,,the ,,purpose ,,of ,,history          
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,,purpose ,,of ,,history  ,,by          
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,,columbia ,,university ,,press #aiaf   
,all rights reserved   ,copyright1      
#aiaf1 ,,by ,,columbia ,,university     
,,press4  ,printed from type1 ,july1    
#aiaf4     ,,note   ,this book contains 
three lectures delivered at the         
,university of ,north ,carolina on the  
,mc,nair ,foundation in ,march of the   
current year4 ,it expresses certain     
conclusions about history to which ,i   
have been led by the study of the       
history of philosophy and by reflection 
on the work of contemporary             
philosophers1 especially ,bergson1      
,dewey1 and ,santayana4  ,i am happy to 
acknowledge my indebtedness to the      

,faculty and ,students of the           
,university of ,north ,carolina for a   
most delightful visit at ,chapel ,hill4 
,f4 ,j4 ,e4 ,w4  ,,columbia ,,university
 ,,in ,,the ,,city ,,of ,,new ,,york    
,,june1 #aiaf     ,,contents    ,i4     
,,from ,,history ,,to ,,philosophy      
#a   ,,ii4 ,,the ,,pluralism ,,of       
,,history       #bg  ,,iii4 ,,the       
,,continuity ,,of ,,history      #eh    
,,the ,,purpose ,,of ,,history     ,i   
,,from ,,history ,,to ,,philosophy      
,the serious study of history is        
characteristic of a certain maturity of 
mind4 ,for the intellectually young1 the
 world is too new and attractive to     
arouse in them a very absorbing interest
 in its past4 ,life is for them an      
adventure1 and the world is a place for 
excursions and experiences4 ,they care  
little about what men have done1 but    
much about what they might do4 ,history1
 to interest them1 must be written as a 
romance which will fire their           
imagination1 rather than as a philosophy

 which might make them wise4 ,but       
maturity1 somewhat disciplined and      
disillusioned1 confirms the suspicion1  
which even youth entertains at times1   
that the world1 while offering an       
opportunity1 hedges the offer about with
 restrictions which must be understood  
and submitted to1 if effort is to be    
crowned with success4 ,the mature may   
thus become eager to understand life    
without ceasing to enjoy it4 ,they may  
become philosophical and show their     
wisdom by a desire to sympathize with   
what men have done and to live          
rationally in the light of what is      
possible4 ,they may study history1      
convinced that it enlarges their        
sympathies and promotes rational living4
  ,we might1 therefore1 conclude that   
the prevailing interest in historical   
studies is a sign that the age is       
growing in maturity and is seeking an   
outlook upon life which is both sane and
 encouraging4 ,this may well be true4   
,but even if the study of history       

indicate a certain maturity of mind1 it 
is not a guarantee that history will not
 be studied in the spirit of youth4     
,history may do little more than afford 
a new world for wild adventure and      
undisciplined experience4 ,moreover1    
maturity is not necessarily wise4       
,disgust1 revolt1 and loss of sympathy  
are not always strangers to it4         
,historical studies may be pursued with 
little comprehension of their aim or    
meaning2 and history may be taught with 
little reflection on its philosophical  
significance4 ,it would appear1         
therefore1 that the study of history    
itself affords an opportunity for       
philosophical inquiry1 and may          
profitably stimulate questions about the
 character of those facts with which    
history is concerned4  ,in these        
lectures ,i intend to deal with the     
purpose of history4 ,i would not1       
however1 be misunderstood4 ,my aim is   
not1 by making another attempt to find  
the increasing purpose running through  

the ages1 to win permanently the laurel 
which1 hitherto1 ambitious philosophers 
have worn only for a season4 ,there is1 
no doubt1 a kind of rapture in seeing   
history as ,st4 ,augustine saw it1--the 
progress of the ,city of ,god from earth
 to heaven2 and there is a kind of pride
 not wholly ignoble1 in seeing it as    
,hegel did1--the vibrating evolution    
from the brooding absolution of the     
,east to the self-conscious freedom of  
one's own philosophy embraced and made  
universal by the civilizing energy of   
one's own state4 ,my aim is more modest4
 ,it is not romantic1 but technical4    
,metaphysics rather than poetry is to be
 my domain1 although ,i cherish the hope
 that poetry may not1 therefore1 be     
misprized4 ,if it may ultimately appear1
 not only as an ornament to living1 but 
also as an exemplary method of living   
well1 ,i may even now invoke the ,muses 
to my aid1 but ,clio first1 and1        
afterwards1 ,calliope4 ,it is my aim1   
through an examination of what the      

historian himself proposes1 to discover 
in what sense the idea of purpose in    
history is appropriate1 and to what     
ideas we are led when we think of       
history as the record of human progress4
  ,the conclusions ,i hope to clarify1  
,i may here anticipate4 ,there is       
discoverable in history no purpose1 if  
we mean by purpose some future event    
towards which the whole creation moves  
and which past and present events       
portend2 but there is purpose in        
history1 if we mean that the past is    
utilized as material for the progressive
 realization1 at least by man1 of what  
we call spiritual ends4 ,more generally1
 history is itself essentially the      
utilization of the past for ends1 ends  
not necessarily foreseen1 but ends to   
come1 so that every historical thing1   
when we view it retrospectively1 has the
 appearance of a result which has been  
selected1 and to which its antecedents  
are exclusively appropriate4 ,in that   
sense purpose is discoverable in        

history4 ,but this purpose is not       
single4 ,history is pluralistic and     
implies a pluralistic philosophy4 ,there
 are many histories1 but no one of them 
exists to the prejudice of any other4   
,and1 finally1 progress is not aptly    
conceived as an evolution from the past 
into the future4 ,evolution is1 rather1 
only a name for historical continuity1  
and this continuity itself is a fact to 
be investigated and not a theory which  
explains anything1 or affords a standard
 of value4 ,the past is not the cause or
 beginning of the present1 but the      
effect and result of history2 so that   
every historical thing leaves1 as it    
were1 its past behind it as the record  
of its life in time4 ,progress may mean 
material progress when we have in mind  
the improvement in efficiency of the    
instruments man uses to promote his     
well-being2 it may mean rational        
progress when we have in mind the       
idealization of his natural impulses4   
,then he frames in his imagination ideal

 ends which he can intelligently pursue 
and which1 through the attempt to       
realize them1 justify his labors4 ,such 
are the conclusions ,i hope to clarify1 
and ,i shall begin by considering the   
purpose men entertain when they write   
histories4  ,it is natural to quote     
,herodotus4 ,the ,father of ,history    
seems to have been conscious of his     
purpose and to have expressed it4 ,we   
are told that he gave his history to the
 world in order that the things men have
 done might not in time be forgotten1   
and that the great and wonderful deeds  
of both ,greeks and barbarians might not
 become unheard of1--this1 and why they 
fought with one another4 ,this statement
 seems to be1 in principle1 an adequate 
expression of the purpose of writing    
histories1 even if ,herodotus did not   
execute that purpose with fidelity4 ,the
 limitations of its specific terms are  
obvious4 ,one might expect that the     
great deeds were mainly exploits at     
arms1 that the history would be         

military1 and that the causes exposed   
would be causes of war4 ,but the history
 itself deals with geography and        
climate1 with manners1 customs1         
traditions1 and institutions1 fully as  
much as with heroes and battles4        
,professor ,gilbert ,murray says of it3 
,his work is not only an account of a   
thrilling struggle1 politically very    
important1 and spiritually tremendous2  
it is also1 more perhaps than any other 
known book1 the expression of a whole   
man1 the representation of all the world
 seen through the medium of one mind and
 in a particular perspective4 ,the world
 was at that time very interesting2 and 
the one mind1 while strongly individual1
 was one of the most comprehensive known
 to human records4 ,herodotus's whole   
method is highly subjective4 ,he is too 
sympathetic to be consistently critical1
 or to remain cold towards the earnest  
superstitions of people about him3 he   
shares from the outset their tendency to
 read the activity of a moral ,god in   

all the moving events of history4 ,he is
 sanguine1 sensitive1 a lover of human  
nature1 interested in details if they   
are vital to his story1 oblivious of    
them if they are only facts and figures2
 he catches quickly the atmosphere of   
the society he moves in1 and falls      
readily under the spell of great human  
influences1 the solid impersonal        
,egyptian hierarchy or the dazzling     
circle of great individuals at ,athens2 
yet all the time shrewd1 cool1 gentle in
 judgment1 deeply and unconsciously     
convinced of the weakness of human      
nature1 the flaws of its heroism and the
 excusableness of its apparent villainy4
 ,his book bears for good and ill the   
stamp of this character and this        
profession4#a  ,the history of          
,herodotus would1 then1 preserve a      
record of the world of human affairs as 
he discovered it and an exposition of   
the causes and conditions which have    
influenced human action4 ,he would      
record what men have done in order that 

their deeds might be remembered and in  
order that they might be understood4    
,like all other historians he had his   
individual limitations1 but for all of  
them he seems to have expressed the     
purpose of their inquiries4 ,that       
purpose may be worked out in many       
different fields4 ,we may have military 
history1 political history1 industrial  
history1 economic history1 religious    
history1 the history of civilization1 of
 education1 and of philosophy1 the      
history1 indeed1 of any human enterprise
 whatever4 ,but always the purpose is   
the same1 to preserve a faithful record 
and to promote the understanding of what
 has happened in the affairs of men4 ,i 
need hardly add that1 for the present1  
,i am restricting history to human      
history4 ,its wider signification will  
not be neglected1 but ,i make the       
present limitation in order that through
 a consideration of the writing of human
 history1 we may be led on to the       
conception of history in its more       

comprehensive form4  ,to conceive the   
purpose of writing history adequately is
 not the same thing as to execute that  
purpose faithfully4 ,if ,herodotus may  
be cited in illustration of the adequate
 conception1 he will hardly be cited by 
historians in illustration of its       
faithful execution4 ,they have          
complained of him from time to time ever
 since ,thucydides first accused him of 
caring more about pleasing his readers  
than about telling the truth4 ,he is    
blamed principally for his credulity and
 for his lack of criticism4 ,credulous  
he was and less critical than one could 
wish1 but it is well to remember1 in any
 just estimate of him1 that he was much 
less credulous and much more critical   
than we should naturally expect a man of
 his time to be4 ,he wrote in an age    
when men generally believed             
spontaneously things which we1 since we 
reflect1 can not believe1 and when it   
was more congenial to listen to a story 
than to indulge in the criticism of it4 

,he frequently expresses disbelief of   
what he has been told and is often at   
great pains to verify what he has heard4
 ,with all his faults he remains among  
the extraordinary men4  ,these faults1  
when they are sympathetically examined1 
indicate far less blemishes in the      
character of ,herodotus than they do the
 practical and moral difficulties which 
beset the faithful writing of all       
history4 ,that is why he is so          
illustrative for our purpose4 ,a        
faithful and true record is the first   
thing the historian desires1 but it is a
 very difficult thing to obtain4 ,human 
testimony even in the presence of       
searching cross-examination is          
notoriously fallible1 and the dumb      
records of the past1 with all their     
variations and contradictions1 present a
 stolid indifference to our curiosity4  
,the questions we ask of the dead1 only 
we ourselves can answer4 ,herodotus     
wrote with these practical and moral    
difficulties at a maximum4 ,we have     

learned systematically to combat them4  
,there has grown up for our benefit an  
abundant literature which would instruct
 the historian how best to proceed4 ,the
 methods of historians1 their failures  
and successes1 have been carefully      
studied with the result that we have an 
elaborate science of writing history    
which we call historiography4 ,therein  
one may learn how to estimate sources1  
deal with documents1 weigh evidence1    
detect causes1 and be warned against the
 errors to which one is liable4         
,moreover1 anthropology1 archology1 and 
psychology have come to the historian's 
aid to help him in keeping his path as  
clear and unobstructed as possible4 ,in 
other words1 history has become more    
easy and more difficult to write than it
 was in the days of ,herodotus4 ,the    
better understanding of its difficulties
 and of the ways to meet them has made  
it more easy2 but the widening of its   
scope has made it more difficult4 ,we   
still face the contrast between the     

adequate conception of the purpose of   
writing history and the faithful        
execution of that purpose4 ,but it would
 seem that only practical and moral     
difficulties stand in the way of        
successful performance4 ,ideally1 at    
least1 a perfect history seems to be    
conceivable4  ,it is1 indeed1           
conceivable that with adequate data1    
with a wise and unbiased mind1 and with 
a moderate supply of genius1 an         
historian might faithfully record the   
events with which he deals1 and make us 
understand how they happened4 ,it is    
conceivable because it has in many cases
 been so closely approximated4 ,our     
standards of judgment and appraisement  
here are doubtless open to question by a
 skeptical mind4 ,we may lack the       
evidence which would make our estimate  
conclusive4 ,but what ,i mean is this3  
histories have been written which       
satisfy to a remarkable degree the      
spirit of inquiry4 ,they present that   
finality and inevitability which mark   

