,note3 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive4 ,see https3_/_/archive4org_/details_/onsamene ss#jj;fulluoft ,transcriber's note3 ,text enclosed by underscores is in italics 7italics74 ,small capitals have been transcribed as ,,all ,,capitals4 ,the ,table of ,contents can be found after the main text4 ,a list of other corrections can be found at the end of the document4 ,,on ,,sameness ,,and ,,identity4 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,,philosophical ,,series4 ,,numbers ,,in ,,preparation4 ,,no4 ,,ii4 ,,studies ,,from ,,the ,,laboratory ,,of ,,experimental ,,psychology4 ,researches are in progress on3 ,memory and the ,least ,noticeable ,difference in ,sensation2 ,measurement in the ,diagnosis of ,diseases of the ,nervous ,system2 ,the ,rate at which the ,nervous ,impulse ,travels2 ,the ,personal ,difference in the ,time of ,mental ,processes2 ,the ,rate1 ,extent1 and ,force of ,movement2 ,accuracy of ,perception as a ,function of the ,time of ,stimulation2 ,the ,correlation of ,mental ,time1 ,intensity1 and ,extensity2 ,the ,relative ,value to ,science of ,experiment1 ,observation1 and ,memory2 ,the ,building of ,complex ,perceptions2 etc4 ,,no4 ,,iii4 ,,descartes' ,,meditations1 with ,latin and ,english ,texts1 and ,philosophical ,analysis4 ,by ,george ,stuart ,fullerton and ,william ,romaine ,newbold4 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,publications of the ,university of ,pennsylvania ,,philosophical ,,series4 ,edited by ,george ,stuart ,fullerton ,professor of ,philosophy and ,james ,mc,keen ,cattell ,professor of ,psychology4 ,no4 #a4 ,april1 #ahij4 ,,on ,,sameness ,,and ,,identity4 ,a ,psychological ,study3 ,being a ,contribution to the ,foundations of a ,theory of ,knowledge4 by ,,george ,,stuart ,,fullerton4 ,philadelphia ,university of ,pennsylvania ,press ,publishers ,on ,sameness and ,identity4 ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,kinds ,,of ,,sameness4 ,and some require everything accurately stated2 whereas1 this accuracy annoys others1 either because of their inability to follow a train of reasoning through1 or because of its hair-splitting character2 for accuracy does involve some hair-splitting4 ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 ,book ,i1 ,the ,less1 c4 #c4 ,,section #a4 ,there are few words the ambiguity of which has led to more confusion and profitless dispute than that of the word same4 ,men constantly use this word as though it had but one meaning1 and that meaning were always clear1 whereas it really gives expression to a number of widely different experiences1 some of which are quite difficult of analysis4 ,it is highly desirable that these experiences should not be confounded with each other1 but kept clearly separate1 as the consequences of such misconception are very far-reaching4 ,how far-reaching1 ,i shall in the pages to follow try to indicate4 ,it is my purpose to point out the differences in connotation of the several senses of this highly ambiguous word1 to show the element which they have in common1 and to trace some of the difficulties and absurdities which have sprung from using the word loosely and without proper discrimination4 ,i shall have to plead guilty to something very like hair-splitting1 but ,i may put forward in excuse the undeniable fact that accuracy does involve some hair-splitting4 ,if anyone prefers the self-contradictions and preposterous conclusions to which loose and unanalytic thought has so often led the unwary1 he is welcome to them4 ,i shall hold a few of these up to inspection after a while4 ,for my part1 ,i prefer a little quibbling at the outset of a discussion to a systematic incoherence all through it1 with the chances of finding myself in a cul-de-sac at the end4 ,whether ,i am successful in dissipating to some degree the fog which has hung about samenesses and obliterated important distinctions1 each one must judge for himself4 ,the kinds of sameness ,i find to be as follows3 ,,sec4 #b4 ,i4 ,we speak of any sensation1 feeling1 or idea1 or complex of sensations1 feelings1 or ideas1 as being the same with itself at any one instant4 ,the pain in my finger is what it is at this moment4 ,the finger itself 7the immediate object of knowledge1 a complex from sense and imagination7 is1 at each moment1 what it is4 ,it is to this sense of the word that the logical laws of ,identity and ,contradiction have ultimate reference4 ,,sec4 #c4 ,,ii4 ,a sensation1 feeling1 or idea1 or complex of sensations1 feelings1 or ideas1 considered in itself and without reference to the world of material things1 is called the same with one previously existent when the two are alike4 ,i say1 for example1 that ,i feel to-day the same pain ,i felt yesterday1 or that ,i have dreamt the same dream three times4 ,this is evidently not sameness of the kind first mentioned4 ,,sec4 #d4 ,,iii4 ,we speak of seeing the same material thing at different times4 ,suppose a man passing along a country road to look across a field at a distant tree4 ,what he actually sees is a small bluish patch of color1 which1 interpreting in terms furnished by his previous experience1 he supplements with material drawn from memory and imagination4 ,on the following day he looks at the tree again from a nearer point and sees a larger green patch of color with distinct differences of shading and with a clear outline4 ,this he interprets in a similar manner4 ,now1 without being a philosopher at all1 and without conscious reference to anything beyond what he has experienced or can experience1 he affirms that he has on two successive days seen the same tree4 ,i ask1 just what is the significance of the word same as used in this connection8 ,what peculiar experience has it been employed to mark8 ,what is perceived on the one occasion is not the same as what is perceived on the other in the sense of the word first given 7by perceived ,i mean existing in consciousness as a complex of mental elements4 ,with the supposed external correlates of our percepts ,i am not now concerned74 ,and it is equally clear that two such percepts need not be the same in the second sense of the word1 for they may be quite unlike4 ,in this case they are unlike1 so far at least as what is actually in sensation is concerned4 ,what peculiar experience then does the word mark when the observer declares that he has seen the same tree twice8 ,we are now in the sphere of material objects 7i4 e41 as experienced2 ,i refer to the mental content and nothing more71 and are not concerned with our experiences as isolated elements1 but as grouped and arranged in series4 ,our total possible experience of any one object is a collection of partly simultaneous and partly successive actual and possible sensations which condition each other1 and which we regard as a unit4 ,the ,idealist believes that this is all there is of the object1 and all we mean when we commonly employ the word4 ,the ,realist assumes that there is something beyond and corresponding to this experience1 and which is to be regarded as the real thing4 ,he1 however1 must admit that all we can know of any object1 in whatever sense we choose to employ that word1 all our evidence for maintaining its existence and determining its qualities1 must be drawn from this group of sensations4 ,it is this that we immediately know1 and anything inferred must be inferred from this4 ,from this it follows that when any one1 whether ,realist1 or ,idealist1 or unreflective man1 feels justified in asserting that what he perceives to-day is the same object he perceived yesterday1 he is led to make this assertion on the strength of some distinction in his immediate experience1 and he refers only secondarily1 if at all1 to anything beyond and external to this4 ,the distinction which he marks by the word is this3 ,he has reason to believe that the two percepts in question belong to the one series1--to the one life history1 so to speak4 ,he believes that had he cared to do so he could have filled up the gap between them by a continuous series of percepts1 each conditioned by the preceding1 and forming the one chain4 ,each represents to him the one object1 in that each stands for the whole series1 and his thought is much more taken up with the series as a whole than with the individuals composing it4 ,he knows that the percepts in such a series can only be successive1 never simultaneous4 ,had he reason to suspect that the two percepts we are discussing belong to different series of this kind1 and that there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent their being simultaneous1 he would decide for two trees4 ,but each percept contains more than one mental element1 and just as we may regard each percept as representing the whole series1 so we may regard each element as representing the whole complex which may be experienced at one time1 and through this the whole series of percepts4 ,i say that the orange ,i smell is the same with the one ,i see2 that ,i can reveal by striking a light the chair ,i fell over in the dark2 that ,i hear rattling down the street the coach ,i stepped out of a few moments ago4 ,it is not worth while to distinguish this use from the use of the word same just mentioned1 for they agree in making a single experience stand for a whole group or series1 which is assumed to be at least potentially present with each one4 ,when we have had two experiences thus representing the one group1 we say that we have in two ways1 or on two occasions1 experienced the same object4 ,in this sense has the man in our illustration seen yesterday and to-day the same tree4 ,in this sense could he at the one time see and touch the same tree4 ,it is in this sense also that we use the word when we say that the object seen with the naked eye and the object seen through a telescope or under a microscope are the same4 ,if ,i look at a distant object with the naked eye and then look at it through a telescope1 what ,i actually see 7or what is actually in the sense7 is in the two cases very different4 ,but just as seeing an object from a distance with the naked eye1 ,i may walk towards it and substitute for the dim and vague percept which ,i first had a series of percepts increasing in clearness and ending in one which ,i regard as altogether satisfactory1 so ,i may substitute at once this clear percept for the dim one1 by the use of the telescope1 and may know that it properly belongs to the series which1 taken as a whole1 constitutes my notion of the object4 ,this ,i may know from the relations which this percept bears to the other percepts of the series1 and which allow me to pass in my inferences from it to them as ,i can from any one of them to another4 ,if1 seeing a dim object upon the horizon1 ,i raise a telescope and through it perceive the figure of a man1 ,i know that ,i could have had a similar percept without any telescope by simply approaching the object4 ,conversely1 on perceiving a man near at hand1 ,i know ,i could have a similar percept from a distance by looking through a telescope4 ,i call the man seen through the telescope the same as the man seen with the naked eye1 for the same reason as ,i call the man seen by the eye at a distance the same with the man seen near at hand4 ,and the apparently non-extended speck which ,i see with the naked eye looks very different from the curious insect ,i see when ,i place a microscope over this speck1 but ,i call them the same for the reason just given4 ,if the insect as seen under the glass be divided1 so is the speck as seen by the eye2 if the insect is taken away1 the speck disappears too4 ,the series of percepts made possible through the microscope may be regarded as a continuation of the series which arises from approaching the eye to the object4 ,each member in it stands in a relation to this primary series similar to that illustrated above in the case of the telescope1 and similar to that held by the terms of the primary series to each other4 ,it should be kept clearly in mind that in all these cases the object 7immediately perceived7 is the same only in the sense pointed out1 i4 e41 two or more percepts1 which may1 in themselves considered1 be quite unlike each other1 are recognized as in a certain relation to each other1 as each representing the one series to which all belong4 ,if one thinks he has reason to believe each percept represents not merely the series of percepts1 but something different1 which he infers and is pleased to call the real thing1 he may be inclined to believe that in saying he sees the same object on two occasions he is referring to this something4 ,it must be clear to him1 however that all his evidence for the sameness of this something lies in the experience ,i have described1 and it is to this that he must point in proof that it is the same4 ,the percepts themselves are certainly not the same in any other sense than the one given4 ,they are not identical1 and they need not be alike4 ,they merely stand for each other4 ,should one forget this1 he will fall into blunders which ,i will illustrate at length when ,i speak of the common opinion on the subject of the infinite divisibility of space4 ,john ,locke1 in his famous ,essay1#a has made a distinction between the sameness of masses of inorganic matter and the sameness of organisms4 ,that of the former1 he says1 consists in the sameness of their particles1 while the sameness of a plant or animal does not consist in that of the particles which compose it at this time or at that1 for they are in continual flux1 but in the participation in the one life of the organism4 ,it does not1 however1 appear to me that we have here a real difference in the kind of experience marked by the word4 ,the difference is merely that in the one case we connect this experience1 not with the object as a whole1 but with the separate particles which compose it1 which we take as so many separate objects each having a sameness of the kind just discussed1 while in the other case we look upon the object as a whole1 as a unit1 and disregard any reference to its component parts4 ,but whether we regard the object as a unit or take each of its ultimate parts as separate objects1 we are thinking of the one kind of sameness4 ,we are thinking of a certain life-history in which any one link may represent the whole1 and any two links may be1 from this point of view1 regarded as equivalent4 ,it is not merely with reference to plants and animals that we speak of sameness without regard to a sameness of constituent parts4 ,we do it in this case simply because the organism furnishes us with a convenient unit1 and one much more important as a unit than as an aggregate4 ,we can make similar units when we please1 and consider their sameness without thinking of their parts4 ,we speak of the same nation as existing through many generations1 and of the same corporation as surviving many deaths4 ,whether the object we are considering be naturally indivisible1 or composite and assumed a unit for convenience1 when we speak of it as the same at two different times we are referring to the one experience4 ,locke does make here a distinction worth noticing1 but it does not mark two fundamentally different uses of the word4 #a ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #bg1 #c4 ,,sec4 #e4 ,,iv4 ,two objects are called the same1 and two other mental experiences occurring at the one time are called the same1 from the fact that they are recognized as alike4 ,the botanist1 finding that two plants belong to the one class calls them the same without any intention of confounding the two individuals4 ,nor does one who places his two hands in warm water and declares that he has the same feeling in both1 confound the two streams of sensation4 ,the fact that only likeness is meant is here clearly recognized4 ,it is not1 ,i think1 as clearly recognized when similar sensations or other mental experiences 7considered singly71 occurring at different times1 are called the same4 ,in that case they are sometimes spoken of as if they were material objects having a continuous sameness after the fashion explained above4 ,,sec4 #f4 ,v4 ,the word same is used to signify the relation between any mental experience and that which is regarded as its representative4 ,this representative may or may not resemble it4 ,we speak1 for example1 of calling up in memory this or that object seen at some past time4 ,the memory-image is certainly not the same with the original percept in ,sense ,i4 ,when we say that the object of memory is the past1 we cannot mean this1 for it is plainly false4 ,nor is it thought of as merely like it1 as in ,sense ,,ii4 ,it is thought of as a something which represents it--stands for it in a peculiar way4 ,just what this implies ,i will not here attempt to discover4 ,it is enough for my purpose to point out that when we say a man remembers an object we do not mean merely to indicate the presence in his imagination of a resembling picture1 but to include a certain relation between this picture and an original percept4 ,it is not easy to describe what is present in an act of memory4 ,when ,i am thinking of another man as calling to mind something from his past experience1 ,i bring before my own mind two pictures1 one representing his original percept1 and one his present memory-image4 ,holding these before me together1 ,i recognize them as related1 but distinct4 ,i use the word same to denote their relation4 ,but the person who is exercising his memory does not have before his mind two objects1 an original and a copy1 with an observed relation between them4 ,he has not the original1 or it would not be an act of memory4 ,when1 however1 he reflects upon his experience as ,i have done1 he represents it to himself as ,i have represented it to myself4 ,he speaks as if1 in the act of remembering1 he were conscious of two objects and could compare them4 ,he speaks of recognizing the memory picture as a copy and representative of the original percept4 ,language1 as commonly used1 adapts itself to this way of regarding the matter1 and ,i may leave a further analysis of it to the student of the memory1 merely pointing out that1 whatever is implied in the experience1 a common use of the word same is to denote this relation between any mental experience and the memory-image which represents it4 ,it will be seen that this kind of sameness may be presupposed in affirming sameness in other senses of the word4 ,when ,i compare a present sensation with one felt some days since1 and affirm that they are the same1 the latter must enter into the comparison through its representative in memory4 ,it is not itself present at the time of the comparison4 ,and when ,i say that ,i have seen the same tree yesterday and to-day1 ,i mean1 as ,i have explained1 that the two percepts belong to the one series2 but since my experience of yesterday cannot be itself present in my consciousness to-day1 it can take its place in the series1 as thought to-day1 only by proxy4 ,when ,i say that ,i have in my mind the same series on two successive days1 ,i evidently mean that it is the same series in the sense in which any experience and its representative in memory are the same4 ,other less important instances might be given of this use of the word same to express the relation between any experience and its representative4 ,we say that we see an object in a mirror1 when we mean that we see its reflected image4 ,we speak of seeing in a picture this man or that4 ,when we have found for anything a satisfactory substitute we say it is the same thing4 ,such uses of the word are not likely to deceive anyone1 and ,i will not dwell upon them4 ,their meaning is too plain to be mistaken4 ,,sec4 #g4 ,,vi4 ,we constantly speak of two men as seeing the same thing4 ,in this we have a sense of the word which demands careful analysis4 ,for the sake of clearness1 and to avoid ambiguity1 ,i will confine myself here1 as ,i have done in the foregoing sections1 to an examination of what is actually experienced by the men1 and will defer all consideration of existences assumed as lying beyond a possible experience in an extra-mental world1 for discussion in sections to follow4 ,the question which interests me at present is simply this3 ,what experience is it that leads a man to affirm that he and someone else are perceiving the same object8 ,the ,realist 7in the modern sense7 would say that this experience is only his evidence that he and another are perceiving the same object1 meaning by object what ,i have referred to as believed to lie beyond his experience2 while the ,idealist would say that this experience exhausts the whole matter4 ,the ,realist must1 however1 admit1 as ,i have brought out in a different connection1 that all his evidence for the existence of the object 7in his sense71 and for any affirmations whatever regarding it1 lying within the field of the immediately known1 any words1 which have been coined to express qualities of1 or distinctions concerning1 this object1 would retain a use and significance as marking distinctions within this field even if the object were supposed non-existent4 ,whether any such duplicate of what is immediately perceived exists or not is a question apart4 ,since we admittedly draw all our distinctions from the field of the immediately known and then carry them over to such objects1 and not vice versa1 we may be sure that we would go on saying that two men see the same object in any case4 ,i myself give the preference to that the existence of which is an indubitable fact1 and prefer using the word object to indicate the complex in consciousness4 ,i have1 however1 no desire to assume any point in dispute by juggling with a word1 and will try to keep clearly in mind the meaning of the word thus assumed whenever ,i use it4 ,now1 the experience which leads me to say that ,i and another man see the same object is just this3 ,i perceive a particular object1 and in a certain relation to it ,i perceive the body of another man4 ,from a past experience of my own body in relation to objects and from reasoning by analogy1 ,i have come to connect such a relation of another body to the object with the thought of another consciousness of the object as connected with that body4 ,just as ,i perceive my own body to perform certain actions when ,i am conscious of perceiving the object1 so ,i perceive this other body with which ,i have connected in thought a consciousness of the object to perform similar acts in response to similar relations towards the object4 ,it is wholly a matter of observation in my own case that the perception of my own body in this or that relation to an object is a sine qua non to the perception of the object4 ,and it is wholly a matter of reasoning from like to like that leads me to connect in thought sensations or percepts with any other animal body whatever4 ,when ,i say1 therefore1 that ,i and another man are perceiving the same thing1 there is in my mind a complex consisting of a percept or idea of the thing1 a percept or idea of the man's body1 and the thought of a percept connected with this body4 ,when ,i say that he is thinking of us both as seeing the same thing1 ,i call up in mind a similar complex and connect it in thought with his body4 ,whatever ,i may believe as to the existence or non-existence of things lying beyond this sphere1 and supposed to cause these experiences1 these are the experiences to which ,i ultimately refer when ,i speak of two men as seeing the same object1 and these furnish the whole ground for the existence of the phrase4 ,the percept of the object which ,i connect in thought with the other man's body need not be wholly similar to my percept of the object4 ,the man who has discovered that he is color-blind1 does not suppose that men not similarly afflicted see just what he does in looking at a cherry tree full of ripe fruit4 ,nevertheless1 he still speaks of himself and others as seeing the same objects4 ,if another man's body is not exactly like mine1 ,i am not justified by argument from similarity in reading into it an exactly similar experience4 ,it is not the similarity of the two percepts that ,i am thinking of chiefly when ,i speak of them as percepts of the same object4 ,i am thinking of the relation in which ,i suppose them to stand to each other4 ,i think of the possible existence of the one under given circumstances as conditioning the possible existence of the other4 ,,sec4 #h4 ,,vii4 ,when a man in an early stage of reflection upon his experience has decided that objects immediately perceived are not the real things but merely their mental copies or representatives1 he may think of these real things in several ways4 ,he may believe in a world of real things1 consisting of groups of real qualities1 external to consciousness2 he may accept such real things1 but add to them a substratum or substance1 distinct from the qualities2 or he may believe that the real exists as mere substratum1 substance1 or noumenon1 and that all qualities1 being merely its revelation to mind1 exist within the circle of consciousness alone4 ,the first position is one not often taken4 ,the second is that held by ,locke1#b who believed that1 corresponding to our ideas of objects1 there exist substances possessed of certain primary qualities1 and having an underlying substance or substratum4 ,the third represents the view of the ,kantian1#c who1 to be consistent1 must deny to his noumenon any qualities whatever4 ,how he is to do this without having it lapse into utter nothingness is a problem for him to solve4 #b ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding4 ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #b1 ,i1 and ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #bc1 #a4 et seq4 #c ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft4--,von dem ,grunde der ,unterscheidung aller ,gegenstnde berhaupt in ,phnomena und ,noumena4 ,kant's ,smmtliche ,werke1 herausgegeben von ,hartenstein4 ,leipzig1 #ahfg1 #c;er ,band1 s4 #bji1 et seq4 ,see also1 ,kritik der ,praktischen ,vernunft2 ,vorrede2 and the discussion3 ,wie eine ,erweiterung der reinen ,vernunft in praktischer ,absicht1 ohne damit ihr ,erkenntniss als speculativ1 zugleich zu erweitern1 zu denken mglich sei8 ,i ,th4 ,,ii ,b4 ,,ii ,hptst42 same edition1 #e;er ,bd41 s4 #e1 #adj4 ,i am not concerned here with the inner contradiction of the ,kantian system4 ,the notion of noumena predominantly in ,kant's mind1 was1 ,i think1 about as ,i have stated4 ,he would not1 of course1 have denied reality to phenomena1 but his misconception of ,berkeley1 and the satisfaction with which he settles down to the noumenal in the ,critique of the ,practical ,reason1 show that he felt toward the blos ,erscheinung very much as ,locke felt toward mere ideas4 ,cf4 ,essay1 ,bk4 #d1 ,chap4 #aa1 #g4 ,the disciple of ,locke has1 therefore1 in discussing all the uses of the word same1 to consider the sameness of3 #a4 ,things immediately known4 #b4 ,groups of real qualities in an extra-mental world1 more or less like what is immediately known4 #c4 ,substance2 the ,i know not what to which ,locke clung through all difficulties4 ,the man who holds the first of the three views above mentioned need only consider the first and the second of these2 and the ,kantian need only consider the first and the third1 rebaptizing the latter noumenon or thing-in-itself4 ,omitting for later consideration the sameness of the self or ego1 ,i have already discussed the uses of the word same within the field of the immediately known4 ,it remains to consider the sameness of what is believed to lie beyond this1 and to belong to a different kind of a world4 ,when men discuss these supposed realities1 in what senses of the word same may they reasonably think of them as the same8 ,when a common1 unreflective man1 whose mind has not been1 in the words of ,bishop ,berkeley1 debauched by learning1 looks at a tree and thinks about it1 he believes he sees a real tree1 at a certain real distance from his body1 and of a given real height and figure4 ,it does not occur to him to make any distinction between the tree immediately perceived1 and an inferred second tree1 not immediately perceived1 but represented by the former4 ,there is the tree2 he sees it2 he can touch it2 it seems to him but one3 and he always talks as if there were but one tree to be discussed in the premises4 ,that one tree1 he thinks1 is really extended2 is really out in space beyond his body2 is1 in short1 what it appears to be4 ,to his unreflective mind this tree does not seem to be a representative or to be seen through a representative1 but to be seen immediately and just where it really is4 ,but when a man has begun to battle with the difficulties of reflection1 and has learned to make a distinction between things and his ideas of the things1 he will probably fall into unforeseen perplexities about this tree4 ,he reflects that1 when he closes his eyes1 the tree disappears2 that when he approaches it it looks green1 and when he recedes from it it grows blue2 that a man with a peculiar defect in his vision does not see it colored as he does2 that when he makes a pressure on the side of one eyeball he sees two trees where before he saw only one2 that when he makes such a pressure upon both eyeballs and moves them about a little he sees two trees moving about1 although he knows real trees can not ordinarily be made to move about so easily4 ,such reflections lead him to distinguish between the tree as he sees it1 and the tree as it really is1 and he defines the tree as he sees it as the tree immediately known1 and the real tree as the tree mediately known1 a cause of the existence of the former4 ,he now thinks that he sees directly only copies or representatives of real things1 and as he believes these copies or representatives to be in his mind1 and usually talks as if his mind were in his head1 or at least in his body1 he concludes that things immediately known must in many instances be much smaller than they seem1 or perhaps lack extension altogether4 ,how can a tree thirty feet high be in a man's mind8 ,it is true1 that1 when ,i press upon my eyeballs in the manner described1 ,i seem to see two trees of that size moving2 but must it not be a mistake8 ,must we not assume that what is immediately seen only seems extended1 and stands for an extended thing which is grasped through it8 ,so our philosopher learns to distrust the immediate object of knowledge2 to regard it as in some sense unreal as compared with what it represents2 and to deny to it those properties which it apparently possesses4 ,it is not extended1 but it stands for extension2 it is not colored1 but it stands for color2 it is not real1 but it stands for reality4 ,it is natural1 however1 for one who has gone thus far to go farther4 ,when he reflects again upon the fact that he sees the tree of a different color at different distances2 when he remembers that colors vary with the quality of the light by which they are seen2 when he and his neighbor dispute concerning the true color of the one tree which he sees dotted with red leaves1 and which his opponent claims to see of a uniform color2 then he may well begin to ask himself what is the true color of the real tree1 or whether it is certain that it has any color at all8 ,may not1 then1 the real tree have only some of the qualities that we ordinarily attribute to trees8 ,perhaps1 the space qualities8 ,or1 worse yet1 since some of the qualities that the ordinary man attributes to trees may be regarded as existing only in a shadowy way in our ideas1 why may not the same be true of all the other qualities8 ,how do we know that real trees are extended8 ,how do we know that real extension must be assumed as the cause of the delusive apparent extension of our ideas1 if it is true that real color need not thus be assumed as a cause of our sensations of color8 ,what if the real thing exists only as an indescribable and incomprehensible somewhat1 which we must assume as a cause of the immediately known1 but of which we can know nothing more8 ,when one has once begun this slippery descent1 it is not easy to say where he may find a peg to stay him in his course4 ,suppose1 however1 he is content to strip the real thing of what are commonly called the secondary qualities of matter1 and to leave to it what are known as the primary4 ,he will follow the example of the wholly unreflective man and speak of it in such a way as to suggest that the thing itself is something apart from its real qualities4 ,a tree1 he will say1 has qualities4 ,it would certainly sound odd to hear him say it is qualities4 ,and he will very possibly go on to justify the use of the language he employs by distinguishing between the real qualities represented by his mental picture of the tree and an obscure something which he assumes as underlying them2 thus embracing the ,lockian distinction of ideas1 real qualities1 and substance4 ,he may conclude1 it is true1 that substance in this sense of the word is chimerical1 and that the belief in it arises out of a misunderstanding of the significance of language2 but if he has gone so far as to assume duplicates of things immediately known1 in the form of real qualities1 it is more probable that he will be inclined to complete his classes of beings by adding the third4#d #d ,there is1 of course1 no reason why he may not add as many more classes as he pleases1 and justify the additions as he justifies this4 ,men do not do this1 as a matter of fact1 but that is no reason4 ,now1 it does not concern me to consider whether this change of view is to be regarded as a real progress in reflective knowledge or as a progressive decline and fall of the unreflective man4 ,the point which concerns me is this3 ,the unreflective man talks as if but one tree were under discussion4 ,the man who reflects uses the same forms of speech3 and even when he believes that he must distinguish between the tree immediately known and the obscure something which he has come to look upon as its cause1 or between the tree immediately known1 the bundle of real qualities inferred1 and the obscure something that he connects with these1 he still goes on talking as if he had only one thing to talk about4 ,the danger of such a proceeding is obvious4 ,if ,i talk about two or three things as though they were one1 it is but natural that ,i should sometimes confuse them with each other4 ,should proof be forthcoming for one of these1 it would be but natural for me to fall occasionally into the error of supposing that it somehow applies to the others4 ,if ,i go on saying the tree when ,i mean one tree and something else1 two trees1 or two trees and something else1 it is only to be expected that ,i sooner or later come to grief in my reasonings4 ,and it should be noted that this peculiar ambiguity in the names of things entails a parallel ambiguity in the use of the words by which we indicate the mind's recognition of the presence of things4 ,we commonly speak of a drunken man's seeing two trees1 where a sober man sees one4 ,we speak of an insane man as hearing voices1 when no one has spoken4 ,we say that we see the maples are turning red1 even when we believe that color may not properly be attributed to the mediate object of knowledge4 ,on the other hand1 those who hold to the existence of real objects of the kind before mentioned1 generally maintain that in referring to things in space1 their positions and mutual relations1 we are giving attention1 not to the immediately known1 but to its external double4 ,i see1 feel1 perceive1 it is said1 not the image1 and not the constituents of the image 7the ideas71 but the external object by means of the image4#e ,if one holds that this external object presupposes a substance1 a something distinct from a group of qualities1 there is nothing to prevent his maintaining1 should he wish to do so1 that in saying ,i see a tree1 primary reference is had to this substance or reality4 ,of course1 if1 in the sentence ,i see a tree1 the word tree can have three meanings1 it follows that there is also a possibility of taking in three senses the word see4 ,it is hardly necessary to point out that1 unless one is very careful1 seeing in one sense may result in believing in another1 as kicking did in the famous case of ,dr4 ,johnson and the stone4 ,the caution is pertinent with respect to any other word used in the same general way as we use the word see4 #e ,ueberweg4 ,see ,krauth's ,ed4 of ,berkeley's ,principles1 ,phila41 #ahgd1 p4 #cdc4 ,i have said that when a man abandons his original unreflective position and learns to distinguish between things immediately known and other things they are supposed to represent1 he goes on using the common language1 and talking as though there were but one thing under consideration4 ,now1 men do not do this merely in common conversation and in writing about matters of everyday life1 but they do it in the very books that have been written to prove that each thing is thus double or triple4 ,john ,locke1 for example1 begins the very chapter in which he is about to draw the distinction between the secondary and primary qualities of bodies 7i4 e41 between the constituents of things immediately known and the constituents of their external correlates71 as well as to enlighten us on our ideas of substances1 with the following words3#f #f ,essay1 ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #bc1 #a4 ,the mind being1 as ,i have declared1 furnished with a great number of the simple ideas1 conveyed in by the senses1 as they are found in exterior things1 or by reflexion on its own operations1 takes notice also1 that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together2 which1 being presumed to belong to one thing1 and words being suited to common apprehensions1 and made use of for quick despatch1 are called1 so united in one subject1 by one name2 which1 by inadvertency1 we are apt afterward to talk of1 and consider as one simple idea1 which indeed is a complication of many ideas together3 because1 as ,i have said1 not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves1 we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist1 and from which they do result1 and which therefore we call substance4 ,it is clear enough from this1 as it is clear enough from other passages in the same book1 that ,locke talked as though the complex of simple ideas in consciousness were the very same thing 7in ,sense ,i7 as the group of real qualities outside of consciousness4 ,and no careful reader of his book can avoid seeing that the confusion of his language is a fair index to the confusion of his thoughts with regard to the two4#g ,it is little better in the case of bodies and substance4 ,in the passage just given1 he would seem to make substance an obscure something underlying groups of ideas1 and not groups of real qualities1 but in the next sentence he makes it a substratum of the qualities which produce in us ideas4 ,in many passages#h he distinguishes between substance and substances1 by which latter he means groups of real qualities with the added substratum or substance2 as such substances he instances oak1 elephant1 iron4 ,he emphasizes the fact that substance is not to be confounded with substances1 which are things of different sorts4#i ,in so far as the substances are bundles of qualities1 they are known to us through sensation4#aj ,in so far as they are also substance1 they cannot be known to us through sensation1 for the idea of substance is not known through sensation4#aa ,we are not then to look upon substance as such a constituent part of a substance as a quality is4 ,the two belong to different classes4 ,and if we offer proof for the existence of real substances1 which is evidently applicable to them only as bundles of qualities--proof from sensation--then substance is overlooked altogether4 ,it is significant that ,locke1 having thus put together under one head as a substance an oak viewed as a bundle of real qualities and an oak viewed as substratum1 proceeded to argue as if he had but one thing to prove when he felt called upon to defend the real existence of substances4 ,in his chapters on ,the ,extent of ,human ,knowledge1 the ,reality of ,knowledge1 and ,our ,knowledge of the ,existence of ,other ,things1#ab he devotes himself wholly to proving things as bundles of qualities1 and pays no more attention to substance than if it had never entered his thought4 ,if we take these chapters as authoritative1 we must banish substance from the sphere of knowledge altogether4 #g ,essay1 ,bk4 #d1 ,chap4 #b1 #ad2 ,bk4 #d1 ,chap4 #d and ,chap4 #aa4 #h ,ibid41 ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #ab1 #f2 ,bk4 #b1 ,chap4 #bc1 #a1 with note 7,phila41 #ahdf1 p4 #ahc1 et seq474 #i ,see note to #a1 ,chap4 #bc1 ,bk4 #b4 #aj ,bk4 #d1 ,chap4 #aa1 et passim4 #aa ,i confess there is another idea1 which would be of general use for mankind to have1 as it is of general talk1 as if they had it2 and that is the idea of substance1 which we neither have1 nor can have1 by sensation or reflection4 ,bk4 #a1 ,chap4 #d1 #ah of the ,essay4 #ab ,essay1 ,bk4 #d1 ,chaps4 #c1 #d and #aa4 ,as another instance of a use of language calculated to produce confusion1 ,i may offer the following from ,sir ,william ,hamilton3 ,whatever we know is not known as it is1 but only as it seems to us to be1#ac--;a use of words which would certainly indicate that the immediate and mediate objects of knowledge are one4 ,and what would we infer from such a sentence as this3 ,thus the consciousness of an ,inscrutable ,power manifested to us through all phenomena1 has been growing ever clearer2 and must eventually be freed from its imperfections4 ,the certainty that on the one hand such a ,power exists1 while on the other hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination1 is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first been progressing4#ad ,or this3 ,we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon2 though ,omnipresence is unthinkable1 yet1 as experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenomena1 we are unable to think of limits to the presence of this ,power2 while the criticisms of ,science teach us that this ,power is ,incomprehensible4 ,and this consciousness of an ,incomprehensible ,power1 called ,omnipresent from inability to assign its limits1 is just that consciousness on which ,religion dwells4#ae #ac ,lectures on ,metaph41 ,,viii1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhj1 p4 #ajb4 #ad ,herbert ,spencer1 ,first ,principles4 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,v1 #ca1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhh1 p4 #ajh4 #ae ,first ,principles4 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,v1 #bg4 ,after concluding that we cannot know the ultimate nature of that which is manifested to us1 there arise the questions--,what is it that we know8 ,in what sense do we know it8#af ,or what shall one say to this3 ,our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or raw material of thought1 to which in thinking we give definite forms1 it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence4#ag #af ,part ,,ii1 ,chap4 ,i1 #ce4 #ag ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,,iv1 #bf4 ,now1 if the consciousness of an inscrutable power is not the inscrutable power itself2 if the existence of such a power does not mean simply its existence in consciousness2 if the phenomena in which1 it is assumed1 a power is manifested1 are to be kept separate in thought from the power1 so that we shall be in no danger of confounding a consciousness of certain phenomena with consciousness of an incomprehensible power2 if our consciousness of the unconditioned is to be kept in mind as signifying merely our unconditioned consciousness1 and an ever-present sense of real existence as signifying only an ever-present sense of raw material in consciousness2 then it is high time that these sentences and all such as these be re-written with some regard for lucidity1 accuracy and consistency4 ,how can a reader help confounding things when he is thus taught by the very man whose business it is to distinguish between them8 ,the blind led by the blind is a cheerful spectacle compared with this4 ,nothing can be more evident than that the man who has abandoned his original unreflective belief in the singleness of the perceived object1 and has come to believe in it as having one or more external correlates1 should keep distinctly in mind that an immediate and a mediate object are1 by hypothesis1 two distinct things3 that he has never had any direct experience whatever save of the one2 and that all distinctions that he makes with regard to the other1 the very notions of its existence1 reality1 and externality1 have been drawn from the sphere of the immediate and carried over to it in thought4 ,and he should never allow himself to forget1 that1 when he says he has passed in thought from the immediate to the mediate object1 he cannot mean literally that his thought is now occupied directly upon this external thing--that it is itself present to mind4 ,he should remember that he can only mean that he has such an experience as the following3 ,he has in mind the immediate object1 and a mental picture of a duplicate of this standing in a causal relation to it and represented by it2 or1 he has 7if a ,lockian71 in addition to these two1 a third highly vague and indefinite mental image 7the idea of substance71 which he connects with the image just described1 as he has connected that with the immediate object2 or 7if a ,kantian71 he has in mind the immediate object1 and1 connected directly with that1 such a vague image as has just been described4 ,this is what he actually has in mind so far as objects are concerned4 ,he does not1 however1 merely recognize the existence in his mind of these different images in their relations to each other1 but he looks upon this mental arrangement as somehow justified by experience and embodying truth4 ,when we ask what the word justified can mean in this connection1 it is not easy to find an answer4 ,within the sphere of the immediately known the meaning of the word is plain enough4 ,when ,i have constructed in my imagination a certain image or complex of images embodying a belief as to matter of fact1 ,i say the mental operation is justified when ,i can substitute for the idea the percept which it is supposed to represent1 or can know indirectly that this might be done according to known laws of the appearance and disappearance of percepts4 ,thus ,i perceive the outside of a tree-trunk and form an idea of what lies under the bark4 ,i have reason to know that by stripping off the bark ,i can substitute for the image ,i have formed the corresponding percept4 ,and if ,i see at a distance a similar tree growing upon an inaccessible cliff1 and form an image of what lies under its bark1 ,i may still regard this as justified by the possibility of referring to cases in which a similar image1 arising out of a similar experience1 has been found to be justified4 ,it is a legitimate inference that1 if circumstances were somewhat different1 the proper percept might take the place of this image too4 ,it is evident1 however1 that the word justified cannot be used in this or any analogous sense in speaking of the relation not of an image to a percept1 but of an image or a percept to a something that1 by hypothesis1 cannot itself enter into experience at all4 ,what then can the word mean8 ,it at first interests us to know that some ,snarks are ,boojums1 but our interest lapses when we discover that we have absolutely no mark by which we may know a ,boojum from anything else4 ,but ,i must not be drawn into digressions4 ,the points with which ,i am concerned are these3--,,first3 ,when a man says he sees this tree or that house1 he ordinarily speaks as if there were but the one object in his thought4 ,if he distinguishes at all between an immediate and a mediate object1 the language that he uses would not indicate that he does so4 ,and even after men have entered into lengthy arguments for the purpose of marking this distinction1 and insisting that things are not single as they seem to the unreflective1 they still indulge in this peculiar use of language1 which would imply either that they have forgotten for the time being their own distinction between the immediate and the mediate1 or that they regard the two as the same in ,sense ,i1 and to be treated as one4 ,certainly1 in their reasonings upon this subject1 men who hold to the two kinds of objects do confound them with one another1 and strengthen their faith in the two by this misconception1 as ,i shall show later4 ,we have here1 then1 what we may call a kind of sameness1 or pseudo-sameness1 which deserves investigation1 and which one should be careful not to confound with sameness of other kinds4 ,whether the word same is commonly applied in the premises is indifferent to my purpose4 ,in the remainder of the present section ,i will consider the relation between the mental representative and its assumed correlatives4 ,,second3 ,if we are to accept not merely the world of objects immediately known1 but also a world or two worlds corresponding to this1 and yet distinct from it1 we cannot be sure our list of samenesses is complete unless we traverse in our search for the different kinds all the spheres of being in which we believe1 and of which we think we can have some knowledge4 ,in the section following this one ,i will try to discover the kinds of sameness which a believer in external things may reasonably attribute to them within their own sphere4 ,in this there is no question of the relation of something in one sphere to a correlative something in another4 ,for the first point4 ,what is in a man's mind when he is thinking of his percept as having a real object corresponding to it1 ,i have shown to be as follows3 ,he has in mind an immediate object and a duplicate of this1 not necessarily altogether like it1 imagined as standing in a causal relation to it and represented by it4 ,when it occurs to him that this imagined duplicate is itself an immediate object and not the real one1 he does as much for it1 and provides it with a similar duplicate4 ,in every case1 when he tries to think of an object immediately perceived as having a real correlate1 he simply furnishes it with an imaginary double in this way4 ,what else is he to do8 ,he is trying to think of two objects2 the real object cannot1 it is said1 be in the mind2 he must then imagine it4 ,if he is a ,lockian he will have in mind the immediate object and two imaginary ones1 one signifying the real object as a bundle of qualities1 and the other1 a highly vague one1 picturing the substance4 ,now1 since this is all that can be before the man's mind1 any kind of sameness which concerns the percept and the real thing must mean to him some relation between the immediate object and the image or images of which ,i have spoken4 ,when this is realized it is seen that we have here not a new kind of sameness1 a distinct experience1 but a kind already discussed4 ,the relation between the immediate object and the images described is simply that between representative and thing represented4 ,this ,i have already examined within the field of what is recognized as immediately known4 ,here1 too1 it would seem that we are in the field of the immediately known1 since we have to do with percepts and ideas1 but though these images are in this field1 they are here1 so to speak1 under protest1 and their framing is supposed to be justified#ah only by something assumed to be not in this field4 ,when this something is thought of at all it is thought of in just the way ,i have described4 ,this is what thinking it means4 ,nevertheless1 this duplicate world is assumed to be a world apart1 and for this reason ,i have considered the sameness of percepts and their corresponding real objects by itself4 ,it gives us sameness in sense seventh4 #ah ,i have already pointed out the vagueness in this word4 ,in writing the foregoing ,i have had in mind chiefly the position of the ,lockian4 ,i need not consider at length that taken by the ,kantian1 for what ,i have said will1 with little change1 apply to it also4 ,if ,i hold to a noumenon as corresponding to my phenomenon1 and yet deny to it all qualities whatsoever1 ,i must1 to retain any appearance of consistency1 represent it in my mind in the very vaguest possible way4 ,nevertheless1 ,i must represent it1 or ,i am not thinking of it at all1 and ,i must relate the phenomenon and this vague representation in the way described4 ,a true consistency would1 of course1 make impossible the whole process1 for it would make impossible the giving of any quality at all to the representation1 and the putting any relation between it and the phenomenon4 ,in so dark a night cats do not merely turn grey1 they disappear4 ,on the other hand1 if one is too liberal with this noumenon1 it palpably ceases to be a noumenon1 and degenerates into something very like a phenomenon4 ,the illusion must not be lost4 ,both these conflicting tendencies may be well illustrated in ,mr4 ,spencer's ,unknowable4 ,if we really refuse to allow to the consciousness of it any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever1#ai our vague image wholly disappears and there is nothing left in our consciousness but the phenomenon4 ,while if we follow the ,first ,principles in coaxing it back into existence by allowing it reality1#bj and causality1#ba and a freedom from limits1#bb and printing its name with a capital letter1#bc as though it were even better than other things--if we do all this there is danger of the convalescent's becoming too robust altogether4 ,the problem has its parallel in the practical problem of paying wages3--one must not pay too little1 or he loses his laborer2 nor too much1 or he loses his money4 ,the thing is to find the happy mean which will keep an object of thought before a man's mind and yet not make him lose all appearance of consistency4 #ai ,first ,principles4 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 #d1 #bf4 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhh1 p4 #ia4 #bj ,ibid4 ,chap4 #d1 #bd2 ,chap4 #e1 #ca1 #cb1 et passim4 #ba ,ibid4 ,chap4 #e1 #ca1 et passim4 #bb ,ibid4 ,chap4 #d1 #bd4 #bc ,ibid4 ,chap4 #e1 #cb1 et passim4 ,but in which ever of the ways mentioned a man thinks of real things1 he does what ,i have described4 ,and when he implies that the immediately known and the real are in some sense the same1 as he does when he talks as if there were but the one object1 or asserts that we do not know things as they are in themselves but only as they appear to us2 he really uses the word same in the fifth sense that ,i have given4 ,the fact that he is using it to indicate the relation between percepts and a certain class of ideas which he has come to regard as duplicates of his percepts does not make the use of the word a new one4 ,whatever may be the state of affairs outside of his consciousness1 this is all that takes place within it2 and the word same1 used in this connection1 can mean no more to him than ,i have said4 ,,sec4 #i4 ,to avoid needless prolixity ,i will class together and very briefly treat of the kinds of sameness which one may attribute to external things4 ,it is not necessary to go at length into the discussion of these1 for since the external world1 as it is assumed by those who have faith in it1 is1 to the man thinking it1 simply a more or less modified duplicate of the world of things immediately perceived2 and since all ground for attributing to it any determinations at all must be found in that which is immediately perceived2 we may naturally look to find in it nothing that we have not already found in this immediate world4 ,how1 indeed1 could anything else get into it8 ,we cannot have in mind what is by hypothesis out of mind4 ,the real world is then1 in the mind of the man who thinks it1 a world of imagined objects1 and the world of imagination depends for its material upon the world of sense4 ,a little reflection will show that the kinds of sameness of these realities are only the kinds of sameness already discussed duplicated1 and assumed to belong to a new world4 #a4 ,an external quality or group of qualities may be said to be the same with itself at any one instant4 ,here we have ,sense ,i carried over into the field of imagined duplicates4 #b4 ,an external quality existing at one time may be said to be the same with an external quality existing at another time1 to indicate that the two are similar4 ,the same thing may be true of any group of qualities4 ,here we have ,sense ,,ii4 #c4 ,the external bundle of qualities1 which formed for ,locke the knowable element in a thing or body1 may be regarded as being the same at two different times--as having1 so to speak1 a life-history4 ,here one is simply calling up in thought the experience described under ,sense ,,iii4 #d4 ,two external things 7bundles of real qualities71 or two external qualities1 existing at one time1 may be called the same to mark similarity4 ,here we have ,sense ,,iv4 #e4 ,an external thing 7in the sense just indicated71 or an external quality1 may be called the same with its representative4 ,if this representative be the immediate object of knowledge1 we have the experience described as ,sense ,,vii4 ,if it be another external thing or quality1 e4 g41 an external picture in an external mirror1 an external statue in external marble1 etc41 we have ,sense ,v4 #f4 ,two men may be said to perceive the same external thing4 ,in saying this one simply calls up in mind the complex described at length under ,,vi1 but makes the duplicate1 which is1 to him1 the thing1 stand in the complex in the place of the percept1 this being now regarded as a mere representative4 #g4 ,an external thing may be said to be the same with its representative in consciousness or with the substance or noumenon assumed to underlie it4 ,here we have ,sense ,,vii4 ,it would seem scarcely necessary to mention this last1 since1 if the representative in consciousness can be called the same with its real correlate1 it would seem self-evident that the real correlate may be called the same with it4 ,i add it1 however1 for the sake of completeness4 ,it should be noted that in this last kind of sameness we step over the limits of any one class of being1 ideas1 things 7as bundles of qualities71 or substance4 ,the word is used to denote a relation between something in one class and a corresponding thing in another class4 ,in the foregoing ,i have been considering the sameness of real or external things regarded as bundles of qualities4 ,if one ask concerning the sameness of ,locke's substance1 or the noumenon of other writers1 ,i would say that our notions of this must vary with the kind of being we allow this nebulous entity4 ,strict consistency in dealing with a noumenon as sometimes defined means1 of course1 its utter collapse4 ,if1 however1 we keep anything in mind at all1 we must carry over to it at least the first of the kinds of sameness described4 ,i do not think it would be hard to show that several other kinds are carried over in despite of consistency by men who hold to this shadowy something under one name or another4 ,as1 however1 we do not find here any new sense of the word same1 but mere repetition in a new field 7if one may call it such71 it seems unnecessary to dwell upon this part of my subject4 ,i have not discussed at all the sameness of things from the point of view of an adherent of that ,natural ,realism which claims that we know immediately real things and yet holds that real things are not our perceptions themselves1 but something extra-mental4 ,this view is so incoherent that it is not likely to be taken seriously by men who have learned to reflect at all4 ,i may say1 however1 en passant1 that it does not add to the kinds of sameness ,i have described3 it merely confounds them one with another1 and falls into the inconsequences which naturally result from so doing4 ,,sec4 #aj4 ,when we come to the question of the sameness of the ,self or ,ego we are1 if possible1 on more debatable ground than heretofore4 ,the whole subject of our knowledge of the ,self lies as yet1 in the opinion of many1 very much in the dark4 ,without undertaking the task of defining narrowly what this elusive something is1 it would seem that ,i may safely make concerning it at least the following assertions3 ,in using the word self1 we may have reference either to what is immediately known as appearing in the circle of consciousness1 the phenomenon1 or to a something supposed to lie beyond this sphere and to be known only through its representative in consciousness4 ,now this something beyond may be looked at in various ways4 ,john ,locke1 in discussing the not-self1 made the three-fold division of idea1 bundle of real qualities1 and substance4 ,he might with equal reason have distinguished in a similar way between the self as idea 7the immediately known71 the self as a bundle of real qualities 7not immediately known71 and the self as substance4 ,as a matter of fact1 however1 he did not put the not-self and the self upon the same plane4 ,he seemed to think that we know the self more immediately1 and to hold that it enters consciousness as the bundle of real qualities#bd which1 in the case of matter1 is assumed to lie beyond4 ,the substance of the self1 however1 he condemns to outer darkness and the company of material substance4 ,to me there seems no reason1 admitting the right to pass at all beyond the immediately perceived1 for making the distinction which he does make4 ,and as one1 who has followed him with assent in his treatment of the not-self1 may1 with some justice complain of his inconsistency and refuse to follow him here1 ,i mention the position he might have taken as well as the position he actually did take with respect to the self and its existences4 #bd ,compare ,bk4 #d1 ,ch4 #i1 #c of the ,essay1 with ,bk4 #d1 ,ch4 #aa1 #a1 #d1 #g1 #h1 and #i4 ,,sec4 #aa4 ,the word self may then be regarded as referring either3 #a4 ,to the self as phenomenon1 a something immediately perceived1 a part or the whole of our conscious experience2 #b4 ,to a complex of real qualities beyond and represented by the self as it appears in consciousness2 #c4 ,to the substance of self1 or self as noumenon1 a vague and ill-defined something1 supposed to be distinct from and to underlie phenomena or real qualities2 or #d4 ,to two1 or to all1 of these taken together4 ,if the word is used in the last of these senses any inquiry concerning sameness must split up its complex meaning and treat separately the different elements included4 ,it remains1 then1 to inquire what kinds of sameness we may attribute to the self in the first three senses given4 ,i will take them in reverse order4 ,,sec4 #ab4 ,with respect to the third sense1 which makes it refer to the substance of ,locke or the noumenon of other writers3 all the difficulties which arise out of the endeavor to attribute sameness of any kind to any substance or noumenon obtain here also4 ,but it seems on the surface more glaringly inconsistent in the adherent of noumena to discriminate between different kinds as admitting of differences of treatment than it does for him to suppose them capable of treatment at all4 ,things that differ cannot be conceived as differing except in qualities1 and here there is question not of qualities but of noumena4 ,if one is to retain any appearance of consistency1 he must not maintain that the word same is applicable in any given sense to certain noumena and not to others4 ,if he does so1 he openly abandons his noumena to a phenomenal fate4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 ,i think it is plain that those believers in noumena1 who distinguish them from one another1 yet think of them in just the one way4 ,if we take the utterances of a good representative of the class1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 we may see that although he distinguishes between the noumenal ego and the noumenal non-ego1 not only do his clearest statements make such a distinction out of the question1 but the distinction drawn is so vague and insignificant#be that the two noumena may be thought of and reasoned about in the one way4 ,phenomena being abstracted1 what was in his mind when he spoke of the one was probably in no respect different from what was in his mind when he spoke of the other4 ,in so far1 then1 as the noumena themselves are concerned1 it would seem that any kind of sameness which we may predicate of the noumenal not-self we may predicate on the same ground and with equal justice of the noumenal self1 and vice versa4 ,if1 however1 any sense of the word same marks a relation between a noumenon and some other thing or things1 and if the two noumena differ as respects this relation1 then this kind of sameness may be attributed to the one and not to the other4 ,it may be claimed that we indicate just such a relation in using the word same in ,sense ,,vi2 and that1 whatever one might do1 one would under no circumstances speak of two men as perceiving the same self1 noumenal or any other4 ,i shall discuss this point when ,i come to discuss the sameness of self as phenomenon4 #be ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 ,,viii1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhj1 p4 #ig4 ,i may add here that when one obliterates the distinction between noumena by plunging them into the darkness of the unknowable1 there can1 of course1 be no question of a new sense of the word same in the field ,i am discussing4 ,on the general question of noumenal sameness1 all that it seems to me necessary to say ,i have said before4 ,,sec4 #ac4 ,the second sense of the word self would make it a complex of real qualities beyond1 and represented by1 the self as it appears in consciousness4 ,now1 ,i do not think that the fact that one would attribute to the self1 so considered1 one class of qualities1 and to the not-self another class1 would1 when the two real objects are considered in themselves1 prevent one's ascribing to the former all the kinds of sameness which one may ascribe to the latter1 or would justify the assumption of a new kind of sameness proper only to the former4 ,in discussing the sameness of external things ,i have not made any one kind of it dependent upon the peculiar quality of their qualities1 if ,i may so speak4 ,i considered them only as groups of qualities in general1 supposed to be external to consciousness4 ,the idea of the real self is in its general character essentially similar to that of the real not-self4 ,provided that the two classes of qualities have enough in common to be properly called qualities1 and to be capable of being related to each other in groups1 they may differ in kind toto clo without necessitating a difference of treatment from the point of view with which ,i am at present concerned4 ,it is very evident1 however1 that those who have thought of the self as a real thing1 distinct from consciousness1 and yet to be in some way intelligibly represented in thought1 have had a tendency to represent it very much as they have represented material objects4 ,there has been a general effort to get rid of the idea of extension1 but this has been shown rather in reducing the size of the object and attributing to it inconsistent space relations than in denying it such relations altogether4 ,bishop ,butler's argument for immortality from the indiscerptibility of the uncompounded shows that he thought of the self as he thought of a material atom1#bf and ,sir ,william ,hamilton's scholastic notion of the ubiquity of the soul in the bodily organism--all in the whole and all in every part#bg--makes it sufficiently clear that he thought of it so1 too2 though1 to be sure1 such ubiquity would make of it a very queer atom indeed4 ,if1 then1 the man1 who holds to the self in the second sense of the word1 calls up in using the word a mental complex like that which represents to him a real not-self1 there is all the more reason why we should not expect to find anything in his thought which would suggest a new kind of sameness within the sphere of the real self4 ,it remains1 of course1 to notice here1 as in the case of the noumenal self1 that any sense of the word same which has reference not so much to the things under discussion as to the relations of these things to other things1 may1 if self and not-self differ as to these relations1 be applicable to the one and not to the other4 ,thus ,sense ,,vi may be regarded as inapplicable to the real self4 ,i will discuss this point more fully in a few moments4 ,with this one exception we may1 therefore1 ,i think1 apply the kinds of sameness enumerated under ,sec4 #i as obtaining in the sphere of external things to the real self also1 and it would seem that no new kinds are to be added4 ,it is unnecessary to repeat here the classification already given4 #bf ,analogy1 ,part #a4 ,chap4 ,i4 #bg ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 ,,xxv41 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhj1 p4 #cef4 ,hamilton's utterances concerning reality are incoherent1 and inconsistent4 ,i do him no injustice1 however1 if ,i give the above as one of his views4 ,,sec4 #ad4 ,we come finally to the self as a something immediately perceived1 the self as phenomenon or idea4 ,i do not mean to use these names in a question-begging way1 and ,i will try to exhaust all reasonable possibilities in discussing it and its samenesses4 ,now1 whatever the self is1 it would seem that it must be1 in so far as it is a thing immediately known1 either a part or the whole of consciousness1 or one or the other of these regarded in some peculiar aspect or relation4 ,if it be a part of consciousness1 recognized as distinct from another part1 the non-ego1 we may reasonably maintain3 #a4 ,that the perceived self is at any moment what it is--is the same with itself4 ,the question whether it be simple and unanalyzable does not affect the problem4 ,this is sameness in sense ,i4 #b4 ,that if it be simple and unanalyzable1 this simple element of consciousness may be the same at two different times1 and if complex1 two elements or two complexes of elements1 belonging to different times may be the same4 ,this is sameness in sense ,,ii4 #c4 ,that if we regard the self as an object having a life-history1 as consisting of successive elements united in a series as sense elements are united in the series which is for us a material object 7immediately known71 we may speak of its being the same on two successive days1 even though it exhibit dissimilar qualities1 primary reference being had not to likeness of elements1 but to the experience which has been described at length in discussing sense ,,iii4 #d4 ,that we may speak of two selves1 of two elements of two selves 7if selves be complex71 or of two elements of one self 7if one self may contain two such elements71 as at any one time the same1 to indicate that they are similar4 ,this is sameness in sense ,,iv4 ,it should be kept in mind1 however1 that we never look upon one consciousness as containing two selves as it contains one self1 or as it may contain two material objects 7immediately known74 ,the second self in mind is recognized as present only as an imagined object4 ,nevertheless it would seem quite proper to use the word same to mark this relation of similarity between the perceived self and an imagined self1 just as we use it to mark a likeness of two material objects1 or of one material object and the memory image of such an object4 #e4 ,that we may speak of the self and its representative as the same4 ,the memory image of a later time may stand for the self as experienced at an earlier4 ,unless it be claimed that yesterday's consciousness of self is actually to-day's consciousness1 one must admit that the self remembered is the self known through its proxy4 ,and one may in his reasonings about the self use as a symbol the pronoun ,i1 paying little attention as he goes along to what it stands for1 and yet knowing it may serve in place of the obscure something it represents4 ,these are instances of sameness in sense ,v4 #f4 ,that we never use the word same in sense ,,vi in speaking of the self as we do in speaking of the not-self4 ,we do not say two men perceive the same self as we say they perceive the same tree or house4 ,the familiar distinction between the subjective and the objective marks out the latter as in a sense1 peculiar to itself1 common and impersonal4 ,i have already shown what we have in mind when we say two men see the same material thing4 ,we have a picture of the thing1 and of the bodies of the two men in a certain relation to it2 and we imagine a copy of the thing as in some way connected with each of these bodies1 and due to its relation to the thing4 ,when relations to a material object are in question all the bodies in a consciousness