,giovanni ,fini ,,hegel',s ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy ,,volume ,,three ,hegel's ,lectures on ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy ,translated from the ,german by ,e4 ,s4 ,,haldane and ,,frances ,h4 ,,simson1 ,m4,a4 ,in three volumes ,,volume ,,three ,illustration ,,routledge ,,kegan ,,paul ,,ltd ,broadway ,house1 #fh-gd ,carter ,lane ,london1 ,e4,c4#d ,first published in ,england #ahif by ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trubner ,co4 ,ltd ,reprinted #aiee by ,routledge ,kegan ,paul ,ltd ,broadway ,house1 #fh-gd ,carter ,lane ,london1 ,e4,c4#d ,reprinted by lithography in ,great ,britain by ,jarrold and ,sons ,limited1 ,norwich ,,contents ,,part ,,two ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,middle ,,ages ,,page ,,introduction #a #a4 ,the ,idea of ,christianity #a #b4 ,the ,fathers and ,heterodoxies #aj #c4 ,church and ,state #bc ,,section ,,one ,,arabian ,,philosophy #bf ,a4 ,the ,philosophy of the ,medabberim #cj ,b4 ,commentators of ,aristotle #cd ,c4 ,jewish ,philosophers3 ,moses ,maimonides #ce ,,section ,,two ,,the ,,scholastic ,,philosophy #cg ,a4 ,relationship of the ,scholastic ,philosophy to ,christianity #de ,b4 ,general ,historical ,points of ,view #fj #a4 ,the ,building up of ,dogmas on ,metaphysical ,grounds #fa a4 ,anselm #fa b4 ,abelard #fg #b4 ,methodical ,representation of the ,doctrinal ,system of the ,church #fh a4 ,peter ,lombard #fi b4 ,thomas ,aquinas #ga c4 ,john ,duns ,scotus #gb #c4 ,acquaintanceship with ,aristotelian ,writings #gc a4 ,alexander of ,hales #gc b4 ,albertus ,magnus #ge #d4 ,opposition between ,realism and ,nominalism #gg a4 ,roscelinus #gh b4 ,walter of ,mortagne #hj c4 ,william ,occam #hb d4 ,buridan #he #e4 ,formal ,dialectic #hf a4 ,julian1 ,archbishop of ,toledo #hg b4 ,paschasius ,radbertus #hh #f4 ,mystics #ia a4 ,john ,charlier #ia b4 ,raymundus of ,sabunde #ia c4 ,roger ,bacon #ib d4 ,raymundus ,lullus #ib ,c4 ,general ,standpoint of the ,scholastics #id ,,section ,,three ,,revival ,,of ,,the ,,sciences #ajh ,a4 ,study of the ,ancients #aji #a4 ,pomponatius #aaa #b4 ,bessarion1 ,ficinus1 ,picus #aab #c4 ,gassendi1 ,lipsius1 ,reuchlin1 ,helmont #aab #d4 ,ciceronian ,popular ,philosophy #aac ,b4 ,certain ,attempts in ,philosophy #aae #a4 ,cardanus #aaf #b4 ,campanella #aai #c4 ,bruno #aai #d4 ,vanini #acg #e4 ,petrus ,ramus #adc ,c4 ,the ,reformation #adf ,,part ,,three ,,modern ,,philosophy ,,introduction #aeg ,,section ,,one ,,modern ,,philosophy ,,in ,,its ,,first ,,statement #agj ,a4 ,bacon #agj ,b4 ,jacob ,boehme #ahh ,,section ,,two ,,period ,,of ,,the ,,thinking ,,understanding #bag ,,chapter ,i4--,,the ,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,understanding #bbj ,a4 ,first ,division #bbj #a4 ,descartes #bbj #b4 ,spinoza #beb #c4 ,malebranche #bij ,b4 ,second ,division #bie #a4 ,locke #bie #b4 ,hugo ,grotius #cac #c4 ,thomas ,hobbes #cae #d4 ,cudworth1 ,clarke1 ,wollaston #cai #e4 ,puffendorf #cba #f4 ,newton #cbb ,c4 ,third ,division #cbe #a4 ,leibnitz #cbe #b4 ,wolff #cdh #c4 ,german ,popular ,philosophy #cef ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,transition ,,period #cfj ,a4 ,idealism and ,scepticism #cfc #a4 ,berkeley #cfd #b4 ,hume #cfi ,b4 ,scottish ,philosophy #cge #a4 ,thomas ,reid #cgf #b4 ,james ,beattie #cgg #c4 ,james ,oswald #cgg #d4 ,dugald ,stewart #cgh ,c4 ,french ,philosophy #cgi #a4 ,the ,negative ,aspect #chh #b4 ,the ,positive ,aspect #cib a4 ,materialism #cic b4 ,robinet #cid #c4 ,idea of a ,concrete ,universal ,unity #cig a4 ,opposition between ,sensation and ,thought #cih b4 ,montesquieu #cii c4 ,helvetius #djj d4 ,rousseau #djj ,d4 ,the ,german ,illumination #djc ,,section ,,three ,,recent ,,german ,,philosophy #dji ,a4 ,jacobi #daj ,b4 ,kant #dbc ,c4 ,fichte #dgi #a4 ,the ,first ,principles of ,fichte's ,philosophy #dha #b4 ,fichte's ,system in a ,re-constituted ,form #eje #c4 ,the ,more ,important of the ,followers of ,fichte #ejf a4 ,friedrich von ,schlegel #ejg b4 ,schleiermacher #ejh c4 ,novalis #eaj d4 ,fries1 ,bouterweck1 ,krug #eaj ,d4 ,schelling #eab ,e4 ,final ,result #ede ,,index #eee ,,corrigenda ,,in ,,vols4 ,i4 ,,and ,,ii4 #egj ,,part ,,two ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,middle ,,ages ,,introduction ,the first period embraces a space of one thousand years--from ,thales1 #eej ,b4,c41 to ,proclus1 who died #dhe ,a4,d41 and until the disappearance of pagan philosophy as an outward institution1 #ebi ,a4,d4 ,the second period extends to the sixteenth century1 and thus again embraces a thousand years1 to pass over which we must provide ourselves with seven-leagued boots4 ,while ,philosophy has hitherto found its place in the religion of the heathen1 from this time on it has its sphere within the ,christian world2 for ,arabians and ,jews have only to be noticed in an external and historic way4 #a4 ,through the ,neo-,platonic philosophy we have come into quite familiar acquaintance with the ,idea of ,christianity1 as the new religion which has entered into the world4 ,for the ,neo-,platonic philosophy has as its essential principle the fact that the ,absolute is determined as spirit in a concrete way1 that ,god is not a mere conception4 ,although the ,absolute is ,thought1 it must1 in order to be true1 be concrete in itself and not abstract2 in what we have just seen we have1 then1 the first appearance of the absolutely existent spirit4 ,but in spite of their profound and true speculation1 the ,neo-,platonists still had not proved their doctrine that the ,trinity is the truth1 for there is lacking to it the form of inward necessity4 ,the ,neo-,platonists begin from the ,one that determines itself1 that sets a limit to itself from which the determinate proceeds2 this1 however1 is itself an immediate method of presentation1 and it is this that makes such philosophers as ,plotinus and ,proclus so tiresome4 ,undoubtedly dialectic considerations enter in1 in which the opposites which are conceived as absolute are shown to be null2 but this dialectic is not methodical1 but occurs only disconnectedly4 ,the principle of retroversion and comprehension found with the ,neo-,platonists is that of substantiality generally1 but because subjectivity is lacking1 this idea of ,spirit is deficient in one moment1 the moment of actuality1 of the point which draws all moments into one1 and which thereby becomes immediate unity1 universality1 and ,being4 ,to them spirit is thus not individual spirit2 and this deficiency is made good through ,christianity1 in which spirit is found as actual1 present spirit1 immediately existent in the world here and now1 and the absolute spirit is known in the immediate present as man4 ,in order to grasp and apply the ,idea of ,christianity1 the philosophic ,idea of which we have already spoken in connection with the ,neo-,platonists must have been comprehended for itself2 but within ,christianity the basis of ,philosophy is that in man has sprung up the consciousness of the truth1 or of spirit in and for itself1 and then that man requires to participate in this truth4 ,man must be qualified to have this truth present to him2 he must further be convinced of this possibility4 ,this is the absolute demand and necessity2 the consciousness must be arrived at that this alone is true4 ,the first point of interest in the ,christian religion thus is that the content of the ,idea should be revealed to man2 more particularly that the unity of the divine and human nature should come to the consciousness of man1 and that1 indeed1 on the one hand as an implicitly existent unity1 and1 on the other1 in actuality as worship4 ,the ,christian life signifies that the culminating point of subjectivity is made familiar with this conception1 the individual himself is laid claim to1 is made worthy of attaining on his own account to this unity1 which is to make himself worthy of the ,spirit of ,god--,grace1 as it is called--dwelling in him4 ,hence the doctrine of reconciliation is that ,god is known as reconciling ,himself with the world1 i4e4 as we have seen in the ,neo-,platonic philosophy1 that ,he particularizes ,himself and does not remain abstract4 ,not external nature alone1 but the whole world pertains to the particular2 above all must human individuality know itself in ,god4 ,the interest of the subject is itself involved1 and here it plays an essential rle in order that ,god may be realized and may realize ,himself in the consciousness of individuals who are spirit and implicitly free4 ,thus through the process these accomplish that reconciliation in themselves1 actualize their freedom2 that is to say1 they attain to the consciousness of heaven upon earth1 the elevation of man to ,god4 ,thus the true intellectual world is not a beyond1 but the so-called finite is an element in it1 and no division exists between this side and that4 ,the real concrete in regard to the absolute ,idea is the knowing of the mundane1 the #8other' in ,god1 as implicitly divine1 as universal1 as the world of intellect1 as having its root in ,god1 but only the root4 ,in ,god man is accepted only in his truth1 and not in his immediacy1 and thus this doctrine is not what we call ,pantheism1 for that leaves the immediate just as it is4 ,man then has himself to accomplish the process of reconciliation in himself in order to attain to his truth4 ,we have thus seen that man possesses the determination and attributes of ,god as the first begotten son1 ,adam ,kadmon1 the first man2 we may call this unity the concrete ,idea1 which1 however1 is still only implicit4 ,but the fact that because man is capable of the divine1 the identity of the divine and human nature must likewise be present for him1 has in an immediate way become known to him in ,christ1 as one in whom the divine and human nature are implicitly one4 ,in the world what has come to pass is that the ,absolute has been revealed as the concrete1 and1 further1 not only in thought in a general way as intelligible world1 but because it has in itself proceeded to its ultimate point of intensity4 ,thus it is an actual self1 an 8,i10 the absolute universal1 the concrete universal1 that is ,god2 and also the absolute opposite of this determination1 the clearly finite as it exists in space and time1 but this finite determined in unity with the eternal as self4 ,the ,absolute comprehended as concrete1 the unity of these two absolutely different determinations1 is the true ,god2 each of them is abstract1 and either of them taken by itself is thus not the true ,god4 ,the fact that the concrete is thus known to men in this perfection as ,god1 brings about the whole revolution that has taken place in the world's history4 ,the ,trinity is thereby not only present in conception1 which would not yet constitute the perfect concrete1 but actuality is perfectly united to it4 ,in the consciousness of the world it has consequently broken in upon men that the ,absolute has attained to this 8culminating point0 of immediate actuality1 as ,proclus says2 and that is the manifestation of ,christianity4 ,the ,greeks were anthropomorphic1 their gods were humanly constituted2 but the deficiency in them is that they were not anthropomorphic enough4 ,or rather the ,greek religion is on the one hand too much1 and1 on the other hand1 too little anthropomorphic--too much1 because immediate qualities1 forms1 actions1 are taken up into the divine2 too little1 because man is not divine as man1 but only as a far-away form and not as #8this1' and subjective man4 ,thus man reaches this truth1 because for him it becomes a sure intuition that in ,christ the has become ,flesh4 ,we thus first have man through this process attaining to spirituality1 and in the second place we have man as ,christ1 in whom this original identity of both natures is known4 ,now since man really is this process of being the negation of the immediate1 and from this negation attaining to himself--to a unity with ,god--he must consequently renounce his natural will1 knowledge1 and existence4 ,this giving up of his natural existence is witnessed in ,christ's sufferings and death1 and in ,his resurrection and elevation to the right hand of the ,father4 ,christ became a perfect man1 endured the lot of all men1 death2 as man ,he suffered1 sacrificed ,himself1 gave up ,his natural existence1 and thereby elevated ,himself above it4 ,in ,him this process1 this conversion of ,his other-being into spirit1 and the necessity of pain in the renunciation of the natural man is witnessed2 but this pain1 the pain of feeling that ,god ,himself is dead1 is the starting point of holiness and of elevation to ,god4 ,thus what must come to pass in the subject--this process1 this conversion of the finite--is known as implicitly accomplished in ,christ4 ,this constitutes the great leading ,idea of ,christianity4 ,from what has been said it follows1 in the second place1 that the world must not be left in its immediate naturalness4 ,the original1 implicitly existent1 is found only in the strictest conception of mind1 or as its determination3 immediately1 man is only a living being1 who has indeed the capacity to become actual spirit--but spirit does not pertain to nature4 ,man is thus not by nature this particular in which the spirit of ,god lives and dwells3 man is not by nature what he ought to be4 ,the animal is by nature what it ought to be4 ,but what has to be noticed in this respect is that natural things merely remain in their implicit ,notion1 or their truth does not enter into their sensuous life1 for this their natural individuality is only a fleeting fact that cannot look back on itself4 ,the misfortune in natural things is that they get no further1 that their essential nature is not for itself and independent2 from this it follows that they do not attain to infinitude1 to liberation from their immediate individuality1 i4e4 they do not attain to freedom1 but only remain in the necessity which is the connection of the 8one0 with an 8other10 so that when this other unites itself to natural things1 these last perish because they cannot bear the contradiction4 ,but because the truth exists for man as consciousness1 and in it he has the qualities necessary for freedom1 he is capable of perceiving the ,absolute1 of placing himself in a relation to the same1 and having knowledge as an end2 and the liberation of mind depends on the fact that consciousness does not remain in its natural condition1 but becomes spiritual1 i4e4 that for it the eternal1 that is the reconciliation of the finite as this subject with the infinite1 exists4 ,thus consciousness does not signify remaining in the sphere of nature1 but the existence of the process whereby the universal becomes object or end to man4 ,man makes himself divine1 but in a spiritual1 that is to say not in an immediate way4 ,in the ancient religions the divine is also united to the natural or human2 but this unity is no reconciliation1 but an immediate1 undeveloped1 and thus unspiritual unity1 just because it is merely natural4 ,but because mind is not natural but only that into which it makes itself1 the spiritual is first met with in this very process of producing unity4 ,to this spiritual unity pertains the negation of nature1 of the flesh1 as that in which man must not rest2 for nature is from the beginning evil4 ,man is likewise naturally evil1 for all the wickedness that man does proceeds from a natural desire4 ,now because man is in himself the image of ,god1 but in existence is only natural1 that which is implicit must be evolved1 while the first natural condition must be abrogated4 ,so much the more is it true that man first becomes spiritual1 and attains to truth through rising above the natural1 inasmuch as ,god ,himself is a spirit only in that ,he transformed the hidden unity into the other of ,himself1 in order from this other to turn back again into ,himself4 ,now the fact that this is given as1 or asserted to be the fundamental ,idea of ,christianity1 implies on the one hand an historic question2 at different times this idea has been grasped in different ways1 and now1 for example1 men again have their particular conceptions of it4 ,in order to bring about the conclusion that this is the historic idea of ,christianity1 we should have to enter upon an historic disquisition2 but because we cannot deal with this here1 we must accept it as an historic axiom4 ,on the other hand1 in so far as this question falls within the history of ,philosophy1 the assertion that this is the idea of ,christianity has another ground to stand on than that of history1 and this constitutes the third point of interest4 ,in connection with the preceding forms it has been shown that this ,idea of ,christianity must have now come forth1 and indeed become the universal consciousness of the nations4 ,the fact that it has come forth as the world-religion1 is the content of history2 it is this necessity in the ,idea which has to be expounded more clearly in the philosophy of history4 ,to this end the conception of mind must be made fundamental1 and it must now be shown that history is the process of mind itself1 the revelation of itself from its first superficial1 enshrouded consciousness1 and the attainment of this standpoint of its free self-consciousness1 in order that the absolute command of mind1 8,know thyself10 may be fulfilled4 ,the recognition of this necessity has been called the priori construction of history2 there is no good in decrying it as inadmissible1 and indeed as arrogant4 ,the development of history may be represented as contingent4 ,or1 if the providence and government of ,god are seriously accepted1 these are represented as though ,christianity were so to speak ready made in the mind of ,god2 then1 when thrust into the world1 it appears to be contingent4 ,but the rationality and likewise the necessity of this decree of ,god's has now to be considered1 and this may be called a theodicy1 a justification of ,god1 i4e4 a vindication of our ,idea4 ,it is a demonstration that1 as ,i have just said1 things have happened rationally in the world1 and it implies the fact that the world-history represents the process of mind partially as the history of mind1 which has to be reflected into itself in order to come to a consciousness of what it is4 ,it is this which is shown forth in temporal history1 and as history1 indeed1 just because mind is the living movement1 proceeding from its immediate existence to beget revolutions in the world1 as well as in individuals4 ,since it is hereby presupposed that this ,idea must necessarily become universal religion1 there is1 in the fourth place1 present in it the source of a method of knowledge proper to the particular consciousness4 ,that is to say1 the new religion has made the intelligible world of ,philosophy the world of common consciousness4 ,tertullian hence says3 8,even children in our day have a knowledge of ,god1 which the wisest men of antiquity alone attained to40 ,but in order that all may know the truth1 this ,idea must come to them as an object1 not for the thinking1 philosophic and cultured consciousness1 but for the sensuous consciousness which still adheres to uncultured methods of regarding things4 ,if this ,idea were not to receive and to retain this form of outward consciousness1 it would be a philosophy of the ,christian religion2 for the standpoint of ,philosophy is the ,idea in the form of the merely universal thought1 and not the ,idea as it is for the subject and directed to the subject4 ,that through which this ,idea appears as religion1 belongs1 however1 to the history of religion1 and this development of its form must here be passed over4 ,through these forms we must however not mistake the content1 much less reject it altogether1 for we must rather recognize its presence more completely2 the forms must likewise not be held to be absolute1 and we must not try to maintain the doctrines in this form alone1 as was at one time done by an orthodoxy 8of straw40 ,only one example will here be given4 ,the so-called doctrine of original sin implies that our first parents have sinned1 that this sin has thus descended to all mankind as an hereditary disorder1 and has come upon posterity in an external way as something inherent in their nature1 which does not pertain to freedom of the mind1 nor has its ground therein4 ,through this original sin1 it is further signified1 man has drawn upon himself the wrath of ,god4 ,now if these forms be adhered to1 we have in the first place there the first parents in time1 and not in thought2 but the thought of these first parents is none other than man as he is in and for himself4 ,what is said of him as such1 what every member of the human race really is in himself1 is represented here in the form of the first man1 ,adam2 and in this first man sin manifests itself as something contingent1 or1 more particularly1 in his allowing himself to be enticed into eating of the apple4 ,but it is again not merely represented that he simply partook of the fruit1 but that he ate of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil2 it is as man that he must partake of it1 and not as beast4 ,the fundamental characteristic1 however1 through which he distinguishes himself from the animal1 is the very fact that he knows what good and evil are4 ,for ,god likewise says1 8,behold1 ,adam has become as one of us1 to know good and evil40 ,but it is only through man's having the power of thinking that he can make this distinction between good and evil2 in thought alone is there thus the source of good and evil1 but the healing of the evil which is brought about through thought is also there4 ,the second point is that man is by nature evil and transmits the evil4 ,on the other hand1 it is said3 8,why should the sinner suffer punishment seeing that there is no responsibility for what is inborn in him80 ,as a matter of fact the statement that man is implicitly or by nature evil would seem to be a hard saying4 ,but if we set aside this hard saying1 and do not speak of a divine punishment1 but make use of milder general expressions1 in this idea of original sin the fact remains for us that man as he is by nature is not what he ought to be before ,god1 but has the power of becoming explicitly what he only is implicitly2 and the fact that this rests in the determination of man as such is represented as inheritance4 ,the abrogation of mere naturalness is known to us simply as education1 and arises of itself2 through education subjection is brought about1 and with that a capacity for becoming good is developed4 ,now if this appears to come to pass very easily1 we must recollect that it is of infinite importance that the reconciliation of the world with itself1 the making good1 is brought about through the simple method of education4 #b4 ,what concerns us now is to make the ,principle of ,christianity1 which has been explained at considerable length1 into the principle of the world2 the task set before the world is to bring this absolute ,idea within itself1 to actualize it in itself1 and thereby to reconcile itself to ,god4 ,this task once more falls into three separate divisions4 ,in the first place we have the dissemination of the ,christian religion and the bringing of it within the hearts of men2 this1 however1 lies outside the limits of our consideration4 ,the heart signifies the subjective man as #8this1' and through this principle the latter has a different position from before2 it is essential that this subject should be present4 ,the individual subject is the object of divine grace2 each subject1 or man as man1 has on his own account an infinite value1 is destined to partake of this spirit which must1 as ,god1 be born within the heart of every man4 ,man is determined for freedom1 he is here recognized as implicitly free2 this freedom is1 however1 at first only formal1 because it remains within the principle of subjectivity4 ,the second point is that the principle of the ,christian religion should be worked out for thought1 and be taken up into thinking knowledge1 and realized in this2 and thus that it should attain to reconciliation1 having the divine ,idea within itself1 and that the riches of thought and culture belonging to the philosophic ,idea should become united to the ,christian principle4 ,for the philosophic ,idea is the ,idea of ,god1 and thought has the absolute right of reconciliation1 or the right to claim that the ,christian principle should correspond with thought4 ,the ,fathers have rendered the service of thus elaborating the ,christian religion in thinking knowledge2 but neither have we to consider further this development of the ,christian principle1 since it belongs to the history of the ,church4 ,we have only here to give the point of view adopted regarding the relation of the ,fathers to ,philosophy4 ,they for the most part lived within the ancient ,roman world and in ,latin culture1 though the ,byzantines likewise are included with them4 ,we know that the ,fathers were men of great philosophic culture1 and that they introduced ,philosophy1 and more especially ,neo-,platonic philosophy1 into the ,church2 in this way they worked out a ,christian system by which the first mode in which ,christianity was manifested in the world was supplemented1 for system was not present in this first manifestation4 ,the ,fathers have dealt with all questions respecting the nature of ,god1 the freedom of man1 the relationship to ,god--who is the objective--the origin of evil1 and so on2 and whatever thought decided regarding these questions was by them brought into and incorporated with the ,christian system4 ,the nature of spirit1 the way of salvation1 i4e4 the various stages in the spiritualizing of the subject1 his growth1 the process of spirit1 whereby it is spirit1 the changes it has undergone1 they have likewise treated in its freedom1 and recognized its moments in the depths to which it reaches4 ,we may thus describe the attitude of the ,christian ,fathers1 and likewise remark that this first philosophic development of the ,christian principle has been looked on as a crime on their part1 and it has been said that they have thus corrupted the purity of ,christianity as originally manifested4 ,we must speak of the nature of this corruption4 ,it is well known that ,luther in his ,reformation made his aim the bringing of the ,church back to the purity of its first estate in the early centuries1 but this first condition already shows the fabric of an extensive and closely interwoven system1 an elaborate tissue of doctrines regarding what ,god is and what is man's relation to ,him4 ,hence at the time of the ,reformation no particular system was built up1 but what was originally there was purified from later additions2 it is a complicated erection1 in which the most intricate pieces of workmanship are to be found4 ,in modern times this elaborately woven system has been entirely pulled to pieces1 because men have wished to bring ,christianity back to the simple lines of the ,word of ,god as found in the writings of the ,new ,testament4 ,men have likewise given up the propagation of the system1 the doctrine of ,christianity as determined through the ,idea and by the ,idea1 and have returned to the manner of its first appearance 7and that1 indeed1 in eclectic fashion1 and having regard to what will fit in with their own notions71 so that now only the original ,gospel narrative is regarded as forming the basis of ,christianity4 ,as regards the title of ,philosophy and the ,fathers to bring ,philosophy into ,christianity we have the following remarks to make4 ,modern ,theology on the one hand derives its formulas from the words of the ,bible1 which are made to form their basis1 so that the whole business of the individual1 as regards his thoughts and his conceptions1 is merely exegetical2 religion must be retained in its positive form1 and thus it is from something received and given1 something most evidently externally posited and revealed1 that a beginning must be made4 ,these words and this text are1 however1 of a nature such that they allow full latitude to the will of the interpreter2 hence the other side is also present1 or the application of the ,bible saying3 8,the letter killeth1 but the spirit giveth life40 ,this must be assented to1 and the spirit means none else than the power which dwells within those who apply themselves to the letter in order that they may spiritually apprehend and animate it4 ,this signifies that it is the conceptions which we bring along with us which have in the letter to give efficacy to themselves4 ,now these reflections brought along with us may be grasped by the most ordinary human understanding1 which is what is indicated in modern times when we say that dogmas must be popular4 ,in that way the right to act upon the letter with the spirit is assumed1 i4e4 the right to approach it with our individual judgment2 but to the ,fathers this is forbidden4 ,they did act upon it with the ,spirit2 and it is expressly said that the ,spirit dwells within the ,church1 directs1 teaches1 and illuminates it4 ,the ,fathers have hence a similar right to relate themselves with the ,spirit to the positive1 to what is given by the senses4 ,only it will depend absolutely upon what the nature of the ,spirit is1 for spirits are very different4 ,the assertion that the spirit must give life to the mere letter is certainly more definitely stated as that spirit has only to expound what is given1 i4e4 it must leave the actual sense of what is immediately contained in the words4 ,we must1 however1 be far behind in culture if we do not see the fallacy in the attitude here adopted4 ,to expound without the individual spirit1 as though the sense were one entirely given1 is impossible4 ,to elucidate signifies to make clear1 and it must be made clear to me2 this can be done by nothing excepting what was already present in me4 ,it must be in conformity with my subjective judgment1 the necessities of my knowledge1 of my apprehension1 of my heart1 c42 thus only is it for me4 ,we find what we look for1 and just because ,i make it clear to myself1 ,i make my conception1 my thought1 a factor in it2 otherwise it is a dead and external thing1 which is not present for me at all4 ,it is hence very difficult to make clear to ourselves those foreign religions which lie far below our spiritual needs2 but yet they touch a side of my spiritual necessities and standpoints1 although it is but a dim and sensuous side4 ,thus when we talk of 8making clear10 we conceal the real matter in a word2 but if this word itself is made clear we find nothing in it but the fact that the spirit which is in man desires therein to recognize itself1 and that it cannot know anything which does not rest in him4 ,thus have men made of the ,bible what may be called a nose of wax4 ,this man finds this thing1 the other man that2 what was secure now shows itself as insecure1 because it is considered by the subjective spirit4 ,in this regard the nature of the text describing the method in which the first manifestation of ,christianity took place1 must be remarked upon2 it cannot as yet expressly contain that which rests in the principle of ,christianity1 but only somewhat of an anticipation of what spirit is and will know as true4 ,this also is expressly said in the text itself4 ,christ says3 8,if ,i depart1 ,i will send the ,comforter1 the ,holy ,ghost4444 ,he will guide you into all truth10 ,he--and not ,christ's earthly presence nor ,his spoken words4 ,it was only to be after ,him1 and after ,his teaching through the text1 that the ,spirit was to come into the ,apostles1 and that they were to become full of the ,spirit4 ,it might almost be said that when ,christianity is carried back to its first appearing1 it is brought down to the level of unspirituality1 for ,christ ,himself says that the ,spirit will not come until ,he ,himself has departed4 ,in the text of the first manifestation of ,christianity we1 on the other hand1 see ,christ only as the ,messiah1 or under the more explicit designation of a mere teacher2 for ,his friends and apostles ,he is a present man whom they can perceive by the senses1 and who does not yet hold to them the relationship of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,his friends have seen ,him1 heard ,his doctrine1 seen ,his miracles1 and have thereby been brought to believe in ,him4 ,but ,christ ,himself sternly rebukes those who demand miracles of ,him2 if ,he thus be made as ,god to man1 ,god in the heart of man1 ,he cannot have a sensuous and immediate presence4 ,the ,dalai-lama1 in the form of a sensuous man1 is ,god to the inhabitants of ,thibet1 but in the ,christian principle1 where ,god dwells in the hearts of men1 ,he cannot be present to them in sensuous form4 ,the second point then is that the sensuous and present form must disappear1 so that it may be taken into the ,mnemosyne1 into the realm of popular conception2 then for the first time can the spiritual consciousness1 the spiritual relation1 enter in4 ,to the question of whither ,christ has gone1 the answer is given1 8,he sits on the right hand of ,god10 which signifies that it is only now that ,god can be known as this concrete ,one1 as the ,one who has the other moment1 ,his ,son 71 71 in ,himself4 ,thus to know what is the principle of ,christianity as truth1 the truth of the ,idea of spirit must be known as concrete spirit1 and this is the form peculiar to the ,fathers of the ,church4 ,with this the idea that the abstractly divine breaks up and has broken up within itself1 first began to appear4 ,this other moment in the divine must not1 however1 be grasped in the mode of an intelligible world1 or1 as we certainly have it in the ordinary conception1 of a kingdom of heaven with many angels1 who are also finite1 limited1 thus approaching closer to humanity4 ,but it is not sufficient that the concrete moment should be known in ,god1 for the further knowledge is requisite that ,christ is an actual present man4 ,this moment of ,christ's actual present humanity is of immense importance to ,christianity1 because it is the union of the most tremendous opposites4 ,this higher conception could not have been present in the text1 in the first manifestation2 the greatness of the ,idea could only come in later on1 after the ,spirit had perfected the ,idea4 ,that the revelation of ,christ has this significance is the belief of ,christians1 while the profane1 immediate and direct significance of this history is that ,christ was a mere prophet and met the fate of all the prophets in being misunderstood4 ,but the fact that it has the significance given by us is known through the ,spirit1 for the ,spirit is revealed in this history4 ,this history is the ,notion1 the ,idea of ,spirit itself1 and the world-history has in it found its end1 which is in this immediate way to know the truth4 ,it is therefore the ,spirit which so comprehends that history1 and at the time of ,pentecost this is shown in an immediate and evident manner4 ,for before this time the ,apostles did not know the infinite significance of ,christ2 they did not yet know that this is the infinite history of ,god2 they had believed in ,him1 but not yet as seeing in ,him this infinite truth4 ,this is the truth which the ,fathers developed2 the general relation of the first ,christian ,church to ,philosophy is hereby given4 ,on the one hand1 the philosophic ,idea has been transplanted into this religion2 on the other1 this moment in the ,idea--according to which the latter breaks up within itself into wisdom1 the active ,logos1 the ,son of ,god1 c41 but yet in so doing remains in universality--has been brought to a culmination in subjectivity1 and further in the sensuous immediate individuality and present existence of a human individual appearing in time and space4 ,these two elements are essentially intermingled in this ,christian system1 the ,idea itself1 and secondly the form as it presents itself through its connection with a single individuality present in time and space4 ,to the ,fathers this history had thus the ,idea as its principle2 the true ,idea of the ,spirit was consequently to them likewise in the determinate form of history4 ,but the ,idea was not yet1 as such1 separated from history2 because the ,church thus held to this ,idea in historic form1 it determined the doctrines4 ,this1 then1 is the general character of the time4 ,from this ,idea as comprehended through the ,spirit1 many so-called heresies arose in the first centuries after ,christ4 ,among such heretics must be included those of the ,gnostics who take the ,christian literature as their basis1 but give a spiritual significance to everything therein present4 ,for they did not remain at this historical form of the ,idea of ,spirit1 since they interpreted the history and deprived it of its historical value4 ,the reflections which they introduced are1 as we have seen 7,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #cif-cii71 to a greater or less extent such as are to be found in the philosophy of the ,alexandrians or of ,philo4 ,in conformity with their principles they adopted a speculative attitude1 but they proceeded into extravagances both of the imagination and morality1 although in this dim fantastic region the elements which we found in history may always be recognized4 ,but the form of immediate existence1 an essential moment in ,christ1 is by them etherealized into a universal thought1 so that the determination of the individual as a #8this' disappears4 ,the ,docet1 for example1 said that ,christ had only a phantom body1 a phantom life2 yet in such assertions thought still constituted the background4 ,the ,gnostics were thus antagonistic to the ,western ,church1 and1 like ,plotinus and the ,neo-,platonists1 this last strove hard against ,gnosticism1 because it remained in what is general1 grasped the conception in the form of imagination1 and because this conception was opposed to that of ,christ in the ,flesh 7 74#a ,the ,church1 on the contrary1 held to the definite form of personality as the principle of concrete actuality4 ,from the ,east other forms of opposition in the principles than those we mentioned in connection with the ,gnostics have been introduced1 namely1 ,light and ,darkness1 ,good and ,evil4 ,but more particularly has this ,parsee opposition emerged in ,manichism1 in which ,god1 as the ,light opposes the evil1 non-existent 7 71 the 1 the material1 self-annihilating4 ,evil is that which contains contradiction in itself3 the powers of evil 771 given over to themselves and raging in blind enmity against one another1 were met by a gleam from the ,kingdom of ,light and thereby attracted1 and this light pacified the powers of evil1 so as to cause them to cease from strife and unite together in order to penetrate into the ,kingdom of ,light4 ,as an inducement to make them so act1 in order to weaken and mitigate their blind fury through a power operating irresistibly1 and in order to bring about their final overthrow1 and the universal supremacy of light1 of life1 of the soul1 the ,father of ,light delivered over one of the powers of good4 ,that is the world-soul 7 72 it was swallowed up by the material1 and this intermixture is the basis of the whole creation4 ,hence the soul is everywhere disseminated1 and in the dead husk it is everywhere working and striving in man1 the microcosm1 as in the universe1 the macrocosm1 but with unequal power2 for where beauty reveals itself1 the ,light-principle1 the soul1 obtains the mastery over matter1 but in the ugly1 the hateful1 it is subordinate1 and matter is the conqueror4 ,this captive soul ,mani likewise called the ,son of ,man--that is1 of the primitive man1 the heavenly man1 of ,adam ,kadmon4 ,but only a part of the ,light-principle which was destined to strive with the ,kingdom of ,evil is in this manner delivered over2 being too weak1 it incurred the danger of being vanquished1 and had to deliver over to matter a part of its armour1 this soul4 ,the part of the soul which had not suffered through such intermingling with matter1 but had raised itself freely to heaven1 works from above for the purification of the imprisoned souls1 its kindred portions of light2 and that is ,jesus1 the ,son of ,man1 in so far as he has not suffered 771 as distinguished from the suffering ,son of ,man1 the soul confined within the universe4 ,but that delivering soul remains in the second and visible light which is still distinguished from the first and unapproachable1 having its seat there1 and by means of sun and moon exercising influence in the purification of nature4 ,to ,mani the whole course of the physical as of the spiritual world appears as a process of purification by means of this soul4 ,the captive principle of ,light required to be raised from the cycle of metempsychosis to an immediate re-union with the ,kingdom of ,light4 ,hence the pure heavenly soul came down to earth and appeared in the semblance of human form in order to reach to the suffering soul 7to the of ,aristotle87 a helping hand4 ,the ,manichans also express themselves to the effect that ,god1 the ,good1 goes forth1 illumines1 and thus produces an intelligible world4 ,what comes third is ,spirit as turning round1 establishing the unity of the second and first1 and experiencing feeling1 and this feeling is ,love4 ,this heresy fully recognizes the ,idea1 but does away with the form of individual existence in which the ,idea is presented in the ,christian religion4 ,the crucifixion of ,christ is consequently taken as merely a semblance1 as allegorical only1 simply an image4 ,that merely phantom crucifixion of the non-suffering ,jesus1 the fellow-suffering1 only imaginary certainly1 of the soul unmingled with matter1 shows forth the actual suffering of the captive soul4 ,thus as the forces of ,darkness could exercise no power over ,christ1 they must also show themselves powerless over the soul allied thereto4 ,with the ,manichans originates the conception of a ,jesus who is crucified in all the world and in the soul2 the crucifixion of ,christ thus mystically signifies only the wounds of our suffering souls4 ,through vegetation the particles of light were held fast1 and thus held fast they were brought forth as plants4 ,the earth becoming fruitful brings forth the suffering 7patibilis7 ,jesus1 who is the life and salvation of men and is crucified on every tree4 ,the which appeared in ,jesus signifies all things4#b ,the ,church has likewise made a principal point of asserting the unity of the divine and human nature4 ,but because this unity in the ,christian religion attained to conceiving consciousness1 human nature was in its actuality taken as #8this1' and not merely in an allegorical or philosophic sense4 ,now if1 on the one hand1 the essential matter with the orthodox ,fathers who opposed themselves to these ,gnostic speculations1 is the fact that they held firmly to the definite form of an objectively conceived ,christ1 on the other hand they attacked the ,arians and all that pertain to them2 for these recognize the individual as manifested1 but do not place the ,person of ,christ in connection with the separation1 with the breaking up of the divine ,idea4 ,they took ,christ to be a man1 accorded to ,him indeed a higher nature1 not1 however1 making ,him a moment of ,god1 of ,spirit itself4 ,the ,arians did not indeed go so far as the ,socinians1 who accepted ,christ merely as a man of noble nature1 a teacher1 and so on2 this sect hence did not form part of the ,church at all1 being simply heathen4 ,but still the ,arians1 since they did not recognize ,god in ,christ1 did away with the idea of the ,trinity1 and consequently with the principle of all speculative philosophy4 ,the according to ,him of a higher nature is likewise a hollow mockery which cannot satisfy us2 as against this the ,fathers accordingly asserted the unity of the divine and human nature1 which has come to consciousness in the individual members of the ,church1 and this is a point of fundamental importance4 ,the ,pelagians again1 denied original sin1 and maintained that man has by nature sufficient virtue and religion4 ,but man should not be what he is by nature2 he should be spiritual4 ,and thus this doctrine is likewise excluded as heretical4 ,therefore the ,church was ruled by ,spirit1 to enable it to hold to the determinations of the ,idea1 though always in the historic form4 ,this is the philosophy of the ,fathers2 they produced the ,church1 as the developed ,spirit required a developed doctrine1 and nothing is so out of place as the endeavour or desire of some men of the present day to lead the ,church back to her original form4 ,what follows thirdly is that the ,idea permeates reality1 is immanent therein1 that not only is there a multitude of believing hearts1 but that from the heart1 just as the natural law rules over a sensuous world1 a higher life of the world1 a kingdom1 is constituted--the reconciliation of ,god with ,himself is accomplished in the world1 and not as a heavenly kingdom that is beyond4 ,this community is the kingdom of ,god upon earth in the ,church2 8,where two or three are gathered together in my name10 says ,christ1 8there am ,i in the midst of them40 ,the ,idea is only for spirit1 for subjective consciousness1 in so far as it realizes itself in actuality1 and thus it not only has to bring itself to perfection in the heart1 but has to perfect itself also into a kingdom of actual consciousness4 ,the ,idea which man1 self-consciousness1 should recognize1 must become altogether objective to him1 so that he may truly apprehend himself as spirit and the ,spirit1 and then that he may be spiritual in a spiritual1 and not in an emotional way4 ,the first objectification is found in the first immediate consciousness of the ,idea1 where it appeared as an individual object1 as the individual existence of a man4 ,the second objectivity is the spiritual worship and communion extended to the ,church4 ,we might imagine a universal community of ,love1 a world of piety and holiness1 a world of brotherly kindness1 of innocent little lambs and pretty triflings with things spiritual1 a divine republic1 a heaven upon earth4 ,but this is not supposed to come to pass on earth2 that imagination is relegated to heaven1 i4e4 to some other place1 that is to say1 it is put off until death4 ,each living actuality directs his feelings1 actions1 and affairs in a very different way from this4 ,on the appearance of ,christianity it is first of all said3 8,my kingdom is not of this world20 but the realization has and ought to be in the present world4 ,in other words the laws1 customs1 constitutions1 and all that belongs to the actuality of spiritual consciousness should be rational4 ,the kingdom of rational actuality is quite a different one1 and must be organized and developed thinkingly and with understanding2 the moment of the self-conscious freedom of the individual must maintain its rights against objective truth and objective command4 ,this1 then1 is the true and actual objectivity of mind in the form of an actual temporal existence as state1 just as ,philosophy is the objectivity of thought which comes to us in the form of universality4 ,such objectivity cannot be in the beginning1 but must come forth after being worked upon by mind and thought4 ,in ,christianity these absolute claims of the intellectual world and of spirit had become the universal consciousness4 ,christianity proceeded from ,judaism1 from self-conscious abjectness and depression4 ,this feeling of nothingness has from the beginning characterized the ,jews2 a sense of desolation1 an abjectness where no reason was1 has possession of their life and consciousness4 ,this single point has later on1 and in its proper time1 become a matter of universal history1 and into this element of the nullity of actuality the whole world has raised itself1 passing out of this principle indeed1 but also into the kingdom of ,thought1 because that nothingness has transformed itself into what is positively reconciled4 ,this is a second creation which came to pass after the first2 in it ,mind became aware of itself as ,i ,i1 that is1 as self-consciousness4 ,this second creation has first of all appeared in self-consciousness equally directly in the form of a sensuous world1 in the form of a sensuous consciousness4 ,as much of the ,notion as has entered in was adopted by the ,fathers from the philosophers already mentioned2 their ,trinity1 in so far as a rational thought1 and not a mere ordinary conception1 comes from these1 and certain other ideas also4 ,but what mainly distinguishes them is the fact that for the ,christian this intelligible world had likewise this immediate sensuous truth of an ordinary course of events--a form which it must have and retain for the majority of men4 #c4 ,this new world has therefore1 however1 to be adopted by a new race of men1 by ,barbarians2 for it is characteristic of barbarians to apprehend the spiritual in a sensuous way4 ,and it must be by northern barbarians1 for it is the northern self-containedness alone that is the immediate principle of this new world-consciousness4 ,with this self-consciousness of the intelligible world as a world immediately actual1 mind1 having regard to what it has in itself become1 is higher than before1 but1 on the other side1 in respect of its consciousness it is thrown quite back to the beginning of culture1 and this consciousness had to commence from the beginning again4 ,what it had to overcome was on the one hand this sensuous immediacy of its intelligible world1 and secondly the opposed sensuous immediacy of actuality1 by its consciousness held as null4 ,it excludes the sun1 replaces it with tapers1 is furnished with images merely2 it is in itself alone1 and inward1 not reconciled for consciousness--to self-consciousness a sinful1 wicked world is present4 ,for the intelligible world of ,philosophy had not yet completed in itself the task of making itself the actual world--of recognizing the intelligible in the actual1 as well as the actual in the intelligible4 ,it is one thing to have the ,idea of ,philosophy1 to recognize absolute essence as absolute essence1 and quite another thing to recognize it as the system of the universe1 of nature1 and of individual self-consciousness1 as the whole development of its reality4 ,the ,neo-,platonists had found that principle of realization--namely1 this real substance which again places itself in quite opposed1 though in themselves real determinations--but having got so far they did not find the form1 the principle of self-consciousness4 ,on the ,teutonic nations the world-spirit imposed the task of developing an embryo into the form of the thinking man4 ,what comes first is the mind as apprehended1 and to that is opposed the subjectivity of will which has not been taken up into mind2 the kingdom of truth and that of the world are bound together and at the same time evidently divided4 ,an intelligible world has thus in the conception of men established itself in the mode of this same actuality1 like a far-away land that is just as really conceived of by us1 peopled and inhabited1 as the world we see1 but which is hidden from us as though by a mountain4 ,it is not the ,greek or any other world of gods and of mythology--a simple1 undivided faith2 for there is likewise present in it the highest negativity1 that is1 the contradiction between actuality and that other world4 ,this intellectual world expresses the nature of real absolute existence4 ,it is on it that ,philosophy tries its powers1 and on it that thought also moils and toils4 ,we have in general outline to deal with these not very pleasing manifestations4 ,our first view of ,philosophy1 as revealed in ,christianity 7pp4 #aj-ba7 is that of a dim groping which is carried on within the depths of the ,idea--as being the forms assumed by the same1 which constitute its moments2 we see a hard struggle made by reason1 which cannot force its way out of the imagination and popular conceptions to the ,notion4 ,there is no venture too rash for the imagination to undertake1 because1 impelled by reason1 it cannot satisfy itself with beautiful images1 but has to pass beyond them4 ,there is likewise no extravagance of reason into which it does not fall1 because it cannot obtain the mastery of the image1 but within this element is merely in the act of warfare with it4 ,later on than this ,western self-immersion1 there arose in the ,east expansion1 negation of all that is concrete1 abstraction from all determinations2 this pure contemplation or pure thought present in ,mohammedanism corresponds to the ,christian descent into self4 ,within ,christianity itself1 however1 the intellectual world is set in opposition to that first ,cabalistic principle2 in it pure conceptions rule which constitute the ideas present in thought1 and with this we enter upon the ,scholastic philosophy4 ,philosophy1 like the arts and sciences1 when1 through the rule of the ,barbarians of ,germany1 they became dumb and lifeless1 took refuge with the ,arabians1 and there attained a wonderful development2 they were the first sources from which the ,west obtained assistance4 ,through the presupposition of the immediately present and accepted truth1 thought had lost its freedom and the truth its presence in conceiving consciousness2 and philosophy sank into a metaphysics of the understanding and into a formal dialectic4 ,we have thus in this period first of all to consider philosophy in the ,east1 and secondly in the ,west2 that is1 the philosophy of the ,arabians first1 and subsequently the philosophy of the ,schools4 ,the ,schoolmen are the principal figures in this period2 they represent ,european philosophy in the ,european ,middle ,ages4 ,the third stage is the dissolution of what is upheld in the scholastic philosophy2 new meteor-like apparitions are now seen1 which precede the third period1 the genuine revival of free ,philosophy4 ,,section ,,one ,,arabian ,,philosophy ,in the ,west the ,germanic tribes had obtained possession of what had hitherto formed a section of the ,roman ,empire1 and their conquests were attaining to shape and solidity1 when another religion dawned in the ,east1 namely the ,mohammedan4 ,the ,east purified itself of all that was individual and definite1 while the ,west descended into the depths and actual presence of spirit4 ,as quickly as the ,arabians with their fanaticism spread themselves over the ,eastern and the ,western world1 so quickly were the various stages of culture passed through by them1 and very shortly they advanced in culture much farther than the ,west4 ,for in ,mohammedanism1 which quickly reached its culminating point1 both as regards external power and dominion and also spiritual development1 ,philosophy1 along with all the other arts and sciences1 flourished to an extraordinary degree1 in spite of its here not displaying any specially characteristic features4 ,philosophy was fostered and cherished among the ,arabians2 the philosophy of the ,arabians must therefore be mentioned in the history of ,philosophy4 ,what we have to say1 however1 chiefly concerns the external preservation and propagation of ,philosophy4 ,the ,arabians became acquainted with ,greek philosophy mainly through the medium of the ,syrians in ,western ,asia1 who had imbibed ,greek culture1 and who were under the ,arabian sway4 ,in ,syria1 which formed a ,greek kingdom1 at ,antioch1 especially in ,berytus and ,edessa1 there were great institutes of learning2 and thus the ,syrians constituted the connecting link between ,greek philosophy and the ,arabians4 ,syrian was the language of the people even in ,bagdad4#c ,moses ,maimonides1 a learned ,jew1 gives further historical particulars in his ,doctor ,perplexorum of this transition of ,philosophy to the ,arabians4 ,he says3 8,all that the ,ishmaelites have written of the unity of ,god and other philosophic dogmas0--especially the sect of the ,muatzali 71 i4e4 the ,separated71 who were the first to take an interest in the abstract intellectual knowledge of such subjects1 while the sect ,assaria 77 arose later--8is based upon arguments and propositions which have been taken from the books of the ,greeks and ,aramans0 7,syrians71 8who strove to refute and deny the teachings of the philosophers40 ,the cause of this is as follows3 ,the ,christian community came to include within it these nations also1 and the ,christians defended many dogmas which were contradictory of philosophic tenets2 among these nations1 however1 the teachings of philosophers were very widely and generally diffused 7for with them ,philosophy had its origin71 and kings arose who adopted the ,christian religion4 ,the ,christian ,greeks and learned ,aramans1 therefore1 when they perceived that their doctrines were so clearly and plainly refuted by the philosophers1 thought out a wisdom of their own1 the 8,wisdom of the ,words0 7,devarim71 and they themselves received on that account the name of the ,speakers 7,medabberim1 74 ,they set up principles which served the purpose both of confirming their faith and of refuting the opposite teaching of the philosophers4 ,when the ,ishmaelites followed and attained supremacy1 and the books of the philosophers themselves fell into their hands1 and along with them the answers which 8,christian ,greeks and ,aramans had written against the philosophic books1 as for instance the writings of ,johannes ,grammaticus1 ,aben ,adi1 and others1 they eagerly laid hold of these and adopted them bodily40#d ,christians and ,ishmaelites felt the same need of philosophy2 the ,ishmaelites1 moreover1 strove all the more eagerly after knowledge of this kind1 because their first desire was to defend ,mohammedanism against ,christianity1 which was the religion of a large proportion of the nations they had conquered4 ,the external sequence of events is this4 ,syriac versions of ,greek works were to be had1 and these were now translated into ,arabic by the ,arabians2 or translations were made from the ,greek directly into ,arabic4 ,in the reign of ,harun al-,raschid several ,syrians are named who lived in ,bagdad1 and who had been called upon by the ,caliphs to translate these works into ,arabic4 ,they were the first scientific teachers among the ,arabians1 and were chiefly physicians2 hence the works they translated were on medicine4 ,among these translators was ,johannes ,mesue of ,damascus1 who lived in the reigns of ,al-,raschid 7d4 ,a4,d4 #ghf71 ,al-,mamun 7d4 ,a4,d4 #hcc7 and ,al-,motawakkil 7d4 ,a4,d4 #hdg71 rather earlier than the rise of the ,turks to supremacy 7,a4,d4 #hfb72 he was a hospital superintendent in ,bagdad4 ,al-,raschid appointed him to make translations from ,syriac into ,arabic2 he opened a public school for the study of medicine and all the sciences then known4 ,honain was a ,christian1 as was also his master ,johannes1 and belonged to the ,arab tribe ,ebadi2 he applied himself to the study of ,greek1 and made a number of translations into ,arabic1 and also into ,syriac1 for example1 ,nicolaus ,de summa philosophi ,aristotelic1 ,ptolemy1 ,hippocrate and ,galen4 ,another is ,ebn ,adda1 an eminent dialectician1 who is quoted by ,abulfaraj4#e ,among the works of the ,greek philosophers it was almost exclusively the writings of ,aristotle which were translated by these ,syrians1 and the later commentaries on the same4 ,it was thus not the ,arabians themselves who translated the above works4 ,in the ,arabic philosophy1 which shows a free1 brilliant and profound power of imagination1 ,philosophy and the sciences took the same bent that they had taken earlier among the ,greeks4 ,plato with his ,ideas or universals laid the foundation of the independent world of intellect1 and established absolute existence as an existence which is manifestly present in the mode of thought2 ,aristotle developed1 completed and peopled the realm of thought2 the ,neo-,platonic philosophy reached the further conception of the intelligible world as ,idea of the existence which is independent in itself1 of spirit2 and then this first ,idea1 which we have already met with in connection with ,proclus1 passed over into a similar ,aristotelian development and completion4 ,consequently it is the ,alexandrian or ,neo-,platonic ,idea which forms the essential principle or basis of the ,arabian as well as the ,scholastic philosophy1 and all that ,christian philosophy offers2 it is on it that the determinations of the ,notion expend their strength1 and around this that they career4 ,a particular description of ,arabian philosophy has in some parts but little interest2 in other parts it will be found that the main dogmas of this philosophy have much in common with those of the ,scholastics4 ,we may say of the ,arabians that their philosophy constitutes no characteristic stage in the development of philosophy4 ,the principal points in this1 as in the later philosophy1 were the question whether the world is eternal1 and the task of proving the unity of ,god and similar dogmas4 ,one great consideration in all this1 however1 was to defend the doctrines of ,mohammedanism1 and owing to this all philosophizing had to be carried on within the limits of these doctrines4 ,the ,arabians1 like the ,christians of the ,west1 were restricted by the dogmas of their ,church 7if one may call it so71 few though these dogmas were2 yet this last circumstance of the small number of the dogmas certainly gave them greater liberty4 ,but according to all that we know of them1 they established no principle of self-conscious reason that was truly higher1 and thus they brought ,philosophy no further4 ,they have no other principle than that of revelation1 therefore only a principle that is external4 ,a4 ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,medabberim4 ,the ,medabberim are specially mentioned by ,moses ,maimonides as a widely extended philosophic school or sect of considerable eminence4 ,he speaks 7,more ,nevochim1 ,p4 ,i4 c4 #ga1 pp4 #acd1 #ace7 of the peculiarity of their method of philosophy somewhat as follows3 8,the ,ishmaelites1 however1 have extended their discourses still further1 and have aspired to other wonderful doctrines1 of which none of the ,greek ,medabberim knew anything1 because they were still on some points in agreement with the philosophers4 ,the main point to be remarked is that all the ,medabberim1 whether among the ,greeks who had become ,christians1 or among the ,ishmaelites1 in the building up of their principles did not follow the nature of the matter itself1 or draw their arguments from it1 but only had in view how the subject must be regarded in order to support their assertion1 or at least not to refute it altogether3 afterwards they boldly asserted that these were the circumstances of the case1 and adduced further arguments and maxims in support of their object4 ,they insisted on that1 and that alone1 which concurred with their opinions1 even though it were in the most remote degree1 through a hundred links of reasoning4 ,the earliest of their learned men adopted this practice1 though professing that they reached these reflections through speculation alone1 without reference to any preconceived opinion4 ,their successors did not follow their example10 c4 ,in the pure philosophy of the so-called 8,speakers0 was expressed the principle1 peculiar to the ,oriental mind1 of the dissolution of definite thought in all its consequences as the dissolution of all connection and relation4 ,maimonides says 7,p4 ,i4 c4 #ga1 p4 #ace2 c4 #gc1 p4 #adi73 8,the ground-principle of the ,medabberim is that men can have no certain knowledge of the nature of things1 because in the understanding the contrary may ever exist and be thought4 ,besides this they in the majority of instances confound imagination with understanding1 and give to the former the name of the latter4 ,they adopted as a principle1 atoms and empty space10 where all connection appears as something contingent4 8,production is nothing but a connection of atoms1 and decay nothing but a separation of the same2 and time consists of many #8nows4'0 ,in this way nothing but the atom really exists4 ,they have thus in the more advanced cultivation of thought brought to consciousness the main standpoint1 then as now the standpoint of the ,orientals--that of substance1 the one substance4 ,this pantheism1 or ,spinozism1 if you like to call it so1 is thus the universal view of ,oriental poets1 historians and philosophers4 ,the ,medabberim go on to say3 8,substances1 i4e4 individuals1 which10 for the rest1 8are created by ,god1 have many accidental qualities1 as in snow every particle is white4 ,but no quality can endure for two moments2 as it comes1 it goes again1 and ,god creates another and yet another in its place40 ,all determinations are thus fleeting or perishable2 the individual alone is permanent4 8,if it pleases ,god to create another quality in a substance1 it continues2 but if ,he ceases to create1 the substance perishes40 ,thereby all necessary connection is done away with1 so that ,nature has no meaning4 8,they therefore deny that anything exists by nature1 likewise that the nature of this or that body necessitates that it should have certain qualities rather than others4 ,but they say that ,god creates all qualities instantaneously1 without natural means and without the help of anything else40 ,general permanence is substance1 and the particular is altered every moment1 and so exists through the substance4 8,according to this principle they say1 for instance1 that when we think we have dyed a garment red with red dye we have not dyed it red at all2 for ,god created the red colour in the garment at the very moment at which we thought we had brought about the result with the red dye4 ,god observes the invariable custom of not permitting that the colour black should be produced except when the garment is dyed with that hue2 and the first colour which comes to pass on the occasion of the connection is not permanent1 but disappears on the instant1 and every moment another appears which is created in its turn4 ,in the same way knowledge also is an accident1 which is created by ,god at every moment that ,i know anything2 to-day we no longer possess the knowledge which we yesterday possessed4 ,a man10 when writing1 8does not move the pen when he thinks he moves it1 but the motion is an accident of the pen1 created by ,god at the moment40 ,in this way ,god alone is in truth the operative cause2 but ,he might have made everything differently4 8,their eighth proposition is to the effect that nothing but substance or accident exists1 and natural forms are themselves accidents2 substances alone are individuals4 ,the ninth proposition is that accidents have nothing to do with one another2 they have no causal connection or other relation2 in every substance all accidents may exist4 ,the tenth proposition is transition 71 transitus1 possibilitas730 8,all that we can fancy may also pass over into the understanding1 i4e4 be possible4 ,but in this way everything is possible10 since there are no laws of the understanding2 this transition of thought is thus perfectly accidental4 8,a man as large as a mountain1 a flea as large as an elephant1 are possible4 ,everything may just as well be something else as what it is1 and there is no reason at all why anything should be one way rather than another4 ,they term it a mere habit that the earth revolves round a centre-point1 that fire moves upward and that it is hot2 it is just as possible1 they say1 that fire should be cold40#f ,we thus see an utter inconstancy of everything2 and this whirl of all things is essentially ,oriental4 ,but at the same time this is certainly also a complete dissolution of all that pertains to reasonableness1 in harmony of course with ,eastern exaltation of spirit1 which allows of nothing definite4 ,god is in ,himself the perfectly undefined1 ,his activity is altogether abstract1 and hence the particulars produced thereby are perfectly contingent2 if we speak of the necessity of things1 the term is meaningless and incomprehensible1 and no attempt should be made to comprehend it4 ,the activity of ,god is thus represented as perfectly devoid of reason4 ,this abstract negativity1 combined with the permanent unity1 is thus a fundamental conception in the ,oriental way of looking at things4 ,oriental poets are in a marked degree pantheists2 the pantheistic is their ordinary point of view4 ,thus the ,arabians developed the sciences and philosophy1 without further defining the concrete ,idea2 their work is rather the dissolution of all that is definite in this substance1 with which is associated mere changeableness as the abstract moment of negativity4 ,b4 ,,commentators ,,of ,,aristotle4 ,the ,arabians1 moreover1 made a point for the most part of studying the writings of ,aristotle very diligently1 and of availing themselves more especially both of his metaphysical and logical writings1 and also of his ,physics2 they occupied themselves particularly with multiplying commentaries on ,aristotle1 and developing still further the abstract logical element there present4 ,many of these commentaries are still extant4 ,works of this kind are known in the ,west1 and have been even translated into ,latin and printed2 but much good is not to be got from them4 ,the ,arabians developed the metaphysics of the understanding and a formal logic4 ,some of the famous ,arabians lived as early as the eighth and ninth centuries2 their progress was therefore very rapid1 for the ,west had as yet made very little advance in culture4 ,alkendi1 who wrote a commentary on the ,logic1 flourished in and about ,a4,d4 #hjj1 under ,almamun4#g ,alfarabi died in #iff2 he wrote commentaries on ,aristotle's ,organon1 which were made diligent use of by the ,scholastics1 and was also author of a work 8,on the ,origin and ,division of the ,sciences40 ,it is related of him that he read through ,aristotle's treatise ,on ,hearing forty times1 and his ,rhetoric two hundred times1 without getting at all tired of them2#h he must have had a good stomach4 ,the very physicians made a study of philosophy1 and formulated theories2 among them was ,avicenna 7b4 ,a4,d4 #ihd1 d4 ,a4,d4 #ajfd71 who belonged to ,bokhara1 to the east of the ,caspian ,sea2 he wrote a commentary on ,aristotle4#i ,algazel 7d4 ,a4,d4 #aabg at ,bagdad7 wrote compendiums of logic and metaphysics2 he was a sceptic of great ability1 with a powerful mind of the ,oriental cast2 he held the words of the ,prophet to be pure truth1 and wrote ,destructio ,philosophorum4#aj ,tofail died in ,seville in ,a4,d4 #aaic4aa ,averros1 who died ,a4,d4 #abag1 was specially distinguished as the commentator of ,aristotle4#ab ,the acquaintance of the ,arabians with ,aristotle has this interest in history that it was thus that ,aristotle first became known also in the ,west4 ,the commentaries on ,aristotle and the collections of passages from his writings become thus for the ,western world a fountain of philosophy4 ,western nations long knew nothing of ,aristotle1 excepting through such retranslations of his works and translations of ,arabian commentaries on them4 ,for such translations were made from ,arabic into ,latin by ,spanish ,arabs1 and especially by ,jews in the south of ,spain and ,portugal and in ,africa2 there was often even a ,hebrew translation between4 ,c4 ,,jewish ,,philosophers4 ,with the ,arabians are closely connected the ,jewish philosophers1 among whom the above-mentioned ,moses ,maimonides held a distinguished place4 ,he was born at ,cordova1 in ,spain1 ,a4,d4 #aaca 7,anno ,mundi #dhia1 or1 according to others1 #dhie71 and lived in ,egypt4#ac ,besides ,more ,nevochim1 which has been translated into ,latin1 he composed other works2 of him and other ,jews much more of a literary character might be said4 ,in their philosophy a strong ,cabalistic element1 on the one hand1 makes itself felt throughout1 in astrology1 geomancy1 c42 on the other hand1 we find in ,moses ,maimonides1 as in the ,fathers1 that the foundation is laid in history4 ,he deals with this in a strictly abstract system of metaphysics1 which is connected1 in ,philo's fashion1 with the ,mosaic books and their interpretation4 ,we find in these ,jewish philosophers proofs brought forward that ,god is ,one1 that the world was created1 and that matter is not eternal2 ,maimonides also speaks of the nature of ,god4 ,the unity of ,god is dealt with as it was among the ancient ,eleatics and the ,neo-,platonists2 to prove1 namely1 that not the ,many1 but the self-begetting and self-abrogating ,one is the truth4#ad ,,section ,,two ,,the ,,scholastic ,,philosophy ,all the ,philosophy which we first encounter in the ,middle ,ages1 when independent states begin to rise1 consists of bare remnants of the ,roman world1 which on its ,fall had sunk in all respects so low that the culture of the world seemed to have come entirely to an end4 ,thus in the ,west hardly anything was known beyond the ,isagoge of ,porphyry1 the ,latin ,commentaries of ,boethius on the ,logical works of ,aristotle1 and extracts from the same by ,cassiodorus--most barren compilations2 there is also what is just as barren1 the dissertations ascribed to ,augustine ,de dialectica and ,de categoriis1 which last is a paraphrase of the ,aristotelian work upon the categories4#ae ,these were the first make-shifts or expedients for carrying on ,philosophy2 in them the most external and most formal reasoning is applied4 ,the whole effect of the scholastic philosophy is a monotonous one4 ,in vain have men hitherto endeavoured to show in this theology1 which reigned from the eighth or even sixth century almost to the sixteenth1 particular distinctions and stages in development4 ,in this case as in that of the ,arabian philosophy1 time does not allow--and if it did the nature of things would not allow--us to separate the scholastic philosophy into its individual systems or manifestations1 but only to give a general sketch of the main elements present therein which it has actually taken up into thought4 ,it is not interesting by reason of its matter1 for we cannot remain at the consideration of this2 it is not a philosophy4 ,the name1 however1 properly speaking indicates a general manner rather than a system--if we may speak of a philosophic system4 ,scholasticism is not a fixed doctrine like ,platonism or ,scepticism1 but a very indefinite name which comprehends the philosophic endeavours of ,christendom for the greater part of a thousand years4 ,however1 this history which occupies nearly a thousand years is1 as a matter of fact1 comprised within one ,notion which we propose to consider more closely2 it has ever occupied the same standpoint1 and been grounded on the same principle2 for it is the faith of the ,church that we catch sight of1 and a formalism which is merely an eternal analysis and constant re-iteration within itself4 ,the more general acceptance of the ,aristotelian writings has merely brought forth a difference of degree and caused no real scientific progress4 ,here there is indeed a history of men1 but speaking properly none of scientific knowledge2 the men are noble1 pious1 and in all respects most distinguished4 ,the study of the scholastic philosophy is a difficult one1 even if its language only be considered4 ,the ,scholastics certainly make use of a barbaric ,latin1 but this is not the fault of the ,scholastics but of their ,latin culture4 ,latin forms a quite unsuitable instrument for applying to philosophic categories such as these1 because the terms which the new culture adopts could not possibly be expressed by this language without unduly straining it2 the beautiful ,latin of ,cicero is not adapted for use in profound speculations4 ,it cannot be expected of anyone to know at first hand this philosophy of the ,middle ,ages1 for it is as comprehensive and voluminous as it is barren and ill-expressed4 ,of the great schoolmen we still have many works left to us which are very lengthy1 so that it is no easy task to study them3 the later they are1 the more formal do they become4 ,the ,schoolmen did not only write compendiums--for the writings of ,duns ,scotus amount to twelve1 and those of ,thomas ,aquinas to eighteen folios4 ,abstracts of them are to be found in various works4 ,the principal sources from which we obtain our knowledge are3 #a1 ,lambertus ,danus in the ,prolegomena to his ,commentarius in librum primum sententiarum ,petri ,lombardi1 ,genev1 #aehj4 7,this is the best authority we have in abridged form72 #b1 ,launoi3 ,de varia ,aristotelis in ,academia ,parisiensi fortuna2 #c1 ,cramer3 ,continuation of ,bossuet's ,history of the ,world1 in the last two volumes2 #d1 the ,summa of ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,in ,tiedemann's ,history of ,philosophy extracts from the ,scholastics are also to be found1 as likewise in ,tennemann2 ,rixner also makes judicious extracts4 ,we shall limit ourselves to general points of view4 ,the name finds its origin in this way4 ,from the time of ,charles the ,great it was only in two places--in the great schools attached to the great cathedral churches and monasteries--that a cleric1 that is a canon who had the oversight of the instructors 7informatores71 was called scholasticus2 he likewise gave lectures on the most important branch of science1 theology4 ,in the monasteries he who was the most advanced instructed the monks4 ,we have not1 properly speaking1 to deal with these2 but although scholastic philosophy was something altogether different1 the name of ,scholastics attached itself to those alone who propounded their theology scientifically and in a system4 ,in place of the patres ecclesi there thus arose later on the doctores4 ,the scholastic philosophy is thus really theology1 and this theology is nothing but philosophy4 ,the further content of theology is merely that which is present in the ordinary conceptions of religion2 theology1 however1 is the science of the system as it must necessarily be present within every ,christian1 every peasant1 c4 ,the science of theology is often placed in an external historical content1 in exegesis1 in the enumeration of the various manuscripts of the ,new ,testament1 in considering whether these are written on parchment1 cotton fabrics or paper1 whether in uncial letters or otherwise1 and which century they belong to2 further matters for consideration are the ,jewish conceptions of time1 the history of the ,popes1 ,bishops and ,fathers1 and what took place at the councils of the ,church4 ,all these matters1 however1 do not pertain to the nature of ,god and its relation to mankind4 ,the one essential object of theology as the doctrine of ,god1 is the nature of ,god1 and this content is in its nature really speculative2 those theologians who consider this are therefore nothing less than philosophers4 ,the science of ,god is nothing but ,philosophy4 ,philosophy and theology have hence here also been counted one1 and it is their separation that constitutes the transition into modern times1 seeing that men have thought that for thinking reason something could be true which is not true for theology4 ,down to the ,middle ,ages1 on the contrary1 it was held as fundamental that there should be but one truth4 ,thus the theology of the scholastics is not to be represented as though1 as with us1 it merely contained doctrines about ,god1 c41 in historic guise1 for in fact it also has within it the profoundest speculations of ,aristotle and of the ,neo-,platonists4 ,their philosophy1 and much in them that is excellent1 is found in ,aristotle1 only in a simpler and purer form2 and to them too the whole lay beyond actuality and mingled with ,christian actuality as it is represented to us4 ,from ,christianity1 within whose bounds we now have our place1 ,philosophy has to re-establish its position4 ,in heathendom the root of knowledge was external nature as thought devoid of self1 and subjective nature as the inward self4 ,both ,nature and the natural self of mankind1 and likewise thought1 there possessed affirmative significance2 hence all this was good4 ,in ,christianity the root of truth has1 however1 quite another meaning2 it was not only the truth as against the heathen gods1 but as against ,philosophy also1 against nature1 against the immediate consciousness of man4 ,nature is there no longer good1 but merely a negative2 self-consciousness1 the thought of man1 his pure self1 all this receives a negative position in ,christianity4 ,nature has no validity1 and affords no interest2 its universal laws1 as the reality under which the individual existences of nature are collected1 have likewise no authority3 the heavens1 the sun1 the whole of nature is a corpse4 ,nature is given over to the spiritual1 and indeed to spiritual subjectivity2 thus the course of nature is everywhere broken in upon by miracles4 ,with this surrender of natural necessity we have the fact associated that all further content1 all that truth which constitutes the universal of that nature1 is given and revealed4 ,the one starting-point1 the contemplation of nature1 is thus for knowledge undoubtedly not present4 ,then this fact is likewise set aside that ,i am present as a self4 ,the self as this immediate certainty has to be abrogated2 it must also merge itself in another self1 but in one beyond1 and only there does it have its value4 ,this other self1 in which the proper self is made to have its freedom1 is first of all likewise a particular self1 that has not the form of universality3 it is determined and limited in time and space1 and at the same time has the significance of an absolute in and for itself4 ,a real sense of self is thus abandoned1 but what self-consciousness on the other hand gains is not a universal1 a thought4 ,in thought ,i have real affirmative significance1 not as an individual1 but as universal #8,i'2 the content of truth is now1 however1 plainly individualized1 and thus the thought of the #8,i' falls away4 ,thereby1 however1 the highest concrete content of the absolute ,idea is set forth1 in which the opposites that are plainly infinite are united2 it is the power which unites in itself what appears to consciousness infinitely removed from one another--the mortal and the absolute4 ,this absolute is itself #8this' first of all as this concrete1 not as abstraction1 but as the unity of universal and individual2 this concrete consciousness is for the first time truth4 ,the reason of the former content being also true1 comes to me as something not pertaining to myself1 but as a thing received outside of self4 ,the testimony of spirit1 indeed1 pertains thereto1 and my inmost self is present there2 but the testimony of spirit is a thing concealed1 which does not further reveal itself1 does not beget the content from itself1 but receives it4 ,the ,spirit which bears witness is further itself distinguished from me as an individual2 my testifying spirit is another1 and there only remains to me the empty shell of passivity4 ,conditioned by this inflexible standpoint1 ,philosophy had to go forth once more4 ,the first working up of this content1 the inward operation of universal thought in the same1 is the task scholastic philosophy has to undertake4 ,the opposition between faith and reason forms the end arrived at2 reason1 on the one hand1 feels the necessity of setting to work on nature in order to obtain immediate certainty1 and on the other hand of finding in genuine thought1 in specific production out of self1 this same satisfaction4 ,we must now speak of the methods and manners of the scholastics4 ,in this scholastic activity thought pursues its work quite apart from all regard to experience2 we no longer hear anything of taking up actuality and determining it through thought4 ,although the ,notion came into recognition earlier than this1 in ,aristotle1 in the first place1 the ,notion was not apprehended as the necessity of carrying the content further2 for this was received in its successive manifestations1 and there was present merely an intermingling of actuality accepted as truth and of thought4 ,still less1 in the second place1 was the greater part of the content permeated by ,notions1 for this content was taken up superficially into the form of thought--more especially with the ,stoics and ,epicureans4 ,the scholastic philosophy altogether dissociates itself from any such endeavours2 it leaves actuality to exist alongside itself as if it were despised and had no interest4 ,for reason found its true existence1 its actualization1 in another world and not in this2 the whole progress of the cultivated world goes1 however1 to the re-instalment of a faith in the present world4 ,nevertheless1 at first all knowledge and action1 and whatever relates to an interest in this world1 were entirely banished4 ,branches of knowledge that pertain to such ordinary matters as sight and hearing1 restful contemplation and occupation with ordinary actuality here found no place2 nor did such sciences as recognize a definite sphere of actuality after their own particular fashion1 and constitute the material for genuine philosophy1 nor arts which give to the ,idea a sensuous existence4 ,likewise law and right1 the recognition of the actual man1 were not esteemed as pertaining to the social relationships of life1 but to some other sphere4 ,in this absence of rationality in the actual1 or of rationality which has its actuality in ordinary existence1 is found the utter barbarism of thought1 in that it keeps to another world1 and does not have the ,notion of reason--the ,notion that the certainty of self is all truth4 ,now thought as sundered has a content1 the intelligible world1 as an actuality existent for itself1 to which thought applies itself4 ,its conduct is here to be compared with that which takes place when the understanding applies itself to the sensuous and perceptible world1 makes it as substance its basis1 having a fixed object in it1 and reasoning respecting it2 it is then not the independent movement of ,philosophy proper which penetrates existence and expresses it1 for all it does is to find predicates regarding it4 ,the scholastic philosophy has thus the intelligible world of the ,christian religion1 ,god and all ,his attributes and works therewith connected1 as an independent object2 and thought is directed to ,god's unchangeableness1 to such questions as whether matter is eternal1 whether man is free1 c4--just as the understanding passes to and fro over the phenomenal and perceived4 ,now the scholastic philosophy was here given over to the infinite movement of determinate ,notions2 the categories of possibility and actuality1 freedom and necessity1 constitution and substance1 c41 are of this nature1 they are not fixed1 but pure movements4 ,anything whatever1 determined as potential1 transforms itself equally into the opposite1 and must necessarily be surrendered2 and determination can only save itself by a new distinction1 because it must1 on the one hand1 be given up1 and on the other retained4 ,the scholastics are thus decried on account of the endless distinctions which they draw4 ,for the sake of these determinations through the abstract ,notion the ,aristotelian philosophy was predominant1 though not in its whole extent4 ,it was the ,aristotelian ,organon that was held in such favour1 and that indeed just as much for its laws of thought as for its metaphysical conceptions--the categories4 ,these abstract ,notions constituted in their determinateness the understanding of the scholastic philosophy1 which could not pass beyond itself and attain to freedom1 nor seize upon the freedom given by reason4 ,with this finite form a finite content is likewise directly associated4 ,from one determination we pass on to another1 and such determinations1 as particular1 are finite2 the determination there relates itself externally and not as self-comprehensive and self-embracing4 ,the result of this determination is that thought will really act as if it brought about conclusions1 for to draw conclusions is the mode of formal logical progression4 ,philosophy thus consists of a methodical and syllogistic reasoning4 ,just as the ,sophists of ,greece wandered about amongst abstract conceptions on behalf of actuality1 so did the scholastics on behalf of their intellectual world4 ,to the former ,being had validity2 it they had rescued and delivered as against the negativity of the ,notion1 while along with that they had justified it through the same4 ,the principal endeavour of the scholastics was in the same way to vindicate the ,christian intellectual world as against the confusion of the ,notion1 and through the latter to demonstrate its conformity with the same4 ,the universal form of the scholastic philosophy thus consisted in this--that a proposition was laid down1 the objections to it brought forward1 and these contradicted through counter-propositions and distinctions4 ,philosophy was hence not separated from theology1 as it is not in itself1 for ,philosophy is the knowledge of absolute existence1 that is to say1 theology4 ,but to that theology the ,christian absolute world was a system which was held to be an actuality1 as was ordinary actuality for the ,greek sophists4 ,of ,philosophy proper there thus remained only the laws of thought and abstractions4 ,a4 ,,relationship ,,of ,,the ,,scholastic ,,philosophy ,,to ,,christianity4 ,philosophy with the scholastics had consequently the same quality of want of independence as it had before this with the ,christian ,fathers and the ,arabians4 ,the ,church as already constituted established itself amongst the ,teutonic nations1 and through its constitution it conditioned philosophy4 ,the ,christian ,church had indeed spread itself abroad throughout the ,roman world1 but1 more especially in the beginning1 it merely formed a community of its own1 by whom the world was renounced1 and which made no special claims to recognition--or if such claims were made they were merely negative1 because the individuals in the world were simply martyrs1 thus renouncing the world4 ,but the ,church in time became dominant1 and the ,roman emperors1 both of the ,east and of the ,west1 embraced ,christianity4 ,thus the ,church attained to a position openly recognized and undisturbed1 from which it exercised much influence upon the world4 ,the political world1 however1 fell into the hands of the ,teutonic nations1 and thereby a new form arose1 and to this the scholastic philosophy pertains4 ,we know the revolution by the name of the ,migration of the ,nations 7supra1 pp4 #bc1 #bd74 ,fresh races inundated the ancient ,roman world and established themselves therein2 they thus erected their new world on the ruins of the old--a picture which ,rome in its present aspect still presents4 ,there the splendour of the ,christian temples is due in part to the remnants of the ancient1 and new palaces are built on ruins and have ruins all around4 #a4 ,the principal feature in the ,middle ,ages is found in this disunion1 the two sides here present2 there are revealed in it two nations1 two manners of speech4 ,we see people who have hitherto ruled1 a previous world having its own language1 arts1 and sciences1 and on this to them foreign element the new nations grafted themselves1 and these thus started upon their course internally dissevered4 ,in this history we have thus before us not the development of a nation from itself1 but one proceeding from its opposite1 and one which is and remains burdened by this opposite1 and which takes it up into itself and has to overcome it4 ,hence these people have in this way represented in themselves the nature of the spiritual process4 ,spirit is the making for itself a presupposition1 the giving to itself the natural as a counterpoise1 the separating itself therefrom1 thus the making it an object1 and then for the first time the working upon this hypothesis1 formulating it1 and from itself bringing it forth1 begetting it1 internally reconstructing it4 ,hence in the ,roman as in the ,byzantine world1 ,christianity has triumphed as a ,church2 but neither of these worlds was capable of effectuating the new religion in itself and of bringing forth a new world from this principle4 ,for in both there was a character already present--customs1 laws1 a juridical system1 a constitution 7if it can be called constitution71 a political condition1 capacities1 art1 science1 spiritual culture--in short1 everything was there4 ,the nature of spirit1 on the contrary1 requires that the world thus constituted should be begotten from it1 and that this process of begetting should take place through the agency of reaction1 through the assimilation of something which has gone before4 ,these conquerors have thus established themselves in a foreign sphere1 and have become the rulers over it2 but at the same time they have come under the dominion of a new spirit which has been imposed upon them4 ,although on the one hand predominant1 on the other they have come under the dominion of the spiritual element1 because they conducted themselves passively in regard to it4 ,the spiritual ,idea or spirituality has become imposed upon the dulness1 both in mind and spirit1 of these rough barbarians2 their hearts were thereby pricked4 ,the rough nature has in this way become immanent in the ,idea as an eternal opposition1 or there is kindled in them infinite pain1 the most terrible suffering--such that it may even be represented as a crucified ,christ4 ,they had to sustain this conflict within themselves1 and one side of it is found in the philosophy which later on made its appearance amongst them1 and was first of all received as something given4 ,they are still uncultured people1 but for all their barbaric dulness they are deep in heart and mind2 on them1 then1 has the principle of mind been bestowed1 and along with it this pain1 this war between spiritual and natural1 has necessarily been instituted4 ,culture here begins from the most terrible contradiction1 and this has to be by it resolved4 ,it is a kingdom of pain1 but of purgatory1 for that which is in the pain is spirit and not animal1 and spirit does not die1 but goes forth from its grave4 ,the two sides of this contradiction are really thus related to one another in such a way that it is the spiritual which has to reign over the barbarians4 ,the true dominion of spirit cannot1 however1 be a dominion in the sense that its opposite is in subjection to it2 spirit in and for itself cannot have the subjective spirit to which it relates confronting it as an externally obedient slave1 for this last is itself also spirit4 ,the dominion that exists must take up this position1 that spirit is in subjective spirit in harmony with itself4 ,the universal is thus that opposition in which the one can only have supremacy by the subjection of the other1 but which already contains the principle of resolution in itself because mind must necessarily bear rule4 ,and hence the consequent development is only this1 that mind as reconciliation attains the mastery4 ,to this it pertains that not the subjective consciousness1 mind and heart alone1 but also the worldly rule1 laws1 institutions1 the human life1 in so far as these rest in mind1 must become rational4 ,in the ,republic of ,plato we have met with the idea that the philosophers are those who ought to reign4 ,now is the time in which it is said that the spiritual are to govern1 but this talk about the spiritual has been made to bear the significance that ecclesiasticism and the ecclesiastics ought to govern4 ,the spiritual is thus made a particular form1 an individual1 but the real meaning that it bears is that the spiritual as such ought to be the determining factor2 and this has passed current until the present day4 ,thus in the ,french ,revolution we see that abstract thought is made to rule2 in accordance with it constitution and laws are determined1 it forms the bond between man and man2 and men come to have the consciousness that what is esteemed amongst them is abstract thought1 and that liberty and equality are what ought to be regarded2 in this the subject also has his real value1 even in relation to actuality4 ,one form of this reconciliation is likewise this1 that the subject is satisfied with himself and in himself as he stands and moves1 with his thoughts1 his desires1 with his spirituality2 and thus that his knowledge1 his thought1 his conviction1 has come to be the highest1 and has the determination of the divine1 of what holds good as absolute4 ,the divine and spiritual is thus implanted in my subjective spirit1 is identical with me2 ,i myself am the universal1 and it has efficacy for me only as ,i directly know it4 ,this form of reconciliation is the newest1 but the most one-sided4 ,for the spiritual is not there determined as objective1 but is only comprehended as it is in my subjectivity1 in my consciousness3 my conviction as such is taken as ultimate1 and that is the formal reconciliation of subjectivity with itself4 ,if the reconciliation has this form1 the point of view of which we spoke before has no longer any interest2 it is past and a mere matter of history4 ,if the conviction as it immediately reveals itself within every subject is the true1 the absolute1 this process of mediation between ,god1 as the true and absolute1 and mankind1 is no longer in us a necessity4 ,the doctrines of the ,christian religion have likewise the position of something foreign1 pertaining to a particular time1 that with which certain men have occupied themselves4 ,the conception that the ,idea is absolutely concrete1 and is as spirit in a relation of opposition to the subject1 has disappeared1 and only shows itself as having passed away4 ,in so far that which ,i have said about the principle of the ,christian system1 and shall still say of the scholastics1 has interest only from the standpoint which ,i have given1 when the interest is in the ,idea in its concrete determination1 and not from the standpoint of the immediate reconciliation of the subject with himself4 #b4 ,we have now to consider further the character of the opposition to any agreement with ,philosophy2 and to do this we must shortly call to mind the historical aspect of the case1 although we need only treat of the main points therein4 ,the first matter to consider is the opposition that exists in the world4 ,this form of opposition as it appears in history is as follows4 ,spirituality as such should be the spirituality of the heart2 spirit1 however1 is one1 and thus the communion of those who have this spirituality is asserted4 ,hence a community arises1 which then becomes an external order1 and thus1 as we have seen 7pp4 #ba1 #bb71 expands into a church4 ,in as far as spirit is its principle1 it is1 as spiritual1 immediately universal1 for isolation in feeling1 opinion1 c41 is unspiritual4 ,the ,church organizes itself1 but yet it goes forth into worldly existence1 attains to riches1 possesses goods1 and even becomes worldly and imbued with all the brute passions2 for the spiritual is merely the original principle4 ,the heart that is set on ordinary existence1 on the world1 and the whole of such human relationships as are hereby involved1 is guided by these inclinations1 desires and passions1 by all this grossness and vulgarity4 ,thus the ,church merely has the spiritual principle within itself without its being truly real1 and in such a way that its further relationships are not yet rational2 for such is their character before the development of the spiritual principle in the world4 ,the worldly element without being conformable to the spiritual1 is present as existence1 and is the immediately natural worldly element2 in this way the ,church comes to have in itself the immediately natural principle4 ,all the passions it has within itself--arrogance1 avarice1 violence1 deceit1 rapacity1 murder1 envy1 hatred--all these sins of barbarism are present in it1 and indeed they belong to its scheme of government4 ,this government is thus already a rule of passion1 although it professes to be a spiritual rule1 and thus the ,church is for the most part wrong in its worldly principles1 though right in its spiritual aspect4 ,hence the new religion separated our whole conception of the world into two different worlds1 the intellectual but not subjectively conceived world1 and the temporal world4 ,therefore life as a whole fell into two parts1 two kingdoms4 ,directly opposite the spiritual worldly kingdom there stands the independent worldly kingdom1 emperor against pope1 papacy and ,church--not a state1 but a worldly government2 there the world beyond1 here the world beside us4 ,two absolutely essential principles conflict with one another2 the rude ways of the world1 the ruggedness of the individual will1 beget an opposition most terrible and severe4 ,the culture which now begins to show itself is confronted by this incomplete reality1 as an actual world in opposition to its world of thought2 and it does not recognize the one as present in the other4 ,it possesses two establishments1 two standards of measure and of weight1 and these it does not bring together but leaves mutually estranged4 ,the spiritual kingdom likewise has as ,church an immediate present of ordinary actuality1 but the worldly kingdom1 both as external nature and as the real self of consciousness1 has no truth or value in itself2 for truth1 as lying beyond it--the measure of truth that shines in it--is given to it from without as something inconceivable and in itself complete4 ,the worldly kingdom must thus be subject to the spiritual become worldly2 the emperor is hence defender and protector of the ,church 7advocatus ecclesi74 ,the worldly element1 in a certain sense1 takes up a position of independence1 no doubt1 but it is still in unity with the other in such a way that it recognizes the spiritual as dominant4 ,in this opposition a war must arise both on account of the worldly element which is present in the ,church itself1 and likewise on account of the directly worldly element of violence and of barbarism in worldly rule as it exists per se4 ,the war must at first1 however1 prove disastrous to the worldly side1 for just as its own position is asserted1 the other is likewise recognized by it1 and it is forced humbly to submit to this last1 to the spiritual and its passions4 ,the bravest1 noblest emperors have been excommunicated by popes1 cardinals1 legates1 and even by archbishops and bishops2 and they could do nothing in self-defence1 nor put their trust in outward power1 for it was internally broken2 and thus they were ever vanquished and finally forced to surrender4 ,in the second place1 as regards morality in the individual1 we see on the one hand religion in its truly noble and attractive form in a few isolated individuals alone4 ,i refer to those solitary spirits who are dead to the world and far removed therefrom1 who find in their emotions what satisfies them1 and1 living in a little circle1 can limit themselves to the sphere of religion4 ,this is the case with women in the ,middle ,ages1 or with the monks or other solitaries who were able to preserve themselves in a restricted and contracted state of fervour such as this1 in which the spiritual side makes itself infinitely felt1 although it lacks actuality4 ,the one truth stood isolated and alone in man1 the whole actuality of mind was not yet penetrated by it4 ,on the other hand it is1 however1 essential that mind as will1 impulse and passion1 should demand quite another position1 another mode of venting and realizing itself1 than any such solitary and contracted sphere affords1 that the world should require a more extended sphere of existence1 an actual association of individuals1 reason and thought coming together in actual relations and actions4 ,this circle in which mind is realized--the human life--is1 however1 at first separated from the spiritual region of truth4 ,subjective virtue partakes more of the character of suffering and privation on its own account1 morality is just this renunciation and self-surrender1 and virtue as regards others merely has the character of benevolence1 a fleeting1 accidental character destitute of relation4 ,all that pertains to actuality is hence not perfected by the truth1 which remains a heavenly truth alone1 a ,beyond4 ,actuality1 the earthly element1 is consequently ,god-forsaken and hence arbitrary2 a few isolated individuals are holy1 and the others are not holy4 ,in these others we first see the holiness of a moment in the quarter of an hour of worship1 and then for weeks a life of rudest selfishness and violence and the most ruthless passion4 ,individuals fall from one extreme into another1 from the extreme of rude excess1 lawlessness1 barbarism1 and self-will1 into the renunciation of all things without exception1 the conquest of all desires4 ,the great army of the ,crusaders gives us the best example of this4 ,they march forth on a holy errand1 but on the way they give free vent to all the passions1 and in this the leaders show the example2 the individuals allow themselves to fall into violence and heinous sin4 ,their march accomplished1 though with an utter lack of judgment and forethought1 and with the loss of thousands on the way1 ,jerusalem is reached3 it is beautiful when ,jerusalem comes in view to see them all doing penance in contrition of heart1 falling on their faces and reverently adoring4 ,but this is only a moment which follows upon months of frenzy1 foolishness and grossness1 which everywhere displayed itself on their march4 ,animated by the loftiest bravery1 they go on to storm and conquer the sacred citadel1 and then they bathe themselves in blood1 revel in endless cruelties1 and rage with a brutal ferocity4 ,from this they again pass on to contrition and penance2 then they get up from their knees reconciled and sanctified1 and once more they give themselves up to all the littleness of miserable passions1 of selfishness and envy1 of avarice and cupidity3 their energies are directed to the satisfaction of their lusts1 and they bring to nought the fair possession that their bravery had won4 ,this comes to pass because the principle is only present in them in its implicitude as an abstract principle1 and the actuality of man is not as yet spiritually formed and fashioned4 ,this is the manner in which the opposition in actuality manifests itself4 ,in the third place1 we reach the opposition existing in the content of religion1 in the religious consciousness2 this has many forms1 though we have here only to call to mind those that are most inward4 ,on the one hand1 we have the ,idea of ,god--that ,he is known as the ,trinity2 on the other1 we have worship1 i4e4 the process of individuals making themselves conformable to spirit1 to ,god1 and reaching the certainty of entering the kingdom of ,god4 ,a present and actual church is an actuality of the kingdom of ,god upon earth1 in such a way that this last is present for every man--every individual lives and must live in the kingdom of ,god4 ,in this disposition we have the reconciliation of every individual2 thereby each becomes a citizen of this kingdom1 and participates in the enjoyment of this certainty4 ,but this reconciliation is allied to the fact that in ,christ the unity of the divine and human nature is shown forth1 that is to say1 the way in which the spirit of ,god must be present in man4 ,this ,christ thus cannot be one who is past and gone1 and the life of reconciliation cannot be a mere recollection of that past4 ,for as the just behold ,christ in heaven1 so must ,christ be an object on earth which may likewise be beheld4 ,in that case this process must be present--the individual must be united to this to him objective form1 and it becomes identical with him2 the history of ,christ1 that ,god reveals ,himself as man1 sacrifices ,himself1 and through this sacrifice raises ,himself to the right hand of ,god1 is in the individual always being accomplished in the culminating point which is called the sacrifice of the mass4 ,the mediating element to which the individual relates himself in worship1 is ever present in the mass as the objective of which the individual must be made to partake1 as the ,host and the act of partaking of the same4 ,this ,host1 on the one hand1 as objective1 is held to be divine1 and1 on the other1 it is in form an unspiritual and external thing4 ,but that is the lowest depth of externality reached in the ,church2 for in this perfect externality it is before the thing that the knee must be bowed1 and not in as far as it is an object that may be partaken of4 ,luther changed this way of regarding matters2 in what is called the ,supper1 he has retained the mystical fact that the subject receives the divine element into himself2 but he maintains that it is only divine in so far as it is partaken of in this subjective spirituality of faith1 and ceases to be an external thing4 ,but in the ,church of the ,middle ,ages1 in the ,catholic ,church generally1 the ,host is honoured even as an external thing2 thus if a mouse eats of the ,host1 both it and its excrements are reverenced2 there the divine element has altogether the form of externality4 ,this is the central point of intense opposition which is on the one hand dissolved1 and on the other remains in perfect contradiction1 so that the ,host1 still held to be a merely external thing1 must nevertheless be thus high and absolute4 ,with this externality the other side is connected--the consciousness of this relation--and here we then have the consciousness of what is spiritual1 of what is the truth1 in the possession of a priesthood4 ,thus as thing it is naturally also in the possession of another1 from whom1 since it is something distinguished by itself1 it has to receive its distinction--or it must be consecrated--and this last is likewise an external action only1 performed by individuals4 ,the power to give this distinction to the thing is in the possession of the ,church2 from the ,church the laity receive it4 ,but besides all this1 the relationship of the subject in himself1 the fact that he belongs to the ,church and is a true member of the same1 must be considered4 ,after the admission of individuals into the ,church their participation therein must likewise be brought about--that is1 their purification from sin4 ,to this it is1 however1 essential1 in the first place1 that it should be known what evil is1 and secondly1 that the individual should desire the good and that pertaining to religion2 and thirdly1 that sin should be committed from an innate and natural sinfulness4 ,now since what is inward1 or conscience1 must be of a right nature1 the sins that are committed must be removed1 and made as though they had not happened2 man must ever be purified1 baptized anew1 so to speak1 and received back again3 the negation that shuts him out must ever be removed4 ,against this sinfulness positive commands and laws are now given1 so that from the nature of spirit men cannot know what is good and evil4 ,thus the divine law is an external1 which must hence be in someone's possession2 and priests are separated from others1 so that they are exclusively acquainted both with the particular details of doctrine and the means of grace1 i4e4 the mode whereby the individual is religious in his worship and comes to know that he participates in the divine4 ,in the same way that the administration of the means of grace belongs as an outward possession to the ,church in relation to worship1 so is the ,church also in possession of a moral estimate for judging of the actions of individuals2 it is in the possession of the conscience1 as of knowledge as a whole1 so that man's inmost essence1 his accountability1 passes into other hands and to another person1 and the subject is devoid of individuality even in his inmost self4 ,the ,church also knows what the individual ought to do2 his faults must be known1 and another1 the ,church1 knows them2 the sins must be taken away1 and this also is effected in an external way1 through purchase1 fasting and stripes1 through journeyings1 pilgrimages1 c4 ,now this is a relation of self-suppression1 unspirituality and deadness both of knowledge and will1 in the highest things as well as in the most trivial actions4 ,these are the main facts as regards externality in religion itself1 on which all further determinations depend4 #c4 ,we have now obtained a better idea of the elements present in this philosophy2 but in barbaric nations ,christianity could have this form of externality alone1 and this pertains to history4 ,for the dulness and frightful barbarism of such nations must be met by servitude1 and through this service must their education be accomplished4 ,man serves under this yoke2 this fearful discipline had to be gone through if the ,teutonic nations were to be raised into spiritual life4 ,but this severe and wearisome service has an end1 an object2 infinite spring and infinite elasticity1 the freedom of spirit1 is the prize4 ,the ,indians are in equal servitude1 but they are irrevocably lost--identified and identical with nature1 yet in themselves opposed to nature4 ,knowledge is thus limited to the ,church1 but in this very knowledge a positive authority is firmly rooted1 and it is a prominent feature of this philosophy1 whose first quality is consequently that of lack of freedom4 ,thought thus does not appear as though it proceeded from itself and was grounded in itself1 but as being really independent of self and depending on a given content1 the doctrine of the ,church--which1 although speculative itself1 also contains the mode of the immediate existence of external objects4 ,in theological form it may be said that1 in general1 the ,middle ,ages signify the dominion of the ,son and not of ,spirit2 for this last is still in the possession of the priesthood4 ,the ,son has differentiated ,himself from the ,father1 and is regarded as remaining in this differentiation1 so that the ,father in ,him is only implicit2 but in the unity of both we first reach ,spirit1 the ,son as ,love4 ,if we remain a moment too long in the difference without likewise asserting the identity1 the ,son is the ,other2 and in this we find the ,middle ,ages defined and characterized4 ,the character of ,philosophy in the ,middle ,ages is thus in the second place an attempt to think1 to conceive1 to philosophize under the burden of absolute hypotheses2 for it is not the thinking ,idea in its freedom1 but set forth in the form of an externality4 ,we thus find here in ,philosophy the same character as is present in the general condition of things1 and for this reason ,i before called to mind the concrete character that prevails2 for on every period of time one special characteristic is always imprinted4 ,the philosophy of the ,middle ,ages thus contains the ,christian principle1 which is the highest incentive to thought1 because the ,ideas therein present are thoroughly speculative4 ,of this one side is that the ,idea is grasped by the heart1 if we call the individual man the heart4 ,the identity of the immediate individuality with the ,idea rests in this1 that the ,son1 the mediator1 is known as this man2 this is the identity of spirit with ,god for the heart as such4 ,but the connection itself1 since it is likewise a connection with ,god in ,god1 is hence immediately mystical and speculative2 thus here there is the call to thought which was first of all responded to by the ,fathers1 and then by the scholastics4 ,but since1 in the third place1 there exists the opposition between the doctrine of the ,church and the worldly man--who has indeed through thought worked his way out of this same barbarism1 but who in his healthy human understanding has not yet penetrated to reason--the mode in which ,philosophy was treated at this time for the setting forth of formal thought1 has still no concrete content4 ,we may appeal to the human concrete mind2 in it we have a living present as thinking and feeling2 a concrete content such as this has its root in the thought of man1 and constitutes the material for his independent consciousness4 ,formal thought directs its course by this2 the wanderings of abstract reflection have in such consciousness an aim1 which sets a limit upon them1 and leads them back to a human concrete4 ,but the reflections of the scholastics on such a content depend unsupported on the determinations of formal thought1 on formal conclusions2 and all the determinations regarding natural relationships1 laws of nature1 c41 that may issue1 receive as yet no sustenance from experience2 they are not yet determined by the healthy human understanding4 ,in this respect the content likewise is unspiritual1 and these unspiritual relationships are inverted and carried into the spiritual in so far as advance is made to determinateness of a higher kind4 ,these three points constitute the main characteristics of this philosophy4 ,more particularly we would shortly deal with the chief representatives of this philosophy4 ,scholastic philosophy is considered to begin with ,john ,scotus ,erigena who flourished about the year #hfj1 and who must not be confused with the ,duns ,scotus of a later date4 ,we do not quite know whether he belonged to ,ireland or to ,scotland1 for ,scotus points to ,scotland1 and ,erigena to ,ireland4 ,with him true philosophy first begins1 and his philosophy in the main coincides with the idealism of the ,neo-,platonists4 ,here and there stray works of ,aristotle were likewise known1 even to ,john ,scotus1 but the knowledge of ,greek was very limited and rare4 ,he shows some knowledge of the ,greek and ,hebrew tongues1 and even of ,arabic as well2 but we do not know how he attained to this4 ,he also translated from ,greek to ,latin writings of ,dionysius the ,areopagite1 a later ,greek philosopher of the ,alexandrian school1 who more especially followed ,proclus3 namely1 ,de clesti hierarchia1 and others which ,brucker calls 7,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #eba71 nug et deliria ,platonica4 ,michael ,balbus1 ,emperor of ,constantinople1 had in the year #hbd made a present of these works to the ,emperor ,louis the ,pious2 ,charles the ,bald caused them to be translated by ,scotus1 who long resided at his court4 ,in this way something of the ,alexandrian philosophy became known in the ,west4 ,the ,pope quarrelled with ,charles1 and complained to him of the translator1 against whom he made the reproach that 8he should have first sent the book to him in conformity with the general usage1 and asked his approval40 ,john ,scotus afterwards lived in ,england as head of a school at ,oxford1 which had been founded by ,king ,alfred4#af ,scotus was also the author of some original works1 which are not without depth and penetration1 upon nature and its various orders 7,de natur divisione71 c4 ,dr4 ,hjort1 of ,copenhagen1 published an epitome of the writings of ,scotus ,erigena1 in #ahbc4 ,scotus ,erigena sets to work philosophically1 expressing himself in the manner of the ,neo-,platonists1 and not freely1 and as from himself4 ,thus in the method of expression adopted by ,plato1 and also by ,aristotle1 we are rejoiced to find a new conception1 and on bringing it to the test of philosophy1 to find it both correct and profound2 but here everything is ready to hand1 cut and dry4 ,yet1 with ,scotus1 theology is not yet built on exegesis1 and on the authority of the ,church2 the ,church in many cases rejected his writings4 ,thus ,scotus is reproached by a ,lyons church council in these words3 8,there have come to us the writings of a boastful1 chattering man1 who disputes about divine providence and predestination1 in human fashion1 or1 as he himself boasts1 with philosophic arguments1 and without relying on the holy scriptures and bringing forward the authority of the ,fathers4 ,and he dares to defend this on its own merit1 and to establish it on its own laws1 without submitting himself to the holy scriptures and the authority of the ,fathers40#ag ,scotus ,erigena hence even said3 8,the true ,philosophy is the true ,religion1 and the true ,religion is the true ,philosophy40#ah ,the separation came later on4 ,scotus then made a beginning1 but properly he does not belong to the scholastics4 ,b4 ,,general ,,historical ,,points ,,of ,,view4 ,all further scholastic philosophy attaches itself more to the doctrines of the ,christian ,church2 the ecclesiastical system which it thereby made its necessary basis1 became early established through church councils1 while the faith of the ,evangelical ,church already prevailed before the time of these councils from which the ,catholic ,church derives its support4 ,the most important and most interesting thoughts which pertain to the scholastics1 are1 on the one hand1 the strife between nominalism and realism2 and1 on the other1 the proof of the existence of ,god--quite a new manifestation4 #a4 ,,the ,,building ,,up ,,of ,,dogmas ,,on ,,metaphysical ,,grounds4 ,the efforts of the scholastics were further directed1 firstly1 to the building up of the dogmas of the ,christian ,church on metaphysical bases4 ,after this1 the collected doctrines of the ,church were systematically treated4 ,then the scholastics had branches or modifications of these dogmas1 which were not determined by the doctrinal system4 ,those grounds themselves1 and then these further and special points of view1 were objects handed over for free discussion4 ,neo-,platonic philosophy was what lay before the theologians first of all2 the manner of this school is recognized in the older and purer scholastics4 ,anselm and ,abelard are the more distinguished of those who follow later4 a4 ,,anselm4 ,amongst those who wished to give additional proof of the doctrines of the ,church through thought1 is ,anselm1 a man of great distinction and high repute4 ,he was born at ,aosta1 in ,piedmont1 about #ajcd2 in #ajfj he became a monk at ,bec1 and in #ajic was raised to the rank of ,archbishop of ,canterbury2 in #aaji he died4#ai ,he sought to consider and prove philosophically the doctrines of the ,church1 and it has even been said of him that he laid the basis for scholastic philosophy4 ,he speaks as follows of the relation of faith to thought3 8,our faith must be defended by reason against the godless1 and not against those who glory in the name of ,christian2 for of these we may rightly demand that they should hold firm to the obligations which they came under in baptism4 ,those others must be shown through reason how irrationally they strive against us4 ,the ,christian must go on through faith to reason1 and not come from reason to faith2 but if he cannot attain to comprehension1 he must still less depart from faith4 ,for if he is able to press on to knowledge1 he rejoices therein2 when he is unable so to do1 he humbly adores40#bj ,he makes a noteworthy remark1 which contains his whole philosophy1 in his work ,cur ,deus homo 7,i4 #b71 which is rich in speculative thought3 8,it appears to me great negligence if we are firm in the faith1 and do not seek also to comprehend what we believe40 ,now this is declared to be arrogance2 immediate knowledge1 faith1 is held to be higher than knowledge4 ,but ,anselm and the scholastics maintained the opposite view4 ,anselm may be regarded from this point of view as quite specially the founder of scholastic theology4 ,for the thought of proving through a simple chain of reasoning what was believed--that ,god exists--left him no rest day and night1 and tortured him for long4 ,at first he believed his desire to prove the divine truths through reason to be a temptation of the devil1 and he was in great anxiety and distress on that account2 finally1 however1 success came to him by the grace of ,god in his ,proslogium4#ba ,this is the so-called ontological proof of the existence of ,god which he set forth1 and which made him specially famous4 ,this proof was included among the various proofs up to the time of ,kant1 and--by some who have not yet reached the ,kantian standpoint--it is so included even to the present day4 ,it is different from what we find and read of amongst the ancients4 ,for it was said that ,god is absolute thought as objective2 for because things in the world are contingent1 they are not the truth in and for itself--but this is found in the infinite4 ,the scholastics also knew well from the ,aristotelian philosophy the metaphysical proposition that potentiality is nothing by itself1 but is clearly one with actuality4 ,later1 on the other hand1 the opposition between thought itself and ,being began to appear with ,anselm4 ,it is noteworthy that only now for the first time through the ,middle ,ages and in ,christianity1 the universal ,notion and ,being1 as it is to ordinary conception1 became established in this pure abstraction as these infinite extremes2 and thus the highest law has come to consciousness4 ,but we reach our profoundest depths in bringing the highest opposition into consciousness4 ,only no advance was made beyond the division as such1 although ,anselm also tried to find the connection between the sides4 ,but while hitherto ,god appeared as the absolute existent1 and the universal was attributed to ,him as predicate1 an opposite order begins with ,anselm--,being becomes predicate1 and the absolute ,idea is first of all established as the subject1 but the subject of thought4 ,thus if the existence of ,god is once abandoned as the first hypothesis1 and established as a result of thought1 self-consciousness is on the way to turn back within itself4 ,then we have the question coming in1 ,does ,god exist8 while on the other side the question of most importance was1 ,what is ,god8 ,the ontological proof1 which is the first properly metaphysical proof of the existence of ,god1 consequently came to mean that ,god as the ,idea of existence which unites all reality in itself1 also has the reality of existence within ,himself2 this proof thus follows from the ,notion of ,god1 that ,he is the universal essence of all essence4 ,the drift of this reasoning is1 according to ,anselm 7,proslogium1 c4 #b71 as follows3 8,it is one thing to say that a thing is in the understanding1 and quite another to perceive that it exists4 ,even an ignorant person 7insipiens7 will thus be quite convinced that in thought there is something beyond which nothing greater can be thought2 for when he hears this he understands it1 and everything that is understood is in the understanding4 ,but that beyond which nothing greater can be thought cannot certainly be in the understanding alone4 ,for if it is accepted as in thought alone1 we may go on farther to accept it as existent2 that1 however1 is something greater0 than what is merely thought4 8,thus were that beyond which nothing greater can be thought merely in the understanding1 that beyond which nothing greater can be thought would be something beyond which something greater can be thought4 ,but that is truly impossible2 there thus without doubt exists both in the understanding and in reality something beyond which nothing greater can be thought40 ,the highest conception cannot be in the understanding alone2 it is essential that it should exist4 ,thus it is made clear that ,being is in a superficial way subsumed under the universal of reality1 that to this extent ,being does not enter into opposition with the ,notion4 ,that is quite right2 only the transition is not demonstrated--that the subjective understanding abrogates itself4 ,this1 however1 is just the question which gives the whole interest to the matter4 ,when reality or completion is expressed in such a way that it is not yet posited as existent1 it is something thought1 and rather opposed to ,being than that this is subsumed under it4 ,this mode of arguing held good until the time of ,kant2 and we see in it the endeavour to apprehend the doctrine of the ,church through reason4 ,this opposition between ,being and thought is the starting point in philosophy1 the absolute that contains the two opposites within itself--a conception1 according to ,spinoza1 which involves its existence likewise4 ,of ,anselm it is however to be remarked that the formal logical mode of the understanding1 the process of scholastic reasoning is to be found in him1 the content indeed is right1 but the form faulty4 ,for in the first place the expression 8the thought of a ,highest0 is assumed as the prius4 ,secondly1 there are two sorts of objects of thought--one that is and another that is not2 the object that is only thought and does not exist1 is as imperfect as that which only is without being thought4 ,the third point is that what is highest must likewise exist4 ,but what is highest1 the standard to which all else must conform1 must be no mere hypothesis1 as we find it represented in the conception of a highest acme of perfection1 as a content which is thought and likewise is4 ,this very content1 the unity of ,being and thought1 is thus indeed the true content2 but because ,anselm has it before him only in the form of the understanding1 the opposites are identical and conformable to unity in a third determination only--the ,highest--which1 in as far as it is regulative1 is outside of them4 ,in this it is involved that we should first of all have subjective thought1 and then distinguished from that1 ,being4 ,we allow that if we think a content 7and it is apparently indifferent whether this is ,god or any other71 it may be the case that this content does not exist4 ,the assertion 8,something that is thought does not exist0 is now subsumed under the above standard and is not conformable to it4 ,we grant that the truth is that which is not merely thought but which likewise is4 ,but of this opposition nothing here is said4 ,undoubtedly ,god would be imperfect1 if ,he were merely thought and did not also have the determination of ,being4 ,but in relation to ,god we must not take thought as merely subjective2 thought here signifies the absolute1 pure thought1 and thus we must ascribe to ,him the quality of ,being4 ,on the other hand if ,god were merely ,being1 if ,he were not conscious of ,himself as self-consciousness1 ,he would not be ,spirit1 a thought that thinks itself4 ,kant1 on the other hand1 attacked and rejected ,anselm's proof--which rejection the whole world afterwards followed up--on the ground of its being an assumption that the unity of ,being and thought is the highest perfection4 ,what ,kant thus demonstrates in the present day--that ,being is different from thought and that ,being is not by any means posited with thought--was a criticism offered even in that time by a monk named ,gaunilo4 ,he combated this proof of ,anselm's in a ,liber pro insipiente to which ,anselm himself directed a reply in his ,liber apologeticus adversus insipientem4#bb ,thus ,kant says 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #dfd of the sixth edition73 ,if we think a hundred dollars1 this conception does not involve existence4 ,that is certainly true3 what is only a conception does not exist1 but it is likewise not a true content1 for what does not exist1 is merely an untrue conception4 ,of such we do not however here speak1 but of pure thought2 it is nothing new to say they are different--,anselm knew this just as well as we do4 ,god is the infinite1 just as body and soul1 ,being and thought are eternally united2 this is the speculative1 true definition of ,god4 ,to the proof which ,kant criticizes in a manner which it is the fashion to follow now-a-days1 there is thus lacking only the perception of the unity of thought and of existence in the infinite2 and this alone must form the commencement4 ,other proofs such1 for example1 as the cosmological1 which argues from the contingency of the world to an absolute existence1 have thereby not reached the idea of absolute essence as spirit1 and are without consciousness of the fact that it is an object of thought4 ,the old physico-theological proof1 which even ,socrates possessed1 from beauty1 order1 organic ends1 indeed implies an understanding1 a richer thought of absolute existence1 and not alone an indeterminate ,being1 but in this proof it likewise remains unknown that ,god is the ,idea4 ,and then what sort of an understanding is ,god8 ,a different and immediate one2 then this spirit is independent4 ,further1 disorder likewise exists1 and thus there must be something else conceived of than this apparent order of nature only4 ,but from asking about the existence of ,god1 from making his objective mode a predicate and thus knowing that ,god is ,idea1 to pass to making the absolute existence ,i ,i1 thinking self-consciousness1 not as predicate but in such a way that each thinking ,i is the moment of this self-consciousness--is still a long stride4 ,here1 where we see this form first emerge1 absolute existence is clearly to be taken as the ,beyond of finite consciousness2 this is to itself the null and void1 and it has not yet grasped its sense of self4 ,its thoughts regarding things are manifold1 and the mere fact of being a thing is to it likewise just such a predicate as the rest2 but it is thereby not yet turned back within itself1 it knows of existence1 but not of itself4 ,in this1 says ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 p4 #aba71 8,anselm has laid the first formal ground of scholastic theology20 but even before this the same was present1 only to a more limited extent1 and merely for individual dogmas--as is also the case with ,anselm4 ,his writings bear witness of great penetration and mental ability2 and he gave rise to the philosophy of the scholastics1 inasmuch as he united theology to philosophy4 ,the theology of the ,middle ,ages thus stands much higher than that of modern times2 never have ,catholics been such barbarians as to say that there should not be knowledge of the eternal truth1 and that it should not be philosophically comprehended4 ,this is one point which has to be specially noted in ,anselm1 the other is that he apprehended in its unity that highest opposition between thought and ,being spoken of above4 b4 ,,abelard4 ,with ,anselm ,peter ,abelard is associated1 both being mainly concerned in the introduction of philosophy into theology4 ,abelard lived about #aajj--;from #ajgi to #aadb--;and is famed for his learning1 but still more famed in the world of sentiment and passion for his love to ,heloise and his after fate4#bc ,after the days of ,anselm he attained to great repute1 and he followed him in his treatment of the doctrines of the ,church1 more especially seeking to give a philosophic proof of the ,trinity4 ,he taught at ,paris4 ,paris about this time was to the theologians what ,bologna was to the jurists1 the central point of the sciences2 it was at that time the seat of philosophizing theology4 ,abelard often delivered his lectures there before a thousand listeners4 ,theological science and philosophizing regarding it1 was in ,france 7as was jurisprudence in ,italy7 a matter of great importance1 which1 as most significant in the development of ,france1 has hitherto been too much neglected4 ,the conception prevailed that philosophy and religion were one and the same2 which they absolutely speaking are4 ,but the distinction was soon reached1 8that much may be true in philosophy and false in theology30 this the ,church denied4 ,tennemann 7,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 pp4 #dfj1 #dfa7 quotes as follows from a rescript of the ,bishop ,stephen3 8,they say that this is true according to philosophy1 and not according to the ,catholic faith1 just as if there were two contradictory truths1 and as if in the doctrines of the accursed heathen a truth contradictory to the truth of the holy scriptures could be present40 ,while then undoubtedly1 through the separation of the four faculties in the ,university of ,paris which came about in #abgj1 philosophy became separated from theology1 it was yet forbidden to it to subject theological beliefs and dogmas to disputation4#bd #b4 ,,methodical ,,representation ,,of ,,the ,,doctrinal ,,system ,,of ,,the ,,church4 ,we now go on to the more definite form which the scholastic theology reached2 for in a second development of scholastic philosophy the main endeavour became to make the teaching of the ,christian ,church methodical1 while still keeping its connection with all previous metaphysical arguments4 ,these and their counter-arguments were placed side by side in stating every dogma1 so that theology became represented in a scientific system1 while before this the ecclesiastical teaching in the general education of the clergy was limited to the propounding of successive dogmas1 and the writing down of passages from ,augustine and other ,fathers bearing on each proposition4 a4 ,,peter ,,lombard4 ,peter of ,novara in ,lombardy was the first of those who brought this to pass2 he dates from the middle of the twelfth century1 and was the originator of this method4 ,he died in the year #aafd4 ,petrus ,lombardus set forth a whole system of scholastic theology which remained for several centuries the basis of the doctrine of the ,church4 ,he composed to that end his ,quatuor libros sententiarum1 and hence he likewise received the name ,magister sententiarum4 ,for in those times every learned schoolman had some predicate such as ,doctor acutus1 invincibilis1 sententiosus1 angelicus1 c4 ,others also availed themselves of the same title for their works2 thus ,robert ,pulleyn wrote ,sententiarum libros octo4#be ,lombard collected the principal points in church doctrines from councils and ,fathers1 and then added subtle questions respecting particular items2 with these the schools occupied themselves1 and they became a subject of disputation4 ,he himself1 indeed1 answered these questions1 but he caused counter-arguments to follow1 and his answer often left the whole matter problematical1 so that the questions were not properly decided4 ,the arguments are thus enumerated on either side2 even the ,fathers contradicted themselves1 and numerous passages from them were quoted by both the opposed sides in support of their respective views4 ,in this way theses arose1 then qustiones1 in reply to these argumenta1 then again positiones1 and finally dubia2 according as men chose to take the words in this sense or that1 and followed this or that authority4 ,yet a certain degree of method began to enter in4 ,speaking generally1 this middle of the twelfth century forms the epoch in which scholasticism became more universal as a learned theology4 ,the book of ,lombard was all through the ,middle ,ages commentated by the doctores theologic dogmatic1 who were now held to be the recognized guardians of ecclesiastical doctrine1 while the clergy had charge of the soul4 ,those doctors had great authority1 they held synods1 criticized and condemned this or that doctrine and book as heretical1 c41 in synods or as the ,sorbonne1 a society of such doctors in the ,university of ,paris4 ,they took the place of assemblages of the ,church1 and were something like the ,fathers in reference to the ,christian doctrine4 ,in particular they rejected the writings of the mystics like ,amalrich and his disciple ,david of ,dinant1 who1 resembling ,proclus in their point of view1 went back to unity4 ,amalrich1 who was attacked as a heretic in #abjd1 for instance said1 8,god is all1 ,god and the ,creature are not different1 in ,god all things are1 ,god is the one universal substance40 ,david asserted1 8,god is the first matter and everything is one in matter1 and ,god is just this unity40 ,he divided everything into three classes1 bodies1 souls1 eternal immaterial substances or spirits4 8,the indivisible principle of souls is the 1 and that of spirits is ,god4 ,these three principles are identical and hence all things in essence are one40 ,his books were burned4#bf b4 ,,thomas ,,aquinas4 ,the other individual who was equally famous with ,peter ,lombard1 was ,thomas ,aquinas1 born in #abbd of the noble race ,aquino1 in his paternal castle ,roccasicca1 in the province of ,naples4 ,he entered the ,order of ,dominicans1 and died in #abgd on a journey to a church council at ,lyons4 ,he possessed a very extensive knowledge of theology1 and also of ,aristotle2 he was likewise called ,doctor angelicus and communis1 a second ,augustine4 ,thomas ,aquinas was a disciple of ,albertus ,magnus1 he wrote commentaries on ,aristotle and on ,petrus ,lombardus2 and he also himself composed a summa theologi 7that is1 a system7 which with his other writings obtained for him the greatest honour1 and which became one of the principal text-books in scholastic theology4#bg ,in this book there are found1 indeed1 logical formalities--not1 however1 dialectical subtleties1 but fundamental metaphysical thoughts regarding the whole range of theology and philosophy4 ,thomas ,aquinas likewise added questions1 answers and doubts1 and he gave the point on which the solution depended4 ,the main business of scholastic theology consisted in working out the summa of ,thomas4 ,the principal point was to make theology philosophic and more widely systematic2 ,peter ,lombard and ,thomas ,aquinas are best known in respect of this endeavour1 and for long their works formed the basis of all further learned elaborations of doctrine4 ,with ,thomas1 ,aristotelian forms constitute the basis--that of substance 7forma substantialis7 is1 for instance1 analogous to the entelechy 77 of ,aristotle4 ,he said of the doctrine of knowledge1 that material things consist of form and matter2 the soul has the substantial form of the stone in itself4#bh c4 ,,john ,,duns ,,scotus4 ,in respect of the formal development of philosophic theology a third individual is famous1 namely1 ,duns ,scotus1 ,doctor subtilis1 a ,franciscan1 who was born at ,dunston in the county of ,northumberland1 and who little by little obtained thirty thousand disciples4 ,in the year #acjd he came to ,paris1 and in #acjh to ,cologne1 as a doctor in the university newly instituted there4 ,he was received with great rejoicings1 but he died there of apoplexy soon after his arrival1 and is said to have been buried alive4 ,he is supposed