the master mind4 ,there are1 in other   
words1 authorities which few of us ever 
question4 ,they have so succeeded1      
within their limitations1 in producing  
the sense of adequacy1 that their       
reputation seems to be secure4 ,their   
limitations have been physical1 rather  
than moral or intellectual1 so that the 
defects which mar their work are less   
their own than those of circumstance4   
,they thus appear to be substantial     
witnesses that the only difficulties in 
the way of faithfully executing the     
purpose of writing history are practical
 and moral--to get the adequate data1   
the wise and unbiased mind1 and the     
moderate supply of genius4 ,there are no
 other difficulties4  ,yet when we say  
that there are no other difficulties we 
may profitably bear in mind that        
,herodotus has been charged not only    
with being credulous and uncritical1 but
 also with not telling the truth4 ,at   
first this might not appear to indicate 
a new difficulty4 ,for if ,herodotus    

lied1 his difficulty was moral4 ,but it 
is not meant that ,herodotus lied4 ,it  
is meant rather that within his own     
limitations he did not1 and possibly    
could not1 give us the true picture of  
the times which he recorded4 ,he saw    
things too near at hand to paint them in
 that perspective which truthfully      
reveals their proportions4 ,his         
emphases1 his lights and shadows1 are   
such as an enlightened man of his time  
might display1 but they are not the     
emphases1 the lights and shadows which1 
as subsequent historians have proved1   
give us ancient ,greece with its true   
shading4 ,we understand his own age much
 better than he did because ,grote and  
other moderns have revealed to us what  
,greece really was4 ,but what1 we may   
ask1 was the real ,greece8 ,who has     
written and who can write its true      
history8 ,grote's reputation as an      
historian is secure1 but his history has
 already been superseded in many        
important respects4 ,we are told that1  

since its publication1 a great change   
has come over our knowledge of ,greek   
civilization4 ,what then shall we say if
 neither ,herodotus1 who saw that       
civilization largely face to face1 nor  
,grote1 who portrays it after an        
exceptionally patient and thorough study
 of its records1 supplemented by what he
 calls scientific criticism and a       
positive philosophy1 has given us the   
real ,greece8 ,clearly it looks as if   
the perfect history is yet to be        
written1 and as if every attempt to     
write it pushes it forward into the     
future4 ,and clearly we face1 if not a  
new difficulty1 a fact at least which is
 of fundamental importance in the       
attempt to understand what history      
itself is4  ,so ,herodotus becomes again
 illustrative4 ,his history once written
 and given to the world becomes itself  
an item in the history of ,greece1      
making it necessary that the story be   
retold4 ,in the face of a fact1 at once 
so simple and so profound1 how idle is  

the boast of the publisher who could say
 of the author of a recent life of      
,christ#b that she has reproduced the   
time of ,christ1 not as we would        
understand it1 but as ,he himself saw   
it4 ,she has told what ,he believed and 
did1 rather than what ,he is reported to
 have said4 ,she has stripped ,him of   
tradition and shown ,him as ,he was2 she
 has given to literature an imperishable
 figure1 not of the wan ,galilean of the
 ,middle ,ages1 but of the towering     
figure of all history4 ,how idle1 ,i    
repeat1 is such a boast of finality when
 we know that this new history of       
,christ1 instead of ending the matter1  
may cause another history to be written 
by some student who comes to the old    
record with a new insight and a new     
inspiration4 ,it is possible1 we may    
say1 to portray the ,christ of ,his own 
day1 or the wan ,galilean of the ,middle
 ,ages1 or the figure which commands the
 attention of the twentieth century1 but
 the real ,christ1 the towering figure  

of all history1--who will portray that8 
,it is yet to be done and done again4   
,no historical fact can ever have its   
history fully written3 and this1 not    
because the adequate data1 the wise and 
unbiased mind1 and the moderate supply  
of genius are lacking1 but because it is
 itself the producer of new history the 
more it is historically understood4 ,it 
grows1 it changes1 it expands the more  
adequately we apparently grasp it4 ,we  
seem never to be at the end of its      
career and we must stop abruptly with   
its history still unfinished4 ,others   
may take up our task1 but they will end 
as we have ended4 ,the history of       
nothing is complete4  ,it is well-nigh  
impossible to avoid the suspicion of    
paradox in such statements as these4    
,yet ,i feel confident that every       
historical student keenly alive to his  
task is abundantly sensible of this     
truth4 ,where will he end the history of
 ,greece or of ,rome8 ,what will be the 
final chapter of the ,french            

,revolution8 ,no3 there is no paradox   
here1 but there is an ambiguity4 ,for   
history is not only a record written to 
preserve memory and promote             
understanding1 it is also a process in  
time4 ,with us1 ,professor ,flint       
writes1 the word 'history1' like its    
equivalents in all modern languages1    
signifies either a form of literary     
composition or the appropriate subject  
or matter of such composition--either a 
narrative of events1 or events which may
 be narrated4 ,it is impossible to free 
the term of this doubleness and         
ambiguity of meaning4 ,nor is it1 on the
 whole1 to be desired4 ,the advantages  
of having one term which may1 with      
ordinary caution1 be innocuously applied
 to two things so related1 more than    
counterbalance the dangers involved in  
two things so distinct having the same  
name4 ,the history of ,england which    
actually happened can not easily be     
confounded with the history of ,england 
written by ,mr4 ,green2 while by the    

latter being termed history as well as  
the former1 we are reminded that it is  
an attempt to reproduce or represent the
 course of the former4 ,occasionally1   
however1 the ambiguity of the word gives
 rise to great confusion of thought and 
gross inaccuracy of speech4 ,and this   
occurs most frequently1 if not          
exclusively1 just when men are trying   
and professing to think and speak with  
especial clearness and exactness        
regarding the signification of          
history--i4e41 when they are labouring  
to define it4 ,since the word history   
has two very different meanings1 it     
obviously can not have merely one       
definition4 ,to define an order of facts
 and a form of literature in the same   
terms--to suppose that when either of   
them is defined the other is defined--is
 so absurd that one would probably not  
believe it could be seriously done were 
it not so often done4 ,but to do so has 
been the rule rather than the exception4
 ,the majority of so-called definitions 

of history are definitions only of the  
records of history4 ,they relate to     
history as narrated and written1 not to 
history as evolved and acted2 in other  
words1 although given as the only       
definitions of history needed1 they do  
not apply to history itself1 but merely 
to accounts of history4 ,they may tell  
us what constitutes a book of history1  
but they can not tell us what the       
history is with which all books of      
history are occupied4 ,it is1 however1  
with history in this latter sense that a
 student of the science or philosophy of
 history is mainly concerned4#c  ,it is 
because history is not only something   
narrated and written1 but also something
 evolved and acted that we are led to   
say that the history of nothing is      
complete4 ,the narrative may begin and  
end where we please2 and might          
conceivably1 within its scope1 be       
adequate4 ,but the beginning and the end
 of the action are so interwoven with   
the whole time process that adequacy    

here becomes progressive4 ,that is the  
fundamental reason why ,grote's history 
surpasses that of ,herodotus in what we 
call historical truth4 ,for the truth of
 history is a progressive truth to which
 the ages as they continue contribute4  
,the truth for one time is not the truth
 for another1 so that historical truth  
is something which lives and grows      
rather than something fixed to be       
ascertained once for all4 ,to remember  
what has happened1 and to understand it1
 carries us thus to the recognition that
 the writing of history is itself an    
historical process4 ,it1 too1 is        
something evolved and acted4 ,it is     
perennially fresh even if the events    
with which it deals are long since past 
and gone4 ,the record may be final1 but 
our understanding of what has been      
recorded can make no such claim4 ,the   
accuracy of the record is not the truth 
of history4 ,we are well assured1 for   
instance1 that the ,greeks defeated the 
,persians at the battle of ,marathon in 

#dij ,b4,c4 ,the record on that point is
 not seriously questionable1 although we
 have to rely on documents which have   
had a precarious fortune4 ,and1 coming  
to our own day1 we can have little doubt
 that the record of this greater        
,marathon of ,europe will surpass all   
others in fulness and accuracy4 ,there  
are1 indeed1 as ,thucydides pointed out 
long ago1 difficulties in the way of    
exactness even when we are dealing with 
contemporaneous events4 ,eye-witnesses  
of the same events speak differently as 
their memories or their sympathies vary4
 ,such difficulties we have learned how 
to check until our records closely      
approach truth of fact4 ,consequently   
the records of what men have done1 or   
may be doing1 may be relatively         
unimpeachable4 ,but it is quite a       
different matter to understand what they
 have done and are doing4 ,without that 
understanding1 history is no better than
 a chronicle1 a table of events1 but not
 that thing to possess and keep always  

after which the historian aspires4  ,to 
understand is not simply difficult1 it  
is also endless4 ,but this fact does not
 make it hopeless4 ,the understanding of
 history grows by what it feeds on1     
enlarges itself with every fresh        
success1 constantly reveals more to be  
understood4 ,our illustrations may serve
 us again4 ,from the accessible records 
of the battle of ,marathon we can       
understand with tolerable success the   
immediate antecedents and consequents of
 that great event4 ,but in calling the  
event great we do not simply eulogize   
its participants4 ,we indicate1 rather1 
that its antecedents and consequents    
have been far-reaching and momentous4   
,greece1 we say1 was saved4 ,but what   
are we to understand by that salvation8 
,to answer we must write and rewrite her
 own history1 the history of what she   
has been and is2 and with every fresh   
writing the battle of ,marathon becomes 
better understood4 ,it becomes a        
different battle with a different truth4

 ,and more than this3 with every        
rewriting we understand better what went
 before and what followed after until   
the battle itself becomes but the       
symptom of deeper things4 ,so1 too1 is  
it with ,europe's present struggle4     
,already its history has begun with many
 volumes4 ,following the example of     
,thucydides in the ,peloponnesian war1  
men are writing it contemporaneously by 
summers and winters4 ,the consequences  
they can only guess at1 but they have   
done much with the antecedents1 so much 
that the last fifty years of ,europe are
 better understood than they were a year
 ago4 ,the record of them has changed   
little2 our understanding of them has   
changed much4 ,it has changed so much   
that they have already become a         
different half-century from what they   
were4 ,the truth about them last year is
 not the truth about them to-day4 ,fifty
 years hence what will the truth about  
them be8  ,i venture another            
illustration1 one from the history of   

philosophy4 ,i choose ,plato4 ,he is    
such a commanding figure that the desire
 to understand him is exceptionally     
keen4 ,the record of his life and of his
 conscious aims and purposes is very    
unsatisfactory4 ,we have no assured     
authorities on these points4 ,that is   
greatly to be regretted1 because a      
correct record is naturally the best of 
aids towards a correct understanding4   
,but the unsatisfactory record is not   
very material to the illustration in    
hand4 ,the record might be correct1 but 
,plato would1 even so1 remain an        
historical figure to be understood4 ,he 
would continue to be the producer of    
what we call ,platonism1 and we should  
have to understand him as that producer4
 ,in that case1 evidently1 the details  
of his life1 his span of years1 his     
immediate aims and activities would     
involve but the beginning of an inquiry 
which would last as long as ,plato is   
studied by those who would understand   
him4 ,who1 then1 would be the real      

,plato8 ,the man about whom ,aristotle  
wrote1 or the man about whom ,professor 
,paul ,shorey writes8 ,undoubtedly the  
real ,plato is the man about whom they  
both write1 but that can mean only that 
he is the man about whom writers can    
write so diversely4 ,he is not the same 
man to ,professor ,shorey that he was to
 ,aristotle2 and it is1 consequently1 a 
nice question which of the two disciples
 has given us the correct estimate of   
their master4 ,who was the real ,plato8 
,and that question could still be asked 
even if the ,platonic tradition were in 
its record1 what it is not1 a continuous
 and uniformly accepted tradition4 ,for 
it is quite evident that the ,platonic  
tradition has grown from age to age as  
students of ,plato have tried to        
understand him and to understand also   
what other students have understood     
about him4 ,the true ,plato is still the
 quest of ,platonists4  ,it seems clear1
 therefore1 that historical truth1 if we
 do not mean by that simply the truth of

 the records with which we deal1 is     
something which can not be ascertained  
once for all4 ,it is a living and       
dynamic truth4 ,it is genuinely         
progressive4 ,we may say that it is like
 something being worked out in the      
course of time1 and something which the 
sequence of events progressively exposes
 or makes clear4 ,if1 therefore1 we     
declare that ,herodotus1 or any other   
historian1 has not told the truth1 and  
do not mean thereby that he has uttered 
falsehoods1 we mean only that the truth 
has grown beyond him and his time4 ,for 
his time it might well be that he told  
the truth sufficiently4 ,ancient ,greece
 may then have been precisely what he   
said it was4 ,to blame him for not      
telling us what ancient ,greece is now1 
is to blame him irrationally4 ,in the   
light of historical truth1 the ,father  
of ,history and all his children have   
been1 not simply historians of times old
 and new1 but also contributors to that 
truth and progressive revealers of it4  