are on a par4 ,we may directly perceive the one thing and two or more bodies holding similar relations to it4 ,but it is not so in the case of selves4 ,the one self that we find in each consciousness seems to be peculiarly related to one body to the exclusion of others4 ,and as we have not1 in the case of this self1 the conditions which led us to mark the similar relations of two human bodies 7our representatives of the men7 to one material object1 by saying two men see the same thing1 we1 of course1 do not say that two men see the same self4 ,the word same1 in sense ,,vi1 we may regard1 then1 as inapplicable to the self as immediately known4#bh ,this appears to be due1 however1 not to the nature of this self in itself considered1 but to its peculiar relation to the other things in a consciousness4 #bh ,owing to the ambiguity already pointed out as existing in terms which stand for our objects of knowledge and our knowledge of these objects1 it would seem almost impossible to avoid misconception without unendurable reiteration4 ,in the above paragraph1 by the words body1 object1 self1 etc41 ,i always refer to things immediately known4 ,moreover1 since the other two selves1 the self as group of real qualities and the self as noumenon1 are to us1 as it were1 shadows cast by the self immediately known--assumed to exist only because this is known to exist1 and thought of as present only because this is known to be present--since1 ,i say1 these two selves hold in our thought this peculiar relation of dependence upon the self in consciousness1 it is to be expected that we never find any one speaking of two men as seeing the same real self as one might readily speak of two men as seeing the same real tree4 ,one says he has evidence that two men see the same real tree1 when he has or can have in consciousness an immediately perceived tree and two immediately perceived human bodies in a certain relation to it4 ,if no one had ever had this experience in the sphere of the immediately known1 we have no reason to think any one would ever have thought of applying the phrase in question to a tree mediately known4 ,and as we do not have a similar experience touching the self in consciousness1 it is only natural to find that no one applies the phrase to any self out of consciousness4 ,when things differ their shadows ought to differ too4 ,sameness in sense ,,vi we may regard1 then1 as not attributable to self in any of the three senses of the word4 #g4 ,that1 finally1 there seems no more reason why one should not call the self as immediately known the same with the self as external thing1 or with the self as noumenon1 than the not-self as similarly perceived the same with the not-self as similarly inferred4 ,the supposed relationships are in the two cases exactly alike4 ,here we have sameness in sense ,,vii4 ,,sec4 #ae4 ,if we claim that by the self as immediately known we understand not a part but the whole of consciousness1 we should seem1 unless we in some way modify our statement1 to obliterate the distinction between self and not-self4 ,still1 taking the words simply1 and assuming that we mean by self all that is immediately known1 we do not find that this will necessitate any important difference in the discussion of its samenesses4 ,consciousness as a whole is certainly what it is1 or the same with itself1 at any instant3 two elements in it belonging to different times1 or two complexes of elements belonging to different times may be the same1 as being alike2 it may be regarded as having a life history1 and may from this point of view be called the same at different times without regard to similarity2 two simultaneous elements or complexes of elements in it may be called the same to mark the fact that they resemble each other1 or it1 as a whole1 may for the same reason be called the same with another consciousness 7imagined72 it and its representative 7for example1 the memory-image of its former self71 may be called the same2 and we may use the word same to indicate its relation to its supposed real correlate in an extra-consciousness world1 whether we make this thing or noumenon4 ,it will be observed that in the preceding ,i have allowed the self1 considered as the whole of consciousness1 all the kinds of sameness upon my list except the sixth4 ,there is1 however1 no objection1 except that arising from oddity of expression1 against allowing it this kind of sameness too4 ,if we really mean by the self the whole of consciousness1 then everything immediately perceived is a part of the self4 ,if then1 it is proper to say two men see the same tree1 one may go on to say1 if one choses1 that two men see a part of the one self4 ,such an expression could1 of course1 be used only in speaking of the objective part of this self1 the part which those who distinguish between ego and non-ego call the not-self4 ,it is needless to say that no one ever thinks of talking in this way4 ,i merely mention the point for the sake of completeness in my analysis4 ,,sec4 #af4 ,if by the self we do not understand a part or the whole of consciousness taken simply1 but the one or the other of these regarded from some peculiar point of view1 does it affect the question of the kinds of sameness we may attribute to it8 ,it may be asserted1 for example1 that when we are thinking of the world of things immediately perceived as conditioned by its relation to a particular organism 7also immediately perceived7--as duplicated by a pressure on the eyes1 as annihilated by a blow on the head--we make these things mental1 and properly include them under the head of self2 whereas1 when we abstract these same things in thought from the organism1 and1 so to speak1 objectify them1 we properly include them under the head of not-self4 ,we are thus to regard the one thing as an element of the self or of the not-self1 according to the light in which it is viewed4 ,but it does not seem to me that if we take the word self in the sense just described1 or in any analogous sense1 we need alter the list of samenesses already given4 ,we are still considering a part or the whole of consciousness1 and the fact that we are viewing it in one light rather than another would not apparently influence in any way its kinds of sameness4 ,,sec4 #ag4 ,this would certainly appear to be the case if we take the words part and whole of consciousness in their common acceptation1 as denoting a portion or the totality of mental elements 7sensations1 feelings1 volitions1 ideas71 in their various relations to each other4 ,it remains1 however1 to consider a position1 which1 it may be claimed1 is not covered by the foregoing classification of possible positions1 when the words part and whole are thus understood4 ,suppose that one distinguishes in the ,kantian fashion between the form and the matter of what appears in consciousness1 and maintains that the formal element1 the arrangement1 or unity of consciousness is to be attributed to mind1 or1 if you please1 is mind1 and for mind ,i may here write self1 while the matter or content1 the raw material to be elaborated and related1 is to be distinguished from this as a thing apart4 ,can it be shown that the above given kinds of sameness have significance in regard to the self so understood8 ,whether we call this a part of consciousness or not will depend on our use of terms4 ,it is not a part1 as commonly understood1 nor is it the whole of consciousness4 ,now1 it has seemed to me that those who have laid most emphasis upon this formal element in consciousness have been very vague in their treatment of it4 ,on the part of many writers there is little evidence of even an attempt at scientific exactitude4 ,and yet it does not appear that the subject admits of treatment only in this loose and unsatisfactory way4 ,if we can discuss it at all1 there seems no reason why1 with increasing knowledge1 we may not expect to discuss it with accuracy and precision4 ,if we consider this formal element of consciousness in a concrete instance1 it may help us to classify our ideas concerning it4 ,let us imagine three points in such relations to each other that when each is connected with the other two by straight lines we have an equilateral triangle4 ,the three points are1 of course1 what they are at any instant4 ,and whatever a relation may be1 if the mutual relations of these three points are capable of being considered apart from the points1 as a distinct element in consciousness1 there appears no reason why we should not assert with equal justice that these relations are what they are at any instant4 ,when we take note of the points we take note of the relations1 and we do not confound the one with the other4 ,and just as ,i may say that such a set of three points imagined or observed now is the same with another and a similar set imagined or observed at some former time1 meaning by the word same to indicate similarity1 and not sameness in the strict sense mentioned just above2 so there appears no reason at all why ,i may not say that the mutual relations of the one set of points are the same with the mutual relations of the other1 making here1 too1 the distinction between sameness in the former1 stricter1 sense1 and sameness in this second sense of similarity4 ,if what is contained in a consciousness at any one instant1 is1 ipso facto1 to be distinguished from what is contained in it at any other instant1 there seems equal reason for making this distinction in the material element and in the formal4 ,it is quite true that men are not accustomed to carrying this distinction into the region of form4 ,the whole history of the dispute as to universals is evidence of the way in which men have confounded the kinds of sameness2 but ,i fancy that even those who would clearly recognize that red color imagined yesterday and red color imagined to-day are the same merely in being similar1 or in standing in a relation of original and representative1 would yet not think of distinguishing triangularity noticed yesterday from triangularity noticed to-day1 and marking that they are not the same in the first and strictest sense of the word4 ,and yet it would be hard to show why two indistinguishably similar color sensations1 existing in consciousness at different times1 are to be kept apart in thought and recognized as two sensations1 while two occurrences of the consciousness of triangularity 7,i use the clumsy phrase to avoid any question-begging word71 are not to be distinguished as separate in a similar way4 ,to say that the formal element is not a thing1 but an activity1 does not alter the position4 ,if an activity is enough of a thing to be talked about and distinguished from other things1 we may surely recognize an activity in consciousness yesterday as numerically different from an activity in consciousness to-day4 ,furthermore1 if1 instead of taking as simple an instance of form as the relations of the three points ,i have been discussing1 ,i choose to take the sum total of the relations between the material elements 7here ,i use material as correlative to formal71 which go to make up the life history of a material object1 say a tree1 why may ,i not speak of the formal tree as being the same at two times1 meaning thereby that the group of relations co-existent at any one time may be regarded as representative of any other group belonging to the one series or of the whole series8 ,to be sure1 ,i am not justified by common usage in thus speaking1 since common usage marks only distinctions which are practically important1 and by the words the same tree includes both form and matter4 ,nevertheless1 ,i can see no reason why1 if this element of form does admit of being considered apart1 it is not at least possible to find in this field the kind of sameness we have in mind when we say that we have seen on two successive days the same tree4 ,again1 if ,i can speak of two simultaneous sensations of redness in one consciousness 7e4 g41 the two halves of a red surface71 as the same1 meaning to indicate simply similarity1 why may ,i not also speak of two simultaneous experiences of triangularity in one consciousness as the same1 and keep clearly in mind here1 too1 that ,i mean only to indicate similarity8 ,if ,i can speak of a sensation or a complex of sensations in one consciousness as the same with a similar sensation or group of sensations in another1 and yet not forget that ,i am dealing with two things1 why may ,i not do as much for two similar relations or groups of relations in two consciousnesses8 ,if in the one case ,i do not confound sameness in the sense of similarity with sameness of the kind we mean when we say each thing is at each instant the same with itself1 why should ,i do so in the other case8 ,if1 ,i repeat1 the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from the material element and discussed1 there appears no reason why it should not be open to distinctions of this kind4 ,and when ,i call up in memory a triangle once seen1 the memory image would seem to stand as a representative of the original in both its elements1 form and matter4 ,in neither should the representative be confounded with the original4 ,if we may use the word same to indicate this peculiar relation of representation between two things yet recognized as two1 it would seem only just to allow this distinction as much in the case of triangularity as in the case of redness or blueness4 ,as to the sixth kind of sameness4 ,may we grant this to the self1 if by self we mean the formal element of consciousness8 ,i have said a little way back1 before taking up the distinction of formal and material1 that1 if we make the word self cover all the immediately known1 there is nothing to prevent one's saying that two men see a part of the same self1 for material objects 7immediately known7 would have to be regarded as such parts4 ,and here it is evident that if we make self to cover the whole of the formal element in a consciousness1 it of course includes the formal element in what we may call the objective side of consciousness--the side which is1 in some sense of the words1 common and impersonal4 ,now1 we do say that two men see the same tree1 and by tree1 the man who distinguishes between form and matter means a certain complex containing both formal and material elements4 ,these elements he believes he can distinguish from one another1 and pay attention predominantly now to the one1 and now to the other4 ,does it not seem to follow that a man may as truly be said to see the formal element as the material1 and that two men who see the same tree may with justice be said to see the same shape or arrangement of parts8 ,in other words1 may we not apply the sixth sense of the word same to the formal element in consciousness if this element is a thing capable of treatment at all8 ,and if this formal element in a tree seen by two men is a part of the self1 why may we not say that two men see a part of the same self1 even though we make self mere form8 ,it would sound very odd to say so1 of course1 but that should not weigh with a philosopher1 if consistency require it4 ,finally1 if ,i may call an immediately perceived object the same with its supposed external correlate1 not confounding the two1 but merely marking by the word a peculiar instance of the representative relation1 why may ,i not1 if ,i believe that external things stand in real relations to each other truly represented by our perceptions of things and their relations--why1 in this case1 may ,i not speak of the relations1 external and internal1 as the same1 without on that account forgetting that ,i am pointing out a relation between two things 7if ,i may thus speak of relations71 numerically different8 ,are they not as different as the matter of consciousness and its correlate in the outer world8 ,,sec4 #ah4 ,in the foregoing ,i have endeavored to make my list of the kinds of sameness complete4 ,i can think of nothing that has been overlooked2 but as ,i have been trying to force a path through a thicket few have made any sustained effort to penetrate1 it is quite possible my map of the ground may need emendation4 ,i shall be very glad of any criticism which will help me to improve it4 ,and as the many divisions made1 and the many distinctions drawn1 may very possibly tend to produce in one who has followed the discussion thus far1 a state of mind akin to that of the true-begotten ,gobbo1 when he was obligingly directed to the ,jew's house by his hopeful son1 a short summary of the results obtained may serve to facilitate apprehension and intelligent criticism4 ,what has been done is this3 ,i began by considering the kinds of sameness of things immediately known1 leaving out of consideration for the time being the sameness of the self or ego4 ,this resulted in the following kinds3 ,i4 ,any mental element or complex of mental elements may be said to be the same with itself at any instant4 ,,ii4 ,any mental element or complex of mental elements in existence at one time may be called the same with a mental element or complex of mental elements existing at another time1 to indicate that the two are similar4 ,,iii4 ,we may say that we perceive the same object 7complex of mental elements7 at two different times1 when we do not mean that what is actually experienced on the two occasions is the same in either of the preceding senses2 but only that the two experiences are terms in a certain series1 the whole of which may be regarded as represented by any part4 ,in this sense does one see the same tree on two succeeding days4 ,,iv4 ,any two mental elements or complexes of mental elements in consciousness at the one time may be called the same to mark the fact that they are alike4 ,v4 ,any mental element or complex of mental elements may be called the same with its representative1 whether this representative resemble it or not4 ,,vi4 ,when a man has learned from experience of his own body 7as a thing immediately known7 that a consciousness of his body in a certain peculiar relation to a given object 7complex of mental elements7 is a presupposition to a consciousness of the object1 and wishes to mark the fact that he is perceiving or imagining two human bodies in this relation to a single object1 and connecting in thought with each of them a picture of the object1 he may say that he is perceiving or imagining two men seeing the same object4 ,this sense of the word same obviously expresses quite a complex thought4 ,,vii4 ,in addition to these kinds of sameness found within the sphere of the immediately known1 we obtain one kind by stepping beyond it1 which1 since we step beyond it1 so to speak1 with only one foot1 may be here mentioned as belonging at least partially to the world of immediate objects4 ,when we have come to believe that things in consciousness have their correlates in a world outside of consciousness1 we may speak of the things in consciousness as the same with their external correlates2 or1 at any rate1 we may talk of them as if they were the same in some sense of the word which will allow us to include the two 7or three7 distinct things under one name1 and treat them as one4 ,this is constantly done4 ,the importance of remembering that we have really more than one thing to consider1 it would seem scarcely necessary to emphasize4 ,how far this is really a new kind of sameness ,i discussed at some length4 ,after having marked these seven kinds of sameness as having to do with the immediately known1 ,i proceeded to consider the kinds of sameness which may obtain in a world or worlds beyond consciousness4 ,it was pointed out that one may look upon the external in three ways4 ,one may believe in external things as merely bundles of real qualities1 and may stop there3 or one may believe in such bundles of real qualities1 and in addition hold to substance or substratum as an obscure something implied by these real qualities3 or1 lastly1 one may hold that the only correlate of the thing in consciousness is noumenon1 a thing not distinguishable from the substance above mentioned4 ,it was then shown that a realm of external things1 consisting of bundles of real qualities in a world beyond consciousness1 would1 since it is to the man thinking it merely a duplicate of the immediate world1 admit of the existence of all the kinds of sameness above enumerated1 and would not furnish any one kind which might increase the list4 ,and with respect to the external as noumenon1 it was stated that if the noumenal be represented to the mind at all1 at least the first kind of sameness must be attributed to it1 and that other kinds will be1 in proportion to the degree of clearness allowed this vague and inconsistent entity4 ,no new kind of sameness need1 however1 be looked for in this field4 ,if one hold to the external in both kinds1 he must1 of course1 search three distinct realms of being before he can be sure that he has not overlooked any legitimate sense of the word same4 ,as a result of the foregoing analysis we may maintain that1 whatever be his belief as to ideas1 things1 and noumena1 his search will not result in more than the seven kinds of sameness ,i have given4 ,in the assumed new fields we find mere repetition4 ,the pure ,idealist would reduce the list to six by dropping off the seventh kind altogether4 ,next1 as to the sameness of the ,self or ,ego4 ,it was pointed out that one may take the word self to mean3 7#a7 the self in consciousness1 or as phenomenon2 7#b7 the self as bundle of real qualities out of consciousness2 7#c7 the self as substance or noumenon2 7#d7 two of these1 or all of these1 taken together4 ,it was said that as the fourth sense is sufficiently discussed in examining the first three1 it would not be separately considered4 ,the three remaining senses were then taken up in reverse order4 ,the third and the ,second were found to furnish no new kind of sameness1 and to be on a par with the corresponding senses of the word not-self1 except as touching the sixth kind of sameness4 ,as respects this1 it was admitted that no one would speak of two men as perceiving the same self1 whether as bundle of real qualities or as noumenon4 ,it was remarked1 however1 that this is due not to a difference in the self and not-self in themselves considered1 but to a difference in their relation to other things in a consciousness4 ,the self in consciousness1 or as immediately known1 was then discussed4 ,it was stated that we may safely assume this to be either a part or the whole of consciousness1 or the one or the other of these in some peculiar aspect or relation4 ,self1 viewed as a part of consciousness1 was found to furnish no new kind of sameness1 and was found to admit of all the kinds discovered except the sixth2 this one being inadmissible from the fact that when we make the self a part of consciousness we always make it the subjective part and not the objective4 ,self1 viewed as the whole of consciousness1 was likewise found to furnish no new kind of sameness1 and it was found to admit of all the seven kinds discovered--even of the sixth1 though in a modified way1 since this kind can belong only to a part of the self1 the objective part1 which is in some sense common and impersonal4 ,it may1 to be sure1 be objected that it would be contrary to common usage to speak of two men as seeing the same self in any sense of that word2 but in making the self the whole of consciousness one has already abandoned the common standpoint1 and one may as well be consistent in carrying out the consequences4 ,assuming the self to be not a part or the whole of consciousness simply1 but regarded in some peculiar aspect or relation1 was not found to be significant as concerns kinds of sameness4 ,it still remained to consider a possible position2 that of the man who distinguishes between the formal and the material element in consciousness1 and identifies self or mind with the former4 ,the formal element of consciousness is not a part of consciousness as the word part is commonly used1 nor is it the whole of consciousness1 in the ordinary acceptation of the word whole4 ,and though this view might very well have been brought under a former head by stretching a little the meaning of the word part1 yet such is its importance that ,i chose rather to omit it when discussing self as a part of consciousness 7there using the word part in a limited sense71 and to take it up later by itself4 ,it was insisted that if the formal element in consciousness is enough of a thing to be distinguished from something else1 and to be discussed1 it is enough of a thing to admit of distinctions and differences much as other things do4 ,after examination it appeared1 as a matter of fact1 that there is no reason why the believer in form should not attribute to it all of the seven kinds of sameness before described--even 7in the modified way described a moment ago7 the sixth kind4 ,and it also appeared that no new kind of sameness is discoverable in this field4 ,with this closed the search for samenesses4 ,it will be observed that we have passed in review the self and the not-self as immediately known1 the self and the not-self as bundles of real qualities out of consciousness1 and the self and the not-self as noumenon or substance4 ,i know of no other field in which the search may be prosecuted1 unless such be invented gratuitously by increasing the layers of being in a way no one seems inclined to increase them4 ,and in view of the fact that the samenesses found in any layer below the first seem to be only repetitions of what we find in that one1 we could have no reason to hope that any such needless increase in strata could add a single new kind of sameness to those described4 ,,sec4 #ai4 ,now that we have obtained a list of the different kinds of sameness1 we may pass our eye over it with a view to discovering what the various kinds have in common1 and what is the reason that we express such diverse experiences by the use of the one word4 ,such an examination reveals the fact that the common notion which unites them is the idea of similarity4 ,in some cases this notion lies more in the foreground than in others1 but in all cases it is present1 and forms the bond of union4 ,i will run through the list and point this out1 beginning1 however1 with the second kind1 and reserving the first for discussion after the others4 ,,ii4 ,a mere mention of the second kind of sameness is1 in this connection1 sufficient4 ,two mental experiences are there avowedly called the same to mark similarity4 ,,iii4 ,when we speak of the same object as perceived on two occasions1 we do not1 as has been noticed1 mean that what is actually in the sense at the two different times is similar4 ,nevertheless1 we find here1 too1 the notion of similarity1 for the two experiences are not considered merely in themselves1 but as elements in a group or series1 and as each representing the whole series4 ,when1 therefore1 we have the two experiences1 we regard ourselves as having in them two experiences of the one series2 which means1 to be more explicit1 that we have in mind on the two occasions two complexes which are similar1 and which1 when thought of together1 are related to each other as the memory image and its original are related4 ,here the likeness lies in what is represented1 not in the representatives4 ,,iv4 ,as in the second kind of sameness1 so in the fourth1 the reference to similarity is unmistakable4 ,we call qualities or things the same when they are of the one kind1 when they are observed to resemble each other4 ,v4 ,the relation of representative and thing represented evidently implies the notion of similarity4 ,it is quite true that we often recognize as in this relation things that we do not think of as being similar at all1 and yet a little reflection will show that one thing can stand for another only in so far as it resembles it4 ,the resemblance may lie in the qualities of the things in themselves considered1 or it may lie in external relations of which the things are capable1 or functions which they may serve4 ,the very notion of a proxy is a something which1 for the purpose in hand1 may be regarded as capable of assuming the functions of another4 ,in so far as it can do this it is like the other4 ,things wholly different 7if things could be wholly different7 could not represent each other4 ,,vi4 ,when a man thinks of two other men as perceiving the same object1 he must recognize1 if he reflect1 that he has in mind a picture of the object1 of two human bodies in a peculiar relation to it1 and two images of the object somehow connected with these bodies4 ,he need not think of these images as wholly resembling his picture of the object or each other4 ,he does1 indeed1 make them more or less like his picture of the object1 but what is prominent in his mind is the thought of them as representatives1 as related to and giving information concerning the object4 ,i say concerning the object1 but this phrase is ambiguous4 ,if the man under discussion believes in real objects in an extra-consciousness world1 he will look upon the images as representing such a real object2 though1 of course1 his guarantee for this real object1 and all his information concerning1 it must be found in his picture of the object1 and this1 or its copy1 will stand for the real object in any mental complex he may construct4 ,if the man be an ,idealist1 accepting only what can be found in a consciousness1 he will look upon the two images as related to his picture of the object and representative of that4 ,in any case he must regard them as representatives1 and in this sense the same with the thing they represent4 ,the notion of similarity which is at the bottom of this idea of representative and thing represented is then implied in sameness of the sixth kind also4 ,,vii4 ,and since those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge make the former representative of the latter1 we have evidently this implied notion of similarity in the seventh kind of sameness as well as in the sixth4 ,the mediate object is said to be known through the immediate3 that is1 the qualities and relations of the one are made to stand for and serve in place of the qualities and relations of the other4 ,this they can do1 of course1 only in so far as the two sets of qualities and relations are similar4 ,it is easy enough to see that this notion of similarity is present when we think of an idea or complex of ideas as representing a real thing beyond consciousness1 and giving information concerning it4 ,when1 however1 we sublimate our real thing into a noumenon and strip it of the determinations which1 taken together1 make up our idea of a thing1 we destroy1 if we are consistent and thorough-going1 all notion of similarity between the two2 but in doing this we destroy our noumenon altogether4 ,if1 for instance1 we refuse to allow to our notion of a thing any qualitative or quantitative expression whatever1 we cannot think of the thing as having reality or existence1 or any mark by which it is to be distinguished from nothing at all4 ,in this case the idea is no longer representative1 for it has nothing to represent4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we do not wholly destroy the noumenon1 but still allow it a diluted existence of an indefinite kind1 in so far as it has this1 and can be represented in mind at all1 it resembles the idea1 and just so far may the idea stand as its representative4 ,i have already pointed out that several of those who pin their faith to external realities seem to apprehend at times but dimly1 if at all1 that the relation of phenomenon and noumenon1 or of idea and real thing1 is that of representative and thing represented1 and that we have here two things and not one4 ,certainly they sometimes pass from one to the other without rhyme or reason1 and apparently in complete unconsciousness of the fact that they have made any change at all4 ,if1 for the time being1 they really take the two for one1 they are not thinking of the seventh kind of sameness1 but of another kind4 ,as this is done through mere inadvertence and looseness of reasoning1 and cannot be justified on their own assumptions1 it is not worth while to dwell upon it farther4 ,where one really has in mind the seventh kind of sameness1 the elements ,i have mentioned will be found in it4 ,i4 ,finally1 we come to the perplexing case that ,i postponed at the outset4 ,what has sameness of the first kind in common with the rest8 ,how can we speak of similarity when strictly one thing is in question8 ,not one thing in the loose sense in which we call a material object one thing in its successive states1 nor one in the sense in which the memory image and its original are one1 but one thing as a single element of knowledge is itself at any one instant8 ,how can the idea of likeness hold here8 ,dundreary's bird flocking all by itself would seem to have found its philosophical prototype4 ,it may be said that though the thing in question is strictly one1 yet we divide it from itself in thought and then affirm it of itself4 ,we give expression to the logical law of identity by saying that x is x4 ,but here the difficulty meets us that1 if we are really talking about only the one x1 we have said quite all we have to say in merely saying x2 while if1 to complete our thought1 we must add the second x1 we have not an identical proposition1 in any strict sense of the word1 but a synthetic one4 ,it is easy enough in words to divide a thing from itself1 since the words thing and itself are two1 and may readily be distinguished4 ,in the same way it is easy in words to affirm a thing to be and not to be at the one time4 ,there is no law to prevent one's stringing sounds together as he may please4 ,but if one is interested not in the mere symbols1 but in that which they are supposed to represent1 one must see that the expression x is x1 to be a significant proposition1 must have a subject and a predicate1 and affirm a relation between them4 ,here we have1 by hypothesis1 strictly one thing for subject and predicate4 ,the proposition x is x must then consist of one thing and a relation between it--which is about as significant as the statement that a door may consist of one side and a relation between it4 ,between what8 ,one side4#bi ,every form of proposition employed to give expression to the law of identity implies this difficulty4 ,whether we say x is x1 or whatever is is1 or everything is identical with itself1 our proposition1 taken literally1 is either useless 7since we have said all we have to say in mentioning the subject alone71 or untrue 7since we add a new element in adding the predicate74 #bi ,this abnormal door has its parallel in the now discredited causa sui4 ,note the following from ,descartes3 ,de mme1 lorsque nous disons que ,dieu est par soi1 nous pouvons aussi la vrit entendre cela ngativement1 comme voulant dire qu'il n'a point de cause2 mais si nous avons auparavant recherch la cause pourquoi il est ou pourquoi il ne cesse point d'tre1 et que1 considrant l'immense et incomprhensible puissance qui est contenue dans son ide1 nous l'ayons reconnue si pleine et si abondante qu'en effet elle soit la vraie cause pourquoi il est1 et pourquoi il continue ainsi toujours d'tre1 et qu'il n'y en puisse avoir d'autre que celle-l1 nous disons que ,dieu est par soi1 non plus ngativement1 mais au contraire trs positivement4 ,car1 encore qu'il n'est pas besoin de dire qu'il est la cause efficiente de soi-mme1 de peur que peut-tre on n'entre en dispute du mot2 nanmoins1 parce que nous voyons que ce qui fait qu'il est par soi1 ou qu'il n'a point de cause diffrente de soi-mme1 ne procde pas du nant1 mais de la relle et vritable immensit de sa puissance1 il nous est tout a fait loisible de penser qu'il fait en quelque faon la mme chose a l'gard de soi-mme que la cause efficiente l'gard de son effet1 et partant qu'il est par soi positivement4--,rponses aux ,premires ,objections4 ,it is then sufficiently evident that the forms used to express the logical law of identity do not1 taken strictly1 express at all the kind of sameness with which we are now concerned1 but1 on the contrary1 something very different4 ,we are considering a sameness in which there is no duality whatever1 but our expressions would seem to have no meaning except as indicating a relation between two4 ,they are then significant1 not as expressing sameness of the first kind1 but as suggesting it1 and this they certainly serve to do4 ,the reason for this ,i shall try to