---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,this version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects4 ,italics are delimited with the #8' character as italic4 ,footnotes have been moved to directly follow the paragraphs in which they are referenced4 ,minor errors1 attributable to the printer1 have been corrected4 ,please see the transcriber's note at the end of this text for details regarding the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation4 ,,studies ,,in ,,the ,,evolutionary ,,psychology ,,of ,,feeling ,,studies ,,in ,,the ,,evolutionary ,,psychology ,,of ,,feeling ,,by ,,hiram ,m4 ,,stanley ,member of the ,american ,psychological ,association ,illustration3 colophon ,london ,,swan ,,sonnenschein ,,co ,,new ,,york3 ,,macmillan ,,co #ahie ,,butler ,,tanner1 ,,the ,,selwood ,,printing ,,works1 ,,frome1 ,,and ,,london4 ,,preface ,illustration ,this work does not profess to be a treatise on the subject of feeling1 but merely a series of studies1 and rather tentative ones at that4 ,i have attempted to deduce from the standpoint of biologic evolution the origin and development of feeling1 and then to consider how far introspection confirms these results4 ,i am well aware that ,i traverse moot points--what points in psychology are not moot8--and ,i trust that the position taken will receive thorough criticism4 ,i should be very glad to have new facts adduced1 whatever way they may bear4 ,i have no theory to defend1 but the results offered are simply the best interpretation ,i have as yet been able to attain4 ,some of the material of this book has appeared during the last ten years in the pages of ,mind1 ,monist1 ,science1 ,philosophical ,review and ,psychological ,review1 but my contributions to these periodicals have in many cases been largely re-written4 ,,hiram ,m4 ,,stanley4 ,,lake ,,forest1 ,,illinois1 ,u ,s4,a4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents ,illustration ,,chapter ,i ,,page ,,on ,,the ,,introspective ,,study ,,of ,,feeling #a ,,chapter ,,ii ,,on ,,primitive ,,consciousness #ab ,,chapter ,,iii ,,theories ,,of ,,pleasure-,,pain #ce ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,feeling ,,to ,,pleasure-,,pain #dh ,,chapter ,v ,,early ,,differentiation #fa ,,chapter ,,vi ,,representation ,,and ,,emotion #gh ,,chapter ,,vii ,,fear ,,as ,,primitive ,,emotion #ic ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,differentiation ,,of ,,fear #ajh ,,chapter ,,ix ,,despair #aba ,,chapter ,x ,,anger #abg ,,chapter ,,xi ,,surprise1 ,,disappointment1 ,,emotion ,,of ,,novelty #afc ,,chapter ,,xii ,,retrospective ,,emotion #agf ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,desire #aib ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,some ,,remarks ,,on ,,attention #bbe ,,chapter ,,xv ,,self ,,feeling #bea ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,induction ,,and ,,emotion #bhb ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,sthetic ,,psychosis #bie ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,literary ,,style #caj ,,chapter ,,xix ,,ethical ,,emotion #ccb ,,chapter ,,xx ,,the ,,expression ,,of ,,feeling #cde ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,conclusion #cga ,,index #cia ,,evolutionary ,,psychology ,illustration ,,chapter ,i ,,on ,,the ,,introspective ,,study ,,of ,,feeling ,of all the sciences psychology is1 perhaps1 the most imperfect4 ,if a science is a body of knowledge obtained by special research and accepted by the general consensus of specialists1 then psychology is so defective as to scarcely merit the name of science4 ,this want of consensus is everywhere apparent1 and must especially impress any one who compares the lack of harmony in manuals of psychology with the practical unanimity in manuals of botany1 geology1 physics1 and other sciences4 ,even in the most fundamental points there is no agreement1 as will be evident in a most summary statement4 ,it is now something more than a century since the general division of psychic phenomena into intellect1 feeling and will1 first came into repute1 but still some psychologists of note do not agree to this fundamental classification1 but would unite feeling and will in a single order4 ,as to the subdivisions of feeling and will we are confessedly wholly at sea4 ,in intellect it is only on the lower side1 sensation and perception1 that anything of great scientific value has been accomplished2 and even now it cannot be said that the classes of sensation have been marked off with perfect certainty4 ,in the higher range of intellect psychology can do scarcely more than accept some ready-made divisions from common observation and logic4 ,and if so little has been settled in the comparatively simple work of a descriptive classification of the facts of mind1 we may be assured that still less has been accomplished toward a scientific consensus for the laws of mind4 ,weber's law alone seems to stand on any secure basis of experiment1 but its range and meaning are still far from being determined4 ,even the laws of the association of ideas are still the subjects of endless controversy4 ,also in method there is manifestly the greatest disagreement4 ,the physiological and introspective schools each magnify their own methods1 sometimes so far as to discredit all others4 ,physiological method has won for itself a certain standing1 indeed1 but just what are its limitations is still far from being settled4 ,but the grievous lack of generally accepted results is most apparent in the domain of feeling4 ,the discussion of feeling in most manuals is very meagre and unsatisfactory4 ,professor ,james's recent treatise1 for instance1 gives some #ijj pages to the ,intellect1 and about #ajj pages each to ,feeling and ,will4 ,there is little thorough analysis and no perfected inductive classification4 ,we often1 indeed1 find essays of literary value which appeal to the authority of literature4 ,but to refer to ,shakspeare or ,goethe as psychological authorities1 or in illustration or proof of psychological laws1 is generally a doubtful procedure4 ,the literary and artistic treatment of human nature is quite distinct from the scientific1 and literature and art cannot be said to be of much more value for psychology than for physics1 chemistry1 or biology4 ,to appeal to the ,bible or ,shakspeare in matters psychological1 is usually as misleading as to consult them for light on geology or botany4 ,even the fuller treatises on the subject of feeling rarely reach beyond literary method and common observation1 being for the most part a collection and arrangement of the results of common sense1 accepting common definitions1 terms1 and classifications4 ,now1 science is always more than common sense and common perception1 it is uncommon sense2 it is an insight and a prolonged special investigation which penetrates beneath the surface of things and shows them in those inner and deeper relations which are entirely hid from general observation4 ,common views in psychology are likely to be as untrustworthy as in physics or astronomy1 or any other department4 ,science must1 indeed1 start with common sense1 but it does not deserve the name of science till it gets beyond it4 ,again1 the subject of pleasure1 pain1 and emotion1 is usually discussed with considerable ethical or philosophical bias4 ,the whole subject of feeling has been so naturally associated with ethics and philosophy from the earliest period of ,greek thought that a purely colourless scientific treatment is quite difficult4 ,furthermore1 feeling has been too often discussed from an a priori point of view1 as in the rigid following out of the ,herbartian theory of feeling as connected with hindrance or furtherance of representation4 ,still further1 the physical side of emotion has been so emphasized by the physiological school as to distract attention from purely psychological investigation4 ,it is obvious1 then1 on the most cursory review1 that very little has been accomplished in the pure psychology of feeling4 ,here is a region almost unexplored1 and which1 by reason of the elusiveness and obscurity of the phenomena1 has seemed to some quite unexplorable4 ,dr4 ,nahlowsky truly remarks1 that feeling is a 8strange mysterious world1 and the entrance to it is dark as to ,hades of old40 ,is there any way out of this darkness and confusion8 ,if the study of feeling is to become scientific1 we must1 ,i think1 assume that all feeling is a biological function governed by the general laws of life and subject in origin and development to the law of struggle for existence4 ,assuming this strictly scientific point of view1 we have to point out some difficulties in the way of the introspective psychology of feeling as compared with other departments of biological science4 ,we trace directly and with comparative ease any physiological organ and function from its simplest to its most complex form2 for example1 in the circulation of the blood there is clearly observable a connected series from the most elementary to the most specialized heart as developed through the principle of serviceability4 ,in some cases1 as in the orohippus1 a form in the evolution of the horse1 we are able to predict an intermediate organism4 ,psychology is still far from this deductive stage2 we have no analogous series of psychic forms1 much less are able to supply1 a priori1 the gaps in a series4 ,the reason for this is mainly the inevitable automorphism of psychological method4 ,in biology we are not driven to understand life solely through analogy with our own life1 but in psychology mind in general must be interpreted through the self-observation of the human mind4 ,in biology we see without effort facts and forms of life most diverse from our own2 the most strange and primitive types are as readily discernible as the most familiar and advanced1 the most simple as the most complex4 ,we study a fish just as readily as a human body1 but the fish's mind--if it has any--seems beyond our ken1 at least is not susceptible of direct study1 but a matter for doubtful inference and speculation4 ,whether a given action does or does not indicate consciousness1 and what kind of consciousness1 this is most difficult to determine4 ,thus we have the most various interpretations1 some1 as ,clifford1 even going so far as to make psychic phenomena universal in matter1 others1 on the other hand1 as ,descartes1 limiting them to man alone4 ,the difficulty of this subjective method1 this reflex investigation1 is almost insurmountable4 ,consciousness must act as both revealer and revealed1 must be a light which enlightens itself4 ,a fact of consciousness to be known must not simply exist like a physical fact or object1 as a piece of stone1 but it must be such that the observing consciousness realizes or re-enacts it4 ,to know the fact we must have the fact1 we must be what we know4 ,mind is pure activity2 we do not see an organ and ask what it is for1 what does it do2 but we are immediately conscious of consciousness as activity1 and not as an objective organ4 ,we must here1 then1 reverse the general order and know the activity before we can identify the organ as a physical basis4 ,by the purely objective vision of the lower sciences we can easily determine a genetic series of forms most remote from our own life1 but in psychology1 mind can be for us only what mind is in us4 ,the primitive types of psychosis are1 no doubt1 as remote and foreign from our own as is the primitive type of heart or nervous system from that of man's4 ,in the case of heart and nerve we can objectively trace with certainty the successive steps1 but in endeavouring to realize by subjective method the evolution of mind we are involved in great doubt and perplexity4 ,how can we understand an insect's feelings8 ,how can we appreciate minds which are without apprehension of object1 though there is reason to believe such minds exist8 ,only to a very limited extent can a trained and sympathetic mind project itself back into some of its immediately antecedent stages4 ,consciousness1 because of its self-directive and self-reflective power1 is the most elastic of functions1 yet it can never attain the power of realizing all its previous stages4 ,sometimes1 however1 the mind in perfect quiescence tends to relapse into primitive modes1 which may afterward be noted by reflection1 but such occasions are comparatively rare4 ,the subjective method means a commonalty of experience which is often impossible to attain4 ,thus a man may believe there are feelings of maternity2 he has observed the expression of nursing mothers1 and knows in a general way that here is a peculiar psychosis into which he can never enter1 and which is1 therefore1 beyond his scientific analysis4 ,the psychic life of the child is more akin to his than that of the mother2 yet it is only by an incessant cultivation of receptivity and repression of adult propensities that one can ever attain any true inkling of infant experience4 ,there is then1 ,i think1 a vast range of psychic life which must for ever lie wholly hidden from us1 either as infinitely below or infinitely above us2 there is also an immense realm where we can only doubtfully infer the presence of some form of consciousness without being able to discriminate its quality1 or in exceptional cases to know it very partially2 and there is but a relatively small sphere where scientific results of any large value may be expected4 ,by reason of its objective method the realm of physical science is practically illimitable1 but psychic science is1 by reason of its subjective method1 kept for ever within narrow boundaries4 ,we must then take into account the inherent difficulties of the subjective method as applied to the study of feeling and mind in general1 and yet we must recognise its necessity4 ,no amount of objective physiological research can tell us anything about the real nature of a feeling1 or can discover new feelings4 ,granting that neural processes are at the basis of all feelings as of all mental activities1 we can infer nothing from the physiological activity as to the nature of the psychic process4 ,it is only such feelings and elements as we have already discovered and analyzed by introspection that can be correlated with a physical process4 ,nor can we gain much light even if we suppose--which is granting a good deal in our present state of knowledge--that there exists a general analogy between nerve growth and activity1 and mental operations4 ,if relating1 i4e41 cognition1 is established on basis of inter-relation in brain tissue1 if every mental connecting means a connecting of brain fibres1 we might1 indeed1 determine the number of thoughts1 but we could not tell what the thoughts were4 ,so if mental disturbance always means bodily disturbance1 we can still tell nothing more about the nature of each emotion than we knew before4 ,we must first know fear1 anger1 etc41 as experiences in consciousness before we can correlate them with corporeal acts4 ,is now this necessarily subjective method peculiarly limited as to feeling8 ,can we know feeling directly as psychic act or only indirectly through accompaniments8 ,mr4 ,james ,ward 7vide article on ,psychology in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 p4 #di1 cf4 p4 #ga7 remarks that feelings cannot be known as objects of direct reflection1 we can only know of them by their effects on the chain of presentation4 ,the reason for this is1 that feeling is not presentation1 and 8what is not presented cannot be re-presented40 8,how can that which was not originally a cognition become such by being reproduced80 ,it cannot4 ,but do we need to identify the known with knowing1 in order that it may be known8 ,must feeling be made into a cognition to be cognized8 ,it is obvious enough that no feeling can be revived into a representation of itself1 but no more can any cognition or any mental activity4 ,revival or recurrence of consciousness can never constitute consciousness of consciousness which is an order apart4 ,if cognition is only presentation and re-presentation of objects1 we can never attain any apprehension of consciousness1 any cognition of a cognition or of a feeling or of a volition1 for they are all equally in this sense subjective acts4 ,re-presentation at any degree is never by itself sense of re-presentation or knowledge of the presentation4 ,of course1 the doctrine of relativity applies to introspection as to all cognition1 and subject qua subject is as unknowable as object qua object4 ,we do not know feeling in itself1 nor anything else in itself1 the subjective like the objective ding an sich is beyond our ken4 ,yet kinds of consciousness are as directly apprehended and discriminated as kinds of things1 but the knowing is1 as such1 distinct from the known even when knowing is known4 ,here the act knowing is not the act known and is different in value4 ,the object known is not1 at least from the purely psychological point of view1 ever to be confounded with the knowing1 to be incorporated into cognition by virtue of being cognized4 ,feeling1 then1 seems to be as directly known by introspection and reflection as any other process4 ,it is not a hypothetical cause brought in by the intellect to explain certain mental phenomena1 but it is as distinctly and directly apprehended as cognition or volition4 ,the distinction between having a feeling and knowing a feeling is a very real one1 though common phraseology confuses them4 ,we say of a brave man1 he never knew fear2 by which we mean he never feared1 never experienced fear1 and not that he was ignorant of fear4 ,again1 in like manner1 we say sometimes of a very healthy person1 he never knew what pain was1 meaning he never felt pain4 ,these expressions convey a truth in that they emphasize that necessity of experience in the exercise of the subjective method upon which we have already commented1 but still they obscure a distinction which must be apparent to scientific analysis4 ,we cannot know feeling except through realization1 yet the knowing is not the realization4 ,being aware of the pain and the feeling pain are distinct acts of consciousness4 ,all feeling1 pain and pleasure1 is direct consciousness1 but knowledge of it is reflex1 is consciousness of consciousness4 ,the cognition of the pain as an object1 a fact of consciousness1 is surely a distinct act from the pain in consciousness1 from the fact itself4 ,the pain disturbance is one thing and the introspective act by which it is cognized quite another4 ,these two acts are not always associated1 though they are commonly regarded as inseparable4 ,it is a common postulate that if you have a pain you will know it1 or notice it4 ,if we feel pained1 we always know it4 ,this seemingly true statement comes of a confounding of terms4 ,if ,i have a pain1 ,i must1 indeed1 be aware of it1 know it1 in the sense that it must be in consciousness2 but this makes1 aware of pain1 and knowing pain1 such very general phrases as to equal experience of pain or having pain4 ,but there is no knowledge in pain itself1 nor pain in the knowing act per se4 ,the knowing the pain must be different from the pain itself1 and is not always a necessary sequent4 ,we may experience pain without cognizing it as such4 ,when drowsy in bed ,i may feel pain of my foot being 8asleep10 but not know it as a mental fact4 ,we may believe1 indeed1 that pain often rises and subsides in consciousness without our being cognizant of it1 but1 of course1 in the nature of the case there is no direct proof1 for proof implies cognizance of fact4 ,pain as mental fact1 an object for consciousness1 not an experience in consciousness1 is what is properly meant by knowing pain4 ,consciousness-of-pain as knowledge of it is not always involved by pain-in-consciousness as experience of it4 ,consciousness of pain by its double meaning as cognizance of pain and experience of pain leads easily to obscurity of thought upon this subject4 ,but experience does not1 if we may trust the general law of evolution from simple to complex1 at the first contain consciousness of experience4 ,this latter element is but gradually built up into experience1 though in the end they are so permanently united in developed ego life that it is difficult to perceive their distinctness and independence4 ,that pain and pleasure are cognized as facts of consciousness seems to us clear1 but this does not deny that for us1 at least1 they may be cognizable only in fusion with other elements1 as with sensation or volition4 ,but whether known only with other elements or not1 pleasure-pain is equally known only by direct introspection4 ,i know directly and immediately pain and pleasure when ,i experience them1 though they always occur bound up with some sensation4 ,it may be that ,i never experience mere pain but some kind of pain1 as a pricking pain1 burning pain1 etc41 and that ,i always recall pain by its sensation tone1 that ,i cannot isolate it by any act of attention4 7,e4 ,b4 ,titchener1 ,philosophical ,review1 vol4 iii41 p4 #dca47 ,however ,i know that ,i have pain as well as ,i know that ,i have a pricking or burning sensation4 8,did you feel the prick80 8,yes40 8,was it painful or pleasurable80 8,pleasurable02 such a common colloquy implies as direct consciousness of the pleasure-pain as of the sensation4 ,that ,i can at once discriminate a sensation as either pleasurable or painful certainly shows a direct awareness of pleasure-pain4 ,if pure pleasure-pain is primitive consciousness 7see chap4 ii471 it must be most rare phenomenon in such an advanced consciousness as that of the human adult3 and it is not surprising that one should search for it in vain4 ,but in any case it could not yield to attention4 ,attention as cognition views its object in relation1 in a milieu2 it can reproduce only by fastening upon something to reproduce by1 but pure pleasure-pain has nothing connected with it4 ,again1 attention as volition cannot reproduce mere pleasure-pain which is not volitional in its origin and growth like sensing1 perceiving1 or ideating4 ,we merely 8suffer0 pain4 ,both pleasure and pain in themselves are purely passive2 willing cannot directly affect them1 and they are not1 like cognitions1 modes of volition1 or effortful activities4 ,for man to have a primitive consciousness by exercise of will would be quite as difficult as to turn himself into a protozon4 ,further1 would not attention as introspective alertness to discover such a fact of consciousness as pure pleasure-pain denote that consciousness is thereby raised far above the level at which such a phenomenon can occur8 ,in general also constant introspective attention tends to defeat itself4 ,a continual intentness and watching for a given psychic phenomenon is a state which1 the more intense and persistent it is1 tends to bar out the particular state watched for1 and1 indeed1 all other states than itself4 ,if attention as act engrosses1 it defeats itself4 ,if1 however1 undifferentiated pleasure-pain should at any time occur in human consciousness1 might we become immediately and spontaneously aware of it8 ,by its very nature it may escape conscious attentive investigation1 but may there not be a direct and simple awareness or apperception of it8 ,we might suppose that one man tells another1 8,i was very sick1 and in state of coma ,i had pain1 merely pain1 not any kind of pain or pain anywhere1 but just pain1 that was all the consciousness ,i had40 ,such an expression is intelligible1 and may be a fact4 ,however1 it is in the phenomena of lapse and rise of consciousness that we see evidences that undifferentiated feeling probably occurs1 and that sometimes in high psychisms4 ,in the following chapter we discuss then this point as a matter of judgment of tendencies1 rather than on basis of direct evidence of introspection1 though this is not barred out4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,on ,,primitive ,,consciousness ,science views the world as an assemblage of objects having mutual relations4 ,in this cosmos of interacting elements certain objects become endowed with mental powers by which they accomplish self-conservation4 ,just what these objects are and how they attain mental quality is beyond our direct investigation4 ,however1 assuming consciousness as a purely biological function1 as a mode for securing favourable reactions1 we can discuss the probable course of its evolution under the law of self-conservation4 ,mind1 like all other vital function1 must originate in some very simple and elementary form as demanded at some critical moment for the preservation of the organism4 ,it is tolerably obvious that this could not be any objective consciousness1 any cognitive act1 like pure sensation1 for this has no immediate value for life4 ,it was not as awareness of object or in any discriminating activity that mind originated1 for mere apprehension would not serve the being more than the property of reflection the mirror4 ,the demand of the organism is for that which will accomplish immediate movement to the place of safety4 ,the stone pressed upon by a heavy weight does not react at once to secure itself1 but is crushed out of its identity2 but the organism reacts at once through pain4 ,it is certainly more consonant with the general law of evolution that mind start thus in pure subjective act rather than in mere objective acts1 like bits of presentation or a manifold of sense4 ,we shall now endeavour to elucidate this conception of pure pain as primitive mind1 first from the general point of view of the law of self-conservation1 and secondly from particular inductive considerations4 ,it is very difficult to conceive what this bare undifferentiated pain as original conscious act was1 it being so foreign to our own mental acts4 ,our psychoses have a certain connection one with the other1 and a connection which is cognized as such1 so that the whole of mental life is pervaded by an ego-sense4 ,but primitive consciousness must have been by intermittent and isolated flashes4 ,the primitive pain1 moreover1 was not a pain in any particular kind1 but wholly undifferentiated or bare pain4 ,there was no sense of the painful1 but only pure pain4 ,nor was there any consciousness of the pain1 any knowledge or apperception of it4 ,the pain stands alone and entirely by itself1 and constituting by itself a genus4 ,now to assert that this general pain exists1 is not1 of course1 realism4 ,the pain is a particular act1 though it is wholly without particular quality4 ,it is not a pain as one of a kind distinct from other kinds1 but it is comparable to a formless1 unorganized mass of protoplasm which has in it potency of future development4 ,pain may exist as such1 but not a consciousness or a feeling4 ,it is meaningless to say that the first psychosis may have been a consciousness in general form which was neither a feeling1 a will1 or a cognition1 but the undifferentiated basis of these1 nor can a feeling per se exist4 ,the expressions1 painful consciousness1 and painful feeling are deceptive2 there is no consciousness which pains1 but consciousness is the pain1 and the feeling is not pleasurable or painful1 but is the pleasure or pain4 8,feeling10 as ,i have said 7,mind1 vol4 xiii41 p4 #bdd71 8has no independent being apart from the attributes which in common usage are attached to it1 nor is there any general act of consciousness with which these properties are to be connected40 ,further1 the law of conservation requires us to associate with this primitive act of blind1 formless pain the will act of struggle and effort which is as simple and undifferentiated as the feeling4 ,and these two we must mark as the original elements of all mental life4 ,strenuousness through and by pain is primal and is simplest force which can conduce to self-preservation4 ,it is thus that active beings with a value in and for themselves are constituted4 ,the earliest conscious response to outward things is purely central and has no cognitive value4 ,the first consciousness was a flash of pain1 of small intensity1 yet sufficient to awaken struggle and preserve life4 ,pleasure1 then1 we have excluded from playing any rle in absolutely primitive consciousness4 ,pleasure and pain could not both be primitive functions1 and of the two pain is fundamental in that the earliest function of consciousness must be purely monitory4 ,pain alone fulfils primitive demands1 and secures struggle which ends in the abatement of pain through change of environment or otherwise4 ,pain lessens1 but pleasure does not come1 but unconsciousness instead1 for no continuous organic psychic life is yet evolved4 ,as long as pain continues there is effort and self-conserving action2 when pain ceases1 consciousness ceases1 because the need for it is gone4 ,each fit of pain subsides into unconsciousness as struggle succeeds1 and there is no room for even the pleasure of relief1 which1 indeed1 must be accounted a tolerably late feeling4 ,as far as the lowest organisms have a conscious life it is a pain life1 but they have a ,nirvana in a real unconsciousness4 ,the evolution of pleasure must be accounted a distinct problem4 ,the law of evolution is1 that origin of function and all progressive modification arise at critical stages4 ,thus it is in painful circumstances that the origin of mind is to be traced1 and the important steps in its development have been achieved in severest struggle and acutest pain at critical periods4 ,pleasure is not then the original stimulant of will1 but is a secondary form4 ,pleasure has an obvious utility which is far from the absolutely primitive4 ,the pleasure-mode early enters1 however1 to sharpen by contrast the pain-mode1 and it is only by their interaction that any high grade of psychic life could be built up4 ,the development of pleasure cannot be from pain1 but as a polar opposite to it4 ,we cannot bring the development of mind into a perfectly continuous evolution from a single germ1 as is the case in biological evolution4 ,in a sense we may say that pleasure and pain are complementary1 like positive and negative electricity1 but the comparison cannot be pressed4 ,we cannot1 indeed1 carry it so far as to believe either absolutely essential to the other4 ,we mention1 then1 the evolution of pleasure as a problem which is yet to be dealt with in full4 ,however1 that it is not original element in mind is easily seen from this4 ,as we ascend the grades of psychic life the pleasure-pain gamut lengthens1 and as we descend1 it shortens1 with pleasure always as the intermediate factor4 ,thus1 if we can represent it by a line1 ,,pain ,,pleasure ,,pain any single element which can affect psychic life1 as temperature1 moves through a highest pain intensity1 an intermediate region1 then to pain again as effects in a range from a very high temperature to very low1 or vice vers4 ,now1 this gamut in a human being1 from the intensest agony from heat to the greatest suffering from cold1 consists of very many notes1 but the step to unconsciousness is always at one end of the scale4 ,in lower psychic life it shortens1 but always at the intermediate points where pain merges into pleasure and pleasure into pain1 and thus in the lowest form the original element of consciousness as feeling is seen when only the two extremes remain1 namely1 primitive consciousness as pain reaction4 ,as the step from feeling--consciousness to unconsciousness is through a pain1 this certainly points to pain as the original feeling1 and the first element of consciousness4 ,we must suppose then that the first organism which attained consciousness felt pain1 that if this came from temperature1 for example1 that intense heat and intense cold would both produce a pain one and the same in nature1 bare pain1 not sensation of heat or cold4 ,and this pain-consciousness response came at first only at the application of these critical temperatures1 all other degrees not bringing any response4 ,if consciousness like other functions originated as an infinitesimal germ at some crisis in life1 it must have been with pain4 ,the pleasure function1 unlike the pain1 does not originate in life and death crises4 ,that pleasure is secondary is also suggested by this1 that pleasure is mainly connected with such late formations as the special senses1 whereas pain is prominent with earlier functions4 ,thus we have pleasures of taste1 but visceral pleasure is scarcely noticeable1 though visceral pain1 as colic1 may be very acute4 ,wild animals1 which feed often under fear of interruption or in extreme hunger1 bolt their food without tasting1 and so miss taste pleasure1 and this seems to be the type of primitive feeding4 ,the origin of pleasure is then1 ,i think1 to be traced as an intermediary feeling between pain as produced by excess1 and pain from lack as differentiated form4 ,pain as original and undifferentiated is the same whether resulting from excess or lack1 but it is only after it has differentiated so far as to be in two modes that pleasure can enter as a mediate form of feeling and become a directing force to advantageous action4 ,the primitive pleasure-pain gamut was this3 ,,lack ,,pain ,,pure ,,pleasure ,,excess ,,pain ,a general survey from the point of view of self-conservation leads us then to regard the original psychic state as a pain-effort form4 ,there is first a purely undifferentiated sense of pain and closely consequent a purely undifferentiated nisus4 ,there is neither sense of objectivity in general1 nor in any special mode1 nor is there feeling of pleasure4 ,and the study of what seem to be the earliest forms of mental life in the child and in the lower animals points toward this conclusion4 ,preyer1 in his studies on the mind of the child1 expresses his conviction that the feelings 8are the first of all psychical events to appear with definiteness10 and that at first in no manifold forms4 ,he adds1 8,the first period of human life belongs to the least agreeable1 inasmuch as not only the number of enjoyments is small1 but the capacity for enjoyment is small likewise1 and the unpleasant feelings predominate until sleep interrupts them0 7,mind of the ,child1 ,part ,i41 ,new ,york1 #ahhh1 p4 #adc1 cf4 p4 #ahe74 ,since in the embryology of the mind as in that of the body the individual repeats in condensed manner the evolution of life1 we judge that these observations point toward the genesis of consciousness in a single feeling state1 pure undifferentiated pain4 ,the earliest consciousness we can discover seems to approach this type4 ,the close observer of very young infants must feel that the meagre psychic life they may have consists mainly of intermittent pains interrupted by comparatively long periods of unconsciousness in sleep4 ,of course1 the earliest psychic life of the infant is not absolutely primitive both on account of heredity and on account of pre-natal experience2 but in its general form it1 no doubt1 reverts toward the original status of mind4 ,this original state1 to which that of a very young infant is akin1 was merely pain1 which knew not itself nor its relation to other states1 nor its relation to the external world1 but was a wholly central subjective fact1 and so was expressed only in wild and blind general movements4 ,the very lowest types of psychic life which we can interpret seems to feel and nothing more4 ,they do not feel at anything1 and do not feel because they know1 nor do they have definite kinds of feeling4 ,pure feeling as bare pain and as undifferentiated pleasure is certainly far removed from our ordinary conscious experience1 yet it may sometimes appear in a survival form1 especially in sluggish states1 in waking from sleep1 and in recovering from ansthetics4 ,we are sometimes awakened by a dull pain which was evidently in its inception mere bare pain without differentiation4 ,but in all such cases the pure pain or pure pleasure is but momentary1 and is quickly swallowed up in a flood of manifold sensations4 ,many objects by many modes of sense at once invade and possess consciousness1 and the early indefinite mode vanishes so quickly that we very rarely have time to note it by reflective consciousness4 ,but it is not merely in exceptional states of developed consciousness that we may trace the elementary form of feeling1 but we may believe it to be fundamental to consciousness in general4 ,it is natural for us who are so pervaded and dominated by sense of objectivity to see in it the causal element in mentality2 feeling and will seem consequent to it1 and we apprehend and feel accordingly4 ,but the order of evolution was not from knowledge in any form to feeling1 but the reverse1 and we may suspect that in the completest analysis consciousness will still be found to obey its original law4 ,if the rise of knowledge was at the instance of feeling1 it is certainly unlikely that a fundamental order should be more than apparently reversed4 ,the order of consciousness is really the reverse of the order conceived by the objectifying consciousness1 and this is a point where cognition by its very nature as objective may be said to obscure itself4 ,to apprehend is to bring into relation1 and the relation is very easily attributed to what is purely unrelated1 to pure subjectivity4 ,thus here in the interpretation of merely subjective facts knowledge tends to stand in its own way4 ,it is only objectively that the objectifying can appear causative of feeling2 subjectively sense of object must always be taken as subsequent to a pleasure-pain psychosis4 ,the object communicates or causes the feeling1 but the subjective order is as such of necessity the opposite2 the object does not come in view2 there is no relating1 until feeling has incited to it1 and gradually the mind reaches out to an objective order from the purely central fact4 ,in every psychical reaction there must be the purely central disturbance before the rebound to the actuality occasioning the disturbance4 ,i must feel before ,i can discriminate or have any sense of the communication of the feeling4 ,this means that when external objects are brought into relation with a wholly unanticipating consciousness1 the first element in psychosis is always pure pleasure or pure pain4 ,thus1 on a cold1 dark day a sudden rush of sunlight on a blindfold man causes pleasure1 then feeling warm1 and then sense of warming object4 ,the glow of pleasure and the pang of pain merely as such is in all cases precedent to any objective reference4 ,pure centrality of response1 ,i thus take to be the initial element of all psychosis1 primitive or developed4 ,the first tendency in every consciousness is pure pain-pleasure1 complete subjectivity which1 however1 in higher consciousness is so quickly lost through practically consentaneous differentiation that all traces of it seem wholly extinguished4 ,pure subjectivity must be pronounced the most evanescent of all characters in developed minds and yet the most constant4 ,it is the inevitable precedent in every sensation and in every perception4 ,we always experience pleasure or pain before the pleasurable or painful4 ,a bright colour gives pleasure before we see it1 and this pleasure incites to the seeing it4 ,but so fully has the objective order been wrought into consciousness as a mode of interpretation that the great majority on reading the preceding sentence will mentally at first attribute sense of objectivity from the expression 8bright colour gives pleasure10 as if there were pleasure at colour1 a colour-pleasure1 whereas is meant pleasure and nothing more1--bare1 undifferentiated pleasure4 ,the objective statement1 however true1 is no measure of subjective fact1 but this twisting of subjective fact to correspond with objective order is so embedded in language and common thought that it will perhaps always remain the form of ordinary thinking1 like common-sense realism and geocentric appearance4 ,the expressions1 it pleased me1 it pained me1 and the common modes of speech in general1 are fundamentally misleading4 ,pleasure and pain bring their objects1 not objects pleasures and pains4 ,pleasure per se does not come for and in consciousness from the object1--though this is objective order--but the object for and in consciousness comes from the pleasure4 ,pleasure and pain always precede any cognizance of the thing1 and it is only the combination of the two elements that constitutes pleasure or pain of or at a thing4 ,the primitive element1 the original feeling movement1 also excludes subject as real object2 both the 8it0 and 8me0 are not yet apparent2 there is not yet identification of experience with subject or object1 and in fact no sense of experience at all4 ,the psychologist must retain common expressions1 however1 but1 like the astronomer who retains such phrases as the sun rises1 the sun sets1 he must reverse common interpretation and correct natural error4 ,guided by this principle we note an obvious error in the interpretation of child consciousness4 ,if a bright-coloured object is passed before the eyes of a young infant we may conclude from its expression that a pleasure-consciousness is awakened1 but we are probably quite at fault if we conceive it to have a consciousness of bright1 and that this consciousness preceded and gave rise to pleasure and gave it a quale as pleasure-brightness4 ,sense of pleasure-object is manifested by appropriative activities1 but in the very young1 where these activities are lacking1 the response to object is best regarded not as in any wise sense of object1 nor even any kind of sensation1 but as a pure subjectivity of pleasure4 ,of course the same remarks apply to the pain side of the child's experience4 ,the purely subjective experience1 while it becomes more and more evanescent factor as mind develops1 yet always maintains its place as the initial point and vanishing-point of every psychosis4 ,every psychosis beyond the most primitive must be accounted a feeling-will-knowing group4 ,these psychic forces exist in a correlated union generally comparable with the correlated activity of physical forces like electricity and heat4 ,each psychosis repeats in itself1 in tendency form at least1 the essential stages in the evolution of consciousness4 ,every psychosis rises from the pure pleasure-pain as the lowest level of mentality like a wave1 and like a wave falls back into it again4 ,every wave of consciousness1 whether it rises slowly or rapidly1 whether it subsides gradually or violently1 rises from pure subjectivity and comes back to it again4 ,this absolutely simple feeling phase is accomplished so rapidly in ordinary human consciousness as to be rarely perceptible1 but in lower consciousness it often exists as mood1 as more or less permanent psychosis4 ,the ,brahmans attain artificially a subjectivity akin to this through their expertness in mental control and manipulation4 ,they succeed in reducing and keeping consciousness in some very simple type1 and their ,nirvana may be considered as a state of pure subjectivity on the pleasure side4 ,they1 of course1 cannot really attain this state or1 at least1 keep it1 for pleasure is at bottom relative1 yet they come to something approaching it4 ,pain at its height just before unconsciousness is reached1 is always of the pure subjective type4 ,in slow torture pain increases to a maximum intensity in pure pain1 beyond which there is a gradual loss of intensity and consciousness in general1 till ultimate failure of all consciousness4 ,from the maximum intensity on to the end1 consciousness is entirely subjective4 ,pleasure at its maximum attains only comparative subjectivity4 ,such facts tend toward a theory of mind which makes its original and fundamental act purely central2 mind starts as in a germ which pushes outward till it penetrates space and time1 but not in any reverse motion a pushing inward of a series of presentation forms4 ,we shall now notice certain of ,mr4 ,james ,ward's statements on primordial mind--in the article ,psychology1 ,encyclopdia ,britannica--in which he controverts feeling as original and simplest unit in mentality4 ,mr4 ,ward regards 8the simplest form of psychical life0 as involving 8qualitatively distinguishable presentations which are the occasions of the feeling40 ,presentation is primitive and initial in all consciousness1 and cognition--feeling--will is the order for all mind4 ,we always act as we are pleased or pained with the 8changes in our sensations1 thoughts1 or circumstances0 of which we are aware4 ,some presentation form is1 throughout all our experience1 the precursor and cause of feeling1 and feeling can never be said to exist in a pure state as bare pleasure and pain totally without cognitive value4 ,on the contrary1 ,i conclude from general considerations and from special indications in our own minds that pure pain is the original element1 and that pure pleasure and pain are fundamental in all mind4 ,pure feeling arises from objects1 indeed1 but is still wholly unknowing of object and without qualitative aspect4 ,pure feeling is the constant incentive to all knowing and will activity4 ,to say that ,i am pleased with a thing is to transform objective order into subjective fact4 ,pleasures and pains certainly come from things but this does not invariably rouse cognition of them as so coming1 or of object as causative agent4 ,the governing and essential fact of mind is always pure feeling1 which1 by reason of its perfect centrality1 necessarily and naturally tends to elude observation4 ,every act of consciousness begins and ends with pure feeling1 but mind1 as far as it minds itself1 is most apt to see only culminating phases rather than the obscure and inner forces which constituted long outgrown stages4 ,the prominent facts of late consciousness are always very complex4 ,cognition as revealer unites with the known and inevitably1 but strongly tends to regard itself as the determining and causative agent1 whereas by its essence and function it is secondary4 ,cognition does not create its object1 except in the view of a transcendental philosophy4 ,mr4 ,ward asserts that phenomena of pleasure and pain involve change in consciousness with consciousness of change whereby we are pleased or pained4 ,a changing presentation continuum is impressed upon mind1 and it is by awareness of these changes that feelings are caused4 ,this is certainly a complex mode to be assigned to all consciousness4 ,this asserts that primarily consciousness merely happens in presentation form as determined from without1 but ,i take it that the evolution of faculty is always acquirement1 not mind determined1 but mind determining1 achieving its own growth in blind struggle4 ,mind is wholly an inward growth1 not a series of givens2 and presentations are accomplished not merely in it but by it4 ,the fundamental principle is that while objects do determine conscious functions1 it is only through self-conservative interest1 through pleasure and pain reacting to them4 ,all sensations1 intuitions1 presentations1 are at bottom achievements as forced by law of struggle for existence4 ,they do1 indeed1 seem to come of necessity and spontaneously to adult human consciousness1 but developed faculty by virtue of being such does not have to attain beginnings4 ,but we note also this1 that while all consciousness is change in the sense of being dynamic1 of being an activity1 this does not include consciousness of change4 ,consciousness as a changing factor is very distinct from consciousness of that change1 and does not necessarily include or imply it4 ,that the forms of activity which we group under the general term consciousness have their existence wholly in movement and change is true1 but this does not necessitate that the changing elements should be aware of the change as such4 ,different things may be felt and known1 but this does not always result in being known as different4 ,this brings in comparison1 consciousness of relation1 which is certainly beyond primitive consciousness4 ,in early mind we conceive that new elements are continually taking the place of the old1 that change is incessant1 yet without sense of the change4 ,so far as the earliest consciousness is spasmodic and intermittent1 appearing in isolated flashes1 we cannot speak even of change in consciousness1 much less of consciousness of change1 for there is no continuous thread1 no integration1 consequently change is not in consciousness from a consciousness to a consciousness1 but the only change is from a consciousness to unconsciousness4 ,in the whole life of some organisms we may believe that only three or four pains or pleasures occur1 entirely subjective and undifferentiated1 and this collection of consciousnesses where state does not follow and influence state1 where there is no complexity1 is scarcely to be termed a consciousness which changes1 much less that is aware of change4 ,it is not improbable that even with civilized and educated men mind may sometimes lapse so far that changes occur with no awareness of change4 ,in such sluggish conditions as when half asleep we may experience succession of consciousnesses without noting succession1 each phase standing alone in itself and by itself4 ,while consciousness is maintained as consciousness--that is1 a continuance of conscious states--by the change1 it is obviously not necessary to this that there should be awareness of change4 ,here as elsewhere we must keep clear of the mistake of making consciousness more than a general term for a group of phenomena4 ,consciousness as such has no reality or existence1 but merely denominates a sum of consciousnesses4 ,the phrase1 change of consciousness1 and similar expressions easily convey the impression that consciousness is a changing something4 ,but we know that consciousness does not exist as a general indefinite something which changes or has other properties1 but is merely a name for certain activities and functions4 ,the formula of ,mr4 ,ward's hardly applies to developed consciousness1 much less to undeveloped4 ,consciousness even in man cannot be regarded as a something which changes in sensation and presentation forms as pure givens1 determined with immediate completeness from without1 and these changes perceived1 and pleasure and pain result4 ,on the contrary the immediateness and spontaneity of presentation forms in our ordinary adult human consciousness are in appearance only2 they stand first before us because they have reached a dominance through heredity and education1 but still the latent and inward order is always from feeling to knowledge and not vice vers4 ,the accomplishment of presentation is usually so marvellously rapid in perceptive beings1 and acts upon such slight incentive that it is only under very rare conditions of regression1 or when developing a new sense or new form of sense that we see that the moving element in mentality is pure feeling4 ,thus1 for example1 in being awakened from sound sleep by a bright light suddenly brought into the room1 the order of consciousness is1 pure feeling of pain1 sensation of light1 perception of lighted object1 and not the reverse2 whenever we can catch consciousness gradually awakening we can always identify this order4 ,the lighted lamp1 objectively speaking1 certainly caused the feeling of discomfort with which consciousness began1 and this feeling roused the mind to both sensation of light and perception of lamp4 ,i1 of course1 have a feeling as to the visible object only after seeing it1 but this is altogether distinct from the feeling which incites to the seeing4 ,a vague1 undifferentiated pain or pleasure is always initiative1 but pure pleasure-pain is often so low in intensity that it does not start any cognitive act4 ,in a general way the influence of feeling and emotion upon cognitive act in higher psychical life is acknowledged by common observation4 ,the wish is father to the thought--we see what we want to see4 ,what we observe depends upon prepossession1 interest1 and the whole pleasure-pain tone4 ,the mind must be determined to cognitive act by interest of some kind1 and even for advanced consciousness with all its strength of inherited aptitude total loss of interest ultimately leads to loss of perceptive power4 ,the impetus of all previous cognitive effort will carry on cognition1 of any high order1 at least1 but a comparatively short time4 ,blot feeling out of life and all nature would soon become a dumb show and quickly fade into nothingness4 ,absolute passionless receptivity is impossible under the conditions of reality1 and pure presentation forms never come as antecedent and causative to feeling4 ,we have constantly to bear in mind that in the nature of the case the simplest elements and fundamental laws are hidden and certainly far from conspicuous in highly developed mind1 which is an intricate nexus of feeling1 will1 and cognition constantly acting and reacting on each other4 ,as a general statement1 then1 impliedly as to mind in general1 and implicitly as to the developed human mind1 the proposition that consciousness is fundamentally aware of changes in itself as the basis and cause of all feeling is an assertion which may well be questioned4 ,certain it is that being 8pleased or pained with the change0 is not feeling in general1 but a particular kind of feeling1 namely1 feeling of variety and novelty4 ,further1 to be pleased with a thing for itself alone is not to be referred to pleasure or pain 8with the change40 ,there is intrinsic pleasurableness and painfulness which does not come under the head of pleasure or pain of change4 ,from both an a priori point of view of the law of self-conservation1 and also from a brief survey of certain forms in comparative and human psychology1 we incline towards accepting pure pain as the original consciousness which is very soon differentiated into excess and lack pain with evolution of pure pleasure4 ,will exists throughout as incited by feeling4 ,much1 indeed1 is to be done before this theory of the nature of mind is either fully elucidated or proved2 but ,i believe that the assumption of mind as life function leads toward such a theory4 ,sensationalism and intuitionalism are both mistaken as to the origin and essence of mentality4 ,consciousness is not at bottom any mode of cognition1 either as more or less freely accomplished by a 8mind10 or as more or less mechanical impression from 8things10 but it is primitively and fundamentally pain and pleasure as serving the organism in the struggle for existence4 ,it is strange that evolutionary psychologists have so generally missed this point of view1 and maintain sensationalism4 ,comte1 indeed1 acutely remarks 7,positive ,philosophy1 vol4 #a1 p4 #dfc7 that 8daily experience shows that the affections1 the propensities1 the passions1 are the great springs of human life2 and that1 so far from resulting from intelligence1 their spontaneous and independent impulse is indispensable to the first awakening and continuous development of the various intellectual faculties40 ,he here assumes the introspection which he elsewhere denies as psychological method1 and enunciates an important principle which he never carried out4 ,horwicz has made a survey of feeling as fundamental aspect of mind1 but his discussion is physiological4 ,our conclusions have been founded on general considerations and on the phenomena of growth of mind in general and particular4 ,another line of evidence would be decadent mind4 ,mental powers should decline and vanish in the reverse of the general order in which they arose2 the order of disappearance should be the reverse of appearance1 and if pain-pleasure be primitive1 we should expect to find it both the first conscious element in infancy and the last in old age4 ,the last stage of senility seems sensitive only to organic pleasures and pains4 ,further1 old age does not so much seek pleasure as guard against pains1 and this fact is in line with our treatment of pain as prior to pleasure and more fundamental than it4 ,we may consider it likely that conscious life in the individual begins with a pain and ends with a pain4 ,senile psychology on this and other points is worthy of far more attention than it has received1 for it is on the whole more accessible and trustworthy than infant psychology4 ,with regard to ,mr4 ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall's remarks 7,philosophical ,review1 vol4 #a1 p4 #fcb71 it is sufficient to say that ,i lay no great emphasis on either pain or pleasure being the first fact of consciousness2 but my main contention is that the primitive facts of consciousness are of the pain-pleasure type4 ,while ,i have noticed some considerations as implying pain to be the first consciousness phenomenon1 yet ,i am satisfied that pain and pleasure are correlative and complementary1 each implying the other4 ,further1 ,i do not regard pain as 8primal sense10 but as primal fact4 ,pain is not in any wise a sense1 and sense of pain can only mean capacity for pain1 or actual pain experience4 ,again1 ,i do not1 as ,mr4 ,marshall implies1 regard pain as the differentiating basis of subsequent evolution1 but rather as mere prius and impetus1 and hence ,i do not look for pain-pleasure to disappear with mental evolution1 nor yet to mark divisions in 8sensational phenomena02 but it will ever remain in representative forms1 at least1 as increasingly complex stimulant of all mental life4 ,the objection urged by ,hffding and others to the primitive nature of pure feeling is that we sense before we feel pain or pleasure2 thus we have the sensation of touch before we feel the pain from contact with a hot stove2 we feel the pin1 then the pricking sensation1 then the pain4 ,this precedence has been measured by ,beau and others4 ,but what is the significance of these well-recognised facts8 ,do they show that pain-pleasure originates always in sensation8 ,what is the origin of tactile power8 ,how and why was the first tactile effort made1 if not at impulse of some pain-pleasure8 ,when conscious life was at pre-tactile stage--before it had learned to touch--it had no pain from touch1 but it had pain4 ,we can scarcely deny that a pre-tactile stage exists1 that all sensation was originally a sensing--an exertive act1 that it did not come1 but was attained2 for all the growth of sensitive power in the race proceeds thus at present1 and the law of present psychic development in this regard seems general4 ,but it is pain-pleasure which forces all action2 here is the impulse which brings exertion whether as sensing or otherwise4 ,a doctrine of spontaneity is against the general law of development by struggle4 ,it is certainly true that1 standing with my back to the stove and inadvertently coming in contact1 ,i1 without any previous pain-pleasure impulse and without exertion1 have sense of touch1 then pain4 ,but this spontaneity is not original factor2 it is the result of inherited powers4 ,when tactility has become a well-developed power and is handed down to descendants1 then contact with things is immediately and spontaneously realized in the form of touch1 which contact would originally have been unnoticed4 ,that is1 the severest condition--a red hot stove--would impress the lowest psychism only in terms of mere pain1 and so result in general reactions of minimum service4 ,the early psychism which is just in process of achieving sense of touch would have pain1 and then with effort touch the object and thus attain some more special reaction of more particular service4 ,but the tactile1 like all sensing activity is anticipatory1 it is a finder1 an interpreter4 ,suppose ,i bring a very fine needle toward your eye1 you may see it and avoid it2 but suppose your eyes are shut the eye comes in contact with the needle1 and you have sensation of touch2 but you are sound asleep1 then pricking sensation may wake you as needle proceeds deeper1 but in profoundest sleep undefined pain may be the first consciousness to result4 ,now the needle might be so small as to be seen with great difficulty by the waking man1 or invisible1 or to be touched with great difficulty2 but this stage of exertive action for the sense is only relative1 and in the history of mind the very grossest forms were at one time only dimly seen by intensest effort1 and lower still1 touched only by intensest effort4 ,seeing originated in looking1 and passive touch in active touch1 as moved by interest or direct pleasure-pain4 ,now pain is not in the mere sight or touch1 but is suggested by them4 ,the whole order--seeing1 touching1 feeling prick1 feeling pain--is the reverse of evolution order4 ,the rational mode1 then1 of interpreting the origin of any sense1 whether tactile1 visual or other1 is not by receptivity1 but through struggle at critical stage when great pain is actual or imminent4 ,thus1 if the conditions of life required the development of a special sense of magnetism1 it would surely arise by strongest effort1 as1 indeed1 all progress in special sensitiveness is now being accomplished4 ,thus1 the anticipatory and premonitory function of sense does not make it original1 rather the contrary2 it is guide and significant of pain-pleasure4 ,it is obvious that the cognitive tendency once established becomes an instinct of objectivity and governs the whole mentality4 ,this is obviously the case with man4 ,he does not exist in that sluggishness and semi-consciousness where pain-pleasure must arise as primitive impulse1 but by habit and instinct he is passively and actively cognitive4 ,the eye is continually seeing things spontaneously1 the hand touching1 but as to some very small object we have to exert effort to see or touch1 and this was undoubtedly the mode by which all seeing and touching arose4 ,it is because generations of ancestors actively sensed1 that we automatically sense2 the tendency has become ingrained in mind4 ,so it is that man is predominantly sensing1 is continually and naturally awake to objective conditions1 is constantly anticipatory1 and so normally senses before he feels pain-pleasure4 ,however1 a man in a 8brown study10 inadvertently touching a hot stove1 has pain1 then warmth1 then touch sensation1 and actively realizes these4 ,so in deep slumber mentality often begins with pain-pleasure4 ,at bottom the reason we have pain from a sensing is because we had originally pain-impulse to that sensing1 and the pain therewith4 ,thus tactility1 arising as effortful sensing1 was produced by pain from thing to be touched1 to be sensed in its experimental value4 ,by innumerable painful experiences with hot things1 the hot thing is tactilily appreciated2 and as touching is actively pursued by organism on the alert1 the associated pain is more and more quickly realized from given object4 ,in origin pain was felt from the hot thing in contact1 before either sense of warmth or contact was sensed2 it was this pain that forced to sensing and development of cognition1 which1 however1 ultimately became habit1 and things were constantly appreciated and anticipated4 ,thus the touch-warmth-pain order is established4 ,sense is significant of pain-pleasure1 but the pain-pleasure came not at first from the sensing1 but the contrary2 sensing was determined by it1 and became correlated with it1 and became sign of it4 ,the progress is from initial subjectivity to an instinctive constant objectivity4 ,this objectivity is reflected in all objective expression as language2 8the heat was painful10 8it hurt02 the 8it0 being tactual thing1 etc41 etc4 ,however1 if we look for primitive consciousness1 we must find it only in primitive organisms in their primitive stage1 and in man most rarely only as tendency in profound relapse4 ,we must mark this1 that cognition is not to be evolved out of feeling1 but at instance