8,theory of ,vision1' is tangible extension1 and this again is alone the object of geometry4 ,as in that treatise a difference is still supposed between tangible extension and the feeling of touch1 the question does not there necessarily arise whether the tactual experience1 that constitutes this extension1 is complete in a single feeling or only in a succession of feelings2 but when in the subsequent treatise the difference is effaced1 it is decided by implication that the experience is successive3 #a and all received modifications of the theory1 which assign to a locomotive or muscular sense the office which ,berkeley roughly assigned to touch1 make the same implication still more clearly4 ,now in the absence of any recognition of a synthetic principle1 in relation to which the successive experience becomes what it is not in itself1 this means nothing else than that space is a succession of feelings1 which again means that space is not space1 not a qualification of bodies or parts of body by mutual externality1 since to such qualification it is necessary that bodies or their parts coexist4 ,thus1 in his hurry to get rid of externality as independence of the mind1 he has really got rid of it as a relation between bodies1 and in so doing 7however the result may be disguised7 has logically made a clean sweep of geometry and physics4 #a #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #dd4 ,it will be observed that in that passage ,berkeley uses the term #8distance' not #8space1' and though with him the terms are strictly interchangeable1 this may have helped to disguise from him the full monstrosity of the doctrine1 #8space is a succession of feelings1' which1 stated in that form1 must surely have scandalised him4 ,if so1 it is not space at all2 but ,berkeley thinks it is only not #8pure' space4 ,space and pure space stand or fall together4 #agi4 ,of this result he himself shows no suspicion4 ,he professes to be able1 without violence to his doctrine1 to accept the sciences as they stand1 except so far as they rest upon the needless and unmeaning assumptions 7as he reckoned them7 of pure space and its infinite divisibility4 ,the truth seems to be that--at any rate in the state of mind represented his earlier treatises--he was only able to work on the lines which ,locke had laid4 ,it did not occur to him to treat the primary qualities as relations constituted by thought1 because ,locke had not done so4 ,locke having treated them as external to the mind1 ,berkeley does so likewise1 and for that reason feels that they must be got rid of4 ,the mode of riddance1 again1 was virtually determined for him by ,locke4 ,locke having admitted that they copied themselves in feelings1 the untenable element in this supposition had only to be dropped and they became feelings simply4 ,it is thus only so far as space is supposed to exist after a mode of which1 according to ,locke himself1 sense could take no copy--i4e4 as exclusive not merely of all colour but of all body1 and as infinitely divisible--that ,berkeley becomes aware of its incompatibility with his doctrine4 ,pure space1 or #8vacuum1' to him means space that can not be touched--a tangible extension that is not tangible--and is therefore a contradiction in terms4 ,the notion that1 though not touched1 it might be seen1 he excludes1 #a apparently for the same reason which prevents him from allowing visible extension to be space at all2 the reason1 namely1 that there is no #8outness' or relation of externality between the parts of such extension4 ,the fact that there can be no such relation between the successive feelings which alone1 according to him1 constitute #8tangible extension1' he did not see to be equally fatal to the latter being in any true sense space4 ,in other words1 he did not see that the test of reduction to feeling1 by which he disposed of the vacuum1 disposed of space altogether4 ,if he had1 he would have understood that space and body were intelligible relations1 which can be thought of apart from the feelings which through them become the world that we know1 since it is they that are the conditions of these feelings becoming a knowledge1 not the feelings that are the condition of the relations being known4 ,whether they can be thought of apart from each other--whether the simple relation of externality between parts of a whole can be thought of without the parts being considered as solid--is of course a further question1 and one which ,berkeley cannot be said properly to discuss at all1 since the abstraction of space from body to him meant its abstraction from feelings of touch4 ,the answer to it ceases to be difficult as soon as the question is properly stated4 #a #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #aaf4 ,berkeley disposes of space for fear of limiting ,god4 #ahj4 ,as with vacuum1 so with infinite divisibility4 ,once let it be understood that extension is constituted by the relation of externality between homogeneous parts1 and it follows that there can be no least part of extension1 none that does not itself consist of parts2 in other words1 that it is infinitely divisible3 just as conversely it follows that there can be no last part of it1 not having another outside it2 in other words1 that 7to use ,locke's phrase7 it is infinitely addible4 ,doubtless1 as ,berkeley held1 there is a #8minimum visibile'2 but this means that there are conditions under which any seen colour disappears1 and disappearing1 ceases to be known under the relation of extension2 but it is only through a confusion of the relation with the colour that the disappearance of the latter is thought to be a disappearance of so much extension4 #a ,it was1 in short1 the same failure to recognise the true ideality of space1 as a relation constituted by thought1 that on the one hand made its #8purity' and infinity unmeaning to ,berkeley1 and on the other made him think that1 if pure 7sc4 irreducible to feelings7 and infinite1 it must limit the ,divine perfection1 either as being itself ,god or as #8something beside ,god which is eternal1 uncreated1 and infinite' 7#8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #aag74 ,fear of this result set him upon that method of resolving space1 and with it the world of nature1 into sequent feelings1 which1 if it had been really susceptible of logical expression1 would at best have given him nothing but a #b for ,god4 ,if he had been in less of a hurry with his philosophy1 he might have found that the current tendency to #8bind ,god in nature or diffuse in space' required to be met by a sounder than his boyish idealism--by an idealism which gives space its due1 but reflects that to make space ,god1 or a limitation on ,god1 is to subject thought itself to the most superficial of the relations by which it forms the world that it knows4 #a ,the same remark of course applies1 mutatis mutandis1 to the #8minimum tangibile4' ,see below1 paragraphs #bfe and #bfj4 #b ,greek 7mega zoon7 great being4 ,tr4 ,how he deals with possibility of general knowledge4 #aha4 ,so far we have only considered ,berkeley's reduction of primary qualities1 supposed to be sensible1 to sensations as it affects the qualities themselves1 rather than as it affects the possibility of universal judgments about them4 ,if1 indeed1 as we have found1 such reduction really amounts to the absolute obliteration of the qualities1 no further question can remain as to the possibility of general knowledge concerning them4 ,as ,berkeley1 however1 did not admit the obliteration1 the further question did remain for him3 and the condition of his plausibly answering it was that he should recognise in the #8idea1' as subject of predication1 that intelligible qualification by relation which he did not recognise in it simply as #8idea1' and which essentially differences it from feeling proper4 ,if any particular #8tangible extension1' e4g4 a right-angled triangle1 is only a feeling1 or in ,berkeley's own language1 #8a fleeting perishable passion' #a not existing at all1 even as an #8abstract idea1' except when some one's tactual organs are being affected in a certain way--what are we to make of such a general truth as that the square on its base is always equal to the squares on its sides8 ,omitting all difficulties about the convertibility of a figure with a feeling1 we find two questions still remain--,how such separation can be made of the figure from the other conditions of the tactual experience as that propositions should be possible which concern the figure simply2 and how a single case of tactual experience--that in which the mathematician finds a feeling called a right-angled triangle followed by another which he calls equality between the squares1 c4--leads in the absence of any #8necessary connexion' to the expectation that the sequence will always be the same4 #b ,the difficulty becomes the more striking when it is remembered that though the geometrical proposition in question1 according to ,berkeley1 concerns the tangible1 the experience which suggests it is merely visual4 #a #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #hi4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #abb4 ,his theory of universals 444 #ahb4 ,berkeley's answer to these questions must be gathered from his theory of general names4 #8,it is1 ,i know1' he says1 #8a point much insisted on1 that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions1 to which ,i fully agree3 but then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction--universality1 so far as ,i can comprehend1 not consisting in the absolute positive nature or conception of anything1 but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it2 by virtue whereof it is that things1 names1 or notions1 being in their own nature particular1 are rendered universal4 ,thus1 when ,i demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles1 it is to be supposed that ,i have in view the universal idea of a triangle2 which is not to be understood as if ,i could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither equilateral nor scalene nor equicrural2 but only that the particular triangle ,i considered1 whether of this or that sort it matters not1 doth equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever1 and is in that sense universal4' ,thus it is that #8a man may consider a figure merely as triangular4' 7#8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' ,introd4 secs4 #ae and #af47 444 of value1 as implying that universality of ideas lies in relation4 #ahc4 ,in this passage appear the beginnings of a process of thought which1 if it had been systematically pursued by ,berkeley1 might have brought him to understand by the #8percipi1' to which he pronounced #8esse' equivalent1 definitely the #8intelligi4' ,as it stands1 the result of the passage merely is that the triangle 7for instance7 #8in its own nature1' because #8particular1' is not a possible subject of general predication or reasoning3 that it is so only as #8considered' under a relation of resemblance to other triangles and by such consideration universalized4 #8,in its own nature1' or as a #8particular idea1' the triangle1 we must suppose1 is so much tangible 7or visible1 as symbolical of tangible7 extension1 and therefore according to ,berkeley a feeling4 ,but a relation1 as he virtually admits1 #a is neither a feeling nor felt4 ,the triangle1 then1 as considered under relation and thus a possible subject of general propositions1 is quite other than the triangle in its own nature4 ,this1 of course1 is so far merely a virtual repetition of ,locke's embarrassing doctrine that real things are not the things which we speak of1 and which are the subject of our sciences2 but it is a repetition with two fruitful differences--one1 that the thing in its #8absolute positive nature' is more explicitly identified with feeling2 the other1 that the process1 by which the thing thought and spoken of is supposed to be derived from the real thing1 is no longer one of #8abstraction1' but consists in consideration of relation4 ,it is true that with ,berkeley the mere feeling has a #8positive nature' apart from considered relations1 #b and that the considered relation1 by which the feeling is universalised1 is only that of resemblance between properties supposed to exist independently of it4 ,the #8particular triangle1' reducible to feelings of touch1 has its triangularity 7we must suppose7 simply as a feeling4 ,it is only the resemblance between the triangularity in this and other figures--not the triangularity itself--that is a relation1 and1 as a relation1 not felt but considered2 or in ,berkeley's language1 something of which we have not properly an #8idea' but a #8notion4' #c #a ,see #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #hi4 7#bnd edit47 #b ,see below1 paragraph #bih4 #c #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' ,ibid4 ,this perhaps is the best place for saying that it is not from any want of respect for ,dr4 ,stirling that ,i habitually use #8notion' in the loose popular way which he counts #8barbarous1' but because the barbarism is so prevalent that it seems best to submit to it1 and to use #8conception' as the equivalent of the ,german #8,begriff4' ,but he fancies that each idea has a positive nature apart from relation4 #ahd4 ,but though ,berkeley only renders explicit the difficulties implicit in ,locke's doctrine of ideas1 that is itself a great step taken towards disposing of them4 ,once let the equivocation between sensible qualities and sensations be got rid of--once let it be admitted that the triangle in its absolute nature1 as opposed to the triangle considered1 is merely a feeling1 and that relations are not feelings or felt--and the question must soon arise1 ,what in the absence of all relation remains to be the absolute nature of the triangle8 ,it is a question which ultimately admits of but one answer4 ,the triangularity of the given single figure must be allowed to be just as much a relation as the resemblance1 consisting in triangularity1 between it and other figures2 and if a relation1 then not properly felt1 but understood4 ,the #8particular' triangle1 if by that is meant the triangle as subject of a singular proposition1 is no more #8particular in time1' no more constituted by the occurrence of a feeling1 than is the triangle as subject of a general proposition4 ,it really exists as constituted by relation1 and therefore only as #8considered' or understood4 ,in its existence1 as in the consideration of it1 the relations indicated by the terms #8equilateral1 equicrural and scalene1' presuppose the relation of triangularity1 not it them2 and for that reason it can be considered apart from them1 though not they apart from it1 without any breach between that which is considered and that which really exists4 ,thus1 too1 it becomes explicable that a single experiment should warrant a universal affirmation2 that the mathematician1 having once found as the result of a certain comparison of magnitudes that the square on the hypothenuse is equal to the square on the sides1 without waiting for repeated experience at once substitutes for the singular proposition1 which states his discovery1 a general one4 ,if the singular proposition stated a sensible event or the occurrence of a feeling1 such substitution would be inexplicable3 for if that were the true account of the singular proposition1 a general one could but express such expectation of the recurrence of the event as repeated experience of it can alone give4 ,but a relation is not contingent with the contingency of feeling4 ,it is permanent with the permanence of the combining and comparing thought which alone constitutes it2 and for that reason1 whether it be recognised as the result of a mathematical construction or of a crucial experiment in physics1 the proposition which states it must already be virtually universal4 ,traces of progress in his idealism4 #ahe4 ,of such a doctrine ,berkeley is rather the unconscious forerunner than the intelligent prophet4 ,it is precisely upon the question whether1 or how far1 he recognised the constitution of things by intelligible relations1 that the interpretation of his early 7which is his only developed7 idealism rests4 ,is it such idealism as ,hume's1 or such idealism as that adumbrated in some passages of his own #8,siris'8 ,is the idea1 which is real1 according to him a feeling or a conception8 ,has it a nature of its own1 consisting simply in its being felt1 and which we afterwards for purposes of our own consider in various relations2 or does the nature consist only in relations1 which again imply the action of a mind that is eternal--present to that which is in succession1 but not in succession itself8 ,the truth seems to be that this question in its full significance never presented itself to ,berkeley1 at least during the period represented by his philosophical treatises4 ,his early idealism1 as we learn from the commonplace-book brought to light by ,professor ,fraser1 was merely a cruder form of ,hume's4 ,by the time of the publication of the #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge' he had learnt that1 unless this doctrine was to efface #8spirit' as well as #8matter1' he must modify it by the admission of a #8thing' that was not an #8idea1' and of which the #8esse' was #8percipere' not #8percipi4' ,this admission carried with it the distinction between the object felt and the object known1 between #8idea' and #8notion'--a distinction which was more clearly marked in the #8,dialogues4' ,of #8spirit' we could have a #8notion1' though not an #8idea4' ,but it was only in the second edition of the #8,principles' that #8relation' was put along with #8spirit1' as that which could be known but which was no #8idea3' and then without any recognition of the fact that the whole reduction of primary qualities to mere ideas was thereby invalidated4 ,the objects1 with which the mathematician deals1 are throughout treated as in their own nature #8particular ideas1' into the constitution of which relation does not enter at all2 in other words1 as successive feelings4 ,his way of dealing with physical truths4 #ahf4 ,if the truths of mathematics seemed to ,berkeley explicable on this supposition1 those of the physical sciences were not likely to seem less so4 ,as long as the relations with which these sciences deal are relations between #8sensible objects1' he does not notice that they are relations1 and therefore not feelings or felt1 at all4 ,he treats felt things as if the same as feelings1 and ignores the relations altogether4 ,thus a so-called #8sensible' motion causes him no difficulty4 ,he would be content to say that it was a succession of ideas1 not perceiving that motion implies a relation between spaces or moments as successively occupied by something that remains one with itself--a relation which a mere sequence of feelings could neither constitute nor of itself suggest4 ,it is only about a motion which does not profess to be #8seen1' such as the motion of the earth1 that any question is raised--a question easily disposed of by the consideration that in a different position we should see it4 #8,the question whether the earth moves or not amounts in reality to no more than this1 to wit1 whether we have reason to conclude from what hath been observed by astronomers1 that if we were placed in such and such circumstances1 and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun1 we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets1 and appearing in all respects like one of them3 and this by the established rules of nature1 which we have no reason to mistrust1 is reasonably collected from the phenomena' 7#8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #eh74 #a #a ,cf4 #8,dialogues1' page #adg1 in ,prof4 ,fraser's edition4 ,if they imply permanent relations1 his theory properly excludes them4 ,he supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another4 #ahg4 ,now this passage clearly does not mean--as it ought to mean if the #8esse' of the motion were the #8percipi' by us--that the motion of the earth would begin as soon as we were there to see it4 ,it means that it is now going on as an #8established law of nature1' which may be #8collected from the phenomena4' ,in other words1 it means that our successive feelings are so related to each other as determined by one present and permanent system1 on which not they only but all possible feelings depend1 that by a certain set of them we are led--not to expect a recurrence of them in like order according to the laws of association1 but1 what is the exact reverse of this--to infer that certain other feelings1 of which we have no experience1 would now occur to us if certain conditions of situation on our part were fulfilled1 because the #8ordo ad universum1' of which these feelings would be the #8ordo ad nos1' does now obtain4 ,but though ,berkeley's words mean this for us1 they did not mean it for him4 ,that such relation--merely intelligible1 or according to his phraseology not an idea or object of an idea at all1 as he must have admitted it to be--gives to our successive feelings the only #8nature' that they possess1 he never recognised4 ,by the relation of idea to idea1 as he repeatedly tells us1 he meant not a #8necessary connexion1' i4e4 not a relation without which1 neither idea would be what it is1 but such de facto sequence of one upon the other as renders the occurrence of one the unfailing but arbitrary sign that the other is coming4 ,it is thus according to him 7and here ,hume merely followed suit7 that feelings are symbolical--symbolical not of an order other than the feelings and which accounts for them1 but simply of feelings to follow4 ,to ,berkeley1 indeed1 unlike ,hume1 the sequence of feelings symbolical of each other is also symbolical of something farther1 viz4 the mind of ,god3 but when we examine what this #8mind' means1 we find that it is not an intelligible order by which our feelings may be interpreted1 or the spiritual subject of such an order1 but simply the arbitrary will of a creator that this feeling shall follow that4 ,locke had explained reality by relation of ideas to outward body4 ,liveliness in the idea evidence of this relation4 #ahh4 ,such a doctrine could not help being at once confused in its account of reality1 and insecure in its doctrine alike of the human spirit and of ,god4 ,on the recognition of relations as constituting the nature of ideas rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality4 ,an isolated idea could be neither real nor unreal4 ,apart from a definite order of relation we may suppose 7if we like7 that it would be1 but it would certainly not be real2 and as little could it be unreal1 since unreality can only result from the confusion in our consciousness of one order of relation with another4 ,it is diversity of relations that distinguishes1 for instance1 these letters as they now appear on paper from the same as ,i imagine them with my eyes shut1 giving each sort its own reality3 just as upon confusion with the other each alike becomes unreal4 ,thus1 though with ,locke simple ideas are necessarily real1 we soon find that even according to him they are not truly so in their simplicity1 but only as related to an external thing producing them4 ,he is right enough1 however inconsistent with himself1 in making relation constitute reality2 wrong in limiting this prerogative to the one relation of externality4 ,when he afterwards1 in virtual contradiction to this limitation1 finds the reality of moral and mathematical ideas just in that sole relation to the mind1 as its products1 which he had previously made the source of all unreality1 he forces upon us the explanation which he does not himself give1 that unreality does not lie in either relation as opposed to the other1 but in the confusion of any relation with another4 ,it is for lack of this explanation that ,locke himself1 as we have seen1 finds in the liveliness and involuntariness of ideas the sole and sufficient tests 7not constituents7 of their reality2 though they are obviously tests which put the dreams of a man in a fever upon the same footing with the #8impressions' of a man awake1 and would often prove that unreal after dinner which had been proved real before4 ,there is a well-known story of a man who in a certain state of health commonly saw a particular gory apparition1 but who1 knowing its origin1 used to have himself bled till it disappeared4 ,the reality of the apparition lay1 he knew1 in some relation between the circulation of his blood and his organs of sight1 in distinction from the reality existing in the normal relations of his visual organs to the light3 and in his idea1 accordingly1 there was nothing unreal1 because he did not confuse the one relation with the other4 ,locke's doctrine1 however1 would allow of no distinction between the apparition as it was for such a man and as it would be for one who interpreted it as an actual #8ghost4' ,however interpreted1 the liveliness and the involuntariness of the idea remain the same1 as does its relation to an efficient cause4 ,if in order to its reality the cause must be an #8outward body1' then it is no more real when rightly1 than when wrongly1 interpreted2 while on the ground of liveliness and involuntariness it is as real when taken for a ghost as when referred to an excess of blood in the head4 ,berkeley retains this notion1 only substituting #8,god' for #8body'4 #ahi4 ,as has been pointed out above1 it is in respect not of the #8ratio cognoscendi' but of the #8ratio essendi' that ,berkeley's doctrine of reality differs from ,locke's4 ,with him it is not as an effect of an outward body1 but as an immediate effect of ,god1 that an #8idea of sense' is real4 ,just as with ,locke real ideas and matter serve each to explain the other1 so with ,berkeley do real ideas and ,god4 ,if he is asked1 ,what is ,god8 the answer is1 ,he is the efficient cause of real ideas2 if he is asked1 ,what are real ideas8 the answer is1 ,those which ,god produces1 as opposed to those which we make for ourselves4 ,to the inevitable objection1 that this is a logical see-saw1 no effective answer can be extracted from ,berkeley but this--that we have subjective tests of the reality of ideas apart from a knowledge of their cause4 ,in his account of these ,berkeley only differs from ,locke in adding to the qualifications of liveliness and involuntariness those of #8steadiness1 order1 and coherence' in the ideas4 ,this addition may mean either a great deal or very little4 ,to us it may mean that the distinction of real and unreal is one that applies not to feelings but to the conceived relations of feelings2 not to events as such1 but to the intellectual interpretation of them4 ,the occurrence of a feeling taken by itself 7it may be truly said7 is neither coherent nor incoherent2 nor can the sequence of feelings one upon another with any significance be called coherence1 since in that case an incoherence would be as impossible as any failure in the sequence4 ,as little can we mean by such coherence an usual1 by incoherence an unusual1 sequence of feelings4 ,if we did1 every sequence not before experienced--such1 for instance1 as is exhibited by a new scientific experiment--being unusual1 would have to be pronounced incoherent1 and therefore unreal4 ,coherence1 in short1 we may conclude1 is only predicable of a system of relations1 not felt but conceived2 while incoherence arises from the attempt of an imperfect intelligence to think an object under relations which cannot ultimately be held together in thought4 ,the qualification then of #8ideas' as coherent has in truth no meaning unless #8idea' be taken to mean not feeling but conception3 and thus understood1 the doctrine that coherent ideas are 7,berkeley happily excludes the notion that they merely represent7 the real1 amounts to a clear identification of the real with the world of conception4 ,not regarding the world as a system of intelligible relations1 he could not regard ,god as the subject of it4 #aij4 ,if such idealism were ,berkeley's1 his inference from the #8ideality' of the real to spirit and ,god would be more valid than it is4 ,to have got rid of the notion that the world first exists and then is thought of--to have seen that it only really exists as thought of--is to have taken the first step in the only possible #8proof of the being of ,god1' as the self-conscious subject in relation to which alone an intelligible world can exist1 and the presence of which in us is the condition of our knowing it4 #a ,but there is nothing to show that in adopting coherence as one test1 among others1 of the reality of ideas1 he attached to it any of the significance exhibited above4 ,he adopted it from ordinary language without considering how it affected his view of the world as a succession of feelings4 ,that still remained to him a sufficient account of the world1 even when he treated it as affording intuitive certainty of a soul #8naturally immortal1' and demonstrative certainty of ,god4 ,he is not aware1 while he takes his doctrine of such certainty from ,locke1 that he has left out1 and not replaced1 the only solid ground for it which ,locke's system suggested4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #adf and #adi-aeb4 ,his view of the soul as #8naturally immortal'4 #aia4 ,the soul or self1 as he describes it1 does not differ from ,locke's #8thinking substance1' except that1 having got rid of #8extended matter' altogether1 he cannot admit with ,locke any possibility of the soul's being extended1 and1 having satisfied himself that #8time was nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in the mind1' #a he was clear that #8the soul always thinks'--since the time at which it did not think1 being abstracted from a succession of ideas1 would be no time at all4 ,a soul which is necessarily unextended and therefore #8indiscerptible1' and without which there would be no time1 he reckons #8naturally immortal4' #a #8,principles of ,human ,knowledge1' sec4 #ih4 ,endless succession of feelings is not immortality in true sense4 ,berkeley's doctrine of matter fatal to a true spiritualism2 #aib4 ,upon this the remark must occur that1 if the fact of being unextended constituted immortality1 all sounds and smells must be immortal1 and that the inseparability of time from the succession of feelings may prove that succession endless1 but proves no immortality of a soul unless there be one self-conscious subject of that succession1 identical with itself throughout it4 ,to the supposition of there being such a subject1 which ,berkeley virtually makes1 his own mode of disposing of matter suggested ready objections4 ,in ,locke1 as we have seen1 the two opposite #8things1' thinking and material1 always appear in strict correlativity1 each representing 7though he was not aware of this7 the same logical necessity of substantiation4 #8,sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances1 and reflection that there are thinking ones4' ,these are not two convictions1 however1 but one conviction1 representing one and the same essential condition of knowledge4 ,such logical necessity indeed is misinterpreted when made a ground for believing the real existence either of a multitude of independent things1 for everything is a #8retainer' to everything else2 #a or of a separation of the thinking from the material substance1 since1 according to ,locke's own showing1 they at least everywhere overlap2 #b or of an absolutely last substance1 which because last would be unknowable3 but it is evidence of the action of a synthetic principle of self-consciousness without which all reference of feelings to mutually-qualified subjects and objects1 and therefore all knowledge1 would be impossible4 ,it is idle1 however1 with ,berkeley so to ignore the action of this principle on the one side as to pronounce the material world a mere succession of feelings1 and so to take it for granted on the other as to assert that every feeling implies relation to a conscious substance4 ,upon such a method the latter assertion has nothing to rest on but an appeal to the individual's consciousness--an appeal which avails as much or as little for material as for thinking substance1 and1 in face of the apparent fact that with a knock on the head the conscious independent substance may disappear altogether1 cannot hold its own against the suggestion that the one substance no less than the other is reducible to a series of feelings1 so closely and constantly sequent on each other as to seem to coalesce4 ,we cannot substitute for this illusory appeal the valid method of an analysis of knowledge1 without finding that substantiation in matter is just as necessary to knowledge as substantiation in mind4 ,if this method had been ,berkeley's he would have found a better plan for dealing with the #8materialism' in vogue4 ,instead of trying to show that material substance was a fiction1 he would have shown that it was really a basis of intelligible relations1 and that thus all that was fictitious about it was its supposed sensibility and consequent opposition to the work of thought4 ,then his doctrine of matter would itself have established the necessity of spirit1 not indeed as substance but as the source of all substantiation4 ,as it was1 misunderstanding the true nature of the antithesis between matter and mind1 in his zeal against matter he took away the ground from under the spiritualism which he sought to maintain4 ,he simply invited a successor in speculation1 of colder blood than himself1 to try the solution of spirit in the same crucible with matter4 #a ,above1 paragraph #abe4 #b ,above1 paragraph #abg4 444 as well as to a true ,theism4 ,his inference to ,god from necessity of a power to produce ideas2 #aic4 ,his doctrine of ,god is not only open to the same objection as his doctrine of spiritual substance1 but to others which arise from the illogical restrictions that have to be put upon his notion of such substance1 if it is to represent at once the ,god of received theology and the ,god whose agency the ,berkeleian system requires as the basis of distinction between the real and unreal4 ,admitting the supposition involved in his certainty of the #8natural immortality' of the soul--the supposition that the succession of feelings which constitutes the world1 and which at no time was not1 implies one feeling substance--that substance we should naturally conclude was ,god4 ,such a ,god1 it is true 7as has been already pointed out #a71 would merely be the #b of the crudest ,pantheism1 but it is the only ,god logically admissible--if any be admissible--in an #8ideal' system of which the text is not #8the world really exists only as thought of1' but #8the world only exists as a succession of feelings4' ,it was other than a feeling substance1 however1 that ,berkeley required not merely to satisfy his religious instincts1 but to take the place held by #8outward body' with ,locke as the efficient of real ideas4 ,the reference to this feeling substance1 if necessary for any idea1 is necessary for all--for the #8fantastic' as well as for those of sense--and can therefore afford no ground for distinction between the real and unreal4 ,instead1 however1 of being thus led to a truer view of this distinction1 as in truth a distinction between the complete and incomplete conception of an intelligible world1 he simply puts the feeling substance1 when he regards it as ,god1 under an arbitrary limitation1 making it relative only to those ideas of which with ,locke #8matter' was the substance1 as opposed to those which ,locke had referred to the thinking thing4 ,the direct consequence of this limitation1 indeed1 might seem to be merely to make ,god an animal of partial1 instead of universal1 susceptibility2 but this consequence ,berkeley avoids by dropping the ordinary notion of substance altogether1 so as to represent the ideas of sense not as subsisting in ,god but as effects of ,his power--as related to ,him1 in short1 just as with ,locke ideas of sense are related to the primary qualities of matter4 #8,there must be an active power to produce our ideas1 which is not to be found in ideas themselves1 for we are conscious that they are inert1 nor in matter1 since that is but a name for a bundle of ideas2 which must therefore be in spirit1 since of that we are conscious as active2 yet not in the spirit of which we are conscious1 since then there would be no difference between real and imaginary ideas2 therefore in a ,divine ,spirit1 to whom1 however1 may forthwith be ascribed the attributes of the spirit of which we are conscious4' ,such is the sum of ,berkeley's natural theology4 #a ,above1 paragraph #ahj4 #b ,greek 7mega zoon7 great being4 ,tr4 444 a necessity which ,hume does not see4 ,a different turn should have been given to his idealism1 if it was to serve his purpose4 #aid4 ,from a follower of ,hume it of course invites the reply that he does not see the necessity of an active power at all1 to which1 since1 according to ,berkeley's own showing1 it is no possible #8idea' or object of an idea1 all his own polemic against the #8absolute idea' of matter is equally applicable2 that the efficient power1 of which we profess to be conscious in ourselves1 is itself only a name for a particular feeling or impression which precedes certain other of our impressions2 that1 even if it were more than this1 the transition from the spiritual efficiency of which we are conscious to another1 of which it is the special differentia that we are not conscious of it1 would be quite illegitimate1 and that thus in saying that certain feelings are real because1 being lively and involuntary1 they must be the work of this unknown spirit1 we in effect say nothing more than that they are real because lively and involuntary4 ,against a retort of this kind ,berkeley's theistic armour is even less proof than ,locke's4 ,his #8proof of the being of ,god' is in fact ,locke's with the sole nervus probandi left out4 ,the value of ,locke's proof1 as an argument from their being something now to their having been something from eternity1 lay1 we saw1 in its convertibility into an argument from the world as a system of relations to a present and eternal subject of those relations4 ,for its being so convertible there was this to be said1 that ,locke1 with whatever inconsistency1 at least recognised the constitution of reality by permanent relations1 though he treated the mere relation of external efficiency--that in virtue of which we say of nature that it consists of bodies outward to and acting on each other--as if it alone constituted the reality of the world4 ,berkeley's reduction of the #8primary qualities of matter' to a succession of feelings logically effaces this relation1 and puts nothing intelligible1 nothing but a name1 in its place4 ,the effacement of the distinction between the real and unreal1 which would properly ensue1 is only prevented by bringing back relation to something under the name of ,god1 either wholly unknown and indeterminate1 or else1 under a thin disguise1 determined by that very relation of external efficiency which1 when ascribed to something only nominally different1 had been pronounced a gratuitous fiction4 ,if ,berkeley had dealt with the opposition of reality to thought by showing the primary qualities to be conceived relations1 and the distinction between the real and unreal to be one between the fully and the defectively conceived1 the case would have been different4 ,the real and ,god would alike have been logically saved4 ,the peculiar embarrassment of ,locke's doctrine we have found to be that it involves the unreality of every object1 into the constitution of which there enters any idea of reflection1 or any idea retained in the mind1 as distinct from the present effect of a body acting upon us--i4e4 of every object of which anything can be said4 ,with the definite substitution of full intelligibility of relations for present sensibility1 as the true account of the real1 this embarrassment would have been got rid of4 ,at the same time there would have been implied an intelligent subject of these relations2 the ascription to whom1 indeed1 of moral attributes would have remained a further problem1 but who1 far from being a #8,great ,unknown1' would be at least determined by relation to that order of nature which is as necessary to ,him as ,he to it4 ,but in fact1 as we have seen1 the notion of the reality of relations1 not felt but understood1 only appears in ,berkeley's developed philosophy as an after-thought1 and the notion of an order of nature1 other than our feelings1 which enables us to infer what feelings that have never been felt would be1 is an unexplained intrusion in it4 ,the same is true of the doctrine1 which struggles to the surface in the ,third ,dialogue1 that the #8sensible world' is to ,god not felt at all1 but known2 that to ,him it is precisely not that which according to ,berkeley's refutation of materialism it really is--a series or collection of sensations4 ,these #8after-thoughts1' when thoroughly thought out1 imply a complete departure from ,berkeley's original interpretation of #8phenomena' as simple feelings2 but with him1 so far from being thought out1 they merely suggested themselves incidentally as the conceptions of ,god and reality were found to require them4 ,in other words1 that interpretation of phenomena1 which is necessary to any valid #8collection' from them of the existence of ,god1 only appears in him as a consequence of that #8collection' having been made4 ,to pursue the original interpretation1 so that all might know what it left of reality1 was the best way of deciding the question of its compatibility with a rational belief in ,god--a question of too momentous an interest to be fairly considered in itself4 ,thus to pursue it was the mission of ,hume4 ,hume's mission4 ,his account of impressions and ideas4 ,ideas are fainter impressions4 #aie4 ,hume begins with an account of the #8perceptions of the human mind1' which corresponds to ,locke's account of ideas with two main qualifications1 both tending to complete that dependence of thought on something other than itself which ,locke had asserted1 but not consistently maintained4 ,he distinguishes #8perceptions' 7equivalent to ,locke's ideas7 into #8impressions' and #8ideas' accordingly as they are originally produced in feeling or reproduced by memory and imagination1 and he does not allow #8ideas of reflection' any place in the original #8furniture of the mind4' #8,an impression first strikes upon the senses1 and makes us perceive heat or cold1 thirst or hunger1 pleasure or pain1 of some kind or other4 ,of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind1 which remains after the impression ceases2 and this we call an idea4 ,this idea of pleasure or pain1 when it returns upon the soul1 produces the new impressions of desire and aversion1 hope and fear1 which may properly be called impressions of reflection1 because derived from it4 ,these1 again1 are copied by the memory and imagination1 and become ideas2 which1 perhaps1 in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas2 so that the impressions are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas1 but posterior to those of sensation and derived from them' 7,part ,i4 #b74 ,he is at the same time careful to explain that the causes from which the impressions of sensation arise are unknown 7ibid471 and that by the term #8impression' he is not to be #8understood to express the manner in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul1 but merely the perceptions themselves'4 #a ,the distinction between impression and idea he treats as equivalent to that between feeling and thinking1 which1 again1 lies merely in the different degrees of #8force and liveliness' with which the perceptions1 thus designated1 severally #8strike upon the mind4' #b ,thus the rule which he emphasises #c #8that all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent1' strictly taken1 means no more than that a feeling must be more lively before it becomes less so4 ,as the reproduced perception1 or #8idea1' differs in this respect from the original one1 so1 according to the greater or less degree of secondary liveliness which it possesses1 is it called #8idea of memory1' or #8idea of imagination4' ,the only other distinction noticed is that1 as might be expected1 the comparative faintness of the ideas of imagination is accompanied by a possibility of their being reproduced in a different order from that in which the corresponding ideas were originally presented4 ,memory1 on the contrary1 #8is in a manner tied down in this respect1 without any power of variation'2 #d which must be understood to mean that1 when the ideas are faint enough to allow of variation in the order of reproduction1 they are not called #8ideas of memory4' #a p4 #cab1 note ,introduction to the ,treatise of ,human ,nature #b ,see pp4 #cbg and #cge ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 and part ,,iii4 sec4 ,,ii4 #c p4 #caj ,introduction to the ,treatise of ,human ,nature #d p4 #cah ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,iii4 #8,ideas' that cannot be so represented must be explained as mere words4 #aif4 ,all1 then1 that ,hume could find in his mind1 when after ,locke's example he #8looked into it1' were1 according to his own statement1 feelings with their copies1 dividing themselves into two main orders--those of sensation and those of reflection1 of which the latter1 though results of the former1 are not their copies4 ,the question1 then1 that he had to deal with was1 to what impressions he could reduce those conceptions of relation--of cause and effect1 substance and attribute1 and identity--which all knowledge involves4 ,failing the impressions of sensation he must try those of reflection1 and failing both he must pronounce such conceptions to be no #8ideas' at all1 but words misunderstood1 and leave knowledge to take its chance4 ,the vital nerve of his philosophy lies in his treatment of the #8association of ideas' as a sort of process of spontaneous generation1 by which impressions of sensation issue in such impressions of reflection1 in the shape of habitual propensities1' #a as will account1 not indeed for there being--since there really are not--but for there seeming to be1 those formal conceptions which ,locke1 to the embarrassment of his philosophy1 had treated as at once real and creations of the mind4 #a ,pp4 #dfj and #dif ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4 and part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,hume1 taken strictly1 leaves no distinction between impressions of reflection and of sensation4 #aig4 ,such a method meets at the outset with the difficulty that the impressions of sensation and those of reflection1 if ,locke's determination of the former by reference to an impressive matter is excluded1 are each determined only by reference to the other4 ,what is an impression of reflection8 ,it is one that can only come after an impression of sensation4 ,what is an impression of sensation8 ,it is one that comes before any impression of reflection4 ,an apparent determination1 indeed1 is gained by speaking of the original impressions as #8conveyed to us by our senses2' but this really means determination by reference to the organs of our body as affected by outward bodies--in short1 by a physical theory4 ,but of the two essential terms of this theory1 #8our own body1' and #8outward body1' neither1 according to ,hume1 expresses anything present to the original consciousness4 #8,properly speaking1 it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members1 but certain impressions which enter by the senses4' ,nor do any of our impressions #8inform us of distance and outness 7so to speak7 immediately1 and without a certain reasoning and experience'4 #a ,in such admissions ,hume is as much a ,berkeleian as ,berkeley himself1 and they effectually exclude any reference to body from those original impressions1 by reference to which all other modes of consciousness are to be explained4 #a p4 #dha ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,locke's theory of sensation disappears4 ,physiology won't answer the question that ,locke asked4 #aih4 ,he thus logically cuts off his psychology from the support which1 according to popular conceptions1 its primary truths derive from physiology4 ,we have already noticed how with ,locke metaphysic begs defence of physic2 #a how1 having undertaken to answer by the impossible method of self-observation the question as to what consciousness is to itself at its beginning1 he in fact tells us what it is to the natural philosopher1 who accounts for the production of sensation by the impact of matter #8on the outward parts1 continued to the brain4' ,to those1 of course1 who hold that the only possible theory of knowledge and of the human spirit is physical1 it must seem that this was his greatest merit2 that1 an unmeaning question having been asked1 it was the best thing to give an answer which indeed is no answer to the question1 but has some elementary truth of its own4 ,according to them1 though he may have been wrong in supposing consciousness to be to itself what the physiologist explains it to be--since any supposition at all about it except as a phenomenon1 to which certain other phenomena are invariably antecedent1 is at best superfluous--he was not wrong in taking the physiological explanation to be the true and sufficient one4 ,to such persons we can but respectfully point out that they have not come in sight of the problem which ,locke and his followers1 on however false a method1 sought to solve2 that1 however certain may be the correlation between the brain and thought1 in the sense that the individual would be incapable of the processes of thought unless he had brain and nerves of a particular sort1 yet it is equally certain that every theory of the correlation must presuppose a knowledge of the processes1 and leave that knowledge exactly where it was before2 that thus their science1 valuable like every other science within its own department1 takes for granted just what metaphysic1 as a theory of knowledge1 seeks to explain4 ,when the origin1 for instance1 of the conception of body or of that of an organic structure is in question1 it is in the strictest sense preposterous to be told that body makes the conception of body1 and that unless the brain were organic to thought ,i should not now be thinking4 #8,the brain is organic to thought2' here is a proposition involving conceptions within conceptions--a whole hierarchy of ideas4 ,how am ,i enabled to re-think these in order1 to make my way from the simpler to the more complex1 by any iteration or demonstration of the proposition1 which no one disputes1 or by the most precise examination of the details of the organic structure itself8 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ag4 ,those who think it will don't understand the question4 #aii4 ,the quarrel of the physiologist with the metaphysician is1 in fact1 due to an ignorantia elenchi on the part of the former1 for which the behaviour of ,english #8metaphysicians1' in attempting to assimilate their own procedure to that of the natural philosophers1 and thus to win the popular acceptance which these alone can fairly look for1 has afforded too much excuse4 ,the question really at issue is not between two co-ordinate sciences1 as if a theory of the human body were claiming also to be a theory of the human soul1 and the theory of the soul were resisting the aggression4 ,the question is1 whether the conceptions which all the departmental sciences alike presuppose shall have an account given of them or no4 ,for dispensing with such an account altogether 7life being short7 there is much to be said1 if only men would or could dispense with it2 but the physiologist1 when he claims that his science should supersede metaphysic1 is not dispensing with it1 but rendering it in a preposterous way4 ,he accounts for the formal conceptions in question1 in other words for thought as it is common to all the sciences1 as sequent upon the antecedent facts which his science ascertains--the facts of the animal organisation4 ,but these conceptions--the relations of cause and effect1 c4--are necessary to constitute the facts4 ,they are not an ex post facto interpretation of them1 but an interpretation without which there would be no ascertainable facts at all4 ,to account for them1 therefore1 as the result of the facts is to proceed as a geologist would do1 who should treat the present conformation of the earth as the result of a certain series of past events1 and yet1 in describing these1 should assume the present conformation as a determining element in each4 ,hume's psychology will not answer it either4 #bjj4 #8,empirical psychology1' however1 claims to have a way of its own for explaining thought1 distinct from that of the physiologist1 but yet founded on observation1 though it is admitted that the observation takes place under difficulties4 ,its method consists in a history of consciousness1 as a series of events or successive states observed in the individual by himself4 ,by tracing such a chain of de facto sequence it undertakes to account for the elements common to all knowledge4 ,its first concern1 then1 must be1 as we have previously put it1 to ascertain what consciousness is to itself at its beginning4 ,no one with ,berkeley before him1 and accepting ,berkeley's negative results1 could answer this question in ,locke's simple way by making the primitive consciousness report itself as an effect of the operation of body4 ,to do so is to transfer a later and highly complex form of consciousness1 whose growth has to be traced1 into the earlier and simple form from which the growth is supposed to begin4 ,this1 upon the supposition that the process of consciousness by which conceptions are formed is a series of psychical events--a supposition on which the whole method of empirical psychology rests--is in principle the same false procedure as that which we have imagined in the case of a geologist above4 ,but the question is whether1 by any procedure not open to this condemnation1 the theory could seem to do what it professes to do--explain thought or #8cognition by means of conceptions' as something which happens in sequence upon previous psychical events4 ,does it not1 however stated1 carry with it an implication of the supposed later state in the earlier1 and is it not solely in virtue of this implication that it seems to be able to trace the genesis of the later8 ,no one has pursued it with stricter promises1 or made a fairer show of being faithful to them1 than ,hume4 ,he will begin with simple feeling1 as first experienced by the individual--unqualified by complex conceptions1 physical or metaphysical1 of matter or of mind--and trace the process by which it generates the #8ideas of philosophical relation4' ,if it can be shown1 as we believe it can be1 that1 even when thus pursued1 its semblance of success is due to the fact that1 by interpreting the earliest consciousness in terms of the latest1 it puts the latter in place of the former1 some suspicion may perhaps be created that a natural history of self-consciousness1 and of the conceptions by which it makes the world its own1 is impossible1 since such a history must be of events1 and self-consciousness is not reducible to a series of events2 being already at its beginning formally1 or potentially1 or implicitly all that it becomes actually or explicitly in developed knowledge4 ,it only seems to do so by assuming the #8fiction' it has to account for2 by assuming that impression represents a real world4 #bja4 ,if ,hume were consistent in allowing no other determination to the impression than that of its having the maximum of vivacity1 or to other modes of consciousness than the several degrees of their removal from this maximum1 he would certainly have avoided the difficulties which attend ,locke's use of the metaphor of impression1 while at the same time he would have missed the convenience1 involved in this use1 of being able to represent the primitive consciousness as already a recognition of a thing impressing it1 and thus an #8idea of a quality of body4' ,but at the outset he remarks that #8the examination of our sensations' 7i4e4 our impressions of sensation7 #8belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral1' and that for that reason he shall begin not with them but with ideas4 #a ,now this virtually means that he will begin1 indeed1 with the feelings he finds in himself1 but with these as determined by the notion that they are results of something else1 of which the nature is not for the present explained4 ,thus1 while he does not1 like ,locke1 identify our earliest consciousness with a rough and ready physical theory of its cause1 he gains the advantage of this identification in the mind of his reader1 who from sensation1 thus apparently defined1 transfers a definiteness to the ideas and secondary impressions as derived from it1 though in the sequel the theory turns out1 if possible at all1 to be at best a remote result of custom and association4 ,we shall see this more clearly if we look back to the general account of impressions and ideas quoted above4 #8,an impression first strikes upon the senses and makes us perceive pleasure or pain1 of which a copy is taken by the mind1' called an idea4 ,now if we set aside the notion of a body making impact upon a sensuous1 and through it upon a mental1 tablet1 pleasure or pain is the impression1 which1 again1 is as much or as little in the mind as the idea4 ,thus the statement might be re-written as follows3--#8,pleasure or pain makes the mind perceive pleasure or pain1 of which a copy is taken by the mind4' ,this1 of course1 is nonsense2 but between this nonsense and the plausibility of the statement as it stands1 the difference depends on the double distinction understood in the latter--the distinction 7a7 between the producing cause of the impression and the impression produced2 and 7b7 between the impression as produced on the senses1 and the idea as preserved by the mind4 ,this passage1 as we shall see1 is only a sample of many of the same sort4 ,throughout1 however explicitly ,hume may give warning that the difference between impression and idea is only one of liveliness1 however little he may scruple in the sequel to reduce body and mind alike to the succession of feelings1 his system gains the benefit of the contrary assumption which the uncritical reader is ready to make for him4 ,as often as the question returns whether a phrase1 purporting to express an #8abstract conception1' expresses any actual idea or no1 his test is1 #8,point out the impression from which the idea1 if there be any1 is derived'--a test which has clearly no significance if the impression is merely the idea itself at a livelier stage 7for a person1 claiming to have the idea1 would merely have to say that he had never known it more lively1 and that1 therefore1 it was itself an impression1 and the force of the test would be gone71 but which seems so satisfactory because the impression is regarded as the direct effect of outward things1 and thus as having a prerogative of reality over any perception to which the mind contributes anything of its own4 ,by availing himself alternately of this popular conception of the impression of sensation and of his own account of it1 he gains a double means of suppressing any claim of thought to originate4 ,every idea1 by being supposed in a more lively state1 can be represented as derived from an impression1 and thus 7according to the popular notion7 as an effect of something which1 whatever it is1 is not thought4 ,if thereupon it is pointed out that this outward something is a form of substance which1 according to ,hume's own showing1 is a fiction of thought1 there is an easy refuge open in the reply that #8impression' is only meant to express a lively feeling1 not any dependence upon matter of which we know nothing4 #a p4 #cag ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,iii4 ,so the #8,positivist' juggles with #8phenomena'4 #bjb4 ,thus the way is prepared for the juggle which the modern popular logic performs with the word #8phenomenon'--a term which gains acceptance for the theory that turns upon it because it conveys the notion of a relation between a real order and a perceiving mind1 and thus gives to those who avail themselves of it the benefit of an implication of the #8noumena' which they affect to ignore4 ,hume's inconsistency1 however1 stops far short of that of his later disciples4 ,for the purpose of detraction from the work of thought he availed himself1 indeed1 of that work as embodied in language1 but only so far as was necessary to his destructive purpose4 ,he did not seriously affect to be reconstructing the fabric of knowledge on a basis of fact4 ,there occasionally appears in him1 indeed1 something of the charlatanry of common sense in passages1 more worthy of ,bolingbroke than himself1 where he writes as a champion of facts against metaphysical jargon4 ,but when we get behind the mask of concession to popular prejudice1 partly ironical1 partly due to his undoubted vanity1 we find much more of the ancient sceptic than of the #8positive philosopher4' ,essential difference1 however1 between ,hume and the #8,positivist'4 #bjc4 ,the ancient sceptic 7at least as represented by the ancient philosophers71 finding knowledge on the basis of distinction between the real and apparent to be impossible1 discarded the enterprise of arriving at general truth in opposition to what appears to the individual at any particular instant1 and satisfied himself with noting such general tendencies of expectation and desire as would guide men in the conduct of life and enable them to get what they wanted by contrivance and persuasion4 #a ,such a state of mind excludes all motive to the #8interrogation of nature1' for it recognises no #8nature' but the present appearance to the individual2 and this does not admit of being interrogated4 ,the #8positive philosopher' has nothing in common with it but the use1 in a different sense1 of the word #8apparent4' ,he plumes himself1 indeed1 on not going in quest of any #8thing-in-itself' other than what appears to the senses2 but he distinguishes between a real and apparent in the order of appearance1 and considers the real order of appearance1 having a permanence and uniformity which belong to no feeling as the individual feels it1 to be the true object of knowledge4 ,no one is more severe upon #8propensities to believe1' however spontaneously suggested by the ordinary sequence of appearances1 if they are found to conflict with the order of nature as ascertained by experimental interrogation2 i4e4 with a sequence observed 7it may be7 in but a single instance4 ,which of the two attitudes of thought is the more nearly ,hume's1 will come out as we proceed4 ,it was just with the distinction between the #8real and fantastic1' as ,locke had left it1 that he had to deal2 and1 as will appear1 it is finally by a #8propensity to feign1' not by a uniform order of natural phenomena1 that he replaces the real which ,locke1 according to his first mind1 had found in archetypal things and their operations on us4 #a ,cf4 ,plato's #8,protagoras1' #cbc1 and #8,theaetetus1' #afg1 with the concluding paragraphs of the last part of the first book of ,hume's #8,treatise on ,human ,nature4' ,he adopts ,berkeley's doctrine of ideas1 but without ,berkeley's saving suppositions1 #bjd4 ,we have seen that ,berkeley1 having reduced #8simple ideas' to their simplicity by showing the illegitimacy of the assumption that they report qualities of a matter which is itself a complex idea1 is only able to make his constructive theory march by the supposition of the reality and knowability of #8spirit' and relations4 #8,ideas' are #8fleeting1 perishable passions2' but the relations between them are uniform1 and in virtue of this uniformity the fleeting idea may be interpreted as a symbol of a real order4 ,but such relations1 as real1 imply the presence of the ideas to the constant mind of ,god1 and1 as knowable1 their presence to a like mind in us4 ,we have further seen how little ,berkeley1 according to the method by which he disposed of #8abstract general ideas1' was entitled to such a supposition4 ,hume sets it aside2 but the question is1 whether without a supposition virtually the same he can represent the association of ideas as doing the work that he assigned to it4 444 in regard to #8spirit'1 #bje4 ,his exclusion of ,berkeley's supposition with regard to #8spirit' is stated without disguise1 though unfortunately not till towards the end of the first book of the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature1' which could not have run so smoothly if the statement had been made at the beginning4 ,it follows legitimately from the method1 which he inherited1 of #8looking into his mind to see how it wrought4' #8,from what impression1' he asks1 #8could the idea of self be derived8 ,it must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea4 ,but self or person is not any impression1 but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference4 ,if any impression gives rise to the idea of self1 that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole course of our lives1 since self is supposed to exist after that manner4 ,but there is no impression constant and invariable4 ,pain and pleasure1 grief and joy1 passions and sensations succeed each other1 and never all exist at the same time4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 be from any of these impressions1 or from any other1 that the idea of self is derived2 and1 consequently1 there is no such idea4' ,again3 #8,when ,i enter most intimately into what is called myself1 ,i always stumble on some particular perception of heat or cold1 light or shade1 love or hatred1 pain or pleasure4 ,i never can catch myself at any time without a perception1 and never can observe anything but the perception4 ,when my perceptions are removed for any time1 as by sound sleep1 so long am ,i insensible of myself1 and may truly be said not to exist4' ,thus #8men are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions that succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity1 and are in a perpetual flux or movement4 ,our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions4 ,our thought is still more variable than our sight4 444 nor is there any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same perhaps for one moment4444 ,there is properly no simplicity in the mind at one time nor identity at different'4 #a #a pp4 #ecc and #ecd ,book ,i41 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi4 444 in regard to relations4 ,his account of these4 #bjf4 ,his position in regard to ideas of relation cannot be so summarily exhibited4 ,it is from its ambiguity1 indeed1 that his system derives at once its plausibility and its weakness4 ,in the first place1 it is necessary1 according to him1 to distinguish between #8natural' and #8philosophical relation4' ,the latter is one of which the idea is acquired by the comparison of objects1 as distinct from natural relation or #8the quality by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination1 and the one naturally' 7i4e4 according to the principle of association7 #8introduces the other'4 #a ,of philosophical relation--or1 according to another form of expression1 of #8qualities by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced'--seven kinds are enumerated2 viz4 #8resemblance1 identity1 relations of time and place1 proportion in quantity and number1 degrees in quality1 contrariety1 and causation'4 #b ,some of these do1 some do not1 apparently correspond to the qualities by which the mind is naturally #8conveyed from one idea to another2' or which1 in other words1 constitute the #8gentle force' that determines the order in which the imagination habitually puts together ideas4 ,freedom in the conjunction of ideas1 indeed1 is implied in the term #8imagination1' which is only thus differenced from #8memory2' but1 as a matter of fact1 it commonly only connects ideas which are related to each other in the way either of resemblance1 or of contiguity in time and place1 or of cause and effect4 ,other relations of the philosophical sort are the opposite of natural4 ,thus1 #8distance will be allowed by philosophers to be a true relation1 because we acquire an idea of it by the comparing of objects2 but in a common way we say1 8that nothing can be more distant than such or such things from each other2 nothing can have less relation0' 7ibid474 #a p4 #cbb ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 #b ibid41 and p4 #cgb ,book ,i41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 ,it corresponds to ,locke's account of the sorts of agreement between ideas4 #bjg4 ,hume's classification of philosophical relations evidently serves the same purpose as ,locke's1 of the #8four sorts of agreement or disagreement between ideas1' in the perception of which knowledge consists2 #a but there are some important discrepancies4 ,locke's second sort1 which he awkwardly describes as #8agreement or disagreement in the way of relation1' may fairly be taken to cover three of ,hume's kinds2 viz4 relations of time and place1 proportion in quantity or number1 and degrees in any quality4 ,about ,locke's first sort1 #8identity and diversity1' there is more difficulty4 ,under #8identity1' as was pointed out above1 he includes the relations which ,hume distinguishes as #8identity proper' and #8resemblance4' #8,diversity' at first sight might seem to correspond to #8contrariety2' but the latter1 according to ,hume's usage1 is much more restricted in meaning4 ,difference of number and difference of kind1 which he distinguishes as the opposites severally of identity and resemblance1 though they come under ,locke's #8diversity1' are not by ,hume considered relations at all1 on the principle that #8no relation of any kind can subsist without some degree of resemblance4' ,they are #8rather a negation of relation than anything real and positive4' #8,contrariety' he reckons only to obtain between ideas of existence and non-existence1 #8which are plainly resembling as implying both of them an idea of the object2 though the latter excludes the object from all times and places in which it is supposed not to exist'4 #b ,there remain #8cause and effect' in ,hume's list2 #8co-existence' and #8real existence' in ,locke's4 #8,co-existence' is not expressly identified by ,locke with the relation of cause and effect1 but it is with #8necessary connection4' ,it means specially1 it will be remembered #c1 the co-existence of ideas1 not as constituents of a #8nominal essence1' but as qualities of real substances in nature2 and our knowledge of this depends on our knowledge of necessary connection between the qualities1 either as one supposing the other 7which is the form of necessary connection between primary qualities71 or as one being the effect of the other 7which is the form of necessary connection between the ideas of secondary qualities and the primary ones74 ,having no knowledge of necessary connection as in real substances1 we have none of #8co-existence' in the above sense1 but only of the present union of ideas in any particular experiment4 #d ,the parallel between this doctrine of ,locke's and ,hume's of cause and effect will appear as we proceed4 ,to #8real existence1' since the knowledge of it according to ,locke's account is not a perception of agreement between ideas at all1 it is not strange that nothing should correspond in ,hume's list of relations4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #be and the passages from ,locke there referred to4 #b p4 #cbc ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 #c ,see above1 paragraph #abb4 #d ,locke1 ,book ,,iv4 sec4 iii4 chap4 xiv42 and above1 paragraph #aba and #abb4 ,could ,hume consistently admit idea of relation at all8 #bjh4 ,it is his method of dealing with these ideas of philosophical relation that is specially characteristic of ,hume1 ,let us1 then1 consider how the notion of relation altogether is affected by his reduction of the world of consciousness to impressions and ideas4 ,what is an impression8 ,to this1 as we have seen1 the only direct answer given by him is that it is a feeling which must be more lively before it becomes less so4 #a ,for a further account of what is to be understood by it we must look to the passages where the governing terms of #8school-metaphysics' are1 one after the other1 shown to be unmeaning1 because not taken from impressions4 ,thus1 when the idea of substance is to be reduced to an #8unintelligible chimaera1' it is asked whether it #8be derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection8 ,if it be conveyed to us by our senses1 ,i ask1 which of them1 and after what manner8 ,if it be perceived by the eyes1 it must be a colour2 if by the ears1 a sound2 if by the palate1 a taste2 and so of the other senses4 ,but ,i believe none will assert that substance is either a colour1 or a sound1 or a taste4 ,the idea of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection1 if it really exist4 ,but the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions'4 #b ,from the polemic against abstract ideas