give in a moment4 ,it has been said that in the other kinds of sameness we always find the notion of similarity4 ,when1 however1 we distinguish two things as two and yet recognize them as similar1 we must have what ,i may call a mixed experience of likeness and unlikeness4 ,in any two things compared1 the degrees of likeness and unlikeness may vary1 and we may fix attention upon similarities or differences4 ,in proportion to the attention given to dissimilar elements will the two objects be clearly distinguished from each other and discriminated as two4 ,if the purpose in hand does not require a careful attention to differences1 and if what is prominent in mind is the likeness of the two objects1 the sense of duality may fall into the background1 and the man pass readily from one object to the other with little consciousness that he has made a change4 ,as ,i now look at the two ink-stands on my desk1 ,i clearly recognize them as two and yet as of the one kind4 ,here ,i am as distinctly aware that they are two as ,i am that they are in some respects the same4 ,but in some of the kinds of sameness ,i have described this sense of duality falls more into the shade4 ,when ,i speak of seeing the same ink-stand twice1 or when ,i call up in memory an ink-stand once seen1 ,i am likely1 unless ,i take particular pains to reflect upon my mental operation1 to have but a dim realization of the fact that ,i have two distinct things to deal with4 ,how those who distinguish between the immediate and the mediate objects of knowledge have a tendency to forget their distinction1 and to pass unconsciously from one to the other1 ,i have dwelt upon sufficiently4 ,suppose1 now1 that from two objects which we recognize as similar and yet distinct1 we abstract one by one the elements which differ4 ,so long as there is any difference left1 we still have identity in diversity--similarity in the ordinary sense of the term1 which implies a recognition of two things as two4 ,when1 however1 the last difference disappears1 all sense of duality must disappear with it1 for any division or distinction within what remains is inadmissible4 ,things which are distinguished are distinguished through some difference4 ,a sense of duality implies a discrimination between two1 and where it is impossible to discriminate duality vanishes4 ,similarity1 as we commonly use the word1 must then disappear with the disappearance of all dissimilarity between two objects4 ,i say between two objects in default of a better expression1 for1 of course1 we have at this point no longer two objects4 ,my meaning is1 however1 sufficiently plain4 ,a sense of duality implies difference1 and similarity1 as commonly understood1 implies duality4 ,the similarity will then take itself off with the last difference4 ,it may be objected that a consciousness of duality and a consciousness of similarity are only possible on the ground that ,i mention1 but that duality and similarity themselves may really obtain when no difference between two is perceptible4 ,but a moment's reflection will make it plain that one who speaks thus is simply supplying in himself the elements that he is supposing absent in the case of another4 ,if he uses the words duality and similarity1 and they really mean anything to him1 they imply all that ,i have said4 ,he cannot represent to himself two things at all without distinguishing them from each other1 and he can not distinguish them from each other unless they differ in some way4 ,if1 then1 he speak of two things as being two and yet completely indistinguishable1 he is1 taken literally1 talking nonsense4 ,he may1 of course1 mean the misleading phrase to be understood as indicating something not actually expressed by the words4 ,he may mean to point out that1 under certain circumstances1 in which he has an experience which he calls a recognition of two objects as two and as similar1 he has reason to think another mind has an experience partly like and partly unlike his own--like in as much as it contains what corresponds to that which is common to the two objects he has in mind2 unlike in as much as it contains nothing which corresponds to the elements which make it possible for him to recognize two objects4 ,it is this that is in his mind when he speaks of thinking of two objects as really two and yet indistinguishable to this man or that4 ,if1 however1 the expression two things may be indistinguishable is used to indicate this experience1 it should be carefully borne in mind that the proposition must not be taken literally1 for the good reason that the subject and predicate are not in the one consciousness4 ,the two objects are in the mind of ,smith1 and the indistinguishable element in the mind of ,jones4 ,when we speak of two men as seeing the same thing1 ,i have shown that we are using the word same in a looser sense which should never be confounded with the stricter sense4 ,strictly speaking1 then1 the two things are never indistinguishable1 but that which corresponds to the two things in a consciousness from which all recognition of duality is absent4 ,that one man may have a consciousness of duality while another man has not1 and that these two experiences may be related as the experiences of different minds are related when we say they are experiencing the same thing1 no one would care to dispute4 ,should a man say that he can think of himself as unable to distinguish two things which are nevertheless two1 the case1 would not be materially different4 ,the man cannot1 of course1 think of the two things as indistinguishable1 but he may think of two things and connect with this thought the thought of himself as having an experience in which there is no consciousness of duality4 ,but1 it may be insisted1 we are still only talking about consciousness2 let us come to real things4 ,suppose no one able to distinguish between them1 abstract all consciousness of difference1 would not two real things remain two1 however we might confound them8 ,can a thing in one place be a thing in another place1 however closely it may resemble it1 or however ignorant we may be8 ,to this ,i answer that when one speaks of two real things the words only mean something to him because he has present in mind what ,i have said must be present if one is to have a consciousness of duality4 ,a thing in one place and a thing in another place are to him two simply because he thinks them as differing--in place4 ,when one has come to the conclusion that he must duplicate his experience1 distinguish between the world of immediate and the world of mediate objects1 and place the latter in a region outside1 there is nothing to prevent him from thinking of two real things as two1 although all distinctions within the field of immediate objects have been obliterated4 ,still1 in thinking these real things as two1 he does just what he does in thinking two immediate objects as two--he recognizes difference4 ,the twoness depends upon difference as much in the one case as in the other1 and to speak of two objects in a real world as two and yet having no differing element would be to use words without meaning4 ,in talking about a real world1 if we are really to talk and not merely to utter a series of sounds1 our words must be significant4 ,to say this or that may be in a 'real' world1 though we may not be able to conceive it1 would1 if this or that implies a contradiction1 be to say nothing4 ,the fact is that this external world1 as we think it1 implies the notions of before and after1 in this place and that1 all the distinctions and differences which make it to us a world of distinct objects4 ,of course it follows that things in the external world are thought as distinct from each other1 but this does not affect my statement that distinction is impossible without difference4 ,we may1 then1 have a series of experiences1 beginning with one in which two objects are recognized as similar and yet are very clearly distinguished as two objects1 continued in others in which the sense of duality falls more and more into the background1 and ending in one in which there is no consciousness of duality at all4 ,the last of these experiences is not wholly different from the others4 ,there is in it no experience of similarity in so far as this word is used to express identity in difference1 or a relation between two4 ,there can be no such relation unless there are two1 and here there are not two4 ,but it should be marked that this experience differs from the others1 not in the element which has led us to declare two objects similar--the element which they have in common--but in that which has led us to declare them two and different4 ,it is by adding to this last experience1 so to speak1 that we get the others4 ,they contain it and more4 ,usage will not allow us to apply the term similarity in speaking of an experience in which two things are not distinguished1 and this is proper enough2 but it should never be forgotten that this experience is at the bottom of all our experiences of similarity--is1 so to speak1 their common core4 ,when1 therefore1 ,i said some pages back that all the kinds of sameness under discussion contain the idea of similarity1 ,i was using the word in a certain broad sense to indicate that which is the ground of all our experiences of similarity1 and is also found in the first kind of sameness on the list4 ,i preferred to use there the word similarity1 because it was easy to show that this notion is really contained in six of the seven uses of the word same1 and it was convenient afterward to show the connection between the first kind of sameness and the notion of similarity4 ,and now it is not difficult to guess why we employ such expressions as we do to indicate strict identity4 ,if ,i habitually use the proposition x is y to indicate a relation between two things having similar elements and yet regarded as distinct1 and look upon the proposition as justified by the similar elements1 observing that1 these remaining unchanged1 the dissimilar elements may be very variable without affecting the truth of the proposition1 what more natural than that ,i should go on using the propositional form when the dissimilar elements have diminished to zero--when the proposition has become x is x8 ,to be sure1 no one can take such a proposition literally1 any more than one can soberly believe that one divided by zero results in infinity4 ,such expressions have their use and value1 but they must be properly understood4 ,if one uses the expression x is x to emphasize the fact that one is not to pass from x to any y or z--that one is to rule out all distinction or sense of difference1 the use cannot be harmful4 ,and the use of the propositional form has this great convenience3 it puts a period1 so to speak1 to one's thinking1 and prevents one from casting about for a completion of the thought4 ,if one merely say to me x1 ,i shall probably take it as a subject and busy myself to find a predicate4 ,if he say x is x1 he says really no more than x1 but he makes me fix my thoughts upon x alone4 ,,sec4 #bj4 ,in the foregoing search for the element that the kinds of sameness have in common1 ,i have had in mind chiefly the samenesses of things immediately known4 ,it is not necessary to repeat the search in the field of the external4 ,we have but the seven kinds of sameness1 and whatever may be the things that are the same in these several ways1 the elements ,i have indicated must be present if our words are to be significant4 ,but one thing remains for me to do in this part of my monograph1 and that will not detain me long4 ,i must distinguish between sameness and identity1 or rather point out to what kinds of sameness this latter word is commonly applied4 ,the word is often used quite loosely1 but where the attempt is made to distinguish between identity and sameness in a looser sense1 and to use terms with some precision1 the former word serves to indicate sameness in which there is no consciousness of duality1 or in which the consciousness of duality has fallen into the background and may easily be overlooked4 ,sameness of the first kind1 for example1 is spoken of as identity4 ,this is the only kind of sameness in which there is no element of duality at all4 ,the use of the word identity is not1 however1 restricted to this4 ,locke's inquiry concerning the identity of masses of inorganic matter1 of vegetables1 of animals1 and of persons1 has to do with sameness of the third kind on the list4 ,in this kind of sameness there is no clear consciousness that one is dealing with more than one thing1 and ,locke's discussion is conducted throughout as though one were not4 ,it may be objected that in certain other kinds there is often no clear consciousness of duality1 and yet one does not think of using the term identity4 ,this is quite true4 ,the two kinds mentioned have been thought worthy of special discussion by logician and philosopher1 and have been given a technical name4 ,the others have not4 ,still1 although the word is not commonly used in such cases1 it would1 ,i fancy1 seem natural to use it in a direct ratio to the degree in which the sense of duality falls into the background4 ,dr4 ,johnson would probably have been willing to say that the stone he saw himself kick was identical with the one the existence of which he wanted to prove4 ,bishop ,berkeley could have felt only disgust at such a use of the term4 ,scarcely anyone1 ,i suppose1 would regard himself as speaking strictly if he called the fourth kind of sameness identity4 ,the co-existence of the two things compared would prevent their being confounded4 ,without1 then1 attempting to assign any very exact limits to the application of a somewhat loosely used word1 ,i may repeat my former statement that men use the word identity to mark certain kinds of sameness in which there is little or no consciousness of duality1 and they are not inclined to use it to mark samenesses in which things are recognized as similar but clearly distinct4 ,with this ,i end the first part of my discussion1 and ,i confess ,i draw a long breath in doing so4 ,when ,i sat down to write it was with the impression that ,i could say all that was necessary about the kinds of sameness in a much smaller number of pages2 but finding it impossible to avoid misunderstandings without being more explicit and detailed1 ,i have had to change my plan4 ,now1 that ,i am through1 ,i must confess to myself that most persons will find this hair-splitting anything but entertaining--which would be held by the inconsiderate to furnish a presumption against the truth it contains1 if ancient adages go for anything4 ,it should be remembered1 however1 that the old saw which puts truth in a well does not indicate that the well may not be a dry one4 ,with this consolatory reflection ,i turn to the second part of my task4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,historical ,,and ,,critical4 ,those now who propose to hold mutual discussion must needs understand one another somewhat3 for without this how can they have any mutual discussion8 ,each of their words then1 must be familiar and have definite meaning1 and not many meanings1 but one only1 and if it have more meanings than one1 they must make it clear in which of these senses it is used4 ,aristotle1 ,metaph41 ,book ,x1 c4 #e1 #c4 ,,section #ba4 ,when ,heraclitus of ,ephesus1 moved thereto by his view of the constant flux of things1 declared it impossible to enter the same river twice1#cj he evidently supposed that a river can be the same only in the first and strictest sense of the word4 ,he denied1 consequently1 a right to use the word1 as it constantly is used1 to indicate that certain phenomena belong to a group or series1 which1 in its totality1 is to us a single object4 ,when we say that we have entered the same river twice we have no reference to the actual experiences of the two occasions considered merely as experiences4 ,of course1 these are not the same1 as each is itself1 and they may even be somewhat dissimilar4 ,nor have we reference to the separate particles of which the body of water is composed4 ,we all admit that the water in a river changes1 and yet we never think of saying that the river is no longer the same4 ,the two kinds of sameness are quite distinct1 yet both are legitimate2 and both were as familiar to the ancient ,greek as to the modern ,american4 ,socrates was considered ,socrates from boyhood through youth to manhood4 ,the ,ilissus was the ,ilissus whether swollen or shrunken4 ,the philosopher's difficulty with the river did not arise out of the fact that this kind of sameness was not perfectly well recognized in language and in common thought4 ,it arose out of the fact that the beginnings of reflection make many things seem strange which before passed unnoticed1 and sometimes lead to assertion and denial evidently contrary to experience and common sense4 ,the unreflective man calls the river the same on two successive days1 but he has no clear notion of what the word implies4 ,in a loose way he opposes same to different4 ,heraclitus saw that the water in a river is constantly changing4 ,he who enters twice does not enter precisely the same body of water4 ,what more natural1 and what more fallacious1 than to assert that he does not twice enter the same river8 #cj ,aristotle1 ,metaph41 ,bk4 ,,iii1 c4 #e1 #g4 ,,sec4 #bb4 ,and well might ,cratylus hold his peace and move his finger#ca when he had capped the climax with the statement that the same river could not be entered once4 ,heraclitus had merely denied sameness of the third kind to be sameness1 since it implies duality4 ,cratylus1 surprised by a discovery of duality where he had not before suspected it1 will not allow the term where there is no duality whatever4 ,it is not surprising that he came at last to be of opinion that one ought to speak of nothing4 ,upon such a basis speech loses its significance4 #ca ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 ,,iii1 c4 #e1 #g4 ,,sec4 #bc4 ,the ,parmenidean argument for the eternity of ,being#cb rests partly upon a confusion of the first kind of sameness with the fourth4 ,being has had no origin1 for from what could it have been derived8 ,not from the non-existent1 for this has no existence3 and not from the existent1 for it is itself the existent4 ,the quibble about the non-existent we need not consider1 though it is seriously repeated by more than one writer of our time4 ,the last part of the argument1 not from the existent1 for it is itself the existent1 draws its whole force from the assumption that it is the existent as a thing is itself1 or in the first sense of the word same4 ,but if this be the case1 the argument is a mere farce1 an argument only in words4 ,the phrase1 derived from the existent1 means nothing at all unless it means that the existent in question is before the thing derived4 ,to say it is the thing derived1 is to reduce the words to nothing4 ,if it mean anything to speak of the existent as derived from the existent1 it is because each of these is an existent--that is1 a thing belonging to a class and distinguished from other members of this class by some difference4 ,in this case the difference is that of before and after4 ,an existent derived from an existent is the same with it only as things of a class are the same4 ,if we choose to eliminate all differences and speak of the existent we may do so2 but then it is inadmissible to raise questions about its derivation1 and bring in those very time distinctions between different existents which we are supposing absent4 #cb ,ueberweg4 ,hist4 of ,philos41 ,vol4 ,i1 #ai1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahgg1 p4 #eg4 ,,sec4 #bd4 ,the nihilistic doctrine of ,gorgias of ,leontini1#cc who taught that nothing exists1 that if it did exist it could not be known1 and that if it did exist and could be known the knowledge of it could not be communicated by one mind to another1 is founded in part upon such bad reasoning that it is rather surprising that ,gorgias should have been guilty of it4 ,that part of it1 however1 which has to do with the communicability of knowledge is rather better than the rest1 and indicates some progress in reflection4 ,a sign1 he says1 differs from the thing it signifies4 ,how can one communicate the notion of color by words1 since the ear hears sounds and not colors8 ,besides1 how can the same idea be in two different persons8 ,this reasoning would seem at least plausible1 ,i think1 to many minds at the present day4 ,it is evidently the offspring of a confusion of samenesses4 ,a sign differs1 it is true1 from the thing signified4 ,the word blue heard by the ear is not like the color blue seen or imagined4 ,but if any one pronounce the word1 and ask me if ,i am thinking of the color he has mentioned1 ,i say yes4 ,the sound is not like the color1 but it is its representative1 and one of the proper uses of the word same 7the fifth7 indicates just this relation between representative and thing represented4 ,any attempt to discredit communication of knowledge on the ground that one cannot speak colors1 and that1 therefore1 one man is speaking one thing and the other thinking another1 goes on the supposition that what is said and what is thought must be the same in sense first 7strict identity7 or in sense fourth 7must be a thing of the same kind74 ,and as to the existence of the same thing in two minds2 here ,gorgias has evidently discovered with some surprise that sameness in sense sixth differs from sameness in sense first1 and has felt impelled to deny it the name altogether4 ,he has perceived a duality where most men have not noticed it2 and1 instead of observing that there are samenesses and samenesses1 and that the communication of knowledge is concerned with the sixth kind in this connection1 and not with the first1 he has denied the communication of knowledge4 ,had he found it necessary to carry out his theoretic premises to practical conclusions he would have stopped talking1 which he did not2 though presumably the irrepressible didactic instinct would have led him1 spite of consistency1 to imitate ,cratylus in moving his finger4 #cc ,ueberweg4 ,hist4 of ,philos41 ,vol4 ,i1 #bi1 p4 #gg4 ,,sec4 #be4 ,the reasoning in the ,platonic ,dialogues is very frequently not above suspicion2 but it is not easy to find anywhere such a nest of paralogisms as we have in the ,parmenides4 ,how far ,plato was in earnest in all this quibbling1 and what was his aim1 ,i will not pretend to say4 ,he has1 however1 very well illustrated the possibilities of equivocation in juggling with samenesses1 and ,i shall quote a bit of the argument concerning the one and the many to show how readily this is done4 ,almost any part of the dialogue would do1 but ,i choose the first bout between ,parmenides and ,aristoteles4 ,i take ,professor ,jowett's version3#cd #cd ,the ,dialogues of ,plato4 ,n4 ,y41 #ahgh4 ,vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #bee4 ,parmenides proceeded3 ,if one is1 he said1 the one cannot be many8 ,impossible4 ,then the one cannot have parts1 and cannot be a whole8 ,how is that8 ,why1 the part would surely be the part of a whole8 ,yes4 ,and that of which no part is wanting1 would be a whole8 ,certainly4 ,then1 in either case1 one would be made up of parts2 both as being a whole1 and also as having parts8 ,certainly4 ,and in either case1 the one would be many1 and not one8 ,true4 ,but1 surely1 one ought to be not many1 but one8 ,surely4 ,then1 if one is to remain one1 it will not be a whole1 and will not have parts8 ,no4 ,and if one has no parts1 it will have neither beginning1 middle1 nor end2 for these would be parts of one8 ,right4 ,but then1 again1 a beginning and an end are the limits of everything8 ,certainly4 ,then the one1 neither having beginning nor end1 is unlimited8 ,yes1 unlimited4 ,and therefore formless1 as not being able to partake either of round or straight4 ,how is that8 ,why1 the round is that of which all the extreme points are equidistant from the centre8 ,yes4 ,and the straight is that of which the middle intercepts the extremes8 ,true4 ,then the one would have parts1 and would be many1 whether it partook of a straight or of a round form8 ,assuredly4 ,but having no parts1 one will be neither straight nor round8 ,right4 ,then1 being of such a nature1 one cannot be in any place1 for it cannot be either in another or in itself4 ,how is that8 ,because1 if one be in another1 it will be encircled in that other in which it is contained1 and will touch it in many places2 but that which is one and indivisible1 and does not partake of a circular nature1 cannot be touched by a circle in many places4 ,certainly not4 ,and one being in itself1 will also contain itself1 and cannot be other than one1 if in itself2 for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it4 ,impossible4 ,but then1 is not that which contains other than that which is contained8 for the same whole cannot at once be affected actively and passively2 and one will thus be no longer one1 but two8 ,true4 ,then one cannot be anywhere1 either in itself or in another8 ,no4 ,further consider1 whether that which is of such a nature can have either rest or motion4 ,why not8 ,why1 because motion is either motion in place or change in self2 these are the only kinds of motion4 ,yes4 ,and the one1 when changed in itself1 cannot possibly be any longer one4 ,it cannot4 ,and therefore cannot experience this sort of motion8 ,clearly not4 ,can the motion of one1 then1 be in place8 ,perhaps4 ,but if one moved in place1 must it not either move round and round in the same place1 or from one place to another8 ,certainly4 ,and that which moves round and round in the same place1 must go round upon a centre2 and that which goes round upon a centre must have other parts which move around the centre2 but that which has no centre and no parts cannot possibly be carried round upon a centre8 ,impossible4 ,but perhaps the motion of the one consists in going from one place to another8 ,perhaps so1 if it moves at all4 ,and have we not already shown that one can not be in anything8 ,yes4 ,and still greater is the impossibility of one coming into being in anything8 ,i do not see how that is4 ,why1 because anything which comes into being in anything1 cannot as yet be in that other thing while still coming into being1 nor remain entirely out of it1 if already coming into being in it4 ,certainly4 ,and therefore whatever comes into being in another must have parts1 and the one part may be in that other1 and the other part out of it2 but that which has no parts cannot possibly be at the same time a whole1 which is either within or without anything4 ,true4 ,and how can that which has neither parts1 nor a whole1 come into being anywhere either as a part or a whole8 ,is not that a still greater impossibility8 ,clearly4 ,then one does not change by a change of place1 whether by going somewhere and coming into being in something2 or again1 by going round in the same place2 or again1 by change in itself8 ,true4 ,the one1 then1 is incapable of any kind of motion8 ,incapable4 ,but neither can the one exist in anything1 as we affirm8 ,yes1 that is affirmed by us4 ,then it is never in the same8 ,why not8 ,because being in the same is being in something which is the same4 ,certainly4 ,but it cannot be in itself1 and cannot be in other8 ,true4 ,then one is never the same8#ce #ce ,the text of ,stallbaum 7#ahdh7 does not harmonize with this4 ,the version ,i quote leaves out 1 and reads in the nominative4 ,it would seem not4 ,and that which is never in the same has no rest1 and stands not still8 ,it cannot stand still4 ,one1 then1 as would seem1 is neither standing still nor in motion8 ,clearly not4 ,neither will one be the same with itself or other2 nor again1 other than itself1 or other4 ,how is that8 ,if other than itself it would be other than one1 and would not be one4 ,true4 ,and if the same with other1 it would be that other1 and not itself2 so that upon this supposition1 too1 it would not have the nature of one1 but would be other than one8 ,it would4 ,then it will not be the same with other1 or other than itself8 ,it will not4 ,neither will one be other than other1 while it remains one2 for not the one1 but only the other1 can be other of other1 and nothing else4 ,true4 ,then not by virtue of being one1 will one be other8 ,certainly not4 ,but if not by virtue of being one1 not by virtue of being itself2 and if not by virtue of being itself1 not itself1 and itself not being other at all1 will not be other of anything8 ,right4 ,neither will one be the same with itself4 ,why not8 ,because the nature of the one is surely not the nature of the same4 ,why is that8 ,because when a thing becomes the same with anything1 it does not necessarily become one4 ,why not8 ,that which becomes the same with the many necessarily becomes many and not one4 ,true4 ,and yet1 if there were no difference between the one and the same1 when a thing became the same1 it would always become one2 and when it became one1 the same4 ,certainly4 ,and1 therefore1 if one be the same with one1 it is not one with one1 and will therefore be one and also not one4 ,but that is surely impossible4 ,and therefore the one can neither be other of other1 nor the same with one4 ,impossible4 ,and thus one is neither the same1 nor other1 in relation to itself or other8 ,no4 ,neither will one be like or unlike itself or other4 ,why not8 ,because likeness is sameness of affections4 ,yes4 ,and sameness has been shown to be a nature distinct from oneness8 ,that has been shown4 ,but if one had any other affection than that of being one1 it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one2 and that is impossible4 ,true4 ,then one can never have the same affections either as another or as itself8 ,clearly not4 ,then it cannot be like other1 or like itself4 ,no4 ,nor can it be affected so as to be other1 for then it would be affected in such a way as to be more than one4 ,it would4 ,that which is affected in a manner other than itself or other1 will be unlike itself or other1 if sameness of affections is likeness4 ,true4 ,but the one1 as appears1 never having affections other than its own1 is never unlike itself or other8 ,never4 ,then the one is never either like or unlike itself or other8 ,plainly not4 ,in reading this extract one cannot but admire the courtesy or wonder at the simplicity of ,aristoteles4 ,he always answers just as he should to keep the ball rolling2 and he is in no wise compelled to do this under the circumstances1 for the argument is loose in the extreme4 ,briefly stated1 the reasoning is as follows3 ,one cannot be a whole1 and cannot have parts1 for then it would not be one1 but many4 ,but if it has no parts it has no beginning1 middle1 or end1 and is formless4 ,it is then in no place1 for it cannot be in itself1 since the container must be different from the thing contained2 nor can it be in other1 for it would have to be encircled by that other1 and touched in many parts1 which is impossible4 ,it follows that it can neither be at rest nor in motion4 ,not in motion2 for it cannot have change in itself1 or it would no longer be one2 nor can it have motion in place1 whether circular motion upon a centre or motion from place to place2 the former for the reason that circular motion implies a centre and parts around the centre2 and the latter because one is in no place3 and as to coming into being in anything1 which may be regarded as a kind of motion1 while doing this it would have to be part in and part not in1 which is impossible4 ,it cannot be at rest1 for one is never in the same2 to be in the same1 is to be in something which is the same1 and one cannot be in anything4 ,nor1 farther1 can one be the same with itself or other1 nor other than itself or other4 ,if other than itself it would not be one2 and if the same with other it would be that other1 and not itself4 ,on the other hand only other can be the other of other1 and not one2 and the one cannot be the same with itself1 for the nature of the one is not the nature of the same1 since that which becomes the same with the many does not become one4 ,finally1 one cannot be like or unlike itself or other1 for likeness is sameness of affections1 and sameness is not oneness2 one must1 however1 have no affection except oneness1 or it becomes more than one4 ,it cannot1 then1 have the same affections as itself or other4 ,as1 for the same reason1 it cannot have other affections than itself or other1 it cannot be unlike4 ,we have here one chief error1 which runs through almost the whole of the argument--is1 indeed1 the ,kern of the ,pudel--and several subsidiary errors of different kinds4 ,some of these last are very readily discovered1 as that about the coming into being in a thing4 ,with these1 however1 ,i am not concerned4 ,i merely remark en passant that they may all be cleared up with a little care and accuracy1 and ,i turn to the main error1 which consists in a constant confusion of two kinds of sameness4 ,the fact is that ,parmenides is always passing from the one1 or one in the abstract1 mere oneness1 to a one1 or one object4 ,these are no more identical in the strict sense than manhood and a man1 and in overlooking their difference he is simply confounding the first and the fourth kinds of sameness4 ,the one cannot have parts1 for the good reason that it is a quality taken by itself1 and not a thing1 which is thought as a bundle of qualities4 ,a one1 on the other hand1 may have parts1 and each of these parts may be a one too4 ,a one by no means consists of a single element1 oneness1 but of this element combined with others2 and each such group may be distinguished from each other such group1 and all be recognized as similar1 or the same in a true sense of the word4 ,the question whether one can be in a place1 too1 evidently has to do1 not with the one1 but a one1 for spacial or temporal differences are individualizing1 and distinguish a thing from another thing of the same kind4 ,to ask whether the one may or may not be in a place is inadmissible4 ,the same error is at the bottom of the argument about the one's being in motion or at rest4 ,the question has no significance except in reference to a one4 ,if we speak of the one as in motion1 we at once put this abstract element in such a relation to other elements that we have no longer the one but a one4 ,the one cannot have change in itself and remain the one1 but a one may change a good deal and still be a one4 ,and without admitting the justice of the argument1 that what has no parts cannot be in anything1 the proof of the impossibility of motion in space may be condemned merely upon the ground that it is only the one which cannot have parts1 while it is only a one which is concerned in the problem of motion4 ,the same may be said for the argument against the one's coming into being in anything4 ,it is only a one which can be thought as coming into being in a thing1 and a one may have parts4 ,as for the impossibility of the one's being at rest1 on the ground that to be at rest1 a thing must be in the same1 and one cannot be in anything--this is a repetition of the former error4 ,a one may be in something1 as has been pointed out1 even on the basis established at the outset1 and it is with this1 and not with the one1 that we are concerned in the problem of rest and motion4 ,the rest of the argument is based upon errors of a different kind1 and in it one may keep to the one throughout1 if one choose4 ,there is1 of course1 no reason to think that the speaker did this4 ,he probably here1 as before1 carried over to a one1 one thought as an individual thing1 distinctions drawn in view of the one1 one viewed in the abstract4 ,as some of the statements made may be true or false as one is taken in this sense or that2 and particularly as the antinomy rests upon a misconception as to the nature of sameness1 ,i will continue the analysis4 ,what is to be proved is1 first1 that one cannot be the same with itself or other1 or other than itself or other2 and second1 that it cannot be like or unlike itself or other4 ,the position that the one1 if other than itself1 would not be one1 and if the same with other1 would be that other1 is somewhat ambiguous4 ,if a one is in question1 it may undoubtedly be a one and yet be other than any particular one2 and it may be the same with other--another one--without ceasing to be one1 if by same we mean similar4 ,the play upon words