,if they have been faithful to their    
professed purpose of preserving the     
memory of what has happened and in      
making what has happened understood1    
they are not rivals in the possession of
 truth4 ,they have all been associated  
in a common enterprise1 that of         
conserving the history of man in order  
that what that history is and what it   
implies may be progressively better     
known4  ,history is therefore not simply
 the telling of what has happened2 it is
 also and more profoundly the conserving
 of what has happened in order that its 
meaning may be grasped4 ,a book of      
history differs radically from a museum 
of antiquities4 ,in the museum1 the past
 is preserved1 but it is a dead past1   
the flotsam and jetsam of the stream of 
time4 ,it may afford material for       
history1 and then it is quickened into  
life4 ,in a book of history1 the past   
lives4 ,it is in a very genuine sense   
progressive4 ,it grows and expands with 
every fresh study of it1 because every  

fresh study of it puts it into a larger1
 a more comprehensive1 and a new        
perspective1 and makes its meaning ever 
clearer4 ,the outcome of reflections    
like these is that history is constantly
 revealing something like an order or   
purpose in human affairs1 a truth to    
which they are subject and which they   
express4 ,history is1 therefore1 a      
career in time4 ,that is why no         
historical item can be so placed and    
dated that the full truth of it is      
definitely prescribed and limited to    
that place and date4 ,conformably with  
the calendar and with geography we may  
be able to affirm that a given event was
 or is taking place1 but to tell what   
that event is in a manner which ensures 
understanding of it1 is to write the    
history of its career in time as        
comprehensively as it can be written4   
,it is to conserve that event1 not as an
 isolated and detached specimen of      
historical fact1 but as something alive 
which1 as it continues to live1 reveals 

more and more its connections in the    
ceaseless flow of history itself4  ,the 
writer of history may1 consequently1    
attain his purpose within the limits of 
the practical and moral difficulties    
which beset it in either of two ways4   
,he may give us the contemporaneous     
understanding of what has happened in   
terms of the outlook and perspective of 
his own day1 giving us a vision of what 
has gone before as an enlightened mind  
of his time might see it4 ,his history  
might then be that of ancient peoples   
beheld in the new perspective into which
 they have now been placed4 ,could he1  
by miracle1 recall the ancients back to 
life1 they would doubtless fail to      
recognize their own history1 truthful as
 it might be4 ,but comprehension might  
dawn upon them as they read1 and they   
might exclaim3 ,these were the things we
 were really doing1 but we did not know 
it at the time2 we have discovered what 
we were2 our history has revealed to us 
ourselves4 ,or the historian1 by the    

restrained exercise of his imagination1 
may give us what has happened in the    
perspective of the time in which it     
happened1 or in a perspective anterior  
to his own day4 ,he may seek to recover 
the sense1 so to speak1 of past         
contemporaneity1 transplanting us in    
imagination to days no longer ours and  
to ways of feeling and acting no longer 
presently familiar4 ,such a history     
would be less comprehensive and complete
 than the former4 ,it would also be more
 difficult to write1 because historical 
imagination of this kind is rare and    
also because it is not easy to divest   
the past of its present estimate4 ,yet  
the imagination has that power and      
enables us to live again in retrospect  
what others have lived before us4 ,but  
in both cases the history would be an   
active conservation of events in time2  
it would reveal their truth1 their      
meaning1 and their purpose4  ,if now we 
ask what may be this truth and meaning1 
or in what sense may we appropriately   

speak of a purpose in history1 we pass  
from history to philosophy4 ,no longer  
shall we be concerned with the purpose  
of writing history1 but rather with the 
character of the facts which stimulate  
that purpose and assist in its          
attainment4 ,from history as the attempt
 to preserve memory and promote         
understanding we pass to history as a   
characteristic of natural processes4 ,we
 shall try to analyze what the career of
 things in time involves2 but we shall  
keep this career in mind in those       
aspects of it which bear most           
significantly upon the history of man4  
,,footnotes3  #a ,murray1 ,gilbert4     
,ancient ,greek ,literature4 ,d4        
,appleton  ,co41 #aijh4 ,page #acc4  #b 
,austin1 ,mary4 ,the ,man ,jesus4       
,harper1 #aiae4  #c ,flint1 ,robert4    
,history of the ,philosophy of ,history4
 ,charles ,scribner's ,sons1 #ahid4     
,page #e4     ,,ii  ,,the ,,pluralism   
,,of ,,history   ,history leads to      
philosophy when it raises in a          

fundamental way the question of truth4  
,as we have seen1 the term truth1 when  
applied to history1 has a double        
meaning4 ,it may mean that the record of
 what has happened is correct1 and it   
may mean that the understanding of what 
has happened is correct4 ,if the record 
is correct1 its truth seems to be       
something fixed once for all and        
unchanging4 ,the perfect record may     
never be possessed1 but it seems to be  
ideally possible1 because the events    
which the record would keep in memory   
must have happened1 and1 therefore1     
might have been recorded if fortune had 
been favorable4 ,if1 however1 the       
understanding of what has happened is   
correct1 its truth can not be something 
fixed once for all4 ,it is fixed only   
from time to time4 ,one correct         
understanding of what has happened does 
not displace another as truth might     
displace error1 but one supplements and 
enlarges another4 ,histories which have 
gone before are not undone by those that

 follow after4 ,they are incorporated   
into them in a very real way4           
,historical truth1 therefore1 when it   
does not mean simply the correctness of 
the records of history1 is progressive4 
,if the record of what has happened is  
correct1 its truth is perpetual2 if the 
understanding of what has happened is   
correct1 its truth is contemporaneous4  
,now what does this distinction involve8
 ,does it involve merely the recognition
 that facts may remain unchanged while  
our knowledge of them grows8 ,a         
suspicion1 at least1 has been created   
that it involves something more1 namely1
 the recognition that the facts         
themselves1 being something evolved and 
acted1 are also progressive4 ,historical
 facts are careers in time4 ,it is their
 occurrence which is recorded and it is 
their career which is understood4 ,we   
may1 therefore1 undertake an inquiry    
into the nature of facts like these4    
,we may start from the distinction      
between facts and our knowledge of them1

 for it is clear that whatever the      
character of the facts may be1 our      
knowledge of them1 at least1 is         
progressive4 ,the past is dead and gone4
 ,it is something over and done with1 so
 that any change in it is forever       
impossible4 ,we should then1 if we would
 be precise1 say1 not that it is the    
past which grows and enlarges1 but only 
our knowledge of it4 ,we recover and    
conserve it in memory and imagination   
only1 and as we recover it more and more
 completely and relate it more and more 
successfully1 we know and understand it 
better4 ,plato is dead1 and not one     
feature1 circumstance1 or action of his 
life can now be changed4 ,he lives only 
in the memory of man2 and because he    
lives there and stimulates the          
imagination1 there is born a ,plato of  
the imagination4 ,there are thus two    
,platos1 the one real and the other     
historical4 ,the one lived and died long
 ago2 the other still lives in human    
history4 ,the real ,plato has produced  

the historical ,plato and affords a     
check upon historians in their          
representation of him4 ,that            
representation may approach             
progressively nearer to what the real   
,plato was like1 but it can never be the
 man who has passed away4 ,history would
 be thus a branch of human knowledge1   
and grow with the growth of knowledge1  
while its objects remain unchanged4     
,that is why history has constantly to  
be rewritten4 ,furthermore1 in the      
rewriting1 new types of history appear  
with new or altered emphases4 ,the moral
 and religious type is supplemented by  
the political1 and the political by the 
economic and social4 ,for with the      
growth of knowledge the past looks      
different to us and we discover that    
what appeared once adequate has to be   
revised4  ,we may admit1 therefore1 that
 history1 whatever else it may be1 is at
 any rate a kind of human knowledge4    
,like all knowledge it leads us to      
recognize that there is a distinction   

between knowledge itself and its        
objects1 and that the progressive       
character of knowledge indicates an     
approximation to an adequate            
representation of the objects and not   
changes in their own character4 ,this   
distinction in its application to       
history is evidently not a distinction  
between literature and its              
subject-matter4 ,for the past1 if we now
 take the past to be the proper         
subject-matter of written history1      
appears to have a twofold character4 ,it
 is all that has happened precisely as  
it happened1 and it is all that is      
remembered and known1 precisely as it is
 remembered and known4 ,there are1 we   
may say1 a real past and an historical  
past4 ,the latter never is the former1  
but always a progressively more adequate
 representation of the former4  ,now    
this distinction between the real past  
and the historical past may be fruitful4
 ,it may also be treacherous1 for the   
terms in which it is expressed are      

treacherous terms4 ,for it is very easy 
to claim that the real past is after all
 only the historical past1 because the  
past itself being dead and gone is now  
real only as it is preserved in history4
 ,yet properly understood1 the          
distinction is essential to any         
philosophical comprehension of what     
history is4 ,it points out that history 
is not the past1 but is its recovery and
 conservation4 ,events begin and end2   
men are born and die2 events and men    
disappear into the past in a manner and 
an order which are unalterable4 ,but it 
is not their disappearance which        
constitutes their existence in time a   
history4 ,their historical existence is 
a kind of continuing life4 ,it may be   
that it continues only in human         
knowledge1 but1 even so1 it clearly     
illustrates the nature of history as a  
process in time4 ,in other words the    
life of knowledge1 of memory and        
imagination1 is itself a continual      
recording of what has happened1 a       

continual understanding of it1 and a    
continual putting of it in a new and    
enlarged perspective4 ,here1 too1 within
 the narrow limits of man's perceiving  
and comprehending life to which we have 
now restricted history1 events begin and
 end1 men are born and die1 and events  
and men disappear into the past in a    
manner and an order which are           
unalterable4 ,yet even as they disappear
 never to return in the precise and     
identical manner of their first         
existence1 they are conserved1 and      
continue the process of dying as        
occurrences in order to live as a       
history4 ,yesterday as yesterday is gone
 forever4 ,its opportunities are over   
and its incidents dead4 ,as an          
historical yesterday it lives as        
material for to-day's employment4 ,it   
becomes an experience to profit by1 a   
mistake to remedy1 or a success to      
enjoy4 ,history is thus the great       
destroyer and the great preserver4 ,we  
must speak of it in apparent paradoxes4 

