,,transcriber',s ,,note3 ,italics have been transcribed using underscores and small capitals as ,,all ,,capitals4 ,inconsistencies in hyphenation and punctuation have not been corrected4 ,a list of other corrections can be found at the end of the document4 ,the ,table of ,contents is left as in the original and does not list all of the subsections4 ,for we are not children of the bond-woman1 but of the free4 ,e pur se muove4 ,,outlines ,,of ,a ,,critical ,,theory ,,of ,,ethics ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,michigan ,,ann ,,arbor1 ,,michigan ,,register ,,publishing ,,company ,the ,inland ,press #ahia4 ,copyright1 #ahia4 ,,register ,,publishing ,,co41 ,ann ,arbor1 ,mich4 ,,contents4 ,,introduction #a-ab ,,part ,i4--,,fundamental ,,ethical ,,notions4 ,,chapter ,i4--,the ,good #ac-ach ,hedonism #ad ,utilitarianism #eb ,evolutionary ,utilitarianism #fg ,kantianism #gh ,problem and ,solution #ie ,realization of ,individuality #ig ,ethical ,postulate #abg ,,chapter ,,ii4--,the ,idea of ,obligation #aci-aeh ,bain's ,theory #adj ,spencer's ,theory #adb ,kant's ,theory #adg ,its ,real ,nature #aeb ,,chapter ,,iii4--,the ,idea of ,freedom #aeh-aff ,negative ,freedom #aeh ,potential ,freedom #aei ,positive ,freedom #afd ,,part ,,ii4--,,the ,,ethical ,,world4 ,social ,relations #afg ,moral ,institutions #afi ,,part ,,iii4--,,the ,,moral ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,individual4 ,division of ,subject #aha ,,chapter ,i4--,the ,formation and ,growth of ,ideals #ahb-baa ,conscience #ahb ,conscientiousness #aii ,development of ,ideals #bjf ,,chapter ,,ii4--,the ,moral ,struggle or the ,realizing of ,ideals #baa-bbg ,goodness as ,struggle #baa ,badness #bad ,goodness and ,badness #bba ,,chapter ,,iii4--,realized ,morality or the ,virtues #bbg-bcc ,cardinal ,virtues #bca ,,conclusion #bcc-bch ,,preface4 ,although the following pages have taken shape in connection with class-room work1 they are intended as an independent contribution to ethical science4 ,it is commonly demanded of such a work that its readers shall have some prefatory hint of its sources and deviations4 ,in accordance with this custom1 ,i may state that for the backbone of the theory here presented--the conception of the will as the expression of ideas1 and of social ideas2 the notion of an objective ethical world realized in institutions which afford moral ideals1 theatre and impetus to the individual2 the notion of the moral life as growth in freedom1 as the individual finds and conforms to the law of his social placing--for this backbone ,i am especially indebted to ,green's ',prolegomena to ,ethics'1 to ,mr4 ,bradley's ',ethical ,studies'1 to ,professor ,caird's ',social ,philosophy of ,comte' and ',critical ,philosophy of ,kant' 7to this latter book in particular my indebtedness is fundamental71 and to ,alexander's ',moral ,order and ,progress'4 ,although ,i have not been able to adopt the stand-point or the method of ,mr4 ,spencer1 or of ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen my obligation to the ',data of ,ethics' and to the ',science of ,ethics' 7especially to the latter7 is large4 ,as to the specific forms which give a flesh and blood of its own to this backbone1 ,i may call attention to the idea of desire as the ideal activity in contrast with actual possession2 to the analysis of individuality into function including capacity and environment2 to the treatment of the social bearings of science and art 7a point concerning which ,i am indebted to my friend1 ,mr4 ,franklin ,ford72 to the statement of an ethical postulate2 to the accounts of obligation1 of moral rules1 and of moral badness4 ,while the book is an analysis1 in outline1 of the main elements of the theory of ethics rather than a discussion of all possible detailed questions1 it will not be found the less fitted1 ,i hope1 to give a student an idea of the main methods and problems of contemporary ethics4 ,other teachers1 indeed1 may agree that a general outline is better than a blanket-mortgage spread over and forestalling all the activity of the student's mind4 ,i have not been unmindful of the advisability of avoiding in presentation both undue polemic1 and undue dogmatism without sufficient reference to the statements of others4 ,i hope the method hit upon1 of comparing opposite one-sided views with the aim of discovering a theory apparently more adequate1 will help keep the balance4 ,i have quoted freely from the chief modern authorities1 hoping that the tastes here given will tempt the reader to the banquet waiting in the authors themselves4 ,the occasional references introduced are not bibliographical1 nor intended as exhaustive statements of authorities consulted2 they are meant as aids to an intelligent reading on the part of the general student4 ,for this reason they are confined mainly to modern ,english writings4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,definition of ,ethics4 ,the term ethics is derived from a ,greek word meaning manners1 customs1 habits1 just as the term morals is derived from a ,latin word with a similar meaning4 ,this suggests the character of the science as an account of human action4 ,anthropology1 ethnology1 psychology1 are also1 in their way1 accounts of human action4 ,but these latter branches of knowledge simply describe1 while the business of ethics is to judge4 ,this does not mean that it belongs to ethics to prescribe what man ought to do2 but that its business is to detect the element of obligation in conduct1 to examine conduct to see what gives it its worth4 ,anthropology1 etc41 do not take into account the whole of action1 but simply some of its aspects--either external or internal4 ,ethics deals with conduct in its entirety1 with reference1 that is1 to what makes it conduct1 its end1 its real meaning4 ,ethics is the science of conduct1 understanding by conduct man's activity in its whole reach4 ,three of the branches of philosophy may be called normative1 implying that they deal with some norm1 standard or end1 estimating the value of their respective subject-matters as tested by this end4 ,these are ,logic1 dealing with the end ,truth1 and the value of intellectual processes with respect to it2 sthetics1 dealing with ,beauty and the value of emotional conditions as referred to it2 and ,ethics1 as defined above4 ,but this norm in no case comes from outside the subject-matter2 it is the subject-matter considered in its totality4 ,,ii4 ,meaning of ,moral4 ,in its widest sense1 the term moral or ethical means nothing more than relating to conduct2 having to do with practice1 when we look at conduct or practice from the point of view not of its occurrence1 but of its value4 ,action is something which takes place1 and as such it may be described like any objective fact4 ,but action has also relation to an end1 and so considered it is moral4 ,the first step in ethics is to fix firmly in mind the idea that the term moral does not mean any special or peculiar kind of conduct1 but simply means practice and action1 conduct viewed not partially1 but in connection with the end which it realizes4 ,it should be noted that the term moral has a wider and a narrower sense4 ,in the wider sense it means action in the moral sphere1 as opposed to non-moral1 and thus includes both good and bad conduct4 ,in the narrower sense it means moral1 as opposed to immoral4 ,see ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 p4 #ec1 note1 for a further meaning4 ,,iii4 ,meaning of ,conduct4 ,ethics then has to do with conduct or action viewed completely1 or in relation to its end4 ,but what is conduct8 ,it must be distinguished from action in general2 for any process of change1 the working of a pump1 the growth of a plant1 the barking of a dog1 may be called action4 ,conduct implies more than something taking place2 it implies purpose1 motive1 intention2 that the agent knows what he is about1 that he has something which he is aiming at4 ,all action accomplishes something or brings about results1 but conduct has the result in view4 ,it occurs for the sake of producing this result4 ,conduct does not simply1 like action in general1 have a cause1 but also a reason1 and the reason is present to the mind of the agent4 ,there can be conduct only when there is a being who can propose to himself1 as an end to be reached by himself1 something which he regards as worth while4 ,such a being is a moral agent1 and his action1 when conscious1 is conduct4 ,,iv4 ,division of ,ethics4 ,the main ethical problem is just this3 ,what is the conduct that really deserves the name of conduct1 the conduct of which all other kinds of action can be only a perverted or deflected form8 ,or1 since it is the end which gives action its moral value1 what is the true end1 summum bonum of man8 ,knowing this1 we have a standard by which we judge particular acts4 ,those which embody this end are right1 others wrong4 ,the question of the rightness of conduct is simply a special form of the question concerning the nature of the end or good4 ,but the end bears another relation to specific acts4 ,they are not only marked off by it as right or wrong1 but they have to fulfill it4 ,the end or good decides what should be or ought to be4 ,any act necessary to fulfill the end is a duty4 ,our second inquiry will be as to the nature of obligation or duty4 ,then we have to discuss the nature of a being who is capable of action1 of manifesting and realizing the end2 capable of right 7or wrong7 of obligatory and good action4 ,this will lead us to discuss the question of ,freedom1 or ,moral ,capacity and its ,realization4 ,the discussion of these three abstract questions will constitute ,part ,i of our theory2 ,part ,,ii will take up the various forms and institutions in which the good is objectively realized1 the family1 state1 etc42 while ,part ,,iii will be devoted to an account of the moral experience of the individual4 ,v4 ,the ,motive in ,conduct4 ,before taking up the first problem presented1 the nature of the good or the end of conduct1 it is necessary to analyze somewhat further the various sides and factors of conduct in order to see where the distinctly ethical element is to be found4 ,the elements particularly deserving consideration are 7#a7 the ,motive2 7#b7 the ,feelings or ,sentiments2 7#c7 ,consequences of the ,act2 7#d7 ,character of ,agent4 ,we shall begin with #a4 ,the ,motive4 ,the motive of the act is the end aimed at by the agent in performing the act4 ,thus the motive of ,julius ,csar in crossing the ,rubicon was the whole series of results which he intended to reach by that act of his4 ,the motive of a person in coming to college is to gain knowledge1 to prepare himself for a certain profession4 ,the motive is thus identical with the ideal element of the action1 the purpose in view4 #b4 ,the ,feelings or ,disposition4 ,some writers speak of the feelings under which the agent acts as his motive4 ,thus we may suppose ,julius ,csar 'moved' by the feelings of ambition1 of revenge1 etc41 in crossing the ,rubicon4 ,the student may be 'moved' by curiosity1 by vainglory1 by emulation1 by conscience1 in coming to college4 ,it is better1 however1 to regard the motive as the reason for which the act is performed1 and to use the term moving or impelling cause for the feelings in their relation to action4 ,thus we may imagine a parent asking a child why he struck a playmate1 meaning what was the motive of the action4 ,if the child should reply that he struck his playmate because he was angry1 this answer would give the moving cause or impelling force of the action1 but not its motive4 ,the motive would be the idea of punishing this playmate1 of getting even with him1 of taking something away from him4 ,the motive is the end which he desired to reach by striking and on account of which he struck4 ,this is implied by the fact that the parent would ask1 ,what made you angry8 ,,vi4 ,moral ,bearing of ,these ,distinctions4 ,it is the feelings which supply the impelling force to action4 ,they may be termed1 collectively1 the natural disposition4 ,the natural disposition in itself has no moral value4 ,this has been well illustrated by ,bentham4 ,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 pp4 #di-ee4 ,bentham here uses the term 'motive' to designate what we have called the moving cause4 ,we may select of the many examples which he gives that of curiosity4 ,we may imagine a boy spinning a top1 reading a useful book and letting a wild ox loose in a road4 ,now curiosity may be the 'motive' of each of these acts1 yet the first act would generally be called morally indifferent1 the second good1 the third abominable4 ,what we mean by the 'natural' feelings1 then1 is the feelings considered in abstraction from activity3 ,benevolence1 as a mere feeling1 has no higher moral value than malevolence4 ,but if it is directed upon action it gets a value at once2 let the end1 the act1 be right1 and benevolence becomes a name for a moral disposition--a tendency to act in the due way4 ,nothing is more important than to distinguish between mere sentiments1 and feeling as an element in conduct4 ,,vii4 ,relation of ,consequences and ,conduct4 ,do the consequences of an act have anything to do with its morality8 ,we may say no1 pointing to the fact that a man who does his best we call good1 although the consequences of his act may be far from good4 ,we say his purpose in acting was right1 and using as he did all the knowledge that he had1 he is not to be blamed for its bad consequences4 ,on the other hand1 it is evident that we do take into account consequences in estimating the moral value of an act4 ,suppose1 to use one of ,bentham's examples1 a person were about to shoot an animal but foresaw that in doing so there was a strong probability that he would also wound some bystander4 ,if he shot and the spectator were wounded1 should we not hold the agent morally responsible8 ,are there not multitudes of intended acts of which we say that we cannot tell whether they are good or bad until we know how they are likely to turn out8 ,the solution of the difficulty is in recognizing the ambiguity of the term 'consequences'4 ,it may mean the whole outcome of the act4 ,when ,i speak1 ,i set in motion the air1 and its vibrations have1 in turn1 long chains of effects4 ,whatever ,i do must have an endless succession of 'consequences' of which ,i can know but very little2 just so far as1 in any act1 ,i am ignorant of the conditions under which it is performed1 so far ,i am ignorant of its consequences4 ,such consequences are wholly irrelevant morally4 ,they have no more to do with the morality of the act than has the fact that the earth is revolving while the act is taking place4 ,but we may mean by consequences the foreseen consequences of an act4 ,just in the degree that any consequence is considered likely to result from an act1 just in that degree it gets moral value1 for it becomes part of the act itself4 ,the reason that in many cases we cannot judge of the morality of an intended act until we can judge its probable results1 is that until we know of these results the action is a mere abstraction1 having no content at all4 ,the conceived results constitute the content of the act to be performed4 ,they are not merely relevant to its morality1 but are its moral quality4 ,the question is whether any consequence is foreseen1 conceived1 or not4 ,the foreseen1 the ideal consequences are the end of the act1 and as such form the motive4 ,see on ,sections #f and #g1 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #cf-df2 on ,section #g1 ,green1 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 pp4 #cag-cbc4 ,,viii4 ,character and ,conduct4 ,we have seen that the moral sentiments1 or the moral disposition 7distinguished from the feelings as passing emotions71 on one side1 and the consequences as ideal or conceived 7distinguished from the consequences that1 de facto1 result71 on the other1 both have moral value4 ,if we take the moral feelings1 not one by one1 but as a whole1 as an attitude of the agent toward conduct1 as expressing the kind of motives which upon the whole moves him to action1 we have character4 ,and just so1 if we take the consequences willed1 not one by one1 but as a whole1 as the kind of end which the agent endeavors to realize1 we have conduct4 ,character and conduct are1 morally1 the same thing1 looked at first inwardly and then outwardly4 ,character1 except as manifest in conduct1 is a barren ideality4 ,our moral judgments are always severe upon a man who has nothing to show but 'good intentions' never executed4 ,this is what character comes to1 apart from conduct4 ,our only way of telling the nature of character is the conduct that issues from it4 ,but1 on the other hand1 conduct is mere outward formalism1 excepting as it manifests character4 ,to say that a man's conduct is good1 unless it is the manifestation of a good character1 is to pass a judgment which is self-contradictory4 ,see ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #dh-ej and p4 #ci4 ,from this point of view we are enabled to identify the two senses of motive already discussed--the ideal of action and the moving feelings4 ,apart from each other they are abstractions4 ,csar's motive in crossing the ,rubicon may have been 'ambition1' but this was not some bare feeling4 ,it was a feeling of ambition produced in view of the contemplation of a certain end which he wished to reach4 ,so a boy's motive in striking a playmate may be anger1 but this means 7if the act is anything more than one of blind physical reaction7 an anger having its conscious cause and aim1 and not some abstract feeling of anger in general4 ,the feeling which has its nature made what it is by the conceived end1 and the end which has ceased to be a bare abstract conception and become an interest1 are all one with each other4 ,morality is then a matter pertaining to character--to the feelings and inclinations as transformed by ends of action2 and to conduct--to conceived ends transformed into act under the influence of emotions4 ,but what kind of character1 of conduct1 is right or realizes its true end8 ,this brings us to our first problem4 ,,part ,i4 ,,fundamental ,,ethical ,,notions4 ,,chapter ,i4--,,the ,,good4 ,,ix4 ,subdivision of ,theories4 ,we may recognize three main types of theories regarding the good1 of which the first two represent 7we shall attempt to show7 each respectively one side of the truth1 while the third combines the one-sided truths of the other two4 ,of the first two theories one is abstract1 because it tends to find the good in the mere consequences of conduct aside from character4 ,this is the hedonistic theory1 which finds the good to be pleasure4 ,this is either individualistic or universalistic according as it takes individual or general pleasure to be the good4 ,the second type of theories attempts to find the good in the motive of conduct apart from consequences even as willed2 it reduces the good to conformity to abstract moral law4 ,the best type of this theory is the ,kantian4 ,we shall criticize these theories with a view to developing the factors necessary to a true moral theory4 ,x4 ,hedonism4 ,according to the strict hedonistic position1 the pleasure resulting to the agent from his act is the end of conduct and is therefore the criterion of its morality4 ,the position as usually taken involves1 first1 that pleasure is psychologically the sole motive to action2 and1 secondly1 that the results of an act in the way of the pain or pleasure it produces are the only tests we have of the rightness of the act4 ,it is said above that these two points are involved in the hedonistic position as usually taken4 ,they are not necessarily involved4 ,sidgwick 7,methods of ,ethics1 ,bk4 ,i1 ch4 ,,iv and ,bk4 ,,iv1 ch4 ,i7 holds that pleasure is not the object of desire or motive of action1 but that happiness is the moral end and criterion4 ,on the other hand ,hodgson 7,theory of ,practice1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 ,,ii7 holds that pleasure may be the motive 7in the sense of impelling force7 but it is never the criterion of conduct4 ,kant adopts the psychology of hedonism regarding pleasure as the object of desire1 but holds that on that very account no object of desire can be the standard of moral conduct4 ,a good statement of strict individualistic hedonism is the following from ,barratt1 ,physical ,ethics1 page #ga3 ,if man aims at pleasure merely by the physical law of action1 that pleasure must evidently be ultimately his own1 and whether it be or not preceded by phenomena which he calls the pain and pleasure of others1 is a question not of principle but of detail1 just as the force of a pound weight is unaltered whether it be composed of lead or of feathers1 or whether it act directly or through pulleys4 ,,xi4 ,the ,hedonistic ,position ,supported4 ,hedonism holds that pleasure is both the natural end and the proper criterion of action3 ,the following quotation from ,bentham 7,principles of ,morals and ,legislation1 ,works1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #a7 gives a statement of both these elements4 ,nature has placed man under the governance of two sovereign masters1 pain and pleasure4 ,it is for them alone to point out what we ought to do1 i4 e4 they are criteria as well as to determine what we shall do motives4 ,on the one hand1 the standard of right or wrong criterion2 on the other the chain of causes and effects motives1 are fastened to their throne4 #a4 ,pleasure as ,criterion4 ,that the tendency of an action to produce pleasure is the standard for judging its moral value is generally held by the hedonists to be so axiomatic as to be beyond argument4 ,see ,bain1 ,moral ,science1 p4 #bg4 ,the ultimate data must be accepted as self-evident3 they have no higher authority than that mankind generally are disposed to accept them4444 ,now there can be no proof offered for the position that happiness is the proper end of all human pursuits1 the criterion of all right conduct4 ,it is an ultimate or final assumption to be tested by reference to the individual judgment of mankind4 ,so ,bentham1 ,enquiry ,i1 ,,ii1 ,the principle is not susceptible of direct proofs for that which is used to prove everything else can not itself be proved2 a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere4 ,mill1 ,utilitarianism4 7,dissertations and ,discussions1 pp4 #cdh-cdi74 ,the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it4 ,in like manner the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it4 ,see ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #db2 ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 pp4 #cj-cb and p4 #df2 ,lotze1 ,practical ,philosophy1 pp4 #ah-ai3 ,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 pp4 #cfh-cfi4 ,hedonism1 then1 represents the good or the desirable and pleasure to be two names for the same fact4 ,what indeed can be worth while unless it be either enjoyable in itself or at least a means to enjoyment8 ,would theft be considered bad if it resulted in pleasure or truth itself good if its universal effect were pain8 #b4 ,pleasure as object of desire4 ,it is also urged that psychological analysis shows that pleasure is not only the desirable1 but also always the desired4 ,desire for an object is only a short way of saying desire for the pleasure which that object may bring4 ,to want food is to want the pleasure it brings2 to want scientific ability is to desire to find satisfaction1 or attain happiness4 ,thus it is laid down as a general principle that the invariable object of desire1 and motive of action is some pleasure to be attained2 the action itself and the direct end of action being simply means to pleasure4 ,for a strong statement of this doctrine see ,mill1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ced-e4 ,desiring a thing and finding it pleasant1 aversion to it and thinking of it as painful1 are phenomena entirely inseparable1 or rather two parts of the same phenomenon1--in strictness of language1 two different modes of naming the same psychological fact2 to think of an object as desirable and to think of it as pleasant are one and the same thing4 ,see also1 ,bain1 ,emotions and ,will1 p4 #dcf1 ,senses and ,intellect1 pp4 #cch-cdd2 ,sully1 ,outlines of ,psychology1 p4 #ege1 ,the inclination or tendency of the active mind towards what is pleasurable and away from what is painful is the essential fact in willing4 ,also pp4 #egf-egg4 ,,xii4 ,criticism4 ,pleasure ,not the ,end of ,impulse4 ,taking up the points in reverse order1 we shall endeavor to show first1 that the motive of action1 in the sense of end aimed at1 is not pleasure4 ,this point in itself1 is1 of course1 rather psychological than ethical4 ,taking up then the psychology of pleasure in its connection with will1 we shall discuss its relation to impulse1 to desire and to motive4 ,it is generally agreed that the raw material of volition is found in some form or other of the impulsive or instinctive actions4 ,such tendencies 7e4 g41 the impulse for food1 for drink1 for unimpeded motion7 clearly precede the reaching of an end1 and hence the experience of any pleasure in the end4 ,our first actions1 at least1 are not for pleasure2 on the contrary1 there is an activity for some independent end1 and this end being reached there is pleasure in an act which has succeeded4 ,this suggests as a possible principle that pleasure is not so much the end of action1 as an element in the activity which reaches an end4 ,what ,aristotle says of another matter is certainly true of instinctive action4 ,it is not true of every characteristic function that its action is attended with pleasure1 except indeed the pleasure of attaining its end4 ,see ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bii-cjj2 ,sidgwick1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ch-de4 ,,xiii4 ,criticism--,continued4 ,pleasure ,not the ,end of ,desire4 ,it may1 however1 be said that1 while our instinctive actions have another end than pleasure1 this is not true of conscious desires--that1 indeed1 just the difference between instinct and desire is that the former goes blindly to its end1 while the latter superimposes the thought of the pleasure to be reached upon the mere instinct4 ,so we have to analyze the nature of desire4 ,a child1 led by impulse1 has put a piece of sugar into his mouth1 just as1 under the same circumstances1 he would put a piece of stone into his mouth4 ,but his action results in a state of pleasure wholly unforseen by him4 ,now the next time the child sees the sugar he will not merely have the impulse to put it in his mouth4 ,there will also be the remembrance of the pleasure enjoyed from sugar previously4 ,there is consciousness of sugar as satisfying impulse and hence desire for it4 #a4 ,this is a description of an instance of desire4 ,does it bear us out in the doctrine that pleasure is the object of desire8 ,it is possible that1 in an irrational animal1 the experience of eating food reinforces the original instinct for it with associated images of pleasure4 ,but even this is very different from a desire for pleasure4 ,it is simply the primordial instinct intensified and rendered more acute by new sensational factors joined to it4 ,in the strict sense1 there is still no desire1 but only stronger impulse4 ,wherever there is desire there is not only a feeling of pleasure associated with other feelings 7e4 g41 those of hunger1 thirst71 but there is the consciousness of an object in which satisfaction is found4 ,the error of the hedonistic psychology is in omitting one's consciousness of an object which satisfies4 ,the hedonists are quite right in holding that the end of desire is not any object external to consciousness1 but a condition of consciousness itself4 ,the error begins in eliminating all objective 7that is1 active7 elements from consciousness1 and declaring it to be a mere state of feeling or sensation4 ,the practical consciousness1 or will1 cannot be reduced to mere feeling1 any more than the theoretical consciousness1 or knowledge1 can be so reduced4 ,even ,mill1 in its statement of the hedonistic psychology1 does not succeed in making the object of desire mere pleasure as a state of feeling4 ,it is the pleasant thing and not pleasure alone which he finds equivalent to the desire4 ,it is true enough that sugar as an external fact does not awaken desire1 but it is equally true that a child does not want a passive pleasure4 ,what he wants is his own activity in which he makes the sugar his own4 ,and it should be remembered that the case of sugar is at once a trivial and an exceptional one4 ,not even children want simply sweet-meats2 and the larger the character which finds expression in wants1 the more does the direct object of want1 the bread1 the meat1 become a mere element in a larger system of activity4 ,what a man wants is to live1 and he wants sweet-meats1 amusements1 etc41 just as he wants substantials--on account of their value in life4 ,professor ,james compares the idea that pleasure is the end of desire to saying that because no steamer can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal1 444 therefore no steamer can go to sea for any other motive than that of coal-consumption4 ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #eeh4 ,see the entire passage1 pp4 #edi-eei4 #b4 ,but granting that an 'object' and a 'pleasure' are both necessary to desire1 it may be argued that the 'object' is ultimately a means to 'pleasure4' ,this expressly raises a question already incidentally touched upon3 ,what is the controlling element in desire8 ,why is the object thought of as pleasant8 ,simply because it is thought of as satisfying want4 ,the hedonists1 says ,green 7,prolegomena to ,ethics1 p4 #afh71 make the mistake of supposing that a desire can be excited by the anticipation of its own satisfaction4 ,this is to say1 of course1 that it exists before it exists1 and thus brings itself into being4 ,green1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #afg1 states the matter thus3 ,ordinary motives are interests in the attainment of objects1 without which it seems to the man that he cannot satisfy himself1 and in the attainment of which1 because he has desired them1 he will find a certain pleasure1 but only because he has previously desired them1 not because pleasures are the objects desired4 ,bradley says on this same point 7,ethical ,studies1 p4 #bcj73 ,the difference is between my finding my pleasure in an end1 and my finding means for the end of my pleasure1 and the difference is enormous4 ,consult the entire passage1 pp4 #bbf-bce4 ,see also ,caird1 ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bbi4 ,it is the object1 then1 which controls1 and the pleasure is on account of the attaining of the desired object4 ,but even this statement makes more division in desire than actually exists2 for #c4 ,the real object of desire is activity itself4 ,the will takes its rise1 as we have seen1 in impulse2 in the reaching for something to satisfy some felt lack4 ,now1 in reality1 desire adds nothing to impulse excepting consciousness of the impulse4 ,volitional action does not differ from impulsive or instinctive1 except in bringing to consciousness the nature of the want and of the activity necessary to satisfy it4 ,but this makes just the difference between 'natural' or animal activity1 and 'moral' or human activity4 ,to be conscious of the impulse is to elevate it from a blind impelling force to an intended or proposed end2 and thus1 by bringing it before consciousness1 both to extend its range and to idealize it1 spiritualize it4 ,to be conscious of an impulse for food means to give up the unreasoned and momentary seizing of it2 to consider the relation of things to this want1 what will satisfy it best1 most easily1 etc4 ,the object of desire is not something outside the action2 it is an element in the enlarged action4 ,and as we become more and more conscious of impulse for food1 we analyze our action into more and more 'objects' of desire1 but these objects never become anything apart from the action itself4 ,they are simply its analyzed and defined content4 ,man wants activity still1 but he knows better what activity means and includes4 ,thus1 when we learn what the activity means1 it changes its character4 ,to the animal the activity wanted is simply that of eating the food1 of realizing the momentary impulse4 ,to man the activity becomes enlarged to include the satisfaction of a whole life1 and not of one life singly1 but of the family1 etc41 connected with the single life4 ,the material well-being of the family becomes one of the objects of desire into which the original impulse has grown4 ,but we misinterpret1 when we conceive of this well-being as an external object lying outside the action4 ,it means simply one aspect of the fuller action4 ,by like growing consciousness of the meaning of the impulse1 production and exchange of commodities are organized4 ,the impulse for food is extended to include a whole range of commercial activities4 ,it is evident that this growing consciousness of the nature of an impulse1 whereby we resolve it into manifold and comprehensive activities1 also takes the impulse out of its isolation and brings it into connection with other impulses4 ,we come to have not a series of disconnected impulses1 but one all-inclusive activity in which various subordinate activities 7or conscious impulses7 are included4 ,thus1 in the previous example1 the impulse for food is united with the family impulse1 and with the impulse for communication and intercourse with society generally4 ,it is this growing unity with the whole range of man's action that is the 'spiritualizing' of the impulse--the natural and brutal impulse being just that which insists upon itself irrespective of all other wants4 ,the spiritualizing of the impulse is organizing it so that it becomes one factor in action4 ,thus we literally come to 'eat to live'1 meaning by life not mere physical existence1 but the whole possible sphere of active human relations4 #d4 ,relation of activity to pleasure4 ,we have seen that the 'object' of desire in itself is a mere abstraction2 that the real object is full activity itself4 ,we are always after larger scope of movement1 fuller income in order to get larger outgo4 ,the 'thing' is always for the sake of doing2 is a part of the doing4 ,the idea that anything less or other than life 7movement1 action1 and doing71 can satisfy man is as ridiculous when compared with the actual course of things in history1 as it is false psychologically4 ,freedom is what we want1 and freedom means full unimpeded play of interests1 that is1 of conscious impulses 7see ,sec4 #cd and #ea74 ,if the object is a mere abstraction apart from activity1 much more is pleasure4 ,mere pleasure as an object is simply the extreme of passivity1 of mere having1 as against action or doing4 ,it is possible to make pleasure to some degree the object of desire2 this is just what the voluptuary does4 ,but it is a commonplace that the voluptuary always defeats himself4 ,he never gets satisfaction who identities satisfaction with having pleasures4 ,the reason is evident enough4 ,activity is what we want1 and since pleasure comes from getting what we want1 pleasure comes only with activity4 ,to give up the activity1 and attempt to get the pleasure is a contradiction in effect4 ,hence also the 'hedonistic paradox'--that in order to get pleasure we must aim at something else4 ,there is an interesting recognition of this in ,mill himself1 7see his ,autobiography1 p4 #adb74 ,and in his ,utilitarianism1 in discussing the feasibility of getting happiness1 he shows 7pp4 #cah-cai7 that the sources of happiness are an intelligent interest in surrounding things--objects of nature1 achievements of art1 incidents of history--and especially an unselfish devotion to others4 ,which is to say that man does not find satisfaction in pleasure as such at all1 but only in objective affairs--that is1 in complete interpretation1 in activity with a wide and full content4 ,further consideration of the end of desire and its relation to pleasure may be found in ,green1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #abc-acb2 pp4 #afc-afg4 ,bradley1 ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xiii1 p4 #a1 and ,dewey1 ,psychology1 pp4 #cfj-cfe4 ,,xiv4 ,criticism--,continued4 ,character and ,pleasure4 ,it now being admitted that the end of desire is activity itself in which the 'object' and 'pleasure' are simply factors1 what is the moving spring to action8 ,what is it that arouses the mind to the larger activity8 ,most of the hedonists have confounded the two senses of motive already spoken of1 and have held that because pleasure is the end of desire1 therefore it is the moving spring of conduct 7or more often that because it is the moving spring of conduct it therefore is the end of desire74 ,mr4 ,stephen 7,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #df-eh71 although classing himself as a hedonist1 has brought out this confusion very clearly4 ,ordinary hedonism confounds1 as he shows1 the judgment of what is pleasant--the supposed end--with the pleasant judgment--the moving spring4 7,see also ,bradley1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bcb-bcf74 ,it may be admitted that it is feeling which moves to action1 but it is the present feeling which moves4 ,if the feeling aimed at moves1 it is only as through anticipation it becomes the present feeling4 ,now is this present feeling which moves 7#a7 mere pleasure and 7#b7 mere feeling at all8 ,this introduces us to the question of the relation of pleasure 7and of feeling in general7 to character4 #a4 ,if the existing state of consciousness--that which moves--were pure pleasure1 why should there be any movement1 any act at all8 ,the feeling which moves must be in so far complex3 over against the pleasure felt in the anticipation of an end as satisfying1 there must be pain felt in the contrasting unsatisfactory present condition4 ,there must be tension between the anticipated or ideal action1 and the actual or present 7relative7 non-action4 ,and it is this tension1 in which pain is just as normal an element as pleasure1 which moves4 ,desire is just this tension of an action which satisfies1 and yet is only ideal1 against an actual possession which1 in contrast with the ideal action1 is felt as incomplete action1 or lack1 and hence as unsatisfactory4 #b4 ,the question now comes as to the nature of this tension4 ,we may call it 'feeling1' if we will1 and say that feeling is the sole motive power to action4 ,but there is no such thing as feeling at large1 and the important thing1 morally1 is what kind of feeling moves4 ,to take a mere abstraction like 'feeling' for the source of action is1 at root1 the fallacy of hedonism4 ,to raise the question1 ,what is it that makes the feeling what it is1 is to recognize that the feeling1 taken concretely1 is character in a certain attitude4 ,stephen1 who has insisted with great force that feeling is the sole 'motive' to action1 has yet shown with equal cogency the moral uselessness of such a doctrine1 when feeling is left undefined 7,op4 cit41 p4 #dd74 ,the love of happiness must express the sole possible motive of ,judas ,iscariot and his master2 it must explain the conduct of ,stylites on his column1 of ,tiberius at ,capre1 of ,a ,kempis in his cell1 and of ,nelson in the cockpit of the ,victory4 ,it must be equally good for saints1 martyrs1 heroes1 cowards1 debauchees1 ascetics1 mystics1 cynics1 misers1 prodigals1 men1 women1 and babes in arms4 ,surely1 this is only to say1 in effect1 that 'love of happiness' is a pure bit of scholasticism1 an undefined entity4 ,in a hedonistic argument 7by ,stanton ,coit1 ,mind1 ,vol4 ,,xi1 p4 #cdi71 the fallacy is seen in the following discussion4 ,the story is told of ,abraham ,lincoln that he once passed an animal in distress by the side of the road1 and that1 after going by1 he finally went back and got him out of the ditch4 ,on being praised for his act1 he replied that he did it on his own account1 since he kept getting more uncomfortable as he thought of the animal in distress4 ,from this1 it cannot be inferred that love of pleasure is at the basis of moral acts4 ,the mere lumping off of feeling as the spring of conduct overlooks the only important thing morally--the fact that ,lincoln felt pain at the thought of the animal unrelieved1 and pleasure at the idea of its relief1 just because he was a man of compassionate character4 ,it was not the feeling1 but the character revealed in1 and creative of1 the feeling that was the real source of the act4 ,to connect this with our previous account of desire 7p4 #bf73 the important thing morally is that the nature of the tension between fact and idea--the actual state and the ideal activity--is an expression of character4 ,what kind of activity does it take to satisfy a man8 ,does riding in a comfortable carriage1 and following the course of his own reflections exhaust his need of action8 or does his full activity require that note be taken of a suffering animal8 ,it is the kind of character one is 7that is1 the kind of activity which satisfies and expresses one7 which decides what pleasure shall be taken in an anticipated end1 what feeling of lack or hindrance 7what pain7 there shall be in the given state1 and hence what the resulting tension1 or desire1 shall be4 ,it is1 therefore1 character which moves to conduct4 ,mere wishing1 the mere floating fancy of this or that thing as desirable1 is not desire4 ,to want is an active projection of character2 really and deeply to want is no surface and passing feeling2 it is the stirring of character to its depths4 ,there may be repressed activity2 that is not1 of itself1 desire4 ,there may be an image of larger activity2 that is not1 of itself1 desire4 ,but given the consciousness of a repressed activity in view of the perception of a possible larger action1 and a man strives within himself to break his bonds and reach the new satisfaction4 ,this striving within one's self1 before the activity becomes overt1 is the emotional antecedent of action4 ,but this inward striving or tension1 which constitutes desire1 is so far from being mere emotion that it is character itself--character as it turns an inward or ideal advance into an outward1 or real progress1 into action4 ,we may fall back on ,aristotle's statement 7page #ch1 of ,peters' translation of his ethics73 ,the pleasure or pain that accompanies an act must be regarded as a test of character4 ,he who abstains from the pleasures of the body and rejoices in his abstinence is temperate1 while he who is vexed at having to abstain is still profligate4 ,as ,plato tells us1 man needs to be so trained from youth up as to take pleasure and pain in the right objects4 ,,xv4 ,summary4 ,the truth in hedonism is its conviction that the good1 the end of man1 is not to be found in any outward object1 but only in what comes home to man in his own conscious experience4 ,the error is in reducing this experience to mere having1 to bare feelings or affections1 eliminating the element of doing4 ,it is this doing which satisfies man1 and it is this which involves as its content 7as knowledge of impulse1 instead of blind impulse7 objective and permanent ends4 ,when ,mill speaks of the end of desire as a satisfied life1 7p4 #cag of ,utilitarianism7 he carries our assent2 but to reduce this satisfied life to feelings of pleasure1 and absence of pains1 is to destroy the life