in other of other it is not necessary to consider4 ,the conclusion that one cannot be the same with itself is based upon the supposition that sameness is a quality superadded to the other qualities of a thing2 but in its first sense the word does not even serve to indicate a relation2 it is merely used to point out the absence of duality4 ,both a one and the one may be the same with themselves perfectly well1 and in saying so we do not in thought endow them with any quality not already possessed4 ,this last error serves also as a basis to the second paradoxical position1 that one cannot be like or unlike itself or other4 ,it assumes likeness and unlikeness to be qualities added to the other qualities of things which are like or unlike4 ,a possible objection to my use of the term a one ,i must forestall before passing on4 ,i have used this as synonymous with one object4 ,one horse is one object1 and so is one part of a horse4 ,it may be said1 however1 that a one may also be used to signify a single occurrence of oneness1 as distinguished from another occurrence of oneness4 ,that any element of consciousness may be distinguished from any similar element merely by spatial or temporal differences ,i have argued in the first part of my monograph4 ,why may not then a one mean the oneness of this one horse1 or the oneness of this part of the horse8 ,and if it may1 can a one of this kind have parts any more than the one8 ,i answer1 it cannot2 for it is then only a particular occurrence of the quality 7if ,i may so use the word7 of oneness4 ,but1 then1 if we so understand the term1 the argument loses all significance4 ,we cannot call a one of this kind a container or a thing contained1 or talk of it as encircled by anything4 ,we do not even try to imagine it as moving on its centre1 or passing from place to place1 or coming into being in anything1 or being at rest in anything4 ,such language we use only in speaking of things4 ,it seems to me plain that the speaker is thinking of one as a thing1 and it is this that gives its charm to the bundle of paradoxes4 ,the ,eleatic one was always a thing and not mere unity or an occurrence of unity4 ,my criticism of the reasoning is1 ,i think1 just4 ,and whether ,plato is responsible for the ,parmenides or not1 we must agree that such a confusion of the one and a one 7as an object7 would not be foreign to his modes of thought4 ,his world of ,ideas is peopled with the's turned into a's1 a fact which his acute pupil ,aristotle was not slow to discover4#cf #cf ,metaph4 ,,xii1 c4 #d4 ,,sec4 #bf4 ,aristotle has again and again discussed with his usual keenness the kinds of sameness4 ,he saw well enough that the word is ambiguous1 and may with equal right be employed in speaking of experiences which do or do not contain an element of duality4 ,he has pointed out that the law of non-contradiction has to do with sameness of the first kind1 and not with the others4#cg ,his question as to ,socrates and ,socrates sitting1 his treatment of ,coriscus and the musical ,coriscus1 his statement that the white and the musical are the same when they are accidents in the same subject1#ch show that he clearly understood the significance of sameness in sense third4 ,he gives us sense fourth when he says that things may be called the same when they belong to the same species or genus4#ci ,in his polemic against the ,protagorean doctrine of relativity1#dj senses sixth and seventh come to the surface1 though they are not very clearly or exhaustively discussed4 ,the fallacy in the apparent possibility of attributing contradictory predicates to the same subject1 from the fact that the same wine may appear sweet to one taster and not sweet to another1 or at one time sweet and at another not sweet to the one palate1 is laid bare in the distinction between kinds of sameness4 ,aristotle distinguishes between the wine itself and the sensations it produces in different persons1 and he recognizes the fact that one man's perception of the same wine need not be wholly like that of another4 ,but this does not imply any violation of the law of non-contradiction1 for each sensation is just what it is at any instant2 and the statement that the same wine is sweet and not sweet at the one moment amounts only to saying that the one object can cause dissimilar sensations in two minds at one moment4 ,as much may be said for the non-simultaneous sensations of the one man4 ,sensations differing in time are two1 and may differ without violating any law4 ,in marking the fact that when we say two men perceive the same thing we do not mean that the immediate object of knowledge is in the two cases strictly one1 but merely that these two objects are related in a peculiar way1 ,aristotle draws the line between sameness in sense first and in sense sixth4 ,as to sense seventh4 ,he distinguishes between the apparent and the real1 and yet goes on speaking1 quite in modern fashion1 as though one thing could serve for both4 ,he points out1 propos of pressing upon the eyeball and doubling the visual image1 that there is a distinction between the apparent and the real1 and then closes the paragraph with the remark that to those persons who do not move their organ of vision that which is one appears one4#da ,this language would certainly seem to indicate that that which is appears--or that they are the same in some strict sense of the word4 ,the sentence reads much in the style of ,mr4 ,spencer or ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 #cg ,metaph4 ,,iii1 c4 #e1 #aj2 c4 #f1 #c4 #ch ,ibid4 ,,iii1 c4 #b1 #f2 ,,iv1 c4 #f1 #a1 and c4 #i1 #a4 #ci ,ibid4 ,,iv1 c4 #i1 #a1 and c4 #f4 #dj ,ibid4 ,,iii1 c4 #e1 #aj2 ,x1 c4 #f1 #f4 #da ,metaph4 ,x1 c4 #f1 #b4 ,it appears1 then1 that ,aristotle recognized a sameness in which there is no sense of duality1 and samenesses in which two things are called the same and yet distinguished as two4 ,our way of expressing strict identity1 however1 a way which1 as ,i have shown1 does not properly express it all--seems to have misled him into finding a sort of quasi duality even here1 where he knows it to be really absent4 ,in a chapter#db devoted to sameness and diversity1 he closes his list of samenesses with the remark3 ,it is plain that sameness is a oneness either of two or more things with reference to their essence1 or of one thing treated as two2 as when you say a thing is the same with itself1 for then you do treat it as two4 ,we do employ two words1 undoubtedly2 but if we are really thinking a thing as itself1 we are not making it dual in any sense whatever4 ,the quotation smacks just a little of ,cratylus4 #db ,ibid4 ,,iv1 c4 #i4 ,,sec4 #bg4 ,the sceptical arguments of ,pyrrho are excellent instances of a confusion of samenesses4 ,the argument1 for example1 that since an apple seen by the eye as yellow seems to the taste sweet1 and to the smell as fragrant1 that which is seen is just as likely to be something else as the reality2#dc this argument gains what little plausibility it may have from the assumption that an object seen and an object tasted are 7or ought to be7 the same in sense first instead of sense third4 #dc ,diogenes ,lartius4 ,,ix1 #i4 ,and the complaints1 that things believed to be large1 sometimes1 as when at a distance1 appear small2 that things which we believe to be straight1 sometimes seem bent2 that the sun has one appearance in the morning1 and another at noon2#dd these1 and all others like them1 assume that an object seen near at hand and then seen at a distance1 a stick seen as straight and then seen as crooked1 the sun on the horizon and the sun at the zenith1 are in each case one strictly1 and not merely one as each element in a complex of experiences is one with each other element1 when any one may represent the whole4 ,the conclusion that1 since it is not possible to view things without reference to place and position1 their true nature cannot be known1#de is founded upon this error4 #dd ,ibid4 loc4 cit4 #de ,ibid4 loc4 cit4 ,this becomes clear when one asks1 what is it1 after all1 the nature of which is so in doubt8 ,is it a stick8 the sun8 ,these words are ambiguous4 ,two consecutive experiences of the same stick--as we ordinarily use this word in speaking of sticks--are not strictly identical1 and need not be alike4 ,the stick seen on two occasions is not the same stick in sense ,i4 ,if ,i limit the meaning of the words the stick to one of these experiences1 then the true nature of the stick is just what is experienced on that occasion4 ,what is experienced on the second occasion is another stick1 and its true nature is also just what it seems to be4 ,if1 however1 by the stick ,i do not mean only the experience of one moment1 but a series of experiences differing more or less from one another1 then ,i am under no necessity to select one of them as the true nature of the stick1 for its true nature is nothing more nor less than the whole group of experiences4 ,if ,i try to discover or to invent some new experience which ,i may call the true nature of the group1 ,i am simply adding to it in thought another experience which takes its place among those the group already contains4 ,i am playing with the word nature4 ,this last experience could not be more important than those among which it is placed1 and it could not stand for any one of them in any other way than each of them could stand for it4 ,should it be objected that by the stick one does not mean either a single experience of the stick or the sum total of the group of experiences1 but a something distinct from all these and inferred through them1 ,i answer1 that in this case the argument from the variability of experiences is not to the point4 ,such a stick as this would be the same with either of those just discussed only in the seventh sense of the word1 and its nature would be the same with their nature only in that sense too4 ,an experience of the stick out of place and position1 if that were conceivable1 would not give us this stick1 for such an experience would still be an experience4 ,it must never be forgotten that this external stick is quite distinct from any or all experiences1 and could not be given in experiences of any kind4 ,it can only be inferred4 ,if an unvarying series of experiences is good ground for inferring an unvarying external stick1 similar to what is experienced1 one would suppose a varying series of experiences would furnish a basis for inference of a varying external stick1 in its successive phases like what is experienced4 ,unless some reason is given for a discrimination in favor of the unvarying series1 the argument from variation does not affect the external stick at all4 ,it is evident1 however1 that in this particular argument1 at least1 the external is not in ,pyrrho's mind at all4 ,what perplexes him is1 that what he is accustomed to call a straight stick sometimes looks crooked4 ,on reflection he discovers that he calls it straight only because it seems straight on some occasions2 and if it may at one time seem straight and at another seem crooked1 which is it in reality8 ,the question is a very natural one4 ,the unreflective do not ask it1 because they assume that one of the experiences is to be taken as expressing the true nature of the object and the other relegated to the sphere of more or less deceptive appearance4 ,the man who has begun to reflect does ask it1 because he sees that the assumed true nature is an appearance too1 and it naturally occurs to him that it also may be deceptive4 ,if he reflected more1 he would see that he is partly right and partly wrong4 ,we do not regard as equally important every element in the group of experiences which we call an object4 ,certain elements1 notably the tactual qualities and those visual experiences which give us the best opportunity of inferring the tactual qualities1 stand in the foreground when we speak of the object4 ,we name the object according to these4 ,in saying a straight stick we have prominently in mind certain tactual experiences1 and certain visual experiences which normally are connected with these and give us the right to infer them4 ,we call any appearance delusive which leads us to infer tactual experiences1 and visual experiences of a kind regarded as best representative of these tactual experiences1 when such cannot be actually experienced4 ,certain elements in the total group1 which is to us an experienced object1 may then properly be regarded as in a sense the true nature of the object1 they are the most important part1 and the part to which other elements are referred4 ,these elements may justly be regarded as delusive when they mislead us in our inferences as to the important elements4 ,so far the common man is right4 ,and as no element is delusive in itself1 but only in so far as it refers the mind to something else1 and to the wrong something else1 those elements which are ultimate and not used as signs of others1 cannot be delusive4 ,in raising this question with regard to them ,pyrrho is wrong4 ,these elements may1 to be sure1 be used as signs or indications of any other elements in the group1 and in their turn made stepping stones2 but this is not commonly done1 and language and common thought rarely mark logical possibilities4 ,the language in use fairly expresses the attitude of the average man towards the elements in his thought4 ,on the other hand1 the unreflective man speaks as if the less important1 or perhaps ,i had better say less prominent1 experiences were not a part of the object as he knows it4 ,he seems to regard the whole object as actually present1 when a single experience only is present4 ,in putting all experiences on the same plane1 so to speak1 the ,pyrrhonist makes a genuine advance4 ,wherein he errs is this3 ,he sees that a stick seen near at hand is as much an experience or appearance as a stick seen at a distance1 and that one of these phenomena does not differ in kind from the other2 he sees also that to assume that one is the real stick and the other is not1 seems to go upon the assumption that they differ in kind2 he is consequently unwilling to call any one of his experiences the real stick1 and yet he insists upon looking for a real stick1 which may be expressed in a single experience4 ,it never seems to occur to him that the real stick may be the name of the whole series of experiences in their appropriate relations4 ,he wishes a sameness in the strict sense1 with no element of duality4 ,the stick seen straight in the air1 and seen bent in the water1 is the same stick in sense third4 ,it takes both of these experiences to express the true nature of this stick4 ,no one experience could serve4 ,it is the battle between stick as a single experience1 and stick as a group of experiences1 that leads to all the confusion4 ,i have given as much space to ,pyrrho as ,i care to1 and ,i will not delay over him and his successors4 ,these furnish good material to one fond of analysis4 ,there is1 however1 a great deal of repetition among the sceptics4 ,they occupy themselves chiefly either in confounding the first kind of sameness with the third1 as in the preceding2 or in confounding the first kind with the sixth1 as in the argument for uncertainty drawn from the varying guise under which the same object appears to different persons4 ,the ambiguity of the word same1 as here used1 is apparent1 and it is in this ambiguity that they become entangled4 ,,sec4 #bh4 ,into the labyrinths of the scholastic philosophy ,i hesitate to enter1 and yet ,i could hardly be excused for passing on to the moderns without at least a reference to the great dispute over ,universals--a dispute which is1 at bottom1 a quarrel concerning samenesses4 ,i shall speak of it very briefly4 ,the object of the general term or class name is in question4 ,plato1 distinguishing between the universal and the individual1 between man and men1 thought it necessary1 according to ,aristotle1 who has not1 ,i think1 done him injustice1 to assume an object for the universal outside of and apart from all the individuals forming a class4 ,the ,idea is a real thing1 the real thing in which the individuals participate1 or of which they are copies2 but it is not itself to be found in any or all of them1 except1 so to speak1 in a figurative or metaphorical way4 ,aristotle1 finding no reason to assume a new individual1 for so he regarded the ,platonic ,idea1 placed the universal in the individuals composing the class4 ,certain of the schoolmen1 emphasizing the distinction between real things and mental representations1 maintained that only individuals have real existence1 and asserted either that universals exist merely as peculiar combinations of mental elements which serve to think the objects forming a class1 or that the universal is the word1 which may be applied indifferently to many individuals of one kind4 ,in these views we have the universalia ante rem1 the universalia in re1 and the universalia post rem2 or extreme ,realism1 moderate ,realism1 and ,nominalism in its two forms4 ,the examination into the respective merits of the positions which have been taken with regard to universals will be facilitated by distinguishing carefully between the different spheres of being2 that is1 between things immediately known and real things mediately known1 as also between things contained in one consciousness and those contained in another4 ,it is plainly important not to confound these classes with each other4 ,let us take1 first1 a number of resembling objects in a single consciousness4 ,i have already pointed out that when we say several such objects are the same we do not at all mean to deny that they are distinct objects4 ,we merely wish to indicate that each possesses certain elements which1 taken by themselves1 and after making abstraction from all other elements1 render impossible any distinction between different objects4 ,we distinguish two objects as two through some difference1 even if it be only local or temporal4 ,redness combined with x and redness combined with y are recognized as two occurrences of redness1 but this only on account of x and y4 ,redness perceived to-day and redness perceived yesterday are two occurrences of redness1 marked as such by the to-day and the yesterday4 ,redness considered simply contains nothing which will allow of such distinctions4 ,this does not imply at all that redness considered simply is an occurrence of redness--that since we have not two or more occurrence of the quality we have a single occurrence of it1 an individual4 ,we have not1 if we have really abstracted from all save the redness1 any occurrence or occurrences at all1 for these imply just the elements of difference which we are endeavoring to eliminate4 ,an occurrence of redness means redness with a difference which will mark it out from other redness1 from another occurrence4 ,if1 then1 one gives to twenty individuals a common name to indicate that they resemble each other1 or are in some sense the same1 he should keep clearly in mind just what this means4 ,it means that along with various differing elements each contains the element x4 ,he should remember that each individual is the same with each other individual only in this sense1 sense fourth4 ,when he proposes to separate the x from the other elements1 and consider it separately1 he should be most careful to see that he is really taking it separately1 and not allowing shreds of foreign matter to hang to it and give rise to difficulties and perplexities4 ,he should not overlook the fact that there is a fallacy in the very question1 ,whether the x in one individual is identical 7the same in sense first7 with the x in any other individual8 ,if these two x's are distinguishable as in two individuals1 one is not considering x merely1 but x with other elements4 ,the separation of the x element from the other elements in the objects is here not complete1 or one would be considering not an x or x's1 but x4 ,any one who sees this must see that he who asks such a question is retaining a duality1 and then trying to get out of it an identity with no element of duality4 ,he is milking the he-goat4 ,he is trying to reduce sameness in sense fourth to sameness in sense first4 ,twenty objects immediately known must not be confounded with twenty real things not immediately known1 and of which the objects are supposed to be representatives4 ,these two classes are the same with each other only in sense seventh4 ,i have discussed in detail in the first part of my monograph the samenesses of real things1 and it is not necessary to repeat what ,i have said4 ,it is enough to state that it was there made evident that when we speak of a number of similar real things as the same1 we use the word in sense fourth1 and have in mind just the elements which are present when we speak of several similar immediate objects of knowledge as the same4 ,we are merely carrying over to a set of imagined duplicates a distinction which we observe in objects recognized as within consciousness4 ,when1 therefore1 we give twenty real things a common name1 and form them into a class1 because they are alike1 we mean that along with various other real elements1 each of these objects contains the real element x4 ,the word same means to us just what it does when we speak of twenty similar immediate objects as the same4 ,we have changed only the objects2 we have not changed the sameness and all that depends upon it4 ,two such objects are the same in sense fourth1 and never in sense first4 ,if they could be the same in sense first1 they would not be two4 ,when a man undertakes to separate in thought the real x element from the other real elements in two or more such objects1 he should be careful1 as in the case of immediate objects1 to make a complete separation and not a partial one4 ,he should see here1 too1 that the question whether the x in one object and the x in another are strictly identical1 is a foolish one4 ,this x and that x are not strictly identical1 or they would not be this x and that x4 ,remove completely the this and the that and all other differing elements--leave1 that is1 only x1 and the possibility of any such question simply disappears4 ,if there still seem to anyone ground for a question in the premises1 it is evidence that he is not considering merely x4 ,he is trying to keep two things two1 and yet make them one4 ,twenty objects in one consciousness must not be confounded with twenty objects in another4 ,when we speak of two men as seeing the same thing1 we do not mean that the object in one mind is the same with the object in the other in sense first1 but in sense sixth4 ,this does not prevent them from being two4 ,a single object in one mind may be the same with itself in sense first4 ,a number of similar objects in one mind may be the same in sense fourth4 ,two objects or two classes of objects in different minds may be the same in sense sixth4 ,one may1 to be sure1 think of twenty objects in one mind1 and of the same 7sense sixth7 twenty objects in another mind as forty objects4 ,philosophical reflection naturally leads to this4 ,i am inducing a reader to do it when ,i tell him that an object in one mind and the same object in another are two objects4 ,but in doing this1 one must bear in mind the fact that the forty objects belong to two quite distinct classes1 and that common language would not reckon them as forty1 but as twenty4 ,in this there is1 of course1 a pitfall for the unwary4 ,now1 when ,plato looked for the object of the general name1 for the x contained in a class of similar objects1 what did he do8 ,he created a new object distinct from and apart from all the others4 ,he is very vague in his statements1 and he was probably quite as vague in his thought2 but ,i cannot see how anyone familiar with the ,phaedrus1 the ,republic1 the ,timaeus1 the ,symposium and the ,parmenides1 and familiar with ,plato's concrete way of thinking in images1 can avoid coming to the conclusion that the ,idea was to him predominantly an object1 an individual--a vague and inconsistent object1 if you please1 but still an object4 ,but an x is in no sense a universal4 ,it is the same with other x's only in sense fourth2 that is1 it is like them4 ,the x that they have in common must be x considered simply1 not x considered as here or there1 in this place or in that4 ,all such differences must be eliminated if one is to get not an individual1 but a universal4 ,if the ,idea may be considered as apart from objects1 it is an object in so far not essentially differing from the others4 ,again1 the ,platonic ,idea is an object1 but not to be put upon the same plane with other objects4 ,they suffer change1 while it is immutable2 they are perceivable by the senses1 and it is not4 ,the objects of sense and the ,idea are in different worlds2 and though we cannot accuse ,plato of drawing the distinctions of the modern hypothetical realist1 he has certainly given us a suggestive parallel to the ,lockian ideas and real things4 ,the trouble has arisen out of his difficulty in keeping an abstraction abstract2 he has turned it into a concrete1 and1 finding in the world of sense no place for this concrete1 this new individual1 he has given it a world of its own4 ,whatever this object in this world apart may be1 it is certainly not what is common to twenty individuals in the world of sensible things4 ,aristotle1 seeing this difficulty1 placed the idea in the objects forming the class4 ,it may be objected that putting x in a place individualizes it as much as putting it out of a place4 ,this is quite true if the in is taken locally--taken as it is when we speak of a man as being in one room rather than another4 ,the x in one object is not identically the x in another object4 ,we do not get the universal1 x in the abstract1 until we lose the distinctions in the one object1 and in the other object4 ,two x's cannot be the same in sense first1 from the mere fact that they are two2 an x in one place and an x in another place are always two4 ,if1 however1 by the statement that the universal is in the objects1 one mean merely that the universal is that element x1 which1 combined with certain elements1 forms a total which is known as this object1 and combined with certain others forms a total which is known as that1 but taken by itself contains no distinction of this and that2 if this is all that is meant by the in1 there is no objection to the use of the statement1 and it is strictly true4 ,the x element is a part of each of the objects1 but1 until some addition is made to it1 it is not the x in this object or the x in that object2 it is what they have in common4 ,the in common means just this4 ,the ,nominalistic doctrine that only individuals have real existence1 and that the universal1 whatever it may be1 is to be sought in the mind1 distinguishes between the spheres of being and denies to one what it allows to another4 ,of the extreme nominalistic position1 that the only true universal is the word1 which may be applied indifferently to several distinct objects1 ,i shall not here speak4 ,i have discussed this wholly untenable view elsewhere4#df ,but the more reasonable ,nominalism1 the conceptualistic1 is worthy of examination here4 ,in so far as it holds that the mind can form a concept1 which shall consist of the element or elements several objects have in common1 we have no quarrel with it4 ,here we find a true universal1 obtained by discarding differences which distinguish objects from one another4 ,we obtain by this that mental core common to several similar mental objects4 ,if1 however1 we distinguish between mental objects and real things corresponding to them1 we have evidently two distinct fields to consider4 ,when we say a number of objects in consciousness are alike1 we are simply pointing out the fact that they contain a universal element as well as individual differences4 ,can we say that a number of real objects are alike8 ,if so1 what do we mean in saying it8 ,if there is nothing to prevent us from calling them individuals1 there would seem to be nothing to prevent us from affirming that they are really alike4 ,does likeness ever mean anything except sameness in difference8 ,is not1 then1 the element in which several objects resemble each other a universal element1 whether the objects be mental or real8 ,what else does universal mean8 ,the excuse for speaking ceases when language ceases to be significant4 ,one does not in the least explain the similarity1 or sameness in the fourth sense1 of a number of real objects1 by assuming a universal in a quite different world--one which could not possibly exist in the world of the objects4 ,this solution of the problem is ,platonic4 ,the element which twenty real objects have in common must be a real element1 or it cannot be a constituent part of each object4 ,if it is not a constituent part of each object1 it is absurd to speak of the objects as having it in common4 ,if they have nothing in common1 it is absurd to say that they are alike4 ,twenty similar objects must have a universal element1 to whatever sphere of being they belong2 and this element must belong to the same sphere as the objects4 ,a mental universal is the same with a real universal only in sense seventh1 and it can furnish no explanation of the likeness of real things4 #df ,see my ,conception of the ,infinite1 ,ch4 ,,vi 7,j4 ,b4 ,lippincott ,co41 ,philadelphia74 ,it is but fair to state that my criticism of ,realism in this volume is directed against the ante rem ,realism4 ,i did not have the ,moderate ,realism in mind1 and what ,i said will not apply to it4 ,in the light of the foregoing analysis a goodly number of the scholastic arguments regarding universals are easily seen to contain errors4 ,the ,anselmic view of genera and species as universal substances1#dg for instance1 makes an abstraction a thing and distinguishes it from other things4 ,it fails to keep it abstract4 ,the doctrine attributed to ,william of ,champeaux1 by ,abelard1 that universals are essentially and wholly present in each of their individuals1 in which latter there is no diversity of essence1 but only variety through accidents1#dh is tenable or not according to the sense in which the words are taken4 ,the word wholly is an awkward one1 and would incline one to the view that ,william regarded the universal as a thing1 a concrete1 which may be in this place or that4 ,if this were his opinion1 and it is perhaps more reasonable to believe that it was1 the objection of ,abelard1 that this would necessitate the same thing's being in different places at the same time1 would hold good4 ,if the essence of humanity be wholly in ,socrates1 it must be where ,socrates is4 ,it cannot1 then1 be somewhere else in ,plato4 ,manifestly humanity1 so regarded1 is not a universal at all4 ,it is this humanity or that humanity1 i4 e41 this or that occurrence of humanity2 and two occurrences of a quality or group of qualities are two individuals4 ,the word in ,i have shown to be ambiguous4 ,any element1 regarded as1 in one sense1 in an individual1 retains the local flavor which makes universality impossible4 ,but if ,william meant nothing more by his statement than that the element common to the individuals is a constituent part of each1 and that there is in it no distinction which will allow us to put it part here and part there1 the polemic of ,abelard is not justifiable4 ,whatever he may have intended to say1 there can be no mistake as to the meaning of the following sentence from ,robert ,pulleyn3 ,the species is the whole substance of individuals1 and the whole species is the same in each individual3 therefore the species is one substance1 but its individuals many persons1 and these many persons are that one substance4#di ,the dialectician represented as saying this1 ought to have been a prey to profound melancholy2 his samenesses are clearly in deplorable confusion4 ,he makes his universal an individual1 and then imposes upon it duties which no individual can fulfil with credit4 ,it is to be one and yet not one3 distinct from something else1 and yet identical with it4 ,it is to be a universal and not a universal4 ,it is by no means to be envied4 ,the conceptualistic position of ,abelard1 that we may gain a subjective universal by abstraction1 but that only individuals exist in reality1 is open to the objections that ,i advanced in discussing ,nominalism4 ,the position is supported#ej by the argument that we may abstract the form from the substantial subject to which it is united1 and consider it separately1 while in nature there is no such abstraction1 the form and the subject forming a united whole4 ,to this one may answer1 as ,i have indicated above1 that1 whatever it may be united with1 the form in the several individuals is in some sense the same1 or the individuals would not be alike1 and the concept would be of no service in representing it4 ,what is meant by such sameness8 ,is it anything but sameness in sense fourth8 ,when several objects are the same in sense fourth1 is not the element common to them a universal8 ,why make this conceptualistic discrimination between things in mind and real things8 #dg ,haurau4 ,philos4 ,scholastique4 ,paris1 #ahgb4 ,i1 p4 #bha4 #dh ,historia ,calamitatum1 quoted by ,haurau4 ,i1 p4 #cbd4 #di ,species est tota substantia individuorum1 totaque species eademque in singulis reperitur individuis3 itaque species una est substantia1 ejus vero individua mult person1 et h mult person sunt illa una substantia4 7,sentent41 p4 ,i1 c4 ,,iii47--,quoted by ,haurau1 ,i1 p4 #cbh4 #ej ,haurau1 ,i1 #chj-cha4 ,the argument is taken from the ,de ,intellectibus4 ,finally1 in passing from scholasticism1 ,i would suggest that it is conducive to clearness in thinking to bear in mind that when ,albert1 or ,thomas1 or ,duns1 declares in favor of all three kinds of universal1 ante rem1 in re1 and post rem1 he is declaring for three things and not one4 ,he is not at all in the position of the old ,platonic ,realist2 but is rather1 if ,i may so express it1 a kind of triple ,aristotelian4 ,one may perfectly well hold to all three universals1 by putting one in the mind of ,god1 one in things1 and one in a human mind2 but an individual may be given this three-fold existence quite as well as a universal4 ,in the old ,realism the problem of the universal called into existence a new sphere of being4 ,here a new sphere of being1 assumed upon extraneous grounds1 furnishes one more universal4 ,the universals in the mind of ,god are not assumed as the object of the general name applied to twenty real objects4 ,the object of this name is the in re4 ,the ante rem universal cannot1 then1 be gotten as ,plato got it4 ,in this distinction between the different spheres of being we have an advance in reflection2 but as ,i have said1 on this new ground the individual may demand its rights4 ,the ante rem ,realism of the great scholastics of the thirteenth century should not be confounded with that of an earlier period4 ,it is not open to the same objections4 ,but on the other hand1 it has not the same excuse for existence4 ,it is a historical relic4 ,,sec4 #bi4 ,the first of the moderns to whom ,i shall refer is ,descartes4 ,there are certain passages in the ,meditations which will well illustrate the efforts made by this remarkable man in the direction of accurate analysis1 as also the errors into which he fell through a confusion of the kinds of sameness4 ,i shall quote from the second and third ,meditations3 ,let us now accordingly consider the things which are commonly thought the easiest of all to know1 and which are thought also to be the most distinctly known1 that is1 the bodies that we touch and see2 not indeed bodies in general1 for these general notions are usually a little more confused3 but let us consider a single one of them4 ,let us take1 for example1 this bit of wax2 it has just been taken from the hive2 it has not yet lost the sweetness of the honey it contained2 it still keeps something of the odor of the flowers from which it has been gathered2 its color1 its figure1 its size1 are apparent2 it is hard1 it is cold1 it is easily handled1 and if struck it gives a sound4 ,in a word1 everything that can make a body distinctly known is found in this one4 ,but notice1 while ,i speak1 it is placed near the fire2 what remained of savor and odor disappears1 its color changes1 its figure is lost1 its size increases1 it becomes liquid1 grows hot1 one can scarcely handle it1 and when struck it no longer gives a sound4 ,does the same wax remain after this change8 ,one must admit that it does2 no one doubts it2 no one judges otherwise4 ,what then was it that was known with so much distinctness in this bit of wax8 ,certainly nothing that ,i perceived by means of the senses1 for all the things which fall under taste1 smell1 sight1 touch and hearing1 are changed1 and yet the same wax remains4 ,perhaps it was what ,i think now1 namely1 that this wax was neither the sweetness of honey1 the agreeable odor of flowers1 the whiteness1 the figure1 nor the sound1 but only a body which a little before appeared to my senses under these forms1 and which now appears to them under others4 ,but to speak precisely1 what do ,i imagine when ,i think it in this way8 ,let us consider it attentively1 and abstracting all that does not belong to the wax1 let us see what remains4 ,surely nothing remains but something extended1 flexible and mutable4 ,but what is that1 flexible and mutable8 ,is it not that ,i imagine that this bit of wax1 being round1 is capable of becoming square and of changing from square to triangular8 ,no1 it is certainly not that1 for ,i think it capable of an infinite number of similar changes2 but ,i could not run through this infinite number by my imagination1 and consequently this conception that ,i have of the wax is not due to the faculty of imagination4 ,but what now is this extension8 ,is it not also unknown8 ,for it becomes greater when the wax melts1 greater when it boils1 and still greater when the heat increases1 and ,i could not conceive clearly and truly what wax is1 if ,i did not think that even this bit that we are considering is capable of receiving more varieties of extension than ,i have ever imagined4 ,it must then be admitted that ,i could not comprehend by imagination even what this bit of wax is1 and that only my understanding can comprehend it4 ,i say this particular bit of wax2 for as for wax in general1 it is still more evident4 ,but what is this bit of wax that cannot be comprehended save by the understanding or the mind8 ,it is certainly the same that ,i see1 that ,i touch1 that ,i imagine2 it is1 in a word1 the same that ,i have always thought it from the beginning4 ,but1 what is important to note here is1 that my perception is not a sensation of sight1 nor of touch1 nor an act of the imagination1 and it has never been this1 although it may have seemed so before2 but it is merely an intuition 7inspection7 of the mind1 which may be imperfect and confused as it was before1 or clear and distinct as it is at present1 according as my attention is directed more or less to the elements in it1 and of which it is composed4 ,however1 ,i cannot be too much surprised when ,i consider the weakness of my mind and its proneness to be carried insensibly into error4 ,for even when ,i consider all this in my own mind1 and without using language1 the words arrest me1 and ,i am almost deceived by the terms in common use2 for we say that we see the same wax if it be present1 and not that we judge that it is the same1 from its having the same color and figure2 whence ,i might be tempted to conclude that one knows the wax by the sight of the eyes1 and not merely by the intuition of the mind1 were it not that1 in looking from a window at men passing in the street1 ,i say that ,i see men1 just as ,i say that ,i see the wax2 and yet what do ,i see from this window except hats and cloaks which might cover machines moved by springs8 ,but ,i judge that they are men1 and thus comprehend only by the power of judging1 which is in my mind1 what ,i thought ,i saw with my eyes4#ea #ea ,mditation ,deuxime4--,ed4 ,simon1 ,paris1 #ahfj1 pp4 #gf-gh4 ,in this extract the author attempts to distinguish between what is thought and what is perceived by the senses or imagined4 ,had he remained within the sphere of the immediately known1 one could not have objected to such a distinction4 ,sameness in sense third is something highly complex1 implying that elaboration of mental elements which we call thought4 ,it is quite just to distinguish the notion a bit of wax from any single sense experience or picture of the imagination4 ,in doing this ,descartes was searching for sameness in sense third4 ,but when he leaves the sphere of consciousness1 and assumes that what remains the same in the bit of wax is something distinct from the sum total of experiences1 as men are distinct from their garments1 he falls into error4 ,it is against this that the criticism in the text is directed4 ,what ,descartes is feeling for in this is sameness in sense third4 ,when we use the words a bit of wax1 we do not have in mind a single experience4 ,the wax in a solid and the wax in a liquid state is to us the same wax4 ,i have pointed out what the word same1 so used1 means4 ,it means that these two experiences are recognized as belonging to the one group or series of experiences2 and the wax1 completely known1 is the sum total of the series4 ,descartes saw very well that the two experiences under discussion are not strictly identical 7the same in sense first71 and he saw also that they are very unlike4 ,he naturally asked1 ,in what then are they the same8 or1 what is there that is here the same8 ,and1 instead of accepting the fact that such a sameness as this cannot be reduced to one of the others1 he solved the problem by passing from the experiences1 the hats and cloaks1 to a real thing underlying4 ,in other words1 to explain the sameness of two experiences of a bit of wax1 sameness in sense third1 he assumed real wax1 which is the same with the experiences which represent it only in sense seventh4 ,this real wax1 or something in it1 he supposes to remain the same on two occasions4 ,it is this to which he makes the mind refer when it calls the wax the same4 ,but when a man advances statements about a bit of wax1 his information rests ultimately upon his experiences1 if it be grounded at all4 ,from the experience one infers the real thing1 and not vice versa4 ,no one knew this better than ,descartes1 with his fundamental principle of the certainty of consciousness and the uncertainty of what is external4 ,he got his real world by a process of reasoning1 and put it in a realm wholly cut off from direct observation4 ,this being the case1 one cannot but wonder at his inconsistency in the present instance4 ,is one to remain in doubt whether a piece of wax felt to be hard1 and then melted before the fire1 is the same1 until one has had some means of discovering that the same real wax is present on the two occasions8 ,how is one to find out whether real wax is ever present unless he infer its presence from some experience8 ,and how is one to know that the same real wax is present on two occasions unless he infer it from the fact that what is directly perceived on the two occasions is the same in some sense of the word8 ,whatever sameness there is rests ultimately for its evidence upon the experiences4 ,there is nothing else to judge from4 ,the reasoning1 which would base the sameness of what is experienced upon the sameness of a corresponding real thing1 when the sameness of this latter is to be inferred from the former1 reminds one of the stupid argument1 still occasionally met with1 which would infer a ,god from data of consciousness1 and then found a belief in the veracity of consciousness upon the goodness of ,god4 ,one may believe1 if one please1 that1 when we have two distinct experiences so connected that we call them two perceptions of the same wax1 there is in some way connected with them a bit of real wax which remains in some sense the same4 ,but one should never suppose that any given experienced wax is proved the same by reference to this4 ,it is judged the same upon observation4 ,descartes then was inconsistent with his own principles when he made this jump to a new sphere of being4 ,the sameness of the experienced object is ultimate2 the only pertinent question is1 what does it mean8 ,it means1 as ,i have said1 that the wax hard and the wax soft are the same in sense third4 ,but sameness in sense third admits of wide dissimilarities in the experiences it unites into the notion of the one object4 ,descartes looked for a sameness without these dissimilarities4 ,he would reduce sense third to sense first1 or1 perhaps1 to sense second4 ,to do this he must go behind the experiences to a real thing1 which is to remain the same as a proxy for what is evidently variable4 ,this makeshift is only satisfactory to one who overlooks1 or allows to fall into the background1 the plain fact that representative and thing represented are two separate things and not to be confused2 that is1 who confuses sameness in sense first with sameness in sense seventh4 ,descartes distinguished carefully between ideas and external things1 but he sometimes overlooked the distinction4 ,but what is this bit of wax that cannot be comprehended save by the understanding or the mind8 ,it is certainly the same that ,i see1 that ,i touch1 that ,i imagine2 it is1 in a word1 the same that ,i have always thought it from the beginning4 ,how ambiguous6 is it the same in sense first or sense seventh8 ,the sentence following would indicate sense seventh1 but the spirit of the whole discussion would argue for sense first4 ,one must delude oneself into believing that one can get at real wax directly1 in some way or other1 or one cannot think of making it an ultimate ground of reasoning4 ,descartes1 like so many others1 would seem to have vibrated between a clear consciousness that ideas and real things are distinct1 belonging to different worlds1 and a confused belief that they belong to the one world1 and that real things are open to direct observation4 ,i shall take still another extract from this author4 ,it contains similar errors4 ,now1 among these ideas1 some appear to me to be inborn1 others to be foreign and to come from without1 and still others to be made and invented by myself4 ,for1 as to the faculty of conceiving that which1 in general1 one calls a thing1 or a truth1 or a thought1 it appears to me that ,i do not get that from any other source than my own nature2 but if now ,i hear a sound1 if ,i see the sun1 if ,i feel the heat1 up to the present ,i have judged that these sensations proceed from things which exist without me2 and lastly1 it seems to me that syrens1 hippogriffs1 and all similar chimeras are fictions and inventions of my mind4 ,but perhaps ,i can persuade myself1 that all these ideas belong to the class of those that ,i call foreign1 and that come to me from without1 or that they are all innate1 or else that they are all created by myself2 for ,i have not yet clearly discovered their true source4 ,and my chief duty here is to consider1 touching those which seem to come from objects without me1 what reasons ,i have for thinking them like their objects4 ,the first of the reasons is that ,i seem to be taught to do so by nature2 and the second1 that ,i perceive that these ideas are not dependent upon my will2 for often they present themselves to me in spite of me1 as now1 whether ,i wish it or not1 ,i feel heat1 and consequently am persuaded that this sensation or idea of heat is produced in me by something different from me1 to wit3 by the heat of the fire by which ,i am sitting4 ,and ,i cannot see that anything is more reasonable than to judge that this external object emits and impresses upon me its resemblance rather than anything else4 ,now ,i must see if these reasons are sufficiently strong and convincing4 ,when ,i say that ,i seem to be taught so by nature1 ,i mean merely by this word nature a certain inclination which leads me to believe it1 and not a natural light which gives me certain knowledge that it is true4 ,but these two ways of speaking are very different1 for ,i cannot doubt anything that the natural light shows me to be true1 as it has just shown me that from the fact of my doubting ,i may infer my existence2 inasmuch as ,i have not in me any other faculty or power of distinguishing the true from the false to teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not true1 and in which ,i may have as much confidence as in it4 ,but as concerns inclinations which also seem to me natural1 ,i have often remarked1 when it has been a question of choice between virtues and vices1 that they do not less incline to evil than to good2 it follows that ,i have no more reason to follow them when the true and the false are in question4 ,and as for the other reason1 which is that these ideas must come from without1 since they are not dependent on my will1 ,i do not find it more convincing4 ,for while these inclinations of which ,i have just spoken are in me1 notwithstanding that they are not always in harmony with my will1 perhaps there is in me some faculty or power capable of producing these ideas without the aid of external things1 although it is yet unknown to me2 as indeed it has always seemed to me up to this time that when ,i sleep they are thus formed in me without the aid of the objects they represent4 ,finally1 even should ,i admit that they are caused by these objects1 it does not necessarily follow that they must be like them4 ,on the contrary1 ,i have often remarked in many instances1 that there is a great difference between an object and its idea3 as1 for example1 ,i find in me two very different ideas of the sun2 the one has its source in the senses1 and should be placed in the class of those which ,i have said above come from without1 and from this it seems to me very small2 the other has it origin in astronomical reasonings1 that is to say1 in certain notions which are inborn1 or else formed in some way or other by myself1 and from this it seems to me many times greater than the whole earth4 ,surely1 these two ideas which ,i have of the sun cannot both be like the same sun2 and reason convinces me that the one which is derived directly from its appearance is the one which is most unlike it4 ,all of which proves to me that1 up to this hour1 it has not been by a sure and premeditated judgment1 but merely by a blind and rash impulse1 that ,i have been led to believe that there are things without me1 and different from my being1 which1 by the organs of my senses1 or by whatever other means1 convey to me their ideas or images1 and impress upon me their resemblances4#eb #eb ,mditation ,troisime1 pp4 #hc-he4 ,from the earlier portions of this extract one may see how clearly ,descartes distinguished between the idea1 or the thing immediately known1 and the external thing which he assumed as corresponding to the idea2 from the latter part one may see how he sometimes confounded them4 ,he finds that he may doubt whether ideas have any external correlatives2 and1 granting that they have1 whether the two resemble each other at all4 ,all this would imply that external things are completely cut off from observation4 ,and yet he states with navet that he has often remarked in many instances that there is a great difference between an object and its idea4 ,now1 if this can really be remarked in many instances1 the doubt as to the existence of objects would seem to be groundless4 ,how can it be remarked8 ,on this point ,descartes is silent4 ,he has evidently fallen back upon the popular notion that under favorable circumstances one can get a look at a real thing1 just as it is4 ,the reason which convinces him that the astronomer's notion of the sun is the true notion is nothing but this4 ,it could certainly not be deduced from his only argument for the existence of external things--the veracity of ,god4 ,how does he know1 that in giving us several different ideas of the sun1 ,god has chosen to have this one only resemble it8 ,it is a pure assumption4 ,reason is of service when one has something to go upon2 but in the absence of premises it will not carry one far4 ,this assumption is an illustration of what ,i had occasion to remark upon in criticizing ,pyrrho2 of the fact that1 from the series of possible perceptions which we group together as one object1 we are apt to select one1 to us for some reason the most satisfactory one1 and to regard it as more truly representing the object than the others4 ,descartes has followed this impulse1 and made this perception the best representative of the real object4 ,had he always distinguished sameness in sense first from sameness in sense seventh1 he would have seen how purely gratuitous is his assumption4 ,the statement1 too1 that two different ideas of the sun cannot both resemble the same sun1 shows how little he comprehended what it meant by the word same when used in the third sense4 ,if by the sun we mean a whole series of possible perceptions1 perhaps quite unlike each other1 but all united and related in certain ways1 there is nothing to prevent very dissimilar things from being like the same sun4 ,each of them need only resemble a single link in the series4 ,by the words the same sun ,descartes meant the same in sense first1 but this sins against the proper meaning of the term4 ,the difficulty is self-created4 ,descartes' sun reminds me of ,berkeley's moon4 ,this latter writer clearly perceived that there may be multiplicity and diversity where one attributes sameness in sense third4 ,note the following3 ,but for a fuller explication of this point1 and to show that the immediate objects of sight are not so much as the ideas or resemblances of things placed at a distance1 it is requisite that we look nearer into the matter1 and carefully observe what is meant in common discourse when one says that which he sees is at a distance from him4 ,suppose1 for example1 that looking at the moon ,i should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth distant from me4 ,let us see what moon this is spoken of4 ,it is plain it cannot be the visible moon1 or anything like the visible moon1 or that ,i see--which is only a round1 luminous plain1 of about thirty visible points in diameter4 ,for1 in case ,i am carried from the place where ,i stand directly toward the moon1 it is manifest the object varies still as ,i go on2 and1 by the time that ,i am advanced fifty or sixty semidiameters of the earth1 ,i shall be so far from being near a small1 round1 luminous flat that ,i shall perceive nothing like it--this object having long since disappeared1 and1 if ,i would recover it1 it must be by going back to the earth from whence ,i set out4#ec #ec ,essay towards a ,new ,theory of ,vision4 ,sec4 #dd4 ,works3 ed4 ,fraser4 ,oxford #ahga4 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #ec4 ,so much for dissimilar experiences of the same object4 ,and ,berkeley is not impelled to assume an external something to explain how the object can be the same under the circumstances4 ,the case1 he finds1 stands thus3 ,having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable by touch--as distance1 tangible figure1 and solidity--to have been connected with certain ideas of sight1 ,i do1 upon perceiving these ideas of sight1 forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are1 by the wonted ordinary course of nature1 like to follow4 ,looking at an object1 ,i perceive a certain visible figure and color1 with some degree of faintness and other circumstances1 which1 from what ,i have formerly observed1 determine me to think that if ,i advance forward so many paces1 miles1 etc41 ,i shall be affected with such and such ideas of touch4#ed #ed ,ibid41 #de4 ,and need one ask a clearer illustration of sameness in sense third than the case of the coach1 which occurs in the following section3 ,sitting in my study ,i hear a coach drive along the street2 ,i look through the casement and see it2 ,i walk out and enter into it4 ,thus1 common speech would incline one to think ,i heard1 saw1 and touched the same thing1 to wit1 the coach4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 certain the ideas intromitted by each sense are widely different and distinct from each other2 but1 having been observed constantly to go together1 they are spoken of as one and the same thing4 ,,sec4 #cj4 ,it would be easy to select from ,spinoza1 that master of reasonings apparently very exact but really very loose1 many good instances of confused samenesses4 ,i shall confine myself to a single one1 his argument to prove that every substance is necessarily infinite4 ,it is the eighth proposition in ,part ,i of the ,ethics4 ,there cannot be more than one substance with the same attribute1 and this exists of its own nature4 ,it belongs1 then1 to its nature to exist either as finite or as infinite4 ,but it cannot be finite1 for then it would have to be limited by another of the same kind1 which would also necessarily exist2 there would then be two substances with the same attribute1 which is absurd4 ,it is1 therefore1 infinite4#ee #ee ,substantia unius attributi non nisi unica existit1 et ad ipsius naturam pertinet existere4 ,erit ergo de ipsius natura vel finita vel infinita existere4 ,at non finita4 ,nam deberet terminari ab alia eiusdem natur1 qu etiam necessario deberet existere2 adeoque darentur du substanti eiusdem attributi1 quod est absurdum4 ,existit ergo infinita2 q4 e4 d4--,ethices1 ,pars prima2 ,,viii4 ,omnis substantia est necessario infinita4 ,leipzig1 #ahge1 p4 #hd4 ,among its defects this argument includes a confusion of sameness in sense fourth with sameness in sense first4 ,attribute ,spinoza has defined as that which is conceived as the essence of substance4 ,mode is a modification of substance4 ,two substances1 he has argued1 cannot be distinguished from each other by their modifications1 for substance is prior to its modifications1 and we may set these aside and consider it as it is in itself4 ,substances cannot then1 be distinguished except by their attributes2 and if the attribute be the same1 how can we say that there are two substances8 ,there cannot1 consequently1 be two substances with the same attribute4 ,but1 the argument continues1 since there cannot be two substances with the same attribute1 every substance must be infinite2 for1 to be finite1 a thing must be limited by something3 and nothing can be limited except by a thing of the same kind 7for example1 a material thing cannot be limited by a thought74 ,but if a thing be limited by another thing of the same kind1 the thing limited and the thing limiting have the same attribute4 ,it follows that they are not two things1 but one4 ,the thing in question is not limited but infinite4 ,in criticizing this1 ,i may call attention1 in passing1 to the highly disputable and gratuitously assumed premise1 that1 to be finite1 a thing must be limited by something4 ,if this be denied1 the ground of the reasoning is removed2 while1 if it be granted1 no argument is needed to prove that something is infinite1 for one has only said in other words that all limits must be limits within something4 ,the question is begged at once4 ,with this1 however1 ,i am not concerned4 ,what interests me is this3 ,the argument assumes a limited thing and a something beyond it1 and then asserts that they are one4 ,but two things of the same kind in different places1 or marked as different by distinctions of any sort1 are readily distinguished as two4 ,to come to the concrete1 extension conceived as on this side of a point and extension conceived as beyond the point are not extension simply1 but this extension and that extension4 ,they are the same only in sense fourth1 not in sense first4 ,we have here not merely the attribute extension1 but the further elements this and that4 ,the conclusion1 then1 that what we started out with is infinite1 is wholly unwarranted4 ,it is not this that is infinite1 but this with something else which is to some degree like it1 although not wholly so4 ,that is to say1 the thing assumed as finite can only be proved to be infinite by confounding two samenesses4 ,the thing proved to be infinite is a new object including it and what it is assumed to presuppose4 ,if it be not permissible to make this distinction between the object assumed as finite1 for the sake of the argument1 and the object which is proved to be infinite1 it is also not permissible to assert that an object to be finite would have to be limited by another of the same kind4 ,if the two are one1 these words are meaningless4 ,if they are not one1 one cannot conclude from the argument that every substance is necessarily infinite1 but only that something is necessarily infinite1 a conclusion already given in the single premise that what is limited must be limited by something of the same kind4 ,as a matter of fact1 ,spinoza retains in his argument not only the attribute1 but the mode1 the this and the beyond this2 and then he overlooks the mode and considers merely the attribute1 which gives him strict identity4 ,this procedure we have met before in the dispute concerning universals4 ,,sec4 #ca4 ,in the former part of my monograph ,i have mentioned ,locke's confusion of sameness in sense seventh with sameness in sense first4 ,i shall now quote a few sections from the ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding to show how significant his error is1 and to what an extent it is responsible for his position regarding ideas1 things1 and substance4 ,my extracts are from the eleventh chapter of the fourth book1 entitled ,of our ,knowledge of the ,existence of ,other ,things4 ,locke argues as follows3#ef #ef ,locke's ,essays1 ,philadelphia1 #ahdf1 p4 #dae1 et seq4 ,the knowledge of our own being we have by intuition4 ,the existence of a ,god reason clearly makes known to us1 as has been shown4 ,the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation3 for there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory1 nor of any other existence but that of ,god1 with the existence of any particular man2 no particular man can know the existence of any other being1 but only when by actual operating upon him it makes itself perceived by him4 ,for the having the idea of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that thing1 than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world1 or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history4 ,it is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without1 that gives us notice of the existence of other things1 and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us1 which causes that idea in us1 though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it3 for it takes not from the certainty of our senses1 and the ideas we receive by them1 that we know not the manner wherein they are produced1 v4 g41 whilst ,i write this ,i have1 by the paper affecting my eyes1 that idea produced in my mind which1 whatever object causes1 ,i call white2 by which ,i know that that quality or accident 7i4 e41 whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea7 doth really exist1 and hath a being without me4 ,and of this1 the greatest assurance ,i can possibly have1 and to which my faculties can attain1 is the testimony of my eyes1 which are the proper and sole judges of this thing1 whose testimony ,i have reason to rely on as so certain1 that ,i can no more doubt1 whilst ,i write this1 that ,i see white and black1 and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me1 than that ,i write or move my hand3 which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of1 concerning the existence of anything but a man's self alone1 and of ,god4 ,the notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us1 though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge1 or the deductions of our reason1 employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds2 yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge4 ,if we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right1 concerning the existence of those objects that affect them1 it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence3 for ,i think nobody can1 in earnest1 be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels4 ,at least1 he that can doubt so far 7whatever he may have with his own thoughts7 will never have any controversy with me2 since he can never be sure ,i say anything contrary to his own opinion4 ,as to myself1 ,i think ,god has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me2 since by their different application ,i can produce in myself both pleasure and pain1 which is one great concernment of my present state4 ,this is certain1 the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of1 concerning the existence of material beings4 ,for we cannot act anything but by our faculties2 nor talk of knowledge itself1 but by the helps of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is4 ,but besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves1 that they do not err in the information they give us1 of the existence of things without us1 when they are affected by them1 we are farther confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons4 ,first1 it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses3 because those that want the organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds4 ,this is too evident to be doubted3 and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense1 and no other way4 ,the organs themselves1 it is plain1 do not produce them2 for then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colors1 and his nose smell roses in the winter3 but we see nobody gets the relish of a pine apple till he goes to the ,indies1 where it is1 and tastes it4 ,secondly1 because sometimes ,i find that ,i cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind4 ,for though when my eyes are shut1 or windows fast1 ,i can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light1 or the sun1 which former sensations had lodged in my memory2 so ,i can at pleasure lay by that idea1 and take into my view that of the smell of a rose1 or taste of sugar4 ,but if ,i turn my eyes at noon towards the sun1 ,i cannot avoid the ideas which the light1 or sun1 then produces in me4 ,so that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory 7over which1 if they were there only1 ,i should have constantly the same power to dispose of them1 and lay them by at pleasure71 and those which force themselves upon me1 and ,i cannot avoid having4 ,and therefore it must needs be some exterior cause1 and the brisk acting of some objects without me1 whose efficacy ,i cannot resist1 that produces those ideas in my mind1 whether ,i will or no4 ,besides1 there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun1 as he hath the idea of it in his memory1 and actually looking upon it2 of which two his perception is so distinct1 that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another4 ,and therefore1 he hath certain knowledge1 that they are not both memory1 or the actions of his mind1 and fancies only within him2 but that actual seeing hath a cause without4 ,thirdly1 add to this1 that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain1 which afterward we remember without the least offense4 ,thus the pain of heat or cold1 when the idea of it is revived in our minds1 gives us no disturbance2 which1 when felt1 was very troublesome1 and is again when actually repeated2 which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies when applied to it4 ,and we remember the pains of hunger1 thirst1 or the headache1 without any pain at all2 which would either never disturb us1 or else constantly do it1 as often as we thought of it1 were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds1 and appearances entertaining our fancies1 without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad4 ,the same may be said of pleasure accompanying several actual sensations1 and though mathematical demonstrations depend not upon sense1 yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight1 and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself4 ,for it would be very strange that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth1 that two angles of a figure1 which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram1 should be bigger one than the other2 and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles1 which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by4 ,fourthly1 our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report1 concerning the existence of sensible things without us4 ,he that sees a fire may1 if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy1 feel it too2 and be convinced by putting his hand in it3 which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom1 unless that the pain1 be a fancy too1 which yet he cannot1 when the burn is well1 by raising the idea of it1 bring upon himself again4 ,thus ,i see1 whilst ,i write this1 ,i can change the appearance of the paper3 and by designing the letters tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment1 by barely drawing my pen over it3 which will neither appear 7let me fancy as much as ,i will71 if my hands stand still2 or though ,i move my pen1 if my eyes be shut3 nor1 when those characters are once made on the paper1 can ,i choose afterward but see them as they are3 that is1 have the ideas of such letters as ,i have made4 ,whence it is manifest1 that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination1 when ,i find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thought1 do not obey them2 nor yet cease to be1 whenever ,i shall fancy it2 but continue to affect the senses constantly and regularly1 according to the figures ,i made them4 ,to which if we will add1 that the sight of those shall1 from another man1 draw such sounds as ,i beforehand design they shall stand for2 there will be little reason left to doubt that those words ,i write do really exist without me1 when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears1 which could not be the effect of my imagination1 nor could my memory retain them in that order4 ,this is quite a long citation1 but ,i have given it at length because it may stand as the type of by far the greater part of the objections urged against ,idealism1 and because a better instance of the confusion of two samenesses could scarcely be desired4 ,notice how constantly it is assumed that the thing given in perception is the real thing1 a thing which is1 nevertheless1 characterized as distinct from1 and the cause of1 the idea4 ,at the outset ,locke distinguishes well enough between the idea and the external thing4 ,the having the idea of any thing in the mind1 he declares1 no more proves the existence of that thing than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world4 ,it is only the receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of things as causes of the ideas4 ,it would seem quite fair here to ask how we know that some ideas come from without8 ,of course1 if the realm of the without were open to inspection1 the question could be answered at once4 ,but it is not open to inspection--certainly not to a consistent ,lockian4 ,how1 then1 may ,i distinguish ideas coming from without from other ideas8 ,no ideas are perceived until they are what ,locke would call within4 ,the appeal to the testimony of the eyes needs examination4 ,to what eyes does one appeal8 ,the immediately known or idea-eyes1 or the external organs whose existence is the matter of dispute8 ,surely not to the last1 for it is only as a result of the argument that we may assume these at all4 ,and what hand is it so certain that ,i move in writing8 ,the complex of ideas immediately known1 or the something beyond1 whose existence is to be established8 ,if it be the latter1 all discussion is unnecessary4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the eyes and the hand concerned are ideas1 it is not clear how the appeal to them can be of any service4 ,does a sense give anything but sensations8 ,and if the very sense organ as immediately known be a group of sensations1 how can the testimony of a sense land one in a world beyond that of sensations8 ,and the argument that ,god has given me assurance of the existence of things without me1 since by applying them to myself ,i can produce in myself pain and pleasure1 presupposes that ,i can apply such things to myself and know that ,i am doing so4 ,if this be the fact1 it is trifling to discuss whether things ,i move to and fro exist4 ,if1 however1 it is still to be proved that there are such things1 and that they are moved to and fro1 the argument is wholly baseless4 ,locke here makes appeal to the common experience that certain objects applied to the body cause pleasure1 