,transcriber's ,notes ,obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected4 ,italics are represented thus italic4 ,footnotes have been placed at the end of each ,lecture4 ,,theism ,,and ,,humanism ,,being ,,the ,,gifford ,,lectures ,,delivered ,,at ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,glasgow1 #aiad ,,by ,,the ,,rt4 ,,hon4 ,,arthur ,,james ,,balfour ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s41 ,,ll4,d41 ,d4,c4,l4 7,,hon4 ,,fellow ,,of ,,trinity ,,college1 ,,cambridge7 ,,hodder ,,and ,,stoughton ,,london ,,new ,,york ,,toronto ,,mcmxv ,printed in ,great ,britain by ,hazell1 ,watson ,viney1 ,ld4 ,london and ,aylesbury4 ,,to ,,the ,,professors ,,and ,,students ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,glasgow1 ,,who ,,gave ,,so ,,kind ,a ,,reception ,,to ,,these ,,lectures ,,on ,,their ,,delivery ,,in ,,the ,,bute ,,hall1 ,i ,,dedicate ,,this ,,volume4 ,,preface ,this volume contains the substance of the ,gifford ,lectures delivered at the ,university of ,glasgow in ,january and ,february #aiad4 ,i say the substance of the lectures1 lest any of those who formed part of my most kindly audience should expect a verbal reproduction of what they then heard4 ,no such reproduction would have been either expedient or possible4 ,the lectures were not read3 they were spoken 7with the aid of brief notes7 in such terms as suggested themselves at the moment2 and their duration was rigidly fixed1 to suit my academic audience1 so as just to occupy the customary hour4 ,although1 therefore1 they were largely 7though not wholly7 based upon written drafts1 none of the language1 and not all the ideas and illustrations contained in the original could be reproduced in the spoken lectures1 nor did everything in the spoken lectures represent passages in the written originals4 ,it is not1 in these circumstances1 surprising that the work has had1 in large measure1 to be rewritten1 though the argument itself1 and the order in which its various parts are presented for consideration1 remains substantially unchanged4 ,i should not have troubled the reader with this very unimportant narrative except for the purpose of explaining the long interval that has elapsed between the delivery of the lectures and their publication4 ,literary composition ,i have always found laborious and slow1 even in favourable conditions4 ,but the conditions have not been favourable4 ,my anxiety to make the argument easy to read for persons who take little interest in1 and have small knowledge of1 philosophical controversies did not make it easy to write2 while external circumstances were singularly unfavourable to rapid composition4 ,no one who took any part in public affairs between ,march #aiad and the outbreak of the war1 or between the outbreak of the war and the present moment1 is likely to regard these months as providing convenient occasion for quiet thought and careful writing4 ,i say this1 however1 not as an excuse for poor workmanship1 but only as an explanation of long delay4 ,it may be desirable to warn the intending reader before he embarks on these lectures1 that though the basis of the argument is wide1 its conclusion is narrow3 and though that conclusion is religious1 the discussions leading up to it are secular4 ,i make no dialectical use of the religious sentiment2 nor do ,i attempt any analysis of its essential character4 ,still less do ,i deal with any doctrines outside what is called 8natural0 religion2 for to 8natural0 religion the ,gifford ,lecturer is expressly confined4 ,but even themes which might well be deemed to fall within these limits are scarcely referred to4 ,for example1 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality have been treated by at least one eminent writer as the great realities beyond the world of sense4 ,i believe in them all4 ,but ,i only discuss the first--and that only from a limited point of view4 ,one other caution ,i must give1 though it is hardly necessary4 ,no one1 ,i suppose1 is likely to consult this small volume in the hope of finding an historic survey1 properly 8documented10 of the great theistic controversy4 ,but1 if so misguided an individual exists1 he is doomed to the severest disappointment4 ,there have been1 and will be1 ,gifford ,lecturers well equipped for so great an undertaking2 but most assuredly ,i am not among them4 ,my warm thanks are due to my brother1 ,mr4 ,gerald ,balfour2 my sister1 ,mrs4 ,sidgwick1 and my brother-in-law1 ,lord ,rayleigh1 for the trouble they have taken in reading the proofs1 and for the aid they have given me in correcting them4 ,in connection with a passage in the ninth lecture1 ,sir ,oliver ,lodge has been good enough to give me an interesting note on 8energy10 which appears in its proper place4 #d ,,carlton ,,gardens ,may #bd1 #aiae4 ,,contents ,,part ,i ,,introductory ,,lecture ,i ,,page ,i4 ,,introductory3 ,,metaphysics ,,and ,,the 8,,plain ,,man0 #c ,,ii4 8,,inevitable0 ,,beliefs ,,and ,,common ,,sense #ac ,,iii4 ,,the ,,material ,,of ,,the ,,present ,,argument ,,for ,,theism3 ,,the ,,character ,,of ,,the ,,theism ,,to ,,be ,,established #ag ,,iv4 ,,what ,,the ,,argument ,,is ,,not4 ,,some ,,of ,,its ,,limitations #bc ,,lecture ,,ii ,i4 ,,design ,,and ,,selection #bh ,,ii4 ,,argument ,,from ,,values4 ,,the ,,cognitive ,,and ,,the ,,causal ,,series #dd ,,part ,,ii ,,sthetic ,,and ,,ethical ,,values ,,lecture ,,iii ,,sthetic ,,and ,,theism ,i4 ,,sthetic ,,described #ee ,,ii4 ,,whence ,,comes ,,it8 #eh ,,iii4 ,,values ,,and ,,the ,,higher ,,emotions #fc ,,iv4 ,,natural ,,beauty #gg ,v4 ,,sthetic ,,of ,,history #ha ,,lecture ,,iv ,,ethics ,,and ,,theism ,i4 ,,ethics ,,described #ie ,,ii4 ,,egoism1 ,,altruism1 ,,and ,,selection #ih ,,iii4 ,,selection ,,and ,,the ,,higher ,,morality #ajg ,,iv4 ,,same ,,subject ,,continued #aai ,v4 ,,theism ,,and ,,the ,,collision ,,of ,,ends #abb ,,part ,,iii ,,intellectual ,,values ,,lecture ,v ,,introduction ,,to ,,part ,,iii ,i4 ,,retrospect #acc ,,ii4 ,,reason ,,and ,,causation #acd ,,iii4 ,,leslie ,,stephen1 ,,and ,,locke',s ,,aphorism #acf ,,iv4 ,,reason ,,and ,,empirical ,,agnosticism #ade ,,lecture ,,vi ,,perception1 ,,common ,,sense1 ,,and ,,science ,i4 ,,common ,,sense ,,and ,,the ,,external ,,world #adi ,,ii4 ,,science ,,and ,,the ,,external ,,world #aec ,,iii4 ,,primary ,,and ,,secondary ,,qualities #aef ,,iv4 ,,perception ,,as ,a ,,causal ,,series #afj ,v4 ,,perception ,,as ,a ,,cognitive ,,act #afe ,,vi4 ,,an ,,irresistible ,,assumption #agj ,,lecture ,,vii ,,probability1 ,,calculable ,,and ,,intuitive ,i4 ,,mathematicians ,,and ,,probability #age ,,ii4 ,,calculable ,,probability #agh ,,iii4 ,,intuitive ,,probability #ahi ,,lecture ,,viii ,,uniformity ,,and ,,causation ,i4 ,,habit1 ,,expectation1 ,,induction #aib ,,ii4 ,,regularity1 ,,causation #aie ,,iii4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,negligibility #aii ,,iv4 ,,causation ,,and ,,foreknowledge #bjg ,,lecture ,,ix ,,tendencies ,,of ,,scientific ,,belief ,i4 ,,from ,,beliefs ,,that ,,we ,,must ,,hold ,,to ,,beliefs ,,that ,,we ,,are ,,inclined ,,to ,,hold #bag ,,ii4 ,,atomism4 ,,beliefs ,,of ,,conservation #bbj ,,iii4 ,,epilogue #bch ,,part ,,iv ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusion ,,lecture ,x ,i4 ,,humanism ,,and ,,theism #bdg ,,ii4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,congruity #bdi ,,iii4 ,,is ,,this ,,systematic ,,philosophy8 #bfa ,,iv4 ,,conclusion #bfh ,the paragraph headings in this ,table of ,contents are not designed to give more than a very imperfect suggestion of the subjects discussed4 ,i have put them in for the convenience of those who1 having read the book1 wish to refer back to some particular passage4 ,the headings do not appear in the text4 ,,part ,i ,,introductory ,,lecture ,i ,i ,those responsible for the selection of ,gifford ,lecturers have made it clear that1 in their interpretation of ,lord ,gifford's ,trust1 studies in a very wide range of subjects are relevant to the theme of ,natural ,religion4 ,gifford lectures have been devoted to such diverse themes as ,comparative ,religion1 ,primitive ,mythologies1 ,vitalism1 ,psychology of ,religious ,experiences1 the ,history of ,religious ,development at particular ,epochs4 ,and1 in addition to these1 we have had expounded to us systems of ,metaphysics of more than one type1 and drawing their inspiration from more than one school4 ,when ,i was honoured by an invitation to take a share in the perennial debate which centres round what ,lord ,gifford described as ,natural ,religion1 ,i had to consider what kind of contribution ,i was least unfitted to make4 ,perhaps if this consideration had preceded my reply to the invitation1 instead of following it1 ,i might have declined the perilous honour4 ,neither in my own opinion nor in that of anybody else1 am ,i qualified to contribute a special study of any of the scientific1 psychological1 anthropological1 or historical problems which may throw light upon the central issue4 ,this must of necessity be the work of specialists4 ,no metaphysical system1 again1 am ,i in a position to provide2--for reasons which will appear in the sequel4 ,a merely critical commentary upon the systems of other people might hardly meet either the expectations of my audience1 or the wishes of those who appointed me to the post4 ,indeed1 the enormous range of modern philosophic literature1 and the divergent tendencies of modern philosophic thought would make the task1 in any case1 one of extreme difficulty4 ,few1 indeed1 are those who1 by the width of their reading and the quickness of their intellectual sympathy1 are qualified to survey the whole field of contemporary speculation2 and1 assuredly1 ,i am not among them4 ,the vast amplitude of relevant material daily growing with the growth of knowledge1 cannot but hamper the sincerest efforts of those who desire to take a comprehensive view of the great problems which ,lord ,gifford desired to solve4 ,most men are amateurs in all departments of activity but the one1 be it scientific or practical1 or artistic1 to which they have devoted their lives4 ,bacon1 indeed1 with the magnificent audacity of youth1 took all knowledge for his province4 ,but he did so in the sixteenth century1 not in the twentieth2 and even ,bacon did not escape the charge of being an amateur4 ,no one1 while human faculty remains unchanged1 is likely to imitate his ambitions4 ,more and more does the division and subdivision of labour become necessary for knowledge1 as for industry4 ,more and more have men to choose whether they shall be dabblers in many subjects or specialists in one4 ,more and more does it become clear that1 while each class has its characteristic defects1 both are required in the republic of knowledge4 ,so far as specialists are concerned1 this last proposition is self-evident4 ,specialists are a necessity4 ,and it may well be that those who have successfully pressed forward the conquering forces of discovery along some narrow front1 careless how the struggle towards enlightenment fared elsewhere1 may be deemed by the historian to have been not only the happiest1 but the most useful thinkers of their generation4 ,their achievements are definite4 ,their contributions to knowledge can be named and catalogued4 ,the memory of them will remain when contemporary efforts to reach some general point of view will seem to posterity strangely ill-directed1 worthless to all but the antiquarian explorers of half-forgotten speculation4 ,yet such efforts can never be abandoned1 nor can they be confined to philosophers4 ,there are for all men moments when the need for some general point of view becomes insistent2 when neither labour1 nor care1 nor pleasure1 nor idleness1 nor habit will stop a man from asking how he is to regard the universe of reality1 how he is to think of it as a whole1 how he is to think of his own relation to it4 ,now ,i have no wish to overpraise these moments of reflection4 ,they are not among the greatest4 ,they do not of necessity involve strenuous action1 or deep emotion1 or concentrated thought4 ,often they are periods of relaxation rather than of tension1 moods that pass and leave no trace4 ,yet it is not always so2 and when the pressure of these ancient problems becomes oppressive1 then those who1 from taste or necessity1 have lived only from hour to hour1 seek aid from those who have had leisure and inclination to give them a more prolonged consideration4 ,of these there is no lack2 some speaking in the name of science1 some in the name of religion1 some in the name of philosophy4 ,the founder of these lectures regarded philosophy1 and 7if ,i mistake not7 philosophy in its most metaphysical aspect1 as the surest guide to the truths of which he was in search4 ,and certainly ,i am the last to criticise such a view4 ,it is clearly the business of metaphysicians1 if they have any business at all1 to provide us with a universal system4 ,they cannot lose themselves in concrete details1 as may happen to men of science4 ,they are neither aided1 nor trammelled1 as all working organisations1 whether in ,church or ,state1 are necessarily aided and trammelled1 by institutional traditions and practical necessities4 ,they exist to supply answers to the very questions of which ,i have been speaking4 ,yet metaphysics does not appeal1 and has never appealed1 to the world at large4 ,for one man who climbs to his chosen point of view by a metaphysical pathway1 a thousand use some other road2 and if we ask ourselves how many persons there are at this moment in existence whose views of the universe have been consciously modified by the great metaphysical systems 7except in so far as these have been turned to account by theologians71 we must admit that the number is insignificant4 ,now1 ,i do not think this is due to the fact1 so often commented upon1 both by the friends of metaphysics and its foes1 that in this branch of inquiry there is little agreement among experts2 that the labours of centuries have produced no accepted body of knowledge2 that1 while the separate sciences progress1 metaphysics1 which should justify them all1 seems alone to change without advancing4 ,mankind is not so easily discouraged4 ,new remedies are not less eagerly adopted because old remedies have so often failed4 ,few persons are prevented from thinking themselves right by the reflection that1 if they be right1 the rest of the world is wrong4 ,and were metaphysical systems what men wanted1 the disagreements among metaphysicians would no more destroy interest in metaphysics than the disagreements among theologians destroys interest in theology4 ,the evil1 if evil it be1 lies deeper4 ,it is not so much that mankind reject metaphysical systems1 as that they omit the preliminary stage of considering them4 ,philosophy is now1 perhaps has always been1 an academic discipline which touches not our ordinary life4 ,a general knowledge of the historic schools of thought may indeed be acquired by the young as part of their education2 but it is commonly forgotten by the middle-aged2 and1 whether forgotten or remembered1 is rarely treated as in any vital relation to the beliefs and disbeliefs which represent their working theories of life and death4 ,if you desire confirmation of this statement1 consider how few men of science have shown the smallest interest in metaphysical speculation4 ,philosophers1 with one or two notorious exceptions1 have commonly had a fair amateur acquaintance with the science of their day4 ,kant1 though ,i believe that his mechanics were not always beyond reproach1 anticipated ,laplace in one famous hypothesis4 ,descartes and ,leibnitz would be immortalised as mathematicians if they had never touched philosophy1 and as philosophers if they had never touched mathematics4 ,in our own day ,huxley not only contributed to biology1 but wrote on philosophy4 ,yet1 speaking generally1 metaphysics has in modern times been treated by men of science with an indifference which is sometimes respectful1 more commonly contemptuous1 almost always complete4 ,nor can we attribute this attitude of mind1 whether on the part of scientific specialists or the general public1 to absorption in merely material interests4 ,there are some observers who would have us believe that the energies of ,western civilisation are now#a entirely occupied in the double task of creating wealth and disputing over its distribution4 ,i cannot think so2 ,i doubt whether there has been for generations a deeper interest than at this moment in things spiritual--however different be its manifestations from those with which we are familiar in history4 ,we must look elsewhere for an explanation of our problem4 ,there must be other reasons why1 to the world at large1 those who study metaphysics seem to sit 7as it were7 far apart from their fellow-men1 seeking wisdom by methods hard of comprehension1 and gently quarrelling with each other in an unknown tongue4 ,among these reasons must no doubt be reckoned the very technical character of much metaphysical exposition4 ,some of this could be avoided1 much of it could not2 and1 in any case1 philosophers might well ask why people should expect metaphysics--to say nothing of logic and psychology--to be easier of comprehension than the differential calculus or the electro-magnetic theory of light4 ,plainly1 there is no reason3 and1 in so far as the thoughts to be expressed are difficult1 and the language required to express them is unfamiliar1 the evil admits of no remedy4 ,but there is something more to be said4 ,it must1 ,i think1 be admitted that most men approach the difficulties of a scientific exposition far more hopefully than the difficulties of a metaphysical argument4 ,they will take more trouble because they expect more result4 ,but why8 ,in part1 ,i think1 because so much metaphysical debate is not1 or does not appear to be1 addressed to the problems of which they feel the pinch4 ,on the contrary1 it confuses what to them seems plain2 it raises doubts about what to them seems obvious2 and1 of the doubts which they do entertain1 it provides no simple or convincing solution4 ,the fact is1 of course1 that the metaphysician wants to re-think the universe2 the plain man does not4 ,the metaphysician seeks for an inclusive system where all reality can be rationally housed4 ,the plain man is less ambitious4 ,he is content with the kind of knowledge he possesses about men and things--so far as it goes4 ,science has already told him much2 each day it tells him more4 ,and1 within the clearing thus made for him in the tangled wilderness of the unknown1 he feels at home4 ,here he can manage his own affairs2 here he needs no philosophy to help him4 ,if philosophy can speak to him about questions on which science has little to say1 he will listen2 provided always that the problems dealt with are interesting1 and the treatment of them easily understood4 ,he would like1 for example1 to hear about ,god1 if there be a ,god1 and his ,soul1 if he has a ,soul4 ,but he turns silently away from discussions on the ,one and the ,many1 on ,subject and ,object1 on degrees of ,reality1 on the possibility of ,error1 on ,space and ,time1 on ,reason and ,intuition1 on the nature of ,experience1 on the logical characteristics of the ,absolute4 ,these may be very proper topics for metaphysicians1 but clearly they are no topics for him4 ,now ,i am far from saying that in these opinions the plain man is right4 ,his speculative ambitions are small1 and his tacit assumptions are many4 ,what is familiar seems to him easy2 what is unfamiliar seems to him useless4 ,and he is provokingly unaware of the difficulties with which his common-sense doctrines are beset4 ,yet in spite of all this1 he has my sympathy2 and ,i propose1 with due qualifications and explanations1 to approach the great subject1 described by the ,trust as ,natural ,religion1 from his--the plain man's--point of view4 ,,ii ,but what is the plain man's point of view8 ,what is the creed of common sense8 ,it has never been summed up in articles1 nor fenced round with definitions4 ,but in our ordinary moments we all hold it2 and there should be no insuperable difficulty in coming to an agreement about certain of its characteristics which are relevant to the purposes of my immediate argument4 ,one such characteristic is that its most important formulas represent beliefs which1 whether true or false1 whether proved or unproved1 are at least inevitable4 ,all men accept them in fact4 ,even those who criticise them in theory live by them in practice4 ,now this category of 8inevitableness0 is not often met with in metaphysics2 indeed1 so far as ,i know1 it is not met with at all4 ,we hear of innate beliefs1 a priori judgments1 axioms1 laws of thought1 truths of reason1 truths the opposite of which is 8inconceivable0--and so forth4 ,these various descriptions are all devised in the interests of epistemology1 i4e4 the theory of knowledge4 ,they are intended to mark off classes of judgments or beliefs which possess peculiar validity4 ,but none of these classes are identical with the class 8inevitable40 ,there are inevitable beliefs which nobody would think of describing either as a priori or axiomatic4 ,there are others of which the contradictory is perfectly conceivable2 though no one who had other things to do would take the trouble to conceive it4 ,an inevitable belief need not be self-evident1 nor even1 in the last analysis1 self-consistent4 ,it is enough that those who deem it in need of proof yet cannot prove it1 and those who think it lacks coherence yet cannot harmonise it1 believe it all the same4 ,but1 are there such inevitable beliefs8 ,there certainly are4 ,we cannot1 in obedience to any dialectical pressure1 suppose the world to be emptied of persons who think1 who feel1 who will2 or of things which are material1 independent1 extended1 and enduring4 ,we cannot doubt that such entities exist1 nor that they act on one another1 nor that they are in space or time4 ,neither can we doubt that1 in the world thus pictured1 there reigns an amount of stability and repetition1 which suggests anticipations and retrospects--and sometimes justifies them4 ,these beliefs are beliefs about what are sometimes called 8facts0 and sometimes 8phenomena0--neither term being either very convenient or very accurate4 ,they are assumed in all sciences of nature1 in all histories of the past1 in all forecasts of the future1 in all practice1 in all theory1 outside philosophy itself4 ,but there are two other kinds of beliefs which must1 ,i think1 be also regarded as inevitable1 of which ,i shall have to speak in the course of these lectures4 ,they have unfortunately no generic names1 and ,i must defer any description of them till future lectures4 ,it is sufficient for the moment to say that one of them relates to the ends of action1 and includes morals2 while the other relates to objects of contemplative interest1 among which is beauty4 ,in some shape or other--perhaps in shapes which seem to us utterly immoral or disgusting--beliefs of both kinds are1 so far as ,i can judge1 entertained by all men4 ,and though they have not the coercive force possessed by such beliefs as those in the independent existence of things and persons1 they may be counted1 for my purposes1 among the inevitable4 ,here1 then1 are three classes of belief which in some shape or other common sense holds1 has always held1 and cannot help holding4 ,but evidently the shapes in which they may be held are many4 ,they vary from age to age and from person to person4 ,they are modified by education1 by temperament1 by the general condition of learning1 by individual opportunities1 and by social pressure4 ,the common sense of the twentieth century ,a4,d4 is very different from the common sense of the twentieth century ,b4,c4 ,yet1 different though it be1 it possesses unalterable similarities1 and up to a certain point submits to the same classification4 ,if you desire an illustration1 consider the case of matter1 or of material things4 ,all men believe in what is commonly called the 8external world0--they believe in it with evidence1 or without evidence1 sometimes 7like ,david ,hume7 in the teeth of evidence1 in any case independently of evidence4 ,but as to what this 8external world0 really is they differ profoundly4 ,the expert of to-day differs from the expert of yesterday1 both differ from the average man1 the average man of the twentieth century differs from his predecessors1 and they differ from each other according to the stage of general and scientific culture at which they have severally arrived4 ,,iii ,but1 though all this be granted1 to what1 you may be disposed to ask1 does it lead8 ,what has it got to do with ,theism8 ,it is not alleged that in any shape these inevitable beliefs are necessarily true2 it is admitted that in most of the shapes in which men have held them they are actually false2 it is not even suggested that a belief in ,god is to be counted among them4 ,how1 then1 is ,natural ,theology advanced8 ,to answer this question would be to anticipate the nine lectures which are still to come4 ,in the meanwhile1 it may be enough to say that these beliefs of common sense supply the material on which ,i propose to work2 that ,i shall treat them as a developing and improving system1 of which the present phase is the most developed and the best4 ,it is with this phase that ,i am chiefly concerned4 ,if1 for example1 ,i make use of beliefs about the 8external world0 they will be 7mainly7 the beliefs of contemporary or recent science so far as ,i know them4 ,if ,i make use of ethics or sthetics1 it will be the ethics and sthetics of ,western civilisation1 not of ,melanesia4 ,i shall not add to them nor subtract from them4 ,i shall not criticise nor question them4 ,i shall accept them at their face values4 ,but ,i shall ask what this acceptance implies4 ,i shall ask how these values are to be maintained4 ,and in particular ,i shall inquire whether the course of development1 whose last known stages these beliefs represent1 can be regarded as a merely naturalistic process without doing fatal damage to their credit4 ,the answer ,i shall give to this last question will be in the negative4 ,and1 if the only alternative to ,naturalism be ,theism1 as from the common-sense standpoint it certainly is1 then the effect of my argument1 for those who accept it1 will be to link up a belief in ,god with all that is1 or seems1 most assured in knowledge1 all that is1 or seems1 most beautiful in art or nature1 and all that is1 or seems1 most noble in morality4 ,at this point you will inevitably ask me to explain what sort of ,deity ,he is whose existence ,i wish to establish4 ,men have thought of ,god in many ways4 ,in what way is ,he thought of in these lectures8 ,the question is legitimate1 though ,i am in some doubt how far you will regard my answer as satisfactory4 ,i1 of course1 admit that the conception of ,god has taken many shapes in the long-drawn course of human development1 some of them degraded1 all of them inadequate4 ,but this1 or something like this1 was inevitable on any theory of development2 and the subject-matter of theology does not seem to have fared differently in this respect from the subject-matter 7say7 of physics or psychology4 ,it is in all cases the later stages of the process which mainly concern us4 ,there is1 however1 something more to be said4 ,the highest conceptions of ,god seem to approximate to one of two types1 which1 without prejudice1 and merely for convenience1 ,i may respectively call the religious and the metaphysical4 ,the metaphysical conception emphasises ,his all-inclusive unity4 ,the religious type emphasises ,his ethical personality4 ,the metaphysical type tends to regard ,him as the logical glue which holds multiplicity together and makes it intelligible4 ,the religious type willingly turns away from such speculations about the ,absolute1 to love and worship a ,spirit among spirits4 ,which of these types is contemplated in the argument that follows8 ,to this question ,i would reply by another4 ,are the two conceptions incompatible8 ,must we abandon the second if we accept the first8 ,if so1 it is the second of which ,i propose to speak4 ,it is the ,god according to religion1 and not the ,god according to metaphysics1 whose being ,i wish to prove4 ,but there are theologians and philosophers of repute who think the two conceptions can be harmonised4 ,they hold that belief in a personal and transcendent ,god is consistent with the acceptance even of those forms of ,absolute ,idealism which their friends call logical and their critics call intellectual--in both cases1 perhaps1 without sufficient justification4 ,for myself1 ,i must admit that ,i have never succeeded to my own satisfaction in fusing the two conceptions4 ,yet ,i do not profess to be content with their separation4 ,the attribution of personality to ,god1 though much truer1 ,i think1 than the denial of it1 is manifestly inadequate to the full reality we are struggling to express4 ,some of the greatest religious teachers1 ,christian and non-,christian1 that the world has seen have more or less explicitly held both1 or at least have leaned towards neither exclusively4 ,this is surely true1 for example1 of ,plato the ,greek philosopher1 of ,philo the platonising ,jew1 of ,st4 ,paul the ,christian ,apostle1 of ,st4 ,augustine the patristic theologian4 ,nor 7so far as ,i know71 has religious mysticism ever felt the least difficulty in bridging the chasm by which1 in the eyes of discursive reason1 the two conceptions seem to be divided4 ,this may well represent the highest wisdom4 ,but1 the argument of these lectures has a narrower scope3 and when1 in the course of them1 ,i speak of ,god1 ,i mean something other than an ,identity wherein all differences vanish1 or a ,unity which includes but does not transcend the differences which it somehow holds in solution4 ,i mean a ,god whom men can love1 a ,god to whom men can pray1 who takes sides1 who has purposes and preferences1 whose attributes1 howsoever conceived1 leave unimpaired the possibility of a personal relation between ,himself and those whom ,he has created4 ,but is not this 7it may be objected7 the degradation of religion8 ,what is a deity so conceived but the old tribal god1 with his character improved and his local limitations swept away8 ,if ,god be not the ,absolute1 can he be more than a magnified man8 ,can you hope to cleanse these religious conceptions from the mud in which they once so rankly flourished8 ,now there are plenty of unsolved1 and perhaps insoluble1 difficulties involved in the religious1 or indeed in any other1 conception of ,god4 ,but ,i hardly count among them the lowly origin and crime-stained history of religious development4 ,on this point you will be able to form a better opinion as these lectures proceed4 ,but1 in the meanwhile1 it may be observed that though no tragic accompaniments attach to the growth of a purely ,absolutist philosophy1 this by no means implies that metaphysics is better than religion4 ,it is true that1 for the sake of a purely logical ,absolute1 no man has been moved to do what a later and higher morality condemns--to placate it1 for example1 with bloody rites or obscene revels4 ,but this is because1 for the sake of such an ,absolute1 no man has ever yet been moved to do anything at all4 ,a belief in it may be the conclusion of our intellectual labours2 but hardly 7as it seems to me7 their motive or their reward4 ,,iv ,let me now bring this introductory lecture to a close by adding to what1 so far1 must seem a bare and obscure suggestion of what my argument is1 a warning hint as to what1 at first sight1 it might seem to be1 but is not4 ,it is not an argument from common sense1 as that phrase ought properly to be interpreted4 ,it does not say to the opponents of ,theism3 8,you accept current beliefs in science1 in morality1 in ethics4 ,in some shape or other common sense has always accepted them1 in some shape or other you cannot help accepting them4 ,you do1 in fact1 probably accept them in the shape which finds favour with the #8best thought of the age' or what you conceive to be such4 ,this is common sense4 ,why not do in the sphere of religion what you are admittedly doing in these other spheres of theory and practice8 ,would not this be common sense also8 ,true1 there is one important difference between the two cases4 ,theological beliefs are not inevitable--at least not at our present stage of culture4 ,it is possible to be an atheist2 and easy to be an agnostic4 ,but inevitableness1 in itself1 is no ground of philosophic certitude4 ,so this point may be ignored2 and in all other respects the parallel seems to be complete4 ,some form of ,theism has been prevalent from an immemorial past4 ,it has strongly appealed to the needs and feelings of mankind4 ,you do not pause before accepting beliefs about things and persons till philosophy has solved all the speculative doubts about them which philosophy itself has raised4 ,why1 then1 should you apply a standard of rationality to religion which1 with general approval1 you reject in the case of science80 ,now ,i do not suggest that this is bad advice4 ,quite the contrary4 ,neither is it necessarily bad argument4 ,but it is not the argument of these lectures4 ,whatever be its intrinsic merits1 it has1 from my point of view1 the defect of implying a theory of knowledge--a very modest and unassuming theory indeed2 but still a theory4 ,and it therefore comes into competition with all other theories of knowledge--,absolutist1 ,empirical1 ,pragmatic1 ,neo-,kantian1 ,neo-,hegelian1 ,realist1 ,new ,realist1 to say nothing of ,professor ,mach's philosophy of science1 or ,m4 ,bergson's world-famous speculations4 ,now ,i preach no theory of knowledge2 partly because ,i have none to preach1 partly because1 in these lectures1 ,i desire to dogmatise as little as ,i can about fundamentals1 and to be constructive rather than critical4 ,if you ask me how it is possible to be constructive without first settling fundamentals1 and how it is possible to settle fundamentals without first being critical1 ,i reply that it is only possible if you start from premises which are practically accepted by both parties to the controversy1 however little agreement there may be as to their speculative proof2 and this is what ,i am trying to do4 ,nor ought this procedure to be deemed unworthy of the attention of serious thinkers4 ,it is provisional1 no doubt2 but ,i do not think it shallow4 ,it can never give us a metaphysic of the universe2 but the creators of such a metaphysic1 when they come1 will not find it stand in their way4 ,moreover1 it takes account of facts as they are4 ,a creed of some kind1 religious or irreligious1 is a vital necessity for all1 not a speculative luxury for the few3 and the practical creed of the few who speculate has a singular1 and even suspicious1 resemblance to that of the many who do not4 ,while those rare individuals who have thought deeply about the theory of knowledge are profoundly divided as to why we should believe1 they largely agree as to what we should believe with that vast multitude who1 on the theory of knowledge1 have never thought at all4 ,is not this a circumstance in itself most worthy of closer consideration8 ,may it not guide us to some approximate solution of our present perplexities8 ,the present lectures are an attempt to answer this question4 ,is my argument1 then1 nothing better than an appeal from the competent to the incompetent1 from the few to the many8 ,by no means4 ,progress1 though of small account unless it touch the many1 gets its vital impetus always from the few4 ,it is to the patient labours of those rare intelligences who possess originality1 courage1 subtlety1 and sympathy that we must look for the gradual working out of a theory of the universe which shall as fully satisfy our reason and our conscience as the limitations of our faculties permit4 ,but that consummation is not yet4 ,and since1 whether we be philosophers or not1 we all act on a working body of root-beliefs about men and things3 since we are also in general agreement as to the form in which those beliefs can best express the present state of knowledge1 is it not legitimate to ask whether1 on the basis thus provided1 a still larger measure of practical harmony cannot in the meantime be reasonably established8 ,it is true that ,theism could never by such methods acquire a certitude either greater than1 or independent of1 the beliefs of science and common sense4 ,but1 could it acquire as much1 theologians might well be content1 though philosophers most rightly strove for more4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,written before the war4 ,,lecture ,,ii ,i ,the argument1 then1 which ,i propose to lay before you1 though its material is provided by our common-sense beliefs1 is not an argument from common sense4 ,it does not extend to theology those uncritical methods which we accept 7most of us without protest7 in the sphere of our every-day activities4 ,is it1 then1 you may be tempted to ask1 some form of the yet more familiar argument from design8 ,is it more than ,paley and the ,bridgwater treatises brought up to date8 ,and1 if so1 has not the vanity of all such endeavours been demonstrated in advance3 from the side of sceptical philosophy by ,hume2 from the side of idealist philosophy by ,kant and his successors2 from the side of empirical philosophy by the nineteenth-century agnostics2 from the side of science by the theory of ,natural ,selection8 ,do not the very catch-words of the argument--8contrivance10 8design10 8adaptation10 exercised by the 8,architect of the ,universe0 fill us with a certain weariness8 ,do they not represent the very dregs of stale apologetics2 the outworn residue of half-forgotten controversies8 ,for my own part1 ,i do not think the argument from contrivance bad1 but ,i do think it very limited3 limited in respect of its premises2 limited also in respect of its conclusions4 ,it may1 perhaps1 be worth dwelling on some of these limitations1 if only to make my own position clearer by contrast4 ,in the first place1 it must be noted that1 from a consideration of inanimate nature alone it is difficult1 perhaps impossible1 to infer design4 ,the mere existence of natural laws is not1 as it seems to me1 a sufficient basis for the argument2 we require also that these laws should combine to subserve an end4 ,were the universe1 for example1 like a huge impervious reservoir of some simple gas1 where nothing rested but nothing changed1 where amid all the hurry and bustle of colliding atoms no new thing was ever born1 nor any old thing ever perished1 we might find in it admirable illustrations of natural law1 but no hints1 so far as ,i can see1 of purpose or design4 ,nor is the case really mended if1 instead of thus artificially simplifying inanimate nature1 we consider it in all its concrete complexity4 ,even cosmic evolution of the ,spencerian type will scarcely help us4 ,herbert ,spencer1 as we know1 regarded the world-story as a continuous progress from the simple to the complex1 in which the emergence of the living out of the not-living is treated as a harmonious episode in one vast evolutionary drama4 ,the plot opens in the first chapter with diffused nebul2 it culminates in the last with the social organisation of man4 ,unfortunately its central episode1 the transition from the not-living to the living1 was never explained by the author of the 8,synthetic ,philosophy02 and the lamentable gap must be filled in by each disciple according to his personal predilections4 ,for the moment1 however1 we are concerned only with one part of the story1 that which deals with the evolution of inanimate nature4 ,can this be regarded as displaying design8 ,i hardly think so4 ,granting1 for the sake of argument1 the validity of the ,spencerian physics1 granting that the material ,universe exhibits this general trend from the simple to the complex1 from a loose diffusion of nebulous matter to the balanced movements of suns and satellites1 does this of itself give any hint of purpose8 ,only1 ,i believe1 