to have been only #cd1 according to others #dc1 and according to others again #fc years old1 for the year of his birth is not known4#bi ,he wrote commentaries on the ,magister sententiarum1 which procured for him the fame of a very keen thinker1 following the order of beginning with the proof of the necessity of a supernatural revelation as against the mere light of reason4#cj ,on account of his power of penetration he has been likewise called the ,deus inter philosophos4 ,he was accorded the most excessive praise4 ,it was said of him3 8,he developed philosophy to such an extent that he himself might have been its discoverer if it had not already been discovered2 he knew the mysteries of the faith so well that he can scarcely be said to have believed them2 he knew the secrets of providence as though he had penetrated them1 and the qualities of angels as though he were himself an angel2 he wrote so much in a few years that scarcely one man could read it all1 and hardly any were able to understand it40#ca ,according to all testimony it appears that ,scotus helped the scholastic method of disputation to reach its height1 finding the material for the same in arguments and counter-arguments arranged in syllogisms2 his manner was to add to each sententia a long succession of distinctiones1 qustiones1 problemata1 solutiones1 argumenta pro et contra4 ,because he also refuted his arguments in a similar series1 everything fell once more asunder2 hence he was held to be the originator of the quodlibetan method4 ,the ,quodlibeta signified collections of miscellaneous dissertations on individual objects in the every-day manner of disputation1 which speaks of everything1 but without systematic order and without any consistent whole being worked out and set forth2 others1 on the other hand1 wrote summas4 ,the ,latin of ,scotus is exceedingly barbarous1 but well suited for exact philosophic expression2 he invented an endless number of new propositions1 terms and syntheses4 #c4 ,,acquaintanceship ,,with ,,aristotelian ,,writings4 ,we must further remark a third development1 which proceeded from the external historical circumstance that in the end of the twelfth and in the thirteenth century the ,western theologians became more generally acquainted with the ,aristotelian writings and their ,greek and ,arabian commentators1 in ,latin translations from the ,arabic4 ,these now became much used by them1 and were made the subject of further commentaries and discussions4 ,the veneration1 admiration and respect which ,aristotle received1 now reached its height4 a4 ,,alexander ,,of ,,hales4 ,the familiar acquaintance with ,aristotle and the ,arabians became first evident in ,alexander of ,hales 7died #abde71 the ,doctor irrefragabilis4 ,the earlier stages by which this familiarity came about has been shown above 7p4 #ce74 ,hitherto the acquaintance with ,aristotle was very slight1 and through many centuries it was limited1 as we saw above 7p4 #cg71 more especially to his ,logic1 which had survived from the earliest times and was transmitted in the works of ,boethius1 ,augustine and ,cassiodorus4 ,it was only when we came to ,scotus ,erigena that we found 7p4 #ei7 a knowledge of ,greek1 although it was quite unusual in his day4 ,in ,spain1 under the ,arabians1 the sciences flourished greatly4 ,in particular the university of ,cordova in ,andalusia was a centre-point of learning2 many from the lands of the ,west journeyed thither1 just as even the ,pope ,sylvester ,,ii41 so well known in his earlier days as ,gerbert1 escaped as a monk to ,spain for the purpose of studying with the ,arabs4#cb ,the sciences of medicine and alchemy were diligently pursued4 ,christian doctors there studied medicine under the ,jewish-,arabian teachers4 ,it was principally the ,aristotelian metaphysics and physics which were then known1 and from these abstracts 7summ7 were constructed4 ,the logic and metaphysics of ,aristotle were spun out with extreme fineness into endless distinctions1 and brought into genuine syllogistic forms of the understanding1 which constituted for the most part the principle for the treatment of the subject dealt with4 ,in this way dialectic subtlety was much increased1 while the properly speculative side in ,aristotle remained for the spirit of externality1 and consequently also of irrationality1 in the background4 ,the ,hohenstaufen emperor ,frederick ,,ii4 then sent for ,aristotelian books from ,constantinople and had them translated into ,latin4 ,at first1 indeed1 on the first appearance of the ,aristotelian writings1 the ,church made difficulties2 the reading of his metaphysics and physics and the abstracts prepared therefrom1 as also the exposition of the same1 was forbidden by a church synod held at ,paris #abji4 ,likewise in #abae the cardinal ,robert ,corceo came to ,paris and there held a visitation of the university1 on which occasion he ordained that regular lectures on the dialectical writings of ,aristotle should be held while he forbade the reading of and lecturing on the metaphysics and natural philosophy of ,aristotle1 and the abstracts prepared from them2 he also condemned the doctrines of the heretics ,david of ,dinant and ,amalrich and likewise the ,spaniard ,mauritius4 ,pope ,gregory1 in a bull issued to the ,university of ,paris in #abca1 without mentioning metaphysics1 forbade the books of the ,physics to be read until they had been examined and purified from all suspicion of error4 ,but later on1 in #acff1 it was on the other hand ordained by two cardinals that no one could be made a magister unless he had studied the prescribed books of ,aristotle--amongst which were the ,metaphysics and some of the ,physics--and had proved himself capable of explaining them4#cc ,it was only much later on1 however1 when ,greek literature in general had again become widely diffused1 that men became better acquainted with the ,greek text of the ,aristotelian writings4 b4 ,,albertus ,,magnus4 ,amongst those who distinguished themselves through their commentaries on ,aristotle's writings1 we must specially mention ,albertus ,magnus1 the most celebrated ,german schoolman1 of the noble race of ,bollstadt4 ,magnus either was his family name1 or it was given him on account of his fame4 ,he was born in #aaic or #abje at ,lauingen on the ,danube in ,swabia1 and began by studying at ,padua1 where his study is still shown to travellers4 ,in the year #abba he became a ,dominican friar1 and afterwards lived at ,cologne as ,provincial of his ,order in ,germany3 in #abhj he died4 ,it is said of him that in his youth he showed himself very dull and stupid1 until1 according to a legend1 the ,virgin ,mary appeared to him in company with three other beautiful women1 incited him to the study of ,philosophy1 liberated him from his dulness of understanding1 and promised him that he should enlighten the ,church1 and1 in spite of his science1 should still die in the faith4 ,what happened was in accordance with this prophecy1 for five years before his death he forgot all his philosophy as quickly as he learned it1 and then actually died in the dulness and orthodoxy of his earlier years4 ,hence there is current regarding him an old saying3 8,albert changed quickly from an ass into a philosopher1 and from a philosopher into an ass40 ,his learning was generally understood to consist largely of magic4 ,for although natural objects have nothing to do with scholasticism proper1 which was really perfectly blind to nature1 he occupied himself much therewith2 and amongst other devices he manufactured a talking machine which alarmed his pupil ,thomas of ,aquino1 who even aimed a blow at it1 thinking he saw therein a work of the devil4 ,likewise the fact that he received and entertained ,william of ,holland#cd in the middle of winter in a garden full of blossom1 is counted as magic4#ce ,while as for us--we find the winter-garden in ,faust quite natural4 ,albert wrote a great deal1 and twenty-one folios remain to us of his writings4 ,he wrote on ,dionysius the ,areopagite1 commentated the ,magister sententiarum1 was specially conversant with the ,arabians and the ,rabbis1 as he was also well acquainted with the works of ,aristotle1 although he himself understood neither ,greek nor ,arabic4 ,he likewise wrote on the ,physics of ,aristotle4 ,there is found in him a remarkable instance of deficient knowledge of the history of ,philosophy4 ,he derived the name ,epicurean 7,opera1 ,t4,v4 pp4 #ecj1 #eca7 from the fact that they idled away their time auf der faulen ,haut lagen 7 cutem7 or else from cura because they concerned themselves with many useless things 7supercurantes74 ,he represents the ,stoics as being something like our choir-boys2 he says that they were people who made songs 7facientes cantilenas71 and roamed about in porticoes4 ,for1 as he here remarks in a very learned way1 the first philosophers clothed their philosophy in verses1 and then sang them in halls and porches1 and hence they are called standers in the porch 7,stoici74 ,gassendi relates 7,vita ,epicuri1 ,i4 c4 #aa1 p4 #ea7 that ,albertus ,magnus mentioned as the first ,epicureans1 ,hesiodus1 ,athalius or ,achalius 7of whom we know nothing71 ,ccina1 or1 as others call him1 ,tetinnus1 a friend of ,cicero1 and ,isaacus1 the ,jewish philosopher4 ,how that is arrived at we do not know at all4 ,of the ,stoics ,albertus1 on the contrary1 mentions ,speusippus1 ,plato1 ,socrates and ,pythagoras4 ,these anecdotes give us a picture of the condition of culture in these times4 #d4 ,,opposition ,,between ,,realism ,,and ,,nominalism4 ,in the fourth place we must mention an important matter1 to which much attention was devoted in the ,middle ,ages1 namely that particular philosophic question which formed the subject of controversy between the ,realists and the ,nominalists1 and the discussion of which was continued through very nearly the whole of the ,scholastic period4 ,speaking generally1 this controversy is concerned with the metaphysical opposition between the universal and the individual2 it occupies the attention of ,scholastic philosophy for several centuries1 and reflects great credit upon it4 ,a distinction is drawn between the earlier and later ,nominalists and ,realists1 but otherwise their history is very obscure2 and we know more of the theological aspect of the subject than of this4 a4 ,,roscelinus4 ,the beginning of the controversy dates back to the eleventh century1 ,roscelinus being the earliest ,nominalist4 ,the famous ,abelard1 although he professes to be an opponent of ,roscelinus1 is himself nothing more or less than a ,nominalist4 ,roscelinus wrote also against the doctrine of the ,trinity1 and was pronounced guilty of heresy in #ajib at an ecclesiastical council which met at ,soissons4 ,his influence was1 however1 but small4#cf ,the matter in question is the universal as such 7universale71 or the genus1 the essence of things1 what in ,plato was called the ,idea--for instance1 ,being1 humanity1 the animal4 ,the followers of ,plato asserted that these universals exist2 their existence was individualized1 and thus #8tableness' was said to be also a real existence 7supra1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bi74 ,we make representations of a thing to ourselves1 and say 8it is blue20 this is a universal4 ,the question now is whether such universals are something real in and for themselves1 apart from the thinking subject1 and independent of the individual existing thing1 so that they exist in the individual things independently of the individuality of the thing and of each other2 or whether the universal is only nominal1 only in the subjective representation1 a thing of thought4 ,those who maintained that the universals had a real existence apart from the thinking subject and distinct from the individual thing1 and that the ,idea alone constitutes the essence of things1 were termed ,realists--a use of the term in quite an opposite sense to that which passes current now4 ,i mean that this expression has for us the signification that things as they are in their immediacy have an actual existence2 and to this idealism is opposed1 that being a name which was given later to the philosophy which ascribes reality to ideas alone1 and asserts that things as they appear in their individuality have no truth4 ,the realism of the ,scholastics in the same way maintained that the ,universal has an independent1 absolute existence1 for ,ideas are not liable to destruction1 like natural things1 therefore they are immutable and the only true existence4 ,in opposition to this1 the others1 the ,nominalists or ,formalists1 asserted that if generals or universals are formed1 these are only names1 matters of form1 representations which we make to ourselves1 a subjective generalization1 a product of the thinking mind2 the individual alone is the real4 ,this is then the matter in question2 it is of great interest1 and is founded upon a much higher opposition than any the ancients knew of4 ,roscelinus made universal conceptions arise only from the necessities of language4 ,he maintained that ideas or universals1 like ,being1 life1 reason1 are in themselves nothing but mere abstract notions or generic names1 which1 as such1 have in and for themselves no universal reality of their own3 that which has ,being and life is found in the individual alone4 ,against these assertions arguments are brought forward by which one can see that the manner in which the ,christian world was taken as basis1 often became in the highest degree ridiculous4 ,for instance1 ,abelard reproaches ,roscelinus for having asserted that no thing has parts1 that only the words which denote the things are divisible4 ,abelard proved that according to ,roscelinus1 ,christ did not eat a real part of the broiled fish1 but only a part--,i do not know which--of the word 8broiled fish10 since according to him there were no parts--which interpretation would be preposterous and highly blasphemous4#cg ,our way of reasoning from 8healthy human understanding10 is not much better4 b4 ,,walter ,,of ,,mortagne4 ,walter of ,mortagne 7d4 #aagd7 aimed at the union of the particular and the universal1 saying that the universal must be individual1 that universals must be united with individuals in accordance with their essence4#ch ,in later times the two rival factions were known to fame as ,thomists1 from the ,dominican ,thomas ,aquinas1 and ,scotists1 from the ,franciscan ,johannes ,duns ,scotus4 ,nevertheless1 the original question as to whether universal notions have reality1 and1 if so1 to what extent they have it1 underwent a great variety of modifications and gradations1 just as the opposing parties received very various names4 ,nominalism1 in its crude form1 declared universal notions to be mere names1 which have reality only in speech1 and it ascribed reality to individuals alone2 ,realism followed the exactly opposite course of attributing reality only to universals1 while it considered that what distinguished individual things was an accident only or a pure difference4 ,neither of these two theories was correct in the manner of passing from the universal to the particular4 ,there were some1 however1 among the ,schoolmen who grasped the true conception that individuation1 the limitation of the universal1 and indeed of what is most universal1 ,being and entity1 is a negation4 ,others said that the limit is itself something positive1 but that it is not one with the universal by union with it1 for it rather stands in a metaphysical connection with it1 that is1 in a connection such as that which binds thought with thought4 ,this implies that the individual is only a clearer expression of what is already contained in the general conception2 so that these conceptions1 in spite of their being divided into parts and differentiated1 still remain simple2 ,being or entity1 moreover1 really is a ,notion4#ci ,thomas1 who was a ,realist1 declared the universal ,idea to be indeterminate1 and placed individuation in determinate matter 7materia signata71 i4e4 matter in its dimensions or determinations4 ,according to him1 the original principle is the universal ,idea2 the form1 as actus purus1 may1 as with ,aristotle1 exist on its own account2 the identity of matter and form1 the forms of matter1 as such1 are further removed from the original principle1--while thinking substances are mere forms4#dj ,but for ,scotus the universal is rather the individual ,one1 the one he thinks may appear also in the other2 he maintained therefore the principle of individuation1 and the formal character of the universal4 ,in his view indeterminate matter becomes individual through an inward positive addition2 the substantial forms of things are their real essence4 ,occam thus represents the views of ,scotus3 8,in the thing that exists outside of the soul the same ,nature exists realiter with the difference limiting 7contrahente7 it to a determinate individual1 being only formally distinguished1 and in itself neither universal nor individual1 but incompletely universal in the thing1 and completely universal in the understanding40#da ,scotus racked his brains much over this subject4 ,to universals the ,formalists allowed only an ideal reality in the divine and human intellect beholding them4#db ,we thus see how closely connected with this is the thought which we first meet with in the ,scholastics1 namely the seeking and giving of so-called proofs of ,god's existence 7supra1 pp4 #fb-fg74 c4 ,,william ,,occam4 ,the opposition between ,idealists and ,realists appeared at an early stage1 it is true1 but it was not until later1 after the time of ,abelard1 that it became the order of the day1 and was invested with general interest4 ,this was brought about chiefly by the ,franciscan ,william ,occam1 of the village of ,occam in the county of ,surrey in ,england1 who was surnamed ,doctor invincibilis1 and flourished in the beginning of the fourteenth century3 the year of his birth is unknown4 ,he is greatly celebrated for his skill in handling the weapons of logic2 he is keen in discrimination and fertile in devising arguments and counter-arguments4 ,occam was a leading champion of ,nominalism1 which up to this time had found only here and there a defender1 like ,roscelinus and ,abelard2 his numerous followers received the name of ,occamists and were ,franciscans1 while the ,dominicans retained the name of ,thomists4 ,the conflict between ,nominalists and ,realists raged with a burning vehemence1 and was carried to the greatest extremes2 a pulpit is still shown which was separated by a wooden partition from the platform of the opponent1 in order that the disputants might not come to blows4 ,henceforth theology was taught under two forms 7theologia scholastica secundum utramque partem74 ,owing to the civil wars in ,france1 politics also began gradually to affect the relationship between the orders1 and this lent increased importance to the conflict into which jealousy had plunged the rival factions4 ,in #acbb1 at a convention of his order1 and also on other occasions1 ,occam and his order defended to the utmost of their power the claims of the different princes1 such as the ,king of ,france and the ,emperor of ,germany1 ,louis of ,bavaria1 against the pretensions of the ,pope4 ,among the words of ,william to the ,emperor were these1 8,do thou defend me with the sword1 and ,i will defend thee with the pen40 ,interdicts of the ,paris ,university and ,papal bulls were issued against ,occam4 ,the ,paris ,university forbade his doctrines to be taught or his works quoted4 ,a special prohibition was issued in #acdj3 8,no teacher shall venture to assert plainly1 or in so many words1 that some familiar maxim of the author on whom he is lecturing is false1 but shall either assent to it1 or distinguish the true and the false significance2 otherwise the dangerous result is to be apprehended that the truths of the ,bible might be in like manner rejected4 ,no teacher shall assert that a maxim cannot be thus explained or further defined40 ,occam was excommunicated in #acbh1 and died at ,munich in #acdc4dc ,occam asks in one of his writings 7in libr4 ,i4 ,sentent4 ,dist4 ,,ii4 ,qust4 #d71 8,whether what is immediately and proximately denoted by the universal and by the generic name is a real thing outside of the soul1 something intrinsic and essential in the things to which it is common and which are called by its name1 and yet in reality distinguished from them40 ,this definition of the ,realists is given more in detail by ,occam as follows3 8,as to this question1 one opinion is that each generic designation or universal is a thing really existing outside of the soul in each and every individual1 and that the ,being 7essentia7 of each individual is really distinguished from each individual0 7i4e4 from its individuality71 8and from each universal4 ,thus man1 the universal1 is a true thing outside of the soul1 which exists in reality in each human being1 but is distinguished from each human being1 from ,universal living nature1 and from the universal substance1 and in this way from all species and genera1 those that are subordinate as well as those that are not subordinate40 ,the universal1 the common designation of all the individuals1 is therefore1 according to this1 not identical with the ,self1 the ultimate point of subjectivity4 8,as many universal predicables as there are of any individual thing0--e4g4 humanity1 reason1 ,being1 life1 quality1 c4--8so many really different things there are in nature1 each of which is really distinct from the other and from that individual1 and all these things are in no wise multiplied in themselves1 however much the separate predicables are multiplied1 which are in every individual of the same kind40 ,that is the most uncompromising way of stating the independence and isolation of every universal quality in a thing4 ,occam refutes this1 saying3 8,nothing which is one in number can1 without being changed or multiplied1 be present in several subjects or individuals4 ,science invariably restricts itself to propositions regarding the known2 it is1 therefore1 a matter of no moment whether the terms of the propositions are known things outside of the soul1 or only in the soul2 and therefore it is not necessary for the sake of science to assume universal things1 really distinct from individual things40 ,occam proceeds to state other opinions opposed to that first given2 he does not exactly give his own decision1 yet in this same passage 7,qust4 #h7 he1 in the main1 argues in favour of the opinion 8that the universal is not something real that has explicit subjectivity 7esse subjectivum7 neither in the soul nor in the thing4 ,it is something conceived1 which1 however1 has objective reality 7esse objectivum7 in the soul1 while the external thing has this objective reality as an explicitly existent subject 7in esse subjectivo74 ,this comes to pass in the following manner4 ,the understanding1 which perceives a thing outside the soul1 forms the mental image of a similar thing1 so that1 if it had productive power1 it would1 like an artist1 exhibit it in an absolutely existing subject1 as numerically an individual distinct from any preceding4 ,should anyone be displeased by this manner of speaking of the mental image as being formed1 it may be said that the mental image and every universal conception is a quality existing subjectively in the mind1 which by its nature is the sign of a thing outside of the soul1 just as the spoken word is a sign of the thing1 arbitrarily instituted for marking out that thing40 ,tennemann says 7,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #hfd73 8,one result of this theory was that the principle of individuation1 which had occupied to such an extent the attention of the ,scholastics1 was cast aside as utterly unnecessary40 ,thus the main question with the ,scholastics concerns the definition of the universal1 and this was in itself highly important and significant for the culture of more modern times4 ,the universal is the ,one1 but not abstract2 it is conceived or thought of as comprehending all things in itself4 ,with ,aristotle the universal was1 in a judgment1 the predicate of the subject in question2 in a syllogism it was the terminus major4 ,with ,plotinus1 and especially with ,proclus1 the ,one is still incommunicable1 and is known only by its subordinate forms4 ,but because the ,christian religion is a revelation1 ,god is no longer therein the unapproachable1 incommunicable1 a hidden mystery3 for the various stages of the progression from ,him are verily ,his manifestation1 and the ,trinity is thus the revealed4 ,in this way the triads and the ,one are not distinguished1 but these three ,persons in the ,godhead are themselves ,god and ,one1 i4e4 ,one as it is for another1 as in itself relative4 ,the ,father1 the ,god of ,israel1 is this ,one2 the moment of the ,son and of the ,spirit is the ,most ,high in spiritual and bodily presence1 the former in the ,church1 the latter in ,nature4 ,with the ,neo-,platonists the universal is1 on the contrary1 only the first condition of things which then merely opens out and develops2 with ,plato and ,aristotle it is rather the ,whole1 the ,all1 the ,all in ,one4 d4 ,,buridan4 ,buridan1 a ,nominalist1 inclines to the view of the ,determinists that the will is determined by circumstances4 ,against him is cited the case of the ass which1 being placed between two equal bundles of hay1 perforce perished from hunger4 ,louis ,,xi41 in #adgc1 confiscated the books of the ,nominalists and interdicted the teaching of their doctrines1 but in the year #adha this interdict was removed4 ,in the theological and philosophical faculty ,aristotle is said to have been interpreted and studied1 as were also his commentators1 ,averros1 ,albertus ,magnus1 and ,thomas ,aquinas4#dd #e4 ,,formal ,,dialectic4 ,the study of dialectics was carried to a very great height1 but it was quite formal in character2 this constitutes the fifth point for consideration4 ,with this is closely connected the interminable finding out of termini technici4 ,this formal dialectic was very ingenious in devising objects1 problems and questions1 destitute of all religious and philosophic interest1 on which to practise its method of procedure4 ,the last remark that we have1 however1 in this connection to make regarding the ,scholastics is this1 that it was not only into the ecclesiastical system that they introduced all possible formal relations of the understanding1 but that also objects intelligible in themselves--the intellectual conceptions and religious ideas--they represented as immediately and sensuously real1 as brought down into the externality of altogether sensuous relations1 and in these relations subjected to systematic investigation4 ,originally1 it is true1 the basis was spiritual1 but the externality in which it was at once comprehended1 made of the spiritual something perfectly unspiritual4 ,it may therefore be said that1 on the one hand1 the ,scholastics showed great profundity in their treatment of ,church dogma2 and1 on the other hand1 that they secularized it by placing it in quite inappropriate external relations2 thus here we have the worst kind of secularity4 ,for the dogma of the ,church explicitly contains1 in the historical form of the ,christian religion1 a number of ordinary conceptions determined in an external way1 which are connected with the spiritual1 it is true1 but trench upon sensuous relationships4 ,if a network of such relationships is then contrived1 there arises a host of oppositions1 contrasts1 contradictions1 which have not the very slightest interest for us4 ,it is this aspect of the matter that the ,scholastics have taken up and handled with finite dialectic2 and it is on this account that the ,scholastics in later times were so much ridiculed4 ,of this ,i have some examples to give4 a4 ,,julian1 ,,archbishop ,,of ,,toledo4 ,julian1 ,archbishop of ,toledo1 sought1 with as great earnestness as if the salvation of the human race depended on it1 to answer questions which contain an absurd assumption4 ,in doing so he no less gives himself up to petty triflings than do the philologists when they institute investigations regarding ,greek accents1 metres1 and verse-divisions4 ,for instance1 there arises a question of this kind as to the dead4 ,it is a dogma of the ,church1 that man will rise again2 now if to this it be added that he will be clothed with the body1 we thereby enter the sensuous sphere4 ,the following were inquiries which arose in connection with this question3 8,what will be the age of the dead when they rise8 ,will they rise as children1 youths1 grown men1 or aged8 ,in what form will they rise8 ,what will be the constitution of their bodies8 ,will the fat be again fat1 and the lean again lean8 ,will the distinction of sex continue in that future life8 ,will those who rise again recover all that they lost here in the way of nails and hair80#de ,thus a special distinction was drawn between the actual dogma1 which was indisputable1 and the various aspects of the supersensuous world which are connected with that dogma4 ,these were regarded1 though often only for the time being1 as detached from the doctrinal system of the ,church4 ,for the system was not so definitely formulated but that anything in it might have to be proved from the ,fathers1 until a council or a special synod decided the point4 ,disputes were also possible regarding the proofs which were given of the content of this system2 and besides there was quite a large amount of matter which was open to discussion1 and respecting which the ,scholastics--with the exception1 of course1 of the noble men1 renowned as ,doctores and writers1--expressed themselves in finite syllogisms and forms1 which degenerated into an utterly empty and formal craze for disputation4 ,the ,scholastic ,philosophy is thus the direct opposite of the empirical science of the understanding1 with which curiosity is largely mingled1 and which1 careless of the ,notion1 follows after facts alone4 b4 ,,paschasius ,,radbertus4 ,about #hdj another subject of discussion was raised1 namely1 the birth of ,christ1 whether it was natural or supernatural4 ,this led to a protracted controversy4 ,paschasius ,radbertus wrote two volumes1 ,de partu beat virginis2 and many others wrote and argued on the same topic4#df ,they went so far as even to speak of an accoucheur1 and to discuss this subject2 and many questions were raised1 to which our sense of what is fitting forbids us even to turn our thoughts4 ,god's wisdom1 omnipotence1 foresight1 and predetermination led in the same way to a host of contradictions in abstract1 meaningless1 local and trivial particulars1 which concern not ,god4 ,in the works of ,petrus ,lombardus1 where the ,trinity1 the ,creation1 and the ,fall are dealt with1 as also angels and their orders and ranks1 questions are found such as whether ,god's providence and predetermination would have been possible1 had nothing been created2 and where ,god was before the ,creation4 ,thomas of ,strasburg answered3 ,tunc ubi nunc1 in se1 quoniam sibi sufficit ipse4#dg ,lombardus goes on to ask 8,if ,god can know more than ,he knows80 as if potentiality and actuality still remained distinguished2 8,if ,god retains at all times all power that ,he has once possessed8 ,where the angels were after their creation8 ,if the angels have always existed80 ,a multitude of other questions of this kind are raised regarding the angels4 ,then he asks3 8,at what age was ,adam created8 ,why was ,eve made from the rib1 and not from some other part of the man8 ,why during sleep1 and not when the man was awake8 ,why did the first human pair not have intercourse in ,paradise8 ,how the human race would have been propagated1 if man had not sinned8 ,if in ,paradise children would have been born with limbs fully grown1 and the complete use of their senses8 ,why it was the ,son1 and not the ,father or the ,holy ,ghost1 who became man80 ,to do this rests in the very ,notion of the ,son4 8,if ,god could not have also become incarnate in female form80#dh ,additional examples of qustiones of this kind are given by those who ridiculed such dialectic1 for instance by ,erasmus in his ,encomium mori3 8,could there be several sonships 7filiationes7 in ,christ8 ,is the proposition possible that ,god the ,father hates the ,son8 ,might ,god not have also taken the form of a woman1 or have passed into the devil8 ,might ,he not also have appeared in the form of an ass or of a pumpkin8 ,in what manner would the pumpkin have preached and wrought miracles1 and how would it have been crucified80#di ,thus were intellectual determinations combined and distinguished in a manner altogether without sense or thought4 ,the main point is that the ,scholastics were like barbarians in their way of handling divine things and bringing them into sensuous determinations and relations4 ,they thus introduced a completely sensuous rigidity and these altogether external and senseless forms into the purely spiritual1 thus bringing it to a lower and unspiritual level2 ,hans ,sachs similarly made a ,nrnberg version of sacred history die gttliche ,geschichte vernrnbergert4 ,in such representations as are given in the ,bible of the wrath of ,god1 or of the history of ,god's work of creation1 it is said that ,god did this or that1 naming some human and homely action4 ,god is certainly not to be looked on as something alien and unapproachable2 on the contrary1 we are to come to ,him with courage and with all our heart4 ,but to bring ,him into the province of thought1 and strive in earnest after a knowledge of ,him1 is a very different matter4 ,the reverse of this is to bring forward arguments pro and contra1 for they decide nothing1 and are of no use2 they are no more than the assumptions which are only sensuous and finite determinations1 and therefore infinite differences and distinctions4 ,this barbarous use of the understanding is utterly irrational2 it is like putting a golden necklace on a sow4 ,the ,one is the ,idea of the ,christian religion1 and it is also the philosophy of the great and noble ,aristotle2 neither of the two could have been more bedraggled and besmirched1 to so low a pass had the ,christians brought their spiritual ,idea4 #f4 ,,mystics4 ,in the above sketch we have mentioned the principal heads which come under our consideration in studying ,scholastic philosophy4 ,with regard to this intrusion of distinctions of the understanding and sensuous relations into that which in and for itself and by virtue of its very nature is spiritual1 absolute and infinite1 it is to be remarked that to this craze for reducing everything to the finite1 some noble spirits here and there opposed themselves4 ,as such we must here1 in the sixth place1 make honourable mention of the many great ,scholastics who have been named ,mystics1 for although they are to be distinguished from the real ecclesiastical ,scholastics1 they followed upon identical lines1 and are closely connected with them4 ,they took but little interest in these discussions and arguments1 and maintained their purity in regard to ,church doctrines and philosophic speculation4 ,some of them were pious and spiritual men1 who carried on their philosophic studies upon the lines of the ,neo-,platonic philosophy1 as ,scotus ,erigena had done in earlier times4 ,among them genuine philosophy is to be found--termed also ,mysticism2 it tends to inwardness and bears a great resemblance to ,spinozism4 ,they also derived morality and the religious sentiment from actual feelings1 and the meditations and maxims we have from them embody these views4 a4 ,,john ,,charlier4 ,john ,charlier1 more generally known as ,von ,jerson or ,gerson1 was born in #acfc2 he wrote a theologia mystica4#ej b4 ,,raymundus ,,of ,,sabunde4 ,very similar were the views expressed by ,raymundus of ,sabunde or ,sabeyde1 a ,spaniard of the fifteenth century1 and professor at ,toulouse about the year #adcg4 ,in his theologia naturalis1 which he handled in a speculative spirit1 he dealt with the ,nature of things1 and with the revelation of ,god in ,nature and in the history of the ,god-man4 ,he sought to prove to unbelievers the ,being1 the trinity1 the incarnation1 the life1 and the revelation of ,god in ,nature1 and in the history of the ,god-man1 basing his arguments on ,reason4 ,from the contemplation of ,nature he rises to ,god2 and in the same way he reaches morality from observation of man's inner nature4#ea ,this purer and simpler style must be set off against the other1 if we are to do justice to the ,scholastic theologians in their turn4 c4 ,,roger ,,bacon4 ,roger ,bacon treated more especially of physics1 but remained without influence4 ,he invented gunpowder1 mirrors1 telescopes1 and died in #abid4eb d4 ,,raymundus ,,lullus4 ,raymundus ,lullus1 the ,doctor illuminatus1 made himself famous chiefly by the art of thinking which he invented1 which was called the ars magna4 ,he was born at ,majorca in #abcd1 and was one of those eccentric1 unsettled natures whose activity finds vent in all directions4 ,he had a strong inclination towards alchemy and great enthusiasm for the sciences in general1 as well as a fiery1 restless power of imagination4 ,in his youth he led a reckless life1 throwing himself headlong into a round of pleasures2 then he retreated to a desert1 and had there many visions of ,jesus4 ,at this time the impulse shaped itself in his ardent nature to dedicate his life to spreading the blessings of ,christianity among the ,mohammedans in ,asia and ,africa4 ,in order to carry on this work of conversion he learned ,arabic1 travelled through ,europe and ,asia1 sought for assistance from the ,pope and all the crowned heads of ,europe1 without giving up1 for all that1 his interest in his #8,art4' ,he suffered persecution and passed through many hardships and strange adventures1 perils of death1 imprisonments1 cruelties4 ,he lived long in ,paris at the beginning of the fourteenth century1 and was the author of well-nigh four hundred works4 ,after a life of the utmost restlessness1 he died in #acae1 revered as a saint and martyr1 his death being the result of cruel treatment which he had suffered in ,africa4#ec ,the chief object aimed at in this man's #8,art' was an enumeration and arrangement of the various concepts under which all objects fall1 or of the pure categories according to which they can be determined1 so that it may be possible in regard to every object to indicate with ease the conceptions applicable to it4 ,lullus is so systematic that he becomes at times mechanical4 ,he constructed a diagram in circles1 on which were marked triangles through which the circles pass4 ,in these circles he arranged the various concepts1 and strove to give a complete catalogue of them4 ,some of the circles were fixed1 others movable1 and they were six in number1 two of them indicating the subjects1 three the predicates1 while the outermost circle represented possible questions4 ,for each class he had nine qualities1 to indicate which he chose nine letters1 ,b ,c ,d ,e ,f ,g ,h ,i ,k4 ,thus in the first place he wrote round the diagram nine absolute predicates1 goodness1 greatness1 duration1 power1 wisdom1 volition1 virtue1 truth1 splendour2 then he wrote nine relative predicates1 diversity1 unanimity1 opposition1 beginning1 middle1 end1 the qualities of being greater1 equal1 or less2 in the third place he set down the questions ,whether8 ,what8 ,whence8 ,why8 ,how great8 ,of what nature8 ,when8 ,where8 ,how and wherewith8 the ninth of which contains two determinations2 in the fourth place he put nine substances 7esse71 viz4 ,god 7divinum71 angel 7angelicum71 heaven 7cleste71 man 7humanum71 imaginativum1 sensitivum1 vegetativum1 elementativum1 instrumentativum2 in the fifth place were nine accidents1 i4e4 natural relations1 viz4 quantity1 quality1 relation1 activity1 passivity1 possession1 position1 time1 place2 and sixthly nine moral relations1 the virtues1 viz4 justice1 prudence1 courage1 temperance1 faith1 hope1 love1 patience1 piety2 and the vices1 viz4 envy1 wrath1 inconstancy1 covetousness1 falsehood1 gluttony1 riotousness1 pride1 sluggishness 7acedia74 ,these circles had to be placed in a certain way1 in order to give proper combinations4 ,by turning them round according to certain rules1 by which all substances received the absolute and relative predicates which fitted them1 it was supposed that there would be obtained in every possible combination universal science1 truth1 and the knowledge of concrete objects in general4#ed ,c4 ,,general ,,standpoint ,,of ,,the ,,scholastics4 ,after thus dealing with the subject in detail1 we must pronounce judgment on the ,scholastics1 and give an estimate of them4 ,though the subjects which they investigated were lofty1 and though there were noble1 earnest and learned individuals in their ranks1 yet this ,scholasticism on the whole is a barbarous philosophy of the finite understanding1 without real content1 which awakens no true interest in us1 and to which we cannot return4 ,for although religion is its subject matter1 thought here reached such an excessive point of subtlety that1 as a form of the mere empty understanding1 it does nothing but wander amongst baseless combinations of categories4 ,scholastic philosophy is this utter confusion of the barren understanding in the rugged ,north ,german nature4 ,we see here two different worlds1 a kingdom of life and a kingdom of death4 ,the intellectual kingdom1 which is outside and above1 while in the popular conception1 is thereby brought within the sphere of the mere understanding and the senses1 even though by nature it is purely peculative2 and this does not take place as in art1 but1 on the contrary1 after the fashion of ordinary reality4 ,as the relationship of ,father and ,son1 to begin with1 appealed to the senses1 so the divine world was furnished for the imaginative faculty and for purposes of devotion 7in a way unknown to the disciples of ,plato7 with angels1 saints and martyrs1 instead of with thoughts2--or the thoughts are nothing but a rubbishy metaphysic of the understanding4 ,in the supersensuous world there was no reality of the thinking1 universal1 rational self-consciousness to be met with3 in the immediate world of sensuous nature1 on the other hand1 there was no divinity1 because nature was but the grave of ,god1 in the same way that ,god was outside of nature4 ,the existence of the ,church1 as the government of ,christ upon earth1 is higher1 it is true1 than the external existence which stands in contrast to it2 for religion must rule our temporal affairs1 and through the subjection of worldly power the ,church became a theocracy4 ,but the divine kingdom1 the dwelling-place of the dead1 was to be reached only through the gate of death2 yet the natural world was dead to an equal degree--all that lived in it was the vision of that other world1 and hope--it had no present4 ,it was of no avail to introduce mediators as a connecting link1 the ,virgin ,mary1 or the dead in a world beyond4 ,the reconciliation was formal1 not absolute2 for it was nothing but the longing of man for a satisfaction to be found only in another world4 ,what purpose does all this serve8 ,it lies behind us as a thing of the past1 and must continue useless to us on its own merits4 ,there is no good1 however1 in calling the ,middle ,ages a barbarous period4 ,it is a singular kind of barbarism1 and is not simple and rude2 for the absolute ,idea and the highest culture have sunk into barbarism1 and that through the agency of thought4 ,thus we have here1 on the one hand1 the most hideous form of barbarism and perversion1 but1 on the other hand1 the never-failing source of a higher reconciliation4 ,if we seek an immediate contrast to scholastic philosophy and theology and their methods1 we may say that it is to be found in the 8healthy human understanding10 in outward and inward experience1 in the contemplation of nature1 and in humanity4 ,the character of ,greek humanity1 for instance1 was that everything concrete1 everything that possessed interest for mind1 had its place in the human breast1 and its root in the feelings and thoughts of man4 ,intelligent consciousness1 cultured science1 has in such content its real material--that in which it is and remains at home with itself2 knowledge busies itself on all sides with that which concerns it1 and remains true to itself1 while both on its serious and its playful side it finds in this material1 in ,nature and its uniform laws1 a standard and a guide by which to direct its course aright4 ,even should we go astray on ground like this1 our errors keep in view the fixed centre-point of the self-consciousness of the human mind1 and as errors even they have a root therein1 which as such forms the justification for them4 ,it is only a one-sided withdrawal from the unity of this root with the altogether concrete ground-work and original1 that is really faulty4 ,what we see here1 in contrast with the above1 is the infinite truth1 expressed as spirit1 committed to a nation of barbarians who have not the self-consciousness of their spiritual humanity--they have a human breast1 it is true1 but not yet a human spirit4 ,the absolute truth does not yet make itself real and present in actual consciousness1 but men are torn out of themselves4 ,they still find this content of spirit within themselves1 introduced as into a strange vessel full of the most intense impulses and desires of physical and intellectual life1 but it is like a ponderous stone1 whose enormous pressure they only feel1 but which they neither digest nor assimilate with their own impulses or desires4 ,thus they can only find rest and reconciliation when they come absolutely out of themselves1 and they have become fierce and savage in the very circumstances and by the very means which ought to have rendered their spirit peaceable and mild4 ,just as truth was not yet the foundation of reality1 so science was likewise destitute of firm basis4 ,the understanding1 when it comes to think1 applies itself1 it is true1 in the first place to the mysteries of religion1 which1 as an altogether speculative content1 exist for the rational ,notion only4 ,but as ,spirit1 the rational element in question1 has not yet taken its place in thought1 thought is still ,god-forsaken1 it is still only abstract1 finite understanding1 a manner of thinking which is in itself quite formal and devoid of content1 which is a stranger to subjects of such profundity as this1 even when it is ostensibly occupying itself with the same4 ,this understanding therefore draws its content entirely from things to which it remains altogether alien1 and which remain altogether alien to it2 yet it is not thereby at all circumscribed1 for it observes no bounds in its determinations and distinctions4 ,it is just as if one were to arbitrarily form and connect propositions1 words and tones--without making the presupposition that they should by themselves express a concrete sense--which need be only capable of being uttered1 without having any restriction except possibility1 that is1 that they must not contradict each other4 ,in the second place1 in so far as the understanding keeps to the given religious content1 it can prove this content2 one can demonstrate that it must be so1 just as if it were a geometrical proposition4 ,but there still remains something to be desired1 in order that the satisfaction may be complete2 the content is proved1 but ,i nevertheless do not understand it4 ,thus ,anselm's excellent proposition 7supra1 pp4 #fc1 #fd7 in which we may perceive the general character of the scholastic understanding1 is a proof1 it may be admitted1 of the existence of ,god1 but it shows no comprehension of it4 ,though ,i see the truth of the proposition1 ,i have not attained to the final point1 the object of my desire2 for there is lacking the ,i1 the inner bond1 as inwardness of thought4 ,this lies only in the ,notion1 in the unity of the particular and the universal1 of ,being and thought4 ,for the comprehension of this unity1 without which there could be no true proof1 it was implied that further progress should not take place after the manner of the understanding4 ,it was necessary that from the nature of thought itself it should become evident how1 taken on its own account1 it negates itself1 and how the determination of ,being itself rests therein1 or that the manner in which thought determines itself into ,being should be shown forth4 ,on the other hand it must in like manner be demonstrated in the case of ,being that it is its peculiar dialectic to abrogate itself1 and from itself to make itself a universal ,notion4 ,the determination of itself into ,being is certainly an object of thought1 whose content is thought itself4 ,this is inwardness1 not a mere conclusion drawn from presuppositions4 ,here in scholastic philosophy1 however1 the object is not the nature of thought and ,being1 for what they are is a mere matter of assumption4 ,the understanding may take its start from experience1 a given concrete content1 a determinate contemplation of nature1 the human heart1 right1 duty1 which are just exactly what inwardness means4 ,it may find its determinations1 so to speak1 on behalf of this content1 and starting from this point it may come to abstractions1 such as matter and force in physics4 ,in this case1 although a general form such as this does not satisfy the content1 it has at any rate therein a fixed point1 by which it can regulate itself1 and a boundary line for speculation1 which would otherwise have no limit set to its roaming4 ,or when we have the concrete perception of state and family1 reasoning has in this content a fixed point which gives it guidance--a conception1 which is the main thing2 the deficiency in its form becomes concealed and forgotten1 and emphasis is not laid on it4 ,but in scholastic philosophy1 in the third place1 a basis was not sought in such objects as direct the course of reflection2 with this understanding of the ,scholastics it was rather the case that they received in the categories the external culture of the understanding as tradition1 and enlarged upon it4 ,because there was no standard set up for this scholastic understanding1 either by concrete intuition or by the pure ,notion1 it remained unregulated in its externality4 ,in later times this spirit-forsaken understanding came across the philosophy of ,aristotle1 in an external way2 but that philosophy is a two-edged sword1 a highly determinate1 clear understanding1 which is at the same time speculative ,notion2 in it the abstract determinations of the understanding1 taken by themselves1 and powerless thus to stand1 pass away by means of dialectic1 and have truth only when taken in their connexion4 ,the speculation that we find in ,aristotle has this condition1 that such thought never abandons itself to free reflection1 but keeps ever before it the concrete nature of the object2 this nature is the ,notion of the thing1 and this speculative essence of the thing is the ruling spirit1 which does not leave the determinations of reflection free on their own account4 ,but the ,scholastics laid down hard and fast the abstract determinations of the understanding1 which are always inadequate to their absolute subject1 and in like manner they took every example from life as subject1 and since the concrete contradicts them1 they could hold fast by these determinations of the understanding only by defining and limiting4 ,in so doing1 however1 they involved themselves in an endless web of distinctions1 which could themselves be held in the concrete1 and maintained thereby alone4 ,there is thus no 8healthy human understanding0 in such procedure of the ,scholastics2 the former cannot oppose itself to speculation1 but it can very well take up a position hostile to ungrounded reflection1 seeing that it contains a basis and a rule of guidance for abstract determinations of the understanding4 ,the ,aristotelian philosophy is quite opposed to this ,scholastic procedure1 but it became therein alienated from itself4 ,the fixed conception of the supersensuous world with its angels and so on was a subject which the ,scholastics elaborated without any regulating standard1 in barbaric fashion1 and they enriched and embellished it with the finite understanding and with the finite relationships of the same4 ,there is present no immanent principle in the thinking itself1 but the understanding of the ,scholastics got into its possession a ready-made metaphysic1 without the need of making it relate to the concrete2 this metaphysic was killed1 and its parts in their lifelessness were separated and parcelled out4 ,it might be said of the ,scholastics that they philosophized without conception1 that is1 without a concrete2 for esse reale1 esse formale1 esse objectivum1 quidditas 7 7 they made their subjects of discussion4 ,this crude understanding1 in the fourth place1 made everything equal1 reduced it all to the same level1 and that in virtue of its abstract universality1 which was held to be valid4 ,in politics also the understanding aims at making all alike equal4 ,this crude understanding did not make away with itself and its finitude1 but in its dealings with them simply reduced to finite relations ,heaven1 the ,idea1 the intellectual1 mystic1 speculative world2 for it makes no difference 7and can make none7 whether its finite determinations are valid here or not4 ,hence arose these senseless questions1 and the endeavours to decide them2 for it is senseless1 ,i may even say it is distasteful and revolting1 although it may be logically correct1 to carry over determinations into a field where they are utterly out of place1 as soon as it comes to be a matter of comprehending a concrete content in its universality4 ,this understanding in its operations furnishes no bridge from the universal to the particular1 and the conclusions which it draws it leaves up in the clouds as conceptions of its fancy4 ,if1 for instance1 law is divided into canonical law1 criminal law1 and so on1 the ground of division is not taken from the universal itself2 and it is thus left vague which particular determination is in accordance with the universal object4 ,if this object is ,god1--for instance1 such a determination as that ,he became man--the relation between ,god and man is not derived from their nature4 ,because ,god only manifests ,himself1 ,he can do so in any way whatever2 then1 because nothing is impossible with ,god1 the pumpkin idea is easily introduced 7p4 #ij71 since it is a matter of indifference in which determination the ,universal is supposed to be4 ,regarding the apple in ,paradise the understanding asks to what species of apple it belonged4 ,we must go on to indicate the principles which have been adopted and stand opposed to one other1 and the development of the same1 in order to comprehend the transition into modern history and the present standpoint of philosophy4 ,for this reason we must speak of the further progress of universal spirit4 ,for thought was distorted by reason of its being bound to an externality1 and spirit was in it no longer acting for spirit4 ,because then in this and similar ways the ,idea of spirit had1 as it were1 its heart pierced through1 the parts remained without spirit and life1 and were worked upon by the understanding4 ,amongst the learned ignorance of the rational was displayed1 a complete and unnatural lack of spirituality2 and in the same way there was the most utter and terrible ignorance amongst the others1 the monks4 ,this destruction of knowledge brought about the transition to a different state of affairs2 while heaven and the divine were thus degraded1 the lofty aspirations and high spiritual claims of the clerical element rose above the secular4 ,for we saw that the supersensuous world of truth1 as the world of religious conceptions1 was ruined by the understanding making all things equal4 ,we saw1 on the one hand1 a handling of dogma in philosophic fashion1 but we saw also a development of formal logical thought1 the secularization of the absolutely existent content4 ,in the same way the existing ,church1 this presence of heaven upon earth1 brought itself down to the level of the secular1 by entering upon the possession of riches and lands4 ,in this way the distinction between the world and the ,church is blotted out1 not in a rational manner as regards the ,church1 but in a way that is altogether revolting1 and which amounts to destruction3 it is a reality1 ,i grant1 but one most terrible and barbarous4 ,for state1 government1 right1 property1 civil order1 all these enter into religion as rational differences1 that is1 laws on their own account fixed4 ,the acknowledgment of ranks1 classes1 divisions1 their different occupations1 the stages and degrees of evil1 as well as of good1 are an entering into the form of finitude1 actuality1 existence of the subjective will1 while what is religious has only the form of infinity4 ,but the ,church in its outward existence is inviolable1 it can throw over all the laws of the good2 every offence against it is a violation of sanctity4 ,evil and its penalties are made eternal1 divergences of opinion are punished even with death3 so are heresy and also heterodoxy in respect of the most abstract and empty determinations of an endless system of dogmas4 ,abominable practices and evil passions1 utter wantonness1 voluptuousness1 bribery1 dissoluteness1 avarice1 crimes of all kinds found their way into the ,church1 because it was unrestrained by laws2 and it founded and maintained the system of government4 ,the secular ought to be only secular2 but this whole secular government of the ,church claims at the same time the dignity and authority of the divine4 ,this mingling of the sacred1 divine1 inviolable1 with temporal interests1 begets1 on the one hand1 fanaticism1 as among the ,turks1 and on the other hand1 the humility and obedientia passiva of the laity against this dread power4 ,it was this ruin of the supersensuous world1 as represented in knowledge and as the actual ,church1 that inevitably forced man out of a temple such as this1 the ,holy of ,holies degraded into finitude4 ,against this disunion1 on the other hand1 the secular element has spiritualized itself in itself2 or it has established itself firmly in itself1 and that in a manner which the ,spirit justifies4 ,to religion was lacking the presence of its culminating point1 the present reality of its head2 to the present secularity there is lacking the presence in it of thought1 reason1 spirit4 ,in the tenth century there was manifested in ,christendom a general impulse to build churches1 although it was not possible to regard ,god ,himself as present therein4 ,it was thus that ,christianity rose up1 in her longing to take to herself the principle of reality as absolutely her own4 ,but neither these buildings1 nor external wealth1 nor the power and dominion of the ,church1 nor monks1 nor clergy1 nor ,pope1 are the principle of real actual presence in her2 they were insufficient for the spiritual4 ,the ,pope or the ,emperor is not ,dalai-lama1 the ,pope is only the ,vicar of ,christ2 ,christ1 as a past existence1 is in memory and hope alone4 ,impatient at the lack of reality and at the want of holiness1 ,christendom goes to seek this true ,head2 and this is the ruling motive of the ,crusades4 ,christendom sought ,christ's outward presence in the land of ,canaan1 the traces of ,him1 the mount where ,he suffered1 ,his grave2 they took possession of the ,holy ,sepulchre4 ,what they represent to themselves as real they also take possession of in fact as real2 but a grave is a grave--all that they find is a grave1 and even that is torn from them4 8,because ,thou wilt not leave my soul in hell1 neither wilt ,thou suffer ,thine ,holy ,one to see corruption40 ,christians made the mistake of thinking that they would find satisfaction in this2 this was the true object of their search2 but they did not understand themselves4 ,these holy spots1 the ,mount of ,olives1 the ,jordan1 ,nazareth1 as external sensuous presence of place without presence of time1 are things of the past1 a mere memory1 no perception of the immediate present2 the ,christians found only their loss1 their grave1 in this present4 ,barbarians all the time1 they did not seek the universal1 the world-controlling position of ,syria and ,egypt1 this central point of the earth1 the free connection of commerce2 ,bonaparte did this when mankind became rational4 ,the ,crusaders were by the ,saracens and by their own violence and repulsiveness1 as also by their own misery 7p4 #ec71 brought to confess that they had in this deceived themselves4 ,this experience taught them that they must hold to the actual reality which they despised1 and seek in this the realization of their intelligible world4 ,what they sought for they were to find in themselves1 in the present of the understanding2 thought1 personal knowledge and will constitute this present4 ,because their acts1 their aims and their interests are upright1 and thus are constituted the ,universal1 the present is rational4 ,what pertains to the world has thus become fixed in itself1 that is1 it has received into itself thought1 justice1 reason4 ,with reference to the general aspect of the period1 from an historical point of view1 it may be remarked that as on the one side we see the selflessness of spirit1 the fact that spirit is not at home with itself1 the torn and rent condition of man1 on the other side we see the political condition becoming more consolidated1 in the establishment of an independence which is no longer merely selfish4 ,in the first independence there is contained the moment of barbarism1 which has need of fear in order to be held within bounds4 ,now1 however1 we see justice and order enter in2 it is true that the ruling order is the feudal system with its servitude1 but everything therein has certainly a firm basis in justice4 ,justice1 however1 has its root in freedom1 and thus the individual therein brings himself into existence1 and is recognized2 nevertheless relationships which properly belong to the state are here still made the concern of private individuals4 ,feudal monarchy1 which now emerges in opposition to the self-abnegation of the ,church1 determines essential rights1 it is true1 according to birth2 ranks are not1 however1 like the system of caste among the ,indians1 for in the ecclesiastical hierarchy1 for instance1 anyone might from the lowest class rise to the very highest position4 ,even under the feudal system1 moreover1 justice1 civil order1 legal freedom gradually emerged4 ,in ,italy and ,germany cities obtained their rights as citizen republics1 and caused these to be recognized by the temporal and ecclesiastical power2 wealth displayed itself in the ,netherlands1 ,florence and the free cities on the ,rhine4 ,in this way men gradually began to emerge from the feudal system2 an example of this is seen in the case of the ,capitani4 ,the fact that the lingua volgare became the language used may also be looked on as a springing up of self-abnegation of spirit3 as in ,dante's ,divina ,commedia4 ,the spirit of the times took this new direction2 it forsook the intellectual world1 and looked upon its present world1 this hither side4 ,the finite heaven1 the content which had lost its religious character1 drove it to the finite present4 ,with this revolution the scholastic philosophy sinks and is lost1 as its thoughts are outside of reality4 ,while the ,church heretofore believed itself to be in possession of divine truth1 so now the temporal government1 as it received into itself order and right1 and worked its way out through the hard discipline of service1 felt itself to be a divine institution1 and consequently considered that it had the divine element here present in it1 and that it was justified in having an independent existence in opposition to the divine element in the ,church1 which takes up an exclusive position as regards the laity4 ,since in this way the temporal power1 the worldly life1 self-consciousness1 has taken into itself the higher and more divine ecclesiastical principle1 the harsh contrast has disappeared4 ,the power of the ,church appeared as the violence of the ,church1 not aiming at operating in accordance with reality and in reality1 but at being mighty in the spirit4 ,there at once came into the secular element the consciousness that abstract ,notions were filled with the reality of the present1 so that this was no longer a nullity1 but had truth also in itself4 ,with this commerce and the arts are associated4 ,it is implied in the arts that man brings what is divine out of himself2 as artists were at one time so pious that as individuals they had self-abnegation as their principle1 it was they from whose subjective abilities these representations were produced4 ,with this is connected the circumstance that the secular knew that it had in itself the right to hold to such determinations as are founded on subjective freedom4 ,in his handicraft the individual is taken in reference to his work1 and is himself the producer4 ,thus men came to the point of knowing that they were free1 and insisting on the recognition of that freedom1 and having the power of exercising their activity for their own objects and interests4 ,thus spirit came again to itself2 it drew itself together again1 and looked into its reason1 as if looking into its own hands4 ,this new birth is pointed out as the revival of the arts and sciences which were concerned with present matter1 the epoch when the spirit gains confidence in itself and in its existence1 and finds its interest in its present4 ,it is in reality reconciled with the world1 not implicitly1 far away in mere thought1 at the last day1 at the world's transfiguration1 i4e4 when the world is reality no more1 but it has to do with the world as not by any means annihilated4 ,the man who was moved to seek what was moral and right1 could no longer find it on such soil1 but looked round about him to seek it elsewhere4 ,the place which was pointed out to him is himself1 his inner life1 and external ,nature2 in the contemplation of ,nature the spirit begins to have a sense of being present therein4 ,,section ,,three ,,revival ,,of ,,the ,,sciences ,the deeper interest of the subject had been lost sight of1 as we have seen1 in the dryness and dulness of the content of thought1 and in speculations which went wandering off into endless details4 ,but now spirit gathered itself together1 and rose to claim the right to find and know itself as actual self-consciousness1 both in the supersensuous world and in immediate nature4 ,this awakening of the self-hood of spirit brought with it the revival of the arts and sciences of the ancient world4 ,this looked like a falling back into childhood1 but it was really a spontaneous ascent into the ,idea1 a movement originating with self--while up to this time the intellectual world had been rather something given from without4 ,from this proceeded all efforts and all inventions1 the discovery of ,america and of the way to the ,east ,indies4 ,thus in a very special way the love for the old1 so-called heathen sciences once more awoke1 for men turned to the works of the ancients1 which had now become objects of study1 as studia humaniora1 where man is recognized in what concerns himself and in what he effects4 ,these sciences1 though at first they were placed in opposition to the divine1 are rather themselves the divine1 as living1 however1 in the reality of spirit4 ,men1 because they are men1 find it interesting to study men as men4 ,with this a further consideration is intimately connected1 namely1 that when the formal culture of the mind1 found among the ,scholastics1 became transformed into the ,universal1 the result necessarily was that thought knew and found itself in itself2 from this the antithesis between the finite understanding and ecclesiastical dogma or faith consequently arose4 ,the idea became prevalent that the understanding can recognize something to be false which the ,church affirms to be true2 and it was of importance that the understanding did so apprehend itself1 although it was in opposition to the positive in general4 ,a4 ,,study ,,of ,,the ,,ancients4 ,the first way in which the desire to find the human element in reference to what pertains to science manifested itself1 was that an interest in such matters sprang up in the ,west1 a receptive power where the ancients in their definiteness and beauty are concerned4 ,but the revival of the arts and sciences1 and especially of the study of ancient literature bearing on ,philosophy1 was at first in some measure a simple revival of the old philosophy in its earlier and original form1 without anything new being added2 this working up of old philosophies1 to which a great number of writings were devoted1 was thus the restoration of something forgotten only4 ,the study of the ,greeks was more especially revived2 the knowledge of the ,greek originals which the ,west acquired is connected with external political events4 ,the ,west kept up constant intercourse with the ,greeks through the ,crusades1 and ,italy did so by means of commerce2 yet there were no special diplomatic relations4 ,even the ,roman laws were brought back from the ,east1 until a code of the corpus juris was by chance discovered4 ,but the ,west was again1 and more effectually1 brought into touch with the ,greek ,east when1 on the disastrous fall of the ,byzantine ,empire1 the noblest and most distinguished of the ,greeks fled to ,italy4 ,earlier than this even1 when the ,greek ,empire was being harassed by the ,turks1 ambassadors had been sent to the ,west in order to solicit help4 ,these ambassadors were men of learning1 and by their means--for as a rule they settled in the ,west--there was transplanted thither that love for antiquity to which we have referred4 ,petrarch in this way learned ,greek from ,barlaam1 a monk in ,calabria1 where dwelt many belonging to the order of ,st4 ,basil2 this order had monasteries in the south of ,italy1 and used ,greek ritual4 ,in ,constantinople ,barlaam had made the acquaintance of ,greeks1 particularly of ,chrysoloras1 who from #acie chose ,italy as his permanent dwelling-place4 ,these ,greeks made the ,west familiar with the works of the ancients1 especially of ,plato4#ee ,too much honour is done to the monks when it is asserted that they preserved for us the writings of the ancients2 these works1 at least such as were in ,greek1 came rather from ,constantinople1 while the ,latin portion of them1 it is true1 were preserved in the ,west4 ,acquaintance was now also for the first time made with ,aristotle's own writings 7supra1 p4 #ge71 and thereby the old philosophies were again revived1 although mingled with intellectual vagaries of the utmost wildness4 ,thus it was partly the old ,platonic philosophy that was sought out1 and partly the ,neo-,platonic1 as also the ,aristotelian and ,stoic1 the ,epicurean as far as it regarded physics1 and the popular philosophy of ,cicero in its first form2 these were brought forward as authorities against ,scholasticism1 being in direct contradiction to it4 ,such endeavours are1 however1 connected rather with the history of literature and culture1 and with the advancement of the same2 we do not find originality in this philosophic work1 nor can we recognize therein any forward step4 ,we have still writings of that period1 by which we find that each school of the ,greeks found its adherents1 and that ,aristotelians1 ,platonists1 and so on appeared on the scenes1 though they were of a very different stamp from those of olden times4 ,for true instruction in philosophy we must1 however1 go to the original sources1 the ancients4 #a4 ,,pomponatius4 ,pomponatius was one of the most remarkable of these ,aristotelians2 among other subjects he wrote in #aecd on the immortality of the soul1 and in so doing he showed--following a practice which was specially in vogue at that time--that this dogma1 which he believed as a ,christian1 was according to ,aristotle and reason incapable of proof4#ef ,the disciples of ,averros alleged that the universal 1 which is present in thought1 is immaterial and immortal1 while the soul as numerically one is mortal2 and ,alexander ,aphrodisiensis also maintained its mortality4 ,both of these opinions were condemned in #aeac at the ,council of ,benevento1 under ,leo ,x4#eg ,the vegetative and sensitive soul ,pomponatius asserted to be mortal 7c4 ,,viii4 p4 #cf2 c4 ,,ix4 pp4 #ea1 #fb-fe73 and he maintained that it is only through thought and reason that man partakes of immortality4 ,pomponatius was summoned before the ,inquisition2 but as cardinals protected him1 no further notice was taken of the matter4#eh ,there were many other pure ,aristotelians2 especially among the ,protestants at a later time were they general4 ,the ,scholastics were erroneously termed ,aristotelians2 therefore the ,reformation was opposed to ,aristotle only in appearance1 but to the ,scholastics it was opposed in fact4 #b4 ,,bessarion1 ,,ficinus1 ,,picus4 ,men now began to form acquaintance more especially with ,plato1 when manuscripts of his works were brought from ,greece2 ,greeks1 refugees from ,constantinople1 gave lectures on ,plato's philosophy4 ,cardinal ,bessarion of ,trapezunt1 at one time ,patriarch of ,constantinople1 was specially active in making ,plato known in the ,west4#ei ,ficinus1 who was born in ,florence in #adcc1 and died in #adii1 the accomplished translator of ,plato1 was a man of note2 it was mainly due to him that the study of ,neo-,platonism1 as presented by ,proclus and ,plotinus1 was again revived4 ,ficinus wrote also a ,platonic ,theology4 ,one of the ,medici in ,florence1 ,cosmo ,,ii41 went so far as to found a ,platonic ,academy even in the fifteenth century4 ,these ,medici1 the elder ,cosmo1 ,lorenzo1 ,leo ,x41 ,clement ,,vii41 were patrons of all the arts and sciences1 and made their court the resort of classical ,greek scholars4#fj ,two counts of the name of ,pico della ,mirandola--,giovanni1 and ,giovanni ,francesco1 his nephew--were influential rather by virtue of their marked personality and their originality2 the elder propounded nine hundred theses1 fifty-five of which were taken from ,proclus1 and invited philosophers one and all to a solemn discussion of the same2 he also in princely fashion undertook to pay the travelling expenses of those at a distance4#fa #c4 ,,gassendi1 ,,lipsius1 ,,reuchlin1 ,,helmont4 ,somewhat later1 and specially by ,gassendi1 the opponent of ,descartes1 the atom theory of ,epicurus was again revived4 ,as a development therefrom the theory of molecules maintained its place thenceforth in physical science4 ,the revival of ,stoic philosophy due to ,lipsius was not so clearly evidenced4 ,in ,reuchlin 7,kapnio71 who was born at ,pforzheim in ,swabia in #adee1 and who was himself the translator of several comedies of ,aristophanes1 the ,cabalistic philosophy found a defender4 ,he endeavoured also to reconstruct the ,pythagorean philosophy proper2 but he mingled with it much that is vague and mysterious4 ,there was in hand a project to destroy all ,hebrew books in ,germany by an imperial decree1 as had been done in ,spain2 ,reuchlin deserves great credit for having prevented this4#fb ,on account of the entire lack of dictionaries1 the study of the ,greek language was rendered so difficult that ,reuchlin travelled to ,vienna for the purpose of learning ,greek from a ,greek4 ,later on we find many profound thoughts in ,helmont1 an ,englishman1 who was born in #afah1 and died in #afii4fc ,all these philosophies were carried on side by side with belief in ,church dogmas1 and without prejudice thereto2 not in the sense in which the ancients conceived them4 ,a mass of literature exists on this subject1 containing the names of a multitude of philosophers1 but it is a literature of the past1 without the vitality characteristic of higher principles2 it is in fact not a true philosophy at all1 and ,i shall therefore not dwell any longer upon it4 #d4 ,,ciceronian ,,popular ,,philosophy4 ,cicero's mode of philosophizing1 a very general mode1 was revived in an especial degree4 ,it is a popular style of philosophizing1 which has no real speculative value1 but in regard to general culture it has this importance1 that in it man derives more from himself as a whole1 from his outer and inner experience1 and speaks altogether from the standpoint of the present4 ,he is a man of understanding who says1-- 8,what helps a man in life1 is what life itself has taught him40 ,the feelings1 c41 of man obtained due recognition1 we must observe1 as against the principle of self-abnegation4 ,a very large number of writings of this kind were issued1 some of them simply on their own account1 others aimed against the ,scholastics4 ,although all that great mass of philosophical writings--much1 for instance1 that ,erasmus wrote on similar subjects--has been forgotten1 and though it possesses little intrinsic value1 it was still of very great service1 as succeeding the barrenness of the ,scholastics and their groundless maunderings in abstractions3--groundless ,i say1 for they had not even self-consciousness as their basis4 ,petrarch was one of those who wrote from himself1 from his heart1 as a thinking man4 ,this new departure in ,philosophy applies in this regard to the reform of the ,church by ,protestantism also4 ,its principle is simply this1 that it led man back to himself1 and removed what was alien to him1 in language especially4 ,to have translated for ,german ,christians the book on which their faith is grounded1 into their mother-tongue1 is one of the greatest revolutions which could have happened4 ,italy in the same way obtained grand poetic works when the vernacular came to be employed by such writers as ,dante1 ,boccaccio and ,petrarch2 ,petrarch's political works were however written in ,latin4 ,it is not until a thing is expressed in my mother tongue that it becomes my own possession4 ,luther and ,melancthon cast the ,scholastic element quite aside1 and drew their conclusions from the ,bible1 from faith1 from the human heart4 ,melancthon presents to us a calm popular philosophy1 in which the human element makes itself felt1 and which therefore forms the most striking contrast to the lifeless and jejune ,scholasticism4 ,this attack against the ,scholastic method was made in the most different directions and in the most various forms4 ,but all this belongs rather to the history of ,religion than to that of ,philosophy4 ,b4 ,,certain ,,attempts ,,in ,,philosophy4 ,a second series of writers who now appeared have mainly to do with particular attempts made in ,philosophy which remained attempts merely1 and are only found while this terrible time of upheaval lasted4 ,many individuals of that period saw themselves forsaken by what had hitherto been accepted by them as content1 by the object which up to this time had formed the stay and support of their consciousness--by faith4 ,side by side with the peaceful reappearance of the ancient philosophy there displayed itself1 on the other hand1 a multitude of individuals in whom a burning desire after the conscious knowledge of what is deepest and most concrete was violently manifested4 ,it was spoilt1 however1 by endless fancies1 extravagances of the imagination and a craze for secret1 astrological1 geomantic and other knowledge4 ,these men felt themselves dominated1 as they really were1 by the impulse to create existence and to derive truth from their very selves4 ,they were men of vehement nature1 of wild and restless character1 of enthusiastic temperament1 who could not attain to the calm of knowledge4 ,though it cannot be denied that there was in them a wonderful insight into what was true and great1 there is no doubt on the other hand that they revelled in all manner of corruption in thought and heart as well as in their outer life4 ,there is thus to be found in them great originality and subjective energy of spirit2 at the same time the content is heterogeneous and unequal1 and their confusion of mind is great4 ,their fate1 their lives1 their writings--which often fill many volumes--manifest only this restlessness of their being1 this tearing asunder1 the revolt of their inner being against present existence and the longing to get out of it and reach certainty4 ,these remarkable individuals really resemble the upheavals1 tremblings and eruptions of a volcano which has become worked up in its depths and has brought forth new developments1 which as yet are wild and uncontrolled4 ,the most outstanding men of this nature are ,cardanus1 ,bruno1 ,vanini1 ,campanella1 and lastly ,ramus4 ,they are representative of the character of the time in this interval of transition1 and fall within the period of the ,reformation4 #a4 ,,cardanus4 ,hieronymus ,cardanus is of their number2 he was remarkable as an individual of world-wide reputation1 in whom the upheaval and fermentation of his time manifested itself in its utmost violence4 ,his writings fill ten folio volumes4 ,cardanus was born in #aeja at ,pavia1 and died at ,rome in #aege4 ,he recounted his own history and described his character in his book ,de vita propria1 where he makes an extraordinary confession of his sins1 passing the severest possible judgment upon them4 ,the following may serve to give a picture of these contradictions4 ,his life was a series of the most varied misfortunes1 external and domestic4 ,he speaks first of his pre-natal history4 ,he relates that his mother1 when pregnant with him1 drank potions in order to produce abortion4 ,when he was still at the breast1 there was an outbreak of the plague2 the nurse who suckled him died of the pestilence1 he survived4 ,his father was very severe in his treatment of him4 ,he lived sometimes in the most crushing poverty and the utmost want1 sometimes in the greatest luxury4 ,afterwards he applied himself to science1 became a ,doctor of ,medicine1 and travelled much4 ,he was celebrated far and wide2 summons came to him from every quarter1 several times he was called to ,scotland4 ,he writes that he cannot tell the sums of money that were offered to him4 ,he was professor at ,milan1 first of mathematics and then of medicine2 after that he lay for two years in ,bologna in the strictest imprisonment1 and had to undergo the most frightful tortures4 ,he was a profound astrologer1 and predicted the future for many princes1 who on that account held him in the greatest awe and reverence4#fd ,he is a name of note in mathematics2 we have from him still the regula ,cardani for the solution of equations of the third degree1 the only rule we have had up to this time4 ,he lived his whole life in perpetual inward and outward storms4 ,he says that he suffered the greatest torments in his soul4 ,in this inward agony he found the greatest delight in inflicting torture both on himself and others4 ,he scourged himself1 bit his lips1 pinched himself violently1 distorted his fingers1 in order to free himself from the tortures of his spiritual disquietude and induce weeping1 which brought him relief4 ,the same contradictions were to be seen in his outward demeanour1 which was sometimes quiet and decorous1 while at other times he behaved as if he were crazy and demented1 and that without any external provocation whatever1 and in matters the most indifferent4 ,sometimes he put on decent clothes and made himself neat and trim1 at other times he went in rags4 ,he would be reserved1 diligent1 persevering in his work1 and then would break out into excesses1 wasting and squandering all that he had1 his household goods and his wife's jewels4 ,sometimes he would walk quietly along1 like other men2 at other times he would rush on as if he were mad4 ,the upbringing of his children1 as was quite to be expected under the circumstances1 was very bad4 ,he had the unhappiness of seeing his sons turn out ill2 one of them poisoned his own wife and was executed with the sword2 he had his second son's ears cut off1 to chastise him for being dissipated4#fe ,he himself was of the wildest temperament1 brooding deeply within himself1 and yet breaking out into violence in the most contradictory manner2 within him there also raged a consuming restlessness4 ,i have epitomized the description which he gives of his own character1 and now quote it3 8,i have by nature a mind of philosophic and scientific cast2 ,i am witty1 elegant1 well-bred1 fond of luxury1 cheerful1 pious1 faithful1 a lover of wisdom1 reflective1 enterprising1 studious1 obliging1 emulous1 inventive1 self-taught4 ,i have a longing to perform prodigies1 ,i am crafty1 cunning1 bitter1 versed in secrets1 sober1 diligent1 careless1 talkative1 contemptuous of religion1 vindictive1 envious1 melancholy1 malicious1 treacherous1 a sorcerer1 a magician1 unhappy2 ,i am surly to my family1 ascetic1 difficult to deal with1 harsh1 a soothsayer1 jealous1 a ribald talker1 a slanderer1 compliant1 inconstant2 such contradictoriness of nature and manners is to be found in me40#ff ,his writings are in parts just as utterly unequal as his character4 ,in them he gave vent to the wild vehemence of his nature2 they are disconnected and contradictory1 and were often written in the direst poverty4 ,they contain a medley of all kinds of astrological and chiromantic superstition1 yet lit up here and there with profound and brilliant flashes2 there are ,alexandrine and ,cabalistic mysteries side by side with perfectly lucid psychological observations of his own4 ,he treated astrologically the life and deeds of ,christ4 ,his positive merit consists1 however1 rather in the stimulus which he gave to original production1 and in this direction he exercised an important influence on his times4 ,he boasted of the originality and novelty of his ideas1 and the craze to be original drove him to the strangest devices4 ,this represents the first form taken by the newly awakened and energizing reason in its spontaneous activity2 to be new and different from others was regarded as tantamount to possessing a private claim to science4 #b4 ,,campanella4 ,tommaso ,campanella1 a student of ,aristotle1 represents just such another medley of all possible dispositions4 ,he was born at ,stilo1 in ,calabria1 in #aefh1 and died at ,paris in #afci4 ,many of his writings still remain to us4 ,for seven-and-twenty years of his life he was kept in strict imprisonment at ,naples4#fg ,such men as he aroused enormous interest and gave great offence1 but on their own account they were productive of very little result4 ,we have still to make special mention of ,giordano ,bruno and ,vanini as belonging to this period4 #c4 ,,bruno4 ,giordano ,bruno was of an equally restless and effervescent temperament1 and we see in him a bold rejection of all ,catholic beliefs resting on mere authority4 ,in modern times he has again been brought into remembrance by ,jacobi 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #e-df71 who appended to his letters on ,spinoza an abstract of one of ,bruno's works4#fh ,jacobi caused great attention to be paid to ,bruno1 more especially by his assertion that the sum of ,bruno's teaching was the ,one and ,all of ,spinoza1 or really ,pantheism2 on account of the drawing of this parallel ,bruno obtained a reputation which passes his deserts4 ,he was less restless than ,cardanus2 but he had no fixed habitation on the earth4 ,he was born at ,nola in the province of ,naples1 and lived in the sixteenth century2 the year of his birth is not known with certainty4 ,he roamed about in most of the ,european states1 in ,italy1 ,france1 ,england1 ,germany1 as a teacher of philosophy3 he forsook ,italy1 where at one time he had been a ,dominican friar1 and where he had made bitter reflections both upon various ,catholic dogmas--for instance1 on transubstantiation and the immaculate conception of the ,virgin--and upon the gross ignorance and scandalous lives of the monks4 ,he then lived in ,geneva in #aehb1 but there he fell out in the same way with ,calvin and ,beza1 and could not live with them3 he made some stay in several other ,french cities1 such as ,lyons2 and after a time he came to ,paris1 where in #aehe he formally challenged the adherents of ,aristotle1 by following a practice greatly in favour in those days 7supra1 p4 #aab71 and proposing for public disputation a series of philosophic theses1 which were specially directed against ,aristotle4 ,they appeared under the title ,jord4 ,bruni ,nol4 ,rationes articulorum physicorum adversus ,peripateticos ,parisiis propositorum1 ,viteberg apud ,zachariam ,cratonem1 #aehh2 he was not successful in them1 however1 as the position of the ,aristotelians was still too well assured4 ,bruno was also in ,london2 he visited ,wittenberg in the year #aehf2 he likewise stayed in ,prague and other universities and towns4 ,in ,helmstedt he was high in the favour of the ,dukes of ,brunswick-,lneburg in #aehi2 after that he went to ,frankfort-on-,main1 where he had several of his works printed4 ,he was a wandering professor and author4 ,finally he came back to ,italy in #aeib1 and lived in ,padua for some time undisturbed1 but at last he was seized in ,venice by the ,inquisition1 cast into prison1 sent on to ,rome1 and there in the year #afjj1 refusing to recant1 he was burned at the stake as a heretic4 ,eye-witnesses1 and amongst them ,scioppius1 recount that he met death with the most unflinching courage4 ,he had become a ,protestant when in ,germany1 and had broken the vows of his order4#fi ,among both ,catholics and ,protestants his writings were held to be heretical and atheistic1 and therefore they were burned and destroyed1 or kept in concealment4 ,his complete works are hence very seldom met with2 the greatest number of them are to be found in the ,university ,library at ,gottingen2 the fullest account of them is given in ,buhle's ,history of ,philosophy 7supra1 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #aac74 ,his works are for the most part rare1 and in many cases interdicted2 in ,dresden they are still included among prohibited writings1 and are therefore not to be seen there4 ,lately#gj an edition of them in the ,italian language was prepared1#ga which possibly has never yet been issued4 ,bruno also wrote a great deal in ,latin4 ,wherever he took up his abode for a time1 he gave public lectures1 wrote and published works2 and this increases the difficulty of making complete acquaintance with his books4 ,many of his writings are for the above reason very similar in their matter1 the form only being different1 and in the evolution of his thoughts he never consequently advanced very much nor attained to any results4 ,but the leading characteristic of his various writings is really to some extent the grand enthusiasm of a noble soul1 which has a sense of indwelling spirit1 and knows the unity of its own ,being and all ,being to be the whole life of thought4 ,there is something bacchantic in his way of apprehending this deep consciousness2 it overflows in becoming thus an object of thought1 and in the expression of its riches4 ,but it is only in knowledge that spirit can bring itself forth as a whole2 when it has not yet attained to this point of scientific culture1 it reaches out after all forms1 without bringing them first into due order4 ,bruno displays just such an unregulated and multiform profusion2 and on that account his expositions have frequently a dreamy1 confused1 allegorical appearance of mystical enthusiasm4 ,many of his writings are in verse1 and much that is fantastic finds a place in them1 as for instance when he says in one of his works1 entitled ,la ,bestia ,trionfante1 that something else must be put in place of the stars4#gb ,he sacrificed his personal welfare to the great enthusiasm which filled him1 and which left him no peace4 ,it is easy to say that he was 8a restless being1 who could get on with nobody40 ,but whence did this restlessness come to him8 ,what he could not get on with was the finite1 the evil1 the ignoble4 ,thence arose his restlessness4 ,he rose to the one universal substantiality by putting an end to this separation of self-consciousness and nature1 whereby both alike are degraded4 ,god was in self-consciousness1 it was admitted1 but externally1 and as remaining something different from self-consciousness1 another reality2 while ,nature was made by ,god1 being ,his creature1 not an image of ,him4 ,the goodness of ,god displayed itself only in final causes1 finite ends1 as when it is said3 8,bees make honey for man's food2 the cork tree grows to provide stoppers for bottles40#gc ,as to his reflections1 ,jacobi has by his recent#gd exposition of them made it seem as if it were a theory specially characteristic of ,bruno that one living ,being1 one ,world-,soul1 should penetrate all existence1 and should be the life of all4 ,bruno asserted1 in the first place1 the unity of life and the universality of the ,world-,soul1 and1 in the second place1 the indwelling presence of reason2 but ,bruno in so saying is far from being original1 and in fact this doctrine is a mere echo of the ,alexandrian4 ,but in his writings there are two specially marked features4 ,the first is the nature of his system1 based as it is on his leading thoughts1 or his philosophic principles generally1 namely the ,idea as substantial unity4 ,the second1 which is closely connected with the first1 is his use of the ,art of ,lullius2 this is specially emphasized and highly esteemed by him1 the art of finding differences in the ,idea3 it he wished to bring into special recognition4 a4 ,his philosophic thoughts1 to express which he sometimes made use of ,aristotle's concepts1 give evidence of a peculiar1 highly strung and very original mind4 ,the substance of his general reflections is found in the greatest enthusiasm for the above-mentioned vitality of ,nature1 divinity1 the presence of reason in nature4 ,his philosophy is thus on the whole certainly ,spinozism1 ,pantheism4 ,the separation of man from ,god or the world1 all such relations of externality1 have been superadded to his living idea of the absolute1 universal unity of all things1 for the expression of which idea ,bruno has been so greatly admired4 ,in his conception of things the main points are that1 on the one hand1 he gives the universal determination of matter1 and1 on the other hand1 that of form4 4 ,the unity of life he thus determines as the universal1 active understanding 771 which manifests itself as the universal form of all the world1 and comprehends all forms in itself2 it bears the same relation to the production of natural objects as does the understanding of man1 and moulds and systematizes them1 as the human understanding moulds the multitude of its concepts4 ,it is the artist within1 who shapes and forms the material without4 ,from within the root or the seed-grain it makes the shoot come forth2 from this again it brings the branches1 and from them the twigs1 and from out of the twigs it calls forth the buds1 and leaves1 and flowers4 ,all is planned1 prepared and perfected within4 ,in the same way this universal reason within calls back their saps from the fruits and blossoms to the twigs1 and so on4 ,the universe is thus an infinite animal1 in which all things live and move and have their being in modes the most diverse4 ,the formal understanding is thus in no wise different from the ,final ,cause 7the ,notion of end1 the entelechy1 the unmoved principle1 which we meet with in ,aristotle72 but these are just as truly also active understanding1 the efficient cause 7causa efficiens71 this same producing force4 ,nature and ,spirit are not separated2 their unity is the formal understanding1 in which is contained the pure ,notion1 not as in consciousness1 but as free and independent1 remaining within itself1 and at the same time exercising activity and passing beyond itself4 ,the understanding working towards one particular end is the inward form of the thing itself1 an inward principle of the understanding4 ,what is continually produced is in accordance with this form1 and contained within it2 what appears is determined as the form is in itself determined4#ge ,with ,proclus in the same way the understanding1 as substantial1 is that which includes all things in its unity3 life is the outgoing1 the producing force3 and the understanding as such similarly includes the returning force1 which brings all things back into unity4 ,in dealing with ,kant's philosophy we shall have again to mention this determination of final purpose4 ,that which has organic life1 whose principle is formative1 which has its efficacy in itself1 and in the same only remains at home with itself and maintains itself1 is nothing but the end1 the activity determined in itself1 which in its relation to what is different does not comport itself as mere cause1 but returns upon itself4 4 ,bruno1 who asserts the final cause to be immediately operative1 and the life immanent in the universe1 asserts it also to be existent1 as substance2 he is therefore opposed to the conception of a merely extra-mundane understanding4 ,to a certain extent ,bruno distinguishes form and matter in substance1 which itself1 as the aforesaid activity of the ,idea1 is the unity of form and matter2 thus matter has life in itself4 ,the permanent element in the endless changes of existence is1 he says1 the first and absolute matter2 although without form1 it is nevertheless the mother of all forms1 and receptive of all forms4 ,because matter is not without the first universal form1 it is itself principle or in itself final cause4 ,form is immanent in matter2 the one simply cannot exist without the other2 thus matter itself brings about these changes of form1 and the same matter runs through them all4 ,what was at first seed becomes blade1 then ear1 then bread1 chyle1 blood1 seed of animal1 an embryo1 a human being1 a corpse1 then once more earth1 stone1 or other substance2 from sand and water frogs are produced4 ,here then we can perceive something which1 although it transforms itself into all these things in turn1 yet still in itself remains one and the same4 ,this matter cannot be a body1 for bodies have form2 nor can it belong to the class which we term properties1 attributes1 or qualities1 for these are liable to change4 ,thus nothing seems to be eternal and worthy of the name of a principle1 except matter4 ,many have for this reason held matter to be the only reality1 and all forms to be accidental4 ,this error arises from the fact of their recognizing only a form of the second kind1 and not that necessary first and eternal form1 which is the form and source of all forms4 ,in the same way the aforesaid matter1 on account of its identity with the understanding which causes form beforehand1 is itself intelligible1 as the universal presupposition of all corporeality4 ,because it is everything in general1 it is nothing in particular1 neither air nor water1 nor anything else1 abstract or otherwise2 it has no dimensions1 in order to have all dimensions4 ,the forms of matter are the inward power of matter itself2 it is1 as intelligible1 the very totality of form4#gf ,this system of ,bruno's is thus objective ,spinozism1 and nothing else2 one can see how deeply he penetrated4 ,bruno here asks the question3 8,but this first universal form and that first universal matter1 how are they united1 inseparable8 ,different--and yet one ,being80 ,he answers by making use of the ,aristotelian forms of and 3 ,matter is to be regarded as potentiality2 in this way all possible forms of existence in a certain sense are included in the ,notion of it4 ,the passivity of matter must be regarded as pure and absolute4 ,now it is impossible to attribute existence to a thing which lacks the power to exist4 ,existence has1 however1 such an express reference to the active mode1 that it is at once clear that the one cannot exist without the other1 but that each of them presupposes the other4 ,if therefore at all times a capacity of working1 producing1 creating1 was there1 so must there also have been at all times a capacity of being worked upon1 produced1 created4 ,the perfect potentiality of the existence of things 7matter7 cannot precede their actual existence1 and just as little can it remain after that is past4 ,the first and most perfect principle includes all existence in itself1 can be all things1 and is all things4 ,active power and potentiality1 possibility and actuality are therefore in it one undivided and indivisible principle4#gg ,this simultaneousness of acting and being acted upon is a very important determination2 matter is nothing without activity1 form is therefore the power and inward life of matter4 ,if matter were nothing but indeterminate potentiality1 how would the determinate be arrived at8 ,this simplicity of matter is itself only one moment of form3 in wishing therefore to tear asunder matter and form1 matter is at once established in one determination of form1 but in so doing there is immediately established also the existence of the ,other4 ,thus the ,absolute is determined for ,bruno3 it is not so with other things1 which may exist and also may not exist1 and which may be determined in one way or in another way4 ,in regard to finite things and in finite determinations of the understanding the distinction between form and matter is thus present4 ,the individual man is at every moment what he may be at that moment1 but not everything which he may be in general and with reference to substance4 ,the things which appear to be different are only modifications of one single thing which includes in its existence all other existence4 ,the universe1 unbegotten ,nature1 is1 however1 everything which it can be in reality and at one time1 because it includes in itself the whole of matter1 as well as the eternal1 unchangeable form of its changing forms4 ,but in its developments from moment to moment1 its particular parts1 qualities1 individual existences1 in its externality as a whole1 it is no more what it is and may be2 but a part such as this is only a shadow of the image of the first principle4#gh ,thus ,bruno wrote also a book1 ,de umbris idearum4 4 ,this is ,bruno's fundamental idea4 ,he says3 8,to recognize this unity of form and matter in all things1 is what reason is striving to attain to4 ,but in order to penetrate to this unity1 in order to investigate all the secrets of ,nature1 we must search into the opposed and contradictory extremes of things1 the maximum and the minimum40 ,it is in these very extremes that they are intelligible1 and become united in the ,notion2 and this union of them is infinite ,nature4 8,to find the point of union is not the greatest matter2 but to develop from the same its very opposite1 this is the real and the deepest secret of the art40#gi ,it is saying much if we speak of knowing the development of the ,idea as a necessity of determinations2 we shall see later how ,bruno proceeded to do this4 ,he represents the original principle1 which is elsewhere known as the form1 under the ,notion of the minimum1 which is at the same time the maximum--,one1 which at the same time is ,all2 the universe is this ,one in ,all4 ,in the universe1 he says1 the body is not distinguished from the point1 nor the centre from the circumference1 nor the finite from the infinite1 nor the maximum from the minimum4 ,there is nothing but centre point2 or the centre point is everywhere and in everything4 ,the ancients expressed the same by saying of the ,father of the gods1 that he really had his dwelling-place in every point of the universe4 ,it is the universe that first gives to things true reality2 it is the substance of all things1 the monad1 the atom1 the spirit poured out on all things1 the innermost essence1 the pure form4#hj b4 ,the second object to which ,bruno devoted himself was the so-called ,lullian ,art1 which received its name from its first inventor1 the ,scholastic ,raymundus ,lullus 7supra1 pp4 #ib-id74 ,bruno adopted this and carried it to completion2 he termed it also his ars combinatoria4 ,this art is in some respects like what we met with in ,aristotle under the name of the ,topics 7,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bag1 #bah71 seeing that both give an immense number of 8places0 and determinations which were fixed in the conception like a table with its divisions1 in order that these headings might be applied to all that came to hand4 ,but the ,topics of ,aristotle did this in order to apprehend and determine an object in its various aspects1 while ,bruno rather worked for the sake of lightening the task of memory4 ,he thus really connected the ,lullian ,art with the art of mnemonics as practised by the ancients1 which has come into notice again in recent times1 and which will be found described in greater detail in the ,auctor ad ,herennium 7,libr4 ,,iii4 c4 #ag1 sqq474 ,to give an example3 one establishes for oneself a certain number of different departments in the imagination1 which are to be chosen at pleasure2 there may be perhaps twelve of these1 arranged in sets of three1 and indicated by certain words1 such as ,aaron1 ,abimelech1 ,achilles1 ,berg1 ,baum1 ,baruch1 etc41 into which divisions one inserts1 as it were1 what has to be learnt by heart1 and forms it into a succession of pictures4 ,in this way when we repeat it1 we have not to say it from memory or out of our head1 as we are accustomed to do1 but we have only to read it off as if from a table4 ,the only difficulty lies in making some ingenious connection between the content in question and the picture2 that gives rise to the most unholy combinations1 and the art is therefore not one to be commended4 ,bruno also soon abandoned it1 since what had been a matter of memory became a matter of imagination2 which was1 of course1 a descent4 ,but since with ,bruno the diagram is not only a picture of external images1 but a system of universal determinations of thought1 he certainly gave to this art a deeper inward meaning4#ha 4 ,bruno passes over to this art from universal ideas which are given4 ,since namely one life1 one understanding is in all things1 ,bruno had the dim hope of apprehending this universal understanding in the totality of its determinations1 and of subsuming all things under it--of setting up a logical philosophy by its means1 and making it applicable in all directions4#hb ,he says3 ,the object of consideration therein is the universe1 in so far as it enters into the relation of the true1 the knowable and the rational4 ,like ,spinoza he distinguishes between the intelligible thing of reason and the actual thing3 ,as metaphysics has for object the universal thing1 which is divided into substance and accident1 so the chief matter is that there is a single and more universal art which knits together and compasses round the thing of reason and the actual thing1 and recognizes them both as harmonizing with one another1 so that the many1 be they of what kind they may1 are led back to simple unity4#hc 4 ,for ,bruno the principle in all this is the understanding generally3 ,none other than the understanding whose activity extends beyond itself1 which brings into existence the sensuous world4 ,it is related to the illumination of the spirit as the sun is related to the eye3 it relates therefore to a phenomenal manifold1 illuminating this1 not itself4 ,the ,other is the active understanding in itself1 which is related to the objects of thought in their various classes1 as the eye is to things visible4#hd ,the infinite form1 the active understanding which dwells in reason1 is the first1 the principle1 which develops2 the process in some respects resembles what was met with in the ,neo-,platonists4 ,bruno's great endeavour is really now to apprehend and demonstrate the modes of organizing this active understanding4 4 ,this is presented more in detail as follows3 ,to the pure truth itself1 the absolute light1 man approaches only2 his ,being is not absolute ,being itself1 which alone is the ,one and ,first4 ,he rests only under the shadow of the ,idea1 whose purity is the light1 but which at the same time partakes of the darkness4 ,the light of substance emanates from this pure ,first ,light1 the light of accident emanates from the light of substance4 ,this we met with also in ,proclus 7supra1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ddf7 as the third moment in the first triad4 ,this absolute principle in its unity is for ,bruno the first matter1 and the first act of this principle he names the original light 7actus primus lucis74 ,but substances and accidents1 which are many1 cannot receive the full light1 they are therefore only included in the shadow of the light2 in like manner the ideas also are only shadows thereof4#he ,the development of ,nature goes on from moment to moment2 created things are only a shadow of the first principle1 not the first principle itself4 4 ,bruno continues3 ,from this super-essential 7super-essentiale7--an expression which is also met with in ,proclus 7supra1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #dda7--;advance is made to the essences1 from the essences to that which is1 from that which is to their traces1 images and shadows1 and that in a double direction3 both towards matter1 in order to be produced within her 7these shadows are then present in natural fashion71 and also towards sensation and reason1 in order to be known by means of these4 ,things withdraw themselves from the ,first ,light towards the darkness4 ,but since all things in the universe are in close connection1 the lower with the middle1 and those with the upper1 the compound with the simple1 the simple with those which are more simple1 the material with the spiritual1 in order that there may be one universe1 one order and government of the same1 one principle and aim1 one first and last2 so1 following the sound of the lyre of the universal ,apollo 7an expression which we saw used by ,heraclitus1 ,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #bhd1 #bhe71 the lower can be led back step by step to the higher1 as fire was condensed and transformed into air1 air into water1 water into earth4 ,thus ,one ,being is in all4 ,that process is the same as this return1 and they form a circle4 ,nature within her limits can produce all from all1 and so the understanding can also know all from all4#hf 4 ,the unity of opposites is explained more in detail as follows3 ,the diversity of shadows is no real opposition4 ,in the same conception the opposites are known1 the beautiful and the ugly1 the appropriate and the inappropriate1 the perfect and the imperfect1 the good and the evil4 ,imperfection1 evil1 ugliness1 do not rest upon special ideas of their own2 they become known in another conception1 not in one peculiar to themselves1 which is nothing4 ,for this that is peculiarly theirs is the non-existent in the existent1 the defect in the effect4 ,the first understanding is the original light2 it streams its light out of the innermost to the outermost1 and draws it again from the outermost to itself4 ,every ,being can1 according to its capacity1 appropriate somewhat of this light4#hg 4 ,the real element in things is just that which is intelligible1 not that which is perceived or felt1 or what is peculiar to the individual2 whatever else is termed real1 the sensuous1 is non-,being4 ,all that comes to pass beneath the sun1 all that dwells in the region of matter1 falls under the notion of vanity 7finitude74 ,seek to take from ,ideas a firm basis for thy conceptions1 if thou art wise4 ,the pure light of things is nothing but this knowableness1 which proceeds from the first understanding and is directed towards it2 the non-existent is not known4 ,what is here contrast and diversity1 is in the first understanding harmony and unity4 ,try therefore if thou canst identify the images thou hast received1 if thou canst harmonize and unite them2 thus thou wilt not render thy mind weary1 thy thoughts obscure1 and thy memory confused4 ,through the idea which is in the understanding a better conception of anything will be formed than by means of the form of the natural thing in itself1 because this last is more material3 but that conception is reached in a supreme degree through the idea of the object as it exists in the divine understanding4#hh ,the differences which are here given1 are therefore no differences at all2 but all is harmony4 ,to develop this was therefore ,bruno's endeavour2 and the determinations1 as natural in that divine understanding1 correspond with those which appear in the subjective understanding4 ,bruno's art consists only in determining the universal scheme of form1 which includes all things within itself1 and in showing how its moments express themselves in the different spheres of existence4 4 ,the main endeavour of ,bruno was thus to represent the ,all and ,one1 after the method of ,lullus1 as a system of classes of regular determinations4 ,hence in the manner of ,proclus he specifies the three spheres3 ,first1 the original form 77 as the originator of all forms2 secondly1 the physical world1 which impresses the traces of the ,ideas on the surface of matter1 and multiplies the original picture in countless mirrors set face to face2 thirdly1 the form of the rational world1 which individualizes numerically for the senses the shadows of the ,ideas1 brings them into one1 and raises them to general conceptions for the understanding4 ,the moments of the original form itself are termed ,being1 goodness 7nature or life71 and unity4 7,something similar to this we also met with in ,proclus1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #dde7 ,in the metaphysical world the original form is thing1 good1 principle of plurality 7ante multa72 in the physical world it manifests itself in things1 goods1 individuals2 in the rational world of knowledge it is derived from things1 goods and individuals4#hi ,unity is the agent that brings them back once more2 and ,bruno1 while distinguishing the natural and metaphysical world1 seeks to set up the system of the above determinations1 in order to show at once how the same thing is in one way a natural appearance1 and in another way an object existing for thought4 ,since ,bruno sought to apprehend this connection more closely1 he considers thinking as a subjective art and activity of the soul1 representing inwardly and in accordance with the ordinary conception1 as it were through an inward writing1 what ,nature represents externally1 as it were1 through an outward writing4 ,thinking1 he says1 is the capability both of receiving into one's self this external writing of nature and of imagining and substantiating the inward writing in the outward4 ,this art of thinking inwardly and organizing outwardly in accordance with the same1 and the capacity to reverse the process--an art possessed by the soul of man--,bruno places in the closest connection with the art of the nature of the universe1 with the energy of the absolute ,world-principle1 by means of which all is formed and fashioned4 ,it is one form which develops2 it is the same world-principle which causes form in metals1 plants and animals1 and which in man thinks and organizes outside himself1 only that it expresses itself in its operations in an endlessly varied manner throughout the entire world4 ,inwardly and outwardly there is consequently one and the same development of one and the same principle4#ij ,in his ,ars ,lulliana ,bruno made the attempt to determine and systematize these various writings of the soul1 by means of which also the organizing world-principle reveals itself4 ,he assumes therein twelve principal kinds of writing1 or classes of natural forms1 to form a starting-point3 8,species1 ,form1 ,simulacra1 ,imagines1 ,spectra1 ,exemplaria1 ,indicia1 ,signa1 ,not1 ,characteres et ,sigilli4 ,some kinds of writing are connected with the external sense1 like external forms1 pictures and ideals 7extrinseca forma1 imago1 exemplar72 these painting and other plastic arts represent1 by imitating ,mother ,nature4 ,some are connected with the inner sense1 where--with regard to mass1 duration1 number--they are magnified1 extended in time and multiplied2 such are the products of fancy4 ,some are connected with a common point of similarity in several things2 some are so divergent from the objective nature of things that they are quite imaginary4 ,finally1 some appear to be peculiar to art1 as signa1 not1 characteres et sigilli2 by means of these the powers of art are so great that it seems to be able to act independently of ,nature1 beyond ,nature1 and1 when the matter in question involves it1 even against ,nature40#ia ,so far all1 on the whole1 goes well2 it is the carrying out of the same scheme in all directions4 ,all respect is due to this attempt to represent the logical system of the inward artist1 the producing thought1 in such a way that the forms of external ,nature correspond thereto4 ,but while the system of ,bruno is otherwise a grand one1 in it the determinations of thought nevertheless at once become superficial1 or mere dead types1 as in later times was the case with the classification of natural philosophy2 for ,bruno merely enumerates the moments and contrasts of the system1 just as the natural philosophers developed the three-fold character in every sphere1 regarded as absolute4 ,further or more determinate moments ,bruno has done nothing more than collect together2 when he tries to represent them by figures and classifications1 the result is confusion4 ,the twelve forms laid down as basis neither have their derivation traced nor are they united in one entire system1 nor is the further multiplication deduced4 ,to this part of his subject he devoted several of his writings 7,de sigillis71 and in different works it is presented in different ways2 the appearances of things are as letters1 or symbols1 which correspond with thoughts4 ,the idea is on the whole praiseworthy compared with the fragmentariness of ,aristotle and the ,scholastics1 according to whom every determination is fixed once for all4 ,but the carrying out of the idea is in part allied with the ,pythagorean numbers1 and consequently unmethodical and arbitrary2 and in part we find metaphorical1 allegorical combinations and couplings1 where we cannot follow ,bruno2 in this attempt to introduce order1 all things are mingled together in the wildest disorder4 ,it is a great beginning1 to have the thought of unity2 and the other point is this attempt to grasp the universe in its development1 in the system of its determinations1 and to show how the outward appearance is a symbol of ideas4 ,these are the two aspects of ,bruno's teaching which had to be taken into consideration4 #d4 ,,vanini4 ,julius ,csar ,vanini has also to be mentioned as belonging to this period2 his first name was really ,lucilius4 ,he has many points of similarity with ,bruno1 and1 like him1 he suffered as a martyr on account of philosophy2 for he shared ,bruno's fate1 which was to be burned at the stake4 ,he was born in #aehf at ,taurozano in the province of ,naples4 ,he wandered from country to country2 we find him in ,geneva1 and then in ,lyons1 whence he fled to ,england in order to save himself from the ,inquisition4 ,after two years he returned to ,italy4 ,in ,genoa he taught ,natural ,philosophy on the system of ,averros1 but did not bring himself into favour4 ,in his travels he met with all manner of strange adventures1 and engaged in many and various disputations on philosophy and theology4 ,he became more and more an object of suspicion1 and fled from ,paris2 he was summoned before the tribunal on a charge of impiety1 not of heresy4 ,franconus1 his accuser1 stated on oath that ,vanini had uttered blasphemies4 ,vanini protested that he had remained faithful to the ,catholic ,church1 and to his belief in the ,trinity2 and in answer to the charge of atheism he took up a straw from the ground in the presence of his judges1 and said that even this straw would convince him of the existence of ,god4 ,but it was of no avail2 in #afai at ,toulouse in ,france he was condemned to the stake1 and before the carrying out of this sentence his tongue was torn out by the executioner4 ,how the case was proved against him is not1 however1 clear2 the proceedings seem to have been in great part due to personal enmity1 and to the zeal for persecution which filled the clergy in ,toulouse4#ib ,vanini derived his chief stimulus from the originality of ,cardanus4 ,in him we see reason and philosophy taking a direction hostile to theology1 while ,scholastic philosophy went hand in hand with theology1 and theology was supposed to be confirmed thereby4 ,art developed in the ,catholic ,church1 but free thought broke off from1 and remained alien to it4 ,in ,bruno and ,vanini the ,church took her revenge for this2 she renounced science1 and took up a position of hostility to it4 ,vanini's philosophy does not go very far2 he admires the living energy of ,nature2 his reasonings were not deep1 but were more of the nature of fanciful ideas4 ,he always chose the dialogue form2 and it is not evident which of the opinions stated are his own4 ,he wrote commentaries on ,aristotle's works on ,physics4 ,we have two other works by ,vanini1 which are very rare4 ,the one is styled3 ,amphitheatrum tern providenti divino-magicum1 christiano-physicum1 nec non astrologo-catholicum1 adversus veteres philosophos1 ,atheos1 ,epicureos1 ,peripateticos et ,stoicos4 ,auctore ,julio ,csare ,vanino1 ,lugd4 #afae2 in this he gives a very eloquent account of all these philosophies and their principles1 but the manner in which he refutes them is rather feeble4 ,the second work is entitled 8,on the ,wonderful ,secrets of ,nature1 the ,queen and ,goddess of ,mortals0 7,de admirandis ,natur1 regin ,deque mortalium1 arcanis libr4 ,,iv41 ,luteti #afaf72 it was printed 8with the approval of the ,sorbonne10 which at first found in it nothing 8which contradicted and was hostile to the ,catholic ,apostolic and ,roman religion40 ,it contains scientific investigations into various matters belonging to physics and natural history1 and is also in dialogue form1 without definite indication being given as to which of the characters is made the mouthpiece of ,vanini's own opinions4 ,what one finds is assurances from him that he would believe this or that doctrine if he had not received ,christian teaching4 ,vanini's tendency1 however1 was towards naturalism2 he showed that it is ,nature that is the ,deity1 that all things had a mechanical genesis4 ,he therefore explained the whole universe in its connection by efficient causes alone1 not by final causes2 but the statement of this is made in such a way that the writer does not give it as his own conclusion4#ic ,thus ,vanini placed reason in opposition to faith and church dogma1 as had already been done by ,pomponatius 7supra1 p4 #aaa7 and others4 ,yet all the time that they were proving by reason this or that dogma which is in direct contradiction to the ,christian belief1 they were declaring that they submitted their conviction to the ,church--a course which was always adopted by ,bayle afterwards in the reformed church4 ,another practice of these philosophers was to bring forward all sorts of arguments and theories contradictory of theological dogmas1 as so many insoluble difficulties and contradictions brought about by reason1 which were1 however1 by them submitted to faith4 ,thus1 for instance1 ,bayle says in the article 8,manichans0 found in his critical ,dictionnaire--in which he touches on many philosophic conceptions--that the assertion of the existence of two principles cannot be disproved1 but that we must submit herein to the ,church4 ,in this fashion all possible arguments were advanced against the ,church4 ,vanini thus states objections against the ,atonement1 and brings forward arguments to prove that ,nature is ,god4 ,now men were convinced that reason could not be contradictory of the ,christian dogmas1 and no faith was placed in the sincerity of a submission which consisted in giving up what one was convinced of by reason2 therefore ,galileo1 because he defended the system of ,copernicus1 had to recant on his knees1 and ,vanini was burned at the stake4 ,both of them had in vain chosen the dialogue form for their writings4 ,vanini certainly made one of the speakers in the ,dialogues prove 7,de natur arcanis1 p4 #dbj7 even 8out of the text of the ,bible1 that the devil is mightier than ,god10 and that therefore ,god does not rule the world4 ,among his arguments are the following3 ,it was against the will of ,god that ,adam and ,eve sinned1 and thus brought the whole human race to ruin 7ad interitum73 ,christ also was crucified by the powers of darkness4 ,moreover it is the will of ,god that all men should be saved4 ,but of ,catholics there are very few in comparison with the rest of the world1 and the ,jews often fell away from their faith2 the ,catholic religion extends only over ,spain1 ,france1 ,italy1 ,poland and a part of ,germany4 ,if there were to be deducted also the atheists1 blasphemers1 heretics1 whoremongers1 adulterers1 and so on1 there would be still fewer left4 ,consequently the devil is mightier than ,god4 ,these are arguments of reason2 they are not to be refuted2 but he submitted himself to the faith4 ,it is remarkable that no one believed this of him2 the reason thereof being that it was impossible for him to be in earnest with the refutation of what he asserted to be rational4 ,that the refutation was but weak and subjective does not justify anyone in doubting ,vanini's sincerity2 for poor reasons may be convincing for the subject1 just as the subject holds to his own rights in respect of objective matters4 ,what lies at the bottom of the proceedings against ,vanini is this1 that when a man by means of his reason has come to perceive something which seems to him incontrovertible1 he cannot but adhere to these definite perceptions1 he cannot believe what is opposed to them4 ,it is impossible to believe that faith is stronger in him than this power of perception4 ,the ,church in this way fell into the strange contradiction of condemning ,vanini1 because he did not find her doctrines in accordance with reason1 and yet submitted himself to them2 she thus appeared to demand--a demand which she emphasized with the burning pile--not that her doctrines should be considered above reason1 but in accordance with it1 and that reason should have merely the formal function of explaining the content of theology1 without adding anything of her own4 ,this susceptibility of the ,church is inconsistent1 and entangled her in contradictions4 ,for in earlier times she certainly admitted that reason could not grasp what was revealed1 and that it was consequently a matter of little importance to refute and solve by reason the objections which reason itself brought forward4 ,but as she now would not permit the contradiction of faith and reason to be taken seriously1 but burned ,vanini at the stake as an atheist for professing so to do1 it was implied that the doctrine of the ,church cannot contradict reason1 while man has yet to submit reason to the ,church4 ,there is kindled here the strife between so-called revelation and reason1 in which the latter emerges independently1 and the former is separated from it4 ,up to this time both were one1 or the light of man was the light of ,god2 man had not a light of his own1 but his light was held to be the divine4 ,the ,scholastics had no knowledge having a content of its own beyond the content of religion2 philosophy remained entirely formal4 ,but now it came to have a content of its own1 which was opposed to the content of religion2 or reason felt at least that it had its own content1 or was opposing the form of reasonableness to the immediate content of the other4 ,this opposition had a different meaning in former times from what it bears now-a-days2 the earlier meaning is this1 that faith is the doctrine of ,christianity1 which is given as truth1 and by which as truth man has to remain4 ,we have here faith in this content1 and opposed to this stands conviction by means of reason4 ,but now this faith is transferred into the thinking consciousness itself2 it is a relation of self-consciousness itself to the facts which it finds within itself1 not to the objective content of the doctrine4 ,in respect to the earlier opposition a distinction must be drawn in the objective creed2 the one part of it is the teaching of the ,church as dogma1 the teaching as to the nature of ,god1 that ,he is ,three in ,one2 to this pertains the appearing of ,god in the world1 in the flesh1 the relation of man to this divine nature1 ,his holiness and divinity4 ,that is the part which has to do with the eternal verities1 the part which is of absolute interest for men2 this part is in its content essentially speculative1 and can be object only for the speculative ,notion4 ,the other part1 belief in which is also required1 has reference to other external conceptions1 which are connected with that content2 to this pertains the whole extent of what belongs to history1 in the ,old and ,new ,testament as well as in the ,church4 ,a belief in all this finite element may be demanded also4 ,if a man1 for instance1 did not believe in ghosts1 he would be taken for a free-thinker1 an atheist3 it would be just the same if a man did not believe that ,adam in ,paradise ate of the forbidden fruit4 ,both parts are placed upon the one level2 but it tends to the destruction of ,church and faith1 when belief is demanded for these parts alike4 ,it is to the external conceptions that attention has been chiefly directed by those who have been decried as opponents of ,christianity and as atheists1 down to the time of ,voltaire4 ,when external conceptions such as these are held to firmly1 it is inevitable that contradictions should be pointed out4 #e4 ,,petrus ,,ramus4 ,pierre de la ,rame was born in #aeae in ,vermandois1 where his father worked as a day-labourer4 ,he early betook himself to ,paris1 in order to satisfy his desire for learning3 he was1 however1 obliged on two occasions to leave it on account of the difficulty he experienced in procuring a subsistence1 before he obtained employment as a servant at the ,collge de ,navarre4 ,here he found an opportunity of extending his knowledge2 he occupied himself with the ,aristotelian philosophy and with mathematics1 and he distinguished himself in disputation by extraordinary oratorical and dialectical readiness4 ,in a disputation for obtaining the degree of magister1 he came publicly forward with a thesis that caused a great sensation3 8,all that ,aristotle taught is not true20 and the honour fell to him4 ,having became magister1 he attacked so bitterly and violently the ,aristotelian logic and dialectic1 that the government took notice of it4 ,he was now accused of undermining by his anti-,aristotelian opinions the foundations of religion and science2 this accusation was brought before the parliament of ,paris by the enemies of ,ramus1 as a criminal case4 ,but because the parliament appeared disposed to act in a judicial way1 and seemed favourably inclined to ,ramus1 the complaint was withdrawn1 and brought before the council of the king4 ,the latter decided that ,ramus should hold a disputation with his opponent ,goveanus before a special commission of five judges1 two of whom ,goveanus was to choose1 and two ,ramus1 while the king was to appoint the president2 these judges were to lay their opinion of the result before the king4 ,the interest of the public was intense1 but the contest was conducted in the most pedantic way4 ,on the first day ,ramus maintained that the ,aristotelian logic and dialectic were imperfect and faulty1 because the ,organon did not begin with a definition4 ,the commission decided that a disputation or a dissertation requires indeed a definition1 but in dialectic it is not necessary4 ,on the second day ,ramus criticized the ,aristotelian logic for its want of arrangement2 this1 he asserted1 is essential4 ,the majority of the judges1 consisting of the commissioner of the king and the two nominees of the opponent ,goveanus1 now wished to annul the investigation as far as it had gone1 and to set to work in another way1 since the assertions of ,ramus put them in a difficulty4 ,he appealed to the king1 who1 however1 refused to hear him1 and decided that the decision of the judges should be considered final4 ,ramus was hence condemned1 but the other two took no share in the matter1 and1 indeed1 resigned4 ,the decision was publicly placarded in all the streets of ,paris1 and sent to all the academies of learning throughout ,europe4 ,plays aimed against ,ramus were performed in the theatres1 greatly to the delight of the ,aristotelians4 ,the public generally took a very lively interest in such disputes1 and a number of contests of this kind had already taken place on similar questions of the schools4 ,for example1 the professors in a royal ,collge disputed with the theologians of the ,sorbonne whether quidam1 quisquis1 quoniam should be said or kidem1 kiskis1 koniam1 and from this dispute a case before parliament arose1 because the doctors took away his benefice from a theologian who said quisquis4 ,another hot and bitter controversy came before the magistrates as to whether ego amat was as correct as ego amo1 and this dispute had to be suppressed by them4 ,finally ,ramus obtained a public educational appointment1 a professorship in ,paris2 but because he had become a ,huguenot he had to vacate this office several times in the internal disquietude that prevailed2 on one occasion he even went to travel in ,germany4 ,on ,st4 ,bartholomew's ,eve in #aegb1 ,ramus finally fell1 murdered through the instrumentality of his enemies2 one of his colleagues who was among his bitterest enemies1 ,charpentier1 had engaged assassins for the purpose1 by whom ,ramus was frightfully maltreated1 and then thrown down from an upper window4#id ,ramus aroused great interest1 more especially by his attacks on the ,aristotelian dialectic as it had hitherto existed1 and he contributed very greatly to the simplification of the formal nature of the rules of dialectic4 ,he is specially famed for his extreme hostility to the scholastic logic1 and for having set up in opposition to it a logic of ,ramus--an opposition which has spread so far that even in the history of literature in ,germany we find various factions of ,ramists and anti-,ramists and semi-,ramists mentioned4 ,there are many other remarkable men who come within this period and who are usually mentioned in the history of ,philosophy1 such as ,michael of ,montaigne1 ,charron1 ,macchiavelli1 etc4 ,the popular writings of the first two contain pleasing1 refined and spiritual thoughts on human life1 social relationships1 the right and good4 ,the efforts of such men are counted as philosophy in as far as they have drawn from their consciousness1 from the sphere of human experience1 from observation1 from what takes place in the world and in the heart4 ,it is in a philosophy of life that they have comprehended and imparted such experiences2 they are thus both entertaining and instructive4 ,in accordance with the principle on which they worked1 they entirely forsook the sources from which ,scholastic knowledge had up to this time been derived1 and also the methods hitherto prevalent of acquiring it4 ,but because they do not make the question of highest interest to ,philosophy the object of their investigation1 and do not reason from thought1 they do not properly belong to the history of ,philosophy1 but to general culture and to the healthy human understanding4 ,they have contributed to man's taking a greater interest in his own affairs1 to his obtaining confidence in himself2 and this is their main service4 ,man has looked within his heart again and given to it its proper value2 then he has restored to his own heart and understanding1 to his faith1 the essence of the relationship of the individual to absolute existence4 ,although still a divided heart1 this division1 this yearning1 has become a disunion within itself2 and man feels this disunion within himself1 and along with that his rest in himself4 ,but here we must notice a transition1 with which we are concerned1 on account of the universal principle which in it is known in a higher way and in its true authority4 ,c4 ,,the ,,reformation4 ,it was in the ,lutheran ,reformation that the great revolution appeared1 as1 after the eternal conflicts and the terrible discipline which the stiff-necked ,germanic character had undergone and which it had to undergo1 mind came to the consciousness of reconciliation with itself1 a reconciliation whose form required that it should be brought about within the mind4 ,from the ,beyond man was thus called into the presence of spirit1 as earth and her bodily objects1 human virtues and morality1 the individual heart and conscience1 began to have some value to him4 ,in the church1 if marriage was not held to be immoral1 self-restraint and celibacy were considered higher1 but now marriage came to be looked on as a divine institution4 ,then poverty was esteemed better than possession1 and to live on alms was considered higher than to support oneself honestly by the work of one's hands2 now1 however1 it becomes known that poverty is not the most moral life1 for this last consists in living by one's work and taking pleasure in the fruits thereof4 ,the blind obedience by which human freedom was suppressed1 was the third vow taken by the monks1 as against which freedom1 like marriage and property1 was now also recognized as divine4 ,similarly on the side of knowledge man turned back into himself from the ,beyond of authority2 and reason was recognized as the absolutely universal1 and hence as divine4 ,now it was perceived that it is in the mind of man that religion must have its place1 and the whole process of salvation be gone through--that man's salvation is his own affair1 and that by it he enters into relationship with his conscience and into immediate connection with ,god1 requiring no mediation of priests having the so-called means of grace within their hands4 ,there is indeed a mediation present still by means of doctrine1 perception1 the observation of self and of one's actions2 but that is a mediation without a separating wall1 while formerly a brazen wall of division was present separating the laity from the church4 ,it is thus the spirit of ,god that must dwell within the heart of man1 and this indwelling spirit must operate in him4 ,although ,wycliffe1 ,huss1 and ,arnold of ,brescia had started from scholastic philosophy with similar ends in view1 they did not possess the character requisite to enable them modestly1 and without any learned scholastic convictions1 to set aside everything but mind and spirit4 ,it was with ,luther first of all that freedom of spirit began to exist in embryo1 and its form indicated that it would remain in embryo4 ,this beginning of the reconciliation of man with himself1 whereby divinity is brought into man's actuality1 is thus1 at first principle alone4 ,the unfolding of this freedom and the self-reflecting grasp of the same was a subsequent step1 in the same way as was the working out of the ,christian doctrine in the ,church in its time4 ,the subjective thought and knowledge of man1 which enables him1 being satisfied in his activity1 to have joy in his work and to consider his work as something both permissible and justifiable--this value accorded to subjectivity now required a higher confirmation1 and the highest confirmation1 in order to be made perfectly legitimate1 and even to become absolute duty2 and to be able to receive this confirmation it had to be taken in its purest form4 ,the mere subjectivity of man1 the fact that he has a will1 and with it directs his actions this way or that1 does not constitute any justification3 for else the barbarous will1 which fulfils itself in subjective ends alone1 such as cannot subsist before reason1 would be justified4 ,if1 further1 self-will obtains the form of universality1 if its ends are conformable to reason1 and it is apprehended as the freedom of mankind1 as legal right which likewise belongs to others1 there is therein only indeed the element of permission1 but still there is much in the end being recognized as permitted1 and not as absolutely sinful4 ,art and industry receive through this principle new activity1 since now their activity is justified4 ,but we always find the principle of personal spirituality and independence at first limited to particular spheres of objects merely1 in accordance with its content4 ,not until this principle is known and recognized in relation to the absolutely existent object1 i4e4 in relation to ,god1 and is likewise grasped in its perfect purity1 free from desires and finite ends1 does it receive its highest confirmation1 and that is its sanctification through religion4 ,this1 then1 is the ,lutheran faith1 in accordance with which man stands in a relation to ,god which involves his personal existence3 that is1 his piety and the hope of his salvation and the like all demand that his heart1 his subjectivity1 should be present in them4 ,his feelings1 his faith1 the inmost certainty of himself1 in short1 all that belongs to him is laid claim to1 and this alone can truly come under consideration3 man must himself repent from his heart and experience contrition2 his own heart must be filled with the ,holy ,ghost4 ,thus here the principle of subjectivity1 of pure relation to me personally1 i4e4 freedom1 is recognized1 and not merely so1 but it is clearly demanded that in religious worship this alone should be considered4 ,the highest confirmation of the principle is that it alone has value in the eyes of ,god1 that faith and the subjection of the individual heart are alone essential3 in this way this principle of ,christian freedom is first presented and brought to a true consciousness4 ,thereby