and certain others pain2 a fact which no reasonable man would think of denying or questioning1 as it is matter of daily observation4 ,but in such experiences1 all that is immediately evident is that an object immediately perceived 7,locke's idea7 is applied to another object immediately perceived 7idea7 with a resulting 7idea7 pain4 ,whether or not certain duplicates of the things immediately known are brought into a peculiar conjunction at the same time is wholly problematic1 and would seem to remain so until some evidence be advanced of the existence of such duplicates4 ,this argument on the part of our author shows most clearly that for the time being he lost the distinction between ideas and real things4 ,they are the same in sense seventh2 he assumed them to be the same in sense first4 ,he falls into this error again and again4 ,the general appeal to the testimony of the senses is followed by four special arguments4 ,according to the first of these1 it is plain that perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses1 because those that want the organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds4 ,this is supposed to prove that they come in by the organs of that sense1 and in no other way4 ,but here again one may ask1 ,what is meant by the organs of any sense8 ,if the real external organ be meant1 one may object that its existence has not yet been proved4 ,if the organ immediately known be meant1 one has only called attention to the fact that certain ideas are a sine qua non to the existence of certain other ideas4 ,how this tends to prove the existence of something distinct from ideas is not apparent4 ,locke's impulse in this argument finds its source in our common experience that bodily organs immediately perceived are proved by observation to be prerequisites to the experiencing of ideas4 ,we see a given object in a certain relation to a normal human body1 and we infer an idea of the object connected with that body4 ,we say the man has an idea of the object1 and can only infer the object itself4 ,we connect the idea with some particular part of his body1 and regard this as the medium through which he gains the idea4 ,all this is reasonable enough4 ,it is well to remember1 however1 that in all this the real object is not observed to play any part4 ,the object which ,i certainly see in relation to the body which ,i certainly see is what ,locke would call an idea4 ,the man's body is an idea4 ,the idea which ,i assume the man to have is to me1 if ,i remain within the sphere of the observable1 an idea of the 7idea7 object ,i see4 ,if ,i am to get any real object at all it is not by reference to observation or experience4 ,if ,i am to get it by inference1 some ground must be furnished for inference4 ,again ,locke has confounded the observable with the real4 ,it is only on this ground that the appeal to the sense organ has any force4 ,the second and the third arguments busy themselves to show that there are unmistakable differences between ideas which have their origin in the brisk acting of objects without and ideas of memory or imagination4 ,the two classes are shown to be distinct1 and it is very properly held that ideas of different kinds should not be confounded4 ,but the statement1 that ideas may be divided into two classes1 is a very different one from the statement that the two classes differ in that one has external correlates and the other has not4 ,one may admit all the distinctions which ,locke makes in the field of ideas2 and1 it being once proved that such distinctions imply a world of real things in relation to certain ideas1 may grant very readily that these ideas have corresponding to them real things1 or that ideas caused by real things differ by such and such marks from other ideas4 ,but1 until it be proved that the marks in question do give a right to infer real things1 it should not be assumed that any given class of ideas is caused by real things4 ,what is to be discovered is assumed4 ,and it is assumed here1 as above1 because ,locke could not keep distinct the two classes of things4 ,he is capable of saying1 ,but if ,i turn my eyes at noon towards the sun1 ,i cannot avoid the ideas which the light1 or sun1 then produces in me1 when the whole dispute is over the question whether there be a real sun toward which real eyes may be turned4 ,how does he know that he is turning his eyes toward the sun8 ,does he not see it up there8 ,is he not actually looking upon it8 ,his error is too plain to overlook4 ,but if one could doubt his confusion of the two suns1 the apparent and the real1 his illustration from the diagrams used in mathematical demonstration would lay the doubt once for all4 ,real lines exist1 for it would be very strange that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth1 that two angles of a figure1 which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram1 should be bigger one than the other2 and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles1 which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by4 ,the ,english is not as bad as the reasoning4 ,the fourth argument is derived from the fact that one sense supports the testimony of another4 ,he that sees a fire may1 if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy1 feel it too4 ,a bare fancy1 ,locke is sure1 would not cause such acute pain4 ,this comes back to the second and third arguments and may be criticized in the same way4 ,if one could refer to a single observation of the fact that real things do not accompany ideas of the fancy and that they do accompany ideas of a different class1 the argument would be unobjectionable4 ,wanting this observation1 or something to take its place1 nothing is proved4 ,and as to the senses helping each other to real things1 if each sense only gives the idea appropriate to it1 it is not easy to see how two together prove more than one alone4 ,in this section1 too1 ,locke is assuming that real things belong to the world of things immediately perceived4 ,he can1 he says1 make what characters he pleases on the paper before him1 but once having made them1 cannot choose but see them as they are4 ,whence it is manifest1 that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination1 when ,i find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thought1 do not obey them2 nor yet cease to be1 whenever ,i shall fancy it2 but continue to affect the senses constantly and regularly1 according to the figures ,i made them4 ,that is1 the ideas which he concludes not to be ideas of imagination are the things which continue to affect the senses1 or the real things4 ,there is little wonder that this author believed in real things4 ,,sec4 #cb4 ,excellent work has been done by ,berkeley in distinguishing samenesses4 ,his treatment of sameness in sense third ,i have already quoted4 ,his discussion of the infinite divisibility of finite lines1#eg a matter of which ,i shall speak more fully later1 again brings out sense third4 ,almost his whole philosophy consists in the endeavor to keep clearly in mind the significance of sense seventh1 and to develop what it implies4 ,on the other hand1 he has fallen into the error of confusing sense first and sense sixth1 and of using this confusion to silence an objection to his doctrine4 #eg ,a ,treatise ,concerning the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 #abc-acb4 ,ed4 ,fraser1 ,vol4 ,i1 pp4 #bbj-bbe4 ,he takes up in the ,principles1 for the purpose of refuting it1 the objection that his doctrine makes things every moment annihilated and created anew4#eh ,this1 he argues1 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised1 so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions4 ,for1 though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived2 yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us1 since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not4 ,wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind1 ,i would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind1 but all minds whatsoever4 ,it does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment1 or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them4 #eh #de-dh1 pp4 #agh-ahj4 ,to the reader of ,mill it is clear enough that ,berkeley is not content to assume potential existence as an integral part of the life history of an object4 ,it seems odd that he should not do so1 as he has himself pointed out the double sense of the word exist4#ei ,however1 he demands actual existence4 ,any lapse in the actual existence of the immediate object seems to him a destruction of the object4 ,he has the common feeling that it is contrary to nature that things should be destroyed and created from moment to moment4 ,they must exist continuously4 ,they evidently do not actually exist continuously in the one mind4 ,so he assumes that1 during the periods of their absence from one mind1 they must exist in another3 otherwise they could not be said to exist at all4 #ei ,principles1 #c1 p4 #aeg4 ,of course1 all this assumes that the objects in one mind are identically 7sense first7 the objects in another4 ,if they be recognized as two distinct things1 belonging to different worlds--worlds so different that what is in one can enter the other only through its representative--the whole argument is seen to be fallacious4 ,one can no more make a consistent whole of elements taken from two different consciousnesses1 than one can piece out a grief with a smell4 ,the attempt is the result of overlooking the duality implied in sameness in sense sixth4 ,,sec4 #cc4 ,there is a clear and forcible passage in ,john ,stuart ,mill's ,system of ,logic1 in which he distinguishes certain samenesses from certain others4 ,it is to be regretted that he dismissed the subject with so slight an examination1 for it could not but have gained by a careful analysis at the hands of this keen man4 ,i quote more particularly to bring out what ,mill has to say about sameness in sense second4 ,while speaking of resemblance1 it is necessary to take notice of an ambiguity of language1 against which scarcely any one is sufficiently on his guard4 ,resemblance1 when it exists in the highest degree of all1 amounting to undistinguishableness1 is often called identity1 and the two similar things are said to be the same4 ,i say often1 not always2 for we do not say that two visible objects1 two persons1 for instance1 are the same1 because they are so much alike that one might be mistaken for the other3 but we constantly use this mode of expression when speaking of feelings2 as when ,i say that the sight of any object gives me the same sensation or emotion to-day that it did yesterday1 or the same which it gives to some other person4 ,this is evidently an incorrect application of the word same2 for the feeling which ,i had yesterday is gone1 never to return2 what ,i have to-day is another feeling1 exactly like the former1 perhaps1 but distinct from it2 and it is evident that two different persons cannot be experiencing the same feeling1 in the sense in which we say that they are both sitting at the same table4 ,by a similar ambiguity we say1 that two persons are ill of the same disease2 that two persons hold the same office2 not in the sense in which we say that they are engaged in the same adventure1 or sailing in the same ship1 but in the sense that they fill offices exactly similar1 though1 perhaps1 in distant places4 ,great confusion of ideas is often produced1 and many fallacies engendered1 in otherwise enlightened understandings1 by not being sufficiently alive to the fact 7in itself not always to be avoided71 that they use the same name to express ideas so different as those of identity and undistinguishable resemblance4#fj #fj ,a ,system of ,logic1 ,book ,i1 ,chap4 ,,iii1 #aa1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhb1 p4 #fb4 ,it will be seen that ,mill here draws a line between sameness in sense first and the samenesses in which there is an element of duality4 ,he also draws attention to the fact--a fact to which ,i have already referred--that successive mental elements1 considered in themselves1 are more likely to be confounded than material things1 though these last may be quite as closely similar4 ,language shows how men overlook the duality of two similar feelings which differ only in time4 ,they may speak of two similar objects as the same1 as they frequently do1 and yet they will not usually lose the sense of their twoness4 ,they say these objects are the same4 ,but when they compare a feeling experienced to-day with one experienced yesterday1 they say this is the same feeling ,i had yesterday4 ,there is nothing in the language used to indicate duality at all4 ,i have said that1 in the extract given1 a line is drawn between samenesses which imply duality and the sameness which does not2 and yet such illustrations are used to represent the latter as a man1 a table1 and a ship--objects which are the same in sense third as well as in sense first1 and which consequently imply duality1 in some sense of the word4 ,but1 if one is not considering single members of the chain of experiences which1 taken together1 we call a man1 but is considering the whole group as a unit1 this difficulty disappears4 ,this is evidently what ,mill has in mind1 and he cannot be taxed with inconsistency4 ,one may1 however1 object to the statement that it is an improper use of the word same to speak of things merely similar as the same4 ,the word has many meanings1 and we can hardly say that any one of them is illegitimate4 ,it is merely illegitimate to confound them4 ,and one should not take quite literally the description of resemblance in the highest degree as amounting to undistinguishableness4 ,strict undistinguishableness removes all duality1 and consequently makes impossible what we call resemblance or similarity4 ,to be similar1 things must be distinguished as two4 ,finally1 one may object to a treatment of samenesses which merely groups them into two classes1 when there are at least seven kinds that should1 in the interests of clear thinking1 be kept separate4 ,it is only by carefully marking such distinctions that fallacious reasonings are to be avoided4 ,as1 however1 this discussion of samenesses is merely a side issue where it occurs in the ,logic1 it would perhaps be unjust to blame ,mill for not going into it more fully4 ,,sec4 #cd4 ,at this point ,i leave the realms of the dead and emerge into the land of the living4 ,the errors that ,i have been criticizing still live1 and it would not be difficult to glean a goodly number of them from the authors of our day4 ,i shall be moderate1 and will content myself with one or two representative instances4 ,it would be surprising if as loose and incautious a reasoner as ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer did not furnish some examples of confused samenesses4 ,to certain of his errors in this direction ,i have briefly referred in the earlier part of my monograph4 ,here ,i shall treat of him a little more at length1 though even here it is impossible to do justice to the subject1 as that would involve my quoting and commenting upon at least a large part of the first division of the ,first ,principles4 ,i shall take only the conclusion of the argument by which he establishes the existence of his ,unknowable1 or ,inscrutable ,power1 or ,ultimate ,cause1 or ,unseen ,reality1 or ,absolute4 ,this contains two confusions of no little significance4 ,mr4 ,spencer writes3 ,hence our firm belief in objective reality--a belief which metaphysical criticisms cannot for a moment shake4 ,when we are taught that a piece of matter1 regarded by us as existing externally1 cannot be really known1 but that we can know only certain impressions produced on us1 we are yet1 by the relativity of our thought1 compelled to think of these in relation to a positive cause--the notion of a real existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent4 ,if it be proved to us that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is utterly inconsistent with itself--that matter1 however conceived by us1 cannot be matter as it actually is1 our conception1 though transfigured1 is not destroyed3 there remains the sense of reality1 dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which it was before represented in thought4 ,though ,philosophy condemns successively each attempted conception of the ,absolute--though it proves to us that the ,absolute is not this1 nor that1 nor that--though in obedience to it we negative1 one after another1 each idea as it arises2 yet1 as we cannot expel the entire contents of consciousness1 there ever remains behind an element which passes into new shapes4 ,the continual negation of each particular form and limit1 simply results in the more or less complete abstraction of all forms and limits2 and so ends in an indefinite consciousness of the unformed and unlimited4 ,and here we come face to face with the ultimate difficulty--,how can there possibly be constituted a consciousness of the unformed and unlimited1 when1 by its very nature1 consciousness is possible only under forms and limits8 ,if every consciousness of existence is a consciousness of existence as conditioned1 then how1 after the negation of conditions1 can there be any residuum8 ,though not directly withdrawn by the withdrawal of its conditions1 must not the raw material of consciousness be withdrawn by implication8 ,must it not vanish when the conditions of its existence vanish8 ,that there must be a solution of this difficulty is manifest2 since even those who would put it1 do1 as already shown1 admit that we have some such consciousness2 and the solution appears to be that above shadowed forth4 ,such consciousness is not1 and cannot be1 constituted by any single mental act2 but is the product of many mental acts4 ,in each concept there is an element which persists4 ,it is alike impossible for this element to be absent from consciousness1 and for it to be present in consciousness alone3 either alternative involves unconsciousness--the one from the want of the substance2 the other from the want of the form4 ,but the persistence of this element under successive conditions1 necessitates a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions1 and independent of them4 ,the sense of a something that is conditioned in every thought1 cannot be got rid of1 because the something cannot be got rid of4 ,how then must the sense of this something be constituted8 ,evidently by combining successive concepts deprived of their limits and conditions4 ,we form this indefinite thought1 as we form many of our definite thoughts1 by the coalescence of a series of thoughts4 ,let me illustrate this3 ,a large complex object1 having attributes too numerous to be represented at once1 is yet tolerably well conceived by the union of several representations1 each standing for part of its attributes4 ,on thinking of a piano1 there first rises in imagination its visual appearance1 to which are instantly added 7though by separate mental acts7 the ideas of its remote side and of its solid substance4 ,a complete conception1 however1 involves the strings1 the hammers1 the dampers1 the pedals2 and while successively adding these to the conception1 the attributes first thought of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness4 ,nevertheless1 the whole group constitutes a representation of the piano4 ,now as in this case we form a definite concept of a special existence1 by imposing limits and conditions in successive acts2 so1 in the converse case1 by taking away the limits and conditions in successive acts1 we form an indefinite notion of general existence4 ,by fusing a series of states of consciousness1 in each of which1 as it arises1 the limitations and conditions are abolished1 there is produced a consciousness of something unconditioned4 ,to speak more rigorously3--this consciousness is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions2 but it is the abstract of all thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions4 ,that which is common to them all1 and cannot be got rid of1 is what we predicate by the word existence4 ,dissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual change of those modes1 it remains as an indefinite consciousness of something constant under all modes--of being apart from its appearances4 ,the distinction we feel between special and general existence1 is the distinction between that which is changeable in us1 and that which is unchangeable4 ,the contrast between the ,absolute and the ,relative in our minds1 is really the contrast between that mental element which exists absolutely1 and those which exist relatively4 ,by its very nature1 therefore1 this ultimate mental element is at once necessarily indefinite and necessarily indestructible4 ,our consciousness of the unconditioned being literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms1 it follows that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of our intelligence4 ,as we can in successive mental acts get rid of all particular conditions and replace them by others1 but cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is conditioned anew in every thought2 there ever remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and independently of conditions4 ,at the same time that by the laws of thought we are rigorously prevented from forming a conception of absolute existence2 we are by the laws of thought equally prevented from ridding ourselves of the consciousness of absolute existence3 this consciousness being1 as we here see1 the obverse of our self-consciousness4 ,and since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs1 is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them1 it follows that this which persists at all times1 under all circumstances1 and cannot cease until consciousness ceases1 has the highest validity of any4 ,to sum up this somewhat too elaborate argument3--,we have seen how in the very assertion that all our knowledge1 properly so called1 is ,relative1 there is involved the assertion that there exists a ,non-relative4 ,we have seen how1 in each step of the argument by which this doctrine is established1 the same assumption is made4 ,we have seen how1 from the very necessity of thinking in relations1 it follows that the ,relative is itself inconceivable1 except as related to a real ,non-relative4 ,we have seen that unless a real ,non-relative or ,absolute be postulated1 the ,relative itself becomes absolute2 and so brings the argument to a contradiction4 ,and on contemplating the process of thought1 we have equally seen how impossible it is to get rid of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearances2 and how1 from this impossibility1 results our indestructible belief in that actuality4#fa #fa ,first ,principles1 ,part #a1 ,chap4 ,,iv1 #bf1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhh1 pp4 #ic-ig4 ,such an extract as this is very tempting to the critic1 but ,i shall try not to be drawn into criticisms which do not immediately concern my purpose in quoting4 ,the points which chiefly interest me are ,mr4 ,spencer's evident confusion of sameness in sense seventh with sameness in sense first1 and of sameness in sense second with sameness in sense first4 ,i shall begin with the first confusion4 ,every careful reader of the extract given above must see that the ,absolute with which ,mr4 ,spencer's argument is concerned is an ,absolute in consciousness4 ,it is an indefinite consciousness1 raw material of consciousness1 an indefinite thought1 an abstract of all thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions4 ,it is the element of existence which is common to all these thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions4 ,if there could be any doubt as to the nature of this ,absolute in which the argument results1 it should be set at rest by the very emphatic statement that our consciousness of the unconditioned is literally the unconditioned consciousness1 or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms4 ,it is this undifferentiated substance of consciousness which is conditional anew in every thought that remains with us as an ,absolute through all forms of the conditioned4 ,now this ,absolute1 the element of existence which accompanies all other elements in consciousness1 is the only one with which the argument has at all concerned itself1 and yet this is evidently not the ,absolute in which the author is chiefly interested4 ,there can be no good reason for calling this ,absolute either ,unknowable1 ,incomprehensible1 or ,inscrutable4 ,it is not a ,power for it is simply the element of existence1 nor is it a ,reality1 for the abstract of all thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions must be common to the unreal or imaginary as well as to the real4 ,it is 7mental7 existence pure and simple4 ,if the argument be good1 this element is known completely and just as it is2 indefinitely1 it is true1 but then it is indefinite1 and if known definitely would not be known as it is4 ,there is nothing farther about it to know4 ,it is in no sense ,unknowable4 ,if the objection be to the use of the word know where the knowledge is indefinite1 we should invent some word to apply to an indefinite consciousness2 but such consciousness1 if denied to be knowledge1 should not be classed with ignorance4 ,moreover1 as knowledge is of all degrees of definiteness1 we should need a series of words to express the gradations4 ,the series would be a long one4 ,but the ,absolute which interests ,mr4 ,spencer1 and which throws that halo of the mysterious about his philosophy1 is a something distinct from the ,absolute in consciousness1 and not known as it is4 ,it is by no means that which is common to impressions made upon us1 but the something assumed to make these impressions4 ,it is under1 apart from1 and behind appearances and modes--which an ,absolute1 which is simply that which is common to appearances and modes1 cannot be4 ,phenomena 7the things immediately known7 are only a manifestation of some ,power by which we are acted upon1#fb and this ,absolute cannot take its place among phenomena1 as the former must4 ,the two ,absolutes are1 indeed1 quite distinct things3 one of them1 the one in consciousness1 has been shown to exist2 no argument is forthcoming to prove the existence of the other4 ,manifestly it is not immediately known1 for then it would be a phenomenon1 however indefinite4 ,upon what ground is it inferred8 ,it is the old problem of ,descartes and ,locke4 #fb ,first ,principles4 ,chap4 ,v1 #bg1 p4 #ii4 ,this problem ,mr4 ,spencer solves in the same way as they1 by assuming the external object to be given immediately2 but there is this important difference1 that whereas ,descartes and ,locke fall into the error from inadvertence1 the author of the ,first ,principles and the ,principles of ,psychology embraces it deliberately4 ,the two earlier writers were sometimes able to recognize as two things a something in consciousness and an assumed something without4 ,they confused them only now and then4 ,mr4 ,spencer has been unable to distinguish them with clearness at any time1 and he elevates the confusion into a principle4 ,the postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out1 is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations--that we certainly know we have these1 and that if there be anything beyond these serving as cause for them1 it can be known only by inference from them4 ,i shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if ,i call in question this postulate2 and the surprise will rise into astonishment if ,i distinctly deny it4 ,yet ,i must do this4 ,limiting the proposition to those epi-peripheral feelings produced in us by external objects 7for these are alone in question7 ,i see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known1 is not that a sensation has been experienced1 but that there exists an outer object4#fc #fc ,principles of ,psychology1 ,part ,,vii1 ,chap4 ,,vi1 ,n4 ,y41 #ahhc1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #cfi4 ,the question here is--,what does consciousness directly testify8 ,and the direct testimony of consciousness is1 that ,time and ,space are not within but without the mind2 and so absolutely independent of it that they cannot be conceived to become non-existent even were the mind to become non-existent4#fd #fd ,first ,principles1 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,,iii1 #ae1 ed4 cit4 p4 #di4 ,the moral of the first bit quoted would seem to be1 unless we make the word primarily refer only to order in time1 that one knows immediately what is beyond consciousness and mediately what is in it--a use of words satisfactory1 ,i should think1 to no one but ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,if1 by primarily be meant previously1 and the two classes of being are known in just the same way1 why distinguish between the classes8 ,moreover1 in this case a thing would not be known through appearances1 but before them4 ,upon the other supposition1 to be sure1 appearances would be known through it--a mode of speaking not in harmony with the language of the ,first ,principles4 ,it seems a choice between ,scylla and ,charybdis4 ,the second extract makes consciousness directly testify not only to what is beyond its pale1 but1 putting on the spirit of prophecy1 even to what does not belong to the present1 but to a possible future4 ,when we speak of consciousness as testifying to a sensation1 we mean simply that the sensation is in consciousness4 ,the word cannot be used in this sense in speaking of what is beyond consciousness4 ,in what sense is it used8 ,it would seem to mean1 if it mean anything1 that consciousness gives one the right to infer a something beyond--a right which thoughtful men believe should be established by proof4 ,this proof1 one cannot1 of course1 expect from a man who makes the thing beyond consciousness the thing primarily known4 ,it would be more consistent in him to attempt a proof that there is something in consciousness4 ,this complete confusion in ,mr4 ,spencer's mind of things in consciousness and things without1 will explain why he keeps talking of his two ,absolutes as if there were only one1 as if this one were the one of which we are conscious1 and yet as if this one were beyond consciousness4 ,his pages swarm with illustrations which ,i might give4 ,i shall give only the following3 ,thus the consciousness of an ,inscrutable ,power manifested to us through all phenomena1 has been growing ever clearer2 and must eventually be freed from its imperfections4#fe ,if ,mr4 ,spencer ever comes to a consciousness that sameness in sense seventh is not sameness in sense first1 he will find work before him in remodeling his doctrine4 #fe ,first ,principles1 ,part ,i1 ,chap4 ,v1 #ca1 p4 #ajh4 ,the second confusion upon which ,i wish to comment comes to the surface in a sentence occurring near the end of the lengthy extract quoted at the outset3 ,and since the only possible measure of relative validity among our beliefs1 is the degree of their persistence in opposition to the efforts made to change them1 it follows that this which persists at all times1 under all circumstances1 and cannot cease until consciousness ceases1 has the highest validity of any4 ,now that which1 it has been argued1 persists at all times and under all circumstances1 is the raw material of thought1 the element of existence which is the abstract of all thoughts1 ideas1 or conceptions4 ,it is merely that which they have in common1 and can include none of those elements in which they differ4 ,if1 however1 persistence mean anything1 it means persistence in time4 ,that which exists at this time and that which exists at that are not one1 strictly speaking1 but two4 ,that is1 they are not the same in sense first1 but in some looser sense which will admit of duality4 ,if1 then1 we are dealing with the ,absolute1 existence pure and simple1 and are abstracting from all differences which may mark out this existence from that1 we must abstract from temporal distinctions too4 ,if we do this1 we can no longer speak of the ,absolute as persisting4 ,if we do not do this1 something may persist1 but it is no ,absolute4 ,mental elements otherwise similar1 but distinguished from each other by temporal differences are the same in sense second1 not in sense first4 ,the existence of which ,i am conscious to-day and the existence of which ,i was conscious yesterday are not the same existence in any sense save this4 ,yesterday's existence does not persist to-day2 it is replaced by another4 ,mr4 ,spencer has evidently fallen into the error of those schoolmen who endeavored to abstract the element which several things have in common1 but created unnecessary difficulties by making an incomplete abstraction and treating it as though it were complete4 ,other defects of this fallacious argument to prove our belief in the ,absolute valid1 ,i will not here discuss4 ,,sec4 #ce4 ,i next take a few passages which will illustrate the confusion of samenesses first and seventh1 from ,dr4 ,james ,mc,cosh's late work on ,first and ,fundamental ,truths4 ,they are selected from the chapter on ,our ,intuition of ,body by the ,senses4#ff #ff ,part ,,ii1 ,book ,i1 ,chap4 ,,ii4 ,we are following the plainest dictates of consciousness1 we avoid a thousand difficulties1 and we get a solid ground on which to rest and to build1 when we maintain that the mind in its first exercises acquires knowledge2 not1 indeed1 scientific or arranged1 not of qualities of objects and classes of objects1 but still knowledge--the knowledge of things presenting themselves1 and as they present themselves2 which knowledge1 individual and concrete1 is the foundation of all other knowledge1 abstract1 general and deductive4 ,in particular1 the mind is so constituted as to attain a knowledge of body or of material objects4 ,it may be difficult to ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come together and influence each other1 in particular1 how far into the body 7,descartes without proof thought to be in the pineal gland71 but it is certain that when they do meet mind knows body as having its essential properties of extension and resisting energy4 ,it is through the bodily organism that the intelligence of man attains its knowledge of all material objects beyond4 ,this is true of the infant mind2 it is true also of the mature mind4 ,we may assert something more than this regarding the organism4 ,it is not only the medium through which we know all bodily objects beyond itself2 it is itself an object primarily known2 nay1 ,i am inclined to think that1 along with the objects immediately affecting it1 it is the only object originally known4 ,intuitively man seems to know nothing beyond his own organism1 and objects directly affecting it2 in all further knowledge there is a process of inference proceeding on a gathered experience4 ,this theory seems to me to explain all the facts1 and it delivers us from many perplexities4#fg #fg ,n4 ,y41 #ahhi1 pp4 #fb-fc4 ,in our primitive cognition of body there is involved a knowledge of ,outness or ,externality4 ,we know the object perceived1 be it the organism or the object affecting the organism1 as not in the mind1 but as out of the mind4 ,in regard to some of the objects perceived by us1 we may be in doubt as to whether they are in the organism or beyond it1 but we are always sure that they are extra-mental4#fh #fh ,pp4 #fh-fi4 ,we know the ,objects as ,affecting ,us4 ,i have already said that we know them as independent of us4 ,this is an important truth4 ,but it is equally true and equally important that these objects are made known to us as somehow having an influence on us4 ,the organic object is capable of affecting our minds1 and the extra-organic object affects the organism which affects the mind4 ,upon this cognition are founded certain judgments as to the relations of the objects known to the knowing mind4#fi #fi ,p4 #gj4 ,but it will be vehemently urged that it is most preposterous to assert that we know all this by the senses4 ,upon this ,i remark that the phrase by the senses is ambiguous4 ,if by senses he meant the mere bodily organism--the eye1 the ears1 the nerves and the brain--,i affirm that we know1 and can know1 nothing by this bodily part1 which is a mere organ or instrument2 that so far from knowing potency or extension1 we do not