if we confound evolution with elaboration and elaboration with improvement1 and read into it some suggestion of progress borrowed from biology or ethics1 sociology or religion4 ,but we have not the slightest right to do this4 ,apart from life and thought1 there is no reason to regard one form of material distribution as in any respect superior to another4 ,a solar system may be more interesting than its parent nebula2 it may be more beautiful4 ,but if there be none to unravel its intricacies or admire its splendours1 in what respect is it better8 ,its constituent atoms are more definitely grouped1 the groups move in assignable orbits2 but why should the process by which these results have been achieved be regarded as other than one of purposeless change super-induced upon meaningless uniformity8 ,why should this type of 8evolution0 have about it any suggestion of progress8 ,and1 if it has not1 how can it indicate design8 ,spencer himself was1 of course1 no advocate of 8design0 after the manner of ,paley2 and ,i only mention his cosmic speculations because their unavowed optimism--the optimism that is always apt to lurk in the word 8evolution0--makes of them material peculiarly suitable for those who seek for marks of design in lifeless nature4 ,but let us add two touches to ,spencer's picture1 and see how the argument then stands4 ,i have already commented on the great omission which mars the continuity of his world-story--the omission1 ,i mean1 of any account of the transition from the not-living to the living4 ,i shall have again to refer to it4 ,but there are1 besides this1 two other omissions1 one at the beginning of his narrative1 and the other at the end1 whose significance in relation to 8design0 should receive a passing comment4 ,as ,i understand the matter1 an intelligence sufficiently endowed--let us call him ,laplace's calculator--might infer the past state of the material universe from the present by a process of rigorous deduction1 on accepted physical principles4 ,but1 if he carried back his investigations into a period sufficiently remote1 he would find a point at which certain fundamental processes reach a theoretical limit2 and1 though we must believe that this condition of things had antecedents1 yet infinite powers of calculation1 based upon infinite knowledge of the present1 could not1 it seems1 tell us what they were4 ,so much for the past4 ,now for the future4 ,here our calculator would be more successful4 ,his prophecy1 unlike his history1 would not break helplessly against any impassable barrier4 ,he could range at will over the illimitable future4 ,but the prospect1 though unbounded1 would not be exhilarating4 ,no faintest tinge of optimism would colour his anticipations4 ,everything that happened1 good or bad1 would subtract something from the lessening store of useful energy1 till a time arrived when nothing could happen any more1 and the universe1 frozen into eternal repose1 would for ever be as if it were not4 ,do our ideas of material evolution1 thus corrected and supplemented1 lend themselves easily to the argument from design8 ,i hardly think so4 ,it is true that in retrospect we can ideally reach a limit which no calculations1 based upon physical laws1 will permit us to overpass1 and that where 7what in old-fashioned language were called7 8secondary causes0 fail us1 a ,first ,cause may plausibly be invoked2 but1 if we gaze forward instead of backward1 the physical course of nature does not merely fail to indicate design1 it seems loudly to proclaim its absence4 ,a world where all energy suffers inevitable degradation1 considered by itself1 appears atheistic on the face of it3 nor can even life consciousness or thought redeem it1 if they1 too1 are doomed to perish when further transformations of energy become impossible4 ,it is not1 therefore1 on any general survey of material nature that1 in the present state of our knowledge1 we can base the argument from 8design40 ,nor is this the foundation on which those who use the argument have chiefly built4 ,they have always sought for proofs of contrivance rather among the living than among the dead4 ,in the intricate adjustment of different parts of an organism to the interests of the whole2 in the adaptation of that whole to its environment1 they found the evidence they required4 ,arrangements which so irresistibly suggested purpose could not 7they thought7 be reasonably attributed to chance4 ,this argument possessed immense force in what was1 comparatively speaking1 the infancy of biology4 ,has that force been lessened by the growth of knowledge8 ,yes and ,no4 ,if we consider organic adaptations and adjustments in themselves1 scientific discovery has increased a thousand-fold our sense of their exquisite nicety and their amazing complexity4 ,i take it as certain that1 had no such theory as ,natural ,selection been devised1 nothing would have persuaded mankind that the organic world came into being unguided by intelligence4 ,chance1 whatever chance may mean1 would never have been accepted as a solution4 ,agnosticism would have been scouted as stupidity4 ,all this has been changed1 as every one knows1 by ,darwin4 ,but what exactly was it that1 in this connection1 ,darwin did8 ,he is justly regarded as the greatest among the founders of the doctrine of organic evolution2 but there is nothing in the mere idea of organic evolution which is incongruous with design4 ,on the contrary1 it almost suggests guidance1 it has all the appearance of a plan4 ,why1 then1 has ,natural ,selection been supposed to shake teleology to its foundation8 ,the reason1 of course1 is that though the fact of ,selection does not make it harder to believe in design1 it makes it easier to believe in accident2 and1 as design and accident are the two mutually exclusive alternatives between which the argument from design requires us to choose1 this comes to the same thing4 ,before ,darwin's great discovery those who denied the existence of a ,contriver were hard put to it to explain the appearance of contrivance4 ,darwin1 within certain limits and on certain suppositions1 provided an explanation4 ,he showed how the most complicated and purposeful organs1 if only they were useful to the species1 might gradually arise out of random variations1 continuously weeded by an unthinking process of elimination4 ,assume the existence of living organisms1 however simple1 let them multiply enough and vary enough1 let their variations be heritable1 then1 if sufficient time be granted1 all the rest will follow4 ,in these conditions1 and out of this material1 blind causation will adapt means to ends with a wealth of ingenuity which we not only cannot equal1 but which we are barely beginning to comprehend4#b ,the theory of selection thus destroys much of the foundation on which1 a hundred years ago1 the argument from design was based4 ,what does it leave untouched8 ,it leaves untouched all that can be inferred from the existence of the conditions which make organic evolution possible3 matter which lives1 multiplies1 and varies2 an environment which possesses the marvellously complex constitution required to make these processes possible4 ,selection may modify these conditions1 but it cannot start them4 ,it may modify the manner in which multiplication is secured2 it may modify the lines which variations follow2 it may enable organic species to adapt their powers to their environment1 and 7within narrow limits7 their environment to their powers4 ,but it cannot produce either the original environment or the original living matter4 ,these must be due either to luck or to contrivance2 and1 if they be due to luck1 the luck 7we must own7 is great4 ,how great we cannot say4 ,we cannot measure the improbability of a fortuitous arrangement of molecules producing not merely living matter1 but living matter of the right kind1 living matter on which selection can act4 ,here1 indeed1 ,laplace's calculator might conceivably help us4 ,but suppose him to have done so1 suppose him to have measured the odds against the accidental emergence of the desired brand of protoplasm1 how are we to compare this probability with its assumed alternative--intelligent design8 ,here1 ,i think1 even ,laplace's calculator would fail us2 for he is only at home in a material world governed by mechanical and physical laws4 ,he has no principles which would enable him to make exhaustive inferences about a world in which other elements are included3 and such a world is ours4 ,for a ,greek philosopher to assert that the world is material was legitimate enough4 ,he was in search of a universal principle2 and if he found it in matter we need neither wonder nor criticise4 ,after all1 matter lies round us on every side2 we are immersed in it2 we are largely dependent on it4 ,it may well seem but a small step further1 and a very natural one1 to treat it as the essence of all that is4 ,but1 as it seems to me1 we now know too much about matter to be materialists4 ,the philosophical difficulties in the way of accepting a materialistic world-system are notorious--at least to philosophers4 ,but ,i am not speaking of them4 ,i am thinking of the scientific difficulties1 those that cannot but suggest themselves when we consider the breach of continuity involved in the appearance of life1 and still more obviously of feeling1 at particular points in the long procession of material causes and effects4 ,the very essence of the physical order of things is that it creates nothing new4 ,change is never more than a redistribution of that which never changes4 ,but sensibility belongs to the world of consciousness1 not to the world of matter4 ,it is a new creation1 of which physical equations can give no account2 nay1 rather1 which falsifies such equations2 which requires us to say that1 before a certain date in the history of the universe1 energy in one shape was converted into precisely the same amount of energy in another shape1 and into nothing more2 that matter in one position was transferred to another position without increase or diminution3 but that1 after this date1 the transformations of energy and the movements of matter were sometimes accompanied by psychical 8epiphenomena0 which differ from them in kind1 which are incommensurable with them in amount1 and which no equations can represent4 ,babbage1 in order to show how occasional 8miracles0 might 8naturally0 break the continuity of the longest sequences1 devised a machine which produced numbers according to a particular law for an indefinite period1 then broke this uniformity by a single exception1 and1 thereafter1 reverted for ever to its original principle of action4 ,but ,babbage's results1 however startling1 depended wholly on known mathematical and mechanical laws4 ,their irregularity was only apparent4 ,to ,laplace's calculator1 they would have seemed not merely inevitable but obvious4 ,it is quite otherwise with the appearance and disappearance of feeling1 thought1 will1 consciousness in general1 within the strictly determinal series of mechanical causes and effects4 ,here the anomaly is real3 the breach of continuity inexplicable by any physical laws and indeed incompatible with them4 ,i am not at this moment concerned either to deny or to assert that at the critical frontier where mind and matter meet1 the even course of nature suffers violence4 ,i am not suggesting1 for example1 that1 if a given physiological state were exactly repeated1 the psychical state formerly associated with it would not be repeated also4 ,my point is different4 ,it is that in a strictly determined physical system1 depending on the laws of matter and energy alone1 no room has been found1 and no room can be found1 for psychical states at all4 ,they are novelties1 whose intrusion into the material world cannot be denied1 but whose presence and behaviour cannot be explained by the laws which that world obeys4 ,the difficulty is a very familiar one2 and ,i cannot see that the progress either of science or philosophy has brought us nearer to its solution4 ,but what 7you may be disposed to ask7 has it to do with the argument from design8 ,at least this much3 ,those who refuse to accept design do so because they think the world-story at least as intelligible without it as with it4 ,this opinion is very commonly associated with a conception of the universe according to which the laws of matter and energy are sufficient to explain1 not only all that is1 but all that has been or that will be4 ,if we thus know the sort of explanation which is sufficient to cover the facts1 why 7it is asked7 should we travel further afield into the misty realms of theology or metaphysics8 ,but the explanation does not cover the facts1 even when all has been conceded to the opponents of design that ,i1 at least1 am ready to concede4 ,grant that the inorganic world1 considered in and for itself1 does not suggest contrivance2 grant that the contrivance which the organic world does undoubtedly suggest may in great part be counterfeit--there still remains a vast residue of fact quite recalcitrant to merely physical explanation4 ,i will not argue whether in this residue we should or should not include life4 ,it is enough that we must undoubtedly include feeling and all other phases of consciousness4 ,we must include them1 even if they be no more than the passive accompaniments of material change2 still more must we include them if we speculatively accept 7what ,i deem to be7 the inevitable belief that they can1 within limits1 themselves initiate movement and guide energy4 ,the choice1 therefore1 is not between two accounts of the universe1 each of which may conceivably be sufficient4 ,the mechanical account is not sufficient4 ,it doubly fails to provide a satisfactory substitute for design4 ,in the first place1 it requires us to believe that the extraordinary combination of material conditions required for organic life is due to hazard4 ,in the second place1 it has to admit that these material conditions are insufficient1 and have somehow to be supplemented4 ,we must assume1 that is to say1 an infinitely improbable accident1 and1 when we have assumed it1 we are still unprovided with an explanation4 ,nay1 the case is even worse--for the laws by whose blind operation this infinitely improbable accident has been brought about are1 by hypothesis1 mechanical2 and1 though mechanical laws can account for rearrangements1 they cannot account for creation2 since1 therefore1 consciousness is more than rearrangement1 its causes must be more than mechanical4 ,to me1 then1 it seems that the common-sense 8argument from design0 is still of value4 ,but1 if it carries us beyond mechanical materialism1 it must be owned that it does not carry us very far towards a religious theology4 ,it is inconsistent with ,naturalism3 it is inconsistent with ,agnosticism4 ,but its demands would be satisfied by the barest creed which acknowledged that the universe1 or part of it1 showed marks of intelligent purpose4 ,and1 though most persons willing to accept this impoverished form of ,theism will certainly ask for more1 this is not because they are swept forward by the inevitable logic of the argument1 but because the argument has done something to clear a path which they were already anxious to pursue4 ,,ii ,as the conclusions which ,i desire to establish are richer in contents than any which can be derived merely from marks of contrivance1 so the method of arriving at them is essentially different4 ,in the first place1 it is based not upon considerations drawn from external nature1 but from the mind and soul of man4 ,stress is laid1 not upon contrivances1 adjustments1 and the happy adaptation of means to ends1 but on the character of certain results attained4 ,it is not an argument from design1 but an argument from value4 ,to emphasise the contrast1 it might be called an argument to design4 ,value 7we assert7 is lost if design be absent4 ,value 7you will ask7 of what8 ,of our most valuable beliefs1 7,i answer7 and of their associated emotions4 ,we are1 no doubt1 accustomed to connect the notion of value rather with things believed in1 than with the beliefs of which they are the subjects4 ,a fine symphony1 an heroic deed1 a good dinner1 an assured livelihood1 have admitted values4 ,but what values can we attribute to beliefs and judgments1 except is so far as they are aids and instruments for obtaining valuable objects8 ,this question1 however1 is based1 as ,i think1 upon an insufficient survey of the subject4 ,we are in search of a world outlook4 ,creeds1 therefore1 are our concern4 ,the inquiry with which these lectures are concerned is whether1 among the beliefs which together constitute our general view of the universe1 we should1 or should not1 include a belief in ,god4 ,and to this question it is certainly relevant to inquire whether the elimination of such a belief might not involve a loss of value in other elements of our creed--a loss in which we are not prepared to acquiesce4 ,but how1 you will ask1 is this loss of value brought about8 ,what is the connection between a belief in ,god and a belief concerning 7say7 beauty1 or goodness1 or natural law8 ,evidently the connection is not1 in the ordinary sense1 a logical one4 ,neither sthetic1 nor ethic1 nor scientific judgments can be #8deduced' from ,theism2 nor can ,theism be #8deduced' from them4 ,we are not dealing with premises and conclusions bound together by a formal chain of inference4 ,how1 then1 is our procedure to be described8 ,in order to make this clear1 ,i must call your attention to a double aspect possessed by all beliefs alike1 whatever be the subject-matter with which they deal4 ,all beliefs have a position1 actually or potentially1 in a cognitive series2 all beliefs1 again1 have a position1 known or unknown1 in a causal series4 ,all beliefs1 in so far as they belong to the first kind of series1 are elements in one or more collections of interdependent propositions4 ,they are conclusions1 or premises1 or both4 ,all beliefs1 in so far as they belong to the second kind of series1 are elements in the temporal succession of interdependent events4 ,they are causes1 or effects1 or both4 ,it has1 further1 to be noted that whereas reasons may1 and usually do1 figure among the proximate causes of belief1 and thus play a part in both kinds of series1 it is always possible to trace back the causal series to a point where every trace of rationality vanishes2 where we are left face to face with conditions of beliefs--social1 physiological1 and physical--which1 considered in themselves1 are quite a-logical in their character4 ,it is on this last point that ,i particularly desire to insist4 ,we are all very familiar with the equivocal origin of most human creeds4 ,to be sure1 we observe it chiefly in the case of other people4 ,in our own case1 we dwell by preference on those causes of our beliefs which are also reasons4 ,but in our detached studies of the opinions we do not share1 we easily perceive how insufficient are the arguments officially urged on their behalf1 and how often even these insufficient arguments have only a nominal connection with the convictions of which they claim the legal paternity4 ,we must1 however1 go yet one step further4 ,we must realise that1 on any merely naturalistic hypothesis1 the rational elements in the causal series lie always on the surface4 ,penetrate but a short way down1 and they are found no more4 ,you might as easily detect life in the minerals wherein plants are rooted1 as reason in the physiological and physical changes to which the source of our most carefully reasoned beliefs must1 in the last resort1 be traced4 ,consider1 for example1 an extreme case--say a proposition of ,euclid4 ,here we have a belief logically inferred from well-assured premises--so1 at least1 we were accustomed to suppose before mathematicians became so very fastidious in the matter of proof4 ,can we not say that in this case the elements of the two series are in a sense identical1 that all the causes for our belief are also reasons for it8 ,certainly we are not moved by prejudice1 or affection1 or authority4 ,it is neither self-interest nor party passion that induces us to believe1 for example1 that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles4 ,has our thought1 then1 in this case freed itself from the dominion of a-logical conditions8 ,is our belief the child of uncontaminated reason8 ,i answer--,no4 ,though the argument1 qua argument1 is doubtless independent of time1 the argumentative process by which we are in fact convinced occurs in time1 and1 like all psychological processes1 is somehow associated with physiological changes in the brain1 ,these1 again1 are part of the general stream of physical happenings1 which in themselves have nothing rational about them4 ,follow up this stream but a little further and every trace1 not only of mind but of life1 is completely lost2 and we are left face to face with unthinking matter and its purposeless movements4 ,logical inference is thus no more than the reasoned termination of an unreasoning process4 ,scratch an argument1 and you find a cause4 ,if this be admitted1 the question at once arises whether we can treat the two kinds of series thus intimately connected as separable when we are estimating the values of the beliefs with which they are both associated4 ,is it permissible1 is it even possible1 to ignore the genesis of knowledge when we are considering its validity8 ,do not origins qualify values8 ,in many cases they notoriously do4 ,a distinguished agnostic once observed that in these days ,christianity was not refuted1 it was explained4 ,doubtless the difference between the two operations was1 in his view1 a matter rather of form than of substance4 ,that which was once explained needed1 he thought1 no further refutation4 ,and certainly we are all made happy when a belief1 which seems to us obviously absurd1 is shown nevertheless to be natural in those who hold it4 ,but we must be careful4 ,true beliefs are effects no less than false4 ,in this respect magic and mathematics are on a level4 ,both demand scientific explanation2 both are susceptible of it4 ,manifestly1 then1 we cannot admit that explanation may be treated as a kind of refutation4 ,for1 if so1 the more successfully science carried out its explanatory task1 the more completely would it shatter its own principles4 ,this way lies universal scepticism4 ,thus would all intellectual values be utterly destroyed4 ,but we have not to do with intellectual values alone4 ,there are beliefs 7as ,i have already said7 round which crystallise complex emotions1 sthetic and ethic1 which play no small part in our highest life4 ,without the beliefs the emotions would dwindle2 without the emotions the beliefs would lose their worth4 ,though they do not imply each other in the world of logic1 they are mutually necessary in the world of values4 ,here1 of course1 there is no question of a contrast between the logical and the causal series4 ,emotions are always effects2 they are never inferences4 ,in their case1 therefore1 the relation of value to origin is not obscured by considerations like those which must occupy us in the case of mere beliefs2 and we have to face in a simpler and more direct form the central problem of these lectures3 the problem of the relation which origin bears to value4 ,it is with this branch of my subject as it is raised by sthetic and by ethic emotions that ,i shall be mainly occupied in the next two lectures4 ,and as in the later part of my course ,i shall contend that it is destructive of rational values to root them in unreason1 so ,i shall now contend that the emotional values associated with1 and required by1 our beliefs about beauty and virtue must have some more congruous source than the blind transformation of physical energy4 ,if ,i am successful in my endeavour ,i shall have done something to show that 8design0 is demanded by all that we deem most valuable in life1 by beauty1 by morals1 by scientific truth3 and that it is design far deeper in purpose1 far richer in significance1 than any which could be inferred from the most ingenious and elaborate adjustments displayed by organic life4 ,,footnotes3 #b ,as ,i shall often have to mention 8selection0 in the course of these lectures1 ,i must observe that it is no part of my business to weigh the comparative merits of competing evolutionary theories4 ,it may be that the hypothesis of small random variations accumulated or eliminated according as they help or hinder survival1 is1 in the light of recent research1 insufficient and unsatisfactory4 ,from my point of view this is immaterial4 ,i use the word 8selection0 as a convenient name for any non-rational process1 acting through heredity1 which successfully imitates contrivance4 ,darwin's theory1 be it true or false1 still provides1 ,i suppose1 the only suggestion as to how this feat may be accomplished1 and his terminology may be used without danger of misunderstanding4 ,,part ,,ii ,,sthetic ,,and ,,ethical ,,values ,,lecture ,,iii ,,sthetic ,,and ,,theism ,i ,in this lecture ,i have undertaken to consider certain beliefs and emotions relating to beauty1 and to inquire how far their value is affected by our views as to their origin4 ,the poverty of language1 however1 makes it rather difficult to describe with any exactness the scope of such an inquiry4 ,beauty is an ill-defined attribute of certain members of an ill-defined class2 and for the class itself there is no very convenient name4 ,we might describe its members as 8objects of sthetic interest0 always bearing in mind that this description 7as ,i use it7 applies to objects of the most varying degrees of excellence--to the small as well as the great1 the trifling as well as the sublime3 to conjuring and dancing2 to literature1 art1 and natural beauty4 ,it follows from this description that1 while all things of beauty possess sthetic interest1 not all things of sthetic interest would in common parlance be described as beautiful4#c ,they might1 for example1 display wit1 or finish1 or skill4 ,they might1 therefore1 properly excite admiration4 ,but beauty is a term whose use may well be confined to the qualities which excite only the highest forms of sthetic interest1 and it is thus ,i propose to employ it4 ,now what are the characteristics which distinguish objects of sthetic interest from interesting objects generally8 ,i will mention two4 ,in the first place1 the value of sthetic objects depends on the intrinsic quality of the emotions they arouse1 and not upon the importance of any ulterior purpose which they may happen to subserve4 ,in the second place1 the emotions themselves1 whatever be their value1 must be contemplative4 ,they must not prompt to action or reach forward to any end4 ,they must be self-sufficient1 and self-contained4 ,of course1 ,i do not suggest that works of art are useless4 ,a building may be beautiful1 although it is also convenient4 ,a sword most delicately damascened may be an admirable engine of destruction4 ,we may even go further and admit that utility unadorned may have about it an sthetic flavour4 ,nice adjustment and fitness exquisitely accomplished are without doubt agreeable objects of contemplation4 ,but1 in the first two of these cases1 beauty is deliberately added to utility1 not organically connected with it4 ,an ill-proportioned building might have been equally fitted for its purpose2 a plain sword might have been equally lethal4 ,in the third case the connection between utility and sthetic interest is organic1 yet undesigned4 ,from the very nature of the case it forms no part of the purpose for which the mechanism was contrived4 ,again--when ,i say that sthetic interest does not prompt to action1 ,i am1 of course1 speaking of those who enjoy1 not of those who are laboriously trying to enjoy1 still less of those who create what is to be enjoyed4 ,it commonly requires effort1 conscious and unconscious1 to be a good spectator2 it always requires effort to become a good artist4 ,yet these are no real exceptions to the principle4 sthetic interests1 once aroused1 do not prompt to action2 and it is1 ,i conceive1 of their essence that they should not4 ,the most emotional spectator does not rush to save ,desdemona from ,othello2 and1 though tragedy may 7or may not7 purify by 8pity and terror10 the pity does not suggest a rescue1 nor the terror urge to flight4 ,,ii ,now these characteristics of sthetic emotions and beliefs raise problems of great interest4 ,how came they to be what they are8 ,to what causal process are they due8 ,in the case of ethics 7to anticipate a discussion that will occupy us in the next lecture7 the earlier stages at least are seemingly due to selection4 ,they lead to action1 and to action which has survival value4 ,but what survival value have sthetic judgments and feelings at any stage of culture8 ,it is true that actions which are sometimes represented as primitive forms of artistic creation play their part in the drama of animal courtship4 ,some animals dance1 some sing1 some croak2 some flaunt colours1 some exhale smells4 ,apes 7it seems7 make inarticulate noises which 7according to ,spencer7 were the humble beginnings1 not only of speech1 but of music4 ,i own that to me this sort of explanation leaves our sthetic interests quite unexplained4 ,grant1 for the sake of argument that1 were our knowledge sufficient1 we could trace a continuous history of musical emotions from the simple satisfaction excited in the female ape by the howling of the male1 down to the delicate delights of the modern musician1 should we be nearer an answer to the problem of sthetic causation8 ,i doubt it4 ,certainly we should not have succeeded in coupling the development of our feelings for beauty to the general process of organic evolution4 ,before this can be satisfactorily accomplished it must be shown1 not merely that the tastes of anthropoid apes are useful to anthropoid apes1 but that the tastes of men are useful to men1 and in particular that the tastes of civilised men are useful to civilised men4 ,nor would even this be enough unless usefulness be carefully defined in terms of survival value4 ,it must1 in other words1 be shown that communities rich in the genius which creates beauty and in the sensibility which enjoys it1 will therefore breed more freely and struggle more successfully than their less gifted neighbours4 ,and ,i am not aware that any attempt to establish such a doctrine has ever been seriously undertaken4 ,but1 if so1 our sthetic sensibilities must be regarded 7from the naturalistic standpoint7 as the work of chance4 ,they form no part of the quasi design which we attribute to selection2 they are unexplained accidents of the evolutionary process4 ,this conclusion harmonises ill with the importance which civilised man assigns to them in his scheme of values4 ,on this point1 at least1 there reigns a singular unanimity4 ,however people may differ as to what we should admire1 all are agreed that we should admire something4 ,however they may differ about the benefits to be derived from sthetic1 all are agreed that the benefits are great4 ,the pessimist finds in art the solitary mitigation of human miseries4 ,a certain type of agnostic treats it as an undogmatic substitute for religion4 ,he worships beauty1 but nothing else2 and expects from it all the consolations of religious experience without the burdens of religious belief4 ,even those who would refuse to art and literature this exalted position1 are prepared to praise them without stint4 ,they regard the contemplative study of beautiful things as a most potent instrument of civilisation2 in countless perorations they preach its virtues2 delicacy of sthetic discrimination they deem the surest proof of culture1 and the enjoyment of sthetic excellence its highest reward4 ,the case is apparently1 but not really1 different when we turn from beauty to the minor sthetic interests--the popular novel1 the music-hall song1 the cricket-match 7as spectacle71 the cinematograph1 and so forth4 ,nobody1 it is true1 greatly praises these things1 but multitudes greatly enjoy them4 ,the space they occupy in the life of the community has increased beyond computation4 ,as locomotion becomes easier and leisure greater that space will increase yet more4 ,this may be good or bad2 but none will deny that it is important4 ,what a paradox this seems6 ,theories of selection were devised to explain the complex structures and the marvellous adjustments of the organic world without needlessly postulating design4 ,we should think but poorly of them if they accounted for some organs by methods quite inapplicable to others--if they showed us1 for example1 how the eye had developed1 but appealed to some wholly different principle 7say special creation7 when they set to work on the ear2 or taught that the nose must be regarded as an evolutionary accident not to be explained on any general principle at all4 ,if what required explanation was of small biological importance1 this last hypothesis would not seem perhaps startling4 ,the most convinced selectionist is not obliged to suppose that selection eliminates everything which does not make for survival4 ,useless variations may be spared if they be harmless4 ,even harmful variations may be spared if they be linked to variations so advantageous that their joint effect proves beneficial on balance4 ,but is this the case with sthetic8 ,are we to treat as unconsidered trifles our powers of enjoying beauty and of creating it8 ,can we be content with a world-outlook which assigns to these chance products of matter and motion so vast a value measured on the scale of culture1 and no value worth counting measured on the scale of race survival8 ,if design may ever be invoked where selection fails and luck seems incredible1 surely it may be invoked here4 ,,iii ,these observations are applicable1 more or less1 to the whole body of our sthetic interests--whether they be roused by objects we deem relatively trivial1 or by objects which are admittedly rare and splendid4 ,but while neither fit comfortably into a purely naturalistic framework1 it is only the second which1 in virtue of their intrinsic quality1 demand a source beyond and above the world of sense perception4 ,here1 then1 we are face to face with a new question4 ,so far we have been concerned to ask whether that which is admittedly valuable can be plausibly attributed to chance4 ,now we must ask whether that which is attributed to chance can thereafter retain its value4 ,of these questions the first is germane to the ordinary argument from design4 ,it is the second which chiefly concerns us in these lectures4 ,perhaps an affirmative answer may seem to have been already given by implication4 ,the admission that the second problem only touches the highest values in the sthetic scale may be thought to render the whole inquiry vain4 ,and the admission cannot be avoided4 ,no one supposes that when we are looking 7for example7 at an acrobat1 it matters in the least what we think of the universe4 ,our beliefs and disbeliefs about the ,cosmic order will not modify either in quantity or quality such satisfaction as we can derive from the contemplation of his grace and agility4 ,where1 then1 it will be asked1 do we reach the point in the sthetic scale at which values begin to require metaphysical or theological postulates8 ,is it the point where beauty begins8 ,if so1 who determine where this lies2 and by what authority do they speak8 ,evidently we are here on difficult and delicate ground4 ,on questions of taste there is notoriously the widest divergence of opinion4 ,nor1 if we regard our sthetic interests simply as the chance flotsam and jetsam of the evolutionary tides1 could it well be otherwise4 ,if there be practically no 8limits of deviation0 imposed by selection2 if1 from a survival point of view1 one taste be as good as another1 it is not the varieties in taste which should cause surprise so much as the uniformities4 ,to be sure1 the uniformities have often no deep sthetic roots4 ,they represent no strong specific likes and dislikes shared by all men at a certain stage of culture1 but rather tendencies to agreement 7as ,i have elsewhere called them71 which govern our social ritual1 and thereby make social life possible4 ,we rail at 8fashion10 which by an unfelt compulsion drives multitudes simultaneously to approve the same dresses1 the same plays1 the same pictures1 the same architecture1 the same music1 and the same scenery4 ,we smile at the obsequious zeal with which men strive to admire what the prophets of the moment assure them is admirable4 ,but admitting1 as ,i think we must1 that these prophets neither possess any inherent authority1 nor can point to any standard of appeal1 we must also admit that if in ,art there were no orthodoxies1 if the heresies themselves were unorganised1 if every man based his sthetic practice on a too respectful consideration of his own moods and fancies1 the world we live in would be even more uncomfortable than it is4 ,however this may be1 it is clear that this second portion of my argument1 which is not based1 like the first1 on any objective survey of the part played in human affairs by general sthetic interests1 has special difficulties to surmount4 ,for it rests on experiences of high emotion rare for all1 unknown to many1 roused in different men by different objects4 ,how can any conclusions be securely based on foundations at once so slender and so shifting8 ,i agree that the values dealt with in this part of the argument are not values for everybody4 ,yet everybody1 ,i think1 would be prepared to go some way in the direction ,i desire4 ,they would acknowledge that1 in art1 origin and value cannot be treated as independent4 ,they would agree that those who enjoy poetry and painting must be at least dimly aware of a poet beyond the poem and a painter beyond the picture4 ,if by some unimaginable process works of beauty could be produced by machinery1 as a symmetrical colour pattern is produced by a kaleidoscope1 we might think them beautiful till we knew their origin1 after which we should be rather disposed to describe them as ingenious4 ,and this is not1 ,i think1 because we are unable to estimate works of art as they are in themselves1 not because we must needs buttress up our opinions by extraneous and irrelevant considerations2 but rather because a work of art requires an artist1 not merely in the order of natural causation1 but as a matter of sthetic necessity4 ,it conveys a message which is valueless to the recipient1 unless it be understood by the sender4 ,it must be expressive4 ,such phrases are no doubt easily misunderstood4 ,let me1 therefore1 hasten to add that by an 8expressive0 message ,i do not mean a message which can be expressed in words4 ,a work of art can never be transferred from one medium into another1 as from marble to music4 ,even when words are the medium employed1 perfect translation is impossible4 ,one poet may paraphrase1 in a different language1 the work of another2 and a new work of art may thus be produced4 ,but however closely it follows the original1 it will never be the same4 ,on the other hand1 if the medium used be 7for example7 colour1 or sound1 or stone1 the work of art cannot be translated into words at all4 ,it may be described2 and the description may better the original4 ,yet it cannot replace it4 ,for every work of art is unique2 and its meaning cannot be alternatively rendered4 ,but are we1 therefore1 to conclude that it has no meaning8 ,because its message cannot be translated1 has it therefore no message8 ,to put these questions is to answer them4 ,many people1 however1 who would travel with me so far would refuse to go further4 ,they would grant that a work of art must be due to genius1 and not1 in the first instance1 to mechanism or to chance4 ,but whether1 in the last resort1 mechanism or chance has produced the genius1 they would regard as1 from the sthetic point of view1 quite immaterial4 ,music and poetry must have a personal source4 ,but the musician and the poet may come whence they will4 ,and perhaps1 in very many