,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,principles ,,of 
,,political ,,obligation    ,,by        
,,thomas ,,hill ,,green ,,late ,,fellow 
,,of ,,balliol ,,college ,,and          
,,whyte',s  ,,professor ,,of ,,moral    
,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,university    
,,of ,,oxford    ,,reprinted ,,from     
,,green',s ,,philosophical ,,works1     
,,vol ,,ii4 ,,with ,,preface ,,by       
,,bernard ,,bosanquet    ,,new          
,,impression    ,,longmans1 ,,green     
,,and ,,co ,,ltd #ci ,,paternoster      
,,row1 ,,london ,,new ,,york1  ,,bombay1
 ,,and ,,calcutta    #aiaa    ,all      
rights reserved    ,,preface4    ,the   
present volume consists of the late     
,professor ,green's lectures  on the    
',principles of ,political ,obligation1'
 together with a chapter  on the        
different senses of the term ',freedom1'
 taken from a course  directly connected
 with the former4 ,the work thus        
re-issued is a  reprint of pp4 #cjg-eec 
of ,vol4 ,,ii4 of ,professor ,green's   
,philosophical  ,works1 with the        

addition of a brief supplement 7p4 #bdh7
 furnished  by the present writer1      
consisting of ,english renderings for   
some  quotations which appear in the    
text 7pp4 #di-ei74    ,the reason for   
this re-issue is as follows4 ,the course
 of lectures in  question has long been 
known to teachers as a most valuable    
text-book  for students of political    
theory4 ,but as a portion of a large and
  expensive volume1 which is itself part
 of a set of collected works1  it       
naturally was not accessible to members 
of popular audiences4  ,in discussing   
the selection of a text-book for a      
projected course  of instruction on     
political theory1 to be given in        
,london1 it was  suggested that a       
separate volume1 containing the         
',principles of  ,political ,obligation'
 would be the best conceivable book for 
the  purpose4 ,no other recent writer1  
it was felt1 has the classical  strength
 and sanity of ,professor ,green1 who   
was never more thorough  and more at    

home then when dealing with those       
questions affecting  citizenship in and 
for which1 it may be said1 he lived4    
,many of the  troubles of today reflect 
the distraction of minds to which a sane
  and balanced view of society has never
 been adequately presented2  and the    
importance of the service which might be
 rendered to general  education by the  
re-issue of these lectures in a         
convenient form  appeared to justify an 
application to those who had the power  
of  carrying out the suggestion which   
had been made4    ,the friends of       
genuine political philosophy will have  
good cause1 it  is hoped1 to be grateful
 to ,mrs ,t4,h4 ,green for her cordial  
assent  to the proposed republication1  
as also to ,messrs4 ,longman for their  
promptitude in agreeing to undertake it4
 ,the elaborate table of  contents1     
reprinted from the ,philosophical       
,works1 was compiled by  their editor1  
the late ,mr4 ,lewis ,nettleship4 ,it   
adds very greatly to  the value of the  

book4    ,,bernard ,,bosanquet          
,transcriber's ,note3 each of ,green's  
footnotes has been placed after  the    
paragraph to which it refers1 and       
renumbered accordingly4  ,the footnotes 
added by ,r4,l4 ,nettleship are treated 
the same way1  remain in the square     
brackets with which he distinguished    
them1  and are marked ',,rln'4 ,the     
transcriber has added a few footnotes1  
mainly explaining ,greek words in the   
text4 ,these are also in square         
brackets1 marked ',tr'4    ,,contents   
,,on ,,the ,,different ,,senses ,,of    
',,freedom' ,,as ,,applied ,,to ,,will  
,,and ,,to ,,the  ,,moral ,,progress    
,,of ,,man4    #a4 ,in one sense 7as    
being search for self-satisfaction7 all 
will  is free2 in another 7as the       
satisfaction sought is or is not real7  
it  may or may not be free    #b4 ,as   
applied to the inner life 'freedom'     
always implies a metaphor4  ,senses of  
this metaphor in ,plato1 the ,stoics1   
,st4 ,paul    #c4 ,st4 ,paul and ,kant4 

,it would seem that with ,kant 'freedom'
 means  merely consciousness of the     
possibility of it1 7'knowledge of sin'7 
#d4 ,hegel's conception of freedom as   
objectively realised in the state    #e4
 ,it is true in so far as society does  
supply to the individual  concrete      
interests which tend to satisfy the     
desire for perfection    #f4 ,though    
7like the corresponding conception in   
,st4 ,paul7 it is not  and could not be 
realised in any actual human society    
#g4 ,in all these uses 'freedom' means1 
not mere self-determination or  acting  
on preference1 but a particular kind of 
this    #h4 ,the extension of the term  
from the outer to the inner relations of
  life1 though a natural result of      
reflection1 is apt to be misleading     
#i4 ,thus the question1 ,is a man free8 
which may be properly asked in  regard  
to his actions1 cannot be asked in the  
same sense in regard  to his will       
#aj4 ,the failure to see this has led to
 the errors 7#a7 of regarding  motive as

 something apart from and acting on     
will1 7#b7 of regarding  will as        
independent of motive    #aa4 ,thus the 
fact that a man1 being what he is1 must 
act in a  certain way1 is construed into
 the negation of freedom    #ab4 ,and to
 escape this negation recourse is had to
 the notion of an  unmotived will1 which
 is really no will at all    #ac4 ,the  
truth is that the will is the man1 and  
that the will cannot  be rightly spoken 
of as 'acting on' its objects or vice   
versa1  because they are neither        
anything without the other    #ad4 ,if  
however the question be persisted in1   
,has a man power over his  will8 the    
answer must be both 'yes' and 'no'      
#ae4 ',freedom' has been taken above 7as
 by ,english psychologists  generally7  
as applying to will1 whatever the       
character of the object  willed    #af4 
,if taken 7as by the ,stoics1 ,st4      
,paul1 ,kant 7generally71 and  ,hegel7  
as applying only to good will1 it must  
still be recognised  that this          

particular sense implies the generic    
#ag4 ,whatever the propriety of the term
 in the particular sense1  both         
'juristic' and 'spiritual' freedom      
spring from the same  self-asserting    
principle in man    #ah4 ,and though the
 former is only the beginning of full   
freedom1 this  identity of source will  
always justify the use of the word in   
the  latter sense    #ai4 ,but does not 
the conception of 'freedom' as  the     
moral ideal  imply an untenable         
distinction like that of ,kant between  
the 'pure'  and 'empirical' ego8    #bj4
 ,the 'pure' and 'empirical' ego are one
 ego1 regarded 7#a7 in its  possibility1
 7#b7 as at any given time it actually  
is    #ba4 ,in man the self-realising   
principle is never realised2 i4e4 the   
objects of reason and will only tend to 
coincide    #bb4 ,so far as they do     
coincide1 man may be said to be 'free'  
and his  will to be 'autonomous'    #bc4
 ,the growing organisation of human life
 provides a medium for the  embodiment1 

and disciplines the natural impulses for
 the reception1  of the idea of         
perfection    #bd4 ,the reconciliation  
of reason and will takes place as the   
individual more and more finds his own  
self-satisfaction in meeting  the       
requirements of established morality    
#be4 ,until these come to be entirely   
superseded by the desire of  perfection 
for its own sake1 and his will becomes  
really free4    ,,lectures ,,on ,,the   
,,principles ,,of ,,political           
,,obligation        ,a4 ,the grounds of 
political obligation4    #a4 ,subject of
 the inquiry    #b4 ,its connection with
 the general theory of morals4 ,ideal   
goodness  is to do good for its own     
sake3 but there must be acts considered 
good on other grounds before they can be
 done for the sake of their  goodness   
#c4 ,when1 however1 the ideal comes to  
be recognised as the ideal1 the  lower  
interests and rules must be criticised  
and revised by it    #d4 ,the criticism 
of interests will yield a 'theory of    

moral  sentiments'2 that of rules will  
relate 7#a7 to positive law1 7#b7 to    
the law of opinion    #e4 ,as moral     
interests greatly depend on recognised  
rules of conduct1  and those again on   
positive law1 it is best to begin by    
considering  the moral value of existing
 civil institutions    #f4 ,the         
condition of morality is the possession 
of will and reason1  and it is realised 
in a personal character in which they   
are  harmonised    #g4 ,civil           
institutions are valuable so far as they
 enable will and  reason to be          
exercised1 and so far they answer to    
'jus naturae'    #h4 ,the essential     
questions as to the 'law of nature' are1
 7#a7 ,are  there rights and obligations
 other than those actually enforced8    
7#b7  ,if so1 what is the criterion of  
them8    #i4 ,while rejecting the theory
 of a 'state of nature1' we may still   
use 'natural' of those rights which     
ought to be1 though they  actually are  
not    #aj4 ,such 'natural law' is 7as  

admitting enforcement7 distinct from1   
but 7as implying a duty to obey it7     
relative to1 the moral law    #aa4      
,hence two principles for the criticism 
of law1 7#a7 only external  acts can be 
matter of obligation proper1 7#b7 the   
ideal of law must be  determined by     
reference to the moral end which it     
serves    #ab4 ,observe 7a7 that in     
confining law to 'external actions1' we 
mean by 'actions' intentions1 without   
which there is properly no  'action'    
#ac4 7b7 ,that by 'external' we mean    
that law1 though it does supply  motives
 to action1 looks merely to whether the 
action is done1 not to  whether it is   
done from a particular motive    #ad4   
,law then can only enjoin or forbid     
certain acts2 it cannot  enjoin or      
forbid motives    #ae4 ,and the only    
acts which it ought to enjoin or forbid 
are those  of which the doing or not    
doing1 from whatever motive1 is         
necessary  to the moral end of society  
#af4 ,the principle of 'natural law1'   

then1 should be to enjoin all  acts     
which further action from the highest   
motive1 and no acts which  interfere    
with such action    #ag4 ,this principle
 would condemn much legislation which   
has tended1  e4g41 to weaken religion1  
self-respect1 or family feeling    #ah4 
,this1 and not the principle of         
'laissez-faire1' is the true  ground of 
objection to 'paternal government'      
#ai4 ,the theory of political obligation
 7i4e4 of what law ought to  be1 and why
 it ought to be obeyed7 is not a theory 
7a7 as to how  existing law has come to 
be what it is    #bj4 ,nor 7b7 as to how
 far it expresses or is derived from    
certain  original 'natural' rights      
#ba4 ',natural' rights 7like law itself7
 are relative to moral ends1  i4e4 they 
are those which are necessary to the    
fulfilment of man's  moral vocation as  
man    #bb4 ,this however is not the    
sense in which political obligation  was
 based on 'natural rights' in the       
seventeenth and eighteenth  centuries1  

previously to utilitarianism    #bc4    
,the utilitarian theory so far agrees   
with that here advocated  that it       
grounds existing law1 not on a 'natural'
 law prior to it1 but  on an end which  
it serves    #bd4 ,the derivation of    
actual rights from natural 7i4e4 more   
primitive7 rights does not touch the    
real question1 viz4 how there  came to  
be rights at all    #be4 ,the conception
 of a moral ideal 7however dim7 is the  
condition of  the existence of rights1  
and conversely anyone who is capable of 
such  a conception is capable of rights 
#bf4 ,thus the consciousness of having  
rights is co-ordinate with the          
recognition of others as having them1   
the ground of both being the  conception
 of a common good which ought to be     
attained    #bg4 ,rights then can only  
subsist among 'persons1' in the moral   
sense of 'persons1' i4e4 being possessed
 of rational will    #bh4 ,though the   
moral idea of personality is later in   
formulation than  the legal1 and this   

again than the actual existence of      
rights    #bi4 ,rights which are        
directly necessary to a man's acting as 
a moral  person at all may be called in 
a special sense 'personal'    #cj4 ,nor 
is there any objection to calling them  
'innate' or 'natural1'  if this means   
'necessary to the moral development of  
man' in which  sense 'duties' are       
equally 'natural'    #ca4 ,without a    
society conscious of a common interest  
there can be  only 'powers1' no         
'rights'4        ,b4 ,spinoza4    #cb4  
,spinoza1 seeing that 'jus naturae'     
'potentia1' and not seeing  that it is  
not really 'jus' at all1 identifies all 
'jus' with  'potentia1' both in the     
state and in the individual    #cc4     
,from which it follows that the 'right' 
of the state against its  individual    
members is only limited by its 'power'  
#cd4 ,and the same principle applies to 
the relations of one state to  other    
states    #ce4 ,but1 according to       
,spinoza1 though everything is 'lawful' 

for the  state1 everything is not       
'best1' and the 'best' state is that    
which  secures a life of 'peace1' i4e4  
rational virtue or perfection    #cf4   
,this conclusion does not seem          
consistent with his starting-point1     
according to which men are 'naturally   
enemies'    #cg4 ,from such a 'status   
naturalis' there is no possible         
transition to  the 'status civilis1' and
 the phrase 'jus naturae' remains       
unmeaning    #ch4 ,spinoza's error of   
regarding 'rights' as possible apart    
from  society was confirmed by his      
denial of final causes    #ci4 ,it was  
just because ,plato and ,aristotle      
regarded man as finding  his end in the 
end of the state1 that they founded a   
true theory of  rights    #dj4 ,spinoza1
 however1 while insisting that man is   
'part of nature1'  yet places his 'good'
 in understanding nature and so         
acquiring a new  character    #da4 ,in  
thus recognising the idea of perfection 
as a determinant of  life1 he really    

recognises an operative final cause1    
though without  seeing its bearing on   
the theory of right4        ,c4 ,hobbes4
    #db4 ,hobbes differs from ,spinoza  
in regarding the right of the           
sovereign1 not as limited by his power1 
but as absolute    #dc4 ,statement of   
his doctrine    #dd4 ,he uses 'person1' 
as in ,roman law1 for either 7#a7 a     
complex of  rights1 or 7#b7 the subject 
of those rights    #de4 ,though by his  
theory the sovereign may be one or many1
 and  sovereignty is transferable by the
 act of a majority1 he tacitly          
vindicates the absolute right of a de   
facto monarchy    #df4 ,the radical     
fiction in his theory is that there can 
be any  'right' after the institution of
 sovereignty1 if 7as he holds7  there is
 none before it    #dg4 ,to justify his 
doctrine of absolute submission he has  
to assume a  'law of nature' which binds
 men to keep covenant1 while yet he     
holds  the 'law of nature' to be mere   
'power' and covenants to be only valid  

under an imperium1    #dh4 ,his         
'contract' can confer none but natural  
right1 and that is  either not a right  
at all1 or 7if it is7 it belongs to all 
men1  subject and sovereign alike       
#di4 ,the real flaw in the theory of    
contract is not that it is              
unhistorical1 but that it implies the   
possibility of rights and  obligations  
independently of society    #ej4 ,though
 it has not been popularly accepted as  
regards the rights  of sovereigns over  
subjects1 the behaviour of individuals  
to society  is to a groat extent        
practically determined by it4        ,d4
 ,locke4    #ea4 ,the development of    
this latter side of it is peculiarly due
 to  ,rousseau1 but ,locke1 ,hooker1 and
 ,grotius have essentially the same     
conception3 ,spinoza alone differs      
#eb4 ,ambiguity of their phrase 'state  
of nature4' ,they agree in  treating it 
as the negation of the 'political       
state4' ,but if so1  contract would be  
impossible in it    #ec4 ,nor could it  

be a state of 'freedom and equality1' as
 most of  them assume it to be    #ed4  
,and if this state of nature implies    
consciousness of obligation1  it must   
imply recognition of social claims1 and 
must therefore be  virtually a political
 state    #ee4 ,in fact the theory of a 
state of nature governed by a law of    
nature1 as preceding civil society1 must
 be untrue either to the  conception of 
law or to that of nature    #ef4 ,locke 
differs from ,hobbes 7#a7 in            
distinguishing the 'state of  nature'   
from the 'state of war'    #eg4 ,he     
implies 7more consistently than ,hobbes7
 that the 'state of  nature' is one in  
which the 'law of nature' is observed   
#eh4 7#b7 ,he limits the supreme power  
in the state by the legislature1  which 
holds its functions in trust from the   
community    #ei4 ,and this distinction 
between the supreme community and the   
supreme executive enables him to        
distinguish between dissolution of  the 
political society and dissolution of the

 government1 which ,hobbes  had confused
    #fj4 ,he invests the community with 
the right of resuming the powers  which 
they have delegated1 and thus justifies 
revolution when it is  the act of the   
whole community    #fa4 ,the difficulty 
is to determine when it is the act of   
the whole  community1 and on this       
,locke's theory gives no help    #fb4   
,the difficulty indeed is not so great  
as that of conceiving the  act of       
original devolution of power1 and is    
inherent in the theory of  contract     
#fc4 ,in the particular case of the     
reform of the ,english  representative  
system1 ,locke does not contemplate the 
carrying out of  his own theory4        
,e4 ,rousseau4    #fd4 ,rousseau        
conceives the community to be in        
continual exercise of  the power which  
,locke conceives it to have exercised   
once and to hold  in reserve    #fe4 ,in
 his view of the motive for passing from
 the state of nature  into the civil    
state he is more like ,spinoza than     

,locke    #ff4 ,his statement of the    
origin and nature of the 'social        
contract'    #fg4 ,its effects upon the 
individual    #fh4 ,his idea of the     
sovereign is really that of a supreme   
disinterested reason1 but he fuses this 
with the ordinary idea of a  supreme    
coercive power    #fi4 ,the practical   
result of his theory has been a vague   
exaltation of  the will of the people1  
regardless of what 'the people' ought to
 mean    #gj4 ,further consequences of  
his ideal conception of sovereignty4 ,it
  cannot be alienated1 represented1 or  
divided    #ga4 ,thus the 'government'  
is never the same as the 'sovereign1'   
and  constitutions differ according to  
where the government1 not the           
sovereignty1 resides    #gb4 ,the       
institution of government is not by     
contract1 but by the  act of the        
sovereign1 and this act must be         
confirmed or repealed  periodically     
#gc4 ,his distinction between the 'will 
of all' and the 'general will'3  the    

latter always wills the common good1    
though it may be mistaken as  to means  
#gd4 ,he admits however that it may be  
overpowered by particular  interests1   
and so find no expression even in the   
vote of a general  assembly    #ge4     
,what then is the test of the 'general' 
will8 ,absolute unanimity  is what      
,rousseau requires of the parties to the
 original contract    #gf4 ,but what is 
to decide whether their successors are  
parties to it8  ,not 'residence1' unless
 there is also freedom to migrate       
#gg4 ,the element of permanent value in 
,rousseau is his conception of  the     
state as representing the 'general will'
    #gh4 ,difficulties in this          
conception4 ,it seems that either no    
actual  state realises it1 or that there
 may be a state without a true          
sovereign    #gi4 ,we may distinguish   
between de facto and de jure            
sovereignty1  and say that ,rousseau    
meant the latter2 but this is only an   
inference from what he says4        ,f4 

,sovereignty and the general will4      
#hj4 ,hence it may be asked1 7#a7 ,is   
any actual sovereignty founded on  the  
'general will'8 7#b7 ,can sovereignty de
 jure be truly said to be  founded on   
it8 7#c7 ,if so1 must it be expressed   
through the vote of a  sovereign people8
    #ha4 7#a7 ,according to 7e4g47      
,austin's definition of sovereignty1 we 
should answer this question in the      
negative    #hb4 7,observe that from    
,austin's definition it would follow    
that1  while every 'law' implies a      
'sovereign1' a 'sovereign's' commands   
need not be 'laws'7    #hc4 ,that       
definition directly contradicts that of 
,rousseau1 in 7a7  placing sovereignty  
in determinate persons1 7b7 making its  
essence lie in power to compel obedience
    #hd4 ,actual sovereignty combines   
both definitions2 the habitual          
obedience of subjects to the sovereign  
is due to the sense that by  obeying    
they secure certain ends    #he4 ,so far
 as ,austin means that a fully developed

 state implies a  determinate supreme   
source of law1 he is right as against   
,rousseau    #hf4 ,but if sovereign     
power  the aggregate influences which   
really  make the people obedient1 it    
must be sought in the 'general will'    
#hg4 ,such power need not be 'sovereign'
 in the narrower sense1 and may  coexist
 with a separate coercive power which is
 'sovereign'    #hh4 ,this has been the 
case in ancient despotisms1 and in the  
modern  empires of the ,east    #hi4 ,so
 in states under foreign dominion1 which
 retain a national  life1 the technical 
sovereign is not the law-making and     
law-maintaining power    #ij4 ,under the
 ,roman ,empire1 in ,british ,india1 in 
,russia1 where the  technical is also   
the real sovereign1 its strength rests  
in different  degrees on the general    
will    #ia4 ,thus the answer to        
question 7#a7 depends on the sense of   
'sovereign4' ,if it  a power which      
guarantees equal rights1 it is  implied 
in every 'political' society    #ib4    

,but 7a7 it need not be the supreme     
coercive power1 and 7b7  if it is so1 it
 is not because it is so that it        
commands habitual  obedience    #ic4    
,thus 7retaining the technical use of   
'sovereign'7 it is true that  if the    
sovereign is to be so really1 it must   
express and maintain a  general will    
#id4 ,though this is compatible with the
 fact that some of the laws of  the     
sovereign conflict with the general will
    #ie4 ,thus as to question 7#b7      
7above1 sec4 #hj71 if sovereignty is    
said  to rest on the general will 'de   
jure1' either 'sovereign' or 'jus' is   
not used in the strict sense    #if4 ,an
 antithesis between sovereign 'de jure' 
and 'de facto' can only  arise from a   
confusion between 'sovereign' as  the   
source of law and  'sovereign' as  the  
'general will'    #ig4 ,though there are
 cases in which 7in a different sense7 a
  sovereign may be conveniently         
described as 'de facto1' not 'de jure1' 
or vice versa    #ih4 ,similarly1 to say

 that the people is 'sovereign de jure' 
is to  confuse the general will with the
 coercive power of the majority    #ii4 
,rousseau's confusion is due to the     
theory of 'natural rights'  7that the   
individual is not bound by anything     
which he has not  individually approved7
    #ajj4 ,the individual must indeed   
judge for himself whether a law is  for 
the common good2 but though he judge it 
not to be1 he ought as a  rule to obey  
it    #aja4 ,cases in which a doubt may 
arise    #ajb4 7a7 ,where the legal     
authority of the law is doubtful1 owing 
to  the doubt where the sovereignty in  
the state resides    #ajc4 ,in such     
cases the truth generally is that the   
'right1' on the  particular issue1 has  
not yet formed itself    #ajd4 ,but it  
does not follow that because the 'right'
 is on both  sides1 one is not 'better' 
than the other2 though this may be the  
case    #aje4 ,in such cases of disputed
 sovereignty the distinction of 'de     
jure' and 'de facto' may be applied1    

though it is better to say that  the    
sovereignty is in abeyance    #ajf4 ,the
 individual1 having no 'right' to guide 
him1 should take the  side whose success
 seems likely to be best for mankind    
#ajg4 7b7 ,another case is where there  
is no legal way of getting  a bad law   
repealed4 ,here it is a question1 not of
 right1 but of  duty1 to resist the     
sovereign    #ajh4 ,nor is it a question
 of the right of a majority1 as a       
majority1 to resist3 it may be the duty 
of a helpless minority    #aji4 ,some   
general questions which the good citizen
 may put to himself  in such dilemmas   
#aaj4 ,they can1 indeed1 seldom be      
applied by the agents at the time as    
they can be after the event    #aaa4 ,in
 simple cases we may judge of the right 
or wrong of an act by  the character    
which it expresses1 but generally we can
 only judge  them by its results        
#aab4 ,all that the historian can say is
 that on the whole the best  character  
is likely to produce the best results1  

notwithstanding  various appearances to 
the contrary4        ,g4 ,will1 not     
force1 is the basis of the state4       
#aac4 ,the doctrines which explain      
political obligation by contract  agree 
in treating sovereign and subject apart1
 whereas they are  correlative    #aad4 
,for the desire for freedom in the      
individual is no real desire  unless he 
is one of a society which recognises it4
 7,slaves are not a  real exception to  
this7    #aae4 ,and without an authority
 embodied in civil institutions he would
  not have the elementary idea of right 
which enables him to question  the      
authority    #aaf4 ,but the theory of   
contract expresses1 in a confused way1  
the  truth that only through the common 
recognition of a common good1 and  its  
embodiment in institutions1 is morality 
possible    #aag4 ,thus morality and    
political subjection have a common      
source4    #aah4 ,and both imply the    
twofold conception1 7a7 ',i must though 
,i do not like1' 7b7 ',i must because it

 is for the common good  which is also  
my good'    #aai4 ,it is a farther and  
difficult question1 how far the sense   
of common interest can be kept alive    
either in the government or  subjects1  
unless the people participates directly 
in legislation    #abj4 ,and this       
suggests the objection1 ,is it not      
trifling with words  to speak of        
political subjection in modern states as
 based on the  will of the subjects8    
#aba4 ,we must admit 7a7 that the idea  
of the state as serving a  common       
interest is only partially realised1    
even by the most  enlightened subject1  
though so far as realised it is what    
makes him a  loyal subject    #abb4 7b7 
,that if he is to be an intelligent     
patriot as well as a  loyal subject1 he 
must take a personal part in the work of
 the state    #abc4 ,and 7c7 that even  
then his patriotism will not be a       
passion  unless it includes a feeling   
for the state analogous to that which he
  has for his family and home    #abd4  

,but are we not again assuming what was 
disputed1 viz4 that a  sense of its     
serving a common interest is necessary  
to the existence  of the state8    #abe4
 ,observe that the idea of an end or    
function1 realised by  agencies         
unconscious of it and into which it     
cannot be resolved1 is  already implicit
 even if the state be treated as a      
'natural organism'    #abf4 ,such a     
treatment1 however1 would ignore the    
distinction between  the 'natural' and  
the 'human' or 'moral' agencies which   
have operated  in the production of     
states    #abg4 ,it may be objected that
 these 'human' agencies are not         
necessarily 'moral1' but on the contrary
 are often selfish    #abh4 ,but though 
human motives are never unalloyed1 they 
only produce  good results so far as    
they are fused with and guided by some  
unselfish element    #abi4 ,if e4g4 we  
would form a complete estimate of       
,napoleon1 we must  consider not only   
his ambition but the particular form in 

which his  ambition worked    #acj4 ,and
 further reflect that the idiosyncrasy  
of such men plays  but a small part in  
the result1 which is mainly due to      
agencies of  which they are only the    
most conspicuous instruments    #aca4   
,thus an ideal motive may co-operate    
with the motives of selfish  men1 and   
only through such co-operation are they 
instrumental for good    #acb4 ,the fact
 that the state implies a supreme       
coercive power gives  colour to the view
 that it is based on coercion2 whereas  
the coercive  power is only supreme     
because it is exercised in a state1 i4e4
  according to some system of law1      
written or customary    #acc4 ,in the   
absence of any other name1 'state' is   
the best for a  society in which there  
is such a system of law and a power to  
enforce  it    #acd4 ,a state1 then1 is 
not an aggregate of individuals under  a
 sovereign1 but a society in which the  
rights of men already  associated in    
families and tribes are defined and     

harmonised    #ace4 ,it developes as the
 absorption of fresh societies or the   
extended intercourse between its members
 widens the range of common  interests  
and rights    #acf4 ,the point to be    
insisted on is that force has only      
formed states  so far as it has operated
 in and through a pre-existing medium of
  political1 tribal1 or family 'rights'4
        ,h4 ,has the citizen rights     
against the state8    #acg4 ,as long as 
power of compulsion is made the essence 
of the state1  political obligation     
cannot be explained either by the theory
 of  'consent1' or by that which derives
 all right from the sovereign    #ach4  
,the state presupposes rights1 rights   
which may be said to belong  to the     
'individual' if this mean 'one of a     
society of individuals'    #aci4 ,a     
right may be analysed into a claim of   
the individual upon  society and a power
 conceded to him by society1 but really 
the claim  and the concession are sides 
of one and the same common consciousness

    #adj4 ,such common consciousness of 
interests is the ground of the  'natural
 right' of slaves and of the members of 
other states    #ada4 ,but though in    
this way there may be rights outside the
 state1  the members of a state derive  
the rights which they have as members   
of other associations from the state1   
and have no rights against it    #adb4  
i4e4 as they derive their rights from   
their membership in the  state1 they    
have no right to disobey the law unless 
it be for the  interest of the state    
#adc4 ,and even then only if the law    
violates some interest which is         
implicitly acknowledged by the          
conscience of the community    #add4 ,it
 is a farther question when the attempt 
to get a law repealed  should be        
exchanged for active resistance to it   
#ade4 e4g4 should a slave be befriended 
against the law8 ,the slave has  as a   
man certain rights which the state      
cannot extinguish1 and by  denying which
 it forfeits its claim upon him    #adf4

 ,and it may be held that the claim of  
the slave upon the citizen1  as a man1  
overrides the claim of the state upon   
him1 as a citizen    #adg4 ,even here1  
however1 the law ought to be obeyed1    
supposing that  its violation tended to 
bring about general anarchy4        ,i4 
,private rights4 ,the right to life and 
liberty4    #adh4 ,there are rights     
which men have as members of            
associations1  which come to be         
comprised in the state1 but which also  
exist  independently of it    #adi4     
,these are 'private' rights1 divided by 
,stephen into 7a7  personal1 7b7 rights 
of property1 7c7 rights in private      
relations    #aej4 ,all rights are      
'personal'2 but as a man's body is the  
condition of his exercising rights at   
all1 the rights of it may be  called    
'personal' in a special sense    #aea4  
,the right of 'life and liberty'        
7better1 of 'free life'71 being  based  
on capacity for society1 belongs in     
principle to man as man1  though this is

 only gradually recognised    #aeb4 ,at 
first it belongs to man as against other
 members of his  family or tribe1 then  
as against other tribes1 then as against
 other  citizens1 which in antiquity    
still implies great limitations    #aec4
 ,influences which have helped to break 
down these limitations are  7a7 ,roman  
equity1 7b7 ,stoicism1 7c7 the          
,christian idea of a  universal         
brotherhood    #aed4 ,this last is the  
logical complement of the idea that man 
as such  has a right to life2 but the   
right is only negatively recognised in  
modern ,christendom    #aee4 ,it is     
ignored e4g4 in war1 nor is much done to
 enable men to  fulfil their capacities 
as members of humanity    #aef4 ,four   
questions as to the relation of the     
state to the right of  man as man to    
free life4        ,k4 ,the right of the 
state over the individual in war4       
#aeg4 7#a7 ,has the state a right to    
override this right in war8 ,it must  be
 admitted that war is not 'murder1'     

either on the part of those  who fight  
or of those who cause the war    #aeh4  
,yet it may be a violation of the right 
of life4 ,it does not  prove it not to  
be so1 that 7a7 those who kill do not   
intend to  kill anyone in particular    
#aei4 ,or that 7b7 those who are killed 
have incurred the risk  voluntarily4    
,even if they have1 it does not follow  
that they had a  'right' to do so       
#afj4 ,it may be said that the right to 
physical life may be overridden  by a   
right arising from the exigencies of    
moral life    #afa4 ,but this only      
shifts the blame of war to those who are
  responsible for those exigencies2 it  
remains a wrong all the same    #afb4   
,but in truth most wars of the last #djj
 years have not been  wars for political
 liberty1 but have arisen from dynastic 
ambition or  national vanity    #afc4   
,admitting1 then1 that virtue may be    
called out by war and that  it may be a 
factor in human progress1 the           
destruction of life in it  is always a  

wrong    #afd4 ',but if it be admitted  
that war may do good1 may not those who 
originate it have the credit of this8'  
#afe4 ,if they really acted from desire 
to do good1 their share in the  wrong is
 less2 but in any case the fact that war
 was the only means  to the good was due
 to human agency and was a wrong        
#aff4 7#b7 7,see sec4 #aeg74 ,hence it  
follows that the state1 so far as  it is
 true to its principle1 cannot have to  
infringe the rights of  men as men by   
conflicts with other states    #afg4 ,it
 is not because states exist1 but       
because they do not fulfil  their       
functions as states in maintaining and  
harmonising general  rights1 that such  
conflicts are necessary    #afh4 ,this  
is equally true of conflicts arising    
from what are called  'religious'       
grounds    #afi4 ,thus no state1 as     
such1 is absolutely justified in doing a
  wrong to mankind1 though a particular 
state may be conditionally  justified   
#agj4 ,it may be objected that such a   

'cosmopolitan' view ignores the         
individuality of states1 and could only 
be realised if they wore all  absorbed  
in a universal empire    #aga4 ,it is   
true that public spirit1 to be real1    
must be national2 but  the more a nation
 becomes a true state1 the more does it 
find outlets  for its national spirit   
other than conflicts with other nations 
#agb4 ,in fact the identification of    
patriotism with military  aggressiveness
 is a survival from a time when states  
in the full  sense did not exist        
#agc4 ,and our great standing armies are
 due1 not to the development  of a      
system of states1 but to circumstances  
which witness to the  shortcomings of   
that system    #agd4 ,the better the    
organisation of each state1 the greater 
is the  freedom of communication with   
others1 especially in trade1 which1     
beginning in self-interest1 may lead to 
the consciousness of a higher  bond     
#age4 ,as compared with individuals1 any
 bonds between nations must  be weak2 on

 the other hand1 governments have less  
temptation than  individuals to deal    
unfairly with one another4        ,l4   
,the right of the state to punish4      
#agf4 7#c7 7,see sec4 #aef74 ,what right
 has the state to punish8 ,the  right to
 live in a community rests on the       
capacity to act for the  common good1   
and implies the right to protect such   
action from  interference    #agg4 ,a   
detailed theory of punishment implies a 
detailed theory of  rights4 ,here we can
 only deal with principles    #agh4 ,is 
punishment retributive8 ,not in the     
sense that it carries on  a supposed    
'right' of private vengeance1 for no    
such 'right' can exist    #agi4 ,the    
most rudimentary 'right' of vengeance   
implies social  recognition and         
regulation1 in early times by the family
    #ahj4 ,and its development up to the
 stage at which the state alone         
punishes is the development of a        
principle implied from the first        
#aha4 ,but if punishment excludes       

private vengeance1 how can it be        
retributory at all8 ,and how can a wrong
 to society be requited8    #ahb4 ,when 
a wrong is said to be 'done to society1'
 it does not mean  that a feeling of    
vindictiveness is excited in the society
    #ahc4 ,the popular indignation      
against a great criminal is an          
expression1 not of individual desire for
 vengeance1 but of the demand  that the 
criminal should have his due    #ahd4   
,and this does not mean an equivalent   
amount of suffering2 nor  such suffering
 as has been found by experience to     
deter men from the  crime    #ahe4      
,punishment1 to be just1 implies 7a7    
that the person punished  can understand
 what right means1 and 7b7 that it is   
some  understood right that he has      
violated    #ahf4 ,he will then         
recognise that the punishment is his own
 act  returning on himself2 7it is in a 
different sense that the physical       
consequences of immorality are spoken of
 as a 'punishment'7    #ahg4 ,punishment

 may be said to be preventive1 if it be 
remembered  7a7 that what it 'prevents' 
must be the violation of a real  right1 
and 7b7 that the means by which it      
'prevents' must be  really necessary    
#ahh4 ,does our criterion of the justice
 of punishment give any  practical help 
in apportioning it8    #ahi4 ,the       
justice of punishment depends on the    
justice of the system  of rights which  
it is to maintain    #aij4 ,the idea    
that 'just' punishment is that which    
the crime  in amount confuses           
retribution for the wrong to society    
with  compensation for damages to the   
individual    #aia4 ',but why not hold  
that the pain of the punishment ought to
  the  moral guilt of the crime8'       
#aib4 ,because the state cannot gauge   
either the one or the other2 and  if it 
could1 it would have to punish every    
case differently    #aic4 ,in truth the 
state has regard in punishing1 not      
primarily to the  individuals concerned1
 but to the future prevention of the    

crime by  associating terror with it in 
the general imagination    #aid4 ,the   
account taken of 'extenuating           
circumstances' may be  similarly        
explained2 i4e4 the act done under them 
requires little  terror to prevent it   
from becoming general    #aie ',but why 
avoid the simpler explanation1 that     
extenuating  circumstances are held to  
diminish the moral guilt of the act8'   
#aif4 ,because 7a7 the state cannot     
ascertain the degree of moral  guilt    
involved in a crime2 7b7 if it tries to 
punish immorality  7proper71 it will    
check disinterested moral effort        
#aig4 ,punishment1 however1 may be truly
 held to express the 'moral             
disapprobation' of society1 but it is to
 the external side of action  that the  
disapprobation is directed    #aih4 ,the
 principle that punishment should be    
regulated by the  importance of the     
right violated explains the severity    
with which  'culpable negligence is     
punished    #aii4 ,and the punishment of

 crimes done in drunkenness illustrates 
the  same principle    #bjj4 ,it also   
justifies the distinction between       
'criminal' and 'civil'  injuries1 7which
 is not a distinction between injuries  
to individuals  and to the community1   
for no 'right' is violated by injury    
done to an  individual as such7    #bja4
 ,there would be no reason in           
associating terror with breaches of  a  
right which the offender either did not 
know that he was breaking  or which he  
could not help breaking    #bjb4 ,when  
such ignorance and inability are        
culpable1 it depends on  the seriousness
 of the wrong or the degree to which the
 civil suit  involves deterrent effects1
 whether they should be treated as      
crimes    #bjc4 ,historically1 the state
 has interfered first through the civil 
process2 gradually1 as public alarm gets
 excited1 more and more  offences come  
to be treated as crimes    #bjd4        
,punishment must also be reformatory    
7this being one way of  being           

preventive71 i4e4 it must regard the    
rights of the criminal    #bje4 ,capital
 punishment is justifiable only 7a7 if  
it can be shown  to be necessary to the 
maintenance of society1 7b7 if there is 
reason to suppose the criminal to be    
permanently incapable of rights    #bjf4
 ,punishment1 though directly it aims at
 the maintenance of  rights1 has        
indirectly a moral end1 because rights  
are conditions of  moral well-being4    
,m4 ,the right of the state to promote  
morality4    #bjg4 7#d7 7,see sec4      
#aef74 ,the right of free life is coming
 to be more  and more recognised amongst
 us negatively2 is it reasonable to do  
so little positively to make its        
exercise possible8    #bjh4 ,first      
observe that the capacity for free life 
is a moral  capacity1 i4e4 a capacity   
for being influenced by a sense of      
common  interest    #bji4 ,this         
influence will only be weakened by      
substituting for it  that of law1 but   
the state can do more than it usually   

does without  deadening spontaneous     
action2 e4g4 'compulsory education' need
 not be  'compulsory' except to those   
who have no spontaneity to be deadened  
#baj4 ,so too with interference with    
'freedom of contract'2 we must  consider
 not only those who are interfered with1
 but those whose  freedom is increased  
by the interference4    ,n4 ,the right  
of the state in regard to property4     
#baa4 ,as to property two questions have
 to be kept distinct1 7a7  how there has
 come to be property1 7b7 how there has 
come to be  a right of property4 ,each  
of those again may be treated either    
historically or metaphysically    #bab4 
,the confusion of those questions and   
methods has given rise  either to       
truisms or to irrelevant researches as  
to the nature of  property    #bac4     
,property implies 7a7 appropriation1    
i4e4 an act of will1 of a  permanent    
self demanding satisfaction and         
expression    #bad4 7b7 ,recognition of 
the appropriation by others4 ,this      

recognition cannot be derived from      
contract 7,grotius71 or from a  supreme 
force 7,hobbes7    #bae4 ,locke rightly 
bases the right of property on the same 
ground as  the right to one's own       
person2 but he does not ask what that   
ground is    #baf4 ,the ground is the   
same as that of the right of life1 of   
which  property is the instrument1 viz4 
the consciousness of a common  interest 
to which each man recognises every other
 man as contributing    #bag4 ,thus the 
act of appropriation and the recognition
 of it  constitute one act of will1 as  
that in which man seeks a good at  once 
common and personal    #bah4 ,the       
condition of the family or clan1 in     
which e4g4 land is held  in common1 is  
not the negation1 but on the contrary   
the earliest  expression of the right of
 property    #bai4 ,its defect lies 7a7 
in the limited scope for free moral     
development which it allows the         
associates1 7b7 in the limited  range of
 moral relations into which it brings   

them    #bbj4 ,but the expansion of the 
clan into the state has not brought     
with it a corresponding emancipation of 
the individual4 ,is then the  existence 
of a practically propertyless class in  
modern states a  necessity1 or an abuse8
    #bba4 ,in theory1 everyone who is   
capable of living for a common good     
7whether he actually does so or not7    
ought to have the means for so  doing3  
these means are property    #bbb4 ,but  
does not this theory of property imply  
freedom of  appropriation and           
disposition1 and yet is it not just this
 freedom  which leads to the existence  
of a propertyless proletariate8    #bbc4
 ,property1 whether regarded as the     
appropriation of nature by men  of      
different powers1 or as the means       
required for the fulfilment of          
different social functions1 must be     
unequal    #bbd4 ,freedom of trade1     
another source of inequality1 follows   
necessarily from the same view of       
property3 freedom of bequest is  more   

open to doubt    #bbe4 ,it seems to     
follow from the general right of a man  
to provide  for his future1 and 7with   
certain exceptions7 to be likely to     
secure  the best distribution2 but it   
does not imply the right of entail      
#bbf4 ,returning to the question raised 
in sec4 #bbj1 observe 7a7 that          
accumulation by one man does not itself 
naturally imply deprivation  of other   
men1 but rather the contrary    #bbg4   
,nor is the prevalence of great capitals
 and hired labour in  itself the cause  
of the bad condition of so many of the  
working  classes    #bbh4 ,the cause is 
to be found1 not in the right of        
property and  accumulation1 but 7partly 
at least7 in the fact that the land has 
been originally appropriated by conquest
    #bbi4 ,hence 7a7 the present        
proletariate inherit the traditions  of 
serfdom1 and 7b7 under landowning       
governments land has been  appropriated 
unjustifiably1 i4e4 in various ways     
prejudicial to the  common interest     

#bcj4 ,and further the masses crowded   
through these causes into large  towns  
have till lately had little done to     
improve their condition    #bca4        
,whether1 if the state did its duty1 it 
would still be advisable  to limit      
bequest of land1 is a question which    
must be differently  answered according 
to circumstances    #bcb4 ,the objection
 to the appropriation by the state of   
'unearned  increment' is that it is so  
hard to distinguish between 'earned' and
  'unearned'4        ,o4 ,the right of  
the state in regard to the family4      
#bcc4 ,the rights of husband over wife  
and father over children are  7a7 like  
that of property in being rights against
 all the world1  7b7 unlike it in being 
rights over persons1 and therefore      
reciprocal    #bcd4 ,the latter         
characteristic would be expressed by    
,german writers  by saying that both the
 'subject' and the 'object' of these    
rights  are persons    #bce4 ,three     
questions about them3 7#a7 ,what makes  

man capable of family  life8 7#b7 ,how  
does it come to have rights8 7#c7 ,what 
ought the form of  those rights to be8  
#bcf4 7#a7 ,the family implies the same 
effort after permanent                  
self-satisfaction as property1 together 
with a permanent interest in  a         
particular woman and her children       
#bcg4 ,the capacity for this interest is
 essential to anything which  can be    
rightly called family life1 whatever    
lower forms of life may  historically   
have preceded it    #bch4 7#b7 ,the     
rights of family life arise from the    
mutual recognition  of this interest by 
members of the same clan 7in which the  
historical  family always appears as an 
element7    #bci4 ,its development has  
been in the direction 7a7 of giving all 
men and women the right to marry1 7b7 of
 recognising the claims of  husband and 
wife to be reciprocal4 ,both these imply
 monogamy    #bdj4 ,polygamy excludes   
many men from marriage and makes the    
wife  practically not a wife1 while it  

also prevents real reciprocity of       
rights both between husband and wife and
 between parents and children    #bda4  
,the abolition of slavery is another    
essential to the development  of the    
true family life1 in both the above     
respects    #bdb4 7#c7 ,thus the right  
7as distinct from the morality7 of      
family  life requires 7a7 monogamy1 7b7 
duration through life1 7c7              
terminability on the infidelity of      
husband or wife    #bdc4 ,why then      
should not adultery be treated as a     
crime8 ,because  7unlike other          
violations of right7 it is generally in 
the public  interest that it should be  
condoned if the injured person is       
willing  to condone it    #bdd4 ,nor    
would the higher purposes of marriage be
 served by making  infidelity penal1 for
 they depend on disposition1 not on     
outward acts  or forbearances    #bde4  
,all that the state can do1 therefore1  
is to make divorce for  adultery easy1  
and to make marriage as serious a matter

 as possible    #bdf4 7b7 ,should       
divorce be allowed except for adultery8 
,sometimes  for lunacy or cruelty1 but  
not for incompatibility1 the object of  
the  state being to make marriage a     
'consortium omnis vitae'4        ,p4    
,rights and virtues4    #bdg4 ,outline  
of remaining lectures1 on 7#a7 rights   
connected with  the functions of        
government1 7#b7 social virtues4 7,the  
antithesis of  'social' and             
'self-regarding' is false7    #bdh4     
,virtues1 being dispositions to exercise
 rights1 are best  co-ordinated with    
rights4 ,thus to the right of life      
correspond those  virtues which maintain
 life against nature1 force1 and animal 
passion    #bdi4 ,similarly there are   
active virtues1 corresponding to the    
negative obligations imposed by property
 and marriage    #bej4 ',moral          
sentiments' should be classified with   
the virtues1 of  which they are weaker  
forms    #bea4 ,although for clearness  
obligations must be treated apart  from 

moral duties1 they are really the outer 
and inner side of  one spiritual        
development1 in the joint result of     
which the idea of  perfection is        
fulfilled4    ,supplement4    ,some     
,quotations rendered into ,english4     
,,on ,,the ,,different ,,senses ,,of    
',,freedom' ,,as ,,applied ,,to ,,will  
,,and ,,to ,,the  ,,moral ,,progress    
,,of ,,man4    ,note of the ,editor1    
,the lectures from which the following  
extract is taken were delivered  in the 
beginning of #ahgi1 in continuation of  
the course in which the  discussion of  
,kant's moral theory occurred4 ,the     
portions here printed  are those which  
were not embodied1 at any rate in the   
same form1 in  the ,prolegomena to      
,ethics4 ,see ,prolegomena to ,ethics1  
,book ii4  ch4 i4 sec4 #ajj1 ,editor's  
note4    ,,on ,,the ,,different ,,senses
 ,,of ',,freedom' ,,as ,,applied ,,to   
,,will ,,and ,,to ,,the  ,,moral        
,,progress ,,of ,,man4    #a4 ,since in 
all willing a man is his own object1 the

 will is always  free4 ,or1 more        
properly1 a man in willing is           
necessarily free1  since willing        
constitutes freedom1 #a and 'free will' 
is the  pleonasm 'free freedom4' ,but   
while it is important to insist upon    
this1 it is also to be remembered that  
the nature of the freedom  really       
differs--the freedom means quite        
different things--according  to the     
nature of the object which the man makes
 his own1 or with  which he identifies  
himself4 ,it is one thing when the      
object in  which self-satisfaction is   
sought is such as to prevent that       
self-satisfaction being found1 because  
interfering with the  realisation of the
 seeker's possibilities or his progress 
towards  perfection3 it is another thing
 when it contributes to this end4 ,in   
the former case the man is a free agent 
in the act1 because through  his        
identification of himself with a certain
 desired object--through  his adoption  
of it as his good--he makes the motive  

which determines  the act1 and is       
accordingly conscious of himself as its 
author4 ,but  in another sense he is not
 free1 because the objects to which his 
actions are directed are objects in     
which1 according to the law of  his     
being1 satisfaction of himself is not to
 be found4 ,his will to  arrive at      
self-satisfaction not being adjusted to 
the law which  determines where this    
self-satisfaction is to be found1 he may
 be  considered in the condition of a   
bondsman who is carrying out the  will  
of another1 not his own4 ,from this     
bondage he emerges into real  freedom1  
not by overcoming the law of his being1 
not by getting  the better of its       
necessity1--every fancied effort to do  
so is but  a new exhibition of its      
necessity1--but by making its fulfilment
  the object of his will2 by seeking the
 satisfaction of himself in  objects in 
which he believes it should be found1   
and seeking  it in them because he      
believes it should be found in them4    

,for  the objects so sought1 however    
various otherwise1 have the common      
characteristic that1 because they are   
sought in such a spirit1 in  them       
self-satisfaction is to be found2 not   
the satisfaction of this  or that       
desire1 or of each particular desire1   
but that satisfaction1  otherwise called
 peace or blessedness1 which consists in
 the whole  man having found his object2
 which indeed we never experience in    
its fulness1 which we only approach to  
fall away from it again1 but  of which  
we know enough to be sure that we only  
fail to attain it  because we fail to   
seek it in the fulfilment of the law of 
our being1  because we have not brought 
ourselves to 'gladly do and suffer what 
we must4'    ,to the above statement    
several objections may be made4 ,they   
will  chiefly turn on two points2 7a7   
the use made of the term 'freedom'2  7b7
 the view that a man is subject to a law
 of his being1 in virtue  of which he at
 once seeks self-satisfaction1 and is   

prevented from  finding it in the       
objects which he actually desires1 and  
in which he  ordinarily seeks it4    #a 
,in that sense in which 'freedom'       
expresses a state of the soul1  as      
distinct from a civil relation4    #b4  
,as to the sense given to 'freedom1' it 
must of course be admitted  that every  
usage of the term to express anything   
but a social and  political relation of 
one man to others involves a metaphor4  
,even in  the original application its  
sense is by no means fixed4 ,it always  
implies indeed some exemption from      
compulsion by others1 but the  extent   
and conditions of this exemption1 as    
enjoyed by the 'freeman'  in different  
states of society1 are very various4 ,as
 soon as the term  'freedom' comes to be
 applied to anything else than an       
established  relation between a man and 
other men1 its sense fluctuates much    
more4  ,reflecting on their             
consciousness1 on their 'inner life'    
7i4e4 their  life as viewed from        

within71 men apply to it the terms with 
which  they are familiar as expressing  
their relations to each other4 ,in      
virtue of that power of self-distinction
 and self-objectification1  which he    
expresses whenever he says ',i1' a man  
can set over against  himself his whole 
nature or any of its elements1 and apply
 to the  relation thus established in   
thought a term borrowed from relations  
of outward life4 ,hence1 as in ,plato1  
the terms 'freedom' and  'bondage' may  
be used to express a relation between   
the man on the  one side1 as            
distinguishing himself from all impulses
 that do not  tend to his true good1 and
 those impulses on the other4 ,he is a  
'slave' when they are masters of him1   
'free' when master of them4  ,the       
metaphor in this form was made further  
use of by the ,stoics1 and  carried on  
into the doctrines of the ,christian    
,church4 ,since there is  no kind of    
impulse or interest which a man cannot  
so distinguish from  himself as to      

present it as an alien power1 of which  
the influence on  him is bondage1 the   
particular application of the metaphor  
is quite  arbitrary4 ,it may come to be 
thought that the only freedom is to be  
found in a life of absolute detachment  
from all interests2 a life  in which the
 pure ego converses solely with itself  
or with a ,god1  who is the same        
abstraction under another name4 ,this is
 a view into  which both saints and     
philosophers have been apt to fall4 ,it 
means  practically1 so far as it means  
anything1 absorption in some one        
interest with which the man identifies  
himself in exclusion of all  other      
interests1 which he sets over against   
himself as an influence  to be kept     
aloof4    ,with ,st4 ,paul the          
application of the metaphor has a       
special character  of its own4 ,with him
 'freedom' is specially freedom from the
 law1  from ordinances1 from the fear   
which these inspire1--a freedom which   
is attained through the communication of

 what he calls the 'spirit  of adoption'
 or 'son-ship4' ,the law1 merely as law 
or as an external  command1 is a source 
of bondage in a double sense4           
,presenting to man  a command which yet 
it does not give him power to obey1 it  
destroys  the freedom of the life in    
which he does what he likes without     
recognising any reason why he should not
 7the state of which ,st4  ,paul says   
',i was alive without the law once'72 it
 thus puts him in  bondage to fear1 and 
at the same time1 exciting a wish for   
obedience  to itself which other desires
 7 7 #a prevent from being              
accomplished1 it makes the man feel the 
bondage of the flesh4 ',what  ,i will1  
that ,i do not'2 there is a power1 the  
flesh1 of which ,i am  the slave1 and   
which prevents me from performing my    
will to obey the  law4 ,freedom 7also   
called 'peace1' and 'reconciliation'7   
comes when  the spirit expressed in the 
law 7for the law is itself 'spiritual'  
according to ,st4 ,paul2 the 'flesh'    

through which it is weak is mine1  not  
the law's7 becomes the principle of     
action in the man4 ,to the  man thus    
delivered1 as ,st4 ,paul conceives him1 
we might almost apply  phraseology like 
,kant's4 ',he is free because conscious 
of himself as  the author of the law    
which he obeys4' ,he is no longer a     
servant1 but  a son4 ,he is conscious of
 union with ,god1 whose will as an      
external  law he before sought in vain  
to obey1 but whose 'righteousness is    
fulfilled' in him now that he 'walks    
after the spirit4' ,what was  before 'a 
law of sin and death' is now a 'law of  
the spirit of life4'  7,see ,epistle to 
the ,romans1 viii47    #a ,greek        
7phronima sarkos7  carnal mind 7,,kjv7  
,tr    #c4 ,but though there is a point 
of connection between ,st4 ,paul's      
conception of freedom and bondage and   
that of ,kant1 which renders  the above 
phrase applicable in a certain sense to 
the 'spiritual  man' of ,st4 ,paul1 yet 
the two conceptions are very different4 

,moral  bondage with ,kant1 as with     
,plato and the ,stoics1 is bondage to   
the  flesh4 ,the heteronomy of the will 
is its submission to the impulse  of    
pleasure-seeking1 as that of which man  
is not in respect of his  reason the    
author1 but which belongs to him as a   
merely natural  being4 ,a state of      
bondage to law1 as such1 he does not    
contemplate4  ,it might even be urged   
that ,kant's 'freedom' or 'autonomy' of 
the  will1 in the only sense in which he
 supposed it attainable by man1 is  very
 much like the state described by ,st4  
,paul as that from which the            
communication of the spirit brings      
deliverance1--the state in which  ',i   
delight in the law of ,god after the    
inward man1 but find another  law in my 
members warring with the law of my      
reason and bringing  me into captivity  
to the law of sin in my members4' ,for  
,kant seems  to hold that the will is   
actually 'autonomous1' i4e4 determined  
by  pure consciousness of what should   

be1 only in rare acts of the best  man4 
,he argues rather for our being         
conscious of the possibility of  such   
determination1 as evidence of an ideal  
of what the good will  is1 than for the 
fact that anyone is actually so         
determined4 ,and  every determination of
 the will that does not proceed from    
pure  consciousness of what should be he
 ascribes to the pleasure-seeking  which
 belongs to man merely as a             
',natur-wesen1' or as ,st4 ,paul might  
say 'to the law of sin in his members4' 
,what1 it may be asked1 is  such        
'freedom1' or rather such consciousness 
of the possibility of  freedom1 worth8  
,may we not apply to it ,st4 ,paul's    
words1 ',by the law  is the knowledge of
 sin'8 ,the practical result to the     
individual of  that consciousness of the
 possibility of freedom which is all    
that  the autonomy of will1 as really   
attainable by man1 according to  ,kant's
 view1 amounts to1 is to make him aware 
of the heteronomy of  his will1 of its  

bondage to motives of which reason is   
not the author4    #d4 ,this is an      
objection which many of ,kant's         
statements of his  doctrine1 at any     
rate1 fairly challenge4 ,it was chiefly 
because he  seemed to make freedom #a an
 unrealised and unrealisable state1     
that his moral doctrine was found       
unsatisfactory by ,hegel4 ,hegel  holds 
that freedom1 as the condition in which 
the will is determined  by an object    
adequate to itself1 or by an object     
which itself as  reason constitutes1 is 
realised in the state4 ,he thinks of the
 state  in a way not familiar to        
,englishmen1 a way not unlike that in   
which  ,greek philosophers thought of   
the 1 #b as a society governed  by laws 
and institutions and established customs
 which secure the  common good of the   
members of the society--enable them to  
make the  best of themselves--and are   
recognised as doing so4 ,such a state   
is 'objective freedom'2 freedom is      
realised in it because in it  the       

reason1 the self-determining principle  
operating in man as his  will1 has found
 a perfect expression for itself 7as an 
artist may  be considered to express    
himself in a perfect work of art72 and  
the  man who is determined by the       
objects which the well-ordered state    
presents to him is determined by that   
which is the perfect expression  of his 
reason1 and is thus free4    #a ,in the 
sense of 'autonomy of rational will1' or
 determination by  an object which      
reason constitutes1 as distinct from    
determination by  an object which the   
man makes his own2 this latter          
determination ,kant  would have         
recognised as characteristic of every   
human act1 properly  so called4    #b   
,greek  7polis7  city-state ,tr4    #e4 
,there is1 no doubt1 truth in this view4
 ,i have already tried to  show #a how  
the self-distinguishing and self-seeking
 consciousness  of man1 acting in and   
upon those human wants and ties and     
affections  which in their proper human 

character have as little reality apart  
from it as it apart from them1 gives    
rise to a system of social  relations1  
with laws1 customs1 and institutions    
corresponding2 and  how in this system  
the individual's consciousness of the   
absolutely  desirable1 of something that
 should be1 of an ideal to be realised  
in his life1 finds a content or object  
which has been constituted  or brought  
into being by that consciousness itself 
as working  through generations of men2 
how interests are thus supplied to the  
man of a more concrete kind than the    
interest in fulfilment of a  universally
 binding law because universally        
binding1 but which yet  are the product 
of reason1 and in satisfying which he is
 conscious  of attaining a true good1 a 
good contributory to the perfection  of 
himself and his kind4 ,there is thus    
something in all forms of  society that 
tends to the freedom #b at least of some
 favoured  individuals1 because it tends
 to actualise in them the possibility of

  that determination by objects         
conceived as desirable in distinction   
from objects momentarily desired1 which 
is determination by reason4  #c ,to put 
it otherwise1 the effect of his social  
relations on a man  thus favoured is    
that1 whereas in all willing the        
individual seeks to  satisfy himself1   
this man seeks to satisfy himself1 not  
as one who  feels this or that desire1  
but as one who conceives1 whose nature  
demands1 a permanent good4 ,so far as it
 is thus in respect of his  rational    
nature that he makes himself an object  
to himself1 his will  is autonomous4    
,this was the good which the ideal 1 as 
conceived  by the ,greek philosophers1  
secured for the true 1 the man who1     
entering into the idea of the 1 was     
equally qualified    4 #d ,no doubt in  
the actual ,greek  there was some       
tendency in this direction1 some        
tendency to rationalise and moralise    
the citizen4 ,without the real tendency 
the ideal possibility would  not have   

suggested itself4 ,and in more primitive
 forms of society1 so  far as they were 
based on family or tribal relations1 we 
can see that  the same tendency must    
have been at work1 just as in modern    
life the  consciousness of his position 
as member or head of a family1 wherever 
it exists1 necessarily does something to
 moralise a man4 ,in modern             
,christendom1 with the extension of     
citizenship1 the security of  family    
life to all men 7so far as law and      
police can secure it71 the              
establishment in various forms of       
,christian fellowship of which the      
moralising functions grow as those of   
the magistrate diminish1 the  number of 
individuals whom society awakens to     
interests in objects  contributory to   
human perfection tends to increase4 ,so 
far the modern  state1 in that full     
sense in which ,hegel uses the term 7as 
including  all the agencies for common  
good of a law-abiding people71 does     
contribute to the realisation of        

freedom1 if by freedom we understand    
the autonomy of the will or its         
determination by rational objects1      
objects which help to satisfy the demand
 of reason1 the effort after            
self-perfection4    #a ,in a previous   
course of lectures4 ,see ,prolegomena to
 ,ethics1  ,,iii4 iii4 ,,rln    #b ,in  
the sense of 'autonomy of will4'    #c  
,this last clause is queried in the     
,,ms4 ,,rln    #d ,greek  7polis7       
city-state1  7polites7  citizen1        
7archein kai archesthai7  to rule and to
 be  ruled ,tr    #f4 ,on the other     
hand1 it would seem that we cannot      
significantly  speak of freedom except  
with reference to individual persons2   
that  only in them can freedom be       
realised2 that therefore the realisation
  of freedom in the state can only mean 
the attainment of freedom by            
individuals through influences which the
 state 7in the wide sense  spoken of7   
supplies1--'freedom' here1 as before1   
meaning not the mere  self-determination

 which renders us responsible1 but      
determination by  reason1 'autonomy of  
the will'2 and that under the best      
conditions  of any society that has ever
 been such realisation of freedom is    
most imperfect4 ,to an ,athenian slave1 
who might be used to gratify a  master's
 lust1 it would have been a mockery to  
speak of the state as  a realisation of 
freedom2 and perhaps it would not be    
much less so to  speak of it as such to 
an untaught and under-fed denizen of a  
,london  yard with gin-shops on the     
right hand and on the left4 ,what ,hegel
  says of the state in this respect     
seems as hard to square with facts  as  
what ,st4 ,paul says of the ,christian  
whom the manifestation of  ,christ has  
transferred from bondage into 'the      
glorious liberty of the  sons of ,god4' 
,in both cases the difference between   
the ideal and the  actual seems to be   
ignored1 and tendencies seem to be      
spoken of as  if they were accomplished 
facts4 ,it is noticeable that by        

uncritical  readers of ,st4 ,paul the   
account of himself as under the law 7in 
,romans vii471 with the 'law of sin in  
his members warring against  the law of 
his reason1' is taken as applicable to  
the regenerate  ,christian1 though      
evidently ,st4 ,paul meant it as a      
description of the  state from which the
 ,gospel1 the 'manifestation of the ,son
 of ,god  in the likeness of sinful     
flesh1' set him free4 ,they are driven  
to  this interpretation because1 though 
they can understand ,st4 ,paul's        
account of his deliverance as an account
 of a deliverance achieved  for them but
 not in them1 or as an assurance of what
 is to be1 they  cannot adjust it to the
 actual experience of the ,christian    
life4 ,in  the same way ,hegel's account
 of freedom as realised in the state    
does  not seem to correspond to the     
facts of society as it is1 or even  as1 
under the unalterable conditions of     
human nature1 it ever could  be2 though 
undoubtedly there is a work of moral    

liberation1 which  society1 through its 
various agencies1 is constantly carrying
 on for  the individual4    #g4         
,meanwhile it must be borne in mind that
 in all these different  views as to the
 manner and degree in which freedom is  
to be attained1  'freedom' does not mean
 that the man or will is undetermined1  
nor  yet does it mean mere              
self-determination1 which 7unless denied
  altogether1 as by those who take the  
strictly naturalistic view  of human    
action7 must be ascribed equally to the 
man whose will  is heteronomous or      
vicious1 and to him whose will is       
autonomous2  equally to the man who     
recognises the authority of law in what 
,st4  ,paul would count the condition of
 a bondman1 and to him who fulfils  the 
righteousness of the law in the spirit  
of adoption4 ,it means  a particular    
kind of self-determination2 the state of
 the man who  lives indeed for himself1 
but for the fulfilment of himself as a  
'giver of law universal' 7,kant72 who   

lives for himself1 but only  according  
to the true idea of himself1 according  
to the law of his  being1 'according to 
nature' 7the ,stoics72 who is so taken  
up into  ,god1 to whom ,god so gives the
 spirit1 that there is no constraint  in
 his obedience to the divine will 7,st4 
,paul72 whose interests1  as a loyal    
citizen1 are those of a well-ordered    
state in which  practical reason        
expresses itself 7,hegel74 ,now none of 
these modes  of self-determination is at
 all implied in 'freedom' according  to 
the primary meaning of the term1 as     
expressing that relation  between one   
man and others in which he is secured   
from compulsion4  ,all that is so       
implied is that a man should have power 
to do what  he wills or prefers4 ,no    
reference is made to the nature of the  
will  or preference1 of the object      
willed or preferred2 whereas according  
to the usage of 'freedom' in the        
doctrines we have just been             
considering1 it is not constituted by   

the mere fact of acting upon            
preference1 but depends wholly on the   
nature of the preference1 upon  the kind
 of object willed or preferred4    #h4  
,if it were ever reasonable to wish that
 the usage of words had  been other than
 it has been 7any more than that the    
processes of  nature were other than    
they are71 one might be inclined to wish
  that the term 'freedom' had been      
confined to the juristic sense of  the  
power to 'do what one wills'3 for the   
extension of its meaning  seems to have 
caused much controversy and confusion4  
,but1 after all1  this extension does   
but represent various stages of         
reflection upon  the                    
self-distinguishing1 self-seeking1      
self-asserting principle1 of  which the 
establishment of freedom1 as a relation 
between man and  man1 is the expression4
 ,the reflecting man is not content with
 the  first announcement which analysis 
makes as to the inward condition  of the
 free man1 viz4 that he can do what he  

likes1 that he has the  power of acting 
according to his will or preference4 ,in
 virtue of the  same principle which has
 led him to assert himself against      
others1  and thus to cause there to be  
such a thing as 7outward7 freedom1  he  
distinguishes himself from his          
preference1 and asks how he is  related 
to it1 whether he determines it or how  
it is determined4 ,is  he free to will1 
as he is free to act2 or1 as the act is 
determined  by the preference1 is the   
preference determined by something else8
  ,thus ,locke 7,essay1 ,,ii4 #ba7      
begins with deciding that freedom means 
power to do or forbear from doing any   
particular act upon preference1  and    
that1 since the will is merely the power
 of preference1 the  question whether   
the will is free is an unmeaning one    
7equivalent  to the question whether one
 power has another power72 that thus the
  only proper question is whether a man 
7not his will7 is free1 which  must be  
answered affirmatively so far as he has 

the power to do or  forbear1 as above4  
,but he recognises the propriety of the 
question  whether a man is free to will 
as well as to act4 ,he cannot refuse to 
carry back the analysis of what is      
involved in a man's action beyond  the  
preference of one possible action to    
another1 and to inquire  what is implied
 in the preference4 ,it is when this    
latter question  is raised1 that        
language which is appropriate enough in 
a definition  of outward or juristic    
freedom becomes misleading4 ,it having  
been  decided that the man civilly free 
has power over his actions1 to do  or   
forbear according to preference1 it is  
asked whether he has also  power to     
prefer4    #i4 ,but while it is proper  
to ask whether in any particular case a 
man has power over his actions1 because 
his nerves and limbs and  muscles may be
 acted upon by another person or a force
 which is not  he or his1 there is no   
appropriateness in asking the question  
in  regard to a preference or will1     

because this cannot be so acted on4  ,if
 so acted on1 it would not be a will or 
preference4 ,there is no  such thing as 
a will which a man is not conscious of  
as belonging to  himself1 no such thing 
as an act of will which he is not       
conscious  of as issuing from himself4  
,to ask whether he has power over it1   
or whether some other power than he     
determines it1 is like asking  whether  
he is other than himself4 ,thus the     
question whether a man1  having power to
 act according to his will1 or being    
free to act1  has also power over his   
will1 or is free to will1 has just the  
same  impropriety that ,locke points out
 in the question whether the will is    
free4 ,the latter question1 on the      
supposition that there is power to      
enact the will1--a supposition which is 
necessarily made by those who  raise the
 ulterior question whether there is     
power over the will1--is  equivalent1 as
 ,locke sees1 to a question whether     
freedom is free4  ,for a will which     

there is power of enacting constitutes  
freedom1 and  therefore to ask whether  
it is free is like asking 7to use       
,locke's  instance7 whether riches are  
rich 7'rich' being a denomination from  
the possession of riches1 just as 'free'
 is a denomination from the  possession 
of freedom1 in the sense of a will which
 there is power  to enact74 ,but if     
there is this impropriety in the        
question whether  the will is free1     
there is an equal one in the question   
which ,locke  entertains1 viz4 whether  
man is free to will1 or has power over  
his  will4 ,it amounts to asking whether
 a certain power is also a power  over  
itself3 or1 more precisely1 whether a   
man possessing a certain  power--that   
which we call freedom--has also the same
 power over that  power4    #aj4 ,it may
 be said perhaps that we are here       
pressing words too  closely2 that it is 
of course understood1 when it is asked  
whether  a man has power over his will1 
that 'power' is used in a different     

sense from that which it bears when it  
is asked whether he has power  to enact 
his will3 that 'freedom1' in like       
manner1 is understood to  express a     
different kind of power or relation when
 we ask whether a  man is free to will1 
and when we ask whether he is free to   
act4 ,but  granting that all this has   
been understood1 the misleading effects 
of the question in the form under       
consideration 7',is a man free  to will 
as well as to act8' ',has he power over 
his will8'7 remain  written in the      
history of the 'free-will controversy4' 
,it has mainly  to answer for two wrong 
ways of thinking on the subject2 7a7 for
  the way of thinking of the determining
 motive of an act of will1  the object  
willed1 as something apart from the will
 or the man  willing1 so that in being  
determined by it the man is supposed not
  to be self-determined1 but to be      
determined as one natural event by      
another1 or at best as a natural        
organism by the forces acting on it3    

7b71 for the view that the only way of  
escaping this conclusion is  to regard  
the will as independent of motives1 as a
 power of deciding  between motives     
without any motive to determine the     
decision1 which  must mean without      
reference to any object willed4 ,a man1 
having 7in  virtue of his power of      
self-distinction and                    
self-objectification7  presented his    
will to himself as something to be      
thought about1 and  being asked whether 
he has power over it1 whether he is free
 in  regard to it as he is free against 
other persons and free to use his  limbs
 and1 through them1 material things1    
this way or that1 must  very soon decide
 that he is not4 ,his will is himself4  
,his character  necessarily shows itself
 in his will4 ,we have already1 in a    
previous  lecture1 #a noticed the       
practical fallacy involved in a man's   
saying  that he cannot help being what  
he is1 as if he were controlled by      
external power2 but he being what he is1

 and the circumstances being  what they 
are at any particular conjuncture1 the  
determination of the  will is already   
given1 just as an effect is given in the
 sum of its  conditions4 ,the           
determination of the will might be      
different1 but  only through the man's  
being different1 ,but to ask whether a  
man has  power over determinations of   
his will1 or is free to will as he is to
  act1 as the question is commonly      
understood and as ,locke understood  it1
 is to ask whether1 the man being what  
at any time he is1 it  is still         
uncertain 7#a7 whether he will choose or
 forbear choosing  between certain      
possible courses of action1 and 7#b7    
supposing him to  choose one or other of
 them1 which he will choose4    #a      
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,sections #ajg1
 ff4--,,rln    #aa4 ,now we must admit  
that there is really no such            
uncertainty4  ,the appearance of it is  
due to our ignorance of the man and the 
circumstances4 ,if1 however1 because    

this is so1 we answer the  question     
whether a man has power over his will1  
or is free to  will1 in the negative1 #a
 we at once suggest the conclusion that 
something else has power over it1 viz4  
the strongest motive4 ,we  ignore the   
truth that in being determined by a     
strongest motive1  in the only sense in 
which he is really so determined1 the   
man 7as  previously explained7 #b is    
determined by himself1 by an object of  
his own making1 and we come to think of 
the will as determined like  any natural
 phenomenon by causes external to it4   
,all this is the  consequence of asking 
questions about the relation between a  
man and  his will in terms only         
appropriate to the relation between the 
man  and other men1 or to that between  
the man and his bodily members or  the  
materials on which he acts through them4
    #a ,instead of saying 7as we should7
 that it is one of those  inappropriate 
questions to which there is no answer2  
since a man's  will is himself1 and     