,the child becomes a man only by ceasing
 to be a child2 ,plato becomes an       
historical figure only by dying2        
whatever happens is conserved only by   
being first destroyed4  ,but the        
conservation of what happens is         
obviously not a perpetuation4 ,history  
is not the staying of events1 for time  
forbids that they stay4 ,the            
conservation is rather a utilization1 a 
kind of employment or working over of   
material4 ,through it discriminations   
and selections are made and connections 
discovered2 the moving panorama is      
converted into an order of events which 
can be understood1 because consequences 
are seen in the light of their          
antecedents and antecedents are seen in 
the light of the consequences to which  
they lead4 ,there is thus a genuine     
incorporation of what has happened into 
what does happen1 of yesterday into     
to-day1 so that yesterday becomes a     
vital part of to-day and finds its      
enlargement and fulfilment there4 ,we   

can thus write our own biographies4 ,it 
is possible for us to discover what     
mistakes we have made and what ends we  
have attained4 ,our history appears thus
 to be a utilization of material1 a     
realization of ends1 a movement with    
purpose in it4 ,selection is            
characteristic of it very profoundly4   
,other histories1 of other men1 of      
times1 of peoples1 of institutions1 we  
write in the same way because in the    
same way we discover and understand what
 has happened in their case4 ,such a    
destroying1 conserving1 utilizing1      
selective1 and purposeful movement in   
time1 history appears to be when we     
restrict it to the domain of human      
knowledge4  ,it seems1 however1 idle so 
to restrict it4 ,for other things       
besides our knowledge grow--animals and 
plants1 and the stars even4 ,they1 too1 
have a history1 and it may be that their
 history1 being also an affair in time1 
is not unlike in character to our own   
growth in knowledge4 ,or perhaps it were

 even better to say that both they and  
our knowledge illustrate equally what   
history is1 discovering time itself to  
be the great historian4 ,all            
time-processes1 that is1 appear to be1  
when we attentively consider them1      
processes which supplement1 complete1 or
 transform what has gone before4 ,they  
are active conservations and            
utilizations of the past as material4   
,they save what has happened from being 
utterly destroyed1 and1 in saving it1   
complete and develop it4 ,time is1 thus1
 constantly rounding out things1 so to  
speak1 or bringing them to some end or  
fulfilment4 ,that is why we call its    
movement purposeful4  ,yet there have   
been philosophies which have tried to   
make of time a magical device by which  
man might represent to himself in       
succession that which in itself is never
 in succession4 ,they picture his       
journey through life as a journey       
through space where all that he sees1   
one thing after another1 comes          

successively into view like the houses  
on a street along which he may walk4    
,but as the houses do not exist in      
succession1 neither do the facts he     
discovers4 ,they1 too1 come into view as
 he moves along4 ,these philosophies1   
consequently1 would have us think of a  
world in itself1 absolute and complete1 
to which nothing can be added and from  
which nothing can be subtracted4 ,it is 
somehow fixed and finished now2 but our 
human experience1 being incomplete and  
unfinished1 gives to it the appearance  
of a process in time and discloses to us
 what it would be like if all its       
factors and the laws which hold them in 
perfect equilibrium were experienced in 
succession4 ,history would thus be a    
kind of temporal revelation of the      
absolute and we should read it as we    
read a book1 from cover to cover1       
discovering page by page a story which  
is itself finished when we begin4  ,or  
philosophy1 when it has not conceived   
the world to be thus finished and       

complete in itself and only appearing to
 us as a temporal revelation1 has often 
thought of movements in time as only the
 results of preceding movements4        
,whatever happens is thus conceived to  
be the effect of what has already       
happened1 rather than the active        
conservation and working over of what   
has already happened4 ,the past is made 
the cause and producer of the present1  
so that the state of the world at any   
moment is only the result or outcome of 
what it was in the preceding moment4    
,to-day is thought to be the effect of  
yesterday and the cause of to-morrow1   
and is thus but a transition from one   
day to another4 ,time-processes are thus
 robbed of any genuine activity or      
productivity1 and time itself is made to
 be nothing but the sequential order in 
which events occur4 ,purpose1           
conservation1 utilization1 and all that 
active supplementing and working over of
 the past on which we have dwelt1 become
 illusions when applied to the world at 

large4 ,they represent our way of       
conceiving things1 but not nature's way 
of doing things4  ,but these            
philosophies1 as ,professor ,bergson    
especially among recent philosophers has
 pointed out1#d gain whatever force they
 have principally from the fact that    
they think of time in terms of space4   
,they picture it as a line already      
drawn1 when they should picture it as a 
line in the process of being drawn4 ,as 
already drawn1 the line has a beginning1
 an end1 and consequently1 a middle     
point4 ,let us call the middle point the
 present4 ,all the line to the left of  
that point we will call the past and all
 to the right of it the future4 ,we thus
 behold time spatially with all its     
parts coexistent as the points on the   
line4 ,events are then conceived to move
 from the past through the present into 
the future1 just as a pencil point may  
pass from the beginning of the line     
through its middle point to the end4    
,but1 unlike the pencil point1 they can 

not go backward4 ,this fact gives us a  
characteristic by which we may          
distinguish time from space even if we  
have represented time spatially4 ,the   
spatial order is reversible1 the        
temporal is not4 ,time is like a line on
 which you can go forward1 but on which 
you can not go backward4 ,but you can go
 forward4 ,everything goes from the past
 to the future4 ,the present is but the 
transition point of their going4  ,there
 are1 undoubtedly1 advantages in        
thinking of time in this spatial way4   
,thereby we are able to make calendars  
and have a science of mechanics4 ,it    
affords a basis for many successful     
predictions4 ,but1 quite evidently1 time
 is neither such a line nor anything    
like it4 ,nothing whatever goes from the
 past through the present into the      
future4 ,we can not make such a         
statement intelligible4 ,for to go from 
the past to the future is not like going
 from ,new ,york to ,boston4 ,boston is 
already there to go to1 but the future  

is not anywhere to go to4 ,and ,new     
,york is there to leave1 but the past is
 not anywhere to leave4 ,what then is   
this mysterious going if its            
starting-point and its end are both     
non-existent now8 ,clearly it is a going
 only in a metaphorical sense4 ,we call 
it a going because we can so represent  
it by dates and places4 ,we can say that
 here we have been going from ,friday   
through ,saturday to ,sunday4 ,but it is
 quite clear that to-day is neither past
 nor future1 that it is neither         
yesterday nor to-morrow1 and that if we 
go anywhere we must start to-day4 ,when 
,sunday comes1 ,saturday will be        
yesterday4 ,but note now the strange    
situation into which we have            
fallen--only in the future is this day  
ever in the past6 ,and that is true of  
every day in the world's history4 ,it   
becomes a past day only in its own      
future4  ,clearly then time is not like 
a line already drawn4 ,it is more like a
 line in the drawing4 ,you take the     

pencil and the line is left behind it as
 the pencil moves4 ,new points are being
 constantly added to what has gone      
before4 ,the line is being manufactured4
 ,let us call so much of it as has now  
been drawn the past and that which has  
not yet been drawn the future4 ,it is   
clear then that the present is not the  
middle point of the line nor any point  
whatever upon it1 for all of the line   
that has been drawn belongs to the past 
and all the rest of it to the future4   
,its past has already been done2 its    
future is not yet done1 but only        
possible4 ,furthermore1 it is clear that
 no point moves from the past into the  
future4 ,such a movement is             
unintelligible4 ,if there is any        
movement of points at all1 it is a      
movement into the past4 ,that is1 the   
line1 instead of growing into the       
future1 grows into the past--continually
 more and more of it is drawn4 ,for     
remember that the future of the line is 
not the place on the paper or in the air

 which by and by the line may occupy4   
,its future is a genuine future1 a      
possibility as yet nowhere realized4 ,it
 is the part of the line which always   
will be1 but never is2 or1 better1 it is
 that part of the line which will have a
 place and a date if the line continues 
to be drawn4 ,the movement of time is   
thus not a movement from the past to the
 future1 but from the possible to the   
actual1 from what may be to what has    
been4 ,the present is not the vanishing 
point between past and future2 it is    
not1 so to speak1 in the same line or   
dimension with them4 ,it is something   
quite different4 ,it is all that we mean
 by activity or eventuality4 ,it is the 
concrete1 definite1 and effective       
transforming of the possible into the   
actual4 ,it is the drawing of the line1 
but in no sense is it a part or point of
 the line itself4  ,there are1          
doubtless1 difficulties in thinking of  
time in this way1 for it is not entirely
 free from spatial reminiscences4 ,but  

it serves to point out that past1       
present1 and future are not like parts  
of a whole into which an absolute or    
complete time is divided4 ,they are more
 like derivatives of the time process   
itself in the concrete instances of its 
activity4 ,they are what every growing  
or changing thing involves1 whether it  
be the knowledge of man or the crust of 
the earth1 for everything that grows or 
changes manufactures a past by realizing
 a future4 ,it leaves behind it the     
record of what it has done conserved by 
memory or by nature1 and in leaving that
 record behind constantly enlarges or   
transforms it4 ,the growth moves in a   
manner and an order which when once     
performed are unalterable1 but there is 
growth none the less4 ,since time is    
like this1 it seems evidently           
unintelligible to restrict it and       
history to human experience and make the
 world in itself absolute4 ,it would be 
better to say that it is history in the 
large sense applicable to the world     

itself that makes human experience      
possible4 ,yet it would be more         
advisable not to make such a distinction
 at all1 but to recognize that human    
experience is one kind of history1      
namely1 history conscious of itself1 the
 time process deliberately at work4     
,now it is evident that history in this 
latter sense is purposive and selective4
 ,that which has happened is not        
remembered as a whole or understood as a
 whole4 ,not only are details forgotten 
or neglected1 but things and events     
otherwise important are omitted for the 
sake of securing emphasis and           
distinction among the things remembered4
 ,herodotus spoke of wonderful deeds and
 others following this example have     
regarded history as concerned only with 
great men and great events4 ,it is true 
that the little men and the little      
events tend to disappear1 but we should 
remember that it is the selective       
character of history which makes them   
little4 ,speaking absolutely1 we may say

 that no item1 however apparently       
insignificant1 is really insignificant  
in the historical development of any    
people or any institution1 for in some  
measure every item is material to that  
development4 ,but all are not equally   
material4 ,the absence of any one of    
them might undoubtedly have changed the 
whole history1 but given the presence of
 them all1 some are of greater          
significance than others4  ,the history 
of the ,english people may be regarded  
as a development of personal liberty4   
,it is doubtless more than that1 but it 
is that4 ,as such a development1 it is  
evident that there are many things which
 an historian of personal liberty will  
disregard in order that the particular  
movement he is studying may be          
emphasized and distinguished4 ,it will  
be that particular movement which will  
determine for him what is great and what
 little4 ,so it comes about that        
histories are diversified even when they
 are histories of the same thing4 ,there

 are many histories of ,england which   
differ from one another not only in     
accuracy1 philosophical grasp1 and      
brilliancy1 but also in the purpose they
 discover ,england to be fulfilling4 ,by
 purpose here is not meant a predestined
 end which ,england is bound to reach1  
but the fact that her history can be    
construed as a development of a specific
 kind4 ,in other words her past can be  
understood only when it is seen to be   
relevant to some particular career which
 has its termination in her existing    
institutions4 ,her past has contributed 
through time to definite results which  
are now apparent4 ,the things that have 
happened have not all contributed to    
these results in the same measure4 ,some
 have contributed more1 some less4 ,what
 is true in this illustration appears to
 be true generally4 ,every history is a 
particular career in the development of 
which some facts1 persons1 and events   
have been more significant than others1 
so that the termination of the career at

 any time is like an end that has been  
reached or a consequence to which its   
antecedents are peculiarly appropriate4 
,that is the sense in which history is  
purposeful and selective4  ,the         
selection is twofold4 ,first1 there is  
selection of the type of career1 and    
secondly1 there is selection of the     
items especially relevant to its        
progress4 ,we may have the military1 the
 political1 the social1 the industrial1 
the economic1 or the religious history  
of ,england1 for instance1 and although 
these histories will overlap and involve
 one another1 each of them will exhibit 
a career which is peculiar and distinct 
from its fellows4 ,when reading the     
industrial history we shall not be      
reading the religious history4 ,in the  
one we shall find circumstances and     
events recorded which we do not find in 
the other1 because all circumstances and
 events do not have significance equally
 for the development of industry and    
religion4 ,historical selection is1     

therefore1 twofold1--the selection of a 
career to be depicted and of events and 
circumstances peculiarly relevant to    
that career4  ,is this selection1 we may
 ask1 only a device on the historian's  
part to facilitate our comprehension1 or
 is it a genuine characteristic of the  
time process itself8 ,does the historian
 read purpose into history or does he   
find it there8 ,it may assist in        
answering such questions to observe that
 if selection is a device of the        
historian1 it is one to which he is     
compelled4 ,without it history is       
unintelligible4 ,unless we understand   
events and circumstances as contributing
 to a definite result and contributing  
in different measures1 we do not        
understand them at all4 ,the ,magna     
,charta1 the ,british ,constitution1 the
 ,tower of ,london1 the ,river ,thames1 
the mines of ,wales1 the plays of       
,shakespeare--all these things and      
things like them are for us quite       
unintelligible if they illuminate no    

career or illustrate no specific        
movements to which they have            
particularly contributed4 ,selection is1
 consequently1 not a device which the   
historian has invented2 it is imposed   
upon him by his own purpose to preserve 
the memory and promote the understanding
 of what has happened4 ,the procedure of
 the historian is not arbitrary1 but    
necessary4 ,it is imposed upon him by   
the character of the facts with which he
 deals4 ,these facts are movements from 
the possible to the actual and are      
helped and hindered by other such       
movements4 ,an historical fact is not   
only spread out in space and exists     
equally with all its contemporaries at  
an assignable place in reference to     
them1 it also persists in time1 comes   
before and after other persisting facts1
 and persists along with others in a    
continuance equal to1 or more or less   
than1 theirs4 ,in a figure we may say1  
facts march on in time1 but not all at  
the same speed or with the same         