and hence the satisfaction4 ,as ,mill recognizes1 a life bounded by the agent's own feelings would be1 as of course1 a life centred in his own miserable individuality4 7,mill1 p4 #cai74 ,such words have meaning only because they suggest the contrast with activity in which are comprehended1 as 'ends' or 'objects' 7that is1 as part of its defined content7 things--art1 science and industry--and persons 7see ,secs4 #cd and #ce74 ,here too we must 'back to ,aristotle4' ,according to him the end of conduct is eudaimonia1 success1 welfare1 satisfied life4 ,but eudaimonia is found not in pleasure1 but in the fulfillment of human powers and functions1 in which fulfillment1 since it is fulfillment1 pleasure is had4 7,ethics1 ,bk4 ,i1 ch4 #d-h74 ,we now take up the question whether pleasure is a standard of right action1 having finished the discussion concerning it as an end of desire4 ,,xvi4 ,pleasure as the ,standard of ,conduct4 ,the line of criticism on this point may be stated as follows3 ,pleasure fails as a standard for the very reason that it fails as a motive4 ,pleasure1 as conceived by the hedonist1 is passive1 merely agreeable sensations1 without any objective and qualitative 7active7 character4 ,this being so1 there is no permanent1 fixed basis to which we may refer acts and by which we may judge them4 ,a standard implies a single comprehensive end which unifies all acts and through connection with which each gets its moral value fixed4 ,only action can be a standard for acts4 ,to reduce all acts to means to getting a mere state of feeling is the inevitable consequence of hedonism4 ,so reducing them is to deprive them of any standard of value4 ,an end to serve as standard must be 7#a7 a comprehensive end for all the acts of an individual1 and 7#b7 an end comprehending the activities of various individuals--a common good4 #a4 ,the moral end must be that for the sake of which all conduct occurs--the organizing principle of conduct--a totality1 a system4 ,if pleasure is the end it is because each detail of conduct gets its placing1 its moral value through relation to pleasure1 through the contribution it makes to pleasure4 #b4 ,the moral end must also include the ends of the various agents who make up society4 ,it must be capable of constituting a social system out of the acts of various agents1 as well as an individual system out of the various acts of one agent2 or1 more simply1 the moral end must be not only the good for all the particular acts of an individual1 but must be a common good--a good which in satisfying one1 satisfies others4 ,all ethical theories would claim that the end proposed by them served these two purposes4 ,we shall endeavor to show that the hedonistic theory1 the doctrine that the pleasure is the good1 is not capable of serving either of them4 ,,xvii4 ,pleasure ,not a ,standard4 #a4 ,it does not unify character4 ,in the first place1 the hedonistic theory makes an unreal and impossible separation between conduct and character4 ,the psychology of hedonism comes into conflict with its ethics4 ,according to the former the motive of all action is to secure pleasure or avoid pain4 ,so far as the motive is concerned1 on this theory there can be no immoral action at all4 ,that the agent should not be moved by pleasure1 and by what1 at the time of acting1 is the greatest pleasure possible1 would be a psychological impossibility4 ,every motive would be good1 or rather there would be no distinction of good or bad pertaining to the motive4 ,the character of the agent1 as measured by his motives1 could never1 under such circumstances1 have any moral quality4 ,to the consequences of action1 or the conduct proper1 however1 the terms good and bad might be applied4 ,although the agent is moved by pleasurable feelings1 the result of his action may be painful and thus bad4 ,in a word1 on the hedonistic theory1 it is only the external consequences of conduct1 or conduct divorced from character1 to which moral adjectives have any application4 ,such a separation not only contradicts our experience 7see ,,viii71 but inverts the true order of moral judgment4 ,consequences do not enter into the moral estimate at all1 except so far as1 being foreseen1 they are the act in idea4 ,that is1 it is only as the consequences are taken up into the motive1 and thus related to character1 that they are subject to moral judgment4 ,indeed1 except so far as action expresses character1 it is not conduct1 but mere physical sequence1 as irrelevant to morality as the change in blood distribution1 which also is the 'result' of an action4 ,hedonism has to rule out at the start the only thing that gives totality to action--the character of the agent1 or conduct as the outcome of motives4 ,furthermore1 the ordinary judgment of men1 instead of saying that the sole moral motive is to get pleasure1 would say that to reduce everything to means for getting pleasure is the very essence of immorality4 ,on the point above1 compare ,bentham1 ,op4 cit41 ,i1 p4 #dh4 ,a motive is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner4 ,now pleasure is in itself a good3 nay1 even1 setting aside immunity from pain1 the only good2 pain is in itself an evil1 and1 indeed1 without exception1 the only evil2 or else the words good and evil have no meaning4 ,and this is alike true of every sort of pain and of every sort of pleasure4 ,it follows1 therefore1 immediately and incontestably1 that there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one4 ,if motives are good or bad1 it is only on account of their effects2 good on account of their tendency to produce pleasure or avert pain2 bad on account of their tendency to produce pain or avert pleasure4 ,now the case is1 that from one and the same motive1 and from every kind of motive1 may proceed actions that are good1 others that are bad and others that are indifferent4 ,further1 on p4 #fj1 ,bentham asks3 ,is there nothing1 then1 about a man that can properly be termed good or bad1 when on such or such an occasion he suffers himself to be governed by such or such a motive8 ,yes1 certainly1 his disposition4 ,now disposition is a kind of fictitious entity1 feigned for the convenience of discourse1 in order to express what there is supposed to be permanent in a man's frame of mind4 ,it is with disposition as with everything else2 it will be good or bad according to its effects4 ,the first quotation1 it will be noticed1 simply states that the motive is in itself always good1 while conduct 7i4 e41 consequences7 may be good1 bad or indifferent4 ,the second quotation seems1 however1 to pass moral judgment upon character under the name of disposition4 ,but disposition is judged according to the tendency of a person's actions4 ,a good or bad disposition1 here1 can mean nothing intrinsic to the person1 but only that the person has been observed to act in ways that usually produce pain or pleasure1 as the case may be4 ,the term is a 'fiction'1 and is a backhanded way of expressing a somewhat habitual result of a given person's conduct his motive remaining good 7or for pleasure7 all the time4 ,the agent would never pronounce any such judgment upon his own disposition1 unless as a sort of surprise that1 his motive being 'good1' his actions turn out so 'bad' all the time4 ,at most1 the judgment regarding disposition is a sort of label put upon a man by others1 a label of ,look out for him1 he is dangerous1 or1 ,behold1 a helpful man4 ,the moral standard of hedonism does not1 then1 bear any relation to the character of the agent1 does not enable us to judge it1 either as a whole or in any specific manifestation4 ,,xviii4 ,it ,does ,not ,give a ,criterion for ,concrete ,acts4 ,pleasure1 as the end1 fails also to throw light on the moral value of any specific acts4 ,its failure in this respect is1 indeed1 only the other side of that just spoken of4 ,there is no organizing principle1 no 'universal' on the basis of which various acts fall into a system or order4 ,the moral life is left a series of shreds and patches1 where each act is torn off1 as to its moral value1 from every other4 ,each act is right or wrong1 according as it gives pleasure or pain1 and independently of any whole of life4 ,there is1 indeed1 no whole of moral life at all1 but only a series of isolated1 disconnected acts4 ,possession1 passivity1 mere feeling1 by its very nature cannot unite--each feeling is itself and that is the end of it4 ,it is action which reduces multiplicity to unity4 ,we cannot say1 in the hedonistic theory1 that pleasure is the end1 but pleasures4 ,each act stands by itself--the only question is3 ,what pleasure will it give8 ,the settling of this question is the hedonistic calculus4 ,we must discover the intensity1 duration1 certainty1 degree of nearness of the pleasure likely to arise from the given act1 and also its purity1 or likelihood of being accompanied by secondary pains and pleasures4 ,then we are to strike the balance between the respective sums on the pleasure and pain sides1 and1 according as this balance is one of pleasure or pain1 the act is good or evil4 ,bentham1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #af1 was the first to go into detail as to this method4 ,he has also given certain memoriter verses stating the points on which the whole fabric of morals and legislation may be seen to rest4 ,intense1 long1 certain1 speedy1 fruitful1 pure1 ,such marks in pleasures and in pains endure1 ,such pleasures seek1 if private be thy end4 ,if it be public1 wide let them extend4 ,such pains avoid whichever be thy view1 ,if pains must come1 let them extend to few4 ,this1 however1 in its reference to others1 states the utilitarian as well as the hedonistic view4 ,now1 it must be remembered that1 if pleasure is the end1 there is no intrinsic connection between the motive of the act1 and its result4 ,it is not claimed that there is anything belonging intrinsically to the motive of the act which makes it result in pleasure or pain4 ,to make such a claim would be to declare the moral quality of the act the criterion of the pleasure1 instead of pleasure the criterion of the act4 ,the pleasures are external to the act2 they are irrelevant and accidental to its quality4 ,there is no 'universal1' no intrinsic bond of connection between the act and its consequences4 ,the consequence is a mere particular state of feeling1 which1 in this instance1 the act has happened to bring about4 ,more concretely1 this act of truth-telling has in this instance1 brought about pleasure4 ,shall we call it right8 ,right in this instance1 of course2 but is it right generally8 ,is truth-telling1 as such1 right1 or is it merely that this instance of it happens to be right8 ,evidently1 on the hedonistic basis1 we cannot get beyond the latter judgment4 ,prior to any act1 there will be plenty of difficulties in telling whether it1 as particular1 is right or wrong4 ,the consequences depend not merely on the result intended1 but upon a multitude of circumstances outside of the foresight and control of the agent4 ,and there can be only a precarious calculation of possibilities and probabilities--a method which would always favor laxity of conduct in all but the most conscientious of men1 and which would throw the conscientious into uncertainty and perplexity in the degree of their conscientiousness4 ,if once the pleas of instinct are to be abolished and replaced by a hedonistic arithmetic1 the whole realm of animated nature has to be reckoned with in weaving the tissue of moral relations1 and the problem becomes infinite and insoluble4--,martineau1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ccd4 ,but waive this2 let the particular case be settled4 ,there is still no law1 no principle1 indeed no presumption as to future conduct4 ,the act is not right because it is truth-telling1 but because1 in this instance1 circumstances were such as to throw a balance of pleasure in its favor4 ,this establishes no certainty1 no probability as to its next outcome4 ,the result then will depend wholly upon circumstances existing then--circumstances which have no intrinsic relation to the act and which must change from time to time4 ,the hedonist would escape this abolition of all principle1 or even rule1 by falling back upon a number of cases--'past experience' it is called4 ,we have found in a number of cases that a certain procedure has resulted in pleasure1 and this result is sufficient to guide us in a vast number of cases which come up4 ,says ,mill 7,op4 cit41 pp4 #ccb-d73 ,during the whole past duration of the species1 mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies of actions1 on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of life are dependent4444 ,mankind must by this time have acquired positive belief as to the effects of some actions on their happiness2 and the beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of morality for the multitude1 and for the philosopher1 until he has succeeded in finding better4444 ,nobody argues that the art of navigation is not founded on astronomy1 because sailors cannot wait to calculate the ',nautical ,almanac'4 ,being rational creatures1 they go to sea with it ready calculated2 and all rational creatures go out upon the sea of life with their minds made up on the common questions of right and wrong1 as well as on many of the far more difficult questions of wise and foolish4 ,that we do learn from experience the moral nature of actions is undoubted4 ,the only question is3 if hedonism were true1 could we so learn8 ,suppose that ,i were convinced that the results of murder in the past had been generally1 or even without exception 7though this could not be proved71 painful2 as long as the act and the result in the way of feeling 7pain or pleasure7 are conceived as having no intrinsic connection1 this would not prove that in the present instance murder will give a surplus of pain4 ,i am not thinking of committing murder in general1 but of murder under certain specific present circumstances4 ,these circumstances may1 and1 to some extent1 must vary from all previous instances of murder4 ,how then can ,i reason from them to it8 ,or1 rather1 let me use the previous cases as much as ,i may1 the moral quality of the act ,i am now to perform must still be judged not from them1 but from the circumstances of the present case4 ,to judge otherwise1 is1 on hedonistic principles1 to be careless1 perhaps criminally careless as to one's conduct4 ,the more convinced a man is of the truth of hedonism and the more conscientious he is1 the more he is bound not to be guided by previous circumstances1 but to form his judgment anew concerning the new case4 ,this result flows out of the very nature of the hedonistic ideal4 ,pleasure is not an activity1 but simply a particular feeling1 enduring only while it is felt4 ,moreover1 there is in it no principle which connects it intrinsically with any kind of action4 ,to suppose then that1 because ninety-nine cases of murder have resulted in pain1 the hundredth will1 is on a par with reasoning that because ninety-nine days have been frosty1 the hundredth will be4 ,each case1 taken as particular1 must be decided wholly by itself4 ,there is no continuous moral life1 and no system of conduct4 ,there is only a succession of unlike acts4 ,mill1 in his examination of ,whewell1 7,diss4 and ,diss41 ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #aeh-ei71 tries to establish a general principle1 if not a universal law1 by arguing that1 even in exceptional cases1 the agent is bound to respect the rule1 because to act otherwise would weaken the rule1 and thus lead to its being disregarded in other cases1 in which its observance results in pleasure4 ,there are1 he says1 persons so wicked that their removal from the earth would undoubtedly increase the sum total of happiness4 ,but if persons were to violate the general rule in these cases1 it would tend to destroy the rule4 ,if it were thought allowable for any one to put to death at pleasure any human being whom he believes that the world would be well rid of1--nobody's life would be safe4 ,that is to say1 if every one were really to act upon and carry out the hedonistic principle1 no rule of life would exist4 ,this does very well as a reductio ad absurdum of hedonism1 or as an argument against adopting hedonism1 but it is difficult to see how ,mill thought that it established a 'rule' on a hedonistic basis4 ,mill's argument comes to saying that if hedonism were uniformly acted upon1 it would defeat itself--that is1 pleasure would not result4 ,therefore1 in order to get pleasure1 we must not act upon the principle of hedonism at all1 but follow a general rule4 ,otherwise put3 hedonism gives no general rule1 but we must have a general rule to make hedonism works and therefore there is a general rule6 ,this begging of the question comes out even more plainly as ,mill goes on3 ,if one person may break through the rule on his own judgment1 the same liberty cannot be refused to others2 and1 since no one could rely on the rule's being observed1 the rule would cease to exist4 ,all of this is obviously true1 but it amounts to saying3 ,we must have a rule1 and this we would not have if we carried out the hedonistic principle in each case2 therefore1 we must not carry it out4 ,a principle1 that carried out destroys all rules which pretend to rest upon it1 lays itself open to suspicion4 ,mill assumes the entire question in assuming that there is a rule4 ,grant this1 and the necessity of not 'making exceptions1' that is1 of not applying the hedonistic standard to each case1 on its own merits1 follows4 ,but the argument which ,mill needs to meet is that hedonism requires us to apply the standard to each case in itself1 and that1 therefore1 there is no rule4 ,mill simply says--assume the rule1 and it follows1 etc4 ,see ,bradley1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #if-aja2 ,green1 ,bk4 ,,iv1 ,ch4 #c2 ,martineau1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cbi-ccd4 ,,xix4 ,the ,sum and the ,quality of ,pleasure as the ,standard4 ,we have been dealing with hedonism in its strict form--that which makes a pleasure1 considered as to its intensity1 certainty1 etc41 the end of an act4 ,hedonism in this form fails to unify life1 and fails1 therefore1 to supply any standard4 ,but the end of conduct is often stated to be the greatest possible sum of pleasures thus introducing a certain element of generality4 ,mill goes further and brings in the idea of quality of pleasure4 ,regarding the sum of pleasures the following from ,sidgwick 7,op4 cit41 p4 #chb2 see also p4 #aad7 gives the hedonistic statement4 ,the assumption is involved that all pleasures are capable of being compared qualitatively with one another and with all pains2 that every feeling has a certain intensive quality1 positive or negative 7or perhaps zero7 in respect to its desirableness and that the quantity may be known1 so that each may be weighed in ethical scales against any other4 ,this assumption is involved in the very motion of maximum happiness1 as the attempt to make as great as possible a sum of elements not quantitatively commensurable would be a mathematical absurdity4 ,i4 ,sum of pleasures as the moral end4 ,this1 first1 taken as criterion1 comes into conflict with the hedonistic psychology of pleasure as the motive of acts2 and1 secondly1 it requires some objective standard by means of which pleasure is to be summed1 and is1 in so far1 a surrender of the whole hedonistic position4 #a4 ,if the object of desire is pleasure or a state of feeling which exists only as it is felt1 it is impossible that we should desire a greatest sum of pleasures4 ,we can desire a pleasure and that only4 ,it is not even possible that we should ever desire a continuous series of pleasures4 ,we can desire one pleasure and when that is gone1 another1 but we can not unify our desires enough to aim at even a sum of pleasures4 ,this is well put by ,green 7,op4 cit1 p4 #bcf74 ,for the feeling of a pleased person1 or in relation to his sense of enjoyment1 pleasure cannot form a sum4 ,however numerous the sources of a state of pleasant feeling1 it is one and is over before another can be enjoyed4 ,it and its successors can be added together in thought1 but not in enjoyment or in imagination of an enjoyment4 ,if the desire is only for pleasure1 i4 e41 for an enjoyment or feeling of pleasure1 we are simply victims of words when we talk of desire for a sum of pleasures1 much more when we take the greatest imaginable sum to be the most desirable4 ,see the whole passage1 pp4 #bce-bdf4 #b4 ,but the phrase sum of pleasures undoubtedly has a meaning--though the fact that it has a meaning shows the untruth of the hedonistic psychology4 ,surrendering this psychology1 what shall we say of the maximum possibility of pleasure as the criterion of the morality of acts8 ,it must be conceded that this conception does afford some basis--although a rather slippery one--for the unification of conduct4 ,each act is considered now not in its isolation merely1 but in its connection with other acts1 according as its relation to them may increase or decrease the possible sum of future happiness4 ,but this very fact that some universal1 or element of relation1 albeit a quantitative one1 has been introduced1 arouses this inquiry3 ,whence do we derive it8 ,how do we get the thought of a sum of pleasure1 and of a maximum sum8 ,only by taking into account the objective conditions upon which pleasures depend1 and by judging the pleasures from the standpoint of these objective conditions4 ,when we imagine we are thinking of a sum of pleasures1 we are really thinking of that totality of conditions which will come nearest affording us self-satisfaction--we are thinking of a comprehensive and continuous activity whose various parts are adjusted to one another4 ,because it is complete activity1 it is necessarily conceived as giving the greatest possible pleasure1 but apart from reference to complete activity and apart from the objects in which this is realized1 the phrase 'greatest sum of happiness' is a mere phrase4 ,pleasures must be measured by a standard1 by a yard stick1 before they can be summed in thought1 and the yard stick we use is the activity in which the pleasure comes4 ,we do not measure conduct by pleasure1 but we compare and sum up pleasures on the basis of the objects which occasion them4 ,to add feelings1 mere transitory consequences1 without first reducing those feelings to a common denominator by their relation to one objective standard1 is an impossibility4 ,pleasure is a sort of sign or symbol of the object which satisfies1 and we may carry on our judgment1 if we will1 in terms of the sign1 without reference to the standard1 but to argue as if the sign were the thing1 as if the sum of pleasure were the activity1 is suicidal4 ,thus ,green says 7,op4 cit41 p4 #bdd73 ,in truth a man's reference to his own true happiness is a reference to the objects which chiefly interest him1 and has its controlling power on that account4 ,more strictly1 it is a reference to an ideal state of well-being1 a state in which he shall be satisfied2 but the objects of the man's chief interests supply the filling of that ideal state4 ,see the argument as put by ,alexander 7,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #aii-bjj74 ,alexander has also brought out 7,ibid41 pp4 #bjg-baj7 that even if we are going to use a quantitative standard1 the idea of a sum is not a very happy one4 ,it is not so much a sum of pleasures we want1 as a certain proportionate distribution and combination of pleasures4 ,to regard the greatest sum of pleasures as the test of conduct1 supposing that we could express it in units of pleasure1 would be like declaring that when you had an atomic weight of #ih you had sulphuric acid4 ,the numerical test would be useless unless we knew what elements were to be combined1 and in what proportion4 ,similarly till we know what kinds of activities 7and therefore what kinds of pleasures7 go with one another to form the end1 the greatest sum of pleasures will give us only the equivalent of the end1 but will not tell us what the composition of the end is1 still less how to get at it2 or1 to put the matter more simply1 when we know what the characters of persons are1 and how they are combined in morality1 we then estimate the corresponding sum of pleasures4 7p4 #bji47 ,,ii4 ,a certain quality of pleasure the end4 ,some moralists1 notably ,john ,stuart ,mill1 introduce considerations regarding the quality of pleasure into the conception of the end4 ,it is quite compatible1 says ,mill1 with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others4 7p4 #caj47 ,is it compatible8 ,is kind of pleasure the same thing as pleasure8 does not strict hedonism demand that all kinds of pleasure equally present as to intensity in consciousness shall be of the same value8 ,to say otherwise is to give up pleasure as such as the standard and to hold that we have means for discriminating the respective values of pleasures which simply1 as feelings1 are the same4 ,it is to hold1 that is to say1 that there is some standard of value external to the pleasures as such1 by means of which their moral quality may be judged4 ,in this case1 this independent standard is the real moral criterion which we are employing4 ,hedonism is surrendered4 ,kant's position on this point seems impregnable4 ,it is surprising1 he says1 that men otherwise astute can think it possible to distinguish between higher and lower desires1 according as the ideas which are connected with the feeling of pleasure have their origin in the senses or in the understanding2 for when we inquire what are the determining grounds of desire1 and place them in some expected pleasantness1 it is of no consequence whence the idea of this pleasing object is derived1 but only how much it pleases4444 ,the only thing that concerns one1 in order to decide choice1 is how great1 how long continued1 how easily obtained and how often repeated1 this agreeableness is4 ,for as to the man who wants money to spend1 it is all the same whether the gold was dug out of the mountain or washed out of the sand1 provided it is every-where accepted at the same value2 so the man who cares only for the enjoyment of life does not ask whether the ideas are of the understanding or the senses1 but only how much and how great pleasure they will give for the longest time4 ,see also ,bradley1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aje-aaj4 ,when we ask how the differences in quality are established and how we translate this qualitative difference into moral difference1 the surrender of pleasure as the standard becomes even more evident4 ,we must know not only the fact of different qualities1 but how to decide which is 'higher' than any other4 ,we must bring the qualities before a tribunal of judgment which applies to them some standard of measurement4 ,in themselves qualities may be different1 but they are not higher and lower4 ,what is the tribunal and what is the law of judgment8 ,according to ,mill the tribunal is the preference of those who are acquainted with both kinds of pleasure4 ,of two pleasures1 if there be one to which all1 or almost all who have experience of both1 give a decided preference1 irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it1 that is the more desirable pleasure4 ,it is an unquestionable fact that such differences exist4 ,few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures4 ,no intelligent person would consent to be a fool2 no instructed person would be an ignoramus2 no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base1 even though they should be persuaded that the fool1 the dunce or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs4444 ,it is better to be a human being dissatisfied1 than a pig satisfied2 better to be a ,socrates dissatisfied1 than a fool satisfied4 ,and if the fool or the pig are of a different opinion1 it is because they only know their own side of the question4 ,the other party to the comparison knows both sides4--,mill1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #caa-cac4 ,and in an omitted portion ,mill says the reason that one of the higher faculty would prefer a suffering which goes along with that higher capacity1 to more pleasure on a lower plane1 is something of which the most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity1 which all human beings possess in one form or another4 ,a question immediately arises regarding this standard of preferability4 ,is it the mere historical fact that some man1 who has experienced both1 prefers ,a to ,b that makes ,a more desirable8 ,surely ,i might say that if that person prefers ,a1 ,a is more desirable to him1 but that ,i for my part prefer ,b1 and that ,i do not intend to give up my preference4 ,and why should ,i1 even though thousands of other men happened to prefer ,a8 ,b is the greater pleasure1 none the less1 to me1 and as a hedonist ,i must cling to the only standard that ,i have4 ,the hedonists1 in a word1 have appealed to feeling1 and to feeling they must go for judgment4 ,and feeling exists only as it is felt and only to him who feels it4 ,on the other hand1 perhaps it is not the bare act that some men prefer one pleasure to another that makes it more desirable1 but something in the character of the men who prefer4 ,and this is what ,mill implies4 ,it is a sense of dignity belonging to man which makes his judgment of pleasure better than that of animals2 it is the human being against the pig1 ,socrates against the fool1 the good man against the rascal4 ,this is the complete surrender of hedonism1 and the all but explicit assertion that human character1 goodness1 wisdom1 are the criteria of pleasure1 instead of pleasure the criterion of character and goodness4 ,mill's sense of dignity1 which is to be considered in all estimates of pleasures1 is just the sense of a moral 7or active7 capacity and destiny belonging to man4 ,to refer pleasures to this is to make it the standard1 and with this standard the anti-hedonist may well be content1 while asking1 however1 for its further analysis4 ,to sum up our long discussion of pleasure as a criterion of conduct in respect of its unity1 we may say3 ,pleasure1 as it actually exists in man1 may be taken as a criterion1 although not the really primary one1 of action4 ,but this is not hedonism2 for pleasure as it exists is something more than pleasurable feeling2 it is qualified through and through by the kind of action which it accompanies1 by the kind of objects which the activity comprehends4 ,and thus it is always a secondary criterion4 ,the moment we begin to analyze we must ask what kind of activity1 what kind of object it is which the pleasure accompanies and of which it is a symbol4 ,we may1 if we will1 calculate a man's wealth in terms of dollars and cents2 but this is only because we can translate the money1 the symbol1 into goods1 the reality4 ,to desire pleasure instead of an activity of self1 is to substitute symbol for fact1 and a symbol cut off from fact ceases to be a symbol4 ,pleasure1 as the hedonist treats it1 mere agreeable feeling without active and thus objective relationships1 is wholly an abstraction4 ,since an abstraction1 to make it the end of desire results in self-contradiction2 while to make it the standard of conduct is to deprive life of all unity1 all system1 in a word--of all standard4 ,,xx4 ,the ,failure of ,pleasure as a ,standard to ,unify ,conduct ,socially4 ,thus far our examination of the hedonistic criterion has been devoted to showing that it will not make a system out of individual conduct4 ,we have now to recognize the fact that pleasure is not a common good1 and therefore fails to give a social unity to conduct--that is1 it does not offer an end for which men may coperate1 or a good which reached by one must be shared by another4 ,no argument is needed to show1 theoretically1 that any proposed moral criterion must1 in order to be valid1 harmonize the interests and activities of different men1 or to show1 practically1 that the whole tendency of the modern democratic and philanthropic movement has been to discover and realize a good in which men shall share on the basis of an equal principle4 ,it is contended that hedonism fails to satisfy these needs4 ,according to it1 the end for each man is his own pleasure4 ,pleasure is nothing objective in which men may equally participate4 ,it is purely individual in the most exclusive sense of that term4 ,it is a state of feeling and can be enjoyed only while felt1 and only by the one who feels it4 ,to set it up for the ideal of conduct is to turn life into an exclusive and excluding struggle for possession of the means of personal enjoyment2 it is to erect into a principle the idea of the war of all against all4 ,no end more thoroughly disintegrating than individual agreeable sensation could well be imagined4 ,says ,kant1 7page #aaf of ,abbott's ,trans41 entitled ,kant's ,theory of ,ethics7 on the basis of the desire of happiness there results a harmony like that which a certain satirical poem depicts as existing between a married couple bent on going to ruin3 ,o1 marvellous harmony1 what he wishes1 she wishes also2 or like what is said of the pledge of ,francis ,i to the emperor ,charles ,v1 what my brother ,charles wishes that ,i wish also 7viz41 ,milan74 ,almost all modern moralists who take pleasure as the end conceive it to be not individual pleasure1 but the happiness of all men or even of all sentient creatures4 ,thus we are brought to the consideration of ,utilitarianism4 ,says ,mill 7,op4 cit41 p4 #cbc71 ,the happiness which forms the ,utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness1 but that of all concerned2 as between his own happiness and that of others1 ,utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator4 ,and 7page #cae7 the ,utilitarian standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness1 but the greatest amount of happiness altogether4 ,see also ,sidgwick 7,op4 cit41 p4 #cgi71 ,by ,utilitarianism is here meant the ethical theory1 first distinctly formulated by ,bentham1 that the conduct which1 under any given circumstances is externally or objectively right is that which will produce the greatest amount of happiness on the whole2 that is1 taking into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct4 ,it would tend to clearness if we might call this principle1 and the method based upon it1 by some such name as ,universalistic hedonism4 ,as popularly put1 the utilitarian standard is the greatest happiness of the greatest number4 ,while in its calculation each is to count for one and only one4 7,bentham74 ,and finally ,bain 7,emotions and ,mill1 p4 #cjc71 ,utility is opposed to the selfish theory1 for1 as propounded1 it always implies the good of society generally1 and the subordination of individual interests to the general good4 ,,xxi4 ,criticism of ,utilitarianism4 ,the utilitarian theory certainly does away entirely with one of the two main objections to hedonism--its failure to provide a general1 as distinct from a private end4 ,the question which we have to meet1 however1 is whether this extension of the end from the individual to society is consistent with the fundamental principles of hedonism4 ,how do we get from individual pleasure to the happiness of all8 ,an intuitional utilitarian1 like ,sidgwick1 has ready an answer which is not open to the empirical utilitarians1 like ,bentham1 ,mill and ,bain4 ,methods of ,ethics1 ,bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 #ac-ad1 p4 #cee4 ,we may obtain the self-evident principle that the good of any one individual is of no more importance1 as a part of universal good1 than the good of any other4 ,the abstract principle of the duty of benevolence1 so far as it is cognizable by direct intuition is1 that one is morally bound to regard the good of any other individual as much as one's own--and page #cfd1 the principles1 so far as they are immediately known by abstract intuition1 can only be stated as precepts to seek 7#a7 one's own good on the whole1 and 7#b7 the good of any other no less than one's own1 in so far as it is no less an element of universal good4 ,sidgwick1 that is1 differs in two important points from most utilitarians4 ,he holds that pleasure is not the sole1 or even the usual object of desire4 ,and he holds that we have an immediate faculty of rational intuition which informs us that the good of others is as desirable an end of our conduct as is our own happiness4 ,our former arguments against pleasure as the end1 bear1 of course1 equally against this theory1 but not the following arguments4 ,criticisms of this position of ,sidgwick's will be found in ,green 7,op4 cit41 pp4 #djf-dae72 ,bradley 7,op4 cit41 pp4 #aad-aag74 ,the popular answer to the question how we get from individual to general happiness1 misses the entire point of the question4 ,this answer simply says that happiness is 'intrinsically desirable'4 ,let it be so2 but 'happiness' in this general way is a mere abstraction4 ,happiness is always a particular condition of one particular person4 ,whose happiness is desirable and to whom8 ,because my happiness is intrinsically desirable to me1 does it follow that your happiness is intrinsically desirable to me8 ,indeed1 in the hedonistic psychology1 is it not nonsense to say that a state of your feeling is desirable to me8 ,mill's amplified version of the popular answer brings out the ambiguity all the more plainly4 ,he says 7,utilitarianism1 p4 #cdi71 ,no reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable1 except that each person1 so far as he believes it to be obtainable1 desires his own happiness4 ,this1 however1 being a fact1 we have not only all the proof which the case admits of1 but all which it is possible to require1 that happiness is a good2 that each person's happiness is a good to that person2 and the general happiness1 therefore1 a good to the aggregate of all persons4 ,but does it follow that because the happiness of ,a is an end to ,a1 the happiness of ,b an end to ,b1 and the happiness of ,c an end to ,c1 that1 therefore1 the happiness of ,b and ,c is an end to ,a8 ,there is obviously no connection between the premises and the supposed conclusion4 ,and there appears to be1 as ,mill puts it1 only an account of the ambiguity of his last clause1 the general happiness a good to the aggregate of all persons4 ,the good of ,a and ,b and ,c may be a good to the aggregate 7,a ,b ,c71 but what universalistic hedonism requires is that the aggregate good of ,a ,b ,c1 be a good to ,a and to ,b and to ,c taken separately--a very different proposition4 ,mill is guilty of the fallacy known logically as the fallacy of division--arguing from a collective whole to the distributed units4 ,because all men want to be happy1 it hardly follows that every man wants all to be happy4 ,there is1 accordingly1 no direct road from individualistic hedonism--private pleasure--to universalistic--general pleasure4 ,moreover1 if we adopt the usual psychology of hedonism and say that pleasure is the motive of acting1 it is absolutely absurd to say that general pleasure can be a motive4 ,how can ,i be moved by the happiness which exists in some one else8 ,i may feel a pleasure resembling his1 and be moved by it1 but that is quite a different matter4 ,,xxii4 ,indirect ,means of ,identifying ,private and ,general ,pleasure4 ,is there any indirect method of going from the pleasure of one to the pleasure of all8 ,upon the whole1 the utilitarians do not claim that there is any natural and immediate connection between the desire for private and for general happiness1 but suppose that there are certain means which are instrumental in bringing about an identity4 ,of these means the sympathetic emotions and the influence of law and of education are the chief4 ,each of these1 moreover1 coperates with the other4 #a4 ,sympathetic and ,social ,emotions4 ,we are so constituted by nature that we take pleasure in the happiness of others and feel pain in their misery4 ,a proper regard for our own welfare must lead us1 therefore1 to take an interest in the pleasure of others4 ,our own feelings1 moreover1 are largely influenced by the feelings of others toward us4 ,if we act in a certain way we shall incur the disapprobation of others1 and this1 independently of any overt punishment it may lead them to inflict upon us1 arouses feelings of shame1 of inferiority1 of being under the displeasure of others1 feelings all of which are decidedly painful4 ,the more enlightened our judgment1 the more we see how our pleasures are bound up in those of others4 ,the ,dictates of ,utility 7,bentham1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #ef7 are neither more nor less than the dictates of the most extensive and enlightened 7that is1 well advised7 benevolence1 and 7p4 #ah71 ,the pleasures of benevolence are the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be possessed by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence4444 ,these may also be called the pleasures of good will1 the pleasures of sympathy1 or the pleasures of the benevolent or social affections2 and 7p4 #add71 ,what motives 7independent of such as legislation and religion may choose to furnish7 can one man have to consult the happiness of another8444 ,in answer to this1 it cannot but be admitted that the only interests which a man at all times and upon all occasions is sure to find adequate motives for consulting1 are his own4 ,notwithstanding this1 there are no occasions in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men4 ,in the first place he has1 on all occasions1 the purely social motive of sympathy and benevolence2 in the next place he has1 on most occasions1 the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of reputation4 ,and so in the ,deontology1 which1 however1 was not published by ,bentham himself1 page #bjc1 ,the more enlightened one is1 the more one forms the habit of general benevolence1 because it is seen that the interests of men combine with each other in more points than they conflict in4 #b4 ,education and ,law4 ,education1 working directly and internally upon the feelings1 and government1 appealing to them from without through commands and penalties1 are constantly effecting an increasing identity of self-interest and regard for others4 ,these means supplement the action of sympathy and the more instinctive emotions4 ,they stimulate and even induce a proper interest in the pleasures of others4 ,in governmental law1 with its punishments1 we have an express instrument for making the pleasures of one harmonize with 7or at least not conflict with7 the pleasures of others4 ,thus ,bentham1 after stating that an enlightened mind perceives the identity of self-interest and that of others 7or of egoism and altruism1 as these interests are now commonly called71 goes on 7,deontology1 p4 #bja73 ,the majority do not have sufficient enlightenment1 nor enough moral feeling so that their character goes beyond the aid of laws1 and so the legislator should supplement the frailty of this natural interest1 in adding to it an artificial interest more appreciable and more continuous4 ,thus the government augments and extends the connexion which exists between prudence and benevolence4 ,mill says 7,op4 cit41 p4 #cbc73 ,to do as you would be done by1 and to love your neighbor as yourself1 constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality4 ,as the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal1 utility would