'freedom' and 'power' express relations 
between  a man and something other than 
himself4    #b ,see ,prolegomena to     
,ethics1 ,section #aje4--,,rln    #ab4  
,on the other side the consciousness of 
self-determination resists  this        
conclusion2 but so long as we start from
 the question whether a  man has power  
over his will1 or is free to will as    
well as to act1  it seems as if the     
objectionable conclusion could only be  
avoided by  answering this question in  
the affirmative4 ,but to say that a man 
has  power over determinations of his   
will is naturally taken to mean that  he
 can change his will while he himself   
remains the same2 that given  his       
character1 motives1 and circumstances as
 these at any time are1  there is still 
something else required for the         
determination of his  will2 that behind 
and beyond the will as determined by    
some motive  there is a will1 itself    
undetermined by any motive1 that        
determines  what the determining motive 

shall be1--that 'has power over' his    
preference or choice1 as this has over  
the motion of his bodily  members4 ,but 
an unmotived will is a will without an  
object1 which is  nothing4 ,the power or
 possibility1 beyond any actual         
determination of  the will1 of          
determining what that determination     
shall be is a mere  negation of the     
actual determination4 ,it is that       
determination as it  becomes after an   
abstraction of the motive or object     
willed1 which  in fact leaves nothing at
 all4 ,if those moral interests1 which  
are  undoubtedly involved in the        
recognition of the distinction between  
man and any natural phenomenon1 are to  
be made dependent on belief in  such a  
power or abstract possibility1 the case 
is hopeless4    #ac4 ,the right way out 
of the difficulty lies in the           
discernment  that the question whether a
 man is free to will1 or has power over 
the determinations of his will1 is a    
question to which there is no  answer1  

because it is asked in inappropriate    
terms2 in terms that  imply some agency 
beyond the will which determines what   
the will  shall be 7as the will itself  
is an agency beyond the motions of the  
muscles which determines what those     
motions shall be71 and that as  to this 
agency it may be asked whether it does  
or does not lie in  the man himself4 ,in
 truth there is no such agency beyond   
the will  and determining how the will  
shall be determined2 not in the man1    
for the will is the self-conscious man2 
not elsewhere than in the  man1 not     
outside him1 for the self-conscious man 
has no outside4 ,he  is not a body in   
space with other bodies elsewhere in    
space acting  upon it and determining   
its motions4 ,the self-conscious man is 
determined by objects1 which in order to
 be objects must already be  in         
consciousness1 and in order to be his   
objects1 the objects which  determine   
him1 must already have been made his    
own4 ,to say that they  have power over 

him or his will1 and that he or his will
 has power  over them1 is equally       
misleading4 ,such language is only      
applicable  to the relation between an  
agent and patient1 when the agent and   
the patient 7or at any rate the agent7  
can exist separately4 ,but              
self-consciousness and its object1 will 
and its object1 form a single           
individual unity4 ,without the          
constitutive action of man or his will  
the objects do not exist2 apart from    
determination by some object  neither he
 nor his will would be more than an     
unreal abstraction4    #ad4 ,if1        
however1 the question is persisted in1  
',has a man power over  the             
determinations of his will8' we must    
answer both 'yes' and 'no4'  ',no1' in  
the sense that he is not other than his 
will1 with ability  to direct it as the 
will directs the muscles4 ',yes1' in the
 sense  that nothing external to him or 
his will or self-consciousness has      
power over them4 ',no1' again1 in the   

sense that1 given the man and  his      
object as he and it at any time are1    
there is no possibility of  the will    
being determined except in one way1 for 
the will is already  determined1 being  
nothing else than the man as directed to
 some  object4 ',yes1' in the sense that
 the determining object is determined   
by the man or will just as much as the  
man or will by the object4 ,the  fact   
that the state of the man1 on which the 
nature of his object at  any time       
depends1 is a result of previous states1
 does not affect  the validity of this  
last assertion1 since 7as we have seen  
#a7  all these states are states of a   
self-consciousness from which all  alien
 determination1 all determination except
 through the medium of                  
self-consciousness1 is excluded4    #a  
,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,section #ajb4 
,,rln    #ae4 ,in the above we have not 
supposed any account to be taken of  the
 character of the objects willed in the 
application to the  will itself of the  

question 'free or not free1' which is   
properly  applied only to an action     
7motion of the bodily members7 or to a  
relation between one man and other men4 
,those who unwisely consent  to         
entertain the question whether a man is 
free to will or has  power over         
determinations of his will1 and answer  
it affirmatively  or negatively1        
consider their answer1 whether 'yes' or 
'no1' to be  equally applicable whatever
 the nature of the objects willed4 ,if  
they decide that a man is 'free to      
will1' they mean that he is so in  all  
cases of willing1 whether the object    
willed be a satisfaction of  animal     
appetite or an act of heroic            
self-sacrifice2 and conversely1  if they
 decide that he is not free to will1    
they mean that he is not  so even in    
cases when the action is done upon cool 
calculation or  upon a principle of     
duty1 as much as when it is done on     
impulse or  in passion4 ,throughout the 
controversy as to free will that has    

been  carried on among ,english         
psychologists this is the way in which  
the  question has been commonly dealt   
with4 ,the freedom1 claimed or denied   
for the will1 has been claimed or denied
 for it irrespectively of  those objects
 willed1 on the nature of which the     
goodness or badness  of the will        
depends4    #af4 ,on the other hand1    
with the ,stoics1 ,st4 ,paul1 ,kant1 and
 ,hegel1 as  we have seen1 the          
attainment of freedom 7at any rate of   
the reality  of freedom1 as distinct    
from some mere possibility of it which  
constitutes the distinctive human       
nature7 depends on the character of  the
 objects willed4 ,in all these ways of  
thinking1 however variously  the proper 
object of will is conceived1 it is only 
as directed to  this object1 and thus   
7in ,hegelian language7 corresponding to
 its  idea1 that the will is supposed to
 be free4 ,the good will is free1  not  
the bad will4 ,such a view of course    
implies some element of  identity       

between good will and bad will1 between 
will as not yet  corresponding to its   
idea and will as so corresponding4 ,st4 
,paul  indeed1 not being a systematic   
thinker and being absorbed in the  idea 
of divine grace1 is apt to speak as if  
there were nothing in  common between   
the carnal or natural man 7the will as  
in bondage to  the flesh7 and the       
spiritual man 7the will as set free72   
just as  ,plato commonly ignores the    
unity of principle in all a man's       
actions1  and represents virtuous       
actions as coming from the ,god in man1 
vicious actions from the beast4 ,kant   
and ,hegel1 however1-- though  they do  
not consider the will as it is in every 
man1 good and bad1  to be free2 though  
,kant in his later ethical writings1 and
 ,hegel  7,i think7 always1 confine the 
term ',wille' to the will as having     
attained freedom or come to correspond  
to its idea1 and apply the  term        
',willkr' to that self-determining      
principle of action which  belongs to   

every man and is in their view the mere 
possibility1 not  actuality1 of         
freedom1--yet quite recognise what has  
been above  insisted on as the common   
characteristic of all willing1 the fact 
that it is not a determination from     
without1 like the determination  of any 
natural event or agent1 but the         
realisation of an object which  the     
agent presents to himself or makes his  
own1 the determination  by an object of 
a subject which itself consciously      
determines that  object2 and they see   
that it is only for a subject free in   
this sense  7'an sich' but not 'fur     
sich1'  but not 7 #a that the  reality  
of freedom can exist4    #a ,greek      
7dynamei7  potential1  7energiea7       
actuality ,tr    #ag4 ,now the propriety
 or impropriety of the use of 'freedom' 
to  express the state of the will1 not  
as directed to any and every  object1   
but only to those to which1 according to
 the law of nature  or the will of ,god 
or its 'idea1' it should be directed1 is

 a matter  of secondary importance4     
,this usage of the term is1 at any rate1
  no more a departure from the primary  
or juristic sense than is  its          
application to the will as distinct from
 action in any sense  whatever4 ,and    
certainly the unsophisticated man1 as   
soon as the usage  of 'freedom' to      
express exemption from control by other 
men and  ability to do as he likes is   
departed from1 can much more readily    
assimilate the notion of states of the  
inner man described as bondage  to evil 
passions1 to terrors of the law1 or on  
the other hand as  freedom from sin and 
law1 freedom in the consciousness of    
union  with ,god1 or of harmony with the
 true law of one's being1 freedom  of   
true loyalty1 freedom in devotion to    
self-imposed duties1 than  he can       
assimilate the notion of freedom as     
freedom to will anything  and           
everything1 or as exemption from        
determination by motives1 or  the       
constitution by himself of the motives  

which determine his will4  ,and there is
 so far less to justify the extension of
 the usage of  the term in these latter 
ways than in the former4 ,it would seem 
indeed that there is a real community of
 meaning between 'freedom'  as          
expressing the condition of a citizen of
 a civilised state1 and  'freedom' as   
expressing the condition of a man who is
 inwardly  'master of himself4' ,that is
 to say1 the practical conception by  a 
man 7'practical' in the sense of having 
a tendency to realise  itself7 of a     
self-satisfaction to be attained in his 
becoming what  he should be1 what he has
 it in him to be1 in fulfilment of the  
law of his being1--or1 to vary the words
 but not the meaning1 in  attainment of 
the righteousness of ,god1 or in perfect
 obedience to  self-imposed law1--this  
practical conception is the outcome of  
the  same self-seeking principle which  
appears in a man's assertion of  himself
 against other men and against nature   
7'against other men1' as  claiming their

 recognition of him as being what they  
are2 'against  nature1' as able to use  
it74 ,this assertion of himself is the  
demand  for freedom1 freedom in the     
primary or juristic sense of power to   
act according to choice or preference4  
,so far as such freedom is  established 
for any man1 this assertion of himself  
is made good2  and such freedom is      
precious to him because it is an        
achievement  of the self-seeking        
principle4 ,it is a first satisfaction  
of its  claims1 which is the condition  
of all other satisfaction of them4  ,the
 consciousness of it is the first form  
of self-enjoyment1 of the  joy of the   
self-conscious spirit in itself as in   
the one object of  absolute value4      
#ah4 ,this form of self-enjoyment1      
however1 is one which consists          
essentially in the feeling by the       
subject of a possibility rather  than a 
reality1 of what it has it in itself to 
become1 not of what it  actually is4 ,to
 a captive on first winning his liberty1

 as to a child  in the early experience 
of power over his limbs and through them
 over  material things1 this feeling of 
a boundless possibility of becoming  may
 give real joy2 but gradually the sense 
of what it is not1 of the  very little  
that it amounts to1 must predominate    
over the sense of  actual good as       
attained in it4 ,thus to the grown man1 
bred to civil  liberty in a society     
which has learnt to make nature its     
instrument1  there is no self-enjoyment 
in the mere consciousness of freedom as 
exemption from external control1 no     
sense of an object in which he  can     
satisfy himself having been obtained4   
,still1 just as the demand for and      
attainment of freedom from external     
control is the expression of that same  
self-seeking principle  from which the  
quest for such an object proceeds1 so   
'freedom'  is the natural term by which 
the man describes such an object to     
himself1--describes to himself the state
 in which he shall have  realised his   

ideal of himself1 shall be at one with  
the law which  he recognises as that    
which he ought to obey1 shall have      
become all  that he has it in him to be1
 and so fulfil the law of his being  or 
'live according to nature4' ,just as the
 consciousness of an  unattainable      
ideal1 of a law recognised as having    
authority but with  which one's will    
conflicts1 of wants and impulses which  
interfere  with the fulfilment of one's 
possibilities1 is a consciousness of    
impeded energy1 a consciousness of      
oneself as for ever thwarted and  held  
back1 so the forecast of deliverance    
from these conditions is  as naturally  
said to be a forecast of 'freedom' as of
 peace' or  'blessedness4' ,nor is it   
merely to a select few1 and as an       
expression  for a deliverance really 7as
 it would seem7 unattainable under  the 
conditions of any life that we know1 but
 regarded by saints  as secured for them
 in another world1 and by philosophers  
as the  completion of a process which is

 eternally complete in ,god1 that       
'freedom' commends itself4 ,to any      
popular audience interested in any  work
 of self-improvement 7e4g4 to a         
temperance-meeting seeking to  break the
 bondage to liquor71 it is as an effort 
to attain freedom  that such work can be
 most effectively presented4 ,it is easy
 to tell  such people that the term is  
being misapplied2 that they are quite   
'free' as it is1 because every one can  
do as he likes so long as he  does not  
prevent another from doing so2 that in  
any sense in which  there is such a     
thing as 'free will1' to get drunk is as
 much an  act of free will as anything  
else4 ,still the feeling of oppression1 
which always goes along with the        
consciousness of unfulfilled            
possibilities1 will always give meaning 
to the representation of the  effort    
after any kind of self-improvement as a 
demand for 'freedom4'    #ai4 ,the      
variation in the meaning of 'freedom'   
having been thus  recognised and        

accounted for1 we come back to the more 
essential  question as to the truth of  
the view which underlies all theories   
implying that freedom is in some sense  
the goal of moral endeavour2  the view1 
namely1 that there is some will in a man
 with which many  or most of his        
voluntary actions do not accord1 a      
higher self that  is not satisfied by   
the objects which yet he deliberately   
pursues4  ,some such notion is common to
 those different theories about freedom 
which in the rough we have ascribed     
severally to the ,stoics1 ,st4  ,paul1  
,kant1 and ,hegel4 ,it is the same      
notion which was previously #a  put in  
the form1 'that a man is subject to a   
law of his being1 in  virtue of which he
 at once seeks self-satisfaction1 and is
 prevented  from finding it in the      
objects which he actually desires1 and  
in  which he ordinarily seeks it4'      
',what can this mean8' it maybe asked4  
',of course we know that there are weak 
people who never succeed  in getting    

what they want1 either in the sense that
 they have not  ability answering to    
their will1 or that they are always     
wishing  for something which yet they do
 not will4 ,but it would not be very    
appropriate to apply the above formula  
to such people1 for the man's  will to  
attain certain objects cannot be        
ascribed to the same law  of his being  
as the lack of ability to attain them1  
nor his wish  for certain objects to the
 same law of his being as those stronger
  desires which determine his will in a 
contrary direction4 ,at any  rate1 if   
the proposition is remotely applicable  
to the man who is  at once selfish and  
unsuccessful1 how can it be true in any 
sense  either of the man who is at once 
selfish and succeeds1 who gets what  he 
wants 7as is unquestionably the case    
with many people who live for  what a   
priori moralists count unworthy         
objects71 or of the man who  'never     
thinks about himself at all'8 ,so far as
 the proposition means  anything1 it    

would seem to represent ,kant's notion1 
long ago found  unthinkable and         
impossible1 the notion of there being   
two wills or  selves in a man1 the      
'pure' will or ego and the 'empirical'  
will or  ego1 the pure will being       
independent of a man's actual desires   
and  directed to the fulfilment of a    
universal law of which it is itself  the
 giver1 the empirical will being        
determined by the strongest  desire and 
directed to this or that pleasure4 ,in  
this proposition the  'objects which the
 man actually desires and in which he   
ordinarily  seeks satisfaction' are     
presumably objects of what ,kant called 
the  'empirical will1' while the 'law of
 his being' corresponds to ,kant's      
'pure ego4' ,but just as ,kant must be  
supposed to have believed in  some      
identity between the pure and empirical 
will1 as implied in the  one term       
'will1' though he does not explain in   
what this identity  consists1 so the    
proposition before us apparently        

ascribes man's  quest for               
self-satisfaction as directed to certain
 objects1 to the  same law of his being 
which prevents it from finding it there4
 ,is not  this nonsense8'    #a ,above1 
section #a ,,rln    #bj4 ,to such       
questions we answer as follows4 ,the    
proposition before  us1 like all the    
theories of moral freedom which we have 
noticed1  undoubtedly implies that the  
will of every man is a form of one      
consciously self-realising principle1   
which at the same time is  not truly or 
fully expressed in any man's will4 ,as a
 form of this  self-realising principle 
it may be called1 if we like1 a 'pure   
ego'  or 'the pure ego' of the          
particular person2 as directed to this  
or that object in such a way that it    
does not truly express the              
self-realising principle of which it is 
a form1 it may be called the  'empirical
 ego' of that person4 ,but if we use    
such language1 it must  be borne in mind
 that the pure and empirical egos are   

still not two  egos but one ego2 the    
pure ego being the self-realising       
principle  considered with reference    
either to its idea1 its possibility1    
what  it has in itself to become1 the   
law of its being1 or to some ultimate   
actualisation of this possibility2 the  
empirical ego being the same  principle 
as it appears in this or that state of  
character1 which  results from its      
action1 but does not represent that     
which it has  in itself to become1 does 
not correspond to its idea or the law of
  its being4 ,by a consciously          
self-realising principle is meant a     
principle that is determined to action  
by the conception of its own            
perfection1 or by the idea of giving    
reality to possibilities which  are     
involved in it and of which it is       
conscious as so involved2 or1  more     
precisely1 a principle which at each    
stage of its existence is  conscious of 
a more perfect form of existence as     
possible for itself1  and is moved to   

action by that consciousness4 ,we must  
now explain a  little more fully how we 
understand the relation of the principle
  in question to what we call our wills 
and our reason1--the will  and reason of
 this man and that1--and how we suppose 
its action to  constitute the progress  
of morality4    #ba4 ,by 'practical     
reason' we mean a consciousness of a    
possibility of  perfection to be        
realised in and by the subject of the   
consciousness4  ,by 'will' we mean the  
effort of a self-conscious subject to   
satisfy  itself4 ,in ,god1 so far as we 
can ascribe reason and will to ,him1 we 
must suppose them to be absolutely      
united4 ,in ,him there can be no        
distinction between possibility and     
realisation1 between the idea  of       
perfection and the activity determined  
by it4 ,but in men the  self-realising  
principle1 which is the manifestation of
 ,god in the  world of becoming1 in the 
form which it takes as will at best only
  tends to reconciliation with itself in

 the form which it takes as  reason4    
,self-satisfaction1 the pursuit of which
 is will1 is sought  elsewhere than in  
the realisation of that consciousness of
 possible  perfection1 which is reason4 
,in this sense the object of will does  
not coincide with the object of reason4 
,on the other hand1 just  because it is 
self-satisfaction that is sought in all 
willing1 and  because by a              
self-conscious and self-realising       
subject it is only  in the attainment of
 its own perfection that such           
satisfaction can  be found1 the object  
of will is intrinsically or potentially1
 and  tends to become actually1 the same
 as that of reason4 ,it is this  that we
 express by saying that man is subject  
to a law of his being  which prevents   
him from finding satisfaction in the    
objects in  which under the pressure of 
his desires it is his natural impulse   
to seek it4 ,this 'natural impulse' 7not
 strictly 'natural'7 is  itself the     
result of the operation of the          

self-realising principle  upon what     
would otherwise be an animal system1 and
 is modified1 no  doubt1 with endless   
complexity in the case of any individual
 by the  result of such operation       
through the ages of human history4 ,but 
though the natural impulses of the will 
are thus the work of the  self-realising
 principle in us1 it is not in their    
gratification that  this principle can  
find the satisfaction which is only to  
be found  in the consciousness of       
becoming perfect1 of realising what it  
has  it in itself to be4 ,in order to   
any approach to this satisfaction  of   
itself the self-realising principle must
 carry its work farther4  ,it must      
overcome the 'natural impulses1' not in 
the sense of either  extinguishing them 
or denying them an object1 but in the   
sense of  fusing them with those higher 
interests1 which have human perfection  
in some of its forms for their object4  
,some approach to this fusion  we may   
notice in all good men2 not merely in   

those in whom all  natural passions1    
love1 anger1 pride1 ambition1 are       
enlisted in the  service of some great  
public cause1 but in those with whom    
such  passions are all governed by some 
such commonplace idea as that of        
educating a family4    #bb4 ,so far as  
this state is reached1 the man may be   
said to be  reconciled to 'the law of   
his being' which 7as was said above7    
prevents him from finding satisfaction  
in the objects in which he  ordinarily  
seeks it1 or anywhere but in the        
realisation in himself of  an idea of   
perfection4 ,since the law is1 in fact1 
the action of that  self-realising      
subject which is his self1 and which    
exists in ,god as  eternally            
self-realised1 he may be said in this   
reconciliation to be  at peace at once  
with himself and with ,god4    ,again1  
he is 'free1' 7#a7 in the sense that he 
is the author of the  law which he obeys
 7for this law is the expression of that
 which  is his self71 and that he obeys 

it because conscious of himself  as its 
author2 in other words1 obeys it from   
that impulse after  self-perfection     
which is the source of the law or rather
 constitutes  it4 ,he is 'free' 7#b7 in 
the sense that he not merely 'delights  
in  the law after the inward man' 7to   
use ,st4 ,paul's phrase71 while his     
natural impulses are at once thwarted by
 it and thwart him in his  effort to    
conform to it1 but that these very      
impulses have been drawn  into its      
service1 so that he is in bondage       
neither to it nor to the  flesh4        
,from the same point of view we may say 
that his will is 'autonomous1'  conforms
 to the law which the will itself       
constitutes1 because the  law 7which    
prevents him from finding satisfaction  
anywhere but in  the realisation in     
himself of an idea of perfection7       
represents the  action in him of that   
self-realising principle of which his   
will  is itself a form4 ,there is an    
appearance of equivocation1 however1  in

 this way of speaking1 because the      
'will' which is liable not to  be       
autonomous1 and which we suppose        
gradually to approach autonomy  in the  
sense of conforming to the law above    
described1 is not  this self-realising  
principle in the form in which this     
principle  involves or gives the law4   
,on the contrary1 it is the             
self-realising  principle as            
constituting that effort after          
self-satisfaction  in each of us which  
is liable to be and commonly is directed
 to  objects which are not contributory 
to the realisation of the idea of       
perfection1--objects which the          
self-realising principle accordingly1   
in the fulfilment of its work1 has to   
set aside4 ,the equivocation  is pointed
 out by saying1 that the good will is   
'autonomous' in the  sense of conforming
 to a law which the will itself1 as     
reason1  constitutes2 which is1 in fact1
 a condensed way of saying1 that the    
good will is the will of which the      

object coincides with that of  practical
 reason2 that will has its source in the
 same self-realising  principle which   
yields that consciousness of a possible 
self-perfection which we call reason1   
and that it can only correspond  to its 
idea1 or become what it has the         
possibility of becoming1 in  being      
directed to the realisation of that     
consciousness4    #bc4 ,according to the
 view here taken1 then1 reason and will1
 even  as they exist in men1 are one in 
the sense that they are alike           
expressions of one self-realising       
principle4 ,in ,god1 or rather in  the  
ideal human person as he really exists  
in ,god1 they are actually  one2 i4e4   
self-satisfaction is for ever sought and
 found in the  realisation of a         
completely articulated or thoroughly    
filled idea  of the perfection of the   
human person4 ,in the historical man--in
  the men that have been and are coming 
to be--they tend to unite4  ,in the     
experience of mankind1 and again in the 

experience of the  individual as        
determined by the experience of mankind1
 both the idea  of a possible perfection
 of man1 the idea of which reason is the
  faculty1 and the impulse after        
self-satisfaction which belongs to  the 
will1 undergo modifications which render
 their reconciliation  in the individual
 7and it is only in individuals that    
they can  be reconciled1 because it is  
only in them that they exist7 more      
attainable4 ,these modifications may be 
stated summarily as 7#a7 an  increasing 
concreteness in the idea of human       
perfection2 its gradual  development    
from the vague inarticulate feeling that
 there is such a  thing into a          
conception of a complex organisation of 
life1 with laws  and institutions1 with 
relationships1 courtesies1 and          
charities1 with  arts and graces through
 which the perfection is to be attained2
 and  7#b7 a corresponding discipline1  
through inheritance and education1 of   
those impulses which may be called      

'natural' in the sense of being         
independent of any conscious direction  
to the fulfilment of an idea  of        
perfection4 ,such discipline does not   
amount to the reconciliation  of will   
and reason2 it is not even1 properly    
speaking1 the beginning  of it2 for the 
reconciliation only begins with the     
direction of the  impulse after         
self-satisfaction to the realisation of 
an idea of  what should be1 as such     
7because it should be72 and no          
discipline  through inheritance or      
education1 just because it is only      
impulses  that are natural 7in the sense
 defined7 which it can affect1 can      
bring about this direction1 which1 in   
theological language1 must  be not of   
nature1 but of grace4 ,on the contrary1 
the most refined  impulses may be       
selfishly indulged2 i4e4 their          
gratification may  be made an object in 
place of that object which consists in  
the  realisation of the idea of         
perfection4 ,but unless a discipline and

  refinement of the natural impulses1   
through the operation of social         
institutions and arts1 went on pari     
passu with the expression of  the idea  
of perfection in such institutions and  
arts1 the direction  of the impulses of 
the individual by this idea1 when in    
some form or  other it has been         
consciously awakened in him1 would be   
practically  impossible4 ,the moral     
progress of mankind has no reality      
except as  resulting in the formation of
 more perfect individual characters2    
but on the other hand every progress    
towards perfection on the  part of the  
individual character presupposes some   
embodiment or  expression of itself by  
the self-realising principle in what may
 be  called 7to speak most generally7   
the organisation of life4 ,it is  in    
turn1 however1 only through the action  
of individuals that this  organisation  
of life is achieved4    #bd4 ,thus the  
process of reconciliation between will  
and reason1--the  process through which 

each alike comes actually to be or to do
 what  it is and does in possibility1 or
 according to its idea1 or according  to
 the law of its being1--so far as it    
comes within our experience  may be     
described as follows4 ,a certain action 
of the self-realising  principle1 of    
which individuals susceptible in various
 forms to the  desire to better         
themselves have been the media1 has     
resulted in  conventional morality2 in a
 system of recognised rules 7whether in 
the shape of law or custom7 as to what  
the good of society requires1  which no 
people seem to be wholly without4 ,the  
moral progress of  the individual1 born 
and bred under such a system of         
conventional  morality1 consists 7#a7 in
 the adjustment of the self-seeking     
principle in him to the requirements of 
conventional morality1 so  that the     
modes in which he seeks                 
self-satisfaction are regulated  by the 
sense of what is expected of him4 ,this 
adjustment 7which it  is the business of

 education to effect7 is so far a       
determination  of the will as in the    
individual by objects which the         
universal or  national human will1 of   
which the will of the individual is a   
partial  expression1 has brought into   
existence1 and is thus a determination  
of the will by itself4 ,it consists 7#b7
 in a process of reflection1  by which  
this feeling in the individual of what  
is expected of  him becomes a conception
 7under whatever name7 of something that
  universally should be1 of something   
absolutely desirable1 of a single  end  
or object of life4 ,the content of this 
conception may be no more  than what was
 already involved in the individual's   
feeling of what is  expected of him2    
that is to say1 if called upon to state 
in detail  what it is that has to be    
done for the attainment of the absolute 
moral end or in obedience to the law of 
what universally should  be1 he might   
only be able to specify conduct which1  
apart from any  such explicit           

conception1 he felt was expected of him4
 ,for all that  there is a great        
difference between feeling that a       
certain line of  conduct is expected of 
me and conceiving it as a form of a     
universal  duty4 ,so long as the        
requirements of established morality are
 felt  in the former way1 they present  
themselves to the man as imposed  from  
without4 ,hence1 though they are an     
expression of practical  reason1 as     
operating in previous generations of    
men1 yet1 unless the  individual        
conceives them as relative to an        
absolute end common to  him with all    
men1 they become antagonistic to the    
practical reason  which operates in him1
 and which in him is the source at once 
of the  demand for self-satisfaction and
 of the effort to find himself in1  to  
carry his own unity into1 all things    
presented to him4 ,unless the  actions  
required of him by 'the divine law1 the 
civil law1 and the  law of opinion or   
reputation' 7to use ,locke's            

classification7 tend to  realise his own
 idea of what should be or is good on   
the whole1 they  do not form an object  
which1 as contemplated1 he can harmonise
 with  the other objects which he seeks 
to understand1 nor1 as a practical      
object1 do they form one in the         
attainment of which he can satisfy      
himself4 ,hence before the completion of
 the process through which  the         
individual comes to conceive the        
performance of the actions  expected of 
him under the general form of a duty    
which in the freedom  of his own reason 
he recognises as binding1 there is apt  
to occur a  revolt against conventional 
morality4 ,the issue of this may either 
be an apparent suspension of the moral  
growth of the individual1  or a clearer 
apprehension of the spirit underlying   
the letter of  the obligations laid on  
him by society1 which makes his rational
  recognition of duty1 when arrived at1 
a much more valuable influence  in      
promoting the moral growth of society4  

#be4 ,process 7#b71 which may be called 
a reconciliation of reason with  itself1
 because it is the appropriation by     
reason as a personal  principle in the  
individual of the work which reason1    
acting through  the media of other      
persons1 has already achieved in the    
establishment  of conventional morality1
 is the condition of the third stage in 
which the moral progress of the         
individual consists2 viz4 the growth  of
 a personal interest in the realisation 
of an idea of what should  be1 in doing 
what is believed to contribute to the   
absolutely  desirable1 or to human      
perfection1 because it is believed to do
 so4  ,just so far as this interest is  
formed1 the reconciliation of the two   
modes in which the practical reason     
operates in the individual is  effected4
 ,the demand for self-satisfaction      
7practical reason as the  will of the   
individual7 is directed to the          
realisation of an ideal  object1 the    
conceived 'should be1' which practical  

reason as our  reason constitutes4 ,the 
'autonomy of the will' is thus attained 
in  a higher sense than it is in the    
'adjustment' described under 7#a71      
because the objects to which it is      
directed are not merely determined  by  
customs and institutions which are due  
to the operation of  practical reason in
 previous ages1 but are embodiments or  
expressions  of the conception of what  
absolutely should be as formed by the   
man  who seeks to satisfy himself in    
their realisation4 ,indeed1 unless in   
the stage of conformity to conventional 
morality the principle of  obedience is 
some feeling 7though not a clear        
conception7 of what  should be1 of the  
desirable as distinct from the          
desired1--if it is  merely fear of pain 
or hope of pleasure1--there is no       
approach to  autonomy of the will or    
moral freedom in the conformity4 ,we    
must not  allow the doctrine that such  
freedom consists in a determination  of 
the will by reason1 and the recognition 

of the truth that the  requirements of  
conventional morality are a product of  
reason as  operating in individuals of  
the past1 to mislead us into supposing  
that there is any moral freedom1 or     
anything of intrinsic value1  in the    
life of conventional morality as        
governed by 'interested  motives1' by   
the desire1 directly or indirectly1 to  
obtain pleasure4  ,there can be no real 
determination of the will by reason     
unless both  reason and will are        
operating in one and the same person4 ,a
 will  is not really anything except as 
the will of a person1 and1 as we  have  
seen1 a will is not really determinable 
by anything foreign  to itself3 it is   
only determinable by an object which the
 person  willing makes his own4 ,as     
little is reason really anything apart  
from  a self-conscious subject1 or as   
other than an idea of perfection  to be 
realised in and by such a subject4 ,the 
determination of will  by reason1 then1 
which constitutes moral freedom or      

autonomy1 must  mean its determination  
by an object which a person willing1 in 
virtue of his reason1 presents to       
himself1 that object consisting in  the 
realisation of an idea of perfection in 
and by himself4 ,kant's  view that the  
action which is merely 'pflichtmssig1'  
not done 'aus  ,pflicht1' #a is of no   
moral value in itself1 whatever may be  
its  possible value as a means to the   
production of the will which does  act  
'aus ,pflicht1' is once for all true1   
though he may have taken  too narrow a  
view of the conditions of actions done  
'aus ,pflicht1'  especially in supposing
 7as he seems to do7 that it is         
necessary  to them to be done painfully4
 ,there is no determination of will by  
reason1 no moral freedom1 in conformity 
of action to rules of which  the        
establishment is due to the operation of
 reason or the idea of  perfection in   
men1 unless the principle of conformity 
in the persons  conforming is that idea 
itself in some form or other4    #a     

,german aus ,pflicht  from duty1        
pflichtmssig  consistent with           
duty--,tr4    ,,lectures ,,on ,,the     
,,principles ,,of ,,political           
,,obligation4    ,note of the ,editor4  
,these lectures1 which are partly       
critical and partly expository1  treat  
of the moral grounds upon which the     
state is based and upon  which obedience
 to the law of the state is justified4  
,they were  delivered in #ahgi-hj1      
following upon the course from which the
  discussion of ,kant's moral theory in 
this volume is taken4 ,the two  courses 
are directly connected1 civil           
institutions being throughout  regarded 
as the external expression of the moral 
progress of mankind1  and as supplying  
the material through which the idea of  
perfection  must be realised4    ,as is 
implied in section #e1 the inquiry into 
the nature of political  obligation     
forms part of a wider inquiry into the  
concrete forms  of morality in general1 
'the detail of goodness4' ,the lecturer 

had intended to complete the course by a
 consideration of 'social  virtues' and 
'moral sentiments'2 but this intention  
was not carried  out4 7,see section     
#bea47    ,,lectures ,,on ,,the         
,,principles ,,of ,,political           
,,obligation4        ,a4 ,,the ,,grounds
 ,,of ,,political ,,obligation4    #a4  
,the subject of this course of lectures 
is the principles of  political         
obligation2 and that term is intended to
 include the  obligation of the subject 
towards the sovereign1 the obligation of
  the citizen towards the state1 and the
 obligation of individuals  to each     
other as enforced by a political        
superior4 ,my purpose is  to consider   
the moral function or object served by  
law1 or by the  system1 of rights and   
obligations which the state enforces1   
and in so  doing to discover the true   
ground or justification for obedience to
  law4 ,my plan will be 7#a7 to state in
 outline what ,i consider the true      
function of law to be1 this being at the

 same time the true ground of  our moral
 duty to obey the law2 and throughout ,i
 distinguish moral  duty from legal     
obligation2 7#b7 to examine the chief   
doctrines of  political obligation that 
have been current in modern ,europe1 and
 by  criticising them to bring out more 
clearly the main points of a truer      
doctrine2 7#c7 to consider in detail the
 chief rights and obligations  enforced 
in civilised states1 inquiring what is  
their justification1  and what is the   
ground for respecting them on the       
principle stated4    #b4 ,in previous   
lectures ,i have explained what ,i      
understand moral  goodness to be1 and   
how it is possible that there should be 
such  a thing2 in other words1 what are 
the conditions on the part of  reason   
and will which are implied in our being 
able to conceive  moral goodness as an  
object to be aimed at1 and to give some 
partial  reality to the conception4 ,our
 results on this question may be        
briefly stated as follows4    ,the      

highest moral goodness we found was an  
attribute of character1  in so far as it
 issued in acts done for the sake of    
their goodness1  not for the sake of any
 pleasure or any satisfaction of desire 
which they bring to the agent4 ,but it  
is impossible that an action  should be 
done for the sake of its goodness1      
unless it has been  previously          
contemplated as good for some other     
reason than that which  consists in its 
being done for the sake of its goodness4
 ,it must  have been done1 or conceived 
as possible to be done1 and have been   
accounted good1 irrespectively of the   
being done from this which we           
ultimately come to regard as the highest
 motive4 ,in other words1 a  prior      
morality1 founded upon interests which  
are other than the pure  interest in    
being good1 and governed by rules of    
conduct relative to  a standard of      
goodness other than that which makes it 
depend on this  interest1 is the        
condition of there coming to be a       

character governed  by interest in an   
ideal of goodness4 ,otherwise this ideal
 would be an  empty one2 it would be    
impossible to say what the good actions 
were1  that were to be done for the sake
 of their goodness2 and the interest  in
 this ideal would be impossible1 since  
it would be an interest  without an     
object4    #c4 ,when1 however1 morality 
of the latter kind has come to be       
recognised as the highest or the only   
true morality1 the prior  morality needs
 to be criticised from the point of view
 thus gained4  ,those interests1 other  
than the interest in being good1 which  
form  the motives on the part of the    
individual on which it rests1 will  not 
indeed be rejected as of no moral value2
 for no one can suppose  that without   
them1 or except as regulating them1 the 
pure interest  in being good could      
determine conduct at all4 ,but they will
 be  estimated according to their value 
as leading up to1 or as capable  of     
becoming elements in1 a character in    

which this interest is the  governing   
principle4 ,again1 those rules of       
conduct1 according to  which the terms  
right and wrong1 good and bad1 are      
commonly applied1  and which1 as was    
just now said1 are relative to a        
standard certainly  not founded on the  
conception of the good as consisting in 
the  character described1 are not indeed
 to be rejected2 for without  them there
 would be nothing to define the duties  
which the highest  character is prepared
 to do for their own sake4 ,but they    
have to be  revised according to a      
method which inquires into their        
rationale  or justification1 as         
conditions of approximation to the      
highest  character4    #d4 ,such a      
criticism of moral interests--of the    
general motives  which determine moral  
conduct and regulate such moral         
approbation  or disapprobation as is not
 based on a strict theory of moral      
good--may be called by the name of 'a   
theory of moral sentiments4'  ,the      

criticism of recognised rules of conduct
 will fall under two  heads1 according  
as these rules are embodied in positive 
law 7law of  which the observance is    
enforced on the individual by a         
political  superior71 or only form part 
of the 'law of opinion' 7part of what   
the individual feels to be expected of  
him by some person or persons  to whose 
expectations he ought to conform74      
#e4 ,moral interests are so greatly     
dependent on generally recognised  rules
 of conduct that the criticism of the   
latter should come  first4 ,the law of  
opinion1 again1 in so many ways         
presupposes a  social fabric supported  
by 'positive' law1 that we can only     
fairly  take account of it when we have 
considered the moral value and          
justifiability of the fabric so         
supported4 ,i propose therefore to      
begin our inquiry into the detail of    
goodness--into the particular  kinds of 
conduct which the man wishing to do good
 for the sake  of its goodness is       

entitled to count good--by considering  
what  is of permanent moral value in the
 institutions of civil life1  as        
established in ,europe2 in what way they
 have contributed and  contribute to the
 possibility of morality in the higher  
sense of  the term1 and are justified1  
or have a moral claim upon our loyal    
conformity1 in consequence4    #f4 ,the 
condition of a moral life is the        
possession of will and  reason4 ,will is
 the capacity in a man of being         
determined to action  by the idea of a  
possible satisfaction of himself4 ,an   
act of  will is an action so determined4
 ,a state of will is the capacity  as   
determined by the particular objects in 
which the man seeks  self-satisfaction2 
and it becomes a character in so far as 
the  self-satisfaction is habitually    
sought in objects of a particular  kind4
 ,practical reason is the capacity in a 
man of conceiving the  perfection of his
 nature as an object to be attained by  
action4  ,all moral ideas have their    

origin in reason1 i4e4 in the idea of a 
possible self-perfection to be attained 
by the moral agent4 ,this  does not mean
 that the moral agent in every stage of 
his progress  could state this idea to  
himself in an abstract form1 any more   
than in every stage in the acquisition  
of knowledge about nature a  man can    
state to himself in an abstract form the
 conception of the  unity of nature1    
which yet throughout conditions the     
acquisition of  his knowledge4 ,ideas do
 not first come into existence1 or begin
 to  operate1 upon the formation of an  
abstract expression for them4 ,this     
expression is only arrived at upon      
analysis of a concrete experience1      
which they have rendered possible4 ,thus
 we only learn to express the  idea of  
self-perfection in that abstract form   
upon an analysis of an  experience of   
self-improvement which we have ourselves
 gone through1  and which must have been
 gone through by those with whom we are 
connected by the possession of language 

and an organisation of life1  however   
elementary3 but the same analysis shows 
that the same idea  must have been at   
work to make such experience possible4  
,in this idea  all particular moral     
ideas--all ideas of particular forms of 
conduct  as estimable--originate1 though
 an abstract expression for the latter  
is arrived at much sooner than such an  
expression for the idea in  which they  
originate4 ,they arise1 as the          
individual's conception of  the society 
on the well-being of which his own      
depends1 and of the  constituents of    
that well-being1 becomes wider and      
fuller2 and they  are embodied in the   
laws1 institutions1 and social          
expectation1 which  make conventional   
morality4 ,this embodiment1 again1      
constitutes the  moral progress of      
mankind4 ,this progress1 however1 is    
only a moral  progress in so far as it  
tends to bring about the harmony of will
 and  reason1 in the only form in which 
it can really exist1 viz4 in the        

characters of persons4 ,and this result 
is actually achieved1 in so  far as upon
 habits disciplined by conformity to    
conventional morality  there supervenes 
an intelligent interest in some of the  
objects  contributory to human          
perfection1 which that conventional     
morality  subserves1 and in so far as   
that interest becomes the dominant      
interest of the character4    #g4 ,the  
value then of the institutions of civil 
life lies in their  operation as giving 
reality to these capacities of will and 
reason1  and enabling them to be really 
exercised4 ,in their general effect1    
apart from particular aberrations1 they 
render it possible for a  man to be     
freely determined by the idea of a      
possible satisfaction  of himself1      
instead of being driven this way and    
that by external  forces1 and thus they 
give reality to the capacity called     
will3  and they enable him to realise   
his reason1 i4e4 his idea of            
self-perfection1 by acting as a member  

of a social organisation in  which each 
contributes to the better-being of all  
the rest4 ,so far  as they do in fact   
thus operate they are morally justified1
 and may  be said to correspond to the  
'law of nature1' the jus naturae1       
according to the only sense in which    
that phrase can be intelligibly  used4  
#h4 ,there has been much controversy as 
to what the jus naturae  7',naturrecht'7
 really is1 or whether there is such a  
thing at all4  ,and the controversy1    
when it comes to be dealt with in       
,english1 is  further embarrassed by the
 fact that we have no one term to       
represent  the full meaning of 'jus' or 
',recht1' as a system of correlative    
rights and obligations1 actually        
enforced or that should be enforced  by 
law4 ,but the essential questions are3  
7#a7 whether we are entitled  to        
distinguish the rights and obligations  
which are anywhere actually  enforced by
 law from rights and obligations which  
really exist though  not enforced2 and  

7#b71 if we are entitled to do so1 what 
is to be  our criterion of rights and   
obligations which are really valid1 in  
distinction from those that are actually
 enforced4    #i4 ,no one would         
seriously maintain that the system of   
rights and  obligations1 as it is       
anywhere enforced by law1--the 'jus' or 
',recht'  of any nation--is all that it 
ought to be4 ,even ,hobbes holds that  a
 law1 though it cannot be unjust1 may be
 pernicious4 ,but there  has been much  
objection to the admission of natural   
rights and  obligations4 ,at any rate   
the phrase is liable to                 
misinterpretation4  ,it may be taken to 
imply that rights and obligations can   
exist in a  'state of nature'--a state  
in which every individual is free to do 
as  he likes--2 that legal rights and   
obligations derive their authority  from
 a voluntary act by which individuals   
contracted themselves  out of this      
state2 and that the individual retains  
from the state  of nature certain rights

 with which no legal obligations ought  
to  conflict4 ,such a doctrine is       
generally admitted to be untenable2 but 
it does not follow from this that there 
is not a true and important  sense in   
which natural rights and obligations    
exist1--the same sense  as that in which
 duties may be said to exist though     
unfulfilled4  ,there is a system of     
rights and obligations which should be  
maintained by law1 whether it is so or  
not1 and which may properly be  called  
'natural'2 not in the sense in which the
 term 'natural' would  imply that such a
 system ever did exist or could exist   
independently  of force exercised by    
society over individuals1 but 'natural' 
because  necessary to the end which it  
is the vocation of human society to     
realise4    #aj4 ,the 'jus naturae1'    
thus understood1 is at once             
distinguished from  the sphere of moral 
duty1 and relative to it4 ,it is        
distinguished  from it because admitting
 of enforcement by law4 ,moral duties do

 not  admit of being so enforced4 ,the  
question sometimes put1 whether moral   
duties should be enforced by law1 is    
really an unmeaning one2 for  they      
simply cannot be enforced4 ,they are    
duties to act1 it is true1  and an act  
can be enforced3 but they are duties to 
act from certain  dispositions and with 
certain motives1 and these cannot be    
enforced4  ,nay1 the enforcement of an  
outward act1 the moral character of     
which  depends on a certain motive and  
disposition1 may often contribute to    
render that motive and disposition      
impossible3 and from this fact  arises a
 limitation to the proper province of   
law in enforcing acts1  which will have 
to be further considered below4 ,when   
obligations  then are spoken of in this 
connection1 as part of the 'jus naturae'
  correlative to rights1 they must      
always be understood not as moral       
duties1 not as relative to states of    
will1 but as relative to  outward acts1 
of which the performance or omission can

 and should  be enforced4 ,there is a   
moral duty to discharge such            
obligations1  and to do so in a certain 
spirit1 but the obligation is such as   
that  with which law has to do or may   
have to do1 is relative to an outward   
act merely1 and does not amount to a    
moral duty4 ,there is a moral  duty in  
regard to obligations1 but there can be 
no obligation in  regard to moral       
duties4 ,thus the 'jus naturae'--the    
system of rights  and obligations1 as it
 should become no less than as it       
actually is  maintained--is distinct    
from morality in the proper sense4 ,but 
it is  relative to it4 ,this is implied 
in saying that there is a moral duty  in
 regard to actual obligations1 as well  
as in speaking of the system  of rights 
and obligations as it should become4 ,if
 such language is  justifiable1 there   
must be a moral ground both for         
conforming to1 and  for seeking to      
develope and improve1 established       
',recht'2 a moral  ground which can only

 lie in the moral end served by that    
established  system4    #aa4 ,thus we   
begin the ethical criticism of law with 
two  principles3--7#a7 that nothing but 
external acts can be matter of          
'obligation' 7in the restricted sense72 
and 7#b7 that1 in regard  to that which 
can be made matter of obligation1 the   
question what  should be made matter of 
obligation--the question how far rights 
and  obligations1 as actually           
established by law1 correspond to the   
true  'jus naturae'--must be considered 
with reference to the moral end1 as     
serving which alone law and the         
obligations imposed by law have their   
value4#a    #a ,there are two           
definitions of ',recht' or 'jus         
naturae1' quoted  by ,ulrici            
7,naturrecht1 p4 #bai71 which embody the
 truths conveyed  in these statements4  
7#a7 ,krause defines ',recht' as 'das   
organische  ,ganze der usseren          
,bedingungen des ,vernunftlebens1' 'the 
organic  whole of the outward conditions

 necessary to the rational life4' 7#b7  
,henrici says that ',recht' is 'was der 
,idee der ,unverletzbarkeit der         
materiellen wesentlichen ,bedingungen   
des moralischen ,menschenthums1  d4 h4  
der menschlichen ,persnlichkeit nach    
ihrer ,existenz und  ihrer              
,vervollkommnung1 oder der              
unverusserlichen ,menschengter im       
usserlichen ,verkehr entspricht'3 i4e4  
',right is what' 7or1 'that  is properly
 matter of legal obligation which'7 'in 
the outward  intercourse of men         
corresponds to the idea of the          
inviolability of  the essential material
 conditions of a moral humanity1 i4e4 of
 the  human personality in respect of   
its existence and its perfection2'  or1 
more simply1 ',right is that which is   
really necessary to the  maintenance of 
the material conditions essential to the
 existence and  perfection of human     
personality4' ,cf4 ,trendelenburg1      
,naturrecht1  ,sect4 #df4 ',das ,recht  
ist im sittlichen ,ganzen der ,inbegriff

  derjenigen allgemeinen ,bestimmungen  
des ,handelns1 durch welche es          
geschieht dass das sittliche ,ganze und 
seine ,gliederung sich erhalten  und    
weiter bilden kann4' ,afterwards he     
emphasises the words 'des  ,handelns1'  
and adds3 ',zwar kann das ,handeln nicht
 ohne den ,willen  gedacht werden1 der  
zum ,grunde liegt3 aber die             
,rechtbestimmungen  sind nicht          
,bestimmungen des ,willens als solchen1 
was dem innern  ,gebiet1 der ,ethik der 
,gesinnung1 anheimfallen wrde4 ,der     
,wille der  nicht ,handlung wird        
entzieht sich dem ,recht4 ,wenn das     
,recht ,schuld  und ,versehen1 dolus und
 culpa1 in sein ,bereich zieht1 so sind 
sie als innere aber charakteristische   
,beschaffenbeiten des ,handelns         
anzusehen4'    #ab4 ,before proceeding1 
some remarks have to be made as to what 
is  implied in these principles1 7a7    
,does the law1 or is it possible  that  
it should1 confine its view to external 
acts8 ,what exactly is  meant by an     

external act8 ,in the case of           
obligations which ,i am  legally        
punishable for disregarding1 the law1 in
 deciding whether  punishment is or is  
not due1 takes account of much beside   
the  external act2 and this implies that
 much beside external action  is        
involved in legal obligation4 ,in the   
case where the person or  property of   
another is damaged by me1 the law does  
not inquire  merely whether the act of  
damage was done1 and done by means of my
  bodily members1 but whether it was    
done intentionally3 and if not  done    
with the direct intention of inflicting 
the damage1 whether  the damage arose in
 a manner that might have been foreseen 
out of  something which ,i did intend to
 do3 whether1 again1 if it was done     
quite accidentally the accident was due 
to culpable negligence4 ,this1  however1
 does not show that the law can enforce 
or prevent anything  but external       
action1 but only that it is action which
 it seeks to  enforce or prevent1 for   

without intention there is no action4   
,we talk  indeed of a man acting against
 his will1 but if this means acting     
against intention it is what it is      
impossible to do4 ,what ,i call an  act 
done against my will is either 7#a7 an  
act done by someone else  using my body1
 through superior force1 as a means3 in 
which case  there is an act1 but it is  
not mine 7e4g4 if another uses my hand  
to pull the trigger of a gun by which   
someone is shot72 or 7#b7 a  natural    
event in which my limbs are affected in 
a certain way which  causes certain     
results to another person 7e4g4 if the  
rolling of a  ship throws me against    
another person who is thus thrown into  
the  water72 or 7#c7 an act which ,i do 
under the influence of some strong      
inducement 7e4g4 the fear of death71 but
 which is contrary to some  strong wish4
 ,in this case the act is mine1 but mine
 because ,i intend  it2 because it is   
not against my will as  intention4 ,in  
saying1  then1 that the proper1 because 

the only possible1 function of law is   
to enforce the performance of or        
abstinence from external actions1  it is
 implied that its function is to produce
 or prevent certain  intentions1 for    
without intention on the part of someone
 there is no  act4    #ac4 ,but if an   
act necessarily includes intention1 what
 is the nature  of the restriction      
implied in calling it external8 ,an     
external action  is a determination of  
will as exhibited in certain motions of 
the  bodily members which produce       
certain effects in the material world2  
not a determination of the will as      
arising from certain motives  and a     
certain disposition4 ,all that the law  
can do is to enjoin or  forbid          
determinations of will as exhibited in  
such motions1 c4 ,it  does indeed       
present a motive1 for it enforces its   
injunctions and  prohibitions primarily 
by fear1 by its threat of certain       
consequences  if its commands are       
disobeyed4 ,this enforcement is not an  

exercise  of physical force in the      
strict sense1 for in this sense no force
  can produce an action1 since it cannot
 produce a determination of  will2 and  
the only way in which the law or its    
administrators employ  such force is not
 in the production but in the prevention
 of action  7as when a criminal is      
locked up or the police prevent         
mischievous  persons from assaulting us 
or breaking into our houses74 ,but      
though1  in enforcing its commands by   
threats1 the law is presenting a motive1
  and thus1 according to our            
distinction1 affecting action on its    
inner side1 it does this solely for the 
sake of the external act4 ,it  does not 
regard the relation of the act to the   
motive fear as of any  intrinsic        
importance4 ,if the action is performed 
without this motive  ever coming into   
play under the influence of what the    
moralist counts  higher motives1 the    
purpose of the law is equally satisfied4
 ,indeed1  it is always understood that 

its purpose is most thoroughly served   
when the threat of pains and penalties  
has ceased to be necessary1  and the    
obligations correlative to the relations
 of individuals and  of societies are   
fulfilled from other motives4 ,its      
business is to  maintain certain        
conditions of life--to see that certain 
actions are  done which are necessary to
 the maintenance of those conditions1   
others omitted which would interfere    
with them4 ,it has nothing to do  with  
the motive of the actions or omissions1 
on which1 however1 the  moral value of  
them depends4    #ad4 ,it appears1 then1
 that legal obligations--obligations    
which can  possibly form the subject of 
positive law--can only be obligations to
  do or abstain from certain acts1 not  
duties of acting from certain  motives1 
or with a certain disposition4 ,it is   
not a question whether  the law should  
or should not oblige to anything but    
performance of  outward acts4 ,it simply
 cannot oblige to anything else1 because

 the  only means at its command for     
obtaining the fulfilment of obligations 
are 7#a7 threats of pain and offers of  
reward1 by means of which it is         
possible indeed to secure the general   
performance of certain acts1  but not   
their performance from the motive even  
of fear of the pain  threatened or hope 
of the reward offered1 much less from   
any higher  motive2 7#b7 the employment 
of physical force1 7a7 in restraining   
men disposed to violate obligations1 7b7
 in forcibly applying the  labour or the
 property of those who violate          
obligations to make good  the breach1 so
 far as is possible3 7as1 e4g41 when the
 magistrate  forestalls part of a man's 
wages to provide for a wife whom he has 
deserted1 or when the property of a     
debtor is seized for the benefit  of his
 creditors47    #ae4 ,only outward acts1
 then1 can be matter of legal           
obligation2 but  what sort of outward   
acts should be matter of legal          
obligation8  ,the answer to this        

question arises out of the above        
consideration of  the means which law   
employs to obtain the fulfilment of     
obligations1  combined with the view of 
law as relative to a moral end1 i4e4 the
  formation of a society of persons1    
acting from a certain disposition1  from
 interest in the society as such4 ,those
 acts only should be  matter of legal   
injunction or prohibition of which the  
performance or  omission1 irrespectively
 of the motive from which it proceeds1  
is so  necessary to the existence of a  
society in which the moral end stated   
can be realised1 that it is better for  
them to be done or omitted  from that   
unworthy motive which consists in fear  
or hope of legal  consequences than not 
to be done at all4    #af4 ,we          
distinguish1 then1 the system of rights 
actually maintained  and obligations    
actually enforced by legal sanctions    
7',recht' or  'jus'7 from the system of 
relations and obligations which should  
be  maintained by such sanctions        

7',naturrecht'72 and we hold that those 
actions or omissions should be made     
obligations which1 when made            
obligations1 serve a certain moral end2 
that this end is the ground  or         
justification or rationale of legal     
obligation2 and that thus we  obtain a  
general rule1 of both positive and      
negative application1 in  regard to the 
proper matter or content of legal       
obligation4 ,for since  the end consists
 in action proceeding from a certain    
disposition1  and since action done from
 apprehension of legal consequences does
  not proceed from that disposition1 no 
action should be enjoined or  prohibited
 by law of which the injunction or      
prohibition interferes  with actions    
proceeding from that disposition1 and   
every action  should be so enjoined of  
which the performance is found to       
produce  conditions favourable to action
 proceeding from that disposition1 and  
of which the legal injunction does not  
interfere with such action4    #ag4     

,does this general rule give any real   
guidance in the difficulties  which     
practically arise in regard to the      
province of law--as to  what should be  
required by law1 and what left to the   
inclination of  individuals8 ,what cases
 are there or have there been of        
enactments  which on this principle we  
can pronounce wrong8 ,have attempts ever
  been made by law to enforce acts as   
virtuous which lose their virtue  when  
done under fear of legal penalties8 ,it 
would be difficult1 no  doubt1 to find  
instances of attempts to enforce by law 
actions of  which we should say that the
 value lies in the disposition from     
which  they are done1 actions1 e4g4 of  
disinterested kindness1 because the     
clear conception of virtue as depending 
not on outward results1  but on         
disposition1 is but slowly arrived at1  
and has never been  reflected in law4   
,but without any strictly moral object  
at all1 laws  have been made which check
 the development of the moral           

disposition4  ,this has been done 7a7 by
 legal requirements of religious        
observance and profession of belief1    
which have tended to vitiate the        
religious source of morality2 7b7 by    
prohibitions and restraints1            
unnecessary1 or which have ceased to be 
necessary1 for maintaining  the social  
conditions of the moral life1 and which 
interfere with the  growth of           
self-reliance1 with the formation of a  
manly conscience and  sense of moral    
dignity1--in short1 with the moral      
autonomy which is  the condition of the 
highest goodness2 7c7 by legal          
institutions  which take away the       
occasion for the exercise of certain    
moral  virtues 7e4g4 the ,poor-law which
 takes away the occasion for the        
exercise of parental forethought1 filial
 reverence1 and neighbourly  kindness74 
#ah4 ,laws of this kind have often been 
objected to on the strength  of a       
one-sided view of the function of laws2 
the view1 viz41 that  its only business 

is to prevent interference with the     
liberty of  the individual4 ,and this   
view has gained undue favour on account 
of  the real reforms to which it has    
led4 ,the laws which it has helped  to  
get rid of were really mischievous1 but 
mischievous for further  reasons than   
those conceived of by the supporters of 
this theory4  ,having done its work1 the
 theory now tends to become obstructive1
  because in fact advancing civilisation
 brings with it more and  more          
interference with the liberty of the    
individual to do as he  likes1 and this 
theory affords a reason for resisting   
all positive  reforms1 all reforms which
 involve an action of the state in the  
way  of promoting conditions favourable 
to moral life4 ,it is one thing  to say 
that the state in promoting these       
conditions must take care  not to defeat
 its true end by narrowing the region   
within which the  spontaneity and       
disinterestedness of true morality can  
have play2  another thing to say that it

 has no moral end to serve at all1 and  
that it goes beyond its province when it
 seeks to do more than secure  the      
individual from violent interference by 
other individuals4 ,the  true ground of 
objection to 'paternal government' is   
not that it  violates the 'laissez      
faire' principle and conceives that its 
office  is to make people good1 to      
promote morality1 but that it rests on a
  misconception of morality4 ,the real  
function of government being to         
maintain conditions of life in which    
morality shall be possible1 and         
morality consisting in the disinterested
 performance of self-imposed  duties1   
'paternal government' does its best to  
make it impossible by  narrowing the    
room for the self-imposition of duties  
and for the play  of disinterested      
motives4    #ai4 ,the question before   
us1 then1 is1 ,in what ways and how far 
do  the main obligations enforced and   
rights maintained by law in all         
civilised societies contribute to the   

moral end described2 viz4  to establish 
those conditions of life in which a     
true1 i4e4 a  disinterested or unselfish
 morality shall be possible8 ,the answer
  to this question will be a theory of  
the 'jus naturae'2 i4e4 it  will explain
 how far positive law is what it should 
be1 and what  is the ground of the duty 
to obey it2 in other words1 of political
  obligation4 ,there are two things from
 which such a theory must be            
distinguished4 7#a7 ,it is not an       
inquiry into the process by which       
actual law came to be what it is2 nor   
7#b7 is it an inquiry how far  actual   
law corresponds to and is derived from  
the exercise of certain  original or    
natural rights4 7#a7 ,it is not the     
former1 because the  process by which   
the law of any nation and the law in    
which civilised  nations agree has come 
to be what it is1 has not been          
determined  by reference to that end to 
which we hold that law ought to be      
directed and by reference to which we   

criticise it4 ,that is to say1  the     
process has not been determined by any  
such conscious reference  on the part of
 the agents in the process4 ,no doubt a 
desire for  social good as distinct from
 private pleasure1 for what is good on  
the whole as distinct from what is good 
for the moment1 has been a  necessary   
condition of it2 but 7a71 as an agent in
 the development  of law1 this has not  
reached the form of a conception of     
moral good  according to that definition
 of it by which the value of law is to  
be  estimated2 and 7b7 in bringing law  
to its present state it has been        
indistinguishably blended with purely   
selfish passions and with the  simple   
struggle for existence4    #bj4 7#b7 ,a 
true theory of 'jus naturae1' a         
rationale of law or ideal  of what it   
should be1 is not to be had by inquiring
 how far actual  law corresponds to1 and
 is derived from1 the exercise of       
certain  original or natural rights1 if 
that is taken to mean that we know1  or 

can ascertain1 what rights are natural  
on grounds distinct from  those on which
 we determine what laws are justifiable1
 and that then  we can proceed to       
ascertain what laws are justifiable by  
deduction  from such rights4 ',natural  
rights1' so far as there are such       
things1  are themselves relative to the 
moral end to which perfect law is       
relative4 ,a law is not good because it 
enforces 'natural rights1'  but because 
it contributes to the realisation of a  
certain end4 ,we  only discover what    
rights are natural by considering what  
powers  must be secured to a man in     
order to the attainment of this end4    
,these powers a perfect law will secure 
to their full extent4 ,thus the         
consideration of what rights are        
'natural' 7in the only legitimate       
sense7 and the consideration what laws  
are justifiable form one  and the same  
process1 each presupposing a conception 
of the moral  vocation of man4    #ba4  
,the doctrine here asserted1 that all   

rights are relative to moral  ends or   
duties1 must not be confused with the   
ordinary statement  that every right    
implies a duty1 or that rights and      
duties are  correlative4 ,this of course
 is true in the sense that possession   
of a right by any person both implies an
 obligation on the part of  someone     
else1 and is conditional upon the       
recognition of certain  obligations on  
the part of the person possessing it4   
,but what is  meant is something        
different1 viz4 that the claim or right 
of the  individual to have certain      
powers secured to him by society1 and   
the counter-claim of society to exercise
 certain powers over the  individual1   
alike rest on the fact that these powers
 are necessary to  the fulfilment of    
man's vocation as a moral being1 to an  
effectual  self-devotion to the work of 
developing the perfect character in     
himself and others4    #bb4 ,this1      
however1 is not the ground on which the 
claim in question  has generally been   

asserted4 ,apart from the utilitarian   
theory1 which  first began to be applied
 politically by ,hume1 the ordinary way 
of  justifying the civil rights of      
individuals 7i4e4 the powers secured  to
 them by law as against each other71 as 
well as the rights of the  state against
 individuals 7i4e4 the powers which1    
with the general  approval of society1  
it exercises against them71 has been to 
deduce  them from certain supposed prior
 rights1 called natural rights4 ,in  the
 exercise of these natural rights1 it   
has been supposed1 men with  a view to  
their general interest established      
political society4  ,from that          
establishment is derived both the system
 of rights and  obligations maintained  
by law as between man and man1 and the  
right  of the state to the submission of
 its subjects4 ,if the question1  then1 
is raised1 why ,i ought to respect the  
legal rights of my  neighbours1 to pay  
taxes1 or have my children vaccinated1  
serve in  the army if the state requires

 it1 and generally submit to the law1   
the answer according to this theory will
 be that if ,i fail to do  so1 ,i shall 
directly or indirectly be violating the 
natural rights  of other men2 directly  
in those cases where the legal rights of
 my  neighbours are also natural rights1
 as they very well may be 7e4g4  rights 
of liberty or personal safety72         
indirectly where this is not  the case1 
because1 although the rights of the     
state itself are not  natural1 and many 
rights exercised by individuals would   
not only  not be secured but would not  
exist at all but for legal enactment1   
yet the state itself results from a     
covenant which originally1 in  the      
exercise of their natural rights1 men   
made with each other1  and to which all 
born under the state and sharing the    
advantages  derived from it must be     
considered parties4 ,there is a natural 
right1  therefore1 on the part of each  
member of a state to have this compact  
observed1 with a corresponding          

obligation to observe it2 and this      
natural right of all is violated by any 
individual who refuses to  obey the law 
of the state or to respect the rights1  
not in themselves  natural1 which the   
state confers on individuals4    #bc4   
,this1 on the whole1 was the form in    
which the ground of political           
obligation1 the justification of        
established rights1 was presented       
throughout the seventeenth century1 and 
in the eighteenth till the  rise of the 
'utilitarian' theory of obligation4     
,special adaptations  of it were made by
 ,hobbes and others4 ,in ,hobbes1       
perhaps 7of whom  more later71 may be   
found an effort to fit an anticipation  
of the  utilitarian theory of political 
obligation into the received theory     
which traced political obligation1 by   
means of the supposition of  a primitive
 contract1 to an origin in natural      
right4 ,but in him as  much as anyone   
the language and framework of the theory
 of compact  is retained1 even if an    

alien doctrine may be read between the  
lines4 ,of the utilitarian theory of    
political obligation more shall  be said
 later4 ,it may be presented in a form  
in which it would  scarcely be          
distinguishable from the doctrine just  
now stated1 the  doctrine1 viz41 that   
the ground of political obligation1 the 
reason  why certain powers should be    
recognised as belonging to the state    
and certain other powers as secured by  
the state to individuals1  lies in the  
fact that these powers are necessary to 
the fulfilment  of man's vocation as a  
moral being1 to an effectual            
self-devotion  to the work of developing
 the perfect character in himself and   
others4 ,utilitarianism proper1 however1
 recognises no vocation of  man but the 
attainment of pleasure and avoidance of 
pain4 ,the only  reason why civil rights
 should be respected--the only          
justification  of them--according to it1
 would be that more pleasure is attained
  or pain avoided by the general respect

 for them2 the ground of our            
consciousness that we ought to respect  
them1 in other words their  ultimate    
sanction1 is the fear of what the       
consequences would be if  we did not4   
,this theory and that which ,i deem true
 have one negative  point in common4    
,they do not seek the ground of actual  
rights in a  prior natural right1 but in
 an end to which the maintenance of the 
rights contributes4 ,they avoid the     
mistake of identifying the inquiry  into
 the ultimate justifiability of actual  
rights with the question  whether there 
is a prior right to the possession of   
them4 ,the right  to the possession of  
them1 if properly so called1 would not  
be a  mere power1 but a power recognised
 by a society as one which should       
exist4 ,this recognition of a power1 in 
some way or other1 as that  which should
 be1 is always necessary to render it a 
right4 ,therefore  when we had shown    
that the rights exercised in political  
society were  derived from prior        

'natural' rights1 a question would still
 remain  as to the ground of those      
natural rights4 ,we should have to ask  
why  certain powers were recognised as  
powers which should be exercised1  and  
thus became these natural rights4       
#bd4 ,thus1 though it may be possible   
and useful to show how the more         
seemingly artificial rights are derived 
from rights more simple and  elementary1
 how the rights established by law in a 
political society  are derived from     
rights that may be called natural1 not  
in the  sense of being prior to society1
 but in the sense of being prior to  the
 existence of a society governed by     
written law or a recognised  sovereign1 
still such derivation is no             
justification of them4 ,it is  no answer
 to the question why they should be     
respected2 because this  question       
remains to be asked in regard to the    
most primitive rights  themselves4      
,political or civil rights1 then1 are   
not to be explained  by derivation from 

natural rights1 but in regard to both   
political  and natural rights1 in any   
sense in which there can be truly said  
to be natural rights1 the question has  
to be asked1 how it is that  certain    
powers are recognised by men in their   
intercourse with each  other as powers  
that should be exercised1 or of which   
the possible  exercise should be        
secured4    #be4 ,i have tried to show  
in lectures on morals that the          
conception  expressed by the 'should be'
 is not identical with the conception of
  a right possessed by some man or men1 
but one from which the latter           
conception is derived4 ,it is1 or       
implies on the part of whoever is       
capable of it1 the conception of an     
ideal1 unattained condition of  himself1
 as an absolute end4 ,without this      
conception the recognition  of a power  
as a right would be impossible4 ,a power
 on the part of  anyone is so recognised
 by others1 as one which should be      
exercised1  when these others regard it 

as in some way a means to that ideal    
good of themselves which they alike     
conceive3 and the possessor of  the     
power comes to regard it as a right     
through consciousness of  its being thus
 recognised as contributory to a good in
 which he too  is interested4 ,no one   
therefore can have a right except 7#a7  
as a  member of a society1 and 7#b7 of a
 society in which some common good  is  
recognised by the members of the society
 as their own ideal good1  as that which
 should be for each of them4 ,the       
capacity for being  determined by a good
 so recognised is what constitutes      
personality  in the ethical sense2 and  
for this reason there is truth in saying
  that only among persons1 in the       
ethical sense1 can there come to be     
rights2 7which is quite compatible with 
the fact that the logical               
disentanglement of the conception of    
rights precedes that of the  conception 
of the legal person2 and that the       
conception of the moral  person1 in its 

abstract and logical form1 is not       
arrived at till  after that of the legal
 person74    ,conversely1 everyone      
capable of being determined by the      
conception of  a common good as his own 
ideal good1 as that which               
unconditionally  should be 7of being in 
that sense an end to himself71 in other 
words1 every moral person1 is capable of
 rights2 i4e4 of bearing  his part in a 
society in which the free exercise of   
his powers is  secured to each member   
through the recognition by each of the  
others  as entitled to the same freedom 
with himself4 ,to say that he is        
capable of rights1 is to say that he    
ought to have them1 in that  sense of   
'ought' in which it expresses the       
relation of man to an  end conceived as 
absolutely good1 to an end which1       
whether desired  or no1 is conceived as 
intrinsically desirable4 ,the moral     
capacity  implies a consciousness on the
 part of the subject of the capacity    
that its realisation is an end desirable

 in itself1 and rights are  the         
condition of realising it4 ,only through
 the possession of rights  can the power
 of the individual freely to make a     
common good his own  have reality given 
to it4 ,rights are what may be called   
the negative  realisation of this power4
 ,that is1 they realise it in the sense 
of  providing for its free exercise1 of 
securing the treatment of one  man by   
another as equally free with himself1   
but they do not realise  it positively1 
because their possession does not imply 
that in any  active way the individual  
makes a common good his own4 ,the       
possession  of them1 however1 is the    
condition of this positive realisation  
of  the moral capacity1 and they ought  
to be possessed because this end  7in   
the sense explained7 ought to be        
attained4    #bf4 ,hence on the part of 
every person 7'person' in the moral     
sense  explained7 the claim1 more or    
less articulate and reflected on1 to    
rights on his own part is co-ordinate   

with his recognition of rights  on the  
part of others4 ,the capacity to        
conceive a common good as  one's own1   
and to regulate the exercise of one's   
powers by reference  to a good which    
others recognise1 carries with it the   
consciousness  that powers should be so 
exercised2 which means that there should
 be  rights1 that powers should be      
regulated by mutual recognition4 ,there 
ought to be rights1 because the moral   
personality1--the capacity on  the part 
of an individual for making a common    
good his own1--ought  to be developed2  
and it is developed through rights2 i4e4
 through  the recognition by members of 
a society of powers in each other       
contributory to a common good1 and the  
regulation of those powers by  that     
recognition4    #bg4 ,in saying that    
only among 'persons' can there come to  
be rights1  and that every 'person'     
should have rights1 ,i have been careful
 to  explain that ,i use 'person' in the
 moral1 not merely in the legal1  sense4

 ,in dealing1 then1 with such phrases as
 'jura personarum'  and 'personal       
rights1' we must keep in view the       
difference between  the legal and       
ethical sense of the proposition that   
all rights are  personal1 or subsist as 
between persons4 ,in the legal sense1 so
 far  as it is true1--and it is so only 
if 'person' is used in the sense  of    
,roman law1--it is an identical         
proposition4 ,a person means a  subject 
of rights and nothing more4 ,legal      
personality is derived  from the        
possession of right1 not vice versa4    
,like other identical  propositions1 its
 use is to bring out and emphasise in   
the predicate  what is included in the  
understood connotation of the subject2  
to  remind us that when we speak of     
rights we imply the existence of        
parties1 in ,english phraseology1       
capable of suing and being sued4  ,in   
the ethical sense1 it means that rights 
are derived from the  possession of     
personality as  a rational will 7i4e4   

the capacity  which man possesses of    
being determined to action by the       
conception  of such a perfection of his 
being as involves the perfection of a   
society in which he lives71 in the sense
 7a7 that only among beings  possessed  
of rational will can there come to be   
rights1 7b7 that  they fulfil their     
idea1 or are justifiable1 or such rights
 as should  be rights1 only as          
contributing to the realisation of a    
rational  will4 ,it is important to bear
 this distinction in mind in order that 
the proposition in its ethical sense1   
which can stand on its own  merits1 may 
not derive apparent confirmation from a 
juristic truism4    #bh4 ,the moral idea
 of personality is constantly tending to
 affect  the legal conception of the    
relation between rights and persons4    
,thus the 'jura personarum1' which      
properly  either rights arising  out of 
'status1' or rights which not only 7like
 all rights7 reside  in someone having a
 legal status and are available against 

others  having a legal status1 but are  
exercised over1 or in respect of1       
someone possessed of such status 7e4g4 a
 wife or a servant71 come  to be        
understood as rights derived from the   
human personality or  belonging to man  
as man4 ,it is with some such meaning   
that ,english  writers on law speak of  
rights to life and liberty as personal  
rights4 ,the expression might seem      
pleonastic1 since no right can  exist   
except as belonging to a person in the  
legal sense4 ,they do not  use the      
phrase either pleonastically or in the  
sense of the ,roman  lawyers' 'jura     
personarum' above1 but in the sense that
 these rights  are immediately derived  
from1 or necessarily attach to1 the     
human  personality in whatever that     
personality is supposed to consist4     
,there is no doubt1 however1 that       
historically the conception of the      
moral person1 in any abstract form1 is  
not arrived at till after  that of the  
legal person has been thus disentangled 

and formulated2  and further that the   
abstract conception of the legal person1
 as the  sustainer of rights1 is not    
arrived at till long after rights have  
been actually recognised and            
established4 ,but the disentanglement   
or abstract formulation of the          
conception of moral personality is      
quite a different thing from the action 
of the consciousness in which           
personality consists4    #bi4 ,the      
capacity1 then1 on the part of the      
individual of conceiving a  good as the 
same for himself and others1 and of     
being determined to  action by that     
conception1 is the foundation of rights2
 and rights  are the condition of that  
capacity being realised4 ,no right is   
justifiable or should be a right except 
on the ground that directly  or         
indirectly it serves this purpose4      
,conversely every power should  be a    
right1 i4e4 society should secure to the
 individual every power1  that is       
necessary for realising this capacity4  