a place has been set apart in the depths of man's inmost nature1 in which alone he is at home with himself and at home with ,god2 and with ,god alone is he really himself1 in the conscience he can be said to be at home with himself4 ,this sense of being at home should not be capable of being destroyed through others2 no one should presume to have a place therein4 ,all externality in relation to me is thereby banished1 just as is the externality of the ,host2 it is only in communion and faith that ,i stand in relation to ,god4 ,the distinction between the laity and the priests is by it removed2 there are no longer any laymen1 for in religion each by himself is enjoined to know personally what it is4 ,responsibility is not to be avoided2 good works without spiritual reality in them are no longer of avail2 there must be the heart which relates itself directly to ,god without mediation1 without the ,virgin1 and without the ,saints4 ,this is the great principle--that all externality disappears in the point of the absolute relation to ,god2 along with this externality1 this estrangement of self1 all servitude has also disappeared4 ,with it is connected our ceasing to tolerate prayer in foreign tongues1 or to study the sciences in such4 ,in speech man is productive2 it is the first externality that he gives himself1 the simplest form of existence which he reaches in consciousness4 ,what man represents to himself1 he inwardly places before himself as spoken4 ,this first form is broken up and rendered foreign if man is in an alien tongue to express or conceive to himself what concerns his highest interest4 ,this breach with the first entrance into consciousness is accordingly removed2 to have one's own right to speak and think in one's own language really belongs to liberty4 ,this is of infinite importance1 and without this form of being-at-home-with-self subjective freedom could not have existed2 ,luther could not have accomplished his ,reformation without translating the ,bible into ,german4 ,now the principle of subjectivity has thus become a moment in religion itself1 and in this way it has received its absolute recognition1 and has been grasped as a whole in the form in which it can only be a moment in religion4 ,the injunction to worship ,god in spirit is now fulfilled4 ,spirit1 however1 is merely conditioned by the free spirituality of the subject4 ,for it is this alone which can be related to spirit2 a subject who is not free does not stand in an attitude of spirituality1 does not worship ,god in spirit4 ,this is the general signification of the principle4 ,now this principle was at first grasped in relation to religious objects only1 and thereby it has indeed received its absolute justification1 but still it has not been extended to the further development of the subjective principle itself4 ,yet in so far as man has come to the consciousness of being reconciled to himself1 and of only being able to reconcile himself in his personal existence1 he has in his actuality likewise attained another form4 ,the otherwise hearty and vigorous man may also1 in as far as he enjoys1 do so with a good conscience2 the enjoyment of life for its own sake is no longer regarded as something which is to be given up1 for monkish renunciation is renounced4 ,but to any other content the principle did not at first extend4 ,yet further1 the religious content has more specially been apprehended as concrete1 as it is for the recollection1 and into this spiritual freedom the beginning and the possibility of an unspiritual mode of regarding things has thus entered4 ,the content of the ,credo1 speculative as it is in itself1 has1 that is to say1 an historical side4 ,within this barren form the old faith of the church has been admitted and allowed to exist1 so that in this form it has to be regarded by the subject as the highest truth4 ,the result then follows that all development of the dogmatic content in a speculative manner is quite set aside4 ,what was required is man's inward assurance of his deliverance1 of his salvation--the relation of the subjective spirit to the absolute1 the form of subjectivity as aspiration1 repentance1 conversion4 ,this new principle has been laid down as paramount1 so that the content of truth is clearly of importance2 but the teaching respecting the nature and the process of ,god is grasped in the form in which it at first appears for the ordinary conception4 ,not only have all this finality1 externality1 unspirituality1 this formalism of scholastic philosophy1 been on the one hand discarded1 and with justice1 but1 on the other1 the philosophic development of the doctrines of the church has been also set aside1 and this is done in connection with the very fact that the subject is immersed in his own heart4 ,this immersion1 his penitence1 contrition1 conversion1 this occupation of the subject with himself1 has become the moment of first importance2 but the subject has not immersed himself in the content1 and the earlier immersion of spirit therein has also been rejected4 ,even to this present day we shall find in the ,catholic ,church and in her dogmas the echoes1 and so to speak the heritage of the philosophy of the ,alexandrian school2 in it there is much more that is philosophic and speculative than in the dogmatism of ,protestantism1 even if there is still in this an objective element1 and if it has not been made perfectly barren1 as though the content were really retained only in the form of history4 ,the connection of ,philosophy with the theology of the ,middle ,ages has thus in the ,catholic ,church been retained in its essentials2 in ,protestantism1 on the contrary1 the subjective religious principle has been separated from ,philosophy1 and it is only in ,philosophy that it has arisen in its true form again4 ,in this principle the religious content of the ,christian ,church is thus retained1 and it obtains its confirmation through the testimony of spirit that this content shall only hold good for me in as far as it makes its influence felt in my conscience and heart4 ,this is the meaning of the words3 8,if any man will do his will1 he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of ,god40 ,the criterion of truth is how it is confirmed in my heart2 the fact that ,i judge and know rightly--or that what ,i hold to be true is the truth--must be revealed to my heart4 ,truth is what it is in my mind2 and1 on the other hand1 my spirit is only then in its proper attitude to truth when truth is within it1 when the spirit and its content are related thus4 ,one cannot be isolated from the other4 ,the content has not thus the confirmation in itself which was given to it by philosophical theology in the fact that the speculative ,idea made itself therein effectual2 neither has it the historic confirmation which is given to a content in so far as it has an outward and historic side in which historic witnesses are heard in evidence1 and in which its correctness is determined by their testimony4 ,the doctrine has to prove itself by the condition of my heart1 by penitence1 conversion and joy in ,god4 ,in doctrine we begin with the external content1 and thus it is external only2 but taken thus1 independently of the state of my mind1 it properly speaking has no significance4 ,now this beginning is1 as ,christian baptism and education1 a working upon the nature in addition to an acquaintance with externals4 ,the truth of the gospel and of ,christian doctrines only1 however1 exists in true relation to the same2 it is really so to speak a use of the content to make it educative4 ,and this is just what has been said1 that the nature is reconstructed and sanctified in itself1 and it is this sanctification for which the content is a true one4 ,no further use can be made of the content than to build up and edify the mind1 and awaken it to assurance1 joy1 penitence1 conversion4 ,another and wrong relation to the content is to take it in an external way1 e4g4 according to the great new principle of exegesis1 and to treat the writings of the ,new ,testament like those of a ,greek1 ,latin or other author1 critically1 philologically1 historically4 ,spirit is alone in true relation to spirit2 and it is a wrong beginning of a wooden and unyielding exegesis to prove in such an external and philological way the truth of the ,christian religion4 ,this has been done by orthodoxy1 which thereby renders the content devoid of spirituality4 ,this1 then1 is the first relation of spirit to this content2 here the content is indeed essential1 but it is as essential that the holy and sanctifying spirit should bear a relation to it4 ,this spirit is1 however1 in the second place really thinking spirit likewise4 ,thought as such must also develop itself therein1 and that really as this form of inmost unity of spirit with itself2 thought must come to the distinction and contemplation of this content1 and pass over into this form of the purest unity of spirit with itself4 ,at first thought1 however1 reveals itself as abstract thought alone1 and it possesses as such a relation to theology and religion4 ,the content which is here in question1 even in so far as it is historic merely and externally accepted1 must yet be religious2 the unfolding of the nature of ,god must be present therein4 ,in this we have the further demand that the thought for which the inward nature of ,god is1 should also set itself in relation to this content4 ,but inasmuch as thought is at first understanding and the metaphysic of the understanding1 it will remove from the content the rational ,idea and make it so empty that only external history remains1 which is devoid of interest4 ,the third position arrived at is that of concrete speculative thought4 ,according to the standpoint which has just been given1 and as religious feeling and its form are here determined1 all speculative content as such1 as well as its developments1 are at first rejected4 ,and as for the enrichment of the ,christian conceptions through the treasures of the philosophy of the ancient world1 and through the profound ideas of all earlier oriental religions1 and the like1--all this is set aside4 ,the content had objectivity2 but this merely signified that the objective content1 without subsisting for itself1 was to constitute the beginning only1 on which the mind had spiritually to build up and sanctify itself4 ,all the enrichment of the content whereby it became philosophic1 is thus abandoned1 and what follows later simply is that the mind1 as thinking1 again immerses itself in itself1 in order to be concrete and rational4 ,what forms the basis of the ,reformation is the abstract moment of a mind being within self1 of freedom1 of coming to self2 freedom signifies the life of the spirit in being turned back within itself in the particular content which appears as another2 while spirit is not free if it allows this other-being1 either unassimilated or dead1 to exist in it as something foreign4 ,in as far as spirit now goes on to knowledge1 to spiritual determinations1 and as it looks around and comes forth as a content1 so far will it conduct itself therein as in its own domain1 as in its concrete world1 so to speak--and it will there really assert and possess its own4 ,this concrete form of knowledge which1 however1 in the beginning remains but dim1 we have now to consider1 and it forms the third period of our treatise1 into which we properly step with the ,reformation1 although ,bruno1 ,vanini and ,ramus1 who lived later1 still belong to the ,middle ,ages4 ,,part ,,three ,,modern ,,philosophy ,,introduction ,if we cast a glance back over the period just traversed1 we find that in it a turning-point had been reached1 that the ,christian religion had placed its absolute content in the mind and will of man1 and that it was thus1 as a divine and supersensuous content1 separated from the world and shut up within itself in the centre-point of the individual4 ,over against the religious life an external world stood as a natural world--a world of heart or feeling1 of desire1 of human nature--which had value only in as far as it was overcome4 ,this mutual independence of the two worlds had much attention bestowed on it throughout the ,middle ,ages2 the opposition was attacked on all quarters and in the end overcome4 ,but since the relation of mankind to the divine life exists upon earth1 this conquest at first presented the appearance of bringing with it the destruction of the church and of the eternal through the sensuous desires of man4 ,the eternal truth was likewise grafted upon the dry1 formal understanding1 so that we might say that the separation of self-consciousness has in itself disappeared1 and thereby a possibility has been given of obtaining reconciliation4 ,but because this implicit union of the ,beyond and the ,here was of so unsatisfactory a nature that the better feelings were aroused and forced to turn against it1 the ,reformation made its appearance1 partly1 no doubt1 as a separation from the ,catholic ,church1 but partly as a reformation from within4 ,there is a mistaken idea that the ,reformation only effected a separation from the ,catholic ,church2 ,luther just as truly reformed the ,catholic ,church1 the corruption of which one learns from his writings1 and from the reports of the emperors and of the empire to the ,pope2 if further evidence be required1 we need only read the accounts given even by the ,catholic bishops1 the ,fathers of the councils at ,constance1 ,basle1 c41 of the condition of the ,catholic priesthood and of the ,roman ,court4 ,the principle of the inward reconciliation of spirit1 which was in itself the very ,idea of ,christianity1 was thus again estranged1 and appeared as a condition of external1 unreconciled alienation and discord2 this gives us an example of the slow operation of the world-spirit in overcoming this externality4 ,it eats away the inward substance1 but the appearance1 the outward form1 still remains2 at the end1 however1 it is an empty shell1 the new form breaks forth4 ,in such times this spirit appears as if it--having so far proceeded in its development at a snail's pace1 and having even retrograded and become estranged from itself--had suddenly adopted seven-leagued boots4 ,since thus the reconciliation of self-consciousness with the present is implicitly accomplished1 man has attained to confidence in himself and in his thought1 in sensuous nature outside of and within him2 he has discovered an interest and pleasure in making discoveries both in nature and the arts4 ,in the affairs of this world the understanding developed2 man became conscious of his will and his achievements1 took pleasure in the earth and its soil1 as also in his occupations1 because right and understanding were there present4 ,with the discovery of gunpowder the individual passion of battle was lost4 ,the romantic impulse towards a casual kind of bravery passed into other adventures1 not of hate or revenge1 or the so-called deliverance from what men considered the wrongs of innocence1 but more harmless adventures1 the exploration of the earth1 or the discovery of the passage to the ,east ,indies4 ,america was discovered1 its treasures and people--nature1 man himself2 navigation was the higher romance of commerce4 ,the present world was again present to man as worthy of the interests of mind2 thinking mind was again capable of action4 ,now the ,reformation of ,luther had inevitably to come--the appeal to the sensus communis which does not recognize the authority of the ,fathers or of ,aristotle1 but only the inward personal spirit which quickens and animates1 in contradistinction to works4 ,in this way the ,church lost her power against it1 for her principle was within it and no longer lacking to it4 ,to the finite and present due honour is accorded2 from this honour the work of science proceeds4 ,we thus see that the finite1 the inward and outward present1 becomes a matter of experience1 and through the understanding is elevated into universality2 men desire to understand laws and forces1 i4e4 to transform the individual of perceptions into the form of universality4 ,worldly matters demand to be judged of in a worldly way2 the judge is thinking understanding4 ,the other side is that the eternal1 which is in and for itself true1 is also known and comprehended through the pure heart itself2 the individual mind appropriates to itself the eternal4 ,this is the ,lutheran faith without any other accessories--works1 as they were called4 ,everything had value only as it was grasped by the heart1 and not as a mere thing4 ,the content ceases to be an objective thing2 ,god is thus in spirit alone1 ,he is not a beyond but the truest reality of the individual4 ,pure thought is likewise one form of inwardness2 it also approaches absolute existence and finds itself justified in apprehending the same4 ,the philosophy of modern times proceeds from the principle which ancient philosophy had reached1 the standpoint of actual self-consciousness--it has as principle the spirit that is present to itself2 it brings the standpoint of the ,middle ,ages1 the diversity between what is thought and the existent universe1 into opposition1 and it has to do with the dissolution of this same opposition4 ,the main interest hence is1 not so much the thinking of the objects in their truth1 as the thinking and understanding of the objects1 the thinking this unity itself1 which is really the being conscious of a presupposed object4 ,the getting rid of the formal culture of the logical understanding and the monstrosities of which it was composed1 was more essential than the extension of it3 investigation in such a case becomes dissipated and diffused1 and passes into the false infinite4 ,the general points of view which in modern philosophy we reach are hence somewhat as follows3-- #a4 ,the concrete form of thought which we have here to consider on its own account1 really appears as subjective with the reflection of implicitude1 so that this has an antithesis in existence2 and the interest is then altogether found in grasping the reconciliation of this opposition in its highest existence1 i4e4 in the most abstract extremes4 ,this highest severance is the opposition between thought and ,being1 the comprehending of whose unity from this time forward constitutes the interest of all philosophies4 ,here thought is more independent1 and thus we now abandon its unity with theology2 it separates itself therefrom1 just as with the ,greeks it separated itself from mythology1 the popular religion1 and did not until the time of the ,alexandrians seek out these forms again and fill the mythological conceptions with the form of thought4 ,the bond remains1 but for this reason it is clearly implicit3 theology throughout is merely what philosophy is1 for this last is simply thought respecting it4 ,it does not help theology to strive against philosophy1 or to say that it wishes to know nothing about it1 and that philosophic maxims are thus to be set aside4 ,it has always to do with the thought that it brings along with it1 and these its subjective conceptions1 its home and private metaphysics1 are thus frequently a quite uncultured1 uncritical thought--the thought of the street4 ,these general conceptions are1 indeed1 connected with particular subjective conviction1 and this last is said to prove the ,christian content to be true in a sense all its own2 but these thoughts which constitute the criterion are merely the reflections and opinions which float about the surface of the time4 ,thus1 when thought comes forth on its own account1 we thereby separate ourselves from theology2 we shall1 however1 consider one other in whom both are still in unity4 ,this individual is ,jacob ,boehme1 for since mind now moves in its own domains1 it is found partly in the natural and finite world1 and partly in the inward1 and this at first is the ,christian4 ,while earlier than this1 moreover1 the spirit1 distracted by outward things1 had to make its influence felt in religion and in the secular life1 and came to be known in the popular philosophy so-called1 it was only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that the genuine ,philosophy re-appeared1 which seeks to grasp the truth as truth because man in thought is infinitely free to comprehend himself and nature1 and along with that seeks to understand the present of rationality1 reality1 universal law itself4 ,for this is ours1 since it is subjectivity4 ,the principle of modern philosophy is hence not a free and natural thought1 because it has the opposition of thought and nature before it as a fact of which it is conscious4 ,spirit and nature1 thought and ,being1 are the two infinite sides of the ,idea1 which can for the first time truly make its appearance when its sides are grasped for themselves in their abstraction and totality4 ,plato comprehended it as the bond1 as limiting and as infinite1 as one and many1 simple and diverse1 but not as thought and ,being2 when we first thinkingly overcome this opposition it signifies comprehending the unity4 ,this is the standpoint of philosophic consciousness generally2 but the way in which this unity must be thinkingly developed is a double one4 ,philosophy hence falls into the two main forms in which the opposition is resolved1 into a realistic and an idealistic system of philosophy1 i4e4 into one which makes objectivity and the content of thought to arise from the perceptions1 and one which proceeds to truth from the independence of thought4 a4 ,experience constitutes the first of these methods1 viz4 ,realism4 ,philosophy now signified1 or had as its main attribute1 self-thought and the acceptance of the present as that in which truth lay1 and which was thereby knowable4 ,all that is speculative is pared and smoothed down in order to bring it under experience4 ,this present is the existent external nature1 and spiritual activity as the political world and as subjective activity4 ,the way to truth was to begin from this hypothesis1 but not to remain with it in its external self-isolating actuality1 but to lead it to the universal4 4 ,the activities of that first method operate1 to begin with1 on physical nature1 from the observation of which men derive universal laws1 and on this basis their knowledge is founded2 the science of nature1 however1 only reaches to the stage of reflection4 ,this kind of experimental physics was once called1 and is still called philosophy1 as ,newton's ,principia philosophi naturalis 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #ei7 show4 ,this work is one in which the methods of the finite sciences through observation and deduction are alone present--those sciences which the ,french still call the sciences exactes4 ,to this1 the understanding of the individual1 piety was opposed1 and hence in this respect philosophy was termed worldly wisdom 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #fj74 ,here the ,idea in its infinitude is not itself the object of knowledge2 but a determinate content is raised into the universal1 or this last in its determinateness for the understanding is derived from observation1 just as is1 for instance1 done in ,keppler's ,laws4 ,in ,scholastic philosophy1 on the other hand1 man's power of observation was set aside1 and disputations respecting nature at that time proceeded from abstruse hypotheses4 4 ,in the second place1 the spiritual was observed as in its realization it constitutes the spiritual world of states1 in order thus to investigate from experience the rights of individuals as regards one another1 and as regards rulers1 and the rights of states against states4 ,before this popes anointed kings1 just as was done in ,old ,testament times to those appointed by ,god2 it was in the ,old ,testament that the tithe was commanded2 the forbidden degrees of relationship in marriage were also adopted from the ,mosaic laws4 ,what was right and permissible for kings was demonstrated from ,saul's and ,david's histories1 the rights of priesthood from ,samuel--in short1 the ,old ,testament was the source of all the principles of public law1 and it is in this way even now that all papal bulls have their deliverances confirmed4 ,it may easily be conceived how much nonsense was in this manner concocted4 ,now1 however1 right was sought for in man himself1 and in history1 and what had been accounted right both in peace and in war was explained4 ,in this way books were composed which even now are constantly quoted in the ,parliament of ,england4 ,men further observed the desires which could be satisfied in the state and the manner in which satisfaction could be given to them1 in order thus from man himself1 from man of the past as well as of the present1 to learn what is right4 b4 ,the second method1 that of ,idealism1 proceeds from what is inward2 according to it everything is in thought1 mind itself is all content4 ,here the ,idea itself is made the object2 that signifies the thinking it and from it proceeding to the determinate4 ,what ,realism draws from experience is now derived from thought priori2 or the determinate is also comprehended but not led back to the universal merely1 but to the ,idea4 ,the two methods overlap one another1 however1 because experience on its side desires to derive universal laws from observations1 while1 on the other side1 thought proceeding from abstract universality must still give itself a determinate content2 thus a priori and a posteriori methods are mingled4 ,in ,france abstract universality was the more predominant2 from ,england experience took its rise1 and even now it is there held in the greatest respect2 ,germany proceeded from the concrete ,idea1 from the inwardness of mind and spirit4 #b4 ,the questions of present philosophy1 the opposites1 the content which occupies the attention of these modern times1 are as follows3-- a4 ,the first form of the opposition which we have already touched upon in the ,middle ,ages is the ,idea of ,god and ,his ,being1 and the task imposed is to deduce the existence of ,god1 as pure spirit1 from thought4 ,both sides must be comprehended through thought as absolute unity2 the extremest opposition is apprehended as gathered into one unity4 ,other subjects which engage our attention are connected with the same general aim1 namely1 the bringing about of the inward reconciliation in the opposition which exists between knowledge and its object4 b4 ,the second form of opposition is that of ,good and ,evil--the opposition of the assertion of independent will to the positive and universal2 the origin of evil must be known4 ,evil is plainly the 8other10 the negation of ,god as ,holiness2 because ,he is1 because ,he is wise1 good1 and at the same time almighty1 evil is contradictory to ,him2 an endeavour is made to reconcile this contradiction4 c4 ,the third form of opposition is that of the freedom of man and necessity4 4 ,the individual is clearly not determined in any other way than from himself1 he is the absolute beginning of determination2 in the #8,i1' in the self1 a power of decision is clearly to be found4 ,this freedom is in opposition to the theory that ,god alone is really absolutely determining4 ,further1 when that which happens is in futurity1 the determining of it through ,god is regarded as ,providence and the fore-knowledge of ,god4 ,in this1 however1 a new contradiction is involved1 inasmuch as because ,god's knowledge is not merely subjective1 that which ,god knows likewise is4 4 ,further still1 human freedom is in opposition to necessity as the determinateness of nature2 man is dependent on nature1 and the external as well as the inward nature of man is his necessity as against his freedom4 4 ,considered objectively1 this opposition is that between final causes and efficient causes1 i4e4 between the acts of freedom and the acts of necessity4 4 ,this opposition between the freedom of man and natural necessity has finally likewise the further form of community of soul and body1 of commercium animi cum corpore1 as it has been called1 wherein the soul appears as the simple1 ideal1 and free1 and the body as the manifold1 material and necessary4 ,these matters occupy the attention of science1 and they are of a completely different nature from the interests of ancient philosophy4 ,the difference is this1 that here there is a consciousness of an opposition1 which is certainly likewise contained in the subjects with which the learning of the ancients was occupied1 but which had not come to consciousness4 ,this consciousness of the opposition1 this #8,fall1' is the main point of interest in the conception of the ,christian religion4 ,the bringing about in thought of the reconciliation which is accepted in belief1 now constitutes the whole interest of knowledge4 ,implicitly it has come to pass2 for knowledge considers itself qualified to bring about in itself this recognition of the reconciliation4 ,the philosophic systems are therefore no more than modes of this absolute unity1 and only the concrete unity of those opposites is the truth4 #c4 ,as regards the stages which were reached in the progress of this knowledge we have to mention three of the principal4 a4 ,first of all we find the union of those opposites stated2 and to prove it genuine attempts are made1 though not yet determined in purity4 b4 ,the second stage is the metaphysical union2 and here1 with ,descartes1 the philosophy of modern times as abstract thought properly speaking begins4 4 ,thinking understanding seeks to bring to pass the union1 inasmuch as it investigates with its pure thought-determinations2 this is in the first place the standpoint of metaphysics as such4 4 ,in the second place1 we have to consider negation1 the destruction of this metaphysics--the attempt to consider knowledge on its own account1 and the determinations which proceed from it4 c4 ,the third stage is that this union itself which is to be brought about1 and which is the only subject of interest1 comes to consciousness and becomes an object4 ,as principle the union has the form of the relationship of knowledge to the content1 and thus this question has been put3 #8,how is1 and how can thought be identical with the objective8' ,with this the inward element which lies at the basis of this metaphysic is raised into explicitude and made an object2 and this includes all modern philosophy in its range4 #d4 ,in respect to the external history and the lives of the philosophers1 it will strike us that from this time on1 these appear to be very different from those of the philosophers of ancient times1 whom we regarded as self-sufficing individualities4 ,it is required that a philosopher should live as he teaches1 that he should despise the world and not enter into connection with it2 this the ancients have accomplished1 and they are such plastic individualities just because the inward spiritual aim of philosophy has likewise frequently determined their external relations and conditions4 ,the object of their knowledge was to take a thoughtful view of the universe2 they kept the external connection with the world all the further removed from themselves because they did not greatly approve of much therein present2 or1 at least1 it ever proceeds on its way1 according to its own particular laws1 on which the individual is dependent4 ,the individual likewise participates in the present interests of external life1 in order to satisfy his personal ends1 and through them to attain to honour1 wealth1 respect1 and distinction2 the ancient philosophers1 however1 because they remained in the ,idea1 did not concern themselves with things that were not the objects of their thought4 ,hence with the ,greeks and ,romans the philosophers lived in an independent fashion peculiar to themselves1 and in an external mode of life which appeared suitable to and worthy of the science they professed2 they conducted themselves independently as private persons1 unfettered by outside trammels1 and they may be compared to the monks who renounced all temporal goods4 ,in the ,middle ,ages it was chiefly the clergy1 doctors of theology1 who occupied themselves with philosophy4 ,in the transition period the philosophers showed themselves to be in an inward warfare with themselves and in an external warfare with their surroundings1 and their lives were spent in a wild1 unsettled fashion4 ,in modern times things are very different2 now we no longer see philosophic individuals who constitute a class by themselves4 ,with the present day all difference has disappeared2 philosophers are not monks1 for we find them generally in connection with the world1 participating with others in some common work or calling4 ,they live1 not independently1 but in the relation of citizens1 or they occupy public offices and take part in the life of the state4 ,certainly they may be private persons1 but if so1 their position as such does not in any way isolate them from their other relationships4 ,they are involved in present conditions1 in the world and its work and progress4 ,thus their philosophy is only by the way1 a sort of luxury and superfluity4 ,this difference is really to be found in the manner in which outward conditions have taken shape after the building up of the inward world of religion4 ,in modern times1 namely1 on account of the reconciliation of the worldly principle with itself1 the external world is at rest1 is brought into order--worldly relationships1 conditions1 modes of life1 have become constituted and organized in a manner which is conformable to nature and rational4 ,we see a universal1 comprehensible connection1 and with that individuality likewise attains another character and nature1 for it is no longer the plastic individuality of the ancients4 ,this connection is of such power that every individuality is under its dominion1 and yet at the same time can construct for itself an inward world4 ,the external has thus been reconciled with itself in such a way that both inward and outward may be self-sufficing and remain independent of one another2 and the individual is in the condition of being able to leave his external side to external order1 while in the case of those plastic forms the external could only be determined entirely from within4 ,now1 on the contrary1 with the higher degree of strength attained by the inward side of the individual1 he may hand the external over to chance2 just as he leaves clothing to the contingencies of fashion1 not considering it worth while to exert his understanding upon it4 ,the external he leaves to be determined by the order which is present in the particular sphere in which his lot is cast4 ,the circumstances of life are1 in the true sense1 private affairs1 determined by outward conditions1 and do not contain anything worthy of our notice4 ,life becomes scholarly1 uniform1 commonplace1 it connects itself with outwardly given relationships and cannot represent or set itself forth as a form pertaining only to itself4 ,man must not take up the character of showing himself an independent form1 and giving himself a position in the world created by himself4 ,because the objective power of external relationships is infinitely great1 and for that reason the way in which ,i perforce am placed in them has become a matter of indifference to me1 personality and the individual life generally are equally indifferent4 ,a philosopher1 it is said1 should live as a philosopher1 i4e41 should be independent of the external relationships of the world1 and should give up occupying himself with and troubling himself concerning them4 ,but thus circumscribed in respect of all necessities1 more especially of culture1 no one can suffice for himself2 he must seek to act in connection with others4 ,the modern world is this essential power of connection1 and it implies the fact that it is clearly necessary for the individual to enter into these relations of external existence2 only a common mode of existence is possible in any calling or condition1 and to this ,spinoza forms the solitary exception4 ,thus in earlier times bravery was individual2 while modern bravery consists in each not acting after his own fashion1 but relying on his connection with others--and this constitutes his whole merit4 ,the calling of philosopher is not1 like that of the monks1 an organized condition4 ,members of academies of learning are no doubt organized in part1 but even a special calling like theirs sinks into the ordinary commonplace of state or class relationships1 because admission thereinto is outwardly determined4 ,the real matter is to remain faithful to one's aims4 ,,section ,,one ,,modern ,,philosophy ,,in ,,its ,,first ,,statement ,the first two philosophers whom we have to consider are ,bacon and ,boehme2 there is as complete a disparity between these individuals as between their systems of philosophy4 ,none the less both agree that mind operates in the content of its knowledge as in its own domain1 and this consequently appears as concrete ,being4 ,this domain in ,bacon is the finite1 natural world2 in ,boehme it is the inward1 mystical1 godly ,christian life and existence2 for the former starts from experience and induction1 the latter from ,god and the pantheism of the ,trinity4 ,a4 ,,bacon4 ,there was already being accomplished the abandonment of the content which lies beyond us1 and which through its form has lost the merit it possessed of being true1 and is become of no significance to self-consciousness or the certainty of self and of its actuality2 this we see for the first time consciously expressed1 though not as yet in a very perfect form1 by ,francis ,bacon1 ,baron ,verulam1 ,viscount ,st4 ,albans4 ,he is therefore instanced as in the fore-front of all this empirical philosophy1 and even now our countrymen like to adorn their works with sententious sayings culled from him4 ,baconian philosophy thus usually means a philosophy which is founded on the observation of the external or spiritual nature of man in his inclinations1 desires1 rational and judicial qualities4 ,from these conclusions are drawn1 and general conceptions1 laws pertaining to this domain1 are thus discovered4 ,bacon has entirely set aside and rejected the scholastic method of reasoning from remote abstractions and being blind to what lies before one's eyes4 ,he takes as his standpoint the sensuous manifestation as it appears to the cultured man1 as the latter reflects upon it2 and this is conformable to the principle of accepting the finite and worldly as such4 ,bacon was born in ,london in #aefa4 ,his progenitors and relatives held high office in the state1 and his father was ,keeper of the ,great ,seal to ,queen ,elizabeth4 ,he in his turn1 having been educated to follow the same vocation1 at once devoted himself to the business of the state1 and entered upon an important career4 ,he early displayed great talent1 and at the age of nineteen he produced a work on the condition of ,europe 7,de statu ,europ74 ,bacon in his youth attached himself to the ,earl of ,essex1 the favourite of ,elizabeth1 through whose support he1 who as a younger son had to see his paternal estate pass to his elder brother1 soon attained to better circumstances1 and was elevated to a higher position4 ,bacon1 however1 sullied his fame by the utmost ingratitude and faithlessness towards his protector2 for he is accused of having been prevailed upon by the enemies of the ,earl after his fall to charge him publicly with ,high ,treason4 ,under ,james ,i41 the father of ,charles ,i4 who was beheaded1 a weak man1 to whom he recommended himself by his work ,de augmentis scientiarum1 he received the most honourable offices of state by attaching himself to ,buckingham3 he was made ,keeper of the ,great ,seal1 ,lord ,chancellor of ,england1 ,baron ,verulam4 ,he likewise made a rich marriage1 though he soon squandered all his means1 and high though his position was1 he stooped to intrigues and was guilty of accepting bribes in the most barefaced manner4 ,thereby he brought upon himself the ill-will both of people and of nobles1 so that he was prosecuted1 and his case was tried before ,parliament4 ,he was fined #dj1jjjl41 thrown into the ,tower1 and his name was struck out of the list of peers2 during the trial and while he was in prison he showed the greatest weakness of character4 ,he was1 however1 liberated from prison1 and his trial was annulled1 owing to the even greater hatred of the king and his minister ,buckingham1 under whose administration ,bacon had filled these offices1 and whose victim he appeared to have been2 for he fell earlier than his comrade ,buckingham1 and was deserted and condemned by him4 ,it was not so much his innocence as the fact that those who ruined him had made themselves hated to an equal degree through their rule1 that caused the hatred and indignation against ,bacon to be somewhat mitigated4 ,but he neither recovered his own sense of self-respect nor the personal esteem of others1 which he had lost through his former conduct4 ,he retired into private life1 lived in poverty1 had to beg sustenance from the king1 occupied himself during the remainder of his life with science only1 and died in #afbf4ie ,since ,bacon has ever been esteemed as the man who directed knowledge to its true source1 to experience1 he is1 in fact1 the special leader and representative of what is in ,england called ,philosophy1 and beyond which the ,english have not yet advanced4 ,for they appear to constitute that people in ,europe which1 limited to the understanding of actuality1 is destined1 like the class of shopkeepers and workmen in the ,state1 to live always immersed in matter1 and to have actuality but not reason as object4 ,bacon won great praise by showing how attention is to be paid to the outward and inward manifestations of ,nature1 and the esteem in which his name is thus held is greater than can be ascribed directly to his merit4 ,it has become the universal tendency of the time and of the ,english mode of reasoning1 to proceed from facts1 and to judge in accordance with them4 ,because ,bacon gave expression to the tendency1 and men require to have a leader and originator for any particular manner of thinking1 he is credited with having given to knowledge this impulse towards experimental philosophy generally4 ,but many cultured men have spoken and thought regarding what concerns and interests mankind1 regarding state affairs1 mind1 heart1 external nature1 c41 in accordance with experience and in accordance with a cultured knowledge of the world4 ,bacon was just such a cultured man of the world1 who had seen life in its great relations1 had engaged in state affairs1 had dealt practically with actual life1 had observed men1 their circumstances and relations1 and had worked with them as cultured1 reflecting1 and1 we may even say1 philosophical men of the world4 ,he thus did not escape the corruption of those who stood at the helm of the state4 ,with all the depravity of his character he was a man of mind and clear perception2 he did not1 however1 possess the power of reasoning through thoughts and notions that are universal4 ,we do not find in him a methodical or scientific manner of regarding things1 but only the external reasoning of a man of the world4 ,knowledge of the world he possessed in the highest degree3 8rich imagination1 powerful wit1 and the penetrating wisdom which he displays upon that most interesting of all subjects1 commonly called the world4 ,this last appears to us to have been the characteristical quality of ,bacon's genius4444 ,it was men rather than things that he had studied1 the mistakes of philosophers rather than the errors of philosophy4 ,in fact he was no lover of abstract reasoning10 and although it pertains to philosophy1 we find as little as possible of it in him4 8,his writings are indeed full of refined and most acute observations1 but it seldom requires any effort on our part to apprehend their wisdom40 ,hence mottoes are often derived from him4 8,his judgments10 however1 8are commonly given ex cathedra1 or1 if he endeavours to elucidate them1 it is by similes and illustrations and pointed animadversions more than by direct and appropriate arguments4 ,general reasoning is absolutely essential in philosophy2 the want of it is marked in ,bacon's writings40#if ,his practical writings are specially interesting2 but we do not find the bright flashes of genius that we expected4 ,as during his career in the state he acted in accordance with practical utility1 he now1 at its conclusion1 likewise applied himself in a practical way to scientific endeavours1 and considered and treated the sciences in accordance with concrete experience and investigation4 ,his is a consideration of the present1 he makes the most of1 and ascribes value to it as it appears2 the existent is thus regarded with open eyes1 respect is paid to it as to what reigns pre-eminent1 and this sensuous perception is reverenced and recognized4 ,here a confidence on the part of reason in itself and in nature is awakened2 it thinkingly applies itself to nature1 certain of finding the truth in it1 since both are in themselves harmonious4 ,bacon likewise treated the sciences methodically2 he did not merely bring forward opinions and sentiments1 he did not merely express himself regarding the sciences dogmatically1 as a fine gentleman might1 but he went into the matter closely1 and established a method in respect of scientific knowledge4 ,it is only through this method of investigation introduced by him that he is noteworthy--it is in that way alone that he can be considered to belong to the history of the sciences and of philosophy4 ,and through this principle of methodical knowledge he has likewise produced a great effect upon his times1 by drawing attention to what was lacking in the sciences1 both in their methods and in their content4 ,he set forth the general principles of procedure in an empirical philosophy4 ,the spirit of the philosophy of ,bacon is to take experience as the true and only source of knowledge1 and then to regulate the thought concerning it4 ,knowledge from experience stands in opposition to knowledge arising from the speculative ,notion1 and the opposition is apprehended in so acute a manner that the knowledge proceeding from the ,notion is ashamed of the knowledge from experience1 just as this again takes up a position of antagonism to the knowledge through the ,notion4 ,what ,cicero says of ,socrates may be said of ,bacon1 that he brought ,philosophy down to the world1 to the homes and every-day lives of men 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #chi74 ,to a certain extent knowledge from the absolute ,notion may assume an air of superiority over this knowledge2 but it is essential1 as far as the ,idea is concerned1 that the particularity of the content should be developed4 ,the ,notion is an essential matter1 but as such its finite side is just as essential4 ,mind gives presence1 external existence1 to itself2 to come to understand this extension1 the world as it is1 the sensuous universe1 to understand itself as this1 i4e4 with its manifest1 sensuous extension1 is one side of things4 ,the other side is the relation to the ,idea4 ,abstraction in and for itself must determine and particularize itself4 ,the ,idea is concrete1 self-determining1 it has the principle of development2 and perfect knowledge is always developed4 ,a conditional knowledge in respect of the ,idea merely signifies that the working out of the development has not yet advanced very far4 ,but we have to deal with this development2 and for this development and determination of the particular from the ,idea1 so that the knowledge of the universe1 of nature1 may be cultivated--for this1 the knowledge of the particular is necessary4 ,this particularity must be worked out on its own account2 we must become acquainted with empirical nature1 both with the physical and with the human4 ,the merit of modern times is to have accomplished or furthered these ends2 it was in the highest degree unsatisfactory when the ancients attempted the work4 ,empiricism is not merely an observing1 hearing1 feeling1 etc41 a perception of the individual2 for it really sets to work to find the species1 the universal1 to discover laws4 ,now because it does this1 it comes within the territory of the ,notion--it begets what pertains to the region of the ,idea2 it thus prepares the empirical material for the ,notion1 so that the latter can then receive it ready for its use4 ,if the science is perfected the ,idea must certainly issue forth of itself2 science as such no longer commences from the empiric4 ,but in order that this science may come into existence1 we must have the progression from the individual and particular to the universal--an activity which is a reaction on the given material of empiricism in order to bring about its reconstruction4 ,the demand of a priori knowledge1 which seems to imply that the ,idea should construct from itself1 is thus a reconstruction only1 or what is in religion accomplished through sentiment and feeling4 ,without the working out of the empirical sciences on their own account1 ,philosophy could not have reached further than with the ancients4 ,the whole of the ,idea in itself is science as perfected and complete2 but the other side is the beginning1 the process of its origination4 ,this process of the origination of science is different from its process in itself when it is complete1 just as is the process of the history of ,philosophy and that of ,philosophy itself4 ,in every science principles are commenced with2 at the first these are the results of the particular1 but if the science is completed they are made the beginning4 ,the case is similar with ,philosophy2 the working out of the empirical side has really become the conditioning of the ,idea1 so that this last may reach its full development and determination4 ,for instance1 in order that the history of the ,philosophy of modern times may exist1 we must have a history of ,philosophy in general1 the process of ,philosophy during so many thousand years2 mind must have followed this long road in order that the ,philosophy may be produced4 ,in consciousness it then adopts the attitude of having cut away the bridge from behind it2 it appears to be free to launch forth in its ether only1 and to develop without resistance in this medium2 but it is another matter to attain to this ether and to development in it4 ,we must not overlook the fact that ,philosophy would not have come into existence without this process1 for mind is essentially a working upon something different4 #a4 ,bacon's fame rests on two works4 ,in the first place1 he has the merit of having in his work ,de augmentis scientiarum presented to us a systematic encyclopedia of the sciences1 an outline which must undoubtedly have caused a sensation amongst his contemporaries4 ,it is important to set before men's eyes a well arranged picture such as this of the whole1 when that whole has not been grasped in thought4 ,this encyclopedia gives a general classification of the sciences2 the principles of the classification are regulated in accordance with the differences in the intellectual capacities4 ,bacon thus divides human learning according to the faculties of memory1 imagination1 and reason1 for he distinguishes what pertains 7#a7 to memory2 7#b7 to imagination2 7#c7 to reason4 ,under memory he considered history2 under imagination1 poetry1 and art2 and finally1 under reason1 philosophy4#ig ,according to his favourite method of division these again are further divided1 since he brings all else under these same heads2 this is1 however1 unsatisfactory4 ,to history belong the works of ,god--sacred1 prophetic1 ecclesiastical history2 the works of men--civil and literary history2 and likewise the works of nature1 and so on4#ih ,he goes through these topics after the manner of his time1 a main characteristic of which is that anything can be made plausible through examples1 e4g4 from the ,bible4 ,thus1 in treating of ,cosmetica1 he says in regard to paint that 8,he is surprised that this depraved custom of painting has been by the penal laws both ecclesiastical and civil so long overlooked4 ,in the ,bible we read indeed of ,jezebel that she painted her face2 but nothing of the kind is said of ,esther or ,judith40#ii ,if kings1 popes1 etc41 are being discussed1 such examples as those of ,ahab and ,solomon must be brought forward4 ,as formerly in civil laws--those respecting marriage1 for instance--the ,jewish forms held good1 in ,philosophy1 too1 the same are still to be found4 ,in this work theology likewise appears1 as also magic2 there is contained in it a comprehensive system of knowledge and of the sciences4 ,the arrangement of the sciences is the least significant part of the work ,de augmentis scientiarum4 ,it was by its criticism that its value was established and its effect produced1 as also by the number of instructive remarks contained in it2 all this was at that time lacking in the particular varieties of learning and modes of discipline1 especially in as far as the methods hitherto adopted were faulty1 and unsuitable to the ends in view3 in them the ,aristotelian conceptions of the schools were spun out by the understanding as though they were realities4 ,as it was with the ,schoolmen and with the ancients1 this classification is still the mode adopted in the sciences1 in which the nature of knowledge is unknown4 ,in them the idea of the science is advanced beforehand1 and to this idea a principle foreign to it is added1 as a basis of division1 just as here is added the distinction between memory1 imagination and reason4 ,the true method of division is found in the self-division of the ,notion1 its separating itself from itself4 ,in knowledge the moment of self-consciousness is undoubtedly found1 and the real self-consciousness has in it the moments of memory1 imagination and reason4 ,but this division is certainly not taken from the ,notion of self-consciousness1 but from experience1 in which self-consciousness finds itself possessed of these capacities4 #b4 ,the other remarkable feature in ,bacon is that in his second work1 his ,organon1 he sought at great length to establish a new method in learning2 in this regard his name is still held greatly in honour by many4 ,what chiefly distinguishes his system is his polemical attitude towards scholastic methods as they had hitherto existed1 towards syllogistic forms4 ,he calls these methods anticipationes natur2 in them men begin with presuppositions1 definitions1 accepted ideas1 with a scholastic abstraction1 and reason further from these without regarding that which is present in actuality4 ,thus regarding ,god and ,his methods of operating in nature1 regarding devils1 c41 they make use of passages from the ,bible1 such as 8,sun1 stand thou still10 in order to deduce therefrom certain metaphysical propositions from which they go further still4 ,it was against this a priori method that ,bacon directed his polemic2 as against these anticipations of nature he called attention to the explanation1 the interpretation of nature4#ajj 8,the same action of mind10 he says1 8which discovers a thing in question1 judges it2 and the operation is not performed by the help of any middle term1 but directly1 almost in the same manner as by the sense4 ,for the sense in its primary objects at once apprehends the appearance of the object1 and consents to the truth thereof40#aja ,the syllogism is altogether rejected by ,bacon4 ,as a matter of fact1 this ,aristotelian deduction is not a knowledge through itself in accordance with its content3 it requires a foreign universal as its basis1 and for that reason its movement is in its form contingent4 ,the content is not in unity with the form1 and this form is hence in itself contingent1 because it1 considered on its own account1 is the movement onwards in a foreign content4 ,the major premise is the content existent for itself1 the minor is likewise the content not through itself1 for it goes back into the infinite1 i4e4 it has not the form in itself2 the form is not the content4 ,the opposite may always be made out equally well through the syllogism1 for it is a matter of indifference to this form what content is made its basis4 8,dialectic does not assist in the discovery of the arts2 many arts were found out by chance40#ajb ,it was not against this syllogism generally1 i4e4 not against the ,notion of it 7for ,bacon did not possess this71 but against deduction as it was put into operation1 as it was to the scholastics--the deduction which took an assumed content as its basis--that ,bacon declaimed1 urging that the content of experience should be made the basis1 and the method of induction pursued4 ,he demanded that observations on nature and experiments should be made fundamental1 and pointed out the objects whose investigation was of special importance in the interests of human society1 and so on4 ,from this there then resulted the establishment of conclusions through induction and analogy4#ajc ,in fact it was only to an alteration in the content that1 without being aware of it1 ,bacon was impelled4 ,for though he rejected the syllogism and only permitted conclusions to be reached through induction1 he unconsciously himself drew deductions2 likewise all these champions of empiricism1 who followed after him1 and who put into practice what he demanded1 and thought they could by observations1 experiments and experiences1 keep the matter in question pure1 could neither so do without drawing deductions1 nor without introducing conceptions2 and they drew their deductions and formed their notions and conceptions all the more freely because they thought that they had nothing to do with conceptions at all2 nor did they go forth from deduction to immanent1 true knowledge4 ,thus when ,bacon set up induction in opposition to the syllogism1 this opposition is formal2 each induction is also a deduction1 which fact was known even to ,aristotle4 ,for if a universal is deduced from a number of things1 the first proposition reads1 8,these bodies have these qualities20 the second1 8,all these bodies belong to one class20 and thus1 in the third place1 this class has these qualities4 ,that is a perfect syllogism4 ,induction always signifies that observations are instituted1 experiments made1 experience regarded1 and from this the universal determination is derived4 ,we have already called to mind how important it is to lead on to the content as the content of actuality1 of the present2 for the rational must have objective truth4 ,the reconciliation of spirit with the world1 the glorification of nature and of all actuality1 must not be a ,beyond1 a ,futurity1 but must be accomplished now and here4 ,it is this moment of the now and here which thereby comes into self-consciousness4 ,but those who make experiments and observations1 do not realize what they are really doing1 for the sole interest taken by them in things1 is owing to the inward and unconscious certainty which reason has of finding itself in actuality2 and observations and experiments1 if entered upon in a right way1 result in showing that the ,notion is the only objective existence4 ,the sensuous individual eludes the experiments even while it is being operated upon1 and becomes a universal2 the best known example of this is to be found in positive and negative electricity in so far as it is positive and negative4 ,there is another shortcoming of a formal nature1 and one of which all empiricists partake1--that is that they believe themselves to be keeping to experience alone2 it is to them an unknown fact that in receiving these perceptions they are indulging in metaphysics4 ,man does not stop short at the individual1 nor can he do so4 ,he seeks the universal1 but thoughts1 even if not ,notions likewise1 are what constitute the same4 ,the most remarkable thought-form is that of force2 we thus speak of the force of electricity1 of magnetism1 of gravity4 ,force1 however1 is a universal and not a perceptible2 quite uncritically and unconsciously the empiricists thus permit of determinations such as these4 #c4 ,bacon finally gives the objects with which ,philosophy mainly has to deal4 ,these objects contrast much with that which we derive from perception and experience4 8,in the summary which ,bacon gives of what he conceives ought to be the objects of philosophical inquiry1 are the following2 and we select those which he principally dwells upon in his works3 #8,the prolongation of life2 the restitution of youth in some degree2 the retardation of old age1 and the altering of statures2 the altering of features2 versions of bodies into other bodies2 making of new species2 impression of the air and raising tempests2 greater pleasures of the senses1 c4'0 ,he likewise deals with objects such as these1 and he seeks to direct attention upon whether in their regard the means could not be found to carry out their ends2 in such powers we should be able to make some progress4 8,he complains that such investigations have been neglected by those whom he designates ignavi regionum exploratores4 ,in his ,natural ,history he gives formal receipts for making gold1 and performing many wonders40#ajd ,bacon thus does not by any means take the intelligent standpoint of an investigation of nature1 being still involved in the grossest superstition1 false magic1 c4 ,this we find to be on the whole propounded in an intelligent way1 and ,bacon thus remains within the conceptions of his time4 8,the conversion of silver1 quicksilver1 or any other metal into gold is a thing difficult to believe1 yet it is far more probable that a man who knows clearly the natures of weight1 of the colour of yellow1 of malleability and extension1 of volatility and fixedness1 and who has also made diligent search into the first seeds and menstruums of minerals1 may at last by much and sagacious endeavour produce gold1 than that a few grains of an elixir may so do4444 ,so again a man who knows well the nature of rarefaction1 of assimilation1 and of alimentation1 shall by diets1 bathings1 and the like prolong life1 or in some degree renew the vigour of youth40#aje ,these assertions are thus not as crude as they at first appear4 ,in dealing with ,medicine ,bacon speaks amongst other things of maceration 7,malacissatio per exterius7#ajf and so forth4 ,bacon emphasizes what has reference to the formal aspect of investigation4 ,for he says1 8,natural philosophy is divided into two parts1 the first consists in the investigation of causes2 the second in the production of effects2 the causes to be investigated are either final or formal causes1 or else material or efficient causes4 ,the former constitutes metaphysics2 the latter physics4 ,this last ,bacon looks upon as a branch of philosophy very inferior in point of dignity and importance to the other and accordingly to ascertain the most probable means of improving our knowledge of metaphysics is the great object of his ,organon40#ajg ,he himself says3 8,it is a correct position that #8true knowledge is knowledge by causes4 ,and causes1 again1 are not improperly distributed into four kinds3 the material1 the formal1 the efficient1 and the final4'0#ajh 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #agd1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #ach47 ,but in this connection an important point is that ,bacon has turned against the teleological investigation of nature1 against the investigation into final causes4 8,the investigation of final causes is useless2 they corrupt rather than advance the sciences except such as have to do with human action40#aji ,to ,bacon the important matter is to investigate by the study of caus efficientes4 ,to the consideration of final causes such assertions as these belong3 8,that the hairs of the eyelids are for a protection to the eyes2 that the thick skins and hides of living creatures are to defend them from heat and cold2 that the trees have leaves so that the fruit may not suffer from sun and wind0#aaj3 the hair is on the head on account of warmth2 thunder and lightning are the punishment of ,god1 or else they make fruitful the earth2 marmots sleep during the winter because they can find nothing to eat2 snails have a shell in order that they may be secure against attacks2 the bee is provided with a sting4 ,according to ,bacon this has been worked out in innumerable different ways4 ,the negative and external side of utility is turned round1 and the lack of this adaptation to end is likewise drawn within the same embrace4 ,it may1 for example1 be said that if sun or moon were to shine at all times1 the police might save much money1 and this would provide men with food and drink for whole months together4 ,it was right that ,bacon should set himself to oppose this investigation into final causes1 because it relates to external expediency1 just as ,kant was right in distinguishing the inward teleology from the outward4 ,as against the external end1 there is1 in fact1 the inward end1 i4e4 the inward ,notion of the thing itself1 as we found it earlier in ,aristotle 7,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #aef-afc74 ,because the organism possesses an inward adaptation to its ends1 its members are indeed likewise externally adapted as regards one another2 but the ends1 as external ends1 are heterogeneous to the individual1 are unconnected with the object which is investigated4 ,speaking generally1 the ,notion of nature is not in nature itself1 which would mean that the end was in nature itself2 but as teleological1 the ,notion is something foreign to it4 ,it does not have the end in itself in such a way that we have to accord respect to it--as the individual man has his end in himself and hence has to be respected4 ,but even the individual man as individual has only a right to respect from the individual as such1 and not from the universal4 ,he who acts in the name of the universal1 of the state1 as a general does for instance1 does not require to respect the individual at all2 for the latter1 although an end in himself1 does not cease to be relative4 ,he is this end in himself1 not as excluding himself and setting himself in opposition1 but only in so far as his true reality is the universal ,notion4 ,the end of the animal in itself as an individual is its own self-preservation2 but its true end in itself is the species4 ,its self-preservation is not involved in this2 for the self-preservation of its individuality is disadvantageous to the species1 while the abrogation of itself is favourable thereto4 ,now ,bacon separates the universal principle and the efficient cause1 and for that reason he removes investigation into ends from physics to metaphysics4 ,or he recognizes the ,notion1 not as universal in nature1 but only as necessity1 i4e4 as a universal which presents itself in the opposition of its moments1 not one which has bound them into a unity--in other words he only acknowledges a comprehension of one determinate from another determinate going on into infinity1 and not of both from their ,notion4 ,bacon has thus made investigation into the efficient cause more general1 and he asserts that this investigation alone belongs to physics1 although he allows that both kinds of investigation may exist side by side4#aaa ,through that view he effected a great deal1 and in so far as it has counteracted the senseless superstition which in the ,germanic nations far exceeded in its horrors and absurdity that of the ancient world1 it has the very merit which we met with in the ,epicurean philosophy4 ,that philosophy opposed itself to the superstitious ,stoics and to superstition generally--which last makes any existence that we set before ourselves into a cause 7a ,beyond which is made to exist in a sensuous way and to operate as a cause71 or makes two sensuous things which have no relation operate on one another4 ,this polemic of ,bacon's against spectres1 astrology1 magic1 c41#aab can certainly not be regarded exactly as ,philosophy like his other reflections1 but it is at least of service to culture4 ,he also advises that attention should be directed to formal causes1 the forms of things1 and that they should be recognized4#aac 8,but to give an exact definition of the meaning which ,bacon attaches to the phrase formal causes is rather difficult2 because his language upon this subject is uncertain in a very remarkable degree40#aad ,it may be thought that he understood by this the immanent determinations of things1 the laws of nature2 as a matter of fact the forms are none else than universal determinations1 species1 c4#aae ,he says3 8,the discovery of the formal is despaired of4 ,the efficient and the material 7as they are investigated and received1 that is as remote causes1 without reference to the latent process leading to the forms7 are but slight and superficial1 and contribute little1 if anything1 to true and active science4 ,for though in nature nothing really exists beside individual bodies1 performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law1 yet in philosophy this very law1 and the investigation1 discovery and explanation of it1 is the foundation as well of knowledge as of operation4 ,and it is this law1 with its clauses1 that ,i mean when ,i speak of ,forms4444 ,let the investigation of ,forms which are eternal and immutable constitute metaphysics4 ,whosoever is acquainted with ,forms embraces the unity of nature in substances the most unlike40#aaf ,he goes through this in detail1 and quotes many examples to illustrate it1 such as that of ,heat4 8,mind must raise itself from differences to species4 ,the warmth of the sun and that of the fire are diverse4 ,we see that grapes ripen by the warmth of the sun4 ,but to see whether the warmth of the sun is specific1 we also observe other warmth1 and we find that grapes likewise ripen in a warm room2 this proves that the warmth of the sun is not specific40#aag 8,physic10 he says1 8directs us through narrow rugged paths in imitation of the crooked ways of nature4 ,but he that understands a form knows the ultimate possibility of superinducing that nature upon all kinds of matter2 that is to say1 as he himself interprets this last expression1 is able to superinduce the nature of gold upon silver10 that is to say to make gold from silver1 8and to perform all those other marvels to which the alchymists pretended4 ,the error of these last consisted alone in hoping to arrive at these ends by fabulous and fantastical methods20 the true method is to recognize these forms4 8,one leading object of the ,instauratio ,magna and of the ,novum ,organon is to point out the necessity of ascertaining the formal causes and logical rules40#aah ,they are good rules1 but not adapted to attain that end4 ,this is all that we have to say of ,bacon4 ,in dealing with ,locke we shall have more to say of these empirical methods which were adopted by the ,english4 ,b4 ,,jacob ,,boehme4 ,we now pass on from this ,english ,lord ,chancellor1 the leader of the external1 sensuous method in ,philosophy1 to the philosophus teutonicus1 as he is called--to the ,german cobbler of ,lusatia1 of whom we have no reason to be ashamed4 ,it was1 in fact1 through him that ,philosophy first appeared in ,germany with a character peculiar to itself3 ,boehme stands in exact antithesis to ,bacon4 ,he was also called theosophus teutonicus1 just as even before this philosophia teutonica was the name given to mysticism4#aai ,this ,jacob ,boehme was for long forgotten and decried as being simply a pious visionary2 the so-called period of enlightenment1 more particularly1 helped to render his public extremely limited4 ,leibnitz thought very highly of him1 but it is in modern times that his profundity has for the first time been recognized1 and that he has been once more restored to honour4 ,it is certain1 on the one hand1 that he did not merit the disdain accorded him2 on the other1 however1 he did not deserve the high honour into which he was elevated4 ,to call him an enthusiast signifies nothing at all4 ,for if we will1 all philosophers may be so termed1 even the ,epicureans and ,bacon2 for they all have held that man finds his truth in something else than eating and drinking1 or in the common-sense every-day life of wood-cutting1 tailoring1 trading1 or other business1 private or official4 ,but ,boehme has to attribute the high honour to which he was raised mainly to the garb of sensuous feeling and perception which he adopted2 for ordinary sensuous perception and inward feeling1 praying and yearning1 and the pictorial element in thought1 allegories and such like1 are in some measure held to be essential in ,philosophy4 ,but it is only in the ,notion1 in thought1 that ,philosophy can find its truth1 and that the ,absolute can be expressed and likewise is as it is in itself4 ,looked at from this point of view1 ,boehme is a complete barbarian1 and yet he is a man who1 along with his rude method of presentation1 possesses a deep1 concrete heart4 ,but because no method or order is to be found in him1 it is difficult to give an account of his philosophy4 ,jacob ,boehme was born in #aege of poor parents1 at ,altseidenburg1 near ,grlitz1 in ,upper ,lusatia4 ,in his youth he was a peasant boy who tended the cattle4 ,he was brought up as a ,lutheran1 and always remained such4 ,the account of his life which is given with his works was drawn up by a clergyman who knew him personally1 from information given by ,boehme himself4 ,much is there related as to how he attained to more profound knowledge and wisdom by means of certain experiences through which he passed4 ,even when a herd tending the cattle1 as he tells of himself1 he had these wonderful manifestations4 ,the first marvellous awakening that occurred to him took place in a thicket in which he saw a cavern and a vessel of gold4 ,startled by the splendour of this sight he was inwardly awakened from a dull stupor1 but afterwards he found it was impossible for him to discover the objects of his vision4 ,subsequently he was bound apprentice to a shoemaker4 ,more especially 8was he spiritually awakened by the words3 #8,your heavenly ,father will give the ,holy ,spirit to them that ask ,him' 7,luke xi4 #ac71 so that1 desiring to come to a knowledge of the truth1 and yet retaining the simplicity of his mind1 he prayed and sought1 and knocked1 fervently and earnestly1 until1 while travelling about with his master1 he was1 through the influence of the ,father in the ,son1 spiritually transported into the glorious peace and the ,sabbath of the soul1 and thus his request was granted4 ,according to his own account1 he was then surrounded with divine light1 and for seven days he remained in the supremest divine contemplation and joy40 ,his master for this dismissed him1 saying he could not keep in his service 8house-prophets such as he was40 ,after that he lived at ,grlitz4 ,in #aeid he rose in his trade to be master1 and married4 ,later on1 8in the year #afjj1 and in the twenty-fifth year of his age1 once more0 the light broke upon him in a second vision of the same kind4 ,he tells that he saw a brightly scoured pewter dish in the room1 and 8by the sudden sight of this shining metal with its brilliant radiance0 he was brought 7into a meditation and a breaking free of his astral mind7 8into the central point of secret nature10 and into the light of divine essence4 8,he went out into the open air in order that he might rid his brain of this hallucination1 and none the less did he continue all the more clearly as time went on to experience the vision in this way received4 ,thus by means of the signatures or figures1 lineaments1 and colours which were depicted1 he could1 so to speak1 look into the heart and inmost nature of all creatures 7in his book ,de signatura rerum this reason which was impressed upon him is found and fully explained72 and for this he was overwhelmed with joy1 thanked ,god1 and went peacefully about his affairs40 ,later on he wrote several works4 ,he continued to pursue his handicraft at ,grlitz1 and died at the same place in #afbd1 being then a master shoemaker4#abj ,his works are especially popular with the ,dutch1 and for that reason most of the editions are issued from ,amsterdam1 though they were also surreptitiously printed in ,hamburg4 ,his first writing is the 8,aurora0 or 8,morgenrthe im ,aufgange10 and this was followed by others2 the work 8,von den drei ,principien10 and another 8,vom dreifachen ,leben des ,menschen10 are1 along with several others1 the most noteworthy4 ,boehme constantly read the ,bible1 but what other works he read is not known4 ,a number of passages in his works1 however1 prove that he read much--evidently mystical1 theosophic1 and alchemistic writings for the most part1 and he must certainly have included in his reading the works of ,theophrastus ,bombastus von ,hohenheim1 known as ,paracelsus1 a philosopher of a somewhat similar calibre1 but much more confused1 and without ,boehme's profundity of mind4 ,he met with much persecution at the hands of the clergy1 but he aroused less attention in ,germany than in ,holland and ,england1 where his writings have been often printed4#aba ,in reading his works we are struck with wonder1 and one must be familiar with his ideas in order to discover the truth in this most confused method of expression4 ,the matter of ,jacob ,boehme's philosophy is genuinely ,german2 for what marks him out and makes him noteworthy is the ,protestant principle already mentioned of placing the intellectual world within one's own mind and heart1 and of experiencing and knowing and feeling in one's own self-consciousness all that formerly was conceived as a ,beyond4 ,boehme's general conceptions thus on the one hand reveal themselves as both deep and sound1 but on the other1 with all his need for and struggle after determination and distinction in the development of his divine intuitions of the universe1 he does not attain either to clearness or order4 ,there is no systematic connection but the greatest confusion in his divisions--and this exists even in his tables1#abb in which three numbers are made use of4 ,i4 ,what ,god is beside nature and creation4 ,,ii4 ,separability3 ,mysterium ,the first ,principium4 ,god in ,love4 magnum4 ,god in ,wrath4 ,,iii4 ,god in wrath and love4 ,here nothing definite to hold the moments asunder is shown1 and we have the sense of merely doing it by effort2 now these and now other distinctions are set forth1 and as they are laid down disconnectedly1 they again come into confusion4 ,the manner and system which ,boehme adopts must accordingly be termed barbarous2 the expressions used in his works prove this1 as when1 for example1 he speaks of the divine ,salitter1 ,marcurius1 c4 ,as ,boehme places the life1 the movement of absolute existence in the heart1 so does he regard all conceptions as being in a condition of actuality2 or he makes use of actuality as ,notion1 that is to say he forcibly takes natural things and sensuous qualities to express his ideas rather than the determinations of the ,notion4 ,for instance1 sulphur and such like are not to him the things that we so name1 but their essence2 or the ,notion has this form of actuality4 ,boehme's profoundest interest is in the ,idea1 and he struggles hard to express it4 ,the speculative truth which he desires to expound really requires1 in order to be comprehended1 thought and the form of thought4 ,only in thought can this unity be comprehended1 in the central point of which his mind has its place2 but it is just the form of thought that is lacking to him4 ,the forms that he employs are really no longer determinations of the ,notion at all4 ,they are on the one hand sensuous1 chemical determinations1 such qualities as acid1 sweet1 sour1 fierce1 and1 on the other1 emotions such as wrath and love2 and1 further1 tincture1 essence1 anguish1 c4 ,for him these sensuous forms do not1 however1 possess the sensuous significance which belongs to them1 but he uses them in order to find expression for his thought4 ,it is1 however1 at once clear to us how the form of manifestation must necessarily appear forced1 since thought alone is capable of unity4 ,it thus appears strange to read of the bitterness of ,god1 of the ,flagrat1 and of lightning2 we first require to have the ,idea1 and then we certainly discern its presence here4 ,but the other side is that ,boehme utilizes the ,christian form which lies nearest to him1 and more especially that of the ,trinity1 as the form of the ,idea3 he intermingles the sensuous mode and the mode of popularly conceived religion1 sensuous images and conceptions4 ,however rude and barbarous this may on the one hand be1 and however impossible it is to read ,boehme continuously1 or to take a firm grasp of his thoughts 7for all these qualities1 spirits and angels make one's head swim71 we must on the other hand recognize that he speaks of everything as it is in its actuality1 and that he does this from his heart4 ,this solid1 deep1 ,german mind which has intercourse with what is most inward1 thus really exercises an immense power and force in order to make use of actuality as ,notion1 and to have what takes place in heaven around and within it4 ,just as ,hans ,sachs represented ,god1 ,christ and the ,holy ,ghost1 as well as patriarchs and angels1 in his own particular manner and as ordinary people like himself1 not looking upon them as past and historic1 so was it with ,boehme4 ,to faith spirit has truth1 but in this truth the moment of certainty of self is lacking4 ,we have seen that the object of ,christianity is the truth1 the ,spirit2 it is given to faith as immediate truth4 ,faith possesses the truth1 but unconsciously1 without knowledge1 without knowing it as its self-consciousness2 and seeing that thought1 the ,notion1 is necessarily in self-consciousness--the unity of opposites with ,bruno--this unity is what is pre-eminently lacking to faith4 ,its moments as particular forms fall apart1 more especially the highest moments--good and evil1 or ,god and the ,devil4 ,god is1 and the ,devil likewise2 both exist for themselves4 ,but if ,god is absolute existence1 the question may be asked1 ,what absolute existence is this which has not all actuality1 and more particularly evil within it8 ,boehme is hence on one side intent on leading the soul of man to the divine life1 on inducing the soul to pay attention to the strife within itself1 and make this the object of all its work and efforts2 and then in respect of this content he strives to make out how evil is present in good--a question of the present day4 ,but because ,boehme does not possess the ,notion and is so far back in intellectual culture1 there ensues a most frightful and painful struggle between his mind and consciousness and his powers of expression1 and the import of this struggle is the profoundest ,idea of ,god which seeks to bring the most absolute opposites into unity1 and to bind them together--but not for thinking reason4 ,thus if we would comprehend the matter1 ,boehme's great struggle has been--since to him ,god is everything--to grasp the negative1 evil1 the devil1 in and from ,god1 to grasp ,god as absolute2 and this struggle characterizes all his writings and brings about the torture of his mind4 ,it requires a great and severe mental effort to bring together in one what in shape and form lie so far asunder2 with all the strength that he possesses ,boehme brings the two together1 and therein shatters all the immediate significance of actuality possessed by both4 ,but when thus he grasps this movement1 this essence of spirit in himself1 in his inward nature1 the determination of the moments simply approaches more nearly to the form of self-consciousness1 to the formless1 or to the ,notion4 ,in the background1 indeed1 there stands the purest speculative thought1 but it does not attain to an adequate representation4 ,homely1 popular modes of conception likewise appear1 a free out-spokenness which to us seems too familiar4 ,with the devil1 particularly1 he has great dealings1 and him he frequently addresses4 8,come here10 he says1 8thou black wretch1 what dost thou want8 ,i will give thee a potion40#abc ,as ,prospero in ,shakespeare's 8,tempest0#abd threatens ,ariel that he will 8rend an oak and peg him in his knotty entrails 444 twelve winters10 ,boehme's great mind is confined in the hard knotty oak of the senses--in the gnarled concretion of the ordinary conception--and is not able to arrive at a free presentation of the ,idea4 ,i shall shortly give ,boehme's main conceptions1 and then several particular forms which he in turn adopts2 for he does not remain at one form1 because neither the sensuous nor the religious can suffice4 ,now even though this brings about the result that he frequently repeats himself1 the forms of his main conceptions are still in every respect very different1 and he who would try to give a consistent explanation of ,boehme's ideas1 particularly when they pass into further developments1 would only delude himself in making the attempt4 ,hence we must neither expect to find in ,boehme a systematic presentation nor a true method of passing over into the individual4 ,of his thoughts we cannot say much without adopting his manner of expression1 and quoting the particular passages themselves1 for they cannot otherwise be expressed4 ,the fundamental idea in ,jacob ,boehme is the effort to comprise everything in an absolute unity1 for he desires to demonstrate the absolute divine unity and the union of all opposites in ,god4 ,boehme's chief1 and one may even say1 his only thought--the thought that permeates all his works--is that of perceiving the holy ,trinity in everything1 and recognizing everything as its revelation and manifestation1 so that it is the universal principle in which and through which everything exists2 in such a way1 moreover1 that all things have this divine ,trinity in themselves1 not as a ,trinity pertaining to the ordinary conception1 but as the real ,trinity of the absolute ,idea4 ,everything that exists is1 according to ,boehme1 this three-fold alone1 and this three-fold is everything4#abe ,to him the universe is thus one divine life and revelation of ,god in all things1 so that when examined more closely1 from the one reality of ,god1 the sum and substance of all powers and qualities1 the ,son who shines forth from these powers is eternally born2 the inward unity of this light with the substance of the powers is ,spirit4 ,sometimes the presentation is vague1 and then again it is clearer4 ,what comes next is the explanation of this ,trinity1 and here the different forms which he uses to indicate the difference becoming evident in the same1 more especially appear4 ,in the ,aurora1 the 8,root or ,mother of ,philosophy1 ,astrology and ,theology10 he gives a method of division in which he places these sciences in proximity1 and yet appears merely to pass from one to the other without any clear definition or determination4 87#a7 ,in ,philosophy divine power is treated of1 what ,god is1 and how in the ,being of ,god nature1 stars and ,elementa are constituted2 whence all things have their origin1 what is the nature of heaven and earth1 as also of angels1 men and devils1 heaven and hell and all that is creaturely1 likewise what the two qualities in nature are1 and this is dealt with out of a right ground in the knowledge of spirit1 by the impulse and motion of ,god4 7#b7 ,in astrology the powers of nature1 of the stars and elements1 are treated of1 and how all creatures proceed from them1 how evil and good are through them effected in men and animals4 7#c7 ,in theology the kingdom of ,christ is dealt with1 as also its nature1 and how it is set in opposition to hell1 and how in nature it wars with the kingdom of darkness40#abf #a4 ,what comes first is ,god the ,father2 this first is at once divided in itself and the unity of both its parts4 8,god is all10 he says1 8,he is the ,darkness and the ,light1 ,love and ,anger1 ,fire and ,light1 but ,he calls ,himself ,god only as to the light of ,his love4 ,there is an eternal ,contrarium between darkness and light2 neither comprehends the other and neither is the other1 and yet there is but one essence or substance1 though separated by pain2 it is likewise so with the will1 and yet there is no separable essence4 ,one single principle is divided in this way1 that one is in the other as a nothing which yet exists2 but it is not manifest in the property of that thing in which it is40#abg ,by anguish is expressed that which we know as the absolute negativity--that is the self-conscious1 self-experienced1 the self-relating negativity which is therefore absolute affirmation4 ,all ,boehme's efforts were directed towards this point2 the principle of the ,notion is living in him1 only he cannot express it in the form of thought4 ,that is to say1 all depends on thinking of the negative as simple1 since it is at the same time an opposite2 thus anguish ,qual is the inward tearing asunder and yet likewise the simple4 ,from this ,boehme derives sources or springs ,quellen1 a good play on the words4 ,for pain die ,qual1 this negativity1 passes into life1 activity1 and thus he likewise connects it with quality ,qualitt1 which he makes into ,quallity4#abh ,the absolute identity of difference is all through present to him4 a4 ,boehme thus represents ,god not as the empty unity1 but as this self-separating unity of absolute opposites2 one must not1 however1 here expect a clearly defined distinction4 ,the first1 the one1 the ,father1 has likewise the mode of natural existence2 thus1 like ,proclus1 he speaks of this ,god being simple essence4 ,this simple essence he calls the hidden2 and he therefore names it the ,temperamentum1 this unity of what is different1 in which all is tempered4 ,we find him also calling it the great ,salitter--now the divine and now the natural ,salitter--as well as ,salniter4 ,when he talks of this great salitter as of something known to us1 we cannot first of all conceive what it means4 ,but it is a vulgar corruption of the word sal nitri1 saltpetre 7which is still called salniter in ,austria71 i4e4 just the neutral and in truth universal existence4 ,the divine pomp and state is this1 that in ,god a more glorious nature dwells1 trees1 plants1 c4 8,in the divine pomp or state two things have principally to be considered2 salitter or the divine power1 which brings forth all fruits1 and marcurius or the sound40#abi ,this great salitter is the unrevealed existence1 just as the ,neo-,platonic unity is without knowledge of itself and likewise unrecognized4 b4 ,this first substance contains all powers or qualities as not yet separated2 thus this salitter likewise appears as the body of ,god1 who embraces all qualities in ,himself4 ,quality thus becomes an important conception1 the first determination with ,boehme2 and he begins with qualities in his work 8,morgenrthe im ,aufgang40 ,he afterwards associates with this the conferring of quality1 and in the same place says3 8,quality is the mobility1 boiling1 springing1 and driving of a thing40 ,these qualities he then tries to define1 but the account he gives of them is vague4 8,as for example heat which burns1 consumes and drives forth all whatsoever comes into it which is not of the same property2 and again it enlightens and warms all cold1 wet1 and dark things2 it compacts and hardens soft things4 ,it contains likewise two other kinds in it1 namely ,light and ,fierceness0 7,negativity72 8of which the light or the heart of the heat is in itself a pleasant1 joyful glance or lustre1 a power of life 444 and a source of the heavenly kingdom of joy4 ,for it makes all things in this world living and moving2 all flesh1 trees1 leaves1 and grass grow in this world1 as in the power of the light1 and have their light therein1 viz4 in the good4 ,again1 it contains also a fierceness or wrath which burns1 consumes and spoils4 ,this wrath or fierceness springs1 drives1 and elevates itself in the light1 and makes the light movable4 ,it wrestles and fights together in its two-fold source4 ,the light subsists in ,god without heat1 but it does not subsist so in nature4 ,for all qualities in nature are one in another1 in the same manner as ,god is all4 ,for ,god0 7the ,father7 8is the ,heart40 ,on another occasion 7,vom dreifachen ,leben des ,menschen1 chap4 iv4 #fh1 p4 #hha7 the ,son is the heart of ,god2 and yet again the ,spirit is called the heart 7,morgenrthe1 chap4 ii4 #ac1 p4 #bi7 8or fountain of nature1 and from ,him comes all4 ,now heat reigns and predominates in all powers in nature and warms all1 and is one source or spring in all4 ,but the light in the heat gives power to all qualities1 for that all grow pleasant and joyful40 ,boehme goes over quite a list of qualities3 cold1 hot1 bitter1 sweet1 fierce1 acid1 hard1 dense1 soft qualities1 sound1 etc4 8,the bitter quality is in ,god also1 but not in that manner as the gall is in man1 but it is an everlasting power1 in an elevating1 triumphing spring or source of joy4 ,all the creatures are made from these qualities1 and live therein as in their mother40#acj 8,the virtues of the stars are nature itself4 ,everything in this world proceeds from the stars4 ,that ,i shall prove to you if you are not a blockhead and have a little reason4 ,if the whole ,curriculum or the whole circumference of the stars is considered1 we soon find that this is the mother of all things1 or the nature from which all things have arisen and in which all things stand and live1 and through which all things move4 ,and all things are formed from these same powers and remain eternally therein40 ,thus it is said that ,god is the reality of all realities4 ,boehme continues3 8,you must1 however1 elevate your mind in the ,spirit1 and consider how the whole of nature1 with all the powers which are in nature1 also extension1 depth and height1 also heaven and earth and all whatsoever is therein1 and all that is above the heavens1 is together the ,body and ,corporeity of ,god2 and the powers of the stars are the fountain veins in the natural ,body of ,god1 in this world4 ,you must not conceive that in the ,body of the stars is the whole triumphing ,holy ,trinity1 ,god the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost4 ,but we must not so conceive as if ,god was not at all in the ,corpus or ,body of the stars1 and in this world4444 ,here now the question is1 ,from whence has heaven1 or whence borrows it this power1 that it causes such mobility in nature8 ,here you must lift up your eyes beyond nature into the light1 holy1 triumphing1 divine power1 into the unchangeable holy ,trinity1 which is a triumphing1 springing1 movable ,being1 and all powers are therein1 as in nature3 of this heaven1 earth1 stars1 elements1 devils1 angels1 men1 beasts1 and all have their ,being2 and therein all stands4 ,when we nominate heaven and earth1 stars and elements1 and all that is therein1 and all whatsoever is above the heaven1 then thereby is nominated the total ,god1 who has made ,himself creaturely in these above-mentioned0 many 8,beings1 in ,his power which proceedeth forth from ,him40#aca c4 ,boehme further defines ,god the ,father as follows3 8,when we consider the whole nature and its property1 then we see the ,father3 when we behold heaven and the stars1 then we behold ,his eternal power and wisdom4 ,so many stars as stand in the whole heaven1 which are innumerable1 so manifold and various is the power and wisdom of ,god the ,father4 ,every star differs in its quality40 ,but 8you must not conceive here that every power which is in the ,father stands in a peculiar severed or divided part and place in the ,father1 as the stars do in heaven4 ,no1 but the ,spirit shows that all the powers in the ,father10 as the fountainhead1 8are one in another as one power40 ,this whole is the universal power which exists as ,god the ,father1 wherein all differences are united2 8creaturely0 it1 however1 exists as the totality of stars1 and thus as separation into the different qualities4 8,you must not think that ,god who is in heaven and above the heaven does there stand and hover like a power and quality which has in it neither reason nor knowledge1 as the sun which turns round in its circle and shoots forth from itself heat and light1 whether it be for benefit or hurt to the earth and creatures4 ,no1 the ,father is not so1 but ,he is an ,all-mighty1 ,all-wise1 ,all-knowing1 ,all-seeing1 ,all-hearing1 ,all-smelling1 ,all-tasting ,god1 who in ,himself is meek1 friendly1 gracious1 merciful1 and full of joy1 yea ,joy itself40#acb ,since ,boehme calls the ,father all powers1 he again distinguishes these as the seven first originating spirits4#acc ,but there is a certain confusion in this and no thought-determination1 no definite reason for there being exactly seven--such precision and certainty is not to be found in ,boehme4 ,these seven qualities are likewise the seven planets which move and work in the great ,salitter of ,god2 8the seven planets signify the seven spirits of ,god or the princes of the angels40 ,but they are in the ,father as one unity1 and this unity is an inward spring and fermentation4 8,in ,god all spirits triumph as one spirit1 and a spirit ever calms and loves the others1 and nothing exists excepting mere joy and rapture4 ,one spirit does not stand alongside the others like stars in heaven1 for all seven are contained within one another as one spirit4 ,each spirit in the seven spirits of ,god is pregnant with all seven spirits of ,god20 thus each is in ,god itself a totality4 8,one brings forth the other in and through itself20 this is the flashing forth of the life of all qualities4#acd #b4 ,as what came first was the source and germ of all powers and qualities1 what comes second is process4 ,this second principle is a very important conception1 which with ,boehme appears under very many aspects and forms1 viz4 as the ,word1 the ,separator1 ,revelation--speaking generally the 8,i10 the source of all difference1 and of the will and implicit ,being which are in the powers of natural things2 but in such a way that the light therein likewise breaks forth which leads them back to rest4 a4 ,god as the simple absolute existence is not ,god absolutely2 in ,him nothing can be known4 ,what we know is something different--but this 8different0 is itself contained in ,god as the perception and knowledge of ,god4 ,hence of the second step ,boehme says that a separation must have taken place in this temperament4 8,no thing can become manifest to itself without opposition2 for if it has nothing to withstand it1 it always goes forward on its own account and does not go back within itself4 ,but if it does not go back into itself as into that from which it originally arose1 it knows nothing of its original state40 ,original state ,urstand he makes use of for substance2 and it is a pity that we cannot use this and many other striking expressions4 8,without adversity life would have no sensibility nor will nor efficacy1 neither understanding nor science4 ,had the hidden ,god who is one solitary existence and will not of ,his own will brought ,himself out of ,himself1 out of the eternal knowledge in the ,temperamento1 into divisibility of will1 and introduced this same element of divisibility into an inclusiveness0 7,identity7 8so as to constitute it a natural and creaturely life1 and had this element of separation in life not come into warfare1 how was the will of ,god which is only one to be revealed to ,himself8 ,how could a knowledge of itself be present in a solitary will80#ace ,we see that ,boehme is elevated infinitely above the empty abstraction of the highest reality1 etc4 ,boehme continues3 8,the commencement of all ,beings is the ,word as the breath of ,god1 and ,god has become the eternal ,one of eternity and likewise remains so in eternity4 ,the ,word is the eternal beginning and remains so eternally1 for it is the revelation of the eternal ,one through and by which the divine power is brought into one knowledge of somewhat4 ,by the ,word we understand the revealed will of ,god3 by the ,word we mean ,god the hidden ,god1 from whom the ,word eternally springs forth4 ,the ,word is the efflux of the divine ,one1 and yet ,god ,himself as ,his revelation40 is more definite than ,word1 and there is a delightful double significance in the ,greek expression indicating as it does both reason and speech4 ,for speech is the pure existence of spirit2 it is a thing which when once heard goes back within itself4 8,what has flowed out is wisdom1 beginning and cause of all powers1 colours1 virtue and qualities40#acf ,of the ,son ,boehme says3 8,the ,son is0 of the ,father and 8in the ,father1 the heart of the ,father or light1 and the ,father beareth him ever1 from eternity to eternity40 ,thus 8the ,son is0 indeed 8another ,person from the ,father1 though no other10 but the same 8,god as the ,father10 whose image he is4#acg 8,the ,son is the ,heart0 or the pulsating element 8in the ,father2 all the powers which are in the ,father are the propriety of the ,father2 and the ,son is the heart or the kernel in all the powers in the whole ,father1 and he is the cause of the springing joy in all powers in the whole ,father4 ,from the ,son the eternal joy rises and springs in all the powers of the ,father1 as the sun does in the heart of the stars4 ,it signifies the ,son1 as the circle of the stars signifies the manifold powers of the ,father2 it lightens the heavens1 the stars and the deep above the earth1 working in all things that are in this world2 it enlightens and gives power to all the stars and tempers their power4 ,the ,son of ,god is continually generated from all the powers of his ,father from eternity1 just as the sun is born of the stars2 ,he is ever born and is not made1 and is the heart and lustre shining forth from all powers4 ,he shines in all powers of the ,father1 and his power is the moving1 springing joy in all the powers of the ,father1 and shines in the whole ,father as the sun does in the whole world4 ,for if the ,son did not shine in the ,father1 the ,father would be a dark valley2 for the ,father's power would not rise from eternity to eternity1 and so the divine ,being would not subsist40#ach ,this life of the ,son is an important matter2 and in regard to this issuing forth and manifestation ,boehme has likewise brought forward the most important assertions4 b4 8,from such a revelation of powers in which the will of the eternal ,one contemplates itself1 flows the understanding and the knowledge of the something ,ichts1 since the eternal will contemplates itself in the something ,ichts40 8,ichts0 is a play upon the word 8,nichts0 7nothing71 for it is simply the negative2 yet it is at the same time the opposite of nothing1 since the ,ich 7,ego7 of self-consciousness is contained in it4 ,the ,son1 the something1 is thus 8,i10 consciousness1 self-consciousness3 ,god is not only the abstract neutral but likewise the gathering together of ,himself into the point of ,being-for-self4 ,the 8other0 of ,god is thus the image of ,god4 8,this similitude is the ,mysterium magnum1 viz4 the creator of all beings and creatures2 for it is the separator0 7of the whole7 8in the efflux of the will which makes the will of the eternal ,one separable--the separability in the will from which powers and qualities take their rise40 ,this separator is 8constituted the steward of nature1 by whom the eternal will rules1 makes1 forms and constitutes all things40 ,the separator is effectuating and self-differentiating1 and ,boehme calls this 8,ichts10 likewise ,lucifer1 the first-born ,son of ,god1 the creaturely first-born angel who was one of the seven spirits4 8,but this ,lucifer has fallen and ,christ has come in his place40#aci ,this is the connection of the devil with ,god1 namely other-,being and then ,being-for-self or ,being-for-one1 in such a way that the other is for one2 and this is the origin of evil in ,god and out of ,god4 ,this is the furthest point of thought reached by ,jacob ,boehme4 ,he represents this ,fall of ,lucifer as that the 8,ichts10 i4e4 self-knowledge1 the 8,i0 ,ichheit 7a word which we find used by him71 the inward imagining of self1 the inward fashioning of self 7the being-for-self71 is the fire which absorbs all things4 ,this is the negative side in the separator1 the anguish2 or it is the wrath of ,god4 ,this divine wrath is hell and the devil1 who through himself imagines himself into himself4 ,this is very bold and speculative2 ,boehme here seeks to show in ,god ,himself the sources of the divine anger4 ,he also calls the will of the something 8,ichts0 self-hood2 it is the passing over of the something 8,ichts0 into the nothing ,nichts1 the 8,i0 imagining itself within itself4 ,he says3 8,heaven and hell are as far removed from one another as day and night1 as something and nothing40 ,boehme has really here penetrated into the utmost depths of divine essence2 evil1 matter1 or whatever it has been called1 is the ,i ,i1 the ,being-for-self1 the true negativity4 ,before this it was the nonens which is itself positive1 the darkness2 but the true negativity is the 8,i40 ,it is not anything bad because it is called the evil2 it is in mind alone that evil exists1 because it is conceived therein as it is in itself4 8,where the will of ,god willeth in anything1 there ,god is manifested1 and in that manifestation the angels also dwell2 but where ,god in any thing willeth not with the will of the thing1 there ,god is not manifested to it1 but dwelleth0 7there7 8in ,himself without the co-operating of the thing20 in that case 8in that thing is its own will1 and there the devil dwelleth and all whatever is without ,god40#adj ,boehme in his own way sets forth the form further assumed in this process in a pictorial manner4 ,this 8,separator deduces qualities from itself1 from which the infinite manifold arises1 and through which the eternal ,one makes itself perceptible0 7so that it is for others7 8not according to the unity1 but in accordance with the efflux of the unity40 ,implicit ,being and the manifold are absolutely opposed through the ,notion1 which ,boehme did not have3 ,being-for-self implies ,being-for-another and retrogression into the opposite4 ,boehme sways backwards and forwards in apparent contradictions1 and does not well know how to find a way out of the difficulty4 8,but the efflux is carried on to the greatest extreme possible1 to the generation of fire0--dark fire without light1 darkness1 the hidden1 the self2#ada--8;in which fiery nature10 however1 since this fire rises and shoots up1 8the eternal ,one becomes majestic and a light10 and this light which there breaks forth is the form which the other principle assumes4 ,this is the return to the ,one4 8,thereby0 7through fire7 8the eternal power becomes desirous and effectual and0 7fire7 8is the original condition0 7essence7 8of the sensitive0 7feeling7 8life1 where in the ,word of power an eternal sensitive life first takes its origin4 ,for if life had no sensitiveness1 it would have no will nor efficacy2 but pain0--anguish1 suffering--first 8makes it0 7all life7 8effectual and endows it with will4 ,and the light of such kindling through fire makes it joyous1 for it is an anointment10 joy and loveliness 8of painfulness40#adb ,boehme turns this round in many ways in order to grasp the something ,ichts1 the ,separator1 as it 8rises0#adc from the ,father4 ,the qualities rise in the great ,salitter1 stir1 raise1 and move rgen themselves4 ,boehme has there the quality of astringency in the ,father1 and he then represents the process of the something ,ichts as a sharpness1 a drawing together1 as a flash of lightning that breaks forth4 ,this light is ,lucifer4 ,the ,being-for-self1 the self-perception1 is by ,boehme called the drawing together into a point4 ,that is astringency1 sharpness1 penetration1 fierceness2 to this pertains the wrath of ,god1 and here ,boehme in this manner grasps the 8other0 of ,god in ,god ,himself4 8,this source can be kindled through great motion or elevation4 ,through the contraction the creaturely ,being is formed so that a heavenly ,corpus may be0 intelligibly 8formed4 ,but if it0--the sharpness--8be kindled through elevation1 which those creatures only can do which are created out of the divine ,salitter1 then it is a burning source-vein of the wrath of ,god4 ,the flash is the mother of light2 for the flash generates the light1 and is the ,father of the fierceness2 for the fierceness abides in the flash as a seed in the father1 and that flash generates also the tone or sound0--the flash is1 speaking generally1 the absolute generator4 ,the flash is still connected with pain2 light is what brings intelligence4 ,the divine birth is the going forth of the flash1 of the life of all qualities4#add ,this is all from the ,aurora4 ,in the ,qustionibus theosophicis ,boehme makes particular use of the form of ,yes and ,no for the separator1 for this opposition4 ,he says3 8,the reader must know that in ,yes and ,no all things consist1 whether divine1 devilish1 earthly1 or what they may be called4 ,the ,one as the ,yes is pure power and life1 and it is the truth of ,god or ,god ,himself4 ,he would be unknowable in ,himself1 and in ,him there would be no joy nor elevation1 nor feeling0--life--8without the ,no4 ,the ,no is a counterstroke of the ,yes1 or of the truth0 7this negativity is the principle of all knowledge1 comprehension71 8that the truth may be manifest and be a something wherein there is a contrarium in which there is the eternal love1 moving1 feeling1 and willing1 and demanding to be loved4 ,and yet we cannot say that the ,yes is separated from the ,no1 and that they are two things in proximity2 for they are only one thing1 but they separate themselves into two beginnings and make two centra1 where each works and wills in itself4 ,without those two1 which are continually in strife1 all things would be a nothing1 and would stand still without movement4 ,if the eternal will did not itself flow from itself and introduce itself into receptibility1 there would be no form nor distinction1 for all powers would0 then 8be one power4 ,neither could there be understanding in that case1 for the understanding arises0 7has its substance7 8in the differentiation of the manifold1 where one property sees1 proves and wills the others4 ,the will which has flowed out wills dissimilarity1 so that it may be distinguished from similarity and be its own something--and that something may exist1 that the eternal seeing may see and feel4 ,and from the individual will arises the ,no1 for it brings itself into ownness1 i4e4 receptivity of self4 ,it desires to be something and does not make itself in accordance with unity2 for unity is a ,yes which flows forth1 which ever stands thus in the breathing forth of itself1 being imperceptible2 for it has nothing in which it can find itself excepting in the receptivity of the dissentient will1 as in the ,no which is counterstroke to the ,yes1 in which the ,yes is indeed revealed1 and in which it possesses something which it can will4 ,and the ,no is therefore called a ,no1 because it is a desire turned inwards on itself1 as if it were a shutting up into negativity4 ,the emanated seeking will is absorbent and comprehends itself within itself1 from it come forms and qualities3 7#a7 ,sharpness1 7#b7 ,motion1 7#c7 ,feeling4 7#d7 ,the fourth property is ,fire as the flash of light2 this rises in the bringing together of the great and terrible sharpness and the unity4 ,thus in the contact a ,flagrat ,schrack results1 and in this ,flagrat ,schrack unity is apprehended as being a ,flash or ,gleam1 an exulting joy40 ,that is the bursting forth of the unity4 8,for thus the light arises in the midst of the darkness1 for the unity becomes a light1 and the receptivity of the carnal will in the qualities becomes a ,spirit-fire which has its source and origin out of the sharp1 cold astringency4 ,and according to that1 ,god is an angry0 and 8jealous ,god10 and in this we have evil4 87a7 ,the first quality of the absorption is the ,no2 7b7 ,sharpness2 7c7 ,hardness2 7d7 ,feeling2 7e7 the source of fire1 hell or hollowness1 ,hiddenness4 7#e7 ,the fifth quality1 ,love1 makes in the fire1 as in pain1 another ,principium as a great fire of love40#ade ,these are the main points under the second head4 ,in such depths ,boehme keeps struggling on1 for to him conceptions are lacking1 and there are only religious and chemical forms to be found2 and because he uses these in a forced sense in order to express his ideas1 not only does barbarism of expression result1 but incomprehensibility as well4 c4 8,from this eternal operation of the sensation the visible world sprang2 the world is the ,word which has flowed forth and has disposed itself into qualities1 since in qualities the particular will has arisen4 ,the ,separator has made it a will of its own after such a fashion40#adf ,the world is none other than the essence of ,god made creaturely4#adg ,hence 8,if thou beholdest the ,deep0 of the heavens1 8the ,stars1 the ,elements and the ,earth10 and what they have brought forth1 8then thou0 certainly 8comprehendest not with thy eyes the bright and clear ,deity1 though indeed it is0 likewise 8there and in them40 ,thou seest only their creaturely manifestation4 8,but if thou raisest thy thoughts and considerest 444 ,god who rules in holiness in this government or dominion1 then thou breakest through the heaven of heavens and apprehendest ,god at ,his holy heart4 ,the powers of heaven ever operate in images1 growths and colours1 in order to reveal the holy ,god1 so that ,he may be in all things known40#adh #c4 ,finally what comes third in these three-fold forms is the unity of the light1 of the separator and power3 this is the spirit1 which is already partially implied in what has preceded4 8,all the stars signify the power of the ,father1 and from them issues the sun0 7they make themselves a counterstroke to unity74 8,and from all the stars there goes forth the power which is in every star1 into the ,deep1 and the power1 heat and shining of the sun goes likewise into the ,deep0--back to the stars1 into the power of the ,father4 8,and in the ,deep the power of all stars1 together with the heat and lustre of the sun1 are all but one thing1 a moving1 boiling ,hovering1 like a spirit or matter4 ,now in the whole deep of the ,father1 externally without the ,son1 there is nothing but the manifold and unmeasurable or unsearchable power of the ,father and the ,light of the ,son4 ,the ,light of the ,son is in the ,deep of the ,father a living1 all-powerful1 all-knowing1 all-hearing1 all-seeing1 all-smelling1 all-tasting1 all-feeling ,spirit1 wherein is all power1 splendour1 and wisdom1 as in the ,father and the ,son40#adi ,that is ,love1 the softener of all powers through the light of the ,son4 ,we see that the sensuous element thus pertains to this4 ,boehme really has the idea that 8,god's essence0 7which has proceeded from the eternal deep as world7 8is thus not something far away which possesses a particular position or place1 for0 essence1 8the abyss of nature and creation1 is ,god ,himself4 ,thou must not think that in heaven there was some manner of ,corpus0--the seven spirits generate this ,corpus or heart--8which above all other things is called ,god4 ,no2 but the whole divine power which itself is heaven and the heaven of all heavens1 is so generated1 and that is called ,god the ,father2 of whom all the holy angels are generated1 in like manner also the spirit of all men4 ,thou canst name no place1 either in heaven or in this world1 where the divine birth is not4 ,the birth of the divine ,trinity likewise takes place in thine own heart2 all three persons are generated in thy heart1 ,god the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost4 ,in the divine power everywhere we find the fountain spring of the divine birth2 and there already are all the seven qualifying or fountain spirits of ,god1 as if thou wouldst make a spacious creaturely circumscribed circle and hadst the deity therein40#aej ,in every spirit all are contained4 ,to ,boehme this trinity is the complete universal life in each individual1 it is absolute substance4 ,he says3 8,all things in this world are according to the similitude of this ternary4 ,ye blind ,jews1 ,turks1 and ,heathens1 open wide the eyes of your mind3 ,i will show you1 in your body1 and in every natural thing1 in men1 beasts1 fowls1 and worms1 also in wood1 stone1 leaves1 and grass1 the likeness of the holy ternary in ,god4 ,you say1 there is but one ,being in ,god1 and that ,god has no ,son4 ,open your eyes and consider your selves3 man is made according to the similitude and out of the power of ,god in his ternary4 ,behold thy inward man1 and then thou wilt see it most plainly and clearly1 if thou art not a fool and an irrational beast4 ,therefore observe1 in thy heart1 in thy veins1 and in thy brain1 thou hast thy spirit2 and all the powers which move in thy heart1 in thy veins1 and in thy brain1 wherein thy life consists1 signify ,god the ,father4 ,from that power springs up gebaret thy light1 so that thou seest1 understandest1 and knowest in the same power what thou art to do2 for that light glimmers in thy whole body2 and the whole body moves in the power and knowledge of the light2 this is the ,son which is born in thee40 ,this light1 this seeing and understanding1 is the second determination2 it is the relationship to itself4 8,out of thy light goes forth into the same power1 reason1 understanding1 skill1 and wisdom1 to govern the whole body1 and to distinguish all whatsoever is externally without the body4 ,and both these are but one in the government of thy mind1 viz4 thy spirit1 which signifies ,god the ,holy ,ghost4 ,and the ,holy ,ghost from ,god rules in this spirit in thee1 if thou art a child of light and not of darkness4 ,now observe3 in either wood1 stone1 or herbs there are three things contained1 neither can anything be generated or grow1 if but one of the three should be left out4 ,first1 there is the power1 from which a body comes to be1 whether wood1 stone1 or herbs2 after that there is in that0 thing 8a sap which is the heart of the thing4 ,and thirdly there is in it a springing1 flowing power1 smell1 or taste1 which is the spirit of the thing whereby it grows and increases4 ,now if any of these three fail1 the thing cannot subsist40#aea ,thus ,boehme regards everything as this ternary4 ,when he comes into particulars we see that he is obscure2 from his detailed explanations there is therefore not much to be derived4 ,as showing his manner of apprehending natural things ,i shall give one more example of the manner in which1 in the further working out of the existence of nature as a counterstroke to the divine knowledge1 he makes use of what we call things as ,notions 7supra1 p4 #aib74 ,the creaturely1 he says1 has 8three kinds of powers or ,spiritus in different ,centris1 but in one ,corpore4 77 ,the first and external ,spiritus is the coarse sulphur1 salt and ,mercurius1 which is a substance of four elements0 7fire1 water1 earth1 air7 8or of the stars4 ,it forms the visible ,corpus according to the constellation of the stars or property of the planets and now enkindled elements--the greatest power of the ,spiritus mundi4 ,the ,separator makes the signature or sign0--the self4 ,the salt1 the salitter1 is approximately the neutral3 mercury ,merk or ,mark the operating1 unrest as against nourishment2 the coarse sulphur1 the negative unity4 77 8,the other ,spiritus is found in the oil of sulphur1 the fifth essence1 viz4 a root of the four elements4 ,that is the softening and joy of the coarse1 painful spirit of sulphur and salt2 the real cause of growing life1 a joy of nature as is the sun in the elements0--the direct principle of life4 8,in the inward ground of that coarse spirit we see a beautiful1 clear ,corpus in which the ideal light of nature shines from the divine efflux40 ,the outward separator signs what is taken up with the shape and form of the plant which receives into itself this coarse nourishment4 77 8,what comes third is the tincture1 a spiritual fire and light2 the highest reason for which the first separation of qualities takes place in the existence of this world4 ,fiat is the ,word of each thing and belongs according to its peculiar quality to eternity4 ,its origin is the holy power of ,god4 ,smell ,ruch is the sensation of this tincture4 ,the elements are only a mansion and counterstroke of the inward power1 a cause of the movement of the tincture40#aeb ,sensuous things entirely lose the force of sensuous conceptions4 ,boehme uses them1 though not as such1 as thought determinations1 that constitutes the hard and barbarous element in ,boehme's representations1 yet at the same time this unity with actuality and this present of infinite existence4 ,boehme describes the opposition in creation in the following way4 ,if nature is the first efflux of the ,separator1 two kinds of life must yet be understood as in the counterstroke of the divine essence1 beyond that temporal one there is an eternal1 to which the divine understanding is given4 ,it stands at the basis of the eternal1 spiritual world1 in the ,mysterium ,magnum of the divine counterstroke 7personality7--a mansion of divine will through which it reveals itself and is revealed to no peculiarity of personal will4 ,in this centrum man has both lives in himself1 he belongs to time and eternity4 ,he is 77 universal in the 8eternal understanding of the one good will which is a temperament2 77 the original will of nature1 viz4 the comprehensibility of the ,centra1 where each centrum in the divisibility shuts itself in one place to egotism and self-will as a personal ,mysterium or mind4 ,the former only requires a counterstroke to its similarity2 this latter1 the self-generated natural will also requires in the place of the egotism of the dark impression a likeness1 that is a counterstroke through its own comprehensibility1 through which comprehension it requires nothing but its corporality as a natural ground40 ,now it is this 8,i10 the dark1 pain1 fire1 the wrath of ,god1 implicitude1 self-comprehension1 which is broken up in regeneration2 the ,i is shattered1 painfulness brought into true rest--just as the dark fire breaks into light4#aec ,now these are the principal ideas found in ,boehme2 those most profound are 77 the generating of ,light as the ,son of ,god from qualities1 through the most living dialectic2 77 ,god's diremption of ,himself4 ,barbarism in the working out of his system can no more fail to be recognized than can the great depths into which he has plunged by the union of the most absolute opposites4 ,boehme grasps the opposites in the crudest1 harshest way1 but he does not allow himself through their unworkableness to be prevented from asserting the unity4 ,this rude and barbarous depth which is devoid of ,notion1 is always a present1 something which speaks from itself1 which has and knows everything in itself4 ,we have still to mention ,boehme's piety1 the element of edification1 the way in which the soul is guided in his writings4 ,this is in the highest degree deep and inward1 and if one is familiar with his form these depths and this inwardness will be found4 ,but it is a form with which we cannot reconcile ourselves1 and which permits no definite conception of details1 although we cannot fail to see the profound craving for speculation which existed within this man4 ,,section ,,two ,,period ,,of ,,the ,,thinking ,,understanding ,after ,neo-,platonism and all that is associated with it is left behind1 it is not until ,descartes is arrived at that we really enter upon a philosophy which is1 properly speaking1 independent1 which knows that it comes forth from reason as independent1 and that self-consciousness is an essential moment in the truth4 ,philosophy in its own proper soil separates itself entirely from the philosophizing theology1 in accordance with its principle1 and places it on quite another side4 ,here1 we may say1 we are at home1 and like the mariner after a long voyage in a tempestuous sea1 we may now hail the sight of land2 with ,descartes the culture of modern times1 the thought of modern ,philosophy1 really begins to appear1 after a long and tedious journey on the way which has led so far4 ,it is specially characteristic of the ,german that the more servile he on the one hand is1 the more uncontrolled is he on the other2 restraint and want of restraint--originality1 is the angel of darkness that buffets us4 ,in this new period the universal principle by means of which everything in the world is regulated1 is the thought that proceeds from itself2 it is a certain inwardness1 which is above all evidenced in respect to ,christianity1 and which is the ,protestant principle in accordance with which thought has come to the consciousness of the world at large as that to which every man has a claim4 ,thus because the independently existent thought1 this culminating point of inwardness1 is now set forth and firmly grasped as such1 the dead externality of authority is set aside and regarded as out of place4 ,it is only through my own free thought within that thought can however be recognized and ratified by me4 ,this likewise signifies that such free thought is the universal business of the world and of individuals2 it is indeed the duty of every man1 since everything is based upon it2 thus what claims to rank as established in the world man must scrutinize in his own thoughts4 ,philosophy is thus become a matter of universal interest1 and one respecting which each can judge for himself2 for everyone is a thinker from the beginning4 ,on account of this new beginning to ,philosophy we find in the old histories of ,philosophy of the seventeenth century--e4g4 that of ,stanley--the philosophy of the ,greeks and ,romans only1 and ,christianity forms the conclusion4 ,the idea was that neither in ,christianity nor subsequently any philosophy was to be found1 because there was no longer a necessity for it1 seeing that the philosophic theology of the ,middle ,ages had not free1 spontaneous thought as its principle 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #aaa1 #aab74 ,but though it is true that this has now become the philosophic principle1 we must not expect that it should be at once methodically developed out of thought4 ,the old assumption is made1 that man only attains to the truth through reflection2 this plainly is the principle4 ,but the determination and definition of ,god1 the world of the manifold as it appears1 is not yet revealed as necessarily proceeding from thought2 for we have only reached the thought of a content which is given through ordinary conception1 observation1 and experience4 ,on the one hand we see a metaphysic1 and1 on the other1 the particular sciences3 on the one hand abstract thought as such1 on the other its content taken from experience2 these two lines in the abstract stand opposed to one another1 and yet they do not separate themselves so sharply4 ,we shall indeed come to an opposition1 viz4 to that between a priori thought--that the determinations which are to hold good for thought must be taken from thought itself--and the determination that we must commence1 conclude and think from experience4 ,this is the opposition between rationalism and empiricism2 but it is really a subordinate one1 because even the metaphysical mode in philosophy1 which only allows validity to immanent thought1 does not take what is methodically developed from the necessity of thought1 but in the old way derives its content from inward or outward experience1 and through reflection and meditation renders it abstract4 ,the form of philosophy which is first reached through thought is metaphysics1 the form of the thinking understanding2 this period has1 as its outstanding figures1 ,descartes and ,spinoza1 likewise ,malebranche and ,locke1 ,leibnitz and ,wolff4 ,the second form is ,scepticism and ,criticism with regard to the thinking understanding1 to metaphysics as such1 and to the universal of empiricism2 here we shall go on to speak of representatives of the ,scottish1 ,german1 and ,french philosophies2 the ,french materialists again turn back to metaphysics4 ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,metaphysics ,,of ,,the ,,understanding ,metaphysics is what reaches after substance1 and this implies that one unity1 one thought is maintained in opposition to dualism1 just as ,being was amongst the ancients4 ,in metaphysics itself we have1 however1 the opposition between substantiality and individuality4 ,what comes first is the spontaneous1 but likewise uncritical1 metaphysics1 and it is represented by ,descartes and ,spinoza1 who assert the unity of ,being and thought4 ,the second stage is found in ,locke1 who treats of the opposition itself inasmuch as he considers the metaphysical ,idea of experience1 that is the origin of thoughts and their justification1 not yet entering on the question of whether they are absolutely true4 ,in the third place we have ,leibnitz's monad--the world viewed as a totality4 ,a4 ,,first ,,division4 ,we here encounter the innate ideas of ,descartes4 ,the philosophy of ,spinoza1 in the second place1 is related to the philosophy of ,descartes as its necessary development only2 the method is an important part of it4 ,a method which stands alongside of ,spinozism and which is also a perfected development of ,cartesianism1 is1 in the third place1 that by which ,malebranche has represented this philosophy4 #a4 ,,descartes4 ,ren ,descartes is a bold spirit who re-commenced the whole subject from the very beginning and constituted afresh the ground-work on which ,philosophy is based1 and to which1 after a thousand years had passed1 it once more returned4 ,the extent of the influence which this man exercised upon his times and the culture of ,philosophy generally1 cannot be sufficiently expressed2 it rests mainly in his setting aside all former presuppositions and beginning in a free1 simple1 and likewise popular way1 with popular modes of thought and quite simple propositions1 in his leading the content to thought and extension or ,being1 and so to speak setting up this before thought as its opposite4 ,this simple thought appeared in the form of the determinate1 clear understanding1 and it cannot thus be called speculative thought or speculative reason4 ,there are fixed determinations from which ,descartes proceeds1 but only of thought2 this is the method of his time4 ,what the ,french called exact science1 science of the determinate understanding1 made its appearance at this time4 ,philosophy and exact science were not yet separated1 and it was only later on that this separation first took place4 ,to come to the life of ,descartes--he was born in #aeif1 at ,la ,haye in ,touraine1 of an ancient and noble race4 ,he received an education of the usual kind in a ,jesuit school1 and made great progress2 his disposition was lively and restless2 he extended his insatiable zeal in all directions1 pursued his researches into all systems and forms2 his studies1 in addition to ancient literature1 embraced such subjects as philosophy1 mathematics1 chemistry1 physics1 and astronomy4 ,but the studies of his youth in the ,jesuit school1 and those studies which he afterwards prosecuted with the same diligence and strenuous zeal1 resulted in giving him a strong disinclination for learning derived from books2 he quitted the school where he had been educated1 and yet his eagerness for learning was only made the keener through this perplexity and unsatisfied yearning4 ,he went as a young man of eighteen to ,paris1 and there lived in the great world4 ,but as he here found no satisfaction1 he soon left society and returned to his studies4 ,he retired to a suburb of ,paris and there occupied himself principally with mathematics1 remaining quite concealed from all his former friends4 ,at last1 after the lapse of two years1 he was discovered by them1 drawn forth from his retirement1 and again introduced to the great world4 ,he now once more renounced the study of books and threw himself into the affairs of actual life4 ,thereafter he went to ,holland and entered the military service2 soon afterwards1 in #afai1 and in the first year of the ,thirty ,years' ,war1 he went as a volunteer with the ,bavarian troops1 and took part in several campaigns under ,tilly4 ,many have found learning unsatisfying2 ,descartes became a soldier--not because he found in the sciences too little1 but because they were too much1 too high for him4 ,here in his winter quarters he studied diligently1 and in ,ulm1 for instance1 he made acquaintance with a citizen who was deeply versed in mathematics4 ,he was able to carry out his studies even better in winter quarters at ,neuberg on the ,danube1 where once more1 and now most profoundly1 the desire awoke in him to strike out a new departure in ,philosophy and entirely reconstruct it2 he solemnly promised the ,mother of ,god to make a pilgrimage to ,loretto if she would prosper him in this design1 and if he should now at last come to himself and attain to peace4 ,he was also in the battle at ,prague in which ,frederick the ,elector-,palatine lost the ,bohemian crown4 ,yet since the sight of these wild scenes could not satisfy him1 he gave up military service in #afba4 ,he made several other journeys through the rest of ,germany1 and then proceeded to ,poland1 ,prussia1 ,switzerland1 ,italy and ,france4 ,on account of its greater freedom he withdrew to ,holland1 in order there to pursue his projects2 here he lived in peace from #afbi to #afdd--;a period in which he composed and issued most of his works1 and also defended them against the manifold attacks from which they suffered1 and which more especially proceeded from the clergy4 ,queen ,christina of ,sweden finally called him to her court at ,stockholm1 which was the rendezvous for all the most celebrated men of learning of the time1 and there he died in #afej4aed ,as regards his philosophic works1 those which contain his first principles have in particular something very popular about their method of presentation1 which makes them highly to be recommended to those commencing the study of philosophy4 ,descartes sets to work in a quite simple and childlike manner1 with a narration of his reflections as they came to him4 ,professor ,cousin of ,paris has brought out a new edition of ,descartes in eleven octavo volumes2 the greater part consists of letters on natural phenomena4 ,descartes gave a new impetus to mathematics as well as to philosophy4 ,several important methods were discovered by him1 upon which the most brilliant results in higher mathematics were afterwards built4 ,his method is even now an essential in mathematics1 for ,descartes is the inventor of analytic geometry1 and consequently the first to point out the way in this field of science to modern mathematics4 ,he likewise cultivated physics1 optics1 and astronomy1 and made the most important discoveries in these2 we have not1 however1 to deal with such matters4 ,the application of metaphysics to ecclesiastical affairs1 investigations1 etc41 has likewise no special interest for us4 #a4 ,in ,philosophy ,descartes struck out quite original lines2 with him the new epoch in ,philosophy begins1 whereby it was permitted to culture to grasp in the form of universality the principle of its higher spirit in thought1 just as ,boehme grasped it in sensuous perceptions and forms4 ,descartes started by saying that thought must necessarily commence from itself2 all the philosophy which came before this1 and specially what proceeded from the authority of the ,church1 was for ever after set aside4 ,but since here thought has properly speaking grasped itself as abstract understanding only1 in relation to which the more concrete content still stands over on the other side1 the determinate conceptions were not yet deduced from the understanding1 but taken up only empirically4 ,in ,descartes' philosophy we have thus to distinguish what has1 and what has not universal interest for us3 the former is the process of his thoughts themselves1 and the latter the mode in which these thoughts are presented and deduced4 ,yet we must not consider the process as a method of consistent proof2 it is indeed a deep and inward progress1 but it comes to us in an ingenuous and nave form4 ,in order to do justice to ,descartes' thoughts it is necessary for us to be assured of the necessity for his appearance2 the spirit of his philosophy is simply knowledge as the unity of ,thought and ,being4 ,and yet on the whole there is little to say about his philosophy4 a4 ,descartes expresses the fact that we must begin from thought as such alone1 by saying that we must doubt everything 7,de omnibus dubitandum est72 and that is an absolute beginning4 ,he thus makes the abolition of all determinations the first condition of ,philosophy4 ,this first proposition has not1 however1 the same signification as ,scepticism1 which sets before it no other aim than doubt itself1 and requires that we should remain in this indecision of mind1 an indecision wherein mind finds its freedom4 ,it rather signifies that we should renounce all prepossessions--that is1 all hypotheses which are accepted as true in their immediacy--and commence from thought1 so that from it we should in the first place attain to some fixed and settled basis1 and make a true beginning4 ,in ,scepticism this is not the case1 for with the sceptics doubt is the end at which they rest4#aee ,but the doubting of ,descartes1 his making no hypotheses1 because nothing is fixed or secure1 does not occur in the interests of freedom as such1 in order that nothing should have value except freedom itself1 and nothing exist in the quality of an external objective4 ,to him everything is unstable indeed1 in so far as the ,ego can abstract from it or can think1 for pure thought is abstraction from everything4 ,but in consciousness the end is predominant1 and it is to arrive at something fixed and objective--and not the moment of subjectivity1 or the fact of being set forth1 known and proved by me4 ,yet this last comes along with the other1 for it is from the starting point of my thought that ,i would attain my object2 the impulse of freedom is thus likewise fundamental4 ,in the propositions in which ,descartes gives in his own way the ground of this great and most important principle1 there is found a nave and empirical system of reasoning4 ,this is an example3 8,because we were born as children1 and formed all manner of judgments respecting sensuous things before we had the perfect use of our reason1 we are through many preconceived ideas hindered from the knowledge of the truth4 ,from these we appear not to be able to free ourselves in any other way but by once in our lives striving to doubt that respecting which we have the very slightest suspicion of an uncertainty4 ,indeed it is really desirable to hold as false everything in respect to which we have any doubt1 so that we may find more clearly what is most certain and most knowable4 ,yet this doubt has to be limited to the contemplation of the truth1 for in the conduct of our life we are compelled to choose the probable1 since there the opportunity for action would often pass away before we could solve our doubts4 ,but here1 where we have only to deal with the search for truth1 we may very reasonably doubt whether any thing sensuous and perceptible exists--in the first place because we find that the senses often deceive us and it is prudent not to trust in what has even once deceived us1 and then because every day in dreaming we think we feel or see before ourselves innumerable things which never were1 and to the doubter no signs are given by which he can safely distinguish sleeping from waking4 ,we shall hereby likewise doubt everything else1 even mathematical propositions1 partly because we have seen that some err even in what we hold most certain1 and ascribe value to what to us seems false1 and partly because we have heard that a ,god exists who has created us1 and who can do everything1 so that ,he may have created us liable to err4 ,but if we conceive ourselves not to derive our existence from ,god1 but from some other source1 perhaps from ourselves1 we are all the more liable1 in that we are thus imperfect1 to err4 ,but we have so far the experience of freedom within us that we can always refrain from what is not perfectly certain and well founded40#aef ,the demand which rests at the basis of ,descartes' reasonings thus is that what is recognized as true should be able to maintain the position of having the thought therein at home with itself4 ,the so-called immediate intuition and inward revelation1 which in modern times is so highly regarded1 has its place here4 ,but because in the ,cartesian form the principle of freedom as such is not brought into view1 the grounds which are here advanced are for the most part popular4 b4 ,descartes sought something in itself certain and true1 which should neither be only true like the object of faith without knowledge1 nor the sensuous and also sceptical certainty which is without truth4 ,the whole of ,philosophy as it had been carried on up to this time was vitiated by the constant presupposition of something as true1 and in some measure1 as in the ,neo-,platonic philosophy1 by not giving the form of scientific knowledge to its matter1 or by not separating its moments4 ,but to ,descartes nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence in consciousness1 or which reason does not recognize so clearly and conclusively that any doubt regarding it is absolutely impossible4 8,because we thus reject or declare to be false everything regarding which we can have any doubt at all1 it is easy for us to suppose that there is no ,god1 no heaven1 no body--but we cannot therefore say that we do not exist1 who think this4 ,for it is contradictory to say that what thinks does not exist4 ,hence the knowledge that #8,i think1 therefore ,i am1' is what we arrive at