cases1 this is so2 but not1 ,i think1 in all1 nor in the highest4 ,if any man will test this for himself1 let him recall the too rare moments when beauty gave him a delight which strained to its extremest limit his powers of feeling2 when not only the small things of life1 but the small things of ,art--its technical dexterities1 its historical associations--vanished in the splendour of an unforgettable vision2 and let him ask whether the attribution of an effect like this to unthinking causes1 or to an artist created and wholly controlled by unthinking causes1 would not go far to impair its value4 ,to such an appeal it is not difficult to raise objections4 ,it may be said1 for example1 that1 under the stress of emotions like those ,i have described1 no man troubles his head about problems of cosmology2 thought is merged in feeling2 speculation is smothered4 ,but though this is true1 it is not wholly true4 ,as no pain1 ,i suppose1 is so intense as to exclude all reflections on its probable duration1 so no rapture is so absorbing as to exclude all reflections on its probable source4 ,i grant that at such moments we do not philosophise2 we do not analyse a problem1 turning it this way or that1 and noting every aspect of it with a cool curiosity4 ,nevertheless1 for those accustomed to reflect1 reflection is never wholly choked by feeling4 ,nor can feeling1 in the long run1 be wholly unaffected by reflection4 ,again1 it may be said that such moments too seldom occur in any man's experience to justify even the most modest generalisations--let alone generalisations that embrace the universe4 ,but this objection seems to rest on a misapprehension4 ,we must remember that the argument from sthetic values is not a scientific induction or a logical inference4 ,there is here no question of truth and falsehood1 or even of good taste and bad taste4 ,we are not striving to isolate what is essential to beauty by well-devised experiments2 nor are we concerned with psycho-physical determination of the normal relation between feeling and stimulus4 ,if it be urged that some particular example of deep sthetic emotion quite outruns the merits of its object1 so that sound canons of criticism require its value to be lowered1 we need not deny it4 ,we are not dealing with sound canons of criticism2 though ,i may observe1 in passing1 that if they lower emotional values in one direction without raising them in others1 good taste becomes a somewhat costly luxury4 ,my point is different4 ,i am not appealing to all men1 but only to some men--to those and to those only who1 when they explicitly face the problem1 become deeply conscious of the incongruity between our feelings of beauty and a materialistic account of their origin4 ,the extreme individualism of this point of view may seem repulsive to many4 ,are the feelings 7they will ask7 of some transient moment to be treated as authentic guides through the mysteries of the universe1 merely because they are strong enough to overwhelm our cooler judgment8 ,and1 if so1 how far is this method of metaphysical investigation to be pressed8 ,are we1 for example1 to attach transcendental value to the feelings of a man in love8 ,there is evidently a close1 though doubtless not a perfect1 parallel between the two cases4 ,it is true that love is rooted in appetite1 and that appetite has a survival value which ,i1 at least1 cannot find in the purely contemplative emotions4 ,but romantic love goes far beyond race requirements4 ,from this point of view it is as useless as sthetic emotion itself4 ,and1 like sthetic emotion of the profounder sort1 it is rarely satisfied with the definite1 the limited1 and the immediate4 ,it ever reaches out towards an unrealised infinity4 ,it cannot rest content with the prose of mere fact4 ,it sees visions and dreams dreams which to an unsympathetic world seem no better than amiable follies4 ,is it from sources like these--the illusions of love and the enthusiasms of ignorance--that we propose to supplement the world-outlook provided for us by sober sense and scientific observation8 ,yet why not8 ,here we have values which by supposition we are reluctant to lose4 ,neither scientific observation nor sober sense can preserve them4 ,it is surely permissible to ask what will4 ,and if ,naturalism be inimical to their maintenance1 the fact should at least be noted4 ,it is true1 no doubt1 that these high-wrought feelings have worse enemies even than naturalism4 ,when the impassioned lover has sunk into a good husband1 and the worshipper of beauty has cooled into a judicious critic1 they may look back on their early raptures with intelligent disdain4 ,in that event there are for them no values to be maintained4 ,they were young1 they were foolish1 they made a mistake1 and there is no more to be said4 ,but there is a higher wisdom4 ,without ignoring what experience has to teach1 they may still believe that through these emotions they have obtained an authentic glimpse of a world more resplendent and not less real than that in which they tramp their daily round4 ,and1 if so1 they will attribute to them a value independent of their immediate cause--a value which cannot be maintained in a merely naturalistic setting4#d ,this may seem a doctrine too mystical to suit the general tenor of these lectures4 ,let me1 therefore1 hasten to add that our ordinary and repeatable experiences of beauty seem to point in the same direction as these rarer and more intense emotions4 ,it is1 of course1 true that even about these we cannot generalise as we may 7for example7 about the external world4 ,we cannot1 ,i mean1 assume that there is a great body of sthetic experience which all normal persons possess in common4 ,there is always something about our feeling for beautiful things which can neither be described nor communicated1 which is unshared and unshareable4 ,many normal persons have no such feelings1 or none worth talking about4 ,their sthetic interests may be great1 but they lie at a lower level of intensity4 ,they do not really care for beauty4 ,again1 there are many who do care1 and care greatly1 who would yet utterly repudiate the doctrine that the highest sthetic values were in any sense dependent on a spiritual view of the universe4 ,the fact that so much of the greatest art has been produced in the service of religion they would not regard as relevant4 ,they would remind us that one great poet at least has been a passionate materialist2 that many have been pessimists2 that many have been atheists2 that many have been in violent revolt against the religion of their age and country4 ,of these we cannot say that their art suffered from their opinions1 for we cannot imagine what their art would have been like had their opinions been different4 ,neither can we say that the readers who shared their opinions1 became1 thereby1 less qualified to enjoy their art4 ,such a paradox would be too violent4 ,how1 then 7the objectors may ask71 are facts like these to be harmonised with the views ,i am recommending8 ,probably they cannot be harmonised4 ,we are confronted with a difference of temperament which must be accepted as final4 ,yet the contradiction may often be less than at first appears4 ,in the case which ,i brought forward just now1 strong sthetic emotion was assumed to carry with it1 both at the crisis of immediate experience and yet more in periods of reflective retrospect1 a demand for some cause emotionally adequate to its effect4 ,in other words1 it was assumed that such an experience suggested the question--whence comes it8 of matter8 or of spirit8 and required the answer--if it be not born of spirit it is little1 or it is naught4 ,but in many cases this answer is not given because the question is not asked2 or1 if it be asked1 is misunderstood4 ,and there are many reasons why it should not be asked2 and many why it should be misunderstood4 ,for there are two things which must1 in this connection1 be remembered4 ,the first is that materialism has never been the prevailing creed among lovers of beauty4 ,the second is that though 7as ,i contend7 a deep-lying incongruity infects theories which trace the ultimate genesis of beauty exclusively to causes which neither think1 nor feel1 nor will1 such theories involve no contradiction1 nor can those who hold them be taxed with inconsistency4 ,there is1 therefore1 little in the ordinary routine of artistic criticism which raises the point which we are now discussing4 ,a critic examining some artistic whole--a picture1 a poem1 a symphony--is much occupied in separating out the elements which contribute to the total effect1 and in observing their character1 value1 and mutual relations4 ,but it is only when we cease to analyse1 when we contemplate1 directly or in retrospect1 the whole as a whole1 that the problem of origin arises2 and even then it need never become explicit4 ,it may remain in the shape of an unsatisfied longing for a spiritual reality beyond the sensuous impression1 or of a vaguely felt assurance that the spiritual reality is there4 ,and in neither case has it developed into a question definitely presented--and pressing for a definite reply4 ,while1 then1 ,i am quite ready to believe that there are many persons whose enjoyment of beauty is quite independent of their world outlook1 ,i am also convinced that there are some who count themselves among the number only because they have never put the matter to the proof4 ,it may be that they have given but little thought to questions of theology or metaphysics4 ,it may be that they are pantheists after the manner of ,shelley1 or pessimists after the manner of ,schopenhauer4 ,perhaps1 again1 they hold one or other of the theosophies which pass current in the ,west as the esoteric wisdom of the ,east4 ,in any case1 they are averse from orthodoxy1 or what they regard as such4 ,a lover of the beautiful belonging to any type like these1 if asked whether his estimate of sthetic values depended on his creed1 might easily miss the point of the inquiry1 and his negative reply would be worthless4 ,let the question1 therefore1 be put in different terms4 ,let him be asked whether beauty would not lose value for him if his world-outlook required him to regard it as a purposeless accident2 whether the sthetic delights which he deems most exquisite would not be somewhat dimmed if reflection showed them to be as vain1 as transitory1 though not so useful1 as the least considered pleasures of sense4 ,if he replies in the negative1 there is no more to be said4 ,this lecture is not addressed to him4 ,but ,i believe there are many to whom such an answer would be profoundly unsatisfying2 and they1 at least1 can hardly deny that sthetic values are in part dependent upon a spiritual conception of the world we live in4 ,,iv ,so far ,i have been considering art and the beauty expressed by art4 ,but there are two kinds of sthetic interest1 which1 though not artistic in the ordinary sense of the word1 are so important that something must be said about them before this lecture closes4 ,the first of these is natural beauty4 ,hegel1 if ,i rightly understand him1 altogether excluded this from the sphere of sthetic4 ,for him the point of importance was ,spirit--the ,idea--expressing itself in art2 and since nature is not spirit1 nor natural beauty art1 the exclusion was logical4 ,for me1 on the other hand1 the main thing is feeling roused by contemplation2 and particularly feeling at its highest level of quality and intensity4 ,natural beauty1 therefore1 cannot be ignored2 since no feelings of contemplation possess higher quality1 or greater intensity1 than those which natural beauty can arouse4 ,evidently1 however1 there is1 even from my point of view1 a great difference between beauty in art and beauty in nature4 ,for1 in the case of nature1 there is no artist2 while1 as ,i observed just now1 8a work of art requires an artist1 not merely in the order of natural causation1 but in the order of sthetic necessity4 ,it conveys a message which is valueless to the recipient unless it be understood by the sender4 ,it must be significant40 ,are we1 then1 to lay down one rule for artistic beauty and another rule for natural beauty8 ,must the first be expressive1 but not the second8 ,is creative mind necessary in one case1 and superfluous in the other8 ,and if in the case of nature it be necessary1 where is it to be found8 ,on the naturalistic hypothesis1 it is not to be found at all4 ,the glory of mountain and of plain1 storm and sunshine1 must be regarded as resembling the kaleidoscopic pattern of which ,i just now spoke2 with this difference only--that the kaleidoscope was designed to give some pattern1 though no one pattern more than another2 while nature was not designed with any intention at all1 and gives us its patterns only by accident4 ,i know not whether you will think that this train of thought is helped or hindered by bringing it into relation with our scientific knowledge of natural realities4 ,the world which stirs our sthetic emotions is the world of sense1 the world as it appears4 ,it is not the world as science asks us to conceive it4 ,this is very ill-qualified to afford sthetic delight of the usual type2 although the contemplation of complicated relations reduced to law may produce an intellectual pleasure in the nature of sthetic interest4 ,yet none1 ,i think1 would maintain that mass and motion abstractly considered1 nor any concrete arrangement of moving atoms or undulating ether1 are beautiful as represented in thought1 or would be beautiful could they become objects of perception4 ,we have a bad habit of saying that science deals with nothing but 8phenomena40 ,if by phenomena are meant appearances1 it is to sthetics rather than to science that1 on the principle of ,solomon's judgment1 phenomena most properly belong4 ,to get away from appearances1 to read the physical fact behind its sensuous effect1 is one chief aim of science2 while to put the physical fact in place of its sensuous effect would be the total and immediate ruin of beauty both in nature and in the arts which draw on nature for their material4 ,natural beauty1 in other words1 would perish if physical reality and physical appearance became one1 and we were reduced to the lamentable predicament of perceiving nature as nature is6 ,now1 to me1 it seems that the feeling for natural beauty cannot1 any more than scientific curiosity1 rest satisfied with the world of sensuous appearance4 ,but the reasons for its discontent are different4 ,scientific curiosity hungers for a knowledge of causes2 causes which are physical1 and1 if possible1 measurable4 ,our admiration for natural beauty has no such needs4 ,it cares not to understand either the physical theories which explain what it admires1 or the psychological theories which explain its admiration4 ,it does not deny the truth of the first1 nor 7within due limits7 the sufficiency of the second4 ,but it requires more4 ,it feels itself belittled unless conscious purpose can be found somewhere in its pedigree4 ,physics and psycho-physics1 by themselves1 suffice not4 ,it longs to regard beauty as a revelation--a revelation from spirit to spirit1 not from one kind of atomic agitation to the 8psychic0 accompaniment of another4 ,on this condition only can its highest values be maintained4#e ,v ,there is yet one other subject of sthetic interest on which ,i desire to say something before the course of these lectures carries me into very different regions of speculation4 ,the subject ,i refer to is history4 ,that history has sthetic value is evident4 ,an age which is both scientific and utilitarian occasionally pretends to see in it no more than the raw material of a science called sociology1 and a storehouse of precedents from which statesmen may draw maxims for the guidance of mankind4 ,it may be all this1 but it is certainly more4 ,what has in the main caused history to be written1 and when written to be eagerly read1 is neither its scientific value nor its practical utility1 but its sthetic interest4 ,men love to contemplate the performances of their fellows1 and whatever enables them to do so1 whether we belittle it as gossip or exalt it as history1 will find admirers in abundance4 ,yet the difference between this subject of contemplative interest and those provided either by beauty in art or beauty in nature are striking4 ,in the first place1 history is not concerned to express beauty4 ,i do not deny that a great historian1 in narrating some heroic incident1 may rival the epic and the saga4 ,he may tell a tale which would be fascinating even if it were false4 ,but such cases are exceptional1 and ought to be exceptional4 ,directly it appears that the governing preoccupation of an historian is to be picturesque1 his narrative becomes intolerable4 ,this is because the interest--,i mean the sthetic interest--of history largely depends upon its accuracy2 or 7more strictly7 upon its supposed accuracy4 ,fictitious narrative1 whether realistic or romantic1 may suggest deeper truths1 may tell us more about the heart of man1 than all the histories that ever were written2 and may tell it more agreeably4 ,but fact has an interest1 because it is fact2 because it actually happened2 because actual people who really lived and really suffered and really rejoiced caused it to happen1 or were affected by its happening4 ,and on this interest the charm of history essentially depends4 ,in this respect there is1 ,i think1 a certain analogy between the sthetic interest aroused by history and that aroused by natural beauty4 ,our pleasure in a landscape is qualified if we discover ourselves to have been the victims of an optical delusion4 ,if1 for example1 purple peaks are seen on a far horizon1 the traveller may exclaim1 8,what beautiful mountains60 ,something thereupon convinces him that the mountains are but clouds1 and his delight suffers an immediate chill4 ,but why8 ,the mountains1 it is true1 proved unreal2 but they had as much reality as mountains in a picture4 ,where lies the essential difference between a representation accidentally produced by condensed vapour and a representation deliberately embodied in paint and canvas8 ,it is not to be found1 as might be at first supposed1 in the fact that the one deceives us and the other does not4 ,were we familiar with this particular landscape1 did we know that nothing but a level plain stretched before us to the limits of our vision1 we might still feel that1 if the clouds on the horizon were what they seemed to be1 the view would gain greatly in magnificence4 ,here there is no deception and no shock of disillusionment4 ,if1 therefore1 we remain dissatisfied1 it is because in this case verisimilitude does not suffice us2 we insist on facts4 ,it has1 perhaps1 not been sufficiently noticed that brute fact1 truth as it is apprehended in courts of law1 truth as it is given by an accurate witness speaking on oath1 has for some purposes great sthetic value4 ,that it is all-important in the dealings between man and man would be universally conceded2 that it has no importance either in fine art or imaginative literature1 and no meaning in music or architecture1 most people would be ready to admit4 ,but that it possesses worth where no practical issues are involved1 and that this worth is of the contemplative or sthetic order1 is perhaps not so easy of acceptance4 ,yet so it is4 ,a tale which would be inexpressibly tedious if we thought it was 7in the 8law court0 sense7 false may become of absorbing interest if we think it true4 ,and this not because it touches morals or practice1 not because it has theoretic interest or controversial importance1 but in its own right and on its own merits4 ,now this sthetic quality is1 it seems to me1 required both from 8natural beauty0 and historic narrative2 but if there is here a resemblance between them1 in other respects they are profoundly different4 ,landscape appeals to us directly4 ,i do not mean that our enjoyment of it1 both in quality and quantity1 is not largely due to the work of artists4 ,our tastes have1 no doubt1 been formed and our sensibilities educated by the interpretation of nature which we owe to painters and poets4 ,but though this is true1 it is also true that what we see and what we enjoy is not art but nature1 nature at first hand1 nature seen immediately1 if not as she is1 at least as she appears4 ,in the case of history it is otherwise4 ,except when we happen to have been ourselves spectators of important events1 there is always an artist to be reckoned with4 ,it may be ,thucydides4 ,it may be ,dr4 ,dryasdust4 ,it may be a medival chronicler4 ,it may be ,mrs4 ,candour at the tea-table4 ,but there is always somebody2 and though that somebody might repudiate the notion that his narrative was a work of art1 yet he cannot evade responsibility for selection1 for emphasis1 and for colour4 ,we may think him a bad artist1 but1 even in his own despite1 an artist he is2--an artist whose material is not marble or sound1 but brute fact4 ,there is another way in which the sthetic interest of history characteristically differs from the interest we feel in beauty1 whether of art or of nature4 ,it is massive rather than acute4 ,particular episodes may indeed raise the most poignant emotions4 ,but1 broadly speaking1 the long-drawn story of man and his fortunes stirs feelings which 7to borrow a metaphor from physics7 are great in quantity but of low intensity4 ,so it comes about that1 whereas in the case of art the emotions stand out prominently above their associated judgments1 in the case of history the positions are commonly reversed4 ,yet this need not be so2 and in particular it need not be so when we are contemplating the historical process as a whole4 ,details are then merged in a general impression2 and the general impression drives us beyond the limits of history proper into questions of origin and purpose1 into reflections about man and destiny1 into problems of whence and whither4 ,speculations like these have an emotional as well as an intellectual value1 which must be affected by the answers we give them4 ,let me illustrate and explain4 ,it is possible1 indeed it is easy1 to contemplate aspects of history with the coolest intellectual interest4 ,in this mood we might1 for instance1 study the development of science and religion out of primitive magics and superstitions4 ,in this mood we might observe the characteristics of the city state1 or the growth and decay of feudalism1 or the history of the ,mongols4 ,on the other hand1 the interest often becomes tinged with stronger feelings when we sympathetically follow the changing fortunes of particular individuals or communities4 ,we are then1 as it were1 spectators of a drama1 moved by dramatic hopes and fears1 dramatic likes and dislikes1 dramatic 8pity and terror40 ,and our emotions are not merely those appropriate to drama2 they have1 besides1 that special quality 7already referred to7 which depends on the belief that they are occasioned by real events in a world of real people4 ,but there is yet a third case to be considered1 in which the two previous cases are included and partially submerged4 ,this occurs when the object of our contemplative interest is not episodic but general1 not the fate of this man or that nation1 this type of polity or that stage of civilisation1 but the fate of mankind itself1 its past and future1 its collective destiny4 ,now we may1 if we please1 treat this as no more than a chapter of natural history4 ,compared with the chapter devoted1 let us say1 to the ,dinosaurs it no doubt has the disadvantage of being as yet unfinished1 for the ,dinosaurs are extinct1 and man still survives4 ,on the other hand1 though the natural history of 8,homo ,sapiens0 is incomplete1 we may admit that it possesses a peculiar interest for the biologist2 but this interest is scientific1 not historical4 ,for what does historical interest require8 ,not merely 8brute fact10 but brute fact about beings who are more than animals1 who look before and after1 who dream about the past and hope about the future1 who plan and strive and suffer for ends of their own invention2 for ideals which reach far beyond the appetites and fears which rule the lives of their brother beasts4 ,such beings have a 8natural history10 but it is not with this that we are concerned4 ,the history which concerns us is the history of self-conscious personalities1 and of communities which are 7in a sense7 self-conscious also4 ,can the contemplative values which this possesses1 especially in its most comprehensive shape1 be regarded as independent of our world-outlook8 ,surely not4 ,observe that history1 so conceived1 must needs compare faculty with desire1 achievement with expectation1 fulfilment with design4 ,and no moralist has ever found pleasure in the comparison4 ,the vanity of human wishes and the brevity of human life are immemorial themes of lamentation2 nor do they become less lamentable when we extend our view from the individual to the race4 ,indeed1 it is much the other way4 ,men's wishes are not always vain1 nor is every life too brief to satisfy its possessor4 ,only when we attempt1 from the point of view permitted by physics and biology1 to sum up the possibilities of collective human endeavour1 do we fully realise the 8vanity of vanities0 proclaimed by the ,preacher4 ,i am not1 of course1 suggesting that history is uninteresting because men are unhappy3 nor yet that naturalism carries pessimism in its train4 ,it may well be that if mankind could draw up a hedonistic balance-sheet1 the pleasures of mundane existence would turn out to be greater than its sufferings4 ,but this is not the question4 ,i am not 7for the moment7 concerned with the miseries of the race1 but with its futility4 ,its miseries might be indefinitely diminished1 yet leave its futility unchanged4 ,we might live without care and die without pain2 nature1 tamed to our desires1 might pour every luxury into our lap2 and1 with no material wish unsatisfied1 we might contemplate at our ease the inevitable1 if distant1 extinction of all the life1 feeling1 thought1 and effort whose reality is admitted by a naturalistic creed4 ,but how should we be advanced8 ,what interest would then be left in the story of the human race from its sordid beginnings to its ineffectual end8 ,poets and thinkers of old dimly pictured a controlling ,fate to which even the ,olympian gods were subject4 ,the unknown power1 which they ignorantly worshipped1 any text-book on physics will now declare unto you4 ,but no altars are erected in its honour4 ,its name is changed4 ,it is no longer called ,fate or ,destiny1 but is known by a title less august if more precise1 the law of energy-degradation1 or 7if you please7 8the second law of thermo-dynamics40 ,it has become the subject of scientific experiment2 the physicists have taken it over from the seers1 and its attributes are defined in equations4 ,all terrestrial life is in revolt against it2 but to it1 in the end1 must all terrestrial life succumb4 ,eschatology1 the doctrine of the last things1 has lapsed from prophecy to calculation1 and has become 7at least potentially7 a quantitative science4 ,and1 from a scientific point of view1 this is quite satisfactory4 ,but it is not satisfactory when we are weighing the sthetic values of universal history4 ,shakespeare1 in the passionate indictment of life which he puts into the mouth of ,macbeth1 declares it to be 8a tale told by an idiot1 full of sound and fury10 and 7mark well the climax7 8signifying nothing40 ,that is the point with which in this lecture we are chiefly concerned4 ,it most clearly emerges when1 in moments of reflection1 we enlarge the circuit of our thoughts beyond the needs of action1 and1 in a mood untouched by personal hopes or fears1 endeavour to survey man's destiny as a whole4 ,till a period within the memory of men now living it was possible to credit terrestrial life with an infinite future1 wherein there was room for an infinite approach towards some1 as yet1 unpictured perfection4 ,it could always be hoped that human efforts would leave behind them some enduring traces1 which1 however slowly1 might accumulate without end4 ,but hopes like these are possible no more4 ,the wider is the sweep of our contemplative vision the more clearly do we see that the rle of man1 if limited to an earthly stage1 is meaningless and futile2--that1 however it be played1 in the end it 8signifies nothing40 ,will any one assert that universal history can maintain its interest undimmed if steeped in the atmosphere of a creed like this8 ,here1 however1 we are evidently nearing the frontier which divides sthetic from ethic4 ,before ,i cross it1 and begin a new subject1 let me very briefly touch on a difficulty which may have occurred to some of my hearers4 ,the line of thought followed in the last section of this lecture assumes1 or seems to assume1 that our only choice lies between history framed in a naturalistic1 and history framed in a theistic1 setting4 ,in the first case we have a world-outlook which forbids the attribution of permanent value to human effort2 in the second case we have a world-outlook which requires1 or1 at the least1 permits it4 ,but are these the only alternatives8 ,what are we to say1 for example1 about those metaphysical religions which1 whether they be described as theistic1 pantheistic1 or atheistic1 agree in regarding all life as illusion1 all desire as wretchedness1 and deem the true end of man to be absorption in the timeless identity of the real8 ,such creeds have no affinity with naturalism4 ,philosophically they are in sharpest contrast to it4 ,but even less than naturalism do they provide history with a suitable setting4 ,for naturalism does1 after all1 leave untouched the interest of historical episodes1 so long as they are considered out of relation to the whole of which they form a part4 ,as we are content1 in the realm of fiction1 to bid farewell to the hero and heroine on their marriage1 unmoved by anxieties about their children1 so1 in the realm of 8brute fact10 we may arbitrarily isolate any period we choose1 and treat the story of it without reference to any theories concerning the future destiny of man4 ,but this process of abstraction must surely be useless for those who think of the world in terms of the metaphysical religions to which ,i have referred4 ,in their eyes all effort is inherently worthless1 all desire inherently vain4 ,nor would they change their opinion even were they persuaded that progress was real and unending2 that effort and desire were building up1 however slowly1 an imperishable polity of super-men4 ,for those who in this spirit face the struggling world of common experience the contemplative interest of universal history must be small indeed4 ,,footnotes3 #c ,i greatly regret having to stretch the ordinary meaning of the word 8sthetic0 to the extent required by the argument of this chapter4 ,i got into trouble in a previous work by the extension ,i gave to the word 8,authority40 ,and as1 in that case1 no explanation seemed sufficient to avoid misconception1 so ,i am afraid it will be in the present case4 ,but what better course is open to me8 ,i require a word to express a concept which is vital to the doctrines ,i am preaching4 ,where am ,i to get it8 ,if there is no such word in ordinary use1 ,i must either invent a new word1 or ,i must modify the familiar meaning of an old word4 ,there are objections to both courses2 yet one of them must be taken4 ,i have chosen the second2 and can do no more than ask for the indulgence of those readers who think ,i should have chosen the first4 #d ,cf4 ,plato in the 8,phdrus40 #e ,it is perhaps to this tendency we may 7in part7 attribute the eagerness with which poetry and fine art have used and abused the personifications of natural objects provided for them by primitive superstition4 ,if not1 it is curious that these tedious mythologies should have been cherished by poets long after they were abandoned by everybody else2 and that we still use every expedient for endowing material nature with fictitious sympathies and powers4 ,but it is1 ,i think1 an error to see nothing in such metaphors but a trick of style4 ,they represent the same deep-rooted tendency which finds significance in such phrases as 8,mother ,earth10 which has suggested certain poetic forms of ,pantheism2 or which gathers a vague1 semi-spiritual consolation from the thought that1 when we die1 our bodies1 resolved into their elements1 may still share in the new manifestations of life which ,nature 7half personified7 pours out in exhaustless profusion4 ,,lecture ,,iv ,,ethics ,,and ,,theism ,i ,i turn now from contemplation to action2 from sthetics to ,ethics4 ,and in so doing ,i must ask permission to stretch the ordinary meaning of the term which ,i use to describe the subject-matter of the present lecture1 as ,i have already stretched the meaning of the term which described the subject-matter of the last4 8sthetics0 there included much besides beauty2 8,ethics0 here will include much besides morality4 ,as1 under the first head1 were ranged contemplative interests far lower in the scale than 7for example7 those of art1 so ,i shall extend the use of the word 8,ethics0 till it embraces the whole range of what used to be called the 8springs of action10 from the loftiest love down to impulses which in themselves are non-moral1 instinctive1 even automatic4 ,the grounds for this procedure are similar in both cases4 ,i am mainly1 almost exclusively1 concerned with beliefs and emotions touching beauty and goodness4 ,yet it is important to remember that1 considered as natural products1 these shade off by insensible gradations into manifestations of life to which the words 8belief0 and 8emotion0 are quite inapplicable1 where 8beauty0 and 8goodness0 have little meaning or none4 ,and as this larger class1 when concerned with action1 has at present no better name1 ,i may be permitted to describe it as ethical4 ,i am mainly concerned1 however1 with that higher part of the ethical scale which all would agree to call ,moral1 and with the debatable region immediately below it4 ,of purposive action1 or what seems to be such1 of a still lower type1 ,i need say little--but we must never forget that it is there4 ,morals1 as ,i conceive them1 are concerned with ends of action3 and principally with ultimate ends of action4 ,an end of action1 in so far as it is ultimate1 is one which is pursued for itself alone1 and not as a means to some other end4 ,of course an end may be1 and constantly is1 both ultimate and contributory4 ,it is sought for on its own account1 and also as an instrument for procuring something else4 ,it is mainly in the first of these capacities1 however1 that it concerns morality4 ,for the purposes of this lecture ,i shall classify ultimate ends as either egoistic or altruistic--egoistic ends being those that are immediately connected with1 or centred in1 the agent2 altruistic ends being those that are not4 ,but ,i beg you to remember that this distinction does not correspond to that between right and wrong4 ,egoism is not necessarily vicious1 nor is altruism necessarily virtuous4 ,indeed1 as ,i shall have occasion to point out later1 the blackest vices1 such as cruelty and hatred1 are often altruistic4 ,this is an unusual1 though not1 ,i think1 an unreasonable1 use of language4 8,egoism0 and 8altruism0 are terms historically associated with the moral theories which regard happiness as the only end of action1 but are under the necessity of distinguishing between actions designed to secure the happiness of the agent and actions designed to secure the happiness of other people4 ,i do not accept these theories1 though ,i borrow their phraseology4 ,happiness may1 or may not1 be the highest of all ultimate ends1 the one to which all others should give way4 ,but it seems to me quite misleading to call it the only one4 ,to describe the sensual man1 the vain man1 the merely selfish man1 the miser1 the ascetic1 the man moved by rational self-love1 the man absorbed in the task of 8self-realisation10 the man consumed by the passion for posthumous fame1 as all pursuing the same egoistic end by different means1 is surely to confuse distinctions of great moral importance without any gain of scientific clarity4 ,in like manner1 to suppose that the man who spends himself in the service 7say7 of his family1 his country1 or his church1 is only striving for the 8happiness0 of the human race1 or of certain selected members of the human race1 is 7it seems to me7 to ignore the plain teaching of daily experience4 ,as there are many egoistic ends besides our own happiness1 so there are many altruistic ends besides the happiness of others4 ,the extended sense1 therefore1 in which ,i employ these terms seems justified by facts4 ,,ii ,i shall not attempt to determine the point at which we can first clearly discriminate between the 8egoistic0 and 8altruistic0 elements in animal instinct4 ,evidently1 however1 it is anterior to and independent of any conceptual recognition either of an ego or an alter4 ,it might be argued that there is an altruistic element in the most egoistic instincts4 ,eating1 multiplying1 fighting1 and running away--acts plainly directed towards preserving and satisfying the individual--also conduce to the preservation of the race4 ,but1 however this may be1 the converse is certainly untrue4 ,there are altruistic instincts into which no element of egoism enters4 ,of these the most important is parental1 especially maternal1 love3 the most amazing are the impulses which regulate the complex polity of 7for example7 a hive of bees4 ,in these cases one organism will work or fight or endure for others3 it will sacrifice its life for its offspring1 or for the commonwealth of which it is a member4 ,egoism is wholly lost in altruism4 ,now1 ,i suppose that1 in the order of causation1 all these animal instincts1 be they egoistic or altruistic1 must be treated as contrivances for aiding a species in the struggle for existence4 ,if anything be due to selection1 surely these must be4 ,this is plainly true of the egoistic appetites and impulses on which depend the maintenance of life and its propagation4 ,it must also be true of the altruistic instincts4 ,take1 for instance1 the case of parental devotion4 ,its survival value is clearly immense4 ,the higher animals1 as at present constituted1 could not exist without it2 and though1 for all we can say to the contrary1 development might have followed a different course1 and a race not less effectively endowed than man might flourish though parental care played no greater part in the life-history of its members than it does in the life-history of a herring1 yet this is not what has actually happened4 ,altruistic effort1 in the world as we know it1 is as essential to the higher organisms as the self-regarding instincts and appetites are to organic life in general2 and there seems no reason for attributing to it a different origin4 ,can this be said with a like confidence about the higher portions of the ethical scale8 ,are these also due to selection8 ,evidently the difference between primitive instincts and developed morality is immense2 and it is as great in the egoistic as in the non-egoistic region of ethics4 ,ideals of conduct1 the formulation of ends1 judgments of their relative worth1 actions based on principles1 deliberate choice between alternative policies1 the realised distinction between the self and other personalities or other centres of feeling-- all these are involved in developed morality1 while in animal ethics they exist not at all1 or only in the most rudimentary forms4 ,compare1 for instance1 a society of bees and a society of men4 ,in both there is division of labour2 in both there is organised effort towards an end which is other and greater than the individual good of any single member of the community4 ,but though there are these deep-lying resemblances between the two cases1 how important are the differences which divide them6 ,in the bee-hive altruism is obeyed1 but not chosen4 ,alternative ends are not contrasted4 ,no member of