of feeling as impelling the knowing effort or volition4 ,we may suppose that primitive consciousness still exists in the lowest types of life1 but it may also be the sub-consciousness in the higher types4 ,viewed biologically1 what is sub-consciousness8 ,the earliest living aggregations attain but a very slight degree of common life1 and very slowly do the cells1 under the pressure of serviceability in the struggle for existence1 give up their independency and become interdependent1 each thereby giving up some functioning to be done for it by others1 and in turn functioning for others4 ,thus it is but slowly that a stomach is specialised1 the cells in general in the organism long retaining and exercising some digestive function1 which is properly termed sub-digestion4 ,in this way a soup bath gives nourishment4 ,if psychic function specializes gradually like other functions1 we shall have in the same way a sub-form here1 a sub-consciousness which stands for lower centres1 and not for the whole organism as such4 ,the wider1 higher1 and more specialized psychic centre does not at once extinguish the lower4 ,now what is a high organism but an involved series of combinations of combinations8 ,with every new integration a higher plane is achieved1 and the vital process has a wider functioning3 but the physical or psychical activity so far as it does not pass over into the service of the new and higher whole remains as sub-function4 ,with every new stage in evolution the integrating psychic factors only partially lose themselves in effecting a common psychism for the new whole1 a sub-consciousness and a sub-sub-consciousness1 etc41 are still carried on in survival4 ,in man1 physiologically speaking1 it is the brain consciousness which is general4 ,but we need not suppose this to extinguish all the lower ganglionic consciousness from which and by which it arose4 ,if psychic function be correlative with other function1 we must expect in man a vast amount of survival sub-mentality which1 while not the mind of the man1 is yet mind in the man4 ,the individual knows necessarily only the general consciousness1 for this only is his consciousness and constitutes his individuality1 yet the doctrine of evolution would call for a vast deal of undiscoverable simple consciousness which never rises to the level of the whole organism's consciousness4 ,a cell or a group of cells may be in pain and yet there be no pain in the individual's consciousness1 and so unknown to this general consciousness4 ,we have intimated that primitive consciousness may occur in a sub-conscious way in the highest organisms4 ,but can this sub-consciousness ever be more than mere survival in its nature8 or may it play essential part as basis of higher manifestations8 ,if the integration of mentality is like other integration1--e4g4 material which is based on molecular and atomic activity--it will be bound up in the activity of psychic units1 which can be none other than sub-consciousness4 ,that is1 any common or general consciousness when looked at from below1 and analytically is the dynamic organic whole of elements2 it is a product of activities which are on another plane from itself4 ,roughly illustrated1 ,i may say that my finger feels pain before ,i do4 ,we conceive that at a certain intensity a sub-consciousness tends to rouse a general consciousness1 and for a time maintain it2 and losing intensity1 the general consciousness disappears leaving only the sub-consciousness1 which may long outlast the general form4 ,sub-consciousness1 whether as survival or basal1 is put beyond our direct observation1 but it remains a necessary biological and psychological hypothesis4 ,here is exemplified for psychosis that law of the aggregation of units in hierarchical order1 that wheel within wheel structure of the universe1 upon which ,i have touched in ,mind1 ix4 pp4 #bgb-c4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,theories ,,of ,,pleasure-,,pain ,the bearing of our studies on a theory of the conditions of pleasure-pain is obvious4 ,if we consider pure feeling as the primary1 fundamental1 and conditioning mentality1 it stands before all other mentality1 and cannot be interpreted as conditioned4 ,pain as primum mobile is not intrinsically dependent on any other psychosis4 ,hence we run counter to the ,herbartian ,school1 which maintains that psychism exists from the first for itself as intellectual ideational activity1 and that pleasure-pain is but reflex of the efficiency and ease1 or the inefficiency and difficulty of this activity4 ,the checking of the current of ideas may give a pain1 but our exposition has been that pain arose before ideas or presentations of any kind1 and long before any interference could be felt as pain4 ,again1 if we say 8all pain comes from tension0 7,mind1 xii4 p4 #f71 we have to ask1 ,tension of what8 ,if we say tension of sensation or ideation1 this is ,herbartianism merely4 ,how also can tension be felt as painful1 except through sensation of tension1 which is a feeling of intense sensation--obviously a late psychosis8 ,and certainly pain is more than a general consciousness fatigue4 ,and further stress and strain result in pain1 because we imply these as painful activities by the very notion of the words4 ,a stress or strain is assumedly painful activity1 but this is not explanation4 ,but apart from this1 if the organism felt pain merely as direct result of struggling and straining1 it would cease activity2 activity and evolution would stop4 ,it may be that by tension is not meant a mode of consciousness1 but of nervous or muscular activity2 but as we are now considering psychosis only as conditioning pure feeling1 we leave this aspect for discussion till a little later4 ,but on the psychical side1 that all pain is a by-product of over-intense consciousness1 intellectual or volitional1 that the origin and development of pain is in a mental intensity which has gone beyond a certain point1 this seems1 on general evolutionary grounds1 unlikely4 ,here1 indeed1 is merely a very particular and rather late mode of pain4 ,and may not pains themselves attain an intensity which is itself painful8 ,it must be acknowledged1 however1 that the whole doctrine as to consciousness intensity1 its nature1 reactions1 laws1 and measurements is very obscure4 ,again1 as to the theory that pleasure-pain is reflex of quantity of consciousness1 that pleasure results from mental expansion1 pain from mental contraction1 this must1 like the intensity theory1 be considered as putting a late and special form as covering all forms4 ,mentality here exists for itself1 and conscious self-development--a very late mode--is presupposed4 ,the promotion of large complete free consciousness1 the sense of progress and of unimpeded mental activity1 certainly conveys high joys to certain choice natures1 but they do not touch the vast majority of even human minds1 much less animal4 ,with the stolid an expanding consciousness is painful4 ,consciousness only as conscious of itself1 and as self-developing1 reaches a pleasure or pain as a felt furtherance or hindrance of its own expansion4 ,all reflex theories take us above the realm of simple consciousness acting directly for life1 and this is the very form which seems commonest1 and which appears to be full of passing pleasures and pains4 ,that consciousness does react on itself in late phases is plain1 but if consciousness1 like other functions1 has developed from the extremely simple to the extremely complex1 this self-reaction cannot be regarded as primitive4 ,not till consciousness becomes integrated as a manifold organism do pleasure and pain become prominent as reflexes4 ,we are not now looking for the functional value of pleasure and pain in mind itself as an independent whole2 but regarding its functional quality and that of all mentality in life values1 and here the functional meaning of such reflexes is secondary4 ,in mind1 as organic continuous whole1 pleasure-pain is both resultant and excitant2 it stands related to an antecedent state and it is stimulant to following states4 ,its function is excitant and it is the starting point of all other mentality1 both originally and in the later manifestation4 ,the having pleasure-pain is what starts both motor and cognitive volition4 ,it has1 indeed1 been maintained that while pleasure-pain is not a product or concomitant of some psychosis1 as sensation1 it is itself a sensation1 a definite mode of sensibility4 ,i have a pain sense just as ,i have a temperature sense1 ,i feel pain in the same way as ,i feel warm1 and by the analogous sensory nerves4 ,with reference to this theory we must ask1 since sensation is correspondent to modes of objects1 to what mode is pain correspondent8 ,sense responds to modes of object1 as light1 and sonorous vibrations2 but pain is not based on any such mode of objects4 ,if pain were1 there would have been long since a department of physics1 which would have treated that basis just as it treats light1 heat1 sound1 etc4 ,but we all know that an object is not painful or pleasing in the same way that it is warm or cold1 heavy or light4 ,i do not say the stone feels heavy and painful1 but ,i do say the stone feels painfully heavy1 that is feeling pain is not a state of awareness4 ,further1 having pain or pleasure is not by any sensing effort4 ,i do not try to feel pain as ,i try to see the light of a star or feel the warm spot in a bar of iron4 ,to be sure1 the doctor asks his patient1 8do you feel any pain80 and after a moment's delay the answer may be1 8yes10 but this is not in the nature of a sensing effort1 but merely an attentiveness to bodily conditions as affecting mental state1 not an objective attention but an analytical self-attention4 ,still further1 a neural basis for pleasure-pain is altogether likely1 but even if these nerves were found to be generally distributed over the body1 this would not prove sensation1 but merely that pleasure-pain is functional throughout the organism1 diffusive organic consciousness4 ,if pleasure-pain is primitive1 and neurality and mentality correlate1 the earliest nerve structure--ganglion--was a pleasure-pain organ4 ,however1 the sensory motor predominance is so early and complete that the current theory1 as the more objective1 is the natural physiologic interpretation4 ,again1 it has been maintained that pleasure-pain is not a definite state of consciousness1 but a quality like intensity1 a modus which must belong to all states4 ,but if we assign pleasure-pain to such a category as intensity we must define just what we mean by this category4 ,is intensity a mere objective quality which we as observers assign to all psychosis1 just as we do to electrical or luminous phenomena8 or is it inherent element1 an actual constituent1 of every psychosis8 ,if a man is angry and becomes more angry1 intensity is increased2 but we may conceive that he simply is more angry without being aware of this change of intensity1 that is without every change of intensity being noted by consciousness4 ,as introspection avers1 it often happens that a man is both unconscious of his anger and unconscious of its increase4 ,as ,i have frequently had occasion to note1 simple natures are wholly unconscious of their emotions and of their intensity variations4 ,that is1 as matter of fact1 intensity of feeling is not feeling of intensity4 ,if you feel warm you feel differently than when you feel warmer1 but this is no more than saying that when the iron is hot it is in a different state than when it is hotter4 ,intensity means the same in both cases4 ,consciousness1 primitively1 at least1 is not self-awareness of its own changes in intensity4 ,the feeling warm and the feeling warmer occur simply as facts which are subjectively unrelated and unmeasured by the consciousness which has the varying intensities4 ,i strike a cow hard--result1 intense pain2 harder1 more intense pain2 this is correlative with1 ,i strike iron1 intense tremor2 harder1 more intense tremor4 ,the cow experiences more intense pain1 but does not consciously measure it off as such4 ,i can say1 8,i feel hotter than ,i did10 but the cow does not appreciate and express its own sense of its experience4 ,the language fallacy leads us astray4 ,by our very use of terms1 warm and warmer1 and by our discussion of the matter1 we imply a consciousness of intensity which is far from being primitive or general4 ,it would probably be an overestimate to say that the intensity of one in a thousand psychoses makes itself felt as such in consciousness4 ,that consciousness is not always conscious of its own intensity is then shown by direct introspection4 ,and in general we must observe that every psychosis has its own intensity1 which intensity may or may not be noted by a consciousness of intensity4 ,if there come a consciousness of intensity1 this consciousness has its own intensity1 which may be noted by a new consciousness1 whose intensity may in like manner be noted by a new consciousness1 etc41 ad infinitum4 ,that is1 a consciousness is never its own intensity1 and intensity is never a consciousness1 such as pain or pleasure1 but is mere comparative objective quality4 ,again1 consciousness has almost from the first different degrees of activity1 but it would be most unlikely that so complex an act as consciousness conscious of its own intensity should be primitive and early4 ,also1 if consciousness develops as life factor it must be immediate utility which determines its early forms4 ,hence on this general principle of biologic evolution it is most unlikely that primitive organisms will both have consciousnesses and consciousness of their intensity1 for of what direct and vital value is this intensity-consciousness as psychic mode8 ,on the other hand it is obviously desirable that psychoses should early differentiate intensity as objective quality1 i4e41 without self-awareness of it1 should have different degrees of a psychosis to meet different degrees of requirement2 thus to fear strongly or weakly according to necessity of the case4 ,to have fear set at one pitch for all cases is perhaps absolutely primitive1 but differentiation is early4 ,but to fear more or less1 i4e41 at different intensities1 is not to have intensity as subjective element1 an actual psychosis constituent appreciated as such1 which is very late evolution since the demand for it is late4 ,in thus defining the category of intensity we have plainly isolated it from the pleasure-pain category4 ,we know pleasure or pain as act of consciousness just as we know volition or sensation4 ,pain and pleasure are definite facts like seeing or touching or willing1 and are so recognised by common consciousness4 ,one or the other may be involved in all experience1 but this does not make them general qualities like intensity4 ,pain is a consciousness1 intensity is not a consciousness4 ,this is the immediate value of the terms1 the very names convey distinctness of category4 ,i have a pain1 ,i do not have an intensity2 ,i am in pain1 ,i am not in intensity4 ,my pain is intense1 but ,i cannot say my intensity is painful4 ,we experience pain and pleasure1 but we never experience intensity4 ,this quale hypothesis as presented by ,marshall in ,pain1 ,pleasure and ,aesthetics1 is set upon the dangerous foundation of ignorance1 viz41 of the neural basis of pleasure-pain1 and of causes of its variability4 ,it is as yet disputed whether a nerve organ for pleasure-pain has been found2 but if one is generally acknowledged1 the theory would be overthrown4 ,greater intensity in any psychosis1 as sensation of warmth1 means simply greater nervous activity in the particular nerves subserving the psychosis1 in this case the temperature nerves4 ,so also pleasure-pain as general concomitant like intensity must mean merely some general mode of nervous activity as yet unknown1 if we allow it any nervous basis at all4 ,again1 the variability of pleasure-pain for a given content1 the fact that the taste of olives is at one time pleasant1 at another1 unpleasant1 suggests that pleasure-pain is like intensity merely a general quality1 which must in one form or another attach to all psychoses4 ,but this does not explain anything4 ,what we want to know is why in any given case we have pleasure and not pain2 we do not wish to be put off with a general statement that the nature of pleasure-pain is such that we may have either1 which is akin to the old metaphysical method of abstract explanation2 making the rationale of the lion leoninity is not unlike the hypothesis that explains pleasure-pain in all its variations by variability as its nature4 ,we have a scientific faith that variability is not a general unexplainable quality1 but that there is for every case of pleasure-pain a definite rationale based in the facts of life demand and life history4 ,that olives now give pleasure1 and now give pain1 is based upon definite conditions of physical state which are very complex1 but which can be revealed by patient research alone4 ,any theory of pleasure-pain then from the point of view of pure psychology1 as explaining it by reference to other modes of consciousness1 is1 we think1 unsatisfactory4 ,but perhaps the physiological point of view will be more satisfactory4 ,it is generally considered that the function and origin of pain is in what is unfavourable to physiological function1 of pleasure1 in what is favourable4 ,i cut my finger1 and the pain says1 stop the injurious action4 ,however1 there are exceptions4 ,i taste sugar of lead2 it is pleasant1 and ,i keep on tasting1 and am poisoned4 ,lotze explains that this sweetness is immediately soothing and advantageous4 8,we must not regard pleasure10 says ,grant ,allen1 as 8prophetic40 ,but what has been the evolution of taste as sensing act except to be 8prophetic10 to give at the opening of the alimentary canal a monitor to the stomach and other digestive organs8 ,that it tastes sweet1 that this taste is pleasant1 and so the substance is swallowed1 or that it tastes bitter and unpleasant1 and the substance is rejected2 this surely is anticipatory and 8prophetic40 ,the taste for sweetness is not evolved for itself2 but for its life value2 and hence ,lotze's explanation fails from the point of view of evolutionary psychology4 ,the organic sweet is the nutritious and beneficial1 and the sensing this quality in connection with these favourable and pleasant effects on the stomach and organism as a whole has led to a taste and liking for sweetness4 8,sweet and wholesome0 is the common and just conception4 ,but if mineral sweets injurious to life1 like sugar of lead1 had been a common environment1 and the only sweet known1 this sweetness would have been as unpleasant as the sour or acid now is4 ,we see even now that sweets that have several times caused nausea1 though at first highly agreeable1 come to be distasteful and disgustful4 ,we now find that sour and bitter substances are disliked by animals in general as painful1 for the sour and bitter is general sign of the unwholesome2 but those animals which live almost exclusively on bitter herbs undoubtedly appreciate this quality as we do a bon bon4 ,men lost in a desert by pertinaciously tasting bitter herbs and becoming dependent upon them for support would soon realize their bitterness as pleasant1 and a race might originate to whom sweetness would be unpleasant4 ,hence the value of a sensation does not--in natural evolution--lie in itself1 it is merely a guide and index2 and the sensation quality will be pleasant or unpleasant according to its relation to the demands of life4 ,a sensation is inherently either pleasurable or painful1 but not essentially one and not the other1 hence the proverb1 de gustibus non disputandum4 ,the sensing act in itself is indifferent1 i4e41 sweetness and bitterness1 purely as tastes1 as sensing acts1 are indifferent2 but as matter of fact having grown up with and for pleasure-pain tones as indicative of life values1 they are either one or the other according to their relation to life4 ,where sense serves not life but itself1 as with the epicure1 a new order of pleasures and pains is determined which is not within our present scope of discussion4 ,this variability of pleasure-pain tone of sensations even under natural evolution shows that the main force at least of their pleasurability or the contrary does not lie in the affection of the sense organ itself4 ,if a given sensation1 for example1 bitterness1 were painful in all degrees only because of its harmfulness to the sense organ1 how could this variability be explained8 ,we consider that the tasting bitterness1 for example1 arose through painful stomachic and bowel experience with herbs which had this quality1 and which by sensing efforts were so cognized at length1 and pain connected by its very origin with sense of bitterness1 which becomes in all degrees painful4 ,the identifying the nutritiously harmful weed by tasting its bitterness has the pain quality of its effects1 since the tasting has grown up in connection with its effects4 ,it is out of actual injurious and painful experiences that the organism is led to put out sensing effort and to reach such a sensation as that of a bitter taste whose pain value is mainly1 at least1 due to the actual results of the substance lower down in the alimentary canal4 ,a sense of bitterness becomes disagreeable in all degrees1 for in its inception1 when first sensed1 it has its connection with the pain effects which stimulate this sensing4 ,to discriminate the unnutritious or poisonous by tasting is a grand achievement1 securing the rejection at the very opening1 the mouth of the alimentary canal1 in place of rejection by nausea from the stomach itself4 ,the organism which could only know that a certain substance was bad for it by very painful nausea1 now knows its badness by the comparatively painless tasting bad4 ,whatever tastes bad1 is bad4 ,the chief difficulty of the theory of bodily advantage and disadvantage as conditioning pleasure and pain comes not from any such instance as the sugar of lead phenomenon2 but it lies in the fact that life progressiveness1 enlargement1 specialization1 that which is to the highest profit of life1 is uniformly reached only by painful struggle4 ,it is only by intense struggle1 by supremest1 painfullest effort1 that those new psychic forms are initiated and developed which are of the utmost service to the organism4 ,the act of adjustment to a new circumstance is so extremely difficult and painful that it is attempted by few and achieved by very few of any set of organisms4 ,by an act of most painful struggle the fittest survive2 and the rest1 the vast majority1 who could not key themselves to that pitch1 perish4 ,adjustment to the ordinary conditions is simply a free using of intelligence and energy integrated and stored by ancestors when these conditions were new to them4 ,the adjustments which are so spontaneously made by new-born animals as response to environment were once new1 and secured and integrated for inheritance by the most painful and persistent effort4 ,such is the inertia and conservatism of life that while it moves spontaneously in grooves already made1 it does not rejoice in the toil of real progress4 ,the struggle by which the greatest life advances have been accomplished has always been intensely painful in itself1 whatever the aftermath of pleasure may be1 the pleasure of achievement and creation1 the satisfaction at successful effort1 which is plainly a very late psychosis4 ,the origin and place of pleasure is indicated by these considerations4 ,though function is generated and developed by severest painfullest struggle1 yet the reward is pleasurability of the free functional activity2 and the more manifold the functioning built up1 the more manifold the pleasure4 ,thus it is that a highly complex organism like man1 which represents many psychic ages of painful function building1 has a very high pleasure capacity4 ,every new adaptation when integrated means a new pleasure4 ,it is pleasurable to inhale fresh1 cool air1 but the lung functioning itself has been built up by painful exertion in the struggle for existence4 ,pleasure as reflex of functioning is merely then conserving power4 ,the immediately and intrinsically pleasure-giving acts are not progressive1 but merely hold life at the given and already acquired status4 ,but the most and largest pleasure is in the mere expenditure of stored energy4 ,the easiest way1 the way of inclination and obvious direct pleasure is regressive4 ,it is living upon the past1 living upon accumulated capital bequeathed1 and perhaps in some measure acquired4 ,the use of a stimulant1 as alcohol1 enables the capital to be used up faster4 ,as the systemic craving becomes greater with the drunkard1 the pleasure increases1 and on the brink of dissolution he may reach the extremest pleasure4 ,in alcoholism the more injurious the drink1 the more violent the pleasure4 ,the most rapid and destructive using up of vital force in lust1 revenge and other excitements gives the keenest pleasure4 ,the orgy1 the chase1 the prize ring1 give the expensive 8thrill10 which is ecstatic pleasure4 ,debauchery and alcoholism are quick ways of using the pleasure capacity which has been built up by painful effort of thousands of generations4 ,a taste sensation1 which was achieved as the highest effort of genius by some very remote ancestor at a critical moment and attained by painful sensing exertion1 is finally after generations of severe volition integrated1 and becomes spontaneous activity1 and reactive as free pleasurable functioning4 ,that is1 in the early stages of tasting the pleasure taken in it was by discriminating effort1 a pleasure realized by exertion as pleasures of artistic 8taste0 are now enjoyed by many people2 which pleasure may at length be so inwrought into psychism that it occurs spontaneously4 ,at least1 we have no other clue to the origin of pleasures except by judging from the present development of definite pleasures in the case of man1 which pleasures come only by effortful cultivation1 for instance1 the highest pleasures of art4 ,the whole range of sense pleasures have been built up and capacity therefore has been inherited1 and may be used up with great intensity4 ,the largest and keenest sort of pleasures is from expenditure4 ,yet storage in certain modes yields a moderate pleasure1 as the pleasure of rest1 dozing after exercise4 ,here is a general spontaneous accumulation of physical pleasure capacity1 it is a case where functional repair has become automatic1 and thus far is analogous to the spontaneity of pleasures of expenditure4 ,but these storage pleasures are mainly negative1 relief only2 and they are not the great positive corporeal pleasures which are so largely sought4 ,the drunkard gradually recovering from a spree experiences feelings of relief1 but he does not indulge in his cups to feel the gradual recovery from the painful after effects4 ,no biologic or psychologic theory of pleasure and pain can yet be enunciated which is fully explanatory4 ,in fact1 if pleasure-pain is the primitive and fundamental fact1 if it constitutes the worth of life and is life1 then it must explain other factors1 but remain itself unexplained4 ,the theory of advantage and disadvantage fails signally1 for the most pleasurable act is frequently the most disadvantageous to the interests of the organism1 and the most advantageous--progressive effortful volition--is invariably most painful4 ,as to why the way of conservation and upbuilding should be painful1 why pleasure should not be inherent in the progressive struggle rather than pain1 is1 at least for the present1 a philosophical problem2 but the fact remains4 ,we have considered that struggle is pain-impelled and painful1 and that pleasure is resultant of functioning thereby established1 and that all pleasure capacity is painfully acquired4 ,with the grand exception of this singular and important fact1 however1 we can say that in natural evolution--that is1 before mind has become independent and artificial and subjected itself to pathologic tendencies--the general law that pleasure denotes favouring organic conditions1 pain1 unfavourable1 may be assumed4 ,however1 if the body is mere dependency and expression of mind1 the form of statement must be reversed2 that is1 a given pain or pleasure is an acquirement by mind in its function building4 ,i have painful taste sensation of bitter1 pleasant sensation of sweet1 not as originally reflex of bodily conditions1 but the sensing power and the organ1 like all bodily specialization1 is outcome of mind as struggle4 ,a typical consciousness--series of a low type which places pleasure in its place is3 pain 7as from hunger7--struggle-sensing 7as touching for food7--desire 7when food is recognised through sensing7--absorptive and digestive effort and action--pleasure--struggle to continue and increase pleasure--slight satiety pain--unconsciousness of sleep4 ,so we do not connect pleasure-pain as outcome of organic function in general or particular1 but function is outcome of pleasure-pain4 ,it determines function1 and not function it4 ,the feelings which prompted and developed a functioning1 and the correlate total--organism--necessarily involve a very high complex1 at least for any late psychism1 and make a general law of pleasure-pain impossible to determine under present conditions4 ,the rationale of particular pleasures and pains can only be reached through a thorough investigation of life history1 an investigation which in present circumstances seems in most cases beyond our powers4 ,a great mass of psychological data1 and not any general theory1 is the desideratum4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,the ,,relation ,,of ,,feeling ,,to ,,pleasure-,,pain ,should the term ,feeling be made to include certain states of consciousness which are neither pleasurable nor painful8 ,or should all such neutral states be designated by some other term8 ,we are concerned here with an important matter of definition which implies an extensive analysis of consciousness with reference to pleasure and pain4 ,it will not be difficult to find many so-called feelings which are neutral1 or seem to be so2 but it is the duty of the psychologist to carefully analyse all such states1 and point out the proper use of the term ,feeling4 ,common observation neglects minute analysis1 and is unreliable when it speaks of certain indifferent states as feelings4 ,when a man speaks of feeling queer1 or strange1 or bewildered1 or surprised1 and says that the state of mind seemed neither agreeable nor disagreeable1 we may suspect that by a perfectly natural tendency he is extending the name ,feeling to closely-connected states of cognition or will4 ,in identification and definition common observation is for all sciences notoriously untrustworthy1 and especially in psychology2 so on this question the evidence of language and popular testimony counts for little one way or the other4 ,this is strikingly evident when people speak of feeling indifferent as to some matter1 meaning that they have no feeling on the matter4 ,the term ,feeling is used in such a broad and vague way that #8,i feel indifferent' means #8,i am indifferent1' #8,i have no feeling4' ,the mistake here is in using the word ,feeling as an equivalent to ,ego1 or any quality of ,ego4 ,a feeling of indifference is no feeling at all4 ,popular evidence then1 ,i believe1 can be no guide in this matter4 ,in passing1 ,i may also say that the very abundant use of analogy by some writers on this subject seems to me ill-advised4 ,analogy does very well to bring up the rear1 but it is often very useless and confusing as an advance-guard4 ,prof4 ,bain 7,mind1 ,no4 #ec7 insists that ideas tend to actualise themselves by neutral intensity or excitement1 which is feeling2 or rather1 he says1 a 8facing-both-ways condition40 ,this last expression is certainly not very helpful or satisfactory4 ,prof4 ,bain admits that typical will is incited by pleasure and pain1 but he maintains that sometimes1 as notably in imitation1 will is stimulated by purely neutral excitement or feeling4 ,in the discussion of this subject much has been said about excitement1 and1 as ,mr4 ,sully has suggested1 this requires careful definition4 ,reflection assures us that every mental activity has a certain intensity1 and the word ,excitement may1 in the most general sense1 denote this intensity4 ,the intensity may be so slight as to be unnoticed by the subject1 and remain wholly unindicated to the keenest observer2 or it may be so strong as to be perfectly evident to both2 or it may be evident to the subject and not to the observer1 or vice vers4 ,thus the obvious division of ,excitement from this point of view is into subjective1 where it is immediately recognised and felt in the consciousness of the subject1 and objective1 where it is unnoticed1 or noticed only by observer4 ,classifying by another principle1 we may distinguish ,cognition-intensity1 ,feeling-intensity and ,will-intensity1 and the natural subdivisions under these according to the accepted subdivisions of mental activities4 ,excitement is not1 however1 generally used in the large sense we have just mentioned1 but as denoting intensity of a high degree so as to be very noticeable to the subject1 or observer1 or both4 ,it is plain that ,excitement1 as subjective intensity1 is the only kind which bears on the question under discussion4 ,it is with excitement as a feeling1 viz41 the feeling of intensity1 and not with excitement as quality of feeling1 that is1 intensity1 that we have to deal1 and it is necessary that this distinction be clearly borne in mind4 ,one may be excited but not feel excited1 may have intensity of feeling but not feeling of intensity4 ,using the term1 then1 as equivalent to feeling of intensity1 it is to be noted that it is a reflex or secondary mental state4 ,it is the feeling resulting from consciousness of intensity of consciousness4 ,the intensity of any consciousness may increase to such a point that it pushes itself into consciousness1 first as mere recognition of intensity1 but immediately and most manifestly as feeling of intensity4 ,in rapid alternations of contrasted states1 as of hope and fear1 intensity soon rises to such a degree that it forces its way into consciousness as feeling of intensity4 ,this feeling of intensity may be itself either weak or intense4 ,in very reflective natures1 the cognition and feeling of intensity may be reflex at any power3 there may be cognition of the intensity of cognition-of-intensity1 etc41 in indefinite regression4 ,most persons stop with the single step in the regression4 ,it is evident that as far as excitement is regarded merely as intensity1 as a fundamental element in all feeling and mental action1 it is a confusion of terms to apply quality to it1 to speak of it as either pleasurable1 or painful1 or neutral4 ,intensity of mental action has degrees but not quality1 just as pitch in sound has degree1 but not timbre or quality4 ,regarding excitement as feeling-of-intensity1 it has the general characteristics of all feelings1 and is not more likely to be neutral than any other feeling4 ,taking the case of surprise1 which is so frequently instanced as a neutral feeling1 let us analyse it with special reference to the excitement as feeling of intensity of cognition4 ,a typical case would be the surprise from hearing thunder in ,january4 ,the presentation is quickly compared with a representation of observed order of facts1 and the disagreement of the two marked4 ,this is so far purely cognitive activity2 but immediately connected with the perception of disagreement is the forcible recognition of the breaking up of a more or less rigid order4 ,there is a disturbance in cognitive activity and the tension breaks into consciousness as excitement1 the feeling of intensity4 ,the conflict of a settled conviction with recent presentation intensifies consciousness1 and this intensity with the abrupt change in quantity and quality of mental activity breaks into consciousness as intellectual sense of shock accompanied and closely followed by feeling of unpleasantness and pain4 ,it is to be noted that when we come upon the feeling-element in surprise we find pain4 ,surprise in the strict sense is then the reflex act of consciousness in which the mind becomes aware of and feels the sudden disturbance and tension set up in itself by the sudden weakening of an established belief4 ,the painful shock has some relation to the force of the disturbing factor1 but is more closely connected with the strength of the belief assailed4 ,the feeling of the disagreement as pain is due to the fact that this disagreement impinges on subjectivity1 personal opinion and conviction1 and the disturbance will be more or less disagreeable according to the degree of personal interest4 ,note that by exact statement the feeling is not painful1 but is the pain concomitant or resultant upon the mental perception4 ,the surprise for a person of rather weak habit of mind and of little generalising power will be almost wholly intellectual4 ,disagreement will be noted1 but not felt4 ,for one of strong intellectual interest1 the surprise will mean definite and acute pain4 ,for a meteorologist who has written a book stating that in this latitude thunder does not occur in ,january the surprise might be very grievous4 ,the intellectual element in surprise is emphasized in the statement 8,i am surprised10 the feeling-element in 8,i feel surprised40 ,if antecedent states of representation1 comparison and inner perception are placed under the term feeling-of-surprise1 we may expect consequent states to be likewise easily confused4 ,when one speaks of being agreeably or disagreeably surprised1 the pleasure or pain is not really1 however1 a part of the surprise4 ,the sense and feeling of intellectual destruction1 which constitutes surprise1 is so quickly and thoroughly swallowed up in pleasure in having hope realized1 or in pain in having fear realized1 as the event may prove1 that the term is naturally applied to what engrosses attention4 ,thus1 8,it was a very pleasant surprise0 means 8,the surprise was followed by very pleasant consequences40 ,when ,i am surprised by the arrival of an intimate friend whom ,i supposed a thousand miles away1 the mental disagreement1 and the pain from conflict of conception and perception1 are quickly eliminated by the event according with desire1 and by the mind anticipating joys4 ,we see1 then1 how easily the antecedents and consequents of surprise are confounded with surprise itself1 which is the reflex act of consciousness recognising and feeling sudden disturbance in intensity1 quality and quantity in cognitive activity4 ,i conclude that surprise1 as feeling1 is pain coloured by cognition of shock and by volition to avoid disturbing element4 ,absorption in thought may be attended by what seems to be neutral excitement1 but is not really so4 ,the intensity of thought may press into consciousness as a knowledge and feeling of intensity1 but so far as it is a feeling it is indubitably pleasure or pain4 ,this pleasure or pain may remain as continuous undertone with frequently repeated intrusion into full consciousness4 ,careful analysis in this case shows that apparent neutrality results from a strong attendant recognition1 or from the natural volitions being quickly overruled by feelings consequent upon other considerations4 ,intellectual men are not apt to be guided by excitement4 ,professor ,bain says that imitation is a test-case1 that this is a volition which is obviously stimulated by neutral feeling4 ,in some cases imitation seems clearly a mechanical1 ideo-motor affair1 an instinctive action without either conscious feeling or willing4 ,in all other cases of imitation analysis will show excitant pleasure or pain4 ,as ,preyer and others have shown in the case of young children1 mimicry arises mainly from pleasure in activity as such1 and not from its peculiar quality as imitation4 ,for children1 and often for adults1 imitation is simply a method of joyous and novel activity4 ,the stimulant in higher grades of imitation is pleasure in attainment4 ,as far as excitement is stimulant1 it is1 on the general principle before stated1 either pleasure or pain4 ,the pleasant feeling of intensity will tend toward continuance of imitative action1 the unpleasant toward discontinuance4 ,the pleasurable sense of activity1 as inciting and continuing will in imitation1 is a good example of excitement as feeling of volition-intensity4 ,if volitional excitement as instanced in imitation1 and cognitive excitement1 as exemplified in surprise and absorption of thought1 cannot be termed neutral1 it is quite unlikely that we shall find any neutral feeling-excitement4 ,a person at a horse-race may at first have so small a degree of pleasurable hope and painful fear aroused that the intensity does not force itself into consciousness4 ,the increasingly rapid pendulum-swing of consciousness from hope to fear and back again becomes soon so intense that this objective intensity of feeling forces its way into conscious life as feeling of intensity4 ,this excitement may be mainly regarded as accompaniment1 or it may be valued in itself as excitement for excitement's sake4 ,this absorption in the feeling of intensity is eagerly sought for by the ennuy4 ,the devoted theatre-goer often induces both pleasures and pains simply for this resultant feeling of tension which he regards as enjoyable for its own sake4 ,feeling-excitement in the simpler and earlier form and in this later artificial form is plainly pleasure or pain coloured by slight element of cognition as recognition of intensity1 and by volition in continuing or in stopping the causative activity4 ,bearing in mind the analysis of excitement just made1 the true interpretation of several matters which have been suggested is obvious and clear4 ,mr4 ,johnson 7,mind1 xiii4 #hb7 remarks that very intense mental pleasure and pain tends to run into a state of neutral excitement4 ,this ,i interpret as the mental law that intensity of any mental activity1 of any pleasure or pain1 tends to displace this activity by feeling of intensity4 ,this feeling of intensity is indeed neutral as regards previous states--that is1 it is not1 of course1 the feeling whose intensity it feels2 but1 as ,i have sought to show1 it is nevertheless always pleasure or pain4 ,again1 as to the question whether states of mind equally pleasurable or painful may have different degrees of excitement4 ,if excitement means here subjective excitement1 then ,i answer that they do not have any degree of excitement1 for feeling of intensity can never be a quality of the feeling whose intensity is felt4 ,if excitement is the objective form1 and refers to the intensity in general1 then1 as has been before said1 it is a confusion in terms to apply the terms pleasure and pain to it4 ,the anticipation suggested by ,mr4 ,johnson as a case of neutral excitement is precisely analogous to the case of excitement at a horse-race1 which has been analysed4 ,mr4 ,johnson concludes that feeling is not only more or less pleasure or pain1 but also more or less excitement4 ,the proper way of stating this is3 all feelings1 including the feeling of excitement1 consist of pleasure or pain and have degrees of intensity4 ,again1 let me note the relation of intensity1 and consequently feeling of intensity1 to quantity of consciousness--a subject suggested by ,mr4 ,sully 7,mind1 xiii4 #beb74 ,the fundamental properties of consciousness--quality1 quantity1 intensity--and also their inter-relations1 would be a fruitful theme for extended discussion4 ,i think that the clearing-up of many problems would result from thorough investigation and careful definition in these points2 but at present ,i can only offer a remark or two upon the subject4 ,it is plain that intensity varies with different qualities1 that certain kinds of mental action are more generally characterised by high degrees of intensity than others4 ,presentations tend to higher intensities than representations1 and pains than pleasures4 ,it is noticeable that our psychological nomenclature1 both popular and scientific1 is mostly concerned with qualities1 which shows that quantities and intensities have not received the attention they deserve1 and have not been carefully discriminated4 ,a representation of the same house comes up in the minds of two persons1 one of whom has lived in it1 the other merely seen it several times4 ,each psychosis is as representative as the other3 they have the same quality1 but in quantity and intensity they vary greatly4 ,in a single multiplex act of consciousness1 the former embraces a wide reach of detail and association and a high degree of intensity which is lacking in the meagre and faint image of the latter4 ,physiologically1 quantity is as the mass of co-ordinate coincident activities of brain in highest centres1 and intensity is as the arterial and nervous tension in the highest centres4 ,intensities may be equal1 and quantities very unequal2 as compare one greatly interested in a game of cards with a person watching a near relative at a critical moment of illness4 ,intensity of pleasurable hope alternating with painful fear may be equal in both cases1 but in quantity the latter would tend to exceed4 ,very quiet natures are often characterised by largeness of quantity of consciousness4 ,other things being equal1 intensity tends to reduce quantity and obscure quality of consciousness4 ,quantity1 like intensity1 may cause a reflex act of consciousness when it becomes so great as to push into consciousness as recognition and feeling of quantity2 and as a feeling of largeness1 elevation and mental power it is clearly distinguishable from excitement as feeling of intensity4 ,intensity is dependent on the force or strength by which a mental state tends to persist against other states which may be crowding in1 and it is also closely connected with rapidity of mental movement2 but it is primarily tension1 consciousness at its highest stretch1 specially as touching upon interest1 an element more or less involved in all consciousness4 ,it would seem highly desirable1 in order to keep clear the distinction between intensity and feeling-of-intensity1 to restrict the term ,excitement to the latter meaning1 and substitute the general term ,intensity for all objective excitement so-called4 ,it is also greatly to be desired that the reflex states which arise from sudden or great changes in quality1 quantity and intensity of consciousness1 and which are commonly termed feelings1 should receive more general attention from psychologists than heretofore4 ,i have in this paper essayed something in this direction1 but it is a very large field1 and comparatively unexplored4 ,however1 so far as the problem of feeling as indifference is concerned1 enough has been said on ,excitement and ,intensity1 and ,i shall now consider ,neutralisation as giving neutral feeling1 a method suggested by ,mr4 ,johnson 7,mind1 xiii4 #hb71 and developed by ,miss ,mason 7xiii4 #bec74 ,does a feeling1 neutral as regards pleasure and pain1 result from the union in one consciousness of a pleasure and pain of equal intensities8 ,is there a composition of equal pleasure-pain forces so that resultant equals zero8 ,such a question implies a clear apprehension of what is meant by being in consciousness1 and as to the possibility of perfect coincidence and equality in mental activities4 ,it is plain that so far as consciousness is linear1 neutralisation cannot occur4 ,where there is but one track1 and but one train at a time1 collision is impossible4 ,mental states often appear coexistent while they are really consecutive4 ,it is doubtful whether pain from toothache and pleasure from music ever appear in absolute synchronism in consciousness1 but they may alternate so rapidly sometimes as to appear synchronous to uncritical analysis4 ,to a man drowning1 a lifetime of conscious experience seems condensed into a few seconds4 ,this means a consciousness made very sensitive and very rapid in its movement1 and which acts like a camera taking pictures with a lightning-shutter4 ,even if a pleasure and pain did coincide1 it is probable that in no case would they be exactly equal4 ,in mental life as in organic life every product has an individuality3 as every leaf differs from every other leaf1 so every mental state is on completest observation sui generis4 ,this is evidently a most delicate investigation1 but ,i doubt whether it can ever be shown that two equal pleasures and pains ever appear in the same sense in consciousness at the same time4 ,practically equal pleasures and pains in consecutive consciousness lead to vacillation1 and the secondary pain of alternation and excitement drives intelligent agents to new activity1 or in stupid agents the alternation may be carried to exhaustion4 ,it is undoubtedly true that consciousness1 in all the higher forms at least1 is a complex2 yet full and complete consciousness is probably of one element only1 and the remaining portion of the nexus grades off into subconsciousness and unconsciousness4 ,there is a network of coexistent states of consciousness in different degrees in mutual reaction1 each striving for dominance but only one at a time reaching it4 ,some portions of the nexus1 as ,ego-tone1 are quite permanent elements4 ,the light of a large and brilliant consciousness may illumine a considerable area1 but brightness most certainly diminishes in rapid ratio as the distance increases from attention1 the single point of greatest illumination4 ,a highly developed brain may sustain a highly complex consciousness1 but it is only at the point of highest functional activity that we find the physiological basis of a full consciousness4 ,while high grades of mental life are so complex1 we do not find anywhere a mental compound4 ,two diverse or opposite elements never combine into a compound which is totally unlike either4 ,close analysis will fail to reveal any process of neutralisation or combination whereby we experience neutral states of feeling4 ,i have endeavoured to set forth the real nature of certain so-called neutral feelings2 but at the bottom the question is1 as was at first intimated1 a matter of definition4 ,is it best to restrict the term ,feeling to pleasurable and painful states of consciousness1 or is it advisable for clearness and definiteness to widen the use of the term so as to include certain neutral states8 ,from such analysis as has been made1 ,i doubt the advisability4 ,appeal in such matters must always be made to analysis1 and the advantage must be shown for a concrete example4 ,the a priori idea or general impression that pleasure and pain is too small a basis for all feeling has no real weight4 ,moreover1 it must always be borne in mind that psychology1 like all other sciences1 deals only with phenomena and not with essences1 not with mind but with mental manifestations1 not with feeling as mental entity having properties1 being pleasurable1 painful1 etc41 but with these qualities in and for themselves4 ,thus the metaphysical fallacy hidden in such common expressions as 8pleasurable and painful feelings0 is to be constantly guarded against4 ,the feeling is not pleasurable or painful1 but is the pleasure or the pain4 ,the feeling has no independent being apart from the attributes which in common usage are attached to it1 nor is there any general act of consciousness with which these properties are to be connected4 ,as indicated at the beginning of this paper1 this common tendency has its psychological basis in the bringing under the term ,feeling some of the more permanent elements of consciousness--especially the ,ego-sense--which stand for metaphysics as beings and entities having properties4 ,knowledge1 ,feeling1 ,will1 are for nominalistic science simply general terms denoting the three groups of mental phenomena which seem to stand off most clearly and fundamentally from each other1 and ,pleasure and ,pain are most clearly and fundamentally set over against ,knowing and ,willing4 ,it does not seem that ,professor ,bain and others have made plain to us any better differentia4 ,if this definition of ,feeling seems the best that descriptive classification can give us1 it is certainly enforced by genetic considerations4 ,the key to a really scientific classification lies in the history of mind in the individual and race4 ,the greatest progress in psychology is not to be attained by the psychologist continually reverting to his own highly developed consciousness1 but1 as in all sciences1 the study of the simple must be made to throw light upon the complex4 ,mentality like life is a body of phenomena whose forms cannot be separated by hard and fast lines into orders1 genera1 species2 but there is a continuous development of radical factors4 ,in the earliest forms of mind we find the most radical distinctions most clearly and simply set forth1 and what ,feeling is at first1 it is by continuity of development the same for ever after4 ,the earliest indications of conscious life show merest trace of apprehension of object1 some organic pleasure and pain1 considerable striving and effort4 ,mental evolution1 like all evolution1 is not by the elimination but by the expansion of its primal factors2 and by the continuous amplification and intensification of these the highest development is reached4 ,pleasure and pain remain then for all consciousness as constant factors2 and if the term ,feeling is to indicate one element in tripartite mind1 it must be held to this meaning of pleasure and pain4 ,pleasure and pain in their most complicated colourings from developed knowledge and will1 and in their most subtle interactions1 remain true to the primal type2 and when we find a state of consciousness in which neither is a dominant factor1 we had best denote it by some other term than ,feeling4 ,this evolutionary reason seems to me the strongest one for making the term ,feeling signify states of pleasure or pain1 and1 as ,i have suggested 7,mind1 xi4 #gd-e71 a genetic classification of the feelings must proceed upon this basis4 ,,chapter ,v ,,early ,,differentiation ,a blind psychic life of pure feeling cannot long avail in the sharp struggle of existence1 for to all stimulations it secures only two crude reactions1 a spasmodic1 defensive activity from pain1 and an appropriative motion from pleasure4 ,this perfectly subjective consciousness can serve only the earliest and crudest demands of life2 but as the struggle for existence becomes fiercer1 the more delicate and definite reactions1 which can only come through cognition1 are required4 ,all that we can say as to the origin of knowledge in general is that it arose1 or rather was achieved1 like other conscious and extra-conscious functions1 in answer to the pressing demands of the organism2 and so far as we can see1 it does not seem to be evolved from any pre-existing consciousness or any common basis of mind4 ,it is a distinct type of consciousness1 and so utterly diverse that we cannot trace any psychical continuity4 ,however1 we can remark this1--that perfect objectifying is not at once achieved1 but cognition must be regarded as beginning in a very minute and obscure germ in some intense feeling state4 ,yet this germ does not seem to have a direct psychical connection with the pure feeling by which it is excited into existence1 but it is a reaction to an opposite mode more diverse from pleasure and pain than these are from each other4 ,moreover1 according to the law of evolution by struggle1 this first cognition does not come to mind1 but is achieved only in most intense will act1 comparable for relative intensity to the knowledge originated by severest effort of a man in danger of his life listening to a barely audible sound1 or watching a barely visible object on a distant horizon4 ,the evolution point for all life is in stress and strain1 and this is the law of the development of sensation at all times in psychic history4,a ----- ,footnote ,a3 ,cf4 my remarks in ,psychological ,review1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #ec ff4 ----- ,cognition undoubtedly began as a very crude sensation1 as the barest movement towards objectifying sense1 as a pure sensation without any image form1 any direct perception of an object4 ,in the order of disappearance of elements from consciousness1 we note that sensation maintains itself through a long series1 and is the last stage before pure feeling sets in4 ,as heat stimulus is increased1 sense of heat begins at a certain point1 and increases up to a certain intensity of the stimulus and to a certain intensity of its own1 when it rapidly vanishes1 and in the agony on the verge of unconsciousness is lost in pure pain4 ,we note also that the cognition of object1 of thing1 disappears before the sensation of heat does4 ,a person burning to death is for a time conscious of the fire1 which consciousness at length is lost in intense painful sensations of heat2 and this in turn1 at the acme of consciousness entirely disappears1 leaving only pure pain4 ,further1 the rise to full consciousness1 as well as the fall to unconsciousness1 also suggests bare sensation as the original cognition4 ,if a hot iron be applied to one in deep sleep1 the order of waking consciousness--apart from any dream order--is pure pain1 then sensation of heat1 then awareness of hot object1 and also of part heated and paining4 ,in our ordinary consciousness it is certainly very hard to even partially isolate the various elements4 ,sometimes1 however1 a person will say1 8,i have such a queer pain2 ,i do not know what it is40 ,the psychosis thus indicated is evidently pain with a movement towards a sensation which yet is not realized4 ,sensation does not come though it is looked for2 there is pain only1 and unqualified save by the peculiarity of being unidentified4 ,the sense of lack of sensation bewilders1 because sensation is so constant for our psychic life2 but in primitive mind there is no such feeling of queerness when sensation does not come1 or it is not able to attain it4 ,this inwrought tendency to sense all our pains and pleasures1 and to feel the lack if we do not1 is evidently the result of a long evolution4 ,sensation is thus seen to be an activity which we exercise to give definition to our pure feelings2 there is something unfulfilled for us if sensation does not come1 and we may thus go out for it and interpret the pain in sense form by a will-effort4 ,primitive mind1 however1 does not achieve its sensations as incited by this indefinite sense of lack-queerness or strangeness1 but through pain at some critical moment to obtain a suitable reaction4 ,all sensation is at first1 as we even now can faintly realize1 by a severe effort1 and is not a spontaneous1 incoming impression4 ,paradoxical as is the expression1 8we learn to know10 yet it contains a truth in that cognition is an attainment incited by the necessities of the organism4 ,necessity is the mother of invention1 and knowledge is at first an invention which the organism hits upon to help it in the exigencies of experience4 ,in early and even in later consciousness it is probable that the majority of pleasures and pains are so dull in intensity that they do not rouse sensation1 and comparatively few incite as far as to perception4 ,a close analysis of our own consciousness even will show many pleasures and pains1 many vague states of uneasiness and discomfort1 and many of organic pleasure and comfort1 which lead to nothing and come to nothing for either sensation or perception4 ,these states stand alone by themselves1 and vanish with little effect on either mind or body4 ,they constitute the outer fringe of consciousness where all mentality starts1 and under sufficient pressure of life-interest develops into great fulness and complexity1 or1 when of comparatively little value to the organism1 they disappear suddenly and completely4 ,i am inclined also to think that close scrutiny will sometimes reveal for psychical life1 as for the physical1 certain entirely useless survivals1 undifferentiated feelings of some types1 and probably also some pure sensations4 ,i conceive then that the fundamental order of consciousness is not1 as usually set forth1 pure sensation with accompanying pleasure and pain1 but the reverse--pure pleasure and pain with accompanying sensation2 and only by a very gradual evolution indeed did pure feeling bring in sensation1 which is thus always sequent and not accompaniment4 ,we commonly inquire as to a sensation1 ,was it pleasurable or painful8 but the true form of inquiry is1 ,was the pain or pleasure senseful8 ,did it attain to bringing in the qualifying element of a sensation1 and in what form8 ,the qualifying of pure feeling to attain actions suitably differentiated for distinct forces must have proceeded very slowly1 and have had the dimmest beginning4 ,we cannot suppose that consciousness attained at once and easily to a manifold of sense1 much less have had this brought to it1 involuntarily received4 ,the earliest forms of sensations were no doubt of those affections of the body produced by heat1 pressure1 and other elements which determine most vitally the existence of the organism4 ,the first sensation indeed was undoubtedly not in any particular mode1 but was a bare and undifferentiated form4 ,it was some such indefinite and general sensation as we may sometimes detect near the vanishing-point of consciousness just before pure pain state occurs4 ,for example1 the sense of heat as such is lost at a given temperature for a given case1 and there exists for a moment a vague general sensation1 sensation per se1 before mere pain absorbs all consciousness4 ,sensation at its very origin was not sense of any kind1 sense of heat1 pressure1 etc41 but a mere undifferentiated sense of bodily affection4 ,the body is not1 of course1 apprehended as object1 but there is a vague attributing and qualifying which marks the state as more than purely central1 as being a real objectifying4 ,toothache1 for instance1 implies ache before the toothache1 and this general aching is the type of early unorganized sensation4 ,pain is the essence of the state1 and is throughout dominant1 the cognition in mere aching being a very minor element4 8,i was awakened in the night by a toothache10 is the objective description of a triple movement in consciousness1 pain1 ache1 toothache4 ,the earliest cognitive experiences were all of this very general type of sensation1 which becomes gradually more definitely localized and qualified as distinct modes of sensation2 pain-hunger1 pain-heat1 pain-pressure1 and corresponding pleasure-sensations are differentiated4 ,subtract the mere pain from hunger state and from painful sensation of heat1 and we have certain quales which are difficult to analyse1 but which are cognitive in nature4 ,diverse bodily affections are sensed diversely instead of being felt in one mode1 pure feeling4 ,we have far outgrown the sensation-cognition psychic stage1 and speaking of psychic history in biologic terms1 it belongs to the early palozoic4 ,we have yet to formulate the succession of psychic ages1 in each of which some distinct psychic power attains dominancy1 and produces minds as diverse from ours as the organisms of past ages are different from our own bodies4 ,as already pointed out1 it is an extremely difficult problem to realize by subjective method these ancient types4 ,a mere general sensation is a very rare phenomenon in our ordinary consciousness1 and even special