first of all1 and it is the most certain fact that offers itself to everyone who follows after philosophy in an orderly fashion4 ,this is the best way of becoming acquainted with the nature of spirit and its diversity from body4 ,for if we inquire who we are who can set forth as untrue everything which is different from ourselves1 we clearly see that no extension1 figure1 change of position1 nor any such thing which can be ascribed to body1 constitutes our nature1 but only thought alone2 which is thus known earlier and more certainly than any corporeal thing40#aeg #8,i' has thus significance here as thought1 and not as individuality of self-consciousness4 ,the second proposition of the ,cartesian philosophy is hence the immediate certainty of thought4 ,certainty is only knowledge as such in its pure form as self-relating1 and this is thought2 thus then the unwieldy understanding makes its way on to the necessity of thought4 ,descartes begins1 just as ,fichte did later on1 with the #8,i' as indubitably certain2 ,i know that something is presented in me4 ,by this ,philosophy is at one stroke transplanted to quite another field and to quite another standpoint1 namely to the sphere of subjectivity4 ,presuppositions in religion are given up2 proof alone is sought for1 and not the absolute content which disappears before abstract infinite subjectivity4 ,there is in ,descartes likewise a seething desire to speak from strong feeling1 from the ordinary sensuous point of view1 just as ,bruno and so many others1 each in his own fashion1 express as individualities their particular conceptions of the world4 ,to consider the content in itself is not the first matter2 for ,i can abstract from all my conceptions1 but not from the #8,i4' ,we think this and that1 and hence it is--is to give the common would-be-wise argument of those incapable of grasping the matter in point2 that a determinate content exists is exactly what we are forced to doubt--there is nothing absolutely fixed4 ,thought is the entirely universal1 but not merely because ,i can abstract1 but because #8,i' is thus simple1 self-identical4 ,thought consequently comes first2 the next determination arrived at1 in direct connection with it1 is the determination of ,being4 ,the #8,i think' directly involves my ,being2 this1 says ,descartes1 is the absolute basis of all ,philosophy4#aeh ,the determination of ,being is in my #8,i'2 this connection is itself the first matter4 ,thought as ,being and ,being as thought--that is my certainty1 #8,i'2 in the celebrated ,cogito1 ergo sum we thus have ,thought and ,being inseparably bound together4 ,on the one hand this proposition is regarded as a syllogism3 from thought ,being is deduced4 ,kant more especially has objected to this that ,being is not contained in thinking1 that it is different from thinking4 ,this is true1 but they are still inseparable1 or constitute an identity2 their difference is not to the prejudice of their unity4 ,yet this maxim of pure abstract certainty1 the universal totality in which everything implicitly exists1 is not proved2#aei we must therefore not try to convert this proposition into a syllogism4 ,descartes himself says3 8,there is no syllogism present at all4 ,for in order that there should be such1 the major premise must have been #8all that thinks exists'0--from which the subsumption would have followed in the minor premise1 #8now ,i am4' ,by this the immediacy which rests in the proposition1 would be removed4 8,but that major premise0 is not set forth at all1 being 8really in the first instance derived from the original #8,i think1 therefore1 ,i am4'0#afj ,for arriving at a conclusion three links are required--in this case we ought to have a third through which thought and ,being should have been mediated1 and it is not to be found here4 ,the #8,therefore' which binds the two sides together is not the #8,therefore' of a syllogism2 the connection between ,being and ,thought is only immediately posited4 ,this certainty is thus the prius2 all other propositions come later4 ,the thinking subject as the simple immediacy of being-at-home-with-me is the very same thing as what is called ,being2 and it is quite easy to perceive this identity4 ,as universal1 thought is contained in all that is particular1 and thus is pure relation to itself1 pure oneness with itself4 ,we must not make the mistake of representing ,being to ourselves as a concrete content1 and hence it is the same immediate identity which thought likewise is4 ,immediacy is1 however1 a one-sided determination2 thought does not contain it alone1 but also the determination to mediate itself with itself1 and thereby--by the mediation being at the same time the abrogation of the mediation--it is immediacy4 ,in thought we thus have ,being2 ,being is1 however1 a poor determination1 it is the abstraction from the concrete of thought4 ,this identity of ,being and ,thought1 which constitutes the most interesting idea of modern times1 has not been further worked out by ,descartes2 he has relied on consciousness alone1 and for the time being placed it in the fore-front4 ,for with ,descartes the necessity to develop the differences from the #8,i think' is not yet present2 ,fichte first applied himself to the deduction of all determinations from this culminating point of absolute certainty4 ,other propositions have been set against that of ,descartes4 ,gassendi1#afa for example1 asks if we might not just as well say ,ludificor1 ergo sum3 ,i am made a fool of by my consciousness1 therefore ,i exist--or properly speaking1 therefore ,i am made a fool of4 ,descartes himself recognized that this objection merited consideration1 but he here repels it1 inasmuch as it is the #8,i' alone and not the other content which has to be maintained4 ,being alone is identical with pure thought1 and not its content1 be it what it may4 ,descartes further says3 8,by thought ,i1 however1 understand all that takes place in us within our consciousness1 in as far as we are conscious of it2 thus will1 conception1 and even feeling are identical with thought4 ,for if ,i say #8,i see1' or #8,i walk out1' and #8therefore ,i am1' and understand by this the seeing and walking which is accomplished by the body1 the conclusion is not absolutely certain1 because1 as often happens in a dream1 ,i may imagine that ,i can see or walk even if ,i do not open my eyes nor move from my place1 and ,i might also possibly do so supposing ,i had no body4 ,but if ,i understand it of the subjective feeling or the consciousness of seeing or walking itself1 because it is then related to the mind that alone feels or thinks that it sees or walks1 this conclusion is perfectly certain40#afb 8,in a dream0 is an empirical mode of reasoning1 but there is no other objection to it4 ,in willing1 seeing1 hearing1 c41 thought is likewise contained1 it is absurd to suppose that the soul has thinking in one special pocket1 and seeing1 willing1 c41 in others4 ,but if ,i say #8,i see1' #8,i walk out1' there is present on the one hand my consciousness #8,i1' and consequently thought1 on the other hand1 however1 there is present willing1 seeing1 hearing1 walking1 and thus a still further modification of the content4 ,now because of this modification ,i cannot say #8,i walk1 and therefore ,i am1' for ,i can undoubtedly abstract from the modification1 since it is no longer universal ,thought4 ,thus we must merely look at the pure consciousness contained in the concrete #8,i4' ,only when ,i accentuate the fact that ,i am present there as thinking1 is pure ,being implied1 for only with the universal is ,being united4 8,in this it is implied10 says ,descartes1 8that thought is more certain to me than body4 ,if from the fact that ,i touch or see the earth ,i judge that it exists1 ,i must more certainly judge from this that my thought exists4 ,for it may very well happen that ,i judge the earth to exist1 even if it does not exist1 but it cannot be that ,i judge this1 and that my mind which judges this does not exist40#afc ,that is to say1 everything which is for me ,i may assert to be non-existent1 but when ,i assert myself to be non-existent1 ,i myself assert1 or it is my judgment4 ,for ,i cannot set aside the fact that ,i judge1 even if ,i can abstract from that respecting which ,i judge4 ,in this ,philosophy has regained its own ground that thought starts from thought as what is certain in itself1 and not from something external1 not from something given1 not from an authority1 but directly from the freedom that is contained in the #8,i think4' ,of all else ,i may doubt1 of the existence of bodily things1 of my body itself2 or this certainty does not possess immediacy in itself4 ,for #8,i' is just certainty itself1 but in all else this certainty is only predicate2 my body is certain to me1 it is not this certainty itself4#afd ,as against the certainty we feel of having a body1 ,descartes adduces the empirical phenomenon that we often hear of persons imagining they feel pain in a limb which they have lost long ago4#afe ,what is actual1 he says is a substance1 the soul is a thinking substance2 it is thus for itself1 separate from all external material things and independent4 ,that it is thinking is evident from its nature3 it would think and exist even if no material things were present2 the soul can hence know itself more easily than its body4#aff ,all else that we can hold as true rests on this certainty2 for in order that anything should be held as true1 evidence is requisite1 but nothing is true which has not this inward evidence in consciousness4 8,now the evidence of everything rests upon our perceiving it as clearly and vividly as that certainty itself1 and on its so entirely depending from1 and harmonizing with this principle1 that if we wished to doubt it we should also have to doubt this principle likewise0 7our ego74#afg ,this knowledge is indeed on its own account perfect evidence1 but it is not yet the truth1 or if we take that ,being as truth1 it is an empty content1 and it is with the content that we have to do4 c4 ,what comes third is thus the transition of this certainty into truth1 into the determinate2 ,descartes again makes this transition in a nave way1 and with it we for the first time begin to consider his metaphysics4 ,what here takes place is that an interest arises in further representations and conceptions of the abstract unity of ,being and ,thought2 there ,descartes sets to work in an externally reflective manner4 8,the consciousness which merely knows itself to be certain now however seeks to extend its knowledge1 and finds that it has conceptions of many things--in which conceptions it does not deceive itself1 so long as it does not assert or deny that something similar outside corresponds to them40 ,deception in the conceptions has meaning only in relation to external existence4 8,consciousness also discovers universal conceptions1 and obtains from them proofs which are evident1 e4g4 the geometric proposition that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles is a conception which follows incontrovertibly from others4 ,but in reflecting whether such things really exist doubts arise40#afh ,that there is such a thing as a triangle is indeed in this case by no means certain1 since extension is not contained in the immediate certainty of myself4 ,the soul may exist without the bodily element1 and this last without it1 they are in reality different2 one is conceivable without the other4 ,the soul thus does not think and know the other as clearly as the certainty of itself4#afi ,now the truth of all knowledge rests on the proof of the existence of ,god4 ,the soul is an imperfect substance1 but it has the ,idea of an absolute perfect existence within itself2 this perfection is not begotten in itself1 just because it is an imperfect substance2 this ,idea is thus innate4 ,in ,descartes the consciousness of this fact is expressed by his saying that as long as the existence of ,god is not proved and perceived the possibility of our deceiving ourselves remains1 because we cannot know whether we do not possess a nature ordered and disposed to err 7supra1 p4 #bbf74agj ,the form is rather a mistaken one1 and it only generally expresses the opposition in which self-consciousness stands to the consciousness of what is different1 of the objective2 and we have to deal with the unity of both--the question being whether what is in thought likewise possesses objectivity4 ,this unity rests in ,god1 or is ,god ,himself4 ,i shall put these assertions in the manner of ,descartes3 8,amongst these various conceptions possessed by us there likewise is the conception of a supremely intelligent1 powerful1 and absolutely perfect ,being2 and this is the most excellent of all conceptions40 ,this all-embracing universal conception has therefore this distinguishing feature1 that in its case the uncertainty respecting ,being which appears in the other conceptions1 finds no place4 ,it has the characteristic that 8,in it we do not recognize existence as something merely possible and accidental1 as we do the conceptions of other things which we perceive clearly1 but as a really essential and eternal determination4 ,for instance1 as mind perceives that in the conception of a triangle it is implied that the three angles are equal to two right angles1 the triangle has them2 and in the same way from the fact that mind perceives existence to be necessarily and eternally implied in the ,notion of the most perfect reality1 it is forced to conclude that the most perfect reality exists40#aga ,for to perfection there likewise pertains the determination of existence1 since the conception of a non-existent is less perfect4 ,thus we there have the unity of thought and ,being1 and the ontological proof of the existence of ,god2 this we met with earlier 7p4 #fc1 seq47 in dealing with ,anselm4 ,the proof of the existence of ,god from the ,idea of ,him is in this wise3 ,in this ,notion existence is implied2 and therefore it is true4 ,descartes proceeds further in the same direction1 in so far as after the manner of empirical axioms he sets forth3 77 8,there are different degrees of reality or entity1 for the substance has more reality than the accident or the mode1 and infinite substance has more than finite40 77 8,in the ,notion of a thing existence is implied1 either the merely potential or the necessary10 i4e4 in the #8,i' there is ,being as the immediate certainty of an other-being1 of the not-,i opposed to the ,i4 77 8,no thing or no perfection of a thing which really exists actu can have the ,nothing as original cause of its existence4 ,for if anything could be predicated of nothing1 thought could equally well be predicated of it1 and ,i would thus say that ,i am nothing because ,i think40 ,descartes here arrives at a dividing line1 at an unknown relationship2 the ,notion of cause is reached1 and this is a thought indeed1 but a determinate thought4 ,spinoza says in his explanation1 8,that the conceptions contain more or less reality1 and those moments have just as much evidence as thought itself1 because they not only say that we think1 but how we think40 ,these determinate modes as differences in the simplicity of thought1 had1 however1 to be demonstrated4 ,spinoza adds to this step in advance that 8,the degrees of reality which we perceive in ideas are not in the ideas in as far as they are considered merely as kinds of thought1 but in so far as the one represents a substance and the other a mere mode of substance1 or1 in a word1 in so far as they are considered as conceptions of things40 77 8,the objective reality of ,notions0 7i4e41 the entity of what is represented in so far as it is in the ,notion71 8demands a first cause in which the same reality is contained not merely objectively0 7that is to say in the ,notion71 8but likewise formally or even eminenter--formally1 that is perfectly likewise3 eminenter1 more perfectly4 ,for there must at least be as much in the cause as in the effect40 77 8,the existence of ,god is known immediately0--a priori--8from the contemplation of ,his nature4 ,to say that anything is contained in the nature or in the ,notion of a thing is tantamount to saying that it is true3 existence is directly contained in the ,notion of ,god4 ,hence it is quite true to say of ,him that existence pertains of necessity to ,him4 ,there is implied in the ,notion of every particular thing either a possible or a necessary existence--a necessary existence in the ,notion of ,god1 i4e4 of the absolutely perfect ,being1 for else ,he would be conceived as imperfect40#agb ,descartes likewise argues after this manner3 8,problem3 to prove a posteriori from the mere ,notion within us the existence of ,god4 ,the objective reality of a ,notion demands a cause in which the same reality is not merely contained objectively0 7as in the finite71 8but formally0 7freely1 purely for itself1 outside of us7 8or eminenter0 7as original74 7,axiom 47 8,we now have a ,notion of ,god1 but ,his objective reality is neither formally nor eminenter contained within us1 and it can thus be only in ,god ,himself40#agc ,consequently we see that with ,descartes this ,idea is an hypothesis4 ,now we should say we find this highest ,idea in us4 ,if we then ask whether this ,idea exists1 why1 this is the ,idea1 that existence is asserted with it4 ,to say that it is only a conception is to contradict the meaning of this conception4 ,but here it is unsatisfactory to find that the conception is introduced thus3 #8,we have this conception1' and to find that it consequently appears like an hypothesis4 ,in such a case it is not proved of this content in itself that it determines itself into this unity of thought and ,being4 ,in the form of ,god no other conception is thus here given than that contained in ,cogito1 ergo sum1 wherein ,being and thought are inseparably bound up--though now in the form of a conception which ,i possess within me4 ,the whole content of this conception1 the ,almighty1 ,all-wise1 c41 are predicates which do not make their appearance until later2 the content is simply the content of the ,idea bound up with existence4 ,hence we see these determinations following one another in an empirical manner1 and not philosophically proved--thus giving us an example of how in a priori metaphysics generally hypotheses of conceptions are brought in1 and these become objects of thought1 just as happens in empiricism with investigations1 observations1 and experiences4 ,descartes then proceeds3 8,mind is the more convinced of this when it notices that it discovers within itself the conception of no other thing wherein existence is necessarily implied4 ,from this it will perceive that that idea of highest reality is not imagined by it1 it is not chimerical1 but a true and unalterable fact which cannot do otherwise than exist1 seeing that existence is necessarily involved in it4 ,our prejudices hinder us from apprehending this with ease1 for we are accustomed to distinguish in all other things the essence0 7the ,notion7 8from the existence40 ,respecting the assertion that thought is not inseparable from existence1 the common way of talking is as follows3 #8,if what men think really existed1 things would be different4' ,but in saying this men do not take into account that what is spoken of in this way is always a particular content1 and that in it the essential nature of the finality of things simply signifies the fact that ,notion and ,being are separable4 ,but how can one argue from finite things to the infinite8 8,this ,notion10 ,descartes continues1 8is furthermore not made by us40 ,it is now declared to be an eternal truth which is revealed in us4 8,we do not find in ourselves the perfections which are contained in this conception4 ,thus we are certain that a first cause in which is all perfection1 i4e4 ,god as really existent1 has given them to us2 for it is certain to us that from nothing1 nothing arises0 7according to ,boehme ,god derived the material of the world from ,himself71 8and what is perfect cannot be the effect of anything imperfect4 ,from ,him we must thus in true science deduce all created things40#agd ,with the proof of the existence of ,god the validity of and evidence for all truth in its origin is immediately established4 ,god as ,first ,cause is ,being-for-self1 the reality which is not merely entity or existence in thought4 ,an existence such as this first cause 7which is not what we know as a thing7 rests in the ,notion of the not-,i1 not of each determinate thing--since these as determinate are negations--but only in the ,notion of pure existence or the perfect cause4 ,it is the cause of the truth of ideas1 for the aspect that it represents is that of their ,being4 d4 ,fourthly1 ,descartes goes on to assert3 8,we must believe what is revealed to us by ,god1 though we cannot understand it4 ,it is not to be wondered at1 since we are finite1 that there is in ,god's nature as inconceivably infinite1 what passes our comprehension40 ,this represents the entrance of a very ordinary conception4 ,boehme on the other hand says 7supra1 p4 #bab73 #8,the mystery of the ,trinity is ever born within us4' ,descartes1 however1 concludes3 8,hence we must not trouble ourselves with investigations respecting the infinite2 for seeing that we are finite1 it is absurd for us to say anything about it40#age ,this matter we shall not1 however1 enter upon at present4 8,now the first attribute of ,god is that ,he is true and the ,giver of all light2 it is hence quite contrary to ,his nature to deceive us4 ,hence the light of nature or the power of acquiring knowledge given us by ,god can affect no object which is not really true in as far as it is affected by it0 7the power of acquiring knowledge7 8i4e4 as it is perceived clearly and distinctly40 ,we ascribe truth to ,god4 ,from this ,descartes goes on to infer the universal bond which exists between absolute knowledge and the objectivity of what we thus know4 ,knowledge has objects1 has a content which is known2 we call this connection truth4 ,the truth of ,god is just this unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived1 and external reality or existence4 8,thereby an end is put to doubt1 as if it could be the case that what appears quite evident to us should not be really true4 ,we can thus no longer have any suspicion of mathematical truths4 ,likewise if we give heed to what we distinguish by our senses in waking or in sleeping1 clearly and distinctly1 it is easy to recognize in each thing what in it is true40 ,by saying that what is rightly and clearly thought likewise is1 ,descartes maintains that man comes to know by means of thought what in fact is in things2 the sources of errors lie on the other hand in the finitude of our nature4 8,it is certain1 because of ,god's truth1 that the faculty of perceiving and that of assenting through the will1 if it extends no further than to that which is clearly perceived1 cannot lead to error4 ,even if this cannot be in any way proved1 it is by nature so established in all things1 that as often as we clearly perceive anything1 we assent to it from ourselves and can in no wise doubt that it is true40#agf ,all this is set forth very plausibly1 but it is still indeterminate1 formal1 and shallow2 we only have the assertion made to us that this is so4 ,descartes' method is the method of the clear understanding merely4 ,certainty with him takes the first place2 from it no content is deduced of necessity1 no content generally1 and still less its objectivity as distinguished from the inward subjectivity of the #8,i4' ,at one time we have the opposition of subjective knowledge and actuality1 and at another their inseparable union4 ,in the first case the necessity of mediating them enters in1 and the truth of ,god is asserted to be this mediating power4 ,it consists in this1 that ,his ,notion contains reality immediately in itself4 ,the proof of this unity then rests solely upon the fact of its being said that we find within us the idea of complete perfection2 thus this conception here appears simply as one found ready to hand4 ,with this is compared the mere conception of ,god which contains no existence within it1 and it is found that without existence it would be imperfect4 ,this unity of ,god ,himself1 of ,his ,idea1 with ,his existence1 is undoubtedly the ,truth2 in this we find the ground for holding as true what is for us just as certain as the truth of ourselves4 ,as ,descartes proceeds further we thus find that in reality everything has truth for him only in so far as it is really an object of thought1 a universal4 ,this truth of ,god has been1 as we shall see1 expressed even more clearly and in a more concise way by a disciple of ,descartes1 if one may venture to call him so--,i mean ,malebranche 7who might really be dealt with here71#agg in his ,recherche de la vrit4 ,the first of the fundamental determinations of the ,cartesian metaphysics is from the certainty of oneself to arrive at the truth1 to recognize ,being in the ,notion of thought4 ,but because in the thought 8,i think10 ,i am an individual1 thought comes before my mind as subjective2 ,being is hence not demonstrated in the ,notion of thought itself1 for what advance has been made is merely in the direction of separation generally4 ,in the second place the negative of ,being likewise comes before self-consciousness1 and this negative1 united with the positive ,i1 is so to speak implicitly united in a third1 in ,god4 ,god1 who before this was a non-contradictory potentiality1 now takes objective form to self-consciousness1 ,he is all reality in so far as it is positive1 i4e4 as it is ,being1 unity of thought and ,being1 the highest perfection of existence2 it is just in the negative1 in the ,notion of this1 in its being an object of thought1 that ,being is contained4 ,an objection to this identity is now old--,kant urged it likewise--that from the ,notion of the most perfect existence more does not follow than that in thought existence here and now and the most perfect essence are conjoined1 but not outside of thought4 ,but the very ,notion of present existence is this negative of self-consciousness1 not out of thought1--but the thought of the #8out of thought4' #b4 ,descartes accepts ,being in the entirely positive sense1 and has not the conception of its being the negative of self-consciousness3 but simple ,being1 set forth as the negative of self-consciousness1 is extension4 ,descartes thus separates extension from ,god1 remains constant to this separation1 unites the universe1 matter1 with ,god in such a way as to make ,him its creator and first cause3 and he has the true perception that conservation is a continuous creation1 in so far as creation as activity is asserted to be separated4 ,descartes does not1 however1 trace extension in a true method back to thought2 matter1 extended substances1 stand over against the thinking substances which are simple2 in as far as the universe is created by ,god1 it could not be as perfect as its cause4 ,as a matter of fact the effect is less perfect than the cause1 since it is that which is posited1 if we are to remain at the conception of cause pertaining to the understanding4 ,hence according to ,descartes extension is the less perfect4 ,but as imperfect the extended substances cannot exist and subsist through themselves or their ,notion2 they thus require every moment the assistance of ,god for their maintenance1 and without this they would in a moment sink back into nothing4 ,preservation is1 however1 unceasing reproduction4#agh ,descartes now proceeds to further particulars1 and expresses himself as follows3 8,we consider what comes under consciousness either as things or their qualities1 or as eternal truths which have no existence outside our thought0--which do not belong to this or that time1 to this or that place4 ,he calls those last something inborn within us1 something not made by us or merely felt1#agi but the eternal ,notion of mind itself and the eternal determinations of its freedom1 of itself as itself4 ,from this point the conception that ideas are inborn 7innat ide7 hence proceeds2 this is the question over which ,locke and ,leibnitz dispute4 ,the expression 8eternal truths0 is current even in these modern times1 and it signifies the universal determinations and relations which exist entirely on their own account4 ,the word #8inborn' is however a clumsy and stupid expression1 because the conception of physical birth thereby indicated1 does not apply to mind4 ,to ,descartes inborn ideas are not universal1 as they are to ,plato and his successors1 but that which has evidence1 immediate certainty1 an immediate multiplicity founded in thought itself--manifold conceptions in the form of a ,being1 resembling what ,cicero calls natural feelings implanted in the heart4 ,we would rather say that such is implied in the nature and essence of our mind and spirit4 ,mind is active and conducts itself in its activity in a determinate manner2 but this activity has no other ground than its freedom4 ,yet if this is the case more is required than merely to say so2 it must be deduced as a necessary product of our mind4 ,we have such ideas1 for instance1 in the logical laws3 8,from nothing comes nothing10 8,a thing cannot both be and not be10#ahj as also in moral principles4 ,these are facts of consciousness which ,descartes however soon passes from again2 they are only present in thought as subjective1 and he has thus not yet inquired respecting their content4 ,as regards things1 on which ,descartes now directs his attention1 the other side to these eternal verities1 the universal determinations of things are substance1 permanence1 order1 c4#aha ,he then gives definitions of these thoughts1 just as ,aristotle draws up a list of the categories4 ,but although ,descartes laid it down formerly as essential that no hypotheses must be made1 yet now he takes the conceptions1 and passes on to them as something found within our consciousness4 ,he defines substance thus3 8,by substance ,i understand none other than a thing 7rem7 which requires no other something for existence2 and there is only one thing1 namely ,god1 which can be regarded as such a substance requiring no other thing40 ,this is what ,spinoza says2 we may say that it is likewise the true definition1 the unity of ,notion and reality3 8,all other0 7things7 8can only exist by means of a concurrence 7concursus7 of ,god02 what we still call substance outside of ,god thus does not exist for itself1 does not have its existence in the ,notion itself4 ,that is then called the system of assistance 7systema assistenti7 which is1 however1 transcendental4 ,god is the absolute uniter of ,notion and actuality2 other things1 finite things which have a limit and stand in dependence1 require something else4 8,hence if we likewise call other things substances1 this expression is not applicable both to them and to ,god univoce1 as is said in the schools2 that is to say no definite significance can be given to this word which would equally apply both to ,god and to the creatures40#ahb 8,but ,i do not recognize more than two sorts of things2 the one is that of thinking things1 and the other that of things which relate to what is extended40 ,thought1 the ,notion1 the spiritual1 the self-conscious1 is what is at home with itself1 and its opposite is contained in what is extended1 spatial1 separated1 not at home with itself nor free4 ,this is the real distinction 7distinctio realis7 of substances3 8,the one substance can be clearly and definitely comprehended without the other4 ,but the corporeal and the thinking and creating substance can be comprehended under this common notion1 for the reason that they are things which require ,god's support alone in order to exist40 ,they are universal2 other finite things require other things as conditions essential to their existence4 ,but extended substance1 the kingdom of nature1 and spiritual substance1 do not require one another4#ahc ,they may be called substances1 because each of them constitutes an entire range or sphere1 an independent totality4 ,but because1 ,spinoza concluded1 each side1 the kingdom of thought as well as nature1 is one complete system within itself1 they are likewise in themselves1 that is absolutely1 identical as ,god1 the absolute substance2 for thinking spirit this implicit is thus ,god1 or their differences are ideal4 ,descartes proceeds from the ,notion of ,god to what is created1 to thought and extension1 and from this to the particular4 8,now substances have several attributes without which they cannot be thought0--that signifies their determinateness--8but each has something peculiar to itself which constitutes its nature and essence0--a simple universal determinateness--8and to which the others all relate4 ,thus thought constitutes the absolute attribute of mind10 thought is its quality2 8extension is0 the essential determination of corporeality1 and this alone is 8the true nature of body4 ,what remains are merely secondary qualities1 modes1 like figure and movement in what is extended1 imagination1 feeling and will in thinking2 they may be taken away or thought away4 ,god is the uncreated1 thinking substance40#ahd ,descartes here passes to what is individual1 and because he follows up extension he arrives at matter1 rest1 movement4 ,one of ,descartes' main points is that matter1 extension1 corporeality1 are quite the same thing for thought2 according to him the nature of body is fulfilled in its extension1 and this should be accepted as the only essential fact respecting the corporeal world4 ,we say that body offers resistance1 has smell1 taste1 colour1 transparency1 hardness1 c41 since without these we can have no body4 ,all these further determinations respecting what is extended1 such as size1 rest1 movement1 and inertia1 are1 however1 merely sensuous1 and this ,descartes showed1 as it had long before this been shown by the ,sceptics4 ,undoubtedly that is the abstract ,notion or pure essence1 but to body or to pure existence1 there likewise of necessity pertains negativity or diversity4 ,by means of the following illustration ,descartes showed that with the exception of extension1 all corporeal determinations may be annihilated1 and that none can be absolutely predicated4 ,we draw conclusions respecting the solidity and hardness of matter from the resistance which a body offers to our disturbance1 and by means of which it seeks to hold its place4 ,now if we admit that matter as we touch it always gives way to us like space1 we should have no reason for ascribing to it solidity4 ,smell1 colour1 taste1 are in the same way sensuous qualities merely2 but what we clearly perceive is alone true4 ,if a body is ground into small parts1 it gives way1 and yet it does not lose its nature2 resistance is thus not essential4#ahe ,this not-being-for-itself is however a quantitatively slighter resistance only2 the resistance always remains4 ,but ,descartes desires only to think2 now he does not think resistance1 colour1 c41 but apprehends them by the senses only4 ,hence he says that all this must be led back to extension as being special modifications of the same4 ,it is undoubtedly to the credit of ,descartes that he only accepts as true what is thought2 but the abrogation of these sensuous qualities simply represents the negative movement of thought3 the essence of body is conditioned through this thought1 that is1 it is not true essence4 ,descartes now makes his way from the ,notion of extension to the laws of motion1 as the universal knowledge of the corporeal in its implicitude2 he shows 77 that there is no vacuum1 for that would be an extension without bodily substance1 i4e4 a body without body2 77 that there are no atoms 7no indivisible independent existence71 for the same reason1 viz41 because the essence of body is extension4 77 ,he further shows that a body is set in motion by something outside of it1 but of itself it continues in a condition of rest1 and likewise it must1 when in a condition of movement1 be brought to rest by another outside of it--this is the property of inertia4#ahf ,these are unmeaning propositions1 for an abstraction is involved for instance in asserting simple rest and movement in their opposition4 ,extension and motion are the fundamental conceptions in mechanical physics2 they represent the truth of the corporeal world4 ,it is thus that ideality comes before the mind of ,descartes1 and he is far elevated above the reality of the sensuous qualities1 although he does not reach so far as to the separation of this ideality4 ,he thus remains at the point of view of mechanism pure and simple4 ,give me matter 7extension7 and motion and ,i will build worlds for you1 is what ,descartes virtually says4#ahg ,space and time were hence to him the only determinations of the material universe4 ,in this1 then1 lies the mechanical fashion of viewing nature1 or the natural philosophy of ,descartes is seen to be purely mechanical4#ahh ,hence changes in matter are due merely to motion1 so that ,descartes traces every relationship to the rest and movement of particles1 and all material diversity such as colour1 and taste--in short1 all bodily qualities and animal phenomena--to mechanism4 ,in living beings processes such as that of digestion are mechanical effects which have as principles1 rest and movement4 ,we here see the ground and origin of the mechanical philosophy2 but further on we find that this is unsatisfactory1 for matter and motion do not suffice to explain life4 ,yet the great matter in all this is that thought goes forward in its determinations1 and that it constitutes from these thought-determinations the truth of nature4 ,in his consideration of the system of the world and the movement of the heavenly bodies1 ,descartes has worked out the mechanical view more fully4 ,he thus comes to speak of the earth1 the sun1 c41 and of his conception of the circling motion of the heavenly bodies in the form of vortices3 of metaphysical hypotheses as to how small particles pass into1 out of1 and through pores and act on one another2 and finally to saltpetre and gunpowder4#ahi ,universal reflections should have the first claim on our attention2 but on the other hand the transition to the determinate is accomplished in a system of ,physics which is the result of observations and experiences1 and this is done entirely by means of the understanding4 ,descartes thus mingles many observations with a metaphysic of this nature1 and to us the result is hence obscure4 ,in this philosophy the thinking treatment of empiricism is thus predominant1 and a similar method has been adopted by philosophers from this time on4 ,to ,descartes and others1 ,philosophy had still the more indefinite significance of arriving at knowledge through thought1 reflection1 and reasoning4 ,speculative cognition1 the derivation from the ,notion1 the free independent development of the matter itself1 was first introduced by ,fichte1 and consequently what is now called philosophic knowledge is not yet separated in ,descartes from the rest of scientific knowledge4 ,in those times all the knowledge of mankind was called philosophy2 in ,descartes' metaphysics we thus saw quite empirical reflection and reasoning from particular grounds1 from experiences1 facts1 phenomena1 being brought into play in the naivest manner1 and one has no sense of speculation in the matter4 ,the strictly scientific element here really consisted mainly in the method of proof as it has long been made use of in geometry1 and in the ordinary method of the formal logical syllogism4 ,hence it likewise happens that ,philosophy1 which ought to form a totality of the sciences1 begins with logic and metaphysics2 the second part is composed of ordinary physics and mathematics1 mingled no doubt with metaphysical speculations1 and the third part1 ethics1 deals with the nature of man1 his duties1 the state1 the citizen4 ,and this is the case with ,descartes4 ,the first part of the ,principia philosophi treats ,de principiis cognitionis human1 the second ,de principiis rerum materialium4 ,this natural philosophy1 as a philosophy of extension1 is1 however1 none other than what a quite ordinary physics or mechanics might at that time be1 and it is still quite hypothetical2 we1 on the other hand1 accurately distinguish empirical physics and natural philosophy1 even though the first likewise pertains to thought4 #c4 ,descartes never reached the third part1 the philosophy of ,mind1 for1 while he made a special study of physics1 in the region of ethics he published one tract only1 ,de passionibus4 ,in this reference ,descartes treats of thought and human freedom4 ,he proves freedom from the fact of the soul thinking that the will is unrestrained1 and of that constituting the perfection of mankind4 ,and this is quite true4 ,in respect to the freedom of the will he comes across the difficulty of how to reconcile it with the divine prescience4 ,as free1 man might do what is not ordained of ,god beforehand--this would conflict with the omnipotence and omniscience of ,god2 and if everything is ordained of ,god1 human freedom would thereby be done away with4 ,yet he does not solve the contradiction contained in these two different aspects without falling into difficulty4 ,but conformably to the method which he adopts1 and which we pointed out above 7pp4 #bch1 #bci71 he says3 8,the human mind is finite1 ,god's power and predetermination are infinite2 we are thus not capable of judging of the relationship in which the freedom of the human soul stands to the omnipotence and omniscience of ,god--but in self-consciousness we have the certainty of it given us as a fact4 ,and we must hold only to what is certain40#aij ,when he proceeds further much appears to him still incapable of explanation2 but we see obstinacy and caprice likewise exhibited in his stopping short at the assertion as to the best of his knowledge4 ,the method of knowledge as set forth by ,descartes1 takes the form of a reasoning of the understanding1 and is thus without special interest4 ,these1 then1 are the principal points in the ,cartesian system4 ,some particular assertions made by ,descartes1 which have been specially instrumental in giving him fame1 have still to be mentioned--particular forms which have been formerly considered in metaphysics1 and likewise by ,wolff4 ,for example1 in the first place we gather that ,descartes regarded animals and other organisms as machines moved by another1 and not possessing the principle of the spontaneity of thought within them#aia--;a mechanical physiology1 a cut and dry thought pertaining to the understanding1 which is of no further importance4 ,in the sharp opposition between thought and extension1 the former is not considered as sensation1 so that the latter can isolate itself4 ,the organic must as body reduce itself to extension2 any further development of this last thus only proves its dependence on the first determinations4 ,in the second place1 the relation between soul and body now becomes an important question1 that is1 the return of the object within itself in such a way that thought posits itself in another1 in matter4 ,as to this1 many systems are offered to us in metaphysics4 ,one of these is the influxus physicus1 that the relation of spirit is of a corporeal nature1 that the object is related to mind as bodies are to one another--a conception like this is very crude4 ,how does ,descartes understand the unity of soul and body8 ,the former belongs to thought1 the latter to extension2 and thus because both are substance1 neither requires the ,notion of the other1 and hence soul and body are independent of one another and can exercise no direct influence upon one another4 ,soul could only influence body in so far as it required the same1 and conversely--that is1 in so far as they have actual relation to one another4 ,but since each is a totality1 neither can bear a real relation to the other4 ,descartes consistently denied the physical influence of one on the other2 that would have signified a mechanical relation between the two4 ,descartes thus established the intellectual sphere in contradistinction to matter1 and on it based the independent subsistence of mind2 for in his cogito #8,i' is at first only certain of itself1 since ,i can abstract from all4 ,now we find the necessity of a mediator to bring about a union of the abstract and the external and individual4 ,descartes settles this by placing between the two what constitutes the metaphysical ground of their mutual changes1 ,god4 ,he is the intermediate bond of union1 in as far as ,he affords assistance to the soul in what it cannot through its own freedom accomplish1 so that the changes in body and soul may correspond with one another4#aib ,if ,i have desires1 an intention1 these receive corporeal realization2 this association of soul and body is1 according to ,descartes1 effected through ,god4 ,for above 7p4 #bci7 we saw that ,descartes says of ,god that ,he is the ,truth of the conception3 as long as ,i think rightly and consistently1 something real corresponds to my thought1 and the connecting link is ,god4 ,god is hereby the perfect identity of the two opposites1 since ,he is1 as ,idea1 the unity of ,notion and reality4 ,in the ,idea of ,spinoza this is worked out and developed in its further moments4 ,descartes' conclusion is quite correct2 in finite things this identity is imperfect4 ,only the form employed by ,descartes is inadequate2 for it implies that in the beginning there are two things1 thought or soul and body1 and that then ,god appears as a third thing1 outside both--that ,he is not the ,notion of unity1 nor are the two elements themselves ,notion4 ,we must not however forget that ,descartes says that both those original elements are created substances4 ,but this expression #8created' pertains to the ordinary conception only and is not a determinate thought2 it was ,spinoza1 therefore1 who first accomplished this return to thought4 #b4 ,,spinoza4 ,the philosophy of ,descartes underwent a great variety of unspeculative developments1 but in ,benedict ,spinoza a direct successor to this philosopher may be found1 and one who carried on the ,cartesian principle to its furthest logical conclusions4 ,for him soul and body1 thought and ,being1 cease to have separate independent existence4 ,the dualism of the ,cartesian system ,spinoza1 as a ,jew1 altogether set aside4 ,for the profound unity of his philosophy as it found expression in ,europe1 his manifestation of ,spirit as the identity of the finite and the infinite in ,god1 instead of ,god's appearing related to these as a ,third--all this is an echo from ,eastern lands4 ,the ,oriental theory of absolute identity was brought by ,spinoza much more directly into line1 firstly with the current of ,european thought1 and then with the ,european and ,cartesian philosophy1 in which it soon found a place4 ,first of all we must1 however1 glance at the circumstances of ,spinoza's life4 ,he was by descent a ,portuguese ,jew1 and was born at ,amsterdam in the year #afcb2 the name he received was ,baruch1 but he altered it to ,benedict4 ,in his youth he was instructed by the ,rabbis of the synagogue to which he belonged1 but he soon fell out with them1 their wrath having been kindled by the criticisms which he passed on the fantastic doctrines of the ,talmud4 ,he was not1 therefore1 long in absenting himself from the synagogue1 and as the ,rabbis were in dread lest his example should have evil consequences1 they offered him a yearly allowance of a thousand gulden if he would keep away from the place and hold his tongue4 ,this offer he declined2 and the ,rabbis thereafter carried their persecution of him to such a pitch that they were even minded to rid themselves of him by assassination4 ,after having made a narrow escape from the dagger1 he formally withdrew from the ,jewish communion1 without1 however1 going over to the ,christian ,church4 ,he now applied himself particularly to the ,latin language1 and made a special study of the ,cartesian philosophy4 ,later on he went to ,rhynsburg1 near ,leyden1 and from the year #affd he lived in retirement1 first at ,voorburg1 a village near the ,hague1 and then at the ,hague itself1 highly respected by numerous friends3 he gained a livelihood for himself by grinding optical glasses4 ,it was no arbitrary choice that led him to occupy himself with light1 for it represents in the material sphere the absolute identity which forms the foundation of the ,oriental view of things4 ,although he had rich friends and mighty protectors1 among whom even generals were numbered1 he lived in humble poverty1 declining the handsome gifts offered to him time after time4 ,nor would he permit ,simon von ,vries to make him his heir2 he only accepted from him an annual pension of three hundred florins2 in the same way he gave up to his sisters his share of their father's estate4 ,from the ,elector ,palatine1 ,carl ,ludwig1 a man of most noble character and raised above the prejudices of his time1 he received the offer of a professor's chair at ,heidelberg1 with the assurance that he would have liberty to teach and to write1 because 8the ,prince believed he would not put that liberty to a bad use by interfering with the religion publicly established40 ,spinoza 7in his published letters7 very wisely declined this offer1 however1 because 8he did not know within what limits that philosophic liberty would have to be confined1 in order that he might not appear to be interfering with the publicly established religion40 ,he remained in ,holland1 a country highly interesting in the history of general culture1 as it was the first in ,europe to show the example of universal toleration1 and afforded to many a place of refuge where they might enjoy liberty of thought2 for fierce as was the rage of the theologians there against ,bekker1 for example 7,bruck4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 #b1 pp4 #gai1 #gbj71 and furious as were the attacks of ,voetius on the ,cartesian philosophy1 these had not the consequences which they would have had in another land4 ,spinoza died on the #bast of ,february1 #afgg1 in the forty-fourth year of his age4 ,the cause of his death was consumption1 from which he had long been a sufferer2 this was in harmony with his system of philosophy1 according to which all particularity and individuality pass away in the one substance4 ,a ,protestant divine1 ,colerus by name1 who published a biography of ,spinoza1 inveighs strongly against him1 it is true1 but gives nevertheless a most minute and kindly description of his circumstances and surroundings--telling how he left only about two hundred thalers1 what debts he had1 and so on4 ,a bill included in the inventory1 in which the barber requests payment due him by ,m4 ,spinoza of blessed memory1 scandalizes the parson very much1 and regarding it he makes the observation3 8,had the barber but known what sort of a creature ,spinoza was1 he certainly would not have spoken of his blessed memory40 ,the ,german translator of this biography writes under the portrait of ,spinoza3 characterem1 reprobationis in vultu gerens1 applying this description to a countenance which doubtless expresses the melancholy of a profound thinker1 but is otherwise mild and benevolent4 ,the reprobatio is certainly correct2 but it is not a reprobation in the passive sense2 it is an active disapprobation on ,spinoza's part of the opinions1 errors and thoughtless passions of mankind4#aic ,spinoza used the terminology of ,descartes1 and also published an account of his system4 ,for we find the first of ,spinoza's works entitled 8,an ,exposition according to the geometrical method of the principles of the ,cartesian philosophy40 ,some time after this he wrote his ,tractatus theologico-politicus1 and by it gained considerable reputation4 ,great as was the hatred which ,spinoza roused amongst his ,rabbis1 it was more than equalled by the odium which he brought upon himself amongst ,christian1 and especially amongst ,protestant theologians--chiefly through the medium of this essay4 ,it contains his views on inspiration1 a critical treatment of the books of ,moses and the like1 chiefly from the point of view that the laws therein contained are limited in their application to the ,jews4 ,later ,christian theologians have written critically on this subject1 usually making it their object to show that these books were compiled at a later time1 and that they date in part from a period subsequent to the ,babylonian captivity2 this has become a crucial point with ,protestant theologians1 and one by which the modern school distinguishes itself from the older1 greatly pluming itself thereon4 ,all this1 however1 is already to be found in the above-mentioned work of ,spinoza4 ,but ,spinoza drew the greatest odium upon himself by his philosophy proper1 which we must now consider as it is given to us in his ,ethics4 ,while ,descartes published no writings on this subject1 the ,ethics of ,spinoza is undoubtedly his greatest work2 it was published after his death by ,ludwig ,mayer1 a physician1 who had been ,spinoza's most intimate friend4 ,it consists of five parts2 the first deals with ,god 7,de ,deo74 ,general metaphysical ideas are contained in it1 which include the knowledge of ,god and nature4 ,the second part deals with the nature and origin of mind 7,de natura et origine mentis74 ,we see thus that ,spinoza does not treat of the subject of natural philosophy1 extension and motion at all1 for he passes immediately from ,god to the philosophy of mind1 to the ethical point of view2 and what refers to knowledge1 intelligent mind1 is brought forward in the first part1 under the head of the principles of human knowledge4 ,the third book of the ,ethics deals with the origin and nature of the passions 7,de origine et natura affectuum72 the fourth with the powers of the same1 or human slavery 7,de servitute humana seu de affectuum viribus72 the fifth1 lastly1 with the power of the understanding1 with thought1 or with human liberty 7,de potentia intellectus seu de libertate humana74#aid ,kirchenrath ,professor ,paulus published ,spinoza's works in ,jena2 ,i had a share in the bringing out of this edition1 having been entrusted with the collation of ,french translations4 ,as regards the philosophy of ,spinoza1 it is very simple1 and on the whole easy to comprehend2 the difficulty which it presents is due partly to the limitations of the method in which ,spinoza presents his thoughts1 and partly to his narrow range of ideas1 which causes him in an unsatisfactory way to pass over important points of view and cardinal questions4 ,spinoza's system is that of ,descartes made objective in the form of absolute truth4 ,the simple thought of ,spinoza's idealism is this3 ,the true is simply and solely the one substance1 whose attributes are thought and extension or nature3 and only this absolute unity is reality1 it alone is ,god4 ,it is1 as with ,descartes1 the unity of thought and ,being1 or that which contains the ,notion of its existence in itself4 ,the ,cartesian substance1 as ,idea1 has certainly ,being included in its ,notion2 but it is only ,being as abstract1 not as real ,being or as extension 7supra1 p4 #bda74 ,with ,descartes corporeality and the thinking #8,i' are altogether independent ,beings2 this independence of the two extremes is done away with in ,spinozism by their becoming moments of the one absolute ,being4 ,this expression signifies that ,being must be grasped as the unity of opposites2 the chief consideration is not to let slip the opposition and set it aside1 but to reconcile and resolve it4 ,since then it is thought and ,being1 and no longer the abstractions of the finite and infinite1 or of limit and the unlimited1 that form the opposition 7supra1 p4 #afa71 ,being is here more definitely regarded as extension2 for in its abstraction it would be really only that return into itself1 that simple equality with itself1 which constitutes thought 7supra1 p4 #bbi74 ,the pure thought of ,spinoza is therefore not the simple universal of ,plato1 for it has likewise come to know the absolute opposition of ,notion and ,being4 ,taken as a whole1 this constitutes the ,idea of ,spinoza1 and it is just what was to the ,eleatics 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #bdd1 #beb74 ,this ,idea of ,spinoza's we must allow to be in the main true and well-grounded2 absolute substance is the truth1 but it is not the whole truth2 in order to be this it must also be thought of as in itself active and living1 and by that very means it must determine itself as mind4 ,but substance with ,spinoza is only the universal and consequently the abstract determination of mind2 it may undoubtedly be said that this thought is the foundation of all true views--not1 however1 as their absolutely fixed and permanent basis1 but as the abstract unity which mind is in itself4 ,it is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of ,spinozism2 to be a follower of ,spinoza is the essential commencement of all ,philosophy4 ,for as we saw above 7,vol ,i4 p4 #add71 when man begins to philosophize1 the soul must commence by bathing in this ether of the ,one ,substance1 in which all that man has held as true has disappeared2 this negation of all that is particular1 to which every philosopher must have come1 is the liberation of the mind and its absolute foundation4 ,the difference between our standpoint and that of the ,eleatic philosophy is only this1 that through the agency of ,christianity concrete individuality is in the modern world present throughout in spirit4 ,but in spite of the infinite demands on the part of the concrete1 substance with ,spinoza is not yet determined as in itself concrete4 ,as the concrete is thus not present in the content of substance1 it is therefore to be found within reflecting thought alone1 and it is only from the endless oppositions of this last that the required unity emerges4 ,of substance as such there is nothing more to be said2 all that we can do is to speak of the different ways in which ,philosophy has dealt with it1 and the opposites which in it are abrogated4 ,the difference depends on the nature of the opposites which are held to be abrogated in substance4 ,spinoza is far from having proved this unity as convincingly as was done by the ancients2 but what constitutes the grandeur of ,spinoza's manner of thought is that he is able to renounce all that is determinate and particular1 and restrict himself to the ,one1 giving heed to this alone4 #a4 ,spinoza begins 7,eth4 ,p4 ,i pp4 #ce1 #cf7 with a series of definitions1 from which we take the following4 a4 ,spinoza's first definition is of the ,cause of itself4 ,he says3 8,by that which is causa sui1 its own cause1 ,i understand that whose essence0 7or ,notion7 8involves existence1 or which cannot be conceived except as existent40 ,the unity of existence and universal thought is asserted from the very first1 and this unity will ever be the question at issue4 8,the cause of itself0 is a noteworthy expression1 for while we picture to ourselves that the effect stands in opposition to the cause1 the cause of itself is the cause which1 while it operates and separates an 8other10 at the same time produces only itself1 and in the production therefore does away with this distinction4 ,the establishing of itself as an other is loss or degeneration1 and at the same time the negation of this loss2 this is a purely speculative ,notion1 indeed a fundamental ,notion in all speculation4 ,the cause in which the cause is identical with the effect1 is the infinite cause 7infra1 p4 #bfc72 if ,spinoza had further developed what lies in the causa sui1 substance with him would not have been rigid and unworkable4 b4 ,the second definition is that of the finite4 8,that thing is said to be finite in its kind which can be limited by another of the same nature10 ,for it comes then to an end1 it is not there2 what is there is something else4 ,this something else must1 however1 be of a like nature2 for those things which are to limit each other must1 in order to be able to limit each other1 touch each other1 and consequently have a relation to each other1 that is to say they must be of one nature1 stand on a like basis1 and have a common sphere4 ,that is the affirmative side of the limit4 8,thus a thought is0 only 8limited by another thought1 a body by another body1 but thoughts are not limited by bodies nor0 conversely 8bodies by thoughts40 ,we saw this 7p4 #bdd7 with ,descartes3 thought is an independent totality and so is extension1 they have nothing to do with one another2 they do not limit each other1 each is included in itself4 c4 ,the third definition is that of substance4 8,by substance ,i understand that which exists in itself and is conceived by itself1 i4e4 the conception of which does not require the aid of the conception of any other thing for its formation 7a quo formari debeat720 otherwise it would be finite1 accidental4 ,what cannot have a conception formed of it without the aid of something else1 is not independent1 but is dependent upon that something else4 d4 ,in the fourth place ,spinoza defines attributes1 which1 as the moment coming second to substance1 belong to it4 8,by attribute ,i understand that which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance20 and to ,spinoza this alone is true4 ,this is an important determination2 the attribute is undoubtedly a determinateness1 but at the same time it remains a totality4 ,spinoza1 like ,descartes1 accepts only two attributes1 thought and extension4 ,the understanding grasps them as the reality of substance1 but the reality is not higher than the substance1 for it is only reality in the view of the understanding1 which falls outside substance4 ,each of the two ways of regarding substance--extension and thought--contains no doubt the whole content of substance1 but only in one form1 which the understanding brings with it2 and for this very reason both sides are in themselves identical and infinite4 ,this is the true completion2 but where substance passes over into attribute is not stated4 e4 ,the fifth definition has to do with what comes third in relation to substance1 the mode4 8,by mode ,i understand the affections of substance1 or that which is in something else1 through the aid of which also it is conceived40 ,thus substance is conceived through itself2 attribute is not conceived through itself1 but has a relation to the conceiving understanding1 in so far as this last conceives reality2 mode1 finally1 is what is not conceived as reality1 but through and in something else4 ,these last three moments ,spinoza ought not merely to have established in this way as conceptions1 he ought to have deduced them2 they are especially important1 and correspond with what we more definitely distinguish as universal1 particular and individual4 ,they must not1 however1 be taken as formal1 but in their true concrete sense2 the concrete universal is substance1 the concrete particular is the concrete species2 the ,father and ,son in the ,christian dogma are similarly particular1 but each of them contains the whole nature of ,god1 only under a different form4 ,the mode is the individual1 the finite as such1 which enters into external connection with what is 8other40 ,in this ,spinoza only descends to a lower stage1 the mode is only the foregoing warped and stunted4 ,spinoza's defect is therefore this1 that he takes the third moment as mode alone1 as a false individuality4 ,true individuality and subjectivity is not a mere retreat from the universal1 not merely something clearly determinate2 for1 as clearly determinate1 it is at the same time ,being-for-itself1 determined by itself alone4 ,the individual1 the subjective1 is even in being so the return to the universal2 and in that it is at home with itself1 it is itself the universal4 ,the return consists simply and solely in the fact of the particular being in itself the universal2 to this return ,spinoza did not attain4 ,rigid substantiality is the last point he reached1 not infinite form2 this he knew not1 and thus determinateness continually vanishes from his thought4 f4 ,in the sixth place1 the definition of the infinite is also of importance1 for in the infinite ,spinoza defines more strictly than anywhere else the ,notion of the ,notion4 ,the infinite has a double significance1 according as it is taken as the infinitely many or as the absolutely infinite 7infra1 p4 #bfc74 8,the infinite in its kind is not such in respect of all possible attributes2 but the absolutely infinite is that to whose essence all belongs that expresses an essence and contains no negation40 ,in the same sense ,spinoza distinguishes in the nine-and-twentieth ,letter 7,oper4 ,t4 ,i4 pp4 #ebf-ecb7 the infinite of imagination from the infinite of thought 7intellectus71 the actual 7actu7 infinite4 ,most men1 when they wish to strive after the sublime1 get no farther than the first of these2 this is the false infinite1 just as when one says 8and so on into infinity10 meaning perhaps the infinity of space from star to star1 or else the infinity of time4 ,an infinite numerical series in mathematics is exactly the same thing4 ,if a certain fraction is represented as a decimal fraction1 it is incomplete2 is1 on the contrary1 the true infinite1 and therefore not an incomplete expression1 although the content here is of course limited4 ,it is infinity in the incorrect sense that one usually has in view when infinity is spoken of2 and even if it is looked on as sublime1 it yet is nothing present1 and only goes ever out into the negative1 without being actual 7actu74 ,but for ,spinoza the infinite is not the fixing of a limit and then passing beyond the limit fixed--the sensuous infinity--but absolute infinity1 the positive1 which has complete and present in itself an absolute multiplicity which has no ,beyond4 ,philosophic infinity1 that which is infinite actu1 ,spinoza therefore calls the absolute affirmation of itself4 ,this is quite correct1 only it might have been better expressed as3 8,it is the negation of negation40 ,spinoza here also employs geometrical figures as illustrations of the ,notion of infinity4 ,in his ,opera postuma1 preceding his ,ethics1 and also in the letter quoted above1 he has two circles1 one of which lies within the other1 which have not1 however1 a common centre4 ,illustration 8,the inequalities of the space between ,a ,b and ,c ,d exceed every number2 and yet the space which lies between is not so very great40 ,that is to say1 if ,i wish to determine them all1 ,i must enter upon an infinite series4 ,this 8beyond0 always1 however1 remains defective1 is always affected with negation2 and yet this false infinite is there to hand1 circumscribed1 affirmative1 actual and present in that plane as a complete space between the two circles4 ,or a finite line consists of an infinite number of points2 and yet the line is present here and determined2 the 8beyond0 of the infinite number of points1 which are not complete1 is in it complete and called back into unity4 ,the infinite should be represented as actually present1 and this comes to pass in the ,notion of the cause of itself1 which is therefore the true infinity4 ,as soon as the cause has something else opposed to it--the effect--finitude is present2 but here this something else is at the same time abrogated and it becomes once more the cause itself4 ,the affirmative is thus negation of negation1 since1 according to the well-known grammatical rule1 duplex negatio affirmat4 ,in the same way ,spinoza's earlier definitions have also the infinite already implied in them1 for instance in the case of the just mentioned cause of itself1 inasmuch as he defines it as that whose essence involves existence 7supra1 p4 #beh74 ,notion and existence are each the ,beyond of the other2 but cause of itself1 as thus including them1 is really the carrying back of this 8beyond0 into unity4 ,or 7supra1 p4 #bei7 8,substance is that which is in itself and is conceived from itself20 that is the same unity of ,notion and existence4 ,the infinite is in the same way in itself and has also its ,notion in itself2 its ,notion is its ,being1 and its ,being its ,notion2 true infinity is therefore to be found in ,spinoza4 ,but he has no consciousness of this2 he has not recognized this ,notion as absolute ,notion1 and therefore has not expressed it as a moment of true existence2 for with him the ,notion falls outside of existence1 into the thought of existence4 g4 ,finally ,spinoza says in the seventh place3 8,god is a ,being absolutely infinite1 i4e4 a substance consisting of infinite attributes1 each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence40 ,does substance1 one might here ask1 possess an infinite number of attributes8 ,but as with ,spinoza there are only two attributes1 thought and extension1 with which he invests ,god1 8infinite0 is not to be taken here in the sense of the indeterminate many1 but positively1 as a circle is perfect infinity in itself4 ,the whole of ,spinoza's philosophy is contained in these definitions1 which1 however1 taken as a whole are formal2 it is really a weak point in ,spinoza that he begins thus with definitions4 ,in mathematics this method is permitted1 because at the outset we there make assumptions1 such as that of the point and line2 but in ,philosophy the content should be known as the absolutely true4 ,it is all very well to grant the correctness of the name-definition1 and acknowledge that the word 8substance0 corresponds with the conception which the definition indicates1 but it is quite another question to determine whether this content is absolutely true4 ,such a question is not asked in the case of geometrical propositions1 but in philosophic investigation it is the very thing to be first considered1 and this ,spinoza has not done4 ,instead of only explaining these simple thoughts and representing them as concrete in the definitions which he makes1 what he ought to have done was to examine whether this content is true4 ,to all appearance it is only the explanation of the words that is given2 but the content of the words is held to be established4 ,all further content is merely derived from that1 and proved thereby2 for on the first content all the rest depends1 and if it is established as a basis1 the other necessarily follows4 8,the attribute is that which the understanding thinks of ,god40 ,but here the question is3 ,how does it come that besides the ,deity there now appears the understanding1 which applies to absolute substance the two forms of thought and extension8 and whence come these two forms themselves8 ,thus everything proceeds inwards1 and not outwards2 the determinations are not developed from substance1 it does not resolve itself into these attributes4 #b4 ,these definitions are followed by axioms and propositions in which ,spinoza proves a great variety of points4 ,he descends from the universal of substance through the particular1 thought and extension1 to the individual4 ,he has thus all three moments of the ,notion1 or they are essential to him4 ,but the mode1 under which head falls individuality1 he does not recognize as essential1 or as constituting a moment of true existence in that existence2 for it disappears in existence1 or it is not raised into the ,notion4 a4 ,the main point then is that ,spinoza proves from these ,notions that there is only ,one ,substance1 ,god4 ,it is a simple chain of reasoning1 a very formal proof4 8,fifth ,proposition3 ,there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or of the same attribute40 ,this is implied already in the definitions2 the proof is therefore a useless and wearisome toil1 which only serves to render ,spinoza more difficult to understand4 8,if there were several0 7substances of the same attribute7 8they must be distinguished from one another either by the diversity of their attributes or by the diversity of their affections0 7modes74 8,if they are distinguished by their attributes1 it would be directly conceded that there is only one substance having the same attribute40 ,for the attributes are simply what the understanding grasps as the essence of the one substance1 which is determined in itself1 and not through anything else4 8,but if these substances were distinguished by their affections1 since substance is by nature prior to its affections it would follow that if from substance its affections were abstracted and it were regarded in itself1 i4e4 in its truth1 it could henceforth not be regarded as distinct from other substances40 8,eighth ,proposition3 ,all substance is necessarily infinite4 ,proof3 ,for otherwise it must be limited by another substance of the same nature1 in which case there would be two substances of the same attribute1 which is contrary to the fifth proposition40 8,every attribute must be conceived for itself10 as determination reflected on itself4 8,for attribute is what the mind conceives of substance as constituting its essence1 from which it follows that it must be conceived through itself10 i4e4 substance is what is conceived through itself 7see the fourth and third definitions74 8,therefore we may not argue from the plurality of attributes to a plurality of substances1 for each is conceived by itself1 and they have all been1 always and at the same time1 in substance1 without the possibility of the one being produced by the other40 8,substance is indivisible4 ,for if the parts retained the nature of the substance1 there would be several substances of the same nature1 which is contrary to the fifth proposition4 ,if not1 infinite substance would cease to exist1 which is absurd40#aie 8,fourteenth ,proposition3 ,no other substance than ,god can either exist or be conceived4 ,proof3 ,god is the absolutely infinite substance1 to whom can be denied no attribute which expresses the essence of substance1 and ,he exists necessarily2 therefore if there were a substance other than ,god1 it must be explained by means of an attribute of ,god40 ,consequently the substance would not have its own being1 but that of ,god1 and therefore would not be a substance4 ,or if it were still to be substance1 8then there would necessarily follow the possibility of there being two substances with the same attribute1 which according to the fifth proposition is absurd4 ,from this it then follows that the thing extended and the thing that thinks0 are not substances1 but 8are either attributes of ,god1 or affections of ,his attributes40 ,by these proofs and others like them not much is to be gained4 8,fifteenth1 proposition3 ,what is1 is in ,god1 and cannot exist or be conceived without ,god40 8,sixteenth proposition3 ,by the necessity of the divine nature infinite things must follow in infinite modes1 i4e41 all that can fall under the infinite understanding4 ,god is therefore the absolute ,first ,cause40#aif ,spinoza then ascribes freedom and necessity to ,god3 8,god is the absolute free cause1 who is determined by nothing outside of ,himself1 for ,he exists solely by the necessity of ,his nature4 ,there is no cause which inwardly or outwardly moves ,him to act1 except the perfection of ,his nature4 ,his activity is by the laws of ,his ,being necessary and eternal2 what therefore follows from ,his absolute nature1 from ,his attributes1 is eternal1 as it follows from the nature of the triangle from eternity and to eternity that its three angles are equal to two right angles40 ,that is to say1 ,his ,being is ,his absolute power2 actus and potentia1 ,thought and ,being1 are in ,him one4 ,god has not therefore any other thoughts which ,he could not have actualized4 8,god is the immanent cause of all things1 not the transient 7transiens710 i4e41 external cause4 8,his essence and ,his existence are the same1 namely1 the truth4 ,a thing which is determined to perform some action1 is1 since ,god is cause1 necessarily determined thereto by ,god2 and a thing which is thus determined cannot render itself undetermined4 ,in nature nothing is contingent4 ,will is not a free cause1 but only a necessary cause1 only a mode2 it is therefore determined by another4 ,god acts in accordance with no final causes 7sub ratione boni74 ,those who assert that ,he does so1 appear to establish something apart from ,god1 which does not depend on ,god1 and which ,god in ,his working keeps in view1 as though it were an end4 ,if this view is taken1 ,god is not a free cause1 but is subject to fate4 ,it is equally inadmissible to subject all things to the arbitrary pleasure of ,god1 i4e41 to ,his indifferent will40#aig ,he is determined solely by ,his own nature2 the activity of ,god is thus ,his power1 and that is necessity4 ,he is then absolute power in contrast to wisdom1 which sets up definite aims1 and consequently limitations2 particular aims1 thoughts of what is about to come to pass1 and the like are therefore put out of the question4 ,but beyond this universal1 no advance is made2 for it must be noticed as specially singular1 that ,spinoza in the fiftieth ,letter 7,oper4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #fcd7 says that every determination is a negation4 ,moreover1 if ,god is the cause of the world1 it is implied that ,he is finite2 for the world is here put beside ,god as something different from ,him4 b4 ,the greatest difficulty in ,spinoza is1 in the distinctions to which he comes1 to grasp the relation of this determinate to ,god1 at the same time preserving the determination4 8,god is a thinking ,being1 because all individual thoughts are modes which express ,god's nature in a certain and determinate manner2 there pertains therefore to ,god an attribute the conception of which all individual thoughts involve1 and by means of this they also are conceived4 ,god is an extended ,being for the same reason40 ,this means that the same substance1 under the attribute of thought1 is the intelligible world1 and under the attribute of extension1 is nature2 nature and thought thus both express the same ,essence of ,god4 ,or1 as ,spinoza says1 8,the order and system of natural things is the same as the order of the thoughts4 ,thus1 for instance1 the circle which exists in nature1 and the idea of the existing circle1 which is also in ,god1 are one and the same thing0 7they are one and the same content71 8which is0 merely 8expressed by means of different attributes4 ,if we therefore regard nature either under the attribute of extension or of thought1 or under any other attribute whatever1 we shall find one and the same connection of causes1 i4e41 the same sequence of things4 ,the formal ,being of the idea of the circle can be conceived only by means of the mode of thought1 as its proximate cause1 and this mode again by means of another1 and so on infinitely2 so that we must explain the order of the whole of nature1 or the connection of causes1 by the attribute of thought alone1 and if things are considered by the attribute of extension1 they must be considered only by the attribute of extension1--and the same holds good of other causes40#aih ,it is one and the same system1 which at one time appears as nature1 and at another time in the form of thought4 ,but ,spinoza does not demonstrate how these two are evolved from the one substance1 nor does he prove why there can only be two of them4 ,neither are extension and thought anything to him in themselves1 or in truth1 but only externally2 for their difference is a mere matter of the understanding1 which is ranked by ,spinoza only among affections 7,eth4 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xxxi4 ,demonst4 p4 #fb71 and as such has no truth4 ,this has in recent times been served up again by ,schelling in the following form3 ,in themselves1 the intelligent world and the corporeal world are the same1 only under different forms2 so that the intelligent universe is in itself the whole absolute divine totality1 and the corporeal universe is equally this same totality4 ,the differences are not in themselves1 but the different aspects from which the ,absolute is regarded are matters external to it4 ,we take a higher tone in saying that nature and mind are rational2 but reason is for us no empty word1 for it means the totality which develops itself within itself4 ,again1 it is the standpoint of reflection to regard aspects only1 and nothing in itself4 ,this defect appears in ,spinoza and ,schelling in the fact that they see no necessity why the ,notion1 as the implicit negative of its unity1 should make a separation of itself into different parts2 so that out of the simple universal the real1 the opposed1 itself becomes known4 ,absolute substance1 attribute and mode1 ,spinoza allows to follow one another as definitions1 he adopts them ready-made1 without the attributes being developed from the substance1 or the modes from the attributes4 ,and more especially in regard to the attributes1 there is no necessity evident1 why these are thought and extension in particular4 c4 ,when ,spinoza passes on to individual things1 especially to self-consciousness1 to the freedom of the #8,i1' he expresses himself in such a way as rather to lead back all limitations to substance than to maintain a firm grasp of the individual4 ,thus we already found the attributes not to be independent1 but only the forms in which the understanding grasps substance in its differences2 what comes third1 the modes1 is that under which for ,spinoza all difference of things alone falls4 ,of the modes he says 7,ethic4 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,demonst4 et ,coroll4 ,,ii4 p4 #fc73 ,in every attribute there are two modes2 in extension1 these are rest and motion1 in thought they are understanding and will 7intellectus et voluntas74 ,they are mere modifications which only exist for us apart from ,god2 therefore whatever refers to this difference and is specially brought about by it1 is not absolute1 but finite4 ,these affections ,spinoza sums up 7,ethices1 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xxix4 ,schol4 pp4 #fa1 #fb7 under the head of natura naturata3 8,natura naturans is ,god regarded as free cause1 in so far as ,he is in ,himself and is conceived by ,himself3 or such attributes of substance as express the eternal and infinite essence4 ,by natura naturata1 ,i understand all that follows from the necessity of the divine nature1 or from any of the attributes of ,god1 all modes of the divine attributes1 in so far as they are regarded as things which are in ,god1 and which without ,god can neither exist nor be conceived40 ,from ,god proceeds nothing1 for all things merely return to the point whence they came1 if from themselves the commencement is made4 ,these then are ,spinoza's general forms1 this is his principal idea4 ,some further determinations have still to be mentioned4 ,he gives definitions of the terms modes1 understanding1 will1 and of the affections1 such as joy and sadness4#aii ,we further find consciousness taken into consideration4 ,its development is extremely simple1 or rather it is not developed at all2 ,spinoza begins directly with mind4 8,the essence of man consists of certain modifications of the attributes of ,god02 these modifications are only something related to our understanding4 8,if we1 therefore1 say that the human mind perceives this or that1 it means nothing else than that ,god has this or that idea1 not in so far as ,he is infinite1 but in so far as ,he is expressed by the idea of the human mind4 ,and if we say that ,god has this or that idea1 not in so far as ,he constitutes the idea of the human mind1 but in so far as ,he has1 along with the human mind1 the idea of another thing1 then we say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately40 ,truth is for ,spinoza1 on the other hand1 the adequate4#bjj ,the idea that all particular content is only a modification of ,god is ridiculed by ,bayle1#bja who argues from it that ,god modified as ,turks and ,austrians1 is waging war with ,himself2 but ,bayle has not a trace of the speculative element in him1 although he is acute enough as a dialectician1 and has contributed to the intelligent discussion of definite subjects4 ,the relation of thought and extension in the human consciousness is dealt with by ,spinoza as follows3 8,what has a place in the object0 7or rather in the objective7 8of the idea which constitutes the human mind must be perceived by the human mind2 or there must necessarily be in the mind an idea of this object4 ,the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind is body1 or a certain mode of extension4 ,if1 then1 the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind1 is the body1 there can happen nothing in the body which is not perceived by the mind4 ,otherwise the ideas of the affections of the body would not be in ,god1 in so far as ,he constitutes our mind1 but the idea of another thing3 that is to say1 the ideas of the affections of our body would not be likewise in our mind40 ,what is perplexing to understand in ,spinoza's system is1 on the one hand1 the absolute identity of thought and ,being1 and1 on the other hand1 their absolute indifference to one another1 because each of them is a manifestation of the whole essence of ,god4 ,the unity of the body and consciousness is1 according to ,spinoza1 this1 that the individual is a mode of the absolute substance1 which1 as consciousness1 is the representation of the manner in which the body is affected by external things2 all that is in consciousness is also in extension1 and conversely4 8,mind knows itself only in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections of body10 it has only the idea of the affections of its body2 this idea is synthetic combination1 as we shall immediately see4 8,the ideas1 whether of the attributes of ,god or of individual things1 do not recognize as their efficient cause their objects themselves1 or the things perceived1 but ,god ,himself1 in so far as ,he is that which thinks40#bjb ,buhle 7,geschichte der neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #ebd7 sums up these propositions of ,spinoza thus3 8,thought is inseparably bound up with extension2 therefore all that takes place in extension must also take place in consciousness40 ,spinoza1 however1 also accepts both in their separation from one another4 ,the idea of body1 he writes 7,epistol4 ,,lxvi4 p4 #fgc71 includes only these two in itself1 and does not express any other attributes4 ,the body which it represents is regarded under the attribute of extension2 but the idea itself is a mode of thought4 ,here we see a dividing asunder2 mere identity1 the undistinguishable nature of all things in the ,absolute1 is insufficient even for ,spinoza4 ,the individuum1 individuality itself1 is thus defined by ,spinoza 7,ethic4 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xiii4 ,defin4 p4 #ib73 8,when several bodies of the same or of different magnitudes are so pressed together that they rest on one another1 or when1 moving with like or different degrees of rapidity1 they communicate their movement to one another in a certain measure1 we say that such bodies are united to one another1 and that all together they form one body or individuum1 which by this union distinguishes itself from all the other bodies40 ,here we are at the extreme limit of ,spinoza's system1 and it is here that his weak point appears4 ,individuation1 the one1 is a mere synthesis2 it is quite a different thing from the ,ichts or self-hood of ,boehme 7supra1 pp4 #bje-bjg71 since ,spinoza has only universality1 thought1 and not self-consciousness4 ,if1 before considering this in reference to the whole1 we take it from the other side1 namely from the understanding1 the distinction really falls under that head2 it is not deduced1 it is found4 ,thus1 as we have already seen 7p4 #bgj7 8the understanding in act 7intellectus actu71 as also will1 desire1 love1 must be referred to natura naturata1 not to natura naturans4 ,for by the understanding1 as recognized for itself1 we do not mean absolute thought1 but only a certain mode of thought--a mode which is distinct from other modes like desire1 love1 etc41 and on that account must be conceived by means of absolute thought1 i4e4 by means of an attribute of ,god which expresses an eternal and infinite essentiality of thought2 without which the understanding1 as also the rest of the modes of thought1 could neither be nor be conceived to be40 7,spinoza1 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,i4 ,propos4 ,,xxxi4 pp4 #fb1 #fc74 ,spinoza is unacquainted with an infinity of form1 which would be something quite different from that of rigid1 unyielding substance4 ,what is requisite is to recognize ,god as the essence of essences1 as universal substance1 identity1 and yet to preserve distinctions4 ,spinoza goes on to say3 8,what constitutes the real 7actuale7 existence of the human mind is nothing else than the idea of a particular0 7individual7 8thing1 that actually exists10 not of an infinite thing4 8,the essence of man involves no necessary existence1 i4e4 according to the order of nature a man may just as well be as not be40 ,for the human consciousness1 as it does not belong to essence as an attribute1 is a mode--a mode of the attribute of thought4 ,but neither is the body1 according to ,spinoza1 the cause of consciousness1 nor is consciousness the cause of the body1 but the finite cause is here only the relation of like to like2 body is determined by body1 conception by conception4 8,the body can neither determine the mind to thought1 nor can the mind determine the body to motion1 or rest1 or anything else4 ,for all modes of thought have ,god as ,cause1 in so far as ,he is a thinking thing1 and not in so far as ,he is revealed by means of another attribute4 ,what therefore determines the mind to thought1 is a mode of thought and not of extension2 similarly motion and rest of the body must be derived from another body40#bjc ,i might quote many other such particular propositions from ,spinoza1 but they are very formal1 and a continual repetition of one and the same thing4 ,buhle 7,gesch4 d4 neuern ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,section #b1 pp4 #ebe-ebh71 attributes limited conceptions to ,spinoza3 8,the soul experiences in the body all the #8other' of which it becomes aware as outside of the body1 and it becomes aware of this #8other' only by means of the conceptions of the qualities which the body perceives therein4 ,if1 therefore1 the body can perceive no qualities of a thing1 the soul also can come to no knowledge of it4 ,on the other hand1 the soul is equally unable to arrive at the perception of the body which belongs to it2 the soul knows not that the body is there1 and knows itself even in no other way than by means of the qualities which the body perceives in things which are outside of it1 and by means of the conceptions of the same4 ,for the body is an individual thing1 determined in a certain manner1 which can only gradually1 in association with and amidst other individual things1 attain to existence1 and can preserve itself in existence only as thus connected1 combined and associated with others10 i4e4 in infinite progress2 the body can by no means be conceived from itself4 8,the soul's consciousness expresses a certain determinate form of a ,notion1 as the ,notion itself expresses a determinate form of an individual thing4 ,but the individual thing1 its ,notion1 and the ,notion of this ,notion are altogether and entirely one and the same thing1 only regarded under different attributes4 ,as the soul is nothing else than the immediate ,notion of the body1 and is one and the same thing with this1 the excellence of the soul can never be anything else than the excellence of the body4 ,the capacities of the understanding are nothing but the capacities of the body1 if they are looked at from the corporeal point of view1 and the decisions of the will are likewise determinations of the body4 ,individual things are derived from ,god in an eternal and infinite manner0 7i4e4 once and for all71 8and not in a transitory1 finite and evanescent manner3 they are derived from one another merely inasmuch as they mutually produce and destroy each other1 but in their eternal existence they endure unchangeable4 ,all individual things mutually presuppose each other2 one cannot be thought without the other2 that is to say they constitute together an inseparable whole2 they exist side by side in one utterly indivisible1 infinite ,thing1 and in no other way whatever40 #c4 ,we have now to speak of ,spinoza's system of morals1 and that is a subject of importance4 ,its great principle is no other than this1 that the finite spirit is moral in so far as it has the true ,idea1 i4e4 in so far as it directs its knowledge and will on ,god1 for truth is merely the knowledge of ,god4 ,it may be said that there is no morality loftier than this1 since its only requisite is to have a clear idea of ,god4 ,the first thing ,spinoza speaks of in this regard is the affections3 8,everything strives after self-preservation4 ,this striving is the actual essence of the thing1 and involves only indefinite time2 when referred exclusively to mind1 it is termed will2 when referred to both mind and body together1 it is called desire4 ,determination of the will 7volitio7 and ,idea are one and the same thing4 ,the sense of liberty rests on this1 that men do not know the determining causes of their actions4 ,the affection is a confused idea2 the more clearly and distinctly1 therefore1 we know the affection1 the more it is under our control40#bjd ,the influence of the affections1 as confused and limited 7inadequate7 ideas1 upon human action1 constitutes therefore1 according to ,spinoza1 human slavery2 of the passionate affections the principal are joy and sorrow2 we are in suffering and slavery in so far as we relate ourselves as a part4#bje 8,our happiness and liberty consist in an enduring and eternal love to ,god2 this intellectual love follows from the nature of mind1 in so far as it is regarded as eternal truth through the nature of ,god4 ,the more a man recognizes ,god's existence and loves ,him1 the less does he suffer from evil affections and the less is his fear of death40#bjf ,spinoza requires in addition the true kind of knowledge4 ,there are1 according to him1 three kinds of knowledge2 in the first1 which he calls opinion and imagination1 he includes the knowledge which we obtain from an individual object through the senses--a knowledge fragmentary and ill-arranged--also knowledge drawn from signs1 pictorial conceptions and memory4 ,the second kind of knowledge is for ,spinoza that which we derive from general conceptions and adequate ideas of the properties of things4 ,the third is intuitive knowledge 7scientia intuitiva7 which rises from the adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of ,god to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things4#bjg ,regarding this last he then says3 8,the nature of reason is not to contemplate things as contingent1 but as necessary 444 to think of all things under a certain form of eternity 7sub quadam specie ternitatis720 i4e4 in absolutely adequate ,notions1 i4e4 in ,god4 8,for the necessity of things is the necessity of the eternal nature of ,god ,himself4 ,every idea of an individual thing necessarily includes the eternal and infinite essence of ,god in itself4 ,for individual things are modes of an attribute of ,god2 therefore they must include in themselves ,his eternal essence4 ,our mind1 in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity1 has to that extent necessarily the knowledge of ,god1 and knows that it is itself in ,god and is conceived through ,god4 ,all ,ideas1 in so far as they are referable to ,god1 are true40#bjh ,man must trace back all things to ,god1 for ,god is the ,one in ,all2 the eternal essence of ,god is the one thing that is1 the eternal truth is the only thing for man to aim at in his actions4 ,with ,spinoza this is not a knowledge arrived at through philosophy1 but only knowledge of a truth4 8,the mind can succeed in tracing back all affections of the body or images of things to ,god4 ,in proportion as the mind regards all things as necessary1 it has a greater power over its affections10 which are arbitrary and contingent4 ,this is the return of the mind to ,god1 and this is human freedom2 as mode1 on the other hand1 the spirit has no freedom1 but is determined from without4 8,from the third kind of knowledge there arises the repose of the mind2 the supreme good of the mind is to know ,god1 and this is its highest virtue4 ,this knowledge necessarily produces the intellectual love of ,god2 for it produces a joyfulness accompanied by the ,idea of ,god as cause--i4e4 the intellectual love of ,god4 ,god ,himself loves ,himself with an infinite intellectual love40#bji ,for ,god can have only ,himself as aim and cause2 and the end of the subjective mind is to be directed on ,him4 ,this is therefore the purest1 but also a universal morality4 ,in the thirty-sixth ,letter 7pp4 #eha-ehb7 ,spinoza speaks of ,evil4 ,the allegation is made that ,god1 as the originator of all things and everything1 is also the originator of evil1 is consequently ,himself evil2 in this identity all things are one1 good and evil are in themselves the same thing1 in ,god's substance this difference has disappeared4 ,spinoza says in answer to this3 8,i assert the fact that ,god absolutely and truly0 7as cause of ,himself7 8is the cause of everything that has an essential content0 7i4e4 affirmative reality7 8be it what it may4 ,now if you can prove to me that evil1 error1 crime1 etc41 are something that expresses an essence1 ,i will freely admit to you that ,god is the originator of crime and evil and error4 ,but ,i have elsewhere abundantly demonstrated that the form of evil cannot subsist in anything that expresses an essence1 and therefore it cannot be said that ,god is the cause of evil40 ,evil is merely negation1 privation1 limitation1 finality1 mode--nothing in itself truly real4 8,nero's murder of his mother1 in so far as it had positive content1 was no crime4 ,for ,orestes did the same external deed1 and had in doing it the same end in view--to kill his mother2 and yet he is not blamed10 and so on4 ,the affirmative is the will1 the intention1 the act of ,nero4 8,wherein then consists ,nero's criminality8 ,in nothing else but that he proved himself ungrateful1 merciless1 and disobedient4 ,but it is certain that all this expresses no essence1 and therefore ,god was not the cause of it1 though ,he was the cause of ,nero's action and intention40 ,these last are something positive1 but yet they do not constitute the crime as such2 it is only the negative element1 such as mercilessness1 etc4 that makes the action a crime4 8,we know that whatever exists1 regarded in itself and without taking anything else into consideration1 contains a perfection which extends as widely as the essence of the thing itself extends1 for the essence is in no way different therefrom40--8,because then10 we find in the thirty-second letter 7pp4 #eda1 #edc71 8,god does not regard things abstractly1 or form general definitions10 7of what the thing ought to be7 8and no more reality is required of things than the ,divine understanding and power has given and actually meted out to them2 therefore it clearly follows that such privation exists only and solely in respect to our understanding1 but not in respect to ,god20 for ,god is absolutely real4 ,it is all very well to say this1 but it does not meet the case4 ,for in this way ,god and the respect to our understanding are different4 ,where is their unity8 ,how is this to be conceived8 ,spinoza continues in the thirty-sixth letter3 8,although the works of the righteous 7i4e4 of those who have a clear idea of ,god1 to which they direct all their actions and even their thoughts71 and0 also the works 8of the wicked 7i4e4 of those who have no idea of ,god1 but only ideas of earthly things10--individual1 personal interests and opinions1--8by which their actions and thoughts are directed71 and all whatsoever exists1 necessarily proceed from ,god's eternal laws and counsels1 and perpetually depend on ,god1 they are yet not distinguished from one another in degree1 but in essence2 for although a mouse as well as an angel depends on ,god1 and sorrow as well as joy1 yet a mouse cannot be a kind of angel1 and sorrow cannot be a kind of joy10--they are different in essence4 ,there is therefore no ground for the objection that ,spinoza's philosophy gives the death-blow to morality2 we even gain from it the great result that all that is sensuous is mere limitation1 and that there is only one true substance1 and that human liberty consists in keeping in view this one substance1 and in regulating all our conduct in accordance with the mind and will of the ,eternal ,one4 ,but in this philosophy it may with justice be objected that ,god is conceived only as ,substance1 and not as ,spirit1 as concrete4 ,the independence of the human soul is therein also denied1 while in the ,christian religion every individual appears as determined to salvation4 ,here1 on the contrary1 the individual spirit is only a mode1 an accident1 but not anything substantial4 ,this brings us to a general criticism of the philosophy of ,spinoza1 in the course of which we shall consider it from three different points of view4 ,in the first place ,spinozism is asserted to be ,atheism--by ,jacobi1 for instance 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,i4 p4 #baf7--;because in it no distinction is drawn between ,god and the world2 it makes nature the real ,god1 or lowers ,god to the level of nature1 so that ,god disappears and only nature is established4 ,but it is not so much ,god and nature that ,spinoza sets up in mutual opposition1 as thought and extension2 and ,god is unity1 not ,one made up of two1 but absolute ,substance1 in which has really disappeared the limitation of the subjectivity of thought and nature4 ,those who speak against ,spinoza do so as if it were on ,god's account that they were interested2 but what these opponents are really concerned about is not ,god1 but the finite--themselves4 ,the relationship between ,god and the finite1 to which we belong1 may be represented in three different ways3 firstly1 only the finite exists1 and in this way we alone exist1 but ,god does not exist--this is atheism2 the finite is here taken absolutely1 and is accordingly the substantial4 ,or1 in the second place1 ,god alone exists2 the finite has no reality1 it is only phenomena1 appearance4 ,to say1 in the third place1 that ,god exists and we also exist is a false synthetic union1 an amicable compromise4 ,it is the popular view of the matter that the one side has as much substantiality as the other2 ,god is honoured and supreme1 but finite things also have ,being to exactly the same extent4 ,reason cannot remain satisfied with this 8also10 with indifference like this4 ,the philosophic requisite is therefore to apprehend the unity of these differences in such a way that difference is not let slip1 but proceeds eternally from substance1 without being petrified into dualism4 ,spinoza is raised above this dualism2 religion is so also1 if we turn its popular conceptions into thoughts4 ,the atheism of the first attitude--when men set up as ultimate the arbitrariness of the will1 their own vanity1 the finite things of nature1 and the world dwells for ever in the mind--is not the standpoint of ,spinoza1 for whom ,god is the one and only substance1 the world on the contrary being merely an affection or mode of this substance4 ,in the respect that ,spinoza does not distinguish ,god from the world1 the finite1 it is therefore correct to term his theory atheism1 for his words are these3 ,nature1 the human mind1 the individual1 are ,god revealed under particular forms4 ,it has been already remarked 7pp4 #beg1 #beh1 #bhj7 that undoubtedly ,substance with ,spinoza does not perfectly fulfil the conception of ,god1 since it is as ,spirit that ,he is to be conceived4 ,but if ,spinoza is called an atheist for the sole reason that he does not distinguish ,god from the world1 it is a misuse of the term4 ,spinozism might really just as well or even better have been termed ,acosmism1 since according to its teaching it is not to the world1 finite existence1 the universe1 that reality and permanency are to be ascribed1 but rather to ,god alone as the substantial4 ,spinoza maintains that there is no such thing as what is known as the world2 it is merely a form of ,god1 and in and for itself it is nothing4 ,the world has no true reality1 and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss of the one identity4 ,there is therefore no such thing as finite reality1 it has no truth whatever2 according to ,spinoza what is1 is ,god1 and ,god alone4 ,therefore the allegations of those who accuse ,spinoza of atheism are the direct opposite of the truth2 with him there is too much ,god4 ,they say3 ,if ,god is the identity of mind and nature1 then nature or the individual man is ,god4 ,this is quite correct1 but they forget that nature and the individual disappear in this same identity3 and they cannot forgive ,spinoza for thus annihilating them4 ,those who defame him in such a way as this are therefore not aiming at maintaining ,god1 but at maintaining the finite and the worldly2 they do not fancy their own extinction and that of the world4 ,spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated into thought4 ,spinozism is therefore very far removed from being atheism in the ordinary sense2 but in the sense that ,god is not conceived as spirit1 it is atheism4 ,however1 in the same way many theologians are also atheists who speak of ,god only as the ,almighty ,supreme ,being1 etc41 who refuse to acknowledge ,god1 and who admit the validity and truth of the finite4 ,they are many degrees worse than ,spinoza4 ,the second point to be considered is the method adopted by ,spinoza for setting forth his philosophy2 it is the demonstrative method of geometry as employed by ,euclid1 in which we find definitions1 explanations1 axioms1 and theorems4 ,even ,descartes made it his starting-point that philosophic propositions must be mathematically handled and proved1 that they must have the very same evidence as mathematics4 ,the mathematical method is considered superior to all others1 on account of the nature of its evidence2 and it is natural that independent knowledge in its re-awakening lighted first upon this form1 of which it saw so brilliant an example4 ,the mathematical method is1 however1 ill-adapted for speculative content1 and finds its proper place only in the finite sciences of the understanding4 ,in modern times ,jacobi has asserted 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #bag-bbc7 that all demonstration1 all scientific knowledge leads back to ,spinozism1 which alone is a logical method of thought2 and because it must lead thither1 it is really of no service whatever1 but immediate knowledge is what we must depend on4 ,it may be conceded to ,jacobi that the method of demonstration leads to ,spinozism1 if we understand thereby merely the method of knowledge belonging to the understanding4 ,but the fact is that ,spinoza is made a testing-point in modern philosophy1 so that it may really be said3 ,you are either a ,spinozist or not a philosopher at all4 ,this being so1 the mathematical and demonstrative method of ,spinoza would seem to be only a defect in the external form2 but it is the fundamental defect of the whole position4 ,in this method the nature of philosophic knowledge and the object thereof1 are entirely misconceived1 for mathematical knowledge and method are merely formal in character and consequently altogether unsuited for philosophy4 ,mathematical knowledge exhibits its proof on the existent object as such1 not on the object as conceived2 the ,notion is lacking throughout2 the content of ,philosophy1 however1 is simply the ,notion and that which is comprehended by the ,notion4 ,therefore this ,notion as the knowledge of the essence is simply one assumed1 which falls within the philosophic subject2 and this is what represents itself to be the method peculiar to ,spinoza's philosophy4 ,of this demonstrative manner we have already seen these examples3 77 ,the definitions from which ,spinoza takes his start--as in geometry a commencement is made with the line1 triangle1 c4--concern universal determinations1 such as cause of itself1 the finite1 substance1 attribute1 mode1 and so on1 which are solely and simply accepted and assumed1 not deduced1 nor proved to be necessary3 for ,spinoza is not aware of how he arrives at these individual determinations4 77 ,he further speaks of axioms1 for instance 7,ethic4 ,p4 ,i4 ,ax4 ,i4 p4 #cf73 8,what is1 is either in itself or in another40 ,the determinations 8in itself0 and 8in another0 are not shown forth in their necessity3 neither is this disjunction proved1 it is merely assumed4 77 ,the propositions have1 as such1 a subject and predicate which are not similar4 ,when the predicate is proved of the subject and necessarily combined with it1 the discrepancy remains that the one as universal is related to the other as particular3 therefore even although the relation is proved1 there is present at the same time a secondary relation4 ,mathematical science1 in its true propositions respecting a whole1 escapes from the difficulty by proving also the converse of the propositions1 in this way obtaining for them a special definiteness by proving each proposition in both ways4 ,true propositions may1 therefore1 be looked on as definitions1 and the conversion is the proof of the proposition in the form in which it is expressed4 ,but this means of escaping the difficulty ,philosophy cannot well employ1 since the subject of which something is proved is itself only the ,notion or the universal1 and the proposition form is therefore quite superfluous and out of place4 ,what has the form of the subject is in the form of an existent thing1 as contrasted with the universal1 the content of the proposition4 ,the existent thing is taken as signifying existent in the ordinary sense2 it is the word which we use in every-day life1 and of which we have a conception that has nothing of the ,notion in it4 ,the converse of a proposition would simply read like this3 ,the ,notion is that which is thus popularly conceived4 ,this proof from the usage of language--that we also understand this to be the meaning in every-day life1 or in other words that the name is correct--has no philosophic significance4 ,but if the proposition is not one like this1 but an ordinary proposition1 and if the predicate is not the ,notion1 but some general term or other1 a predicate of the subject1 such propositions are really not philosophic3 we might instance the statement that substance is one and not several1 but only that in which substance and unity are the same4 ,or1 in other words1 this unity of the two moments is the very thing which the proof has to demonstrate1 it is the ,notion or the essence4 ,in this case it looks as if the proposition were the matter of chief importance1 the truth4 ,but if in these really only so-called propositions1 subject and predicate are in truth not alike1 because one is individual and the other universal1 their relation is essential1 i4e4 the reason for which they are one4 ,the proof has here a false position indeed1 as if that subject were implicit or in itself1 whereas subject and predicate are1 fundamentally even1 moments in separation2 in the judgment 8,god is ,one10 the subject itself is universal1 since it resolves itself into unity4 ,on the other side it is implied in this false position that the proof is brought in from outside merely1 as in mathematics from a preceding proposition1 and that the proposition is not therefore conceived through itself2 thus we see the ordinary method of proof take its middle term1 the principle1 from anywhere it can1 in the same way as in classification it takes its principle of classification4 ,the proposition is then1 as it were1 a secondary affair2 but we must ask if this proposition is true4 ,the result as proposition ought to be truth1 but is only knowledge4 ,the movement of knowledge1 as proof1 falls therefore1 in the third place1 outside of the proposition1 which ought to be the truth4 ,the essential moments of the system are really already completely contained in the presuppositions of the definitions1 from which all further proofs have merely to be deduced4 ,but whence have we these categories which here appear as definitions8 ,we find them doubtless in ourselves1 in scientific culture4 ,the existence of the understanding1 the will1 extension1 is therefore not developed from infinite substance1 but it is directly expressed in these determinations1 and that quite naturally2 for of a truth there exists the ,one into which everything enters1 in order to be absorbed therein1 but out of which nothing comes4 ,for as ,spinoza has set up the great proposition1 all determination implies negation 7supra1 p4 #bfg71 and as of everything1 even of thought in contrast to extension1 it may be shown that it is determined and finite1 what is essential in it rests upon negation4 ,therefore ,god alone is the positive1 the affirmative1 and consequently the one substance2 all other things1 on the contrary1 are only modifications of this substance1 and are nothing in and for themselves4 ,simple determination or negation belongs only to form1 but is quite another thing from absolute determinateness or negativity1 which is absolute form2 in this way of looking at it negation is the negation of negation1 and therefore true affirmation4 ,this negative self-conscious moment1 the movement of knowledge1 which pursues its way in the thought which is present before us1 is however certainly lacking to the content of ,spinoza's philosophy1 or at least it is only externally associated with it1 since it falls within self-consciousness4 ,that is to say1 thoughts form the content1 but they are not self-conscious thoughts or ,notions3 the content signifies thought1 as pure abstract self-consciousness1 but an unreasoning knowledge1 into which the individual does not enter3 the content has not the signification of #8,i4' ,therefore the case is as in mathematics2 a proof is certainly given1 conviction must follow1 but yet the matter fails to be understood4 ,there is a rigid necessity in the proof1 to which the moment of self-consciousness is lacking2 the #8,i' disappears1 gives itself altogether up1 merely withers away4 ,spinoza's procedure is therefore quite correct2 yet the individual proposition is false1 seeing that it expresses only one side of the negation4 ,the understanding has determinations which do not contradict one another2 contradiction the understanding cannot suffer4 ,the negation of negation is1 however1 contradiction1 for in that it negates negation as simple determination1 it is on the one hand affirmation1 but on the other hand also really negation2 and this contradiction1 which is a matter pertaining to reason1 is lacking in the case of ,spinoza4 ,there is lacking the infinite form1 spirituality and liberty4 ,i have already mentioned before this 7pp4 #ic1 #id2 #abi-acg7 that ,lullus and ,bruno attempted to draw up a system of form1 which should embrace and comprehend the one substance which organizes itself into the universe2 this attempt ,spinoza did not make4 ,because negation was thus conceived by ,spinoza in one-sided fashion merely1 there is1 in the third place1 in his system1 an utter blotting out of the principle of subjectivity1 individuality1 personality1 the moment of self-consciousness in ,being4 ,thought has only the signification of the universal1 not of self-consciousness4 ,it is this lack which has1 on the one side1 brought the conception of the liberty of the subject into such vehement antagonism to the system of ,spinoza1 because it set aside the independence of the human consciousness1 the so-called liberty which is merely the empty abstraction of independence1 and in so doing set aside ,god1 as distinguished from nature and the human consciousness--that is as implicit or in ,himself1 in the ,absolute2 for man has the consciousness of freedom1 of the spiritual1 which is the negative of the corporeal1 and man has also the consciousness that his true ,being lies in what is opposed to the corporeal4 ,this has been firmly maintained by religion1 theology1 and the sound common sense of the common consciousness1 and this form of opposition to ,spinoza appears first of all in the assertion that freedom is real1 and that evil exists4 ,but because for ,spinoza1 on the other hand1 there exists only absolute universal substance as the non-particularized1 the truly real--all that is particular and individual1 my subjectivity and spirituality1 has1 on the other hand1 as a limited modification whose ,notion depends on another1 no absolute existence4 ,thus the soul1 the ,spirit1 in so far as it is an individual ,being1 is for ,spinoza a mere negation1 like everything in general that is determined4 ,as all differences and determinations of things and of consciousness simply go back into the ,one substance1 one may say that in the system of ,spinoza all things are merely cast down into this abyss of annihilation4 ,but from this abyss nothing comes out2 and the particular of which ,spinoza speaks is only assumed and presupposed from the ordinary conception1 without being justified4 ,were it to be justified1 ,spinoza would have to deduce it from his ,substance2 but that does not open itself out1 and therefore comes to no vitality1 spirituality or activity4 ,his philosophy has only a rigid and unyielding substance1 and not yet spirit2 in it we are not at home with ourselves4 ,but the reason that ,god is not spirit is that ,he is not the ,three in ,one4 ,substance remains rigid and petrified1 without ,boehme's sources or springs2 for the individual determinations in the form of determinations of the understanding are not ,boehme's originating spirits1 which energize and expand in one another 7supra1 pp4 #bjb1 #bjc74 ,what we find regarding this particular then is that it is only a modification of absolute substance1 which1 however1 is not declared to be such2 for the moment of negativity is what is lacking to this rigid motionlessness1 whose single form of activity is this1 to divest all things of their determination and particularity and cast them back into the one absolute substance1 wherein they are simply swallowed up1 and all life in itself is utterly destroyed4 ,this is what we find philosophically inadequate with ,spinoza2 distinctions are externally present1 it is true1 but they remain external1 since even the negative is not known in itself4 ,thought is the absolutely abstract1 and for that very reason the absolutely negative2 it is so in truth1 but with ,spinoza it is not asserted to be the absolutely negative4 ,but if in opposition to ,spinozism we hold fast to the assertion that ,spirit1 as distinguishing itself from the corporeal1 is substantial1 actual1 true1 and in the same way that freedom is not something merely privative1 then this actuality in formal thought is doubtless correct1 yet it rests only upon feeling2 but the further step is that the ,idea essentially includes within itself motion and vitality1 and that it consequently has in itself the principle of spiritual freedom4 ,on the one hand1 therefore1 the defect of ,spinozism is conceived as consisting in its want of correspondence with actuality2 but on the other side it is to be apprehended in a higher sense1 ,i mean in the sense that substance with ,spinoza is only the ,idea taken altogether abstractly1 not in its vitality4 ,if1 in conclusion1 we sum up this criticism that we have offered1 we would say that on the one hand with ,spinoza negation or privation is distinct from substance2 for he merely assumes individual determinations1 and does not deduce them from substance4 ,on the other hand the negation is present only as ,nothing1 for in the absolute there is no mode2 the negative is not there1 but only its dissolution1 its return3 we do not find its movement1 its ,becoming and ,being4 ,the negative is conceived altogether as a vanishing moment--not in itself1 but only as individual self-consciousness2 it is not like the ,separator we met with in ,boehme's system 7supra1 p4 #bjf74 ,self-consciousness is born from this ocean1 dripping with the water thereof1 i4e4 never coming to absolute self-hood2 the heart1 the independence is transfixed--the vital fire is wanting4 ,this lack has to be supplied1 the moment of self-consciousness has to be added4 ,it has the following two special aspects1 which we now perceive emerging and gaining acceptance2 in the first place the objective aspect1 that absolute essence obtains in self-consciousness the mode of an object of consciousness for which the 8other0 exists1 or the existent as such1 and that what ,spinoza understood by the 8modes0 is elevated to objective reality as an absolute moment of the absolute2 in the second place we have the aspect of self-consciousness1 individuality1 independence4 ,as was formerly the case with respect to ,bacon and ,boehme1 the former aspect is here taken up by the ,englishman1 ,john ,locke1 the latter by the ,german ,leibnitz2 in the first case it did not appear as a moment1 nor did it in the second appear as absolute ,notion4 ,now while ,spinoza only takes notice of these ordinary conceptions1 and the highest point of view he reaches in regard to them is that they sink and disappear in the one ,substance1 ,locke on the contrary examines the genesis of these conceptions1 while ,leibnitz opposes to ,spinoza the infinite multiplicity of individuals1 although all these monads have one monad as the basis of their ,being4 ,both ,locke and ,leibnitz therefore came forward as opponents of the above-mentioned one-sidedness of ,spinoza4 #c4 ,,malebranche4 ,the philosophy of ,malebranche is in point of matter entirely identical with that of ,spinoza1 but it has another1 a more religious and more theological form2 on account of this form it never encountered the opposition met with by ,spinoza1 and for the same reason ,malebranche has never been reproached with ,atheism4 ,nicholas ,malebranche was born at ,paris in #afch4 ,he was sickly and deformed in body1 and was hence brought up with great care4 ,he was diffident and loved solitude2 in his twenty-second year he entered the congrgation de l'oratoire1 a sort of spiritual order1 and devoted himself to the sciences4 ,in passing a bookseller's shop he happened accidentally to see ,descartes' work ,de homine2 he read it1 and it interested him greatly--so much so that the reading of it brought on severe palpitation and he was forced to cease4 ,this decided his future life2 there awoke in him an irrepressible inclination for ,philosophy4 ,he was a man of most noble and gentle character1 and of the most genuine and unswerving piety4 ,he died at ,paris in #agae1 and in the seventy-seventh year of his age4#baj ,his principal work bears the title3 ,de la recherche de la vrit4 ,one part of it is entirely metaphysical1 but the greater part is altogether empirical4 ,for instance1 ,malebranche in the first three books treats logically and psychologically of the errors in sight and hearing1 in the imagination and understanding4 a4 ,what is most important in this book is his idea of the origin of our knowledge4 ,he says3 8,the essence of the soul is in thought1 just as that of matter is in extension4 ,all else1 such as sensation1 imagination and will1 are modifications of thought04 ,he thus begins with two sides1 between which he sets an absolute chasm1 and then he follows out in detail the ,cartesian idea of the assistance of ,god in knowledge4 ,his main point is that 8the soul cannot attain to its conceptions and notions from external things40 ,for when ,i and the thing are clearly independent of one another and have nothing in common1 the two can certainly not enter into relation with one another nor be for one another4 8,bodies are impenetrable2 their images would destroy one another on the way to the organs40 ,but further3 8,the soul cannot beget ideas from itself1 nor can they be inborn10 for as 8,augustine has said1 #8,say not that ye yourselves are your own light4'0 ,but how then comes extension1 the manifold1 into the simple1 into the spirit1 since it is the reverse of the simple1 namely the diverse8 ,this question regarding the association of thought and extension is always an important one in ,philosophy4 ,according to ,malebranche the answer is1 8,that we see all things in ,god40 ,god ,himself is the connection between us and them1 and thus the unity between the thing and thought4 8,god has in ,him the ideas of all things because ,he has created all2 ,god is through ,his omnipresence united in the most intimate way with spirits4 ,god thus is the place of spirits10 the ,universal of spirit1 8just as space0 is the universal1 8the place of bodies4 ,consequently the soul knows in ,god what is in ,him10 bodies1 8inasmuch as ,he sets forth0 7inwardly conceives7 8created existence1 because all this is spiritual1 intellectual1 and present to the soul40#baa ,because things and ,god are intellectual and we too are intellectual1 we perceive them in ,god as they are1 so to speak1 intellectual in ,him4 ,if this be further analyzed it in no way differs from ,spinozism4 ,malebranche indeed in a popular way allows soul and things to subsist as independent1 but this independence vanishes away like smoke when the principle is firmly grasped4 ,the catechism says3 8,god is omnipresent10 and if this omnipresence be developed ,spinozism is arrived at2 and yet theologians then proceed to speak against the system of identity1 and cry out about ,pantheism4 b4 ,we must further remark that ,malebranche also makes the universal1 thought1 the essential1 by placing it before the particular4 8,the soul has the ,notion of the infinite and universal3 it knows nothing excepting through the ,idea which it has of the infinite2 this ,idea must hence come first4 ,the universal is not a mere confusion of individual ideas1 it is not a union of individual things40 ,according to ,locke the individual from which the universal is formed precedes 7infra1 p4 #bii72 according to ,malebranche the universal ,idea is what comes first in man4 8,if we wish to think of anything particular we think first of the universal20 it is the principle of the particular1 as space is of things4 ,all essentiality precedes our particular conceptions1 and this essentiality comes first4 8,all essential existences 7essences7 come before our ordinary conception2 they cannot be such excepting by ,god's presence in the mind and spirit4 ,he it is who contains all things in the simplicity of ,his nature4 ,it seems evident that mind would not be capable of representing to itself the universal ,notions of species1 kind1 and suchlike1 if it did not see all things comprehended in one40 ,the universal is thus in and for itself1 and it does not take its rise through the particular4 8,since each existent thing is an individual1 we cannot say that we see something actually created when1 for example1 we see a triangle in general10 for we see it through ,god4 8,no account can be given of how spirit knows abstract and common truths1 excepting through the presence of ,him who can enlighten spirit in an infinite way10 because ,he is in and for ,himself the universal4 8,we have a clear idea of ,god10 of the universal3 8,we can have such only through union with ,him1 for this idea is not a created one10 but is in and for itself4 ,as with ,spinoza1 the one universal is ,god1 and in so far as it is determined1 it is the particular2 we see this particular only in the universal1 as we see bodies in space4 8,we already have a conception of infinite ,being1 inasmuch as we have a conception of ,being without regard to whether it is finite or infinite4 ,to know a finite we must limit the infinite2 and this last must thus precede4 ,thus spirit perceives all in the infinite2 this is so far from being a confused conception of many particular things that all particular conceptions are merely participations in the universal ,idea of infinitude--in the same way that ,god does not receive this ,being from0 finite 8creatures1 but10 on the contrary1 8all creatures only subsist through ,him40#bab c4 ,as regards the turning of the soul to ,god1 ,malebranche says what ,spinoza said from his ethical point of view3 8,it is impossible that ,god should have an end other than ,himself 7the ,holy ,scriptures place this beyond doubt720 the will of ,god can only have the good1 what is without doubt universal as its end4 8,hence not only is it essential that our natural love1 i4e4 the emotion which ,he brings forth in our spirit1 should strive after ,him0--8the will is really love towards ,god0--8but it is likewise impossible that the knowledge and the light which ,he gives to our spirit should make anything else known than what is in ,him10 for thought only exists in unity with ,god4 8,if ,god were to make a spirit and give it the sun as an idea or as the immediate object of its knowledge1 ,god would have made this spirit and the idea of this spirit for the sun and not for ,himself40 ,all natural love1 and still more knowledge1 and the desire after truth1 have ,god as their end4 8,all motions of the will as regards the creatures are only determinations of motion as regards the creator40 ,malebranche quotes from ,augustine 8that we see ,god even from the time we first enter upon this life 7ds cette vie71 through the knowledge that we have of eternal truths4 ,the truth is uncreated1 unchangeable1 immeasurable1 eternal above all things2 it is true through itself1 and has its perfection from no thing4 ,it makes the creator more perfect1 and all spirits naturally seek to know it3 now there is nothing that has these perfections but ,god1 and thus the truth is ,god4 ,we perceive these unchangeable and eternal truths1 hence we see ,god40 8,god indeed sees but ,he does not feel sensuous things4 ,if we see something sensuous1 sensation and pure thought are to be found in our consciousness4 ,sensation is a modification of our spirit2 ,god occasions this because ,he knows that our soul is capable of it4 ,the ,idea which is bound up with the sensation is in ,god2 we see it1 etc4 ,this relation1 this union of our mind and spirit with the ,word 7,verbe7 of ,god1 and of our will with ,his love1 is that we are formed after the image of ,god and in ,his likeness40#bac ,thus the love of ,god consists in relating one's affections to the ,idea of ,god2 whoever knows himself and thinks his affections clearly1 loves ,god4 ,we further find sundry empty litanies concerning ,god1 a catechism for children of eight years of age respecting goodness1 justice1 omnipresence1 the moral order of the world2 in all their lifetime theologians do not get any further4 ,we have given the principal of ,malebranche's ideas2 the remainder of his philosophy is composed partly of formal logic1 and partly of empirical psychology4 ,he passes to the treatment of errors1 how they arise1 how the senses1 the imagination1 the understanding1 deceive us1 and how we must conduct ourselves in order to effect a remedy4 ,then ,malebranche goes on 7,t4 ,,iii4 ,l4 ,,vi4 ,p4 ,i4 chap4 i4 pp4 #a-c7 to the rules and laws for recognizing the truth4 ,thus here the term ,philosophy was even applied to the manner in which reflections on particular objects are drawn from formal logic and external facts4 ,b4 ,,second ,,division4 ,it was ,locke who became the instrument of setting forth this entire manner of thinking in a systematic way1 for he worked out ,bacon's position more fully4 ,and if ,bacon made sensuous ,being to be the truth1 ,locke demonstrated the universal1 ,thought1 to be present in sensuous ,being1 or showed that we obtained the universal1 the true1 from experience4 ,from ,locke a wide culture proceeds1 influencing ,english philosophers more especially2 the forms adopted by this school were various1 but the principle was the same2 it became a general method of regarding things in a popular way1 and calls itself ,philosophy1 although the object of ,philosophy is not to be met with here4 #a4 ,,locke4 ,when experience means that the ,notion has objective actuality for consciousness1 it is indeed a necessary element in the totality2 but as this reflection appears in ,locke1 signifying as it does that we obtain truth by abstraction from experience and sensuous perception1 it is utterly false1 since1 instead of being a moment1 it is made the essence of the truth4 ,it is no doubt true that against the hypothesis of the inward immediacy of the ,idea1 and against the method of setting it forth in definitions and axioms1 as also against absolute substance1 the demand that ideas should be represented as results1 and the claims of individuality and self-consciousness1 assert their rights to recognition4 ,in the philosophy of ,locke and ,leibnitz1 however1 these necessities make themselves known in an imperfect manner only2 the one fact which is common to both philosophers is that they1 in opposition to ,spinoza and ,malebranche1 take for their principle the particular1 finite determinateness and the individual4 ,according to ,spinoza and ,malebranche substance or the universal is the true1 the sole existent1 the eternal1 that which is in and for itself1 without origin1 and of which particular things are only modifications which are conceived through substance4 ,but hereby ,spinoza has done an injury to this negative2 he hence arrived at no immanent determination1 for all that is determined and individual is merely annihilated in his system4 ,now1 on the contrary1 the general inclination of consciousness is to maintain the difference1 partly in order to mark itself out as implicitly free in opposition to its object--,being1 nature1 and ,god1 and partly in order to recognize the unity in this opposition1 and from the opposition itself to make the unity emerge4 ,but those who were the instruments of this tendency comprehended themselves but little1 they had still no clear consciousness of their task1 nor of the manner in which their claims could be satisfied4 ,with ,locke1 this principle makes its first entrance into ,philosophy in a manner so completely at variance with the inflexible undifferentiated identity of the substance of ,spinoza1 that the sensuous and limited1 the immediate present and existent1 is the main and fundamental matter4 ,locke does not get beyond the ordinary point of view of consciousness1 viz4 that objects outside of us are the real and the true4 ,the finite is thus not grasped by ,locke as absolute negativity1 i4e4 in its infinitude2 this we shall not find until we come to deal in the third place with ,leibnitz4 ,it is in a higher sense that ,leibnitz asserts individuality1 the differentiated1 to be self-existent and indeed objectless1 to be true ,being4 ,that is to say1 it is not according to him finite1 but is yet distinguished2 thus1 each monad is itself the totality4 ,leibnitz and ,locke hence likewise stand in a position of mutual independence and antagonism4 ,john ,locke was born in #afcb1 at ,wrington1 in ,england4 ,he studied for himself the ,cartesian philosophy at ,oxford1 setting aside the scholastic philosophy which was still in vogue4 ,he devoted himself to the study of medicine1 which1 however1 on account of his delicate health1 he never really practised4 ,in #affd he went with an ,english ambassador for a year to ,berlin4 ,after his return to ,england1 he became acquainted with the intellectual ,earl of ,shaftesbury of that time1 who availed himself of his medical advice1 and in whose house he lived without requiring to give himself up to practice4 ,when ,lord ,shaftesbury became ,lord ,chancellor of ,england1 ,locke received an office from him1 which1 however1 he soon lost by a change of ministry4 ,owing to his dread of falling a prey to consumption1 he betook himself in #afge to ,montpellier for the benefit of his health4 ,when his patron came into power again he once more recovered the place he had lost1 only to be again deposed on a fresh overthrow of this minister1 and he was now compelled to flee from ,england4 8,the act by means of which ,locke was driven from ,oxford0 7what post he held there we are not told7 8was not an enactment of the ,university1 but of ,james ,,ii41 by whose express command1 and by the peremptory authority of a written warrant1 the expulsion was carried out4 ,from the correspondence that took place1 it is evident that the college submitted itself against its will to a measure which it could not resist without compromising the peace and quiet of its members40 ,locke went to ,holland1 which was at that time the land wherein all who were obliged to effect their escape from any oppression1 whether political or religious1 found protection1 and in which the most famous and liberal-minded men were to be met with4 ,the ,court party persecuted him even here1 and by royal warrant he was ordered to be taken prisoner and sent to ,england2 consequently he had to remain hidden with his friends4 ,when ,william of ,orange ascended the ,english throne1 after the ,revolution of #afhh1 ,locke returned with him to ,england4 ,he was there made ,commissioner of ,trade and ,plantations1 gave to the world his famous treatise on the ,human ,understanding1 and finally1 having withdrawn from public office on account of the delicacy of his health1 he spent his remaining years in the country houses of ,english nobles2 he died on the #bhth day of ,october1 #agjd1 in the seventy-third year of his life4#bad ,the philosophy of ,locke is much esteemed2 it is still1 for the most part1 the philosophy of the ,english and the ,french1 and likewise in a certain sense of the ,germans4 ,to put it in a few words1 it asserts on the one hand that truth and knowledge rest upon experience and observation2 and on the other the analysis of and abstraction from general determinations is prescribed as the method of knowledge2 it is1 so to speak1 a metaphysical empiricism1 and this is the ordinary method adopted in the sciences4 ,in respect of method1 ,locke thus employs an exactly opposite system to that of ,spinoza4 ,in the methods of ,spinoza and ,descartes an account of the origin of ideas may be dispensed with2 they are accepted at once as definitions1 such as those of substance1 the infinite1 mode1 extension1 etc41 all of which constitute a quite incoherent list4 ,but we require to show where these thoughts come in1 on what they are founded1 and how they are verified4 ,thus ,locke has striven to satisfy a true necessity4 ,for he has the merit of having deserted the system of mere definitions1 which were before this made the starting point1 and of having attempted to make deduction of general conceptions1 inasmuch as he was1 for example1 at the pains to show how substantiality arises subjectively from objects4 ,that is a further step than any reached by ,spinoza1 who begins at once with definitions and axioms which are unverified4 ,now they are derived1 and no longer oracularly laid down1 even if the method and manner whereby this authentication is established is not the right one4 ,that is to say1 here the matter in question is merely subjective1 and somewhat psychological1 since ,locke merely describes the methods of mind as it appears to us to be4 ,for in his philosophy we have more especially to deal with the derivation of the general conceptions1 or ideas1 as he called them1 that are present in our knowledge1 and with their origin as they proceed from what is outwardly and inwardly perceptible4 ,malebranche no doubt likewise asks how we arrive at conceptions1 and thus he apparently has before him the same subject of investigation as has ,locke4 ,but firstly1 this psychological element in ,malebranche is merely the later development1 and then to him the universal or ,god is plainly first1 while ,locke commences at once with individual perceptions1 and only from them does he proceed to ,notions1 to ,god4 ,the universal to ,locke is1 therefore1 merely a later result1 the work of our minds2 it is simply something pertaining to thought1 as subjective4 ,every man undoubtedly knows that when his consciousness develops empirically1 he commences from feelings1 from quite concrete conditions1 and that it is only later on that general conceptions come in1 which are connected with the concrete of sensation by being contained therein4 ,space1 for example1 comes to consciousness later than the spacial1 the species later than the individual2 and it is only through the activity of my consciousness that the universal is separated from the particular of conception1 feeling1 etc4 ,feeling undoubtedly comes lowest1 it is the animal mode of spirit2 but in its capacity as thinking1 spirit endeavours to transform feeling into its own form4 ,thus the course adopted by ,locke is quite a correct one1 but all dialectic considerations are utterly and entirely set aside1 since the universal is merely analyzed from the empirical concrete4 ,and in this matter ,kant reproaches ,locke with reason1 the individual is not the source of universal conceptions1 but the understanding4 ,as to ,locke's further reflections1 they are very simple4 ,locke considers how the understanding is only consciousness1 and in being so is something in consciousness1 and he only recognizes the implicit in as far as it is in the same4 a4 ,locke's philosophy is more especially directed against ,descartes1 who1 like ,plato1 had spoken of innate ideas4 ,locke likewise makes special examination of the 8inborn impressions 7notiones communes in foro interiori descript70 which ,lord ,herbert assumes in his work ,de veritate4 ,in the first book of his work ,locke combats the so-called innate ideas1 theoretic as well as practical1 i4e4 the universal1 absolutely