enjoin1 first1 that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness or the interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole2 and1 secondly1 that education and opinion1 which have so vast a power over human character1 should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole4 ,,xxiii4 ,private ,pleasures and ,general ,welfare4 ,in criticism of these indirect methods of establishing the identity of 'egoism' and 'altruism1' it may be said3 #a4 ,that the supposed relation between the private and the general happiness is extrinsic1 and hence always accidental and open to exception4 ,it is not contended that there is any order which morally demands that there be an identity of interests4 ,it is simply argued that there are certain physical and psychological forces which operate1 as matter of fact1 to bring about such a result4 ,now we may admit1 if we like1 that such forces exist and that they are capable of accomplishing all that ,bentham and ,mill claim for them4 ,but all that is established is1 at most1 a certain state of facts which is interesting as a state of facts1 but which has no especial moral bearing4 ,it is not pretended that there is in the very order of things any necessary and intrinsic connection between the happiness of one and of another4 ,such identity as exists1 therefore1 must be a mere external result of the action of certain forces4 ,it is accidental4 ,this being the case1 how can it constitute the universal ideal of action8 ,why is it not open for an agent1 under exceptional circumstances1 to act for his own pleasure1 to the exclusion of that of others8 ,we may admit that1 upon the whole 7or that always1 though this is wholly impossible to prove7 in past experience1 personal pleasure has been best attained by a certain regard for the pleasures of others2 but the connection being wholly empirical 7that is1 of past instances and not of an intrinsic law71 we may ask how it can be claimed that the same connection is certain to hold in this new case8 ,nor is it probable that any one would claim that the connection between individual pleasure and general pleasure had been so universal and invariable in past experience4 ,intrinsic moral considerations 7that is1 those based on the very nature of human action7 being put aside1 a pretty strong case could be made out for the statement that individual happiness is best attained by ignoring the happiness of others4 ,probably the most that can be established on the other side is that a due prudence dictates that some attention be paid to the pleasures of others1 in calculating one's own pleasures4 ,and this suggests3 #b4 ,that the end is still private pleasure1 general pleasure being simply a means4 ,granting all that the hedonists urge1 what their arguments prove is not that the general pleasure is the end of action1 but that1 private pleasure being the end1 regard for the pleasures of others is one of the most efficient means of reaching it4 ,if private pleasure is a selfish end1 the end is not less selfish because the road to it happens to bring pleasure to others also4 ,see ,royce1 ,religious ,aspect of ,philosophy1 pp4 #fa-gd4 #c4 ,the use of education and law to bring about this identity1 presupposes that we already have the ideal of the identity as something desirable to realize--it takes for granted the very thing to be proved4 ,why should it occur to men to use the private influence of opinion and education1 and the public influences of law and penalty to identify private welfare with public1 unless they were already convinced that general welfare was the end of conduct1 the one desirable thing8 ,what the hedonist has to do is to show how1 from the end of private happiness1 we may get to the end of general happiness4 ,what ,bentham and ,mill do show is1 that if we take general happiness as the end1 we may and do use education and law to bring about an identity of personal and general pleasures4 ,this may go undoubted1 but the question how we get the general happiness as the end1 the good1 remains unanswered4 ,nor is this all4 ,the conception of general happiness1 taken by itself1 has all the abstractness1 vagueness and uncertainty of that of personal happiness1 multiplied indefinitely by the greater number of persons introduced4 ,to calculate the effects of actions upon the general happiness--when happiness is interpreted as a state of feeling--is an impossibility4 ,and thus it is that when one is speaking of pleasures one is really thinking of welfare1 or well-being1 or satisfied and progressive human lives4 ,happiness is considered as it would be1 if determined by certain active and well defined interests1 and thus the hedonistic theory1 while contradicting itself1 gets apparently all the support of an opposed theory4 ,universalistic hedonism thus1 more or less expressly1 takes for granted a social order1 or community of persons1 of which the agent is simply one member like any other4 ,this is the ideal which it proposes to realize4 ,in this way--although at the cost of logical suicide--the ideal gets a content and a definiteness upon which it is possible to base judgments4 ,that this social organization of persons is the ideal which ,mill is actually thinking of1 rather than any succession of states of agreeable sensation1 is evident by his treatment of the whole subject4 ,mill is quite clear that education and opinion may produce any sort of feeling1 as well as truly benevolent motives to actions4 ,for example1 in his critique of ,whewell1 he says1 7,op4 cit41 p4 #aed73 ,all experience shows that the moral feelings are preminently artificial1 and the products of culture2 that even when reasonable1 they are no more spontaneous than the growth of corn and wine 7which are quite as natural71 and that the most senseless and pernicious feeling can as easily be raised to the utmost intensity by inculcation1 as hemlock and thistles could be reared to luxuriant growth by sowing them instead of wheat4 ,it is certainly implied here that legislation1 education and public opinion must have as a presupposed standard the identity of general and private interests or else they may produce anything whatever4 ,that is to say1 ,mill instead of arriving at his result of general happiness simply takes it for granted4 ,this fact and the further fact that he virtually defines happiness through certain objective interests and ends 7thus reversing the true hedonistic position7 is obvious from the following1 7,mill1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #cdc-cdg73 ,after again stating that the moral feelings are capable of cultivation in almost any direction1 and stating that moral associations that are of artificial construction dissolve through the force of intellectual analysis 7cf4 his ,autobiography1 p4 #acf71 and that the association of pleasure with the feeling of duty would similarly dissolve unless it had a natural basis of sentiment1 he goes on4 ,but there is this basis of powerful natural sentiment4 ,this firm foundation is that of the social feelings of mankind2 the desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures4 ,the social state is at once so natural1 so necessary1 and so habitual to man that except in some unusual circumstances1 or by an effort of voluntary abstraction he never conceives of himself otherwise than as a member of a body4 ,any condition1 therefore1 which is essential to a state of society becomes more and more an inseparable part of every person's conception of the state of things which he is born into1 and which is the destiny of a human being4 ,mill then goes on to describe some of the ways in which the social unity manifests itself and influences the individual's conduct4 ,then the latter comes1 as though instinctively1 to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regard to others4 ,the good of others becomes to him a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to1 like any of the physical conditions of our existence4 ,the deeply-rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being tends to make him feel it as one of his natural wants1 that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow-creatures4 ,this conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality4 ,it is to be noticed that there is involved in this account three ideas1 any one of which involves such a reconstruction of the pleasure theory as to be a surrender of hedonism4 #a4 ,there is1 in one instance1 a natural 7or intrinsic7 connection between the end of conduct and the feelings1 and not simply an external or artificial bond4 ,this is in the case of the social feelings4 ,in other words1 in one case the ideal1 that is1 happiness1 is intrinsically1 or necessarily connected with a certain kind of conduct1 that flowing from the social impulses4 ,this1 of course1 reverses hedonism for it makes happiness dependent upon a certain kind of conduct1 instead of determining the nature of conduct according as it happens to result in pleasure or pain4 #b4 ,man conceives of himself1 of his end or of his destiny as a member of a social body1 and this conception determines the nature of his wants and aims4 ,that is to say1 it is not mere happiness that a man wants1 but a certain kind of happiness1 that which would satisfy a man who conceived of himself as social1 or having ends and interests in common with others4 #c4 ,finally1 it is not mere general happiness which is the end1 at all4 ,it is social unity2 harmony of feelings and aims1 a beneficial condition for one's self in which the benefits of all are included4 ,instead of the essentially vague idea of states of pleasurable sensation we have the conception of a community of interests and ends1 in securing which alone is true happiness to be found4 ,this conception of the moral ideal we regard as essentially true1 but it is not hedonism4 ,it gives up wholly the notion that pleasure is the desired1 and1 since it sets up a standard by which it determines pleasure1 it gives up equally the notion that pleasure as such is the desirable4 ,in addition to the works already referred to1 the following will give fuller ideas of hedonism and utilitarianism3 ,for historical treatment see ,sidgwick1 ,history of ,ethics2 ,jodl1 ,geschichte der ,ethik1 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #dhb-dfh2 ,bain1 ,moral ,science1 ,historical ,mention2 ,guyau1 ,la ,morale ,anglaise ,contemporaine2 ,wallace1 ,epicureanism2 ,pater1 ,marius1 the ,epicurean2 ,paley1 ,moral and ,political ,philosophy2 ,grote1 ,examination of the ,utilitarian ,philosophy 7especially fair and valuable criticism72 ,lecky1 ,history of ,european ,morals1 ,vol4 ,i1 ch4 ,i2 ,birks1 ,utilitarianism 7hostile72 ,blackie1 ,four ,phases of ,morals3 ,essay on ,utilitarianism 7hostile72 ,gizycki1 ,students' ,manual of ,ethical ,philosophy1 7,coit's trans41 favorable72 ,calderwood1 ,hand-,book of ,moral ,philosophy 7opposed72 ,laurie1 ,ethica 7e4 g41 p4 #aj74 ,the object of will is not pleasure1 not yet happiness1 but reason-given law--the law of harmony2 but this necessarily ascertained through feeling1 and1 therefore1 through happiness4 ,wilson and ,fowler1 ,principles of ,morals1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #ih-aab2 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bfb-bgc4 ,paulsen1 ,system der ,ethik1 pp4 #aie-baj4 ,,xxiv4 ,the ,utilitarian ,theory ,combined ,with the ,doctrine of ,evolution4 ,there has lately been an attempt to combine utilitarian morality with the theory of evolution4 ,this position1 chiefly as occupied by ,herbert ,spencer and ,leslie ,stephen1 we shall now examine4 ,alexander1 also1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 makes large use of the theory of evolution1 but does not attempt to unite it with any form of hedonism4 ,for the combination1 at least three decided advantages are claimed over ordinary utilitarianism4 #a4 ,it transforms 'empirical rules' into 'rational laws4' ,the evolutionary hedonists regard pleasure as the good1 but hold that the theory of evolution enables them to judge of the relation of acts to pleasure much better than the ordinary theory4 ,as ,mr4 ,spencer puts it1 the ordinary theory is not scientific1 because it does not fully recognize the principle of causation as existing between certain acts as causes1 and pleasures 7or pains7 as effects4 ,it undoubtedly recognizes that some acts do result in pain or pleasure1 but does not show how or why they so result4 ,by the aid of the theory of evolution we can demonstrate that certain acts must be beneficial because furthering evolution1 and others painful because retarding it4 ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 pp4 #egeh4 ,morality properly so-called--the science of right conduct--has for its object to determine how and why certain rules of conduct are detrimental1 and certain other rules beneficial4 ,those good and bad results cannot be accidental1 but must be necessary consequences of the constitution of things2 and ,i conceive it to be the business of moral science to deduce1 from the laws of life and the conditions of existence1 what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness1 and what kinds to produce unhappiness4 ,having done this1 its deductions are to be recognized as laws of conduct2 and are to be conformed to irrespective of a direct estimation of happiness or misery4444 ,the objection which ,i have to the current utilitarianism is1 that it recognizes no more developed form of utility--does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of moral science4444 ,it is supposed that in future1 as now1 utility is to be determined only by observation of results2 and that there is no possibility of knowing by deduction from fundamental principles what conduct must be detrimental and what conduct must be beneficial4 ,cf4 also ch4 ,,ix1 and ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 ,,ix4 ,it is contended1 then1 that by the use of the evolutionary theory1 we may substitute certain conditions1 which in the very nature of things tend to produce happiness1 for a calculation1 based upon observation of more or less varying cases in the past1 of the probable results of the specific action4 ,thus we get a fixed objective standard and do away with all the objections based upon the uncertainty1 vagueness and liability to exceptions1 of the ordinary utilitarian morality4 ,spencer1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #afb3 ,when alleging that empirical utilitarianism is but introductory to rational utilitarianism ,i pointed out that the last does not take welfare for its immediate object of pursuit1 but takes for its immediate object of pursuit conformity to certain principles which1 in the nature of things1 causally determine welfare4 #b4 ,it reconciles 'intuitionalism' with 'empiricism4' ,the theory of evolution not only gives us an objective standard on which happiness necessarily depends1 and from which we may derive our laws of conduct1 instead of deriving them from observation of particular cases1 but it enables us to recognize that there are certain moral ideas now innate or intuitive4 ,the whole human race1 the whole animal race1 has for an indefinite time been undergoing experiences of what leads to pleasure and of what leads to pain1 until finally the results of these experiences have become organized into our very physical and mental make-up4 ,the first point was that we could substitute for consideration of results consideration of the causes which determine these results2 the present point is that so far as we have to use results1 we can use those of the race1 instead of the short span of the individual's life4 ,spencer1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #abc-abd4 ,the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race have been producing corresponding nervous modifications1 which1 by continued transmission and accumulation1 have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition--certain emotions corresponding to right and wrong conduct1 which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility4444 ,the evolution hypothesis thus enables us to reconcile opposed moral theories4444 ,the doctrine of innate powers of moral perception become congruous with the utilitarian doctrine1 when it is seen that preferences and aversions are rendered organic by inheritance of the effects of pleasurable and painful experiences in progenitors4 #c4 ,it reconciles 'egoism' with 'altruism4' ,as we have seen1 the relation of personal pleasure to general happiness presents very serious difficulties to hedonism4 ,it is claimed1 however1 that the very process of evolution necessitates a certain identity4 ,the being which survives must be the being which has properly adapted himself to his environment1 which is largely social1 and there is assurance that the conduct will be adapted to the environment just in the degree in which pleasure is taken in acts which concern the welfare of others4 ,if an agent has no pleasure in such acts he will either not perform them1 or perform them only occasionally1 and thus will not meet the conditions of surviving4 ,if surrounding conditions demand constantly certain actions1 those actions in time must come to be pleasurable4 ,the conditions of survival demand altruistic action1 and hence such action must become pleasurable to the agent 7and in that sense egotistic74 ,from the laws of life 7,spencer ,op4 cit41 p4 #bje7 it must be concluded that unceasing social discipline will so mould human action1 that eventually sympathetic pleasures will be pursued to the fullest extent advantageous to each and all4444 ,though pleasure may be gained by giving pleasure1 yet the thought of the sympathetic pleasure to be gained will not occupy consciousness1 but only the thought of the pleasure given4 ,,xxv4 ,criticism of ,evolutionary ,utilitarianism4 ,regarding the whole foregoing scheme1 it may be said so far as it is true1 or suggestive of truth1 it is not hedonistic4 ,it does not judge actions from their effects in the way of pleasure or pain1 but it judges pleasures from the basis of an independent standard 'in the nature of things4' ,it is expressly declared that happiness is not to be so much the end1 as the test of conduct1 and it is not happiness in general1 of every sort and kind1 but a certain kind of happiness1 happiness conditioned by certain modes of activity1 that is the test4 ,spencer's hedonism in its final result hardly comes to more than saying that in the case of a perfect individual in a perfect society1 every action whatever would be accompanied by pleasure1 and that1 therefore1 in such a society1 pleasure would be an infallible sign and test of the morality of action--a position which is not denied by any ethical writer whatever1 unless a few extreme ascetics4 ,such a position simply determines the value of pleasure by an independent criterion1 and then goes on to say of pleasure so determined1 that it is the test of the morality of action4 ,this may be true1 but1 true or not1 it is not hedonistic4 ,furthermore1 this standard by which the nature of pleasure is determined is itself an ethical 7that is1 active7 standard4 ,we have already seen that ,spencer conceives that the modes of producing happiness are to be deduced from the laws of life and the conditions of existence4 ,this might be1 of course1 a deduction from physical laws and conditions4 ,but when we find that the laws and conditions which ,spencer employs are mainly those of social life1 it is difficult to see why he is not employing a strictly ethical standard4 ,to deduce not right actions directly from happiness1 but the kinds of actions which will produce happiness from a consideration of a certain ideal of social relationships seems like a reversal of hedonism2 but this is what ,mr4 ,spencer does4 ,,xxvi4 ,the ,real ,criterion of ,evolutionary ,ethics4 ,mr4 ,spencer expressly recognizes that there exists 7#a7 an ideal code of conduct1 formulating the conduct of the completely adapted man in the completely evolved society4 ,such a code is called absolute ethics as distinguished from relative ethics--a code the injunctions of which are alone to be considered as absolutely right1 in contrast with those that are relatively right or least wrong1 and which1 as a system of ideal conduct1 is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving1 as well as we can1 the problems of real conduct 7p4 #bge of the ,data of ,ethics74 ,the ideal code deals1 it will be observed1 with the behavior of the completely adapted man in a completely evolved society4 ,this ideal as elsewhere stated1 is an ideal social being so constituted that his spontaneous activities are congruous with the conditions imposed by the social environment formed by other such beings4444 ,the ultimate man is one in whom there is a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society 7p4 #bge74 ,furthermore1 to make the ideal man serve as a standard1 he has to be defined in terms of the conditions which his nature fulfill--in terms of the objective requisites which must be met before conduct can be right 7p4 #agi74 ,hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state 7p4 #bhj74 ,here we have in the most express terms the recognition of a final and permanent standard with reference to which the nature of happiness is determined1 and the standard is one of social relationships4 ,to be sure it is claimed that the standard is one which results in greatest happiness1 but every ethical theory has always claimed that the ideal moral condition would be accompanied by the maximum possible happiness4 #b4 ,the ideal state is defined with reference to the end of evolution4 ,that is1 ,spencer defines pleasure from an independent standard instead of using pleasure as the standard4 ,this standard is to be got at by considering that idea of fully evolved conduct given by the theory of evolution4 ,this fully evolved conduct implies3 7i47 ,greatest possible quantity of life1 both in length and breadth2 7ii47 ,similar maintenance of life in progeny2 and 7iii47 ,life in which there is no interference of actions by one with those of another1 and1 indeed1 life in which the members of a society give material help in the achievement of ends1 thus rendering the lives of all more complete4 7,see ,chap4 ,,ii of ,data of ,ethics74 ,furthermore1 the complete life here identified with the ideally moral life may be otherwise defined as a life of perfect equilibrium 7p4 #gd71 or balance of functions 7p4 #ij71 and this considered not simply with reference to the individual1 but also with reference to the relation of the individual to society4 ,complete life in a complete society is but another name for complete equilibrium between the co-ordinated activities of each social unit and those of the aggregate of units 7p4 #gd1 and the whole of chap4 ,v4 ,see also pp4 #afi-agj for the position that the end is a society in which each individual has full functions freely exercised in due harmony1 and is1 p4 #ajj1 the spontaneous exercise of duly proportioned faculties74 #c4 ,not only is pleasure thus determined by an objective standard of complete living in a complete society but it is expressly recognized that as things are now1 pleasure is not a perfect guide to1 or even test of action4 ,and this difficulty is thought to be removed by reference to the ideal state in which right action and happiness will fully coincide4 ,the failure of pleasure as a perfect test and guide of right conduct1 comes out in at least three cases3-- #a4 ,there is the conflict of one set of pleasures with another1 or of present happiness with future1 one lot having to be surrendered for the sake of another4 ,this is wrong1 since pleasure as such is good1 and1 although a fact at present1 exists only on account of the incomplete development of society4 ,when there is complete adjustment of humanity to the social state there will be recognition of the truth that actions are completely right only when1 besides being conducive to future happiness1 special and general1 they are immediately pleasurable1 and that painfulness1 not only ultimate but proximate1 is the concomitant of actions which are wrong 7p4 #bi4 ,see for various cases in which pleasures are not connected with actions which must be performed and for the statement that this difficulty will be removed in an ideal state of society1 p4 #gg2 pp4 #he-hg2 pp4 #ih-ii74 #b4 ,there is also1 at present1 a conflict of individual happiness with social welfare4 ,in the first place1 as long as there exist antagonistic societies1 the individual is called upon to sacrifice his own happiness to that of others1 but such moralities are1 by their definition1 shown to belong to incomplete conduct2 not to conduct that is fully evolved 7,see pp4 #acc-acg74 ,furthermore1 there will be conflict of claims1 and consequent compromises between one's own pleasure and that of others 7p4 #adh71 until there is a society in which there is complete living through voluntary co-operation1 this implying negatively that one shall not interfere with another and shall fulfill contracts1 and positively that men shall spontaneously help to aid one another lives beyond any specified agreement 7pp4 #adf-adi74 #c4 ,there is1 at present1 a conflict of obligation with pleasure4 ,needed activities1 in other words1 have often to be performed under a pressure1 which either lessens the pleasure of the action1 or brings pain1 the act being performed1 however1 to avoid a greater pain 7so that this point really comes under the first head74 ,but the remoulding of human nature into fitness for the requirements of social life1 must eventually make all needful activities pleasurable1 while it makes displeasurable all activities at variance with these requirements 7p4 #ahc74 ,the things now done with dislike1 through sense of obligation1 will be done then with immediate liking 7p4 #hd1 and p4 #ahf2 and pp4 #bee-bef74 ,all the quotations on these various points are simply so many recognitions that pleasure and pain as such are not tests of morality1 but that they become so when morality is independently realized4 ,pleasure is not now a test of conduct1 but becomes such a test as fast as activity becomes full and complete6 ,what is this but to admit 7what was claimed in ,sec4 ,,xiii7 that activity itself is what man wants2 not mere activity1 but the activity which belongs to man as man1 and which therefore has for its realized content all man's practical relationships4 ,of ,spencer's conception of the ideal as something not now realized1 but to be some time or other realized once for all1 we have said nothing4 ,but see below1 ,sec4 #fd1 and also ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bfd-bgg1 and also ,james1 ,unitarian ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xxii41 pp4 #bab-bac4 ,we have attempted1 above1 to deal with evolutionary ethics only in the one point of its supposed connection with pleasure as a standard4 ,accounts and criticisms of a broader scope will be found in ,darwin1 ,descent of ,man2 ,martineau1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cce-cic2 ,schurman1 ,ethical ,import of ,darwinism2 ,sorley1 ,ethics of ,naturalism1 chapters ,v1 and ,,vi2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 particularly pp4 #ca-cd2 #gh-hi2 #cei-cgi2 ,royce1 ,religious ,aspect of ,philosophy1 pp4 #gd-he2 ,everett1 ,poetry1 ,comedy and ,duty1 ,essay on the ,new ,ethics2 ,seth in ,mind1 ,jan4 #ahhi1 on ,evolution of ,morality2 ,dewey1 ,andover ,review1 ,vol4 ,,vii1 p4 #egj2 ,hyslop1 ,ibid41 ,vol4 ,,ix1 p4 #cdh4 ,,xxvii4 ,formal ,ethics4 ,we come now to the ethical theories which attempt to find the good not only in the will itself1 but in the will irrespective of any end to be reached by the will4 ,the typical instance of such theories is the ,kantian1 and we shall1 therefore1 make that the basis of our examination4 ,kant's theory1 however1 is primarily a theory not of the good1 but of the nature of duty1 and that makes a statement of his doctrine somewhat more difficult4 ,the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law 7of which it seems as if it must be the foundation71 but only after it and by means of it 7,abbott's ,trans41 p4 #aed74 ,separating1 as far as we can1 his theory of the good from that of duty1 we get the following results3 #a4 ,goodness belongs to the will1 and to that alone4 ,nothing can possibly be conceived1 in the world or out of it1 which can be called good without qualification except a good will4 ,the will is not good because of what it brings about1 or what it is fitted to bring about2 that is1 it is not good on account of its adaptation to any end outside of itself4 ,it is good in itself4 ,it is like a jewel which shines by its own light1 having its whole value in itself4 #b4 ,the good1 then1 is not to be found in any object of will or of desire1 nor in the will so far as it is directed towards an end outside itself4 ,for the will to be moved by inclination or by desire is for it to be moved for the sake of some external end1 which1 moreover1 is always pleasure 7,kant1 i4 e41 agrees with the hedonists regarding the object of desire1 but on that very ground denies that pleasure is the good or the desirable74 ,if1 then1 no object of desire can be the motive of a good will1 what is its motive8 ,evidently only some principle derived from the will itself4 ,the good will is the will which acts from regard to its own law4 #c4 ,what is the nature of this law8 ,all objects of desire 7i4 e41 all material7 have been excluded from it4 ,it must1 therefore1 be purely formal4 ,the only content of the law of the good will is the idea of law itself4 ,the good will acts from reverences for law as law4 ,it not only acts in conformity with law1 but has the conception of law as its directing spring4 #d4 ,there must1 however1 be some application of this motive of law in general to particular motives or acts4 ,this is secured as follows3 ,the idea of law carries with it the idea of universality or self-identity4 ,to act from the idea of law is then so to act that the motive of action can be generalized--made a motive for all conduct4 ,the good will is the legislative will2 the will whose motive can be made a law for conduct universally4 ,the question in a specific case is then3 ,can your motive here be made universal1 i4 e41 a law8 ,if the action is bad1 determined by an object of desire1 it will be contingent and variable1 since pleasures are different to different persons and to the same person from moment to moment4 ,the will is good1 then1 when its motive 7or maxim7 is to be found solely in the legislative form of the action1 or in its fitness to be generalized into a universal principle of conduct1 and the law of the good will is3 ,act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation 7,abbott's ,trans41 p4 #aai2 also p4 #ee74 #e4 ,the application may be illustrated by the following cases3 7a7 ,some one1 wearied by what he conceives to be the entire misery of life proposes to commit suicide1 but he asks himself whether this maxim based on the principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature2 and we see at once that a system of nature in which the very feeling1 whose office is to compel men to the preservation of life1 should lead men by a universal law to death1 cannot be conceived without contradiction4 ,that is to say1 the principle of the motive which would lead a man to suicide cannot be generalized without becoming contradictory--it cannot be made a law universal4 7b7 ,an individual wishes to borrow money which he knows that he cannot repay4 ,can the maxim of this act be universalized8 ,evidently not3 a system of nature in which it should be a universal law to promise without performing1 for the sake of private good1 would contradict itself1 for then no one would believe the promise--the promise itself would become impossible as well as the end it had in view4 7c7 ,a man finds that he has certain powers1 but is disinclined to develop them4 ,can he make the maxim of such conduct a universal law8 ,he cannot will that it should become universal4 ,as a rational being1 he must will that his faculties be developed4 7d7 ,a prosperous individual is disinclined to relieve the misery of others4 ,can his maxim be generalized8 ,it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature4 ,for a will which resolved this would contradict itself1 in as much as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others1 and in which1 by such a law of nature1 sprung from his own will1 he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires4 ,in conclusion1 then1 the good is the good will itself1 and the will is good in virtue of the bare form of its action1 independently of all special material willed4 ,see ,abbott's trans41 pp4 #i-df2 #aje-abj4 ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #aga-aha2 #bji-bab4 ,,xxviii4 ,relation of this ,theory to ,hedonism4 ,the ,kantian theory1 as already noticed1 agrees in its psychology with hedonism4 ,it holds that pleasures are the objects of desire4 ,but it reverses the conclusion which hedonism draws from this fact as to the desirable4 ,since pleasures are the object of desire1 and pleasures can give no law1 no universality to action1 the end of action must be found wholly outside the pleasures1 and wholly outside the desires4 ,it can be found only in the bare law of the will itself4 #a4 ,hedonism finds the end of conduct1 or the desirable1 wholly determined by the various particular desires which a man happens to have2 ,kantianism holds that to discover the end of conduct1 we must wholly exclude the desires4 #b4 ,hedonism holds that the rightness of conduct is determined wholly by its consequences2 ,kantianism holds that the consequences have nothing to do with the rightness of an act1 but that it is decided wholly by the motive of the act4 ,from this contrast1 we may anticipate both our criticism of the ,kantian theory and our conception of the true end of action4 ,the fundamental error of hedonism and ,kantianism is the same--the supposition that desires are for pleasure only4 ,let it be recognized that desires are for objects conceived as satisfying or developing the self1 and that pleasure is incidental to this fulfillment of the capacities of self1 and we have the means of escaping the one-sidedness of ,kantianism as well as of hedonism4 ,we can see that the end is neither the procuring of particular pleasures through the various desires1 nor action from the mere idea of abstract law in general1 but that it is the satisfaction of desires according to law4 ,the desire in its particular character does not give the law2 this1 as we saw in our criticism of hedonism1 is to take away all law from conduct and to leave us at the mercy of our chance desires as they come and go4 ,on the other hand the law is not something wholly apart from the desires4 ,this1 as we shall see1 is equally to deprive us of a law capable of governing conduct4 ,the law is the law of the desires themselves--the harmony and adjustment of desires necessary to make them instruments in fulfilling the special destiny or business of the agent4 ,from the same point of view we can see that the criterion is found neither in the consequences of our acts as pleasures1 nor apart from consequences4 ,it is found indeed in the consequences of acts1 but in their complete consequences3--those upon the agent and society1 as helping or hindering them in fulfillment of their respective functions4 ,,xxix4 ,criticism of ,kantian ,criterion of ,conduct4 #a4 ,with reference to the unification of the conduct of the individual4 ,of pleasure as the object of desire1 we need now say nothing further1 but may proceed at once to the criticism of the theory that the will1 acting according to the mere idea of law in general1 is the end of man and hence that it is the criterion of the rightness or wrongness of his acts4 ,we shall attempt to show that such an end is wholly empty1 and that it fails 7as much as hedonism7 to unify conduct or to place any specific act as to its morality4 ,the difficulty of the end proposed by ,kant is that it is an abstraction2 that it is remote4 ,the hedonist leaves out one element from conduct1 and takes into account the merely particular or individualistic side2 the ,kantian abstracts the opposite element--the merely universal4 ,the formal universal1 or universal stripped of all particular content1 has1 considered as an end of action1 at least three defects4 ,i4 ,it is an end which would make impossible that very conduct of which it is taken to be the end--that is1 moral conduct4 ,in denying that pleasure is the end of action1 we took pains to show that it 7or rather the feeling due to the tension between pleasure of a state considered better and the pain of the experienced worse state7 is a necessary element in the force impelling to action4 ,the mere conception of an end is purely intellectual2 there is nothing in it to move to action4 ,it must be felt as valuable1 as worth having1 and as more valuable than the present condition before it can induce to action4 ,it must interest1 in a word1 and thus excite desire4 ,but if feeling is1 as ,kant declares1 to be excluded from the motive to action1 because it is pathological or related to pleasure as the object of desire1 how can there be any force moving to action8 ,the mind seems to be set over against a purely theoretical idea of an end1 with nothing to connect the mind with the end4 ,unless the end interests1 unless it arouses emotion1 why should the agent ever aim at it8 ,and if the law does excite feeling or desire1 must not this1 on ,kant's theory1 be desire for pleasure and thus vitiate the morality of the act8 ,we seem to be in a dilemma1 one side of which makes moral action impossible by taking away all inducing force1 while the other makes it impossible by introducing an immoral factor into the motive4 ,kant attempts to escape from this difficulty by claiming that there is one feeling which is rational1 and not sensuous in quality1 being excited not by the conception of pleasure or pain1 but by that of the moral law itself4 ,this is the feeling of reverence1 and through this feeling we can be moved to moral action4 ,waiving the question whether the mere idea of law in general would be capable of arousing any moral sentiment--or1 putting the matter from the other side1 whether ,kant gives us a true account of the feeling of reverence--it is clear that this admission is fatal to ,kant's theory4 ,if desire or feeling as such is sensuous 7or pathological1 as ,kant terms it71 what right have we to make this one exception8 ,and if we can make this one exception1 why not others8 ,if it is possible in the case of reverence1 why not in the case1 say1 of patriotism1 or of friendship1 or of philanthropy1 or of love--or even of curiosity1 or of indignation1 or of desire for approbation8 ,kant's separation of reverence1 as the one moral sentiment from all others as pathological1 is wholly arbitrary4 ,the only distinction we can draw is of the feelings as they well up naturally in reaction upon stimuli1 sentiments not conceived and thus neither moral nor immoral1 and sentiments as transformed by ends of action1 in which case all without exception may be moral or immoral1 according to the character of the end4 ,the ,kantian separation is not only arbitrary psychologically1 but is false historically4 ,so far is it from true that the only moral sentiment is reverence for law1 that men must have been moved toward action for centuries by motives of love and hate and social regard1 before they became capable of such an abstract feeling as reverence4 ,and it may be questioned whether this feeling1 as ,kant treats it1 is even the highest or ultimate form of moral sentiment--whether it is not transitional to love1 in which there is complete union of the individual interest on one hand1 and the objective end on the other4 ,for these criticisms at greater length1 see ,caird1 ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 ,,iv4 ,,ii4 ,the ,kantian end would not bring about any system in conduct--on the contrary1 it would tend to differences and collisions4 ,what is required to give unity to the sphere of conduct is1 as we have seen1 a principle which shall comprehend all the motives to action1 giving each its due place in contributing to the whole--a universal which shall organize the various particular acts into a harmonious system4 ,now ,kant's conception of the good does not lead to such result4 ,we may even say that it makes it impossible4 ,according to ,kant each act must be considered independently of every other1 and must be capable of generalization on its own account4 ,each motive of action must be capable of being itself a universal law of nature4 ,each particular rule of action is thus made absolute1 and we are left not with one universal which comprehends all particulars in their relations to one another1 but literally with a lot of universals4 ,these not only fail to have a unity1 but each1 as absolute1 must contradict some other4 ,if the principles always to tell the truth and always to preserve life are universal in themselves1 and not universal simply through their relation to some total and controlling principle of life1 it must be impossible to reconcile them when they come into conflict4 ,see ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ahg-aij1 and p4 #bae4 ,cf4 ,treated as universal and without exception1 even two such commands as e4 g41 ',thou shalt not steal1' and ',thou shalt not kill1' must ultimately come into conflict with each other2 for1 if all other interests are to be postponed to the maintenance of the rights of property1 it is impossible that all other interests should also be postponed to the preservation of human life--and to make either property or life an absolute end is to raise a particular into a universal1 to treat a part as if it were a whole4 ,but the true moral vindication of each particular interest cannot be found in elevating it into something universal and absolute1 but only in determining its place in relation to the others in a complete system of morality4 ,,iii4 ,the principle is so empty of all content that it does not enable us to judge of any specific act4 ,a caution should be noticed here1 which is equally applicable to the criticism of hedonism3 ,when it is said that the end does not enable us to judge of specific acts1 the objection is not that the theory 7,kantianism or hedonism1 as the case may be7 does not give us rules for moral conduct4 ,it is not the business of any theory1 however correct as a theory1 to lay down rules for conduct4 ,the theory has simply to discover what the end is1 and it is the end in view which determines specific acts4 ,it is no more the business of ethics to tell what in particular a man ought to do1 than it is of trigonometry to survey land4 ,but trigonometry must state the principles by which land is surveyed1 and so ethics must state the end by which conduct is governed4 ,the objection to hedonism and ,kantianism is that the end they give does not itself stand in any practical relation to conduct4 ,we do not object to ,kantianism because the theory does not help us as to specific acts1 but because the end1 formal law1 does not help us1 while the real moral end must determine the whole of conduct4 ,suppose a man thrown into the complex surroundings of life with an intelligence fully developed1 but with no previous knowledge of right or wrong1 or of the prevailing moral code4 ,he is to know1 however1 that goodness is to be found in