sensations rarely occur in pure form4 ,to realize what sensation of heat is for a simple consciousness1 we must strip our minds bare of most of their furnishings1 for all our sensations of heat are interpreted with reference to visual and tactual objects which must be non-existent for early consciousness4 ,sensation for us is a complex of sensations plus perceptions and other cognitive and emotional elements which lie beyond early mind1 but which by an inevitable automorphism we interpret into early forms4 ,this automorphism with the child is complete1 and is never perfectly effaced even in the most accomplished psychologist4 ,a life of simple feeling1 or of this plus simple sensation is most difficult of realization2 still we may have reason to believe that the psychic life of a low type consists wholly in repeated pains and pleasures occasionally rising so high that consciousness reaches to a vague general sensation1 or rarely to a thrill of heat1 or sense of hunger or pressure4 ,of course1 in all cases we assume will-activity4 ,and we have to emphasize this again1 that all sensation1 like all pain1 while always from objects is never of objects4 ,the objective description here1 as usual1 does not give the inner state4 ,our automorphic tendency leads us inevitably to regard the order in which we perceive the organism to be effected by external objects to be its received order4 ,but a little reflection always convinces us that this is in the nature of the case an erroneous procedure1 that what happens within consciousness is not primarily any cognition of a world of objects1 nor an apprehension of them in any form4 ,sensation1 while objective by virtue of being cognition1 is not in any way a realization of object1 but is objective only toward the dynamic within the individual organism1 and is not apprehension of static wholes of any kind4 ,it is an objectifying to force1 not to things1 and this in the modes of physiological affection4 ,it is not appreciation of a something1 but of a somehow4 ,in the earliest stage of mind1 as has been before noticed1 all manner of material causes rouse nought more than a pure feeling mode2 heat1 pressure1 electricity1 sound1 light1 nutriment or its absence1 if they attain to waken the function of consciousness1 accomplish no more than pure feeling as bare pain and pleasure4 ,it is1 of course1 natural to conceive that from the first consciousness1 responds objectively in sensation in as many modes as organism is moved by external and internal forces2 but a multiform sense origin of consciousness is not borne out by the general tendency and law of evolution1 nor yet by such special indications in consciousness as we are able to observe4 ,when a very young infant seems to reach pleasurably to warmth1 if we are correct in positing consciousness at all1 it is still very unlikely that there is sense of warmth1 but the state is probably pure pleasure2 and if there is sense of warmth1 it did not give the pleasure1 but the reverse4 ,we believe likewise that it is probable that a consciousness response to nutriment is1 at first1 mere pleasure1 and only1 secondarily1 organic sensation4 ,thus1 warmth and nutriment effect1 but only1 at first1 in the one mode of pure feeling1 and secondly1 pure sensation as general organic satisfaction4 ,lastly arises a differencing in consciousness for the different bodily changes4 ,and the multiformity of stimulus and paucity of consciousness in modes while so very apparent in early mind is yet always found in all grades of psychic life4 ,the responsiveness of consciousness is never perfected1 and mind has a practically infinite field for the acquirement of sensation1 for appreciating what has never affected consciousness1 or which mind has felt or known only by some general mode4 ,the infant1 no doubt1 has many pains for which it has no sensation values4 ,these pains1 perfectly pure and undifferentiated the one from the other1 have had their occasion in a variety of physical changes4 ,a native of the tropics1 who on first touching ice says it burns1 has at first but a single sensation for very diverse physical affections2 but he soon attains an icy sensation1 that ice feels not burning1 but stinging cold4 ,men1 civilized and educated1 often are consciously affected by bodily changes of which they are wholly incognizant1 the psychosis being not specialized according to the mode of change4 ,in degraded states of consciousness1 which come to all1 there often appears obscure feeling and sensation1 which is a practically single mode of answer to a very wide variety of physical excitation4 ,in realizing the variety of external objects and changes the mind proceeds but slowly1 each new form always at first in pure feeling4 ,it is only as something affects feeling and interest that we ever come to know it or its manifestations in physiological change4 ,sensations are1 then1 by no means such original and simple elements of mind as often conceived2 but they are developed forms of some general undifferentiated cognitive state1 sensation as bare apprehension of bodily disturbance1 and this itself cannot be accounted absolutely original4 ,the evolution into particular modes of sensation1 as sense of heat1 hunger1 light1 pressure1 etc41 is in the struggle for existence gradually achieved1 and also therewith the evolution of special sense-organs4 ,and we must always bear in mind that it is not the sense-organ that develops the sensation1 but on the contrary the effort at sensing that produces1 maintains1 and improves the sense-organ4 ,the eagle's eye has been developed by unceasing straining as incited by the necessities of existence felt in pain and pleasure4 ,it is natural for us at our stage of development to suppose that the organs of sense give sensations and to explain the sensation by the physiological organ2 but when we reflect that sensations come to us from the organ only up to the measure of the momentum from heredity1 we see the insufficiency of purely physiological interpretation4 ,evolution to-day is on the same basis as evolution at any period1 and as it always has been1 it always will be1 dependent upon a ceaseless nisus4 ,it is only by painstaking effort--labour--that man progresses in sensibility1 and this effort has always an incentive in some form of interest that is pleasure-pain basis4 ,thus it is that the astronomer's eye1 the microscopist's eye1 the artist's eye1 is formed4 ,the multiform sensibility of the tea-taster is attained by assiduous tasting1 and the development in organ only follows pari passu4 ,what is seemingly simple and original in sensation for us was1 no doubt1 like the very special forms of sensibility acquired by our specialist1 achieved by the lower forms painfully and toilfully1 and passed on to us4 ,our highest feats of sensation and insight may likewise for our remote descendants be intuitions1 whose apparently simple nature may be asserted as the basis of philosophic systems4 ,a genius is one who antedates the general stage of progress of his period by having as intuitions1 as seemingly direct and simple knowledges and sensations1 what is beyond or barely within the intensest effort of his contemporaries1 though it may become common and easy for all men of later ages4 ,the moving factors1 the active agents in the evolution of consciousness1 are not1 ,i think1 sense-impressions of any kind2 these are the results1 rather than the incentives1 of mental evolutions4 ,mind acquires its whole sense outfit1 and receives no cognition whatever ready-made4 ,it is hard1 indeed1 for us to put ourselves at the point of view of acquirement of what seem to us simple impressions of sense2 but the difficulty is only of the same general nature as to understand how what seem to be direct perceptions of things in space are really indirect4 ,the progress of psychology will1 in my opinion1 tend to show more and more that givens of all kinds are such in appearance only1 and that mind in its essence is purely a feeling-effort4 ,the differentiation of action secured through sensation and its differentiations is evidently of the utmost importance to life1 but still the objectivity secured is small4 ,in the pure feeling stage1 reaction is a very hit-and-miss affair1 and in pure sensation stage it is but little better4 ,guided only by present sensations1 the organism in the struggle for existence is blind to all objects1 and1 knowing not itself nor other objects1 anticipatory action is entirely beyond its power4 ,the growth of mind is to secure delicacy and precision of adjustment with largest time and space extension1 and the achievement of objectification was a tour de force of the highest value4 ,the exigencies of life-struggle lead comparatively early from cognition of mode of affection to the cognition of thing affecting4 ,perception arises to supplement sensation1 and full objectification opens the way for intelligent activities4 ,thing or object is first1 no doubt1 apprehended tactually2 but the sense of touch is1 of course1 acquired before cognition of thing touched4 ,we1 indeed1 find it difficult to appreciate this1 since in touch we constantly apprehend things as in contact with us2 still1 if in some very sluggish state1 as deep sleep1 when the varied and correlated life of sensation with perception is practically nil1 a rough object be made to bear upon the body as a lump in the mattress1 it is evident that consciousness begins as bare pain1 then general uneasiness as bare general sensation1 then sense of touch1 and finally cognition of object by means of and through the touch sensation4 ,the sense of thing touched follows on sense of touch4 ,this general order may be illustrated from a squib in a comic paper of the day4 ,a swell finding a friend sitting by an open window on a cold day asks him if he does not feel cold4 ,he answers1 8,ya-as2 ,i guess ,i do4 ,i knew theah was something the mattah with me2 ,i suppose it must be cold40 ,the threefold movement in this noodle's mind as evidenced by his words1 is1 first1 feeling pain2 second1 a something the matter1 i4e41 general sensing and objectifying thereupon2 third1 particularizing to feeling cold4 ,he has simply gone back to primitive process4 ,touch or other sensation is in itself no more than an objectification of physiological change1 and calls up no object whatever4 ,in pure sensation there is no image of anything1 but it is merely a peculiar modifying of pleasure-pain according to mode of physiological stimulus4 ,a heat thrill does not include objectification to any existences1 not even to the physical body of the organism sensing4 ,it is only by and through sense of physiological disturbance that awareness of object is achieved4 ,intense sensation stimulates to full cognition1 to complete act of objectifying4 ,this tendency of sensation is illustrated by the common saying1 8hunger sharpens wit02 and certain it is that presentation of food objects is arrived at only by this stimulus4 ,the earliest objectifying1 no doubt1 arose from a pain-sensation of some kind2 but this primitive cognition of object was purely general1 just as primitive sensation was purely general4 ,a world of objects is not at first and at once attained1 but only object barely as such1 dim awareness of a mere mass4 ,in the earliest stage every presentation is of a bare objectivity1 so that one cognition differs from another in no wise as regards content4 ,this mere thing1 which is first full cognition content1 is next to no-thing4 ,when we try to conceive this thing we inevitably foist in some special sensation and perception1 most generally sense of light and seeing2 and the explication just made in the previous sentence was undoubtedly understood by the reader in visual terms4 ,our apprehension of object is correlation of several modes1 and it is most difficult to intimate in any wording what bare undifferentiated apprehension of object may be4 ,if the embryology of mind were more thoroughly studied1 we should understand in some measure1 for this stage most probably occurs in the very earliest activities of every human and animal mind4 ,a totum objectivum1 which is thing and nothing more1 is1 perhaps1 occasionally observable in our own consciousness when at very low ebb--at such times when pure feeling and pure sensation become possible phases4 ,this general1 undifferentiated cognition of object and all the special forms therefrom developed must always be accounted as coming about in no spontaneous way1 but as attained and supported through will activity of an intense form4 ,perception of object is not in any true sense impressed from without1 nor yet in any true sense is it a native faculty or power4 ,it is not more or less freely constructed out of more or less given data4 ,it is the necessities of life that bring mind to achieve full cognition2 and this alone is the first cause of cognition1 which is always in its inception cognitive effort toward objective realities1 towards a world of things4 ,these objects1 among which and in close relation to which some single object1 organism1 must live--this is the common postulate of all biologic science1 psychology included--constitute a world4 ,the living object is such by virtue of the simplest consciousness1 a feeling-will1 as absolutely essential to any advantageous action4 ,it is by this root-form1 feeling-will1 that cognition is ultimately accomplished1 and not by virtue of any imprinting of objects upon mind as in some measure a tabula rasa1 nor yet in any purely subjective construction of object4 ,object is revealed neither from without nor from within2 it is achieved solely as a guide to advantageous action in the struggle for existence4 ,of course1 the mind does not knowingly reach knowledge1 does not foreknow it and its advantage in order to attain it2 this is a contradiction in terms1 and profects backward a highly refined teleology4 ,all we do at present is to simply assume it as law that serviceable consciousnesses1 cognition and others1 are inevitably attained in the stress of existence4 ,for the science of psychology1 metaphysics apart1 this is the best standpoint1 and all we can now say4 ,the confirmation of an organism's activity1 cognitive and otherwise1 as serviceable1 is in feeling pain and pleasure1 which is the original mode in which objects excite consciousness or consciousness reacts to them4 ,it is in feeling as the starting point that cognition is determined and maintained4 ,we cannot scientifically speak of any mental process as native1 that is1 mind itself is not native4 ,by the very term original we exclude inborn4 ,the first consciousness occurred1 it was merely event1 useful event2 and if we further say it was acquired1 we probably say what agrees best with biology as a whole4 ,it is impossible at present to discuss whether or not mind may be a primitive vital function1 for where life begins or ends is itself a most obscure problem2 but whether it be primary or secondary1 mind in no form is properly native1 that is a pure given1 but we simply say the function is displayed1 as we speak of nutrition or reproduction4 ,in the organism we see something which has nutritive1 reproductive1 motor processes1 perhaps also consciousness processes2 and so far as there is any problem as to the nature of consciousness as native function it belongs to a general biologic problem4 ,as to the question as to whether cognition or what cognitions are original and simple in all mind1 we have already excluded the whole field of cognition from this position4 ,does the general objectification1 the first stage in cognition of object1 have any special function for the developed presentation forms of later consciousness8 ,mr4 ,ward1 in his suggestive article in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 seems to intimate that it has4 ,he says 7p4 #ej71 ,actual presentation consists in this continuum being differentiated and every differentiation constitutes a new presentation48 ,mr4 ,ward in this connection sets forth that presentation-continuity in consciousness is determined by a presentation-continuum which is 0totum objectivum4 ,presentation activity is fundamentally a differentiating of this constant element4 ,we might compare this continuum to an ocean from whose surface rise waves1 particular presentations1 which subside again into the parent sea1 which ever remains as the constant basis of all wave movements4 ,now the question of continua is a very broad one4 ,do the early stages of consciousness1 pure feeling1 pure sensation1 pure objectivity1 remain as constituting the basic bulk of all higher consciousness1 and is all higher consciousness but differentiation of these as well as from these1 that is1 is it no more than differentiating activity kept up on a vast series of levels and sub-levels8 ,or are we to regard them as regressive stages to which developed consciousness rarely returns8 ,may we consider that there is a certain histology of mind1 that certain primitive forms1 like tissues in the body1 constitute the inner and constant structure of mind8 ,the theory of continua1 be it observed1 in its fulness requires a numberless series of levels and sub-levels supporting one another1 for a high form of consciousness pre-supposes an indefinite series of antecedent stages4 ,while any highly differentiated consciousness is going on it must be an actual differentiating of the preceding stage1 which is therefore coincident and pre-existent to it1 and this latter in turn must have its supporting continuum1 and so on down ad infinitum4 ,the theory makes mind a wheel within wheel of bewildering intricacy4 ,yet mind in this point of view has a certain analogy with the physiological status of the higher organisms1 for example1 the human body is colonial1 is constituted of a multitude of cells1 a simple type of organisms1 by whose consentaneous activity the whole body is animate4 ,one objection to this theory is that it confounds functioning with differentiating4 ,not every act of consciousness is by its very nature a differentiating1 a movement toward specialization4 ,consciousness is on the whole more often regressive than progressive1 and very often practically neither1 as for example1 in all instinctive1 habitual1 and spontaneous activities4 ,but again1 while differentiating act certainly pre-supposes the undifferentiated1 does it require coincidence8 ,for instance1 vision as ordinary form1 receiving impressions1 certainly contains no totum objectivum activity1 but also as differentiating act1 as intense visual effort reaching to higher development1 it generally1 at least1 seems free from any lower stage1 and is engrossed in itself4 ,since we make the prime cause of all mental development and differentiation in will1 we do not need any undifferentiated general ground remaining in consciousness as basic element1 nor does analysis of consciousness show this constant element4 ,successive phases of presentation development are attained through effort1 but one does not gradually grow and branch out of the other by a purely inward impetus of its own4 ,i believe1 indeed1 that the inner life of mind consists in its original forms1 and that they remain in late mind not merely as useless survivals but having a distinct functional value2 but ,i do not see how any or all of the general stages of mentality constitute continua for consciousness of higher types4 ,instead of being constant basal elements they occur and are blotted out with such rapidity that reflection can very rarely identify them 7vide p4 #fc74 ,they are lost and swallowed up in complex consciousness so quickly as to leave no trace upon memory1 and they do not subsist or continue throughout the complex forms4 ,they are then the very opposite of continua1 being1 in fact1 the most evanescent of mental phenomena4 ,consciousness in all higher forms1 as the human mind1 must and does mount the main steps of its very early growth with marvellous rapidity and leaves them entirely behind4 ,the more primitive the stage the more quickly it vanishes1 till often it seems to appear in tendency form only1 or be thrown into a subconsciousness4 ,primitive types exercise a most important but fleeting influence in advanced consciousness which rises through them most rapidly and easily1 but in the less advanced the contrary is the case4 ,the ,australian savages1 as observed by ,lumholtz1 came to their senses and reached a full awakening in the morning very slowly as compared with civilized men4 ,with dull children likewise we observe how slowly they awaken4 ,all regressive forms reach but slowly to their full consciousness and dwell long in intermediate stages4 ,but in all cases when higher forms enter the lower disappears1 when varied perception enters in awakening1 then the preceding dim general objectivity is wholly obliterated4 ,it will be remarked that admitting1 as we do1 the constant existence in mental life of feeling as pleasure and pain1 we thereby make this a real continuum4 ,but we may say that consciousness is never without a pleasure-pain constituent and yet not assert a continuum4 ,consciousness continually possesses some pleasure-pain element1 but this is not a feeling as continuous state1 as an underlying differentiating basis pleasures and pains as diverse independent states are essential incentives in all consciousness1 but they do not constitute a single continuum4 ,of course1 every consciousness1 as long as it continues1 is in this very general sense a continuum1 but no form of consciousness1 primitive or advanced1 can1 with one exception1 be called a continuum1 as a single mode running through and unifying a long stretch of varied consciousnesses4 ,this exception is the complex element of ego-tone4 ,early mind is no more than a kaleidoscopic jumble1 with no one organizing and unifying element4 ,even when consciousness from happening in purely disconnected flashes attains first a certain limited continuity1 this is not by means of some conscious element persisting through a series1 but merely signifies that as fast as one consciousness dies out1 another takes its place1 i4e41 the continuity is purely formal and temporal4 ,it is through self-consciousness alone that any real continuum is achieved in and for consciousness1 and this ego-tone is far from being primitive4 ,the sensation and objectifying as discussed in this chapter in connection with feeling1 both pain and pleasure1 constitutes complex states of consciousness which may be termed a feeling when the pain or pleasure is dominant1 or a cognition when the sensing and objectifying is dominant4 ,thus by a feeling ,i understand a state of consciousness which is either entirely or dominantly pain or pleasure1 the former being pure feeling1 the latter mixed feeling4 ,this latter class constitutes the feelings properly so-called1 as varied pains and pleasures1 the variation element being the cognition in some form4 ,feeling as being in different kinds is made such by the differentiation of cognition4 ,thus hunger is neither a pure sensation--that is by pure sensation meaning not absolutely pure1 for pleasure or pain is invariable incentive concomitant1 but sensation pure from any distinct mode of apprehension1 as merely general and undifferentiated--nor yet is hunger pure pain1 but it is the combination of a certain definite sensing1 beyond the pure stage1 with pain4 ,hunger is a feeling when the pain aspect is dominant1 is cognition when sensation aspect is dominant4 ,the confusion in the use of the terms sensation and feeling comes from the difficulty in determining dominancy in given cases4 ,certainly the exact line where feeling of hunger passes into sensation of hunger can be settled only by the most careful discrimination1 but at any great remove from this line the character of the state is very manifest4 ,by no effort can we separate the sensing from the pain so as to have nothing but sensation1 though the attributing to bodily affection does in the incipient stages of hunger become dominant1 but as hunger increases1 pain becomes dominant1 and ultimately the end as the beginning is pure pain4 ,we say1 8,i feel hungry10 for all stages when any sensing is present1 and this indiscriminate popular use of the word 8feel10 has tended to obscure the real nature of the whole mentality4 ,the same line of remark applies to feeling thirsty1 feeling hot1 etc4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,representation ,,and ,,emotion 8,i feel cold10 and 8,i feel afraid of cold10 are expressions which denote two tolerably distinct feelings4 ,the main characteristic which distinguishes the second feeling as an emotion is obviously representation4 ,in the first case1 ,i have pain with presentation of the cold1 in the second1 pain with the mere representation of the cold4 ,if ,i feel cold1 ,i have direct and immediate experience2 if ,i fear the cold1 ,i have an experience in view of experience1 pain at pain4 ,when one says1 8,i have a violent pain in my head10 and a friend answers1 8,i am deeply pained to hear it10 we recognise at once the fundamental distinction between sensation and emotion4 ,we have in this chapter to discuss some points as to the rise and nature of emotion in its relation to representation4 ,the theory which we have been elaborating is that pure pleasure and pain are the original and causative elements in the whole realm of mind4 ,pure feeling is the most direct and necessary1 and so the first response in conscious form1 to all stimuli1 and it is the incitement to all cognitive activity in its inception and growth4 ,the harm and good to organism1 are at once1 and most quickly realized in terms of pure feeling1 and the painful necessities in the struggle for existence1 lead to a continuous development from this point4 ,dominant pleasure and pain1 with the different presentation forms1 constitute different feelings1 as of warmth1 hunger1 cold1 etc41 to which some fuller objectification may be added4 ,adjustment is thereby made manifold1 but only with present stimulus4 ,there is no appreciation of the experienceable4 ,all that is attained is immediate present apprehension which in no wise suggests or interprets1 but which is strictly self-contained4 ,we must1 indeed1 acknowledge that no consciousness1 save1 of course1 the very first1 can exist in perfect isolation totally unaffected by any other4 ,the second conscious activity was not a perfect facsimile of the first1 and its variation is due at least in the main to the precedent mentality4 ,what is1 is determined by what has been1 and this universal law is in mind the inductive nature of all experience4 ,the solidarity of all mentality and of all materiality is a scientific postulate1 a principle which we must assume1 or deny all scientific investigation4 ,the movement of a molecule in the sun1 millions of years since1 influences the condition of my body to-day1 and the flush of pain in some protozoan millions of years since1 has had an infinitesimal share in determining my present state of mind4 ,yet this fact that every psychosis is what it is by reason of the whole line of previous psychoses1 does not lead us to suppose that experience cognizes itself from the beginning1 and consciously builds itself up4 ,there is for a long time no consciousness of process of mental integration4 ,the whole universe of mind is the necessary prius of each individual manifestation1 yet the particular phenomenon in consciousness does not include a sense of1 or reaching out to1 these conditioning agencies4 ,no sense of dependence is generated4 ,but we ask1 ,how can one conscious state unconsciously effect or determine another8 ,how can consciousness be affected without consciousness of affection8 ,yet1 difficult as it may appear to set clearly before us the nature of this relation of a consciousness to all the preconsciousness1 it is still obvious that the intricate nexus of cause and effect in mind does not need to be known of mind or realized in the individual consciousness1 and is not1 and cannot be4 ,every consciousness is the derivative resultant of innumerable pre-consciousnesses1 and it goes to the determining and qualifying of innumerable post-consciousnesses1 yet it is neither consciousness of the future or the past1 though it involves both4 ,the early phase of mind where consciousnesses are wholly un-unified from within by any central or continuous consciousness1 and whose solidarity is wholly in an unconscious integration is so foreign to us who have minds where experience of experience is continually in process1 that it is with the utmost difficulty we can in any wise conceive it4 ,it is evident that a very low organism may have consciousnesses1 but no mind1 that is1 no self-unifying whole of consciousnesses4 ,it does not possess a mind1 but during its whole life it attains psychoses which are merely disjecta reached to help an immediate necessity of existence1 and then fading completely away4 ,each psychosis is achieved more easily than the former by reason of the former1 though there is no consciousness of connection with it4 ,the increment and qualifying of a given experience by past experience is not reached by it4 ,some differentiation is attained under pressure of struggle for existence1 and experience is constituted1 but is wholly unknowing of itself and in no wise self-formative4 ,we have now1 however1 to consider the problem1 how experience came to itself1 and how and why representation and emotion should arise in the struggle of existence4 ,at the first1 as we have seen1 organisms responded in conscious form only in pleasure and pain1 and this only when the actual damage or benefit to the individual was very considerable4 ,when the hurt was critical1 then only was pain accomplished as a function to secure self-preservative action1 but gradually through survival of the fittest the greater susceptibility was attained1 so that minor lesions are felt in pain terms1 and some general sensing and objectifying lead to some differentiation in adjustment4 ,the external parts of the body become specially sensitive1 and ciliate extensions are formed4 ,injury to these results in pain and consequent reactions1 and in this wise by injury to a small part great harm to the organism as a whole is prevented4 ,the low forms of life are thus enabled to avoid the hurtful before they meet it in full annihilatory force4 ,these practically anticipatory reactions--though there is no real anticipation in consciousness1 no real experience of experience--,i term the method of incipiency4 ,pain reactions are thus reached with less and less actual harm until the very slightest injury to a minute tentacle will suffice to awaken pain4 ,this tentacular experience1 however1 is obviously very limited1 and has incidental disadvantages4 ,further1 that pain should be attained when there is little actual harm1 is good1 but to attain pain1 and self-conservative action before any injury is done1 but only about to be done is better4 ,reaction to potential harm is a most important advantageous step4 ,in the earlier form of mentality1 the animal must actually be in the process of being devoured by an enemy before a pain reaction is achieved1 but in the later representative form of reaction there is complete anticipation1 and the animal can come off with an absolutely whole skin4 ,ideal pains1 as fear1 anger1 and other emotions1 are gradually substituted for pains which are real in the sense that they arise in a positive hurt to the life of the organism4 ,the saving which is effected through emotion is most important1 and this economy is reason for the rise of emotion in the struggle of existence4 ,those animals who are able1 not merely to react on slight injuries to themselves1 but also through fear1 etc41 to avoid all actual injury1 have a very manifest advantage4 ,if now the rationale of the rise of emotion is apparent1 let us next proceed to some analysis of emotional process in general4 ,the mental mechanism by which anticipatory function is secured is certainly complex1 and a complete analysis presents many difficulties4 ,in the incipiency stage1 which we have just discussed1 the organism was enabled to avoid the full force of the injurious by meeting it half-way with extensions from its own body1 but we cannot suppose that this was purposely accomplished1 or that the lesser pain conveyed in any form sense of the greater pain4 ,there was no fear1 no anger1 not any experience at experience in consciousness4 ,there is simply pain on less and less injury1 but no anticipation of pain4 ,in early consciousness there is1 of course1 frequent return of a given object which becomes the occasion of a large number of objectifyings which are identical in nature yet do not contain sense of identity4 ,there is repeated reaction to the same objective stimulus1 yet with no sense of sameness1 there is frequent cognition of the same thing yet no recognition4 ,with primitive consciousness1 no matter how often a thing is experienced1 it is equally new2 revival of the past is not stimulated1 nor sense of identity attained4 ,mere return of a state is not sense of return1 and no amount of re-occurrence or combinations thereof will make sense of re-occurrence4 ,re-occurrence of a psychosis is nothing more subjectively than occurrence unless there arise sense of re-occurrence or revival4 ,the pure feeling states in primitive consciousness are perfectly identical in nature1 and they arise on occasions which are the same1 yet there is of course no sense of identity4 ,a young child may see a thing a hundred times without recognising it2 there are a hundred re-occurrences of state yet no sense of re-occurrence4 ,the hundredth perception does not differ materially from the first1 does not include any true representative element4 ,the immediate image does not stand for the past1 the mind does not revive previous presentation on the strength of it4 ,mind is regarded by many as consisting fundamentally of vivid sense presentations and their faint reproductions1 of sense impressions and their representations4 ,that which has been repeatedly experienced has a tendency to re-occur without the particular objective stimulus1 but merely indirectly by some connected stimulus1 through an association of states4 ,but this revival1 however attained1 does not constitute real representation1 it does not really differ from the presentation simply because it re-occurs without the original particular objective stimulus4 ,representation in true sense of term is representation with sense of re-presentation4 ,a representation is a repetition of a presentation with no consciousness of repetition or any added nature4 ,repetition is a fact in consciousness before it is a fact for consciousness4 ,all presentations and re-presentations have mere immediate validity and value1 they point to nothing1 and mean nothing1 there is no going beyond what is immediately given1 no prescience of a possible experience4 ,revival often occurs in mind without sense of revival1 and so is not true representation4 ,in disordered states of the nerves we frequently see objects which have no real existence1 the states are revival states as objectively interpreted1 yet there being no sense of revival they stand in consciousness for real presentations4 ,when ,i see a person sitting in a chair but afterwards find that no one was there1 ,i characterize the state very naturally as a mere imagination1 a representation2 yet in fact it was in subjective quality a presentation4 ,we are not to psychologically classify1 as is too often done1 psychical states according to presence or absence of object1 but as to sense of presence or absence of object4 ,it is only as consciousness takes note with reference to object that there is differentiation in consciousness to make presentation and representation4 ,we must consider it probable that the earliest revivals by consciousness were solely of the unconscious sort1 or1 objectively speaking1 were hallucinatory4 ,a sense order is formed1 which attends to a series of objective realities2 let now1 on some occasion1 one of these objects drop out1 yet there will be attaining of some sense of it as though it were present1 and the proper reaction will be carried out4 ,the mind gets its early revivals without sense of revival4 ,they have presentative force1 and are sensings of objective reality though there is no objective reality there at the time to sense4 ,these early simple revivals1 which are all hallucinatory1 perform an important function4 ,they are practically anticipatory1 in that the reaction is secured before the actual presence of the reality4 ,thus they save an actual bodily experience1 though the mental is quite real1 yet fainter than actual object would give4 ,thus with an enemy an animal will revive1 upon slight indirect sensation1 previous experiences1 and it will have in ideal form1 i4e41 without the objective reality1 a very real experience with what is to it real enemy1 thus escaping before full advent of enemy4 ,when a shadow alarms a low organism--and even very low organisms seem to react to shadows--there is no actual harm done to its members as would happen with a concrete body1 and hence there is no direct pain4 ,the shadow is yet taken for real body1 and revival pains and revival sensations are attained with this1 and there is consequent activity4 ,shadow does not appear as sign of enemy1 but in itself a dangerous reality1 so that anticipatory reaction is gained without actual representation4 ,in most cases in low organisms what we take for fear or other emotion is probably no more than revival of the type of which this shadow experience is an example4 ,what is actually unreal1 being only revival1 is taken for the real1 and is acted on accordingly1 and in most cases this action is of service as anticipatory4 ,when the organism discovers the shadow to be but shadow1 a something1 not the object1 yet connected with it1 when it becomes a sign of further experience1 this is representation as the basis of emotions such as fear and anger4 ,the pain intensity in the simple revivals1 re-presentations1 is doubtless less than in experience with objective realities1 so there is a saving on this score in pseudo-direct experience4 ,while reactions are secured upon this method without injury being actually inflicted1 still there is loss of economy in this1 that the activity is excessive under the circumstances4 ,priority of action to real injury is secured1 but at an excessive expense of energy1 almost equal to that in actual experience with the real thing4 ,this acting to a false reality1 while it has a value for experience1 is1 as said1 uneconomical1 and it must sometimes not have the anticipatory force4 ,the cheat and illusion is ultimately at some critical moment cognized by consciousness1 revival comes to be estimated at its real worth1 and sense of reality and unreality is formed4 ,the revived presentation does not stand in and by itself alone1 but it acquires a significance1 and it loses the force of complete reality value4 ,that which is brought into consciousness again is not only revival1 but is felt to be such4 ,to constitute representation1 then1 there must be not merely revival1 but sense of revival with some sense of unreality of revival form4 ,but this would avail nothing save it brought in sense of its value for experience4 ,the revival must not only be appreciated as such1 but the relation to the experienceable must be cognized4 ,the calling up of the past must be applied to experience4 ,the sight of a fire not only calls up revivals1 but there is the sense of the experienceable therewith1 and an emotion which incites me to walk to the fire and receive warmth4 ,mere return and sense of return must be supplemented by sense of value for future experience4 ,representation is experience doubling on itself4 ,all representation is more than representation of thing1 revival2 it is representation of experience as such1 hence an experience of experience4 ,we must always emphasize as the essence of representation not the revival1 but the sense of the experienceable or experienced thereby conveyed4 ,the process to representation we see exemplified in measure in awaking from a dream4 ,the dream itself1 speaking from the objective point of view of observing psychologist who detects no real things in interaction with the body1 is representative in nature2 but1 for the experiencing consciousness1 there is no sense of revival1 and all is presentative activity4 ,things are known as such1 and not as dreamt or represented4 ,awaking is a gradual pouring in of sense of revival and of sense of objective unreality of the experience2 we become conscious that the activity is no direct consciousness1 but a recalling or reproduction4 ,the dream image1 which was so real to me while in the dream1 ,i now hold as representative only1 as having no immediate answering form and substance4 ,when1 as with the superstitious1 the dream is felt to have significance1 to have a meaning for life in pleasure-pain terms1 then emotion becomes possible1 and fear1 hope and kindred feelings are excited4 ,we observe that representation is then a new order of consciousness4 ,representation cannot be attained by any combination of experiences1 revival or direct1 but it is a unique and reflex act4 ,it is not a development of presentation1 as an echo and re-echo of it2 and the mere fact of absence of external cause or object does not constitute a cognition as representation4 ,the objectifying is not self-contained1 but it conveys a meaning for experience4 ,representation is an experience which includes some cognizance of or sense of experience1 and it is thus the germ of self-consciousness and consciousness of consciousness4 ,experience comes to be more than a series of detached and isolated activities with no cognitive power beyond a direct and immediate apprehension1 but by rising to some appreciation of itself it becomes forewarned and forearmed1 able to consciously appreciate and attend to its own welfare4 ,we have also to emphasize this1 that while representation involves a conscious re-objectifying1 it must also include some re-feeling consciously accomplished of pain and pleasure4 ,revivals of pain and pleasure are felt and are appreciated as revivals1 as having their basis not in present object1 but in previous experience4 ,it is by understanding feeling as experienced and experienceable1 it is in view of pleasure-pain experience1 that emotion arises4 ,it is not sense of imminence of object1 but of imminence of pain and pleasure1 that awakens responsive emotion and so self-conservative action4 ,emotion always implies a pleasure or a pain in ideal sense of the experienceability of either4 ,representation as cognitive revival and sense thereof is subsidiary to representation as feeling revival with sense thereof4 ,for instance1 the representation of a tooth and of pain of toothache are correlative representations4 ,mere representation of cognition has no value in itself1 is a mere idle panorama1 save as it brings on representation of pleasure-pain4 ,unless representation of object implies representation of pain1 there is no deterrent effect on the mind1 and no proper bodily reaction4 ,we may believe that the order and basis of the representative side of mind is practically the same as indirect and simple activity1 that the actual motive forces and originating impulses are pleasures and pains4 ,we should suspect that the first revival attained was a pure feeling revival1 and that the first representation was of pain and pleasure1 and not of object1 a consciously re-feeling rather than a consciously re-objectifying4 ,the immediate value of the feeling side necessitates that all differentiation be initiated there4 ,representation is only of experience of things or of pleasure-pain experience4 ,it is always experience of experience1 hence the expression1 representation of an object1 is1 in strictness1 inaccurate4 ,experience of things1 as cognitive act1 is always presentation4 ,yet early representation must be considered as very much adulterated by presentative elements4 ,it was only slowly that representation was differentiated as a distinct power such as we find it in human consciousness2 at the first it must have resembled the confused state that we sometimes experience between sleeping and waking when a given image often shifts from presentation value to representation value1 and then back again4 ,representation at the first is also purely concrete and particular4 ,bare appreciation of the experienceable does not include idea of experience4 ,but representation in itself is merely a calling up and application of definite experiences as such4 ,experience as general term is not known1 but only the particular facts as experiences4 ,the earliest emotions arise1 of course1 with reference to the bodily functions which have the most direct vital significance1 as nutritive1 reproductive1 and motor activity4 ,very simple organisms seem to apprehend that a certain object is food before actually consuming1 to have sense of the experience1 and some emotive disturbance4 ,the pleasure of feeding and incorporating into the bodily tissue is sensational1 but any feeling previous or subsequent to this and with reference to this is emotional4 ,a very young child feeds1 and does not know food4 ,gradually it associates the visual sensation of whiteness of the milk with the immediate taste sensation and pleasure feeling4 ,but the sense of whiteness at first arises only with and after the actual taste and pleasure experiences2 it only gradually notices what gives it satisfaction or pain1 thus repeating the evolution of mind1 which is from feeling to sense1 and not vice vers4 ,only slowly does it attain power of appreciating whiteness previous to actual experience and as indicative of such1 that is1 a power of representation4 ,then emotions1 as expectancy1 and desire1 become possible1 and will can be stirred to active appropriation of food1 a fact of the greatest importance in the struggle for existence4 ,once attaining the sense of the representative value of its cognitions1 the child is enabled to consciously accomplish anticipatory actions4 ,an element which complicates emotion at a late stage is representation of representation in indefinite regressus4 ,in advanced human consciousness1 where mind is very reflective and introspective1 this phase is prominent4 ,the nuances of modern emotion are largely due to this mode of complication4 ,montaigne remarks that what he most fears is fear4 ,as fear implies representation1 fear of fear implies representation of representation1 which in its turn may be feared1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,spencer terms love of property a re-representative feeling2 but this psychosis does not imply representation of representation1 but merely representation of desirable realities4 ,desire of possession is an emotion1 but not emotion at emotion4 ,it is not an experience in view of representative experience1 but with reference to a direct experience1 that of ownership4 ,since we make representation the basis of emotion1 it would be natural to make classes of emotion representative1 re-representative1 etc42 but this is quite too subtle a distinction to be fruitful or practical4 ,as there are stages of representation1 so there are varying degrees of strength in the sense of representativeness4 ,a colour may be recalled to consciousness several times as neither more nor less red1 and precisely of the same quantity1 yet the sense of its representation quality may differ greatly at each time4 ,there are all degrees of intensity in this sense1 from dimmest feeling1 when the representation hovers on the confines of the presentation field1 to the point of perfect conviction of representative nature4 ,when consciousness is not exactly sure whether an object is directly seen or only recalled1 is a presentation or only a revival1 sense of representation is obviously at its lowest degree of intensity4 ,we have also to remark that in presentation and representation the object is not to be divorced from activity4 ,it is a natural analogy that cognition as subjective-objective is a picturing1 the picture and the object pictured seeming to be diverse but co-existent constituents of consciousness4 ,cognition seems to consist in both the thing as realized and the realizing act4 ,it is an attitude of mind which is a holding on to a something which it has in its grasp4 ,but there is no distinction in consciousness itself of the presented and the presenting1 the represented and the representing1 of product and process1 of content and activity2 there is only the presenting1 the activity1 which is itself the object4 ,sense of colour conveys1 indeed1 by the common vice of language that the colour exists for consciousness1 and is perceived by consciousness4 ,but1 subjectively and psychologically speaking1 the object is always no more than the objectifying1 the thing no more than the activity4 ,thus the analysis into content and activity is fundamentally false2 it assumes a world of objects which are merely at bottom object-sensings4 ,emotion is an arousing and energizing4 ,it is perturbation1 disturbance1 agitation1 excitement4 ,it is a throwing open the throttle and putting on a full head of steam4 ,the whole organism quivers with the sudden inflow of force and life1 is quickened to its highest pressure4 ,in all higher psychic life it is a driving force of the utmost importance4 ,however1 the trend of evolution is in the direction of economy1 and with the highest forms of consciousness emotion accomplishes its work even before arriving at agitation intensity4 ,feeling of the emotion type1 that is1 representative1 is always at first a rather intense perturbation4 ,fear1 for example1 is with the lower minds always fright2 with higher minds it often appears as dread4 ,i stand on the railway track when a train is approaching1 and a slight fear enables me to take the self-conservative action of stepping from the track2 but with my dog1 in similar circumstances1 ,i judge by his hasty jump and general expression that his fear is always more intense and more generally disturbing4 ,emotion being a force which quickly tends to exhaustion1 it is obvious that those animals will1 ceteris paribus1 have the advantage which react with the least expenditure4 ,thus the tendency of evolution is away from intense emotionalism4 ,in this emotion conforms to a general law4 ,the earliest occurrences of any given form of psychosis are with strenuousness and with exaltation and excitement of the organism4 ,we speak of fits of anger and gusts of passion1 but for early consciousness we might also justly speak of fits of seeing and hearing4 ,common vision of external objects is for lower consciousness as rarely attained1 and requires as much of force as beatific vision of seer and poet in the human mind4 ,the new psychosis is but momentary1 and implies high tension and great friction1 but progress is toward continuity and ease of working4 ,emotion is in human life a tolerably constant element1 like perception with whose representative side it is correlated1 and within certain ranges it rises because of the force of heredity with apparent spontaneity4 ,we remark that the social significance of emotion is embodied in the word treat1 as treat kindly1 badly1 etc4 ,our treatment of each other always means activities inspired by some emotion4 ,we must acknowledge that representation is very complex and difficult of analysis4 ,for our present purpose1 however1 representation is a revival with sense of revival and unreality1 and yet indicative of reality experienceable in pleasure-pain terms1 and thus the occasion of emotion as stimulus of self-conservative action4 ,the young child perceives no danger2 its pleasures and pains are not related to things1 and have not led to the evolution of a world of objects4 ,pain and pleasure lead it slowly to correlate its senses1 so that the burnt child learns to dread the fire2 the emotion of fear is aroused with cognition of the experienceable4 ,objectively1 we must divide psychoses into those which directly result from actual engagement of the organism with objects1 or the reverberations therefrom2 subjectively1 into simple self-contained states1 and into reflex states which view experience1 and so being representations involving emotion4 ,just how from re-experience sense of re-experience and of its value for experience--sense of pre-experience--arises1 is something we have not particularly inquired into1 but it is something that appears a mysterious and difficult problem4 ,that the perception of object should ever carry with it sense of possibility or certainty of further experience1 painful or pleasurable1 is1 when candidly considered1 a remarkable and singular operation4 ,the problems of origin of consciousness of self1 of consciousness of consciousness1 and of sense of reality seem unsolved1 but ,i believe that a thorough study of representation would throw much light on these points2 but this is not the place to pursue this investigation4 ,when we take up representation--emotion life in detail1 we may be able to make suggestions on some moot points4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,fear ,,as ,,primitive ,,emotion,b ,it may be considered as plausible that if the first feeling was pain1 the first emotion was also of the pain character4 ,the first representation of an object as painful induced that reaction of mind which we term an emotion1 and the painful emotion we call fear4 ,that the first emotion to appear was fear1 as fright1 seems likely when we consider that the general alertness and defensiveness imperatively required in the struggle for existence is thereby most immediately and simply attained4 ,the acquirement of the power to become frightened is plainly a most important requisite for self-preservation1 and thus is indicated as a very early factor in conscious life4 ,an animal being devoured by another may merely suffer pain without any perception of the object as pain-giving and to give pain2 but if it attains this perception1 there may be added to the stimulus of simple pain that of fright4 ,the direct actual pain may be but small1 and so inducing but feeble reaction1 as when some less sensitive portion is being injured2 but if there occurs a vivid representation of potential pain1 fright happens and stimulates most strenuous endeavours1 and so rids the animal both of the immediately and the prospectively painful4 ,thus emotion acts as a complement to simple feeling1 and also secures practically anticipatory reaction4 ,animals which must receive actual injury before experiencing pain are clearly inferior to those which experience emotion-pain before the injury is actually received4 ,other things being equal1 the most easily frightened have1 in the midst of many destructive agents1 the best chance of survival and of perpetuating their kind4 ----- ,footnote ,b3 ,originally appeared in part in ,philosophical ,review1 i4 pp4 #bda-bef4 ----- ,it is unnecessary to dwell at length on child life and savage life as illustrating the primitive quality and function of fear4 ,the earliest experiences of the child with things are lessons of fear4 ,the burnt child dreads the fire1 and thus is enabled to preserve himself from threatened injury4 ,fear is a primary and most important motive to action in a very wide range of the lower mental life4 ,those who have observed animals and man in a state of nature are always greatly impressed with the constant and large part which this emotion plays in their consciousness4 ,with the timid and weaker species1 like the rabbit and squirrel1 it is likely that a majority of their cognitions prompt to fear or are prompted by fear1 and with some persecuted races of savages the same may be said4 ,the necessity and value of anticipatory reaction being acknowledged in the struggle of existence1 we plainly see a primitive motive thereto in fear1 and the earliest emotional life which we can clearly interpret likewise seems to be fear4 ,it is sufficiently easy to see the general function of fear and its primitive character1 but we find it very hard to make a satisfactory analysis1 and to show the exact steps of its evolution4 ,it is obvious1 however1 in the first place1 that fear1 like other emotions1 is purely indirect and secondary experience2 it pre-supposes previous painful experience of the feared object4 ,pain experienced in connection with cognition of object is the basis of all fear4 ,animals that have not felt pain from man do not fear him4 ,but fear while thus based on previous direct experience is always hindered by simultaneous direct experience1 as1 for example1 sensation4 ,thus when we1 whip in hand1 say to a child crying from fear1 8,i will give you something to cry for10 we imply the law that direct pain and sensation tend to supplant indirect feeling as emotion4 ,this common expression emphasizes the essential representativeness of emotion1 its imaginary nature1 as also the supplanting power of direct real experience4 ,the sight of the whip inspires fear in the child who has been whipped1 but this fear is in the course of a punishment wholly eliminated by the direct pain endured4 ,the direct experience is thus the basis of every fear1 but only as it is cognized1 and not felt4 ,the great difficulty in analysing fear is in clearly apprehending the mode in which previous experience is utilized4 ,if we could study in ourselves the genesis of a simple emotion1 we should doubtless be enabled to see the steps by which experience reacts upon itself so as to give a reflex form like the emotion of fear1 but this is hardly possible4 ,however1 cognition is evolved at the instance of pain1 and all objects are viewed1 not for themselves1 but in their feeling significance4 ,cognition is embedded in feeling1 and at first is a mere tone of feeling4 ,things are not at first known for themselves but solely as sources of present pleasure and pain4 ,things are perceived in and through the feeling which has stimulated the perception4 ,the immediate feeling value of the object is given by the very origin and process of cognition4 ,when an animal is pained by contact with a sharp rock1 and this pain stimulates cognition of the rock1 this is solely on the pain account4 ,repeated experiences enable the percept to arise at stimulus of less and less pain1 and so the proper reaction is accomplished more and more economically4 ,we may say that the order of evolution is this3 first1 a pain2 second1 a cognition of pain-giver--8it hurts0--third1 emotion about pain-giver1 as fear thereof--8,i am afraid of it40 ,primitive and normal cognition always implies emotion as impelling self-preservative action4 ,knowledge which does not spring into emotion and action is abortive4 ,at first the known is always startling4 ,the original pain-impelled cognition brings in the painful emotion1 primitive fear4 ,and as knowledge has brought in fear1 so fear reacts on knowledge1 and fearfulness incites to knowing even when the pain from object ceases4 ,thus before any actual experience of an object it may be known and felt about4 ,thus that habit of objectivity is formed1 of alertness1 of a fearful sensing and perceiving1 which is noticeable in many animals4 ,a cognitive-emotive1 emotive-cognitive life is formed and developed4 ,it is a tremendous stride onward to be able through fearful cognition to wholly pre-perceive and anticipate the injurious1 instead of having to suffer it in part before being enabled to get away4 ,now primitive fear and all primitive emotion plainly utilizes the past experience as interpreting the future2 emotion is about a known potency4 ,yet it is often stated that emotion is but a summation of revivals of past experience4 ,having often been burnt by fires that ,i have coincidently been looking at1 it sometimes happens that ,i see a fire which has not yet harmed me1 but still the mere sight affects me with what ,i call the emotion of fear1 which1 in closest analysis1 means merely the revival of the burning pains associated with this seeing in the past4 8,i am afraid0 equals 8,i re-experience the pains of burning0 by suggestion4 ,pains faintly re-occurring constitute the painful fear4 ,there is in this mass of re-awakenings no real cognition of experience and no feeling about it as such1 no psychosis at the experienceable4 ,and it is certainly true that when a fixed sequence of experiences tend to recur together1 there will follow upon the cognition1 revival waves of pain before any actual increase of pain is really inflicted in the given case4 ,these waves stand for1 and are the echoes of1 the former real pain sequences of cognition4 ,thus the perception of a great mass of ice will often cause a shivery feeling1 a painful sensation is revived as correlated with former cognition experiences4 ,even the image or representation1 the purely and consciously ideal cognition1 may bring in painful feeling1 as when ,i say1 8,it makes me shiver to think of it40 ,here the painful sensation-bringing idea is cognized as such1 but the representation here is the occasion of a direct painful sensation1 and evidently does not imply fear or other emotion4 ,while not arising from actual injuries1 revivals strengthen both cognition and volition4 ,they have recurred before further hurtful experiences with the fire which originally incited them4 ,these revival pains of previous sequences to the cognition1 which are carried along with the present cognition1 are real enough in themselves1 yet they are objectively anticipatory of actual injury4 ,the whole order of previous experience is by the nature of mind and nervous system re-enacted before the actual injuries are inflicted4 ,it is always a race between mind and nature1 but it is a prime function of mind to anticipate practically the movements of nature4 ,mind by its revival forms accomplishes this1 but if it lags in its work the real injuries are mercilessly inflicted by slow but sure nature4 ,when the sequence of revival is quicker than the objective sequence1 the reactions anticipate objective order1 and thus a manifest economy is achieved4 ,but pain revivals of this kind are not fear1 nor is there a real pre-perception4 ,since the revival forms are1 to the observer's point of view1 incentive to anticipatory reaction1 psychologists must often1 especially with low organisms1 mistake them for fear2 the animal is often1 doubtless1 merely suffering revival pains when it appears to be fearing pain4 ,thus we may suspect that organisms which seem to fear shadows or real objects are often merely suffering revival pains brought up in conjunction with the cognition1 and not really fearing as result of perceiving feeling quality inherent in the object4 ,manifestation of pain must often be mistaken for manifestations of emotion1 and there is as yet no accurate objective determination for fear or other emotions4 ,revival pains are not representations of pains as in some way coming from object4 ,emotion requires representation1 and cannot occur in any presentation or re-presentation chain4 ,true pre-perception is not merely perceiving the thing before its effects in feeling are experienced1 but it is a representing the feeling quality of the object before1 in any given case1 this quality is directly experienced4 ,this obviously rests on past experience1 but the connecting of object with pleasure-pain experience is at all times1 as before intimated1 equally a problem4 ,emotion and representation are built not of revivals1 but upon them perceived as such4 ,at some critical moment1 in some rather early period in mental development1 a consciousness which was pain