existent ideas which at the same time are represented as pertaining to mind in a natural way4 ,locke said that we arrive first at that which we call idea4 ,by this he understands not the essential determinations of man1 but conceptions which we have and which are present and exist in consciousness as such3 in the same way we all have arms and legs as parts of our bodies1 and the desire to eat exists in everyone4 ,in ,locke we thus have the conception of the soul as of a contentless tabula rasa which is by-and-by filled with what we call experience4#bae ,the expression 8innate principles0 was at that time common1 and these innate principles have sometimes been foolishly spoken of4 ,but their true signification is that they are implicit1 that they are essential moments in the nature of thought1 qualities of a germ1 which do not yet exist3 only in relation to this last there is an element of truth in ,locke's conclusions4 ,as diverse conceptions essentially determined they are only legitimatized by its being shown that they are implied in the essential nature of thought2 but as propositions which hold good as axioms1 and conceptions which are immediately accepted as laid down in definitions1 they undoubtedly possess the form of that which is present and inborn4 ,as they are regarded they are bound to have value in and for themselves2 but this is a mere assertion4 ,from the other point of view the question of whence they come is a futile one4 ,mind is undoubtedly determined in itself1 for it is the explicitly existent ,notion2 its development signifies the coming to consciousness4 ,but the determinations which it brings forth from itself cannot be called innate1 for this development must be occasioned by an external1 and only on that does the activity of mind react1 in order that it may for the first time become conscious of its reality4 ,the grounds on which ,locke refutes innate ideas are empirical4 8,there is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain principles1 both speculative and practical1 universally agreed upon by all mankind3 which therefore1 they argue1 must needs be constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first ,beings40 ,but this universal consent is not to be found4 ,we may instance the proposition1 8,whatsoever is1 is2 and ,it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be2 which of all others ,i think have the most allowed title to innate40 ,but this proposition does not hold good for the ,notion2 there is nothing either in heaven or earth which does not contain ,being and non-,being4 ,many men1 8,all children and idiots10 says ,locke1 8have not the least apprehension of these propositions40 8,no proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew1 which it was never yet conscious of4444 ',tis usually answered1 ,that all men know and assent to them0 7the propositions7 8when they come to the use of reason4444 ,if it be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims1 it would prove them not to be innate40 ,reason is said to be the deriving from principles already known unknown truths4 ,how then should the application of reason be required to discover supposed innate principles8 ,this is a weak objection1 for it assumes that by innate ideas we understand those which man possesses in consciousness as immediately present4 ,but development in consciousness is something altogether different from any inherent determination of reason1 and therefore the expression innate idea is undoubtedly quite wrong4 ,innate principles must be found 8clearest and most perspicuous nearest the fountain1 in children and illiterate people1 who have received least impression from foreign opinion40 ,locke gives further reasons of a similar nature1 more especially employing those which are of a practical kind--the diversity in moral judgments1 the case of those who are utterly wicked and depraved1 devoid of sense of right or conscience4#baf b4 ,in the second book ,locke goes on to the next stage1 to the origin of ideas1 and seeks to demonstrate this process from experience--this is the main object of his efforts4 ,the reason that the positive point of view which he opposes to any derivation from within1 is so false1 is that he derives his conceptions only from outside and thus maintains ,being-for-another1 while he quite neglects the implicit4 ,he says3 8,every man being conscious to himself1 that he thinks2 and that which his mind is applied about1 while thinking1 being the ideas that are there2 'tis past doubt1 that men have in their minds several ideas1 such as those expressed in the words1 whiteness1 hardness1 sweetness1 thinking1 motion1 man1 elephant1 army1 drunkenness1 and others40 ,idea here signifies both the ordinary conception and thought2 we understand something quite different by the word idea4 8,it is in the first place then to be inquired1 how he comes by them0 7these ideas78 ,innate ideas have already been refuted4 8,let us then suppose the mind to be1 as we say1 white paper1 void of all characters1 without any ideas2 how comes it to be furnished8444 ,to this ,i answer in a word1 from ,experience3 in that all our knowledge is founded40#bag ,as to the question in point we must in the first place say that it is true that man commences with experience if he desires to arrive at thought4 ,everything is experienced1 not merely what is sensuous1 but also what excites and stimulates my mind4 ,consciousness thus undoubtedly obtains all conceptions and ,notions from experience and in experience2 the only question is what we understand by experience4 ,in a usual way when this is spoken of the idea of nothing particular is conveyed2 we speak of it as of something quite well known4 ,but experience is nothing more than the form of objectivity2 to say that it is something which is in consciousness means that it has objective form for consciousness or that consciousness experiences it1 it sees it as an objective4 ,experience thus signifies immediate knowledge1 perception1 i4e4 ,i myself must have and be something1 and the consciousness of what ,i have and am is experience4 ,now there is no question as to this1 that whatever we know1 of whatever kind it may be1 must be experienced1 that rests in the conception of the thing4 ,it is absurd to say that one knows anything which is not in experience4 ,i undoubtedly know men1 for instance1 from experience1 without requiring to have seen them all1 for ,i have1 as man1 activity and will1 a consciousness respecting what ,i am and what others are4 ,the rational exists1 i4e4 it is as an existent for consciousness1 or this last experiences it2 it must be seen and heard1 it must be there or have been there as a phenomenon in the world4 ,this connection of universal with objective is however in the second place not the only form1 that of the implicit is likewise absolute and essential--that is1 the apprehension of what is experienced or the abrogation of this apparent other-being and the knowledge of the necessity of the thing through itself4 ,it is now quite a matter of indifference whether anything is accepted as something experienced1 as a succession of empirical ideas1 if one may so say1 or conceptions2 or whether the succession is a succession of thoughts1 i4e4 implicitly existent4 ,locke treats of the various kinds of these ideas imperfectly and empirically merely4 4 ,according to ,locke simple ideas arise partly from outward1 and partly from inward experience4 ,for experiences1 he says1 are in the first place sensations2 the other side is reflection1 the inward determinations of consciousness4#bah ,from sensation1 from the organs of sight for instance1 the conceptions of colour1 light1 etc41 arise2 there further arises from outward experience the idea of impenetrability1 of figure1 rest1 motion and such like4 ,from reflections come the ideas of faith1 doubt1 judgment1 reasoning1 thinking1 willing1 etc42 from both combined1 pleasure1 pain1 etc4 ,this is a very commonplace account of the matter4 4 ,after ,locke has presupposed experience1 he goes on to say that it is the understanding which now discovers and desires the universal--the complex ideas4 ,the ,bishop of ,worcester made the objection that 8,if the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident reason1 then we must allow an idea of substance which comes not in by sensation or reflection40 ,locke replies3 8,general ideas come not into the mind by sensation or reflection1 but are the creatures or inventions of the understanding4 ,the mind makes them from ideas which it has got by sensation and reflection40 ,the work of the mind now consists in bringing forth from several simple so-called ideas a number of new ones1 by means of its working upon this material through comparing1 distinguishing and contrasting it1 and finally through separation or abstraction1 whereby the universal conceptions1 such as space1 time1 existence1 unity and diversity1 capacity1 cause and effect1 freedom1 necessity1 take their rise4 8,the mind in respect of its simple ideas is wholly passive1 and receives them all from the existence and operation of things1 such as sensation or reflection offers them1 without being able to make any one idea40 ,but 8the mind often exercises an active power in making these several combinations4 ,for it being once furnished with simple ideas it can put them together in several combinations40 ,according to ,locke therefore thought itself is not the essence of the soul1 but one of its powers and manifestations4 ,he maintains thought to be existent in consciousness as conscious thought1 and thus brings it forward as a fact in his experience1 that we do not always think4 ,experience demonstrates dreamless sleep when the sleep is profound4 ,locke quotes the example of a man who remembered no dream until he had reached his twenty-fifth year4 ,it is as in the ,xenien1--#bai ,oft schon war ich1 und hab' wirklich an gar nichts gedacht4 ,that is to say1 my object is not a thought4 ,but sensuous perception and recollection are thought1 and thought is truth4#bbj ,locke1 however1 places the reality of the understanding only in the formal activity of constituting new determinations from the simple conceptions received by means of perception1 through their comparison and the combination of several into one2 it is the apprehension of the abstract sensations which are contained in the objects4 ,locke likewise distinguishes 7,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xi4 #ae-ag7 between pure and mixed modes4 ,pure modes are simple determinations such as power1 number1 infinitude2 in such expressions as causality we reach1 on the other hand1 a mixed mode4 ,locke now explains in detail the manner in which the mind1 from the simple ideas of experience1 reaches more complex ideas2 but this derivation of general determinations from concrete perception is most unmeaning1 trivial1 tiresome and diffuse2 it is entirely formal1 an empty tautology4 ,for instance we form the general conception of space from the perception of the distance of bodies by means of sight and feeling4#bba ,or in other words1 we perceive a definite space1 abstract from it1 and then we have the conception of space generally2 the perception of distances gives us conceptions of space4 ,this however is no deduction1 but only a setting aside of other determinations2 since distance itself is really space1 mind thus determines space from space4 ,similarly we reach the notion of time through the unbroken succession of conceptions during our waking moments1#bbb i4e4 from determinate time we perceive time in general4 ,conceptions follow one another in a continual succession2 if we set aside the particular element that is present we thereby receive the conception of time4 ,substance 7which ,locke does not accept in so lofty a sense as ,spinoza71 a complex idea1 hence arises from the fact that we often perceive simple ideas such as blue1 heavy1 etc41 in association with one another4 ,this association we represent to ourselves as something which so to speak supports these simple ideas1 or in which they exist4#bbc ,locke likewise deduces the general conception of power4#bbd ,the determinations of freedom and necessity1 cause and effect1 are then derived in a similar way4 8,in the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things1 we cannot but observe1 that several particulars1 both qualities and substance1 begin to exist2 and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being4 ,from this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect10 for instance when wax is melted by the fire4#bbe ,locke goes on to say3 8,every one1 ,i think1 finds in himself a power to begin or forbear1 continue or put an end to several actions in himself4 ,from the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man1 which every one finds in himself1 arise the ideas of liberty and necessity40#bbf ,we may say that nothing can be more superficial than this derivation of ideas4 ,the matter itself1 the essence1 is not touched upon at all4 ,a determination is brought into notice which is contained in a concrete relationship2 hence the understanding on the one hand abstracts and on the other establishes conclusions4 ,the basis of this philosophy is merely to be found in the transference of the determinate to the form of universality1 but it was just this fundamental essence that we had to explain4 ,as to this ,locke confesses of space1 for example1 that he does not know what it really is4#bbg ,this so-called analysis by ,locke of complex conceptions1 and his so-called explanation of the same1 has1 on account of its uncommon clearness and lucidity of expression1 found universal acceptance4 ,for what can be clearer than to say that we have the notion of time because we perceive time1 if we do not actually see it1 and that we conceive of space because we see it8 ,the ,french have accepted this most readily and they have carried it further still2 their ,idologie contains nothing more nor less4 4 ,when ,locke starts by saying that everything is experience and we abstract for ourselves from this experience general conceptions regarding objects and their qualities1 he makes a distinction in respect of external qualities which was before this made by ,aristotle 7,de anima1 ,,ii4 #f71 and which we likewise met with in ,descartes 7supra1 pp4 #bde1 #bdf74 ,that is to say1 ,locke distinguishes between primary and secondary qualities2 the first pertain to the objects themselves in truth1 the others are not real qualities1 but are founded on the nature of the organs of sensation4 ,primary qualities are mechanical1 like extension1 solidity1 figure1 movement1 rest2 these are qualities of the corporeal1 just as thought is the quality of the spiritual4 ,but the determinations of our individual feelings such as colours1 sounds1 smells1 taste1 etc41 are not primary4#bbh ,in ,descartes' case this distinction has however another form1 for the second class of these determinations is defined by him in such a way as that they do not constitute the essence of body1 while ,locke says that they exist for sensation1 or fall within existence as it is for consciousness4 ,locke1 however1 no doubt reckons figure1 etc41 as still pertaining to reality1 but by so doing nothing is ascertained as to the nature of body4 ,in ,locke a difference here appears between the implicit and being #8for-another1' in which he declares the moment of #8for-another' to be unreal--and yet he sees all truth in the relation of #8for-another' only4 c4 ,since the universal as such1 the idea of species1 is1 according to ,locke1 merely a product of our mind1 which is not itself objective1 but relates merely to objects which are germane to it1 and from which the particular of qualities1 conditions1 time1 place1 etc41 are separated1 ,locke distinguishes essences into real essences and nominal essences2 the former of these express the true essence of things1 while species on the other hand are mere nominal essences which no doubt express something which is present in the objects1 but which do not exhaust these objects4 ,they serve to distinguish species for our knowledge1 but the real essence of nature we do not know4#bbi ,locke gives good reasons for species being nothing in themselves--for their not being in nature1 or absolutely determined--instancing in exemplification the production of monstrosities 7,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 #ag73 were species absolute no monster would be born4 ,but he overlooks the fact that since it pertains to species to exist1 it thereby likewise enters into relationship with other determinations2 thus that is the sphere in which individual things operate upon one another1 and may hence be detrimental to the existence of the species4 ,locke thus argues just as one would who wished to prove that the good does not exist in itself1 because there are likewise evil men1 that the circle does not exist absolutely in nature1 because the circumference of a tree1 for example1 represents a very irregular circle1 or because ,i draw a circle badly4 ,nature just signifies the lack of power to be perfectly adequate to the ,notion2 it is only in spirit that the ,notion has its true existence4 ,to say that species are nothing in themselves1 that the universal is not the essential reality of nature1 that its implicit existence is not the object of thought1 is tantamount to saying that we do not know real existence3 it is the same litany which has since been so constantly repeated that we are tired of listening to it3 ,das ,innere der ,natur kennt kein erschaffener ,geist1 and which goes on until we have perceived that ,being-for-another1 perception1 is not implicit2 a point of view which has not made its way to the positive position that the implicit is the universal4 ,locke is far back in the nature of knowledge1 further back than ,plato1 because of his insistence on ,being-for-another4 ,it is further noteworthy that from the sound understanding ,locke argues 7,vol4 ,,iii4 ,bk4 ,,iv4 chap4 vii4 #h-aa7 against universal propositions or axioms such as that ,a ,a1 i4e4 if anything is ,a it cannot be ,b4 ,he says they are superfluous1 of very little use or of no use at all1 for nobody yet has built up a science on a proposition which asserts a contradiction4 ,from such the true may be proved as easily as the false2 they are tautological4 ,what ,locke has further achieved in respect of education1 toleration1 natural rights or universal state-right1 does not concern us here1 but has to do with general culture4 ,this is the philosophy of ,locke1 in which there is no trace of speculation4 ,the great end of ,philosophy1 which is to know the truth1 is in it sought to be attained in an empiric way2 it thus indeed serves to draw attention to general determinations4 ,but such a philosophy not only represents the standpoint of ordinary consciousness1 to which all the determinations of its thought appear as if given1 humble as it is in the oblivion of its activity1 but in this method of derivation and psychological origination that which alone concerns ,philosophy1 the question of whether these thoughts and relationships have truth in and for themselves1 is not present at all1 inasmuch as the only object aimed at is to describe the manner in which thought accepts what is given to it4 ,it may be held with ,wolff that it is arbitrary to begin with concrete conceptions1 as when our conception of identity is made to take its origin from such things as blue flowers and the blue heavens4 ,one can better begin directly from universal conceptions and say that we find in our consciousness the conceptions of time1 cause and effect2 these are the later facts of consciousness4 ,this method forms the basis of the ,wolffian system of reasoning1 only here we must still distinguish amongst the different conceptions those that are to be regarded as most essential2 in ,locke's philosophy1 this distinction cannot really be said to come under consideration4 ,from this time1 according to ,locke1 or in this particular aspect of ,philosophy1 there is a complete and entire change in the point of view adopted2 the whole interest is limited to the form in which the objective1 or individual sensations1 pass into the form of conceptions4 ,in the case of ,spinoza and ,malebranche1 we undoubtedly likewise saw that it was made a matter of importance to recognize this relation of thought to what is sensuously perceived1 and thus to know it as falling into relation1 as passing into the relative2 the main question hence was3 ,how are the two related8 ,but the question was answered to the effect that it is only this relation for itself that constitutes the point of interest1 and this relation itself as absolute substance is thus identity1 the true1 ,god1 it is not the related parts4 ,the interest does not lie in the related parts2 the related parts as one-sided are not the existent1 presupposed and permanently established1 they are accidental merely4 ,but here the related sides1 the things and the subject1 have their proper value1 and they are presupposed as having this value4 ,locke's reasoning is quite shallow2 it keeps entirely to the phenomenal1 to that which is1 and not to that which is true4 ,there is another question however3 ,are these general determinations absolutely true8 ,and whence come they not alone into my consciousness1 into my mind and understanding1 but into the things themselves8 ,space1 cause1 effect1 etc41 are categories4 ,how do these categories come into the particular8 ,how does universal space arrive at determining itself8 ,this point of view1 the question whether these determinations of the infinite1 of substance1 etc41 are in and for themselves true1 is quite lost sight of4 ,plato investigated the infinite and the finite1 ,being and the determinate1 etc41 and pronounced that neither of these opposites is of itself true2 they are so only as together constituting an identity1 wherever the truth of this content may come from4 ,but here the truth as it is in and for itself is entirely set aside and the nature of the content itself is made the main point4 ,it does not matter whether the understanding or experience is its source1 for the question is whether this content is in itself true4 ,with ,locke1 the truth merely signifies the harmony of our conceptions with things2 here relation is alone in question1 whether the content is an objective thing or a content of the ordinary conception4 ,but it is quite another matter to investigate the content itself1 and to ask1 8,is this which is within us true80 ,we must not dispute about the sources1 for the ,whence1 the only important point to ,locke1 does not exhaust the whole question4 ,the interest of the content in and for itself wholly disappears when that position is taken up1 and thereby the whole of what is aimed at by ,philosophy is given up4 ,on the other hand1 when thought is from the beginning concrete1 when thought and the universal are synonymous with what is set before us1 the question of the relation of the two which have been separated by thought is destitute of interest and incomprehensible4 ,how does thought overcome the difficulties which itself has begotten8 ,here with ,locke none at all have been begotten and awakened4 ,before the need for reconciliation can be satisfied1 the pain of disunion must be excited4 ,the philosophy of ,locke is certainly very comprehensible1 but for that very reason it is likewise a popular philosophy to which the whole of the ,english philosophy as it exists at this day is allied2 it is the thinking method of regarding things which is called philosophy carried to its perfection1 the form which was introduced into the science which then took its rise in ,europe4 ,this is an important moment in culture2 the sciences in general and specially the empiric sciences have to ascribe their origin to this movement4 ,to the ,english1 ,philosophy has ever signified the deduction of experiences from observations2 this has in a one-sided way been applied to physical and economic subjects4 ,general principles of political economy such as free-trade in the present day1 and all matters which rest on thinking experience1 the knowledge of whatever reveals itself in this sphere as necessary and useful1 signifies philosophy to the ,english 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #eg1 #eh74 ,the scholastic method of starting from principles and definitions has been rejected4 ,the universal1 laws1 forces1 universal matter1 etc41 have in natural science been derived from perceptions2 thus to the ,english1 ,newton is held to be the philosopher ' 4 ,the other side is that in practical philosophy regarding society or the state1 thought applies itself to concrete objects such as the will of the prince1 subjects and their ends and personal welfare4 ,inasmuch as we have an object such as that before us1 the indwelling and essential universal is made evident2 it must1 however1 be made clear which conception is the one to which the others must yield4 ,it is in this way that rational politics took their rise in ,england1 because the institutions and government peculiar to the ,english led them specially and in the first place to reflection upon their inward political and economic relationships4 ,hobbes must be mentioned as an exemplification of this fact4 ,this manner of reasoning starts from the present mind1 from what is our own1 whether it be within or without us1 since the feelings which we have1 the experiences which fall directly within us1 are the principles4 ,this philosophy of reasoning thought is that which has now become universal1 and through which the whole revolution in the position taken up by mind has come to pass4 #b4 ,,hugo ,,grotius4 ,hugo ,grotius was studying the laws of nations at the same time as ,locke2 and in him the very same methods may be found as those already mentioned1 inasmuch as he also falls into a quite empirical system of associating nations with one another1 combining with that an empirical mode of reasoning4 ,hugo van ,groot1 born #aehc at ,delft1 was a lawyer1 fiscal general1 and council pensionary2 in #afai1 however1 he was implicated in the ,barneveldt trial1 and was compelled to fly the country4 ,for a long time he remained in ,france1 but in #afcd he entered the service of ,queen ,christina of ,sweden4 ,in #afce he was made ,swedish ambassador in ,paris1 and in #afde he died at ,rostock1 while on a journey from ,stockholm to ,holland4#bcj ,his principal work1 ,de jure belli et pacis1 he composed in #afbe2 now it is not read1 but at one time it exercised a very great and important influence4 ,in it ,grotius presented a comparative historical account1 the material of which was partly derived from the ,old ,testament1 of the manner in which nations in the various relationships of war and peace have acted towards one another1 and what usages they held to be binding4 ,the following may serve as an example of his empirical method of reasoning3 ,prisoners ought not to be killed2 for the object is to disarm the enemy1 and if this end be attained nothing further should be done4#bca ,this empirical way of connecting facts had the effect of bringing general comprehensible and rational principles into consciousness1 of making them recognized1 and of causing them to be more or less acceptable4 ,thus we see principles set forth1 respecting the righteousness of a king's power for instance2 for thought applied itself to everything4 ,we are unsatisfied by such proofs and deductions1 but we must not overlook what is thereby accomplished2 and this is the establishment of principles which have their ultimate confirmation in the objects themselves1 in mind and thought4 #c4 ,,thomas ,,hobbes4 ,hobbes1 who was celebrated and distinguished on account of the originality of his views1 was tutor to the ,earl of ,devonshire2 he was born in #aehh at ,malmesbury1 and died in #afgi4bcb ,as a contemporary of ,cromwell1 he found in the events of that time1 in the ,revolution which then took place in ,england1 an occasion for reflecting on the principles of state and law1 and in fact he succeeded in making his way to quite original conceptions4 ,he wrote much1 including a treatise on ,philosophy1 entitled 8,the ,elements of ,philosophy40 ,the first section 7,sectio7 of this work1 ,de corpore1 appeared in ,london in #afee2 in it he first of all treats of ,logic 7,pars ,i471 and secondly of philosophia prima 7,pars ,,ii472 this last is an ontology and metaphysic4 ,the next sub-division 7,pars ,,iii471 8,on the relation between motion and magnitude10 is a system of mechanism1 a quite popular system of physics2 and a study of the human organs4 ,the second section was to treat of the nature of man 7,de homine71 and the third of the state 7,de cive71 but the intellectual sections of the work ,hobbes did not entirely finish4 ,he says in his preface that ,copernicus first opened up astronomy1 and ,galileo physics1 before them there was nothing certain in either science4 ,harvey worked out the science of the human body1 and physics generally as well as astronomy were perfected by ,keppler4 ,all this was termed ,philosophy1 in accordance with the point of view which has been already given 7p4 #cac71 since in it the reflective understanding desires to know the universal4 ,hobbes further says concerning the philosophy of the state 7philosophia civilis71 that it only dates from the publication of his book ,de cive4#bcc ,this work1 which appeared at ,paris in #afdb1bcd is1 like his ,leviathan1 a much decried book2 the second mentioned writing was forbidden to be circulated1 and is hence very rare4 ,both works contain sounder reflections on the nature of society and government than many now in circulation4 ,society1 the state1 is to ,hobbes absolutely pre-eminent1 it is the determining power without appeal as regards law and positive religion and their external relations2 and because he placed these in subjection to the state1 his doctrines were of course regarded with the utmost horror4 ,but there is nothing speculative or really philosophic in them1 and there is still less in ,hugo ,grotius4 ,before this ideals were set before us1 or ,holy ,scripture or positive law was quoted as authoritative4 ,hobbes1 on the contrary1 sought to derive the bond which holds the state together1 that which gives the state its power1 from principles which lie within us1 which we recognize as our own4 ,in this way two opposite principles arise4 ,the first is the passive obedience of subjects1 the divine authority of rulers1 whose will is absolute law1 and is itself elevated above all other law4 ,all this is represented in close connection with religion1 and proved by examples from the ,old ,testament1 by such stories as those of ,saul and ,david4 ,criminal and marriage laws1 too1 for long derived their character from the ,mosaic laws1 or1 speaking generally1 from those the provisions of which possessed their value by the fact of being established by express divine command4 ,on the other hand we have in the second place the reasoning wherein we ourselves are the determining agents1 and which was called sound reason4 ,in the movement which ,cromwell made use of there was allied with this a fanaticism1 which from the written letter drew opposite conclusions to the above1 and this we see exemplified in the equality of property1 for instance4 ,hobbes1 it is true1 likewise maintained passive obedience1 the absolute freedom of the royal will and power2 but at the same time he sought to derive the principles of monarchical power1 etc41 from universal determinations4 ,the views that he adopts are shallow and empirical1 but the reasons he gives for them1 and the propositions he makes respecting them1 are original in character1 inasmuch as they are derived from natural necessities and wants4 ,hobbes maintained that 8,the origin of all society is to be found in the mutual fear of all its members20 it is hence a phenomenon in consciousness4 8,each association is thus formed in its own interest or for its own renown1 that is1 from selfish motives40 ,all such matters as security of life1 property1 and enjoyment1 are not to be found outside it4 8,but men have in all dissimilarity of strength a natural similarity as well40 ,this ,hobbes proves by a characteristic reason1 viz4 that 8each individual can make away with the other10 each is the ultimate power over the others4 8,each can be supreme40#bce ,thus their similarity is not derived from the greatest strength2 it is not1 as in modern times1 founded on the freedom of the spirit1 or on an equality of merit and independence1 but on the equal weakness of mankind2 each man is weak as regards others4 b4 ,hobbes further takes up the position that this natural condition is of such a nature that all possess the desire to rule over one another4 8,all in their natural condition are possessed of the will to injure others10 to tyrannize over other men2 each has thus to fear the other4 ,hobbes looks at this condition in its true light1 and we find in him no idle talk about a state of natural goodness2 the natural condition is really far more like that of the animals--a condition in which there is an unsubdued individual will4 ,all thus wish to 8secure themselves against the pretensions of others1 to acquire for themselves advantages and superior rights4 ,opinions1 religions1 desires1 arouse strife2 the stronger bears away the victory4 ,the natural condition is consequently a condition of mistrust on the part of all towards all2 it is a war of all against all 7bellum omnium in omnes710 and the endeavour of one to overreach another4 ,the expression nature has a double significance3 ,in the first place the nature of man signifies his spiritual and rational ,being2 but his natural condition indicates quite another condition1 wherein man conducts himself according to his natural impulses4 ,in this way he conducts himself in conformity with his desires and inclinations1 while the rational1 on the contrary1 is the obtaining supremacy over the immediately natural4 8,in the condition of nature a certain irresistible power grants the right to rule over those who cannot resist2 it is absurd to leave those whom we have in our power to become free and strong again40 ,from this ,hobbes draws the conclusion that 8man must go forth from the natural condition40#bcf ,this is true2 the natural condition is not what it should be1 and must hence be cast off4 c4 ,hobbes finally passes to the laws of reason which preserve tranquillity4 ,this condition of law is the subjection of the natural1 particular will of the individual to the universal will1 which1 however1 is not that of all individuals1 but is the will of the ruler2 this is consequently not responsible to individuals1 but is directed against this private will1 and to it all must be obedient4#bcg ,thus the whole matter is now placed on quite another footing4 ,but because the universal will is made to reside in the will of one monarch1 there nevertheless proceeds from this point of view1 which is really correct1 a condition of absolute rule1 of perfect despotism4 ,the condition of law does not1 however1 mean that the arbitrary will of one man constitutes absolute law1 for the universal will is no despotism1 being rational1 inasmuch as it is consistently expressed and determined in laws4 ,rixner 7,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #cj7 says3 8,law to him is nothing but the sum of the conditions of peace extorted by iron necessity from the original wickedness of mankind40 ,we might add that in ,hobbes we at least find this1 that the nature and organism of the ,state is established on the principle of human nature1 human desire1 c4 ,the ,english concerned themselves greatly with that principle of passive obedience1 in accordance with which it is said that kings receive their power from ,god4 ,this1 in one aspect1 is quite true1 but in another it is falsely taken to mean that they have no responsibility1 that their blind desires1 their merely subjective will1 is what must be obeyed4 #d4 ,,cudworth1 ,,clarke1 ,,wollaston4 ,cudworth wished to revive ,plato in ,england1 but to do this after the manner of the demonstrations which we met with in ,descartes1 and through a trivial metaphysic of the understanding4 ,he wrote a celebrated work3 8,the true intellectual ,system of the ,universe10 but the ,platonic ideas expressed are often in a clumsy form and mingled with the ,christian conceptions of ,god and angels--all regarded as particular existent things4 ,what in ,plato is mythical1 is here taken as reality in the form of existence2 this is reasoned about just as we reason respecting a matter of ordinary fact1 such as whether it is probable that the ,french seek to effect a landing in ,england1 and if so1 whether they will successfully accomplish it4 ,the ,christian intellectual world is dragged down to the form of ordinary actuality1 and consequently it is ruined4 ,the name of ,clarke is likewise famous in connection with his proof of the existence of ,god4 ,there were quite a number of other ,english philosophers1 whom we do not1 however1 require to notice2 for ,clarke1 ,wollaston1 and others carry on their speculations within forms such as belong to a very commonplace metaphysic of the understanding4 ,the manifold systems of moral philosophy which we find taking their rise in ,england are drawn up from this same mental standpoint2 in them the implicitude of mind appears in a form of natural existence1 namely1 of desires and feelings4 ,their principles are found in moral sentiments1 benevolent desires1 sympathy1 c4 ,that form alone is worthy of notice which1 on the one hand1 represents duty as something which is not foreign1 given1 commanded1 but as clearly belonging to self-consciousness1 even while1 on the other hand1 it represents this property as a natural1 unconscious1 unspiritual1 and irrational existence4 ,impulse is blind1 a solid existence which cannot get beyond itself like thinking self-consciousness4 ,it is indeed true of impulse that its pure activity or its process1 and the content1 are1 as in thought1 immediately posited as the same2 it has its content in itself1 and this is not dead and passive1 but self-acting and impelling4 ,but that unity has the form of immediacy only as existent2 in the first place it is not a knowledge1 it is not necessary1 for it is only taken from inward perception2 in the second place1 it is a determinate which does not abrogate itself1 beyond which we cannot get1 and which thus is not a universal4 ,impulse is no more an infinite than is the fixed category of force4 ,such reasoning takes the impulses in their determinate character from experience1 and expresses the appearance of necessity in the same as an inward existence1 as a force4 ,for instance1 the social instinct is a moment which is found in experience1 because man derives all manner of utility from society4 ,wherein does the necessity of the ,state1 of society1 find its basis8 ,in a social desire4 ,this is cause1 just as in the physical world a formal interpretation such as this is always to be found4 ,the necessity of any existent fact1 such as what pertains to electrical phenomena1 finds its basis in a force which brings it forth2 it is merely the form of returning from the external to an inward1 of passing from the existent to what is thought1 which is again in turn represented as an existent4 ,force is necessitated by reason of the manifestation1 we must argue from the latter to the former4 ,on the other hand1 the manifestation takes place through the force1 for it is the cause of the manifestation2 we hence have force in one place as reason1 and in another as cause4 ,but in all this there is no realization of the fact that in respect of form there is a transition from the ,notion into ,being and the other way1 while in respect of content there is a perfect contingency of manifestation2 we look at electricity in the same way as we look at the fact that men have social instincts1 sympathetic inclinations1 and so on4 #e4 ,,puffendorf4 ,in the struggle to give to just and equitable relations in the ,state an independent basis of their own1 and to found a judicial system of government1 reflective thought put forth its efforts2 and this became to it a real interest and concern4 ,and1 as in the case of ,grotius1 it was also true of ,puffendorf1 that the instinct of mankind--that is1 the social instinct1 c4--was made the principle4 ,samuel von ,puffendorf was born in #afcb in ,saxony2 he studied public law1 philosophy1 and mathematics at ,leipzig and ,jena2 in #affa1 as a professor at ,heidelberg1 he made natural and civil law for the first time academic studies2 in #affh he became tutor in a ,swedish family1 which office he later on exchanged for the service of the ,house of ,brandenburg1 and in #afid he died at ,berlin as a privy councillor4 ,he wrote several works on political law and history2 we must specially mention his work1 ,de jure natur et gentium1 ,libr4 viii41 ,londin4 ,scan4 #afgb1 #d2 and also his compendium ,de officio hominis1 published at the same place in #afgc1 #h1 and ,elementa jurisprudenti universalis4#bch ,while the divine right of kings was here still recognized--whereby they rendered account to ,god alone1 or1 at all events1 were still bound to take counsel of the ,church--the impulses and necessities present in mankind were now considered as well4 ,these were regarded as the inward principles for private and political law1 and from them the duties both of the government and of rulers were deduced1 so that the freedom of mankind might not be interfered with4 ,the basis of the state in ,puffendorf's view is the social instinct3 the highest end of the state is the peace and security of social life through the transformation of inward duties as prescribed by conscience into external duties as compelled by law4#bci #f4 ,,newton4 ,the other side is that thought likewise applied itself to nature1 and in this connection ,isaac ,newton is famous by reason of his mathematical discoveries and his work in physics4 ,he was born in #afdb at ,cambridge1 made a special study of mathematics1 and became professor of the same at ,cambridge2 later on he was made president of the ,royal ,society in ,london1 and he died in #agbg4bdj ,newton was indisputably the chief contributor to the popularity of the philosophy of ,locke1 or the ,english method of treating of ,philosophy1 and more especially did he promote its application to all the physical sciences4 8,physics1 beware of metaphysics10 was his maxim1#bda which signifies1 ,science1 beware of thought2 and all the physical sciences1 even to the present day1 have1 following in his wake1 faithfully observed this precept1 inasmuch as they have not entered upon an investigation of their conceptions1 or thought about thoughts4 ,physics can1 however1 effect nothing without thought2 it has its categories and laws through thought alone1 and without thought it does not effect any progress4 ,newton was mainly instrumental in introducing to physics the determinations respecting forces1 which pertain to reflection2 he raised science to the standpoint of reflection1 and set the laws of forces in the place of the laws of phenomena4 ,regarding matters as he did1 ,newton derived his conclusions from his experiences2 and in physics and the theory of colour-vision1 he made bad observations and drew worse conclusions4 ,he passed from experiences to general points of view1 again made them fundamental1 and from them constructed the individual2 this is how his theories are constructed4 ,the observation of things1 the discovery of the law immanent therein1 and the universal which is found within them1 has become the real point of interest4 ,in this way1 ,newton is so complete a barbarian as regards his conceptions that his case is like that of another of his countrymen who was surprised and rejoiced to learn that he had talked prose all his life1 not having had any idea that he was so accomplished4 ,this ,newton1 like all the ,physicists1 indeed1 never learned2 he did not know that he thought in1 and had to deal with ,notions1 while he imagined he was dealing with physical facts3 and he presented the extremest contrast to ,boehme1 who handled sensuous things as ,notions1 and1 by sheer force of mind1 obtained entire possession of their actuality and subjugated them4 ,instead of this ,newton treated ,notions like sensuous things1 and dealt with them just as men deal with wood and stone4 ,and this is even now the case4 ,in the beginnings of physical science we read of the power of inertia1 for instance1 of the force of acceleration1 of molecules1 of centripetal and centrifugal force1 as of facts which definitely exist2 what are really the final results of reflection are represented as their first grounds4 ,if we ask for the cause of there being no advance made in such sciences1 we find that it is because men do not understand that they should apply themselves to ,notions1 but make up their minds to adopt these determinations without sense or understanding4 ,hence in ,newton's ,optics1 for instance1 there are conclusions derived from his experience which are so untrue and devoid of understanding1 that while they are set forth as the finest example of how men can learn to know nature by means of experiments and conclusions derived from experiments1 they may also serve as an example of how we should neither experiment nor draw conclusions1 of how nothing at all can be learned4 ,a miserable kind of experience like this itself contradicts itself through nature1 for nature is more excellent than it appears in this wretched experience3 both nature itself and experience1 when carried a little further1 contradict it4 ,hence1 of all the splendid discoveries of ,newton in optics1 none now remain excepting one--the division of light into seven colours4 ,this is partly because the conception of whole and part come into play1 and partly from an obdurate closing of the eyes to the opposite side4 ,from this empirical method in ,philosophy1 we shall now pass on to ,leibnitz4 ,c4 ,,third ,,section4 ,the third development of the philosophy of the understanding is that represented by ,leibnitz and ,wolff4 ,if ,wolff's metaphysics is divested of its rigid form1 we have as a result the later popular philosophy4 #a4 ,,leibnitz4 ,as in other respects ,leibnitz represents the extreme antithesis to ,newton1 so in respect of philosophy he presents a striking contrast to ,locke and his empiricism1 and also to ,spinoza4 ,he upholds thought as against the perception of the ,english school1 and in lieu of sensuous ,being he maintains ,being for thought to be the essence of truth1 just as ,boehme at an earlier time upheld implicit ,being4 ,while ,spinoza asserted the universality1 the oneness of substance merely1 and while with ,locke we saw infinite determinations made the basis1 ,leibnitz1 by means of his fundamental principle of individuality1 brings out the essentiality of the opposite aspect of ,spinoza's philosophy1 existence for self1 the monad1 but the monad regarded as the absolute ,notion1 though perhaps not yet as the 8,i40 ,the opposed principles1 which were forced asunder1 find their completion in each other1 since ,leibnitz's principle of individuation completed ,spinoza's system as far as outward aspect goes4 ,gottfried ,wilhelm1 ,baron von ,leibnitz1 was born in #afdf at ,leipzig1 where his father was professor of ,philosophy4 ,the subject that he studied in view of a profession was jurisprudence1 but first1 in accordance with the fashion of the day1 he made a study of ,philosophy1 and to it he devoted particular attention4 ,to begin with1 he picked up in ,leipzig a large and miscellaneous stock of knowledge1 then he studied ,philosophy and mathematics at ,jena under the mathematician and theosophist ,weigel1 and took his degree of ,master of ,philosophy in ,leipzig4 ,there also1 on the occasion of his graduation as ,doctor of ,philosophy1 he defended certain philosophical theses1 some of which discourses are still contained in his works 7ed4 ,dutens1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #djj74 ,his first dissertation1 and that for which he obtained the degree of doctor of philosophy1 was3 ,de principio individui1--a principle which remained the abstract principle of his whole philosophy1 as opposed to that of ,spinoza4 ,after he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the subject1 he wished to graduate also as ,doctor of ,laws4 ,but though he died an imperial councillor1 it was his ill fortune to receive from the ,faculty at ,leipzig a refusal to confer the doctorate upon him1 his youth being the alleged reason4 ,such a thing could scarcely happen now-a-days4 ,it may be that it was done because of his over-great philosophical attainments1 seeing that lawyers are wont to hold the same in horror4 ,he now quitted ,leipzig1 and betook himself to ,altdorf1 where he graduated with distinction4 ,shortly afterwards he became acquainted in ,nrnberg with a company of alchemists1 with whose ongoings he became associated4 ,here he made extracts from alchemistic writings1 and studied the mysteries of this occult science4 ,his activity in the pursuit of learning extended also to historical1 diplomatic1 mathematical and philosophical subjects4 ,he subsequently entered the service of the ,elector of ,mayence1 becoming a member of council1 and in #afgb he was appointed tutor to a son of ,von ,boineburg1 ,chancellor of ,state to the ,elector4 ,with this young man he travelled to ,paris1 where he lived for four years4 ,he at this time made the acquaintance of the great mathematician ,huygens1 and was by him for the first time properly introduced into the domain of mathematics4 ,when the education of his pupil was completed1 and the ,baron ,von ,boineburg died1 ,leibnitz went on his own account to ,london1 where he became acquainted with ,newton and other scholars1 at whose head was ,oldenburg1 who was also on friendly terms with ,spinoza4 ,after the death of the ,elector of ,mayence1 the salary of ,leibnitz ceased to be paid2 he therefore left ,england and returned to ,france4 ,the ,duke of ,brunswick-,lneburg then took him into his service1 and gave him the appointment of councillor and librarian at ,hanover1 with permission to spend as much time as he liked in foreign countries4 ,he therefore remained for some time longer in ,france1 ,england1 and ,holland4 ,in the year #afgg he settled down in ,hanover1 where he became busily engaged in affairs of state1 and was specially occupied with historical matters4 ,in the ,harz ,mountains he had works constructed for carrying off the floods which did damage to the mines there4 ,notwithstanding these manifold occupations he invented the differential calculus in #afgg1 on occasion of which there arose a dispute between him and ,newton1 which was carried on by the latter and the ,royal ,society of ,london in a most ungenerous manner4 ,for it was asserted by the ,english1 who gave themselves the credit of everything1 and were very unfair to others1 that the discovery was really made by ,newton4 ,but ,newton's ,principia only appeared later1 and in the first edition indeed ,leibnitz was mentioned with commendation in a note which was afterwards omitted4 ,from his headquarters in ,hanover1 ,leibnitz1 commissioned by his prince1 made several journeys through ,germany1 and also went to ,italy in order to collect historical evidence relative to the ,house of ,este1 and for the purpose of proving more clearly the relationship between this princely family and that of ,brunswick-,lneburg4 ,at other times he was likewise much occupied with historical questions4 ,owing to his acquaintance with the consort of ,frederick ,i4 of ,prussia1 ,sophia ,charlotte1 a ,hanoverian princess1 he was enabled to bring about the foundation of an ,academy of ,science in ,berlin1 in which city he lived for a considerable time4 ,in ,vienna he also became acquainted with ,prince ,eugne1 which occasioned his being appointed finally an ,imperial ,councillor4 ,he published several very important historical works as the result of this journey4 ,his death took place at ,hanover in #agaf1 when he was seventy years of age4#bdb ,it was not only on ,philosophy1 but also on the most varied branches of science that ,leibnitz expended toil and trouble and energy2 it was to mathematics1 however1 that he specially devoted his attention1 and he is the inventor of the methods of the integral and differential calculus4 ,his great services in regard to mathematics and physics we here leave out of consideration1 and pay attention to his philosophy alone4 ,none of his books can be exactly looked on as giving a complete systematic account of his philosophy4 ,to the more important among them belongs his work on the human understanding 7,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain7 in reply to ,locke2 but this is a mere refutation4 ,his philosophy is therefore scattered through various little treatises which were written in very various connections1 in letters1 and replies to objections which caused him to bring out one aspect of the question more strongly than another2 we consequently find no elaborated systematic whole1 superintended or perfected by him4 ,the work which has some appearance of being such1 his ,thodice1 better known to the public than anything else he wrote1 is a popular treatise which he drew up for ,queen ,sophia ,charlotte in reply to ,bayle1 and in which he took pains not to present the matter in very speculative form4 ,a ,wurtemberg theologian1 ,pfaff by name1 and others who were correspondents of ,leibnitz and were themselves only too well versed in philosophy1 brought it as a charge against ,leibnitz--a charge which he never denied--that his philosophy was written in popular form4#bdc ,they laughed very much afterwards at ,wolff1 who had taken them to be quite in earnest2 his opinion was that if ,leibnitz were not perfectly serious in this sense with his ,thodice1 yet he had unconsciously written his best therein4 ,leibnitz's ,thodice is not what we can altogether appreciate2 it is a justification of ,god in regard to the evil in the world4 ,his really philosophic thoughts are most connectedly expressed in a treatise on the principles of ,grace 7,principes de la ,nature et de la ,grace71#bdd and especially in the pamphlet addressed to ,prince ,eugne of ,savoy4#bde ,buhle 7,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 vol4 iv4 section #a1 p4 #aca7 says3 8,his philosophy is not so much the product of free1 independent1 original speculation1 as the result of well-tested earlier0 and later 8systems1 an eclecticism whose defects he tried to remedy in his own way4 ,it is a desultory treatment of ,philosophy in letters40 ,leibnitz followed the same general plan in his philosophy as the physicists adopt when they advance a hypothesis to explain existing data4 ,he has it that general conceptions of the ,idea are to be found1 from which the particular may be derived2 here1 on account of existing data1 the general conception1 for example the determination of force or matter furnished by reflection1 must have its determinations disposed in such a way that it fits in with the data4 ,thus the philosophy of ,leibnitz seems to be not so much a philosophic system as an hypothesis regarding the existence of the world1 namely how it is to be determined in accordance with the metaphysical determinations and the data and assumptions of the ordinary conception1 which are accepted as valid#bdf--thoughts which are moreover propounded without the sequence pertaining to the ,notion and mainly in narrative style1 and which taken by themselves show no necessity in their connection4 ,leibnitz's philosophy therefore appears like a string of arbitrary assertions1 which follow one on another like a metaphysical romance2 it is only when we see what he wished thereby to avoid that we learn to appreciate its value4 ,he really makes use of external reasons mainly in order to establish relations3 8,because the validity of such relations cannot be allowed1 nothing remains but to establish the matter in this way40 ,if we are not acquainted with these reasons1 this procedure strikes us as arbitrary4 a4 ,leibnitz's philosophy is an idealism of the intellectuality of the universe2 and although from one point of view he stands opposed to ,locke1 as from another point of view he is in opposition to the ,substance of ,spinoza1 he yet binds them both together again4 ,for1 to go into the matter more particularly1 on the one hand he expresses in the many monads the absolute nature of things distinguished and of individuality2 on the other hand1 in contrast to this and apart from it1 he expresses the ideality of ,spinoza and the non-absolute nature of all difference1 as the idealism of the popular conception4 ,leibnitz's philosophy is a metaphysics1 and in sharp contrast to the simple universal ,substance of ,spinoza1 where all that is determined is merely transitory1 it makes fundamental the absolute multiplicity of individual substances1 which after the example of the ancients he named monads--an expression already used by the ,pythagoreans4 ,these monads he then proceeds to determine as follows4 ,firstly 8,substance is a thing that is capable of activity1 it is compound or simple1 the compound cannot exist without the simple4 ,the monads are simple substances40 ,the proof that they constitute the truth in all things is very simple1 it is a superficial reflection4 ,for instance1 one of ,leibnitz's maxims is 8,because there are compound things1 the principles of the same must be simple1 for the compound consists of the simple40#bdg ,this proof is poor enough1 it is an example of the favourite way of starting from something definite1 say the compound1 and then drawing conclusions therefrom as to the simple4 ,it is quite light in a way1 but really it is tautology4 ,of course1 if the compound exists1 so does the simple1 for the compound means something in itself manifold whose connection or unity is external4 ,from the very trivial category of the compound it is easy to deduce the simple4 ,it is a conclusion drawn from a certain premiss1 but the question is whether the premiss is true4 ,these monads are not1 however1 something abstract and simple in itself1 like the empty ,epicurean atoms1 which1 as they were in themselves lacking in determination1 drew all their determination from their aggregation alone4 ,the monads are1 on the contrary1 substantial forms1 a good expression1 borrowed from the ,scholastics 7supra1 p4 #ga71 or the metaphysical points of the ,alexandrian ,school 7,vol ,,ii4 p4 #dci71 they are the entelechies of ,aristotle taken as pure activity1 which are forms in themselves 7,vol ,,ii4 pp4 #ach1 #ahb1 #ahc74 8,these monads are not material or extended1 nor do they originate or decay in the natural fashion1 for they can begin only by a creative act of ,god1 and they can end only by annihilation40#bdh ,thereby they are distinguished from the atoms1 which are regarded simply as principles4 ,the expression creation we are familiar with from religion1 but it is a meaningless word derived from the ordinary conception2 in order to be a thought and to have philosophic significance1 it must be much more closely defined4 ,secondly3 8,on account of their simplicity the monads are not susceptible of alteration by another monad in their inner essence2 there is no causal connection between them40 ,each of them is something indifferent and independent as regards the rest1 otherwise it would not be an entelechy4 ,each of them is so much for itself that all its determinations and modifications go on in itself alone1 and no determination from without takes place4 ,leibnitz says3 8,there are three ways in which substances are connected3 7#a7 ,causality1 influence2 7#b7 ,the relation of assistance2 7#c7 ,the relation of harmony4 ,the relation of influence is a relation pertaining to a commonplace or popular philosophy4 ,but as it is impossible to understand how material particles or immaterial qualities can pass from one substance into another1 such a conception as this must be abandoned40 ,if we accept the reality of the many1 there can be no transition at all2 each is an ultimate and absolutely independent entity4 8,the system of assistance10 according to ,descartes1 8is something quite superfluous1 a ,deus ex machina1 because continual miracles in the things of nature are assumed40 ,if we1 like ,descartes1 assume independent substances1 no causal nexus is conceivable2 for this presupposes an influence1 a bearing of the one upon the other1 and in this way the other is not a substance4 8,therefore there remains only harmony1 a unity which is in itself or implicit4 ,the monad is therefore simply shut up in itself1 and cannot be determined by another2 this other cannot be set into it4 ,it can neither get outside itself1 nor can others get inside it40#bdi ,that is also ,spinoza's way of regarding matters3 each attribute entirely represents the essence of ,god for itself1 extension and thought have no influence on each other4 ,in the third place1 8however1 these monads must at the same time have certain qualities or determinations in themselves1 inner actions1 through which they are distinguished from others4 ,there cannot be two things alike1 for otherwise they would not be two1 they would not be different1 but one and the same40#bej ,here then ,leibnitz's axiom of the undistinguishable comes into words4 ,what is not in itself distinguished is not distinguished4 ,this may be taken in a trivial sense1 as that there are not two individuals which are alike4 ,to such sensuous things the maxim has no application1 it is prima facie indifferent whether there are things which are alike or not2 there may also be always a difference of space4 ,this is the superficial sense1 which does not concern us4 ,the more intimate sense is1 however1 that each thing is in itself something determined1 distinguishing itself from others implicitly or in itself4 ,whether two things are like or unlike is only a comparison which we make1 which falls within our ken4 ,but what we have further to consider is the determined difference in themselves4 ,the difference must be a difference in themselves1 not for our comparison1 for the subject must have the difference as its own peculiar characteristic or determination1 i4e4 the determination must be immanent in the individual4 ,not only do we distinguish the animal by its claws1 but it distinguishes itself essentially thereby1 it defends itself1 it preserves itself4 ,if two things are different only in being two1 then each of them is one2 but the fact of their being two does not constitute a distinction between them2 the determined difference in itself is the principal point4 ,fourthly3 8,the determinateness and the variation thereby established is1 however1 an inward implicit principle2 it is a multiplicity of modifications1 of relations to surrounding existences1 but a multiplicity which remains locked up in simplicity4 ,determinateness and variation such as this1 which remains and goes on in the existence itself1 is a perception20 and therefore ,leibnitz says all monads perceive or represent 7for we may translate perceptio by representation ,vorstellung74 ,in other words1 they are in themselves universal1 for universality is just simplicity in multiplicity1 and therefore a simplicity which is at the same time change and motion of multiplicity4 ,this is a very important determination2 in substance itself there is negativity1 determinateness1 without its simplicity and its implicitude being given up4 ,further1 in it there is this idealism1 that the simple is something in itself distinguished1 and in spite of its variation1 that it yet remains one1 and continues in its simplicity4 ,an instance of this is found in 8,i10 my spirit4 ,i have many conceptions1 a wealth of thought is in me1 and yet ,i remain one1 notwithstanding this variety of state4 ,this identity may be found in the fact that what is different is at the same time abrogated1 and is determined as one2 the monads are therefore distinguished by modifications in themselves1 but not by external determinations4 ,these determinations contained in the monads exist in them in ideal fashion2 this ideality in the monad is in itself a whole1 so that these differences are only representations and ideas4 ,this absolute difference is what is termed the ,notion2 what falls asunder in the mere representation is held together4 ,this is what possesses interest in ,leibnitz's philosophy4 ,such ideality in the same way pertains to the material1 which is also a multiplicity of monads2 therefore the system of ,leibnitz is an intellectual system1 in accordance with which all that is material has powers of representation and perception4 ,as thus representing1 the monad1 says ,leibnitz1 possesses activity2 for activity is to be different1 and yet to be one1 and this is the only true difference4 ,the monad not only represents1 it also changes2 but in doing so1 it yet remains in itself absolutely what it is4 ,this variation is based on activity4 8,the activity of the inner principle1 by means of which it passes from one perception to another1 is desire 7appetitus740 ,variation in representation is desire1 and that constitutes the spontaneity of the monad2 all is now complete in itself1 and the category of influence falls away4 ,indeed1 this intellectuality of all things is a great thought on the part of ,leibnitz3 8,all multiplicity is included in unity20#bea determination is not a difference in respect of something else1 but reflected into itself1 and maintaining itself4 ,this is one aspect of things1 but the matter is not therein complete2 it is equally the case that it is different in respect of other things4 ,fifthly3 ,these representations and ideas are not necessarily conscious representations and ideas1 any more than all monads as forming representations are conscious4 ,it is true that consciousness is itself perception1 but a higher grade of the same2 perceptions of consciousness ,leibnitz calls apperceptions4 ,the difference between the merely representing and the self-conscious monads ,leibnitz makes one of degrees of clearness4 ,the expression representation has1 however1 certainly something awkward about it1 since we are accustomed to associate it only with consciousness1 and with consciousness as such2 but ,leibnitz admits also of unconscious representation4 ,when he then adduces examples of unconscious representations1 he appeals to the condition of a swoon or of sleep1 in which we are mere monads3 and that representations without consciousness are present in such states he shows from the fact of our having perceptions immediately after awakening out of sleep1 which shows that others must have been there1 for one perception arises only out of others4#beb ,that is a trivial and empirical demonstration4 ,sixthly3 ,these monads constitute the principle of all that exists4 ,matter is nothing else than their passive capability4 ,this passive capability it is which constitutes the obscurity of the representations1 or a confusion which never arrives at distinction1 or desire1 or activity4#bec ,that is a correct definition of the conception2 it is ,being1 matter1 in accordance with the moment of simplicity4 ,this is implicitly activity2 8mere implicitness without actualization0 would therefore be a better expression4 ,the transition from obscurity to distinctness ,leibnitz exemplifies by the state of swooning4 ,seventhly3 ,bodies as bodies are aggregates of monads3 they are mere heaps which cannot be termed substances1 any more than a flock of sheep can bear this name4#bed ,the continuity of the same is an arrangement or extension1 but space is nothing in itself2#bee it is only in another1 or a unity which our understanding gives to that aggregate4#bef b4 ,leibnitz goes on to determine and distinguish more clearly as the principal moments1 inorganic1 organic1 and conscious monads1 and he does it in the following way4 4 ,such bodies as have no inner unity1 whose elements are connected merely by space1 or externally1 are inorganic2 they have not an entelechy or one monad which rules over the rest4#beg ,the continuity of space as a merely external relation has not the ,notion in itself of the likeness of these monads in themselves4 ,continuity is in fact to be regarded in them as an arrangement1 a similarity in themselves4 ,leibnitz therefore defines their movements as like one another1 as a harmony in themselves2#beh but again1 this is as much as saying that their similarity is not in themselves4 ,in fact continuity forms the essential determination of the inorganic2 but it must at the same time not be taken as something external or as likeness1 but as penetrating or penetrated unity1 which has dissolved individuality in itself like a fluid4 ,but to this point ,leibnitz does not attain1 because for him monads are the absolute principle1 and individuality does not annul itself4 4 ,a higher degree of ,being is found in bodies with life and soul1 in which one monad has dominion over the rest4 ,the body which is bound up with the monad1 of which the one monad is the entelechy or soul1 is with this soul named a living creature1 an animal4 ,one such entelechy rules over the rest1 yet not really1 but formally3 the limbs of this animal1 however1 are again themselves such living things1 each of which has in its turn its ruling entelechy within it4#bei ,but ruling is here an inappropriate expression4 ,to rule in this case is not to rule over others1 for all are independent2 it is therefore only a formal expression4 ,if ,leibnitz had not helped himself out with the word rule1 and developed the idea further1 this dominant monad would have abrogated the others1 and put them in a negative position2 the implicitness of the other monads1 or the principle of the absolute ,being of these points or individuals would have disappeared4 ,yet we shall later on come across this relation of the individuals to one another4 4 ,the conscious monad distinguishes itself from the naked 7material7 monads by the distinctness of the representation4 ,but this is of course only an indefinite word1 a formal distinction2 it indicates that consciousness is the very thing that constitutes the distinction of the undistinguished1 and that distinction constitutes the determination of consciousness4 ,leibnitz more particularly defined the distinction of man as that 8he is capable of the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths10--or that he conceives the universal on the one hand1 and on the other what is connected with it2 the nature and essence of self-consciousness lies in the universality of the ,notions4 8,these eternal truths rest on two maxims2 the one is that of contradiction1 the other is that of sufficient reason40 ,the former of these is unity expressed in useless fashion as a maxim1 the distinction of the undistinguishable1 ,a ,a2 it is the definition of thinking1 but not a maxim which could contain a truth as content1 or it does not express the ,notion of distinction as such4 ,the other important principle was1 on the other hand3 ,what is not distinguished in thought is not distinguished 7p4 #ccc74 8,the maxim of the reason is that everything has its reason10#bfj--the particular has the universal as its essential reality4 ,necessary truth must have its reason in itself in such a manner that it is found by analysis1 i4e4 through that very maxim of identity4 ,for analysis is the very favourite plan of resolving into simple ideas and principles3 a resolution which annihilates their relation1 and which therefore in fact forms a transition into the opposite1 though it does not have the consciousness of the same1 and on that account also excludes the ,notion2 for every opposite it lays hold of only in its identity4 ,sufficient reason seems to be a pleonasm2 but ,leibnitz understood by this aims1 final causes 7caus finales71 the difference between which and the causal nexus or the efficient cause he here brings under discussion4#bfa c4 ,the universal itself1 absolute essence1 which with ,leibnitz is something quite different from the monads1 separates itself also into two sides1 namely universal ,being and ,being as the unity of opposites4 4 ,that universal is ,god1 as the cause of the world1 to the consciousness of whom the above principle of sufficient reason certainly forms the transition4 ,the existence of ,god is only an inference from eternal truths2 for these must as the laws of nature have a universal sufficient reason which determines itself as none other than ,god4 ,eternal truth is therefore the consciousness of the universal and absolute in and for itself2 and this universal and absolute is ,god1 who1 as one with ,himself1 the monad of monads1 is the absolute ,monas4 ,here we again have the wearisome proof of ,his existence3 ,he is the fountain of eternal truths and ,notions1 and without ,him no potentiality would have actuality2 ,he has the prerogative of existing immediately in ,his potentiality4#bfb ,god is here also the unity of potentiality and actuality1 but in an uncomprehending manner2 what is necessary1 but not comprehended1 is transferred to ,him4 ,thus ,god is at first comprehended chiefly as universal1 but already in the aspect of the relation of opposites4 4 ,as regards this second aspect1 the absolute relation of opposites1 it occurs in the first place in the form of absolute opposites of thought1 the good and the evil4 8,god is the ,author of the world10 says ,leibnitz2 that refers directly to evil4 ,it is round this relation that philosophy specially revolves1 but to the unity of which it did not then attain2 the evil in the world was not comprehended1 because no advance was made beyond the fixed opposition4 ,the result of ,leibnitz's ,thodice is an optimism supported on the lame and wearisome thought that ,god1 since a world had to be brought into existence1 chose out of infinitely many possible worlds the best possible--the most perfect1 so far as it could be perfect1 considering the finite element which it was to contain4#bfc ,this may very well be said in a general way1 but this perfection is no determined thought1 but a loose popular expression1 a sort of babble respecting an imaginary or fanciful potentiality2 ,voltaire made merry over it4 ,nor is the nature of the finite therein defined4 ,because the world1 it is said1 has to be the epitome of finite ,beings1 evil could not be separated from it1 since evil is negation1 finitude4#bfd ,reality and negation remain standing in opposition to one another exactly in the same way as before4 ,that is the principal conception in the ,thodice4 ,but something very like this can be said in every-day life4 ,if ,i have some goods brought to me in the market at some town1 and say that they are certainly not perfect1 but the best that are to be got1 this is quite a good reason why ,i should content myself with them4 ,but comprehension is a very different thing from this4 ,leibnitz says nothing further than that the world is good1 but there is also evil in it2 the matter remains just the same as it was before4 8,because it had to be finite0 is then a mere arbitrary choice on the part of ,god4 ,the next question would be3 ,why and how is there finitude in the ,absolute and ,his decrees8 ,and only then should there be deduced from the determination of finitude the evil which no doubt exists therein4 ,it is true that ,leibnitz has a reply to the above question3 8,god does not will what is evil2 evil comes only indirectly into the results0 7blind71 8because oftentimes the greater good could not be achieved if evils were not present4 ,therefore they are means to a good end40 ,but why does not ,god employ other means8 ,they are always external1 not in and for themselves4 8,a moral evil may not be regarded as a means1 nor must we1 as the apostle says1 do evil that good may come2 yet it has often the relation of a conditio sine qua non of the good4 ,evil is in ,god only the object of a permissive will 7voluntatis permissiv720 but everything that is wrong would be such4 8,god has therefore among the objects of ,his will the best possible as the ultimate object1 but the good as a matter of choice 7qualemcunque71 also as subordinate2 and things indifferent and evils often as means4 ,evil is1 however1 an object of ,his will only as the condition of something otherwise necessary 7rei alioqui debit71 which without it could not exist2 in which sense ,christ said it must needs be that offences come40#bfe ,in a general sense we are satisfied with the answer3 8,in accordance with the wisdom of ,god we must accept it as a fact that the laws of nature are the best possible10 but this answer does not suffice for a definite question4 ,what one wishes to know is the goodness of this or that particular law2 and to that no answer is given4 ,if1 for example1 it is said that 8,the law of falling bodies1 in which the relation of time and space is the square1 is the best possible10 one might employ1 as far as mathematics are concerned1 any other power whatever4 ,when ,leibnitz answers3 8,god made it so10 this is no answer at all4 ,we wish to know the definite reason of this law2 such general determinations sound pious1 but are not satisfying4 4 ,he goes on to say that the sufficient reason has reference to the representation of the monads4 ,the principles of things are monads1 of which each is for itself1 without having influence on the others4 ,if now the ,monad of monads1 ,god1 is the absolute substance1 and individual monads are created through ,his will1 their substantiality comes to an end4 ,there is therefore a contradiction present1 which remains unsolved in itself--that is between the one substantial monad and the many monads for which independence is claimed1 because their essence consists in their standing in no relation to one another4 ,yet at the same time1 in order to show the harmony that exists in the world1 ,leibnitz understands the relation of monads to monads more generally as the unity of contrasted existences1 namely of soul and body4 ,this unity he represents as a relation without difference1 and notionless1 i4e4 as a pre-established harmony4#bff ,leibnitz uses here the illustration of two clocks1 which are set to the same hour1 and keep the same time2#bfg in the same way the movement of the kingdom of thought goes on1 determined in accordance with ends1 and the movement onward of the corporeal kingdom which corresponds with it1 proceeds according to a general causal connection4#bfh ,the case is the same as with ,spinoza1 that these two sides of the universe have no connection with each other1 the one does not influence the other1 but both are entirely indifferent to one another2 it is really the differentiating relation of the ,notion that is lacking4 ,in abstract thought that is without ,notion1 that determination now receives the form of simplicity1 of implicitude1 of indifference with regard to what is other1 of a self-reflection that has no movement3 in this way red in the abstract is in a position of indifference as regards blue1 c4 ,here1 as before1 ,leibnitz forsakes his principle of individuation2 it has only the sense of being exclusively one1 and of not reaching to and including what is other2 or it is only a unity of the popular conception1 not the ,notion of unity4 ,the soul has thus a series of conceptions and ideas which are developed from within it1 and this series is from the very first placed within the soul at its creation1 i4e4 the soul is in all immediacy this implicit determination2 determination is1 however1 not implicit1 but the reflected unfolding of this determination in the ordinary conception is its outward existence4 ,parallel with this series of differentiated conceptions1 there now runs a series of motions of the body1 or of what is external to the soul4#bfi ,both are essential moments of reality2 they are mutually indifferent1 but they have also an essential relation of difference4 ,since now every monad1 as shut up within itself1 has no influence upon the body and its movements1 and yet the infinite multitude of their atoms correspond with one another1 ,leibnitz places this harmony in ,god2 a better definition of the relation and the activity of the ,monad of monads is therefore that it is what pre-establishes harmony in the changes of the monads4#bgj ,god is the sufficient reason1 the cause of this correspondence2 ,he has so arranged the multitude of atoms that the original changes which are developed within one monad correspond with the changes of the others4 ,the pre-established harmony is to be thought of somewhat in this style2 when a dog gets a beating1 the pain develops itself in him1 in like fashion the beating develops itself in itself1 and so does the person who administers the beating3 their determinations all correspond with one another1 and that not by means of their objective connection1 since each is independent4#bga ,the principle of the harmony among the monads does not consequently belong to them1 but it is in ,god1 who for that very reason is the ,monad of monads1 their absolute unity4 ,we saw from the beginning how ,leibnitz arrived at this conception4 ,each monad is really possessed of the power of representation1 and is as such a representation of the universe1 therefore implicitly the totality of the whole world4 ,but at the same time this representation is not in consciousness2 the naked monad is implicitly the universe1 and difference is the development of this totality in it4#bgb ,what develops itself therein is at the same time in harmony with all other developments2 all is one harmony4 8,in the universe all things are closely knit together1 they are in one piece1 like an ocean3 the slightest movement transmits its influence far and wide all around40#bgc ,from a single grain of sand1 ,leibnitz holds1 the whole universe might be comprehended in its entire development--if we only knew the sand grain thoroughly4 ,there is not really much in all this1 though it sounds very fine2 for the rest of the universe is considerably more than a grain of sand1 well though we knew it1 and considerably different therefrom4 ,to say that its essence is the universe is mere empty talk3 for the fact is that the universe as essence is not the universe4 ,to the sand grain much must be added which is not present2 and since thought adds more than all the grains of sand that exist1 the universe and its development may in this way certainly be comprehended4 ,thus according to ,leibnitz every monad has or is the representation of the entire universe1 which is the same as saying that it is really representation in general2 but at the same time it is a determinate representation1 by means of which it comes to be this particular monad1 therefore it is representation according to its particular situation and circumstances4#bgd ,the representations of the monad in itself1 which constitute its universe1 develop themselves from themselves1 as the spiritual element in it1 according to the laws of their own activity and desire1 just as the movements of their outer world do according to laws of bodies2 hence liberty is nothing other than this spontaneity of immanent development1 but as in consciousness4 ,the magnetic needle1 on the contrary1 has only spontaneity without consciousness1 and consequently without freedom4 ,for1 says ,leibnitz1 the nature of the magnetic needle is to turn to the north2 if it had consciousness it would imagine that this was its self-determination2 it would thus have the will to move round in accordance with its nature4#bge ,but it is clear that in the course of conscious representations there is involved no necessary connection1 but contingency and want of sequence are to be found1 the reason of this according to ,leibnitz 7,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii ,p4 ,i4 p4 #ge7 being 8because the nature of a created substance implies that it changes incessantly according to a certain order1 which order guides it spontaneously 7spontanment7 in all the circumstances which befall it2 so that one who sees all things recognizes in the present condition of substance the past also and the future4 ,the law of order1 which determines the individuality of the particular substance1 has an exact reference to what takes place in every other substance and in the whole universe40 ,the meaning of this is that the monad is not a thing apart1 or that there are two views of it1 the one making it out as spontaneously generating its representations1 so far as form is concerned1 and the other making it out to be a moment of the whole of necessity2 ,spinoza would call this regarding it from both sides4 ,an organic whole1 a human being1 is thus for instance the assertion of his aim from out of himself3 at the same time the being directed on something else is involved in his ,notion4 ,he represents this and that to himself1 he wills this and that2 his activity employs itself and brings about changes4 ,his inward determination thus becomes corporeal determination1 and then change going beyond himself2 he appears as cause1 influencing other monads4 ,but this ,being-for-another is only an appearance4 ,for the other1 i4e4 the actual1 in so far as the monad determines it or makes it negative1 is the passive element which the monad has in itself3 all moments are indeed contained therein1 and for that very reason it has no need of other monads1 but only of the laws of the monads in itself4 ,but if the ,being-for-another is mere appearance1 the same may be said of ,being-for-self2 for this has significance only in reference to ,being-for-another4 ,the important point in ,leibnitz's philosophy is this intellectuality of representation which ,leibnitz1 however1 did not succeed in carrying out2 and for the same reason this intellectuality is at the same time infinite multiplicity1 which has remained absolutely independent1 because this intellectuality has not been able to obtain mastery over the ,one4 ,the separation in the ,notion1 which proceeds as far as release from itself1 or appearance in distinct independence1 ,leibnitz did not succeed in bringing together into unity4 ,the harmony of these two moments1 the course of mental representations and the course of things external1 appearing mutually as cause and effect1 is not brought by ,leibnitz into relation in and for themselves2 he therefore lets them fall asunder1 although each is passive as regards the other4 ,he moreover considers both of them in one unity1 to be sure1 but their activity is at the same time not for themselves4 ,every forward advance becomes therefore incomprehensible when taken by itself1 because the course of the representation as through aims in itself1 requires this moment of ,other-,being or of passivity2 and again the connection of cause and effect requires the universal3 each however lacks this its other moment4 ,the unity which according to ,leibnitz is to be brought about by the pre-established harmony1 namely that the determination of the will of man and the outward change harmonize1 is therefore brought about by means of another1 if not indeed from without1 for this other is ,god4 ,before ,god the monads are not to be independent1 but ideal and absorbed in ,him4 ,at this point the demand would come in that in ,god ,himself there should be comprehended the required unity of that which before fell asunder2 and ,god has the special privilege of having laid on ,him the burden of what cannot be comprehended4 ,the word of ,god is thus the makeshift which leads to a unity which itself is only hypothetical2 for the process of the many out of this unity is not demonstrated4 ,god plays therefore in the later philosophy a far greater part than in the early1 because now the comprehension of the absolute opposition of thought and ,being is the chief demand4 ,with ,leibnitz the extent to which thoughts advance is the extent of the universe2 where comprehension ceases1 the universe ceases1 and ,god begins3 so that later it was even maintained that to be comprehended was derogatory to ,god1 because ,he was thus degraded into finitude4 ,in that procedure a beginning is made from the determinate1 this and that are stated to be necessary2 but since in the next place the unity of these moments is not comprehended1 it is transferred to ,god4 ,god is therefore1 as it were1 the waste channel into which all contradictions flow3 ,leibnitz's ,thodice is just a popular summing up such as this4 ,there are1 nevertheless1 all manner of evasions to be searched out--in the opposition of ,god's justice and mercy1 that the one tempers the other2 how the fore-knowledge of ,god and human freedom are compatible--all manner of syntheses which never come to the root of the matter nor show both sides to be moments4 ,these are the main moments of ,leibnitz's philosophy4 ,it is a metaphysic which starts from a narrow determination of the understanding1 namely1 from absolute multiplicity1 so that connection can only be grasped as continuity4 ,thereby absolute unity is certainly set aside1 but all the same it is presupposed2 and the association of individuals with one another is to be explained only in this way1 that it is ,god who determines the harmony in the changes of individuals4 ,this is an artificial system1 which is founded on a category of the understanding1 that of the absoluteness of abstract individuality4 ,what is of importance in ,leibnitz lies in the maxims1 in the principle of individuality and the maxim of indistinguishability4 #b4 ,,wolff4 ,the philosophy of ,wolff is directly connected with that of ,leibnitz1 for really it is a pedantic systematization of the latter1 for which reason it is likewise called the ,leibnitz-,wolffian system of philosophy4 ,wolff attained to great distinction in mathematics and made himself famous by his philosophy as well2 the latter was for long predominant in ,germany4 ,in ,wolff1 as a teacher dealing with the understanding1 we find a systematic exposition of the philosophic element present in human conceptions as a whole4 ,as regards his connection with ,german culture generally1 great and immortal praise is more especially due to him2 before all others he may be termed the teacher of the ,germans4 ,we may indeed say that ,wolff was the first to naturalize philosophy in ,germany4 ,tschirnhausen and ,thomasius likewise participated in this honour1 for the special reason that they wrote upon ,philosophy in the ,german language4 ,in regard to the matter of the philosophy of ,tschirnhausen and ,thomasius we have not much to say2 it is so-called healthy reason--there is in it the superficial character and the empty universality always to be found where a beginning is made with thought4 ,in this case the universality of thought satisfies us because everything is present there1 just as it is present in a moral maxim which has1 however1 no determinate content in its universality4 ,wolff1 then1 was the first to make1 not exactly ,philosophy1 but thoughts in the form of thought1 into a general possession1 and he substituted this in ,germany for mere talk originating from feeling1 from sensuous perception1 and from the ordinary conception4 ,this is most important from the point of view of culture1 and yet it does not really concern us here1 excepting in so far as the content in this form of thought has caused itself to be recognized as ,philosophy4 ,this philosophy1 as a philosophy of the understanding1 became the ordinary culture of the day2 in it determinate1 intelligent thought is the fundamental principle1 and it extends over the whole circle of objects which fall within the region of knowledge4 ,wolff defined the world of consciousness for ,germany1 and for the world in general1 in the same wide sense in which we may say that this was done by ,aristotle4 ,what distinguishes him from ,aristotle is that in so doing the point of view that he adopted was that of the understanding merely1 while ,aristotle treated the subject speculatively4 ,the philosophy of ,wolff is hence no doubt built on foundations laid by ,leibnitz1 but yet in such a manner that the speculative interest is quite eliminated from it4 ,the spiritual philosophy1 substantial in a higher sense1 which we found emerging first in ,boehme1 though still in a peculiar and barbarous form1 has been quite lost sight of1 and has disappeared without leaving any traces or effects in ,germany2 his very language was forgotten4 ,the principal events in ,christian ,wolff's life are these3 ,he was the son of a baker1 and was born at ,breslau in #afgi4 ,he first studied ,theology and then ,philosophy1 and in #agjg he became ,professor of ,mathematics and ,philosophy at ,halle4 ,here the pietistic theologians1 and more especially ,lange1 treated him in the basest manner4 ,piety did not trust this understanding2 for piety1 if it is true1 embodies a content which is speculative in nature1 and which passes beyond the understanding4 ,as his opponents could make no headway by their writings1 they resorted to intrigues4 ,they caused it to be conveyed to ,king ,frederick ,william ,i41 the father of ,frederick ,,ii41 a rough man who took an interest in nothing but soldiers1 that according to the determinism of ,wolff1 free will was impossible1 and that soldiers could not hence desert of their own free will1 but by a special disposition of ,god 7pre-established harmony7--a doctrine which1 if disseminated amongst the military1 would be extremely dangerous4 ,the king1 much enraged by this1 immediately issued a decree that within forty-eight hours ,wolff should leave ,halle and the ,prussian ,states1 under penalty of the halter4 ,wolff thus left ,halle on the #bcrd of ,november1 #agbc4 ,the theologians added to all this the scandal of preaching against ,wolff and his philosophy1 and the pious ,franke thanked ,god on his knees in church for the removal of ,wolff4 ,but the rejoicings did not last long4 ,wolff went to ,cassel1 was there immediately installed first professor in the philosophic faculty at ,marburg1 and at the same time made a member of the ,academies of ,science of ,london1 ,paris1 and ,stockholm4 ,by ,peter the ,first of ,russia he was made ,vice-,president of the newly instituted ,academy in ,st4 ,petersburg4 ,wolff was also summoned to ,russia1 but this invitation he declined2 he received1 however1 an honorary post1 he was made a ,baron by the ,elector of ,bavaria1 and1 in short1 loaded with public honours which1 more especially at that time1 though even now it is the case1 were very much thought of by the general public1 and which were too great not to make a profound sensation in ,berlin4 ,in ,berlin a commission was appointed to pass judgment on the ,wolffian philosophy--for this it had not been possible to eradicate--and it declared the same to be harmless1 that is to say1 free from all danger to state and religion2 it also forbade the theologians to make it a subject of dispute1 and altogether put an end to their clamour4 ,frederick ,william now issued a recall in very respectful terms to ,wolff1 who1 however1 hesitated to comply with it owing to his lack of confidence in its sincerity4 ,on the accession of ,frederick ,,ii4 in #agdj he was again recalled in terms of the highest honour 7,lange had meanwhile died71 and only then did he comply4 ,wolff became ,vice-,chancellor of the ,university1 but he outlived his repute1 and his lectures at the end were very poorly attended4 ,he died in #aged4bgf ,like ,tschirnhausen and ,thomasius1 ,wolff wrote a great part of his works in his mother tongue1 while ,leibnitz for the most part wrote only in ,latin or ,french4 ,this is an important matter1 for1 as we have already noticed 7pp4 #aad and #aej71 it is only when a nation possesses a science in its own language that it can really be said to belong to it2 and in ,philosophy most of all this is requisite4 ,for thought has in it this very moment of pertaining to self-consciousness or of being absolutely its own2 when one's own language is the vehicle of expression1 as when we talk of 8,bestimmtheit0 instead of 8,determination10 and 8,wesen0 instead of 8,essenz10 it is immediately present to our consciousness that the conceptions are absolutely its own2 it has to deal with these at all times1 and they are in no way foreign to it4 ,the ,latin language has a phraseology1 a definite sphere and range of conception2 it is at once taken for granted that when men write in ,latin they are at liberty to be dull2 it is impossible to read or write what men permit themselves to say in ,latin4 ,the titles of ,wolff's philosophic works are perpetually of this nature3 8,rational thoughts on the powers of the human understanding and their right uses in the knowledge of the truth10 ,halle1 #agab1 #hvo2 8,rational thoughts on ,god1 the world1 and the soul of man1 likewise on all things generally10 ,frankfort and ,leipzig1 #agai2 8,on the action and conduct of men10 ,halle1 #agbj2 8,on ,social ,life10 ,halle1 #agbj2 8,on the operations of ,nature10 ,halle1 #agbc1 and so on4 ,wolff wrote ,german and ,latin quartos on every department of ,philosophy1 even on economics--twenty-three thick volumes of ,latin1 or about forty quartos altogether4 ,his mathematical works make a good many more quartos4 ,he brought into general use the differential and integral calculus of ,leibnitz4 ,it is only in its general content and taken as a whole that ,wolff's philosophy is the philosophy of ,leibnitz1 that is to say1 only in relation to the fundamental determinations of monads and to the theodicy--to these he remained faithful2 any other content is empiric1 derived from our feelings and desires4 ,wolff likewise accepted in their entirety all the ,cartesian and other definitions of general ideas4 ,hence we find in him abstract propositions and their proofs mingled with experiences1 on the indubitable truth of which he builds a large part of his propositions2 and he must so build and derive his foundations if a content is to result at all4 ,with ,spinoza1 on the contrary1 no content is to be found excepting absolute substance and a perpetual return into the same4 ,the greatness of ,wolff's services to the culture of ,germany1 which now appeared quite independently and without any connection with an earlier and profounder metaphysical standpoint 7supra1 p4 #cej71 are in proportion to the barrenness and inward contentless condition into which ,philosophy had sunk4 ,this he divided into its formal disciplines1 spinning it out into determinations of the understanding with a pedantic application of geometric methods2 and1 contemporaneously with the ,english philosophers1 he made the dogmatism of the metaphysics of the understanding fashionable1 that is a philosophizing which determines the absolute and rational by means of self-exclusive thought-determinations and relationships 7such as one and many1 simple and compound1 finite and infinite1 causal connection1 c474 ,wolff entirely displaced the ,aristotelian philosophy of the schools1 and made ,philosophy into an ordinary science pertaining to the ,german nation4 ,but besides this he gave ,philosophy that systematic and requisite division into sections which has down to the present day served as a sort of standard4 ,in theoretic philosophy ,wolff first treats of ,logic purified from scholastic interpretations or deductions2 it is the logic of the understanding which he has systematized4 ,the second stage is ,metaphysics1 which contains four parts3 first there is ,ontology1 the treatment of abstract and quite general philosophic categories1 such as ,being 77 and its being the ,one and ,good2 in this abstract metaphysic there further comes accident1 substance1 cause and effect1 the phenomenon1 c4 ,next in order is ,cosmology1 a general doctrine of body1 the doctrine of the world2 here we have abstract metaphysical propositions respecting the world1 that there is no chance1 no leaps or bounds in nature--the law of continuity4 ,wolff excludes natural science and natural history4 ,the third part of the metaphysic is rational psychology or pneumatology1 the philosophy of the soul1 which deals with the simplicity1 immortality1 immateriality of the soul4 ,finally1 the fourth is natural theology1 which sets forth the proofs of the existence of ,god4#bgg ,wolff also inserts 7chap4 iii47 an empirical psychology4 ,practical philosophy he divides into the ,rights of ,nature1 ,morality1 the ,rights of ,nations or ,politics1 and ,economics4 ,the whole is propounded in geometric forms such as definitions1 axioms1 theorems1 scholia1 corollaries1 c4 ,in mathematics the understanding is in its proper place1 for the triangle must remain the triangle4 ,wolff on the one hand started upon a large range of investigation1 and one quite indefinite in character1 and on the other1 held to a strictly methodical manner with regard to propositions and their proofs4 ,the method is really similar to that of ,spinoza1 only it is more wooden and lifeless than his4 ,wolff applied the same methods to every sort of content--even to that which is altogether empirical1 such as his so-called applied mathematics1 into which he introduces many useful arts1 bringing the most ordinary reflections and directions into the geometric form4 ,in many cases this undoubtedly gives his work a most pedantic aspect1 especially when the content directly justifies itself to our conception without this form at all4 ,for ,wolff proceeds by first laying down certain definitions1 which really rest upon our ordinary conceptions1 since these he translated into the empty form of determinations of the understanding4 ,hence the definitions are merely nominal definitions1 and we know whether they are correct only by seeing whether they correspond to conceptions which are referred to their simple thoughts4 ,the syllogism is the form of real importance in this mode of reasoning1 and with ,wolff it often attains to its extreme of rigidity and formalism4 ,under mathematics1 which is the subject of four small volumes1 ,wolff also treats of architecture and military science4 ,one of the propositions in ,architecture is this3 8,windows must be wide enough for two persons40 ,the making of a door is also propounded as a task1 and the solution thereof given4 ,the next best example comes from the art of warfare4 ,the 8,fourth proposition4 ,the approach to the fortress must always be harder for the enemy the nearer he comes to it40 ,instead of saying1 because the danger is greater1 which would be trivial1 there follows the 8,proof4 ,the nearer the enemy comes to the fortress1 the greater the danger4 ,but the greater the danger the greater the resistance that must be offered in order to defy the attacks1 and1 so far as may be1 avert the danger4 ,hence the nearer the enemy is to the fort the harder must the approach be made for him4 ,q4,e4,d40#bgh ,since the increase of the danger is given as the reason1 the whole is false1 and the contrary may be said with equal truth4 ,for if at the beginning all possible resistance is offered to the enemy1 he cannot get nearer the fortress at all1 and thus the danger cannot become greater4 ,the greater resistance has a real cause1 and not this foolish one--namely1 that because the garrison is now at closer quarters1 and consequently operates in a narrow field1 it can offer a greater resistance4 ,in this most trivial way ,wolff proceeds with every sort of content4 ,this barbarism of pedantry1 or this pedantry of barbarism1 represented as it is in its whole breadth and extent1 necessarily brought itself into disrepute2 and without there being a definite consciousness of the reason why the geometric method is not the only and ultimate method of knowledge1 instinct and an immediate consciousness of the foolishness of its applications caused this method to be set aside4 #c4 ,,the ,,popular ,,philosophy ,,of ,,germany4 ,popular philosophy flatters our ordinary consciousness1 makes it the ultimate standard4 ,although with ,spinoza we begin with presupposed definitions1 the content is still profoundly speculative in nature1 and it is not derived from the ordinary consciousness4 ,in ,spinoza thinking is not merely the form1 for the content belongs to thinking itself2 it is the content of thought in itself4 ,in the speculative content the instinct of reason satisfies itself on its own account1 because this content1 as a totality which integrates itself within itself1 at once in itself justifies itself to thought4 ,the content in ,spinoza is only without ground in so far as it has no external ground1 but is a ground in itself4 ,but if the content is finite1 a demand for an external ground is indicated1 since in such a case we desire to have a ground other than this finite4 ,in its matter the philosophy of ,wolff is indeed a popular philosophy1 even if in form it still makes thought authoritative4 ,until the time of ,kant the philosophy of ,wolff was thus pre-eminent4 ,baumgarten1 ,crusius1 and ,moses ,mendelssohn worked each of them independently on the same lines as ,wolff2 the philosophy of the last-mentioned was popular and graceful in form4 ,the ,wolffian philosophy was thus carried on1 although it had cast off its pedantic methods3 no further progress was however made4 ,the question dealt with was how perfection could be attained--what it is possible to think and what not2 metaphysic was reduced to its slightest consistency and to its completest vacuity1 so that in its texture not a single thread remained secure4 ,mendelssohn considered himself1 and was considered1 the greatest of philosophers1 and was lauded as such by his friends4 ,in his 8,morgenstunden0 we really find a dry ,wolffian philosophy1 however much these gentlemen endeavoured to give their dull abstractions a bright ,platonic form4 ,the forms of ,philosophy which we have considered bear the character which pertains specially to metaphysics1 of proceeding from general determinations of the understanding1 but of combining therewith experience and observation1 or the empiric method in general4 ,one side of this metaphysic is that the opposites of thought are brought into consciousness1 and that attention is directed upon the solution of this contradiction4 ,thought and ,being or extension1 ,god and the world1 good and evil1 the power and prescience of ,god on the one side1 and the evil in the world and human freedom on the other3 these contradictions1 the opposites of soul and spirit1 things conceived and things material1 and their mutual relation1 have occupied all men's attention4 ,the solution of these opposites and contradictions has still to be given1 and ,god is set forth as the ,one in whom all these contradictions are solved4 ,this is what is common to all these philosophies as far as their main elements are concerned4 ,yet we must likewise remark that these contradictions are not solved in themselves1 i4e4 that the nullity of the supposition is not demonstrated in itself1 and thereby a true concrete solution has not come to pass4 ,even if ,god is recognized as solving all contradictions1 ,god as the solution of these contradictions is a matter of words rather than something conceived and comprehended4 ,if ,god is comprehended in ,his qualities1 and prescience1 omnipresence1 omniscience1 power1 wisdom1 goodness justice1 c41 are considered as qualities of ,god ,himself1 they simply lead to contradictions2 and these contradictions1 ,leibnitz 7supra1 p4 #cdh7 sought to remove by saying that the qualities temper one another1 i4e4 that they are combined in such a way that one annuls the other4 ,this1 however1 is no real comprehension of such contradiction4 ,this metaphysic contrasts greatly with the old philosophy of a ,plato or an ,aristotle4 ,to the old philosophy we can always turn again and admit its truth2 it is satisfying in the stage of development it has reached--a concrete centre-point which meets all the problems set by thought as these are comprehended4 ,in this modern metaphysic1 however1 the opposites are merely developed into absolute contradictions4 ,god is indeed given as their absolute solution1 but only as an abstract solution1 as a ,beyond2 on this side all contradictions are1 as regards their content1 unsolved and unexplained4 ,god is not comprehended as the ,one in whom these contradictions are eternally resolved2 ,he is not comprehended as ,spirit1 as the ,trinity4 ,it is in ,him alone as ,spirit1 and as ,spirit which is ,three in ,one1 that this opposition of ,himself and ,his ,other1 the ,son1 is contained1 and with it the resolution of the same2 this concrete ,idea of ,god as reason1 has not as yet found an entrance into ,philosophy4 ,in order that we may now cast a retrospective glance over the philosophic efforts of other nations1 we shall apply ourselves to the further progress of ,philosophy4 ,once more we see ,scepticism making its way into this arid philosophy of the understanding4 ,but this time it is1 properly speaking1 in the form of ,idealism1 or the determinations are subjective determinations of self-consciousness4 ,in the place of thought we consequently find the ,notion now making its appearance4 ,just as with the ,stoics determinateness is held to be an object of thought1 we have in modern times this same manifestation of thought as the unmoved form of simplicity4 ,only here the image or inner consciousness of totality is present1 the absolute spirit which the world has before it as its truth and to whose ,notion it makes its way--this is another inward principle1 another implicitude of mind which it endeavours to bring forth from itself and for itself1 so that reason is a comprehension of the same1 or has the certitude of being all reality4 ,with the ancients reason 771 as the implicit and explicit ,being of consciousness1 had only an ethereal and formal existence as language1 but here it has certainty as existent substance4 ,hence with ,descartes there is the unity of the ,notion and ,being1 and with ,spinoza the universal reality4 ,the first commencement of the ,notion of the movement of fixed thoughts in themselves is found in this1 that the movement which1 as method1 simply falls outside its object1 comes within it1 or that self-consciousness comes within thought4 ,thought is implicitude without explicitude1 an objective mode bearing no resemblance to a sensuous thing2 and yet it is quite different from the actuality of self-consciousness4 ,this ,notion which we now find entering into thought1 has the three kinds of form which we still have to consider2 in the first place it has that of individual self-consciousness or the formal conception generally2 secondly1 that of universal self-consciousness1 which applies itself to all objects whether they be objects of thought1 determinate conceptions1 or have the form of actuality--that is to say it applies itself to what is established in thought1 to the intellectual world with the riches of its determinations and looked on as a ,beyond1 or to the intellectual world in as far as it is its realization1 the world here and around us4 ,it is in those two ways1 and in those ways alone1 that the actual ,notion is present in the succeeding chapter2 for not as yet is it in the third place to be found as taken back into thought1 or as the self-thinking or thought-of ,notion4 ,while that universal self-consciousness is1 on the whole1 a thought which grasps and comprehends1 this third kind of thought is the ,notion itself recognized as constituting reality in its essence1 that is to say as ,idealism4 ,these three aspects again divide themselves as before into the three nations which alone count in the civilized world4 ,the empirical and perfectly finite form of ,notion pertains to the ,english2 to the ,french belongs its form as making an attempt at everything1 as establishing itself in its reality1 abolishing all determination1 and therefore being universal1 unlimited1 pure self-consciousness2 and1 lastly1 to the ,german pertains the entering into itself of this implicitude1 the thought of the absolute ,notion4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,transition ,,period ,the decadence which we find in thought until the philosophy of ,kant is reached1 is manifested in what was at this time advocated in opposition to the metaphysic of the understanding1 and which may be called a general popular philosophy1 a reflecting empiricism1 which to a greater or less extent becomes itself a metaphysic2 just as1 on the other hand1 that metaphysic1 in as far as it extended to particular sciences1 becomes empiricism4 ,as against these metaphysical contradictions1 as against the artificialities of the metaphysical synthesis1 as against the assistance of ,god1 the pre-established harmony1 the best possible world1 c41 as against this merely artificial understanding1 we now find that fixed principles1 immanent in mind1 have been asserted or maintained respecting what is felt1 intuitively perceived and honoured in the cultured human breast4 ,and in distinction to the assertion that we only find the solution in the ,beyond1 in ,god1 these concrete principles of a fixed and permanent content form a reconciliation here and now1 they adopt a position of independence1 and assume an intellectual standing-ground which they find in what has generally been termed the healthy human understanding4 ,such determinations may indeed be found to be perfectly good and valid if the feelings1 intuitions1 heart and understanding of man be morally and intellectually fashioned2 for in that case better and more noble feelings and desires may rule in men and a more universal content may be expressed in these principles4 ,but when men make what we call sound reason--that which is by nature implanted in man's breast--into the content and the principle1 the healthy human understanding discovers itself to be identical with a feeling and knowledge belonging to nature4 ,the ,indians who worship a cow1 and who expose or slay new-born children1 and commit all sorts of barbarous deeds1 the ,egyptians who pray to a bird1 the apis1 c41 and the ,turks as well1 all possess a healthy human understanding similar in nature4 ,but the healthy human understanding and the natural feeling of rude and barbarous ,turks1 when taken as a standard1 result in shocking principles4 ,when we speak of healthy human understanding1 however1 of natural feelings1 we always have before our eyes a cultured mind2 and those who make the healthy human reason1 the natural knowledge1 the immediate feelings and inspirations found in themselves1 into a rule and standard1 do not know that when religion1 morality1 and rectitude are discovered to be present in the human breast1 this is due to culture and education1 which are the first to make such principles into natural feelings4 ,here natural feelings and the healthy human understanding are thus made the principle2 and much may be recognized as coming under these heads4 ,this then is the form taken by ,philosophy in the eighteenth century4 ,taken as a whole1 three points of view have to be considered2 in the first place1 ,hume must be regarded on his own account1 then the ,scottish1 and1 thirdly1 the ,french philosophy4 ,hume is a sceptic2 the ,scottish philosophy opposes the scepticism of ,hume1 the ,french philosophy has in the 8enlightenment0 of ,germany 7by which expression is indicated that form of ,german philosophy which is not ,wolffian metaphysics7 an appendage of a feebler form4 ,since from the metaphysical ,god we can make no further progress in the concrete1 ,locke grounds his content on experience4 ,but that empiricism leads thought to no fixed standpoint1 ,hume demonstrates by denying every universal2 the ,scottish philosophers1 on the contrary1 undoubtedly maintain universal propositions and truths1 but not through thought4 ,hence in empiricism itself the fixed standpoint has now to be adopted2 thus the ,french find the universal in the actuality which they call ralit4 ,they do not1 however1 find its content in and from thought1 but as living substance1 as nature and matter4 ,all this is a further working out of reflecting empiricism1 and some more details respecting it must still be given4 ,a4 ,,idealism ,,and ,,scepticism4 ,thought generally is simple1 universal self-identity1 but in the form of negative movement1 whereby the determinate abrogates itself4 ,this movement of ,being-for-self is now an essential moment of thought1 while hitherto it was outside it2 and thus grasping itself as movement in itself1 thought is self-consciousness--at first indeed formal1 as individual self-consciousness4 ,such a form it has in scepticism1 but this distinction marks it off from the older scepticism1 that now the certainty of reality is made the starting point4 ,with the ancients1 on the contrary1 scepticism is the return into individual consciousness in such a way that to it this consciousness is not the truth1 in other words that scepticism does not give expression to the results arrived at1 and attains no positive significance4 ,but since in the modern world this absolute substantiality1 this unity of implicitude and self-consciousness is fundamental--that is1 this faith in reality generally--scepticism has here the form of idealism1 i4e4 of expressing self-consciousness or certainty of self as all reality and truth4 ,the crudest form of this idealism is when self-consciousness1 as individual or formal1 does not proceed further than to say3 ,all objects are our conceptions4 ,we find this subjective idealism in ,berkeley1#bgi and another form of the same in ,hume4 #a4 ,,berkeley4 ,this idealism1 in which all external reality disappears1 has before it the standpoint of ,locke1 and it proceeds directly from him4 ,for we saw that to ,locke the source of truth is experience1 or ,being as perceived4 ,now since this sensuous ,being1 as ,being1 has in it the quality of being for consciousness1 we saw that it necessarily came to pass that in ,locke's case some qualities1 at least1 were so determined that they were not in themselves1 but only for another2 and that colour1 figure1 c41 had their ground only in the subject1 in his particular organization4 ,this ,being-for-another1 however1 was not by him accepted as the ,notion1 but as falling within self-consciousness--i4e4 self-consciousness not looked on as universal1--not within mind1 but within what is opposed to the implicit4 ,george ,berkeley was born in #afhd at ,kilcrin1 near ,thomastown1 in the county of ,kilkenny1 ,ireland3 in #aged he died as an ,english ,bishop4#bhj ,he wrote the 8,theory of ,vision10 #agji2 8,a ,treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge10 #agaj2 8,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous10 #agac4 ,in #aghd his collected works were published in ,london in two quarto volumes4 ,berkeley advocated an idealism which came very near to that of ,malebranche4 ,as against the metaphysic of the understanding1 we have the point of view that all existence and its determinations arise from feeling1 and are constituted by self-consciousness4 ,berkeley's first and fundamental thought is consequently this3 8,the ,being of whatever is called by us a thing consists alone in its being perceived10 i4e4 our determinations are the objects of our knowledge4 8,all objects of human knowledge are ideas0 7so called by ,berkeley as by ,locke71 8which arise either from the impressions of the outward senses1 or from perceptions of the inward states and activities of the mind1 or finally1 they are such as are constituted by means of memory and imagination through their separation and rearrangement4 ,a union of different sensuous feelings appears to us to be a particular thing1 e4g4 the feeling of colour1 taste1 smell1 figure1 c42 for by colours1 smells1 sounds1 something of which we have a sensation is always understood40#bha ,this is the matter and the object of knowledge2 the knower is the percipient 8,i10 which reveals itself in relation to those feelings in various activities1 such as imagination1 remembrance1 and will4 ,berkeley thus indeed acknowledges the distinction between ,being-for-self and ,other-,being1 which in his case1 however1 itself falls within the 8,i40 ,of the matter on which activity is directed1 it is no doubt in regard to one portion allowed that it does not exist outside of mind--that is to say1 so far as our thoughts1 inward feelings and states1 or the operations of our imaginary powers are concerned4 ,but in like manner the manifold sensuous conceptions and feelings can only exist in a mind4 ,locke certainly distinguished extension and movement1 for example1 as fundamental qualities1 i4e4 as qualities which pertain to the objects in themselves4 ,but ,berkeley very pertinently points out inconsistency here from the point of view that great and small1 quick and slow1 hold good as something relative2 thus were extension and movement to be inherent or implicit1 they could not be either large or small1 quick or slow2 that is1 they could not be1 for these determinations rest in the conception#bhb of such qualities4 ,in ,berkeley the relation of things to consciousness is alone dealt with1 and beyond this relationship they do not in his view come4 ,from this it follows that it is only self-consciousness that possesses them2 for a perception which is not in a conceiving mind is nothing3 it is a direct contradiction4 ,there can be no substance1 he says1 which neither conceives nor perceives1 and which is yet the substratum of perceptions and conceptions4 ,if it is represented that there is something outside of consciousness which is similar to the conceptions1 this is likewise contradictory2 a conception can alone be similar to a conception1 the idea to the idea alone4#bhc ,thus1 while ,locke's ultimate point is abstract substance1 ,being generally with the real determination of a substratum of accidents1 ,berkeley declares this substance to be the most incomprehensible assumption of all2 but the incomprehensibility does not make this ,being into an absolute nullity1 nor does it make it in itself incomprehensible4#bhd ,for ,berkeley brings forward against the present existence of external objects only the inconceivability of the relation of a ,being to mind4 ,this inconceivability1 however1 is destroyed in the ,notion1 for the ,notion is the negative of things2 and this moved ,berkeley and ,leibnitz to shut up the two sides in themselves4 ,there nevertheless remains a relationship of what is 8other0 to us2 these feelings do not develop from us as ,leibnitz represents1 but are determined through somewhat else4 ,when ,leibnitz speaks of development within the monads1 it is nothing but empty talk2 for the monads as they follow in succession have no inward connection4 ,each individual is thus determined through another1 and not through us2 and it does not matter what this external is1 since it remains a contingent4 ,now in relation to the two sides of ,leibnitz which are indifferent to one another1 ,berkeley says that such an 8other0 is quite superfluous4 ,berkeley calls the other the objects2 but these1 he says1 cannot be what we call matter1 for spirit and matter cannot come together4#bhe ,but the necessity of conceptions directly contradicts this ,being-within-self of the conceiver2 for the ,being-within-self is the freedom of the conceiver2 the latter does not1 however1 produce the conceptions with freedom2 they have for him the form and determinateness of an independent 8other40 ,berkeley likewise does not accept idealism in the subjective sense1 but only in respect that there are spirits which impart themselves 7in the other case the subject forms his own conceptions71 and consequently that it is ,god alone who brings to pass such conceptions2 thus the imaginations or conceptions which are produced by us with our individual activity remain separate from these others1#bhf i4e4 from the implicit4 ,this conception gives an instance of the difficulties which appear in regard to these questions1 and which ,berkeley wished to escape from in a quite original way4 ,the inconsistency in this system ,god has again to make good2 ,he has to bear it all away2 to ,him the solution of the contradiction is left4 ,in this idealism1 in short1 the common sensuous view of the universe and the separation of actuality1 as also the system of thought1 of judgments devoid of ,notion1 remain exactly as before2 plainly nothing in the content is altered but the abstract form that all things are perceptions only4#bhg ,such idealism deals with the opposition between consciousness and its object merely1 and leaves the extension of the conceptions and the antagonisms of the empirical and manifold content quite untouched2 and if we ask what then is the truth of these perceptions and conceptions1 as we asked formerly of things1 no answer is forthcoming4 ,it is pretty much a matter of indifference whether we believe in things or in perceptions1 if self-consciousness remains possessed entirely by finalities2 it receives the content in the ordinary way1 and that content is of the ordinary kind4 ,in its individuality it stumbles about amid the conceptions of an entirely empirical existence1 without knowing and understanding anything else about the content3 that is to say in this formal idealism reason has no content of its own4 ,as to what ,berkeley further states in respect of the empirical content1 where the object of his investigation becomes entirely psychological1 it relates in the main to finding out the difference between the sensations of sight and feeling1 and to discovering which kind of sensations belong to the one and which to the other4 ,this kind of investigation keeps entirely to the phenomenal1 and only therein distinguishes the various sorts of phenomena2 or comprehension only reaches as far as to distinctions4 ,the only point of interest is that these investigations have in their course chiefly lighted on space1 and a dispute is carried on as to whether we obtain the conception of distance and so on1 in short all the conceptions relating to space1 through sight or feeling4 ,space is just this sensuous universal1 the universal in individuality itself1 which in the empirical consideration of empirical multiplicity invites and leads us on to thought 7for it itself is thought71 and by it this very sensuous perception and reasoning respecting perception is in its action confused4 ,and since here perception finds an objective thought1 it really would be led on to thought or to the possession of a thought1 but at the same time it cannot arrive at thought in its completion1 since thought or the ,notion are not in question1 and it clearly cannot come to the consciousness of true reality4 ,nothing is thought in the form of thought1 but only as an external1 as something foreign to thought4 #b4 ,,hume4 ,we must add to what has preceded an account of the ,scepticism of ,hume1 which has been given a more important place in history than it deserves from its intrinsic nature2 its historic importance is due to the fact that ,kant really derives the starting point of his philosophy from ,hume4 ,david ,hume was born in #agaa at ,edinburgh and died there in #aggf4 ,he held a librarian's post in that town for some time1 then he became secretary to the ,embassy in ,paris2 for quite a long period1 indeed1 he moved in diplomatic circles4 ,in ,paris he came to know ,jean ,jacques ,rousseau and invited him to ,england1 but ,rousseau's terribly distrustful and suspicious nature very soon estranged the two4#bhh ,hume is more celebrated as a writer of history than through his philosophic works4 ,he wrote3 8,a ,treatise of human nature10 #c vols41 #agci1 translated into ,german by ,jacob1 ,halle1 #agij1 #hvo2 likewise 8,essays and ,treatises on several subjects10 #b vols4 7,vol4 ,i4 containing 8,essays moral1 political and literary10 printed for the first time in ,edinburgh1 #agdb2 ,vol4 ,,ii4 containing an 8,inquiry concerning human understanding10 a further development of the ,treatise1 and first printed separately in ,london1 #agdh1 #hvo74 ,in his 8,essays10 which contributed most to his fame as far as the philosophic side is concerned1 he treated philosophic subjects as an educated1 thoughtful man of the world would do--not in a systematic connection1 nor showing the wide range which his thoughts should properly have been able to attain2 in fact in some of his treatises he merely dealt with particular points of view4 ,we must shortly deal with the main aspects of ,hume's philosophy4 ,he starts directly from the philosophic standpoint of ,locke and ,bacon1 which derives our conceptions from experience1 and his scepticism has the idealism of ,berkeley as its object4 ,the sequence of thought is this3 ,berkeley allows all ideas to hold good as they are2 in ,hume the antithesis of the sensuous and universal has cleared and more sharply defined itself1 sense being pronounced by him to be devoid of universality4 ,berkeley does not make any distinction as to whether in his sensations there is a necessary connection or not4 ,formerly experience was a mixture of the two elements4 ,hume tells us that all perceptions of the mind may be divided into two classes or species1 that of impressions1 i4e4 sensuous perceptions1 and thoughts or ideas2 the latter are similar in content to the former1 but less forcible and lively4 ,all objects of reason are consequently either relations of thoughts such as mathematical axioms1 or facts of experience4#bhi ,since ,hume makes these into the content he naturally rejects innate ideas4#bij ,now when ,hume goes on to consider more closely what is subsumed under experience1 he finds categories of the understanding present there1 and more especially the determination of the universal and of universal necessity2 he took under his consideration more particularly the category of cause and effect1 and in it set forth the rational element1 inasmuch as in this causal relationship necessity is especially contained4 ,here ,hume really completed the system of ,locke1 since he consistently drew attention to the fact that if this point of view be adhered to1 experience is indeed the principle of whatever one knows1 or perception itself contains everything that happens1 but nevertheless the determination of universality and necessity are not contained in1 nor were they given us by experience4 ,hume has thus destroyed the objectivity or absolute nature of thought-determinations4 8,our conviction of the truth of a fact rests on feeling1 memory1 and the reasonings founded on the causal connection1 i4e4 on the relation of cause and effect4 ,the knowledge of this relation is not attained by reasonings a priori1 but arises entirely from experience2 and we draw inferences1 since we expect similar results to follow from similar causes1 by reason of the principle of the custom or habit of conjoining different manifestations1 i4e4 by reason of the principle of the association of ideas4 ,hence there is no knowledge and no metaphysics beyond experience40#bia ,the simple thought we have here is exactly what ,locke says1 that we must receive the conception of cause and effect1 and thus of a necessary connection1 from experience2 but experience1 as sensuous perception1 contains no necessity1 has no causal connection4 ,for in what we term such1 that which we properly speaking perceive is merely the fact that something first of all happens and that then something else follows4 ,immediate perception relates only to a content of conditions or things which are present alongside of and in succession to one another1 but not to what we call cause and effect2 in time-succession there is thus no relation of cause and effect1 and consequently no necessity either4#bib ,when we say the pressure of the water is the cause of the destruction of this house1 that is no pure experience4 ,we have merely seen the water pressing or moving along in this direction1 and subsequently the house falling down2 and so with other examples4 ,necessity is thus not justified by experience1 but we carry it into experience2 it is accidentally arrived at by us and is subjective merely4 ,this kind of universality which we connect with necessity1 ,hume calls custom4 ,because we have often seen results to follow we are accustomed to regard the connection as a necessary one2 the necessity to him is thus a quite contingent association of ideas1 which is custom4 ,it is the same thing in respect of the universal4 ,what we perceive are individual phenomena and sensations in which we see that this is now one thing and now another4 ,it may likewise be that we perceive the same determination frequently repeated and in manifold ways4 ,but this is still far removed from universality2 universality is a determination which is not given to us through experience4 ,it may be said that this is quite a correct remark on ,hume's part1 if by experience we understand outward experience4 ,experience is sensible that something exists1 but nevertheless the universal is not as yet present in it4 ,indeed1 sensuous existence as such is something which is set forth as indifferent1 not differentiated from anything else2 but sensuous existence is likewise universal in itself1 or the indifference of its determinateness is not its only determinateness4 ,but since ,hume regards necessity1 the unity of opposites1 as resting quite subjectively on custom1 we cannot get any deeper in thought4 ,custom is indeed so far a necessity in consciousness1 and to this extent we really see the principle of this idealism in it2 but in the second place this necessity is represented as something quite devoid of thought or ,notion4 ,this custom obtains both in our perception which relates to sensuous nature1 and in relation to law and morality4 ,the ideas of justice and morality rest upon an instinct1 on a subjective1 but very often deceptive moral feeling4#bic ,from a sceptical point of view the opposite may likewise be demonstrated4 ,from this side ,hume considers justice1 morality1 religious determinations1 and disputes their absolute validity4 ,that is to say when it is assumed that our knowledge arises from experience1 and that we must consider only what we obtain thereby to be the truth1 we find indeed in our feeling1 the sentiment e4g4 that the murderer1 the thief1 c41 must be punished2 and because this is likewise felt by others it is universally allowed4 ,but ,hume1 like the sceptics of former days1 appeals to the various opinions of various nations3 amongst different nations and in different times various standards of right have been held4#bid ,there are those who in this case do not have the feeling of wrong-doing in respect of stealing1 e4g4 the ,lacedmonians or the so-called innocent inhabitants of the ,south ,sea ,islands4 ,what is by one nation called immoral1 shameful and irreligious1 is by another not considered so at all4 ,thus because such matters rest upon experience1 one subject has such and such an experience1 finds1 for instance1 in his religious feelings this determination which inclines him to ,god1 while another subject has different experiences altogether4 ,we are in the habit of allowing one thing to be just and moral1 others have another mode of regarding it4 ,hence if the truth depends upon experience1 the element of universality1 of objectivity1 c41 comes from elsewhere1 or is not justified by experience4 ,hume thus declared this sort of universality1 as he declared necessity1 to be rather subjectively than objectively existent2 for custom is just a subjective universality of this kind4 ,this is an important and acute observation in relation to experience looked at as the source of knowledge2 and it is from this point that the ,kantian reflection now begins4 ,hume 7,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sect4 #h1 #aa7 then extended his scepticism to the conceptions and doctrines of freedom and necessity1 and to the proofs of the existence of ,god2 and in fact scepticism here possesses a wide field4 ,to such a system of reasoning from thoughts and possibilities another method of reasoning may again be opposed1 and this reasoning is no better than the other4 ,what is said to be metaphysically established regarding immortality1 ,god1 nature1 c41 lacks a real ground for resting upon1 such as is professed to be given2 for the inferences on which men ground their proofs are subjectively formed conceptions4 ,but where a universality is found1 it does not rest in the matter in itself1 but is simply a subjective necessity which is really mere custom4 ,hence the result which ,hume arrives at is necessarily astonishment regarding the condition of human knowledge1 a general state of mistrust1 and a sceptical indecision--which indeed does not amount to much4 ,the condition of human knowledge regarding which ,hume so much wonders1 he further describes as containing an antagonism between reason and instinct2 this instinct1 it is said1 which embraces many sorts of powers1 inclinations1 c41 deceives us in many different ways1 and reason demonstrates this4 ,but on the other side it is empty1 without content or principles of its own2 and if a content is in question at all1 it must keep to those inclinations4 ,in itself reason thus has no criterion whereby the antagonism between individual desires1 and between itself and the desires1 may be settled4#bie ,thus everything appears in the form of an irrational existence devoid of thought2 the implicitly true and right is not in thought1 but in the form of an instinct1 a desire4 ,b4 ,,scottish ,,philosophy4 ,in ,scotland quite another school of thought developed1 and the ,scotch are the foremost of ,hume's opponents2 in ,german philosophy1 on the other hand1 we have to recognize in ,kant another opposing force to that of ,hume4 ,to the ,scottish school many philosophers belong2 ,english philosophy is now restricted to ,edinburgh and ,glasgow1 in which places a number of professors belonging to this school succeeded one another4 ,to the scepticism of ,hume they oppose an inward independent source of truth for all that pertains to religion and morality4 ,this coincides with ,kant1 who also maintains an inward source or spring as against external perception2 but in the case of ,kant this has quite another form than that which it possesses with the ,scottish philosophers4 ,to them this inward independent source is not thought or reason as such1 for the content which comes to pass from this inwardness is concrete in its nature1 and likewise demands for itself the external matter of experience4 ,it consists of popular principles1 which on the one hand are opposed to the externality of the sources of knowledge1 and1 on the other1 to metaphysics as such1 to abstract thought or reasoning on its own account4 ,this sort of reasoning understanding applied itself to ethics and to politics--sciences which have been much developed by ,german1 ,french1 and above all by ,scottish philosophers 7supra1 p4 #cbj73 they regarded morality as cultured men would1 and sought to bring moral duties under a principle4 ,many of their works are translated into ,german2 several of these on ethics or morality are translated by ,garve1 for instance1 who also translated ,cicero ,de ,officiis1 and they are written in a manner similar to that of ,cicero when he uses the expression ,insitum est a natura 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #ic74 ,this moral sentiment and the ordinary human understanding hereafter formed the common principle to a whole succession of ,scots1 such as ,thomas ,reid1 ,beattie1 ,oswald1 and others2 in this way they frequently made sagacious observations1 but with them speculative philosophy quite disappears4 ,one special characteristic of these ,scottish philosophers is that they have sought accurately to define the principle of knowledge2 but on the whole they start from the same point as that which was in ,germany likewise accepted as the principle4 ,that is to say they represented the so-called healthy reason1 or common-sense 7sensus communis71 as the ground of truth4 ,the following are the principal members of this school1 each of whom has some special feature distinguishing him from the rest4 #a4 ,,thomas ,,reid4 ,thomas ,reid1 born in #agaj1 died as a professor in ,glasgow in #agif4bif ,he maintained the principle of common-sense4 ,his endeavour was to discover the principles of knowledge1 and the following are his conclusions3 87a7 ,there are certain undemonstrated and undemonstrable fundamental truths which common-sense begets and recognizes as immediately conclusive and absolute40 ,this hence constitutes an immediate knowledge2 in it an inward independent source is set forth which is hereby opposed to religion as revealed4 87b7 ,these immediate truths require no support from any elaborated science1 nor do they submit to its criticism20 they cannot be criticized by philosophy4 87c7 ,philosophy itself has no root other than that of an immediate1 self-enlightening truth2 whatever contradicts such truth is in itself false1 contradictory1 and absurd40 ,this is true for knowledge and 87d7 ,morality2 the individual is moral if he acts in accordance with the perfect principles of the perfection of the whole and with his own duty as it is known to him40#big #b4 ,,james ,,beattie4 ,james ,beattie1 born #agce1 was a professor of moral philosophy in ,edinburgh and ,aberdeen1 and died in #ahjc4 ,he likewise made common-sense the source of all knowledge4 8,the common-sense of the plain human understanding is the source of all morality1 of all religion1 and all certainty4 ,the confirmation of common-sense must be added to the testimony of our senses4 ,the truth is what the necessities of my nature call upon me to believe4 ,belief signifies conviction in the case of truths which are certain1 in that of those which are probable1 approbation4 ,the truth which is certain is known by means of intuition1 the probable truth by means of proofs40#bih ,such convictions as are quite certain form the basis of actions4 #c4 ,,james ,,oswald4 ,james ,oswald1 a ,scottish clergyman1 made use of an expression which indicates that we have the principles just mentioned as facts existing within