the good will1 and that the good will is the will moved by the mere idea of the universality of law4 ,can we imagine such an one deriving from his knowledge any idea of what concrete ends he ought to pursue and what to avoid8 ,he is surrounded by special circumstances calling for special acts1 and all he knows is that whatever he does is to be done from respect for its universal or legislative quality4 ,what community is there between this principle and what he is to do8 ,there is no bridge from the mere thought of universal law to any concrete end coming under the law4 ,there is no common principle out of which grows the conception of law on one hand1 and of the various special ends of action1 on the other4 ,suppose1 however1 that ends are independently suggested or proposed1 will the ,kantian conception serve to test their moral fitness8 ,will the conception that the end must be capable of being generalized tell us whether this or that end is one to be followed8 ,the fact is1 that there is no end whatever that in or by itself1 cannot be considered as self-identical1 or as universal4 ,if we presuppose a certain rule1 or if we presuppose a certain moral order1 it may be true that a given motive cannot be universalized without coming into conflict with this presupposed rule or order4 ,but aside from some moral system into connection with which a proposed end may be brought1 for purposes of comparison1 lying is just as capable as truth-telling of generalization4 ,there is no more contradiction in the motive of universal stealing than there is in that of universal honesty--unless there is as standard some order or system of things into which the proposed action is to fit as a member4 ,and this makes not the bare universality of the act1 but the system1 the real criterion for determining the morality of the act4 ,thus ,mill remarks1 regarding ,kant's four illustrations 7,ante1 p4 #hj71 that ,kant really has to employ utilitarian considerations to decide whether the act is moral or not4 ,for the foregoing criticisms1 see ,bradley1 ,ethical ,studies1 ,essay ,,iv2 ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ahe-ahf1 and #bab-bad1 and1 indeed1 the whole of ch4 ,,ii of ,bk4 ,,ii4 ,,xxx4 ,criticism of ,kantian ,criterion of ,conduct4 #b4 ,with reference to the furnishing of a common good or end4 ,if the ,kantian end is so formal and empty as not to enable us to bring into relation with one another the various acts of one individual1 we may agree1 without argument1 that it does not provide us with an end which shall unify the acts of different men into a connected order of conduct4 ,the moral end1 the acting from regard for law as law1 is presented to each individual by himself1 entirely apart from his relations to others4 ,that he has such relations may1 indeed1 furnish additional material to which the law must be applied1 but is something to which the character of the law is wholly indifferent4 ,the end is not in itself a social end1 and it is a mere accident if in any case social considerations have to be taken into account4 ,it is of the very quality of the end that it appeals to the individual as an isolated individual4 ,it is interesting to note the way in which ,kant1 without expressly giving up the purely formal character of the moral end1 gives it more and more content1 and that content social4 ,the moral law is not imposed by any external authority1 but by the rational will itself4 ,to be conscious of a universal self-imposed law is to be conscious of one's self as having a universal aspect4 ,the source of the law and its end are both in the will--in the rational self4 ,thus man is an end to himself1 for the rational self is man4 ,such a being is a person--,rational beings are persons1 because their nature marks them out as ends in themselves1 i4 e41 as beings who should never be used merely as means4444 ,such beings are not ends simply for us1 whose existence as brought about by our action has value1 but objective ends1 i4 e41 beings whose existence is an end in itself1 an end for which no other end can be substituted so as to reduce it to a mere means4 ,thus1 we get a second formula4 ,always treat humanity1 both in your own person and in the person of others1 as an end and never merely as a means4 7,abbott's ,trans41 pp4 #df-dg2 ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 #bai74 ,here the criterion of action is no longer the bare self-consistency of its motive1 but its consistency with the rational nature of the agent1 that which constitutes him a person4 ,and1 too1 the will of every rational being is likewise a universally law-giving will4 7,abbott1 p4 #di74 ,the conception of humanity embodied in others as well as in one's self is introduced1 and thus our criterion is socialized4 ,even now1 however1 we have a lot of persons1 each of whom has to be considered as an end in himself1 rather than a social unity as to which every individual has an equal and common reference4 ,kant advances to this latter idea in his notion of a ,kingdom of ends4 ,we get the idea of a complete and systematically connected totality of all ends--a whole system of rational beings as ends in themselves as well as of the special ends which each of them may set up for himself--i4e41 a kingdom of ends4444 ,morality is the reference of all deeds to the legislation which alone can make such a kingdom possible4 7,see ,abbott's ,trans41 pp4 #ea-eb74 ,this transformation of a mere formal universal into a society or kingdom of persons--while not sufficiently analyzed as ,kant states it 7see ,caird1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bbe-bbf7--;gives us truly a social criterion1 and we shall hereafter meet something resembling it as the true ideal4 ,as finally stated1 it does not differ in essential content from ,mill's individual who conceives of himself only as a member of a body1 or from ,spencer's free man in a free society4 ,,xxxi4 ,value of ,kantian ,theory4 ,we must not leave the ,kantian theory with the impression that it is simply the caprice of a philosopher's brain4 ,in two respects1 at least1 it presents us1 as we shall see1 with elements that must be adopted2 and even where false it is highly instructive4 ,kant's fundamental error is in his conception that all desires or inclinations are for private pleasure1 and are1 therefore1 to be excluded from the conception of the moral end4 ,kant's conclusion1 accordingly1 that the good will is purely formal follows inevitably if ever it is granted that there is any intrinsic opposition between inclination as such1 and reason or moral law as such4 ,if there is such an opposition1 all desire must be excluded from relation to the end4 ,we cannot make a compromise by distinguishing between higher and lower desires4 ,on the contrary1 if the end is to have content1 it must include all desires1 leaving out none as in itself base or unworthy4 ,kant's great negative service was showing that the ascetic principle logically results in pure formalism--meaning by ascetic principle that which disconnects inclinations from moral action4 ,kant's positive service was1 first1 his clear insight into the fact that the good is to be found only in activity2 that the will itself1 and nothing beyond itself1 is the end2 and that to adopt any other doctrine1 is to adopt an immoral principle1 since it is to subordinate the will 7character1 self and personality71 to some outside end4 ,his second great service was in showing the necessity of putting in abeyance the immediate satisfaction of each desire as it happens to arise1 and of subordinating it to some law not to be found in the particular desire4 ,he showed that not the particular desire1 but only the desire as controlled by the idea of law could be the motive of moral action4 ,and if he fell into the error of holding that this meant that the desire must be excluded from the moral motive1 this error does not make it less true that every particular desire must be controlled by a universal law4 ,the truth of asceticism is that the desire must be checked until subordinated to the activity of the whole man4 ,see ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #bjj2 pp4 #bjc-bjg2 #bbf-bbg4 ,,xxxii4 ,the ,problem and ,its ,solution4 ,if we gather together the results of our observations of hedonism and of ,kantianism we get something like the following problem and solution in outline4 ,the end of action1 or the good1 is the realized will1 the developed or satisfied self4 ,this satisfied self is found neither in the getting of a lot of pleasures through the satisfaction of desires just as they happen to arise1 nor in obedience to law simply because it is law4 ,it is found in satisfaction of desires according to law4 ,this law1 however1 is not something external to the desires1 but is their own law4 ,each desire is only one striving of character for larger action1 and the only way in which it can really find satisfaction 7that is1 pass from inward striving into outward action7 is as a manifestation of character4 ,a desire1 taken as a desire for its own apparent or direct end only1 is an abstraction4 ,it is a desire for an entire and continuous activity1 and its satisfaction requires that it fitted into this entire and continuous activity2 that it be made conformable to the conditions which will bring the whole man into action4 ,it is this fitting-in which is the law of the desire--the 'universal' controlling its particular nature4 ,this 'fitting-in' is no mechanical shearing off1 nor stretching out1 but a reconstruction of the natural desire till it becomes an expression of the whole man4 ,the problem then is to find that special form of character1 of self1 which includes and transforms all special desires4 ,this form of character is at once the ,good and the ,law of man4 ,we cannot be content with the notion that the end is the satisfaction of the self1 a satisfaction at once including and subordinating the ends of the particular desire4 ,this tells us nothing positive--however valuable it may be negatively in warning us against one-sided notions--until we know what that whole self is1 and in what concretely its satisfaction consists4 ,as the first step towards such a more concrete formula1 we may say3 ,,xxxiii4 ,the ,moral ,end or the ,good is the ,realization by a ,person and as a ,person of ,individuality4 ,in saying that this realization is by a person and as a person we are saying nothing new4 ,we are simply repeating what we have already learned about moral conduct 7,sec4 ,,iii74 ,conduct is not that which simply reaches certain consequences--a bullet shot from a rifle does that2 there is conduct only when the consequences are foreseen2 made the reason of action4 ,a person is a being capable of conduct--a being capable of proposing to himself ends and of attempting to realize them4 ,but what is the meaning of the rest of the formula8 ,what do we mean by individuality8 ,we may distinguish two factors--or better two aspects1 two sides--in individuality4 ,on one side1 it means special disposition1 temperament1 gifts1 bent1 or inclination2 on the other side1 it means special station1 situation1 limitations1 surroundings1 opportunities1 etc4 ,or1 let us say1 it means specific capacity and specific environment4 ,each of these elements1 apart from the other1 is a bare abstraction and without reality4 ,nor is it strictly correct to say that individuality is constituted by these two factors together4 ,it is rather1 as intimated above1 that each is individuality looked at from a certain point of view1 from within or from without4 ,if we are apt to identify individuality with the inner side alone1 with capacity apart from its surroundings1 a little reflection will show the error4 ,even the most devoted adherent of self-culture would not hold that a gift could be developed1 or a disposition manifested1 in isolation from all exterior circumstances4 ,let the disposition1 the gift be what it may 7amiable or irascible1 a talent for music or for abstract science1 or for engineering71 its existence1 to say nothing of its culture1 apart from some surroundings is bare nonsense4 ,if a person shuts himself up in a closet or goes out into the desert the better to cultivate his capacities1 there is still the desert or the closet there2 and it is as conditioned by them1 and with reference to them that he must cultivate himself4 ,for more is true than that1 as a matter of fact1 no man can wholly withdraw himself from surroundings2 the important point is that the manner and the purpose of exercising his capacity is always relative to and dependent upon the surroundings4 ,apart from the environment the capacity is mere emptiness2 the exercise of capacity is always establishing a relation to something exterior to itself4 ,all we can say of capacity apart from environment is that if certain circumstances were supplied1 there would be something there4 ,we call a capacity capability1 possibility1 as if for the very purpose of emphasizing the necessity of external supplementing4 ,we get the same fact1 on the other side1 by calling to mind that circumstances1 environment are not indifferent or irrelevant to individuality4 ,the difference between one individual and another lies as much in the station in which each is placed as in the capacity of each4 ,that is to say1 environment enters into individuality as a constituent factor1 helping make it what it is4 ,on the other hand1 it is capacity which makes the environment really an environment to the individual4 ,the environment is not simply the facts which happen objectively to lie about an agent2 it is such part of the facts as may be related to the capacity and the disposition and gifts of the agent4 ,two members of the same family may have what1 to the outward eye1 are exactly the same surroundings1 and yet each may draw from these surroundings wholly unlike stimulus1 material and motives4 ,each has a different environment1 made different by his own mode of selection2 by the different way in which his interests and desires play upon the plastic material about him4 ,it is not1 then1 the environment as physical of which we are speaking1 but as it appeals to consciousness1 as it is affected by the make-up of the agent4 ,this is the practical or moral environment4 ,the environment is not1 then1 what is then and there present in space4 ,to the ,christian martyr the sufferings of his master1 and the rewards of faithfulness to come to himself were more real parts of his environment than the stake and fire4 ,a ,darwin or a ,wallace may find his environment in ,south ,america or the ,philippine ,islands--or1 indeed1 in every fact of a certain sort wherever found upon the earth or in whatever geological era4 ,a man of philanthropic instincts may find his environment among ,indians or ,congo negroes4 ,whatever1 however near or remote in time and space1 an individual's capacities and needs relate him to1 is his environment4 ,the moment we realize that only what one conceives as proper material for calling out and expressing some internal capacity is a part of his surroundings1 we see not only that capacity depends upon environment1 but that environment depends upon capacity4 ,in other words1 we see that each in itself is an abstraction1 and that the real thing is the individual who is constituted by capacity and environment in their relation to one another4 ,function is a term which we may use to express union of the two sides of individuality4 ,the idea of function is that of an active relation established between power of doing1 on one side1 and something to be done on the other4 ,to exercise a function as a student is not to cultivate tastes and possibilities internally2 it is also to meet external demands1 the demands of fact1 of teachers1 of others needing knowledge4 ,the citizen exercises his function not simply in cultivating sentiments of patriotism within2 one has to meet the needs of the city1 the country in which one lives4 ,the realization of an artistic function is not poring over emotions of beauty pumped up within one's self2 it is the exercise of some calling4 ,on the other hand1 it hardly needs saying that the function of a student1 a citizen1 an artist1 is not exercised in bare conformity to certain external requirements4 ,without the inner disposition and inclination1 we call conduct dead1 perfunctory1 hypocritical4 ,an activity is not functional1 unless it is organic1 expressing the life of the agent4 ,a function thus includes two sides--the external and the internal--and reduces them to elements in one activity4 ,we get an analogy in any animal function4 ,the digestive function includes the material appropriated1 just as much as it does the organ appropriating4 ,it is the service1 the work which the organ does in appropriating material4 ,so1 morally1 function is capacity in action2 environment transformed into an element in personal service4 ,thus we get another formula for the moral end3 ,the performance by a person of his specific function1 this function consisting in an activity which realizes wants and powers with reference to their peculiar surroundings4 ,,xxxiv4 ,moral ,functions as ,interests4 ,if morality consists in the exercise of one's specific functions1 it follows that no detailed account of the content of the moral end can possibly be given4 ,this content is thoroughly individual or infinite4 ,it is concrete to the core1 including every detail of conduct1 and this not in a rigid formula1 but in the movement of life4 ,all we can do is1 by abstraction1 to select some of the main features of the end1 such as the more common and the more permanent4 ,while each individual has his own particular functions1 which can no more be exhausted by definition or description than the qualities of any other individual object1 it is also true that we can recognize certain typical functions to be found permanently and in all4 ,these make1 as it were1 the skeleton of the moral end which each clothes with his own flesh and blood4 ,functions are interests--objective interests were not the term tautological4 ,interests have three traits worth special mention4 #a4 ,they are active4 ,an interest is not an emotion produced from without4 ,it is the reaction of the emotion to the object4 ,interest is identified1 in ordinary speech1 with attention2 we take an interest1 or1 if we say simply 'interested1' that involves some excitation1 some action just beginning4 ,we talk of a man's interests1 meaning his occupations or range of activities4 #b4 ,they are objective4 ,the emotion aroused goes out to some object1 and is fixed upon that2 we are always interested in something4 ,the active element of interest is precisely that which takes it out of the inner mood itself and gives it a terminus1 an end in an object4 #c4 ,an interest is satisfaction4 ,it is its own reward4 ,it is not a striving for something unrealized1 or a mere condition of tension4 ,it is the satisfaction in some object which the mind already has4 ,this object may be possessed in some greater or less degree1 in full realization or in faint grasp1 but interest attaches to it as possessed4 ,this differentiates it from desire1 even where otherwise the states are the same4 ,desire refers to the lack1 to what is not present to the mind4 ,one state of mind may be called both interest in1 and desire for1 knowledge1 but desire emphasizes the unknown1 while interest is on account of the finding of self1 of intelligence1 in the object4 ,interest is the union in feeling1 through action1 of self and an object4 ,an interest in life is had when a man can practically identify himself with some object lying beyond his immediate or already acquired self and thus be led to further expression of himself4 ,to have an interest1 then1 is to be alert1 to have an object1 and to find satisfaction in an activity which brings this object home to self4 ,not every interest carries with it complete satisfaction4 ,but no interest can be wholly thwarted4 ,the purer the interest1 the more the interest is in the object for its own sake1 and not for that of some ulterior consequence1 the more the interest fulfills itself4 ,it is better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all1 and love is simply the highest power of interest--interest freed from all extrinsic stuff4 ,of the interests1 two abstract forms may be recognized1 interest in persons and interest in things4 ,and these may be subdivided3 ,interest in persons3 interest in self and others4 ,interest in things--into their contemplation 7knowledge7 and into their production 7art74 ,and art again may be either productive of things to be contemplated 7fine art71 or useful--manufactures1 industry1 etc4 ,the moral end1 then1 or the ,good will consist in the exercise of these interests1 varied as they may be in each individual by the special turn which his capacities and opportunities take4 ,,xxxv4 ,the ,exercise of ,interests as the ,moral ,end4 ,let us now1 as a means of rendering our conception of the moral end more concrete1 consider briefly each of the forms of interest4 #a4 ,interest in self4 ,we must free ourselves from any notion that an interest in self is non-moral1 if not actually immoral4 ,the latter position is seldom consciously assumed1 but it is not uncommon to have interest in self1 under the name of prudence1 marked off from the moral sphere4 ,interest in self1 if the interest is pure1 is just as much an interest in the moral end as interest in anything or anybody else4 ,interest in self may take the form of selfishness1 or of sentimentalism2 but this is only an impure interest1 an interest not in self1 but in some consequences to which the self may be directed4 ,interest in self may take many forms1 according to the side of self which is the object of attention1 and according to the range of the self taken into account4 ,a rudimentary form is prudence1 but even this1 instead of being non-moral1 is1 in proper place and degree1 moral1 as moral as benevolence2 and1 if not in its proper place1 immoral4 ,from such an interest there are all stages up to the interest in self as it most deeply and broadly is1 the sense of honor1 moral dignity1 self-respect1 conscientiousness1 that attempt to be and to make the most of one's self1 which is at the very root of moral endeavor4 ,the ground that is usually given for making the distinction between ,prudence1 ,self-,regard1 ,self-,love as non-moral1 and ,benevolence1 ,altruism etc41 as moral1 is that in the former case a mere regard for one's own advantage dictates proper conduct1 while in the latter case there must be a positive virtuous intent4 ,we may1 for example1 be pointed to some cool calculating man who takes care of his health and his property1 who indeed is generally 'prudent'1 because he sees that it is for his advantage1 and be told that while such an end is not immoral it is certainly not moral4 ,but in return it must be asked what is meant here by advantage8 ,if by it is meant private pleasure1 or advantage over somebody else1 then this conduct does not spring from interest in self at all1 but from interest in some exterior consequence1 and as springing from such an impure interest is not simply non-moral1 but positively immoral4 ,on the other hand1 if 'advantage' means regard for one's whole function1 one's place in the moral order1 then such interest in self is moral4 ,care for bodily health in the interest of efficiency in conduct is supremely moral beside reckless disregard of it in the interest of some supposed higher or more spiritual function4 ,if it is meant that conduct is immoral because it springs from some interest on the part of the agent1 the reply is that all conduct must so arise1 and that any other supposition leads us immediately into asceticism and into formalism4 #b4 ,interest in others4 ,the generic form of interest in others is sympathy1 this being specified by the various forms of social organization of which the individual is a member4 ,a person is1 we have seen1 one who can conceive of ends and can act to realize these ends4 ,only a person1 therefore1 can conceive of others as ends1 and so have true sympathy4 ,it is not meant1 of course1 that animals do not perform acts which1 de facto1 are altruistic or even self-sacrificing4 ,what is meant is that the animal does not act from the idea of others of his kind as ends in themselves4 ,if the animal does so act1 it cannot be denied the name of person4 ,true interest in others is pure1 or disinterested1 in the sense of having no reference to some further and external consequence to one's self4 ,interest in others need not be moral 7or pure7 any more than interest in self is necessarily immoral 7or impure74 ,it is a mistake to distinguish interest in self as egoistic and interest in others as altruistic4 ,genuine interests1 whatever their object1 are both egoistic and altruistic4 ,they are egoistic simply because they are interests--imply satisfaction in a realized end4 ,if man is truly a social being1 constituted by his relationships to others1 then social action must inevitably realize himself1 and be1 in that sense1 egoistic4 ,and on the other hand1 if the individual's interest in himself is in himself as a member of society1 then such interest is thoroughly altruistic4 ,in fact1 the very idea of altruism is likely to carry a false impression when it is so much insisted upon1 as it is nowadays in popular literature1 as the essence of morality4 ,the term as used seems to imply that the mere giving up of one's self to others1 as others1 is somehow moral4 ,just as there may be an immoral interest in self1 so there may be an immoral 'altruism4' ,it is immoral in any case to sacrifice the actual relationships in the case1 those which demand action1 to some feeling outside themselves--as immoral when the feeling to which the sacrifice is offered up is labelled 'benevolence'1 as when it is termed 'greediness'4 ,it is no excuse when a man gives unwisely to a beggar that he feels benevolent4 ,moral benevolence is the feeling directed toward a certain end which is known to be the fit or right end1 the end which expresses the situation4 ,the question is as to the aim in giving4 ,apart from this aim1 the act is simply relieving the agent's own feelings and has no moral quality4 ,rather it is immoral2 for feelings do have a moral capacity1 that is1 a relation to ends of action1 and hence to satisfy them on their account1 to deprive them of their practical reference1 is bad4 ,aside from what this illustrates1 there is a tendency in the present emphasis of altruism to erect the principle of charity1 in a sense which implies continued social inequality1 and social slavery1 or undue dependence of one upon another1 into a fundamental moral principle4 ,it is well to do good to others1 but it is much better to do this by securing for them the freedom which makes it possible for them to get along in the future without such 'altruism' from others4 ,there is what has been well termed an egotism of renunciation2 a desire to do for others which1 at bottom1 is simply an attempt to regulate their conduct4 ,much of altruism is an egoism of a larger radius1 and its tendency is to manufacture a gigantic self1 as in the case where a father sacrifices everything for his children or a wife for her husband4 ,see ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #djb4 ,see also ,hinton1 ,the ,law ,breaker1 p4 #bhg3 ,the real meaning of the difficulty about a word for regard for others is that we do not want it4 ,it would mislead us if we had it4 ,it is not a regard for others that we need1 but simply a true regard1 a regard to the facts1 to nature2 it is only a truth to facts in our regard1 and its nature is obscured by a reference to others1 as if that were the essential point4444 ,it is not as being for others1 but as being true1 that the regard for others is demanded4 ,some ethical writers have gone to the other extreme and held that all benevolence is a disguised or an enlightened selfishness1 since having a necessary reference to self4 ,the reference to self must be admitted2 unless the action springs from an interest of the agent himself the act may be outwardly useful1 but cannot be moral4 ,but the argument alluded to inverts the true relation involved4 ,if a man's interests are such that he can find satisfaction only in the satisfaction of others1 what an absurdity to say that his acting from these interests is selfish6 ,the very fact of such identity of self with others in his interest is the proof of his unselfishness4 ,see ,leslie ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 p4 #bda1 for an admirable discussion of this difficulty4 ,when it is said that your pain is painful to me1 he says1 the inference is often insinuated that ,i dislike your pain because it is painful to me in some special relation4 ,i do not dislike it as your pain1 but in virtue of some particular consequence1 such1 for example1 as its making you less able to render me a service4 ,in that case ,i do not really object to your pain as your pain at all1 but only to some removable and accidental consequences4 7,and see his whole treatment of sympathy1 pp4 #bcj-bde74 ,the whole question is shown to come to this3 ,is my interest in1 my sympathy with1 your joy and sorrow as such1 or in your joy and sorrow as contributing to mine8 ,if the latter1 of course the interest is selfish1 not being an interest in others at all4 ,but if the former1 then the fact that such sympathy involves one's own satisfaction is the best proof that man is not selfishly constructed4 ,when ,stephen goes on to say that such sympathy does not involve the existence of a real unity larger than the individual1 he seems to me to misread his own facts1 probably because he conceives of this unity as some abstract or external thing4 ,discussion regarding self-love and benevolence1 or1 in modern phrase1 egoism and altruism1 has been rife in ,english ethics since the time of ,hobbes1 and especially of ,shaftesbury and ,butler4 ,see1 in particular1 the ,sermons of the latter1 which gave the central point of discussion for almost a century4 ,with reference to the special weakness of this point of view1 with its co-ordination of two independent principles1 see ,green1 ,philosophical ,works1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #ii-ajd4 ,the essential lack 7the lack which we have tried to make good in the definition of individuality as the union of capacity and surroundings in function71 was the failure to analyze the idea of the individual4 ,individuality being defined as an exclusive principle1 the inevitable result was either 7i47 the disguised selfishness theory2 or 7ii47 the assumption of two fundamentally different principles in man4 ,the ordinary distinction between prudence and virtue is an echo of the latter theory4 ,then1 finally1 7iii47 a third principle1 generally called conscience by ,butler1 was brought in as umpire in the conflict of prudence and virtue4 ,suggestive modern treatment of the matter1 from a variety of points of view1 will be found in ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 chs4 ,,xi-,,xiii2 ,stephen1 ,op4 cit41 ch4 ,,vi2 ,sidgwick1 ,op4 cit41 ,bk4 ,v1 ch4 ,,vii2 ,royce1 ,op4 cit41 ch4 ,,iv2 ,sorley1 ,ethics of ,naturalism1 pp4 #acd-aej2 ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #agb-ahj2 ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #djj-dje2 ,paulsen1 ,system der ,ethik1 pp4 #bie-caa4 #c4 ,interest in ,science and ,art4 ,man is interested in the world about him2 the knowledge of the nature and relations of this world become one of his most absorbing pursuits4 ,man identifies himself with the meaning of this world to the point that he can be satisfied only as he spells out and reads its meaning4 7,see1 for example1 ,browning's ,grammarian's ,funeral47 ,the scientific interest is no less a controlling motive of man than the personal interest4 ,this knowledge is not a means for having agreeable sensations2 it is not dilettanteism or love of culture2 it is interest in the large and goodly frame of things4 ,and so it is with art2 man has interests which can be satisfied only in the reconstruction of nature in the way of the useful and the beautiful4 ,i have made no distinction between 'fine' and 'useful' art4 ,the discussion of this question does not belong here1 but the rigid separation of them in sthetic theory seems to me to have no justification4 ,both are products of intelligence in the service of interests1 and the only difference is in the range of intelligence and interests concerned4 ',use' is a limited service and hence implies an external end2 beauty is complete use or service1 and hence not mere use at all1 but self-expression4 ,historically1 all art which has not been merely sentimental and 'literary' has sprung from interest in good workmanship in the realizing of an idea4 ,it seems as if here interests violated their general law1 and1 in the case of use at least1 were an interest in some ulterior end4 ,but it may be questioned whether a carpenter whose aim was consciously beyond the work he was doing1 would be a good workman--and this whether the further end is his own private advantage1 or social benefit at large4 ,the thought of the further benefit to self and of the utility to accrue to some one else1 will1 if it becomes a part of what he is doing1 undoubtedly intensify his interest--it must do so1 for it enlarges its content4 ,but to identify one's own or another's well-being with work1 and to make the work a mere means to this welfare1 are two quite different things4 ,the good artisan has his heart in his work4 ,his self-respect makes it necessary for him to respect this technical or artistic capacity1 and to do the best by it that he can without scrimping or lowering4 ,to a good business man business is not the mere means to money-making2 and it is sentimentalism 7and hence immoral7 to demand that it be a mere means to the good of society4 ,the business1 if it is a moral one 7and any business1 so far as it is thus carried on1 is moral71 is carried on for the sake of the activity itself1 as a realizing of capacity in a specific situation4 ,,xxxvi4 ,the ,moral ,quality of ,science4 ,we seem1 however1 to meet here1 in relation to science and art1 a difficulty which threatens our whole theory4 ,can it be claimed1 it may be asked1 that devotion to science or art constitutes goodness in the same sense that devotion to the interests of one's family or state constitutes it8 ,no one doubts that a good father or a good citizen is a good man1 in so far forth4 ,are we ready to say that a good chemist or good carpenter1 or good musician is1 in so far1 a good man8 ,in a word1 is there not a reference to the good of persons present in one case and absent in another1 and does not its absence preclude the scientific and artistic activities from any share1 as such1 in the moral end8 ,it must be remembered that the moral end does not refer to some consequence which happens1 de facto1 to be reached4 ,it refers to an end willed2 i4e41 to an idea held to and realized as an idea4 ,and this fact shows us the way to meet the query1 in part at least4 ,if1 when we say good carpenter1 or good merchant1 we are speaking from the standpoint of results1 independently of the idea conceived as end in the mind of the agent2 if we mean simply1 'we like what that man does'1 then the term good has no moral value4 ,a man may paint 'good' pictures and not be1 in so far1 a good man1 but in this sense a man may do a great deal of 'good'1 and yet not be a good man4 ,it was agreed at the outset that moral goodness pertains to the kind of idea or end which a man clings to1 and not to what he happens to effect visibly to others4 ,if a scientific man pursues truth as a mere means to reputation1 to wealth1 etc41 we do not 7or should not7 hesitate to call him immoral4 ,this does not mean that if he thinks of the reputation1 or of wealth1 he is immoral1 for he may foresee wealth and the reputation as necessarily bound up in what he is doing2 it may become a part of the end4 ,it means that if knowledge of truth is a mere means to an end beyond it1 the man is immoral4 ,what reason is there why we should not call him moral if he does his work for its own sake1 from interest in this cause which takes him outside his own miserable individuality1 in ,mill's phrase8 ,after all1 the phrase a 'good father' means but a character manifesting itself in certain relations1 as is right according to these relations2 the phrase has moral significance not in itself1 but with reference to the end aimed at by character4 ,and so it is with the phrase 'a good carpenter4' ,that also means devotion of character to certain outer relations for their own sake4 ,these relations may not be so important1 but that is not lack of moral meaning4 ,,xxxvii4 ,adjustment to ,environment4 ,so far we have been discussing the moral ideal in terms of its inner side--capacity1 interest4 ,we shall now discuss it on its outer or objective side--as 'adjustment to environment' in the phrase made familiar by the evolutionists4 ,certain cautions1 however1 must be noted in the use of the phrase4 ,we must keep clearly in mind the relativity of environment to inner capacity2 that it exists only as one element of function4 ,even a plant must do something more than adjust itself to a fixed environment2 it must assert itself against its surroundings1 subordinating them and transforming them into material and nutriment2 and1 on the surface of things1 it is evident that transformation of existing circumstances is moral duty rather than mere reproduction of them4 ,the environment must be plastic to the ends of the agent4 ,but admitting that environment is made what it is by the powers and aims of the agent1 what sense shall we attribute to the term adjustment8 ,not bare conformity to circumstances1 nor bare external reproduction of them1 even when circumstances are taken in their proper moral meaning4 ,the child in the family who simply adjusts himself to his relationships in the family1 may be living a moral life only in outward seeming4 ,the citizen of the state may transgress no laws of the state1 he may punctiliously fulfill every contract1 and yet be a selfish man4 ,true adjustment must consist in willing the maintenance and development of moral surroundings as one's own end4 ,the child must take the spirit of the family into himself and live out this spirit according to his special membership in the family4 ,so a soldier in the army1 a friend in a mutual association1 etc4 ,adjustment to intellectual environment is not mere conformity of ideas to facts4 ,it is the living assimilation of these facts into one's own intellectual life1 and maintaining and asserting them as truth4 ,there are environments existing prior to the activities of any individual agent2 the family1 for example1 is prior to the moral activity of a child born into it1 but the point is to see that 'adjustment'1 to have a moral sense1 means making the environment a reality for one's self4 ,a true description of the case would say that the child takes for his own end1 ends already existing for the wills of others4 ,and1 in making them his own1 he creates and supports for himself an environment that already exists for others4 ,in such cases there is no special transformation of the existing environment2 there is simply the process of making it the environment for one's self4 ,so in learning1 the child simply appropriates to himself the intellectual environment already in existence for others4 ,but in the activity of the man of science there is more than such personal reproduction and creation2 there is increase1 or even reconstruction of the prior environment4 ,while the ordinary citizen hardly does more than make his own the environment of ends and interests already sustained in the wills of others1 the moral reformer may remake the whole4 ,but whether one case or the other1 adjustment is not outer conformity2 it is living realization of certain relations in and through the will of the agent4 ,,xxxviii4 ,the ,moral ,end is the ,realization of a ,community of ,wills4 ,since the performance of function is1 on the other side1 the creation1 perpetuation1 and further development of an environment1 of relations to the wills of others1 its performance is a common good4 ,it satisfies others who participate in the environment4 ,the member of the family1 of the state1 etc41 in exercising his function1 contributes to the whole of which he is a member by realizing its spirit in himself4 ,but the question discussed in section ,,xxxvi recurs under another aspect4 ,granting that the satisfying of personal interests realizes a common good1 what shall we say of the impersonal interests--interests in science and art4 ,is the good carpenter or chemist not only in so far a good man1 but also a good social member8 ,in other words1 does every form of moral activity realize a common good1 or is the moral end partly social1 partly non-social8 ,one objection sometimes brought to the doctrine that the moral end is entirely social1 may be now briefly dismissed4 ,this is the objection that a man has moral duties toward himself4 ,certainly1 but what of himself8 ,if he is essentially a social member1 his duties toward himself have a social basis and bearing4 ,the only relevant question is whether one is wholly a social member--whether scientific and artistic activities may not be non-social4 ,the ground here taken is that the moral end is wholly social4 ,this does not mean that science and art are means to some social welfare beyond themselves4 ,we have already stated that even the production of utilities must1 as moral1 be its own end4 ,the position then is that intellectual and artistic interests are themselves social1 when considered in the completeness of their relations--that interest in the development of intelligence is1 in and of itself1 interest in the well-being of society4 ,unless this be true there is no moral end at all1 but only moral ends4 ,there is no comprehensive unity in life1 but a number of ends which1 being irreducible to a common principle1 must be combined on the best principle of compromise available4 ,we have no ',the ,good'1 but an aggregate of fragmentary ends4 ,it helps nothing to say that this necessary unity is found in the self to be realized1 unless we are pointed to something in the self that unites the social and non-social functions4 ,our objection is that the separation of intellectual interests from social makes a chasm in the self4 ,for the same reason it follows that in the case of a collision of social with intellectual ends--say the conflict of a man's interests as a member of a family with his interests in new scientific discovery--no reconciliation is possible4 ,if the interests are forms of social interest1 there is a common end in both1 on the basis of which the conflict can be resolved4 ,while such considerations do not prove that there is but one end1 and that social1 they may well make us hesitate about carelessly taking a position of which they are the logical consequence4 ,of course1 every one recognizes that a certain amount of scientific and artistic interest is social in character4 ,a certain amount of interest in truth1 or in intelligence1 a certain amount of susceptibility to beauty1 a certain amount of devotion to utility1 are universally recognized to be necessary to make judicious1 agreeable and efficient social members4 ,the whole system of modern education has meaning only on this supposition4 ,more than this3 ,a certain amount of intelligence1 and a certain amount of