endurance2 they help or impede one      
another's movement2 they do not all     
reach the goal2 some of them turn out to
 be leaders1 others followers2 their    
careers overlap and interfere2 so that  
the result is a failure for some and a  
success for others4 ,the march is their 
history4  ,this is figure1 but it looks 
like the fact4 ,simple illustrations may
 enforce it4 ,the seeds which we buy and
 sow in the spring are not simply so    
many ounces of chemical substances4     
,they are also so many possible         
histories or careers in time1 so many   
days of growth1 so much promise of fruit
 or flower4 ,each seed has its own      
peculiar history with its own peculiar  
career4 ,the seeds are planted4 ,then in
 the course of time1 soil and moisture  
and atmosphere and food operate in      
unequal ways in the development of each 
career4 ,each is furthered or hindered  
as events fall out4 ,some careers are   
cut short1 others prosper4 ,everywhere  
there is selection4 ,everywhere there is

 adaptation of means to ends4 ,the      
history of the garden can be written    
because there is a history there to     
write4  ,such an illustration can be    
generalized4 ,our world is indubitably a
 world in time4 ,that means much more   
than the fact that its events can be    
placed in accordance with a map or dated
 in accordance with a calendar4 ,it     
means that they are events in genuine   
careers1 each with its own particular   
character and its own possibility of a  
future1 like the seeds in the garden4   
,things with histories have not only    
structures in space and are1            
accordingly1 related geometrically to   
one another2 they have not only chemical
 structures and are thus analyzable into
 component parts2 they have also        
structures in time4 ,they are not now   
what they will be1 but what they will be
 is always continuous with what they    
are1 so that we must think of them      
stretched out1 so to speak1 in time as  
well as in space1 or as being so many   

moments as well as so much volume4 ,what
 they become1 however1 depends not only 
on their own time structures1 but also  
on their interplay with one another4    
,they are helped and hindered in their  
development4 ,the results reached at any
 time are such as complete those which  
have gone before1 for each career is the
 producer1 but not the product of its   
past4  ,it seems clear1 therefore1 that 
there is purpose in history4 ,but       
purpose is a troublesome word4 ,it      
connotes design1 intention1 foresight1  
as well as the converging of means upon 
a specific end4 ,only in the latter     
sense is it here used1 but with this    
addition3 the end is to be conceived not
 in terms of any goal ultimately        
reached1 but in terms of the career of  
which it is the termination2 and in this
 career1 the present is continually     
adding to and completing the past4 ,the 
growing seeds end each in its own       
specific flower or fruit4 ,they are each
 of its own kind and named accordingly4 

,it is only because each of them has its
 specific structure in time that their  
growth presents that convergence of     
means toward an end by which we         
distinguish them and for which we value 
them4 ,in purpose construed in this way 
there is evidently no need of design or 
intention or foresight4 ,in making a    
garden there is such need4 ,the purposes
 of nature may be deliberately employed 
to attain the purposes of men4 ,but     
apart from beings who foresee and plan  
there appears to be no evidence of      
intention in the world4 ,when we speak  
of nature's designs1 we speak           
figuratively1 and impute to her rational
 and deliberate powers4 ,but we can not 
clearly affirm that the rain falls in   
order that the garden may be watered1 or
 that the eye was framed in order that  
we might see4 ,the evidence for design  
of that character has been proved       
inadequate again and again with every   
careful examination of it4 ,to say1     
therefore1 that nature is full of       

purpose does not mean that nature has   
been framed in accordance with some     
preconceived plan1 but rather that      
nature is discovered to be an historical
 process1 the conversion of the possible
 into the actual in such a way that     
there is conserved a progressive record 
of that conversion4  ,from the selective
 character of history it follows that a 
single complete history of anything is  
impossible--certainly a single complete 
history of the world at large4 ,history 
is pluralistic4 ,this conclusion might  
be reached as others have already been  
reached by pointing out how it follows  
from the purpose of writing history1 and
 how this purpose indicates the         
character of movements in time4 ,indeed 
this has already been done in pointing  
out that the history of ,england is its 
many histories and the history of a     
garden the history of its many seeds4   
,always there is a particular career and
 particular incidents appropriate to it4
 ,any career may be as comprehensive as 

desired1 but the more inclusive it is   
the more restricted it becomes4 ,the    
history of ,milton contains details     
which the history of ,english literature
 will omit2 and the history of the      
cosmos shrinks to nothing when we try to
 write it4 ,the only universal history  
is the exposition of what history itself
 is1 the time process stripped of all   
its variety and specific interests4     
,consequently1 a single purpose is not  
discoverable2 there are many purposes4  
,when we try to reduce them all to some 
show of singleness we again do no more  
than try to tell what a temporal order  
is like4 ,it is metaphysics and not     
history we are writing4  ,to affirm that
 history is pluralistic is1 however1    
only to reaffirm the selective character
 of history generally4 ,a history of the
 world in order to be single1 definite1 
and coherent1 must exhibit a single1    
definite1 and coherent purpose or time  
process4 ,that means1 of course1 that it
 is distinguished from other purposes   

equally single1 definite1 and coherent4 
,there are thus many histories of the   
world distinguished from one another by 
the incidence of choice or emphasis4    
,the flower in the crannied wall with   
its history fully recorded and          
understood would1 consequently1         
illustrate the universe4 ,all that has  
ever happened might be interpreted in   
illumination of its career4 ,yet it     
would be absurd to maintain that either 
nature or ,tennyson intended that the   
little flower should be exclusively     
illustrative4 ,the wall would do as     
well1 or its crannies1 or the poet4     
,nature exhibits no preference either in
 the choice of a history or in the      
extent of its comprehensiveness4 ,man   
may be thought to be1 and man is1 an    
incident in the universe1 and the       
universe may be thought to be1 and the  
universe is1 the theater of man's       
career4  ,the same principle may be     
illustrated from human history          
exclusively4 ,we who are of ,european   

ancestry and largely ,anglo-,saxon by   
inheritance are pleased to write history
 as the development of our own          
civilization with its institutions1     
customs1 and laws2 and we regard ,china 
and ,japan1 for example1 as incidental  
and contributory to our own continuation
 in time4 ,because our heritage is      
,christian we date all events from the  
birth of ,christ4 ,yet we gain some     
wisdom by pausing to reflect how our    
procedure might impress an enlightened  
historian from ,china or ,japan4 ,would 
he begin with the cradle of ,european   
civilization1 pass through ,greece and  
,rome1 and then from ,europe to         
,america1 remarking that in #aheb ,a4,d4
 ,commodore ,perry opened ,japan to the 
world8 ,surely he would begin otherwise1
 and not unlike ourselves would construe
 the history of the world in a manner   
relevant to the progress of his own     
civilization4 ,europe and ,america and  
,christianity would contribute to that  
development1 but would not constitute   

its essential or distinctively          
significant factors4 ,the historian is  
himself an historical fact indicating a 
selection1 a distinction1 and an        
emphasis in the course of time4 ,his    
history is naturally colored by that    
fact4 ,other histories he can write only
 with an effort at detachment from his  
own career4 ,he must forget himself if  
he would understand others2 but he must 
understand himself first1 if he is      
successfully to forget what he is4 ,he  
must know what history is1 recognize its
 pluralistic character1 and try to do it
 justice4  ,to do justice to the        
pluralistic character of history is not1
 however1 simply to write other         
histories than one's own with           
commendable impartiality4 ,it is also to
 be keenly alive to the philosophical   
implications of this pluralism4 ,the    
most significant of them is doubtless   
this3 since philosophically considered  
history is a thing not written1 but     
evolved and acted1 to no one history can

 absolute superiority or preference be  
assigned4 ,absolutely considered the    
history of man can not claim preminence 
over the history of the stars4 ,he is no
 more the darling of the universe than  
is the remotest nebula4 ,it is just as  
intelligible and just as true to say    
that man exists as an illustration of   
stellar evolution as to say that the sun
 exists to divide light from darkness   
for the good of man4 ,absolutely        
considered the cosmos is impartial to   
its many histories4 ,but even that is   
not well said1 for it implies that the  
cosmos might be partial if it chose4 ,we
 should rather say that there is no     
considering of history absolutely at    
all4 ,for history is just the denial of 
absolute considerations4 ,it is the     
affirmation of relative considerations1 
of considerations which are relative to 
a selected career4 ,there is no other   
kind of history possible4  ,the         
recognition of this fact does not1      
however1 imply the futility of all      

history4 ,it does not imply that any    
history is good enough for men since all
 histories are good enough for the      
cosmos4 ,so to conclude is to disregard 
completely the implications of          
pluralism4 ,if no history can claim     
absolute distinction1 all histories are 
distinguished1 nevertheless1 from one   
another4 ,if no history can claim       
preminence over any other1 it is true   
also that none can be robbed by any     
other of its own distinction and        
character4 ,the fact that the morning   
stars do not sing together is not the   
universe's estimate of the value of     
poetry4 ,the fact that the rain falls   
equally upon the just and the unjust is 
evidence neither of the impartial       
dispensations of deity nor of the equal 
issue of vice and virtue4 ,each event in
 its own history and illustrative of its
 own career is the law4  ,yet men have  
been prone to write their own history as
 if it were something else than a human 
enterprise1 as if it were something else

 than the history of humanity4 ,those   
who seek to read their destiny from the 
constellations ascendant at their birth 
are generally called superstitious2 but 
those who seek to read it from the      
constitution of matter1 or from the     
mechanism of the physical world1 or from
 the composition of chemical substances1
 although no less superstitious1 are too
 frequently called scientists4 ,but dust
 thou art and unto dust thou shalt      
return is an essential truth only about 
the history of dust2 it is only an      
incidental truth about the history of   
man4 ,one learns nothing peculiarly     
characteristic of humanity from it4 ,it 
affords no measure of the appreciation  
of poetry1 of the constitution of a     
state1 or of the passion for happiness4 
,human history is human history only4   
,the hopes and fears1 the aspirations1  
the wisdom and the folly of man are to  
be understood only in the light of his  
career4 ,they are to be understood in   
terms of that into which they may and do

 eventuate for him1 by the way in which 
they are incorporated into his past to  
make it more fully remembered and more  
adequately understood1 and by the way   
they are used for his future to make his
 past more satisfactory to remember and 
more satisfying to understand4  ,yet    
some there are who stop worshipping the 
stars when they discover that the stars 
neither ask for worship nor respond to  
it1 and who dismiss reverence and piety 
when they discover that a god did not   
create the world4 ,perhaps they should  
not worship the stars nor believe in    
,god1 but neither astronomy nor geology 
affords good reasons for putting an end 
to human reverence and faith4 ,if the   
stars have not begged man to worship    
them1 he has begged them to be an       
inspiration to a steadfast purpose4 ,it 
is in his history1 not in theirs1 that  
they have been divine4 ,how stupid of   
him therefore1 and how traitorous to his
 own history1 if he shames his capacity 
for reverence1 when once he has found   

that the stars have a different history 
from his own4  ,the inevitable failure  
of astronomy and geology to afford man  
gods suitable for his worship is not a  
recommendation that he should vigorously
 embrace the superstitions of his       
ancestors4 ,to counsel that would be an 
infamy equal to that which has just been
 condemned4 ,the counsel is rather that 
what is not human should not be taken as
 the standard and measure of what is    
human4 ,human history can not be wholly 
resolved into physical processes nor the
 enterprises of men be construed solely 
as the by-product of material forces4   
,such resolution of it appears to be    
unwarranted in view of the conclusions  
to which a consideration of what history
 is1 leads4 ,the obverse error has long 
since been sufficiently condemned4 ,we  
have been warned often enough that water
 does not seek its own level or nature  
abhor a vacuum4 ,even literary criticism
 warns us against the pathetic fallacy4 
,but in refusing to anthropomorphize    

matter1 we ought not to be led to       
materialize man4 ,we should rather be   
led to recognize that the reasons which 
condemn anthropomorphic science are     
precisely the reasons which commend     
humanistic philosophy4 ,it is just      
because history is pluralistic that it  
is unpardonable to confound different   
histories with one another4 ,so we may  
conclude that the pluralism of history  
which makes all histories1 when         
absolutely considered1 of equal rank and
 of indifferent importance1 does not rob
 them1 therefore1 of their specific     
characters1 nor make human history a    
presumptuous enterprise for them that   
write it not in the language of nature1 
but in the language of man4  ,this      
conclusion needs greater refinement of  
statement if it is to be freed from     
ambiguity4 ,for the distinction between 
nature and man is an artifice4 ,it is   
not a distinction which philosophy can  
ultimately justify4 ,undoubtedly man is 
a part or instance of nature1 governed  