we learn further that #8the appearance of an object to the senses' is the same thing as an #8impression becoming present to the mind'4 #c ,that is to say1 when we talk of an impression of an object1 it is not to be understood that the feeling is determined by reference to anything other than itself3 it is itself the object4 ,to the same purpose1 in the criticism of the notion of an external world1 we are told that #8the senses are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continued existence of their objects1 after they no longer appear to the senses2 for that is a contradiction in terms' 7since the appearance is the object72 and that #8they offer not their impressions as the images of something distinct1 or independent1 or external1 because they convey to us nothing but a single perception1 and never give us the least intimation of anything beyond'4 #d ,the distinction between impression of sensation and impression of reflection1 then1 cannot1 any more than that between impression and idea1 be regarded as either really or apparently a distinction between outer and inner4 #8,all impressions are internal and perishing existences'2 #e and1 #8everything that enters the mind being in reality as the impression1 'tis impossible anything should to feeling appear different'4 #f #a ,see above1 paragraphs #aie and #aig4 #b p4 #cbd ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vi4 #c p4 #cbg ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vii4 #d p4 #dgi ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #e p4 #dhc ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #f p4 #dhj ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #bji4 ,this amounts to a full acceptance of ,berkeley's doctrine of sense2 and the question necessarily arises--such being the impression1 and all ideas being impressions grown weaker1 can there be an idea of relation at all8 ,is it not open to the same challenge which ,hume offers to those who talk of an idea of substance or of spirit8 #8,it is from some one impression that every real idea is derived4' ,what1 then1 is the one impression from which the idea of relation is derived8 #8,if it be perceived by the eyes1 it must be a colour2 if by the ears1 a sound2 if by the palate1 a taste2 and so of the other senses4' ,there remain #8our passions and emotions2' but what passion or emotion is a resemblance1 or a proportion1 or a relation of cause and effect8 ,only in regard to identity and causation that he sees any difficulty4 ,these he treats as fictions resulting from #8natural relations' of ideas3 i4e4 from resemblance and contiguity4 #baj4 ,respect for ,hume's thoroughness as a philosopher must be qualified by the observation that he does not attempt to meet this difficulty in its generality1 but only as it affects the relations of identity and causation4 ,the truth seems to be that he wrote with ,berkeley steadily before his mind2 and it was ,berkeley's treatment of these two relations in particular as not sensible but intelligible1 and his assertion of a philosophic ,theism on the strength of their mere intelligibility1 that determined ,hume1 since it would have been an anachronism any longer to treat them as sensible1 to dispose of them altogether4 ,the condition of his doing so with success was that1 however unwarrantably1 he should treat the other relations as sensible4 ,the language1 which seems to express ideas of the two questionable relations1 he has to account for as the result of certain impressions of reflection1 called #8propensities to feign1' which in their turn have to be accounted for as resulting from the natural relations of ideas according to the definition of these quoted above1 #a as #8the qualities by which one idea habitually introduces another4' ,among these1 as we saw1 he included not only resemblance and contiguity in time or place1 but #8cause and effect4' #8,there is no relation1' he says1 #8which produces a stronger connection in the fancy than this4' ,but in this1 as in much of the language which gives the first two ,parts their plausibility1 he is taking advantage of received notions on the part of the reader1 which it is the work of the rest of the book to set aside4 ,in any sense1 according to him1 in which it differs from usual contiguity1 the relation of cause and effect is itself reducible to a #8propensity to feign' arising from the other natural relations2 but when the reader is told of its producing #8a strong connection in the fancy1' he is not apt to think of it as itself nothing more than the product of such a connection4 ,for the present1 however1 we have only to point out that ,hume1 when he co-ordinates it with the other natural relations1 must be understood to do so provisionally4 ,according to him it is derived1 while they are primary4 ,upon them1 then1 rested the possibility of filling the gap between the occurrence of single impressions1 none #8determined by reference to anything other than itself1' and what we are pleased to call our knowledge1 with its fictions of mind and thing1 of real and apparent1 of necessary as distinct from usual connection4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #bjf4 #baa4 ,we will begin with ,resemblance4 ,as to this1 it will be said1 it is an affectation of subtlety to question whether there can be an impression of it or no4 ,the difficulty only arises from our regarding the perception of resemblance as different from1 and subsequent to1 the resembling sensations2 whereas1 in fact1 the occurrence of two impressions of sense1 such as 7let us say7 yellow and red1 is itself the impression of their likeness and unlikeness4 ,hume himself1 it may be further urged1 at any rate in regard to resemblance1 anticipates this solution of an imaginary difficulty by his important division of philosophical relations into two classes #a--#8such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together1 and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas'--and by his inclusion of resemblance in the former class4 #a p4 #cgb ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 ,is resemblance then an impression8 #bab4 ,now we gladly admit the mistake of supposing that sensations undetermined by relation first occur1 and that afterwards we become conscious of their relation in the way of likeness or unlikeness4 ,apart from such relation1 it is true1 the sensations would be nothing4 ,but this admission involves an important qualification of the doctrine that impressions are single1 and that the mind 7according to ,hume's awkward figure7 is a #8bundle or collection of these1' succeeding each other #8in a perpetual flux or movement4' ,it implies that the single impression in its singleness is what it is through relation to another1 which must therefore be present along with it2 and that thus1 though they may occur in a perpetual flux of succession--every turn of the eyes in their sockets1 as ,hume truly says1 giving a new one--yet1 just so far as they are qualified by likeness or unlikeness to each other1 they must be taken out of that succession by something which is not itself in it1 but is indivisibly present to every moment of it4 ,this we may call soul1 or mind1 or what we will2 but we must not identify it with the brain #a either directly or by implication 7as we do when we #8refer to the anatomist' for an account of it71 since by the brain is meant something material1 i4e4 divisible1 which the unifying subject spoken of1 as feeling no less than as thinking1 cannot be4 ,in short1 any such modification of ,hume's doctrine of the singleness and successiveness of impressions as will entitle us to speak of their carrying with them1 though single and successive1 the consciousness of their resemblance to each other1 will also entitle us to speak of their carrying with them a reference to that which is not itself any single impression1 but is permanent throughout the impressions2 and the whole ground of ,hume's polemic against the idea of self or spirit is removed4 #b #a ,it is1 of course1 quite a different thing to say that the brain 7or1 more properly1 the whole body7 is organic to it4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #bje4 ,distinction between resembling feelings and idea of resemblance4 #bac4 ,the above admission1 however1 does not dispose of the question about ideas of resemblance4 ,a feeling qualified by relation of resemblance to other feelings is a different thing from an idea of that relation--different with all the difference which ,hume ignores between feeling and thought1 between consciousness and self-consciousness4 ,the qualification of successive feelings by mutual relation implies1 indeed1 the presence to them of a subject permanent and immaterial 7i4e4 not in time or space72 but it does not imply that this subject presents them to itself as related objects1 permanent with its own permanence1 which abide and may be considered apart from #8the circumstances in time' of their occurrence4 ,yet such presentation is supposed by all language other than interjectional4 ,it is it alone which can give us names of things1 as distinct from noises prompted by the feelings as they occur4 ,of course it is open to any one to say that by an idea of resemblance he does not mean any thought involving the self-conscious presentation spoken of1 but merely a feeling qualified by resemblance1 and not at its liveliest stage4 ,thus ,hume tells us that by #8idea' he merely means a feeling less lively than it has been1 and that by idea of anything he implies no reference to anything other than the idea1 #a but means just a related idea1 i4e4 a feeling qualified by #8natural relation' to other feelings4 ,it is by this thoughtful abnegation of thought1 as we shall find1 that he arrives at his sceptical result4 ,but language 7for the reason mentioned7 would not allow him to be faithful to the abnegation4 ,he could not make such a profession without being false to it4 ,this appears already in his account of #8complex' and #8abstract' ideas4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #bjh4 ,substances collections of ideas4 #bad1 ,his account of the idea of a substance #a is simply ,locke's1 as ,locke's would become upon elimination of the notion that there is a real #8something' in which the collection of ideas subsist1 and from which they result4 ,it thus avoids all difficulties about the relation between nominal and real essence4 ,just as ,locke says that in the case of a #8mixed mode' the nominal essence is the real1 so ,hume would say of a substance4 ,the only difference is that while the collection of ideas1 called a mixed mode1 does not admit of addition without a change of its name1 that called a substance does4 ,upon discovery of the solubility of gold in aqua regia we add that idea to the collection1 to which the name #8gold' has previously been assigned1 without disturbance in the use of the name1 because the name already covers not only the ideas of certain qualities1 but also the idea of a #8principle of union' between them1 which will extend to any ideas presented along with them4 ,as this principle of union1 however1 is not itself any #8real essence1' but #8part of the complex idea1' the question1 so troublesome to ,locke1 whether a proposition about gold asserts real co-existence or only the inclusion of an idea in a nominal essence1 will be superfluous4 ,how the #8principle of union' is to be explained1 will appear below4 #b #a p4 #cbd ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vi4 #b ,paragraph #cjc1 and the following4 ,how can ideas #8in flux' be collected8 #bae4 ,there are names1 then1 which represent #8collections of ideas4' ,how can we explain such collection if ideas are merely related feelings grown' fainter8 ,do we1 when we use one of these names significantly1 recall1 though in a fainter form1 a series of feelings that we have experienced in the process of collection8 ,does the chemist1 when he says that gold is soluble in aqua regia1 recall the visual and tactual feeling which he experienced when he found it soluble8 ,if so1 as that feeling took its character from relation to a multitude of other #8complex ideas1' he must on the same principle recall in endless series the sensible occurrences from which each constituent of each constituent of these was derived2 and a like process must be gone through when gold is pronounced ductile1 malleable1 c4 ,but this would be1 according to the figure which ,hume himself adopts1 to recall a #8perpetual flux4' ,the very term #8collection of ideas1' indeed1 if this be the meaning of ideas1 is an absurdity1 for how can a perpetual flux be collected8 ,if we turn for a solution of the difficulty to the chapter where ,hume expressly discusses the significance of general names1 we shall find that it is not the question we have here put1 and which flows directly from his account of ideas1 that he is there treating1 but an entirely different one1 and one that could not be raised till for related feeling had been substituted the thought of an object under relations4 ,are there general ideas8 ,berkeley said1 #8yes and no'4 #baf4 ,the chapter mentioned concerns the question which arises out of ,locke's pregnant statement that words and ideas are #8particular in their existence' even when #8general in their signification4' ,from this statement we saw #a that ,berkeley derived his explanation of the apparent generality of ideas--the explanation1 namely1 which reduces it to a relation1 yet not such a one as would affect the nature of the idea itself1 which is and remains #8particular1' but a symbolical relation between it and other particular ideas for which it is taken to stand4 ,an idea1 however1 that carries with it a consciousness of symbolical relation to other ideas1 cannot but be qualified by this relation4 ,the generality must become part of its #8nature1' and1 accordingly1 the distinction between idea and thing being obliterated1 of the nature of things4 ,thus ,berkeley virtually arrives at a result which renders unmeaning his preliminary exclusion of universality from #8the absolute1 positive nature or conception of anything4' ,hume seeks to avoid it by putting #8custom' in the place of the consciousness of symbolical relation4 ,true to his vocation of explaining away all functions of thought that will not sort with the treatment of it as #8decaying sense1' he would resolve that idea of a relation between certain ideas1 in virtue of which one is taken to stand for the rest1 into the de facto sequence upon one of them of the rest4 ,here1 as everywhere else1 he would make related feelings do instead of relations of ideas2 but whether the related feelings1 as he is obliged to describe them1 do not already presuppose relations of ideas in distinction from feelings1 remains to be seen4 #a ,above1 paragraphs #ahb and #ahc4 ,hume #8no' simply4 ,how he accounts for the appearance of there being such4 #bag4 ,the question about #8generality of signification1' as he puts it1 comes to this4 ,in every proposition1 though its subject be a common noun1 we necessarily present to ourselves some one individual object #8with all its particular circumstances and proportions4' ,how then can the proposition be general in denotation and connotation8 ,how can it be made with reference to a multitude of individual objects other than that presented to the mind1 and how can it concern only such of the qualities of the latter as are common to the multitude8 ,the first part of the question is answered as follows3-#8,when we have found a resemblance among several objects that often occur to us1 we apply the same name to all of them 444 whatever differences may appear among them4 ,after we have acquired a custom of this kind1 the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects1 and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances and proportions4 ,but as the same word is supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals1 that are different in many respects from that idea which is immediately present to the mind1 the word not being able to revive the idea of all these individuals1 only touches the soul and revives that custom which we have acquired by surveying them4 ,they are not really and in fact present to the mind1 but only in power4 444 ,the word raises up an individual idea along with a certain custom1 and that custom produces any other individual one for which we may have occasion4 444 ,thus1 should we mention the word triangle and form the idea of a particular equilateral one to correspond to it1 and should we afterwards assert that the three angles of a triangle are equal to each other1 the other individuals of a scalenum and isosceles1 which we overlooked at first1 immediately crowd in upon us and make us perceive the falsehood of this proposition1 though it be true with relation to that idea which we had formed'4 #a #a p4 #cbh ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vii4 #bah4 ,next1 as to the question concerning connotation3--#8,the mind would never have dreamed of distinguishing a figure from the body figured1 as being in reality neither distinguishable nor different nor separable1 did it not observe that even in this simplicity there might be contained many different resemblances and relations4 ,thus1 when a globe of white marble is presented1 we receive only the impression of a white colour disposed in a certain form1 nor are we able to distinguish and separate the colour from the form4 ,but observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white1 and comparing them with our former object1 we find two separate resemblances in what formerly seemed1 and really is1 perfectly inseparable4 ,after a little more practice of this kind1 we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by a distinction of reason2--i4e4 we consider the figure and colour together1 since they are1 in effect1 the same and indistinguishable2 but still view them in different aspects according to the resemblances of which they are susceptible4 444 ,a person who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour1 desires an impossibility2 but his meaning is1 that we should consider the colour and figure together1 but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble or that to any other globe whatever'4 #a #a p4 #ccc ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vii4 ,his account implies that #8ideas' are conceptions1 not feelings4 #bai4 ,it is clear that the process described in these passages supposes #8ab initio' the conversion of a feeling into a conception2 in other words1 the substitution of the definite individuality of a thing1 thought of under attributes1 for the mere singleness in time of a feeling that occurs after another and before a third4 ,the #8finding of resemblances and differences among objects that often occur to us' implies that each object is distinguished as one and abiding from manifold occurrences1 in the way of related feelings1 in which it is presented to us1 and that these accordingly are regarded as representing permanent relations or qualities of the object4 ,thus from being related feelings1 whether more or less #8vivacious1' they have become1 in the proper sense1 ideas of relation4 ,the difficulty about the use of general names1 as ,hume puts it1 really arises just from the extent to which this process of determination by ideas of relation1 and with it the removal of the object of thought from simple feeling1 is supposed to have gone4 ,it is because the idea is so complex in its individuality1 and because this qualification is not understood to be the work of thought1 by comparison and contrast accumulating attributes on an object which it itself constitutes1 but is regarded as given ready-made in an impression 7i4e4 a feeling71 that the question arises whether a general proposition is really possible or no4 ,to all intents and purposes ,hume decides that it is not4 ,the mind is so tied down to the particular collection of qualities which is given to it or which it #8finds1' that it cannot present one of them to itself without presenting all4 ,having never found a triangle that is not equilateral or isosceles or scalene1 we cannot imagine one1 for ideas can only be copies of impressions1 and the imagination1 though it has a certain freedom in combining what it finds1 can invent nothing that it does not find4 ,thus the idea1 represented by a general name and of which an assertion1 general in form1 is made1 must always have a multitude of other qualities besides those common to it with the other individuals to which the name is applicable4 ,if any of these1 however1 were included in the predicate of the proposition1 the sleeping custom1 which determines the mind to pass from the idea present to it to the others to which the name has been applied1 would be awakened1 and it would be seen at once that the predicate is not true of them4 ,when ,i make a general statement about #8the horse1' there must be present to my mind some particular horse of my acquaintance1 but if on the strength of this ,i asserted that #8the horse is a grey-haired animal1' the custom of applying the name without reference to colour would return upon me and correct me--as it would not if the predicate were #8four-footed4' ,he virtually yields the point in regard to the predicate of propositions4 #bbj4 ,it would seem then that the predicate may1 though the subject cannot1 represent either a single quality1 or a set of qualities which falls far short even of those common to the class1 much more of those which characterise any individual4 ,if ,i can think these apart1 or have an idea of them1 as the predicate of a proposition1 why not 7it may be asked7 as the subject8 ,it may be said1 indeed1 with truth1 that it is a mistake to think of the subject as representing one idea and the predicate another2 that the proposition as a whole represents one idea1 in the sense of a conception of relation between attributes1 and that at bottom this account of it is consistent with ,locke's definition of knowledge as a perception of relation between #8ideas1' since with him #8ideas' and #8qualities' are used interchangeably4 #a ,it is no less true1 however1 that the relation between attributes1 which the proposition states1 is a relation between them in an individual subject4 ,it is the nature of the individuality of this subject1 then1 that is really in question4 ,must it1 as ,hume supposed1 be #8considered' under other qualities than those to which the predicate relates8 ,when the proposition only concerns the relation between certain qualities of a spherical figure1 must the figure still be considered as of a certain colour and material8 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ag4 ,as to the subject1 he equivocates between singleness of feeling and individuality of conception4 #bba4 ,the possibility of such a question being raised implies that the step has been already taken1 which ,hume ignored1 from feeling to thought4 ,his doctrine on the matter arises from that mental equivocation1 of which the effects on ,locke have been already noticed1 #a between the mere singleness of a feeling in time and the individuality of the object of thought as a complex of relations4 ,if the impression is the single feeling which disappears with a turn of the head1 and the idea a weaker impression1 every idea must indeed be in one sense #8individual1' but in a sense that renders all predication impossible because it empties the idea of all content4 ,really1 according to ,hume's doctrine of general names1 it is individual in a sense which is the most remote opposite of this1 as a multitude of #8different resemblances and relations' in #8simplicity4' ,it is just such an individual as ,locke supposed to be found 7so to speak7 ready-made in nature1 and from which he supposed the mind successively to abstract ideas less and less determinate4 ,such an object ,hume1 coming after ,berkeley1 could not regard in ,locke's fashion as a separate material existence outside consciousness4 ,the idea with him is a #8copy' not of a thing but of an #8impression1' but to the impression he transfers all that individualization by qualities which ,locke had ascribed to the substance found in nature2 and from the impression again transfers it to the idea which #8is but the weaker impression4' ,thus the singleness in time of the impression becomes the #8simplicity' of an object #8containing many different resemblances and relations1' and the individuality of the subject of a proposition1 instead of being regarded in its true light as a temporary isolation from other relations of those for the time under view--an individuality which is perpetually shifting its limits as thought proceeds--becomes an individuality fixed once for all by what is given in the impression4 ,because1 as is supposed1 ,i can only #8see' a globe as of a certain colour and material1 ,i can only think of it as such4 ,if the #8sight' of it had been rightly interpreted as itself a complex work of thought1 successively detaching felt things from the #8flux' of feelings and determining these by relations similarly detached1 the difficulty of thinking certain of these--e4g4 those designated as #8figure'--apart from the rest would have disappeared4 ,it would have been seen that this was merely to separate in reflective analysis what had been gradually put together in the successive synthesis of perception4 ,but such an interpretation of the supposed datum of sense would have been to elevate thought from the position which ,hume assigned to it1 as a #8decaying sense1' to that of being itself the organizer of the world which it knows4 #b #a ,see above1 paragraphs #dg1 #ie1 c4 #b ,the phrase #8decaying sense' belongs to ,hobbes1 but its meaning is adopted by ,hume4 ,result is a theory which admits predication1 but only as singular4 #bbb4 ,here1 then1 as elsewhere1 the embarrassment of ,hume's doctrine is nothing which a better statement of it could avoid4 ,nay1 so dexterous is his statement1 that only upon a close scrutiny does the embarrassment disclose itself4 ,to be faithful at once to his reduction of the impression to simple feeling1 and to his account of the idea as a mere copy of the impression1 was really impossible4 ,if he had kept his word in regard to the impression1 he must have found thought filling the void left by the disappearance1 under ,berkeley's criticism1 of that outward system of things which ,locke had commonly taken for granted4 ,he preferred fidelity to his account of the idea1 and thus virtually restores the fiction which represents the real world as consisting of so many1 materially separate1 bundles of qualities--a fiction which even ,locke in his better moments was beginning to outgrow--with only the difference that for the separation of #8substances' in space he substitutes a separation of #8impressions' in time4 ,that thought 7the #8idea'7 can but faintly copy feeling 7the #8impression'7 he consistently maintains1 but he avails himself of the actual determination of feeling by reference to an object of thought--the determination expressed by such phrases as impression of a man1 impression of a globe1 c4--to charge the feeling with a content which it only derives from such determination1 while yet he denies it4 ,by this means predication can be accounted for1 as it could not be if our consciousness consisted of mere feelings and their copies1 but only in the form of the singular proposition2 because the object of thought determined by relations1 being identified with a single feeling1 must be limited by the #8this' or #8that' which expresses this singleness of feeling4 ,it is really this or that globe1 this or that man1 that is the subject of the proposition1 according to ,hume1 even when in form it is general4 ,it is true that the general name #8globe' or #8man' not merely represents a #8particular' globe or man1 though that is all that is presented to the mind1 but also #8raises up a custom which produces any other individual idea for which we may have occasion4' ,as this custom1 however1 is neither itself an idea nor affects the singleness of the subject idea1 it does not constitute any distinction between singular and general propositions1 but only between two sorts of the singular proposition according as it does1 or does not1 suggest an indefinite series of other singular propositions1 in which the same qualities are affirmed of different individual ideas to which the subject-name has been applied4 ,all propositions restricted in same way as ,locke's propositions about real existence4 #bbc4 ,a customary sequence1 then1 of individual ideas upon each other is the reality1 which through the delusion of words 7as we must suppose7 has given rise to the fiction of there being such a thing as general knowledge4 ,we say #8fiction1' for with the possibility of general propositions1 as the ,greek philosophers once for all pointed out1 stands or falls the possibility of science4 ,locke was so far aware of this that1 upon the same principle which led him to deny the possibility of general propositions concerning real existence1 he #8suspected' a science of nature to be impossible1 and only found an exemption for moral and mathematical truth from this condemnation in its #8bare ideality4' ,hume does away with the exemption4 ,he applies to all propositions alike the same limitation which ,locke applies to those concerning real existence4 ,with ,locke there may very well be a proposition which to the mind1 as well as in form1 is general--one of which the subject is an #8abstract general idea'--but such proposition #8concerns not existence4' ,as knowledge of real existence is limited to the #8actual present sensation1' so a proposition about such existence is limited to what is given in such sensation4 ,it is a real truth that this piece of gold is now being dissolved in aqua regia1 when the #8particular experiment' is going on under our eyes1 but the general proposition #8gold is soluble' is only an analysis of a nominal essence4 ,with ,hume the distinction between propositions that do1 and those that do not1 #8concern existence' disappears4 ,every proposition is on the same footing in this respect1 since it must needs be a statement about an #8idea1' and every idea exists4 #8,every object that is presented must necessarily be existent4 444 ,whatever we conceive1 we conceive to be existent4 ,any idea we please to form is the idea of a being2 and the idea of a being is any idea we please to form'4 #a ,but since1 according to him1 the idea cannot be separated1 as ,locke supposed it could1 from the conditions #8that determine it to this or that particular existence1' propositions of the sort which ,locke understood by #8general propositions concerning substances1' though if they were possible they would #8concern existence' as much as any1 are simply impossible4 ,hume1 in short1 though he identifies the real and nominal essences which ,locke had distinguished1 yet limits the nominal essence by the same #8particularity in space and time' by which ,locke had limited the real4 #a p4 #cgj ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,vi4 ,the question1 how the singular proposition is possible1 the vital one4 #bbd4 ,a great advance in simplification has been made when the false sort of #8conceptualism' has thus been got rid of--that conceptualism which opposes knowing and being under the notion that things1 though merely individual in reality1 may be known as general4 ,this riddance having been achieved1 as it was by ,hume1 the import of the proposition becomes the central question of philosophy1 the answer to which must determine our theory of real existence just as much as of the mind4 ,the issue may be taken on the proposition in its singular no less than in its general form4 ,the weakness of ,hume's opponents1 indeed1 has lain primarily in their allowing that his doctrine would account for any significant predication whatever1 as distinct from exclamations prompted by feelings as they occur4 ,this has been the inch1 which once yielded1 the full ell of his nominalism has been easily won2 just as ,locke's empiricism becomes invincible as soon as it is admitted that qualified things are #8found in nature' without any constitutive action of the mind4 ,as the only effective way of dealing with ,locke is to ask1--,after abstraction of all that he himself admitted to be the creation of thought1 what remains to be merely found8--so ,hume must be met in limine by the question whether1 apart from such ideas of relation as according to his own showing are not simple impressions1 so much as the singular proposition is possible4 ,if not1 then the singularity of such proposition does not consist in any singleness of presentation to sense2 it is not the #8particularity in time' of a present feeling2 and the exclusion of generality1 whether in thoughts or in things1 as following from the supposed necessity of such singleness or particularity1 is quite groundless4 ,not relations of resemblance only1 but those of quantity also1 treated by ,hume as feelings4 #bbe4 ,hitherto the idea of relation which we have had specially in view has been that of relation in the way of resemblance1 and the propositions have been such as represent the most obvious #8facts of observation'--facts about this or that #8body1' man or horse or ball4 ,we have seen that these already suppose the thought of an object qualified1 not transitory as are feelings1 but one to which feelings are referred on their occurrence as resemblances or differences between it and other objects2 but that by an equivocation1 which unexamined phraseology covers1 between the thought of such an object and feeling proper--as if because we talk of seeing a man1 therefore a man were a feeling of colour--,hume is able to represent them as mere data of sense1 and thus to ignore the difference between related feelings and ideas of relation4 ,thus the first step has been taken towards transferring to the sensitive subject1 as merely sensitive1 the power of thought and significant speech4 ,the next is to transfer to it ideas of those other relations #a which ,hume classifies as #8relations of time and place1 proportion in quantity or number1 degrees in any quality'4 #b ,this done1 it is sufficiently equipped for achieving its deliverance from metaphysics4 ,an animal1 capable of experiments concerning matter of fact1 and of reasoning concerning quantity and number1 would certainly have some excuse for throwing into the fire all books which sought to make it ashamed of its animality4 #c #a ,the course which our examination of ,hume should take was marked out1 it will be remembered1 by his enumeration of the #8natural' relations that regulate the association of ideas4 ,it might seem a departure from this course to proceed1 as in the text1 from the relation of resemblance to #8relations of time and place1 proportion in quantity or number1 and degrees of any quality1' since these appear in ,hume's enumeration1 not of #8natural' but of #8philosophical' relations4 ,such departure1 however1 is the consequence of ,hume's own procedure4 ,whether he considered these relations merely equivalent to the #8natural ones' of resemblance and contiguity1 he does not expressly say2 but his reduction of the principles of mathematics to data of sense implies that he did so4 ,the treatment of degrees in quality and proportions in quantity as sensible implies that the difference between resemblance and measured resemblance1 between contiguity and measured contiguity1 is ignored4 #b p4 #cfh ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 #c ,if we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school-metaphysics1 for instance1 let us ask1 ,does it contain any abstract reasoning for quantity or number8 ,no4 ,does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence8 ,no4 ,commit it then to the flames1 for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion4'--#8,inquiry concerning the ,human ,understanding1' at the end4 ,he draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point as ,locke2 but is more definite as to probability1 #bbf4 ,in thus leaving mathematics and a limited sort of experimental physics 7limited by the exclusion of all general inference from the experiment7 out of the reach of his scepticism1 and in making them his basis of attack upon what he conceived to be the more pretentious claims of knowledge1 ,hume was again following the course marked out for him by ,locke4 ,it will be remembered that ,locke1 even when his #8suspicion' of knowledge is at its strongest1 still finds solid ground 7a7 in #8particular experiments' upon nature1 expressed in singular propositions as opposed to assertions of universal or necessary connexion1 and 7b7 in mathematical truths which are at once general1 certain1 and instructive1 because #8barely ideal4' ,all speculative propositions that do not fall under one or other of these heads are either #8trifling' or merely #8probable4' ,hume draws the line between certainty and probability at the same point1 nor in regard to the ground of certainty as to #8matter of fact or existence' is there any essential difference between him and his master4 ,as this ground is the #8actual present sensation' with the one1 so it is the #8impression' with the other2 and it is only when the proposition becomes universal or asserts a necessary connection1 that the certainty1 thus given1 is by either supposed to fail4 ,it is true that with ,locke this authority of the sensation is a derived authority1 depending on its reference to a #8body now operating upon us1' while with ,hume1 so far as he is faithful to his profession of discarding such reference1 it is original4 ,but with each alike the fundamental notion is that a feeling must be #8true while it lasts1' and that in regard to real existence or matter of fact no other truth can be known but this4 ,neither perceives that a truth thus restricted is no truth at all--nothing that can be stated even in a singular proposition2 that the #8particularity in time1' on which is supposed to depend the real certainty of the simple feeling1 is just that which deprives it of significance #a--;because neither is really faithful to the restriction4 ,each allows himself to substitute for the momentary feeling an object qualified by relations1 which are the exact opposite of momentary feelings4 #8,if ,i myself see a man walk on the ice1' says ,locke 7,,iv1 xv4 #e71 #8it is past probability1 it is knowledge3' nor would ,hume1 though ready enough on occasion to point out that what is seen must be a colour1 have any scruple in assuming that such a complex judgment as the above so-called #8sight' has the certainty of a simple impression4 ,it is only in bringing to bear upon the characteristic admission of ,locke's ,fourth ,book1 that no general knowledge of nature can be more than probable1 a more definite notion of what probability is1 and in exhibiting the latent inconsistency of this admission with ,locke's own doctrine of ideas as effects of a causative substance1 that he modifies the theory of physical certainty which he inherited4 ,in their treatment of mathematical truths on the other hand1 of propositions involving relations of distance1 quantity and degree1 a fundamental discrepancy appears between the two writers4 ,the ground of certainty1 which ,hume admits in regard to propositions of this order1 must be examined before we can appreciate his theory of probability as it affects the relations of cause and substance4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #de and #ig4 444 and does not admit opposition of mathematical to physical certainty--here following ,berkeley4 #bbg4 ,it has been shown #a that ,locke's opposition of mathematical to physical certainty1 with his ascription to the former of instructive generality on the ground of its bare ideality--the #8ideal' in this regard being opposed to what is found in sensation--strikes at the very root of his system4 ,it implies that thought can originate1 and that what it originates is in some sort real--nay1 as being nothing else than the #8primary qualities of matter1' is the source of all other reality4 ,here was an alien element which #8empiricism' could not assimilate without changing its character4 ,carrying such a conception along with it1 it was already charged with an influence which must ultimately work its complete transmutation by compelling1 not the admission of an ideal world of guess and aspiration alongside of the empirical1 but the recognition of the empirical as itself ideal ,the time for this transmutation1 however1 was not yet4 ,berkeley1 in over-hasty zeal for ,god1 had missed that only true way of finding ,god in the world which lies in the discovery that the world is ,thought4 ,having taken fright at the #8mathematical ,atheism1' which seemed to grow out of the current doctrines about primary qualities of matter1 instead of applying ,locke's own admissions to show that these were intelligible and merely intelligible1 he fancied that he had won the battle for ,theism by making out that they were merely feelings or sequences of feelings4 ,from him ,hume got the text for all he had to say against the metaphysical mathematicians2 but1 for the reason that ,hume applied it with no theological interest1 its true import becomes more apparent with him than with ,berkeley4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #aag and #abe4 ,his criticisms of the doctrine of primary qualities4 #bbh4 ,his account of mathematical truths1 as contained in ,part ,,ii4 of the ,first ,book of the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature1' cannot be fairly read except in connection with the chapters in ,part ,,iv4 on #8,scepticism with regard to the ,senses1' and on #8the ,modern ,philosophy4' ,the latter chapter is expressly a polemic against ,locke's doctrine of primary qualities1 and its drift is to reverse the relations which ,locke had asserted between them and sensations1 making the primary qualities depend on sensations1 instead of sensations on the primary qualities4 ,in ,locke himself we have found that two inconsistent views on the subject perpetually cross each other4 #a ,according to one1 momentary sensation is the sole conveyance to us of reality2 according to the other1 the real is constituted by qualities of bodies which not only #8are in them whether we perceive them or not1' but which only complex ideas of relation can represent4 ,the unconscious device which covered this inconsistency lay1 we found1 #b in the conversion of the mere feeling of touch into the touch of a body1 and thus into an experience of solidity4 ,by this conversion1 since solidity according to ,locke's account carries with it all the primary qualities1 these too become data of sensation1 while yet1 by the retention of the opposition between them and ideas1 the advantage is gained of apparently avoiding that identification of what is real with simple feeling1 which science and common sense alike repel4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #ii and following4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #aja4 ,it will not do to oppose bodies to our feeling when only feeling can give idea of body4 #bbi4 ,hume makes a show of getting rid of this see-saw4 ,instead of assuming at once the reality of sensation on the strength of its relation to the primary qualities and the reality of these on the strength of their being given in tactual experience1 he pronounces sensations alone the real1 to which the primary qualities must be reduced1 if they are not to disappear altogether4 #8,if colours1 sounds1 tastes1 and smells be merely perceptions1 nothing we can conceive is possessed of a real1 continued1 and independent existence'4 #a ,that they are perceptions is of course undoubted4 ,the question is1 whether there is a real something beside and beyond them1 contrast with which is implied in speaking of them as #8merely perceptions4' ,the supposed qualities of such a real are #8motion1 extension1 and solidity'4 #b ,to modes of these the other primary qualities enumerated by ,locke are reducible2 and of these again motion and extension1 according to ,locke's account no less than ,hume's own1 presuppose solidity4 ,what then do we assert of the real1 in contrast with which we talk of perception1 as mere perception1 when we say that it is solid8 #8,in order to form an idea of solidity we must conceive two bodies pressing on each other without any penetration4 444 ,now1 what idea do we form of these bodies8 444 ,to say that we conceive them as solid is to run on ad infinitum4 ,to affirm that we paint them out to ourselves as extended1 either resolves them all into a false idea or returns in a circle2 extension must necessarily be conceived either as coloured1 which is a false idea1 #c or as solid1 which brings us back to the first question4' ,of solidity1 then1 the ultimate determination of the supposed real1 there is #8no idea to be formed' apart from those perceptions to which1 as independent of our senses1 it is opposed4 #8,after exclusion of colours1 sounds1 heat and cold from the rank of external existences1 there remains nothing which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body4' #a p4 #eac ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,iv4 #b ,ibid4 #c #8,a false idea1' that is1 according to the doctrine that extension is a primary quality1 while colour is only an idea of a secondary quality1 not resembling the quality as it is in the thing4 ,locke's shuffle of #8body1' #8solidity1' and #8touch1' fairly exposed4 #bcj4 ,our examination of ,locke has shown us how it is that his interpretation of ideas by reference to body is fairly open to this attack4 ,it is so because1 in thus interpreting them1 he did not know what he was really about4 ,he thought he was explaining ideas of sense according to the only method of explanation which he recognises--the method of resolving complex into simple ideas1 and of #8sending a man to his senses' for a knowledge of the simple4 ,in fact1 however1 when he explained ideas of sense as derived from the qualities of body1 he was explaining simple ideas by reference to that which1 according to his own showing1 is a complex idea4 ,to say that1 as ,locke understood the derivation in question1 the primary qualities are an to the ideas of secondary qualities1 but not an #a--that without our having ideas of them they cause those ideas of sense from which afterwards our ideas of the primary qualities are formed--is to suppose an order of reality other than the order of our sensitive experience1 and thus to contradict ,locke's fundamental doctrine that the genesis of ideas is to be found by observing their succession in #8our own breasts4' ,it is not thus that ,locke himself escapes the difficulty4 ,as we have seen1 he supposes our ideas of sense to be from the beginning ideas of the qualities of bodies1 and virtually justifies the supposition by sending the reader to his sense of touch for that idea of solidity in which1 as he defines it1 all the primary qualities are involved4 ,that the sense in question does not really yield the idea is what ,hume points out when he says that1 #8though bodies are felt by means of their solidity1 yet the feeling is quite a different thing from the solidity1 nor have they the least resemblance to each other4' ,in other words1 having come to suppose that there are solid bodies1 we explain our feeling as due to their solidity2 but we may not at once interpret feeling as the result of solidity1 and treat solidity as itself a feeling4 ,it was by allowing himself so to treat it that ,locke disguised from himself the objection to his interpretation of feeling4 ,hume tears off the disguise1 and in effect gives him the choice of being convicted either of reasoning in a circle or of explaining the simple idea by reference to the complex4 ,the solidity1 which is to explain feeling1 can itself only be explained by reference to body4 ,if body is only a complex of ideas of sense1 in referring tactual feeling to it we are explaining a simple idea by reference to a compound one4 ,if it is not1 how is it to be defined except in the #8circular' way1 which ,locke in fact adopts when he makes body a #8texture of solid parts' and solidity a relation of bodies8 #b #a ,greek 7aition geneseos7 cause of coming-to-be1 7aition gnoseos7 cause of being known4 ,tr4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #aja4 ,true rationale of ,locke's doctrine4 #bca4 ,this #8vicious circle' was nothing of which ,locke need have been ashamed1 if only he had understood and avowed its necessity4 ,body is to solidity and to the primary qualities in general simply as a substance to the relations that determine it2 and the #8circle' in question merely represents the logical impossibility of defining a substance except by relations1 and of defining these relations without presupposing a substance4 ,it was only ,locke's confusion of the order of logical correlation with the sequence of feelings in time1 that laid him open to the charge of making body and the ideas of primary qualities1 and again the latter ideas and those of secondary qualities1 at once precede and follow each other4 ,to avoid this confusion by recognising the logical order--the order of intellectual #8fictions'--as that apart from which the sequence of feelings would be no order of knowable reality at all1 would be of course impossible for one who took ,locke's antithesis of thought and fact for granted4 ,the time for that was not yet4 ,a way of escape had first to be sought in a more strict adherence to ,locke's identification of the sequence of feelings with the order of reality4 ,hence ,hume's attempt1 reversing ,locke's derivation of ideas of sense from primary qualities of body1 to derive what with ,locke had been primary qualities1 as compound impressions of sense1 from simple impressions and to reduce body itself to a name not for any #8just and consistent idea1' but for a #8propensity to feign1' the gradual product of custom and imagination4 ,the question by which the value of such derivation and reduction is to be tried is our old one1 whether it is not a tacit conversion of the supposed original impressions into qualities of body that alone makes them seem to yield the result required of them4 ,if the ,fourth ,book of the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature1' with its elimination of the idea of body1 had come before the second1 would not the plausibility of the account of mathematical ideas contained in the latter have disappeared8 ,and conversely1 if these ideas had been reduced to that which upon elimination of the idea of body they properly become1 would not that #8propensity to feign1' which is to take the place of the excluded idea1 be itself unaccountable8 ,with ,hume #8body' logically disappears4 ,what then8 #bcb4 #8,after exclusion of colours1 sounds1 heat and cold1 from the rank of external existences1 there remains nothing which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body4' ,now1 no one can #8exclude them from the rank of external existences' more decisively than ,hume4 ,they are impressions1 and #8all impressions are internal and perishing existences1 and appear as such4' ,nor does he shirk the consequence1 that we have no #8just and consistent idea of body4' ,it is true that we cannot avoid a #8belief in its existence'--a belief which according to ,hume consists in the supposition of #8a continued existence of objects when they no longer appear to the senses1 and of their existence as distinct from the mind and perceptions2' in other words1 as #8external to and independent of us4' ,this belief1 however1 as he shows1 is not given by the senses4 ,that we should feel the existence of an object to be continued when we no longer feel it1 is a contradiction in terms2 nor is it less so1 that we should feel it to be distinct from the feeling4 ,we cannot1 then1 have an impression of body2 and1 since we cannot have an idea which does not correspond to an impression or collection of impressions1 it follows that we can have no idea of it4 ,how the #8belief in its existence' is accounted for by ,hume in the absence of any idea of it1 is a question to be considered later4 #a ,our present concern is to know whether the idea of extension can hold its ground when the idea of body is excluded4 #a ,see below1 paragraph #cjc1 and foll4 ,can space survive body8 ,hume derives idea of it from sight and feeling4 ,significance with him of such derivation4 #bcc4 #8,the first notion of space and extension1' he says1 #8is derived solely from the senses of sight and feeling3 nor is there anything but what is coloured or tangible that has parts disposed after such a manner as to convey the idea4' ,now1 there may be a meaning of #8derivation1' according to which no one would care to dispute the first clause of this sentence4 ,those who hold that really1 i4e4 for a consciousness to which the distinction between real and unreal is possible1 there is no feeling except such as is determined by thought1 are yet far from holding that the determination is arbitrary2 that any and every feeling is potentially any and every conception4 ,of the feelings to which the visual and tactual nerves are organic1 as they would be for a merely feeling consciousness1 nothing1 they hold1 can be said2 in that sense they are an 2 #a but for the thinking consciousness1 or 7which is the same7 as they really are1 these feelings do1 while those to which other nerves are organic do not1 form the specific possibility of the conception of space4 ,according to this meaning of the words1 all must admit that #8the first notion of space and extension is derived from the senses of sight and feeling2' though it does not follow that a repeated or continued activity of either sense is necessary to the continued presence of the notion4 ,with ,hume1 however1 the derivation spoken of must mean that the notion of space is1 to begin with1 simply a visual or tactual feeling1 and that such it remains1 though with indefinite abatement and revival in the liveliness of the feeling1 according to the amount of which it is called #8impression' or #8idea4' ,if we supposed him to mean1 not that the notion of space was either a visual or tactual feeling indifferently1 but that it was a compound result of both1 #b we should merely have to meet a further difficulty as to the possibility of such composition of feelings when their inward synthesis in a soul1 and the outward in a body1 have been alike excluded4 ,in the next clause of the sentence1 however1 we find that for visual and tactual feelings there are quietly substituted #8coloured and tangible objects1 having parts so disposed as to convey the idea of extension4' ,it is in the light of this latter clause that the uncritical reader interprets the former4 ,he reads back the plausibility of the one into the other1 and1 having done so1 finds the whole plausible4 ,now this plausibility of the latter clause arises from its implying a three-fold distinction--a distinction of colour or tangibility on the one side from the disposition of the parts on the other2 a distinction of the colour1 tangibility and disposition of parts alike from an object to which they belong2 and a distinction of this object from the idea that it conveys4 ,in other words1 it supposes a negative answer to the three following questions3--,is the idea of extension the same as that of colour or tangibility8 ,is it possible without reference to something other than a possible impression8 ,is the idea of extension itself extended8 ,yet to the two latter questions1 according to ,hume's express statements1 the answer must be affirmative2 nor can he avoid the affirmative answer to the first1 to which he would properly be brought1 except by equivocation4 #a ,greek 7apeiron7 unlimited1 indefinite or infinite4 ,tr4 #b ,it is not really in this sense that the impression of space according to ,hume is a #8compound' one1 as will appear below4 ,it means1 in effect1 that colour and space are the same1 and that feeling may be extended4 #bcd4 ,the pices justificatives for this assertion are not far to seek4 ,some of them have been adduced already4 ,the idea of space1 like every other idea1 must be a #8copy of an impression4' #a ,to speak of a feeling in its fainter stage as an #8image' of what it was in its livelier stage may1 indeed1 seem a curious use of terms2 but in this sense only1 according to ,hume's strict doctrine1 can the idea of space be spoken of as an #8image' of anything at all4 ,the impression from which it is derived1 i4e4 the feeling at its liveliest1 cannot properly be so spoken of1 for #8no impression is presented by the senses as the image of anything distinct1 or external1 or independent4' #b ,if no impression is so presented1 neither can any idea1 which copies the impression1 be so4 ,it can involve no reference to anything which does not come and go with the impression4 ,accordingly no distinction is possible between space on the one hand1 and either the impression or idea of it on the other4 ,all impressions and ideas that can be said to be of extension must be themselves extended2 and conversely1 as ,hume puts it1 #8all the qualities of extension are qualities of a perception4' ,it should follow that space is either a colour or feeling of touch4 ,in the terms which ,hume himself uses with reference to #8substance1' #8if it be perceived by the eyes1 it must be colour2 if by the ears1 a sound2 and so on1 of the other senses4' ,as he expressly tells us that it is #8perceived by the eyes1' the conclusion is inevitable4 #a ,p4 #cdj ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #b ,p4 #dgi ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,the parts of space are parts of a perception4 #bce4 ,hume does not attempt to reject the conclusion directly4 ,he had too much eye to the appearance of consistency for that4 ,but1 in professing to admit it1 he wholly alters its significance4 ,the passage in question must be quoted at length4 #8,the table1 which just now appears to me1 is only a perception1 and all its qualities are qualities of a perception4 ,now1 the most obvious of all its qualities is extension4 ,the perception consists of parts4 ,these parts are so situated as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity1 of length1 breadth1 and thickness4 ,the termination of these three dimensions is what we call figure4 ,the figure is moveable1 separable1 and divisible4 ,mobility and separability are the distinguishing properties of extended objects4 ,and1 to cut short all disputes1 the very idea of extension is copied from nothing but an impression1 and consequently must perfectly agree to it4 ,to say the idea of extension agrees to anything is to say it is extended4' ,thus #8there are impressions and ideas that are really extended4' #a #a ,p4 #ebc ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 ,yet the parts of space are co-existent not successive4 #bcf4 ,in order to a proper appreciation of this passage it is essential to bear in mind that ,hume1 so far as the usages of language would allow him1 ignores all such differences in modes of consciousness as the ,germans indicate by the distinction between #8,empfindung' and #8,vorstellung1' and by that between #8,anschauung' and #8,begriff2' or1 more properly1 that he expressly merges them in a mode of consciousness for which1 according to the most consistent account that can be gathered from him1 the most natural term would be #8feeling4' #a ,it is true that ,hume himself1 admitting a distinction in the degree of vivacity with which this consciousness is at different times presented1 inclines to restrict the term #8feeling' to its more vivacious stage1 and to use #8perception' as the more general term1 applicable whatever the degree of vivacity may be4 #b ,we must not allow him1 however1 in using this term to gain the advantage of a meaning which popular theory does1 but his does not1 attach to it4 #8,perception' with him covers #8idea' as well as #8impression2' but nothing can be said of idea that cannot be said of impression1 save that it is less lively1 nor of impression that cannot be said of idea1 save that it is more so4 ,it is this explicit reduction of all consciousness virtually1 if not in name1 to feeling that brings to the surface the difficulties latent in ,locke's #8idealism4' ,these we have already traced at large2 but they may be summed up in the question1 ,how can feelings1 as #8particular in time' or 7which is the same7 in #8perpetual flux1' constitute or represent a world of permanent relations8 #c ,the difficulty becomes more obvious1 though not more real1 when the relations in question are not merely themselves permanent1 like those between natural phenomena1 but are #8relations between permanent parts1' like those of space4 ,it is for this reason that its doctrine about geometry has always been found the most easily assailable point of the #8sensational' philosophy4 ,locke distinguishes the ideas of space and of duration as got1 the one #8from the permanent parts of space1' the other #8from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts of succession4' #d ,he afterwards prefers the term #8expansion' to space1 as the opposite of duration1 because it brings out more clearly the distinction of a relation between permanent parts from that between #8fleeting successive parts which never exist together4' ,how1 then1 can a consciousness consisting simply of #8fleeting successive parts' either be or represent that of which the differentia is that its parts are permanent and co-exist8 #a ,as implying no distinction from1 or reference to1 a thing causing and a subject experiencing it4 ,see above1 paragraphs #aie and #bjh1 and the passages there referred to4 #b #8,to hate1 to love1 to think1 to feel1 to see2 all this is nothing but to perceive4' p4 #cga ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv44 #8,when ,i shut my eyes and think of my chamber1 the ideas ,i form are exact representations of the impressions ,i felt4' p4 #cab ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,i44 #c ,see above1 paragraphs #agb #agf4 #d ,essay ,book ,,ii4 chap4 xiv4 sec4 #a4 ,hume cannot make space a #8perception' without being false to his own account of perception2 #bcg4 ,if this crux had been fairly faced by ,hume1 he must have seen that the only way in which he could consistently deal with it was by radically altering1 with whatever consequence to the sciences1 ,locke's account of space4 ,as it was1 he did not face it1 but--whether intentionally or only in effect--disguised it by availing himself of the received usages of language1 which roughly represent a theory the exact opposite of his own1 to cover the incompatibility between the established view of the nature of space1 and his own reduction of it to feeling4 ,a very little examination of the passage1 quoted at large above1 will show that while in it a profession is made of identifying extension and a certain sort of perception with each other1 its effect is not really to reduce extension to such a perception as ,hume elsewhere explains all perceptions to be1 but to transfer the recognised properties of extension which with such reduction would disappear1 to something which for the time he chooses to reckon a perception1 but which he can only so reckon at the cost of contradicting his whole method of dealing with the ideas of ,god1 the soul1 and the world4 ,the passage1 in fact1 is merely one sample of the continued shuffle by which ,hume on the one hand ascribes to feeling that intelligible content which it only derives from relation to objects of thought1 and on the other disposes of these objects because they are not feelings4 444 as appears if we put #8feeling' for #8perception' in the passages in question4 #bch4 #8,the table1 which just now appears to me1 is only a perception1 and all its qualities are qualities of a perception4 ,now1 the most obvious of all its qualities is extension4 ,the perception consists of parts4 ,these parts are so situated as to afford us the notion of distance and contiguity1 of length1 breadth1 and thickness1' c41 c4 ,if1 now1 throughout this statement 7as according to ,hume's doctrine we are entitled to do7 we write feeling for #8perception' and #8notion1' it will appear that this table is a feeling1 which has another feeling1 called extension1 as one of its qualities2 and that this latter feeling consists of parts4 ,these1 in turn1 must be themselves feelings1 since the parts of which a perception consists must be themselves perceived1 and1 being perceived1 must1 according to ,hume1 be themselves perceptions which feelings4 ,these feelings1 again1 afford us other feelings of certain relations--distance and contiguity1 c4--feelings which1 as ,hume's doctrine allows of no distinction between the feeling and that of which it is the feeling1 must be themselves relations4 ,thus it would seem that a feeling may have another feeling as one of its qualities2 that the feeling1 which is thus a quality1 has other feelings as its co-existent parts2 and that the feelings which are parts #8afford us' other feelings which are relations4 ,is that sense or nonsense8 ,to make sense of them1 we must take perception to mean perceived thing1 #bci4 ,to this a follower of ,hume1 if he could be brought to admit the legitimacy of depriving his master of the benefit of synonyms1 might probably reply1 that the apparent nonsense only arises from our being unaccustomed to such use of the term #8feeling2' that the table is a #8bundle of feelings1' actual and possible1 of which the actual one of sight suggests a lively expectation1 easily confused with the presence1 of the others belonging to the other senses2 that any one of these may be considered a quality of the total impression formed by all2 that the feeling thus considered1 if it happens to be visual1 may not improperly be said to consist of other feelings1 as a whole consists of parts1 since it is the result of impressions on different parts of the retina1 and from a different point of view even itself to be the relation between the parts1 just as naturally as a mutual feeling of friendship may be said either to consist of the loves of the two parties to the friendship1 or to constitute the relation between them4 ,such language represents those modern adaptations of ,hume1 which retain his identification of the real with the felt but ignore his restrictions on the felt4 ,undoubtedly1 if ,hume allowed us to drop the distinction between feeling as it might be for a merely feeling consciousness1 and feeling as it is for a thinking consciousness1 the objection to his speaking of feeling in those terms1 in which it must be spoken of if extension is to be a feeling1 would disappear2 but so1 likewise1 would the objection to speaking of thought as constitutive of reality4 ,to appreciate his view we must take feeling not as we really know it--for we cannot know it except under those conditions of self-consciousness1 the logical categories1 which in his attempt to get at feeling1 pure and simple1 ,hume is consistent enough to exclude--but as it becomes upon exclusion of all determination by objects which ,hume reckons fictitious4 ,what it would thus become positively we of course cannot say1 for of the unknowable nothing can be said2 but we can decide negatively what it cannot be4 ,can that in any case be said of it1 which must be said of it if a feeling may be extended1 and if extension is a feeling8 ,can it be such a quality of an object1 so consisting of parts1 and such a relation1 as we have found that ,hume takes it to be in his account of the perception of this table8 444 which it can only mean as the result of certain #8fictions'4 #bdj4 ,after having taken leave throughout the earlier part of the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature' to speak in the ordinary way of objects and their qualities--and otherwise of course he could not have spoken at all--in the fourth book he seems for the first time to become aware that his doctrine did not authorise such language4 ,to perceive qualities of an object is to be conscious of relation between a subject and object1 of which neither perishes with the moment of perception4 ,such consciousness is self-consciousness1 and cannot be reduced to any natural observable event1 since it is consciousness of that of which we cannot say #8,lo1 here1' or #8,lo1 there1' #8it is now but was not then1' or #8it was then but is not now4' ,it is therefore something which the spirit of the ,lockeian philosophy cannot assimilate1 and which ,hume1 as the most consistent exponent of that spirit1 most consistently tried to get rid of4 ,the subject as self1 the object as body1 he professes to reduce to figures of speech1 to be accounted for as the result of certain #8propensities to feign3' nor will he allow that any impression or idea 7and impressions and ideas with him1 be it remembered1 exhaust our consciousness7 carries with it a reference to an object other than itself1 any more than do pleasure or pain to which #8in their nature' all perceptions correspond4 #a ,he cannot1 indeed1 avoid speaking of the consciousness thus reduced to the level of simple pain and pleasure1 as being that which in fact it can only be when determined by relation to a self-conscious subject1 i4e4 as itself an object2 but he is so far faithful in his attempt to avoid such determination1 that he does not reckon the object more permanent than the impression4 ,it1 too1 is a #8perishing existence4' ,as the impression disappears with a #8turn of the eye in its socket1' so does the object1 which really is the impression1 and cannot appear other than it is any more than a feeling can be felt to be what it is not4 #b #a #8,every impression1 external and internal1 passions1 affections1 sensations1 pains1 and pleasures1 are originally on the same footing2 and1 whatever other differences we may observe among them1 appear1 all of them1 in their true colours1 as impressions or perceptions4' p4 #dhj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #8,all sensations are felt by the mind such as they really are2 and1 when we doubt whether they present themselves as distinct objects or as mere impressions1 the difficulty is not concerning their nature1 but concerning their relations and situation4' p4 #dhj4 ibid4 #b ,see above1 paragraph #bjh1 with the passages there cited4 ,if felt thing is no more than feeling1 how can it have qualities8 #bda4 ,such being the only possible object1 how can qualities of it be perceived8 ,we cannot here find refuge in any such propensity to feign as that which1 according to ,hume1 leads us to #8endow objects with a continued existence1 distinct from our perceptions4' ,if such propensities can give rise to impressions at all1 it can only be to impressions of reflection1 and it cannot be in virtue of them that extension1 an impression of sensation1 is given as a quality of an object4 ,now if there is any meaning in the phrase #8qualities of an object1' it implies that the qualities co-exist with each other and the object4 ,feelings1 then1 which are felt as qualities of another feeling must co-exist with1 i4e4 7according to ,hume7 be felt at the same time as1 it and each other4 ,thus1 if an impression of sight be the supposed object1 no feeling that occurs after this impression has disappeared can be a quality of it4 ,accordingly1 when ,hume speaks of extension being seen as one of the qualities of this table1 he is only entitled to mean that it is one among several feelings1 experienced at one and the same time1 which together constitute the table4 ,whatever is not so experienced1 whether extension or anything else1 can be no quality of that #8perception4' ,how much of the perception1 then1 will survive8 ,can any feelings1 strictly speaking1 be cotemporaneous8 ,those received through different senses1 as ,hume is careful to show1 may be2 e4g4 the smell1 taste1 and colour of a fruit4 #a ,in regard to them1 therefore1 we may waive the difficulty1 ,how can feelings successive to each other be yet co-existent qualities8 but only to find ourselves in another as to what the object may be of which the cotemporaneous feelings are qualities4 ,it cannot1 according to ,hume1 be other than one or all of the cotemporaneous feelings4 ,is1 then1 the taste of an apple a quality of its colour or of its smell1 or of colour1 smell1 and taste put together8 ,it will not help us to speak of the several feelings as qualities of the #8total impression2' for the #8total impression' either merely means the several feelings put together1 or else covertly implies just that reference to an object other than these1 which ,hume expressly excludes4 #a #8,the taste and smell of any fruit are inseparable from its other qualities of colour and tangibility1 and 444 'tis certain they are always co-existent4 ,nor are they only co-existent in general1 but also cotemporary in their appearance in the mind4' p4 #eba4 7,contrast p4 #cgj1 where existence and appearance are identified47 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 and part ,,ii1 sec4 ,,iv4 ,the thing will have ceased before the quality begins to be4 #bdb4 ,in fact1 however1 when he speaks of the feeling1 which is called extension1 as a quality of the feeling1 which is called sight1 of the table1 he has not even the excuse that he might have had if the feelings in question1 being of different senses1 might be cotemporary4 ,according to him they are feelings of the same sense4 ,the extension of the table he took to be a datum of sight just as properly as its colour2 yet he cannot call it the same as colour1 but only #8a quality of the coloured object4' ,as the #8coloured object1' however1 apart from #8propensities to feign1' can1 according to him1 be no other than the feeling of colour1 his doctrine can only mean that1 colour and extension being feelings of the same sense1 the latter is a quality of the former4 ,is this any more possible than that red should be a quality of blue1 or a sour taste of a bitter one8 ,must not the two feelings be successive1 however closely successive1 so that the one which is object will have disappeared before the other1 which is to be its quality1 will have occurred8 #a #a ,it should be needless to point out that by taking extension to be a quality of #8tangibility' or muscular effort we merely change the difficulty4 ,the question as to its relation to such feelings will be simply a repetition of that1 put in the text1 as to its relation to the feeling of colour4 ,hume equivocates by putting #8coloured points' for colour4 #bdc4 ,if we look to the detailed account which ,hume gives of the relation between extension and colour1 we find that he avoids the appearance of making one feeling a quality of another1 by in fact substituting for colour a superficies of coloured points1 in which it is very easy to find extension as a quality because it already is extension as an object4 ,to speak of extension1 though a feeling1 as made up of parts is just as legitimate or illegitimate as to speak of the feeling of colour being made up of coloured points4 ,the legitimacy of this once admitted1 there remains1 indeed1 a logical question as to how it is that a quality should be spoken of in terms that seem proper to a substance--as is done when it is said to consist of parts--and yet1 again1 should be pronounced a relation of these parts2 but to one who professed to merge all logical distinctions in the indifference of simple feeling1 such a question could have no recognised meaning4 ,it is1 then1 upon the question whether1 according to ,hume's doctrine of perception1 the perception of an object made up of coloured points may be used interchangeably with the perception of colour1 that the consistency of his doctrine of extension must finally be tried4 #bdd4 ,the detailed account is to the following effect3--#8,upon opening my eyes and turning them to the surrounding objects1 ,i perceive many visible bodies2 and upon shutting them again and considering the distance betwixt these bodies1 ,i acquire the idea of extension4' ,from what impression1 ,hume proceeds to ask1 is this idea derived8 #8,internal impressions' being excluded1 #8there remain nothing but the senses which can convey to us this original impression4' 444 #8,the table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension4 ,this idea1 then1 is borrowed from and represents some impression which this moment appears to the senses4 ,but my senses convey to me only the impressions of coloured points1 disposed in a certain manner4 444 ,we may conclude that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these coloured points and of the manner of their appearance4' #a #a ,pp4 #cdj and #cda4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii4 ,can a #8disposition of coloured points' be an impression8 #bde4 ,if the first sentence of the above had been found by ,hume in an author whom he was criticising1 he would scarcely have been slow to pronounce it tautological4 ,as it stands1 it simply tells us that having seen things extended we consider their extension1 and upon considering it acquire an idea of it4 ,it is a fair sample enough of those #8natural histories' of the soul in vogue among us1 which by the help of a varied nomenclature seem able to explain a supposed later state of consciousness as the result of a supposed earlier one1 because the terms in which the earlier is described in effect assume the later4 ,it may be said1 however1 that it is only by a misinterpretation of a carelessly written sentence that ,hume can be represented as deriving the idea of extension from the consideration of distance2 that1 as the sequel shows1 he regarded the #8consideration' and the #8idea' in question as equivalent1 and derived from the same impression of sense4 ,it is undoubtedly upon his account of this impression that his doctrine of extension depends4 ,it is described as #8an impression of coloured points disposed in a certain manner4' ,to it the idea of extension is related simply as a copy2 which1 we have seen1 properly means with ,hume1 as a feeling in a less lively stage is related to the same feeling in a more lively stage4 ,it is itself1 we must note1 the impression of extension2 and it is an impression of sense1 about which1 accordingly1 no further question can properly be raised4 ,hume1 indeed1 allows himself to speak as if it were included in a #8perception of visible bodies' other than itself2 just as in the passage from the fourth book previously examined1 he speaks as if the perception1 called extension1 were a quality of some other perception4 ,this we must regard as an exercise of the privilege which he claims of #8speaking with the vulgar while he thought with the learned2' since1 according to him1 #8visible body1' in any other sense than that of the impression of coloured points1 is properly a name for a #8propensity to feign' resulting from a process posterior to all impressions of sense4 ,the question remains whether1 in speaking of an impression as one of #8coloured points disposed in a certain manner1' he is not introducing a #8fiction of thought' into the impression just as much as in calling it a #8perception of body4' ,the points must be themselves impressions1 and therefore not co-existent4 #bdf4 ,an impression1 we know1 can1 according to ,hume1 never be of an object in the sense of involving a reference to anything other than itself4 ,when one is said1 then1 to be of coloured points1 c41 this can only mean that itself is1 or consists of1 such points4 ,thus the question we have to answer is only a more definite form of the one previously put1 ,can a feeling consist of parts8 ,in answering it we must remember that the parts1 here supposed to be coloured points1 must1 according to ,hume's doctrine1 be themselves impressions or they are nothing4 ,consistently with this he speaks of extension as #8a compound impression1 consisting of parts or lesser impressions1 that are indivisible to the eye or feeling1 and may be called impressions of atoms or corpuscles1 endowed with colour and solidity4' #a ,now1 unless we suppose that a multitude of feelings of one and the same sense can be present together1 these #8lesser impressions' must follow each other and precede the #8compound impression4' ,that is to say1 none of the parts of which extension consists will be in existence at the same time1 and all will have ceased to exist before extension itself comes into being4 ,can we1 then1 adopt the alternative supposition that a multitude of feelings of one and the same sense can be present together8 ,in answering this question according to ,hume's premisses we may not help ourselves by saying that in a case of vision there really are impressions on different parts of the retina4 ,to say that it really is so1 is to say that it is so for the thinking consciousness--for a consciousness that distinguishes between what it feels and what it knows4 ,to a man1 as simply seeing and while he sees1 his sight is not an impression on the retina at all1 much less a combination of impressions on different parts of the retina4 ,it is so for him only as thinking on the organs of his sight2 or1 if we like1 as #8seeing' them in another1 but #8seeing' them in a way determined by sundry suppositions 7bodies1 rays1 and the like7 which are not feelings1 and therefore with ,hume not possible #8perceptions1' at all4 ,but it is the impression of sight1 as it would be for one simply seeing and while he sees1 undetermined by reference to anything other than itself1 whether subject or object--an impression as it would be for a merely feeling consciousness or 7in ,hume's language7 #8on the same footing with pain and pleasure'--that we have to do with when1 from ,hume's point of view1 we ask whether a multitude of such impressions can be present at once1 i4e4 as one impression4 #a ,p4 #cde ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 ,a #8compound impression' excluded by ,hume's doctrine of time4 #bdg4 ,if this question had been brought home to ,hume1 he could scarcely have avoided the admission that to answer it affirmatively involved just as much of a contradiction as that which he recognises between the #8interrupted' and #8continuous' existence of objects2 #a and just as in the latter case he gets over the contradiction by taking the interrupted existence1 because the datum of sense1 to be the reality1 and the continued existence to be a belief resulting from #8propensities to feign1' so in the case before us he must have taken the multiplicity of successive impressions to be the reality1 and their co-existence as related parts to be a figure of speech1 which he must account for as best he could4 ,as it is1 he so plays fast and loose with the meaning of #8impression' as to hide the contradiction which is involved in the notion of a #8compound impression' if impression is interpreted as feeling--the contradiction1 namely1 that a single feeling should he felt to be manifold--and in consequence loses the chance of being brought to that truer interpretation of the compound impression1 as the thought of an object under relations1 which a more honest trial of its reduction to feeling might have shown to be necessary4 ,to convict so skilful a writer of a contradiction in terms can never be an easy task4 ,he does not in so many words tell us that all impressions of sight must be successive1 but he does tell us that #8the impressions of touch1' which1 indifferently with those of sight1 he holds to constitute the compound impression of extension1 #8change every moment upon us4' #b ,and in the immediate sequel of the passage where he has made out extension to be a compound of co-existent impressions1 he derives the idea of time #8from the succession of our perceptions of every kind1 ideas as well as impressions1 and impressions of reflection as well as of sensation4' ,the parts of time1 he goes on to say1 cannot be co-existent2 and1 since #8time itself is nothing but different ideas and impressions succeeding each other1' these parts1 we must conclude1 are those #8perceptions of every kind' from which the idea of time is derived4 #c ,it is only1 in fact1 by availing himself of the distinction1 which he yet expressly rejects1 between the impression and its object1 that he disguises the contradiction in terms of first pronouncing certain impressions1 as parts of space1 co-existent1 and then pronouncing all impressions1 as parts of time1 successive4 ,a statement that #8as from the coexistence of visual1 and also of tactual1 perceptions we receive the idea of extension1 so from the succession of perceptions of every kind we form the idea of time1' would arouse the suspicion of the most casual reader2 while ,hume's version of the same1--#8as 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space1 so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time' #d--;has the full ring of empirical plausibility4 #a ,p4 #dhc and following1 and p4 #dhf ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,p4 #eaf ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,iv44 #c ,pp4 #cdb1 #cdc ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii44 #d ,p4 #cdb ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii4 ,the fact that colours mix1 not to the purpose4 #bdh4 ,this plausibility depends chiefly on our reading into ,hume's doctrine a physical theory which1 as implying a distinction between feeling and its real but unfelt cause1 is strictly incompatible with it4 ,is it not an undoubted fact1 the reader asks1 that two colours may combine to produce a third different from both--that red and yellow1 for instance1 together produce orange8 ,is not this already an instance of a compound impression8 ,why may not a like composition of unextended impressions of colour constitute an impression different from any one of the component impressions1 viz4 extended colour8 ,a moment's consideration1 however1 will show that no one has a conscious sensation at once of red and yellow1 and of orange as a compound of the two4 ,the elements which combine to produce the colour called orange are not--as they ought to be if it is to be a case of compound impression in ,hume's sense--feelings of the person who sees the orange colour1 but certain known causes of feeling1 confused in language with the feelings1 which separately they might produce1 but which in fact they do not produce when they combine to give the sensation of orange2 and to such causes of feeling1 which are not themselves feelings1 ,hume properly can have nothing to say4 ,how ,hume avoids appearance of identifying space with colour1 and accounts for the abstraction of space4 #bdi4 ,so far we have been considering the composition of impressions generally1 without special reference to extension4 ,the contradiction pointed out arises from the confusion between impressions as felt and impressions as thought of2 colour1 between feelings as they are in themselves1 presented successively in time1 and feelings as determined by relation to the thinking subject1 which takes them out of the flux of time and converts them into members of a permanent whole4 ,it is in this form that the confusion is most apt to elude us4 ,when the conceived object is one of which the qualities can really be felt1 e4g4 colour1 we readily forget that a felt quality is no longer simply a feeling4 ,but the case is different when the object is one1 like extension1 which forces on us the question whether its qualities can be felt1 or presented in feeling1 at all4 ,a compound of impressions of colour1 to adopt ,hume's phraseology1 even if such composition were possible1 would still be nothing else than an impression of colour4 ,in more accurate language1 the conception1 which results from the action of thought upon feelings of colour1 can only be a conception of colour4 ,is extension1 then1 the same as colour8 ,to say that it was would imply that geometry was a science of colour2 and ,hume1 though ready enough to outrage #8,metaphysics and ,school ,divinity1' always stops reverently short of direct offence to the mathematical sciences4 ,as has been said above1 of the three main questions about the idea of extension which his doctrine raises--,is it itself extended8 ,is it possible without reference to something other than a possible impression8 ,is it the same as the idea of colour or tangibility8--the last is the only one which he can scarcely even profess to answer in the affirmative4 #a ,even when he has gone so far as to speak of the parts of a perception1 a sound instinct compels him1 instead of identifying the perception directly with extension1 to speak of it as #8affording through the situation of its parts the notion of' extension4 #b ,in like manner1 when he has asserted extension to be a compound of impressions1 he avoids the proper consequence of the assertion by speaking of the component impressions as those1 not of colour but1 of coloured points1 #8atoms or corpuscles endowed with colour and solidity2' and1 again1 does not call extension the compound of these simply1 but the compound of them as #8disposed in a certain manner4' ,when the idea which is a copy of this impression has to be spoken of1 the expression is varied again4 ,it is an #8idea of the coloured points and of the manner of their appearance1' or of their #8disposition4' ,the disposition of the parts having been thus virtually distinguished from their colour1 it is easy to suppose that1 finding a likeness in the disposition of points under every unlikeness of their colour1 #8we omit the peculiarities of colour1 as far as possible1 and found an abstract idea merely on that disposition of points1 or manner of appearance1 in which they agree4 ,nay1 even when the resemblance is carried beyond the objects of one sense1 and the impressions of touch are found to be similar to those of sight in the disposition of their parts1 this does not hinder the abstract idea from representing both on account of their resemblance'4 #c #a ,above1 paragraph #bcc4 ,though1 as we shall see1 he does so in one passage4 #b ,above1 paragraph #bce4 #c ,p4 #cda ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii4 ,in so doing1 he implies that space is a relation1 and a relation which is not a possible impression4 #bej4 ,if words have any meaning1 the above must imply that the disposition of points is at least a different idea from either colour or tangibility1 however impossible it may be for us to experience it without one or other of the latter4 ,nor can we suppose that this impression1 other than colour1 is one that first results from the composition of colours1 even if we admit that such composition could yield a result different from colour4 ,according to ,hume1 the components of the compound impression are already impressions of coloured #8points1 atoms1 or corpuscles1' and such points imply just that limitation by mutual externality1 which is already the disposition in question4 ,is this #8disposition1' then1 an impression of sensation8 ,if so1 #8through which of the senses is it received8 ,if it be perceived by the eyes it must be a colour1' c4 c42 #a but from colour1 the impression with which ,hume would have identified it if he could1 he yet finds himself obliged virtually to distinguish it4 ,it is a relation1 and not even one of those relations1 such as resemblance1 which in ,hume's language1 #8depending on the nature of the impressions related1' #b may plausibly be reckoned to be themselves impressions4 ,the #8disposition' of parts and their #8situation' he uses interchangeably1 and the situation of impressions he expressly opposes to their #8nature' #c--that nature in respect of which all impressions1 call them what we like1 are #8originally on the same footing' with pain and pleasure4 ,consistently with this he pronounces the #8external position' of objects--their position as bodies external to each other and to our body--to be no datum of sense1 no impression or idea1 at all4 #d ,our belief in it has to be accounted for as a complex result of #8propensities to feign4' ,how1 then1 can there be an impression of that which does not belong to the nature of any impression8 ,what difference is there between #8bodies' and #8corpuscles endowed with colour and solidity1' that the outwardness of the latter to each other--also called their #8distance' from each1 other #e--should be an impression1 while it is admitted that the same relation between #8bodies' cannot be so8 #a ,above1 paragraph #bjh4 #b ,p4 #cgb ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i41 #8,philosophical relations may be divided into two classes3 into such as depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together2 and such as may be changed without any change in the ideas4 444 ,the relations of contiguity and distance between two objects may be changed without any change in the objects themselves or their ideas4' #c ,p4 #dhj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #8,when we doubt whether sensations present themselves as distinct objects or as mere impressions1 the difficulty is not concerning their nature1 but concerning their relations and situation4' #d ,p4 #dha4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,in there showing that the senses alone cannot convince us of the external existence of body1 he remarks that #8sounds1 tastes1 and smells appear not to have any existence in extension2' and 7p4 #dhc7 ibid #8as far as the senses are judges1 all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence4' ,therefore perceptions of sight cannot have #8an existence in extension' any more than #8sounds1 tastes1 and smells2' and if so1 how can #8existence in extension' be a perception8 #e ,above1 paragraphs #bce and #bdd4 ,no logical alternative between identifying space with colour1 and admitting an idea not copied from an impression4 #bea4 ,to have plainly admitted that it was not an impression must have compelled ,hume either to discard the #8abstract idea' with which geometry deals1 or to admit the possibility of ideas other than #8fainter impressions4' ,it is a principle on which he insists with much emphasis and repetition1 that whatever #8objects1' #8impressions1' or #8ideas' are distinguishable are also separable4 #a ,now if there is an abstract idea of extension1 it can scarcely be other than distinguishable1 and consequently 7according to ,hume's account of the relation of idea to impression7 derived from a distinguishable and therefore separable impression4 ,it would seem then that ,hume cannot escape conviction of one of two inconsistencies2 either that of supposing a separate impression of extension1 which yet is not of the nature of any assignable sensation2 or that of supposing an abstract idea of it in the absence of any such impression4 ,we shall find that he does not directly face either horn of the dilemma1 but evades both of them4 ,he admits that #8the ideas of space and time are no separate and distinct ideas1 but merely those of the manner or order in which objects' 7sc4 impressions7 #8exist'4 #b ,in the ,fourth ,book1 where the equivalence of impression to feeling is more consistently carried out1 the fact that what is commonly reckoned an impression is really a judgment about the #8manner of existence1' as opposed to the #8nature1' of impressions1 is taken as sufficient proof that it is no impression at all2 and if not an impression1 therefore not an idea4 #c ,he thus involuntarily recognized the true difference between feeling and thought1 between the mere occurrence of feelings and the presentation of that occurrence by the self-conscious subject to itself2 and1 if only he had known what he was about in the recognition1 might have anticipated ,kant's distinction between the matter and form of sensation4 ,in the ,second ,book1 however1 he will neither say explicitly that space is an impression of colour or a compound of colours--that would be to extinguish geometry2 nor yet that it is impression of sense separate from that of colour--that would lay him open to the retort that he was virtually introducing a sixth sense2 nor on the other hand will he boldly avow of it1 as he afterwards does of body1 that it is a fiction4 ,he denies that it is a separate impression1 so far as that is necessary for avoiding the challenge to specify the sense through which it is received2 he distinguishes it from a mere impression of sight1 when it is necessary to avoid its simple identification with colour4 ,by speaking of it as #8the manner in which objects exist'--so long as he is not confronted with the declarations of the ,fourth ,book or with the question how1 the objects being impressions1 their order of existence can be at once that of succession in time and of co-existence in space--he gains the credit for it of being a datum of sight1 yet so far distinct from colour as to be a possible #8foundation for an abstract idea1' representative also of objects not coloured at all but tangible4 ,at the same time1 if pressed with the question how it could be an impression of sight and yet not interchangeable with colour1 he could put off the questioner by reminding him that he never made it a #8separate or distinct impression1 but one of the manner in which objects exist4' #a ,pp4 #cai1 #cbf1 #ccb1 #cce1 #eah4 ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,iv and ,,vii1 part ,,ii1 sec4 ,i1 and part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 #b ,p4 #cdf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 #c ,p4 #dhj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,in his account of the idea as abstract1 ,hume really introduces distinction between feeling and conception2 #beb4 ,disguise it as he might1 however1 the admission that there was in some sense an abstract idea of space1 which the existence of geometry required of him1 really carried with it the admission either of a distinct impression of the same1 or of some transmuting process by which the idea may become what the impression is not4 ,his way of evading this consequence has been already noticed in our examination of his doctrine of #8abstract ideas' generally1 though without special reference to extension4 #a ,it consists in asserting figure and colour to be #8really1' or as an impression1 #8the same and indistinguishable1' but different as #8relations and resemblances' of the impression2 in other words1 different according to the #8light in which the impression is considered' or #8the aspect in which it is viewed4' ,of these #8separate resemblances and relations1' however1 are there ideas or are there not8 ,if there are not1 they are according to ,hume nothing of which we are conscious at all2 if there are1 there must be distinguishable1 and therefore separable1 impressions corresponding4 ,to say then that figure and colour form one and the same indistinguishable impression1 and yet that they constitute #8different resemblances and relations1' without such explanation as ,hume cannot consistently give1 is in fact a contradiction in terms4 ,the true explanation is that the #8impression' has a different meaning1 when figure and colour are said to be inseparable in the impression1 from that which it has when spoken of as a subject of different resemblances and relations4 ,in the former sense it is the feeling pure and simple--one as presented singly in time1 after another and before a third4 ,in this sense it is doubtless insusceptible of distinction into qualities of figure and colour1 because 7for reasons already stated7 it can have no qualities at all4 ,but the #8simplicity in which many different resemblances and relations may be contained' is quite other than this singleness4 ,it is the unity of an object thought of under manifold relations--a unity of which ,hume1 reducing all consciousness to #8impression' and impression to feeling1 has no consistent account to give4 ,failing such an account1 the unity of the intelligible object1 and the singleness of the feeling in time1 are simply confused with each other4 ,it is only an object as thought of1 not a feeling as felt1 that can properly be said to have qualities at all2 while it is only because it is still regarded as a feeling that qualities of it1 which cannot be referred to separate impressions1 are pronounced the same and indistinguishable4 ,if the idea of space is other than a feeling grown fainter1 the sole reason for regarding it as originally an impression of colour disappears2 if it is such a feeling1 it cannot contain such #8different resemblances and relations' as render it representative of objects not only coloured in every possible way1 but not coloured at all4 #a ,above1 paragraph #bah4 444 yet avoids appearance of doing so1 by treating #8consideration' of the relations of a felt thing as if it were itself the feeling4 #bec4 ,it is thus by playing fast and loose with the difference between feeling and conception that ,hume is able1 when the character of extension as an intelligible relation is urged1 to reply that it is the same with the feeling of colour2 and on the other hand1 when asked how there then can be an abstract idea of it1 to reply that this does not mean a separate idea1 but coloured objects considered under a certain relation1 viz4 under that which consists in the disposition of their parts4 ,the most effective way of meeting him on his own ground is to ask him how it is1 since #8consideration' can only mean a succession of ideas1 and ideas are fainter impressions1 that extension1 being one and the same impression with colour1 can by any #8consideration' become so different from it as to constitute a resemblance to objects that are not coloured at all4 ,the true explanation1 according to his own terminology1 would be that the resemblance between the white globe and all other globes1 being a resemblance not of impressions but of such relations between impressions as do not #8depend on the nature of the impressions' related1 is unaffected by the presence or absence of colour or any other sensation4 ,of such relations1 however1 there can properly1 if ideas are fainter impressions1 be no ideas at all4 ,in regard to those of cause and identity ,hume virtually admits this2 but the #8propensities to feign' by which in the case of these latter relations he tries to account for the appearance of there being ideas of them1 cannot plausibly be applied to relations in space and time1 of which1 as we shall see1 ideas must be assumed in order to account for the #8fictions' of body and necessary connexion4 ,since then they cannot be derived from any separate impression without the introduction in effect of a sixth sense1 and since all constitutive action of thought as distinct from feeling is denied by ,hume1 the only way to save appearances is to treat the order in which a multitude of impressions present themselves as the same with each impression1 even though immediately afterwards it may have to be confessed1 that it is so independent of the nature of any or all of the impressions as to be the foundation of an abstract idea1 which is representative of other impressions having nothing whatever in common with them but the order of appearance4 ,this once allowed--an abstract idea having been somehow arrived at which is not really the copy of any impression--it is easy to argue back from the abstract idea to an impression1 and because there is an idea of the composition of points to substitute a #8composition of coloured points' for colour as the original impression4 ,from such impression1 being already extension1 the idea of extension can undoubtedly be abstracted4 ,summary of contradictions in his account of extension4 #bed4 ,we now know what becomes of #8extended matter' when the doctrine1 which has only to be stated to find acceptance1 that we cannot #8look for anything anywhere but in our ideas'--in other words that for us there is no world but consciousness--is fairly carried out4 ,its position must become more and more equivocal1 as the assumption1 that consciousness reveals to us an alien matter1 has in one after another of its details to be rejected1 until a principle of synthesis within consciousness is found to explain it4 ,in default of this1 the feeling consciousness has to be made to take its place as best it may2 which means that what is said of it as feeling has to be unsaid of it as extended1 and vice vers4 ,as feeling1 it carries no reference to anything other than itself1 to an object of which it is a quality2 as extended1 it is a qualified object4 ,as extended again1 its qualities are relations of coexistent parts2 as feeling1 it is an unlimited succession1 and therefore1 not being a possible whole1 can have no parts at all4 ,finally as feeling1 it must in each moment of existence either be #8on the same footing' with pain and pleasure or else--a distinction between impressions of sensation and reflection being unwarrantably admitted--be a colour1 a taste1 a sound1 a smell1 or #8tangibility2' as extended1 it is an #8order of appearance' or #8disposition of corpuscles1' which1 being predicable indifferently at any rate of two of these sensations1 can no more be the same with either than either can be the same with the other4 ,it is not the fault of ,hume but his merit that1 in undertaking to maintain more strictly than others the identification of extension with feeling1 he brought its impossibility more clearly into view4 ,the pity is that having carried his speculative enterprise so far before he was thirty1 he allowed literary vanity to interfere with its consistent pursuit1 caring only to think out the philosophy which he inherited so far as it enabled him to pose with advantage against ,mystics and ,dogmatists1 but not to that further issue which is the entrance to the philosophy of ,kant4 ,he gives no account of quantity as such4 #bee4 ,as it was1 he never came fairly to ask himself the fruitful question4 ,how the sciences of quantity #8continuous and discreet1' which undoubtedly do exist1 are possible to a merely feeling consciousness1 because1 while professedly reducing all consciousness to this form1 he still allowed himself to interpret it in the terms of these sciences and1 having done so1 could easily account for their apparent #8abstraction' from it4 ,if colour is already for feeling a magnitude1 as is implied in calling it a #8composition of coloured points1' the question1 how a knowledge of magnitude is possible1 is of course superfluous4 ,it only remains to deal1 as ,hume professes to do1 with the apparent abstraction in mathematics of magnitude from colour and the consequent suppositions of pure space and infinite divisibility4 ,any ulterior problem he ignores4 ,that magnitude is not any the more a feeling for being #8endowed with colour' he shows no suspicion4 ,he pursues his #8sensationalism' in short1 in its bearing on mathematics1 just as far as ,berkeley did and no further4 ,the question at issue1 as he conceived it1 was not as to the possibility of magnitude altogether1 but only as to the existence of a vacuum2 not as to the possibility of number altogether1 but only as to the infinity of its parts4 ,just as he takes magnitude for granted as found in extension1 and extension as equivalent to the feeling of colour1 so he takes number for granted1 without indeed any explicit account of the impression in which it is to be found1 but apparently as found in time1 which again is identified with the succession of impressions4 ,in the second part of the ,treatise1 though the idea of number is assumed and an account is given of it which is supposed to be fatal to the infinite divisibility of extension1 we are told nothing of the impression or impressions from which it is derived4 ,in the ,fourth ,part1 however1 there is a passage in which a certain consideration of time is spoken of as its source4 ,his account of the relation between ,time and ,number4 #bef4 ,in the latter passage1 in order to account for the idea of identity1 he is supposing #8a single object placed before us and surveyed for any time without our discovering in it any variation or interruption4' #8,when we consider any two points of this time1' he proceeds1 #8we may place them in different lights4 ,we may either survey them at the very same instant2 in which case they give us the idea of number1 both by themselves and by the object1 which must be multiplied in order to be conceived at once1 as existent in these two different points of time3 or1 on the other hand1 we may trace the succession of time by a like succession of ideas1 and conceiving first one moment1 along with the object then existent1 imagine afterwards a change in the time without any variation or interruption in the object2 in which case it gives us the idea of unity'4 #a #a ,p4 #dij4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,what does it come to8 #beg4 ,a slight scrutiny of this passage will show that it is a prolonged tautology4 ,the difference is merely verbal between the processes by which the ideas of number and unity are severally supposed to be given1 except that in the former process it is the moment of surveying the times that is supposed to be one1 while the times themselves are many2 in the latter it is the object that is supposed to be one1 but the times many4 ,according to the second version of the former process--that according to which the different times surveyed together are said to give the idea of number #8by their object'--even this difference disappears4 ,the only remaining distinction is that in the one case the object is supposed to be given as one1 #8without interruption or variation1' but to become multiple as conceived to exist in different moments2 in the other the objects are supposed to be given as manifold1 being ideas presented in successive times1 but to become one through the imaginary restriction of the multiplicity to the times in distinction from the object4 ,undoubtedly any one of these verbally distinct processes will yield indifferently the ideas of number and of unity1 since these ideas in strict correlativity are presupposed by each of them4 #8,two points of time surveyed at the same time' will give us the idea of number because1 being a duality in unity1 they are already a number4 ,so1 too1 and for the same reason1 will the object1 one in itself but multiple as existent at different times4 ,nor does the idea given by imagining ideas1 successively presented1 to be #8one uninterrupted object1' differ from the above more than many-in-one differs from one-in-many4 ,the real questions of course are1 ,how two times can be surveyed at one time2 how a single object can be multiplied or become many2 how a succession of ideas can be imagined to be an unvaried and uninterrupted object4 ,to these questions ,hume has no answer to give4 ,his reduction of thought to feeling logically excluded an answer1 and the only alternative for him was to ignore or disguise them4 ,unites alone really exist3 number a #8fictitious denomination'4 ,yet #8unites' and #8number' are correlative2 and the supposed fiction unaccountable4 #beh4 ,in the passage from part ,,ii4 of the ,treatise1 already referred to1 he distinctly tells us that the unity to which existence belongs excludes multiplicity4 #8,existence itself belongs to unity1 and is never applicable to number but on account of the unites of which the number is composed4 ,twenty men may be said to exist1 but 'tis only because one1 two1 three1 four1 c41 are existent4 444 ,a unite1 consisting of a number of fractions1 is merely a fictitious denomination1 which the mind may apply to any quantity of objects it collects together2 nor can such an unity any more exist alone than number can1 as being in reality a true number4 ,but the unity which can exist alone1 and whose existence is necessary to that of all number1 is of another kind and must be perfectly indivisible and incapable of being resolved into any lesser unity'4 #a ,what then is the #8unity which can exist alone'8 ,the answer1 according to ,hume1 must be that it is an impression separately felt and not resoluble into any other impressions4 ,but then the question arises1 how a succession of such impressions can form a number or sum2 and if they cannot1 how the so-called real unity or separate impression can in any sense be a unite1 since a unite is only so as one of a sum4 ,to put the question otherwise1 ,is it not the case that a unite has no more meaning without number than number without unites1 and that every number is not only just such a #8fictitious denomination1' as ,hume pronounces a #8unite consisting of a number of fractions' to be1 but a fiction impossible for our consciousness according to ,hume's account of it8 ,it will not do to say that such a question touches only the fiction of #8abstract number1' but not the existence of numbered objects2 that 7to take ,hume's instance7 twenty men exist with the existence of each individual man1 each real unit1 of the lot4 ,it is precisely the numerability of objects--not indeed their existence1 if that only means their successive appearance1 but their existence as a sum--that is in question4 ,if such numerability is possible for such a consciousness as ,hume makes ours to be2 in other words1 if he can explain the fact that we count2 #8abstract number' may no doubt be left to take care of itself4 ,is it then possible8 #8,separate impressions' mean impressions felt at different times1 which accordingly can no more co-exist than1 to use ,hume's expression1 #8the year #agcg can concur with the year #agch2' whereas the constituents of a sum must1 as such1 co-exist4 ,thus when we are told that #8twenty may be said to exist because one1 two1 three1 c41 are existent1' the alleged reason1 understood as ,hume was bound to understand it1 is incompatible with the supposed consequence4 ,the existence of an object would1 to him1 mean no more than the occurrence of an impression2 but that one impression should occur1 and then another and then another1 is the exact opposite of their coexistence as a sum of impressions1 and it is such co-existence that is implied when the impressions are counted and pronounced so many4 ,thus when ,hume tells us that a single object1 by being #8multiplied in order to be conceived at once as existent in different points of time1' gives us the idea of number1 we are forced to ask him what precisely it is which thus1 being one1 can become manifold4 ,is it a #8unite that can exist alone'8 ,that1 having no parts1 cannot become manifold by resolution4 #8,but it may by repetition8' ,no1 for it is a separate impression1 and the repetition of an impression cannot co-exist1 so as to form one sum1 with its former occurrence4 #8,but it may be thought of as doing so8' ,no1 for that1 according to ,hume1 could only mean that feelings might concur in a fainter stage though they could not in a livelier4 ,is the single object then a unite which already consists of parts8 ,but that is a #8fictitious denomination1' and presupposes the very idea of number that has to be accounted for4 #a ,p4 #cch4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,idea of time even more unaccountable on ,hume's principles4 #bei4 ,the impossibility of getting number1 as a many-in-one1 out of the succession of feelings1 so long as the self is treated as only another name for that succession1 is less easy to disguise when the supposed units are not merely given in succession1 but are actually the moments of the succession2 in other words1 when time is the many-in-one to be accounted for4 ,how can a multitude of feelings of which no two are present together1 undetermined by relation to anything other than the feelings1 be at the same time a consciousness of the relation between the moments in which the feelings are given1 or of a sum which these moments form8 ,how can there be a relation between #8objects' of which one has ceased before the other has begun to exist8 #8,for the same reason1' says ,hume1 #8that the year #agcg cannot concur with the present year #agch1 every moment must be distinct from1 and posterior or antecedent to1 another'4 #a ,how then can the present moment form one sum with all past moments1 the present year with all past years2 the sum which we indicate by the number #agch8 ,the answer of common sense of course will be that1 though the feeling of one moment is really past before that of another begins1 yet thought retains the former1 and combining it with the latter1 gets the idea of time both as a relation and as a sum4 ,such an answer1 however1 implies that the retaining and combining thought is other than the succession of the feelings1 and while it takes this succession to be the reality1 imports into it that determination by the relations of past and present which it can only derive from the retaining and combining thought opposed to it4 ,it is thus both inconsistent with ,hume's doctrine1 which allows no such distinction between thought1 i4e4 the succession of ideas1 and the succession of impressions1 and inconsistent with itself4 ,yet ,hume by disguising both inconsistencies contrives to avail himself of it4 ,by tacitly assuming that a conception of #8the manner in which impressions appear to the mind' is given in and with the occurrence of the impressions1 he imports the consciousness of time1 both as relation and as numerable quantity1 into the sequence of impressions4 ,he thus gains the advantage of being able to speak of this sequence indifferently under predicates which properly exclude each other4 ,he can make it now a consciousness in time1 now a consciousness of itself as in time2 now a series that cannot be summed1 now a conception of the sum of the series4 ,the sequence of feelings1 then1 having been so dealt with as to make it appear in effect that time can be felt1 that it should be thought of can involve no further difficulty4 ,the conception1 smuggled into sensitive experience as an #8impression1' can be extracted from it again as #8idea1' without ostensible departure from the principle that the idea is only the weaker impression4 #a ,p4 #cch4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,his ostensible explanation of it4 #bfj4 #8,the idea of time is not derived from a particular impression mixed up with others and plainly distinguishable from them1 but arises altogether from the manner in which impressions appear to the mind1 without making one of the number4 ,five notes played on the flute give us the impression and idea of time1 though time be not a sixth impression which presents itself to the hearing or any other of the senses4 ,nor is it a sixth impression which the mind by reflection finds in itself4 ,these five sounds1 making their appearance in this particular manner1 excite no emotion or affection in the mind1 which being observed by it can give rise to a new idea4 ,for that is necessary to produce a new idea of reflection2 nor can the mind1 by revolving over a thousand times all its ideas of sensation1 ever extract from them any new original idea1 unless nature has so framed its faculties that it feels some new original impression arise from such a contemplation4 ,but here it only takes notice of the manner in which the different sounds make their appearance1 and that it may afterwards consider without considering these particular sounds1 but may conjoin it with any other objects4 ,the ideas of some objects it certainly must have1 nor is it possible for it without these ever to arrive at any conception of time2 which1 since it appears not as any primary distinct impression1 can plainly be nothing but different ideas or impressions or objects disposed in a certain manner1 i4e4 succeeding each other4 #a #a ,p4 #cdc4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii4 ,it turns upon equivocation between feeling and conception of relations between felt things4 #bfa4 ,in this passage the equivocation between #8impression' as feeling1 and #8impression' as conception of the manner in which feelings occur1 is less successfully disguised than is the like equivocation in the account of extension--not indeed from any failure in ,hume's power of statement1 but from the nature of the case4 ,in truth the mere reproduction of impressions can as little account for the one conception as for the other4 ,just as1 in order to account for the #8impression' from which the abstract idea of space may be derived1 we have to suppose first that the feeling of colour1 through being presented by the self-conscious subject to itself1 becomes a coloured thing1 and next1 that this thing is viewed as a whole of parts limiting each other2 so1 in order to account for the #8impression' from which the idea of time may be abstracted1 we have to suppose the presentation of the succession of feelings to a consciousness not in succession1 and the consequent view of such presented succession as a sum of numerable parts4 ,it is a relation only possible for a thinking consciousness--a relation1 in ,hume's language1 not depending on the nature of the impressions related--that has in each case to be introduced into experience in order to be extracted from it again by #8consideration3' but there is this difference1 that in one case the relation is not really between feelings at all1 but between things or parts of a thing2 while in the other it is just that relation between feelings1 the introduction of which excludes the possibility that any feeling should be the consciousness of the relation4 ,thus to speak of a feeling of extension does not involve so direct a contradiction as to speak in the same way of time4 ,the reader gives ,hume the benefit of a way of thinking which ,hume's own theory excludes4 ,himself distinguishing between feeling and felt thing1 and regarding extension as a relation between parts of a thing1 he does not reflect that for ,hume there is no such distinction2 that a #8feeling of extension' means that feeling is extended1 which again means that it has co-existent parts2 and that what is thus said of feeling as extended is incompatible with what is said of it as feeling4 ,but when it comes to a #8feeling of time'--a feeling of the successiveness of all feelings--the incompatibility between what is said of feeling as the object and what is implied of it as the subject is less easy to disguise4 ,in like manner because we cannot really think of extension as being that which yet according to ,hume it is1 it does not strike us1 when he speaks of it as coloured or of colour as extended1 that he is making one feeling a quality of another4 ,but it would be otherwise if any specific feeling were taken as a quality of what is ostensibly a relation between all feelings4 ,there is thus no #8sensible quality' with which time can be said to be #8endowed1' as extension with #8colour and solidity2' none that can be made to do the same duty in regard to it as these do in regard to extension1 #8giving the idea' of it without actually being it4 ,he fails to assign any impression or compound of impressions from which idea of time is copied4 #bfb4 ,hence1 as the passage last quoted shows1 in the case of time the alternative between ascribing it to a sixth sense1 and confessing that it is not an impression at all1 is very hard to avoid4 ,it would seem that there is an impression of #8the manner in which impressions appear to the mind1' which yet is no #8distinct impression4' ,what1 then1 is it8 ,it cannot be any one of the impressions of sense1 for then it would be a distinct impression4 ,it cannot be a #8compound impression1' for such composition is incompatible with that successiveness of all feelings to each other which is the object of the supposed impression4 ,it cannot be any #8new original impression' arising from the contemplation of other impressions1 for then1 according to ,hume1 it would be #8an affection or emotion4' ,but after the exclusion of impressions of sense1 compound impressions1 and impressions of reflection1 ,hume's inventory of the possible sources of ideas is exhausted4 ,to have been consistent1 he ought to have dealt with the relation of time as he afterwards does with that of cause and effect1 and1 in default of an impression from which it could be derived1 have reduced it to a figure of speech4 ,but since the possibility of accounting for the propensities to feign1 which our language about cause and effect according to him represents1 required the consciousness of relation in time1 this course could not be taken4 ,accordingly after the possibility of time being an impression has been excluded as plainly as it can be by anything short of a direct negation1 by a device singularly naf it is made to appear as an impression after all4 ,on being told that the consciousness of time is not a #8new original impression of reflection1' since in that case it would be an emotion or affection1 but #8only the notice which the mind takes of the manner in which impressions appear to it1' the reader must be supposed to forget the previous admission that it is no distinct impression at all1 and to interpret this #8notice which the mind takes1' because it is not an impression of reflection1 as an impression of sense4 ,to make such interpretation easier1 the account given of time earlier in the paragraph quoted is judiciously altered at its close1 so that instead of having to ascribe to feeling a consciousness of #8the manner in which impressions appear to the mind1' we have only to ascribe to it the impressions so appearing4 ,but this alteration admitted1 what becomes of the #8abstractness' of the idea of time1 i4e4 of the possibility of its being #8conjoined with any objects' indifferently8 ,it is the essential condition of such indifferent conjunction1 as ,hume puts it1 that time should be only the manner of appearance as distinct from the impressions themselves4 ,if time is the impressions1 it must have the specific sensuous character which belongs to these4 ,it must be a multitude of sounds1 a multitude of tastes1 a multitude of smells--these one after the other in endless series4 ,how then can such a series of impressions become such an idea1 i4e4 so grow fainter as to be #8conjoined' indifferently #8with any impressions whatever'8 ,how can he adjust the exact sciences to his theory of space and time8 #bfc4 ,the case then between ,hume and the conceptions which the exact sciences presuppose1 as we have so far examined it1 stands thus4 ,of the idea of quantity1 as such1 he gives no account whatever4 ,we are told1 indeed1 that there are #8unites which can exist alone1' i4e4 can be felt separately1 and which are indivisible2 but how such unites1 being separate impressions1 can form a sum or number1 or what meaning a unite can have except as one of a number--how again a sum formed of separate unites can be a continuous whole or magnitude--we are not told at all4 ,of the ideas of space and time we do find an account4 ,they are said to be given in impressions1 but1 to justify this account of them1 each impression has to be taken to be at the same time a consciousness of the manner of its own existence1 as determined by relation to other impressions not felt along with it and as interpreted in a way that presupposes the unexplained idea of quantity4 ,with this supposed origin of the ideas the sciences resting on them have to be adjusted4 ,they may take the relations of number and magnitude1 time and space1 for granted1 as #8qualities of perceptions1' and no question will be asked as to how the perceptions come to assume qualities confessed to be #8independent of their own nature4' ,it is only when they treat them in a way incompatible not merely with their being feelings--that must always be the case--but with their being relations between felt things1 that they are supposed to cross the line which separates experimental knowledge from metaphysical jargon4 ,so long then as space is considered merely as the relation of externality between objects of the #8outer1' time as that of succession between objects of the #8inner1' sense--in other words1 so long as they remain what they are to the earliest self-consciousness and do not become the subject matter of any science of quantity--if we sink the difference between feelings and relations of felt things1 and ask no questions about the origin of the distinction between outer and inner sense1 they may be taken as data of sensitive experience4 ,it is otherwise when they are treated as quantities1 and it is their susceptibility of being so treated that1 rightly understood1 brings out their true character as the intelligible element in sensitive experience4 ,but ,hume contrives at once to treat them as quantities1 thus seeming to give the exact sciences their due1 and yet to appeal to their supposed origin in sense as evidence of their not having properties which1 if they are quantities1 they certainly must have4 ,having thus seemingly disposed of the purely intelligible character of quantity in its application to space and time1 he can more safely ignore what he could not so plausibly dispose of--its pure intelligibility as number4 ,in order to seem to do so1 he must get rid of #8,infinite ,divisibility'4 #bfd4 ,the condition of such a method being acquiesced in is1 that quantity in all its forms should be found reducible to ultimate unites or indivisible parts in the shape of separate impressions4 ,should it be found so1 the whole question indeed1 how ideas of relation are possible for a merely feeling consciousness1 would still remain1 but mathematics would stand on the same footing with the experimental sciences1 as a science of relations between impressions4 ,upon this reducibility1 then1 we find ,hume constantly insisting4 ,in regard to number indeed he could not ignore the fact that the science which deals with it recognizes no ultimate unite1 but only such a one as #8is itself a true number4' ,but he passes lightly over this difficulty with the remark that the divisible unite of actual arithmetic is a #8fictitious denomination'--leaving his reader to guess how the fiction can be possible if the real unite is a separate indivisible impression--and proceeds with the more hopeful task of resolving space into such impressions4 ,he is well aware that the constitution of space by impressions and its constitution by indivisible parts stand or fall together4 ,if space is a compound impression1 it is made up of indivisible parts1 for there is a #8minimum visibile' and by consequence a minimum of imagination2 and conversely1 if its parts are indivisible1 they can be nothing but impressions2 for1 being indivisible1 they cannot be extended1 and1 not being extended1 they must be either simple impressions or nothing4 ,with that instinct of literary strategy which never fails him1 ,hume feels that the case against infinite divisibility1 from its apparent implication of an infinite capacity in the mind1 is more effective than that in favour of space being a compound impression1 and accordingly puts that to the front in the ,second ,part of the ,treatise1 in order1 having found credit for establishing it1 to argue back to the constitution of space by impressions4 ,in fact1 however1 it is on the supposed composition of all quantity from separate impressions that his argument against its infinite divisibility rests4 ,quantity made up of impressions1 and there must be a least possible impression4 #bfe4 ,the essence of his doctrine is contained in the following passages3 #8',tis certain that the imagination reaches a minimum1 and may raise up to itself an idea1 of which it cannot conceive any subdivision1 and which cannot be diminished without a total annihilation4 ,when you tell me of the thousandth and ten thousandth part of a grain of sand1 ,i have a distinct idea of these numbers and of their several proportions1 but the images which ,i form in my mind to represent the things themselves are nothing different from each other nor inferior to that image by which ,i represent the grain of sand itself1 which is supposed so vastly to exceed them4 ,what consists of parts is distinguishable into them1 and what is distinguishable is separable4 ,but whatever we may imagine of the thing1 the idea of a grain of sand is not distinguishable nor separable into twenty1 much less into a thousand1 ten thousand1 or an infinite number of different ideas4 ',tis the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the imagination4 ,put a spot of ink upon paper1 fix your eye upon that spot1 and retire to such a distance that at last you lose sight of it2 'tis plain that the moment before it vanished the image or impression was perfectly indivisible4 ',tis not for want of rays of light striking on our eyes that the minute parts of distant bodies convey not any sensible impression2 but because they are removed beyond that distance at which their impressions were reduced to a minimum1 and were incapable of any further diminution4 ,a microscope or telescope1 which renders them visible1 produces not any new rays of light1 but only spreads those which always flowed from them2 and by that means both gives parts to impressions1 which to the naked eye appear simple and uncompounded1 and advances to a minimum what was formerly imperceptible4' #a #a ,p4 #cce1 ,part ,,ii4 #a4 ,yet it is admitted that there is an idea of number not made up of impressions4 ,a finite division into impressions no more possible than an infinite one4 #bff4 ,in this passage it will be seen that ,hume virtually yields the point as regards number4 ,when he is told of the thousandth or ten thousandth part of a grain of sand he has #8a distinct idea of these numbers and of their different proportions1' though to this idea no distinct #8image' corresponds2 in other words1 though the idea is not a copy of any impression4 ,it is of such parts as parts of the grain of sand--as parts of a #8compound impression'--that he can form no idea1 and for the reason given in the sequel1 that they are less than any possible impression1 less than the #8minimum visibile4' ,this1 it would seem1 is a fixed quantity4 ,that which is the least possible impression once is so always4 ,telescopes and microscopes do not alter it1 but present it under conditions under which it could not be presented to the naked eye4 ,their effect1 according to ,hume1 could not be to render that visible which existed unseen before1 nor to reveal parts in that which previously had1 though it seemed not to have1 them--that would imply that an impression was #8an image of something distinct and external'--but either to present a simple impression of sight where previously there was none or to substitute a compound impression for one that was simple4 #a ,it is then because all divisibility is supposed to be into impressions1 i4e4 into feelings1 and because there are conditions under which every feeling disappears1 that an infinite divisibility is pronounced impossible4 ,but the question is whether a finite divisibility into feelings is not just as impossible as an infinite one4 ,just as for the reasons stated above #b a #8compound feeling' is impossible1 so is the division of a compound into feelings4 ,undoubtedly if the #8minimum visibile' were a feeling it would not be divisible1 but for the same reason it would not be a quantity4 ,but if it is not a quantity1 with what meaning is it called a minimum1 and how can a quantity be supposed to be made up of such #8visibilia' as have themselves no quantity8 ,in truth the #8minimum visibile' is not a feeling at all but a felt thing1 conceived under attributes of quantity2 in particular1 as the term #8minimum' implies1 under a relation of proportion to other quantities of which1 if expressed numerically1 ,hume himself1 according to the admission above noticed1 would have to confess there was an idea which was an image of no impression4 ,that which thought thus presents to itself as a thing doubtless has been a feeling2 but1 as thus presented1 it is already other than and independent of feeling4 ,with a step backward or a turn of the head1 the feeling may cease1 #8the spot of ink may vanish2' but the thing does not therefore cease to be a thing or to have quantity1 which implies the possibility of continuous division4 #a ,it will be noticed that in the last sentence of the passage quoted1 ,hume assumes the convenient privilege of #8speaking with the vulgar1' and treats the #8minimum visibile' presented by telescope or microscope as representing something other than itself1 which previously existed1 though it was imperceptible4 #b ,see above1 #bda #bdf4 ,in ,hume's instances it is not really a feeling1 but a conceived thing1 that appears as finitely divisible4 #bfg4 ,it is thus the confusion between feeling and conception that is at the bottom of the difficulty about divisibility4 ,for a consciousness formed merely by the succession of feelings1 as there would be no thing at all1 so there would be no parts of a thing--no addibility or divisibility4 ,but ,hume is forced by the exigencies of his theory to hold together1 as best he may1 the reduction of all consciousness to feeling and the existence for it of divisible objects4 ,the consequence is his supposition of #8compound impressions' or feelings having parts1 divisible into separate impressions but divisible no further when these separate impressions have been reached4 ,we find1 however1 that in all the instances he gives it is not really a feeling that is divided into feelings1 but a thing into other things4 ,it is the heap of sand1 for instance1 that is divided into grains1 not the feeling which1 by intellectual interpretation1 represents to me a heap of sand that is divided into lesser feelings4 ,i may feel the heap and feel the grain1 but it is not a feeling that is the heap nor a feeling that is the grain4 ,hume would not offend common sense by saying that it was so1 but his theory really required that he should1 for the supposition that the grain is no further divisible when there are no separate impressions into which it may be divided1 implies that in that case it is itself a separate impression1 even as the heap is a compound one4 ,but what difference1 it may be asked1 does it make to say that the heap and the grain are not feelings1 but things conceived of1 if it is admitted1 as since ,berkeley it must be1 that the thing is nothing outside or independent of consciousness8 ,do we not by such a statement merely change names and invite the question how a thought can have parts1 in place of the question how a feeling can have them8 ,upon true notion of quantity infinite divisibility follows of course4 #bfh4 ,if thought were no more than ,hume takes feeling to be1 this objection would be valid4 ,but if by thought we understand the self-conscious principle which1 present to all feelings1 forms out of them a world of mutually related objects1 permanent with its own permanence1 we shall also understand that the relations by which thought qualifies its object are not qualities of itself--that1 in thinking of its object as made up of parts1 it does not become itself a quantum4 ,we shall also be on the way to understand how thought1 detaching that relation of simple distinctness by which it has qualified its objects1 finds before it a multitude of units of which each1 as combining in itself distinctions from all the other units1 is at the same time itself a multitude2 in other words1 finds a quantum of which each part1 being the same in kind with the whole and all other parts1 is also a quantum2 i4e4 which is infinitely divisible4 ,when once it is understood1 in short1 that quantity is simply the most elementary of the relations by which thought constitutes the real world1 as detached from this world and presented by thought to itself as a separate object1 then infinite divisibility becomes a matter of course4 ,it is real just in so far as quantity1 of which it is a necessary attribute1 is real4 ,if quantity1 though not feeling1 is yet real1 that its parts should not be feelings can be nothing against their reality4 ,this once admitted1 the objections to infinite divisibility disappear2 but so likewise does that mysterious dignity supposed to attach to it1 or to its correlative1 the infinitely addible1 as implying an infinite capacity in the mind4 ,from ,hume's point of view1 the mind being #8a bundle of impressions'--though how impressions1 being successive1 should form a bundle is not explained--its capacity must mean the number of its impressions1 and1 all divisibility being into impressions1 it follows that infinite divisibility means an infinite capacity in the mind4 ,this notion however arises1 as we have shown1 from a confusion between a felt division of an impossible #8compound feeling1' and that conceived divisibility of an object which constitutes but a single attribute of the object and represents a single relation of the mind towards it4 ,there may be a sense in which all conception implies infinity in the conceiving mind1 but so far from this doing so in any special way1 it arises1 as we have seen1 from the presentation of objects under that very condition of endless1 unremoved1 distinction which constitutes the true limitation of our thought4 ,what are the ultimate elements of extension8 ,if not extended1 what are they8 #bfi4 ,when1 as with ,hume1 it is only in its application to space and time that the question of infinite divisibility is treated1 its true nature is more easily disguised1 for the reason already indicated1 that space and time are not necessarily considered as quanta4 ,when ,hume1 indeed1 speaks of space as a #8composition of parts' or #8made up of points1' he is of course treating it as a quantum2 but we shall find that in seeking to avoid the necessary consequence of its being a quantum--the consequence1 namely1 that it is infinitely divisible--he can take advantage of the possibility of treating it as the simple1 unquantified1 relation of externality4 ,we have already spoken of the dexterity with which1 having shown that all divisibility1 because into impressions1 is into simple parts1 he turns this into an argument in favour of the composition of space by impressions4 #8,our idea of space is compounded of parts which are indivisible4' ,let us take one of these parts1 then1 and ask what sort of idea it is3 #8let us form a judgment of its nature and qualities4' #8',tis plain it is not an idea of extension3 for the idea of extension consists of parts2 and this idea1 according to the supposition1 is perfectly simple and indivisible4 ,is it therefore nothing8 ,that is impossible1' for it would imply that a real idea was composed of nonentities4 ,the way out of the difficulty is to #8endow the simple parts with colour and solidity4' ,in words already quoted1 #8that compound impression1 which represents extension1 consists of several lesser impressions1 that are indivisible to the eye or feeling1 and may be called impressions of atoms or corpuscles endowed with colour and solidity4' 7,part ,,ii4 #c1 near the end47 ,colours or coloured points8 ,what is the difference8 #bgj4 ,it is very plain that in this passage ,hume is riding two horses at once4 ,he is trying so to combine the notion of the constitution of space by impressions with that of its constitution by points1 as to disguise the real meaning of each4 ,in what lies the difference between the feelings of colour1 of which we have shown that they cannot without contradiction be supposed to #8make up extension1' and #8coloured points or corpuscles'8 ,unless the points1 as points1 mean something1 the substitution of coloured points for colours means nothing4 ,but according to ,hume the point is nothing except as an impression of sight or touch4 ,if then we refuse his words the benefit of an interpretation which his doctrine excludes1 we find that there remains simply the impossible supposition that space consists of feelings4 ,this result cannot be avoided1 unless in speaking of space as composed of points1 we understand by the point that which is definitely other than an impression4 ,thus the question which ,hume puts--,if extension is made up of parts1 and these1 being indivisible1 are unextended1 what are they8--really remains untouched by his ostensible answer4 ,such a question indeed to a philosophy like ,locke's1 which1 ignoring the constitution of reality by relations1 supposed real things to be first found and then relations to be superinduced by the mind--much more to one like ,hume's1 which left no mind to superinduce them--was necessarily unanswerable4 ,true way of dealing with the question4 #bga4 ,in truth1 extension is the relation of mutual externality4 ,the constituents of this relation have not1 as such1 any nature but what is given by the relation4 ,if in ,hume's language we #8separate each from the others and1 considering it apart1 form a judgment of its nature and qualities1' by the very way we put the problem we render it insoluble or1 more properly1 destroy it2 for1 thus separated1 they have no nature4 ,it is this that we express by the proposition which would otherwise be tautological1 that extension is a relation between extended points4 ,the #8points' are the simplest expression for those coefficients to the relation of mutual externality1 which1 as determined by that relation and no otherwise1 have themselves the attribute of being extended and that only4 ,if it is asked whether the points1 being extended1 are therefore divisible1 the answer must be twofold4 ,separately they are not divisible1 for separately they are nothing4 ,whether1 as determined by mutual relation1 they are divisible or no1 depends on whether they are treated as forming a quantum or no4 ,if they are not so treated1 we cannot with propriety pronounce them to be either further divisible or not so1 for the question of divisibility has no application to them4 ,but being perfectly homogeneous with each other and with that which together they constitute1 they are susceptible of being so treated1 and are so treated when1 with ,hume in the passage before us1 we speak of them as the parts of which extended matter consists4 ,thus considered as parts of a quantum and therefore themselves quanta1 the infinite divisibility which belongs to all quantity belongs also to them4 #8,if the point were divisible1 it would be no termination of a line4' ,answer to this4 #bgb4 ,in this lies the answer to the most really cogent argument which ,hume offers against infinite divisibility #8,a surface terminates a solid2 a line terminates a surface2 a point terminates a line3 but ,i assert that if the ideas of a point1 line1 or surface were not indivisible1 'tis impossible we should ever conceive these terminations4 ,for let these ideas be supposed infinitely divisible1 and then let the fancy endeavour to fix itself on the idea of the last surface1 line1 or point1 it immediately finds this idea to break into parts2 and upon its seizing the last of these parts it loses its hold by a new division1 and so on ad infinitum1 without any possibility of its arriving at a concluding idea'4 #a ,if #8point1' #8line1' or #8surface' were really names