us4#bii 8,the existence of the ,divine ,being is 7according to him7 a fact absolutely raised above all reasoning and all doubt1 and immediately certain for the common-sense of morality40#cjj ,the same principle was likewise established in ,germany at this time--an inward revelation1 a knowledge of the conscience1 and specially of ,god and ,his ,being4 #d4 ,,dugald ,,stewart4 ,to this school also belong ,dugald ,stewart1 ,edward ,search1#cja ,ferguson1 and ,hutcheson1 most of whom have written on morals4 ,the political economist ,adam ,smith from this point of view is likewise a philosopher1 and the best known of them all4 ,this ,scottish philosophy is now given forth in ,germany as something new4 ,it is a popular philosophy1 which1 on the one hand1 has the great merit of seeking in man1 and in his consciousness1 for the source of all that should be held by him as true1 the immanence of what should be by him esteemed4 ,the content is at the same time a concrete content2 in a certain degree1 it is the antithesis of metaphysics proper1 of the wandering about in abstract determinations of the understanding4 ,of these ,scots1 ,dugald ,stewart1 who is living still1#cjb appears to be the last and least significant2 in them all there is the same ground-work to be found1 the same circle of reflection1 namely1 an a priori philosophy1 though not one which is to be pursued in a speculative way4 ,the general idea which pervades their principle is that of the healthy human understanding2 to this they have added benevolent desires1 sympathy1 a moral sense1 and from such grounds composed very excellent moral writings4 ,that is certainly all very well in order to understand approximately1 up to a certain degree of culture1 what universal thoughts are1 in order to narrate their history1 to appeal to examples1 and to explain them2 but further it does not extend4 ,in more recent times this ,scottish philosophy has passed to ,france1 and ,professor ,royer-,collard1 now president of the ,second ,chamber1#cjc as also his disciple1 ,jouffroy1 in conformity with it1 pass from the facts of consciousness through cultured reasoning and experience1 to a further stage in development4 ,what by the ,french is called ,idologie 7supra1 p4 #cjh7 has also its place here2 it is abstract metaphysics1 in so far as it is an enumeration and analysis of the most simple thought-determinations4 ,they are not treated dialectically1 but from our reflection1 from our thoughts1 the material is derived1 and in this the determinations therein contained are demonstrated4 ,c4 ,,french ,,philosophy4 ,we pass on to the ,french philosophy2 the relation it bears to metaphysics is this1 that while man as a metaphysician stands to himself in the attitude of a layman or outsider1 ,french philosophy does away with the lay or outside position in regard alike to politics1 religion1 and philosophy4 ,two forms have to be mentioned which are of the greatest importance in respect to culture--,french philosophy and the ,aufklrung4 ,with the ,english we saw a certain idealism only3 this was either formal1 as the mere general translation of ,being into ,being-for-another1 i4e4 into perceptibility1 or else what is implicit in this perceptibility1 instincts1 impulses1 habits1 c4--blind determinate forces2 a return into self-consciousness1 which itself appears as a physical thing4 ,in that first idealism the whole finitude and extension of appearances1 of sensations1 and likewise of thoughts and determinate fixed conceptions1 remain just what they are in the unphilosophic consciousness4 ,the scepticism of ,hume makes all that is universal sink into habits and instincts1 i4e4 it consists in a more simple synthesis of the phenomenal world2 but these simpler elements1 these instincts1 impulses1 and forces1 are just as much a fixed present existence in self-consciousness1 unspiritual1 and without movement4 ,the ,french philosophy has more life1 more movement1 more spirit2 it would perhaps be more correct to describe it as full of life and spirit4 ,it is the absolute ,notion1 which revolts against the whole reigning system of prevalent conceptions and established ideas1 which overthrows all that has settled into fixity1 and acquires the consciousness of perfect liberty4 ,at the root of this idealistic activity lies the certainty that whatever is1 whatever counts for anything in itself1 is all a matter of self-consciousness2 and as to ,notions 7individual and isolated existences ruling actual self-consciousness71 such as the ,notions of good and evil1 of power and riches1 and the fixed conceptions regarding faith in ,god and ,his relation to the world1 ,his mode of government and1 further1 the duties of self-consciousness towards ,him--that all these are not truths in themselves1 having validity beyond the bounds of self-consciousness4 ,all these forms1 the real implicitude of the actual world and also of the supersensuous world1 are therefore set aside in this spirit conscious of itself4 ,it does not trouble itself seriously about those who admit the validity of these conceptions just as they are1 and accept them as true1 respecting them as independent and free apart from self-consciousness1 but it speaks of such conceptions with intelligence and spirit1 that is to say1 it asserts that self-consciousness by its activity is the first to make anything of them1 and to make that a something very different from what they profess to be2 for the self-conscious spirit only intellectual relations1 these processes of formation and movement by means of its self-consciousness1 possess validity and interest4 ,this is the character of the ,notion in its actuality2 what has reality for this all-perceiving and all-comprehending consciousness is held to be valid4 ,we must now consider what form existence takes for this absolutely comprehending self-consciousness4 ,in the first place this ,notion is fixed as the negative movement of the ,notion only2 the positive and simple1 or existence1 falls outside of this movement4 ,there remains to the ,notion no distinction1 no content2 for all determinate content is lost in that negativity4 ,this empty existence is for us pure thought generally1 what the ,french call tre suprme1 or if represented objectively as existent1 and as in opposition to consciousness1 it is matter4 ,absolute ,being is therefore determined as matter1 as empty objectivity1 through a ,notion which destroys all content and determination1 and has as its object this universal alone4 ,it is a ,notion which acts only destructively1 and does not again construct itself out of this matter or pure thought or pure substantiality4 ,we here see so-called materialism and atheism freely emerge1 as the necessary result of the pure comprehending self-consciousness4 ,from one point of view there perishes in this negative movement all determination which represents spirit as something beyond self-consciousness1 and more especially all determinations within the spirit1 and also those which express it as spirit1 indeed all the conceptions formed of it by faith1 for which it has validity as an existent self-consciousness beyond self-consciousness--in short1 all that is traditional or imposed by authority4 ,there remains only a present1 actual ,being1 for self-consciousness recognizes implicit existence only in the form which it has for self-consciousness1 and in which it is actually known to itself2 in matter1 and matter as actively extending and realizing itself in multiplicity1 i4e4 as nature4 ,in the present ,i am conscious to myself of my reality1 and consequently self-consciousness finds itself as matter1 finds the soul to be material1 and conceptions to be movements and changes in the inner organ of the brain1 which result from external impressions on the senses4 ,thought is therefore a mode of the existence of matter4 ,the ,one ,substance of ,spinoza1 to which ,french materialism as naturalism is parallel1 really finds its accomplishment here in this object as in all respects the ultimate2 but while in ,spinoza this category is a possession which we find ready to hand1 here it appears as the result of the abstraction of the understanding proceeding from empiricism4 ,the other form of the ,aufklrung is1 on the contrary1 when absolute ,being is set forth as something beyond self-consciousness1 so that of itself1 of its implicit ,being1 nothing whatever can be known4 ,it bears the empty name of ,god4 ,for though ,god may be determined in any way whatever1 all these determinations fall away2 ,he is1 like x1 the altogether unknown quantity4 ,this view is not therefore to be termed atheism1 in the first place because it still employs the empty1 meaningless name1 and in the second place because it expresses the necessary relations of self-consciousness1 duties1 c41 not as necessary in an absolute sense1 but as necessary through relation to another1 namely to the unknown--although there can be no positive relation to an unknown except by abrogating the self as particular4 ,yet it is not matter1 because this simple and empty something is negatively defined as non-existent for self-consciousness4 ,this all comes to the same thing1 however1 for matter is the universal1 and is ,being-for-self represented as abrogated4 ,but the true reflection on that unknown is this1 that it exists for self-consciousness simply as a negative of the same1 i4e4 as matter1 reality1 the present2 it is this negative for me1 this is its ,notion4 ,the difference distinguishing this from what appears to be in its entirety something 8other10 and in which any one side is not permitted to say that what it thinks is such is that particular thing1 is the difference which rests on this last abstraction4 ,since then the ,notion is present only in its negative form1 positive extension remains without a ,notion2 it has the form of nature1 of an existent1 both in the physical and in the moral sphere4 ,the knowledge of nature remains the ordinary1 scientifically unspeculative knowledge1 and as to its essence1 in so far as it claims to be philosophy1 it is a general way of speaking that plays with the words1 8forces1 relations1 manifold connections10 but arrives at nothing definite4 ,similarly1 in the spiritual sphere1 it is so far true that the metaphysic of the spirit is of such a nature that it is nothing more nor less than a particular organization by means of which the powers which are termed sensation1 perception1 c41 come into existence2 but this is a wearisome way of talking1 which can make nothing intelligible1 which accepts appearances and perceptions and reasons about them1 but none the less reduces their implicit existence to certain determinate forces1 of the inward nature of which we know nothing further4 ,the determination and knowledge of the moral sphere has similarly for its object to bring man back to his so-called natural promptings2 its essence has the form of a natural impulse1 and this natural impulse is termed self-love1 selfishness1 or benevolence4 ,it is required that man should live in conformity with nature2 but this nature does not reach further than general expressions and descriptions1 such as the state of nature we find depicted by ,rousseau4 ,what is called the metaphysic of ordinary conceptions is the empiricism of ,locke1 which seeks to show their origin to be in consciousness1 in as far as it is individual consciousness2 which1 when born into the world1 emerges out of unconsciousness in order to acquire knowledge as sensuous consciousness4 ,this external origin they confound with the ,becoming and ,notion of the matter in point4 ,if one were to ask vaguely what is the origin and genesis of water1 and the answer were to be given that it comes from the mountains or from rain1 this would be a reply in the spirit of the above philosophy4 ,in short1 it is only the negative aspect that is interesting1 and as for this positive ,french philosophy1 it is out of the question4 ,but even the negative side of it belongs properly to culture mainly1 with which we have here nothing to do1 and the ,aufklrung likewise belongs to the same4 ,in the ,french philosophic writings1 which in this respect are of importance1 what is worthy of admiration is the astonishing energy and force of the ,notion as directed against existence1 against faith1 against all the power of authority that had held sway for thousands of years4 ,on the one hand we cannot help remarking the feeling of utter rebellion against the whole state of affairs at present prevailing1 a state which is alien to self-consciousness1 which would fain dispense with it1 and in which self-consciousness does not find itself2 there is a certainty of the truth of reason1 which challenges the whole intellectual world as it stands aloof1 and is confident of destroying it4 ,french atheism1 materialism1 or naturalism has overcome all prejudices1 and has been victorious over the senseless hypotheses and assumptions of the positive element in religion1 which is associated with habits1 manners1 opinions1 determinations as to law and morality and civil institutions4 ,with the healthy human understanding and earnestness of spirit1 and not with frivolous declamations1 it has rebelled against the condition of the world as legally established1 against the constitution of the state1 the administration of justice1 the mode of government1 political authority1 and likewise against art4 ,contrasting with this barren content there is the other and fertile side4 ,the positive is in its turn constituted by so-called immediately enlightening truths of the healthy human understanding1 which contains nothing except this truth and the claim to find itself1 and beyond this form does not pass4 ,but in so doing there arises the endeavour to grasp the absolute as something present1 and at the same time as an object of thought and as absolute unity3 an endeavour which1 as it implies denial of the conception of design both in the natural and in the spiritual sphere--the former involving the idea of life1 and the latter that of spirit and freedom--only reaches to the abstraction of a nature undetermined in itself1 to sensation1 mechanism1 self-seeking1 and utility4 ,it is this then that we shall have to make evident in the positive side of ,french philosophy4 ,in their political constitutions the ,french have1 it is true1 started from abstractions1 but they have done so as from universal thoughts1 which are the negative of reality2 the ,english1 on the other hand1 proceed from concrete reality1 from the unwieldy structure of their constitution2 just as their writers even have not attained to universal principles4 ,what ,luther began in the heart only and in the feelings--the freedom of spirit which1 unconscious of its simple root1 does not comprehend itself1 and yet is the very universal itself1 for which all content disappears in the thought that fills itself with itself--these universal determinations and thoughts the ,french asserted and steadfastly adhered to3 they are universal principles1 in the form of the conviction of the individual in himself4 ,freedom becomes the condition of the world1 connects itself with the world's history and forms epochs in the same2 it is the concrete freedom of the spirit1 a concrete universality2 fundamental principles as regards the concrete now take the place of the abstract metaphysic of ,descartes4 ,among the ,germans we find mere chatter2 they would have liked to offer explanations also1 but all they have to give is in the form of miserable phenomena and individualism4 ,the ,french1 from their starting-point of the thought of universality1 and the ,german liberty of conscience starting from the conscience which teaches us to 8,prove all things10 to 8hold fast that which is good10 have1 however1 joined hands with one another1 or they follow the same path4 ,only the ,french1 as though they were without conscience1 have made short work of everything1 and have systematically adhered to a definite thought--the physiocratic system2 while the ,germans wish to leave themselves a free retreat1 and examine from the standpoint of conscience whether a certain course is permissible4 ,the ,french warred against the speculative ,notion with the spirit1 the ,germans did so with the understanding4 ,we find in the ,french a deep all-embracing philosophic need1 different from anything in the ,english and ,scotch and even in the ,germans1 and full of vitality3 it is a universal concrete view of all that exists1 with entire independence both of all authority and of all abstract metaphysics4 ,the method employed is that of development from perception1 from the heart2 it is a comprehensive view of the entire matter1 which keeps the whole ever in sight1 and seeks to uphold and attain to it4 ,this healthy human understanding1 this sound reason1 with its content taken from the human breast1 from natural feeling1 has directed itself against the religious side of things in various moments3 on the one hand and first of all1 as ,french philosophy1 it did so against the ,catholic religion1 the fetters of superstition and of the hierarchy2 on the other hand1 in less pronounced form1 as the ,german 8illumination10 against the ,protestant religion1 in as far as it has a content which it has derived from revelation1 from ecclesiastical authority in general4 ,on the one hand the form of authority in general was challenged1 and on the other hand its matter4 ,the content can be easily enough disposed of by this form of thought1 which is not what we understand by reason1 but which must be termed understanding2 it is easy for the understanding to show objections to the ultimate principles of what can be comprehended only by means of speculation4 ,the understanding has thus tried the content of religion by its standard1 and has condemned it2 the understanding proceeds in the same way against a concrete philosophy4 ,what of religion has in many theologies been very commonly left remaining is what is termed theism1 faith in general2 this is the same content which is found also in ,mohammedanism4 ,but along with this attack upon religion on the part of the reasoning understanding there has been also a movement towards materialism1 atheism and naturalism4 ,it is true that we should not make the charge of atheism lightly1 for it is a very common occurrence that an individual whose ideas about ,god differ from those of other people is charged with lack of religion1 or even with atheism4 ,but here it really is the case that this philosophy has developed into atheism1 and has defined matter1 nature1 c41 as that which is to be taken as the ultimate1 the active1 and the efficient4 ,some ,frenchmen1 ,rousseau for instance1 are not1 however1 to be included with the rest2 one of this author's works1 8,the ,confession of ,faith of a ,vicar10#cjd contains the very same theism which is found in ,german theologians4 ,thus ,french metaphysics finds a parallel not only in ,spinoza 7supra1 p4 #chb7 but also in the ,german metaphysics of ,wolff4 ,other ,frenchmen have confessedly gone over to naturalism2 among them is specially to be mentioned ,mirabaud1 to whom the ,systme de la ,nature is attributed4 ,in what has been termed ,french philosophy1 represented by ,voltaire1 ,montesquieu1 ,rousseau1 d',alembert1 ,diderot1 and in what subsequently appeared in ,germany as the ,aufklrung1 and has been also stigmatized as atheism1 we may now distinguish three aspects1 first1 the negative side1 to which most exception has been taken2 secondly1 the positive side2 thirdly1 the philosophical1 metaphysical side4 #a4 ,,the ,,negative ,,aspect4 ,justice must be done even to this negative side1 as to everything else2 what is substantial in it is the attack of the reasoning instinct against a condition of degeneracy1 ,i may even say of utter and universal falsehood2 for instance1 against the positive side of a religion that has become wooden and lifeless4 ,what we call religion is firm faith1 conviction that there is a ,god2 if this is faith in the doctrines of ,christianity1 it is more or less abstracted from4 ,but in this attack against religion we have to think of something quite different from the above2 in what we find here1 the positive of religion is the negative of reason4 ,if we would understand the feeling of indignation to which these writers give utterance1 we must keep before our eyes the state of religion in those days1 with its might and magnificence1 the corruption of its manners1 its avarice1 its ambition1 its luxury1 for which nevertheless reverence was claimed--a state of contradiction present and existent4 ,we perceive into what a frightful condition of formalism and deadness positive religion had sunk1 as had the bonds of society as well1 the means employed for the administration of justice1 the power of the state4 ,this ,french philosophy also attacked the state2 it assailed prejudices and superstition1 especially the depravity of civic life1 of court manners and of ,government officials2 it laid hold of and brought to light the evil1 the ridiculous1 the base1 and exposed the whole tissue of hypocrisy and unjust power to the derision1 the contempt and the hatred of the world at large1 and thus brought men's minds and hearts into a state of indifference to the idols of the world and indignation against them4 ,old institutions1 which in the sense of self-conscious freedom and humanity that had developed1 no longer found a place1 and which had formerly been founded and upheld by mutual good feeling and the obtuseness of a consciousness unconscious of self1 institutions which were no longer in harmony with the spirit that had established them1 and now1 in consequence of the advance that had been made in scientific culture1 were bound to make good to reason their claim to be sacred and just1--this was the formalism that those philosophers overthrew4 ,in making their attacks1 they wrote sometimes with reasoned argument1 sometimes satirically1 sometimes in the language of plain common-sense1 and they did not wage war on what we call religion2 that was left quite unharmed1 and its claims were urged with words of choicest eloquence4 ,those who enforced these views were therefore agents of destruction against that alone which was in itself already destroyed4 ,we place it to our credit when we reproach the ,french for their attacks upon religion and on the state4 ,we must represent to ourselves the horrible state of society1 the misery and degradation in ,france1 in order to appreciate the services that these writers rendered4 ,hypocrisy and cant1 imbecility of mind and the tyranny which sees itself robbed of its prey1 may say that attacks were made on religion1 on the state1 and on manners4 ,but what a religion6 ,not the religion that ,luther purified1 but the most wretched superstition1 priestly domination1 stupidity1 degradation of mind1 and more especially the squandering of riches and the revelling in temporal possessions in the midst of public misery4 ,and what a state6 ,the blindest tyranny of ministers and their mistresses1 wives and chamberlains2 so that a vast army of petty tyrants and idlers looked upon it as a right divinely given them to plunder the revenues of the state and lay hands upon the product of the nation's sweat4 ,the shamelessness1 the dishonesty were past belief2 and morals were simply in keeping with the corruptness of the institutions4 ,we see the law defied by individuals in respect to civil and political life2 we see it likewise set at nought in respect to conscience and thought4 ,in regard to practical politics1 the writers in question never even thought of a revolution1 but desired and demanded reforms alone1 and that these should be subjective mainly2 they called on the ,government to sweep away abuses1 and appoint honourable men as ministers4 ,the positive recommendations made by them as to the course to be pursued were1 for example1 that the royal children should receive a good upbringing1 that princes should be of frugal habits1 c4 ,the ,french ,revolution was forced on by the stiff-necked obstinacy of prejudices1 by haughtiness1 utter want of thought1 and avarice4 ,the philosophers of whom we are speaking were able to give only a general idea of what ought to be done2 they could not indicate the mode in which the reforms were to be carried out4 ,it was the ,government's business to make arrangements and carry out reforms in concrete shape2 but it did not perceive this4 ,what the philosophers brought forward and maintained as a remedy for this horrible state of disorder was1 speaking generally1 that men should no longer be in the position of laymen1 either with regard to religion or to law2 so that in religious matters there should not be a hierarchy1 a limited and selected number of priests1 and in the same way that there should not be in legal matters an exclusive caste and society 7not even a class of professional lawyers71 in whom should reside1 and to whom should be restricted1 the knowledge of what is eternal1 divine1 true1 and right1 and by whom other men should be commanded and directed2 but that human reason should have the right of giving its assent and its opinion4 ,to treat barbarians as laymen is quite as it should be--barbarians are nothing but laymen2 but to treat thinking men as laymen is very hard4 ,this great claim made by man to subjective freedom1 perception and conviction1 the philosophers in question contended for heroically and with splendid genius1 with warmth and fire1 with spirit and courage1 maintaining that a man's own self1 the human spirit1 is the source from which is derived all that is to be respected by him4 ,there thus manifests itself in them the fanaticism of abstract thought4 ,we ,germans were passive at first with regard to the existing state of affairs1 we endured it2 in the second place1 when that state of affairs was overthrown1 we were just as passive3 it was overthrown by the efforts of others1 we let it be taken away from us1 we suffered it all to happen4 ,in ,germany1 ,frederick ,,ii4 allied himself with this culture1 a rare example in those days4 ,french court manners1 operas1 gardens1 dresses1 were widely adopted in ,germany1 but not ,french philosophy2 yet in the form of wit and jest much of it found its way into this upper world1 and much that was evil and barbarous was driven away4 ,frederick ,,ii41 without having been brought up on melancholy psalms1 without having had to learn one or two of them every day by heart1 without the barbarous metaphysics and logic of ,wolff 7for what did he find to admire in ,germany except ,gellert871 was well acquainted with the great1 although formal and abstract principles of religion and the state1 and governed in accordance therewith1 as far as circumstances allowed4 ,nothing else was at that time required in his nation2 one cannot ask that he should have reformed and revolutionized it1 since not a single person yet demanded representative government and the publicity of courts of justice4 ,he introduced what there was need of1 religious tolerance1 legislation1 improvements in the administration of justice1 economy in the revenues of state2 of the wretched ,german law there remained no longer in his states even the merest phantom4 ,he showed what was the object and purpose of the state1 and at the same time cast down all privileges1 the private rights which pertained to ,germans1 and arbitrary statute laws4 ,it is foolish when cant and ,german pseudo-patriotism pounce down upon him now1 and try to disparage the greatness of a man whose influence was so enormous1 and would even detract from his fame by a charge of vanity and wickedness4 ,what ,german patriotism aims at should be reasonable4 #b4 ,,the ,,positive ,,aspect4 ,the affirmative content of this philosophy certainly does not satisfy the requirements of profundity4 ,a leading characteristic of its teaching1 which is found also with the ,scottish philosophers and with ourselves1 is the assumption of primitive feelings of justice which man has in himself1 as for example benevolence and social instincts which should be cultivated4 ,the positive source of knowledge and of justice is placed in human reason and the common consciousness of mankind1 in the healthy human reason1 and not in the form of the ,notion4 ,it is certainly wonderful to find truths expressed in the form of universal thoughts1 respecting which it is of infinite importance that they should be assumptions present in the human mind3 that man has in his heart the feeling of right1 of love to his fellow-creatures3 that religion and faith are not matters of compulsion2 that merit1 talent1 virtue are the true nobility1 c4 ,an important question1 especially among the ,germans1 was what is the end and character of man1 by which was meant the nature of his mind and spirit2 and certainly1 as far as the spiritual is concerned1 it is to this point that we must return4 ,but in order to find the nature of spirit1 to discover what this determination is1 a return was made to perception1 observation1 experience1 to the existence of certain impulses4 ,these are certainly determinations in ourselves1 but we have not known them in their necessity4 ,such an impulse is besides taken as natural1 and thus it is here indeterminate in itself1 it has its limitation only as a moment of the whole4 ,in regard to knowledge1 very abstract thoughts are to be found--though of a truth they are quite as good as ours1 and more ingenious--which according to their content ought to be concrete1 and also were so4 ,but so superficially were they comprehended that they soon showed themselves far from sufficient for what had to be derived from them4 ,they said1 for instance1 that ,nature is a whole1 that all is determined by laws1 through a combination of different movements1 through a chain of causes and effects1 and so on2 the various properties1 materials1 connections of things bring everything to pass4 ,these are general phrases1 with which one can fill whole books4 a4 ,,syst,,me ,,de ,,la ,,nature4 ,to this philosophy belongs the ,systme de la ,nature1 the leading work on the subject1 written in ,paris by a ,german1 ,baron von ,hollbach1 who was the central figure of all those philosophers4 ,montesquieu1 d',alembert1 ,rousseau1 were for a time in his circle2 however much these men were moved to indignation at the existing state of things1 they were yet in other respects very different from one another4 ,the ,systme de la ,nature may very easily be found tiresome to read1 because it treats discursively of general conceptions1 which are often repeated2 it is not a ,french book1 for vivacity is lacking and the mode of presentation is dull4 ,the great ,whole of ,nature 7le grand tout de la nature7 is the ultimate3 8,the universe displays nothing but an immense collection of matter and motion0 7as with ,descartes71 8an unbroken chain of causes and effects1 of which causes some directly affect our senses1 while others are unknown to us1 because their effects1 which we perceive1 are too remote from their causes4 ,the different qualities of these materials1 their manifold connections1 and the effects which result therefrom1 constitute essences for us4 ,from the diversity of these essences arise the different orders1 species1 systems1 under which things fall1 and whose sum total1 the great whole1 is what we call ,nature40#cje ,it is like what ,aristotle 7vide ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bda7 says of ,xenophanes1 that he gazed into the blue1 i4e4 into ,being4 ,according to ,hollbach all is movement1 matter moves itself3 beer ferments1 the soul is moved by its passions4#cjf 8,the manifold variety of natural phenomena1 and their incessant rise and disappearance1 have their sole ground in the variety of motions and of their material40 ,through different combinations and modifications1 through a different arrangement1 another thing is originated4 8,material substances have either a tendency to combine with one another1 or else they are incapable of so combining4 ,upon this are based by physical scientists the forces of attraction and repulsion1 sympathy and antipathy1 affinity and relation2 and the moralists base thereon hatred and love1 friendship and enmity40 ,spirit1 the incorporeal1 contradicts or opposes itself to motion1 to a change of the relations of a body in space4#cjg b4 ,,robinet4 ,another work of importance is the still more 8dangerous0 treatise1 ,de la ,nature1 by ,robinet4 ,in it there reigns quite a different and a deeper spirit2 one is frequently struck by the depth of earnestness which the writer displays4 ,he begins thus3 8,there is a ,god1 i4e4 a cause of the phenomena of that ,whole which we call ,nature4 ,who is ,god8 ,we know not1 and we are so constituted that we can never know in what order of things we have been placed4 ,we cannot know ,god perfectly1 because the means of doing so will always be lacking to us4 ,we too might write over the doors of our temples the words which were to be read upon the altar which the ,areopagite raised1 #8,to the unknown ,god4'0 ,the very same thing is said now-a-days3 there can be no transition from the finite to the infinite4 8,the order which reigns in the universe is just as little the visible type of ,his wisdom1 as our weak mind is the image of ,his intelligence40 ,but this ,first ,cause1 ,god1 is according to ,robinet a creative ,god1 ,he has brought ,nature into existence2 so that for him the only possible knowledge is that of ,nature4 8,there is only ,one ,cause4 ,the eternal ,cause1 who so to speak had sown 7engrain7 events one in the other1 in order that they might without fail follow one upon another as ,he chose1 in the beginning set in motion the endless chain of things4 ,through this permanent impression the ,universe goes on living1 moving and perpetuating itself4 ,from the unity of cause there follows the unity of activity1 for even it does not appear as something to be more or less admitted4 ,by virtue of this single act all things come to pass4 ,since man has made ,nature his study1 he has found no isolated phenomenon1 and no independent truth1 because there are not and cannot be such4 ,the whole sustains itself through the mutual correspondence of its parts40#cjh ,the activity of ,nature is one1 as ,god is ,one4 ,this activity1 more particularly regarded1 signifies that germs unfold themselves in everything3 everywhere there are organic ,beings which produce themselves2 nothing is isolated1 everything is combined and connected and in harmony4 ,robinet here goes through the plants1 the animals1 and also the metals1 the elements1 air1 fire1 water1 c42 and seeks from them to demonstrate the existence of the germ in whatever has life1 and also how metals are organized in themselves4 8,the example of the polypus is convincing as to the animal nature 7animalit7 of the smallest portions of organized matter2 for the polypus is a group of associated polypi1 each of which is as much a true polypus as the first4 ,it stands proved that from the same point of view the living consists only of the living1 the animals of minute animals1 every animal in particular of minute animals of the same kind1 a dog of dog-germs1 man of human germs40 ,in proof of this ,robinet states in a 8,recapitulation0 that 8animal sperm swarms with spermatic animalcules40 ,since he then connects every propagation properly so-called with the co-operation of both sexes1 he alleges that every individual is inwardly or also in the external organs a hermaphrodite4 ,of the minerals he says3 8,are we not compelled to regard as organic bodies all those in which we meet with an inward structure such as this8 ,it presupposes throughout a seed1 seed-granules1 germs1 of which they are the development40 ,in the same way the air must have its germ1 which does not come to reality until it is nourished by water1 fire1 c4 8,the air1 as principle1 is only the germ of the air2 as it impregnates or saturates itself in varying degrees with water and fire1 it will gradually pass through different stages of growth3 it will become first embryo1 then perfect air40#cji ,robinet gives the name of germ to the simple form in itself1 the substantial form1 the ,notion4 ,although he seeks to prove this too much from the sensuous side1 he yet proceeds from principles in themselves concrete1 from the form in itself4 ,he speaks also of the evil and good in the world4 ,the result of his observation is that good and evil balance each other2 this equilibrium constitutes the beauty of the world4 ,in order to refute the assertion that there is more good than evil in the world1 he says that everything to which we reduce the good consists only in an enjoyment1 a pleasure1 a satisfaction2 but this must be preceded by a want1 a lack1 a pain1 the removal of which constitutes satisfaction4#caj ,this is not only a correct thought empirically1 but it also hints at the deeper idea that there is no activity except through contradiction4 #c4 ,,idea ,,of ,a ,,concrete ,,universal ,,unity4 ,the result of the ,french philosophy is that it insisted on maintaining a general unity1 not abstract1 but concrete4 ,thus ,robinet now propounded the theory of a universal organic life1 and a uniform mode of origination2 this concrete system he called ,nature1 over which ,god was set1 but as the unknowable2 all predicates which could be expressed of ,him contained something inapplicable4 ,we must admit that grand conceptions of concrete unity are to be found here1 as opposed to the abstract metaphysical determinations of the understanding1 e4g4 the fruitfulness of ,nature4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the point of most importance with these philosophers is that what is to be accepted as valid must have presence1 and that man in all knowledge must be himself the knower2 for1 as we may see1 those philosophers made war on all external authority of state and church1 and in particular on abstract thought which has no present meaning in us4 ,two determinations found in all philosophy are the concretion of the ,idea and the presence of the spirit in the same2 my content must at the same time be something concrete1 present4 ,this concrete was termed ,reason1 and for it the more noble of those men contended with the greatest enthusiasm and warmth4 ,thought was raised like a standard among the nations1 liberty of conviction and of conscience in me4 ,they said to mankind1 8,in this sign thou shalt conquer10 for they had before their eyes what had been done in the name of the cross alone1 what had been made a matter of faith and law and religion--they saw how the sign of the cross had been degraded4 ,for in the sign of the cross lying and deceit had been victorious1 under this seal institutions had become fossilized1 and had sunk into all manner of degradation1 so that this sign came to be represented as the epitome and root of all evil4 ,thus in another form they completed the ,reformation that ,luther began4 ,this concrete had manifold forms2 social instincts in the practical sphere1 laws of nature in the theoretical4 ,there is present the absolute impulse to find a compass immanent in themselves1 i4e4 in the human mind4 ,for the human mind it is imperative to have a fixed point such as this1 if1 indeed1 it is to be within itself1 if it is to be free in its own world at least4 ,but this striving after really present vitality took forms which as by-paths were themselves one-sided4 ,in this striving after unity1 which was1 however1 concrete unity1 the further varieties of the content likewise lie4 ,on the theoretic side of their philosophy1 therefore1 the ,french proceeded to materialism or naturalism1 because the requirements of the understanding1 as abstract thought1 which from a firmly fixed principle allows the most monstrous consequences to be drawn1 drove them to set up one principle as ultimate1 and that a principle which had at the same time to be present and to lie quite close to experience4 ,hence they accept sensation and matter as the only truth1 to which must be reduced all thought1 all morality1 as a mere modification of sensation4 ,the unities which the ,french propounded were in this way one-sided4 a4 ,,opposition ,,of ,,sensation ,,and ,,thought4 ,to this one-sidedness belongs the opposition between sentir and penser1 or else1 if you like1 their identity1 making the latter only a result of the former2 there is not1 however1 any speculative reconciliation of this opposition in ,god1 such as we find in ,spinoza and ,malebranche4 ,this reduction of all thought to sensation1 which in certain respects took place with ,locke1 becomes a widely extended theory4 ,robinet 7,de la ,nature1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,,iv4 chap4 iii4 pp4 #beg-bei7 lights also on this opposition1 beyond which he does not get1 that mind and body are not separate1 but that the manner in which they are united is inexplicable4 ,the ,systme de la ,nature 7,t4 ,i4 chap4 x4 p4 #agg7 is marked by an especially plain reduction of thought to sensation4 ,the leading thought is this3 8,abstract thoughts are only modes in which our inmost organ views its own modifications4 ,the words goodness1 beauty1 order1 intelligence1 virtue1 c41 have no meaning for us if we do not refer and apply them to objects which our senses have shown to be capable of these qualities1 or to modes of being and acting which are known to us40 ,thus even psychology passed into materialism1 as for instance we may find in ,la ,mettrie's work ,l'homme ,machine3 ,all thought and all conception have meaning only if they are apprehended as material2 matter alone exists4 b4 ,,montesquieu4 ,other great writers have opposed to the above the feeling in the breast1 the instinct of self-preservation1 benevolent dispositions towards others1 the impulse to fellowship1 which last ,puffendorf also made the foundation of his system of law 7supra1 p4 #cba74 ,from this point of view much that is excellent has been said4 ,thus ,montesquieu1 in his charming book1 ,l',esprit des ,lois1 of which ,voltaire said it was an esprit sur les lois1 regarded the nations from this important point of view1 that their constitution1 their religion1 in short1 everything that is to be found in a state1 constitutes a totality4 c4 ,,helvetius4 ,this reduction of thought to feeling in the case of ,helvetius takes the form that if in man as a moral being a single principle is sought1 this ought to be called self-love1 and he endeavoured to demonstrate by ingenious analysis that whatever we term virtue1 all activity and law and right1 has as its foundation nothing but self-love or selfishness1 and is resolvable thereinto4#caa ,this principle is one-sided1 although the 8,i myself0 is an essential moment4 ,what ,i will1 the noblest1 the holiest1 is my aim2 ,i must take part in it1 ,i must agree to it1 ,i must approve of it4 ,with all self-sacrifice there is always conjoined some satisfaction1 some finding of self2 this element of self1 subjective liberty1 must always be present4 ,if this is taken in a one-sided sense1 there may be consequences drawn from it which overthrow all that is sacred2 but it is found in equal degree in a morality as noble as any possibly can be4 d4 ,,rousseau4 ,in connection with the practical side of things this particular must also be noted1 that when the feeling of right1 the concrete practical mind1 and1 speaking generally1 humanity and happiness were made the principle1 this principle1 universally conceived1 had certainly the form of thought2 but in the case of such concrete content derived from our impulse or inward intuition1 even though that content were religious1 the thought itself was not the content4 ,but now this further phase appeared1 that pure thought was set up as the principle and content1 even if again there was lacking to this content the true consciousness of its peculiar form2 for it was not recognized that this principle was thought4 ,we see it emerge in the sphere of will1 of the practical1 of the just1 and so apprehended that the innermost principle of man1 his unity with himself1 is set forth as fundamental and brought into consciousness1 so that man in himself acquired an infinite strength4 ,it is this that ,rousseau from one point of view said about the state4 ,he investigated its absolute justification1 and inquired as to its foundation4 ,the right of ruling and associating1 of the relation of order1 of governing and being governed1 he apprehends from his own point of view1 so that it is made to rest historically on power1 compulsion1 conquest1 private property1 c4#cab ,rousseau makes free-will the principle of this justification1 and without reference to the positive right of states he made answer to the above question 7chap4 iv4 p4 #ab71 that man has free-will1 because 8liberty is the distinguishing feature of man4 ,to renounce his liberty signifies to renounce his manhood4 ,not to be free is therefore a renunciation of a man's rights as a human being1 and even of his duties40 ,the slave has neither rights nor duties4 ,rousseau therefore says 7chap4 vi4 p4 #ba73 8,the fundamental task is to find a form of association which will shield and protect with the power of the whole commonwealth combined the person and property of every one of its members1 and in which each individual1 while joining this association1 obeys himself only1 and thus remains as free as before4 ,the solution is given by the ,social ,contract20 this is the association of which each is a member by his own will4 ,these principles1 thus abstractly stated1 we must allow to be correct1 yet the ambiguity in them soon begins to be felt4 ,man is free1 this is certainly the substantial nature of man2 and not only is this liberty not relinquished in the state1 but it is actually in the state that it is first realized4 ,the freedom of nature1 the gift of freedom1 is not anything real2 for the state is the first realization of freedom4 ,the misunderstanding as to the universal will proceeds from this1 that the ,notion of freedom must not be taken in the sense of the arbitrary caprice of an individual1 but in the sense of the rational will1 of the will in and for itself4 ,the universal will is not to be looked on as compounded of definitively individual wills1 so that these remain absolute2 otherwise the saying would be correct3 8,where the minority must obey the majority1 there is no freedom40 ,the universal will must really be the rational will1 even if we are not conscious of the fact2 the state is therefore not an association which is decreed by the arbitrary will of individuals4 ,the wrong apprehension of these principles does not concern us4 ,what does concern us is this1 that thereby there should come into consciousness as content the sense that man has liberty in his spirit as the altogether absolute1 that free-will is the ,notion of man4 ,freedom is just thought itself2 he who casts thought aside and speaks of freedom knows not what he is talking of4 ,the unity of thought with itself is freedom1 the free will4 ,thought1 as volition merely1 is the impulse to abrogate one's subjectivity1 the relation to present existence1 the realizing of oneself1 since in that ,i am endeavouring to place myself as existent on an equality with myself as thinking4 ,it is only as having the power of thinking that the will is free4 ,the principle of freedom emerged in ,rousseau1 and gave to man1 who apprehends himself as infinite1 this infinite strength4 ,this furnishes the transition to the ,kantian philosophy1 which1 theoretically considered1 made this principle its foundation2 knowledge aimed at freedom1 and at a concrete content which it possesses in consciousness4 ,d4 ,,the ,,german ,,illumination4 ,the ,germans were at this time quietly drifting along in their ,leibnitzo-,wolffian philosophy1 in its definitions1 axioms and proofs4 ,then they were gradually breathed upon by the spirit of foreign lands1 they made acquaintance with all the developments which there came to pass1 and took very kindly to the empiricism of ,locke2 on the other hand they at the same time laid aside metaphysical investigations1 turned their attention to the question of how truths can be grasped by the healthy human understanding1 and plunged into the ,aufklrung and into the consideration of the utility of all things--a point of view which they adopted from the ,french4 ,utility as the essence of existent things signifies that they are determined as not being in themselves1 but for another3 this is a necessary moment1 but not the only one4 ,the ,german ,aufklrung warred against ideas1 with the principle of utility as its weapon4 ,philosophic investigations on this subject had degenerated into a feeble popular treatment of it which was incapable of going deeper2 they displayed a rigid pedantry and an earnestness of the understanding1 but were unspiritual4 ,the ,germans are busy bees who do justice to all nations1 they are old-clothesmen for whom anything is good enough1 and who carry on their haggling with everyone4 ,picked up as it was from foreign nations1 all this had lost the wit and life1 the energy and originality which with the ,french had made the content to be lost sight of in the form4 ,the ,germans1 who honestly sift a matter to its root1 and who would put rational arguments in the place of wit and vivacity1 since wit and vivacity really prove nothing1 in this way reached a content which was utterly empty1 so much so that nothing could be more wearisome than this profound mode of treatment2 such was the case with ,eberhard1 ,tetens1 and those like them4 ,others1 like ,nicolai1 ,sulzer and their fellows1 were excellent in their speculations on questions of taste and the liberal sciences2 for literature and art were also to flourish among the ,germans4 ,but with all this they only arrived at a most trivial treatment of sthetics--,lessing#cac called it shallow chatter4 ,as a matter of fact1 indeed1 the poems of ,gellert1 ,weisse and ,lessing sank almost1 if not quite as much into the same poetic feebleness4 ,moreover1 previous to the philosophy of ,kant1 the general principle was really the theory of happiness1 which we have already met with in the philosophy of the ,cyrenaics 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #dgg71 and the point of view of pleasant or unpleasant sensations held good among the philosophers of that time as an ultimate and essential determination4 ,of this manner of philosophizing ,i will quote an example which ,nicolai gives in the account of a conversation which he had with ,mendelssohn3 what is in question is the pleasure in tragic subjects which is held to be awakened even by means of the unpleasant emotions depicted in a tragedy3 ,,herr ,,moses4 8,the power of having an inclination for perfections and of shunning imperfections is a reality40 ,therefore the exercise of this power brings a pleasure with it1 which1 however1 is in nature comparatively less than the displeasure which arises from the contemplation of the object4 ,i4 ,yet even then1 when the violence of passion causes us unpleasant sensations1 the movement 7what else is this movement than the power of loving perfections1 c487 which it brings with it has still delights for us4 ,it is the strength of the movement which we enjoy1 even in spite of the painful sensations which oppose what is pleasant in the passion1 and in a short time obtain the victory4 ,,herr ,,moses4 ,in a stage play1 on the contrary1 as the imperfect object is absent1 pleasure must gain the upper hand and eclipse the small degree of displeasure4 ,i4 ,a passion therefore which is not followed by these results must be altogether pleasant4 ,of this sort are the imitations of the passions which the tragedy affords40#cad ,with such vapid and meaningless drivel they rambled on4 ,in addition to these1 the eternity of punishment in hell1 the salvation of the heathen1 the difference between uprightness and godliness1 were philosophic matters on which much labour was expended among the ,germans1 while the ,french troubled themselves little about them4 ,finite determinations were made to hold good against the infinite2 against the ,trinity it was asserted that ,one cannot be ,three2 against original sin1 that each must bear his own guilt1 must have done his own deeds of himself1 and must answer for them2 in the same way against redemption1 that another cannot take upon himself punishment that is due2 against forgiveness of sin1 that what is done cannot be rendered undone2 to sum up generally1 the incommensurability of the human nature with the divine4 ,on the one side we see healthy human understanding1 experience1 facts of consciousness1 but on the other side there was still in vogue the ,wolffian metaphysics of the dry1 dead understanding2 thus we see ,mendelssohn take his stand by the healthy human understanding1 and make it his rule4 ,some movement was brought into this authority1 which had settled into perfect peace and security and let no dreams of other matters cross its path1 by the chance dispute of ,mendelssohn with ,jacobi1 first as to whether ,lessing had been a disciple of ,spinoza1 and then regarding the doctrines of ,spinoza himself4 ,on this occasion it came to light how much ,spinoza was really forgotten1 and in what horror ,spinozism was held4 ,but while ,jacobi in this way once more unexpectedly brought to remembrance in connection with ,spinozism a quite different content of philosophy1 faith1 i4e4 the simply immediate certainty of external1 finite things1 as well as of the divine 7which faith in the divine he called reason7 was certainly placed by him1 as an independent thinker1 in opposition to mediating knowledge1 which he apprehended as mere understanding4 ,this continued until ,kant gave a new impulse in ,germany to philosophy1 which had died out in the rest of ,europe4 ,as far as the transition to modern ,german philosophy is concerned1 it is from ,hume and ,rousseau1 as we have said 7pp4 #cfi1 #cgd1 #djb71 that it took its start4 ,descartes opposes extension to thought1 as what is simply one with itself4 ,he is charged with dualism1 but1 like ,spinoza and ,leibnitz1 he did away with the independence of the two sides1 and made supreme their unity1 ,god4 ,but1 as this unity1 ,god is first of all only the ,third2 and ,he is further determined in such a way that no determination pertains to ,him4 ,wolff's understanding of the finite1 his school metaphysics generally1 his science of the understanding1 and his divergence into the observation of nature1 after it has grown strong in its conformity with law and in its finite knowledge1 turns against the infinite and the concrete determinations of religion1 and comes to a standstill with abstractions in his theologia naturalis2 for the determinate is his domain4 ,but from this time an utterly different point of view is introduced4 ,the infinite is transported into abstraction or incomprehensibility4 ,this is an incomprehensible position to adopt4 ,nowadays it is looked on as most pious1 most justifiable4 ,but as we see the third1 the unity of differences1 defined as something which cannot be thought or known1 this unity is not one of thought1 for it is above all thought1 and ,god is not simply thought4 ,nevertheless this unity is defined as the absolutely concrete1 i4e4 as the unity of thought and ,being4 ,now we have come so far that this unity is a unity simply in thought1 and pertaining to consciousness1 so that the objectivity of thought--reason--comes forth as ,one and ,all4 ,this is dimly conceived by the ,french4 ,whether the highest ,being1 this ,being divested of all determination1 is elevated above nature1 or whether nature or matter is the highest unity1 there is always present the establishing of something concrete1 which at the same time belongs to thought4 ,since the liberty of man has been set up as an absolutely ultimate principle1 thought itself has been set up as a principle4 ,the principle of liberty is not only in thought but the root of thought2 this principle of liberty is also something in itself concrete1 at least in principle it is implicitly concrete4 ,thus far have general culture and philosophic culture advanced4 ,since what is knowable has now been placed entirely within the sphere of consciousness1 and since the liberty of the spirit has been apprehended as absolute1 this may be understood to mean that knowledge has entered altogether into the realm of the finite4 ,the standpoint of the finite was at the same time taken as ultimate1 and ,god as a ,beyond outside consciousness2 duties1 rights1 knowledge of nature1 are finite4 ,man has thereby formed for himself a kingdom of truth1 from which ,god is excluded2 it is the kingdom of finite truth4 ,the form of finitude may here be termed the subjective form2 liberty1 self-consciousness ,ichheit of the mind1 known as the absolute1 is essentially subjective--in fact it is the subjectivity of thought4 ,the more the human reason has grasped itself in itself1 the more has it come down from ,god and the more has it increased the field of the finite4 ,reason is ,one and ,all1 which is at the same time the totality of the finite2 reason under these conditions is finite knowledge and knowledge of the finite4 ,the question is1 since it is this concrete that is established 7and not metaphysical abstractions71 how it constitutes itself in itself2 and then1 how it returns to objectivity1 or abrogates its subjectivity1 i4e4 how by means of thought ,god is to be again brought about1 who at an earlier time and at the beginning of this period was recognized as alone the true4 ,this is what we have to consider in the last period1 in dealing with ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,schelling4 ,,section ,,three ,,recent ,,german ,,philosophy ,in the philosophy of ,kant1 ,fichte1 and ,schelling1 the revolution to which in ,germany mind has in these latter days advanced1 was formally thought out and expressed2 the sequence of these philosophies shows the course which thought has taken4 ,in this great epoch of the world's history1 whose inmost essence is laid hold of in the philosophy of history1 two nations only have played a part1 the ,german and the ,french1 and this in spite of their absolute opposition1 or rather because they are so opposite4 ,the other nations have taken no real inward part in the same1 although politically they have indeed so done1 both through their governments and their people4 ,in ,germany this principle has burst forth as thought1 spirit1 ,notion2 in ,france1 in the form of actuality4 ,in ,germany1 what there is of actuality comes to us as a force of external circumstances1 and as a reaction against the same4 ,the task of modern ,german philosophy is1 however1 summed up in taking as its object the unity of thought and ,being1 which is the fundamental idea of philosophy generally1 and comprehending it1 that is1 in laying hold of the inmost significance of necessity1 the ,notion 7supra1 p4 #cfj74 ,the philosophy of ,kant sets forth1 in the first place1 the formal aspect of the task1 but it has the abstract absoluteness of reason in self-consciousness as its sole result1 and1 in one respect1 it carried with it a certain character of shallowness and want of vigour1 in which an attitude of criticism and negativity is retained1 and which1 as far as any positive element is concerned1 adheres to the facts of consciousness and to mere conjecture1 while it renounces thought and returns to feeling4 ,on the other hand1 however1 there sprang from this the philosophy of ,fichte1 which speculatively grasps the essence of self-consciousness as concrete egoism1 but which does not reach beyond this subjective form pertaining to the absolute4 ,from it again comes the philosophy of ,schelling1 which subsequently rejects ,fichte's teaching and sets forth the ,idea of the ,absolute1 the truth in and for itself4 ,a4 ,,jacobi4 ,in connection with ,kant we must here begin by speaking of ,jacobi1 whose philosophy is contemporaneous with that of ,kant2 in both of these the advance beyond the preceding period is very evident4 ,the result in the two cases is much the same1 although both the starting point and the method of progression are somewhat different4 ,in ,jacobi's case the stimulus was given mainly by ,french philosophy1 with which he was very conversant1 and also by ,german metaphysics1 while ,kant began rather from the ,english side1 that is1 from the scepticism of ,hume4 ,jacobi1 in that negative attitude which he preserved as well as ,kant1 kept before him the objective aspect of the method of knowledge1 and specially considered it1 for he declared knowledge to be in its content incapable of recognizing the ,absolute3 the truth must be concrete1 present1 but not finite4 ,kant does not consider the content1 but took the view of knowledge being subjective2 and for this reason he declared it to be incapable of recognizing absolute existence4 ,to ,kant knowledge is thus a knowledge of phenomena only1 not because the categories are merely limited and finite1 but because they are subjective4 ,to ,jacobi1 on the other hand1 the chief point is that the categories are not merely subjective1 but that they themselves are conditioned4 ,this is an essential difference between the two points of view1 even if they both arrive at the same result4 ,friedrich ,heinrich ,jacobi1 born at ,dsseldorf in #agdc1 held office first in the ,duchy of ,berg1 and then in ,bavaria4 ,he studied in ,geneva and ,paris1 associating in the former place with ,bonnet and in the latter with ,diderot4 ,jacobi was a man of the highest character and culture4 ,he was long occupied with ,state affairs1 and in ,dsseldorf he held a public office which was connected with the administration of the finance department in the ,state4 ,at the time of the ,french ,revolution he was obliged to retire4 ,as a ,bavarian official he went to ,munich1 there became ,president of the ,academy of ,sciences in #ahjd1 which office he1 however1 resigned in #ahab2 for in the ,napoleonic period ,protestants were decried as demagogues4 ,he lived at ,munich till the end of his life1 and died at the same place on the #ajth of ,march1 #ahai4cae ,in the year #aghe1 ,jacobi published ,letters on ,spinoza1 which were written in #aghc1 on the occasion of the dispute with ,mendelssohn above-mentioned 7p4 #djf72 for in none of his writings did ,jacobi develop his philosophy systematically1 he set it forth in letters only4 ,when ,mendelssohn wished to write a life of ,lessing1 ,jacobi sent to ask him if he knew that 8,lessing was a ,spinozist0 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 pp4 #ci1 #dj74 ,mendelssohn was displeased at this1 and it was the occasion of the correspondence4 ,in the course of the dispute it was made evident that those who held themselves to be professed philosophers and possessed of a monopoly of ,lessing's friendship1 such as ,nicolai1 ,mendelssohn1 c41 knew nothing about ,spinozism2 not only was there manifested in them the superficial character of their philosophic insight1 but ignorance as well2 with ,mendelssohn1 for instance1 this was shown respecting even the outward history of the ,spinozistic philosophy1 and much more regarding the inward 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 p4 #ia74 ,that ,jacobi asserted ,lessing to be a ,spinozist1 and gave a high place to the ,french--this serious statement came to these good men as a thunderbolt from the blue4 ,they--the self-satisfied1 self-possessed1 superior persons--were quite surprised that he also made pretensions to knowledge1 and of such a 8dead dog0 as ,spinoza 7ibidem1 p4 #fh74 ,explanations followed upon this1 in which ,jacobi further developed his philosophic views4 ,mendelssohn is directly opposed to ,jacobi1 for ,mendelssohn took his stand on cognition1 placed true existence immediately in thought and conception1 and maintained3 8,what ,i cannot think as true does not trouble me as doubt4 ,a question which ,i do not understand1 ,i cannot answer1 it is for me as good as no question at all40#caf ,he continued to argue on these same lines4 ,his proof of the existence of ,god thus carries with it this necessity of thought1 viz4 that actuality must plainly be in thought1 and a thinker must be presupposed1 or the possibility of the actual is in the thinker4 8,what no thinking ,being conceives as possible is not possible1 and what is thought by no thinking creature as actual cannot be actual in fact4 ,if we take away from anything whatsoever the conception formed by a thinking ,being that that thing is possible or actual1 the thing itself is done away with40 ,the ,notion of the thing is thus to man the essence of the same4 8,no finite ,being can think the actuality of a thing in its perfection as actual1 and still less can he perceive the possibility and actuality of all present things4 ,there must thus be a thinking ,being or an understanding which in the most perfect way thinks the content of all possibilities as possible1 and the content of all actualities as actual2 i4e4 there must be an infinite understanding1 and this is ,god40#cag ,here on the one hand we see a unity of thought and ,being1 on the other the absolute unity as infinite understanding--the former is the self-consciousness which is apprehended as finite merely4 ,actuality1 ,being1 has its possibility in thought1 or its possibility is thought2 it is not a process from possibility to actuality1 for the possibility remains at home in the actuality4 ,jacobi maintains against these demands of thought--and this in one view is the chief thought in his philosophy--that every method of their demonstration leads to fatalism1 atheism1 and ,spinozism1#cah and presents ,god as derived and founded upon something else2 for comprehending ,him signifies demonstrating ,his dependence4 ,jacobi thus asserts that mediate knowledge consists in giving a cause of something which has in its turn a finite effect1 and so on2 so that a knowledge such as this can all through relate to the finite only4 ,jacobi further states upon this subject1 in the first place1 that 8,reason0--later on when he distinguished reason and understanding 7of which more hereafter#cai71 he altered it to understanding#cbj--8;can never bring to light more than the conditions of what is conditioned1 natural laws and mechanism4 ,we comprehend a thing when we can deduce it from its proximate causes10 and not from the remoter causes2 the most remote and quite universal cause is always ,god4 8,or0 we know the thing if we 8perceive its immediate conditions as they come in due succession4 ,thus1 for instance1 we comprehend a circle when we can clearly represent to ourselves the mechanism of its origination or its physical conditions2 we know the syllogistic formul when we have actually come to know the laws to which the human understanding is subject in judgment and conclusion1 its physical nature and its mechanism4 ,for this reason we have no conceptions of qualities as such1 but only intuitions4 ,even of our present existence we have a feeling only1 but no conceptions4 ,genuine conceptions we have merely of figure1 number1 position1 movement and the forms of thought2 qualities are known and understood1 if they are traced back to these and objectively annulled40 ,this is undoubtedly really finite knowledge1 which is to give the determinate conditions of anything determinate1 to demonstrate it as resulting from another cause1 in such a way that each condition is again conditioned and finite4 ,jacobi continues3 8,the business of reason is really progressive union and connection1 and its speculative business is union and connection in accordance with the known laws of necessity1 i4e4 of identity4 ,everything that reason can bring forth by means of analysis1 combination1 judgment1 conclusion1 and re-conception1 consists in nothing but things of nature0 7i4e4 finite things71 8and reason itself1 as a limited existence1 belongs to these things4 ,but the whole of nature1 the sum of all conditioned existence1 cannot reveal more to the investigating understanding than what is contained in it1 namely1 manifold existence1 changes1 a succession of forms0 7the conditioned71 8and not an actual beginning0 7of the world71 8nor a real principle of any objective existence40#cba ,but ,jacobi in the second place here accepts reason in a wider sense and says3 8,if we understand by reason the principle of knowledge generally1 it is the mind from which the whole living nature of man is constituted2 through it man arises2 he is a form which it has adopted40 ,with this ,jacobi's view of the attempt to know the unconditioned is connected4 8,i take the whole human being1 and find that his consciousness is composed of two original conceptions1 the conceptions of the conditioned and the unconditioned4 ,both are inseparably bound up with one another1 and yet in such a way that the conception of the conditioned presupposes the conception of the unconditioned1 and can be given in this alone4 ,we are just as certain of its existence as we are of our own conditioned existence1 or even more so4 ,since our conditioned existence rests on an infinitude of mediations1 there is opened up to our investigation a vast field which1 for the sake of our preservation even1 we are forced to work upon40 ,it would1 however1 be quite another thing to wish to know the unconditioned apart from this practical end4 ,however ,jacobi here remarks1 8,to try to discover the conditions of the unconditioned1 to find a possibility for absolute necessity1 and to construct this last in order to be able to comprehend it1 is what we undertake when we endeavour to make nature an existence comprehensible to us1 i4e4 a merely natural existence1 and to bring the mechanism of the principle of mechanism into the light of day4 ,for if everything which can be said to arise and be present in a way comprehensible to us1 must arise and be present in a conditioned way1 we remain1 so long as we continue to comprehend1 in a chain of conditioned conditions4 ,where this chain breaks off1 we cease to comprehend1 and there the connection which we call nature likewise ceases4 ,the conception of the possibility of the outward existence of nature would thus be the conception of an absolute beginning or origin of nature2 it would be the conception of the unconditioned itself in so far as it is a conditioning of nature not naturally connected1 i4e4 a conditioning of nature unconnected and unconditioned for us4 ,now should a conception of what is thus unconditioned and unconnected1 and consequently supernatural1 be possible1 the unconditioned must cease to be unconditioned1 it must itself receive conditions2 and absolute necessity must commence to be possibility in order that it may allow itself to be constructed40#cbb ,this is contradictory4 ,jacobi then passes on from this point to the second of his main propositions1 8,the unconditioned is called the supernatural4 ,now since everything which lies outside the connection of what is conditioned1 of what is naturally mediated1 also lies outside the sphere of our clear and certain knowledge1 and cannot be understood through conceptions1 the supernatural cannot be accepted in any other way by us than that in which it is given to us--namely as a fact4 ,it is6 ,this supernatural1 this essence of all essence1 all tongues join in proclaiming to be ,god40#cbc ,god as the universal1 the true1 is here taken in the sense of a spiritual generally1 in the sense of power1 wisdom1 c4 ,that ,god is1 however1 is to ,jacobi not absolutely true2 for to knowledge pertains ,his objective absolute existence1 but ,he cannot be said to be known4 ,it is thus merely a fact of my consciousness that ,god exists independently apart from my consciousness2 this1 however1 is itself maintained through my consciousness2 the subjective attitude of thought is thus to ,jacobi the element of most importance4 ,the consciousness of ,god1 which is in our consciousness1 is1 however1 of such a nature that along with the thought of ,god we have immediately associated the fact that ,he is4 ,the existence of the supernatural and supersensuous1 to which the thought of man regarding the natural and finite passes on1 is just as certain to ,jacobi as he is himself4 ,this certainty is identical with his self-consciousness2 as certainly as ,i am1 so certainly is ,god 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #ce74 ,since he thus passes back into self-consciousness1 the unconditioned is only for us in an immediate way2 this immediate knowledge ,jacobi calls ,faith1 inward revelation 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #c1 #d72 to this appeal can be made in man4 ,god1 the absolute1 the unconditioned1 cannot1 according to ,jacobi1 be proved4 ,for proof1 comprehension1 means to discover conditions for something1 to derive it from conditions2 but a derived absolute1 ,god1 c41 would thus not be absolute at all1 would not be unconditioned1 would not be ,god 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #g74 ,this immediate knowledge of ,god is then the point which is maintained in the philosophy of ,jacobi4 ,the faith of ,kant and of ,jacobi are1 however1 different4 ,to ,kant it is a postulate of reason1 it is the demand for the solution of the contradiction between the world and goodness2 to ,jacobi it is represented on its own account as immediate knowledge4 ,everything which has been written upon ,god since ,jacobi's time1 by philosophers such as ,fries and by theologians1 rests on this conception of immediate intellectual knowledge1 and men even call this revelation1 though in another sense than the revelation of theology4 ,revelation as immediate knowledge is in ourselves1 while the ,church holds revelation to be something imparted from without4#cbd ,in the theological sense1 faith is faith in something which is given to us through teaching4 ,it is a sort of deception when faith and revelation are spoken of and represented as if faith and revelation in the theological sense were here in question2 for the sense in which they are used1 and which may be termed philosophic1 is quite a different one1 however pious an air may be assumed in using the terms4 ,this is ,jacobi's standpoint1 and whatever is by philosophers and theologians said against it1 this teaching is eagerly accepted and disseminated4 ,and nowhere is there anything to be found but reflections originating from ,jacobi1 whereby immediate knowledge is opposed to philosophic knowledge and to reason2 and people speak of reason1 philosophy1 c41 as a blind man speaks of colours4 ,it is1 indeed1 allowed that a man cannot make shoes unless he is a shoemaker1 even although he have the measure and foot1 and also the hands4 ,but when ,philosophy is concerned1 immediate knowledge signifies that every man as he walks and stands is a philosopher1 that he can dogmatize as he chooses1 and that he is completely acquainted with ,philosophy4 ,by reason1 however1 mediate knowledge merely is on the one hand understood1 and on the other the intellectual perception which speaks of facts 7supra1 pp4 #dac-dae74 ,in this respect it is true that reason is the knowledge and revelation of absolute truth1 since the understanding is the revelation of the finite 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #h-ad1 #aja74 8,we maintained that two different powers of perception in man have to be accepted3 a power of perception through visible and tangible and consequently corporeal organs of perception1 and another kind of power1 viz4 through an invisible organ which in no way represents itself to the outward senses1 and whose existence is made known to us through feeling alone4 ,this organ1 a spiritual eye for spiritual objects1 has been called by men--generally speaking--reason4 ,he whom the pure feelings of the beautiful and good1 of admiration and love1 of respect and awe1 do not convince that in and with these feelings he perceives something to be present which is independent of them1 and which is unattainable by the outward senses or by an understanding directed upon their perceptions alone--such an one cannot be argued with0 7,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #gd1 #gf74 ,but by faith ,jacobi likewise understands all that has immediacy of ,being for me3 8,through faith we know that we have a body1 we become aware of other actual things1 and that indeed with the same certainty with which we are aware of ourselves4 ,we obtain all conceptions through the qualities which we receive and accept1 and there is no other way of attaining real knowledge2 for reason1 when it begets objects1 begets phantoms of the brain4 ,thus we have a revelation of nature40#cbe ,hence the expression faith1 which had a deep significance in religion1 is made use of for different contents of every kind2 this in our own time is the point of view most commonly adopted4 ,jacobi here brings faith into opposition with thought4 ,let us compare the two1 and discover whether they are separated by so great a chasm as those who thus oppose them think4 ,on the one hand absolute existence is to faith immediate2 believing consciousness feels itself penetrated by this as by its essence3 that existence is its life1 believing consciousness asserts itself to be in direct unity with it4 ,thought thinks the absolute existence2 such existence is to it absolute thought1 absolute understanding1 pure thought2 but that signifies that it is likewise immediate itself4 ,on the other hand to faith the immediacy of absolute existence has also the significance of a ,being3 it is1 and is another than #8,i4' ,and the same is true of the thinker2 to him it is absolute ,being1 actual in itself1 and different from self-consciousness or thought as finite understanding1 to use the common term4 ,now what is the reason that faith and thought do not understand one another1 and each recognize itself in the other8 ,in the first place faith has no consciousness of being a thought1 inasmuch as it asserts absolute consciousness to be identical with it as self-consciousness1 and has direct inward knowledge of the same4 ,but it expresses this simple unity2 in its consciousness it is only immediacy so to speak in the signification of ,being1 a unity of its unconscious substance4 ,in the second place ,being-for-self is contained in thought2 to this faith opposes the immediacy of ,being4 ,thought1 on the contrary1 has the immediate as absolute potentiality1 as absolutely a thing of thought3 and the immediacy belonging to this thing of thought is without the determination of ,being1 of life4 ,on the heights of this abstraction the two stand opposed to each other1 as the ,aufklrung which asserts absolute existence to be a ,beyond of self-consciousness1 and as the materialism which makes it so to speak present matter 7supra1 pp4 #chb1 #chc74 ,in the one case it is in faith and thought as positive existence or thought1 and in the other it is the negative of self-consciousness1 which is thus either only determined as negative1 as a ,beyond1 or likewise as existent for self-consciousness4 ,hence faith and thought are both of them knowledge4 ,we call universal knowledge thought1 particular knowledge we call sensuous perception2 and we term the introduction of external determinations understanding4 ,the universal element in man is thought1 but to it likewise appertains religious feeling for instance2 the animal does not possess it1 for it has no human feeling2 and in so far as this feeling is religious1 it is the feeling of a thinker1 and what determines this feeling is not the determination of natural desire1 c41 but a universal determination4 ,thus ,god1 even though ,he is only felt and believed in1 is yet the universal taken quite abstractly--even in ,his personality ,he is the absolutely universal personality4 ,as thought and faith are thus one1 the same is true of the antithesis between mediated and immediate knowledge4 ,we must1 it is true1 keep before our eyes the fact that what is revealed in immediate knowledge is the universal4 ,but abstract immediate knowledge is natural1 sensuous knowledge2 the immediate man in his natural condition1 in his desires1 does not know this universal4 ,children1 the ,esquimaux1 c41 know nothing of ,god2 or what the natural man knows of ,him is not a real knowledge of ,him4 ,thus the intuitive knowledge of the ,egyptians told them that ,god was an ox or a cat1 and the ,indians still possess similar sorts of knowledge4 ,on the other hand when man has come so far as to know ,god as merely an object of the mind1 i4e4 as spiritual1 it is easy to perceive that this knowledge which is asserted to be immediate is really a result mediated through instruction1 through a long continued culture4 ,it is only by means of being elevated above nature that man arrives at a consciousness of what is higher1 and at a knowledge of the universal2 there indeed his knowledge is immediate1 but he has only arrived at this through mediation4 ,i think1 and thus ,i know the universal immediately1 but this very thought is just process in itself1 movement and life4 ,all life is process within itself1 is mediated1 and this is all the more true of spiritual life2 for it is the passing from one to the other1 that is1 from the merely natural and sensuous to the spiritual4 ,it thus indicates a deficiency in the most simple reflection not to know that the universal is not in immediate knowledge1 but is a result of the culture1 the education1 and the self-revelation of the human race4 ,if immediate knowledge is to be allowed1 everyone will be responsible merely to himself3 this man knows this1 another that1 and consequently everything is justified and approved1 however contrary to right and religion4 ,this opposition between immediacy and mediacy is thus a very barren and quite empty determination2 it is a platitude of the extremest type to consider anything like this to be a true opposition2 it proceeds from a most wooden understanding1 which thinks that an immediacy can be something on its own account1 without a mediation within itself4 ,if ,philosophy were to result in this it would be a poor affair2 these determinations are merely forms1 none of which has intrinsic truth4 ,the form into which ,philosophy has in ,jacobi's case finally fallen1 which is that immediacy is grasped as absolute1 manifests a lack of all critical faculty1 of all logic4 ,the ,kantian philosophy is critical philosophy1 but from it the fact has been omitted that we cannot constitute the infinite with finite categories--and immediacy is such an one4 ,when we regard this opposition more closely all knowledge may be termed immediate1 but all immediate knowledge is likewise mediated in itself4 ,this we know within our consciousness1 and we may see it in the most general phenomena4 ,i know1 for example1 of ,america immediately1 and yet this knowledge is very much mediated4 ,if ,i stand in ,america and see its soil1 ,i must first of all have journeyed to it1 ,columbus must first have discovered it1 ships must have been built1 c42 all these discoveries and inventions pertain to it4 ,that which we now know immediately is consequently a result of infinitely many mediations4 ,likewise when ,i see a right-angled triangle ,i know that the squares of the two sides are equal to the square of the hypotenuse3 ,i know this immediately1 and yet ,i have merely learned it and am convinced of it through the mediation of proof4 ,immediate knowledge is thus everywhere mediated1 and ,philosophy does nothing but bring this to consciousness--demonstrating the mediation which in point of fact is already present there1 e4g4 in religion1 c4 ,the philosophy of ,jacobi1 inasmuch as it says3 8,thought cannot proceed further than to the feeling of ,god10 has been accepted utiliter2 it was more easily arrived at than in the case of ,kant4 ,knowledge1 however1 is something very different from what ,jacobi calls such2 against finite knowledge his arguments are quite correct4 ,immediate knowledge is not knowledge1 comprehension1 for that implies that the content is determined in itself1 i4e4 is grasped as concrete4 ,but in immediate knowledge it is the case that the only fact known of ,god is that ,he exists4 ,for should there be determinations respecting ,god1 they must1 according to ,jacobi1 be grasped as a finite1 and the knowledge of them would again merely be a progression from finite to finite4 ,there thus remains only the indeterminate conception of ,god1 an 8,above me10 an indeterminate ,beyond4 ,this gives accordingly the same result as does the ,aufklrung1 viz4 that the highest reality is ultimate3 we find the same in ,french philosophy and in ,kant--only here we still have the opinion that this emptiness is the highest philosophy possible4 ,but if each standpoint has an aspect wherein it is justified1 there always rests in the proposition that the human mind knows ,god immediately1 the important consideration that we have here a recognition of the freedom of the human spirit3 in it we have the source of the knowledge of ,god1 and all externality of authority is thus abrogated in this principle4 ,the principle is hereby gained1 but only the principle of freedom of spirit2 and the greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom1 the peculiar possession of mind whereby it is at home with itself in itself1 is recognized1 and that mind has this consciousness within itself4 ,this however is merely abstract1 for the next step is that the principle of freedom is again purified and comes to its true objectivity1 so that not everything which strikes me or springs up within me must1 because it is manifested in me1 hold good as true4 ,it is only through thought1 which casts off the particular and accidental1 that the principle receives this objectivity which is independent of mere subjectivity and in and for itself--though in such a way that the freedom of mind still remains respected4 ,one's own spirit must bear witness to spirit that ,god is ,spirit2 the content must be true4 ,but this does not give authenticity to itself by its being revealed with certainty to me4 ,this is the standpoint1 and we have thus seen its deficiency and the greatness of the principle which is involved in it4 ,b4 ,,kant4 ,the philosophy of ,kant1 which we have now more particularly to consider1 made its appearance at the same time as the above4 ,while ,descartes asserted certainty to be the unity of thought and ,being1 we now have the consciousness of thought in its subjectivity1 i4e4 in the first place1 as determinateness in contrast with objectivity1 and then as finitude and progression in finite determinations4 ,abstract thought as personal conviction is that which is maintained as certain2 its contents are experience1 but the methods adopted by experience are once more formal thought and argument4 ,kant turns back to the standpoint of ,socrates2 we see in him the freedom of the subject as we saw it with the ,stoics1 but the task in respect of content is now placed on a higher level4 ,an endless aiming at the concrete is required for thought1 a filling up in accordance with the rule which completion prescribes1 which signifies that the content is itself the ,idea as the unity of the ,notion and reality4 ,with ,jacobi thought1 demonstration1 does not in the first place reach beyond the finite and conditioned1 and in the second place1 even when ,god is likewise the metaphysical object1 the demonstration is really the making ,him conditioned and finite2 in the third place the unconditioned1 what is then immediately certain1 only exists in faith1 a subjectively fixed point of view but an unknowable one1 that is to say an undetermined1 indeterminable1 and consequently an unfruitful one4 ,the standpoint of the philosophy of ,kant1 on the contrary1 is in the first place to be found in the fact that thought has through its reasoning got so far as to grasp itself not as contingent but rather as in itself the absolute ultimate4 ,in the finite1 in connection with the finite1 an absolute standpoint is raised which acts as a connecting bond2 it binds together the finite and leads up to the infinite4 ,thought grasped itself as all in all1 as absolute in judgment2 for it nothing external is authoritative1 since all authority can receive validity only through thought4 ,this thought1 determining itself within itself and concrete1 is1 however1 in the second place1 grasped as subjective1 and this aspect of subjectivity is the form which from ,jacobi's point of view is predominant2 the fact that thought is concrete ,jacobi has on the other hand for the most part set aside4 ,both standpoints remain philosophies of subjectivity2 since thought is subjective1 the capacity of knowing the absolute is denied to it4 ,to ,kant ,god cannot on the one hand be found in experience2 ,he can neither be found in outward experience--as ,lalande discovered when he swept the whole heavens and found no ,god--nor can ,he be discovered within2 though no doubt mystics and enthusiasts can experience many things in themselves1 and amongst these ,god1 i4e4 the ,infinite4 ,on the other hand ,kant argues to prove the existence of ,god1 who is to him an hypothesis necessary for the explanation of things1 a postulate of practical reason4 ,but in this connection another ,french astronomer made the following reply to the ,emperor ,napoleon3 8,je n'ai pas eu besoin de cette hypothse40 ,according to this the truth underlying the ,kantian philosophy is the recognition of freedom4 ,even ,rousseau represented the absolute to be found in freedom2 ,kant has the same principle1 but taken rather from the theoretic side4 ,the ,french regard it from the side of will1 which is represented in their proverb3 8,il a la tte prs du bonnet40 ,france possesses the sense of actuality1 of promptitude2 because in that country conception passes more immediately into action1 men have there applied themselves more practically to the affairs of actuality4 ,but however much freedom may be in itself concrete1 it was as undeveloped and in its abstraction that it was there applied to actuality2 and to make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy actuality4 ,the fanaticism which characterized the freedom which was put into the hands of the people was frightful4 ,in ,germany the same principle asserted the rights of consciousness on its own account1 but it has been worked out in a merely theoretic way4 ,we have commotions of every kind within us and around us1 but through them all the ,german head quietly keeps its nightcap on and silently carries on its operations beneath it4 ,immanuel ,kant was born at ,knigsberg in #agbd1 and there studied theology to begin with2 in the year #agee he entered upon his work as an academic teacher2 in #aggj he became professor of logic1 and in #ahjd he died at ,knigsberg on the #abth of ,february1 having almost attained his eightieth year 7,tennemann's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie by ,wendt1 #chj1 pp4 #dfe1 #dff71 without ever having left his native town4 ,while to ,wolff thought as thought was merely positive self-identity and grasped itself as such1 we saw the negative self-moving thought1 the absolute ,notion1 appear in all its power in ,france2 and in the ,aufklrung it likewise made its way to ,germany in such a manner that all existence1 all action1 was called upon to serve a useful purpose1 i4e4 the implicit was done away with and everything had to be for another2 and that for which everything had to be is man1 self-consciousness1 taken1 however1 as signifying all men generally4 ,the consciousness of this action in abstract form is the ,kantian philosophy4 ,it is thus the self-thinking absolute ,notion that passes into itself which we see making its appearance in ,germany through this philosophy1 in such a way that all reality falls within self-consciousness2 it is the idealism which vindicates all moments of the implicit to self-consciousness1 but which at first itself remains subject to a contradiction1 inasmuch as it still separates this implicit from itself4 ,in other words the ,kantian philosophy no doubt leads reality back to self-consciousness1 but it can supply no reality to this essence of self-consciousness1 or to this pure self-consciousness1 nor can it demonstrate ,being in the same4 ,it apprehends simple thought as having difference in itself1 but does not yet apprehend that all reality rests on this difference2 it does not know how to obtain mastery over the individuality of self-consciousness1 and although it describes reason very well1 it does this in an unthinking empiric way which again robs it of the truth it has4 ,theoretically the ,kantian philosophy is the 8,illumination0 or ,aufklrung reduced to method2 it states that nothing true can be known1 but only the phenomenal2 it leads knowledge into consciousness and self-consciousness1 but from this standpoint maintains it to be a subjective and finite knowledge4 ,thus although it deals with the infinite ,idea1 expressing its formal categories and arriving at its concrete claims1 it yet again denies this to be the truth1 making it a simple subjective1 because it has once for all accepted finite knowledge as the fixed and ultimate standpoint4 ,this philosophy made an end of the metaphysic of the understanding as an objective dogmatism1 but in fact it merely transformed it into a subjective dogmatism1 i4e4 into a consciousness in which these same finite determinations of the understanding persist1 and the question of what is true in and for itself has been abandoned4 ,its study is made difficult by its diffuseness and prolixity1 and by the peculiar terminology found in it4 ,nevertheless this diffuseness has one advantage1 that inasmuch as the same thing is often repeated1 the main points are kept before us1 and these cannot easily be lost from view4 ,we shall endeavour to trace the lines which ,kant pursued4 ,the philosophy of ,kant has in the first place a direct relation to that of ,hume as stated above 7p4 #cgj74 ,that is to say1 the significance of the ,kantian philosophy1 generally expressed1 is from the very beginning to allow that determinations such as those of universality and necessity are not to be met with in perception1 and this ,hume has already shown in relation to ,locke4 ,but while ,hume attacks the universality and necessity of the categories generally1 and ,jacobi their finitude1 ,kant merely argues against their objectivity in so far as they are present in external things themselves1 while maintaining them to be objective in the sense of holding good as universal and necessary1 as they do1 for instance1 in mathematics and natural science4#cbf ,the fact that we crave for universality and necessity as that which first constitutes the objective1 ,kant thus undoubtedly allows4 ,but if universality and necessity do not exist in external things1 the question arises 8,where are they to be found80 ,to this ,kant1 as against ,hume1 maintains that they must be a priori1 i4e4 that they must rest on reason itself1 and on thought as self-conscious reason2 their source is the subject1 8,i0 in my self-consciousness4#cbg ,this1 simply expressed1 is the main point in the ,kantian philosophy4 ,in the second place the philosophy of ,kant is likewise called a critical philosophy because its aim1 says ,kant1 is first of all to supply a criticism of our faculties of knowledge2 for before obtaining knowledge we must inquire into the faculties of knowledge4 ,to the healthy human understanding that is plausible1 and to it this has been a great discovery4 ,knowledge is thereby represented as an instrument1 as a method and means whereby we endeavour to possess ourselves of the truth4 ,thus before men can make their way to the truth itself they must know the nature and function of their instrument4 ,they must see whether it is capable of supplying what is demanded of it--of seizing upon the object2 they must know what the alterations it makes in the object are1 in order that these alterations may not be mixed up with the determinations of the object itself4#cbh ,this would appear as though men could set forth upon the search for truth with spears and staves4 ,and a further claim is made when it is said that we must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know4 ,for to investigate the faculties of knowledge means to know them2 but how we are to know without knowing1 how we are to apprehend the truth before the truth1 it is impossible to say4 ,it is the old story of the who would not go into the water till he could swim4 ,thus since the investigation of the faculties of knowledge is itself knowing1 it cannot in ,kant attain to what it aims at because it is that already--it cannot come to itself because it is already with itself2 the same thing happens as happened with the ,jews1 the ,spirit passes through the midst of them and they know it not4 ,at the same time the step taken by ,kant is a great and important one--that is1 the fact that he has made knowledge the subject of his consideration4 ,on the one hand this critique of knowledge applies to the empirical knowledge of ,locke1 which asserts itself to be grounded on experience1 and1 on the other hand1 it also deals with what claims to be on the whole a more metaphysical kind of philosophy--the ,wolffian and ,german--which had also taken up the line of proceeding on the more empiric method which has been depicted4 ,but this last has at the same time kept itself separate from the merely empiric method1 inasmuch as its main efforts have been directed towards making such categories of thought as those of potentiality1 actuality1 ,god1 c41 have as their foundation categories of the understanding1 and then reasoning from them4 ,the ,kantian philosophy is in the first instance directed against both4 ,kant takes away the objective significance of the determinations of the ,wolffian metaphysics1 and shows how they must be ascribed to subjective thought alone4 ,at the same time ,jacobi likewise declared himself against this metaphysic1 but since he started more especially from the standpoint of the ,french and ,germans1 his point of view was different3 he asserts that our finite thought can set forth finite determinations alone1 and thus can only consider ,god and ,spirit in accordance with finite relationships4 ,on the practical side there reigned at that time the so-called happiness theory1 since man's inherent ,notion and the way to realize this ,notion was apprehended in morality as a satisfaction of his desires4 ,as against this ,kant has very rightly shown that it involves a heteronomy and not an autonomy of reason--a determination through nature and consequently an absence of freedom4 ,but because the rational principle of ,kant was formal1 and his successors could not make any further progress with reason1 and yet morality had to receive a content1 ,fries and others must still be called ,hedonists though they avoid giving themselves the name4 ,in the third place1 as regards the relation of the categories to the material which is given through experience1 there is according to ,kant already inherent in the subjective determinations of thought1 e4g4 in those of cause and effect1 the capacity of themselves to bind together the differences which are present in that material4 ,kant considers thought as in great measure a synthetic activity1 and hence he represents the main question of ,philosophy to be this1 8,how are synthetic judgments a priori possible80#cbi ,judgment signifies the combination of thought-determinations as subject and predicate4 ,synthetic judgments a priori are nothing else than a connection of opposites through themselves1 or the absolute ,notion1 i4e4 the relations of different determinations such as those of cause and effect1 given not through experience but through thought4 ,space and time likewise form the connecting element2 they are thus a priori1 i4e4 in self-consciousness4 ,since ,kant shows that thought has synthetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception1 he shows that thought is so to speak concrete in itself4 ,the idea which is present here is a great one1 but1 on the other hand1 quite an ordinary signification is given it1 for it is worked out from points of view which are inherently rude and empirical1 and a scientific form is the last thing that can be claimed for it4 ,in the presentation of it there is a lack of philosophical abstraction1 and it is expressed in the most commonplace way2 to say nothing more of the barbarous terminology1 ,kant remains restricted and confined by his psychological point of view and empirical methods4 ,to mention one example only of his barbarous expressions1 ,kant calls his philosophy 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #ai7 a ,transcendental philosophy1 i4e4 a system of principles of pure reason which demonstrate the universal and necessary elements in the self-conscious understanding1 without occupying themselves with objects or inquiring what universality and necessity are2 this last would be transcendent4 ,transcendent and transcendental have accordingly to be clearly distinguished4 ,transcendent mathematics signifies the mathematics in which the determination of infinitude is made use of in a pre-eminent degree3 in this sphere of mathematics we say1 for instance1 that the circle consists of an infinitude of straight lines2 the periphery is represented as straight1 and since the curve is represented as straight this passes beyond the geometric category and is consequently transcendent4 ,kant1 on the contrary1 defines the transcendental philosophy as not a philosophy which by means of categories passes beyond its own sphere1 but one which points out in subjective thought1 in consciousness1 the sources of what may become transcendent4 ,thought would thus be transcendent if the categories of universality1 of cause and effect1 were predicated of the object1 for in this way men would from the subjective element #8transcend' into another sphere4 ,we are not justified in so doing as regards the result nor even to begin with1 since we merely contemplate thought within thought itself4 ,thus we do not desire to consider the categories in their objective sense1 but in so far as thought is the source of such synthetic relationships2 the necessary and universal thus here receive the significance of resting in our faculties of knowledge4 ,but from this faculty of knowledge ,kant still separates the implicit1 the thing-in-itself1 so that the universality and necessity are all the time a subjective conditionment of knowledge merely1 and reason with its universality and necessity does not attain to a knowledge of the truth4#ccj ,for it requires perception and experience1 a material empirically given in order1 as subjectivity1 to attain to knowledge4 ,as ,kant says1 these form its 8constituent parts02 one part it has in itself1 but the other is empirically given4#cca ,when reason desires to be independent1 to exist in itself and to derive truth from itself1 it becomes transcendent2 it transcends experience because it lacks the other constituent1 and then creates mere hallucinations of the brain4 ,it is hence not constitutive in knowledge but only regulative2 it is the unity and rule for the sensuous manifold4 ,but this unity on its own account is the unconditioned1 which1 transcending experience1 merely arrives at contradictions4 ,in the practical sphere alone is reason constitutive4 ,the critique of reason is consequently not the knowing of objects1 but of knowledge and its principles1 its range and limitations1 so that it does not become transcendent4#ccb ,this is an extremely general account of what we shall now consider in its separate details4 ,in dealing with this matter ,kant adopts the plan of first considering theoretic reason1 the knowledge which relates to outward objects4 ,in the second place he investigates the will as self-actualization2 and1 in the third place1 the faculty of judgment1 the special consideration of the unity of the universal and individual2 how far he gets in this matter we shall likewise see4 ,but the critique of the faculty of knowledge is the matter of main importance4 #a4 ,in the first place1 as to the theoretic philosophy1 ,kant in the ,critique of ,pure ,reason sets to work in a psychological manner1 i4e4 historically1 inasmuch as he describes the main stages in theoretic consciousness4 ,the first faculty is sensuousness generally1 the second understanding1 the third reason4 ,all this he simply narrates2 he accepts it quite empirically1 without developing it from the ,notion or proceeding by necessity4 a4 ,the a priori fact of sensuous existence1 the forms of sensuous existence1 constitute the beginning of this transcendentalism4 ,kant calls the judgment of the same the transcendental sthetic4 ,nowadays sthetic signifies the knowledge of the beautiful4 ,but here the doctrine of intuition or perception is taken from the point of view of its universality1 i4e4 from what in it pertains to the subject as such4 ,perception1 says ,kant1 is the knowledge of an object given to us through the senses2 sensuousness1 however1 is the capacity of being affected by conceptions as external4 ,now1 according to ,kant1 in perception there are to be found all manner of contents1 and in dealing with this he first of all distinguishes feeling as external1 such as redness1 colour1 hardness1 c41 and then as internal1 such as justice1 wrath1 love1 fear1 pleasurable and religious feelings1 c4 ,he says content such as this forms the one constituent and pertains to feeling2 all this is subjective and merely subjective4 ,in this sensuous element there is1 however1 a universal sensuous element likewise contained1 which as such does not belong to feeling in so far as it is immediately determined2 in such a content this #8other' consists in the categories of space and time1 which of themselves are void and empty4 ,the filling in is performed by the content1 by colour1 softness1 hardness1 c41 as regards space2 while as regards time1 the same content1 so soon as it is something transient1 or again some other content1 and in particular inward feelings are what causes the determination4 ,space and time are consequently pure1 i4e4 abstract perceptions in which we place outside of us the content of individual sensations1 either in time as succeeding one another1 or in space as separate from one another4 ,here we thus meet with the division between subjectivity and objectivity1 for if we isolate the #8alongside of' and #8after' we have space and time4 ,it is the act of a priori sensuousness to project the content2 the forms of intuition or perception constitute this pure perception4#ccc ,now everything indeed is termed perception1 even thought and consciousness2 ,god1 who certainly pertains to thought alone1 is said to be comprehended by perception or intuition1 the so-called immediate consciousness4 ,kant further remarks in this regard1 7#a7 8,space is no empirical ,notion which has been derived from outward experiences40 ,but the ,notion is never really anything empiric3 it is in barbarous forms like this that ,kant1 however1 always expresses himself3 8,for in order that ,i may relate my sensations to something outside of me1 ,i must presuppose space40 ,of time ,kant speaks in similar terms3 8,in order that something outside of me may be represented in separate space or time1 the conception of space and time must come first1 or it cannot be derived from experience1 for experience first becomes possible through this antecedent conception40 ,that is to say1 time and space which may appear as objective1 since their particular filling in certainly belongs to subjective feeling1 are not empirical2 for consciousness has time and space first of all in itself4 7#b7 8,space is a necessary conception which lies at the basis of all external perceptions4 ,space and time are conceptions a priori1 because we cannot represent things without space and time4 ,time is a necessary basis for all phenomena40 ,as a priori1 space and time are universal and necessary1 that is to say we find this to be the case2 but it does not follow that they must be previously present as conceptions4 ,they are fundamental indeed1 but they are likewise an external universal4 ,kant however places the matter somewhat in this fashion3 there are things-in-themselves outside1 but devoid of time and space2 consciousness now comes1 and it has time and space beforehand present in it as the possibility of experience1 just as in order to eat it has mouth and teeth1 c41 as conditions necessary for eating4 ,the things which are eaten have not the mouth and teeth1 and as eating is brought to bear on things1 so space and time are also brought to bear on them2 just as things are placed in the mouth and between the teeth1 so is it with space and time4 7#c7 8,space and time are not general ,notions of the relations of things1 but pure intuitive perceptions4 ,for we can only represent to ourselves one space2 there are not different component parts of space40 ,the same is the case with time4 ,the abstract conception tree1 for example1 is in its actuality a number of individual and separate trees1 but spaces are not such particulars1 nor are they parts2 for one immediate continuity remains1 and hence a simple unity4 ,ordinary perception has always something individual before it2 space or time are always however one only1 and therefore a priori4 ,it might however be replied to ,kant3 ,the nature of space and time undoubtedly involves their being an abstract universal2 but there is in like manner only one blue4 7#d7 8,each ,notion or conception certainly comprises an infinite number of conceptions under itself1 but not within itself2 nevertheless this last is the case in space and time1 and they are therefore intuitive perceptions and not ,notions or conceptions40#ccd ,space and time1 then1 are certainly not thought-determinations1 if no thoughts are there present1 but a ,notion1 so soon as we have a ,notion of them4 ,from the transcendental point of view it is likewise maintained that this conception of space and time contains synthetic propositions a priori1 connected with the consciousness of its necessity4 ,examples of these synthetic propositions are sought in statements such as that of space having three dimensions1 or in the definition of a straight line1 that it is the shortest distance between two points1 and likewise in the statement that #e #g #ab4cce ,all these propositions are however very analytic4 ,kant nevertheless in the first place holds that such propositions do not take their rise from experience1 or1 as we might better express it1 are not an individual contingent perception2 this is very true1 the perception is universal and necessary4 ,in the second place he states that we acquire them from pure sensuous perception1 and not through the understanding or ,notion4 ,but ,kant does not grasp the two together1 and yet this comprehension of them is involved in such propositions being immediately certain even in ordinary perception4 ,when ,kant then expresses himself 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #di7 to the effect that we have many sensations which constitute 8the real matter10 with which we externally and inwardly 8occupy our minds10 and that the mind has in itself in space and time 8formal conditions of the mode in which we place them0 7those manifold feelings7 8in our mind10 the question of how mind arrives at having just these special forms now forces itself upon us4 ,but what the nature of time and space is1 it does not occur to the ,kantian philosophy to inquire4 ,to it what space and time are in themselves does not signify #8,what is their ,notion1' but #8,are they external things or something in the mind8' b4 ,the second faculty1 the understanding1 is something very different from sensuousness2 the latter is ,receptivity1 while ,kant calls thought in general ,spontaneity--an expression which belongs to the philosophy of ,leibnitz4 ,the understanding is active thought1 ,i myself2 it 8is the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous perception40 ,yet it has thoughts merely without real content3 8,thoughts without content are void and empty1 sensuous perceptions without ,notions are blind40 ,the understanding thus obtains from the sensuous its matter1 both empirical and a priori1 time and space2 and it thinks this matter1 but its thoughts are very different from this matter4 ,or it is a faculty of a particular kind1 and it is only when both occur1 when the sensuous faculty has supplied material and the understanding has united to this its thoughts1 that knowledge results4#ccf ,the thoughts of the understanding as such are thus limited thoughts1 thoughts of the finite only4 ,now logic1 as transcendental logic1 likewise sets forth the conceptions which the understanding has a priori in itself and 8whereby it thinks objects completely a priori40 ,thoughts have a form which signifies their being the synthetic function which brings the manifold into a unity4 ,i am this unity1 the transcendental apperception1 the pure apperception of self-consciousness4 ,i ,i2 ,i must #8accompany' all our conceptions4#ccg ,this is a barbarous exposition of the matter4 ,as self-consciousness ,i am the completely void1 general ,i1 completely indeterminate and abstract2 apperception is determination generally1 the activity whereby ,i transplant an empirical content into my simple consciousness1 while perception rather signifies feeling or conceiving4 ,in order that a content may enter this ,one1 it must be infected by its simplicity2 it is thus that the content first becomes my content4 ,the comprehending medium is #8,i'2 whatever ,i have to do with must allow itself to be forced into these forms of unity4 ,this is a great fact1 an important item of knowledge2 what thought produces is unity2 thus it produces itself1 for it is the ,one4 ,yet the fact that ,i am the one and1 as thinking1 the simplifier1 is not by ,kant satisfactorily set forth4 ,the unity may likewise be called relation2 for in so far as a manifold is presupposed1 and as this on the one side remains a manifold while on the other side it is set forth as one1 so far may it be said to be related4 ,now as #8,i' is the universal transcendental unity of self-consciousness which binds together the empirical matter of conception generally1 there are various modes in this relationship1 and here we have the transcendental nature of the categories or universal thought-determinations4 ,but ,kant 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #gj1 #gg7 approaches these modes of simplicity by accepting them as they are classified in ordinary logic4 ,for he says that in common logic particular kinds of judgment are brought forward2 and since judgment is a special kind of relationship of the manifold1 the various functions of thought which #8,i' has in it are shown therein4 ,but the following kinds of judgment have been noticed1 viz4 ,universal1 ,particular and ,singular2 ,affirmative1 ,negative1 ,infinite2 ,categorical1 ,hypothetical1 ,disjunctive2 ,assertoric1 ,problematic and ,apodictic judgments4 ,these particular modes of relationship now brought forward are the pure forms of the understanding4 ,there are thus1 according to ,kant 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #ge1 #gf1 #gh-hb71 twelve fundamental categories1 which fall into four classes2 and it is noteworthy1 and deserves to be recognized1 that each species of judgment again constitutes a triad4 7#a7 ,the first kind of categories are those of ,quantity1 viz4 ,unity1 ,plurality and ,totality4 ,plurality is negation of the one1 the assertion of difference2 and the third1 the bringing of the other two into one1 plurality circumscribed1 the indeterminate plurality comprehended as one1 is the ,totality4 7#b7 ,in the second series are the categories of ,quality3 ,reality1 ,negation1 ,limitation4 ,limitation is as real or positive as negation4 7#c7 ,the third series comprises the categories of relation1 of connection2 and first of all1 indeed1 the relation of ,substantiality1 ,substance and ,accident3 then the relation of ,causality1 the relation of ,cause and ,effect1 and finally ,reciprocity4 7#d7 ,the categories of ,modality1 of the relation of the objective to our thought1 come fourth1 viz4 ,possibility1 ,existence 7actuality7 and ,necessity4 ,possibility should come second2 in abstract thought1 however1 the empty conception comes first4 ,it betrays a great instinct for the ,notion when ,kant says that the first category is positive1 the second the negative of the first1 the third the synthesis of the two4 ,the triplicity1 this ancient form of the ,pythagoreans1 ,neo-,platonists and of the ,christian religion1 although it here reappears as a quite external schema only1 conceals within itself the absolute form1 the ,notion4 ,but since ,kant says that a conception can determine itself in me as accidental1 as cause1 effect1 unity1 plurality1 c41 we thereby have the whole of the metaphysics of the understanding4 ,kant does not follow up further the derivation of these categories1 and he finds them imperfect1 but he says that the others are derived from them4 ,kant thus accepts the categories in an empiric way1 without thinking of developing of necessity these differences from unity4 ,just as little did ,kant attempt to deduce time and space1 for he accepted them likewise from experience--a quite unphilosophic and unjustifiable procedure4 ,thinking understanding is thus indeed the source of the individual categories1 but because on their own account they are void and empty1 they only have significance through their union with the given1 manifold material of perception1 feeling1 c4 ,such connection of sensuous material with categories now constitutes the facts of experience1 i4e4 the matter of sensation after it is brought under the categories2 and this is knowledge generally4#cch ,the matter of perception which pertains to the feelings or sensuous perception is not left in the determination of individuality and immediacy1 but ,i am active in relation to it1 inasmuch as ,i bring it into connection through the categories and elevate it into universal species1 natural laws1 c4 ,the question of whether a completed sensuousness or the ,notion is the higher may accordingly be easily decided4 ,for the laws of the heavens are not immediately perceived1 but merely the change in position on the part of the stars4 ,it is only when this object of immediate perception is laid hold of and brought under universal thought-determinations that experience arises therefrom1 which has a claim to validity for all time4 ,the category which brings the unity of thought into the content of feeling is thus the objective element in experience1 which receives thereby universality and necessity1 while that which is perceived is rather the subjective and contingent4 ,our finding both these elements in experience demonstrates indeed that a correct analysis has been made4 ,kant 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #aai1 #abj7 however connects with this the statement that experience grasps phenomena only1 and that by means of the knowledge which we obtain through1 experience we do not know things as they are in themselves1 but only as they are in the form of laws of perception and sensuousness4 ,for the first component part of experience1 sensation1 is doubtless subjective1 since it is connected with our organs4 ,the matter of perception is only what it is in my sensation4 ,i know of this sensation only and not of the thing4 ,but1 in the second place1 the objective1 which ought to constitute the opposite to this subjective side1 is itself subjective likewise3 it does not indeed pertain to my feeling1 but it remains shut up in the region of my self-consciousness2 the categories are only determinations of our thinking understanding4 ,neither the one nor the other is consequently anything in itself1 nor are both together1 knowledge1 anything in itself1 for it only knows phenomena--a strange contradiction4 ,the transition of the category to the empiric is made in the following way3 8,pure conceptions of the understanding are quite of a different nature from empiric1 indeed from any sensuous perceptions20 we have thus 8to show how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to phenomena40 ,this is dealt with by the transcendental faculty of judgment4 ,for ,kant says that in the mind1 in self-consciousness1 there are pure conceptions of the understanding and pure sensuous perceptions2 now it is the schematism of the pure understanding1 the transcendental faculty of the imagination1 which determines the pure sensuous perception in conformity with the category and thus constitutes the transition to experience4#cci ,the connection of these two is again one of the most attractive sides of the ,kantian philosophy1 whereby pure sensuousness and pure understanding1 which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites1 are now united4 ,there is thus here present a perceptive understanding or an understanding perception2 but ,kant does not see this1 he does not bring these thoughts together3 he does not grasp the fact that he has here brought both sides of knowledge into one1 and has thereby expressed their implicitude4 ,knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments2 but with ,kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular1 and they are only united in an external1 superficial way1 just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together by a cord4 ,thus1 for example1 the conception of substance in the schema becomes permanent in time1#cdj i4e4 the pure conception of the understanding1 the pure category1 is brought into unity with the form of pure sensuous perception4 ,in as far as we have to deal with our own determinations only and as we do not reach the implicit1 the true objective1 the ,kantian philosophy called itself ,idealism4 ,but in this connection ,kant 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bjj1 #bja7 brings forward a refutation of empirical or material idealism1 thus3 8,i am conscious of my existence as determined in time4 ,but all time-determination presupposes something permanent in perception4 ,this permanence cannot be0 a sensuous perception 8in me40 ,for all the determining grounds of my existence which are met with in me are conceptions1 and as such themselves require a constant element different from them1 and in relation to which the change taking place in them--consequently 8my existence in time10 in which they change1 8may be determined40 ,or ,i am conscious of my existence as of an empirical consciousness which is only capable of being determined in relation to something which is outside of me2 i4e4 ,i am conscious of something external to me4 ,conversely it may be said3 ,i am conscious of external things as determined in time and as changing2 these hence presuppose something constant which is not in them but outside of them4 ,and this is #8,i1' the transcendental ground of their universality and necessity1 of their implicitude1 the unity of self-consciousness4 ,on another occasion ,kant regards it thus 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #aja73 ,these moments confuse themselves1 because the constant element is itself a category4 ,idealism1 when we regard it as signifying that nothing exists outside of my individual self-consciousness as individual1 as also the refutation of this1 the assertion that things exist outside of my self-consciousness as individual1 are the one as bad as the other4 ,the former is the idealism of ,berkeley1 in which self-consciousness as individual is alone in question1 or the world of self-consciousness appears as a number of limited1 sensuous1 individual conceptions1 which are as completely devoid of truth as though they were called things4 ,the truth or untruth does not rest in their being things or conceptions1 but in their limitation and contingency1 whether as conceptions or things4 ,the refutation of this idealism is nothing more than calling attention to the fact that this empirical consciousness does not exist in itself--just as those empiric things do not exist in themselves4 ,but the knowing subject does not with ,kant really arrive at reason1 for it remains still the individual self-consciousness as such1 which is opposed to the universal4 ,as a matter of fact there is described in what we have seen only the empirical finite self-consciousness which requires a material from outside1 or which is limited4 ,we do not ask whether these facts of knowledge are in and for themselves true or untrue2 the whole of knowledge remains within subjectivity1 and on the other side there is the thing-in-itself as an external4 ,this subjectivity is however concrete in itself2 even the determinate categories of the thinking understanding are concrete1 and much more is experience so--the synthesis of the sensation and the category4#cda c4 ,the third faculty ,kant finds in reason1 to which he advances from the understanding after the same psychological method2 that is to say1 he hunts through the soul's sack to see what faculties are still to be found there2 and thus by merest chance he lights on ,reason4 ,it would make no difference if there had been no ,reason there1 just as with physicists it is a matter of perfect indifference whether1 for instance1 there is such a thing as magnetism or not4 8,all our knowledge begins from the senses1 thence proceeds to the understanding1 and finishes up with reason2 nothing higher than this is to be found in us1 for it signifies the working up of the material of perception1 and the reducing of it to the highest unity of thought40 ,reason is therefore1 according to ,kant1 the power of obtaining knowledge from principles1 that is1 the power of knowing the particular in the universal by means of ,notions2 the understanding1 on the contrary1 reaches its particular by means of perception4 ,but the categories are themselves particular4 ,the principle of reason1 according to ,kant1 is really the universal1 inasmuch as it finds the unconditioned involved in the conditioned knowledge of the understanding4 ,understanding is hence for him thought in finite relations2 reason1 on the contrary1 is thought which makes the unconditioned its object4 ,since ,kant's time it has become customary in the language of philosophy to distinguish understanding and reason1 while by earlier philosophers this distinction was not drawn4 ,the product of reason is1 according to ,kant1 the ,idea--a ,platonic expression--and he understands by it the unconditioned1 the infinite4#cdb ,it is a great step forward to say that reason brings forth ,ideas2 with ,kant1 however1 the ,idea is merely the abstract universal1 the indeterminate4 ,this1 the unconditioned1 must now be grasped as concrete1 and therein lies the main difficulty4 ,for to know the unconditioned means to determine it and to deduce its determinations4 ,much has been written and said on the subject of knowledge1 without a definition of it ever having been offered4 ,but it is the business of ,philosophy to see that what is taken for granted as known is really known4 ,now on this point ,kant says that reason has certainly the desire to know the infinite1 but has not the power4 ,and the reason which ,kant gives for this 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bgg1 #bgh71 is on the one hand that no psychologically sensuous intuition or perception corresponds with the infinite1 that it is not given in outward or inward experience2 to the ,idea 8no congruent or corresponding object can be discovered in the sensuous world40 ,it depends1 however1 on how the world is looked at2 but experience and observation of the world mean nothing else for ,kant than a candlestick standing here1 and a snuff-box standing there4 ,it is certainly correct to say that the infinite is not given in the world of sensuous perception2 and supposing that what we know is experience1 a synthesis of what is thought and what is felt1 the infinite can certainly not be known in the sense that we have a sensuous perception of it4 ,but no one wishes to demand a sensuous proof in verification of the infinite2 spirit is for spirit alone4 ,the second reason for considering that the infinite cannot be known1 lies in this1 that ,reason has no part in it except as supplying the forms of thought which we call categories2 and these doubtless afford what ,kant calls objective determinations1 but in such a way that in themselves they are still only subjective4 ,if therefore for the determination of the infinite we employ these categories which are applicable only to phenomena1 we entangle ourselves in false arguments 7paralogisms7 and in contradictions 7antinomies72 and it is an important point in the ,kantian philosophy that the infinite1 so far as it is defined by means of categories1 loses itself in contradictions4 ,although reason1 says ,kant1 becomes transcendent by the exhibition of these contradictions1 it still retains its claim to trace perception1 experience1 and knowledge pertaining to the understanding1 back to the infinite4 ,this union of the infinite1 the unconditioned1 with the finite and conditioned as existing in the knowledge given by the understanding1 or even in perception1 would signify that the acme of concreteness had been reached4 ,of this ,unconditioned there are several kinds1 objects having special features of their own and proceeding from reason1 transcendental ,ideas2 they are thus themselves particular in their nature4 ,the manner in which ,kant arrives at these ,ideas is again derived from experience1 from formal logic1 according to which there are various forms of the syllogism4 ,because1 says ,kant1 there are three forms of the syllogism1 categorical1 hypothetical1 and disjunctive1 the ,unconditioned is also three-fold in its nature3 8,firstly1 an ,unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject40 ,synthesis is the concrete2 but the expression is ambiguous1 since it indicates an external association of independent elements4 8,in the second place1 an ,unconditioned of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series will have to be looked for2 and in the third place1 an ,unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in a system40 ,we make the first connection1 expressed as object of ,reason or transcendental ,idea1 when we conceive 8the thinking subject20 the second 8is the sum total of all phenomena1 the world20 and the third is 8the thing which contains the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought1 the ,being of all ,beings10 i4e4 ,god4 ,when brought to an ultimate point1 the question which meets us is whether ,reason can bring these objects to reality1 or whether they remain confined to subjective thought4 ,now1 according to ,kant1 ,reason is not capable of procuring reality for its ,ideas--otherwise it would be transcendent1 its limits would be overstepped2 it produces only paralogisms1 antinomies1 and an ideal without reality4#cdc 4 8,a4 paralogism is a syllogism false in its form40 ,since ,reason credits with reality that mode of the ,unconditioned which constitutes the categorical synthesis in a subject1 and therefore the thinking subject1 it is termed substance4 ,now is the thinking ego a substance1 a soul1 a soul-thing8 ,further questions are whether it is permanent1 immaterial1 incorruptible1 personal and immortal1 and such as to have a real community with the body4 ,the falsity of the syllogism consists in this1 that the idea of the unity of the transcendental subject essential to ,reason is expressed as a thing2 for it is only in this way that the permanency of the same becomes substance4 ,otherwise ,i find myself permanent in my thought1 of course1 but only within perceiving consciousness1 not outside of that4 ,the ego is therefore the empty1 transcendental subject of our thoughts1 that moreover becomes known only through its thoughts2 but of what it is in itself we cannot gather the least idea4 7,a horrible distinction6 ,for thought is nothing more or less than the 8in-itself0 or implicit47 ,we cannot assert of it any present ,being1 because thought is an empty form1 we have a conception of what thinking ,beings are through no outward experience1 but only by means of self-consciousness1--i4e4 because we cannot take the 8,i0 in our hands1 nor see it1 nor smell it4 ,we therefore know very well that the ego is a subject1 but if we pass beyond self-consciousness1 and say that it is substance1 we go farther than we are entitled to do4 ,i cannot therefore assign any reality to the subject4#cdd ,we here see ,kant fall into contradiction1 what with the barbarity of the conceptions which he refutes1 and the barbarity of his own conceptions which remain behind when the others are refuted4 ,in the first place1 he is perfectly correct when he maintains that the ego is not a soul-thing1 a dead permanency which has a sensuous present existence2 indeed1 were it to be an ordinary thing1 it would be necessary that it should be capable of being experienced4 ,but1 in the second place1 ,kant does not assert the contrary of this1 namely that the ego1 as this universal or as self-thinking1 has in itself the true reality which he requires as an objective mode4 ,for he does not get clear of the conception of reality in which reality consists in the possession of a sensuous present existence2 accordingly1 because the ego is given in no outward experience1 it is not real4 ,for self-consciousness1 the ego as such1 is not1 according to ,kant1 reality2 it is only our thought1 or in other words he regards self-consciousness as being itself simply and entirely sensuous4 ,the form which ,kant accordingly bestows on ,being1 thing1 substance1 would seem to indicate that these categories of the understanding were too high for the subject1 too high to be capable of being predicated of it4 ,but really such determinations are too poor and too mean1 for what possesses life is not a thing1 nor can the soul1 the spirit1 the ego1 be called a thing4 ,being is the least or lowest quality that one can assign to spirit1 its abstract1 immediate identity with itself2 ,being thus no doubt pertains to spirit1 but it must be considered as a determination scarcely worth applying to it4 4 ,in the second place we have the antinomy1 i4e4 the contradiction in ,reason's ,idea of the ,unconditioned1 an ,idea applied to the world in order to represent it as a complete summing-up of conditions4 ,that is to say1 in the given phenomena ,reason demands the absolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility1 so far as these constitute a series1 so that the unconditioned is contained in the world1 i4e4 the totality of the series4 ,if now this completeness is expressed as existing1 an antinomy is alone presented1 and ,reason is presented only as dialectic3 i4e4 in this object there is on every side a perfect contradiction found4#cde ,for phenomena are a finite content1 and the world is a conjunction of the limited2 if this content is now thought by ,reason1 and therefore subsumed under the unconditioned and the unlimited1 we have two determinations1 finite and infinite1 which contradict each other4 ,reason demands a perfectly complete synthesis1 an absolute beginning2 but in phenomena we have1 on the contrary1 a succession of causes and effects1 which never come to an end4 ,kant here points out four contradictions 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #cbj71 which1 however1 is not enough2 for in each ,notion there are antinomies1 since it is not simple but concrete1 and therefore contains different determinations1 which are direct opposites4 4 ,these antinomies in the first place involve our making the one determination1 limitation1 just as valid as non-limitation4 8,thesis3 ,the world has a beginning and an end in time1 and it is limited in regard to space4 ,antithesis3 ,it has no beginning and no end in time1 and also no limits in space40 ,the one1 says ,kant1 can be proved just as easily as the other2 and indeed he does prove each indirectly1 though his are not 8advocate's proofs40#cdf ,the world1 as the universe1 is the whole2 it is thus a universal idea1 and therefore unlimited4 ,the completion of the synthesis in progression as regards time and space is1 however1 a first beginning of time and space4 ,if therefore the categories of limited and unlimited are applied to the world in order to attain to a knowledge of it1 we fall into contradictions1 because the categories are not applicable to things-in-themselves4 4 ,the second antinomy is that atoms1 from which substance is composed1 must necessarily be admitted to exist1 therefore simplicity can be proved2 but just as easy is it to prove incompleteness1 the endless process of division4 ,the thesis is accordingly stated thus3 8,every compound substance consists of simple parts10 and the antithesis is as follows3 8,there exists nothing simple40#cdg ,the one is here the limit1 a material self-existence1 the point which is likewise the enclosing surface2 the other is divisibility ad infinitum4 4 ,the third antinomy is the opposition between freedom and necessity4 ,the first is the self-determining1 the point of view pertaining to infinity3 causality according to the laws of freedom is the only causality4 ,the other is3 ,determinism alone is to be found3 everything is determined by means of an external ground or reason4#cdh 4 ,the fourth antinomy rests on what follows3 ,on the one hand totality completes itself in freedom as a first beginning of action1 or in an absolutely necessary ,being1 as the cause of the world1 so that the process is interrupted3 but there is opposed to that freedom the necessity of a process according to conditions of causes and effects1 and to the necessity of a ,being is opposed the consideration that everything is contingent4 ,the absolute necessity of the conditioned world is therefore on the one hand maintained thus3 8,to the world belongs an absolutely necessary ,being40 ,the opposite to this is1 8,there exists no absolutely necessary ,being1 either as part of the world or outside of the world40#cdi ,one of these opposites is just as necessary as the other1 and it is superfluous to carry this further here4 ,the necessity of these contradictions is the interesting fact which ,kant 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #cbd7 has brought to consciousness2 in ordinary metaphysics1 however1 it is imagined that one of these contradictions must hold good1 and the other be disproved4 ,the most important point involved in this assertion of ,kant's is1 however1 unintentional on his part4 ,for he indeed solves these antinomies 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #che1 #chf71 but only in the particular sense of transcendental idealism1 which does not doubt or deny the existence of external things 7supra1 p4 #ddb71 but 8allows that things are perceived in space and time0 7which is the case1 whether it allows it or not73 for transcendental idealism1 however1 8space and time in themselves are not things at all10 and therefore 8do not exist apart from our mind20 i4e4 all these determinations of a beginning in time1 and so on1 do not really belong to things1 to the implicitude of the phenomenal world1 which has independent existence outside of our subjective thought4 ,if such determinations belonged to the world1 to ,god1 to free agents1 there would be an objective contradiction2 but this contradiction is not found as absolute1 it pertains only to us4 ,or1 in other words1 this transcendental idealism lets the contradiction remain1 only it is not ,being in itself that is thus contradictory1 for the contradiction has its source in our thought alone4 ,thus the same antinomy remains in our mind2 and as it was formerly ,god who had to take upon ,himself all contradictions1 so now it is self-consciousness4 ,but the ,kantian philosophy does not go on to grapple with the fact that it is not things that are contradictory1 but self-consciousness itself4 ,experience teaches that the ego does not melt away by reason of these contradictions1 but continues to exist2 we need not therefore trouble ourselves about its contradictions1 for it can bear them4 ,nevertheless ,kant shows here too much tenderness for things3 it would be a pity1 he thinks1 if they contradicted themselves4 ,but that mind1 which is far higher1 should be a contradiction--that is not a pity at all4 ,the contradiction is therefore by no means solved by ,kant2 and since mind takes it upon itself1 and contradiction is self-destructive1 mind is in itself all derangement and disorder4 ,the true solution would be found in the statement that the categories have no truth in themselves1 and the ,unconditioned of ,reason just as little1 but that it lies in the unity of both as concrete1 and in that alone4 4 ,kant now goes on to the ,idea of ,god2 this third idea is the ,being of ,beings1 which the other ideas presupposed4 ,kant says 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #dda-deb71 that according to the definition of ,wolff1 ,god is the most real of all ,beings2 the object then comes to be to prove that ,god is not only ,thought1 but that ,he is1 that ,he has reality1 ,being4 ,this ,kant calls the ,ideal of ,reason1 to distinguish it from the ,idea1 which is only the sum of all possibility4 ,the ,ideal is thus the ,idea as existent2 just as in art we give the name of ideal to the ,idea realized in a sensuous manner4 ,here ,kant takes into consideration the proof of the existence of ,god1 as he asks whether reality can be assigned to this ,ideal4 ,the ontological proof proceeds from the absolute ,notion1 in order from it to argue up to ,being4 ,with ,anselm1 ,descartes1 and ,spinoza the transition to ,being is thus made2 and all of them assume in so doing the unity of ,being and thought4 ,but ,kant says 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #deh-dff73 ,to this ,ideal of ,reason just as little reality can be assigned3 there is no transition from the ,notion to ,being4 8,being is not a real predicate10 like any other1 8a ,notion of something which might be added to the ,notion of