the community thinks that it could do something different from1 and more agreeable than1 the inherited task4 ,nor in truth could it4 ,general interest and individual interest are never opposed1 for they are never distinguished4 ,the agent never compares1 and therefore never selects4 ,far different are the ethical conditions requiring consideration when we turn from bees to men4 ,here egoism and altruism are not only distinguished in reflection2 they may be1 and often are1 incompatible in practice4 ,nor does this conflict of ends only show itself between these two great ethical divisions2 it is not less apparent within them4 ,here1 then1 we find ourselves in a world of moral conflict very faintly foreshadowed in animal ethics4 ,for us1 ultimate ends are many4 ,they may reinforce each other1 or they may weaken each other4 ,they may harmonise1 or they may clash4 ,personal ends may prove incompatible with group ends3 one group end may prove incompatible with another4 ,loyalty may be ranged against loyalty1 altruism against altruism2 nor is there any court of appeal which can decide between them4 ,but there are yet other differences between the ethics of instinct and the ethics of reflection4 ,instincts are 7relatively7 definite and stable2 they move in narrow channels2 they cannot easily be enlarged in scope1 or changed in character4 ,the animal mother1 for example1 cares for its young children1 but never for its young grandchildren4 ,the lifelong fidelity of the parent birds in certain species 7a fidelity seemingly independent of the pairing season1 or the care of particular broods7 never becomes the nucleus of a wider association4 ,altruistic instincts may lead to actions which equal1 or surpass1 man's highest efforts of abnegation2 but the actions are matters of routine1 and the instincts never vary4 ,they emerge in the same form at the same stage of individual growth1 like any other attribute of the species--its colour1 for instance1 or its claws4 ,and if they be1 like colour and claws1 the products of selection1 this is exactly what we should expect4 ,but then1 if the loyalties of man be also the product of selection1 why do they not show a similar fixity8 ,plainly they do not4 ,man inherits the capacity for loyalty1 but not the use to which he shall put it4 ,the persons and causes 7if any7 to which he shall devote himself are suggested to him1 often1 indeed1 imposed upon him1 by education and environment4 ,nevertheless1 they are his by choice1 not by hereditary compulsion4 ,and his choice may be bad4 ,he may unselfishly devote himself to what is petty or vile1 as he may to what is generous and noble4 ,but on the possibility of error depends the possibility of progress2 and if 7to borrow a phrase from physics7 our loyalty possessed as few 8degrees of freedom0 as that of ants or bees1 our social organisation would be as rigid4 ,the most careless glance at the pages of history1 or the world of our own experience1 will show how varied are the forms in which this capacity for loyalty is displayed4 ,the ,spartans at ,thermopyl1 the 8,blues0 and the 8,greens0 at ,byzantium1 rival politicians in a hard-fought election1 players and spectators at an ,eton and ,harrow ,match1 supply familiar illustrations of its variety and vigour4 ,and do not suppose that in thus bringing together the sublime1 the familiar1 and the trivial1 ,i am paradoxically associating matters essentially disparate4 ,this is not so4 ,i am not putting on a moral level the patriot and the partisan1 the martyr to some great cause and the shouting spectator at a school match4 ,what ,i am insisting on is that they all have loyalty in common2 a loyalty which often is1 and always may be1 pure from egoistic alloy4 ,loyalties1 then1 which are characteristically human differ profoundly from those which are characteristically animal4 ,the latter are due to instincts which include both the end to be sought for and the means by which it is to be attained4 ,the former are rooted in a general capacity for1 or inclination to1 loyalty1 with little inherited guidance either as to ends or means4 ,yet1 if we accept selection as the source of the first1 we can hardly reject it as the source of the second4 ,for the survival value of loyalty is manifest4 ,it lies at the root of all effective co-operation4 ,without it the family and tribe would be impossible2 and without the family and the tribe1 or some yet higher organisation1 men1 if they could exist at all1 would be more helpless than cattle1 weak against the alien forces of nature1 at the mercy of human foes more capable of loyalty than themselves4 ,a more powerful aid in the struggle for existence cannot easily be imagined4 ,we are indeed apt to forget how important are its consequences1 even when it supplies no more than a faint qualification of other and more obvious motives4 ,it acts like those alloys which1 in doses relatively minute1 add strength and elasticity even to steel4 ,the relation 7for example7 between a commercial company and its officials is essentially a business one4 ,the employer pays the market price for honesty and competence1 and has no claim to more4 ,yet that company is surely either unfortunate or undeserving whose servants are wholly indifferent to its fortunes1 feeling no faintest flicker of pride when it succeeds1 no tinge of regret when it fails4 ,honourable is the tie between those who exchange honest wage and honest work2 yet loyalty can easily better it4 ,and a like truth is manifest in spheres of action less reputable than those of commerce4 ,mercenaries1 to be worth hiring1 must be partly moved by forces higher than punishment or pay4 ,even pirates could not plunder with profit were their selfishness unredeemed by some slight tincture of reciprocal loyalty4 ,there are1 however1 many who would admit the occasional importance of loyalty while strenuously denying that social life was wholly based upon it4 ,for them society is an invention2 of all inventions the most useful1 but still only an invention4 ,it was 7they think7 originally devised by individuals in their individual interest2 and1 though common action was the machinery employed1 personal advantage was the end desired4 ,by enlightened egoism social organisation was created2 by enlightened egoism it is maintained and improved4 ,contrivance1 therefore1 not loyalty1 is the master faculty required4 ,this is a great delusion--quite unsupported by anything we know or can plausibly conjecture about the history of mankind4 ,no one1 indeed1 doubts that deliberate adaptation of means to ends has helped to create1 and is constantly modifying1 human societies2 nor yet that egoism has constantly perverted political and social institutions to merely private uses4 ,but there is something more fundamental to be borne in mind1 namely1 that without loyalty there would be no societies to modify1 and no institutions to pervert4 ,if these were merely well-designed instruments like steam-engines and telegraphs1 they would be worthless4 ,they would perish at the first shock1 did they not at once fall into ruin by their own weight4 ,if they are to be useful as means1 they must first impose themselves as ends2 they must possess a quality beyond the reach of contrivance3 the quality of commanding disinterested service and uncalculating devotion4 ,,iii ,i should therefore be ready to admit1 as a plausible conjecture1 that the capacity for altruistic emotions and beliefs is a direct product of organic evolution2 an attribute preserved and encouraged1 because it is useful to the race1 and transmitted from parents to offspring by physiological inheritance4 ,on this theory loyalty in some shape or other is as natural to man as maternal affection is natural to mammals4 ,doubtless it is more variable in strength1 more flexible in direction1 more easily smothered by competing egoisms2 but the capacity for it is not less innate1 and not less necessary in the struggle for existence4 ,but when we ask how far selection has been responsible for the development of high altruistic ideals out of primitive forms of loyalty1 we touch on problems of much greater complexity4 ,evidently there has been a profound moral transformation in the course of ages4 ,none suppose that ethical values are appraised in the twentieth century as they were in the first stone age4 ,but what has caused the change is not so clear4 ,there are obvious1 and1 ,i think1 insurmountable difficulties in attributing it to organic selection4 ,selection is of the fittest--of the fittest to survive4 ,but in what consists this particular kind of fitness8 ,the answer from the biological point of view is quite simple3 almost a matter of definition4 ,that race is 8fit0 which maintains its numbers2 and that race is fittest which most increases them4 ,the judge of such 8fitness0 is not the moralist or the statesman4 ,it is the ,registrar-,general4 ,so little is 8fitness0 inseparably attached to excellence1 that it would be rash to say that there is any quality1 however unattractive1 which might not in conceivable circumstances assist survival4 ,high authorities1 ,i believe1 hold that at this moment in ,britain we have so managed matters that congenital idiots increase faster than any other class of the population4 ,if so1 they must be deemed the 8fittest0 of our countrymen4 ,no doubt this fact1 if it be a fact1 is an accident of our social system4 ,legislation has produced this happy adaptation of environment to organism1 and legislation might destroy it4 ,the fittest to-day might become the unfittest to-morrow4 ,but this is nothing to the purpose4 ,that part of man's environment which is due to man does no doubt usually vary more quickly than the part which is due to nature2 none the less is it environment in the strictest sense of the word4 ,the theory of selection draws no essential distinction between 7say7 the secular congelation of a continent in the ice age1 and the workings of the ,english ,poor ,law in the twentieth century4 ,it is enough that each1 while it lasts1 favours or discourages particular heritable variations1 and modifies the qualities that make for 8survival40 ,what is more important1 however1 than the fact that heritable 8fitness0 may be completely divorced from mental and moral excellence1 is the fact that so large a part of man's mental and moral characteristics are not heritable at all1 and cannot therefore be directly due to organic selection4 ,races may accumulate accomplishments1 yet remain organically unchanged4 ,they may learn and they may forget1 they may rise from barbarism to culture1 and sink back from culture to barbarism1 while through all these revolutions the raw material of their humanity varies never a bit4 ,in such cases there can be no question of ,natural ,selection in the sense in which biologists use the term4 ,and there are other considerations which suggest that1 as development proceeds1 the forces of organic selection diminish4 ,while man was in the making we may easily believe that those possessing no congenital instinct for loyalty failed1 and that failure involved elimination4 ,in such circumstances1 the hereditary instinct would become an inbred characteristic of the race4 ,but in a civilised1 or even in a semi-civilised1 world1 the success of one competitor has rarely involved the extinction of the other--at least by mere slaughter4 ,when extinction has followed defeat1 it has been due rather to the gradual effects of disease and hardship1 or to other causes more obscure1 but not less deadly4 ,the endless struggles between tribes1 cities1 nations1 and races1 have in the main been struggles for domination1 not for existence4 ,slavery1 not death1 has been the penalty of failure2 and if domination has produced a change in the inherited type1 it is not because the conquered has perished before the conqueror1 but because1 conquest having brought them together1 the two have intermarried4 ,there is thus no close or necessary connection between biological 8fitness0 and military or political success4 ,the beaten race1 whose institutions or culture perish1 may be the race which in fact survives2 while victors who firmly establish their language1 religion1 and polity may1 after a few centuries1 leave scarce a trace behind them of any heritable characteristics which the anthropologist is able to detect4 ,this observation1 however1 suggests a new point4 ,is there not1 you may ask1 a 8struggle for existence0 between non-heritable acquirements which faintly resembles the biological struggle between individuals or species8 ,religious systems1 political organisations1 speculative creeds1 industrial inventions1 national policies1 scientific generalisations1 and 7what specially concerns us now7 ethical ideals1 are in perpetual competition and conflict4 ,some maintain themselves or expand4 ,these are1 by definition1 the 8fit40 ,some wane or perish4 ,these are1 by definition1 the unfit4 ,here we find selection1 survival1 elimination2 and1 though we see them at work in quite other regions of reality than those explored by the student of organic evolution1 the analogy between the two cases is obvious4 ,but is the analogy more than superficial8 ,is it relevant to our present argument8 ,can it explain either the spread of higher moral ideals or their development8 ,let us consider for a moment some examples of this psychological 8struggle for existence40 ,take1 as a simple case1 the competition between rival inventions--between the spinning-jenny and the hand-loom1 the breech-loader and the muzzle-loader1 pre-,listerian and post-,listerian methods of surgery4 ,unless the environment be strongly charged with prejudice1 ignorance1 or sinister interests1 the 8fittest0 in such cases is that which best serves its purpose4 ,measurable efficiency is the quality which wins4 ,but this supplies us with no useful analogy when we are dealing with ethics4 ,morality1 as ,i have already insisted1 is not an invention designed to serve an external purpose4 ,the 8struggle for existence0 between higher and lower ethical ideals has no resemblance to the struggle between the spinning-jenny and the hand-loom4 ,it is a struggle between ends1 not between means4 ,efficiency is not in question4 ,a like observation applies to that quality of our beliefs which might be described as 8argumentative plausibility40 ,this is to abstract theorising what efficiency is to practical invention4 ,it has survival value4 ,both1 of course1 are relative terms1 whose application varies with circumstances4 ,an invention is only efficient while the commodity it produces is in demand4 ,a theory is only plausible while it hits off the intellectual temper of the day4 ,but if efficiency and plausibility be thus understood1 the more efficient invention and the more plausible doctrine will oust their less favoured rivals4 ,they are the 8fittest40 ,but as morality is not a means1 so neither is it a conclusion4 ,whatever be its relation to ,reason1 reasoning can never determine the essential nature of its contents4 ,plausibility1 therefore1 is no more in question than efficiency4 ,i do not1 of course1 deny that ethics are always under discussion1 or that the basis of moral rules and their application are themes of unending controversy4 ,this is plainly true4 ,but it is also true that there is no argumentative method of shaking any man's allegiance to an end which he deems intrinsically worthy1 except by showing it to be inconsistent with some other end which he 7not you7 deems more worthy still4 ,dialectic can bring into clear consciousness the implicit beliefs which underlie action1 but it cannot either prove them or refute them4 ,it is as untrue to say that there is no disputing about morals as to say that there is no disputing about tastes4 ,but also it is as true2 and the truth1 properly understood1 is fundamental4 ,what pass for opposing arguments are really rival appeals2 and it is interesting to observe that the appeal which1 to the unreflecting1 seems the most rational is the appeal to selfishness4 ,i am told#f that on any fine ,sunday afternoon in some of our big towns you may find an orator asking why any man should love his country4 8,what10 he inquires1 8does a man get by it8 ,will national success bring either to himself or to any of his hearers more food1 more drink1 more amusements8 ,if not1 why make personal sacrifices for what will never confer personal advantage80 ,to this particular question it might be replied 7though not always with truth7 that the antithesis is a false one1 and that on the whole the selfish ideal and the patriotic ideal are both promoted by the same policy of public service4 ,but there is another question of the same type to which no such answer is possible4 ,we have all heard it1 either in jest or in earnest4 8,why0 7it is asked7 8should we do anything for posterity1 seeing that posterity will do nothing for us80 ,the implication is infamous1 but the statement is true4 ,we cannot extract from posterity an equivalent for the sacrifices we make on its behalf4 ,these are debts that will never be recovered4 ,the unborn cannot be sued2 the dead cannot be repaid4 ,but what then8 ,altruism is not based on egoism2 it is not egoism in disguise4 ,the ends to which it points are ends in themselves2 and their value is quite independent of argument1 neither capable of proof nor requiring it4 ,in what1 then1 consists the psychological 7as distinguished from the organic7 8fitness0 of the higher moral ideals8 ,if it cannot be found in their practical efficiency1 nor yet in their argumentative plausibility1 where shall we seek it8 ,sometimes1 no doubt1 the explanation is to be found in their association with a culture1 other elements of which do possess both these kinds of 8fitness40 ,thus ,western morality--or 7to be accurate7 ,western notions of morality--find favour with backward races1 because they are associated with ,western armaments and ,western arts4 ,again1 they may be diffused1 perhaps as part of some militant religion1 by the power of the sword or by its prestige4 ,they reach new regions in the train of a conqueror1 and willingly or unwillingly the conquered accept them4 ,but these associations are seemingly quite casual4 ,the prestige of ,western arts and science may assist the diffusion of ,western morals1 as it assists the diffusion of ,western languages1 or ,western clothes4 ,conquests by ,mahommedan or ,christian ,states may substitute a higher for a lower ethical creed in this or that region of the world4 ,such cases1 however1 leave us still in the realm of accident4 ,the causes thus assigned for the spread of a particular type of ethical ideal have nothing to do with the quality of that type4 ,they would promote bad morals not less effectively than good2 as a hose will1 with equal ease1 scatter dirty water or clean4 ,moreover1 the growth of the higher type in its place of origin is left wholly unexplained4 ,its 8fitness0 seems a mere matter of luck due neither to design nor to any natural imitation of design4 ,the rigour of this conclusion would be little mitigated even if we could connect psychological fitness with some quite non-moral peculiarity habitually associated with the higher morality1 but not with the lower4 ,if1 for example1 the former were found to lead normally to worldly success1 its repute would need no further explanation4 ,if1 in private life1 those endowed with ,sir ,charles ,grandison's merits usually possessed ,sir ,charles ,grandison's estate1 if1 in political or national life1 victory and virtue went ever hand in hand1 morality might be none the better1 but certainly it would be more the fashion4 ,heaven would be wearied with prayers for an unselfish spirit1 uttered by suppliants from purely selfish motives4 ,saints would become the darlings of society1 and the book of ,job would be still unwritten4#g ,i can devise no more extravagant hypothesis4 ,but though1 if it were true1 the 8fitness0 of the higher morality might seem to have found an explanation1 it is not the explanation we require4 ,it is too external4 ,it gives no account of the appeal which the nobler ends of action make to our judgments of intrinsic value4 ,it suggests the way in which a higher ideal might increase the number of its possessors at the expense of a lower1 but not the way in which the higher ideal might itself arise4 ,indeed1 we must go further4 ,few are the moralists who would maintain that indifference to worldly triumphs was not1 on the whole1 a bar to their attainment4 ,few are the biologists who would maintain that care and kindness1 lavished on the biologically unfit1 will never tend to diminish the relative number of the biologically fit4 ,but1 if so1 we must agree with ,nietzsche in thinking that ethical values have become 8denaturalised40 ,in their primitive forms the products of selection1 they have1 by a kind of internal momentum1 overpassed their primitive purpose4 ,made by nature for a natural object1 they have developed along lines which are certainly independent of selection1 perhaps in opposition to it4 ,and though not as remote from their first manifestations as is the sthetic of men from the sthetic of monkeys1 no evolutionary explanation will bridge the interval4 ,if we treat the ,sermon on the ,mount as a naturalistic product1 it is as much an evolutionary accident as ,hamlet or the ,ninth ,symphony4 ,,iv ,in what setting1 then1 are we to place morality so that these 8denaturalised0 values may be retained8 ,can we be content to regard the highest loyalties1 the most devoted love1 the most limitless self-abnegation as the useless excesses of a world-system1 which in its efforts to adapt organism to environment has overshot its mark8 ,i deem it impossible4 ,the naturalistic setting must be expanded into one which shall give the higher ethics an origin congruous with their character4 ,selection must be treated as an instrument of purpose1 not simply as its mimic4 ,theistic teleology must be substituted for ,naturalism4 ,thus1 and thus only1 can moral values1 as it seems to me1 be successfully maintained4 ,this would not1 ,i suppose1 have been denied by ,nietzsche and ,nietzsche's predecessors in revolt4 ,on the contrary1 they would admit the interdependence of morals and religion1 as these are commonly understood in ,christendom1 and they would condemn both4 ,it would1 however1 have been vehemently denied by agnostics like ,huxley2 for ,huxley accepted1 broadly speaking1 ,christian ethics1 while refusing to accept the ,christian1 or1 indeed1 any other form of theology4 ,in my opinion1 this position is not permanently tenable4 ,i do not mean that it involves a logical contradiction4 ,i do mean that it involves an emotional and doctrinal incompatibility of a very fundamental kind4 ,and this is a defect which may be even more fatal than logical contradiction to the stability of ethical beliefs4 ,for what was ,huxley's position8 ,his condemnation of evolutionary ethics was far more violent than my own4 ,he states categorically that 8,what is ethically best involves conduct which in all respects is opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence40 ,on a biological question ,i differ from him with misgiving2 but1 as ,i have already urged1 selection may plausibly be credited with the earlier stages of the noblest virtues4 ,i cannot think that the mother who sacrifices herself for her child1 the clansman who dies for his chief1 the generation which suffers for the sake of its posterity1 are indulging in 8conduct which is in all respects opposed to that which leads to success in the cosmic struggle for existence40 ,but1 whether ,huxley be right on this point or ,i1 it is surely impossible for the mass of mankind to maintain1 at the cost of much personal loss1 an ideal of conduct which science tells us is not merely an evolutionary accident1 but an evolutionary mistake2 something which was1 and is1 contrary to the whole trend of the cosmic process which brought us into being1 and made us what we are4 ,it requires but a small knowledge of history to show how easily mankind idealises nature2 witness such phrases as 8the return to nature10 the 8state of nature10 8natural rights10 8natural law10 and so forth4 ,appeals founded upon these notions have proved powerful1 even when they ran counter to individualistic selfishness4 ,when the two are in alliance1 how can they be resisted8 ,is it possible for the ordinary man to maintain undimmed his altruistic ideals if he thinks ,nature is against them8--unless1 indeed he also believes that ,god is on their side8 ,v ,here are questions raised to which there is no parallel in the case of sthetics4 ,doubtless differences of sthetic judgment abound2 but they do not produce difficulties quite matching those due to the collision of incompatible ends2 nor is their solution so important4 ,on this subject ,i must say a few words before bringing this lecture to a conclusion4 ,possible collisions between ends are many1 for ends themselves are many4 ,and of these ends some are in their very nature irreconcilable2--based on essential differences which reflection only makes more apparent1 and moral growth more profound4 ,now these collisions are not always between altruism and egoism4 ,often they are between different forms of altruism--call them1 if you please1 the positive form and the negative4 ,enmity1 hate1 cruelty1 tyranny1 and all that odious brood whose end and object is the pain and abasement of others are not intrinsically egoistic4 ,though they be the vilest of all passions1 yet they do not necessarily involve any taint of selfish alloy4 ,often as disinterested as the most devoted love or the most single-minded loyalty1 they may demand no smaller sacrifices on the part of those whom they inspire1 and the demand may be not less willingly obeyed4 ,it is1 perhaps1 worth observing that these altruistic ends1 the positive and the negative1 the benevolent and the malevolent1 irreconcilably opposed as they are in moral theory1 have often been associated in ethical practice4 ,family affection has in many half-civilised communities produced the binding custom of family vendetta4 ,political loyalty1 which has blossomed into some of the noblest forms of positive altruism1 has also bred cruelty and hatred against those who are outside the pale of the tribe1 the state1 the party1 or the creed4 ,the brightest light has cast the deepest shadows4 ,to torture and enslave1 not because it brings profit to the victor1 but because it brings pain to the vanquished1 has1 through long ages1 been deemed a fitting sequel to victories born of the most heroic courage and the noblest self-sacrifice2 while no small part of moral progress has consisted in expelling this perverted altruism from the accepted ideals of civilised mankind4 ,egoism is far more reputable4 ,the agent's own good1 considered in itself1 is1 what negative altruism can never be1 a perfectly legitimate object of endeavour4 ,when1 therefore1 there is a collision between egoism and positive altruism1 problems of real difficulty may arise2 the competing ends may both have value1 and the need for a reconciliation1 practical as well as speculative1 of necessity impresses both moralists and legislators4 ,in practice the evils of this conflict arise largely from the fact that the end which has most worth has too often least power4 ,this is not surprising if the account of ethical evolution1 which ,i have provisionally adopted in this lecture1 be near the truth4 ,for the extra-regarding instincts are of later birth than the self-regarding4 ,all animals look after themselves4 ,only the more developed look also after others4 ,the germ of what1 in reflection1 becomes egoism is of far earlier growth than the germ of what1 in reflection1 becomes altruism4 ,being more primitive1 it is more deeply rooted in our nature2 and1 even when recognised as morally lower1 it tends1 when there is conflict1 to prevail over its rival4 8,the evil that ,i would not1 that ,i do40 ,now this result has1 as we all know1 serious social consequences4 ,even the least stable society must be organised on some firm framework of custom1 rule1 and law2 and these1 in their turn1 must find their main support in the willing loyalty of the general community4 ,but1 though loyalty is the great essential1 it is not sufficient4 ,legislators1 lawyers1 moralists1 all agree that in the collision between ends--especially between egoistic and altruistic ends--it is not always the highest end as judged by the agent himself1 still less the highest end as measured by the standards of the community1 which finally prevails4 ,therefore must law and custom have the support of sanctions3 sanctions being nothing else than devices for bringing a lower motive to the aid of a higher1 and so producing better conduct1 if not#h better morals4 ,public approval and disapproval1 the jailer and the hangman1 heaven and hell1 are familiar examples4 ,can they in any true sense effect a reconciliation between discordant ends1 and1 in particular1 between altruism and egoism8 ,i hardly think so4 ,when they are effective they doubtless diminish ethical conflict2 but it is by ignoring the intrinsic value of one set of ethical ends4 ,in so far as we are honest because honesty is the best policy1 in so far as we do not injure lest we should ourselves be injured1 in so far as we benefit that we may be benefited ourselves--just in that proportion we treat altruistic actions merely as the means of attaining egoistic ends4 ,the two competitors are not reconciled1 but a working arrangement is reached under which the conduct appropriate to the higher ideal is pursued from motives characteristic of the lower4 ,is any truer reconciliation possible8 ,scarcely1 as ,i think1 without religion4 ,i do not suggest that any religious theory gets rid of ethical anomalies1 or theoretically lightens by a feather-weight the heavy problem of evil4 ,but ,i do suggest that in the love of ,god by the individual soul1 the collision of ends for that soul loses all its harshness1 and harmony is produced by raising1 not lowering1 the ethical ideal4 ,kant1 by a famous feat of speculative audacity1 sought to extract a proof of ,god's existence from the moral law4 ,in his view the moral law requires us to hold that those who are good will also in the end be happy2 and1 since without ,god this expectation cannot be fulfilled1 the being of ,god becomes a postulate of morality4 ,is this 7you may ask71 or any variant of this1 the argument suggested in the last paragraph8 ,it is not4 ,in ,kant's argument1 as ,i understand it1 ,god was external to morality in the sense that ,he was not ,himself a moral end4 ,it was not our feeling of love and loyalty to ,him that was of moment1 but ,his guidance of the world in the interests of virtue and the virtuous4 ,my point is different4 ,i find in the love of ,god a moral end which reconciles other moral ends1 because it includes them4 ,it is not intolerant of desires for our own good4 ,it demands their due subordination1 not their complete suppression4 ,it implies loyal service to ,one who by ,his essential nature wills the good of all4 ,it requires1 therefore1 that the good of all shall be an object of our endeavour2 and it promises that1 in striving for this inclusive end1 we shall1 in ,pauline phrase1 be fellow-workers with ,him4 ,i will not further pursue this theme4 ,its development is plainly inappropriate to these lectures1 which are not directly concerned with personal religion4 ,in any case1 this portion of my argument1 though important1 is subsidiary4 ,my main contention rests1 not upon the difficulty of harmonising moral ends in a ,godless universe1 but upon the difficulty of maintaining moral values if moral origins are purely naturalistic4 ,that they never have been so maintained on any large scale is a matter of historic fact4 ,at no time has the mass of mankind treated morals and religion as mutually independent4 ,they have left this to the enlightened2 and the enlightened have 7as ,i think7 been wrong4 ,they have been wrong through their omission to face the full results of their own theories4 ,if the most we can say for morality on the causal side is that it is the product of non-moral1 and ultimately of material agents1 guided up to a certain point by selection1 and thereafter left the sport of chance1 a sense of humour1 if nothing else1 should prevent us wasting fine language on the splendour of the moral law and the reverential obedience owed it by mankind4 ,that debt will not long be paid if morality comes to be generally regarded as the causal effect of petty causes2 comparable in its lowest manifestations with the appetites and terrors which rule1 for their good1 the animal creation2 in its highest phases no more than a personal accomplishment1 to be acquired or neglected at the bidding of individual caprice4 ,more than this is needful if the noblest ideals are not to lose all power of appeal4 ,ethics must have its roots in the divine2 and in the divine it must find its consummation4 ,,footnotes3 #f ,written in #aiac4 #g ,doubtless under such circumstances ideal virtue might also have survival value in the biological sense4 #h ,indirectly1 no doubt1 sanctions may perform a most important educational work in stimulating and guiding the higher loyalties4 ,the approval or disapproval of our fellows1 the 8terrors of the law10 the belief in future rewards and punishments1 though their immediate appeal is only to self-interest1 may powerfully aid in the creation of moral judgments sufficiently free from any 8empirical elements of desire0 to have satisfied ,kant himself4 ,,part ,,iii ,,intellectual ,,values ,,lecture ,v ,,introduction ,,to ,,part ,,iii ,i ,in the preceding lectures ,i have given reasons for thinking that in two great departments of human interest--sthetics and ,ethics--the highest beliefs and emotions cannot claim to have any survival value4 ,they must be treated as by-products of the evolutionary process2 and are1 therefore1 on the naturalistic hypothesis1 doubly accidental4 ,they are accidental in the larger sense of being the product of the undesigned collocation and interplay of material entities--molecular atoms1 sub-atoms1 and ether--which preceded1 and will presumably outlast1 that fraction of time during which organic life will have appeared1 developed1 and perished4 ,they are also accidental in the narrower sense of being only accidentally associated with that process of selective elimination1 which1 if ,darwinism be true1 has so happily imitated contrivance in the adaptation of organisms to their environment4 ,they are the accidents of an accident4 ,i disagreed with this conclusion1 but ,i did not attempt to refute it4 ,i contented myself with pointing out that it was destructive of values2 and that1 the greater the values1 the more destructive it became4 ,the difficulty1 indeed1 on which ,i have so far insisted is not a logical one4 ,we have not been concerned with premises and conclusions4 ,neither our sthetic emotions nor our moral sentiments are the product of ratiocination2 nor is it by ratiocination that they are likely to suffer essential wrong4 ,if you would damage them beyond repair1 yoke them to a theory of the universe which robs them of all general significance4 ,then1 at the very moment when they aspire to transcendent authority1 their own history will rise up in judgment against them1 impugning their pretensions1 and testifying to their imposture4 ,,ii ,the inquiry on which ,i now propose to enter will follow a more or less parallel course1 and will reach a more or less similar conclusion4 ,yet some characteristic differences it must necessarily exhibit4 ,in the higher regions of sthetics and ethics1 emotions and beliefs are inextricably intertwined4 ,they are what naturalists describe as 8symbiotic40 ,though essentially different1 they are mutually dependent4 ,if one be destroyed1 the other withers away4 ,but ,knowledge--the department of human interest to which ,i now turn--is differently placed4 ,the values with which we shall be concerned are mainly rational2 and intellectual curiosity is the only emotion with which they are associated4 ,yet here also two questions arise corresponding to those which we have already dealt with in a different connection3 7#a7 what are the causes of our knowledge1 or of that part of our knowledge which concerns the world of common sense and of science8 7#b7 does the naturalistic account of these causes affect the rational value--in other words the validity--of their results8 ,we are1 perhaps1 more sensitive about the pedigree of our intellectual creed than we are about the pedigree of our tastes or our sentiments4 ,we like to think that beliefs which claim to be rational are the product of a purely rational process2 and though1 where others are concerned1 we complacently admit the intrusion of non-rational links in the causal chain1 we have higher ambitions for ourselves4 ,yet surely1 on the naturalistic theory of the world1 all such ambitions are vain4 ,it is abundantly evident that1 however important be the part which reason plays among the immediate antecedents of our beliefs1 there are no beliefs which do not trace back their origin to causes which are wholly irrational4 ,proximately1 these beliefs may take rank as logical conclusions4 ,ultimately1 they are without exception rooted in matter and motion4 ,the rational order is but a graft upon the causal order2 and1 if ,naturalism be true1 the causal order is blind4 ,,iii ,before ,i further develop this line of speculation it may help you to understand what ,i am driving at if ,i venture upon an autobiographical parenthesis4 ,the point ,i have just endeavoured to make ,i have made before in these lectures1 and ,i have made it elsewhere4 ,it is one of a number of considerations which have led me to question the prevalent account of the theoretical ground-work of our accepted beliefs4 ,taken by itself1 its tendency is sceptical2 and1 since it has been associated with arguments in favour of a spiritual view of the universe1 ,i have been charged 7and not always by unfriendly commentators7 with the desire to force doubt into the service of orthodoxy by recommending mankind to believe what they wish1 since all beliefs alike are destitute of proof4 ,as we cannot extricate ourselves from the labyrinth of illusion1 let us at least see to it that our illusions are agreeable4 ,this1 however1 is not what ,i have ever wanted to say1 nor is it what ,i want to say now4 ,if ,i have given just occasion for such a travesty of my opinions1 it must have been an indirect consequence of my early1 and no doubt emphatically expressed1 contempt for the complacent dogmatism of the empirical philosophy1 which in ,great ,britain reigned supreme through the third quarter of the nineteenth century4 ,but was this contempt altogether unreasonable8 ,i went to ,cambridge in the middle sixties with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science1 but a very keen desire to discover what ,i ought to think of the world1 and why4 ,for the history of speculation ,i cared not a jot4 ,dead systems seemed to me of no more interest than abandoned fashions4 ,my business was with the ground-work of living beliefs2 in particular1 with the ground-work of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved mankind4 ,and surely there was nothing perverse in asking modern philosophers to provide us with a theory of modern science6 ,i was referred to ,mill2 and the shock of disillusionment remains with me to the present hour4 ,mill possessed at that time an authority in the ,english ,universities1 and1 for anything ,i know to the contrary1 in the ,scotch ,universities also1 comparable to that wielded forty years earlier by ,hegel in ,germany and in the ,middle ,ages by ,aristotle4 ,precisely the kind of questions which ,i wished to put1 his ,logic was deemed qualified to answer4 ,he was supposed to have done for scientific inference what ,bacon tried to do1 and failed4 ,he had provided science with a philosophy4 ,i could have forgiven the claims then made for him by his admirers2 ,i could have forgiven1 though young and intolerant1 what seemed