susceptibility to embodied ideals1 must exist to give moral conduct4 ,a moral end is1 as we have seen1 always a conception1 an idea4 ,the very act of bringing conduct out of the impulsive into the moral sphere1 depends upon the development of intelligence so as to transform a feeling into the perception of a situation4 ,and1 as we watch moral development from childhood to maturity1 is it not evident that progress consists in power to conceive of larger and better defined ends8 to analyze the situation which demands active response1 the function which needs exercise1 into specific relations1 instead of taking it partially or even upon some one else's say so8 ,conduct1 so far as not based upon an intelligent recognition and realization of the relationships involved1 is either sentimental1 or merely habitual--in the former case immoral1 and in the latter failing of the complete morality possible4 ,if the necessary part played in conduct by artistic cultivation is not so plain1 it is largely because ',art' has been made such an unreal ,fetich--a sort of superfine and extraneous polish to be acquired only by specially cultivated people4 ,in reality1 living is itself the supreme art2 it requires fineness of touch2 skill and thoroughness of workmanship2 susceptible response and delicate adjustment to a situation apart from reflective analysis2 instinctive perception of the proper harmonies of act and act1 of man and man4 ,active art is the embodiment of ideals2 the clothing of ideas otherwise abstract in their peculiar and fit garb of concrete outward detail2 passive art is the quick and accurate response to such embodiments as are already made4 ,what were human conduct without the one and the other8 ,granting the necessity of knowledge and of its artistic application in conduct1 the question arises as to where the line is to be drawn4 ,evidently1 if anywhere1 at specialisms1 remote philosophic or mathematical endeavors2 life-times spent in inventive attempts without appreciable outcome4 ,but to draw the line is not easy4 ,the remote of one generation is the social tool of the next2 the abstract mathematics and physics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are the great social forces of the nineteenth--the locomotive1 the telegraph1 the telephone1 etc4 ,and how1 in any case1 can we tell a scientific investigator that up to a certain experiment or calculation his work may be social1 beyond that1 not8 ,all that we can say is that beyond a certain point its social character is not obvious to sense and that the work must be carried on by faith4 ,thus it is that we dispose of objections like ,bradley's 7,ethical ,studies1 p4 #bjb73 ,nothing is easier than to suppose a life of art or speculation which1 as far as we can see1 though true to itself1 has1 so far as others are concerned1 been sheer waste or even loss1 and which knew that it was so4 ,that we can not see any social result in such cases has nothing to do with the question whether or not the interests themselves are social4 ,we may imagine a life of philanthropic activity1 say of devotion to emancipation of slaves in a country wholly given over to slavery1 or of a teacher in an unenlightened country1 which1 as far as we can see1 7though1 in this case1 as in the one referred to by ,mr4 ,bradley1 everything depends upon how far we can see7 has been sheer waste1 so far as influence on others is concerned4 ,the point is whether in such cases the life lived is not one of devotion to the interests of humanity as such4 ,we have been trying to show that everyone admits that science and art1 up to a certain point1 are social1 and that to draw a line where they cease to be so1 is in reality to draw a line where we cease to see their social character4 ,that we should cease to see it1 is necessary in the case of almost every advance4 ,just because the new scientific movement is new1 we can realize its social effects only afterwards4 ,but it may be questioned whether the motive which actuates the man of science is not1 when fully realized1 a faith in the social bearing of what he is doing4 ,if we were to go into a metaphysical analysis1 the question would have to be raised whether a barely intellectual fact or theory be not a pure abstraction--an unreality if kept apart entirely from the activities of men in relation to one another4 ,,xxxix4 ,science and ,art as ,necessary ,factors of ,social ,welfare4 ,let us consider the problem on its other side4 ,what kind of an interest is our interest in persons1 our distinctively social interest8 ,suppose we attempt to separate our interests in truth1 beauty1 and use from our interest in persons3 ,what remains in the persons to be interested in8 ,is not a necessary part of out interest in persons1 an interest in them as beings fulfilling their respective intellectual and artistic capacities2 and if we cut this out of our social interest1 have we not maimed and stunted our interest in persons8 ,we wish the fullest life possible to ourselves and to others4 ,and the fullest life means largely a complete and free development of capacities in knowledge and production--production of beauty and use4 ,our interest in others is not satisfied as long as their intelligence is cramped1 their appreciation of truth feeble1 their emotions hard and uncomprehensive1 their powers of production compressed4 ,to will their true good is to will the freeing of all such gifts to the highest degree4 ,shall we say that their true good requires that they shall go to the point of understanding algebra1 but not quaternions1 of understanding ordinary mechanics1 but not to working out an electro-magnetic theory of light8 to ability to appreciate ordinary chords and tunes1 but not to the attempt to make further developments in music8 ,and this throws light upon the case referred to by ,mr4 ,bradley4 ,social welfare demands that the individual be permitted to devote himself to the fulfilling of any scientific or artistic capacity that he finds within himself--provided1 of course1 it does not conflict with some more important capacity--irrespective of results4 ,to say to a man3 ,you may devote yourself to this gift1 provided you demonstrate beforehand its social bearing1 would be to talk nonsense4 ,the new discovery is not yet made4 ,it is absolutely required by the interests of a progressive society that it allow freedom to the individual to develop such functions as he finds in himself1 irrespective of any proved social effect4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 morality works by faith1 not by sight4 ,indeed the ordinary conception of social interests1 of benevolence1 needs a large over-hauling4 ,it is practically equivalent to doing something directly for others--to one form or another of charity4 ,but this is only negative morality4 ,a true social interest is that which wills for others freedom from dependence on our direct help1 which wills to them the self-directed power of exercising1 in and by themselves1 their own functions4 ,any will short of this is not social but selfish1 willing the dependence of others that we may continue benignly altruistic4 ,the idea of giving pleasure to others1 making others happy1 if it means anything else than securing conditions so that they may act freely in their own satisfaction1 means slavery4 ,as society advances1 social interest must consist more and more in free devotion to intelligence for its own sake1 to science1 art and industry1 and in rejoicing in the exercise of such freedom by others4 ,meantime1 it is truth which makes free4 ,see ,spencer1 ,data of ,ethics1 pp4 #bdi-beg1 where this doctrine is stated with great force4 ,where1 finally1 does the social character of science and art come in8 ,just here3 they are elements in the perfection of individuality1 and they are elements whose very nature is to be moving1 not rigid2 distributed from one to another and not monopolistic possessions4 ,if there are forms of science and art which1 at present1 are static1 being merely owned collections of facts1 as one may have a collection of butterflies in a frame1 or of etchings in a closed portfolio1 this is not because they are science and art1 but imperfect science and art4 ,to complete their scientific and artistic character is to set these facts in motion2 to hurl them against the world of physical forces till new instruments of man's activity are formed1 and to set them in circulation so that others may also participate in their truth and rejoice in their beauty4 ,so far as scientific or artistic attainments are treasured as individual possessions1 so far it is true that they are not social--but so far it is also true that they are immoral3 indeed that they are not fully scientific or artistic1 being subordinated to having certain sensations4 ,the intellectual movement of the last four or five centuries has resulted in an infinite specialization in methods1 and in an immense accumulation of fact4 ,it is quite true1 since the diversity of fact and of method has not yet been brought to an organic unity1 that their social bearing is not yet realized4 ,but when the unity is attained 7as attained it must be if there is unity in the object of knowledge71 it will pass into a corresponding unity of practice4 ,and then the question as to the social character of even the most specialized knowledge will seem absurd4 ,it will be to ask whether men can coperate better when they do not know than when they do know what they want4 ,meantime the intellectual confusion1 and the resulting divorce of knowledge from practice1 exists4 ,but this constitutes a part of the environment of which action must take heed4 ,it makes it one of the pressing duties that every man of intelligence should do his part in bringing out the public and common aspects of knowledge4 ,the duty of the present is the socializing of intelligence--the realizing of its bearing upon social practice4 ,,xl4 ,the ,ethical ,postulate4 ,we have attempted to show that the various interests are social in their very nature4 ,we have not attempted to show that this can be seen or proved in any given case4 ,on the contrary1 in most1 if not all cases1 the agent acts from a faith that1 in realizing his own capacity1 he will satisfy the needs of society4 ,if he were asked to prove that his devotion to his function were right because certain to promote social good1 he might well reply3 ,that is none of my affair4 ,i have only to work myself out as strength and opportunity are given me1 and let the results take care of themselves4 ,i did not make the world1 and if it turns out that devotion to the capacity which was given me1 and loyalty to the surroundings in which ,i find myself do not result in good1 ,i do not hold myself responsible4 ,but1 after all1 ,i cannot believe that it will so turn out4 ,what is really good for me must turn out good for all1 or else there is no good in the world at all4 ,the basis1 in a word1 of moral conduct1 with respect to the exercise of function1 is a faith that moral self-satisfaction 7that is1 satisfaction in accordance with the performance of function as already defined7 means social satisfaction--or the faith that self and others make a true community4 ,now such faith or conviction is at the basis of all moral conduct--not simply of the scientific or artistic4 ,interest in self must mean belief in one's business1 conviction of its legitimacy and worth1 even prior to any sensible demonstration4 ,under any circumstances1 such demonstration can extend only to past action2 the social efficiency of any new end must be a matter of faith4 ,where such faith is wanting1 action becomes halting and character weak4 ,forcible action fails1 and its place is taken by a feeble idealism1 of vague longing for that which is not1 or by a pessimistic and fruitless discontent with things as they are--leading1 in either case1 to neglect of actual and pressing duty4 ,the basis of moral strength is limitation1 the resolve to be one's self only1 and to be loyal to the actual powers and surroundings of that self4 ,the saying of ,carlyle's about doing the duty that lies nearest1 and of ,goethe's that ,america is here or nowhere1 both imply that faith in the existing moral capacity and environment is the basis of conduct4 ,all fruitful and sound human endeavor roots in the conviction that there is something absolutely worth while1 something 'divine' in the demands imposed by one's actual situation and powers4 ,in the great moral heroes of the world the conviction of the worth of their destiny1 and of what they were meant to do1 has amounted to a kind of fatalism4 ,they have done not simply what they could do1 but what they must do4 ,on the other hand1 effective social interest is based upon what is vaguely called 'faith in humanity'1 or1 more specifically1 belief in the value of each man's individuality1 belief in some particular function which he might exercise1 given appropriate conditions and stimuli4 ,moral interest in others must be an interest in their possibilities1 rather than in their accomplishments2 or1 better1 in their accomplishments so far as these testify to a fulfilling of function--to a working out of capacity4 ,sympathy and work for men which do not grow out of faith in them are a perfunctory and unfertile sort of thing4 ,this faith is generally analyzed no further2 it is left as faith in one's 'calling' or in 'humanity'4 ,but what is meant is just this3 in the performing of such special service as each is capable of1 there is to be found not only the satisfaction of self1 but also the satisfaction of the entire moral order1 the furthering of the community in which one lives4 ,all moral conduct is based upon such a faith2 and moral theory must recognize this as the postulate upon which it rests4 ,in calling it a postulate1 we do not mean that it is a postulate which our theory makes or must make in order to be a theory2 but that1 through analysis1 theory finds that moral practice makes this postulate1 and that with its reality the reality end value of conduct are bound up4 ,in calling it a postulate we do not mean to call it unprovable1 much less unverifiable1 for moral experience is itself1 so far as it goes1 its verification4 ,but we mean that the further consideration of this postulate1 its demonstration or 7if the case so be7 its refutation1 do not belong to the realm of ethics as such4 ,each branch of human experience rests upon some presupposition which1 for that branch1 is ultimate4 ,the further inquiry into such presuppositions belong not to mathematics1 or physics1 or ethics1 but to metaphysics4 ,unless1 then1 we are to extend our ethical theory to inquire into the possibility and value of moral experience1 unless1 that is1 we are to make an excursion into the metaphysics of ethics1 we have here reached our foundation4 ,the ethical postulate1 the presupposition involved in conduct1 is this3 ,,in ,,the ,,realization ,,of ,,individuality ,,there ,,is ,,found ,,also ,,the ,,needed ,,realization ,,of ,,some ,,community ,,of ,,persons ,,of ,,which ,,the ,,individual ,,is ,a ,,member2 ,,and1 ,,conversely1 ,,the ,,agent ,,who ,,duly ,,satisfies ,,the ,,community ,,in ,,which ,,he ,,shares1 ,,by ,,that ,,same ,,conduct ,,satisfies ,,himself4 ,otherwise put1 the postulate is that there is a community of persons2 a good which realized by the will of one is made not private but public4 ,it is this unity of individuals as respects the end of action1 this existence of a practical common good1 that makes what we call the moral order of the world4 ,shakespeare has stated the postulate-- ,to thine ownself be true2 ,and it must follow1 as the night the day1 ,thou can'st not then be false to any man4 ,its significance may be further developed by comparing it with the scientific postulate4 ,all science rests upon the conviction of the thorough-going and permanent unity of the world of objects known--a unity which is sometimes termed the 'uniformity of nature' or the 'reign of law'2 without this conviction that objects are not mere isolated and transitory appearances1 but are connected together in a system by laws or relations1 science would be an impossibility4 ,moral experience makes for the world of practice an assumption analogous in kind to that which intellectual experience makes for the world of knowledge4 ,and just as it is not the affair of science1 as such1 or even of logic 7the theory of science7 to justify this presupposition of science1 or to do more than show its presence in intellectual experience1 so it is not the business of conduct1 or even of ethics 7the theory of conduct7 to justify what we have termed the 'ethical postulate'4 ,in each case the further inquiry belongs to metaphysics4 ,,xli4 ,does the ,end ,proposed ,serve as a ,criterion of ,conduct8 ,we have now concluded that an end which may be termed indifferently ',the ,realization of ,individuality'1 ',the ,performance of ,specific ,functions'1 ',the ,satisfaction of ,interests'1 ',the ,realization of a ,community of ,individuals' is the moral end4 ,will this end serve the two aims 7see ,sec4 ,,xvi7 required of a criterion1 or standard3 7#a7 ,will it unify individual conduct8 7#b7 ,will it afford a common good8 ,we have just been endeavoring to show that it does both of these things2 that as the realization of one's specific capacity1 it unifies individual conduct1 and that1 as the performance of function1 it serves to satisfy the entire community4 ,to take up just these points1 accordingly1 would involve a repetition of what has been said1 and we shall therefore take up instead some aspects of the individual and social unity of conduct1 not already considered4 #a4 ,the ,system of ,individual ,conduct4 ,we must be careful not to interpret the idea of specific function too rigidly or abstractly4 ,it does not mean that each one has some supreme mission in life to which everything else must be sacrificed--that a man is to be an artist1 or a soldier1 or a student1 or a day-laborer and nothing else4 ,on the contrary1 the idea of function is that which comprehends all the various sides of life1 and it cannot be narrowed below the meaning we have already given3 the due adjustment of capacity and surroundings4 ,wherever there is any capacity or any circumstance1 no matter how trivial1 there is something included in the exercise of function1 and1 therefore to be satisfied--according to its place1 of course1 in the whole of life4 ,amusements and all the minor details of life are included within the scope of morality4 ,they are elements in the exercise of function1 and their insignificance and triviality does not exclude them from the grasp of duty and of the good4 ,it is a mistake to suppose that because it is optional or indifferent--as it constantly is--what acts among the minor details of life are to be done or left undone1 or unimportant whether they are done or left undone at all1 therefore such acts have no moral value4 ,morality consists in treating them just as they are--if they are slight or trivial they are to be performed as slight and trivial4 ,morality does not simply permit the performance of such acts1 but demands it4 ,to try to make1 in the interests of duty1 a serious matter out of every detail of life would be immoral--as much so1 in kind1 as to make light of momentous matters4 ,see ,alexander1 ,op4 cit4 pp4 #ec-ed4 ,bradley1 ,op4 cit41 pp1 #aid-aig4 ,consider1 also1 how this conception of the end stands in definite relation to concrete acts2 how it explains the possibility of decision as to whether this or that proposed act is right4 ,we do not have to trace the connection of the act with some end beyond1 as pleasure1 or abstract law4 ,we have only to analyze the act itself4 ,we have certain definite and wholly concrete facts2 the given capacity of the person at the given moment1 and his given surroundings4 ,the judgment as to the nature of these facts is1 in and of itself1 a judgment as to the act to be done4 ,the question is not3 ,what is the probability that this act will result in the balance of maximum pleasure2 it is not what general rule can we hunt up under which to bring this case4 ,it is simply3 ,what is this case8 ,the moral act is not that which satisfies some far-away principle1 hedonistic or transcendental4 ,it is that which meets the present1 actual situation4 ,difficulties indeed1 arise1 but they are simply the difficulty of resolving a complex case2 they are intellectual1 not moral4 ,the case made out1 the moral end stands forth4 ,no extraneous manipulation1 to bring the case under some foreign end1 is required4 ,and this suggests the elasticity of the criterion4 ,in fact moral conduct is entirely individualized4 ,it is where1 when1 how and of whom4 ,there has been much useless discussion as to the absolute or relative character of morals--useless because the terms absolute and relative are not defined4 ,if absolute is taken to mean immobile and rigid1 it is anything but desirable that morals should be absolute4 ,if the physical world is a scene of movement1 in which there is no rest1 it is a poor compliment to pay the moral world to conceive of it as static and lifeless4 ,a rigid criterion in a world of developing social relations would speedily prove no criterion at all4 ,it would be an abstract rule1 taking no account of the individualized character of each act2 its individuality of capacity and of surroundings1 of time1 place and relationships involved4 ,a truly absolute criterion is one which adjusts itself to each case according to the specific nature of the case2 one which moves with the moving world4 ,on the other hand1 if relative means uncertain in application1 changing in time and place without reason for change in the facts themselves1 then certainly the criterion is not relative4 ,if it means taking note of all concrete relations involved1 it is relative4 ,the absoluteness1 in fine1 of the standard of action consists not in some rigid statement1 but in never-failing application4 ,universality here1 as elsewhere1 resides not in a thing1 but in a way1 a method of action4 ,the absolute standard is the one applicable to all deeds1 and the conception of the exercise of function is thus absolute1 covering all conduct from the mainly impulsive action of the savage to the most complex reaches of modern life4 ,aristotle's well known theory of the 'mean' seems to have its bearing here4 ,it is possible1 he says 7,peters' trans4 of ,ethics1 p4 #df71 to feel fear1 confidence1 desire1 anger1 pity1 and generally to be affected pleasantly and painfully1 either too much or too little--in either case wrongfully2 but to be affected thus at the right times1 and on the right occasions1 and toward the right persons1 and with the right object and in the right fashions1 is the mean course and the best course1 and these are characteristics of virtue4 ,the right time1 occasion1 person1 purpose and fashion--what is it but the complete individualization of conduct in order to meet the whole demands of the whole situation1 instead of some abstraction8 ,and what else do we mean by fit1 due1 proper1 right action1 but that which just hits the mark1 without falling short or deflecting1 and1 to mix the metaphor1 without slopping over8 #b4 ,the system of social conduct1 or common good4 ,moral conduct springs from the faith that all right action is social and its purpose is to justify this faith by working out the social values involved4 ,the term 'moral community' can mean only a unity of action1 made what it is by the co-operating activities of diverse individuals4 ,there is unity in the work of a factory1 not in spite of1 but because of the division of labor4 ,each workman forms the unity not by doing the same that everybody else does1 or by trying to do the whole1 but by doing his specific part4 ,the unity is the one activity which their varied activities make4 ,and so it is with the moral activity of society and the activities of individuals4 ,the more individualized the functions1 the more perfect the unity4 7,see section ,,lii47 ,the exercise of function by an agent serves1 then1 both to define and to unite him4 ,it makes him a distinct social member at the same time that it makes him a member4 ,possession of peculiar capacities1 and special surroundings mark one person off from another and make him an individual2 and the due adjustment of capacities to surroundings 7in the exercise of function7 effects1 therefore1 the realization of individuality--the realization of what we specifically are as distinct from others4 ,at the same time1 this distinction is not isolation2 the exercise of function is the performing of a special service without which the social whole is defective4 ,individuality means not separation1 but defined position in a whole2 special aptitude in constituting the whole4 ,we are now in a position to take up the consideration of the two other fundamental ethical conceptions--obligation and freedom4 ,these ideas answer respectively to the two sides of the exercise of function4 ,on the one hand1 the performing of a function realizes the social whole4 ,man is thus 'bound' by the relations necessary to constitute this whole4 ,he is subject to the conditions which the existence and growth of the social unity impose4 ,he is1 in a word1 under obligation2 the performance of his function is duty owed to the community of which he is a member4 ,but on the other hand1 activity in the way of function realizes the individual2 it is what makes him an individual1 or distinct person4 ,in the performance of his own function the agent satisfies his own interests and gains power4 ,in it is found his freedom4 ,obligation thus corresponds to the social satisfaction1 freedom to the self-satisfaction1 involved in the exercise of function2 and they can no more be separated from each other than the correlative satisfaction can be4 ,one has to realize himself as a member of a community4 ,in this fact are found both freedom and duty4 ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,obligation4 ,,xlii4 ,theories ,regarding ,moral ,authority4 ,the idea of obligation or duty has two sides4 ,there is the idea of law1 of something which controls conduct1 and there is the consciousness of the necessity of conforming to this law4 ,there is1 of course1 no separation between the two sides1 but the consideration of the latter side--the recognition of obligation--may be best dealt with in discussing conscience4 ,here we shall deal simply with the fact that there is such a thing in conduct as law controlling action1 and constituting obligation4 ,theories regarding obligation may1 for our purposes1 be subdivided into those which make its exercise restraint or coercion 7and which therefore hold that in perfect moral conduct1 duty as such disappears72 and those which hold that obligation is a normal element in conduct as such1 and that it is not1 essentially1 but only under certain circumstances1 coercive4 ,of the former type1 some theories 7mainly the hedonistic7 regard the restraint as originally imposed from without upon the desires of the individual1 while others 7as the ,kantian7 regard it as imposed by man's reason upon his desires and inclinations4 ,,xliii4 ,bain's ,theory of ,obligation4 ,it is obvious that the question of obligation presents considerable difficulty to the hedonistic school4 ,if the end of conduct is pleasure1 as the satisfaction of desire1 why should not each desire be satisfied1 if possible1 as it arises1 and thus pleasure secured8 ,what meaning is there in the term 'duty' or 'obligation' if the moral end or good coincides wholly with the natural end of the inclinations themselves8 ,it is evident1 at all events1 that the term can have significance only if there is some cause preventing the desires as they arise from natural satisfaction4 ,the problem of obligation in hedonism thus becomes the problem of discovering that outside force which restrains1 or1 at least1 constrains1 the desire from immediate gratification4 ,according to ,bain1 this outside force is social disapprobation manifested through the form of punishment4 ,i consider that the proper meaning1 or import of the terms duty1 obligation refers to that class of action which is enforced by the sanction of punishment4444 ,the powers that impose the obligatory sanction are ,law and ,society1 or the community acting through the ,government by public judicial acts1 and apart from the ,government by the unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion from social good offices4 ,emotions and ,will1 p4 #bhf4 ,see also pp4 #cba-cbc and p4 #ebg4 ,through this 'actual and ideal avoidance of certain acts and dread of punishment' the individual learns to forego the gratification of some of his natural impulses1 and learns also to cultivate and even to originate desires not at first spontaneous4 ,the child is open from the first to the blame and praise of others1 and thus is led to do or avoid certain acts4 ,on the model1 however1 of the action of this external authority there grows up1 in time an internal authority--an ideal resemblance of public authority 7p4 #bhg71 or a fac simile of the system of government around us 7p4 #cac74 ,the sentiment1 at first formed and cultivated by the relations of actual command and obedience1 may come at last to stand upon an independent foundation4444 ,when the young mind1 accustomed at the outset to implicitly obeying any set of rules is sufficiently advanced to appreciate the motive--the utilities or the sentiment that led to their imposition--the character of the conscience is entirely changed4444 ,regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law1 and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power 7,e4 and ,w41 p4 #cah74 ,but when the sense of obligation becomes entirely detached from the social sanction1 even then the notion1 sentiment or form of duty is derived from what society imposes1 although the particular matter is quite different4 ,social obligation develops in the mind originally the feeling and habit of obligation1 and this remains although the particular articles are changed 7page #cai1 note74 ,cf4 also ,bain1 ,moral ,science1 pp4 #bj-ba and #da-dc4 ,,xliv4 ,spencer's ,theory of ,obligation4 ,spencer's theory is1 in substance1 an enlarged and better analyzed restatement of ,bain's theory4 ,bain nowhere clearly states in what the essence of obligation consists1 when it becomes independent1 when the internal fac simile is formed4 ,why should ,i not gratify my desires as ,i please in case social pressure is absent or lets up8 ,spencer supplies the missing element4 ,according to him1 the essential trait in the moral consciousness is the control of some feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings 7,data of ,ethics1 p4 #aac74 ,the kind of feeling which controls is that which is more complex and which relates to more remote ends2 or1 we are 'obliged' to give up more immediate1 special and direct pleasures for the sake of securing more general1 remote and indirect ones4 ,obligation1 in its essence1 is the surrender or subordination of present to future satisfaction4 ,this control1 restraint1 or suppression may be 'independent' or1 self-imposed1 but is not so at first1 either in the man or in the child4 ,prior to self-restraint are the restraints imposed by the visible ruler1 the invisible ruler and society at large--the policeman1 the priest and public opinion4 ,the man is induced to postpone immediate gratification through his fear of others1 especially of the chief1 of the dead and of social displeasure--legal penalty1 supernatural punishment and social reprobation4 ,thus there grows up the sense of obligation4 ,this refers at first only to the above-mentioned extrinsic effects of action4 ,but finally the mind learns to consider the intrinsic effect of the action itself--the evil inflicted by the evil deed1 and then the sense of duty1 or coercion1 evolved through the aforesaid external agencies1 becomes transferred to this new mode of controlling action4 ,desires are now controlled through considerations of what their own effects would be1 were the desires acted upon4 ,it follows that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory1 and will diminish as fast as moralization increases 7page #abg74 ,even when compulsion is self-imposed1 there is still compulsion1 coercion1 and this must be done away with4 ,it is done away with as far as an act which is at first done only for the sake of its own remoter consequences comes to be done for its own sake4 ,and this will ultimately occur1 if the act is continued1 since persistence in performing a duty ends in making it a pleasure4 ,see ,guyau1 ,la ,morale ,anglaise ,contemporaine1 besides the works of ,bain and ,spencer4 ,in addition to objections which will forthwith be made1 we may here note a false abstraction of ,spencer's4 ,he makes the act and its consequences two things1 while the act and its consequences 7provided they are known as such7 are the same thing1 no matter whether consequences are near or remote4 ,the only distinction is that consequences once not known as such at all are seen in time to be really consequences1 and thus to be part of the content of the act4 ,the transfer from the external consequences imposed by the ruler1 priest and public-opinion to the intrinsic consequences of the act itself1 is thus a transfer from an immoral to a moral basis4 ,this is very different from a change of the form of obligation itself4 ,,xlv4 ,criticism of these ,theories4 ,putting aside the consideration of the relation of desire to duty1 7the question whether duty is essentially coercive7 until after we have taken up the ,kantian idea of obligation1 we may note the following objections to the theories just stated4 ,their great defect is that they do not give us any method of differentiating moral coercion 7or obligation7 from the action of mere superior physical force4 ,taking it 7first7 upon the side of the individual3 ,is there any reason why the individual submits to the external authority of government except that he has to do so8 ,he may argue that1 since others possess superior force1 he will avoid certain pains by conforming to their demands1 but such yielding1 whether temporary or permanent1 to superior force is very far from being a recognition that one ought to act as the superior force dictates4 ,the theories must logically commit us to the doctrine that 'might makes right' in its baldest form4 ,every one knows that1 when the individual surrenders the natural gratifications of his desires to the command of others1 if his sole reason is the superior force of the commanding party1 he does not forego in the surrender his right to such gratification the moment he has the chance to get it4 ,actual slavery would be the model school of duties1 if these theories were true4 ,the facts adduced by ,bain and ,spencer--the growth of the recognition of duties in the child through the authority of the parents1 and in the savage through the use of authority by the chief--are real enough1 but what they prove is that obligation may be brought home to one by force1 not that force creates obligation4 ,the child and the man yield to force in such a way that their sense of duty is developed only in case they recognize1 implicitly1 the force or the authority as already right4 ,let it be recognized that rightful force 7as distinct from mere brute strength7 resides in certain social authorities1 and these social authorities may do much1 beyond the shadow of doubt1 to give effect to the special deeds and relations which are to be considered obligatory4 ,these theories1 in fine1 take the fact of obligation for granted1 and1 at most1 only show the historical process by which its fuller recognition is brought about4 ,force in the service of right is one thing2 force as constituting and creating right is another4 ,and this is to say 7secondly71 considering the matter from the side of society1 that the theories of ,bain and ,spencer do not explain why or how social authority should exercise coercive force over the individual4 ,if it is implied that they do so in the moral interests of the individual or of the community1 this takes it for granted that there already is in existence a moral ideal obligatory upon the individual4 ,if it is implied that they exercise coercive force in the interests of their own private pleasure1 this might establish a despotism1 or lead to a political revolt1 but it is difficult to see how it could create the fact of duty4 ,when we consider any concrete case1 we see that society1 in its compelling of the individual1 is possessed of moral ideals2 and that it conceives itself not merely as having the power to make the individual conform to them1 nor as having the right merely2 but as under the bounden duty of bringing home to the individual his duties4 ,the social authorities do not1 perforce1 create morality1 but they embody and make effective the existing morality4 ,it is only just because the actions which they impose are thought of as good1 good for others as for themselves1 that this imposition is taken out of the realm of tyranny into that of duty 7see ,sec4 ,,xxxviii74 ,,xlvi4 ,the ,kantian ,theory of ,obligation4 ,as we have seen1 ,kant takes the conception of duty as the primary ethical notion1 superior to that of the good1 and places it in the most abrupt opposition to desire4 ,the relation of duty to desire is not control of some feelings by others1 but rather suppression of all desire 7not in itself1 but as a motive of action7 in favor of the consciousness of law universal4 ,we have1 on one side1 according to ,kant1 the desire and inclination1 which are sensuous and pathological4 ,these constitute man's 'lower nature'4 ,on the other side there is ,reason1 which is essentially universal1 above all caprice and all prostitution to private pleasure4 ,this ,reason1 or 'higher nature'1 imposes a law upon the sentient being of man1 a law which takes the form of a command 7the ',categorical ,imperative'74 ,this relation of a higher rational nature issuing commands to a lower sensuous nature 7both within man himself71 is the very essence of duty4 ,if man were wholly a sentient being1 he would have only to follow his natural impulses1 like the animals4 ,if he were only a rational being1 he would necessarily obey his reason1 and there would still be no talk of obligation4 ,but because of the dualism1 because of the absolute opposition between ,reason and ,desire1 man is a being subject to obligation4 ,reason says to the desires ,thou shalt or ,thou shalt not4 ,yet this obligation is not externally imposed2 the man as rational imposes it upon himself as sensuous4 ,thus ,kant says that1 in the realm of morality1 man is both sovereign and subject4 ,the reflex influence of ,rousseau's social theories upon ,kant's moral doctrines in this respect is worthy of more attention than it usually receives4 ,kant's moral theory is hardly more than a translation of ,rousseau's politics into ethical terms1 through its union with ,kant's previously established dualism of reason and sense4 ,,xlvii4 ,criticism of the ,kantian ,theory4 #a4 ,no one can deny that a genuine opposition exists between the 'natural' desires and moral activity4 ,the being that satisfies each desire or appetite as it arises1 without reference of it to1 or control of it by1 some principle1 has not had the horizon of conduct lift before him4 ,but ,kant makes the satisfaction of desire as such 7not of this or that desire7 antagonistic to action from duty4 ,kant was forced into this position by his fundamental division of sense from reason1 but it carries with it its own condemnation and thus that of the premises from which it is derived4 ,it comes to saying that the actual desires and appetites are not what they ought to be4 ,this1 in itself1 is true enough4 ,but when ,kant goes on to say1 as he virtually does1 that what ought to be cannot be1 that the desires as such cannot be brought into harmony with principle1 he has made the moral life not only a riddle1 but a riddle with no answer4 ,if mankind were once convinced that the moral ideal were something which ought to be but which could not be1 we may easily imagine how much longer moral endeavor would continue4 ,the first or immediate stimulus to moral effort is the conviction that the desires and appetites are not what they should be2 the underlying and continuing stimulus is the conviction that the expression of desires in harmony with law is the sole abiding good of man4 ,to reconcile the two is the very meaning of the moral struggle 7see ,sec4 ,,lxiv74 ,strictly1 according to ,kant1 morality would either leave the appetites untouched or would abolish them--in either case destroying morality4 ,see ,caird1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #bbf-bh4 #b4 ,kant again seems to be on the right track in declaring that obligation is not anything externally imposed1 but is the law of man's being1 self-imposed4 ,this principle of 'autonomy' is the only escape from a theory of obligation which would make obligation external1 and regard for it slavish fear1 or servile hope of reward4 ,to regard even a ,divine ,being as the author of obligation is to make it a form of external constraint1 appealing only to hope or fear1 unless this ,divine ,being is shown to be organically connected with self4 ,but this abstract universal reason which somehow dwells1 without mediation or reason1 in each individual1 seems to be somewhat scholastic1 a trifle mythological4 ,there is undoubtedly in man's experience a function which corresponds to what ,kant is aiming1 thus mythologically1 to describe4 ,but it is one thing to recognize an opposition of a desire1 in its isolation1 to desire as organic to the function of the whole man2 it is another to split man into a blank dualism of an abstract reason1 on one side1 having no antecedents or bearings1 and of a mess of appetites1 having only animal relationship1 on the other4 ,the truth that ,kant is aiming to preserve seems to be fairly stated as two-fold3 first1 that duty is self-imposed1 and thus the dutiful will autonomous or free2 and1 second1 the presence of struggle in man between a 'lower' and a 'higher'4 ,the first point seems to be sufficiently met by the idea already advanced that self1 or individuality1 is essentially social1 being constituted not by isolated capacity1 but by capacity acting in response to the needs of an environment--an environment which1 when taken in its fullness1 is a community of persons4 ,any law imposed by such a self would be 'universal'1 but this universality would not be an isolated possession of the individual2 it would be another name for the concrete social relationships which make the individual what he is1 as a social member or organ4 ,furthermore1 such a universal law would not be formal1 but would have a content--these same relationships4 ,the second point seems to be met by recognizing that in the realization of the law of social function1 conflict must occur between the desire as an immediate and direct expression of the individual--the desire in its isolation--and desire as an expression of the whole man2 desire1 that is1 as wholly conformable to the needs of the surroundings4 ,such a conflict is real enough1 as everyone's experience will testify1 but it is a conflict which may be solved--which must be solved so far as morality is attained4 ,and since it is a conflict within desire itself1 its solution or morality1 does not require any impossible obliteration of desire1 nor any acting from an 'ought' which has no relation to what 'is'4 ,this1 indeed1 is the failure