plus sense of object1 realized1 under the pressure of struggle for existence1 the feeling quality of the object1 and there arose with the knowledge of object as pain-giver the painful emotion4 ,and as soon as object is not merely cognized1 but cognized as pain-giver1 it may be feared4 ,the moment that object was known as a pain agent1 then fear of the object came1 and thus true anticipatory action arose4 ,we are said1 indeed1 to fear objects1 to fear men1 animals1 etc41 but1 in truth1 the fear is never of the object as such1 but only in view of its pain agency4 ,the cognizing the experienced and experienceable as such seems then a peculiar and distinct process in fear and in all emotion1 a genus apart which cannot be constituted by interaction of simple elements4 ,the growth of mind is largely in multiplying and enlarging the signs of experience4 ,the connecting once achieved of object with pain1 it becomes increasingly easy to cognize the feeling value of objects1 and before full and extreme pain experience therefrom to pre-react through emotion4 ,thus emotion saves both direct pain and injury4 ,as it becomes a permanent tendency1 and an impulse of consciousness to proceed from all pure feelings to cognition of object1 so also to cognition of object in its feeling quality1 and thus by inherent tendency it ultimately comes about that there is attaching of pain to various objects cognized1 even when there is no immediate experience of pain to be connected therewith4 ,finally the precedent inciting pains to cognition become such minor factors1 and knowledge arises with such apparent spontaneity1 that emotion as involving pain significance becomes dominant rather than the immediate pain4 ,an order of consciousness becomes established in which the notable event is emotional cognition of experience values as bringing in permanent emotion rather than an order of pleasure-pain inciting cognition with evanescent emotion4 ,but at the first it is evident that fear was but a slight event in a consciousness which was mainly absorbed in immediate pain experience and some sense of object4 ,it is so habitual and instinctive for us to perceive all things as having feeling value1 that it is most difficult to appreciate the standpoint of a consciousness which is just attaining emotion life4 ,the preliminary elements to simple primitive fear1 as expressed by any such phrase as1 8it hurts10 are at least four3 pain1 cognition of object1 cognition of the pain1 cognition of the pain agency of object4 ,these operations1 as being at first successive1 do not necessarily imply1 however1 sense of time4 ,the consciousness of a pain is certainly1 at first1 consciousness of pain really past1 yet not consciousness of it as past4 ,the pain stands as immediately antecedent act to the consciousness which is cognition of it1 but sense of experience is not thereby sense of experience in time4 ,the sense of time-relations of experiences is wholly subsequent to the simple sense of experience4 ,all experience is1 of course1 in time1 but far from being of time4 ,an organism1 which has suffered knowingly from an object1 and so feared1 attains at length the power of fearing antecedent to any real injury4 ,this seems to be brought about somewhat in the following manner3 ,if ,i in any way1 as by a pin pricking1 rouse a sleeping animal to a cognition of an object which has often injured it1 and which it has often feared1 immediately there would re-occur the original concomitants of the cognition in the previous cases2 there would be pain1 cognition of pain1 ascription to object1 and fear1 all merely revivals1 and happening most probably before any actual injury1 etc41 received in the present case4 ,now these revivals1 as before insisted1 do not and cannot in themselves alone form a new fear4 ,this is only constituted when the revival pains are known as such1 when they are not merely presented in consciousness1 but represented as belonging to past experience of thing1 and so to be experienced4 ,the thing is thereby truly interpreted for its feeling value4 ,not merely pain1 as being experienced1 is connected with thing1 but as having been experienced1 and to be experienced4 ,thus only arises that sense of the experienceable1 that real apprehension for the future1 which is so valuable an acquisition in the struggle for existence4 ,feeling quality comes thus to be assigned as real and permanent property of things1 and every cognition comes to imply representation of feeling value1 and so to be a basis for emotion4 ,but all sense of experienceability is founded on sense of experience2 the sense of things as possibilities of sensation and feeling is based on actual relatings of feelings to objects in simple direct experiences4 ,fear is in itself pre-eminently a painful state1 and we have to inquire as to the origin and nature of this pain4 ,the statement of the problem in general form is1 how does that which does not yet please or pain1 but is only cognized as about to do so1 give immediate pleasure or pain8 ,we have already expressed the opinion that fear is based on more than mere pain revivals2 there must be true representation1 the revival must be appreciated as representation of past experience1 and indicative of future4 ,the painful agitation consequent on prospect of pain seems1 indeed1 to include as pain element more than revival pain1 but it is only seeming4 ,where does the pain come from which a person feels at the mere prospect of pain unless from the past8 ,the pain is1 of course1 not the identical pain feared4 ,again1 one cannot see how a cognition in itself1 entirely empty of feeling1 can cause a pain1 except as acting as a link in a chain of association whereby conjoined past pains are revived4 ,so far as fear is pain1 it is1 we may be told1 revival1 for representation of pain is not pain1 and cannot cause pain4 ,the pain which arises from cognition of pain to be experienced appears in a strict analysis to be wholly re-occurrence stimulated thereby1 and not any new and peculiar mode of pain at pain4 ,that this is the case is apparent from the fact that we can only have the pain of fear so far as we have experienced pain4 ,poignant pains experienced are the basis of poignant pain in fear4 ,the knowledge that you are soon to re-experience an intense pain leads to an intense dread1 in which the intense pain is revived from former experience4 ,there are1 to be sure1 in the phenomena of fear in highly developed consciousness1 complex pains which cannot be ascribed to revivals1 reflexes upon consciousness of the great tension and agitation thereof1 pain of loss of self-possession and self-power1 and other modes which proceed from consciousness of consciousness1 but this does not bear upon the question how mere cognition of pain1 as to be experienced1 can in itself give pain2 how there arises from mere apprehension a pain which is more than and distinct from the revival pains4 ,but1 however we may be puzzled to see how mere cognition of experienceable pain develops a peculiar pain which is the essence of fear1 yet we must acknowledge its production to be a fact4 ,we may say1 indeed1 that the bare thought of pain even when conveyed by the printed word--the abstract sign of an arbitrary vocal name--is not without a tinge of a peculiar fear-pain which does not wholly consist of revivals4 ,when preparing to go out into the storm on a very cold day ,i have pain in anticipation of the pain ,i am to receive from the bitterly cold wind4 ,now ,i may have preliminary shiverings1 and there may be recurrent painful sensations as ,i look intently at the raging elements1 pains which return from actual experiences which ,i have before undergone and at the time knowingly connected with wind and snow4 ,but all these revivals1 while the basis of my fear1 do not give the distinct pain quality of the fear4 ,the pain which ,i do experience when ,i actually step into the biting blast ,i know at once to be entirely distinct in quality from that which ,i before felt at the anticipation1 the real pain1 of fear4 ,again1 when ,i say1 8,i was deeply pained to hear of it10 and when ,i say1 8,the noise pained me greatly10 ,i indicate that difference between purely mental distress and sensuous pain1 between pain at representation and pain referred to presentation1 which is to be emphasized in all our study of emotion4 ,with a man in the hands of hostile ,indians the tortures of fear are quite distinct in quality from the tortures actually endured4 ,the agony of fear is a genus apart from the agony of physical pain4 ,again1 if the pain in fear were derived from revivals1 then the nature of the pain in different states of fear would be as different as the sensations feared4 ,but as a matter of fact the pain in fear of cold1 fear of heat1 of famine1 of punishment1 etc41 is substantially of the same quality4 ,i may fear one more than another1 but the real mental agitation and pain which constitute the fear are in all cases essentially the same4 ,if the pain in fear were sensation revivals1 then fear of cold and fear of heat would be quite diverse and contrary in quality of pain value1 but we all know that the dread of a cold day and of a hot day are in themselves essentially the same in nature4 ,as far as the states are pure fear and have a pain quality1 the conscious activity in both is entirely similar4 ,further1 if the pain in fear were wholly of revival nature1 not only should we expect fear of different sensations to be correspondingly distinct1 but we should also expect the pain in fear to never exceed in amount and intensity the pain feared as indicated by measure of past experience4 ,but we know that our fears are often much more painful than pain feared and than our experience of past pain4 ,the pang of fear1 of sudden fright1 is often more acute and intense than any direct pain we have ever experienced4 ,the terrible convulsions of fear which we see in the insane give evidence of pain which could not have been reflection from direct experience4 ,that excessive and sudden fear which turns men's hair gray in a few hours and transforms their whole physical system is plainly not any revival from the individual's past experience4 ,as revealed by its effects it is often1 perhaps1 greater than the whole amount of pain they have ever suffered4 ,where1 in the direct-experience form1 pain is greater in the fear than the real pain suffered1 we express the fact by the common phrase1 8more scared than hurt40 ,in all such cases the pain in fear is not the revival of past experiences of the object feared4 ,fear is1 in the main1 the peculiar pain coming from consciousness of experienceable pain1 but in general in all complex consciousness it is marked by dissolution and weakening of mental force4 ,there is a shrinking of will1 and a clouding of cognition1 a general unsettling of all mental elements1 a commotion or agitation which destroys the organic consensus of consciousness4 ,but any excessive functioning of some element in consciousness1 of emotion life1 as fear1 or of any other form1 is unbalancing and detracts from normal activity of the whole4 ,fear1 however1 in its normal measure and form arose and was developed as a desirable stimulant2 where it becomes paralyzing in its force1 it is pathological in quality4 ,also where fear is pathologically intense it tends to disappear in sensation feared4 ,cognition becomes so weakened that sense of representativeness is lost1 the thing feared is no longer brought before the mind in its potential quality1 but is immediately apprehended as present in its influence--though really objectively absent--hallucination is produced1 and fear naturally reverts to its earliest and direct form in immediate experience4 ,as cognition is still further weakened the sense of object as giving pain is lost and fear in any form entirely disappears4 ,the pain is not felt which before was feared to be felt4 ,fear thus in the general order of its disappearance repeats the order of its appearance and growth4 ,fear always includes some sense of object4 ,the apprehension of something evil to happen is the basis of all fear1 but the thing1 or1 subjectively speaking1 the objectifying1 may be extremely vague4 ,we may fear that some harm is to befall us1 but what and how1 we know not4 ,we must suppose that in early stages this bare objectifying of approaching pain was a regular incipient form1 that an indefinite fear preceded every case of defined fear4 ,we1 as a rule1 attain a full objectifying with such ease and rapidity that this form does not often appear4 ,a complete fear movement1 then with reference to cognition includes four stages3 first1 a very general sense of object as about to give pain2 second1 an increasing definition of object up to the maximum of clearness1 thus marking the highest efficiency of the fear function2 third1 a decreasing definition of object till1 fourth1 a purely indefinite objectifying is again reached4 ,every fear1 if it attains a normal life1 will rise1 culminate1 and decline in this way4 ,even in man1 where the full development of single simple psychoses rarely proceed undisturbed1 there is yet observed a general tendency toward these stages4 ,i awaken in the night at a sudden noise with slight and vague fear2 suspicious sounds increase my fear and ,i listen and look more intently till ,i see clearly and quite fully crouching near the bed a dark body which ,i make out to be an armed burglar2 as he approaches with his pointed weapon fear will most likely become so intense that ,i see less and less clearly1 and a shot might terrify me into vague but very intense fear4 ,if the object is discerned to be not a burglar but a chair1 the fear quickly lapses4 ,at a certain point of maximum clearness either a weakening or an intensifying of fear weakens cognition4 ,too much or too little pain is equally injurious to the knowing activity4 ,low psychisms examine and clearly define only that from which they have something to fear or hope4 ,the qualitative relation of the pain of fear to the pain feared varies greatly with the evolution of mind4 ,fear-pain could not have originated as a substitutionary function for the real pain except by being at the first somewhat less in quality than the pain to be endured1 otherwise there would be no economy in the function4 ,the progress of this function is to secure at less and less expense of fear-pain the suitable reaction4 ,the function of fear being to escape a greater direct pain by a less indirect one1 the progress of the function is in diminishing the amount of fear-pain for required effectiveness4 ,the small original gain in the ratio is increased by small increments till in the highest minds proportion of fear-pain to pain feared might be represented by #a4 ,the pain in the usual fear which commonly induces me to step from the track before an approaching train1 or which enables me after reading some advice on the subject to take precautions against the cholera1 is evidently in infinitesimal relation to the pain feared4 ,when fear is unsuccessful1 as in anticipating a visit to the dentist1 we1 of course1 suffer a double pain1 both the fear-pain and the pain feared4 ,often we must observe that the pain of fear is equal to or greater than the experience feared1 and we have to ask how this disadvantageous excess could have been evolved4 ,often the pain of anticipation turns out to be far greater than the pain anticipated4 ,however1 a little reflection assures us that the excess of fear in many cases is only in appearance4 ,we do not fear too much upon the judgment we have formed as to the coming pain1 but we have by error of judgment assigned too much value to the pain4 ,when a person being initiated into a secret society trembles with fear at being told to jump from a precipice1 when he really is to jump but a few feet downward1 his fear was perfectly just according to his judgment4 ,if his belief is perfectly assured1 the mortal fear will make him offer the most strenuous resistance and most likely secure his release from the ordeal4 ,in all such cases the feeling is right enough1 but the estimate of future experience is inaccurate4 ,when an animal is terrified at its own shadow the fear is justly proportioned to the estimate of danger1 which1 however1 happens to be erroneous4 ,in the evolution of mind in the struggle for existence1 more and more accurate calculations of possible injury are attained1 and fear becomes more and more rational4 ,educated men fear only what is worthy of fear2 they fear many things that lower minds do not1 and do not fear many things they do4 ,the true excess of fear is where we fear against judgment1 as when1 knowing the safety of travel by rail1 ,i am yet constantly in fear while aboard a railway train4 ,when ,i still continue to fear1 though ,i know the fear to be groundless1 this is a true hypertrophy of fear4 ,we constantly observe those who are fearful and timid against their own reason4 ,when dangers known are compared with dangers obscure or unknown--and perceived to be unknowable--the fear of the unknown often prevails against the fear of the known1 and we prefer with ,hamlet to fear the ills we have than fly to others we know not of4 ,i must in conclusion express my conviction that while the physiological and objective study of fear and other emotions is of very considerable value1 yet it is only introspective analysis which can reveal the true nature and genesis of fear and all emotion4 ,what fear is and what is the process of its development can only be determined by the direct study of consciousness as a life factor in the struggle for existence4 ,this ,i attempt in the present chapter1 with the main result that fear1 as indeed every emotion1 does not consist of pain or cognition-revivals in any form1 but is a feeling reaction from the representation of the feeling potency of the object4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,differentiation ,,of ,,fear ,fear1 according to the analysis we have made1 includes representation of object in its feeling value1 predominant tone of mental pain1 and will recoil4 ,fear in its primitive form1 as we have seen1 was a sudden and transitory phenomenon in consciousness1 a simple thrill of feeling awaking will to spasmodic violent effort in the struggle for existence4 ,all states of fear in early psychical history were practically alike in quantity1 quality and intensity4 ,every fear is like every other fear in its pain tone and will effort4 ,every object and event considered as painful is equally feared2 there is no distinction of more or less fear1 nor any qualitative differentiation4 ,very young children manifest equal fear disturbance and seemingly identical in nature on all fearful occasions4 ,prospect of vaccination1 of a scratch1 of the pulling of a tooth1 of a whipping1 of an amputation1 produce equally paroxysms of fear1 waves of painful emotion1 which discharge themselves in muscular contortions4 ,the lowest animals likewise appear in all cases frightened to the same degree and in the same way4 ,it must be said1 however1 that this period of simple undifferentiated fear is undoubtedly very brief1 and embraces in the individual and the race but a comparatively small number of phenomena2 but a careful study1 even by the method of approximation will1 ,i believe1 show it to be a definite initial phase4 ,while this primitive undifferentiated fear1 which acts with the same force and quality in all instances1 confers upon the organism which possesses it a great superiority over those which do not possess it1 in the race for life1 and thus marks a great advance in psychical progress1 yet it is manifestly uneconomical in its action in that there should be precisely the same amount and quality of reaction in all cases4 ,so when a considerable number of organisms had attained the power to fear1 competition would inevitably lead to some differentiation1 and this doubtless first in the direction of greater economy4 ,the animal which could fear much or little1 according to the degree of actual injury threatened1 would have a great advantage in the struggle for existence over his fellows4 ,the amount of pain in prospect is definitely gauged1 and the fear pain becomes proportioned thereto1 and so the will effort and muscular exertions4 ,fear in its earliest form sets the whole motor apparatus going at the highest rate1 the whole organism is at the highest pitch of activity1 and life and death struggle happens at every apprehension of pain1 no matter how small the reality4 ,later1 through discrimination1 animals become capable of either a slight scare or a great fear1 according to circumstances4 ,the fear force is gradually rationalized and made less spasmodic and so more adaptive4 ,the fear pain becomes proportioned to the real amount of pain and so to injury actually imminent4 ,this mode of evolution by decrease rather than increase of intensity may seem peculiar4 ,fear1 however1 certainly originates as a simple outburst of considerable strength relative to the individual organism1 and the first step in fear growth is a development in the representation-of-object element in fear which tends to reduce the essence of fear as pain-emotion4 ,spasmodic primitive fear in becoming intelligent loses intensity in the essential feeling aspect4 ,other things being equal1 the intensity of fear is inversely as the definition of its object4 ,the dimly and uncertainly known is always thereby more fearful than the well known and familiar4 ,however1 as regards primitive psychism1 we must remark that all phenomena are very large in relative quantity to individual capacity1 but very small in absolute psychological quantity4 ,a fear which convulses a very small mind would make but a very small disturbance in a mind of very great capacity4 ,an amount of fear which would absorb completely one consciousness capacity1 would require comparatively little force in a mind of greater calibre4 ,the lowest minds are possessed by their fears1 higher minds possess them1 do not 8lose their heads10 i4e41 both cognition and will co-exist as stable controlling elements4 ,primitive consciousness is constantly at saturation point1 phenomena occur only in linear consecutive order1 and every phenomenon is a feeling-willing which absorbs the low conscious capacity4 ,it may then1 perhaps1 be regarded that the evolution of fear is not through absolute decrease in intensity1 but an increase of conscious capacity1 whereby greater definition of object becomes possible and coincident with fear-pain of original quantity4 ,the complete determination of this question must then await a fuller analysis1 but the relation to individual capacity in the evolution of fear remains apparent4 ,whatever may be the absolute quantity and intensity of the fear phenomenon1 its relative quantity and intensity changes very greatly4 ,the number of adaptive degrees of fear which are ultimately evolved and of which any very high mind is susceptible1 is quite beyond our present means of psychological analysis4 ,we have no phobometer to register all the gradations1 other than the popular usage of language1 but between 8,i was scared just the least bit10 and 8,i was scared stiff10 or 8scared to death10 there is certainly a vast number of intermediaries4 ,terror is an intensive term denoting strong fear1 and a terrible fright is a redundancy for extreme fear4 ,by the use of adjectives and various qualifying phases we roughly denote a number of fear degrees1 but scientific precision is wholly lacking4 ,such expressions as 8,i have very little fear of him10 8,i fear him a little10 8,i fear him greatly10 8,i fear him very much10 convey a meaning indeed1 but no exact measurement is indicated4 ,terror is often used as a term not merely for fear in general1 but for fear which paralyzes by its force4 ,the individual is often 8rooted to the spot0 by terror1 he loses all power of motion and becomes as an inert mass4 ,with animals even of the lower grades this is doubtless often a pathological manifestation4 ,we find that predatory animals are often furnished with apparatus to inspire benumbing fear in their victims4 ,various means1 as inflation of size1 strident noises1 etc41 are employed with great effect4 ,on the other hand1 we find that predacious animals seek to reduce the stimulus of fear in their victims by quieting and alluring methods4 ,both hypertrophy and atrophy of fear are disadvantageous1 and we should see then in paralyzing terror an instance of over-development of useful function which produces the direct opposite of the normal fear4 ,fear1 the great means of salvation to all weaker organisms1 is also in its highest intensities taken advantage of by enemies4 ,hence the due graduation and restraint of fear becomes one of the most important lines of mental evolution for the organism preyed upon1 but the over stimulation or undue weakening of the fear function in its prey becomes a most important object and advantage for the predacious animal4 ,this evolution is often by the individual disadvantageous variation when this is advantage to some other organism2 and1 as living beings are soon divided into the two classes1 those who flee and those who pursue1 the destroying and preserving of the chief psychological defence becomes a leading form of psychic growth of a pathologic character4 ,fear in its origin was certainly a stimulant to action and not sedative4 ,however1 so far as fear effects an unconscious mimicry of death it often reaches thereby negatively to conservative action1 and paralyzing fear is thus explained by the general law of advantage in the struggle for existence4 ,we can then trace a double evolution of fear1 on the one hand as leading to action1 on the other to inaction1 but the former will1 ,i think1 be found to be the primitive form4 ,the primary and main function of fear in all life is in a duly modulated energizing in view of approaching injury1 and the depressing mode is secondary and exceptional4 ,again1 we must remark upon the sense of personal weakness1 or1 objectively stated1 the sense of overwhelming power1 as entering into fear4 ,i cannot agree with ,mr4 ,mercier that this is a mark of all fear4 ,in its origin and early gradations fear1 as we have noticed it in the immediately preceding paragraphs1 requires no other cognition than that of pain to come4 ,self-measurement of power in relation to that of pain giving object is certainly too complex to be primitive1 nor do the simplest forms of fear as we observe them in ourselves and judge of them in lower organisms pre-suppose any such process4 ,primitively every perception of painful event fills consciousness with the impetuous self-conserving fear revulsion4 ,there is neither time nor capacity for estimating one's own strength or weakness in relation to opposing power4 ,by the very low intelligence only the immediately imminent is apprehended1 and action is always immediate1 short1 and decisive4 ,in fact1 it is now probable that originally painful events are really actualized by the mind1 and the fear is thus at the event as actual1 rather than as ideal1 as represented as to be4 ,certain it is that mind1 in its hurry to get ahead of natural harmful agencies in their action1 must in its earliest pre-apprehensions have no room or time for dynamic interpretations4 ,of course the whole value of sense of one's own superior power is in fear1 thereby securing the contingency of the painful event1 but sense of contingency upon one's own efforts no doubt first occurs at a considerably advanced stage1 much beyond that of simple fear4 ,primitively mind regards events as being1 or about to be1 with no sense either of their certainty or uncertainty4 ,early mind cannot appreciate certainty1 for it knows not uncertainty1 it has not yet accomplished the prevision to which certainty and uncertainty may attach2 it cannot say1 8,i fear this will happen10 or 8,i fear that will not happen10 but only 8,i fear or do not fear the thing happening1 the event coming40 ,the world of the earliest psychical life is simply factual1 and the fears are simple and wholly undifferentiated4 ,fear certainly antedates the perception of contingency and of one's own agency in producing contingency4 ,even in the ordinary fears in human consciousness sense of personal power in relation to pain-giver is actually subsequent to the fear phenomenon and reacts upon it1 but is not constitutive of it in its first impulse4 ,fear is first graduated by the increasing discrimination as to the amount of pain and injury to be inflicted1 and later it is graduated by the sense of the painful event as more or less contingent1 either in the natural course of things1 or as determined by the individual's strength in warding off impending evil4 ,taking chances and risks is learned1 and becomes often very advantageous4 ,fear is also greatly diminished and modified by acquiring a sense of one's individual power in overcoming or resisting pain given4 ,the rabbit1 often chased by a clumsy dog1 evidently fears him less and less4 ,man1 both by his increasing knowledge of natural contingencies and by his increasing power over elemental and animal pain-giving forces1 fears less and less4 ,the inevitable evil1 sure to come1 and sure to overcome1 is that which strikes intensest fear1 as we often see in criminals led to execution4 ,the discrimination between the animate and the inanimate also differentiates fear4 ,when this distinction is fully achieved1 the attitude of mind toward each in fear is plainly distinct4 ,the thing1 perceived as having psychic powers1 and capable of purposive evil and self-directive of its movements1 awakens thereby a complex of feelings which rapidly develops beyond our present powers of analysis to follow them4 ,for the present sketch of the early natural history of fear it is sufficient merely to remark this differentiation as one of prime value in the struggle for existence4 ,however1 as we have before suggested 7p4 #ajf71 the nature of fear1 purely in itself considered1 does not depend on the nature of the object feared2 thus fear of cold and fear of heat are perfectly alike as psychic facts1 though having regard to very diverse physical facts4 ,animistic mind1 indeed1 reacts to all objects differently from naturalistic mind1 yet in its essential quality fear is identical in both4 ,in fear of a storm1 both as a purely physical manifestation and as the expression of the psychical nature of a deity1 the fear act is by itself quite the same2 the fear pain and the willing are quite the same1 but on the more external1 the representation side1 they do greatly differ1 the complication being greater in the latter instance1 and introducing a complex of feelings4 ,fear in the narrowest sense does not reach to the object to consider its nature1 to regard its objective quality1 for this is the base of very different feelings2 but fear proper is engrossed in object purely for its immediate pain significance2 it is given up to viewing personal pain infliction4 ,i am inclined to think1 then1 that we shall find that mind is primarily neither animistic nor naturalistic4 ,the only interpretation of object which is first made is as pain or pleasure given1 and a personalizing and impersonalizing stage is decidedly later4 ,we must remember that mind at first goes only so far as it is positively obliged to by the struggle for existence2 and hence1 though it is quite impossible for us to fully realize such a simple state1 yet originally objects were discriminated merely as pleasure and pain sources4 ,object at first was of the more vague sort1 merely an indefinite locus for pleasure-pain2 something painful or pleasurable is the discrimination1 but attribution of sentiency or insentiency is not yet reached1 for no interpretation of the sort is yet imperatively demanded4 ,it is so ingrained in us to perceive beings as either living or non-living1 that it is quite impossible to thoroughly conceive a state so primitive as to be unable to rise to this attribution or distinction4 ,however1 like the bare statement of a fourth dimension in space1 the statement that pre-animistic mind exists or has existed1 a way of looking at objects entirely without reference to their personal or impersonal quality--this is intelligible1 and hypothetically required by a complete theory of the evolution of mind4 ,in a dolce far niente of perfect sensuousness1 even the adult man sometimes approximates this stage1 and the actions of very young infants are best interpreted as expressions of a similar state4 ,things for them seem entirely uninterpreted and unperceived1 except as imparters of crass sensual pains and pleasures1 as mere pleasure-pain potencies4 ,a very important differentiation of fear is brought about by the extension of the time sense4 ,fear begins with a minimum of time sense2 only the immediately impending1 the absolutely imminent danger1 suffices to awaken fear4 ,but in the struggle for existence the advantage of being influenced for action by the more and more remote1 in time1 determines a rapid extension in time to feared events4 ,with man actions are thus influenced by fears1 which reach even beyond the present life4 ,the cautious and prudent are those whose fears are far-sighted1 and who1 conducting themselves accordingly1 maintain supremacy over the short-sighted and improvident4 ,carpe diem is1 from the point of view of evolutionary psychology1 the cry of the retrogressive fool4 ,the time differentiation of fear is recognised in popular language in the term--dread4 ,i am frightened in the night by a sudden noise2 ,i am alarmed for the safety of a child awaking near a precipice2 but ,i dread next week's task4 ,of course dread1 like other popular psychological terms1 is plastic1 and often denotes fear in general1 and is often used intensively1 or to denote vague fear1 still it is the most correct and distinctive term for fear of a more or less remote event4 ,it would be most interesting to investigate the relation of distance in time of feared event to intensity of the fear1 but we have as yet no standards for estimating in mathematical ratios either time or intensity psychologically considered4 ,it is not1 of course1 physical determination of time as minutes1 hours1 etc41 with which we are concerned1 but only with variations in sense of nearness or remoteness of event4 ,our sense of time is most variable1 and fluctuates from many causes1 so that hours sometimes seem minutes1 and minutes at other times seem hours4 ,however1 there is1 doubtless1 other things being equal1 some fixed relation between our sense of the nearness and remoteness of a fearful event and the intensity of the fear1 but we may well doubt whether it can ever be reduced to any law of inverse squares like that of physical intensities4 ,a criminal sentenced to die at the expiration of thirty days certainly has a marked increase in fear as time approaches1 or rather1 as he has sense of the time approaching1 but a quantitative analysis is beyond our present powers4 ,a most important but tolerably late differentiation is the altruistic form of fear--fear1 not of others1 but for others4 ,psychic life is at first wholly self-centred1 there is no perception of things or interest in them otherwise than as bearing on the experience of the self4 ,other selves are wholly unrecognised1 and pain-giving effects to them are then unperceivable4 ,in very young infants we see a close approximation to primitive selfish life4 ,the exact point in the history of life when altruism is developed by the struggle of existence is not at present determinable1 but we may well believe that it arose with the evolution of the sexes in separate individuals4 ,fear for mate and offspring is obviously an essential advantage in the progress and perpetuation of the kind4 ,pure altruism is not at first attained1 and there is only the faintest gleam of appreciation of pain-states in others1 and genuine feeling therefor4 ,the sexual appetite is1 like other appetites1 purely selfish at first1 and the animal fears the loss of what will satisfy in an individualistic way1 quite as he fears that food may be taken away or destroyed4 ,even in higher psychisms much that we readily interpret as altruistic is often mainly personal2 it is not a true regard and emotion at pain and injury imminent to others1 a manifestation of feeling at their experience as such1 but mostly a feeling for their experience only so far as it involves our pleasure-pain4 ,when sociality and interdependence of organisms is attained as a great advantage in the struggle of life1 when personal experience is perceived as dependent upon experiences of others1 then a feeling value attaches to the experienceable for others1 yet selfishly at first4 ,even parental oversight and care must originally have been selfish--the satisfaction of a personal craving1 rather than the promotion of the well-being of another1 considered for its own sake4 ,real and pure altruism must1 indeed1 be accounted1 even in human society1 as a rare phenomenon1 perfect self-forgetfulness being almost impossible even for the most developed consciousness1 owing to the strength and persistence of an indefinite heredity of selfishness4 ,fear for others is1 then1 in truth1 merely an indirect fear for ourselves2 and particularly so is this true in all lower consciousness4 ,but we must acknowledge that elements of real altruism do enter and do grow in value and strength in the evolution of consciousness1 and we must1 if we adhere strictly to the principle of personal advantage as determining evolution1 find a reason here for a singular and seemingly incompatible manifestation4 ,regard for the good of others is not always indirectly regard for personal good1 and self-sacrifice is certainly an element in psychic life1 even in lower consciousness1 where we often seem to see a distinct struggle between egoistic fear and altruistic fear1 as in animals protecting their young4 ,but we see the same in an animal defending food from being acquired by its enemies4 ,advantage for the race is certainly gained1 but this wholly unconsciously2 and it plays no part in the actual psychism of the individual4 ,in a highly social1 which is also in the most effective and advantageous mode of life1 it is certain that the purely self-seeking will be at a disadvantage in general1 whereas those who give themselves up to help others are by others so helped1 that the final status of the individual is higher and better than if he had been wholly a self-seeker4 ,however1 he who1 perceiving this law1 sets out to be altruistic for his own ends1 invariably suffers defeat in the long run1 for entire disinterestedness can alone avail4 ,but the problem of altruism1 from an evolutionary point of view1 cannot here be further remarked on2 a fuller discussion would lead us too far afield4 ,however1 we are convinced that altruism springs up and grows like the other elements of psychic life1 as functional in the largest way to the demands of life in the struggle for existence4 ,horror is a distinctive term for altruistic fear4 ,when on a train1 ,i am terrified if ,i perceive a collision imminent and inevitable1 but as a mere spectator walking near the tracks1 ,i am horrified by the prospect of a collision4 ,one may be 8in mortal terror10 but not in mortal horror4 ,our sense of the feelings of others towards us1 whether they be egoistic or altruistic1 determines a large class of reflex emotions which are often very subtle4 ,if we perceive that some one is fearing us or fearing for us there is immediate reaction on our part4 ,feeling response to feeling acts and reacts in a multitude of complex ways1 as we cannot but observe when in the company of very 8sensitive0 people4 ,the 8sensitive0 one is he whose emotional life is governed by his perception of the feelings of others toward himself1 and he becomes wonderfully responsive to the least expressions of emotion toward himself4 ,the delicate responsiveness of women1 their intuitions1 are merely quick perceptiveness of emotion expression4 ,the fears of such are largely concerned with this dependence on the emotional attitudes of others toward themselves2 they fear to incur displeasure1 they fear loss of love1 etc4 ,thus psychical phenomena become more and more determined by psychical phenomena as interpreted and considered with reference to the self4 ,panic is contagious fear1 and has originated and been developed as securing mutual safety in societies of animals4 ,however1 there is less real fear on occasions of panic than is often supposed1 for much of the expression which we read as fear inspired is really merely imitative1 and does not signify any real basis of emotion4 ,moreover1 we must note that there is no direct contagion1 but the perception of fear in others merely leads us to dimly body forth some fearful events as impending1 which representation involves the full phenomenon of fear4 ,there is also a discrimination as to those who shall impart fear2 the fear of a child on shipboard will not start a panic1 while the fear of a captain would4 ,convinced that there is something worth fearing1 we fear1 and make frantic efforts to escape4 ,we have before mentioned 7p4 #hi7 the peculiar fear of fear4 ,the latest and culminating differentiation of fear is awe1 and the highest1 most refined development of awe is in the feeling for the sublime4 ,the sense of magnitude and mighty potency of injurious agents or agencies in themselves considered1 and not as immediately affecting the individual or any individual1 is the essential element in awe as a species of fear4 ,this fear is then neither egoistic nor altruistic1 but impersonal4 ,we fear neither for ourselves nor others in standing awestruck at the foot of ,niagara1 but a sense of overwhelming greatness and might stirs a thrill of emotion which is at bottom a sublimation of fear4 ,the view which to a peasant or an animal would give terror1 or produce no emotional effect whatever1 with very rational and sensitive minds produces awe4 ,awe does not1 as early emotions and fear generally1 lead directly to will1 it is not a stimulant to action1 and thus has not been evolved by the principle of usefulness for action which governs the general course of physiological and psychical evolution4 ,it is evident that with awe and the sense of the sublime emotion has a value and end in itself4 ,in the higher evolution of man we see that the psychic elements evolve no longer in a strict dependency for their value in securing advantage and success in the struggle for existence1 but comfortable existence being practically assured1 psychic development is pushed on in lines ethical1 emotional and intellectual1 for no practical end1 but for their own intrinsic value4 ,thus the feeling for the sublime is a purely independent development1 which1 indeed1 is based upon man's capacity to fear egoistically and altruistically1 but is really exercised solely for its own sake4 ,a consciousness which has had no common fear stage1 could never arrive at awe4 ,we stand in awe of persons who are totally beyond us in their superiority1 who exist in a sphere of power and glory1 which transcends even our understanding1 and thus awe has a religious as well as sthetic side4 ,the chief differentiations then of fear we note as intensive dread1 as altruistic horror1 as impersonal awe4 ,the chronological order of evolution may be denoted in this order--fright1 alarm1 terror1 dread1 horror4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,on ,,despair ,despair is a phase of painful emotion which is certainly related to fear1 yet is very distant from it4 ,despair has always a fear basis2 we can only despair where fear is implied1 and what does not excite fear will give no hold for despair4 ,i must first fear a pain before ,i can despair of escaping it4 ,the prisoner condemned to death must fear death before he will be in despair at the prospect of it4 ,yet while despair always implies fear1 fear may often exist and that in very strong form without despair4 ,the prisoner often displays great fear1 but no despair4 ,there is1 in fact1 a strong contrast between fear and despair4 ,fear normally stimulates effort1 despair depresses it4 ,fear is active1 despair passive4 ,deep dejection and lassitude mark despair1 while fear is intense agitation and activity4 ,fear in its original and normal function is stimulant of defensive action1 fear as paralytic being secondary or abnormal1 but in normal despair there is absolute inertness4 ,fear1 again1 in contrast with despair1 is direct and transitive4 ,i fear the pain or injury1 but my despair is only in relation to it1 despair of1 in despair1 etc4 ,fear is at the evil itself1 it is a direct attitude of mind toward it1 through an ideal pre-experiencing1 the very representation of any pain as experienceable carrying with it a thrill of fear4 ,but despair concerns itself1 not with the pain per se as experienceable1 but with the inevitability of the painful4 ,fear rests upon idea of pain1 despair1 upon idea of its inevitability4 8,i despair of escape10 means a recoil of painful emotion at inevitability of painful experience4 ,sense of complete and permanent inability to attain an end1 whether release from pain1 or positively1 a securing a pleasure1 generates commonly this distressful emotion4 ,despair is not then simple pain at pain1 but at the unavertibility of the pain4 ,despair is then the mind bent down and crushed by the sense of the inevitable and irremediable nature of the pain1 positive or negative1 it experiences or is to experience4 ,despair is1 indeed1 hopelessness1 though all hopelessness is not despair4 ,there is no hope in stolidity or in stoicism1 psychic modes quite distinct from despair1 but which take the place with some natures4 ,again1 we must note that while fear has its degrees1 and may be but partial1 despair is always complete collapse4 ,i may fear a little but not despair a little1 ,i may be frightened 8just the least bit10 but not despair a little bit4 ,the hostess who is 8in despair0 because the ice cream has not come1 speaks truly1 however1 for the affair is for her so important and momentous as to be the basis of real despair4 ,that which is the occasion of despair must always be or seem of capital value4 ,an adjacent and often precedent state to despair is desperation1 which is a feeling of the almost inevitable4 ,in the face of heavy odds there is often awakened a painful emotion which we term desperation1 and which leads to strong and furious will action1 to an intense and general struggle which is often advantageous4 ,an enemy fears to drive his adversary to desperation4 ,in desperation we take one chance in a thousand or in a million2 for example1 the leader of a forlorn hope4 ,it would be difficult to say whether despair or desperation contains more of pain1 but they are obviously quite opposite in their character4 ,to combative temperaments and with pugnacious animals the sense of the seeming inevitable is often stimulative of desperation rather than despair4 ,such are 8game0 to the last4 ,a criminal of this type will run amuck rather than submit to his fate in despair4 ,the desperado is defiant to the end4 ,with some whose natures are balanced between reflection and action there are in the face of the inevitable or almost inevitable rapid fluctuations of despair and desperation4 ,dismay is another form closely akin to despair4 ,dismay is the immediate result for feeling of a sudden cognition of great difficulties and pains as imminent4 ,as the transition stage of rapid movement in feeling toward despair1 as the sudden falling in temperature from hope1 it is really incipient despair4 ,dismay is essentially temporary1 and settles quickly into despair or rises into renewed hope4 ,though but such a passing mode1 it yet has for the moment that sense of self-efficiency annihilated which is so characteristic of despair4 ,consternation is very intense dismay4 ,but what now is the real quality and inner nature of despair8 what essentially is this strange drooping before inevitable loss1 injury and pain8 and what is its significance for life8 ,despair is certainly a very advanced and complex emotion1 and we can do no more at present than merely remark on some of its most striking features4 ,a most noticeable and remarkable quality of despair is its introactive tendency4 ,when the whole strength and vital motive1 of a full-grown teleologic psychic life--the dilettante is not capable of despair--is suddenly and completely withdrawn1 there results1 not indifference nor ennui but a deep disturbance which is active on the minus side of mental life4 ,the complete breaking up of great and absorbing hopes and of the free objective activity flowing from them brings will tension down1 not simply to nil1 but gives it a spring back into the negative region beyond the line of mere quiescence and indifferentism4 ,despair is a revulsive process by which the whole mind is broken up1 just as a propeller wheel running at high speed out of water or an engine working at high pressure when disconnected from its shafting1 tend to wrench and shatter themselves4 ,desire is not really extinct1 but latent2 though smothered it burns inward4 ,this is that peculiar cankering1 corroding quality1 which is always so marked in despair4 ,will1 not self-shattered1 but forcibly pent by external circumstances1 gives a sullen restlessness to the mental life now turned in upon itself4 ,hence the capacity for despair will be directly as the co-ordinate capacity for action and reflection in any individual1 and as such co-ordination marks the highest level of conscious life1 despair is certainly a phenomenon of exceptionally complex and advanced consciousness4 ,again1 we note that despair is intensely and oppressively a pain state1 but the dull despair pain is distinct from racking fear pain4 ,what now is the nature of despair pain1 and what the reason for its peculiar quality8 ,here is not as in fear a feeling pain at pain1 but at the idea of its inevitability and completely destructive power4 ,the actual pain foreseen may seem bearable and excite little feeling1 but it is the total loss of personal success1 the complete thwarting of self-realization1 that moves the mind to despair1 that causes that sickening1 dull1 emotional pain which we term despair4 ,thus despair is eminently a disease of self-hood1 an egoistic distemper1 the strong and large individuality being peculiarly subject to it4 ,however1 the general problem of despair pain is practically the same as of the origin and nature of fear pain1 which has already been discussed4 ,whether any mere representation induces pain1 and how it does so1 is certainly one of the most difficult problems of emotional psychology4 ,we have in a previous chapter sought to indicate in a general way that purely subjective or mental pain which is not in any wise revival of sensation or objective does really exist4 ,also since pain per se is always simple and identical1 the differentiation of pains as seemingly quite different in kind1 as fear pain1 despair pain1 etc41 is really due to sensation1 will1 and other elements which closely adhere to pain and give it a certain local colouring4 ,the whole emotion is a complex of various factors which are closely knit into a single state which to common observation seems simple1 but which is really constituted in its ensemble by the total specific forces of many elements4 ,in psychics1 as in physics1 we know that common sense analysis of phenomena must be at fault1 and that one who says 8,i certainly have an entirely different pain when ,i fear and when ,i despair10 is as much in the wrong as he who maintains essential diversities in material substance1 or radical distinctions of species in the organic world4 ,so we must believe that the peculiar quality of the pain in despair exists1 not in the pain itself1 but is really the colouring result from various coincident sensations and ideas4 ,the lowering of the mental tone far below the zero point is greatly accentuated by refluent waves of organic sensation set up from the physical basis of the psychic disturbance4 ,how1 we may now ask1 did despair ever evolve and become a well-defined psychic form8 in what way in the course of natural selection could such an apparently disadvantageous variation have arisen and been developed8 ,the serviceability of fear is plain to every one1 but of what possible value could despair be in the struggle of life8 ,the one who gives up in despair is but very rarely doing the best thing4 ,if we cannot look to the general principle of evolution1 serviceability1 how can we account for the appearance and growth of such a phase as despair1 except as abnormal variation1 a disease1 profitable to the enemies of the individual1 and so developed by and for external organisms4 ,as there is an abnormal pathological variation of fear1 which we have previously noticed1 and which is forced in its development by enemies who profit by it1 so despair is a psychic disease1 entirely hurtful to the individual1 and1 so far1 only advantageous for its enemies4 ,despair is1 without doubt1 one of those altruistic variations which serve1 not the individual1 but some antagonist in the struggle of existence4 ,to bring one to despair is to make him entirely helpless and wholly at our mercy for our own ends4 ,the possibility that active-reflective natures may prey upon themselves is thus stimulated into an actual phenomenon whose growth is continually fostered by those whose advantage it is to reduce the individual to a helpless condition4 ,despair is hardly an hypertrophy or atrophy of any normal tendency1 it is rather a pathological genus by itself4 ,the capacity for despair being inherent in the general formation of mind as subject to collapse1 it arose solely in response to the needs of organisms warring upon the organism afflicted4 ,the whole field of physical and psychical altruistic variation under the general law of natural selection1 decadent and self-injurious characteristics being stimulated and maintained in a kind of artificial selection1 is an interesting but unexplored field1 attention so far having been turned to the individually advantageous as determining element in evolution4 ,despair is a disease of advanced and mature psychic life4 ,children are1 in general1 incapable of despair4 ,it implies a well-developed sense of self and a general experience of the world4 ,high and strong emotional natures1 but rather weak-willed and narrow of intelligence1 are predisposed to it4 ,occasions which would lead to despair will with lower natures be unnoticed or lead merely to stolidity2 while with the highest natures1 there comes heroic endeavour and wide searching for means and methods4 ,,chapter ,x ,,anger ,in studying any state of consciousness we first inquire what constitutes its dominant factor2 if this is sense of object1 we call it a cognition2 if effortful action1 it is a volition2 if the marked feature is pleasure-pain1 we term it a feeling4 ,finding that the consciousness is a feeling1 we would next inquire whether the pleasure-pain is mainly determined in its colouring by direct presentation1 and so is a sensation1 or whether this dominant colouring comes indirectly through representation1 and is thus what we term an emotion4 ,for example1 the distinction between 8,i feel a pain in my shoulder10 and 8,i feel pained at your conduct0 illustrates the most radical division of feeling4 ,if emotion is founded on an appreciation of the experienceable1 which has developed under natural selection1 we must look upon the emotional power in general and upon the various emotions in particular as merely advantageous psychoses which are as clearly determined by general evolutionary laws as the merely physical organs like heart1 lungs1 wings1 horns1 etc4 ,it is clearly desirable that the organism should look before1 should anticipate experience and so direct its way2 but bare anticipation has no value in itself unless it powerfully stimulates will through emotion4 ,all conscious life above the most primitive is eminently and increasingly anticipatory1 and so becomes more and more infused with emotional powers4 ,among the earliest developed of these in the struggle for existence are fear and anger4 ,the fear group1 embracing large numbers of allied forms1 simple and complex1 has been discussed in a general way in the preceding pages1 and we now come to some consideration of the correlative anger group4 ,the rationale of the evolution of anger is not far to seek4 ,we have seen that fear is the spring of defensive action1 and it is obvious that anger is the stimulant to offensive action4 ,fear is regressive1 anger aggressive4 ,fear is contractile1 anger expansive4 ,fear is the emotion of the pursued1 of the prey2 anger the emotion of the pursuer1 of the predacious4 ,emotion in the service of life evidently has two great psychic ramifications from this point1 and the whole world of emotion-beings1 which compose the greater mass of organisms1 is hence divided in two great divisions1 a fear class and an anger class4 ,likewise in relation to opposing natural forces as to neighbouring competing and destroying organisms1 the same distinction is to be made according as the animal either combats or flees4 ,shyness or fierceness1 timidity or irascibility1 these are characters which divide the animate world into two grand antagonistic groups4 ,zoology has recognised this psychic differentiation as a marked and essential feature in its nomenclature1 thus lepus timidus4 ,in fact1 the most important part of evolution is the psychical2 in this1 indeed1 lies the whole significance and value of the organism4 ,the attainment of more and more advantageous psychic qualities is the main trend of evolution1 for psychic power as distinct from main force1 like that of the elements1 is far and away of the most value in the struggle for existence1 and ultimately1 as in man1 it achieves the subduing all lower powers1 natural1 vegetable and brute1 to its own ends4 ,it is psychical quality1 moreover1 which determines physical1 and not vice vers4 ,thus it is not the possession of claws1 fangs1 etc41 that makes an animal fierce1 but it is fierceness which develops and maintains these weapons of offence4 ,thus it is1 though thus far practically overlooked by scientists1 that psychic development1 especially on the emotional side1 is of the utmost importance as the prime factor and motive in organic processes4 ,the central core of life is emotional capacity1 and this in its evolution determines the whole external morphological trend of evolution of organisms which is so closely followed by the science of to-day4 ,but the science of the future is comparative psychology1 which1 when once placed on a secure basis of interpretation1 will determine the real and inner law of evolution as a psychic movement incarnating itself in a succession of animate forms4 ,but a sure method of knowing a psychic fact as such when it occurs1 and what1 how1 and why it is1 is yet to be discovered and applied1 and extra-human and even extra-ego consciousness is a field1 so far1 for little else than hypothesis4 ,if this remark be turned against us1 we say that our work is mainly a deductive interpretation of the course of psychic evolution from the general standpoint of natural selection1 reinforced and illustrated by introspective investigation1 and merely using the most obvious facts of comparative psychology in a very general and provisional way4 ,we do not profess to show where1 how1 and when mind originated1 or what particular powers any certain organisms possess1 but we do endeavour to show how the principle of utility may be made a key to the study of a very perplexing region of mental life--the emotions4 ,we proffer then merely a very general sketch of the history of emotion as a life factor1 hoping that it may1 at least in its general scope1 be of service to future explorers4 ,in taking up this subject of anger we do then thus reiterate the position we occupy and the method we follow4 ,anger like fear certainly originated at some critical point in some individuals life as an advantageous variation of essential value4 ,a vital issue at some early point in the history of life determined the genesis of this new psychic mode and function as a stimulant of aggressive will action4 ,very likely it was in competition of organisms for food that some favoured individual first attained the power of getting mad and violently attacking its fellows1 and so obtaining sustenance4 ,however this may be1 certain it is that a direct attack is often more self-conservative than attempts at escape when injury threatens2 it is a greater advantage to destroy pain-giver than to shun it4 ,fear enables organisms to avoid loss1 but it does not accomplish positive gain1 as anger does through overcoming hindrance4 ,anger is often also more economical for the forces of the organism1 and thus1 in general1 predacious animals are longer-lived than even those of their prey who may attain a full length of life4 ,even in the face of great odds a direct attack is often more serviceable than attempt at escape4 ,anger is certainly the primitive motive force of all offensive action1 though of course we cannot say that the animal got mad because it saw the serviceability4 ,psychic evolution1 at least as far as new powers are concerned1 never comes by teleologic foresight1 and1 indeed1 cannot by the nature of the case4 ,the animal did not definitely set out to get angry because it foresaw the value1 yet in the earliest angers there must have been effort1 a certain nisus which marked the new form as a real attainment1 a marked achievement4 ,that the provoking occasion gives rise now to anger inevitably and naturally1 that anger comes upon us and overcomes us is true enough1 but in its earliest phases anger must have been1 like other just evolving factors1 supported only by powerful will effort4 ,the oftener the early psychism got mad1 the easier it got mad4 ,facility came only by practice1 and a large variety of occasions1 besides the simple critical and original one1 were gradually utilized by the anger faculty4 ,but in its original form and occasion anger was1 no doubt1 akin to that we see when an extremely timid animal at the last extremity will turn in anger and fiercely fight for its life4 ,such an attempt1 sometimes successful1 marks an origin of a new mode of conscious emotion which may never return to the individual again during all its future life for lack of occasion4 ,if often returning and often improved1 a definite new habit of emotion is established1 and from being a fearful animal it may at length become dominantly irascible1 and so belong to a totally distinct psychic genus4 ,by the evolution of anger then1 as in contradistinction to fear1 two grand divisions of animate existence were set apart1 two great psychical orders as fundamentally distinct and important for evolutionary psychics1 as invertebrate and vertebrate for biology4 ,the rise of the back-boned animal is not more important for physiological morphology than the evolution of anger for psychical morphology1 and1 indeed1 as we have before remarked1 the psychical growth is ever the broadest and deepest fact in evolution4 ,by the acquirement and predominance of the anger stimulus certain animals became differentiated as a distinct class from their fearful neighbours1 and they then by this new impulse gradually attained instruments of offence1 and also by increase of size became physically distinct forms4 ,henceforth the animate world becomes divided in a more and more marked way into pursuers and pursued4 ,by mutual interaction fear is