for #8ideas' either in ,hume's sense1 as feelings grown fainter1 or in ,locke's1 as definite imprints made by outward things1 this passage would be perplexing4 ,in truth they represent objects determined by certain conceived relations1 and the relation under which the object is considered may vary without a corresponding variation in the name4 ,when a #8point' is considered simply as the #8termination of a line1' it is not considered as a quantum4 ,it represents the abstraction of the relation of externality1 as existing between two lines4 ,it is these lines1 not the point1 that in this case are the constituents of the relation1 and thus it is they alone that are for the time considered as extended1 therefore as quanta1 therefore as divisible4 ,so when the line in turn is considered as the #8termination of a surface4' ,it then represents the relation of externality as between surfaces1 and for the time it is the surfaces1 not the line1 that are considered to have extension and its consequences4 ,the same applies to the view of a surface as the termination of a solid4 ,just as the line1 though not a quantum when considered simply as a relation between surfaces1 becomes so when considered in relation to another line1 so the point1 though it #8has no magnitude' when considered as the termination of a line1 yet acquires parts1 or becomes divisible1 so soon as it is considered in relation to other points as a constituent of extended matter2 and it is thus that ,hume considers it1 #b1 when he talks of extension as #8made up of coloured points4' #a ,p4 #cde4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 #b ,greek 7hekon e akon7 like it or not4 ,tr4 ,what becomes of the exactness of mathematics according to ,hume8 #bgc4 ,it is the necessity then1 according to his theory1 of making space an impression that throughout underlies ,hume's argument against its infinite divisibility2 and1 as we have seen1 the same theory which excludes its infinite divisibility logically extinguishes it as a quantity1 divisible and measurable1 altogether4 ,he of course does not recognize this consequence4 ,he is obliged indeed to admit that in regard to the proportions of #8greater1 equal and less1' and the relations of different parts of space to each other1 no judgments of universality or exactness are possible4 ,we may judge of them1 however1 he holds1 with various approximations to exactness1 whereas upon the supposition of infinite divisibility1 as he ingeniously makes out1 we could not judge of them at all4 ,he #8asks the mathematicians1 what they mean when they say that one line or surface is equal to1 or greater or less than1 another4' ,if they #8maintain the composition of extension by indivisible points1' their answer1 he supposes1 will be that #8lines or surfaces are equal when the numbers of points in each are equal4' ,this answer he reckons #8just1' but the standard of equality given is entirely useless4 #8,for as the points which enter into the composition of any line or surface1 whether perceived by the sight or touch1 are so minute and so confounded with each other that 'tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number1 such a computation will never afford us a standard by which we may judge of proportions4' ,the opposite sect of mathematicians1 however1 are in worse case1 having no standard of equality whatever to assign4 #8,for since1 according to their hypothesis1 the least as well as greatest figures contain an infinite number of parts1 and since infinite numbers1 properly speaking1 can neither be equal nor unequal with respect to each other1 the equality or inequality of any portion of space can never depend on any proportion in the number of their parts4' ,his own doctrine is #8that the only useful notion of equality or inequality is derived from the whole united appearance1 and the comparison of1 particular objects4' ,the judgments thus derived are in many cases certain and infallible4 #8,when the measure of a yard and that of a foot are presented1 the mind can no more question that the first is longer than the second than it can doubt of those principles which are most clear and self-evident4' ,such judgments1 however1 though #8sometimes infallible1 are not always so4' ,upon a #8review and reflection' we often #8pronounce those objects equal which at first we esteemed unequal1' and vice vers4 ,often also #8we discover our error by a juxtaposition of the objects2 or1 where that is impracticable1 by the use of some common and invariable measure which1 being successively applied to each1 informs us of their different proportions4 ,and even this correction is susceptible of a new correction1 and of different degrees of exactness1 according to the nature of the instrument by which we measure the bodies1 and the care which we employ in the comparison4' #a #a ,pp4 #cea-ec4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 ,the universal propositions of geometry either untrue or unmeaning4 #bgd4 ,such indefinite approach to exactness is all that ,hume can allow to the mathematician4 ,but it is undoubtedly another and an absolute sort of exactness that the mathematician himself supposes when he pronounces all right angles equal4 ,such perfect equality #8beyond what we have instruments and art' to ascertain1 ,hume boldly calls a #8mere fiction of the mind1 useless as well as incomprehensible'4 #a ,thus when the mathematician talks of certain angles as always equal1 of certain lines as never meeting1 he is either making statements that are untrue or speaking of nonentities4 ,if his #8lines' and #8angles' mean ideas that we can possibly have1 his universal propositions are untrue2 if they do not1 according to ,hume they can mean nothing4 ,he says1 for instance1 that #8two right lines cannot have a common segment2' but of such ideas of right lines as we can possibly have this is only true #8where the right lines incline upon each other with a sensible angle4' #b ,it is not true when they #8approach at the rate of an inch in #bj leagues4' ,according to the #8original standard of a right line1' which is #8nothing but a certain general appearance1 'tis evident right lines may be made to concur with each other'4 #c ,any other standard is a #8useless and incomprehensible fiction4' ,strictly speaking1 according to ,hume1 we have it not1 but only a tendency to suppose that we have it arising from the progressive correction of our actual measurements4 #d #a ,p4 #cec4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 #b ,cf4 ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 #iih;a1 on a corresponding view ascribed to ,protagoras4 #c ,p4 #cef4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 #d ,p4 #ced4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iv4 ,distinction between ,hume's doctrine and that of the hypothetical nature of mathematics4 #bge4 ,now it is obvious that what ,hume accounts for by means of this tendency to feign1 even if the tendency did not presuppose conditions incompatible with his theory1 is not mathematical science as it exists4 ,it has even less appearance of being so than 7to anticipate7 has that which is accounted for by those propensities to feign1 which he substitutes for the ideas of cause and substance1 of being natural science as it exists4 ,in the latter case1 when the idea of necessary connexion has been disposed of1 an impression of reflection can with some plausibility be made to do duty instead2 but there is no impression of reflection in ,hume's sense of the word1 no #8propensity1' that can be the subject of mathematical reasoning4 ,he speaks1 indeed1 of our supposing some imaginary standard--of our having #8an obscure and implicit notion'--of perfect equality1 but such language is only a way of saving appearances2 for according to him1 a #8supposition' or #8notion' which is neither impression nor idea1 cannot be anything4 ,a hasty reader1 catching at the term #8supposition1' may find his statement plausible with all the plausibility of the modern doctrine1 which accounts for the universality and exactness of mathematical truths as #8hypothetical'--the doctrine that we suppose figures exactly corresponding to our definitions1 though such do not really exist4 ,with those who take this view1 however1 it is always understood that the definitions represent ideas1 though not ideas to which real objects can be found exactly answering4 ,perhaps1 if pressed about their distinction between idea and reality1 they might find it hard consistently to maintain it1 but it is by this practically that they keep their theory afloat4 ,hume can admit no such distinction4 ,the real with him is the impression1 and the idea the fainter impression4 ,there can be no idea of a straight line1 a curve1 a circle1 a right angle1 a plane1 other than the impression1 other than the #8appearance to the eye1' and there are no appearances exactly answering to the mathematical definitions4 ,if they do not exactly answer1 they might as well for the purposes of mathematical demonstration not answer at all4 ,the ,geometrician1 having found that the angles at the base of this isosceles triangle are equal to each other1 at once takes the equality to be true of all isosceles triangles1 as being exactly like the original one1 and on the strength of this establishes many other propositions4 ,but1 according to ,hume1 no idea that we could have would be one of which the sides were precisely equal4 ,the ,fifth ,proposition of ,euclid then is not precisely true of the particular idea that we have before us when we follow the demonstration4 ,much less can it be true of the ideas1 i4e4 the several appearances of colour1 indefinitely varying from this1 which we have before us when we follow the other demonstrations in which the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles is taken for granted4 ,the admission that no relations of quantity are data of sense removes difficulty as to general propositions about them4 #bgf4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 what we have to lament is not that ,hume #8pushed his doctrine too far1' so far as to exclude ideas of those exact proportions in space with which geometry purports to deal1 but that he did not carry it far enough to see that it excluded all ideas of quantitative relations whatever4 ,he thus pays the penalty for his equivocation between a feeling of colour and a disposition of coloured points4 ,even alongside of his admission that #8relations of space and time' are independent of the nature of the ideas so related1 which amounts to the admission that of space and time there are no ideas at all in his sense of the word1 he allows himself to treat #8proportions between spaces' as depending entirely on our ideas of the spaces--depending on ideas which in the context he by implication admits that we have not4 #a ,if1 instead of thus equivocating1 he had asked himself how sensations of colour and touch could be added or divided1 how one could serve as a measure of the size of another1 he might have seen that only in virtue of that in the #8general appearance' of objects which1 in his own language1 is #8independent of the nature of the ideas themselves'--i4e4 which does not belong to them as feelings1 but is added by the comparing and combining thought--are the proportions of greater1 less1 and equal predicable of them at all2 that what thought has thus added1 viz4 limitation by mutual externality1 it can abstract2 and that by such abstraction of the limit it obtains those several terminations1 as ,hume well calls them--the surface terminating bodies1 the line terminating surfaces1 the point terminating lines--from which it constructs the world of pure space3 that thus the same action of thought in sense1 which alone renders appearances measurable1 gives an object matter which1 because the pure construction of thought1 we can measure exactly and with the certainty that the judgment based on a comparison of magnitudes in a single case is true of all possible cases1 because in none of these can any other conditions be present than those which we have consciously put there4 #a ,part ,,iii4 #a1 sub init4 ,hume does virtually admit this in regard to numbers4 #bgg4 ,to have arrived at this conclusion ,hume had only to extend to proportions in space the principle upon which the impossibility of sensualizing arithmetic compels him to deal with proportions in number4 #8,we are possessed1' he says1 #8of a precise standard by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers2 and according as they correspond or not to that standard we determine their relations without any possibility of error4 ,when two numbers are so combined1 as that the one has always an unite answering to every unite of the other1 we pronounce them equal'4 #a ,now what are the unites here spoken of8 ,if they were those single impressions which he elsewhere #b seems to regard as alone properly unites1 the point of the passage would be gone1 for combinations of such unites could at any rate only yield those #8general appearances' of whose proportions we have been previously told there can be no precise standard4 ,they can be no other than those unites which1 not being impressions1 he has to call #8fictitious denominations'--unites which are nothing except in relation to each other and of which each1 being in turn divisible1 is itself a true number4 ,we can easily retort upon ,hume1 then1 when he argues that the supposition of infinite divisibility is incompatible with any comparison of quantities because with any unite of measurement1 that1 according to his own virtual admission1 in the only case where such comparison is exact the ultimate unite of measurement is still itself divisible2 which1 indeed1 is no more than saying that whatever measures quantity must itself be a quantity1 and that therefore quantity is infinitely divisible4 ,if ,hume1 instead of slurring over this characteristic of the science of number1 had set himself to explain it1 he would have found that the only possible explanation of it was one equally applicable to the science of space--that what is true of the unite1 as the abstraction of distinctness1 is true also of the abstraction of externality4 ,as the unite1 because constituted by relation to other unites1 so soon as considered breaks into multiplicity1 and only for that reason is a quantity by which other quantities can be measured2 so is it also with the limit in whatever form abstracted1 whether as point1 line1 or surface4 ,if the fact that number can have no least part since each part is itself a number or nothing1 so far from being incompatible with the finiteness of number1 is the consequence of that finiteness1 neither can the like attribute in spaces be incompatible with their being definite magnitudes1 that can be compared with and measured by each other4 ,the real difference1 which is also the rationale of ,hume's different procedure in the two cases1 is that the conception of space is more easily confused than that of number with the feelings to which it is applied1 and which through such application become sensible spaces4 ,hence the liability to the supposition1 which is at bottom ,hume's1 that the last feeling in the process of diminution before such sensible space disappears 7being the #8minimum visibile'7 is the least possible portion of space4 #a ,p4 #cgd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 #b ,above1 par4 #beh4 ,with ,hume idea of vacuum impossible1 but logically not more so than that of space4 #bgh4 ,just as that reduction of consciousness to feeling1 which really excludes the idea of quantity altogether1 is by ,hume only recognised as incompatible with its infinite divisibility1 so it is not recognised as extinguishing space altogether1 but only space as a vacuum4 ,if it be true1 he says1 #8that the idea of space is nothing but the idea of visible or tangible points distributed in a certain order1 it follows that we can form no idea of vacuum1 or space where there is nothing visible or tangible'4 #a ,here as elsewhere the acceptability of his statement lies in its being taken in a sense which according to his principles cannot properly belong to it4 ,it is one doctrine that the ideas of space and body are essentially correlative1 and quite another that the idea of space is equivalent to a feeling of sight or touch4 ,it is of the latter doctrine that ,hume's denial of a vacuum is the corollary2 but it is the former that gains acceptance for this denial in the mind of his reader4 ,space we have already spoken of as the relation of externality4 ,if1 abstracting this relation from the world of which it is the uniform but most elementary determination1 we regard it as a relation between objects having no other determination1 these become spaces and nothing but spaces--space pure and simple1 vacuum4 ,but we have known the world in confused fulness before we detach its constituent relations in the clearness of unreal abstraction4 ,we have known bodies #b1 before we think their limits apart and out of these construct a world of pure space4 ,it is thus in a sense true that in the development of our consciousness an idea of body precedes that of space1 though the abstraction of space--the detachment of the relation so-called from the real complex of relations--precedes that of body2 and it is this fact that1 in the face of geometry1 strengthens common sense in its position that an idea of vacuum is impossible4 ,it is not1 however1 the inseparability of space from body whether in reality or for our consciousness1 but its identity with a certain sort of feeling1 that is implied in ,hume's exclusion of the idea of vacuum4 #8,body1' as other than feeling1 is with him as much a fiction as vacuum4 ,that there can be no idea of vacuum1 is thus in fact merely his negative way of putting that proposition of which the positive form is1 that space is a compound impression of sight and touch4 ,having examined that proposition in the positive1 we need not examine it again in the negative form4 ,it will be more to the purpose to enquire whether the #8tendency to suppose' or #8propensity to feign' by which1 in the absence of any such idea1 our language about #8pure space' has to be accounted for1 does not according to ,hume's own showing presuppose such an idea4 #a ,p4 #ceh4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 #b ,greek 7synkechymenos7 confused or jumbled-up4 ,tr4 ,how it is that we talk as if we had idea of vacuum according to ,hume4 #bgi4 ,by vacuum he understands invisible and intangible extension4 ,if an idea of vacuum1 then1 is possible at all1 he argues1 it must be possible for darkness and mere motion to convey it4 ,that they cannot do so alone is clear from the consideration that darkness is #8no positive idea' and that an #8invariable motion1' such as that of a #8man supported in the air and softly conveyed along by some invisible power1' gives no idea at all4 ,neither can they do so when #8attended with visible and tangible objects4' #8,when two bodies present themselves where there was formerly an entire darkness1 the only change that is discoverable is in the appearance of these two objects3 all the rest continues to be1 as before1 a perfect negation of light and of every coloured or tangible object'4 #a #8,such dark and indistinguishable distance between two bodies can never produce the idea of extension1' any more than blindness can4 ,neither can a like #8imaginary distance between tangible and solid bodies4' #8,suppose two cases1 viz4 that of a man supported in the air1 and moving his limbs to and fro without meeting anything tangible2 and that of a man who1 feeling something tangible1 leaves it1 and after a motion of which he is sensible perceives another tangible object4 ,wherein consists the difference between these two cases8 ,no one will scruple to affirm that it consists merely in the perceiving those objects1 and that the sensation which arises from the motion is in both cases the same2 and as that sensation is not capable of conveying to us an idea of extension1 when unaccompanied with some other perception1 it can no more give us that idea1 when mixed with the impressions of tangible objects1 since that mixture produces no alteration upon it'4 #b ,but though a #8distance not filled with any coloured or solid object' cannot give us an idea of vacuum1 it is the cause why we falsely imagine that we can form such an idea4 ,there are #8three relations'--natural relations according to ,hume's phraseology #c--;between it and that distance which really #8conveys the idea of extension4' #8,the distant objects affect the senses in the same manner1 whether separated by the one distance or the other2 the former species of distance is found capable of receiving the latter2 and they both equally diminish the force of every quality4 ,these relations betwixt the two kinds of distance will afford us an easy reason why the one has so often been taken for the other1 and why we imagine we have an idea of extension without the idea of any object either of the sight or feeling'4 #d #a ,p4 #cfb4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 #b ,p4 #cfc4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 #c ,above1 #bjf4 #d ,p4 #cfd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 ,his explanation implies that we have an idea virtually the same4 #bhj4 ,it appears then that we have an idea of #8distance unfilled with any coloured or solid object4' ,to speak of this distance as #8imaginary' or fictitious can according to ,hume's principles make no difference1 so long as he admits1 which he is obliged to do1 that we actually have an idea of it2 for every idea1 being derived from an impression1 is as much or as little imaginary as every other4 ,and not only have we such an idea1 but ,hume's account of the #8relations' between it and the idea of extension implies that1 as ideas of distance1 they do not differ at all4 ,but the idea of #8distance unfilled with any coloured or solid object' is the idea of vacuum4 ,it follows that the idea of extension does not differ from that of vacuum1 except so far as it is other than the idea of distance4 ,but it is from the consideration of distance that ,hume himself expressly derives it2 #a and so derived1 it can no more differ from distance than an idea from a corresponding impression4 ,thus1 after all1 he has to all intents and purposes to admit the idea of vacuum1 but saves appearances by refusing to call it extension--the sole reason for such refusal being the supposition that every idea1 and therefore the idea of extension1 must be a datum of sense1 which the admission of an idea of #8invisible and intangible distance' already contradicts4 #a ,part ,,ii4 #c1 sub4 inst4 ,by a like device that he is able to explain the appearance of our having such ideas as ,causation and ,identity4 #bha4 ,we now know the nature of that preliminary manipulation which #8impressions and ideas' have to undergo1 if their association is to yield the result which ,hume requires--if through it the succession of feelings is to become a knowledge of things and their relations4 ,such a result was required as the only means of maintaining together the two characteristic positions of ,locke's philosophy2 that1 namely1 the only world we can know is the world of #8ideas1' and that thought cannot originate ideas4 ,those relations1 which ,locke had inconsistently treated at once as intellectual superinductions and as ultimate conditions of reality1 must be dealt with by one of two methods4 ,they must be reduced to impressions where that could plausibly be done3 where it could not1 it must be admitted that we have no ideas of them1 but only #8tendencies to suppose' that we have such1 arising from the association1 through #8natural relations1' of the ideas that we have4 ,so dexterously does ,hume work the former method that1 of all the #8philosophical relations' which he recognizes1 only ,identity and ,causation remain to be disposed of by the latter2 and if the other relations--resemblance1 time and space1 proportion in quantity and degree in quality--could really be admitted as data of sense1 there would at least be a possible basis for those #8tendencies to suppose' which1 in the absence of any corresponding ideas1 the terms #8,identity' and #8,causation' must be taken to represent4 ,but1 as we have shown1 they can only be claimed for sense1 if sense is so far one with thought--one not by conversion of thought into sense but by taking of sense into thought--as that ,hume's favourite appeals to sense against the reality of intelligible relations become unmeaning4 ,they may be #8impressions1' there may be #8impressions of them1' but only if we deny of the impression what ,hume asserts of it1 and assert of it what he denies--only if we understand by #8impression' not an #8internal and perishing existence2' not that which1 if other than taste1 colour1 sound1 smell or touch1 must be a #8passion or emotion #82 not that which carries no reference to an object other than itself1 and which must either be single or compound2 but something permanent and constituted by permanently coexisting parts2 something that may #8be conjoined with' any feeling1 because it is none2 that always carries with it a reference to a subject which it is not but of which it is a quality2 and that is both many and one1 since #8in its simplicity it contains many different resemblances and relations4' #bhb4 ,in the account just adduced of vacuum1 the effect of that double dealing with #8impressions1' which we shall have to trace at large in ,hume's explanation of our language about ,causation and ,identity1 is already exhibited in little4 ,just as1 after the idea of pure space has been excluded because not a copy of any possible impression1 we yet find an #8idea1' only differing from it in name1 introduced as the basis of that tendency to suppose which is to take the place of the excluded idea1 so we shall find ideas of relation in the way of ,identity and ,causation--ideas which according to ,hume we have not--presupposed as the source of those #8propensities to feign' which he accounts for the appearance of our having them4 ,knowledge of relation in way of ,identity and ,causation excluded by ,locke's definition of knowledge4 #bhc4 ,the primary characteristic of these relations according to ,hume1 which they share with those of space and time1 and which in fact vitiates that definition of #8philosophical relation1' as depending on comparison1 which he adopts1 is that they #8depend not on the ideas compared together1 but may be changed without any change in the ideas'4 #a ,it follows that they are not objects of knowledge1 according to the definition of knowledge which ,hume inherited1 as #8the perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas4' ,a partial recognition of this consequence in regard to cause and effect we found in ,locke's suspicion that a science of nature was impossible--impossible because1 however often a certain #8idea of quality and substance' may have followed or accompanied another1 such sequence or accompaniment never amounts to agreement or #8necessary connexion' between the ideas1 and therefore never can warrant a general assertion1 but only the particular one1 that the ideas in question have so many times occurred in such an order4 #8,matters of fact1' however1 which no more consist in agreement of ideas than does causation1 are by ,locke treated without scruple as matter of knowledge when they can be regarded as relations between present sensations4 ,thus the #8particular experiment' in ,physics constitutes knowledge--the knowledge1 for instance1 that a piece of gold is now dissolved in aqua regia2 and when #8,i myself see a man walk on the ice1 it is knowledge4' ,in such cases it does not occur to him to ask1 either what are the ideas that agree or how much of the experiment is a present sensation4 #b ,nor does ,hume commonly carry his analysis further4 ,after admitting that the relations called #8identity and situation in time and place' do not depend on the nature of the ideas related1 he proceeds3 #8,when both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation1 we call this perception rather than reasoning2 nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought or any action1 properly speaking1 but a mere passive admission of the impressions through the organs of sensation4 ,according to this way of thinking1 we ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity and the relations of time and place2 since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses1 either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects'4 #c #a ,p4 #cgb4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 #b ,above1 #abb #abc4 #c ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,inference a transition from an object perceived or remembered to one that is not so4 #bhd4 ,this passage points out the way which ,hume's doctrine of causation was to follow4 ,that in any case #8the mind should go beyond a present feeling1 either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects' other than present feelings1 was what he could not consistently admit4 ,in the judgment of causation1 however1 it seems to do so4 #8,from the existence or action of one object1' seen or remembered1 it seems to be assured of the existence or action of another1 not seen or remembered1 on the ground of a necessary connection between the two4 #a ,it is such assurance that is reckoned to constitute reasoning in the distinctive sense of the term1 as different at once from the analysis of complex ideas and the simple succession of ideas--such reasoning as1 in the language of a later philosophy1 can yield synthetic propositions4 ,what ,hume has to do1 then1 is to explain this #8assurance' away by showing that it is not essentially different from that judgment of relation in time and place which1 because the related objects are #8present to the senses along with the relation1' is called #8perception rather than reasoning1' and to which no #8exercise of the thought' is necessary1 but a #8mere passive admission of impressions through the organs of sensation4' ,nor1 for the assimilation of reasoning to perception1 is anything further needed than a reference to the connection of ideas with impressions and of the ideas of imagination with those of memory1 as originally stated by ,hume4 ,when both of the objects compared are present to the senses1 we call the comparison perception2 when neither1 or only one1 is so present1 we call it reasoning4 ,but the difference between the object that is present to sense1 and that which is not1 is merely the difference between impression and idea1 which again is merely the difference between the more and the less lively feeling4 #b ,to feeling1 whether with more or with less vivacity1 every object1 whether of perception or reasoning1 must alike be present4 ,is it then a sufficient account of the matter1 according to ,hume1 to say that when we are conscious of contiguity and succession between objects of which both are impressions we call it perception2 but that when both objects are ideas1 or one an impression and the other an idea1 we call it reasoning8 ,not quite so4 ,suppose that ,i #8have seen that species of object we call flame1 and have afterwards felt that species of sensation we call heat4' ,if ,i afterwards remembered the succession of the feeling upon the sight1 both objects 7according to ,hume's original usage of terms #c7 would be ideas as distinct from the impressions2 or1 if upon seeing the flame ,i remembered the previous experience of heat1 one object would be an idea2 but we should not reckon it a case of reasoning4 #8,in all cases wherein we reason concerning objects1 there is only one either perceived or remembered1 and the other is supplied in conformity to our past experience'--supplied by the only other faculty than memory that can #8supply an idea1' viz4 imagination4 #d #a ,pp4 #cgf1 #chd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 secs4 ,,ii4 and ,,iv4 #b ,pp4 #cbg1 #cge4 ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vii4 and part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #c ,above1 par4 #aie4 #d ,pp4 #chd1 #chh4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 secs4 ,,iv4 and ,v4 ,relation of cause and effect the same as this transition4 #bhe4 ,this being the only account of #8inference from the known to the unknown1' which ,hume could consistently admit1 his view of the relation of cause and effect must be adjusted to it4 ,it could not be other than a relation either between impression and impression1 or between impression and idea1 or between idea and idea2 and all these relations are equally between feelings that we experience4 ,thus1 instead of being the #8objective basis' on which inference from the known to the unknown rests1 it is itself the inference2 or1 more properly1 it and the inference alike disappear into a particular sort of transition from feeling to feeling4 ,the problem1 then1 is to account for its seeming to be other than this4 #8,there is nothing in any objects to persuade us that they are always remote or always contiguous2 and when from experience and observation we discover that the relation in this particular is invariable1 we always conclude that there is some secret cause which separates or unites them'4 #a ,it would seem1 then1 that the relation of cause and effect is something which we infer from experience1 from the connection of impressions and ideas1 but which is not itself impression or idea4 ,and it would seem further1 that1 as we infer such an unexperienced relation1 so likewise we make inferences from it4 ,in regard to identity #8we readily suppose an object may continue individually the same1 though several times absent from and present to the senses2 and ascribe to it an identity1 notwithstanding the interruption of the perception1 whenever we conclude that if we had kept our hand or eye constantly upon it1 it would have conveyed an invariable and uninterrupted perception4 ,but this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connection of cause and effect2 nor can we otherwise have any security that the object is not changed upon us1 however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses4' #a ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,yet seems other than this4 ,how this appearance is to be explained4 #bhf4 ,this relation which1 going beyond our actual experience1 we seem to infer as the explanation of invariable contiguity in place or time of certain impressions1 and from which again we seem to infer the identity of an object of which the perception has been interrupted1 is what we call necessary connection4 ,it is their supposed necessary connection which distinguishes objects related as cause and effect from those related merely in the way of contiguity and succession1 #a and it is a like supposition that leads us to infer what we do not see or remember from what we do4 ,if then the reduction of thought and the intelligible world to feeling was to be made good1 this supposition1 not being an impression of sense or a copy of such1 must be shown to be an #8impression of reflection1' according to ,hume's sense of the term1 i4e4 a tendency of the soul1 analogous to desire and aversion1 hope and fear1 derived from impressions of sense but not copied from them2 #b and the inference which it determines must be shown to be the work of imagination1 as affected by such impression of reflection4 ,this in brief is the purport of ,hume's doctrine of causation4 #a ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,above1 par4 #aie4 ,inference1 resting on supposition of necessary connection1 to be explained before that connection4 #bhg4 ,after his manner1 however1 he will go about with his reader4 ,the supposed #8objective basis' of knowledge is to be made to disappear1 but in such a way that no one shall miss it4 ,so dexterously1 indeed1 is this done1 that perhaps to this day the ordinary student of ,hume is scarcely conscious of the disappearance4 ,hume merely announces to begin with that he will #8postpone the direct survey of this question concerning the nature of necessary connection1' and deal first with these other two questions1 viz4 7#a7 #8,for what reason we pronounce it necessary that everything whose existence has a beginning1 should also have a cause8' and 7#b7 #8,why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects2 and what is the nature of that inference we draw from the one to the other1 and of the belief we repose in it8' ,that is to say1 he will consider the inference from cause or effect1 before he considers cause and effect as a relation between objects1 on which the inference is supposed to depend4 ,meanwhile necessary connection1 as a relation between objects1 is naturally supposed in some sense or other to survive4 ,in what sense1 the reader expects to find when these two preliminary questions have been answered4 ,but when they have been answered1 necessary connection1 as a relation between objects1 turns out to have vanished4 ,account of the inference given by ,locke and ,clarke rejected4 #bhh4 ,with the first of the above questions ,hume only concerns himself so far as to show that we cannot know either intuitively or demonstratively1 in ,locke's sense of the words1 that #8everything whose existence has a beginning also has a cause4' ,locke's own argument for the necessity of causation--that #8something cannot be produced by nothing'--as well as ,clarke's--that #8if anything wanted a cause it would produce itself1 i4e4 exist before it existed'--are merely different ways1 as ,hume shows1 of assuming the point in question4 #8,if everything must have a cause1 it follows that upon exclusion of other causes we must accept of the object itself1 or of nothing1 as causes4 ,but 'tis the very point in question1 whether everything must have a cause or not'4 #a ,on that point1 according to ,locke's own showing1 there can be no certainty1 intuitive or demonstrative2 for between the idea of beginning to exist and the idea of cause there is clearly no agreement1 mediate or immediate4 ,they are not similar feelings1 they are not quantities that can be measured against each other1 and to these alone can the definition of knowledge and reasoning1 which ,hume retained1 apply4 ,there thus disappears that last remnant of #8knowledge' in regard to nature which ,locke had allowed to survive--the knowledge that there is a necessary connection1 though one which we cannot find out4 #b #a ,p4 #chb4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #b cf4 ,locke ,,iv4 #c1 #bi1 and ,introduc1 par4 #aba4 ,three points to be explained in the inference according to ,hume4 #bhi4 ,having thus shown1 as he conceives1 what the true answer to the first of the above questions is not1 ,hume proceeds to show what it is by answering the second4 #8,since it is not from knowledge or any scientific reasoning that we derive the opinion of the necessity of a cause to every new production1' it must be from experience2 #a and every general opinion derived from experience is merely the summary of a multitude of particular ones4 ,accordingly when it has been explained why we infer particular causes from particular effects 7and vice vers71 the inference from every event to a cause will have explained itself4 ,now #8all our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or senses1 and of the idea of that existence which produces the object of the impression or is produced by it4 ,here1 therefore1 we have three things to explain1 viz4 first1 the original impression2 secondly1 the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect2 thirdly1 the nature and qualities of that idea4' #b #a ,p4 #chc4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #b ,p4 #che4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,v4 a4 ,the original impression from which the transition is made1 and b4 ,the transition to inferred idea #bij4 ,as to the original impression we must notice that there is a certain inconsistency with ,hume's previous usage of terms in speaking of an impression of memory at all4 #a ,this1 however1 will be excused when we reflect that according to him impression and idea only differ in liveliness1 and that he is consistent in claiming for the ideas of memory1 not indeed the maximum1 but a high degree of vivacity1 superior to that which belongs to ideas of imagination4 ,all that can be said1 then1 of that #8original impression1' whether of the memory or senses1 which is necessary to any #8reasoning from cause or effect1' is that it is highly vivacious4 ,that the transition from it to the #8idea of the connected cause or effect' is not determined by reason1 has already been settled4 ,it could only be so determined1 according to the received account of reason1 if there were some agreement in respect of quantity or quality between the idea of cause and that of the effect1 to be ascertained by the interposition of other ideas4 #b ,but when we examine any particular objects that we hold to be related as cause and effect1 e4g4 the sight of flame and the feeling of heat1 we find no such agreement4 ,what we do find is their #8constant conjunction' in experience1 and #8conjunction' is equivalent to that #8contiguity in time and place1' which has already been pointed out as one of those #8natural relations' which act as #8principles of union' between ideas4 #c ,because the impression of flame has always been found to be followed by the impression of heat1 the idea of flame always suggests the idea of heat4 ,it is simple custom then that determines the transition from the one to the other1 or renders #8necessary' the connection between them4 ,in order that the transition1 however1 may constitute an inference from cause to effect 7or vice vers71 one of the two objects thus naturally related1 but not both1 must be presented as an impression4 ,if both were impressions it would be a case of #8sensation1 not reasoning2' if both were ideas1 no belief would attend the transition4 ,this brings us to the question as to the #8nature and qualities' of the inferred idea4 #a ,above1 par4 #aie4 #b ,cf4 ,locke ,,iv4 #ag1 #b4 #c ,above1 par4 #bjf4 c4 ,the qualities of this idea4 #bia4 #8',tis evident that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions concerning matter of fact1 i4e4 concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities'2 #a in other words1 in belief4 ,if this meant a new idea1 an idea that we have not previously had1 it would follow that inference could really carry us beyond sense1 that there could be an idea not copied from any prior impression4 ,but according to ,hume it does not mean this4 #8,the idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent2' #b and not only so1 #8the belief of existence joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object4 ,when ,i think of ,god1 when ,i think of him as existent1 and when ,i believe him to be existent1 my idea of him neither increases nor diminishes'4 #c ,in what then lies the difference between incredulity and belief2 between an #8idea assented to1' or an object believed to exist1 and a fictitious object or idea from which we dissent8 ,the answer is1 #8not in the parts or composition of the idea1 but in the manner of conceiving it1' which must be understood to mean the manner of #8feeling' it2 and this difference is further explained to lie in #8the superior force1 or vivacity1 or steadiness' with which it is felt4' #d ,we are thus brought to the further question1 how it is that this #8superior vivacity' belongs to the inferred idea when we #8reason' from cause to effect or from effect to cause4 ,the answer here is that the #8impression of the memory or senses1' which in virtue of a #8natural relation' suggests the idea1 also #8communicates to it a share of its force or vivacity4' #a ,p4 #cid4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vii4 #b ,p4 #cgj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,vi4 #c ,p4 #cie4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 #d ,p4 #cih ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vii44 ,cf4 above1 par4 #agj1 for the corresponding view in ,berkeley4 ,it results that necessary connection is an impression of reflection1 i4e41 a propensity to the transition described4 #bib4 ,thus it appears that in order to the conclusion that any particular cause must have any particular effect1 there is needed first the presence of an impression1 and secondly the joint action of those two #8principles of union among ideas1' resemblance and contiguity4 ,in virtue of the former principle the given impression calls up the image of a like impression previously experienced1 which again in virtue of the latter calls up the image of its usual attendant1 and the liveliness of the given impression so communicates itself to the recalled ideas as to constitute belief in their existence4 ,if this is the true account of the matter1 the question as to the nature of necessary connexion has answered itself4 #8,the necessary connexion betwixt causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other4 ,the foundation of the inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union4 ,these are therefore the same'4 #a ,we may thus understand how it is that there seems to be an idea of such connexion to which no impression of the senses1 or 7to use an equivalent phrase of ,hume's7 no #8quality in objects' corresponds4 ,if the first presentation of two objects1 of which one is cause1 the other effect1 7i4e4 of which we afterwards come to consider one the cause1 the other the effect7 gives no idea of a connexion between them1 as it clearly does not1 neither can it do so however often repeated4 ,it would not do so1 unless the repetition #8either discovered or produced something new' in the objects2 and it does neither4 ,but it does #8produce a new impression in the mind4' ,after observing a #8constant conjunction of the objects1 and an uninterrupted resemblance of their relations of contiguity and succession1 we immediately feel a determination of the mind to pass from one of the objects to its usual attendant1 and to conceive it in a stronger light on account of that relation4' ,it is of this #8internal impression1' this #8propensity which custom produces1' that the idea of necessary connexion is the copy4 #b #a ,p4 #dfj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4 #b ,pp4 #deg-dfj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4 ,the transition not to anything beyond sense4 #bic4 ,the sequence of ideas1 which this propensity determines1 clearly does not involve any inference #8beyond sense1' #8from the known to the unknown1' #8from instances of which we have had experience1 to those of which we have had none1' any more than does any other #8recurrence of an idea'--which1 as we have seen1 merely means1 according to ,hume1 the return of a feeling at a lower level of intensity after it has been felt at a higher4 ,the idea which we speak of as an inferred cause or effect is only an #8instance of which we have no experience' in the sense of being numerically different from the similar ideas1 whose previous constant association with an impression like the given one1 determines the #8inference2' but in the same sense the #8impression' which ,i now feel on putting my hand to the fire is different from the impressions previously felt under the same circumstances1 and ,i do not for that reason speak of this impression as an instance of which ,i have had no experience4 ,thus ,hume1 though retaining the received phraseology in reference to the #8conclusion from any particular cause to any particular effect'--phraseology which implies that prior to the inference the object inferred is in some sense unknown or unexperienced--yet deprives it of meaning by a doctrine which makes inference1 as he himself puts it1 #8a species of sensation1' #8an unintelligible instinct of our souls1' #8more properly an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of our natures' #a--which in fact leaves no #8part of our natures' to be cogitative at all4 #a ,pp4 #djd1 #dge1 and #dga4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,viii41 part ,,iv4 sec4 ,i4 and part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xvi4 ,nor determined by any objective relation4 #bid4 ,we are not entitled then1 it would seem1 to say that any inference to matter of fact1 any proof of an #8instructive proposition1'--as distinct from the conclusion of a syllogism1 which is simply derived from the analysis of a proposition already conceded1--rests on the relation of cause and effect4 ,such language implies that the relation is other than the inference1 whereas1 in fact1 they are one and the same1 each being merely a particular sort of sequence of feeling upon feeling--that sort of which the characteristic is that1 when the former feeling only has the maximum of vivacity1 it still1 owing to the frequency with which it has been attended by the other1 imparts to it a large1 though less1 amount of vivacity4 ,this is the naked result to which ,hume's doctrine leads--a result which1 thus put1 might have set men upon reconsidering the first principles of the ,lockeian philosophy4 ,but he wished to find acceptance1 and would not so put it4 ,a consideration of the points in which he had to sacrifice consistency to plausibility--since he was always consistent where he decently could be--will lead us to the true #a1 the impossibility on his principles of explaining the world of knowledge4 #a ,greek 7aition tou pseudous7 the cause of the error4 ,tr4 ,definitions of cause3 a4 ,as a #8philosophical' relation4 #bie4 ,as the outcome of his doctrine1 he submits two definitions of the relation of cause and effect4 ,considering it as #8a philosophical relation or comparison of two ideas1 we may define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another1 and where all objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter4' ,considering the relation as #8a natural one1 or as an association between ideas1' we may say that #8a cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another1 and so united with it that the idea of one determines the mind to form the idea of the other1 and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other'4 #a #a ,p4 #dfd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4 ,is ,hume entitled to retain #8philosophical' relations as distinct from #8natural'8 #bif4 ,our first enquiry must be how far these definitions are really consistent with the theory from which they are derived4 ,at the outset1 it is a surprise to find that the #8philosophical relation' of cause and effect1 as distinct from the natural one1 should still appear to survive4 ,such a distinction has no meaning unless it implies a conceived relation of objects other than the de facto sequence of feelings1 of which one #8naturally' introduces the other4 ,it is the characteristic of ,locke's doctrine of knowledge that in it this distinction is still latent4 ,his language constantly implies that knowledge1 as a perception of relations1 is other than the sequence of feelings2 but by confining his view chiefly to relation in the way of likeness and unlikeness--a relation that exists between feelings merely as felt1 or as they are for the feeling consciousness--he avoids the necessity of deciding what the #8ideas' are in the connection of which knowledge and reasoning consist1 whether objects constituted by conceived relations or feelings suggestive of each other4 ,but when once attention had been fixed1 as it was by ,hume1 on an ostensible relation between objects1 like that of cause and effect1 which1 if it exist at all1 is clearly not one in the way of resemblance between feelings1 the distinction spoken of becomes patent4 ,if the colour red had not the likeness and unlikeness which it has to the colour blue1 the colours would be different feelings from what they are2 but if the flame of fire and its heat were not regarded severally as cause and effect1 it would make no difference to them as feelings2 or1 to put it conversely1 it is not upon any comparison of two feelings with each other that we regard them as related in the way of cause and effect4 ,in what sense then can the relation between flame and heat be a philosophical relation1 as defined by ,hume--a relation in virtue of which we compare objects1 or an idea that we acquire upon comparison8 ,examination of ,hume's language about them4 #big4 ,this definition1 indeed1 is not stated so exactly or so uniformly as might be wished4 ,in different passages #8philosophical relation' appears as that in respect of which we compare any two ideas2 as that of which we acquire the idea by comparing objects1 #a and finally 7in the context of the passage last quoted7 as itself the comparison4 #b ,the real source of this ambiguity lies in that impossibility of regarding an object as anything apart from its relations1 which compels any theory that does not recognize it to be inconsistent with itself4 ,it is ,locke's cardinal doctrine that real #8objects' are first given as simple ideas1 and that their relations1 unreal in contrast with the simple ideas1 are superinduced by the mind--a doctrine which ,hume completes by excluding all ideas that are not either copies of simple feelings or compounds of these1 and by consequence ideas of relation altogether4 ,the three statements of the nature of philosophical relation1 given above1 mark three stages of departure from1 or approach to1 consistency with this doctrine4 ,the first1 implying as it does that relation is not merely a subjective result in our minds from the comparison of ideas1 but belongs to the ideas themselves1 is most obviously inconsistent with it according to the form in which it is presented by ,locke2 but the second is equally incompatible with ,hume's completion of the doctrine1 for it implies that we so compare ideas as to acquire an idea of relation other than the ideas put together--an idea at once open to ,hume's own challenge1 #8,is it a colour1 sound1 smell1 c42 or is it a passion or emotion8' #a ,cf4 ,part ,i4 #e4 #b ,p4 #dfd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4 ,philosophical relation consists in a comparison1 but no comparison between cause and effect4 #bih4 ,we are thus brought to the third statement1 according to which philosophical relation1 instead of being an idea acquired upon comparison1 is itself the comparison4 ,a comparison of ideas may seem not far removed from the simple sequence of resembling ideas2 but if we examine the definition of cause1 as stated above1 which with ,hume corresponds to the view of the relation of cause and effect as a #8philosophical' one1 we find that the relation in question is neither a comparison of the related objects nor an idea which arises upon such comparison4 ,according to his statement a comparison is indeed necessary to give us an idea of the relation--a comparison1 however1 not of the objects which we reckon severally cause and effect with each other1 but 7a7 of each of the two objects with other like objects1 and 7b7 of the relation of precedency and contiguity between the two objects with that previously observed between the like objects4 ,now1 unless the idea of relation between objects in the way of cause and effect is one that consists in1 or is acquired by1 comparison of those objects1 the fact that another sort of comparison is necessary to constitute it does not touch the question of its possibility4 ,however we come to have it1 however reducible to impressions the objects may be1 it is not only other than the idea of either object taken singly2 it is not1 as an idea of resemblance might be supposed to be1 constituted by the joint presence or immediate sequence upon each other of the objects4 ,here1 then1 is an idea which is not taken either from an impression or from a compound of impressions 7if such composition be possible71 and this idea is #8the source of all our reasonings concerning matters of fact4' ,the comparison is between present and past experience of succession of objects4 #bii4 ,the modern followers of ,hume may perhaps seek refuge in the consideration that though the relation of cause and effect between objects is not one in the way of resemblance or one of which the idea is given by comparison of the objects1 it yet results from comparisons1 which may be supposed to act like chemical substances whose combination produces a substance with properties quite different from those of the combined substances1 whether taken separately or together4 ,some anticipation of such a solution1 it may be said1 we find in ,hume himself1 who is aware that from the repetition of impressions of sense and their ideas new1 heterogeneous1 impressions--those of #8reflection'--are formed4 ,of this more will be said when we come to ,hume's treatment of cause and effect as a #8natural relation4' ,for the present we have to enquire what exactly is implied in the comparisons from which this heterogeneous idea of relation is derived4 ,if we look closely we shall find that they presuppose a consciousness of relations as little reducible to resemblance1 i4e4 as little the result of comparison1 as that of cause and effect itself4 ,it has been already noticed how ,hume treats the judgment of proportion between figures as a mere affair of sense1 because such relation depends entirely on the ideas compared1 without reflecting that the existence of the figures presupposes those relations of space to which1 because 7as he admits7 they do not depend on the comparison of ideas1 the only excuse for reckoning any relation sensible does not apply4 ,in the same way he contents himself with the fact that the judgment of cause and effect implies a comparison of present with past experience1 and may thus be brought under his definition of #8philosophical relation1' without observing that the experiences compared are themselves by no means reducible to comparison4 ,we judge that an object1 which we now find to be precedent and contiguous to another1 is its cause when1 comparing present experience with past1 we find that it always has been so4 ,that in effect is ,hume's account of the relation1 #8considered as a philosophical one3' and it implies that the constitution of the several experiences compared involves two sorts of relation which ,hume admits not to be derived from comparison1 7a7 relation in time and place1 7b7 relation in the way of identity4 ,observation of succession already goes beyond sense4 #cjj4 ,as to relations in time and space1 we have already traced out the inconsistencies which attend ,hume's attempt to represent them as compound ideas4 ,the statement at the beginning of ,part ,,iii41 that they are relations not dependent on the nature of compared ideas1 is itself a confession that such representation is erroneous4 ,if the difficulty about the synthesis of successive feelings in a consciousness that consists merely of the succession could be overcome1 we might admit that the putting together of ideas might constitute such an idea of relation as depends on the nature of the combined ideas4 ,but no combination of ideas can yield a relation which remains the same while the ideas change1 and changes while they remain the same4 ,thus1 when ,hume tells us that #8in none of the observations we may make concerning relations of time and place can the mind go beyond what is immediately present to the senses1 to discover the relations of objects' #a the statement contradicts itself4 ,either we can make no observation concerning relation in time and place at all1 or in making it we already #8go beyond what is immediately present to the senses1' since we observe what is neither a feeling nor several feelings put together4 ,if then ,hume had succeeded in his reduction of reasoning from cause or effect to observation of this kind1 as modified in a certain way by habit1 the purpose for which the reduction is attempted would not have been attained4 ,the separation between perception and inference1 between #8intuition' and #8discourse1' would have been got rid of1 but inference and discourse would not therefore have been brought nearer to the mere succession of feelings1 for the separation between feeling and perception would remain complete2 and that being so1 the question would inevitably recur--,if the #8observation' of objects as related in space and time already involves a transition from the felt to the unfelt1 what greater difficulty is there about the interpretation of a feeling as a change to be accounted for 7which is what is meant by inference to a cause71 that we should do violence to the sciences by reducing it to repeated observation lest it should seem that in it we #8go beyond' present feeling8 #a ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,as also does the #8observation concerning identity1' which the comparison involves4 #cja4 ,relation in the way of identity is treated by ,hume in the third part of the ,treatise #a pretty much as he treats contiguity and distance4 ,he admits that it does not depend on the nature of any ideas so related--in other words1 that it is not constituted by feelings as they would be for a merely feeling consciousness--yet he denies that the mind #8in any observations we may make concerning it' can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses4 ,directly afterwards1 however1 we find that there is a judgment of identity which involves a #8conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses'--the judgment1 namely1 that an object of which the perception is interrupted continues individually the same notwithstanding the interruption4 ,such a judgment1 we are told1 is a supposition founded only on the connection of cause and effect4 ,how any #8observation concerning identity' can be made without it is not there explained1 and1 pending such explanation1 observations concerning identity are freely taken for granted as elements given by sense in the experience from which the judgment of cause and effect is derived4 ,in the second chapter of ,part ,,iv41 however1 where #8belief in an external world' first comes to be explicitly discussed by ,hume1 we find that #8propensities to feign' are as necessary to account for the judgment of identity as for that of necessary connection4 ,if that chapter had preceded1 instead of following1 the theory of cause and effect as given in ,part ,,iii41 the latter would have seemed much less plain sailing than to most readers it has done4 ,it is probably because nothing corresponding to it appears in that later redaction of his theory by which ,hume sought popular acceptance1 that the true suggestiveness of his speculation was ignored1 and the scepticism1 which awakened ,kant1 reduced to the commonplaces of inductive logic4 ,to examine its purport is the next step to be taken in the process of testing the possibility of a #8natural history' of knowledge4 ,its bearing on the doctrine of cause will appear as we proceed4 #a ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,identity of objects an unavoidable crux for ,hume4 ,his account of it4 #cjb4 ,the problem of identity necessarily arises from the fusion of reality and feeling4 ,we must once again recall the propositions in which ,hume represents this fusion--that #8everything which enters the mind is both in reality and appearance as the perception2' that #8so far as the senses are judges1 all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence2' that #8perceptions' are either impressions1 or ideas which are #8fainter impressions2' and #8impressions are internal and perishing existences1 and appear as such4' ,if these propositions are true--and the #8new way of ideas' inevitably leads to them--how is it that we believe in #8a continued existence of objects even when they are not present to the senses1' and an existence #8distinct from the mind and perception'8 ,they are the same questions from which ,berkeley derived his demonstration of an eternal mind--a demonstration premature because1 till the doctrine of #8ideas1' and of mind as their subject1 had been definitely altered in a way that ,berkeley did not attempt1 it was explaining a belief difficult to account for by one wholly unaccountable4 ,before ,theism could be exhibited with the necessity which ,locke claimed for it1 it was requisite to try what could be done with association of ideas and #8propensities to feign' in the way of accounting for the world of knowledge1 in order that upon their failure another point of departure than ,locke's might be found necessary4 ,the experiment was made by ,hume4 ,he has the merit1 to begin with1 of stating the nature of identity with a precision which we found wanting in ,locke4 #8,in that proposition1 an object is the same with itself1 if the idea expressed by the word object were no ways distinguished from that meant by itself1 we really should mean nothing4' #8,on the other hand1 a multiplicity of objects can never convey the idea of identity1 however resembling they may be supposed4 444 ,since then both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity1 it must lie in something that is neither of them4 ,but at first sight this seems impossible4' ,the explanation is that when #8we say that an object is the same with itself1 we mean that the object existent at one time is the same with itself existent at another4 ,by this means we make a difference betwixt the idea meant by the word object and that meant by itself without going the length of number1 and at the same time without restraining ourselves to a strict and absolute unity4' ,in other words1 identity means the unity of a thing through a multiplicity of times2 or1 as ,hume puts it1 #8the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object through a supposed variation of time'4 #a #a ,pp4 #dhi1 #dij4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,properly with him it is a fiction1 in the sense that we have no such idea4 ,yet he implies that we have such idea1 in saying that we mistake something else for it4 #cjc4 ,now that #8an object exists' can with ,hume mean no more than that an #8impression' is felt1 and without succession of feelings according to him there is no time4 #a ,it follows that unity in the existence of the object1 being incompatible with succession of feelings1 is incompatible also with existence in time4 ,either then the unity of the object or its existence at manifold times--both being involved in the conception of identity--must be a fiction2 and since #8all impressions are perishing existences1' perishing with a turn of the head or the eyes1 it cannot be doubted which it is that is the fiction4 ,that the existence of an object1 which we call the same with itself1 is broken by as many intervals of time as there are successive and different1 however resembling1 #8perceptions1' must be the fact2 that it should yet be one throughout the intervals is a fiction to be accounted for1 ,hume accounts for it by supposing that when the separate #8perceptions' have a strong #8natural relation' to each other in the way of resemblance1 the transition from one to the other is so #8smooth and easy' that we are apt to take it for the #8same disposition of mind with which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception2' and that1 as a consequence of this mistake1 we make the further one of taking the successive resembling perceptions for an identical1 i4e4 uninterrupted as well as invariable object4 #b ,but we cannot mistake one object for another unless we have an idea of that other object4 ,if then we #8mistake the succession of our interrupted perceptions for an identical object1' it follows that we have an idea of such an object--of a thing one with itself throughout the succession of impressions--an idea which can be a copy neither of any one of the impressions nor1 even if successive impressions could put themselves together1 of all so put together4 ,such an idea being according to ,hume's principles impossible1 the appearance of our having it was the fiction he had to account for2 and he accounts for it1 as we find1 by a #8habit of mind' which already presupposes it4 ,his procedure here is just the same as in dealing with the idea of vacuum4 ,in that case1 as we saw1 having to account for the appearance of there being the impossible idea of pure space1 he does so by showing1 that having #8an idea of distance not filled with any coloured or tangible object1' we mistake this for an idea of extension1 and hence suppose that the latter may be invisible and intangible4 ,he thus admits an idea1 virtually the same with the one excluded1 as the source of the #8tendency to suppose' which is to replace the excluded idea4 ,so in his account of identity4 ,either the habit1 in virtue of which we convert resembling perceptions into an identical object1 is what ,hume admits to be a contradiction1 #8a habit acquired by what was never present to the mind'2 #c or the idea of identity must be present to the mind in order to render the habit possible4 #a #8,wherever we have no successive perceptions1 we have no notion of time4' 7p4 #cdb7 ,book ,i1 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,iii44 #b ,p4 #dib4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #c ,p4 #dhg4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,succession of like feelings mistaken for an identical object3 but the feelings1 as described1 are already such objects4 #cjd4 ,the device by which this petitio principii is covered is one already familiar to us in ,hume4 ,in this case it is so palpable that it is difficult to believe he was unconscious of it4 ,as he has #8to account for the belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body1' he will #8entirely conform himself to their manner of thinking and expressing themselves2' in other words1 he will assume the fiction in question as the beginning of a process by which its formation is to be accounted for4 ,the vulgar make no distinction between thing and appearance4 #8,those very sensations which enter by the eye or ear are with them the true objects1 nor can they readily conceive that this pen or this paper1 which is immediately perceived1 represents another which is different from1 but resembling it4 ,in order therefore to accommodate myself to their notions1 ,i shall at first suppose that there is only a single existence1 which ,i shall call indifferently object and perception1 according as it shall seem best to suit my purpose1 understanding by both of them what any common man may mean by a hat1 or shoe1 or stone1 or any other impression conveyed to him by his senses'4 #a ,now it is of course true that the vulgar are innocent of the doctrine of representative ideas4 ,they do not suppose that this pen or this paper1 which is immediately perceived1 represents another which is different from1 but resembling1 it2 but neither do they suppose that this pen or this paper is a sensation4 ,it is the intellectual transition from this1 that1 and the other successive sensations to this pen or this paper1 as the identical object to which the sensations are referred as qualities1 that is unaccountable if1 according to ,hume's doctrine1 the succession of feelings constitutes our consciousness4 ,in the passage quoted he quietly ignores it1 covering his own reduction of felt thing to feeling under the popular identification of the real thing with the perceived4 ,with #8the vulgar' that which is #8immediately perceived' is the real thing1 just because it is not the mere feeling which with ,hume it is4 ,but under pretence of provisionally adopting the vulgar view1 he entitles himself to treat the mere feeling1 because according to him it is that which is immediately perceived1 as if it were the permanent identical thing1 which according to the vulgar is what is immediately perceived4 #a ,p4 #dia4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,fiction of identity thus implied as source of the propensity which is to account for it4 #cje4 ,thus without professedly admitting into consciousness anything but the succession of feelings he gets such individual objects as ,locke would have called objects of #8actual present sensation4' ,when #8,i survey the furniture of my chamber1' according to him1 ,i see sundry #8identical objects'--this chair1 this table1 this inkstand1 c4 #a ,so far there is no fiction to be accounted for4 ,it is only when1 having left my chamber for an interval and returned to it1 ,i suppose the objects which ,i see to be identical with those ,i saw before1 that the #8propensity to feign' comes into play1 which has to be explained as above4 ,but in fact the original #8survey' during which1 seeing the objects1 ,i suppose them to continue the same with themselves1 involves precisely the same fiction4 ,in that case1 says ,hume1 ,i #8suppose the change' 7which is necessary to constitute the idea of identity7 #8to lie only in the time4' ,but without #8succession of perceptions1' different however resembling1 there could according to him be no change of time4 ,the continuous survey of this table1 or this chair1 then1 involves the notion of its remaining the same with itself throughout a succession of different perceptions--i4e4 the full-grown fiction of identity--just as much as does the supposition that the table ,i see now is identical with the one ,i saw before4 ,the #8reality1' confusion with which of #8a smooth passage along resembling ideas' is supposed to constitute the #8fiction1' is