of the ,kantian ,ethics3 in separating what should be from what is1 it deprives the latter1 the existing social world as well as the desires of the individual1 of all moral value2 while1 by the same separation1 it condemns that which should be to a barren abstraction4 ,an 'ought' which does not root in and flower from the 'is'1 which is not the fuller realization of the actual state of social relationships1 is a mere pious wish that things should be better4 ,and morality1 that is1 right action1 is not so feeble as this would come to4 ,,xlviii4 ,the ,source and ,nature of ,obligation4 ,the basis of a correct theory of obligation lies1 as already stated1 in holding fast to its concrete relations to the moral end1 or good4 ,this end consists in an activity in which capacity is exercised in accordance with surroundings1 with the social needs which affect the individual4 ,it is implied in this very idea1 that the end is not something which the individual may set up at his own arbitrary will4 ,the social needs give control1 law1 authority4 ,the individual may not manifest his capacity1 satisfy his desires1 apart from their specific relation to the environment in which they exist4 ,the general fact of obligation which is constituted through this control of capacity by the wider function is1 of course1 differentiated into specific 'laws' or duties by the various forms which the one function takes1 as capacity and circumstances vary4 ,in other words1 obligation or duty is simply the aspect which the good or the moral end assumes1 as the individual conceives of it4 ,from the very fact that the end is the good1 and yet is not realized by the individual1 it presents itself to him as that which should be realized--as the ideal of action4 ,it requires no further argument to show that obligation is at once self-imposed1 and social in its content4 ,it is self-imposed because it flows from the good1 from the idea of the full activity of the individual's own will4 ,it is no law imposed from without2 but is his own law1 the law of his own function1 of his individuality4 ,its social content flows from the fact that this individuality is not mere capacity1 but is this capacity acting1 and acting so as to comprehend social relationships4 ,suppose that man's good and his conviction of duty were divorced from one another--that man's duty were other than to fulfill his own specific function4 ,such a thing would make duty purely formal2 the moral law would have no intrinsic relation to daily conduct1 to the expression of man's powers and wants4 ,there have1 indeed1 been moralists who think they do the ,lord service1 who think they add to the dignity and sacredness of ,duty by making it other than the idea of the activity of man1 regulated indeed1 but regulated only by its own principle of activity4 ,but such moralists in their desire to consecrate the idea of duty remove from it all content1 and leave it an empty abstraction4 ,on the other hand1 their eagerness to give absoluteness and imperativeness to duty by making it a law other than that of the normal expression of man1 casts discredit upon the one moral reality--the full1 free play of human life4 ,in denying that duty is simply the intrinsic law1 the self-manifestation of this life1 they make this life immoral1 or at least non-moral4 ,they degrade it to a bundle of appetites and powers having no moral value until the outside moral law is applied to them4 ,in reality1 the dignity and imperativeness of duty are simply the manifest dignity and unconditioned worth of human life as exhibited in its free activity4 ,the whole idea of the separateness of duty from the concrete flow of human action is a virulent example of the fallacy mentioned in an early section--the fallacy that moral action means something more than action itself 7see ,sec4 ,,ii74 ,the attempt to act upon a theory of the divorce of satisfaction and duty1 to carry it out in practice1 means the maiming of desire through distrust of its moral significance1 and thus1 by withdrawing the impetus of action1 the reduction of life to mere passivity4 ,so far as this does not happen1 it means the erection of the struggle itself1 the erection of the opposition of law to desire1 into the very principle of the moral life4 ,the essential principle of the moral life1 that good consists in the freeing of impulse1 of appetite1 of desire1 of power1 by enabling them to flow in the channel of a unified and full end is lost sight of1 and the free service of the spirit is reduced to the slavish fear of a bond-man under a hard taskmaster4 ,the essential point in the analysis of moral law1 or obligation1 having been found1 we may briefly discuss some subsidiary points4 #a4 ,the relation of duty to a given desire4 ,as any desire arises1 it will be1 except so far as character has already been moralized1 a demand for its own satisfaction2 the desire1 in a word1 will be isolated4 ,in so far1 duty will be in a negative attitude towards the desire2 it will insist first upon its limitation1 and then upon its transformation4 ,so far as it is merely limitative1 it demands the denying of the desire1 and so far assumes a coercive form4 ,but this limitation is not for its own sake1 but for that of the transformation of desire into a freer and more adequate form--into a form1 that is1 where it will carry with it1 when it passes into action1 more of activity1 than the original desire would have done4 ,does duty itself disappear when its constraint disappears8 ,on the contrary1 so far as an act is done unwillingly1 under constraint1 so far the act is impure1 and undutiful4 ,the very fact that there is need of constraint shows that the self is divided2 that there is a two-fold interest and purpose--one in the law of the activity according to function1 the other in the special end of the particular desire4 ,let the act be done wholly as duty1 and it is done wholly for its own sake2 love1 passion take the place of constraint4 ,this suggests3 #b4 ,duty for duty's sake4 ,it is clear that such an expression states a real moral fact2 unless a duty is done as duty it is not done morally4 ,an act may be outwardly just what morality demands1 and yet if done for the sake of some private advantage it is not counted moral4 ,as ,kant expresses it1 an act must be done not only in accordance with duty1 but from duty4 ,this truth1 however1 is misinterpreted when it is taken to mean that the act is to be done for the sake of duty1 and duty is conceived as a third thing outside the act itself4 ,such a theory contradicts the true sense of the phrase 'duty for duty's sake'1 for it makes the act done not for its own sake1 but as a mere means to an abstract law beyond itself4 ',do the right because it is the right' means do the right thing because it is the right thing2 that is1 do the act disinterestedly from interest in the act itself4 ,a duty is always some act or line of action1 not a third thing outside the act to which it is to conform4 ,in short1 duty means the act which is to be done1 and 'duty for duty's sake' means do the required act as it really is2 do not degrade it into a means for some ulterior end4 ,this is as true in practice as in theory4 ,a man who does his duty not for the sake of the acts themselves1 but for the sake of some abstract 'ideal' which he christens duty in general1 will have a morality at once hard and barren1 and weak and sentimental4 #c4 ,the agency of moral authority in prescribing moral law and stimulating to moral conduct4 ,the facts1 relied upon by ,bain and ,spencer1 as to the part played by social influences in imposing duties1 are undeniable4 ,the facts1 however1 are unaccountable upon the theory of these writers1 as that theory would1 as we have seen1 explain only the influence of society in producing acts done from fear or for hope of reward4 ,but if the individual and others are equally members of one society1 if the performance by each man of his own function constitutes a good common to all1 it is inevitable that social authorities should be an influence in constituting and teaching duties4 ,the community1 in imposing its own needs and demands upon the individual1 is simply arousing him to a knowledge of his relationships in life1 to a knowledge of the moral environment in which he lives1 and of the acts which he must perform if he is to realize his individuality4 ,the community in awakening moral consciousness in the morally immature may appeal to motives of hope and fear4 ,but even this fact does not mean that to the child1 duty is necessarily constituted by fear of punishment or hope of reward4 ,it means simply that his capacity and his surroundings are both so undeveloped that the exercise of his function takes mainly the form of pleasing others4 ,he may still do his duty as his duty1 but his duty now consists in pleasing others4 ,on ,obligation see ,green1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #ceb-cef2 ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #adb-adg4 ,for different views1 ,martineau1 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #ib-aai2 ,calderwood1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aca-ach1 and see also1 ,grote1 ,treatise on ,moral ,ideals1 ch4 ,,vii4 ,,chapter ,,iii4--,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,freedom4 ,,xlix4 ,the ,forms of ,freedom4 ,we may now deal1 more briefly1 with the problem of moral capacity4 ,it is1 in principle1 the ability to conceive of an end and to be governed in action by this conceived end4 ,we may consider this capacity in three aspects1 as negative1 as potential and as positive4 #a4 ,negative ,aspect of ,freedom4 ,the power to be governed in action by the thought of some end to be reached is freedom from the appetites and desires4 ,an animal which does not have the power of proposing ends to itself is impelled to action by its wants and appetites just as they come into consciousness4 ,it is irritated into acting4 ,each impulse demands its own satisfaction1 and the animal is helpless to rise above the particular want4 ,but a person1 one who can direct his action by conscious ends1 is emancipated from subjection to the particular appetites4 ,he can consider their relation to the end which he has set before himself1 and can reject1 modify or use them as best agrees with the purposed end4 ,this capacity to control and subjugate impulses by reflection upon their relationship to a rational end is the power of self-government1 and the more distinct and the more comprehensive in scope the end is1 the more real the self-government4 #b4 ,potential ,freedom4 ,the power to conceive of ends involves the possibility of thinking of many and various ends1 and even of ends which are contrary to one another4 ,if an agent could conceive of but one end in some case1 it would always seem to him afterwards that he had been necessitated to act in the direction of that end2 but the power to put various ends before self constitutes freedom of choice1 or potential freedom4 ,after action1 the agent calls to mind that there was another end open to him1 and that if he did not choose the other end1 it was because of something in his character which made him prefer the one he actually chose4 ,l4 ,moral ,responsibility4 ,here we have the basis of moral responsibility or accountability4 ,there is no responsibility for any result which is not intended or foreseen4 ,such a consequence is only physical1 not moral4 7,sec4 ,,vii74 ,but when any result has been foreseen1 and adopted as foreseen1 such result is the outcome not of any external circumstances1 nor of mere desires and impulses1 but of the agent's conception of his own end4 ,now1 because the result thus flows from the agent's own conception of an end1 he feels himself responsible for it4 ,it must be remembered that the end adopted is that which is conceived as satisfying self--that1 indeed1 when we say end of action1 we mean only some proposed form of self-satisfaction4 ,the adopted end always indicates1 therefore1 that sort of condition which the agent considers to be good1 or self-satisfactory4 ,it is because a result flows from the agent's ideal of himself1 the thought of himself which he considers desirable or worth realizing1 that the agent feels himself responsible4 ,the result is simply an expression of himself2 a manifestation of what he would have himself be4 ,responsibility is thus one aspect of the identity of character and conduct4 7,sec4 ,,vii74 ,we are responsible for our conduct because that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions4 ,the idea of responsibility is intensified whenever there have been two contrary lines of conduct conceived1 of which one has been chosen4 ,if the end adopted turns out not to be satisfactory1 but1 rather1 unworthy and degrading1 the agent feels that he might have chosen the other end1 and that if he did not1 it was because his character was such1 his ideal of himself was such1 that this other end did not appeal to him4 ,the actual result is felt to be the outcome of an unworthy character manifested in the adoption of a low form of satisfaction2 and the evident contrast of this low form with a higher form1 present to consciousness but rejected1 makes the sense of responsibility more acute4 ,as such1 it is the judgment of disapprobation passed upon conduct2 the feeling of remorse and of the desert of punishment4 ,freedom as the power of conceiving ends and of realizing the ideal end in action1 is thus the basis both of responsibility and of approbation 7or disapprobation74 ,the ,freedom of ,indifference4 ,it is this potential freedom1 arising from the power of proposing various ends of action1 which1 misinterpreted1 gives rise to the theory of a liberty of indifferent choice--the theory that the agent can choose this or that without any ground or motive4 ,the real experience is the knowledge1 after the choice of one end1 that since another end was also present to consciousness that other end might have been chosen1 if only the character had been such as to find its satisfaction in that other end4 ,the theory of indifference misconstrues this fact to mean that the agent might just as well have chosen that other end1 without any if or qualification whatever4 ,the theory of indifference1 moreover1 defeats its own end4 ,the point which it is anxious to save is responsibility4 ,it sees that if only one course of action were ever open to an agent1 without the possibility of any conception of another course1 an agent1 so acting1 could not be held responsible for not having adopted that other course4 ,and so it argues that there must always be the possibility of indifferent or alternate choice2 the possibility of adopting this or that line of action without any motive4 ,but if such were the case responsibility would be destroyed4 ,if the end chosen is not an expression of character1 if it does not manifest the agent's ideal of himself1 if its choice is a matter of indifference1 it does not signify morally1 but is mere accident or caprice4 ,it is because choice is not a matter of indifference1 but an outcome of character that the agent feels responsibility1 and approves or disapproves4 ,he virtually says3 ,i am responsible for this outcome1 not because ,i could have chosen another end just as well without any reason1 but because ,i thought of another end and rejected it2 because my character was such that that end did not seem good1 and was such that this end did seem good4 ,my character is myself1 and in this unworthy end ,i stand self-condemned4 ,,li4 ,moral ,reformation4 ,freedom considered as potential1 depending upon the power of the agent to frame diverse ends1 is the basis not only of responsibility1 but also of the possibility of reformation1 or of change in character and conduct4 ,all moral action is the expression of self1 but the self is not something fixed or rigid4 ,it includes as a necessary part of itself the possibility of framing conceptions of what it would be1 and there is1 therefore1 at any time the possibility of acting upon some ideal hitherto unrealized4 ,if conduct were the expression of character1 in a sense which identified character wholly with past attainments1 then reformation would be impossible4 ,what a man once was he must always continue to be4 ,but past attainments do not exhaust all the possibilities of character4 ,since conduct necessarily implies a continuous adjustment of developing capacity to new conditions1 there is the ability to frame a changed ideal of self-satisfaction--that is1 ability to lead a new life4 ,that the new ideal is adopted from experience of the unworthy nature of former deeds is what we should expect4 ,the chosen end having proved itself unsatisfactory1 the alternative end1 previously rejected1 recurs to consciousness with added claims4 ,to sum up3 ,the doctrine that choice depends upon character is correct1 but the doctrine is misused when taken to mean that a man's outward conduct will always be in the same direction that it has been4 ,character involves all the ideas of different and of better things which have been present to the agent1 although he has never attempted to carry them out4 ,and there is always the possibility that1 if the proper influences are brought to bear1 some one of these latent ideals may be made vital1 and wholly change the bent of character and of conduct4 ,,lii4 ,positive ,freedom4 ,the capacity of freedom lies in the power to form an ideal or conception of an end4 ,actual freedom lies in the realization of that end which actually satisfies4 ,an end may be freely adopted1 and yet its actual working out may result not in freedom1 but in slavery4 ,it may result in rendering the agent more subject to his passions1 less able to direct his own conduct1 and more cramped and feeble in powers4 ,only that end which executed really effects greater energy and comprehensiveness of character makes for actual freedom4 ,in a word1 only the good man1 the man who is truly realizing his individuality1 is free1 in the positive sense of that word4 ,every action which is not in the line of performance of functions must necessarily result in self-enslavement4 ,the end of desire is activity2 and it is only in fullness and unity of activity that freedom is found4 ,when desires are not unified--when1 that is1 the idea of the exercise of function does not control conduct--one desire must conflict with another4 ,action is directed now this way1 now that1 and there is friction1 loss of power4 ,on account of this same lack of control of desires by the comprehensive law of social activity1 one member of society is brought into conflict with another1 with waste of energy1 and with impeded and divided activity and satisfaction of desire4 ,exercise of function1 on the other hand1 unifies the desires1 giving each its relative1 although subordinate1 place4 ,it fits each into the others1 and1 through the harmonious adjustment of one to another1 effects that complete and unhindered action which is freedom4 ,the performance of specific function falls also into free relations with the activities of other persons1 coperating with them1 giving and receiving what is needed1 and thus constituting full liberty4 ,other aspects of freedom1 as the negative and the potential1 are simply means instrumental to the realization of individuality1 and when not employed toward this1 their true end1 they become methods of enslaving the agent4 ,on the subject of moral freedom1 as1 upon the whole1 in agreement with the view presented here3 ,see ,green3 ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 pp4 #ij-aag2 #adb-aeh4 ,bradley3 ,ethical ,studies1 ch4 ,i2 ,caird3 ,phil4 of ,kant1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ch4 #c2 ,alexander3 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #ccf-cda4 ,and1 for a view agreeing in part1 ,stephen3 ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #bgh-bic4 ,for presentations of the freedom of indifference1 see1 ,lotze3 ,practical ,philosophy1 ch4 #c4 ,martineau3 ,op4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #cd-dj4 ,calderwood3 ,handbook of ,moral ,philosophy4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,the ,,ethical ,,world4 ,,liii4 ,the ,reality of ,moral ,relations4 ,the habit of conceiving moral action as a certain kind of action1 instead of all action so far as it really is action1 leads us to conceive of morality as a highly desirable something which somehow ought to be brought into our lives1 but which upon the whole is not4 ,it gives rise to the habit of conceiving morality as a vague ideal which it is praiseworthy for the individual to strive for1 but which depends wholly for its existence upon the individual's wish in the matter4 ,morality1 that is1 is considered as a relation existing between something which merely ought to be1 on one hand1 and the individual's choice1 or his conscience on the other4 ,this point of view has found typical expression in ,bishop ,butler's saying3 ,if conscience had might as it has right1 it would rule the world4 ,but right is not such a helpless creature4 ,it exists not in word but in power4 ,the moral world is1 here and now2 it is a reality apart from the wishes1 or failures to wish1 of any given individual4 ,it bears the same relation to the individual's activity that the 'physical world' does to his knowledge4 ,not till the individual has to spin the physical world out of his consciousness in order to know it1 will it be necessary for him to create morality by his choice1 before it can exist4 ,as knowledge is mastery in one's self of the real world1 the reproduction of it in self-consciousness1 so moral action is the appropriation and vital self-expression of the values contained in the existing practical world4 ,the existence of this moral world is not anything vaguely mysterious4 ,imagine a well organized factory1 in which there is some comprehensive industry carried on--say the production of cotton cloth4 ,this is the end2 it is a common end--that for which each individual labors4 ,not all individuals1 however1 are doing the same thing4 ,the more perfect the activity1 the better organized the work1 the more differentiated their respective labors4 ,this is the side of individual activity or freedom4 ,to make the analogy with moral activity complete we have to suppose that each individual is doing the work because of itself1 and not merely as drudgery for the sake of some further end1 as pay4 ,now these various individuals are bound together by their various acts2 some more nearly because doing closely allied things1 all somewhat1 because contributing to a common activity4 ,this is the side of laws and duties4 ,this group of the differentiated and yet related activities is the analogue of the moral world4 ,there are certain wants which have constantly to be fulfilled2 certain ends which demand coperating activities1 and which establish fixed relations between men4 ,there is a world of ends1 a realm of definite activities in existence1 as concrete as the ends and activities in our imagined factory4 ,the child finds1 then1 ends and actions in existence when he is born4 ,more than this3 he is not born as a mere spectator of the world2 he is born into it4 ,he finds himself encompassed by such relations1 and he finds his own being and activity intermeshed with them4 ,if he takes away from himself1 as an agent1 what he has1 as sharing in these ends and actions1 nothing remains4 ,,liv4 ,moral ,institutions4 ,this world of purposes and activities is differentiated into various institutions4 ,the child is born as a member of a family2 as he grows up he finds that others have possessions which he must respect1 that is1 he runs upon the institution of property4 ,as he grows still older1 he finds persons outside of the family of whose actions he must take account as respects his own3 society1 in the limited sense as meaning relations of special intimacy or acquaintanceship4 ,then he finds the political institutions2 the city1 state and nation4 ,he finds an educational institution1 the school1 the college2 religious institutions1 the church1 etc41 etc4 ,everywhere he finds men having common wants and thus proposing common ends and using coperative modes of action4 ,to these organized modes of action1 with their reference to common interests and purposes1 he must adjust his activities2 he must take his part therein1 if he acts at all1 though it be only negatively or hostilely1 as in evil conduct4 ,these institutions are morality real and objective2 the individual becomes moral as he shares in this moral world1 and takes his due place in it4 ,institutions1 then1 are organized modes of action1 on the basis of the wants and interests which unite men4 ,they differ as the family from the town1 the church from the state1 according to the scope and character of the wants from which they spring4 ,they are not bare facts like objects of knowledge2 they are practical1 existing for the sake of1 and by means of the will--as execution of ideas which have interest4 ,because they are expressions of common purposes and ideas1 they are not merely private will and intelligence1 but1 in the literal sense1 public will and reason4 ,the moral endeavor of man thus takes the form not of isolated fancies about right and wrong1 not of attempts to frame a morality for himself1 not of efforts to bring into being some praiseworthy ideal never realized2 but the form of sustaining and furthering the moral world of which he is a member4 ,since the world is one of action1 and not of contemplation like the world of knowledge1 it can be sustained and furthered only as he makes its ends his own1 and identifies himself and his satisfaction with the activities in which other wills find their fulfillment4 ,this is simply a more concrete rendering of what has already been said about the moral environment 7see ,sec4 #cc74 ,,lv4 ,the ,aspects of a ,moral ,institution4 ,an institution is1 as we have seen the expression of unity of desires and ideas2 it is general intelligence in action1 or common will4 ,as such common will1 it is1 as respects the merely private or exclusive wants and aims of its members1 absolutely sovereign4 ,it must aim to control them4 ,it must set before them the common end or ideal and insist upon this as the only real end of individual conduct4 ,the ends so imposed by the public reason are laws4 ,but these laws are for the sake of realizing the common end1 of securing that organized unity of action in which alone the individual can find freedom and fullness of action1 or his own satisfaction4 ,thus the activity of the common will gives freedom1 or rights1 to the various members of the institution4 ,every institution1 then1 has its sovereignty1 or authority1 and its laws and rights4 ,it is only a false abstraction which makes us conceive of sovereignty1 or authority1 and of law and of rights as inhering only in some supreme organization1 as the national state4 ,the family1 the school1 the neighborhood group1 has its authority as respects its members1 imposes its ideals of action1 or laws1 and confers its respective satisfactions in way of enlarged freedom1 or rights4 ,it is true that no one of these institutions is isolated2 that each stands in relation with other like and unlike institutions4 ,each minor institution is a member of some more comprehensive whole1 to which it bears the same relation that the individual bears to it4 ,that is to say1 its sovereignty gives way to the authority of the more comprehensive organization2 its laws must be in harmony with the laws which flow from the larger activity2 its rights must become aspects of a fuller satisfaction4 ,only humanity or the organized activity of all the wants1 powers and interests common to men1 can have absolute sovereignty1 law and rights4 ,but the narrower group has its relations1 none the less1 although1 in ultimate analysis1 they flow from and manifest the wider good1 which1 as wider1 must be controlling4 ,without such minor local authorities1 rights and laws1 humanity would be a meaningless abstraction1 and its activity wholly empty4 ,there is an authority in the family1 and the moral growth of the child consists in identifying the law of his own conduct with the ends aimed at by the institution1 and in growing into maturity and freedom of manhood through the rights which are bestowed upon him as such a member4 ,within its own range this institution is ultimate4 ,but its range is not ultimate2 the family1 valuable and sacred as it is1 does not exist for itself4 ,it is not a larger selfishness4 ,it exists as one mode of realizing that comprehensive common good to which all institutions must contribute1 if they are not to decay4 ,it is the same with property1 the school1 the local church1 and with the national state4 ,we can now translate into more concrete terms what was said1 in ,part ,i1 regarding the good1 obligation and freedom4 ,that performance of function which is 'the good'1 is now seen to consist in vital union with1 and reproduction of1 the practical institutions of which one is a member4 ,the maintenance of such institutions by the free participation therein of individual wills1 is1 of itself1 the common good4 ,freedom also gets concreteness2 it is the assured rights1 or powers of action which one gets as such a member3--powers which are not mere claims1 nor simply claims recognized as valid by others1 but claims re-inforced by the will of the whole community4 ,freedom becomes real in the ethical world2 it becomes force and efficiency of action1 because it does not mean some private possession of the individual1 but means the whole coperating and organized action of an institution in securing to an individual some power of self expression4 ,,lvi4 ,moral ,law and the ,ethical ,world4 ,without the idea of the ethical world1 as the unified activity of diverse functions exercised by different individuals1 the idea of the good1 and of freedom1 would be undefined4 ,but probably no one has ever attempted to conceive of the good and of freedom in total abstraction from the normal activity of man4 ,such has not been the lot of duty1 or of the element of law4 ,often by implication1 sometimes in so many words1 it is stated that while a physical law may be accounted for1 since it is simply an abstract from observed facts1 a moral law stands wholly above and apart from actual facts2 it expresses solely what 'ought to be' and not what is2 that1 indeed1 whether anything in accordance with it ever has existed or not1 is a matter of no essential moral importance theoretically1 however it may be practically4 ,now it is evident that a law of something which has not existed1 does not and perhaps never will exist1 is essentially inexplicable and mysterious4 ,it is as against such a notion of moral law that the idea of a real ethical world has perhaps its greatest service4 ,a moral law1 e4 g41 the law of justice1 is no more merely a law of what ought to be than is the law of gravitation4 ,as the latter states a certain relation of moving masses to one another1 so the law of justice states a certain relation of active wills to one another4 ,for a given individual1 at a given time and circumstances1 the law of justice may appear as the law of something which ought to be1 but is not3--is not for him in this respect1 that is to say4 ,but the very fact that it ought to be for him implies that it already is for others4 ,it is a law of the society of which he is a member4 ,and it is because he is a member of a society having this law1 that is a law of what should be for him4 ,would then justice cease to be a law for him if it were not observed at all in the society of which he is a member8 ,such a question is as contradictory as asking what would happen to a planet if the solar system went out of existence4 ,it is the law of justice 7with other such laws7 that makes society2 that is1 it is those active relations which find expression in these laws that unify individuals so that they have a common end1 and thus mutual duties4 ,to imagine the abolition of these laws is to imagine the abolition of society2 and to ask for the law of individual conduct apart from all relationship1 actual or ideal1 to society1 is to ask in what morality consists when moral conditions are destroyed4 ,a society in which the social bond we call justice does not obtain to some degree in the relations of man to man1 is not society2 and1 on the other hand1 wherever some law of justice actually obtains1 there the law is for every individual who is a member of the society4 ,this does not mean that the 'is'1 the actual status of the moral world1 is identical with the 'ought'1 or the ideal relations of man to man4 ,but it does mean that there is no obligation1 either in general or as any specific duty1 which does not grow out of the 'is'1 the actual relations now obtaining4#a ,the ethical world at any given time is undoubtedly imperfect1 and1 therefore1 it demands a certain act to meet the situation4 ,the very imperfection1 the very badness in the present condition of things1 is a part of the environment with reference to which we must act2 it is1 thus1 an element in the law of future action that it shall not exactly repeat the existing condition4 ,in other words1 the 'is' gives the law of the 'ought'1 but it is a part of this law that the 'ought' shall not be as the 'is'4 ,it is because the relation of justice does hold in members of a stratum of society1 having a certain position1 power or wealth1 but does not hold between this section and another class1 that the law of what should be is equal justice for all4 ,in holding that actual social relations afford the law of what should be1 we must not forget that these actual relations have a negative as well as a positive side1 and that the new law must be framed in view of the negatives1 the deficiencies1 the wrongs1 the contradictions1 as well as of the positive attainments4 ,a moral law1 to sum up1 is the principle of action1 which1 acted upon1 will meet the needs of the existing situation as respects the wants1 powers1 and circumstances of the individuals concerned4 ,it is no far-away abstraction1 but expresses the movement of the ethical world4 #a ,see ,secs4 #ei1 #fj and #fc for discussion of other aspects of this question4 ,one example will help define the discussion4 ,take the case of a street railway conductor1 whose union has ordered a strike4 ,what determines the law of his conduct under the circumstances8 ,evidently the existing ethical institutions of which he is a member1 so far as he is conscious of their needs4 ,to determine what he should do1 he does not hunt up some law of an 'ought' apart from what is2 if he should hunt for and should find such a law he would not know what to do with it4 ,just because it is apart from his concrete circumstances it is no guide1 no law for his conduct at all4 ,he has to act not in view of some abstract principle1 but in view of a concrete situation4 ,he considers his present wage1 its relation to its needs and abilities2 his capacity and taste for this and for that work2 the reasons for the strike2 the conditions of labor at present with reference to winning the strike1 and as to the chance of getting other work4 ,he considers his family1 their needs and developing powers2 the demand that they should live decently2 that his children should be fairly educated and get a fair start in the world2 he considers his relationships to his fellow members in the union1 etc4 ,these considerations1 and such as these1 give the law to his decision in so far as he acts morally and not instinctively4 ,where in this law-giving is there any separation from facts8 ,on the contrary1 the more right the act 7the nearer it comes to its proper law71 the more it will simply express and reflect the actual concrete facts4 ,the law1 in other words1 of action1 is the law of actual social forces in their onward movement1 in so far as these demand some response in the way of conduct from the individual4 ,we may restate from this point of view1 what we have already learned3 ,a moral law is thoroughly individualized4 ,it cannot be duplicated2 it cannot be for one act just what it is for another4 ,the ethical world is too rich in capacity and circumstance to permit of monotony2 it is too swift in its movement to allow of bare repetition4 ,it will not hold still2 it moves on1 and moral law is the law of action required from individuals by this movement4 ,the consideration of specific institutions1 as the family1 industrial society1 civil society1 the nation1 etc41 with their respective rights and laws1 belongs rather to political philosophy than to the general theory of ethics4 ,,part ,,iii4 ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,individual4 ,,lvii4 ,division of ,subject4 ,we have now analyzed the fundamental moral notions--the good1 duty and freedom2 we have considered their objective realization1 and seen that they are outwardly expressed in social relations1 the more typical and abiding of which we call institutions2 that abstract duties are realized in the laws created and imposed by such institutions1 and that abstract freedom is realized in the rights possessed by members in them4 ,we have now to consider the concrete moral life of an individual born into this existing ethical world and finding himself confronted with institutions in which he must execute his part1 and in which he obtains his satisfaction and free activity4 ,we have to consider how these institutions appeal to the individual1 awakening in him a distinct moral consciousness1 or the consciousness of active relations to persons1 in antithesis to the theoretical consciousness of relations which exist in contemplation2 how the individual behaves towards these institutions1 realizing them by assuming his proper position in them1 or attempting to thwart them by living in isolation from them2 and how a moral character is thus called into being4 ,more shortly1 we have to deal 7,i7 with the practical consciousness1 or the formation and growth of ideals of conduct2 7,,ii7 with the moral struggle1 or the process of realizing ideals1 and 7,,iii7 with moral character1 or the virtues4 ,,chapter ,i4--,,the ,,formation ,,and ,,growth ,,of ,,ideals4 ,,lviii4 ,analysis of ,conscience4 ,the practical consciousness1 or the recognition of ends and relations of action1 is what is usually termed conscience4 ,the analysis of conscience shows that it involves three elements1 which may be distinguished in theory1 although they have no separate existence in the actual fact of conscience itself4 ,these three elements are 7#a7 the knowledge of certain specific forms of conduct1 7#b7 the recognition of the authority or obligatoriness of the forms1 and 7#c7 the emotional factors which cluster about this recognition4 ,that is to say1 we often speak 7#a7 of conscience telling or informing us of duties2 we speak of an enlightened or unenlightened conscience2 of savage1 or medival1 or modern conscience4 ,here we are evidently thinking of the kind and range of particular acts considered right or wrong4 ,but we also speak 7#b7 of the authority and majesty of conscience2 of the commands of conscience1 etc4 ,here we are thinking of the consciousness of obligation in general4 ,the savage and the civilized man may vary greatly in their estimate of what particular acts are right or wrong1 and yet agree in the recognition that such acts as are right are absolutely obligatory4 ,finally we speak of an approving or disapproving1 or remorseful conscience1 of a tender or a hardened conscience1 of the pangs1 the pricks of conscience1 etc4 ,here 7#c7 we are evidently dealing with the responsiveness of the disposition to moral distinctions1 either in particular acts1 or in the recognition of moral law in general4 ,,lix4 ,conscience as the ,recognition of ,special ,acts as ,right or ,wrong4 ,conscience in this sense is no peculiar1 separate faculty of mind4 ,it is simply intelligence dealing with a certain subject-matter4 ,that is1 conscience is distinguished not by the kind of mental activity at work1 but by the kind of material the mind works upon4 ,intelligence deals with the nature and relations of things1 and we call it understanding2 intelligence deals with the relations of persons and deeds1 and it is termed conscience4 ,we may1 with advantage1 recognize these stages in the development of intelligence as dealing with moral relationships3 #a4 ,the ,customary or ,conventional ,conscience4 ,the existing moral world1 with the types and varieties of institutions peculiar to it1 is constantly impressing itself upon the immature mind2 it makes certain demands of moral agents and enforces them with all the means in its power--punishment1 reward1 blame1 public-opinion1 and the bestowal of social leadership4 ,these demands and expectations naturally give rise to certain convictions in the individual as to what he should or should not do4 ,such convictions are not the outcome of independent reflection1 but of the moulding influence of social institutions4 ,moreover the morality of a time becomes consolidated into proverbs1 maxims and law-codes4 ,it takes shape in certain habitual ways of looking at and judging matters4 ,all these are instilled into the growing mind through language1 literature1 association and legal custom1 until they leave in the mind a corresponding habit and attitude toward things to be done4 ,this process may be compared to the process by which knowledge of the world of things is first attained4 ,certain of the more permanent features of this world1 especially those whose observance is important in relation to continued physical existence and well-being1 impress themselves upon the mind4 ,consciousness1 with no reflective activity of its own1 comes to mirror some of the main outlines of the world4 ,the more important distinctions are fixed in language1 and they find their way into the individual mind1 giving it unconsciously a certain bent and coloring4 #b4 ,the ,loyal ,conscience4 ,but just as the mind1 which seems at first to have the facts and features of the world poured into itself as a passive vessel1 comes in time through its own experience to appreciate something of their meaning1 and1 to some extent1 to verify them for itself2 so the mind in its moral relations4 ,without forming any critical theory of the institutions and codes which are forming character1 without even considering whether they are what they should be1 the individual yet comes at least to a practical recognition that it is in these institutions that he gets his satisfactions1 and through these codes that he is protected4 ,he identifies himself1 his own life1 with the social forms and ideals in which he lives1 and repels any attack upon them as he would an attack upon himself4 ,the demands which the existing institutions make upon him are not felt as the coercions of a despot1 but as expressions of his own will1 and requiring loyalty as such4 ,the conventional conscience1 if it does not grow into this1 tends to become slavish1 while an intelligence which practically realizes1 although without continual reflection1 the significance of conventional morality is free in its convictions and service4 #c4 ,the ,independent or ,reflective ,conscience4 ,the intelligence may not simply appropriate1 as its own1 conventions embodied in current institutions and codes1 but may reflect upon them4 ,it may ask3 ,what is this institution of family1 property for8 ,does the institution in its present form work as it should work1 or is some modification required8 ,does this rule which is now current embody the true needs of the