increased on one side as anger increases on the other1 and the division into timid and fierce1 predacious and prey1 becomes more and more established and marked4 ,we take it then that it was a most momentous day in the progress of mind when anger was first achieved1 and some individual actually got mad4 ,if the exact date and the particular individual were ascertainable a memorial day set apart for all time would not be too great an honour4 ,in the struggle of existence1 other things being equal1 the most irascible is the most successful1 faring the best1 securing the best mate1 and having the best and most numerous progeny4 ,susceptibility to anger becomes a necessity to a large class of organisms1 and those who will not get angry and fight for their interests are surely trampled on or pushed aside to become starveling or outcast4 ,is now this primitive anger an absolutely new power1 a de novo evolution1 or is it possible to study its rise as a gradual differentiation from some other factor8 ,must we not view psychical evolution like all evolution as coming under the law of continuity8 ,how then explain the sudden rise of apparently new and distinct forms like anger or fear8 ,anger as a response to the demands of life seems from the very first to be as distinctly and peculiarly anger as at any time in its development4 ,the peculiar quality which makes anger anger1 does not seem to appear as a gradual differentiation from other elements as slowly emerging from previous modes1 but we can only judge that it bursts suddenly upon the field as a new and unique creation1 which does not find its explanation in pre-existent forms and cannot be traced as a gradual evolution from them4 ,on the other hand1 while it does not at first sight seem possible to regard anger as being from the first other than a radically new power and activity determined1 indeed1 by the struggle for existence1 but wholly unexplained in its essence and formation as a consciousness related to and differentiated from other consciousnesses1 yet we must acknowledge our profound ignorance of the real morphology of mind and what is the real nature of mental differentiation4 ,here the problem is altogether more difficult than in biology1 where the appearance of new forms like wings can be readily traced as slow modifications of previous members1 the physical possibility and rationale of which is easily seen to be inherent in the physical constitution of the body and its circumambient matter1 the air4 ,however1 in the present state of our psychical knowledge it is quite impossible to attain any similarly clear conception as to the formation of new psychical forms4 ,we may see why they should be called into being by the necessities of animate life1 we can perceive their functional importance from the first1 but to trace their morphological development as gradually assuming their peculiar qualities as modifications of already existing activities1 and as inherently possible in the psychical constitution of things1 this is clearly beyond us at present4 ,we can conceive that the earliest anger was weak and rather ineffective as compared with the fully developed anger of later life1 but we cannot see that it was any the less anger1 any the less purely and wholly sui generis than the very latest and strongest form4 ,has it ever in its earlier stages that hybrid and mixed character which marks it as a modification of existent factors8 ,it is certainly not a modified fear1 to which it is1 indeed1 a polar opposite4 ,but we may perhaps regard anger1 and fear as well1 as modified from previous general emotion4 ,we may1 indeed1 consider it likely that some general emotional phase preceded the special emotions1 just as a general indefinite pain and pleasure preceded definite pains and pleasures4 ,it may be considered as probable that emotion first appeared as a purely undifferentiated disturbance sequent on sense of the experienceable pain1 this general emotion being neither fear nor anger1 but the basis from which both develop4 ,the psychic agitation we term emotional very likely began in a purely general form1 yet it is hard to understand how peculiar forms develop therefrom4 ,we are too far from such inchoate experience to readily come to any appreciation of its method or mode4 ,we may be disturbed as to something imminent and know not whether to fear or be angry1 but this in general means only a rapid alternation of fear and anger according as the mind runs back and forth between fear and anger-provoking elements4 ,it is unlikely that we can trace in any such a purely undifferentiated emotion4 ,at the best we but throw the difficulty farther back1 for emotion per se is then the de novo form to which the principle of continuity does not seem to apply4 ,if anger is a traceable modification of some more general emotion as combined with definite representation and volition modes1 yet how the peculiar anger quality is achieved is still unexplained4 ,on the whole it seems simplest and truest to assume the first impulse of anger as a perfectly new and diverse wave of emotion suddenly generated in answer to some extreme urgency in the struggle of existence4 ,the analogy of organic and psychic evolution may be pressed to a certain extent4 ,it is plainly possible to set in order an evolutionary series of light--sensing organs1 eyes--from most elementary to most complex1 and it is quite as possible1 though yet to be done1 to set forth in similar genetic order a series of psychic states as offence-sense1 i4e41 angers1 in their increasing differentiation4 ,but previous to any eye1 to local visualization1 there is a period of common sensation when an absolutely simple organism is in every part equally responsive to light2 in a crude way the whole organism reacts to light1 from which stage by traceable specialization the eye as a light-sensing organ is gradually developed4 ,here analogy would seem to fail1 unless we consider it to be the stage when any psychosis1 e4g41 anger1 requires the whole consciousness capacity1 mind being merely a capacity for the recurrent but isolated single-activities4 ,mind certainly but slowly grows into that sum of organic coincident interdependent yet distinct consciousnesses which we commonly think of under the term1 mind4 ,anger in its very earliest and lowest form is no doubt an absorbing nave isolated wave1 as common to mind as a whole1 that is1 as making up the whole of mind for the time being1 is perhaps in its measure an analogy to common sensation4 ,anger may then be but a common emotion1 answering in a certain aspect to light-sense1 sound-sense1 etc41 as purely common sensations4 ,but we must remark that general sensation is not to be confounded with common sensation1 or general emotion with common emotion4 ,common sensations are1 indeed1 usually very general in form1 and a sensation per se1 a purely general sensation1 is probably very rarely anything else1 yet when we close the eyes and direct them toward the sun1 the general sensation of light we receive--very like the original primitive common sensation--is general1 yet by a special organ4 ,the word common refers1 not to the special nature of the function itself1 but the fact that the function1 whether special or general1 is performed indifferently1 or practically so1 by the common whole4 ,a sensation of coloured light is more special than a mere sensation of light1 and this than mere general sensation of force1 but all may be accomplished either by common sensation or special sensation4 ,general emotion may similarly be either common or in organic co-activity4 ,there was certainly a time when consciousness existed which was not and could not be anger or fear or even an emotion per se4 ,pre-emotional and pre-representative consciousness was so absolutely primitive1 general1 and common1 that psychology as a necessarily automorphic science will be very long in coming to any understanding of this field1 but yet we must set it off as something which must always receive some consideration4 ,anger is not a property of all consciousness by the nature of consciousness itself1 but is merely a possible mode dependent on circumstances for its development at a certain psychic stage4 ,what now is the inner nature and what the constituent elements of the anger state8 ,comparatively few reflect upon their emotions save from an ethical standpoint1 and very few indeed attempt any analysis of them4 ,to determine the process and exact psychical constituents of getting mad and being mad1 may seem to many a quite useless and foolish introspective endeavour4 ,if a person is angry1 he is angry1 and that is all there is of it1 will be the general verdict of common sense4 ,you can dissect flowers into their parts1 you can analyse rocks and soils1 but any emotion such as anger is wholly unanalyzable4 ,no one can know what it is to be mad until he has once been mad1 and1 thereafter1 he can only reflect upon it as a peculiar excitement1 a powerful agitation1 whose occasions and results may be fully traced1 but which in itself is sui generis and irresolvable4 ,the form of consciousness we know as being angry1 is really a simple wave of emotion which stands by itself as an elementary and ultimate form4 ,suppose we acknowledge these remarks as true1 we may yet maintain that anger1 like all emotions1 is a highly complex state of manifold factors whose sum total1 whose grand resultant1 is a seemingly simple and peculiar status4 ,why should one arrangement of atoms produce a peculiar perfume1 another a peculiar stench8 ,anger may likewise be merely an unexplainable ensemble of early ascertainable elements4 ,certain it is1 in the first place1 that sense of object is necessary to anger4 ,one cannot be mad without being mad at something4 ,the attitude of mind is objective1 and even rage in its blindest moment preserves this attitude4 ,blind with rage1 means no more than that various definite qualities of the object are lost in the intense emotional reaction at pain-giver4 ,at its height1 anger preserves1 indeed1 only the barest apprehension of object2 but this is intense and overpowering in connection with the sense of it as infringing and injuring4 ,in the transports of rage and fury1 the movements are wild and reckless enough1 but always antagonistic1 implying outward destructive activity4 ,anger is the fixation of the mind upon some object in its quality of personal hurtfulness1 and is revulsion1 not from it1 as fear1 but against it4 ,with early psychisms1 all perceptions of objects end in either anger or fear1 and a large part of early education consists in learning what objects to be fearful of1 and what to be angry at4 ,the alertness of wild animals is determined mainly by either nascent fear or anger4 ,when a dog is suddenly wakened from sleep he generally shows either fear or anger4 ,this is merely an illustration of how the dimmest sense of object immediately connects itself with emotion as primitive and fundamental tendency4 ,the organism perceives the object1 and representing its imminent hurtfulness1 feels fear and dashes away from it1 or feels anger and dashes against it4 ,these are the two simplest possible reactions with sense of the experienceable injurious4 ,in fear there is elimination of oneself from the injury1 and in anger the elimination of the injury from oneself4 ,with later anger and fear these processes of elimination themselves become matters of representation1 and make a large part in highly-developed forms4 ,a knowledge which very generally enters into anger is the comparative estimate of power4 ,a cat scratches us1 we are angry2 a lion threatens us1 we are afraid4 ,the progress of the lower psychic life is largely in learning what is best to fear and what should excite anger4 ,that which at first angers will often1 when better understood1 produce fear1 and vice vers4 ,wild animals at first often show merely anger when molested by man1 but soon manifest fear as they learn to appreciate his superior power4 ,the ,african elephant learns to distinguish between the savage with his spear1 and the white hunter with his rifle1 and is merely irritated or angry with the one1 while he manifests genuine fear of the other4 ,the young of animals and of man continually show irrelevant fear and anger4 ,they are generally either over fearful or over irritable4 ,our own feelings are powerfully modified by varying estimates of opposing force and injury4 ,if1 in passing through a dark street1 ,i am tripped by what ,i take to be a child's snare1 ,i am angered1 but upon noticing that it is a fuse to a dynamite bomb1 ,i am thrown into intense fear4 ,in general1 any sensation1 as of sound or light1 in its lower grades of intensity produces anger1 in higher occasions fear4 ,as a rule when reactions induced by either fear or anger are uniformly unsuccessful1 natural selection favours the development of the other4 ,while the comparative estimate of opposing force with one's own is general ingredient in anger1 anger being fear-limited1 it is not1 as ,mercier would indicate 7,mind1 ix41 p4 #cdf71 a constant element in anger4 ,we often see cases of anger1 and have perhaps1 ourselves1 experienced anger which is totally unrelated to a sense of power4 ,some animals seem at times utterly fearless and utterly unaware of the tremendous crushing force they angrily oppose4 ,it is1 moreover1 altogether probable that anger and fear originated and received a certain measure of development before any capacity of measuring comparative force of antagonist arose in mind4 ,however1 the discrimination between overwhelming and slight force is certainly tolerably early1 and is obviously a very necessary factor in self-conservative action4 ,yet it is very unlikely that this was an element in primitive fear or anger1 which must have been no more than a simple emotional reaction to perceived injury without any reference to whether pain-giver is more or less strong than pain-receiver4 ,the earliest fears and angers of infants seem to be quite devoid of any guidance from sense of powerlessness or power1 but merely direct1 unthinking reactions4 ,a marked and constant element in anger is hostility4 ,this is the aggressive fighting attitude of will which is exercised toward and against the perceived pain-giving object4 ,anger can never subsist without this volition element1 and it always appears as direct simple reaction to anger-provoking object4 ,anger always exhibits itself as hostility1 openly and freely in lower life1 and in higher life1 which is often disingenuous1 the hostility as real psychic act remains1 though somewhat concealed in physical manifestation as long as angry mood exists4 ,the will tendency is always toward the violent removing and destroying of the offending object4 ,however1 nave primitive anger does not include in its hostility giving pain for pain received1 making the object suffer in turn1 which is1 indeed1 far removed from the capacity of primitive mind to conceive4 ,anger in its earliest form does1 of course1 inflict pain where its object is pain-susceptible2 but this1 it may confidently be said1 cannot lie in the intent of the pain-inflicter4 ,the simple original ebullitions of anger do not include intent in any form4 ,volition is powerfully and directly incited by the emotion without the intervention of any idea4 ,the only representation in the simplest anger is the representation of pain experience impending which occasions the excitement1 which then directly and violently starts will-activity2 but the representations of destructiveness and pain-infliction as ends become guiding ideas only in the slow evolution of anger toward more intelligent forms4 ,pain is certainly a prominent element in anger4 ,this pain is the emotional pain1 the pain at pain1 whose nature and origin we have commented on in the chapter on fear4 ,the mere representation of pain to be starts a violent pain quite distinct from the fear-pain1 yet like it1 pre-eminently central and subjective4 ,precedent1 however1 to both fear and anger-pain1 is the simple pain which immediately arises on representation of pain1 the prospect of pain being immediately and peculiarly painful in itself4 ,this commonly continues throughout1 and gives a dominant pain tone4 ,but there immediately succeeds a rush of either fear or anger emotion1 each intensely painful in opposite ways4 ,the pain which results from the anger1 which is by the anger occasioned in me1 is again distinct from the pain in and of the anger4 ,anger is itself a state of pain4 ,in its earliest forms1 as rarely and with difficulty attained1 there is still another pain connected with anger1 the pain of exertion and stress4 ,but all the pain factors1 as more or less continuous1 make anger1 as emotion in general1 a complex pain state4 ,thus1 when angered by a man shaking his fist in my face1 we trace first a purely subjective pain at prospect of pain1 then a rush of aggressive emotion which embodies in it a pain of its own1 then a pain which reacts from the peculiar tension of the anger state4 ,of course1 in our stage of evolution1 anger has become such an inwrought factor that it arises spontaneously1 it overtakes and overcomes us1 not we reaching it2 and so the stress or labour pain is absent4 ,it is never or very rarely an effort for us to get angry1 but it must have been for our very remote psychical ancestors4 ,while it may be said with truth that some people are never so happy as when mad1 yet we must remember this does not alter the fact that anger is radically a pain state4 ,there may be a pleasure from anger excitement1 and from successful anger2 there may be a pleasure in the mere exercise of aggressive power2 but the happiness meant is mostly the excitement pleasure plus the delight which always comes from freely following out one's nature4 ,especially when the outflow of natural force in an irascible man has been pent up and restrained for some time1 a fit of anger is altogether a delightful experience1 the pleasure of relief in a habitual function4 ,thus an occasional fight is necessary to the pugnacious amongst both animals and men2 it is an inbred function and tendency which must work itself out1 or render the being as miserable as a rodent kept from gnawing4 ,but all this does not interfere with the analysis of anger as fundamentally painful4 ,happiness is a very late evolution1 and1 as the reaction from freely working out one's strongest tendency1 it is unfelt by early minds1 which only gradually attain inwrought tendencies and so the capacity for being happy or unhappy4 ,to witness a fight is likewise to a large class of minds a supreme felicity4 ,this is largely the pleasure which comes at second hand from representation of participancy4 ,and so1 to have a fight described1 or to read about it even1 is a source of considerable representative pleasure to many1 a spurious and reflected anger1 and an ideal fighting in the fray4 ,however1 all this leads far away from primitive emotion1 which is now our main concern4 ,we may grant then that sense of the object giving pain1 sense of comparative power1 hostility1 and pains of various kinds1 are usual elements in anger2 yet it is evident that anger is explained by no one or all of them4 ,it is not a mere aggregation and mixture of states1 it is essentially a compound which has in some unexplained way a peculiar quality which is not in any of its constituent elements4 ,when ,i am angry1 there occurs a phenomenon which1 while based on and inclusive of these factors1 is yet peculiar in itself4 ,the flush of anger1 the wave of emotion1 the tempest of passion1 bases itself on and includes cognition1 hostility1 and pain2 but it is more--it is a deep psychic disturbance of a peculiar and undefinable kind which we recognise when we have it1 but which we cannot analyse4 ,we express the nature of anger metaphorically1 indeed1 when we speak of an angry man being 8hot10 8boiling with rage10 etc41 as opposed to being chilled and frozen stiff by fear4 ,the being angry is obviously a kind of being pained at pain quite opposite to that of fear4 ,it is also true that ,i may see threatening injury1 ,i may be pained1 ,i may combat1 but not be angry4 ,there are other and higher motives which may bring about the violent will offensive activity so often required in the struggle of life2 but we may take it that anger is the most primitive1 and throughout the whole range of psychism the most common offensive motive1 and so of the utmost importance as a life factor4 ,which shall we regard as the more primitive1 anger or fear8 ,were animals at first universally timid1 and subsequently acquired anger as an advantageous variation1 or was anger the first1 and fear the complementary and later evolution1 or may we suppose that they developed in strict correlation8 ,the earliest manifestations of emotion with some animals1 and with some human infants1 seem to be anger4 ,everything perceived to be painful irritates and makes them mad1 and they are quite fearless in the presence of overwhelming danger4 ,these but slowly learn to fear2 by hard experience they learn the hurtfulness and inutility of combatting in many cases1 and occasions which would once make them mad now cause them to fear4 ,on the other hand1 we observe many of the very young who seem to be universally fearful1 and but slowly acquire 8spunk0 and spirit4 ,mental embryology thus1 at least with our present very imperfect knowledge1 is quite indecisive on the question4 ,if fear and anger were wholly determined by relation of predacious and prey1 then we might suppose correlated simultaneous origin2 but we know that obstacles and injuries1 not from competitors1 but from elements1 forces1 and objects of nature1 were the first environment and the first field for struggle4 ,organism began as a weak thing planted amongst manifold opposing forces1 where fear was quite the most salutary emotion and anger useless4 ,if1 as we must deem probable1 mental function in general and emotion in particular reaches back toward primitive organism1 it is likely1 on merely general grounds1 that fear is the more ancient and original emotion1 though anger was closely subsequent4 ,the general conditions of life at the first would demand the development of fear more imperatively than anger4 ,certainly1 however1 both emotions are sufficiently primitive1 as is shown by their being so ingrained and dominant forces in the whole range of lower psychic life4 ,all higher animals1 moreover1 are peculiarly sensitive to and observant of signs of anger and fear4 ,rarey1 a most excellent judge1 made it an axiom of his method that horses are extremely acute in detecting either fear or anger in those who deal with them1 and this is also noticeably true of animals in general4 ,these are also the emotional attitudes which are earliest interpreted by children4 ,now what is soonest1 easiest and surest interpreted by psychisms above the lowest may be taken to be fundamentally primitive and such are fear and anger4 ,to discover with readiness and certainty the emotional states of organisms about them1 because these states are the motives of very important activities1 is clearly an advantage early gained in the struggle of existence4 ,it means preparedness1 and there is a nascent anger to break forth against the fearful1 or fear or counter-anger prepared against the fear discerned or suspected4 ,the inter-related activity of these two emotions is the chiefest and most interesting spectacle we see in all lower psychic phases4 ,but we must notice now a form which seems on the whole to belong to the anger group1 and that is hate4 ,hate often precedes and succeeds anger1 and the object of anger is peculiarly apt to be the object of hate4 ,the man whom we hate very easily angers us1 and he who provokes us is one whom we are apt to hate4 ,yet a person may be very provoking1 even exasperating1 and not be hateful1 and vice vers for hate4 ,it is obvious then that while the object of anger and hate is apt to be the same1 yet it is viewed from very different standpoints1 and the emotion reactions are somehow very different4 8,i hate him10 and 8,i am angry at him10--these expressions denote very distinct emotions4 ,while anger and hate are both aggressive emotion reactions against the pain-giver1 yet in their nature they are essentially diverse4 ,in general we hate him who deliberately and constantly provokes us1 who establishes himself as a deliberate enemy4 ,it is harmful1 opposed intent that particularly stimulates hate4 ,but anger is most generally a sudden flash of feeling leading to violent repulsive effort against pain-giver1 but without any insight into intent4 ,the immediacy of reaction is accomplished through anger2 but hate1 having more of insight and foresight1 is more slowly generated1 and is not so directly and promptly active4 ,i may be angry at one who casually pinches me in sport1 but ,i will hate him who continually pinches me in spite4 ,i may be angry at the child who in its childish play often interrupts my studies1 but ,i do not hate it2 this ,i reserve for the malicious boys who continually put tick-tacks on my windows4 ,and so also inanimate things often arouse anger2 but we hate only the animate1 and then mainly when we discern deliberate1 purposed offence4 ,to be sure we often hear some such expression as1 8,i hate the very sight of that house02 but here the term hate denotes loathing1 and is only a little less flagrant misuse than when ,i say 8,i hate ham1 but love beefsteak40 ,hate1 then1 marks in a very noticeable way the growth of psychic responsiveness4 ,a prevision of psychic attitude of others1 especially the emotional and volitional1 is of the utmost service as helping to and preparing for an appropriate response4 ,thus we may believe that quite early in mental evolution there came an appreciation and interpretation of the psychic modes of others as affecting the interests of the individual4 ,we may judge that this is probable by the very apparent difference of reaction of even certain of the lower animals in the presence of threatening dangers from common material things1 and from animate beings capable of being not merely crushed or pushed away1 but intimidated and frightened away4 ,young children learn quickly to distinguish between mere physical events and psychic expressions1 and to feel and to act toward the psychic in the peculiar manner which will best serve them4 ,thus it becomes of very definite value to excite fear in enemies1 but even a low animal learns speedily that it cannot terrify a large stone which prevents access to food4 ,now fear and anger obviously do not specially belong to the rather advanced class of emotions which are always psychically responsive1 for1 in earliest phases at least1 both fear and anger may be taken to have no reference to the psychic quality of the object1 but only to the physical quality as painful and injurious4 ,however1 later fear and anger become cognizant of the psychic attitude and responsive thereto2 but it may be said that hate from the first is a psychic responsive1 it is an answer to the psychic attitude of others as interpreted by the individual as turned towards itself4 ,hate is always against evil intent2 anger and fear may be4 ,hate and anger are both intensified by hate and anger in the object--though this may often occasion fear--but fear1 on the contrary1 is greatly weakened1 and sometimes turned into hate or anger1 by perceiving its object as fearing it4 ,i naturally hate those and am angered with those whom ,i perceive as having the same passions against me2 but he whom ,i see fearing me does not thereby inspire my fear for him1 but tends in quite the contrary direction4 ,yet mutual fear in equally matched opponents is consistent with mutual anger and hate4 ,fear1 with those who are capable of inflicting about equal losses on each other1 acts as a check upon anger and hate1 and gives caution and wariness to passion itself4 ,the object of hate then differs from that of anger and fear1 as being invariably a psychic quality in another as injurious to one's own interests4 ,injuriousness per se does not excite hate as it may anger and fear4 ,animals1 indeed1 often seem to hate that which has no psychic attitude toward them1 and may be wholly incapable of it2 but this is error of judgment1 just as we ourselves often find ourselves wrong in hating where we supposed there was evil feeling toward us1 but where we now see there is none4 ,hate disappears the moment we discover our mistake of interpretation4 ,while hate often views its object very largely from the retrospective side1 as opposed to fear and anger1 which are generally prospective1 yet hate originally must have applied to the present or latent potency of the object for harm1 for only in this wise does it reach self-conservative value4 ,in early psychic life there is no time or place for purely retrospective emotion like revenge and resentment4 ,hate is not essentially a paying back for the past offence1 but a will-inciting emotion of immediate1 or imminently prospective value4 ,in fact1 though we say1 8he has done me injury and ,i hate him for it10 yet we do not hate the dead injurer or the one so crippled as to be entirely powerless against us4 ,certainly there is no value for our interests in injuring the one who is past injuring us1 and from the self-conservative point of view to exercise ourselves in hate or anger in such a case is to waste energy4 ,feeling for what has been done against us1 purely as such1 is plainly sheer waste of force4 ,the past is irretrievable1 and emotion about it is valuable for life only so far as the past implies the future4 ,thus it is that hate1 arising because of self-conservative value1 and developing under natural selection1 never becomes wholly retrospective4 ,hate then is at first much the same in its elements as anger4 ,it is always objective4 ,hate is always of something1 though extreme passion dulls perception1 yet at its normal tension hate1 like other emotions1 is incentive to beneficial cognition4 ,we are closely observant of those we hate4 ,beside sense of object1 there is the will-stirring1 the hostility1 which is prominent in anger1 though here more controlled and not so impetuous and nave4 ,hate thus often allies itself with fear1 but anger is very rarely coincident with it1 though there may be rapid alternations4 ,there is also a hate pain which is a parallel complex to the anger pain already analysed4 ,we might term hate a distilled anger1 and yet this signifies little1 for the innermost emotion seems very distinct4 ,like fear and anger1 hate seems a genus by itself1 and in its essential feature as emotion-reaction1 quite beyond scientific analysis1 which can point out its conditions1 but not account for their total value or for the peculiar quality of hate disturbance by which hate is hate4 ,hate can be appreciated only by realization1 but no matter how long we reflect upon and try to catch its exact nature in some definite formula1 the essence of hate always eludes1 and presents itself as only a bare simple psychosis wholly indefinable and inexplicable in its essential nature4 ,but if we turn now to the origin and development of hate1 shall we arrive at anything more satisfactory8 ,is hate a modified anger1 or is it from the first a wholly distinct emotion and not slowly differentiated from any preceding psychosis8 ,hate evidently belongs with anger as aggressive emotional reaction1 but it is very hard to see how it could originate by any slow growth1 and it seems easier and simpler to regard it as being a unique response to some very pressing demand in the struggle of existence4 ,the whole subject of mental differentiation needs clarifying4 ,are we to consider mind merely as a sum of many distinct modes each of which has1 in the course of evolution1 appeared suddenly in answer to the demands of life at a critical period1 and is faint1 indeed1 yet from the first having a distinct and peculiar quality by which it suitably stimulates will1 and that the sole growth of these diverse forms has been in intensity and by various associations with other states8 or are we to consider that mind was originally a very general vague state1 which1 by a continuous and traceable differentiation1 has slowly developed into many different modes8 ,certainly the latter seems the more rational4 ,to conceive that there are no essential and radical subdivisions in mind1 that not even knowing1 feeling1 and willing1 are fundamentally primitive1 but each1 and each form of each1 but modifications of precedent modes1 this is a theory which is enticing in its simplicity and in its analogy to physical evolution from a single underlying material element4 ,but when we come to particular investigations1 as this of the origin and development of hate1 we cannot well discover any modes intermediate between it and say1 anger1 which are the links in a continuous evolution1 but for aught we can see or conceive1 hate is as much hate the first time it appears as at any subsequent time4 ,the links in the evolution of mind from phase to phase are all missing1 and how are we to supply them8 ,of necessity as subjective facts they must first be realized1 before they can be known1 but how can this be done by a consciousness which has long outgrown them8 ,we cannot discover these fossil and extinct forms objectively1 as the paleontologist discovers extinct species1 but in some way we must re-enact and re-experience them in our own consciousness before we can know anything about them4 ,if every mind embryologically passes through the several stages of its general evolution in the race1 still the strange intermediate forms which might then have existed are beyond the recall of the reflective stage1 when we first demand to know the history of mind4 ,and when we appeal to comparative psychology we are equally in the dark1 for we must judge animals by ourselves1 we can interpret their consciousness only by our own1 and they may have very rude and peculiar forms which are unknown and unknowable by us4 ,thus the limitations and difficulties of subjective research are especially brought up to us in evolutionary study which thus seems wholly confined to a priori speculation4 ,while we can conceive it likely that hate was suddenly brought into full being by the demands of life1 yet it is hardly a rational view of emotion to regard it as a per saltum series of distinct psychical species called successively into being by the exigencies of existence1 which indeed1 is a view almost as ultra-scientific as that which regards all mental modes as direct endowments from ,deity4 ,but though on general scientific analogy we are led to believe in fossil mental forms1 in missing psychic links now extinct as regards our own consciousness1 but which were the germs of our present distinct emotions1 perceptions1 etc41 how are we to discover and investigate them8 ,can we work our own consciousness back through the multitudinous stages of its past evolution1 through myriads of human and pre-human forms to the confused1 primal1 undifferentiated psychoses8 ,certainly the forms which lead up to such an emotion as hate and from which it is gradually evolved must be realized1 must be actually felt in some measure before they can be understood and analyzed4 ,here then seems a great barrier to introspective evolutionary psychology1 perhaps insuperable1 for how can mind retrace itself1 involute itself1 in the interests of science8 ,mind is fundamentally action1 motive-feeling1 which1 in connection with cognitive forms gradually achieved1 becomes from mere pure pleasure-pain a very complex manifold4 ,we feel many of these forms in our own experience1 and we can say of some that they are the higher1 of others that they are the lower and more primitive4 ,thus fear1 anger1 and hate are generally regarded as low action-motives as compared with love of truth or justice4 ,but while we distinguish in our own consciousness and by analogy in the consciousness of others a considerable variety of psychic forms1 they are1 so far as we are able to see--and we have given some special attention to this in discussing fear and other emotions--invariably distinct1 and each has its own peculiar quality1 and we do not find1 and we should not expect to find1 the intermediate forms any more than the anatomist would expect to find in man a radial starfish structure4 ,the hazy1 indefinite phases which mark evolving consciousness into new forms have been long done away with for such emotions as hate1 and it would seem an impossible task to ever bring them back4 ,when we let consciousness lapse of its own regressive tendency--and undirected consciousness tends always to revert to wild states--we fall down through a series1 but it is by steps1 and no gradual descent1 that is1 defined mental forms succeed each other1 with no transitional phases which are both as differentiating into either4 ,we have mixed states1 indeed1 but these have no evolutionary value in this line1 being merely coincident distinct psychoses1 and not an intermediate differentiating mode4 ,the psychoses which we call lower and which we naturally fall into1 were really a higher level once for some remote ancestors1 and it was only by occasional great efforts that fear1 anger1 hate1 etc41 were reached1 by just such efforts as now are required by many a worldling who would be religious and would attain a feeling for holiness1 or that of a ,philistine1 ambitious of reaching sthetic feeling1 who endeavours to appreciate the refined1 elaborate power in a poem by ,rossetti1 or the simple human grandeur in a painting by ,millet4 ,in some forms we know what it is to try to feel1 to have dim and vague stirring of sthetic emotion1 and to reach new levels in emotion generally1 and we know the stages of differentiation and the severe nisus of the earlier realizations4 ,on the nisus side of our psychic life there is abundant opportunity for every one to observe the process of mental differentiation1 and how slowly evolving a new emotion is1 for instance1 before it reaches a definite form1 but there is the great range of purely natural1 spontaneous life1 deriving its whole impetus from ancestral minds1 where1 as in hate and anger1 it is impossible to study the slowly modifying forms precursory to the distinct mode4 ,how can we find or produce in ourselves a state which is not yet hate1 but merely hate in becoming1 a half-differentiated1 half-evolved hate8 ,if we could put ourselves on the nisus side1 and look up to hate as something to be reached1 instead of something we may fall into1 we might attain some idea of its process of formation4 ,but since hate1 anger1 and so forth1 invariably come upon us and overcome us1 how can we appreciate their evolutionary stages8 ,if we could trace these old intermediate disused forms which merely lead up to others1 we should find them very strange1 and should need an entirely new nomenclature for them4 ,but to reach back and realize long outgrown and fossil psychoses1 will1 if ever possible1 require more exertion and ability than even the intense struggle of the actual psychical advances which adds1 by the efforts of exceptional individuals--8geniuses0--new modes of cognition and feeling to the mind of a race4 ,to regress beyond a certain point is harder than to progress4 ,how then hate developed from non-hate1 from anger1 or from any other emotion1 is obviously a very difficult problem4 ,it would seem to us in our present stage of mentality that the first hate phenomenon was definitely and inexplicably such4 ,we cannot perceive or conceive how the origin of hate is other than a sudden apparition of a new and elementary emotion in response to an extraordinary call upon some extraordinary organism in its life career4 ,yet we may easily believe that the direct occasion of its rise and progress was as complement to anger4 ,anger is certainly in general a very advantageous self-conservative factor1 but by reason of its violence it requires a vast amount of vital energy to accomplish its end1 and it thus also tends to disturb the cognitive power in its clear and cool actions4 ,a burst of passion1 though it may succeed in destroying the injurious1 is both uneconomical and unintelligent4 ,it is also a very transient phase4 ,anger will be defeated and supplanted in the evolution of life by some factor which has not these incidental disadvantages4 ,hate is such a superior psychosis1 and is surer1 steadier1 and more economical than anger1 and defeats it in the long run4 ,hate then may be taken to exemplify the principle of antithetic evolution4 ,we are careful not to raise the anger of some men and of some animals1 and thus anger1 or the capacity for anger1 serves them as advantage and defence4 ,we fear to make them mad4 ,however1 the antagonists of many individuals1 knowing the weakening effect of such a strong emotion as anger1 and knowing also how apt the angry one is to 8lose his head10 purposely stimulate anger to their own advantage1 and the disadvantage of the angered4 ,thus1 cunning and wary animals1 impelled by hate1 often tease and torment their stronger and larger adversaries and competitors into a furious rage1 which is so rash and unintelligent that they are completely at the mercy of the weaker4 ,where in such a way as this an advantageous variation is turned into disadvantageous by an opposing form1 as anger by hate1 we have what may be called an antithetic evolution4 ,new psychic variations are then continually stimulated by the earlier1 and it is only for a short time that any variation maintains itself as purely beneficial1 but an answering one soon takes advantage of its weak points and turns it from self-conservative into self-destructive4 ,under the constant success of opposing factors1 there is gradual loss of value and soon disuse1 with the inception of some new form to combat more effectively the opponent4 ,this opposing form meanwhile attains dominancy1 culminates1 and is gradually ousted by some variation which has been attained in order to meet the new weapons on the other side4 ,thus1 in the battle of life1 offence and defence1 attack versus retreat and counter-attack1 mutually stimulate to a series of new and higher antithetic psychic variations4 ,the so-called problem of evil is1 then1 tolerably easy to a thorough-going evolutionist4 ,all developments1 all perversions which are self-destructive rather than self-conservative to the individual1 have received their original stimulus from other antagonistic individuals to whose interest it is to promote these evils to the utmost4 ,what is an evil to me is first so much of a good to him whose interest lies in defeating and destroying me1 and he will take advantage of all my weaknesses to his own profit4 ,competition and struggle involve the existence of evils to individuals who are conquered and maltreated in the battle of life4 ,disease and death itself is necessary to evolution on a finite sphere4 ,as long as the good and desirable is limited as compared with the number of those who want1 competition must exist1 and this competition must be by both cultivating advantageous variations in ourselves1 and also by cultivating the disadvantageous variations latent in our enemies4 ,thus1 evil sown in others that our own good may be advanced is the general law of all life4 ,to injure as much as possible all those who oppose1 and to get as many as possible well affected towards us1 and to be subservient to our ends1 this is the meaning of psychical evolution in all its earlier1 and most of its later1 course4 ,on any scheme of evolution by struggle1 evil to particular individuals is a necessary fact4 ,we throw1 then1 the problem back to how and why life arose and developed through this competition mode2 and all science at present can say is that it is the 8nature of things10 an expression which covers ignorance and is really metaphysical4 ,in all its later stages anger1 and likewise hate as well1 and all the allied emotions1 attach only to what is distinctly known as animate4 ,the futility and self-destructiveness of anger against the inanimate and insentient comes to be fully recognised4 ,but early anger is quite undiscriminating4 ,the hunter1 who1 pursued by an enraged bear1 scatters his clothes and accoutrements behind him for the bear to tear in pieces1 takes advantage of the unintelligent anger of the bear for his own ends4 ,since animals do not wear clothes they have no conception of what they are as independent insentient things distinct from the wearer4 ,to the bear the weapons and clothes dropped by the hunter appear not as inanimate beings1 but as living1 vitally-connected parts of the creature pursued4 ,the error arose1 not from senselessness1 but from lack of range of experience1 and it is akin to the error of the ancient ,mexicans who1 having never seen a horse by itself1 regarded a man on horseback as a single creature4 ,a dog1 the first time he sees his master unclothed1 is greatly puzzled1 and but slowly learns that clothes are something the master has and not what he is4 ,when weapons1 clothes1 etc41 are at length distinguished as property1 there is yet a natural and right impulse to destroy them as injuring the owner2 but the animal which stops to do this commits an error of judgment1 as it is usually of more importance to despatch the hunter than to destroy his implements4 ,it is the tendency of anger to destroy all which is in any wise connected with its object4 ,this is true1 not only of the animal world1 but also of the lower human development4 ,a savage in a fit of fury will slay1 not only an offending fellow1 but also his family and relations1 and also destroy all his property4 ,the uselessness1 not to say the injustice1 of such an indulgence of anger is only recognised at a comparatively late stage of evolution4 ,anger in its later form concerns itself only with purposive offence in its object1 and vents itself solely on the individual offending4 ,a clear distinction is drawn between animate and inanimate4 ,thus1 my dog1 playing with another1 hurt itself by running into a tree1 and gave an angry growl2 but noticing the real nature of the paingiver as1 not the other dog1 but an inoffensive tree1 his attitude immediately changed1 and he seemed to take the injury as a matter of course4 ,a puppy would in like case senselessly continue its demonstrations of anger to no good and perhaps to its own injury4 ,as to the function of anger and hate1 this has already been intimated in the remarks we have just made on its origin and development4 ,for function it is which gives rise to organ and activity2 in some unknown1 mysterious way the pressing life-struggle for useful mental activity determines ultimately its appearance4 ,we know that extremely hard conditions1 which would threaten the continued existence of animate life as a whole1 or of any large subdivision1 would give rise to new perceptions and emotions by which a saving remnant would escape2 and on this principle we must expect the most signal psychic advance of the future at that seemingly remote period when mankind will be threatened with extinction by the slow refrigeration of the earth4 ,a long-continued uniformity of easy conditions of life1 as in the tropics1 is distinctly unfavourable to psychic progress2 but let a glacial period invade that zone1 and the changed conditions would awaken such a struggle for existence in all organisms1 man included1 that new organic and mental types would be developed4 ,the necessities of existence and the self-interest of the individual in an unceasingly sharp competition develop slowly in the few those mental modes which1 from their functional importance1 become the heritage of a race and genus2 and these 8sports0 thereby secure to themselves a certain temporary dominancy4 ,this is the history of life in general1 and of man in particular4 ,how demand determines supply1 how necessity is the mother of invention1 is obvious enough in man1 who1 clearly conceiving the function1 sets about by his knowledge of means to accomplish the needed improvement2 but in the lower life1 which is incapable of such teleological foresight1 we can only say that through pain of lack in the altered conditions of existence there is stimulated a blind1 intense struggle1 which1 moving out in all lines1 somewhere1 at sometime1 by mere chance hitting on the right variation1 sticks to it and accomplishes its own salvation1 and leaves descendants who tend in the same direction4 ,new psychic qualities1 as well as new physical organs1 are in some way gradually determined through struggle which is practically blind4 ,that mental variation1 that bodily variation1 which was incessantly demanded in the struggle of existence does somehow ultimately appear1 is1 indeed1 a fact which1 for the present at least1 we can only state in this indefinite1 unsatisfactory manner4 ,blind1 pain-impelled will1 fiercely striking out in every direction1 does at length1 achieve those new psychical and physical forms which are most needed by life4 ,the chance serviceable variation is fixed and continued by reason of its serviceability2 but when its utility wanes by reason of new life factors appearing or new conditions of existence1 it is lost by disuse1 or survives in rudimentary forms4 ,the function of hate is1 like anger1 to injure and eliminate the injurious2 but what anger accomplishes by a sudden volcanic outburst1 hate accomplishes in a slower1 but surer and more subtle way4 ,hate is1 as previously pointed out1 a manifest improvement over anger as a method of offensive warfare4 ,other things being equal1 the best hater is the most successful individual4 ,dr4 ,johnson had reason on his side when he said that he loved a good hater4 ,a strong hater1 who pertinaciously assails and injures his enemies1 strengthens his own position and makes the largest place for himself in life4 ,hate1 as a permanent1 economically aggressive motion1 marks certainly a great advance1 and is of the highest import for life4 ,if now hate has its own function as direct stimulus to offensive action toward those who will be injurious1 toward those who are capable and likely to pain and harm us1 how shall we explain the hate--and we might say anger as well--which arises at mere remembrance of injury1 and which seems to have no immediate value for life8 ,in the first place we may well doubt whether any purely retrospective emotion exists1 at least in early psychic life4 ,the past1 of course1 has no value in and by itself2 it is irretrievable1 and emotional force spent upon it as such wasted--8no use crying for spilled milk40 ,it may well be that for simple psychisms the past never exists as such2 at least1 it is never a stopping point1 but a mere datum for interpreting the inexperienceable4 ,the sense of experience1 especially in its temporal aspect1 is very difficult of analysis2 yet we may say with some confidence that at first it does not imply a sense of either the past or future as such4 ,the mind is immediately impressed by the injuriousness of the injurious1 which1 though coming1 of course1 in terms of the experienced1 is not relegated thereby to a past time1 nor is it at all dwelt upon as such for emotion reaction4 ,primitive emotion is not backward looking2 for this is in itself entirely futile1 and primitive life depends for its existence and progress upon utility4 ,the value of emotion is in stimulating preparedness for defence and offence4 ,the representation of injury inflicted comes up to early mind as some injury being inflicted1 or imminently so1 or is applied at once in interpretation of the experienceable1 with no thought or emotion for it as merely past fact4 ,advanced psychic life may stop at the first step1 may indulge in retrospection for its own sake1 and not for its immediate value in understanding the experienceable1 but primitive emotion is ever an alertness and anticipatory readiness4 ,if1 now1 we turn to some classification of the anger group in itself and in its general relation to emotion1 we obtain something like the following3-- ,reaction to ,regressive--fear4 ,emotion4 injurious4 ,aggressive--anger4 ,reaction to ,receptive4 beneficial4 ,appropriative4 ,simple anger or wrath4 ,intensive--,rage or fury4 ,incipient--,displeasure4 ,mild--,irritation4 ,response to purposive injury--,hate4 ,anger ,altruistic--,indignation4 ,sentiment--,indignation and ,hate4 ,retrospective--,resentment4 ,revenge4 ,sub-hate--,detestation4 ,despite4 ,scorn4 ,but few remarks need to be added to elucidate the outline4 ,exasperation is plainly a late form of anger4 ,it belongs to the period when anger has been subjected to will restraint1 and when something passes all bounds of forbearance--is 8perfectly maddening0--we are exasperated4 ,anger of a high and peculiar intensity produced by special and repeated provocation is known as exasperation4 ,for intensive hate there seems no special word1 at least1 in ,english1 though we denote it by adjective as bitter1 malignant1 virulent4 ,detest sometimes means strong hatred4 ,malice is not an emotion2 it is a state of mind which is implied in hate1 namely1 deliberate intent to injure4 ,we do not say we feel malicious2 but if we hate1 we are malicious4 ,malice is merely an objective term for a will element in hate1 and denotes character of act4 ,the sight of injury done to others produces indignation4 ,when law or principle injured and violated excites indignation or hate1 we have that feeling for the abstract--rarely pure--which is termed sentiment4 ,he who is indignant at injustice and he who hates sin have risen to the highest evolution of the anger group4 ,for an account of resentment and revenge see chapter on ,retrospective ,emotion4 ,in the earlier stages both anger and hate are rather undiscriminating as to rank or status of opposing object1 but in later evolution there must be a sense of equality4 ,when we consider the offending ones as entirely below us1 as unworthy of our anger or hate1 we detest or despise4 ,our relations with them may compel us to notice them and to have some feeling toward them1 but we would not lower ourselves to fight them4 ,to detest is to feel a strong revulsion1 but it also in measure has a direct objective movement4 ,still1 although detestation1 despising1 scorn1 contempt1 are by no means so actively aggressive as the other members of the group1 they have evidently a direct affiliation with hate and anger4 ,in all these there is direct repulse of all relation with what is below us1 a position holding off and looking down upon the offending object as too small and mean for us to seriously oppose4 ,we cannot at present elaborate more fully an analysis1 a genetic investigation1 nor a classification1 of what must appear to every attentive student of mind as a most important and extraordinary group of psychic phenomena4 ,in all the lower psychic life with every perception comes an emotion reaction1 very generally either of a fear or anger character4 ,everything perceived has a definite life meaning1 nothing is indifferent1 and1 in fact1 primitive perception cannot exist except as prompting and being prompted by emotion or feeling4 ,for the low psychism there is no such vast collection of practically indifferent objects1 a world of things1 as maintains a constant and large place in advanced psychism4 ,lower mental life is piecemeal1 inconsequent and broken1 and wholly directed by feeling phases4 ,every object has its place only in relation to self-interest1 as favouring or injuring4 ,this is impressed upon those who have made any study of lower human types1 and of wild animals1 where your very presence1 no matter how accidental and really meaningless1 is construed as suggesting detriment1 and suspicion is aroused1 a preparatory stage to some fear or anger exhibition1 one of those being often nascent1 though sometimes not very active owing to the lack of full certainty as to your injuriousness4 ,for the savage1 who is incapable of disinterestedness1 and wholly given up to self-seeking1 the missionary and scientist must have some hidden personal motive1 some intent to take advantage of them1 and profit by them4 ,from the first they are regarded with fear1 anger1 or hate4 ,the strange and peculiar is hated merely for being unlike the self1 and all non-conformity means personal slight and insult4 ,with primitive psychism all objects are coloured by a strong emotion light1 and this remains a tendency till the latest stages of evolution4 ,anger and hate have by no means spent their force1 even for human evolution in some of its more advanced forms4 ,we all recognise the necessity of 8spirit0 to success4 ,the one who is incapable of anger and of venting it powerfully is a weakling1 and will be trodden under foot in the battle of life4 ,the high sense of personal honour and advantage1 which will brook no insult with impunity1 or allow no injury to go unpunished and unresented1 is still the sine qua non of worldly success4 ,show anger1 hate1 and defiance to all those who invade your rights2 stand up and fight the battle of life against every oncomer1 and secure and hold the position against all competitors4 ,in the natural course of events--the struggle for self-conservation and self-aggrandizement--the meek do not inherit the earth1 but rather those who are irascibly aggressive4 ,the most notable revolution in human history against the general course of evolution which we have been considering has come from ,christianity4 ,the world says1 8,if any one smite you on the cheek1 hit him between the eyes02 the ,nazarene says1 8,offer him the other cheek also02 the world says1 8,if any one takes away your cloak1 fall upon him and despoil him of his all02 the ,nazarene says1 8,give him your coat also02 the world says1 8,hate your enemies02 the ,nazarene says1 8,love your enemies1 bless them which curse you1 and do good to them that despitefully use you40 ,the law of natural evolution by fear1 anger1 hate1 strife1 is replaced by a new law of a spiritual evolution through forbearance1 humility1 love1 loyalty to truth1 to beauty1 to goodness1 and to holiness in a kingdom not of this 8world40 ,life consists1 not in making friends and fighting enemies1 but in a fight with one's self to realize unselfish ideals1 to exemplify the highest principles and laws1 and to achieve the largest and best work1 without regard to self-conservation or self-aggrandizement4 ,in this radically new evolution the mind is for itself1 and is not1 as in the lower evolution1 merely a utilitarian factor1 subservient to the general demands of life4 ,life1 on the contrary1 here becomes subservient to the development of mentality purely for its own sake4 ,thus pure science1 art for art's sake1 an independent morality and religion1 become possible4 ,the greatest minds of the race are those who have lived most completely this highest life2 but this new form scarcely touches the great bulk of humanity1 and is very partially developed even in the so-called highest classes4 ,but it is not our present purpose to survey the higher evolution1 or to point out its rationale4 ,for the lower evolution1 however1 it is tolerably evident that fear1 anger and hate1 give the dominant tone to psychic life4 ,these strong1 direct emotions act as fundamental life factors2 without them the individual would be quickly overwhelmed in the struggle for existence4 ,the conditions of early life absolutely require these simple1 nave emotions to stimulate advantageous reactions4 ,emotional indifferentism is possible only as an artificial and by-product1 a sort of disease or abnormal symptom even in the very latest phases of human evolution4 ,the comparative psychology of the future will show more and more clearly and fully the nature and function of both the fear and anger groups as factors in biologic evolution4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,surprise ,,and ,,disappointment1 ,,emotion ,,of ,,novelty ,to anticipate what is to occur is plainly one of the most useful achievements of mind1 for all providence implies apprehension and emotion therewith4 ,but to look before and after is certainly not the prerogative of man alone1 but anticipatory power is found throughout the realm of mind1 and constitutes the larger portion of all cognition4 ,to know a thing means1 in general1 to appreciate its potentiality2 and all science is really prescience4 ,knowledge is not the immediate sensation1 but the meaning of it for life2 it is the ideal translation from one sense to another in feeling tendency4 ,thus1 to scent is by itself a useless acquirement1 but the connecting it with desired food is of the utmost service4 ,the psychism gradually attains the power to interpret by various media the nature1 that is1 the experienceability1 of the environment4 ,to foresee is then one of the commonest events in mind1 and according to the painfulness or pleasurability foreseen is felt anger or fear1 hope or desire1 or allied emotions4 ,but the foreseen does not always come to pass1 and hence there results a new order of intellectual and emotional reaction4 ,that what we had in mind would happen comes not1 or is other than foreseen2 this has a disturbing effect on cognition and emotion4 ,prescience defeated becomes not merely nescience1 but there is the positive definite shock of surprise1 and the emotion of disappointment or some correlated form4 ,surprise as the sense of contrast of real and ideal1 involving personal sense of limitation and error1 is1 as we have noted 7pp4 #ej ff471 a painful experience4 ,but where there is no preconceived notion1 no expectation1 there is no surprise1 as ,lumholtz remarks of the ,australian savages1 that they are not surprised at the railway and other wonders of civilization2 they do not know enough to be surprised4 ,the full apprehension and understanding of the gap between ideal and real is but very slowly attained4 ,at first the thwarting is naturally and easily attributed to an enemy1 and there is anger and pertinacious violence1 but ultimately1 by sad and repeated experience1 mind is led to notice its own insufficiency1 to feel that the conflict between the actual and the expected is due to subjective error rather than objective interference4 ,genuine surprise1 as distinct from mere nervous shock1 is then1 ,i think1 a later phenomenon than is generally supposed4 ,what is often taken for surprise with animals and children is really eager attention4 ,again1 certain modes of fright are often taken for surprise4 ,but experience must have made a considerable advance in apprehension of experienceability before a real surprise can be manifested1 which is always the correlative of a sudden contrariness of experience to what was preconceived4 ,surprise involves a certain measure of a theory of experience2 in short1 a more or less definite body of knowledge4 ,one who has framed no ideas of what experience should be can never be really surprised at whatever may happen4 ,however1 to be able to feel surprise is obviously very advantageous1 to have a painful and sharp sense of the incongruity of real and ideal often conducts to that investigation which results in being prepared against being surprised in the same way again4 ,the imperfectness of adaptation is thus consciously and intelligently remedied4 ,the man of large resources1 cautious nature1 and keen insight and foresight1 is little liable to be surprised1 for in all circumstances he accurately forecasts a very wide range of possibilities4 ,when the good expected comes in less measure than was foreseen1 or not at all1 or some real evil instead1 there is not merely surprise1 but disappointment as well4 ,when what is confidently expected does not happen1 the emotional