a thing4 ,a hundred real dollars do not contain in the very least more than a hundred possible dollars10 they are the same content1 i4e4 the same ,notion2 they are also a hundred exactly4 ,the one is the ,notion1 or rather the conception1 the other is the object2 ,being is no new determination of the ,notion1 otherwise my ,notion of a hundred real dollars would contain something different from a hundred real dollars4 ,but 8the object1 as real1 is not contained in my ,notion alone2 or to my ,notion the real hundred dollars are synthetically added40 ,being cannot therefore be derived from the ,notion1 because it is not contained therein1 but must be added to it4 8,we must go out of the ,notion in order to arrive at existence4 ,with regard to objects of pure thought1 there are no means of coming to know of their existence1 because it had to be known a priori2 but our consciousness of all existence belongs entirely to experience40 ,that is to say1 ,kant does not attain to the comprehension of that very synthesis of ,notion and ,being1 or in other words1 he does not comprehend existence1 i4e4 he does not attain to the establishment of it as ,notion2 existence remains for him something absolutely different from a ,notion4 ,the content is no doubt the same for him in what exists and in the ,notion3 but since ,being is not involved in the ,notion1 the attempt to derive the one from the other is unavailing4 ,of course the determination of ,being is not found as positive and ready-made in the ,notion2 the ,notion is something different from reality and objectivity4 ,if we therefore abide by the ,notion1 we abide by ,being as something different from the ,notion1 and adhere to the separation of the two2 we then have conception1 and not ,being at all4 ,that a hundred possible dollars are something different from a hundred actual ones is a reflection of a very popular nature1 so much so that no proposition has been so well received as the assertion that no transition can be made from the ,notion to ,being2 for though ,i imagine to myself a hundred dollars1 ,i do not possess them for all that4 ,but in a like popular fashion it might be said that one must leave off imagining1 for that is mere conception3 i4e4 what is merely imaginary is untrue1 the hundred imaginary dollars are and remain imaginary4 ,therefore to believe in them is a proof of an unsound understanding1 and is of no manner of use2 and he is a foolish fellow who indulges in such fancies and wishes4 ,one possesses a hundred dollars1 when they are real only2 if a man has therefore so great a desire to possess a hundred dollars1 he must put his hand to work in order to obtain them3 i4e4 he must not come to a standstill at the imagination of them1 but pass out beyond it4 ,this subjective side is not the ultimate or the absolute2 the true is that which is not merely subjective4 ,if ,i possess a hundred dollars1 ,i have them actually1 and at the same time ,i form a conception of them to myself4 ,but according to ,kant's representation we come to a deadlock at the difference2 dualism is ultimate1 and each side has independent validity as an absolute4 ,against this false idea of what is to be absolute and ultimate1 the healthy human understanding is directed2 every ordinary consciousness rises above it1 every action aims at setting aside a subjective conception and making it into something objective4 ,there is no man so foolish as that philosophy2 when a man feels hungry1 he does not call up the imagination of food1 but sets about satisfying his hunger4 ,all activity is a conception which does not yet exist1 but whose subjectivity is abrogated4 ,moreover the imaginary hundred dollars become real1 and the real ones imaginary3 this is a frequent experience1 this is their fate2 it depends on circumstances entirely outward whether a hundred dollars become my property or not4 ,of course the mere conception is of no good1 if ,i obstinately hold by it3 for ,i can imagine what ,i will1 but that does not make it exist4 ,the only important point is what ,i conceive to myself1 and then whether ,i think or comprehend the subjective and ,being2 by means of this each passes into the other4 ,thought1 the ,notion1 of necessity implies that the ,notion does not remain subjective2 this subjective is on the contrary abrogated and reveals itself as objective4 ,now that unity is expressly affirmed by ,descartes solely in reference to the ,notion of ,god1 for it is just that which is ,god2 he speaks of no hundred dollars1 as these are not an existence which has a ,notion in itself4 ,that opposition does away with itself absolutely and entirely1 i4e4 the finite passes away2 it holds good only in the philosophy of finitude4 ,if1 therefore1 there is not a ,notion of existence formed1 we have in it a notionless1 sensuous object of perception2 and what is notionless is certainly not a ,notion1--therefore sensation1 handling1 are not ,notions4 ,such existence has of course no ,absolute1 no real essence3 or such existence has no truth1 it is only a vanishing moment4 ,this useless thrashing of the empty grainless straw of the common logic is termed philosophizing3 it is like ,issachar the strong ass1 which could not be made to move from the spot where it was 7,gen4 xlix4 #ad74 ,people of this kind say3 ,we are good for nothing1 and because we are good for nothing1 we are good for nothing1 and wish to be good for nothing4 ,but it is a very false idea of ,christian humility and modesty to desire through one's abjectness to attain to excellence2 this confession of one's own nothingness is really inward pride and great self-conceit4 ,but for the honour of true humility we must not remain in our misery1 but raise ourselves above it by laying hold of the ,divine4 ,the fact to which ,kant clings most strongly 7,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #dfg7 is this1 that ,being cannot be extracted from the ,notion4 ,the result of this is the proposition that to have the thought of the ,infinite is certainly ,reason2 but that from the ,idea of ,reason is separated determination in general1 and especially the determination which is known as ,being4 ,the ,ideas of ,reason cannot be proved from experience1 or obtain from it their verification3 if they are defined by means of categories1 contradictions arise4 ,if the ,idea in general is to be defined as existent only1 it is nothing more or less than the ,notion2 and the ,being of the existent is still distinguished from it4 ,this result1 however1 so highly important with reference to knowledge of the understanding1 ,kant does not1 with reference to ,reason1 carry further than to say that ,reason has on its own account nothing but formal unity for the methodical systematization of the knowledge of the understanding4 ,abstract thinking is adhered to2 it is said that the understanding can only bring about order in things2 but order is nothing in and for itself1 it is only subjective4 ,there therefore remains nothing for ,reason except the form of its pure identity with itself1 and this extends no further than to the arranging of the manifold laws and relations of the understanding1 the classes1 kinds and species which the understanding discovers4#cej ,i1 as ,reason or conception1 and the things external to me1 are both absolutely different from one another2 and that1 according to ,kant1 is the ultimate standpoint4 ,the animal does not stop at this standpoint1 but practically brings about unity4 ,this is the critique of theoretical ,reason which ,kant gives1 and in which he states the a priori and determinate character of ,reason in itself1 without bringing it to the determinateness of individuality4#cea ,mention should still be made of the positive philosophy or metaphysics1 which ,kant sets a priori above objective existence1 the content of the object of experience1 nature2 we have here his natural philosophy1 which is a demonstration of the universal conceptions of ,nature4 ,but this is on the one hand very scanty and restricted in content1 containing as it does sundry general qualities and conceptions of matter and motion1 and with regard to the scientific side or the a priori1 as ,kant calls it1 it is likewise altogether unsatisfactory4 ,for ,kant assumes all such conceptions as that matter has motion and also a power of attraction and repulsion1#ceb instead of demonstrating their necessity4 ,the 8,principles of ,natural ,philosophy0 have nevertheless been of great service1 inasmuch as at the commencement of a philosophy of nature1 attention was called to the fact that physical science employs thought-determinations without further investigation2 and these determinations constitute the real foundations of its objects4 ,density1 for instance1 is looked on by physical science as a variable quantity1 as a mere quantum in space3 instead of this ,kant asserted it to be a certain degree of occupation of space1 i4e4 energy1 intensity of action4 ,he demands accordingly 7,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,naturwissenschaft1 pp4 #fe-fh7 a construction of matter from powers and activities1 not from atoms2 and ,schelling still holds to this without getting further4 ,kant's work is an attempt to think1 i4e4 to demonstrate the determinations of thought1 whose product consists of such conceptions as matter2 he has attempted to determine the fundamental ,notions and principles of this science1 and has given the first impulse to a so-called dynamic theory of ,nature4 8,religion within pure ,reason0 is also a demonstration of dogmas as aspects of ,reason1 just as in ,nature4 ,thus in the positive dogmas of religion1 which the ,aufklrung 7the clearing-up7--or the ,ausklrung 7the clearing-out7--made short work of1 ,kant called to remembrance ,ideas of ,reason1 asking what rational and1 first of all1 what moral meaning lies in that which men call dogmas of religion1 e4g4 original sin4#cec ,he is much more reasonable than the ,ausklrung1 which thinks it beneath its dignity to speak of such matters4 ,these are the principal points in respect to the theoretical part of ,kant's philosophy4 #b4 ,the second subject of review in ,kant's philosophy is the practical sphere1 the nature and principle of the will2 this subject is dealt with in the ,critique of ,practical ,reason1 in which ,kant accepted ,rousseau's conclusion that the will is absolutely free4 ,kant's idea of theoretic ,reason is that when ,reason relates itself to an object1 this object must be given to it2 but when the object is given by ,reason to itself1 it has no truth2 and ,reason in knowledge of this kind does not arrive at independence4 ,as practical1 on the contrary1 ,reason is independent in itself2 as a moral ,being man is free1 raised above all natural law and above all phenomena4 ,as the theoretic ,reason had in itself categories1 a priori distinctions1 so practical ,reason has in turn the moral law in general1 the further determinations of which are constituted by the notions of duty and right1 lawful and unlawful2 and here ,reason disdains all the given material which was necessary to it on the theoretic side4 ,the will determines itself within itself2 all that is right and moral rests on freedom2 in this man has his absolute self-consciousness4#ced ,on this side self-consciousness finds essential reality in itself1 as theoretical ,reason found it in an 8other02 and in the first place1 indeed1 the ego in its individuality is immediate reality1 universality1 objectivity2 in the second place subjectivity strives after reality1 but not after sensuous reality such as we had before1 for here ,reason holds itself to be the real4 ,here we have the ,notion which is sensible of its own deficiency2 this theoretic ,reason could not be1 as in it the ,notion had to remain the ,notion4 ,thus we have the standpoint of absoluteness revealed1 since there is an infinite disclosed within the human breast4 ,the satisfying part in ,kant's philosophy is that the truth is at least set within the heart2 and hence ,i acknowledge that1 and that alone1 which is in conformity with my determined nature4 a4 ,kant divides will into lower and higher faculties of desire2 this expression is not inapt4 ,the lower faculties of desire are impulses1 inclinations1 etc42 the higher faculty is the will as such1 which has not external1 individual aims1 but universal4 ,to the question what the principle of will that should determine man in his actions is1 all sorts of answers have been given2 for instance1 self-love1 benevolence1 happiness1 etc4 ,such material principles of action1 ,kant now says1 are all reducible to impulses1 to happiness2 but the rational in itself is purely formal1 and consists in the maxim that what is to hold good as law1 must be capable of being thought of as a law of universal application1 without destroying itself4 ,all morality of action now rests upon the conviction that the act is done with consciousness of the law1 for the sake of the law and out of respect for the law and for itself1 without any regard to what makes for happiness4 ,as a moral ,being man has the moral law in himself1 the principle of which is freedom and autonomy of the will2 for the will is absolute spontaneity4 ,determinations which are taken from the inclinations are heterogeneous principles as regards the will2 or the will is heteronomy if it takes such determinations as its end and aim2 for in that case it takes its determinations from something else than itself4 ,but the essence of the will is to determine itself from itself2 for practical ,reason gives itself laws4 ,but the empirical will is heteronomous1 for it is determined by desires2 and they belong to our nature1 not to the realm of freedom4#cee ,it is a highly important point in the ,kantian philosophy that what self-consciousness esteems reality1 law1 and implicit ,being1 is brought back within itself4 ,while a man is striving after this aim and that1 according as he judges the world or history in one way or the other1 what is he to take as his ultimate aim8 ,for the will1 however1 there is no other aim than that derived from itself1 the aim of its freedom4 ,it is a great advance when the principle is established that freedom is the last hinge on which man turns1 a highest possible pinnacle1 which allows nothing further to be imposed upon it2 thus man bows to no authority1 and acknowledges no obligations1 where his freedom is not respected4 ,great popularity has from one point of view been won for ,kantian philosophy by the teaching that man finds in himself an absolutely firm1 unwavering centre-point2 but with this last principle it has come to a standstill4 ,while the highest pinnacle of the theoretic ,reason is abstract identity1 because it can furnish only a canon1 a rule for abstract classifications1#cef practical ,reason1 as law-giving1 is immediately regarded as concrete2 the law which it gives to itself is the moral law4 ,but even if it is stated that it is concrete in itself1 there is the further consideration that this freedom is at first only the negative of everything else2 no bond1 nothing external1 lays me under an obligation4 ,it is to this extent indeterminate2 it is the identity of the will with itself1 its at-homeness with itself4 ,but what is the content of this law8 ,here we at once come back to the lack of content4 ,for the sole form of this principle is nothing more or less than agreement with itself1 universality2 the formal principle of legislation in this internal solitude comes to no determination1 or this is abstraction only4 ,the universal1 the non-contradiction of self1 is without content1 something which comes to be reality in the practical sphere just as little as in the theoretical4 ,the universal moral law ,kant therefore expresses thus 7and the setting up of such a universal form was at all times the demand of the abstract understanding73 8,act from maxims0 7the law is also to be my particular law71 8which are capable of becoming universal laws40#ceg ,thus for the determination of duty 7for the question which meets us is1 what is duty for the free will7 ,kant has contributed nothing but the form of identity1 which is the law of abstract ,understanding4 ,to defend one's fatherland1 to promote the happiness of another1 is a duty1 not because of the content1 but because it is duty2 as with the ,stoics1 what was thought was true for the very reason that1 and in so far as it was thought 7,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 #bed1 #bfj1 #bfc74 ,the content as such is indeed not what holds good universally in the moral law1 because it contradicts itself4 ,for benevolence1 for instance1 enjoins3 8,give your possessions to the poor10 but if all give away what they have1 beneficence is done away with 7,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #dag1 #dah74 ,even with abstract identity1 however1 we do not get a step further1 for every content which is put into this form is by being so put freed from self-contradiction4 ,but nothing would be lost if it were not put into this form at all4 ,with regard to property1 for instance1 the law of my actions is this3 ,property ought to be respected1 for the opposite of this cannot be universal law4 ,that is correct1 but it is quite a formal determination3 ,if property is1 then it is4 ,property is here presupposed1 but this determination may also in the same way be omitted1 and then there is no contradiction involved in theft3 ,if there is no such thing as property1 then it is not respected4 ,this is the defect in the principle of ,kant and ,fichte1 that it is really formal2 chill duty is the final undigested lump left within the stomach1 the revelation given to ,reason4 ,the first postulate in practical ,reason is thus free1 independent will which determines itself1 but this concrete is still abstract4 ,the second and third are forms which remind us that the will is concrete in a higher sense4 b4 ,the second point is the connection of the ,notion of the will with the particular will of the individual2 the concrete is here the fact that my particular will and the universal will are identical1 or that ,i am a moral human being4 ,the unity1 that man should be moral1 is postulated2 but beyond the 8should0 and this talk of morality1 no advance is made4 ,it is not said what is moral2 and no thought is given to a system of the self-realizing spirit4 ,for really1 as theoretic ,reason stands opposed to the objective of the senses1 so practical ,reason stands opposed to the practical sensuousness1 to impulses and inclinations4 ,perfected morality must remain a ,beyond2 for morality presupposes the difference of the particular and universal will4 ,it is a struggle1 the determination of the sensuous by the universal2 the struggle can only take place when the sensuous will is not yet in conformity with the universal4 ,the result is1 therefore1 that the aim of the moral will is to be attained in infinite progress only2 on this ,kant founds 7,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #bai-bbc7 the postulate of the immortality of the soul1 as the endless progress of the subject in his morality1 because morality itself is incomplete1 and must advance into infinitude4 ,the particular will is certainly something other than the universal will2 but it is not ultimate or really permanent4 c4 ,the third point is the highest concrete1 the ,notion of the freedom of all men1 or the natural world has to be in harmony with the ,notion of freedom4 ,that is the postulate of the existence of ,god1 whom ,reason1 however1 does not recognize4 ,will has the whole world1 the whole of the sensuous1 in opposition to it1 and yet ,reason insists on the unity of ,nature or the moral law1 as the ,idea of the ,good1 which is the ultimate end of the world4 ,since1 however1 it is formal1 and therefore has no content on its own account1 it stands opposed to the impulses and inclinations of a subjective and an external independent ,nature4 ,kant reconciles the contradiction of the two 7,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #aih-bjj7 in the thought of the highest ,good1 in which ,nature is conformed to rational will1 and happiness to virtue2--a harmony which does not enter into the question at all1 although practical reality consists therein4 ,for happiness is only one's own sensuous consciousness1 or the actuality of a particular individual1 not universal reality in itself4 ,the unification spoken of itself therefore remains only a ,beyond1 a thought1 which is not actually in existence1 but only ought to be4 ,kant 7,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #bje-bji7 thus agrees entirely with the talk which alleges that in this world it often fares ill with the good1 and well with the wicked1 and so on2 and he postulates further the existence of ,god as the ,being1 the causality1 through whom this harmony comes to pass1 on behalf both of the sanctity of the moral law1 and of the rational end to be attained in ,nature1 but only in infinite progress2 which postulate1 like that of the immortality of the soul1 allows the contradiction to remain as it is all the time1 and expresses only in the abstract that the reconciliation ought to come about4 ,the postulate itself is always there1 because the ,good is a ,beyond with respect to ,nature2 the law of necessity and the law of liberty are different from one another1 and placed in this dualism4 ,nature would remain ,nature no longer1 if it were to become conformed to the ,notion of the ,good2 and thus there remains an utter opposition between the two sides1 because they cannot unite4 ,it is likewise necessary to establish the unity of the two2 but this is never actual1 for their separation is exactly what is presupposed4 ,kant employs popular language thus3 evil ought to be overcome1 but yet must not have been overcome4 ,god is to him1 therefore1 only a faith1 an opinion1 which is only subjectively1 and not absolutely true4#ceh ,this result is also of a very popular character4 ,these postulates express nothing but the synthesis1 devoid of thought1 of the different moments which contradict each other on every hand2 they are therefore a 8nest0#cei of contradictions4 ,for instance1 the immortality of the soul is postulated on account of imperfect morality1 i4e4 because it is infected with sensuousness4 ,but the sensuous is implied in moral self-consciousness2 the end1 perfection1 is what really destroys morality as such4 ,similarly the other aim1 the harmony of the sensuous and the rational1 to an equal extent abrogates morality2 for that consists in this very opposition of ,reason to the sensuous4 ,the actuality of the ,god who produces harmony is of such a character that it does not enter into consciousness at all2 it is accepted by consciousness for the sake of harmony1 just as children make some kind of scarecrow1 and then agree with each other to pretend to be afraid of it4 ,the ground on which ,god is accepted--that by the conception of a holy law-giver the moral law may acquire additional reverence--contradicts the fact that morality really consists in reverence for the law simply for its own sake4#cfj ,in ,practical ,reason self-consciousness esteems itself to be implicit ,being1 as contrasted with theoretic ,reason1 which assigns implicitude to objective existence1 but the one1 we see1 attains just as little as the other to unity and actuality in itself4 ,it is hard for man to believe that ,reason actually exists3 but there is nothing real except ,reason2 it is the absolute power4 ,the vanity of man aspires to have an ideal before him1 in order to be able to find fault with everything alike4 ,we possess all wisdom1 it is within us1 but is not forthcoming4 ,that is the ultimate standpoint2 it is a high standpoint1 no doubt1 but in it the truth is never reached4 ,the absolute ,good remains 8what ought to be10 or without objectivity2 and there it has to remain4 #c4 ,there is still left for us to consider the third side in ,kant's philosophy1 the ,critique of the ,faculty of ,judgment1 in which the demand for the concrete comes in1 the demand that the ,idea of unity spoken of before should be established not as a ,beyond1 but as present2 and this side is of special importance4 ,kant says that the understanding no doubt regulates in the theoretic sphere and produces categories2 but these remain mere general determinations1 beyond which lies the particular 7the other element which belongs to every item of knowledge74 ,the two are distinguished from one another for the understanding2 for its distinctions remain in universality4 ,in the practical sphere ,reason is certainly the implicit1 but its free independence1 its law-giving freedom in higher form1 is opposed to ,nature in its freedom or to ,nature's own laws4 8,in the theoretic sphere ,reason can draw conclusions from given laws through syllogisms1 only by means of the understanding1 and these conclusions never get beyond ,nature2 it is only in the practical sphere that ,reason itself gives laws4 ,understanding and0 7practical7 8,reason have two different regulative systems on one and the same ground of experience1 without the one being detrimental to the other4 ,for if the ,notion of ,nature has but little influence on the giving of laws by the ,notion of ,freedom1 just as little does the latter interfere with the legislation of ,nature4 ,the possibility of the existence side by side of the two regulative systems and of the powers belonging to them was proved in the ,critique of pure ,reason40 7687 8,now if a unity is not constituted by these two different spheres1 which certainly do not put a limit on each other in their regulative action1 but do so incessantly in their operations in the sensuous world0 7i4e4 where they encounter each other71 8the reason is this1 that the ,notion of ,nature represents its objects in perception1 not as things in themselves1 but as mere phenomena1 while the ,notion of ,freedom1 on the other hand1 represents in its object a thing in itself1 no doubt1 but not in perception4 ,consequently neither of them can attain to a theoretic knowledge of its object 7and even of the thinking subject7 as a thing-in-itself1 which last would be the supersensuous1 an unlimited and inaccessible realm for our whole faculty of knowledge4 ,now truly there is fixed a gulf over which the eye cannot reach1 between the realm of the ,notion of ,nature1 as the sensuous1 and the realm of the ,notion of ,freedom1 as the supersensuous1 so that it is not possible to pass from the one to the other1 since it is just as if there were two different worlds1 the first of which could have no influence on the second4 ,nevertheless the latter is conceived as having an influence on the former1 or1 in other words1 freedom is conceived as having for its mission the realization in the sensuous world of the end indicated by the laws of freedom4 ,consequently ,nature must be so conceived that1 while in form it realizes its own laws1 there may yet be a possibility of ends being realized in it according to the laws of freedom4 ,therefore there must surely be some ground for the unity of the supersensuous which lies at the foundation of ,nature with that which the ,notion of ,freedom practically contains1 the ,notion of which ground of unity1 although it attains neither theoretically nor practically to a knowledge of the same1 and consequently has no peculiar province1 yet makes possible the transition from the mode of thought in accordance with the principles of the one1 to the mode of thought in accordance with the principles of the other4 ,between ,understanding and ,reason there now comes the ,faculty of ,judgment1 as between the powers of knowledge and desire there come pleasure and its opposite2 in this faculty must therefore lie the transition from the province of the ,notions of ,nature to the province of the ,notion of ,freedom40#cfa ,adaptation to ends has its place here1 i4e4 a particular reality1 which is determined only through the universal1 the end4 ,the understanding is the ground of this unity of the manifold2 the sensuous is therefore here determined by means of the supersensuous4 ,this idea of a universal which implicitly contains the particular is according to ,kant the precise object of the faculty of judgment1 which he divides as follows3--8,if the universal 7the rule1 principle1 law7 is given1 the faculty of judgment which subsumes the particular under that universal1 is determinative10--the immediate faculty of judgment4 ,but here there is also a particular which is not determined by species4 8,if1 however1 only the particular is given1 for which the faculty of judgment has to find the universal1 it is reflective40 ,the reflective judgment has as its principle the unity of particularity and the abstract universal of the understanding1 the idea of a legal necessity which is at the same time free1 or of a freedom which is directly one with its content4 8,this principle can be no other but the fact that since universal laws of ,nature have their foundation in our understanding1 which prescribes them to nature1 although only according to their general conception1 the particular1 empirical laws1 in so far as they are undetermined by universal laws1 must be viewed as containing that unity which they would contain if they had been given by some intelligence--other1 it may be1 than our own--with express reference to our cognitive faculties1 in order to render possible a system of experience according to particular natural laws4 ,it is not as if such an intelligence must be assumed 7for it is only the reflective faculty of judgment to which this idea serves as principle73 this faculty gives a law only to itself1 not to ,nature in addition4 ,now the conception of an object 7if it at the same time contains the ground of the reality of this object71 the end1 and the harmony of a thing with that quality of things which is only possible in conformity with ends1 are termed the adaptation to purpose of the form2 therefore the principle of the faculty of judgment in respect to the form of the things of ,nature under empirical laws in general is the adaptability to purpose of ,nature in its multiplicity4 ,that is to say1 ,nature is represented by this ,notion as if an intelligence contained the ground of the unity in multiplicity of ,nature's empirical laws40#cfb ,aristotle already regarded ,nature as in itself showing this adaptation to end1 and as having in itself 1 intelligence1 the ,universal1 so that in undivided unity one element is moment of another 7v4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #aef-afb74 ,purpose is the ,notion1 and immanent2 not external form and abstraction as distinguished from a fundamental material1 but penetrating1 so that all that is particular is determined by this universal itself4 ,according to ,kant this is ,understanding3 no doubt the laws of the ,understanding1 which it implicitly has in knowledge1 leave the objective still undetermined1 but because this manifold itself must have a connection in itself1 which is yet contingent for human intelligence1 8the faculty of judgment must assume as a principle for its own use that what is contingent for us contains a unity1 which for us indeed is not knowable1 but yet thinkable1 in the connection of the manifold with an implicitly possible experience40#cfc ,this principle hereby at once falls back again into the subjectivity of a thought1 and is only a maxim of our reflection1 by which nothing is to be expressed regarding the objective nature of the object1#cfd because ,being-in-itself is once for all fixed outside of self-consciousness1 and the ,understanding is conceived only in the form of the self-conscious1 not in its becoming another4 ,now this principle of the reflective faculty of judgment is in itself a two-fold adaptation to end1 the formal and the material2 the faculty of judgment is thus either sthetic or teleological3 of these the former has to do with subjective1 the latter with objective1 logical adaptation to end4 ,there are thus two objects of the faculty of judgment--the beautiful in works of art and the natural products of organic life--which make known to us the unity of the ,notion of ,nature and the ,notion of ,freedom4#cfe ,the consideration of these works involves the fact1 that we see a unity of the ,understanding and the particular4 ,but as this consideration is only a subjective manner of representing such products1 and does not contain the truth of the same1 such things are regarded only according to this unity1 and they are not in themselves of this nature2 what they are in themselves lies beyond4 a4 ,the ,beautiful of the sthetic faculty of judgment consists in the following3 8,pleasure and displeasure are something subjective1 which can in no way become a part of knowledge4 ,the object has adaptation to end only to the extent that its conception is directly bound up with the feeling of pleasure2 and this is an sthetic conception4 ,the taking up of forms into the imaginative faculty can never occur without the reflecting faculty of judgment at least comparing them1 even unintentionally1 by means of its power of relating perceptions to ,notions40 ,now if in this comparison the imaginative faculty 7as a faculty of perceptions a priori87 8is1 by means of a conception given0--something beautiful1--8unintentionally placed in agreement with the ,understanding1 as the faculty of ,notions1 and thereby a feeling of pleasure is awakened1 the object must then be looked on as in conformity with end for the reflecting faculty of judgment4 ,such a judgment regarding the adaptability to end of the object1 a judgment which is grounded on no previous ,notion of the object1 and furnishes no ,notion of it1 is an sthetic judgment4 ,an object whose form 7not the material of its conception as sensation7 is judged to be a cause of the pleasure which springs from the conception of such an object1 is beautiful10--the first reasonable thing said about beauty4 ,the sensuous is one moment of the ,beautiful1 but it must also express the spiritual1 a ,notion4 8,the ,beautiful is what is conceived without0 subjective 8interest10 but similarly also 8without ,notions0 7i4e4 determinations of reflection1 laws7 8as object of a universal pleasure4 ,it is related to no inclination1 therefore the subject feels itself quite free therein4 ,it is not beautiful for me4 ,the end is the object of a ,notion1 so far as the latter is looked on as the cause of the former0 7the object72 8and the causality of a ,notion in respect to its object is adaptation to end40 ,to the ideal belongs 8the ,idea of reason1 which makes the aims of humanity1 as far as they cannot be sensuously conceived1 the principle of judgment of a form through which these aims reveal themselves as their effect in the phenomenon4 ,the ideal we may expect to find revealed only in human form40 ,the sublime is the effort to give sensuous expression to an ,idea in which the inconceivability of the ,idea1 and the impossibility of finding an adequate expression of it by means of the sensuous1 are clearly evidenced4#cff ,here in the sthetic faculty of judgment we see the immediate unity of the universal and the particular2 for the ,beautiful is this very unity1 without ,notion and immediate4 ,because ,kant1 however1 places it in the subject1 it is limited1 and as sthetic it also ranks lower1 inasmuch as it is not the unity as ,notion4 b4 ,the other manner of bringing harmony to pass is the teleological way of regarding ,nature1 which is found in the objective and material adaptation to end4 ,here the immediate unity of the ,notion and reality is looked upon as objective in the organic products of ,nature--this being the purpose of ,nature1 containing in its universality the particular1 in its particularity the species4 ,but such a mode of consideration must be practised not externally1 but in conformity with internal teleology4 ,in external adaptation to end one thing has its end in another3 8,snow protects the sown crops in cold lands from frost1 and facilitates the intercourse of men by permitting of sleighing40#cfg ,internal adaptation to end signifies1 on the contrary1 that a thing is in itself end and means1 its end is not therefore beyond itself4 ,in the contemplation of the living creature we do not remain at the point of having something sensuous before us1 which according to the categories of the ,understanding is only brought into relation to something other than itself2 for we regard it as cause of itself1 as producing itself4 ,this is the self-preservation of the living creature2 as an individual it is no doubt perishable1 but in living it produces itself1 although for that purpose certain conditions are requisite4 ,the end or purpose of ,nature is therefore to be sought for in matter1 to the extent that matter is an inwardly organized product of nature1 8in which all is end1 and all in turn is means20#cfh because all the members of the organism are at the same time means and end1 it is an end in itself4 ,that is the ,aristotelian ,notion--the infinite that returns into itself1 the ,idea4 ,kant at this point calls to mind the following3 8,we should find no difference between natural mechanism and the technique of ,nature1 i4e4 the connection of ends in the same1 were our ,understanding not of such a kind that it must pass from the universal to the particular1 and the faculty of judgment can therefore pronounce no determining sentences1 without having a universal law under which it may subsume the particular4 ,now the particular as such contains a contingent element in regard to the universal1 but nevertheless ,reason also demands unity in the connection of particular laws of ,nature1 and consequently a regulative character1 which character when found in the contingent is termed adaptation to end3 and the derivation of particular laws from universal is1 in regard to the element of contingency which those particular laws contain1 a priori impossible through the determination of the ,notion of the object2 the ,notion of the adaptation to end of ,nature in its products becomes thus a ,notion necessary for the human faculty of judgment1 but not affecting the determination of the objects themselves1 and therefore a subjective principle40#cfi ,an organic ,being is therefore1 according to ,kant 7,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 p4 #ced7 one in which natural mechanism and end are identical4 ,we regard it as if there dwelt in the sensuous a ,notion which brings the particular into conformity with itself4 ,in the organic products of ,nature we perceive this immediate unity of the ,notion and reality2 for in a living creature there is perceived in one unity the soul1 or the universal1 and existence or particularity1 which is not the case with inorganic ,nature4 ,thus there enters into the ,kantian philosophy the conception of the concrete1 as that the universal ,notion determines the particular4 ,but ,kant took these ,ideas again in a subjective sense only1 as guiding thoughts for the faculty of judgment1 by which no ,being-in-itself can be expressed2 and thus1 although he expresses the unity of the ,notion and reality1 he yet lays fresh emphasis on the side of the ,notion4 ,he will not therefore throw off his limitations in the moment in which he assumes them as limitations4 ,this is the perpetual contradiction in ,kant's philosophy3 ,kant exhibited the extremes of opposition in their one-sidedness1 and expressed also the reconciliation of the contradiction2 ,reason postulates unity1 and this we have also in the faculty of judgment4 ,kant1 however1 says 7,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 pp4 #cee-cfc73 ,this is only a mode of our reflecting faculty of judgment1 life itself is not so2 we are merely accustomed so to regard it4 ,in art it is thus certainly the sensuous mode which gives us the conception of the ,idea2 reality and ideality are here directly in one4 ,but at this point also ,kant says that we must remain at what is one-sided1 at the very moment when he is passing out beyond it4 ,the wealth of thought therefore still unfolds itself with ,kant in subjective form alone2 all fulness1 all content1 concentrates in conceiving1 thinking1 postulating4 ,the objective1 according to ,kant1 is only what is in itself2 and we know not what ,things-in-themselves are4 ,but ,being-in-itself is only the caput mortuum1 the dead abstraction of the 8other10 the empty1 undetermined ,beyond4 ,the reason why that true ,idea should not be the truth is therefore that the empty abstractions of an understanding which keeps itself in the abstract universal1 and of a sensuous material of individuality standing in opposition to the same1 are presupposed as the truth4 ,kant no doubt expressly advances to the conception of an intuitive or perceiving understanding1 which1 while it gives universal laws1 at the same time determines the particular2 and the determination thus given is deep2 it is the true concrete1 reality determined by the indwelling ,notion1 or1 as ,spinoza says1 the adequate ,idea4 ,for 8to knowledge there also belongs intuitive perception1 and the possession of a perfect spontaneity of intuition would be a faculty of knowledge0 specifically 8distinct from the sensuous1 and quite independent thereof1 and therefore it would be understanding in the most universal sense4 ,consequently it is possible to think of an intuitive understanding which does not pass from the universal to the particular1 and thus proceed through conceptions to the individual--an understanding in which we do not meet with the contingency of the harmony of ,nature in her products1 according to particular laws1 with the understanding1 a contingency which makes it so hard for our understanding to bring0 together 8into the unity of knowledge the manifold of ,nature40 ,but that this 8intellectus archetypus0 is the true ,idea of the understanding1 is a thought which does not strike ,kant4 ,strange to say1 he certainly has this idea of the intuitive2 and he does not know why it should have no truth--except because our understanding is otherwise constituted1 namely such 8that it proceeds from the analytic universal to the particular40#cgj ,but absolute ,reason and ,understanding in itself1 as we have already seen 7pp4 #dcb1 #dfa71 are1 in ,kant's view1 of such a nature that they have no reality in themselves3 the ,understanding requires material to work upon1 theoretic ,reason spins cobwebs of the brain1 practical ,reason has to allow its reality to come to an end with its postulates4 ,in spite of their directly and definitely expressed non-absoluteness1 they are yet looked on as true knowledge2 and intuitive ,understanding1 which holds ,notion and sensuous perception in one unity1 is looked on as a mere thought which we make for ourselves4 c4 ,the highest form in which the conception of the concrete comes into ,kant's philosophy is this1 that the end is grasped in its entire universality2 and thus it is the ,good4 ,this ,good is an ,idea2 it is my thought2 but there exists the absolute demand that it should be realized also in the world1 that the necessity of ,nature should correspond with the laws of freedom1 not as the necessity of an external ,nature1 but through what is right and moral in human life1 through life in the ,state1--or in other words that the world in general should be good4 ,this identity of the ,good and reality is the demand of practical ,reason2 but subjective ,reason cannot realize this4 ,in every good action a man no doubt accomplishes something good1 but this is only limited2 universal ,good1 as the final object of the world1 can be attained to only through a third4 ,and this power over the world1 which has as its final object the ,good in the world1 is ,god4#cga ,thus the ,critique of the ,faculty of ,judgment also ends with the postulate of ,god4 ,now1 although the particular laws of ,nature1 as independent individual relations1 have no relation to the ,good1 ,reason consists in having and desiring unity as the essential or substantial in itself4 ,the opposition of these two1 the ,good and the world1 is contrary to that identity2 ,reason must therefore demand that this contradiction should be abrogated1 that there should be a power which is good on its own account1 and is a ,power over ,nature4 ,this is the position which ,god assumes in ,kant's philosophy3 no proof is possible1 he says1 of ,god's existence1 but the demand is there4 ,the deficiency here is the impossibility of proving ,god's existence1 and it consists in this1 that if we admit ,kant's dualism1 it cannot be shown how the ,good as abstract ,idea in itself is the abrogating of its ,idea as abstract2 and how the world in itself is the abrogating of itself in its externality1 and in its diversity from the ,good--this being done in order that both may reveal themselves to be their truth1 which in respect to them appears as the ,third1 but is at the same time determined as the ,first4 ,thus1 therefore1 according to ,kant 7,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 pp4 #dfj1 #dfa71 ,god can only be believed in4 ,we associate the faith of ,jacobi with this2 for in this point ,kant agrees with ,jacobi4#cgb ,if now1 in accordance with this standpoint of ,kant and ,jacobi1 ,god is believed in1 and we admit this standpoint for an instant1 there is certainly a return to the ,absolute4 ,but the question remains3 ,what is ,god8 ,to define ,him as supersensuous is not much1 nor is it more to say ,he is universal1 abstract1 absolute4 ,what then is ,his determination8 ,were we here1 however1 to pass over to determinations of the ,absolute1 the evil result would follow1 as far as this standpoint is concerned1 that we should pass over to knowledge2 for this signifies knowledge of an object which is in itself concrete1 i4e4 determined4 ,but here the furthest point reached is the general statement that ,god exists with the determination of being infinite1 universal1 indeterminate4 ,god cannot be known in this way2 for in order to be known ,he must as concrete possess at least two determinations4 ,in this way mediation would be established1 for a knowledge of the concrete is at once a mediate knowledge4 ,but this standpoint lacks mediation1 and thus remains at the immediate4 ,paul1 in speaking to the ,athenians1 appeals to the altar which they had dedicated to the ,unknown ,god1 and declares to them what ,god is2 but the standpoint indicated here takes us back to the ,unknown ,god4 ,all the life of ,nature1 as of ,spirit1 is mediation in itself2 and to this mediation the philosophy of ,schelling now passed on4 ,if we sum up the ,kantian philosophy1 we find on all hands the ,idea of ,thought1 which is in itself the absolute ,notion1 and has in itself difference1 reality4 ,in the theoretic and practical ,reason it has only abstract difference1 but in the ,faculty of ,judgment1 as the unity of the two1 ,kant goes so far as to establish the difference as actual1 establishing not only particularity1 but also individuality4 ,but1 to be sure1 this ,philistine conception proceeds from our human faculty of knowledge1 which is valid for him in its empirical form1 notwithstanding his statement that it does not know the truth1 and his further description of the true idea of the same as being merely a thought which we possess4 ,therefore actuality counts as something sensuous1 empirical1 for the comprehension of which ,kant takes the categories of the ,understanding1 giving them the same validity as they have in every-day life4 ,this is a complete philosophy of the ,understanding1 which renounces ,reason3 the reason why it became so popular was the negative one1 that men were once for all free from the old metaphysic4 ,according to ,kant something sensuous is produced1 having thought-determinations1 which1 however1 is not the thing1 for if a man1 for instance1 feels something hard1 ,kant says3 8,i feel hardness1 but ,i do not feel ,something40 ,kant's philosophy thus ends with a dualism1 with the relation which is a plainly essential 8ought10 with the unreconciled contradiction4 ,it is otherwise with ,jacobi's faith2 he finds the conception of ,god as immediate existence1 and all mediation is untrue for him4 ,with ,kant1 therefore1 the result is3 8,we know only phenomena20 with ,jacobi1 on the other hand1 it is3 8,we know only the finite and conditioned40 ,over these two results there has been unmingled joy among men1 because the sloth of ,reason 7,heaven be praised67 considered itself liberated from every call to reflect1 and now1 being saved the trouble of penetrating to its own inward meaning and exploring the depths of ,nature and ,spirit1 it could very well leave itself alone4 ,the further result attending this is the autocracy of the subjective ,reason1 which1 seeing that it is abstract and without knowledge1 has only subjective certainty and not objective truth4 ,the second cause of rejoicing was the concession to freedom of a perfect right1 which ,i can neither understand nor justify1 and need not do so2 my subjective liberty of conviction and certainty holds good all round4 ,the third cause of joy was added by ,jacobi1 who said that it amounted even to a crime to seek to know the truth1 because the infinite was thereby only rendered finite4 ,truth is in a bad way1 when all metaphysic is done away with1 and the only philosophy acknowledged is not a philosophy at all6 ,but besides the general idea of synthetic judgments a priori1 a universal which has difference in itself1 ,kant's instinct carried this out in accordance with the scheme of triplicity1 unspiritual though that was1 in the whole system into which for him the entire universe was divided4 ,this he not only practised in the three critiques1 but he also followed it out in most of the sub-divisions under the categories1 the ideas of ,reason1 c4 ,kant has therefore set forth as a universal scheme the rhythm of knowledge1 of scientific movement2 and has exhibited on all sides thesis1 antithesis and synthesis1 modes of the mind by means of which it is mind1 as thus consciously distinguishing itself4 ,the first is existence1 but in the form of ,other-,being for consciousness2 for what is only existence is object4 ,the second is ,being-for-self1 genuine actuality2 here the reverse relation enters in1 for self-consciousness1 as the negative of ,being-in-itself1 is itself reality4 ,the third is the unity of the two2 the absolute1 self-conscious actuality is the sum of true actuality1 into which are re-absorbed both the objective and the independently existent subjective4 ,kant has thus made an historical statement of the moments of the whole1 and has correctly determined and distinguished them3 it is a good introduction to ,philosophy4 ,the defect of ,kant's philosophy consists in the falling asunder of the moments of the absolute form2 or1 regarded from the other side1 our understanding1 our knowledge1 forms an antithesis to ,being-in-itself3 there is lacking the negative1 the abrogation of the 8ought10 which is not laid hold of4 ,but thought and thinking had become once for all an absolute requisite that could no longer be set aside4 ,it was consequently in the first place demanded by consistency that particular thoughts should appear as if produced of necessity from the original unity of the ego1 and in that way justified4 ,but1 in the second place1 thought had spread itself over the world1 had attached itself to everything1 investigated everything1 introduced its forms into everything1 and systematized everything1 so that on every hand thought-determinations had to be followed1 instead of any mere feeling or routine or practical common-sense1 or what is evidenced in the extraordinary lack of understanding on the part of so-called practical men4 ,and therefore in theology1 in governments and their legislation1 in the object aimed at by the state1 in trades and in mechanics1 it is said that men ought to act according to universal determinations1 i4e4 rationally3 and men even talk of a rational brewery1 a rational brick-kiln1 etc4 ,this is the requisite of concrete thought2 while in the ,kantian result1 which is that of phenomenon1 an empty thought was alone present4 ,it is verily also the essence of revealed religion to know what ,god is4 ,there was1 therefore1 to be found a yearning desire for content1 for truth1 since man could not possibly return to the condition of a brute1 nor yet sink to the form of sensation1 so that this yearning was for him the only thing that held good with regard to the higher life4 ,the first requirement--consistency--,fichte sought to satisfy2 the other--content--,schelling strove to fulfil4 ,c4 ,,fichte4 ,fichte created a great sensation in his time2 his philosophy is the ,kantian philosophy in its completion1 and1 as we must specially notice1 it is set forth in a more logical way4 ,he does not pass beyond the fundamentals of ,kant's philosophy1 and at first regarded his own philosophy as no more than a systematic working out of the other4#cgc ,in addition to these systems of philosophies1 and that of ,schelling1 there are none4 ,any that pretend to be such merely pick out something from these1 and over this they fight and wrangle among themselves4 ,ils se sont battus les flancs1 pour tre de grands hommes4 ,for in those times there were in ,germany many systems of philosophy1 such as those of ,reinhold1 ,krug1 ,bouterweck1 ,fries1 ,schulze1 c42 but in them there is only an extremely limited point of view1 combined with boastfulness--a strange medley of stray thoughts and conceptions or facts which ,i find within me4 ,but their thoughts are all derived from ,fichte1 ,kant1 or ,schelling--that is in so far as there are thoughts there present at all4 ,or else some slight modification is added1 and this for the most part merely consists in making the great principles barren1 what points in them were living are destroyed1 or else subordinate forms are changed1 whereby another principle is said to be set forth1 though when we look closer we find that these principles are but the principles of one of those philosophies that have gone before4 ,this may serve as a justification for my not speaking further of all these philosophies2 any exposition of them would be no more than a demonstration that everything in them is taken from ,kant1 ,fichte1 or ,schelling1 and that the modification in form is only the semblance of a change1 while really it indicates a deterioration in the principles of those philosophies4 ,johann ,gottlieb ,fichte was born on the #aith of ,may1 #agfb1 at ,rammenau1 near ,bischoffswerda1 in ,upper ,lusatia4 ,he studied at ,jena1 and for some time was a private tutor in ,switzerland4 ,he wrote a treatise on ,religion1 termed a 8,critique of all ,revelation10 where the ,kantian phraseology is employed throughout--so much so that it was thought to be the work of ,kant4 ,after this he was in #agic summoned to ,jena by ,goethe as ,professor of ,philosophy1 which appointment he1 however1 resigned in the year #agii1 on account of an unpleasantness which had arisen through his essay 8,on the ground of our ,belief in a ,divine ,government of the ,world40 ,for ,fichte published a journal in ,jena1 and a paper in it which was by someone else was regarded as atheistical4 ,fichte might have kept silence1 but he published the above-mentioned essay as an introduction to the article4 ,the authorities wished an investigation to be made into the matter4 ,then ,fichte wrote a letter which contained threats1 and respecting it ,goethe said that a ,government ought not to allow itself to be threatened4 ,fichte now taught privately for some time in ,berlin2 in #ahje he became professor at ,erlangen1 and in #ahji at ,berlin1 at which place he died on the #bgth ,january1 #ahad4cgd ,we cannot here deal more particularly with the details of his life4 ,in what is termed the philosophy of ,fichte a distinction must be made between his properly-speaking speculative philosophy1 in which the argument is most consistently worked out1 and which is less well known1 and his popular philosophy1 to which belong the lectures delivered in ,berlin before a mixed audience1 and1 for example1 the work termed a 8,guidance to a ,blessed ,life40 ,these last have much in them that is affecting and edifying--many who call themselves the disciples of ,fichte know this side alone--and they are expressed in language most impressive to a cultured1 religious temperament4 ,in the history of ,philosophy1 however1 such cannot be taken into consideration1 although through their matter they may have the highest possible value2 the content has to be speculatively developed1 and that is done in ,fichte's earlier philosophic works alone4#cge #a4 ,,the ,,first ,,principles ,,of ,,fichte',s ,,philosophy4 ,as we mentioned above 7p4 #dgh71 the shortcoming in the ,kantian philosophy was its unthinking inconsistency1 through which speculative unity was lacking to the whole system2 and this shortcoming was removed by ,fichte4 ,it is the absolute form which ,fichte laid hold of1 or in other words1 the absolute form is just the absolute ,being-for-self1 absolute negativity1 not individuality1 but the ,notion of individuality1 and thereby the ,notion of actuality2 ,fichte's philosophy is thus the development of form in itself4 ,he maintained the ego to be the absolute principle1 so that from it1 the direct and immediate certainty of self1 all the matter in the universe must be represented as produced2 hence1 according to ,fichte1 reason is in itself a synthesis of ,notion and actuality4 ,but this principle he once more in an equally one-sided manner set aside2 it is from the very beginning subjective1 conditioned by an opposite1 and its realization is a continual rushing onward in finitude1 a looking back at what has gone before4 ,the form in which it is presented has also the disadvantage1 and indeed1 the real drawback of bringing the empiric ego ever before one's eyes1 which is absurd1 and quite distracting to one's point of view4 ,the claims of ,philosophy have advanced so far that in the first place self-consciousness refuses any longer to regard absolute essence as immediate substance which does not in itself possess difference1 reality1 and actuality4 ,against this substance self-consciousness ever struggled1 for it does not find its explicit ,being there1 and consequently feels the lack of freedom4 ,but besides this it demanded that this essence1 objectively presented1 should be personal1 living1 self-conscious1 actual1 and not shut up in abstract metaphysical thoughts alone4 ,on the other hand consciousness1 for which the other is1 demanded the moment of external actuality1 ,being as such1 into which thought must pass1 truth in objective existence2 and this is what we more especially noticed in connection with the ,english4 ,this ,notion1 which is immediately actuality1 and this actuality which is immediately its ,notion1 and that indeed in such a way that there neither is a third thought above this unity1 nor is it an immediate unity which does not possess difference1 separation1 within it1 is the ego2 it is the self-distinction of opposites within itself4 ,that whereby it distinguishes itself from the simplicity of thought1 and distinguishes this other1 is likewise immediately for it2 it is identical with1 or not distinguished from it4#cgf ,hence it is pure thought1 or the ego is the true synthetic judgment a priori1 as ,kant called it4 ,this principle is apprehended actuality1 for the taking back of the other-,being into self-consciousness is just apprehension4 ,the ,notion of the ,notion is from this point of view found in the fact that in what is apprehended self-consciousness has the certainty of itself2 what is not apprehended is something foreign to it4 ,this absolute ,notion or this absolutely existent infinitude it is which has to be developed in knowledge1 and its distinction as the whole distinction of the universe has to be represented from itself1 and this has in its distinction to remain reflected within itself in equal absoluteness4 ,nothing other than the ego anywhere exists1 and the ego is there because it is there2 what is there is only in the ego and for the ego4#cgg ,now ,fichte merely set forth this ,notion2 he did not bring it to a scientific realization from itself4 ,for to him this ,notion maintains and asserts itself as this ,notion2 it has absoluteness for him in so far as it is merely the unrealized ,notion1 and thus indeed comes once more into opposition with reality4 ,the ,fichtian philosophy has the great advantage of having set forth the fact that ,philosophy must be a science derived from one supreme principle1 from which all determinations are necessarily derived4 ,the important point is this unity of principle and the attempt to develop from it in a scientifically consistent way the whole content of consciousness1 or1 as has been said1 to construct the whole world4#cgh ,beyond this no progress was made4#cgi ,but the great necessity in ,philosophy is to possess one living ,idea2 the world is a flower which is eternally produced from one grain of seed4 ,thus ,fichte does not1 like ,kant1 throw his work into narrative form because he begins with the ego2 but he has proceeded further1 inasmuch as he sought to bring about a construction of determinations of knowledge from the ego4 ,the whole extent of knowledge in all the world must be developed1 and further this knowledge must be the consequence of the development of determinations2 but because ,fichte says that what is not for us does not concern us1 he has not grasped this principle of the ego as ,idea1 but solely in the consciousness of the activity which we exercise in knowing1 and consequently it is still laid hold of in the form of subjectivity4 ,thus as ,kant treats of cognition ,erkennen1 so ,fichte sets forth real knowledge ,wissen4 ,fichte states that the task of ,philosophy is to find a theory of knowledge2 universal knowledge is both the object and the starting-point of ,philosophy4 ,consciousness knows1 that is its nature2 the end of philosophic learning is the knowledge of this knowledge4 ,hence ,fichte called his philosophy the ,theory of ,knowledge 7,begriff der ,wissenschaftslehre1 p4 #ah71 the science of knowledge4 ,that is to say ordinary consciousness as the active ego finds this and that1 occupies itself1 not with itself1 but with other objects and interests1 but the necessity that ,i bring forth determinations1 and which determinations--cause and effect1 for example1--lies beyond my consciousness3 ,i bring them forth instinctively and cannot get behind my consciousness4 ,but when ,i philosophize1 ,i make my ordinary consciousness itself my object1 because ,i make a pure category my consciousness3 ,i know what my ego is doing1 and thus ,i get behind my ordinary consciousness4 ,fichte thus defines ,philosophy as the artificial consciousness1 as the consciousness of consciousness4#chj a4 ,where ,fichte in his system has attained the highest degree of determinateness1 he begins1 as we saw ,kant did before 7pp4 #dcg1 #dch71 from the transcendental unity of self-consciousness2 in it ,i--as this--am one1 this unity is to ,fichte the same and the original4 ,ego is there a fact1 says ,fichte1 but not yet a proposition4 ,as proposition1 as principle1 the ego must not remain barren1 nor be accepted as one1 for to a proposition pertains a synthesis4 ,now ,fichte proceeds in his system from the fact that ,philosophy must begin with an absolutely unconditioned1 certain principle1 with something indubitably certain in ordinary knowledge4 8,it cannot be proved or defined1 because it must be absolutely the first principle40#cha ,according to ,wendt's account 7,tennemann's ,grundriss1 #cic1 pp4 #did1 #die7 ,fichte gives an exposition of the necessity of such a principle as follows3 8,scientific knowledge is a system of cognition obtained through a supreme principle which expresses the content and form of knowledge4 ,the theory of knowledge is the science of knowledge which sets forth the possibility and validity of all knowledge1 and proves the possibility of principles in reference to form and content1 the principles themselves1 and thereby the connection existing in all human knowledge4 ,it must have a principle which can neither be proved from it nor from another science2 for it is supreme4 ,if there is a theory of knowledge there also is a system2 if there is a system there is also a theory of knowledge and an absolute first principle--and so on through an inevitable circle40#chb ,the simple principle of this knowledge is certainty of myself1 which is the relation of me to myself2 what is in me1 that ,i know4 ,the supreme principle1 as immediate and not derived1 must be certain on its own account2 that is1 a determination of the ego only1 for it is only from the ego that ,i cannot abstract4#chc ,fichte thus begins1 like ,descartes1 with #8,i think1 therefore ,i am1' and he expressly brings this proposition to mind4 ,the ,being of the ego is not a dead1 but a concrete ,being2 but the highest ,being is thought4 ,ego1 as an explicitly self-existent activity of thought1 is thus knowledge1 even if it is only abstract knowledge1 as in the beginning at least it cannot help being4 ,at the same time ,fichte begins from this absolute certainty with quite other necessities and demands2 for from this ego not only ,being but also the larger system of thought has to be derived 7supra1 p4 #bcj74 ,according to ,fichte1 the ego is the source of the categories and ideas1 but all conceptions and thoughts are a manifold reduced to a synthesis through ,thought4 ,thus while with ,descartes in connection with the ego other thoughts appear which we simply find already in us1 such as ,god1 nature1 c41 ,fichte sought for a philosophy entirely of a piece1 in which nothing empiric was to be admitted from without4 ,with this reflection a false point of view was at once introduced1 namely that contained in the old conception of knowledge1 of commencing with principles in this form and proceeding from them2 so that the reality which is derived from such a principle is brought into opposition with it1 and hence in truth is something different1 i4e4 it is not derived3 or that principle for this same reason expresses only the absolute certainty of itself and not the truth4 ,the ego is certain1 it cannot be doubted2 but ,philosophy desires to reach the truth4 ,the certainty is subjective1 and because it is made to remain the basis1 all else remains subjective also without there being any possibility of this form being removed4 ,fichte now analyzes the ego1 reducing it to three principles from which the whole of knowledge has to be evolved4 4 ,the first proposition must be simple1 in it predicate and subject must be alike2 for were they unlike1 their connection--since in accordance with their diversity the determinations are not directly one--would have to be first of all proved by means of a third4 ,the first principle must thus be identical4 ,fichte now proceeds further to distinguish in this first principle the form and content2 but in order that this same may be immediately true through itself1 form and content must be again the same1 and the principle conditioned by neither4 ,it signifies ,a ,a1 the abstract undetermined identity2 that is the proposition of contradiction1 wherein ,a is an indifferent content4 ,fichte says1 8,thought is by no means essence1 but only a particular determination of ,being2 there are outside of it many other determinations of our ,being4 ,i merely remark this1 that when #8,i am' is overstepped1 ,spinozism is necessarily reached4 ,its unity is something which ought to be produced through us1 but which cannot be so2 it is not anything that is40 ,the first proposition is then that ,i am identical with myself1 ,ego ,ego2#chd that undoubtedly is the definition of the ego4 ,the subject and the predicate are the content2 and this content of the two sides is likewise their relation1 i4e4 form4 ,relation requires two sides2 the relating and the related are here1 however1 the same2 for on account of the simplicity of the ego1 there is nothing but a relation of the ego to the ego4 ,i have knowledge of myself2 but in so far as ,i am consciousness1 ,i know of an object which is different from me1 and which is then likewise mine4 ,but the ego is in such a way identical with its difference that what is different is immediately the same1 and what is identical is likewise different2 we have a difference without a difference4 ,self-consciousness is not dead identity1 or non-,being1 but the object which is identical with me4 ,this is immediately certain2 all else must be as certain to me1 inasmuch as it must be my relation to myself4 ,the content must be transformed into the ego1 so that in it ,i have my determination alone4 ,this principle is at first abstract and deficient1 because in it no difference1 or a formal difference only is expressed2 whereas the principle should possess a content3 a subject and a predicate are indeed distinguished in it1 but only for us who reflect upon it1 i4e4 in itself there is no difference1 and consequently no true content4 ,in the second place1 this principle is indeed the immediate certainty of self-consciousness1 but self-consciousness is likewise consciousness1 and in it there is likewise the certainty that other things exist to which it stands in an attitude of opposition4 ,in the third place1 that principle has not the truth in it1 for the very reason that the certainty of itself possessed by the ego has no objectivity2 it has not the form of the differentiated content within it--or it stands in opposition to the consciousness of an 8other04 4 ,now in order that determination should come to pass1 i4e4 a content and difference1 it is essential for ,fichte that a second principle should be established1 which in regard to form is unconditioned1 but the content of which is conditioned1 because it does not belong to the ego4 ,this second principle1 set forth under the first1 is1 8,i assert a non-ego in opposition to the ego10 and in this something other than absolute self-consciousness is set forth4#che ,to this pertains the form therein present1 relation2 but the content is the non-ego1 another content from the ego4 ,we might say that through this content the proposition is independent1 since the negative therein is an absolute1 as truly as the reverse--that it is independent through the form of opposition which cannot be derived from the original4 ,here1 then1 we have no more to do with derivation1 although this derivation of opposition from the first proposition was all the same demanded4 ,inasmuch as ,i posit another in opposition to the ego1 ,i posit myself as not posited2 this non-ego is the object generally1 i4e4 that which is opposed to me4 ,this other is the negative of the ego2 thus when ,fichte called it the non-ego he was expressing himself in a very happy1 suitable1 and consistent manner4 ,there has been a good deal of ridicule cast on the ego and non-ego2 the expression is new1 and therefore to us ,germans it seems strange at first4 ,but the ,french say ,moi and ,non-moi1 without finding anything laughable in it4 ,in this principle the positing belongs1 however1 to the ego2 but because the non-ego is independent of the ego1 we have two sides1 and self-consciousness relates itself to another4 ,this second proposition thus signifies that ,i posit myself as limited1 as non-ego2 but non-ego is something quite new to be added4 ,on the one side we thus have before us a field which is merely appropriated from the ego2 and in this way we have before us the non-ego as our object4 4 ,to these is added yet a third proposition1 in which ,i now make this division into ego and non-ego3 it is the synthetic principle1 the proposition of ground1 which in content is unconditioned1 just as in the second was the case in regard to form4 ,this third proposition is the determination of the first two through one another1 in such a way that the ego limits the non-ego4 8,in and through the ego both the ego and the non-ego are posited as capable of being mutually limited by means of one another1 i4e4 in such a way that the reality of the one abrogates the reality of the other40 ,in limitation both are negated1 but 8only in part02 only thus are synthesis and deduction possible4 ,i posit the non-ego1 which is for me1 in myself1 in my identity with myself2 thus ,i take it from its non-identity1 its not-being-,i1 that is to say ,i limit it4 ,this limitation of the non-ego ,fichte expresses thus3 8,i place in opposition to the ego10 and indeed 8to the divisible ego1 a divisible non-ego40 ,the non-ego ,i destroy as a complete sphere1 which it was according to the second principle1 and posit it as divisible2 ,i likewise posit the ego as divisible in so far as the non-ego is present in it4 ,the whole sphere which ,i have before me is supposed indeed to be the ego1 but in it ,i have not one but two4 ,the proposition of ground is thus the relation of reality and negation1 i4e4 it is limitation2 it contains the ego limited by the non-ego1 and the non-ego limited by the ego4#chf ,of this synthesis there is nothing1 properly speaking1 contained in the two earlier propositions4 ,even this first presentation of the three principles does away with the immanence of real knowledge4 ,thus the presentation is here also subject to an opposite from the first1 as it is with ,kant1 even if these are two acts of the ego merely1 and we remain entirely in the ego4 ,now that limitation may take place for me in two different ways3 at one time the one is passive1 at another time the other is so4 ,in this limitation the ego may posit the non-ego as limiting and itself as limited1 in such a way that the ego posits itself as requiring to have an object2 ,i know myself indeed as ego1 but determined by the non-ego2 non-ego is here active and ego passive4 ,or1 on the other hand1 the ego1 as abrogating other-being1 is that which limits1 and non-ego is the limited4 ,i know myself then as clearly determining the non-ego1 as the absolute cause of the non-ego as such1 for ,i can think4 ,the first is the proposition of the theoretic reason1 of intelligence3 the second the proposition of practical reason1 of will4#chg ,the will is this1 that ,i am conscious of myself as limiting the object2 thus ,i make myself exercise activity upon the object and maintain myself4 ,the theoretic proposition is that the object is before me and it determines me4 ,the ego is1 since ,i perceive1 a content1 and ,i have this content in me1 which is thus outside of me4 ,this is on the whole the same thing as we meet with in the experience of ,kant3 it comes to the same thing whether it is by matter or the non-ego that the ego is here determined4 b4 ,in the theoretic consciousness the ego1 although the assertive generally1 finds itself limited by the non-ego4 ,but it is identical with itself2 hence its infinite activity ever sets itself to abrogate the non-ego and to bring forth itself4 ,now the different methods whereby the ego sets forth itself are the different methods of its activity2 these we have to understand in their necessity4 ,but since philosophic knowledge is the consideration of consciousness itself 7supra1 p4 #dhc71 ,i can only know knowledge1 the act of the ego4 ,fichte thus appeals to consciousness1 postulates ego and non-ego in their abstraction1 and since philosophic knowledge is the consciousness of consciousness1 it is not sufficient that ,i should find its determinations in consciousness1 for ,i produce them with consciousness4 ,common consciousness1 indeed1 likewise brings forth all the determinations of the ordinary conception and of thought1 but without--on the theoretic side at least--having any knowledge of it2 for it is the fact of being limited alone that is present to it4 ,thus1 when ,i see a large square object1 such as a wall1 my ordinary consciousness accepts these determinations as they are given to it2 the object is4 ,in so doing ,i do not think of seeing1 but of the object2 seeing1 however1 is my activity1 the determinations of my faculty of sensation are thus posited through me4#chh ,the ego as theoretic is1 indeed1 aware in philosophic consciousness that it is the ego which posits2 but here it posits that the non-ego posits somewhat in me4 ,the ego thus posits itself as that which is limited by the non-ego4 ,i make this limitation mine2 thus is it for me in me1 this passivity of the ego is itself the activity of the ego4 ,as a matter of fact1 all reality which appears in the object for the ego is a determination of the ego1#chi just as the categories and other determinations were in ,kant's case4 ,thus it is here more especially that we should expect ,fichte to demonstrate the return of other-,being into absolute consciousness4 ,however1 because after all the other-,being was regarded as unconditioned1 as implicit1 this return does not come to pass4 ,the ego determines the #8other1' indeed1 but this unity is an altogether finite unity2 non-ego has thus immediately escaped from determination once more and gone forth from this unity4 ,what we find is merely an alternation between self-consciousness and the consciousness of another1 and the constant progression of this alternation1 which never reaches any end4#cij ,the development of theoretic reason is the following-out of the manifold relationships between the ego and non-ego2 the forms of this limitation which ,fichte now goes through are the determinations of the object4 ,these particular thought-determinations he calls categories1 and he seeks to demonstrate them in their necessity2 from the time of ,aristotle onwards no one had thought of so doing4 ,the first of these forms is the determination of reciprocity1 which we already met with in the third proposition3 8,by the determination of the reality or negation of the ego1 the negation or reality of the non-ego is equally determined20 the two in one is reciprocal action4 ,in the second place1 8,causality is the same degree of activity in the one as of passivity in the other40 ,in so far as something is considered as the reality of the non-ego1 the ego is considered as passive1 and1 on the other hand1 in so far as #8,i' am real1 the object is passive2 this relation1 that the passivity of the object is my activity or reality1 and the opposite1 is the conception of ,causality4 8,as many parts of negation as the ego posits in itself1 so many parts of reality it posits in the non-ego2 it therefore posits itself as self-determining in so far as it is determined1 and as suffering determination in so far as it determines itself4 ,in so far10 in the third place1 8as the ego is regarded as embracing the whole absolutely determined realm of all reality1 it is substance2 on the other hand when it is posited in a not absolutely determined sphere of this realm1 in so far there is an accidence in the ego40#cia ,that is the first rational attempt that has ever been made to deduce the categories2 this progress from one determination to another is1 however1 only an analysis from the standpoint of consciousness1 and is not in and for itself4 ,the ego is so far the ideal ground of all conceptions of the object2 all determination of this object is a determination of the ego4 ,but in order that it may be object1 it must be placed in opposition to the ego1 i4e4 the determinations set forth through the ego are another1 the non-ego2 this placing of the object in opposition is the real ground of conceptions4 ,the ego is1 however1 likewise the real ground of the object2 for it is likewise a determination of the ego that the non-ego as object is set in opposition to the ego4 ,both1 the real ground and the ideal ground of the conception1 are thus one and the same4#cib ,regarding the ego as ideal principle and the non-ego as real principle1 ,krug has likewise talked a great deal of nonsense4 ,regarded from the one point of view1 the ego is active and the non-ego purely passive2 while from the other side the ego is passive and the object active and operative4 ,but since the ego in the non-philosophic consciousness does not have the consciousness of its activity in the conception of the object1 it represents to itself its own activity as foreign1 i4e4 as belonging to the non-ego4 ,we here see the opposition adopting various forms3 ego1 non-ego2 positing1 setting in opposition2 two sorts of activity of the ego1 c4 ,the fact that ,i represent is undoubtedly my activity1 but the matter of main importance is the content of the positing and its necessary connection through itself4 ,if one occupies oneself only with this content1 that form of subjectivity which is dominant with ,fichte1 and which remains in his opposition1 disappears4 ,as the ego is affirmative and determining1 there now is in this determination a negative likewise present2 ,i find myself determined and at the same time the ego is like itself1 infinite1 i4e4 identical with itself4 ,this is a contradiction which ,fichte indeed endeavours to reconcile1 but in spite of it all he leaves the false basis of dualism undisturbed4 ,the ultimate1 beyond which ,fichte does not get1 is only an #8ought1' which does not solve the contradiction2 for while the ego should be absolutely at home with itself1 i4e4 free1 it should at the same time be associated with another4 ,to ,fichte the demand for the solution of this contradiction thus adopts the attitude of being a demanded solution only1 of signifying that ,i ever have to destroy the barriers1 that ,i ever have to reach beyond the limitation into utter infinitude1 and that ,i ever find a new limit2 a continual alternation takes place between negation and affirmation1 an identity with self which again falls into negation1 and from this negation is ever again restored4 ,to speak of the bounds of human reason is1 however1 an unmeaning form of words4 ,that the reason of the subject is limited is comprehensible from the nature of the case1 but when we speak of ,thought1 infinitude is none other than one's own relation to self1 and not to one's limit2 and the place in which man is infinite is ,thought4 ,infinitude may then be likewise very abstract1 and in this way it is also once more finite2 but true infinitude remains in itself4 ,fichte further deduces the ordinary conception thus3 the fact that the ego in going forth at once finds its activity checked by a limitation1 and returns once more into itself1 brings about two opposite tendencies in me1 between which ,i waver1 and which ,i try to unite in the faculty of imagination4 ,in order that a fixed determination may exist between the two1 ,i have to make the limit a permanent one1 and we have that in the understanding4 ,all further determinations of the object are1 as categories of the understanding1 modes of synthesis2 but each synthesis is a new contradiction4 ,new mediations are thus once more necessary1 and these are new determinations4 ,thus ,fichte says3 ,i can always continue to determine the non-ego1 to make it my conception1 i4e4 to take from it its negation as regards me4 ,i have to deal with my activity alone2 but there is always an externality therein present which still remains1 and which is not explained by my activity4 ,this ,beyond which alone remains to the undetermined ego ,fichte calls the infinite check upon the ego1 with which it ever has to deal1 and beyond which it cannot get2 thus the activity which proceeds into infinitude finds itself checked and driven back by this repulsive force1 and then it reacts upon itself4 8,the ego in its self-determination has been considered both as determining and determined2 if we reflect on the fact that the absolutely determined determining power must be an absolutely indeterminate1 and further1 that ego and non-ego are absolutely opposed to one another1 in the one case ego is the indeterminate and in the other case non-ego40#cic ,inasmuch as the ego here makes the object its conception and negates it1 this philosophy is ,idealism1 in which philosophy all the determinations of the object are ideal4 ,everything determinate which the ego possesses it has through its own positing2 ,i even make a coat or a boot because ,i put them on4 ,there remains only the empty repulsive force1 and that is the ,kantian ,thing-in-itself1 beyond which even ,fichte cannot get1 even though the theoretic reason continues its determination into infinitude4 8,the ego as intelligence0 ever 8remains dependent on an undetermined non-ego2 it is only through this that it is intelligence40#cid ,the theoretic side is thus dependent4 ,in it we have not therefore to deal with the truth in and for itself1 but with a contingent1 because ego is limited1 not absolute1 as its ,notion demands3 intelligence is not here considered as spirit which is free4 ,this is ,fichte's standpoint as regards the theoretic side4 c4 ,practical reason comes next2 the point of view from which it starts is that 8,the ego posits itself as determining the non-ego40 ,now the contradiction has thus to be solved of ego being at home with itself1 since it determines its ,beyond4 ,the ego is thus infinite activity1 and1 as ego ego1 the absolute ego1 it is undoubtedly abstract4 ,but in order to have a determination1 a non-ego must exist2 ego is thus activity1 causality1 the positing of the non-ego4 ,but as with ,kant sensuousness and reason remain opposed1 the same contradiction is present here1 only in a more abstract form1 and not in the rude empiricism of ,kant4 ,fichte here turns and twists in all sorts of ways1 or he gives the opposition many different forms2 the crudest form is that ego is posited as causality1 for in it another is necessitated on which it exercises its activity4 8,the absolute ego has accordingly to be0 now 8the cause of the non-ego1 i4e4 only of that in the non-ego which remains when we abstract from all demonstrable forms of representation or conception--of that to which is ascribed the check given to the infinitely operative activity of the ego2 for the fact that the intelligent ego is1 in accordance with the necessary laws of the conception1 the cause of the particular determinations of that which is conceived as such1 is demonstrated in the theoretic science of knowledge40#cie ,the limits of intelligence must be broken through1 the ego must alone be active2 the other side1 the infinite repulsion1 must be removed1 in order that the ego may be liberated4 8,according to our hypothesis the ego must now posit a non-ego absolutely1 and without any ground1 i4e4 absolutely and without any ground it must limit or in part not posit itself40 ,this1 indeed1 it already does as intelligent4 8,it must therefore have the ground of not positing itself0 only 8in itself40 ,the ego is1 however1 just the ego1 it posits itself1 8it must0 therefore 8have the principle of positing itself within it1 and also the principle of not positing itself4 ,hence the ego in its essence would be contradictory and self-repellent2 there would be in it a two-fold or contradictory principle1 which assumption contradicts itself1 for in that case there would be no principle within it4 ,the ego would0 consequently 8not exist1 for it would abrogate itself4 ,all contradictions are reconciled through the further determination of contradictory propositions4 ,the ego must be posited in one sense as infinite1 and in another as finite4 ,were it to be posited as infinite and finite in one and the same sense1 the contradiction would be insoluble2 the ego would not be one but two4 ,in so far as the ego posits itself as infinite1 its activity is directed upon itself and on nothing else but itself4 ,in so far as the ego posits limits1 and itself in these limits1 its activity is not exercised directly on itself1 but on a non-ego which has to be placed in opposition10 upon another and again upon another1 and so on into infinitude2 that is the object1 and the activity of the ego 8is objective activity40#cif ,in this way ,fichte in the practical sphere also remains at opposition1 only this opposition now has the form of two tendencies in the ego1 both of which are said to be one and the same activity of the ego4 ,i am called upon to proceed to determine the other in relation to which ,i am negative1 the non-ego1 in accordance with my freedom2 it has indeed all determinations through the activity of the ego1 but beyond my determination the same non-ego ever continues to appear4 ,the ego clearly posits an object1 a point of limitation1 but where the limitation is1 is undetermined4 ,i may transfer the sphere of my determination1 and extend it to an infinite degree1 but there always remains a pure ,beyond1 and the non-ego has no positive self-existent determination4 ,the last point in respect of the practical sphere is hence this1 that the activity of the ego is a yearning or striving#cig--like the ,kantian 8ought02 ,fichte treats this with great prolixity4 ,the ,fichtian philosophy consequently has the same standpoint as the ,kantian2 the ultimate is always subjectivity1 as existent in and for itself4 ,yearning1 according to ,fichte1 is divine2 in yearning ,i have not forgotten myself1 ,i have not forgotten that ,i possess a superiority in myself2 and therefore it is a condition of happiness and satisfaction4 ,this infinite yearning and desire has then been regarded as what is highest and most excellent in the ,beautiful1 and in religious feelings likewise2 and with it is connected the irony of which we have spoken before 7,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #djj1 #dja74 ,in this return the ego is merely an effort1 on its side it is fixed1 and it cannot realize its endeavours4 ,striving is thus an imperfect or implicitly limited action4 ,the ultimate result is consequently a 8circle0 which cannot be broken through1 so that 8the finite spirit must necessarily posit an absolute outside itself 7a thing-in-itself71 and yet on the other hand it must recognize that this same is only there for it 7a necessary noumenon740#cih ,to put it otherwise1 we see the ego absolutely determined in opposition only1 we see it only as consciousness and self-consciousness which does not get beyond this1 and which does not reach so far as to ,spirit4 ,the ego is the absolute ,notion in so far as it does not yet reach the unity of thought1 or in this simplicity does not reach difference1 and in motion does not have rest2 that is to say1 in so far as positing1 or the pure activity of the ego1 and setting in opposition1 are not by it comprehended as the same4 ,or the ego does not comprehend the infinite repulsion1 the non-ego2 self-consciousness determines the non-ego1 but does not know how to make this ,beyond its own4 ,the deficiency in the ,fichtian philosophy is thus firstly that the ego retains the significance of the individual1 actual self-consciousness1 as opposed to that which is universal or absolute1 or to the spirit in which it is itself a moment merely2 for the individual self-consciousness simply signifies standing apart as far as another is concerned4 ,hence1 if the ego was ever called absolute existence1 the most terrible offence was given1 because really the ego only came before us as signifying the individual subject as opposed to the universal4 ,in the second place1 ,fichte does not attain to the idea of ,reason as the perfected1 real unity of subject and object1 or of ego and non-ego2 it is only1 as with ,kant1 represented as the thought of a union in a belief or faith1 and with this ,fichte likewise concludes 7,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 p4 #cja74 ,this he worked out in his popular writings4 ,for because the ego is fixed in its opposition to the non-ego1 and is only as being opposed1 it becomes lost in that unity4 ,the attainment of this aim is hence sent further and further back into the false1 sensuous infinitude3 it is a progression implying just the same contradiction as that found in ,kant1 and having no present actuality in itself2 for the ego has all actuality in its opposition only4 ,the ,fichtian philosophy recognizes the finite spirit alone1 and not the infinite2 it does not recognize spirit as universal thought1 as the ,kantian philosophy does not recognize the not-true2 or it is formal4 ,the knowledge of absolute unity is apprehended as faith in a moral disposition of the world1 an absolute hypothesis in accordance with which we have the belief that every moral action that we perform will have a good result4#cii ,as in ,kant's case1 this ,idea belongs to universal thought4 8,in a word1 when anything is apprehended it ceases to be ,god2 and every conception of ,god that is set up is necessarily that of a false ,god4 ,religion is a practical faith in the moral government of the world2 faith in a supersensuous world belongs1 according to our philosophy1 to the immediate verities40#djj ,fichte thus concludes with the highest ,idea1 with the union of freedom and nature1 but a union of such a nature that1 immediately regarded1 it is not known2 the opposition alone falls within consciousness4 ,this union of faith he likewise finds in the ,love of ,god4 ,as believed and experienced1 this form pertains to ,religion1 and not to ,philosophy1 and our only possible interest is to know this in ,philosophy4 ,but with ,fichte it is still associated with a most unsatisfying externality of which the basis is the non-,idea1 for the one determination is essential only because the other is so1 and so on into infinitude4 8,the theory of knowledge is realistic--it shows that the consciousness of finite beings can only be explained by presupposing an independent and wholly opposite power1 on which1 in accordance with their empirical existence1 they themselves are dependent4 ,but it asserts nothing more than this opposed power1 which by finite beings can merely be felt and not known4 ,all possible determinations of this power or of this non-ego which can come forth into infinity in our consciousness1 it pledges itself to deduce from the determining faculties of the ego1 and it must actually be able to deduce these1 so certainly as it is a theory of knowledge4 ,this knowledge1 however1 is not transcendent but transcendental4 ,it undoubtedly explains all consciousness from something independent of all consciousness1 but it does not forget that this independent somewhat is again a product of its own power of thought1 and consequently something dependent on the ego1 in so far as it has to be there for the ego4 ,every thing is1 in its ideality1 dependent upon the ego2 but in its reality even the ego is dependent4 ,the fact that the finite spirit must posit for itself somewhat outside of itself1 which last exists only for it1 is that circle which it may infinitely extend but never break through40 ,the further logical determination of the object is that which in subject and object is identical1 the true connection is that in which the objective is the possession of the ego2 as thought1 the ego in itself determines the object4 ,but ,fichte's theory of knowledge regards the struggle of the ego with the object as that of the continuous process of determining the object through the ego as subject of consciousness1 without the identity of the restfully self-developing ,notion4#dja ,thirdly1 because the ego is thus fixed in its one-sidedness1 there proceeds from it1 as representing one extreme1 the whole of the progress that is made in the content of knowledge2 and the deduction of the philosophy of ,fichte1 cognition in its content and form1 is a progression from certain determinations to others which do not turn back into unity1 or through a succession of finitenesses which do not have the ,absolute in them at all4 ,the absolute point of view1 like an absolute content1 is wanting4 ,thus the contemplation of nature1 for instance1 is a contemplation of it as of pure finitenesses from the point of view of another1 as though the organic body were regarded thus3 8,consciousness requires a sphere entirely its own for its activity4 ,this sphere is posited through an original1 necessary activity of the ego1 in which it does not know itself as free4 ,it is a sensuous perception1 a drawing of lines2 the sphere of activity thereby becomes something extended in space4 ,as quiescent1 continuous1 and yet unceasingly changing1 this sphere is matter1 which1 as body1 has a number of parts which in relation to one another are called limbs4 ,the person can ascribe to himself no body without positing it as being under the influence of another person4 ,but it is likewise essential that ,i should be able to check this same influence1 and external matter is also posited as resisting my influences on it1 i4e4 as a tough1 compact matter40#djb ,these tough matters must further be separated from one another--the different persons cannot hold together like one mass of dough4 ,for 8my body is my body and not that of another2 it must further operate and be active without my working through it4 ,it is only through the operation of another that ,i can myself be active and represent myself as a rational being who can be respected by him4 ,but the other being should treat me immediately as a rational being1 ,i should be for him a rational being even before my activity begins4 ,or my form must produce an effect through its mere existence in space1 without my activity1 i4e4 it must be visible4 ,the reciprocal operation of rational beings must take place without activity2 thus a subtle matter must be assumed in order that it may be modified by means of the merely quiescent form4 ,in this way are deduced first ,light and then ,air40#djc ,this constitutes a very external manner of passing from one step to another1 resembling the method of the ordinary teleology1 which makes out1 for instance1 that plants and animals are given for the nourishment of mankind4 ,this is how it is put3 ,man must eat1 and thus there must be something edible--consequently plants and animals are at once deduced2 plants must have their root in something1 and consequently the earth is forthwith deduced4 ,what is altogether lacking is any consideration of the object as what it is in itself2 it is plainly considered only in relation to another4 ,in this way the animal organism appears as a tough1 tenacious matter which is 8articulated0 and can be modified2 light is a subtle matter which is the medium of communication of mere existence1 c4--just as in the other case plants and animals are merely edible4 ,as regards a philosophic consideration of the content there is nothing at all to be found4 ,fichte likewise wrote both a ,science of ,morals and of ,natural ,rights1 but he treats them as sciences pertaining to the understanding only1 and his method of procedure is destitute of ideas and carried on by means of a limited understanding4 ,the ,fichtian deduction of the conceptions of justice and morality thus remains within the limitations and rigidity of self-consciousness1 as against which ,fichte's popular presentations of religion and morality present inconsistencies4 ,the treatise on ,natural ,rights is a special failure1 e4g4 where he1 as we have just seen 7p4 #ejb71 deduces even nature just as far as he requires it4 ,the organization of the state which is described in ,fichte's ,science of ,rights is furthermore as unspiritual as was the deduction of natural objects just mentioned1 and as were many of the ,french constitutions which have appeared in modern times--a formal1 external uniting and connecting1 in which the individuals as such are held to be absolute1 or in which ,right is the highest principle4 ,kant began to ground ,right upon ,freedom1 and ,fichte likewise makes freedom the principle in the ,rights of ,nature2 but1 as was the case with ,rousseau1 it is freedom in the form of the isolated individual4 ,this is a great commencement1 but in order to arrive at the particular1 they have to accept certain hypotheses4 ,the universal is not the spirit1 the substance of the whole1 but an external1 negative power of the finite understanding directed against individuals4 ,the state is not apprehended in its essence1 but only as representing a condition of justice and law1 i4e4 as an external relation of finite to finite4 ,there are various individuals2 the whole constitution of the state is thus in the main characterized by the fact that the freedom of individuals must be limited by means of the freedom of the whole4#djd ,the individuals always maintain a cold attitude of negativity as regards one another1 the confinement becomes closer and the bonds more stringent as time goes on1 instead of the state being regarded as representing the realization of freedom4 ,this philosophy contains nothing speculative1 but it demands the presence of the speculative element4 ,as the philosophy of ,kant seeks in unity its ,idea of the ,supreme ,good1 wherein the opposites have to be united1 so the ,fichtian philosophy demands union in the ego and in the implicitude of faith2 in this self-consciousness in all its actions makes its starting-point conviction1 so that in themselves its actions may bring forth the highest end and realize the good4 ,in the ,fichtian philosophy nothing can be seen beyond the moment of self-consciousness1 of self-conscious ,being-within-self1 as in the philosophy of ,england we find expressed--in just as one-sided a way--the moment of ,being-for-another1 or of consciousness1 and that not as a moment simply1 but as the principle of the truth2 in neither of the two is there the unity of both--or spirit4 ,fichte's philosophy constitutes a significant epoch in ,philosophy regarded in its outward form4 ,it is from him and from his methods that abstract thought proceeds1 deduction and construction4 ,hence with the ,fichtian philosophy a revolution took place in ,germany4 ,the public had penetrated as far as the philosophy of ,kant1 and until the ,kantian philosophy was reached the interest awakened by ,philosophy was general2 it was accessible1 and men were curious to know about it1 it pertained to the ordinary knowledge of a man of culture 7supra1 p4 #bah74 ,formerly men of business1 statesmen1 occupied themselves with ,philosophy2 now1 however1 with the intricate idealism of the philosophy of ,kant1 their wings droop helpless to the ground4 ,hence it is with ,kant that we first begin to find a line of separation which parts us from the common modes of consciousness2 but the result1 that the ,absolute cannot be known1 has become one generally acknowledged4 ,with ,fichte the common consciousness has still further separated itself from ,philosophy1 and it has utterly departed from the speculative element therein present4 ,for ,fichte's ego is not merely the ego of the empiric consciousness1 since general determinations of thought such as do not fall within the ordinary consciousness have likewise to be known and brought to consciousness2 in this way since ,fichte's time few men have occupied themselves with speculation4 ,fichte1 it is true1 in his later works especially1 wrote with a view to meeting the popular ear as we may see in the 8,attempt to force the reader into comprehension10 but this end was not accomplished4 ,the public was through the philosophy of ,kant and ,jacobi strengthened in its opinion--one which it accepted utiliter--that the knowledge of ,god is immediate1 and that we know it from the beginning and without requiring to study1 and hence that ,philosophy is quite superfluous4 #b4 ,,fichte',s ,,system ,,in ,a ,,re-,,constituted ,,form4 ,the times called for life1 for spirit4 ,now since mind has thus retreated within self-consciousness1 but within self-consciousness as a barren ego1 which merely gives itself a content or a realization through finitenesses and individualities which in and for themselves are nothing1 the next stage is found in knowing this realization of self-consciousness in itself1 in knowing the content in itself as a content which1 penetrated throughout by spirit1 is self-conscious and spiritual1 or a spirit full of content4 ,in his later popular works ,fichte thus set forth faith1 love1 hope1 religion1 treating them without philosophic interest1 and as for a general public3 it was a philosophy calculated to suit enlightened ,jews and ,jewesses1 councillors and ,kotzebues4 ,he places the matter in a popular form3 8,it is not the finite ego that is1 but the divine ,idea is the foundation of all ,philosophy2 everything that man does of himself is null and void4 ,all existence is living and active in itself1 and there is no other life than ,being1 and no other ,being than ,god2 ,god is thus absolute ,being and ,life4 ,the divine essence likewise comes forth1 revealing and manifesting itself--the world40#dje ,this immediate unity of the self-conscious ego and its content1 or spirit1 which merely has an intuition of its self-conscious life and knows it as the truth immediately1 manifested itself subsequently in poetic and prophetic tendencies1 in vehement aspirations1 in excrescences which grew out of the ,fichtian philosophy4 #c4 ,,the ,,more ,,important ,,of ,,the ,,followers ,,of ,,fichte4 ,on the one hand1 in respect of the content which the ego reaches in the philosophy of ,fichte1 the complete absence of spirituality1 the woodenness1 and1 to put it plainly1 the utter foolishness therein evidenced1 strike us too forcibly to allow us to remain at his standpoint2 our philosophic perception likewise tells us of the one-sidedness and deficiencies of the principle1 as also of the evident necessity that the content should prove to be what it is4 ,but on the other hand self-consciousness was therein posited as reality or essence--not as a foreign1 alien self-consciousness1 but as ego--a signification which all possess1 and which finds an answer in the actuality of all4 ,the ,fichtian standpoint of subjectivity has thus retained its character of being unphilosophically worked out1 and arrived at its completion in forms pertaining to sensation which in part remained within the ,fichtian principle1 while they were in part the effort--futile though it was--to get beyond the subjectivity of the ego4 a4 ,,friedrich ,,von ,,schlegel4 ,in ,fichte's case the limitation is continually re-appearing2 but because the ego feels constrained to break through this barrier1 it reacts against it1 and gives itself a resting-place within itself2 this last ought to be concrete1 but it is a negative resting-place alone4 ,this first form1 ,irony1 has ,friedrich von ,schlegel as its leading exponent4 ,the subject here knows itself to be within itself the ,absolute1 and all else to it is vain2 all the conclusions which it draws for itself respecting the right and good1 it likewise knows how to destroy again4 ,it can make a pretence of knowing all things1 but it only demonstrates vanity1 hypocrisy1 and effrontery4 ,irony knows itself to be the master of every possible content2 it is serious about nothing1 but plays with all forms4 ,the other side is this1 that subjectivity has cast itself into religious subjectivity4 ,the utter despair in respect of thought1 of truth1 and absolute objectivity1 as also the incapacity to give oneself any settled basis or spontaneity of action1 induced the noble soul to abandon itself to feeling and to seek in ,religion something fixed and steadfast2 this steadfast basis1 this inward satisfaction1 is to be found in religious sentiments and feelings4 ,this instinct impelling us towards something fixed has forced many into positive forms of religion1 into ,catholicism1 superstition and miracle working1 in order that they may find something on which they can rest1 because to inward subjectivity everything fluctuates and wavers4 ,with the whole force of its mind subjectivity tries to apply itself to what is positively given1 to bend its head beneath the positive1 to cast itself1 so to speak1 into the arms of externality1 and it finds an inward power impelling it so to do4 b4 ,,schleiermacher4 ,on the other hand the ego finds in the subjectivity and individuality of the personal view of things the height of all its vanity--its ,religion4 ,all the various individualities have ,god within themselves4 ,dialectic is the last thing to arise and to maintain its place4 ,as this is expressed for philosophic self-consciousness1 the foreign intellectual world has lost all significance and truth for ordinary culture2 it is composed of three elements1 a deity pertaining to a time gone by1 and individualized in space and existence1 a world which is outside the actuality of self-consciousness1 and a world which had yet to appear1 and in which self-consciousness would first attain to its reality4 ,the spirit of culture has deserted it1 and no longer recognizes anything that is foreign to self-consciousness4 ,in accordance with this principle1 the spiritual living essence has then transformed itself into self-consciousness1 and it thinks to know the unity of spirit immediately from itself1 and in this immediacy to be possessed of knowledge in a poetic1 or at least a prophetic manner4 ,as regards the poetic manner1 it has a knowledge of the life and person of the ,absolute immediately1 by an intuition1 and not in the ,notion1 and it thinks it would lose the whole as whole1 as a self-penetrating unity1 were it not to express the same in poetic form2 and what it thus expresses poetically is the intuition of the personal life of self-consciousness4 ,but the truth is absolute motion1 and since it is a motion of forms and figures ,gestalten1 and the universe is a kingdom of spirits1 the ,notion is the essence of this movement1 and likewise of each individual form2 it is its ideal form ,form and not the real one1 or that of figure ,gestalt4 ,in the latter case necessity is lost sight of2 individual action1 life and heart1 remain within themselves1 and undeveloped2 and this poetry vacillates betwixt the universality of the ,notion and the determinateness and indifference of the figure2 it is neither flesh nor fish1 neither poetry nor philosophy4 ,the prophetic utterance of truths which claim to be philosophical1 thus belongs to faith1 to self-consciousness1 which indeed perceives the absolute spirit in itself1 but does not comprehend itself as self-consciousness1 since it places absolute reality above ,knowledge1 beyond self-conscious reason1 as was done by ,eschenmayer and ,jacobi4 ,this uncomprehending1 prophetic manner of speech affirms this or that respecting absolute existence as from an oracle1 and requires that each man should find the same immediately in his own heart4 ,the knowledge of absolute reality becomes a matter pertaining to the heart2 there are a number of would-be inspired speakers1 each of whom holds a monologue and really does not understand the others1 excepting by a pressure of the hands and betrayal of dumb feeling4 ,what they say is mainly composed of trivialities1 if these are taken in the sense in which they are uttered2 it is the feeling1 the gesture1 the fulness of the heart1 which first gives them their significance2 to nothing of more importance is direct expression given4 ,they outbid one another in conceits of fancy1 in ardent poetry4 ,but before the ,truth vanity turns pale1 spitefully sneering it sneaks back into itself4 ,ask not after a criterion of the truth1 but after the ,notion of the truth in and for itself2 on that fix your gaze4 ,the glory of ,philosophy is departed1 for it presupposes a common ground of thoughts and principles--which is what science demands--or at least of opinions4 ,but now particular subjectivity was everything1 each individual was proud and disdainful as regards all others4 ,the conception of independent thought--as though there could be a thought which was not such 7,vol4 ,i4 p4 #fj7--;is very much the same2 men have1 it is said1 to bring forth a particularity of their own1 or else they have not thought for themselves4 ,but the bad picture is that in which the artist shows himself2 originality is the production of what is in its entirety universal4 ,the folly of independent thought is that it results in each bringing forth something more preposterous than another4 c4 ,,novalis4 ,subjectivity signifies the lack of a firm and steady basis1 but likewise the desire for such1 and thus it evermore remains a yearning4 ,these yearnings of a lofty soul are set forth in the writings of ,novalis4 ,this subjectivity does not reach substantiality1 it dies away within itself1 and the standpoint it adopts is one of inward workings and fine distinctions2 it signifies an inward life and deals with the minuti of the truth4 ,the extravagances of subjectivity constantly pass into madness2 if they remain in thought they are whirled round and round in the vortex of reflecting understanding1 which is ever negative in reference to itself4 d4 ,,fries1 ,,bouterweck1 ,,krug4 ,yet a last form of subjectivity is the subjectivity of arbitrary will and ignorance4 ,it maintained this1 that the highest mode of cognition is an immediate knowledge as a fact of consciousness2 and that is so far right4 ,the ,fichtian abstraction and its hard understanding has a repellent effect on thought2 slothful reason allowed itself to be told the result of the philosophy of ,kant and ,jacobi1 and renounced all consistent thought1 all construction4 ,this arbitrariness gave itself entire liberty--the liberty of the ,tabagie--but in doing so it regarded itself from a poetic or prophetic point of view1 as we have just seen 7pp4 #ejh1 #eji74 ,then it was both more sober and more prosaic1 and thus brought the old logic and metaphysic once more into evidence1 though with this modification that they are made facts of consciousness4 ,thus ,fries turns back to the faith of ,jacobi in the form of immediate judgments derived from reason1 and dark conceptions incapable of utterance4#djf ,he wished to improve the critique of pure reason by apprehending the categories as facts of consciousness2 anything one chooses can in such a case be introduced4 ,bouterweck speaks of 8,the virtue1 the living nature of power2 the fact that subject and object are regarded as one1 that is as absolute virtue4 ,with this absolute virtue we have all ,being and action1 namely the eternal1 absolute and pure unity2 in one word we have grasped the world within us and we have grasped ourselves in the world1 and that indeed not through conceptions and conclusions1 but directly through the power which itself constitutes our existence and our rational nature4 ,to know the ,all1 or indeed to know ,god in any way1 is1 however1 impossible for any mortal40#djg ,krug wrote a 8,groundwork of ,philosophy10 setting forth a 8,transcendental ,synthesis--that is a transcendental realism and a transcendental idealism inseparably bound together10 ,it is an 8original1 transcendental synthesis of the real and the ideal1 the thinking subject and the corresponding outer world20 this transcendental synthesis must 8be recognized and asserted without any attempt being made at explaining it40#djh ,d4 ,,schelling4 ,it was ,schelling1 finally1 who made the most important1 or1 from a philosophic point of view1 the only important advance upon the philosophy of ,fichte2 his philosophy rose higher than that of ,fichte1 though undoubtedly it stood in close connection with it2 indeed1 he himself professes to be a ,fichtian4 ,now the philosophy of ,schelling from the first admitted the possibility of a knowledge of ,god1 although it likewise started from the philosophy of ,kant1 which denies such knowledge4 ,at the same time ,schelling makes ,jacobi's principle of the unity of thought and ,being fundamental1 although he begins to determine it more closely4#dji ,to him concrete unity is this1 that the finite is no more true than the infinite1 the subjective idea no more than objectivity1 and that combinations in which both untruths are brought together in their independence in relation to one another1 are likewise combinations of untruths merely4 ,concrete unity can only be comprehended as process and as the living movement in a proposition4 ,this inseparability is in ,god alone2 the finite1 on the other hand1 is that which has this separability within it4 ,in so far as it is a truth it is likewise this unity1 but in a limited sphere1 and for that reason in the separability of both moments4 ,frederick ,wilhelm ,joseph ,schelling1 born on the #bgth ,january1 #agge1 at ,schorndorf1#daj in ,wurtemberg1 studied in ,leipzig and ,jena1 where he came to be on terms of great intimacy with ,fichte4 ,in the year #ahjg he became secretary of the ,academy of ,science in ,munich4 ,we cannot with propriety deal fully with his life1 for he is still living4#daa ,schelling worked out his philosophy in view of the public4 ,the series of his philosophic writings also represents the history of his philosophic development and the gradual process by which he raised himself above the ,fichtian principle and the ,kantian content with which he began4 ,it does not thus contain a sequence of separately worked out divisions of ,philosophy1 but only successive stages in his own development4 ,if we ask for a final work in which we shall find his philosophy represented with complete definiteness none such can be named4 ,schelling's first writings are still quite ,fichtian1 and it is only by slow degrees that he worked himself free of ,fichte's form4 ,the form of the ego has the ambiguity of being capable of signifying either the absolute ,ego or ,god1 or ego in my particularity2#dab this supplied the first stimulus to ,schelling4 ,his first and quite short work of four sheets which he wrote in #agie at ,tubingen1 while still at the university1 was called1 8,on the ,possibility of any ,form of ,philosophy02 it contains propositions respecting the ,fichtian philosophy only4 ,the next work1 8,on the ,ego as principle of ,philosophy1 or on the ,unconditioned in ,human ,knowledge0 7,tubingen1 #agie71 is likewise quite ,fichtian2 in this case1 however1 it is from a wider and more universal point of view1 since the ego is therein grasped as an original identity4#dac ,we find1 however1 a summary of the ,fichtian principle and the ,kantian mode of presentation3 8,it is only by something being originally set in opposition to the ego1 and by the ego being itself posited as the manifold 7in time71 that it is possible for the ego to get beyond the unity which belongs to it of merely being posited1 and that1 for example1 it posits the same content on more than one occasion40#dad ,schelling then passed on to natural philosophy1 adopted ,kantian forms and reflective determinations1 such as those of repulsion and attraction1 from ,kant's 8,metaphysics of ,nature10 and likewise dealt with quite empirical phenomena in expressions taken from ,kant4 ,all his first works on this subject come under this category1 viz43 8,ideas towards a ,philosophy of ,nature10 #agig2 8,on the ,world-,soul10 #agih1 the second edition of which possesses appendices which are entirely inconsistent with what goes before4 ,in the writings of ,herder and ,kielmeyer#dae we find sensibility1 irritability1 and reproduction dealt with1 as also their laws1 such as that the greater the sensibility the less the irritability1 c4--just as the powers or potencies were dealt with by ,eschenmayer4 ,it was only later on in relation to these that ,schelling first apprehended nature in the categories of thought1 and made general attempts of a more definite character in the direction of greater scientific development4 ,it was only through what had been accomplished by these men that he was enabled to come into public notice so young4 ,the spiritual and intellectual side1 morality and the state1 he represented on the other hand purely in accordance with ,kantian principles3 thus in his 8,transcendental ,idealism10 although it was written from a ,fichtian point of view1 he goes no further than ,kant did in his 8,philosophy of ,rights0 and his work 8,on ,eternal ,peace40 ,schelling1 indeed1 later on published a separate treatise on ,freedom1 deeply speculative in character2 this1 however1 remains isolated and independent1 and deals with this one point alone2 in ,philosophy1 however1 nothing isolated can be worked out or developed4 ,in the various presentations of his views ,schelling on each occasion began again from the beginning1 because1 as we may see1 what went before did not satisfy him2 he has ever pressed on to seek a new form1 and thus he has tried various forms and terminologies in succession without ever setting forth one complete and consistent whole4 ,his principal works in this connection are the 8,first ,sketch of a ,system of ,natural ,philosophy10 #agii2 the 8,system of ,transcendental ,idealism10 #ahjj1 one of his most carefully thought-out works2 8,bruno1 a ,dialogue on the ,divine and ,natural ,principle of ,things10 #ahjb2 8,journal of ,speculative ,physics10 #ahja2 8,new ,journal of ,speculative ,physics10 #ahjb et ,in the second number of the second volume of his 8,journal of ,speculative ,physics10 ,schelling made the commencement of a detailed treatment of the whole of his philosophy4 ,here he likewise starts to a certain measure1 though unconsciously1 from the ,fichtian form of construction2 but the idea is already present that nature equally with knowledge is a system of reason4 ,it is not feasible here to go into details respecting what is called the philosophy of ,schelling1 even if time permitted4 ,for it is not yet a scientific whole organized in all its branches1 since it rather consists in certain general elements which do not fluctuate with the rest of his opinions4 ,schelling's philosophy must still be regarded as in process of evolution1 and it has not yet ripened into fruit2#daf we can hence give a general idea of it only4 ,when ,schelling made his first appearance the demands put forward by ,philosophy were as follows4 ,with ,descartes thought and extension were in some incomprehensible way united in ,god1 with ,spinoza it was as motionless substance2 and beyond this point of view neither of them ever passed4 ,later on we saw the form develop1 partly in the sciences and partly in the ,kantian philosophy4 ,finally1 in the ,fichtian philosophy1 the form was subjectivity on its own account1 from which all determinations were held to develop4 ,what is thus demanded is that this subjectivity of infinite form which we saw dying into irony or arbitrariness 7pp4 #ejg-eaj7 should be delivered from its one-sidedness in order to be united with objectivity and substantiality4 ,to put it otherwise1 the substance of ,spinoza should not be apprehended as the unmoved1 but as the intelligent1 as a form which possesses activity within itself of necessity1 so that it is the forming power of nature1 but at the same time knowledge and comprehension4 ,this then is the object of ,philosophy2 it is not the formal union of ,spinoza that is demanded1 nor the subjective totality of ,fichte1 but totality with the infinite form4 ,we see this developing in the philosophy of ,schelling4 #a4 ,in one of his earlier writings1 the 8,system of ,transcendental ,idealism10 which we shall consider first of all1 ,schelling represented transcendental philosophy and natural philosophy as the two sides of scientific knowledge4 ,respecting the nature of the two1 he expressly declared himself in this work1 where he once more adopts a ,fichtian starting-point3 8,all knowledge rests on the harmony of an objective with a subjective40 ,in the common sense of the words this would be allowed2 absolute unity1 where the ,notion and the reality are undistinguished in the perfected ,idea1 is the ,absolute alone1 or ,god2 all else contains an element of discord between the objective and subjective4 8,we may give the name of nature to the entire objective content of our knowledge2 the entire subjective content1 on the other hand1 is called the ego or intelligence40 ,they are in themselves identical and presupposed as identical4 ,the relation of nature to intelligence is given by ,schelling thus3 8,now if all knowledge has two poles which mutually presuppose and demand one another1 there must be two fundamental sciences1 and it must be impossible to start from the one pole without being driven to the other40 ,thus nature is impelled to spirit1 and spirit to nature2 either may be given the first place1 and both must come to pass4 8,if the objective is made the chief10 we have the natural sciences as result1 and 8the necessary tendency10 the end1 8of all natural science thus is to pass from nature to intelligence4 ,this is the meaning of the effort to connect natural phenomena with theory4 ,the highest perfection of natural science would be the perfect spiritualization of all natural laws into laws of intuitive perception and thought4 ,the phenomenal 7the material element7 must entirely disappear1 and laws 7the formal element7 alone remain4 ,hence it comes to pass that the more that which is in conformity with law breaks forth in nature itself1 the more the outward covering disappears2 the phenomena themselves become more spiritual1 and finally cease altogether4 ,the perfect theory of nature would be that by which the whole of nature should be resolved into an intelligence4 ,the dead and unconscious products of nature are only abortive attempts on the part of nature to reflect itself1 but the so-called dead nature is really an immature10 torpid1 fossilized 8intelligence02 it is implicit only1 and thus remains in externality2 8hence in its phenomena10 even though 8still unconsciously1 the character of intelligence shines through4 ,its highest end1 which is to become object to itself1 is first attained by nature0 7instead of nature we should call it the ,idea of nature71 8through its highest and ultimate reflection1 which is none other than man1 or1 more generally1 it is that which we call reason1 through which nature for the first time returns completely within itself1 and whereby it becomes evident that nature is originally identical with what is known in us as intelligence or the conscious4 ,through this tendency to make nature intelligent natural science becomes the philosophy of nature40 ,the intelligent character of nature is thus spoken of as a postulate of science4 ,the other point of view is 8to give the subjective the foremost place40 ,thus here 8the problem is how to add an objective element agreeing with it4 ,to start from the subjective as from the first and absolute1 and to make the objective arise from it10 signifies a new departure2 its consideration forms the content of true ,transcendental ,philosophy1 or1 as ,schelling himself now named this science1 8the other science fundamental to ,philosophy40 ,the organ of transcendental philosophy is the subjective1 the production of inward action4 ,production and reflection upon this production1 the unconscious and conscious in one1 is the sthetic act of the imagination4#dag ,thus these two separate processes are as a whole very clearly expressed3 the process which leads from nature to the subject1 and that leading from the ego to the object4 ,but the true process could only be traced out by means of logic1 for it contains pure thoughts2 but the logical point of view was what ,schelling never arrived at in his presentation of things4 a4 ,in respect of the ego1 as principle of the transcendental philosophy1 ,schelling sets to work in the same way as did ,fichte1 inasmuch as he begins from the fact of knowledge 8in which the content is conditioned through the form1 and the form through the content02 this is formal ,a ,a4 ,but does ,a exist8 ,the ego is 8the point where subject and object are one in their unmediated condition02 the ego is just ,ego ,ego1 subject-object2 and that is the act of self-consciousness wherein ,i am for myself object to myself4 ,in self-consciousness there is not to be found a distinction between me and anything else2 what are distinguished are directly identical1 and there is so far nothing at all in opposition to this self-consciousness4 ,how the case stands with regard to external objects is the question which must be decided later1 in the further course of development4 ,it is only the ,notion of the ego which is to be laid hold of3 8,the ,notion of the ego1 that is the act whereby thought in general becomes object to itself1 and the ego itself 7the object7 are absolutely one2 independently of this act the ego is nothing40 ,it is the act whereby thought makes itself objective1 and wherein the ego is brought into harmony with the objective1 with thought2 and from this standpoint it had to be demonstrated how the ego makes its way to objectivity4 8,the ego1 as pure act1 as pure action1 is not objective in knowledge itself1 for the reason that it is the principle of all knowledge4 ,if it is to be object of knowledge1 this must come to pass through a very different kind of knowledge than the ordinary40 ,the immediate consciousness of this identity is intuition1 but inwardly it becomes 8intellectual intuition02 it 8is a knowledge which is the production of its object3 sensuous intuition or perception is perception of such a nature that the perception itself appears to be different from what is perceived4 ,now intellectual intuition is the organ of all transcendental thought10 the act of pure self-consciousness generally4 8,the ego is nothing else than a process of production which ever makes itself its own object4 ,science can start from nothing objective10 but from 8the non-objective which itself becomes object0 as an 8original duplicity4 ,idealism is the mechanism of the origination of the objective world from the inward principle of spiritual activity40#dah ,on the one hand ,schelling's system is related to the philosophy of ,fichte1 and1 on the other hand1 he1 like ,jacobi1 makes his principle immediate knowledge--the intelligent intuitive perception which all who wish to philosophize must have4 ,but what comes next is that its content is no longer the indeterminate1 the essence of essence1 but likewise the ,absolute1 ,god1 the absolutely self-existent1 though expressed as concrete1 i4e4 as mediating itself within itself1 as the absolute unity or indifference of subjective and objective4 ,intellectual intuition is the ,fichtian imagination oscillating between two different points4 ,we have already spoken above 7p4 #dag7 of the form of intellectual intuition2 it is the most convenient manner of asserting knowledge respecting--anything one likes4 ,but the immediate knowledge of ,god as spiritual is only in the consciousness of ,christian nations1 and not for others4 ,this immediate knowledge appears to be still more contingent as the intellectual intuition of the concrete1 or the identity of subjectivity and objectivity4 ,this intuition is intellectual indeed1 because it is a rational intuition1 and as knowledge it is likewise absolutely one with the object of knowledge4 ,but this intuition1 although itself knowledge1 is not as yet known2 it is the unmediated1 the postulated4 ,as it is in this way an immediate we must possess it1 and what may be possessed may likewise not be possessed4 ,thus since the immediate presupposition in ,philosophy is that individuals have the immediate intuition of this identity of subjective and objective1 this gave the philosophy of ,schelling the appearance of indicating that the presence of this intuition in individuals demanded a special talent1 genius1 or condition of mind of their own1 or as though it were generally speaking an accidental faculty which pertained to the specially favoured few4 ,for the immediate1 the intuitively perceived1 is in the form of an existent1 and is not thus an essential2 and whoever does not understand the intellectual intuition must come to the conclusion that he does not possess it4 ,or else1 in order to understand it1 men must give themselves the trouble of possessing it2 but no one can tell whether he has it or not--not even from understanding it1 for we may merely think we understand it4 ,philosophy1 however1 is in its own nature capable of being universal2 for its ground-work is thought1 and it is through thought that man is man4 ,schelling's principle is thus indeed clearly a universal2 but if a definite intuition1 a definite consciousness is demanded1 such as the consciousness or intuition of the identity of subjective and objective1 this determinate particular thought is not as yet to be found in it4 ,it was1 however1 in this form of knowledge of the absolute as concrete1 and1 further1 in the form of unity of subjective and objective1 that ,philosophy as represented by ,schelling more especially marked itself off from the ordinary conceiving consciousness and its mode of reflection4 ,even less than ,fichte did ,schelling attain to popularity 7supra1 pp4 #ejd1 #eje71 for the concrete in its nature is directly speculative4 ,the concrete content1 ,god1 life1 or whatever particular form it has1 is indeed the content and object of natural consciousness2 but the difficulty lies in bringing what is contained in the concrete into concrete thought in accordance with its different determinations1 and in laying hold of the unity4 ,it pertains to the standpoint of the understanding to divide and to distinguish1 and to maintain the finite thought-determinations in their opposition2 but ,philosophy demands that these different thoughts should be brought together4 ,thought begins by holding apart infinite and finite1 cause and effect1 positive and negative2 since this is the region of reflecting consciousness1 the old metaphysical consciousness was able to take part in so doing3 but the speculative point of view is to have this opposition before itself and to reconcile it4 ,with ,schelling the speculative form has thus again come to the front1 and philosophy has again obtained a special character of its own2 the principle of ,philosophy1 rational thought in itself1 has obtained the form of thought4 ,in the philosophy of ,schelling the content1 the truth1 has once more become the matter of chief importance1 whereas in the ,kantian philosophy the point of interest was more especially stated to be the necessity for investigating subjective knowledge4 ,this is the standpoint of ,schelling's philosophy in its general aspects4 b4 ,since in further analysis the distinction between subject and object comes into view and is accepted1 there follows the relationship of the ego to its other2 with ,fichte that forms the second proposition1 in which the self-limitation of the ego is posited4 ,the ego posits itself in opposition to itself1 since it posits itself as conditioned by the non-ego2 that is the infinite repulsion1 for this conditionment is the ego itself4 ,schelling1 on the one hand1 says3 8,the ego is unlimited as the ego only in so far as it is limited10 as it relates to the non-ego4 ,only thus does consciousness exist1 self-consciousness is a barren determination2 through its intuition of self the ego becomes finite to itself4 8,this contradiction only allows itself to be dissolved by the ego becoming in this finitude infinite to itself1 i4e4 by its having an intuitive perception of itself as an infinite ,becoming40 ,the relation of the ego to itself and to the infinite check or force of repulsion is a constant one4 ,on the other hand it is said3 8,the ego is limited only in so far as it is unlimited20 this limitation is thus necessary in order to be able to get beyond it4 ,the contradiction which we find here remains even if the ego always limits the non-ego4 8,both activities--that which makes for infinitude1 the limitable1 real1 objective activity1 and the limiting and ideal1 mutually presuppose one another4 ,idealism reflects merely on the one1 realism on the other1 transcendental idealism on both40#dai ,all this is a tangled mass of abstractions4 c4 8,neither through the limiting activity nor through the limited does the ego arrive at self-consciousness4 ,there consequently is a third activity1 compounded from the other two1 through which the ego of self-consciousness arises2 this third is that which oscillates between the two--the struggle between opposing tendencies40 ,there is essential relation only1 relative identity2 the difference therein present thus ever remains4 8,this struggle cannot be reconciled by one such action1 but only by an infinite succession of such10 i4e4 the reconciliation of the opposition between the two tendencies of the ego1 the inward and the outward1 is1 in the infinite course of progression1 only an apparent one4 ,in order that it may be complete1 the whole inward and outward nature must be presented in all its details3 but ,philosophy can only set forth the epochs which are most important4 8,if all the intermediate links in sensation could be set forth1 that would necessarily lead us to a deduction of all the qualities in nature1 which last is impossible40 ,now this third activity1 which contains the union directly in itself1 is a thought in which particularity is already contained4 ,it is the intuitive understanding of ,kant1 the intelligent intuition or intuitively perceiving intelligence2 ,schelling1 indeed1 definitely names this absolute unity of contradictions intellectual intuition4 ,the ego here is not one-sided in regard to what is different2 it is identity of the unconscious and the conscious1 but not an identity of such a nature that its ground rests on the ego itself4#dbj ,this ego must be the absolute principle3 8,all philosophy starts from a principle which as absolute identity is non-objective40 ,for if it is objective1 separation is at once posited and it is confronted by another2 but the principle is the reconciliation of the opposition1 and therefore in and for itself it is non-objective4 8,now how should a principle such as this be called forth to consciousness and understood1 as is required if it is the condition attached to the comprehension of all philosophy8 ,that it can no more be comprehended through ,notions ,begriffe than set forth1 requires no proof40 ,notion to ,schelling signifies a category of the ordinary understanding2 ,notion is1 however1 the concrete thought which in itself is infinite4 8,there thus remains nothing more than that it should be set forth in an immediate intuition4 ,if there were such an intuition which had as object the absolutely identical1 that which in itself is neither subjective nor objective1 and if for such1 which10 however1 8can be an intellectual intuition only1 one could appeal to immediate experience10 the question would be3 8,how can this intuition be again made objective1 i4e4 how can it be asserted without doubt that it does not rest on a subjective deception1 if there is not a universal objectivity in that intuition1 which is recognized by all80 ,this intellectual principle in itself should thus be given in an experience so that men may be able to appeal to it4 8,the objectivity of intellectual intuition is art4 ,the work of art alone reflects to me what is otherwise reflected through nothing--that absolute identical which has already separated itself in the ego itself40 ,the objectivity of identity and the knowledge of the same is art2 in one and the same intuition the ego is here conscious of itself and unconscious4#dba ,this intellectual intuition which has become objective is objective sensuous intuition--but the ,notion1 the comprehended necessity1 is a very different objectivity4 ,thus a principle is presupposed both for the content of philosophy and for subjective philosophizing3 on the one hand it is demanded that the attitude adopted should be one of intellectual intuition1 and1 on the other hand1 this principle has to be authenticated1 and this takes place in the work of art4 ,this is the highest form of the objectivization of reason1 because in it sensuous conception is united with intellectuality1 sensuous existence is merely the expression of spirituality4 ,the highest objectivity which the subject attains1 the highest identity of subjective and objective1 is that which ,schelling terms the power of imagination4 ,art is thus comprehended as what is inmost and highest1 that which produces the intellectual and real in one1 and philosophizing is conceived as this genius of art4 ,but art and power of imagination are not supreme4 ,for the ,idea1 spirit1 cannot be truly given expression to in the manner in which art expresses its ,idea4 ,this last is always a method pertaining to intuitive perception2 and on account of this sensuous form of existence the work of art cannot correspond to the spirit4 ,thus because the point last arrived at is designated as the faculty of imagination1 as art1 even in the subject this is a subordinate point of view1 and thus in itself this point is not the absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity4 ,in subjective thought1 rational1 speculative thought is thus indeed demanded1 but if this appears false to you nothing farther can be said than that you do not possess intellectual intuition4 ,the proving of anything1 the making it comprehensible1 is thus abandoned2 a correct apprehension of it is directly demanded1 and the ,idea is thus assertorically pre-established as principle4 ,the ,absolute is the absolute identity of subjective and objective1 the absolute indifference of real and ideal1 of form and essence1 of universal and particular2 in this identity of the two there is neither the one nor the other4 ,but the unity is not abstract1 empty1 and dry2 that would signify logical identity1 classification according to something common to both1 in which the difference remains all the while outside4 ,the identity is concrete3 it is subjectivity as well as objectivity2 the two are present therein as abrogated and ideal4 ,this identity may easily be shown in the ordinary conception3 the conception1 we may for example say1 is subjective2 it has1 too1 the determinate content of exclusion in reference to other conceptions2 nevertheless1 the conception is simple--it is one act1 one unity4 ,what is lacking in ,schelling's philosophy is thus the fact that the point of indifference of subjectivity and objectivity1 or the ,notion of reason1 is absolutely presupposed1 without any attempt being made at showing that this is the truth4 ,schelling often uses ,spinoza's form of procedure1 and sets up axioms4 ,in philosophy1 when