know even color1 or taste1 or smell4 ,but if by the senses he meant the mind exercised in sense-perception1 summoned into activity by the organism1 and contemplating cognitively the external world1 then ,i maintain that we do know1 and this intuitively1 external objects as influencing us2 that is1 exercising powers in reference to us4 ,i ask those who would doubt of this doctrine of what it is that they suppose the mind to be cognizant in sense-perception4 ,if they say a mere sensation or impression in the mind1 ,i reply that this is not consistent with the revelation of consciousness1 which announces plainly that what we know is something extra-mental4 ,if they say1 with ,kant1 a mere phenomenon in the sense of appearance1 then ,i reply that this1 too1 is inconsistent with consciousness1 which declares that we know the thing4#gj #gj ,pp4 #ga and #gb4 ,the statements contained in these extracts are plainly in a state of civil war1 and might be left1 without foreign aid1 to complete their own destruction4 ,i shall first let them criticize each other4 7#a7 ,it is asserted that it may be difficult to ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come together and influence each other--in particular how far into the body--but that it is certain that when they do meet mind knows body as having its essential properties of extension and resisting energy4 ,this knowledge is said to arise when they meet1 be it marked1 and not before4 7#b7 ,it is also asserted that it is through the body that the mind attains its knowledge of all material objects beyond4 ,this makes our knowledge of objects beyond the body mediate and not immediate4 ,why are objects beyond the body regarded as mediately known8 ,no reason is suggested except that they are not themselves in contact with the mind1 but only in contact with that which is in contact with the mind4 ,it is then presumable that any parts of the bodily organism which never themselves meet the mind 7if there are any such7 are not known immediately1 but only through the parts which do meet the mind4 ,that is1 they are known mediately1 too4 ,that there are1 or at least may be1 such parts1 is directly inferrible from the statement that we do not know how far into the body mind and body come together4 7#c7 ,it is stated that the body is an object primarily known4 ,it is regarded by the author as probable that1 along with the objects immediately affecting it1 it is the only object originally known4 ,he thinks that man knows intuitively nothing beyond his own organism and objects directly affecting it4 ,but what is meant by the words primarily1 originally1 intuitively8 ,if things not in direct contact with mind are not known immediately but through something else1 and if the point or surface at which mind and body meet is at some uncertain distance from the surface of the body1 surely the only material thing immediately known is that portion of the body in contact with mind1 and not the whole body with the objects directly affecting it4 ,knowledge of these mediate objects must be due to a process of inference from what is directly experienced4 ,things known primarily1 originally and intuitively are then known mediately and inferentially--even in some cases so imperfectly known that it is not known what and where they are1 whether in or beyond the body4 7#d7 ,the doctrine that we are conscious in sense-perception of a mere sensation or impression in the mind is answered by the statement that this is not consistent with the revelation of consciousness1 which announces plainly that what we know is something extra-mental4 ,kant's phenomenalism is met by the claim that consciousness declares that we know the thing4 ,a thing known mediately1 however1 cannot be more certainly known than the thing known immediately1 and from which its existence is inferred4 ,the immediate revelation of consciousness cannot do more than give as a knowledge of the point or surface at which mind and body meet4 ,it is only here that mind can directly know body as having its essential properties of extension and resisting energy4 ,but so far from consciousness testifying to the extension and resistance of this part of the body1 it does not1 as ,dr4 ,mc,cosh admits1 testify to this part of the body at all4 ,if it reveal nothing as to what it knows immediately1 what can its statement as to what it knows mediately be worth8 ,and if consciousness testifies that it knows immediately what ,dr4 ,mc,cosh has maintained to be mediately known1 he must hold that its revelation is false and delusive4 ,it certainly seems to me that my consciousness reveals the ink-stand before me as it does not reveal the part of my body with which the mind has come together1 since it does not even reveal whether this part be a point or a surface4 ,if my knowledge of the ink-stand must rest upon my knowledge of this1 and can have no greater certainty1 my faith in the ink-stand must go4 ,a tower cannot be more firm than its foundation4 ,so much for the consistency of the extracts themselves4 ,i now turn to a criticism on a different basis4 ,the difficulties connected with this inconsistent doctrine naturally arise out of the standpoint occupied by the author4 ,he accepts as final1 and as justifiable in metaphysics1 the convenient psychological assumption that the group of sensations gained from an object is a something distinct from the object itself2 that the object may be external to the organism1 but that the mind1 with its sensations1 is1 or may be treated as if it were1 somewhere within the organism2 that the sensations are gained from real things1 but are not themselves real things1 so that a world of sensations--things being abstracted--must be an unreal and phantom world4 ,now1 the man who has thus distinguished between things and sensations1 if he regard the sensations as our only immediate representatives of the things1 will find it difficult1 without making an evidently gratuitous assumption somewhere1 to prove his right to reach things at all4 ,dr4 ,mc,cosh sees this difficulty1 and so he assumes that consciousness reveals both sensations and things4 ,he allows us perceptions mingled with sensations4#ga ,where are these mingled perceptions and sensations8 ,in the mind4 ,where is the mind8 ,in the body4 ,in what body8 ,the body perceived4 ,is this body perceived itself in the mind and mingled with sensations8 ,no4 ,it is then distinct from the mental percept--the perception of it is somewhere in it1 but is not it4 ,how do we know1 then1 that there is a body8 ,we infer it from the percept2 consciousness 7the percept7 reveals it4 ,on what principle is it inferred8 ,the question is a just one if the knowledge be not immediate4 ,our author does not even see that there is a question4 ,the fact is that this doctrine seems to avoid the difficulties of a representative perception only while it is allowed to remain loose and vague4 ,if things are not to be known representatively1 they must either be themselves in consciousness--and then they are not extra-mental--or they must be directly known in some other way than as in consciousness1 and then consciousness does not reveal them and cannot be appealed to4 ,an appeal to consciousness1 unless the thing itself is in consciousness1 is fatal4 #ga ,chap4 ,,iii1 p4 #ge4 ,but this discrimination between sensations and the thing causing the sensations1 and the assumption that consciousness testifies to the two classes of things1 does not seem to be borne out by the facts4 ,consciousness does not testify to the two classes4 ,the common man thinks that he knows directly the things that he sees and feels1 and the distinction between these things and his ideas of the things1 or his sensations gathered from the things1 arises only upon reflection and after a comparison of his experiences with those of other men4 ,he sees the ink-stand in front of another man's body4 ,he discovers that the other man sees the ink-stand--that is1 has an experience like his own4 ,he finds1 after investigation1 that this other man does not have the experience until after some influence has been conducted by the nerves to the brain4 ,he accordingly concludes that the mind of this other man1 and all that it immediately knows1 is situated somewhere in the brain4 ,he thus distinguishes between the ink-stand and the representative of the ink-stand in the mind of the other man4 ,this is precisely what ,dr4 ,mc,cosh has done1 though he has preferred to use the word perception instead of sensation or impression4 ,having gone as far as this1 the man in question reflects1 if he be consistent1 that his own case must be essentially similar to that of the man he is considering1 and concludes that he1 too1 sees only 7immediately1 at least7 some representative of the ink-stand1 and not the thing itself4 ,dr4 ,mc,cosh does not conclude this1 because he is not consistent4 ,but an ink-stand1 a tree1 a house1 in the brain1 cannot be very much like a real ink-stand1 tree or house4 ,then one does not see things as they are1 but is condemned to a phantom world4 ,having gone thus far1 our common man is appalled at his own conclusions1 as well he may be4 ,he may1 however1 be readily reassured1 if one will point out to him the error in his argument4 ,the whole argument began by assuming that he has evidence that some object is in front of his body and in front of the body of another man2 that he has a body and so has the other man4 ,if this knowledge be immediate1 of course it may furnish the basis of an argument2 but if it be not immediate1 one has no right to begin with it1 but should go back to what is immediate4 ,let us assume that it is immediate4 ,what ,i am then conscious of is my own body1 the other man's body and the object in relation to them4 ,upon this basis ,i argue to some representative of the object ,i immediately see1 and ,i connect it with the man's brain4 ,does the man now see two objects or only one8 ,if only one1 which one8 ,the one ,i refer to his brain1 or the one ,i see8 ,does the one he sees seem to him to be in his brain8 ,probably he has not the least notion that it is connected with that organ4 ,am ,i1 then1 in his case8 ,do ,i also see only a copy of the object in my brain8 ,and may this not be true1 although ,i have no immediate knowledge of my brain and its relation to that object8 ,but--and this is the important point--if all this be true1 how about the position with which ,i started8 ,my argument is based upon two real bodies and a real object4 ,i see that ,i was wholly in error in supposing that ,i saw these and could reason from them4 ,then the reasoning is not good4 ,then the conclusion is not reliable1 and it is not proved that ,i see immediately only an image in1 or in some sort of contact with1 my brain4 ,the fallacious character of the argument is plain enough2 where is the flaw8 ,it lies in this3 ,i assume that ,i see the two bodies and the object immediately4 ,consciousness seems to reveal them4 ,after granting the man opposite me a representative of that object ,i apply the same reasoning to myself1 forgetting that ,i assumed at the outset that ,i see the real object4 ,i can certainly not put the object ,i see in my brain1 for the brain in any way ,i can be conceived to know it belongs to precisely the same class of things as this object1 and they are beside each other in consciousness4 ,the representative the other man has is a representative of the object in my consciousness1 and not--at least1 ,i have no evidence that it is--a representative of a something else of which my object is also a representative4 ,and if the object of which ,i am immediately conscious is extended and without my body 7immediately perceived71 ,i may assume that the object in his consciousness is also extended and without the body in his consciousness4 ,his representative of my object is not in the head ,i see1 for his head as ,i see it is in my consciousness1 if the object ,i see is1 and any object in his consciousness is the same with any corresponding object in mine only in sense sixth--a sense of sameness which ,i have explained at length in the earlier part of my work4 ,this reasoning is1 it seems to me1 clear enough and consistent enough1 and should be plain to any one who will take the trouble to follow it carefully4 ,it lands one in no such difficulties and inconsistencies as result from the doctrine ,i have been criticizing4 ,should it be said this is a form of ,idealism1 and at least abandons what is extra-mental1 ,i answer1 the name is a matter of taste and of little significance2 what is important is that this doctrine does not found its reasoning upon an assumption which its conclusion declares to be false2 nor does it maintain that what is immediately known is not extended1 figured1 external to the body1 as it seems to be1 but something quite different and dissimilar4 ,it is in harmony with the revelation of consciousness4 ,should it still be objected that it makes no distinction between things and the sensations or impressions which represent them1 ,i answer1 one can object to things being regarded as complexes of sensations only as long as he separates sensations and things1 making the former unlike the things and relegating them to a place 7the brain7 where the things are not1 and to exist in which they must be very bad copies of the things indeed4 ,the doctrine ,i advocate does not deny the things as perceived at all2 it merely holds that consciousness does declare for the things1 and not for a set of representatives much unlike them and said to exist in a place in which we are not conscious of perceiving anything4 ,it objects to seeing double through an incomplete reflection upon what consciousness reveals4 ,now it is very evident that ,dr4 ,mc,cosh1 in his anxiety to prove an extra-mental world1 is actuated by a desire to retain real things4 ,he is under the impression that1 unless the extra-mental is known1 our knowledge is confined to shadows and unrealities4 ,he combats the ,idealist1 because he supposes him to deny the body of which we are conscious2 whereas1 all that the ,idealist is denying 7if he be consistent with his principles7 is the hypothetical representative of the body1 assumed to exist within the body1 and to which consciousness does not testify4 ,it is this that is the unreality4 ,the body to which the ,idealist holds is the very body to which ,dr4 ,mc,cosh thinks consciousness testifies2 but this body is not beyond consciousness1 nor in any proper sense of the words extra-mental4 ,the above argument for the extra-mental is consequently due to a misconception--to the misconception that the body revealed by consciousness is the extra-mental body1 and that the only body left to an ,idealist is an unreal phantom of this body1 and distinct from it4 ,and it is the attempt to make this body revealed by consciousness both in mind and out of mind that has occasioned the difficulties and inconsequences of the reasoning ,i have quoted4 ,this attempt is due to a confusion of sameness in sense seventh with sameness in sense first4 ,my excuse for so minute a criticism of this plainly untenable position is that we have here a representative instance of an error quite common1 and indeed characteristic of a certain stage of reflection4 ,,sec4 #cf4 ,the last confusion of samenesses that ,i shall discuss lies at the bottom of the common opinion on the infinite divisibility of space1 and causes the antinomies which arise from it4 ,the position ,i shall criticize is well set forth in ,professor ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford's popular lecture entitled ,of ,boundaries in ,general4#gb ,from this ,i take a few passages which will suffice to illustrate his doctrine4 #gb ,seeing and ,thinking1 ,london1 ,macmillan ,co41 #ahgi4 ,now the idea expressed by that word continuous is one of extreme importance2 it is the foundation of all exact science of things2 and yet it is so very simple and elementary that it must have been almost the first clear idea that we got into our heads4 ,it is only this3 ,i cannot move this thing from one position to another1 without making it go through an infinite number of intermediate positions4 ,infinite2 it is a dreadful word1 ,i know1 until you find out that you are familiar with the thing which it expresses4 ,in this place it means that between any two positions there is some intermediate position2 between that and either of the others1 again1 there is some other intermediate2 and so on without any end4 ,infinite means without any end4 ,if you went on with that work of counting forever1 you would never get any further than the beginning of it4 ,at last you would only have two positions very close together1 but not the same2 and the whole process might be gone over again1 beginning with those as many times as you like4 99 99 99 99 ,when a point moves1 it moves along some line2 and you may say that it traces out or describes the line4 ,to look at something definite1 let us take the point where this boundary of red on paper is cut by the surface of water4 ,i move all about together4 ,now you know that between any two positions of the point there is an infinite number of intermediate positions4 ,where are they all8 ,why1 clearly1 in the line along which the point moved4 ,that line is the place where all such points are to be found4 99 99 99 99 ,it seems a very natural thing to say that space is made up of points4 ,i want you to examine very carefully what this means1 and how far it is true4 ,and let us first take the simplest case1 and consider whether we may safely say that a line is made up of points4 ,if you think of a very large number--say1 a million--of points all in a row1 the end ones being an inch apart2 then this string of points is altogether a different thing from a line an inch long4 ,for if you single out two points which are next one another1 then there is no point of the series between them2 but if you take two points on a line1 however close together they may be1 there is an infinite number of points between them4 ,the two things are different in kind1 not in degree4 99 99 99 99 ,when a point moves along a line1 we know that between any two positions of it there is an infinite number 7in this new sense#gc7 of intermediate positions4 ,that is because the motion is continuous4 ,each of those positions is where the point was at some instant or other4 ,between the two end positions on the line1 the point where the motion began and the point where it stopped1 there is no point of the line which does not belong to that series4 ,we have thus an infinite series of successive positions of a continuously moving point1 and in that series are included all the points of a certain piece of line-room4 ,may we say then that the line is made up of that infinite series of points8 #gc ,professor ,clifford has used the word number in two senses1 a quantitative and a qualitative4 ,by number in the latter sense he means simply unlimited units4 ,yes2 if we mean no more than that the series makes up the points of the line4 ,but no1 if we mean that the line is made up of those points in the same way that it is made up of a great many very small pieces of line4 ,a point is not to be regarded as a part of a line1 in any sense whatever4 ,it is the boundary between two parts4 ,these extracts suffice1 ,i think1 to show what the common doctrine is1 and to show also the unavoidable difficulties connected with it4 ,these were clearly seen long ago4 ,motion1 argues ,zeno of ,elea1#gd cannot begin1 because a body in motion must pass through an infinite number of intermediate places before it can arrive at any other place4 ,achilles can never overtake the tortoise1 for by the time that he has reached the place where it was1 it has always moved a little beyond4 ,if ,professor ,clifford could not move a thing from one position to another1 without making it go though an infinite number of intermediate positions1 if these positions must be gone through with successively1 and if infinite really mean without any end1 then the final member of the series could never have been reached1 for the plain reason that there is no final member to an endless series4 ,if the new position is reached without passing through every member of the series and leaving none farther to pass through1 it is not reached by passing through an infinite number of intermediate positions4 ,the difficulty here is a hopeless one2 either the series has a final member1 and then it is not infinite2 or it has not1 and then one cannot come to the end4 #gd ,ueberweg1 ,hist4 of ,philos41 ,vol4 ,i1 #bj4 ,n4 ,y41 #ahgg1 pp4 #eg-eh4 ,the attempt sometimes made to avoid this difficulty by calling upon a precisely similar one for aid is of not the least avail4 ,the time of the motion1 it is said1 is divisible just as is the space over which the body moves2 the spaces and the times then vary together1 and as the spaces become very small the times become very small2 infinitesimal spaces are passed over in infinitesimal times1 and all these infinitesimals are included in the finite space and finite time of the motion4 ,but if there be a difficulty in arriving at the end of an endless series of places or positions1 there is surely no less a difficulty in reaching the end of an endless series of times4 ,if the series of times to be successively exhausted be truly endless1 then an end of the motion can never be reached4 ,quibbling over the size of the members of the series in the case of either space or time is useless4 ,whether things are big or little1 if the supply of them is truly endless1 one can never get to the end of the supply4 ,the rapidity with which they are exhausted has nothing to do with the question1 for an increase in rapidity has obviously no effect in facilitating an approach to what is assumed not to exist1 a final term4 ,it is1 then1 perfectly clear that1 if1 in order to move a body1 ,i must come to the end of an endless series1 ,i may reasonably conclude that ,i cannot move a body4 ,granting the assumption upon which it is based1 ,zeno's argument is unanswerable4 ,it is not a question of an ordinary difficulty1 a trifling evil2 it is a question of an impossibility1 a flat contradiction2 to move an inch1 to endure for a minute1 one is to accomplish the feat of reaching the end of the endless4 ,one thing is quite certain2 no rival doctrine can present a greater difficulty4 ,it is possible that some one may wish to find a way out of this difficulty by distinguishing1 as ,clifford has done1 between the points of the line and the parts of the line4 ,but this distinction is of no service4 ,all these points are declared to be on the line1 and anything that passes over the whole line must exhaust them one by one until it arrives at the final point4 ,by hypothesis1 there is no final point to the series--the series is without any end4 ,unless1 then1 the line can be passed over without passing over the points1 there would seem to be no help in turning to line pieces4 ,moreover1 it appears reasonable to assume that there are as many parts to the line as there are points4 ,for all these points are on the line1 and no two of them are in precisely the same position on the line2 they must consequently be on different parts of the line4 ,if it be objected that1 having no extension1 they cannot properly be said to be on parts of the line1 ,i answer that1 even on this hypothesis1 they must be at different parts of the line1 in order to be distinguished from each other4 ,the part of the line between any two of them is certainly not the same as the part between any other two4 ,it follows that the number of parts of which the line is made up is at least as great as the number of points less one1 if we refuse to say that the points are on the line2 and is as great as the number of points1 if we are willing to say that they are on the line4 ,to move over the whole line1 then1 a point must come within one term of the end of an endless series1 or it must pass over an endless number of small pieces of line until it comes to the very end4 ,does this seem a sensible doctrine8 ,the rival doctrine1 sometimes called the ,berkeleyan1 contains no such difficulties1 and it makes evident that the difficulties discussed above arise simply out of a confusion of samenesses1 and are gratuitous4 ,its discussion demands that ,i call to mind a few distinctions already made4 ,one must bear in mind1 in the first place1 that a line immediately known1 existing in consciousness1 is the same with an external line corresponding to it1 not in sense first1 but in sense seventh4 ,that is1 they are two lines1 not one1 and in the interests of clearness they should be considered separately4 ,one should remember1 in the second place1 that a line in consciousness at one moment is not1 in the strictest sense1 the same with a line in consciousness at another moment4 ,one may stand for the other and thus be the same with it in sense fifth2 or the two may be regarded as both belonging to the one series of experiences1 which1 taken together1 represent to us an object1 in which case they are the same in sense third4 ,a thing the same with another thing in either of these senses is not necessarily much like it4 ,it must only be able to serve as its representative4 ,now ,i see a line about an inch long on the paper before me4 ,it is a certain distance from my eyes4 ,i shall concern myself for the present only with the line immediately perceived1 which means for me so much sensation4 ,if ,i move this line 7which remains the same in sense third71 nearer to me or farther away1 ,i do not perceive the identical thing that ,i did before4 ,my quantity of sensation is increased or diminished4 ,if ,i keep the line at the same distance and change none of the conditions1 the quantity of sensation remains presumably the same4 ,the question arises1 ,is this line as actually experienced at this moment infinitely divisible or not8 ,i can certainly conceive of it as divisible to some extent1 for ,i see part out of part1 and ,i can think of these parts as separated4 ,but if this line were divided1 the division would soon result in parts which could be seen1 but which could not be seen to consist of part out of part4 ,were these apparently non-extended parts 7they would remain the same in sense third71 approached to the eyes1 they1 too1 would be seen to consist of part out of part1 but then ,i should simply have substituted for the apparently non-extended a representative which was extended4 ,this would not prove that what was before in consciousness was extended and could be divided4 ,consciousness certainly seems to testify that any particular line in consciousness is composed of a limited number of indivisible parts1 and when one adds to this reflection the consideration that a point moving over a given line does not appear to have an endless task before it1 but soon arrives at the final term1 one is irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the parts of the line are not infinite1 but that the division results in the indivisible1 the simple element of sensation1 which1 joined with other such elements1 makes an extended object1 but which taken alone is not extended at all4 ,the whole difficulty lies in keeping to the line and the parts with which one started4 ,it is so easy to pass from sameness in sense first to sameness in sense third or sense fifth2 it is so natural to bring an object which is1 as we say1 imperfectly seen1 closer to the eye and thus substitute for what was seen before a new experience connected with it in the order of nature1 confident that any system of relations derived from the latter may safely be carried over to all possible experiences connected with the former2 one does this so instinctively that a man may very readily suppose that he is still busied about the apparently non-extended element with which he started1 when he is in reality dividing and sub-dividing its representative1 which is evidently extended4 ,but the question is not whether1 when one has divided a line until the parts cannot be seen to consist of parts1 one may substitute for these parts what evidently does consist of parts1 and go on dividing that4 ,the question is1 whether an apparently non-extended element of a line in consciousness is divisible or not4 ,any argument from the possibility of dividing its substitutes evidently has nothing to do with this point4 ,it is plain that this doctrine1 which makes any particular finite line in consciousness to consist of a limited number of simple parts1 is not open to the objection that it necessitates the absurdity of exhausting an endless series4 ,moving along such a line1 ,achilles could overtake the tortoise1 for the successively diminishing distances between them do not constitute an endless series4 ,the descending series results after a limited number of terms in the simple1 and the series is broken1 for the simple does not consist of parts4 ,in this there is at least no contradiction4 ,it remains to see what other objections may lie against it4 ,it may be argued1 first1 as it often is argued1 that it is impossible to conceive of any part of a line as not itself extended and having parts4 ,it may be admitted that the small parts arrived at do not seem to have part out of part2 that these sub-parts are not observed in them1 but still it is said that one who thinks about them cannot but think of them as really having such parts4 ,i ask one who puts forward this objection to look into his own mind and see whether he does not mean by thinking about them1 bringing them in imagination nearer to the eye1 or by some means substituting for them what can be seen to have part out of part4 ,that one can do this no one would think of denying1 but1 as ,i have said1 this does not prove the original parts to be extended4 ,it may be objected again that extension can never be built up out of the non-extended--that if one element of a given kind has1 taken alone1 no extension at all1 two or more such elements together cannot have any extension either4 ,i answer that a straight line has no angularity at all1 and yet two straight lines may obviously make an angle2 that one man is not in the least a crowd1 but that one hundred men may be2 that no single tree is a forest1 but that many trees together do make a forest2 that a uniform expanse of color is in no sense a variegated surface1 but that several such together do make a variegated surface4 ,it may be that extension is simply the name we give to several simple sense-elements of a particular kind taken together4 ,one cannot say off-hand that it is not4 ,should one object1 finally1 that1 if a given line in consciousness be composed of a limited number of indivisible elements of sensation1 consciousness ought to distinguish these single elements and testify as to their number2 ,i answer that what is in consciousness is not necessarily in a clear analytical consciousness1 nor well distinguished from other elements4 ,for example1 ,i am at present conscious of a stream of sensations which ,i connect with the hand that holds my pen4 ,the single elements in this complex ,i cannot distinguish from each other1 nor can ,i give their number4 ,it does not follow that ,i am to assume the number to be infinite4 ,much less should ,i be impelled to make this assumption1 if it necessitated my accepting as true what ,i see to be flatly contradictory1 as in the case under discussion4 ,it was because of this vagueness and lack of discrimination in the testimony of consciousness that ,i said1 some distance back1 that consciousness seems to testify that any finite line in it is composed of simple parts4 ,if the testimony were quite clear1 the matter would be settled at once4 ,as it is not quite clear1 the matter has to be settled on a deductive basis4 ,the most reasonable solution appears to be the ,berkeleyan4 ,so much for the line immediately perceived1 the line in consciousness4 ,what shall we say to one who is willing to admit that this line is not infinitely divisible1 but is composed of simple sense-elements2 and yet who maintains that there exists an external line corresponding to it1 which is not immediately perceived1 and is infinitely divisible8 ,we may begin by suggesting to him that an external point moving over this external line must perform the wholly impossible feat to which ,clifford condemns a point moving over a line2 and we may farther suggest that1 if the external world be an intelligible world at all1 a contradiction may be as much out of place in it as anywhere else4 ,and if the existence of this world be problematic1 a thing not self-evident1 it seems quite reasonable to demand very good proof indeed of the existence1 of that which contains in its very conception such excellent reasons for believing in its non-existence4 ,this proof1 the student of the history of speculation will testify1 has not as yet been forthcoming4 ,,sec4 #cg4 ,with this ,i close my analysis of samenesses1 and of confusions which have resulted in needless embarrassments and gratuitous difficulties4 ,more instances of the latter could be given1 of course4 ,the reader will be able to furnish1 ,i presume1 many like them4 ,those which ,i have given seem to me quite sufficient to prove the need of much greater care and exactitude than one commonly finds in metaphysical reasonings4 ,loose reasoning is bad reasoning1 and leads to bad results4 ,its one virtue is that it does not require much mental application on the part of either author or reader4 ,on the other hand1 the attempt to be cautious and exact1 to distinguish between things easily confounded1 and to keep strictly to the thing in dispute through a long discussion1 these things are wearisome to all concerned4 ,although ,i am quite conscious of this fact1 ,i have tried to do these things3 with what result1 my fellow-analysts must judge4 ,i feel reasonably sure that ,i have succeeded in being wearisome1 and for this ,i make due apology4 ,,contents4 ,,part ,i4 ,,the ,,kinds ,,of ,,sameness4 ,,page4 ,,sec4 #a4 ,object of the ,monograph1 #e #b4 ,sameness in ,sense ,first1 or ,strict ,identity1 #f #c4 ,sameness in ,sense ,second1 #f #d4 ,sameness in ,sense ,third1 #f #e4 ,sameness in ,sense ,fourth1 #aa #f4 ,sameness in ,sense ,fifth1 #ab #g4 ,sameness in ,sense ,sixth1 #ad #h4 ,sameness in ,sense ,seventh1 #af #i4 ,the ,samenesses of ,external ,things1 #ca #aj4 ,ambiguity of the ,word ,self1 #cd #aa4 ,the ,samenesses of the ,self1 #ce #ab4 ,samenesses of the ,self as ,noumenon or ,substance1 #ce #ac4 ,samenesses of the ,real ,self out of ,consciousness1 #cg #ad4 ,samenesses of the ,self in ,consciousness1 #ch #ae4 ,samenesses of the ,self in ,consciousness 7continued71 #db #af4 ,samenesses of the ,self in ,consciousness 7continued71 #dc #ag4 ,the ,self as ,form1 and its ,samenesses1 #dc #ah4 ,summary of ,results of the ,foregoing ,analysis1 #dh #ai4 ,the ,element ,common to the ,kinds of ,sameness1 #ed #bj4 ,use of the ,word ,identity1 #fd ,,part ,,ii4 ,,historical ,,and ,,critical4 ,,sec4 #ba4 ,the ,error of ,heraclitus1 #fg #bb4 ,the ,climax of ,cratylus1 #fh #bc4 ,the ,parmenidean ,argument for the ,eternity of ,being1 #fh #bd4 ,gorgias and ,samenesses ,fifth and ,sixth1 #fi #be4 ,plato and the ,eleatic ,one1 #gj #bf4 ,aristotle's ,treatment of ,samenesses1 #hb #bg4 ,the ,confusions of ,pyrrho1 and ,their ,results1 #hd #bh4 ,sameness and the ,dispute concerning ,universals1 #hh #bi4 ,descartes' ,confusion of ,samenesses1 #ih #cj4 ,spinoza's ,argument to ,prove every ,substance ,infinite1 #ajh #ca4 ,locke's ,confusion of ,sense ,first and ,sense ,seventh1 #aaa #cb4 ,berkeley's ,error concerning ,sense ,sixth1 #abj #cc4 ,john ,stuart ,mill on the ,kinds of ,sameness1 #abb #cd4 ,the ,spencerian ,unknowable1 and ,samenesses ,seventh and ,second1 #abd #ce4 ,the ,confusions at the ,basis of ,dr4 ,mc,cosh's ,realism1 #acd #cf4 ,sameness and the ,infinite ,divisibility of ,space1 #adc #cg4 ,conclusion1 #aeb 99 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's note3 ,inconsistencies in hyphenation and punctuation have not been corrected4 ,transcriber's corrections3 page original text correction #ag aller ,gergenstnde aller ,gegenstnde #dh element in consciousnesss element in consciousness #ee found in a consciousnesss1 found in a consciousness1 #eh parce que vous voyons parce que nous voyons #eh ,premires ,objections4 ,premires ,objections4 #gi differences are invidualizing differences are individualizing #aja upon his expe-ences1 upon his experiences1