,claims to such powers  as are directly 
necessary to a man's acting as a moral  
person at  all--acting under the        
conception of a good as the same for    
self and  others--may be called in a    
special sense personal rights 7though   
they  will include more than ,stephen   
includes under that designation72 they  
may also be called1 if we avoid         
misconceptions connected with these     
terms1 'innate' or 'natural' rights4    
,they are thus distinguished from       
others which are 7#a7 only indirectly   
necessary to the end stated1 or  7#b7   
are so only under special conditions of 
society2 as well as from  claims which  
rest merely on legal enactment and might
 cease to be  enforced without any      
violation of the 'jus naturae4'    #cj4 
,the objection to calling them 'innate' 
or 'natural1' when  once it is admitted 
on the one side that rights are not     
arbitrary  creations of law or custom   
but that there are certain powers which 
ought to be secured as rights1 on the   

other hand that there are no  rights    
antecedent to society1 none that men    
brought with them into a  society which 
they contracted to form1 is mainly one  
of words4 ,they  are 'innate' or        
'natural' in the same sense in which    
according to  ,aristotle the state is   
natural3 not in the sense that they     
actually  exist when a man is born and  
that they have actually existed as long 
as the human race1 but that they arise  
out of1 and are necessary for  the      
fulfilment of1 a moral capacity without 
which a man would not be  a man4 ,there 
cannot be innate rights in any other    
sense than that in  which there are     
innate duties1 of which1 however1 much  
less has been  heard4 ,because a group  
of beings are capable each of conceiving
 an  absolute good of himself and of    
conceiving it to be good for himself  as
 identical with1 and because identical  
with1 the good of the rest  of the      
group1 there arises for each a          
consciousness that the common  good     

should be the object of action1 i4e4 a  
duty1 and a claim in each  to a power of
 action that shall be at once secured   
and regulated by  the consciousness of a
 common good on the part of the rest1   
i4e4 a  right4 ,there is no ground for  
saying that the right arises out of a   
primary human capacity1 and is thus     
'innate1' which does not apply  equally 
to the duty4    #ca4 ,the dissociation  
of innate rights from innate duties has 
gone  along with the delusion that such 
rights existed apart from society4  ,men
 were supposed to have existed in a     
state of nature1 which was  not a state 
of society1 but in which certain rights 
attached to  them as individuals1 and   
then to have formed societies by        
contract  or covenant4 ,society having  
been formed1 certain other rights arose 
through positive enactment2 but none of 
these1 it was held1 could  interfere    
with the natural rights which belonged  
to men antecedently  to the social      
contract or survived it4    ,such a     

theory can only be stated by an         
application to an imaginary  state of   
things1 prior to the formation of       
societies as regulated  by custom or    
law1 of terms that have no meaning      
except in relation  to such societies4  
',natural right1' as  right in a state  
of nature  which is not a state of      
society1 is a contradiction4 ,there can 
be  no right without a consciousness of 
common interest on the part of  members 
of a society4 ,without this there might 
be certain powers on  the part of       
individuals1 but no recognition of these
 powers by others  as powers of which   
they allow the exercise1 nor any claim  
to such  recognition2 and without this  
recognition or claim to recognition     
there can be no right4        ,b4       
,,spinoza4    #cb4 ,spinoza is aware of 
this4 ,in the ,tractatus ,politici1     
,,it4 #d1  he says1 ',per jus itaque    
naturae intelligo 444 ipsam naturae     
potentiam4' #a 444 ',quicquid           
unusquisque homo ex legibus suae        

naturae agit1 id summo naturae jure     
agit1 tantumque in naturam  habet juris1
 quantum potentia valet4' ,if only1     
seeing that the  'jus naturae' was mere 
'potentia1' he had denied that it was   
'jus'  at all1 he would have been on the
 right track4 ,instead of that1         
however1 he treats it as properly 'jus1'
 and consistently with this  regards all
 'jus' as mere 'potentia'3 nor is any   
'jus humanum'  according to him guided  
by or the product of reason4 ,it arises1
 in  modern phrase1 out of the 'struggle
 for existence4' ,as ,spinoza says1     
'homines magis caeca cupiditate quam    
ratione ducuntur2 ac proinde  hominum   
naturalis potentia sive jus non ratione1
 sed quocumque  appetitu quo ad agendum 
determinantur1 quoque se conservare     
conantur1  definiri debet' 7,,ii4 #e74  
,the 'jus civile' is simply the result  
of  the conflict of natural powers1     
which  natural rights1 which arises     
from the effort of every man to gratify 
his passions and 'suum esse             

conservare4' ,man is simply a 'pars     
naturae1' the most crafty of the        
animals4 ',quatenus homines ira1 invidia
 aut aliquo odii affectu  conflictantur1
 eatenus diverse trahuntur et invicem   
contrarii sunt1  et propterea eo plus   
timendi1 quo plus possunt1 magisque     
callidi  et astuti sunt1 quam reliqua   
animalia2 et quia homines ut plurimum   
his affectibus natura sunt obnoxii1 sunt
 ergo homines ex natura  hostes' 7,,ii4 
#ad74 ,universal hostility means        
universal fear1 and fear  means         
weakness4 ,it follows that in the state 
of nature there is  nothing fit to be   
called 'potentia' or consequently 'jus'2
 'atque  adeo concludimus jus naturae   
vix posse concipi nisi ubi homines  jura
 habent communia1 qui simul terras1 quas
 habitare et colere  possunt1 sibi      
vindicare1 seseque munire1 vimque omnem 
repellere et  ex communi omnium         
sententia vivere possunt4 ,nam 7per art4
 #ac hujus  cap47 quo plures in unum sic
 conveniunt1 eo omnes simul plus juris  

habent' 7#ae74 ,the collective body1    
i4e41 has more 'jus in naturam1'  i4e4  
'potentiam1' than any individual could  
have singly 7#ac74 ,in the  advantage of
 this increased 'jus in naturam' the    
individual shares4  ,on the other hand  
7#af71 ',ubi homines jura communia      
habent omnesque  una veluti mente       
ducuntur1 certum est 7per art4 #ac hujus
 cap47  eorum unumquemque tanto minus   
habere juris1 quanto reliqui simul  ipso
 potentiores sunt1 hoc est1 ilium revera
 jus nullum in naturam  habere praeter  
id1 quod ipsi commune concedit jus4     
,ceterum quicquid  ex communi consensu  
ipsi imperatur1 teneri exsequi vel 7per 
art4 #d  hujus cap47 jure ad id cogi4'  
,this 'jus' by which the individual's   
actions are now to be regulated1 is     
still simply 'potentia4' ',hoc  jus1    
quod multitudinis potentia definitur1   
imperium appellari solet'  7#ag74 ,it is
 not to be considered anything different
 from the 'jus  naturae4' ,it is simply 
the 'naturalis potentia' of a certain   

number  of men combined2 'multitudinis  
quae una veluti mente ducitur' 7,,iii4  
#b74 ,thus in the 'status civilis' the  
'jus naturae' of the individual  in one 
sense disappears1 in another does not4  
,it disappears in the  sense that the   
individual member of the state has no   
mind to act or  power to act against the
 mind of the state4 ,anyone who had such
 mind  or power would not be a member of
 the state4 ,he would be an enemy       
against whose 'potentia' the state must 
measure its own4 ,on the other  hand1   
'in statu civili1' just as much as 'in  
statu naturali1' 'homo  ex legibus suae 
naturae agit suaeque utilitati consulit'
 7#c74 ,he  exercises his 'naturalis    
potentia' for some natural end of       
satisfying  his wants and preserving his
 life as he did or would do outside the 
'status civilis4' ,only in the 'status  
civilis' these motives on the  part of  
individuals so far coincide as to form  
the 'una veluti mens'  which directs the
 'multitudinis potentia4' ,according to 

this view1  any member of a state will  
have just so much 'jus1' i4e4           
'potentia1'  against other members as   
the state allows him4 ,if he can        
exercise  any 'jus' or 'potentia'       
against another 'ex suo ingenio1' he is 
so  far not a member of the state and   
the state is so far imperfect4 ,if  he  
could exercise any 'jus' or 'potentia'  
against the state itself1  there would  
be no state1 or1 which is the same1 the 
state would not  be 'sui juris4'    #a  
,many of the ,latin passages quoted in  
this chapter are translated  in         
,bosanquet's ,supplement4 ,tr    #cc4   
,is there then no limit to the 'jus'    
which the state may exercise8  ,with    
,spinoza this is equivalent to the      
question1 is there no limit to  the     
'potentia' which it can exercise8 ,as to
 this1 he suggests three                
considerations4    7#a74 ,its power is  
weakened by any action against right    
reason1  because this must weaken the   
'animorum unio' on which it is founded4 

',civitatis jus potentia multitudinis1  
quae una veluti mente ducitur1          
determinatur4 ,at haec animorum unio    
concipi nulla ratione posset1  nisi     
civitas id ipsum maxime intendat1 quod  
sana ratio omnibus  hominibus utile esse
 docet' 7,,iii4 #g74    7#b74 ,the      
'right' or 'power' of the state depends 
on its power of  affecting the hopes and
 fears of individual citizens4444       
',subditi  eatenus non sui1 sed         
civitatis juris sint1 quatenus ejus     
potentiam  seu minas metuunt1 vel       
quatenus statum civilem amant 7per art4 
#aj  praeced4 cap474 ,ex quo sequitur1  
quod ea omnia1 ad quse agenda nemo      
praemiis aut minis induci potest1 ad    
jura civitatis non pertineant'  7,,iii4 
#h74 ,whatever cannot be achieved by    
rewards and threats1 is  beyond the     
power and therefore beyond the 'right'  
of the state4  ,examples are given in   
the same section4    7#c74 ',ad         
civitatis jus ea minus pertinere1 quae  
plurimi indignantur'  7,,iii4 #i74      

,severities of a certain kind lead to   
conspiracies against  the state1 and    
thus weaken it4 ',sicut unusquisque     
civis sive homo  in statu naturali1 sic 
civitas eo minus sui juris est1 quo     
majorem  timendi causam habet4'    ,just
 so far then as there are certain things
 which the state cannot  do1 or by doing
 which it lessens its power1 so far     
there are things  which it has no       
'right' to do4    #cd4 ,spinoza proceeds
 to consider the relation of states or  
sovereign  powers to each other4 ,here  
the principle is simple4 ,they are to   
each  other as individuals in the state 
of nature1 except that they will  not be
 subject to the same weaknesses4 ',nam  
quandoquidem 7per art4  #b hujus cap47  
jus summae potestatis nihil est praeter 
ipsum naturae  jus1 sequitur duo imperia
 ad invicem sese habere1 ut duo homines 
in  statu naturali1 excepto hoc1 quod   
civitas sibi cavere potest1 ne ab  alia 
opprimatur1 quod homo in statu naturali 
non potest1 nimirum  qui quotidie somno1

 saepe morbo aut animi aegritudine1 et  
tandem  senectute gravatur1 et prater   
haec aliis incommodis est obnoxius1  a  
quibus civitas securam se reddere       
potest' 7,,iii4 #aa74 ,in other  words1 
'444 duae civitates natura hostes sunt4 
,homines enim in  statu naturali hostes 
sunt4 ,qui igitur jus naturae extra     
civitatem  retinent1 hostes manent'     
7,,iii4 #ac74 ,the 'jura belli' are     
simply the  powers of any one state to  
attack or defend itself against another4
  ,the 'jura pacis1' on the other hand1 
do not appertain to any single  state1  
but arise out of the agreement of two at
 least4 ,they last as  long as the      
agreement1 the 'foedus1' lasts2 and this
 lasts as long as  the fear or hope1    
which led to its being made1 continues  
to be shared  by the states which made  
it4 ,as soon as this ceases to be the   
case1  the agreement is necessarily at  
an end1 'nec dici potest1 quod dolo  vel
 perfidia agat1 propterea quod fidem    
solvit1 simulatque metus vel  spei causa

 sublata est1 quia haec conditio        
unicuique contrahentium  aequalis fuit1 
ut scilicet quae prima extra metum esse 
potest1 sui  juris esset1 eoque ex sui  
animi sententia uteretur1 et praeterea  
quia  nemo in futurum contrahit nisi    
positis prsecedentibus circumstantiis'  
7,,iii4 #ad74    #ce4 ,it would seem to 
follow from the above that a state can  
do no  wrong1 in the sense that there   
are no rights that it can violate4  ,the
 same principle is applicable to it as  
to the individual4 ',in  statu naturali 
non dari peccatum1 vel si quis peccat1  
is sibi1 non  alteri peccat3 444 nihil  
absolute naturae jure prohibetur1 nisi  
quod  nemo potest' 7,,ii4 #ah74 ,a state
 is to any other state1 and to its      
subjects1 as one individual to another  
'in statu naturali4' ,a wrong1  a       
'peccatum1' consists in a violation by  
individuals of the 'commune  decretum4' 
,there can be no 'peccare' on the part  
of the 'commune  decretum' itself4 ,but 
'non id omne1 quod jure fieri dicimus1  

optime  fieri affirmamus4 ,aliud namque 
est agrum jure colere1 aliud agrum      
optime colere2 aliud1 inquam1 est sese  
jure defendere1 conservare1  judicium   
ferre1 c1 aliud sese optime defendere1  
conservare1 atque  optimum judicium     
ferre2 et consequenter aliud est jure   
imperare  et reipublicae curam habere1  
aliud optime imperare et rempublicam    
optime gubernare4 ,postquam itaque de   
jure cujuscumque civitatis in  genere   
egimus1 tempus est1 ut de optimo        
cujuscumque imperii statu  agamus' 7,v4 
#a74 ,hence a further consideration 'de 
optimo cujusque  imperii statu4' ,this  
is guided by reference to the 'finis    
status  civilis1' which is 'pax vitaeque
 securitas4' ,accordingly that is the   
best government under which men live in 
harmony1 and of which the  rights are   
kept inviolate4 ,where this is not the  
case1 the fault lies  with the          
government1 not with any 'subditorum    
malitia4' ',homines  enim civiles non   
nascuntur1 sed fiunt4 ,hominum praeterea

 naturales  affectus ubique iidem sunt' 
7,v4 #b74    ,the end is not fully      
attained where men are merely kept in   
order  by fear4 ,such a state of things 
is not peace but merely absence of  war4
 ',pax enim non belli privatio1 sed     
virtus est1 quae ex animi  fortitudine  
oritur2#a est namque obsequium constans 
voluntas id  exsequendi1 quod ex communi
 civitatis decreto fieri debet' 7,v4    
#d74    ,the 'peace1' then1 which it is 
the end of the state to obtain1         
consists in rational virtue2 in a common
 mind1 governed by desire on  the part  
of each individual for perfection of    
being in himself and  others4 ,the      
harmony of life1 too1 which is another  
way of expressing  its object1 is to be 
understood in an equally high sense4    
,the life  spoken of is one 'quae maxime
 ratione1 vera mentis virtute et vita1  
definitur4'    ,the 'imperium' which is 
to contribute to this end must clearly  
be one  'quod multitudo libera          
instituit1 non autem id1 quod in        

multitudinem  jure belli acquiritur4'   
,between the two forms of 'imperium'    
there  may be no essential difference in
 respect of the 'jus' which belongs  to 
each1 but there is the greatest in      
respect of the ends which they  serve as
 well as in the means by which they have
 to be maintained 7,v4  #f74    #a ,for 
the definition of 'fortitudo1' see      
,ethics1 ,,iii4 #ei1  ,schol4 ',omnes   
actiones quae sequuntur ex affectibus   
qui ad mentem  referuntur1 quatenus     
intelligit1 ad fortitudinem refero1 quam
 in  animositatem et generositatem      
distinguo4 ,nam per animositatem        
intelligo cupiditatem1 qua unusquisque  
conatur suum esse ex solo  rationis     
dictamine conservare4 ,per generositatem
 444 cupiditatem  qua unusquisque ex    
solo rationis dictamine conatur reliquos
 homines  juvare et sibi amicitia       
jungere4'    #cf4 ,this conclusion of   
,spinoza's doctrine of the state does   
not seem  really consistent with the    
beginning4 ,at the outset1 no motives   

are  recognised in men but such as      
render them 'natura hostes4' ,from the  
operation of these motives the state is 
supposed to result4 ,each  individual   
finds that the war of all against all is
 weakness for all4  ,consequently the   
desire on the part of each to strengthen
 himself1  which is a form of the       
universal effort 'suum esse conservare1'
  leads to combination1 it being        
discovered that 'homini nihil homine    
utilius' 7,eth4 ,,iv4 #ah4 ,schol474    
,but we are expressly told that the     
civil state does not bring with it other
 motives than those operative  'in statu
 naturali4' ',homo namque tam in statu  
naturali quam civili  ex legibus suae   
naturae agit1 suaeque utilitati         
consulit4' ,but then  it appears that   
there supervenes or may supervene on    
such motives  'constans voluntas id     
exsequendi quod ex communi civitatis    
decreto  fieri debet1' and that not of a
 kind which seeks to carry out the      
'commune decretum' as a means of        

escaping pain or obtaining pleasure1    
for it is said to arise from the 'animi 
fortitudo' which rests on  reason 7'ad  
mentem refertur quatenus intelligit'7   
and includes  'generositas' defined as  
above4 ,it is also said that the true   
object  of 'imperium' is 'vitam         
concorditer transigere' or 'vitam       
colere' in  a sense of 'vita' in which  
it 'maxime ratione 444 definitur4' ,and 
as the 'imperium' established for this  
end is one which 'multitudo  libera     
instituit1' it seems #a to be implied   
that there is a desire  for such an end 
on the part of the people4 ,it is not   
explained  how such desires should arise
 out of the conflict of 'naturales      
potentiae' or out of the impulses which 
render men 'natura hostes4'  ,on the    
other hand1 if the elements of them     
already exist in the  impulses which    
lead to the formation of the 'status    
civilis1' the  reasons for saying that  
men are 'natura hostes' disappear1 and  
we get  a different view of 'jus1'      

whether 'naturale' or 'civile1' from    
that  which identifies it simply with   
'potentia4' ,some power of conceiving   
and being interested in a good as       
common1 some identification of  the     
'esse' of others with the 'suum esse'   
which every man1 as ,spinoza  says1     
seeks to preserve and promote1 must be  
supposed in those who  form the most    
primitive social combinations1 if these 
are to issue  in a state directed to    
such ends and maintained by such a      
'constans  voluntas' as ,spinoza        
describes4 ,and it is the interest of   
men in a  common good1 the desire on the
 part of each which he thinks of others 
as sharing1 for a good which he         
conceives to be equally good for  them1 
that transforms mere 'potentia' into    
what may fitly be called  'jus1' i4e4 a 
power claiming recognition as exercised 
or capable of  being exercised for the  
common good4    #a ,certainly this is   
so1 if we apply to the 'libera          
multitudo' the  definition of freedom   

applied to the 'liber homo4' ',hominem  
eatenus  liberum omnino voco1 quatenus  
ratione ducitur1 quia eatenus ex        
causis1 quae per solam eius naturam     
possunt adaequate intelligi1  ad agendum
 determinatur1 tametsi ex iis necessario
 ad agendum  determinetur4 ,nam libertas
 agendi necessitatem non tollit1 sed    
ponit'7,,ii4 #aa74    #cg4 ,if this     
qualification of 'potentia' which alone 
renders it 'jus'  had been apprehended  
by ,spinoza1 he would have been entitled
 to speak  of a 'jus naturale' as       
preceding the 'jus civile1' i4e4 of     
claims to  the recognition of powers and
 the actual customary recognition of    
such1 as exercised for a common good1   
preceding the establishment of  any     
regular institutions or general laws for
 securing their exercise4  ,as it is1   
the term 'jus naturale' is with him     
really unmeaning4 ,if it  means no more 
than 'potentia1' why call it 'jus'8     
',jus' might have  a meaning distinct   
from that of 'potentia' in the sense of 

a power  which a certain 'imperium'     
enables one man to exercise as against  
another4 ,this is what ,spinoza         
understands by 'jus civile4' ,but there 
is no need to qualify it as 'civile1'   
unless 'jus' may be employed  with some 
other qualification and with a          
distinctive meaning4 ,but  the 'jus     
naturale1' as he understands it1 has no 
meaning other than  that of 'potentia1' 
and his theory as it stands would have  
been more  clearly expressed if instead 
of 'jus naturale' and 'jus civile' he   
had spoken of 'potentia' and 'jus1'     
explaining that the latter was a  power 
on the part of one man against others1  
maintained by means of  an 'imperium'   
which itself results from a combination 
of 'powers4'  ,he himself in one passage
 shows a consciousness of the           
impropriety  of speaking of 'jus' except
 with reference to a community2 'jus    
naturae1 quod humani generis proprium   
est1 vix posse concipi1 nisi  ubi       
homines jura habent communia1 qui simul 

terras1 quas habitare  et colere        
possunt1 sibi vindicare1 seseque munire1
 vimque omnem  repellere et ex communi  
omnium sententia vivere possunt' 7,,ii4 
#ae74 ,he  takes no notice1 however1 of 
any forms of community more primitive   
than that of the state4 ,the division   
into the 'status naturalis'  and the    
'status civilis' he seems to treat as   
exhaustive1 and the  'status naturalis' 
he regards1 after the manner of his     
time1 as one  of pure individualism1 of 
simple detachment of man from man1 or of
  detachment only modified by conflict4 
,from such a 'status naturalis1'        
lacking both the natural and the        
rational principles of social           
development 7the natural principle1 i4e4
 the interest in others  arising        
primarily from family ties1 and the     
rational principle1 i4e4  the power of  
conceiving a good consisting in the more
 perfect being  of the individual and of
 those in whom he is interested71 no    
process  could be traced to the 'status 

civilis4' ,the two 'status' stand over  
against each other with an impassable   
gulf between4 ',homines civiles  non    
nascuntur1 sed fiunt4' ,they are so     
made1 he seems to hold1 by  the action  
of the 'imperium' upon them4 ,but how is
 the 'imperium'  to be made8 ,men must  
first be1 if not 'civiles1' yet         
something very  different from what they
 are in the 'status naturalis1' between 
which  and the 'status civilis' ,spinoza
 recognises no middle term1 before  any 
'imperium' which could render them      
'civiles' could be possible4    #ch4    
,the cardinal error of ,spinoza's       
',politik' is the admission of the      
possibility of a right in the individual
 apart from life in society1  apart from
 the recognition by members of a society
 of a correlative  claim upon and duty  
to each other1 as all interested in one 
and the  same good4 ,the error was the  
error of his time1 but with ,spinoza it 
was confirmed by his rejection of final 
causes4 ,the true conception  of 'right'

 depends on the conception of the       
individual as being  what be really is  
in virtue of a function which he has to 
fulfil  relatively to a certain end1    
that end being the common well-being  of
 a society4 ,a 'right' is an ideal      
attribute 7'ideal' in the sense  of not 
being sensibly verifiable1 not reducible
 to any perceivable  fact or facts7     
which the individual possesses so far as
 this function  is in some measure      
freely fulfilled by him--i4e4 fulfilled 
with  reference to or for the sake of   
the end--and so far as the ability  to  
fulfil it is secured to him through its 
being recognised by the  society as     
properly belonging to him4 ,the essence 
of right lies in  its being not simply a
 power producing sensible effects1 but a
 power  relative to an insensible       
function and belonging to individuals   
only  in so far as each recognises that 
function in himself and others4 ,it  is 
not in so far as ,i can do this or that1
 that ,i have a right to  do this or    

that1 but so far as ,i recognise myself 
and am recognised  by others as able to 
do this or that for the sake of a common
 good1  or so far as in the             
consciousness of myself and others ,i   
have a  function relative to this end4  
,spinoza1 however1 objects to regard    
anything as determined by relation to a 
final cause4 ,he was not  disposed      
therefore to regard individuals as being
 what they are in  virtue of functions  
relative to the life of society1 still  
less as  being what they are in virtue  
of the recognition by each of such      
functions in himself and others4 ,he    
looked upon man1 like everything  else  
in nature1 as determined by material and
 efficient causes1 and  as himself a    
material and efficient cause4 ,but as   
such he has no  'rights' or 'duties1'   
but only 'powers4'    #ci4 ,it was      
because ,plato and ,aristotle conceived 
the life of the   #a so clearly as the  
of the individual1 relation to  which   
makes him what he is--the relation in   

the case of the   proper being a        
conscious or recognised relation--that  
they laid the  foundation for all true  
theory of 'rights4' ,it is true that    
they have  not even a word for 'rights4'
 ,the claims which in modern times have 
been advanced on behalf of the          
individual against the state under  the 
designation 'natural rights' are most   
alien from their way of  thinking4 ,but 
in saying that the  was a 'natural'     
institution  and that man was  1        
,aristotle1 according to the sense      
which he attached to 1 was asserting the
 doctrine of 'natural  rights' in the   
only sense in which it is true4 ,he     
regards the state  77 as a society of   
which the life is maintained by what its
  members do for the sake of maintaining
 it1 by functions consciously  fulfilled
 with reference to that end1 and which  
in that sense imposes  duties2 and at   
the same time as a society from which   
its members  derive the ability1 through
 education and protection1 to fulfil    

their  several functions1 and which in  
that sense confers rights4 ,it is thus  
that the       4 ,man1 being   1--being 
already in respect of capacities and    
tendencies  a member of such a society1 
existing only in  which contain  its    
elements1--has 'naturally' the          
correlative duties and rights  which the
 state imposes and confers4 ,practically
 it is only the ,greek  man that        
,aristotle regards as  1 but the ,greek 
conception  of citizenship once         
established was applicable to all men   
capable of  a common interest4 ,this way
 of conceiving the case1 however1       
depends  on the 'teleological' view of  
man and the forms of society in which   
he is found to live1 i4e4 on the view of
 men as being what they are  in virtue  
of non-sensible functions1 and of       
certain forms of life  determined by    
relation to more perfect forms which    
they have the  capacity or tendency to  
become4    #a ,greek  7polis7  city1    
7telos7  end or purpose1   7polites7    

citizen1   or   7physei  polites or     
politikos7  social or a citizen by      
nature1         7polites metechei tou   
archein kai  tou archesthai7  a citizen 
by turns rules and is ruled1            
7koinoniai7  associations4 ,tr    #dj4  
,spinoza1 like ,bacon1 found the        
assumption of ends which things  were   
meant to fulfil in the way of accurate  
inquiry into what things  are           
7materially7 and do4 ,he held ,plato and
 ,aristotle cheap as  compared with     
,democritus and ,epicurus 7,epist4 ,,lx4
 #ac74 ,accordingly  he considers the   
individual apart from his vocation as a 
member of  society1 the state apart from
 its office as enabling the individual  
to fulfil that vocation4 ,each1 so      
considered1 is merely a vehicle of  so  
much power 7natural force74 ,on the     
other hand1 he recognises a  difference 
between a higher and lower1 a better and
 worse1 state of  civil society1 and a  
possibility of seeking the better state 
because  it is understood to be better4 

,and this is to admit the possibility   
of the course of human affairs being    
affected by the conception of  a final  
cause4 ,it is characteristic of ,spinoza
 that while he never  departs from the  
principle 'homo naturae pars1' he       
ascribes to him  the faculty of         
understanding the order of nature1 and  
of conforming  to it or obeying it in a 
new way on account of that              
understanding4  ,in other words1 he     
recognised the distinction called by    
,kant the  distinction between          
determination according to law and      
determination  according to the         
consciousness of law2 though in his     
desire to assert  the necessity of each 
kind of determination he tends to       
disguise the  distinction and to ignore 
the fact that1 if rational determination
  7or the determination by a conception 
of a law7 is a part of nature1  it is so
 in quite a different sense from        
determination merely  according to laws 
of nature4 ,as he puts it1 the clear    

understanding  that we are parts of     
nature1 and of our position in the      
universe  of things1 will yield a new   
character4 ,we shall only then desire   
what is ordained for us and shall find  
rest in the truth1 in the  knowledge of 
what is necessary4 ,this he regards as  
the highest state  of the individual1   
and the desire to attain it he evidently
 considers  the supreme motive by which 
the individual should be governed4 ,the 
analogue in political life to this      
highest state of the individual  is the 
direction of the 'imperium' by a 'libera
 multitudo' to the  attainment of 'pax  
vitaeque securitas' in the high sense   
which he  attaches to those words in    
,tract4 ,pol4 cap4 ,v4 #a    #a ,cp4    
,eth4 ,,iv4 ,appendix1 xxxii4 ',ea quae 
nobis eveniunt contra  id1 quod nostrae 
utilitatis ratio postulat1 aequo animo  
feremus1  si conscii simus nos functos  
nostro officio fuisse1 et potentiam1    
quam habemus1 non potuisse se eo usque  
extendere1 ut eadem vitare  possemus1   

nosque partem totius naturae esse1 cujus
 ordinem sequimur4  ,quod si clare et   
distincte intelligamus1 pars illa       
nostri1 quae  intelligentia definitur1  
hoc est1 pars melior nostri1 in eo plane
  acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia     
perseverare conabitur4 ,nam quatenus    
intelligimus1 nihil appetere nisi id1   
quod necessarium est1 nec  absolute nisi
 in veris acquiescere possumus2 adeoque 
quatenus haec  recte intelligimus1      
eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri  
cum ordine  totius naturae convenit4'   
,eth4 ,,iv4 ,preface 444 ',per bonum 444
  intelligam id1 quod certo scimus      
medium esse1 ut ad exemplar humanae     
naturae1 quod nobis proponimus1 magis   
magisque accedamus4444 ,deinde  homines 
perfectiores aut imperfectiores dicemus1
 quatenus ad hoc  idem exemplar magis   
aut minus accedunt4'    #da4 ,the       
conclusion1 then1 is that ,spinoza did  
really1 though not  explicitly1 believe 
in a final cause determining human life4
 ,that  is to say1 he held that the     

conception of an end consisting in the  
greater perfection of life on the part  
of the individual and the  community    
might1 and to some extent did1 determine
 the life of the  individual and the    
community4 ,he would have said no doubt 
that  this end1 like every good1 existed
 only in our consciousness2 that  it was
 'nihil positivum in rebus in se        
consideratis' 7,ethics1  ,,iv4          
,preface72 but an existence of the end  
in human consciousness1  determining    
human action1 is a sufficiently real    
existence1 without  being 'positivum in 
rebus4' ,but he made the mistake of     
ignoring the  more confused and mixed   
forms in which the conception of this   
end  operates2 of recognising it only in
 the forms of the philosophic  'amor    
,dei1' or in the wisdom of the          
exceptional citizen1 whom alone  he     
would admit 'ratione duci4' ,and in     
particular he failed to notice  that it 
is the consciousness of such an end to  
which his powers may  be directed1 that 

constitutes the individual's claim to   
exercise  them as rights1 just as it is 
the recognition of them by a society  as
 capable of such direction which renders
 them actually rights2 in  short that1  
just as according to him nothing is good
 or evil but  thinking makes it so1 so  
it is only thinking that makes a might a
  right1--a certain conception of the   
might as relative to a social  good on  
the part at once of the person or       
persons exercising it1 and  of a society
 which it affects4        ,c4 ,,hobbes4 
#db4 ,all the more fruitful elements in 
,spinoza's political doctrine  are      
lacking in that of ,hobbes1 but the     
principle of the two theories  is very  
much the same4 ,each begins with the    
supposition of an  existence of human   
individuals1 unaffected by society1 and 
each  struggling for existence against  
the rest1 so that men are 'natura       
hostes4' ,each conceives 'jus naturale' 
as  'potentia naturalis4'  ,but ,spinoza
 carries out this conception much more  

consistently4 ,he  does not consider    
that the natural right1 which is might1 
ceases to  exist or becomes anything    
else when a multitude combine their     
natural  rights or mights in an         
'imperium4' ,if the ostensible          
'imperium' comes  into collision with   
the powers of individuals1 single or    
combined1  among those who have hitherto
 been subject to it1 and proves the     
weaker1 it ipso facto ceases to be an   
'imperium4' ,not having  superior power1
 it no longer has superior right to the 
'subditi4'  ,it is on this principle1 as
 we have seen1 that he deals with the   
question of limitations to the right of 
a sovereign4 ,its rights are  limited   
because its powers are so4 ,exercised in
 certain ways and  directions they      
defeat themselves4 ,thus as he puts it  
in ,epist4  ,l4 7where he points out his
 difference from ,hobbes71 ',supremo    
magistratui in qualibet urbe non plus in
 subditos juris1 quam juxta  mensuram   
potestatis1 qua subditum superat1       

competere statuo4' ,hobbes1  on the     
other hand1 supposes his sovereign power
 to have an absolute  right to the      
submission of all its subjects1 singly  
or collectively1  irrespectively of the 
question of its actual power against    
them4 ,this  right he considers it to   
derive from a covenant by which         
individuals1  weary of the state of war1
 have agreed to devolve their           
'personae1'  in the language of ,roman  
law1 upon some individual or collection 
of individuals1 which is henceforward to
 represent them1 and to be  considered  
as acting with1 their combined powers4  
,this covenant being  in the nature of  
the case irrevocable1 the sovereign     
derives from it  an indefeasible right  
to direct the actions of all members of 
the  society over which it is sovereign4
    #dc4 ,the doctrine may be found in  
,leviathan1 ,part ,,ii41 chapter #ag4   
,in order 'to erect such a common power 
as may be able to defend them  from the 
invasion of foreigners and the injuries 

of one another1'  men 'confer all their 
power and strength upon one man or upon 
one  assembly of men1' 444 i4e4 'appoint
 one man or assembly of men to  bear    
their person4444 ,this is more than     
consent and concord2 it is a  real unity
 of them all in one and the same person1
 made by covenant  of every man with    
every man1 in such a manner as if every 
man should  say to every man1 ',i       
authorise1 and give up my right of      
governing  myself to this man or this   
assembly of men1 on condition that thou 
give up thy right to him and authorise  
all his actions in like  manner4' ,this 
done1 the multitude so united in one    
person is called  a commonwealth1 in    
,latin civitas 444 which 7to define it7 
is one  person1 of whose acts a great   
multitude by mutual covenant one with   
another have made themselves everyone   
the author1 to the end he may  use the  
strength and means of them all1 as he   
shall think expedient1  for their peace 
and common defence4 ,and he that        

carrieth this person  is called         
sovereign1 and said to have sovereign   
power2 and everyone  besides1 his       
subject4'    #dd4 ,in order to          
understand the form in which the        
doctrine is stated1  we have to bear in 
mind the sense in which 'persona' is    
used by  the ,roman lawyers1 as  either 
a complex of rights1 or the subject  7or
 possessor7 of those rights1 whether a  
single individual or  a corporate body4 
,in this sense of the word1 a man's     
person is  separable from his individual
 existence as a man4 ',unus homo        
sustinet  plures personas4' ,a          
magistrate1 e4g41 would be one thing in 
respect  of what he is in himself1      
another thing in respect of his         
'persona'  or complex of rights         
belonging to him as a magistrate1 and so
 too a  monarch4 ,on the same principle1
 a man1 remaining a man as before1      
might devolve his 'persona1' the complex
 of his rights1 on another4  ,a son1    
when by the death of his father         

according to ,roman law he was          
delivered from 'patria potestas' and    
became in turn head of a family1        
acquired a 'persona' which he had not   
before1 the 'persona' which had         
previously belonged to the father4      
,again1 to take a modern instance1  the 
fellows of a college1 as a corporation1 
form one 'persona1' but  each of them   
would bear other 'persons1' if1 e4g41   
they happened to  be magistrates1 or    
simply in respect of their rights as    
citizens4  ,thus 'one person' above  one
 sustainer of rights2 while in the      
second passage1 444 'carrieth this      
person1' it rather  the rights          
sustained4    #de4 ,hobbes expressly    
states that the sovereign 'person' may  
be an  assembly of men1 but the natural 
associations of the term1 when  the     
sovereign is spoken of as a person1     
favour the development of a  monarchical
 doctrine of sovereignty4    ,sovereign 
power is attained either by acquisition 
or institution4 ,by  acquisition1 when a

 man makes his children and their       
children1 or a  conqueror his enemies1  
to submit under fear of death4 ,by      
institution1  when men agree among      
themselves to submit to some man or     
assembly  'on confidence to be protected
 against all others4' ,hobbes speaks    
7,,ii4 #ag1 end7 as if there were two   
ways by which a commonwealth  and a     
sovereign defined as above could be     
brought into existence1  but clearly a  
sovereign by acquisition is not a       
sovereign in the  sense explained4 ,he  
does not 'carry a person of whose acts a
 great  multitude by mutual covenant one
 with another1 have made themselves     
everyone the author1 to the end he may  
use the strength and means of  them all1
 as he shall think expedient1 for their 
peace and common  defence4' ,and what   
,hobbes describes in the sequel 7c4 #ah7
 are1 as he  expressly says1 rights of  
sovereigns by institution2 but he seems 
tacitly to assume that every sovereign  
may claim the same1 though he  could    

hardly have supposed that the existing  
sovereignties were in  their origin     
other than sovereignties by acquisition4
    ',a commonwealth is said to be      
instituted1 when a multitude of men     
covenant1 everyone with everyone1 that  
to whatsoever man or assembly  of men   
shall be given by the major part the    
right to represent the  person of them  
all1 everyone1 as well he that voted for
 it as he  that voted against it1 shall 
authorise all the actions and judgments 
of that man or assembly of men1 in the  
same manner as if they were  his own1 to
 the end to live peaceably amongst      
themselves1 and to be  protected against
 other men' 7c4 #ah74 ,here a           
distinction is drawn  between the       
covenant of all with all to be bound by 
the act of the  majority in appointing a
 sovereign1 and that act of appointment 
itself which is not a covenant of all   
with all4 ,the natural  conclusion would
 be that it was no violation of the     
covenant if the  majority afterwards    

transferred the sovereign power to other
 hands4  ,but in the sequel ,hobbes     
expressly makes out such a transference 
to  be a violation of the original      
compact4 ,this is an instance of his    
desire to vindicate the absolute right  
of a de facto monarch4    #df4          
,throughout these statements we are     
moving in a region of fiction  from     
which ,spinoza keeps clear4 ,not only is
 the supposition of  the devolution of  
wills or powers on a sovereign by a     
covenant  historically a fiction 7about 
that no more need be said72 the  notion 
of an obligation to observe this        
covenant1 as distinct from  a           
compulsion1 is inconsistent with the    
supposition that there is  no right     
other than power prior to the act by    
which the sovereign  power is           
established4 ,if there is no such right 
antecedent to the  establishment of the 
sovereign power1 neither can there be   
any  after its establishment except in  
the sense of a power on the part  of    

individuals which the sovereign power   
enables them to exercise4  ,this power1 
or 'jus civile1' cannot itself belong to
 the sovereign1  who enables individuals
 to exercise it4 ,the only right which  
can  belong to the sovereign is the 'jus
 naturale1' #a consisting in the        
superiority of his power1 and this right
 must be measured by the  inability of  
the subjects to resist4 ,if they can    
resist1 the right  has disappeared4 ,in 
a successful resistance1 then1 to an    
ostensibly  sovereign power1 there can  
on the given supposition be no wrong    
done  to that power4 ,to say that there 
is1 would be a contradiction in  terms4 
,is such resistance1 then1 a violation  
of the 'jus civile' as  between the     
several subject citizens8 ,in the       
absence of a sovereign  power1 no doubt1
 the 'jus civile' 7according to the view
 in question1  which makes it depend on 
the existence of an 'imperium'7 would   
cease  to exist4 ,but then a successful 
resistance would simply show that  there

 was no longer such a sovereign power4  
,it would not itself be a  violation of 
'jus civile1' but simply a proof that   
the conditions of  'jus civile' were no 
longer present4 ,it might at the same   
time be a  step to re-establishing them 
if1 besides being a proof that the old  
'imperium' no longer exists1 it implied 
such a combination of powers  as        
suffices to establish a new one4    #a  
',the 'jus naturale' is the liberty each
 man hath to use his own  power as he   
will himself for the preservation of his
 own nature2 that  is to say of his own 
life2 and consequently of doing anything
 which  in his own judgment and reason  
he shall conceive to be the aptest      
means thereunto4' 7,lev41 ,i4 #ad47     
#dg4 ,no obligation1 then1 as distinct  
from compulsion1 to submit  to an       
ostensibly sovereign power can          
consistently be founded on  a theory    
according to which right either  simple 
power1 or only  differs from it1 in the 
form of 'jus civile1' through being a   

power  which an 'imperium' enables      
individuals to exercise as against each 
other4 ,hobbes could not1 indeed1 have  
made out his doctrine 7of the  absolute 
submission to the sovereign7 with any   
plausibility1 if he  had stated with the
 explicitness of ,spinoza that 'jus     
naturale'   'naturalis potentia4' ,that 
it is so is implied in the account of   
the  state of things preceding the      
establishment of sovereignty as one  of 
'bellum omnium contra omnes'2 for where 
there is no recognition  of a common    
good1 there can be no right in any other
 sense than  power4 ,but where there are
 no rights but natural power1 no        
obligatory  covenant can be made4 ,in   
order1 however1 to get a sovereignty1 to
  which there is a perpetual obligation 
of submission1 ,hobbes has to  suppose a
 covenant of all with all1 preceding the
 establishment of  sovereignty1 and to  
the observance of which1 therefore1     
there cannot  be an obligation in the   
sense that the sovereign punishes for   

the  non-observance 7the obligation     
corresponding to 'jus civile' in        
,spinoza's sense71 but which no one can 
ever be entitled to break4  ,as the     
obligatoriness of this covenant1 then1  
cannot be derived  from the sovereignty 
which is established through it1 ,hobbes
 has to  ascribe it to a 'law of nature'
 which enjoins 'that men perform their  
covenants made' 7,lev41 ,i4 #ae74 ,yet  
in the immediate sequel of this  passage
 he says expressly1 ',the nature of     
justice consisteth in the  keeping of   
valid covenants1 but the validity of    
covenants begins not  but with the      
constitution of a civil power1          
sufficient to compel men  to keep them2 
and then it is also that propriety      
begins4' ,on this  principle the        
covenant by which a civil power is for  
the first time  constituted cannot be a 
valid covenant4 ,the men making it are  
not in  a position to make a valid      
covenant at all4 ,the 'law of nature1'  
to  which alone ,hobbes can appeal      

according to his principles1 as the     
source of the obligatoriness of the     
covenant of all with all1 he  defines as
 a 'precept or general rule1 found out  
by reason1 by which  a man is forbidden 
to do that which is destructive of his  
life1 or  taketh away the means of      
preserving the same2 and to omit that by
  which he thinketh it may best be      
preserved' 7,i4 #ad74 ,when a law of    
nature1 however1 is said to command or  
forbid1 we must not understand  those   
terms in that sense which1 according to 
,hobbes1 could only  be derived from the
 establishment of an 'imperium4' ,this  
'law of  nature1' therefore1 is merely  
an expression in a general form of the  
instinct by which1 as ,spinoza says1    
every living creature 'in suo  esse     
perseverare conatur1' as guided by a    
calculation of consequences  7for no    
meaning but this can be given to        
'reason' according to  ,hobbes74 ,the   
prohibition1 then1 by this law of nature
 of a breach of  that covenant of all   

with all1 by which a sovereign power is 
supposed  to be established1 can        
properly mean nothing more than that it 
is  everyone's interest to adhere to it4
 ,this1 however1 could only be a        
conditional prohibition1 conditional1 in
 particular1 on the way in  which the   
sovereign power is exercised4 ,hobbes   
tries to show that it  must always be   
for the advantage of all to obey it1    
because not to  do so is to return to   
the state of universal war2 but a       
successful  resistance to it must be    
ipso facto an establishment of a new    
combined power which prevents the       
'bellum omnium contra omnes' from       
returning4 ,at any rate1 an obligation  
to submit to the established            
'imperium1' measured by the             
self-interest of each in doing so1 is   
quite a different thing from the        
obligation which ,hobbes describes in   
terms only appropriate 7according to his
 own showing7 to contracts  between     
individuals enforced by a sovereign     

power4    #dh4 ,it would seem that      
,hobbes' desire to prove all resistance 
to established sovereignty unjustifiable
 leads him to combine  inconsistent     
doctrines4 ,he adopts the notion that   
men are 'natura  hostes1' that 'jus     
naturale'  mere power1 because it       
illustrates  the benefit to man's estate
 derived from the establishment of a    
supreme power and the effects of the    
subversion of such power once           
established1 which he assumes to be     
equivalent to a return to a  state of   
nature4 ,but this notion does not       
justify the view that a  rebellion1     
which is strong enough to succeed1 is   
wrong4 ,for this  purpose he has to     
resort to the representation of the     
sovereign as  having a right distinct   
from power1 founded on a contract of all
  with all1 by which sovereignty is     
established4 ,this representation  is   
quite alien to ,spinoza1 with whom      
sovereignty arises1 it is true1  when   
'plures in unum conveniunt1' but in the 

sense of combining  their powers1 not of
 contracting4 ,but after all1 the       
fiction of this  contract will not serve
 the purpose which ,hobbes wants it to  
serve4  ,the sovereignty established by 
the contract can only have a natural    
right to be maintained inviolate1 for   
all other right presupposes it1  and    
cannot be presupposed by it4 ,if this   
natural right means mere  power1 then   
upon a successful rebellion it          
disappears4 ,if it means  anything else 
it must mean that there are natural     
rights of men1  other than their mere   
power1 which are violated by its        
subversion4  ,but if there are such     
rights1 there must equally be a         
possibility of  collision between the   
sovereign power and these natural       
rights1 which  would justify a          
resistance to it4    #di4 ,it may be    
asked whether it is worth while to      
examine the internal  consistency of a  
theory which turns upon what is admitted
 to be  historically a fiction1 the     

supposition of a contract of all with   
all4 ,there are fictions and fictions   
however4 ,the supposition that  some    
event took place which as a matter of   
history did not take place  may be a way
 of conveying an essentially true       
conception of some  moral relation of   
man4 ,the great objection to the        
representation  of the right of a       
sovereign power over subjects1 and the  
rights  of individuals which are        
enforced by this 'imperium1' as having  
arisen out of a contract of all with    
all1 is that it conveys a  false notion 
of rights4 ,it is not merely that the   
possibility of  such a contract being   
made presupposes just that state of     
things--a  rgime of recognised and      
enforced obligations--which it is       
assumed  to account for4 ,since those   
who contract must already have rights1  
the representation of society with its  
obligations as formed by  contract      
implies that individuals have certain   
rights1 independently  of society and of

 their functions as members of a        
society1 which they  bring with them to 
the transaction4 ,but such rights       
abstracted from  social function and    
recognition could only be powers1 or    
7according  to ,hobbes' definition7     
liberties to use powers1 which comes to 
the  same2 i4e4 they would not be rights
 at all2 and from no combination  or    
devolution of them could any right in   
the proper sense1 anything  more than a 
combined power1 arise4    #ej4 ,thus the
 only logical development of that       
separation of right  from social duty   
which is implied in the doctrine of     
'social  contract' is that of ,spinoza4 
,happily the doctrine has not been      
logically developed by those whose way  
of thinking has been affected  by it4   
,the reduction of political right--the  
right of the state over  its            
subjects--to superior power1 has not    
been popularly accepted1  though the    
general conception of national right    
seems pretty much  to identify it with  

power4 ,among the enlightened1 indeed1  
there has  of late appeared a tendency  
to adopt a theory very like that of     
,spinoza1 without the higher elements   
which we noticed in ,spinoza2  to       
consider all right as a power attained  
in that 'struggle for  existence' to    
which human 'progress' is reduced4 ,but 
for one person1  who1 as a matter of    
speculation1 considers the right of     
society over  him to be a disguised     
might1 there are thousands who1 as a    
matter of  practice1 regard their own   
right as independent of that correlation
  to duty without which it is merely a  
might4 ,the popular effect of  the      
notion that the individual brings with  
him into society certain  rights which  
he does not derive from society1--which 
are other than  claims to fulfil freely 
7i4e4 for their own sake7 certain       
functions  towards society1--is seen in 
the inveterate irreverence of the       
individual towards the state1 in the    
assumption that he has rights  against  

society irrespectively of his fulfilment
 of any duties to  society1 that all    
'powers that be' are restraints upon his
 natural  freedom which he may rightly  
defy as far as he safely can4        ,d4
 ,,locke4    #ea4 ,it was chiefly       
,rousseau who gave that cast to the     
doctrine of  the origin of political    
obligation in contract1 in which it best
  lends itself to the assertion of      
rights apart from duties on the part  of
 individuals1 in opposition to the      
counter-fallacy which claims  rights for
 the state irrespectively of its        
fulfilment of its function  as securing 
the rights of individuals4 ,it is       
probably true that  the ,contrat ,social
 had great effect on the founders of    
,american  independence1 an effect which
 appears in the terms of the            
,declaration  of ,independence and in   
preambles to the constitutions of some  
of the  original ,american states4 ,but 
the essential ideas of ,rousseau are  to
 be found in ,locke's ,treatise of      

,civil ,government1 which was  probably 
well known in ,america for half a       
century before ,rousseau was  heard of4 
#a ,locke again constantly appeals to   
,hooker's first book  on ,ecclesiastical
 ,polity1#b and ,grotius#c argues in    
exactly the  same strain4    ,hooker1   
,grotius1 ,hobbes1 ,locke1 and ,rousseau
 only differ in their  application of   
the same conception2 viz4 that men live 
first in a  state of nature1 subject to 
a law of nature1 also called the law of 
reason2 that in this state they are in  
some sense free and equal2  that        
'finding many inconveniences' in it they
 covenant with each  other to establish 
a government--a covenant which they are 
bound by  the 'law of nature' to        
observe--and that out of this covenant  
the  obligation of submission to the    
'powers that be' arises4 ,spinoza  alone
 takes a different line3 he does not    
question the state of  nature or the    
origin of government in a combination of
 men who find  the state of nature      

'inconvenient'2 but he regards this     
combination  as one of powers directed  
to a common end1 and constituting       
superior  force1 not as a covenant which
 men are bound by the law of nature to  
observe4    #a ,locke1 ,civil           
,government1 chap4 vii4 sec4 #hg4 ',man1
 being born  with a title to perfect    
freedom1 and an uncontrolled enjoyment  
of  all the rights and privileges of the
 law of nature1 equally with any  other 
man or number of men in the world1 hath 
by nature a power not  only to preserve 
his life1 liberty1 and estate against   
444 other men2  but to judge of and     
punish the breaches of that law in      
others4444  ,there1 and there only1 is  
political society where every one of    
the members hath quitted this natural   
power1 resigned it up into  the hands of
 the community in all cases that exclude
 him not from  appealing for protection 
to the law established by it4'    #b    
',laws human1 of what kind soever1 are  
available by consent1'  ,hooker1 ,eccl4 

,pol4 ,i4 #aj 7quoted by ,locke1 l4c4   
chap4 xi4 sec4  #acd74 ',to be commanded
 we do consent1 when that society1      
whereof we  be a part1 hath at any time 
before consented1 without revoking the  
same after by the like universal        
agreement4' ,hooker2 ibid4    #c ,de    
jure belli et pacis1 ,proleg4 secs4 #ae 
and #af4    #eb4 ,the common doctrine is
 so full of ambiguities that it readily 
lends itself to opposite applications4  
,in the first place 'state of  nature'  
may be understood in most different     
senses4 ,the one idea  common to all the
 writers who suppose such a state to    
have preceded  that of civil society is 
a negative one4 ,it was a state which   
was  not one of political society1 one  
in which there was no civil  government2
 i4e4 no supreme power1 exercised by a  
single person or  plurality of persons1 
which could compel obedience on the part
 of  all members of a society1 and was  
recognised as entitled to do so  by them
 all1 or by a sufficient number of them 

to secure general  obedience4 ,but was  
it one of society at all8 ,was it one in
 which men  had no dealings with each   
other except in the way of one          
struggling  to make another serve his   
will and to get for himself what the    
other  had1 or was it one in which there
 were ties of personal affection and    
common interest1 and recognised         
obligations1 between man and man8       
,evidently among those who spoke of a   
state of nature1 there were very        
various and wavering conceptions on this
 point4 ,they are apt to make  an       
absolute opposition between the state of
 nature and the political  state1 and to
 represent men as having suddenly       
contracted themselves  out of one into  
the other4 ,yet evidently the contract  
would have been  impossible unless      
society in a form very like that        
distinctively  called political had been
 in existence beforehand4 ,if political 
society is to be supposed to have       
originated in a pact at all1 the        

difference between it and the preceding 
state of nature cannot1 with  any       
plausibility1 be held to have been much 
more than a difference  between a       
society regulated by written law and    
officers with defined  power and one    
regulated by customs and tacitly        
recognised authority4    #ec4 ,again1 it
 was held that in a state of nature men 
were 'free and  equal4' ,this is        
maintained by ,hobbes as much as by the 
founders of  ,american independence4    
,but if freedom is to be understood in  
the  sense in which most of these       
writers seem to understand it1 as a     
power of executing1 of giving effect to1
 one's will1 the amount  of freedom     
possessed in a state of nature1 if that 
was a state of  detachment and collision
 between individuals1 must have been    
very  small4 ,men must have been        
constantly thwarting each other1 and 7in
  the absence of that 'jus in naturam1' 
as ,spinoza calls it1 which  combination
 gives7 thwarted by powers of nature4   

,in such a state  those only could be   
free1 in the sense supposed1 who were   
not  equal to the rest2 who1 in virtue  
of superior power1 could use the  rest4 
,but whether we suppose an even balance 
of weaknesses1 in  subjection to the    
crushing forces of nature1 or a dominion
 of few  over many by means of superior 
strength1 in such a state of nature no  
general pact would be possible4 ,no     
equality in freedom is possible  except 
for members of a society of whom each   
recognises a good of  the whole which is
 also his own1 and to which the free    
co-operation  of all is necessary4 ,but 
if such society is supposed in the state
  of nature--and otherwise the 'pact'   
establishing political society  would be
 impossible--it is already in principle 
the same as political  society4    #ed4 
,it is not always certain whether the   
writers in question  considered men to  
be actually free and equal in the state 
of nature1  or only so according to the 
'law of nature1' which might or might   

not be observed4 7,hobbes represents the
 freedom and equality in the  state of  
nature as actual1 and this state as     
being for that reason  'bellum omnium   
contra omnes4'7 ,they all1 however1     
implicitly assume  a consciousness of   
the law of nature in the state of       
nature4 ,it  is thus not a law of nature
 in the sense in which we commonly use  
the term4 ,it is not a law according to 
which the agents subject to  it act     
necessarily but without consciousness of
 the law4 ,it is a  law of which the    
agent subject to it has a consciousness1
 but one  according to which he may or  
may not act2 i4e4 one according to which
  he ought to act4 ,it is from it that  
the obligation to submission to  civil  
government1 according to all these      
writers1 is derived4 ,but in  regard to 
such a law1 two questions have to be    
asked3 firstly1 how  can the            
consciousness of obligation arise       
without recognition by the  individual  
of claims on the part of others--social 

claims in some  form or other--which may
 be opposed to his momentary            
inclinations8  and secondly1 given a    
society of men capable of such a        
consciousness  of obligation1           
constituting a law according to which   
the members  of the society are free and
 equal1 in what does it differ from a   
political society8 ,if these questions  
had been fairly considered1  it must    
have been seen that the distinction     
between a political  society and a state
 of nature1 governed by such a law of   
nature1 was  untenable2 that a state of 
things out of which political society   
could have arisen by compact1 must have 
been one in which the  individual       
regarded himself as a member of a       
society which has claims  on him and on 
which he has claims1 and that such      
society is already  in principle a      
political society4 ,but the ambiguity   
attending the  conception of the law of 
nature prevented them from being        
considered4  ,when the writers in       

question spoke of a law of nature1 to   
which men  in the state of nature were  
subject1 they did not make it clear to  
themselves that this law1 as understood 
by them1 could not exist at  all without
 there being some recognition or        
consciousness of it on  the part of     
those subject to it4 ,the designation of
 it as 'law of  nature' or 'law of ,god'
 helped to disguise the fact that there 
was no  imponent of it1 in the sense in 
which a law is imposed on individuals   
by a political superior4 ,in the absence
 of such an imponent1 unless  it is     
either a uniformity in the relations of 
natural events or an  irresistible      
force--and it is not represented in     
either of these ways  in juristic       
writings--it can only mean a recognition
 of obligation  arising in the          
consciousness of the individual from his
 relations  to society4 ,but this not   
being clearly realised1 it was possible 
to  represent the law of nature as      
antecedent to the laws imposed by a     

political superior1 without its being   
observed that this implied the          
antecedence of a condition of things in 
which the result supposed  to be        
obtained through the formation of       
political society--the  establishment1  
viz4 of reciprocal claims to freedom and
 equality on  the part of members of a  
society--already existed4    #ee4 ,in   
fact1 the condition of society in which 
it could properly  be said to be        
governed by a law of nature1 i4e4 by an 
obligation  of which there is no        
imponent but the consciousness of man1  
an  obligation of which the breach is   
not punished by a political  superior1  
is not antecedent to political society1 
but one which it  gradually tends to    
produce4 ,it is the radical fault of the
 theory  which finds the origin of      
political society in compact1 that it   
has  to reverse the true process4 ,to   
account for the possibility of the      
compact of all with all1 it has to      
assume a society subject to a law  of   

nature1 prescribing the freedom and     
equality of all4 ,but a society         
governed by such a law as a law of      
nature1 i4e4 with no imponent  but man's
 consciousness1 would have been one from
 which political  society would have    
been a decline1 one in which there could
 have  been no motive to the            
establishment of civil government4 ,thus
 this  theory must needs be false to    
itself in one of two ways4 ,either it is
  false to the conception of a law of   
nature1 with its prescription of        
freedom and equality1 as governing the  
state of things prior to the  compact by
 which political society is established1
 only introducing  the law of nature as 
the ground of the obligatoriness of that
  compact1 but treating the state of    
nature as one of universal war in  which
 no reciprocal claims of any sort were  
recognised1 7so ,hobbes72  or just so   
far as it realises the conception of a  
society governed  by a law of nature1 as
 equivalent to that spontaneous         

recognition by  each of the claims of   
all others1 without which the covenant  
of all  with all is in fact             
unaccountable1 it does away with any    
appearance  of necessity for the        
transition from the state of nature to  
that of  political society and tends to 
represent the latter as a decline from  
the former4 ,this result is seen in     
,rousseau2 but to a great extent        
,rousseau had been anticipated by       
,locke4 ,the broad differences between  
,locke and ,hobbes in their development 
of the common doctrine1 are  7#a7 that  
,locke denies that the state of nature  
is a state of war1  and 7#b7 that ,locke
 distinguishes the act by which         
political society  is established from  
that by which the government1           
legislative and  executive1 is          
established1 and is consequently able to
 distinguish  the dissolution of the    
political society from the dissolution  
of the  government 7,civ4 ,gov4 ,chapter
 ,,xix4 ,sect4 #baa74    #ef4 ,the      

'state of nature' and the 'state of war'
 'are so far distant  as a state of     
peace1 good-will1 mutual assistance and 
preservation1  and a state of enmity1   
malice1 violence1 and mutual            
destruction1 are  from one another4 ,men
 living together1 according to reason1  
without  a common superior on earth with
 authority to judge between them1 is    
properly the state of nature4 ,but      
force1 or a declared design of  force1  
upon the person of another1 where there 
is no common superior  on earth to      
appeal to for relief1 is the state of   
war' 7,civ4 ,gov4  ,,iii4 ,sect4 #ai74  
,in the state of nature1 however1 when  
the state of  war has once begun1 there 
is not the same means of terminating it 
as  in civil society4    ,the right of  
war may belong to a man1 'though he be  
in society and  a fellow-subject1' when 
his person or property is in such       
immediate  danger that it is impossible 
to appeal for relief to the common      
superior4 ',but when the actual force is

 over1 the state of war ceases  between 
those that are in society 444 because   
there lies the remedy  of appeal for the
 past injury and to prevent future      
harm4' ,in the  state of nature1 when   
the state of war has once begun1 it     
continues  until the aggressor offers   
peace and reparation4 ,the state of war1
  though not proper to the state of     
nature1 is a frequent incident of  it1  
and to avoid it is one great reason of  
men's putting themselves  into society  
7ib4 ,sect4 #ba74 ,the state of nature  
is not one that is  altogether over and 
done with4 ',all rulers of independent  
governments  all through the world are  
in a state of nature4' ,the members of  
one  state in dealing with those of     
another are in a state of nature1  and  
the law of nature alone binds them4     
',for truth and keeping of  faith       
belongs to men as men1 and not as       
members of society' 7,civ4  ,gov4 ,,ii4 
,sect4 #ad74 ',all men are naturally in 
that state and remain  so till by their 

own consents they make themselves       
members of some  politic society' 7ib4  
,sect4 #ae74    #eg4 ,the antithesis1 as
 put above1 between the state of nature 
and  the state of war1 can only be      
maintained on the supposition that the  
'law of nature' is observed in a state  
of nature4 ,locke does not  explicitly  
state that this is the case4 ,if it were
 so1 it would not  appear how the state 
of war should arise in the state of     
nature4  ,but he evidently thought of   
the state of nature as one in which men 
recognised the law of nature1 though    
without fully observing it4 ,he  quotes 
with approval from ,hooker language     
which implies that not only  is the     
state of nature a state of equality1 but
 that in it there is  such consciousness
 of equality with each other on the part
 of men  that they recognise the        
principle 'do as you would be done by'  
7,civ4  ,gov4 ,,ii4 ,sect4 #e74 ,with   
,hobbes1 in the supposed state of nature
 the  'law of nature' is emphatically   

not observed1 and hence it is a  state  
of war4 ,as has been pointed out above1 
a 'law of nature' in the  sense in which
 these writers use the term1 as a law   
which obliges but  yet has no imponent  
in the shape of a sovereign power1 is1  
as ,locke  says 7,sect4 #acf71 'nowhere 
to be found but in the minds of men'2 it
  can only have its being in the        
consciousness of those subject to it4   
,if therefore we are to suppose a state 
of nature in which such a law  of nature
 exists1 it is more consistent to       
conceive it in ,locke's  way than in    
that of ,hobbes2 more consistent to     
conceive it as one in  which men        
recognise duties to each other than as a
 'bellum omnium  contra omnes4'    #eh4 
,as to the second point1 from his own   
conception of what men  are in the state
 of nature1 and of the ends for which   
they found  political societies1 ,locke 
derives certain necessary limitations   
of what the supreme power in a          
commonwealth may rightfully do4 ,the    

prime business of the political society1
 once formed1 is to establish  the      
legislative power4 ,this is 'sacred and 
unalterable in the hands  where the     
community have once placed it' 7,civ4   
,gov4 ,,xi4 ,sect4 #acd72               
'unalterable1' that is1 as we gather    
from the sequel1 by anything  short of  
an act of the community which originally
 placed it in these  hands4 ,but as men 
in a state of nature have 'no arbitrary 
power' over  each other 7which must mean
 that according to the 'law of nature'  
they have no such power71 so they cannot
 transfer any such power to  the        
community nor it to the legislature4 ,no
 legislature can have the  right to     
destroy1 enslave1 or designedly         
impoverish the subjects4 ,and  as no    
legislature can be entitled to do       
anything which the individual  in the   
state of nature would not by the law of 
nature be entitled to  do1 so its great 
business is to declare the law of nature
 in general  terms and administer it by 

known authorised judges4 ,the state of  
nature1 ,locke seemed to think1 would   
have done very well1 but for  the       
inconvenience of every man being judge  
in his own case of what  the law of     
nature requires4 ,it is to remedy this  
inconvenience by  establishing 7#a7 a   
settled law1 received by common consent1
 7#b7 a  known and indifferent judge1   
7#c7 a power to enforce the decisions of
  such a judge1 that political society  
is formed4    ,hence a legislature      
violates the 'trust that is put in it'  
by society  unless it observes the      
following rules3 7#a7 it is to govern   
'by  promulgated established laws1' not 
to be varied to suit particular         
interests2 7#b7 these laws are to be    
designed only for the good of  the      
people2 7#c7 it must not raise taxes but
 by consent of the people  through      
themselves or their deputies2 7#d7 it   
neither 'must1 nor  can1 transfer the   
power of making laws to anybody else1 or
 place it  anywhere but where the people

 have' 7,civ4 ,gov4 ,,xi4 ,sect4 #adb74 
#ei4 ,thus 'the legislative being only a
 fiduciary power to act for  certain    
ends1 there remains still in the people 
a supreme power  to remove or alter the 
legislature4' ,subject to this ultimate 
'sovereignty' 7a term which ,locke does 
not use7 of the people1 the  legislative
 is necessarily the supreme power1 to   
which the executive  is subordinate4 ,an
 appearance to the contrary can only    
arise in cases  where 7as in ,england7  
the supreme executive power is held by a
 person  who has also a share in the    
legislative4 ,such a person may 'in a   
very tolerable sense be called supreme4'
 ,it is not1 however1 to him  as supreme
 legislator 7which he is not1 but only a
 participator in  supreme legislation7  
but to him as supreme executor of the   
law that  oaths of allegiance are taken4
 ,it is only as executing the law that  
he can claim obedience1 his executive   
power being1 like the power  of the     
legislative1 'a fiduciary trust placed  

in him' to enforce  obedience to law and
 that only 7,civ4 ,gov4 ,,xiii4 ,sect4  
#aea74 ,this  distinction of the supreme
 power of the people from that of the   
supreme executive1 corresponding to a   
distinction between the act of          
transferring individual powers to a     
society and the subsequent act  by which
 that society establishes a particular  
form of government1  enables ,locke to  
distinguish what ,hobbes had confounded1
 the  dissolution of government and the 
dissolution of political society4       
#fj4 ,he gets rid of ,hobbes' notion1   
that because the 'covenant of all  with 
all1' by which a sovereignty is         
established1 is irrevocable1  therefore 
the government once established is      
unalterable4 ,he  conceives the original
 pact merely as an agreement to form a  
civil  society1 which must indeed have a
 government1 but not necessarily  always
 the same government4 ,the pact is a    
transfer by individuals of  their       
natural rights to a society1 and can    

only be cancelled through  the          
dissolution of the society by foreign   
conquest4 ,the delegation  by the       
society of legislative and executive    
powers to a person or  persons is a     
different matter4 ,the society always   
retains the right1  according to ,locke1
 of resuming the powers thus delegated1 
and must  exercise the light in the     
event either of the legislative being   
altered1 7placed in different hands from
 those originally intended71  of a      
collision between its executive and     
legislative officers1 or of  a breach   
between different branches of the       
legislature 7when as in  ,england there 
are such different branches71 or when   
legislative and  executive or either of 
them 'act contrary to their trust4' ,he 
thus in  effect vindicates the right of 
revolution1 ascribing to a 'sovereign   
people' the attributes which ,hobbes    
assigned to a 'person1' single  or      
corporate1 on which the people forming a
 society were supposed by  an           

irrevocable act to have devolved their  
powers4 ,in other words1  he considered 
the whole civil society in all cases to 
have the  rights which ,hobbes would    
only have allowed it to possess where   
the  government was not a monarchy or   
aristocracy but a democracy2 i4e4  where
 the supreme 'person' upon which all    
devolve their several  'personae' is an 
'assembly of all who will come          
together4' ,as such  a democracy did not
 then exist in ,europe1 any more than it
 does  now1 except in some ,swiss       
cantons1 the practical difference       
between  the two views was very great4  
,both ,locke and ,hobbes wrote with a   
present political object in view1       
,hobbes wishing to condemn the          
,rebellion1 ,locke to justify the       
,revolution4 ,for practical purposes1   
,locke's doctrine is much the better2   
but if ,hobbes' translation  of the     
irrevocableness of the covenant of all  
with all into the  illegitimacy of      
resistance to an established government 

in effect  entitles any tyrant l to do  
as he likes1 on the other hand1 it is   
impossible upon ,locke's theory to      
pronounce when resistance to a de  facto
 government is legitimate or otherwise4 
,it would be legitimate  according to   
him when it is an act of the 'sovereign 
people' 7not  that ,locke uses the      
phrase71 superseding a government which 
has been  false to its trust4 ,but this 
admitted1 all sorts of questions arise  
as to the means of ascertaining what is 
and what is not an act of the           
'sovereign people4'    #a ,according to 
,hobbes1 tyranny  'monarchy misliked'2  
oligarchy   'aristocracy misliked4'     
#fa4 ,the rapid success of the          
revolution without popular disorder     
prevented ,locke's theory from becoming 
of importance1 but in the  presence of  
such sectarian enthusiasm as existed in 
,hobbes' time  it would have become     
dangerous4 ,it would not any more than  
that of  ,hobbes justify resistance to  
'the powers that be' on the part of any 

body of men short of the civil society  
acting as a whole1 i4e4 by a  majority4 
,the sectaries of the time of the       
,rebellion1 in pleading  a natural or   
divine right to resist the orders of the
 government1  would have been as much   
condemned by ,locke's theory as by that 
of  ,hobbes4 ,but who can say when any  
popular action by which established     
powers1 legislative or executive1 are   
resisted or altered is an  act of the   
'sovereign people1' of the civil society
 acting as a  whole1 or no4 ,where      
government is democratic1 in ,hobbes'   
sense1  i4e4 vested in an assembly of   
all who will come together1 the act  of 
the 'sovereign people' is unmistakeable4
 ,it is the act of the  majority of such
 an assembly4 ,but in such a case the   
difficulty  cannot arise4 ,there can be 
no withdrawal by the sovereign people   
of power from its legislative or        
executive representatives1 since  it has
 no such representatives4 ,in any other 
case it would seem  impossible to say   

whether any resistance to1 or deposition
 of1 an  established legislative or     
executive is the act of the majority of 
the society or no ,any sectary or       
revolutionary may plead that he has  the
 'sovereign people' on his side4 ,if he 
fails1 it is not certain  that he has   
them not on his side2 for it may be     
that1 though he has  the majority of the
 society on his side1 yet the society   
has allowed  the growth within it of a  
power which prevents it from giving     
effect  to its will4 ,on the other hand1
 if the revolution succeeds1 it is not  
certain that it had the majority on its 
side when it began1 though  the majority
 may have come to acquiesce in its      
result4 ,in short1  on ,locke's         
principle that any particular government
 derives its  authority from an act of  
the society1 and society by a like act  
may  recall the authority1 how can we   
ever be entitled to say that such an    
act has been exercised8    #fb4 ,it is  
true that there is no greater difficulty

 about supposing  it to be exercised in 
the dissolution than in the             
establishment of a  government1 indeed  
not so much2 but the act of first       
establishing a  government is thrown    
back into an indefinite past4 ,it may   
easily be  taken for granted without    
further inquiry into the conditions of  
its  possibility4 ,on the other hand1 as
 the act of legitimately dissolving  a  
government or superseding one by another
 has to be imagined as  taking place in 
the present1 the inquiry into the       
conditions of  its possibility cannot   
well be avoided4 ,if we have once       
assumed  with ,hobbes and ,locke1 that  
the authority of government is derived  
from a covenant of all with all1--either
 directly or mediately by a  subsequent 
act in which the covenanted society     
delegates its powers  to a              
representative or representatives1--it  
will follow that a like  act is required
 to cancel it2 and the difficulties of  
conceiving  such an act under the       

conditions of the present are so great1 
that  ,hobbes' view of the              
irrevocableness of the original act by  
which  any government was established   
has much to say for itself4 ,if the     
authority of any government--its claim  
on our obedience--is held to  be derived
 not from an original covenant1 or from 
any covenant1 but  from the function    
which it serves in maintaining those    
conditions  of freedom which are        
conditions of the moral life1 then no   
act of  the people in revocation of a   
prior act need be reckoned necessary  to
 justify its dissolution4 ,if it ceases 
to serve this function1  it loses its   
claim on our obedience4 ,it is a 4 #a   
7,here  again the ,greek theory1        
deriving the authority of government not
  from consent but from the end which it
 serves1 is sounder than the  modern47  
,whether or no any particular government
 has on this ground  lost its claim and 
may be rightly resisted1 is a question1 
no doubt1  difficult for the individual 

to answer with certainty4 ,in the long  
run1 however1 it seems generally if not 
always to answer itself4 ,a  government 
no longer serving the function          
described--which1 it must  be           
remembered1 is variously served         
according to circumstances--brings      
forces into play which are fatal to it4 
,but if it is difficult  upon this      
theory for the individual to ascertain1 
as a matter of  speculation1 whether    
resistance to an established government 
is  justified or no1 at any rate upon   
this theory such a justification of     
resistance is possible4 ,upon ,locke's  
theory1 the condition necessary  to     
justify it--viz4 an act of the whole    
people governed--is one  which1 anywhere
 except in a ,swiss canton1 it would be 
impossible  to fulfil4 ,for practical   
purposes1 ,locke comes to a right result
  by ignoring this impossibility4       
,having supposed the reality of one     
impossible event1--the establishment of 
government by compact or  by the act of 

a society founded on compact1--he       
cancels this error  in the result by    
supposing the possibility of another    
transaction  equally impossible1 viz1   
the collective act of a people          
dissolving  its government4    #a ,greek
  7parekbasis7  a government without a  
proper  basis ,tr    #fc4 ,it is evident
 from the chapter 7,,xix47 on the       
'dissolution of  government' that he did
 not seriously contemplate the          
conditions  under which such an act     
could be exercised4 ,what he was really 
concerned about was to dispute 'the     
right divine to govern wrong'  on the   
part of a legislative as much as on the 
part of an executive  power2 to maintain
 the principle that government is only  
justified  by being for the good of the 
people1 and to point out the difference 
between holding that some government is 
necessarily for the good of  the people1
 and holding that any particular        
government is for their  good1 a        
difference which ,hobbes had ignored4   

,in order to do this1  starting with the
 supposition of an actual deed on the   
part of a  community establishing a     
government1 he had to suppose a reserved
  right on the part of the community by 
a like deed to dissolve  it4 ,but in the
 only particular case in which he       
contemplates a  loss by the legislature 
of its representative character1 he does
  not suggest the establishment of      
another by an act of the whole  people4 
,he saw that the ,english ,parliament in
 his time could not  claim to be such as
 it could be supposed that the          
covenanting  community originally       
intended it to be4 ',it often comes to  
pass1'  he says1 'in governments where  
part of the legislative consists of     
representatives chosen by the people1   
that in tract of time this              
representation becomes very unequal and 
disproportionate to the  reasons it was 
first established upon4444 ,the bare    
name of a town1  of which there remains 
not so much as the ruins1 where scarce  

so  much housing as a sheepcote1 or more
 inhabitants than a shepherd is  to be  
found1 sends as many representatives to 
the grand assembly of  law-makers1 as a 
whole county1 numerous in people1 and   
powerful in  riches4 ,this strangers    
stand amazed at1 and everyone must      
confess  needs a remedy2 though most    
think it hard to find one1 because the  
constitution of the legislative being   
the original and supreme act  of the    
society antecedent to all positive laws 
in it1 and depending  wholly on the     
people1 no inferior power can alter it4 
,and therefore  the people1 when the    
legislative is once constituted1 having1
 in such  a government as we have been  
speaking of1 no power to act as long as 
the government stands1 this             
inconvenience is thought incapable of a 
remedy' 7,chapter ,,xiii4 ,sect4 #aeg74 
,the only remedy which he suggests  is  
not an act of the sovereign people1 but 
an exercise of prerogative  on the part 
of the executive1 in the way of         

redistributing  representation1 which   
would be justified by 'salus populi     
suprema  lex4'        ,e4 ,,rousseau4   
#fd4 ,that 'sovereignty of the people1' 
which ,locke looks upon as  held in     
reserve after its original exercise in  
the establishment  of government1 only  
to be asserted in the event of a        
legislature  proving false to its trust1
 ,rousseau supposes to be in constant   
exercise4 ,previous writers had thought 
of the political society  or            
commonwealth1 upon its formation by     
compact1 as instituting a  sovereign4   
,they differed chiefly on the point     
whether the society  afterwards had or  
had not a right of displacing an        
established  sovereign4 ,rousseau does  
not think of the society1 civitas or    
commonwealth1 as thus instituting a     
sovereign1 but as itself in the  act of 
its formation becoming a sovereign and  
ever after continuing  so4    #fe4 ,in  
his conception of a state of nature1    
,rousseau does not differ  from ,locke4 