we desire to establish a position1 we demand proof4 ,but if we begin with intellectual intuition1 that constitutes an oracle to which we have to give way1 since the existence of intellectual intuition was made our postulate4 ,the true proof that this identity of subjective and objective is the truth1 could only be brought about by means of each of the two being investigated in its logical1 i4e4 essential determinations2 and in regard to them1 it must then be shown that the subjective signifies the transformation of itself into the objective1 and that the objective signifies its not remaining such1 but making itself subjective4 ,similarly in the finite1 it would have to be shown that it contained a contradiction in itself1 and made itself infinite2 in this way we should have the unity of finite and infinite4 ,in so doing1 this unity of opposites is not asserted beforehand1 but in the opposites themselves it is shown that their truth is their unity1 but that each taken by itself is one-sided--that their difference veers round1 casting itself headlong into this unity--while the understanding all the time thinks that in these differences it possesses something fixed and secure4 ,the result of thinking contemplation would in this former case be that each moment would secretly make itself into its opposite1 the identity of both being alone the truth4 ,the understanding certainly calls this transformation sophistry1 humbug1 juggling1 and what-not4 ,as a result1 this identity would1 according to ,jacobi1 be one which was no doubt conditioned and of set purpose produced4 ,but we must remark that a one-sided point of view is involved in apprehending the result of development merely as a result2 it is a process which is likewise mediation within itself1 of such a nature that this mediation is again abrogated and asserted as immediate4 ,schelling1 indeed1 had this conception in a general way1 but he did not follow it out in a definite logical method1 for with him it remained an immediate truth1 which can only be verified by means of intellectual intuition4 ,that is the great difficulty in the philosophy of ,schelling4 ,and then it was misunderstood and all interest taken from it4 ,it is easy enough to show that subjective and objective are different4 ,were they not different1 nothing could be made of them any more than of ,a ,a2 but they are in opposition as one4 ,in all that is finite1 an identity is present1 and this alone is actual2 but besides the fact that the finite is this identity1 it is also true that it is the absence of harmony between subjectivity and objectivity1 ,notion and reality2 and it is in this that finitude consists4 ,to this principle of ,schelling's1 form1 or necessity1 is thus lacking1 it is only asserted4 ,schelling appears to have this in common with ,plato and the ,neo-,platonists1 that knowledge is to be found in the inward intuition of eternal ,ideas wherein knowledge is unmediated in the ,absolute4 ,but when ,plato speaks of this intuition of the soul1 which has freed itself from all knowledge that is finite1 empirical1 or reflected1 and the ,neo-,platonists tell of the ecstasy of thought in which knowledge is the immediate knowledge of the ,absolute1 this definite distinction must be noticed1 viz41 that with ,plato's knowledge of the universal1 or with his intellectuality1 wherein all opposition as a reality is abrogated1 dialectic is associated1 or the recognized necessity for the abrogation of these opposites2 ,plato does not begin with this1 for with him the movement in which they abrogate themselves is present4 ,the ,absolute is itself to be looked at as this movement of self-abrogation2 this is the only actual knowledge and knowledge of the ,absolute4 ,with ,schelling this idea has1 however1 no dialectic present in it whereby those opposites may determine themselves to pass over into their unity1 and in so doing to be comprehended4 #b4 ,schelling begins with the idea of the ,absolute as identity of the subjective and objective1 and accordingly there evinced itself in the presentations of his system which followed1 the further necessity of proving this idea2 this he attempted to do in the two ,journals of ,speculative ,physics4 ,but if that method be once adopted1 the procedure is not immanent development from the speculative ,idea1 but it follows the mode of external reflection4 ,schelling's proofs are adduced in such an exceedingly formal manner that they really invariably presuppose the very thing that was to be proved4 ,the axiom assumes the main point in question1 and all the rest follows as a matter of course4 ,here is an instance3 8,the innermost essence of the ,absolute can only be thought of as identity absolute1 altogether pure and undisturbed4 ,for the ,absolute is only absolute1 and what is thought in it is necessarily and invariably the same1 or in other words1 is necessarily and invariably absolute4 ,if the idea of the ,absolute were a general ,notion0 7or conception71 8this would not prevent a difference being met with in it1 notwithstanding this unity of the absolute4 ,for things the most different are yet in the ,notion always one and identical1 just as a rectangle1 a polygon and a circle are all figures4 ,the possibility of the difference of all things in association with perfect unity in the ,notion lies in the manner in which the particular in them is combined with the universal4 ,in the ,absolute this altogether disappears1 because it pertains to the very idea of the ,absolute that the particular in it is also the universal1 and the universal the particular2 and further that by means of this unity form and existence are also one in it4 ,consequently1 in regard to the ,absolute1 from the fact of its being the ,absolute1 there likewise follows the absolute exclusion from its existence of all difference1 and that at once40#dbb ,in the former of the two above-named works1 the 8,journal of ,speculative ,physics10 ,schelling began by again bringing forward the ,substance of ,spinoza1 simple1 absolute ,existence1 inasmuch as he makes his starting-point the absolute identity of the subjective and objective4 ,here1 like ,spinoza1 he employed the method of geometry1 laying down axioms and proving by means of propositions1 then going on to deduce other propositions from these1 and so on4 ,but this method has no real application to philosophy4 ,schelling at this point laid down certain forms of difference1 to which he gave the name of potencies1 adopting the term from ,eschenmayer1 who made use of it 7p4 #ead72dbc they are ready-made differences1 which ,schelling avails himself of4 ,but philosophy must not take any forms from other sciences1 as here from mathematics4 ,with ,schelling1 the leading form is that which was brought into remembrance again by ,kant1 the form of triplicity as first1 second1 and third potency4 ,schelling1 like ,fichte1 begins with ,i ,i1 or with the absolute intuition1 expressed as proposition or definition of the ,absolute1 that 8,reason is the absolute indifference of subject and object03 so that it is neither the one nor the other1 for both have in it their true determination2 and their opposition1 like all others1 is utterly done away with4 ,the true reality of subject and object is placed in this alone1 that the subject is not posited in the determination of subject against object1 as in the philosophy of ,fichte2 it is not determined as in itself existent1 but as subject-object1 as the identity of the two2 in the same way the object is not posited according to its ideal determination as object1 but in as far as it is itself absolute1 or the identity of the subjective and objective4 ,but the expression 8indifference0 is ambiguous1 for it means indifference in regard to both the one and the other2 and thus it appears as if the content of indifference1 the only thing which makes it concrete1 were indifferent4 ,schelling's next requirement is that the subject must not be hampered with reflection2 that would be bringing it under the determination of the understanding1 which1 equally with sensuous perception1 implies the separateness of sensuous things4 ,as to the form of its existence1 absolute indifference is with ,schelling posited as ,a ,a2 and this form is for him the knowledge of absolute identity1 which1 however1 is inseparable from the ,being or existence of the same4#dbd ,thus1 therefore1 opposition1 as form and reality or existence1 no doubt appears in this ,absolute1 but it is determined as a merely relative or unessential opposition3 8,between subject and object no other than quantitative difference is possible4 ,for no qualitative difference as regards the two is thinkable10 because absolute identity 8is posited as subject and object only as regards the form of its ,being1 not as regards its existence4 ,there is consequently only a quantitative difference left10 i4e4 only that of magnitude3 and yet difference must really be understood as qualitative1 and must thus be shown to be a difference which abrogates itself4 ,this quantitative difference1 says ,schelling1 is the form actu3 8,the quantitative difference of subjective and objective is the basis of all finitude4 ,each determined potency marks a determined quantitative difference of the subjective and objective4 ,each individual ,being is the result of a quantitative difference of subjectivity and objectivity4 ,the individual expresses absolute identity under a determined form of ,being30 so that each side is itself a relative totality1 ,a ,b1 and at the same time the one factor preponderates in the one1 and the other factor in the other1 but both remain absolute identity4#dbe ,this is insufficient1 for there are other determinations2 difference is undoubtedly qualitative1 although this is not the absolute determination4 ,quantitative difference is no true difference1 but an entirely external relation2 and likewise the preponderance of subjective and objective is not a determination of thought1 but a merely sensuous determination4 ,the ,absolute itself1 in so far as the positing of difference is taken into account1 is defined by ,schelling as the quantitative indifference of subjective and objective3 in respect to absolute identity no quantitative difference is thinkable4 8,quantitative difference is only possible outside of absolute identity1 and outside of absolute totality4 ,there is nothing in itself outside of totality1 excepting by virtue of an arbitrary separation of the individual from the whole4 ,absolute identity exists only under the form of the quantitative indifference of subjective and objective40 ,quantitative difference1 which appears outside of absolute identity and totality1 is therefore1 according to ,schelling1 in itself absolute identity1 and consequently thinkable only under the form of the quantitative indifference of the subjective and objective4 8,this opposition does not therefore occur in itself1 or from the standpoint of speculation4 ,from this standpoint ,a exists just as much as ,b does2 for ,a like ,b is the whole absolute identity1 which only exists under the two forms1 but under both of them alike4 ,absolute identity is the universe itself4 ,the form of its ,being can be thought of under the image of a line10 as shown by the following scheme3 ,a ,b ,a ,b ----------------- ,a ,a 8in which the same identity is posited in each direction1 but with ,a or ,b preponderating in opposite directions40#dbf ,if we go into details1 the main points from an elementary point of view are the following4 ,the first potency is that the first quantitative difference of the ,absolute1 or 8the first relative totality is matter4 ,proof3 ,a ,b is not anything real either as relative identity or as relative duplicity4 ,as identity ,a ,b1 in the individual as in the whole1 can be expressed only by the line10--the first dimension4 8,but in that line ,a is posited throughout as existent10 i4e4 it is at the same time related to ,b4 8,therefore this line presupposes ,a ,b as relative totality throughout2 relative totality is therefore the first presupposition1 and if relative identity exists1 it exists only through relative totality10--this is duplicity1 the second dimension4 8,in the same way relative duplicity presupposes relative identity4 ,relative identity and duplicity are contained in relative totality1 not indeed actu1 but yet potentia4 ,therefore the two opposites must mutually extinguish each other in a third0 dimension4 8,absolute identity as the immediate basis of the reality of ,a and ,b in matter1 is the force of gravitation4 ,if ,a preponderates we have the force of attraction1 if ,b preponderates we have that of expansion4 ,the quantitative positing of the forces of attraction and expansion passes into the infinite2 their equilibrium exists in the whole1 not in the individual40#dbg ,from matter as the first indifference in immediacy ,schelling now passes on to further determinations4 ,the second potency 7,a7 is light1 this identity itself posited as existent2 in so far as ,a ,b1 ,a is also posited4 ,the same identity1 8posited under the form of relative identity10 i4e4 of the polarity which we find appearing 8in ,a and ,b1 is the force of cohesion4 ,cohesion is the impression made on matter by the self-hood0 of light 8or by personality1 whereby matter first emerges as particular out of the universal identity1 and raises itself into the realm of form40 ,planets1 metals and other bodies form a series which under the form of dynamic cohesion expresses particular relations of cohesion1 in which on the one hand contraction preponderates1 and on the other hand expansion4 ,these potencies appear with ,schelling as north and south1 east and west polarity3 their developments further appear as north-west1 south-east1 c4 ,he counts as the last potency ,mercury1 ,venus1 the ,earth1 c4 ,he continues3 8,cohesion outside of the point of indifference ,i term passive4 ,towards the negative side0 7or pole7 8fall some of the metals which stand next to iron1 after them the so-called precious metals10 then the 8diamond1 and lastly carbon1 the greatest passive cohesion4 ,towards the positive side1 again1 some metals fall1 in which the cohesive nature of iron gradually diminishes10 i4e4 approaches disintegration1 and lastly 8disappears in nitrogen40 ,active cohesion is magnetism1 and the material universe is an infinite magnet4 ,the magnetic process is difference in indifference1 and indifference in difference1 and therefore absolute identity as such4 ,the indifference point of the magnet is the 8neither nor0 and the 8as well as02 the poles are potentially the same essence1 only posited under two factors which are opposed4 ,both poles depend 8only upon whether or - preponderates02 they are not pure abstractions4 8,in the total magnet the empirical magnet is the indifference point4 ,the empirical magnet is iron4 ,all bodies are mere metamorphoses of iron--they are potentially contained in iron4 ,every two different bodies which touch each other set up mutually in each other relative diminution and increase of cohesion4 ,this mutual alteration of cohesion by means of the contact of two different bodies is electricity2 the cohesion-diminishing factor ,e is the potency of hydrogen1-,e is the potency of oxygen4 ,the totality of the dynamic process is represented only by the chemical process40#dbh 8,by the positing of the dynamic totality the addition of light is directly posited as a product4 ,the expression1 the total product1 therefore signifies light combined with the force of gravitation2 by the positing of the relative totality of the whole potency1 the force of gravity is directly reduced to the mere form of the ,being of absolute identity40 ,thus is the third potency 7,a71 the organism4#dbi ,schelling launched out into too many individual details1 if he desired to indicate the construction of the whole universe4 ,on the one hand1 however1 he did not complete this representation1 and on the other hand1 he has confined himself mainly to implicit existence1 and has mixed therewith the formalism of external construction according to a presupposed scheme4 ,in this representation he advanced only as far as the organism1 and did not reach the presentation of the other side of knowledge1 i4e4 the philosophy of spirit4 ,schelling began time after time1 in accordance with the idea implied in this construction1 to work out the natural universe1 and especially the organism4 ,he banishes all such meaningless terms as perfection1 wisdom1 outward adaptability2 or1 in other words1 the ,kantian formula1 that a thing appears so and so to our faculty of knowledge1 is transformed by him into this other formula1 that such and such is the constitution of ,nature4 ,following up ,kant's meagre attempt at demonstrating spirit in nature1 he devoted special attention to inaugurating anew this mode of regarding nature1 so as to recognize in objective existence the same schematism1 the same rhythm1 as is present in the ideal4 ,hence nature represents itself therein not as something alien to spirit1 but as being in its general aspect a projection of spirit into an objective mode4 ,we have further to remark that ,schelling by this theory became the originator of modern ,natural ,philosophy1 since he was the first to exhibit ,nature as the sensuous perception or the expression of the ,notion and its determinations4 ,natural ,philosophy is no new science2 we met with it continually--in the works of ,aristotle1 for instance1 and elsewhere4 ,english ,philosophy is also a mere apprehension in thought of the physical2 forces1 laws of ,nature1 are its fundamental determinations4 ,the opposition of physics and ,natural ,philosophy is therefore not the opposition of the unthinking and the thinking view of ,nature2 ,natural ,philosophy means1 if we take it in its whole extent1 nothing else than the thoughtful contemplation of ,nature2 but this is the work of ordinary physics also1 since its determinations of forces1 laws1 c41 are thoughts4 ,the only difference is that in physics thoughts are formal thoughts of the understanding1 whose material and content cannot1 as regards their details1 be determined by thought itself1 but must be taken from experience4 ,but concrete thought contains its determination and its content in itself1 and merely the external mode of appearance pertains to the senses4 ,if1 then1 ,philosophy passes beyond the form of the understanding1 and has apprehended the speculative ,notion1 it must alter the determinations of thought1 the categories of the understanding regarding ,nature4 ,kant was the first to set about this2 and ,schelling has sought to grasp the ,notion of ,nature1 instead of contenting himself with the ordinary metaphysics of the same4 ,nature is to him nothing but the external mode of existence as regards the system of thought-forms1 just as mind is the existence of the same system in the form of consciousness4 ,that for which we have to thank ,schelling1 therefore1 is not that he brought thought to bear on the comprehension of ,nature1 but that he altered the categories according to which thought applied itself to ,nature2 he introduced forms of ,reason1 and applied them--as he did the form of the syllogism in magnetism1 for instance--in place of the ordinary categories of the understanding4 ,he has not only shown these forms in ,nature1 but has also sought to evolve ,nature out of a principle of this kind4 ,in the 8,further ,exposition of the ,system of ,philosophy0 which the 8,new ,journal for ,speculative ,physics0 furnishes1 ,schelling chose other forms2 for1 by reason of incompletely developed form and lack of dialectic1 he had recourse to various forms one after another1 because he found none of them sufficient4 ,instead of the equilibrium of subjectivity and objectivity1 he now speaks of the identity of existence and form1 of universal and particular1 of finite and infinite1 of positive and negative1 and he defines absolute indifference sometimes in one and sometimes in another form of opposition1 just according to chance4 ,all such oppositions may be employed2 but they are only abstract1 and refer to different stages in the development of the logical principle itself4 ,form and essence are distinguished by ,schelling in this way1 that form1 regarded on its own account1 is the particular1 or the emerging of difference1 subjectivity4 ,but real existence is absolute form or absolute knowledge immediately in itself1 a self-conscious existence in the sense of thinking knowledge1 just as with ,spinoza it had the form of something objective or in thought4 ,speculative ,philosophy is to be found in this assertion1 not that it asserts an independent philosophy1 for it is purely organization2 knowledge is based on the ,absolute4 ,thus ,schelling has again given to transcendental ,idealism the significance of absolute ,idealism4 ,this unity of existence and form is thus1 according to ,schelling1 the ,absolute2 or if we regard reality as the universal1 and form as the particular1 the ,absolute is the absolute unity of universal and particular1 or of ,being and knowledge4 ,the different aspects1 subject and object1 or universal and particular1 are only ideal oppositions2 they are in the ,absolute entirely and altogether one4 ,this unity as form is intellectual intuition1 which posits ,thinking and ,being as absolutely alike1 and as it formally expresses the ,absolute1 it becomes at the same time the expression of its essence4 ,he who has not the power of imagination1 whereby he may represent this unity to himself1 is deficient in the organ of ,philosophy4 ,but in this consists the true absoluteness of all and each1 that the one is not recognized as universal1 and the other as particular1 but the universal in this its determination is recognized as unity of the universal and particular1 and in like manner the particular is recognized as the unity of both4 ,construction merely consists in leading back everything determined and particular into the ,absolute1 or regarding it as it is in absolute unity2 its determinateness is only its ideal moment1 but its truth is really its ,being in the ,absolute4 ,these three moments or potencies--that of the passing of existence 7the infinite7 into form 7the finite71 and of form into existence 7which are both relative unities71 and the third1 the absolute unity1 thus recur anew in each individual4 ,hence ,nature1 the real or actual aspect1 as the passing of existence into form or of the universal into the particular1 itself again possesses these three unities in itself1 and in the same way the ideal aspect does so2 therefore each potency is on its own account once more absolute4 ,this is the general idea of the scientific construction of the universe--to repeat in each individual alike the triplicity which is the scheme of the whole1 thereby to show the identity of all things1 and in doing so to regard them in their absolute essence1 so that they all express the same unity4#dcj ,the more detailed explanation is extremely formal3 8,existence passes into form--this taken by itself being the particular 7the finite7--by means of the infinite being added to it2 unity is received into multiplicity1 indifference into difference40 ,the other assertion is3 8,form passes into existence by the finite being received into the infinite1 difference into indifference40 ,but passing into and receiving into are merely sensuous expressions4 8,otherwise expressed1 the particular becomes absolute form by the universal becoming one with it1 and the universal becomes absolute existence by the particular becoming one with it4 ,but these two unities1 as in the ,absolute1 are not outside of one another1 but in one another1 and therefore the ,absolute is absolute indifference of form and existence10 as unity of this double passing-into-one4 8,by means of these two unities two different potencies are determined1 but in themselves they are both the exactly equal roots of the ,absolute40#dca ,that is a mere assertion1 the continual return after each differentiation1 which is perpetually again removed out of the ,absolute4 8,of the first absolute transformation there are copies in phenomenal ,nature2 therefore ,nature1 regarded in itself1 is nothing else than that first transformation as it exists in the absolute 7unseparated from the other74 ,for by means of the infinite passing into the finite1 existence passes into form2 since then form obtains reality only by means of existence1 existence1 when it has passed into form without form having 7according to the assumption7 similarly passed into existence1 can be represented only as potentiality or ground of reality1 but not as indifference of possibility and actuality4 ,but that which may be described thus1 namely as existence1 in so far as that is mere ground of reality1 and therefore has really passed into form1 although form has not in turn passed into it1 is what presents itself as ,nature4--,existence makes its appearance in form1 but in return form also makes its appearance in existence2 this is the other unity10 that of mind4 8,this unity is established by the finite being received into the infinite4 ,at this point form1 as the particular1 strikes into existence1 and itself becomes absolute4 ,form which passes into existence places itself as absolute activity and positive cause of reality in opposition to the existence which passes into form1 and which appears only as ground4 ,the passing of absolute form into existence is what we think of as ,god1 and the images or copies of this transformation are in the ideal world1 which is therefore in its implicitude the other unity40#dcb ,each of these two transformations1 then1 is the whole totality1 not1 however1 posited and not appearing as totality1 but with the one or the other factor preponderating2 each of the two spheres has1 therefore1 in itself again these differences1 and thus in each of them the three potencies are to be found4 ,the ground or basis1 ,nature as basis merely1 is matter1 gravity1 as the first potency2 this passing of form into existence is in the actual world universal mechanism1 necessity4 ,but the second potency is 8the light which shineth in darkness1 form which has passed into existence4 ,the absolute unification of the two unities in actuality1 so that matter is altogether form1 and form is altogether matter1 is organism1 the highest expression of ,nature as it is in ,god1 and of ,god as ,he is in ,nature1 in the finite40 ,on the ideal side 8,knowledge is the essence of the ,absolute brought into the daylight of form2 action is a transformation of form1 as the particular1 into the essence of the ,absolute4 ,as in the real world form that is identified with essence appears as light1 so in the ideal world ,god ,himself appears in particular manifestation as the living form which has emerged in the passing of form into essence1 so that in every respect the ideal and real world are again related as likeness and symbol4 ,the absolute unification of the two unities in the ideal1 so that material is wholly form and form wholly material1 is the work of art2 and that secret hidden in the ,absolute which is the root of all reality comes here into view1 in the reflected world itself1 in the highest potency and highest union of ,god and ,nature as the power of imagination40 ,on account of that permeation art and poetry therefore hold the highest rank in ,schelling's estimation4 ,but art is the ,absolute in sensuous form alone4 ,where and what could the work of art be1 which should correspond to the ,idea of the spirit8 8,the universe is formed in the ,absolute as the most perfect organic existence and the most perfect work of art3 for ,reason1 which recognizes the ,absolute in it1 it possesses absolute truth2 for the imagination1 which represents the ,absolute in it1 it possesses absolute ,beauty4 ,each of these expresses the very same unity10 regarded 8from different sides2 and both arrive at the absolute indifference point in the recognition of which lies both the beginning and the aim of real knowledge40#dcc ,this highest ,idea1 these differences1 are grasped as a whole in a very formal manner only4 #c4 ,the relation of ,nature to ,spirit1 and to ,god1 the ,absolute1 has been stated by ,schelling elsewhere1 i4e4 in his later expositions1 as follows3 he defines the existence of ,god as ,nature--in so far as ,god constitutes ,himself its ground or basis1 as infinite perception--and ,nature is thus the negative moment in ,god1 since intelligence and thought exist only by means of the opposition of one ,being4 ,for in one of his writings1 directed on some particular occasion against ,jacobi1 ,schelling explains himself further with regard to the nature of ,god and ,his relation to ,nature4 ,he says3 8,god1 or more properly the existence which is ,god1 is ground3 ,he is ground of ,himself as a moral ,being4 ,but0 then 8it is ground that ,he makes ,himself0--not cause4 ,something must precede intelligence1 and that something is ,being--8since thought is the exact opposite of ,being4 ,that which is the beginning of an intelligence cannot be in its turn intelligent1 since there would otherwise be no distinction2 but it cannot be absolutely unintelligent1 for the very reason that it is the potentiality of an intelligence4 ,it will accordingly be something between these1 i4e4 it will operate with wisdom1 but as it were with an innate1 instinctive1 blind1 and yet unconscious wisdom2 just as we often hear those who are under a spell uttering words full of understanding1 but not uttering them with comprehension of their meaning1 but as it were owing to an inspiration40 ,god1 therefore1 as this ground of ,himself1 is ,nature--,nature as it is in ,god2 this is the view taken of ,nature in ,natural ,philosophy4#dcd ,but the work of the ,absolute is to abrogate this ground1 and to constitute itself ,intelligence4 ,on this account ,schelling's philosophy has later been termed a ,philosophy of ,nature1 and that in the sense of a universal philosophy1 while at first ,natural ,philosophy was held to be only a part of the whole4 ,it is not incumbent on us here to give a more detailed account of ,schelling's philosophy1 or to show points in the expositions hitherto given by him which are far from satisfactory4 ,the system is the latest form of ,philosophy which we had to consider1 and it is a form both interesting and true4 ,in the first place special emphasis1 in dealing with ,schelling1 must be laid on the idea that he has grasped the true as the concrete1 as the unity of subjective and objective4 ,the main point in ,schelling's philosophy thus is that its interest centres round that deep1 speculative content1 which1 as content1 is the content with which ,philosophy in the entire course of its history has had to do4 ,the ,thought which is free and independent1 not abstract1 but in itself concrete1 comprehends itself in itself as an intellectually actual world2 and this is the truth of ,nature1 ,nature in itself4 ,the second great merit possessed by ,schelling is to have pointed out in ,nature the forms of ,spirit2 thus electricity1 magnetism1 c41 are for him only external modes of the ,idea4 ,his defect is that this ,idea in general1 its distinction into the ideal and the natural world1 and also the totality of these determinations1 are not shown forth and developed as necessitated in themselves by the ,notion4 ,as ,schelling has not risen to this point of view1 he has misconceived the nature of thought2 the work of art thus becomes for him the supreme and only mode in which the ,idea exists for spirit4 ,but the supreme mode of the ,idea is really its own element2 thought1 the ,idea apprehended1 is therefore higher than the work of art4 ,the ,idea is the truth1 and all that is true is the ,idea2 the systematizing of the ,idea into the world must be proved to be a necessary unveiling and revelation4 ,with ,schelling1 on the other hand1 form is really an external scheme1 and his method is the artificial application of this scheme to external objects4 ,this externally applied scheme takes the place of dialectic progress2 and this is the special reason why the philosophy of ,nature has brought itself into discredit1 that it has proceeded on an altogether external plan1 has made its foundation a ready-made scheme1 and fitted into it ,nature as we perceive it4 ,these forms were potencies with ,schelling1 but instead of mathematical forms or a type of thought like this1 by some other men sensuous forms have been taken as basis1 just as were sulphur and mercury by ,jacob ,boehme4 ,for instance1 magnetism1 electricity1 and chemistry have been defined to be the three potencies in ,nature1 and thus in the organism reproduction has been termed chemistry2 irritability1 electricity2 and sensibility1 magnetism4#dce ,in this way there has crept into ,natural ,philosophy the great formalism of representing everything as a series1 which is a superficial determination without necessity1 since instead of ,notions we find formulas4 ,brilliant powers of imagination are displayed1 such as were exhibited by ,grres4 ,this mistake of applying forms which are taken from one sphere of ,nature to another sphere of the same has been carried a long way2 ,oken1 for example1 calls wood-fibres the nerves and brain of the plant1 and is almost crazy on the subject4 ,philosophy would in this way become a play of mere analogical reflections2 and it is not with these but with thoughts that we have to do4 ,nerves are not thoughts1 any more than such expressions as pole of contraction1 of expansion1 masculine1 feminine1 c4 ,the formal plan of applying an external scheme to the sphere of ,nature which one wishes to observe1 is the external work of ,natural ,philosophy1 and this scheme is itself derived from the imagination4 ,that is a most false mode of proceeding2 ,schelling took advantage of it to some extent1 others have made a complete misuse of it4 ,all this is done to escape thought2 nevertheless1 thought is the ultimate simple determination which has to be dealt with4 ,it is therefore of the greatest importance to distinguish ,schelling's philosophy1 on the one hand1 from that imitation of it which throws itself into an unspiritual farrago of words regarding the ,absolute2 and1 on the other hand1 from the philosophy of those imitators1 who1 owing to a failure to understand intellectual intuition1 give up comprehension1 and with it the leading moment of knowledge1 and speak from so-called intuition1 i4e4 they take a glance at the thing in question1 and having fastened on it some superficial analogy or definition1 they fancy they have expressed its whole nature1 while in point of fact they put an end to all capacity for attaining to scientific knowledge4 ,this whole tendency places itself1 in the first place1 in opposition to reflective thought1 or to progress in fixed1 steadfast1 immovable ,notions4 ,but instead of remaining in the ,notion and recognizing it as the unresting ego1 they have lighted on the opposite extreme of passive intuition1 of immediate ,being1 of fixed implicitude2 and they think that they can make up for the lack of fixity by superficial observation1 and can render this observation intellectual by determining it once more by some fixed ,notion or other2 or they bring their minds to bear on the object of consideration by saying1 for instance1 that the ostrich is the fish among birds1 because he has a long neck--fish becomes a general term1 but not a ,notion4 ,this whole mode of reasoning1 which has forced its way into natural history and natural science1 as well as into medicine1 is a miserable formalism1 an irrational medley of the crudest empiricism with the most superficial ideal determinations that formalism ever descended to4 ,the philosophy of ,locke is not so crude as it is1 for it is not a whit better in either its content or its form1 and it is combined with foolish self-conceit into the bargain4 ,philosophy on this account sank into general and well-deserved contempt1 such as is for the most part extended to those who assert that they have a monopoly of philosophy4 ,instead of earnestness of apprehension and circumspection of thought1 we find in them a juggling with idle fancies1 which pass for deep conceptions1 lofty surmises1 and even for poetry2 and they think they are right in the centre of things when they are only on the surface4 ,five-and-twenty years ago#dcf the case was the same with poetic art2 a taste for ingenious conceits took possession of it1 and the effusions of its poetic inspiration came forth blindly from itself1 shot out as from a pistol4 ,the results were either crazy ravings1 or1 if they were not ravings1 they were prose so dull that it was unworthy of the name of prose4 ,it is just the same in the later philosophies4 ,what is not utterly senseless drivel about the indifference-point and polarity1 about oxygen1 the holy1 the infinite1 c41 is made up of thoughts so trivial that we might well doubt our having correctly apprehended their meaning1 in the first place because they are given forth with such arrogant effrontery1 and in the second place because we cannot help trusting that what was said was not so trivial as it seems4 ,as in the ,philosophy of ,nature men forgot the ,notion and proceeded in a dead unspiritual course1 so here they lose sight of spirit entirely4 ,they have strayed from the right road2 for by their principle1 ,notion and perception are one unity1 but in point of fact this unity1 this spirit1 itself emerges in immediacy1 and is therefore in intuitive perception1 and not in the ,notion4 ,e4 ,,final ,,result4 ,the present standpoint of philosophy is that the ,idea is known in its necessity2 the sides of its diremption1 ,nature and ,spirit1 are each of them recognized as representing the totality of the ,idea1 and not only as being in themselves identical1 but as producing this one identity from themselves2 and in this way the identity is recognized as necessary4 ,nature1 and the world or history of spirit1 are the two realities2 what exists as actual ,nature is an image of divine ,reason2 the forms of self-conscious ,reason are also the forms of ,nature4 ,the ultimate aim and business of philosophy is to reconcile thought or the ,notion with reality4 ,it is easy from subordinate standpoints to find satisfaction in modes of intuitive perception and of feeling4 ,but the deeper the spirit goes within itself1 the more vehement is the opposition1 the more abundant is the wealth without2 the depth is to be measured by the greatness of the craving with which spirit seeks to find itself in what lies outside of itself4 ,we saw the thought which apprehends itself appearing2 it strove to make itself concrete within itself4 ,its first activity is formal2 ,aristotle was the first to say that is the thought of thought4 ,the result is the thought which is at home with itself1 and at the same time embraces the universe therein1 and transforms it into an intelligent world4 ,in apprehension the spiritual and the natural universe are interpenetrated as one harmonious universe1 which withdraws into itself1 and in its various aspects develops the ,absolute into a totality1 in order1 by the very process of so doing1 to become conscious of itself in its unity1 in ,thought4 ,philosophy is thus the true theodicy1 as contrasted with art and religion and the feelings which these call up--a reconciliation of spirit1 namely of the spirit which has apprehended itself in its freedom and in the riches of its reality4 ,to this point the ,world-spirit has come1 and each stage has its own form in the true system of ,philosophy2 nothing is lost1 all principles are preserved1 since ,philosophy in its final aspect is the totality of forms4 ,this concrete idea is the result of the strivings of spirit during almost twenty-five centuries of earnest work to become objective to itself1 to know itself3 ,tant molis erat1 se ipsam cognoscere mentem4 ,all this time was required to produce the philosophy of our day2 so tardily and slowly did the ,world-spirit work to reach this goal4 ,what we pass in rapid review when we recall it1 stretched itself out in reality to this great length of time4 ,for in this lengthened period1 the ,notion of ,spirit1 invested with its entire concrete development1 its external subsistence1 its wealth1 is striving to bring spirit to perfection1 to make progress itself and to develop from spirit4 ,it goes ever on and on1 because spirit is progress alone4 ,spirit often seems to have forgotten and lost itself1 but inwardly opposed to itself1 it is inwardly working ever forward 7as when ,hamlet says of the ghost of his father1 8,well said1 old mole6 canst work i' the ground so fast80#dcg71 until grown strong in itself it bursts asunder the crust of earth which divided it from the sun1 its ,notion1 so that the earth crumbles away4 ,at such a time1 when the encircling crust1 like a soulless decaying tenement1 crumbles away1 and spirit displays itself arrayed in new youth1 the seven league boots are at length adopted4 ,this work of the spirit to know itself1 this activity to find itself1 is the life of the spirit and the spirit itself4 ,its result is the ,notion which it takes up of itself2 the history of ,philosophy is a revelation of what has been the aim of spirit throughout its history2 it is therefore the world's history in its innermost signification4 ,this work of the human spirit in the recesses of thought is parallel with all the stages of reality2 and therefore no philosophy oversteps its own time4 ,the importance which the determinations of thought possessed is another matter1 which does not belong to the history of ,philosophy4 ,these ,notions are the simplest revelation of the ,world spirit3 in their more concrete form they are history4 ,we must1 therefore1 in the first place not esteem lightly what spirit has won1 namely its gains up to the present day4 ,ancient ,philosophy is to be reverenced as necessary1 and as a link in this sacred chain1 but all the same nothing more than a link4 ,the present is the highest stage reached4 ,in the second place1 all the various philosophies are no mere fashionable theories of the time1 or anything of a similar nature2 they are neither chance products nor the blaze of a fire of straw1 nor casual eruptions here and there1 but a spiritual1 reasonable1 forward advance2 they are of necessity one ,philosophy in its development1 the revelation of ,god1 as ,he knows ,himself to be4 ,where several philosophies appear at the same time1 they are different sides which make up one totality forming their basis2 and on account of their one-sidedness we see the refutation of the one by the other4 ,in the third place we do not find here feeble little efforts to establish or to criticize this or that particular point2 instead of that1 each philosophy sets up a new principle of its own1 and this must be recognized4 ,if we glance at the main epochs in the whole history of ,philosophy1 and grasp the necessary succession of stages in the leading moments1 each of which expresses a determinate ,idea1 we find that after the ,oriental whirl of subjectivity1 which attains to no intelligibility and therefore to no subsistence1 the light of thought dawned among the ,greeks4 #a4 ,the philosophy of the ancients had the absolute ,idea as its thought2 and the realization or reality of the same consisted in comprehending the existing present world1 and regarding it as it is in its absolute nature4 ,this philosophy did not make its starting-point the ,idea itself1 but proceeded from the objective as from something given1 and transformed the same into the ,idea2 the ,being of ,parmenides4 #b4 ,abstract thought1 1 became known to itself as universal essence or existence1 not as subjective thought2 the ,universal of ,plato4 #c4 ,in ,aristotle the ,notion emerges1 free and unconstrained1 as comprehending thought1 permeating and spiritualizing all the forms which the universe contains4 #d4 ,the ,notion as subject1 its independence1 its inwardness1 abstract separation1 is represented by the ,stoics1 ,epicureans and ,sceptics3 here we have not the free1 concrete form1 but universality abstract and in itself formal4 #e4 ,the thought of totality1 the intelligible world1 is the concrete ,idea as we have seen it with the ,neo-,platonists4 ,this principle is ideality generally speaking1 which is present in all reality1 but not the ,idea which knows itself3 this is not reached until the principle of subjectivity1 individuality1 found a place in it1 and ,god as spirit became actual to ,himself in self-consciousness4 #f4 ,but it has been the work of modern times to grasp this ,idea as spirit1 as the ,idea that knows itself4 ,in order to proceed from the conscious ,idea to the self-conscious1 we must have the infinite opposition1 namely the fact that the ,idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely sundered in twain4 ,as spirit had the thought of objective existence1 ,philosophy thus perfected the intellectuality of the world1 and produced this spiritual world as an object existing beyond present reality1 like ,nature1--the first creation of spirit4 ,the work of the spirit now consisted in bringing this ,beyond back to reality1 and guiding it into self-consciousness4 ,this is accomplished by self-consciousness thinking itself1 and recognizing absolute existence to be the self-consciousness that thinks itself4 ,with ,descartes pure thought directed itself on that separation which we spoke of above4 ,self-consciousness1 in the first place1 thinks of itself as consciousness2 therein is contained all objective reality1 and the positive1 intuitive reference of its reality to the other side4 ,with ,spinoza ,thought and ,being are opposed and yet identical2 he has the intuitive perception of substance1 but the knowledge of substance in his case is external4 ,we have here the principle of reconciliation taking its rise from thought as such1 in order to abrogate the subjectivity of thought3 this is the case in ,leibnitz's monad1 which possesses the power of representation4 #g4 ,in the second place1 self-consciousness thinks of itself as being self-consciousness2 in being self-conscious it is independent1 but still in this independence it has a negative relation to what is outside self-consciousness4 ,this is infinite subjectivity1 which appears at one time as the critique of thought in the case of ,kant1 and at another time1 in the case of ,fichte1 as the tendency or impulse towards the concrete4 ,absolute1 pure1 infinite form is expressed as self-consciousness1 the ,ego4 #h4 ,this is a light that breaks forth on spiritual substance1 and shows absolute content and absolute form to be identical2--substance is in itself identical with knowledge4 ,self-consciousness thus1 in the third place1 recognizes its positive relation as its negative1 and its negative as its positive1--or1 in other words1 recognizes these opposite activities as the same1 i4e4 it recognizes pure ,thought or ,being as self-identity1 and this again as separation4 ,this is intellectual perception2 but it is requisite in order that it should be in truth intellectual1 that it should not be that merely immediate perception of the eternal and the divine which we hear of1 but should be absolute knowledge4 ,this intuitive perception which does not recognize itself is taken as starting-point as if it were absolutely presupposed2 it has in itself intuitive perception only as immediate knowledge1 and not as self-knowledge3 or it knows nothing1 and what it perceives it does not really know1--for1 taken at its best1 it consists of beautiful thoughts1 but not knowledge4 ,but intellectual intuition is knowledge1 since1 in the first place1 in spite of the separation of each of the opposed sides from the other1 all external reality is known as internal4 ,if it is known according to its essence1 as it is1 it shows itself as not existing of itself1 but as essentially consisting in the movement of transition4 ,this ,heraclitean or ,sceptical principle1 that nothing is at rest1 must be demonstrated of each individual thing2 and thus in this consciousness--that the essence of each thing lies in determination1 in what is the opposite of itself--there appears the apprehended unity with its opposite4 ,similarly this unity is1 in the second place1 to be recognized even in its essence2 its essence as this identity is1 in the same way1 to pass over into its opposite1 or to realize itself1 to become for itself something different2 and thus the opposition in it is brought about by itself4 ,again1 it may be said of the opposition1 in the third place1 that it is not in the ,absolute2 this ,absolute is existence1 the eternal1 c4 ,this is1 however1 itself an abstraction in which the ,absolute is apprehended in a one-sided manner only1 and the opposition is apprehended only as ideal 7supra1 p4 #ecf72 but in fact it is form1 as the essential moment of the movement of the ,absolute4 ,this ,absolute is not at rest1 and that opposition is not the unresting ,notion2 for the ,idea1 unresting though it is1 is yet at rest and satisfied in itself4 ,pure thought has advanced to the opposition of the subjective and objective2 the true reconciliation of the opposition is the perception that this opposition1 when pushed to its absolute extreme1 resolves itself2 as ,schelling says1 the opposites are in themselves identical--and not only in themselves1 but eternal life consists in the very process of continually producing the opposition and continually reconciling it4 ,to know opposition in unity1 and unity in opposition--this is absolute knowledge2 and science is the knowledge of this unity in its whole development by means of itself4 ,this is then the demand of all time and of ,philosophy4 ,a new epoch has arisen in the world4 ,it would appear as if the ,world-spirit had at last succeeded in stripping off from itself all alien objective existence1 and apprehending itself at last as absolute ,spirit1 in developing from itself what for it is objective1 and keeping it within its own power1 yet remaining at rest all the while4 ,the strife of the finite self-consciousness with the absolute self-consciousness1 which last seemed to the other to lie outside of itself1 now comes to an end4 ,finite self-consciousness has ceased to be finite2 and in this way absolute self-consciousness has1 on the other hand1 attained to the reality which it lacked before4 ,this is the whole history of the world in general up to the present time1 and the history of ,philosophy in particular1 the sole work of which is to depict this strife4 ,now1 indeed1 it seems to have reached its goal1 when this absolute self-consciousness1 which it had the work of representing1 has ceased to be alien1 and when spirit accordingly is realized as spirit4 ,for it becomes such only as the result of its knowing itself to be absolute spirit1 and this it knows in real scientific knowledge4 ,spirit produces itself as ,nature1 as the ,state2 nature is its unconscious work1 in the course of which it appears to itself something different1 and not spirit2 but in the ,state1 in the deeds and life of ,history1 as also of ,art1 it brings itself to pass with consciousness2 it knows very various modes of its reality1 yet they are only modes4 ,in scientific knowledge alone it knows itself as absolute spirit2 and this knowledge1 or spirit1 is its only true existence4 ,this then is the standpoint of the present day1 and the series of spiritual forms is with it for the present concluded4 ,at this point ,i bring this history of ,philosophy to a close4 ,it has been my desire that you should learn from it that the history of ,philosophy is not a blind collection of fanciful ideas1 nor a fortuitous progression4 ,i have rather sought to show the necessary development of the successive philosophies from one another1 so that the one of necessity presupposes another preceding it4 ,the general result of the history of ,philosophy is this3 in the first place1 that throughout all time there has been only one ,philosophy1 the contemporary differences of which constitute the necessary aspects of the one principle2 in the second place1 that the succession of philosophic systems is not due to chance1 but represents the necessary succession of stages in the development of this science2 in the third place1 that the final philosophy of a period is the result of this development1 and is truth in the highest form which the self-consciousness of spirit affords of itself4 ,the latest philosophy contains therefore those which went before2 it embraces in itself all the different stages thereof2 it is the product and result of those that preceded it4 ,we can now1 for example1 be ,platonists no longer4 ,moreover we must raise ourselves once for all above the pettinesses of individual opinions1 thoughts1 objections1 and difficulties2 and also above our own vanity1 as if our individual thoughts were of any particular value4 ,for to apprehend the inward substantial spirit is the standpoint of the individual2 as parts of the whole1 individuals are like blind men1 who are driven forward by the indwelling spirit of the whole4 ,our standpoint now is accordingly the knowledge of this ,idea as spirit1 as absolute ,spirit1 which in this way opposes to itself another spirit1 the finite1 the principle of which is to know absolute spirit1 in order that absolute spirit may become existent for it4 ,i have tried to develop and bring before your thoughts this series of successive spiritual forms pertaining to ,philosophy in its progress1 and to indicate the connection between them4 ,this series is the true kingdom of spirits1 the only kingdom of spirits that there is--it is a series which is not a multiplicity1 nor does it even remain a series1 if we understand thereby that one of its members merely follows on another2 but in the very process of coming to the knowledge of itself it is transformed into the moments of the one ,spirit1 or the one self-present ,spirit4 ,this long procession of spirits is formed by the individual pulses which beat in its life2 they are the organism of our substance1 an absolutely necessary progression1 which expresses nothing less than the nature of spirit itself1 and which lives in us all4 ,we have to give ear to its urgency--when the mole that is within forces its way on--and we have to make it a reality4 ,it is my desire that this history of ,philosophy should contain for you a summons to grasp the spirit of the time1 which is present in us by nature1 and--each in his own place--consciously to bring it from its natural condition1 i4e4 from its lifeless seclusion1 into the light of day4 ,i have to express my thanks to you for the attention with which you have listened to me while ,i have been making this attempt2 it is in great measure due to you that my efforts have met with so great a measure of success4 ,and it has been a source of pleasure to myself to have been associated with you in this spiritual community2 ,i ought not to speak of it as if it were a thing of the past1 for ,i hope that a spiritual bond has been knit between us which will prove permanent4 ,i bid you a most hearty farewell4 99 99 99 99 99 7,the closing lecture of the series was given on the #bbnd ,march1 #ahag2 on the #adth ,march1 #ahah2 on the #abth ,august1 #ahai2 on the #bcrd ,march1 #ahba2 on the #cjth ,march1 #ahbd2 on the #bhth ,march1 #ahbh2 and on the #bfth ,march1 #ahcj47 ,,footnotes3 #a ,neander4 ,genet4 ,entwickelung d4 vornehmsten gnost4 ,systeme1 p4 #dc4 #b ,neander4 ,genetische ,entwickelung1 c41 pp4 #hg-ia4 #c ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii ,section ,i4 p4 #cff2 ,buhle3 ,lehrb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,part ,v4 p4 #cf2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #bc1 #bd2 #bh1 #bi4 #d ,moses ,maimonides3 ,more ,nevochim1 ,p4 ,i4 c4 #ga1 pp4 #acc1 #acd 7,basil4 #afbi74 #e ,abulphar4 ,dynast4 ,,ix4 pp4 #aec1 #aga1 #bjh1 #bji2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #bg-bi1 #dd4 #f ,moses ,maimonides3 ,more ,nevochim1 ,p4 ,i4 c4 #gc1 pp4 #aeb-aee1 #aeg-aei4 #g ,pocock4 ,specim4 hist4 ,arab4 pp4 #gh1 #gi2 ,hottinger4 ,biblioth4 orient4 c4 #b1 p4 #bai2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #fe1 #ff2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 p4 #cgd4 #h ,hottinger4 ,biblioth4 orient4 c4 #b1 p4 #bba2 ,gabriel ,sionita3 ,de moribus ,orient4 p4 #af2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #gc1 #gd2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #cgd1 #cge4 #i ,leo ,africanus3 ,de illustrib4 ,arabum viris1 c4 #i1 p4 #bfh2 ,abulphar4 ,dynast4 ,,ix4 p4 #bcj1 ,tiedemann1 ,geist4 d4 spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #aab1 sqq41 ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #hj-hd4 #aj ,leo ,afric4 ,de illustrib4 ,arabum viris1 c4 #ab1 p4 #bgd2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #ic-ie2 ,tiedemann1 ,geist4 d4 spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #abj-abf1 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #chc-cif4 #aa ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #ig4 #ab ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #aja2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #dbj1 #dba4 #ac ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,ii4 p4 #heg2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #ddf1 #ddg4 #ad ,moses ,maimonides3 ,more ,nevochim1 ,p4 ,i4 c4 #ea1 pp4 #gf-gh2 c4 #eg1 #eh1 pp4 #ic-ih2 ,,ii4 c4 #a1 #b1 pp4 #ahd-aic2 ,,iii4 c4 #h1 pp4 #cdd-cej2 c41 c4 #ae ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,pt4 ,i4 p4 #di4 #af ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #fad-fag2 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,universitatis ,parisiensis2 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ahd4 #ag ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univ4 ,paris4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ahb4 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 pp4 #ga1 #gb47 #ah ,de prdestinatione4 ,promium 7,veterum auctorum1 qui ,,ix4 sculo de prdestinatione et gratia scripserunt1 opera et fragmenta1 cura ,gilb4 ,mauguin4 ,paris1 #afej4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ajc47 #ai ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 pp4 #aae1 #aag4 #bj ,anselmi ,epistol4 ,,xli4 ,i4 #aa 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 pp4 #aei1 #afj47 #ba ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 p4 #aaf2 ,eadmerus3 ,de vita ,anselmi 7subjuncta operibus ,anselmi editis a ,gabr4 ,gerberon4 #agba4 ,fol471 p4 #f4 #bb ,gaunilo3 ,liber pro insipiente1 c4 #e2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 p4 #aci2 ,brucker1 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #ffe4 #bc ,tiedemann3 ,geist d4 specul4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #bgg2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #gfb4 #bd ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 pp4 #deg1 #deh4 #be ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #gfd-gfh4 #bf ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 pp4 #cag1 #cbe2 ,brucker1 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #fhh2 ,thomas ,aquinas3 in ,,iv4 libros sentent4 ,l4 ,,ii4 ,dist4 #ag1 ,qu4 ,i4 ,art4 ,i2 ,alberti ,magni3 ,summa ,theol4 ,p4 ,i4 ,tract4 ,,iv4 ,qu4 #bj 7,oper4 ,t4 ,,xvii4 p4 #gf74 #bg ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 pp4 #eej-eec2 ,brucker1 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #hjb4 #bh ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 pp4 #eed-efa4 #bi ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #hbe-hbh2 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univ4 ,paris4 ,t4 ,,iv4 p4 #igj4 #cj ,duns ,scotus in ,magistrum sententiarum4 ,promium 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 p4 #gjf74 #ca ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #hbh2 et not4 from ,sancrutius4 #cb ,trithemius3 ,annal4 ,hirsaugiens1 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ace4 #cc ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #ggi1 #fig2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,sec4 ,i4 pp4 #cec-cei1 and in the same place1 note #c 7cf4 ,jourdain1 ,gesch4 d4 ,arist4 ,schriften im ,mittelalter1 ubersetzt von ,stahr pp4 #afe-agf72 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univers4 ,paris1 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #hb1 #adb2 ,launoius1 ,de varia ,arist4 fortuna in ,academ4 ,paris1 c4 ,,ix4 p4 #baj4 #cd ,hegel erroneously mentions this event as occurring to 8,william of ,england0 instead of to ,william of ,holland1 ,king of the ,romans4 ,translator's note4 #ce ,brucker4 ,hist4 cr4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #ghh-gih4 #cf ,anselmus3 ,de fide trinitatis1 c4 #b1 #c2 ,epist4 ,,xli4 #a4 #aa2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 p4 #aeh4 #cg ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philos41 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bf 7#ast ed472 ,anselmus ,de fide trinitatis1 c4 #b2 ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch d4 ,geschichte d4 ,philosoph41 ,part ,v4 p4 #ahd2 ,ablard1 ,epist4 ,,xxi42 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii ,section ,i4 pp4 #afb1 #afc4 #ch ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 p4 #cci2 ,joh4 ,sarisberiensis3 ,metalogicus1 ,l4 ,,ii4 c4 #ag4 #ci ,tiedemann3 ,geist d4 specul4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,v4 pp4 #dja1 #djb2 ,suarez4 ,disputationes metaphysic1 ,disp4 ,i ,sectio #f4 #dj ,tiedemann2 ,geist d4 specul4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #dij1 #dia2 ,thomas ,aquinas3 ,de ente et essent4 c #c et #e4 #da ,tiedemann3 ,geist d4 spec4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 pp4 #fji-fac2 ,scotus3 in ,magistrum sententiar4 ,l4 ,,ii4 ,dist41 #c4 ,qu4 #a-f2 ,occam3 in libr4 ,i4 sentent4 ,dist4 ,,ii4 ,qust4 #f 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #heb1 #hec47 #db ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #aaj4 #dc ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #hdf-hdh1 #iaa1 #iab2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #ijc1 #idd1 #ide1 #ibe1 #ici1 #idj2 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univers4 ,paris1 ,t4 ,,iv4 pp4 #beg1 #bfe4 #dd ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #iad-iai1 #ide-idg2 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univ4 ,paris4 ,t4,v4 pp4 #gjf1 #gci1 #gdj4 #de ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 p4 #fa2 ,cramer1 ,fortsetzung von ,bossuet1 ,part ,v4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #hh4 #df ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i4 p4 #fa2 ,bulus3 ,hist4 ,univ4 ,paris4 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #afi4 #dg ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #aec4 #dh ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,i1 pp4 #bcf1 #bcg4 #di ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iii4 p4 #hgh4 #ej ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #iee1 #ief4 #ea ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,geschichte d4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #aeg2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #ifd seq42 ,tiedemann3 ,geist d4 spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,v4 p4 #bij seq4 #eb ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #hbd-hbi4 #ec ,rixner3 ,lehrbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #abf2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #hbi1 #hcc4 #ed ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,viii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #hcd-hcf2 ,rixner3 ,handb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,appendix1 pp4 #hf-hi2 ,jordanus ,brunus ,nolanus3 ,de compendiosa architectura et complemento artis ,lullii1 ,sectio ,,ii4 7,bruni scripta1 qu latine confecit1 omnia2 ed4 ,gfrrer1 ,stuttgardi #ahce1 ,fasciculus ,,ii4 pp4 #bdc-bfd74 #ee ,buhle3 ,lehrb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil41 ,part ,,vi4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #abe--abh2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #bb1 #bc4 #ef ,pomponatius3 ,tractatus de immortalitate anim1 c4 ,,vii41 ,,viii4 p4 #ce2 c4 ,,ix4 pp4 #eg1 #eh2 c4 ,,xii4 pp4 #hi1 #ij2 c4 ,,xv4 p4 #adb4 #eg ,ficinus3 ,promium in ,plotinum1 p4 #b1 ,pomponatius1 l4 l4 c4 ,,iii4 p4 #i2 c4 ,,iv4 #ab2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #fe-fg4 #eh ,bruck4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #afd4 #ei ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #dd1 #de4 #fj ,ficinus3 ,promium in ,plotinum1 p4 #a2 ,brucker4 ,i4 #a1 p4 #di1 #ee1 #dh4 #fa ,proclus3 ,theologia ,platonis1 ,appendix1 pp4 #ejc-eje2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 p4 #adi4 #fb ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #afd1 #afe2 ,tiedemann3 ,geist d4 ,spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,v4 p4 #dhc2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #ceh1 #cfe1 #cff2 ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #bjf4 #fc ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #bbh-bcj2 ,brucker4 #a4 #a1 p4 #gba4 #fd ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #fc1 #fd1 #ff-fh2 ,buhle3 ,lehrb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,part ,,vi4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #cfj1 #cfb2 ,cardanus3 ,de vita propria1 c4 #d1 pp4 #i-aa2 ,tiedemann1 ,geist d4 spec4 ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 pp4 #efc1 #efd4 #fe ,buhle3 ,lehrb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,part ,,vi4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #cfb-cfe2 ,tiedemann1 ,geist4 d4 ,spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,v4 p4 #efe2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ga-gd2 ,cardanus3 ,de vita propria1 c4 #bf1 p4 #gj4 #ff ,cardanus3 ,de genitur4 ,,xii4 p4 #hd2 ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,part ,,vi4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #cfc1 #cfd2 ,tiedemann3 ,geist4 d4 ,spec4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,v4 pp4 #efd1 #efe4 #fg ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ajh1 #aad-abj2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #bij-bie4 #fh ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,venetia #aehd1 #h1 which was certainly not really printed at ,venice1 since both it and the following work1 ,de l'infinito1 ,universo e ,mondi1 ,venetia #aehd1 #h1 appeared at ,paris4 ,both these works are dialogues4 #fi ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ae-bi4 #gj ,lectures of #ahbi-cj4 #ga ,opere di ,giordano ,bruno ,nolano1 ora per la prima volta raccolte e pubblicate da ,adolfo ,wagner in due volumi4 ,lipsia1 ,weidmann #ahcj4 #gb ,cf4 ,opere di ,giordano ,bruno pubbl4 da ,wagner4 ,introduzione1 pp4 xxiv41 xxv4 #gc v4 ,hegel's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,vii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #aj4 #gd ,lectures of #ahje-f4 #ge ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #g-ah2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #cia-cid2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dialog4 ,,ii4 7,opere pubbl4 da ,ad4 ,wagner1 ,vol4 ,i471 pp4 #bce-bdc4 #gf ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #ai-bc1 #bh-ca2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #cid-cif1 #cih1 #cii2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dial4 ,,iii4 pp4 #bea-beg2 ,dial4 ,,iv4 pp4 #bfi-bgd4 #gg ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #bc-be2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 p4 #cif2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dial4 ,,iii4 pp4 #bfj1 #bfa4 #gh ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #be1 #bf2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 p4 #cig2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dial4 ,,iii4 p4 #bfa4 #gi ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #cb1 #de2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #cii1 #djc1 #djd2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dial4 ,,iv4 p4 #bge2 ,dial4 ,v4 p4 #bia4 #hj ,jordanus ,brunus3 ,de ,minimo1 pp4 #aj1 #af-ah2 ,jacobi3 ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #cd-ci2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,ix4 pp4 #djj-djb2 ,giordano ,bruno3 ,de la causa1 principio et uno1 ,dial4 ,v4 pp4 #bha-bhd4--,on this opposition of the minimum and the maximum ,bruno wrote several special works1 for example1 ,de triplici ,minimo et ,mensura libri ,v4 ,francofurti apud ,wechelium et ,fischer1 #aeia1 #h2 the text is hexameters1 with notes and scholia2 ,buhle gives the title as ,de ,minimo libri ,v4 ,another work bears the title3 ,de ,monade1 ,numero et figura liber2 ,item ,de ,innumerabilibus1 ,immenso et ,infigurabili3 seu de ,universo et ,mundis libri ,,viii4 ,francof4 #aeia1 #h4 #ha ,bruno wrote many such topico-mnemonic works1 of which the earliest are the following3 ,philotheus ,jordanus ,brunus ,nolanus ,de compendiosa architectura et complemento artis ,lullii1 ,paris4 ap4 g4 ,gorbinum1 #aehb4 #ab4--;,j4 ,brunus ,nol4 ,de ,umbris idearum1 implicantibus ,artem qurendi1 c41 ,paris4 ap4 eund4 #aehb4 #h4 ,the second part has the title3 ,ars memori4--,ph4 ,jord4 ,bruni ,explicatio ,,xxx sigillorum c4 ,quibus adjectus est ,sigillus sigillorum1 c4 ,it is evident from the dedication that ,bruno published this work in ,england1 therefore between #aehb and #aehe4--;,jordanus ,brunus ,de ,lampade combinatoria ,lulliana1 ,viteberg #aehg4 #h4 ,in the same place he wrote ,de ,progressu et lampade venatoria ,logicorum1 ,anno #aehg1 which he dedicated to the ,chancellor of the ,wittenberg ,university4--,jordanus ,brunus ,de ,specierum scrutinio et lampade combinatoria ,raym4 ,lullii1 ,prag1 exc4 ,georg4 ,nigrinus #aehh4 #h2 also printed in the works of ,raymund ,lullius4--,also ,de imaginum1 signorum et idearum compositione ,libri ,,iii4 ,francofurti ap4 ,jo4 ,wechel4 et ,petr4 ,fischer4 #aeia4 #h4 #hb ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #gae 7#gag72 ,jordanus ,brunus3 ,de compendiosa architectura et complemento artis ,lullii 7,jordani ,bruni ,nolani scripta1 qu latine confecit1 omnia4 ed4 ,a4 ,fr4 ,gfrrer1 ,stuttgard1 #ahce1 ,fasc4 ,,ii471 c4 #a1 p4 #bch4 #hc ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gag1 #gah 7#gai1 a-#gah1 b72 ,jord4 ,brunus3 ,de compend4 architect4 c4 #e1 p4 #bci4 #hd ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #gag 7#gai1 a72 ,jord4 ,brun4 ,de compend4 architect4 c4 #b1 #c1 pp4 #bch1 #bci4 #he ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gbc1 #gbd2 ,jordani ,bruni ,de ,umbris idearum 7,jord4 ,bruni ,nolani scripta1 ed4 ,a4 ,fr4 ,gfrrer1 ,fasc4 ,,ii473 ,triginta intentiones umbrarum1 ,intentio ,i-,,iv4 pp4 #cjj-cjb4 #hf ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gbd-gbf2 ,jordanus ,brunus3 ,de ,umbris idearum1 ,intentio ,v-,,ix4 pp4 #cjb-cje4 #hg ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gbg1 #gca2 ,jordanus ,brunus3 ,de ,umbris idearum1 ,intentio ,,xxi4 p4 #caj2 ,de triginta idearum conceptibus3 ,conceptus ,x4 p4 #cai4 #hh ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gcj-gcd2 ,jordani ,bruni ,de ,umbris idearum3 ,de triginta idearum conceptibus1 ,conceptus ,,vii4 ,x4 ,,xiii4 ,,xxvi4 pp4 #cah-cbj1 #cbc1 #cbd4 #hi ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #gde2 ,jordani ,bruni ,explicatio triginta sigillorum3 ,sigillus ,sigillorum1 ,p4 ,,ii4 #aa4 #ij ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 p4 #gcd2 cf4 ,jordan4 ,brun4 ,de ,umbris ,idearum3 ,ars ,memori1 ,i4-,,xi4 pp4 #cbf-ccj4 #ia ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #gcd1 #gce2 ,jordan4 ,brun4 ,de ,umbris ,idearum3 ,ars ,memori1 ,,xii4 pp4 #ccj1 #cca4 #ib ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #fga-fgg2 ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #hff-hfi4 #ic ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,part ,,vi4 ,section ,i4 pp4 #daj-dae2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #fgg-fhj2 ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #hgj-hgh4 #id ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,sec4 ,,ii4 pp4 #fgj-fhj2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #edh-efb4 #ie ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,section ,,ii4 pp4 #iej-ied2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ia-ie4 #if ,the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii41 ,april1 #ahag1 p4 #ec4 #ig ,bacon1 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,ii4 c4 #a 7,lugd4 ,batavor1 #afeb4 #ab71 pp4 #ajh-aaj 7,operum omnium1 pp4 #dc1 #dd1 ,lipsi1 #afid7 #ih ,ibidem1 c4 #b1 p4 #aaa 7,operum1 p4 #dd72 c4 #d1 pp4 #abc1 #abd 7p4 #di71 c4 #aa1 pp4 #ade-adg 7pp4 #eg1 #eh74 #ii ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iv4 c4 #b1 pp4 #bid1 #bie 7p4 #bac7 7,ellis and ,spedding's translation1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #cid74 #ajj ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,i4 ,aphor4 #aa-cd1 pp4 #bhj-bhb 7,operum74 #aja ,bacon4 ,de augm4 scient4 ,v4 c4 #d1 p4 #ceh 7p4 #acg74 7,ellis and ,spedding's translation4 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #dbh47 #ajb ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,v4 c4 #b1 pp4 #cbj1 #cba 7pp4 #abb1 #abc74 #ajc ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,i4 ,aphor4 #aje1 p4 #cac2 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,v4 c4 #b1 pp4 #cbf1 #cbg 7pp4 #abd1 #abe74 #ajd ,the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii41 ,april1 #ahag1 pp4 #ej1 #ea3 cf4 ,bacon silva silvarum sive historia naturalis1 ,cent4 ,,iv41 ,sect4 #cbf1 #cbg 7,operum1 pp4 #hbb1 #hbc74 #aje ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iii4 c4 #e1 pp4 #bde1 #bdf 7p4 #ie74 #ajf ,ibid4 ,,iv4 c4 #b1 p4 #bic 7p4 #aab74 #ajg ,the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii41 ,april1 #ahag1 pp4 #ea1 #eb2 cf4 ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iii4 c4 #c1 #d1 pp4 #bjj-bjf 7pp4 #gh-hj74 #ajh ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,,ii4 ,aphor4 #b4 7,ellis and ,spedding's translation1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #aai47 #aji ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,,ii4 ,aphor4 #b2 cf4 the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,april1 #ahag1 p4 #eb4 #aaj ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iii4 c4 #d2 p4 #bcg 7p4 #ib74 #aaa ,bacon4 ,de augm4 scient4 ,,iii4 c4 #d1 p4 #bci 7p4 #ib74 #aab ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,i4 p4 #df 7p4 #ai72 ,,iii4 c4 #d1 pp4 #baa-bac 7pp4 #hb1 #hc72 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,i4 ,aphor4 #he1 p4 #cjd4 #aac ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iii4 c4 #d1 pp4 #bca-bcd 7pp4 #hi1 #ij74 #aad ,the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,april1 #ahag1 p4 #eb4 #aae ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l4 ,,ii4 ,aphor4 #ag1 pp4 #cde1 #cdf4 #aaf ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l ,,ii ,aphor4 ,,ii pp4 #cbe1 #cbf 7,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,x4 pp4 #ce1 #cf72 ,lib ,i4 ,aphor4 #ea1 p4 #bhf1 ,l4 ,,ii ,aphor4 #i2 ,aphor4 #c1 p4 #cbf4 #aag ,bacon4 ,novum ,organon1 ,l ,,ii4 ,aphor4 #ce1 p4 #cff4 #aah ,the ,quarterly ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xvii4 ,april1 #ahag1 p4 #eb4 ,cf4 ,bacon4 ,de augmentis scientiarum1 ,,iii4 c4 #d1 p4 #bcf 7p4 #ia74 #aai ,jacob ,bhme's ,leben und ,schriften 7in his ,works1 ,hamburg1 #agae1 #d71 ,no4 ,i4 #ah1 pp4 #aa1 #ab2 ,no4 ,v41 #b1 p4 #ed and the title-page2 ,no4 ,i4 #eg1 pp4 #bg1 #bh4 #abj ,jacob ,bhme's ,leben und ,schriften1 ,no4 ,i4 #b-d1 pp4 #c1 #d2 #f1 #g1 p4 #e2 #aj1 #aa1 pp4 #g1 #h2 #bh1 #bi1 pp4 #ag1 #ah4 #aba ,jacob ,bhme's ,leben und ,schriften1 ,no4 ,,vi4 #c-h1 pp4 #ha-hg2 ,no4 ,i4 #ab-ag1 pp4 #h-aa4 #abb ,theosophische ,sendbriefe1 #dgth ,letter 7,werke1 ,hamburg1 #agae1 #d71 p4 #chgi4 #abc ,trostschrift von vier ,complexionen1 #dc-fc1 pp4 #afjb-afjg4 #abd ,act ,i4 ,scene #b4 #abe ,von ,christi ,testament der heiligen ,taufe1 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 #d-e1 pp4 #bfec1 #bfed4 #abf ,morgenrthe im ,aufgang1 ,preface1 #hd1 #he1 #hh1 p4 #ah4 #abg ,von wahrer ,gelassenheit1 chap4 ii4 #i1 #aj1 p4 #afgc4 #abh ,von den drei ,principien gttlichen ,wesens1 chap4 x4 #db1 p4 #dgj4 #abi ,von der ,gnadenwahl1 chap4 i4 #c-aj1 pp4 #bdjh-bdaj2 chap4 ii4 #i1 p4 #bdah2 #ai1 #bj1 p4 #bdbj2 ,schlssel der vornehmsten ,puncten und ,wrter1 #b1 p4 #cffh2 #ade1 #adf1 pp4 #cfif1 #cfig2 ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iv4 #i-ba1 pp4 #di-ea2 chap4 xi4 #dg1 pp4 #abf1 #abg1 etc4 #acj ,morgenrthe1 chap4 i4 #c-g1 #i-bd1 pp4 #bc-bg2 chap4 ii4 #ch-dj1 pp4 #cd1 #ce2 i4 p4 #bh see ,law's translation4 #aca ,morgenrthe1 chap4 #aa4 #h1 #ad-ah1 #ca-cc1 pp4 #bi-cd see ,law's translation4 #acb ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #b1 #h-aa1 pp4 #cf-ch4 #acc ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iv4 #e1 #f1 p4 #dh2 chap4 viii4 #ae-;chap4 xi4 #df1 pp4 #gh-abf4 #acd ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #ah1 p4 #dj2 chap4 x4 #ed1 p4 #aae2 #ci1 #dj1 p4 #aab2 chap4 xi4 #g-ab1 pp4 #aai1 #abj4 #ace ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 i4 #h-aj1 p4 #agci4 #acf ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 iii4 #a-c1 pp4 #agee1 #agef4 #acg ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #cc-ce1 p4 #dd 7cf4 ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,appendix1 p4 #ajf1 #g74 #ach ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #ae1 #ah-bb1 pp4 #ci-da4 #aci ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 iii4 #d1 #e1 p4 #agef1 #ab1 p4 #ageh2 ,morgenrthe1 chap4 xii4 #ii-ajg1 p4 #adi1 #aej2 chap4 xiii4 #ib-ajd1 #ca-eb1 pp4 #aff-afh1 #aeg-afj2 chap4 xiv4 #cf1 p4 #agh2 ,von den drei ,principien gttlichen ,wesens1 chap4 iv4 #fi1 p4 #djf2 chap4 xv4 #e1 pp4 #edc1 #edd4 #adj ,morgenrthe1 chap4 xiii4 #ec-fd1 pp4 #afj-afb2 ,vierzig ,fragen von der ,seele1 ,,xii4 #d1 p4 #abja2 ,von sechs theosophischen ,puncten1 ,v4 #g1 #c1 p4 #aecg2 ,von wahrer ,gelassenheit1 chap4 i4 #a-g1 pp4 #affa-affc2 ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 i4 #bc-bf1 pp4 #agdb1 #agdc2 ,von der ,geburt und ,bezeichnung aller ,wesen1 chap4 xvi4 #di1 p4 #bcia2 ,vom bersinnlichen ,leben1 #da1 #db1 p4 #afif see ,law's translation4 #ada ,von der ,menschwerdung ,jesu ,christi1 ,pt4 ,i4 chap4 v4 #ad1 p4 #acbc2 ,von den drei ,principien gttlichen ,wesens1 chap4 x4 #dc1 p4 #dgj4 #adb ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 iii4 #aa1 p4 #ageg4 #adc ,infra1 p4 #bac4 #add ,morgenrthe1 chap4 viii4 #ae-bj1 pp4 #gh1 #gi2 chap4 x4 #ch1 p4 #aab2 chap4 xiii4 #fi-ia1 pp4 #afb-aff2 chap xi4 #e-ac1 pp4 #aai1 #abj4 #ade #agg ,fragen von gttlicher ,offenbarung1 ,,iii4 #b-e1 #aj-af1 pp4 #ceia-ceie4 #adf ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 iii4 #ab1 #ad1 pp4 #ageg1 #ageh4 #adg ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch d4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,appendix1 p4 #ajh1 #e 7from ,boehme's ,morgenrthe1 chap4 ii4 #af1 pp4 #cj1 #ca1 #cc1 p4 #cd74 #adh ,morgenrthe1 chap4 xxiii4 #aa1 #ab1 pp4 #cjg1 #cjh 7cf4 ,rixner3 ,handb4 d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,philos4 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,appendix1 p4 #ajh1 #e71 ,theosophische ,sendbriefe1 ,i4 #e1 p4 #cgaj4 #adi ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #bi1 #cj1 p4 #dc see ,law's translation4 #aej ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 iii4 #ac1 p4 #ageh2 ,morgenrthe1 chap4 x4 #ee1 #fj1 #eh1 pp4 #aae1 #aaf 7chap4 xi4 #d1 p4 #aah74 #aea ,morgenrthe1 chap4 iii4 #cf-ch1 #dg1 pp4 #dd-df see ,law's translation4 #aeb ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 i4 #cc1 p4 #agde2 chap4 ii4 #bi1 p4 #aged1 chap4 iii4 #ae1 #ah-bd1 #bg1 #bi1 pp4 #ageh-agfa2 ,von den drei ,principien gttlichen ,wesens1 chap4 viii #e1 p4 #dcc1 ,mysterium ,magnum1 oder ,erklarung des ersten ,buchs ,mosis1 chap xix #bh1 pp4 #bhcj1 #bhca4 #aec ,von gttlicher ,beschaulichkeit1 chap4 i4 #bc-ci1 pp4 #agdb-agdf2 chap4 ii4 #a-ac1 #ae-cj1 pp4 #agdg-aged4 #aed ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #bjc-bag2 ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,i-,,ii 7,amstelod4 #afgb1 #d71 pp4 #b-g 7uvres compltes de ,descartes publies par ,victor ,cousin1 ,t4 ,i471 pp4 #abe-acc2 ,notes sur l'loge de ,descartes par ,thomas 7uvres de ,descartes publies par ,cousin1 ,t4 ,i471 p4 #hc1 et suiv42 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,x4 pp4 #baj-baf4 #aee ,spinoza3 ,principia philosophi ,cartesian 7,benedicti de ,spinoza ,opera1 ed4 ,paulus4 ,jen1 #ahjb1 ,t4 ,i471 p4 #b4 #aef ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #a-f 7,amstelod4 #afgb1 #d71 pp4 #a1 #b 7uvres1 ,t4 ,,iii4 pp4 #fc-ff72 cf4 ,meditationes de prima philosophia1 ,i4 7,amstelod4 #afhe1 #d71 pp4 #e-h 7uvres1 ,t4 ,i4 pp4 #bce-bde72 ,de ,methodo1 ,,iv4 p4 #bj 7pp4 #aef-aeh74 #aeg ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #g1 #h1 p4 #b 7pp4 #ff1 #fg74 #aeh ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,,iv4 pp4 #bj1 #ba 7p4 #aeh72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philosophi ,cartes1 p4 #ad4 #aei ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,,iv4 p4 #ba 7p4 #aei72 ,epistol4 ,t4 ,i4 ep4 #aah 7,amstelod4 #afhb1 #d71 p4 #cgi 7uvres1 ,t4 ,,ix4 pp4 #ddb1 #ddc74 #afj ,cartes4 ,responsiones ad sec4 objectiones1 adjunct ,meditationibus de prima philosophia1 p4 #gd 7p4 #dbg72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philosophi ,cartes41 pp4 #d1 #e4 #afa ,appendix ad ,cartes4 ,meditationes1 continens objectiones quint4 p4 #d 7uvres1 ,t4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ib1 #ic74 #afb ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p ,i #i1 pp4 #b1 #c 7pp4 #fg1 #fh74 #afc ,ibid4 ,p ,i #aa1 p4 #c 7pp4 #fi1 #gj7 #afd ,cartes4 ,respons4 ad sec4 object43 ,rationes more geometr4 dispos41 ,postulata1 p4 #hf 7pp4 #ded1 #dee72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philosophi1 ,cartes41 p4 #ac4 #afe ,cartes4 ,princip4 philos41 ,p4 ,,iv4 #aif1 pp4 #bae1 #baf 7pp4 #ejg-eji72 ,meditation4 ,,vi4 p4 #ch 7pp4 #cbi1 #ccj72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philos4 ,cartes41 pp4 #b1 #c4 #aff ,cartes4 ,respons4 ad sec4 object43 ,rat4 more geom4 dispos41 ,axiomata ,v41 ,,vi4 p4 #hf 7p4 #dec71 et ,propositio ,,iv4 p4 #ia 7pp4 #dfd1 #dfe72 ,meditationes1 ,,ii4 pp4 #i-ad 7pp4 #bdf-bfb74 #afg ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,,iv4 p4 #ba 7pp4 #aeh1 #aei72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philosoph4 ,cartes41 p4 #ad4 #afh ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #ac1 pp4 #c1 #d 7pp4 #ga1 #gb74 #afi ,cartes4 ,respons4 ad sec4 object4 ,rationes more geom4 dispos41 ,def4 ,i4 p4 #he 7pp4 #dea1 #deb71 et ,proposit4 ,,iv4 p4 #ia 7pp4 #dfd1 #dfe71 ,meditationes1 ,,iii4 pp4 #ae-ag 7pp4 #bfc-bfh74 #agj ,cartes4 ,principia philos41 ,p4 ,i4 #bj1 p4 #f 7pp4 #gf1 #gg72 ,meditationes1 ,,iii4 pp4 #ag-be 7pp4 #bfh-bib72 ,de ,methodo1 ,,iv4 pp4 #ba1 #bb 7pp4 #aei-afb72 ,spinoza3 ,principia philos4 ,cartes41 p4 #aj4 #aga ,cartes4 ,principia philos4 ,p4 ,i41 #ad1 p4 #d 7pp4 #gb1 #gc47 #agb ,cartes4 ,resp4 ad sec4 obj43 ,rat4 more geom4 disp41 ,ax4 ,,iii4-,,vi41 ,x41 ,prop4 ,i4 pp4 #hh1 #hi 7pp4 #deh-dfa72 ,spinoza3 ,princ4 phil4 ,cart41 pp4 #ad-ag4 #agc ,spinoza3 ,princip4 philos4 ,cart41 p4 #bj2 ,cartesii ,resp4 ad sec4 obj43 ,rat4 more geom4 dispos41 ,propos4 ,,ii4 p4 #hi 7pp4 #dfa1 #dfb74 #agd ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 4 #ae1 #af1 #ah1 #bd1 pp4 #d1 #e1 #g 7pp4 #gc-ge1 #gh1 #gi74 #age ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #bd-bf1 p4 #g 7pp4 #gi1 #hj74 #agf ,ibid4 ,p4 ,i4 #bi1 #cj1 #ce1 #cf1 #ch1 #dc1 pp4 #h-aa 7pp4 #ha-hf1 #hi72 ,meditationes1 ,,iv4 pp4 #be1 #bf 7pp4 #bic-big74 #agg ,in the ,lectures of #ahbi-ahcj the philosophy of ,malebranche is inserted here4 7,editor's note74 #agh ,cartes4 ,principia philos4 ,p4 ,i4 #bb1 #bc1 pp4 #f1 #g 7pp4 #gg1 #gh72 ,responsiones quart1 p4 #acc 7p4 #gj72 ,spinoza3 ,princip4 philos4 ,cart4 pp4 #cj1 #ca1 #cf1 #ch2 ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sec4 ,i4 pp4 #ag1 #ah4 #agi ,cartes4 ,principia philos4 ,p4 ,i4 #dh1 p4 #ab 7p4 #ib72 ,meditationes1 ,,iii4 p4 #ag 7pp4 #bfh1 #bfi74 #ahj ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #di1 p4 #ac 7p4 #ic74 #aha ,ibid4 ,p4 ,i4 #dh1 p4 #ab 7p4 #ib74 #ahb ,cartes4 ,princip4 philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #ea1 p4 #ad 7p4 #ie7 #ahc ,ibid4 ,p4 ,i4 #dh1 pp4 #ab1 #ac 7p4 #ib72 #fj1 p4 #af 7p4 #aja72 #eb1 p4 #ad 7p4 #ie72 ,ration4 more geometr4 dispos41 ,definit4 ,x4 p4 #hf 7p4 #ded74 #ahd ,cartes4 ,principia philosophi1 ,p4 ,i4 #ec1 #ed1 p4 #ad 7pp4 #if1 #ig74 #ahe ,cartes4 ,princip4 philos41 ,p4 ,i4 #ff-gd1 pp4 #ai-bb 7pp4 #ajg-aag72 ,p4 ,,ii4 #d1 p4 #be 7pp4 #abc1 #abd74 #ahf ,cartes4 ,principia philos4 ,p4 ,,ii4 #af1 #bj1 #cg1 #ch1 pp4 #bi-ca1 #ch1 #ci 7pp4 #acc1 #acd1 #acg1 #ach1 #aeb-aed74 #ahg ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sec4 ,i4 p4 #ai2 cf4 ,cartes4 ,princip4 phil41 ,p4 ,,iii4 #df1 #dg1 p4 #fe 7pp4 #baj-bab74 #ahh ,cf4 ,cartes4 ,principia philos41 ,p4 ,,ii4 #fd1 p4 #di 7pp4 #agh1 #agi74 #ahi ,cartes4 ,principia philos41 ,p4 ,,iii4 #e-db1 #df sqq4 pp4 #ea-fc1 #fe sqq4 7pp4 #ahc-bjh1 p4 #baj et suiv472 ,p4 ,,iv4 #a sqq41 #fi1 #aji-aae1 p4 #acg sqq41 #aaf1 #agh-ahj 7p4 #ccj et suiv41 #chh1 #dbj-dbe74 #aij ,cartes4 ,principia philosoph1 ,p4 ,i4 #cg1 #ci-da1 pp4 #aj1 #aa 7pp4 #he-hh74 #aia ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,v4 pp4 #ce1 #cf 7pp4 #ahe-ahi74 #aib ,cartes4 ,de ,methodo1 ,v4 p4 #bi 7#agc1 #agd74 #aic ,collectanea de vita ,b4 de ,spinoza 7addita ,operibus ed4 ,paulus ,jen #ahjb-ahjc1 ,t4 ,,ii471 pp4 #eic-fjd1 #fab-fbh 7,spinoza ,epist4 ,,liii-,,liv4 in ,oper4 ed4 ,paul4 ,t4 ,i4 pp4 #fch-fdj7 #fdb-ffe2 ,spinoz ,oper4 ed4 ,paul4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,prf4 p4 ,,xvi4 #aid ,collectanea de vita ,b4 de ,spinoza1 pp4 #fbi-fda2 ,spinoz ,ethic4 7,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii47 pp4 #a1 #c et not41 #cc4 #aie ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,v4 ,,viii4 ,x4 et ,schol41 ,,xiii4 pp4 #cg-ci1 #da1 #db1 #de4 #aif ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xiv4 et ,coroll4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xv4 ,,xvi4 et ,coroll4 ,i4 pp4 #df1 #ea4 #aig ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xvii41 ,coroll4 ,i41 ,,ii41 et ,schol1 ,prop4 ,,xviii41 ,prop4 ,,xx1 et ,coroll4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xxi41 ,,xxvi41 ,,xxvii41 ,,xxix41 ,,xxxii41 ,,xxxiii4 ,schol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #ea-eg1 #ei1 #fa1 #fc1 #fg1 #fh4 #aih ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,i41 ,,ii41 ,,vii4 et ,schol4 pp4 #gh1 #gi1 #hb1 #hc4 #aii ,spinoz4 ,ethic4 ,p4 ,i4 ,prop4 ,,xxx-,,xxxii4 pp4 #fb1 #fc2 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,defin4 ,,iii4 p4 #acb2 ,prop4 ,,xi4 ,schol41 p4 #ada4 #bjj ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xi4 ,demonst4 et ,coroll4 pp4 #hf1 #hg2 ,defin4 ,,iv4 pp4 #gg1 #gh4 #bja ,dictionnaire historique et critique 7dition de #agdj1 ,t4 ,,iv471 ,article ,spinosa1 p4 #bfa1 ,note ,n4 ,no4 ,,iv4 #bjb ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xii41 ,,xiii4 et ,schol4 ,prop4 ,,xiv41 ,,xxiii41 ,v4 pp4 #hg-hi1 #ie1 #ajb1 #hj1 #ha4 #bjc ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xi4 7,axiom ,i4 p4 #gh7 et ,demonstr4 ,prop4 ,x4 pp4 #he-hg2 ,prop4 ,,vi4 p4 #ha2 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,,ii4 pp4 #acc1 #acd4 #bjd ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,,vi4-,,viii4 ,prop4 ,,ix4 ,schol4 pp4 #aci1 #adj2 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xlix4 ,coroll4 p4 #abc2 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,,ii4 ,schol4 p4 #acf2 ,p4 ,v4 ,prop4 ,,iii4 ,demonst4 et ,coroll4 pp4 #bgb1 #bgc4 #bje ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,i4 p4 #acb2 ,prop4 ,,iii4 p4 #ach2 ,p4 ,,iv4 ,prf4 p4 #aii2 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,,xi4 ,schol4 pp4 #ada1 #adb2 ,p4 ,,iv4 ,prop4 ,,ii4 p4 #bje2 ,p4 ,,iii4 ,prop4 ,,iii4 et ,schol4 p4 #ach4 #bjf ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,v4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvi4 ,schol4 ,prop4 ,,xxxvii4 ,demonstr41 ,prop4 ,,xxxviii4 et ,schol4 pp4 #bic-bie4 #bjg ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xl4 ,schol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #aac1 #aad4 #bjh ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xliv4 et ,coroll4 ,,ii4 pp4 #aag1 #aah2 ,prop4 ,,xlv4 p4 #aai2 ,p4 ,v4 ,prop4 ,,xxx4 p4 #bhi2 ,p4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 ,,xxxii4 p4 #ajg4 #bji ,spinoz4 ,ethices1 ,p4 ,v4 ,prop4 ,,xiv4 p4 #bhj2 ,prop4 ,,vi4 p4 #bge2 ,prop4 ,,xxvii4 pp4 #bhg1 #bhh2 ,prop4 ,,xxxii4 ,coroll42 ,prop4 ,,xxxv4 pp4 #bia1 #bib4 #baj ,buhle3 ,gesch4 d4 neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sec4 #b1 pp4 #dcj1 #dca4 #baa ,malebranche3 ,de la recherche de la vrit 7,paris1 #agcf71 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,l4 ,,iii4 ,part ,i4 chap4 i4 pp4 #d-f2 ,t4 ,i4 ,l4 ,i4 chap4 i4 pp4 #f1 #g2 ,p4 ,,ii4 chap4 ii4 pp4 #ff-fh2 chap4 iii4 p4 #gb2 chap4 iv4 p4 #hd2 chap4 v4 p4 #ib2 chap4 vi4 pp4 #ie1 #if4 #bab ,malebranche3 ,de la recherche de la vrit1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,l4 ,,iii4 ,part ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 pp4 #ajj-ajb4 #bac ,malebranche3 ,de la recherche de la vrit1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,l4 ,,iii4 ,p4 ,,ii4 chap4 vi4 pp4 #ajc-ajg1 #aji-aaa4 #bad ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 pp4 #bch-bda2 ,quarterly ,review1 ,april1 #ahag1 pp4 #gj1 #ga2 ,the ,works of ,john ,locke 7,london1 #ahab71 ,vol4 ,i43 ,the ,life of the ,author1 pp4 xix4-xxxix4 #bae ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,the ,works of ,john ,locke1 ,vol4 ,i471 ,book ,i4 chap4 ii4 #a2 chap4 iii4 #ae1 #bb4 #baf ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,i7 ,book ,i4 chap4 ii4 #b-i1 #bg2 chap4 iii4 #a-ae4 #bag ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,i47 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 i4 #a1 #b4 #bah ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 i4 #b-e4 #bai v4 ,schiller's ,xenien4 #bbj ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii41 chap4 ii4 #b1 not42 chap4 xii4 #a2 chap4 xxii4 #b2 chap4 i4 #aj-ad4 #bba ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,i71 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 #b2 chap4 iv4 #b4 #bbb ,ibidem 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xiv4 #c4 #bbc ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,,ii471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xxiii4 #a1 #b4 #bbd ,ibidem 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xxi4 #a4 #bbe ,ibidem 7,vol4 ,,ii471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xxvi4 #a4 #bbf ,ibidem 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap xxi4 #g4 #bbg ,ibidem 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 #ag1 #ah4 #bbh ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,i471 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 viii4 #i-bf4 #bbi ,locke3 ,an ,essay concerning human ,understanding 7,vol4 ,,ii471 ,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 iii4 #f2 #ac1 #ae4 #bcj ,brucker4 ,histor4 critic4 philos4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 #b1 pp4 #gca-gcf1 #gdc-gde4 #bca ,hug4 ,grot4 ,de jure belli ac pacis1 ,b4 ,,iii4 chap4 xi4 #ac-af 7,ed4 ,gronov4 ,lipsi1 #ageh1 #hvo71 pp4 #ijj-ije2 chap4 iv4 #aj1 pp4 #gib1 #gic4 #bcb ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sec4 #a1 pp4 #bbc1 #bbd1 #bbg4 #bcc ,hobbes4 ,epistola dedicatoria ante ,elementor philos ,sectionem primam 7,thom ,hobbesii ,opera philosophica1 qu latine scripsit omnia1 ,amstelod1 #affh1 #dto71 pp4 #a1 #b4 #bcd ,cf4 ,brucker4 ,histor4 crit4 philos4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 p4 #aed4 #bce ,hobbes1 ,de cive1 chap4 i4 #b1 #c 7,oper4 phil4 etc4 ,amstel4 #affh71 pp4 #c1 #d4 #bcf ,hobbes1 ,de cive1 chap4 i4 #d-f1 #ab-ad1 pp4 #d-h2 ,leviathan1 chap4 xiii4 7,oper471 pp4 #fc-ff4 #bcg ,ibidem1 chap4 v4 #f-ab1 pp4 #cg-ch2 chap4 vi4 #ab-ad1 pp4 #dd-df4 #bch ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #b1 pp4 #eai-ebc2 ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #bi4 #bci ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #ca2 cf4 ,puffendorf4 ,de jure natur et gent4 ,,ii4 #b1 #e-g 7,francof4 ad ,moenum1 #agjf1 #d71 pp4 #aeg-afa2 ,,vii4 #a1 #c-g1 pp4 #ijj-iji4 #bdj ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 pp4 #ajg1 #ajh4 #bda ,buhle1 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #aae1 cf4 ,newtoni ,optices4 ,p4 ,,iii 7,londini1 #agjf1 #d7 p4 #cad4 #bdb ,la vie de ,mr4 ,leibnitz par ,mr4 le ,chevalier de ,jaucourt 7,essais de ,thodice1 par ,leibnitz1 ,amsterdam1 #agdg1 ,t4 ,i471 pp4 #a-bh1 #de1 #ei-fb1 #ff-gd1 #gg-hj1 #hg-ib1 #aaj-aaf1 #adh-aea2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 phil41 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #cce-cfh2 ,leibnitzii ,opera omnia 7ed4 ,dutens71 ,t4 ,,ii41 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #de1 #df4 #bdc ,vie de ,mr4 ,leibnitz1 pp4 #acd-adc2 ,brucker4 ,hist4 crit4 philos4 ,t4 ,,iv4 ,p4 ,,ii4 pp4 #che1 #chi2 ,tennemann1 vol4 xi4 pp4 #aha1 #ahb4 #bdd ,leibnitzii ,opera1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #cb-ci4 #bde ,ibidem1 ,principia philosophi1 pp4 #bj-ca4 #bdf cf4 ,leibnitz3 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #aj1 p4 #hf4 #bdg ,leibnitz1 ,principes de la nature et la grace #a1 p4 #cb4 7,recueil de diverses pieces par ,des ,maiseaux1 ,t4 ,,ii4 p4 #dhe1 ,principia philosophi1 #a1 #b1 p4 #bj47 #bdh ,leibnitzii ,de ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturarum 7,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,,ii471 #aa1 p4 #ee1 ,principia philosophi1 #c-f1 #ah1 pp4 #bj-bb2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #b1 p4 #cb4 #bdi ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #g1 p4 #ba2 ,troisime claircissement du systme de la communication des substances 7,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i471 p4 #gc 7,recueil1 ,t4 ,,ii4 p4 #djb74 #bej ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #h1 #i1 p4 #ba2 ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #abh1 #abi1 #d1 #e3 ,il n'y a point deux individus indiscernables4 ,un gentilhomme d'esprit de mes amis1 en parlant avec moi en prsence de ,mad4 l',electrice dans le jardin de ,herrenhausen1 crut qu'il trouverait bien deux feuilles entirement semblables4 ,mad4 l',electrice l'en dfia1 et il courut longtemps en vain pour en chercher4 ,deux gouttes d'eau ou de lait regardes par le microscope se trouveront discernables4 ,c'est un argument contre les ,atomes 7,recueil1 ,t4 ,i4 p4 #ej74--;,cf4 ,hegel's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 p4 #de4 #bea ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #aj-af1 pp4 #ba1 #bb2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #b1 p4 #cb4 #beb ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #ai-bc1 pp4 #bb1 #bc2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #d1 pp4 #cc1 #cd2 ,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain 7uvres philosophiques de ,leibnitz par ,raspe71 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 ix4 #d1 p4 #ij4 #bec ,leibnitzii ,de anima brutorum 7,op4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i471 #b-d1 pp4 #bcj1 #bca4 #bed ,leibnitzii ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #bad1 #bae1 #c2 ,de ipsa natura sive de vi insita1 #aa1 p4 #ee2 ,systme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances 7,op4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i471 pp4 #ej1 #ec4 #bee ,leibnitzii ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #gi1 #aba1 #bcd-bcg1 #bhj1 #bie2 ,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xiii4 #ae1 #ag1 pp4 #ajf1 #ajg4 #bef ,leibnitz3 ,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xii4 #g1 pp4 #ajb1 #ajc2 chap4 xxi4 #gb1 p4 #agj2 chap4 xxiv4 #a1 p4 #ahe4 #beg ,leibnitzii ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #ci2 ,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain1 ,bk4 ,,iii4 chap4 vi4 #bd1 p4 #bgh2 #ci1 p4 #bij4 #beh ,leibnitzii ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,,ii4 p4 #fj2 ,nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain1 ,bk4 ,,ii4 chap4 xxiii4 #bc1 p4 #aha4 #bei ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #fe-ga1 p4 #bh2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #c1 #d1 pp4 #cb1 #cc4 #bfj ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi4 #bi-ca1 p4 #bd2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #e1 p4 #cd2 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #dd1 p4 #aae4 #bfa ,leibnitz4 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #g1 p4 #ce4 #bfb ,leibnitz3 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #h1 p4 #ce2 ,principia philosophi1 #dc-df1 p4 #be4 #bfc ,leibnitz3 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #f-h1 pp4 #hc-he2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #aj1 p4 #cf4 #bfd ,leibnitz3 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #bj1 pp4 #if1 #ig2 #cb1 #cc1 pp4 #ajf1 #ajg2 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,,ii4 #aec1 pp4 #eg1 #eh2 #cgh1 pp4 #bef1 #beg4 #bfe ,leibnitzii ,causa ,dei asserta per justitiam ejus 7,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,,ii471 #cd-ci1 pp4 #che1 #chf4 #bff ,leibnitz3 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #c1 p4 #cc2 ,premier laircissement du systme de la communication des substances1 p4 #gj4 #bfg ,leibnitz3 ,second et troisime claircissements du systme de la communication des substances1 pp4 #ga-gc4 #bfh ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #hb1 p4 #cj2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #aa1 p4 #cf4 #bfi ,leibnitz3 ,systme nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances1 pp4 #ed1 #ee4 #bgj ,leibnitzii ,principia philosophi1 #ij1 p4 #ca2 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #ab1 #ac1 pp4 #cf1 #cg2 #ae1 pp4 #cg1 #ch4 #bga ,leibnitzii ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #ge1 #gf4 #bgb ,leibnitzii ,principia philosoph41 #eh-fb1 p4 #bg2 ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 pp4 #df1 #dg4 #bgc ,leibnitz3 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #i1 pp4 #he1 #hf4 #bgd ,leibnitz3 ,principes de la nature et de la grace1 #ab1ac1 pp4 #cf1 #cg2 ,oper4 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #ccg4 #bge ,leibnitz3 ,essais de ,thodice1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,p4 ,,iii4 #bia1 pp4 #ahd1 #ahe2 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 #ej1 p4 #aai4 #bgf ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosoph41 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 ,,ii41 pp4 #ega-ehb2 ,tiedemann3 ,geist der speculativen ,philos41 ,vol4 ,,vi4 pp4 #eaa-eah2 ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #gi1 pp4 #aie1 #aif4 #bgg ,wolf's ,vernnftige ,gedanken von ,gott1 der ,welt und der ,seele des ,menschen 7,halle1 #agda71 ,pt4 ,i4 chap4 ii4 #aad1 #abj1 pp4 #ei1 #fj1 #fb1 #fc2 chap4 iv4 #ege-eha1 #fhf1 pp4 #ceb-cei1 #dbe2 chap4 v4 #gdb1 p4 #dfc2 #ibf1 p4 #egc2 chap vi4 #ibh1 p4 #egd1 seq4 #bgh ,wolff's ,anfangsgrnde aller mathematischen ,wissenschaften1 ,pt4 ,i43 ,anfangsgrnde der ,baukunst1 ,pt4 ,,ii4 ,prop4 #h1 p4 #dad2 ,problem #bb1 pp4 #deb1 #dec2 ,pt4 ,,ii43 ,anfangsgrnde der ,fortification1 ,pt4 ,i4 p4 #egj4 #bgi ,in the lectures of #ahbe-ahbf and #ahbi-ahcj ,berkeley was passed over by ,hegel2 in both courses ,hume follows directly after the ,scottish and ,french philosophers1 and thus comes immediately before ,kant2 in the course of #ahbe-ahbf the ,french philosophy precedes the ,scottish also4 #bhj ,nachrichten von dem ,leben und den ,schriften des ,bischofs ,berkeley 7in ,berkeley's philosoph4 ,werk4 ,pt4 ,i4 ,leipzig1 #agha71 pp4 #a1 #de1 ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #hf-ij4 #bha ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol ,v4 pp4 #ij1 #ia2 ,the ,works of ,george ,berkeley1 ,prof4 ,fraser's edition 7,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous71 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bfd1 seq4 et passim4 #bhb ,buhle1 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #ib1 #ic2 ,the ,works of ,george ,berkeley1 ,vol4 ,i4 p4 #bgi seq4 #bhc ,buhle1 ibidem1 pp4 #ia1 #ib2 ,berkeley1 ibidem1 pp4 #bhh seq41 #cjj seq4 et passim4 #bhd ,buhle1 ibidem1 pp4 #ic1 #id2 ,berkeley1 ibidem1 pp4 #bhi1 #cjh1 seq4 #bhe ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #ia1 #ie2 ,the ,works of ,george ,berkeley1 ,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #cjh1 #cce4 #bhf ,buhle1 ibidem1 pp4 #if-ii2 ,berkeley1 ibidem1 p4 #cbe1 seq4 et passim4 #bhg ,cf4 ,berkeley1 ibidem1 passim4 #bhh ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #aic-bjj4 #bhi ,tennemann's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie von ,wendt 7,leipzig1 #ahbi71 #cgj1 pp4 #dci1 #ddj2 ,hume3 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 containing an ,inquiry concerning human understanding 7,london1 #aggj71 ,sect4 #b1 pp4 #ba1 #bb1 ,sect4 #d1 ,p4 ,i4 p4 #db1 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,xi pp4 #dcc1 #dcd4 #bij ,hume3 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol ,,iii4 ,not4 ,a1 pp4 #bhc1 #bhd4 #bia ,tennemann's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie von ,wendt1 #cgj1 p4 #ddj2 ,hume1 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sect4 #d1 ,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #dc-de2 ,sect4 #e1 pp4 #ff1 #fg2 ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #bjd1 #bje2 ,tennemann1 ,vol4 ,,xi4 pp4 #dce1 #dcf4 #bib ,hume3 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sect4 vii4 ,pt4 #a1 pp4 #ajb1 #ajc2 ,pt4 #b1 pp4 #ajh1 #aji2 ,sect4 viii4 pp4 #aah1 #aai4 #bic ,hume3 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 containing an ,inquiry concerning the principles of morals1 ,sect4 #a1 p4 #d2 ,appendix ,i4 p4 #agj4 #bid ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 pp4 #bcj1 #bca2 cf4 ,hume1 ibidem1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sect4 #ab1 ,p4 ,,ii4 p4 #bba2 ,vol4 ,,iv42 ,an ,inquiry1 c41 ,sect4 #d1 pp4 #fb-fe2 ,a dialogue1 pp4 #bce1 #bcf1 c41 c4 #bie ,hume3 ,essays and ,treatises on several subjects1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 ,sect4 #ab1 ,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #bag1 #bah2 ,not4 ,n4 pp4 #bif1 #big2 ,buhle3 ,geschichte der neuern ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,v4 ,sect4 #a1 p4 #baj4 #bif ,tennemann's ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,philosophie von ,wendt1 #cga1 p4 #ddb4 #big ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #aai1 p4 #bei2 cf4 ,thomas ,reid2 ,an ,inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense 7,edinburgh1 #ahaj71 chap4 i4 ,sect4 #d1 pp4 #ai1 #bj 7translated into ,german1 ,leipzig1 #aghb1 pp4 #ag1 #ah72 chap4 vi4 ,sect4 #bj1 pp4 #cgb-cge 7pp4 #caj1 #caa71 c4 #bih ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #abj1 pp4 #bfa1 #bfb2 cf4 ,james ,beattie3 ,essays on the nature and immutability of ,truth1 c4 7,edinburgh1 #aggb71 ,pt4 ,i41 chap1 i41 pp4 #ah-ca 7translated into ,german1 ,copenhagen and ,leipzig1 #aggb1 pp4 #bd-db72 chap4 ii4 ,sect4 #b1 pp4 #cg-db 7pp4 #di-ee71 c4 #bii ,cf4 ,james ,oswald3 ,an ,appeal of common-sense in behalf of religion 7,edinburgh1 #aggb71 ,vol4 ,i4 ,book ,i4 ,introduction1 p4 #ab 7translated by ,wilmsen1 ,leipzig1 #aggd1 p4 #aa74 #cjj ,rixner1 ibidem1 #aba1 p4 #bfb2 cf4 ,james ,oswald1 ibidem1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,book ,,ii4 chap4 i4 pp4 #ej1 #ea 7pp4 #ed1 #ee74 #cja ,the name assumed by ,abraham ,tucker4--,translator's note4 #cjb ,lectures of #ahbe-ahbf4 #cjc ,lectures of #ahbi-ahcj4 #cjd ,emile ou de l'ducation4 ,t4 ,,ii4 7,paris1 #ahac1 l4 strotype71 ,book ,,iv41 ,profession de foi du vicaire savoyard1 p4 #bae seq4 #cje ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,pt4 ,,viii4 pp4 #fb1 #fc3 ,systme de la ,nature par ,mirabaud 7,londres1 #aggj71 ,t4 ,i4 chap4 i4 p4 #aj2 chap4 ii4 p4 #bh4 #cjf ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,pt4 ,,viii4 pp4 #fc1 #fd4 ,systme de la ,nature1 ,t4 ,i4 chap4 ii4 pp4 #ah1 #af1 #ba1 et #ae4 #cjg ,buhle1 ibidem1 pp4 #fd1 #fe1 #gj2 ,systme de la ,nature1 ,t4 ,i4 chap4 ii4 pp4 #cj1 #ca2 chap4 iii4 pp4 #ci1 #dj2 chap4 iv4 pp4 #de1 #df2 chap4 vii4 pp4 #ij1 #ia4 #cjh ,robinet3 ,de la ,nature 7,troisime dition1 ,amsterdam1 #agff71 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 chap4 iii4 iv4 pp4 #af1 #ag4 #cji ,robinet1 ,de la ,nature1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,,ii4 chap4 ii4 pp4 #aef1 #aeg2 chap4 vii4 pp4 #aff1 #afh2 chap4 ix4-xi42 chap4 xv4 pp4 #bjb1 #bjc1 chap4 xix4 p4 #bag4 #caj ,robinet3 ,de la ,nature1 ,t4 ,i4 ,p4 ,i4 chap4 xxviii4 p4 #ach2 chap4 xiii4 p4 #gj4 #caa ,helvetius3 ,de l'esprit 7,oeuvres compltes1 ,t4 ,,ii4 ,deux-,ponts1 #aghd71 ,t4 ,i4 ,discours ,,ii4 chap4 i4 pp4 #fb-fd2 chap4 ii4 pp4 #fe1 #fh1 #fi2 chap4 iv4 p4 #ij2 chap4 v4 p4 #ia2 chap4 viii4 p4 #aad2 chap4 xxiv4 pp4 #bef1 #beg4 #cab ,rousseau3 ,du contrat social 7,lyon1 #agij71 ,book ,i4 chap4 iii4 pp4 #h1 #i2 chap4 iv4 pp4 #aj1 #aa1 #ac-af4 #cac ,smmtliche ,schriften1 ,vol4 ,,xxxix4 7,berlin u4 ,stettin1 #ahbh71 pp4 #aaa1 #aab4 #cad ,lessing's ,smmtliche ,schriften1 ,vol4 ,,xxix4 pp4 #abb1 #abc4 #cae ,tenneman's ,grundriss von ,wendt1 #djf1 p4 #eca2 ,rixner3 ,handbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #ade1 p4 #cag2 ,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 p4 #c4 #caf ,jacobi3 ,briefe ber die ,lehre des ,spinoza 7second edition1 #aghi71 pp4 #he1 #hf 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #a1 p4 #aaj74 #cag ,buhle3 ,lehrbuch der ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,part ,,viii4 pp4 #chf1 #chg2 ,mendelssohn's ,morgenstunden 7second edition1 #aghf71 pp4 #bic-bif4 #cah ,jacobi3 ,briefe ber die ,lehre des ,spinoza1 ,,iv4 ,prop4 pp4 #bbe1 #bbc 7pp4 #bbc1 #baf74 #cai ,infra1 pp4 #dah1 #dai4 #cbj ,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 pp4 #g seq42 p4 #bba1 note4 #cba ,jacobi3 ,briefe ber die ,lehre des ,spinoza1 supplement vii4 pp4 #dai-dba1 and note 7,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iv4 ,sec4 #b1 pp4 #adi-aea74 #cbb ,jacobi3 ,briefe ber die ,lehre des ,spinoza1 supplement vii4 pp4 #dbb-dbf 7pp4 #aea-aee74 #cbc ,ibidem1 pp4 #dbf1 #dbg 7pp4 #aee1 #aef74 #cbd ,cf4 ,jacobi's ,werke1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 p4 #bgg4 #cbe ,jacobi3 ,briefe ber die ,lehre des ,spinoza1 pp4 #baf1 #bag 7p4 #baa74 #cbf ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft 7sixth edition1 ,leipzig1 #ahah71 pp4 #d1 #aa1 #ac1 #ic4 #cbg ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #c-e4 #cbh ,ibidem1 ,preface1 pp4 xviii41 xix4 #cbi ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #h1 #i1 #ge1 #gg1 #ae4 #ccj ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bee1 #bef4 #cca ,ibidem1 p4 #ajg4 #ccb ,ibidem1 pp4 #dig1 #dih2 ,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft 7fourth edition1 ,riga1 #agig71 p4 #bed2 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft 7third edition1 ,berlin1 #agii71 ,preface1 p4 v4 #ccc ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #be-bg4 #ccd ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bi1 #cj2 #cd-cf4 #cce ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #cj1 #ca1 #da2 #ab1 #ac1 #aej4 #ccf ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #ed1 #ee4 #ccg ,ibidem1 pp4 #ei1 #ig-ajd4 #cch ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #aje-aaj4 #cci ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #abi-acb4 #cdj ,ibidem1 p4 #acd4 #cda ,in the lectures of #ahbe-ahbf the philosophy of ,fichte on its theoretic side is interpolated here1 while its practical side is only shortly mentioned after an account is given of the ,critique of ,practical ,reason4 #cdb ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #beg-bei1 #bfd1 #bfg1 #bfh1 #bgc4 #cdc ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bfa1 #bfb1 #bgd1 #bge1 #bhd1 #bhh1 #bhi4 #cdd ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #bhi-bii4 #cde ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #cab-cad4 #cdf ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #cag1 #cah1 #cbh1 #cbi1 #ccb4 #cdg ,ibidem1 pp4 #cah1 #ccf1 #ccg4 #cdh ,ibidem1 pp4 #cai1 #cdf1 #cdg4 #cdi ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #cai1 #ced1 #cee4 #cej ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #dig1 #dih4 #cea ,here there is inserted in the lectures of #ahbe-ahbf an examination of what the philosophy of ,jacobi has to say on this point4 #ceb ,kant3 ,metaphysische ,anfangsgrnde der ,naturwissenschaft 7third edition1 ,leipzig1 #ahjj71 pp4 #a1 #bg4 #cec ,kant3 ,die ,religion innerhalb der ,grenzen der blossen ,vernunft 7second edition1 ,knigsberg1 #agid71 pp4 #bj-dh4 #ced ,kant3 ,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft 7fourth edition1 ,riga1 #agig71 pp4 #c-aa1 #bi-cb4 #cee ,kant3 ,kritik d4 prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #dj1 #da1 #ef1 #abf-ace1 #eh1 #ch1 #gg4 #cef ,kant3 ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 pp4 #fb1 #ejj4 #ceg ,kant3 ,kritik d4 prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #ed1 #eh 7#ce74 #ceh ,kant3 ,kritik d4 prakt4 ,vernunft1 pp4 #bbc-bbg4 #cei ,cf4 ,kant's ,kritik d4 reinen ,vernunft1 p4 #dga4 #cfj ,kant3 ,kritik der prakt4 ,vernunft1 p4 #adf4 #cfa ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft 7third edition1 ,berlin1 #agii71 ,einleitung1 pp4 xvii4-xx4 xxiv41 xxv4 #cfb ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 ,introduction1 pp4 xxv4-xxviii4 #cfc ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 ,einleitung1 pp4 xxvi4-xxxiii4 #cfd ,ibidem1 p4 xxxiv4 #cfe ,ibidem1 pp4 xlviii4-lii4 #cff ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 pp4 xliii4-xlv41 #af-ai1 #cb1 #ef1 #ei1 #gg4 #cfg ,ibidem1 pp4 #bgi-bhc4 #cfh ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 pp4 #bhf-bhh1 #bib-bif4 #cfi ,ibidem1 pp4 #cdc1 #cdd4 #cgj ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft4 pp4 #cdg1 #cdh 7#cea74 #cga ,kant3 ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 pp4 #dbc1 #dbd4 #cgb ,what falls under this heading in ,jacobi's philosophy is inserted here in the lectures of #ahbe-ahbf4 #cgc ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre 7,leipzig1 #agid71 ,preface1 p4 xii4 #cgd ,fichte's ,leben und ,briefwechsel1 edited by his son1 ,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #c1 #f1 #bd seq42 #ch seq42 #adb1 #ahi2 #ccg1 #cch1 #cdh1 #cdi1 #cec1 #ced1 #ceh-cfd2 ,pt4 ,,ii4 pp4 #adj-adb2 ,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #cgj-cgb1 #ddb-ddh1 #dee2 #eah1 #edj2 #egh4 #cge ,fichte's posthumous works1 which were not published until after ,hegel's death1 nevertheless show that the writer in his lectures at the ,berlin ,university likewise worked out scientifically this newly developed point of view in his philosophy2 ,fichte made a beginning in this regard brocheven in the ure which appeared in #ahaj3 8,die ,wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen ,umrisse0 7v4 ,michelet3 ,geschichte der letzten ,systeme der ,philosophie1 ,pt4 ,i4 pp4 #dda1 #ddb74 ,editor's note4 #cgf ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #aj-ab4 #cgg ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #ac1 #ad4 #cgh ,fichte3 ,ueber den ,begriff der ,wissenschaftslehre 7,weimar1 #agid71 p4 #ab4 #cgi ,fichte3 ,grundlage der ges4 ,wissenschaftsl41 ,preface1 pp4 x41 xi4 #chj ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #ahd1 #ahe4 #cha ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 p4 #c4 #chb ,cf4 ,fichte3 ,ueber den ,begriff der ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #ac-ag1 #ai-ci1 #ej-eb4 #chc ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #d1 #e4 #chd ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #bc1 #e1 #ae1 #ag1 #h4 #che ,fichte3 ,grundlage der ges4 ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #ag1 #ai-bb4 #chf ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #cd1 #ca1 #bc1 #bg-cj 7#eb71 #ad1 #ah4 #chg ,ibidem1 pp4 #eb-ef1 #gd4 #chh ,fichte's ,anweisung zum seligen ,leben1 pp4 #hj-hb4 #chi ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 p4 #eg4 #cij ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #gh1 #gi4 #cia ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #fj1 #fg1 #ei1 #gf4 #cib ,ibidem1 pp4 #aba1 #abb4 #cic ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #aid-aig1 #bjd1 #bba1 #bbb4 #cid ,ibidem1 p4 #bbh4 #cie ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #bbe1 #bbi1 #bcb4 #cif ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #bcc1 #bch1 #bci4 #cig ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #cjb1 #bdf1 #bdg4 #cih ,ibidem1 p4 #bgc4 #cii ,fichte3 ,ueber den ,grund unseres ,glaubens an eine gttliche ,weltregierung 7,fichte's ,leben1 ,part ,,ii471 p4 #aaa4 #djj ,fichte3 ,verantwortungsschreiben gegen die ,anklage des ,atheismus1 pp4 #ea1 #ec4 #dja ,fichte3 ,grundlage der gesammten ,wissenschaftslehre1 pp4 #bgb-bgd4 #djb ,fichte3 ,grundlage des ,naturrechts 7,jena und ,leipzig1 #agif71 ,part ,i4 pp4 #ee-ga4 #djc ,ibidem1 pp4 #gh-hb4 #djd ,fichte3 ,grundlage des ,naturrechts1 ,part ,,ii4 p4 #ba4 #dje ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iii41 #aib1 p4 #daf2 ,fichte3 ,ueber das ,wesen des ,gelehrten 7,berlin1 #ahjf71 pp4 #d1 #e1 #ae1 #be-bg4 #djf ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #aeh1 pp4 #cej1 #cea2 ,fries3 ,neue ,kritik d4 ,vernunft 7,first edition1 ,heidelberg1 #ahjg71 ,vol4 ,i4 pp4 #ge1 #bha1 #bhd1 #cdc2 #bjf4 #djg ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,gesch4 d4 ,phil4 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #aef1 pp4 #cdg1 #cdh2 cf4 ,bouterweck's ,apodiktik 7#agii71 ,part ,,ii4 pp4 #bjf-bab4 #djh ,krug3 ,entwurf eines neuen ,organon der ,philosophie 7,meissen1 #ahja71 pp4 #ge1 #gf2 ,rixner3 ,handbuch d4 ,geschichte d4 ,philosophie1 ,vol4 ,,iii4 #aeg1 p4 #cdi4 #dji ,schelling's philosophische ,schriften 7,landshut1 #ahji1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,vom ,ich als ,princip der ,philosophie1 pp4 #a-aad71 pp4 #c1 #d 7first edition1 ,tubingen1 #agie1 pp4 #d-g74 #daj ,his birthplace is usually stated to have been ,leonberg1 a short distance from ,schorndorf4--,translators' note4 #daa ,lectures of #ahaf-ahag4 ,translators' note4 #dab ,schelling's philosophische ,schriften3 ,vom ,ich als ,princip der ,philosophie1 p4 #ii seq4 7p4 #agh seq474 #dac ,ibidem1 pp4 #bc1 #bd 7pp4 #ch-db74 #dad ,ibidem1 p4 #hc 7p4 #aej74 #dae ,schelling's ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 p4 #beg1 not4 ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 #b1 p4 #ib4 #daf ,lectures of #ahje-ahjf4 #dag ,schelling3 ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 pp4 #a-g1 #ag-ba4 #dah ,schelling3 ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 pp4 #bd-df1 #di-eb1 #ee-eh1 #fc-fe4 #dai ,schelling3 ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 pp4 #fi1 #gj1 #gb-gi4 #dbj ,schelling3 ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 pp4 #he1 #hf1 #hi1 #ih1 #ddb-ddd4 #dba ,schelling3 ,system des transcendentalen ,idealismus1 pp4 #dga1 #dgb1 #dge4 #dbb ,schelling3 ,neue ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,i4 pp4 #eb1 #ec4 #dbc ,kritisches ,journal der ,philosophie1 published by ,schelling and ,hegel1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,i4 p4 #fg2 ,schelling3 ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,,ii4 ,preface1 p4 xiii4 #dbd ,schelling3 ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,,ii4 #a1 pp4 #a1 #b2 #d1 p4 #d2 #af-ah1 pp4 #aj-ab4 #dbe ,ibidem1 #bb-bd1 pp4 #ac-ae2 #cg1 #ch1 pp4 #bb1 #bc2 #dj-db1 pp4 #be1 #bf4 #dbf ,schelling3 ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,,ii4 #be1 #bf1 #bh1 #cj-cb1 pp4 #ae-ai2 #dd1 #df1 pp4 #bg-bi4 #dbg ,schelling3 ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,,ii4 #ej1 ,note ,i1 #ea1 pp4 #cd-cf2 #ed1 p4 #dj2 #ef1 ,appendix #b1 #eg and note1 pp4 #db-dd4 #dbh ,schelling3 ,zeitschrift fr spec4 ,phys41 ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,no4 ,,ii4 #fb-fd1 pp4 #dg1 #dh2 #ib1 #ic1 pp4 #ei1 #fj2 #fg-fi1 pp4 #di1 #ej2 #ie1 pp4 #fd-fh2 7,neue ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,,ii4 pp4 #ib1 #ic1 #ih1 #aag-aai2 ,erster ,entwurf eines ,systems der ,nutur-philosophie1 p4 #big72 #gf-gh1 p4 #ec2 #hc and ,appendix1 p4 #ed2 #ajc1 ,note1 p4 #gf2 #aab1 p4 #hd4 #dbi ,ibidem1 #acf1 #acg1 pp4 #aji1 #aaj1 #ada1 ,appendix ,i4 p4 #aab4 #dcj ,schelling3 ,neue ,zeitschrift fr speculative ,physik1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,i4 pp4 #a-gg2 ,part ,,ii4 pp4 #a-ch4 #dca ,schelling3 ,ibidem1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,,ii4 p4 #ci4 #dcb ,schelling3 ,ibidem1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,,ii4 pp4 #ci-da4 #dcc ,schelling1 ,ibidem1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,part ,,ii4 pp4 #da-ej4 #dcd ,schelling3 ,denkmal der ,schrift von den gttlichen ,dingen1 pp4 #id1 #he1 #hf 7,philosophische ,untersuchungen ber das ,wesen der menschlichen ,freiheit in den ,philosophischen ,schriften1 ,vol4 ,i4 ,landshut1 #ahji1 p4 #dbi74 #hi-ic4 #dce ,cf4 ,schelling's ,erster ,entwurf der ,natur-philosophie1 p4 #big4 #dcf ,from the lectures of #ahje-ahjf4 #dcg ,hamlet1 ,act ,i4 ,scene ,v4 ,,index ,abelard1 ,,iii4 #fg1 #fh1 #gh1 #gi1 #hb4 ,absolute1 the1 ,i4 #ia1 #id1 #ajb1 #ajh1 #aji1 #aed1 #agh-ahj1 #aic1 #bgi1 #cja1 #cgd2 ,,ii4 #cj1 #cgh2 ,,iii4 #d1 #f1 #daj1 #eea2 of ,bruno1 ,,iii4 #abg2 of ,schelling1 ,,iii4 #ebe seq4 ,abstraction1 ,i4 #ig4 ,academies of ,science1 ,,ii4 #djb4 ,academy and ,academics1 ,,ii4 #e1 #bcf2 ,old1 ,,ii4 #bcb1 #caa2 ,middle1 ,,ii4 #caa2 ,new1 ,i4 #ajg1 #afg1 #dgd2 ,,ii4 #aag1 #bcb1 #caj-cbh2 subjectivity of ,new1 ,,ii4 #cbg2 #aeth cent4 ,platonic1 ,i4 #df2 ,,iii4 #aab4 ,achilles the ,swift1 ,i4 #bgb4 ,achilles1 ,i4 #ddc4 ,adam1 ,,ii4 #cib2 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non-identical1 ,,ii4 #hj2 ,greek idea of1 ,,ii4 #abe2 ,aristotle's idea of1 ,,ii4 #acf2 ,jewish conception of1 ,,ii4 #cgi2 as ,self-limiting1 ,,ii4 #chb2 as ,concrete1 ,,ii4 #chd-chg2 as ,light1 ,,ii4 #cie2 as self-conscious ,spirit1 ,,ii4 #dja2 ,nature of1 ,,iii4 #fc2 unity in1 ,,iii4 #aif1 #cdg2 existence of1 ,,iii4 #afd1 #bcc seq42 in unity with existence1 ,,iii4 #bdj2 assistance of1 ,,iii4 #bea2 as ,one ,substance1 ,,iii4 #bfd seq42 ,idea of1 ,,iii4 #bid2 as absolute ,monad1 ,,iii4 #cci2 as ,beyond1 ,,iii4 #cfa1 #chb1 #djg2 as ,supernatural1 ,,iii4 #daf2 indeterminate conception of1 ,,iii4 #dbb2 immediate consciousness of1 ,,iii4 #dcd1 #eje4 ,gods1 ,greek1 ,i4 #da1 #ga1 #gd1 #aag1 #aed1 #agh1 #bdh1 #dca1 #dcb1 #dce2 ,,ii4 #cjd1 #cje2 ,roman1 ,i4 #aag4 ,goethe1 ,i4 #bg1 #ij1 #aac2 ,,ii4 #ccg4 ,good1 ,evil1 ,i4 #hc-he2 ,,iii4 #afd1 #aid1 #cdj seq4 ,gorgias1 ,i4 #agj1 #cga1 #cgb1 #dha2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #cgh-chd4 ,grres1 ,,iii4 #edc4 ,gospels1 ,i4 #adi4 ,gotama1 ,i4 #ada1 #adb1 #add4 ,goveanus1 ,,iii4 #add4 ,greece1 the ,greeks1 ,i4 #bb1 #eb1 #gg1 #ajj1 #aja1 #aai1 #abe1 #aai-afd1 #bjf1 #bjg1 #bcd1 #cbb1 #cff1 #dbc1 #deh2 ,,ii4 #be1 #bcd1 #bgd1 #cgf1 #cgg1 #chb1 #dea2 ,,iii4 #d1 #bd1 #bg-bi1 #if1 #aji1 #afj1 #afg1 #bah1 #edh2 disintegration of ,greece1 ,i4 #cej2 culture in ,greece1 ,i4 #cee2 constitutions of ,greece1 ,,ii4 #bji4 ,gregory1 ,pope1 ,,iii4 #ge4 ,grotius1 ,hugo1 ,i4 #ei2 ,,iii4 #cac1 #cad1 #cba4 ,gymnosophists1 ,i4 #abf4 ,harmony of music1 ,,ii4 #fi2 pre-established 7of ,leibnitz71 ,,iii4 #cdb-cdd1 #cdg1 #cej1 #cfa4 ,harvey1 ,,iii4 #cae4 ,hegesias the ,cyrenaic1 ,i4 #dfi1 #dgg1 #dgh1 #dhj4 ,helmont1 ,,iii4 #aac4 ,helvetius1 ,,iii4 #djj4 ,heraclitus1 ,heraclitics1 ,i4 #afg1 #afi1 #agj1 #aia1 #baa1 #bfb1 #cjb1 #cac1 #caf1 #cag1 #cbj1 #ccj1 #cca1 #ccf1 #ceb1 #cgg2 ,,ii4 #d1 #ab1 #ed1 #adj1 #bci1 #bdd-bdf1 #ccd1 #djb2 ,,iii4 #acb1 #eej2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #bgh-bih2 obscurity of1 ,i4 #bha2 doctrine of ,becoming1 ,i4 #bhc seq42 time as first principle1 ,i4 #bhf seq4 ,herbert1 ,lord1 ,,iii4 #cjj4 ,herder1 ,,iii4 #ead4 ,hermias1 ,,ii4 #abj1 #aba1 #abc1 #abf4 ,hermippus1 ,i4 #aef4 ,hermotimus of ,clazomen1 ,i4 #cbj1 #cba4 ,herodotus1 ,i4 #fi1 #gi1 #aae1 #aeg1 #aeh1 #afa1 #afh1 #aga1 #aif1 #aih1 #bcc4 ,hesiod1 ,i4 #fi1 #bje1 #bdh2 ,,ii4 #ajg1 #bgh4 ,hieronymus1 ,i4 #agb4 ,hipparchia the ,cynic1 ,i4 #dhg4 ,hippasus1 ,i4 #aia4 ,hippias1 ,i4 #aaf4 ,hippocrates1 ,i4 #ceh-cfa4 ,history1 ,i4 #a1 #b1 #e1 #f1 #aaj1 #aea1 #aeb2 of religion1 ,i4 #h2 political1 ,i4 #aae2 conception of1 ,,ii4 #bd2 philosophy of1 ,,iii4 #g1 #h1 #af4 ,hobbes1 ,i4 #ei2 ,,iii4 #cac1 #cae-cai4 ,hollbach1 ,baron von1 ,,iii4 #cic4 ,holy ,ghost1 sin against1 ,i4 #gd4 ,homeliness1 ,i4 #aej1 #aea4 ,homer1 ,homeric1 ,i4 #fi1 #abj1 #agh1 #agi1 #bje1 #bdh1 #dac2 ,,ii4 #ae1 #gb1 #ajg1 #aec1 #ccd1 #chh4 ,homonyms1 ,,ii1 #bab4 ,homomeri1 ,i4 #ccd1 #cce seq4 ,hugo1 ,master1 ,,ii4 #bgf4 ,hume1 ,,iii4 #cfb-cfd1 #cfi-cge1 #chj1 #djf1 #daj1 #dbg4 ,huss1 ,,iii4 #adh4 ,hutcheson1 ,,iii4 #cgh4 ,iamblichus1 ,i4 #aig1 #bba1 #bbf2 ,,ii4 #dji4 ,idea1 the1 ,i4 #bj1 #bd1 #be1 #bg-ca1 #cc-ce1 #da1 #db1 #fa1 #hb1 #hc1 #aja1 #ajc-ajf1 #acd1 #adf1 #afc-afe1 #ahc1 #baf1 #bhb1 #cbd1 #cde1 #cdf1 #cej1 #chg1 #djf2 ,,ii4 #hd1 #if1 #acf1 #adj1 #ahh1 #bcb1 #bcc1 #cah1 #cdd1 #cgj1 #cgd1 #chj1 #djb1 #djg1 #dah2 ,,iii4 #h1 #aj1 #af1 #ba1 #bi1 #di1 #ajj1 #abc1 #aca1 #afa1 #age1 #agf2 of ,plato1 ,,ii4 #ag seq42 of ,aristotle1 ,,ii4 #ag2 of ,proclus1 ,,ii4 #ddj2 of ,bruno1 ,,iii1 #abh2 of ,kant1 ,,iii4 #ddd2 self-determinate1 ,,ii4 #fh2 abstract1 ,,ii4 #cca2 the ,true1 ,,ii4 #aac2 speculative1 ,,ii4 #aeb1 #bbb1 #cfg seq42 ,,iii4 #aeb2 concrete1 ,,iii4 #c2 nature of1 ,,ii4 #gi2 determination of1 ,,ii4 #gd2 of reality1 ,,ii4 #cgi2 as thought1 ,,ii4 #chc2 of ,philosophy1 ,,ii4 #ceh1 #djj2 of spirit1 ,,iii4 #aja1 #edi2 of ,absolute1 ,,iii4 #daj2 in its necessity1 ,,iii4 #ede4 ,ideal1 ,idealism1 ,i4 #ajb2 ,,ii4 #a1 #dc1 #ie1 #cfa1 #cfd2 ,,iii4 #afc1 #ceh1 #cfj1 #cfc-cfh1 #eaf 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,,iii4 #dda seq42 faculty of reason1 ,,iii4 #ddc2 ,idea of ,god1 ,,iii4 #dea seq41 #dfc2 practical reason1 ,,iii4 #deg-dfd2 faculty of judgment1 ,,iii4 #dfd-dgf2 the ,beautiful1 ,,iii4 #dfh-dgj2 teleology in nature1 ,,iii4 #dgj-dgd2 the good as ,god1 ,,iii4 #dgd-dgf2 thing-in-itself1 ,,iii4 #die4 ,kepler1 ,i4 #bca2 ,,ii4 #hj2 ,,iii4 #afb1 #cae4 ,kielmeyer1 ,,iii4 #ead4 ,knowledge1 ,,ii4 #ba1 #bb1 #bg1 #ca-ce1 #da1 #dd2 immediate1 ,i4 #ajg2 ,,iii4 #dah2 and mediate1 ,,iii4 #dbj seq42 of ,spinoza1 ,,iii4 #bgf-bgh4 ,krug1 ,,iii4 #dgi1 #dic1 #eaj1 #eaa4 ,lacedmon1 ,lacedmonians1 ,i4 #cbc1 #cia1 #djh1 #ddh4 ,lalande1 ,,iii4 #dbe4 ,lambertus ,danus1 ,,iii4 #ci4 ,la ,mettrie1 ,,iii4 #cii4 ,lange1 ,,iii4 #cea4 ,launoi1 ,,iii4 #ci4 ,lavoisier1 ,i4 #bia4 ,law1 ,i4 #fj1 #adi2 as sublated1 #dah1 #dai2 as having a conscience1 ,i4 #ddc4 ,learning1 ,i4 #ceb1 #daj2 ,,ii4 #ba1 #cc1 #ce1 #db1 #dd4 ,leibnitz1 ,i4 #abj1 #bce1 #cdb2 ,,ii4 #ahh1 #cca2 ,,iii4 #ahh1 #bai1 #bbj1 #bdb1 #bij1 #bif1 #big1 #cej1 #ceh1 #cff1 #cfg1 #djc1 #djf1 #dcf2 life and teaching1 ,,iii4 #cbe-cdh2 ,monads of1 ,,iii4 #ccj seq41 #edi4 ,lessing1 ,,iii4 #djd1 #djf1 #daa1 #dab4 ,leucippus1 ,i4 #afi1 #agj1 #bgg1 #bih1 #cce2 ,,ii4 #bi1 #add1 #bbe1 #bgh2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #bii-caj2 atomic theory1 ,i4 #cjj seq42 ,,ii4 #bhh2 principle of the ,one1 ,i4 #cjb seq42 plenum and vacuum1 ,i4 #cje seq42 principle of diversity1 ,i4 #cjg4 ,liberty of speech1 ,i4 #dci4 ,life1 its ends1 ,i4 #ccb1 #ccc4 ,light principle1 ,i4 #hd1 #he4 ,limitation1 ,i4 #aec1 #bfj2 of ,parmenides1 ,i4 #bec2 of ,zeno1 ,i4 #bgd4 ,lipsius1 ,i4 #df2 ,,iii4 #aab1 #aac4 ,livy1 ,i4 #aae4 ,locke1 ,,ii4 #aai1 #bhi2 ,,iii4 #ahh1 #bai1 #bbj1 #bdb1 #bij1 #bib1 #cbe1 #cbh1 #ccj1 #cfc1 #cfd1 #cff1 #cgj1 #cga1 #chc1 #cii1 #djc1 #dbg1 #dbi1 #eda2 life and teaching1 ,,iii4 #bie-cac2 doctrine of reality1 ,,iii4 #bif seq42 innate ideas1 ,,iii4 #cjj2 origin of ideas1 ,,iii4 #cjb seq4 ,logos 7,reason71 ,,ii4 #bdd1 #cha1 #cia seq41 #cig1 #djg2 of ,plotinus1 ,,ii4 #daf2 ,,iii4 #d1 #aj1 #cei4 ,lombard1 ,peter1 ,,iii4 #fi-ga1 #hi4 ,longinus1 ,,ii4 #djd4 ,lullus1 ,raymundus1 ,,iii4 #ib-id1 #bhg2 ,his ,art1 ,,iii4 #ic1 #abc1 #abi1 #acd1 #acf4 ,luther1 ,,iii4 #ab1 #ed1 #aad1 #adh1 #aej1 #aeh1 #aei1 #che1 #chi1 #cih4 ,lutheran faith1 ,i4 #gc2 ,,iii4 #adi4 ,lyceum1 ,,ii4 #abf ,lycurgus1 ,i4 #aeh2 ,,ii4 #h4 ,macchiavelli1 ,,iii4 #adf4 ,magna ,grcia1 ,i4 #afi1 #bjf4 ,maheswara1 ,i4 #aca1 #ace4 ,mahomed1 ,mahomedanism1 ,i4 #ga2 ,,iii4 #bd1 #bf1 #bh1 #cj1 #chg4 ,malebranche1 ,,iii4 #bai1 #bbj1 #bdj1 #bif1 #bii1 #caa1 #cfd1 #cii2 life and teaching1 ,,iii4 #bij-bie2 origin of knowledge1 ,,iii4 #bia seq4 ,manichism1 ,,iii4 #ag-bj4 ,marcus the ,gnostic1 ,,ii4 #cig4 ,marinus1 ,,ii4 #dcc1 #dcd1 #dej4 ,materialism1 ,,ii4 #fb2 ,,iii4 #abe1 #cha1 #chg1 #cih4 ,mathematics1 ,i4 #aj4 ,mauritius1 ,,iii4 #ge4 ,mayer1 ,ludwig1 ,,iii4 #bee4 ,medabberim1 ,,iii4 #bg1 #cj-cc4 ,medici1 ,cosmo de'1 ,i4 #df2 ,,iii4 #aab4 ,megarics1 the1 ,i4 #deb-dfi2 dialectic of1 ,i4 #dec1 #ded4 ,melancthon1 ,,iii4 #aad4 ,melchisedec1 ,i4 #dg4 ,melissus1 ,i4 #bdj1 #bda1 #bdi1 #bej1 #bfc1 #chj2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #beg-bfj4 ,melitus1 ,i1 #dce4 ,mendelssohn1 ,moses1 ,,ii4 #ee2 ,,iii4 #cef1 #ceg1 #djd-djf1 #daa1 #dab4 ,menedemus1 ,i4 #dee1 #dfa4 ,messemans1 ,i4 #ajj4 ,messina1 ,i4 #bda4 ,metaphysics1 ,,ii4 #acg seq41 #bhc seq42 ,,iii4 #fa seq41 #bbj seq4 ,metrodorus1 ,,ii4 #bgi4 ,michael of ,montaigne1 ,,iii4 #adf4 ,middle ,ages1 ,i4 #aaj2 thought of the1 ,,ii4 #bbg2 standpoint of the1 ,,iii4 #afj4 ,miletus1 ,i4 #aga4 ,miltiades1 ,i4 #aeg4 ,mimansa1 ,i4 #abh4 ,mind1 ,i4 #bb1 #bc1 #bf1 #bg1 #cb-cf1 #df-dh1 #ej-ee1 #fb1 #fc1 #fh1 #gj1 #ge1 #gf1 #ha1 #hh1 #ie-ig1 #ajb-ajh1 #add1 #aeb1 #aec1 #cec1 #ced2 ,,ii4 #ag1 #ah1 #cc-cf1 #da1 #hc1 #chh2 ,,iii4 #f2 universal1 ,i4 #c1 #gg2 principle of1 ,,ii4 #bge2 reconciling mind1 ,,ii4 #chb2 as concrete1 ,,ii4 #chd-chf4 ,mirabaud1 ,,iii4 #chg4 ,miracles1 ,i4 #gb2 ,,ii4 #daj4 ,mithra1 ,i4 #he4 ,moderatus1 ,i4 #bji4 ,moisture1 principle of1 see ,water4 ,monads of ,leibnitz1 ,,iii4 #ccj seq4 ,montesquieu1 ,,iii4 #chg1 #cic1 #cii4 ,morality1 ,i4 #aec1 #aef1 #djh1 #dji2 ,,ii4 #ij1 #ajh2 objective and subjective1 ,i4 #chg1 #chh1 #daa2 shaking of1 ,i4 #dad2 ,greek1 ,i4 #dae2 ,,ii4 #ih2 reflective1 ,,ii4 #ih2 traditional1 ,,ii4 #ii1 #ajj2 ,stoic1 ,,ii4 #bge4 ,mortagne1 ,walter of1 ,,iii4 #hj-hb4 ,moses ,maimonides1 ,,iii4 #bg1 #cj1 #ca1 #ce1 #cf4 ,motion1 principle of1 ,i4 #aic2 ,zeno's dialectic of1 ,i4 #bff-bgg4 ,mysticism1 ,,ii4 #ddh2 ,,iii4 #ia-id4 ,mythology1 ,i4 #f1 #ef1 #gc1 #gh1 #ha-hh1 #ic1 #acc seq42 ,,iii4 #afj4 ,nature1 ,i4 #bi1 #cb1 #cf1 #ic1 #if1 #ajc1 #ajg1 #acj-acb1 #adj1 #aeb1 #aed1 #aee1 #cae2 ,,ii4 #cgf1 #chc1 #chf2 ,,iii4 #ajg1 #cji1 #chc1 #cig2 state of1 ,,ii4 #ib2 systme de la1 ,,iii4 #cic1 #cid4 ,neander1 ,,ii4 #cig4 ,necessity1 ,i4 #bf1 #cf1 #ajf2 ,,ii4 #bdh1 #bge2 ,,iii4 #f1 #cgd2 of ,heraclitus1 ,i4 #bic1 #bid4 ,nemesis1 ,i4 #cbh2 ,,ii4 #gc1 #ace4 ,neo-,platonists1 ,neo-,platonism1 ,i4 #ec1 #gh1 #hb1 #ajd1 #aji1 #afc1 #bjb1 #bjh2 ,,ii4 #cac1 #cgd-dec1 #cha1 #chb2 ,,iii4 #a-c1 #aa1 #ag1 #bc1 #bi1 #cf1 #dj1 #ei1 #fa1 #ia1 #aaj1 #aca1 #bag1 #bbg1 #dci1 #ebg1 #edh4 ,neo-,pythagoreans1 ,i4 #aid1 #bjh2 ,,ii4 #chj4 ,newton1 ,i4 #ei1 #bge2 ,,iii4 #afb1 #cac1 #cbb-cbe1 #cbg4 ,nicolai1 ,,iii4 #djd1 #daa4 ,nicomachus1 ,i4 #bba4 ,nominalists1 ,,iii4 #gg-hf4 ,notion1 ,notions1 ,i4 #bj1 #bi-ca1 #ed1 #gh-hj1 #hb1 #he1 #hi1 #ajb-ajd1 #ajf1 #ajh1 #aji1 #ace1 #agh1 #aha1 #ahb1 #ahe1 #aid1 #bjh-baa1 #bci1 #bfh1 #bhd1 #bij-bic1 #cjf1 #cci1 #cdd1 #ceb1 #cee1 #dae2 ,,ii4 #acc1 #bbg-bcj1 #bcg1 #bgi1 #dbi2 ,,iii4 #ahi1 #aig1 #cbd1 #cei1 #cff1 #chj1 #cha1 #dji1 #edd2 of ,plato and ,socrates1 ,i4 #cfg2 ,,ii4 #ah-bj1 #gd2 of ,aristotle1 ,,ii4 #acb2 of ,stoics1 ,,ii4 #bdh2 of ,proclus1 ,,ii4 #dch2 of ,philosophy1 ,i4 #deb2 of universal1 ,,ii4 #cc2 nature of ,notion1 ,,ii4 #fa2 subjective and objective identical1 ,,ii4 #bcc2 logical1 ,,ii4 #ccj2 as self-movement1 ,,ii4 #cfi2 of absolute essence1 ,,ii4 #daa2 absolute1 ,,iii4 #age2 as essence1 ,,iii4 #dab3 ,notion or ,being1 ,,iii4 #deb seq4 ,nous1 ,i4 #ajb1 #ajd1 #afe1 #bic1 #cai1 #cbi seq41 #cej1 #cea1 #djf1 #dea2 ,,ii4 #cha1 #ddd1 #ddf2 ,,iii4 #abc2 of ,plotinus1 ,,ii4 #dac seq42 of ,aristotle1 ,,iii4 #dfg1 #edf4 ,novalis1 ,,iii4 #eaj4 ,numbers1 ,i4 #hi2 of ,pythagoreans1 ,i4 #aie1 #bjh-bch1 #bgh4 ,nyaya1 ,i4 #abh1 #ada1 #adb1 #add4 ,occam1 ,occamists1 ,,iii4 #ha1 #hb-he4 ,oceanus1 ,i4 #agf4 ,oken1 ,,iii4 #edc4 ,oldenburg1 ,,iii4 #cbg4 ,om1 ,i4 #acg4 ,opinion1 ,opinions1 ,i4 #aa-ae1 #ca1 #fb1 #ii1 #bdg1 #bed1 #bee1 #bei1 #cec2 ,,ii4 #ca1 #cb1 #bhc1 #bhd1 #cah4 ,oriental1 ,orientals1 ,i4 #if1 #ih2 ,,ii4 #cij2 ,,iii4 #cc2 theory of identity1 ,,iii4 #beb4 ,origen1 ,,ii4 #djd4 ,origination and ,decease 7of ,parmenides71 ,i4 #beb1 #bec2 of ,aristotle1 ,,ii4 #agf1 #agh4 ,ormuzd1 ,i4 #hc1 #he1 #aah4 ,orpheus1 ,,ii4 #dcd4 ,oswald1 ,james1 ,,iii4 #cgf-cgh4 8,other10 principle of1 ,,ii4 #he4 ,palestine1 ,i4 #gd4 ,panaetius1 ,,ii4 #bdb4 ,pantheism1 ,,ii4 #cha2 ,,iii4 #c1 #abj1 #abc1 #agj1 #bib4 ,paracelsus1 ,,iii4 #aia4 ,parents and children1 relation between1 ,i4 #dcg1 #dch1 #ddj4 ,parmenides1 ,i4 #afi1 #bdj-bdb1 #bdg1 #bdi-beh1 #bfa-bfd1 #bgi1 #cjb1 #caa2 ,,ii4 #ad1 #gh1 #cij1 #djb1 #dac2 ,being of1 ,,ii4 #ec2 ,,iii4 #edh4 ,pascal1 ,i4 #ic4 ,paul1 ,,iii4 #dge4 ,paulus1 ,prof41 ,,iii4 #bef4 ,pausanias1 ,i4 #dbc4 ,pedantry1 ,i4 #cec4 ,pelagians1 ,,iii4 #bj4 ,pelopideans1 ,i4 #aee4 ,peloponnesus1 ,i4 #afh4 ,pentecost1 ,,iii4 #af4 ,perception1 ,i4 #acj1 #adb2 of ,berkeley ,,iii4 #cfe seq4 ,periander1 ,i4 #aef1 #afj4 ,pericles1 ,i4 #aeg1 #cbe1 #cbf1 #cbh1 #ceg1 #cfa1 #cgb1 #cic1 #cid1 #dbg1 #dda2 ,,ii4 #abf4 ,peripatetics1 ,i4 #afg1 #dgi2 ,,ii4 #abf1 #acj1 #bbe1 #bbf1 #ccg4 ,persians1 ,i4 #hc1 #aah1 #aee1 #aga4 ,peter1 ,apostle1 ,i4 #ag2 ,,ii4 #chg4 ,petrarch1 ,,iii4 #aaj1 #aad4 ,pfaff1 ,,iii4 #cbi4 ,pherecydes1 ,i4 #ahe1 #aij1 #aia1 #bcc4 ,philetas of ,cos1 ,i4 #dfj4 ,philip of ,macedon1 ,,ii4 #aai1 #aba4 ,philo1 ,,ii4 #cig2 ,,iii4 #ag1 #cf2 life and teaching1 ,,ii4 #chg-cid2 doctrine of ecstasy1 ,,ii4 #chi2 logos1 ,,ii4 #cia seq42 man as ,wisdom1 ,,ii4 #cib2 ideas of ,,ii4 #cib2 matter as negative1 ,,ii4 #cic4 ,philo of ,biblus1 ,i4 #hf4 ,philolaus1 ,i4 #bjg2 ,,ii4 #e4 ,philosophers1 lives and calling of1 ,,iii4 #aff-afi4 ,philosophos1 ,i4 #aii4 ,philosophy1 ,general idea of ,history of1 ,i4 #a-g1 #bi1 #ca1 #di1 #ajh1 #aaj2 as the true and eternal1 ,i4 #ch1 #ci2 systems of1 ,i4 #ah1 #ai1 #ce1 #cg1 #ch1 #de2 particular form of1 ,i4 #ec2 beginning of1 ,i4 #agh1 #bed2 natural1 ,i4 #agc1 #ahj2 doubt essential in1 ,i4 #djf2 its one reality1 ,,ii4 #ac2 its meaning1 ,,ii4 #bd1 #be2 its object1 ,,ii4 #acd2 its essence1 ,,ii4 #cea2 its objectivity1 ,,iii4 #bb2 idea of1 ,,iii4 #bc2 as physics1 ,,iii4 #afb2 its history1 ,,iii4 #agf2 new epoch in1 ,,iii4 #bbc seq42 its nature1 ,,iii4 #bdh2 its aims1 ,,iii4 #ede seq42 one philosophy1 ,,iii4 #eec4 ,philosophy1 ,alexandrian1 ,i4 #ajc2 ,,ii4 #acj1 #cgc1 #chj-chb1 #cii-dec2 ,,iii4 #ag1 #aah1 #abc1 #aeb1 #afj1 #cca4 0 ,arabian1 ,,iii4 #bf-ce4 0 ,aristotelian1 ,,ii4 #aag-bca1 #djj2 ,,iii4 #cec4 0 ,atomic1 ,i4 #cg1 #adc1 #cjj-caj1 #chd2 ,,ii4 #agd1 #bhh-bia1 #bii2 ,,iii4 #ddi4 0 ,christian1 ,i4 #fc4 0 ,ciceronian1 ,,iii4 #aac-aae4 0 of ,fathers1 ,i4 #fd4 0 ,french1 ,,iii4 #bai1 #cfb1 #cfc1 #cge1 #cgi-djb1 #dji1 #dbc1 #dbe1 #dbf1 #dbi4 0 ,german1 ,,iii4 #bai1 #cef-cfj1 #cge1 #djc-djh1 #dbe1 #dbf1 #dbi1 #ejd2 recent1 ,,iii4 #dji seq4 0 ,gnostic1 ,i4 #aag4 0 ,greek1 ,i4 #eb1 #ee1 #gh1 #ajc1 #ajd1 #ajg1 #aji1 #aaa1 #aee2 in ,roman world1 ,i4 #afc4 0 ,indian1 ,i4 #fc1 #ii1 #abe-adf1 #afb4 0 ,ionic1 ,i4 #eb1 #eh1 #aee1 #aga-aid1 #bjh1 #cbj1 #chd4 0 ,kantian1 ,i4 #bgg1 #chh2 ,,iii4 #dba1 #dbc-dgh1 #eje4 0 of ,middle ,ages1 ,i4 #aji2 ,,iii4 #a-aee4 0 ,modern1 ,i4 #aji2 ,,iii4 #aeg-eed 0 ,neo-,aristotelian1 ,,ii4 #cha4 0 ,oriental1 ,i4 #fc1 #if-ii1 #aag-adg4 0 ,platonic1 ,,ii4 #a-aag1 #djj2 ,,iii4 #ch1 #aaj1 #aaa4 0 ,popular1 ,i4 #ib1 #ic1 #chi4 0 ,pythagorean1 ,i4 #aid-bci2 ,,iii4 #aac4 0 ,scholastic1 ,i4 #fd2 ,,ii4 #acj1 #cie2 ,,iii4 #be1 #cg-ajg1 #aad1 #aae1 #ach1 #adb1 #adf1 #aea1 #afb1 #ahj2 language of1 ,,iii4 #ch2 name1 ,,iii4 #ci4 0 ,scottish1 ,,iii4 #bai1 #cfb1 #cfc1 #cge-cgi1 #cib4 0 of the ,sophists1 ,i4 #ajg1 #ceb-chd4 0 ,teutonic1 ,i4 #aja1 #aji4 0 ,western1 ,i4 #ii4 ,phnicians1 ,i4 #he4 ,physiocratic system1 ,,iii4 #chf4 ,picus1 ,,iii4 #aab4 ,pindar1 ,,ii4 #ce4 ,pisistratus1 ,i4 #aeh-afj4 ,pittacus1 ,i4 #aef1 #afj4 ,plato1 ,i4 #ad1 #df1 #dh1 #eb1 #hg1 #hh1 #ia1 #ace1 #afc1 #afe-afg1 #aie1 #bjf-bji1 #bac1 #bae1 #bbh1 #bdi1 #bej1 #bfb1 #cdb1 #cej1 #ced1 #cfe-cfh1 #cgd-cgf1 #chf1 #chg1 #cif1 #dja-djf1 #daj-dad1 #dca1 #ddc1 #ddh1 #deg1 #dei1 #dfd1 #dga1 #dgd1 #dhf2 ,,ii4 #aah-aba1 #acd-acf1 #adj1 #baj1 #bcb1 #bcd1 #bdd1 #bgd1 #caa1 #cad1 #cag1 #cch1 #cej1 #cfd1 #chc1 #chh1 #dja-djc1 #djg1 #daj1 #dac1 #dbi1 #dcd1 #dce1 #dda1 #dde1 #deb2 ,,iii4 #bi1 #ei1 #he1 #ie1 #aaj1 #afa1 #bdb1 #beg1 #cjj1 #caj1 #cab1 #cai1 #ceh1 #ebg2 life and teaching1 ,,ii4 #a-aag2 disciple of ,socrates1 ,,ii4 #a1 #c1 #d2 studied ,heraclitus1 ,i4 #bhb1 #bhc2 ,,ii4 #d2 difficulty of his philosophy ,,ii4 #aj2 dialogues1 ,,ii4 #ab seq42 ,symposium1 ,i4 #bhd1 #bhe1 #cij1 #cid1 #cie2 ,phdo1 ,i4 #cdj1 seq42 ,,ii4 #da1 #ee2 ,timus1 ,i4 #ch1 #adc1 #bcc1 #beb2 ,,ii4 #ad1 #bj1 #bb1 #di1 #fb1 #ga1 #gc1 #ha1 #ajf1 #acd1 #cab2 ,parmenides1 ,i4 #hh1 #aff1 #bdi1 #bfa1 #bfd1 #bff2 ,,ii4 #di1 #ef1 #ei1 #fj1 #fd1 #dcg2 ,republic1 ,i4 #cbc2 ,,ii4 #bb1 #bc1 #bg1 #dd1 #df1 #di1 #ea1 #ij1 #ic1 #ie-ii1 #aji1 #abb1 #dje2 ,,iii4 #dh2 ,thetetus1 ,i4 #bdi2 ,protagoras1 ,i4 #ceh-cfd2 ,meno1 ,i4 #djf2 ,,ii4 #cc1 #cd2 ,phdrus1 ,,ii4 #ad1 #cf1 #da1 #gd2 ,critias1 ,,ii4 #di2 ,philebus1 ,,ii4 #ef1 #fh1 #gj1 #ddb2 ,sophist1 ,,ii4 #ef1 #fb2 ,laws1 ,,ii4 #ajd2 aim of dialogues1 ,,ii4 #ej1 #ea2 ,ideas of1 ,i4 #bbj1 #bgh2 ,,ii4 #ba1 #bi seq41 #ef1 #ei1 #aci1 #adj1 #bbh1 #bbi1 #dai1 #dea2 inert ideas1 ,,ii4 #add2 myths1 ,,ii4 #ai seq42 conception of ,philosophy1 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#bcc4 ,trinity1 the1 ,i4 #hi1 #abe1 #ace1 #bbb2 ,,ii4 #dah2 ,,iii4 #b1 #d1 #bj1 #bb1 #ec1 #gh1 #aic1 #aif1 #bab1 #bch1 #dje2 of ,plato1 ,,ii4 #gf2 ,christian1 ,,ii4 #chc2 of ,proclus1 ,,ii4 #ddj2 ,abelard's proof of1 ,,iii4 #fh4 ,tropes1 ,,ii4 #cdf2 earlier1 ,,ii4 #cdg-ceg2 later1 ,,ii4 #ceg-cfe4 ,truth1 ,i4 #h1 #i1 #ac-ae1 #ag-bj1 #fb1 #ga1 #gh1 #ajh1 #aji1 #bgg1 #dej2 ,,ii4 #cj1 #ca1 #de1 #ej1 #fe-fg1 #fi1 #ie-ig1 #adh-aej1 #bja1 #bbj-bbc1 #bcc1 #bdi-bed1 #bgf1 #bgg1 #bha-bhf1 #bhg1 #caa1 #cae-cai1 #cba-ccc1 #cce-cdg1 #cej1 #chd1 #chf-chh2 ,,iii4 #bga1 #dgg2 as simple1 ,i4 #dei2 ,notion of1 ,,iii4 #eji4 ,tschirnhausen1 ,,iii4 #cdi1 #cea4 ,tyrannion1 ,,ii4 #abh4 ,tyrants1 ,tyranny1 ,i4 #aeh-afj4 ,understanding1 the1 ,,iii4 #aeh1 #cjd2 healthy1 ,i4 #cgi2 ,,iii4 #chf4 ,universal1 ,universality1 ,i4 #ie1 #if1 #ih1 #ajb1 #ajh1 #adg1 #agg1 #agh1 #agi1 #cdg1 #chf2 ,,ii4 #bi1 #bbh1 #bca2 ,,iii4 #cci1 #cgb2 ,anaxagoras' view of1 ,i4 #cbj2 spiritual1 ,i4 #chg2 of ,socrates1 ,i4 #daa2 fixed nature of disappears1 ,i4 #dah4 ,uranus1 ,i4 #aah4 ,valentinus1 ,,ii4 #cig4 ,valerius ,maximus1 ,i4 #bii1 #cbb4 ,vedas1 ,i4 #abf-acj4 ,vespasian1 ,i4 #hf4 ,virtue1 ,i4 #dab1 #dad4 seq42 ,,ii4 #cb1 #eb1 #ajb1 #ajc1 #bjd-bjg1 #bei-bfc1 #bfe-bfh1 #bgb1 #cai1 #dbg1 #dbh2 ,,iii4 #eb1 #adg2 the teaching of1 ,i4 #cfc2 political1 ,i4 #cfa-cfd2 as perception1 ,i4 #daa2 as whole heart1 ,i4 #dac4 ,vishnu1 ,i4 #aah1 #abg1 #abh1 #aca4 ,voetius1 ,,iii4 #bed4 ,voltaire1 ,,iii4 #adc1 #cdj1 #chg1 #cii4 ,water1 as ,principle1 ,i4 #age-ahe1 #ahg4 ,weigel1 ,,iii4 #cbf4 ,weisse1 ,,iii4 #djd4 ,wendt1 ,a41 ,i4 #aaa1 #aad4 ,western ,church1 ,,iii4 #ag4 ,windischmann1 ,i4 #abc4 ,wisdom1 worldly1 ,i4 #fj1 #fa1 #fe4 ,wise ,man1 the ,doctrine of the1 ,i4 #dgd1 #dge2 ,,ii4 #bcc1 #bfg seq41 #cja1 #cji1 #cad-caf1 #cah1 #cai4 ,wit1 ,i4 #dbg1 #dbh4 ,wolff1 ,august1 ,i4 #aai1 #caa2 ,,ii4 #gb1 #cbe2 ,,iii4 #bai1 #bej1 #caj1 #caa1 #cbe1 #cbi1 #ceg1 #chg1 #cia1 #djc1 #dje1 #djf1 #dbf1 #dbi2 life and teaching1 ,,iii4 #cdh-cef4 ,wollaston1 ,,iii4 #cai1 #cbj4 ,worcester1 ,bishop of1 ,,iii4 #cjd4 ,word1 the1 ,,iii4 #bjb seq4 ,world-spirit1 the1 ,i4 #cf1 #gi1 #aji2 ,,ii4 #cgh4 ,worship1 ,i4 #fb1 #fc1 #gd1 #gf1 #abi2 spiritual1 ,,iii4 #aej4 ,wycliffe1 ,,iii4 #adh4 ,xeniades1 ,i4 #bgh4 ,xenocrates1 ,,ii4 #bch1 #bgg4 ,xenophon1 ,i4 #cij1 #cif1 #djb1 #dad-daf1 #dbb-dbd1 #dca1 #dcb1 #dcf1 #dda1 #dej2 ,,ii4 #ae4 ,xenophanes1 ,i4 #gg1 #afi1 #bdj1 #bdi1 #bej1 #beg1 #beh1 #bfc2 ,,ii4 #ccd2 ,,iii4 #cic2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #bda-bdh4 ,zaleucus1 ,i4 #bja4 ,zalmoxis1 ,i4 #aif4 ,zeno1 ,i4 #afi1 #bdj-bdb1 #bdi1 #bej1 #bgi1 #bhb1 #bhd1 #ced1 #chj2 ,,ii4 #ad1 #agd1 #bai1 #ccd1 #dac2 life and teaching1 ,i4 #bfa-bgh4 ,zeno the ,stoic4 ,,ii4 #bch-bdj1 #bdd1 #bde1 #bej1 #bea1 #cac1 #cad4 ,zervane ,akerene1 ,i4 #hc1 #aah4 ,zeus1 ,i4 #aia1 #cfb4 ,zoroaster1 ,i4 #ha4 ,,corrigenda ,,in ,,vols4 ,i4 ,,ii4 ,,vol4 ,i4 ,page xii41 line #cb1 for 8never 444 completely0 read 8never have emptiness and conceit swum so persistently on the surface40 0 #ab1 0 #bf1 for 8is in0 read 8is not in40 0 #ef1 0 #i1 for 8sound0 read 8found40 0 #fj1 0 #ag1 for 8wherever1 etc40 read 8be this positive character derived from whence it may40 0 #gj1 0 #bi1 for 8,and ,mind 444 implicit10 read 8,and ,mind is implicitly not that40 0 #ga1 0 #b1 for 8,finality0 read 8,finiteness40 0 #gb1 0 #g1 for 8involve0 read 8involves02 line #bb1 omit 8through02 line #bd omit 8of40 0 #gc1 0 #bf1 for 8and0 read 8all40 0 #ha1 0 #aa1 for 8,what 444 evidence0 read 8,the essential truth contained in the testimony40 0 #hb1 0 #i1 for 8symbolism0 read 8his ,symbolik40 0 #he1 0 #cf1 omit 8the40 0 #hf1 0 #c1 omit 8the40 0 #ij1 0 #bi1 for 8thought--determination0 read 8thought-determination40 0 #aab1 0 #bd1 for 8,tiedmann0 read 8,tiedemann02 line #cj1 for 8,plato of ,brucker0 read 8,bipontine edition of ,plato40 0 #aac1 0 #ba1 for 8overthrown by0 read 8converted into20 line #bg1 for 8a correct0 read 8a more correct40 0 #aad1 lines #e and #h1 for 8,aft0 read 8,ast20 line #ah1 for 8,rirner0 read 8,rixner02 line #cc1 for 8and hence 444 philosophers0 read 8giving also biographical sketches of the principal philosophers40 0 #aag1 line #i1 for 8,east0 read 8,west02 line #bj1 for 8and approximates0 to end of sentence read 8which is very liable to be taken for ,philosophy1 and we must indicate the main reason why the ,oriental idea of religion is so liable to be regarded as a religious philosophy40 0 #aah1 0 #aj1 for 8,civa0 read 8,siva02 line #af1 for 8,zeroane0 read 8,zervane40 0 #aai1 0 #f1 for 8lawlessness0 read 8absence of individual rights02 line #bj1 for 8,to that 444 substance0 read 8,this finite can only come to be true when absorbed in substance40 0 #abj1 0 #af1 for 8last0 read 8arise02 line #bf1 for 8,liebnitz0 read 8,leibnitz40 0 #abb1 0 #f1 for 8sensuous0 read 8thoughtful40 0 #abc1 0 #cb1 0 0 0 0 0 #ace1 0 #aa1 0 0 0 0 0 #abh1 0 #bc1 for 8very extensive0 read 8widely diffused40 0 #abi1 0 #e1 for 8it must 444 again0 read 8it must be separated from nature in order that it may not come back40 0 #aed1 0 #e1 for 8connoisseurs0 read 8masters40 0 #afi1 0 #d1 for 8of0 read 8in40 0 #agc1 0 #e1 for 82 and it carries 444 weight0 read 8with a very important air40 0 #agd1 0 #b1 for 8for he speaks 444 them0 read 82 he speaks of them in general terms for the most part0 0 #agf1 0 #f1 for 8,tiedmann0 read 8,tiedemann40 0 #aha1 0 #i1 0 0 0 0 0 #ahc1 0 #bi1 0 0 0 0 0 #bad1 0 #ae1 for 8posited as0 read 8added to02 line #af1 for 8as0 read 8to40 0 #bca1 lines #cb and #cc1 for 8solar corpuscles0 read 8motes40 0 #bdd1 line #ai1 for 8,spinozaism0 read 8,spinozism40 0 #bdi1 0 #bc1 for 8,thtetus10 read 8,thetetus40 0 #bhj1 0 #bc1 for 8if0 read 8even though20 line #bd1 omit 8also02 line #cd1 for 8until modern time0 read 8until a late period of antiquity40 0 #bha1 0 #h1 for 8knowledge of language0 read 8philological learning0 0 #cbc1 0 #ah1 for 8we find1 it held among0 read 8as we have seen1 was held by40 0 #cei1 0 #bc1 for 8we have a desire to go on0 read 8let us go on0 0 #chd1 0 #be1 for 8,for a mental turning-point 444 thought0 read 8,for there exhibited itself in him a turning-point of spirit in the guise of philosophic thought40 0 #chh1 0 #bd1 for 8yield itself up 444 that0 read 8make concessions1 and therefore achieved no substantial result by its study1 praised ,socrates as he has often enough been praised since1 in that40 0 #cij1 0 #cc1 for 8maintaining that it was given0 read 8but succeeded in having it given40 0 #cic1 0 #ca1 for 8every0 read 8that40 0 #cid1 0 #a1 omit 8alone40 0 #djf1 0 #g1 omit comma after 8that40 0 #dbg1 0 #i1 for 8happy0 read 8frivolous02 line #ah1 for 8refute0 read 8establish40 0 #dbi1 0 #ca1 for 8suprem0 read 8supreme02 line #ce1 for 8execrations0 read 8execration40 0 #dgb1 0 #cc1 for 8that 444 other0 read 8in this way that one stone would not be sitting on another40 0 #dgh1 0 #bh1 for 8the ,ptolemies0 read 8by the ,ptolemy40 ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,page #ei1 line #a1 omit 8either of40 0 #ih1 0 #af1 for 8to be0 read 8as40 0 #afj1 lines #ac and #ad1 for 8,in the ,kantian philosophy 444 have0 read 8,not until we come to the ,kantian philosophy have we40 0 #bjd1 line #bg1 for 8virtue0 read 8reason40 ,,transcriber',s ,,notes3 --,obvious print and punctuation errors were corrected4 --,the transcriber of this project created the book cover image using the title page of the original book4 ,the image is placed in the public domain4