already itself the fiction--the fiction of an object which must be other than our feelings1 since it is permanent while they are successive1 yet so related to them that in virtue of reference to it1 instead of being merely different from each other1 they become changes of a thing4 #a ,p4 #dic4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,with ,hume continued existence of perceptions a fiction different from their identity4 ,can perceptions exist when not perceived8 #cjf4 ,having thus in effect imported all three #8fictions of imagination'--identity1 continued existence1 and existence distinct from perception--into the original #8perception1' ,hume1 we may think1 might have saved himself the trouble of treating them as separate and successive formations4 ,unless he had so treated them1 however1 his #8natural history' of consciousness would have been far less imposing than it is4 ,the device1 by which he represents the #8vulgar' belief in the reality of the felt thing as a belief that the mere feeling is the real object1 enables him also to represent the identity1 which a smooth transition along closely resembling sensations leads us to suppose1 as still merely identity of a perception4 #8,the very image which is present to the senses is with us the real body2 and 'tis to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect identity'4 #a ,the identity lying thus in the images or appearances1 not in anything to which they are referred1 a further fiction seems to be required by which we may overcome the contradiction between the interruption of the appearances and their identity--the fiction of #8a continued being which may fill the intervals' between the appearances4 #b ,that a #8propension' towards such a fiction would naturally arise from the uneasiness caused by such a contradiction1 we may readily admit4 ,the question is how the propension can be satisfied by a supposition which is merely another expression for one of the contradictory beliefs4 ,what difference is there between the appearance of a perception and its existence1 that interruption of the perception1 though incompatible with uninterruptedness in its appearance1 should not be so with uninterruptedness in its existence8 ,it may be answered that there is just the difference between relation to a feeling subject and relation to a thinking one--between relation to a consciousness which is in time1 or successive1 and relation to a thinking subject which1 not being itself in time1 is the source of that determination by permanent conditions1 which is what is meant by the real existence of a perceived thing4 ,but to ,hume1 who expressly excludes such a subject--with whom #8it exists' #8it is felt'--such an answer is inadmissible4 ,he can1 in fact1 only meet the difficulty by supposing the existence of unfelt feelings1 of unperceived perceptions4 ,the appearance of a perception is its presence to #8what we call a mind1' which #8is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions1 united together by certain relations1 and supposed1 though falsely1 to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity'4 #c ,to consider a perception1 then1 as existing though not appearing is merely to consider it as detached from this #8heap' of other perceptions1 which1 on ,hume's principle that whatever is distinguishable is separable1 is no more impossible than to distinguish one perception from all others4 #d ,in fact1 however1 it is obvious that the supposed detachment is the very opposite of such distinction4 ,a perception distinguished from all others is determined by that distinction in the fullest possible measure4 ,a perception detached from all others1 left out of the #8heap which we call a mind1' being out of all relation1 has no qualities--is simply nothing4 ,we can no more #8consider' it than we can see vacancy4 ,yet it is by the consideration of such nonentity1 by supposing a world of unperceived perceptions1 of #8existences' without relation or quality1 that the mind1 according to ,hume--itself only #8a heap of perceptions'--arrives at that fiction of a continued being which1 as involved in the supposition of identity1 is the condition of our believing in a world of real things at all4 #a ,p4 #dic4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,pp4 #did1 #die4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #c ,p4 #die4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #d ,ibid4 ,existence of objects1 distinct from perceptions1 a further fiction still4 #cjg4 ,it is implied1 then1 in the process by which1 according to ,hume1 the fiction of a continued being is arrived at1 that this being is supposed to be not only continued but #8distinct from the mind' and #8independent' of it4 ,with ,hume1 however1 the supposition of a distinct and #8independent' existence of the perception is quite different from that of a distinct and independent object other than the perception4 ,the former is the #8vulgar hypothesis1' and though a fiction1 it is also a universal belief3 the latter is the #8philosophical hypothesis1' which1 if it has a tendency to obtain belief at all1 at any rate derives that tendency1 in other words #8acquires all its influence over the imagination1' from the vulgar one4 #a ,just as the belief in the independent and continued existence of perceptions results from an instinctive effort to escape the uneasiness1 caused by the contradiction between the interruption of resembling perceptions and their imagined identity1 so the contradiction between this belief and the evident dependence of all perceptions #8on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits' leads to the doctrine of representative ideas or #8the double existence of perceptions and objects4' #8,this philosophical system1 therefore1 is the monstrous offspring of two principles which are contrary to each other1 which are both at once embraced by the mind and which are unable mutually to destroy each other4 ,the imagination tells us that our resembling perceptions have a continued and uninterrupted existence1 and are not annihilated by their absence4 ,reflection tells us that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence and different from each other4 ,the contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy1 by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences2 the interruption to perceptions1 and the continuance to objects'4 #b #a ,p4 #ejj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,p4 #ejb4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,are these several #8fictions' really different from each other8 #cjh4 ,here1 again1 we find that the contradictory announcements1 which it is the object of this new fiction to elude1 are virtually the same as those implied in that judgment of identity which is necessary to the #8perception' of this pen or this paper4 ,that #8interruption of our resembling perceptions1' of which #8reflection' 7in the immediate context #8,reason'7 is here said to #8tell us1' is merely that difference in time1 or succession1 which ,hume everywhere else treats as a datum of sense1 and which1 as he points out1 is as necessary a factor in the idea of identity1 as is the imagination of an existence continued throughout the succession4 ,thus the contradiction1 which suggests this philosophical fiction of double existence1 has been already present and overcome in every perception of a qualified object4 ,nor does the fiction itself1 by which the contradiction is eluded1 differ except verbally from that suggested by the contradiction between the interruption and the identity of perceptions4 ,what power is there in the word #8object' that the supposition of an unperceived existence of perceptions1 continued while their appearance is broken1 should be an unavoidable fiction of the imagination1 while that of #8the double existence of perceptions and objects' is a gratuitous fiction of philosophers1 of which #8vulgar' thinking is entirely innocent8 ,are they not all involved in the simplest perception8 #cji4 ,that it is gratuitous we may readily admit1 but only because a recognition of the function of the ,ego in the primary constitution of the qualified individual object--this pen or this paper--renders it superfluous4 ,to the philosophy1 however1 in which ,hume was bred1 the perception of a qualified object was simply a feeling4 ,no intellectual synthesis of successive feelings was recognized as involved in it4 ,it was only so far as the dependence of the feeling on our organs1 in the absence of any clear distinction between feeling and felt thing1 seemed to imply a dependent and broken existence of the thing1 that any difficulty arose--a difficulty met by the supposition that the felt thing1 whose existence was thus broken and dependent1 represented an unfelt and permanent thing of which it is a copy or effect4 ,to the ,berkeleian objections1 already fatal to this supposition1 ,hume has his own to add1 viz4 that we can have no idea of relation in the way of cause and effect except as between objects which we have observed1 and therefore can have no idea of it as existing between a perception and an object of which we can only say that it is not a perception4 ,is all existence then #8broken and dependent'8 ,that is the #8sceptical' conclusion which ,hume professes to adopt--subject1 however1 to the condition of accounting for the contrary supposition 7without which1 as he has to admit1 we could not think or speak1 and which alone gives a meaning to his own phraseology about impressions and ideas7 as a fiction of the imagination4 ,he does this1 as we have seen1 by tracing a series of contradictions1 with corresponding hypotheses invented1 either instinctively or upon reflection1 in order to escape the uneasiness which they cause1 all ultimately due to our mistaking similar successive feelings for an identical object4 ,of such an object1 then1 we must have an idea to begin with1 and it is an object permanent throughout a variation of time1 which means a succession of feelings2 in other words1 it is a felt thing1 as distinct from feelings but to which feelings are referred as its qualities4 ,thus the most primary perception--that in default of which ,hume would have no reality to oppose to fiction1 nor any point of departure for the supposed construction of fictions--already implies that transformation of feelings into changing relations of a thing which1 preventing any incompatibility between the perpetual brokenness of the feeling and the permanence of the thing1 #8eludes' by anticipation all the contradictions which1 according to ,hume1 we only #8elude' by speaking as if we had ideas that we have not4 ,yet they are not possible ideas1 because copied from no impressions4 #caj4 #8,ideas that we have not2' for no one of the fictions by which we elude the contradictions1 nor indeed any one of the contradictory judgments themselves1 can be taken to represent an #8idea' according to ,hume's account of ideas4 ,he allows himself indeed to speak of our having ideas of identical objects1 such as this table while ,i see or touch it--though in this case1 as has been shown1 either the object is not identical or the idea of it cannot be copied from an impression--and of our transferring this idea to resembling but interrupted perceptions4 ,but the supposition to which the contradiction involved in this transference gives rise--the supposition that the perception continues to exist when it is not perceived--is shown by the very statement of it to be no possible copy of an impression4 ,yet according to ,hume it is a #8belief1' and a belief is #8a lively idea associated with a present impression4' ,what then is the impression and what the associated idea8 #8,as the propensity to feign the continued existence of sensible objects arises from some lively impressions of the memory1 it bestows a vivacity on that fiction2 or1 in other words1 makes us believe the continued existence of body'4 #a ,well and good3 but this only answers the first part of our question4 ,it tells us what are the impressions in the supposed case of belief1 but not what is the associated idea to which their liveliness is communicated4 ,to say that it arises from a propensity to feign1 strong in proportion to the liveliness of the supposed impressions of memory1 does not tell us of what impression it is a copy4 ,such a propensity indeed would be an #8impression of reflection1' but the fiction itself is neither the propensity nor a copy of it4 ,the only possible supposition left for ,hume would be that it is a #8compound idea2' but what combination of #8perceptions' can amount to the existence of perceptions when they are not perceived8 #a ,p4 #dif4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,comparison of present experience with past1 which yields relation of cause and effect1 pre-supposes judgment of identity2 #caa4 ,from this long excursion into ,hume's doctrine of relation in the way of identity--having found him admitting explicitly that it is only by a #8fiction of the imagination' that we identify this table as now seen with this table as seen an hour ago1 and implicitly that the same fiction is involved in the perception of this table as an identical object even when hand or eye is kept upon it1 while yet he says not a word to vindicate the possibility of such a fiction for a faculty which can merely reproduce and combine #8perishing impressions'--we return to consider its bearing upon his doctrine of relation in the way of cause and effect4 ,according to him1 as we saw1 #a that relation1 #8considered as a philosophical' one1 is founded on a comparison of present experience with past1 in the sense that we regard an object1 precedent and contiguous to another1 as its cause when all like objects have been found similarly related4 ,the question then arises whether the experiences compared--the present and the past alike--do not involve the fiction of identity along with the whole family of other fictions which ,hume affiliates to it8 ,does the relation of precedence and sequence1 which1 if constant1 amounts to that of cause and effect1 merely mean precedence and sequence of two feelings1 indefinitely like an indefinite number of other feelings that have thus the one preceded and the other followed2 or is it a relation between one qualified thing or definite fact always the same with itself1 and another such thing or fact always the same with itself8 ,the question carries its own answer4 ,if in the definition quoted ,hume used the phrase #8all like objects' instead of the #8same object1' in order to avoid the appearance of introducing the #8fiction' of identity into the definition of cause1 the device does not avail him much4 ,the effect of the #8like' is neutralized by the #8all4' ,a uniform relation is impossible except between objects of which each has a definite identity4 #a ,above1 pars4 #bih and #bii4 444 without which there could be no recognition of an object as one observed before4 #cab4 ,when ,hume has to describe the experience which gives the idea of cause and effect1 he virtually admits this4 #8,the nature of experience1' he tells us1 #8is this4 ,we remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of objects1 and also remember that the individuals of another species of objects have always attended them1 and have existed in a regular order of contiguity and succession with regard to them4 ,thus we remember to have seen that species of object we call flame1 and to have felt that species of sensation we call heat4 ,we likewise call to mind their constant conjunction in all past instances4 ,without any farther ceremony we call the one cause1 and the other effect1 and infer the existence of the one from the other'4 #a ,it appears1 then1 that upon experiencing certain sensations of sight and touch1 we recognize each as #8one of a species of objects' which we remember to have observed in certain constant relations before4 ,in virtue of the recognition the sensations become severally this flame and this heat2 and in virtue of the remembrance the objects thus recognized are held to be related in the way of cause and effect4 ,now it is clear that though the recognition takes place upon occasion of a feeling1 the object recognized--this flame or this heat--is by no means the feeling as a #8perishing existence4' ,unless the feeling were taken to represent a thing1 conceived as permanently existing under certain relations and attributes--in other words1 unless it were identified by thought--it would be no definite object1 not this flame or this heat1 at all4 ,the moment it is named1 it has ceased to be a feeling and become a felt thing1 or1 in ,hume's language1 an #8individual of a species of objects4' ,and just as the present #8perception' is the recognition of such an individual1 so the remembrance which determines the recognition is one wholly different from the return with lessened liveliness of a feeling more strongly felt before4 ,according to ,hume's own statement1 it consists in recalling #8frequent instances of the existence of a species of objects4' ,it is remembrance of an experience in which every feeling1 that has been attended to1 has been interpreted as a fresh appearance of some qualified object that #8exists' throughout its appearances--an experience which for that reason forms a connected whole4 ,if it were not so1 there could be no such comparison of the relations in which two objects are now presented with those in which they have always been presented1 as that which according to ,hume determines us to regard them as cause and effect4 ,the condition of our so regarding them is that we suppose the objects now presented to be the same with those of which we have had previous experience4 ,it is only on supposition that a certain sensation of sight is not merely like a multitude of others1 but represents the same object as that which ,i have previously known as flame1 that ,i infer the sequence of heat and1 when it does follow1 regard it as an effect4 ,if ,i thought that the sensation of sight1 however like those previously referred to flame1 did not represent the same object1 ,i should not infer heat as effect2 and conversely1 if1 having identified the sensation of sight as representative of flame1 ,i found that the inferred heat was not actually felt1 ,i should judge that ,i was mistaken in the identification4 ,it follows that it is only an experience of identical1 and by consequence related and qualified1 objects1 of which the memory can so determine a sequence of feelings as to constitute it an experience of cause and effect4 ,thus the perception and remembrance upon which1 according to ,hume1 we judge one object to be the cause of another1 alike rest on the #8fictions of identity and continued existence4' ,without these no present experience would1 in his language1 be an instance of an individual of a certain species existing in a certain relation1 nor would there be a past experience of individuals of the same species1 by comparison with which the constancy of the relation might be ascertained4 #a ,p4 #chh4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vi4 ,hume makes conceptions of identity and cause each come before the other4 ,their true correlativity4 #cac4 ,against this derivation of the conception of cause and effect1 as implying that of identity1 may be urged the fact that when we would ascertain the truth of any identification we do so by reference to causes and effects4 ,as ,hume himself puts it at the outset of his discussion of causation1 an inference of identity #8beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect4' 444 #8,whenever we discover a perfect resemblance between a new object and one which was formerly present to the senses1 we consider whether it be common in that species of objects2 whether possibly or probably any cause could operate in producing the change and resemblance2 and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects1 we form our judgment concerning the identity of the object'4 #a ,this admission1 it may be said1 though it tells against ,hume's own subsequent explanation of identity as a fiction of the imagination1 is equally inconsistent with any doctrine that would treat identity as the presupposition of inference to cause or effect4 ,now undoubtedly if the identity of interrupted perceptions is one fiction of the imagination and the relation of cause and effect another1 each resulting from #8custom1' to say with ,hume1 that we must have the idea of cause in order to arrive at the supposition of identity1 is logically to exclude any derivation of that idea from an experience which involves the supposition of identity4 ,the #8custom' which generates the idea of cause must have done its work before that which generates the supposition of identity can begin4 ,hume therefore1 after the admission just quoted1 was not entitled to treat the inference to cause or effect as a habit derived from experience of identical things4 ,but it is otherwise if the conceptions of causation and identity are correlative--not results of experience of which one must be formed before the other1 but co-ordinate expressions of one and the same synthetic principle1 which renders experience possible4 ,and this is the real state of the case4 ,it is true1 as ,hume points out1 that when we want to know whether a certain sensation1 precisely resembling one that we have previously experienced1 represents the same object1 we do so by asking how otherwise it can be accounted for4 ,if no difference appears in its antecedents or sequents1 we identify it--refer it to the same thing--as that previously experienced2 for its relations 7which1 since it is an event in time1 take the form of antecedence and sequence7 are the thing4 ,the conceptions of identity and of relation in the way of cause and effect are thus as strictly correlative and inseparable as those of the thing and of its relations4 ,without the conception of identity experience would want a centre1 without that of cause and effect it would want a circumference4 ,without the supposition of objects which #8existing at one time are the same with themselves as existing at other times'--a supposition which at last1 when through acquaintance with the endlessness of orderly change we have learnt that there is but one object for which such identity can be claimed without qualification1 becomes the conception of nature as a uniform whole--there could be no such comparison of the relations in which an object is now presented with those in which it has been before presented1 as determines us to reckon it the cause or effect of another2 but it is equally true that it is only by such comparison of relations that the identity of any particular object can be ascertained4 #a ,p4 #cgf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,hume quite right in saying that we do not go more beyond sense in reasoning than in perception4 #cad4 ,thus1 though we may concede to ,hume that neither in the inference to the relation of cause and effect nor in the conclusions we draw from it do we go #8beyond experience1' #a this will merely be1 if his account of it as a #8philosophical relation' be true1 because in experience we already go beyond sense4 #8,there is nothing1' says ,hume1 #8in any object considered in itself that can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it' #b--;a statement which to him means that1 if the mind really passes from it to another1 this is only because as a matter of fact another feeling follows on the first4 ,but1 in truth1 if each feeling were merely #8considered in itself1' the fact that one follows on another would be no fact for the subject of the feelings1 no starting-point of intelligent experience at all2 for the fact is the relation between the feelings--a relation which only exists for a subject that considers neither feeling #8in itself1' as a #8separate and perishing existence1' but finds a reality in the determination of each by the other which1 as it is not either or both of them1 so survives1 while they pass1 as a permanent factor of experience4 ,thus in order that any definite #8object' of experience may exist for us1 our feelings must have ceased to be what according to ,hume they are in themselves4 ,they cease to be so in virtue of the presence to them of the ,ego1 in common relation to which they become related to each other as mutually qualified members of a permanent system--a system which at first for the individual consciousness exists only as a forecast or in outline1 and is gradually realized and filled up with the accession of experience4 ,it is quite true that nothing more than the reference to such a system1 already necessary to constitute the simplest object of experience1 is involved in that interpretation of every event as a changed appearance of an unchanging order1 and therefore to be accounted for1 which we call inference to a cause or the inference of necessary connection2 or1 again1 in the identification of the event1 the determination of its particular nature by the discovery of its particular cause4 #a ,above1 pars4 #bhe #bhf4 #b ,p4 #dcf and elsewhere4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xii4 ,how his doctrine might have been developed4 ,its actual outcome4 #cae4 ,the supposed difference then between immediate and mediate cognition is no absolute difference4 ,it is not a difference between experience and a process that goes beyond experience1 or between an experience unregulated by a conception of a permanent system and one that is so regulated4 ,it lies merely in the degree of fullness and articulation which that conception has attained4 ,if this had been what ,hume meant to convey in his assimilation of inference to perception1 he would have gone far to anticipate the result of the enquiry which ,kant started4 ,and this is what he might have come to mean if1 instead of playing fast and loose with #8impression' and #8object1' using each as plausibility required on the principle of accommodation to the #8vulgar1' he had faced the consequence of his own implicit admission1 that every perception of an object as identical is a #8fiction' in which we go beyond present feeling4 ,as it is1 his #8scepticism with regard to the senses' goes far enough to empty their #8reports' of the content which the #8vulgar' ascribe to them1 and thus to put a breach between sense and the processes of knowledge1 but not far enough to replace the #8sensible thing' by a function of reason4 ,in default of such replacement1 there was no way of filling the breach but to bring back the vulgar theory under the cover of habits and #8tendencies to feign1' which all suppose a ready-made knowledge of the sensible thing as their starting-point4 ,hence the constant contradiction1 which it is our thankless task to trace1 between his solution of the real world into a succession of feelings and the devices by which he sought to make room in his system for the actual procedure of the physical sciences4 ,conspicuous among these is his allowance of that view of relation in the way of cause and effect as an objective reality1 which is represented by his definition of it as a #8philosophical relation4' ,it is in the sense represented by that definition that his doctrine has been understood and retained by subsequent formulators of inductive logic2 but on examining it in the light of his own statements we have found that the relation1 as thus defined1 is not that which his theory required1 and as which to represent it is the whole motive of his disquisition on the subject4 ,it is not a sequence of impression upon impression1 distinguished merely by its constancy2 nor a sequence of idea upon impression1 distinguished merely by that transfer of liveliness to the idea which arises from the constancy of its sequence upon the impression4 ,it is a relation between #8objects' of which each is what it is only as #8an instance of a species' that exists continuously1 and therefore in distinction from our #8perishing impressions1' according to a regular order of #8contiguity and succession4' ,as such existence and order are by ,hume's own showing no possible impressions1 and by consequence no possible ideas1 so neither are the #8objects' which derive their whole character from them4 ,no philosophical relation admissible with ,hume that is not derived from a natural one4 #caf4 ,it may be said1 however1 that wherever ,hume admits a definition purporting to be of a #8philosophical relation1' he does so only as an accommodation1 and under warning that every such relation is #8fictitious' except so far as it is equivalent to a natural one2 that according to his express statement #8it is only so far as causation is a natural relation1 and produces an union among our ideas1 that we are able to reason upon it or draw any inference from it'2 #a and that therefore it is only by his definition of it as a #8natural relation' that he is to be judged4 ,such a vindication of ,hume would be more true than effective4 ,that with him the #8philosophical' relation of cause and effect is #8fictitious1' with all the fictitiousness of a #8continued existence distinct from perceptions1' is what it has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show4 ,but the fictitiousness of a relation can with him mean nothing else than that1 instead of having an idea of it1 we have only a #8tendency to suppose' that we have such an idea4 ,thus the designation of the philosophical relation of cause and effect carries with it two conditions1 one negative1 the other positive1 on the observance of which the logical value of the designation depends4 ,the #8tendency to suppose' must not after all be itself translated into the idea which it is to replace2 and it must be accounted for as derived from a #8natural relation' which is not fictitious4 ,that the negative condition is violated by ,hume1 we have sufficiently seen4 ,he treats the #8philosophical relation' of cause and effect1 in spite of the #8fictions' which it involves1 not as a name for a tendency to suppose that we have an idea which we have not1 but as itself a definite idea on which he founds various #8rules for judging what objects are really so related and what are not'4 #b ,that the positive condition is violated also--that the #8natural relation' of cause and effect1 according to the sense in which his definition of it is meant to be understood1 already itself involves #8fictions1' and only for that reason is a possible source of the #8philosophical'--is what we have next to show4 #a ,p4 #cid4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vii4 #b ,part ,,iii4 #ae4 ,examination of his account of cause and effect as #8natural relation'4 #cag4 ,that definition1 it will be remembered1 runs as follows3 #8,a cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another1 and so united with it in the imagination that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other1 and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other4' ,now1 as has been sufficiently shown1 the object of an idea with ,hume can properly mean nothing but the impression from which the idea is derived1 which again is only the livelier idea1 even as the idea is the fainter impression4 ,the idea and the object of it1 then1 only differ as different stages in the vivacity of a feeling4 #a ,it must be remembered1 further1 in regard to the #8determination of the mind' spoken of in the definition1 that the #8mind' according to ,hume is merely a succession of impressions and ideas1 and that its #8determination' means no more than a certain habitualness in this succession4 ,deprived of the benefit of ambiguous phraseology1 then1 the definition would run thus3 #8,a cause is a lively feeling immediately precedent to another1 #b and so united with it that when either of the two more faintly recurs1 the other follows with like faintness1 and when either occurs with the maximum of liveliness the other follows with less1 but still great1 liveliness4' ,thus stated1 the definition would correspond well enough to the process by which ,hume arrives at it1 of which the whole drift1 as we have seen1 is to merge the so-called objective relation of cause and effect1 with the so-called inference from it1 in the mere habitual transition from one feeling to another4 ,but it is only because not thus stated1 and because the actual statement is understood to carry a meaning of which ,hume's doctrine does not consistently admit1 that it has a chance of finding acceptance4 ,its plausibility depends on #8object' and #8mind' and #8determination' being understood precisely in the sense in which1 according to ,hume1 they ought not to be understood1 so that it shall express not a sequence of feeling upon feeling1 as this might be for a merely feeling subject1 but that permanent relation or law of nature which to a subject that thinks upon its feelings1 and only to such a subject1 their sequence constitutes or on which it depends4 #a ,see above1 paragraphs #aie and #bjh4 ,cf4 also1 among other passages1 one in the chapter now under consideration 7p4 #dea7 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiv4--#8,ideas always represent their objects or impressions4' #b ,the phrase #8immediately precedent' would seem to convey ,hume's meaning better than his own phrase #8precedent and contiguous4' ,contiguity in space 7which is what we naturally understand by #8contiguity1' when used absolutely7 he could not have deliberately taken to be necessary to constitute the relation of cause and effect1 since the impressions so related1 as he elsewhere shows1 may often not be in space at all4 ,double meaning of natural relation4 ,how ,hume turns it to account4 #cah4 ,it is this essential distinction between the sequence of feeling upon feeling for a sentient subject and the relation which to a thinking subject this sequence constitutes--a distinction not less essential than that between the conditions1 through which a man passes in sleep1 as they are for the sleeping subject himself1 and as they are for another thinking upon them--which it is the characteristic of ,hume's doctrine of natural relation in all its forms to disguise4 ,only in virtue of the presence to feelings of a subject1 which distinguishes itself from them1 do they become related objects4 ,thus1 with ,hume's exclusion of such a subject1 with his reduction of mind and world alike to the succession of feelings1 relations and ideas of relation logically disappear4 ,but by help of the phrase #8natural relation1' covering1 as it does1 two wholly different things--the involuntary sequence of one feeling upon another1 and that determination of each by the other which can only take place for a synthetic self-consciousness--he is able on the one hand to deny that the relations which form the framework of knowledge are more than sequences of feeling1 and on the other to clothe them with so much of the real character of relations as qualifies them for #8principles of union among ideas4' ,thus the mere occurrence of similar feelings is with him already that relation in the way of resemblance1 which in truth only exists for a subject that can contemplate them as permanent objects4 ,in like manner the succession of feelings1 which can only constitute time for a subject that contrasts the succession with its own unity1 and which1 if ideas were feelings1 would exclude the possibility of an idea of time1 is yet with him indifferently time and the idea of time1 though ideas are feelings and there is no #8mind' but their succession4 ,if an effect is merely a constantly observed sequence1 how can an event be an effect the first time it is observed8 ,hume evades this question2 #cai4 ,the fallacy of ,hume's doctrine of causation is merely an aggravated form of that which has generally passed muster in his doctrine of time4 ,if time1 because a relation between feelings1 can be supposed to survive the exclusion of a thinking self and the reduction of the world and mind to a succession of feelings1 the relation of cause and effect has only to be assimilated to that of time in order that its incompatibility with the desired reduction may disappear1 ,the great obstacle to such assimilation lies in that opposition to the mere sequence of feelings which causation as #8matter of fact'--as that in discovering which we #8discover the real existence and relations of objects'--purports to carry with it4 ,why do we set aside our usual experience as delusive in contrast with the exceptional experience of the laboratory--why do we decide that an event which has seemed to happen cannot really have happened1 because under the given conditions no adequate cause of it could have been operative--if the relation of cause and effect is itself merely a succession of seemings1 repeated so often as to leave behind it a lively expectation of its recurrence8 ,this question1 once fairly put1 cannot be answered3 it can only be evaded4 ,it is ,hume's method of evasion that we have now more particularly to notice4 ,still1 he is a long way off the ,inductive ,logic1 which supposes an objective sequence4 #cbj4 ,in its detailed statement it is very different from the method adopted in those modern treatises of ,logic which1 beginning with the doctrine that facts are merely feelings in the constitution of which thought has no share1 still contrive to make free use in their logical canon of the antithesis between the real and apparent4 ,the key to this modern method is to be found in its ambiguous use of the term #8phenomenon1' alike for the feeling as it is felt1 #8perishing' when it ceases to be felt1 and for the feeling as it is for a thinking subject--a qualifying and qualified element in a permanent world4 ,only if facts were #8phenomena' in the former sense would the antithesis between facts and conceptions be valid2 only if #8phenomena' are understood in the latter sense can causation be said to be a law of phenomena4 ,so strong1 however1 is the charm which this ambiguous term has exercised1 that to the ordinary modern logician the question above put may probably seem unmeaning4 #8,the appearance1' he will say1 #8which we set aside as delusive does not consist in any of the reports of the senses--these are always true--but in some false supposition in regard to them due to an insufficient analysis of experience1 in some reference of an actual sensation to a group of supposed possibilities of sensation1 called a 8thing10 which are either unreal or with which it is not really connected4 ,the correction of the false appearance by a discovery of causation is the replacement of a false supposition1 as to the possibility of the antecedence or sequence of one feeling to another1 by the discovery1 through analysis of experience1 of what feelings do actually precede and follow each other4 ,it implies no transition from feelings to things1 but only from a supposed sequence of feelings to the actual one4 ,science in its farthest range leaves us among appearances still4 ,it only teaches us what really appears4' ,can the principle of uniformity of nature be derived from sequence of feelings8 #cba4 ,now the presupposition of this answer is the existence of just that necessary connexion as between appearances1 just that objective order1 for which1 because it is not a possible #8impression or idea1' ,hume has to substitute a blind propensity produced by habit4 ,those who make it1 indeed1 would repel the imputation of believing in any #8necessary connexion1' which to them represents that #8mysterious tie' in which they vaguely suppose #8metaphysicians' to believe4 ,they would say that necessary connexion is no more than uniformity of sequence4 ,but sequence of what8 ,not of feelings as the individual feels them1 for then there would be no perfect uniformities1 but only various degrees of approximation to uniformity1 and the measure of approximation in each case would be the amount of the individual's experience in that particular direction4 ,the procedure of the inductive logician shows that his belief in the uniformity of a sequence is irrespective of the number of instances in which it has been experienced4 ,a single instance in which one feeling is felt after another1 if it satisfy the requirements of the #8method of difference1' i4e4 if it show exactly what it is that precedes and what it is that follows in that instance1 suffices to establish a uniformity of sequence1 on the principle that what is fact once is fact always4 ,now a uniformity that can be thus established is in the proper sense necessary4 ,its existence is not contingent on its being felt by anyone or everyone4 ,it does not come into being with the experiment that shows it4 ,it is felt because it is real1 not real because it is felt4 ,it may be objected indeed that the principle of the #8uniformity of nature1' the principle that what is fact once is fact always1 itself gradually results from the observation of facts which are feelings1 and that thus the principle which enables us to dispense with the repetition of a sensible experience is itself due to such repetition4 ,the answer is1 that feelings which are conceived as facts are already conceived as constituents of a nature4 ,the same presence of the thinking subject to1 and distinction of itself from1 the feelings1 which renders them knowable facts1 renders them members of a world which is one throughout its changes4 ,in other words1 the presence of facts from which the uniformity of nature1 as an abstract rule1 is to be inferred1 is already the consciousness of that uniformity in concreto4 ,with ,hume the only uniformity is in expectation1 as determined by habit2 but strength of such expectation must vary indefinitely4 #cbb4 ,hume himself makes a much more thorough attempt to avoid that pre-determination of feelings by the conception of a world1 of things and relations1 which is implied in the view of them as permanent facts4 ,he will not1 if he can help it1 so openly depart from the original doctrine that thought is merely weaker sense4 ,such conceptions as those of the uniformity of nature and of reality1 being no possible #8impressions or ideas1' he only professes to admit in a character wholly different from that in which they actually govern inductive philosophy4 ,just as by reality he understands not something to which liveliness of feeling may be an index1 but simply that liveliness itself1 and by an inferred or believed reality a feeling to which this liveliness has been communicated from one that already has it2 so he is careful to tell us #8that the supposition that the future resembles the past is derived entirely from habit1 by which we are determined to expect for the future the same train of objects to which we have been accustomed'4 #a ,the supposition then is this #8determination1' this #8propensity1' to expect4 ,any #8idea' derived from the propensity can only be the propensity itself at a fainter stage2 and between such a propensity and the conception of #8nature1' whether as uniform or otherwise1 there is a difference which only the most hasty reader can be liable to ignore4 ,but if by any confusion an expectation of future feelings1 determined by the remembrance of past feelings1 could be made equivalent to any conception of nature1 it would not be of nature as uniform4 ,as is the #8habit' which determines the expectation1 such must be the expectation itself2 and as have been the sequences of feeling in each man's past1 such must be the habit which results from them4 ,now no one's feelings have always occurred to him in the same relative order4 ,there may be some pairs of feelings of which one has always been felt before the other and never after it1 and between which there has never been an intervention of a third--although 7to take ,hume's favourite instance7 even the feeling of heat may sometimes precede the sight of the flame--and in these cases upon occurrence of one there will be nothing to qualify the expectation of the other4 ,but just so far as there are exceptions in our past experience to the immediate sequence of one feeling upon another1 must there be a qualification of our expectation of the future1 if it be undetermined by extraneous conceptions1 with reference to those particular feelings4 #a ,p4 #dca4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xii4 ,it could not serve the same purpose as the conception of uniformity of nature4 #cbc4 ,thus the expectation that #8the future will resemble the past1' if the past means to each man 7and ,hume could not allow of its meaning more7 merely the succession of his own feelings1 must be made up of a multitude of different expectations--some few of these being of that absolute and unqualified sort which alone1 it would seem1 can regulate the transition that we are pleased to call #8necessary connexion2' the rest as various in their strength and liveliness as there are possible differences between cases where the chances are evenly balanced and where they are all on one side4 ,from ,hume's point of view1 as he himself says1 #8every past experiment1' i4e4 every instance in which feeling 7a7 has been found to follow feeling 7b71 #8may be considered a kind of chance'4 #a ,as are the instances of this kind to the instances in which some other feeling has followed 7b71 such are the chances or #8probability' that 7a7 will follow 7b7 again1 and such upon the occurrence of 7b7 will be that liveliness in the expectation of 7a71 which alone with ,hume is the reality of the connexion between them4 ,in such an expectation1 in an expectation made up of such expectations1 there would be nothing to serve the purpose which the conception of the uniformity of nature actually serves in inductive science4 ,it could never make us believe that a feeling felt before another--as when the motion of a bell is seen before the sound of it has been heard--represents the real antecedent4 ,it could never set us upon that analysis of our experience by which we seek to get beyond sequences that are merely usual1 and admit of indefinite exceptions1 to such as are invariable2 upon that #8interrogation of nature' by which1 on the faith that there is a uniformity if only we could find it out1 we wrest from her that confession of a law which she does not spontaneously offer4 ,the fact that some sequences of feeling have been so uniform as to result in unqualified expectations 7if it be so7 could of itself afford no motive for trying to compass other expectations of a like character which do not naturally present themselves4 ,nor could there be anything in the appearance of an exception to a sequence1 hitherto found uniform1 to lead us to change our previous expectation for one which shall not be liable to such modification4 ,the previous expectation would be so far weakened1 but there is nothing in the mere weakening of our expectations that should lead to the effort to place them beyond the possibility of being weakened4 ,much less could the bundle of expectations come to conceive themselves as one system so as that1 through the interpretation of each exception to a supposed uniformity of sequence as an instance of a real one1 the changes of the parts should prove the unchangeableness of the whole4 #a ,p4 #dcc4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xii4 ,hume changes the meaning of this expectation by his account of the #8remembrance' which determines it4 ,bearing of his doctrine of necessary connexion upon his argument against miracles4 ,this remembrance1 as he describes it1 supposes conception of a system of nature4 #cbd4 ,that a doctrine which reduces the order of nature to strength of expectation1 and exactly reverses the positions severally given to belief and reality in the actual procedure of science1 #a should have been ostensibly adopted by scientific men as their own--with every allowance for ,hume's literary skill and for the charm which the prospect of overcoming the separation between reason and instinct exercises over naturalists--would have been unaccountable if the doctrine had been thus nakedly put or consistently maintained4 ,but it was not so4 ,hume's sense of consistency was satisfied when expectation determined by remembrance had been put in the place of necessary connexion1 as the basis of #8inference to matters of fact4' ,it does not lead him to adjust his view of the fact inferred to his view of the basis on which the inference rests4 ,expectation is an #8impression of reflection1' and if the relation of cause and effect is no more than expectation1 that which seemed most strongly to resist reduction to feeling has yet been so reduced4 ,but if the expectation is to be no more than an impression of reflection1 the object expected must itself be no more than an impression of some kind or other4 ,the expectation must be expectation of a feeling1 pure and simple4 ,nor does ,hume in so many words allow that it is otherwise1 but meanwhile though the expectation itself is not openly tampered with1 the remembrance that determines it is so4 ,this is being taken to be that1 which it cannot be unless ideas unborrowed from impressions are operative in and upon it4 ,it is being regarded1 not as the recurrence of a multitude of feelings with a liveliness indefinitely less than that in virtue of which they are called impressions of sense1 and indefinitely greater than that in virtue of which they are called ideas of imagination1 but as the recognition of a world of experience1 one1 real and abiding4 ,an expectation determined by such remembrance is governed by the same #8fictions' of identity and continued existence which are the formative conditions of the remembrance4 ,expectation and remembrance1 in fact1 are one and the same intellectual act1 one and the same reference of feelings1 given in time1 to an order that is not in time1 distinguished according to the two faces which1 its #8matter' being in time1 it has to present severally to past and future4 ,the remembrance is the measure of the expectation1 but as the remembrance carries with it the notion of a world whose existence does not depend on its being remembered1 and whose laws do not vary according to the regularity or looseness with which our ideas are associated1 so too does the expectation1 and only as so doing becomes the mover and regulator of #8inference from the known to the unknown4' #a ,it is by a curious fate that ,hume should have been remembered1 at any rate in the #8religious' world1 chiefly by the argument against miracles which appears in the #8,essays'--an argument which1 however irrefragable in itself1 turns wholly upon that conception of nature as other than our instinctive expectations and imaginations1 which has no proper place in his system 7see ,vol4 ,,iv4 page #hi74 ,if #8necessary connexion' were really no more than the transition of imagination1 as determined by constant association1 from an idea to its usual attendant--if there were no conception of an objective order to determine belief other than the belief itself--the fact that such an event1 as the revival of one four-days-dead at the command of a person1 had been believed1 since it would show that the imagination was at liberty to pass from the idea of the revival to that of the command 7or vice versa7 with that liveliness which constitutes reality1 would show also that no necessary connexion1 no law of nature in the only sense in which ,hume entitles himself to speak of such1 was violated by the sequence of the revival on the command4 ,at the same time there would be nothing #8miraculous1' according to his definition of the miraculous as distinct from the extraordinary1 in the case4 ,taken strictly1 indeed1 his doctrine implies that a belief in a miracle is a contradiction in terms4 ,an event is not regarded as miraculous unless it is regarded as a #8transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the ,deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent' 7page #ic1 note #a72 but it could not transgress a law of nature in ,hume's sense unless it were so inconsistent with the habitual association of ideas as that it could not be believed4 ,hume's only consistent way of attacking miracles1 then1 would have been to show that the events in question1 as miraculous1 had never been believed4 ,having been obliged to recognize the belief in their having happened1 he is open to the retort #8ad hominem' that according to his own showing the belief in the events constitutes their reality4 ,such a retort1 however1 would be of no avail in the theological interest1 which requires not merely that the events should have happened but that they should have been miraculous1 i4e4 #8transgressions of a law of nature by a particular volition of the ,deity4' #cbe4 ,in the passage already quoted1 where ,hume is speaking of the expectation in question as depending simply on habit1 he yet speaks of it as an expectation #8of the same train of objects to which we have been accustomed4' ,these words in effect imply that it is not habit1 as constituted simply by the repetition of separate sequences of feelings1 that governs the expectation--in which case1 as we have seen1 the expectation would be made up of expectations as many and as various in strength as have been the sequences and their several degrees of regularity--but1 if habit in any sense1 habit as itself governed by conceptions of #8identity and distinct continued existence1' in virtue of which1 as past experience is not an indefinite series of perishing impressions of separate men but represents one world1 so all fresh experience becomes part #8of the same train of objects2' part of a system of which1 as a whole1 #8the change lies only in the time'4 #a ,if now we look back to the account given of the relation of memory to belief we shall find that it is just so far as1 without distinct avowal1 and in violation of his principles1 he makes #8impressions of memory' carry with them the conception of a real system1 other than the consciousness of their own liveliness1 that he gains a meaning for belief which makes it in any respect equivalent to the judgment1 based on inference1 of actual science4 #a ,p4 #dib4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,this explains his occasional inconsistent ascription of an objective character to causation4 #cbf4 ,any one who has carefully read the chapters on inference and belief will have found himself frequently doubting whether he has caught the author's meaning correctly4 ,a clear line of thought may be traced throughout1 as we have already tried to trace it #a--one perfectly consistent with itself and leading properly to the conclusion that #8all reasonings are nothing but the effect of custom1 and that custom has no influence but by enlivening the imagination' #b--;but its even tenour is disturbed by the exigency of showing that proven fact1 after turning out to be no more than enlivened imagination1 is still what common sense and physical science take it to be4 ,according to the consistent theory1 ideas of memory are needed for inference to cause or effect1 simply because they are lively4 ,such inference is inference to a #8real existence1' that is to an #8idea assented to1' that is to a feeling having such liveliness as1 not being itself one of sense or memory1 it can only derive from one of sense or memory through association with it4 ,that the inferred idea is a cause or effect and1 as such1 has #8real existence1' merely means that it has this derived liveliness or is believed2 just as the reality ascribed to the impression of memory lies merely in its having this abundant liveliness from which to communicate to its #8usual attendant4' ,but while the title of an idea to be reckoned a cause or effect is thus made to depend on its having the derived liveliness which constitutes belief1 #c on the other hand we find ,hume from time to time making belief depend on causation1 as on a relation of objects distinct from the lively suggestion of one by the others4 #8,belief arises only from causation1 and we can draw no inference from one object to another except they be connected by this relation4' #8,the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence'4 #d ,in the context of these disturbing admissions we find a reconsideration of the doctrine of memory which explains them1 but only throws back on that doctrine the inconsistency which they exhibit in the doctrine of belief4 #a ,above1 paragraphs #bhi and ff4 #b ,p4 #dde4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiii4 #c ,it may be as well here to point out the inconsistency in ,hume's use of #8belief4' ,at the end of sec4 #e 7,part ,,iii47 the term is extended to #8impressions of the senses and memory4' ,we are said to believe when #8we feel an immediate impression of the senses1 or a repetition of that impression in the memory4 ,but in the following section the characteristic of belief is placed in the derived liveliness of an idea as distinct from the immediate liveliness of impression4 #d ,pp4 #djg #dji4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,reality of remembered #8system' transferred to #8system of judgment'4 #cbg4 ,this reconsideration arises out of an objection to his doctrine which ,hume anticipates1 to the effect that since1 according to it1 belief is a lively idea associated #8to a present impression1' any suggestion of an idea by a resembling or contiguous impression should constitute belief4 ,how is it then that #8belief arises only from causation'8 ,his answer1 which must be quoted at length1 is as follows3--#8',tis evident that whatever is present to the memory1 striking upon the mind with a vivacity which resembles an immediate impression1 must become of considerable moment in all the operations of the mind and must easily distinguish itself above the mere fictions of the imagination4 ,of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system1 comprehending whatever we remember to have been present either to our internal perception or senses1 and every particular of that system1 joined to the present impressions1 we are pleased to call a reality4 ,but the mind stops not here4 ,for finding that with this system of perceptions there is another connected by custom or1 if you will1 by the relation of cause and effect1 it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas2 and as it feels that 'tis in a manner necessarily determined to view these particular ideas1 and that the custom or relation by which it is determined admits not of the least change1 it forms them into a new system1 which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities4 ,the first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses2 the second of the judgment4 ',tis this latter principle which peoples the world1 and brings us acquainted which such existences as1 by their removal in time and place1 lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory'4 #a #a ,p4 #djh4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,reality of the former #8system' other than vivacity of impressions4 #cbh4 ,from this it appears that #8what we are pleased to call reality' belongs1 not merely to a #8present impression1' but to #8every particular of a system joined to the present impression' and #8comprehending whatever we remember to have been present either to our internal perception or senses4' ,this admission already amounts to an abandonment of the doctrine that reality consists in liveliness of feeling4 ,it cannot be that every particular of the system comprehending all remembered facts1 which is joined with the present impression1 can have the vivacity of that impression either along with it or by successive communication4 ,we can only feel one thing at a time1 and by the time the vivacity had spread far from the present impression along the particulars of the system1 it must have declined from that indefinite degree which marks an impression of sense4 ,it is not1 then1 the derivation of vivacity from the present impression1 to which it is joined1 that renders the #8remembered system' real2 and what other vivacity can it be8 ,it may be said indeed that each particular of the system had once the required vivacity1 was once a present impression2 but if in ceasing to be so1 it did not cease to be real--if1 on the contrary1 it could not become a #8particular of the system1' counted real1 without becoming other than the #8perishing existence' which an impression is--it is clear that there is a reality which lively feeling does not constitute and which involves the #8fiction' of an existence continued in the absence1 not only of lively feeling1 but of all feelings whatsoever4 ,so soon1 in short1 as reality is ascribed to a system1 which cannot be an #8impression' and of which consequently there cannot be an #8idea1' the first principle of ,hume's speculation is abandoned4 ,the truth is implicitly recognized that the reality of an individual object consists in that system of its relations which only exists for a conceiving1 as distinct from a feeling1 subject1 even as the unreal has no meaning except as a confused or inadequate conception of such relations2 and that thus the #8present impression' is neither real nor unreal in itself1 but may be equally one or the other according as the relations1 under which it is conceived by the subject of it1 correspond to those by which it is determined for a perfect intelligence4 #a #a ,see above1 paragraphs #ahd #ahc4 ,it is constituted by relations1 which are not impressions at all2 and in this lies explanation of the inference from it to #8system of judgment'4 #cbi4 ,a clear recognition of this truth can alone explain the nature of belief as a result of inference from the known to the unknown1 which is1 at the same time1 inference to a matter of fact4 ,the popular notion1 of course1 is that certain facts are given by feeling without inference and then other facts inferred from them4 ,but what is #8fact' taken to mean8 ,if a feeling1 then an inferred fact is a contradiction1 for it is an unfelt feeling4 ,if 7as should be the case7 it is taken to mean the relation of a feeling to something1 then it already involves inference--the interpretation of the feeling by means of the conception of a universal1 self or world1 brought to it--an inference which is all inference in posse1 for it implies that a universe of relations is there1 which ,i must know if ,i would know the full reality of the individual object3 so that no fact can be even partially known without compelling an inference to the unknown1 nor can there be any inference to the unknown without modification of what already purports to be known4 ,hume1 trying to carry out the equivalence of fact and feeling1 and having clearer sight than his masters1 finds himself in the presence of this difficulty about inference4 ,unless the inferred object is other than one of sense 7outer or inner7 or of memory1 there is no reasoning1 but only perception2 #a but if it is other1 how can it be real or even an object of consciousness at all1 since consciousness is only of impressions1 stronger or fainter8 ,the only consistent way out of the difficulty1 as we have seen1 is to explain inference as the expectation of the recurrence of a feeling felt before1 through which the unknown becomes known merely in the sense that from the repetition of the recurrence the expectation has come to amount to the fullest assurance4 ,but according to this explanation the difference between the inferences of the savage and those of the man of science will lie1 not in the objects inferred1 but in the strength of the expectation that constitutes the inference4 ,meanwhile1 if a semblance of explanation has been given for the inference from cause to effect1 that from effect to cause remains quite in the dark4 ,how can there be inference from a given feeling to that felt immediately before it8 #a ,pp4 #cgf #chh4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 secs4 ,,ii4 and ,,vi4 ,not seeing this1 ,hume has to explain inference to latter system as something forced upon us by habit4 #ccj4 ,from the avowal of such paradoxical results1 ,hume only saved himself by reverting1 as in the passage before us1 to the popular view--to the distinction between two #8systems of reality1' one perceived1 the other inferred2 one #8the object of the senses and memory1' the other #8of the judgment4' ,he sees that if the educated man erased from his knowledge upon us by of the world all #8facts' but those for which he has #8the evidence of his senses and memory1' his world would be unpeopled2 but he has not the key to the true identity between the two systems4 ,not recognizing the inference already involved in a fact of sense or memory1 he does not see that it is only a further articulation of this inference which gives the fact of judgment2 that as the simplest fact for which we have the #8evidence of sense' is already not a feeling but an explanation of a feeling1 which connects it by relations1 that are not feelings1 with an unfelt universe1 so inferred causes and effects are explanations of these explanations1 by which they are connected as mutually determinant in the one world whose presence the simplest fact1 the most primary explanation of feeling1 supposes no less than the most complete4 ,not seeing this1 what is he to make of the system of merely inferred realities8 ,he will represent the relation of cause and effect1 which connects it with the #8system of memory1' as a habit derived from the constant de facto sequence of this or that #8inferred' upon this or that remembered idea4 ,the mind1 #8feeling' the unchangeableness of this habit1 regards the idea1 which in virtue of it follows upon the impression of memory1 as equally real with that impression4 ,in this he finds an answer to the two questions which he himself raises3 7a7 #8,why is it that we draw no inference from one object to another1 except they be connected by the relation of cause and effect2' or 7which is the same1 since inference to an object implies the ascription of reality to it71 #8,why is this relation requisite to persuade us of any real existence8' and 7b71 #8,how is it that the relations of resemblance and contiguity have not the same effect8' ,the answer to the first is1 that we do not ascribe reality to an idea recalled by an impression1 unless we find that1 owing to its customary sequence upon the impression1 we cannot help passing from the one to the other4 ,the answer to the second corresponds4 ,the contiguity of an idea to an impression1 if it has been repeated often enough and without any #8arbitrary' action on our part1 is the relation of cause and effect1 and thus does #8persuade us of real existence4' ,a #8feigned' contiguity1 on the other hand1 because we are conscious that it is #8of our mere good-will and pleasure' that we give the idea that relation to the impression1 can produce no belief4 #8,there is no reason why1 upon the return of the same impression1 we should be determined to place the same object in the same relation to it'4 #a ,in like manner we must suppose 7though this is not so clearly stated7 that when an impression--such as the sight of a picture--calls up a resembling idea 7that of the man depicted7 with much vivacity1 it does not #8persuade us of his real existence' because we are conscious that it is by the #8mere good-will and pleasure' of some one that the likeness has been produced4 #a ,p4 #dji4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,but if so1 #8system of judgment' must consist of feelings constantly experienced2 #cca4 ,now this account has the fault of being inconsistent with ,hume's primary doctrine1 inasmuch as it makes the real an object of thought in distinction from feeling1 without the merit of explaining the extension of knowledge beyond the objects of sense and memory4 ,it turns upon a conception of the real1 as the unchangeable1 which the succession of feelings1 in endless variety1 neither is nor could suggest4 ,it implies that not in themselves1 but as representing such an unchangeable1 are the feelings which #8return on us whether we will or no1' regarded as real4 ,the peculiar sequence of one idea on another1 which is supposed to constitute the relation of cause and effect1 is not1 according to this description of it1 a sequence of feelings simply2 it is a sequence reflected on1 found to be unchangeable1 and thus to entitle the sequent idea to the prerogative of reality previously awarded 7but only by the admission as real of the #8fiction' of distinct continued existence7 to the system of memory4 ,but while the identification of the real with feeling is thus in effect abandoned1 in saving the appearance of retaining it1 ,hume makes his explanation of the #8system of judgment' futile for its purpose4 ,he saves the appearance by intimating that the relation of cause and effect1 by which the inferred idea is connected with the idea of memory and derives reality from it1 is only the repeated sequence of the one idea upon the other1 of the less lively feelings upon the more lively1 or a habit that results from such repetition4 ,but if the sequence of the inferred idea upon the other must have been so often repeated in order to the existence of the relation which renders the inference possible1 the inferred idea can be no new one1 but must itself be an idea of memory1 and the question1 how any one's knowledge comes to extend beyond the range of his memory1 remains unanswered4 444 which only differ from remembered feelings inasmuch as their liveliness has faded4 ,but how can it have faded1 if they have been constantly repeated8 #ccb4 ,what ,hume himself seems to mean us to understand is1 that the inferred idea is one of imagination1 as distinct from memory2 and that the characteristic of the relation of cause and effect is that through it ideas of imagination acquire the reality that would otherwise be confined to impressions of sense and memory4 ,but1 according to him1 ideas of imagination only differ from those of memory in respect of their less liveliness1 and of the freedom with which we can combine ideas in imagination that have not been given together as impressions4 #a ,now the latter difference is in this case out of the question4 ,a compound idea of imagination1 in which simple ideas are put together that have never been felt together1 can clearly never be connected with an impression of sense or memory by a relation derived from constant experience of the sequence of one upon the other1 and specially opposed to the creations of #8caprice'4 #b ,we are left1 then1 to the supposition that the inferred idea1 as idea of imagination1 is one originally given as an impression of sense1 but of which the liveliness has faded and requires to be revived by association in the way of cause and effect with one that has retained the liveliness proper to an idea of memory4 ,then the question recurs1 how the restoration of its liveliness by association with an impression1 on which it must have been constantly sequent in order that the association may be possible1 is compatible with the fact that its liveliness has faded4 ,and however this question may be dealt with1 if the relation of cause and effect is merely custom1 the extension of knowledge by means of it remains unaccounted for2 the breach between the expectation of the recurrence of familiar feelings and inductive science remains unfilled2 ,locke's #8suspicion' that #8a science of nature is impossible1' instead of being overcome1 is elaborated into a system4 #a ,part ,i41 sec4 #c2 cf4 note on p4 #daf ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix44 #b ,p4 #dji4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,inference then can give no new knowledge4 #ccc4 ,thus inference1 according to ,hume's account of it as originating in habit1 suffers from a weakness quite as fatal as that which he supposes to attach to it if accounted for as the work of reason4 #8,the work of reason' to a follower of ,locke meant either the mediate perception of likeness between ideas1 which the discovery of cause or effect cannot be2 or else syllogism1 of which ,locke had shown once for all that it could yield no #8instructive propositions4' ,but if an idea arrived at by that process could be neither new nor real--not new1 because we must have been familiar with it before we put it into the compound idea from which we #8deduce' it2 not real1 because it has not the liveliness either of sensation or of memory--the idea inferred according to ,hume's process1 however real with the reality of liveliness1 is certainly not new4 #8,if this means' 7the modern logician may perhaps reply71 #8that according to ,hume no new phenomenon can be given by inference1 he was quite right in thinking so4 ,if the object of inference were a separate phenomenon1 it would be quite true that it must have been repeatedly perceived before it could be inferred1 and that thus inference would be nugatory4 ,but inference is in fact not to such an object1 but to a uniform relation of certain phenomena in the way of co-existence and sequence2 and what ,hume may be presumed to mean is not that every such relation must have been perceived before it can be inferred1 much less that it must have been perceived so constantly that an appearance of the one phenomenon causes instinctive expectation of the other1 but 7a7 that the phenomena themselves must have been given by immediate perception1 and 7b7 that the conception of a law of causation1 in virtue of which a uniformity of relation between them is inferred from a single instance of it1 is itself the result of an 8inductio per