by nature's laws and intimately involved
 in her processes4 ,but he is so        
governed and involved not as matter     
without imagination1 but as a being     
whose distinction is the historical     
exercise of his intelligence4 ,nature is
 not what she would be without him and  
that is why his history can never be    
remembered or understood if he is       
forgotten4 ,he can not be taken out of  
nature and nature be then called upon to
 explain him4 ,as a part or instance of 
nature man is to be remembered and      
understood1 but as the part or instance 
which he himself is1 and not another4   
,his history1 consequently1 can never be
 adequately written solely in terms of  
physics or chemistry1 or even of        
biology2 it must be written also in     
terms of aspiration4  ,all time         
processes are histories1 but man only is
 the writer of them1 so that historical 
comprehension becomes the significant   
trait of human history4 ,to live in the 
light of a past remembered and          

understood is to live1 not the life of  
instinct and emotion1 but the life of   
intelligence4 ,it is to see how means   
converge upon ends1 and so to discover  
means for the attainment of ends        
desired4 ,human history becomes thus the
 record of human progress4 ,from it we  
may learn how that progress is to be    
defined and so discover the purpose of  
man in history4 ,for him the study of   
his own history is his congenial task to
 which all his knowledge of other       
histories is contributory2 and for him  
the conscious1 reflective1 and          
intelligent living of his own history is
 his congenial purpose4  ,,footnote3  #d
 ,see especially his ,donnes immdiates  
de la conscience1 #ahhh4 7,eng4 tr4     
,time and ,free ,will1 by ,f4 ,l4       
,pogson4 ,the ,macmillan ,company1      
#aiab47 ,l'volution cratrice1 #aijh4    
7,eng4 tr4 ,creative ,evolution1 by     
,arthur ,mitchell4 ,henry ,holt and     
,company1 #aiac47     ,,iii  ,,the      
,,continuity ,,of ,,history   ,although 

history is pluralistic1 it is not1      
therefore1 discontinuous4 ,we can not   
divide it in two in such a manner that  
its parts will be wholly unconnected4   
,any division we may make1 although we  
make it as plain as the fence which     
divides a field1 gives us a boundary    
which1 like the fence1 belongs equally  
to the parts on either side of it4      
,novelty and distinction may abound in  
the world1 but nothing is so novel or   
distinct that it is wholly cut off from 
antecedents and consequences of some    
sort4 ,it is this fact which we denote  
when we speak of the continuity of      
history4 ,we indicate that every action 
of time1 every conversion of the        
possible into the actual1 is intimately 
woven into the order of events and finds
 there a definite place and definite    
connections4 ,consequently it becomes   
easy to represent the movement of       
history as a kind of progress from      
earlier to later things1 from ancestors 
to descendants1 or from the original or 

primitive to the derived4 ,if1 however1 
progress is to mean anything more than  
just this representation of historical  
continuity1 if1 for example1 it is to   
mean1 besides a progression from the    
earlier to the later1 some improvement  
also1 clearly a criterion is necessary1 
by which progress may be judged and     
estimated4 ,an inquiry is thus suggested
 into the continuity of history to see  
in what sense progress may be affirmed  
of it and by what criteria that         
affirmation may be warranted4 ,as a     
preliminary to this inquiry it is       
advisable to envisage the continuity    
itself and determine how far it assists 
in understanding what has happened4     
,from among the many illustrations which
 might be cited to bring the fact of    
historical continuity visibly before us1
 these from ,professor ,tylor's         
,primitive ,culture are particularly    
suggestive because they deal with       
familiar things3 ,progress1 degradation1
 survival1 modification1 are all modes  

of the connection that binds together   
the complex network of civilization4 ,it
 needs but a glance into the trivial    
details of our own daily life to set us 
thinking how far we are really its      
originators1 and how far but the        
transmitters and modifiers of the       
results of long past ages4 ,looking     
round the rooms we live in1 we may try  
here how far he who knows only his own  
time can be capable of rightly          
comprehending even that4 ,here is the   
honeysuckle of ,assyria1 there the      
fleur-de-lis of ,anjou1 a cornice with a
 ,greek border runs round the ceiling1  
the style of ,louis ,,xiv and its parent
 the ,renaissance share the             
looking-glass between them4             
,transformed1 shifted1 or mutilated1    
such elements of art still carry their  
history plainly stamped upon them2 and  
if the history yet farther behind is    
less easy to read1 we are not to say    
that because we can not clearly discern 
it there is therefore no history there4 

,it is thus even with the fashion of the
 clothes men wear4 ,the ridiculous      
little tails of the ,german postilion's 
coat show of themselves how they came to
 dwindle to such absurd rudiments2 but  
the ,english clergyman's bands no longer
 so convey their history to the eye1 and
 look unaccountable enough till one has 
seen the intermediate stages through    
which they came down from the more      
serviceable wide collars1 such as       
,milton wears in his portrait1 and which
 gave their name to the 'band-box' they 
used to be kept in4 ,in fact1 the books 
of costume1 showing how one garment grew
 or shrank by gradual stages and passed 
into another1 illustrate with much force
 and clearness the nature of the change 
and growth1 revival and decay1 which go 
on from year to year in more important  
matters of life4 ,in books1 again1 we   
see each writer not for and by himself1 
but occupying his proper place in       
history2 we look through each           
philosopher1 mathematician1 chemist1    

poet1 into the background of his        
education1--through ,leibnitz into      
,descartes1 through ,dalton into        
,priestly1 through ,milton into ,homer4 
',man1' said ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1    
'ever connects on from what lies at hand
 7der ,mensch knpft immer an            
,vorhandenes an74' ,the notion of the   
continuity of civilization contained in 
this maxim is no barren philosophic     
principle1 but is at once made practical
 by the consideration that they who wish
 to understand their own lives ought to 
know the stages through which their     
opinions and habits have become what    
they are4 ,auguste ,comte scarcely      
overstated the necessity of this study  
of development1 when he declared at the 
beginning of his ',positive ,philosophy'
 that 'no conception can be understood  
except through its history1' and his    
phrase will bear extension to culture at
 large4 ,to expect to look modern life  
in the face and comprehend it by mere   
inspection1 is a philosophy whose       

weakness can easily be tested4 ,imagine 
any one explaining the trivial saying1  
'a little bird told me1' without knowing
 of the old belief in the language of   
birds and beasts1 to which ,dr4 ,dasent 
in the introduction to the ,norse       
,tales1 so reasonably traces its origin4
 ,to ingenious attempts at explaining by
 the light of reason things which want  
the light of history to show their      
meaning1 much of the learned nonsense of
 the world has indeed been due4#e  ,the 
illustrations are drawn from the domain 
of human interests4 ,they could be      
paralleled by others drawn from natural 
history4 ,the honeysuckle may carry us  
elsewhere than to ,assyria1 revealing   
unsuspected kinships in the world of    
plants4 ,biology has made the conception
 of the continuity of living forms a    
familiar commonplace1 and geology can   
find in the earth's crust the story of  
countless years4 ,so familiar has the   
idea of continuity become that terms    
like evolution and development have     

ceased to be technical and have become  
terms of common speech4 ,we speak       
readily of the evolution of man1 of     
government1 of the steam-engine1 of the 
automobile1 and of the atom4 ,the idea  
has so possessed all departments of     
inquiry that a large part of the        
literature of every subject is occupied 
with setting forth connections which    
have gone before4 ,not only do we go    
through ,milton into ,homer1 but through
 yesterday into an ever receding past   
which grows more alluring the more it   
recedes4 ,the quest for origins has been
 of absorbing interest4 ,it would seem  
that we can never understand anything at
 all until we have discovered its origin
 in something which preceded it4  ,in   
the first lecture ,i pointed out how    
impossible it appears ever to end any   
history finally4 ,we now seem to face a 
corresponding impossibility1 namely1 the
 impossibility of ever really beginning 
it successfully4 ,it would appear that  
we stop only because we do not care to  

go farther1 or lack the means to do so1 
and not because we can say that we have 
found a first beginning with no         
antecedents before it4 ,we may begin the
 history of philosophy with the ,greeks1
 with ,thales of ,miletus1 but the      
question has been repeatedly asked1 ,was
 not ,thales a ,semite8 ,did he not     
derive his ideas from ,egypt and        
,babylonia8 ,and whence came philosophy 
itself8 ,was it not the offspring of    
religion which preceded it1 so that1    
before we begin its history1 we must    
pass1 as ,professor ,cornford           
suggests1#f from religion to philosophy8
 ,then what of religion itself8 ,what   
were its antecedents and whence was its 
descent8 ,so the questions multiply     
interminably until we must admit that in
 the beginning is a time arbitrarily    
fixed or only relatively determined4    
,history1 being continuous1 has neither 
beginning nor end4  ,this fact1 however1
 ought not to bewilder any one who      
contemplates it steadily4 ,it is an     

obvious consequence of the nature of    
time1 for every present has a past and a
 future1 and a first or last present is1
 consequently1 quite unintelligible4    
,the historian1 least of all1 should be 
bewildered4 ,if he has recognized that  
history is pluralistic1 he will         
recognize also that beginnings and ends 
are1 in any intelligible sense1 the     
termini of distinctions4 ,there is not  
an absolute first or last in history    
taken as a whole1 for1 as we have seen1 
the attempt to take history as a whole1 
if it has any meaning at all1 means the 
attempt to define history4 ,it gives us 
the metaphysics of time1 but not an     
absolute1 complete1 and finished whole1 
whose boundaries1 although never        
empirically reached1 are ideally        
conceivable4 ,our thinking moves in a   
direction quite different4 ,it leads us 
to observe that distinctions begin and  
end1 and begin and end as absolutely as 
one chooses1 but do not1 thereby1 cut   
themselves off from all connections4    

,these lectures began to be delivered   
last ,friday1 but not the day before2   
the first word of them was written at a 
perfectly definite time and place which 
can never be changed2 they will end with
 a definiteness equally precise2 but    
these beginnings and endings destroy no 
continuity4 ,every history is equally   
continuous1 undisturbed by its          
beginnings and endings4 ,each action of 
time is preceded and followed by        
everything which precedes and follows   
it1 and yet each action of time begins  
and ends with its own peculiar and      
individual precision4 ,in affirming this
 we are affirming1 by means of a        
particular instance1 the metaphysical   
nature of continuity itself4 ,for by    
continuity we mean the possibility of   
precise and definite distinctions4 ,the 
continuity of a line may be divided at  
its middle point4 ,it is then precisely 
divided1 but is not1 thereby1 broken    
into two separate lines4#g ,after this  
manner the continuity of history is to  

be conceived4 ,and in the light of this 
conception we should understand what the
 continuity of history can explain4  ,it
 is tempting to say that it can explain 
nothing at all1 but it is evident that  
there is an uncertainty of meaning in   
such a claim4 ,for things may be        
explained or made clear in a variety of 
ways with little resemblance to one     
another4 ,what we mean by a circle may  
be made clear by defining a circle1 or  
by an algebraical formula1 or by drawing
 a circle4 ,all these ways will be      
fruitful1 but they will be fruitful     
relatively to the problem which provokes
 them4 ,to explain anything at all1 it  
is necessary to keep in mind the        
questions to which the proposed         
explanation is relevant4 ,if ,i am asked
 to draw a circle it will not do simply 
to define it2 and if ,i am asked to tell
 what it is algebraically1 it will not  
do simply to draw it4 ,so it is apparent
 that1 when we wish to know what the    
continuity of history can explain1 or   

when we affirm that it explains nothing1
 we should have in mind1 first of all1  
the questions to which the continuity of
 history would be an appropriate answer4
 ,there appears to be only one such     
question1 and that is1 ,what have been  
the antecedents of any given fact8      
,these antecedents the continuity of    
history explains in that it makes them  
clear4 ,it may also make clear what the 
consequences of a given fact have been  
or may be4 ,but this explanatory value  
is a derivative of the preceding or an  
enlargement of it1 through our habit of 
looking at consequences as derived from 
their antecedents1 and of basing our    
expectations of what may happen upon our
 observations of what has happened4     
,further explanatory value in the       
continuity of history it seems difficult
 to find1 even if we make the statement 
of it less general and more precise4    
,but in saying this1 it is not implied  
that this value is mean or              
inconsiderable4 ,the continuity of      