reaction is surprise2 when what is eagerly hoped for does not occur1 disappointment is the result4 ,i am disappointed in not receiving a certain remittance ,i had hoped for4 ,here the ought to be1 the expected1 is ranged over against the actual not1 as in surprise1 as a sudden and painful change in cognition1 but solely for the personal advantage missed4 ,disappointment is bound up with the sense of personal loss and detriment from the happening contrary to expectation4 ,feeling of disappointment is thus emotional reaction from cognizance of evil result where good is looked for4 ,the more it was hoped for1 the more bitter the disappointment4 ,this disappointment has its function as an emphatic protest against impracticality2 the lessons of experience are thus brought home and made memorable4 ,disappointment turns life from false dreams to stern realities2 it prompts to an investigation of causes1 and rouses cognition to a full understanding of the situation4 ,hope thereby becomes more and more rational and realizable4 ,in all disappointment we note that the feeling is not about the past as such1 but is with reference to the immediately actual in its unexpected bearing on life4 ,thus it is not strictly retrospective emotion4 ,though often initial to regret and grief1 it should not be confounded with these4 ,a curiously illogical remark1 and one not uncommonly heard1 is1 8,i hope you will succeed1 but do not be disappointed if you don't40 ,this is really a psychological ,hibernicism4 ,hope is the foundation of disappointment1 and one cannot say1 8hope1 but do not be disappointed10 in the same breath with definite meaning4 ,we cannot escape the painful implications of unfulfilled desire3 we cannot both have our cake and eat it too4 ,some measure of expectation of success is implied in all futuritive effort1 hence a like measure of disappointment4 ,the real sense of any such admonition can only be for moderating desire1 and so tempering possible reaction4 ,the expression in question amounts to little else than a phrase of well-wishing1 but with little confidence in the actual result4 ,from the feeling of surprise and its congener1 disappointment1 it is natural to turn to the feeling for novelty4 ,surprise and novelty both relate1 but in different ways1 to the character of the experience in relation to other experiences4 ,the strangeness1 however1 in what is surprising1 and which makes it surprising1 is not intrinsic1 but wholly relative to a preconception4 ,thunder is familiar to me1 but it may surprise me if it occur in ,january1 and also totally out of my preconceived order2 but a friend who has neither heard1 nor heard of1 thunder1 will not be surprised by the sound in ,january1 though he may be startled1 and may feel the novelty of the phenomenon4 ,the novel1 purely as such1 cannot surprise1 for there is no field for the expectation which is the foundation of surprise4 ,the surprising is always contrary to expectation1 but the novel is simply unexpected1 not in the range of thought and conception in any manner4 ,a novel experience is one which has previously been unexperienced1 and the feeling of novelty is the feeling of it as such1 while a surprising experience goes quite against all we look for1 and is often familiar and common enough1 though sometimes it is novel1 as when the absolutely new experience and not some familiar experience comes in place of the expected experience4 ,if the man to whom thunder is novel is awaiting merely the pattering of rain1 the crash of thunder will excite both feelings of surprise and novelty4 ,in this case he is surprised before he feels the novelty of the surprising event4 ,a feeling for the novelty of an experience implies sense of experience and experienceable1 and is thus debarred from primitive consciousness1 which is merely a series of disconnected flashes1 occurring a few times at the critical moments in an organism's life4 ,it is probable that in the origin of mind the first consciousness was the last1 an entirely unique and isolated phenomenon in the animal's life1 hence supremely novel4 ,however1 at first1 and undoubtedly also in later mind1 consciousness but slowly rises to the sense of novelty of consciousness as such4 ,after a long period of unconsciousness from any cause we do not appreciate returning consciousness as per se a comparatively novel phenomenon4 ,in early mind every experience is practically a new experience1 and so novel1 but as there is no cognizance of experience in any light1 and least of all in this light which is rather remote from immediate practicality1 the feeling for novelty does not occur4 ,sense of novelty implies a comparison of experience purely for its own sake1 certainly a very late acquirement4 ,thus in primitive mind1 though all experiences are uniformly fresh1 yet they are not appreciated as such4 ,the feeling for novelty must always rest upon a considerable body of experience unified by ego-sense and apprehended as such1 that is1 consciousness of novelty implies both consciousness of consciousness and self-consciousness4 ,the consciousness of novelty is thus far from being equivalent to novel consciousness4 ,whenever1 even in advanced mind1 a novel consciousness occurs1 we should be over hasty if we at once concluded that feeling of novelty was also experienced4 ,the first step in life is to get an experience1 to struggle into a consciousness which may be immediately valuable1 and which is at once emotional and motor in its action2 the second step is to compare and identify the experience gained so as to ascertain its meaning for life with greater certainty4 ,recognition thus comes early into play1 but while the sphere of the sense of the novel lies in that of the unrecognised1 it does not in any wise occupy the whole1 for much that is unrecognised still is far from conveying feeling of novelty1 because this feeling is1 as we have said1 far from being experienced on every presentation of the novel4 ,the novel is equivalent rather to the unrecognisable4 ,a dog may lose in a few months the power of recognising its master1 yet the master after such a lapse of time cannot be said to awaken sense of novel4 ,though not recognised for master he is recognised as one of many familiar objects1 he is known to be a man1 and that is as far as the identification goes4 ,the experience then is in reality not a fresh one4 ,here is a new man but there is nothing novel in the experience1 much less is there a feeling of novelty4 ,i doubt much if a dog or any lower animal notices and appreciates pleasurably or painfully the novel as such4 ,the unrecognisable and unclassifiable presented to them may agitate them in various ways1 as contrast a horse and a courageous dog on first seeing a locomotive1 but there is no evidence of real feeling of the novelty of the experience as such4 ,the enjoyment of the novel for its own sake is probably wholly confined to late human psychism4 ,it must1 indeed1 be granted that change from monotonous or confining circumstances is appreciated and appreciated pleasurably by lower animals1 though they may not know enough to seek change for its own sake4 ,animals certainly suffer from ennui1 and enjoy variety within certain limits1 but change is not newness1 and absolute change or novelty in strict sense hardly appeals to them1 that is1 they do not appreciate the novelty of a situation4 ,the really novel disturbs them1 they do not desire it nor are pleased with it4 ,it is only in fact in the higher ranges of human mind that experience of any kind1 novel or various1 comes to be sought for its own sake4 ,to say1 8this is a novel sensation10 or 8how novel and delightful10 and all similar expressions1 denotes a frame of mind which is artificial1 that is1 lies away from and beyond the common course of psychism under natural selection4 ,the changefulness of experience and the novelty of an experience are in reality two distinct elements4 ,one who has been ill in bed for weeks enjoys the change in sitting up in his arm chair1 but there is no real novelty or sense of novelty4 ,everything1 we say1 is novel and interesting to the child1 tiresome and a bore to the blas man of the world4 ,the world is1 in truth1 fresh and new to the child1 but the sense of the novel per se is very slowly developed1 and the rarer the novel becomes1 the more keen our appreciation of it4 ,where all is novel1 there can be no sense of novelty1 for this is purely a contrast type of psychosis4 ,the zest and eagerness of the child proceeds from radically other sentiments than the feeling for novelty2 it is absorbed in things for themselves and what they directly give1 and does not stop to reflect and feel about the relations of experiences1 and so feel the novel as such4 ,further we note that pleasing novelties are far from being equally pleasing as such4 ,it may be as novel to carry a potato in my pocket as a double eagle1 but not equally pleasing4 ,the real value of novelty for emotion must always be carefully determined by subtracting accessory feelings4 ,with regard to the relation of novelty to pleasure and pain1 the novel and the sense of the novel is always in its inception under evolution by natural selection unpleasant and painful4 ,a novel experience is one which can only originate in painful struggle1 and the new is always per se distasteful to early mind1 which is ever conservative in its instincts and tendencies4 ,a perfect life1 biologically speaking1 is one which is perfectly adapted to its environment1 and so goes through its evolution with mechanically exact adjustment to circumstances2 and the novel would break in upon the unconscious rhythm which is here perfected4 ,habituation becomes so iron fast that the novel1 even when distinctly pleasurable in itself1 is resented1 much less is the novel sought for its own sake4 ,however1 so far as a novel experience may come rather by way of regressiveness than progressiveness1 it may delight us by its novelty whenever the mind becomes capable of appreciating novelty4 ,thus purely hereditary tendencies1 which we do not accomplish but which are accomplished in us during youth1 as1 for instance1 the sexual evolution1 may charm1 not only in themselves1 but for their novelty as well4 ,but this experience which is not merely novel to the individual as springing up spontaneously by impetus from the past1 but which is novel for the race1 and requires effort to assimilate1 and so is in the distinct line of higher evolution1 as1 the achieving a high spiritual sentimentality in love2 this1 the real novel1 is inevitably and naturally painful4 ,the first time the emotion of humility--a comparatively recent evolution--was experienced by a human being was a truly novel experience1 though it is quite uncertain whether there was with it either sense or sentiment of novelty4 ,if the novel and the novel experience--and these terms are practically identical--are essentially painful1 whence and how arises the peculiar pleasure which we undeniably may experience in connection with the novel appreciated as such8 ,must all such pleasure be placed to the account of regressiveness8 ,but pleasure of this kind is intrinsic in the act itself and not for its novelty per se4 ,there is a wide variety of experience intrinsically either pleasurable or painful1 which may be pleasurable to us solely by reason of its novelty4 ,i may enjoy the novel experience of tasting a pomegranate1 be the actual experience agreeable or disagreeable1 merely enjoying the novelty as such4 ,what is this novelty1 why is it noticed1 and why does it give occasion to pleasure or pain in emotional form8 ,as we have already pointed out1 the sense of the novel and emotion about it cannot be said to arise with novel experiences in general4 ,the novel in the objective sense is the first occurrence of any given definite kind of psychosis1 as humility or pity1 in the history of mind1 and this novelty is probably not at first appreciated4 ,bain says that novelty is not an emotion1 but 8merely expresses the superior force of all stimulants on being first applied40 ,but from the point of view of psychic history the initial force of stimulants is always very inferior and slight4 ,for example1 to taste and to qualitatively distinguish tastes is an extremely slow growth in the race1 and by no means suddenly completed even in the offspring of the most advanced individuals4 ,place a drop of wormwood extract on an infant's tongue and it may have a novel sensation and a disagreeable one1 as evidenced by the reaction1 yet the real force of the sensation is certainly quite inferior to that of a ten year old child in the given case4 ,the absolutely new impression is always slight1 for mind is1 in the natural course of evolution1 always slow at fully experiencing things1 it is by effort and by effort alone that it attains the several orders of sensation and perception1 and it is only by effort that they are realized with greater and greater force and clearness4 ,by the very nature of psychic evolution as a progressive process toward helping adjustability the novel exercises at the first but a slight reaction4 ,however1 in the exigencies of existence the most wide awake1 those most susceptible to perceiving novelties and new circumstances and to being suitably affected by them1 have the advantage4 ,hence the apprehension1 interpretation1 and application1 of novelties is the path of progress which finally culminates in the achievements of human invention4 ,an openness to the novel is thus of prime importance in a practical way1 though this is quite distinct from the pleasing sense of novelty4 ,however1 the novel is not primarily attractive and interesting in and for itself1 but this must be accounted a late evolution in an artificial period4 ,the novel is at the first anything but charming4 ,the absolutely novel is never pleasant for its own sake4 ,it is only in a relative way that the objectively novel pleases1 that is1 in the way of variety and change4 ,where overflowing mental energy by reason of habituation finds no full and easy diverse activity the mind is hampered and constrained4 ,thus youth in particular finds delight and relief in new sights and sounds1 in fresh experiences of all kinds4 ,quickly wearied and exhausted in one channel and yet full of active power1 the mind springs rapidly from object to object along those lines which ancestral experience has rendered the lines of least resistance1 thus especially in the plays and sports of childhood4 ,while the novel in this way as change pleases1 yet there is no pleasing sense of novelty4 ,sensations1 sights1 sounds1 tastes1 etc41 please by their novelty1 there is a pleasure in the sensations not merely intrinsic but relative to previous experiences1 but the mind is not yet capable of the emotion of novelty which belongs to reflective consciousness4 ,the child may be pleased by the novel1 but is not consciously charmed by the novelty4 ,the sense of experience as novel1 and as such pleasing1 belongs to a higher grade of consciousness than the nave direct consciousness of the child4 ,novelty consciously known1 appreciated1 and sought for its own sake is a decidedly late evolution4 ,there is an emotion and emotion of pleasure which we may feel in view of the novel per se4 ,not merely the new object becomes the stimulant of a new and refreshing experience1 but this experience being known as novel by the reflecting consciousness1 and contrasted with other experiences1 there comes therewith a peculiar ripple of pleasurable emotion1 the emotion of the novel4 ,the first emotion of novelty is itself thereby a novel consciousness which might be1 to a very reflective self-conscious mind1 an object for another emotion of novelty4 ,in touching upon the emotion of novelty we have thus risen beyond the common course of natural selection1 to the point where experience values itself for its own sake4 ,in contrast to the emotion of novelty is the emotion of familiarity4 ,this might be discussed in a strictly parallel way to our discussion of the emotion of novelty4 ,it is founded upon likeness1 being the sentiment of likeness4 ,an absolute novelty1 the perfectly new1 is of course imperceptible as such1 and by the law of continuity cannot occur in nature4 ,some correlation with past experience is required to make the thing cognizable at all1 as is also some measure of unlikeness to make it distinguishable and so familiar4 ,the emotion of familiarity is much neglected by psychologists1 yet it forms a more important and a larger element in the pleasures of advanced mind than the emotion of novelty4 ,many of the delights of home and domestic life are tinged by it4 ,the pleasing sense of familiarity is1 of course1 most felt in contrast after some long experience of novelties1 as when the traveller returns home from a prolonged journey4 ,delight in the familiar for its own sake often largely prompts to the revisiting old scenes and renewing old habits4 ,the emotions of novelty and familiarity have a constant contrasting play in many men4 ,the familiar which is painful in itself may yet1 like the novel painful in itself1 be pleasurable4 ,we often welcome the familiar and novel purely for their own sake whatever be their actual hedonalgic,c content4 ,footnote ,c3 ,this adjective1 which ,i used before seeing ,mr4 ,marshall's 8algedonic10 more exactly expresses pleasure--pain quality4 ,noticed familiarity like novelty may be painful4 ,the disgusting emotion by which we may meet the unwelcome novelty1 has its correlate in the wearing sense of monotony from the regular return of the familiar even though it be intrinsically pleasurable4 ,in the reflective emotions we have touched upon but a single group1 the novelty-familiarity1 which is certainly a complex but interesting kind of psychoses4 ,in all this field we have rightly to separate mere sensitiveness to likeness and unlikeness--a tolerably early phenomenon--from sense of relatedness and unrelatedness of experiences in and for themselves4 ,consciousness of experience as such is the mark of a radically new type of consciousness1 quite set off from the nave unreflecting consciousness under the primitive conditions of natural selection and the struggle for existence4 ,the significance of this1 by which experience rests purely upon itself and is for itself1 leads into a wide region4 ,it is enough that we have instanced one of these later emotions in contrast to the directly serviceable emotions which have most concerned us in our present discussions1 without inquiring closely into its function4 ,it is evident that in the ordinary course of evolution the character of the situation as affecting life determines the serviceable emotion1 thus different kinds of harmful situations determine fear1 anger1 hate1 etc4 ,if a situation is really interesting for life1 it ultimately will be both known and felt in the progress of the struggle for existence just as surely as light1 colour1 sound1 etc41 are gradually appreciated4 ,hence we might predict that the novel situation and the incongruous situation would receive some advantageous cognitive and feeling response1 and that even emotions of novelty1 familiarity1 congruity1 and incongruity1 would arise1 as well as the feelings for these things1 if this were useful2 that is1 experience may ultimately consciously react upon itself in these ways as well as directly sense mere objects4 ,now the pleasure in novelty for its own sake1 while not consciously in the region of natural selection1 yet indirectly may be favoured by it as propdeutic to progressiveness4 ,it would1 indeed1 from one standpoint seem possible to deduce according to the law of serviceability the whole course of experience past1 present and future1 and we might as assuredly predict particular feelings as we may predict the evolution of the wing or the hoof or the four-ventricled heart in the course of a physical biologic evolution4 ,the psychic biologic evolution is to a certain point as strictly interpretable by the principle of advantageous natural selection as the physical1 for the two are really co-ordinated4 ,in the near future of psychology every psychosis in its origin and development will be as clearly traceable as any purely physiological organ1 though this can never be accomplished in the purely objective manner1 but will require a subjective manipulation which is now quite beyond us4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,retrospective ,,emotion ,brown divided emotions into retrospective and prospective1 but such a classification has no basis in a general biological view nor yet in a special analysis of the particular phenomena4 ,it is evident that the two great classes of emotion from the point of view of struggle for existence will be response to injurer and to benefactor4 ,these are the two prime qualities in things for which emotional notice is most needed as a service to life1 and hence the broad and fundamental division of emotion must always be into that which is response to the harmful and that which is response to the beneficial4 ,here only is the great and constant distinction in the nature of emotions4 ,prospect and retrospect are equally meaningless in themselves considered4 ,from a merely a priori biologic point of view we must1 then1 pronounce it quite unlikely that the time-sense should fundamentally differentiate emotion1 but we should expect that the prime division would be with respect to cognised injury or benefit4 ,that time-sense is not a grand principle of division we also see plainly when we examine particular emotions4 ,thus1 in the case of anger1 while we can say at once that this is1 in all its forms1 repulse to injury1 can we claim it is either prospective or retrospective emotion8 ,the truth is1 the thought of injury done1 doing1 or to be done1 equally wakens anger in choleric individuals4 ,the man who harmed me yesterday excites my anger1 and so does the man whom ,i perceive to be now injuring me or about to injure me4 ,the quality of the emotion is identically the same whether the object be considered as in past1 present1 or future4 ,even what seems to be a purely temporal emotion1 like hope1 which is usually regarded as wholly prospective1 may yet have other temporal aspects4 ,thus1 we sometimes say1 8,i hope it was not so10 where hope is obviously retrospective1 or more strictly prospective-retrospective1 having reference to expectation with desire that the event will turn out not to have happened4 ,but it may be said that1 as emotion rests upon representation1 the proper classification of the emotions will depend upon the divisions of representation which are essentially determined by the time-sense as representation of past or future4 ,representation with sense of representation implies a cognition of the thing as represented merely1 and so as non-existent to present actual sensing1 as something having been1 or to be1 sensed4 ,the emotion arises thus on cognition of the experienceable1 and includes always some dim impression of potency of object for harm or benefit at some time4 ,however1 though this may be the case1 it is plain that it makes no radical distinction in emotion4 ,if a man threatens me with some injury1 this fires my rage1 which is greatly increased if ,i catch him in the act of committing the injury threatened1 or find that he has committed the evil deed4 ,change in time-sense may thus bring change in intensity of some emotions1 but it does not determine quality of emotion4 ,the prime factor as to kind of emotion is always1 not any sense of time1 but the personal value of the event1 which may or may not receive a definite time determination4 ,indeed1 a form of representation1 before any sense of experience as merely subjective phenomenon is attained1 is a prominent feature in the direct nave experience which constitutes by far the greater bulk in the total existent consciousness4 ,before experience is aware of itself and of the experienceable there is a certain purely subjective mirroring of that which is not present to sense1 but has been1 i4e41 there is a re-occurrence in consciousness which has the subjective force of reality2 though the objective actuality is lacking1 such re-occurrence by association without the actual presence of the object stands1 however1 for reality to the mind experiencing--it is a direct intuition2 the object1 though unreal1 is perfectly real to consciousness1 and conveys no meaning1 and so is not a basis for emotion4 ,yet in the higher representation with a sense of experience as integral element1 the representation is sometimes practically timeless1 though surcharged with emotion tendency4 ,the highest objects which the mind represents have little time quality1 and all the nobler sentiments1 as love of truth1 justice1 etc41 exist with little or no reference to time4 ,so also in the very earliest representation1 the object is seen in its feeling value--emotion basis--as soon as it is perceived as object2 but this is as an immediate subjective realizing in which time-sense plays very little part4 ,the conscious interpretation of past and future as a conscious connecting of the two is certainly not a primitive function4 ,the time form is1 then1 on the whole1 merely incidental in emotion1 and is by no means a fundamental principle determining classification4 ,yet1 though we must reject time as a cardinal principle of division in emotion1 still we must acknowledge that the term retrospective emotion denotes a real group of mental phenomena1 including revenge1 regret1 remorse1 and kindred forms1 which are marked as feeling for the past merely as past4 ,however1 pure retrospection is rare and late4 ,the past does not for primitive mind stand by itself as something to be dwelt upon1 to be thought about1 to be moved by1 and stirred to action4 ,the immediate present absorbs the mind1 and the past interests and excites only so far as bearing directly on the present4 ,and so it is that the child lives in the present1 the youth and man in the future1 the old man in the past2 and this denotes the relatively late appearance of pure retrospection and of emotion founded thereon4 ,emotion is first merely spectant1 then prospective1 then retrospective4 ,however1 when we say an emotion is concerned solely with the present in the very young1 we mean1 of course1 the immediately prospective--that which has relation to but one sense and by association rouses emotion1 as an apple1 seen or handled by a child1 awakens emotion1 desire to taste4 ,where sense consciousness is not multiform1 but single and uniform1 as1 doubtless1 in very low organisms1 there is no opportunity for any emotion1 for there is no interpretation power4 ,but the intensification of some one sense connection already attained may be a basis for emotion which we may loosely call emotion spectant1 as when the greedy child eagerly eating an apple desires a larger bite1 sweeter portion1 etc4 ,however1--though it has little classification value1--emotion can be only prospective or retrospective2 and this is1 of course1 implied in its basis--representation4 ,emotion by its very nature must be a looking forward1 or a looking backward1 or both4 ,as a feeling about1 and not a direct feeling1 this is obviously its unvariable cognitive content4 ,the immediate and actual realization may be direct feeling or sensation1 but it is never in itself emotion4 ,emotion is always over something1 an experience of experience1 and cannot thus be simple content4 ,it is thus a consciously idealizing mode as distinguished from direct realization which is wholly self-contained4 ,one of the most important and interesting retrospective emotions is revenge4 ,the cardinal idea in revenge is returning evil for evil4 ,not only must there be a paying back for past injury1 but there must be an equivalence1 eye for an eye1 and tooth for a tooth2 and the revengeful emotion is the meting out such purely retributive action4 ,exact return becomes the basis of a general usage in animal and human societies4 ,justice1 law1 and punishment rest upon the idea of inflicting duplicate or equivalent injury for injury received4 ,administrative justice is the specialization of revenge in the hands of a few members of a community1 a social differentiation by which individuals in general secure their revenges at great economy by proxy4 ,further1 the revengeful emotion is a smouldering hate which vents itself only some time after the immediate occasion4 ,this is not the flush of anger which prompts to vigorous offensive action upon the injurer at the very moment of harm perceived1 and it does not appear as stimulant to immediate self-conservative activities1 but is simply the spirit of getting even for relatively long past injury4 ,what1 now1 is the function of revenge as a life factor8 ,it surely does not mend my injury that ,i do another harm solely because he has some time harmed me1 and the whole impulse might seem a pure waste of energy4 ,but under natural selection revenge must arise in serviceability of some sort2 and it is obvious that while revenge is of no use in mending the past1 it yet has a large value with reference to future possible injury4 ,yet revenge is undeniably without conscious meaning for present or future2 it is merely the spirit and determination to get even1 and so its deterrent function is unconsciously attained4 ,a dwelling in thought on the past per se1 a feeling about it and acting on it1 while it cannot help life directly1 has a large value in its ultimate effect upon enemies4 ,he who never forgets injury1 and for whom by-gones are never by-gones1 who never fails to return injury for injury1 is feared and is less likely to be injured4 ,junker1 the ,african traveller1 remarks of the pygmies1 8,they are much feared for their revengeful spirit40 ,thus1 other things being equal1 the most revengeful are the most successful in the struggle for self-conservation and self-furtherance4 ,though by itself considered irrational and foolish to inflict return injuries upon an injurer long after the immediate occasion1 yet its deterrent effect is very great with reference to other assailants4 ,thus1 pure retrospection may have unconsciously prospective value1 or sometimes revenge may be really retrospective-prospective1 as when one says1 8,i will fix him so he will not do that again40 ,here function is consciously known1 but in instinctive revenge there is no such foresight1 and1 in general1 utility is no consideration with the revenger1 whose mind is bent rather on doing great harm for its own sake to his enemy rather than benefiting himself4 ,it is always the conscious or unconscious significance for the future that justifies revenge in the natural course of events2 while it is no remedy for my hurt1 if some one has put out my eye1 to put out his in return1 yet this revenge act1 and so the feeling which prompts it1 is of highest prospective value with reference to future possible enemies4 ,every one will know that ,i cannot be harmed with impunity4 ,despoil or injure the revengeful in any way and you inevitably suffer for it sooner or later1 and so revenge acts as a protective psychical variation of high value4 ,on the whole the revengeful is less likely than others to be molested and injured1 and thus has a manifest advantage in the struggle for existence4 ,revenge has1 then1 also rightfully its own subjective sanction1 a pleasure reaction1 for revenge is1 indeed1 8sweet40 ,revenge is apparently found in a considerable range in the animal kingdom1 and seems universal in the genus homo4 ,however1 we cannot infallibly conclude from certain actions that revengeful emotion is present1 and especially is this so in the case of animals4 ,thus1 in the well-known instance of the elephant1 who1 observing a man passing by who had greatly annoyed him years before1 suddenly drenched him with dirty water1 we are not necessarily to suppose that this elephant was prompted by the emotion of revenge2 although this may have been the case1 we are not perfectly sure how far the elephant did the act merely as recompense for what the man had done1 or how far the sight of the injurer1 and so one likely to injure1 roused to simple anger and defence against the threatening harmful4 ,many acts which seem like revenge are quite likely to be common defence or offence1 are done with reference to what the object is and will be as injurious1 based upon knowledge of the past1 and not as merely retrospective retributive acts4 ,memory for injuries received is strong in many animals2 that which has harmed is often recognised after many years as the harmful1 and appropriate simple emotion1 not revenge1 is manifested4 ,rage1 rather than revenge1 is the usual emotion among lower animals in special instances where revenge might seem called for2 and thus it is more likely that the elephant should rage and hate rather than have pure revenge as in the case considered4 ,however1 somewhere rather late in sub-human psychism revengeful emotion certainly arose as an advantageous variation1 and it grew in strength and prominence for many ages of psychic progress4 ,at length it culminated1 and began its decline with the marked increase of co-operative sociality1 with which it must greatly interfere4 ,reprisal and counter-reprisal1 vendetta1 feud1 is opposed to that social union which is strength2 and so we see that tribes and nations in which the spirit of personal revenge has been a dominant trait have been left behind in the march of progress4 ,revengefulness1 at least in the form of retributive personal violence for injuries done1 is1 in a highly civilized community1 entirely superseded by the machinery of law4 ,instead of slaying a brother's murderer ,i call upon the law to execute justice and retribution1 and ,i bring certain designated ones among my fellows to secure my revenge4 ,where a man takes the law in his own hands1 and kills or injures the violator of his home or the slayer of his nearest kin1 he recedes to the lower unsocial plane from which civilization has arisen4 ,thus revengefulness1 in certain forms at least1 has become in the highest human communities a disadvantageous variation1 and is gradually being eliminated4 ,this negative elimination of revenge is also greatly hastened by the progress of certain ethical and ,christian conceptions by which a new and opposite law of conduct is enforced1 namely1 the returning good for evil4 ,one of the most interesting and most retrospective of emotions is sorrow4 ,sorrow1 grief and regret are wholly regardful of the past1 are pains at the past4 ,they are purely subjective or 8mental0 pains at the past1 and in no wise pains from the past2 they are not pains recurrent from past pains1 but purely a painful emotion at the representation of past pain4 ,thus1 a man says1 8,i did it to my own harm and hurt1 and ,i have always been sorry ,i did it40 ,here the sorrow-pain is evidently quite distinct from the direct pain of the injury2 pain for the harm done is one thing1 and pain from the harm done is another4 ,i hurt myself1 and ,i not only have this pain1 but1 being sorry that ,i did it1 ,i have this new emotional pain added4 ,sorrow as painful emotion for the past is thus plainly unique and peculiar4 ,to feel sorry over what has happened is a mode of feeling altogether different from feeling proud of it1 angry at it1 etc41 and we may reasonably regard sorrow as a distinct genus of retrospective emotion4 ,what1 now1 is the nature and function of this special emotion reaction8 ,we have to consider here only that simple primitive sorrow which is a painful emotion at regarding personal loss or failure4 ,such simple sorrow we see in the child who cries over spilled milk1 in the man who expresses deep regret at the careless misstep by which he broke his leg4 ,in this emotional reaction at the injurious the harmful is neither escaped nor repelled1 as through fear and anger2 the feeling disturbance is comparatively passive and purely reflective1 and is not a spur to some immediate advantageous defensive or offensive activity4 ,in sorrow we are pained emotionally at the trouble which has come upon us through our own agency or otherwise1 but we do not struggle from it or against it1 but there is purely helpless retrospection4 ,harm and loss which might provoke in one nature to fear or anger1 in another lead only to inactive sorrow4 ,the cognition form in sorrow means always sense of personal loss4 ,i may fear a thing1 or ,i may be angry at a thing1 but ,i can be sorry only for a person4 ,i do not feel sorry for a broken chair1 though ,i may feel sorry for having broken it4 ,this view of one's own personal agency in causing harm to one's self and harm to others is very prominent in a large range of sorrow4 ,in viewing any action which determined some evil1 ,i say1 8,i am sorry ,i did it40 ,this is1 however1 a later mode of the emotion1 which at the first cannot take account of any agency1 but is simply an acute feeling of distress at the injury received4 ,thus the one who grieves over the spilled milk regards1 not his own agency1 but only his loss2 he is sorry1 not that he spilled the milk1 but that his milk was spilled4 ,yet the sense of personal agency certainly forms a great part in much sorrow1 and tends to intensify it4 ,i may grieve over any harm that has come upon me1 but my grief is intensified as ,i remember my own agency in bringing it about4 ,i may feel sorry over the loss of my goods by fire1 but if ,i lose them by my own careless act1 my sorrow is redoubled4 ,strictly speaking1 perhaps1 the sorrows are distinct1 ,i feel sorry for having done it and ,i am sorry at it done2 yet they may be said to constitute a single psychic state4 ,sense of our own agency1 however1 in having produced harm to self is as likely to produce anger at self or even fear of self4 ,hence our intensest and purest sorrows are apt to be those occasioned by considering injuries occasioned by elemental forces4 ,that harm which we did not help because we could not1 the inevitable injury1 this excites a keen regret and deep mourning4 ,the pain in sorrow is as peculiar1 searching1 unanalyzable and undescribable as other simple emotion pains1 and only conceivable through realization4 ,this sinking1 helpless pain over what has happened is clearly distinct from the sensation order of pains1 and is in no wise a reflection from them4 ,the pain ,i have at remembrance of some great loss which has befallen me is certainly very distinct from that which came from the loss itself4 ,what part now does sorrow play as a psychic life-function1 and how explain it on the general principle of natural selection8 ,at first sight1 sorrow or grief over the past seems utterly valueless1 seems to be mental energy thrown away4 ,the past is irretrievable1 of what use then is any grief8 ,is not all regret vain8 ,to deplore its loss does not tend to restore a lost arm1 and it is of no use crying over spilled milk4 ,indeed1 he who bewails spilled milk has not only the actual loss but the ideal pain about the loss4 ,he who grieves suffers doubly4 ,but while it is true that sorrow for what has happened cannot alter the occurrence1 yet it has a permanent salutary effect on the one who sorrows to give more caution for the future4 ,the child will carry the pitcher of milk the more carefully next time by the more he has grieved over the past occurrence4 ,by increasing sensitiveness and capacity for sorrow experience is strengthened1 deepened1 and completely adjusted to environment4 ,shallow and volatile natures1 who take all loss and harm easily1 and even gaily1 have little strength1 and attain no great and permanent growth4 ,but with most1 when the object of strong desire is suddenly lost1 not only will there be a disappearance of the positive feeling about it1 but an actual minus or negative state will be generated1 a reaction mode we term grief4 ,by this grief the chief lessons of all higher experience are made possible4 ,grief is not a pathological phenomenon in mind1 but in its place thoroughly normal and useful4 ,indeed1 if under certain circumstances grief did not appear1 mind would be proved very crude1 obtuse1 or diseased4 ,he who never feels sad about what has happened1 is not of a progressive or highly advanced type4 ,if one does not feel sorry for his past errors and hurtful actions1 he plainly has so much the less motive force to higher action for the future4 ,if sorrow had never entered the world of mind1 if the whole corrective for injurious actions or want of action lay wholly in the immediate pain resulting or in the direct simple emotions like fear and anger1 a most potent factor in psychic progress would be lacking4 ,the possibility of going wrong1 i4e41 literally aside1 and contrariwise to one's own interests1 is implied in the struggle for existence4 ,the next best thing to the impossible status of being unable to do wrong1 is to have the capacity of feeling for the wrong1 that is1 of experiencing grief4 ,sorrow is thus a corrective of the highest importance in the history of experience4 ,the slips1 willed and unwilled1 from the narrow path of upward evolution are of necessity many2 but a man is1 on the whole1 best doing the largest part in the evolution scheme in which he finds himself1 who both knows the wrong as such1 and is sorry for it1 whether in the primitive selfish mode1 or better still1 on the higher ethical and religious grounds4 ,the greatest and most efficient minds are those who have felt most keenly for their errors1 faults1 and sins4 ,as to the origin of grief1 we may say with confidence that it is tolerably late1 and certainly subsequent to anger and hate and like reactions4 ,under certain circumstances sorrow must be accounted a more favourable reaction than these4 ,rage is certainly impotent and useless on many occasions of recalled injury1 and rage is besides a very intense emotion and expensive of energy4 ,the general law in the development of emotion is toward milder1 more economical1 and more permanent forms1 and then it is that sorrow must at some time have originated under the demands of life1 and been preserved and developed under natural selection4 ,sorrow most probably originated as supplanting rage at the view or remembrance of injury done4 ,in young children we often see rage mingled with the first manifestation of grief1 and but slowly is the rage eliminated and pure grief attained4 ,sorrow exercises its function where rage is useless4 ,the child cries over spilled milk partly from rage1 partly from grief1 but such mishaps will tend more and more to be attended by grief only1 as the better and more economical reaction4 ,further1 in a certain range of cases1 sorrow in its manifestations serves to appease revenger1 and sincere regret1 unmistakably expressed1 often saves the wrong-doer an equivalent harm4 ,this form of sorrow function is distinctly cultivated in the education of children where they are taught to feel sorry for faults if they would be forgiven and escape punishment4 ,grief in its origin and its earlier occurrence is not the spontaneous and almost irresistible impulse of our adult human experience1 but1 like all emotion and all progressive psychism1 is by effort of will4 ,that is1 we must suppose that grief has its origin in some such nisus as a child exhibits when he is taught to be sorry for something he has done4 ,hence it is only gradually and with the lapse of many generations after its origin that sorrow becomes hereditary and spontaneous4 ,at first sorrow was a distinct attainment1 rarely and but occasionally reached by any individual1 and it is comparatively late in psychic history that it becomes a permanent and innate power4 ,sorrow also very gradually widens its sphere4 ,at first purely selfish1 a retrospective reaction at one's own hurt1 it becomes at length1 through sociality and its concurrent advantages1 altruistic2 sorrow is felt for others and the springs of sympathy and pity are developed4 ,that this altruism is very late development is obvious1 in that it has still to be taught even among the most advanced of the human race to their children4 ,the child is taught to feel sorry for the cat he has hurt1 for the blind man1 for the cripple4 ,and we must conclude that at one time in psychic history egoistic sorrow was likewise at the stage of development at which we now see altruistic1 and we may suppose that in the far future the altruistic may come to the present status of the egoistic sorrow4 ,however1 for both there is an indefinite field for expansion1 for refinement of sensibility1 and for readiness and appropriateness of manifestation4 ,sorrow also will develop more and more on ethical and religious grounds4 ,remorse arises and develops2 and also the 8godly sorrow for sin40 ,we learn to feel1 not merely sorry over the past as affecting our disadvantage1 but to feel sorry conscientiously as our deeds or those of others conflict with the law of right or with the law of ,god4 ,those who have no ,god-consciousness1 and so no feeling about their action in the sight of ,god1 no sense of sinfulness1 have yet often acute moral sense and feelings4 ,however1 the origin and function of the moral and religious sense in the light of natural selection is a wide subject which can only be alluded to here2 suffice it to say that sorrow is thereby lifted to a peculiar and new plane of self-contained spirituality4 ,that is1 the bearing of it is often without relation to physical life-function1 and even adverse thereto1 and throughout has its value and sanction in itself alone4 ,one of the deepest and most significant of late forms of sorrow is that for the dead1 and its importance is obvious from the fact that a word is especially coined to denote its expression1 namely1 mourning4 ,nothing can be more useless than mourning for the dead as far as the individual object is concerned2 the most poignant sorrow cannot in anywise tend to reanimate the corpse4 ,however1 it plainly serves as an index to the value put upon life1 and so in general has a most powerful effect on conservation and upbuilding of life4 ,other things being equal1 sensitiveness to this form of sorrow measures accurately possibly self-conservative effort or effort for others' conservation1 which in a state of sociality1 is equivalent in value to one's self4 ,the lives for which there is the most mourning and real sorrow when death comes are the most valuable to the community1 and for the conserving of which the utmost combined effort would be extended4 ,where life has little value attached to it1 sorrow is slight and mourning short4 ,as compared with the savage state1 loss and injury to life is infinitely more respected in the great centres of modern civilization--the nuclei of progress4 ,it is because we feel strongly for the safety of friends and relatives that we employ the best devices to insure their protection from injury and death4 ,one who has sorrowed most deeply over the death of a friend caused by his own careless handling of a gun1 will for the future be much more careful for himself and others4 ,to be sure we sorrow deeply because we place a high estimate upon the life rather than place high estimate because we sorrow greatly2 but if there were no sorrow reaction1 there would be no emotion basis for the future caution and care1 and it affects our general estimate of life4 ,thus there is ever a cumulative emotional development4 ,perhaps the latest developed form of sorrow is the feeling of sadness which comes over one in reflecting upon pain as a universal fact of existence4 ,the pessimistic mood1 with its converse1 the optimistic1 as based on philosophic generalization1 is certainly extremely late4 ,pain at pain in general1 pleasure at pleasure as a purely general fact1 are equally remote from primitive modes1 and mark culminating phases4 ,while1 perhaps1 there is a certain justification and value in being saddened by the spectacle of universal pain1 yet a gravity rather than a despondency is its proper measure4 ,pain1 punitive and premonitory1 plays1 as we have already noted more than once in our discussions1 a most beneficent and essential part in the struggle for existence and in all the higher struggle4 ,it is a necessary and salutary phenomenon1 involved in the very nature of evolution by struggle2 hence he who impugns pain and is offended at it1 really impugns the psychic nature of things and desires with ,schopenhauer the annihilation of will4 ,as a matter of fact the extreme pessimistic spirit is more destructive to progress than even the most buoyant optimism1 in that it nips all earnest and forceful activity in the bud4 ,a foolishly happy-go-lucky activity is better than a paralysis of effort through conviction of its inherent painfulness and ultimate inutility4 ,the scientific evidence1 so far as we can now read it1 points decisively to the belief that pain-will activity1 an intense struggle1 is the earliest mind1 and the condition of its birth has been the law of its development1 and for aught that we can see1 ever will be4 ,into this we are born1 and it is as foolish to run counter to it as to the law of gravitation4 ,a philosophy which runs counter to reality must either build a new reality or subside2 but it is most certainly to be doubted whether the philosophic spirit ever has or ever will determine a general innovation in psychic evolution4 ,but we cannot do more than merely advert to these large questions here4 ,with reference to the development of sorrow it is an obvious remark that much which causes grief in the earlier stages of mental growth ceases to have that effect with maturer experience4 ,thus the man may not notice1 or may laugh at1 or may feel irritation at occasions which in his early life would have wakened grief4 ,on the contrary1 much that seems grievous to the old is not so regarded by the young4 ,in general1 grief tends to become less frequent and paroxysmal1 but more profound and lasting with the growth of mind4 ,as to the kinds of retrospective emotion the largest division is1 of course1 into the painful and pleasurable4 ,we have touched only on some of the painful1 but each painful emotion has its analogous pleasurable emotion4 ,we have used the terms sorrow and grief as synonyms4 ,if we should make a distinction1 it would be to put sadness or sorrow in antithesis to happiness1 and grief to joy2 that is1 sorrow proceeds from outward circumstances1 grief from subjective conditions4 ,however1 popular usage is not firm on this point4 ,regret is a mild sorrow4 ,remorse is the ethical side of sorrow4 ,resignation is a very late phase of emotion related to sorrow4 ,a person says1 ,my child was crushed in the accident1 yet ,i do not grieve1 but am quite resigned4 ,here certainly is a new mode of feeling about past harm1 and it is a mode as far above sorrow proper as sorrow is above anger in the evolutionary scale4 ,we do not lament or weep over the past1 but there is self-conscious1 self-constrained sinking of the will1 and a composure which is not apathy1 but a gentle emotion wave4 ,nor is there a callousness2 one is not hardened1 but softened1 and made the more sensitive4 ,the emotion of resignation is thus cultivated and to be cultivated1 and is yet in the volition stage which marks the early form of all emotions4 ,even in the highest human types resignation does not come1 it must be brought2 the instinctive impulse upon contemplating past personal evil is toward sorrow or anger and revenge1 which must be checked1 and resignation directly willed and assumed as the proper emotion4 ,resignation1 then1 as a growing point in psychic evolution1 a distinct attainment as frame of mind1 is generally and rightly accounted a virtue4 ,at present1 then1 it seems the culmination of retrospective emotion with regard to past personal injuries1 and it exercises and will more and more exercise a most important function in human psychic development4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,desire ,the lowest organisms come in contact with things1 have objective relations of contact1 but it is quite unlikely that the earliest psychic life feels contacts1 really touches things4 ,from the objective commerce with things pleasures and pains are realized1 but object is unsensed and unknown4 ,the simplest marine forms are incessantly feeding at hazard at the prompting of a subjective lack-pain4 ,that the lowest life is born into a nutritive medium and that at birth many later organisms are incased or in direct connection with nutritive material1 shows that at the very beginning psychic life is not needed as discriminatory1 but as simple subjective pain and pleasure moving to undirected activities4 ,however1 such perfect environment being rare and temporary1 in its blind and senseless activity the organism is often trying to assimilate the unassimilable1 or the harmful1 and is often appropriating when there is no substance present4 ,it would obviously be of great advantage if it could touch its food1 have sensation as guide to activity4 ,thus realization of a very limited world of things arises in touch achieved during the feeding act4 ,that which satisfies and gives pleasure is by touch discriminated from that which does not give these results4 ,discrimination of soft and hard is probably the earliest touch impression4 ,the soft thing is manipulated in the feeding act as edible4 ,but a great step is made when psychical effect of the edible is not only comprehended through touch in direct connection with the assimilatory act1 but antecedently thereto4 ,the animal establishes a connection between the feeling the soft thing and pleasure experience in its struggling activities4 ,it touches more and more readily what it is assimilating1 and thence rejects more easily and promptly the injurious4 ,in appropriative effort with pleasure experience it feels the thing1 cognizes in most general way its physical quality4 ,as sensitiveness increases through struggle and natural selection the assimilatory attempt will be more and more quickly met by the touch sensation1 until touch ultimately becomes precedent and actually directive to food4 ,recognition1 in a far more emphatic way than before1 becomes added to cognition2 the thing is not merely known in its bare objectivity1 but is recognised1 identified1 and has a meaning4 ,touch must give1 not only the thing1 but the thing as potent for some quality not now being appreciated1 though formerly appreciated pari passu with the touching4 ,the interpretative act comes through the association gradually established in past experiences1 so that the edible is no longer fortuitously hit upon1 but touch precedes active effort at appropriation1 and suggests by itself edibility or non-edibility4 ,thus is action greatly economized and made certain4 ,definite feelers1 extending from the body1 and sometimes quite long1 are evolved1 and the first period in the history of knowledge1 the age of touch1 is inaugurated4 ,it is here when touch involves representation and becomes a sign of something1 e4g41 edible thing1 that desire and other simple emotions originate4 ,a possibility of pleasurable experience being recognised1 it is necessary1 if useful action would follow1 that emotion springs up as incentive1 and this emotion we term desire4 ,hunger drives1 but desire draws1 and as reinforcement and guide to the blind hunger impulse desire has a large function4 ,a mere indifferent recognition1 the pleasurable foreseen but not felt about1 would be entirely unserviceable4 ,if we do not desire the pleasurable and beneficial1 we do not act for it4 ,and originally1 at least1 perception of the good always stirred desire2 and desire was awakened in no other way2 for in the course of natural evolution1 knowledge and emotions have alike to be interpreted in their origin and meaning with reference to advantageous action1 this alone being the arena of natural selection4 ,a meaningless knowledge and a self-contained emotion or feeling1 are entirely contrary to the trend of evolution on the basis we have assumed4 ,moreover1 through ages of activity the tendency to desire the good and the good only becomes so ingrained that ,i think it hardly fails1 even in the highest and latest minds4 ,the most hyper-conscious man1 once convinced that something will give him pleasant experience1 so long and so far as this feeling is dominant in mind will have incipient desire4 ,on this long disputed question of the relation of desire to the good or pleasurable1 evolutionary psychology1 which views mind as serving life1 as interpreting things with reference to their serviceability and so implied pleasurability1 always bases desire in its origin and growth on pleasure4 ,but is this general point of view borne out by the facts of mind8 ,a typical example of common desire is this3 ,at a fair ,i observe a toboggan chute and say to my companion1 8,that must be sport1 how would you like to try it80 ,the appeal to 8sport0 awakens desire in my comrade and he says1 8,let's try it40 ,we test its pleasurability1 and1 enjoying it1 desire to go again4 ,it is evident that desire arises not on the mere image of actualization as such1 the idea of sliding1 but on conception of its pleasure quality4 ,whenever by our own experience or by the testimony of others we are assured of a good thing to be experienced we straightway desire it4 ,this1 it may be said1 is all very true for a certain class of desires1 but the principle does not apply in the higher desires like the desire for knowledge4 ,but knowledge originates only as serviceable1 and primarily only serviceable knowledges are desired4 ,we desire knowledge only so far as it is worth having1 and it may be that ,i esteem all knowledge as worth something and so desirable4 ,however1 some knowledges are worth nothing and are never desired4 ,who wants to know the exact measurements of the pebbles on the road1 or how many hairs are on the mane of his neighbour's pony1 or the names of all the inhabitants of ,pekin8 ,but if one thinks it would be any satisfaction to know such facts1 he may desire to know them4 ,the insatiable curiosity of children which seeks to know all such irrelevant facts hardly comes under the category of desire1 but is rather instinctive hereditary impulse4 ,it has no clear idea of a thing to be known and a desire to know it1 but is only a spontaneous outburst of knowing activity which is inbred and comes from ancestral integration4 ,there is a sensing and perceiving activity which is very intense at the questioning age1 but which hardly implies the desire to know4 ,the incessant 8,what's this80 8,what's that80 is merely outcome of an instinctive impulsion to interpret environment2 it is not significant of full-formed desire1 there is no idea of thing to be known1 of an actualization to be accomplished4 ,if a man desires knowledge1 not for his own sake1 but for its own sake1 desire as such really ceases1 it merges into love and devotion1 which are disinterested and clearly distinct as mental modes from desire4 ,desire is not a sentiment2 and it does not properly include all impulse to actualization4 ,for instance1 the feeling for actualization merely as such1 for achievement of ideal per se1 is beyond the biologic stage of consciousness wherein desire has its chief function4 ,the attainment of end merely for the sake of the end must be distinguished from actualizing an image for the pleasure of actualization1 which thus has desire element4 ,we know that the image of realization may act as end by compulsion1 as in feeling of duty1 which is thus marked off from desire as impulsion4 ,thus desire is but one mode of teleological emotion4 ,but desire is emotion at unrealized good and not at unrealization in general4 ,spinoza's dictum1 followed by ,volkmann1 that we do not desire a thing because we deem it good1 but we deem it good because we desire it1 is not borne out by the commonest facts4 ,a peddler shows me an apple1 but ,i do not desire it and then deem it good1 but ,i examine it1 and if it seems good ,i may desire and buy it1 but if bad1 ,i have aversion1 and return it4 ,my desire thus depends altogether upon whether or not ,i deem the apple good1 and not my deeming it good upon my desire4 ,if ,i see any one desiring anything ,i at once judge that he first thought it good or he would not have desired it4 ,all the excitation of desire is by representation of the good4 ,the merchant tempts you by exhibiting his goods1 the child with candy offers it to you crying1 8good6 good60 the moralist proclaims1 8do this and thou shalt live40 ,the cause of desire1 which for weal or woe plays such a large part in almost all psychism1 is always by imaging the good4 ,the bait and the reward as excitants of desire are most common2 a mere suggestion of a representation without implication of its goodliness in realization does not excite desire4 ,thus some one1 speaking of a totally unknown town1 asks1 8,how would you like to live in ,perry80 and we answer1 8,is it a pleasant town80 ,a mere suggestion of change of abode starts desire only when there is already displeasure with present residence1 and so desire for release as a good2 but image of actualization considered solely by itself is desireless4 ,and if to excite desire we offer the good or pleasurable1 to extinguish desire we offer the bad and painful4 ,i desire a fair looking apple1 but cutting it and finding it wormy and rotten1 desire flees4 ,i extinguish the desire of a child for eating some noxious substance by assuring it of the bad taste and nauseating effect4 ,both positively and negatively then1 common sense finds the basis1 not of the good in desire1 but of desire in the good4 ,the facts in both exciting and extinguishing desire point to this conclusion4 ,spinoza 7,ethics iii41 ,prop ix47 defines desire as 8appetite with consciousness thereof40 ,but to be aware of being hungry is but the first step toward desire4 ,in the midst of my daily occupations ,i become aware of pain1 then of uneasiness1 then of hunger1 whereupon ,i may desire food1 which desire includes as distinct elements3 7#a7 idea of eating as act or movement2 7#b7 idea of the thing eaten as food1 a something satisfying2 affording relief1 and so a good2 7#c7 thereupon the emotion wave of longing1 the essential point in desire4 ,this is1 of course1 followed by volition1 ,i act to realize1 ,i go to a restaurant4 ,when ,hffding 7,psychology1 p4 #cbc7 says that the impulse in hunger 8has reference primarily to the food1 not to the feeling of pleasure in its consumption10 he forgets that 8food0 is a something satisfying1 and only thus is desired4 ,object is not desired as object1 but for its value in experience4 ,we must also touch upon a certain class of experiences which have been adduced as showing a desire not based upon the idea of the pleasure4 ,take the example of a man in ennui who takes to playing tennis as a relief1 but with no desire of being victorious4 ,engaging in the game he finds that 8this desire which does not exist at first is stimulated to considerable intensity by the competition itself2 and in proportion as it is thus stimulated both the mere contest becomes more pleasurable1 and the victory1 which was originally indifferent1 comes to afford a keen enjoyment40 7,sidgwick1 ,methods of ,ethics1 p4 #df47 ,but does the desire really come from some idea of pleasure8 ,the player volleys a ball successfully against his opponent1 and thereby receiving a thrill of pleasure desire awakes to beat4 8,wouldn't ,i like to beat him8 ,i would enjoy nothing better40 ,this desire foresees the pleasure of triumph4 ,if he gets no pleasure from returning the ball successfully he does not desire success2 but if unanticipated pleasure comes up in beating his opponent1 as soon as he recognises