enumerationem simplicem10 of the accumulated experience of generations that the same sequents follow the same antecedents4' ,nor does this merely mean that it cannot constitute new phenomena1 while it can prove relations1 previously unknown1 between phenomena4 ,such a distinction inadmissible with ,hume4 #ccd4 ,at the point which our discussion has reached1 few words should be wanted to show that thus to interpret ,hume is to read into him an essentially alien theory1 which has doubtless grown out of his1 but only by a process of adaptation which it needs a principle the opposite of his to justify4 ,hume1 according to his own profession1 knows of no objects but impressions and ideas--feelings stronger or more faint--of no reality which it needs thought1 as distinct from feeling1 to constitute4 ,but a uniform relation between phenomena is neither impression nor idea1 and can only exist for thought4 ,he could not therefore admit inference to such relation as to a real existence1 without a double contradiction1 nor does he ever explicitly do so4 ,he never allows that inference is other than a transition to a certain sort of feeling1 or that it is other than the work of imagination1 the weakened sense1 as enlivened by custom to a degree that puts it almost on a level with sense2 which implies that in every case of inference the inferred object is not a uniform relation--for how can there be an image of uniform relation8--and that it is something which has been repeatedly and without exception perceived to follow another before it can be inferred4 ,even when in violation of his principle he has admitted a #8system of memory'--a system of things which have been felt1 but which are not feelings1 stronger or fainter1 and which are what they are only through relation--he still in effect1 as we have seen1 makes the #8system of judgment1' which he speaks of as inferred from it1 only the double of it4 ,to suppose that1 on the strength of a general inference1 itself the result of habit1 in regard to the uniformity of nature1 particular inferences may be made which shall be other than repetitions of a sequence already habitually repeated1 is1 if there can be degrees of contradiction1 even more incompatible with ,hume's principles than to suppose such inferences without it4 ,if a uniformity of relation between particular phenomena is neither impression nor idea1 even less so is the system of all relations4 ,his distinction of probability of causes from that of chances might seem to imply conception of nature1 as determining inference4 #cce4 ,there is language1 however1 in the chapters on #8,probability of ,chances and of ,causes1' which at first sight might seem to warrant the ascription of such a supposition to ,hume4 ,according to the distinction which he inherited from ,locke all inference to or from causes or effects1 since it does not consist in any comparison of the related ideas1 should be merely probable4 ,and as such he often speaks of it4 ,his originality lies in his effort to explain what ,locke had named2 in his treating that #8something not joined on both sides to1 and so not showing the agreement or disagreement of1 the ideas under consideration' which yet #8makes me believe'1 #a definitely as ,habit4 ,but #8in common discourse1' as he remarks1 #8we readily affirm that many arguments from causation exceed probability'2 #b the explanation being that in these cases the habit which determines the transition from impression to idea is #8full and perfect4' ,there has been enough past experience of the immediate sequence of the one #8perception' on the other to form the habit1 and there has been no exception to it4 ,in these cases the #8assurance1' though distinct from knowledge1 may be fitly styled #8proof1' the term #8probability' being confined to those in which the assurance is not complete4 ,hume thus comes to use #8probability' as equivalent to incompleteness of assurance1 and in this sense speaks of it as #8derived either from imperfect experience1 or from contrary causes1 or from analogy'4 #c ,it is derived from analogy when the present impression1 which is needed to give vivacity to the #8related idea1' is not perfectly like the impressions with which the idea has been previously found united2 #8from contrary causes1' when there have been exceptions to the immediate sequence or antecedence of the one perception to the other2 #8from imperfect experience' when1 though there have been no exceptions1 there has not been enough experience of the sequence to form a #8full and perfect habit of transition4' ,of this last #8species of probability1' ,hume says that it is a kind which1 #8though it naturally takes place before any entire proof can exist1 yet no one who is arrived at the age of maturity can any longer be acquainted with4 ',tis true1 nothing is more common than for people of the most advanced knowledge to have attained only an imperfect experience of many particular events2 which naturally produces only an imperfect habit and transition2 but then we must consider that the mind1 having formed another observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects1 gives new force to its reasoning from that observation2 and by means of it can build an argument on one single experiment1 when duly prepared and examined4 ,what we have found once to follow from any object we conclude will for ever follow from it2 and if this maxim be not always built upon as certain1 'tis not for want of a sufficient number of experiments1 but because we frequently meet with instances to the contrary'--which give rise to the other sort of weakened assurance or probability1 that from #8contrary causes'4 #d #a ,locke1 #d1 #ae1 #c4 #b ,p4 #dbc4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xi4 #c ,p4 #dci4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xiii4 #d ,pp4 #dbi #dcj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xii4 ,but this distinction he only professes to adopt in order to explain it away4 #ccf4 ,there is a great difference between the meaning which the above passage conveys when read in the light of the accepted logic of science1 and that which it conveys when interpreted consistently with the theory in the statement of which it occurs4 ,whether ,hume1 in writing as he does of that conclusion from a single experiment1 which our observation concerning the connexion of cause and effect enables us to draw1 understood himself to be expressing his own theory or merely using the received language provisionally1 one cannot be sure2 but it is certain that such language can only be justified by those #8maxims of philosophers' which it is the purpose or effect of his doctrine to explain away--in particular the maxims that #8the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes2' and that #8what the vulgar call chance is but a concealed cause'4 #a ,these maxims represent the notion that the law of causation is objective and universal2 that all seeming limitations to it1 all #8probable and contingent matter1' are the reflections of our ignorance1 and exist merely ex parte nostr4 ,in other words1 they represent the notion of that #8continued existence distinct from our perceptions1' which with ,hume is a phrase generated by #8propensities to feign4' ,yet he does not profess to reject them2 nay1 he handles them as if they were his own1 but after a very little of his manipulation they are so #8translated' that they would not know themselves4 ,because philosophers #8allow that what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a concealed cause1' #8probability of causes' and #8probability of chances' may be taken as equivalent4 ,but chance1 as #8merely negation of a cause1' has been previously explained1 on the supposition that causation means a #8perfect habit of imagination1' to be the absence of such habit--the state in which imagination is perfectly indifferent in regard to the transition from a given impression to an idea1 because the transition has not been repeated often enough to form even the beginning of a habit4 ,such being mere chance1 #8probability of chances' means a state of imagination between the perfect indifference and that perfect habit of transition1 which is #8necessary connexion4' #8,probability of causes' is the same thing4 ,its strength or weakness depends simply on the proportion between the number of experiments 7#8each experiment being a kind of chance'7 in which ,a has been found to immediately follow ,b1 and the number of those in which it has not4 #b ,mere chance1 probability1 and causation then are equally states of imagination4 ,the #8equal necessity of the connexion between all causes and effects' means not that any #8law of causation pervades the universe1' but that1 unless the habit of transition between any feelings is #8full and perfect1' we do not speak of these feelings as related in the way of cause and effect4 #a ,pp4 #dbi #dcj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,xii4 #b ,pp4 #dbd-dbh1 #dcb-dcd4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 secs4 ,,xi4 and ,,xii4 ,laws of nature are unqualified habits of expectation4 #ccg4 ,interpreted consistently with this doctrine1 the passage quoted in the last paragraph but one can only mean that1 when a man has arrived at maturity1 his experience of the sequence of feelings cannot fail in quantity4 ,he must have had experience enough to form not only a perfect habit of transition from any impression to the idea of its usual attendant1 but a habit which would act upon us even in the case of novel events1 and lead us after a single experiment or a sequence confidently to expect its recurrence1 if only the experience had been uniform4 ,it is because it has not been so1 that in many cases the habit of transition is still imperfect1 and the sequence of ,a on ,b not #8proven1' but #8probable4' ,the probability then which affects the imagination of the matured man is of the sort that arises from #8contrary causes1' as distinct from #8imperfect experience4' ,this is all that the passage in question can fairly mean4 ,such #8probability' cannot become #8proof1' or the #8imperfect habit1' perfect1 by discovery of any necessary connexion or law of causation1 for the perfect habit of transition1 the imagination enlivened to the maximum by custom1 is the law of causation4 ,the formation of the habit constitutes the law3 to discover it would be to discover what does not yet exist4 ,the incompleteness of the habit in certain directions1 the limitation of our assurance to certain sequences as distinct from others1 must be equally a limitation to the universality of the law4 ,it is impossible then that on the faith of the universality of the law we should seek to extend the range of that assurance which is identical with it4 ,our #8observation concerning the connexion of causes and effects' merely means the sum of our assured expectations1 founded on habit1 at any given time1 and that on the strength of this we should #8prepare an experiment1' with a view to assuring ourselves of a universal sequence from a single instance1 is as unaccountable as that1 given the instance1 the assurance should follow4 ,experience1 according to his account of it1 cannot be a parent of knowledge4 #cch4 ,the case then stands thus4 ,in order to make the required distinction between inference to real existence and the lively suggestion of an idea1 ,hume has to graft on his theory the alien notion of an objective system1 an order of nature1 represented by ideas of memory1 and on the strength of such a notion to interpret a transition from these ideas to others1 because we cannot help making it1 as an objective necessity4 ,of such alien notion and interpretation he avails himself in his definition 7understood as he means it to be understood7 of cause as a #8natural relation'4 #a ,but he had not the boldness of his later disciples4 ,though he could be inconsistent so far1 he could not be inconsistent far enough to make his theory of inference fit the practice of natural philosophers4 ,bound by his doctrine of ideas as copied from impressions1 he can give no account of inferred ideas that shall explain the extension of knowledge beyond the expectation that we shall feel again what we have felt already4 ,it was not till another theory of experience was forthcoming than that given by the philosophers who were most fond of declaring their devotion to it1 that the procedure of science could be justified4 ,the old philosophy1 we are often truly told1 had been barren for want of contact with fact4 ,it sought truth by a process which really consisted in evolving the #8connotation' of general names4 ,the new birth came when the mind had learnt to leave the idols of the tribe and cave1 and to cleave solely to experience4 ,if the old philosophy1 however1 was superseded by science1 science itself required a new philosophy to answer the question4 ,what constitutes experience8 ,it was in effect to answer this question that ,locke and ,hume wrote1 and it is the condemnation of their doctrine that1 according to it1 experience is not a possible parent of science4 ,it is not those1 we know1 who cry #8,lord1 ,lord6' the loudest1 that enter into the kingdom of heaven1 nor does the strongest assertion of our dependence on experience imply a true insight into its nature4 ,hume has found acceptance with men of science as the great exponent of the doctrine that there can be no new knowledge without new experience4 ,it has not been noticed that with him such #8new experience' could only mean a further repetition of familiar feelings1 and that if it means more to his followers1 it is only because they have been less faithful than he was to that antithesis between thought and reality which they are not less loud in asserting4 #a ,see above1 paragraph #cag4 ,his attitude towards doctrine of thinking substance4 #cci4 ,from the point that our enquiry has reached1 we can anticipate the line which ,hume could not but take in regard to ,self and ,god4 ,his scepticism lay ready to his hand in the incompatibility between the principles of ,locke and that doctrine of #8thinking substance1' which ,locke and ,berkeley alike maintained4 ,if the reader will revert to the previous part of this introduction1 in which that doctrine was discussed1 #a he will find it equally a commentary upon those sections of the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature' which deal with #8immateriality of the soul' and #8personal identity4' ,substance1 we saw1 alike as #8extended' and as #8thinking1' was a #8creation of the mind1' yet real2 something of which there was an #8idea1' but of which nothing could be said but that it was not an #8idea4' ,the #8thinking' substance1 moreover1 was at a special disadvantage in contrast with the #8extended1' because1 in the first place1 it could not1 like body1 be represented as given to consciousness in the feeling of solidity1 and secondly it was not wanted4 ,it was a mere double of the extended substance to which1 as the #8something wherein they do subsist and from which they do result' our ideas had already been referred4 ,having no conception1 then1 of ,spirit or ,self before him but that of the thinking substance1 of which ,berkeley had confessed that it was not a possible idea or object of an idea1 ,hume had only to apply the method1 by which ,berkeley himself had disposed of extended substance1 to get rid of ,spirit likewise4 ,this could be done in a sentence1 #b but having done it1 ,hume is at further pains to show that immateriality1 simplicity1 and identity cannot be ascribed to the soul2 as if there were a soul left to which anything could be ascribed4 #a ,above1 paragraphs #abg-ace1 #add-adf1 #aib4 #b ,p4 #eag4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 ,as to ,immateriality of the ,soul1 he plays off ,locke and ,berkeley against each other1 and proves ,berkeley a ,spinozist4 #cdj4 ,there were two ways of conceiving the soul as immaterial1 of which ,hume was cognizant4 ,one1 current among the theologians and ordinary ,cartesians and adopted by ,locke1 distinguishing extension and thought as severally divisible and indivisible1 supposed separate substances--matter and the soul--to which these attributes1 incapable of #8local conjunction1' severally belonged4 ,the other1 ,berkeley's1 having ostensibly reduced extended matter to a succession of feelings1 took the exclusion of all #8matter' to which thought could be #8joined' as a proof that the soul was immaterial4 ,hume1 with cool ingenuity1 turns each doctrine to account against the other4 ,from ,berkeley he accepts the reduction of sensible things to sensations4 ,our feelings do not represent extended objects other than themselves2 but we cannot admit this without acknowledging the consequence1 as ,berkeley himself implicitly did1 #a that certain of our impressions--those of sight and touch--are themselves extended4 ,what then becomes of the doctrine1 that the soul must be immaterial because thought is not extended1 and cannot be joined to what is so8 ,thought means the succession of impressions4 ,of these some1 though the smaller number1 are actually extended2 and those that are not so are united to those that are by the #8natural relations' of resemblance and of contiguity in time of appearance1 and by the consequent relation of cause and effect4 #b ,the relation of local conjunction1 it is true1 can only obtain between impressions which are alike extended4 ,the ascription of it to such as are unextended arises from the #8propensity in human nature1 when objects are united by any relation1 to add some new relation in order to complete the union'4 #c ,this admission1 however1 can yield no triumph to those who hold that thought can only be joined to a #8simple and indivisible substance4' ,if the existence of unextended impressions requires the supposition of a thinking substance #8simple and indivisible1' the existence of extended ones must equally imply a thinking substance that has all the properties of extended objects4 ,if it is absurd to suppose that perceptions which are unextended can belong to a substance which is extended1 it is equally absurd to suppose that perceptions which are extended can belong to a substance that is not so4 ,thus ,berkeley's criticism has indeed prevailed against the vulgar notion of a material substance as opposed to a thinking one1 but meanwhile he is himself #8hoist with his own petard4' ,if that thinking substance1 the survival of which was the condition of his theory serving its theological purpose1 #d is to survive at all1 it can only be as equivalent to ,spinoza's substance1 in which #8both matter and thought were supposed to inhere4' ,the universe of our experience--#8the sun1 moon1 and stars2 the earth1 seas1 plants1 animals1 men1 ships1 houses1 and other productions1 either of art or nature'--is the same universe when it is called #8the universe of objects or of body1' and when it is called #8the universe of thought1 or of impressions and ideas2' but to hold1 according to ,spinoza's #8hideous hypothesis1' that #8the universe of objects or of body' inheres in one simple uncompounded substance1 is to rouse #8a hundred voices of scorn and detestation2' while the same hypothesis in regard to the #8universe of impressions and ideas' is treated #8with applause and veneration4' ,it was to save ,god and ,immortality that the #8great philosopher1' who had found the true way out of the scholastic absurdity of abstract ideas1 #e had yet clung to the #8unintelligible chimaera' of thinking substance2 and after all1 in doing so1 he fell into a #8true atheism1' indistinguishable from that which had rendered the unbelieving ,jew #8so universally infamous'4 #f #a ,see above1 par4 #agg4 #b ,pp4 #ebj-eba4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 #c ,p4 #eba4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 #d ,see page #cbe4 ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vii4 #e ,see above1 paragraphs #aia and foll4 #f ,pp4 #ebc-ebf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v4 ,causality of spirit treated in the same way4 #cda4 ,the supposition of spiritual substance being thus at once absurd1 and of a tendency the very opposite of the purpose it was meant to serve1 can anything better be said for the supposition of a spiritual cause8 ,it was to the representation of spirit as cause rather than as substance1 it will be remembered1 that both ,locke and ,berkeley trusted for the establishment of a ,theism which should not be ,pantheism4 #a ,locke1 in his demonstration of the being of ,god1 trusted for proof of a first cause to the inference from that which begins to exist to something having power to produce it1 and to the principle of necessary connexion--connexion in the way of agreement of ideas--between cause and effect for proof that this first cause must be immaterial1 even as its effect1 viz4 our thought1 is4 ,hume's doctrine of causation1 of course1 renders both sides of the demonstration unmeaning4 ,inference being only the suggestion by a feeling of the image of its #8usual attendant1' there can be no inference to that which is not a possible image of an impression4 ,nor1 since causation merely means the constant conjunction of impressions1 and there is no such contrariety between the impression we call #8motion of matter' and that we call #8thought1' anymore than between any other impressions1 #b as is incompatible with their constant conjunction1 is there any reason why we should set aside the hourly experience1 which tells us that bodily motions are the cause of thoughts and sentiments4 ,if1 however1 there were that necessary connexion between effect and cause1 by which ,locke sought to show the spirituality of the first cause1 it would really go to show just the reverse of infinite power in such cause4 ,it is from our impressions and ideas that we are supposed to infer this cause2 but in these--as ,berkeley had shown1 and shown as his way of proving the existence of ,god--there is no efficacy whatever4 ,they are #8inert4' ,if then the cause must agree with the effect1 the ,supreme ,being1 as the cause of our impressions and ideas1 must be #8inert' likewise4 ,if1 on the other hand1 with ,berkeley we cling to the notion that there must be efficient power somewhere1 and having excluded it from the relation of ideas to each other or of matter to ideas1 find it in the direct relation of ,god to ideas1 we fall #8into the grossest impieties2' for it will follow that ,god #8is the author of all our volitions and impressions4' #c #a ,see above1 #adg1 #aga1 #aic4 #b ,there is no contrariety1 according to ,hume1 except between existence and non-existence 7p4 #cbc7 ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 and as all impressions and ideas equally exist 7p4 #cid7 ,book ,i1 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vii41 there can be no contrariety between any of them4 ,he does indeed in certain leading passages allow himself to speak of contrariety between ideas 7e4g4 pp4 #did and #ece ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 secs4 ,,ii4 and ,,vi471 which is incidental evidence that the ideas there treated of are not so1 according to his account of ideas1 at all4 #c ,pp4 #ebi-eca ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,v41 a commentary on the argument here given has been in effect supplied in paragraphs #adh-aeb1 and #aid4 ,disposes of #8personal' identity by showing contradictions in ,locke's account of it4 #cdb4 ,against the doctrine of a real #8identity of the self or person' ,hume had merely to exhibit the contradictions which ,locke's own statement of it involves4 #a ,to have transferred this identity definitely from #8matter' to consciousness was in itself a great merit1 but1 so transferred1 in the absence of any other theory of consciousness than ,locke's1 it only becomes more obviously a fiction4 ,if there is nothing real but the succession of feelings1 identity of body1 it is true1 disappears as inevitably as identity of mind2 and so we have already found it to do in ,hume4 #b ,but whereas the notion of a unity of body throughout the succession of perceptions only becomes contradictory through the medium of a reduction of body to a succession of perceptions1 the identity of a mind1 which has been already defined as a succession of perceptions1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,there can be #8properly no simplicity in it at one time1 nor identity at different2 it is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance4' ,but this comparison must not mislead us4 #8,they are the successive perceptions only1 that constitute the mind2 nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented1 or of the materials of which it is composed4' ,the problem for ,hume then in regard to personal1 as it had been in regard to bodily1 identity is to account for that #8natural propension to imagine' it which language implies4 #a ,see above1 #acd and foll4 #b ,see above1 #cjf and foll4 ,yet can only account for it as a #8fiction' by supposing ideas which with him are impossible4 #cdc4 ,the method of explanation in each case is the same4 ,he starts with two suppositions1 to neither of which he is logically entitled4 ,one is that we have a #8distinct idea of identity or sameness1' i4e4 of an object that remains invariable and uninterrupted through a supposed variation of time'--a supposition which1 as we have seen1 upon his principles must mean that a feeling1 which is one in a succession of feelings1 is yet all the successive feelings at once4 ,the other is that we have an idea #8of several different objects existing in succession1 and connected together by a close' 7natural7 #8relation'--which in like manner implies that a feeling1 which is one among a succession of feelings1 is at the same time a consciousness of these feelings as successive and under that qualification by mutual relation which implies their equal presence to it4 ,these two ideas1 which in truth are #8distinct and even contrary' #a we yet come to confuse with each other1 because #8that action of the imagination1 by which we consider the uninterrupted and invisible object1 and that by which we reflect on the succession of related objects1 are almost the same to the feeling4' ,thus1 though what we call our mind is really a #8succession of related objects1' we have a strong propensity to mistake it for an #8invariable and uninterrupted object4' ,to this propensity we at last so far yield as to assert our successive perceptions to be in effect the same1 however interrupted and variable2 and then1 by way of #8justifying to ourselves this absurdity1 feign the continued existence of the perceptions of our senses1 to remove the interruption2 and run into the notion of a soul and self1 and substance1 to disguise the variation'4 #b #a ,see note to #cda4 #b ,pp4 #ece-ecf4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi44 ,in origin this #8fiction' the same as that of #8,body'4 #cdd4 ,it will be seen that the theory1 which we have just summarised1 would merely be a briefer version of that given in the section on #8,scepticism with regard to the ,senses1' if in the sentence1 which states its conclusion1 for #8the notion of a soul and self and substance' were written #8the notion of a double existence of perceptions and objects'4 #a ,to a reader who has not thoroughly entered into the fusion of being and feeling1 which belongs to the #8new way of ideas1' it may seem strange that one and the same process of so-called confusion has to account for such apparently disparate results1 as the notion of a permanently identical self and that of the distinct existence of body4 ,if he bears in mind1 however1 that with ,hume the universe of our experience is the same when it is called #8the universe of objects or of body' and when it is called the #8universe of thought or my impressions and ideas'1 #b he will see that on the score of consistency ,hume is to be blamed1 not for applying the same method to account for the fictions of material and spiritual identity1 but for allowing himself1 in his preference for physical1 as against theological1 pretension1 to write as if the supposition of spiritual were really distinct from that of material identity1 and might be more contemptuously disposed of4 ,the original #8mistake1' out of which according to him the two fictitious suppositions arise1 is one and the same2 and though it is a #8mistake' without which1 as we have found #c from ,hume's own admissions1 we could not speak even in singular propositions of the most ordinary #8objects of sense'--this pen1 this table1 this chair--it is yet one that on his principles is logically impossible1 since it consists in a confusion between ideas that we cannot have4 ,of this original #8mistake' the fictions of body and of its #8continued and distinct existence' are but altered expressions4 ,they represent in truth the same logical category of substance and relation4 ,and of the ,self according to ,locke's notion of it #d 7which was the only one that ,hume had in view71 as a #8thinking thing' within each man among a multitude of other thinking things1 the same would have to be said4 ,but in order to account for the #8mistake1' of which the suppositions of thinking and material substance are the correlative expressions1 and which it is the net result of ,hume's speculation to exhibit at once as necessary and as impossible1 we have found another notion of the self forced upon us--not as a double of body1 but as the source of that #8familiar theory' which body in truth is1 and without which there would be no universe of objects1 whether #8bodies' or #8impressions and ideas1' at all4 #a ,above1 #cjf-caj4 #b ,above1 #cdj4 #c ,above1 #cjc #cjd4 #d ,above1 #abi-acb4 ,possibility of such fictitious ideas implies refutation of ,hume's doctrine4 #cde4 ,thus the more strongly ,hume insists that #8the identity which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious one'1 #a the more completely does his doctrine refute itself4 ,if he had really succeeded in reducing those #8invented' relations1 which ,locke had implicitly recognised as the framework of the universe1 to what he calls #8natural' ones--to mere sequences of feeling--the case would have been different4 ,with the disappearance of the conception of the world as a system of related elements1 the necessity of a thinking subject1 without whose presence to feelings they could not become such elements1 would have disappeared likewise4 ,but he cannot so reduce them4 ,in all his attempts to do so we find that the relation1 which has to be explained away1 is pre-supposed under some other expression1 and that it is #8fictitious' not in the sense which ,hume's theory requires--the sense1 namely1 that there is no such thing either really or in imagination1 either as impression or idea--but in the sense that it would not exist if we did not think about our feelings4 ,thus1 whereas identity ought for ,hume's purpose to be either a #8natural relation1' or a propensity arising from such relation1 or nothing1 we find that according to his account1 though neither natural relation nor propensity1 it yet exists both as idea and as reality4 ,he saves appearances indeed by saying #b that natural relations of ideas #8produce it1' but they do so1 according to his detailed account of the matter1 in the sense that1 the idea of an identical object being given1 we mistake our successive and resembling feelings for such an object4 ,in other words1 the existence of numerically identical things is a #8fiction1' not as if there were no such things1 but because it implies a certain operation of thought upon our feelings1 a certain interpretation of impressions under direction of an idea not derived from impressions4 ,by a like equivocal use of #8fiction' ,hume covers the admission of real identity in its more complex forms--the identity of a mass1 whose parts undergo perpetual change of distribution2 of a body whose form survives not merely the redistribution of its materials1 but the substitution of others2 of animals and vegetables1 in which nothing but the #8common end' of the changing members remains the same4 ,the reality of such identity of mass1 of form1 of organism1 he quietly takes for granted4 #c ,he calls it #8fictitious' indeed1 but only either in the sense above given or in the sense that it is mistaken for mere numerical identity4 #a ,p4 #edj4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi4 #b ,p4 #edc ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi44 #8,identity depends on the relations of ideas2 and these relations produce identity by means of that easy transition they occasion4' ,strictly it should be #8that easy transition in which they consist2' since1 according to ,hume1 the #8easiness of transition' is not an effect of natural relation1 but constitutes it4 ,cf4 pp4 #cbb #dig ,book ,i1 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 and part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,ii41 and above1 #cah4 #c ,pp4 #ecf-ech4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi4 #cdf4 ,after he has thus admitted1 as constituents of the #8universe of objects1' a whole hierarchy of ideas of which the simplest must vanish before the demand to #8point out the impression from which it is derived1' we are the less surprised to find him pronouncing in conclusion #8that the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences1 which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect1 and mutually produce1 destroy1 influence and modify each other'4 #a ,a better definition than this1 as a definition of nature1 or one more charged with #8fictions of thought1' could scarcely be desired4 ,if the idea of such a system is a true idea at all1 which we are only wrong in confusing with mere numerical identity1 we need be the less concerned that it should be adduced as the true idea not of nature but of the #8human mind4' ,having learnt1 through the discipline which ,hume himself furnishes1 that the recognition of a system of nature logically carries with it that of a self-conscious subject1 in relation to which alone #8different perceptions' become a system of nature1 we know that we cannot naturalise the #8human mind' without presupposing that which is neither nature nor natural1 though apart from it nature would not be--that of which the designation as #8mind1' as #8human1' as #8personal1' is of secondary importance1 but which is eternal1 self-determined1 and thinks4 #a ,p4 #eda4 ,book ,i1 part ,,iv41 sec4 ,,vi4 ,t4,h4 ,green ,,general ,,introduction ,,to ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,hume's doctrine of morals parallel to his doctrine of nature4 #a4 ,in his speculation on morals1 no less than on knowledge1 ,hume follows the lines laid down by ,locke4 ,with each there is a precise correspondence between the doctrine of nature and the doctrine of the good4 ,each gives an account of reason consistent at least in this that1 as it allows reason no place in the constitution of real objects1 so it allows it none in the constitution of objects that determine desire and1 through it1 the will4 ,with each1 consequently1 the #8moral faculty1' whether regarded as the source of the judgments #8ought and ought not1' or of acts to which these judgments are appropriate1 can only be a certain faculty of feeling1 a particular susceptibility of pleasure and pain4 ,the originality of ,hume lies in his systematic effort to account for those objects1 apparently other than pleasure and pain1 which determine desire1 and which ,locke had taken for granted without troubling himself about their adjustment to his theory1 as resulting from the modification of primary feelings by #8associated ideas4' #8,natural relation1' the close and uniform sequence of certain impressions and ideas upon each other1 is the solvent by which in the moral world1 as in the world of knowledge1 he disposes of those ostensibly necessary ideas that seem to regulate impressions without being copied from them2 and in regard to the one application of it as much as to the other1 the question is whether the efficiency of the solvent does not depend on its secretly including the very ideas of which it seems to get rid4 ,its relation to ,locke3 ,locke's account of freedom1 will1 and desire4 #b4 ,the place held by the #8,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1' as a sort of philosopher's ,bible in the last century1 is strikingly illustrated by the effect of doctrines that only appear in it incidentally4 ,it does not profess to be ethical treatise at all1 yet the moral psychology contained in the chapter #8of ,power' 7,,ii4 #ba71 and the account of moral good and evil contained ,in the chapter #8of other ,relations' 7,,ii4 #bh7 furnished the text for most of the ethical speculation that prevailed in ,england1 ,france1 and ,scotland for a century later4 ,if ,locke's theory was essentially a reproduction of ,hobbes'1 it was yet in the form he gave it that it survived while ,hobbes was decried and forgotten4 ,the chapter on ,power is in effect an account of determination by motives4 ,more1 perhaps1 than any other part of the essay it bears the marks of having been written #8currente calamo4' ,in the second edition a summary was annexed which differs somewhat in the use of terms1 but not otherwise1 from the original draught4 ,the main course of thought1 however1 is clear throughout4 ,will and freedom are at first defined in all but identical terms as each a #8power to begin or forbear action barely by a preference of the mind' 7 #e1 #h1 #ga74 ,nor is this identification departed from1 except that the term #8will' is afterwards restricted to the #8preference' or #8power of preference1' while freedom is confined to the power of acting upon preference2 in which sense it is pointed out that though there cannot be freedom without will1 there may be will without freedom1 as when1 through the breaking of a bridge1 a man cannot help falling into the water1 though he prefers not to do so4 #8,freedom' and #8will' being thus alike powers1 if not the same power1 it is as improper to ask whether the will is free as whether one power has another power4 ,the proper question is whether man is free 7 #ad1 #ba71 and the answer to this question1 according to ,locke1 is that within certain limits he is free to act1 but that he is not free to will4 ,when in any case he has the option of acting or forbearing to act1 he cannot help preferring1 i4e4 willing1 one or other alternative4 ,if it is further asked1 ,what determines the will or preference8 the answer is that #8nothing sets us upon any new action but some uneasiness' 7 #bi71 viz41 the #8most urgent uneasiness we at any time feel' 7 #dj71 which again is always #8the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good1 either negative1 as indolence to one in pain1 or positive1 as enjoyment of pleasure4' ,in one sense1 indeed1 it may be said that the will often runs counter to desire1 but this merely means that we #8being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses1 distressed with different desires1' the determination of the will by the most pressing desire often implies the counteraction of other desires which would1 indeed1 under other circumstances1 be the most pressing1 but at the particular time of the supposed action are not so4 ,two questions3 ,does man always act from the strongest motive8 and1 ,what constitutes his motive8 ,the latter the important question3 ,distinction between desires that are1 and those that are not1 determined by the conception of self4 #c4 ,so far ,locke's doctrine amounts to no more than this1 that action is always determined by the strongest motive2 and only those who strangely hold that human freedom is to be vindicated by disputing that truism will care to question it4 ,to admit that the strongest desire always moves action 7there being1 in fact1 no test of its strength but its effect on action7 and that1 since every desire causes uneasiness till it is satisfied1 the strongest desire is also the most pressing uneasiness1 #a is compatible with the most opposite views as to the constitution of the objects which determine desire4 ,to understand that it is this constitution of the desired object1 not any possible intervention of unmotived willing between the presentation of a strongest motive and action1 which forms the central question of ethics1 is the condition of all clear thinking on the subject4 ,it is a question1 however1 which ,locke ignores1 and popular philosophy1 to its great confusion1 has not only continued to do the same1 but would probably resent as pedantic any attempt at more accurate analysis4 ,when we hear of the strongest #8desire' being the uniform motive to action1 we have to ask1 in the first place1 whether the term is confined to impulses determined by a prior consciousness1 or is taken to include those impulses1 commonly called #8mere appetites1' which are not so determined1 but depend directly and solely on the #8constitution of our bodily organs4' ,the appetite of hunger is obviously quite independent of any remembrance of the pleasure of eating1 yet nothing is commoner than to identify with such simple appetite the desire determined by consciousness of some sort1 as when we say of a drunkard1 who never drinks merely because he is thirsty1 that he is governed by his appetite4 ,upon this distinction1 however1 since it is recognised by current psychology1 it is less important to insist than on that between the kinds of prior consciousness which may determine desire proper4 ,does this prior consciousness consist simply in the return of an image of past pleasure with consequent hope of its renewal1 or is it a conception--the thought of an object under relations to self or of self in relation to certain objects--in a word1 self-consciousness as distinct from simple feeling8 #a ,locke's language in regard to #8the most pressing uneasiness' will not be found uniformly consistent4 ,his usual doctrine is that the strength of a desire1 as evinced by the resulting action1 and the uneasiness which it causes are in exact proportion to each other4 ,according to this view1 desire for future happiness can only become a prevalent motive when the uneasiness which it causes has come to outweigh every other 7,cf4 ,chap1 xxi41 ,secs4 #dc and #de74 ,on the other hand1 he sometimes seems to distinguish the desire for future pleasure from present uneasiness1 while at the same time implying that it may be a strongest motive 7,cf4 sec4 #fe74 ,but if so1 it follows that there may be a strongest desire which is not the most pressing uneasiness4 7,see below1 sec4 #ac47 ,hume1 distinguishing strong from violent desires1 and restricting #8uneasiness' to the latter1 is able to hold that it is not alone the present uneasiness which determines action4 7,book ,,ii41 part #c1 sec4 #c1 sub fin47 ,effect of this conception on the objects of human desire4 #d4 ,of desire determined in the former way we have experience1 if at all1 in those motives which actuate us1 as we say1 #8unconsciously'2 which means1 without our attending to them--feelings which we do not fix even momentarily by reference to self or to a thing4 ,as we cannot set ourselves to recall such feelings without thinking them1 without determining them by that reference to self which we suppose them to exclude1 they cannot be described2 but some of our actions 7such as the instinctive recurrence to a sweet smell71 seem only to be thus accounted for1 and probably those actions of animals which do not proceed from appetite proper are to be accounted for in the same way4 ,but whether such actions are facts in human experience or no1 those which make us what we are as men are not so determined4 ,the man whom we call the slave of his appetite1 the enlightened pleasure-hunter1 the man who lives for his family1 the artist1 the enthusiast for humanity1 are alike in this1 that the desire which moves their action is itself determined not by the recurring image of a past pleasure1 but by the conception of self4 ,the self may be conceived of simply as a subject to be pleased1 or may be a subject of interests1 which1 indeed1 when gratified1 produce pleasure but are not produced by it--interests in persons1 in beautiful things1 in the order of nature and society--but self is still not less the #8punctum stans' whose presence to each passing pleasure renders it a constituent of a happiness which is to be permanently pursued1 than it is the focus in which the influences of that world which only self-conscious reason could constitute--the world of science1 of art1 of human society--must be regathered in order to become the personal interests which move the actions of individuals4 ,it is in this self-consciousness involved in our motives1 in that conversion into a conception by reference to self1 which the image even of the merest animal pleasure must undergo before it can become an element in the formation of character1 that the possibility of freedom lies4 ,without it we should be as sinless and as unprogressive1 as free from remorse and aspiration1 as incapable of selfishness and self-denial as the animals4 ,each pleasure would be taken as it came4 ,we should have #8the greatest happiness of which our nature is capable1' without possibility of asking ourselves whether we might not have had more4 ,it is only the conception of himself as a permanent subject to be pleased that can set man upon the invention of new pleasures1 and then1 making each pleasure a disappointment when it comes1 produce the #8vicious' temper2 only this that can suggest the reflection how much more pleasure he might have had than he has had1 and thus produce what the moralists know as #8cool selfishness'2 only this1 on the other hand1 which1 as #8enlightened self-love1' perpetually balances the attraction of imagined pleasure by the calculation whether it will be good for one as a whole4 ,nor less is it the conception of self1 with a #8matter' more adequate to its #8form1' taking its content not from imagined pleasure1 but from the work of reason in the world of nature and humanity1 which determines that personal devotion to a work or a cause1 to a state1 a church1 or mankind1 which we call self-sacrifice4 ,objects so constituted ,locke should consistently exclude3 ,but he finds room for them by treating every desire for an object1 of which the attainment gives pleasure1 as a desire for pleasure4 #e4 ,if1 now1 we ask ourselves whether ,locke recognised this function of reason1 as self-consciousness1 in the determination of the will1 the answer must be yes and no4 ,his cardinal doctrine1 as we have sufficiently seen1 forbade him to admit that reason or thought could originate an object4 ,the only possible objects with him are either simple ideas or resoluble into these1 and the simple idea1 as that which we receive in pure passivity1 is virtually feeling4 ,now no combination of feelings 7supposing it possible #a7 can yield the conception of self as a permanent subject even of pleasure1 much less as a subject of social claims4 ,it cannot1 therefore1 yield the objects1 ranging from sensual happiness to the moral law1 humanity1 and ,god1 of which this conception is the correlative condition4 ,thus1 strictly taken1 ,locke's doctrine excludes every motive to action1 but appetite proper and such desire as is determined by the imagination of animal pleasure or pain1 and in doing so renders vice as well as virtue unaccountable--the excessive pursuit of pleasure as well as that dissatisfaction with it which affords the possibility of ordinary reform4 ,on the other hand1 the same happy intellectual unscrupulousness1 which we have traced in his theory of knowledge1 attends him also here4 ,just as he is ready on occasion to treat any conceived object that determines sense as if it were itself a sensation1 so he is ready to treat any object that determines desire1 without reference to the work of thought in its construction1 as if it were itself the feeling of pleasure1 or of uneasiness removed1 which arises upon satisfaction of the desire4 ,in this way1 without professedly admitting any motive but remembered pleasure--a motive which1 if it were our only one1 would leave #8man's life as cheap as beasts''--he can take for granted any objects of recognised interest as accounting for the movement of human life1 and as constituents of an utmost possible pleasure which it is his own fault if every one does not pursue4 #a ,cf4 ,introduction to ,vol4 ,i41 #bae and #bdg4 ,confusion covered by calling #8happiness' the general object of desire4 #f4 ,the term #8happiness' is the familiar cover for confusion between the animal imagination of pleasure and the conception of personal well-being4 ,it is so when--having raised the question4 ,what moves desire8--,locke answers1 #8happiness1 and that alone4' ,what1 then1 is happiness8 #8,good and evil are nothing but pleasure and pain1' and #8happiness in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of4' #a ,this is #8the proper object of desire in general1' but ,locke is careful to explain that the happiness which #8moves every particular man's desire' is not the full extent of it1 but 'so much of it as is considered and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness4' ,it is that #8wherewith he in his present thoughts can satisfy himself4' ,happiness in this sense #8every one constantly pursues1' and without possibility of error2 for #8as to present pleasure the mind never mistakes that which is really good or evil4' ,every one #8knows what best pleases him1 and that he actually prefers4' ,that which is the greater pleasure or the greater pain is really just as it appears 7,ibid4 #dc1 #eh1 #fc74 ,now in these statements1 if we look closely1 we shall find that four different meanings of happiness are mixed up1 which we will take leave to distinguish by letters--7a7 happiness as an abstract conception1 the sum of possible pleasure2 7b7 happiness as equivalent to the pleasure which at any time survives most strongly in imagination2 7c7 happiness as the object of the self-conscious pleasure-seeker2 7d7 happiness as equivalent to any object at any time most strongly desired1 not really a pleasure1 but by ,locke identified with happiness in sense 7b7 through the fallacy of supposing that the pleasure which arises on satisfaction of any desire1 great in proportion to the strength of the desire1 is itself the object which excites desire4 #a ,ibid41 sec4 #db1 and cap4 #bh1 sec4 #e4 #8,greatest sum of pleasure' and #8,pleasure in general' unmeaning expressions4 #g4 ,happiness #8in its full extent1' as #8the utmost pleasure we are capable of1' is an unreal abstraction if ever there was one4 ,it is curious that those who are most forward to deny the reality of universals1 in that sense in which they are the condition of all reality1 viz41 as relations1 should yet1 having pronounced these to be mere names1 be found ascribing reality to a universal1 which cannot without contradiction be supposed more than a name4 ,does this #8happiness in its full extent' mean the #8aggregate of possible enjoyments1' of which modern utilitarians tell us8 ,such a phrase simply represents the vain attempt to get a definite by addition of indefinites4 ,it has no more meaning than #8the greatest possible quantity of time' would have4 ,pleasant feelings are not quantities that can be added4 ,each is over before the next begins1 and the man who has been pleased a million times is not really better off--has no more of the supposed chief good in possession--than the man who has only been pleased a thousand times4 ,when we speak of pleasures1 then1 as forming a possible whole1 we cannot mean pleasures as feelings1 and what else do we mean8 ,are we1 then1 by the #8happiness' in question to understand pleasure in general1 as might be inferred from ,locke's speaking of it as the #8object of desire in general'8 ,but it is in its mere particularity that each pleasure has its being4 ,it is a simple idea1 and therefore1 as ,locke and ,hume have themselves taught us1 momentary1 indefinable1 in #8perpetual flux1' changing every moment upon us4 ,pleasure in general1 therefore1 is not pleasure1 and it is nothing else4 ,it is not a conceived reality1 as a relation1 or a thing determined by relations1 is1 since pleasure as feeling1 in distinction from its conditions which are not feelings1 for the same reason that it cannot be defined1 cannot be conceived4 ,it is a mere name which utilitarian philosophy has mistaken for a thing2 but for which--since no one1 whatever his theory of the desirable1 can actually desire either the abstraction of pleasure in general or the aggregate of possible pleasures--a practical substitute is apt to be found in any lust of the flesh that may for the time be the strongest4 ,in what sense of happiness is it true that it #8is really just as it appears8' ,in what sense that it is every one's object8 #h4 ,having begun by making this fiction #8the proper object of desire in general1' ,locke saves the appearance of consistency by representing the particular pleasure or removal of uneasiness1 which he in fact believed to be the object of every desire1 as if it were a certain part of the #8full extent of happiness' which the individual1 having this full extent before him1 picked out as being what #8in his present thoughts would satisfy him4' ,nor does he ever give up the notion of a #8happiness in general1' in distinction from the happiness of each man's actual choice1 as a possible motive1 which a man who finds himself wretched in consequence of his actions may be told that he ought to have adopted4 ,his real notion1 however1 of the happiness which is motive to action is a confused result of the three other notions of happiness1 distinguished above as 7b71 7c7 and 7d74 ,as that about which no one can be mistaken1 #8happiness' can only be so in sense 7b71 as the #8pleasure which survives most strongly in imagination4' ,of this it can be said truly1 and of this only1 that #8it really is just as it appears1' and that #8a man never chooses amiss' since he must #8know what best pleases him4' ,but with this1 almost in the same breath1 ,locke confuses #8happiness' in senses 7c7 and 7d74 ,so soon as it is said of an object that it is #8taken by the individual to make a necessary part of his happiness1' it is implied that it is determined by his conception of self4 ,it is something which1 as the result of the action of this conception on his past experience1 he has come to present to himself as a constituent of his personal good4 ,unless he were conscious of himself as a permanent subject1 he could have no conception of happiness as a whole from relation to which each present object takes its character as a part4 ,nor of the objects determined by this relation is it true1 as ,locke says1 that they are always pleasures1 or that they #8are really just as they appear4' ,our readiness to accept his statements to this effect1 is at bottom due to a confusion between the pleasure1 or removal of uneasiness1 incidental to the satisfaction of a desire and the object which excites the desire4 ,if having explained desire1 as ,locke does1 by reference to the good1 we then allow ourselves to explain the good by reference to desire1 it will indeed be true that no man can be mistaken as to his present good1 but only in the sense of the identical proposition that every man most desires what he does most desire2 and true also1 that every attained good is pleasure1 but only in the sense that what satisfies desire does satisfy it4 ,the man of whom it could be truly said1 in any other sense than that of the above identical proposition1 that his only objects of desire--the only objects which he #8takes to make a necessary part of his happiness'--were pleasures1 would be a man1 as we say1 of no interests4 ,he would be a man who either lived simply for pleasures incidental to the satisfaction of animal appetite1 or one who1 having been interested in certain objects in which reason alone enables us to be interested--e4g41 persons1 pursuits1 or works of art--and having found consequent pleasure1 afterwards vainly tries to get the pleasure without the interests4 ,to the former type of character1 of course1 the approximations are numerous enough1 though it may be doubted whether such an ideal of sensuality is often fully realised4 ,the latter in its completeness1 which would mean a perfect misery that could only issue in suicide1 would seem to be an impossibility1 though it is constantly being approached in proportion to the unworthiness and fleetingness of the interests by which men allow themselves to be governed1 and which1 after stimulating an indefinite hunger for good1 leave it without an object to satisfy it2 in proportion1 too1 to the modern habit of hugging and poring over the pleasures which our higher interests cause us till these interests are vitiated1 and we find ourselves in restless and hopeless pursuit of the pleasure when the interest which might alone produce it is gone4 ,no real object of human desire can ever be just as it appears4 #i4 ,just as it is untrue1 then1 of the object of desire1 as #8taken to be part of one's happiness' or determined by the conception of self1 that it is always a pleasure1 so it is untrue that it is always really just as it appears1 except in the trifling sense that what is most strongly desired is most strongly desired4 ,rather it is never really what it appears4 ,it is least of all so to the professed pleasure-seeker4 ,obviously1 to the man who seeks the pleasure incidental to interests which he has lost1 there is a contradiction in his quest which for ever prevents what seems to him desirable from satisfying his desire4 ,and even the man who lives for merely animal pleasure1 just because he seeks it as part of a happiness1 never finds it to be that which he sought4 ,there is no mistake about the pleasure1 but he seeks it as that which shall satisfy him1 and satisfy him1 since he is not an animal1 it cannot4 ,nor are our higher objects of desire ever what they seem4 ,that is too old a topic with poets and moralizers to need enforcing4 ,each in its turn1 we know1 promises happiness when it shall have been attained1 but when it is attained the happiness has not come4 ,the craving for an object adequate to oneself1 which is the source of the desire1 is still not quenched2 and because it is not1 nor can be1 even #8the joy of success' has its own bitterness4 ,can ,locke consistently allow the distinction between true happiness and false8 ,or responsibility8 #aj4 ,the case1 then1 stands thus4 ,locke1 having too much #8common sense' to reduce all objects of desire to the pleasures incidental to satisfactions of appetite1 takes for granted any number of objects which only reason can constitute 7or1 in other words1 which can only exist for a self-conscious subject7 without any question as to their origin4 ,it is enough for him that they are not conscious inventions of the individual1 and that they are related to feeling--though related as determining it4 ,this being so1 they are to him no more the work of thought than are the satisfactions of appetite4 ,the conception of them is of a kind with the simple remembrance or imagination of pleasures caused by such satisfactions4 ,the question how1 if only pleasure is the object of desire1 they came to be desired before there had been experience of the pleasures incidental to their attainment1 is virtually shelved by treating these latter pleasures as if they were themselves the objects originally desired4 ,so far consistency at least is saved4 ,no object but feeling1 present or remembered1 is ostensibly admitted within human experience4 ,but meanwhile1 alongside of this view1 comes the account of the strongest motive as determined by the conception of self--as something which a man #8takes to be a necessary part of his happiness1' and which he is #8answerable to himself' for so taking4 ,the inconsistency of such language with the view that every desired object must needs be a pleasure1 would have been less noticeable if ,locke himself had not frankly admitted1 as the corollary of this view that the desired good #8is really just as it appears4' ,the necessity of this admission has always been the rock on which consistent ,hedonism has broken4 ,locke himself has scarcely made it when he becomes aware of its dangerous consequences1 and great part of the chapter on ,power is taken up by awkward attempts to reconcile it with the distinction between true happiness and false1 and with the existence of moral responsibility4 ,if greatest pleasure is the only possible object1 and the production of such pleasure the only possible criterion of action1 and if #8as to present pleasure and pain the mind never mistakes that which is really good or evil1' with what propriety can any one be told that he might or that he ought to have chosen otherwise than he has done8 #8,he has missed the true good1' we say1 #8which he might and should have found'2 but #8good1' according to ,locke1 is only pleasure1 and pleasure1 as ,locke in any other connexion would be eager to tell us1 must mean either some actual present pleasure or a series of pleasures of which each in turn is present4 ,if every one without possibility of mistake has on each occasion chosen the greatest present pleasure1 how can the result for him at any time be other than the true good1 i4e41 the series of greatest pleasures1 each in its turn present1 that have been hitherto possible for him8 ,objections to the ,utilitarian answer to these questions4 #aa4 ,a modern utilitarian1 if faithful to the principle which excludes any test of pleasure but pleasure itself1 will probably answer that every one does attain the maximum of pleasure possible for him1 his character and circumstances being what they are2 but that with a change in these his choice would be different4 ,he would still choose on each occasion the greatest pleasure of which he was then capable1 but this pleasure would be one #8truer'--in the sense of being more intense1 more durable1 and compatible with a greater quantity of other pleasures--than is that which he actually chooses4 ,but admitting that this answer justifies us in speaking of any sort of pleasure as #8truer' than that at any time chosen by any one--which is a very large admission1 for of the intensity of any pleasure we have no test but its being actually preferred1 and of durability and compatibility with other pleasures the tests are so vague that a healthy and unrepentant voluptuary would always have the best of it in an attempt to strike the balance between the pleasures he has actually chosen and any truer sort--it still only throws us back on a further question4 ,with a better character1 it is said1 such as better education and improved circumstances might have produced1 the actually greatest happiness of the individual--i4e41 the series of pleasures which1 because he has chosen them1 we know to have been the greatest possible for him--might have been greater or #8truer4' ,but the man's character is the result of his previous preferences2 and if every one has always chosen the greatest pleasure of which he was at the time capable1 and if no other motive is possible1 how could any other than his actual character have been produced8 ,how could that conception of a happiness truer than the actual1 of something that should be most pleasant1 and therefore preferred1 though it is not--a conception which all education implies--have been a possible motive among mankind8 ,to say that the individual is1 to begin with1 destitute of such a conception1 but acquires it through education from others1 does not remove the difficulty4 ,how do the educators come by it8 ,common sense assumes them to have found out that more happiness might have been got by another than the merely natural course of living1 and to wish to give others the benefit of their experience4 ,but such experience implies that each has a conception of himself as other than the subject of a succession of pleasures1 of which each has been the greatest possible at the time of its occurrence2 and the wish to give another the benefit of the experience implies that this conception1 which is no possible image of a feeling1 can originate action4 ,the assumption of common sense1 then1 contradicts the two cardinal principles of the ,hedonistic philosophy2 yet1 however disguised in the terminology of development and evolution1 it1 or some equivalent supposition1 is involved in every theory of the progress of mankind4 ,according to ,locke present pleasures may be compared with future1 and desire suspended till comparison has been made4 #ab4 ,such difficulties do not suggest themselves to ,locke1 because he is always ready to fall back on the language of common sense without asking whether it is reconcilable with his theory4 ,having asserted1 without qualification1 that the will in every case is determined by the strongest desire1 that the strongest desire is desire for the greatest pleasure1 and that #8pleasure is just so great1 and no greater1 than it is felt1' he finds a place for moral freedom and responsibility in the #8power a man has to suspend his desires and stop them from determining his will to any action till he has examined whether it be really of a nature in itself and consequences to make him happy or no4' #a ,but how does it happen that there is any need for such suspense1 if as to pleasure and pain #8a man never chooses amiss1' and pleasure is the same with happiness or the good8 ,to this ,locke answers that it is only present pleasure which is just as it appears1 and that in #8comparing present pleasure or pain with future we often make wrong judgments of them2' again1 that not only present pleasure and pain1 but #8things that draw after them pleasure and pain1 are considered as good and evil1' and that of these consequences under the influence of present pleasure or pain we may judge amiss4 #b ,by these wrong judgments1 it will be observed1 ,locke does not mean mistakes in discovering the proper means to a desired end 7,aristotle's ' 7 #c1 which it is agreed are not a ground for blame or punishment1 but wrong desires--desires for certain pleasures as being the greater1 which are not really the greater4 ,regarding such desires as involving comparisons of one good with another1 he counts them judgments1 and 7the comparison being incorrectly made7 wrong judgments4 ,a certain present pleasure1 and a certain future one1 are compared1 and though the future would really be the greater1 the present is preferred2 or a present pleasure1 #8drawing after it' a certain amount of pain1 is compared with a less amount of present pain1 drawing after it a greater pleasure1 and the present pleasure preferred4 ,in such cases the man #8may justly incur punishment' for the wrong preference1 because having #8the power to suspend his desire' for the present pleasure1 he has not done so1 but #8by too hasty choice of his own making has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil4' #8,when he has once chosen it1' indeed1 #8and thereby it is become part of his happiness1 it raises desire1 and that proportionately gives him uneasiness1 which determines his will4' ,but the original wrong choice1 having the #8power of suspending his desires1' he might have prevented4 ,in not doing so he #8vitiated his own palate1' and must be #8answerable to himself' for the consequences4 #d #a ,,ii4 #ba1 ,sec4 #ea and #ef4 #b ,ibid41 ,sec4 #fa1 #fc1 #fg4 #c ,greek ' 7agnoia he kath' hekasta7 unawareness of the particular circumstances4 ,tr4 #d ,ibid41 ,sec4 #ef4 ,what is meant by #8present' and #8future' pleasure8 ,by the supposed comparison ,locke ought only to have meant the competition of pleasures equally present in imagination 444 #ac4 ,responsibility for evil1 then 7with its conditions1 blame1 punishment1 and remorse7 supposes that a man has gone wrong in the comparison of present with future pleasure or pain1 having had the chance of going right4 ,upon this we must remark that as moving desire--and it is the determination of desire that is here in question--,,no pleasure can be present in the sense of actual enjoyment1 or 7in ,hume's language7 as #8impression1' but only in memory or imagination1 as #8idea4' ,otherwise desire would not be desire4 ,it would not be that uneasiness which1 according to ,locke1 implies the absence of good1 and alone moves action4 ,on the other hand1 to imagination ,,every pleasure must be present that is to act as motive at all4 ,in whatever sense1 then1 pleasure1 as pleasure1 i4e4 as undetermined by conceptions1 can properly be said to move desire1 every pleasure is equally present and equally future4 #a ,for man1 if he only felt and retained his feelings in memory1 or recalled them in imagination1 the only difference among the imagined pleasures which solicit his desires1 other than difference of intensity1 would lie in the imagined pains with which each may have become associated4 ,one pleasure might be imagined in association with a greater amount of the pain of waiting than another4 ,in that sense1 and only in that1 could one be distinguished from the other as a future pleasure from a present one4 ,according as the greater imagined intensity of the future pleasure did or did not outweigh the imagined pain of waiting for it1 the scale of desire would turn one way or the other4 ,or with one pleasure1 imagined as more intense than another1 might be associated an expectation of a greater amount of pain to be #8drawn after it4' ,here1 again1 the question would be whether the greater imagined intensity of pleasure would have the more effect in exciting desire1 or the greater amount of imagined sequent pain in quenching it--a question only to be settled by the action which results4 ,in whatever sense it is true of the #8present pleasure or pain1' that it is really just as it appears1 it is equally true of the future4 ,whenever the determination of desire is in question1 the statement that present pleasure is just as it appears must mean that the pleasure present in imagination is so1 and in this sense all motive pleasures are equally so present4 ,undoubtedly the pleasure associated with the pain of prolonged expectancy might turn out greater1 and that associated with sequent pain less1 than was imagined2 but so might a pleasure not thus associated4 ,of every pleasure alike it is as true1 that while it is imagined it is just as it is imagined1 as that while felt it is just as it is felt2 and if man only felt and imagined1 there would be no more reason why he should hold himself accountable for his imaginations than for his feelings4 ,whatever pleasure was most attractive in imagination would determine desire1 and1 through it1 action1 which would be the only measure of the amount of the attraction4 ,it would not indeed follow because an action was determined by the pleasure most attractive in imagination1 that the ensuing pleasure in actual enjoyment would be greater than might have been attained by a different action--though it would be very hard to show the contrary--but it would follow that the man attained the greatest pleasure of which his nature was capable4 ,there would be no reason why he should blame himself1 or be blamed by others1 for the result4 #a ,it is noticeable that when ,locke takes to distinguishing the pleasures that move desire into present and future1 he speaks as if the future pleasure alone were an absent good1 in contradiction to his previous view that every object of desire is an absent good4 7,cf4 sec4 #fe with sec4 #eg of cap4 #ba47 444 and this could give no ground for responsibility4 ,in order to do so1 it must be understood as implying determination by conception of self4 #ad4 ,thus on ,locke's supposition1 that desire is only moved by pleasure--which must mean imagined pleasure1 since pleasure1 determined by conceptions1 is excluded by the supposition that pleasure alone is the ultimate motive1 and pleasure in actual enjoyment is no longer desired--the #8suspense of desire1' that he speaks of1 can only mean an interval1 during which a competition of imagined pleasures 7one associated with more1 another with less1 of sequent or antecedent pain7 is still going on1 and none has become finally the strongest motive4 ,of such suspense it is unmeaning to say that a man has #8the power of it1' or that1 when it terminates in an action which does not produce so much pleasure as another might have done1 it is because the man #8has vitiated his palate1' and that therefore he must be #8answerable to himself' for the consequences4 ,this language really implies that pleasures1 instead of being ultimate ends1 are determined to be ends through reference to an object beyond them which the man himself constitutes2 that it is only through his conception of self that every pleasure--not indeed best pleases him1 or is most attractive in imagination--but becomes his personal good4 ,it may be that he identifies his personal good with the pleasure most attractive in imagination2 but a pleasure so identified is quite a different motive from a pleasure simply as imagined4 ,it is no longer mere pleasure that the man seeks1 but self-satisfaction through the pleasure4 ,the same consciousness of self1 which sets him on the act1 continues through the act and its consequences1 carrying with it the knowledge 7commonly called the #8voice of conscience'7 that it is to himself1 as the ultimate motive1 that the act and its