to me the futility of his philosophic system1 if he had ever displayed any serious misgiving as to the scope and validity of his empirical methods4 ,if he had admitted1 for example1 that1 when all had been done that could be done to systematise our ordinary modes of experimental inference1 the underlying problem of knowledge still remained unsolved4 ,but he seemed to hold1 in common with the whole empirical school of which1 in ,english-speaking countries1 he was the head1 that the fundamental difficulties of knowledge do not begin till the frontier is crossed which divides physics from metaphysics1 the natural from the supernatural1 the world of 8phenomena0 from the world of 8noumena10 8positive0 experiences from religious dreams4 ,it may be urged that1 if these be errors1 they are errors shared by ninety-nine out of every hundred persons educated in the atmosphere of ,western civilisation1 whatever be their theological views3 and ,i admit that it has sunk deep into our ordinary habits of thought4 ,apologetics are saturated with it1 not less than agnosticism or infidelity4 ,but1 for my own part1 ,i feel now1 as ,i felt in the early days of which ,i am speaking1 that the problem of knowledge cannot properly be sundered in this fashion4 ,its difficulties begin with the convictions of common sense1 not with remote1 or subtle1 or otherworldly speculations2 and if we could solve the problem in respect of the beliefs which1 roughly speaking1 everybody shares1 we might see our way more clearly in respect of the beliefs on which many people are profoundly divided4 ,that ,mill's reasoning should have satisfied himself and his immediate disciples is strange4 ,but that the wider public of thinking men1 whom he so powerfully influenced1 should on the strength of this flimsy philosophy adopt an attitude of dogmatic assurance both as to what can be known and what cannot1 is surely stranger still4 ,thus1 at least1 ,i thought nearly half a century ago1 and thus ,i think still4 ,consider1 for example1 a typical form of the ordinary agnostic position3 that presented by ,leslie ,stephen4 ,the best work of this excellent writer was biographical and literary2 but he was always deeply interested in speculation2 and his own creed seems early to have taken its final shape under the philosophical influences of the ,british empiricists4 ,he regarded the 8appeal to experience0 as the fundamental dogma of agnosticism1 and by the 8appeal to experience0 he meant what ,mill meant by it4 ,he sincerely supposed that this gave you indisputable knowledge of 8phenomena10 and that if you went beyond 8phenomena0 you were dreaming1 or you were inventing4 ,this is a possible creed2 and it is1 in fact1 the creed held implicitly1 or explicitly1 by many thousands of quite sensible people4 ,but why should those who hold it suppose that it must always satisfy impartial inquirers8 ,why should they assume that those who reject it are sacrificing their reason to their prejudices or their fancies8 ,it may represent the best we can do1 but is it1 after all1 so obviously reasonable8 ,on this subject the empirical agnostic has no doubts4 ,he holds1 with unshaken confidence1 that nothing deserves to be believed but that which in the last resort is proved by 8experience02 that the strength of our beliefs should be exactly proportioned to the evidence which 8experience0 can supply1 and that every one knows or can discover exactly what this evidence amounts to4 ,leslie ,stephen refers to a well-known aphorism of ,locke1 who declared that 8there is one unerring mark by which a man may know whether he is a lover of truth in earnest1 viz4 the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant40 ,upon which ,leslie ,stephen observes that the sentiment is a platitude1 but1 in view of the weakness of human nature1 a useful platitude4 ,is it a platitude8 ,did ,locke act up to it8 ,did ,hume act up to it1 or any other of ,leslie ,stephen's philosophic progenitors8 ,does anybody act up to it8 ,does anybody sincerely try to act up to it8 ,read through the relevant chapters in ,locke's ,essay1 and observe his ineffectual struggles1 self-imprisoned in the circle of his own sensations and ideas1 to reach the external world in which he believed with a far 8greater assurance0 than was warranted by any proofs which he1 at all events1 was able to supply4 ,read ,hume's criticism of our grounds for believing in a real world without1 or a real self within1 and compare it with his admission that scepticism on these subjects is a practical impossibility4 ,but we need not go beyond the first chapter of 8,an ,agnostic's ,apology0 to find an illustration of my argument4 ,leslie ,stephen there absolves himself from giving heed to the conclusions of philosophers1 because there are none on which all philosophers are agreed1 none on which there is even a clear preponderance of opinion4 ,on the other hand1 he is ready to agree with astronomers1 because astronomers1 8from ,galileo to ,adams and ,leverrier10 substantially agree with each other4 ,agreement among experts is1 in his opinion1 a guarantee of truth1 and disagreement a proof of error4 ,but then he forgets that these distressing differences among philosophers do not touch merely such entities as ,god and the soul1 or the other subjects with which agnostics conceive man's faculties are incapable of dealing4 ,they are concerned 7among other things7 with the presuppositions on which our knowledge of 8phenomena0--including1 of course 8astronomy from ,galileo to ,adams and ,leverrier10 is entirely constructed4 ,what1 in these circumstances1 is ,locke's 8sincere lover of truth0 to do8 ,how is he to avoid 8entertaining propositions with greater assurance than the proofs they are built on will warrant08 ,where will he find a refuge from the 8pure scepticism0 which is1 in ,leslie ,stephen's opinion1 the natural result of divided opinions8 ,how is he to get on while he is making up his mind whether any theory of the world within his reach will satisfy unbiased reason8 ,the fact is that the adherents of this philosophic school apply1 quite unconsciously1 very different canons of intellectual probity to themselves and to their opponents4 8,why10 asks ,mr4 ,stephen1 8should a lad who has just run the gauntlet of examination and escaped to a country parsonage be dogmatic80 ,if to be dogmatic is to hold opinions with a conviction in excess of any reason that can be assigned for them1 there seems to be no escape for the poor fellow4 ,the common lot of man is not going to be reversed for him4 ,though he abandon his parsonage and renounce his ,church1 though he scrupulously purify his creed from every taint of the 8metempirical10 though he rigidly confine himself to themes which his critics declare to be within the range of his intellectual vision1 fate will pursue him still4 ,he may argue much or argue little2 he may believe much or believe little2 but1 however much he argues and however little he believes1 his beliefs will always transcend his arguments1 and to faith1 in his own despite1 he must still appeal4 ,those who accept ,leslie ,stephen's philosophy suppose that for this young man1 as for all others1 a way of escape may be found by appealing to experience4 ,but surely none are so sanguine as to suppose that1 by appealing to experience1 they are going to avoid what ,mr4 ,stephen describes as 8endless and hopeless controversies40 ,alas1 this is not so6 ,the field of experience is no well-defined and protected region under whose clear skies useful knowledge flourishes unchallenged1 while the mist-enshrouded territories of its metaphysical neighbours are devastated by unending disputations4 ,on the contrary1 it is the very battlefield of philosophy1 the cockpit of metaphysics1 strewn with abandoned arguments1 where every strategic position has been taken and retaken1 to which every school lays formal claim1 which every contending system pretends to hold in effective occupation4 ,indeed1 by a singular irony1 the thinkers who1 at this particular moment1 talk most about experience are those metaphysicians of the ,absolute in whose speculations ,mr4 ,stephen saw no beginning of interest1 except that of being 7as he supposed7 at once the refuge and the ruin of traditional religion4 ,but these philosophers have no monopoly4 ,all men nowadays speak well of experience4 ,they begin to differ only when they attempt to say what experience is1 to define its character1 explain its credentials1 and expound its message4 ,but1 unhappily1 when this stage is reached their differences are endless4 ,,iv ,i am1 of course1 not concerned with ,mr4 ,stephen except as a brilliant representative of a mode of thought to which ,i most vehemently object4 ,i do not object to it merely because it is in my judgment insufficient and erroneous1 still less because ,i dislike its conclusion4 ,i object to it because it talks loudly of experience1 yet never faces facts2 and boasts its rationality1 yet rarely reasons home4 ,these are far graver crimes against the spirit of truth than any condemned in ,locke's pretentious aphorism1 and they lead to far more serious consequences4 ,if you ask me what ,i have in mind when ,i say that agnostic empiricism never faces facts1 ,i reply that it never really takes account of that natural history of knowledge1 of that complex of causes1 rational and non-rational1 which have brought our accepted stock of beliefs into being4 ,and if you ask me what ,i have in mind when ,i say that though it reasons1 it rarely reasons home1 ,i reply that1 when it is resolved not to part with a conclusion1 anything will serve it for an argument2 only when it is incredulous does it know how to be critical4 ,this is not an error into which ,i propose to fall4 ,but ,i hope that ,i shall not on that account be deemed indifferent to the claims of reason1 or inclined to treat lightly our beliefs either about the material world or the immaterial4 ,on the contrary1 my object1 and my only object1 is to bring reason and belief into the closest harmony that at present seems practicable4 ,and if you thereupon reply that such a statement is by itself enough to prove that ,i am no ardent lover of reason2 if you tell me that it implies1 if not permanent contentment1 at least temporary acquiescence in a creed imperfectly rationalised1 ,i altogether deny the charge4 ,so far as ,i am concerned1 there is no acquiescence4 ,let him that thinks otherwise show me a better way4 ,let him produce a body of beliefs which shall be at once living1 logical1 and sufficient2--not forgetting that it cannot be sufficient unless it includes within the circuit of its doctrines some account of itself regarded as a product of natural causes1 nor logical unless it provides a rational explanation of the good fortune which has made causes which are not reasons1 mixed1 it may be1 with causes which are not good reasons1 issue in what is1 by hypothesis1 a perfectly rational system4 ,he who is fortunate enough to achieve all this may trample as he likes upon less successful inquirers4 ,but ,i doubt whether1 when this discoverer appears1 he will be found to have reached his goal by the beaten road of empirical agnosticism4 ,this1 though it be fashionably frequented1 is but a blind alley after all4 ,in the meanwhile we must1 ,i fear1 suffer under a system of beliefs which is far short of rational perfection4 ,but we need not acquiesce1 and we should not be contented4 ,whether this state of affairs will ever be cured by the sudden flash of some great philosophic discovery is another matter4 ,my present aim1 at all events1 is far more modest4 ,but they1 at least1 should make no complaint who hold that common-sense beliefs1 and science which is a development of common-sense beliefs1 are1 if not true1 at least on the way to truth4 ,for this conviction ,i share4 ,i profess it2 ,i desire to act upon it4 ,and surely ,i cannot act upon it better than by endeavouring1 so far as ,i can1 to place it in the setting which shall most effectually preserve its intellectual value4 ,this1 at all events1 is the object to which the four lectures that immediately follow are designed to contribute4 ,,lecture ,,vi ,,perception1 ,,common ,,sense1 ,,and ,,science ,i ,nothing would seem easier1 at first sight1 than to give a general description of the ordinary beliefs of ordinary people about our familiar world of things and persons4 ,it is the world in which we live2 it is for all men a real world2 it is for many men the real world2 it is the world of common sense1 the world where the plain man feels at home1 and where the practical man seeks refuge from the vain subtleties of metaphysics4 ,our stock of beliefs about it may perhaps be difficult to justify1 but it seems strange that they should be difficult to describe2 yet difficult1 ,i think1 they are4 ,some statements about it may1 however1 be made with confidence4 ,it is in space and time2 i4e4 the material things of which it is composed1 including living bodies1 are extended1 have mutual position1 and possess at least some measure of duration4 ,things are not changed by a mere change of place1 but a change of place relative to an observer always changes their appearance for him4 ,common sense is1 therefore1 compelled in this1 as in countless other cases1 to distinguish the appearance of a thing from its reality2 and to hold1 as an essential article of its working creed1 that appearances may alter1 leaving realities unchanged4 ,common sense does not1 however1 draw the inference that our experiences of material things is other than direct and immediate4 ,it has never held the opinion--or1 if you will1 the heresy--that what we perceive 7at least by sight and touch7 are states of our own mind1 which somehow copy or represent external things4 ,neither has it ever held that the character or duration of external things in any way depends upon our observations of them4 ,in perception there is no reaction by the perceiving mind on the object perceived4 ,things in their true reality are not affected by mere observation1 still less are they constituted by it4 ,when material objects are in question1 common sense never supposes that esse and percipi are identical4 ,but then1 what1 according to common sense1 are things in their true reality8 ,what are they 8in themselves10 when no one is looking at them1 or when only some of their aspects are under observation8 ,we can1 at all events1 say what 7according to common sense7 things are not4 ,they are more than collections of aspects4 ,if we could simultaneously perceive a 8thing0 at a thousand different distances1 at a thousand different angles1 under a thousand varieties of illumination1 with its interior ideally exposed in a thousand different sections1 common sense1 if pressed1 would1 ,i suppose1 still hold that these were no more than specimens of the endless variety of ways in which things may appear1 without either changing their nature or fully revealing what that nature is4 ,but though common sense might give this answer1 it would certainly resent the question being put4 ,it finds no difficulty in carrying on its work without starting these disturbing inquiries4 ,it is content to say that1 though a thing is doubtless always more than the sum of those aspects of it to which we happen to be attending1 yet our knowledge that it is and what it is1 however imperfect1 is1 for practical purposes1 sufficiently clear and trustworthy1 requiring the support neither of metaphysics nor psychology4--,this1 with all its difficulties1 is1 ,i believe1 an account1 true as far as it goes1 of the world of things as common sense conceives it4 ,this is the sort of world which science sets out to explain4 ,let me give an illustration4 ,we perceive some object--let us say the sun4 ,we perceive it directly and not symbolically4 ,what we see is not a mental image of the sun1 nor a complex of sensations caused by the sun2 but the sun itself4 ,moreover1 this material external object retains its identity while it varies in appearance4 ,it is red in the morning2 it is white at midday2 it is red once more in the evening2 it may be obscured by clouds or hidden in eclipse2 it vanishes and reappears once in every twenty-four hours2 yet1 amid all these changes and vanishings1 its identity is unquestioned4 ,though we perceive it differently at different times1 and though there are times when we do not perceive it at all1 we know it to be the same2 nor do we for a moment believe 7with ,heraclitus7 that when it is lost to view it has1 on that account1 either altered its character or ceased to exist4 ,in the main1 therefore1 experience is1 according to common sense1 a very simple affair4 ,we see something1 or we feel something1 or1 like ,dr4 ,johnson1 we kick something1 and 8there's an end on't40 ,experience is the source of all knowledge1 and therefore of all explanation2 but1 in itself1 it seems scarcely to require to be explained4 ,common sense is prepared to leave it where it finds it4 ,no doubt the occurrence of optical or other illusions may disturb this mood of intellectual tranquillity4 ,common sense1 when it has to consider the case of appearances1 some of which are held1 on extraneous grounds1 to be real and others to be illusory1 may feel that there are1 after all1 problems raised by perception--by the direct experience of things--which are not without their difficulties4 ,but the case of illusions is exceptional1 and rarely disturbs the even tenor of our daily round4 ,,ii ,now science1 as it gladly acknowledges1 is but an extension of common sense4 ,it accepts1 among other matters1 the common-sense view of perception4 ,like common sense1 it distinguishes the thing as it is from the thing as it appears4 ,like common sense1 it regards the things which are experienced as being themselves unaffected by experience4 ,but1 unlike common sense1 it devotes great attention to the way in which experience is produced by things4 ,its business is with the causal series4 ,this1 to be sure1 is a subject which common sense does not wholly ignore4 ,it would acknowledge that we perceive a lamp through the light which it sheds1 and recognise a trumpet through the sound which it emits2 but the nature of light or sound1 and the manner in which they produce our experience of bright or sonorous objects1 it hands over to science for further investigation4 ,and the task is cheerfully undertaken4 ,science also deems perception to be the source of all our knowledge of external nature4 ,but it regards it as something more1 and different4 ,for perception is itself a part of nature1 a natural process1 the product of antecedent causes1 the cause of subsequent effects4 ,it requires1 therefore1 like other natural facts1 to be observed and explained2 and it is the business of science to explain it4 ,thus we are brought face to face with the contrast on which so much of the argument of these lectures turns3 the contrast between beliefs considered as members of a cognitive series1 and beliefs considered as members of a causal series4 ,in the cognitive series1 beliefs of perception are at the root of our whole knowledge of natural laws4 ,in the causal series1 they are the effects of natural laws in actual operation4 ,this is so important an example of this dual state that you must permit me to consider it in some detail4 ,we may examine what goes on between the perceiving person and the thing he perceives from either end2 but it is by no means a matter of indifference with which end we begin4 ,if we examine the relation of the perceiver to the perceived it does not seem convenient or accurate to describe that relation as a process4 ,it is an experience1 immediate and intuitive2 not indeed infallible1 but direct and self-sufficient4 ,if ,i look at the sun1 it is the sun ,i see1 and not an image of the sun1 nor a sensation which suggests the sun1 or symbolises the sun4 ,still less do ,i see ethereal vibrations1 or a retinal image1 or a nervous reaction1 or a cerebral disturbance4 ,for1 in the act of perceiving1 no intermediate entities are themselves perceived4 ,but now if we1 as it were1 turn round1 and1 beginning at the other end1 consider the relation of the perceived to the perceiver1 no similar statements can be made4 ,we find ourselves concerned1 not with an act of intuition1 but with a physical process1 which is complicated1 which occupies time1 which involves many stages4 ,we have left behind cognition2 we are plunged in causation4 ,experience is no longer the immediate apprehension of fact2 it is the transmission of a message conveyed from the object to the percipient by relays of material messengers4 ,as to how the transmission is effected explanations vary with the growth of science4 ,they have been entirely altered more than once since the modern era began1 and with each alteration they become more complicated4 ,they depend1 not on one branch of science only1 but on many4 ,newtonian astronomy1 solar physics1 the theory of radiation1 the optical properties of the atmosphere1 the physiology of vision1 the psychology of perception1 and ,i daresay many other branches of research1 have to be drawn upon3 and all this to tell us what it is we see1 and how it is we come to see it4 ,,iii ,now there is no one who possesses the least smattering of philosophy who does not know that the views ,i have just endeavoured to describe are saturated with difficulties3 difficulties connected with the nature of perception2 difficulties connected with the nature of the object as perceived2 difficulties connected with its unperceived physical basis2 difficulties connected with the relation in which these three stand to each other4 ,for common sense the material object consists of a certain number of qualities and aspects which are perceived1 an inexhaustible number which might be perceived1 but are not1 and 7perhaps7 a vaguely conceived 8somewhat0 lying behind both4 ,the medieval ,aristotelian1 if ,i rightly understand him 7which very likely ,i do not71 developed this 8somewhat0 into the notion of substance--an entity somewhat loosely connected with the qualities which it supported1 and in no way explaining them4 ,there was 8substance0 in a piece of gold1 and 8substance0 in a piece of lead2 but there was nothing unreasonable in the endeavour to associate the qualities of gold with the substance of lead1 and thus for all practical purposes to turn lead into gold4 ,modern science teaches a very different lesson4 ,it has1 perhaps1 not wholly abandoned the notion of material substance1 if this be defined as the unperceivable support of perceivable qualities2 but it persistently strives to connect the characteristics of matter with its structure1 and1 among other characteristics1 that of producing1 or helping to produce1 in us those immediate perceptions which we describe as our experience of matter itself4 ,an important stage in this endeavour was marked by the famous distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter3 the primary qualities being the attributes of external material things which were deemed to be independent of the observer 7for example1 impenetrability1 density1 weight1 configuration72 the secondary qualities being those which1 apart from observers endowed with senses like our own1 would either exist differently1 or would not exist at all 7for example1 colour and taste74 ,on this view the primary qualities were among the causes of the secondary qualities1 and the secondary qualities were transferred from the thing perceived to the person perceiving4 ,i am not the least concerned to defend this theory4 ,it has been much derided1 and is certainly open to attack4 ,but something like it seems to be an inevitable stage in the development of modern views of nature4 ,the whole effort of physical science is to discover the material or non-psychical facts which shall1 among other things1 account for our psychical experiences4 ,it is true that there are men of science1 as well as philosophers1 who regard all such constructions as purely arbitrary--mere labour-saving devices which have nothing to do with reality4 ,but though ,i shall have something to say about these theories in my next course of lectures1 for the present ,i need only observe that they do not represent ordinary scientific opinion1 either as it is1 or as it has ever been4 ,science thinks1 rightly or wrongly1 that she is concerned with a real world1 which persists independently of our experience3 she has never assented to the doctrine that the object of her patient investigations is no more than a well-contrived invention for enabling us to foretell1 and perhaps to modify1 the course of our personal feelings4 ,but then1 if science is right1 we are committed to a division between the contents of immediate experience and its causes1 which showed itself dimly and tentatively in the distinction between the secondary and the primary qualities of matter1 but has become deeper and more impassable with every advance in physics and physiology4 ,it was possible to maintain 7though1 ,i admit1 not very easy7 that1 while the secondary qualities of matter are due to the action of the primary qualities on our organs of perception1 the primary qualities themselves are1 nevertheless1 the objects of direct experience4 ,the fact1 for example1 that colour is no more than a sensation need not preclude us from perceiving the material qualities which1 like shape1 or motion1 or mass1 are the external and independent causes to which the sensation is due4 ,i do not say that this view was ever explicitly entertained--nor does it signify4 ,for1 if we accept the teaching of science1 it can1 ,i suppose1 be entertained no more4 ,the physical causes of perception are inferred1 but not perceived4 ,the real material world has been driven by the growth of knowledge further and further into the realm of the unseen1 and now lies completely hidden from direct experience behind the impenetrable screen of its own effects4 ,,iv ,for consider what the causal process of perception really is if we trace it from the observed to the observer--if we follow the main strands in the complex lines of communication through which the object seen reveals itself to the man who sees it4 ,i revert to my previous example--the sun4 ,we need not consider those of its attributes which are notoriously arrived at by indirect methods--which are not perceived but inferred--its magnitude1 for example1 or its mass4 ,confining ourselves to what is directly perceived1 its angular size1 its shape 7projected on a plane71 its warmth1 its brightness1 its colour1 its 7relative7 motion1 its separation from the observer in space--how are these immediate experiences produced8 ,the answers have varied with the progress of science2 nor1 for my present purpose1 does it greatly matter which answers we adopt4 ,let us take those which are commonly accepted at the present moment4 ,they are not only the truest1 but the fullest2 and for that very reason they put the difficulty with which we are concerned in the highest relief4 ,we begin our causal series with electrons1 or1 if you do not accept the electric theory of matter in any of its forms1 then with atoms and molecules4 ,we start with these1 because the sun is a collection of them1 and because it is their movements which set going the whole train of causes and effects by which the sun produces in us the perception of itself4 ,we may take1 as the next stage1 ethereal vibrations1 of various lengths and various amplitudes1 sent travelling into space by the moving particles4 ,a fraction of these waves reaches our atmosphere1 and of that fraction a fraction reaches our eyes1 and of that fraction a further fraction falls within the narrow limits of length to which our eyes are sensitive4 ,it is through these that we are able to see the sun4 ,still another fraction1 not necessarily identical in wave-lengths1 affects the nerves which produce in us the sensation of warmth4 ,it is through these that we are able to feel the sun4 ,but1 before we either see or feel1 there is much still to be accomplished4 ,the causal series is not nearly completed4 ,complicated neural processes1 as yet only imperfectly understood2 complicated cerebral processes--as yet understood still less--both involving physiological changes far more complicated than the electrical 8accelerations0 or electro-magnetic disturbances with which we have hitherto been dealing1 bring us to the end of the material sequence of causes and effects1 and lay the message from the object perceived on the threshold of the perceiving consciousness4 ,so does a postman slip into your letter-box a message which has been first written1 then carried by hand1 then by a mail-cart1 then by a train1 then by hand again1 till it reaches its destination1 and nothing further is required except that what has been written should be read and understood4 ,thus far the material process of transmission4 ,the psychical process has still to come4 ,psychology is a science1 not less than physiology or physics2 and psychology has much to say on the subject of perception4 ,it is true that scientific explorers whose point of departure is introspective2 who concern themselves primarily with ideas1 conceptions1 sensations1 and so forth1 rarely succeed in fitting their conclusions without a break to those of their colleagues who begin with the 8external0 causes of perception4 ,the two tunnels1 driven from opposite sides of the mountain1 do not always meet under its crest4 ,still1 we cannot on that account ignore the teaching of psychology on the genesis of perceptual experience regarded1 not as the ground of knowledge1 but as a natural product4 ,i do not mean to attempt a summary of psychology from this point of view1 any more than ,i have attempted a summary of physics or physiology4 ,my argument is really independent1 in this case as in the other1 of particular systems4 ,all ,i ask for is the admission that in perception there are conditions antecedently supplied by the perceiving consciousness which profoundly modify every perceptual experience--and that these conditions 7unlike ,kant's forms7 are natural growths1 varying1 like other natural growths1 from individual to individual4 ,this admission must1 ,i think1 be made by every empirical psychologist1 to whatever school he happens to belong4 ,if this statement seems obscure in its general and abstract form1 consider a particular application of it4 ,let us assume1 with many psychologists1 that ,will1 in the form of selective attention1 lies at the root of our perceptual activities2 that we may therefore be said1 in a sense1 voluntarily to create the objects we perceive2 that experience of the present is largely qualified by memories of the past1 and that the perceptual mould into which our sensations are run is largely a social product--born of the intercourse between human beings1 and1 in its turn1 rendering that intercourse possible4 ,is it not clear that1 on assumptions like these1 consciousness1 so far from passively receiving the messages conveyed to it through physical and physiological channels1 actively modifies their character8 ,v ,but why1 it may be asked1 should these considerations involve any difficulty8 ,and1 if there be a difficulty1 what is its exact character8 ,in its most general form the difficulty is this4 ,it is claimed by science that its conclusions are based upon experience4 ,the experience spoken of is unquestionably the familiar perception of external things and their movements as understood by common sense2 and1 however much our powers of perception be increased by telescopes1 microscopes1 balances1 thermometers1 electroscopes1 and so forth1 this common-sense view suffers no alteration4 ,the perceptions of a man of science are1 in essence1 the perceptions of ordinary men in their ordinary moments1 beset with the same difficulties1 accepted with the same assurance4 ,whatever be the proper way of describing scientific results1 the experimental data on which they rest are sought and obtained in the spirit of 8naf realism40 ,on this foundation science proceeds to build up a theory of nature by which the foundation itself is shattered4 ,it saws off the branch on which it is supported4 ,it kicks down the ladder by which it has climbed4 ,it dissolves the thing perceived into a remote reality which is neither perceived nor perceivable4 ,it turns the world of common sense into an illusion1 and on this illusion it calmly rests its case4 ,but this is not the only logical embarrassment in which we are involved4 ,when science has supplied us with a description of external things as they 8really are10 and we proceed to ask how the physical reality reveals itself to us in experience1 a new difficulty arises1 or1 if you like1 the old difficulty with a new face4 ,for science requires us to admit that experience1 from this point of view1 is equivalent to perception2 and that perception is a remote psychological effect of a long train of causes1 physical and physiological1 originally set in motion by the external thing1 but in no way resembling it4 ,look carefully at this process from the outside1 and ask yourselves why there should be any such correspondence between the first of these causes and the last of these effects1 as should enable us to know or infer the one from the other8 ,why should the long train of unperceivable intermediaries that connect the perceived with the perceiver be trusted to speak the truth8 ,i just now likened these intermediaries to relays of messengers4 ,but messengers are expected to hand on their message in the form in which they have received it4 ,the messengers change1 but not the message4 ,the metaphor1 therefore1 is far too complimentary to the train of physical causes which reveal the material thing to the perceiving consciousness4 ,the neural changes which are in immediate causal contiguity with that psychical effect which we call 8the experience of an external object0 have no resemblance whatever either to the thing as it is perceived or to the thing as it really is4 ,nor have they any resemblance to the proximate cause which sets them going1 namely1 the ethereal vibrations2 nor have these to the accelerated electrons which constitute the incandescent object which we 8experience0 as the sun4 ,nor has the sun1 as experienced1 the slightest resemblance to the sun as it really is4 ,hume1 in his 8,dialogues on ,natural ,religion10 urges the absurdity of arguing from an effect like the universe to a cause like ,god1 since the argument from a particular effect to a particular cause1 or from a particular cause to a particular effect1 is only legitimate when we have had some previous experience of that particular class of causal sequence2 and nobody1 it is plain1 has had the opportunity of observing ,creation4 ,whatever be the value of this argument in the case of ,god and the world1 it seems to me conclusive in the case of matter and man4 ,we cannot argue from purely psychical effects1 like perceptions and sensations1 to external causes1 like physiological processes or ethereal vibrations1 unless we can experience both sets of facts in causal relation4 ,and this1 if we accept the conclusions of science1 we can never do--partly because the intermediate members of the causal series are unperceivable2 partly because1 if they were perceivable1 perception has been reduced by science to a purely psychical effect--which obviously cannot include its material cause4 ,this last must for ever remain outside the closed circle of sensible experiences4 ,here1 of course1 we find ourselves face to face with a familiar objection to those philosophies of perception which deny that we have any access to external reality1 except through ideas which are its copy4 ,but they are in a better case than science4 ,they need not explicitly admit a discrepancy between their premises and their conclusions4 ,they arrive at the subjectivity of perception by methods of introspection4 ,they interrogate consciousness1 and are convinced that every experience can be analysed into sensations and ideas1 some of which1 no doubt1 suggest externality1 but none of which are external4 ,if1 then1 the worst comes to the worst1 they can1 and often do1 lighten their philosophic ship by pitching the whole material universe overboard as a bit of superfluous cargo4 ,but physical science cannot 7at least in my opinion7 do anything of the kind4 ,its whole business is with the material universe4 ,its premises are experiences of external things1 not of internal sensation and ideas4 ,and if it has associated its fortunes with a theory of perception which treats experience as a natural effect of the thing experienced2 if it has thereby wandered within sight of the perilous problems which haunt the frontier where mind and matter meet1 it has not done so in a spirit of reckless adventure1 but in the legitimate pursuit of its own affairs4 ,this does not necessarily make things easier4 ,we are not here concerned with questionings about the remoter provinces of knowledge--provinces unexplored except by specialists1 negligible by ordinary men engaged on ordinary business4 ,on the contrary1 the difficulties to which ,i have called your attention threaten the unquestioned assumption of daily life1 the presupposition of every scientific experiment1 and the meaning of every scientific generalisation4 ,they cannot be ignored4 ,on the other hand1 threaten as they may1 these difficulties can never modify our attitude either towards practical action or scientific theory4 ,beliefs which were inevitable before remain inevitable still4 ,the supreme act of instinctive faith involved in the perception of external objects stands quite unshaken4 ,whatever we may think of ,berkeley1 we cannot give up ,dr4 ,johnson4 8,seeing10 says the proverb1 8is believing02 and it speaks better than it knows4 ,,vi ,can we1 then1 adopt a middle course1 and1 imitating the serene acquiescence of ,hume1 accept the position of sceptics in the study and believers in the market-place8 ,this seems eminently unsatisfactory2 and1 since believers on this subject we must perforce remain1 it behoves us to consider how1 and on what terms1 we can best qualify our scepticism4 ,observe1 then1 that the particular difficulty which has been occupying our attention arises in the main from the assumption that our common-sense beliefs in the reality and character of material things have no other foundation than the fact that we so perceive them4 ,from such premises it was impossible1 it seemed1 to infer that they exist otherwise than as they are perceived2 and still more impossible to regard the immediate intuition by which we apprehend the object1 and the long-drawn sequence of causes by which the object is revealed1 as being the same process looked at from different ends4 ,but this difficulty is greatly mitigated if we hold that our belief in an independent world of material objects1 however it may be caused1 is neither a conclusion drawn from this or that particular experience nor from all our experiences put together1 but an irresistible assumption4 ,grant the existence of external things1 and it becomes possible and legitimate to attempt explanations of their appearance1 to regard our perceptions of them as a psychical and physiological product of material realities which do not themselves appear and cannot be perceived4 ,refuse1 on the other hand1 to grant this assumption1 and no inductive legerdemain will enable us to erect our scientific theories about an enduring world of material things upon the frail foundation of successive personal perceptions4 ,if this does not seem clear at first sight it is1 ,i think1 because we do not consider our experiences as a whole4 ,a limited group of experiences--say ,faraday's experiments with electro-magnets--may guide us into new knowledge about the external world1 including aspects of that world which are not open to sense perception4 ,but then these experiences assume that this external world exists1 they assume it to be independent of perception1 they assume it to be a cause of perception4 ,these assumptions once granted1 experiment may be1 and is1 the source of fresh discoveries4 ,but experiment based on these