,he conceives the motive for passing out
 of it1 however1  somewhat differently  
and more after the manner of ,spinoza4  
,with  ,locke the motive is chiefly a   
sense of the desirability of having  an 
impartial judge1 and efficient          
enforcement of the law of nature4       
,according to ,rousseau1 some pact takes
 place when men find the  hindrances to 
their preservation in a state of nature 
too strong for  the forces which each   
individual can bring to bear against    
them4  ,this recalls ,spinoza's view of 
the 'jus in naturam' as acquired by a   
combination of the forces of individuals
 in civil society4    #ff4 ,the 'problem
 of which the social contract is a      
solution' ,rousseau  states thus3 ',to  
find a form of association which        
protects with the  whole common force   
the person and property of each         
associate1 and in  virtue of which      
everyone1 while uniting himself to all1 
only obeys  himself and remains as free 
as before4' 7,contrat ,social1 ,i1 vi47 

,the terms of the contract which solves 
this problem ,rousseau states  thus3    
',each of us throws into the common     
stock his person and all  his faculties 
under the supreme direction of the      
general will2 and  we accept each member
 as an individual part of the whole4444 
,there  results from this act of        
association1 in place of the several    
persons  of the several contracting     
parties1 a collective moral body1       
composed  of as many members as there   
are voices in the assembly1 which body  
receives from this act its unity1 its   
common self1 its life1 and its  will4444
 ,it is called by its members a state   
when it is passive1 a  sovereign when it
 is active1 a power when compared with  
similar  bodies4 ,the associates are    
called collectively a people1 severally 
citizens as sharing in the sovereign    
authority1 subjects as  submitted to the
 laws of the state4' 7,ib47 ,each of    
them is under  an obligation in two     
relations1 'as a member of the sovereign

 body  towards the individuals1 and as a
 member of the state towards the        
sovereign4' ,all the subjects can by a  
public vote be placed under a           
particular obligation towards the       
sovereign1 but the sovereign cannot     
thus incur an obligation towards itself4
 ,it cannot impose any law  upon itself 
which it cannot cancel4 ,nor is there   
need to restrict  its powers in the     
interest of the subjects4 ,for the      
sovereign body1  being formed only of   
the individuals which constitute it1 can
 have no  interest contrary to theirs4  
',from the mere fact of its existence1  
it is always all that it ought to be'   
7since1 from the very fact of  its      
institution1 all merely private         
interests are lost in it74 ,on  the     
other hand1 the will of the individual  
7his particular interest  as founded    
upon his particular desires7 may very   
well conflict with  that general will   
which constitutes the sovereign4 ,hence 
the social  pact necessarily involves a 

tacit agreement1 that anyone refusing to
  conform to the general will shall be  
forced to do so by the whole  body      
politic2 in other words1 'shall be      
forced to be free1' since the  universal
 conformity to the general will is the  
guarantee to each  individual of freedom
 from dependence on any other person or 
persons4  7,i1 vii47    #fg4 ,the result
 to the individual may be stated thus4  
,he exchanges  the natural liberty to do
 and get what he can1 a liberty limited 
by  his relative strength1 for a liberty
 at once limited and secured by  the    
general will2 he exchanges the mere     
possession of such things  as he can    
get1 a possession which is the effect of
 force1 for a  property founded on a    
positive title1 on the guarantee of     
society4 ,at  the same time he becomes a
 moral agent4 ,justice instead of       
instinct  becomes the guide of his      
actions4 ,for the moral slavery to      
appetite  he substitutes the moral      
freedom which consists in obedience to a

  self-imposed law4 ,now for the first  
time it can be said that there is       
anything which he ought to do1 as       
distinguished from that which he  is    
forced to do4 7,i1 viii47    #fh4 ,such 
language makes it clear that the        
sovereignty of which  ,rousseau         
discusses the origin and attributes1 is 
something  essentially different from   
the supreme coercive power which        
previous  writers on the 'jus civile'   
had in view4 ,a contemporary of ,hobbes 
had  said that        'there's on earth 
a yet auguster thing1      ,veiled      
though it be1 than ,parliament and      
,king4'    ,it is to this 'auguster     
thing1' not to such supreme power as    
,english  lawyers held to be vested in  
',parliament and ,king1' that           
,rousseau's  account of the sovereign is
 really applicable4 ,what he says of it 
is  what ,plato or ,aristotle might have
 said of the  1 #a which  is the source 
of the laws and discipline of the ideal 
polity1 and  what a follower of ,kant   

might say of the 'pure practical        
reason1'  which renders the individual  
obedient to a law of which he regards   
himself1 in virtue of his reason1 as the
 author1 and causes him to  treat       
humanity equally in the person of others
 and in his own always  as an end1 never
 merely as a means4 ,but all the while  
,rousseau  himself thinks that he is    
treating of the sovereign in the        
ordinary  sense2 in the sense of some   
power of which it could be reasonably   
asked how it was established in the part
 where it resides1 when and  by whom and
 in what way it is exercised4 ,a reader 
of him who is more  or less familiar    
with the legal conception of            
sovereignty1 but not at  all with that  
of practical reason or of a 'general    
will4' a common  ego1 which wills       
nothing but what is for the common good1
 is pretty  sure to retain the idea of  
supreme coercive power as the attribute 
of  sovereignty1 and to ignore the      
attribute of pure disinterestedness1    

which1 according to ,rousseau1 must     
characterise every act that can be      
ascribed to the sovereign4    #a ,greek 
7theios nous7  divine mind or           
intelligence ,tr    #fi4 ,the practical 
result is a vague exaltation of the     
prerogatives  of the sovereign people1  
without any corresponding limitation of 
the  conditions under which an act is to
 be deemed that of the sovereign        
people4 ,the justifiability of laws and 
acts of government1 and of  the rights  
which these confer1 comes to be sought  
simply in the fact  that the people     
wills them1 not in the fact that they   
represent a  true 'volont gnrale1' an   
impartial and disinterested will for the
  common good4 ,thus the question of    
what really needs to be enacted  by the 
state in order to secure the conditions 
under which a good  life is possible1 is
 lost sight of in the quest for         
majorities2  and as the will of the     
people in any other sense than the      
measure  of what the people will        

tolerate is really unascertainable in   
the  great nations of ,europe1 the way  
is prepared for the sophistries of      
modern political management1 for        
manipulating electoral bodies1 for      
influencing elected bodies1 and         
procuring plbiscites4    #gj4 ,the      
incompatibility between the ideal       
attributes which ,rousseau  ascribes to 
the sovereign and any power that can    
actually be  exercised by any man or    
body of men becomes clearer as we       
proceed4 ,he  expressly distinguishes   
'sovereignty' from power1 and on the    
ground  of this distinction holds that  
it cannot be alienated1 represented1  or
 divided4 ',sovereignty being simply the
 exercise of the general  will can never
 be alienated1 and the sovereign1 who is
 only a  collective being1 can only be  
represented by himself4 ,power can be   
transmitted1 but not will4' 7,,ii1 i47  
,in order to the possibility of a       
representation of the general will1     
there must be a permanent accord        

between it and the individual will or   
wills of the person or persons          
representing it4 ,but such permanent    
accord is impossible4 7,ib47  ,again1 a 
general will is from the nature of the  
case indivisible4  ,it is commonly held 
to be divided1 not1 indeed1 in respect  
of its  source1 but in respect of the   
objects to which its acts are directed1 
e4g4 into legislative and executive     
powers2 into rights of taxation1  of    
war1 of justice1 c4 ,but this supposed  
division of sovereign  powers or rights 
implies that 'what are only emanations  
from the  sovereign authority are taken 
to be parts of it4' 7,,ii1 ii47 ,the    
only  exercise of sovereign power1      
properly so called1 is in legislation1  
and there is no proper act of           
legislation except when the whole       
people comes to a decision with         
reference to the whole people4 ,then    
the matter decided on is as general as  
the will which decides on it2  and this 
is what constitutes a law4 7,,ii1 vi47  

,by this consideration  several         
questions are answered4 ,whose office is
 it to make laws8  ,it is that of the   
general will1 which can neither be      
alienated nor  represented4 ,is the     
prince above the law8 ,the answer is1   
,he is a  member of the state1 and      
cannot be so4 ,can the law be unjust8   
,no one  can be unjust to himself3      
therefore not the whole people to the   
whole  people4 ,how can we be free and  
yet subject to the laws8 ,the laws are  
the register of our own will4 7,ib47    
,laws1 in short1 are properly  those    
general 'conditions of civil            
association' which the associates       
impose on themselves4 ,where either of  
the specified conditions is  lacking1   
where either it is not the universal    
will from which an  ordinance proceeds  
or it is not the whole people to which  
it relates1  it is not a law but a      
decree1 not an act of sovereignty but of
  magistracy4 7,ib47    #ga4 ,this leads
 to a consideration of the nature and   

institution of  magistracy or           
government4 7,,iii1 i47 ,the government 
is never the same  as the sovereign4    
,the two are distinguished by their     
functions1  that of the one being       
legislative1 that of the other          
executive4  ,even where the people      
itself governs1 its acts of government  
must  be distinguished from its acts of 
sovereignty1 the former having  a       
particular1 the latter a general1       
reference4 ,government is the  exercise 
according to law of the executive power1
 and the 'prince'  or 'magistrate' is   
the man or body of men charged with this
  administration2 'a body intermediary  
between the subjects and the  sovereign1
 charged with the execution of the laws1
 and with the  maintenance of civil and 
political freedom' 7,ib47 ,where all or 
most of the citizens are magistrates1 or
 charged with the supreme  functions of 
government1 we have a democracy2 where a
 few1 an  aristocracy2 where one is so  
charged1 a monarchy4 7,,iii1 iii47 ,the 

differences depend1 not as ,hobbes and  
others had supposed1 on the  quarter    
where the sovereignty resides--for it   
must always reside in  the whole body of
 people--but on that in which government
 resides4  ,the idea of government is   
that the dominant will of the prince    
should  be the general will or law1 that
 it should be simply the public  force  
by which that general will is brought to
 bear on individuals  or against other  
states1 serving the same purpose in the 
state as  the union of soul and body in 
the individual 7,,iii1 i472 and this    
idea is most likely to be satisfied     
under a democracy4 ,there1 the  general 
will 7if there is a general will1 which 
the democracy is  no guarantee for there
 being1 according to ,rousseau's        
distinction  between the 'volont gnrale'
 and 'volont de tous1' of which more    
hereafter7 cannot fail to coincide with 
the dominant will of the  government4   
,the prevalence of particular interests 
may prevent there  being a will at all  

of the kind which ,rousseau would count 
general or  truly sovereign1 but they   
cannot be more prevalent in the         
magistracy1  constituted by the whole   
people1 than in the same people acting  
in the way of legislation4 ,in a        
democracy1 therefore1 the will of  the  
sovereign1 so far as there is a         
sovereign in the proper sense1          
necessarily finds expression in the will
 of the magistracy4 ,on the  other hand1
 though under either of the other forms 
of government  there is danger of       
collision between sovereign and         
government1 yet  the force of the       
government is greater than in a         
democracy4 ,it is  greatest when the    
government is a monarchy1 because under 
all other  forms there is more or less  
discrepancy between the individual wills
  of the several persons composing the  
government1 as directed to the          
particular good of each1 and the        
corporate will of the government of     
which the object is its own efficiency1 

and under a monarchy this  source of    
weakness is avoided4 7,,iii1 ii47 ,as   
there is more need of  force in the     
government in proportion to the number  
of subjects whose  particular wills it  
has to control1 it follows that monarchy
 is best  suited to the largest1        
democracy to the smallest states4       
7,,iii1 iii47    #gb4 ,as to the        
institution of government1 ,rousseau    
maintains  strenuously that it is not   
established by contract4 ',there is only
  one contract in the state1 viz4 that  
of the original association2  and this  
excludes every other4 ,no other public  
contract can be  imagined which would   
not be a violation of the first4'       
7,,iii1 xvi47  ,even when government is 
vested in an hereditary body1 monarchic 
or aristocratic1 this is merely a       
provisional arrangement1 made  and      
liable to be reversed by the sovereign1 
whose officers the  governors are4 ,the 
act by which government is established  
is twofold1  consisting firstly of the  

passing of a law by the sovereign1 to   
the  effect that there shall be a       
government2 secondly1 of an act in      
execution of this law1 by which the     
governors--the 'magistrates'--are       
appointed4 ,but it may be asked1 ,how   
can the latter act1 being one not  of   
sovereignty but of magistracy 7for it   
has a particular reference  in the      
designation of the governors71 be       
performed when as yet there  is no      
government8 ,the answer is that the     
people resolves itself  from a sovereign
 body into a body of magistrates1 as the
 ,english  ,parliament resolves itself  
constantly from a legislative body into 
a committee4 ,in other words1 by a      
simple act of the general will a        
democracy is for the time established1  
which then proceeds either to  retain   
the government in its own hands1 or to  
place it in those of an  officer1       
according to the form in which the      
sovereign has decided to  establish the 
government4 7,,iii1 xvii47 ,acts similar

 to that by which  the government was   
originally constituted need to be       
periodically  repeated in order to      
prevent the government from usurping the
  functions of the sovereign1 i4e4 the  
function of legislation4  7,could this  
usurpation occur under a democracy87 ,in
 order that the  sovereignty may not    
fall into abeyance1 it must be          
exercised1 and  it can only be exercised
 in assemblies of the whole people4     
,these  must be held periodically1 and  
at their opening two questions ought  to
 be submitted2 one1 whether it pleases  
the sovereign to maintain  the present  
form of government2 the other1 whether  
it pleases the  people to leave the     
administration in the hands of those at 
present  charged with it4 7,,iii1       
xviii47 ,such assemblies are entitled to
  revise and repeal all previously      
enacted laws4 ,a law not so repealed    
the sovereign must be taken tacitly to  
confirm1 and it retains  its authority4 
,but as the true sovereign is not any   

law but the  general will1 no law1 even 
the most fundamental1 can be exempt from
  liability to repeal4 ,even the social 
pact itself might legitimately  be      
dissolved1 by agreement of all the      
citizens assembled4 7,ib47  7,whether   
unanimity is necessary for the purpose  
is not specified47  ,without such       
assemblies there can be no exercise of  
the general will  7which1 as before     
stated1 cannot be represented71 and     
consequently  no freedom4 ,the ,english 
people1 e4g41 is quite mistaken in      
thinking  itself free4 ,it is only free 
while the election of members of        
,parliament is going on4 ,as soon as    
they are elected1 it is in  bondage1 it 
is nothing4 ,in the short moments of its
 freedom it makes  such a bad use of it 
that it well deserves to lose it4       
7,,iii1 xv47    #gc4 ,it appears from   
the above that1 according to ,rousseau1 
the  general will1 which is the true    
sovereign1 can only be exercised  in    
assemblies of the whole people4 ,on the 

other hand1 he does not  hold that an   
act of such an assembly is necessarily  
an act of the  general will4 ,after     
telling us that the 'general will is    
always  right1 and always tends to the  
public good1' he adds1 'but it does  not
 follow that the deliberations of the   
people have always the same             
rectitude4444 ,there is often a great   
difference between the will  of all and 
the general will4 ,the latter only looks
 to the common  interest2 the other     
looks to private interests1 and is only 
a sum of  the wills of individuals4'    
7,,ii1 iii47 ,again 7,,ii1 iv471 'that  
which  generalises the will is not so   
much the number of voices as the  common
 interest which unites them4' ,he holds 
apparently that in the  assembly of the 
whole people1 if they had sufficient    
information1 and  if no minor           
combinations of particular interests    
were formed within  the entire body1 the
 difference between the wills of        
individuals  would neutralise each      

other1 and the vote of the whole body   
would  express the true general will4   
,but in fact in all assemblies there  is
 at least a liability to lack of        
information and to the formation  of    
cliques2 and hence it cannot be held    
that the vote of the  assembly          
necessarily expresses the general will4 
,rousseau1 however1  does not go so far 
as to say that unless the law is        
actually such  as contributes to the    
common good1 it is not an expression of 
the  general will4 ,the general will1   
according to him1 always aims at  or    
wills the common good1 but is liable to 
be mistaken as to the  means of         
attaining it4' ,it is always right1 but 
the judgment which  guides it is not    
always enlightened4444 ,individuals see 
the good  which they reject2 the public 
wills the good which it does not  see4' 
7,,ii1 vi47 ,hence the need of a guide  
in the shape of a great  lawgiver4      
,apparently1 however1 the possible lack 
of enlightenment on  the part of the    

general will does not1 in ,rousseau's   
view1 prevent  its decisions from being 
for the public good4 ,in discussing the 
'limits of the sovereign power' he      
maintains that there can be no  conflict
 between it and the natural right of the
 individual1 because1  'although it is  
only that part of his power1 his goods1 
his freedom1  of which the use is       
important to the community1 that the    
individual  transfers to the sovereign  
by the social pact1 yet the sovereign   
alone can be judge of the importance'2  
and the sovereign 'cannot  lay on the   
subjects any constraint which is not for
 the good of the  community4' ',under   
the law of reason' 7which is thus       
identified with  the general will7      
'nothing is done without a cause1 any   
more than  under the law of nature4'    
7,,ii1 iv47    #gd4 ,but though even an 
unenlightened general will is the       
general  will still1 and 7as we are left
 to infer7 cannot in its decisions  do  
otherwise than promote the public good1 

,rousseau distinctly  contemplates the  
possibility of the general will being so
 overpowered  by particular interests   
that it finds no expression in the votes
 of  a popular assembly1 though the     
assembly be really one of a whole       
people1 and the vote of the majority is 
duly taken4 7,,iv1 i47 ,in such  cases  
it is not that the general will is      
'annihilated or corrupted2  it is always
 constant1 unalterable1 and pure4' ,even
 in the individual  whose vote is       
governed by his private interest the    
general will  is not extinct1 nor is he 
unaware either of what the public good  
requires or of the fact that what is for
 the public good is also for  his own4  
,but his share in the public evil to    
which he knows that  his vote will      
contribute1 seems nothing by the side of
 the special  private good which he     
hopes to gain4 ,by his vote1 in short1  
he does  not answer the question1 ,is so
 and so for the advantage of the state8 
but1 ,is it for the advantage of this   

particular man or party8 7,ib47    #ge4 
,the test of the dominance of the       
general will in assemblies of  the      
people is an approach to unanimity4     
',long debates1 discussions1  tumult1   
indicate the ascendency of particular   
interests and the  decline of the       
state4' 7,,iv1 ii47 ,rousseau1 however1 
does not venture  to say that absolute  
unanimity in the assembly is necessary  
to an  expression of the general will1  
or to give a law a claim upon the       
obedience of the subjects4 ,this would  
have been to render effectual           
legislation impossible4 ,upon the       
theory1 however1 of the foundation  of  
legitimate sovereignty in consent1 the  
theory that the natural  right of the   
individual is violated unless he is     
himself a joint  imponent of the law    
which he is called to obey1 it is not   
easy to see  what rightful claim there  
can be to the submission of a minority4 
,rousseau so far recognises the         
difficulty that he requires unanimity   

in the original compact4 7,,iv1 ii47 ,if
 among those who are parties  to it     
there are others who oppose it1 the     
result is simply that  the latter are   
not included in it4 ',they are strangers
 among the  citizens4' ,but this does   
not explain how they are to be          
rightfully  controlled1 on the principle
 that the only rightful control is      
founded on consent2 or1 if they are not 
controlled1 what is the  value of the   
'social compact4' ,how can the object of
 the pact be  attained while those who  
are bound by it have these 'strangers'  
living among them who are not bound by  
it1 and who1 not being bound  by it1    
cannot be rightfully controlled8 ,the   
difficulty must recur  with each        
generation of the descendants of those  
who were parties to  the original pact4 
,the parties to the pact1 it is true1   
have no right  to resist the general    
will1 because the pact is ex hypothesi  
to the  effect that each individual1 in 
all things of common concern1 will  take

 the general will for his own4 ,the true
 form1 therefore1 of the  question upon 
which each party to the pact should     
consider himself  to be voting in the   
assembly is1 as ,rousseau puts it1 not  
',is the  proposed measure what ,i wish 
for1 or what ,i approve1 or no8' but    
',is  it in conformity with the general 
will8' ,if1 having voted upon this      
question1 he finds himself in a         
minority1 he is bound to suppose that   
he is mistaken in his views of the      
general will1 and to accept the         
decision of the majority as the general 
will which1 by the pact1 he  is bound to
 obey4 ,so far all is consistent2 though
 how the individual  is to be answered  
if he pleads that the vote of the       
assembly has been  too much biassed by  
particular interests to be an expression
 of the  general will1 and that         
therefore it is not binding on him1 does
 not  appear4    #gf4 ,but after the    
first generation of those who were      
parties to  the supposed original       

compact1 what is to settle whether      
anyone  is a party to it or no8         
,rousseau faces the question1 but his   
only  answer is that when once the state
 is instituted1 consent is implied  in  
residence2 'to dwell on the territory is
 to submit to the  sovereignty4' 7,,iv1 
ii47 ,this answer1 however1 will        
scarcely stand  examination4 ,rousseau  
himself does not consider that residence
 in  the same region with the original  
parties to the pact renders those  so   
resident also parties to it4 ,why should
 it do so1 when the pact  has descended 
to a later generation8 ,it may be argued
 of course that  everyone residing in a 
settled society1 which secures him in   
his  rights of person and property1 has 
the benefit of the society from  the    
mere fact of his residence in it1 and is
 therefore morally bound  to accept its 
laws4 ,but this is to abandon the       
doctrine of obligation  being founded on
 consent4 ,residence in a territory     
governed by a  certain sovereign can    

only be taken to imply consent to the   
rule of  that sovereign1 if there is any
 real possibility of relinquishing it1  
and this there can scarcely ever be4    
#gg4 ,rousseau certainly carried out the
 attempt to reconcile  submission to    
government with the existence of natural
 rights  antecedent to the institution  
of government1 by the hypothesis of a   
foundation of government in consent1    
more consistently than any other        
writer2 and his result shows the        
hopelessness of the attempt4 ,to the    
consistency of his theory he sacrifices 
every claim to right on the  part of any
 state except one in which the whole    
body of citizens  directly legislates1  
i4e4 on the part of nearly all states   
then or  now existing2 and finally he   
can only justify the control of the     
minority by the majority in any state   
whatever by a subterfuge4 ,it  does not 
follow1 however1 because the doctrine of
 natural rights and  the consequent     
conception of government as founded on  

compact are  untenable1 that there is no
 truth in the conception of the state   
or sovereign as representing a general  
will1 and as authorised or  entitled to 
obedience on that account4 ,it is this  
conception1 as the  permanently valuable
 thing in ,rousseau1 that we have now   
further to  consider4    #gh4 ,the first
 remark upon it which suggests itself is
 that1 as  ,rousseau puts the matter1   
there may be an independent political   
society in which there is no sovereign  
power at all1 or in which1 at  any rate1
 it is not exercised4 ,the sovereign is 
the general will4  ,but the general will
 can only be exercised through the      
assembly of  a whole people4 ,the       
necessary conditions of its exercise1   
then1  in ,rousseau's time1 were only   
fulfilled in the ,swiss cantons and     
7perhaps7 in the ,united ,provinces4 ,in
 ,england they were fulfilled in  a way 
during the time of a general election4  
,but even where these  conditions were  
fulfilled1 it did not follow that the   

general will  was put in force4 ,it     
might be overpowered1 as in the ,roman  
comitia1  by particular interests4 ,is  
it then to be understood that1 according
  to ,rousseau1 either there can be     
independent states without any          
sovereignty in actual exercise1 or that 
the ,european states of his  time1 and  
equally the great states of the present 
day 7for in none  of these is there any 
more exercise of the general will than  
in the  ,england of his time71 are not  
properly states at all8    #gi4 ,we may 
try to answer this question by          
distinguishing sovereign  de facto from 
sovereign de jure1 and saying that what 
,rousseau  meant was that the general   
will1 as defined by him and as exercised
  under the conditions which he         
prescribes1 was the only sovereign de   
jure1 but that he would have recognised 
in the ordinary states of  his time a   
sovereign de facto2 and that in the same
 way1 when he  describes the institution
 of government as arising out of a      

twofold  act consequent on the original 
pact 7an act in which the sovereign     
people first decides that there shall be
 a government1 and then1  not as a      
sovereign people1 but as a democratic   
magistracy1 decides  in what hands the  
government shall be placed71 he does not
 conceive  himself to be describing what
 has actually taken place1 but what is  
necessary to give a government a moral  
title to obedience4 ,whether  ,rousseau 
himself had this distinction in view is 
not always clear4  ,at the outset he    
states his object thus3 ',man is born   
free1 and  everywhere he is in fetters4 
,how has this change come about8 ,i do  
not know4 ,what can render it           
legitimate8 ,that is a question which   
,i deem myself able to answer4' 7,i1 i47
 ,the answer is the account  of the     
establishment of a sovereign by social  
pact4 ,it might be  inferred from this  
that he considered himself in the sequel
 to be  delineating transactions to the 
actual occurrence of which he did  not  

commit himself1 but which1 if they did  
occur1 would constitute  a duty as      
distinct from a physical necessity of   
submission on the  part of subjects to a
 sovereign1 and to which some equivalent
 must  be supposed1 in the shape of a   
tacit present convention on the part  of
 the members of a state1 if their       
submission is to be matter of  duty as  
distinct from physical necessity1 or is 
to be explained as  a matter of right by
 the ostensible sovereign4 ,this1       
however1 would  merely be an inference  
as to his meaning4 ,his actual procedure
 is to  describe transactions1 by which 
the sovereignty of the general will  was
 established1 and by which it in turn   
established a government1 as  if they   
had actually taken place4 ,nor is he    
content with supposing a  tacit consent 
of the people as rendering subjection   
legitimate4 ,the  people whose          
submission to law is to be 'legitimate' 
must actually  take part in sovereign   
legislative assemblies4 ,it is very     

rarely that  he uses language which     
implies the possibility of a sovereign  
power  otherwise constituted4 ,he does  
indeed speak #a of the possibility  of a
 prince 7in the special meaning of the  
term1 as representing  the head of the  
executive7 usurping sovereignty1 and    
speaks of the  sovereignty thus usurped 
as existing de facto1 not de jure2 but  
in no other connection 7so far as ,i    
have observed7 does he speak of         
anything short of the 'volont gnrale'   
exercised through the vote  of an       
assembled people as sovereign at all4   
,and the whole drift of  his doctrine is
 to show that no sovereign1 otherwise   
constituted1 had  any claim on          
obedience4 ,there was no state in       
,europe at his time in  which his       
doctrine would not have justified       
rebellion1 and even under  existing     
representative systems the conditions   
are not fulfilled  which according to   
him are necessary to give laws the claim
 on our  obedience which arises from    

their being an expression of the general
  will4 ,the only system under which    
these conditions could be fulfilled     
would be one of federated self-governing
 communes1 small enough to  allow each  
member an active share in the           
legislation of the commune4  ,it is     
probably the influence of ,rousseau that
 has made such a system  the ideal of   
political enthusiasts in ,france4    #a 
',if it happened that the prince had a  
private will more active  than that of  
the sovereign1 and that he made use of  
the public  force placed in his hands as
 the instrument of this private will1   
there would result1 so to speak1 two    
sovereignties1 one de jure1  the other  
de facto2 but from that moment the      
social union would  disappear1 and the  
body politic would be dissolved4'       
7,,iii1 i47 ',when  the prince ceases to
 administer the state according to the  
laws1 and  usurps the sovereign power   
444 then the state in the larger sense  
is  dissolved1 and there is formed      

another within it1 composed only of  the
 members of the government 444 the      
social pact is broken 444 and  all the  
ordinary citizens return as a matter of 
right to their state  of natural        
liberty1 and are merely forced1 but not 
obliged1 to obey4'  7,,iii1 ,x47        
,f4 ,,sovereignty ,,and ,,the ,,general 
,,will4 ,rousseau and ,austin4    #hj4  
,the questions then arise 7#a7 whether  
there is any truth in  ,rousseau's      
conception of sovereignty as founded    
upon a 'volont  gnrale' in its          
application to actual sovereignty4 ,does
 anything  like such a sovereignty exist
 in the societies properly called       
political8 7#b7 ,is there any truth in  
speaking of a sovereignty de  jure      
founded upon the 'volont gnrale8 7#c7   
,if there is1 are we to  hold with      
,rousseau that this 'will' can only be  
exercised through the  votes of a       
sovereign people8    #ha4 7#a7 ,the     
first question is one which1 if we take 
our notions  of sovereignty from such   

writers as ,austin1 we shall be at first
  disposed decidedly to negative4       
,austin is considered a master of       
precise definition4 ,we may begin1      
therefore1 by looking to his  definition
 of sovereignty and the terms connected 
with it4 ,his  general definition of law
 runs as follows3 ',a law1 in the most  
general and comprehensive acceptation in
 which the term1 in its  literal        
meaning1 is employed1 may be said to be 
a rule laid down  for the guidance of an
 intelligent being by an intelligent    
being  having power over him4' #a ,these
 rules are of two kinds3 7#a7 laws  set 
by ,god to men1 or the law of nature2   
and 7#b7 laws set by men to  men1 or    
human law4 ,we are only concerned with  
the latter1 the human  laws4 ,these are 
again distinguished into two classes1   
according as  they are or are not       
established by political superiors4 ',of
 the laws  or rules set by men to men1  
some are established by political       
superiors1 sovereign and subject2 by    

persons exercising supreme and          
subordinate government1 in independent  
nations1 or independent  political      
societies' 7pp4 #hh and #hi74 ',the     
aggregate of the rules  established by  
political superiors is frequently styled
 positive  law1 or law existing by      
position' 7p4 #hi74 ,this is            
distinguished  from 'positive morality4'
 ,laws are further explained as a       
species of  commands4 ,a command is a   
signification of desire1 distinguished  
by  the fact that the party to whom it  
is addressed is liable to evil  from the
 party expressing the desire in case he 
does not comply  with it 7p4 #ia74 ,this
 liability to evil forms the sanction of
 the  command4 ,where a command 'obliges
 generally to acts or forbearances  of a
 class1 it is a law' 7p4 #ie74 ',every  
positive law1 or every  law simply and  
strictly so called1 is set by a         
sovereign person or a  sovereign body of
 persons to a member or members of the  
independent  political society wherein  

that person or body is sovereign or     
supreme4 ,or 7changing the expression7  
it is set by a monarch1 or  sovereign   
member1 to a person or persons in a     
state of subjection to  its author4     
,even though it sprung directly from    
another fountain or  source1 it is a    
positive law1 or a law strictly so      
called1 by the  institution of that     
present sovereign in the character of   
political  superior4 ,or 7borrowing the 
language of ,hobbes7 the legislator is  
he1  not by whose authority the law was 
first made1 but by whose authority  it  
continues to be a law' 7pp4 #bbe and    
#bbf74    ',the notions of sovereignty  
and independent political society may be
  expressed concisely thus4 ,if a       
determinate human superior1 not in  a   
habit of obedience to a like superior1  
receive habitual obedience  from the    
bulk of a given society1 that           
determinate superior is  sovereign in   
that society1 and the society 7including
 the superior7  is a society political  

and independent' 7p4 #bbf74    ',in     
order that a given society may form a   
society political and  independent1 the 
two distinguishing marks which ,i have  
mentioned  above must unite4 ,the       
generality of the given society must be 
in a  habit of obedience to a           
determinate and common superior2 whilst 
that determinate person1 or determinate 
body of persons1 must not  be habitually
 obedient to a determinate person or    
body4 ,it is the  union of that positive
 with this negative mark which renders  
that  certain superior sovereign or     
supreme1 and which renders that given   
society 7including that certain         
superior7 a society political and       
independent' 7p4 #bbg74    #a ,lectures 
on ,jurisprudence1 vol4 i4 p4 #hh 7edit4
 of #ahfi1 in two  vols47    #hb4 ,it   
may be remarked in passing that1        
according to the above1 while  every law
 implies a sovereign1 from whom directly
 or indirectly  7through a subordinate  
political superior7 it proceeds1 it is  

not  necessary to a sovereign that his  
commands should take the form of  laws1 
as opposed to 'particular or occasional 
commands4' ,a superior  might signify   
his desires only in the form of such    
particular and  occasional commands1 and
 yet there might be a habit of obedience
 to  him1 and he might not be habitually
 obedient to any other person or  body2 
in which case he would be a 'sovereign4'
    #hc4 ,austin's doctrine seems       
diametrically opposite to one which     
finds the sovereign in a 'volont        
gnrale1' because 7a7 it only  recognises
 sovereignty in a determinate person or 
persons1 and  7b7 it considers the      
essence of sovereignty to lie in the    
power1 on  the part of such determinate 
persons1 to put compulsion without limit
  on subjects1 to make them do exactly  
as it pleases4 #a ,the 'volont  gnrale1'
 on the other hand1 it would seem1      
cannot be identified  with the will of  
any determinate person or persons2 it   
can1 indeed1  according to ,rousseau1   

only be expressed by a vote of the whole
 body  of subject citizens2 but when you
 have got them together1 there is  no   
certainty that their vote does express  
it2 and it does not--at  any rate       
necessarily--command any power of       
compulsion1 much less  unlimited power4 
,rousseau expressly contemplates the    
possibility of  the executive power     
conflicting with and overbearing the    
general  will4 ,indeed1 according to his
 view1 it was the ordinary state  of    
things2 and though this view may be     
exaggerated1 no one could  maintain that
 the 'general will1' in any intelligible
 sense of the  words1 had always        
unlimited force at its command4    #a   
,cf4 ,maine's statement of ,austin's    
doctrine in ,the ,early ,history  of    
,institutions1 pp4 #cdi and #cej3       
',there is in every independent         
political community--that is1 in every  
political community not in the  habit of
 obedience to a superior above          
itself--some single person or  some     

combination of persons which has the    
power of compelling the  other members  
of the community to do exactly as it    
pleases4 ,this  single person or        
group--this individual or this          
collegiate sovereign  7to employ        
,austin's phrase7 may be found in every 
independent  political community as     
certainly as the centre of gravity in a 
mass  of matter4 ,if the community be   
violently or voluntarily divided into  a
 number of separate fragments1 then1 as 
soon as each fragment has  settled down 
7perhaps after an interval of anarchy7  
into a state of  equilibrium1 the       
sovereign will exist1 and with proper   
care will be  discoverable in each of   
the now independent portions4 ,the      
sovereignty  over the ,north ,american  
colonies of ,great ,britain had its seat
 in  one place before they became the   
,united ,states1 in another place       
afterwards2 but in both cases there was 
a discoverable sovereign  somewhere4    
,this sovereign1 this person or         

combination of persons1  universally    
occurring in all independent political  
communities1 has  in all such           
communities one characteristic1 common  
to all the shapes  sovereignty may take1
 the possession of irresistible force1  
not  necessarily exerted1 but capable of
 being exerted4 ,according to the       
terminology preferred by ,austin1 the   
sovereign1 if a single person1  is or   
should be called a monarch2 if a small  
group1 the name is an  oligarchy2 if a  
group of considerable dimensions1 an    
aristocracy2  if very large and         
numerous1 a democracy4 ,limited         
monarchy1 a phrase  perhaps more        
fashionable in ,austin's day than it is 
now1 is abhorred  by ,austin1 and the   
government of ,great ,britain he classes
 with  aristocracies4 ,that which all   
the forms of sovereignty have in  common
 is the power 7the power but not        
necessarily the will7 to put  compulsion
 without limit on subjects or           
fellow-subjects4'    #hd4 ,the two views

 thus seem mutually exclusive1 but      
perhaps it may  be by taking each as    
complementary to the other that we shall
 gain  the truest view of sovereignty as
 it actually exists4 ,in those  states  
of society in which obedience is        
habitually rendered by the  bulk of     
society to some determinate superior1   
single or corporate1  who1 in turn1 is  
independent of any other superior1 the  
obedience  is so rendered because this  
determinate superior is regarded as     
expressing or embodying what may        
properly be called the general  will1   
and is virtually conditional upon the   
fact that the superior  is so regarded4 
,it is by no means an unlimited power of
 compulsion  that the superior          
exercises1 but one dependent in the long
 run1 or  dependent for the purpose of  
insuring an habitual obedience1 upon    
conformity to certain convictions on the
 part of the subjects as to  what is for
 their general interest4 ,as ,maine says
 7,early ,history  of ,institutions1 p4 

#cei71 'the vast mass of influences1    
which we  may call for shortness moral1 
perpetually shapes1 limits1 or forbids  
the actual direction of the forces of   
society by its sovereign4'  ,thus1 quite
 apart from any belief in the right of  
revolution1 from  the view that the     
people in any state are entitled to an  
ultimate  sovereignty1 or are sovereign 
de jure1 and may withdraw either        
legislative or executive power from the 
hands in which it has been  placed in   
the event of its being misused1 it may  
fairly be held that  the ostensible     
sovereign--the determinate person or    
persons to whom  we can point and say   
that with him or them lies the ultimate 
power of  exacting habitual obedience   
from the people--is only able to        
exercise  this power in virtue of an    
assent on the part of the people1 nor   
is this assent reducible to the fear of 
the sovereign felt by each  individual4 
,it is rather a common desire for       
certain ends--specially  the 'pax       

vitaeque securitas'--to which the       
observance of law or  established usage 
contributes1 and in most cases implies  
no conscious  reference on the part of  
those whom it influences to any supreme 
coercive power at all4 ,thus when it has
 been ascertained in regard to  any     
people that there is some determinate   
person or persons to whom1  in the last 
resort1 they pay habitual obedience1 we 
may call this  person or persons        
sovereign if we please1 but we must not 
ascribe to  him or them the real power  
which governs the actions and           
forbearances  of the people1 even those 
actions and forbearances 7only a very   
small part7 which are prescribed by the 
sovereign4 ,this power is a  much more  
complex and less determinate1 or less   
easily determinable1  thing2 but a sense
 of possessing common interests1 a      
desire for  common objects on the part  
of the people1 is always the condition  
of  its existence4 ,let this sense or   
desire--which may properly be called    

general will--cease to operate1 or let  
it come into general conflict  with the 
sovereign's commands1 and the habitual  
obedience will cease  also4    #he4 ,if1
 then1 those who adopt the ,austinian   
definition of a sovereign  mean no more 
than that in a thoroughly developed     
state there must be  some determinate   
person or persons1 with whom1 in the    
last resort1  lies the recognised power 
of imposing laws and enforcing their    
observance1 over whom no legal control  
can be exercised1 and that  even in the 
most thorough democracy1 where laws are 
passed in the  assembly of the whole    
people1 it is still with determinate    
persons1  viz4 a majority of those who  
meet in the assembly1 that this power   
resides1 they are doubtless right4 ,so  
far they only need to be  reminded that 
the thoroughly developed state1 as      
characterised by  the existence of such 
definite sovereignty1 is even among     
civilised  people but imperfectly       
established4 ,it is perfectly           

established 7#a7  where customary or    
'common' or 'judge-made' law1 which does
 not  proceed from any determinate      
person or persons1 is either superseded 
by express enactments that do proceed   
from such person or persons1  or 7as in 
,england7 is so frequently trenched upon
 by statute law  that it may fairly be  
said only to survive upon sufferance1 or
 to be  itself virtually enacted by the 
sovereign legislature2 and 7#b7 where   
no question of right can be raised      
between local legislatures or           
authorities and the legislature claiming
 to be supreme1 as in ,america  before  
the war of secession1 and as might      
perhaps be found to be the  case in     
,germany now1 if on certain educational 
and ecclesiastical  matters the imperial
 legislature came to be at issue with   
the local  legislatures4 ,but though the
 organisation of the state1 even in     
civilised and independent nations1 is   
not everywhere complete1 it  no doubt   
involves the residence with determinate 

persons1 or a body  or bodies1 of       
supreme i4e4 legally uncontrolled power 
to make and  enforce laws4 ,the term    
'sovereign' having acquired this        
definite  meaning1 ,rousseau was        
misleading his readers when he ascribed 
sovereignty to the general will4 ,he    
could only be understood as  meaning1   
and in fact understood himself to mean1 
that there was no  legitimate sovereign 
except in the most thorough democracy1  
as just  described4    #hf4 ,but the    
,austinians1 having found their         
sovereign1 are apt to  regard it as a   
much more important institution than--if
 it is to  be identified with a         
determinate person or persons--it really
 is2  they are apt to suppose that the  
sovereign1 with the coercive power      
7i4e4 the power of operating on the     
fears of the subjects7 which  it        
exercises1 is the real determinant of   
the habitual obedience of  the people1  
at any rate of their habitual obedience 
in respect of  those acts and           

forbearances which are prescribed by    
law4 ,but1 as we  have seen1 this is not
 the case4 ,it then needs to be pointed 
out  that if the sovereign power is to  
be understood in this fuller1 less      
abstract sense1 if we mean by it the    
real determinant of the habitual        
obedience of the people1 we must look   
for its sources much more  widely and   
deeply than the 'analytical jurists' do2
 that it can no  longer be said to      
reside in a determinate person or       
persons1 but in  that impalpable        
congeries of the hopes and fears of a   
people1 bound  together by common       
interests and sympathy1 which we call   
the general  will4    #hg4 ,it may be   
objected that this view of the general  
will1 as that  on which habitual        
obedience to the sovereign really       
depends1 is at  best only applicable to 
'self-governing' communities1 not to    
those  under a despotic sovereign4 ,the 
answer is that it is applicable in  all 
forms of society where a sovereign in   

the sense above defined  7as a          
determinate person or persons with whom 
in the last resort  lies the recognised 
power of imposing laws and enforcing    
their  observance7 really exists1 but   
that there are many where there cannot  
fairly be said to be any such sovereign 
at all2 in other words1 that  in all    
organised communities the power which   
practically commands  the habitual      
obedience of the people in respect of   
those acts and  forbearances which are  
enjoined by law or authoritative custom1
 is  one dependent on the general will  
of the community1 but this power is     
often not sovereign in the sense in     
which the ruler of an independent  state
 is sovereign4 ,it may very well be that
 there is at the same  time another     
power merely coercive1 a power really   
operating on  people simply through     
their fears1 to which obedience is      
rendered1  and which is not in turn     
representative of a general will2 but   
where  this is the case we shall find   

that such power is only in contact  with
 the people1 so to speak1 at one or two 
points2 that their  actions and         
forbearances1 as determined by law and  
custom1 are in the  main independent of 
it2 that it cannot in any proper sense  
be said  to be a sovereign power over   
them2 at any rate1 not in the sense in  
which we speak of ,king1 ,lords1 and    
,commons as sovereign in ,england4      
#hh4 ,maine has pointed out 7,early     
,history of ,institutions1 ,lecture     
,,xiii47 that the great despotic empires
 of ancient times1 excluding  the       
,roman1 of which more shall be said     
directly1 and modern empires  in the    
,east were in the main tax-collecting   
institutions4 ,they  exercise coercive  
force over their subjects of the most   
violent kind  for certain purposes at   
certain times1 but they do not impose   
laws  as distinct from 'particular and  
occasional commands' nor do they        
judicially administer or enforce a      
customary law4 ,in a certain sense  the 

subjects render them habitual obedience1
 i4e4 they habitually  submit when the  
agents of the empire descend on them for
 taxes and  recruits1 but in the general
 tenor of their lives their actions and 
forbearances are regulated by           
authorities with which the empire  never
 interferes1--with which probably it    
could not interfere  without destroying 
itself4 ,these authorities can scarcely 
be said  to reside in a determinate     
person or persons at all1 but1 so far as
  they do so1 they reside mixedly in    
priests or exponents of customary       
religion1 in heads of families acting   
within the family1 and in some          
village-council acting beyond the limits
 of the family4 ,whether1 in  such a    
state of things1 we are to consider that
 there is a sovereign  power at all1    
and1 if so1 where it is to be considered
 to reside1  are chiefly questions of   
words4 ,if complete uncontrolledness by 
a  stronger power is essential to       
sovereignty1 the local authorities  just

 spoken of are not sovereign4 ,the      
conquering despot could descend  on them
 and sweep them away1 leaving anarchy in
 their place1 and he  does compel them  
to be put in exercise for a particular  
purpose1  that of raising tribute or    
sometimes recruits4 ,on the other hand1 
these authorities1 which represent a    
general will of the communities1  form  
the power which determines such actions 
and forbearances of the  individual as  
do not proceed from natural inclination4
 ,the military  ruler1 indeed1 is       
sovereign in the sense of possessing    
irresistible  coercive power1 but in    
fact this power is only exercised within
  narrow limits1 and not at all in any  
legislative or judicial way4 ,if        
exercised beyond these limits and in    
conflict with customary law1  the result
 would be a general anarchy4 ,the truest
 way of expressing  the state of the    
case is to say that1 taking the term    
'sovereign' in  the sense which we      
naturally associate with it1 and in     

which it is  used by modern ,european   
writers on sovereignty1 there is under  
such  conditions no sovereign1 but that 
the practical regulation of life1       
except during intervals of military     
violence and anarchy1 rests with        
authorities representing the general    
will1 though these are to a  certain    
extent interfered with by an alien      
force4    #hi4 ,the same account is     
applicable to most cases of foreign     
dominion over a people with any         
organised common life of their own4     
,the foreign power is not sovereign in  
the sense of being a maker  or          
maintainer of laws4 ,law-making1 under  
such conditions1 there  is properly     
none4 ,the subject people inherits laws1
 written or  unwritten1 and maintains   
them for itself1 a certain shelter from 
violence being afforded by the foreign  
power4 ,such1 in the main1  was the     
condition of ,north ,italy1 for         
instance1 under ,austrian  domination4  
,where this is the case1 the removal of 

the coercive  power of the foreigner    
need not involve anarchy1 or any        
violation of  established rights 7such  
as ,hobbes supposes to follow           
necessarily  from the deposition of an  
actual sovereign74 ,the social order    
does  not depend on the foreign         
dominion1 and may survive it4 ,the      
question  whether in any particular case
 it actually can do so must depend on   
the possibility of preventing further   
foreign aggression1 and on the  question
 whether there is enough national unity 
in the subject people  to prevent them  
from breaking up into hostile           
communities when the  foreign dominion  
is removed4    #ij4 ,it is otherwise    
where the foreign power is really a     
law-making  and law-maintaining one1 and
 is sovereign in that proper sense1 as  
was the ,roman ,empire4 ,but just so far
 as the ,roman ,empire was of  this     
sovereign1 i4e4 law-making and          
law-maintaining1 character1 it  derived 
its permanence1 its hold on the         

'habitual obedience' of  its subjects1  
from the support of the general will4   
,as the empire  superseded customary or 
written laws of conquered countries1 it 
conferred rights of ,roman citizenship1 
a much more perfect system of           
protection in action and acquisition    
than the conquered people had  generally
 possessed before4 ,hence1 while nothing
 could be further  removed from what    
,rousseau would have counted liberty    
than the  life of the citizens of the   
,roman ,empire1 for they had nothing to 
do with making the laws which they      
obeyed1 yet probably there was  never   
anv political system more firmly        
grounded on the good-will of  the       
subjects1 none in the maintenance of    
which the subjects felt a  stronger     
interest4 ,the ,british power in ,india 
exercises a middle  function between    
that of the ,roman ,empire and that of  
the mere  tax-collecting and            
recruit-raising empire with which the   
,roman ,empire  has just been           

contrasted4 ,it presents itself to the  
subject people  in the first place as a 
tax-collector4 ,it leaves the customary 
law  of the people mostly untouched4    
,but if only to a very small extent  a  
law-making power1 it is emphatically a  
law-maintaining one4 ,it  regulates the 
whole judicial administration of the    
country1 but  applies its power         
generally only to enforce the customary 
law which  it finds in existence4 ,for  
this reason an 'habitual obedience' may 
fairly be said to be rendered by the    
,indian people to the ,english          
government1 in a sense in which it could
 not be said to be rendered  to a merely
 tax-collecting military power2 but the 
'habitual  obedience' is so rendered    
only because the ,english government    
presents itself to the people1 not      
merely as a tax-collector1 but  as the  
maintainer of a customary law1 which1 on
 the whole1 is the  expression of the   
general will4 ,the same is true in      
principle of  those independent states  

which are despotically governed1 in     
which1  i4e41 the ultimate legislative  
power does not reside1 wholly or in     
part1 with an assembly representing the 
people1 or with the people  themselves2 
e4g4 ,russia4 ,it is not the absolute   
coercive power of  the ,czar which      
determines the habitual obedience of the
 people4 ,this  coercive power1 if put  
to the test as a coercive power1 would  
probably be found very far from         
absolute4 ,the habitual obedience  is   
determined by a system of law1 chiefly  
customary1 which the  administration    
controlled by the ,czar enforces against
 individuals1  but which corresponds to 
the general sense of what is equitable  
and  necessary4 ,if a despotic          
government comes into anything like     
habitual  conflict with the unwritten   
law which represents the general will1  
its dissolution is beginning4    #ia4   
,the answer1 then1 to the question      
whether there is any truth  in          
,rousseau's conception of sovereignty as

 founded upon a 'volont  gnrale1' in its
 application to actual sovereignty1 must
 depend on  what we mean by 'sovereign4'
 ,the essential thing in political      
society  is a power which guarantees men
 rights1 i4e4 a certain freedom of      
action and acquisition conditionally    
upon their allowing a like  freedom in  
others4 ,it is but stating the same     
condition otherwise  to speak of a power
 which guarantees the members of the    
society  these rights1 this freedom of  
action and acquisition1 impartially  or 
according to a general will or law4     
,what is the lowest form in  which a    
society is fit to be called political1  
is hard to say4 ,the  political society 
is more complete as the freedom         
guaranteed is more  complete1 both in   
respect of the persons enjoying it and  
of the range  of possible action and    
acquisition over which it extends4 ,a   
family  or a nomad horde could not be   
called a political society1 on account  
of the narrow range of the political    

freedom which they severally  guarantee4
 ,the nomad horde might indeed be quite 
as numerous as a  ,greek state1 or as   
the sovereign canton of ,geneva in      
,rousseau's  time2 but in the horde the 
range within which reciprocal freedom of
  action and acquisition is guaranteed  
to the individual is exceedingly  small4
 ,it is the power of guaranteeing       
rights1 defined as above1  which the old
 writers on sovereignty and civil       
government supposed to  be established  
by covenant of all with all1 translating
 the common  interest which men have in 
the maintenance of such a power into an 
imaginary historical act by which they  
instituted it4 ,it was this  power that 
they had chiefly in view when they spoke
 of sovereignty4    #ib4 ,it is to be   
observed1 however1 that the power may   
very well exist  and serve its purpose  
where it is not sovereign in the sense  
of being  exempt from any liability of  
being interfered with by a stronger     
coercive power1 such as that of a       

tax-collecting military ruler4 ,the     
occasional interference of the military 
ruler is so far a drawback  to the      
efficiency with which freedom of action 
and acquisition is  guaranteed1 but does
 not nullify the general maintenance of 
rights4  ,on the other hand1 when the   
power by which rights are guaranteed is 
sovereign 7as it is desirable that it   
should be7 in the special sense  of     
being maintained by a person or persons1
 and wielding coercive  force not liable
 to control by any other human force1 it
 is not  this coercive force that is the
 important thing about it1 or that      
determines the habitual obedience       
essential to the real maintenance  of   
rights4 ,that which determines this     
habitual obedience is a power  residing 
in the common will and reason of men1   
i4e4 in the will and  reason of men as  
determined by social relations1 as      
interested in  each other1 as acting    
together for common ends4 ,it is a power
 which  this universal rational will    

exercises over the inclinations of  the 
individual1 and which only needs        
exceptionally to be backed by  coercive 
force4    #ic4 ,thus1 though it may be  
misleading to speak of the general will 
as anywhere either actually or properly 
sovereign1 because the term  'sovereign'
 is best kept to the ordinary usage in  
which it signifies  a determinate person
 or persons charged with the supreme    
coercive  function of the state1 and the
 general will does not admit of being   
vested in a person or persons1 yet it is
 true that the institutions  of         
political society--those by which equal 
rights are guaranteed to  members of    
such a society--are an expression of1   
and are maintained  by1 a general will4 
,the sovereign should be regarded1 not  
in  abstraction as the wielder of       
coercive force1 but in connection with  
the whole complex of institutions of    
political society4 ,it is as  their     
sustainer1 and thus as the agent of the 
general will1 that the  sovereign power 

must be presented to the minds of the   
people if it  is to command habitual    
loyal obedience2 and obedience will     
scarcely  be habitual unless it is      
loyal1 not forced4 ,if once the coercive
  power1 which must always be an        
incident of sovereignty1 becomes the    
characteristic thing about it in its    
relation to the people governed1  this  
must indicate one of two things2 either 
that the general  interest in the       
maintenance of equal rights has lost its
 hold on  the people1 or that the       
sovereign no longer adequately fulfils  
its  function of maintaining such       
rights1 and thus has lost the support   
derived from the general sense of       
interest in supporting it4 ,it may  be  
doubted whether the former is ever      
really the case2 but whatever           
explanation of the case may be the true 
one1 it is certain that when  the idea  
of coercive force is that predominantly 
associated with  the law-imposing and   
law-enforcing power1 then either a      

disruption  of the state or a change in 
the sources of sovereignty must sooner  
or later take place4 ,in judging1       
however1 whether this is the case1  we  
must not be misled by words4 ,in        
,england1 e4g41 from the way in  which  
many people speak of 'government1' we   
might suppose that it  was looked on    
mainly as the wielder of coercive force2
 but it would  be a mistake on that     
account to suppose that ,english people 
commonly  regard the laws of the country
 as so much coercion1 instead of as an  
institution in the maintenance of which 
they are interested4 ,when  they speak  
disapprovingly of 'government1' they are
 not thinking of  the general system of 
law1 but of a central administrative    
agency1  which they think interferes    
mischievously with local and customary  
administration4    #id4 ,it is more     
true1 then1 to say that law1 as the     
system of rules  by which rights are    
maintained1 is the expression of a      
general will  than that the general will

 is the sovereign4 ,the sovereign1 being
  a person or persons by whom in the    
last resort laws are imposed  and       
enforced1 in the long run and on the    
whole is an agent of the  general will1 
contributes to realise that will4       
,particular laws may1  no doubt1 be     
imposed and enforced by the sovereign1  
which conflict  with the general will2  
not in the sense that if all the subject
  people could be got together to vote  
upon them1 a majority would  vote       
against them1--that might be or might   
not be1--but in the sense  that they    
tend to thwart those powers of action1  
acquisition1 and  self-development on   
the part of the members of the society1 
which  there is always a general desire 
to extend 7though the desire may  not be
 enlightened as to the best means to the
 end71 and which it is  the business of 
the law to sustain and extend4 ,the     
extent to which  laws of this kind may  
be intruded into the general 'corpus    
juris'  without social disruption it is 

impossible to specify4 ,probably  there 
has never been a civilised state in     
which they bore more than  a very small 
proportion to the amount of law which   
there was the  strongest general        
interest in maintaining4 ,but1 so far as
 they go1  they always tend to lessen   
the 'habitual obedience' of the people1 
and thus to make the sovereign cease to 
be sovereign4 ,the hope must  be that   
this will result in the transfer of     
sovereignty to other  hands before a    
social disruption ensues2 before the    
general system  of law has been so far  
perverted as to lose its hold on the    
people4  ,of the possibility of a change
 in sovereignty without any detraction  
from the law-abiding habits of the      
people1 ,france has lately given  a     
conspicuous example4 ,here1 however1 it 
must be remembered that a  temporary    
foreign conquest made the transition    
easier4    #ie4 7#b7 ,after what has    
been said1 we need not dwell long on the
  second question raised #a concerning  

,rousseau's theory3 ,is there  any truth
 in speaking of a sovereignty 'de jure' 
founded upon the  'volont gnrale'8 ,it  
is a distinction which can only be      
maintained  so long as either           
'sovereign' is not used in a determinate
 sense1 or  by 'jus' is understood      
something else than law or right        
established  by law4 ,if by 'sovereign' 
we understand something short of a      
person  or persons holding the supreme  
law-making and law-enforcing power1     
e4g4 an ,english king who is often      
called sovereign1 we might say  that    
sovereignty was exercised 'de facto' but
 not 'de jure' when  the power of such a
 'sovereign' was in conflict with1 or   
was not  sanctioned by1 the law as      
declared and enforced by the really     
supreme  power4 ,thus an ,english king1 
so far as he affected to control the    
army or raise money without the         
co-operation of ,parliament1 might be   
said to be sovereign 'de facto' but not 
'de jure'2 only1 however1  on the       

supposition that the supreme law-making 
and law-enforcing  power does not belong
 to him1 and thus that he is called     
'sovereign'  in other than the strict   
sense4 ,if he were sovereign in the full
  sense 'de facto1' he could not fail to
 be so 'de jure1' i4e4  legally4 ,in    
such a state of things1 if the          
antagonism between king  and parliament 
continued for any length of time1 it    
would have to  be admitted that there   
was no sovereign in the sense of a      
supreme  law-making and law-enforcing   
power2 that sovereignty in this sense   
was in abeyance1 and that anarchy       
prevailed4 ,or the same thing might  be 
explained by saying that sovereignty    
still resided 'de jure'  with the king  
and parliament1 though not 'de facto'   
exercised by  them2 but if we use such  
language1 we must bear in mind that we  
are  qualifying 'sovereignty' by an     
epithet which neutralises its meaning   
as an actually supreme power4 ,if1      
however1 the king succeeded in          

establishing such a power on a permanent
 footing1 he would have  become         
sovereign in the full sense1 and there  
would be no ground  for saying1 as      
before1 that he was not sovereign 'de   
jure'2 for the  qualifications 'de jure'
 and 'not de jure1' in that sense in    
which  they might be applied to a power 
which is not supreme1 are equally       
inapplicable to the power of making and 
enforcing law which is  supreme4 ,the   
monarch's newly established supremacy   
may be in conflict  with laws that were 
previously in force1 but he has only to 
abolish  those laws in order to render  
it legal4 ,if1 then1 it is still to  be 
said to be not 'de jure1' it must be    
because 'jus' is used for  something    
else than law or right established by   
law2 viz4 either  for 'natural right'   
7if we admit that there is such a       
thing71 and  'natural right' as not     
merely  natural power2 or for certain   
claims  which the members of the subject
 community have come to recognise as    

inherent in the community and in        
themselves as members of it1 claims     
regarded as the foundation of law1 not  
as founded upon it1 and with  which the 
commands of the sovereign conflict4 ,but
 even according to  this meaning of     
'jus1' a sovereign in the strict        
,austinian sense1  that is not so 'de   
jure1' is in the long run an            
impossibility4  ',habitual obedience'   
cannot be secured in the face of such   
claims4    #a ,above1 sec4 #hj4 ,,rln   
#if4 ,but whether or no in any qualified
 sense of 'sovereign' or 'jus1'  a      
sovereign that is not so 'de jure' is   
possible1 once understand  by           
'sovereign' the determinate person or   
persons with whom the  ultimate         
law-imposing and law-enforcing power    
resides1 and by 'jus'  law1 it is then  
obviously a contradiction to speak of a 
sovereign  'de jure' as distinguished   
from one 'de facto4' ,the power of the  
ultimate imponent of law cannot be      
derived from1 or limited by1 law4  ,the 

sovereign may no doubt by a legislative 
act of its own lay down  rules as to the
 mode in which its power shall be       
exercised1 but if  it is sovereign in   
the sense supposed1 it must always be   
open to it  to alter these rules4 ,there
 can be no illegality in its doing so4  
,in short1 in whatever sense 'jus' is   
derived from the sovereign1 in  that    
sense no sovereign can hold his power   
'de jure4' ,so ,spinoza held  that      
'imperium' was 'de jure' indeed1 but 'de
 jure naturali' 7'jus  naturale'        
natural power71 which is the same as 'de
 jure divino'2  only powers exercised in
 subordination to 'imperium' are 'de    
jure  civili4' ,so ,hobbes said that    
there could be no 'unjust law4' ,a law  
was not a law unless enacted by a       
sovereign1 and 'the just' being  that to
 which the sovereign obliges1 the       
sovereign could not enact  the unjust1  
though it might enact the inequitable   
and the pernicious1  the 'inequitable'  
presumably meaning that which conflicts 

with a law  of nature1 the 'pernicious' 
that which tends to weaken individuals  
or society4 ,rousseau retains the same  
notion of the impeccability of  the     
sovereign1 but on different grounds4    
,every act of the sovereign  is         
according to him 'de jure1' not because 
all right is derived from  a supreme    
coercive power and the sovereign is that
 power1 but because  the sovereign is   
the general will1 which is necessarily a
 will for  the good of all4 ,the        
enactment of the sovereign could as     
little1 on  this view1 be 'inequitable' 
or 'pernicious' as it could be 'unjust4'
  ,but this view necessitates a         
distinction between the sovereign1 thus 
conceived1 and the actually supreme     
power of making and enforcing  law as it
 exists anywhere but in what ,rousseau  
considered a perfect  state4 ,rousseau  
indeed generally avoids calling this    
actually supreme  power 'sovereign1'    
though he cannot1 as we have seen1      
altogether  avoid it2 and since1        

whatever he liked to call it1 the       
existence  of such a power in forms     
which according to him prevented its    
equivalence to the general will was     
almost everywhere a fact1 his  readers  
would naturally come to think of the    
actually supreme power  as sovereign 'de
 facto1' in distinction from something  
else which was  sovereign 'de jure4'    
,and further1 under the influence of    
,rousseau's  view that the only organ of
 the general will was an assembly of    
the whole people1 they would naturally  
regard such an assembly as  sovereign   
'de jure1' and any other power actually 
supreme as merely  sovereign 'de facto4'
 ,this opposition1 however1 really      
arises out of  a confusion in the usage 
of the term 'sovereign'2 out of         
inability  on the one side to hold fast 
the identification of sovereign with    
general will1 on the other to keep it   
simply to the sense of the  supreme     
law-making and law-enforcing power4 ,if 
'sovereign'  'general  will1' the       

distinction of 'de facto' and 'de jure' 
is inapplicable  to it4 ,a certain      
desire either is or is not the general  
will4 ,a  certain interest is or is not 
an interest in the common good4 ,there  
is no sense in saying that such desire  
or interest is general will  'de jure'  
but not 'de facto1' or vice versa4 ,on  
the other hand1 if  'sovereign'  the    
supreme law-making and law-enforcing    
power1 the  distinction is equally      
inapplicable to it4 ,if any person or   
persons  have this power at all1 they   
cannot be said to have it merely 'de    
facto' while others have it 'de jure4'  
#ig4 ,it may be urged with much truth   
that the actual possession of  such     
power by a determinate person or persons
 is rather a convenient  hypothesis of  
writers on jurisprudence than an actual 
fact2 and1 as  we have seen1 the actual 
condition of things at certain times in 
certain states may conveniently be      
expressed by saying that there was  a   
sovereign 'de facto' that was not so 'de

 jure1' or vice versa2 but  only on the 
supposition that 'sovereign' is not     
taken necessarily  in the full sense of 
a supreme law-making and law-enforcing  
power4  ,in a state of things that can  
be so described1 however1 there is no   
'sovereignty' at all in the sense of an 
actually supreme power of  making and   
enforcing law resident in a determinate 
person or persons4  ,sovereignty in this
 sense can only exist 'de facto'2 and   
when it so  exists1 it is obvious that  
no other can in the same sense exist 'de
  jure4' ,it may be denied indeed in    
particular cases that an actually       
supreme power of making and enforcing   
law is exercised 'de jure1' in  a sense 
of that phrase already explained 7see   
section #ie74 ,reasons  were given for  
doubting whether a power could really   
maintain its  sovereign attributes if   
conflicting with 'jus1' in the sense    
thus  explained4 ,but supposing that it 
could1 the fact that it was not         
exercised 'de jure' would not entitle us

 to say that any other person  or       
persons were sovereign 'de jure1'       
without altering the meaning of         
'sovereign4' ,if any one has supreme    
power 'de facto1' that which any  one   
else has cannot be supreme power4 ,the  
qualification of a power as  held not   
'de facto' but 'de jure' is one which   
destroys its character  as supreme1 i4e4
 as sovereign in the sense before us4   
#ih4 ,it is only through trying to      
combine under the term 'sovereign'  the 
notions of the general will and of      
supreme power that we are led  to speak 
of the people as sovereign 'de jure1' if
 not 'de facto4'  ,there would be no    
harm indeed in speaking of the general  
will as  sovereign1 if the natural      
association of 'sovereign' with supreme 
coercive power could be got rid of2 but 
as this cannot be1 when once  we have   
pronounced the general will 'sovereign1'
 we are pretty sure  to identify the    
general will with a vote of the majority
 of citizens4  ,a majority of citizens  

can be conceived as exercising a supreme
  coercive power1 but a general will1 in
 the sense of an unselfish  interest in 
the common good which in various degrees
 actuates men in  their dealings with   
each other1 cannot be so conceived4     
,thus for the  sovereignty1 in an       
impalpable and unnatural sense1 of the  
general  will1 we get a sovereignty1 in 
the natural and demonstrable sense1 of  
the multitude4 ,but as the multitude is 
not everywhere supreme1 the  assertion  
of its sovereignty has to be put in the 
form that it is  sovereign 'de jure4'   
,the truth which underlies this         
proposition is  that an interest in     
common good is the ground of political  
society1  in the sense that without it  
no body of people would recognise any   
authority as having a claim on their    
common obedience4 ,it is so far  as a   
government represents to them a common  
good that the subjects  are conscious   
that they ought to obey it1 i4e4 that   
obedience to it  is a means to an end   

desirable in itself or absolutely4 ,this
 truth  is latent in ,rousseau's        
doctrine of the sovereignty of the      
general  will1 but he confounds with it 
the proposition that no government has  
a claim on obedience1 but that which    
originates in a vote passed by  the     
people themselves who are called on to  
obey 7a vote which must  be unanimous in
 the case of the original compact1 and  
carried by a  majority in subsequent    
cases74    #ii4 ,this latter doctrine   
arises out of the delusion of natural   
right4  ,the individual1 it is thought1 
having a right1 not derived from        
society1 to do as he likes1 can only    
forego that right by an act to  which he
 is a party4 ,therefore he has a right  
to disregard a law  unless it is passed 
by an assembly of which he has been a   
member1  and by the decision of which he
 has expressly or tacitly agreed to  be 
bound4 ,clearly1 however1 such a natural
 right of the individual  would be      
violated under most popular             

sovereignties no less than under  one   
purely monarchical1 if he happened to   
object to the decision of  the majority2
 for to say1 as ,rousseau says1 that he 
has virtually  agreed1 by the mere fact 
of residence in a certain territory1 to 
be  bound by the votes of the majority  
of those occupying that territory1  is a
 mere trick to save appearances4 ,but in
 truth there is no such  natural right  
to do as one likes irrespectively of    
society4 ,it is on  the relation to a   
society1 to other men recognising a     
common good1  that the individual's     
rights depend1 as much as the gravity of
 a body  depends on relations to other  
bodies4 ,a right is a power claimed and 
recognised as contributory to a common  
good4 ,a right against society1  in     
distinction from a right to be treated  
as a member of society1 is  a           
contradiction in terms4 ,no one1        
therefore1 has a right to resist a  law 
or ordinance of government1 on the      
ground that it requires him  to do what 

he does not like1 and that he has not   
agreed to submit  to the authority from 
which it proceeds2 and if no one person 
has  such a right1 no number of persons 
have it4 ,if the common interest        
requires it1 no right can be alleged    
against it4 ,neither can its  enactment 
by popular vote enhance1 nor the absence
 of such vote  diminish1 its right to be
 obeyed4 ,rousseau himself well says    
that  the proper question for each      
citizen to ask himself in regard to any 
proposal before the assembly is not1 ,do
 ,i like or approve it8 but1  ,is it    
according to the general will8 which is 
only another way of  asking1 ,is it     
according to the general interest8 ,it  
is only as the  organ of this general   
interest that the popular vote can endow
 any  law with the right to be obeyed2  
and ,rousseau himself1 if he could  have
 freed himself from the presuppositions 
of natural right1 might  have admitted  
that1 as the popular vote is by no means
 necessarily  an organ of the general   

interest1 so the decree of a monarch or 
of  an aristocratic assembly1 under     
certain conditions1 might be such an    
organ4    #ajj4 ,but it may be asked1   
,must not the individual judge for      
himself  whether a law is for the common
 good8 and if he decides that it is     
not1 is he not entitled to resist it8   
,otherwise1 not only will laws  passed  
in the interest of individuals or       
classes1 and against the  public good1  
have a claim to our absolute and        
permanent submission1  but a government 
systematically carried on for the       
benefit of a few  against the many can  
never be rightfully resisted4 ,to the   
first  part of this question we must of 
course answer 'yes1' without            
qualification4 ,the degree to which the 
individual judges for himself  of the   
relation between the common good and the
 laws which cross  the path of his      
ordinary life1 is the measure of his    
intelligent1  as distinguished from a   
merely instinctive1 recognition of      

rights  in others and in the state2 and 
on this recognition again depends  his  
practical understanding of the          
difference between mere powers  and     
rights as recognised by himself4        
,supposing then the individual  to have 
decided that some command of a          
'political superior' is not  for the    
common good1 how ought he to act in     
regard to it8 ,in a  country like ours1 
with a popular government and settled   
methods of  enacting and repealing laws1
 the answer of common sense is simple   
and sufficient4 ,he should do all he can
 by legal methods to get the  command   
cancelled1 but till it is cancelled he  
should conform to it4  ,the common good 
must suffer more from resistance to a   
law or to the  ordinance of a legal     
authority1 than from the individual's   
conformity  to a particular law or      
ordinance that is bad1 until its repeal 
can be  obtained4 ,it is thus the social
 duty of the individual to conform1  and
 he can have no right1 as we have seen1 

that is against his social  duty2 no    
right to anything or to do anything that
 is not involved in  the ability to do  
his duty4    #aja4 ,but difficulties    
arise when either 7,i7 it is a case of  
disputed  sovereignty1 and in           
consequence the legal authority of the  
supposed  command is doubtful2 or 7#b7  
when the government is so conducted     
that there are no legal means of        
obtaining the repeal of a law2 or  7#c7 
when the whole system of a law and      
government is so perverted  by private  
interests hostile to the public that    
there has ceased to  be any common      
interest in maintaining it2 or 7#d71--;a
 more frequent  case1--when the         
authority from which the objectionable  
command  proceeds is so easily separable
 from that on which the maintenance of  
social order and the fabric of settled  
rights depends1 that it can be  resisted
 without serious detriment to this order
 and fabric4 ,in such  cases1 may there 
not be a right of resistance based on a 