consequences1 whether in the shape of natural pains or civil penalties1 are due--a knowledge which breeds remorse1 and1 through it1 the possibility of a better mind4 ,thus1 when ,locke finds the ground of responsibility in a man's power of suspending his desire till he has considered whether the act1 to which it inclines him1 is of a kind to make him happy or no1 the value of the explanation lies in the distinction which it may be taken to imply1 but which ,locke could not consistently admit1 between the imagination of pleasure and the conception of self as a permanent subject of happiness1 by reference to which an imagined pleasure becomes a strongest motive4 ,it is not really as involving a comparison between imagined pleasures1 but as involving the consideration whether the greatest imagined pleasure will be the best for one in the long run1 that the suspense of desire establishes the responsibility of man4 ,even if we admitted with ,locke that nothing entered into the consideration but an estimate of #8future pleasures'--and ,locke1 it will be observed1 by supposing the estimate to include #8pleasures of a sort we are unacquainted with1' #a which is as much of a contradiction as to suppose a man influenced by unfelt feelings1 renders this restriction unmeaning--still to be determined by the consideration whether something is good for me on the whole is to be determined1 not by the imagination of pleasure1 but by the conception of self1 though it be of self only as a subject to be pleased4 #a ,cap4 #ba1 sec4 #fe4 ,he has specially in view the pleasures of #8another life'1 which #8being intended for a state of happiness1 must certainly be agreeable to every one's wish and desire3 could we suppose their relishes as different there as they are here1 yet the manna in heaven will suit every one's palate4' ,locke finds moral freedom in necessity of pursuing happiness4 #ae4 ,the mischief is that1 though his language implies this distinction1 he does not himself understand it4 #8,the care of ourselves1' he tells us1 #8that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness1 is the necessary foundation of our liberty4 ,the stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general1 which is our greatest good1 and which1 as such1 our desires always follow1 the more are we free from any necessary determination of our will to any particular action1 till we have examined whether it has a tendency to1 or is inconsistent with1 our real happiness4' #a ,but he does not see that the rationale of the freedom1 thus paradoxically1 though truly1 placed in the strength of a tie1 lies in that determination by the conception of self to which the #8unalterable pursuit of happiness' is really equivalent4 ,to him it is not as one mode among others in which that self-determination appears1 but simply in itself1 that the consideration of what is for our real happiness is the #8foundation of our liberty1' and the consideration itself is no more than a comparison between imagined pleasures and pains4 ,hence to a reader who refuses to read into ,locke an interpretation which he does not himself supply1 the range of moral liberty must seem as narrow as its nature is ambiguous4 ,as to its range1 the greater part of our actions1 and among them those which we are apt to think our best1 are not and could not be preceded by any consideration whether they are for our real happiness or no4 ,in truth1 they result from a character which the conception of self has rendered possible1 or express an interest in objects of which this conception is the condition1 and for that reason they represent a will self-determined and free2 but they do not rest on the foundation which ,locke calls #8the necessary foundation of our liberty4' ,as to the nature of this liberty1 the reader1 who takes ,locke at his word1 would find himself left to choose between the view of it as the condition of a mind #8suspended' between rival presentations of the pleasant1 and the equally untenable view of it as that #8liberty of indifference1' which ,locke himself is quite ready to deride--as consisting in a choice prior to desire1 which determines what the desire shall be4 #b #a ,cap4 #ba1 sec4 #ea4 #b ,cf4 the passage in sec4 #ef3 #8,when he has once chosen it1 and thereby it is become part of his happiness1 it raises desire1' c4 7,cf4 also sec4 #dc sub fin47 ,if an action is moved by desire for an object1 ,locke asks no questions about origin of the object3 ,but what is to be said of actions1 which we only do because we ought8 #af4 ,this ambiguous deliverance about moral freedom1 it must be observed1 is the necessary result on a mind1 having too strong a practical hold on life to tamper with human responsibility1 of a doctrine which denies the originativeness of thought1 and in consequence cannot consistently allow any motive to desire1 but the image of a past pleasure or pain4 ,the full logical effect of the doctrine1 however1 does not appear in ,locke1 because1 with his way of taking any desire of which the satisfaction produces pleasure to have pleasure for its object1 he never comes in sight of the question how the manifold objects of actual human interest are possible for a being who only feels and retains1 or combines1 his feelings4 ,an action moved by love of country1 love of fame1 love of a friend1 love of the beautiful1 would cause him no more difficulty than one moved by desire for the renewal of some sensual enjoyment1 or for that maintenance of health which is the condition of such enjoyment in the future4 ,if pressed about them1 we may suppose that--availing himself of the language probably current in the philosophic society in which he lived1 though it first became generally current in ,england through the writings of his quasi-pupil1 ,shaftesbury--he would have said that he found in his breast affections for public good1 as well as for self-good1 the satisfaction of which gave pleasure1 and to which his doctrine1 that pleasure is the #8object of desire in general1' was accordingly applicable4 ,the question--of what feelings or combinations of feelings are the objects which excite these several desires copies8--it does not occur to him to ask4 ,it is only when a class of actions presents itself for which a motive in the way of desire or aversion is not readily assignable that any difficulty arises1 and then it is a difficulty which the assignment of such a motive1 without any question asked as to its possibility for a merely feeling and imagining subject1 is thought sufficiently to dispose of4 ,such a class of actions is that of which we say that we #8ought' to do them1 even when we are not compelled and had rather not4 ,we ought1 it is generally admitted1 to keep our promises1 even when it is inconvenient to us to do so and no punishment could overtake us if we did not4 ,we ought to be just even in ways that the law does not prescribe1 and when we are beyond its ken2 and that1 too1 in dealing with men towards whom we have no inclination to be generous4 ,we ought even--so at least ,locke #8on the authority of ,revelation' would have said--to forgive injuries which we cannot forget1 and if not #8to love our enemies' in the literal sense1 which may be an impossibility1 yet to act as if we did4 ,to what motive are such actions to be assigned8 ,their object is pleasure1 but pleasure given not by nature but by law4 #ag4 #8,to desire for pleasure or aversion from pain1' ,locke would answer1 #8but a pleasure and pain other than the natural consequences of acts and attached to them by some law4' ,this is the result of his enquiry into #8,moral ,relations' 7,book ,,ii41 chap4 #bh74 ,good and evil1 he tells us1 being #8nothing but pleasure and pain1 moral good or evil is only the conformity or disagreement of our actions to some law1 whereby good or evil1 i4e41 pleasure or pain1 is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker4' ,all law according to its #8true nature' is a rule set to the actions of others by an intelligent being1 having #8power to reward the compliance with1 and punish deviation from1 his rule by some good and evil that is not the natural product and consequence of the action itself2 for that1 being a natural convenience or inconvenience1 would operate of itself without a law4' ,of such law there are three sorts4 #a4 ,divine ,law1 #8promulgated to men by the light of nature or voice of revelation1 by comparing their actions to which they judge whether1 as duties or sins1 they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the ,almighty4' #b4 ,civil ,law1 #8the rule set by the ,commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it1' reference to which decides #8whether they be criminal or no4' #c4 #8,the law of opinion or reputation1' according to agreement or disagreement with which actions are reckoned #8virtues or vices4' ,this law may or may not coincide with the divine law4 ,so far as it does1 virtues and vices are really1 what they are always supposed to be1 actions #8in their own nature #8severally right or wrong4 ,it is not as really right or wrong1 however1 but only as esteemed so1 that an act is virtuous or vicious1 and thus #8the common measure of virtue and vice is the approbation or dislike1 praise or blame1 which by a tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies1 tribes1 and clubs of men in the world1 whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace among them1 according to the judgment1 maxims1 or fashions of the place4' ,each sort of law has its own #8enforcement in the way of good and evil4' ,that of the civil law is obvious4 ,that of the ,divine ,law lies in the pleasures and pains of #8another world1' which 7we have to suppose7 render actions #8in their own nature good and evil4' ,that of the third sort of law lies in those consequences of social reputation and dislike which are stronger motives to most men than are the rewards and punishments either of ,god or the magistrate 7chap4 #bh1 #e-ab74 ,conformity to law not the moral good1 but a means to it4 #ah4 #8,moral goodness or evil1' ,locke concludes1 #8is the conformity or non-conformity of any action' to one or other of the above rules 7 #ad74 ,but such conformity or non-conformity is not a feeling1 pleasant or painful1 at all4 ,if1 then1 the account of the good as consisting in pleasure1 of which the morally good is a particular form1 is to be adhered to1 we must suppose that1 when moral goodness is said to be conformity to law1 it is so called merely with reference to the specific means of attaining that pleasure in which moral good consists4 ,not the conception of conformity to law1 but the imagination of a certain pleasure1 will determine the desire that moves the moral act1 as every other desire4 ,the distinction between the moral act and an act judiciously done for the sake1 let us say1 of some pleasure of the palate1 will lie only in the channel through which comes the pleasure that each is calculated to obtain4 ,if the motive of an act done for the sake of the pleasure of eating differs from the motive of an act done for the sake of sexual pleasure on account of the difference of the channels through which the pleasures are severally obtained1 in that sense only can the motive of either of these acts1 upon ,locke's principles1 be taken to differ from the motive of an act morally done4 ,the explanation1 then1 of the acts not readily assignable to desire or aversion1 of which we say that we only do them because we #8ought1' has been found4 ,they are so far of a kind with all actions done to obtain or avoid what ,locke calls #8future' pleasures or pains that the difficulty of assigning a motive for them only arises from the fact that their immediate result is not an end but a means4 ,they differ from these1 however1 inasmuch as the pleasure they draw after them is not their #8natural consequence1' any more than the pain attaching to a contrary act would be1 but is only possible through the action of ,god1 the magistrate1 or society in some of its forms4 ,hume has to derive from #8impressions' the objects which ,locke took for granted4 #ai4 ,after the above examination we can easily anticipate the points on which a candid and clear-headed man1 who accepted the principles of ,locke's doctrine1 would see that it needed explanation and development4 ,if all action is determined by impulse to remove the most pressing uneasiness1 as consisting in desire for the greatest pleasure of which the agent is at the time capable2 if this1 again1 means desire for the renewal of some #8impression' previously experienced1 and all impressions are either those of sense or derived from them1 how are we to account for those actual objects of human interest and pursuit which seem far removed from any combination of animal pleasures or of the means thereto1 and specially for that class of actions determined1 as ,locke says1 by expectation of pain or pleasure other than the #8natural consequence' of the act1 to which the term #8moral' is properly applied8 ,hume1 as we have seen1 #a in accepting ,locke's principles1 clothes them in a more precise terminology1 marking the distinction between the feeling as originally felt and the same as returning in memory or imagination as that between #8impression and idea1' and excluding original ideas of reflection4 #8,an impression first strikes upon the senses1 and makes us perceive heat or cold1 thirst or hunger1 pleasure or pain1 of some kind or other4 ,of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind1 which remains after the impression ceases2 and this we call an idea4 ,this idea of pleasure or pain1 when it returns upon the soul1 produces the new impressions of desire and aversion1 hope and fear1 which may properly be called impressions of reflection1 because derived from it' 7a74 #8,these1 again1 are copied by the memory and imagination1 and become ideas2 which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions' 7b74 ,thus the impressions of reflection1 marked 7a71 will be determined by ideas copied from impressions of sense4 ,if desires1 they will be desires for the renewal either of a pleasure incidental to the satisfaction of appetite1 or of a pleasant sight or sound1 a sweet taste or smell4 ,these desires and their satisfactions will again be copied in ideas1 but how can the impressions 7b7 to which these ideas give rise be other than desires for the renewal of the original animal pleasures8 ,how do they come to be desires as unlike these as are the motives which actuate not merely the saint or the philanthropist1 but the ordinary good neighbour or honest citizen or head of a family8 #a ,general ,introd41 ,vol4 ,i1 par4 #aie ,questions which he found at issue1 a4 ,is virtue interested8 b4 ,what is conscience8 #bj4 ,during the interval between the publication of ,locke's essay and the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature' there had been much writing on ethical questions in ,english4 ,the effect of this on ,hume is plain enough4 ,he writes with reference to current controversy1 and in the moral part of the treatise probably had the views of ,clarke1 ,shaftesbury1 ,butler1 and ,hutcheson more consciously before him than ,locke's4 ,this does not interfere1 however1 with the propriety of affiliating him in respect of his views on morals1 no less than on knowledge1 directly to ,locke1 whose principles and method were in the main accepted by all the moralists of that age4 ,his characteristic lies in his more consistent application of these1 and the effect of current controversy upon him was chiefly to show him the line which this application must take4 ,it was a controversy which turned almost wholly on two points2 7a7 the distinction between #8interested and disinterested1' selfish and unselfish affections2 7b7 the origin and nature of that #8law1' relation to which1 according to ,locke1 constitutes our action #8virtuous or vicious4' ,in the absence of any notion of thought but as a faculty which puts together simple ideas into complex ones1 of reason but as a faculty which calculates means and perceives the agreement of ideas mediately1 it could have but one end4 ,hobbes' answer to first question1 #ba4 ,by the generation in which ,hume was bred the issue as to the possible disinterestedness of action was supposed to lie between the view of ,hobbes and that of ,shaftesbury4 ,hobbes' moral doctrine had not been essentially different from ,locke's1 but he had been offensively explicit on questions which ,locke left open to more genial views than his doctrine logically justified4 ,each started from the position that the ultimate motive to every action can only be the imagination of one's own pleasure or pain1 and neither properly left room for the determination of desire by a conceived object as distinct from remembered pleasure4 ,but while ,locke1 as we have seen1 illogically took for granted desires so determined1 and thus made it possible for a disciple to admit any benevolent desires as motives on the strength of the pleasure which they produce when satisfied1 ,hobbes had been more severe in his method1 and had explained every desire1 of which the direct motive could not be taken to be the renewal of some animal pleasure1 as desire either for the power in oneself to command such pleasure at will or for the pleasure incidental to the contemplation of the signs of such power4 ,hence his peculiar treatment of compassion and the other #8social affections1' which it is easier to show to be untrue to the facts of the case than to be other than the proper consequence of principles which ,locke had rendered orthodox4 #a ,the counter-doctrine of ,shaftesbury holds water just so far as it involves the rejection of the doctrine that pleasure is the sole ultimate motive4 ,it becomes confused just because its author had no definite theory of reason1 as constitutive of objects1 that could justify this rejection4 #a ,see #8,leviathan1' part #a1 chap4 #f4 ,counter-doctrine of ,shaftesbury4 ,vice is selfishness3 ,but no clear account of selfishness4 #bb4 ,he begins with a doctrine that directly contradicts ,locke's identification of the good with pleasure1 and of the morally good with pleasure occurring in a particular way1 #8,in a sensible creature that which is not done through any affection at all makes neither good nor ill in the nature of that creature2 who then only is supposed good1 when the good or ill of the system to which he has relation is the immediate object of some passion or affection moving him4' #a ,this1 it will be seen1 as against ,locke1 implies that the good of a man's action lies not in any pleasure sequent upon it to him1 but in the nature of the affection from which it proceeds2 and that the goodness of this affection depends on its being determined by an object wholly different from imagined pleasure--the conceived good of a system to which the man has relation1 i4e41 of human society1 which in ,shaftesbury's language is the #8public' as distinct from the #8private' system4 ,it is not enough that an action should result in good to this system2 it must proceed from affection for it4 #8,whatever is done which happens to be advantageous to the species through an affection merely towards self-good does not imply any more goodness in the creature than as the affection itself is good4 ,let him in any particular act ever so well2 if at the bottom it be that selfish affection alone which moves him1 he is in himself still vicious4' #b ,here1 then1 we seem to have a clear theory of moral evil as consisting in selfish1 of moral good as consisting in unselfish affections4 ,but what exactly constitutes a selfish affection1 according to ,shaftesbury8 ,the answer that first suggests itself1 is that as the unselfish affection is an affection for public good1 so a selfish one is an affection for #8self-good1' the good of the #8private system4' ,shaftesbury1 however1 does not give this answer4 #8,affection for private good' with him is not1 as such1 selfish2 it is so only when #8excessive' and #8inconsistent with the interest of the species or public4' #c ,this qualification seems at once to efface the clear line of distinction previously drawn4 ,it puts #8self-affection' on a level with public affection which1 according to ,shaftesbury1 may equally err on the side of excess4 ,it implies that an affection for self-good1 if only it be advantageous to the species1 may be good2 which is just what had been previously denied4 ,and not only so2 although1 when the self-affections are under view1 they are only allowed a qualified goodness in virtue of their indirect contribution to the good of the species1 yet conversely1 the superiority of the affections1 which have this latter good for their object1 is urged specially on the ground of the greater amount of happiness or #8self-good' which they produce4 #a #8,inquiry concerning ,virtue1' ,book ,i4 part #b1 sec4 #a4 #b ,ibid41 ,book ,i41 part #b1 sec4 #b4 #c ,ibid41 ,book ,,ii41 part #a1 sec4 #c4 ,confusion in his notions of self-good and public good3 ,is all living for pleasure1 or only too much of it1 selfish8 #bc4 ,the truth is that the notions which ,shaftesbury attached to the terms #8affection for self-good' and #8affection for public good' were not such as allowed of a consistent opposition between them4 ,they can only be so opposed if1 on the one hand1 self-good is identified with pleasure2 and on the other1 affection for public good is carefully distinguished from desire for that sort of pleasure of which the gratification of others is a condition4 ,but with ,shaftesbury1 affections for self-good do not represent merely those desires for pleasure determined by self-consciousness--for pleasure presented as one's personal good--which can alone be properly reckoned sources of moral evil4 ,they include equally mere natural appetites--hunger1 the sexual impulse1 c4--which are morally neutral1 and they do not clearly exclude any desire for an object which a man has so #8made his own' as to find his happiness--#8self-enjoyment' or #8self-good1' according to ,shaftesbury's language--in attaining it1 though it be as remote from imagined pleasure as possible4 #a ,on the other hand1 #8affections for public good1' as he describes them1 are not restricted to such desires for the good of others as are irrespective of pleasure to self4 ,they include not only such natural instincts as #8parental kindness and concern for the nurture and propagation of the young1' which1 morally1 at any rate1 are not to be distinguished from the appetites reckoned as affections for self-good1 but also desires for sympathetic pleasure--the pleasure to oneself which arises on consciousness that another is pleased4 ,shaftesbury's special antipathy1 indeed1 is the doctrine that benevolent affections are interested in the sense of having for their object a pleasure to oneself1 apart from and beyond the pleasure of the person whom they move us to please2 but unless he regards them as desires for the pleasure which the subject of them experiences in the pleasure of another1 there is no purpose in enlarging1 as he does with much unction1 on the special pleasantness of the pleasures which they produce4 ,with such vagueness in his notions of what he meant by affections for #8self-good' and for #8public good1' it is not strange that he should have failed to give any tenable account of the selfishness in which he conceived moral evil to consist4 ,he could not apply such a term of reproach to the #8self-affections' in general1 without condemning as selfish the man who #8finds his own happiness in doing good1' and who is in truth indistinguishable from one to whom #8affection for public good' has become1 as we say1 the law of his being4 ,nor could he identify selfishness1 as he should have done1 with all living for pleasure without a more complete rupture than he was capable of with the received doctrine of his time and without bringing affection for public good1 in the form in which it was most generally conceived1 and which was1 at any rate1 one of the forms under which he presented it to himself--as desire1 namely1 for sympathetic pleasure--into the same condemnation4 ,his way out of the difficulty is1 as we have seen1 in violation of his own principle to find the characteristic of selfishness not in the motive of any affection but in its result2 not in the fact that a man's desire has his own good for its object1 which is true of one to whom his neighbour's good is as his own1 nor in the fact that it has pleasure for its object1 which ,shaftesbury1 as the child of his age1 could scarcely help thinking was the case with every desire1 but in the fact that it is stronger than is #8consistent with the interest of the species or public4' #a ,book ,,ii41 part #b1 sec4 #b4 ,what have ,butler and ,hutcheson to say about it8 ,chiefly that affections terminate upon their objects4 ,but this does not exclude the view that all desire is for pleasure4 #bd4 ,neither ,butler nor ,hutcheson #a can claim to have carried the ethical controversy much beyond the point at which ,shaftesbury left it4 ,each took for granted that the object of the #8self-affection' was necessarily one's own happiness1 and neither made any distinction between living for happiness and living for pleasure4 ,they could not then identify selfishness with the living for pleasure without condemning the self-affection1 and with1 it the best man's pursuit of his own highest good in the service of others1 altogether as evil4 ,nor in the absence of any better theory of the object of the self-affection could the social affections1 which1 according to ,butler1 are subject in the developed man to the direction of self-love1 escape the suggestion that they are one mode of the general desire for pleasure4 ,butler and ,hutcheson1 indeed1 are quite clear that they are #8disinterested' in the sense of #8terminating upon their objects4' #b ,this means1 what is sufficiently obvious when once pointed out1 7a7 that a benevolent desire is not a desire for that particular pleasure1 or rather #8removal of uneasiness1' which shall ensue when it is satisfied1 and 7b7 that it cannot originally arise from the general desire for happiness1 since this creates no pleasures but merely directs us to the pursuit of objects found pleasant independently of it1 and thus1 if it directs us to benevolent acts1 presupposes a pleasure previously found in them4 ,this1 however1 as ,butler points out1 is equally true of all particular desires whatever--of those styled self-regarding1 no less than of the social--and if it is not incompatible with the former being desires for pleasure1 no more is it with the latter being so4 ,much confusion on the matter1 it may be truly said1 arises from the loose way in which the words #8affection' and #8passion' are used by ,butler and his contemporaries1 not excluding ,hume himself1 alike for appetite1 desire1 and emotion4 ,in every case a pleasure other than satisfaction of desire must have been experienced before desire can be excited by the imagination of it4 ,a pleasure incidental to the satisfaction of appetite must have been experienced before imagination of it could excite the desire of the glutton4 ,in like manner1 social affection1 as desire1 cannot be first excited by the pleasure which shall arise when it is satisfied2 it must previously exist as the condition of that pleasure being experienced2 but it does not follow that it is other than a desire for an imagined pleasure1 for that sympathetic pleasure in the pleasure of another in which the social affection as emotion consists4 ,now though ,butler and ,hutcheson sufficiently showed that it is no other pleasure than this which is the original object of benevolent desires1 they did not attempt to show that it is not this2 and failing such an attempt1 the received doctrine that the object of all desire1 social and self-regarding alike1 is pleasure of one sort or another1 would naturally be taken to stand4 ,this admitted1 there can be nothing in the fact that a certain pleasure depends on the pleasure of another1 and that a certain other does not1 to entitle an action moved by desire for the former sort of pleasure to be called unselfish in the way of praise1 and one moved by desire for the latter sort selfish in the way of reproach4 ,the motive--desire for his own pleasure--is the same to the doer in both cases4 ,the distinction between the acts can only lie in that which ,shaftesbury had said could not constitute moral good or ill--in the consequences by which society judges of them1 but which do not form the motive of the agent4 ,in other words1 it will be a distinction fixed by that law of opinion or reputation1 in which ,locke had found the common measure of virtue and vice1 though he had not entered on the question of the considerations by which that law is formed4 #a ,the works of ,hutcheson1 published before ,hume's treatise was written1 and which strongly affected it1 were the #8,enquiry into the ,original of our ,ideas of ,beauty and ,virtue' 7#agbe71 and the #8,essay on the ,nature and ,conduct of the ,passions and ,affections' 7#agbh74 ,in what follows ,i wrote with direct reference to his posthumous work1 not published till after ,hume's treatise1 but which only reproduces more systematically his earlier views4 #b ,see in ,preface to ,butler's ,sermons1 the part relating to ,sermon ,,xi41 #8,besides1 the only idea of an interested pursuit' c42 also the early part of ,sermon ,,xi41 #8,every man hath a general desire1' c4 ,of moral goodness ,butler's account circular3 ,hutcheson's inconsistent with his doctrine that reason gives no end4 #be4 ,such a conclusion would lie ready to hand for such a reader of ,butler and ,hutcheson as we may suppose ,hume to have been1 but it is needless to say that it is not that at which they themselves arrive4 ,butler1 indeed1 distinctly refuses to identify moral good and evil respectively with disinterested and interested action1 #a but neither does he admit that desire for pleasure or aversion from pain is the uniform motive of action in such a way as to compel the conclusion that moral good and ill represent a distinction1 not of motives1 but of consequences of action contemplated by the onlooker4 ,an act is morally good1 according to him1 when it is approved by the #8reflex faculty of approbation1' bad when it is disapproved1 but what it is that this #8faculty' approves he never distinctly tells us4 ,the good is what #8conscience' approves1 and conscience is what approves the good--that is the circle out of which he never escapes4 ,if we insist on extracting from him any more satisfactory conclusion as to the object of moral approbation1 it must be that it is the object which #8self-love' pursues1 i4e41 the greatest happiness of the individual1 a conclusion which in some places he certainly adopts4 #b ,hutcheson1 on the other hand1 gives a plain definition of the object which this faculty approves4 ,it consists in #8affections tending to the happiness of others and the moral perfection of the mind possessing them4' ,if in this definition by #8tending to' may be understood #8of which the motive is'--an interpretation which the general tenor of ,hutcheson's view would justify--it implies in effect that the morally good lies in desires of which the object is not pleasure4 ,that desire for moral perfection1 if there is such a thing1 is not desire for pleasure is obvious enough2 nor could desire for the happiness of others be taken to be so except through confusion between determination by the conception of another's good1 to which his apparent pleasure is rightly or wrongly taken as a guide1 and by the imagination of a pleasure to be experienced by oneself in sympathy with the pleasure of another4 ,nor is it doubtful that ,hutcheson himself1 though he might have hesitated to identify moral evil1 as selfishness1 with the living for pleasure1 yet understood by the morally good the living for objects wholly different from pleasure4 ,the question is whether the recognition of such motives is logically compatible with his doctrine that reason gives no ends1 but is only a #8subservient power' of calculating means4 ,if feeling1 undetermined by thought or reason1 can alone supply motives1 and of feeling1 thus undetermined1 nothing can be said but that it is pleasant or painful1 what motive can there be but imagination of one's own pleasure or pain--one's own1 for if imagination is merely the return of feeling in fainter form1 no one can imagine any feeling1 any more than he can originally feel it1 except as his own8 #a ,see preface to ,sermons 7about four pages from the end in most editions73-#8,the goodness or badness of actions does not arise hence1' c4 ,the conclusion he there arrives at is that a good action is one which #8becomes such creatures as we are'2 and this1 read in the light of the second sermon1 must be understood to mean an action #8suitable to our whole nature1' as containing a principle of #8reflex approbation4' ,in other words1 the good action is so because approved by conscience4 #b ,see a passage towards the end of ,sermon ,,iii41 #8,reasonable self-love and conscience are the chief1' c4 c42 also a passage towards the end of ,sermon ,,xi41 #8,let it be allowed though virtue1' c4 c4 ,source of the moral judgment3 ,received notion of reason incompatible with true view4 ,shaftesbury's doctrine of rational affection2 spoilt by doctrine of #8moral sense' #bf4 ,the work of reason in constituting the moral judgment 7#8,i ought'71 as well as the moral motive 7#8,i must1 because ,i ought'71 could not find due recognition in an age which took its notion of reason from ,locke4 ,the only theory then known which found the source of moral distinctions in reason was ,clarke's1 and ,clarke's notion of reason was essentially the same as that which appears in ,locke's account of demonstrative knowledge4 #a ,it was in truth derived from the procedure of mathematics1 and only applicable to the comparison of quantities4 ,clarke talks loftily about the ,eternal ,reason of things1 but by this he means nothing definite except the laws of proportion1 and when he finds the virtue of an act to consist in conformity to this ,eternal ,reason1 the inevitable rejoinder is the question--,between what quantities is this virtue a proportion8 #b ,in ,shaftesbury first appears a doctrine of moral sense4 ,over and above the social and self-regarding affections proper to a #8sensible' creature1 the characteristic of man is a #8rational affection' for goodness as consisting in the proper adjustment of the two orders of #8sensible' affection4 ,this rational affection is not only a possible motive to action--it is the only motive that can make that character good of which human action is the expression2 for with ,shaftesbury1 though a balance of the social and self-affections constitutes the goodness of those affections1 yet the man is only good as actuated by affection for this goodness1 and #8should the sensible affections stand ever so much amiss1 yet if they prevail not because of those other rational affections spoken of1 the person is esteemed virtuous4' #c ,such a notion1 it is clear1 if it had met with a psychology answering it1 had only to be worked out in order to become ,kant's doctrine of the rational will as determined by reverence for law2 but ,shaftesbury had no such psychology1 nor1 with his aristocratic indifference to completeness of system1 does he seem ever to have felt the want of it4 ,he never asked himself what precisely was the theory of reason implied in the admission of an affection #8rational' in the sense1 not that reason calculates the means to its satisfaction1 but that it is determined by an object only possible for a rational as distinct from a #8sensible' creature2 and just because he did not do so1 he slipped into adaptations to the current view of the good as pleasure and of desire as determined by the pleasure incidental to its own satisfaction4 ,thus1 to a disciple1 who wished to extract from ,shaftesbury a more definite system than ,shaftesbury had himself formed1 the #8rational affection' would become desire for a specific feeling of pleasure supposed to arise on the view of good actions as exhibiting a proper balance between social and self-regarding affections4 ,this pleasure is the #8moral sense1' #d with which ,shaftesbury's name has become specially associated1 while the doctrine of rational affection1 with which he certainly himself connected it1 but which it essentially vitiates1 has been forgotten4 #a ,see ,clarke's ,boyle ,lectures1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 proposition #a4 ,the germ of ,clarke's doctrine of morals is to be found in ,locke's occasional assimilation of moral to mathematical truth and certainty4 7,cf4 ,essay1 ,book ,,iv1 ch4 #d1 sec4 #g1 and ch4 #ab1 sec4 #h74 #b ,cf4 ,hume1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #bch4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,i4 #c #8,inq4 concerning ,virtue1' ,book ,i41 pt4 #b4 sec4 #d4 ,cf4 ,sec4 #c sub init4 #d ,in using the term #8moral sense1' ,shaftesbury himself1 no doubt1 meant to convey the notion that the moral faculty was one of #8intuition1' in ,locke's sense of the word1 as opposed to reason1 the faculty of demonstration1 rather than that it was a susceptibility of pleasure and pain4 ,consequences of the latter4 #bg4 ,that doctrine is of value as maintaining that those actions only are morally good of which the rational affection is the motive1 in the sense that they spring from a character which this affection has fashioned4 ,but if the rational affection is desire for the pleasure of moral sense1 we find ourselves in the contradiction of supposing that the only motive which can produce good acts is one that cannot operate till after the good acts have been done4 ,it is desire for a pleasure which yet can only have been experienced as a consequence of the previous existence of the desire4 ,shaftesbury himself1 indeed1 treats the moral sense of pleasure in the contemplation of good actions as a pleasure in the view of the right adjustment between the social and self-affections4 ,if1 however1 on the strength of this1 we suppose that certain actions are first done1 not from the rational affection1 but yet good1 and that then remembrance of the pleasure found in the view of their goodness1 exciting desire1 becomes motive to another set of acts which are thus done from rational affection1 we contradict his statement that only the rational affection forms the goodness of man1 and are none the nearer to an account of what does form it4 ,to say that it is the #8right adjustment' of the two orders of affection tells us nothing4 ,except as suggesting an analogy from the world of art1 really inapplicable1 but by which ,shaftesbury was much influenced1 this expression means no more than that goodness is a good state of the affections4 ,from such a circle the outlet most consistent with the spirit of that philosophy1 which had led ,shaftesbury himself to bring down the rational affection to the level of a desire for pleasure1 would lie in the notion that a state of the affections is good in proportion as it is productive of pleasure2 which again would suggest the question whether the specific pleasure of moral sense itself1 the supposed object of rational affection1 is more than pleasure in that indefinite anticipation of pleasure which the view of affections so ordered tends to raise in us4 ,is an act done for #8virtue's sake' done for pleasure of moral sense8 #bh4 ,here1 again1 neither ,butler nor ,hutcheson1 while they avoid the most obvious inconsistency of ,shaftesbury's doctrine1 do much for its positive development4 ,with each the #8moral faculty1' though it is said to approve and disapprove1 is still a #8sense' or #8sentiment1' a specific susceptibility of pleasure in the contemplation of goodness2 and each again recognises a #8reflex affection' for--a desire to have--the goodness of which the view conveys this pleasure4 ,but they neither have the merit of stating so explicitly as ,shaftesbury does that this rational affection alone constitutes the goodness of man1 as man2 nor1 on the other hand1 do they lapse1 as he does1 into the representation of it as a desire for the pleasure which the view of goodness causes4 ,butler1 indeed1 having no account to give of the goodness which is approved or morally pleasing1 but the fact that it is so pleasing1 could logically have nothing to say against the view that this reflex affection is merely a desire for this particular sort of pleasure2 but by representing it as equivalent in its highest form to the love of ,god1 to the longing of the soul after ,him as the perfectly good1 he in effect gives it a wholly different character4 ,hutcheson1 by his definition of the object of moral approbation1 #a which is also a definition of the object of the reflex affection1 is fairly entitled to exclude1 as he does1 along with the notion that the goodness which we morally approve is the quality of exciting the pleasure of such approval1 the notion that #8affection for goodness' means desire for this or any other pleasure4 ,but1 in spite of his express rejection of this view1 the question will still return1 how either a faculty of consciousness of which we only know that it is #8a kind of taste or relish1' or a desire from the determination of which reason is expressly excluded1 can have any other object than pleasure or pain4 #a ,see above1 sec4 #be4 ,hume excludes every object of desire but pleasure4 #bi4 ,in contrast with these well-meant efforts to derive that distinction between the selfish and unselfish1 between the pleasant and the morally good1 which the ,christian conscience requires1 from principles that do not admit of it1 ,hume's system has the merit of relative consistency4 ,he sees that the two sides of ,locke's doctrine--one that thought originates nothing1 but takes its objects as given in feeling1 the other that the good which is object of desire is pleasant feeling--are inseparable4 ,hence he decisively rejects every notion of rational or unselfish affections1 which would imply that they are other than desires for pleasure2 of virtue1 which would imply that it antecedently determines1 rather than is constituted by1 the specific pleasure of moral sense2 and of this pleasure itself1 which would imply that anything but the view of tendencies to produce pleasure can excite it4 ,but here his consistency stops4 ,the principle which forbade him to admit any object of desire but pleasure is practically forgotten in his account of the sources of pleasure1 and its being so forgotten is the condition of the desire for pleasure being made plausibly to serve as a foundation for morals4 ,it is the assumption of pleasures determined by objects only possible for reason1 made in the treatise on the ,passions1 that prepares the way for the rejection of reason1 as supplying either moral motive or moral standard1 in the treatise on ,morals4 ,his account of #8direct passions'3 ,all desire is for pleasure4 #cj4 #8,the passions' is ,hume's generic term for #8impressions of reflection'--appetites1 desires1 and emotions alike4 ,he divides them into two main orders1 #8direct and indirect1' both #8founded on pain and pleasure4' ,the direct passions are enumerated as #8desire and aversion1 grief and joy1 hope and fear1 along with volition' or will4 ,these #8arise from good and evil' 7which are the same as pleasure and pain7 #8most naturally and with least preparation4' #8,desire arises from good1 aversion from evil1 considered simply4' ,they become will or volition1 #8when the good may be attained or evil avoided by any action of the mind or body'--will being simply #8the internal impression we feel and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body or new perception of our mind4' #8,when good is certain or probable it produces joy' 7which is described also as a pleasure produced by pleasure or by the imagination of pleasure72 #8when it is uncertain1 it gives rise to hope4' ,to these the corresponding opposites are grief and fear4 ,we must suppose them to be distinguished from desire and aversion as being what he elsewhere calls #8pure emotions'2 such as do not1 like desires1 #8immediately excite us to action4' ,given such an immediate impression of pleasure or pain as excites a #8distinct passion' of one or other of these kinds1 and supposing it to #8arise from an object related to ourselves or others1' it excites mediately1 through this relation1 the new impressions of pride or humility1 love or hatred--pride when the object is related to oneself1 love when it is related to another person4 ,these are indirect passions4 ,they do not tend to displace the immediate impression which is the condition of their excitement1 but being themselves agreeable give it additional force4 #8,thus a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty2 and this pleasure produces the direct passions1 or the impressions of volition and desire4 ,again1 when these clothes are considered as belonging to oneself1 the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride1 which is an indirect passion2 and the pleasure which attends that passion returns back to the direct affections1 and gives new force to our desire or volition1 joy or hope4' #a #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #bad1 #bae4 ,cf4 pp4 #gf1 #ij1 #aec and #bjc4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix42 part #a1 sec4 ,i2 part ,i41 sec4 ,,vi42 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,vi42 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,vi4 ,yet he admits #8passions' which produce pleasure1 but proceed not from it #ca4 ,alongside of the unqualified statement that #8the passions1 both direct and indirect1 are founded on pain and pleasure1' and the consequent theory of them1 we find the curiously cool admission that #8beside pain and pleasure1 the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct1 which is perfectly unaccountable4 ,of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies1 and of happiness to our friends2 hunger and lust1 and a few other bodily appetites4 ,these passions1 properly speaking1 produce good and evil1 and proceed not from them like the other affections4' #a ,in this casual way appears the recognition of that difference of the desire for imagined pleasure from appetite proper on the one side1 and on the other from desire determined by reason1 which it is the point of ,hume's system to ignore4 ,the question is1 how many of the pleasures in which he finds the springs of human conduct are other than products of a desire which is not itself moved by pleasure1 or emotions excited by objects which reason constitutes4 #a ,p4 #bae4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,the passage in the #8,dissertation on the ,passions' 7,vol4 ,,iv41 #8,dissertation on the ,passions1' sub init471 which corresponds to the one here quoted1 throws light on the relation in which ,hume's later redaction of his theory stands to the earlier1 as occasionally disguising1 but never removing1 its inconsistencies4 #8,some objects1 by being naturally conformable or contrary to passion1 excite an agreeable or painful sensation1 and are thence called good or evil4 ,the punishment of an adversary1 by gratifying revenge1 is good3 the sickness of a companion1 by affecting friendship1 is evil4' ,here he avoids the inconsistency of admitting in so many words a #8desire' which is not for a pleasure4 ,but the inconsistency really remains4 ,what is the passion1 the #8conformability' to which of an object in the supposed cases constitutes pleasure8 ,since it is neither an appetite 7such as hunger71 nor an emotion 7such as pride71 it remains that it is a desire1 and a desire which1 though the #8gratification' of it is a pleasure1 cannot be a desire for that or any other pleasure4 ,desire for objects1 as he understands it1 excluded by his theory of impressions and ideas4 #cb4 ,in what sense1 we have first to ask1 do ,hume's principles justify him in speaking of desire for an object at all4 #8,the appearance of an object to the senses' is the same thing as #8an impression becoming present to the mind1' #a and if this is true of impressions of sense it cannot be less true of impressions of reflection4 ,if sense #8offers not its object as anything distinct from itself1' neither can desire4 ,its object1 according to ,hume1 is an idea of a past impression2 but this1 if we take him at his word1 can merely mean that a feeling which1 when at its liveliest1 was pleasant1 has passed into a fainter stage1 which1 in contrast with the livelier1 is pain--the pain of want1 which is also a wish for the renewal of the original pleasure4 ,in fact1 however1 when ,hume or anyone else 7whether he admit the possibility of desiring an object not previously found pleasant1 or no71 speaks of desire for an object1 he means something different from this4 ,he means either desire for an object that causes pleasure1 which is impossible except so far as the original pleasure has been--consciously to the subject feeling it--pleasure caused by an object1 i4e41 a feeling determined by the conception of a thing under relations to self2 or else desire for pleasure as an object1 i4e41 not merely desire for the revival of some feeling which1 having been pleasant as #8impression1' survives without being pleasant as #8idea1' but desire determined by the consciousness of self as a permanent subject that has been pleased1 and is to be pleased again4 ,it is here1 then1 as in the case of the attempted derivation of space1 or of identity and substance1 from impressions of sense4 ,in order to give rise to such an impression of reflection as desire for an object is1 either the original impression of sense1 or the idea of this1 must be other than ,hume could allow it to be4 ,either the original impression must be other than a satisfaction of appetite1 other than a sight1 smell1 sound1 c41 or the idea must be other than a copy of the impression4 ,one or other must be determined by conceptions not derived from feeling1 the correlative conceptions of self and thing4 ,thus1 in order to be able to interpret his primary class of impressions of reflection #b as desires for objects1 or for pleasures as good1 ,hume has already made the assumption that is needed for the transition to that secondary class of impressions through which he has to account for morality4 ,he has assumed that thought determines feeling1 and not merely reproduces it4 ,even if the materials out of which it constructs the determining object be merely remembered pleasures1 the object is no more to be identified with these materials than the living body with its chemical constituents4 #a ,see ,general ,introduction1 paragraph #bjh4 #b ,see above1 sec4 #ai4 ,pride determined by reference to self4 #cc4 ,in the account of the #8indirect passions' the term object is no longer applied1 as in the account of the direct ones1 to the pleasure or pain which excites desire or aversion4 ,it is expressly transferred to the self or other person1 to whom the #8exciting causes' of pride and love must be severally related4 #8,pride and humility1 though directly contrary1 have yet the same object1' viz41 self2 but since they are contrary1 #8'tis impossible this object can be their cause1 or sufficient alone to excite them 444 ,we must therefore make a distinction betwixt that idea which excites them1 and that to which they direct their view when excited4444 ,the first idea that is presented to the mind is that of the cause or productive principle4 ,this excites the passion connected with it2 and that passion1 when excited1 turns our view to another idea1 which is that of self4444 ,the first idea represents the cause1 the second the object of the passion4' #a ,again a further distinction must be made #8in the causes of the passion betwixt that quality which operates1 and the subject on which it is placed4 ,a man1 for instance1 is vain of a beautiful house which belongs to him1 or which he has himself built or contrived4 ,here the object of the passion is himself1 and the cause is the beautiful house2 which cause again is subdivided into two parts1 viz41 the quality which operates upon the passion1 and the subject in which the quality inheres4 ,the quality is the beauty1 and the subject is the house1 considered as his property or contrivance4' #b ,it is next found that the operative qualities which produce pride1 however various1 agree in this1 that they produce pleasure--a #8separate pleasure1' independent of the resulting pride4 ,in all cases1 again1 #8the subjects to which these qualities adhere are either parts of ourselves or something nearly related to us4' ,the conclusion is that #8the cause1 which excites the passion1 is related to the object which nature has attributed to the passion2 the sensation1 which the cause separately produces1 is related to the sensation of the passion3 from this double relation of ideas and impressions the passion is derived4' #c ,the ideas1 it will be observed1 are severally those of the exciting #8subject' 7in the illustrative case quoted1 the beautiful house7 and of the #8object' self2 the impressions are severally the pleasure immediately caused by the #8subject' 7in the case given1 the pleasure of feeling beauty7 and the pleasure of pride4 ,the relation between the ideas may be any of the #8natural ones' that regulate association4 #d ,in the supposed case it is that of cause and effect1 since a man's property #8produces effects on him and he on it4' ,the relation between the impressions must be that of resemblance--this1 as we are told by the way 7somewhat strangely1 if impressions are only stronger ideas71 being the only possible relation between impressions--the resemblance of one pleasure to another4 #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #gg and #gh4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,ibid41 p4 #gi4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 #c ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #hd1 #he4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 #d ,book ,i41 part #a1 secs4 #d and #e4 ,this means that it takes its character from that which is not a possible #8impression'4 #cd4 ,pride1 then1 is a special sort of pleasure excited by another special sort of pleasure1 and the distinction of the two sorts of pleasure from each other depends on the character which each derives from an idea--one from the idea of self1 the other from the idea of some #8quality in a subject1' which may be the beauty of a picture1 or the achievement of an ancestor1 or any other quality as unlike these as these are unlike each other1 so long as the idea of it is capable of association with the idea of self4 ,apart from such determination by ideas1 the pleasure of pride itself and the pleasure which excites it1 on the separateness of which from each other ,hume insists1 could only be separate in time and degree of liveliness--a separation which might equally obtain between successive feelings of pride4 ,of neither could anything be said but that it was pleasant--more or less pleasant than the other1 before or after it1 as the case might be4 ,is the idea1 then1 that gives each impression its character1 itself an impression grown fainter8 ,it should be so1 of course1 if ,hume's theory of consciousness is to hold good1 either in its general form1 or in its application to morals1 according to which all actions1 those moved by pride among the rest1 have pleasure for their ultimate motive2 and no doubt he would have said that it was so4 ,the idea of the beauty of a picture1 for instance1 is the original impression which it #8makes on the senses' as more faintly retained by the mind4 ,but is the original impression merely an impression--an impression undetermined by conceptions1 and of which1 therefore1 as it is to the subject of it1 nothing can be said1 but simply that it is pleasant8 ,this1 too1 in the particular instance of beauty1 ,hume seems to hold2 #a but if it is so1 the idea of beauty1 as determined by reference to the impression1 is determined by reference to the indeterminate1 and we know no more of the separate pleasure that excites the pleasure of pride1 when we are told that its source is an impression of beauty1 than we did before4 ,apart from any other reference1 we only know that pride is a pleasure excited by a pleasure which is itself excited by a pleasure grown fainter4 ,of effect1 proximate cause1 and ultimate cause1 only one and the same thing can be said1 viz41 that each feels pleasant4 ,meanwhile in regard to that other relation from which the pleasure of pride1 on its part1 is supposed to take its character1 the same question arises4 ,this pleasure #8has self for its object4' ,is self1 then1 an impression stronger or fainter8 ,can one feeling be said without nonsense to have another feeling for its object8 ,if it can1 what specification is gained for a pleasure or pain by reference to an object of which1 as a mere feeling1 nothing more can be said than that it is a pleasure or pain8 ,if1 on the other hand1 the idea of self1 relation to which makes the feeling of pride what it is1 and through it determines action1 is not a copy of any impression of sense or reflection--not a copy of any sight or sound1 any passion or emotion #b--;how can it be true that the ultimate determination of action in all cases arises from pleasure or pain8 #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #if2 ,,iv ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,viii41 #8,dissertation on the ,passions1' ,,ii4 #g4 #b ,intr4 to ,vol4 ,i41 paragraph #bjh4 ,hume's attempt to represent idea of self as derived from impression4 #ce4 ,from the pressure of such questions as these ,hume offers us two main subterfuges4 ,one is furnished by his account of the self1 as #8that succession of related ideas and impressions of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness' #a--;an account which1 to an incurious reader1 conveys the notion that #8self1' if not exactly an impression1 is something in the nature of an impression1 while yet it seems to give the required determination to the impression which has this for its #8object4' ,it is evident1 however1 that its plausibility depends entirely on the qualification of the #8succession1 c41' as that of which we have an #8intimate consciousness4' ,the succession of impressions1 simply as such1 and in the absence of relation to a single subject1 is nothing intelligible at all4 ,hume1 indeed1 elsewhere represents it as constituting time1 which1 as we have previously shown1 #b by itself it could not properly be said to do2 but if it could1 the characterisation of pleasure as having time for its object would not be much to the purpose4 ,the successive impressions and ideas are further said to be #8related1' i4e41 naturally related1 according to ,hume's sense of the term2 but this we have found means no more than that when two feelings have been often felt to be either like each other or #8contiguous1' the recurrence of one is apt to be followed by the recurrence in fainter form of the other4 ,this characteristic of the succession brings it no nearer to the intelligible unity which it must have1 in order to be an object of which the idea makes the pleasure of pride what it is4 ,the notion of its having such unity is really conveyed by the statement that we have an #8intimate consciousness' of it4 ,it is through these words1 so to speak1 that we read into the definition of self that conception of it which we carry with us1 but of which it states the reverse4 ,now1 however difficult it may be to say what this intimate consciousness is1 it is clear that it cannot be one of the feelings1 stronger or fainter--impressions or ideas--which the first part of the definition tells us form a succession1 for this would imply that one of them was at the same time all the rest4 ,nor yet can it be a compound of them all1 for the fact that they are a succession is incompatible with their forming a compound4 ,here1 then1 is a consciousness1 which is not an impression1 and which we can only take to be derived from impressions by supposing these to be what they first become in relation to this consciousness4 ,in saying that we have such a consciousness of the succession of impressions1 we say in effect that we are other than the succession4 ,how1 then1 without contradiction1 can our self be said to be the succession of impressions1 c4--a succession which in the very next word has to be qualified in a way that implies we are other than it8 ,this question1 once put1 will save us from surprise at finding that in one place1 among frequent repetitions of the account of self already given1 the #8succession c4' is dropped1 and for it substituted #8the individual person of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious4' #c #a ,vol1 ,,ii41 p4 #gg1 c4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 #b ,intr4 to ,vol4 ,i41 sec4 #bfa4 #c ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #hd4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 ,another device is to suggest a physiological account of pride4 #cf4 ,the other way of gaining an apparent determination for the impression1 pride1 without making it depend on relation to that which is not an impression at all1 corresponds to that appeal to the #8anatomist' by the suggestion of which1 it will be remembered1 ,hume avoids the troublesome question1 how the simple impressions of sense1 undetermined by relation1 can have that definite character which they must have if they are to serve as the elements of knowledge4 ,the question in that case being really one that concerns the simple impression1 as it is for the consciousness of the subject of it1 ,hume's answer is in effect a reference to what it is for the physiologist4 ,so in regard to pride2 the question being what character it can have1 for the conscious subject of it1 to distinguish it from any other pleasant feeling1 except such as is derived from a conception which is not an impression1 ,hume is ready on occasion to suggest that it has the distinctive character which for the physiologist it would derive from the nerves organic to it1 if such nerves could be traced4 #8,we must suppose that nature has given to the organs of the human mind a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion1 which we call ,,pride3 to this emotion she has assigned a certain idea1 viz41 that of ,,self1 which it never fails to produce4 ,this contrivance of nature is easily conceived4 ,we have many instances of such a situation of affairs4 ,the nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed1 as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind2 the sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects1 which are suitable to each appetite4 ,these two circumstances are united in pride4 ,the organs are so disposed as to produce the passion2 and the passion1 after its production1 naturally produces a certain idea4' #a #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #he4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,v4 ,fallacy of this3 it does not tell us what pride is to the subject of it4 #cg4 ,here1 it will be noticed1 the doctrine1 that the pleasant emotion of pride derives its specific character from relation to the idea of self1 is dropped4 ,the emotion we call pride is supposed to be first produced1 and then1 in virtue of its specific character as pride1 to produce the idea of self4 #a ,if the idea of self1 then1 does not give the pleasure its specific character1 what does8 #8,that disposition fitted to produce it1' ,hume answers1 which belongs to the #8organs of the human mind4' ,now either this is the old story of explaining the soporific qualities of opium by its vis soporifica1 or it means that the distinction of the pleasure of pride from other pleasures1 like the distinction of a smell from a taste1 is due to a particular kind of nervous irritation that conditions it1 and may presumably be ascertained by the physiologist4 ,whether such a physical condition of pride can be discovered or no1 it is not to the purpose to dispute4 ,the point to observe is that1 if discovered1 it would not afford an answer to the question to which an answer is being sought--to the question1 namely1 what the emotion of pride is to the conscious subject of it4 ,if it were found to be conditioned by as specific a nervous irritation as the sensations of smell and taste to which ,hume assimilates it1 it would yet be no more the consciousness of such irritation than is the smell of a rose to the person smelling it4 ,in the one case as in the other1 the feeling1 as it is to the subject of it1 can only be determined by relation to other feelings or other modes of consciousness4 ,it is by such a relation that1 according to ,hume's general account of it1 pride is determined1 but the relation is to the consciousness of an object which1 not being any form of feeling1 has no proper place in his psychology4 ,hence in the passage before us he tries to substitute for it a physical determination of the emotion1 which for the subject of it is no determination at all2 and1 having gained an apparent specification for it in this way1 to represent as its product that idea of a distinctive object which he had previously treated as necessary to constitute it4 ,pride produces the idea of self1 just as #8the sensations of hunger and lust always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects1 which are suitable to each appetite4' ,now it is a large assumption in regard to animals other than men1 that1 because hunger and lust move them to eat and generate1 they so move them through the intervention of any ideas of objects whatever--an assumption which in the absence of language on the part of the animals it is impossible to verify--and one still more questionable1 that the ideas of objects which these appetites 7if it be so7 produce in the animals1 except as determined by self-consciousness1 are ideas in the same sense as the idea of self4 ,but at any rate1 if such feelings produce ideas of peculiar objects1 it must be in virtue of the distinctive character which1 as feelings1 they have for the subjects of them4 ,the withdrawal1 however1 of determination by the idea of self from the emotion of pride1 leaves it with no distinctive character whatever1 and therefore with nothing by which we may explain its production of that idea as analogous to the production by hunger1 if we admit such to take place1 of the #8idea of the peculiar object suited to it4' #a ,cf4 ,vol4 ,,iv41 #8,dissertation on the ,passions1' ,,ii4 #b4 ,account of love involves the same difficulties2 and a further one as to nature of sympathy4 #ch4 ,if1 in ,hume's account of pride1 for pleasure1 wherever it occurs1 is substituted pain1 it becomes his account of humility4 ,a criticism of one account is equally a criticism of the other2 and with him every passion that #8has self for its object1' according as it is pleasant or painful1 is included under one or other of these designations4 ,in like manner1 every passion that has #8some other thinking being' for its object1 according as it is pleasant or painful1 is either love or hatred4 ,to these the key is to be found in the same #8double relation of impressions and ideas' by which pride and humility are explained4 ,if beautiful pictures1 for instance1 belong not to oneself but to another person1 they tend to excite not pride but esteem1 which is a form of love4 ,the idea of them is #8naturally related' to the idea of the person to whom they belong1 and they cause a separate pleasure which naturally excites the resembling impression of which this other person is the object4 ,write #8other person1' in short1 where before was written #8self1' and the account of pride and humility becomes the account of love and hatred4 ,of this pleasure determined by the idea of another person1 or of which such a person #8is the object1' ,hume gives no rationale1 and1 failing this1 it must be taken to imply the same power of determining feeling on the part of a conception not derived from feeling1 which we have found to be implied in the pleasure of which self is the object4 ,all his pains and ingenuity in the second part of the book #8on the ,passions1' are spent on illustrating the #8double relation of impressions and ideas'--on characterising the separate pleasures which excite the pleasure of love1 and showing how the idea of the object of the exciting pleasure is related to the idea of the beloved person4 ,the objection to this part of his theory1 which most readily suggests itself to a reader1 arises from the essential discrepancy which in many cases seems to lie between the exciting and the excited pleasure4 ,the drinking of fine wine1 and the feeling of love1 are doubtless #8resembling impressions1' so far as each is pleasant1 and from the idea of the wine the transition is natural to that of the person who gives it2 but is there really anything1 it will be asked1 in my enjoyment of a rich man's wine1 that tends to make me love him1 even in the wide sense of #8love' which ,hume admits8 ,this objection1 it will be found1 is so far anticipated by ,hume1 that in most cases he treats the exciting pleasure as taking its character from sympathy4 ,thus it is not chiefly the pleasure of ear1 sight1 and palate1 caused by the rich man's music1 and gardens1 and wine1 that excites our love for him1 but the pleasure we experience through sympathy with his pleasure in them4 #a ,the explanation of love being thus thrown back on sympathy 7which had previously served to explain that form of pride which is called #8love of fame'71 we have to ask whether sympathy is any less dependent than we have found pride to be on an originative1 as distinct from a merely reproductive1 reason4 #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #adg4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,v4 ,hume's account of sympathy4 #ci4 #8,when any affection is infused by sympathy1 it is at first known only by its effects1 and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey an idea of it4' ,by inference from effect to cause1 #8we are convinced of the reality of the passion1' conceiving it #8to belong to another person1 as we conceive any other matter of fact4' ,this idea of another's affection #8is presently converted into an impression1 and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity as to become the very passion itself1 and produce an equal emotion as any original affection4' ,the conversion is not difficult to account for when we reflect that #8all ideas are borrowed from impressions1 and that these two kinds of perceptions differ only in the degrees of force and vivacity with which they strike upon the soul4444 ,as this difference may be removed in some measure by a relation between the impressions and ideas'--in the case before us1 the relation between the impression of one's own person and the idea of another's1 by which the vivacity of the former may be conveyed to the latter--#8'tis no wonder an idea of a sentiment or passion may by this means be so enlivened as to become the very sentiment or passion4' #a #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #aaa-aad4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,it implies a self-consciousness not reducible to impressions4 #dj4 ,upon this it must be remarked that the inference from the external signs of an affection1 according to ,hume's doctrine of inference1 can only mean that certain impressions of the other person's words and gestures call up the ideas of their #8usual attendants'2 which1 again1 must mean either that they convey the belief in certain exciting circumstances experienced by the other man1 and the expectation of certain acts to follow upon his words and gestures2 or else that they suggest to the spectator the memory of certain like manifestations on his own part and through these of the emotion which in his own case was their antecedent4 ,either way1 the spectator's idea of the other person's affection is in no sense a copy of it1 or that affection in a fainter form4 ,if it is an idea of an impression of reflection at all1 it is of such an impression as experienced by the spectator himself1 and determined1 as ,hume admits1 by his consciousness of himself2 nor could any conveyance of vivacity to the idea make it other than that impression4 ,how it should become to the spectator consciously at once another's impression and his own1 remains unexplained4 ,hume only seems to explain it by means of the equivocation lurking in the phrase1 #8idea of another's affection4' ,the reader1 not reflecting that1 according to the copying theory1 so far as the idea is a copy of anything in the other1 it can only be a copy of certain #8external signs1 c41' and so far as it is a copy of an affection1 only of an affection experienced by the man who has the idea1 thinks of it as being to the spectator the other's affection minus a certain amount of vivacity--the restoration of which will render it an impression at once his own and the other's4 ,it can in truth only be so in virtue 7a7 of an interpretation of words and gestures1 as related to a person1 which no suggestion by impressions of their usual attendants can account for1 and in virtue 7b7 of there being such a conceived identity1 or unity in difference1 between the spectator's own person and the person of the other that the same impression1 in being determined by his consciousness