history is both entertaining and        
instructive4 ,it is entertaining because
 it reveals unsuspected kinships and    
alluring connections4 ,it is instructive
 because it furnishes a foundation for  
inference and practice4 ,to man it gives
 the long experience of his race to     
enjoy and profit by4 ,it guides his     
expectations and enhances the control of
 his own affairs4 ,it is the same with  
the continuities of nature generally4   
,they beget the vision of an ordered    
world and help to frame rules which are 
applicable in the control of nature4    
,accordingly it is not disparagement    
which is here intended1 but a limitation
 which should be appreciated4  ,when we 
say to our children1 ,a little bird told
 me1 both we and our children may be    
quite ignorant of ,dr4 ,dasent's        
introduction to the ,norse ,tales4 ,we  
may be quite unconscious that we are    
using an expression traceable to a time 
when people believed in such language of
 birds and beasts as gifted persons     

could understand4 ,it may be that we    
repeat the words simply because we      
remember that our parents once          
successfully deceived us in our         
childhood by using them1 and that our   
parents did but follow the example of   
theirs4 ,but evidently we should not    
explain the trivial saying simply by    
following it back endlessly into        
antiquity unless we concluded that it   
had always been characteristic of       
parents to deceive children in this     
manner4 ,in that case we should have    
discovered a metaphysical truth about   
the nature of parents1 and no further   
explanation would be required4  ,if1    
however1 we are not willing to admit    
that parents are such by nature that    
they will cite birds as sources of      
information when it is expedient to keep
 the real source hidden1 but insist that
 this habit be otherwise explained1 we  
ask for an explanation which the        
continuity of history alone can not     
afford4 ,an explanation in              

contemporaneous terms is required4 ,we  
do not use the phrase because our       
ancestors used it1 although we may have 
derived it from them2 we use it because 
of its known efficacy4 ,we may1 however1
 discover that our ancestors--or ,norse 
parents--used it for a different reason1
 namely1 because they believed in a     
language of beasts and birds4 ,but if we
 ask why they so believed1 it will not  
profit us to pursue antiquity again1    
unless by so doing we come upon the     
contemporaneous1 experimental origin of 
that belief4 ,for it is evident that if 
the belief had an origin1 there was a   
time anterior when it did not exist1 and
 its origin can not1 therefore1 be      
explained solely in terms of that       
anterior time4 ,its origin points1 not  
to continuity1 but to action4 ,it       
indicates not that the originators of   
the belief had ancestors1 but that1 in  
view of their contemporaneous           
circumstances1 they acted in a certain  
way4 ,to explain the origin of anything1

 therefore1 we can not trust to the     
continuity of history alone4 ,that      
continuity may carry us back to the     
beginnings of beliefs and institutions  
which have persisted and been           
transmitted from age to age2 it may     
reveal to us experimental factors which 
have shaped beliefs and institutions1   
but which have long since been          
forgotten2 but it can never1 of itself1 
reveal the experimental origin of any   
belief or institution whatever4 ,that   
is1 in principle1 the limitation by     
which the explanatory value of          
historical continuity is restricted4 ,to
 understand origins we must appeal to   
the contemporaneous experience of their 
own age1 or to experimental science4#h  
,simple as this consideration is1 it has
 been too much neglected by historians  
and philosophers in recent times on     
account of the profound influence of the
 doctrine of evolution4 ,the great      
service1 which that doctrine has        
rendered1 has been to fix our attention 

on the evident fact of continuity from  
which our minds had been distracted by a
 too exclusive preoccupation with       
theories of the atomic kind4 ,through   
several centuries1 philosophy had       
acquired the habit of thinking generally
 in terms of elements and their         
compounds1 whenever it addressed itself 
to a consideration of nature1 or of the 
mind1 or of the relation between the    
two4 ,its principal problem was to      
discover means of connection and        
unification which might make clear how  
that which is essentially discrete and  
discontinuous might1 none the less1 be  
combined into a unity of some sort4 ,as 
it failed1 it usually took refuge in the
 opposite idea1 and attempted to        
conceive an original unity out of which 
diversity was generated by some         
impulsion in this initial and primal    
being4 ,philosophy thus vibrated between
 the contrasted poles of the same       
fundamental endeavor1 between the       
attempt to combine elements into a      

unity1 and the attempt to resolve unity 
into elements4 ,the latter attempt1     
especially in men like ,hegel and       
,spencer1 had the advantage of involving
 the idea of continuity1 and became the 
controlling philosophical enterprise of 
the latter part of the last century4    
,but it was principally the doctrine of 
evolution or development as set forth by
 biologists1 anthropologists1 and       
historians that made the fact of        
continuity convincingly apparent and    
freed philosophy from the necessity of  
attempting to explain it4 ,continuity   
became a fact to be appreciated and     
understood1 and ceased to be a riddle to
 be solved4 ,the doctrine of evolution  
thus wrought a real emancipation of the 
mind4  ,but this freedom has been often 
abused4 ,relieved of the necessity of   
explaining continuity1 philosophers1    
biologists1 historians1 and even        
students of language1 literature1 and   
the arts1 have been too frequently      
content to let the fact of continuity do

 all the explaining that needs to be    
done4 ,to discover the historical       
origins and trace the descent of ideas1 
institutions1 customs1 and forms of     
life1 have been for many the exclusive  
and sufficient occupation1 to the       
neglect of experimental science and with
 the consequent failure to make us very 
much wiser in our attempts to control   
the intricate factors of human living4  
,if we would appreciate our own morals  
and religion we are often advised to    
consider primitive man and his          
institutions4 ,if we would evaluate     
marriage or property1 we are often      
directed to study our remote ancestors4 
,and this practical advice has sometimes
 taken the form of metaphysics4 ,if we  
wish to know the nature of things or to 
appraise their worth1 we are told to    
contemplate some primitive cosmic stuff 
from which everything has been derived4 
,thus man and all the varied panorama of
 the world vanish backward into nebul1  
and life disappears into the impulse to 

live4 ,not trailing clouds of glory do  
we come1 but trailing the primitive and 
the obsolete4  ,such considerations as  
these have diverse effects according to 
our temperaments4 ,they quite uniformly 
produce1 however1 disillusionment and   
sophistication4 ,that is the usual      
result of inquisitions into one's       
ancestry4 ,but disillusionment and      
sophistication may produce either regret
 or rebellion4 ,this exaltation of the  
past1 as the ancestral home of all that 
we are1 may make us regret our loss of  
illusions and our disconcerting         
enlightenment4 ,it had been better for  
us to have lived then when illusions    
were cherished and vital1 than to live  
now when they are exposed and           
artificial4 ,the joy of living has been 
sapped1 and we may cry with ,matthew    
,arnold's ,obermann        ,oh1 had ,i  
lived in that great day6   ,or          
disillusionment and sophistication may  
beget rebellion4 ,we may break with the 
past1 scorn an inheritance so redolent  

of blood and lust and superstition1     
revel in an emancipation unguided by the
 discipline of centuries1 strive to     
create a new world every day1 and       
imagine that1 at last1 we have begun to 
make progress4  ,but progress is not to 
be construed in terms of a conservatism 
which is artificial and reactionary1 or 
of a radicalism which is undisciplined  
and irresponsible4 ,conservatism and    
radicalism are1 as already indicated1   
temperamental affections which a too    
exclusive and irrational contemplation  
of our ancestry may produce in us4 ,they
 are born of fear or impatience1 and are
 not the legitimate offspring of        
history4 ,for historical continuity1    
just because it does not of itself      
reveal the experimental origin of any   
belief or institution1 does not of      
itself disclose progress or any standard
 by which progress may be estimated4 ,it
 teaches no lesson in morals and        
provides no guide to the perplexed4 ,and
 the reason for this is simple4 ,history

 is continuous1 and1 therefore1 there is
 no point1 no date1 no occurrence1 no   
incident1 no origin1 no belief1 and no  
institution1 which can claim preminence 
simply on account of its position4 ,if  
men were once superstitious because of  
their place in history and are now      
scientific for precisely the same       
reason1 we can not therefore conclude1  
with any intelligent or rational        
certainty1 that evolution has progressed
 from superstition to science1 or that  
science is better than superstition4    
,values are otherwise determined4 ,the  
continuity of history levels them all4  
,yet there may be laws of history4 ,the 
comparative study of history1 whether   
the history be of civilizations or of   
living forms or of geological           
formations1 reveals uniformities and    
sequences which promote our             
understanding and aid our practice4 ,if 
we should find that wherever men have   
lived1 their institutions1 laws1        
customs1 religion1 and philosophy tend  

to show a uniformity of direction in    
their development1 we should feel       
justified in concluding that the        
tendency indicated a law of history4    
,yet such laws would not be indications 
of progress4 ,they would indicate rather
 the conditions under which progress is 
or can be made4 ,for laws are           
expressions of the limitations under    
which things may be done4 ,they show the
 forms and structures to which actions  
conform4 ,but whether these actions are 
good or bad1 upward or downward1        
progressive or retrogressive1 they do   
not show4 ,for decline no less than     
progress is in conformity with law1 and 
the continuity of history is indifferent
 to both4 ,were we1 therefore1 in       
possession of all the laws and          
uniformities of history1 we should not  
have discovered thereby what either     
decline or progress is2 but were we in  
possession of a knowledge of what       
decline and progress are1 the laws and  
uniformities of history would teach us  

better to avoid the one and attain the  
other4  ,it would seem to follow from   
these considerations that progress      
involves something more than the        
continuous accumulation of results in   
some specified direction1 the piling of 
them up on one another in such a way    
that the total heap is more impressive  
than any of the portions added to it1   
and more illustrative1 consequently1 of 
a particular career4 ,there might1      
indeed1 be progress in this sense1 if we
 divorced the conception of it from any 
standard which might intelligently judge
 it and set a value upon it4 ,for the   
passage from seed to fruit1 or any      
movement in time which attains an end   
illustrative of the steps by which it   
has been reached is in that sense       
progressive4 ,but progress in this sense
 means no more than the fact of history4
 ,the career of things in time is       
precisely that sort of movement1 and    
indicates the sense in which history is 
naturally purposeful4 ,to call it       

progress adds nothing to the meaning of 
it unless a standard is introduced by   
which it can be measured4 ,if we will   
risk again the treacherous distinction  
between man as intelligent and nature as
 simply forceful1 we may say that       
progress rightfully implies some        
improvement of nature4 ,we should then  
see that to improve nature involves the 
doing of something which nature1 left to
 herself1 does not do1 and1             
consequently1 that nature herself       
affords no indication of progress and no
 measure or standard of it4 ,nor does   
history afford them1 if we divorce      
history from every moral estimate of it4
 ,for again1 we may say that progress   
implies some improvement of history1 so 
that to judge that there has been       
progress is not to discover that history
 by evolving has put a value upon       
itself4 ,it is rather to judge that     
history has measured up to a standard   
applied to it4 ,it seems idle1          
therefore1 to suppose that history apart

 from such a standard can tell us what  
progress is or whether it has been made4
  ,yet history might do so if we are    
ready to admit man makes moral judgments
 as naturally as the sun shines4 ,if his
 morality were some miracle1            
supernaturally imposed upon his natural 
career1 we should need supernatural     
sanctions for it1 for no natural        
achievement of his could justify it4    
,these sanctions might justify him and  
what he does1 if he conformed to them1  
but neither he nor his actions could    
give them natural warrant4 ,they would  
express nothing after which he naturally
 aspires1 and could1 consequently1      
afford him no vision of a goal the      
attainment of which would crown his     
history with its own natural fruition4  
,but if his morality is natural1 his    
ideals and standards of judgment express
 what he has discovered he might be1 and
 point out to him what his history might
 attain1 had he knowledge and power     
enough to turn it in the direction of   

his own conscious purposes4 ,accordingly
 his history then might reveal both     
progress and the criterion of it4 ,but  
it would do so not simply because it is 
a history1 but because it is a history  
of a certain kind4 ,man makes progress  
because he can conceive what progress   
is1 and use that conception as a        
standard of selection and as a goal to  
be reached4 ,he participates in his own 
history consciously1 and that means that
 he participates in it morally1 with a  
sense of obligation to his career4 ,for 
to be conscious implies the anticipation
 in imagination of results which are not
 yet attained1 but which might be       
attained if appropriate means were      
found4 ,conceiving thus what he might   
be1 man always has some standard and    
measure of what he is4 ,he sees ahead of
 him1 and moves1 therefore1 with care   
and discrimination4 ,all the forces and 
impulses of his nature do not simply    
impel him on from behind2 they also draw
 him on from before through his ability 

to conceive to what enlargement and     
fruition they might be carried4 ,he     
condemns his life as miserable1 only    
because he conceives a happiness which  
condemns it2 and he calls it good1 only 
because joys1 once anticipated but now  
attained1 have blessed it4 ,progress is 
thus characteristic of human history1   
because it is characteristic of man that
 progress should be conceived4 ,his life
 is not only a life of nutrition and    
reproduction1 or of pleasures and pains1
 but a life also of hopes and fears4    
,and when hope and fear are not blind1  
but enlightened1 his life is also a life
 of reason1 for reason is the ability to
 conceive the ends which clarify the    
movements toward them4  ,without reason1
 as without memory1 there might still be
 pleasures and pains in existence4 ,to  
increase those pleasures and reduce     
those pains would be to introduce an    
improvement into the sentient world1 as 
if a devil suddenly died in hell or in  
heaven a new angel were created4 ,since 