'higher law'  than the command of the   
ostensible sovereign8    #ajb4 7#a7 ,as 
to cases where the legal authority of   
the supposed  command is doubtful4 ,in  
modern states the definition of         
sovereignty1--the determination of the  
person or persons with whom  the supreme
 power of making and enforcing law      
legally resides1--has  only been arrived
 at by a slow process4 ,the ,european   
monarchies have  mostly arisen out of   
the gradual conversion of feudal        
superiority  into sovereignty in the    
strict sense4 ,great states1 such as    
,germany  and ,italy1 have been formed  
by the combination of independent or    
semi-dependent states4 ,in ,england the 
unity of the state goes back  much      
further than anywhere else1 but in      
,england it was but gradually  that the 
residence of sovereignty jointly in     
king1 lords1 and commons  came to be    
practically established1 and it is still
 founded merely on  a customary law4 ,in
 the ,united ,states1 with a written    

constitution1  it required all ,austin's
 subtlety to detect where sovereignty   
lay1  and he places it where probably no
 ordinary citizen of the ,united        
,states had ever thought of it as       
residing1 viz4 'in the states'          
governments as forming one aggregate    
body3 meaning by a state's  government1 
not its ordinary legislature1 but the   
body of citizens  which appoints its    
ordinary legislature1 and which1 the    
union apart1  is properly sovereign     
therein4' ,he bases this view on the    
provision  in the constitution1         
according to which amendments to it are 
only  valid 'when ratified by the       
legislature in three-fourths of the     
several states1 or by convention in     
three-fourths thereof4' 7,i1 p4  #bfh47 
,but no ordinary citizen of the ,united 
,states probably ever  thought of       
sovereignty except as residing either in
 the government  of his state or in the 
federal government consisting of        
congress and  president1 or sometimes in

 one way1 sometimes in the other4 ,in   
other  countries1 e4g4 ,france1 where   
since ,louis ,,xiv the quarter in which 
sovereignty resides has at any given    
time been easily assignable1  there have
 since the revolution been such frequent
 changes in the  ostensible sovereign   
that there might almost at any time have
 been a  case for doubting whether the  
ostensible sovereign had such command   
over the habitual obedience of the      
people as to be a sovereign in  that    
sense in which there is a social duty to
 obey the sovereign1 as  the            
representative of the common interest in
 social order2 whether  some prior      
sovereignty was not really still in     
force4 ,for these  various reasons there
 have been occasions in the history of  
all  modern states at which men1 or     
bodies of men1 without the conscious    
assertion of any right not founded upon 
law1 might naturally deem  themselves   
entitled to resist an authority which on
 its part claimed  a right--a legally   

established power--to enforce obedience1
 and  turned out actually to possess the
 power of doing so4    #ajc4 ,in such   
cases the truest retrospective account  
to be given  of the matter will often   
be1 that at the time there was nothing  
amounting to a right on either side4 ,a 
right is a power of which the  exercise 
by the individual or by some body of men
 is recognised by  a society1 either as 
itself directly essential to a common   
good1 or  as conferred by an authority  
of which the maintenance is recognised  
as so essential4 ,but in cases of the   
kind described the authorities1         
appealed to on each side as justifying  
respectively compulsion and  resistance1
 often do not command a sufficiently    
general recognition  of their being     
necessary to the common good to enable  
them to confer  rights of compulsion or 
resistance4 ,one or other of them may be
  coming to do so1 or ceasing to do so1 
but rights1 though on the one  hand they
 are eternal or at least coeval with    

human society1 on the  other hand take  
time to form themselves in this or that 
particular  subject and to transfer     
themselves from one subject to another2 
7just  as one may hold reason to be     
eternal1 and yet hold that it takes     
time for this or that being to become   
rational47 ,hence in periods  of        
conflict between local or customary and 
imperial or written law1  between the   
constituent powers of a sovereignty1    
such as king and  parliament in         
,england1 of which the relation to each 
other has not  become accurately        
defined1 between a falling and a rising 
sovereign  in a period of revolution1   
between federal and state authorities in
  a composite state1 the facts are best 
represented by saying that  for a time  
there may be no right on either side in 
the conflict1  and that it is impossible
 to determine precisely the stage at    
which  there comes to be such a right on
 the one side as implies a definite     
resistance to right on the other4 ,this 

of course is not to be taken  to mean   
that in such periods rights in general  
are at an end4 ,it is  merely that right
 is in suspense on the particular point 
at issue  between the conflicting       
powers4 ,as we have seen1 the general   
fabric  of rights in any society does   
not depend on the existence of a        
definite and ascertained sovereignty1 in
 the restricted sense of the  words2 on 
the determination of a person or persons
 in whom supreme  power resides2 but on 
the control of the conduct of men       
according to  certain regular principles
 by a society recognising common        
interests2  and though such control may 
be more or less weakened during periods 
of conflict of the kind supposed1 it    
never ceases4    #ajd4 ,it does not     
follow1 however1 because there may often
 not be  strictly a right on either side
 in such periods of conflict1 that      
there is not a good and an evil1 a      
better and a worse1 on one side  or the 
other4 ,of this we can only judge by    

reference to the end1  whatever it be1  
in which we conceive the good of man to 
consist4  ,there may be clear ground for
 saying1 in regard to any conflict1     
that one side rather than the other     
ought to have been taken1 not  because  
those on one side were1 those on the    
other were not1 entitled  to say that   
they had a right to act as they did1 but
 because the  common good of a nation or
 mankind was clearly promoted by one    
line  of action1 not by the other4 ,e4g4
 in the ,american war of secession1     
though it would be difficult to say that
 a man had not as much a  right to fight
 for his seceding state as for the      
,union1 yet as the  special interest of 
the seceding states was that of         
maintaining  slavery1 there was reason  
for holding that the side of the ,union1
 not  that of the seceding states1 was  
the one which ought to be taken4 ,on    
the other hand1 it does not follow that 
in a struggle for sovereignty  the good 
of man is more served by one of the     

competing powers than  by the other4    
,good may come out of the conflict      
without one power  contributing more to 
it than the other4 ,there may thus be as
 little  ground retrospectively for     
saying that one side or the other ought 
to have been taken1 as that men had a   
right to take one and not  the other4   
,at the same time1 as regards the       
individual1 there is  no reason for     
doubting that the better the motive     
which determines  him to take this side 
or that1 the more he is actuated in     
doing so  by some unselfish desire for  
human good1 the more free he is from    
egotism1 and that conceit or            
opinionatedness which is a form of      
egotism1 the more good he will do       
whichever side he adopts4    #aje4 ,it  
is in such cases as we have been        
considering that the  distinction       
between sovereign 'de facto' and        
sovereign 'de jure'  arises4 ,it has a  
natural meaning in the mouths of those  
who1 in  resisting some coercive power  

that claims their obedience1 can point  
to another determinate authority to     
which they not only consider  obedience 
due1 but to which such obedience in some
 considerable  measure is actually      
rendered2 a meaning which it has not    
when all  that can be opposed to        
sovereign 'de facto' is either a        
'general  will1' or the mere name of a  
fallen dynasty exercising no control    
over men in their dealings with each    
other4 ,but where this opposition  can  
be used with a natural meaning1 it is a 
truer account of the  matter 7as we have
 seen7 to say that sovereignty is in    
abeyance4 ,the  existence of competing  
powers1 each affecting to control men in
 the  same region of outward action1 and
 each having partisans who regard  it   
alone as entitled to exercise such      
control1 implies that there is  not that
 unity of supreme control over the      
outward actions of men  which           
constitutes sovereignty and which is    
necessary to the complete  organisation 

of a state4 ,the state has either not   
reached complete  organisation1 or is   
for the time disorganised1 the          
disorganisation  being more or less     
serious according to the degree to which
 the  everyday rights of men 7their     
ordinary freedom of action and          
acquisition7 are interfered with by this
 want of unity in the supreme  control4 
#ajf4 ,in such a state of things1 the   
citizen has no rule of 'right'  7in the 
strict sense of the word7 to guide him4 
,he is pretty sure  to think that one or
 other of the competing powers has a    
right to  his obedience because1 being  
himself interested 7not necessarily     
selfishly interested7 in its support1 he
 does not take account of its  lacking  
that general recognition as a power     
necessary to the common  good which is  
requisite in order to give it a right4  
,but we looking  back may see that there
 was no such right4 ,was there then     
nothing to  direct him either way8      
,simply1 ,i should answer1 the general  

rule of  looking to the moral good of   
mankind1 to which a necessary means is  
the organisation of the state1 which    
again requires unity of supreme         
control1 in the common interest1 over   
the outward actions of men4  ,the       
citizen ought to have resisted or obeyed
 either of the competing  authorities1  
according as by doing so he contributed 
most to the  organisation of the state  
in the sense explained4 ,it must be     
admitted  that without more knowledge   
and foresight than the individual can be
  expected to possess1 this rule1 if he 
had recognised it1 could have  afforded 
him no sure guidance2 but this is only  
to say that there are  times of         
political difficulty in which the line  
of conduct adopted  may have the most   
important effect1 but in which it is    
very hard to  know what is the proper   
line to take4 ,on the other side must be
 set  the consideration that the man who
 brings with him the character most     
free from egotism to the decision even  

of those questions of conduct1  as to   
which established rules of right and    
wrong are of no avail1 is  most sure on 
the whole to take the line which yields 
the best results4    #ajg4 ,we come next
 to the question of the possible duty of
 resistance  in cases where no law1     
acknowledged or half-acknowledged1      
written or customary1 can be appealed to
 against a command  7general or         
particular7 contrary to the public good2
 where no  counter-sovereignty1 in the  
natural sense of the words1 can be      
alleged against that of the imponent of 
the law2 and where at the  same time1   
from the people having no share1 direct 
or indirect1 in  the government1 there  
is no means of obtaining a repeal of the
 law  by legal means4 ,i say the 'duty' 
of resistance because1 from the  point  
of view here adopted1 there can be no   
'right1' unless on the  ground that it  
is for the common good1 and if so1 there
 is a duty4 ,in  writings of the        
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1   

starting with  the assumption of natural
 rights1 the question was never put on  
its  proper footing4 ,it was not asked1 
,when1 for the sake of the common  good1
 the citizen ought to resist the        
sovereign8 but1 ,what sort of  injury to
 person or property gave him a natural  
right to resist8 ,now  there is sense in
 inquiring upon what sort and amount of 
provocation  from government individuals
 inevitably will resist2 how 7in        
,spinoza's  language7 that 'indignatio' 
is excited which leads them 'in unum    
conspirare'2 but there is none in asking
 what gives them a right to  resist1    
unless we suppose a wrong done to       
society in their persons2  and then it  
becomes a question not of right merely1 
but of duty1  whether the wrong done is 
such as to demand resistance4 ,now when 
the  question is thus put1 no one       
presumably would deny that under certain
  conditions there might be a duty of   
resistance to sovereign power4    #ajh4 
,it is important1 however1 that instead 

of discussing the right  of a majority  
to resist1 we should discuss the duty of
 resistance as  equally possible for a  
minority and a majority4 ,there can be  
no right  of a majority of citizens1 as 
such1 to resist a sovereign4 ,if by     
law1 written or customary1 the majority 
of citizens possess or share  in the    
sovereign power1 then any conflict that 
may arise between it  and any power     
cannot be a conflict between it and the 
sovereign4 ,the  majority may have a    
right to resist such a power1 but it    
will not be  a right to resist a        
sovereign4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the  
majority  of citizens have no share by  
law or custom in the supreme law-making 
and law-enforcing power1 they never can 
have a right1 simply as a  majority1 to 
resist that power4    ,in such a case1  
there may arise a social duty to resist1
 and the  exercise of men's powers in   
fulfilment of that duty may be sustained
  by such a general recognition of its  
being for the public good1 as to  become

 a right2 but the resistance may be a   
duty before a majority of  the citizens 
approve it1 and does not necessarily    
become a duty when  a majority of them  
do approve it2 while that general       
recognition of  its exercise as being   
for the common good1 through which the  
power  of resistance becomes a right1   
must be something more habitual and     
sustained and penetrating than any vote 
of a majority can convey4               
,incidentally1 however1 the             
consideration of the attitude of the    
mass  of the people in regard to a      
contemplated resistance to established  
government must always be most important
 in determining the question  whether   
the resistance should be made4 ,it      
should be made1 indeed1 if  at all1 not 
because the majority approve it1 but    
because it is for  the public good2 but 
account must be taken of the state of   
mind of  the majority in considering    
whether it is for the public good or no4
  ,the presumption must generally be    

that resistance to a government is  not 
for the public good when made on grounds
 which the mass of the  people cannot   
appreciate2 and it must be on the       
presence of a strong  and intelligent   
popular sentiment in favour of          
resistance that the  chance of avoiding 
anarchy1 of replacing the existing      
government  by another effectual for its
 purpose1 must chiefly depend4 ,on the  
other hand1 it is under the worst       
governments that the public spirit  is  
most crushed2 and thus in extreme cases 
there may be a duty of  resistance in   
the public interest1 though there is no 
hope of the  resistance finding         
efficient popular support4 7,an instance
 is the  ,mazzinian outbreaks in        
,italy47 ,its repeated renewal and      
repeated  failure may afford the only   
prospect of ultimately arousing the     
public spirit which is necessary for the
 maintenance of a government  in the    
public interest4 ,and just as there may 
thus be a duty of  resistance on the    

part of a hopeless minority1 so on the  
other side  resistance even to a        
monarchic or oligarchic government is   
not  justified by the fact that a       
majority1 perhaps in some temporary  fit
 of irritation or impatience1 is ready  
to support it1 if1 as may  very well be1
 the objects for which government       
subsists--the general  freedom of action
 and acquisition and                    
self-development--are likely to  suffer 
from an overthrow of the government in  
the popular interest4    #aji4 ,no      
precise rule1 therefore1 can be laid    
down as to the  conditions under which  
resistance to a despotic government     
becomes  a duty4 ,but the general       
questions which the good citizen should 
ask himself in contemplating such       
resistance will be1 7a7 ,what  prospect 
is there of resistance to the sovereign 
power leading to  a modification of its 
character or an improvement in its      
exercise  without its subversion8 7b7   
,if it is overthrown1 is the temper of  

the people such1 are the influences on  
which the general maintenance  of social
 order and the fabric of recognised     
rights depend so far  separable from it1
 that its overthrow will not mean       
anarchy8 7c7 ,if  its overthrow does    
lead to anarchy1 is the whole system of 
law and  government so perverted by     
private interests hostile to the public1
  that there has ceased to be any common
 interest in maintaining it8    #aaj4   
,such questions are so little likely to 
be impartially  considered at a time    
when resistance to a despotic government
 is  in contemplation1 and1 however     
impartially considered1 are so          
intrinsically difficult to answer1 that 
it may seem absurd to dwell  on them4   
,no doubt revolutionists do and must to 
a great extent 'go  it blind4' ,such    
beneficent revolutions as there have    
been could not  have been if they did   
not4 ,but in most of those questions of 
right  and wrong in conduct1 which have 
to be settled by consideration of  the  

probable effects of the conduct1 the    
estimate of effects which  regulates our
 approval or disapproval upon a         
retrospective survey1  and according to 
which we say that an act should or      
should not have  been done1 is not one  
which we could expect the agent himself 
to have  made4 ,the effort to make it   
would have paralysed his power of       
action4    #aaa4 ,in the simple cases of
 moral duty1 where there is no real     
doubt  as to the effects of this or that
 action1 and danger arises from         
interested self-sophistication1 we can  
best decide for ourselves  whether we   
ought to act in this way or that by     
asking whether it  is what is good in   
us--a disinterested or unselfish        
motive--that  moves us to act in this   
way or that2 and in judging of the      
actions  of others1 where the issues and
 circumstances are simple1 the moral    
question1 the question of 'ought' or    
'ought not1' is often best put  in the  
form1 ,how far was the action such as   

could represent a good  character8 ,that
 indeed is the form in which the        
question should  always be put1 when the
 nature of the case admits it2 since1 as
  argued elsewhere ,prol4 to ,ethics1   
,bk ,,ii1 ,chaps ,i and ,,ii1 it is     
only in its relation to character that  
action is in the full sense  good or    
bad4 ,but where the probable effects of 
a certain line of  action are at the    
time of taking it very obscure1 we      
cannot be sure  that relatively the best
 character will lead a man to take the  
line  which turns out best in the       
result1 or that because a line of action
  has turned out well in result1 the    
character of the man who adopted  it was
 good4 ,this being so1 in judging of the
 act retrospectively we  have to        
estimate it by the result simply1 in    
abstraction from the  character of the  
agent4 ,thus in looking back upon a     
revolutionary  outbreak we can only     
judge whether it was vindicated by the  
result4  ,if in the light of the result 

it appears that conditions were not     
present under which it would have       
furthered rather than interfered  with  
the true objects of government1 we judge
 that it should not  have been made2 if 
otherwise1 we approve it1--judge that   
the persons  concerned in it were doing 
their duty in acting as they did4 ,but  
whether they were really doing their    
duty in the full sense of  the term in  
acting as they did in a case when the   
outbreak was  successful1 or not doing  
it in a case where it failed1 is what we
  simply cannot tell2 for this depends  
on the state of character which  their  
action represented1 and that is beyond  
our ken4    #aab4 ,such is the necessary
 imperfection under which all historical
  judgments labour1 though historians   
are not apt to recognise it and  would  
be thought much more dull if they did4  
,they would have fewer  readers if they 
confined themselves to the analysis of  
situations1  which may be correctly     
made1 and omitted judgments on the      

morality  of individuals for which1 in  
the proper sense1 the data can never  be
 forthcoming4 ,we scarcely have them for
 ourselves 7except that we  know that we
 are none of us what we should be71     
still less for our  intimate            
acquaintance2 not at all for men whom we
 only know through  history1 past or    
present1 in regard to them1 we can only 
fall back on  the generalisation1 that  
the best man--the man most              
disinterestedly  devoted to the         
perfecting of humanity1 in some form or 
other1 in  his own person or that of    
others--is more likely to act in a way  
that is good as measured by its results1
 those results again being  estimated   
with reference to an ideal of character1
 and that this is  so even under        
circumstances of political complication4
 ,appearances  to the contrary1         
appearances of harm done from good      
motives1 may be  met by the             
considerations1 7#a7 that there is often
 much egotism in  what calls itself     

conscientiousness1 and that the         
'conscientious'  motives which lead to  
mischievous acts may not be in the      
highest  sense disinterested2 7#b7 that 
to what we call the consequences of an  
action many influences contribute       
besides the action which we call  the   
cause1 and if evil seems to clog the    
consequences of action pure  in motive1 
this may be due to other influences     
connected with motives  less worthy1    
while the consequences which in the     
rough we call bad  might have been worse
 but for the intervention of the        
purely-motived  action2 7#c7 that the   
beneficent results are often put to the 
credit  of the actions of selfish men   
when they should rather be credited to  
influences more remote and complex1     
without which those actions would  have 
been impossible or had no good effect1  
and which have arisen out  of unselfish 
activities4 ,we see the evil in a course
 of events and  lay the blame on someone
 who should have acted differently1 and 

whom  perhaps we take as an instance of 
how good men cause mischief2 but  we do 
not see the greater evil which would    
otherwise have ensued4 ,in  regard to   
the questions stated above as those     
which the good citizen  should set      
himself in contemplation of a possible  
rebellion1 though  they are questions to
 which it is impossible for a citizen in
 the  heat of a revolutionary crisis to 
give a sufficient answer1 and which  in 
fact can only be answered after the     
event1 yet they represent  objects which
 the good citizen will set before       
himself at such times2  and in          
proportion to the amount of good        
citizenship1 as measured by  interest in
 those objects1 interest in making the  
best of existing  institutions1 in      
maintaining social order and the general
 fabric of  rights1 interest which leads
 to a bona fide estimate of the value   
of the existing government in its       
relation to public good1 will be  the   
good result of the political movement4  

,g4 ,,will1 ,,not ,,force1 ,,is ,,the   
,,basis ,,of ,,the ,,state4    #aac4    
,looking back on the political theories 
which we have discussed1  we may see    
that they all start with putting the    
question to be dealt  with in the same  
way1 and that their errors are very much
 due to the  way in which they put it4  
,they make no inquiry into the          
development  of society and of man      
through society4 ,they take no account  
of  other forms of community than that  
regulated by a supreme coercive  power1 
either in the way of investigating their
 historical origin  and connection1 or  
of considering the ideas and states of  
mind which  they imply or which render  
them possible4 ,they leave out of sight 
the  process by which men have been     
clothed with rights and duties1 and     
with senses of right and duty1 which are
 neither natural nor derived  from a    
sovereign power4 ,they look only to the 
supreme coercive power  on the one side 
and to individuals1 to whom natural     

rights are  ascribed1 on the other1 and 
ask what is the nature and origin of    
the right of that supreme coercive power
 as against these natural  rights of    
individuals4 ,the question so put can   
only be answered by  some device for    
representing the individuals governed as
 consenting  parties to the exercise of 
government over them4 ,this they no     
doubt  are so long as the government is 
exercised in a way corresponding to     
their several wishes2 but1 so long as   
this is the case1 there is no           
interference with their 'natural        
liberty' to do as they like4 ,it is     
only when this liberty is interfered    
with1 that any occasion arises  for an  
explanation of the compatibility of the 
sovereign's right with  the natural     
right of the individual2 and it is just 
then that the  explanation by the       
supposition that the right of the       
sovereign is  founded on consent1 fails4
 ,but the need of the fictitious        
explanation  arises from a wrong way of 

putting the question2 the power which   
regulates our conduct in political      
society is conceived in too  abstract a 
way on the one side1 and on the other   
are set over against  it1 as the        
subjects which it controls1 individuals 
invested with all  the moral attributes 
and rights of humanity4 ,but in truth it
 is only  as members of a society1 as   
recognising common interests and        
objects1  that individuals come to have 
these attributes and rights2 and the    
power1 which in a political society they
 have to obey1 is derived  from the     
development and systematisation of those
 institutions for  the regulation of a  
common life without which they would    
have no  rights at all4    #aad4 ,to ask
 why ,i am to submit to the power of the
 state1 is to  ask why ,i am to allow my
 life to be regulated by that complex of
  institutions without which ,i         
literally should not have a life to     
call my own1 nor should be able to ask  
for a justification of what  ,i am      

called on to do4 ,for that ,i may have a
 life which ,i can call  my own1 ,i must
 not only be conscious of myself and of 
ends which ,i  present to myself as     
mine2 ,i must be able to reckon on a    
certain  freedom of action and          
acquisition for the attainment of those 
ends1  and this can only be secured     
through common recognition of this      
freedom on the part of each other by    
members of a society1 as being  for a   
common good4 ,without this1 the very    
consciousness of having  ends of his own
 and a life which he can direct in a    
certain way1 a  life of which he can    
make something1 would remain dormant in 
a man4  ,it is true that slaves have    
been found to have this consciousness   
in high development2 but a slave even at
 his lowest has been partly  made what  
he is by an ancestral life which was not
 one of slavery  pure and simple1 a life
 in which certain elementary rights were
  secured to the members of a society   
through their recognition of a  common  

interest4 ,he retains certain spiritual 
aptitudes from that  state of family or 
tribal freedom4 ,this1 perhaps1 is all  
that could  be said of most of the      
slaves on plantations in modern times2  
but  the slavery of the ancient world1  
being mainly founded on captivity  in   
war1 was compatible with a considerable 
amount of civilisation  on the part of  
the slaves at the time when their       
slavery began4 ,a  ,jewish slave1 e4g41 
would carry with him into slavery a     
thoroughly  developed conception of     
right and law4 ,slavery1 moreover1      
implies the  establishment of some      
regular system of rights in the         
slave-owning  society4 ,the slave1      
especially the domestic slave1 has the  
signs  and effects of this system all   
about him4 ,hence such elementary       
consciousness of rights--of powers that 
are his own to make the best  of--as the
 born slave may inherit from an         
ancestral life of freedom1  finds a     
stimulus to its inward development1     

though no opportunity  for outward      
exercise1 in the habits and ideas of    
civilised life with  which a common     
language enables the slave to become    
conversant1 and  which1 through the     
sympathy implied in a common language1  
he to some  extent makes his own4 ,thus 
the appearance in slaves of the         
conception  that they should be masters 
of themselves1 does not conflict with   
the proposition that only so far as a   
certain freedom of action and           
acquisition is secured to a body of men 
through their recognition of  the       
exercise of that freedom by each other  
as being for the common  good1 is there 
an actualisation of the individual's    
consciousness  of having life and ends  
of his own4 ,the exercise1              
manifestation1  expression of this      
consciousness through a freedom secured 
in the way  described is necessary to   
its real existence1 just as language of 
some sort is necessary to the real      
existence of thought1 and bodily        

movement to that of the soul4    #aae4  
,the demand1 again1 for a justification 
of what one is called on  by authority  
to do presupposes some standard of      
right1 recognised  as equally valid for 
and by the person making the demand and 
others  who form a society with him1 and
 such a recognised standard in turn     
implies institutions for the regulation 
of men's dealings with each  other1     
institutions of which the relation to   
the consciousness of  right may be      
compared1 as above1 to that of language 
to thought4  ,it cannot be said that the
 most elementary consciousness of right 
is prior to them1 or they to it4 ,they  
are the expressions in which  it becomes
 real4 ,as conflicting with the         
momentary inclinations  of the          
individual1 these institutions are a    
power which he obeys  unwillingly2 which
 he has to1 or is made to1 obey4 ,but it
 is only  through them that the         
consciousness takes shape and form which
  expresses itself in the question1     

',why should ,i thus be constrained8    
,by what right is my natural right to do
 as ,i like overborne8'    #aaf4 ,the   
doctrine that the rights of government  
are founded on the  consent of the      
governed is a confused way of stating   
the truth1  that the institutions by    
which man is moralised1 by which he     
comes  to do what he sees that he must1 
as distinct from what he would  like1   
express a conception of a common good2  
that through them that  conception takes
 form and reality2 and that it is in    
turn through its  presence in the       
individual that they have a constraining
 power over  him1 a power which is not  
that of mere fear1 still less a physical
  compulsion1 but which leads him to do 
what he is not inclined to  because     
there is a law that he should4          
,rousseau1 it will be remembered1 speaks
 of the 'social pact' not  merely as the
 foundation of sovereignty or civil     
government1 but as  the foundation of   
morality4 ,through it man becomes a     

moral agent2 for  the slavery to        
appetite he substitutes the freedom of  
subjection to a  self-imposed law4 ,if  
he had seen at the same time that rights
 do not  begin till duties begin1 and   
that if there was no morality prior to  
the pact there could not be rights1 he  
might have been saved from the  error   
which the notion of there being natural 
rights introduces into  his theory4 ,but
 though he does not seem himself to have
 been aware  of the full bearing of his 
own conception1 the conception itself   
is essentially true4 ,setting aside the 
fictitious representation  of an        
original covenant as having given birth 
to that common 'ego'  or general will1  
without which no such covenant would    
have been  possible1 and of obligations 
arising out of it1 as out of a bargain  
made between one man and another1 it    
remains true that only through  a       
recognition by certain men of a common  
interest1 and through the  expression of
 that recognition in certain regulations

 of their  dealings with each other1    
could morality originate1 or any meaning
 be  gained for such terms as 'ought'   
and 'right' and their equivalents4      
#aag4 ,morality1 in the first instance1 
is the observance of such  regulations1 
and though a higher morality1 the       
morality of the  character governed by  
'disinterested motives1' i4e4 by        
interest  in some form of human         
perfection1 comes to differentiate      
itself  from this primitive morality    
consisting in the observance of rules   
established for a common good1 yet this 
outward morality is the  presupposition 
of the higher morality4 ,morality and   
political  subjection thus have a common
 source1 'political subjection'  being  
distinguished from that of a slave1 as a
 subjection which  secures rights to the
 subject4 ,that common source is the    
rational  recognition by certain human  
beings--it may be merely by children of 
the same parent--of a common well-being 
which is their well-being1  and which   

they conceive as their well-being       
whether at any moment  any one of them  
is inclined to it or no1 and the        
embodiment of that  recognition in rules
 by which the inclinations of the       
individuals are  restrained1 and a      
corresponding freedom of action for the 
attainment  of well-being on the whole  
is secured4    #aah4 ,from this common  
source morality and political subjection
 in  all its forms always retain two    
elements in common1 one consisting  in  
antagonism to some inclination1 the     
other consisting in the  consciousness  
that the antagonism to inclination is   
founded on reason  or on the conception 
of some adequate good4 ,it is the       
antagonism  to inclination involved in  
the moral life1 as alone we know it1    
that makes it proper to speak           
analogically of moral 'laws' and        
'imperatives4' ,it must be remembered1  
however1 that such language  is         
analogical1 and that there is an        
essential difference between  laws in   

the strictest sense 7laws which are     
indeed not adequately  described as     
general commands of a political         
superior1 sanctioned  by liability to   
pains which that superior can inflict1  
but in which  a command so sanctioned is
 an essential element71 and the laws of 
conscience1 of which it is the peculiar 
dignity that they have no  external     
imponent and no sanction consisting in  
fear of bodily evil4  ,the relation of  
constraint1 in the one case between the 
man and the  externally imposed law1 in 
the other between some particular desire
  of the man and his consciousness of   
something absolutely desirable1  we     
naturally represent in ,english1 when we
 reflect on it1 by the  common term     
'must4' ',i must connect with the main  
drainage1' says  the householder to     
himself1 reflecting on an edict of the  
,local  ,board4 ',i must try to get     
,a4,b4 to leave off drinking1' he says  
to  himself1 reflecting on a troublesome
 moral duty of benevolence to his       

neighbour4 ,and if the 'must' in the    
former case represents in part  the     
knowledge that compulsion may be put on 
the man who neglects to  do what he     
must1 which is no part of its meaning in
 the second1 on  the other hand the     
consciousness that the constraint is for
 a common  good1 which wholly           
constitutes the power over inclination  
in the  second case1 must always be an  
element in that obedience which is      
properly called obedience to law1 or    
civil or political obedience4  ,simple  
fear can never constitute such          
obedience4 ,to represent it as  the     
basis of civil subjection is to confound
 the citizen with the  slave1 and to    
represent the motive which is needed for
 the restraint  of those in whom the    
civil sense is lacking1 and for the     
occasional  reinforcements of the       
law-abiding principle in others1 as if  
it were  the normal influence in habits 
of life of which the essential value    
lies in their being independent of it4  

,how far in any particular act  of      
conformity to law the fear of penalties 
may be operative1 it is  impossible to  
say4 ,what is certain is1 that a habit  
of subjection  founded upon such fear   
could not be a basis of political or    
free  society2 for to this it is        
necessary1 not indeed that everyone     
subject to the laws should take part in 
voting them1 still less  that he should 
consent to their application to himself1
 but that it  should represent an idea  
of common good1 which each member of the
  society can make his own so far as he 
is rational1 i4e4 capable of  the       
conception of a common good1 however    
much particular passions  may lead him  
to ignore it and thus necessitate the   
use of force  to prevent him from doing 
that which1 so far as influenced by the 
conception of a common good1 he would   
willingly abstain from4    #aai4        
,whether the legislative and            
administrative agencies of society  can 
be kept in the main free from bias by   

private interests1 and  true to the idea
 of common good1 without popular        
control2 whether  again1 if they can1   
that 'civil sense1' that appreciation of
 common  good on the part of the        
subjects1 which is as necessary to a    
free or  political society as the       
direction of law to the maintenance of a
  common good1 can be kept alive without
 active participation of the  people in 
legislative functions2 these are        
questions of circumstances  which       
perhaps do not admit of unqualified     
answers4 ,the views of those  who looked
 mainly to the highest development of   
political life in a  single small       
society1 have to be modified if the     
object sought for  is the extension of  
political life to the largest number of 
people4  ,the size of modern states     
renders necessary the substitution of a 
representative system for one in which  
the citizens shared directly  in        
legislation1 and this so far tends to   
weaken the active interest  of the      

citizens in the common weal1 though the 
evil may partly be  counteracted by     
giving increased importance to municipal
 or communal  administration4 ,in some  
states1 from the want of homogeneity or 
facilities of communication1 a          
representative legislature is  scarcely 
possible4 ,in others1 where it exists1 a
 great amount of  power1 virtually      
exempt from popular control1 has to be  
left with  what ,rousseau would have    
called the 'prince or magistrate4' ,in  
all  this there is a lowering of civil  
vitality as compared with that of  the  
ancient1 and perhaps of some            
exceptionally developed modern1         
commonwealths4 ,but perhaps this is a   
temporary loss that we have to  bear as 
the price of having recognised the claim
 to citizenship as  the claim of all    
men4 ,certainly all political ideals1   
which require  active and direct        
participation by the citizens in the    
functions of  the sovereign state1 fail 
us as soon as we try to conceive their  

realisation on the wide area even of    
civilised mankind4 ,it is easy  to      
conceive a better system than that of   
the great states of modern  ,europe1    
with their national jealousies1 rival   
armies1 and hostile  tariffs2 but the   
condition of any better state of things 
would seem  to be the recognition of    
some single constraining power1 which   
would  be even more remote from the     
active co-operation of the individual   
citizen than is the sovereign power of  
the great states at present4    #abj4   
,these considerations may remind us how 
far removed from any  foundation in     
their own will the requirements of the  
modern state  must seem to be to most of
 those who have to submit to them4 ,it  
is  true that the necessity which the   
state lays upon the individual  is for  
the most part one to which he is so     
accustomed that he no  longer kicks     
against it2 but what is it1 we may ask1 
but an external  necessity1 which he no 
more lays on himself than he does the   

weight  of the atmosphere or the        
pressure of summer heat and winter      
frosts1  that compels the ordinary      
citizen to pay rates and taxes1 to serve
  in the army1 to abstain from walking  
over the squire's fields1  snaring his  
hares1 or fishing in preserved streams1 
to pay rent1  to respect those          
artificial rights of property which only
 the  possessors of them have any       
obvious interest in maintaining1 or     
even 7if he is one of the               
'proletariate'7 to keep his hands off   
the  superfluous wealth of his          
neighbour1 when he has none of his own  
to lose8 ,granted that there are good   
reasons of social expediency  for       
maintaining institutions which thus     
compel the individual to  actions and   
forbearances that are none of his       
willing1 is it not  abusing words to    
speak of them as founded on a conception
 of general  good8 ,a conception does   
not float in the air4 ,it must be       
somebody's  conception4 ,whose          

conception1 then1 of general good is it 
that these  institutions represent8 ,not
 that of most of the people who conform 
to them1 for they do so because they are
 made to1 or have come to  do so        
habitually from having been long made   
to2 7i4e4 from being  frightened at the 
consequences of not conforming1 not     
consequences  which follow from not     
conforming in the ordinary course of    
nature1  but consequences which the     
state inflicts1 artificial              
consequences47  ,but when a man is said 
to obey an authority from interest in a 
common  good1 some other good is meant  
than that which consists in escaping    
the punishment which the authority would
 inflict on disobedience4 ,is  then the 
conception of common good which is      
alleged a conception of  it on the part 
of those who founded or who maintain the
 institutions  in question8 ,but is it  
not certain that private interests have 
been  the main agents in establishing1  
and are still in maintaining1 at any    

rate all the more artificial rights of  
property8 ,have not our modern  states1 
again1 in nearly every case been founded
 on conquest1 and are  not the actual   
institutions of government in great     
measure the direct  result of such      
conquest1 or1 where revolutions have    
intervened1 of  violence which has been 
as little governed by any conception of 
general good8 ,supposing that           
philosophers can find exquisite reasons 
for considering the institutions and    
requirements which have resulted  from  
all this self-seeking and violence to be
 contributory to the  common good of    
those who have to submit to them1 is it 
not trifling  to speak of them as       
founded on or representing a conception 
of this  good1 when no such conception  
has influenced those who established1   
maintain1 or submit to them8 ,and is it 
not seriously misleading1 when  the     
requirements of the state have so       
largely arisen out of force  directed by
 selfish motives1 and when the motive to

 obedience to  those requirements is    
determined by fear1 to speak of them as 
having  a common source with the        
morality of which it is admitted that   
the  essence is to be disinterested and 
spontaneous8    #aba4 ,if we would meet 
these objections fairly1 certain        
admissions  must be made4 ,the idea of a
 common good which the state fulfils has
  never been the sole influence         
actuating those who have been agents in 
the historical process by which states  
have come to be formed2 and  even so far
 as it has actuated them1 it has been   
only as conceived  in some very         
imperfect form that it has done so4     
,this is equally  true of those who     
contribute to the formation and         
maintenance of  states rather as agents1
 and of those who do so rather as       
patients4  ,no one could pretend that   
even the most thoughtful and            
dispassionate  publicist is capable of  
the idea of the good served by the state
 to  which he belongs1 in all its       

fulness4 ,he apprehends it only in some 
of its bearings2 but it is as a common  
good that he apprehends it1  i4e4 not as
 a good for himself or for this man or  
that more than  another1 but for all    
members equally in virtue of their      
relation  to each other and their common
 nature4 ,the idea which the ordinary   
citizen has of the common good served by
 the state is much more  limited in     
content4 ,very likely he does not think 
of it at all in  connection with        
anything that the term 'state'          
represents to him4  ,but he has a clear 
understanding of certain interests and  
rights  common to himself with his      
neighbours1 if only such as consist in  
getting his wages paid at the end of the
 week1 in getting his money's  worth at 
the shop1 in the inviolability of his   
own person and that  of his wife4       
,habitually and instinctively1 i4e4     
without asking the  reason why1 he      
regards the claim which in these        
respects he makes  for himself as       

conditional upon his recognising a like 
claim in  others1 and thus as in the    
proper sense a right1--a claim of which 
the essence lies in its being common to 
himself with others4 ,without  this     
instinctive recognition he is one of the
 'dangerous classes1'  virtually        
outlawed by himself4 ,with it1 though he
 have no reverence  for the 'state'     
under that name1 no sense of an interest
 shared with  others in maintaining it1 
he has the needful elementary conception
 of  a common good maintained by law4   
,it is the fault of the state if this   
conception fails to make him a loyal    
subject1 if not an intelligent  patriot4
 ,it is a sign that the state is not a  
true state2 that it is  not fulfilling  
its primary function of maintaining law 
equally in  the interest of all1 but is 
being administered in the interest of   
classes2 whence it follows that the     
obedience which1 if not rendered        
willingly1 the state compels the citizen
 to render1 is not one that  he feels   

any spontaneous interest in rendering1  
because it does not  present itself to  
him as the condition of the maintenance 
of those  rights and interests1 common  
to himself with his neighbours1 which he
  understands4    #abb4 ,but if the law 
which regulates private relations and   
its  administration are so equally      
applied to all1 that all who are        
capable of a common interest are        
prompted by that interest to conform  to
 the law1 the result is still only the  
loyal subject as distinct  from the     
intelligent patriot1 i4e4 as distinct   
from the man who so  appreciates the    
good which in common with others he     
derives from the  state--from the nation
 organised in the form of a             
self-governing  community to which he   
belongs--as to have a passion for       
serving  it1 whether in the way of      
defending it from external attack1 or   
developing it from within4 ,the citizens
 of the ,roman empire were  loyal       
subjects2 the admirable maintenance of  

private rights made them  that2 but they
 were not intelligent patriots1 and     
chiefly because  they were not1 the     
empire fell4 ,that active interest in   
the service  of the state1 which makes  
patriotism in the better sense1 can     
hardly  arise while the individual's    
relation to the state is that of a      
passive recipient of protection in the  
exercise of his rights of  person and   
property4 ,while this is the case1 he   
will give the state  no thanks for the  
protection which he will come to take as
 a matter  of course1 and will only be  
conscious of it when it descends upon   
him  with some unusual demand for       
service or payment1 and then he will be 
conscious of it in the way of           
resentment4 ,if he is to have a higher  
feeling of political duty1 he must take 
part in the work of the  state4 ,he must
 have a share1 direct or indirect1 by   
himself acting  as a member or by voting
 for the members of supreme or          
provincial  assemblies1 in making and   

maintaining the laws which he obeys4    
,only  thus will he learn to regard the 
work of the state as a whole1 and  to   
transfer to the whole the interest which
 otherwise his particular  experience   
would lead him to feel only in that part
 of its work that  goes to the          
maintenance of his own and his          
neighbour's rights4    #abc4 ,even then 
his patriotism will hardly be the       
passion which it  needs to be1 unless   
his judgment of what he owes to the     
state is  quickened by a feeling of     
which the 'patria1' the fatherland1 the 
seat of one's home1 is the natural      
object2 and of this feeling  the state  
becomes the object only so far as it is 
an organisation  of a people to whom the
 individual feels himself bound by ties 
analogous to those which bind him to his
 family1 ties derived from a  common    
dwelling-place with its associations1   
from common memories1  traditions and   
customs1 and from the common ways of    
feeling and  thinking which a common    

language and still more a common        
literature  embodies4 ,such an          
organisation of an homogeneous people   
the modern  state in most cases is 7the 
two ,austrian states being the most     
conspicuous exceptions71 and such the   
,roman state emphatically was  not4     
#abd4 ,but1 it will be said1 we are here
 again falling back on our  unproved    
assumption that the state is an         
institution for the  promotion of a     
common good4 ,this granted1 it is not   
difficult to  make out that in most men 
at any rate there is a sufficient       
interest  in some form of social        
well-being1 sufficient understanding of 
the  community between their own        
well-being and that of their neighbours1
  to make them loyal to such an         
institution4 ,but the question is1      
whether the promotion of a common good1 
at any rate in any sense  appreciable by
 the multitude1 is any necessary        
characteristic of a  state4 ,it is      
admitted that the outward visible sign  

of a state is  the presence of a supreme
 or independent coercive power1 to      
which1  habitual obedience is rendered  
by a certain multitude of people1  and  
that this power may often be exercised  
in a manner apparently  detrimental to  
the general well-being4 ,it may be the  
case1 as we  have tried to show that it 
is1 that a power which is in the main so
  exercised1 and is generally felt to be
 so1 is not likely long to  maintain its
 supremacy2 but this does not show that 
a state cannot  exist without the       
promotion of the common good of its     
subjects1 or  that 7in any intelligible 
way7 the promotion of such good belongs 
to the idea of a state4 ,a short-lived  
state is not therefore not a  state1 and
 if it were1 it is rather the active    
interference with the  subject's        
well-being1 than a failure to promote   
it1 that is fatal  to the long life of a
 state4 ,how1 finally1 can the state be 
said to  exist for the sake of an end1  
or to fulfil an idea1 the contemplation 

of which1 it is admitted1 has had little
 to do with the actions which  have had 
most to do with bringing states into    
existence8    #abe4 ,the last question  
is a crucial one1 which must be met at  
the outset4 ,it must be noticed that the
 ordinary conception of  organisation1  
as we apply it in the interpretation of 
nature1 implies  that agents may be     
instrumental in the attainment of an end
 or the  fulfilment of an idea of which 
there is no consciousness on the  part  
of the organic agents themselves4 ,if it
 is true on the one  hand that the      
interpretation of nature by the         
supposition of ends  external to it1    
with reference to which its processes   
are directed1  has been discarded1 and  
that its rejection has been the         
condition  of growth in an exact        
knowledge of nature1 on the other hand  
the  recognition of ends immanent in    
nature1 of ideas realised within it1  is
 the basis of a scientific explanation  
of life4 ,the phaenomena  of life are   

not ideal1 in the sense in which the    
ideal is opposed  to that which is      
sensibly verifiable1 but they are       
related to the  processes of material   
change which are their conditions1 as   
ideas  or ideal ends which those        
processes contribute to realise1        
because1  while they determine the      
processes 7while the processes would not
  be what they are but for relation to  
them71 yet they are not those           
processes1 not identical with any one or
 number of them1 or all of  them        
together4 ,life does not reside in any  
of the organs of life1  or in any or all
 of the processes of material change    
through which  these pass4 ,analyse or  
combine these as you will1 you do not   
detect  it as the result of the analysis
 or combination4 ,it is a function or   
end which they realise according to a   
plan or idea which determines  their    
existence before they exist and survives
 their disappearance4  ,if it were held1
 then1 that the state were an organised 

community  in the same sense in which a 
living body is1 of which the members  at
 once contribute to the function called 
life1 and are made what  they are by    
that function1 according to an idea of  
which there is no  consciousness on     
their part1 we should only be following 
the analogy  of the established method  
of interpreting nature4    #abf4 ,the   
objection to such a view would be that  
it represents the  state as a purely    
natural1 not at all as a moral1         
organism4 ,moral  agency is not merely  
an agency by which an end is attained1  
or an  idea realised1 or a function     
fulfilled1 but an agency determined by  
an idea on the part of the agent1 by his
 conception of an end or  function2 and 
the state would be brought into being   
and sustained  by merely natural1 as    
opposed to moral1 agency1 unless there  
were  a consciousness of ends--and of   
ends the same in principle with  that   
served by the state itself--on the part 
of those by whom it is  brought into    

being1 and sustained4 ,i say 'ends the  
same in principle  with that served by  
the state itself1' because1 if the state
 arose  out of the action of men        
determined1 indeed1 by the consciousness
 of  ends1 but ends wholly heterogeneous
 to that realised by the state1  it     
would not be a moral institution1 would 
not stand in any moral  relation to men4
 ,now among the influences that have    
operated in the  formation of states1 a 
large part1 it must be admitted1 are    
simply  natural4 ,such are the          
influences of climate1 of distribution  
of  mountain and plain1 land and water1 
c1 of all physical demarcations  and    
means of communication4 ,but these1 it  
is clear1 are only organic  to the      
formation of states so far as1 so to    
speak1 they take a  character1 which    
does not belong to them as merely       
natural1 from  agencies distinctively   
human4    #abg4 ',human1 if you like1'  
it may be replied1 'but not moral1 if a 
moral agency implies any reference to a 

social or human good1 to a  good which  
the individual desires because it is    
good for others1 or  for mankind1 as    
well as himself4 ,in the earth--hunger  
of conquering  hordes1 in the passions  
of military despots1 in the pride or    
avarice  or vindictiveness which moved  
such men as ,louis ,,xi or ,henry ,,viii
 to  override the semi-anarchy of       
feudalism with a real sovereignty1 what 
is there of reference to such good8 ,yet
 if we suppose the influence  of such   
motives as these1 together with the     
natural influences just  spoken of1 to  
be erased from the history of the       
formation of states1  its distinguishing
 features are gone4'    #abh4 ,the      
selfish motives described must not1 any 
more than the  natural influences1 be   
regarded in abstraction1 if we would    
understand their true place in the      
formation of states4 ,the pure  desire  
for social good does not indeed operate 
in human affairs  unalloyed by egotistic
 motives1 but on the other hand what we 

call  egotistic motives do not act      
without direction from an involuntary   
reference to social good1--'involuntary'
 in the sense that it is so  much a     
matter of course that the individual    
does not distinguish it  from his       
ordinary state of mind4 ,the most       
conspicuous modern instance  of a man   
who was instrumental in working great   
and in some ways  beneficial changes in 
the political order of ,europe1 from    
what we  should be apt to call the most 
purely selfish motives1 is ,napoleon4   
,without pretending to analyse these    
motives precisely1 we may say  that a   
leading one was the passion for glory2  
but if there is to  be truth in the     
statement that this passion governed    
,napoleon1 it  must be qualified by the 
farther statement that the passion was  
itself governed by social influences1   
operative on him1 from which  it derived
 its particular direction4 ,with all his
 egotism1 his  individuality was so far 
governed by the action of the national  

spirit in and upon him1 that he could   
only glorify himself in the  greatness  
of ,france2 and though the national     
spirit expressed itself  in an effort   
after greatness which was in many ways  
of a mischievous  and delusive kind1 yet
 it again had so much of what may be    
called the  spirit of humanity in it1   
that it required satisfaction in the    
belief  that it was serving mankind4    
,hence the aggrandisement of ,france1 in
  which ,napoleon's passion for glory   
satisfied itself1 had to take at  least 
the semblance of a deliverance of       
oppressed peoples1 and in  taking the   
semblance it to a great extent performed
 the reality2 at  any rate in western   
,germany and northern ,italy1 wherever  
the ,code  ,napolon was introduced4     
#abi4 ,it is thus that actions of men1  
whom in themselves we reckon  bad1 are  
'overruled' for good4 ,there is nothing 
mysterious or  unintelligible in such   
'overruling4' ,there is nothing in the  
effect  which we ascribe to the         

'overruling1' any more than in any      
effect  belonging to the ordinary course
 of nature1 which there was not  in the 
cause as it really was and as we should 
see it to be if we  fully understood it4
 ,the appearance to the contrary arises 
from our  taking too partial and        
abstract a view of the cause4 ,we look  
at the  action e4g4 of ,napoleon with   
reference merely to the selfishness  of 
his motives4 ,we forget how far his     
motives1 in respect of their  concrete  
reality1 in respect of the actual nature
 of the ends  pursued as distinct from  
the particular relation in which those  
ends stood to his personality1 were made
 for him by influences with  which his  
selfishness had nothing to do4 ,it was  
not his selfishness  that made ,france a
 nation1 or presented to him            
continuously an end  consisting in the  
national aggrandisement of ,france1 or  
at particular  periods such ends as the 
expulsion of the ,austrians from ,italy1
 the  establishment of a centralised    

political order in ,france on the  basis
 of social equality1 the promulgation of
 the civil code1 the  maintenance of the
 ,french system along the ,rhine4 ,his  
selfishness  gave a particular character
 to his pursuit of these ends1 and 7so  
far  as it did so7 did so for evil4     
,finally it led him into a train of     
action altogether mischievous4 ,but at  
each stage of his career1 if  we would  
understand what his particular agency   
really was1 we must  take account of his
 ends in their full character1 as       
determined by  influences with1 which1  
his passion for glory no doubt          
co-operated1  but which1 did not        
originate with it or with him1 and in   
some measure  represented the struggle  
of mankind towards perfection4    #acj4 
,and not only must we thus correct our  
too abstract views of the  particular   
agency of such a man as ,napoleon4 ,if  
we would understand  the apparent       
results of his action1 we must bear in  
mind how much  besides his particular   

agency has really gone to produce them1 
so far  as they were good2 how much of  
unnoticed effort on the part of men     
obscure because unselfish1 how much of  
silent process in the general  heart of 
man4 ,napoleon was called the 'armed    
soldier of revolution1'  and it was in  
that character that he rendered what    
service he did  to men2 but the         
revolution was not the making of him or 
his likes4  ,caesar again we have learnt
 to regard as a benefactor of mankind1  
but  it was not ,caesar that made the   
,roman law1 through which chiefly or    
solely the ,roman empire became a       
blessing4 ,the idiosyncrasy1 then1  of  
the men who have been most conspicuous  
in the production of great  changes in  
the condition of mankind1 though it has 
been an essential  element in their     
production1 has been so only so far as  
it has been  overborne by influences and
 directed to ends1 which were indeed not
  external to the men in question--which
 on the contrary helped to make  them   

inwardly and spiritually what they      
really were--but which formed  no part  
of their distinguishing idiosyncrasy4   
,if that idiosyncrasy  was conspicuously
 selfish1 it was still not through their
 selfishness  that such men contributed 
to mould the institutions by which      
nations  have been civilised and        
developed1 but through their fitness to 
act  as organs of impulses and ideas    
which had previously gained a hold on   
some society of men1 and for the        
realisation of which the means and      
conditions had been preparing quite     
apart from the action of those  who     
became the most noticeable instruments  
of their realisation4    #aca4 ,the     
assertion1 then1 that an idea of social 
good is represented  by1 or realised in1
 the formation of states1 is not to be  
met by  pointing to the selfishness and 
bad passions of men who have been       
instrumental in forming them1 if there  
is reason to think that the  influences1
 under the direction of which these     

passions became thus  instrumental1 are 
due to the action of such an idea4 ,and 
when we  speak thus we do not refer to  
any action of the idea otherwise than   
in the consciousness of men4 ,it may be 
legitimate1 as we have seen1  to        
consider ideas as existing and acting   
otherwise1 and perhaps1  on thinking the
 matter out1 we should find ourselves   
compelled to  regard the idea of social 
good as a communication to the human    
consciousness1 a consciousness          
developing itself in time1 from an      
eternally complete consciousness4 ,but  
here we are considering it as  a source 
of the moral action of men1 and         
therefore necessarily as  having its    
seat in their consciousness1 and the    
proposition advanced  is that such an   
idea is a determining element in the    
consciousness of  the most selfish men  
who have been instrumental in the       
formation or  maintenance of states2    
that only through its influence in      
directing  and controlling their actions

 could they be so instrumental2 and     
that1 though its active presence in     
their consciousness is due to the       
institutions1 the organisation of life1 
under which they are born  and bred1 the
 existence of these institutions is in  
turn due to the  action1 under other    
conditions1 of the same idea in the     
minds of men4    #acb4 ,it is the       
necessity of a supreme coercive power to
 the existence  of a state that gives   
plausibility to the view that the action
 of  merely selfish passions may lead to
 the formation of states4 ,they  have   
been motive causes1 it would seem1 in   
the processes by which  this 'imperium' 
has been established2 as1 e4g41 the     
acquisition of  military power by a     
tribal chieftain1 the conquest of one   
tribe  by another1 the supersession of  
the independent prerogatives of         
families by a tyrant which was the      
antecedent condition of the  formation  
of states in the ancient world1 the     
supersession of feudal  prerogatives by 

the royal authority which served the    
same purpose in  modern ,europe4 ,it is 
not1 however1 supreme coercive power1   
simply  as such1 but supreme coercive   
power exercised in a certain way and    
for certain ends1 that makes a state2   
viz4 exercised according to  law1       
written or customary1 and for the       
maintenance of rights4 ,the  abstract   
consideration of sovereignty has led to 
these qualifications  being overlooked4 
,sovereignty  supreme coercive power1   
indeed1  but such power as exercised in 
and over a state1 which means with  the 
qualifications specified2 but the       
mischief of beginning with  an inquiry  
into sovereignty before the idea of a   
state has been  investigated1 is that it
 leads us to adopt this abstract notion 
of  sovereignty1 as merely supreme      
coercive power1 and then1 when we  come 
to think of the state as distinguished  
by sovereignty1 makes  us suppose that  
supreme coercive power is all that is   
essential  to a state1 forgetting that  

it is rather the state that makes the   
sovereign1 than the sovereign that makes
 the state4 ,supposing one  man had been
 master of all the slaves in one of the 
states of the  ,american ,union1 there  
would have been a multitude of men under
 one  supreme coercive power1 but the   
slaves and the master would have  formed
 no state1 because there would have been
 no recognised rights  of slave against 
slave enforced by the master1 nor would 
dealings  between master and slaves have
 been regulated by any law4 ,the fact   
that sovereign power1 as implied in the 
fact of its supremacy1  can alter any   
laws1 is apt to make us overlook the    
necessity of  conformity to law on the  
part of the sovereign1 if he is to be   
the  sovereign of a state4 ,a power that
 altered laws otherwise than  according 
to law1 according to a constitution1    
written or unwritten1  would be         
incompatible with the existence of a    
state1 which is a body  of persons1     
recognised by each other as having      

rights1 and possessing  certain         
institutions for the maintenance of     
those rights4 ,the office  of the       
sovereign1 as an institution of such a  
society1 is to protect  those rights    
from invasion1 either from without1 from
 foreign  nations1 or from within1 from 
members of the society who cease to     
behave as such4 ,its supremacy is the   
society's independence of such  attacks 
from without or within4 ,it is an agency
 of the society1 or  the society itself 
acting for this end4 ,if the power1     
existing for  this end1 is used on the  
whole otherwise than in conformity      
either  with a formal constitution or   
with customs which virtually serve the  
purpose of a constitution1 it is no     
longer an institution for the           
maintenance of rights and ceases to be  
the agent of a state4 ,we only  count   
,russia a state by a sort of courtesy on
 the supposition that  the power of the 
,czar1 though subject to no             
constitutional control1  is so far      

exercised in accordance with a          
recognised tradition of what  the public
 good requires as to be on the whole a  
sustainer of rights4    ,it is true     
that1 just as in a state1 all law being 
derived from the  sovereign1 there is a 
sense in which the sovereign is not     
bound by  any law1 so there is a sense  
in which all rights are derived from    
the sovereign1 and no power which the   
sovereign refuses to allow  can be a    
right2 but it is only in the sense that1
 the sovereign  being the state acting  
in a certain capacity1 and the state    
being  an institution for the more      
complete and harmonious maintenance of  
the rights of its members1 a power1     
claimed as a right1 but which  the state
 or sovereign refuses to allow1 cannot  
be really compatible  with the general  
system of rights4 ,in other words1 it is
 true only  on the supposition that a   
state is made a state by the functions  
which it fulfils of maintaining the     
rights of its members as a  whole or a  

system1 in such a way that none gains at
 the expense of  another 7no one has any
 power guaranteed to him through        
another's  being deprived of that       
power74 ,thus the state1 or the         
sovereign as  a characteristic          
institution of the state1 does not      
create rights1  but gives fuller reality
 to rights already existing4 ,it secures
 and  extends the exercise of powers1   
which men1 influenced in dealing with   
each other by an idea of common good1   
had recognised in each other  as being  
capable of direction to that common     
good1 and had already  in a certain     
measure secured to each other in        
consequence of chat  recognition4 ,it is
 not a state unless it does so4    #acc4
 ,it may be said that this is an        
arbitrary restriction of the  term      
'state4' ,if any other word1 indeed1 can
 be found to express  the same thing1 by
 all means let it be used instead4 ,but 
some word  is wanted for the purpose1   
because as a matter of fact societies of

  men1 already possessing rights1 and   
whose dealings with each other  have    
been regulated by customs conformable to
 those rights1 but not  existing in the 
form to which the term 'state' has just 
been applied  7i4e4 not having a        
systematic law in which the rights      
recognised are  harmonised1 and which is
 enforced by a power strong enough at   
once  to protect a society against      
disturbance within and aggression from  
without71 have come to take on that     
form4 ,a word is needed to express  that
 form of society1 both according to the 
idea of it which has  been operative in 
the minds of the members of the         
societies which  have undergone the     
change described 7an idea only gradually
 taking  shape as the change proceeded71
 and according to the more explicit  and
 distinct idea of it which we form in   
reflecting on the process4  ,the word   
'state' is the one naturally used for   
the purpose4 ,the exact  degree to which
 the process must have been carried     

before the term  'state' can be applied 
to the people in which it has gone on1  
cannot  be precisely determined1 but as 
a matter of fact we never apply it      
except in cases where it has gone some  
way1 and we are justified in  speaking  
of the state according to its idea as   
the society in which  it is completed4  
#acd4 ,it is a mistake then to think of 
the state as an aggregation  of         
individuals under a sovereign2 equally  
so whether we suppose the  individuals  
as such1 or apart from what they derive 
from society1 to  possess natural       
rights1 or suppose them to depend on the
 sovereign  for the possession of       
rights4 ,a state presupposes other forms
 of  community1 with the rights that    
arise out of them1 and only exists  as  
sustaining1 securing1 and completing    
them4 ,in order to make a  state there  
must have been families of which the    
members recognised  rights in each other
 7recognised in each other powers       
capable of  direction by reference to a 

common good72 there must further have   
been intercourse between families1 or   
between tribes that have grown  out of  
families1 of which each in the same     
sense recognised rights  in the other4  
,the recognition of a right being very  
short of its  definition1 the admission 
of a right in each other by two parties1
  whether individuals1 families1 or     
tribes1 being very different from       
agreement as to what the right consists 
in1 what it is a right to do  or        
acquire1 the rights recognised need     
definition and reconciliation  in a     
general law4 ,when such a general law   
has been arrived at1  regulating the    
position of members of a family towards 
each other  and the dealings of families
 or tribes with each other2 when it is  
voluntarily recognised by a community of
 families or tribes1 and  maintained by 
a power strong enough at once to enforce
 it within  the community and to defend 
the integrity of the community against  
attacks from without1 then the          

elementary state has been formed4       
#ace4 ,that1 however1 is the beginning1 
not the end1 of the state4  ,when once  
it has come into being1 new rights arise
 in it 7#a7 through  the claim for      
recognition on the part of families and 
tribes living  on the same territory    
with those which in community form the  
state1  but living at first in some     
relation of subjection to them4 ,a      
common  humanity1 of which language is  
the expression1 necessarily leads to    
the recognition of some good as common  
to these families with those  which form
 the state4 ,this is in principle the   
recognition of rights  on their part2   
and the consequent embodiment of this   
recognition in  the laws of the state is
 their admission as members of it4      
7,instances  of this process are found  
in the states of ,greece and the early  
history of ,rome47 7#b7 ,the same thing 
may happen in regard to external        
communities 7'external' territorially71 
whether these have been  already formed 

into states or no4 ,it may happen       
through the conquest  of one by another1
 through their submission to a common   
conqueror1  as under the ,roman empire1 
or through voluntary combination1 as    
with the ,swiss cantons and the ,united 
,states of ,america4 ,however  the      
combination may arise1 it results in new
 rights as between the  combined        
communities within the system of a      
single state4 7#c7 ,the  extended       
intercourse between individuals1 which  
the formation of the  state renders     
possible1 leads to new complications in 
their dealings  with each other1 and    
with it to new forms of right1          
especially in  regard to property2      
rights as far removed from any obvious  
foundation  on the suum cuique principle
 as the right of a college to the great 
tithes of a parish for which it does    
nothing4 7#d7 ,the administration  of   
the state gives rise to rights1 to the  
establishment of powers  necessary for  
its administration4 7#e7 ,new situations

 of life may  arise out of the extended 
dealings of man with man which the state
  renders possible 7e4g4 through the    
crowding of population in certain       
localities7 which make new modes of     
protecting the people a matter          
virtually of right4 ,and1 as new rights 
arise in the state once  formed1 so     
further purposes are served4 ,it leads  
to a development and  moralisation of   
man beyond the stage which they must    
have reached  before it could be        
possible4    #acf4 ,on this ,i shall    
dwell more in my next course of         
lectures4 ,what  ,i am now concerned to 
point out is that1 however necessary a  
factor  force may have been in the      
process by which states have been formed
  and transformed1 it has only been such
 a factor as co-operating with  those   
ideas without which rights could not    
exist4 ,i say 'could not  exist1' not   
'could not be recognised1' because      
rights are made by  recognition4 ,there 
is no right 'but thinking makes it so'2 

none that  is not derived from some idea
 that men have about each other4        
,nothing  is more real than a right1 yet
 its existence is purely ideal1 if by   
'ideal' is meant that which is not      
dependent on anything material  but has 
its being solely in consciousness4 ,it  
is to these ideal  realities that force 
is subordinate in the creation and      
development  of states4 ,the force of   
conquest from without1 the force        
exercised  within communities by such   
agents as the early ,greek tyrants or   
the  royal suppressors of feudalism in  
modern ,europe1 has only contributed  to
 the formation of states in so far as   
its effects have taken  a character     
which did not belong to them as effects 
of force2 a  character due to their     
operation in a moral world1 in which    
rights  already existed1 resting on the 
recognition by men of each other as     
determined1 or capable of being         
determined1 by the conception of a      
common good4 ,it is not indeed true that

 only a state can produce a  state1     
though modern history might seem to     
favour that notion4 ,as a  matter of    
fact1 the formation of modern states    
through feudalism out  of an earlier    
tribal system has been dependent on     
ideas derived from  the ,roman state1 if
 not on institutions actually handed    
down from it2  and the improvement and  
development of the state-system which   
has  taken place since the ,french      
,revolution has been through agencies   
which all presuppose and are determined 
by the previous existence  of states4   
,but the ,greek states1 so far as we    
know1 were a first  institution of the  
kind1 not a result of propagation from  
previously  existing states4 ,but the   
action which brought them into being was
  only effectual for its purpose1       
because the idea of right1 though  only 
in the form of family or tribal right1  
was already in operation4        ,h4    
,,has ,,the ,,citizen ,,rights ,,against
 ,,the ,,state8    #acg4 ,i propose to  

pursue the inquiry1 begun in my last    
course1  into the nature and functions  
of the state4 ,in the last course we    
were chiefly occupied with criticism4   
,we have seen that no true  conception  
of the rights of individuals against    
each other or against  the state1 or of 
the rights of the state over            
individuals1 can be  arrived at1 while  
we look upon the state merely as an     
aggregation  of individuals under a     
sovereign power that is able to compel  
their  obedience1 and consider this     
power of compelling a general obedience 
to be the characteristic thing in a     
state4 ,so long as this view is         
retained1 no satisfactory answer can be 
given to the question1 by  what right   
the sovereign compels the obedience of  
individuals4 ,it can  only be met either
 by some device for representing the    
individuals  as so consenting to the    
exercise of sovereign power over them   
that  it is no violation of their       
individual rights1 or by representing   

the rights of individuals as derived    
from the sovereign and thus  as having  
no existence against it4 ,but it is     
obviously very often  against the will  
of individuals that the sovereign power 
is exercised  over them2 indeed if it   
were not so1 its characteristic as a    
power  of compulsion would be lost2 it  
would not be a sovereign power2 and  the
 fact that the majority of a given      
multitude may consent to its  exercise  
over an unconsenting minority1 is no    
justification for its  exercise over    
that minority1 if its justification is  
founded on  consent2 the representation 
that the minority virtually consent to  
be  bound by the will of the majority   
being an obvious fiction4 ,on the  other
 hand1 the theory that all right is     
derived from a sovereign1  that it is a 
power of which the sovereign secures the
 exercise to  the individual1 and that  
therefore there can be no right against 
the  sovereign1 conflicts with the      
primary demands of human consciousness4 

,it implies the identification of ',i   
ought' with ',i am forced to4'          
,reducing the 'right' of the sovereign  
simply to a power1 it makes  it         
unintelligible that this power should   
yet represent itself as a  right1 and   
claim obedience to itself as such4 ,no  
such theory indeed  admits of consistent
 statement4 ,to say 7with ,hobbes7 that 
a law may  be inequitable or pernicious1
 though it cannot be unjust1 is to admit
  a criticism of laws1 a distinction    
between those enactments of the         
sovereign which are what they should be 
and those which are not4 ,and  this is  
to recognise the individual's demand for
 a justification of  the laws which he  
obeys2 to admit in effect that there is 
some rule  of right1 of which the       
individual is conscious1 and to which   
law  ought to conform4    #ach4 ,it is  
equally impossible1 then1 to hold that  
the right of the  sovereign power in a  
state over its members is dependent on  
their  consent1 and1 on the other hand1 

that these members have no rights       
except such as are constituted and      
conferred upon them by the  sovereign4  
,the sovereign1 and the state itself as 
distinguished by  the existence of a    
sovereign power1 presupposes rights and 
is an  institution for their            
maintenance4 ,but these rights do not   
belong to  individuals as they might be 
in a state of nature1 or as they might  
be if each acted irrespectively of the  
others4 ,they belong to them  as members
 of a society in which each recognises  
the other as an  originator of action in
 the same sense in which he is conscious
 of  being so himself 7as an 'ego1' as  
himself the object which determines  the
 action71 and thus regards the free     
exercise of his own powers as  dependent
 upon his allowing an equally free      
exercise of his powers  to every other  
member of the society4 ,there is no harm
 in saying  that they belong to         
individuals as such1 if we understand   
what  we mean by 'individual1' and if we

 mean by it a self-determining  subject1
 conscious of itself as one among other 
such subjects1 and  of its relation to  
them as making it what it is2 for then  
there is  no opposition between the     
attachment of rights to the individuals 
as such and their derivation from       
society4 ,they attach to the            
individual1 but only as a member of a   
society of free agents1 as  recognising 
himself and recognised by others to be  
such a member1 as  doing and done by    
accordingly4 ,a right1 then1 to act     
unsocially1--to  act otherwise than as  
belonging to a society of which each    
member  keeps the exercise of his powers
 within the limits necessary to the     
like exercise by all the other          
members1--is a contradiction4 ,no one   
can say that1 unless he has consented to
 such a limitation of his  powers1 he   
has a right to resist it4 ,the fact of  
his not consenting  would be an         
extinction of all right on his part4    
#aci4 ,the state then presupposes       

rights1 and rights of individuals4 ,it  
is a form which society takes in order  
to maintain them4 ,but rights  have no  
being except in a society of men        
recognising each other as    4 #a ,they 
are constituted by that mutual          
recognition4  ,in analysing the nature  
of any right1 we may conveniently look  
at  it on two sides1 and consider it as 
on the one hand a claim of the          
individual1 arising out of his rational 
nature1 to the free exercise  of some   
faculty2 on the other1 as a concession  
of that claim by  society1 a power given
 by it to the individual of putting the 
claim  in force4 ,but we must be on our 
guard against supposing that these      
distinguishable sides have any really   
separate existence4 ,it is only  a man's
 consciousness of having an object in   
common with others1 a  well-being which 
is consciously his in being theirs and  
theirs in  being his1--only the fact    
that they are recognised by him and he  
by  them as having this object1--that   

gives him the claim described4  ,there  
can be no reciprocal claim on the part  
of a man and an animal  each to exercise
 his powers unimpeded by the other1     
because there is  no consciousness      
common to them4 ,but a claim founded on 
such a common  consciousness is already 
a claim conceded2 already a claim to    
which  reality is given by social       
recognition1 and thus implicitly a      
right4    #a ,greek    7isoi kai        
homoioi7  equals and alike1  plural ,tr 
#adj4 ,it is in this sense that a slave 
has 'natural rights' ,they are          
'natural' in the sense of being         
independent of1 and in conflict with1   
the laws of the state in which he lives1
 but they are not independent  of social
 relations4 ,they arise out of the fact 
that there is a  consciousness of       
objects common to the slave with those  
among whom  he lives1--whether other    
slaves or the family of his owner1--and 
that this consciousness constitutes at  
once a claim on the part of  each of    

those who share it to exercise a free   
activity conditionally  upon his        
allowing a like activity in the others1 
and a recognition  of this claim by the 
others through which it is realised4    
,the slave  thus derives from his social
 relations a real right which the law of
  the state refuses to admit4 ,the law  
cannot prevent him from acting  and     
being treated1 within certain limits1 as
 a member of a society of  persons      
freely seeking a common good4 ,now that 
capability of living  in a certain      
limited community with a certain limited
 number of  human beings1 which the     
slave cannot be prevented from          
exhibiting1  is in principle a          
capability of living in community with  
any other  human beings1 supposing the  
necessary training to be allowed2 and as
  every such capability constitutes a   
right1 we are entitled to say  that the 
slave has a right to citizenship1 to a  
recognised equality  of freedom with any
 and every one with whom he has to do1  

and that  in refusing him not only      
citizenship but the means of training   
his  capability of citizenship1 the     
state is violating a right founded on   
that common human consciousness which is
 evinced both by the language  which the
 slave speaks1 and by actual social     
relations subsisting  between him and   
others4 ,and on the same principle upon 
which a state  is violating natural     
rights in maintaining slavery1 it does  
the same  in using force1 except under  
the necessity of self-defence1 against  
members of another community4           
,membership of any community is so  far1
 in principle1 membership of all        
communities as to constitute a  right to
 be treated as a freeman by all other   
men1 to be exempt from  subjection to   
force except for prevention of force4   
#ada4 ,a man may thus have rights as a  
member of a family or of human  society 
in any other form1 without being a      
member of a state at  all1--rights which
 remain rights though any particular    

state or all  states refuse to recognise
 them2 and a member of a state1 on the  
ground of that capability of living as a
 freeman among freemen which  is implied
 in his being a member of a state1 has  
rights as against  all other states and 
their members4 ,these latter rights are 
in fact  during peace recognised by all 
civilised states4 ,it is the object of  
'private international law' to reduce   
them to a system4 ,but though  it       
follows from this that the state does   
not create rights1 it may  be still true
 to say that the members of a state     
derive their rights  from the state and 
have no rights against it4 ,we have     
already seen  that a right against      
society1 as such1 is an impossibility2  
that  every right is derived from some  
social relation3 that a right  against  
any group of associated men depends on  
association1 as     #a1 with them and   
with some other men4 ,now for  the      
member of a state to say that his rights
 are derived from his  social relations1

 and to say that they are derived from  
his position  as member of a state1 are 
the same thing4 ,the state is for him   
the  complex of those social relations  
out of which rights arise1 so far  as   
those rights have come to be regulated  
and harmonised according to  a general  
law1 which is recognised by a certain   
multitude of persons1  and which there  
is sufficient power to secure against   
violation from  without and from within4
 ,the other forms of community which    
precede  and are independent of the     
formation of the state1 do not continue 
to exist outside it1 nor yet are they   
superseded by it4 ,they are  carried on 
into it4 ,they become its organic       
members1 supporting its  life and in    
turn maintained by it in a new harmony  
with each other4  ,thus the citizen's   
rights1 e4g4 as a husband or head of a  
family or a  holder of property1 though 
such rights1 arising out of other social
  relations than that of citizen to     
citizen1 existed when as yet there  was 

no state1 are yet to the citizen derived
 from the state1 from  that more highly 
developed form of society in which the  
association  of the family and that of  
possessors who respect each other's     
possessions are included as in a fuller 
whole2 which secures to the  citizen his
 family rights and his rights as a      
holder of property1 but  under          
conditions and limitations which the    
membership of the fuller  whole--the    
reconciliation of rights arising out of 
one sort of social  capability with     
those arising out of another--renders   
necessary4 ,nor  can the citizen have   
any right against the state1 in the     
sense of a  right to act otherwise than 
as a member of some society1 the state  
being for its members the society of    
societies1 the society in which  all    
their claims upon each other are        
mutually adjusted4    #a ,greek    7isos
 kai homoios7  equal and alike1         
singular ,tr4    #adb4 ,but what exactly
 is meant by the citizen's acting 'as a 

member  of his state'8 ,what does the   
assertion that he can have no right  to 
act otherwise than as a member of his   
state amount to8 ,does it  mean that he 
has no right to disobey the law of the  
state to which  he belongs1 whatever    
that law may be8 that he is not entitled
 to  exercise his power in any way that 
the law forbids and to refuse  to       
exercise them in any way that it        
commands8 ,this question was  virtually 
dealt with before #a in considering the 
justifiability of  resistance to an     
ostensible sovereign4 ,the only         
unqualified answer  that can be given to
 it is one that may seem too general to 
be of  much practical use1 viz4 that so 
far as the laws anywhere or at any  time
 in force fulfil the idea of a state1   
there can be no right to  disobey them2 
or1 that there can be no right to       
disobey the law of  the state except in 
the interest of the state2 i4e4 for the 
purpose  of making the state in respect 
of its actual laws more completely      

correspond to what it is in tendency or 
idea1 viz4 the reconciler  and sustainer
 of the rights that arise out of the    
social relations  of men4 ,on this      
principle there can be no right to      
disobey or evade  any particular law on 
the ground that it interferes with any  
freedom  of action1 any right of        
managing his children or 'doing what he 
will with his own1' which but for that  
law the individual would  possess4 ,any 
power which has been allowed to the     
individual up to a  certain time1 he is 
apt to regard as permanently his right4 
,it has1  indeed1 been so far his right1
 if the exercise of that power has been 
allowed with any reference to social    
good1 but it does not1 as he  is apt to 
think1 remain his right when a law has  
been enacted that  interferes with it4  
,a man e4g4 has been allowed to drive at
 any pace  he likes through the streets1
 to build houses without any reference  
to sanitary conditions1 to keep his     
children at home or send them to  work  