assumptions never can establish their truth2 and if our theory of knowledge requires us to hold that 8no proposition should be entertained with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant10 our fate is sealed1 and we need never hope to extricate ourselves from the entanglements in which a too credulous empiricism has involved us4 ,this means that one at least of the inevitable beliefs enumerated in the first lecture--the belief in an external world--is a postulate which science is compelled to use but is unable to demonstrate4 ,how1 then1 are we to class it8 ,it is not a law of thought in the accepted meaning of that expression4 ,we are not rationally required to accept it by the very structure of our thinking faculties4 ,many people1 indeed1 theoretically reject it2 none1 so far as ,i know1 regard it as self-evident4 ,on the other hand1 it is not an inference from experience2 neither is it an analytic judgment in which the predicate is involved in the subject4 ,described in technical language1 it would seem to be a priori without being necessary1 and synthetic without being empirical--qualities which1 in combination1 scarcely fit into any familiar philosophic classification4 ,according to the view which ,i desire to press in these lectures1 this marks a philosophic omission4 ,i regard the belief in an external world as one of a class whose importance has been ignored by philosophy1 though all science depends on them4 ,they refuse to be lost in the common herd of empirical beliefs2 though they have no claim to be treated as axioms4 ,we are inclined to accept them1 but not rationally compelled4 ,the inclination may be so strong as practically to exclude doubt2 and it may diminish from this maximum to a faint feeling of probability4 ,but1 whatever be the strength of these beliefs1 and whatever the nature of their claims1 the importance of the part they play in the development and structure of our current creed cannot easily be exaggerated4 ,before1 however1 ,i consider other specimens of this class1 ,i must interpolate a long parenthesis upon probability4 ,i have just described these fundamental beliefs as being 8probable0 in varying degrees4 ,gradations of probability are familiar to the mathematical theorist4 ,are we1 then1 here concerned with probability as conceived by the mathematician8 ,it is evidently essential to settle this question before proceeding with the main argument2 and ,i propose1 therefore1 to turn aside and devote the next lecture to its consideration4 ,,lecture ,,vii ,,probability1 ,,calculable ,,and ,,intuitive ,i ,i wish ,i were a mathematician4 ,there is in the history of the mathematical sciences1 as in their substance1 something that strangely stirs the imagination even of the most ignorant4 ,its younger sister1 ,logic1 is as abstract1 and its claims are yet wider4 ,but it has never shaken itself free from a certain pretentious futility3 it always seems to be telling us1 in language quite unnecessarily technical1 what we understood much better before it was explained4 ,it never helps to discover1 though it may guarantee discovery2 it never persuades1 though it may show that persuasion has been legitimate2 it never aids the work of thought1 it only acts as its auditor and accountant-general4 ,i am not referring1 of course1 to what ,i see described in recent works as 8modern scientific logic40 ,of this ,i do not presume to speak4 ,still less am ,i referring to so-called ,inductive ,logic4 ,of this it is scarce worth while to speak4#i ,i refer to their more famous predecessor1 the formal logic of the schools4 ,but in what different tones must we speak of mathematics6 ,mill1 if ,i remember rightly1 said it was as full of mysteries as theology4 ,but while the value of theology for knowledge is disputed1 the value of mathematics for knowledge is indisputable4 ,its triumphs can be appreciated by the most foolish1 they appeal to the most material4 ,if they seem sometimes lost to ordinary view in the realms of abstract infinities1 they do not disdain to serve us in the humbler fields of practice4 ,they have helped mankind to all the greatest generalisations about the physical universe3 and without them we should still be fumbling over simple problems of practical mechanics1 entangled in a costly and ineffectual empiricism4 ,but while we thank the mathematician for his aid in conquering ,nature1 we envy him his powers of understanding her4 ,though he deals1 it would seem1 entirely with abstractions1 they are abstractions which1 at his persuasion1 supply the key to the profoundest secrets of the physical universe4 ,he holds the clues to mazes where the clearest intellect1 unaided1 would wander hopelessly astray4 ,he belongs to a privileged caste4 ,i intend no serious qualification of this high praise when ,i add that1 as regards the immediate subject of this lecture1 ,i mean ,probability1 mathematicians do not seem to have given ignorant inquirers like myself all the aid which perhaps we have a right to ask4 ,they have treated the subject as a branch of applied mathematics4 ,they have supplied us with much excellent theory4 ,they have exercised admirable skill in the solution of problems4 ,but ,i own that1 when we inquire into the rational basis of all this imposing superstructure1 their explanations1 from the lay point of view1 leave much to be desired4 8,probability10 says an often-quoted phrase of ,butler1 8is the guide of life40 ,but the ,bishop did not define the term2 and he wrote before the theory of probability had attained to all its present dignities4 ,neither ,d',alembert nor ,laplace had discussed it4 ,quetelet had not applied it to sociology1 nor ,maxwell to physics4 ,jevons had not described it as the 8noblest creation of the intellect40 ,it is doubtful whether ,butler meant by it exactly what the mathematicians mean by it1 and certain that he did not suspect any lurking ambiguity in the expression4 ,nor1 indeed1 would the existence of such ambiguity be commonly admitted by any school of thought4 ,the ordinary view is that the theory of probabilities is1 as ,laplace described it1 8common sense reduced to calculation40 ,that there could be two kinds of probability1 only one of which fitted this description1 would be generally regarded as a heresy4 ,but it is a heresy in which ,i myself believe2 and which1 with much diffidence1 ,i now propose to defend4 ,,ii ,the well-known paradox of the theory of probabilities is that1 to all seeming1 it can extract knowledge from ignorance and certainty from doubt4 ,the point cannot be better put than by ,poincar in discussing the physical theory of gases1 where the doctrine of probability finds an important application4 ,let me give you his view--partly in paraphrase1 partly in translation4 8,for omniscience10 he says in substance1 8chance would not exist4 ,it is but the measure of our ignorance4 ,when we describe an event as accidental we mean no more than that we do not fully comprehend the conditions by which it was brought about4 8,but is this the full truth of the matter8 ,are not the laws of chance a source of knowledge8 ,and1 stranger still1 is it not sometimes easier to generalise 7say7 about random movements than about movements which obey even a simple law--witness the kinetic theory of gases8 ,and1 if this be so1 how can chance be the equivalent of ignorance8 ,ask a physicist to explain what goes on in a gas4 ,he might1 perhaps1 express his views in some such terms as these3 #8,you wish me to tell you about these complex phenomena4 ,if by ill luck ,i happened to know the laws which govern them1 ,i should be helpless4 ,i should be lost in endless calculations1 and could never hope to supply you with an answer to your questions4 ,fortunately for both of us1 ,i am completely ignorant about the matter2 ,i can1 therefore1 supply you with an answer at once4 ,this may seem odd4 ,but there is something odder still1 namely1 that my answer will be right4'0 ,now1 what are the conditions which make it possible thus to extract a correct answer from material apparently so unpromising8 ,they would seem to be a special combination of ignorance and knowledge1 the joint effect of which is to justify us in supposing that the particular collection of facts or events with which we are concerned are happening 8at random40 ,if we could calculate the complex causes which determine the fall of a penny1 or the collisions of a molecule1 we might conceivably deal with pennies or molecules individually2 and the calculus of probability might be dispensed with4 ,but we cannot2 ignorance1 therefore1 real or assumed1 is thus one of the conditions required to provide us with the kind of chaos to which the doctrine of chances may most fittingly be applied4 ,but there is another condition not less needful1 namely1 knowledge--the knowledge that no extraneous cause or internal tendency is infecting our chaotic group with some bias or drift whereby its required randomness would be destroyed4 ,our penny must be symmetrical1 and ,maxwell's demons#aj must not meddle with the molecules4 ,the slow disintegration of radium admirably illustrates the behaviour of a group or collection possessing all the qualities which we require4 ,the myriad atoms of which the minutest visible fragment is composed are numerous enough to neutralise eccentricities such as those which1 in the case of a game of chance1 we call 8runs of luck40 ,of these atoms we have no individual knowledge4 ,what we know of one we know of all2 and we treat them not only as a collection1 but as a collection made at random4 ,now1 physicists tell us that out of any such random collection a certain proportion will disintegrate in a given time2 and always the same proportion4 ,but whence comes their confidence in the permanence of this ratio8 ,why are they so assured of its fixity that these random explosions are thought to provide us with a better time-keeper than the astronomical changes which have served mankind in that capacity through immemorial ages8 ,the reason is that we have here the necessary ignorance and the necessary knowledge in a very complete form4 ,nothing can well exceed our ignorance of the differences between one individual radium atom and another1 though relevant differences there must be4 ,nothing1 again1 seems better assured than our knowledge that no special bias or drift will make one collection of these atoms behave differently from another4 ,for the atomic disintegration is due to no external shock or mutual reaction which might affect not one atom only1 but the whole group4 ,a milligram of radium is not like a magazine of shells1 where if one spontaneously explodes all the rest follow suit4 ,the disruption of the atom is due to some internal principle of decay whose effects no known external agent can either hasten or retard4 ,although1 therefore1 the proportion of atoms which will disintegrate in a given time can only be discovered1 like the annual death-rate among men1 by observation1 yet once discovered it is discovered for ever4 ,our human death-rate not only may change1 but does change4 ,the death-rate of radium atoms changes not4 ,in the one case1 causes are in operation which modify both the organism and the surroundings on which its life depends4 ,in the other case1 it would seem that the average of successive generations of atoms does not vary1 and that1 once brought into existence1 they severally run their appointed course unaffected by each other or by the world outside4 ,so far we have been concerned with groups or collections or series2 and about these the doctrine of chances and the theory of error may apparently supply most valuable information4 ,but in practical affairs--nay1 even in many questions of scientific speculation--we are yet more concerned about individual happenings4 ,we have1 therefore1 next to ask how we can infer the probability of a particular event from our knowledge of some group or series to which it belongs4 ,there seems at first sight no difficulty in this1 provided we have sufficient knowledge of the group or series of which the particular event is a member4 ,if we know that a tossed penny will in the long run give heads and tails equally often1 we do not hesitate to declare that the chances of a particular throw giving 8heads0 are even4 ,to expect in any given case heads rather than tails1 or tails rather than heads1 is inconsistent with the objective knowledge of the series which by hypothesis we actually possess4 ,but what if our information about the group or series is much less than this8 ,suppose that1 instead of knowing that the two possible alternatives do in fact occur equally often1 we are in the less advantageous position of knowing no reason why they should not occur equally often4 ,we ought1 ,i suppose1 still to regard the chances of a particular toss as even2 although this estimate1 expressed by the same fraction 77 and held with the same confidence1 is apparently a conclusion based on ignorance1 whereas the first conclusion was apparently based on knowledge4 ,if1 for example1 we know that a die is fairly made and fairly thrown1 we can tell how often a particular number will turn up in a long series of throws1 and we can tell what the chances are that it will turn up on the occasion of a single throw4 ,moreover1 the two conclusions seem to be logically connected4 ,but if we know that the die is loaded we can no longer say how the numbers will be distributed in a series of throws1 however long1 though we are sure that the distribution will be very different from what it would have been had the die been a fair one4 ,nevertheless1 we can still say 7before the event7 what the chances are of a particular number turning up on a single throw2 and these chances are exactly the same whether the die be loaded or whether it be fair--namely1 one-sixth4 ,our objective knowledge of the group or series has vanished1 but1 with the theory of probability to help us1 our subjective conviction on this point apparently remains unchanged4 ,there is here1 surely1 a rather awkward transition from the 8objective0 to the 8subjective0 point of view4 ,we were dealing1 in the first case1 with groups or series of events about which the doctrine of chances enabled us to say something positive1 something which experience would always confirm if the groups or series were large enough4 ,a perfect calculator1 endowed with complete knowledge of all the separate group members1 would have no correction to make in our conclusions4 ,his information would be more complete than our own1 but not more accurate4 ,it is true that for him 8averages0 would have no interest and 8chance0 no meaning4 ,nevertheless1 he would agree that in a long series of fair throws of a fair die any selected face would turn up one-sixth times as often as all the others taken together4 ,but in the second case this is no longer so4 ,foresight based on complete knowledge would apparently differ from foresight based on the calculation of chances4 ,our calculator would be aware of the exact manner in which the die was loaded1 and of the exact advantage which this gave to certain numbers4 ,he would1 therefore1 know that in asserting the chance of any particular number turning up on the first throw to be one-sixth1 we were wrong4 ,in what sense1 then1 do we deem ourselves to have been right8 ,the answer1 ,i suppose1 is that we were right not about a group of throws made with this loaded die1 but about a group of such groups made with dice loaded at random--a group in which 8randomness0 was so happily preserved among its constituent groups that its absence within each of these groups was immaterial1 and no one of the six alternative numbers was favoured above another4 ,a similar reply might be given if we suppose our ignorance carried yet a step further4 ,instead of knowing that our die was loaded1 and being ignorant only of the manner of its loading1 we might be entirely ignorant whether it was loaded or not4 ,the chances of a particular number turning up on the first throw would still be one-sixth4 ,but the series to which this estimate would refer would neither be one composed of fair throws with a fair die1 nor one composed of a series of throws with dice loaded at random1 but one composed of a series of throws with dice chosen at random from a random collection of dice1 loaded and not loaded6 ,it seems plain that we have no experimental knowledge of series piled on series after this fashion4 ,our conclusions about them are not based on observation1 nor collected from statistics4 ,they are arrived at a priori2 and when the character of a series is arrived at a priori1 the probability of a particular event belonging to it can be arrived at independently by the same method4 ,no reference to the series is required4 ,the reason we estimate the chances against any one of the six possible throws of a die as five to one under each and all of the suppositions we have been discussing is that under none of them have we any ground for thinking any one of the six more probable than another2--even though we may have ground for thinking that in a series of throws made with that particular die1 some number1 to us unknown1 will in fact turn up with exceptional frequency4 ,the most characteristic examples1 therefore1 of problems in probability depend for their solution on a bold use of the 8principle of sufficient reason40 ,we treat alternatives as equally likely when we cannot see any ground for supposing that one is more likely than another4 ,this seems sensible enough2 but how far may we carry this process of extracting knowledge from ignorance8 ,an agnostic declines to offer any opinion on the being of ,god because it is a matter about which he professes to know nothing4 ,but the universe either has a spiritual cause1 or it has not4 ,if the agnostic is as ignorant as he supposes1 he cannot have any reason for preferring the first alternative to the second1 or the second to the first4 ,must he1 therefore1 conclude that the chances of ,theism are even8 ,the man who knows this knows much4 ,he knows1 or may know1 that ,god's existence is slightly more probable than his own chance of winning a coup at ,monte ,carlo4 ,he knows1 or may know1 the exact fraction by which the two probabilities differ4 ,how1 then1 can he call himself an agnostic8 ,every one must1 ,i think1 feel that such reasoning involves a misuse of the theory of probability4 ,but is that misuse without some justification8 ,the theory1 unless ,i misread it1 permits1 or rather requires1 us to express by the same fraction probabilities based on what is little less than complete knowledge1 and probabilities based on what is little more than complete ignorance4 ,to arrive at a clear conclusion1 it seems only necessary to apply the 8law of sufficient reason0 to defined alternatives2 and it is apparently a matter of perfect indifference whether we apply this law in its affirmative or its negative shape2 whether we say 8there is every reason for believing that such and such alternatives happen equally often10 or whether we say 8there is no reason for thinking that one alternative happens more often than the other40 ,i do not criticise this method2 still less do ,i quarrel with it4 ,on the contrary1 ,i am lost in admiration of this instrument of investigation1 the quality of whose output seems to depend so little on the sort of raw material with which it is supplied4 ,,iii ,my object1 indeed1 is neither to discuss the basis on which rests the calculus of probabilities--a task for which ,i own myself totally unfit--nor yet to show that a certain obscurity hangs over the limits within which it may properly be employed4 ,i desire rather to suggest that1 wherever those limits are placed1 there lies beyond them a kind of probability yet more fundamental1 about which the mathematical methods can tell us nothing1 though it possesses supreme value as a 8guide of life40 ,wherein lies the distinction between the two8 ,in this3 the doctrine of calculable probability 7if ,i may so call it7 has its only application1 or its only assured application1 within groups whose character is either postulated1 or is independently arrived at by inference and observation4 ,these groups1 be they natural or conventional1 provide a framework1 marking out a region wherein prevails the kind of ignorance which is the subjective reflection of objective 8randomness40 ,this is the kind of ignorance which the calculus of probabilities can most successfully transmute into knowledge3 and herein lies the reason why the discoverers of the calculus found their original inspiration in the hazards of the gambling-table1 and why their successors still find in games of chance its happiest illustrations4 ,for in games of chance the group framework is provided by convention2 perfect 8randomness0 is secured by fitting devices2 and he who attempts to modify it is expelled from society as a cheat4 ,none of these observations apply to the kind of probability on whose importance ,i am now insisting4 ,if calculable probability be indeed 8common sense reduced to calculation10 intuitive probability lies deeper4 ,it supports common sense1 and it supplies the ultimate ground--be it secure or insecure--of all work-a-day practice and all scientific theory4 ,it has nothing to do with 8randomness02 it knows nothing of averages2 it obeys no formal laws2 no light is thrown on it by cards or dice2 it cannot be reduced to calculation4 ,how1 then1 is it to be treated8 ,what place is it to occupy in our general scheme8 ,these are all important questions4 ,but no answer to them can be given till we have pressed somewhat further the line of thought which the discussion in this present lecture has for a moment interrupted4 ,before ,i began this long parenthesis on the theory of chance1 ,i was occupied with a most important example of a belief which possesses the highest degree of intuitive probability1 but no calculable probability at all4 ,i mean the belief in an independent physical universe4 ,in the next lecture ,i shall resume the general thread of my argument1 and consider another belief of the same kind which is not less--some would say even more--essential to natural science than the one with which ,i have already dealt4 ,i mean a belief in the regularity of nature4 ,,footnotes3 #i ,although1 as a matter of fact1 ,i do speak of it in the next lecture4 #aj ,maxwell1 as all who interest themselves in physics are aware1 arrived at very interesting conclusions by considering what would happen if little demons interfered with the random motions of the molecules constituting a gas4 ,,lecture ,,viii ,,uniformity ,,and ,,causation ,i ,in my last lecture but one ,i dwelt upon the interplay of causes and reasons in one special case--the case of our immediate experiences of the external world1 the world in which we move1 the world investigated by the physical sciences4 ,no case can indeed be more important2 for these immediate experiences are deemed by every man to be his guide through all the hours of his waking life1 and by every man of science to supply the evidence on which depends all our knowledge of natural laws4 ,yet this very statement suggests the existence of another series of problems not less important and not less closely connected with my general argument4 ,for1 how do we get from particular experiences to general laws--from beliefs about individual occurrences to beliefs about the ordering of the universe8 ,these beliefs1 looked at from the scientific point of view1 are1 as ,i have so often observed1 a natural product4 ,they have a history like other natural products4 ,they are the effects of a long train of causes2 and among those causes are some which claim1 rightly or wrongly1 to be reasons1 an uncounted multitude which make no such claim1 and others1 again1 which occupy a doubtful position between the two4 ,imagine an external intelligence studying the methods by which earth-born creatures of various types adjust themselves to future circumstances4 ,the most primitive method is1 ,i suppose1 no more than simple nervous reaction4 ,the most developed method involves reasoned expectation4 ,and between these two extremes our supposed observer would see a long series of intermediate forms melting into one another by insensible gradation4 ,from the point of view of the argument ,i am endeavouring to present to you1 this development is of the greatest interest4 ,the creation of a capacity for expectation1 and of an inclination to expect a future similar to the past1 must be deemed one of the most remarkable triumphs of selection--if to selection it indeed be due4 ,here we have this irrational mimic of reason1 starting from the simplest forms of response to external stimulus1 improving them into such excellent imitations of inductive reasoning as those which lead a chick1 no more than a few hours old1 to reject food which it has once found nasty#aa2 and finally evolving out of these humble beginnings a mode of inference which1 according to empirical philosophy1 is the true and only source of all our general knowledge1 whether of nature or of man4 ,it must be owned1 indeed1 that the attempt to treat instinctive expectation as a form of rational inference has been a lamentable failure4 ,by no exercise of ingenuity can beliefs about what is not experienced be logically extracted from particular experiences1 multiply them as you will4 ,it is in vain that empirical philosophers attempt to give an air of rationality to this leap from the known to the unknown by the use of high-sounding logical titles4 8,induction by simple enumeration0 is doubtless an imposing name4 ,but those who practise the thing are in no wise improving on their predecessor1 the chick4 ,indeed they lag behind it4 ,for the chick expects--but gives no reason2 the empirical philosopher expects--and gives a bad one4 ,,ii ,expectation1 then1 if it is to be rational1 can only be rationally extracted from experiences by the aid of one or more general principles4 ,what principles are they8 ,one of them1 at all events1 must be the regularity of nature4 ,in some form or other1 and to some degree or other1 this is assumed in every scientific speculation and in every purposeful action reflectively performed4 ,it is1 as you may recollect1 one of the 8inevitable beliefs of common sense0 to which ,i referred in my first lecture4 ,but you may also recollect that in the same lecture ,i pointed out that inevitable beliefs1 though we cannot avoid holding them in some shape1 are1 and have been1 held in many shapes2 shapes which vary with the changes in our general outlook on men and things4 ,in what shape1 then1 should our belief in regularity now be held8 ,the shape in which it is very commonly formulated is something of this kind3 8everything is caused2 and the same causes are always followed by the same effects40 ,this is the so-called 8law of universal causation40 ,it has been treated as an assured truth by philosophers of many different schools1 though not always for the same reasons2 and1 so far as the physical universe is concerned1 the modern world accepts it without demur4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 open to criticism from two points of view4 ,it asserts somewhat more about the course of nature than experience suggests1 and somewhat less than science requires4 ,let me take the two points separately4 ,when ,i was dealing with ethics ,i had occasion to point out that if the primitive manifestations of loyalty and love are products of selection1 they have developed by a kind of internal momentum1 to a point far beyond that to which selection can possibly have carried them4 ,something of the same kind has happened in the case of the causal postulate4 ,selection1 we must suppose1 has produced the capacity for acquiring habitual expectations2 and habitual expectation is induction without reasoning4 ,like induction1 it would not only be useless1 but harmful1 if no regularity existed2 if at any moment the future ceased to bear some resemblance to the past4 ,but the regularity asserted by the law of universal causation is far in excess of this requirement4 ,the law applies to regions which never come within the range of finite experience2 and1 as regards regions which do come within that range1 experience hardly confirms it4 ,we may1 of course1 attribute the apparent irregularities in nature to our ignorance or our errors2 and this1 in fact1 is what we always do4 ,we must 7we think7 have observed wrongly or insufficiently2 or it may be that a clearer insight would show how apparent aberrations really illustrate some larger law1 or depend on conditions at present beyond our ken4 ,such explanations are easy2 and1 what is more1 they are true4 ,there is no complaint to be made of a verdict in favour of absolute uniformity except that it outruns the evidence4 ,none surely1 who understand the meaning of the words they use1 will dare to assert that nature appears regular4 ,what they may assert is1 that the more you examine it1 the more regular it appears4 ,the reign of law is always extending4 ,new provinces are always being added to its domains4 ,anomalies vanish as knowledge grows2 and the absolute uniformity which we now only know by faith1 we may some day know by sight4 ,to this 8credo0 7with reservations7 ,i readily subscribe4 ,but it sounds a little strange in the mouths of some who preach it4 ,does it not imply that we interpret our experiences in the light of a preconceived scheme of things2 that we force our observations into a mould which they do not naturally fit8 ,if1 in unravelling a cypher1 ,i come across passages which are unintelligible1 ,i attribute the check to my own ignorance or dullness4 ,why8 ,because ,i know independently that the cypher has a meaning1 if only ,i could find it4 ,but the empirical agnostic professes to know nothing about the world1 except what he has observed himself or what other people have observed for him4 ,why1 then1 should he suppose perfect regularity to exist when no perfect regularity appears8 ,why is he not content to accept what he finds1 namely1 a regularity which is real but incomplete8 ,it is no reply to say that patient genius is constantly detecting order in apparent chaos4 ,so it is4 ,and when this happens1 by all means rearrange your map of the universe accordingly4 ,but do not argue that chaos is therefore non-existent4 ,the belief in universal causation is not based on argument1 nor yet on observation4 ,it depends on what ,i have described as intuitive probability4 ,and if we refuse to regard nature as liable to lapses from perfect uniformity1 this is not because such a theory is unthinkable1 not because it is contrary to experience1 not because it is incompatible with knowledge1 not because it is fatal to purposeful action2 for it is none of these things4 ,we reject it because it is out of harmony with the ideal we have formed of what the material universe ought to be and is3 and so strong is this speculative prepossession that there is no experimental evidence which would convince a man of science that1 when physical causes were the same1 physical consequences could be different4 ,,iii ,but this observation brings me to my second commentary on the formula of universal causation4 ,if1 as ,i have contended1 it goes beyond what mere experience suggests1 it also falls short of what scientific inference requires4 ,the uniformity it postulates lacks a certain kind of 8structure0 which is absolutely necessary if the past is to be explained and the future foreseen4 ,it is not enough for this purpose that the course of ,nature should be determined4 ,it must be determined after a particular pattern2 its uniformity must conform to a particular type4 ,at first sight this statement may seem rather obscure4 ,what 7you will ask7 is this 8structure0 or pattern whose absence would be so disastrous to knowledge8 ,it is a structure 7,i reply7 which makes it possible to break up the flow of events into intelligible repetitions4 ,it is not enough that the condition of the world at any moment should be strictly determined by its condition at the preceding moment4 ,such a world would1 ,i suppose1 completely conform to the doctrine of uniformity1 and obey both in spirit and in letter the law of universal causation4 ,yet1 unless it also conformed to the additional canon ,i have just laid down1 it would provide no basis either for scientific knowledge or for practical decision4 ,the same consequent would always succeed the same antecedent1 if and when it recurred4 ,but1 unless we accept the cyclic theories of the ,stoics1 it never would recur4 ,the completest knowledge of the past would tell us nothing about the future2 not because the succession of events was arbitrary or 7as the word is commonly misused7 miraculous2 but because each cross-section of the stream of ,time 7that is to say1 the sum of all contemporaneous facts and events7 had to be considered as a single cause1 completely determining the whole cross-sections immediately in front of it2 and1 as a single effect1 completely determined by the whole cross-section immediately behind it4 ,such a world might have a history1 but it could never have a science4 ,the reason is plain4 ,science requires uniformities even more than uniformity2 and a universe such as ,i have just described has uniformity but no uniformities4 ,the very phrase 8laws of nature0 shows that it is these subordinate uniformities for which we look4 ,the whole efforts of the skilled investigator are directed towards so isolating the sequences he is examining that his experiments shall become 7as the phrase goes7 crucial4 ,if no such isolation could be effected1 it would never be possible to point to some 8phenomenon0 and say of it 8,here is a cause10 and to some other 8phenomenon0 and say of it 8,here is its effect40 ,the world1 in short1 must have a structure which connects its successive phases in such a way that definite parts of all that exists or happens are knit with peculiar closeness to definite parts of what existed or happened before4 ,it is on these connecting strands that we mainly fix our gaze2 they are often difficult to trace1 they are sometimes hopelessly entangled2 but when we can bring them into clear vision1 then1 and not till then1 we triumphantly say that we have discovered a law of nature4 ,we are so familiar with this 8fibrous0 structure of the natural world that it seems almost a matter of course4 ,mill1 for example1 assumes it1 unconsciously no doubt1 through all his exposition of inductive methods3 and if he had not assumed it1 these methods would have come tumbling about his ears in irreparable ruin4 ,but assuredly neither he nor any other logician has a right to make such an assumption in silence4 ,in spite of many speculative difficulties1 there is no principle more vital to knowledge1 practical and theoretical1 than the principle of 8negligibility02 the principle which asserts that sequences can be isolated and repeated1 and that vast bodies of contemporaneous facts and happenings may be wholly neglected4 ,it is much more important than the principle of causation1 if by causation is meant1 not a working1 though possibly imperfect1 regularity1 but the speculative completeness implied by the phrase 8universal causation0 as commonly interpreted4 ,it may be said1 and ,i think with truth1 that these observations scarcely apply to a material world conceived in a purely mechanical fashion4 ,in such a world negligibility is theoretically measurable4 ,the mass of ,sirius1 without doubt1 modifies the weight of the pen with which ,i am writing4 ,but the effect is demonstrably infinitesimal1 and negligibility is not assumed1 but proved4 ,laplace's calculator1 surveying the universe1 would have no difficulty either in fixing his attention on particular repetitions which exemplify the 8laws of nature10 or in regarding them as integral parts of a single mechanical whole1 whose successive phases 7if the law of energy dissipation be universal7 can never be repeated4 ,but this does not lighten the difficulty4 ,the world may1 or may not1 be a single mechanical system2 but1 if it is1 the fact can only be empirically known to us through induction3 and induction assumes negligibility1 and cannot1 so far as ,i can see1 move a step without it4 ,choose the most perfect experiment on record1 idealise its conditions to your heart's content2 for greater security1 suppose it repeated even to weariness1 how will you be advanced8 ,there are1 ,i suppose1 millions of circumstances1 for the most part utterly unknown1 which have co-existed with all the experiments already tried1 but will have vanished before the next experiment is undertaken4 ,does this disturb you8 ,do you ask yourself whether1 among the unnumbered circumstances in which the world of to-day differs from the world of yesterday1 there may not be one which is necessary to the expected effect8 ,not at all4 ,you brush them aside4 ,you say they may be neglected4 ,and doubtless you do well4 ,but why8 ,not on any grounds which observation or reasoning can supply1 not on any grounds formulated in the logic of induction1 or the calculus of chances4 ,you trust yourself to a feeling of antecedent probability2--the intuitive probability on whose importance ,i dwelt in the last lecture1 which is not the flower of experience but its root2--and your trust will sometimes be betrayed4 ,the principle of negligibility1 or 7in terms of belief7 the belief that observed regularities may often be treated as if they were complete and self-contained cases of cause and effect1 separable from contemporary events1 is thus a necessary presupposition of concrete science2 and1 like other presuppositions1 it is incapable of scientific proof4 ,we often hear it said1 indeed1 that principles of this kind should be regarded as hypotheses verified by an ever-increasing volume of experimental proof4 ,they are found to work2 what more can be desired8 ,but it is not accurate to say that these and other fundamental principles are1 or ever have been1 regarded either by common sense or science as inferences from experience or as hypotheses requiring verification4 ,nor is it accurate to suggest that verification differs essentially from any other kind of experimental evidence except in the date of its occurrence4 ,if evidence follows conjecture1 but not otherwise1 it is called verification2 and though1 from the point of view of method1 this chronological order is of immense importance1 from the point of view of logic it is nothing4 ,a doubtful conjecture 7let us suppose7 is 8verified0 by experiment4 ,if the experiment had come earlier there would have been no conjecture1 but there would have been equal evidence1 indeed the same evidence4 ,it is true that without the conjecture there might have been no experiment1 and that without the experiment there might have been no proof4 ,but1 though the conjecture occasioned the proof1 it certainly adds nothing to its force1 and we therefore come back to the question already discussed--namely1 whether principles without which no inference from experiences is possible1 can be themselves inferred from experiences8--a question to which1 as ,i conceive1 only one answer is possible4 ,experiences may produce habit1 and habit may produce expectation1 and this process may masquerade as induction4 ,but expectations thus engendered belong to the causal series1 not the cognitive4 ,physiology and psychology may explain them4 ,but they can neither be proved nor treated as axiomatic4 ,axiomatic they certainly are not2 nor do they possess the universality and precision of outline which we are accustomed to associate with axioms4 ,it is curious1 in this connection1 to note that the philosophers who are most firmly resolved to root the principle of regularity 7they ignore negligibility7 in experience always insist on giving it that absolute character which our inferences from experience rarely possess4 ,the notion that fundamental beliefs should be liable to exception1 should be capable of degrees1 and should apply unequally in different fields of observation1 is as abhorrent to them as to any metaphysician out of the opposite camp4 ,one