the beings1 however1 in which these     
values would reside1 would1 by          
hypothesis1 know nothing of one another1
 and since the betterment would take    
place unprayed-for and unnoticed1 it    
could hardly be called a progress2 and  
certainly not a progress in man1 since  
man1 without the ideal continuity given 
by memory and reason1 would have no     
moral being4 ,in human progress1        
therefore1 reason is not a casual       
instrument1 having its sole value in its
 service to sense2 such a betterment in 
sentience would not be progress unless  
it were a progress in reason1 and the   
increasing pleasure revealed some object
 that could please2 for without a       
picture of the situation from which a   
heightened vitality might flow1 the     
improvement could be neither remembered 
nor measured nor desired4#i  ,carrying  
thus the conception and measure of      
progress in his own career1 man can     
judge his history morally1 and decide   
what progress he has made4 ,he speaks   

aptly of making progress1 recognizing in
 that expression that he uses the       
materials at his command for the ends he
 desires4 ,but the materials at his     
command are not of his own making4 ,he  
may1 indeed1 have modified them by      
former use1 but in each instance of his 
using them they are always so much      
matter with a structure and character of
 their own4 ,this fact puts the         
continuity of history in a new light4   
,it forbids the attempt to conceive it  
as a movement pushing forward1 as it    
were1 into the future4 ,we should       
conceive it rather from the point of    
view of the time process as we have     
already analyzed it4 ,then we should see
 that the continuity of history is the  
continuity of the results of the        
conversion of the possible into the     
actual--the part of the line which has  
been drawn4 ,it comprises all that has  
been accomplished1 conserved either by  
man's memory or by nature at large1 and 
existing for continued modification or  

use4 ,as such1 it has its own structure1
 its own uniformities1 and its own laws4
 ,to them every modification made is    
subject4 ,that is why everything        
connects on from what lies at hand1 and 
why everything we do--even the          
expressions we use--points backward to  
what our ancestors have done4 ,since    
what they have done is only material for
 what we may do1 it can not of itself   
explain our use of it1 or judge our own 
values4 ,an understanding of it should1 
however1 make us wiser in the use of it4
 ,that is why we need contemporaneous   
experience and empirical science4 ,we   
need to discover1 either by our own     
experience or by reconstituting the     
experience of others1 what happens when 
given material is used in a given way4  
,such discoveries are the only genuine  
explanations4 ,they reveal the          
conditions to which actions must conform
 if the ends we desire are to be        
attained4  ,more generally expressed the
 continuity of history is the continuity

 of matter4 ,it comprises in sum the    
structure to which every movement in    
time is subject4 ,it makes up what we   
call the laws of nature conformably to  
which whatever is done must be done4    
,but in itself it is inert and impotent4
 ,activity of some sort must penetrate  
it1 if there is to be anything effected4
 ,and what is effected reveals1 when    
experimentally understood1 the laws as  
limitations within which the control of 
any movement is possible4  ,a wall is   
built by laying stone on stone4 ,it may 
be torn down and built again1 or left a 
ruin4 ,the placing or overthrow of every
 stone occurs as just that event but    
once1 never to return1 but the stones1  
though chiseled or worn in the handling1
 remain constant material for constant  
use4 ,the result is a wall or a ruin1   
both of which illustrate the law of     
gravitation1 but neither of which was   
produced by that law4 ,that is what     
history is like4 ,it is an activity     
which transforms the materials of the   

world without destroying them1 and      
transforms them subject to laws of their
 own4 ,the world is thus ever new1 but  
never lawless4 ,it is always fresh and  
always old4 ,the present is1 as ,francis
 ,bacon said1 its real antiquity4 ,time 
is thus the arch-conservative and the   
arch-radical4 ,forever it revises its   
inheritance1 but it is never quit of it4
  ,man's inheritance comprises both what
 he has derived from his ancestors1 and 
also the world bequeathed to him from   
day to day4 ,this material he uses with 
some knowledge of its laws1 and with the
 conscious desire to convert it to his  
own ends4 ,the kinds of progress he can 
make are thus relevant to the purposes  
he sets before him4 ,since the          
satisfaction of his physical needs and  
the desire of comfortable living require
 some mastery of physical resources1 his
 progress can naturally be measured by  
the degree of success he makes in       
providing for satisfactions of this     
kind4 ,such progress is material        

progress1 and its standards are economy 
and efficiency1 or the attainment of the
 maximum result with the minimum of     
effort4 ,this kind of progress is very  
diversified1 embracing all the economic 
concerns of life1 and much of society   
and the arts4 ,but material prosperity  
is provisional4 ,to be well-housed1     
well-fed1 well-clothed1 and even to have
 friends and the opportunity for        
unlimited amusement1 these things have  
never been permanently regarded as      
defining human happiness to the full4   
,having these things man is still       
curious to know what he will do4        
,material progress indicates mastery of 
the necessities of his existence in     
order that he may then be free to act4  
,if no free act follows upon such       
mastery1 life loses its savor1 and      
pleasures grow stale4 ,material progress
 would thus seem to be a preliminary to 
living well1 but would not be living    
well itself4 ,for man would be in a     
sorry plight if he succeeded in         

mastering the physical resources of his 
world1 and then found nothing to do4    
,there seems to be nothing further for  
him to do than to reflect1 or rather    
what he does further1 flows from his    
reflections4 ,since he satisfies his    
bodily wants1 not blindly1 but          
consciously and through exercise of his 
intelligence1 looking before and after1 
and trying to see his life from         
beginning to end1 his reflections lead  
him to self-consciousness4 ,he discovers
 his personality and makes the crucial  
distinction between his body and his    
soul4 ,he speaks of his world1 of his   
friends1 of his life4 ,he begins then to
 wonder for what purpose and by what    
right his possessive attitude is        
warranted2 for unless he suppresses his 
reflections or yields himself           
thoughtlessly to his instincts and      
emotions1 he can not fail to observe    
that things are no more rightfully his  
than another's1 and that to belong      
rightfully to any one there must be some

 warrant drawn from a world with which  
his soul could be congenial4 ,even his  
soul begins to appear as not rightfully 
his1 for why should he have now this    
haunting sense of belonging to another  
world1 and of being a visitor to this in
 need of introduction and credentials8  
,reflection thus gives birth to a new   
kind of life in which also progress may 
be made4 ,we call it rational progress1 
for it involves the attempt to justify  
existence by discovering sanctions which
 reason can approve1 and to which all   
should give assent1 because each soul   
must1 on seeing them1 recognize them as 
its own4  ,reflection may lead man to do
 generous things4 ,he may comfort the   
distressed1 help the poor1 relieve pain1
 or reform society4 ,the world affords  
him abundant opportunity for his        
benefactions4 ,he may create beautiful  
things which he and others can enjoy    
perfectly in the mere beholding of them4
 ,he may worship the gods1 dimly        
conscious that they at least lead the   

perfect life1 and that to dwell with    
them is immortality4 ,such exercises of 
the spirit yield him a new kind of      
happiness4 ,but his danger lies in      
supposing that his existence can be thus
 externally justified3 that others will 
bless him for his benefactions2 that    
,beauty lurks hidden to be gloriously   
seen even at the risk of destruction2 or
 that ,god intended him to be happy4    
,if1 however1 he is saved from thus     
superstitiously converting the ideal    
possibilities of his life into          
justifying reasons why he should exist  
at all1 he may see in them the fruition 
of all his history4 ,even his material  
progress gives him a hint of this1 for  
it is genuine progress and justifies    
itself naturally through the attainment 
of its ends4 ,for he needs no sanction  
to warm his body when cold1 or to feed  
it when hungry4 ,it is sufficient that  
he sees the end to be reached and finds 
the means to reach it4 ,the hunger of   
the soul may be no less efficacious4    

,although these cravings tend to bring  
uneasiness and distaste into his animal 
enjoyments1 they find some satisfaction 
if these enjoyments are idealized and   
transformed into a vision of what they  
might be freed from the material        
grossness which clogs them4 ,man then   
begins to conceive ideal love and       
friendship1 and an ideal society4 ,if   
only he were the free partaker of such  
perfect things1 his existence would need
 no justification4 ,in acknowledging    
this1 however1 he may rediscover himself
 and learn more adequately what the     
purpose of his history is4 ,it is so to 
use the materials of the world that they
 will be permanently used in the light  
of the ideal perfection they naturally  
suggest4 ,man can conceive no occupation
 more satisfying and no happiness more  
complete4 ,in entering upon it he makes 
rational progress4 ,its measure is the  
degree of success he attains in making  
his animal life minister to ideals he   
can own without reserve and love without

 regret4  ,human history is something   
more than the lives of great men1 the   
rise and fall of states1 the growth of  
institutions and customs1 the vagaries  
of religion and philosophy1 or the      
controlling influence of economic       
forces4 ,it is also a rational          
enterprise4 ,expressed in naturalistic  
terms it is history conscious of what   
history is4 ,to remember and to         
understand what has happened is not1    
therefore1 simply an interesting and    
profitable study2 it may be also an     
illustration of rational living4 ,it may
 be an indication that man1 in finally  
discovering what his history genuinely  
is1 is at the same time making it       
minister constantly and consciously to  
its own enlargement and perfection4     
,that intelligent beings should recover 
their history is no reason why they     
should repudiate it1 even if they find  
many things of which to be ashamed2 for 
they are examples of the recovery of the
 past with the prospect of a future4 ,in

 reading their own history1 they may    
smile at that which once they           
reverenced1 and laugh at that which once
 they feared4 ,they may have to unlearn 
many established lessons and renounce   
many cherished hopes4 ,they may have to 
emancipate themselves continually from  
their past2 but note that it is from    
their past that they would be           
emancipated and that it is freedom that 
they seek4 ,it is not a new form of     
slavery4 ,into what greater slavery     
could they fall than into that implied  
by the squandering of their inheritance 
or by blaming their ancestors for       
preceding them8 ,they will be ancestors 
themselves one day and others will ask  
what they have bequeathed4 ,these others
 may not ask for ,greece again or for   
,rome or for ,christianity1 but they    
will ask for the like of these1 things  
which can live perennially in the       
imagination1 even if as institutions    
they are past and dead4 ,he is not freed
 from the past who has lost it or who   

regards himself simply as its product4  
,in the one case he would have no       
experience to guide him and no memories 
to cherish4 ,in the other he would have 
no enthusiasm4 ,to be emancipated is to 
have recovered the past untrammeled in  
an enlightened pursuit of that          
enterprise of the mind which first begot
 it4 ,it is not to renounce imagination1
 but to exercise it illumined and       
refreshed4  ,history is1 then1 not only 
the conserving1 the remembering1 and the
 understanding of what has happened3 it 
is also the completing of what has      
happened4 ,and since in man history is  
consciously lived1 the completing of    
what has happened is also the attempt to
 carry it to what he calls perfection4  
,he looks at a wilderness1 but1 even as 
he looks1 beholds a garden4 ,for him1   
consequently1 the purpose of history is 
not a secret he vainly tries to find1   
but a kind of life his reason enables   
him to live4 ,as he lives it well1 the  
fragments of existence are completed and

 illumined in the visions they reveal4  
,,footnotes3  #e ,tylor1 ,edward ,b4    
,primitive ,culture4 ,henry ,holt  ,co41
 #ahhi4 ,vol4 ,i1 pages #ag ff4  #f     
,cornford1 ,francis ,m4 ,from ,religion 
to ,philosophy4 ,longmans1 ,green  ,co41
 #aiab4  #g ,see ,dedekind1 ,richard4   
,continuity and ,irrational ,numbers1 in
 ,essays on the ,theory of numbers4 ,tr4
 by ,wooster ,w4 ,beman4 ,open ,court   
,publishing ,co41 #aija4  #h ,if space  
permitted1 this same limitation could be
 abundantly illustrated from the        
sciences1 especially the biological     
sciences4 ,they have made very clear    
what an essential difference there is   
between the continuity of living forms  
and the origin of new forms4 ,this      
difference can be readily appreciated by
 comparing a work on evolution or       
natural history with a work on          
experimental biology4  #i ,santayana1   
,george4 ,the ,life of ,reason1 #aije4  
,vol4 ,i1 pages #c-d4