situation1 or is it an antiquated expression of by-gone relations8 ,what is the true spirit of existing institutions1 and what sort of conduct does this spirit demand8 ,here1 in a word1 we have the same relation to the ethical world1 that we have in physical science to the external world4 ,intelligence is not content1 on its theoretical side1 with having facts impressed upon it by direct contact or through language2 it is not content with coming to feel for itself the value of the truths so impressed4 ,it assumes an independent attitude1 putting itself over against nature and cross-questioning her4 ,it proposes its own ideas1 its own theories and hypotheses1 and manipulates facts to see if this rational meaning can be verified4 ,it criticises what passes as truth1 and pushes on to more adequate statement4 ,the correlative attempt1 on the part of intelligence on its practical side1 may have a larger or a smaller scope4 ,in its wider course it aims to criticise and to re-form prevailing social ideals and institutions--even those apparently most fixed4 ,this is the work of the great moral teachers of the world4 ,but in order that conscience be critical1 it is not necessary that its range be so wide4 ,the average member of a civilized community is nowadays called upon to reflect upon his immediate relationships in life1 to see if they are what they should be2 to regulate his own conduct by rules which he follows not simply because they are customary1 but the result of his own examination of the situation4 ,there is no difference in kind between the grander and the minuter work4 ,and it is only the constant exercise of reflective examination on the smaller scale which makes possible1 and which gives efficiency to1 the deeper criticism and transformation4 ,,lx4 ,reflective ,conscience and the ,ethical ,world4 ,this conception of conscience as critical and reflective is one of the chief fruits of the ,socratic ethics1 fructified by the new meaning given life through the ,christian spirit4 ,it involves the 'right of free conscience'--the right of the individual to know the good1 to know the end of action1 for himself1 rather than to have some good1 however imposing and however beneficent1 enjoined from without4 ,it is this principle of subjective freedom1 says ,hegel1 which marks the turning-point in the distinction of modern from ancient times 7,sec4 #abd1 ,grundlinien der ,philosophie des ,rechts1 ,vol4 ,,viii of ,hegel's ,works74#b #b ,i hardly need say how largely ,i am indebted in the treatment of this topic1 and indeed1 in the whole matter of the 'ethical world'1 to ,hegel4 ,but this notion of conscience is misinterpreted when the content as well as the form of conscience is thought to be individual4 ,there is no right of private judgment1 in the sense that there is not a public source and standard of judgment4 ,what is meant by this right is that the standard1 the source1 is not the opinion of some other person1 or group of persons4 ,it is a common1 objective standard4 ,it is that embodied in social relationships themselves4 ,the conception of conscience as a private possession1 to be exercised by each one in independence of historical forms and contemporary ideals1 is thoroughly misleading4 ,the saying ,i had to follow my own notion of what is right has been made the excuse for all sorts of capricious1 obstinate and sentimental performance4 ,it is of such notions that ,hegel further says3 ,the striving for a morality of one's own is futile1 and by its very nature impossible of attainment2 in respect of morality the saying of the wisest men of antiquity is the only true one3 ,to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country 7,hegel1 ,works1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #chi74 ,and in discussing the same question1 ,bradley has said that the wish to have a morality of one's own better than that of the world is to be on the threshold of morality 7p4 #ahj74 ,yet1 on the other hand1 conscience should not simply repeat the burden of existing usages and opinions4 ,no one can claim that the existing morality embodies the highest possible conception of personal relations4 ,a morality which does not recognize both the possibility and the necessity of advance is immorality4 ,where then is the way out from a capricious self-conceit1 on one hand1 and a dead conformity on the other8 ,reflective conscience must be based on the moral consciousness expressed in existing institutions1 manners and beliefs4 ,otherwise it is empty and arbitrary4 ,but the existing moral status is never wholly self-consistent4 ,it realizes ideals in one relation which it does not in another2 it gives rights to 'aristocrats' which it denies to low-born2 to men1 which it refuses to women2 it exempts the rich from obligations which it imposes upon the poor4 ,its institutions embody a common good which turns out to be good only to a privileged few1 and thus existing in self-contradiction4 ,they suggest ends which they execute only feebly or intermittently4 ,reflective intelligence cross-questions the existing morality2 and extracts from it the ideal which it pretends to embody1 and thus is able to criticise the existing morality in the light of its own ideal4 ,it points out the inconsistencies1 the incoherencies1 the compromises1 the failures1 between the actual practice and the theory at the basis of this practice4 ,and thus the new ideal proposed by the individual is not a product of his private opinions1 but is the outcome of the ideal embodied in existing customs1 ideas and institutions4 ,,lxi4 ,the ,sense of ,obligation4 ,there has been much discussion regarding the nature of the act of mind by which obligation is recognized4 ,a not uncommon view has been that the sense of duty as such must be the work of a peculiar faculty of the mind4 ,admitting that the recognition of this or that particular thing as right or wrong1 is the work of ordinary intelligence1 it is held that the additional recognition of the absolute obligatoriness of the right cannot be the work of this intelligence4 ,for our intellect is confined to judging what is or has been2 the conception of obligation1 of something which should be1 wholly transcends its scope4 ,there is1 therefore1 some special moral in faculty called which affixes to the ordinary judgments the stamp of the categorical imperative ,you ought4 ,see for example ,maurice on ,conscience4 ,the view is traceable historically to ,kant's conception of ,practical ,reason1 but as the view is ordinarily advanced the function of ,practical ,reason in ,kant's philosophy is overlooked4 ,the ,practical ,reason is no special faculty of man's being2 it is his consciousness of himself as an acting being2 that is1 as a being capable of acting from ideas4 ,kant never separates the consciousness of duty from the very nature of will as the realization of conceptions4 ,in the average modern presentation1 this intrinsic connection of duty with activity is absent4 ,conscience becomes a faculty whose function it is to clap the idea of duty upon the existent conception of an act2 and this existent conception is regarded as morally indifferent4 ,it is true that ,kant's ,practical ,reason has a certain separateness or isolation4 ,but this is because of his general separation of the rational from the sensuous factor1 and not because of any separation of the consciousness of action from the consciousness of duty4 ,if ,kant erred in his divorce of desire and duty1 then even the relative apartness of the ,practical ,reason must be given up4 ,the consciousness of obligation is involved in the recognition of any end of conduct1 and not simply in the end of abstract law4 ,such a conception of conscience1 however1 is open to serious objections4 ,aside from the fact that large numbers of men declare that no amount of introspection reveals any such machinery within themselves1 this separate faculty seems quite superfluous4 ,the real distinction is not between the consciousness of an action with1 and without1 the recognition of duty1 but between a consciousness which is and one which is not capable of conduct4 ,any being who is capable of putting before himself ideas as motives of conduct1 who is capable of forming a conception of something which he would realize1 is1 by that very fact1 capable of a sense of obligation4 ,the consciousness of an end to be realized1 the idea of something to be done1 is1 in and of itself1 the consciousness of duty4 ,let us consider again the horse-car conductor 7see ,sec4 ,,lvi74 ,after he has analyzed the situation which faces him and decided that a given course of conduct is the one which fits the situation1 does he require some additional faculty to inform him that this course is the one which should be followed8 ,the analysis of practical ideas1 that is1 of proposed ends of conduct1 is from the first an analysis of what should be done4 ,such being the case1 it is no marvel that the conclusion of the reflection is3 ,this should 7ought to7 be done4 ,indeed1 just as every judgment about existent fact naturally takes the form ',s is ,p'1 so every judgment regarding an activity which executes an idea takes the form1 ',s ought 7or ought not7 to be ,p'4 ,it requires no additional faculty of mind1 after intelligence has been studying the motions of the moon1 to insert itself1 and affirm some objective relation or truth--as that the moon's motions are explainable by the law of gravitation4 ,it is the very essence of theoretical judgment1 judgment regarding fact1 to state truth--what is4 ,and it is the very essence of practical judgment1 judgment regarding deeds1 to state that active relation which we call obligation1 what ought to be4 ,the judgment as to what a practical situation is1 is an untrue or abstract judgment4 ,the practical situation is itself an activity2 the needs1 powers1 and circumstances which make it are moving on4 ,at no instant in time is the scene quiescent4 ,but the agent1 in order to determine his course of action in view of this situation1 has to fix it2 he has to arrest its onward movement in order to tell what it is4 ,so his abstracting intellect cuts a cross-section through its on-going1 and says ',this is the situation'4 ,now the judgment ',this ought to be the situation'1 or 'in view of the situation1 my conduct ought to be thus and so'1 is simply restoring the movement which the mind has temporarily put out of sight4 ,by means of its cross-section1 intelligence has detected the principle1 or law of movement1 of the situation1 and it is on the basis of this movement that conscience declares what ought to be4 ,just as the fact of moral law1 or of authority1 of the incumbency of duty1 needs for its explanation no separation of the 'is' from the 'ought' 7see ,,lvi71 but only recognition of the law of the 'is' which is1 perforce1 a law of movement1 and of change2--so the consciousness of law1 'the sense of obligation' requires no special mental faculty which may declare what ought to be4 ,the intelligence that is capable of declaring truth1 or what is1 is capable also of making known obligation4 ,for obligation is only practical truth1 the 'is' of doing4 ,see upon this point1 as well as upon the relation of laws and rules to action1 my article in ,vol4 ,i1 ,no4 #b1 of the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 entitled ',moral ,theory and ,practice'4 ,,lxii4 ,conscience as ,emotional ,disposition4 ,probably no judgment is entire-free from emotional coloring and accompaniments4 ,it is doubtful whether the most indifferent judgment is not based upon1 and does not appeal to1 some interest4 ,certainly all the more important judgments awaken some response from the self1 and excite its interests to their depths4 ,some of them may be excited by the intrinsic nature of the subject-matter under judgment1 while others are the results of associations more or less accidental4 ,the former will necessarily be aroused in every being1 who has any emotional nature at all1 whenever the judgment is made1 while the latter will vary from time to time1 and may entirely pass away4 ,that moral judgments1 judgments of what should be 7or should have been7 done1 arouse emotional response1 is therefore no cause for surprise4 ,it may help clear up difficulties if we distinguish three kinds of such emotional accompaniment4 #a4 ,there are1 first1 the interests belonging to the sense of obligation as such4 ,we have just seen that this sense of obligation is nothing separate from the consciousness of the particular act which is to be performed4 ,nevertheless the consciousness of obligation1 of an authority and law1 recurs with every act1 while the special content of the act constantly varies4 ,thus an idea of law1 or of duty in general1 is formed1 distinct from any special duty4 ,being formed1 it arouses the special emotional excitation appropriate to it4 ,the formation of this general idea of duty1 and the growth of feeling of duty as such1 is helped on through the fact that children 7and adults so far as their moral life is immature7 need to have their moral judgments constantly reinforced by recurrence to the thought of law4 ,that is to say1 a child1 who is not capable of seeing the true moral bearings and claims of an act1 is yet continually required to perform such an act on the ground that it is obligatory4 ,the feeling1 therefore1 is natural and legitimate4 ,it must1 however1 go hand in hand with the feelings aroused by the special moral relations under consideration4 ,disconnected from such union1 it necessarily leads to slavish and arbitrary forms of conduct4 ,a child1 for example1 who is constantly taught to perform acts simply because he ought to do so1 without having at the same time his intelligence directed to the nature of the act which is obligatory 7without1 that is1 being led to see how or why it is obligatory71 may have a strongly developed sense of obligation4 ,as he grows up1 however1 this sense of duty will be largely one of dread and apprehension2 a feeling of constraint1 rather than of free service4 ,besides this1 it will be largely a matter of accident to what act this feeling attaches itself4 ,anything that comes to the mind with the force of associations of past education1 any ideal that forces itself persistently into consciousness from any source may awaken this sense of obligation1 wholly irrespective of the true nature of the act4 ,this is the explanation of strongly 'conscientious' persons1 whose morality is yet unintelligent and blundering4 ,it is of such persons that it has been said that a thoroughly good man can do more harm than a number of bad men4 ,when1 however1 the feeling of obligation in general is developed along with particular moral judgments 7that is1 along with the habit of considering the special nature of acts performed71 it is one of the strongest supports to morality4 ,acts constantly need to be performed which are recognized as right and as obligatory1 and yet with reference to which there is no fixed habit of conduct4 ,in these cases1 the more direct1 or spontaneous1 stimulus to action is wanting4 ,if1 however1 there is a strong sense of obligation in general1 this may attach itself to the particular act and thus afford the needed impetus4 ,in unusual experiences1 and in cases where the ordinary motive-forces are lacking1 such a feeling of regard for law may be the only sure stay of right conduct4 #b4 ,there is the emotional accompaniment appropriate to the special content of the act4 ,if1 for example1 the required act has to do with some person1 there arise in consciousness the feelings of interest1 of love and friendship1 or of dislike1 which belong to that person4 ,if it relate to some piece of work to be done1 the sweeping of a room1 the taking of a journey1 the painting of a picture1 there are the interests natural to such subjects4 ,these feelings when aroused necessarily form part of the emotional attitude as respects the act4 ,it is the strength and normal welling-up of such specific interests which afford the best assurance of healthy and progressive moral conduct1 as distinct from mere sentimental dwelling upon ideals4 ,only interests prevent the divorce of feelings and ideas from habits of action4 ,such interests are the union of the subjective element1 the self1 and the objective1 the special relations to be realized 7,sec4 ,,xxxiv71 and thus necessarily produce a right and healthy attitude towards moral ends4 ,it is obvious that in a normal moral life1 the law of obligation in general1 and the specific interests in particular cases1 should more and more fuse4 ,the interests1 at their strongest1 take the form of love4 ,and thus there is realized the ideal of an effective character2 the union of law and inclination in its pure form--love for the action in and of itself4 #c4 ,emotions due to accidental associations4 ,it is matter of common notice that the moral feelings are rarely wholly pure2 that all sorts of sentiments1 due to associations of time and place and person not strictly belonging to the acts themselves1 cluster about them4 ,while this is true1 we should not forget the great difficulty there is in marking off any associations as wholly external to the nature of the act4 ,we may say that mere fear of punishment is such a wholly external feeling1 having no place in moral emotion4 ,yet it may be doubted whether there is any feeling that may be called mere fear of punishment4 ,it is1 perhaps1 fear of punishment by a parent1 for whom one has love and respect1 and thus the fear has partially a genuinely moral aspect4 ,some writers would call the sthetic feelings1 the feelings of beauty1 of harmony1 which gather about moral ends adventitious4 ,yet the fact that other moralists have made all moral feelings essentially sthetic1 as due to the perception of the fitness and proportion of the acts1 should warn us from regarding sthetic feelings as wholly external4 ,about all that can be said is that feelings which do not spring from some aspect of the content of the act itself should be extruded1 with growing maturity of character1 from influence upon conduct4 ,,lxiii4 ,conscientiousness4 ,conscientiousness is primarily the virtue of intelligence in regard to conduct4 ,that is to say1 it is the formed habit of bringing intelligence to bear upon the analysis of moral relations--the habit of considering what ought to be done4 ,it is based upon the recognition of the idea first distinctly formulated by ,socrates--that an unexamined life is not one that should be led by man4 ,it is the outgrowth of the customary morality embodied in usages1 codes and social institutions1 but it is an advance upon custom1 because it requires a meaning and a reason4 ,it is the mark of a character which will not be satisfied without understanding the law that it obeys2 without knowing what the good is1 for which the demand has hitherto been blindly at work 7,green1 ,op4 cit41 p4 #bgj74 ,conscientiousness1 then1 is reflective intelligence grown into character4 ,it involves a greater and wider recognition of obligation in general1 and a larger and more stable emotional response to everything that presents itself as duty2 as well as the habit of deliberate consideration of the moral situation and of the acts demanded by it4 ,conscientiousness is an analysis of the conditions under which conduct takes place1 and of the action that will meet these conditions2 it is a thoroughly objective analysis4 ,what is sometimes termed conscientiousness is merely the habit of analyzing internal moods and sentiments2 of prying into 'motives' in that sense of motive which identifies it not with the end of action1 but with some subjective state of emotion4 ,thus considered1 conscientiousness is morbid4 ,we are sometimes warned against over-conscientiousness4 ,but such conscientiousness means simply over-regard of one's private self2 keeping an eye upon the effect of conduct on one's internal state1 rather than upon conduct itself4 ,over-conscientiousness is as impossible as over-intelligence1 since it is simply the application of intelligence to conduct4 ,it is as little morbid and introspective as is the analysis of any fact in nature4 ,another notion which is sometimes thought to be bound up with that of conscience1 also has nothing to do with it2 namely1 the notion of a precision and coldness opposed to all large spontaneity and broad sympathy in conduct4 ,the reflective man of narrow insight and cramped conduct is often called the conscientious man and opposed to the man of generous impulses4 ,this comes from identifying conscience with a ready-made code of rules1 and its action with the application of some such fixed code to all acts as they come up4 ,it is evident1 on the contrary1 that such a habit is opposed to conscience4 ,conscience means the consideration of each case in itself2 measuring it not by any outside code1 but in the existing moral situation4 ,on conscientiousness1 see ,green1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bfi-bga and #cbc-cbg2 and ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #aef-afj4 ,these writers1 however1 seem to identify it too much with internal scrutiny4 ,green1 for example1 expressly identifies conscientiousness with a man's questioning about himself1 whether he has been as good as he should have been1 whether a better man would not have acted otherwise than he has done 7p4 #cbc74 ,he again speaks of it as comparison of our own practice1 as we know it on the inner side in relation to the motives and character which it expresses1 with an ideal of virtue4 ,the first definition seems to be misleading4 ,questioning as to whether the end adopted was what it should have been1 i4 e41 whether the analysis of the situation was correctly performed1 may be of great service in aiding future decisions1 but questioning regarding the purity of one's own 'motive' does not seem of much avail4 ,in a man upon the whole good1 such questioning is apt to be paralyzing4 ,the energy that should go to conduct goes to anxiety about one's conduct4 ,it is the view of goodness as directed mainly towards one's own private motives1 which has led such writers as ,henry ,james1 ,sr41 and ,mr4 ,hinton1 to conceive of 'morality'1 the struggle for goodness1 to be in essence bad4 ,they conceived of the struggle for 'private goodness' as no different from the struggle for private pleasure1 although likely1 of course1 to lead to better things4 ,nor in a bad man is such scrutiny of 'motive'1 as apart from objective end1 of much value4 ,the bad man is generally aware of the badness of his motive without much close examination4 ,the truth aimed at by ,green is1 ,i think1 amply covered by recognizing that conscientiousness as a constant will to know what should be1 and to readjust conduct to meet the new insight1 is the spring of the moral life4 ,,lxiv4 ,moral ,commands1 ,rules and ,systems4 ,what is the part played by specific commands and by general rules in the examination of conduct by conscience8 ,we should note1 in the first place1 that commands are not rules1 and rules are not commands4 ,a command1 to be a command1 must be specific and individual4 ,it must refer to time1 place and circumstance4 ',thou shalt do no murder' is not strictly speaking a command1 for it allows questioning as to what is murder4 ,is killing in war murder8 ,is the hanging of criminals murder8 ,is taking life in self-defense murder8 ,regarded simply as a command1 this command would be 'void for uncertainty'4 ,a true command is a specific injunction of one person to another to do or not to do a stated thing or things4 ,under what conditions do commands play a part in moral conduct8 ,in cases where the intelligence of the agent is so undeveloped that he cannot realize for himself the situation and see the act required1 and when a part of the agent's environment is constituted by others who have such required knowledge1 there is a moral element in command and in obedience4 ,this explains the moral responsibility of parents to children and of children to parents4 ,the soldier1 too1 in recognizing a general's command1 is recognizing the situation as it exists for him4 ,were there simply superior force on one side1 and fear on the other1 the relation would be an immoral one4 ,it is implied1 of course1 in such an instance as the parents' command1 that it be so directed as to enable the child more and more to dispense with it--that is1 that it be of such a character as to give the child insight into the situation for himself4 ,here is the transition from a command to a rule4 ,a rule does not tell what to do or what to leave undone4 ,the ,golden ,rule1 for example1 does not tell me how to act in any specific case4 ,a rule is a tool of analysis4 ,the moral situation1 or capacity in its relation to environment1 is often an extremely complicated affair4 ,how shall the individual resolve it8 ,how shall he pick it to pieces1 so as to see its real nature and the act demanded by it8 ,it is evident that the analysis will be the more truly and speedily performed if the agent has a method by which to attack it1 certain principles in the light of which he may view it1 instruments for cross-questioning it and making it render up its meaning4 ,moral rules perform this service4 ,while the ,golden ,rule does not of itself give one jot of information as to what ,i should do in a given case1 it does1 if accepted1 immensely simplify the situation4 ,without it ,i should perhaps have to act blindly2 with it the question comes to this3 ,what should ,i1 under the given circumstances1 like to have done to me8 ,this settled1 the whole question of what should be done is settled4 ,it is obvious1 then1 that the value of a moral rule depends upon its potency in revealing the inner spirit and reality of individual deeds4 ,rules in the negative form1 rules whose application is limited in scope because of an attempt to be specific1 are midway between commands proper and rules4 ,the ,golden ,rule1 on the other hand1 is positive1 and not attempting to define any specific act1 covers in its range all relations of man to man4 ,it is indeed only a concrete and forcible statement of the ethical principle itself1 the idea of a common good1 or of a community of persons4 ,this is also a convenient place for considering the practical value of ethical systems4 ,we have already seen that no system can attempt to tell what in particular should be done4 ,the principle of a system1 however1 may be of some aid in analyzing a specific case4 ,in this way1 a system may be regarded as a highly generalized rule4 ,it attempts to state some fundamental principle which lies at the basis of moral conduct4 ,so far as it succeeds in doing this1 there is the possibility of its practical application in particular cases1 although1 of course1 the mediate rules must continue to be the working tools of mankind--on account of their decided concrete character1 and because they have themselves taken shape under the pressure of practice rather than of more theoretical needs4 ,,lxv4 ,development of ,moral ,ideals4 ,thus far we have been speaking of conscience mainly as to its method of working4 ,we have now to speak more definitely of its content1 or of the development of ideals of action4 ,it is of the very nature of moral conduct to be progressive4 ,permanence of specific ideals means moral death4 ,we say that truth-telling1 charity1 loyalty1 temperance1 have always been moral ends and while this is true1 the statement as ordinarily made is apt to hide from us the fact that the content of the various ideals 7what is meant by temperance1 etc47 has been constantly changing1 and this of necessity4 ,the realization of moral ends must bring about a changed situation1 so that the repetition of the same ends would no longer satisfy4 ,this progress has two sides3 the satisfaction of wants leads to a larger view of what satisfaction really is1 i4 e41 to the creation of new capacities and wants2 while adjustment to the environment creates wider and more complex social relationships4 ,let the act be one of intelligence4 ,some new fact or law is discovered4 ,on one hand1 this discovery may arouse a hitherto comparatively dormant mind2 it may suggest the possession of capacities previously latent2 it may stimulate mental activity and create a thirst for expanding knowledge4 ,this readjustment of intellectual needs and powers may be comparatively slight1 or it may amount1 as it has with many a young person1 to a revolution4 ,on the other hand1 the new fact changes the intellectual outlook1 the mental horizon1 and1 by transforming somewhat the relations of things1 demands new conduct4 ,all this1 even when the growth of knowledge concerns only the physical world4 ,but development of insight into social needs and affairs has a larger and more direct progressive influence4 ,the social world exists spiritually1 as conceived1 and a new conception of it1 new perception of its scope and bearings1 is1 perforce1 a change of that world4 ,and thus it is with the satisfaction of the human want of knowledge1 that patience1 courage1 self-respect1 humility1 benevolence1 all change character4 ,when1 for example1 psychology has given an increase of knowledge regarding men's motives1 political economy an increase of knowledge regarding men's wants1 when historical knowledge has added its testimony regarding the effects of indiscriminate giving1 charity must change its content4 ,while once1 the mere supplying of food or money by one to another may have been right as meeting the recognized relations1 charity now comes to mean large responsibility in knowledge of antecedents and circumstances1 need of organization1 careful tracing of consequences1 and1 above all1 effort to remove the conditions which made the want possible4 ,the activity involved has infinitely widened4 ,let the act be in the region of industrial life--a new invention4 ,the invention of the telephone does not simply satisfy an old want--it creates new4 ,it brings about the possibility of closer social relations1 extends the distribution of intelligence1 facilitates commerce4 ,it is a common saying that the luxury of one generation is the necessity of the next2 that is to say1 what once satisfied a somewhat remote need becomes in time the basis upon which new needs grow up4 ,energy previously pent up is set free1 new power and ideals are evoked4 ,consider again a person assuming a family relation4 ,this seems1 at first1 to consist mainly in the satisfaction of certain common and obvious human wants4 ,but this satisfaction1 if moral1 turns out rather to be the creation of new insight into life1 of new relationships1 and thus of new energies and ideals4 ,we may generalize these instances4 ,the secret of the moral life is not getting or having1 it is doing and thus being4 ,the getting and the possessing side of life has a moral value only when it is made the stimulus and nutriment of new and wider acting4 ,to solve the equation between getting and doing is the moral problem of life4 ,let the possession be acquiesced in for its own sake1 and not as the way to freer 7and thus more moral7 action1 and the selfish life has set in 7see ,sec4 ,,lxvii74 ,it is essential to moral activity that it feed itself into larger appetites and thus into larger life4 ,this must not be taken to deny that there is a mechanical side even to the moral life4 ,a merchant1 for example1 may do the same thing over and over again1 like going to his business every morning at the same hour4 ,this is a moral act and yet it does not seem to lead to a change in moral wants or surroundings4 ,yet even in such cases it should be noted that it is only outwardly that the act is the same4 ,in itself1 that is1 in its relation to the will of the agent1 it is simply one element in the whole of character2 and as character opens up1 the act must change somewhat also4 ,it is performed somehow in a new spirit4 ,if this is not to some extent true1 if such acts become wholly mechanical1 the moral life is hardening into the rigidity of death4 ,this progressive development consists on one side in a richer and subtler individual activity1 in increased individualization1 in wider and freer functions of life2 on the other it consists in increase in number of those persons whose ideal is a 'common good'1 or who have membership in the same moral community2 and1 further1 it consists in more complex relations between them4 ,it is both intensive and extensive4 ,history is one record of growth in the sense of specific powers4 ,its track is marked by the appearance of more and more internal and distinguishing traits2 of new divisions of labor and corresponding freedom in functioning4 ,it begins with groups in which everything is massed1 and the good is common only in the sense of being undifferentiated for all4 ,it progresses with the evolution of individuality1 of the peculiar gifts entrusted to each1 and hence of the specific service demanded of each4 ,the other side1 the enlargement of the community of ends1 has been termed growth in comprehensiveness4 ,history is again a record of the widening of the social consciousness--of the range of persons whose interests have to be taken into account in action4 ,there has been a period in which the community was nothing more than a man's own immediate family group1 this enlarging to the clan1 the city1 the social class1 the nation2 until now1 in theory1 the community of interests and ends is humanity itself4 ,this growth in comprehensiveness is not simply a growth in the number of persons having a common end4 ,the quantitative growth reacts upon the nature of the ends themselves4 ,for example1 when the conceived community is small1 bravery may consist mainly in willingness to fight for the recognized community against other hostile groups4 ,as these groups become themselves included in the moral community1 courage must change its form1 and become resoluteness and integrity of purpose in defending manhood and humanity as such4 ,that is to say1 as long as the community is based largely upon physical facts1 like oneness of blood1 of territory1 etc41 the ideal of courage will have a somewhat external and physical manifestation4 ,let the community be truly spiritual1 consisting in recognition of unity of destiny and function in coperation toward an all-inclusive life1 and the ideal of courage becomes more internal and spiritual1 consisting in loyalty to the possibilities of humanity1 whenever and wherever found4 ,on this development of moral ideals1 and especially of the growth in comprehensiveness as reacting upon the intrinsic form which the ideal itself takes1 see ,green1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bfd-cjh1 followed by ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #chd-cih4 ,for the process of change of ideals in general1 see ,alexander1 pp4 #bga-bib1 and #cfi-cga4 ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,the ,,moral ,,struggle ,,or ,,the ,,realizing ,,of ,,ideals4 ,,lxvi4 ,goodness as a ,struggle4 ,we have already seen that the bare repetition of identically the same acts does not consist with morality4 ,to aim at securing a satisfaction precisely like the one already experienced1 is to fail to recognize the altered capacity and environment1 and the altered duty4 ,moral satisfaction prior to an act is ideal2 ideal not simply in the sense of being conceived1 or present to thought1 but ideal in the sense that it has not been already enjoyed4 ,some satisfaction has been enjoyed in a previous activity1 but that very satisfaction has so enlarged and complicated the situation1 that its mere repetition would not afford moral or active satisfaction1 but only what ,kant terms 'pathological' satisfaction4 ,morality thus assumes the form of a struggle4 ,the past satisfaction speaks for itself2 it has been verified in experience1 it has conveyed its worth to our very senses4 ,we have tried and tasted it1 and know that it is good4 ,if morality lay in the repetition of similar satisfactions1 it would not be a struggle4 ,we should know experimentally before hand that the chosen end would bring us satisfaction1 and should be at rest in that knowledge4 ,but when morality lies in striving for satisfactions which have not verified themselves to our sense1 it always requires an effort4 ,we have to surrender the enjoyed good1 and stake ourselves upon that of which we cannot say3 ,we know it is good4 ,to surrender the actual experienced good for a possible ideal good is the struggle4 ,we arrive1 in what is termed the opposition of desire and duty1 at the heart of the moral struggle4 ,of course1 taken strictly1 there can be no opposition here4 ,the duty which did not awaken any desire would not appeal to the mind even as a duty4 ,but we may distinguish between a desire which is based on past satisfaction actually experienced1 and desire based simply upon the idea that the end is desirable--that it ought to be desired4 ,it may seem strange to speak of a desire based simply upon the recognition that an end should be desired1 but the possibility of awakening such a desire and the degree of its strength are the test of a moral character4 ,how far does this end awaken response in me because ,i see that it is the end which is fit and due8 ,how far does it awaken this response although it does not fall into line with past satisfactions1 or although it actually thwart some habitual satisfaction8 ,here is the opposition of duty and desire4 ,it lies in the contrast of a good which has demonstrated itself as such in experience1 and a good whose claim to be good rests only on the fact that it is the act which meets the situation4 ,it is the contrast between a good of possession1 and one of action4 ,from this point of view morality is a life of aspiration1 and of faith2 there is required constant willingness to give up past goods as the good1 and to press on to new ends2 not because past achievements are bad1 but because1 being good1 they have created a situation which demands larger and more intricately related achievements4 ,this willingness is aspiration and it implies faith4 ,only the old good is of sight1 has verified itself to sense4 ,the new ideal1 the end which meets the situation1 is felt as good only in so far as the character has formed the conviction that to meet obligation is itself a good1 whether bringing sensible satisfaction or not4 ,you can prove to a man that he ought to act so and so 7that is to say1 that such an act is the one which fits the present occasion71 but you cannot prove to him that the performance of that duty will be good4 ,only faith in the moral order1 in the identity of duty and the good1 can assert this4 ,every time an agent takes as his end 7that is1 chooses as good7 an activity which he has not already tried1 he asserts his belief in the goodness of right action as such4 ,this faith is not a mere intellectual thing1 but it is practical--the staking of self upon activity as against passive possession4 ,,lxvii4 ,moral ,badness4 ,badness originates in the contrast which thus comes about between having the repetition of former action1 and doing--pressing forward to the new right action4 ,goodness is the choice of doing2 the refusal to be content with past good as exhausting the entire content of goodness4 ,it is1 says ,green1 'in the continued effort to be better that goodness consists'4 ,the man1 however bad his past and however limited his range of intellectual1 sthetic and social activity1 who is dissatisfied with his past1 and whose dissatisfaction manifests itself in act1 is accounted better than the man of a respectable past and higher plane of life who has lapsed into contented acquiescence with past deeds4 ,for past deeds are not deeds1 they are passive enjoyments4 ,the bad man1 on the other hand1 is not the man who loves badness in and for itself4 ,such a man would be a mad man or a devil4 ,all conduct1 bad as well as good1 is for the sake of some satisfaction1 that is1 some good4 ,in the bad man1 the satisfaction which is aimed at is simply the one congruent with existing inclinations1 irrespective of the sufficiency of those inclinations in view of the changed capacity and environment3 it is a good of having4 ,the bad man1 that is to say1 does not recognize any ideal or active good2 any good which has not already commended itself to him as such4 ,this good may be good in itself2 but1 as distinguished from the good which requires action1 that which would fulfill the present capacity or meet the present situation1 it is bad4 ,thus ,alexander terms badness a survival1 in part at least1 of former goodness4 ,hinton says 7,philosophy and ,religion1 p4 #adf71 ,that a thing is wrong does not mean that it ought never to have been done or thought1 but that it ought to be left off4 ,it will be noted that we are not dealing with the metaphysical or the religious problem of the nature and origin of evil1 but simply with an account of bad action as it appears in individual conduct4 ,badness has four traits1 all derivable from this basal fact4 ,they are3 7#a7 ,lawlessness1 7#b7 ,selfishness1 7#c7 ,baseness1 7#d7 ,demoralization4 #a4 ,lawlessness4 ,when desire and duty1 that is1 when desires based on past having and on future acting1 conflict1 the bad man lets duty go4 ,he virtually denies that it is a good at all--it may be a good in the abstract but not a good for him4 ,he denies that obligation as such has any value2 that any end is to be consulted save his own state of mind4 ,he denies that there is law for conduct--at least any law beyond the inclination which he happens to have at the time of action4 ,keeping himself within that which has verified itself to his feeling in the past1 he abrogates all authority excepting that of his own immediate feelings4 #b4 ,selfishness4 ,it has already been shown that the self is not necessarily immoral1 and hence that action for self is not necessarily bad--indeed1 that the true self is social and interest in it right 7see ,sec4 ,,xxxv74 ,but when a satisfaction based on past experience is set against one proceeding from an act as meeting obligation1 there grows up a divorce in the self4 ,the actual self1 the self recognizing only past and sensible satisfaction1 is set over against the self which recognizes the necessity of expansion and a wider environment4 ,since the former self confines its action to benefits demonstrably accruing to itself1 while the latter1 in meeting the demands of the situation1 necessarily contributes to the satisfaction of others1 one takes the form of a private self1 a self whose good is set over against and exclusive of that of others1 while the self recognizing obligation becomes a social self--the self which performs its due function in society4 ,it is1 again1 the contrast between getting and doing4 ,all moral action is based upon the presupposition of the identity of good 7,sec4 ,,xl71 but it by no means follows that this identity of good can be demonstrated to the agent at the time of action4 ,on the contrary1 it is matter of the commonest experience that the sensible good1 the demonstrable good 7that is1 the one visible on the line of past satisfaction7 may be contradictory to the act which would satisfy the interests of others4 ,the identity of interests can be proved only by acting upon it2 to the agent1 prior to action1 it is a matter of faith4 ,choice presents itself then in these cases as a test3 ,do you believe that the ,good is simply your private good1 or is the true ,good1 is your good1 one which includes the good of others8 ,the condemnation passed upon the 'selfish' man is that he virtually declares