would suppose1 to hear them talk1 that1 unless causation be universal1 experience is worthless4 ,,iv ,the region where these uncompromising doctrines show to least advantage is human character4 ,i do not propose to discuss causation and free will2 but ,i may with advantage say something on a less hackneyed theme1 namely1 negligibility and foreknowledge4 ,the thesis ,i desire to maintain is that1 in dealing with a human character1 full foreknowledge is theoretically impossible1 even though free will be wholly absent1 and the succession of psychic states be completely determined4 ,practically impossible we know it to be4 ,but most determinists would hold that this impossibility is due partly to our ignorance and partly to our incapacity4 ,we know too little either of the general laws of mind1 or of individual character1 or of surrounding circumstances1 to make accurate forecasts2 and1 even if we possessed the requisite information1 we could not use it1 owing to the irremediable weakness of our powers of calculation4 ,it is this contention that ,i wish to traverse4 ,i hold that1 had we the supernatural powers of ,laplace's calculator1 armed with a knowledge of the human heart which supernatural powers of observation could alone supply1 we should still fail1 because we are face to face with that which is inherently incalculable4 ,the contrary opinion is due1 ,i think1 to an imperfect comprehension of the doctrines ,i have touched on in this lecture4 ,all human foreknowledge depends on detecting old sequences in a new context4 ,the context1 of course1 is always new4 ,there is never full or complete repetition4 ,but1 unless there be partial repetitions embedded in the universal flux1 prescience is impossible4 ,this is the doctrine of 8negligibility40 ,now consider two illustrative examples4 ,first1 imagine yourself standing on the edge of a valley down which a landslip has just let loose the waters of some great reservoir in the hills4 ,the catastrophe is sudden in its onset1 brief in its duration1 wildly irregular in its character4 ,even the most tumultuous cataract retains a certain steadiness of outline3 and few sights are more impressive than the stationary waves in a great rapid4 ,but there is here no trace of order imposed on disorder1 fixity on motion4 ,the rushing wall of water1 spouting into foam over every obstacle it encounters1 the tossing flood that follows furiously behind1 seem in their brief violence to present the very ideal of incalculable confusion4 ,but we know it is not so4 ,in the presence of such a spectacle our calculator would not feel a moment's embarrassment4 ,he could forecast without difficulty the whole scene down to its minutest eddy2 the motions of each drop obey laws with which he was perfectly familiar2 and the total effect1 catastrophic though it be1 is but the sum of all these component examples of natural uniformity4 ,turn now and contemplate a calmer scene4 ,consider the commonplace life of a commonplace man as it develops in the untroubled prosperity of a steady business and a quiet home4 ,such a career seems as orderly and uniform as the flood ,i have been describing is terrible and strange4 ,surely no supernatural calculator is required to cast the horoscope of its hero3 for he does1 and leaves undone1 the same actions1 he thinks and leaves unthought the same ideas1 as thousands of his contemporaries2 and1 so far as outward appearance goes1 he is an indistinguishable member of an undistinguished crowd4 ,yet1 in spite of this1 we know him to be unique4 ,there never has been before1 nor will there ever be again1 another individual exactly like him4 ,a similar statement1 it may be urged1 can be made about our catastrophic flood4 ,though this has plenty of parallels1 none of them1 strictly speaking1 are exact4 ,where1 then1 lies the distinction on which ,i am trying to insist8 ,let me endeavour to mark the contrast4 ,if the material world be conceived as a mechanical system1 the flood in my illustration may be regarded as a piece arbitrarily cut out of it at the whim of the spectator4 ,it possesses no natural unity2 and1 like the whole of which it is a fraction1 the moving particles which compose it do each obey laws which are 7we assume7 perfectly well known1 and have been endlessly exemplified4 ,its behaviour is the sum of the behaviour of these several parts3 and it is by estimating their movements that our imaginary calculator can prophesy its course with absolute exactness4 ,he is never perplexed by the problem of negligibility2 for negligibility in such a case can be accurately measured1 and our calculator possesses all the data required for its measurement4 ,in short1 the principle of regularity may here be applied in its most uncompromising form2 it requires no qualification1 nor can it be pressed too boldly or too far4 ,but the case is otherwise when we have to abandon the strictly mechanical point of view1 and investigate regions where negligibility has a small and uncertain application4 ,such a region is individual consciousness4 ,this possesses a natural or intrinsic unity4 ,its phases are never precisely repeated2 nor can it be regarded as a collection of independent elements1 the sequences of which may be separately examined1 verified1 and repeated4 ,not only is the whole unique1 but the parts are unique also4 ,or1 perhaps it would be more accurate to say that there are no parts possessing a fixed character of their own apart from the whole4 ,not only is everything qualified by everything else1 but few of these qualifications are negligible4 ,perfect repetition is therefore impossible1 and our calculator1 whatever his powers1 could never feel at home with his premises1 or secure in his conclusions4 ,the present would always be new1 and the future would always be doubtful4 ,if this seems paradoxical it is1 ,i think1 mainly for two reasons4 ,in the first place1 such a doctrine seems inconsistent with the fact that1 whatever ,laplace's calculator could do1 humbler beings like ourselves manage somehow or other to forecast the behaviour of our neighbours with some small measure of success4 ,this1 no doubt1 is true4 ,but it is in part because the alternatives of behaviour are very few and very definite compared with the infinitely graduated variations of thought1 will1 and feeling4 ,action is 8canalised40 ,it can flow only along channels engineered for it by circumstances1 and among these the choice is commonly small4 ,but the character which lies behind action is complex beyond all power of analysis1 and variable beyond all powers of anticipation4 ,the routine which is unwaveringly pursued from month to month and year to year is pursued each day in a different spirit3 and often a critical hour strikes when some well-drilled creature of custom1 to his own surprise and the scandal of his friends1 deserts the ancient ways and wanders suddenly forth into the unknown4 ,of course1 these violent aberrations are the exception4 ,the more familiar experience is that1 in an orderly society1 the alternatives of action which need be taken into account are few1 and the 8limits of deviation0 narrow4 ,often1 therefore1 we can anticipate conduct without any real insight into the depths of character or the complexities of motive from which the conduct springs4 ,and truly this is fortunate2 for1 if mutual comprehension were necessary to social intercourse1 how could society exist8 ,but there is another reason why we take little note of the distinction ,i am endeavouring to draw between the calculable uniformities of a material world and the incalculable regularities of psychic life4 ,the distinction is rather speculative than practical4 ,it does not affect the routine of daily existence4 ,for1 although the course of the material world is calculable1 we mortals have neither the time nor the knowledge nor the mental powers required to calculate it4 ,we behave1 therefore1 towards nature as we behave towards man4 ,we content ourselves with approximations1 with analogies1 with resemblances4 ,even if we had the power1 we should not have the time to resolve the movement of all the bits of matter with which we have to deal from minute to minute into the exact sequences of which they are composed4 ,we would not if we could4 ,we apply rough methods2 we are satisfied with imperfect results4 ,nor are these results always more imperfect in the psychic than in the material sphere of observation4 ,the ways 7for example7 of ,british weather are even more mysterious than the ways of ,british men4 ,why1 then1 should we interest ourselves in a speculation which tells us1 however truly1 that perfect foreknowledge is theoretically possible in the first case1 but theoretically impossible in the second8 ,in practice it is impossible in both4 ,and with this we must be content4 ,and yet the speculation is interesting4 ,for the distinction between the two cases lies deep4 ,it has nothing 7let me say again7 to do with free will4 ,it has nothing to do with our ignorance of facts4 ,it has nothing to do with our intellectual insufficiency4 ,it is due to a fundamental difference between the uniformities of matter and the regularities of mind4 ,perfect foresight requires perfect repetition1 and in the psychic sphere perfect repetition can never happen4 ,every self is unique2 all its experiences are unique2 and these unique wholes are not compounded of interchangeable elements obeying identical laws4 ,they do not alter by mere addition1 subtraction1 or rearrangement of parts4 ,they grow4 ,and the sequence of one phase upon another faintly resembles that which would prevail in the imaginary universe of which ,i spoke just now1 the universe where all contemporaneous events were treated as the single effect of the immediate past and the single cause of the immediate future4 ,of such a universe ,i observed that it would have a history1 but could have no science4 ,and though we cannot go so far when speaking of psychic unities1 though we cannot rule out psychology or sociology1 it must be admitted that no regularities which observation discloses can ever possess the precision which we theoretically attribute to material mechanism4 ,instructive likenesses we shall find in abundance1 complete determination we may assume if we please2 but 8laws10 in the full and strict sense of the term1 we shall not find1 for they are not there4 ,,note ,the shortcomings of mechanism have been discussed by ,m4 ,bergson in a manner which no other thinker is likely to rival4 ,he has1 however1 usually dealt with the subject in connection with freedom2 whereas in this section ,i have only dealt with it in connection with foreknowledge1 repetition1 and what ,i have termed the doctrine of 8negligibility40 ,he approaches it from the side of reality4 ,i approach it from the side of inductive inference and the law of universal causation4 ,,footnotes3 #aa ,extract from ,morgan's 8,habit and ,instinct10 page #dj4 8,a young chick two days old1 for example1 had learnt to pick out pieces of yolk from others of white of egg4 ,i cut little bits of orange-peel of about the same size as the pieces of yolk1 and one of these was soon seized1 but at once relinquished1 the chick shaking his head4 ,seizing another1 he held it for a moment in the bill1 but then dropped it and scratched at the base of his beak4 ,that was enough2 he could not again be induced to seize a piece of orange-peel4 ,the obnoxious material was now removed1 and pieces of yolk of egg substituted1 but they were left untouched1 being probably taken for orange-peel4 ,subsequently1 he looked at the yolk with hesitation1 but presently pecked doubtfully1 not seizing1 but merely touching4 ,then he pecked again1 seized1 and swallowed40 ,,lecture ,,ix ,,tendencies ,,of ,,scientific ,,belief ,i ,in the sixth and eighth lectures of this course ,i dealt with two inevitable beliefs which lie at the root of all science and all practice--the beliefs that an independent1 or1 as it is commonly called1 an 8external0 world exists1 and the belief that the world1 whether external or internal1 has at least a measure of regularity4 ,in the seventh lecture ,i interpolated a discussion upon probability2 and showed1 or attempted to show1 that we must take account of a kind of probability other than that which1 in the hands of mathematicians1 has so greatly contributed to knowledge4 ,if1 now1 we consider these subjects in their mutual relation1 we perceive that an 8inevitable0 belief is one which possesses the highest degree of this intuitive probability4 ,these are two descriptions of the same quality--one emphasising the objective1 the other the subjective1 aspects of a single fact4 ,but this at once suggests a further inquiry4 ,probability is evidently a matter of degree4 ,a belief may be more probable or less probable4 ,inevitableness1 on the other hand1 seems at first sight to be insusceptible of gradation4 ,it is1 or it is not4 ,yet this extreme definiteness vanishes if we regard it as a limiting case--as the last term of a series whose earlier members represent varying degrees of plausibility4 ,on this view we should regard our beliefs about the universe as moulded by formative forces1 which vary from irresistible coercion to faint and doubtful inclination4 ,beliefs in the reality of the external world and in its regularity are important products of the first4 ,i now propose to call attention to some beliefs which are due to the less obvious action of the second4 ,both kinds1 whether capable of proof or not1 are more or less independent of it4 ,both are to be regarded rather as the results of tendencies than as the conclusions of logic4 ,i am well aware that a doctrine like this will find few admirers among systematic thinkers4 ,inevitable beliefs which are fundamental without being axiomatic2 which lack definiteness and precision2 which do not seem equally applicable to every field of experience2 which do not claim to be of the essence of our understanding1 like the categories of the critical philosophy1 or the so-called laws of thought1 have little to recommend them to philosophers4 ,and when inevitableness is treated as merely an extreme form of plausibility1 when guidance is discovered in tendencies which are weak and of uncertain application1 leading to error as well as to truth1 their objections will scarcely be mitigated4 ,many of those who look at these problems from 7what they deem to be7 a strictly scientific point of view are not likely to be more favourable4 ,their loyalty to experience takes the form of supposing that men accumulate knowledge by peering about for 8sequences0 among 8phenomena10 as a child looks for shells upon the beach--equally ready to go north or south1 east or west1 as the humour of the moment moves him4 ,they would regard any antecedent preference for this or that sort of explanation as a sin against the categorical imperatives of intellectual morals4 ,science1 they think1 should have no partialities3 and as the honest investigator 8entertains no belief with a conviction the least in excess of the evidence10#ab so he will resist any leaning toward one kind of conclusion rather than another4 ,such is their view of scientific duty4 ,scientific practice1 however1 has been otherwise4 ,that the practice of ordinary humanity has been otherwise seems indeed sufficiently plain4 ,the folk-lore1 the magic1 and the religions of primitive races1 with all their unborrowed resemblances1 are there to attest it4 ,but these 7you will say7 are superstitions4 ,the objection is not1 ,i think1 relevant2 yet1 for the sake of peace1 let us pass to what is not regarded as a superstition1 namely1 morality4 ,here you have the singular spectacle of a close agreement among moralists as to the contents of the moral law1 and a profound disagreement as to the grounds on which the moral law is to be accepted4 ,can the power of 8tendency0 be better shown8 ,can there be a clearer illustration of the way in which it may guide belief and anticipate proof8 ,,ii ,but our business to-day is neither with magic nor morality4 ,it is with physical science4 ,when we survey man's strivings to understand the world in which he lives1 can we detect any secular leanings towards certain types of belief1 any deep-lying inclination to guess by preference in one direction rather than another8 ,we surely can4 ,there are some answers1 for example1 which we refuse to take from experiment and observation4 ,i have already referred to one such case in connection with causation4 ,no man of science can be provoked1 by any seeming irregularities1 into supposing that the course of nature is subject to lapses from the rule of perfect uniformity4 ,consider1 again1 another case1 where the tendency is far less strong1 but where few can doubt that it is real4 ,i refer to the deep-seated reluctance felt by most physicists to accept as final any scientific explanation which involves a belief in 8action at a distance0--a reluctance which is the more remarkable since action at a distance seems a familiar fact of experience1 while action by contact1 when you attempt to work it out in detail1 seems hard to comprehend4 ,but there are tendencies feebler and less general than these which give much food for reflection4 ,consider1 for example1 the familiar history of atomism4 ,at least as far back as ,democritus we find the confident assertion that the world consists of atoms1 and that its infinite variety is due to the motions and positions of immutable and imperceptible units1 which1 if they are not exactly alike1 at least differ less among themselves than do the visible objects into which they are compounded4 ,through successive centuries this theory never died4 ,with the revival of learning and the beginning of modern science it burst into fresh life4 ,it was believed in firmly by ,bacon1 the prophet of the new era4 ,it was treated as almost self-evident by philosophers like ,gassendi and ,hobbes4 ,boyle held it in its most uncompromising form4 ,newton assumed it without question4 ,after a period of varying fortunes in the eighteenth century1 a modification of it in the hands of ,dalton started a new era in chemistry4 ,taken over by the physicists1 it now lies at the root of the modern theory of gases and liquids2 the modern theory of matter1 the modern theory of heat1 and the modern theory of electricity4 ,this is a very strange story2 and it is not really made less strange by those who emphasise the differences between the atoms of ,democritus1 which are the theme of its first chapter1 and the electrons of ,sir ,joseph ,thomson1 which appear in its last4 ,different indeed they are2 but1 though the difference be great1 the agreement is fundamental4 ,there are some who think that the achievement sung by ,lucretius is lessened by showing that the ancients who believed in atoms had no experimental warrant for their convictions4 ,and this is perfectly true4 ,they had not4 ,nor had ,bacon1 nor ,gassendi1 nor ,hobbes1 nor ,boyle1 nor ,newton4 ,but this only brings into clearer relief the point ,i desire to emphasise4 ,if experience did not establish the belief1 whence came it8 ,if it represents nothing better than an individual guess1 why did it appeal so persistently to leaders of scientific thought1 and by what strange hazard does it turn out to be true8 ,it is certainly curious that ,tyndal1 in a once famous address to the ,british ,association at ,belfast1 should have sketched the story from ,democritus to ,lucretius1 and from ,lucretius to #ahgd1 without ever putting these questions to his audience1 or1 so far as ,i know1 to himself4 ,but the ,atomic ,theory is by no means the only example of tendencies which have played an important part in the evolution of science4 ,there are other beliefs1 or kinds of beliefs1 of the most far-reaching importance which have almost exactly similar characteristics4 ,they anticipate evidence1 they guide research1 and in some shape or other they turn out to be true4 ,consider1 for example1 the group of beliefs which may be described generally as beliefs in persistence1 or beliefs in conservation--the kind of belief which has been applied at different periods1 and by different schools of scientific thought1 to matter1 mass1 bulk1 weight1 motion1 force1 heat1 and energy4 ,as every one knows1 these ascriptions have not always been correct4 ,but this only emphasises the strength of the tendency4 ,weight was at one time supposed to be invariable4 ,we know now that the weight of a body varies with its position relatively to other bodies4 ,it is different1 for example1 at the poles from what it is at the ,equator4 ,but how was the error discovered8 ,not by experiment4 ,there were experiments1 no doubt4 ,but those who undertook them already believed in the law of gravitation2 and the law of gravitation made it necessary to distinguish the mass of any given fragment of matter both from its weight and from the occult quality of gravity1 which is one of the factors on which its weight in any given situation depends4 ,the desire for conservation was not1 however1 defeated2 since physicists1 till within the last few years1 regarded both mass and gravity as unalterable characteristics of all material bodies4 ,again1 consider the case of heat4 ,this also has been regarded by powerful schools of scientific thought as a substance that was 8conserved40 ,it is so regarded no longer4 ,but is the inclination to believe in conservation thereby defeated8 ,not at all4 ,though heat may vanish1 energy remains1 and heat is a form of energy4 ,this doctrine of the conservation of energy is indeed the crowning triumph of the tendency ,i am discussing1 and provides the best illustrations of its strength4 ,for natural philosophers1 intent on finding conservation wherever they could1 started too boldly on their quest4 ,descartes regarded the conservation of motion as a self-evident inference from the rationality of ,god4 ,it is true that he neither had experimental evidence of his doctrine1 nor could he1 under any circumstances1 have obtained it2 for the energy of motion1 as he incorrectly described it1 is not conserved4 ,leibnitz described it correctly1 and had as great a confidence as his predecessor in its conservation1 and as little proof to support him4 ,so confident indeed was he1 and so independent of experimental evidence was his faith1 that he dogmatically asserted that1 when motion seemed to disappear1 what was lost by the bodies which we see1 was exactly taken up by their component elements which we do not see2 so that nothing in the nature of what he called vis viva was either lost or created4 ,that this transformation of energy from molar to molecular motion is constantly occurring we now have sufficient proof4 ,but ,leibnitz had no proof2 and apparently thought none was required other than the ,cartesian deduction from the rationality of ,god4 ,he made a bold anticipation of experience1 with nothing to support him but a priori inclination4 ,his anticipation1 however1 was not only bold2 it was fortunate4 ,kinetic energy may really be transformed from molar to molecular motion1 and suffer no variation4 ,it is conserved4 ,on the other hand1 it may not4 ,it may altogether cease1 and what becomes of conservation then8 ,the scientific formula which satisfies both the facts of the case and our desire for conservation is well known4#ac ,energy1 we are taught1 is of two kinds3 kinetic and potential energy--energy in act and energy in possibility4 ,each may turn into the other1 and is continually so turning4 ,each1 therefore1 may vary in quantity1 and does vary in quantity4 ,it is only their sum which is indestructible4 ,few scientific generalisations have been more fruitful2 few have been accepted on more slender evidence2 none are more certain2 none more clearly illustrate our natural appetite for beliefs of conservation4 ,for1 indeed1 to the over-critical this sort of conservation must needs leave something to be desired4 ,when we assert the indestructibility of matter we mean that a real entity continues through time unchanged in quantity4 ,but the word has a less obvious meaning when it is applied to energy4 ,the propriety of describing motion as energy seems indeed clear enough2 and if all energy were energy of motion1 and if energy of motion were always conserved1 the conservation of energy would be on all fours with the conservation of matter4 ,but this is not the case4 ,in spite of ,leibnitz1 the amount of vis viva is not indestructible4 ,what1 then1 happens when some of it is destroyed8 ,in that case1 says science1 energy changes its form but not its quantity4 ,energy of motion becomes energy of position4 ,what was kinetic becomes potential2 and1 as the transformation is effected without loss1 the principle of conservation is saved4 ,when1 however1 energy thus becomes potential1 in what sense does it still exist1 and why do we still call it energy8 ,energy suggests 8doings0 and 8happenings40 ,in the case of 8potential0 energy there are no 8doings0 and no 8happenings40 ,it is 8stored02 and stored it may for ever remain1 hibernating 7as it were7 to all eternity1 neither changing nor causing change4 ,i do not quarrel with this2 but ,i ask myself why 8energy0 should be treated more leniently than 8force40 ,though force is now known not to be 8conserved10 ordinary thought attributes to it a certain continuity of existence even when it does not show itself in motion4 ,force may be exerted though nothing moves2 as1 for example1 by a book pressing on a table4 ,but this view is profoundly unsatisfactory to many scientific thinkers4 ,for them force is nothing apart from 8acceleration02 it does not represent a cause1 it only measures an effect4 ,and if in our ordinary moments we think otherwise1 this 7they think7 is simply because we illegitimately attribute to matter something which corresponds to muscular effort in man4 ,it is not1 perhaps1 so easy as these critics suppose to extrude from scientific thought 7,i say nothing of scientific language7 this notion of latent force--force which would produce movement if it could2 and is actively1 though imperceptibly1 striving to show itself in motion4 ,but why should they try8 ,they welcome potential energy--why should they anathematise latent force8 ,i think the answer is to be found in the fact that1 whether force has1 or has not1 any being apart from acceleration1 it is certainly not conserved2 while1 if energy be as real when it is potential as when it is kinetic1 it certainly is conserved4 ,a lapse into anthropomorphism1 therefore1 is without excuse in the first case1 while a lapse into metaphysics is justified in the second4 ,any heresy may be forgiven1 and any evidence is worth respectful attention when conservation is the thing to be proved4 ,i have sometimes amused myself by wondering what would have happened about the year #ahdb if the conservation of energy had been a theological dogma instead of a scientific guess4 ,descartes1 as ,i mentioned just now1 inferred the conservation of motion from the attributes of ,god4 ,colding and ,joule used the same argument in favour of the conservation of energy4 ,now1 if a belief in the conservation of energy had been an integral part of religious orthodoxy in the early forties of the last century surely some positivist philosopher would have used ,joule's first investigation on ,work and ,heat to upset the very dogma they were intended to establish4 8,here0 7he would have said7 8you have a believer in these metaphysico-theological methods of discovering the laws of nature2 and mark what happens4 ,in true medieval fashion he begins with some fanciful deductions from the way in which he thinks ,god must have made the world4 ,fortunately1 however1 though his principles are medieval1 his methods are modern4 ,not only is he a most brilliant experimenter1 but he has the courage to put his own speculations to an experimental test4 ,he takes the minutest precautions1 he chooses the most favourable conditions1 and what happens8 ,does he prove his case8 ,do his results square with his theories8 ,does he find a fixed relation between work and heat8 ,does he justify his views of ,god8 ,not at all4 ,between his lowest determination of the mechanical equivalent of heat1 and his highest1 there is an immense and lamentable gap4 ,what does he do8 ,he takes their mean value3--a very proper method if he knew there was a mechanical equivalent of heat2 a very improper method if the reality of such an equivalent was the thing to be proved4 ,clearly1 if he had not put his theological opinions into his scientific premises when he began his experiment1 he never would have got them out again as scientific conclusions when he had reached its end40 ,for my own part1 ,i think this imaginary critic would1 at that date1 have had something to say for himself--supposing always we are prepared to accept his presuppositions about scientific method4 ,if sound reason and intellectual integrity require us to follow the lead of observation and experiment with no antecedent preference for one class of conclusions rather than another1 then no doubt ,joule and a long line of distinguished predecessors were the spoilt children of fortune4 ,they made their discoveries in advance of their evidence1 and in spite of their methods4 ,if they turned out to be right1 or1 at least1 on the right road1 what can we do but criticise their credulity and wonder at their luck8 unless1 indeed1 their luck be a form of inspiration4 ,before leaving beliefs of conservation1 ,i must say one more word about the most famous of them all--the belief in the conservation of matter4 ,this was an important article in the scientific creed of the early atomists1 who had no better evidence for it than they had for the ,atomic ,theory itself4 ,the material 8substance0 of the medieval ,aristotelians was1 ,i imagine1 also conserved2 though as all that could be known about it were its qualities1 and as these were not necessarily conserved1 the doctrine in practice did not1 perhaps1 amount to much4 ,then came the theory which1 chiefly in the hands of ,boyle#ad at the end of the seventeenth century1 initiated modern chemistry4 ,what was conserved1 according to this view1 was not a metaphysical substance with detachable qualities1 but elementary kinds of matter with inseparable qualities2 and out of these qualified entities was compounded the whole material universe4 ,i may incidentally observe that a company promoter who should issue a prospectus based on no better evidence than ,boyle could advance for this tremendous theory would certainly be in peril of the law4 ,yet ,boyle was right3 and1 notwithstanding subsequent developments1 his conjecture remains the corner-stone of modern chemical research4 ,now1 what is it that we intend to assert when we say that matter is conserved1 or is indestructible8 ,we certainly do not mean that its qualities never suffer change3 for most of those which are obvious and striking are always liable to change4 ,if you sufficiently vary temperature or pressure2 if you effect chemical composition or decomposition1 the old characteristics will vanish and new characteristics will take their place4 ,what1 then1 is conserved8 ,in the first place1 the lost qualities can 7in theory7 always be restored1 though not always without the expenditure of energy4 ,water never ceases to be convertible into steam1 nor steam into water4 ,the characteristics may vanish1 but in appropriate conditions they will always reappear4 ,now science1 as we have just seen1 is tolerant of this notion of latency or potentiality1 and is ready enough to use it in aid of beliefs in conservation4 ,it was so used in connection with heat when heat was regarded as a material substance4 ,it is still so used in connection with energy1 which is sometimes described as an immaterial substance4 ,but 7as ,i have already noted7 it has never been so used in connection with matter4 ,the reason1 ,i suppose1 is that the conservation of matter is much more a belief of common sense than the conservation of energy4 ,energy is a conception which has but recently been disengaged from other conceptions1 like force and momentum1 and has but recently been associated with heat1 with chemical reactions1 with changes of physical phase1 and with electro-magnetic phenomena4 ,it is1 therefore1 a remote and somewhat abstract product of scientific reflection2 and science may do what it will with its own4 ,the notion of matter1 on the other hand1 is the common possession of mankind4 ,whatever difficulties it may present to reflective analysis1 it presents none to our work-a-day beliefs4 ,we are quite ready to regard it as indestructible2 but we are not ready to combine this conviction with the view that it possesses no single characteristic which may not be temporarily etherealised into a 8potentiality40 ,on such terms the eternal and unchanging identity of this or that parcel of matter would seem a difficult and elusive doctrine1 inappropriate to the familiar and substantial world in which we suppose ourselves to live4 ,a belief in the conservation of matter has therefore always1 or almost always1 carried with it a belief in the unchanging continuity of at least some material qualities2 though as to what these qualities are there has been much dispute4 ,descartes1 though not consistent1 found unchanging continuity in the attribute of size2 so also did ,hobbes4 ,i presume that the older atomists1 who explained the appearances of matter by the shape of its constituent atoms1 would have regarded both atomic form and atomic magnitude as persistent4 ,but it was the assumption that the same piece of ponderable matter always possessed the same gravitating power1 and that the same gravitating power was always associated with the same mass1 which1 in the hands of ,lavoisier1 made so great a revolution in eighteenth-century chemistry4 ,matter might change its size1 its shape1 its colour1 its phase1 its power of acting and reacting2 but its mass and the quality which caused its weight it could not change2 these characteristics were always associated with each other1 and were never in abeyance4 ,to ,lavoisier this double principle seemed self-evident4 ,it was not a hypothesis that required testing1 but a touchstone by which other hypotheses might safely be tested4 ,if1 in the course of some chemical operation1 weight increased1 then no further proof was required to show that mass had increased also1 and that matter had been added4 ,if1 on the other hand1 weight diminished1 then no further proof was required to show that mass had diminished also1 and that matter had been subtracted4 ,whatever other qualities matter might gain or lose1 mass and gravity were indestructible and unchanging4 ,men of science seemed1 on the whole1 content silently to assume these principles of conservation without inconveniently raising the question of evidence4 ,philosophers have not always been so cautious4 ,kant supposed himself to have demonstrated them a priori4 ,schopenhauer followed suit4 ,spencer declared their contraries to be inconceivable4 ,mill said they were proved by experience4 ,in short1 all these eminent thinkers vied with each other in conferring upon this doctrine the highest honours permitted by their respective philosophies4 ,but apparently they were hasty4 ,recent discoveries have changed our point of view4 ,mass 7it seems7 is no longer to be regarded as unchanging4 ,when bodies move at speeds approaching the velocity of light their mass rapidly increases2 so that this quality1 which is peculiarly characteristic of matter1 must be removed from the category of those which persist unchanged1 and placed in the category of those which change but can always be restored4 ,are we so to class gravitation8 ,would the weight of a body moving nearly at the speed of light increase as1 in like circumstances1 its inertia increases8 ,if the answer is 8no10 then the link is broken which has for long been thought to connect gravity and mass4 ,if the answer is 8yes10 then what ,kant regarded as certain a priori is false2 what ,spencer regarded as 8inconceivable0 is true2 another carrier of 8persistence0 is lost1 and some fresh characteristic must be found which will remain unchanged through all time1 and under all conditions4 ,if this characteristic should turn out to be electric charge1 what a curious light it will throw upon our tendency to 8beliefs of conservation0#ae4 ,after long seeking for some indestructible attribute of matter2 after taking up and rejecting size1 shape1 weight1 mass1 and 7perhaps7 impenetrability1 we shall at last find the object of our quest in a conception which has 7,i suppose7 been clearly realised only within the last hundred years1 about which our senses tell us nothing1 and of which the general run of educated mankind are still completely ignorant6 ,,iii ,it is possible1 but not1 ,i hope1 probable1 that some hasty reader may suppose that in this and the preceding lectures ,i am recommending a new method or instrument of discovery4 8,if you want to reach truth1 follow your unreasoned inclination10 may be his summary of my doctrine3 brief--but also unjust4 ,of the manner in which discoveries are going to be made ,i say nothing1 for ,i know nothing4 ,i am dealing with the past3 and in the historic movements of scientific thought ,i see1 or think ,i see1 drifts and currents such as astronomers detect among the stars of heaven4 ,and1 as the law of gravitation will hardly 7,i suppose7 explain the last1 so observation1 experiment1 and reasoning will hardly explain the first4 ,they belong to the causal1 not to the cognitive1 series2 and the beliefs in which they issue are effects rather than conclusions4 ,those who feel little sympathy for such a view may be inclined to regard the relatively faint inclinations dealt with in this lecture as ordinary scientific hypotheses confirmed by ordinary scientific methods4 ,this view1 as ,i have already observed1 is not applicable to the inevitable beliefs dealt with in earlier lectures4 ,whatever philosophers may say after the event the conviction that we live in an external world of things and persons1 where events are more or less regularly repeated1 has never been treated as a speculative conjecture about which doubt was a duty till truth was proved4 ,beliefs like these are not scientific hypotheses1 but scientific presuppositions1 and all criticism of their validity is a speculative after-thought4 ,the same may be said1 though with less emphasis and some qualification1 about beliefs fostered by the intellectual tendencies considered in this chapter4 ,these1 as we have seen1 are many4 ,they are often inconsistent2 they are never inevitable2 and they perpetually change their form under the pressure of scientific discovery4 ,atomism in one shape follows atomism in another2 doctrines of conservation rise1 fall1 and rise again2 incredulity about 8action at a distance0 breeds explanations whose failure 7in the case of gravity7 leaves the hope of final success untouched4 ,now1 it would be an error to say that science does not1 when it can1 apply to these various theories its ordinary methods of verification4 ,they are in a different position from inevitable beliefs1 which can hardly be verified because the process of verification assumes them4 ,yet they must not be confounded with ordinary scientific hypotheses1 for they are something more and something different4 ,like these1 they are guesses1 but they are guesses directed1 not by the immediate suggestion of particular experiences 7which indeed they sometimes contradict71 but by general tendencies which are enduring though sometimes feeble4 ,those who make them do not attempt the interrogation of ,nature wholly free from certain forms of bias4 ,in cross-examining that most stubborn and recalcitrant of witnesses they never hesitate to ply her with leading questions2 and1 whether this procedure be logically defensible or not1 no lover of truth need regret its results4 ,readers of ,m4 ,bergson's 8,creative ,evolution0 may remember the picture he draws of the lan vital--the principle of life--forcing its way along different paths of organic evolution1 some without issue or promise