'analphabetic1' to buy or sell alcoholic
 drinks at his pleasure4  ,if laws are  
passed interfering with any or all of   
these powers1  he says that his rights  
are being violated4 ,but he only        
possessed  these powers as rights       
through membership of a society which   
secured  them to him1 and of which the  
only permanent bond consists in the     
reference to the well-being of its      
members as a whole4 ,it has been  the   
social recognition grounded on that     
reference that has rendered  certain of 
his powers rights4 ,if upon new         
conditions arising1 or  upon elements of
 social good being taken account of     
which had been  overlooked before1 or   
upon persons being taken into the       
reckoning as  capable of participation  
in the social well-being who had        
previously  been treated merely as means
 to its attainment1--if in any of these 
ways or otherwise the reference to      
social well-being suggest the  necessity
 of some further regulation of the      

individual's liberty to  do as he       
pleases1 he can plead no right against  
this regulation1  for every right that  
he has possessed has been dependent on  
that  social judgment of its            
compatibility with general well-being   
which in  respect to the liberties in   
question is now reversed4    #a ,above1 
sections #ajj1 #aja4 ,,rln    #adc4 ',is
 then1' it may be asked1 'the general   
judgment as to the  requirements of     
social well-being so absolutely         
authoritative that  no individual right 
can exist against it8 ,what if according
 to this  judgment the institution of   
slavery is so necessary that citizens   
are  prohibited by law from teaching    
slaves to read and from harbouring      
runaways8 or if according to it the     
maintenance of a certain form  of       
worship is so necessary that no other   
worship can be allowed  and no opinion  
expressed antagonistic to it8 ,has the  
individual no  rights against enactments
 founded on such accepted views of      

social  well-being8' ,we may answer3 ,a 
right against society as such1 a right  
to act without reference to the needs or
 good of society1 is an  impossibility1 
since every right depends on some social
 relation1 and  a right against any     
group of associated men depends upon    
association  on some footing of equality
 with them or with some other men4 ,we  
saw how the right of the slave really   
rested on this basis1 on a  social      
capacity shown in the footing on which  
he actually lives  with other men4 ,on  
this principle it would follow1 if we   
regard the  state as the sustainer and  
harmoniser of social relations1 that the
  individual can have no right against  
the state2 that its law must be  to him 
of absolute authority4 ,but in fact1 as 
actual states at best  fulfil but       
partially their ideal function1 we      
cannot apply this rule  to practice4    
,the general principle that the citizen 
must never act  otherwise than as a     
citizen1 does not carry with it an      

obligation  under all conditions to     
conform to the law of his state1 since  
those  laws may be inconsistent with the
 true end of the state as the  sustainer
 and harmoniser of social relations4    
,the assertion1 however1  by the citizen
 of any right which the state does not  
recognise must  be founded on a         
reference to an acknowledged social     
good4 ,the fact  that the individual    
would like to exercise the power claimed
 as a  right does not render the        
exercise of it a right1 nor does the    
fact  that he has been hitherto allowed 
to exercise it render it a right1  if   
social requirements have arisen under   
changed conditions1 or have  newly come 
to be recognised1 with which its        
exercise is incompatible4  ,the reason  
that the assertion of an illegal right  
must be founded on  reference to        
acknowledged social good is that1 as we 
have seen1 no  exercise of a power1     
however abstractedly desirable for the  
promotion  of human good it might be1   

can be claimed as a right unless there  
is  some common consciousness of utility
 shared by the person making the  claim 
and those on whom it is made4 ,it is not
 a question whether or  no it ought to  
be claimed as a right2 it simply cannot 
be claimed  except on this condition4   
,it would have been impossible1 e4g41 in
  an ancient state1 where the symbol of 
social union was some local  worship1   
for a monotheistic reformer to claim a  
right to attempt the  subversion of that
 worship4 ,if a duty to do so had       
suggested itself1  consciousness of the 
duty could never have expressed itself  
in the  form of a claim of right1 in the
 absence of any possible sense of  a    
public interest in the religious        
revolution to which the claim  could be 
addressed4 ,thus1 just as it is not the 
exercise of every  power1 properly      
claimable as a right1 that is a right in
 the full  or explicit sense of being   
legally established1 so it is not every 
power1 of which the exercise would be   

desirable in an ideal state  of things1 
that is properly claimable as a right4  
,the condition of  its being so         
claimable is that its exercise should be
 contributory  to some social good which
 the public conscience is capable of    
appreciating1 not necessarily one which 
in the existing prevalence  of private  
interests can obtain due acknowledgment1
 but still one of  which men in their   
actions and language show themselves to 
be aware4    #add4 ,thus to the         
question1 ,has the individual no rights 
against  enactments founded on imperfect
 views of social well-being8 we may     
answer1 ,he has no rights against them  
founded on any right to do  as he likes4
 ,whatever counter-rights he has must be
 founded on a  relation to the social   
well-being1 and that a relation of which
 his  fellow -citizens are aware4 ,he   
must be able to point to some public    
interest1 generally recognised as such1 
which is involved in the  exercise of   
the power claimed by him as a right2 to 

show that it is  not the general        
well-being1 even as conceived by his    
fellow-citizens1  but some special      
interest of a class that is concerned in
 preventing  the exercise of the power  
claimed4 ,in regard to the right of     
teaching  or harbouring the slave1 he   
must appeal to the actual capacity of   
the  slave for community with other men 
as evinced in the manner described      
above1 to the recognition of this       
capacity as shown by the actual         
behaviour of the citizens in many       
respects towards the slave1 to  the     
addition to social well-being that      
results from the realisation  of this   
capacity in all who possess it through  
rights being legally  guaranteed to     
them4 ,in this way he must show that the
 reference to  social well-being1 on    
which is founded the recognition of     
powers as  rights1 if fairly and        
thoroughly carried out1 leads to the    
exercise  of powers in favour of the    
slave1 in the manner described1 not to  

the prohibition of that exercise as the 
supposed law prohibits it4  ,the        
response which in doing so he elicits   
from the conscience of  fellow-citizens 
shows that in talking of the slave as 'a
 man and a  brother1' he is exercising  
what is implicitly his right1 though it 
is  a right which has not become        
explicit through legal enactments4 ,this
  response supplies the factor of social
 recognition which1 as we have  seen1 is
 necessary in order to render the       
exercise of any power a  right4 ,to have
 an implicit right1 however1 to exercise
 a power which  the law disallows is not
 the same thing as having a right to    
exercise  that right4 ,the right may be 
claimed without the power being actually
  exercised so long as the law prohibits
 its exercise4 ,the question1           
therefore1 would arise whether the      
citizen was doing his duty as           
such--acting as a member of the         
state--if he not merely did what he     
could for the repeal of the law         

prohibiting the instruction of a  slave 
or the assistance of runaways1 but      
himself in defiance of the  law         
instructed and assisted them4 ,as a     
general rule1 no doubt1 even  bad laws1 
laws representing the interests of      
classes or individuals  as opposed to   
those of the community1 should be       
obeyed4 ,there can  be no right to      
disobey them1 even while their repeal is
 urged on  the ground that they violate 
rights1 because the public interest1  on
 which all rights are founded1 is more  
concerned in the general  obedience to  
law than in the exercise of those powers
 by individuals  or classes which the   
objectionable laws unfairly withhold4   
,the  maintenance of a duty prohibiting 
the import of certain articles in  the  
interest of certain manufacturers would 
be no justification for  smuggling these
 articles4 ,the smuggler acts for his   
private gain1  as does the man who buys 
of him2 and no violation of the law for 
the private gain of the violator1       

however unfair the law violated1  can   
justify itself by reference to a        
recognised public good1 or  consequently
 be vindicated as a right4 ,on the other
 hand1 there may  be cases in which the 
public interest--not merely according to
 some  remote philosopher's view of it1 
but according to conceptions which  the 
people are able to assimilate--is best  
served by a violation  of some actual   
law4 ,it is so in regard to slavery when
 the public  conscience has come to     
recognise a capacity for right 7for     
exercising  powers under the control of 
a reference to general well-being7 in a 
body of men to whom legal rights have   
hitherto been refused1 but when  some   
powerful class in its own interest      
resists the alteration of the  law4 ,in 
such a case the violation of the law on 
behalf of the slave  is not only not a  
violation in the interest of the        
violator2 the  general sense of right on
 which the general observance of law    
depends  being represented by it1 there 

is no danger of its making a breach in  
the law-abiding habits of the people4   
#ade4 ',but this1' it will be said1 'is 
to assume a condition of things  in     
which the real difficulty of the        
question disappears4 ,what is to  be    
done when no recognition of the implicit
 rights of the slave can  be elicited   
from the public conscience2 when the    
legal prohibitions  described are       
supported by the only conceptions of    
general good of  which the body of      
citizens is capable8 ,has the citizen   
still a right  to disregard these legal 
prohibitions8 ,is the assertion of such 
a  right compatible with the doctrine   
that social recognition of any  mode of 
action as contributory to the common    
good is necessary to  constitute a right
 so to act1 and that no member of a     
state can  have a right to act otherwise
 than according to that position8' ,the 
question1 be it observed1 is not as to  
the right of the slave1 but  as to the  
right of the citizen to treat the slave 

as having rights  in a state of which   
the law forbids his being so treated4   
,the claim  of the slave to be free1 his
 right implicit to have rights explicit1
  i4e4 to membership of a society of    
which each member is treated by  the    
rest as entitled to seek his own good in
 his own way1 on the  supposition that  
he so seeks it as not to interfere with 
the like  freedom of quest on the part  
of others1 rests1 as we have seen1 on   
the fact that the slave is determined by
 conceptions of a good common  to       
himself with others1 as shown by the    
actual social relations in  which he    
lives4 ,no state-law can neutralise this
 right4 ,the state  may refuse him      
family rights and rights of property1   
but it cannot  help his living as a     
member of a family1 acting and being    
treated as  a father1 husband1 son1 or  
brother1 and therefore cannot extinguish
  the rights which are necessarily      
involved in his so acting and being  so 
treated4 ,nor can it prevent him from   

appropriating things and from           
associating with others on the          
understanding that they respect each    
other's appropriations1 and thus        
possessing and exercising rights of     
property4 ,he has thus rights which the 
state neither gives nor can  take away1 
and they amount to or constitute a right
 to freedom in  the sense explained4    
,the state1 under which the slave is a  
slave1  refusing to recognise this      
right1 he is not limited in its exercise
  by membership of the state4 ,he has a 
right to assert his right to  such      
membership in any way compatible with   
that susceptibility to  the claims of   
human fellowship on which the right     
rests4 ,other men  have claims upon him1
 conditioning his rights1 but the state1
 as  such1 which refuses to recognise   
his rights1 has no claim on him4 ,the   
obligation to observe the law1 because  
it is the law1 does not exist  for him4 
#adf4 ,it is otherwise with the citizen4
 ,the slave has a claim upon him  to be 

treated in a certain way1 the claim     
which is properly described  as that of 
a common humanity4 ,but the state which 
forbids him so to  treat the slave has  
also a claim upon him1 a claim which    
embodies  many of the claims that arise 
out of a common humanity in a form  that
 reconciles them with each other4 ,now  
it may be argued that the  claim of the 
state is only absolutely paramount on   
the supposition  that in its commands   
and prohibitions it takes account of all
 the  claims that arise out of human    
fellowship2 that its authority over  the
 individual is in principle the         
authority of those claims1 taken  as a  
whole2 that if1 as in the case supposed1
 its ordinances conflict  with those    
claims as possessed by a certain class  
of persons1 their  authority1 which is  
essentially a conditional or derived    
authority1  disappears2 that a disregard
 of them in the interest of the claims  
which they disregard is really          
conformity to the requirements of  the  

state according to its true end or idea1
 since it interferes  with none of the  
claims or interests which the state has 
its value  in maintaining or protecting1
 but1 on the contrary1 forces on  the   
attention of members of the state claims
 which they hitherto  disregarded2 and  
that if the conscience of the citizens  
is so far  mastered by the special      
private interests which the institution 
of  slavery breeds that it cannot be    
brought to recognise action on the      
slave's behalf as contributory to a     
common good1 yet there is no  ground    
under such conditions for considering a 
man's fellow-citizens  to be the sole   
organs of the recognition which is      
needed to render  his power of action a 
right2 that the needful recognition is  
at any  rate forthcoming from the slave1
 and from all those acquainted with  the
 action in whom the idea of a good      
common to each man with others  operates
 freely4    #adg4 ,this may be truly    
urged1 but it does not therefore follow 

that  the duty of befriending the slave 
is necessarily paramount to the  duty of
 obeying the law which forbids his being
 befriended3 and if it  is possible for 
the latter duty to be paramount1 it will
 follow1 on  the principle that there is
 no right to violate a duty1 that under 
certain conditions the right of helping 
the slave may be cancelled  by the duty 
of obeying the prohibitory law4 ,it     
would be so if the  violation of law in 
the interest of the slave were liable to
 result  in general anarchy1 not merely 
in the sense of the dissolution of  this
 or that form of civil combination1 but 
of the disappearance of  the conditions 
under which any civil combination is    
possible2 for  such a destruction of the
 state would mean a general loss of     
freedom1  a general substitution of     
force for mutual good-will in men's     
dealings with each other1 that would    
outweigh the evil of any slavery  under 
such limitations and regulations as an  
organised state imposes  on it4         

,i4 ,,private ,,rights4 ,,the ,,right   
,,to ,,life ,,and ,,liberty4    #adh4   
,returning from this digression1 we     
resume our consideration of  the nature 
and functions of the state4 ,in order to
 understand this  nature1 we must       
understand the nature of those rights   
which do not  come into being with the  
state1 but arise out of social relations
  that may exist where a state is not2  
it being the first though  not the only 
office of the state to maintain those   
rights4 ,they  depend for their         
existence1 indeed1 on society1 a society
 of men  who recognise each other as   1
 as capable of a common  well-being1 but
 not on society's having assumed the    
form of a state4  ,they may therefore be
 treated as claims of the individual    
without  reference to the form of the   
society which concedes or recognises    
them1 and on whose recognition1 as we   
have seen1 their nature as  rights      
depends4 ,only it must be borne in mind 
that the form in which  these claims are

 admitted and acted on by men in their  
dealings with  each other varies with   
the form of society2 that the actual    
form1  e4g41 in which the individual's  
right of property is admitted under  a  
patriarchal rgime is very different from
 that in which it is  admitted in a     
state2 and that though the principle of 
each right is  throughout the same1 it  
is a principle which only comes to be   
fully  recognised and acted on when the 
state has not only been formed1 but     
fully developed according to its idea4  
#adi4 ,the rights which may be treated  
as independent of the state  in the     
sense explained are of course those     
which are commonly  distinguished as    
private1 in opposition to public rights4
 ',if  rights be analysed1 they will be 
found to consist of several kinds4      
,for1 first1 they are such as regard a  
man's own person2 secondly1  such as    
regard his dominion over the external   
and sensible things by  which he is     
surrounded2 thirdly1 such as regard his 

private relations  as a member of a     
family2 fourthly1 such as regard his    
social state or  condition as a member  
of the community3 the first of which    
classes  may be designated as personal  
rights2 the second1 as rights of        
property2 the third1 as rights in       
private relations2 and the  fourth1 as  
public rights4' 7,stephen1 ,comm41 ,i1  
p4 #acf47    #aej4 ,an objection might  
fairly be made to distinguishing one    
class  of rights as 'personal1' on the  
ground that all rights are so2  not     
merely in the legal sense of 'person'   
according to which the  proposition is a
 truism1 since every right implies a    
person as its  subject1 but in the moral
 sense1 since all rights depend on that 
capacity in the individual for being    
determined by a conception of           
well-being1 as an object at once for    
himself and for others1 which           
constitutes personality in the moral    
sense4 ,by personal rights in the  above
 classification are meant rights of life

 and liberty1 i4e4 of  preserving one's 
body from the violence of other men1 and
 of using  it as an instrument only of  
one's own will2 if of another's1 still  
only through one's own4 ,the reason why 
these come to be spoken of  as          
'personal' is probably the same with the
 reason why we talk of a  man's 'person'
 in the sense simply of his body4 ,they 
may1 however1  be reckoned in a special 
sense personal even by those who        
consider  all rights personal1 because  
the person's possession of a body and   
its exclusive determination by his own  
will is the condition of  his exercising
 any other rights1--indeed1 of all      
manifestation of  personality4 ,prevent 
a man from possessing property 7in the  
ordinary  sense71 and his personality   
may still remain4 ,prevent him 7if it   
were  possible7 from using his body to  
express a will1 and the will itself     
could not become a reality2 he would not
 be really a person4    #aea4 ,if there 
are such things as rights at all1 then1 

there must be a  right to life and      
liberty1 or1 to put it more properly1 to
 free life4  ,no distinction can be made
 between the right to life and the right
  to liberty1 for there can be no right 
to mere life1 no right to life  on the  
part of a being that has not also the   
right to use the life  according to the 
motions of its own will4 ,what is the   
foundation of  this right8 ,the answer  
is1 capacity on the part of the subject 
for  membership of a society1 for       
determination of the will1 and through  
it of the bodily organisation1 by the   
conception of a well-being  as common to
 self with others4 ,this capacity is the
 foundation of  the right1 or the right 
potentially1 which becomes actual       
through  the recognition of the capacity
 by a society1 and through the power    
which the society in consequence secures
 to the individual of acting  according 
to the capacity4 ,in principle1 or      
intrinsically1 or in  respect of that   
which it has it in itself to become1 the

 right is  one that belongs to every man
 in virtue of his human nature 7of the  
qualities that render him capable of any
 fellowship with any other  men71 and is
 a right as between him and any other   
men2 because1 as  we have seen1 the     
qualities which enable him to act as a  
member of  any one society having the   
general well-being of its members for   
its  object 7as distinct from any       
special object requiring special talent 
for its accomplishment7 form a capacity 
for membership of any other  such       
society2 but actually1 or as recognised1
 it only gradually  becomes a right of a
 man1 as man1 and against all men4      
#aeb4 ,at first it is only a right of   
the man as a member of some one         
particular society1 and a right as      
between him and the other members  of   
that society1 the society being         
naturally a family or tribe4  ,then1 as 
several such societies come to          
recognise1 in some limited  way1 a      
common well-being1 and thus to associate

 on settled terms1  it comes to be a    
right not merely between the members of 
any one of  the societies1 but between  
members of the several families or      
tribes  in their dealings with each     
other1 not1 however1 as men1 but only   
as belonging to this or that particular 
family4 ,this is the state  of things in
 which1 if one man is damaged or killed1
 compensation  is made according to the 
terms of some customary law by the      
family  or tribe of the offender to that
 of the man damaged or killed1 the      
compensation varying according to the   
rank of the family4 ,upon  this system1 
generally through some fusion of family 
demarcations  and privileges1 whether   
through pressure upward of a population 
hitherto inferior1 or through a         
levelling effected by some external     
power1 there supervenes one in which the
 relation between citizen  and citizen1 
as such1 is substituted for that between
 family and  family as such4 ,this      
substitution is one of the essential    

processes  in the formation of the      
state4 ,it is compatible1 however1 with 
the  closest limitation of the          
privileges of citizenship1 and implies  
no acknowledgment in man as man of the  
right to free life ascribed  to the     
citizen as citizen4 ,in the ancient     
world the companion  of citizenship is  
everywhere slavery1 and it was only     
actual  citizenship1 not any such       
capacity for becoming a citizen as might
  naturally be held to be implied in    
civil birth1 that was considered  to    
give a right to live2 for the exposure  
of children was everywhere  practised #a
 7and with the approval of the          
philosophers71 a practice  in strong    
contrast with the principle of modern   
law that even a child  in the womb has a
 right to live4    #a ,tacitus speaks of
 it as a peculiarity of the ,jews and   
,germans  that they did not allow the   
killing of younger children 7,hist41    
,v1 #e2 ,germ4 #ai74 ,aristotle 7,pol4  
#acce1 b1 #ai7 enjoins that    shall be 

brought up1 but seems to condemn        
exposure1  preferring that the required 
limit of population should be preserved 
by destruction of the embryo1 on the    
principle that              ,plato's    
rule is the same  as regards the        
defective children and the procuring    
abortion1 but he  leaves it in the dark 
whether he meant any healthy children1  
actually  born1 to be put out of the way
 7,rep4 #dfj ,c4 and #dfa ,c474         
,greek   7meden peperomenon7  no        
deformed child1              7to  hosion
 kai to me diorismenon te aisthesei kai 
to zen estai7  what  may lawfully be    
done in such cases of children not      
deformed depends  on the question of    
sensation and life ,tr    #aec4 ,the    
influences commonly pointed out as      
instrumental in  bringing about the     
recognition of rights in the man1 as    
independent  of particular citizenship1 
are these3 7#a7 ,the adjudication by    
,roman praetors of questions at issue   
between citizens and those  who were not

 so1 which led to the formation of the  
system of  'equity1' independent of the 
old civil law and tending gradually  to 
be substituted for it4 ,the existence of
 such a system1 however1  presupposes   
the recognition of rights so far        
independent of  citizenship in a        
particular state as to obtain between   
citizens of  different states4 7#b7 ,the
 doctrine of a 'law of nature'          
applicable  to dealings of all men1     
popularised by the ,stoics4 7#c7 ,the   
,christian  conception of the universal 
redemption of a brotherhood1 of which   
all  could become members through a     
mental act within the power of all4     
#aed4 ,the admission of a right to free 
life on the part of every man1  as man1 
does in fact logically imply the        
conception of all men as  forming one   
society in which each individual has    
some service to  render1 one organism in
 which each has a function to fulfil4   
,there  can be no claim on society such 
as constitutes a right1 except in       

respect of a capacity freely 7i4e4 under
 determination by conception  of the    
good7 to contribute to its good4 ,if the
 claim is made on  behalf of any and    
every human being1 it must be a claim on
 human  society as a whole1 and there   
must be a possible common good of  human
 society as a whole1 conceivable as     
independent of the special  conditions  
of particular societies1 to render such 
a claim possible4  ,we often find1      
however1 that men assimilate a practical
 idea in  respect of one of its         
implications without doing so in respect
 of  the rest4 ,thus the idea of the    
individual's right to free life has     
been strongly laid hold of in           
,christendom in what may be called an   
abstract or negative way1 but little    
notice has been taken of what  it       
involves4 ,slavery is everywhere        
condemned4 ,it is established that  no  
one has a right to prevent the          
individual from determining the         
conditions of his own life4 ,we treat   

life as sacred even in the human        
embryo1 and even in hopeless idiots and 
lunatics recognise a right to  live1 a  
recognition which can only be rationally
 explained on either  or both of two    
grounds3 7#a7 that we do not consider   
either their  lives1 or the society     
which a man may freely serve1 to be     
limited to  this earth1 and thus ascribe
 to them a right to live on the strength
  of a social capacity which under other
 conditions may become what  it is not  
here2 or 7#b7 that the distinction      
between curable and  incurable1 between 
complete and incomplete1 social         
incapacity is so  indefinite that we    
cannot in any case safely assume it to  
be such as  to extinguish the right to  
live4 ,or perhaps it may be argued that 
even in cases where the incapacity is   
ascertainably incurable1 the  patient   
has still a social function 7as         
undoubtedly those who are  incurably ill
 in other ways have71 a passive function
 as the object  of affectionate         

ministrations arising out of family     
instincts and  memories2 and that the   
right to have life protected corresponds
 to  this passive social function4 ,the 
fact1 however1 that we have almost  to  
cast about in certain cases for an      
explanation of the established  belief  
in the sacredness of human life1 shows  
how deeply rooted that  belief is unless
 where some counter-belief interferes   
with it4    #aee4 ,on the other hand1 it
 is equally noticeable that there are   
counter-beliefs which1 under conditions1
 do neutralise it1 and that  certain    
other beliefs1 which form its proper    
complement1 have very  slight hold on   
the mind of modern ,christendom4 ,it is 
taken for  granted that the exigencies  
of the state in war1 whether the war be 
necessary or not for saving the state   
from dissolution1 absolutely  neutralise
 the right to live4 ,we are little      
influenced by the idea of  the universal
 brotherhood of men1 of mankind as      
forming one society  with a common good1

 of which the conception may determine  
the action  of its members4 ,in         
international dealings we are apt to    
suppose that  it can have no place at   
all4 ,yet1 as has been pointed out1 it  
is  the proper correlative of the       
admission of a right to free life as    
belonging to man in virtue simply of his
 human nature4 ,and though  this right  
can only be grounded on the capacity1   
which belongs to  the human nature1 for 
freely fulfilling some function in the  
social  organism1 we do very little to  
give reality to the capacity or to      
enable it to realise itself4 ,we content
 ourselves with enacting that  no man   
shall be used by other men as a means   
against his will1 but we  leave it to be
 pretty much a matter of chance whether 
or no he shall  be qualified to fulfil  
any social function1 to contribute      
anything to  the common good1 and to do 
so freely 7i4e4 under the conception of 
a  common good74 ,the only reason why a 
man should not be used by other  men    

simply as a means to their ends1 is that
 he should use himself  as a means to an
 end which is really his and theirs at  
once4 ,but  while we say that he shall  
not be used as a means1 we often leave  
him  without the chance of using himself
 for any social end at all4    #aef4    
,four questions then arise3 7#a7 ,with  
what right do the  necessities of war   
override the individual's right of life8
 7#b7 ,in  what relation do the rights  
of states to act for their own interest 
stand to that right of human society1 as
 such1 of which the existence  is       
implied in the possession of right by   
the individual as a member  of that     
society1 irrespectively of the laws of  
particular states8  7#c7 ,on what       
principle is it to be assumed that the  
individual by a  certain conduct of his 
own forfeits the right of free life1 so 
that  the state 7at any rate for a time7
 is entitled to subject him to  force2  
to treat him as an animal or a thing8   
,is this forfeiture ever  so absolute   

and final that the state is justified in
 taking away his  life8 7#d7 ,what is   
the nature and extent of the            
individual's claim  to be enabled to    
realise that capacity for contributing  
to a social  good1 which is the         
foundation of his right to free life8   
,k4 ,,the ,,right ,,of ,,the ,,state    
,,over ,,the ,,individual ,,in ,,war4   
#aeg4 7#a7 ,it may be admitted that to  
describe war as 'multitudinous  murder' 
is a figure of speech4 ,the essence of  
murder does not lie  in the fact that   
one man takes away the life of another1 
but that  he does this to 'gain his     
private ends' and with 'malice' against 
the person killed4 ,i am not here       
speaking of the legal definition  of    
murder1 but of murder as a term of moral
 reprobation1 in which  sense it must be
 used by those who speak of war as      
'multitudinous  murder4' ,they cannot   
mean murder in the legal sense1 because 
in  that sense only 'unlawful killing1' 
which killing in war is not1 is  murder4

 ,when ,i speak of 'malice1' therefore1 
,i am not using 'malice'  in the legal  
sense4 ,in that sense 'malice' is       
understood to be the  attribute of every
 'wrongful act done intentionally       
without just  or lawful excuse1' #a and 
is ascribed to acts 7such as killing an 
officer of justice1 knowing him to be   
such1 while resisting him in a  riot7 in
 which there is no ill-will of the kind 
which we suppose in  murder1 when we    
apply the term in its natural sense as  
one of moral  disapprobation4 ,of murder
 in the moral sense the characteristics 
are  those stated1 and these are not    
present in the case of a soldier who    
kills one on the other side in battle4  
,he has no ill-will to that  particular 
person or to any particular person4 ,he 
incurs an equal  risk with the person   
whom he kills1 and incurs that risk not 
for  the sake of killing him4 ,his      
object in undergoing it is not private  
to himself1 but a service 7or what he   
supposes to be a service7 to  his       

country1 a good which is his own no     
doubt 7that is implied in  his desiring 
it71 but which he presents to himself as
 common to him  with others4 ,indeed1   
those who might speak of war as         
'multitudinous  murder' would not look  
upon the soldier as a murderer4 ,if     
reminded  that there cannot be a murder 
without a murderer1 and pressed to say  
who1 when a bloody battle takes place1  
the murderer or murderers  are1 they    
would probably point to the authors of  
the war4 ,it may be  questioned1 by the 
way1 whether there has ever been a war  
of which  the origination could be truly
 said to rest with a definite person  or
 persons1 in the same way in which the  
origination of an act which  would be   
called murder in the ordinary sense     
rests with a particular  person4 ,no    
doubt there have been wars for which    
certain assignable  individuals were    
specially blameable1 wars which they    
specially  helped to bring about or had 
special means of preventing 7and the    

more the wickedness of such persons is  
kept in mind the better72 but  even in  
these cases the cause of the war can    
scarcely be held to be  gathered up     
within the will of any individual1 or   
the combined will  of certain           
individuals1 in the same way as is the  
cause of murder or  other punishable    
acts4 ,when ,a4,b4 is murdered1 the sole
 cause lies in  some definite volition  
of ,,cd4 or others1 however that        
volition may  have been caused4 ,but    
when a war 'breaks out1' though it is   
not to  be considered1 as we are too apt
 to consider it1 a natural calamity     
which could not be prevented1 it would  
be hard to maintain that  the sole cause
 lies in some definite volition on the  
part of some  assignable person or      
persons1 even of those who are most to  
blame4  ,passing over this point1       
however1 if the acts of killing in war  
are  not murders 7in the moral sense1   
the legal being out of the  question7   
because they lack those characteristics 

on the part of the  agent's state of    
mind which are necessary to constitute a
 murder1  the persons who cause those   
acts to be committed1 if such persons   
can be pointed out1 are not the authors 
of murder1 multitudinous  or other4     
,they would only be so if the           
characteristic of 'malice1'  which is   
absent on the part of the immediate     
agent of the act1 were  present on their
 part as its ultimate agents4 ,but this 
is not the  case4 ,however selfish their
 motives1 they cannot fairly be         
construed  into ill-will towards the    
persons who happened to be killed in the
  war2 and therefore1 whatever          
wickedness the persons responsible for  
the war are guilty of1 they are not     
guilty of 'murder' in any natural  sense
 of the term1 nor is there any murder in
 the case at all4    #a ,markby1        
,elements of ,law1 sec4 #bbf4    #aeh4  
,it does not follow from this1 however1 
that war is ever other  than a great    
wrong1 as a violation on a multitudinous

 scale of the  individual's right to    
life4 ,whether it is so or not must be  
discussed  on other grounds4 ,if there  
is such a thing as a right to life on   
the  part of the individual man as such1
 is there any reason to doubt that  this
 right is violated in the case of every 
man killed in war8 ,it is  not to the   
purpose to allege that in order to a    
violation of right  there must be not   
only a suffering of some kind on the    
part of the  subject of a right1 but an 
intentional act causing it on the part  
of  a human agent4 ,there is of course  
no violation of right when a man  is    
killed by a wild beast or a stroke of   
lightning1 because there is  no right as
 between a man and a beast or between a 
man and a natural  force4 ,but the      
deaths in a battle are caused distinctly
 by human  agency and intentional       
agency4 ,the individual soldier may not 
have  any very distinct intention when  
he fires his rifle except to obey       
orders1 but the commanders of the army  

and the statesmen who send it  into the 
field intend the death of as many men as
 may be necessary  for their purpose4   
,it is true they do not intend the death
 of this or  that particular person1 but
 no more did the ,irishman who fired    
into  a body of police guarding the     
,fenian prisoners4 ,it might fairly be  
held that this circumstance exempted the
 ,irishman from the special  moral guilt
 of murder1 though according to our law 
it did not exempt  him from the legal   
guilt expressed by that term2 but no one
 would  argue that it made the act other
 than a violation of the right to  life 
on the part of the policeman killed4 ,no
 more can the absence  of an intention  
to kill this or that specific person on 
the part of  those who cause men to be  
killed in battle save their act from    
being  a violation of the right to life4
    #aei4 ,is there then any condition  
on the part of the persons killed  that 
saves the act from having this          
character8 ,it may be urged that  when  

the war is conducted according to usages
 that obtain between  civilised nations1
 7not when it is a village-burning war  
like that  between the ,english and     
,afghans71 the persons killed are       
voluntary  combatants1 and    #a4       
,soldiers1 it may be said1  are in the  
position of men who voluntarily         
undertake a dangerous  employment4 ,if  
some of them are killed1 this is not    
more a violation  of the human right to 
life than is the death of men who have  
engaged  to work in a dangerous         
coal-pit4 ,to this it must be answered  
that  if soldiers did in fact           
voluntarily incur the special risk of   
death  incidental to their calling1 it  
would not follow that the right to  life
 was not violated in their              
being--killed4 ,it is not a right  which
 it rests with a man to retain or give  
up at his pleasure4 ,it  is not the less
 a wrong that a man should be a slave   
because he has  sold himself into       
slavery4 ,the individual's right to live

 is but  the other side of the right    
which society has in his living4 ,the   
individual can no more voluntarily rid  
himself of it than he can of  the social
 capacity1 the human nature1 on which it
 is founded4 ,thus1  however ready men  
may be for high wages to work in a      
dangerous pit1  a wrong is held to be   
done if they are killed in it4 ,if      
provisions  which might have made it    
safe have been neglected1 someone is    
held  responsible4 ,if nothing could    
make it safe1 the working of the pit    
would not be allowed4 ,the reason for   
not more generally applying the  power  
of the state to prevent voluntary       
noxious employments1 is not  that there 
is no wrong in the death of the         
individual through the  incidents of an 
employment which he has voluntarily     
undertaken1 but  that the wrong is more 
effectually prevented by training and   
trusting  individuals to protect        
themselves than by the state protecting 
them4  ,thus the waste of life in war   

would not be the less a wrong1--not the 
less a violation of the right1 which    
subsists between all members  of        
society1 and which none can alienate1   
that each should have his  life         
respected by society1--if it were the   
fact that those whose  lives are wasted 
voluntarily incurred the risk of losing 
them4 ,but  it can scarcely be held to  
be the fact4 ,not only is it impossible1
  even when war is conducted on the most
 civilised methods1 to prevent  great   
incidental loss of life 7to say nothing 
of other injury7 among  non-combatants2 
the waste of the life of the combatants 
is one which  the power of the state    
compels4 ,this is equally true whether  
the army  is raised by voluntary        
enlistment or by conscription4 ,it is   
obviously  so in the case of            
conscription2 but under a system of     
voluntary  enlistment1 though the       
individual soldier cannot say that he in
  particular has been compelled by the  
government to risk his life1  it is     

still the case that the state compels   
the risk of a certain  number of lives4 
,it decrees that an army of such a size 
shall be  raised1 though if it can get  
the men by voluntary hiring it does not 
exercise compulsion on the men of a     
particular age1 and it sends the  army  
into the field4 ,its compulsive agency  
causes the death of the  soldiers       
killed1 not any voluntary action on the 
part of the soldiers  themselves4 ,the  
action of the soldiers no doubt         
contributes to the  result1 for if they 
all refused to fight there would be no  
killing1  but it is an action put in    
motion and directed by the power of the 
state1 which is compulsive in the sense 
that it operates on the  individual in  
the last resort through fear of death4  
#a ,greek    7oudeis adikeitai hekon7   
there can  be no injustice to a person  
who has agreed to what is done to him   
,tr4    #afj4 ,we have then in war a    
destruction of human life inflicted on  
the sufferers intentionally by voluntary

 human agency4 ,it is true1  as we saw1 
that it is not easy to say in any case  
by whose agency in  particular4 ,we may 
say indeed that it is by the agency of  
the state1  but what exactly does that  
mean8 ,the state here must  the         
sovereign  power in the state2 but it is
 always difficult to say by whom that   
power is wielded1 and if we could in any
 case specify its present  holders1 the 
further question will arise whether     
their course of  action has not been    
shaped for them by previous holders of  
power4  ,but however widely distributed 
the agency may be which causes the      
destruction of life in war1 it is still 
intentional human agency4 ,the          
destruction is not the work of accident 
or of nature4 ,if then it is  to be     
other than a wrong1 because a violation 
of the right to mutual  protection of   
life involved in the membership of human
 society1 it  can only be because there 
is exercised in war some right that is  
paramount to this4 ,it may be argued    

that this is the case2 that there  is no
 right to the preservation of life at   
the cost of losing the  necessary       
conditions of 'living well'2 that war is
 in some cases the  only means of       
maintaining these conditions1 and that  
where this is  so1 the wrong of causing 
the destruction of physical life        
disappears  in the paramount right of   
preserving the conditions under which   
alone  moral life is possible4    #afa4 
,this argument1 however1 seems to be    
only available for shifting  the quarter
 in which we might be at first disposed 
to lay the blame  of the wrong involved 
in war1 not for changing the character  
of  that wrong4 ,it goes to show that   
the wrong involved in the death  of     
certain soldiers does not necessarily   
lie with the government  which sends    
those soldiers into the field1 because  
this may be  the only means by which the
 government can prevent more serious    
wrong2 it does not show that there is no
 wrong in their death4 ,if  the         

integrity of any state can only be      
maintained at the cost of  war1 and if  
that state is more than what many       
so-called states have  been1--more than 
an aggregation of individuals or        
communities under  one ruling power1--if
 it so far fulfils the idea of a state1 
that  its maintenance is necessary to   
the free development of the people      
belonging to it2 then by the authorities
 or people of that state no  wrong is   
done by the destruction of life which   
war involves1 except  so far as they are
 responsible for the state of things    
which renders  the maintenance of the   
integrity of the state impossible by    
other  means4 ,but how does1 it come    
about that the integrity of such a state
  is endangered8 ,not by accident or by 
the forces of nature1 but by            
intentional human agency in some form or
 other1 however complicated2  and with  
that agency lies the wrong-doing4 ,to   
determine it 7as we  might be able to do
 if a horde of barbarians broke in on a 

civilised  state1 compelling it to      
resort to war for its defence7 is a     
matter  of small importance3 what is    
important to bear in mind 7being one  of
 those obvious truths out of which we   
may allow ourselves to be               
sophisticated71 is that the destruction 
of life in war is always  wrong-doing1  
whoever be the wrong-doer1 and that in  
the wars most  strictly defensive of    
political freedom the wrong-doing is    
only  removed from the defenders of     
political freedom to be transferred     
elsewhere4 ,if it is difficult in any   
case to say precisely where1  that is   
only a reason for more general          
self-reproach1 for a more  humbling     
sense 7as the preachers would say7 of   
complicity in that  radical 7but        
conquerable1 because moral7 evil of     
mankind which  renders such a means of  
maintaining political freedom necessary4
 ,the  language1 indeed1 which we hear  
from the pulpit about war being a       
punishment for the sins of mankind1 is  

perfectly true1 but it needs  to be     
accompanied by the reminder that this   
punishment of sin is  simply a          
consequence of the sin and itself a     
further sin1 brought  about by the      
action of the sinner1 not an external   
infliction brought  about by agencies to
 which man is not a party4    #afb4 ,in 
fact1 however1 if most wars had been    
wars for the maintenance  or acquisition
 of political freedom1 the difficulty of
 fixing the  blame of them1 or at any   
rate of freeing one of the parties in   
each case from blame1 would be much less
 than it really is4 ,of the  ,european  
wars of the last four hundred years1 how
 many could be  fairly said to have been
 wars in which either or any of the     
parties  were fighting for this end8    
,perhaps the wars in which the ,dutch   
,republics defended themselves against  
,spain and against ,louis ,,xiv1  and   
that in which ,germany shook off the    
dominion of ,napoleon4 ,perhaps  the    
more recent struggles of ,italy and     

,hungary against the ,austrian          
,government4 ,perhaps in the first      
outset of the war of #agib the ,french  
may be fairly held to have been         
defending institutions necessary  for   
the development of social freedom and   
equality4 ,in this war1  however1 the   
issue very soon ceased to be one between
 the defenders  of such institutions on 
the one side1 and their assailants on   
the  other1 and in most modern wars the 
issue has not been of this kind  at all4
 ,the wars have arisen primarily out of 
the rival ambition of  kings and        
dynasties for territorial               
aggrandisement1 with national           
antipathies and ecclesiastical          
ambitions1 and the passions arising  out
 of religious partisanship1 as          
complicating influences4 ,as nations    
have come more and more to distinguish  
and solidify themselves1 and  a national
 consciousness has come definitely to be
 formed in each1  the rival ambitions of
 nations have tended more and more first

 to  support1 then perhaps to supersede1
 the ambitions of dynasties as  causes  
of war4 ,the delusion has been          
practically dominant that the  gain of  
one nation must mean the loss of        
another4 ,hence national  jealousies in 
regard to colonial extension1 hostile   
tariffs and  the effort of each nation  
to exclude others from its markets4 ,the
  explosion of this idea in the region  
of political economy has had  little    
effect in weakening its hold on men's   
minds4 ,the people of  one nation still 
hear with jealousy of another nation's  
advance  in commerce1 as if it meant    
some decay of their own4 ,and if the    
commercial jealousy of nations is very  
slow in disappearing1 their  vanity1    
their desire apart from trade each to   
become or to seem  stronger than the    
other1 has very much increased4 ,a      
hundred and fifty  years ago national   
vanity could scarcely be said to be an  
influence  in politics4 ,the people     
under one ruler were not homogeneous    

enough1  had not enough of a corporate  
consciousness1 to develope a national   
vanity4 ,now 7under the name of         
patriotism7 it has become a more        
serious disturber of peace than dynastic
 ambition4 ,where the latter  is        
dangerous1 it is because it has national
 vanity to work upon4    #afc4 ,our     
conclusion then is that the destruction 
of life in war 7to  say nothing of other
 evils incidental to it with which we   
are not  here concerned7 is always wrong
 doing1 with whomsoever the guilt of    
the wrong-doing may lie2 that only those
 parties to a war are exempt  from a    
share in the guilt who can truly plead  
that to them war is  the only means of  
maintaining the social conditions of the
 moral  development of man1 and that    
there have been very few cases in which 
this plea could be truly made4 ,in      
saying this it is not forgotten1  either
 that many virtues are called into      
exercise by war1 or that  wars have been
 a means by which the movement of       

mankind1 which there  is reason for     
considering a progress to higher good1  
has been carried  on4 ,these facts do   
not make the wrong-doing involved in war
 any less  so4 ,if nothing is to be     
accounted wrong-doing through which     
final  good is wrought1 we must give up 
either the idea of there being such  a  
thing as wrong-doing1 or the idea of    
there being such a thing as  final good4
 ,if final good results from the world  
of our experience1  it results from     
processes in which wrong-doing is an    
inseparable  element4 ,wrong-doing is   
voluntary action1 either 7in the deeper 
moral sense7 proceeding from a will     
uninfluenced by the desire to be  good  
on the part of the agent 7which may be  
taken to include action  tending to     
produce such action71 or 7in the sense  
contemplated by  the 'jus naturae'7 it  
is action that interferes with the      
conditions  necessary to the free-play  
and development of a good-will on the   
part of others4 ,it may be that1        

according to the divine scheme of  the  
world1 such wrong-doing is an element in
 a process by which men  gradually      
approximate more nearly to good 7in the 
sense of a good  will74 ,we cannot think
 of ,god as a moral being without       
supposing  this to be the case4 ,but    
this makes no difference to wrong-doing 
in  those relations in which it is      
wrong-doing1 and with which alone we    
are concerned1 viz4 in relation to the  
will of human agents and to  the results
 which those agents can foresee and     
intend to produce4 ,if  an action1 so   
far as any results go which the agent   
can have in view  or over which he has  
control1 interferes with conditions     
necessary  to the free-play and         
development of a good-will on the part  
of  others1 it is not the less          
wrong-doing because1 through some agency
  which is not his1 the effects which he
 intended1 and which rendered  it       
wrong-doing1 come to contribute to an   
ulterior good4 ,nor1 if it  issues from 

bad will 7in the sense explained71 is it
 less wrong 7in  the moral sense7       
because this will is itself1 in the view
 of some  higher being1 contributory to 
a moral good which is not1 in whole or  
part1 within the view of the agent4 ,if 
then war is wrong-doing in  both the    
above senses 7as it is always1 at any   
rate on the part of  those with whom the
 ultimate responsibility for it lies71  
it does not  cease to be so on account  
of any good resulting from it in a      
scheme  of providence4    #afd4 ',but1' 
it may be asked1 'are we justified in   
saying that it  is always wrong-doing on
 the part of those with whom the        
ultimate  responsibility lies8 ,it is   
admitted that certain virtues may be    
evoked by war2 that it may have results 
contributory to the moral  progress of  
mankind2 may not the eliciting of these 
virtues1 the  production of these       
results1 be contemplated by the         
originators of  war1 and does not the   
origination of war1 so far as influenced

 by  such motives1 cease to be          
wrong-doing8 ,it must be admitted that  
,caesar's wars in ,gaul were unprovoked 
wars of conquest1 but their  effect was 
the establishment of ,roman civilisation
 with its equal law  over a great part  
of western ,europe1 in such a way that  
it was never  wholly swept away1 and    
that a permanent influence in the       
progress of  the ,european polity can be
 traced to it4 ,may he not be credited  
with  having had1 however indefinitely1 
such an effect as this in view8  ,even  
if his wish to extend ,roman            
civilisation was secondary to a plan    
for raising an army by which he might   
master the ,republic1 is he to  have no 
credit for the beneficent results which 
are admitted to have  ensued from the   
success of that plan8 ,may not a similar
 justification  be urged for ,english   
wars in ,india8 ,if1 again1 the         
establishment  of the civil unity of    
,germany and the liberation of          
,christian  populations in ,turkey are  

admitted to have been gains to mankind1 
is  not that a justification of the     
persons concerned in the origination  of
 the wars that brought about those      
results1 so far as they can be  supposed
 to have been influenced by a desire for
 them8'    #afe4 ,these objections might
 be to the purpose if we were attempting
  the task 7generally1 if not always1 an
 impossible one7 of determining  the    
moral desert1 good or ill1 of those who 
have been concerned  in bringing this or
 that war about4 ,their tendency merely 
is to  distribute the blame of the      
wrong-doing involved in war1 to show    
how widely ramified is the agency in    
that wrong-doing1 not to  affect its    
character as wrong-doing4 ,if the only  
way of civilising  ,gaul was to kill all
 the people whom ,caesar's wars caused  
to be  killed1 and if the desire for    
civilising it was a prevailing motive   
in ,caesar's mind1 so much the better   
for ,caesar1 but so much the  worse for 
the other unassignable and innumerable  

human agents who  brought it about that 
such an object could only be attained in
 such  a way4 ,we are not1 indeed1      
entitled to say that it could have been 
brought about in any other way4 ,it is  
true to say 7if we know what  we are    
about in saying it7 that nothing which  
happens in the world  could have        
happened otherwise than it has4 ,the    
question for us is1  whether that       
condition of things which rendered e4g4 
,caesar's ,gallic  wars1 with the       
violation of human rights which they    
involved1 the  interference in the case 
of innumerable persons with the         
conditions  under which man can be      
helpful to man 7physical life being the 
first  of these71 the sine qua non in   
the promotion of ulterior human         
welfare1 was or was not the work of     
human agency4 ,if it was 7and  there is 
no doubt that it was1 for to what merely
 natural agency  could the necessity be 
ascribed871 then in that ordinary sense 
of  the word 'could' in which it        

expresses our responsibility for our    
actions1 men could have brought about   
the good result without the  evil means4
 ,they could have done so if they had   
been better4 ,it was  owing to human    
wickedness--if less on ,caesar's part1  
then so much  the more on the part of   
innumerable others--that the wrong-doing
  of those wars was the appropriate     
means to this ulterior good4 ,so  in    
regard to the other cases instanced4 ,it
 is idle to speculate on  other means by
 which the permanent pacification of    
,india1 or the  unification of ,germany1
 or the liberation of ,christians in    
,european  ,turkey might have been      
brought about2 but it is important to   
bear  in mind that the innumerable wrong
 acts involved in achieving  them--acts 
wrong1 because violations of the rights 
of those directly  affected by them--did
 not cease to be wrong acts because     
under the  given condition of things the
 results specified would not have been  
obtained without them4 ,this given      

condition of things was not like  that  
7e4g47 which compels the castaways from 
a shipwreck1 so many  days from shore1  
and with only so much provision in their
 boat1 to  draw lots which shall be     
thrown overboard4 ,it was a condition of
  things which human wickedness1 through
 traceable and untraceable  channels1   
brought about4 ,if the individual       
promoters of wars1  which through the   
medium of multitudinous wrong-doing have
 yielded  good to mankind1 have been    
really influenced by a desire for any   
such good1--and much scepticism is      
justified in regard to such a           
supposition1--then so much less of the  
guilt of the wrong-doing has  been      
theirs4 ,no nation1 at any rate1 that   
has taken part in such wars  can fairly 
take credit for having been governed by 
such a motive4 ,it  has been either a   
passive instrument in the hands of its  
rulers1 or  has been animated by less   
worthy motives1 very mixed1 but of which
  perhaps a diffused desire for         

excitement has been the most innocent4  
,on what reasonable ground can          
,englishmen or ,germans or ,russians    
claim  that their several nations took  
part in the wars by which ,india was    
pacified1 ,germany unified1 ,bulgaria   
liberated1 under the dominant  influence
 of a desire for human good8 ,rather1 if
 the action of a  national conscience in
 such matters is possible at all1 they  
should  take shame for their share in   
that general human selfishness which    
rendered certain conditions of human    
development only attainable by  such    
means4    #aff4 7#b7 ,reverting then to 
the questions which arose #a out of the 
assertion of a right to free life on the
 part of the individual man  as such1 it
 appears that the first must be answered
 in the negative4  ,no state of war can 
make the destruction of man's life by   
man other  than a wrong1 though the     
wrong is not always chargeable upon all 
the  parties to a war4 ,the second      
question is virtually answered by what  

has been said about the first4 ,in      
regard to the state according to  its   
idea the question could not arise1 for  
according to its idea  the state is an  
institution in which all rights are     
harmoniously  maintained1 in which all  
the capacities that give rise to rights 
have  free-play given to them4 ,no      
action in its own interest of a state   
that fulfilled this idea could conflict 
with any true interest or  right of     
general society1 of the men not subject 
to its law taken as  a whole4 ,there is 
no such thing as an inevitable conflict 
between  states4 ,there is nothing in   
the nature of the state that1 given a   
multiplicity of states1 should make the 
gain of the one the loss of  the other4 
,the more perfectly each one of them    
attains its proper  object of giving    
free scope to the capacities of all     
persons living  on a certain range of   
territory1 the easier it is for others  
to  do so2 and in proportion as they all
 do so the danger of conflict           

disappears4    #a ,above1 sec4 #aef4    
,,rln    #afg4 ,on the other hand1 the  
imperfect realisation of civil equality 
in the full sense of the term in certain
 states1 is in greater or  less degree a
 source of danger to all4 ,the presence 
in states either  of a prerogatived     
class or of a body of people who1       
whether by open  denial of civil rights 
or by restrictive laws1 are thwarted in 
the free development of their           
capacities1 or of an ecclesiastical     
organisation which disputes the         
authority of the state on matters  of   
right and thus prevents the perfect     
civil fusion of its members  with other 
citizens1 always breeds an imagination  
of there being  some competition of     
interests between states4 ,the          
privileged class  involuntarily believes
 and spreads the belief that the        
interest of  the state lies in some     
extension without1 not in an improvement
 of  organisation within4 ,a suffering  
class attracts sympathy from without    

and invites interference with the state 
which contains it2 and that  state      
responds1 not by healing the sore1 but  
by defending against  aggression what it
 conceives to be its special interests1 
but which  are only special on account  
of its bad organisation4 ,or perhaps the
  suffering population overflows into   
another state1 as the ,irish into       
,america1 and there becomes a source not
 only of internal difficulty  but of    
hostile feeling between it and the state
 where the suffering  population still  
survives4 ,people1 again1 who1 in       
matters which the  state treats as      
belonging to itself1 take their         
direction from an  ecclesiastical power 
external to the state under which they  
live1  are necessarily in certain       
relations alien to that state1 and may  
at  any time prove a source of          
apparently conflicting interests between
  it and some other state1 which under  
the influence of the hostile            
ecclesiastical power espouses their     

cause4 ,remove from ,european  states1  
as they are and have been during the    
last hundred years1 the  occasions of   
conflict1 the sources of apparently     
competing interests1  which arise in one
 or other of the ways mentioned1--either
 from the  mistaken view of             
state-interests which a privileged class
 inevitably  takes1 or from the presence
 in them of oppressed populations1 or   
from  what we improperly call the       
antagonism of religious                 
confessions1--and  there would not be or
 have been anything to disturb the peace
 between  them4 ,and this is to say that
 the source of war between states lies  
in their incomplete fulfilment of their 
function2 in the fact that  there is    
some defect in the maintenance or       
reconciliation of rights  among their   
subjects4    #afh4 ,this is equally true
 in regard to those causes of conflict  
which are loosely called 'religious4'   
,these do not arise out of any          
differences between the convictions of  

different people in regard  to the      
nature of ,god or their relations to    
,him1 or the right way of  worshipping  
,him4 ,they arise either out of some    
aggression upon the  religious freedom  
of certain people1 made or allowed by   
the powers  of the state1 which thus    
puts these people in the position of an 
alien or unenfranchised class1 or else  
out of an aggression on the  rights of  
the state by some corporation calling   
itself spiritual but  really claiming   
sovereignty over men's actions in the   
same relations  in which the state      
claims to determine them4 ,there would  
be nothing  tending to international    
disturbance in the fact that bodies of  
people who worship ,god in the ,catholic
 manner live in a state where  the      
majority worship in the ,greek or       
,protestant manner1 and alongside  of   
another state where the majority is     
,catholic1 but for one or other  or both
 of these circumstances1 viz4 that the  
,catholic worship and  teaching is      

interfered with by the ,protestant or   
,greek state1 and  that ,catholics are  
liable to a direction by a power which  
claims to  regulate men's transactions  
with each other by a law of its own1 and
  which may see fit 7e4g47 to prohibit  
the ,catholic subjects in the  ,greek or
 ,protestant state from being married1  
or having their parents  buried1 or     
their children taught the necessary     
arts1 in the manner  which the state    
directs4 ,this reciprocal invasion of   
right1 the  invasion of the rights of   
the state by the church on the one side1
  and on the other the restriction      
placed by the sovereign upon the        
subject's freedom1 not of conscience1   
7for that is impossible71 but  of       
expressing his conscience in word and   
act1 has sometimes caused a  state of   
things in which certain of the subjects 
of a state have been  better affected to
 another state than to their own1 and in
 such a  case there is an element of    
natural hostility between the states4   

,an  obvious instance to give of this   
relation between states would have  been
 that between ,russia and ,turkey1 if   
,turkey could be considered to  have    
been constituted as a state at all4     
,perhaps a better instance  would be the
 position of ,ireland in the past2 its  
disaffection to  ,england and           
gravitation1 first to ,france1 then to  
the ,united ,states1  caused chiefly by 
,protestant penal laws which in turn    
were at least  provoked by the          
aggressive attitude of the church       
towards the ,english  state4 ,whenever a
 like invasion of rights still takes    
place1 e4g4  in the treatment of the    
,catholic subjects of ,russia in        
,poland1 in  the ultramontane movement  
of resistance to certain requirements   
of the state among the ,catholic        
subjects of ,germany1 it tends to       
international conflict4 ,and what is now
 a somewhat remote tendency  has in the 
past been a formidable stimulant to war4
    #afi4 ,it is nothing then in the    

necessary organisation of the state1    
but rather some defect of that          
organisation in relation to its proper  
function of maintaining and reconciling 
rights1 of giving scope to  capacities1 
that leads to a conflict of apparent    
interests between  one state and        
another4 ,the wrong1 therefore1 which   
results to human  society from conflicts
 between states cannot be condoned on   
the  ground that it is a necessary      
incident of the existence of states4    
,the wrong cannot be held to be lost in 
a higher right1 which attaches  to the  
maintenance of the state as the         
institution through which  alone the    
freedom of man is realised4 ,it is not  
the state1 as such1  but this or that   
particular state1 which by no means     
fulfils its  purpose1 and might perhaps 
be swept away and superseded by another 
with advantage to the ends for which the
 true state exists1 that  needs to      
defend its interests by action injurious
 to those outside  it4 ,hence there is  

no ground for holding that a state is   
justified  in doing whatever its        
interests seem to require1              
irrespectively  of effects on other men4
 ,if those effects are bad1 as involving
  either a direct violation of personal 
rights or obstruction to the  moral     
development of society anywhere in the  
world1 then there is  no ultimate       
justification for the political action  
that gives rise  to them4 ,the question 
can only be 7as we have seen generally  
in  regard to the wrong-doing of war71  
where in particular the blame  lies4    
,whether there is any justification for 
a particular state1  which in defence of
 its interests inflicts an injury on    
some portion  of mankind2 whether1 e4g41
 the ,germans are justified in holding  
,metz1 on the supposition that their    
tenure of such a thoroughly  ,french    
town necessarily thwarts in many ways   
the healthy activity  of the            
inhabitants1 or the ,english in carrying
 fire and sword into  ,afghanistan for  

the sake of acquiring a scientific      
frontier2 this  must depend 7#a7 on the 
nature of the interests thus defended1  
7#b7 on  the impossibility of otherwise 
defending them1 7#c7 on the question    
how they came to be endangered4 ,if they
 are interests of which the  maintenance
 is essential to those ends as a means  
to which the state  has its value1 if   
the state which defends them has not    
itself been a  joint-cause of their     
being endangered1 and if they cannot be 
defended  except at the cost of injury  
to some portion of mankind1 then the    
state which defends them is clear of the
 guilt of that injury4 ,but  the guilt  
is removed from it only to be somewhere 
else1 however wide  its distribution may
 be4 ,it may be doubted1 however1       
whether the  second question could ever 
be answered altogether in favour of a   
state which finds it necessary to       
protect its interests at the cost  of   
inflicting an injury on mankind4        
#agj4 ,it will be said1 perhaps1 that   

these formal arguments in proof  of the 
wrong-doing involved in war1 and of the 
unjustifiability  of the policy which   
nations constantly adopt in defence of  
their  apparent interests1 carry very   
little conviction2 that a state is  not 
an abstract complex of institutions for 
the maintenance of  rights1 but a       
nation1 a people1 possessing such       
institutions2 that  the nation has its  
passions which inevitably lead it to    
judge all  questions of international   
right from its own point of view1 and to
  consider its apparent national        
interests as justifying anything2  that 
if it were otherwise1 if the            
cosmopolitan point of view could  be    
adopted by nations1 patriotism would be 
at an end2 that whether  this be        
desirable or no1 such an extinction of  
national passions is  impossible2 that  
while they continue1 wars are as        
inevitable between  nations as they     
would be between individuals1 if        
individuals were  living in what        

philosophers have imagined to be the    
state of nature1  without recognition of
 a common superior2 that nations in     
short are  in the position of men       
judging their own causes1 which it is   
admitted  that no one can do            
impartially2 and that this state of     
things cannot  be altered without the   
establishment of a common constraining  
power1  which would mean the extinction 
of the life of independent states1--a   
result as undesirable as it is          
unattainable4 ,projects of perpetual    
peace1 to be logical1 must be projects  
of all-embracing empire4    #aga4 ,there
 is some cogency in language of this    
kind4 ,it is true  that when we speak of
 a state as a living agency1 we mean1   
not an  institution or complex of       
institutions1 but a nation organised in 
a certain way2 and that members of the  
nation in their corporate  or associated
 action are animated by certain         
passions1 arising out  of their         
association1 which1 though not egoistic 

relatively to the  individual subjects  
of them 7for they are motives to        
self-sacrifice71  may1 in their         
influence on the dealings of one nation 
with another1  have an effect analogous 
to that which egoistic passions1        
properly  so called1 have upon the      
dealings of individuals with each other4
  ,on the other hand1 it must be        
remembered that the national passion1   
which in any good sense is simply the   
public spirit of the good  citizen1 may 
take1 and every day is taking1          
directions which lead  to no collision  
between one nation and another2 7or1 to 
say the  same thing negatively1 that it 
is utterly false to speak as if the     
desire for one's own nation to show more
 military strength than  others were the
 only or the right form of patriotism72 
and that  though a nation1 with national
 feeling of its own1 must everywhere    
underlie a state1 properly so called1   
yet still1 just so far as the  perfect  
organisation of rights within each      

nation1 which entitles  it to be called 
a state1 is attained1 the occasions of  
conflict  between nations disappear2 and
 again1 that by the same process1 just  
so far as it is satisfactorily carried  
out1 an organ of expression  and action 
is established for each nation in       
dealing with other  nations1 which is   
not really liable to be influenced by   
the same  egoistic passions in dealing  
with the government of another nation as
  embroil individuals with each other4  
,the love of mankind1 no doubt1  needs  
to be particularised in order to have   
any power over life and  action4 ,just  
as there can be no true friendship      
except towards this  or that individual1
 so there can be no true public spirit  
which is  not localised in some way4    
,the man whose desire to serve his kind 
is  not centred primarily in some home1 
radiating from it to a commune1  a      
municipality1 and a nation1 presumably  
has no effectual desire to  serve his   
kind at all4 ,but there is no reason why

 this localised  or nationalised        
philanthropy should take the form of a  
jealousy of  other nations or a desire  
to fight them1 personally or by proxy4  
,those in whom it is strongest are every
 day expressing it in good  works which 
benefit their fellow-citizens without   
interfering with  the men of other      
nations4 ,those who from time to time   
talk of the  need of a great war to     
bring unselfish impulses into play1 give
 us  reason to suspect that they are too
 selfish themselves to recognise  the   
unselfish activity that is going on all 
round them4 ,till all  the methods have 
been exhausted by which nature can be   
brought into  the service of man1 till  
society is so organised that everyone's 
capacities have free scope for their    
development1 there is no need to  resort
 to war for a field in which patriotism 
may display itself4    #agb4 ,in fact1  
just so far as states are thoroughly    
formed1 the  diversion of patriotism    
into the military channel tends to come 

to an  end4 ,it is a survival from a    
condition of things in which1 as yet1   
the state1 in the full sense1 was not2  
in the sense1 namely1 that  in each     
territory controlled by a single        
independent government1  the rights of  
all persons1 as founded on their        
capacities for  contributing to a common
 good1 are equally established by one   
system  of law4 ,if each separately     
governed territory were inhabited by a  
people so organised within itself1 there
 would be nothing to lead  to the       
association of the public spirit of the 
good citizen with  military             
aggressiveness1--an association which   
belongs properly not  to the  #a1 but to
 the 4 ,the ,greek states1 however      
complete might be the equality of their 
citizens among themselves1  were all  in
 relation to some subject populations1  
and1 as  such1 jealous of each other4   
,the ,peloponnesian war was eminently a 
war of rival 4 ,and those habits and    
institutions and modes  of feeling in   

,europe of the present day1 which tend  
to international  conflict1 are either  
survivals from the  of the past1 or     
arise out of the very incomplete manner 
in which1 as yet1 over most  of ,europe 
the  has superseded the 4 ,patriotism1  
in that special military sense in which 
it is distinguished from  public spirit1
 is not the temper of the citizen       
dealing with  fellow-citizens1 or with  
men who are themselves citizens of their
  several states1 but that of the       
follower of the feudal chief1 or  of the
 member of a privileged class conscious 
of a power1 resting  ultimately on      
force1 over an inferior population1 or  
of a nation  holding empire over other  
nations4    #a ,greek  7politeia7       
constitutional government1  particularly
 a city-state1 _/ 7dunasteia_/i7  narrow
  oligarchy_/ies ,tr    #agc4 ,standing 
armies1 again1 though existing on a     
larger scale now  than ever before1 are 
not products of the civilisation of     
,europe1 but  of the predominance over  

that civilisation of the old 4  ,the    
influences which have given rise to and 
keep up those armies  essentially belong
 to a state of things in which          
mankind--even  ,european mankind--is not
 yet thoroughly organised into political
  life4 ,roughly summarised1 they are   
these3 7#a74 ,the temporary             
confiscation by ,napoleon to his own    
account of the products of the  ,french 
,revolution1 which thus1 though founded 
on a true idea of a  citizenship in     
which not the few only1 but all men1    
should partake1  for the time issued in 
a  over the countries which most        
directly felt the effects of the        
revolution4 7#b74 ,the consequent       
revival in dynastic forms1 under the    
influence of antagonism to  ,france1 of 
national life in ,germany4 7#c71 ,the   
aspiration after  national unity        
elsewhere in ,europe1--a movement which 
must precede  the organisation of states
 on a sound basis1 and for the time     
readily  yields itself to direction by a

 4 7#d74 ,the existence1 over  all the  
,slavonic side of ,europe1 of           
populations which are only just         
beginning to make any approach to       
political life--the life of the  1 or   
'civitas '--and still offer a tempting  
field to the  ambition of rival 1       
,austrian1 ,russian1 and ,turkish       
7which1  indeed1 are by no means to be  
put on a level1 but are alike as not    
resting on a basis of citizenship74     
7#e74 ,the tenure of a great ,indian    
empire by ,england1 which not only gives
 it a military character which  would   
not belong to it simply as a state1 but 
brings it into outward  relations with  
the  just spoken of4 ,this is no doubt a
  very incomplete account of the        
influences which have combined to  'turn
 ,europe into a great camp' 7a very     
exaggerated expression72 but  it may    
serve to show what a fuller account     
would show more clearly1  that the      
military system of ,europe is no        
necessary incident of the  relations    

between independent states1 but arises  
from the fact that  the organisation of 
state-life1 even with those peoples that
 have  been brought under its influence 
at all1 is still so incomplete4    #agd4
 ,the more complete that organisation   
becomes1 the more the  motives and      
occasions of international conflict tend
 to disappear1  while the bonds of unity
 become stronger4 ,the latter is the    
case1 if  for no other reason1 yet for  
this2 that the better organisation of   
the state means freer scope to the      
individual 7not necessarily to do  as he
 likes1 e4g4 in1 the buying and selling 
of alcohol1 but in such  development of 
activity as is good on the whole74 ,this
 again means  free intercourse between  
members of one state and those of       
another1  and in particular more freedom
 of trade4 ,all restrictions on freedom 
of wholesome trade are really based on  
special class-interests1  and must      
disappear with the realisation of that  
idea of individual  right1 founded on   

the capacity of every man for free      
contribution  to social good1 which is  
the true idea of the state4 ,and as     
trade  between members of different     
states becomes freer and more full1 the 
sense of common interests between them1 
which war would infringe1  becomes      
stronger4 ,the bond of peace thus       
established is sometimes  depreciated as
 a selfish one1 but it need be no more  
selfish than  that which keeps the peace
 between members of the same state1 who 
have no acquaintance with each other4   
,in one case as in the other  it may be 
said that the individual tries to       
prevent a breach of the  peace because  
he knows that he has more to gain than  
to lose by it4  ,in the latter case1    
however1 this account of the matter     
would be1 to  say the least1            
insufficient4 ,the good citizen observes
 the law in  letter and in spirit1 not  
from any fear of consequences to himself
  if he did not1 but from an idea of the
 mutual respect by men for  each other's

 rights as that which should be an idea 
which has become  habitual with him1 and
 regulates his conduct without his      
asking airy  questions about it4 ,there 
was a time1 however1 when this idea only
  thus acted spontaneously in regulating
 a man's action towards his  family or  
immediate neighbours or friends4        
,considerations of interest  were the   
medium through which a wider range of   
persons came to be  brought within its  
range4 ,and thus1 although              
considerations of an  identity of       
interests1 arising out of trade1 may be 
the occasion of  men's recognising in   
men of other nations those rights which 
war  violates1 there is no reason why1  
upon that occasion and through  the     
familiarity which trade brings about1 an
 idea of justice1 as a  relation which  
should subsist between all mankind as   
well as between  members of the same    
state1 may not come to act on men's     
minds as  independently of all          
calculation of their several interests  

as does  the idea which regulates the   
conduct of the good citizen4    #age4   
,if the necessary or impelling power of 
the idea of what is  due from members of
 different nations to each other is     
weak1 it  must be observed on the other 
hand that the individual members of a   
nation have no such apparent interest in
 their government's dealing  unfairly   
with another nation as one individual   
may have in getting  the advantage of   
another4 ,thus1 so far as this idea     
comes to form  part of the habit of     
men's minds1 there ceases to be anything
 in the  passions of the people which a 
government represents to stimulate the  
government to that unfairness in dealing
 with another government1  to which an  
individual might be moved by            
self-seeking passions in  dealing with  
another individual1 in the absence of an
 impartial  authority having power over 
both4 ,if at the same time the several  
governments are purely representative of
 the several peoples1 as they  should   

become with the due organisation of the 
state1 and thus have  no dynastic       
interests of their own in embroiling one
 nation with  another1 there seems to be
 no reason why they should not arrive at
 a  passionless impartiality in dealing 
with each other1 which would be  beyond 
the reach of the individual in defending
 his own cause against  another4 ,at any
 rate1 if no government can ever get rid
 of some bias  in its own favour1 there 
remains the possibility of mediation in 
cases of dispute by disinterested       
governments4 ,with the abatement of     
national jealousies and the removal of  
those deeply-seated causes  of war      
which1 as we have seen1 are connected   
with the deficient  organisation of     
states1 the dream of an international   
court with  authority resting on the    
consent of independent states may come  
to  be realised4 ,such a result may be  
very remote1 but it is important  to    
bear in mind that there is nothing in   
the intrinsic nature of a  system of    

independent states incompatible with it1
 but that on the  contrary every advance
 in the organisation of man kind into   
states in  the sense explained is a step
 towards it4        ,l4 ,,the ,,right   
,,of ,,the ,,state ,,to ,,punish4       
#agf4 7#c7 ,we come now to the third of 
the questions raised l in  regard to the
 individual's right to free life1 the   
question under  what conditions that    
right may be forfeited2 the question1 in
 other  words1 of the state's right of  
punishment4 ,the right 7i4e4 the power  
secured by social recognition7 of free  
life in every man rests on  the assumed 
capacity in every man of free action    
contributory to  social good 7'free' in 
the sense of determined by the idea of a
  common good4 ,animals may and do      
contribute to the good of man1 but  not 
thus 'freely'74 ,this right on the part 
of associated men implies  the right on 
their part to prevent such actions as   
interfere with  the possibility of free 
action contributory to social good4     

,this  constitutes the right of         
punishment1 the right so far to use     
force  upon a person 7to treat him as an
 animal or a thing7 as may be  necessary
 to save others from this interference4 
#a ,above1 sec4 #aef4 ,,rln    #agg4    
,under what conditions a person needs to
 be thus dealt with1  what particular   
actions on his part constitute such an  
interference1  is a question which can  
only be answered when we have considered
  what powers in particular need to be  
secured to individuals or to  officials 
in order to the possibility of free     
action of the kind  described4 ,every   
such power is a right of which the      
violation1 if  intended as a violation  
of a right1 requires a punishment1 of   
which  the kind and amount must depend  
on the relative importance of the  right
 and of the extent to which its general 
exercise is threatened4  ,thus every    
theory of rights in detail must be      
followed by1 or  indeed implies1 a      
corresponding theory of punishment in   

detail1 a  theory which considers what  
particular acts are punishable1 and how 
they should be punished4 ,the latter    
cannot precede the former3 all  that can
 be done here is further to consider    
what general rules of  punishment are   
implied in the principle on which we    
hold all right of  punishment to rest1  
and how far in the actual practice of   
punishment  that principle has been     
realised4    #agh4 ,it is commonly asked
 whether punishment according to its    
proper  nature is retributive or        
preventive or reformatory4 ,the true    
answer  is that it is and should be all 
three4 ,the statement1 however1  that   
the punishment of the criminal by the   
state is retributive1  though true in a 
sense that will be explained directly1  
yet so  readily lends itself to a       
misunderstanding1 that it is perhaps    
best  avoided4 ,it is not true in the   
sense that in legal punishment as it    
should be there survives any element of 
private vengeance1 of the  desire on the

 part of the individual who has received
 a hurt from  another to inflict an     
equivalent hurt in return4 ,it is true  
that  the beginning of punishment by the
 state first appears in the form  of a  
regulation of private vengeance1 but it 
is not therefore to be  supposed that   
punishment by the state is in any way a 
continuation of  private vengeance4 ,it 
is the essence of the former to suppress
 and  supersede the latter1 but it only 
does so gradually1 just as rights  in   
actuality are only formed gradually4    
,private vengeance belongs  to the state
 of things in which rights are not as   
yet actualised2  in the sense that the  
powers which it is for the social good  
that  a man should be allowed to        
exercise1 are not yet secured to him  by
 society4 ,in proportion as they are    
actualised1 the exercise of  private    
vengeance must cease4 ,a right of       
private vengeance is an  impossibility2 
for1 just so far as the vengeance is    
private1 the  individual in executing it

 is exercising a power not derived from 
society nor regulated by reference to   
social good1 and such a power  is not a 
right4 ,hence the view commonly taken by
 writers of the  seventeenth and        
eighteenth centuries implies an entire  
misconception  of the nature of a right2
 the view1 viz41 that there first       
existed  rights of self-defence and     
self-vindication on the part of         
individuals in a state of nature1 and   
that these came to be devolved  on a    
power representing all individuals1 so  
that the state's right  of using force  
against those men who use or threaten   
force against  other men1 is merely the 
sum or equivalent of the private rights 
which individuals would severally       
possess if there were no public         
equivalent for them4 ,this is to suppose
 that to have been a right  which in    
truth1 under the supposed conditions1   
would merely have been  animal impulse  
and power1 and public right 7which is a 
pleonasm1 for  all right is public7 to  

have resulted from the combination of   
these  animal impulses and powers3 it is
 to suppose that from a state of  things
 in which 'homo homini lupus' by mere   
combination of wolfish  impulses1 there 
could result the state of things in     
which 'homo  homini deus4'    #agi4 ,in 
a state of things in which private      
vengeance for hurt  inflicted was the   
universal practice1 there could be no   
rights at  all4 ,in the most primitive  
society in which rights can exist1 it   
must at least within the limits of the  
family be suppressed by  that authority 
of the family or its head which first   
constitutes  rights4 ,in such a society 
it is only on the members of another    
family that a man may retaliate at      
pleasure a wrong done to him1 and  then 
the vengeance is not1 strictly speaking1
 taken by individual  upon individual1  
though individuals may be severally the 
agent and  patient of it1 but by family 
upon family4 ,just because there is as  
yet no idea of a state independent of   

ties of birth1 much less of  a universal
 society from relation to which a man   
derives rights1  there is no idea of    
rights attaching to him as a citizen or 
as a  man1 but only as a member of a    
family4 ,that social right1 which is  at
 once a right of society over the       
individual1 and a right which  society  
communicates and secures to the         
individual1 appears1 so far1  only as a 
control exercised by the family over its
 members in their  dealings with each   
other1 as an authorisation which it     
gives them in  prosecuting their        
quarrels with members of another family1
 and at the  same time to a certain     
extent as a limitation on the manner in 
which  feuds between families may be    
carried on1 a limitation generally      
dependent on some religious authority   
equally recognised by the  families at  
feud4    #ahj4 ,from this state of      
things it is a long step to the rgime of
  law in a duly constituted state4      
,under it the arm of the state alone  is

 the organ through which force may be   
exercised on the individual2  the       
individual is prohibited from averting  
violence by violence1  except so far as 
is necessary for the immediate          
protection of life1  and altogether from
 avenging wrong done to him1 on the     
understanding  that the society1 of     
which he is an organ and from which he  
derives  his rights1 being injured in   
every injury to him1 duly protects him  
against injury1 and when it fails to    
prevent such injury from being  done1   
inflicts such punishment on the offender
 as is necessary for  future protection4
 ,but the process from the one state of 
things to  the other1 though a long one1
 consists in the further development of 
that social right #a which properly     
speaking was the only right the         
individual ever had1 and from the first1
 or ever since a permanent  family tie  
existed1 was present as a qualifying and
 restraining  element in the exercise of
 private vengeance so far as that       

exercise  partook at all in the nature  
of a right4 ,the process is not a       
continuance of private vengeance under  
altered forms1 but a gradual            
suppression of it by the fuller         
realisation of the higher principle     
which all along controlled it4    #a    
',social right1' i4e4 right belonging to
 a society of persons  recognising a    
common good1 and belonging through      
membership of the  society to the       
several persons constituting it4 ,the   
society to which  the right belongs1 is 
in principle or possibility a society of
 all  men as rendered capable of free   
intercourse with each other by the      
organisation of the state4 ,actually at 
first it is only this or  that family2  
then some association of families2      
finally the state1  as including all    
other forms of association1 reconciling 
the rights  which arise out of them1 and
 thus the most perfect medium through   
which the individual can contribute to  
the good of mankind and  mankind to his4