that good is essentially exclusive and private4 ,he shuts himself up within himself1 within1 that is1 his past achievements1 and the inclinations based upon them4 ,the good man goes out of himself in new action4 ,bad action is thus essentially narrowing1 it confines the self2 good action is expansive and vital1 it moves on to a larger self4 ,in fine1 all conduct1 good and bad1 satisfies the self2 bad conduct1 however1 aims at a self which1 keeping its eye upon its private and assured satisfaction1 refuses to recognize the increasing function with its larger social range1--the 'selfish' self4 ,light is thrown upon this point by referring to what was said about interest 7,sec4 ,,xxxiv74 ,interest is active feeling1 feeling turned upon an object1 and going out toward it so as to identify it with self4 ,in this active and objective interest there is satisfaction1 but the satisfaction is in the activity which has the object for its content4 ,this is the satisfaction of the good self4 ,in the bad self1 interest is reduced to mere feeling2 for the aim of life in such a self is simply to have certain feelings as its own possession2 activity and its object are degraded into mere means for getting these sensations4 ,activity has two sides2 as activity1 as projection or expression of one's powers1 it satisfies self2 as activity1 also1 it has some end1 some object1 for its content4 ,the activity as such1 therefore1 the activity for its own sake1 must involve the realization of this object for its own sake4 ,but in having1 in getting1 there is no such creation or maintenance of an object for itself4 ,objects cease to be 'ends in themselves' when they cease to be the content of action2 and are degraded into means of private satisfaction1 that is1 of sensation4 #c4 ,baseness4 ,for1 when we say that bad action takes account of ideals only on the basis of possession1 we say1 in effect1 that it takes account only of sensible satisfaction4 ,as it is in the progressive movement of morality that there arises the distinction of the law-abiding and the lawless self1 of the social and the selfish self1 so in the same aspect there comes into existence the distinction of the low1 degraded1 sensual self1 as against the higher or spiritual self4 ,in themselves1 or naturally1 there is no desire high1 none low4 ,but when an inclination for an end which consists in possession comes into conflict with one which includes an active satisfaction--one not previously enjoyed--the contrast arises4 ,it is wrong to say1 with ,kant1 that the bad act is simply for pleasure2 for the bad act1 the choice of a past satisfaction as against the aspiration for a wider good1 may have a large content--it may be the good of one's family2 it may be scientific or sthetic culture4 ,yet the moment a man begins to live on the plane of past satisfaction as such1 he has begun to live on the plane of 'sense'1 or for pleasure4 ,the refusal to recognize the ideal good1 to acknowledge activity as good1 throws the agent back into a life of dwelling upon his own sensible good1 and thus he falls more and more into a life of dwelling upon mere sensations4 ,what made the past good a good at all was the spirit1 the activity1 in it1 and when it is no longer an activity1 but a mere keeping1 the life is gone out of it4 ,the selfish life must degenerate into mere sensuality--although when sensuality is 'refined' we call it sentimentality4 #d4 ,demoralization4 ,morality is activity2 exercise of function4 ,to cease this activity is not to remain on the attained level1 for that1 when attained1 was active4 ,it is to relapse1 to slip down into badness4 ,the moral end is always an activity4 ,to fail in this activity is1 therefore1 to involve character in disintegration4 ,it can be kept together only by constant organizing activity2 only by acting upon new wants and moving toward new situations4 ,let this activity cease1 and disorganization ensues1 as surely as the body decays when life goes1 instead of simply remaining inert as it was4 ,bad conduct is thus unprincipled2 it has no center1 no movement4 ,the good man is 'organic'2 he uses his attainments to discover new needs1 and to assimilate new material4 ,he lives from within outwards1 his character is compact1 coherent2 he has integrity4 ,the bad man1 having no controlling unity1 has no consistent line of action2 his motives of conduct contradict one another2 he follows this maxim in relation to this person1 that in relation to another2 character is demoralized4 ,the bad man is unstable and double-minded4 ,he is not one person1 but a group of conflicting wills4 ,so far as he is really bad he becomes as many persons as he has desires4 ,his conduct cannot be made universal4 ,he always makes exceptions in favor of himself4 ,he does not want moral relations abolished1 but relaxed or deflected in his own case1 while they still hold for other men4 ,this is the truth at the basis of ,kant's contention regarding goodness as conduct whose maxim is capable of generalization4 ,see also ,bradley1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #bfa-bga4 ,and ,alexander1 ,op4 cit41 pp4 #cji-cab4 ,,lxviii4 ,goodness in its ,relation to the ,struggle4 #a4 ,two aspects of this we have already noted2 one1 that of conscientiousness1 or habitual alertness and responsiveness of intelligence to the nature of obligation1 both in general and as to the specific acts which are obligatory4 ,the other is that goodness1 in this relation1 consists in progressive adjustment1 involving aspiration as to future conduct1 and correlative humility as to present achievements of character4 #b4 ,we may state what has already been suggested1 that goodness as self-sacrifice or self-renunciation has also its place here4 ,the moral attitude is one of renunciation1 because1 on account of the constantly growing wants and circumstances1 the satisfactions which belong to the actually realized self must be given up for active goods4 ,that the self-sacrifice takes largely the form of the surrender of private interests to the welfare of the whole1 is explained by what has just been said regarding selfishness4 ,self-sacrifice is not in any way the moral end or the last word4 ,life is lost that it may be found4 ,the smaller local life of the private self is given up in order that the richer and fuller life of the social or active self may be realized4 ,but none the less the self-sacrifice at the time that it is made is genuine and real4 ,while it is involved in the very nature of morality that moral conduct shall bring greater activity1 larger life1 the motive of the agent in self-sacrifice is not to give up the lesser satisfaction for the sake of getting a greater4 ,it is only so far as he is already moral that he is convinced that the new duty will bring satisfaction1 and his conviction is not one of sense1 but of faith4 ,to the agent at the time of action1 it is a real satisfaction which is given up for one that is only ideal1 and given up because the ideal satisfaction is ethical1 active--one congruent to duty1 while the actual satisfaction is only pathological2 that is1 congruent to the actualized self--to the having1 instead of the doing self4 #c4 ,goodness is not remoteness from badness4 ,in one sense1 goodness is based upon badness2 that is1 good action is always based upon action good once1 but bad if persisted in under changing circumstances4 ,the moral struggle thus presents itself as the conflict between this bad and the good which would duly meet the existing situation4 ,this good1 of course1 does not involve the annihilation of the previously attained good--the present bad--but its subordination2 its use in the new function4 ,this is the explanation of the apparently paradoxical statement that badness is the material of good action--a statement literally correct when badness is understood as it is here4 ,evil is simply that which goodness has to overcome--has to make an element of itself4 ,badness1 as just spoken of1 is only potential--the end is bad as contrasted with the better4 ,badness may also1 of course1 be actual2 the bad end may be chosen1 and adopted into character4 ,even in this sense1 goodness is not the absence of evil1 or entire freedom from it4 ,badness even on this basis is the material of goodness2 it is to be put under foot and made an element in good action4 ,but how can actual evil be made a factor of right conduct8 ,in this way2 the good man learns from his own bad acts2 he does not continue to repeat such acts1 nor does he1 while recognizing their badness1 simply endeavor to do right without regard to the previous bad conduct4 ,perceiving the effect of his own wrong acts1 the change produced in his own capacities1 and his altered relations to other people1 he acts so as to meet the situation which his own bad act has helped to create4 ,conduct is then right1 although made what it is1 to some degree1 by previous wrong conduct4 ,in this connection1 the introduction of ,christianity made one of its largest ethical contributions4 ,it showed how it was possible for a man to put his badness behind him and even make it an element in goodness4 ,teaching that the world of social relations was itself an ethical reality and a good 7a redeemed world71 it taught that the individual1 by identifying himself with the spirit of this ethical world1 might be freed from slavery to his past evil2 that by recognizing and taking for his own the evil in the world1 instead of engaging in an isolated struggle to become good by himself1 he might make the evil a factor in his own right action4 ,moreover1 by placing morality in activity and not in some thing1 or in conformity to an external law1 ,christianity changed the nature of the struggle4 ,while the old struggle had been an effort to get away from evil to a good beyond1 ,christianity made the struggle itself a good4 ,it1 then1 was no longer the effort to escape to some fixed1 unchanging state2 the constant onward movement was itself the goal4 ,virtue1 as ,hegel says1 is the battle1 the struggle1 carried to its full4 #d4 ,the conception of merit4 ,this is1 essentially1 the idea of social desert--the idea that an agent deserves well of others on account of his act or his character4 ,an action evokes two kinds of judgments3 first1 that the act is right or virtuous1 that it fulfills duty4 ,this judgment may be passed by any one2 as well by the agent as by any one else4 ,it is simply the recognition of the moral character of the act4 ,but a right act may also awaken a conviction of desert2 that the act is one which furthers the needs of society1 and thus is meritorious4 ,this is not a judgment which the agent can pass upon his own act4 ,virtue and duty are strictly coextensive2 no act can be so virtuous1 so right1 as to go beyond meeting the demands of the situation4 ,everything is a duty which needs to be done in a given situation2 the doing of what needs to be done is right or virtuous4 ,while the agent may and must approve of right action in himself1 he cannot claim desert or reward because of its virtuousness2 he simply does what he should4 ,others1 however1 may see that the act has been done in the face of great temptation2 after a hard struggle2 that it denotes some unusual qualification or executes some remarkable service4 ,it is not only right1 but obligatory1 for others to take due notice of these qualities1 of these deeds4 ,such notice is as requisite as it is to show gratitude for generosity1 or forgiveness to a repentant man4 ,two errors are to be avoided here2 both arising from the identification of merit with virtue4 ,one view holds that the virtue and merit consist in doing something over and above duty4 ,there is a minimum of action which is obligatory2 to perform this1 since it is obligatory1 is no virtue4 ,anything above this is virtuous4 ,the other view reverses this and holds that since no man can do more than he ought1 there is no such thing as merit4 ,great excellence or heroism in one man is no more meritorious than ordinary conduct in another2 since the one man is naturally more gifted than the other4 ,but while one act is no more right or virtuous than another1 it may be more meritorious1 because contributing more to moral welfare or progress4 ,to depreciate the meritorious deed is a sign of a carping1 a grudging or a mean spirit4 ,the respective relations of duty1 virtue and merit have been variously discussed4 ,different views will be found in ,sidgwick1 ,method of ,ethics1 ,bk4 ,,iii1 ch4 iv2 ,alexander1 ,moral ,order and ,progress1 pp4 #ahg-aie and #bdb-bdg2 ,stephen1 ,science of ,ethics1 pp4 #bic-cjc2 ,martineau1 ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 pp4 #gh-ha2 ,laurie1 ,ethica1 pp4 #ade-adh4 ,,chapter ,,iii4--,,realized ,,morality ,,or ,,the ,,virtues4 ,,lxix4 ,goodness as ,found in ,character4 ,we have treated of the forming of moral ideals1 and of the attempt to realize them against the counter attractions of sensible desire4 ,we have now to treat these ideas as actual ends of conduct and thus reacting upon the agent4 ,the good character1 considered in relation to the moral struggle1 is the one which chooses the right end1 which endeavors to be better4 ,the good character in itself is that made by this choice4 ,it is good for the self to choose a due end in an effort caused by contrary allurements4 ,but the very fact of the struggle witnesses that morality is not yet the natural and spontaneous manifestation of character4 ,a wholly good man would feel such satisfaction in the contemplation of the ideal good that contrary desires would not affect him4 ,he would take pleasure only in the right4 ,every accomplished moral deed tends to bring this about4 ,moral realization brings satisfaction4 ,the satisfaction becomes one with the right act4 ,duty and desire grow into harmony4 ,interest and virtue tend toward unity4 ,this is the truth aimed at1 but not attained1 by the hedonistic school4 ,in complete moral action1 happiness and rightness know no divorce4 ,and this is true1 even though the act1 in some of its aspects1 involves pain4 ,the act1 so far as its quality of rightness is concerned1 calls forth unalloyed satisfaction1 however bound up with pain to self and to others in some respects4 ,the error of hedonism is not in insisting that right action is pleasurable1 but in its failure to supply content to the idea of happiness1 in its failure to define what happiness is4 ,in the failure to show those active relations of man to nature and to man involved in human satisfaction1 it reduces happiness to the abstraction of agreeable sensation4 ,a virtue then1 in the full sense1 that is as the expression of virtuous character1 and not of the struggle of character to be virtuous against the allurements of passive goods1 is an interest4 ,the system of virtues includes the various forms which interest assumes4 ,truthfulness1 for example1 is interest in the media of human exchange2 generosity is interest in sharing any form of superior endowment with others less rich by nature or training1 etc4 ,it is distinguished from natural generosity1 which may be mere impulse1 by its being an interest in the activity or social relation itself1 instead of in some accidental accompaniment of the relation4 ,another way of getting at the nature of the virtues is to consider them as forms of freedom4 ,positive freedom is the good1 it is realized activity1 the full and unhindered performance of function4 ,a virtue is any one aspect which the free performance of function may take4 ,meekness is one form of the adjustment of capacity to surroundings2 honesty another2 indignation another2 scientific excellence another1 and so on4 ,in each of these virtues1 the agent realizes his freedom3 ,freedom from subjection to caprice and blind appetite1 freedom in the full play of activity4 ,,lxx4 ,two ,kinds of ,virtues4 ,we may recognize two types of virtuous action4 ,these are3 #a4 ,the ,special ,virtues4 ,these arise from special capacities or special opportunities4 ,the ,greek sense of virtue was almost that of excellence1 some special fitness or power of an agent4 ,there is the virtue of a painter1 of a scientific investigator1 of a philanthropist1 of a comedian1 of a statesman1 and so on4 ,the special act may be manifested in view of some special occasion1 some special demand of the environment--charity1 thankfulness1 patriotism1 chastity1 etc4 ,goodness1 as the realization of the moral end1 is a system1 and the special virtues are the particular members of the system4 #b4 ,cardinal ,virtues4 ,besides these special members of a system1 however1 the whole system itself may present various aspects4 ,that is to say1 even in a special act the whole spirit of the man may be called out1 and this expression of the whole character is a cardinal virtue4 ,while the special virtues differ in content1 as humility from bravery1 earnestness from compassion1 the cardinal virtues have the same content1 showing only different sides of it4 ,conscientiousness1 for example1 is a cardinal virtue4 ,it does not have to do with an act belonging to some particular capacity1 or evoked by some special circumstance1 but with the spirit of the whole self as manifested in the will to recognize duty--both its obligatoriness in general and the concrete forms which it takes4 ,truthfulness as a special virtue would be the desire to make word correspond to fact in some instance of speech4 ,as a cardinal virtue1 it is the constant will to clarify and render true to their ideal all human relations--those of man to man1 and man to nature4 ,,lxxi4 ,the ,cardinal ,virtues4 ,the cardinal virtues are marked by #a4 ,wholeness4 ,this or that virtue1 not calling the whole character into play1 but only some special power1 is partial4 ,but a cardinal virtue is not a virtue1 but the spirit in which all acts are performed4 ,it lies in the attitude which the agent takes towards duty2 his obedience to recognized forms1 his readiness to respond to new duties1 his enthusiasm in moving forward to new relations4 ,it is a common remark that moral codes change from ',do not' to ',do'1 and from this to ',be'4 ,a ,mosaic code may attempt to regulate the specific acts of life4 ,christianity says1 ',be ye perfect'4 ,the effort to exhaust the various special right acts is futile4 ,they are not the same for any two men1 and they change constantly with the same man4 ,the very words which denote virtues come less and less to mean specific acts1 and more the spirit in which conduct occurs4 ,purity1 for example1 does not mean freedom from certain limited outward forms of defilement2 but comes to signify rightness of natures as a whole1 their freedom from all self-seeking or exclusive desire for private pleasure1 etc4 ,thus purity of heart comes to mean perfect goodness4 #b4 ,disinterestedness4 ,any act1 to be virtuous1 must of course be disinterested1 but we may now connect this disinterestedness with the integral nature of moral action just spoken of4 ,immoral action never takes account of the whole nature of an end2 it deflects the end to some ulterior purpose2 it bends it to the private satisfaction of the agent2 it takes a part of it by making exceptions in favor of self4 ,bad action is never 'objective'4 ,it is 'abstract'2 it takes into account only such portion of the act as satisfies some existing need of the private self4 ,the immoral man shows his partial character again by being full of casuistries1 devices by which he can get the act removed from its natural placing and considered in some other light3--this act1 for example1 would be dishonest1 of course1 if done under certain circumstances1 but since ,i have certain praiseworthy feelings1 certain remote intentions1 it may now be considered otherwise4 ,it is a large part of the badness of 'good' people that instead of taking the whole act just as it is1 they endeavor to make the natural feelings in their own mind--feelings of charity1 or benevolence--do substitute duty for the end aimed at2 they excuse wrong acts on the ground that their 'intentions' were good1 meaning by intentions the prevailing mood of their mind4 ,it is in this sense that 'hell is paved with good intentions4' ,now it is against this deflection1 perversion and mutilating of the act that disinterestedness takes its stand4 ,disinterested does not mean without interest1 but without interest in anything except the act itself4 ,the interest is not in the wonderful moods or sentiments with which we do the act2 it is not in some ulterior end to be gained by it1 or in some private advantage which it will bring1 but in the act itself--in the real and concrete relations involved4 ,there is a vague ,french saying that 'morality is the nature of things4' ,if this phrase has a meaning it is that moral conduct is not a manifestation of private feelings nor a search for some unattainable ideal1 but observance and reproduction of actual relations4 ,and this is the mark of a disinterested character4 ,,conclusion4 ,,lxxii4 ,the ,practical ,end of ,morality4 ,virtues1 then1 are cardinal1 and character is integral1 just in the degree in which every want is a want of the whole man4 ,so far as this occurs1 the burden of the moral struggle is transformed into freedom of movement4 ,there is no longer effort to bring the particular desire into conformity with a law1 or a universal1 outside itself4 ,the fitting in of each special desire1 as it arises1 to the organism of character takes place without friction1 as a natural re-adjustment4 ,there is not constraint1 but growth4 ,on the other side1 the attained character does not tend to petrify into a fixed possession which resists the response to needs that grow out of the enlarged environment4 ,it is plastic to new wants and demands2 it does not require to be wrenched and wracked into agreement with the required act1 but moves into it1 of itself4 ,the law is not an external ideal1 but the principle of the movement4 ,there is the identity of freedom and law in the good4 ,this union of inclination and duty in act is the practical end4 ,all the world's great reformers have set as their goal this ideal1 which may be termed either the freeing of wants1 or the humanizing of the moral law4 ,it will help summarize our whole discussion1 if we see how the theories of hedonism and of ,kant have endeavored to express this same goal4 ,hedonism1 indeed1 has this identity for its fundamental principle4 ,it holds strongly to the idea of moral law immanent in human wants themselves4 ,but its error lies in taking this identity of desire and the good1 as a direct or immediate unity1 while1 in reality1 it exists only in and through activity2 it is a unity which can be attained only as the result of a process4 ,it mistakes an ideal which is realized only in action for bare fact which exists of itself4 ,hedonism1 as represented by ,spencer1 recognizes1 it is true1 that the unity of desire and duty is not an immediate or natural one2 but only to fall into the error of holding that the separation is due to some external causes1 and that when these are removed we shall have a fixed millenium4 ,as against this doctrine1 we must recognize that the difference between want and duty is always removed so far as conduct is moral2 that it is not an ideal in the sense of something to be attained at some remote period1 but an ideal in the sense of being the very meaning of moral activity whenever and wherever it occurs4 ,the realizing of this ideal is not something to be sometime reached once for all1 but progress is itself the ideal4 ,wants are ever growing larger1 and thus freedom ever comes to have a wider scope 7,sec4 ,,lxv74 ,kant recognizes that the identity of duty and inclination is not a natural fact1 but is the ideal4 ,however1 he understands by ideal something which ought to be1 but is not4 ,morality is ever a struggle to get desire into unity with law1 but a struggle doomed1 by its very conditions1 not to succeed4 ,the law is the straight line of duty1 which the asymptotic curve of desire may approximate1 but never touch4 ,an earthly taint of pleasure-seeking always clings to our wants1 and makes of morality a striving which defeats itself4 ,the theory that morality lies in the realization of individuality recognizes that there is no direct1 or natural1 identity of desire and law1 but also recognizes that their identification is not an impossible task4 ,the problem is solved in the exercise of function1 where the desires1 however1 are not unclothed1 but clothed upon4 ,flowing in the channel of response to the demands of the moral environment1 they unite1 at once1 social service and individual freedom4 ,,lxxiii4 ,the ,means of ,moralization4 ,this practical end of the unification of desire and duty1 in the play of moral interests1 is reached1 therefore1 so far as the desires are socialized4 ,a want is socialized when it is not a want for its own isolated and fixed satisfaction1 but reflects the needs of the environment4 ,this implies1 of course1 that it is bound by countless ties to the whole body of desires and capacities4 ,the eye1 in seeing for itself1 sees for the whole body1 because it is not isolated but1 through its connections1 an organ of a system4 ,in this same way1 the satisfaction of a want for food1 or for commercial activity1 may necessitate a satisfaction of the whole social system4 ,but how shall this socialization of wants be secured8 ,it is in answering this question that we are brought again to a point already discussed at length3 the moral bearings of intelligence4 ,it is intelligence that is the sole sure means of taking a want out of the isolation of merely impulsive action4 ,it is the passing of the desire through the alembic of ideas that1 in rationalizing and spiritualizing it1 makes it an expression of the want of the whole man1 and thus of social needs4 ,to know one's self was declared by ,socrates1 who first brought to conscious birth the spirit of the moral life1 to be the very core of moral endeavor4 ,this knowledge of self has taken1 indeed1 a more circuitous and a more painful path1 than ,socrates anticipated4 ,man has had1 during two thousand years of science1 to go around through nature to find himself1 and as yet he has not wholly come back to himself--he oftentimes seems still lost in the wilderness of an outer world4 ,but when man does get back to himself it will be as a victor laden with the spoils of subdued nature4 ,having secured1 in theory and invention1 his unity with nature1 his knowledge of himself will rest on a wide and certain basis4 ,this is the final justification of the moral value of science and art4 ,it is because through them wants are inter-connected1 unified and socialized1 that they are1 when all is said and done1 the preminent moral means4 ,and if we do not readily recognize them in this garb1 it is because we have made of them such fixed things1 that is1 such abstractions1 by placing them outside the movement of human life4 ,,index4 ,absolute--and relative ,ethics1 according to ,spencer #gb4 ,accountability--,see responsibility4 ,activity--human1 the subject-matter of ethics #a ff4 --the object of desire #ba ff4 --the standard of pleasure #de2 #ej4 --equals exercise of function #aja4 --opposed to mere possession #bji2 #bae2 #bah2 #bbj4 --two sides of #bai4 --see freedom4 sthetic feelings--may be moral #aii4 --see art4 ,agent--moral1 one capable of acting from ideas #c4 --see person4 ,alexander1 ,s4--quoted3 on idea of sum of pleasures #df4 --referred to3 #i2 #df2 #gg2 #aaa2 #acd2 #aeh2 #afe2 #bjb2 #baf2 #bba2 #bbg4 ,altruism--how identified with egoism #ei4 --reconciled1 by ,spencer1 with egoism #gj ff4 --conflicts1 at present1 with egoism #gf4 --older moralists termed benevolence #aie4 --not necessarily moral #ajg4 --not disguised selfishness #aji4 --may equal charity #abe4 ,amusements--moral nature of #acc4 ,approbation--nature of #afa4 ,aristotle--quoted3 on pleasure #ah2 on pleasure and character #bi2 on the mean #acf4 --referred to3 #ca4 ,art 7and ,science7--nature of interest in #aaa4 --distinction of fine and useful #aab4 --interest in1 why moral #aac ff4 --interest in1 really social #aah ff4 --life an1 #abj4 --essentially dynamic #abf4 ,asceticism--means formalism #id4 --element of truth in #ie4 --results when interest is excluded #ajf4 ,aspiration--involved in morality #bac2 #bbb4 ,autonomy--,kant's conception of justified #adi4 ,badness--of environment a factor in right action #agf2 #bbd4 --its source and factors #bad4 --its relation to goodness #bbc4 --potential and actual #bbc4 --of good people #bcb4 ,bain1 ,a4--quoted3 that pleasure is a self-evident criterion #af2 his definition of utilitarianism #ec2 on obligation #adj2 #ada4 --referred to3 #ag2 #ff2 #bbg4 ,barratt--quoted3 that all pleasure is individual #ad4 ,baseness--why badness becomes #bai4 ,benevolence--see altruism4 ,bentham1 ,j4--quoted3 pleasure both criterion and motive #ae2 self-evident criterion #af2 all motives good #cd ff42 hedonistic calculus #cf ff42 identity of individual and general pleasure #eg ff42 influence of law #ei4 --referred to3 #ec4 ,birks--referred to3 #ff4 ,blackie1 ,j4 ,s4--referred to3 #ff4 ,bradley1 ,f4 ,h4--quoted3 on pleasure and desire #ba2 scientific interest not necessarily social #abb2 on merely individual conscience #ahi4 --referred to3 #be2 #bf2 #db2 #dh2 #ed2 #ia2 #abd2 #acd2 #afe2 #bba4 ,browning1 ,r4--referred to3 #aaa4 ,butler--,bishop1 quoted3 on conscience #afg4 --referred to3 #aaj4 ,caird1 ,e4--quoted3 on collision of moral ends #hh4 --referred to3 #ba2 #hb2 #hg2 #ia2 #ib2 #ic2 #ie2 #aji2 #aaa2 #adi2 #afe4 ,calderwood--referred to3 #aeh2 #aff4 ,capacity--its relation to environment #ig4 --increased by moral action #bjf4 ,carlyle1 ,t4--referred to3 #abh4 ,casuistry--inevitable1 if moral end is not wholly social #aai4 ,character--reciprocal with conduct #i4 --the source of motive1 desire and moral pleasure #bf ff4 --separated from conduct by hedonists #cb ff4 --and virtues #bbg ff4 --see capacity1 conduct1 interests and motive4 ,charity--idea of1 involves social inequality #abe4 ,christianity--ethical influence of #bbd4 --has no specific ethical code #bca4 ,coit1 ,s4--referred to3 #bh2 #ff4 ,commands--moral value of3 #bjc4 ,common ,good--an ethical ideal #ea4 --not furnished by hedonism #fj4 --not furnished by ,kant #ia4 --why necessarily involved in morality #aag2 #bag2 #bbb4 --demands reciprocal satisfaction of individual and society #abg4 --its existence postulated by moral conduct #acj4 --results from exercise of function #afh4 --constituted by activity #afi ff4 --realized in institutions #agc4 --development of #baj4 --see institutions and society4 ,comprehensiveness--growth of1 in moral end #baj ff4 ,conduct--defined #c4 --relation to consequences #g4 --relation to character #i4 --an individual system #acc4 --a social system #acf4 --how related to character #afc4 --see activity1 consequences1 character and motive4 ,conflict--of moral ends #hh ff4 --morality has an aspect of #aea2 #bbg4 ,conscience--,bain's idea of #ada4 --equals consciousness of action #aha4 --elements in #ahb4 --not a special faculty #ahc4 --kinds of #ahc ff4 --not merely individual #ahh4 ,conscientiousness--nature of #aii4 --does not equal introspection #bjj4 --nor application of code #bja4 --a cardinal virtue #bcb4 ,consequences--moral value of #g ff42 #hd2 #aad2 #afj4 --excluded from morality by ,kantianism #ac2 #bi4 --identified with moral value by hedonism #cc4 --responsibility for #afj4 ,criterion--hedonistic is pleasure #ae4 --criticism of hedonistic #ca ff4 --two ends to be met by every #cb4 --of higher and lower pleasures #di ff4 --when pleasure may be a #ej4 --,mill's really social #fc4 --,spencer's really social #gc4 --,kant's nominally formal #gi ff4 --the real #acb ff4 --its elasticity #ace4 ,darwin1 ,c4--referred to3 #gh4 ,demoralization--involved in badness #bbj4 ,desire--pleasure as end of #af2 #ah ff4 --defined #ai4 --how spiritualized #bc4 --not purely pleasurable #bg4 --an expression of character #bh4 --excluded from moral motive by ,kant #gi4 --all or no involved in morality #id4 --relation to pleasure #hc4 --particular1 an abstraction #if4 --how distinguished from interest #ajc4 --opposed to reason by ,kant #adg4 --when opposed to moral action #adh2 #aee2 #bac2 #baf4 --how socialized1 #bcg4 ,dewey1 ,j4--referred to3 #be2 #gh2 #aid4 ,disinterestedness--equals full interest #ajg4 --an aspect of cardinal virtue #bcb4 ,disposition--,bentham on #ce4 ,dualism--the ,kantian #adh ff4 ,duty--see obligation4 ,egoism--see altruism4 ,empiricism--,spencer's reconciliation with intuitionalism #fi ff4 ,end--moral3 see common good2 function2 motive4 ,environment--defined by relation to capacity #ii ff4 --meaning of adjustment to #aae ff4 --moral1 exists in institutions #aga4 --badness of1 an element in right action #agf2 #aij4 --enlarged by moral action #bjg4 ,ethical ,world--discussed #afg ff4 --nature illustrated #afh4 --relation to moral law #agd4 --see ,institutions4 ,ethics--defined #a4 --divided #c4 --its object according to ,spencer #fh4 --see theory4 ,evolution1 ,theory of--combined with hedonism #fg ff4 --not really hedonistic #ga ff4 --its real standard objective #gb4 ,faith--a factor in moral progress #abc2 #abg ff4 --in humanity1 meaning of #abi4 --why demanded in moral action #bag2 #bbb4 ,feelings--natural and moral #e ff42 #be ff42 #hg4 --sympathetic relied upon by utilitarians #eg4 --necessary in moral activity #he4 --active1 equal interests #ajb4 --moral1 defined by end #ajh2 see also motive4 --value of #aie ff4 --moral1 not too narrowly limited #aii4 ,freedom--is object of desire #bd4 --equals exercise of function #ach4 --various aspects of #aeh4 --of choice defined #aei4 --of indifference discussed #afa ff4 --actualized in rights #agb2 #agd4 --positive1 realized in virtues #bbi4 ,function--union of capacity and circumstance in act #ajc4 --freedom found in exercise of #afd ff4 ,gizycki--referred to3 #ff4 ,god--an external1 cannot be the source of obligation #adi4 ,goethe--referred to3 #abh4 ,golden ,rule--identified by ,mill with principle of utilitarianism #ei4 --gives no directions as to conduct #bjd4 --is a concrete statement of ethical postulate #bje4 ,green1 ,t4 ,h4--quoted3 on desire and pleasure #ba2 on sum of pleasures #dc2 on nature of happiness #de2 on conscientiousness #bjj2 #bjb2 on goodness #bae4 --referred to3 #i2 #be2 #db2 #ed2 #aaj2 #aeh2 #afe4 ,grote1 ,j4--referred to3 #ff2 #aeh4 ,guyau--referred to3 #ff2 #adc4 ,hedonism--defined #ad ff4 --its paradox #be4 --confuses feeling and idea #bf2 #dc ff4 --summarized #cj4 --all motives good #cc4 --its calculus #cf4 --fails to provide laws #ci ff4 --its contrast with ,kantianism #hb ff4 --its treatment of obligation #adj ff4 --is correct in holding rightness to be pleasurable #bbh4 --truth and falsity in #bcd4 ,hegel--quoted3 on reflective conscience #ahh2 on merely individual conscience #ahi4 ,hinton1 ,j4--quoted3 on altruism #aji2 on badness #baf4 --referred to3 #bjb4 ,hodgson1 ,s4 ,h4--referred to3 #ad4 ,idealism--when feeble #abh4 ,ideals--moral1 progressive1 #bjf4 ,imperative1 ,categorical--of ,kant #adg4 --of conscience #aia4 ,impulse--and pleasure #ag4 --and desire #bb4 --nature of action from #aei4 --see desire4 ,individuality--defined #ig4 --not identical with inner side alone #ih4 --evils of defining from this standpoint #aaj4 --made by function #aca4 --realized is autonomy #aej4 --realized is freedom #afd4 --growth in #baj4 --see freedom and rights4 ,institutions--nature of #afi ff4 --sovereignty1 rights and law inhere in #aga ff4 --influence of1 upon conscience #ahd2 #ahi4 --movement of1 the source of duties1 #aid4 --see common good and society4 ,interests--are functions on personal side #ajb ff4 --classified and discussed #ajd ff4 --social1 involve science and art #abc ff4 --realized in institutions #agj4 --their relation to conscience #aih4 --pure1 are virtue #bbh4 --the active element of #bah4 --the freeing of1 the moral goal #bcc4 ,james1 ,sr41 ,h4--referred to3 #bjb4 ,james1 ,wm4--quoted3 on pleasure and desire #bj4 --referred to3 #gg4 ,kant--agrees with hedonism as to end of desire #gi4 --his end an abstraction #hd4 --his practical ideal that of ,mill and ,spencer #ic4 --value of his theory #ic4 --his theory of obligation #adg4 --his conception of autonomy #adi4 --his idea of duty #aef4 --his conception of practical reason #aia4 --quoted3 on pleasure #dg2 on pleasure as common good #eb2 on priority of duty to good #gh2 on good will #gi2 his formula for right action #hj2 illustrations of moral law #hj ff4 --referred to3 #ad2 #gh2 #bab2 #bba2 #bce4 ,kantianism--compared with hedonism #hb ff4 --its practical breakdown #ij4 ,knowledge--moral effect of advance in #bjg4 --socializes wants #bcg4 --see art4 ,laurie1 ,s4 ,s4--quoted3 on happiness #ff4 --referred to3 #bbg4 ,law--utilitarian use of #eh2 #fa ff4 --,kant's moral1 formal #gh4 --relation to desire #id4 --realized in institutions #agb2 #agd4 --of the 'is'1 not merely of the 'ought' #age4 --idea of1 in general #aie4 --see obligation4 ,lawlessness--involved in morality #baf4 ,leckey--referred to3 #ff4 ,limitation--the basis of moral strength #abh4 ,lincoln1 ,a4--anecdote regarding #bh4 ,lotze--referred to3 #af2 #aff4 ,love--the union of duty and desire #aed4 ,martineau1 ,j4--quoted3 on the difficulty of the hedonistic calculus #ch4 --referred to3 #db2 #gh2 #aeh2 #aff2 #bbg4 ,maurice1 ,f4 ,d4--referred to3 #aia4 ,merit--means social desert #bbe4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,s4--criticizes ,kant #ia4 --his equivoke of pleasure and pleasant thing #bj4 --his fallacy #ef4 --introduces quality of pleasure into hedonism #db2 #df4 --quoted3 pleasure self-evident criterion #af2 end of desire #ag2 on rules of morality #ci ff2 on moral tribunal #dh2 on utilitarian standard #ec2 on importance of law and education #ei2 on social feeling #fc ff4 --referred to3 #be2 #cj2 #di4 ,morality--sphere of as broad as conduct #b2 #aed4 --not dependent upon an individual's wish #afg ff4 --realized in institutions #agj4 --struggle for private1 bad #bjb4 --in the nature of things #bcc4 ,motive--defined #e4 --two elements in #aj4 --determined by character #bh4 --never bad according to hedonism #cc4 --formal and legislative according to ,kant #hj4 --not a subjective mood #bcb4 ,norms--in philosophy #a4 ,obligation--in conflict with pleasure #gf ff4 --how related to function #ach4 --theories regarding #aci4 --distinct from coercion #add4 --enforced1 not created by power #ade4 --,kantian idea of criticized #adh4 --does not relate simply to what ought to be1 but is not #aea2 #agd ff4 --relation to conscience #ahc4 --how made known #aij ff4 --practical value of sense of #aif4 --must be individualized #aig2 #bja4 --when opposed to desire #bac2 #baf4 --the union with desire the moral ideal #bcd4 --see desire1 law and universal4 ,pater--referred to3 #ff4 ,pathological--all inclination1 according to ,kant #hf4 --opposed to active #bab4 ,paulsen--referred to3 #fg2 #aaa4 ,person--is one capable of conduct #ig4 ,pleasure--an element in activity #bd4 --not the moving spring to action #bf4 --sum of1 dependent on objective conditions #dd ff4 --quality of1 similarly dependent #dg ff4 --may symbolize action #ea4 --general1 a vague idea #fb4 --fixed by social relations #fe2 #gg4 --not a sufficient guide at present #ge4 --dependent on self-realization #hc4 --all right action involves #bbh4 --see desire and hedonism4 ,postulate--moral1 defined #abi ff4 --equals ,golden ,rule #bje4 ,problem--moral #c4 ,progress--necessary in moral action #ace ff4 --moral1 nature of #bji4 ,prudence--not outside moral sphere #aje4 ,reason--opposed to desire by ,kant #adg4 --,kant's conception too immediate #aej4 --practical1 idea of #aia4 ,reformation--possibility of #afb ff4 ,relativity--of morals1 means what #acf4 ,responsibility--nature of #afj ff4 --of parents and children #bjc4 ,reverence--,kant regards as sole moral feeling #hf4 ,rights--exist by common will #agb4 ,rousseau--his influence upon ,kant #adh4 ,royce1 ,j4--referred to3 #fa2 #aaa4 ,rule--moral1 not a command #bjd4 --a tool of analysis #bjd4 ,satisfaction--moral1 creates new wants #bjh4 --good and bad #bag4 ,science--nature of interest in #aaa4 --the preminent moral means #bcg4 --see art4 ,schurman1 ,j4 ,g4--referred to3 #gh4 ,self--interest in #aje ff4 --involves sympathy #aji4 --dualism in self1 how arises #baf4 --knowledge of #bcg4 ,selfishness--involved in immorality #baf4 ,self-sacrifice--its moral nature #bbb4 ,sentimentality--immoral #aac4 --escape from1 only through knowledge #abj4 --results from abstract idea of duty #aeg4 --refined1 equals sensuality #bbj4 ,shakespeare--quoted3 on common good #aca4 ,sidgwick1 ,h4--quoted3 on the hedonistic assumption #dc2 on utilitarian standard #ec2 on intuitional utilitarianism #ed4 --referred to3 #ad2 #af2 #ah2 #ff2 #aaa2 #bbg4 ,society--its moral influence #adf2 #aeg4 --its relation to obligation #aeb4 --constituted by moral relationships #age4 --development of1 changes moral ideals #bjg4 --see common good1 institutions4 ,socrates--author of idea of reflective conscience #ahh4 --initiator of modern ethical spirit #bcg4 ,sorley--referred to3 #gh2 #aaa4 ,sovereignty--exists in common will and good #aga4 --ultimate possessed in humanity #agc4 ,spencer1 ,h4--believes in fixed social ideal #gc ff42 #bce4 --quoted3 on pleasure as a necessary effect #fh2 not immediate object of desire #fi2 egoism and altruism #gj ff42 on ideal man #gc2 equilibrium of functions #gd2 on obligation #adb2 #adc4 --referred to3 #af2 #fg2 #gb2 #gc2 #gd2 #ge2 #gf2 #aaa2 #abe2 #bce4 ,stephen1 ,l4--quoted3 on feeling as universal motive #bg2 on sympathy #aji ff4 --referred to3 #af2 #be2 #fg2 #fh2 #gh2 #aaa2 #afe2 #bbg4 ,struggle--when morality is a #bab4 --changed by ,christianity into movement #bbe4 --see conflict4 ,sully1 ,j4--referred to3 #ag4 ,theory--ethical and conduct #a4 --ethical1 sub-divided #ac4 --ethical1 not casuistry #hi4 --value of #ahf4 ,universal--a1 lacking in hedonism #cg4 --,kant's emphasis of #hj4 --,kant's1 formal #hj2 #he2 #ij4 --,kant's1 leads to conflict #hg4 --true1 equals organization1 #hh2 #ij2 #if4 --bad action cannot be #bba4 --means a method1 not a thing #acf4 --found in movement of character #bcd4 --see law4 ,utilitarianism--is universalistic hedonism #ac2 #ec4 --defined by ,mill1 ,sidgwick1 ,bain1 #ec4 --criticized #ed ff4 --assumes social order #fc ff4 --combined with evolution #fg4 ,virtue--change in nature of #baa4 --correlative to duty #bbe4 --distinguished from merit #bbf4 --is an interest of character #bbh4 --two types of #bbi4 --cardinal #bcj4 ,wants--see desires4 ,wilson 7and ,fowler7--referred to3 #fg4 ,will--,kant's good will #gi4 ,,transcriber',s ,,corrections page original text correction #ag endquote missing are one and the same thing4 #bj want simply sweat-meats2 want simply sweet-meats2 #bd so that it becoms one factor so that it becomes one factor #ce unless as a sort of suprise unless as a sort of surprise #ch but the the most conscientious but the most conscientious #ch cicumstances were such as circumstances were such as #db sum of pleasnres sum of pleasures #dg this agreableness is4 this agreeableness is4 #fh ,science of ,ehtics1 ch4 ,,ix4 ,science of ,ethics1 ch4 ,,ix4 #gd endquote missing members of a society #hc of well as of hedonism as well as of hedonism #ib without expressily giving up without expressly giving up #abd ordinary chords and and tunes1 ordinary chords and tunes1 #aef just what what morality demands just what morality demands #ahc ,,lvix4 ,,lix4 #aib seems quite superflous seems quite superfluous #bea entry ,society missing from index in original