of himself1 is determined also by his consciousness of the other as an #8alter ego4' ,thus sympathy1 according to ,hume's account of it1 so soon as that account is rationalized1 is found to involve the determination of pleasure and pain1 not merely by self-consciousness1 but by a self-consciousness which is also self-identification with another4 ,if self-consciousness cannot in any of its functions be reduced to an impression or succession of impressions1 least of all can it in this4 ,on the other hand1 if it is only through its constitutive action1 its reflection of itself1 upon successive impressions of sense that these become the permanent objects which we know1 we can understand how by a like action on certain impressions of reflection1 certain emotions and desires1 it constitutes those objects of interest which we love as ourselves4 ,ambiguity in his account of benevolence3 ,it is a desire and therefore has pleasure for its object4 ,what pleasure8 #da4 ,pride1 love1 and sympathy1 then1 are the motives which ,hume must have granted him1 if his moral theory is to march4 ,sympathy is not only necessary to his explanation of that most important form of pride which is the motive to a man in maintaining a character with his neighbours when #8nothing is to be gained by it'--nothing1 that is1 beyond the immediate pleasure it gives--and of all forms of #8love1' except those of which the exciting cause lies in the pleasures of beauty and sexual appetite3 he finds in it also the ground of benevolence4 ,where he first treats of benevolence1 indeed1 this does not appear4 ,unlike pride and humility1 we are told1 which #8are pure emotions of the soul1 unattended with any desire1 and not immediately exciting us to action1 love and hatred are not completed within themselves 444 ,love is always followed by a desire of the happiness of the person beloved1 and an aversion to his misery2 as hatred produces a desire of the misery1 and an aversion to the happiness1 of the person hated4' #a ,this actual sequence of #8benevolence' and #8anger' severally upon love and hatred is due1 it appears1 to #8an original constitution of the mind' which cannot be further accounted for4 ,that benevolence is no essential part of love is clear from the fact that the latter passion #8may express itself in a hundred ways1 and may subsist a considerable time1 without our reflecting on the happiness of its object4' ,doubtless1 when we do reflect on it1 we desire the happiness2 but1 #8if nature had so pleased1 love might have been unattended with any such desire4' #b ,so far1 the view given tallies with what we have already quoted from the summary account of the direct and indirect passions1 where the #8desire of punishment to our enemies and happiness to our friends' is expressly left outside the general theory of the passions as a #8natural impulse wholly unaccountable1' a #8direct passion' which yet does not proceed from pleasure4' ,with his instinct for consistency1 however1 ,hume could scarcely help seeking to assimilate this alien element to his definition of desire as universally for pleasure2 and accordingly1 while the above view of benevolence is never in so many words given up1 an essentially different one appears a little further on1 which by help of the doctrine of sympathy at once makes the connection of benevolence with love more accountable1 and brings it under the general definition of desire4 #8,benevolence1' we are there told1 #8is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person beloved1 and a pain proceeding from his pain1 from which correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure and aversion to his pain4' #c #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #aec4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,vi4 #b ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #aed4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,vi4 #c ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #agj4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ix4 ,compare ,vol4 ,,ii41 #8,inquiry concerning the ,principles of ,morals1' ,appendix ,,ii41 note #c1 where #8general benevolence1' also called #8humanity1' is identified with #8sympathy4' #8,benevolence is naturally divided into two kinds1 the general and the particular4 ,the first is1 where we have no friendship1 or connection1 or esteem for the person1 but feel only a general sympathy with him1 or a compassion for his pains1 and a congratulation with his pleasures1' c4 c4 ,pleasure of sympathy with the pleasure of another4 #db4 ,now1 strictly construed1 this passage seems to efface the one clear distinction of benevolence that had been previously insisted on--that it is a desire1 namely1 as opposed to a pure emotion4 ,if benevolence is an #8original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person beloved1' it is identical with love1 so far as sympathy is an exciting cause of love1 instead of being distinguished from it as desire from emotion4 ,we must suppose1 however1 that the sentence was carelessly put together1 and that ,hume did not really mean to identify benevolence with the pleasure spoken of in the former part of it 7for which his proper term is simply sympathy71 but with the desire for that pleasure1 spoken of in the latter part4 ,in that case we find that benevolence forms no exception to the general definition of desire4 ,it is desire for one's own pleasure1 but for a pleasure received through the communication by sympathy of the pleasure of another4 ,in like manner1 the sequence of benevolence upon love1 instead of being an unaccountable #8disposition of nature1' would seem explicable1 as merely the ordinary sequence upon a pleasant emotion of a desire for its renewal4 ,though it be not strictly the pleasant emotion of love1 but that of sympathy1 for which benevolence is the desire1 yet if sympathy is necessary to the excitement of love1 it will equally follow that benevolence attends on love4 ,pleasure sympathised with1 we may suppose1 first excites the secondary emotion of love1 and afterwards1 when reflected on1 that desire for its continuance or renewal1 which is benevolence4 ,that love #8should express itself in a hundred ways1 and subsist a considerable time' without any consciousness of benevolence1 will merely be the natural relation of emotion to desire4 ,when a pleasure is in full enjoyment1 it cannot be so reflected on as to excite desire2 and thus1 if benevolence is desire for that pleasure in the pleasure of another1 which is an exciting cause of love1 the latter emotion must naturally subsist and express itself for some time before it reaches the stage in which reflection on its cause1 and with it benevolent desire1 ensues4 ,all #8passions' equally interested or disinterested3 ,confusion arises from use of #8passion' alike for desire and emotion4 ,of this ,hume avails himself in his account of active pity4 #dc4 ,this rationale1 however1 of the relation between love and benevolence is not explicitly given by ,hume himself4 ,he nowhere expressly withdraws the exception1 made in favour of benevolence1 to the rule that all desire is for pleasure--an exception which1 once admitted1 undermines his whole system--or tells us in so many words that benevolence is desire for pleasure to oneself in the pleasure of another4 ,in an important note to the ,essays1 #a indeed1 he distinctly puts benevolence on the same footing with such desires as avarice or ambition4 #8,a man is no more interested when he seeks his own glory1 than when the happiness of his friend is the object of his wishes2 nor is he any more disinterested when he sacrifices his own ease and quiet to public good1 than when he labours for the gratification of avarice or ambition4' 444 #8,though the satisfaction of these latter passions gives us enjoyment1 yet the prospect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passion1 but1 on the contrary1 the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment1 and without the former the latter could not possibly exist4' ,in other words1 if #8passion' means desire--and1 as applied to emotion1 the designation #8interested' or #8disinterested' has no meaning--every passion is equally disinterested in the sense of presupposing an #8enjoyment' a pleasant emotion1 antecedent to that which consists in its satisfaction2 but at the same time equally interested in the sense of being a desire for such enjoyment4 ,whether from a wish to find acceptance1 however1 or because forms of man's good-will to man forced themselves on his notice which forbade the consistent development of his theory1 ,hume is always much more explicit about the disinterestedness of benevolence in the former sense than about its interestedness in the latter4 #b ,accordingly he does not avail himself of such an explanation of its relation to love as that above indicated1 which by avowedly reducing benevolence to a desire for pleasure1 while it simplified his system1 might have revolted the #8common sense' even of the eighteenth century4 ,he prefers--as his manner is1 when he comes upon a question which he cannot face--to fall back on a #8disposition of nature' as the ground of the #8conjunction' of benevolence with love4 ,there is a form of benevolence1 however1 which would seem as little explicable by such natural conjunction as by reduction to a desire for sympathetic pleasure4 ,how is it that active good-will is shown towards those whom1 according to ,hume's theory of love1 it should be impossible to love--towards those with whom intercourse is impossible1 or from whom1 if intercourse is possible1 we can derive no such pleasure as is supposed necessary to excite that pleasant emotion1 but rather such pain1 in sympathy with their pain1 as according to the theory should excite hatred8 ,to this question ,hume in effect finds an answer in the simple device of using the same terms1 #8pity' and #8compassion1' alike for the painful emotion produced by the spectacle of another's pain and for #8desire for the happiness of another and aversion to his misery4' #c ,according to the latter account of it1 pity is already #8the same desire' as benevolence1 though #8proceeding from a different principle1' and thus has a resemblance to the love with which benevolence is conjoined--a #8resemblance not of feeling or sentiment but of tendency or direction4' #d ,hence1 whereas #8pity' in the former sense would make us hate those whose pain gives us pain1 by understanding it in the latter sense we can explain how it leads us to love them1 on the principle that one resembling passion excites another4 #a #8,inquiry concerning ,human ,understanding1' note to sec4 #a4 ,in the editions after the second1 this note was omitted4 #b ,attention should be called to a passage at the end of the account of #8self-love' in the ,essays1 where he seems to revert to the view of benevolence as a desire not originally produced by pleasure1 but productive of it1 and thus passing into a secondary stage in which it is combined with desire for pleasure4 ,he suggests tentatively that #8from the original frame of our temper we may feel a desire for another's happiness or good1 which1 by means of that affection1 becomes our own good1 and is afterwards pursued from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment4' ,the passage might have been written by ,butler4 7,vol4 ,,iv41 #8,inquiry concerning ,principles of ,morals1' ,appendix ,,ii47 #c ,book ,,ii41 part #b1 secs4 #g and #i4 ,within a few lines of each other will be found the statements 7a7 that #8pity is an uneasiness arising from the misery of others1' and 7b7 that #8pity is desire for the happiness of another1' c4 #d #8,dissertation on the ,passions' 7in the ,essays71 sec4 #c1 sub-sec4 #e4 ,explanation of apparent conflict between reason and passion4 #dd4 ,we are now in a position to review the possible motives of human action according to ,hume4 ,reason1 constituting no objects1 affords no motives4 #8,it is only the slave of the passions1 and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them4' #a ,to any logical thinker who accepted ,locke's doctrine of reason1 as having no other function but to #8lay in order intermediate ideas1' this followed of necessity4 ,it is the clearness with which ,hume points out that1 as it cannot move1 so neither can it restrain1 action1 that in this regard chiefly distinguishes him from ,locke4 ,the check to any passion1 he points out1 can only proceed from some counter-motive1 and such a motive reason1 #8having no original influence1' cannot give4 ,strictly speaking1 then1 a passion can only be called unreasonable1 as accompanied by some false judgment1 which on its part must consist in #8disagreement of ideas1 considered as copies1 with those objects which they represent2' and #8even then it is not the passion1 properly speaking1 which is unreasonable1 but the judgment4' ,it is nothing against reason--not1 as ,locke had inadvertently said1 a wrong judgment--#8to prefer my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater4' ,the only unreasonableness would lie in supposing that #8my own acknowledged lesser good1' being preferred1 could be attained by means that would not really lead to it4 ,hence #8we speak not strictly when we talk of the combat of reason and passion4' ,they can in truth never oppose each other4 ,the supposition4 that they do so arises from a confusion between #8calm passions' and reason--a confusion founded on the fact that the former #8produce little emotion in the mind1 while the operation of reason produces none at all4' #b ,calm passions1 undoubtedly1 do often conflict with the violent ones and even prevail over them1 and thus1 as the violent passion causes most uneasiness1 it is untrue to say with ,locke #c that it is the most pressing uneasiness which always determines action4 ,the calmness of a passion is not to be confounded with weakness1 nor its violence with strength4 ,a desire may be calm either because its object is remote1 or because it is customary4 ,in the former case1 it is true1 the desire is likely to be relatively weak2 but in the latter case1 the calmer the desire1 the greater is likely to be its strength1 since the repetition of a desire has the twofold effect1 on the one hand of diminishing the #8sensible emotion' that accompanies it1 on the other hand of #8bestowing a facility in the performance of the action' corresponding to the desire1 which in turn creates a new inclination or tendency that combines with the original desire4 #d #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #aie4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #b ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #aie1 #aif4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii4 #c ,above1 sec4 #c4 #d ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #aih-bjj4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iv4 ,it will be found that here ,hume might have stated his case much more succinctly by avoiding the equivocal use of #8passion' at once for #8desire' and #8emotion4' ,when a #8passion' is designated as #8calm' or #8violent1' #8passion' means emotion4 ,when the terms #8strong' and #8weak' are applied to it1 it means #8desire4' ,since of the strength of any desire there is in truth no test but the resulting action1 and habit facilitates action1 if we will persist in asking the idle question about the relative strength of desires1 we must suppose that the most habitual is the strongest4 ,a #8reasonable' desire means one that excites little emotion3 ,enumeration of possible motives4 #de4 ,the distinction1 then1 between #8reasonable' and #8unreasonable' desires--and it is only desires that can be referred to when will1 or the determination to action1 is in question--in the only sense in which ,hume can admit it1 is a distinction not of objects but of our situation in regard to them4 ,the object of desire in every case--whether near or remote1 whether either by its novelty or by its contrariety to other passions it excites more or less #8sensible emotion'--is still #8good1' i4e4 pleasure4 ,the greater the pleasure in prospect1 the stronger the desire4 #a ,the only proper question1 then1 according to ,hume1 as to the pleasure which in any particular case is an object of desire will be whether it is 7a7 an immediate impression of sense1 or 7b7 a pleasure of pride1 or 7c7 one of sympathy4 ,under the first head1 apparently1 he would include pleasures incidental to the satisfaction of appetite1 and pleasures corresponding to the several senses--not only the smells and tastes we call #8sweet1' but the sights and sounds we call #8beautiful4' #b ,pleasures of this sort1 we must suppose1 are the ultimate #8exciting causes' #c of all those secondary ones1 which are distinguished from their #8exciting causes' as determined by the ideas either of self or of another thinking person--the pleasures1 namely1 of pride and sympathy4 ,sympathetic pleasure1 again1 will be of two kinds1 according as the pleasure in the pleasure of another does or does not excite the further pleasure of love for the other person4 ,if the object desired is none of these pleasures1 nor the means to them1 it only remains for the follower of ,hume to suppose that it is #8pleasure in general'--the object of #8self love4' #a ,cf p4 #aih4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iv4 #8,the same good1 when near1 will cause a violent passion1 which1 when remote1 produces only a calm one4' ,the expression1 here1 is obviously inaccurate4 ,it cannot be the same good in ,hume's sense1 i4e4 equally pleasant in prospect1 when remote as when near4 #b ,no other account of pleasure in beauty can be extracted from ,hume than this--that it is either a #8primary impression of sense1' so far co-ordinate with any pleasant taste or smell that but for an accident of language the term #8beautiful' might be equally applicable to these1 or else a pleasure in that indefinite anticipation of pleasure which is called the contemplation of utility4 #c ,ultimate because according to ,hume the immediate exciting cause of a pleasure of pride may be one of love1 and vice versa4 ,in that case1 however1 a more remote #8exciting cause' of the exciting pleasure must be found in some impressions of sense1 if the doctrine that these are the sole #8original impressions' is to be maintained4 ,if pleasure sole motive1 what is the distinction of self-love8 ,its opposition to disinterested desires1 as commonly understood1 disappears3 it is desire for pleasure in general4 #df4 ,anyone reading the #8,treatise on ,human ,nature' alongside of ,shaftesbury or ,butler would be surprised to find that while sympathy and benevolence fill a very large place in it1 self-love #8eo nomine' has a comparatively small one4 ,at first1 perhaps1 he would please himself with thinking that he had come upon a more #8genial' system of morals4 ,the true account of the matter1 however1 he will find to be that1 whereas with ,shaftesbury and his followers the notion of self-love was really determined by opposition to those desires for other objects than pleasure1 in the existence of which they really believed1 however much the current psychology may have embarrassed their belief1 on the other hand with ,hume's explicit reduction of all desire to desire for pleasure self-love loses the significance which this opposition gave it1 and can have no meaning except as desire for #8pleasure in general' in distinction from this or that particular pleasure4 ,passages from the ,essays may be adduced1 it is true1 where self-love is spoken of under the same opposition under which ,shaftesbury and ,hutcheson conceived of it1 but in these1 it will be found1 advantage is taken of the ambiguity between #8emotion' and #8desire1' covered by the term #8passion4' ,that there are sympathetic emotions--pleasures occasioned by the pleasure of others--is1 no doubt1 as cardinal a point in ,hume's system as that all desire is for pleasure to self2 but between such emotions and self-love there is no co-ordination4 ,no emotion1 as he points out1 determines action directly1 but only by exciting desire2 which with him can only mean that the image of the pleasant emotion excites desire for its renewal4 ,in other words1 no emotion amounts to volition or will4 ,self-love1 on the other hand1 if it means anything1 means desire and a possibly strongest desire1 or will4 ,it can thus be no more determined by opposition to generous or sympathetic emotions than can these by opposition to hunger and thirst4 ,hume1 however1 when he insists on the existence of generous #8passions' as showing that self-love is not our uniform motive1 though he cannot consistently mean more than that desire for #8pleasure in general1' or desire for the satisfaction of desire1 is not the uniform motive--which might equally be shown 7as he admits7 by pointing to such self-regarding #8passions' as love of fame1 or such appetites as hunger--is yet apt1 through the reader's interpretation of #8generous passions' as desires for something other than pleasure1 to gain credit for recognising a possibility of living for others1 in distinction from living for pleasure1 which was in truth as completely excluded by his theory as by that of ,hobbes4 ,if he himself meant to convey any other distinction between self-love and the generous passions than one which would hold no less between it and every emotion whatever1 it was through a fresh intrusion upon him of that notion of benevolence1 as a #8desire not founded on pleasure1' which was in too direct contradiction to the first principles of his theory to be acquiesced in4 #a #a ,cf4 ,,ii4 p4 #aig ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,iii41 where1 speaking of #8calm desires1' he says they #8are of two kinds2 either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures1 such as benevolence and resentment1 the love of life1 and kindness to children2 or the general appetite to good and aversion to evil1 considered merely as such4' ,this seems to imply a twofold distinction of the #8general appetite to good' 7a7 from desires for particular pleasures1 which are commonly not calm1 and 7b7 from certain desires1 which resemble the #8general appetite' in being calm but are not for pleasure at all4 ,see above1 sec4 #ca4 ,in that section of the ,essays where #8self-love' is expressly treated of1 there is a still clearer appearance of the doctrine1 that there are desires 7in that instance called #8mental passions'7 which have not pleasure for their object any more than have such #8bodily wants' as hunger and thirst4 ,from these self-love1 as desire for pleasure1 is distinguished1 though1 when the pleasure incidental to their satisfaction is discovered and reflected on1 it is supposed to combine with them4 7,vol4 ,,iv4 ,appendix on ,self-love1 near the end4 ,see above1 sec4 #dc and note47 ,this amounts1 in fact1 to a complete withdrawal from ,hume's original position and the adoption of one which is most clearly stated in ,hutcheson's posthumous treatise--the position1 namely1 that we begin with a multitude of #8particular' or #8violent' desires1 severally #8terminating upon objects' which are not pleasures at all1 and that1 as reason developes1 these gradually blend with1 or are superseded by1 the #8calm' desire for pleasure2 so that moral growth means the access of conscious pleasure-seeking4 ,this in effect seems to be ,butler's view1 and ,hutcheson reckons it #8a lovely representation of human nature1' though he himself holds that benevolence may exist1 not merely as one of the #8particular desires' controlled by self-love1 but as itself a #8calm' and controlling principle1 co-ordinate with self-love4 7#8,system of ,moral ,philosophy1' ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #ea1 c47 ,how ,hume gives meaning to this otherwise unmeaning definition3 #8,interest1' like other motives described1 implies determination by reason4 #dg4 ,such desire1 then1 being excluded1 what other motive than #8interest' remains1 by contrast with which the latter may be defined8 ,it has been explained above 7#g7 that since pleasure as such1 or as a feeling1 does not admit of generality1 #8pleasure in general' is an impossible object4 ,when the motive of an action is said to be #8pleasure in general1' what is really meant is that the action is determined by the conception of pleasure1 or1 more properly1 of self as a subject to be pleased4 ,such determination1 again1 is distinguished by opposition to two other kinds--7a7 to that sort of determination which is not by conception1 but either by animal want1 or by the animal imagination of pleasure1 and 7b7 to determination by the conception of other objects than pleasure4 ,by an author1 however1 who expressly excluded the latter sort of determination1 and who did not recognise any distinction between the thinking and the animal subject1 the motive in question could not thus be defined4 ,hence the difficulty of extracting from ,hume himself any clear and consistent account of that which he variously describes as the #8general appetite for good1 considered merely as such1' as #8interest1' and as #8self-love4' ,to say that he understood by it a desire for pleasure which is yet not a desire for any pleasure in particular1 may seem a strange interpretation to put on one who regarded himself as a great liberator from abstractions1 but there is no other which his statements1 taken together1 would justify4 ,this desire for nothing1 however1 he converts into a desire for something by identifying it on occasion1 7#a7 with any desire for a pleasure of which the attainment is regarded as sufficiently remote to allow of calmness in the desire1 and 7#b7 with desire for the means of having all pleasures indifferently at command4 ,it is in one or other of these senses--either as desire for some particular pleasure distinguished only by its calmness1 or as desire for power--that he always understands #8interest' or #8self-love1' except where he gains a more precise meaning for it by the admission of desires1 not for pleasure at all1 to which it may be opposed4 ,now taken in the former sense1 its difference from the desires for the several pleasures of #8sense1' #8pride1' and #8sympathy1' of which ,hume's account has already been examined1 cannot lie in the object1 but--as he himself says of the distinction1 which he regarded as an equivalent one1 between #8reasonable and unreasonable' desires--in our situation with regard to it4 ,if then the object of each of these desires1 as we have shown to be implied in ,hume's account of them1 is one which only reason1 as self-consciousness1 can constitute1 it cannot be less so when the desire is calm enough to be called self-love4 ,still more plainly is the desire in question determined by reason--by the conception of self as a permanent susceptibility of pleasure--if it is understood to be desire for power4 ,thus ,hume1 having degraded morality for the sake of consistency1 after all is not consistent4 #dh4 ,having now before us a complete view of the possible motives to human action which ,hume admits1 we find that while he has carried to its furthest limit1 and with the least verbal inconsistency possible1 the effort to make thought deny its own originativeness in action1 he has yet not succeeded4 ,he has made abstraction of everything in the objects of human interest but their relation to our nervous irritability--he has left nothing of the beautiful in nature or art but that which it has in common with a sweetmeat1 nothing of that which is lovely and of good report to the saint or statesman but what they share with the dandy or diner-out--yet he cannot present even this poor residuum of an object1 by which all action is to be explained1 except under the character it derives from the thinking soul1 which looks before and after1 and determines everything by relation to itself4 ,thus if1 as he says1 the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable desires does not lie in the object1 this will not be because reason has never anything to do with the constitution of the object1 but because it has always so much to do with it as renders selfishness--the self-conscious pursuit of pleasure--possible4 ,sensuality then will have been vindicated1 the distinction between the #8higher' and #8lower' modes of life will have been erased1 and after all the theoretic consistency--for the sake of which1 and not1 of course1 to gratify any sinister interest1 ,hume made his philosophic venture--will not have been attained4 ,man will still not be ultimately passive1 nor human action natural4 ,reason may be the #8slave of the passions1' but it will be a self-imposed subjection4 ,if all good is pleasure1 what is moral good8 ,ambiguity in ,locke's view4 #di4 ,we have still1 however1 to explain how ,hume himself completes the assimilation of the moral to the natural2 how1 on the supposition that the #8good' can only mean the #8pleasant1' he accounts for the apparent distinction between moral and other good1 for the intrusion of the #8ought and ought not' of ethical propositions upon the #8is and is not' of truth concerning nature4 #a ,here again he is faithful to his rle as the expander and expurgator of ,locke4 ,with ,locke1 it will be remembered1 the distinction of moral good lay in the channel through which the pleasure1 that constitutes it1 is derived4 ,it was pleasure accruing through the intervention of law1 as opposed to the operation of nature3 and from the pleasure thus accruing the term #8morally good' was transferred to the act which1 as #8conformable to some law1' occasions it4 #b ,this view ,hume retains1 merely remedying ,locke's omissions and inconsistencies4 ,locke1 as we saw1 not only neglected to derive the existence of the laws1 whose intervention he counted necessary to constitute the morally good1 from the operation of that desire for pleasure which he pronounced the only motive of man2 in speaking of moral goodness as consisting in conformity to law1 he might1 if taken at his word1 be held to admit something quite different from pleasure alike as the standard and the motive of morality4 ,hume then had1 in the first place1 to account for the laws in question1 and so account for them as to remove that absolute opposition between them and the operation of nature which ,locke had taken for granted2 secondly1 to exhibit that conformity to law1 in which the moral goodness of an act was held to consist1 as itself a mode of pleasure--pleasure1 namely1 to the contemplator of the act2 and thirdly1 to show that not the moral goodness of the act1 even thus understood1 but pleasure to himself was the motive to the doer of it4 #c #a ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bde4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,i4 #b ,above1 secs4 #af-ah4 #c ,of the three problems here specified1 ,hume's treatment of the second is discussed in the following secs4 #ej-ed2 of the first in secs4 #ee-eh2 of the third in secs4 #fj to the end4 ,development of it by ,clarke1 which breaks down for want of true view of reason4 #ej4 ,it was a necessary incident of this process that ,locke's notion of a ,law of ,god1 conformity to which rendered actions #8in their own nature right and wrong1' should disappear4 ,the existence of such a law cannot be explained as a result of any desire for pleasure1 nor conformity to it as a mode of pleasure4 ,locke1 indeed1 tries to bring the goodness1 consisting in such conformity1 under his general definition by treating it as equivalent to the production of pleasure in another world4 ,this1 however1 is to seek refuge from the contradictory in the unmeaning4 ,the question--,is it the pleasure it produces1 or its conformity to law1 that constitutes the goodness of an act8--remains unanswered1 while the further one is suggested--,what meaning has pleasure except as the pleasure we experience8 #a ,between pleasure1 then1 and a #8conformity' irreducible to pleasure1 as the moral standard1 the reader of ,locke had to choose4 ,clarke1 supported by ,locke's occasional assimilation of moral to mathematical truth1 had elaborated the notion of conformity4 ,to him an action was #8in its own nature right' when it conformed to the #8reason of things'--i4e4 to certain #8eternal proportions1' by which ,god1 #8qui omnia numero1 ordine1 mensur posuit1' obliges ,himself to govern the world1 and of which reason in us is #8the appearance4' #b ,thus reason1 as an eternal #8agreement or disagreement of ideas1' was the standard to which action ought to conform1 and1 as our consciousness of such agreement1 at once the judge of and motive to conformity4 ,to this ,hume's reply is in effect the challenge to instance any act1 of which the morality consists either in any of those four relations1 #8depending on the nature of the ideas related1' which he regarded as alone admitting of demonstration1 or in any other of those relations 7contiguity1 identity1 and cause and effect7 which1 as #8matters of fact1' can be #8discovered by the understanding4' #c ,such a challenge admits of no reply1 and no other function but the perception of such relations being allowed to reason or understanding in the school of ,locke1 it follows that it is not this faculty which either constitutes1 or gives the consciousness of1 the morally good4 ,reason excluded1 feeling remains4 ,no action1 then1 can be called #8right in its own nature1' if that is taken to imply 7as #8conformity to divine law' must be71 relation to something else than our feeling4 ,it could only be so called with propriety in the sense of exciting some pleasure immediately1 as distinct from an act which may be a condition of the attainment of pleasure1 but does not directly convey it4 #a ,above1 sec4 #ad4 #b ,boyle ,lectures1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 prop4 #a4 secs4 #a-d4 #c ,book ,,iii4 part #a1 sec4 #a4 7,cf4 ,book ,i part #c1 sec4 #a1 and ,introduction to ,vol4 ,i1 secs4 #bhc and ff47 ,it will be observed that throughout the polemic against ,clarke and his congeners ,hume writes as if there were a difference between objects of reason and feeling1 which he could not consistently admit4 ,he begins by putting the question thus 7page #bcd71 #8whether #8tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue3' but if1 as he tells us1 #8the idea is merely the weaker impression1 and the impression the stronger idea1' such a question has no meaning4 ,in like manner he concludes by saying 7page #bde7 that #8vice and virtue may be compared to sounds1 colours1 heat and cold1 which are not qualities in objects1 but perceptions in the mind4' ,but1 since the whole drift of ,book ,i4 is to show that all #8objective relations' are such #8perceptions' or their succession1 this still leaves us without any distinction between science and morality that shall be tenable according to his own doctrine4 ,with ,hume1 moral good is pleasure excited in a particular way1 viz43 in the spectator of the #8good' act and by the view of its tendency to produce pleasure4 #ea4 ,so far1 however1 there is nothing to distinguish the moral act either from any #8inanimate object1' which may equally excite immediate pleasure1 or from actions which have no character1 as virtuous or vicious1 at all4 ,some further limitation1 then1 must be found for the immediate pleasure which constitutes the goodness called #8moral1' and of which praise is the expression4 ,this ,hume finds in the exciting object which must be 7a7 #8considered in general and without reference to our particular interest1' and 7b7 an object so #8related' 7in the sense above #a explained7 to oneself or to another as that the pleasure which it excites shall cause the further pleasure either of pride or love4 #b ,the precise effect of such limitation he does not explain in detail4 ,a man's pictures1 gardens1 and clothes1 we have been told1 tend to excite pride in himself and love in others4 ,if then we can #8consider them in general and without reference to our particular interest1' and in such #8mere survey' find pleasure1 this pleasure1 according to ,hume's showing1 will constitute them morally good4 #c ,he usually takes for granted1 however1 a further limitation of the pleasure in question1 as excited only by #8actions1 sentiments1 and characters1' and thus finds virtue to consist in the #8satisfaction produced to the spectator of an act or character by the mere view of it4' #d ,virtues and vices then mean1 as ,locke well said1 the usual likes and dislikes of society4 ,if we choose with him to call that virtue of an act1 which really consists in the pleasure experienced by the spectator of it1 #8conformity to the law of their opinion1' we may do so1 provided we do not suppose that there is some other law1 which this imperfectly reflects1 and that the virtue is something other than the pleasure1 but to be inferred from it4 #8,we do not infer a character to be virtuous1 because it pleases2 but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner1 we in effect feel that it is virtuous4' #e #a ,sec4 #cc4 #b ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bdg and #bdh4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 #c ,hume treats them as such in ,book ,,iii4 part #c1 sec4 #e4 #d ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bea4 ,cf4 p4 #bbe4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii42 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,x4 #e ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bdg4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,i41 sec4 ,,ii4 #eb4 ,some further explanation1 however1 of the #8particular manner' of this pleasure was clearly needed in order at once to adjust it to the doctrine previously given of the passions 7of which this1 as a pleasant emotion1 must be one71 and to account for our speaking of the actions which excite it--at least of some of them--as actions which we ought to do4 ,if we revert to the account of the passions1 we can have no difficulty in fixing on that of which this peculiar pleasure1 excited by the #8mere survey' of an action without reference to the spectator's #8particular interest1' must be a mode4 ,it must be a kind of sympathy--pleasure felt by the spectator in the pleasure of another1 as distinct from what might be felt in the prospect of pleasure to himself4 #a ,on the other hand1 there seem to be certain discrepancies between pleasure and moral sentiment4 ,we sympathise where we neither approve nor disapprove2 and1 conversely1 we express approbation where it would seem there was no pleasure to sympathise with1 e4g41 in regard to an act of simple justice1 or where the person experiencing it was one with whom we could have no fellow-feeling--an enemy1 a stranger1 a character in history--or where the experience1 being one not of pleasure but of pain 7say1 that of a martyr at the stake71 should excite the reverse of approbation in the spectator1 if approbation means pleasure sympathised with4 ,our sympathies1 moreover1 are highly variable1 but our moral sentiments on the whole constant4 ,how must #8sympathy' be qualified1 in order that1 when we identify moral sentiment with it1 these objections may be avoided8 #a ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #cce-ccg4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 ,moral sense is thus sympathy with pleasure qualified by consideration of general tendencies4 #ec4 ,hume's answer1 in brief1 is that the sympathy1 which constitutes moral sentiment1 is sympathy qualified by the consideration of #8general tendencies4' ,thus we sympathise with the pleasure arising from any casual action1 but the sympathy does not become moral approbation unless the act is regarded as a sign of some quality or character1 generally permanently agreeable or useful 7sc4 and productive of pleasure directly or indirectly7 to the agent or others4 ,an act of justice may not be productive of any immediate pleasure with which we can sympathise2 nay1 taken singly1 it may cause pain both in itself and in its results1 as when a judge #8takes from the poor to give to the rich1 or bestows on the dissolute the labour of the industrious2 #8but we sympathise with the general satisfaction resulting to society from #8the whole scheme of law and justice1' to which the act in question belongs1 and approve it accordingly4 ,the constancy which leads to a dungeon is a painful commodity to its possessor1 but sympathy with his pain need not incapacitate a spectator for that other sympathy with the general pleasure caused by such a character to others1 which constitutes it virtuous4 ,again1 though remote situation or the state of one's temper may at any time modify or suppress sympathy with the pleasure caused by the good qualities of any particular person1 we may still apply to him terms expressive of our liking4 #8,external beauty is determined merely by pleasure2 and #8tis evident a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure1 when seen at a distance of twenty paces1 as when it is brought nearer to us4 ,we say not1 however1 that it appears to us less beautiful2 because we know what effect it will have in such a position1 and by that reflection we correct its momentary appearance4' ,as with the beautiful1 so with the morally good4 #8,in order to correct the continual contradictions' in our judgment of it1 that would arise from changes in personal temper or situation1 #8we fix on some steady and general points of view1 and always in our thoughts place ourselves in them1 whatever may be our present situation4' ,such a point of view is furnished by the consideration of #8the interest or pleasure of the person himself whose character is examined1 and of the persons who have a connection with him1' as distinct from the spectator's own4 ,the imagination in time learns to #8adhere to these general views1 and distinguishes the feelings they produce from those which arise from our particular and momentary situation4' ,thus a certain constancy is introduced into sentiments of blame and praise1 and the variations1 to which they continue subject1 do not appear in language1 which #8experience teaches us to correct1 even where our sentiments are more stubborn and unalterable4' #a #a ,book ,,iii4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 part #c1 sec4 #a4 ,specially pp4 #cci1 #cdb1 #cdf1 #cdi4 ,in order to account for the facts it has to become sympathy with unfelt feelings4 #ed4 ,it thus appears that though the virtue of an act means the pleasure which it causes to a spectator1 and though this again arises from sympathy with imagined pleasure of the doer or others1 yet the former may be a pleasure which no particular spectator at any given time does actually feel--he need only know that under other conditions on his part he would feel it--and the latter pleasure may be one either not felt at all by any existing person1 or only felt as the opposite of the uneasiness with which society witnesses a departure from its general rules4 ,of the essential distinction between a feeling of pleasure or pain and a knowledge of the conditions under which a pleasure or pain is generally felt1 ,hume shows no suspicion2 nor1 while he admits that without substitution of the knowledge for the feeling there could be no general standard of praise or blame1 does he ask himself what the quest for such a standard implies4 ,as little does he trouble himself to explain how there can be such sympathy with an unfelt feeling--with a pleasure which no one actually feels but which is possible for posterity--as will explain our approval of the virtue which defies the world1 and which is only assumed1 for the credit of a theory1 to bring pleasure to its possessor1 because it certainly brings pleasure to no one else4 ,for the #8artificial' virtue1 however1 of acts done in conformity with the #8general scheme of justice1' or other social conventions1 he accounts at length in part ,,ii4 of his ,second ,book--that entitled #8,of ,justice and ,injustice4' ,can the distinction between the #8moral' and #8natural' be maintained by ,hume8 ,what is #8artificial virtue'8 #ee4 ,to a generation which has sufficiently freed itself from all #8mystical' views of law--which is aware that #8natural right1' if it means a right that existed in a #8state of nature1' is a contradiction in terms2 that1 since contracts could not be made1 or property exist apart from social convention1 any question about a primitive obligation to respect them is unmeaning--the negative side of this part of the treatise can have little interest4 ,that all rights and obligations are in some sense #8artificial1' we are as much agreed as that without experience there can be no knowledge4 ,the question is1 how the artifice1 which constitutes them1 is to be understood1 and what are its conditions4 ,if we ask what ,hume understood by it1 we can get no other answer than that the artificial is the opposite of the natural4 ,if we go on to ask for the meaning of the natural1 we only learn that we must distinguish the senses in which it is opposed to the miraculous and to the unusual from that in which it is opposed to the artificial1 #a but not what the latter sense is4 ,the truth is that1 if the first book of ,hume's treatise has fulfilled its purpose1 the only conception of the natural1 which can give meaning to the doctrine that the obligation to observe contracts and respect property is artificial1 must disappear4 ,there are1 we shall find1 two different negations which in different contexts this doctrine conveys4 ,sometimes it means that such an obligation did not exist for man in a #8state of nature1' i4e41 as man was to begin with4 ,but in that sense the law of cause and effect1 without which there would be no nature at all1 is1 according to ,hume1 not natural1 for it--not merely our recognition of it1 but the law itself--is a habit of imagination1 gradually formed4 ,sometimes it conveys an opposition to ,clarke's doctrine of obligation as constituted by certain #8eternal relations and proportions1' which also form the order of nature1 and are other than1 though regulative of1 the succession of our feelings4 ,nature1 however1 having been reduced by ,hume to the succession of our feelings1 the #8artifice1' by which he supposes obligations to be formed1 cannot be determined by opposition to it1 unless the operation of motives1 which explains the artifice1 is something else than a succession of feelings4 ,but that it is nothing else is just what it is one great object of the moral part of his treatise to show4 #a ,book ,,ii4 part #a1 sec4 #b4 ,no ground for such distinction in relation between motive and act4 #ef4 ,he is nowhere more happy than in exposing the fallacies by which #8liberty of indifferency'--the liberty supposed to consist in a possibility of unmotived action--was defended4 #a ,every act1 he shows1 is determined by a strongest motive1 and the relation between motive and act is no other than that between any cause and effect in nature4 ,in one case1 as in the other1 #8necessity' lies not in an #8esse' but in a #8percipi4' ,it is the #8determination of the thought of any intelligent being1 who considers #8an act or event1' to infer its existence from some preceding objects2' #b and such determination is a habit formed by1 and having a strength proportionate to1 the frequency with which certain phenomena--actions or events--have followed certain others4 ,the weakness in this part of ,hume's doctrine lies1 not in the assumption of an equal uniformity in the sequence of act upon motive with that which obtains in nature1 but in his inability consistently to justify the assumption of an absolute uniformity in either case4 ,when there is an apparent irregularity in the consequences of a given motive--when according to one #8experiment' action 7a7 follows upon it1 according to another action 7b71 and so on--although #8these contrary experiments are entirely equal1 we remove not the notion of causes and necessity2 but1 supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and concealed causes1 we conclude that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge1 not in the things themselves1 which are in every case equally necessary1 though to appearance not equally constant or uniform4' #c ,but we have already seen that1 if necessary connection were in truth only a habit arising from the frequency with which certain phenomena follow certain others1 the cases of exception to a usual sequence1 or in which the balance of chances did not incline one way more than another1 could only so far weaken the habit4 ,the explanation of them by the #8operation of concealed causes' implies1 as he here says1 an opposition of real necessity to apparent inconstancy1 which1 if necessity were such a habit as he says it is1 would be impossible4 #d ,this difficulty1 however1 applying equally to moral and natural sequences1 can constitute no difference between them4 ,it cannot therefore be in the relation between motive and act that the followers of ,hume can find any ground for a distinction between the process by which the conventions of society are formed1 and that succession of feelings which he calls nature4 ,may he then find it in the character of the motive itself by which the #8invention' of justice is to be accounted for8 ,is this other than a feeling determined by a previous1 and determining a sequent1 one8 ,not1 we must answer1 as ,hume himself understood his own account of it1 which is as follows3- #a ,book ,,ii4 part #c1 secs4 #a and #b4 #b ,vol4 ,,ii4 p1 #ahi4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,,ii4 #c ,ibid41 p4 #ahe4 ,book ,,ii41 part ,,iii41 sec4 ,i4 #d ,see ,introduction to ,vol4 ,i4 secs4 #cbc and #ccf4 ,motive to artificial virtues4 #eg4 ,he will examine1 he says1 #8two questions1 viz41 concerning the manner in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men2 and concerning the reasons which determine us to attribute to the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity4' #a ,of the motives which he recognises 7 #de7 it is clear that only two--#8benevolence' and #8interest'--can be thought of in this connection1 and a little reflection suffices to show that benevolence cannot account for the artifice in question4 ,benevolence with ,hume means either sympathy with pleasure--and this 7though ,hume could forget it on occasion7 #b must be a particular pleasure of some particular person--or desire for the pleasure of such sympathy4 ,even if a benevolence may be admitted1 which is not a desire for pleasure at all but an impulse to please1 still this can only be an impulse to please some particular person1 and the only effect of thought upon it1 which ,hume recognises1 is not to widen its object but to render it #8interested4' #c #8,there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind1 merely as such1 independent of personal qualities1 of services1 or of relation to ourself4' #d ,the motive1 then1 to the institution of rules of justice cannot be found in general benevolence4 #e ,as little can it be found in private benevolence1 for the person to whom ,i am obliged to be just may be an object of merited hatred4 ,it is true that1 #8though it be rare to meet with one who loves any single person better than himself1 yet #8tis as rare to meet with one in whom all the kind affections1 taken together1 do not overbalance all the selfish'2 but they are affections to his kinsfolk and acquaintance1 and the generosity which they prompt will constantly conflict with justice4 #f #8,interest1' then1 must be the motive we are in quest of4 ,of the #8three species of goods which we are possessed of--the satisfaction of our minds1 the advantages of our body1 and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good fortune'--the last only #8may be transferred without suffering any loss or alteration2 while at the same time there is not sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessities4' ,hence a special instability in their possession4 ,reflection on the general loss caused by such instability leads to a #8tacit convention1 entered into by all the members of a society1 to abstain from each other's possessions2' and thereupon #8immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice2 as also those of property1 right1 and obligation4' ,it is not to be supposed1 however1 that the #8convention' is of the nature of a promise1 for all promises presuppose it4 #8,it is only a general sense of common interest2 which sense all the members of the society express to one another1 and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules2' and this #8general sense of common interest1' it need scarcely be said1 is every man's sense of his own interest1 as in fact coinciding with that of his neighbours4 ,in short1 #8'tis only from the selfishness and confined generosity of man1 along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants1 that justice derives its origin4' #g #a ,book ,,iii4 part #b1 sec4 #b4 #b ,cf4 sec4 #ed4 #c ,cf4 secs4 #db1 #dc1 and #df4 #d ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bee4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,i4 #e ,for the sense in which ,hume did admit a #8general benevolence1' see sec4 #da1 note4 #f ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bef and #bfj4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ii4 #g ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bfa1 #bfc1 #bfh4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,how artificial virtues become moral4 #eh4 ,thus the origin of rules of justice is explained1 but the obligation to observe them so far appears only as #8interested1' not as #8moral4' ,in order that it may become #8moral1' a pleasure must be generally experienced in the spectacle of their observance1 and a pain in that of their breach1 apart from reference to any gain or loss likely to arise to the spectator himself from that observance or breach4 ,in accounting for this experience ,hume answers the second of the questions1 proposed above4 #8,to the imposition and observance of these rules1 both in general and in every particular instance1 men are at first induced only by a regard to interest2 and this motive1 on the first formation of society1 is sufficiently strong and forcible4 ,but when society has become numerous1 and has increased to a tribe or nation1 this interest is more remote2 nor do men so readily perceive that disorder and confusion follow upon each breach of these rules1 as in a more narrow and contracted society4 ,but though1 in our own actions1 we may frequently lose sight of that interest which we have in maintaining order1 and may follow a lesser and more present interest1 we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive1 either mediately or immediately1 from the injustice of others4444 ,nay1 when the injustice is so distant from us1 as no way to affect our interest1 it still displeases us1 because we consider it as prejudicial to human society1 and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it4 ,we partake of their uneasiness by sympathy2 and as everything which gives uneasiness in human actions1 upon the general survey1 is called vice1 and whatever produces satisfaction1 in the same manner1 denominated virtue1 this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice4 ,and though this sense1 in the present case1 be derived only from contemplating the actions of others1 yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions4 ,the general rule reaches beyond those instances from which it arose1 while at the same time we naturally sympathise with others in the sentiments they entertain of us4' #a #a ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bga4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,,ii4 ,interest and sympathy account for all obligations civil and moral4 #ei4 ,to this account of the process by which rules of justice have not only come into being1 but come to bind our #8conscience' as they do1 the modern critic will be prompt to object that it is still affected by the #8unhistorical' delusions of the systems against which it was directed4 ,in expression1 at any rate1 it bears the marks of descent from ,hobbes1 and1 if read without due allowance1 might convey the notion that society first existed without any sort of justice1 and that afterwards its members1 finding universal war inconvenient1 said to themselves1 #8,go to2 let us abstain from each other's goods4' ,it would be hard1 however1 to expect from ,hume the full-blown terminology of development4 ,he would probably have been the first to admit that rules of justice1 as well as our feelings towards them1 were not made but grew2 and in his view of the #8passions' whose operation this growth exhibits1 he does not seriously differ from the ordinary exponents of the #8natural history' of ethics4 ,these passions1 we have seen1 are #8,interest' and #8,sympathy1' which with ,hume only differ from the pleasures and desires we call #8animal' as any one of these differs from another--the pleasure of eating1 for instance1 from that of drinking1 or desire for the former pleasure from desire for the latter4 ,nor do their effects in the regulation of society1 and in the growth of #8artificial' virtues and vices1 differ according to his account of them from sentiments which1 because they #8occur to us whether we will or no1' he reckons purely natural1 save in respect of the further extent to which the modifying influence of imagination--itself reacted on by language--must have been carried in order to their existence2 and since this in his view is a merely #8natural' influence1 there can only be a relative difference between the #8artificiality' of its more complex1 and the #8naturalness' of its simpler1 products4 ,locke's opposition1 then1 of #8moral' to other good1 on the ground that other than natural instrumentality is implied in its attainment1 will not hold even in regard to that good which1 it is admitted1 would not be what it is1 i4e41 not a pleasure1 but for the intervention of civil law4 ,what is meant by an action which ought to be done4 #fj4 ,the doctrine1 which we have now traversed1 of #8interested' and #8moral' obligation1 implicitly answers the question as to the origin and significance of the ethical copula #8ought4' ,it originally expresses1 we must suppose1 obligation by positive law1 or rather by that authoritative custom in which 7as ,hume would probably have been ready to admit7 the #8general sense of common interest' first embodies itself4 ,in this primitive meaning it already implies an opposition between the #8interest which each man has in maintaining order' and his #8lesser and more present interests4' ,its meaning will be modified in proportion as the direct interest in maintaining order is reinforced or superseded by sympathy with the general uneasiness which any departure from the rules of justice causes4 ,and as this uneasiness is not confined to cases where the law is directly or in the letter violated1 the judgment1 that an act ought to be done1 not only need not imply a belief that the person1 so judging1 will himself gain anything by its being done or lose anything by its omission2 it need not imply that any positive law requires it4 ,whether it is applicable to every act #8causing pleasure on the mere survey'--whether the range of #8imperfect obligation' is as wide as that of moral sentiment--,hume does not make clear4 ,that every action representing a quality #8fitted to give immediate pleasure to its possessor' should be virtuous--as according to ,hume's account of the exciting cause of moral sentiment it must be--seems strange enough1 but it would be stranger that we should judge of it as an act which ought to be done4 ,it is less difficult1 for instance1 to suppose that it is virtuous to be witty1 than that one ought to be so4 ,perhaps it would be open to a disciple of ,hume to hold that as1 according to his master's showing1 an opposition between permanent and present interest is implied in the judgment of obligation as at first formed1 so it is when the pleasure to be produced by an act1 which gratifies moral sense1 is remote rather than near1 and a pleasure to others rather than to the doer1 that the term #8ought' is appropriate to it4 ,sense of morality no motive3 ,when it seems so the motive is really pride4 #fa4 ,but though ,hume leaves some doubt on this point1 he leaves none in regard to the sense in which alone any one can be said to do an action because he ought4 ,this must mean that he does it to avoid either a legal penalty or that pain of shame which would arise upon the communication through sympathy of such uneasiness as a contrary act would excite in others upon the survey4 ,so far from its being true that an act1 in order to be thoroughly virtuous1 must be done for virtue's sake1 #8no action can be virtuous or morally good unless there is some motive to produce it1 distinct from the sense of its morality4' #a ,an act is virtuous on account of the pleasure which supervenes when it is contemplated as proceeding from a motive fitted to produce pleasure to the agent or to others4 ,the presence of this motive1 then1 being the antecedent condition of the act's being regarded as virtuous1 the motive cannot itself have been a regard to the virtue4 ,it may be replied1 indeed1 that though this shows #8regard to virtue' or #8sense of morality' to be not the primary or only virtuous motive1 it does not follow that it cannot be a motive at all4 ,an action cannot be prompted for the first time by desire for a pleasure which can only be felt as a consequence of the action having been done1 but it may be repeated1 after experience of this pleasure1 from desire for its renewal4 ,in like manner1 since with ,hume the #8sense of morality' is not a desire at all but an emotion1 and an emotion which cannot be felt till an act of a certain kind has been done1 it cannot be the original motive to such an action2 but why may not desire for so pleasant an emotion1 when once it has been experienced1 lead to a repetition of the act8 ,the answer to this question is that the pleasure of moral sentiment1 as ,hume thinks of it1 is essentially a pleasure experienced by a spectator of an act who is other than the doer of it4 ,if the doer and spectator were regarded as one person1 there would be no meaning in the rule that the tendency to produce pleasure1 which excites the sentiment of approbation1 must be a tendency to produce it to the doer himself or others1 as distinct from the spectator himself4 ,thus pleasure1 in the specific form in which ,hume would call it #8moral sentiment1' is not what any one could attain by his own action1 and consequently cannot be a motive to action4 ,transferred by sympathy to the consciousness of the man whose act is approved1 #8moral sentiment' becomes #8pride1' and desire for the pleasure of pride--otherwise called #8love of fame'--is one of the #8virtuous' motives on which ,hume dwells most4 ,when an action1 however1 is done for the sake of any such positive pleasure1 he would not allow apparently that the agent does it #8from a sense of duty' or #8because he ought4' ,he would confine this description to cases where the object was rather the avoidance of humiliation4 #8,i ought' means #8it is expected of me4' #8,when any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature1 a person who feels his heart devoid of that motive may hate himself' 7strictly1 according to ,hume's usage of terms1 #8despise himself'7 #8on that account1 and may perform the action without the motive from a certain sense of duty1 in order to acquire by practice that virtuous principle1 or at least to disguise to himself as much as possible his want of it4' #b #a ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #bec4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,i4 #b ,vol4 ,,ii41 p4 #bec4 ,book ,,iii41 part ,,ii41 sec4 ,i4 ,distinction between virtuous and vicious motive does not exist for person moved4 #fb4 ,what difference1 then1 we have finally to ask1 does ,hume leave between one motive and another1 which can give any significance to the assertion that an act1 to be virtuous1 must proceed from a virtuous motive8 ,when a writer has so far distinguished between motive and action as to tell us that the moral value of an action depends on its motive--which is what ,hume is on occasion ready to tell us--we naturally suppose that any predicate1 which he proceeds to apply to the motive1 is meant to represent what it is in relation to the subject of it4 ,it cannot be so1 however1 when ,hume calls a motive virtuous4 ,this predicate1 as he explains1 refers not to an #8esse' but to a #8percipi2' which means that it does not represent what the motive is to the person whom it moves1 but a pleasant feeling excited in the spectator of the act4 ,to the excitement of this feeling it is necessary that the action should not merely from some temporary combination of circumstances produce pleasure for that time and turn1 but that the desire1 to which the spectator ascribes it1 should be one according to his expectation #8fitted to produce pleasure to the agent or to others4' ,in this sense only can ,hume consistently mean that virtue in the motive is the condition of virtue in the act1 and in this sense the qualification has not much significance for the spectator of the act1 and none at all in relation to the doer4 ,it has not much for the spectator1 because1 according to it1 no supposed desire will excite his displeasure and consequently be vicious unless in its general operation it produces a distinct overbalance of pain to the subject of it and to others2 #a and by this test it would be more difficult to show that an unseasonable passion for reforming mankind was not vicious than that moderate lechery was so4 ,it has no significance at all for the person to whom vice or virtue is imputed1 because a difference in the results1 which others anticipate from any desire that moves him to action1 makes no difference in that desire1 as he feels and is moved by it4 ,to him1 according to ,hume1 it is simply desire for the pleasure of which the idea is for the time most lively1 and1 being most lively1 cannot but excite the strongest desire4 ,in this--in the character which they severally bear for the subjects of them--the virtuous motive and the vicious are alike4 ,hume1 it is true1 allows that the subject of a vicious desire may become conscious through sympathy of the uneasiness which the contemplation of it causes to others1 but if this sympathy were strong enough to neutralize the imagination which excites the desire1 the desire would not move him to act4 ,that predominance of anticipated pain over pleasure in the effects of a motive1 which renders it vicious to the spectator1 cannot be transferred to the imagination of the subject of it without making it cease to be his motive because no longer his strongest desire4 ,a vicious motive1 in short1 would be a contradiction in terms1 if that productivity of pain1 which belongs to the motive in the imagination of the spectator1 belonged to it also in the imagination of the agent4 #a ,i write #8,,and to others1' not #8,,or1' because according to ,hume the production of pleasure to the agent alone is enough to render an action virtuous1 if it proceeds from some permanent quality4 ,thus an action could not be unmistakably vicious unless it tended to produce pain both to the doer and to others4 ,if1 though tending to bring pain to others1 it had a contrary tendency for the agent himself1 there would be nothing to decide whether the viciousness of the former tendency was1 or was not1 balanced by the virtuousness of the latter4 #8,consciousness of sin' disappears4 #fc4 ,thus the consequence1 which we found to be involved in ,locke's doctrine of motives1 is virtually admitted by its most logical exponent4 ,locke's confusions began when he tried to reconcile his doctrine with the fact of self-condemnation1 with the individual's consciousness of vice as a condition of himself2 or1 in his own words1 to explain how the vicious man could be #8answerable to himself' for his vice4 ,consciousness of vice could only mean consciousness of pleasure wilfully foregone1 and since pleasure could not be wilfully foregone1 there could be no such consciousness4 ,hume1 as we have seen1 cuts the knot by disposing of the consciousness of vice1 as a relation in which the individual stands to himself1 altogether4 ,a man's vice is someone else's displeasure with him1 and1 if we wish to be precise1 we must not speak of self-condemnation or desire for excellence as influencing human conduct1 but of aversion from the pain of humiliation and desire for the pleasure of pride--humiliation and pride of that sort of which each man's sympathy with the feeling of others about him is the condition4 ,only respectability remains2 and even this not consistently accounted for4 #fd4 ,that such a doctrine leaves large fields of human experience unexplained1 few will now dispute4 ,wesley1 ,wordsworth1 ,fichte1 ,mazzini1 and the ,german theologians1 lie between us and the generation in which1 to so healthy a nature as ,hume's1 and in so explicit a form1 it could be possible4 ,enthusiasm--religious1 political1 and poetic--if it has not attained higher forms1 has been forced to understand itself better since the time when ,shaftesbury's thin and stilted rhapsody was its most intelligent expression4 ,it is now generally agreed that the saint is not explained by being called a fanatic1 that there is a patriotism which is not #8the last refuge of a scoundrel1' and that we know no more about the poet1 when we have been told that he seeks the beautiful1 and that what is beautiful is pleasant1 than we did before4 ,this admitted1 ,hume's ,hedonism needs only to be clearly stated to be found #8unsatisfactory4' ,if it ever tends to find acceptance with serious people1 it is through confusion with that hybrid1 though beneficent1 utilitarianism which finds the moral good in the #8greatest happiness of the greatest number' without reflecting that desire for such an object1 not being for a feeling of pleasure to be experienced by the subject of the desire1 is with ,hume impossible4 ,understood as he himself understood his doctrine1 it is only #8respectability'--the temper of the man who #8naturally1' i4e41 without definite expectation of ulterior gain1 seeks to stand well with his neighbours--that it will explain2 and this it can only treat as a fixed quantity4 ,taking for granted the heroic virtue1 for which it cannot account1 it still must leave it a mystery how the heroic virtue of an earlier age can become the respectability of a later one4 ,recent literary fashion has led us perhaps unduly to depreciate respectability1 but the avowed insufficiency of a moral theory to explain anything beyond it may fairly entitle us to enquire whether it can consistently explain even that4 ,the reason1 as we have sufficiently seen1 why ,hume's ethical speculation has such an issue is that he does not recognize the constitutive action of self-conscious thought4 ,misunderstanding our passivity in experience--unaware that it has no meaning except in relation to an object which thought itself projects1 yet too clear-sighted to acquiesce in the vulgar notion of either laws of matter or laws of action1 as simply thrust upon us from an unaccountable without--he seeks in the mere abstraction of passivity1 of feeling which is a feeling of nothing1 the explanation of the natural and moral world4 ,nature is a sequence of sensations1 morality a succession of pleasures and pains4 ,it is under the pressure of this abstraction that he so empties morality of its actual content as to leave only the residuum we have described4 ,yet to account even for this he has to admit such motives as #8pride1' #8love1' and #8interest2' and each of these1 as we have shown1 implies that very constitutive action of reason1 by ignoring which he compels himself to reduce all morality to that of the average man in his least exalted moments4 ,the formative power of thought1 as exhibited in such motives1 only differs in respect of the lower degree1 to which it has fashioned its matter1 from the same power as the source of the #8desire for excellence1' of the will autonomous in the service of mankind1 of the forever 7to us7 unfilled ideal of a perfect society4 ,it is because ,hume de-rationalizes respectability1 that he can find no rationale1 and therefore no room1 for the higher morality4 ,this might warn us that an #8ideal' theory of ethics tampers with its only sure foundation when it depreciates respectability2 and if it were our business to extract a practical lesson from him1 it would be that there is no other genuine #8enthusiasm of humanity' than one which has travelled the common highway of reason--the life of the good neighbour and honest citizen--and can never forget that it is still only on a further stage of the same journey4 ,our business1 however1 has not been to moralise1 but to show that the philosophy based on the abstraction of feeling1 in regard to morals no less than to nature1 was with ,hume played out1 and that the next step forward in speculation could only be an effort to re-think the process of nature and human action from its true beginning in thought4 ,if this object has been in any way attained1 so that the attention of ,englishmen #8under five-and-twenty' may be diverted from the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent among us to the study of ,kant and ,hegel1 an irksome labour will not have been in vain4 ,t4 ,h4 ,green4