this pleasure he desires to continue and complete it4 ,this pleasure in succeeding in competitive activity1 extremely old and integrated from all the struggle of existence1 springs up spontaneously4 ,there may also be added pleasure from activity and pleasure from skill which will make the game very interesting1 i4e41 full of desire and other emotions4 ,professor ,sidgwick allows that pleasure may be the cause of desire1 but not its object4 ,but surely if ,i cognize pleasure coming from an act1 ,i attach this pleasure to it in representation2 if ,i take pleasure from returning a tennis ball and then represent a coming opportunity to return the ball ,i also represent its pleasurability4 ,pleasure or pain connected with acts is connected by association with representation of the acts1 the pleasure-pain tone penetrates the representation1 and only thus does actualization of an image become object of desire4 ,if it is possible to conceive an activity indifferent--which may be doubted--we should have no emotion about it4 ,but we have already sufficiently emphasized how the perceived experience quality of things determines desire and all emotion4 ,professor ,sidgwick's remark that the pleasurableness of the contest is 8in proportion0 7,ibid41 p4 #df7 to the desire1 i4e41 that the pleasure results from the desire rather than desire from the pleasure1 also shows defective analysis4 ,if ,i desire intensely to beat1 and am on the losing side1 ,i am greatly pained1 for desire is always in itself painful4 ,in any case desire is pleasurable only so far as it is being satisfied1 which1 of course1 means only so far as desire is being extinguished4 ,it is not the increasing desire intensity1 but the decreasing1 that gives pleasure1 i4e41 desire is negatively related to pleasure4 ,intense desire may act as excitement-pleasure1 but this does not bear on the nature of desire4 ,another objection that has been brought up against pleasure as desire basis is that 8pleasures are diminished by repetition1 whilst habits are strengthened by it2 if the intensity of desire therefore were proportioned to the #8pleasure value' of its gratification1 the desire for renewed gratification should diminish as this pleasure grows less1 but if the present pain of restraint from action determines the intensity of desire1 this should increase as the action becomes habitual40 7,james ,ward in ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 vol4 xx41 p4 #gi47 ,but pleasure and so also desire often increases with repetition4 ,one who tastes champagne for the first time may receive slight pleasure4 ,the next time he dines out he will1 with image of his previous experience1 have slight desire for champagne4 ,as experience is repeated his pleasure and desire may increase to ecstasy and passion4 ,but habits not obviously pleasure-yielding1 as the morning chore to the country lad1 will be desired after intermittance2 the country boy homesick in the city longs in the morning for the familiar scene and familiar task which was a source of aversion at home4 ,we painfully miss the customary1 even the painful customary1 for thereby the conservative tendency of nature and organic activity is broken up4 ,desire arises for relief from this pain1 and the habitual is so far regarded as pleasurable4 ,thus desire is in proportion to the 8restraint0 only so far as the restraint is painful1 and thus relief appears pleasurable4 ,thus the desire for the habitual has1 like other desire1 its basis in prospective pleasure4 ,that the analysis of desire as regards representation of pleasure is still an open question certainly marks the psychology of feeling as very backward2 that here is a most common and prominent psychosis1 whose simplest analysis is not yet agreed upon1 shows how far we yet are from a standard of subjective verification4 ,i have expressed my own opinion that both the evolutionary standpoint and special analysis indicate a distinct emotion at prospective good which is best denominated by the term desire4 ,this is a purely psychological result1 and has absolutely no reference to ethics4 8,pleasure0 has such an inevitable ethical tinge that a purely scientific denotation would be useful4 ,the 8good0 is a better1 but also objectionable term4 ,that then the organism should foresee and image the good and should have a feeling about it which should stimulate will to its appropriation and realization is a psychosis of utmost value1 and one which is in all psychism above the lowest an extremely common phenomenon4 ,this does not assert that desire in all its lower range is a seeking for pleasure1 an extremely late conception and endeavour2 but it means that as perception is of things in their experience values1 so representation also1 as giving the basis of desire2 but a conscious hedonism is still afar off4 ,the general function which desire subserves in stimulating advantageous action is obvious4 ,as anger and fear are primarily useful emotions in view of potential pain and harm1 so desire in view of potential pleasure and benefit4 ,the function of desire in stimulating advantageous action is obvious4 ,desire answers to potential pleasure and benefit just as anger does to potential pain and harm4 ,it is a correlative and supplement of fear1 and in general the more one fears a thing the more one desires the opposite4 ,when sailing ,i desire fair weather in proportion as ,i fear a squall4 ,desire is the very spring of life and progress1 and when desire is extinguished the will to live ceases1 and psychic life declines and dies4 ,fulness of desire is fulness of life1 and the largest mental life is that in which desire1 constant1 multiplex1 and far-reaching1 is strong and dominant4 ,desire seems thus to be a permanent factor1 and1 though there is a pre-desire period1 no post-desire age seems to be indicated in psychic history so far4 ,somewhat as to the analysis of desire has already been intimated in touching upon its origin and function1 but we are now to study its elements more in detail4 ,the very young infant certainly experiences hunger pains in almost its initial consciousness2 but it is only gradually that the need felt leads up to presentation and representation of the needed thing1 and so to desire4 ,hunger with it1 as with all organisms1 sharpens the wits1 and leads to knowing things1 interpreting them1 and acting definitely toward them4 ,through touch it first comes to appreciate object1 and object as food1 a representative-inductive act4 ,the earliest meaning attached to object is edibility1 and this1 indeed1 indiscriminately to all objects1 as we see that infants mouth everything4 ,gradually from this1 or by dint of a good deal of unpleasant experience1 objects are divided into edible and non-edible1 the primitive classification of things4 ,from the consideration of any such simple example as the desire for food we determine that the first element toward and in desire is a lack-pain generating felt want1 and so--and such common use of words is significant--we want1 i4e41 desire what we are in want of4 ,a feeling of need or lack is fundamental4 ,now sense of lack is more than pain from restriction or intermission1 for it implies a measure of in-ground integrated experience with objects1 a constant connecting of object with purely subjective experience4 ,for instance1 hunger and feeling the need of food1 the craving for food1 are not the same1 for it is evident that to feel lack of anything with such a central pain as hunger-pain means that this something has often been conjoined with the pain experience4 ,hunger is primarily an organic uneasiness and gnawing pain which does not include any sense of object as of a food or reference thereto4 ,our subjective and objective experience have been so completely integrated1 and feeling of lack and that for a very definite thing has become so ingrained in mind with pains1 we feel so spontaneously and immediately need of thing in connection with organic pains that it is very difficult for us to realize a state where this connection has not been formed or is forming4 ,but it would seem that the first hunger pains of the infant are of this primitive quality1 and that need is not felt in connection therewith4 ,it is only after some crude cognitions of bodies have been generated in connection with the feeding act and as guides thereto that on occasion of hunger pains there can occur the sense of lack of food object1 a painful feeling of unrealization1 at first very dimly representative1 and so a craving1 an incipient emotion4 ,desire rests then upon capacity to feel the lack of accustomed satisfying thing in connection with some form of perception or representation of the thing4 ,when a satisfying object is missing1 it must be missed psychically before desire can awake4 ,the reaction when a customarily conjoined experience does not occur is a peculiar feeling in mind1 a disturbance1 uneasiness1 a unique sense of loss and lack which is the immediate stimulus of desire4 ,hunger at first leads blindly to activities tending to satisfy hunger1 but the satisfying thing--food--therewith becomes gradually known1 hence thereafter when hunger comes there is struggle both to know and to act thereby4 ,this struggle has impulsation from feelings of lack4 ,lack pains then prompt to cognitive activities to find the thing lacked and desired4 ,the first knowledge is that some things satisfy1 and an appropriative activity is excited4 ,the lowest organisms under impulse of hunger pains reach out after things1 feel for them1 and as soon as they sense the edible1 appropriate it4 ,it is quite evident that they exercise cognition only as driven to it1 and then it is effort even for the simplest knowing4 ,but what the first psychic facts are is hard for us to interpret1 because we have progressed so far beyond them4 ,however1 we may well believe that the general form of primitive consciousness is akin to what we have when dozing or half awake4 ,the realization of things is dim indefinite1 and it is only as pains of considerable severity are felt and as the psychism gains in capacity for pain that particular knowledges and particular needs and desires are accomplished4 ,after having repeatedly sensed something--as a soft vegetable form--in connection with bodily pain as hunger and with the feeding activity as allaying hunger1 a renewal of the pain from organic conditions will give1 not merely purely subjective pains1 but also1 as the pre-associated cognition of thing and the allaying of hunger is not experienced1 there arises as reaction a vague sense of lack which may lead to equally vague desire4 ,a vague uneasiness and restlessness which knows object and misses object only in the most general way is the lowest basis4 ,a study of some case of waking from a doze by reason of hunger would give the original formation of desire as involving lack sense4 ,here a purely subjective pain gradually intensifies till it wakens a very general objectifying1 and we feel need of undefined something1 which soon becomes specialized1 when fully wakened1 to need of something to eat1 and finally as need of some particular usual food1 as bread1 meat1 or milk1 which is then desired4 ,pain from restriction or intermission of some organic activity1 as the digestive and assimilatory1 may then lead to sense of lack and desire for object which is unrealized4 ,however1 craving-desire as implying sense of loss1 of something pleasurable missed1 is not organic1 but is mere reflex of organization4 ,it is not progressive1 but conservative2 it does not initiate1 it merely keeps the organism to its accustomed level4 ,this is the limited range of appetite4 ,craving rests on past evolution4 ,however1 we have to explain the origin of those activities which1 when intermitted1 produce such distressful results4 ,we must first acquire the liking before we miss what we like1 and tastes uniformly originate through effort1 and all pleasurable activity is built up by painful volition as urged by direct pains or by desires4 ,desire then is more than craving4 ,craving as based on organic lack is satiable1 desire is insatiable4 ,we desire what we have never missed and modes of experience we have never attained4 ,we1 who have never had a gold watch1 desire one1 and having received one1 we lose it1 miss it1 and so desire is reinforced4 ,all the progressive activity of the human world originates in desire1 as ambition1 or as desire of truth1 virtue1 etc4 ,here we do not miss what we are accustomed to1 but we are forming habits1 which will be the basis for cravings with descendants4 ,for instance1 one who now does not miss beauty of art1 but is ambitiously striving to appreciate art1 may come finally--or at least his descendants--to miss art1 and so to crave it4 ,but for the time he has no art craving1 only an art desire4 ,of course all desire in the craving form1 or in the higher desire form1 involves a missing actualization4 ,all desire is extinguished in realization4 ,but this obviously does not destroy the distinction of desire as based on craving1 a spontaneous resultant from integration1 an intermittence of habit1 and desire as itself integrating habit-forming emotion4 ,however1 with the lowest psychisms1 we may perhaps suppose it unlikely that representation does ever become definite enough for desire1 except when in direct sensing of a thing1 as1 for example1 in a touch perception4 ,the psychism is impelled to touch activity by its subjective pains and simple1 undifferentiated lack pains4 ,it does not desire a food through the representation of it brought up by hunger1 for such representation of things in their potentiality is probably not originally stimulated directly by subjective feelings1 though with man1 for instance1 we know that hunger and other simple feelings will provoke representations of foods1 which foods will be desired2 and particularly in famine the most lively representations of feasts occur1 and thus there is a strengthening and defining of desire4 ,thus in famine there comes a greater and greater urgency to action as its necessity becomes greater4 ,the vivid representations of foods become through desire--though there may be no sense connection with food--a mighty force for self-preservative action4 ,yet primitively desire probably awoke only after some sensing was accomplished1 not the mere subjective pain1 but the touch perception awoke the representation1 for it would seem the original status that representation occurs at first only with correlated presentation4 ,thus it is that the simplest psychisms are driven by their pains to achieve a touch or some sensing of a thing before they interpret it as food1 and so desire it2 that is1 things must have a food meaning attached to them through actual sense appreciation of them as such1 before they can be directly instanced in pure representation as foods4 ,hunger leads us immediately to think of food1 but this ability to directly represent food is based upon having thoroughly learned certain things as food by repeated direct experiences4 ,a savage who has never seen or known of bonbons is presented with a box of them1 and he may receive them with indifference1 but a bonbon is placed in his mouth1 whereupon he says1 8it tasted so good1 ,i want another40 ,such is the genesis of desire when pleasure quality is attached to thing1 is learned by experience4 ,the visual and tactual experience is actively conjoined with pleasure experience1 so that seeing another bonbon1 he represents its pleasurability and so desires it4 ,further1 the relative presentations and feelings must be mentally correlative1 the connection must be more than phenomenal series of several forms2 there must be an active connecting psychic process as basis4 ,you are told to open your mouth and shut your eyes1 and a bonbon is dropped in2 the taste will at once give rise to a revival visual presentation1 and if a person holds up before your eyes a fine bonbon1 saying1 8look at this10 there may occur revival taste experiences4 ,but the immediate basis of desire is not here1 for if psychic process stopped here1 there would be no higher elements2 these can only be accomplished by a definite bringing up and attribution of subjective quality to the thing4 ,you represent its possible pleasurableness on the basis of past experience1 by the action of the inductive instinct1 a complex process4 ,here revival is not an active correlating1 but is self-contained1 lying isolated by itself1 and unfruitful till its revival character is recognised1 and it is actively wrought into experience4 ,that is1 integrating act is presupposed in all desire4 ,the way in which revival becomes the basis representation is hard to trace1 but in many cases it seems to be connected with certain physiological activities4 ,a revival form implies correlated physical functions1 as when the sight of a peach causes the taste pre-experienced therewith to be revived1 and the mouth waters1 as if in actual deglutition4 ,as the reacting and assimilating process is carried on without any real thing to be acted upon1 there comes a physiological reaction1 which in turn gives rise to peculiar psychic affections1 and specially the uneasy feeling of lack4 ,the unreality and mere revival character of the revival experience is ultimately recognised1 and representation becomes possible1 and idea of pleasure as both experienced and experienceable is evolved4 ,thus an unsubstantial revival1 where the thing is sensed in one form only1 but thereby re-awakening other associated experiences1 as in the case of merely seeing a peach1 leads finally to know the thing as a potency2 ,i taste1 but after all ,i taste nothing2 hence ,i am led to perceive the thing as a sign1 as unrealized in its pleasure significance1 but realizable4 ,how we attain sense of reality and unreality we discuss in chapter on ,induction1 but with special reference to desire we add here an illustration4 ,when engaged in reading on a hot day1 ,i have feeling of discomfort1 and then spontaneously arises image of a wonted bathing place1 ,i have the image of moving in the clear1 cool water1 but at once recognising the unreality of the image1 ,i long for realization4 ,i1 when heated1 have so often seen the water1 and plunged in it1 that the presentation of mode of relief has become firmly associated with the discomfort1 so when it organically returns1 presentation revives1 and its unreality known1 desire rises4 ,one not accustomed to bathe1 but to taking lemonade when heated1 will have visions of lemonade and desire therefor4 ,one who is just forming some habit of relief will not have spontaneous images1 but must call them up4 ,desire also will be purely general1 8,oh6 to get rid of this heat40 ,specific desire1 as founded upon a definite image of realization1 is primarily the result of active association of definite object and mode with a given pleasure-pain state4 ,the realizing the image as unreality1 as suggesting an actualization to be wished for1 is learned from rude experience with present sensations and perceptions quite at variance with the image4 ,thus1 that the vision of water is unreality ,i know by seeing the room before me1 touching the chair1 sense of painful heat unrelieved1 etc4 ,an image of actualization barely of itself does not include desire4 ,i may conceive that ,i can image myself moving in water without any emotion therewith connected1 but as matter of fact1 this never occurs2 all our images of actualization carry some desire value4 ,even bare phantasy1 as imagining myself living on the moon1 is not without a tinge of desire or aversion1 for the origin and growth of imaging has been so bound up with desire1 and is for desire as life function that some desire tendency is retained even in the purest flights of imagination4 ,it becomes increasingly evident that such a simple and understandable expression as1 8,i want that peach10 implies a great complexity of psychic process which is hidden from us by the summarizing facility of language4 ,emotion is evidently far too complex for full analysis4 ,its complexity is such that we may well hesitate to attribute it1 as is so often and easily done1 to the lowest psychisms4 ,since desire includes a measure of self-consciousness1 and also of consciousness of pleasure1 it seems improbable at first sight that such elements should exist in certain low consciousnesses where primitive organisms seem impelled by desire4 ,however1 though this a priori view has weight1 it must not be allowed to be of supreme value4 ,yet when we fairly interpret a very simple case1 as when a dog scenting and seeing meat on a shelf1 is said to desire it1 and so to spring for it1 we certainly imply a complexity of mental activity1 which might by many be thought quite beyond the power of even a very intelligent dog4 ,we have at least the following factors3-- #a4 ,simple scent or vision of the thing2 bare presentation or representation of object4 #b4 ,either a definite bringing up1 or a mechanical re-occurrence of past pleasurable associated feelings and sensations1 or both4 #c4 ,sense of unreality4 #d ,feeling of lack4 #e4 ,pain of lack4 #f4 ,sense of pleasure potentiality of the thing1 which implies-- 7a7 ,idea of pleasure4 7b7 ,idea of personal experience thereof1 i4e41 some egoistic sense4 7c7 ,sense of experience as in time past1 as experienced4 7d7 ,sense of time as future as implied in sense of the experienceable4 #g4 ,the longing1 yearning1 peculiar desire quality as feeling mode4 #h4 ,desire pain4 ,in the first place then1 the object of desire1 the desideratum1 is not the object as such4 ,we do not desire things merely as such1 but only as far as they are significant of experience4 ,presentation does not1 at least normally and originally1 ever end in itself1 but it is always connected1 and connects with pleasure-pain experiences4 ,desire begins by being vague as to its object2 under slight pressures of pain we want something1 but we know not what2 we have dim1 undefined longing1 but the indefinite object is always a possibility of experience1 a centre of pleasure-pain potency4 ,at the first stirring of hunger pains1 we have a vague uneasiness and sense of lack1 with a most general idea of object and longing toward it1 and suffer the pain from hunger4 ,we may be physiologically hungry without feeling hungry1 and so may have a desire of thing in general to remove pain before the pain is felt and recognised in its particularity as hunger pain4 ,when hunger comes1 or1 primitively1 is achieved1 then we want something to eat2 and as this feeling intensifies1 the craving becomes more and more definite as to object2 bread1 etc41 is wanted1 and in famine hunger there is the most particular representation1 as of certain dishes formerly eaten with great relish4 ,lumholtz1 wandering famished on a ,christmas in the wilds of ,australia1 thinks of the puddings in his native ,norway4 ,the evolutionary significance of this increasing definition of object in desire is obvious in that greater definiteness and accuracy of self-preservative action is thereby assured4 ,as far as the nature of the emotion desire goes1 it seems quite indifferent whether there is presentation or representation of object4 ,i desire equally1 whether ,i actually see the bonbon on the table or when ,i merely represent it--see it in my mind's eye4 ,primarily then1 and always1 even in the latest evolution1 as tendency at least1 the desire is for the pleasure in the object1 and desire is excited by every representation of the pleasurable4 ,if one says1 8,i can look upon pleasure without desire10 we may well question whether there is really personal pleasure represented4 ,dancing1 card-playing1 wine-drinking1 may be pleasures which do not attract me because ,i do not care for them2 and by such a statement we indicate the practical parallelism of pleasure and desire which is forced upon common introspection4 ,if you care for it1 it is a pleasure to you2 if you do not care for it1 it is not a pleasure to you2 such is the result of common observation1 and a very just conclusion so far as ,i can see4 ,to excite desire1 we naturally suggest the pleasurable4 ,one person persuading another to go to a party says3 8,i know you would have a good time40 ,when one answers1 8,i know that ,i would have a good time1 but ,i dread the trouble of getting ready02 here is a conflict of desires in which desire of present ease and comfort may overcome desire of future pleasure4 ,we may1 indeed1 assert that one cannot honestly say1 8,i know it would be a great pleasure to me1 but ,i have no desire for it40 ,when such a phrase is used1 it can only mean that the pleasure is interpreted as belonging to the generic class of pleasures1 yet not a pleasure to the individual in his present conception1 or else its contingency1 implied by 8would10 is so great that desire is practically nil4 ,and if the pleasurable is always the desirable1 the desirable also may be said to be only the pleasurable4 ,the martyr in his most eager desire for a painful death1 fixes his mind1 not upon the pain as pain1 but upon the enduring it successfully1 and the triumphant pleasure1 also the satisfaction of the reward of martyrdom1 and the pleasure of suffering for right and the approval of conscience2 these and many other factors influence him4 ,desire is at pleasure1 not in pleasure1 and thus contains pain1 especially as implied in the preparative factors1 sense of unreality and sense of lack4 ,a bonbon may be so cunningly imitated1 that placed in the mouth it feels like a bonbon1 yet not tasting so1 the painful sense of unreality and loss occurs4 ,there is a painful waking up to the fact of non-realization1 much the same in quality as that which we suppose to have happened in the original genesis of desire4 ,the pleasant hallucination is broken in upon by actuality not fulfilling the psychic co-ordination pre-established under more favourable circumstances2 and this occurs in early psychisms on a wider variety of occasions than in later development4 ,that ,i am not tasting the bonbon ,i see on the table1 this fact per se does not pain me4 ,i take it as a matter of course in an order of nature already well learned and completely acquiesced in4 ,but with infantile and lower stages of evolution generally1 the lack of immediate correlation seems highly painful4 ,seeing has directly developed in immediate connection with a tasting1 and the seeing without tasting seems by its very nature as disquieting as the feeling in the mouth the artificial bonbon without being able to taste is for later experience4 ,it is through the negations of customary coincident impressions that anticipation and desire become forced by the exigencies of life4 ,the early psychism is limited in its adjustments to a very few simple coincidences1 but in the struggle of life in complex nature there comes disruption of these primitive co-ordinations1 and sequences become apprehended1 and meaning is discerned in things4 ,this disruption primitively occurred most easily when there was direct opposition to the usual course of sensations4 ,just as when mouthing the imitation bonbon1 we apprehend most quickly and easily non-realization when it tastes sour rather than sweet4 ,by realities continually breaking in upon the common course of psychic association1 the significance of things is gradually apprehended1 and to see a thing is understood not merely as coincident with other sensations and perceptions1 touching1 tasting1 and pleasure-feeling1 but the thing is cognized as centre of pleasure potency1 and so can become object of desire4 ,experience loses its self-contained simplicity1 and is forced in the struggle of experience in a complex environment into some definite understanding of things1 and into a feeling for them or at them1 and not merely a feeling from them4 ,and so a world of desirables and aversibles is formed4 ,if no pain was felt in the experience of unreality and lack1 if there was mere passivity1 desire would not be generated4 ,this pain of loss spurs the mind to achieve desire1 and desire enables the organism to attain the advantageous4 ,at length a conventionalized world of desirables so formed1 and certain significances1 become so inground into experience that they seem often to be instinctively and immediately recognised by the individual1 anterior to any personal learning by experience1 as in cases of instinctive fear of1 and desire for1 certain objects4 ,while desire is attained at the incitement of pain1 it is in itself a painful mental act4 ,the emotional going out toward the desideratum is in itself a painful mode of consciousness4 ,the feeling ,i have for the bonbon which ,i see and desire is1 so far as desire1 painful1 yet negatively and comparatively1 it may be pleasurable in that this psychosis may supplant one more painful still4 ,it may be said that desire is painful1 and also lack of desire1 or ennui4 ,but mere desirelessness is not ennui4 ,ennui is a feeling of lack and loss1 and so a feeling of desire1 but a peculiar kind of desire4 ,it is desire for activity1 when by a morbid status there is no desire moving to activity4 ,lack of desire and interest in things may be painfully revealed to some active natures1 but to the great majority of psychisms it is a pleasure state4 ,as far as we can judge1 the undesire of the cow leisurely chewing her cud in a warm corner of the barn yard is supreme felicity4 ,a state of desirelessness1 complete yet blissful1 occasionally visits even the consciousness of the nineteenth century busy-body4 ,but the normality of desire for human adult consciousness in general is apparent to all4 ,one who loses all interest or desire loses hold on life4 ,thus desire is life1 and even when it is sought to extinguish it either as dictated by a philosophical maxim or by religious and moral scruples1 on account of the innate selfishness of desire--,madame ,guyon1 for instance--yet desire is sure to intrude1 and must as a desire to destroy desire4 ,so whether we would fly1 or would reach desire1 we thereby desire4 ,we may uproot or cultivate certain kinds of desire which thereby become objects of aversion or desire1 but the effort to extinguish desire as general fact of psychic life involves either a psychological indefinite regressus which is never desireless1 or else it means the extinction of consciousness itself in any grade above the lowest4 ,a further element which appears in all desire is some measure of self-consciousness4 ,the representation of the experienceable implies some representation of experiences4 ,in constituting the world as the sum total of the experienceable1 we imply an ego-consciousness1 and that objectifying as psychic act is correlated with subjectifying4 ,desire1 like all other emotion1 implies a subjective reference4 ,we see clearly that the psychic act expressed by 8this is the food10 and as such the precursor of and ingredient of desire1 means an identification with past personal experience4 ,a similar act is performed1 no doubt1 by animals very commonly1 though not expressible in speech1 yet in measure expressible1 as in the cluckings of a hen to attract the brood to some seeds4 ,in various ways the desideratum is suggested to the mind1 and in view of it1 both in the identifying as having experiences1 and the longing to experience1 some consciousness of personality is implied4 ,this in early forms of psychosis is1 no doubt1 meagre and indefinite enough1 but not more so than its correlate sense of object4 ,when a strange object is presented1 as when a famished traveller finds a new house1 identifying effort is instinctive2 he at once seeks to understand it1 and gropes through his past experience to determine what has been its life significance for him or other persons1 and so what will be4 ,what is thus done in the full light of reflective consciousness by man1 is done in a summary and imperfect manner1 generally by psychisms1 as preparative to making the object a desideratum or anti-desideratum4 ,the assimilating and integrating1 the knowing1 never exists without some appreciation of subject1 because integration is not only of something--objectifying act--but also to something--subjectifying act4 ,things are from the first apprehended only in their immediate egoistic significance1 and also very early as centres of possible sensations which become a matter of fear and hope1 desire and aversion4 ,desire is certainly a very extensive psychic genus including many varieties which are noted by common introspection1 and which are even denoted by special words4 ,a wish is a momentary act of desire1 longing is intense form2 ambition and aspiration are desires for higher order of objects1 as contrasted with desire for food or dress4 ,the kinds as distinguished by object are numberless since any object may be desirable1 and the realm of the desirable is coincident with the realm of the knowable4 ,in the course of evolution we become aware of things and of states of consciousness1 so that by feeling about them--having emotions--there may result the advantageous action with reference to them4 ,this order1 not consciously apprehended of course1 is the natural order of psychic events1 and one which1 in tendency at least1 always appears1 even in latest evolutions4 ,the desire to know what is the full experience value of things1 curiosity1 is an early acquirement1 since complete cognition of object is obviously of the greatest advantage1 especially to the weaker animals1 as deer1 who act wholly on the defensive4 ,the very strong can afford to be largely indifferent to their environment4 ,with reference to intensity1 we can place forms from a positive to a negative pole4 ,thus with a famished man desire for food is first intense craving1 becoming with continued eating moderate desire1 then feeling of satisfaction1 then of repletion1 then negative1 as aversion in passive form or satiety1 then becoming active as disgust1 and intense as loathing4 ,content1 or desire satisfied1 is not desire extinguished1 rather it is an equilibrium wherein desire and its function are in continual equalizing action4 ,when desire granted means all desire extinguished1 with beings of any high tendency to activity ennui is the result4 ,here1 as ,schopenhauer notes1 wish for a wish develops4 ,even in complete pleasurable quiescence1 there is desire for its continuance1 which is only saying that there can be no complete quiescence short of coma1 or else of a state where reality has never broken in1 and experience is wholly unformed where the being cannot anticipate or note change4 ,pure and absolute content never occurs1 and as a matter of fact never will1 the point of transition in the desire gamut1 in passing from positive to negative1 being like a mathematical form1 unreal and theoretical4 ,when positive desire ends1 negative desire springs up immediately1 just as in the pleasure-pain gamut1 where the indifference point of transition has no existence in reality4 ,desire in any of its forms may take on an altruistic1 disinterested phase1 though much that is taken for altruistic is only apparently or partially so1 being really due to self-extension4 ,if you take an interest in anything1 it becomes interesting to you1 it is a matter of personal concern1 and becomes identified with the self4 ,thus in our family1 our town1 our nation1 our race1 desire plants itself2 it is in this personal extension of view that most of the pity1 sympathy1 and benevolence is exercised4 ,a well-wishing and consequent exertion for humanity in general is very late1 and still later is desire for animals as sentient beings having a worth of being in themselves4 ,the remarks we have made concerning desire proper1 apply equally to aversion4 ,we must bear constantly in mind that desire proper and aversion are really in psychic analysis1 merely phases positive and negative of a certain definite mode of psychosis1 hence we often use desire in this large and generic sense1 which instances will be apparent from the context4 ,desire1 like other emotions1 is polar1 and desire generic has its antipodal feeling in some form of active desirelessness4 ,as desire is naturally and originally connected with all perception of object1 we find it closely allied with other emotions4 ,while we must suppose that early desire is upon idea of pleasure1 upon the idea of its realization to be attained1 without any estimate of likelihood or unlikelihood of realization1 which factor is slow in evolution1 yet when through experience1 sense of certainty or uncertainty is attained as to the experienceable1 this psychosis--belief--has a marked effect upon desire1 and is closely associated with it4 ,bare sense of the experienceable was sufficient to generate desire1 but when the measure of probability of the experienceable actually happening is measured1 we have belief1 expectation1 hope1 and kindred psychoses1 bound up with desire4 ,the expression1 8,i hope it will be a good day to-morrow10 indicates a wish that it would1 plus some confidence that it will be a good day2 8,i wish it would be a good day1 but ,i fear it will not10 shows some lack of confidence in the realization of the event4 ,hope then equals wish1 plus the intellectual element expectation1 a desire for a realization plus some belief in it as actually to happen4 ,a large share of learning by experience consists in the reaction of this expectation on the wish1 in learning not to set our hearts on what we believe to be unrealizable or extremely improbable to happen4 ,wish also acts on belief1 as is plainly expressed in the common phrase1 8the wish is father to the thought40 ,if belief tends to restrict or magnify desire1 desire also tends to determine belief4 ,hope1 as very commonly used1 as when we say1 8,i hope it will turn out so10 is a passive emotion1 and does not appeal to the individual as self-determining the event4 ,as the primary end of emotion is to incite the organism to determine its own experience1 hope as passive seems a rather late evolution1 as having only an indirect and general value by maintaining general pleasurable tone4 ,the one who hopes it will be a good day to-morrow is in a better and more advantageous frame of mind than he who fears it will be a bad day1 in so far as the events are equally beyond self-determination1 and it is of no direct use to either hope or fear4 ,as to the range of desire we must then disagree with ,aristotle and later psychologists1 who suppose that desire is limited by the belief in the possibility of realization4 ,desire existed before this belief was generated2 and while1 after its generation1 it may often affect desire1 yet often it does not4 ,i may wish for the moon as readily as the child to whom the notion of possibility or impossibility of realization is beyond experience4 ,the unrepresentable only cannot be wished1 and desire is bounded only by the power of conception and perception4 ,hope is a species of desire which has to do with belief in the possibility of the event or act3 it is a joyful emotion connected with belief of realization of the pleasurable4 ,this distinction between hope and desire in general is implied in the phrases1 8,i wish he would do it10 and 8,i hope he will40 ,the hope includes the desire1 but the desire may exist without the hope1 as we say1 8,i wish he would1 but know he won't40 ,desire may be hopeless1 but hope cannot be desireless4 ,desire is vitally connected with ideation and volition1 but properly it is the intermediate emotional moment between these1 and not idea of pleasure--as ,james ,mill--nor yet to be placed under will--,bain1 ,james4 ,it is neither phase of ideation or volition4 ,desire is neither idea of1 nor striving after realization2 it is not the idea of goal nor the effort to reach goal4 ,i may have idea of a goal without desire to reach it--at least1 analysis discriminates thus as separate mental stages--and ,i may desire to reach it without trying to reach it1--impotent desire1 sometimes called wish4 ,the striving is the consequent1 and the idea the antecedent of the desire which is the emotion wave we emphasize by the word1 longing4 ,desire is neither phase of volition nor ideation4 ,volition is properly effort at realization1 and is stimulated by the emotion toward the realization ideally apprehended4 ,the relation of desire to will has been a fertile subject of discussion from ,aristotle down1 but we have to take up but a single aspect1 namely1 whether will and desire may with reference to the same object be contrary or distinct4 ,take the example of contrariety mentioned by ,stewart4 ,i wish a certain man not to do a certain act1 but yet ,i persuade him to do it at the request of a friend4 ,if ,i say ,i will persuade him1 though ,i wish him not to be persuaded1 this merely implies that the wish to oblige my friend overcomes the aversion to persuading the man4 ,and1 in general1 apparent cases of conflict of will and desire may be resolved into conflict of desires4 ,hence the phrase1 8,i will do it1 though ,i do not want to do it10 is inaccurate or rather an incomplete analysis4 ,we should always add1 8because ,i have some extraneous and stronger desire40 ,a box of bonbons is hung in a room at a height to be had by whomsoever will jump and reach it4 ,in any party of persons there may be some to whom the wish for ease1 the disinclination to jump1 overcomes the inclination for the bonbons1 so that this volition does not occur1 others who jump even against this disinclination1 the desire for the bonbons being the stronger desire1 and others1 very active1 who jump without feeling any disinclination to the act4 ,conflict of desires is a common and almost constant state with many minds1 and the evolution of man has been mainly through conflict of desire in sacrificing an immediate to a future good4 ,in lower minds with so little self-consciousness and consciousness of a consciousness that they do not grasp conduct as a whole1 there is a simple alternation of volitions flowing from the desires of rival goods1 till one by its intrinsic force dominates with some permanence4 ,these are the creatures of impulse1 unreflecting and unself-directing by principle and reason4 ,higher minds realize their situation and consciously bring in higher desire or motive2 they form rules and principles of conduct3 they become ethical beings1 having self-control and self-direction4 ,desire is based by ,mr4 ,bain on hindrance and opposition to activity1 on 8a bar in the way of activity40 ,this is true if we understand it to refer to sense of unreality and of lack as connected with an apprehension of thing where the thing is really absent from the usual correlation1 and hence physiological activities are checked4 ,we have in the previous pages discussed this1 but this is not ,mr4 ,bain's point of view4 ,the three elements he emphasizes are3 deficiency1 idea of pleasure1 and the hindrance4 ,thus1 he contrasts the prisoner who looks out on a bright day and longs to take a walk1 with a perfectly free man who looks out on a fine day and freely follows his inclination to walk4 ,however1 it appears to me that both have desire1 and that in the same sense both are moved by the motive1 though only one is free to attain the action4 ,so if ,i get thirsty in a waterless desert or in my room with a jug of water on the table1 the bodily sensations will equally lead to desire4 ,the conflict in desire is between state actual and state conceived1 and not between will and restraint4 ,mr4 ,bain remarks1 8,if all motive impulses could be at once followed up1 desire would have no place40 7,emotions and ,will1 p4 #dbc47 ,but desire is itself an original impulse1 and is more or less an ingredient in all emotion impulse2 and it is plain that emotion impulses as implying representation are the only ones which can be 8followed up40 ,where every wish is gratified as soon as formed1 as with a petted child of rich parents1 desire still remains in all its characteristic quality4 ,such an one1 however1 by having only the momentary pleasure of completed realization1 misses the joys of realizing1 and loses all that happiness which has been defined as sense of progress4 ,if every wish were gratified as soon as formed1 if every representation of pleasure was immediately followed by realization1 desire would still exist in all its peculiar force4 ,the moment of gratification is always second to the moment of desire1 and a ,fortunatus with his wishing-cap cannot possess in absolute coincidence with the wish4 ,it may be objected that ,tantalus' desire is certainly a form where hindrance is the main stimulant4 ,when one is continually hindered just on the point of realization1 desire is intensified1 but this intensifying is very largely due to the increased definiteness of presentation or representation1 and to the increase of confidence in the event4 ,to tantalize is to bring before one an object of strong desire into the clearest prominence and seemingly certain attainment1 yet to constantly withhold it4 ,we have spoken of desire as an impulse1 and we would include all emotion as impulse1 for to impel is its function and action4 ,impulse is the will side of emotion as interest is its intellectual side4 ,if ,i fear a man1 this is my interest in him and impulse from him4 ,true1 we speak of being driven by 8blind impulse02 but emotion cannot be blind1 it can only be kindled by object imaged4 ,anything which actuates the will may very broadly but wrongly be called impulse1 for impulse strictly connotes an emotion wave undirected and issuing at once in action4 ,where unforeseen ends are served1 as when a hen driven by sensation of heat sits on eggs1 we commonly but wrongly denominate it impulse4 ,without some representation there is no emotion and no impulse4 ,so when standing over a precipice ,i say ,i have the impulse to throw myself down1 this means that the depth wakens in me image of falling and an awful desire to realize the image1 which impels the act4 ,if ,i am merely giddy ,i will fall1 but if ,i have the emotion-impulse ,i will throw myself down2 ,i am not impelled by dizziness or any sensation1 but the term denotes emotion as desire or fear4 ,for the ordinary human mind desire seems in general a spontaneous and instinctive act4 ,we do not make an effort in desiring1 though desire like other mental functions undoubtedly arose in struggle4 ,originally this psychosis was a stress and strain activity2 it was a rarely achieved emotion1 just as the emotion of pleasurable appreciation of ,beethoven's music or ,michael ,angelo's sculpture is for most minds a rare uplift of psychic force4 ,knowing as compound of presentation and representation and as involving emotion and volition1 is1 with us1 within certain limits1 an habitual spontaneous act of mind4 ,i feel the pain from cold1 without sensation of cold1 as bare pain1 as undifferentiated feeling of discomfort1 ,i then feel cold1 ,i feel cold object1 ,i desire warmth1 ,i will to draw near the stove2 here is a progressive series of correlated psychoses which are constantly occurring in a spontaneous way in ordinary experience4 ,but this psychic structure which operates so easily is really the outgrowth of ages of psychic evolution wherein the separate steps have been achieved and the correlation established only by the severest nisus4 ,associations are first achieved in experience established by numberless reiterations before there is spontaneous tendency to re-occurrence1 this is the law of psychic evolution to-day1 and is the only clue we have to the past4 ,the evolution of mind is not and never has been a mechanical process1 but its basis is in pure feeling as stimulating volition4 ,paradoxical as the expression sounds1 yet in a sense it is true that the organism has learned to know and to feel thereupon4 ,it may even be that in the course of psychic ages with certain species of animals some emotions may become innate1 and such advantageous psychoses as fear or desire may occur without any integration through individual experience4 ,the new-born chick1 when it hears the note of a hawk1 is said to show signs of fear1 though what actual psychosis occurs1 if any1 seems almost beyond our power to know4 ,the whole process may be reflex nervous action1 a mere closed neural circuit being affected4 ,it is no doubt true that all long-continued1 often recurring psychoses tend to so embody themselves in a neural combination that the given activities are carried on in a sub-conscious and finally in an unconscious way4 ,it is very probable that much that we take for emotion with lower animals is reflex or semi-reflex action2 yet it is likewise true that there is1 as a matter of advantage in struggle for existence1 an inherited instinctive tendency to certain emotions1 to certain kinds of fear and desire1 and there may be a distinct awareness of the potency in things1 which has never been individually realized4 ,in its every transaction with things the young organism may act by reflex action or by inherited emotional tendency4 ,how far either or both enter into the first individual experiences is a matter for the psychology of the future4 ,the general function of desire in life is obvious2 it is the most potent factor in conserving and extending life4 ,far back in a paleozoic psychic period life was below desire2 but once originating under the pressure of the struggle for existence it has since developed into the most manifold and complex forms4 ,human life is the outcome of desire1 and the human being is par excellence the desiring psychism4 ,as the moving factor of humanity history is its record1 and present human organization1 faculty1 and achievement is its product4 ,desire1 as the force to realize1 to convert seen potency into actuality1 the idea into reality1 is now in the very highest examples of psychic development an ever increasing power1 and no prospect of a psychic stage to be reached beyond desire is intimated in the present course of normal development4 ,the tendency toward extinction of desire1 when it does occur1 appears always as pathologic or retrogressive symptom4 ,it may be the dream of a philosopher or of a cult1 but with ,schopenhauer himself desire was a most forceful factor1 and the devotee of desirelessness by very reason of being a devotee to an object1 desires it1 namely1 the state of desirelessness4 ,we may desire to extinguish certain desires1 and succeed in accomplishing this1 but to desire not to desire1 as general act1 is a psychological contradiction in terms4 ,a very low vegetative psychic status without any desire is possible1 but all teleologic activity implies desire1 hence extinction of desire can never be attained as an end4 ,desire moves the world and is the core of psychic being4 ,deprived of definite desire1 we long for it1 and if every wish were immediately realized1 we should desire delay in gratification4 ,the amount and value of life is measured by the quantity1 quality1 and effectiveness of desire4 ,orton characterizes the ,indians of the ,amazon as 8without curiosity or emotion10 which must1 however1 be taken only as relatively true1 but yet marking them as extremely low in the psychic scale4 ,education then1 is a process of stimulating desire1 of leading to ambitions and aspirations4 ,as what is imposed on consciousness without desire is a hurtful burden1 the true pedagogic method is always to awaken the wish for knowledge and power before it is granted4 ,desire as interest is assimilating power1 and without it there is no mental growth4 ,the art of education is the art of stimulating intellectual1 sthetic1 moral and religious desires1 and of providing for their progressive gratification with the best arranged and most suggestive material4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,some ,,remarks ,,on ,,attention ,the term attention is1 like feeling1 a word of extremely doubtful and variable import4 ,like feeling1 attention may be used as denominating any stage of consciousness1 or it may be restricted to some more or less specific form4 ,as affections of the organism all psychoses are termed feelings2 viewed as subjective-objective acts1 a content being attained1 consciousness as such is termed attention4 ,we are said to be attending when we have any activity of mind1 when we have anything in the mind or before the mind4 ,when consciousness has something in it1 consciousness is attending1 whence attention means consciousness acting4 ,but what is consciousness inactive8 ,nothing4 ,hence consciousness attending1 used for consciousness acting1 is a pleonasm4 ,consciousness1 by virtue of always being conscious of something1 does not need the word attention to qualify it4 ,the attention of consciousness is called1 attracted1 or engaged1 when any mental act occurs1 whether a pain1 pleasure1 perception1 or whatever form it may be4 ,when the mind is occupied with anything1 i4e41 is active1 it is thereby attending to the thing4 ,if ,i am conscious1 ,i am1 of course1 conscious of something1 hence attending to that something4 ,but all these expressions are incompatible with a purely psychological point of view4 ,in psychics1 as opposed to physics1 the thing exists only as perceived and in perceiving1 esse is percipi2 the object or content of consciousness exists neither beyond consciousness nor in it2 it is consciousness and consciousness is it1 it is nothing more than objectifying fact4 ,consciousness does not1 like a pail1 have contents1 but it is merely a name for the sum of activities we term conscious4 ,such a phrase1 then1 as1 attending to something1 may be radically misleading4 ,we do not have both consciousness and a field of consciousness1 a presentation field4 ,a tolerably constant part of human consciousness is an activity which is a constituting a world of external and internal objects4 ,this objectifying activity1 which may or may not be object for higher activity--apperception or attention in one sense--does not1 however1 persist and subsist as a more or less mechanical continuum1 as ,mr4 ,james ,ward and that school maintain4 ,still the word attention may in a vague and general way denote both the realizing force and will effort therein of every act of consciousness4 ,but yet as thus a general term for certain aspects or general qualities1 it is liable to misconstruction1 and we do not propose to employ it either as denoting any act of consciousness as such1 or any aspect thereof4 ,attention may also denote dominancy in consciousness4 ,when any one factor is pre-eminent1 we say the mind is therewith attentive4 ,when any element has a marked ascendency1 so that all others are much feebler and subservient1 thereby is constituted a state of attention2 as when sight perception monopolizes consciousness in an eagle watching for prey1 or hearing commands all the mental powers of a deer listening to a strange sound4 ,however1 practically all states are in reality complexes in which some one factor is and must be dominant1 and this universal phenomenon of dominancy scarcely deserves the specific name1 attention4 ,consciousness is always more or less concentrated in some single channel2 the factors in any state of consciousness are never perfectly equal in intensity1 and so are never in perfect balance4 ,but attention is not this fact of dominancy1 but rather that of consciously sustained dominancy1 as we shall note later4 ,if attention is not a proper term to denote simple dominancy1 may it not denote that complete form1 engrossment1 or absorption1 where one element predominates to the exclusion of all others1 and so occupies all of consciousness--that is1 more exactly1 is all the consciousness--and also tests the capacity for consciousness to the full8 ,the fixed idea is an instance in point1 and in a certain way also preoccupation or absent-mindedness4 ,still1 in this last there are manifold elements and often great complexity--e4g41 train of thought--hence dominances of different forms1 but yet a persistence of a certain mode with consciousness running at its full capacity1 and the result being that the general trend is not easily altered4 ,in cases of fixed idea and brown study we say1 8his attention is fully occupied10 which means nothing more than his mind or consciousness capacity is fully taken4 ,i do not see that we gain anything by using attention in the same sense as these two general terms1 mind and consciousness1 which are surely sufficient4 ,further1 when one 8loses himself in a subject10 the power of self-activity1 and hence power of real attention1 is lost4 ,mental activity which has slipped beyond the control of will is not in any true and high sense an attending1 nor is attention good term for consciousness at saturation point4 ,again1 attention is often used to denote consciousness in its change aspect4 ,when a new consciousness comes in and supplants a former state1 we say1 in popular but misleading phrase1 8it takes or attracts his attention10 as if attention were entity rather than activity4 ,but when we say that change of consciousness is change of attention1 we really add nothing2 it is an identical proposition4 ,attention does not qualify consciousness1 but is merely synonym for it4 ,still again1 may attention designate intensity1 or some certain degree of intensity8 ,we may say of one1 8he was looking inattentively10 or of a fixed1 intense gaze1 8he was looking very attentively40 ,a strong vision is thus opposed to weak as an attention4 ,as all psychoses have some degree of intensity1 they are thereby acts of attention1 if we reckon from a zero point1 or a more or less large number of consciousnesses if we reckon from some fixed degree of intensity4 ,but to call a psychosis1 because of its intensity1 or because it has reached a certain degree thereof1 an attention1 seems an unnecessary procedure4 ,nothing is gained by describing an intense psychosis as an attention1 and certainly intense pains and pleasures hardly come under the term4 ,nor yet are intense cognitions1 merely by reason of the intensity1 properly states of attention4 ,fixed ideas are commonly intense1 yet there is no true attention1 as we have before intimated4 ,cognitions which come as intense must be marked off from those which are intense by reason of a self-determined self-consciousness intensifying4 ,the essence of attention is intensifying act self-regulated4 ,to be sure1 intense presentations are given as such only by an heredity momentum1 from past ancestral intensifyings2 their impetus is on the basis of past cognitive exertions4 ,presentation intensity1 and1 indeed1 all mental intensity1 is originally and fundamentally volitional2 the act had its force solely in will power2 but in late phases psychoses which originally required intense exertion rise spontaneously and have a strength and persistence apart from volition1 and so the word attention does not rightly apply to them4 ,thus also we can solve the problem that ,mr4 ,ward states when he says1 8,how the intensity that presentations have apart from volition is related to that which they have by means of it--how the objective component is related to the subjective--is a hard problem2 still there is no gain in a spurious simplicity that ignores the difference0 7,mind1 xii4 p4 #fe74 ,but 8objective component0 and 8subjective0 do not enter into the question2 cognition does not arise as a given1 as forced and determined from without1 but it is rather at bottom a mode of volition4 ,still attention is not then cognition intensity in general4 ,if attention is not any form or quality of mental activity in general or of cognition in particular1 we must find its essence in volition--as1 indeed1 has been intimated in the immediately preceding pages4 ,attention is properly the will side of cognition2 it is cognitive effort4 ,considering attentively1 looking attentively1 listening attentively1 mean cognitive efforts in thinking1 seeing and hearing4 ,here is a cognitive experience which does not simply happen1 but is definitely brought about and held to4 ,there is intensifying act by which the given cognition is held and kept in dominancy4 ,the word attention must1 as a psychological term1 be extended to denote1 not merely modes of cognitive effort prominent in man1 but all cognitive exertion of whatever grade4 ,it will include all will-tension in all the senses--olfactory1 gustatory1 muscular1 etc4--as well as visual and auditory4,d ,a dog scenting game may be as truly attentive as a waiter listening to your order4 ,so far as the smelling by the dog is merely instinctive1 that is1 heredity survival1 there is no real attention2 the mental activities are not efforts of will-attentions--so far as they occur spontaneously and inevitably4 ,but when1 as we often see1 a dog is somewhat baffled in scenting1 it plainly puts forth cognitive effort1 it exerts its cognitive powers to the utmost1 there is that strain and stretch which the word attention literally and naturally suggests4 ,as soon1 in fact1 as the labour point is reached in any mode of cognition1 here is attention4 ,all toil and work is attention1 as a definite exertion of will including some cognitive element4 ,the labour of life is attention1 is minding or attending to business4 ,attention is thus will effort in maintaining and intensifying a mode of cognition4 ----- ,footnote ,d3 ,see also my remarks in ,psychological ,review1 ii4 p4 #ec4 ----- ,concentration of attention is then1 we may now remark1 a redundancy1 as we make attention equal to concentration4 ,to say his attention was concentrated upon a certain subject1 is equivalent to saying his mind was concentrated4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 concentrated attention may mean intense attention or concentration1 but some concentration being always involved in attention1 it is a confusing and inaccurate phrase4 ,in a more restricted sense1 attention is not merely any will tension in cognition1 but only so far as self-consciousness is involved in all the exertion4 ,we must sharply distinguish between this attention as willed activity and as simple act of will4 ,willed cognitive activity denotes cognition determined upon and consciously accomplished4 ,the willing in the knowing act may not be will to know4 ,willed cognitive activity1 when not against the will1 when including choice and acquiescence1 is in the true sense voluntary attention--attention voluntarily1 freely1 willingly performed4 ,the term voluntary is not the proper correlative of spontaneous1 but rather volitional1 while non-voluntary must be set over against voluntary4 ,in self-conscious attention of any kind there must be consciousness of the tension1 and consciously exercised effort in delineating and maintaining cognition4 ,in this narrow sense attention is conscious furtherance or hindrance of cognition4 ,effort is consciously put forth in some particular cognitive form2 there is a self-limitation by the mind in cognitive process4 ,in short1 attention here equals cognition consciously constrained4 ,as to the relation of attention to subject1 we remark that psychology as the science of mental phenomena1 rather than science of the soul1 is not called upon to imply a subject as in any wise attending4 ,yet we use1 and use inevitably1 substantive forms and personal pronouns1 but while it is impossible for science to desubstantialize language1 yet it must be ever on its guard against the delusions of language4 ,it is a common impulse to explain activities by referring them to agents1 to describe attention and all mental acts as being what they are by reason of the actor1 the self1 or ego2 but science in this1 as in so many things1 inverts the common order2 the agent is made by and of activities1 and not the reverse4 ,agent or subject is no more than a congeries of manifold interdependent