    #aha4 ,but it will be asked1 how    
upon this view of the nature  of        
punishment as inflicted by the state it 
can be considered  retributory4 ,if no  
private vengeance1 no vengeance of the  
injured  individual1 is involved in     
punishment1 there can be no vengeance in
  it at all4 ,the conception of         
vengeance is quite inappropriate to the 
action of society or the state on the   
criminal4 ,the state cannot be  supposed
 capable of vindictive passion4 ,nor1 if
 the essence of crime  is a wrong done  
to society1 does it admit of retaliation
 upon the  person committing it4 ,a hurt
 done to an individual can be requited  
by  the infliction of a like hurt upon  
the person who has done it2 but no      
equivalent of wrong done to society can 
be paid back to the doer of  it4        
#ahb4 ,it is true that there is such a  
thing as a national desire  for revenge 
#a 7,france and ,germany73 and1 if a    
state  a nation  organised in a certain 
way1 why should it not be 'capable of   

vindictive passion'8 ,no doubt there is 
a unity of feeling among the  members of
 a nation which makes them feel any loss
 of strength1 real  or apparent1        
sustained by the nation in its corporate
 character1 as  a hurt or disgrace to   
themselves1 which they instinctively    
desire to  revenge4 ,the corporate      
feeling is so strong that individuals   
feel  themselves severally hurt in the  
supposed hurt of the nation4 ,but  when 
it is said that a crime is an offence   
against the state1 it is  not meant that
 the body of persons forming the nation 
feel any hurt  in the sense in which the
 person robbed or wounded does1 such a  
hurt  as excites a natural desire for   
revenge4 ,what is meant is that there   
is a violation of a system of rights    
which the nation has1 no doubt1  an     
interest in maintaining1 but a purely   
social interest1 quite  different from  
the egoistic interest of the individual 
of which the  desire for vengeance is a 
form4 ,a nation is capable of vindictive

  feeling1 but not so a nation as acting
 through the medium of a  settled1      
impartial1 general law for the          
maintenance of rights1 and  that is what
 we mean when we talk of the state as   
that against which  crimes are committed
 and which punishes them4    #a ',happy 
shall he be that rewardeth thee as thou 
hast served us4'    #ahc4 ,it is true   
that when a crime of a certain sort1    
e4g4 a  cold-blooded murder1 has been   
committed1 a popular sympathy with  the 
sufferer is excited1 which expresses    
itself in the wish to  'serve out' the  
murderer4 ,this has some resemblance to 
the desire  for personal revenge1 but is
 really quite different1 because not    
egoistic4 ,indignation against wrong    
done to another has nothing in  common  
with a desire to revenge a wrong done to
 oneself4 ,it borrows  the language of  
private revenge1 just as the love of    
,god borrows the  language of sensuous  
affection4 ,such indignation is         
inseparable from  the interest in social

 well-being1 and along with it is the   
chief  agent in the establishment and   
maintenance of legal punishment4 ,law   
indeed is necessarily general1 while    
indignation is particular in its        
reference2 and accordingly the treatment
 of any particular crime1  so far as    
determined by law1 cannot correspond    
with the indignation  which the crime   
excites2 but the law merely determines  
the general  category under which the   
crime falls1 and fixes certain limits to
  the punishment that may be inflicted  
under that category4 ,within  those     
limits discretion is left to the judge  
as to the sentence that  he passes1 and 
his sentence is in part influenced by   
the sort of  indignation which in the   
given state of public sentiment the     
crime  is calculated to excite2 though  
generally much more by his opinion  as  
to the amount of terror required for the
 prevention of prevalent  crime4 ,now   
what is it in punishment that this      
indignation demands8 ,if  not the sole  

foundation of public punishment1 it is  
yet inseparable  from that public       
interest1 on which the system of rights1
 with the  corresponding system of      
punishments protective of rights1       
depends4  ,in whatever sense then this  
indignation demands retribution in      
punishment1 in that sense retribution   
would seem to be a necessary  element in
 punishment4 ,it demands retribution in 
the sense of  demanding that the        
criminal should have his due1 should be 
dealt with  according to his deserts1   
should be punished justly4    #ahd4     
,this is quite a different thing from an
 equivalence between  the amount of     
suffering inflicted by the criminal and 
that which  he sustains in punishment4  
,the amount of suffering which is caused
  by any crime is really as incalculable
 as that which the criminal  endures in 
punishment1 whatever the punishment4 ,it
 is only in the  case of death for      
murder that there is any appearance of  
equivalence  between the two sufferings1

 and in this case the appearance is     
quite  superficial4 ,the suffering      
involved in death depends almost        
entirely  on the circumstances1 which   
are absolutely different in the case  of
 the murdered man and in that of the man
 executed for murder4  ,when a man is   
imprisoned with hard labour for robbery1
 there is not  even an appearance of    
equivalence of suffering between the    
crime  and the punishment4 ,in what then
 does the justice of a punishment1  or  
its correspondence with the criminal's  
deserts consist8 ,it will  not do to say
 that these terms merely represent the  
result of an  association of ideas      
between a crime and the penalty which we
 are  accustomed to see inflicted on it2
 that society has come to attach        
certain penalties to certain actions as 
a result of the experience  7#a7 of     
suffering and loss caused by those acts1
 and 7#b7 of the kind  of suffering of  
which the expectation will deter men    
from doing them2  and that these        

penalties having become customary1 the  
onlookers and  the criminal himself1    
when one of them is inflicted1 feel that
 he has  got what was to be expected1   
and call it his due or desert or a just 
punishment4 ,if this were the true      
account of the matter1 there would  be  
nothing to explain the difference       
between the emotion excited by  the     
spectacle of a just punishment          
inflicted1 or the demand that it  should
 be inflicted1 on the one side1 and on  
the other that excited  by the sight of 
physical suffering following according  
to the usual  course of things upon a   
physical combination of circumstances1  
or the  expectation that such suffering 
will follow4 ,if it is said that the    
difference is explained by the fact that
 in the one case both the  antecedent   
7the criminal act7 and the consequent   
represent voluntary  human agency1 while
 in the other they do not1 we reply1    
,just so1 but  for that reason the      
conception of a punishment as just      

differs wholly  from any conception of  
it that could result either from its    
being  customary1 or from the infliction
 of such punishment having been         
commonly found a means for protecting us
 against hurt4    #ahe4 ,the idea of    
punishment implies on the side of the   
person  punished at once a capacity for 
determination by the conception of a    
common or public good1 or in other words
 a practical understanding of  the      
nature of rights as founded on relations
 to such public good1 and  an actual    
violation of a right or omission to     
fulfil an obligation1  the right or     
obligation being one of which the agent 
might have  been aware and the violation
 or omission one which he might have    
prevented4 ,on the side of the authority
 punishing1 it implies equally  a       
conception of right founded on relation 
to public good1 and one  which1 unlike  
that on the part of the criminal1 is    
realised in act2 a  conception of which 
the punitive act1 as founded on a       

consideration  of what is necessary for 
the maintenance of rights1 is the       
logical  expression4 ,a punishment is   
unjust if either element is absent2 if  
either the act punished is not a        
violation of known rights or an         
omission to fulfil known obligations of 
a kind which the agent might  have      
prevented1 or the punishment is one that
 is not required for  the maintenance of
 rights1 or 7which comes to the same    
thing71 if  the ostensible rights for   
the maintenance of which the punishment 
is required are not real rights1 are not
 liberties of action or  acquisition    
which there is any real public interest 
in maintaining4    #ahf4 ,when the      
specified conditions of just punishment 
are fulfilled1  the person punished     
himself recognises it as just1 as his   
due or  desert1 and it is so recognised 
by the onlooker who thinks himself  into
 the situation4 ,the criminal1 being    
susceptible to the idea of  public good1
 and through it to the idea of rights1  

though this idea  has not been strong   
enough to regulate his actions1 sees in 
the  punishment its natural expression4 
,he sees that the punishment is his  own
 act returning on himself1 in the sense 
that it is the necessary  outcome of his
 act in a society governed by the       
conception of rights1  a conception     
which he appreciates and to which he    
does involuntary  reverence4    ,it is  
the outcome of his act1 or his act      
returning upon himself1 in  a different 
way from that in which a man's act      
returns on himself  when1 having misused
 his body1 he is visited according to   
physical  necessity by painful          
consequences4 ,the cause of the         
suffering which  the act entails in the 
one case is the relation of the act to a
  society governed by the conception of 
rights2 in the other it is not4  ,for   
that reason1 the painful consequence of 
the act to the doer in  the one case is1
 in the other is not1 properly a        
punishment4 ,we do  indeed commonly     

speak of the painful consequences of    
imprudent or  immoral acts 7'immoral' as
 distinct from 'illegal'7 as a          
punishment  of them1 but this is either 
metaphorically or because we think of   
the course of the world as regulated by 
a divine sovereign1 whom we  conceive as
 a maintainer of rights like the        
sovereign of a state4  ,we may think of 
it as divinely regulated1 and so        
regulated with a  view to the           
realisation of moral good1 but we shall 
still not be  warranted in speaking of  
the sufferings which follow in the      
course of  nature upon certain kinds of 
conduct as punishments1 according to the
  distinctive sense in which crime is   
punished1 unless we suppose the         
maintenance of rights to be the object  
of the moral government of the          
world1--which is to put the cart before 
the horse2 for1 as we have  seen1 rights
 are relative to morality1 not morality 
to rights 7the  ground on which certain 
liberties of action and acquisition     

should  be guaranteed as rights being   
that they are conditions of the moral   
perfection of society74    ,while there 
would be reason1 then1 as against those 
who say that the  punishment of crime is
 merely preventive1 in saying that it is
 also  retributive1 if the needed       
correction of the 'merely preventive'   
doctrine could not be more accurately   
stated1 it would seem that  the truth   
can be more accurately stated by the    
proposition that  punishment is not     
justified unless it is just1 and that it
 is not  just unless the act punished is
 an intentional violation of real  right
 or neglect of real obligation which the
 agent could have  avoided 7i4e4 unless 
the agent knowingly and by intentional  
act  interferes with some freedom of    
action or acquisition which there is  a 
public interest in maintaining71 and    
unless the future maintenance  of rights
 requires that the criminal be dealt    
with as he is in the  punishment4#a     
#a ,the conceptions of the just and of  

justice implied in this  statement of   
the conditions of just punishment may be
 expressed  briefly as follows4 ',the   
just'  that complex of social conditions
  which for each individual is necessary
 to enable him to realise his  capacity 
of contributing to social good4         
',justice' is the habit of  mind which  
leads us to respect those conditions in 
dealing with  others1--not to interfere 
with them so far as they already exist1 
and to bring them into existence so far 
as they are not found in  existence4    
#ahg4 ,it is clear1 however1 that this  
requirement1 that punishment of  crime  
should be just1 may be covered by the   
statement that in its  proper nature it 
is preventive1 if the nature of that    
which is to be  prevented by it is      
sufficiently defined4 ,its proper       
function is1 in  the interest of rights 
that are genuine 7in the sense          
explained71 to  prevent actions of the  
kind described by associating in the    
mind of  every possible doer of them a  

certain terror with the contemplation   
of the act1--such terror as is necessary
 on the whole to protect the  rights    
threatened by such action4 ,the whipping
 of an ill-behaved  dog is preventive1  
but not preventive in the sense in which
 the  punishment of crime is so1 because
 7#a7 the dog's ill conduct is not  an  
intentional violation of a right or     
neglect of a known obligation1  the dog 
having no conception of right or        
obligation1 and 7#b7 for  the same      
reason the whipping does not lead to the
 association of  terror in the minds of 
other dogs with the violation of rights 
and  neglect of obligations4 ,to shoot  
men down who resist a successful  coup  
d'tat may be effectually preventive of  
further resistance  to the government   
established by the coup d'tat1 but it   
does not  satisfy the true idea of      
punishment1 because the terror produced 
by  the massacre is not necessary for   
the protection of genuine rights1       
rights founded on public interest4 ,to  

hang men for sheep-stealing1  again1    
does not satisfy the idea2 because1     
though it is a genuine  right that      
sheep-stealing violates1 in a society   
where there was  any decent             
reconciliation of rights no such terror 
as is caused  by the punishment of death
 would be required for the protection   
of the right4 ,it is because the theory 
that punishment is 'merely  preventive' 
favours the notion that the repetition  
of any action  which any sufficient body
 of men find inconvenient may           
justifiably  be prevented by any sort of
 terror that may be convenient for the  
purpose1 that it requires to be guarded 
by substituting for the  qualifying     
'merely' a statement of what it is which
 the justifiable  punishment prevents   
and why it prevents it4    #ahh4 ,but   
does our theory1 after all has been said
 about the  wrongness of punishment that
 is not just1 afford any standard for   
the apportionment of just punishment1   
any criterion of the amount of          

interference with a criminal's personal 
rights that is appropriate to  his      
crime1 except such as is afforded by a  
prevalent impression among  men as to   
what is necessary for their security8   
,can we construe it so  as to afford    
such a criterion1 without at the same   
time condemning  a great deal of        
punishment which yet society could be   
never brought  to dispense with8 ,does  
it really admit of being applied at all 
in  the presence of the admitted        
impossibility of ascertaining the       
degree of moral guilt of criminals1 as  
depending on their state of  character  
or habitual motives8 ,how1 according to 
it1 can we justify  punishments         
inflicted in the case of 'culpable      
negligence1' e4g4 when  an              
engine-driver1 by careless driving1 for 
which we think very little  the worse of
 him1 is the occasion of a bad accident1
 and is heavily  punished in            
consequence8    #ahi4 ,it is true that  
there can be no a priori criterion of   

just  punishment1 except of an abstract 
and negative kind4 ,we may say that  no 
punishment is just1 unless the rights   
which it serves to protect  are powers  
on the part of individuals or           
corporations of which the  general      
maintenance is necessary to the         
well-being of society on  the whole1 and
 unless the terror which the punishment 
is calculated  to inspire is necessary  
for their maintenance4 ,for a positive  
and  detailed criterion of just         
punishment1 we must wait till a system  
of rights has been established in which 
the claims of all men1 as  founded on   
their capacities for contributing to    
social well-being1  are perfectly       
harmonised1 and till experience has     
shown the degree  and kind of terror    
with which men must be affected in order
 to the  suppression of the anti-social 
tendencies which might lead to the      
violation of such a system of rights4   
,and this is perhaps equivalent  to     
saying that no complete criterion of    

just punishment can be  arrived at till 
punishment is no longer necessary2 for  
the state of  things supposed could     
scarcely be realised without bringing   
with it  an extinction of the tendencies
 which state-punishment is needed to    
suppress4 ,meanwhile there is no method 
of approximation to justice  in         
punishment but that which consists in   
gradually making the system  of         
established rights just1 i4e4 in        
harmonising the true claims of  all men1
 and in discovering by experience the   
really efficient means  of restraining  
tendencies to violation of rights4 ,an  
intentional  violation of a right must  
be punished1 whether the right violated 
is one that should be a right or no1 on 
the principle that social  well-being   
suffers more from violation of any      
established right1  whatever the nature 
of the right1 than from the             
establishment as a  right of a power    
which should not be so established2 and 
it can only  be punished in the way     

which for the time is thought most      
efficient  by the maintainers of law for
 protecting the right in question by    
associating terror with its violation4  
,this1 however1 does not  alter the     
moral duty1 on the part of the society  
authorising the  punishment1 to make its
 punishments just by making the system  
of  rights which it maintains just4 ,the
 justice of the punishment depends  on  
the justice of the general system of    
rights2 not merely on the  propriety    
with reference to social well-being of  
maintaining this  or that particular    
right which the crime punished violates1
 but on  the question whether the social
 organisation in which a criminal has   
lived and acted is one that has given   
him a fair chance of not being  a       
criminal4    #aij4 ,we are apt to think 
that the justice of a punishment depends
 on  some sort of equality between its  
magnitude and that of the crime         
punished1 but this notion arises from a 
confusion of punishment as  inflicted by

 the state for a wrong done to society  
with compensation  to the individual for
 damage done him4 ,neither a crime nor  
its  punishment admits of strictly      
quantitative measurement4 ,it may be    
said1 indeed1 that the greater the crime
 the heavier should be its  punishment1 
but this is only true if by the 'heavier
 punishment' is  understood that with   
which most terror is associated in the  
popular  imagination1 and if the        
conception of the 'greater crime' is    
taken on  the one hand to exclude any   
estimation of the degree of moral guilt1
  and1 on the other hand1 to be         
determined by an estimate not only of   
the importance in the social system of  
the right violated by the  crime1 but of
 the amount of terror that needs to be  
associated with  the crime in the       
general apprehension in order to its    
prevention4 ,but  when its terms are    
thus understood1 the statement that the 
greater  the crime the heavier should be
 its punishment1 becomes an identical   

proposition4 ,it amounts to this1 that  
the crime which requires most  terror to
 be associated with it in order to its  
prevention should  have most terror thus
 associated with it4    #aia4 ,but why  
do the terms 'heavier punishment' and   
'greater crime'  need to be thus        
understood8 ,why should not the 'greater
 crime' be  understood to mean the crime
 implying most moral wickedness1 or     
partly this1 partly the crime which     
violates the more important kind  of    
right8 ,why should a consideration of   
the amount of terror that  needs to be  
associated with it in order to its      
prevention enter into  the determination
 of the 'greater crime' at all8 ,why    
again should  not the 'heavier          
punishment' mean simply that in which   
the person  punished actually suffers   
most pain8 ,why should it be taken to   
mean  that with which most terror is    
associated upon the contemplation8  ,in 
short1 is not the proposition in        
question at once true and  significant  

in the sense that the crime which       
implies the most moral  depravity1 or   
violates the most important right 7such 
as the right to  life71 or which does   
both1 should be visited with the        
punishment that  involves most pain to  
the sufferer8    #aib4 ,the answer is3  
,as regards heaviness of punishment1 it 
is not in  the power of the state to    
regulate the amount of pain which it    
causes  to the person whom it punishes4 
,if it could only punish justly by      
making this pain proportionate in each  
case to the depravity implied  in the   
crime1 it could not punish justly at    
all4 ,the amount of pain  which any kind
 of punishment causes to the particular 
person depends  on his temperament and  
circumstances1 which neither the state  
nor  its agent1 the judge1 can          
ascertain4 ,but if it could be          
ascertained1  and if 7which is equally  
impossible7 the amount of depravity     
implied  in each particular crime could 
be ascertained likewise in order to     

make the pain of the punishment         
proportionate to the depravity1  a      
different punishment would have to be   
inflicted in each case  according to the
 temperament and circumstances of the   
criminal4 ,there  would be an end to all
 general rules of punishment4    #aic4  
,in truth1 however1 the state in its    
capacity as the sustainer  of rights    
7and it is in this capacity that it     
punishes7 has nothing  to do with the   
amount of moral depravity in the        
criminal1 and the  primary reference in 
punishment1 as inflicted by the state1  
is not  to the effect of the punishment 
on the person punished but to its       
effect on others4 ,the considerations   
determining its amount should  be       
prospective rather than retrospective4  
,in the crime a right has  been         
violated4 ,no punishment can undo what  
has been done1 or make  good the wrong  
to the person who has suffered4 ,what it
 can do is  to make less likely the     
doing of a similar wrong in other cases4

  ,its object1 therefore1 is not to     
cause pain to the criminal for the  sake
 of causing it1 nor chiefly for the sake
 of preventing him1  individually1 from 
committing the crime again1 but to      
associate  terror with the contemplation
 of the crime in the mind of others  who
 might be tempted to commit it4 ,and    
this object1 unlike that of  making the 
pain of the punishment commensurate with
 the guilt of the  criminal1 is in the  
main attainable4 ,the effect of the     
spectacle  of punishment on the onlooker
 is independent of any minute inquiry   
into the degree to which it affects the 
particular criminal4 ,the  attachment of
 equal penalties to offences that are   
alike in respect  of the importance of  
the rights which they violate1 and in   
respect  of the ordinary temptations to 
them1 will1 on the whole1 lead to  the  
association of an equal amount of terror
 with the prospect of  committing like  
offences in the public mind4 ,when the  
circumstances1  indeed1 of two criminals

 guilty of offences alike in both the   
above  respects are very greatly and    
obviously different1 so different as to 
make the operation of the same penalty  
upon them very conspicuously  different1
 then the penalty may be varied without 
interfering with  its terrifying effect 
on the public mind4 ,we will suppose    
e4g4 that  a fraud on the part of a     
respectable banker is equivalent1 both  
in  respect of the rights which it      
violates and of the terror needed to    
prevent the recurrence of like offences1
 to a burglary4 ,it will not  follow    
because the burglary is punished by     
imprisonment with hard  labour that hard
 labour should be inflicted on the      
fraudulent banker  likewise4 ,the       
infliction of hard labour is in         
everyone's apprehension  so different to
 the banker from what it is to the      
burglar1 that its  infliction is not    
needed in order to equalise the terror  
which the  popular imagination          
associates with the punishment in the   

two cases4    #aid4 ,on the same        
principle may be justified the          
consideration of  extenuating           
circumstances in the infliction of      
punishment4 ,in fact1  whether under    
that name or another1 they are taken    
account of in  the administration of    
criminal law among all civilised        
nations4  ',extenuating circumstances'  
is not a phrase in use among our        
lawyers1 but in fact the consideration  
of them does constantly1 with  the      
approval of the judge1 convert what     
would otherwise have been  conviction   
for murder into conviction for          
manslaughter1 and when  there has been  
conviction for murder1 leads to the     
commutation of  the sentence4 ,this fact
 is often taken to show that the degree 
of  moral depravity on the part of the  
criminal1 the question of his  character
 and motive1 is and must be considered  
in determining the  punishment due to   
him4 ,in truth1 however1 'extenuating   
circumstances'  may very well make a    

difference in the kind of terror which  
needs  to be associated with a crime in 
order to the future protection of       
rights1 and under certain conditions the
 consideration of them may be           
sufficiently justified on this ground4  
,suppose a theft by a starving  man1 or 
a hare shot by an angry farmer whose    
corn it is devouring4  ,these are       
crimes1 but crimes under such           
extenuating circumstances  that there is
 no need to associate very serious      
terror with them in  order to the       
protection of the essential rights of   
property4 ,in the  latter case the right
 which the farmer violates is one which 
perhaps  might be disallowed altogether 
without interference with any right     
which society is interested in          
maintaining4 ,in the former case the    
right violated is a primary and         
essential one2 one which1 where there   
are many starving people1 is in fact    
pretty sure to be protected by  the most
 stringent penalties4 ,and it might be  

argued that on the  principle stated    
this is as it should be2 that1 so far   
from the  hunger of the thief being a   
reason for lightening his punishment1 it
  is a reason for increasing it1 in     
order that the special temptation  to   
steal when far gone in hunger may1 if   
possible1 be neutralised by  a special  
terror associated with the commission of
 the crime under  those conditions4 ,but
 this would be a one-sided application  
of the  principle4 ,it is not the       
business of the state to protect one    
order  of rights specially1 but all     
rights equally4 ,it ought not therefore 
to protect a certain order of rights by 
associating special terror  with the    
violation of them1 when the special     
temptation to their  violation itself   
implies a violation of right in the     
persons of  those who are so tempted1 as
 is the case when a general danger to   
property arises from the fact that many 
people are on the edge of  starvation4  
,the attempt to do so is at once        

ineffectual and diverts  attention from 
the true way of protecting the          
endangered right1 which  is to prevent  
people from falling into a state of     
starvation4 ,in  any tolerably organised
 society the condition of a man1        
ordinarily  honest and industrious1 who 
is driven to theft by hunger1 will be   
so abnormal that very little terror     
needs to be associated with the  crime  
as so committed in order to maintain the
 sanctity of property  in the general   
imagination4 ,suppose again a man to be 
killed in a  quarrel arising out of his 
having tampered with the fidelity of his
  neighbour's wife4 ,in such a case     
'extenuating circumstances' may  fairly 
be pleaded against the infliction of the
 extremest penalty1  because the        
extremest terror does not need to be    
associated with  homicide1 as committed 
under such conditions1 in order to the  
general  protection of human life1 and  
because the attempt so to associate it  
would tend1 so far as successful1 to    

weaken the general sense of the         
wrong--the breach of family             
right--involved in the act which1 in the
  case supposed1 provokes the homicide4 
#aie4 ',after all1' it may be said1     
'this is a far-fetched way of           
explaining the admission of extenuating 
circumstances as modifying  the         
punishment of crime4 ,why so strenuously
 avoid the simpler  explanation1 that   
extenuating circumstances are taken into
 account  because they are held to      
modify the moral guilt of the crime8 ,is
 not  their recognition a practical     
proof that the punishment of a crime by 
the state represents the moral          
disapproval of the community8 ,does it  
not show that1 however imperfectly the  
amount of punishment inflicted  on a    
crime may in fact correspond to its     
moral wickedness1 it is  generally felt 
that it ought to do so8'    #aif4 ,the  
answer is that there are two reasons for
 holding that  the state neither can nor
 should attempt to adjust the amount of 

punishment which it inflicts on a crime 
to the degree of moral  depravity which 
the crime implies4 7#a7 ,that the degree
 of moral  depravity implied in any     
crime is unascertainable4 ,it depends on
 the  motive of the crime1 and on this  
as part of the general character of  the
 agent2 on the relation in which the    
habitual set of his character  stands to
 the character habitually set on the    
pursuit of goodness4 ,no  one can       
ascertain this in regard to himself4 ,he
 may know that he is  always far from   
being what he ought to be2 that one     
particular action  of his represents on 
the whole1 with much admixture of       
inferior  motives2 the better tendency2 
another1 with some admixture of better  
motives1 the worse4 ,but any question in
 regard to the degree of  moral goodness
 or badness in any action of his own or 
of his most  intimate friend is quite   
unanswerable4 ,much less can a judge or 
jury  answer such a question in regard  
to an unknown criminal4 ,we may be  sure

 indeed that any ordinary crime--nay1   
perhaps even that of the  'disinterested
 rebel'--implies the operation of some  
motive which  is morally bad1 for though
 it is not necessarily the worst men who
  come into conflict with established   
rights1 it probably never can be  the   
best2 but the degree of badness implied 
in such a conflict in  any particular   
case is quite beyond our ken1 and it is 
this degree  that must be ascertained if
 the amount of punishment which the     
state  inflicts is to be proportionate  
to the moral badness implied in the     
crime4 7#b7 ,the notion that the state  
should1 if it could1 adjust  the amount 
of punishment which it inflicts on a    
crime to the moral  wickedness of the   
crime1 rests on a false view of the     
relation of  the state to morality4 ,it 
implies that it is the business of the  
state to punish wickedness1 as such4    
,but it has no such business4 ,it       
cannot undertake to punish wickedness1  
as such1 without vitiating  the         

disinterestedness of the effort to      
escape wickedness1 and thus  checking   
the growth of a true goodness of the    
heart in the attempt to  promote a      
goodness which is merely on the surface4
 ,this1 however1 is  not to be          
understood as meaning that the          
punishment of crime serves  no moral    
purpose4 ,it does serve such a purpose1 
and has its value  in doing so1 but only
 in the sense that the protection of    
rights1  and the association of terror  
with their violation1 is the condition  
antecedent of any general advance in    
moral well-being4    #aig4 ,the         
punishment of crime1 then1 neither is1  
nor can1 nor should  be adjusted to the 
degree of moral depravity1 properly so  
called1  which is implied in the crime4 
,but it does not therefore follow that  
it does not represent the disapproval   
which the community feels for  the      
crime4 ,on the whole1 making allowance  
for the fact that law  and judicial     
custom vary more slowly than popular    

feeling1 it does  represent such        
disapproval4 ,and the disapproval may   
fitly be called  moral1 so far as that  
merely means that it is a disapproval   
relating  to voluntary action4 ,but it  
is a disapproval founded on a sense of  
what is necessary for the protection of 
rights1 not on a judgment  of good and  
evil of that kind which we call         
conscience when it is  applied to our   
own actions1 and which is founded on an 
ideal of  moral goodness with which we  
compare our inward conduct 7'inward1'   
as representing motives and character74 
,it is founded essentially on  the      
outward aspect of a man's conduct1 on   
the view of it as related  to the       
security and freedom in action and      
acquisition of other  members of        
society4 ,it is true that this          
distinction between the  outward and    
inward aspects of conduct is not present
 to the popular  mind4 ,it has not been 
recognised by those who have been the   
agents  in establishing the existing law

 of crimes in civilised nations4  ,as   
the state came to control the individual
 or family in revenging  hurts1 and to  
substitute its penalties for private    
vengeance1 rules  of punishment came to 
be enacted expressive of general        
disapproval1  without any clear         
consciousness of what was the ground of 
the  disapproval4 ,but in fact it was by
 what have been just described as  the  
outward consequences of conduct that a  
general disapproval of  it was          
ordinarily excited4 ,its morality in the
 stricter or inward  sense was not      
matter of general social consideration4 
,thus in the  main it has been on the   
ground of its interference with the     
general  security and freedom in action 
and acquisition1 and in proportion  to  
the apprehension excited by it in this  
respect1 that conduct has  been punished
 by the state4 ,thus the actual practice
 of criminal  law has on the whole      
corresponded to its true principle4 ,so 
far as  this principle has been departed

 from1 it has not been because the      
moral badness of conduct1 in the true or
 inward sense1 has been  taken account  
of in its treatment as a crime1 for this
 has not been  generally contemplated at
 all1 but because 'religious'           
considerations  have interfered4        
,conduct which did not call for         
punishment by the  state as interfering 
with any true rights 7rights that should
 be  rights7 has been punished as       
'irreligious4' ,this1 however1 did not  
mean that it was punished on the ground 
of moral badness1 properly  so called4  
,it meant that its consequences were    
feared either as  likely to weaken the  
belief in some divine authority on which
 the  established system of rights was  
supposed to rest1 or as likely to  bring
 evil on the community through provoking
 the wrath of some  unseen power4       
#aih4 ,this account of the              
considerations which have regulated the 
punishment of crimes explains the       
severity with which 'criminal           

negligence' is in some cases punished1  
and that severity is justified  by the  
account given of the true principle of  
criminal law1 the  principle1 viz41 that
 crime should be punished according to  
the  importance of the right which it   
violates1 and to the degree of  terror  
which in a well-organised society needs 
to be associated with  the crime in     
order to the protection of the right4   
,it cannot be held  that the            
carelessness of an engine-driver who    
overlooks a signal  and causes a fatal  
accident1 implies more moral depravity  
than is  implied in such negligence as  
all of us are constantly guilty of4     
,considered with reference to the state 
of mind of the agent1 it is  on a level 
with multitudes of actions and omissions
 which are not  punished at all4 ,yet   
the engine-driver would be found guilty 
of  manslaughter and sentenced to penal 
servitude4 ,the justification is  not to
 be found in distinctions between       
different kinds of negligence  on the   

part of different agents1 but in the    
effect of the negligence  in different  
cases upon the rights of others4 ,in the
 case supposed1  the most important of  
all rights1 the right to life1 on the   
part  of railway passengers depends for 
its maintenance on the vigilance  of the
 drivers4 ,any preventible failure in   
such vigilance requires  to have        
sufficient terror associated with it in 
the mind of other  engine-drivers to    
prevent the recurrence of a like failure
 in  vigilance4 ,such punishment is     
just1 however generally virtuous the    
victim of it is1 because it is necessary
 to the protection of rights  of which  
the protection is necessary to social   
well-being2 and the  victim of it1 in   
proportion to his sense of justice1     
which means his  habit of practically   
recognising true rights1 will recognise 
it as  just4    #aii4 ,on this principle
 crimes committed in drunkenness must be
 dealt  with4 ,not only is all depravity
 of motive specially inapplicable to    

them1 since the motives actuating a     
drunken man often seem to have  little  
connection with his habitual character2 
it is not always the  case that a crime 
committed in drunkenness is even        
intentional4  ,when a man in a drunken  
rage kills another1 he no doubt intends 
to kill him1 or at any rate to do him   
'grievous bodily harm1' and  perhaps the
 association of great penal terror with 
such an offence  may tend to restrain   
men from committing it even when drunk2 
but  when a drunken mother lies on her  
child and smothers it1 the hurt  is not 
intentional but accidental4 ,the        
drunkenness1 however1 is not            
accidental1 but preventible by the      
influence of adequate motives4  ,it is  
therefore proper to treat such a        
violation of right1 though  committed   
unknowingly1 as a crime1 and to         
associate terror with it  in the popular
 imagination1 in order to the protection
 of rights by  making people more       
careful about getting drunk1 about      

allowing or  promoting drunkenness1 and 
about looking after drunken people4 ,it 
is  unreasonable1 however1 to do this   
and at the same time to associate  so   
little terror1 as in practice we do1    
with the promotion of  dangerous        
drunkenness4 ,the case of a crime       
committed by a drunkard is  plainly     
distinguishable from that of a crime    
committed by a lunatic1  for the        
association of penal terror with the    
latter would tend  neither to prevent a 
lunatic from committing a crime nor     
people from  becoming lunatics4    #bjj4
 ,the principle above stated1 as that   
according to which  punishment by the   
state should be inflicted and regulated1
 also  justifies a distinction between  
crimes and civil injuries1 i4e4  between
 breaches of right for which the state  
inflicts punishment  without redress to 
the person injured1 and those for which 
it  procures or seeks to procure redress
 to the person injured without          
punishment of the person causing the    

injury4 ,we are not here  concerned with
 the history of this distinction 7for   
which see ,maine1  ,ancient ,law1 chap4 
x1 and ,w4,e4 ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan       
,household1 chap4  xix71 nor with the   
question whether many breaches of right 
now among  us treated as civil injuries 
ought not to be treated as crimes1  but 
with the justification that exists for  
treating certain kinds  of breach of    
right as cases in which the state should
 interfere  to procure redress for the  
person injured1 but not in the way of   
inflicting punishment on the injurer    
until he wilfully resists the  order to 
make redress4 ,the principle of the     
distinction as ordinarily  laid down1   
viz4 that civil injuries 'are violations
 of rights when  considered in reference
 to the injury sustained by the         
individual1'  while crimes are          
'violations of rights when considered in
 reference  to their evil tendency as   
regards the community at large'         
7,stephen1  ,book ,v1 chap1 i71 is      

misleading2 for if the well-being of the
  community did not suffer in the hurt  
done to the individual1 that  hurt would
 not be a violation of a right in the   
true sense at all1  nor would the       
community have any ground for insisting 
that the hurt  shall be redressed1 and  
for determining the mode in which it    
shall  be redressed4 ,a violation of    
right cannot in truth be considered     
merely in relation to injury sustained  
by an individual1 for1 thus  considered1
 it would not be a violation of right4  
,it may be said that  the state is only 
concerned in procuring redress for civil
 injuries1  because1 if it left an      
individual to procure redress in his own
 way1  there would be no public peace4  
,but there are other and easier ways  of
 preventing fighting than by procuring  
redress of wrong4 ,we prevent  our dogs 
from fighting1 not by redressing wrongs 
which they sustain  from each other 7of 
wrongs as of rights they are in the     
proper sense  incapable71 but by beating

 them or tying them up4 ,the community  
would  not keep the peace by procuring  
redress for hurt or damage sustained  by
 individuals1 unless it conceived itself
 as having interest  in the security of 
individuals from hurt and damage1 unless
 it  considered the hurt done to        
individuals as done to itself4 ,the true
  justification for treating some       
breaches of right as cases merely for   
redress1 others as cases for punishment1
 is that1 in order to the  general      
protection of rights1 with some it is   
necessary to associate  a certain       
terror1 with others it is not4    #bja4 
,what then is the general ground of     
distinction between those  with which   
terror does1 and those with which it    
does not1 need to  be associated8       
,clearly it is purposeless to associate 
terror with  breaches of right in the   
case where the breaker does not know    
that  he is violating a right1 and is   
not responsible for not knowing it4  ,no
 association of terror with such a      

breach of right can prevent men  from   
similar breaches under like conditions4 
,in any case1 therefore1  in which it   
is1 to begin with1 open to dispute      
whether a breach of  right has been     
committed at all1 e4g4 when it is a     
question whether  a contract has been   
really broken1 owing to some doubt as to
 the  interpretation of the contract or 
its application to a particular  set of 
circumstances1 or whether a commodity of
 which someone is  in possession        
properly belongs to another1--in such a 
case1 though  the judge finally decides 
that there has been a breach of right1  
there is no ground for treating it as a 
crime or punishing it4 ,if1  in the     
course of judicial inquiry1 it turns out
 that there has been  fraud by one or   
other of the parties to the litigation1 
a criminal  prosecution1 having         
punishment1 not redress1 for its object1
 should  properly supervene upon the    
civil suit1 unless the consequences of  
the civil suit are incidentally such as 

to amount to a sufficient  punishment of
 the fraudulent party4 ,again1 it is    
purposeless to  associate terror with a 
breach of obligation which the person   
committing it knows to be a breach1 but 
of an obligation which he has  no means 
of fulfilling1 e4g4 non-payment of an   
acknowledged debt by  a man who1 through
 no fault of his own1 is without means  
of paying  it4 ,it is only in cases of  
one or other of the above kinds1--cases 
in which the breach of right1 supposing 
it to have been committed1  has         
presumably arisen either from inability 
to prevent it or from  ignorance of the 
existence of the right1--that it can be 
held as an  absolute rule to be no      
business of the state to interfere      
penally but  only in the way of         
restoring1 so far as possible1 the      
broken right4    #bjb4 ,but there are   
many cases of breach of right which can 
neither  be definitely reduced to one of
 the above kinds1 nor distinguished     
from them by any broad demarcation2     

cases in which the breaker of a  right  
has been ignorant of it1 because he has 
not cared to know1 or  in which his     
inability to fulfil it is the result of 
negligence or  extravagance4 ,whether   
these should be treated penally or no1  
will  depend partly on the seriousness  
of the wrong done through avoidable     
ignorance or negligence1 partly on the  
sufficiency of the deterrent  effect    
incidentally involved in the civil      
remedy4 ,in the case e4g4 of  inability 
to pay a debt through extravagance or   
recklessness1 it may  be unnecessary and
 inadvisable to treat the breach of     
right penally1  in consideration that it
 is indirectly punished by poverty and  
the  loss of reputation incidental to   
bankruptcy1 and the creditors  should   
not look to the state to protect them   
from the consequences  of lending on bad
 security4 ,the negligence of a trustee1
 again1  may be indirectly punished by  
his being obliged to make good the      
property lost through his neglect to the

 utmost of his means4 ,this  may serve  
as a sufficiently deterrent example     
without the negligence  being proceeded 
against criminally4 ,again1 damage done 
to property  by negligence is in        
,england dealt with civilly1 not        
criminally2  and it may be held that in 
this case the liability to civil action 
is a sufficient deterrent4 ,on the other
 hand1 negligence which1 as  negligence1
 is not really distinguishable from the 
above1 is rightly  treated criminally   
when its consequences are more serious2 
e4g4 that  of the railway-servant whose 
negligence results in a fatal accident1 
that of the bank-director who allows a  
misleading statement of  accounts to be 
published1 fraudulently perhaps in the  
eye of the  law1 but in fact            
negligently4 ,as a matter of principle1 
no doubt1  if intentional violation of  
the right of property is treated as     
penal equally with the violation of the 
right of life1 the negligent  violation 
should be treated as penal in the one   

case as much as in  the other4 ,but as  
the consequences of an action for       
damages may  be virtually though not    
ostensibly penal to the person proceeded
  against1 it may be convenient to leave
 those negligences which do  not1 like  
the negligence of a railway-servant1    
affect the most  important rights1 or do
 not affect rights on a very large scale
 as  does that of a bank-director1 to be
 dealt with by the civil process4       
#bjc4 ,the actual distinction between   
crimes and civil injuries in  ,english  
law is no doubt largely accidental4 ,as 
the historians of law  point out1 the   
civil process1 having compensation1 not 
punishment1  for its object1 is the form
 which the interference of the community
  for the maintenance of rights         
originally takes4 ,the community1       
restraining private vengeance1 helps the
 injured person to redress1  and        
regulates the way in which redress shall
 be obtained4 ,this  procedure no doubt 
implies the conviction that the         

community is  concerned in the injury   
done to an individual1 but it is only by
  degrees that this conviction becomes  
explicit1 and that the community  comes 
to treat all preventible breaches of    
right as offences against  itself or its
 sovereign representative1 i4e4 as      
crimes or penal2 in  the language of    
,english law1 as 'breaches of the king's
 peace4' ,those  offences are first so  
treated which happen to excite most     
public  alarm1 most fear for general    
safety 7hence1 among others1 anything   
thought sacrilegious74 ,in a country    
like ,england1 where no code has  been  
drawn up on general principles1 the     
class of injuries that  are treated     
penally is gradually enlarged as public 
alarm happens  to be excited in         
particular directions1 but it is largely
 a matter  of accident how the          
classification of crimes on one side and
 civil  injuries on the other happens to
 stand at any particular time4 #a    #a 
,see ,markby1 ,elements of ,law1 chap4  

xi1 especially note #a1 p4  #bdc2 and   
,austin1 ,lecture ,,xxvii4 ,between     
crimes and civil injuries  the          
distinction1 as it actually exists1 is  
merely one of procedure  7as stated by  
,austin1 p4 #eah74 ,the violation of    
right in one case is  proceeded against 
by the method of indictment1 in the     
other by an  'action4' ,the distinction 
that in one case punishment is the      
object  of the process1 in the other    
redress1 is introduced in order to      
explain the difference of procedure2 and
 to justify this distinction  resort is 
had to the further distinction1 that    
civil injury is  considered to affect   
the individual merely1 crime to affect  
the  state4 ,but in fact the action for 
civil injury may incidentally have  a   
penal result 7,austin1 p #eba71 and if  
it had not1 many violations  of right   
now treated as civil injuries would have
 to be treated as  crimes4 ,as an       
explanation therefore of the distinction
 between crimes  and injuries as it     

stands1 it is not correct to say that   
for the  former punishment is sought1   
for the latter merely redress4 ,nor for 
reasons already given is it true of any 
civil injury to say that it  affects1 or
 should be considered as affecting1     
injured individuals  merely4 ,the only  
distinction of principle is that between
  violations of right which call for    
punishment and those which do  not2 and 
those only do not call for punishment in
 some form or other  which arise either 
from uncertainty as to the right        
violated1 or from  inability to prevent 
the violation4    #bjd4 ,according to   
the view here taken1 then1 there is no  
direct  reference in punishment by the  
state1 either retrospective or          
prospective1 to moral good or evil4 ,the
 state in its judicial action  does not 
look to the moral guilt of the criminal 
whom it punishes1  or to the promotion  
of moral good by means of his punishment
 in  him or others4 ,it looks not to    
virtue and vice but to rights and       

wrongs4 ,it looks back to the wrong done
 in the crime which it  punishes2 not1  
however1 in order to avenge it1 but in  
order to the  consideration of the sort 
of terror which needs to be associated  
with such wrong-doing in order to the   
future maintenance of rights4  ,if the  
character of the criminal comes into    
account at all1 it  can only be properly
 as an incident of this consideration4  
,thus  punishment of crime is preventive
 in its object2 not1 however1           
preventive of any or every evil and by  
any and every means1 but  7according to 
its idea or as it should be7 justly     
preventive  of injustice2 preventive of 
interference with those powers of       
action and acquisition which it is for  
the general well-being that  individuals
 should possess1 and according to laws  
which allow those  powers equally to all
 men4 ,but in order effectually to      
attain its  preventive object and to    
attain it justly1 it should be          
reformatory4  ,when the reformatory     

office of punishment is insisted on1 the
  reference may be1 and from the        
judicial point of view must be1 not  to 
the moral good of the criminal as an    
ultimate end1 but to his  recovery from 
criminal habits as a means to that which
 is the proper  and direct object of    
state-punishment1 viz4 the general      
protection  of rights4 ,the reformatory 
function of punishment is from this     
point  of view an incident of its       
preventive function1 as regulated by the
  consideration of what is just to the  
criminal as well as to others4  ,for the
 fulfilment of this latter function1 the
 great thing1 as we  have seen1 is by   
the punishment of an actual criminal to 
deter other  possible criminals2 but for
 the same purpose1 unless the actual    
criminal is to be put out of the way or 
locked up for life1 it must  be         
desirable to reform him so that he may  
not be dangerous in future4  ,now when  
it is asked why he should not be put out
 of the way1 it  must not be forgotten  

that among the rights which the state   
has to  maintain are included rights of 
the criminal himself4 ,these indeed  are
 for the time suspended by his action in
 violation of rights1 but  founded as   
they are on the capacity for            
contributing to social good1  they could
 only be held to be finally forfeited on
 the ground that  this capacity was     
absolutely extinct4    #bje4 ,this      
consideration limits the kind of        
punishment which the  state may justly  
inflict4 ,it ought not in punishing to  
sacrifice  unnecessarily to the         
maintenance of rights in general what   
might be  called the reversionary rights
 of the criminal1 rights which1 if      
properly treated1 he might ultimately   
become capable of exercising  for the   
general good4 ,punishment therefore     
either by death or by  perpetual        
imprisonment is justifiable only on one 
of two grounds2  either that association
 of the extremest terror with certain   
actions  is under certain conditions    

necessary to preserve the possibility of
  a social life based on the observance 
of rights1 or that the crime  punished  
affords a presumption of a permanent    
incapacity for rights  on the part of   
the criminal4 ,the first justification  
may be pleaded  for the executions of   
men concerned in treasonable outbreaks1 
or  guilty of certain breaches of       
discipline in war 7on the supposition   
that the war is necessary for the safety
 of the state and that such  punishments
 are a necessary incident of war74      
,whether the capital  punishment is     
really just in such cases must depend1  
not only on  its necessity as an        
incident in the defence of a certain    
state1  but on the question whether that
 state itself is fulfilling its         
function as a sustainer of true rights4 
,for the penalty of death  for murder   
both justifications may be urged4 ,it   
cannot be defended  on any other ground1
 but it may be doubted whether the      
presumption  of permanent incapacity for

 rights is one which in our ignorance we
  can ever be entitled to make4 ,as to  
the other plea1 the question is         
whether1 with a proper police system and
 sufficient certainty of  detection and 
conviction1 the association of this     
extremest terror  with the murderer is  
necessary to the security of life4      
,where the  death-penalty1 however1 is  
unjustifiable1 so must be that of really
  permanent imprisonment2 one as much as
 the other is an absolute  deprivation  
of free social life1 and of the         
possibilities of moral  development     
which that life affords4 ,the only      
justification for  a sentence of        
permanent imprisonment in a case where  
there would  be none for capital        
punishment would be that1 though        
inflicted as  permanent1 the            
imprisonment might be brought to an end 
in the event  of any sufficient proof   
appearing of the criminal's amendment4  
,but such proof could only be afforded  
if the imprisonment were so  modified as

 to allow the prisoner a certain amount 
of liberty4    #bjf4 ,if punishment then
 is to be just1 in the sense that in its
  infliction due account is taken of all
 rights1 including the  suspended rights
 of the criminal himself1 it must be1 so
 far as  public safety allows1          
reformatory4 ,it must tend to qualify   
the  criminal for the resumption of     
rights4 ,as reformatory1 however1       
punishment has for its direct object the
 qualification for the  exercise of     
rights1 and is only concerned with the  
moralisation of  the criminal indirectly
 so far as it may result from the       
exercise  of rights4 ,but even where it 
cannot be reformatory in this sense1    
and over and above its reformatory      
function in cases where it has  one1 it 
has a moral end4 ,just because          
punishment by the state has  for its    
direct object the maintenance of rights1
 it has1 like every  other function of  
the state1 indirectly a moral object1   
because true  rights1 according to our  

definition1 are powers which it is for  
the general well-being that the         
individual 7or association7 should      
possess1 and that well-being is         
essentially a moral well-being4         
,ultimately1 therefore1 the just        
punishment of crime is for the  moral   
good of the community4 ,it is also for  
the moral good of the  criminal himself1
 unless--and this is a supposition which
 we ought  not to make--he is beyond the
 reach of moral influences4 ,though not 
inflicted for that purpose1 and though  
it would not the less have to  be       
inflicted if no moral effect on the     
criminal could be discerned1  it is     
morally the best thing that can happen  
to him4 ,it is so1 even  if a true      
social necessity requires that he be    
punished with death4  ,the fact that    
society is obliged so to deal with him  
affords the best  chance of bringing    
home to him the anti-social nature of   
his act4 ,it  is true that the last     
utterances of murderers generally convey

 the  impression that they consider     
themselves interesting persons1 quite   
sure of going to heaven2 but these are  
probably conventional4 ,at  any rate if 
the solemn infliction of punishment on  
behalf of human  society1 and without   
any sign of vindictiveness1 will not    
breed the  shame which is the moral new 
birth1 presumably nothing else within   
human reach will4        ,m4 ,,the      
,,right ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,to         
,,promote ,,morality4    #bjg4 ,the     
right of the individual man as such to  
free life is  constantly gaining on its 
negative side more general recognition4 
,it  is the basis of the growing        
scrupulosity in regard to punishments   
which are not reformatory1 which put    
rights finally out of the reach  of a   
criminal instead of qualifying him for  
their renewed exercise4  ,but the only  
rational foundation for the ascription  
of this right  is the ascription of     
capacity for free contribution to social
 good4  ,we treat this capacity in the  

man whose crime has given proof of  its 
having been overcome by anti-social     
tendencies1 as yet giving  him a title  
to a further chance of its development2 
on the other  hand1 we act as if it     
conferred no title on its possessors1   
before  a crime has been committed1 to  
be placed under conditions in which  its
 realisation would be possible4 ,is this
 reasonable8 ,yet are not  all modern   
states so acting8 ,are they not allowing
 their ostensible  members to grow up   
under conditions which render the       
development of  social capacity         
practically impossible8 ,was it not more
 reasonable1  as in the ancient states1 
to deny the right to life in the human  
subject as such1 than to admit it under 
conditions which prevent the            
realisation of the capacity that forms  
the ground of its admission8  ,this     
brings us to the fourth of the questions
 that arose #a out of  the assertion of 
the individual's right to free life4    
,what is the  nature and extent of the  

individual's claim to be enabled        
positively  to realise that capacity for
 freely contributing to social good     
which  is the foundation of his right to
 free life8    #a ,above1 sec4 #aef4    
,,rln    #bjh4 ,in dealing with this    
question1 it is important to bear in    
mind  that the capacity we are          
considering is essentially a free or    
7what  is the same7 a moral capacity4   
,it is a capacity1 not for action       
determined by relation to a certain end1
 but for action determined  by a        
conception of the end to which it is    
relative4 ,only thus is  it a foundation
 of rights4 ,the action of an animal or 
plant may  be made contributory to      
social good1 but it is not therefore a  
foundation of rights on the part of an  
animal or plant1 because  they are not  
affected by the conception of the good  
to which they  contribute4 ,a right is a
 power of acting for his own ends1--for 
what he conceives to be his             
good1--secured to an individual by the  

community1 on the supposition that its  
exercise contributes to the  good of the
 community4 ,but the exercise of such a 
power cannot be so  contributory1 unless
 the individual1 in acting for his own  
ends1 is  at least affected by the      
conception of a good as common to       
himself  with others4 ,the condition of 
making the animal contributory to human 
good is that we do not leave him free to
 determine the exercise of  his powers2 
that we determine them for him2 that we 
use him merely  as an instrument2 and   
this means that we do not1 because we   
cannot1  endow him with rights4 ,we     
cannot endow him with rights because    
there is no conception of a good common 
to him with us which we can  treat as a 
motive to him to do to us as he would   
have us do to him4  ,it is not indeed   
necessary to a capacity for rights1 as  
it is to  true moral goodness1 that     
interest in a good conceived as common  
to  himself with others should be a     
man's dominant motive4 ,it is enough  if

 that which he presents to himself from 
time to time as his good1  and which    
accordingly determines his action1 is so
 far affected by  consideration of the  
position in which he stands to          
others1--of  the way in which this or   
that possible action of his would affect
  them1 and of what he would have to    
expect from them in return1--as  to     
result habitually1 without force or fear
 of force1 in action not  incompatible  
with conditions necessary to the pursuit
 of a common  good on the part of       
others4 ,in other words1 it is the      
presumption  that a man in his general  
course of conduct will of his own motion
  have respect to the common good1 which
 entitles him to rights at  the hands of
 the community4 ,the question of the    
moral value of the  motive which may    
induce this respect--whether an         
unselfish interest  in common good or   
the wish for personal pleasure and fear 
of personal  pain--does not come into   
the account at all4 ,an agent1 indeed1  

who  could only be induced by fear of   
death or bodily harm to behave          
conformably to the requirements of the  
community1 would not be a  subject of   
rights1 because this influence could    
never be brought to  bear on him so     
constantly1 if he were free to regulate 
his own life1  as to secure the public  
safety4 ,but a man's desire for pleasure
  to himself and aversion from pain to  
himself1 though dissociated  from any   
desire for a higher object1 for any     
object that is desired  because good for
 others1 may constitute a capacity for  
rights1 if  his imagination of pleasure 
and pain is so far affected by sympathy 
with the feeling of others about him as 
to make him1 independently of  force or 
fear of punishment1 observant of        
established rights4 ,in such  a case the
 fear of punishment may be needed to    
neutralise anti-social  impulses under  
circumstances of special temptation1 but
 by itself it  could never be a         
sufficiently uniform motive to qualify a

 man1 in the  absence of more           
spontaneously social feelings1 for the  
life of a free  citizen4 ,the           
qualification for such a life is a      
spontaneous habit  of acting with       
reference to a common good1 whether that
 habit be  founded on an imagination of 
pleasures and pains or on a conception  
of what ought to be4 ,in either case the
 habit implies at least an              
understanding that there is such a thing
 as a common good1 and a  regulation of 
egoistic hopes and fears1 if not an     
inducing of more  'disinterested'       
motives1 in consequence of that         
understanding4    #bji4 ,the capacity   
for rights1 then1 being a capacity for  
spontaneous  action regulated by a      
conception of a common good1 either so  
regulated through an interest which     
flows directly from that  conception1 or
 through hopes and fears which are      
affected by it  through more complex    
channels of habit and association1 is a 
capacity  which cannot be               

generated--which on the contrary is     
neutralised--by  any influences that    
interfere with the spontaneous action of
 social  interests4 ,now any direct     
enforcement of the outward conduct1     
which ought to flow from social         
interests1 by means of threatened       
penalties--and a law requiring such     
conduct necessarily implies  penalties  
for disobedience to it--does interfere  
with the spontaneous  action of those   
interests1 and consequently checks the  
growth of  the capacity which is the    
condition of the beneficial exercise of 
rights4 ,for this reason the effectual  
action of the state1 i4e4 the  community
 as acting through law1 for the         
promotion of habits of  true            
citizenship1 seems necessarily to be    
confined to the removal  of obstacles4  
,under this head1 however1 there may and
 should be  included much that most     
states have hitherto neglected1 and much
 that  at first sight may have the      
appearance of an enforcement of moral   

duties1 e4g4 the requirement that       
parents have their children taught  the 
elementary arts4 ,to educate one's      
children is no doubt a moral  duty1 and 
it is not one of those duties1 like that
 of paying debts1  of which the neglect 
directly interferes with the rights of  
someone  else4 ,it might seem1          
therefore1 to be a duty with which      
positive law  should have nothing to do1
 any more than with the duty of striving
  after a noble life4 ,on the other     
hand1 the neglect of it does tend  to   
prevent the growth of the capacity for  
beneficially exercising  rights on the  
part of those whose education is        
neglected1 and it is  on this account1  
not as a purely moral duty on the part  
of a parent1  but as the prevention of a
 hindrance to the capacity for rights on
  the part of children1 that education  
should be enforced by the state4  ,it   
may be objected1 indeed1 that in        
enforcing it we are departing in  regard
 to the parents from the principle above

 laid down2 that we are  interfering    
with the spontaneous action of social   
interests1 though  we are doing so with 
a view to promoting this spontaneous    
action  in another generation4 ,but the 
answer to this objection is1 that a  law
 of compulsory education1 if the        
preferences1 ecclesiastical or          
otherwise1 of those parents who show any
 practical sense of their               
responsibility are duly respected1 is   
from the beginning only felt  as        
compulsion by those in whom1 so far as  
this social function is  concerned1     
there is no spontaneity to be interfered
 with2 and that in  the second          
generation1 though the law with its     
penal sanctions still  continues1 it is 
not felt as a law1 as an enforcement of 
action by  penalties1 at all4    #baj4  
,on the same principle the freedom of   
contract ought probably  to be more     
restricted in certain directions than is
 at present the  case4 ,the freedom to  
do as they like on the part of one set  

of men  may involve the ultimate        
disqualification of many others1 or of a
  succeeding generation1 for the        
exercise of rights4 ,this applies most  
obviously to such kinds of contract or  
traffic as affect the health  and       
housing of the people1 the growth of    
population relatively to  the means of  
subsistence1 and the accumulation or    
distribution of  landed property4 ,in   
the hurry of removing these restraints  
on free  dealing between man and man1   
which have arisen partly perhaps from   
some confused idea of maintaining       
morality1 but much more from the  power 
of class-interests1 we have been apt to 
take too narrow a view  of the range of 
persons--not one generation merely1 but 
succeeding  generations--whose freedom  
ought to be taken into account1 and of  
the conditions necessary to their       
freedom 7'freedom' here meaning  their  
qualification for the exercise of       
rights74 ,hence the massing  of         
population without regard to conditions 

of health2 unrestrained  traffic in     
deleterious commodities2 unlimited      
upgrowth of the class  of hired         
labourers in particular industries which
 circumstances have  suddenly           
stimulated1 without any provision       
against the danger of an  impoverished  
proletariate in following generations4  
,meanwhile1 under  pretence of allowing 
freedom of bequest and settlement1 a    
system has  grown up which prevents the 
landlords of each generation from being 
free either in the government of their  
families or in the disposal of  their   
land1 and aggravates the tendency to    
crowd into towns1 as well  as the       
difficulties of providing healthy       
house-room1 by keeping land  in a few   
hands4 ,it would be out of place here to
 consider in detail  the remedies for   
these evils1 or to discuss the question 
how far it  is well to trust to the     
initiative of the state or of           
individuals in  dealing with them4 ,it  
is enough to point out the directions in

 which  the state may remove obstacles  
to the realisation of the capacity for  
beneficial exercise of rights1 without  
defeating its own object by  vitiating  
the spontaneous character of that       
capacity4        ,n4 ,,the ,,right ,,of 
,,the ,,state ,,in ,,regard ,,to        
,,property4    #baa4 ,we have now       
considered the ground of the right to   
free life1  and what is the             
justification1 if any1 for the apparent 
disregard of  that right1 7a7 in war1   
7b7 in the infliction of punishment4 ,we
  have also dealt with the question of  
the general office of the state  in     
regard to the development of that       
capacity in individuals which  is the   
foundation of the right1 pointing out on
 the one hand the  necessary limitation 
of its office in this respect1 on the   
other hand  the directions in which it  
may remove obstacles to that            
development4  ,we have next to consider 
the rationale of the rights of property4
    ,in discussions on the 'origin of   

property' two questions are apt  to be  
mixed up which1 though connected1 ought 
to be kept distinct4  ,one is the       
question how men have come to           
appropriate2 the other  the question how
 the idea of right has come to be       
associated with  their appropriations4  
,as the term 'property' not only implies
 a  permanent possession of something1  
or a possession which can only be  given
 up with the good will of the possessor1
 but also a possession  recognised as a 
right1 an inquiry into the origin of    
property must  involve both these       
questions1 but it is not the less       
important that  the distinction between 
them should be observed4 ,each of them  
again  has both its analytical and its  
historical side4 ,in regard to the      
first question it is important to learn 
all that can be learnt as  to the kind  
of things that were first1 and          
afterwards at successive  periods1      
appropriated2 as to the mode in which1  
and the sort of  persons or societies by

 whom1 they were appropriated4 ,this is 
an  historical inquiry4 ,but it cannot  
take the place of a metaphysical  or    
psychological analysis of the conditions
 on the part of the  appropriating      
subject implied in the fact that he does
 such a thing  as appropriate4 ,so1 too1
 in regard to the second question1 it is
  important to investigate historically 
the forms in which the right  of men in 
their appropriations has been           
recognised2 the parties1  whether       
individuals or societies1 to whom the   
right has been allowed2  and the sort of
 objects1 capable of appropriation1 to  
which it has  been considered to extend4
 ,but neither can these inquiries help  
us  to understand1 in the absence of a  
metaphysical or moral analysis1  either 
what is implied in the ascription of a  
right to certain  appropriations1 or why
 there should be a right to them4       
#bab4 ,we have then two questions1 as   
above stated1 each requiring  two       
different methods of treatment4 ,but    

neither have the questions  themselves1 
nor the different methods of dealing    
with them1 been duly  distinguished4    
,it is owing to confusion between them  
that the right of property  in things   
has been supposed to originate in the   
first occupancy of  them4 ,this         
supposition1 in truth1 merely disguises 
the identical  proposition that in order
 to property there must to begin with   
have been some appropriation4 ,the      
truism that there could be no  property 
in anything which had not been at some  
time and in some  manner appropriated1  
tells us nothing as to how or why the   
property  in it1 as a right1 came to be 
recognised1 or why that right should  be
 recognised4 ,but owing to the confusion
 between the origin of  appropriation   
and the origin of property as a right1  
an identical  proposition as to the     
beginning of appropriation seemed to be 
an  instructive statement as to the     
basis of the rights of property4 ,of    
late1 in a revulsion from theories      

founded on identical propositions1      
'historical' inquiries into the 'origin 
of property' have come into  vogue4 ,the
 right method of dealing with the       
question has been taken  to lie in an   
investigation of the earliest forms in  
which property  has existed4 ,but such  
investigation1 however valuable in      
itself1  leaves untouched the questions1
 7#a7 what it is in the nature of men   
that makes it possible for them1 and    
moves them1 to appropriate2 7#b7  why it
 is that they conceive of themselves and
 each other as having a  right in their 
appropriations2 7#c7 on what ground this
 conception is  treated as a moral      
authority1--as one that should be acted 
on4    #bac4 7#a7 ,appropriation is an  
expression of will2 of the individual's 
effort to give reality to a conception  
of his own good2 of his  consciousness  
of a possible self-satisfaction as an   
object to be  attained4 ,it is different
 from mere provision to supply a future 
want4 ,such provision appears to be made

 by certain animals1 e4g4  ants4 ,it can
 scarcely be made under the influence of
 the imagination  of pain incidental to 
future want derived from previous       
experience1  for the ant lays up for the
 winter though it has not previously    
lived through the winter4 ,it may be    
suggested that it does so from          
inherited habit1 but that this habit has
 originally arisen from an  experience  
of pain on the part of ants in the past4
 ,whether this is  the true account of  
the matter we have not1 ,i              
think1--perhaps from  the nature of the 
case we cannot have--the means of       
deciding4 ,we  conceal our ignorance by 
saying that the ant acts instinctively1 
which is in effect a merely negative    
statement1 that the ant is not  moved to
 make provision for winter either by    
imagination of the  pain which will be  
felt in winter if it does not1 or by    
knowledge  7conception of the fact7 that
 such pain will be felt4 ,in fact1  we  
know nothing of the action of the ant   

from the inside1 or as  an expression of
 consciousness4 ,if we are not entitled 
to deny  dogmatically that it expresses 
consciousness at all1 neither are  we   
entitled to say that it does express    
consciousness1 still less  what         
consciousness it expresses4 ,on the     
other hand we are able to  interpret the
 acts of ourselves1 and of those with   
whom we can  communicate by means of    
signs to which we and they attach the   
same  meaning1 as expressions of        
consciousness of a certain kind1 and    
thus  by reflective analysis to assure  
ourselves that acts of appropriation  in
 particular express a will of the kind  
stated2 that they are not  merely a     
passing employment of such materials as 
can be laid hands on  to satisfy this or
 that want1 present or future1 felt or  
imagined1  but reflect the consciousness
 of a subject which distinguishes itself
  from its wants2 which presents itself 
to itself as still there and  demanding 
satisfaction when this or that want1 or 

any number of  wants1 have been         
satisfied2 which thus not merely uses a 
thing to  fill a want1 and in so doing  
at once destroys the thing and for the  
time removes the want1 but says to      
itself1 ',this shall be mine to do  as  
,i like with1 to satisfy my wants and   
express my emotions as they  arise4'    
#bad4 ,one condition of the existence of
 property1 then1 is  appropriation1 and 
that implies the conception of himself  
on the  part of the appropriator as a   
permanent subject for whose use1 as     
instruments of satisfaction and         
expression1 he takes and fashions       
certain external things1 certain things 
external to his bodily  members4 ,these 
things1 so taken and fashioned1 cease to
 be external  as they were before4 ,they
 become a sort of extension of the man's
  organs1 the constant apparatus through
 which he gives reality to  his ideas   
and wishes4 ,but another condition must 
be fulfilled in  order to constitute    
property1 even of the most simple and   

primitive  sort4 ,this is the           
recognition by others of a man's        
appropriations as  something which they 
will treat as his1 not theirs1 and the  
guarantee  to him of his appropriations 
by means of that recognition4 ,what then
  is the ground of the recognition8 ,the
 writers of the seventeenth  and        
eighteenth centuries1 who discussed the 
basis of the rights of  property1 took  
it for granted1 and in so doing begged  
the question4  ,grotius makes the right 
of property rest on contract1 but       
clearly  until there is a recognised    
'meum' and 'tuum' there can be no       
contract4 ,contract presupposes         
property4 ,the property in a particular 
thing may be derived from a contract    
through which it has been  obtained in  
exchange for another thing or for some  
service rendered1  but that implies that
 it was previously the property of      
another1  and that the person obtaining 
it had a property in something else1  if
 only in the labour of his hands1 which 

he could exchange for it4  #a ,hobbes is
 so far more logical that he does not   
derive property  from contract1 but     
treats property and 'the validity of    
covenants'  as co-ordinately dependent  
on the existence of a sovereign power   
of compulsion4 #b ,but his account of   
this1 as of all other forms  of right1  
is open to the objection 7before dwelt  
on7 that if the  sovereign power is     
merely a strongest force it cannot be a 
source of  rights2 and that if it is    
other than this1 if it is a             
representative  and maintainer of       
rights1 its existence presupposes       
rights1 which  remain to be accounted   
for4 ,as previously shown1 ,hobbes1     
while  professing to make all rights    
dependent on the sovereign power1       
presupposes rights in his account of the
 institution of this power4  ,the       
validity of contracts 'begins not but   
with its institution1'  yet its own     
right is derived from an irrevocable    
contract of all  with all in which each 

devolves his 'persona1' the body of his 
rights1 upon it4 ,without pressing his  
particular forms of expression  unfairly
 against him1 it is clear that he could 
not really succeed  in thinking of      
rights as derived simply from supreme   
force2 that he  could not associate the 
idea of absolute right with the         
sovereign  without supposing prior      
rights which it was made the business of
 the  sovereign to enforce1 and in      
particular such a recognised distinction
  between 'meum' and 'tuum' as is       
necessary to a covenant4 ,nor when we   
have dropped ,hobbes' notion of         
government or law-making power1 as      
having originated in a covenant of all  
with all1 shall we succeed any  better  
in deriving rights of property1 any more
 than other rights1  from law or a      
sovereign which makes law1 unless we    
regard the law or  sovereign as the     
organ or sustainer of a general social  
recognition  of certain powers1 as      
powers which should be exercised4    #a 