of progress2 others leading on through regions hitherto untraversed to ends remote and unforeseen4 ,the secular movements of science1 as ,i conceive them1 somewhat resemble this process1 even though it be faintly and at a distance4 ,there is in both a striving towards some imperfectly foreshadowed end2 and in both the advance is irregular1 tentative1 precarious1 with many changes of direction1 and some reversals4 ,yet ,i would not press the parallel over-far or plunge too deeply into metaphor4 ,it is enough to say that as1 according to ,m4 ,bergson1 the course followed by organic evolution cannot be wholly due to ,selection1 so the course followed by scientific discovery1 as ,i read its history1 cannot be wholly due to reasoning and experience4 ,in both cases we seem forced to assume something in the nature of a directing influence1 and 7as ,i should add1 though perhaps ,m4 ,bergson would not7 of supramundane design4 ,and if 8a ,power that makes for truth0 be required to justify our scientific faith1 we must surely count ourselves as theists4 ,,note ,extracts from a letter from ,sir ,oliver ,lodge on certain passages in this lecture relating to ,energy and its transformations4 99 99 99 99 99 ,you say1 on page #bbf1 8,energy1 we are taught1 is of two kinds3 kinetic and potential energy--energy in act and energy in possibility40 ,so long as emphasis is laid upon the words 8we are taught10 ,i have no objection4 ,people have taught that1 though ,i strongly object to such teaching1 because ,i object to the idea 8,energy in possibility0 or 8possible ,energy0 of any kind4 ,i teach the identity of ,energy in much the same terms as the identity of ,matter2 not merely the conservation1 with the idea that one quantity can disappear and another quantity reappear4 ,it is not another quantity1 but the same2 though it may have been locked up for any length of time4 ,but then it has not been usually taught so1 and ,i think you are dealing with what is usual4 99 99 99 99 99 ,again1 you say on page #bbg1 8,energy suggests #8doings' and #8happenings4'0 ,no1 say ,i1 activity suggests doings and happenings1 and activity is ,energy in transformation4 ,energy alone is something stored1 like ,capital4 ,the earth's rotational energy1 for instance1 is stored just as really as1 and for a longer time than1 the vegetation of the carboniferous epoch4 ,lower down you observe that 8,force may be exerted though nothing moves40 ,certainly it may1 when resisted by an equal opposite force4 ,but ,i fully admit that a lot of nonsense has been talked about the acceleration measure of force1 as if it were the only measure1 and that some criticism on this procedure is useful4 ,but ,i should not speak of 8latent0 force2 it is real force you have in mind1 or at least real stress--i4e4 two equal and opposite forces4 ,it is latent ,activity which becomes active when the other factor1 viz4 ,motion1 is supplied or allowed--e4g4 by the release of a bent bow1 or a wound-up spring1 or a raised weight4 ,so it is also with the ,energy of a fly-wheel4 ,that1 too1 is latent ,activity until the other factor1 viz4 ,force1 is supplied1 i4e4 when it is employed to overcome resistance1 and therefore do work4 ,otherwise its ,motion will be stored to all eternity4 ,in short1 activity1 or doing of work1 has two factors1 ,force and ,motion4 ,when both are present1 work is done2 when either is present alone1 ,energy is stored4 ,static ,energy is the ,force factor1 with the possibility of a certain range of effectiveness understood2 like a head of water1 for instance1 a certain height above the sea4 ,kinetic ,energy is the ,motion factor1 with a certain inertia or possibility of ,force understood2 not ,motion alone1 but a mass in motion1 so that it may be able to overcome resistance4 ,there is no real reason why one form of ,energy should be considered more 8actual0 or real than another2 our eyes appreciate the one form1 our muscles could appreciate the other4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in considering cases of ,potential ,energy1 it is wise to realise that our knowledge about ,gravitation is altogether too vague to make the case of a raised weight useful4 ,and our knowledge of solid elasticity1 though not so insignificant1 is small enough to make the case of a bent bow or wound spring not very easy for fundamental contemplation4 ,a case of chemical ,energy1 like gun-cotton1 is in much the same predicament4 ,but a typical and satisfactory example of ,potential ,energy is the case of a vessel of compressed air4 ,here is ,energy stagnant enough1 and violent enough when released1 and one that can be locked up apparently to all eternity1 and yet released by the pulling of a trigger4 ,it represents1 however1 a case of which we know something concerning the internal mechanism2 and we have learnt that in this case the force statically exerted on the walls of a vessel is really a kinetic bombardment of the molecules4 ,in other words1 we recognise in this case that ,potential ,energy is ultimately resolvable into ,kinetic4 ,it may be so in the other cases4 ,and on ,kelvin's ,kinetic ,theory of ,elasticity1 which he showed a tendency in later life to abandon1 all strain or stress in ,ether may be ultimately due to its ultramicroscopic vortex circulation4 ,but none of this is yet proven4 99 99 99 99 99 ,the general argument of your lecture deals with the ease with which certain general propositions are accepted as it were intuitively1 without real conclusive evidence4 ,i am entirely with you4 ,and the way we feel secure about general laws1 when adequate evidence for them is really impossible1 has often struck me as remarkable4 ,even when facts appear to go against them1 we question the facts1 and find after all that in so doing we have been right4 ,,footnotes3 #ab ,see ,lecture ,,vi4 #ac ,see note at the end of the ,lecture4 #ad ,i got this view of ,boyle's relation to modern chemistry from ,ostwald's work4 #ae ,in this chapter1 especially in that part of it which deals with beliefs of conservation1 ,i am greatly indebted to ,meyerson's 8,identit et ,ralit40 ,this acute and learned work is not written from the same point of view as that which ,i have adopted2 but this in no way diminishes the amount of my obligation to its author4 ,,part ,,iv ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusion ,,lecture ,x ,,summary ,,and ,,conclusion ,i ,now that we have reached our closing lecture1 those who have followed the course from the beginning may1 on looking back1 find themselves somewhat bewildered by the variety of subjects which ,i have asked them to consider4 ,art1 ,history1 ,morals1 the ,theory of ,probability1 the ,logic of ,perception1 the presuppositions of ,science1 have all been touched on4 ,themes that might fill volumes--nay1 that have filled volumes--are made the text for an hour's discourse4 ,introduced one after the other with breathless rapidity1 each for a moment has been shown under the limelight1 and then hurried off the stage to make room for its successor4 ,it seems hard to believe that with such diversity of materials there can be continuity of argument4 ,but the critic who would judge the matter fairly must bear in mind the title of the course1 and the purpose for which it has been delivered4 ,my desire has been to show that all we think best in human culture1 whether associated with beauty1 goodness1 or knowledge1 requires ,god for its support1 that ,humanism without ,theism loses more than half its value4 ,though1 therefore1 the subjects discussed are embarrassing in their variety1 no diminution of their number seems possible4 ,the argument would have broken down had ,i confined myself to a narrower scope--had ,i1 for example1 been content to show the importance of ,theism for morality1 leaving untouched its importance for science and sthetic4 ,such a limitation would have shattered the whole design4 ,no doubt there are precedents for such a procedure4 ,kant1 for instance1 kept ,god out of the critique which dealt with ordinary knowledge1 while giving ,him a place of honour in the critique which dealt with the moral law4 ,but the procedure has always seemed to me singularly artificial1 even in a philosophy which is artificial through and through4 ,in any case1 such a limitation is quite inconsistent with the scheme of these lectures4 ,this could not be accomplished by setting up a departmental ,deity--even were his department the whole province of ethics4 ,right conduct is much1 but it is not all4 ,we not only act1 but we know1 and we admire2 nor could ,i be quite content with any form of ,theism which did not sustain in every essential part the full circle of human interests4 ,,ii ,but when all explanations have been given1 and all excuses made1 ,i am well aware that in the actual presentation of my case ,i have introduced so much illustrative material1 and of this material so much is disputable1 that some of my hearers may feel themselves distracted rather than enlightened by the number of seemingly subsidiary points of which they are asked to take account4 ,i trust such persons are in a minority2 and that1 on the whole1 my main contention will seem enriched and strengthened1 not embarrassed or confused1 by the manner of its exposition4 ,nevertheless1 it may not be amiss1 before ,i bring the course to an end1 to restate the most important points in the general case ,i have endeavoured to present4 ,the root principle which1 by its constant recurrence in slightly different forms1 binds together1 like an operatic leit-motif1 the most diverse material1 is that if we would maintain the value of our highest beliefs and emotions1 we must find for them a congruous origin4 ,beauty must be more than an accident4 ,the source of morality must be moral4 ,the source of knowledge must be rational4 ,if this be granted1 you rule out ,mechanism1 you rule out ,naturalism1 you rule out ,agnosticism2 and a lofty form of ,theism becomes1 as ,i think1 inevitable4 ,it is1 ,i imagine1 the application of this method to knowledge which will be most generally resented by those who refuse to acknowledge its validity4 ,in the case of beauty1 for example1 the point will seem of small importance to those for whom art means little4 ,it may not greatly impress many of those for whom art means much4 ,for it proclaims no new canons of taste4 ,it belittles no sthetic school4 ,it asks no critic to revise his judgments4 ,it touches the interests neither of artist nor author4 ,it may well be ignored4 ,with ethics the case is somewhat different4 ,there are1 no doubt1 sceptics in religion who treat scepticism as a luxury which can be safely enjoyed only by the few4 ,religion they think good for morals2 morals they think good for society2 society they think good for themselves4 ,such persons may well treat the opinions expressed in the lecture on ethics with benevolent disagreement4 ,but there are more robust thinkers who will not be so lenient4 ,they will reject as intolerable the idea that the morality they desire to preserve depends on a religion they desire to destroy2 and any doctrine which1 like the present1 binds the two more closely together will encounter their uncompromising hostility4 ,nevertheless1 it is the lectures dealing with intellectual values that will rouse1 as ,i suppose1 the most serious opposition4 ,the endeavour to treat our beliefs about the world and our beliefs about ,god as interdependent will seem to many extravagant1 even unnatural4 ,it will be urged that1 for all reasonable beings1 reason must be the supreme judge in matters of belief4 ,it can neither resign its office nor delegate its authority4 ,let it then endorse ,science1 as it must2 and establish ,theism1 if it can2 but do not require it to commit the folly of treating truths about which opinions are agreed as dependent on conjectures about which opinions are divided4 ,this may be excellent advice2 but it is hardly to the point4 ,i ask for nothing better than the supremacy of reason3 not one of its prerogatives do ,i desire to curtail4 ,indeed 7as ,i have already complained7 it is the agnostic empiricists who most obstinately shrink from following it to conclusions they dislike1 who mutiny1 like some old-time mariners1 whenever they are required to navigate unfamiliar seas4 ,i have no sympathy with the singular combination of intellectual arrogance and intellectual timidity so often presented by this particular school of thought4 ,i like it no better than ,i like the attitude of those who declare that1 since reason is bankrupt1 authority should take over its liabilities1 however small be the prospect of discharging them in full4 ,my point of view is utterly different4 ,and if ,i urge that the criticism of common knowledge brings us ultimately to ,theism1 this involves no intolerable paradox1 nor indeed anything very new or strange4 ,descartes1 for example1 thought that all knowledge was based on clear and distinct ideas1 and that clear and distinct ideas could be trusted because1 being due to ,god1 they were guaranteed by ,his truthfulness4 ,that there is a ,god possessing every perfection was independently established by an a priori argument into which ,i need not enter4 ,but the point of interest is that1 though ,descartes conceived himself to have found a refuge from scepticism in the famous 8,i think1 therefore ,i am10 he could only get from this narrow assurance to general knowledge by the use of 8clear and distinct ideas0 certified by divine veracity4 ,if1 therefore1 belief in one's self was the first of truths1 belief in ,god was the second2 and on this second truth all subordinate beliefs1 mathematical1 physical1 and metaphysical1 were1 in his opinion1 ultimately founded4 ,in one sense1 and from one point of view1 this is no doubt an exact inversion of the argument developed in these lectures4 ,descartes rests the belief in science on a belief in ,god4 ,i rest the belief in ,god on a belief in science4 ,nevertheless1 beneath this contrast there is deep-lying agreement4 ,both views reject the notion that we possess in the general body of common-sense assumptions and scientific truths a creed self-sufficing and independent1 to which we may add at our pleasure ,theism in such doses as suit our intellectual palate4 ,both views1 therefore1 are profoundly divided1 not merely from all that calls itself agnostic1 but from much that calls itself religious4 ,i must not1 however1 press the parallel too far4 ,descartes did not1 and could not1 regard our beliefs as a developing system1 which is not merely increasing by external accretion1 like a crystal in its mother-liquid1 but is growing and changing through and through like a living organism4 ,such conceptions were not of his age or country1 nor1 if they had been1 could they have been easily accommodated to his peculiar genius4 ,his was the mathematical temperament1 always striving for precise definitions and rigorous proof2 always tolerant of any simplification of the concrete complexities of reality1 which would make them amenable to deductive treatment4 ,of this1 as a method1 we need make no complaint4 ,within due limits it is invaluable4 ,but ,descartes1 so to speak1 8objectified0 it4 ,he assumed that any judgment which could properly be described as 8clear and distinct0 was not only convenient in form1 but true in substance4 ,the world1 alas6 is not so made4 ,the things which are clear and distinct are usually things of our own creation4 ,definitions1 abstractions1 diagrams1 syllogisms1 machines--such and such like are1 or may be1 8clear and distinct40 ,but the great facts which we have not made--these1 at our present level of knowledge1 are never clear and never distinct4 ,life1 the organism1 the self1 the state1 the world1 freedom1 causality1 the flow of time1 the relation between mind and body1 between perceiver and perceived1 between consciousness and sub-consciousness1 between person and person 7,i say nothing of beauty1 of virtue1 or of ,god7--who is there will dare to say that he either finds in these notions1 or can put into them without injury1 the qualities which ,descartes deemed the inevitable marks of real and certain knowledge8 ,truth1 for us1 is a plant of a different and of a slower growth4 ,how much indeed of that growth consists in discovering that what we thought was clear is in fact obscure2 what we thought was simple is in fact complex2 what we thought was distinct is in fact confused2 and how helpful are such discoveries to the augmentation of learning6 ,however this may be1 there is nothing in the doctrine of 8congruity0 which should shock those who are jealous for the supremacy of reason and the dignity of science4 ,it is science itself which assures us that all premises1 all conclusions1 and all the logical links by which they are connected must be regarded as natural products4 ,it is science itself which assures us that they belong1 like all natural products1 to the tissue of causes and effects whose lengthening web is continuously thrown off by the loom of time4 ,it is science itself which requires us to harmonise these two aspects of the knowing process--the one logical and timeless2 the other causal and successive4 ,but how are they to be harmonised if the causal series is fundamentally non-rational8 ,suppose yourself able to observe the development of beliefs in some alien being 7say an inhabitant of ,mars7 as a bacteriologist observes a growing colony of microbes3 suppose1 further1 that your observation showed how these beliefs arose from causes which had in them no tincture of reason1 and that1 so far as you could see1 they were quite unsupported by any independent evidence which--for you--had weight or even meaning4 ,would you rate their value high8 ,surely not4 ,now it is quite true that when we examine our own system of beliefs we cannot imitate this attitude of complete detachment1 since in the very act of examination some of these beliefs are assumed4 ,but we can examine the beliefs of other people1 and we do1 as a matter of common-sense practice1 rate low the value of the beliefs whose sources we perceive to be non-rational4 ,how1 then1 can we refuse to apply to ourselves a principle of judgment which we thus apply without scruple to our neighbours8 ,whenever we do so apply it1 we shall1 ,i think1 be forced to admit that all creeds which refuse to see an intelligent purpose behind the unthinking powers of material nature are intrinsically incoherent4 ,in the order of causation they base reason upon unreason4 ,in the order of logic they involve conclusions which discredit their own premises4 ,nor is there1 as far as ,i can see1 any mitigation of this condemnation to be looked for except by appealing to the principle of ,selection4 ,and how far will this help us out of the difficulty8 ,just so far as an imitation of intelligent purpose can be a substitute for its reality1 but no further4 ,and how far is this8 ,at first sight we might suppose that1 at the worst1 the cognitive series and the causal series might be harmonised on the basis of natural selection if knowledge never aspired to rise above the level which promoted race survival1 if no faculties of knowing were trusted beyond the point where they ceased effectively to foster the multiplication of the species4 ,up to this point it would seem that1 if selection be true1 there is congruity between beliefs and their origin4 ,the sequence of events which brought them into being suggests no doubt about their value4 ,this scheme of thought1 therefore1 though narrowly restricted1 is apparently coherent4 ,yet even this modest claim must be deemed excessive3 for the speculation on which it rests does violence to its own principles4 ,manifestly we cannot indulge ourselves in reflections upon the limits of the 8knowable0 without using our intellect for a purpose never contemplated by selection4 ,i do not allege that our intellect is therefore unequal to the task4 ,i only say that1 if it be indeed equal to it1 we are in the presence of a very surprising coincidence4 ,why should faculties1 8designed0 only to help primitive man1 or his animal progenitors1 successfully to breed and feed1 be fitted to solve philosophic problems so useless and so remote8 ,why1 indeed1 do such problems occur to us8 ,why do we long for their solution8 ,to such questions ,naturalism can neither find an answer nor be content without one4 ,wearied with unavailing efforts to penetrate the unknown1 many not ignoble spirits have preached the wisdom of dulling unhealthy curiosity by the aid of healthy labour4 8,let us cultivate our gardens0 7they say71 seeking no solution of the insoluble4 ,but the advice is ambiguous4 ,will the proposed remedy1 in their opinion1 cure the ill1 or only help us to forget it8 ,if the latter1 then1 in some circumstances and with some patients1 it will doubtless fulfil its promise4 ,oblivion may be attained by growing vegetables1 as by other less reputable expedients4 ,but if absorption in daily labour be recommended as the final stage of a rational cure1 it cannot be effectual4 ,no rational cure is1 on naturalistic principles1 within our reach4 ,could we empty ourselves of all that makes us men1 could we lower our intellectual level to the point where the scope of our mental activities harmonised with their naturalistic source1 we should doubtless free ourselves from the malady of vain speculation4 ,but though the remedy1 if applied1 would be effectual1 it would not be rational4 ,reflective ,agnosticism cannot be combined with scientific ,naturalism1 because reflective ,agnosticism is the product of a process which ,naturalism inevitably discredits4 ,and if ,naturalism be incompatible even with reasoned ignorance1 how can we hope to harmonise it with the claims of reasoned knowledge8#af ,the best imitation of creative purpose1 therefore1 which ,naturalism can provide breaks down where it is most required--namely1 at the highest levels of value4 ,i have just shown this in connection with our powers of thought1 and the beliefs to which they lead4 ,but the failure is not confined to them4 ,it is as wide as ,humanism itself4 ,wherever we find great intrinsic worth1 there we are in a region where the direct effect of selection is negligible4 ,the noblest things in speculation1 in art1 in morals1 possess small survival value2 and1 though the geniuses to whom we owe them have added greatly to the glory of their race1 they have added but little to its animal successes4 ,in the language of these lectures1 they are 8accidental0--due neither to purpose nor to any arrangement of causes by which purpose is successfully copied4 ,,iii ,you are now in a position to judge how far the hopes held out to you at the beginning of this course have been fulfilled1 and to measure the merits and the demerits1 the claims and the limitations1 of the scheme ,i have endeavoured to expound4 ,i disowned1 as you remember1 any intention of providing you with a philosophical system--not because ,i despise philosophical systems or those who labour to construct them1 but in part because ,i have none to recommend1 and in part because it seems to me doubtful whether at our present stage of development a satisfactory system is possible4 ,but how 7you may ask7 does my point of view differ from a philosophical system8 ,it may be a bad system1 as it certainly is a most imperfect one4 ,yet1 seeing that it touches on everything in heaven and earth1 seeing that its very title embraces ,god and man1 why should it repudiate a description which seemingly is not a whit in excess of its pretensions8 ,the question thus raised is more than a merely verbal one1 and a few observations upon it may fittingly conclude the course4 ,note1 then1 in the first place1 that my scheme of beliefs does not show itself unworthy to be considered systematic merely because it is incomplete4 ,all systems are incomplete4 ,all systems1 however ambitious1 admit their inability to exhaust reality4 ,nor is its unworthiness due to any mere accident of execution1 such as inferior workmanship or defective learning4 ,its failures are essential and irremediable4 ,they are inseparable from 8the point of view40 ,let me explain4 ,every system that deserves to be described as a constructive philosophy--be it dogmatic1 critical1 empirical1 idealist1 what you will--conceives itself not merely to be rooted in reason1 but to be rationalised throughout4 ,the conceptions with which it works should be sifted1 clarified1 defined4 ,it should assume nothing which requires proof4 ,it should rest nothing 7in the last resort7 on faith or probability4 ,it should admit no inexplicable residues4 ,philosophers seem to me entirely right if they think that this is what a system ought to be2 but not entirely right if they think that this is what any system is1 or has ever been4 ,in any case1 no description could be less applicable to the point of view which ,i am provisionally recommending4 ,the philosopher refuses--in theory--to assume anything which requires proof4 ,i assume 7among other things7 the common-sense outlook upon life1 and the whole body of the sciences4 ,the philosopher admits--in theory--no ground of knowledge but reason4 ,i recognise that1 in fact1 the whole human race1 including the philosopher himself1 lives by faith alone4 ,the philosopher asks what creed reason requires him to accept4 ,i ask on what terms the creed which is in fact accepted can most reasonably be held4 ,the philosopher conceives that within the unchanging limits of his system an appropriate niche can be found for every new discovery as it arises4 ,my view is that the contents of a system are always reacting on its fundamental principles1 so that no philosophy can flatter itself that it will not be altered out of all recognition as knowledge grows4 ,this last statement may look like a truism2 but it is a truism which few philosophers are1 in practice1 disposed to accept2 and the generality of mankind are perhaps even less disposed to accept it even than philosophers4 ,that there are beliefs which can and should be held1 with the same shade of meaning1 by all men1 in all ages1 and at all stages of culture1 is a view to which by nature we easily incline4 ,but it is1 to say the least1 most doubtful4 ,language is here no true or certain guide4 ,even when beliefs have not outgrown the formulas by which they have been traditionally expressed1 we must beware of treating this fixity of form as indicating complete identity of substance4 ,men do not necessarily believe exactly the same thing because they express their convictions in exactly the same phrases4 ,and most fortunate it is1 in the interests of individual liberty1 social co-operation1 and institutional continuity that this latitude should be secured to us1 not by the policy of philosophers1 statesmen1 or divines1 but by the inevitable limitations of language4 ,this1 however1 by the way4 ,the point ,i wish to press is that1 speaking generally1 we must not conceive the development of knowledge as a process of adding new truths to old truths1 in the course of which old truths are supplemented but are not changed4 ,it rather resembles the increase of some plastic body which1 wherever it takes place1 involves a readjustment of every part4 ,add brick to brick1 and you may finish your house1 yet never alter its foundation4 ,add belief to belief1 and you will set up strains and stresses within your system of knowledge which will compel it to move towards some new position of equilibrium4 ,sometimes1 no doubt1 the process is more violent and catastrophic than this metaphor naturally suggests4 ,then occurs in the moral world the analogue of the earthquake1 the lava flood1 and the tidal wave1 which shatter mountains and sweep cities to destruction4 ,men's outlook on the universe suffers sudden revolution3 the obvious becomes incredible1 and the incredible obvious2 whole societies lose their balance1 and stately systems are tumbled in the dust4 ,more often1 however1 the movements of belief are gradual4 ,they resemble the slow rise or fall of ancient coast-lines1 where1 by imperceptible degrees1 sea turns into land1 or land into sea4 ,so1 without shock or clamour1 man smoothly modifies his point of view1 till1 gazing over the spaces he has traversed1 he greatly marvels at the change4 ,but we must look forward as well as backward4 ,the spaces still to be traversed far exceed those that have been traversed already4 ,we can set no limits to the intellectual voyage which lies before the race4 ,even if we arbitrarily limit the life of men to that which is possible under terrestrial conditions1 we must anticipate transformations of belief comparable in magnitude with those which already divide us from primitive mankind4 ,how1 in circumstances like these1 can we hope to sketch1 even in outline1 an enduring system of philosophy8 ,why should we succeed where under similar conditions the greatest of our forefathers have already failed8 ,if1 then1 we cannot attain to a scheme of belief which1 whatever be its shortcomings1 is good 7so far as it goes7 for all time1 we must be content with something less4 ,we must put up with what ,i have called in these lectures 8a point of view40 ,we must recognise that our beliefs must be provisional1 because1 till we approach complete knowledge1 all beliefs are provisional4 ,we cannot claim that they are good 8so far as they go02 but only that they are as good as we are at present able to make them4 ,and we must recognise that the two statements are profoundly different4 ,now1 if ,i were asked what categories or conceptions such a 8point of view0 required for its expression1 ,i should answer ,providence and ,inspiration--categories for which systematic philosophy has so far found no great use4 ,these terms1 it must be owned1 are now a little the worse for wear4 ,defaced and battered by centuries of hard usage1 they have suffered the fate which the current coin of popular discussion cannot easily avoid4 ,but they have merits negative and positive1 which make them peculiarly apt for my present purpose4 ,in the first place1 they do not suggest a philosophy of the universe4 ,they openly evade the great problems of theological metaphysics4 ,no one1 for example1 would employ them in discussing the essential nature of an ,absolute ,god1 or ,his relation to time1 to the act of creation1 to the worlds created4 ,they belong to a different level of speculation4 ,in the second place1 they concentrate attention on the humanistic side of ,theism1 on the relation of ,god to man1 and to man's higher spiritual needs4 ,divine 8guidance0--the purposeful working of informing ,spirit--is the notion on which emphasis is specially laid4 ,the term 8,providence0 suggests this in a broad and general way4 ,the term 8,inspiration0 suggests it in the narrower sphere of beliefs and emotions4 ,and do not complain that no endeavour is made to explain the mode in which divine guidance works either on matter or on spirit4 ,these are mysteries as hard of solution as those which surround the action of mind on matter1 and of mind on mind4 ,but the difficulties are difficulties of theory1 not of practice4 ,they never disturb the ordinary man--nor the extraordinary man in his ordinary moments4 ,human intercourse is not embarrassed by the second1 nor simple piety by the first4 ,and perhaps the enlightened lounger1 requesting a club-waiter to shut the window1 brushes aside1 or ignores1 as many philosophic puzzles as a mother passionately praying for the safety of her child4 ,,iv ,to some this conclusion of a long and intricate discussion will seem curiously trivial in its unambitious simplicity4 ,especially will this be true of those who accept empirical ,naturalism in any of its forms4 8,there is 7they may admit7 something grandiose about the great metaphysical systems which appeals even to those who are least able to accept them4 ,it was no ignoble ambition which inspired their architects4 ,it was no light labour1 or trivial ingenuity1 which brought them into being4 ,on the other hand 7they will say71 if naturalistic methods are more modest1 naturalistic results are more secure4 ,they aim lower1 but they reach the mark4 ,if the long-drawn 8conflict between religion and science0 has robbed us of some illusions which we abandon with regret1 the knowledge it has spared us we may hold with assurance4 ,but when we turn to the narrow ,theism of these lectures1 fittingly couched in the outworn language of the pulpit and the ,sunday-school1 can we find in it either the glory of metaphysical speculation or the security of positive knowledge8 ,it has not the courage to explore the unknowable1 nor the power to add to the known4 ,it dare not fly2 it will not walk4 ,it is neither philosophy nor science2 nor does it seek the modest security of some middle way4 ,how1 then1 are we to class this strange amalgam of criticism and credulity8 ,what purpose can it serve8 ,to whom will it appeal8 ,whose beliefs will it alter even by a hair's breadth80 ,these are pertinent questions4 ,let me try to answer them4 ,the customary claims of ,naturalism1 which ,i have here put into the mouth of my imaginary critic1 seem to me 7as you know7 to be quite unreasonable4 ,otherwise ,i have no great objection to the statements contained in his indictment--however little ,i may agree with its spirit4 ,in particular ,i admit the charge that the argument of these lectures1 elaborate as it may appear1 does not after all carry us far beyond the position occupied by uncritical piety and simple faith4 ,could it be otherwise8 ,if we build1 as ,i build1 upon our common-sense beliefs about the natural world1 our theories of the supernatural world will surely share the defects inherent in their foundation4 ,it may--or may not--be possible to know all about the evolution of ,god as the ,absolute ,idea1 while lamentably ignorant of much that pertains to the ,particular4 ,but if we begin with the ,particular--and that most imperfectly apprehended--we cannot hope to grasp the full reality of the ,absolute4 ,on this line of advance the philosopher will not far outstrip the peasant4 ,when1 therefore1 my supposed critic satirically asks who it is that ,i hope to influence1 ,i grant at once that it is not the plain man who already accepts without doubt or commentary a theistic view of the ,universe4 ,he is beyond my arguments2--perhaps above them4 ,neither do ,i greatly hope to influence the trained man of speculation1 who has already found a theory of things which satisfies his reason1 or is sure that no such theory is within his reach4 ,even he may1 ,i trust1 find in these lectures discussions of some philosophic interest4 ,i ask him to consider whether his system provides an honourable place for the actual beliefs by which his waking life is ruled2 whether all the gradations of intuitive probability1 from inevitable compulsion to faint inclination1 find house-room not merely in his psychology of belief1 but in his theory of knowledge2 whether he is satisfied with his logic of science1 or can bring into one harmonious scheme his creed regarded as a body of rational conclusions and his creed regarded as a bundle of natural effects4 ,if he replies in the affirmative his state is the more gracious4 ,but he is not likely to be interested in my arguments2 and assuredly they will not convert him to my views4 ,i need say nothing about his pretentious imitator1 who1 under many names1 has long been a familiar figure in certain societies4 ,with no deep desire for truth1 and poorly equipped for pursuing it1 his main ambition is to indicate discreetly that he holds what the fashion of the moment regards as 8advanced0 views in their most advanced form4 ,wherein the quality of 8advancement0 consists1 it might be hard to determine2 nor is it 7in this connection7 a subject worthy of investigation4 ,it is enough to say that 8advanced0 views must have an air of novelty1 must be making some stir in the world1 must be sufficiently unorthodox to shock the old-fashioned1 and either sufficiently plausible to deceive the simple or sufficiently imposing to overawe them4 ,i do not think that ,i shall find many converts among members of this class2 nor is it to them that ,i desire to speak4 ,but there are many persons1 both earnest and sincere1 to whom the conclusions which modern ,naturalism extracts from modern science are a source of deep perplexity and intellectual unrest4 ,their mood1 if ,i rightly read it1 is something of this kind4 ,they would agree that a world where ,god is either denied or ignored is a world where some higher values are greatly impoverished4 ,they would read the lectures ,i have devoted to ,beauty and ,morals with sympathy1 if not with agreement4 ,life1 they would admit1 is but a poor thing if it does no more than fill with vain desires the brief interval between two material 8accidents0--the 8accident0 which brought it into being1 and the 8accident0 which will extinguish it for ever4 ,but this 7they will say7 is no argument4 ,a wise man faces facts1 a good man prefers the hardest truth to the most alluring illusion4 ,if there be no ground for assuming a living purpose behind the indifferent mask of nature1 let us not fill the vacancy with a phantasm of our own creation4 ,let us at least sink back into the nothingness from which we rose with our intellectual integrity undamaged4 ,let all other values perish1 so long as rational values remain undimmed4 ,here1 according to my view1 lies the great illusion4 ,those who in all sincerity1 and often with deep emotion1 plead after a fashion like this1 profoundly misunderstand the situation4 ,they are indeed worthy of respect4 ,they must not be confounded with those unstable souls who ignore ,god when they are happy1 deny ,him when they are wretched1 tolerate ,him on ,sundays1 but truly call on ,him only when life1 or fortune1 hangs doubtfully in the balance4 ,they are of a different and more virile temper4 ,but are they less mistaken8 ,they search for proofs of ,god1 as men search for evidence about ghosts or witches4 ,show us1 they say1 the marks of ,his presence4 ,tell us what problems ,his existence would solve4 ,and when these tasks have been happily accomplished1 then will we willingly place ,him among the hypothetical causes by which science endeavours to explain the only world we directly know1 the familiar world of daily experience4 ,but ,god must not thus be treated as an entity1 which we may add to1 or subtract from1 the sum of things scientifically known as the canons of induction may suggest4 ,he is ,himself the condition of scientific knowledge4 ,if ,he be excluded from the causal series which produces beliefs1 the cognitive series which justifies them is corrupted at the root4 ,and as it is only in a theistic setting that beauty can retain its deepest meaning1 and love its brightest lustre1 so these great truths of sthetics and ethics are but half-truths1 isolated and imperfect1 unless we add to them yet a third4 ,we must hold that reason and the works of reason have their source in ,god2 that from ,him they draw their inspiration2 and that if they repudiate their origin1 by this very act they proclaim their own insufficiency4 ,,footnotes3 #af ,let me here parenthetically remind you that again 7as ,i observed in an earlier lecture7 the ,naturalism of which ,i speak is ,naturalism in what1 from our present point of view1 must be regarded as its most plausible shape4 ,those who have followed1 even at a distance1 the trend of biological thought are aware that many naturalists of the highest authority are shaken in their allegiance to natural selection4 ,they do not1 indeed1 exclude it from the evolutionary drama1 but they reduce its rle to insignificance4 ,why then1 you may ask1 do these lectures so constantly refer to selection1 but say never a word about other theories of organic evolution8 ,the answer is that selection1 and only selection1 really imitates contrivance4 ,other theories may deal1 and do deal1 with variation and heredity4 ,but selection alone can explain adjustment2 whence it follows that selection alone can imitate design4 ,printed in ,great ,britain by ,hazell1 ,watson ,viney1 ,ld41 ,london and ,aylesbury4