,grotius1 ,de ,jure1 etc4 ,book ,,ii1   
chap4 ii4 ,sect4 #e4 ',simul  discimus  
quomodo res in proprietatem iverint 444 
pacto quodam aut  expresso1 ut per      
divisionem1 aut tacito1 ut per          
occupationem3 simul  atque enim communio
 displicuit1 nec instituta est divisio1 
censeri  debet inter omnes convenisse   
ut1 quod quisque occupasset1 id proprium
  haberet4' ,but he supposes a previous 
process by which things had been        
appropriated 7,sect4 #d71 owing to the  
necessity of spending labour on  them in
 order to satisfy desire for a more     
refined kind of living  than could be   
supplied by spontaneous products of the 
earth4 ',hinc  discimus quae fuerit     
causa1 ob quam a primaeva communione    
rerum  primo mobilium1 deinde et        
immobilium discessum est3 nimirum quod  
non  contenti homines vesci sponte      
natis1 antra habitare 444 vitae genus   
exquisitius delegissent1 industria opus 
fuit1 quam singuli rebus  singulis      
adhiberent4' 444 ,the 'communio rerum1' 

thus departed from  when labour came to 
be expended on things1 ,grotius had     
previously  described 7,sect4 #a7 as a  
state of things in which everyone had a 
right to whatever he could lay hands on4
 ',erant omnia communia et  indivisa    
omnibus1 veluti unum cunctis patrimonium
 esset4 ,hinc factum  ut statim quisque 
hominum ad suos usus arripere posset    
quod vellet1  et quae consumi poterant  
consumere1 ac talis usus universalis    
juris  erat tum vice proprietatis4 ,nam 
quod quisque sic arripuerat1 id ei      
eripere alter nisi per injuriam non     
poterat4' ,here then a virtual  right of
 property1 though not so called1 seems  
to be supposed in  two forms previous to
 the establishment of what ,grotius     
calls the  right of property by         
contract4 ,there is 7#a7 a right of     
property in  what each can 'take to his 
use and consume' out of the raw material
  supplied by nature2 7#b7 a further    
right of each man in that on which  he  
has expended labour4 ,grotius does not  

indeed expressly call this  a right1 but
 if there is a right1 as he says there  
is1 on the part  of each man to that    
which he is able 'ad suos arripere      
usus1' much  more must there be a right 
to that which he has not only taken but 
fashioned by his labour4 ,on the nature 
and rationale of this right  ,grotius   
throws no light1 but it is clearly      
presupposed by that right  of property  
which he supposes to be derived from    
contract1 and must  be recognised before
 any such contract could be possible4   
#b ',there is annexed to the sovereignty
 the whole power of  prescribing the    
rules whereby every man may know what   
goods he may  enjoy and what actions he 
may do without being molested by any of 
his fellow-subjects3 and this is it men 
call propriety4 ,for before             
constitution of sovereign power all men 
had right to all things1  which         
necessarily causeth war2 and therefore  
this propriety1 being  necessary to     
peace1 and depending on sovereign power1

 is the act  of that power in order to  
the public peace4' 7,leviathan1 pt4     
,,ii1  chap4 xviii47 ',the nature of    
justice consisteth in keeping of valid  
covenants1 but the validity of covenants
 begins not but with the  constitution  
of a civil power1 sufficient to compel  
men to keep them2  and then it is also  
that propriety begins4' 7,ibid4 chap1   
xv47    #bae4 ,locke #a treats          
property--fairly enough so long as only 
its  simplest forms are in question--as 
derived from labour4 ,by the same  law  
of nature and reason by which a man has 
'a property in his  own person1' 'the   
labour of his body and the work of his  
hand are  properly his' too4 ,now that  
the right to free life1 which we have   
already dwelt on1 carries with it a     
certain right to property1 to  a certain
 permanent apparatus beyond the bodily  
organs1 for the  maintenance and        
expression of that life1 is quite true4 
,but apart  from the difficulty of      
tracing some kinds of property1 in which

 men  are in fact held to have a right1 
to the labour of anyone1 even of        
someone from whom it has been derived by
 inheritance or bequest 7a  difficulty  
to be considered presently71 to say that
 it is a 'law of  nature and reason'    
that a man should have a property in the
 work  of his hands is no more than     
saying that that on which a man has     
impressed his labour is recognised by   
others as something which  should be    
his1 just as he himself is recognised by
 them as one that  should be his own    
master4 ,the ground of the recognition  
is the same  in both cases1 and it is   
,locke's merit to have pointed this out2
 but  what the ground is he does not    
consider1 shelving the question by      
appealing to a law of nature and reason4
    #a ,civil ,government1 chap4 v4 ,the
 most important passages are  quoted in 
,fox ,bourne's ,life of ,locke1 vol4 ii4
 pp4 #aga and #agb4    #baf4 ,the ground
 of the right to free life1 the reason  
why a man is  secured in the free       

exercise of his powers through          
recognition of  that exercise by others 
as something that should be1 lay1 as we 
saw1  in the conception on the part of  
everyone who concedes the right to      
others and to whom it is conceded1 of an
 identity of good for himself  and      
others4 ,it is only as within a society1
 as a relation between  its members1    
though the society be that of all men1  
that there can  be such a thing as a    
right2 and the right to free life rests 
on the  common will of the society1 in  
the sense that each member of the       
society within which the right subsists 
contributes to satisfy the  others in   
seeking to satisfy himself1 and that    
each is aware that the  other does so2  
whence there results a common interest  
in the free  play of the powers of all4 
,and just as the recognised interest of 
a  society constitutes for each member  
of it the right to free life1  just as  
it makes each conceive of such life on  
the part of himself  and his neighbour  

as what should be1 and thus forms the   
basis of  a restraining custom which    
secures it for each1 so it constitutes  
the right to the instruments of such    
life1 making each regard the  possession
 of them by the other as for the common 
good1 and thus  through the medium first
 of custom1 then of law1 securing them  
to  each4    #bag4 ,thus the doctrine   
that the foundation of the right of     
property  lies in the will1 that        
property is 'realised will1' is true    
enough  if we attach a certain meaning  
to 'will'2 if we understand by it1  not 
the momentary spring of any and every   
spontaneous action1 but a  constant     
principle1 operative in all men         
qualified for any form of  society1     
however frequently overborne by passing 
impulses1 in virtue  of which each seeks
 to give reality to the conception of a 
well-being  which he necessarily regards
 as common to himself with others4 ,a   
will of this kind explains at once the  
effort to appropriate1 and  the         

restraint placed on each in his         
appropriations by a customary           
recognition of the interest which each  
has in the success of the  like effort  
on the part of the other members of a   
society with which  he shares a common  
well-being4 ,this customary recognition1
 founded  on a moral or rational will1  
requires indeed to be represented by    
some adequate force before it can result
 in a real maintenance of  the rights of
 property4 ,the wild beast in man will  
not otherwise  yield obedience to the   
rational will4 ,and from the operation  
of  this compulsive force1 very         
imperfectly controlled by the moral     
tendencies which need its               
co-operation1--in other words from the  
historical incidents of conquest and    
government1 --there result  many        
characteristics of the institution of   
property1 as it actually  exists1 which 
cannot be derived from the spiritual    
principle which  we have assigned as its
 foundation4 ,still1 without that       

principle  it could not have come into  
existence1 nor would it have any moral  
justification at all4    #bah4 ,it      
accords with the account given of this  
principle that the  right of property1  
like every other form of right1 should  
first  appear within societies founded  
on kinship1 these being naturally  the  
societies within which the restraining  
conception of a common  well-being is   
first operative4 ,we are apt indeed to  
think of the  state of things in which  
the members of a family or clan hold    
land  and stock in common1 as the       
antithesis of one in which rights  of   
property exist4 ,in truth it is the     
earliest stage of their  existence1     
because the most primitive form of      
society in which the  fruit of his      
labour is secured to the individual by  
the society1  under the influence of the
 conception of a common well-being4 ,the
  characteristic of primitive           
communities is not the absence of       
distinction between 'meum' and 'tuum1'  

without which no society of  intelligent
 as opposed to instinctive agents would 
be possible at  all1 but the common     
possession of certain materials1 in     
particular  land1 on which labour may be
 expended4 ,it is the same common       
interest  which prevents the separate   
appropriation of these materials1 and   
which secures the individual in the     
enjoyment and use of that which  his    
labour can extract from them4    #bai4  
,from the moral joint of view1 however1 
the clan-system is  defective1 because  
under it the restraint imposed upon the 
individual  by his membership of a      
society is not1 and has not the         
opportunity  of becoming1 a self-imposed
 restraint1 a free obedience1 to which1 
though the alternative course is left   
open to him1 the individual  submits1   
because he conceives it as his true     
good4 ,the area within  which he can    
shape his own circumstances is not      
sufficient to allow  of the opposite    
possibilities of right and wrong being  

presented to  him1 and thus of his      
learning to love right for its own sake4
 ,and the  other side of this moral     
tutelage of the individual1 this        
withholding  from him of the opportunity
 of being freely determined by          
recognition  of his moral relations1 is 
the confinement of those relations      
themselves1 which under the clan-system 
have no actual existence  except as     
between members of the same clan4 ,a    
necessary condition  at once of the     
growth of a free morality1 i4e4 a       
certain behaviour  of men determined by 
an understanding of moral relations and 
by the  value which they set on them as 
understood1 and of the conception  of   
those relations as relations between all
 men1 is that free play  should be given
 to every man's powers of appropriation4
 ,moral freedom  is not the same thing  
as a control over the outward           
circumstances  and appliances of life4  
,it is the end to which such control is 
a  generally necessary means1 and which 

gives it its value4 ,in order to  obtain
 this control1 men must cease to be     
limited in their activities  by the     
customs of the clan4 ,the range of their
 appropriations must  be extended2 they 
must include more of the permanent      
material on  which labour may be        
expended1 and not merely the passing    
products of  labour spent on            
unappropriated material2 and they must  
be at once  secured and controlled in it
 by the good-will1 by the sense of      
common  interest1 of a wider society1 of
 a society to which any and every  one  
may belong who will observe its         
conditions1 and not merely those  of a  
particular parentage2 in other words by 
the law1 written or  unwritten1 of a    
free state4    #bbj4 ,it is too long a  
business here to attempt an account of  
the  process by which the organisation  
of rights in the state has  superseded  
that of the clan1 and at the same time  
the restriction of  the powers of       
appropriation implied in the latter has 

been removed4  ,it is important to      
observe1 however1 that this process has 
by no  means contributed unmixedly to   
the end to which1 from the moral  point 
of view1 it should have contributed4    
,that end is at once the  emancipation  
of the individual from all restrictions 
upon the free  moral life1 and his      
provision with means for it4 ,but the   
actual  result of the development of    
rights of property in ,europe1 as part  
of  its general political development1  
has so far been a state of things  in   
which all indeed may have property1 but 
great numbers in fact  cannot have it in
 that sense in which alone it is of     
value1 viz4 as a  permanent apparatus   
for carrying out a plan of life1 for    
expressing  ideas of what is beautiful1 
or giving effect to benevolent wishes4  
,in the eye of the law they have rights 
of appropriation1 but in fact  they have
 not the chance of providing means for a
 free moral life1  of developing and    
giving reality or expression to a good  

will1 an  interest in social well-being4
 ,a man who possesses nothing but his   
powers of labour and who has to sell    
these to a capitalist for bare  daily   
maintenance1 might as well1 in respect  
of the ethical purposes  which the      
possession of property should serve1 be 
denied rights  of property altogether4  
,is the existence of so many men in this
  position1 and the apparent liability  
of many more to be brought to  it by a  
general fall of wages1 if increase of   
population goes along  with decrease in 
the productiveness of the earth1 a      
necessary result  of the emancipation of
 the individual and the free play given 
to  powers of appropriation8 or is it an
 evil incident1 which may yet be        
remedied1 of that historical process by 
which the development of the  rights of 
property has been brought about1 but in 
which the agents  have for the most part
 had no moral objects in view at all8   
#bba4 ,let us first be clear about the  
points in which the conditions  of      

property1 as it actually exists1 are at 
variance with property  according to its
 idea or as it should be4 ,the rationale
 of property1  as we have seen1 is that 
everyone should be secured by society in
 the  power of getting and keeping the  
means of realising a will1 which  in    
possibility is a will directed to social
 good4 ,whether anyone's  will is       
actually and positively so directed1    
does not affect his  claim to the power4
 ,this power should be secured to the   
individual  irrespectively of the use   
which he actually makes of it1 so long  
as  he does not use it in a way that    
interferes with the exercise of  like   
power by another1 on the ground that its
 uncontrolled exercise  is the condition
 of attainment by man of that free      
morality which is  his highest good4 ,it
 is not then a valid objection to the   
manner in  which property is possessed  
among us1 that its holders constantly   
use it in a way demoralising to         
themselves and others1 any more than    

such misuse of any other liberties is an
 objection to securing men in  their    
possession4 ,only then is property held 
in a way inconsistent  with its idea1   
and which should1 if possible1 be got   
rid of1 when the  possession of property
 by one man interferes with the         
possession of  property by another2 when
 one set of men are secured in the power
 of  getting and keeping the means of   
realising their will1 in such a way     
that others are practically denied the  
power4 ,in that case it may  truly be   
said that 'property is theft4' ,the     
rationale of property1  in short1       
requires that everyone who will conform 
to the positive  condition of possessing
 it1 viz4 labour1 and the negative      
condition1  viz4 respect for it as      
possessed by others1 should1 so far as  
social  arrangements can make him so1 be
 a possessor of property himself1  and  
of such property as will at least enable
 him to develope a sense  of            
responsibility1 as distinct from mere   

property in the immediate  necessaries  
of life4    #bbb4 ,but then the question
 arises1 whether the rationale of       
property1  as thus stated1 is not       
inconsistent with the unchecked freedom 
of  appropriation1 or freedom of        
appropriation checked only by the       
requirement that the thing appropriated 
shall not have previously  been         
appropriated by another4 ,is the        
requirement that every honest  man      
should be a proprietor to the extent    
stated1 compatible with  any great      
inequalities of possession8 ,in order to
 give effect to  it1 must we not remove 
those two great sources of the          
inequality of  fortunes1 7#a7 freedom of
 bequest1 and the other arrangements by 
which  the profits of the labour of     
several generations are accumulated  on 
persons who do not labour at all2 7#b7  
freedom of trade1 of  buying in the     
cheapest market and selling in the      
dearest1 by which  accumulated profits  
of labour become suddenly multiplied in 

the  hands of a particular proprietor8  
,now clearly1 if an inequality of       
fortunes1 of the kind which naturally   
arises from the admission of  these two 
forms of freedom1 necessarily results in
 the existence of a  proletariate1      
practically excluded from such ownership
 as is needed  to moralise a man1 there 
would be a contradiction between our    
theory  of the right of property and the
 actual consequence of admitting the    
right according to the theory2 for the  
theory logically necessitates  freedom  
both in trading and in the disposition  
of his property by the  owner1 so long  
as he does not interfere with the like  
freedom on the  part of others2 and in  
other ways as well its realisation      
implies  inequality4    #bbc4 ,once     
admit as the idea of property that      
nature should be  progressively adapted 
to the service of man by a process in   
which  each1 while working freely or for
 himself1 i4e4 as determined by  a      
conception of his own good1 at the same 

time contributes to the  social good1   
and it will follow that property must be
 unequal4 ,if we  leave a man free to   
realise the conception of a possible    
well-being1  it is impossible to limit  
the effect upon him of his desire to    
provide for his future well-being1 as   
including that of the persons  in whom  
he is interested1 or the success with   
which at the prompting  of that desire  
he turns resources of nature to account4
 ,considered  as representing the       
conquest of nature by the effort of free
 and  variously gifted individuals1     
property must be unequal2 and no less   
must it be so if considered as a means  
by which individuals fulfil  social     
functions4 ,as we may learn from        
,aristotle1 those functions  are various
 and the means required for their       
fulfilment are various4  ,the artist and
 man of letters require different       
equipment and  apparatus from the tiller
 of land and the smith4 ,either then the
  various apparatus needed for various  

functions must be provided for          
individuals by society1 which would     
imply a complete regulation of  life    
incompatible with that highest object of
 human attainment1 a  free morality2 or 
we must trust for its provision to      
individual  effort1 which will imply    
inequality between the property of      
different  persons4    #bbd4 ,the       
admission of freedom of trade follows   
from the same  principle4 ,it is a      
condition of the more complete          
adaptation of  nature to the service of 
man by the free effort of individuals4  
',to  buy in the cheapest and sell in   
the dearest market' is a phrase which   
may no doubt be used to cover           
objectionable transactions1 in which    
advantage is taken of the position of   
sellers who from circumstances  are not 
properly free to make a bargain4 ,it is 
so employed when the  cheapness of      
buying arises from the presence of      
labourers who have  no alternative but  
to work for 'starvation wages4' ,but in 

itself it  merely describes transactions
 in which commodities are bought where  
they are of least use and sold where    
they are of most use4 ,the trader  who  
profits by the transaction is profiting 
by what is at the same  time a          
contribution to social well-being4      
,in regard to the freedom which a man   
should be allowed in disposing  of his  
property by will or gift1 the question  
is not so simple4 ,the  same principle  
which forbids us to limit the degree to 
which a man  may provide for his future1
 forbids us to limit the degree to which
  he may provide for his children1 these
 being included in his forecast  of his 
future4 ,it follows that the amount     
which children may inherit  may not     
rightly be limited2 and in this way     
inequalities of property1  and          
accumulations of it to which possessors 
have contributed  nothing by their own  
labour1 must arise4 ,of course the      
possessor  of an estate1 who has        
contributed nothing by his own labour to

 its  acquisition1 may yet by his labour
 contribute largely to the social  good1
 and a well-organised state will in     
various ways elicit such  labour from   
possessors of inherited wealth4 ,nor    
will it trust merely  to encouraging the
 voluntary fulfilment of social         
functions1 but  will by taxation make   
sure of some positive return for the    
security  which it gives to inherited   
wealth4 ,but while the mere permission  
of inheritance1 which seems implied in  
the permission to a man to  provide     
unlimitedly for his future1 will lead to
 accumulations of  wealth1 on the other 
hand1 if the inheritance is to be equal 
among  all children1 and1 failing       
children1 is to pass to the next of kin1
  the accumulation will be checked4 ,it 
is not therefore the right of           
inheritance1 but the right of bequest1  
that is most likely to lead to          
accumulation of wealth1 and that has    
most seriously been questioned  by those
 who hold that universal ownership is a 

condition of moral  well-being4 ,is a   
proprietor to be allowed to dispose of  
his property  as he likes among his     
children 7or1 if he has none1 among     
others71  making one very rich as       
compared with the others1 or is he to be
  checked by a law requiring            
approximately equal inheritance8        
#bbe4 ,as to this1 consider that on the 
same principle on which we  hold that a 
man should be allowed to accumulate as  
he best can for  his children1 he should
 have discretion in distributing among  
his  children4 ,he should be allowed to 
accumulate1 because in so doing he  at  
once expresses and developes the sense  
of family responsibility1  which        
naturally breeds a recognition of duties
 in many other  directions4 ,but if the 
sense of family responsibility is to    
have  free play1 the man must have due  
control over his family1 and this  he   
can scarcely have if all his children as
 a matter of necessity  inherit equally1
 however undutiful or idle or           

extravagant they may  be4 ,for this     
reason the true theory of property would
 seem to favour  freedom of bequest1 at 
any rate in regard to wealth generally4 
,there  may be special reasons1 to be   
considered presently1 for limiting it   
in regard to land4 ,but as a general    
rule1 the father of a family1 if  left  
to himself and not biassed by any       
special institutions of his  country1 is
 most likely to make that distribution  
among his children  which is most for   
the public good4 ,if family pride moves 
him to endow  one son more largely than 
the rest1 in order to maintain the      
honour  of his name1 family affection   
will keep this tendency within limits   
in the interest of the other children1  
unless the institutions of his  country 
favour the one tendency as against the  
other4 ,and this they  will do if they  
maintain great dignities1 e4g4 peerages1
 of which the  possession of large      
hereditary wealth is virtually the      
condition1 and  if they make it easy1   

when the other sons have been           
impoverished for  the sake of endowing  
the eldest1 to maintain the former at   
the public  expense by means of         
appointments in the church or state4    
,it must be borne in mind1 further1 that
 the freedom of bequest which  is to be 
justified on the above principles must  
not be one which  limits that freedom in
 a subsequent generation1 ,it must      
therefore be  distinguished from the    
power of settlement allowed by ,english 
law and  constantly exercised in dealing
 with landed estate2 for this power1  as
 exercised by the landowning head of a  
family in one generation1  prevents the 
succeeding head of the family from being
 free to make  what disposition he      
thinks best among his children and ties 
up  the succession to the estate to his 
eldest son4 ,the practice of  settlement
 in ,england1 in short1 as applied to   
landed estate1 cancels  the freedom of  
bequest in the case of most landowners  
and neutralises  all the dispersive     

tendency of family affection1 while it  
maintains  in full force all the        
accumulative tendency of family pride4  
,this1  however1 is no essential        
incident of a system in which the rights
 of  individual ownership are fully     
developed1 but just the contrary4       
#bbf4 ,the question then remains1       
whether the full development of  those  
rights1 as including that of unlimited  
accumulation of wealth  by the          
individual and of complete freedom of   
bequest on his part1  necessarily       
carries with it the existence of a      
proletariate1 nominal  owners of their  
powers of labour1 but in fact obliged to
 sell  these on such terms that they are
 owners of nothing beyond what is       
necessary from day to day for the       
support of life1 and may at any  time   
lose even that1 so that1 as regards the 
moral functions of  property1 they may  
be held to be not proprietors at all2 or
 whether  the existence of such a class 
is due to causes only accidentally      

connected with the development of rights
 of individual property4    ,we must    
bear in mind 7#a7 that the increased    
wealth of one man does  not naturally   
mean the diminished wealth of another4  
,we must not  think of wealth as a given
 stock of commodities of which a larger 
share cannot fall to one without taking 
from the share that falls  to another4  
,the wealth of the world is constantly  
increasing in  proportion as the        
constant production of new wealth by    
labour exceeds  the constant consumption
 of what is already produced1 ,there is 
no  natural limit to its increase except
 such as arises from the fact  that the 
supply of the food necessary to sustain 
labour becomes more  difficult as more  
comes to be required owing to the       
increase in the  number of labourers1   
and from the possible ultimate          
exhaustion of the  raw materials of     
labour in the world4 ,therefore in the  
accumulation  of wealth1 so far as it   
arises from the saving by anyone of the 

products of his labour1 from his bequest
 of this capital to another  who farther
 adds to it by saving some of the profit
 which the capital  yields1 as employed 
in the payment for labour or in trade   
either by  the capitalist himself or    
someone to whom he lends it1 and from   
the  continuation of this process       
through generations1 there is nothing   
which tends to lessen for anyone else   
the possibilities of ownership4  ,on the
 contrary1 supposing trade and labour to
 be free1 wealth  must be constantly    
distributed throughout the process in   
the shape  of wages to labourers and of 
profits to those who mediate in the     
business of exchange4    #bbg4 ,it is   
true that the accumulation of capital   
naturally leads  to the employment of   
large masses of hired labourers4 ,but   
there  is nothing in the nature of the  
case to keep these labourers in  the    
condition of living from hand to mouth1 
to exclude them from  that education of 
the sense of responsibility which       

depends on the  possibility of permanent
 ownership4 ,there is nothing in the    
fact  that their labour is hired in     
great masses by great capitalists to    
prevent them from being on a small scale
 capitalists themselves4 ,in  their     
position they have not indeed the same  
stimulus to saving1 or  the same        
constant opening for the investment of  
savings1 as a man  who is 2 #a but their
 combination in work gives them every   
opportunity1 if they have the needful   
education and self-discipline1  for     
forming societies for the investment of 
savings4 ,in fact1 as  we know1 in the  
well-paid industries of ,england the    
better sort  of labourers do become     
capitalists1 to the extent often of     
owning  their houses and a good deal of 
furniture1 of having an interest in     
stores1 and of belonging to             
benefit-societies through which they    
make provision for the future4 ,it is   
not then to the accumulation  of        
capital1 but to the condition1 due to   

antecedent circumstances  unconnected   
with that accumulation1 of the men with 
whom the  capitalist deals and whose    
labour he buys on the cheapest terms1   
that  we must ascribe the multiplication
 in recent times of an impoverished  and
 reckless proletariate4    #a ,greek    
7autourgos7  yeoman farmer1 literally   
one who  works for himself ,tr4    #bbh4
 ,it is difficult to summarise the      
influences to which is due  the fact    
that in all the chief seats of          
population in ,europe the  labour-market
 is constantly thronged with men who are
 too badly  reared and fed to be        
efficient labourers2 who for this       
reason1 and  from the competition for   
employment with each other1 have to sell
  their labour very cheap2 who have thus
 seldom the means to save1 and  whose   
standard of living and social           
expectation is so low that1 if  they    
have the opportunity of saving1 they do 
not use it1 and keep  bringing children 
into the world at a rate which          

perpetuates the  evil4 ,it is certain1  
however1 that these influences have no  
necessary  connection with the          
maintenance of the right of individual  
property  and consequent unlimited      
accumulation of capital1 though they no 
doubt are connected with that rgime of  
force and conquest by which  existing   
governments have been                   
established1--governments which do not  
indeed create the rights of individual  
property1 any more than other  rights1  
but which serve to maintain them4 ,it   
must always be borne  in mind that the  
appropriation of land by individuals has
 in most  countries--probably in all    
where it approaches completeness--been  
originally effected1 not by the         
expenditure of labour or the results  of
 labour on the land1 but by force4 ,the 
original landlords have been            
conquerors4    #bbi4 ,this has affected 
the condition of the industrial classes 
in at  least two ways3 7#a7 ,when the   
application of accumulated capital to   

any work in the way of mining or        
manufacture has created a demand for    
labour1 the supply has been forthcoming 
from men whose ancestors1 if  not       
themselves1 were trained in habits of   
serfdom2 men whose life has  been one of
 virtually forced labour1 relieved by   
church--charities  or the poor law      
7which in part took the place of these  
charities72  who were thus in no        
condition to contract freely for the    
sale of  their labour1 and had nothing  
of that sense of family--responsibility 
which might have made them insist on    
having the chance of saving4  ,landless 
countrymen1 whose ancestors were serfs1 
are the parents of  the proletariate of 
great towns4 7#b7 ,rights have been     
allowed to  landlords1 incompatible with
 the true principle on which rights of  
property rest1 and tending to interfere 
with the development of the             
proprietorial capacity in others4 ,the  
right to freedom in unlimited           
acquisition of wealth1 by means of      

labour and by means of the saving  and  
successful application of the results of
 labour1 does not imply  the right of   
anyone to do as he likes with those     
gifts of nature1  without which there   
would be nothing to spend labour upon4  
,the earth  is just as much an original 
natural material necessary to productive
  industry1 as are air1 light1 and      
water1 but while the latter from  the   
nature of the case cannot be            
appropriated1 the earth can be and  has 
been4 ,the only justification for this  
appropriation1 as for any  other1 is    
that it contributes on the whole to     
social well-being2 that  the earth as   
appropriated by individuals under       
certain conditions  becomes more        
serviceable to society as a whole1      
including those who  are not proprietors
 of the soil1 than if it were held in   
common4 ,the  justification disappears  
if these conditions are not observed2   
and  from government having been chiefly
 in the hands of appropriators  of the  

soil1 they have not been duly observed4 
,landlords have been  allowed to 'do    
what they would with their own1' as if  
land were  merely like so much capital1 
admitting of indefinite extension4  ,the
 capital gained by one is not taken from
 another1 but one man  cannot acquire   
more land without others having less2   
and though a  growing reduction in the  
number of landlords is not necessarily  
a social evil1 if it is compensated by  
the acquisition of other  wealth on the 
part of those extruded from the soil1 it
 is only not  an evil if the landlord is
 prevented from so using his land as to 
make it unserviceable to the wants of   
men 7e4g4 by turning fertile  land into 
a forest71 and from taking liberties    
with it incompatible  with the          
conditions of general freedom and       
health2 e4g4 by clearing  out a village 
and leaving the people to pick up       
house-room as they  can elsewhere 7a    
practice common under the old poor-law1 
when the  distinction between close and 

open villages grew up71 or1 on the      
other hand1 by building houses in       
unhealthy places or of unhealthy        
structure1 by stopping up means of      
communication1 or forbidding  the       
erection of dissenting chapels4 ,in fact
 the restraints which  the public       
interest requires to be placed on the   
use of land if  individual property in  
it is to be allowed at all1 have been   
pretty  much ignored1 while on the other
 hand1 that full development of its     
resources1 which individual ownership   
would naturally favour1 has  been       
interfered with by laws or customs      
which1 in securing estates to  certain  
families1 have taken away the interest1 
and tied the hands1  of the nominal     
owner--the tenant for life--in making   
the most of his  property4    #bcj4     
,thus the whole history of the ownership
 of land in ,europe has  been of a kind 
to lead to the agglomeration of a       
proletariate1  neither holding nor      
seeking property1 wherever a sudden     

demand has  arisen for labour in mines  
or manufactures4 ,this at any rate was  
the  case down to the epoch of the      
,french ,revolution2 and this1 which    
brought to other countries deliverance  
from feudalism1 left ,england1  where   
feudalism had previously passed into    
unrestrained landlordism1  almost       
untouched4 ,and while those influences  
of feudalism and  landlordism which tend
 to throw a shiftless population upon   
the  centres of industry have been left 
unchecked1 nothing till quite  lately   
was done to give such a population a    
chance of bettering  itself1 when it had
 been brought together4 ,their health1  
housing1  and schooling were unprovided 
for4 ,they were left to be freely       
victimised by deleterious employments1  
foul air1 and consequent  craving for   
deleterious drinks4 ,when we consider   
all this1 we shall  see the unfairness  
of laying on capitalism or the free     
development  of individual wealth the   
blame which is really due to the        

arbitrary  and violent manner in which  
rights over land have been acquired and 
exercised1 and to the failure of the    
state to fulfil those functions  which  
under a system of unlimited private     
ownership are necessary to  maintain the
 conditions of a free life4    #bca4    
,whether1 when those functions have been
 more fully recognised  and executed1   
and when the needful control has been   
established in  the public interest over
 the liberties which landlords may take 
in  the use of their land1 it would     
still be advisable to limit the right   
of bequest in regard to land1 and       
establish a system of something  like   
equal inheritance1 is a question which  
cannot be answered on  any absolute     
principle4 ,it depends on circumstances4
 ,probably the  question should be      
answered differently in a country like  
,france or  ,ireland1 where the most    
important industries are connected      
directly  with the soil1 and in one like
 ,england where they are not so4 ,the   

reasons must be cogent which could      
justify that interference with  the     
control of the parent over his family1  
which seems to be implied  in the       
limitation of the power of bequeathing  
land when the parent's  wealth lies     
solely in land1 and which arises1 be it 
remembered1  in a still more mischievous
 way from the present ,english practice 
of settling estates4 ,but it is         
important to bear in mind that the      
question in regard to land stands on a  
different footing from that  in regard  
to wealth generally1 owing to the fact  
that land is a  particular commodity    
limited in extent1 from which alone can 
be  derived the materials necessary to  
any industry whatever1 on which  men    
must find house-room if they are to find
 it at all1 and over  which they must   
pass in communicating with each other1  
however much  water or even air may be  
used for that purpose4 ,these are indeed
 not  reasons for preventing private    
property in land or even free bequest   

of land1 but they necessitate a special 
control over the exercise of  rights of 
property in land1 and it remains to be  
seen whether that  control can be       
sufficiently established in a country   
where the power  of great estates has   
not first been broken1 as in ,france1 by
 a law of  equal inheritance4    #bcb4  
,to the proposal that 'unearned         
increment' in the value of the  soil1 as
 distinct from value produced by        
expenditure of labour and  capital1     
should be appropriated by the state1    
though fair enough in  itself1 the great
 objection is that the relation between 
earned and  unearned increment is so    
complicated1 that a system of           
appropriating  the latter to the state  
could scarcely be established without   
lessening the stimulus to the individual
 to make the most of the  land1 and thus
 ultimately lessening its               
serviceableness to society4        ,o4  
,,the ,,right ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,in   
,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,family4    #bcc4  

,in the consideration of those rights   
which do not arise out of  the existence
 of the state1 but which are antecedent 
to it 7though  of course implying       
society in some form71 and which it is  
its office  to enforce1 we now come to  
family or household rights--also called1
  though not very distinctively1 rights 
in private relations--of which  the most
 important are the reciprocal rights of 
husband and wife1  parent and child4    
,the distinctive thing about these is   
that they are  not merely rights of one 
person as against all or some other     
persons  over some thing1 or to the     
performance of or abstention from some  
action2 they are rights of one person as
 against all other persons  to require  
or prevent a certain behaviour on the   
part of another4  ,right to free life is
 a right on the part of any and every   
person to  claim from all other persons 
that course of action or forbearance    
which is necessary to his free life4 ,it
 is a right against all the  world1 but 

not a right over any particular thing or
 person4 ,a right  of property1 on the  
other hand1 is a right against all the  
world1 and  also over a particular      
thing2 a right to claim from any and    
every  one certain actions and          
forbearances in respect of a particular 
thing 7hence called 'jus in rem'74 ,a   
right arising from contract1  unlike the
 right of property or the right of free 
life1 is not a  right as against all the
 world1 but a right as against a        
particular  person or persons contracted
 with to claim a certain performance or 
forbearance4 ,it may or may not be a    
right over a particular thing1  but as  
it is not necessarily so1 while it is a 
right against a  particular person or   
persons in distinction from all the     
world1 it  is called 'jus in personam'  
as distinct from 'in rem4' ,the right of
  husband over wife and that of parent  
over children 7or vice versa7  differs  
from the right arising out of contract1 
inasmuch as it is  not merely a right   

against the particular person contracted
 with1  but a right against all the     
world4 ,in this respect it corresponds  
to the right of property2 but differs   
again from this1 since it is  not a     
right over a thing but over a person4   
,it is a right to claim  certain acts or
 forbearances from all other persons in 
respect of a  particular person3 or     
7more precisely7 to claim a certain     
behaviour  from a certain person1 and at
 the same time to exclude all others    
from claiming it4 ,just because this    
kind of right is a right over a  person1
 it is always reciprocal as between the 
person exercising it  and the person    
over whom it is exercised4 ,all rights  
are reciprocal  as between the person   
exercising them and the person against  
whom  they are exercised4 ,my claim to  
the right of free life implies a  like  
claim upon me on the part of those from 
whom ,i claim acts and  forbearances    
necessary to my free life4 ,my claim    
upon others in  respect of the right of 

property1 or upon a particular person in
  respect of an action which he has     
contracted to perform1 implies  the     
recognition of a corresponding claim    
upon me on the part of all  persons or  
the particular party to the contract4   
,but the right of a  husband in regard  
to his wife not merely implies that all 
those as  against whom he claims the    
right have a like claim against him1 but
  that the wife over whom he asserts the
 right has a right1 though not  a       
precisely like right1 over him4 ,the    
same applies to the right of a  father  
over a son1 and of a master over a      
servant4    #bcd4 ,a ,german would      
express the peculiarity of the rights   
now under  consideration by saying that1
 not only are persons the subjects of   
them1 but persons are the objects of    
them4 ,by the 'subject' of rights  he   
would mean the person exercising them or
 to whom they belong2  by 'object' that 
in respect of which the rights are      
exercised4 ,the  piece of land or goods 

which ,i own is the 'object' of the     
right  of property1 the particular      
action which one person contracts to    
perform for another is the 'object' of a
 right of contract2 and in  like manner 
the person from whom ,i have a right to 
claim certain  behaviour1 which excludes
 any right on the part of anyone else to
  claim such behaviour from him or her1 
is the 'object' of the right4  ,but     
,english writers commonly call that the 
subject of a right which  the ,germans  
would call the object4 ,by the subject  
of a right of  property they would not  
mean the person to whom the right       
belongs1  but the thing over which1 or  
in respect of which1 the right exists4  
,and in like manner1 when a right is    
exercised over1 or in respect of  a     
person1 such as a wife or a child1 they 
would call that person1 and  not the    
person exercising the right1 the subject
 of it4 ,by the object  of a right1 on  
the other hand1 they mean the action or 
forbearance  which someone has a right  

to claim4 ,the object of a right arising
  out of contract would be the action   
which the person contracting  agrees to 
perform4 ,the object of a connubial     
right would not be1 as  according to    
,german usage1 the person in regard to1 
or over1 whom  the right is             
exercised--that person would be the     
subject of the  right--but either the   
behaviour which the person possessing   
the right  is entitled to claim from    
that person1 or the forbearances in     
respect  to that person1 which he is    
entitled to claim from others4 7,austin1
  ,i4 #cgh and ,,ii4 #gcf47 ,either     
usage is justifiable in itself4 ,the    
only  matter of importance is not to    
confuse them4 ,there is a convenience   
in expressing the peculiarity of family 
rights by saying1 according  to the     
sense of the terms adopted by ,german   
writers1 that not only  are persons     
subjects of them but persons are objects
 of them4 ,it is  in this sense that ,i 
shall use these terms1 if at all4       

#bce4 ,so much for the peculiarity of   
family rights1 as distinct from  other  
rights4 ,the distinction is not merely a
 formal one4 ,from the  fact that these 
rights have persons for their objects1  
there follow  important results1 as will
 appear1 in regard to the true nature   
of the right1 to the manner in which it 
should be exercised4 ,the  analytical1  
as distinct from the historical1        
questions which have to  be raised with 
reference to family rights correspond to
 those raised  with reference to rights 
of property4 ,as we asked what in the   
nature  of man made appropriation       
possible for him1 so now we ask 7#a7    
what  it is in the nature of man that   
makes him capable of family life4 ,as   
we asked next how appropriations came to
 be so sanctioned by social  recognition
 as to give rise to rights of property1 
so now we have to  ask 7#b7 how certain 
powers exercised by a man1 certain      
exemptions  which he enjoys from the    
interference of others1 in his family   

life1  come to be recognised as rights4 
,and as we inquired further how far  the
 actual institutions of property        
correspond with the idea of  property as
 a right which for social good should be
 exercised1 so now  we have to inquire  
7#c7 into the proper adjustment of      
family rights1  as determined by their  
idea2 in what form these rights should  
be  maintained2 bearing in mind 7a7     
that1 like all rights1 their value      
depends on their being conditions of    
which the general observance is         
necessary to a free morality1 and 7b7   
their distinctive character  as rights  
of which1 in the sense explained1       
persons are the objects4    #bcf4 7#a7  
,we saw that appropriation of that kind 
which1 when secured  by a social power1 
becomes property1 supposes an effort on 
the part  of the individual to give     
reality to a conception of his own good1
  as a whole or as something permanent1 
in distinction from the mere  effort to 
satisfy a want as it arises4 ,the       

formation of family life  supposes a    
like effort1 but it also supposes that  
in the conception  of his own good to   
which a man seeks to give reality there 
is  included a conception of the        
well-being of others1 connected with    
him by sexual relations or by relations 
which arise out of these4 ,he  must     
conceive of the well-being of these     
others as a permanent object  bound up  
with his own1 and the interest in it as 
thus conceived must  be a motive to him 
over and above any succession of passing
 desires  to obtain pleasure from1 or   
give pleasure to1 the others2 otherwise 
there would be nothing to lead to the   
establishment of a household1  in which 
the wants of the wife or wives are      
permanently provided  for1 in the       
management of which a more or less      
definite share is  given to them 7more  
definite1 indeed1 as approach is made to
 a  monogamistic system1 but not wholly 
absent anywhere where the wife is       
distinguished from the female71 and upon

 which the children have a  recognised  
claim for shelter and sustenance4       
#bcg4 ,no doubt family life as we know  
it is an institution of gradual  growth4
 ,it may be found in forms where it is  
easy to ignore the  distinction between 
it and the life of beasts4 ,it is       
possible that  the human beings with    
whom it first began--beings 'human'     
because  capable of it--may have been   
'descended' from animals not capable of 
it1 i4e4 they may have been connected   
with such animals by certain  processes 
of generation4 ,but this makes no       
difference in the nature  of the        
capacity itself1 which is determined not
 by a past history  but by its results1 
its functions1 that of which it is a    
capacity4  ,as the foundation of any    
family life1 in the form in which we    
know  it1 implies that upon the mere    
sexual impulse there has supervened on  
the part of the man a permanent interest
 in a woman as a person with  whom his  
own well-being is united1 and a         

consequent interest in the  children    
born of her1 so in regard to every less 
perfect form out of  which we can be    
entitled to say that the family life1 as
 we know it1  has developed1 we must be 
also entitled to say that it expresses  
some  interest which is in principle    
identical with that described1 however  
incompletely it has emerged from lower  
influences4    #bch4 7#b7 ,such an      
interest being the basis of family      
relations1 it  is quite intelligible    
that everyone actuated by the interest  
should  recognise1 and be recognised by1
 everyone else to whom he ascribes  an  
interest like his own1 as entitled to   
behave towards the objects  of the      
interest--towards his wife and          
children--in a manner from  which       
everyone else is excluded2 that there   
should thus come to be  rights in family
 relations to a certain privacy in      
dealing with them2  rights to deal with 
them as his alone and not another's2    
claims1  ratified by the general sense  

of their admission being for the common 
good1 to exercise certain powers and    
demand certain forbearances  from       
others1 in regard to wife and children4 
,it is only indeed at an  advanced stage
 of reflection that men learn to ascribe
 to other men1  simply as men1 the      
interests which they experience         
themselves2 and  hence it is at first   
only within narrow societies that men   
secure  to each other the due privileges
 and privacies of family life4 ,in      
others of the same kin or tribe they can
 habitually imagine an  interest like   
that of which each feels his own family 
life to be  the expression1 and hence in
 them they spontaneously respect family 
rights2 but they cannot thus practically
 think themselves into the  position of 
a stranger1 and hence towards him they  
do not observe the  same restraints4    
,they do not regard the women of another
 nation as  sacred to the husbands and  
families of that nation4 ,but that power
  of making another's good one's own1   

which in the more intense and           
individualised form is the basis of     
family relations1 must always at  the   
same time exist in that more diffused   
form in which it serves as  the basis of
 a society held together by the         
recognition of a common  good4          
,wherever1 therefore1 the family        
relations exist1 there is  sure to exist
 also a wider society which by its      
authority gives to  the powers exercised
 in those relations the character of    
rights4 ,by  what process the relations 
of husband and wife and the institution 
of the household may have come to be    
formed among descendants of a  single   
pair1 it is impossible to conceive or to
 discover1 but in  fact we find no trace
 in primitive history of households     
except as  constituents of a clan       
recognising a common origin2 and it is  
by the  customs of the clan1 founded on 
the conception of a common good1 that   
those forbearances on the part of       
members of one household in dealing     

with another1 which are necessary to the
 privacy of the several  households1 are
 secured4    #bci4 ,the history of the  
development of family life is the       
history of  the process 7a7 by which    
family rights have come to be regarded  
as independent of the special custom of 
a clan and the special  laws of a state1
 as rights which all men and women1 as  
such1 are  entitled to4 ,this1 however1 
characterises the history of all rights 
alike4 ,it is a history farther 7b7 of  
the process by which the  true nature of
 these rights has come to be recognised1
 as rights  over persons2 rights of     
which persons are the objects1 and which
  therefore imply reciprocal claims on  
the part of those over whom they  are   
exercised and of those who exercise     
them4 ,the establishment of  monogamy1  
the abolition of 'patria potestas' in   
its various forms1  the 'emancipation of
 women' 7in the proper sense of the     
phrase71 are  involved in these two     
processes4 ,the principles 7#a7 that all

 men and  all women are entitled to     
marry and form households1 7#b7 that    
within  the household the claims of the 
husband and wife are throughout         
reciprocal1 cannot be realised without  
carrying with them not merely  monogamy1
 but the removal of those faulty        
relations between men and  women which  
survive in countries where monogamy is  
established by law4    #bdj4 ,under a   
system of polygamy1 just so far as it is
 carried out1  there must be men who are
 debarred from marrying4 ,it can only   
exist1  indeed1 alongside of a slavery1 
which excludes masses of men from  the  
right of forming a family4 ,nor does the
 wife1 under a polygamous  system1      
though she ostensibly marries1 form a   
household1 or become  the co-ordinate   
head of a family1 at all4 ,the husband  
alone is  head of the family and has    
authority over the children4 ,the wife1 
indeed1 who for the time is the         
favourite1 may practically share  the   
authority1 but even she has no equal and

 assured position4 ,the  'consortium    
omnis vitae1' the 'individua vitae      
consuetudo1' which  according to the    
definition in the ,digest is an         
essential element in  marriage1 is not  
hers4 #a #b    ,and further as the      
polygamous husband requires a           
self-restraint  from his wife which he  
does not put on himself1 he is treating 
her  unequally4 ,he demands a continence
 from her which1 unless she is  kept in 
the confinement of slavery1 can only    
rest on the attachment  of a person to a
 person and on a personal sense of duty1
 and at the  same time is practically   
ignoring the demand1 which this personal
  attachment on her part necessarily    
carries with it1 that he should  keep   
himself for her as she keeps herself for
 him4 ,the recognition of  children as  
having claims upon their parents        
reciprocal to those of  the parents over
 them1 equally involves the condemnation
 of polygamy4  ,for these claims can    
only be duly satisfied1 the             

responsibilities of  father and mother  
towards the children 7potentially       
persons7 whom  they have brought into   
the world can only be fulfilled1 if     
father and  mother jointly take part in 
the education of the children2 if the   
children learn to love and obey father  
and mother as one authority4  ,but if   
there is no permanent 'consortium vitae'
 of one husband with  one wife1 this    
joint authority over the children       
becomes impossible4  ,the child1 when   
its physical dependence on the mother is
 over1 ceases  to stand in any special  
relation to her4 ,she has no recognised 
duties  to him1 or he to her4 ,these lie
 between him and his father only1 and   
just because the father's interests are 
divided between the children  of many   
wives1 and because these render their   
filial offices to  the father           
separately1 not to father and mother    
jointly1 the true  domestic training is 
lost4    #a ',nuptiae sunt conjunctio   
maris et feminae1 consortium omnis      

vitae1 divini et humani juris           
communicatio' ,digest1 xxiii4 #b1  #a4  
',matrimonium est viri et mulieris      
conjunctio individuam vita              
consuetudinem continens4' ,inst41       
i4#i4b4 7,quoted by ,trendelenburg1     
,naturrecht1 p4 #bhb47    #b ,latin     
consortium omnis vitae  partnership for 
life individua  vitae consuetudo        
unbroken companionship of life ,tr      
#bda4 ,monogamy1 however1 may be        
established1 and an advance so far  made
 towards the establishment of a due     
reciprocity between husband  and wife1  
as well as towards a fulfilment of the  
responsibilities  incurred in bringing  
children into the world1 while yet the  
true  claims of men in respect of women1
 and of women in respect of men1  and of
 children upon their parents1 are far   
from being generally  realised4         
,wherever slavery exists alongside of   
monogamy1 on the one  side people of the
 slave class are prevented from forming 
family  ties1 and on the other those    

people who are privileged to marry1     
though they are confined to one wife1   
are constantly tempted to be  false to  
the true monogamistic idea by the       
opportunity of using women  as chattels 
to minister to their pleasures4 ,the    
wife is thus no more  than an           
institution1 invested with certain      
dignities and privileges1  for the      
continuation of the family2 a           
continuation1 which under pagan         
religions is considered necessary for   
the maintenance of certain  ceremonies1 
and to which among ourselves an         
importance is attached  wholly          
unconnected with the personal affection 
of the man for the  wife4 #a ,when      
slavery is abolished1 and the title of  
all men and  women equally to form      
families is established by law1 the     
conception  of the position of the wife 
necessarily rises4 ,the  and   #b cease 
at any rate to be recognised            
accompaniments of married  life1 and the
 claim of the wife upon the husband's   

fidelity1 as  reciprocal to his claim   
upon hers1 becomes established by law4  
#a ,her position among the ,greeks is   
well illustrated by a passage  from the 
speech of ,demosthenes 787 against      
,neaera1 ,sect4 #abb 7quoted  by ,w4 ,e4
 ,hearn1 ,the ,aryan ,household1 p4     
#ga74        1          1               
7tas men gar hetairas hedones henek     
echomen1 tas  de pallakas tes kath'     
hemeran therapeias tou somatos1 tas de  
gynaikas  tou paidopoieisthai gnesios   
kai ton endon phylaka pisten echein74   
,the query as to ,demosthenes'          
authorship is in ,green's text4 ,hearn  
translates this passage3 ,mistresses we 
keep for pleasure1 concubines  for daily
 attendance on our persons1 wives to    
bear us legitimate  children and to be  
our faithful housekeepers4 ,tr    #b    
,greek  7hetaira7  courtesan1  7pallake7
   concubine4 ,tr    #bdb4 ,thus that   
marriage should only be lawful with one 
wife1 that it  should be for life1 that 
it should be terminable by the          

infidelity  of either husband or wife1  
are rules of right2 not of morality1 as 
such1 but of right4 ,without such rules 
the rights of the married  persons are  
not maintained4 ,those outward          
conditions of family life  would not be 
secured to them1 which are necessary on 
the whole for  the development of a free
 morality4 ,polygamy is a violation of  
the  rights1 7#a7 of those who through  
it are indirectly excluded from  regular
 marriage1 and thus from the moral      
education which results  from this2 7#b7
 of the wife1 who is morally lowered by 
exclusion  from her proper position in  
the household and by being used1 more   
or less1 as the mere instrument of the  
husband's pleasure2 7#c7  of the        
children1 who lose the chance of that   
full moral training  which depends on   
the connected action of father and      
mother4 ,the  terminability of marriage 
at the pleasure of one of the parties to
 it  7of its terminability at the desire
 of both we will speak presently7  is a 

violation of the rights at any rate of  
the unconsenting party1  on the grounds 
7a7 that liability to it tends to       
prevent marriage  from becoming that    
'individua vitae consuetudo' which gives
 it its  moral value1 and 7b7 that1 when
 the marriage is dissolved1 the  woman1 
just in proportion to her capacity for  
self-devotion and the  degree to which  
she has devoted herself to her original 
husband1 is  debarred from forming that 
'individua vitae consuetudo' again1 and 
thus crippled in her moral              
possibilities4 ,it is a violation of the
  rights of children for the same reason
 for which polygamy is so4    ,on the   
other hand1 that the wife should be     
bound indissolubly by  the marriage-tie 
to an unfaithful husband 7or vice       
versa71 is a  violation of the right of 
wife 7or husband1 as the case may be71  
because on the one hand the restraint   
which makes her liable to be  used      
physically as the instrument of the     
husband's pleasures1 when  there is no  

longer reciprocal devotion between them1
 is a restraint  which 7except in       
peculiar cases7 renders moral elevation 
impossible2  and on the other1 she is   
prevented from forming such a true      
marriage  as would be1 according to     
ordinary rules1 the condition of the    
realisation of her moral capacities4    
,though the husband's right  to divorce 
from an unfaithful wife has been much   
more thoroughly  recognised than the    
wife's to divorce from an unfaithful    
husband1 he  would be in fact less      
seriously wronged by the inability to   
obtain a  divorce1 for it is only the   
second of the grounds just stated that  
fully applies to him4 ,the rights of the
 children do not seem so  plainly       
concerned in the dissolution of a       
marriage to which husband  or wife has  
been unfaithful4 ,in some cases the best
 chance for them  might seem to lie in  
the infidelities being condoned and an  
outward  family peace re-established4   
,but that their rights are violated by  

the infidelity itself is plain4 ,in the 
most definite way it detracts  from     
their possibilities of goodness4        
,without any consent on their  part1    
quite independently of any action of    
their own will1 they are  placed by it  
in a position which tends--though       
special grace may  counteract it--to put
 the higher kinds of goodness beyond    
their reach4    #bdc4 ,these            
considerations suggest some further     
questions which may be  discussed under 
the following heads4 7#a7 ,if infidelity
 in marriage is  a violation of rights  
in the manner stated1 and if 7as it must
 be7 it  is a wilful and knowing        
violation1 why is it not treated as a   
crime1  and1 like other such violations 
of rights1 punished by the state  in    
order to the better maintenance of      
rights8 7#b7 ,should any other  reason  
but the infidelity of husband or wife be
 allowed for the legal  dissolution of  
the marriage-tie8 7#c7 ,how are the     
rights connected  with marriage related 

to the morality of marriage8    7#a7    
,there is good reason why the state     
should not take upon itself  to         
institute charges of adultery1 but leave
 them to be instituted  by the          
individuals whose rights the adultery   
violates4 ,the reasons  ordinarily      
alleged would be1 7a7 the analogy of    
ordinary breaches  of contract1 against 
which the state leaves it to the        
individual  injured to set the law in   
motion2 7b7 the practical impossibility 
of preventing adultery through the      
action of the functionaries of  the     
state4 ,the analogy1 however1 from      
ordinary breaches of contract  does not 
really hold4 ,in the first place1 though
 marriage involves  contract1 though    
without contract there can be no        
marriage1 yet  marriage at once gives   
rise to rights and obligations of a kind
  which cannot arise out of contract1 in
 particular to obligations  towards the 
children born of the marriage4 ,these   
children1 at any  rate1 are in no       

condition to seek redress--even if from 
the nature  of the case redress could be
 had--for the injuries inflicted on     
them by a parent's adultery1 as a person
 injured by a breach of  contract can   
seek redress for it4 ,again1 though the 
state leaves  it to the individual      
injured by a breach of contract to      
institute  proceedings for redress1 if  
the breach involves fraud1 it1 at any   
rate in certain cases1 treats the fraud 
as a crime and punishes4 ,now  in every 
breach of the marriage-contract by      
adultery there is that  which answers to
 fraud in the case of ordinary breach of
 contract4  ,the marriage-contract is   
broken knowingly and intentionally4 ,if 
there  were no reason to the contrary1  
then1 it would seem that the state1     
though it might leave to the injured    
individuals the institution of          
proceedings against adultery1 should yet
 treat adultery as a crime  and seek to 
prevent it by punishment in the interest
 of those whose  virtual rights are     

violated by it1 though not in the way of
 breach of  contract4 ,but there are    
reasons to the contrary--reasons that   
arise  out of the moral purposes served 
by the marriage-tie--which make it      
desirable both that it should be at the 
discretion of the directly  injured     
party whether a case of adultery should 
be judicially dealt  with at all1 and   
that in no case should penal terror be  
associated  with such a violation of the
 marriage-bond ,under ordinary          
conditions1  it is a public injury that 
a violation of his rights should be     
condoned by the person suffering it4 ,if
 the injured individual were  likely to 
fail in the institution of proceedings  
for his own redress  or defence1 the    
public interest would require that the  
matter should  be taken out of his      
hands4 ,but if an injured wife or       
husband is  willing to condone a breach 
of his or her rights through adultery1  
it is generally best that it should be  
condoned4 ,that married life  should be 

continued in spite of anything like     
dissoluteness on  the part of husband or
 wife1 is no doubt undesirable4 ,the    
moral  purposes which married life      
should serve cannot be served1 either   
for the married persons themselves or   
for the children1 under such            
conditions4 ,on the other hand1 the     
condonation of a single offence  would  
generally be better for all concerned   
than an application for  divorce4 ,the  
line cannot be drawn at which1 with a   
view to the higher  ends which marriage 
should serve1 divorce becomes desirable4
 ,it is  therefore best that the state1 
while uniformly allowing the right of   
divorce where the marriage-bond has been
 broken by adultery 7since  otherwise   
the right of everyone to form a true    
marriage1 a marriage  which shall be the
 basis of family life1 is neutralised17 
and taking  care that procedure for     
divorce be cheap and easy1 should leave 
the  enforcement of the right to the    
discretion of individuals4    #bdd4 ,on 

similar grounds1 it is undesirable that 
adultery as such  should be treated as a
 crime1 that penal terror should be     
associated  with it4 ,though rights1 in 
the strict sense1 undoubtedly arise out 
of marriage1 though marriage has thus   
its strictly legal aspect1 it  is       
undesirable that this legal aspect      
should become prominent4 ,it  may suffer
 in respect of its higher moral         
purposes1 if the element  of force      
appears too strongly in the maintenance 
of the rights to  which it gives rise4  
,if a husband who would otherwise be    
false to  the marriage-bond is kept     
outwardly faithful to it by fear of the 
punishment which might attend its       
breach1 the right of the wife and       
children is indeed so far protected1 but
 is anything gained for those  moral    
ends1 for the sake of which the         
maintenance of these rights  is alone of
 value8 ,the man in whom disloyal       
passion is neutralised  by fear of      
punishment will contribute little in his

 family life to  the moral development  
of himself1 his wife1 or his children4  
,if he  cannot be kept true by family   
affection and sympathy with the social  
disapprobation attaching to matrimonial 
infidelity 7and unless it is  a matter  
of social disapprobation no penalties   
will be effectually  enforced against   
it71 he will not be kept true in a way  
that is of  any value to those concerned
 by fear of penalties4 ,in other words1 
the rights that arise out of marriage   
are not of a kind which can in  their   
essence be protected by associating     
penal terror with their  violation1 as  
the rights of life and property can be4 
,they are not  rights to claim mere     
forbearances or to claim the performance
 of  certain outward actions1 by which a
 right is satisfied irrespectively  of  
the disposition with which the act is   
done4 ,they are claims which  cannot be 
met without a certain disposition on the
 part of the person  upon whom the claim
 rests1 and that disposition cannot be  

enforced4  ,the attempt to enforce the  
outward behaviour in order to satisfy   
the  claim1 which is a claim not to the 
outward behaviour merely but to  this in
 connection with a certain disposition1 
defeats its own end4    #bde4 ,for the  
protection1 therefore1 of the rights of 
married persons  and their children     
against infidelity1 it does not appear  
that the  law can do more than secure   
facilities of divorce in the case of    
adultery4 ,this indeed is not in itself 
a protection against the wrong  involved
 in adultery1 but rather a deliverance  
from the further  wrong to the injured  
husband or wife and to the children that
 would  be involved in the continuance  
of any legal claim over them on the     
part of the injurer4 ,but indirectly it 
helps to prevent the wrong  being done  
by bringing social disapprobation to    
bear on cases of  infidelity1 and thus  
helping to keep married persons faithful
 through  sympathy with the             
disapprobation of which they feel that  

they would  be the objects when they    
imagine themselves unfaithful4 ,the only
  other effectual way in which the state
 can guard against the injuries  in     
question is by requiring great          
precaution and solemnity in the         
contraction of marriages4 ,this it can  
do by insisting on the consent  of      
parents to the marriage of all minors1  
exacting a long notice  7perhaps even a 
preliminary notice of betrothal71 and1  
while not  preventing civil marriage1 by
 encouraging the celebration of marriage
  in the presence of religious          
congregations and with religious rites4 
#bdf4 ,question 7#b7 is one that does   
not admit of being answered on  any     
absolute principle ,we must bear in mind
 that all rights--in  idea or as they   
should be--are relative to moral ends4  
,the ground  for securing to individuals
 in respect of the marriage-tie certain 
powers as rights1 is that in a general  
way they are necessary to  the          
possibility of a morally good life1     

either directly to the  persons         
exercising them or to their children4   
,the more completely  marriage is a     
'consortium omnis vitae' in the sense of
 a unity in  all interests and for the  
whole of a lifetime1 the more likely are
  the external conditions of a moral    
life to be fulfilled in regard  both to 
married persons and their children4     
,therefore the general  rule of the     
state in dealing with marriage should be
 to secure such  powers as are          
favourable and withhold such as are not 
favourable to  the 'consortium omnis    
vitae4' ,but in the application of the  
principle  great difficulties arise4    
,lunacy may clearly render the          
'consortium  omnis vitae' finally       
impossible2 but what kind and degree of 
lunacy8  ,if the lunatic may possibly   
recover1 though there is undoubtedly    
reason for the separation from husband  
or wife during lunacy1 should  permanent
 divorce be allowed8 ,if it is allowed1 
and the lunatic  recovers1 a wrong will 

have been done both to him and to the   
children  previously born of the        
marriage4 ,on the other hand1 to reserve
 the  connubial rights of a lunatic of  
whose recovery there is hope1 and  to   
restore them when he recovers1 may      
involve the wrong of bringing  further  
children into the world with the taint  
of lunacy upon them4  ,is cruelty to be 
a ground of divorce1 and if so1 what    
amount8 ,there  is a degree of          
persistent cruelty which renders        
'consortium omnis  vitae' impossible1   
but unless it is certain that cruelty   
has reached  the point at which a       
restoration of any sort of family life  
becomes  impossible1 a greater wrong    
both to wife and children may be        
involved  in allowing divorce than in   
refusing it4 ,a husband impatient for   
the  time of the restraint of marriage  
may be tempted to passing cruelty  as a 
means of ridding himself of it1 while if
 no such escape were  open to him he    
might get the better of the temporary   

disturbing  passion and settle down into
 a decent husband4 ,the same            
consideration  applies still more       
strongly to allowing incompatibility of 
temper  as a ground of divorce4 ,it     
would be hard to deny that it might be  
of a degree and kind in which it so     
destroyed the possibility of            
'consortium omnis vitae1' that1 with a  
view to the interests of the  children1 
who ought in such a case to be chiefly  
considered1 divorce  implied less wrong 
than the maintenance of the             
marriage-tie4 ,but on  the other hand1  
to hold out the possibility of divorce  
on the ground  of incompatibility is    
just the way to generate that           
incompatibility4  ,on the whole1 the    
only conclusion seems to be that this   
last ground  should not be allowed1 and 
that in deciding on other grounds large 
discretion should be allowed to a       
well-constituted court4        ,p4      
,,rights ,,and ,,virtues    #bdg4 ,we   
have now considered in a perfunctory way

 those rights which  are antecedent to  
the state1 which are not derived from it
 but may  exist where a state is not1   
and which it is the office of the state 
to maintain4 ,we have inquired what it  
is in the nature of man that  renders   
him capable of these rights1 what are   
the moral ends to  which the rights are 
relative1 and in what form the rights   
should be  realised in order to the     
attainment of these ends4 ,in order to  
make  the inquiry into rights complete1 
we ought to go on to examine in  the    
same way the rights which arise out of  
the establishment of a  state1 the      
rights connected with the several       
functions of government2  how these     
functions come to be necessary1 and how 
they may best be  fulfilled with a view 
to those moral ends to which the        
functions of  the state are ultimately  
relative4 ,according to my project1 ,i  
should  then have proceeded to consider 
the social virtues1 and the 'moral      
sentiments' which underlie our          

particular judgments as to what is  good
 and evil in conduct4 ,all virtues are  
really social2 or1 more  properly1 the  
distinction between social and          
self-regarding virtues  is a false one4 
,every virtue is self-regarding in the  
sense that it  is a disposition1 or     
habit of will1 directed to an end which 
the man  presents to himself as his     
good2 every virtue is social in the     
sense  that unless the good to which the
 will is directed is one in which  the  
well-being of society in some form or   
other is involved1 the will  is not     
virtuous at all4    #bdh4 ,the virtues  
are dispositions to exercise positively1
 in some way  contributory to social    
good1 those powers which1 because       
admitting of  being so exercised1       
society should secure to him2 the powers
 which  a man has a right to possess1   
which constitute his rights4 ,it is     
therefore convenient to arrange the     
virtues according to the division  of   
rights4 ,e4g4 in regard to the right of 

all men to free life1 the  obligations1 
strictly so called1 correlative to that 
right having  been considered           
7obligations which are all of a negative
 nature1  obligations to forbear from   
meddling with one's neighbour71 we      
should proceed to consider the          
activities by which a society of men    
really free is established1 or by which 
some approach is made to its            
establishment 7'really free1' in the    
sense of being enabled to make  the most
 of their capabilities74 ,these         
activities will take different  forms   
under different social conditions1 but  
in rough outline they  are those by     
which men in mutual helpfulness conquer 
and adapt  nature1 and overcome the     
influences which would make them victims
 of  chance and accident1 of brute force
 and animal passion4 ,the virtuous      
disposition displayed in these          
activities may have various names       
applied to it according to the          
particular direction in which it is     

exerted2 'industry1' 'courage1' 'public 
spirit4' ,a particular aspect  of it was
 brought into relief among the ,greeks  
under the name of  4 #a ,the ,greek     
philosophers already gave an extension  
to the  meaning of this term beyond that
 which belonged to it in popular  usage1
 and we might be tempted further to     
extend it so as to cover  all the forms 
in which the habit of will necessary to 
the maintenance  and furtherance of free
 society shows itself4 ,the name1       
however1  does not much matter4 ,it is  
enough that there are specific modes of 
human activity which contribute directly
 to maintain a shelter for  man's       
worthier energies against disturbance by
 natural forces and  by the consequences
 of human fear and lust4 ,the state of  
mind which  appears in them may properly
 be treated as a special kind of virtue4
  ,it is true that the principle and the
 end of all virtues is the same4  ,they 
are all determined by relation to social
 well-being as their  final cause1 and  

they all rest on a dominant interest in 
some form  or other of that well-being2 
but as that interest may take different 
directions in different persons1 as it  
cannot be equally developed at  once in 
everyone1 it may be said roughly that a 
man has one kind of  virtue and not     
others4    #a ,greek  7andreia7         
manliness ,tr4    #bdi4 ,as the kind of 
moral duties 7in distinction from those 
obligations which are correlative to    
rights7 which relate to the  maintenance
 of free society and the disposition to 
fulfil those  duties should form a      
special object of inquiry1 so another   
special  kind would be those which have 
to do with the management of property1  
with the acquisition and expenditure of 
wealth4 ,to respect the  rights of      
property in others1 to fulfil the       
obligations correlative  to those       
rights1 is one thing2 to make a good use
 of property1 to  be justly generous and
 generously just in giving and          
receiving1 is  another1 and that may    

properly be treated as a special kind of
 virtue  which appears in the duly      
blended prudence1 equity1 and generosity
  of the ideal man of business4 ,another
 special kind will be that  which       
appears in family relations2 where      
indeed that merely negative  observance 
of right1 which in other relations can  
be distinguished  from the positive     
fulfilment of moral duties1 becomes     
unmeaning4 ,as  we have seen1 there are 
certain aggravations and perpetuations  
of  wrong from which husband or wife or 
children can be protected by law1  but  
the fulfilment of the claims which arise
 out of the marriage-tie  requires a    
virtuous will in the active and positive
 sense--a will  governed by unselfish   
interests--on the part of those         
concerned4    #bej4 ,what is called     
'moral sentiment' is merely a weaker    
form of  that interest in social        
well-being which1 when wrought into a   
man's  habits and strong enough to      
determine action1 we call virtue4 ,so   

far  as this interest is brought into   
play on the mere survey of action1  and 
serves merely to determine an           
approbation or disapprobation1 it  is   
called moral sentiment4 ,the forms of   
moral sentiment accordingly  should be  
classified on some principle as forms of
 virtue1 i4e4 with  relation to the     
social functions to which they          
correspond4    #bea4 ,for the           
convenience of analysis1 we may treat   
the obligations  correlative to rights1 
obligations which it is the proper      
office of  law to enforce1 apart from   
moral duties and from the virtues which 
are tendencies to fulfil those duties4  
,i am properly obliged to  those actions
 and forbearances which are necessary to
 the general  freedom1 necessary if each
 is not to interfere with the           
realisation  of another's will4 ,my duty
 is to be interested positively in my   
neighbour's well-being4 ,and it is      
important to understand that1  while the
 enforcement of obligations is possible1

 that of moral  duties is impossible4   
,but the establishment of obligations by
 law or  authoritative custom1 and the  
gradual recognition of moral duties1    
have not been separate processes ,they  
have gone on together in the  history of
 man4 ,the growth of the institutions by
 which more complete  equality of rights
 is gradually secured to a wider range  
of persons1  and of those interests in  
various forms of social well-being by   
which the will is moralised1 have been  
related to each other as the  outer and 
inner side of the same spiritual        
development1 though at a  certain stage 
of reflection it comes to be discovered 
that the agency  of force1 by which the 
rights are maintained1 is ineffectual   
for  eliciting the moral interests4 ,the
 result of the twofold process has  been
 the creation of the actual content of  
morality2 the articulation  of the      
indefinite consciousness that there is  
something that should  be--a true       
well-being to be aimed at other than any

 pleasure or  succession of             
pleasures--into the sentiments and      
interests which  form an 'enlightened   
conscience4' ,it is thus that when the  
highest  stage of reflective morality is
 reached1 and upon interests in this  or
 that mode of social good there         
supervenes an interest in an ideal  of  
goodness1 that ideal has already a      
definite filling2 and the man  who      
pursues duty for duty's sake1 who does  
good for the sake of being  good or in  
order to realise an idea of perfection1 
is at no loss to  say what in particular
 his duty is1 or by what particular     
methods the  perfection of character is 
to be approached4    ,,supplement4      
,some ,quotations rendered into         
,english4    ,from ,sect4 #cb4          
,tractatus ,politici1 ,,ii4 #d 7',per   
jus itaque'74 ',by  right of nature     
7natural right7 ,i understand 444 the   
actual power of  nature4' ',whatever an 
individual man does by the laws of his  
nature1  that he does with the highest  

natural right1 and his right towards    
nature goes just as far as his power    
holds out4'    ',jus naturae'  'natural 
right4' ',potentia'  'power4' ',jus'    
'right4' ',jus humanum'  'right of man1'
 or 'right qua human4'    ,ib4 ,,ii4 #e 
7',homines magis'74 ',human beings are  
led more by blind  desire than by       
reason2 and hence their natural power or
 right should  be marked out not by     
reason but by any inclination by which  
they  are determined to act1 and by     
which they endeavour after their own    
preservation4'    ',jus civile'  'civic 
right or law4'    ,ib4 ,,ii4 #ad        
7',quatenus homines'74 ',in as far as   
human beings are  troubled by anger1    
jealousy1 or any emotion of hate1 so far
 they are  drawn in different directions
 and are antagonistic to one another1   
and therefore they are more to be feared
 in so far as they are more  powerful1  
and more shrewd and astute1 than the    
other animals2 and  because human beings
 are in the highest degree liable by    

nature to  these emotions1 therefore    
they are natural enemies 7to one        
another74'    ,ib4 #ae 7',atque adeo'74 
',and so we conclude that natural right 
can  hardly be conceived unless where   
human beings have laws in common1       
7human beings7 who have power at once to
 assert possession of the  lands which  
they are able to inhabit and to till1   
and to defend  themselves1 and to repel 
all violence1 and to live in accordance 
with the common sentiment of all4 ,for  
7by art4 #ac of this chapter7  the more 
that thus come together into one1 the   
more right they all  together possess4' 
,ib4 #af 7',ubi homines'74 ',where human
 beings have laws in common  and all    
together are guided as by one mind1 it  
is certain 7by art4  #ac of this        
chapter7 that each of them has so much  
the less right as  the rest are together
 more powerful than he2 that is1 that he
 in fact  has no right over nature      
beyond that which the common 7social7   
law  concedes him4 ,but whatever is     

enjoined upon him by common consent1 he 
is bound to perform1 or 7by art4 #d of  
this chapter7 he is compelled  to it by 
law4'    ,ib4 #ag 7',hoc jus'74 ',this  
law 7or right71 which is coextensive    
with the power of the plurality1 is     
usually called 'imperium'  7'authority1'
 'government'74    ,ib4 ,,iii4 #b       
7',multitudinis quae'74 ',of a number or
 plurality1 which  is guided as if by a 
single mind4' ',status civilis'  'civic1
 or  social1 condition4'    ,ib4 ,,iii4 
#c 7',homo ex legibus'74 ,in the civic  
condition as well as  in the state of   
nature 'man acts from the laws of his   
own nature  and consults his own        
interest4' ',sui juris'  'in its own    
right1'  'autonomous4'    ,sect4 #cc    
7#a74 ,ib4 ,,iii4 #g 7',civitatis jus'74
 ',the right of the state  is           
coextensive with the power of the       
plurality which is guided as if  by one 
mind4 ,but this oneness of minds is     
inconceivable1 unless the  state has for
 its main intention what sound reason   

shows to be for  the interest of all    
men4'    7#b74 ,ib4 ,,iii4 #h 7',subditi
 eatenus'74 ',subjects are not in their 
own  right1 but under the right 7or law7
 of the state1 so far as they fear  its 
power or threats1 or so far as they love
 the social condition  7by art4 #aj of  
preceding chapter74 ,from which it      
follows1 that all  those acts to which  
no one can be impelled by rewards or    
threats lie  outside the right 7or law7 
of the state4'    7#c74 ,ib4 ,,iii4 #i  
7',ad civitatis jus'74 ',that belongs to
 the right  of the state in a less      
degree1 which causes indignation in a   
greater  number4' 7',sicut'74 ',like the
 individual citizen1 or the man in a    
state of nature1 the state is less in   
its own right in proportion as  it has  
greater cause for fear4'    ,sect4 #cd4 
,ib4 ,,iii4 #aa 7',nam quandoquidem'74  
',for seeing that 7by  art4 #b of this  
chapter7 the right of the supreme power 
is nothing but  the actual right of     
nature1 it follows that two governments 

are to  one another as two men in the   
state of nature1 except that the state  
can defend itself against external      
aggression in a way impossible for  man 
in a state of nature1 inasmuch as he is 
overcome daily by sleep1  often by      
disease or distress1 and in the end by  
old age1 and besides  this is exposed to
 other inconveniences1 against which the
 state can  protect itself4'    ,ib4    
,,iii4 #ac 7',duae civitates'74 ',two   
states are natural enemies4  ,for men in
 the state of nature are enemies4       
,those1 therefore1 who  retain the right
 of nature1 as not being in the same    
state1 are  enemies4'    ,ib4 ,,iii4 #ad
 7',nec dici potest'74 ',nor can it be  
said to act with  craft or perfidy in   
that it dissolves its promise as soon as
 the  cause of fear or hope is removed2 
because this condition was the same  for
 both contracting parties1 that         
whichsoever is first enabled to be  free
 from fear should be in its own right1  
and should use its right  according to  

the sentiment of its mind2 and1         
moreover1 because no one  contracts for 
the future except on supposition of the 
circumstances  under which he           
contracts4'    ,sect4 #ce4 ,ib4 ,,ii4   
#ah 7',in statu'74 ',in a state of      
nature there  can be no transgression1  
or if one transgresses1 he does so      
against  himself1 not against another2  
444 nothing is absolutely forbidden by  
the law of nature1 except what no one   
has power to do4'    ',commune decretum'
  'the common 7or social7 behest4'      
,ib4 ,v4 #a 7',non id omne'74 ',not     
everything which we say is done         
rightfully1 do we affirm to be the best 
to be done4 ,it is one thing  to till a 
field within your right1 and another    
thing to till it in  the best way2 it is
 one thing1 ,i say1 to defend yourself1 
preserve  yourself1 give judgment c4    
within your right1 and another thing to 
do all these acts in the best way2 and  
accordingly it is one thing to  govern  
and manage a state within its rights1   

and another thing to do  this in the    
best way4 ,thus1 now that we have       
treated in general of  the right of     
every state1 it is time to treat of the 
best condition  of every state4'        
',finis status civilis'  'the end or aim
 of the civic or social  condition4'    
,ib4 ,v4 #b 7',homines enim'74 ',men are
 not born of civic temper1 but  become  
so4 ,moreover1 the natural dispositions 
of men are everywhere  the same4'       
,ib4 ,v4 #d 7',pax enim'74 ',peace is   
not absence of war1 but a virtue  which 
arises from fortitude of mind2 for      
obedience is a constant will  to perform
 that which the common behest of the    
state requires to be  done4'    ,ethics1
 ,,iii4 #ei1 ,schol4 7in footnote on    
preceding passage7 7',omnes  actiones'74
 ',all the actions which follow from the
 affects which  are related to the mind1
 in so far as it thinks1 ,i ascribe to  
fortitude1 which ,i divide into strength
 of mind and generosity4  ,by strength  
of mind ,i mean the desire by which each

 person  endeavours1 from the dictates  
of reason alone1 to preserve his own    
being4 ,by generosity ,i mean the desire
 by which1 from the dictates  of reason 
alone1 each person endeavours to help   
other people and to  join them to him in
 friendship4'    7',quae maxime'74      
',which is mainly coextensive with      
reason1 the true  virtue and life of the
 mind4'    7',quod multitudo libera'74  
,an authority which 'a free plurality   
institutes1 not one which is acquired   
against the plurality by the  right of  
war4'    ,sect4 #cf4 ',suum esse        
conservare'  'to preserve his own       
being4'    ',homini nihil'  'nothing is 
more useful to man1 than man4'    ',homo
 namque4' ,see on sect4 #cb4            
',constans voluntas4' ,see on sect4 #ce4
    ',vitam concorditer transigere'  'to
 live in harmony4'    ,footnote on      
',libera multitudo1' ,,ii4 #aa          
7',hominem eatenus'74 ',the  sense in   
which at all ,i call a man free is in so
 far as he is  guided by reason2 because

 thus far he is determined to action by 
causes which can be adequately          
understood out of his nature alone1     
although by them he be necessarily      
determined to action4 ,for freedom  of  
action does not deny but affirms        
necessity4'    ,on ,sect4 #cg4 ,,ii4 #ae
 7',jus naturae'74 ,see on sect4 #cb4   
,on ,sect4 #ci4  7polis7  state1        
including much that we mean by          
'society4'     7telos7  end1 aim1 final 
cause4     7polites7  citizen4          
7phusei politikos7  social1 or civic1 by
 nature4           7polites metechei7   
',the  citizen takes his share both in  
governing and in being governed4'    ,on
 ,sect4 #dj4 ,footnote1 ,eth4 ,,iv4     
,appendix1 xxxii 7',ea quae'74  ',we    
shall bear with equanimity those things 
which happen to us  contrary to what a  
consideration of our own profit demands1
 if we are  conscious that we have      
performed our duty1 that the power we   
have  could not reach so far as to      
enable us to avoid those things1 and    

that we are a part of the whole of      
nature1 whose order we follow4  ,if we  
clearly and distinctly understand this1 
the part of us which  is determined by  
intelligence--that is to say1 the better
 part of  us--will be entirely satisfied
 therewith1 and in that satisfaction    
will endeavour to persevere2 for1 in so 
far as we understand1 we  cannot desire 
anything excepting what is necessary1   
nor absolutely  can we be satisfied with
 anything but the truth4 ,therefore1 in 
so  far as we understand these things   
properly will the efforts of the  better
 part of us agree with the whole order  
of nature4' ,eth4 ,,iv4  ,preface 7',per
 bonum'74 ',by good1 therefore1 ,i      
understand in the  following pages      
everything which we are certain is a    
means by which  we may approach nearer  
and nearer to the model of human nature 
we  set before us4444 ,again1 ,i shall  
call men more or less perfect or        
imperfect in so far as they approach    
nearer and nearer to the model  of human

 nature we set before us4'    ,on ,sect4
 #da4 ',nihil positivum in rebus in se  
consideratis'  'nothing  positive in    
things considered in themselves4'    ,in
 all the quotations from ,spinoza's     
,ethics ,mr4 ,hales ,white's            
translation has been followed4