activities4 ,there is1 and can be1 no fixing of the mind by the mind3 the word1 mind1 being used in the same sense in both cases4 ,when ,i say1 8,i fix the mind upon something10 this means for analytical psychology1 that in the complex of consciousnesses which are unified by an ego-sense1 there occurs a will effort accomplishing a perception4 ,this purely dynamic interpretation is the method of all science which cannot accept inexplicable essences and agents as explaining anything4 ,attention is not to be explained by an attender1 but it is a mode of activity in that collection of activities which we term organic life with conscious process4 ,so even attention1 as self-conscious exertion1 is not to be interpreted as an agent which is conscious of itself in exerting2 but we consider it as volitional activity with consciousness of self as manifold complex of objects vitally connected with will effort4 ,self-consciousness does not necessarily mean a self conscious of itself4 ,it is obvious from our discussion thus far that we do not accept the common division of attention into spontaneous and voluntary1 which means for us no more than spontaneous and voluntary--more properly volitional--cognition4 ,so-called spontaneous attention is the displacing of one consciousness element by another without any will effort2 there is no displacing or placing as will activity1 but cognitions appear1 persist and disappear by an inherent force4 ,when in deep study the noise of a whistle may spontaneously 8attract my attention10 as the phrase is1 but this denotes no more than forcible change of state4 ,there is nought in the new act but the sensing the noise of whistle2 there is no real attending activity1 no will effort at either promotion or inhibition4 ,however1 we must grant that most cognition contains a volition element4 ,absolute zero or negative value as to volition is but a momentary and comparatively rare phenomenon in normal consciousness1 where self-possession and self-direction in some measure is almost constant4 ,in the case of noise of steam-whistle suddenly breaking in upon a student1 there is quickly attention--either positively1 as listening to quality1 or to detect direction of sound2 or negatively--true inattention--as inhibiting and disturbing element4 ,when one is made 8wild10 or distracted1 by noise1 then his mind is occupied unwillingly1 indeed1 yet there being no real promotion or inhibition1 we must term the state unattention4 ,another form is where we give up in despair1 and passively suffer the annoying noise4 ,in both cases we neither stimulate nor repress1 and so both are emotional unattentions4 ,on account of the pain-pleasure nature of all experience1 there is even here1 however1 some will attitude and tendency1 some favouring or retarding act1 though it be wholly impotent in effect4 ,just when a cognition rises to attention point1 just when volition with effort becomes prominent factor1 this is a difficult and delicate problem4 ,however1 according to the relative prominence or obscurity of volition element1 we must divide cognitions into attentions and impressions4 ,in the variety of human cognitive activity there is a constant flow of cognitions which are one moment being strengthened to attentions1 and another1 weakened to impressions4 ,with volatile persons cognitive life is a kaleidoscopic congeries of rapidly experienced impressions and attentions4 ,will darts in and out with marvellous velocity1 now vivifying some1 now others1 in the stream of cognitive activities determined by pleasure and pain interest4 ,with all of us there is a manifold complex continuum of cognition1 a general non-attention knowing of external world and ego1 which we continually carry with us4 ,into this field of exertionless cognitive life will-effort penetrates now to one point1 now to another1 seizing upon and enlarging the most interesting and significant facts4 ,as ,i am sitting in my chair1 ,i am dimly aware1 without will tension1 of a large field of varied objects1 any one of which ,i may emphasize1 attend to1 when incited by sufficient interest4 ,practically exertionless awareness is a constant substratum for developed consciousness2 here1 in the world of habit1 it is always at home1 and moves with great ease and smallest friction2 but the process of learning1 the work of adding to mental possessions and enlarging the totum objectivum and totum subjectivum1 this is attention for complex consciousness4 ,we must note this1 that attention is any general alertness toward cognizing1 though no actual cognition be attained4 ,cognitive straining without result is truly a form of attention4 ,a man listening for a sound is equally attentive with a man listening to a sound4 ,it is not necessary for an attention to have something to attend to4 ,attention is effort at cognizing as well as in cognizing4 ,the stupid boy is often the most attentive1 the most strenuous in cognitive effort1 yet there may be little apprehension4 ,in fact1 we must recognise that in cognitive1 as in muscular activity1 effort may be excessive1 and defeat its own end4 ,when suddenly awaking in the night we often strain sense to the utmost1 but with no result2 nothing is heard or seen4 ,in this1 as in some other cases1 we must notice that attention is not necessarily delineation4 ,while generally a particularizing effort of cognition1 attention may sometimes occur as mere general cognition stress4 ,if attention consists in cognitive effort1 whether successful or not1 what is the nature of the effort to attend8 ,a student says1 ,i try to attend1 but ,i cannot2 ,i cannot hold my mind down to anything4 ,professor ,james remarks1 8,in fact1 it is only to the effort to attend1 not to the mere attending1 that we are seriously tempted to ascribe spontaneous power0 7,psychology1 p4 #dea74 ,but it is obvious in such phrases attention means simply cognition1 and may be substituted for it1 whereas we have just pointed out that attention is both the effort toward and in cognizing act4 ,literally interpreted1 then1 the problem is whether we can make an effort to make an effort at cognizing4 ,in great lassitude or exhaustion we lose control of ourselves1 we are unable to exercise volition either as attention or otherwise4 ,we recognise and lament the fact to ourselves1 we feel our powerlessness1 but ,i hardly think we do ever really make an effort at effort4 ,at the very first stage of recovery from such state of utter non-volition1 the will act is always toward definite sense adjustments1 or in holding to and promoting certain thoughts and representations1 and we thus have real attention4 ,the utter rout of psychoses1 which once possessed us1 we now conquer and control for our ends and interests4 ,attention to attention is obviously distinctively different from this phase4 ,we can and do attend to attention as psychic fact4 ,an act of attention cannot1 indeed1 attend to itself1 but the volition act in consciousness of consciousness1 as consciousness of some attention act1 is very properly an attention to attention4 ,if ,i am looking attentively at a man1 ,i cannot1 by the very nature of attention1 be simultaneously volitionally introspective of1 i4e41 attentive to the looking attentively4 ,when actively sensing light1 ,i cannot at the same moment attend to this attention1 because attention is always concentrative of will4 ,to be volitionally conscious of light is one moment1 and to be volitionally conscious of this light consciousness is another moment4 ,the attention attended to is not in process at the same moment as the attention4 ,this does not deny that we have simultaneous spontaneous introspection of attentions4 ,introspection1 like sensation1 perception1 ideation1 is attention only so far as it is effortful4 ,in his recent treatise on psychology ,professor ,james discusses in an interesting and suggestive way the relation of ideation to attention1 maintaining that 8ideational preparation 444 is concerned in all attentive acts40 ,attention is 8anticipatory imagination0 or 8preperception0 which prepares the mind for what it is to experience4 ,thus the schoolboy1 listening for the clock to strike twelve1 anticipates in imagination and is prepared to hear perfectly the very first sound of the striking4 ,it is undoubtedly true that in the form of attention we term expectant1 where we are awaiting some given impression1 there is a representing1 antedating experience1 which may be a preparatory preperception4 ,but with a wrong imaging of what is to be experienced there is hindrance1 as when in a dark1 quiet room we are led to expect sensation of light but actually receive sensation of sound4 ,very often1 indeed1 our anticipations make us unprepared for experience4 ,further1 the experiments adduced by ,professor ,james from ,wundt and ,helmholtz are in the single form of expectant attention1 and we must remark that in these experiments the reagent is also experimenter1 and this introduces a new attention1 consciousness of consciousness1 and that of a peculiar kind1 which complicates an already complex consciousness4 ,in general we may say that experimentally incited consciousness is artificial1 at least as far as it feels itself as such1 and for certain points like simple attention this tends to vitiate results4 ,self-experimentation or experiment on those conscious of it as such may mislead in certain cases1 and must1 so far as this element of consciousness of experiment is not allowed for4 ,in physical science things always act naturally1 whether with observation or experiment1 but in psychology observation1 other things being equal1 is more trustworthy than experiment4 ,in all cases of expectant or experimentally expectant attention1 the attention does not1 however1 lie in the expectancy or in the imaging as such1 but it is merely the will effort concerned in these operations4 ,yet as we may expect without effort1 and preconceive without volition1 attention is necessarily involved in neither4 ,a perception or a preperception is an attention only as accomplished by will with effort1 but only an unattention when purely involuntary4 ,professor ,james's use of attention as preperception brings us back to the common idea of attention1 as any consciousness which cognizes something4 ,this is so inbred in thought and language that it is most difficult to avoid using the term in this sense4 ,many psychologists1 like ,mr4 ,james and ,mr4 ,sully1 frequently mention attention as a will phenomenon1 but they do not treat it under will1 and they constantly return to the cognition meaning4 ,hffding1 however1 treats attention under psychology of will4 ,attention as the exercise of will in building up and maintaining cognitive activity1 is naturally treated under cognition2 but it is on the whole safer and better to discuss attention under will so as to keep it sharply distinguished from the presentation form which it vitalizes4 ,i have endeavoured to hold the term strictly to this sense1 yet it is not unlikely ,i may sometimes unwittingly countenance the common confusion1 but trust the instances will be few4 ,when we have1 then1 a case of expectant attention1 we must distinguish the attention in the imaging from the attention in the actual cognizing4 ,it is1 indeed1 true for us almost invariably that cognitive strain without immediate realization is incentive to ideating4 ,in listening in the night in vain for a sound we hear in imagination many sounds1 and we form preparatory ideas of what we are to hear4 ,sense-adjustments call up a train of sensations in ideal form4 ,but it is obvious that low intelligences which have no power of expectancy or ideation do yet really attend4 ,the very first cognitions and all early cognitions by their very newness and difficulty were attentions long before ideation was evolved4 ,with low organisms1 as cognitive power extends only to the present in time and space1 immediacy of reaction is imperatively demanded1 and every tension of cognitive apparatus is immediately directive of motor apparatus1 so that suitable motion is at once accomplished4 ,the cognition1 though dim and evanescent factor1 is yet powerfully energized1 and so a true attention4 ,always with lowest sentiencies1 and often with higher1 pain is suddenly realized without anticipation1 followed quickly by attention as strong effort to cognize the nature and quality of the pain-giver and so to effectually get rid of pain-giver and pain4 ,preliminary idea1 then1 cannot occur in early attentions and in late attentions1 it is by no means necessary4 ,it is said that we see only what we look for1 but it must be answered that seeing commonly happens without any looking for4 ,the kindergarten child1 ,professor ,james to the contrary notwithstanding1 is not confined in his seeing to merely those things which he has been told to see and whose names have been given him4 ,a child continually asks1 ,what is that8 and is quick to discern the new and strange4 ,he accomplishes a wide variety of attentions without ideas and gives himself almost entirely to immediate presentations4 ,to be sure1 every one sees only what he is prepared to see1 only what is made possible for him by his mental constitution as determined by his own pre-experience and the experience of his ancestors1 but this does not signify ideation4 ,every cognizing is conditioned by the past1 but this does not call for a reawakening and projecting in ideal form at every instance of cognitive effort before any real cognition is reached4 ,in fact many1 if not the most of our attentions1 are merely intensifyings of some present cognition1 of some cognitive psychosis which has simply come or happened4 ,take the instance of attention to marginal and retinal images2 this certainly does not always imply pre-perception1 the forming of an idea of what we are to see1 though in the cases mentioned by ,professor ,james it may4 ,for example1 ,i was writing the above seated with my profile to the window when ,i became suddenly aware1 through the physiological agency of a marginal image1 of a moving object to my right4 ,this perception of bare1 undefined object was spontaneous1 a pure given2 ,i exercised no will in attaining it1 and so the state of cognition was not an attention4 ,however1 by attending1 by intensifying the cognition by will effort1 ,i perceive that the indefinite object is a man walking on the sidewalk1 who is of a certain height1 clothed in a certain way1 etc4 ,i do not trace the least ideation in the whole process2 the slight attending as act of will did not imply any anterior or posterior idea or representation4 ,the reason for the will act was the intrinsic interest of movement1 and this intrinsic interest arises in the fact that moving objects have had for all life a special pleasure-pain significance2 the moving object is the most dangerous1 and so motion perceived has become ingrained in mind as a special stimulant of attention4 ,this habit of attentiveness to things in motion survives and continues for cases where it is of no use and even of harm2 thus1 in the present instance1 it diverts me from my work4 ,it is obvious that attention often occurs in the same way for other senses without preliminary idea4 ,is there such a state as negative attention or active inattention8 ,is will activity in cognition always positive merely1 and never existing as direct repression or weakening of acts8 ,to some psychologists negative attention means only that certain elements in a consciousness are overshadowed by the dominancy of some single factor2 that1 owing to the limited capacity of mind1 many elements can exist only in enfeebled form beside their stronger neighbours4 ,if the life blood of mind1 will1 is largely absorbed by some particular form or mode1 all other forms must suffer in consequence4 ,it is1 of course1 obvious that the amount of will force which is put into some given cognition is potentially or actually withdrawn from other factors which then1 however1 are more justly termed unattentions than inattentions4 ,but is the withdrawal of energy attained only by transference8 ,may it not be attained by direct repression and suppression8 ,when we wish to weaken some particular cognition1 is it to be done only by specially energizing some other cognition8 ,it would seem on general principles rather strange that we can1 under stimulus of interest1 increase our energizing of any given cognition but cannot reduce it except indirectly by transference4 ,this would mean that the sum total of actual will force remains constant as far as subject to voluntary control1 and it is only by subdivision into many channels that any actual diversion is secured4 ,will force may be withdrawn and transferred1 but not an atom of it can be directly suppressed4 ,but can ,i not directly repress a troublesome thought or a painful sight8 ,if by a great effort of will ,i keep my eyes closed to some horrible but fascinating sight1 this is a true active inattention1 the exactly opposite exertion to holding my eyes open and fixed upon my book for reading when very sleepy1 which process is always termed attention4 ,when our energy is going in some comparatively undesirable way we often do simply switch on to another track1 but often also we shut off steam and reverse4 ,instead of direct promotion or indirect inhibition there is direct inhibition or often both forms of inhibition combined4 ,we may1 under pressure of interest1 directly weaken any cognition1 untensify1 check and reduce the will effort involved by immediate relaxation4 ,in putting ourselves to sleep we relax with effort1 we reduce and stop all attentions4 ,in awaking we often go through a reverse process4 ,the attitude of any cognition is either by and through will1 or with comparative indifference and no intervention of will or with will directly against it1 which three states we term attention1 unattention1 inattention4 ,negative attention is then1 ,i think1 a real activity1 a will force which directly hinders and crushes out the unwelcome in consciousness1 while positive attention is will force vitalizing and strengthening the pleasant4 ,in conflict of interests these forms are complementary1 and attention is here a double will-effort1 both the effort at withdrawing energy from one point1 and the effort at applying it in a new point4 ,in most cases attention is both resistance and insistance4 ,even in simple forms the natural tendency to inertia constitutes a constant counter interest to any particular activity-interest4 ,attention then is always resistance to this natural inertia plus the direct energy in effecting the particular activity4 ,but in advanced consciousness there is always a multitude of difficulties in the way of specializing cognition1 a great variety of distractions to be resisted1 all which1 added to the definite exertion required in the special work1 makes the ordinary attention in human consciousness a very complex affair4 ,a student engaged on a mathematical problem is incessantly driving out distracting thoughts and positively fixing his mind upon the problem4 ,resistance is manifold1 according to the speciality of the task--the more special1 the more distractions--and the direct concentration is also a real and direct activity4 ,we may then1 ,i think1 see the importance of both positive and negative acts in attention4 ,as counter to the theory that positive attention is the only real form1 we might plausibly argue the opposite1 that it is only the reverse side of negative attention4 ,if we shut out all but one element from consciousness1 do we not thereby bring that one into bolder relief and so indirectly strengthen it8 ,may not all intensification of cognition be thus but an indirect result of negative attention8 ,no1 for even when all distractions are kept away1 there is the inherent difficulty of the act plus the inertia1 the general disinclination to effort4 ,positive attention may rarely appear as practically pure1 and rarely also negative attention4 ,consciousness may sometimes consist of merely pure will tension as keeping off all defined activities2 and persons of great will power sometimes achieve this in putting themselves to sleep4 ,consciousness is a blank field1 tensely kept1 but perfectly so only for a very brief time4 ,as to the origin of attention1 it must arise with cognition itself4 ,the past act of cognition was1 as we have seen 7p4 #fa71 a powerful will act1 an achievement through struggle1 and therefore an attention4 ,the history of cognition and of its ultimate development into the highest forms is a story of incessant and fierce competition in the struggle of life4 ,man's power of sense1 perception and thought is an inheritance from an immense deal of will effort by untold millions of ancestors4 ,the necessities of existence compelled an alertness1 a general cognitive strain1 which effected progress and discovery1 the attainment and integration of new and most valuable forms of experience which have been handed down to later generations4 ,the earliest cognitive life is then almost entirely attentive2 cognition does not come1 it must be attained4 ,gradually1 however1 some low form like general sensation is so integrated1 and requires less and less attention1 till it comes1 is given1 with comparatively no effort1 and a state of unattention thus appears in consciousness4 ,the child repeats quickly1 easily1 without attention1 the evolution of the past1 and this spontaneous re-enactment continues up to the full point of hereditary integration4 ,without effort the child is carried on at the incitement of instinctive inherent interest up to a certain comparatively high grade of experience4 ,but heredity momentum gradually ceases1 and if there is to be individual progress1 attention must come in4 ,thus1 intellectual education is fundamentally a developing of attention4 ,conscious control of cognition1 both positively and negatively1 becomes more and more efficient1 and the progress of the race is dependent on exceptional attention in exceptional individuals--geniuses4 ,attention becomes more and more limited and specialized1 and a minute subdivision of labour results4 ,now1 primitive attention is not as ,mr4 ,ward1 for example1 would make it1 a primordial fact of mind1 but as a cognitive form of will or will form of cognition--it is essentially secondary4 ,however1 ,mr4 ,ward1 in his article in the ,encyclopdia ,britannica1 makes a peculiarly advanced form of attention the initial fact of consciousness1 namely1 by the non-voluntary act of mind being conscious of changes in itself4 ,but mind is not at first a something which is inevitably cognizant of its own experience1 but it merely is a state1 does not have states1 and is not consciously aware of them as such4 ,there is1 for instance1 pain1 but no consciousness of the pain as fact of experience4 ,mind is not primitively a something acted on1 reacting1 and cognizant of these self-movements1 but merely effortful will activity attaining snatches of cognition at the pressure of pain and pleasure4 ,it seems1 indeed1 tolerably plain that apperception is not necessary to consciousness as such1 and the general law of evolution from simple to complex leads us to suppose that consciousness was not at first with any apperceptive process4 ,changes1 whether as occurring or as being brought about1 did not imply an apperception taking cognizance of them4 ,but however this may be1 certain it is that apperception1 as consciousness of self-change or as consciousness of consciousness1 must as a form of cognition arise in will effort like any other forms1 must be a real attention1 not a so-called non-voluntary attention4 ,we do not see any reason why this form of cognition should be an exception to the general law that every step of consciousness is an acquirement and achievement determined by the struggle for existence4 ,the relation of attention to feeling has already been touched upon1 especially as related to interest4 ,attention1 like other volitions1 is aroused by feeling1 primarily as direct pleasures and pains1 secondarily by the ideal forms of these1 that is1 interest4 ,low organisms are incited to attentions as simple sensation-cognitions only by present or immediately impending pain or pleasure4 ,direct pain does not interest or include interest in itself4 ,there must be1 not merely pain1 but cognition of it as element in experience1 before there is interest1 which is always in something4 ,interest implies representation1 the sense of the value for experience of any given thing4 ,what pleases or pains interests only so far as perceived as pleasurable-painful2 the thing perceived as source of feeling1 or as in any wise related to it1 arouses interest4 8,i am pleased or pained10 does not equal1 8,i am interested02 but only so far as ,i have cognizance of the object1 pleasing or paining1 am ,i interested in it4 ,the interesting is what touches my interests1 what affects my experience1 what potentially reaches or touches me4 ,it is obviously to the great advantage of the organism that pleasure-pain object merely perceived should move1 excite1 or interest1 which brings in attention to the thing1 and so fuller knowledge and preparedness for action4 ,interest1 then1 is practically equivalent to emotion4 8,it interests me10 is equal to1 8,it arouses my emotion40 ,the interesting picture1 book1 man1 animal1 etc41 is that which awakens emotion1 and thus incites attention4 ,what affects me or moves me1 interests me4 ,interest is generally used to denote favourable emotion of rather low intensity1 as when ,i say1 8,he interests me02 but as a psychological term it may well be used in the broad sense to denote any emotion so far as it stimulates attention4 ,the function of interest lies wholly in its effect upon attention1 it is always a feeling stimulant to the will act of cognition4 ,i do not exert my cognitive powers unless ,i have some interest at stake4 ,there are1 of course1 many degrees of interest4 ,often interest is so slight as not to rouse attention1 being too weak to overcome natural inertia to will effort or unable to deflect will as bent by some conflicting interest4 ,a lesson is to be learned1 but the interest1 often extrinsic1 does not rise to attention point till possibly a few minutes before recitation4 ,the interest1 fear of failure1 may then be sufficiently strong to induce very vigorous attention1 and within a certain range the stronger the interest1 the stronger the attention4 ,yet at a certain point of intensity emotion begins to derange will activity and to hinder and even destroy attention4 ,fear which has become fright extinguishes attention4 ,self-controlling power of attention is lost in a flood of emotion4 ,yet ungovernably intense emotion is no longer properly termed interest1 which always implies cognitive power4 ,interest is properly comparatively mild emotion state1 which includes definite cognitive element4 ,but interest may be not only at or below attention point1 but it may be of such an intensity and kind as to do away with need of attention1 securing a spontaneous1 or practically spontaneous1 cognition4 ,thus1 my interest in a book may at first be insufficient1 i4e41 practically nil1 to constrain attention in any degree2 it may become so strong that ,i make constant cognitive effort1 and finally1 as it becomes profound and absorbing1 ,i cognize without any attention4 ,when anything becomes sufficiently interesting1 interest acts of itself directly upon cognition1 which is then performed without attention4 ,interest frequently increases to the spontaneous cognition point1 carries cognition in it2 but we must remember1 nevertheless1 that all cognition had its origin in attention4 ,interest acquired and become habitual demands less and less force of attention1 so that our customary interests finally awake cognition without any attention act4 ,if given cognitions always required the original will effort1--attention1--intellect could not progress1 delicate and far-reaching reactions could not be initiated1 for they could have no basis4 ,the force of inherent hereditary interests makes itself felt throughout all advanced psychic life4 ,a survey of the cognitions of any single day would show us that by far the greater number are by this type and degree of interest4 ,the common cognitions and adjustments of every-day life in walking1 sitting down1 and in matters of routine1 are mostly of this type4 ,it is tolerably plain that the relation of feeling to cognition cannot be expressed by any single formula1 and it is certainly far from true that sensation or other cognition is inversely as the intensity of feeling4 ,if feeling1 either as simple pleasure-pain or as interest1 is the incentive of attention1 which is the primary measure of cognition2 then intensity of cognition is directly as intensity of feeling for a certain range1 and this is also true where attention has lapsed4 ,the law of inverse ratio applies only when feeling has risen beyond the point of highest efficiency1 when there is over pressure1 and mind runs wild beyond self-control and attention4 ,then we should1 of course1 find at a certain point1 if we could make exact measurement1 geometrical decrease in cognition for arithmetical increase in feeling1 but ratio would constantly change4 ,the centre and spring of any high psychic life is interest1 and as interest increases intellection and volition increases pari passu4 ,in cases of decline1 where interest or capacity for emotion is lost1 psychic life as a whole dissolves and disappears4 ,on the contrary1 the progress of mind is in the strengthening and extension of interest4 ,interest leads to attention in the forms mentioned1 but it seems also a mode of attention when1 at the bidding of interest1 we not only promote or inhibit some cognition1 but some particular feeling4 ,in a fit of anger we may be prompted by prudence or conscience to forcibly and directly restrain and abate it4 ,i may similarly maintain an amiable frame of mind as opposed to crossness4 ,to repel a fit of anger of course implies repelling the representations which enter into the angry emotion1 and so it is that the repressing or stimulating all emotions1 by reason of their representative nature1 necessitates a will effort with reference to the cognitive element1 and thus an attention4 ,it is commonly believed that attention to a feeling intensifies it--that the more we attend to our feelings the stronger they are1 and the less attention we pay to them the weaker they are4 ,a soldier wounded on the field of battle heeds not the pain in the excitement of the conflict4 ,but the truth is in this case that he has no pain so long as he feels none1 and that he does not attend to the pain signifies simply that pain does not become a psychic fact1 but is wholly physiological1 and so not a subject for psychological discussion4 ,this is a case of the confusing use of attention for consciousness in general which we have before criticised4 ,very often1 indeed1 such an expression as1 8,the more he attends to his pain the more he has10 means simply1 the more pain he has the more he feels1 an identical proposition4 ,but we must also discriminate between attention in a feeling and attention to a feeling4 ,i work myself up into a passion by strenuously dwelling on representations involved in anger--this is an attention in a feeling2 but attention to anger would be self-observational effort4 ,the former does not involve consciousness of the feeling1 the latter is nothing more than strenuous consciousness of the feeling4 ,men are often angry without being conscious of it or but dimly so1 and attention to the feeling would consist in intensifying by will effort this consciousness4 ,when a person says1 8,i was mad and ,i knew it10 he asserts the distinctness of the acts and that the first does not always imply the second4 ,this cognition originally1 like all cognition1 required volition1 and it is still subject to volitional control and emphasis1 that is attention1 even in advanced consciousness4 ,attention to a feeling is cognitive effort in attaining or strengthening consciousness of feeling1 hence is but a mode of apperceptive or introspective effort4 ,we must distinguish sharply then between the observing act and the observed feeling1 between a cognition of consciousness of pain and a pain consciousness1 and we must note that attention may be either1 neither1 or both4 ,apperception has become such a habit with higher human consciousness that it is commonly exercised without attention1 and so has seemed to some as a necessary fact of all consciousness1 an anthropomorphism1 which seems to us erroneous4 ,when we are conscious we are generally conscious that we are conscious2 when a man has toothache there is not only pain1 ache1 toothache1 but consciousness of this as fact of experience2 but this does not establish apperception as fact of all consciousness4 ,is it true now that the more we are conscious of a consciousness the less we have of the latter8 ,certainly the more conscious we are of it does not imply having the more of it1 though we may say with truth that within a limited range the greater and intenser the consciousness1 the greater the facility for consciousness of consciousness4 ,a mental fact must have a certain definiteness and prominence before it is clearly and easily cognizable4 ,however1 speaking of the effect of apperception upon the consciousness apperceived1 it must be evident that it is always a minifying and not a magnifying4 ,consciousness is self-divided when there is both experience and consciousness of experience1 hence a loss of force for the consciousness cognized4 ,a feeling self-consciously felt is weakened thereby4 ,the feelings we are most conscious of are of comparatively low intensities4 ,in very intense feelings we lose or forget ourselves3 we do not know what we are doing or feeling4 ,if now we make the consciousness of consciousness effortful1 it is plain that we diminish the consciousness cognized in still greater measure4 ,a consciousness of consciousness cannot be forwarded except at expense of general mental capacity1 and so as diverting force from the act observed1 whatever this be4 ,attention to a feeling must then on general principles diminish the feeling1 and that in a marked measure4 ,the psychologist who is always twigging his own consciousness to find out what is going on there must often be surprised to find nothing there4 ,it is astonishing how fast feeling disappears when we begin to examine and analyse it4 ,the emotion fades the moment we turn attention to it4 ,we find that in psychological matters as elsewhere that we cannot have our cake and eat it too4 ,we murder to dissect4 ,apperceptive effort is never intensification in the consciousness cognized1 but cognition and pleasure-pain feeling as a consciousness cognized lose in force1 just as in the body1 an undue exaltation of one function is always a depressing of others by withdrawal of force4 ,the more conscious ,i am of my fear the less ,i fear4 ,while this law of withdrawal of force is obviously the case when consciousness is at its fullest capacity1 yet it may be said that apperception in other phases acts as stimulant to waken latent forces1 just as in the body stimulus of one function is often stimulus of all1 though we doubt that apperception is original and permanent function in consciousness4 ,but still in such cases it is a new consciousness which is stimulated and strengthened and not the consciousness which is being cognized1 and still more then is there decrease in the latter4 ,a given feeling is never increased by attentive consciousness of it4 ,when a feeling is said to be intensified by attention to it1 we may suspect either inaccurate analysis or misuse of terms4 ,this1 of course1 does not deny that within a certain range immanent attention increases pleasure1 etc41 for example1 the more actively we taste an orange the more taste pleasure we get4 ,we note in passing the very interesting psychological paradox that the more we view ourselves the less we have to view1 the principle of which has been set forth above4 ,we know well that the very reflective and self-conscious have little personal force and individual quality4 ,moreover the self-conscious stage in youth is precisely the period when there is the least real self to be conscious of4 ,a strong multiplex mind is rarely very self-observant4 ,finally we have to remark upon the way in which attention may be divisive of cognition4 ,boswell makes ,dr4 ,johnson to say1 8,if we read without inclination1 half the mind is employed in fixing the attention2 so that there is but one half to be employed on what we read40 ,but admitting the necessity of intrinsic interest1 this does not do away with attention4 ,attention hinders rather than helps cognition only when it becomes wearing strain1 as in reading when much fatigued4 ,but attention as fulness of vigorous normal will activity gives a force and value to cognition which it would not otherwise have1 and often makes its very existence possible4 ,the greatest1 most significant cognitions in the mental life of any individual are those which are achieved at the top of endeavour4 ,real knowledge as advancement and acquirement is always the fruit of long training and attention4 ,the act of attention is painful and therefore is not exercised by lower organisms1 at least1 only under absolute necessity4 ,often the pain from attention is so great that the individual prefers to suffer than to exert himself cognitively and so help to remove pain-giver4 ,it is only under the greatest pressure that new knowledge and new ideas are acquired1 and the history of mind shows a series of tours de force achieved only in moments of direst need4 ,the strengthening and the holding of cognitive powers to a given point by effort of will is peculiarly distasteful and painful activity4 ,all minds tend toward inaction or toward the regions of effortless action where overwhelming interest carries them freely along4 ,attention1 while the most advantageous of actions1 is yet most irksome and painful4 ,it would seem to us at first blush that if pleasure and not pain had attached to the attentive act from the beginning1 the evolution of mind would have been accomplished in the merest fraction of the time actually required4 ,it would have been the difference between going down a steep incline rather than up4 ,why progress should only be realized through painful effort and struggle is a problem which has vexed the thought of man throughout history but upon which psychology has little light to throw4 ,our present concern is to simply emphasize the fact that cognitive act as attention is always painful1 and if the act of cognition is performed without pain we may promptly deny this to be an attention4 ,this is1 of course1 far from asserting that all cognizings with pain are attentions4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,self-,,feeling ,popular and scientific observation agree that a very interesting and important phenomenon in consciousness is the sense of self as involving such feelings as pride1 shame1 self-satisfaction1 and self-disgust4 ,and the evolutionary psychologist is bound to consider self-consciousness in its rise and development as a life factor4 ,what is its significance for life8 ,how and when did it arise as answering a demand in the struggle for existence8 ,further1 the psychologist is bound to clearly define and analyse the self-sense as psychic fact1 to understand just what it is1 as well as what it seems4 ,the nature of the self-sense must be carefully studied by introspection1 and its elements and quality determined4 ,however1 the psychist has nothing1 of course1 to do with the self which is sensed1 an inquiry which belongs alone to the metaphysician4 ,self-consciousness has been throughout all our discussion assumed and implied as factor in emotion life4 ,object is not merely perceived1 for this in itself has no life value1 but is at once interpreted in experience terms1 is self-related1 and emotion arises and stimulates suitable will-response in bodily activities4 ,thus all response to environment through cognition of environment means with sense of the environment as its own4 ,thus1 and thus only1 is sense of environment rendered efficacious1 for bare objectivity1 which signifies nothing1 has no value for life4 ,under the conditions of existence in the struggle of life object cognition could not originate because it has no function4 ,the theory of natural selection then requires that object and subject cognition be regarded as complementary psychic factors1 coincident in their origin1 and developing in strict correlation4 ,this corollary from the theory of natural selection1 implying a self-relating act in all cognition under the condition of struggle for existence1 is seen to be a likely hypothesis so far as we can judge from the action of low psychisms4 ,any one who closely observes animals must recognise that self-interest determines their cognitive activities and in turn is roused by it4 ,the alert listening and looking of a squirrel is obviously impelled by fear and awakens fear4 ,the object perceived is constantly interpreted for its experience value1 that is1 there is constant self-reference4 ,this is the type of all cognition under natural selection1 i4e41 where use dominates4 ,assuming then psychism as mode of adaptive reaction1 we see the necessity for the correlation of the sense of self with the sense of things4 ,an experiencer blind to self1 who has no awareness of self1 but merely blindly strives1 has little advantage1 for it possesses no self-directivity and no power of intelligent action4 ,its adaptation is purely general2 to be specific adaptation it must appreciate differences in environment in their differential action upon itself1 an appreciation of the objective in subjective terms4 ,it is probable then that the first knowledge was the apprehension of thing as painer and then of the thing as pleasurer4 ,a discrimination of the two is attained1 probably tactile1 as hard and soft4 ,the subjective import of the thing is at once realized from these signs4 ,it is obvious that the origin of self-consciousness must be placed very early in psychic life4 ,with organisms which have but a few flashes of consciousness during their whole individual existence1 whose whole experience is a mere sum of separate pleasure-pain thrills and blind efforts1 there is neither sense of objectivity nor subjectivity4 ,these very lowest psychisms have experience1 but no sense of experience2 pleasures and pains possess them1 but they do not possess these4 ,but if mentality arises and progresses solely by virtue of its function in saving and profiting the individual living organism1 if the end of psychosis is this self-conservation of the bodily whole in its vitality1 there is an imperative demand for self-cognizance in order to self-care4 ,under the law of struggle and survival of the fittest1 the organism which does not look out for itself must go to the wall or be in the lowest grade4 ,self-conservation is closely linked with self-sense4 ,hence the individual very early acquires some sense of itself in its environment1 and so acts and conducts itself4 ,thus under adverse forces it learns to know itself1 to realize its own place and power1 and to feel fear1 anger1 and so to appropriately respond to any environment4 ,thus is secured manifold and special response to multiform conditions1 whereas in the organism which has only pure subjectivity of pain the response would be uniform4 ,the condition of an ego being sensed or known is1 of course1 that there is an ego to be sensed4 ,all experience is an individual's experience1 is personal1 but this does not constitute egoism as an experience4 ,the experiencer must have experience before he can know himself as experience centre1 that is1 there must be experience before there can be experience of experience4 ,but the amount of consciousness and integration thereof which is required for self-cognizance is probably very small4 ,the dynamic organic whole of psychic life1 which we denominate ego1 has almost from the start self-consciousness1 and grows by self-integration4 ,by the conjoint interaction of subject and object cognition with feeling and will elements egohood or personality is gradually developed to the largeness which we see in the human mind4 ,experience which does not self-integrate is scarce worthy the name1 and it is noticeable that we usually associate self-consciousness with the term4 8,having an experience0 signifies a self-related psychic fact4 ,given the first germ and experience constantly returns upon itself and self-develops4 ,it anticipates itself1 experiences the experienceable1 and so serves life4 ,a psychic individual without sense of his own individuality is practically undiscoverable and impossible4 ,it is perhaps not too much to say that psychically egohood really begins when experience cognizes and organizes itself2 the self is made by the sense of self4 ,at first only an occasional achievement upon a very meagre basis of psychosis1 the self-sense rose only through intense pain and effort1 but has now become so built into experience that1 with human minds at least1 it seems constant and spontaneous factor4 ,just what this means we have to note when we come to analyze the self-sense4 ,while the ego-sense is to be regarded as a reflection of experience upon itself1 this reflection is far from being abstract1 or general1 or spontaneous4 ,the self-sense is wrought out in the direct commerce with objects demanded by the exigencies of existence1 a particular and concrete apprehension is produced4 ,that is1 mind is no purely internal development nor yet a mechanical impression4 ,development is forced upon it in a world of competition and danger1 but yet this development is always active response4 ,the self-sense then by which the individual becomes aware of its own activities and feelings as its own1 originates1 like all other new modes1 by stress and strain as a most valuable psychosis in the struggle of existence4 ,the primitive self-consciousness is evidently nave1 that is1 there is no consciousness of the self-consciousness4 ,the low psychism is conscious of itself1 knows what is to its own advantage1 and is absorbingly selfish1 but it is wholly unconscious of its self regard2 so also with very young children we see an egoism which is perfectly unconscious and nave1 often humorously so to the observant adult who perceives the utter simplicity of its selfishness4 ,the embarrassing self-consciousness of the boy and girl in their teens1 a conscious self-consciousness1 is not yet achieved4 ,the immediate consciousness of self cannot by itself embarrass1 it must be complicated with reflection and with cognizance of other ego's2 but later forms we do not need to discuss here4 ,in the simplest form of self-consciousness what are the necessary elements8 and what is the essential nature of self-consciousness as psychic fact8 ,in the first place1 then1 what is the nature of self-consciousness as cognition8 ,if cognition be awareness of object1 what is self or subject cognition8 ,is subject merely a kind of object8 ,is self-consciousness a peculiar conscious mode1 or is it merely of the same type as the general cognition of object8 ,of course we wish to consider such questions here simply in the light of psychic fact4 ,it is often considered that self-cognitions are really in no way unique1 that the subject sensed is merely the individual's body or his mental powers4 ,and it is undoubtedly true that subject is always some object1 the subject cognition is apprehension of some object either corporeal or mental2 yet self-cognition is never merely an object seen as object4 ,the psychic act of self-cognition is a peculiar qualifying of the object cognition2 the individual who merely knows body or mind has not self-sense1 he must be aware of body and mind as his own4 ,the essence of self-sense is not in the object as so perceived1 but in the subjectifying reference4 ,while the ego then is always constituted as object1 ego sense as psychic fact is more than mere object cognition4 ,the psychic self as object1 as some mode or modes of consciousness1 has naturally been emphasized4 ,thus the self may be defined as that which is subject to will4 ,yet the least reflection shows us that for self-sense this must imply my will1 and so assume what it would explain4 ,a consciousness of will act as effective psychic fact is not ego sense4 ,a cognition of effort or nisus is not the sense of self save so far as the effort is known or felt as mine4 ,and so in any other objectivist definition of self as psychic object1 the self in its real nature as psychic act vanishes4 ,thus the consciousness of pleasure-pain capacity1 while closely related to self-sense1 does not make it1 for we have to add that the capacity must be known as one's own4 ,in every endeavour then to define or analyze the self as psychic fact we must either eliminate it or presuppose it1 and this must be taken as very significant4 ,it means at least that this stating it--being merely objectifying act--destroys the subjectifying which is its essence4 ,the radical distinction and polar opposition of subjectifying and objectifying is therein suggested1 and the difficulty of all fruitful discussion and scientific investigation1 which is objectifying1 is made apparent4 ,the objective cognition of a self can only mean cognition of an object capable of experience4 ,objects are thus discriminated into two classes--experiencers and non-experiencers1 subject-objects and bare objects2 but this is not self-sense whereby the experiencer directly knows his own experience as such1 but merely sense of a self as any individual object experiencing4 ,this objective definition of a self is simple enough4 ,it merely asserts that any object which at any moment of its persistence or existence has a consciousness or experience of any kind is thereby a self4 ,but this is obviously not a definition of the self and self-sense as psychic act1 nor does it explain it4 ,the scientific statement that individual objects exist as experiencers1 and so are personalities1 or ego's1 does not clear up the self-sense whereby the individual is aware of his own individuality as such4 ,egohood as selfishness in this objective sense1 and ego-hood as self-experience1 as a feeling and knowing myself1 are quite distinct4 ,to the question1 ,what makes an object--this particular object1 body with limbs and various organs capable of feeling pain-pleasure--what makes this myself8 the only answer is relation not1 be it noted1 to experience1 but to my experience felt as such4 ,and what makes an experience mine is that ,i consciously experience it2 not merely that ,i experience--that experience occurs to me1 or in me1 as objective fact--but that ,i consciously experience1 subjectively realize the experience as mine2 not merely as realizing experience as experience1 but as mine own4 ,this ceaseless circle into which we fall in trying to define ego is hinted at in various common expressions4 ,a child even will often remark1 8,i did not do it1 my hand did it02 8you did not touch me1 you touched my foot10 etc4 ,that is1 even the most cursory observation asserts that object in itself is not subject1 that the me is not mine4 ,while1 then1 we must regard self-cognition as a genus by itself and as unanalyzable simple psychic fact1 arising early upon a very slight basis of experience1 and continually developing as most important psychosis for life1 we may yet distinguish what is involved with it1 what modes of consciousness it presupposes1 and from which it yet is distinct4 ,we might speak of ego-sense as an experience knowing itself4 ,but since cognition implies always a knowing and the known1 an experience cannot1 and does not1 know itself4 ,the consciousness knowing is never the consciousness known2 and to speak of a consciousness as aware of itself is misleading and inaccurate4 ,to speak of the cognizance of a pain as pain self-cognizant is an erroneous expression1 for the pain does not know itself2 but it is known by a cognition which is not it4 ,to be aware of pain as such is awareness of consciousness1 but is1 interpreted strictly1 in no wise self-consciousness4 ,i may even speak of a self-conscious self-consciousness4 ,this does not really mean what it directly implies1 but can only mean a self-consciousness plus a consciousness of it as one's own2 that is1 the self-consciousness is not actually conscious of itself4 ,even if a consciousness could both be and know its being as an absolute1 simple act1 yet this would not be self-sense1 an individual realizing its own individuality1 but merely a single psychic act existing1 and at the same time conscious of its existence4 ,self-consciousness is more and other than any consciousness which is self-conscious1 if that were possible4 ,consciousness of consciousness is not1 then1 self-consciousness4 ,it is1 indeed1 conceivable that an ego1 in objective sense1 might know his own consciousness not as his own--the act of self-consciousness--but merely as consciousness1 and he would thus exist as an individual1 yet without subjective individuality4 ,yet1 as matter of fact1 consciousness of consciousness always carries self-consciousness with it4 ,if ,i become conscious of a consciousness which is my own1 ,i know it1 not merely as a consciousness1 but as my own consciousness2 if ,i am conscious of anger1 ,i am conscious of being angry4 ,hume1 in his chapter on ,personal ,identity1 observes1 8,for my part1 when ,i enter most intimately into what ,i call myself1 ,i always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold1 light or shade1 love or hatred1 pain or pleasure4 ,i never can catch myself at any time without a perception1 and never can observe anything but the perception40 ,this is a good illustration of a futile and mistaken attempt to absorb self-consciousness in consciousness of consciousness4 ,of course ,hume was not the hypothetical ego which we have instanced as purely objective observer of his own consciousness2 when he was conscious of any consciousness1 as a heat or light sensation1 a pleasure or a pain1 he was assuredly1 like other mortals1 conscious of it as his own4 ,the sense of mine-ness as psychic fact he should not have ignored1 whatever might be his conclusions as to the myself ,but metaphysical psychology is always apt to swerve from fact4 ,the close connection of self-consciousness with consciousness of consciousness leads often to their confusion4 ,thus under the head 8,illusions of ,self-consciousness10 ,j4 ,m4 ,baldwin1 in his treatise on the ,senses and ,intellect1 says1 8,of these subjective illusions we may mention emotional illusions1 wrong estimates of our emotional states1 as when an angry man declares that he was never more cool in his life40 ,this instance is plainly an illusion of introspection1 not of self-inspection2 there is a mistake in the consciousness of consciousness4 ,wundt1 in defining self-sense as perception of the unity of experience1 falls into the same confusion4 ,it points to the fundamental value and place of these cognition factors1 that when we say any one is conscious we imply them all4 ,thus ,i say of some one rendered unconscious by an accident1 8,he slowly recovered consciousness10 by which ,i mean1 became aware of himself and his surroundings with awareness of his own mental activities4 ,he is consciously conscious1 objectively conscious1 and self-conscious4 ,all this makes up for us being conscious1 and is for cognitive mind such a simple organic basal movement as circulatory-nervous-motor function is for body4 ,an organism must1 of course1 have had some psychosis before it can become conscious of it1 and of it as its own1 and this primitive psychosis we regard as pure pleasure-pain series4 ,but in the struggle for existence the organism is driven out of this subjectivity to cognize its environment as related to itself1 to apprehend and comprehend and so to feel about itself--emotion--and so led to intelligent will activity as real self-activity4 ,at the very first the organism has pleasures and pains1 without knowing them as determined in itself by objects1 but this primitive pre-cognitive stage is short1 and most psychisms are certainly beyond it2 they sense and notice things1 bodily and beyond the body1 as of experience value in pleasure and pain terms4 ,at some most critical moment cognition first arose as triple movement1 object--subject--consciousness knowledge4 ,just what may have been its original form it is most difficult to determine1 but we may suppose it to have been a very weak activity1 possibly expressible1 as1 8it hurts10 object being simply pain centre4 8,it hurts10 means object self-related1 with consciousness of the consciousness1 and this is our language expression for what seems to be an extremely common psychosis among many organisms4 ,as simple pains were probably the first conscious phenomena1 consciousness of pain was probably the first consciousness of consciousness1 involving also subject and object consciousness4 ,not only to have a pain1 but to be conscious of it as definitely objectively determined is decidedly useful attainment1 which is finally inground in experience1 so that it occurs spontaneously in highest psychisms4 ,but it is only with a few of the highest human psychisms that consciousness object and subject are apprehended as general facts4 ,even by philosophers and scientists1 subject1 subjectivity1 and object are not easily apprehended in their distinctness as purely general modes2 it requires will strain to properly know them4 ,we have throughout sought the origin and place of modes of consciousness in function1 and from this point of view we must view object-knowledge1 subject-knowledge1 and consciousness-knowledge as early coincident and correlative4 ,cognition springs up as a threefold mode1 for in no single factor by itself has it life value4 ,pain1 we say1 forced the organism to work out to object as painer1 cognition arising at once as triple activity4 ,however1 this does not imply that there is a constant knowing with1 an apperception1 that every consciousness is accompanied with a consciousness of it4 ,pains1 pleasures1 perceptions1 etc41 constantly engross the consciousness field without our apprehending them4 ,simple1 common folk and children are rarely apperceptive1 but yet they are eminently self-conscious1 and consciousness conscious in all their life of nave selfishness4 ,they are constantly perceiving the significance of things for their own experience1 and acting upon this felt meaning4 ,although not immediately aware of what is passing in their own consciousness1 as is common to certain high types of human psychism1 yet in their self-interest they certainly know themselves as experiencers4 ,thus immediate awareness of one's own psychic attitude as such--apperception--is a kind of consciousness of consciousness in measure divorced from consciousness of the object1 and so belonging to such a high scope of psychism that it hardly falls within the range of our discussion1 which is confined to simple direct emotion--value of things as implying both self and consciousness knowledge4 ,apperception as a constant reflection and introspection is certainly not original4 ,in its original form consciousness of consciousness is merely implied element in the study of things4 ,the study of conscious self self-possession1 self-poise1 conscious psychic self-development1 is all very late4 ,leaving now the general consideration and analysis of self-consciousness in the light of the general doctrine of evolution1 let us note how it occurs in consciousness to-day4 ,let us come to some direct inductive study4 ,the simplest method and the most direct of studying the rise and nature of self-consciousness is in those experiences in coming to self-consciousness from deep sleep or from coma after severe accident4 ,i say1 8,i regained consciousness10 8,i came to consciousness10 meaning1 not bare consciousness as in mere sensations or perceptions1 but a self-consciousness involved therein4 ,in becoming conscious ,i came to self-consciousness2 in becoming aware of the objective1 ,i at once realize my subjectivity1 myself as experiencer4 ,in coming out from under the influence of chloroform1 there is1 ,i have distinctly observed in my own case1 a struggling to realize1 which is both objective and subjective cognition4 ,it is true a person having awakened under very strange circumstances1 as in a bed in a hospital after an accident1 may declare1 8,i did not know myself10 but this does not mean that he had no self-consciousness1 but merely that for the moment he did not identify this self1 himself1 as ,john ,smith1 of ,jonesville1 etc4 ,sometimes it happens that self-identification is not reached at all1 but the self1 as bodily whole experiencing1 is speedily aware of self1 a new personality and sense of personality quickly grows up4 ,again1 a lunatic mistaking himself for ,herod or ,csar is thus always self-conscious4 ,he has consciously established himself as the self playing a part in the world1 but according to the opinion of his sane fellows he is much in error as to what that part is4 ,strictly speaking1 there is no illusion of self-consciousness1 except under the impossible supposition that a being not a real self or psychic individual should have self-sense2 but the very act of self-cognizance implies reality of self-hood4 ,it is plain that even the insane man who regards himself as tree or stone1 has1 however1 the act of self-regard1 is really self-conscious4 ,strictly speaking1 we cannot identify or recognise self1 for sense of self is necessary in any recognition to make it such1 a self-consciousness is a fundamental prius4 ,you recognise a tree1 a house1 but you do not recognise yourself except as yourself is mere object related to you1 to your experience4 ,self-identification means only objective act1 and is not1 then1 the same as self-consciousness1 though based upon it4 ,i have endeavoured to make observations of myself in moments of awaking from sleep or going to sleep1 to find whether subjective reference and objective apprehension are mingled co-ordinately in consciousness from the beginning1 whether the self-sense reaches through both the perceptive life and the sensation life4 ,drowsing in bed ,i sometimes have a feeling of bare pleasure as the first stage in a pleasant awakening4 ,there is here no sensing1 no localizing1 no awareness of body or of anything1 no self-consciousness4 ,this mere undifferentiated pleasure1 interrupted by 8cat-naps10 may often recur4 ,lolling half-awake every one has frequently experienced these feelings of pure pleasure1 unsensed and unlocalized1 and wholly unobjectivised1 the barest and simplest consciousness1 the very first stage in awaking4 ,in this very lowest status in which ,i can ever catch my consciousness ,i have the pleasure from the warmth and softness of the bed without having to feel warm or sensing the soft4 ,it is a distinct step to even feeling warm2 moreover1 in extreme drowsiness it is an effortful step1 an active sensing1 an objectifying self-activity1 and hence a real self-consciousness1 implied in the sensing act4 ,to feel warm1 to sense in this mode1 is primarily object cognition which implies a measure of subject and consciousness cognition in feeling the warmth as source of the pleasure4 ,any one who will closely examine his mental state at the very first stage of slow awaking from deep sleep--a state of primitive consciousness--will notice a vanishing moment of mere pleasure or pain1 and in cases of great drowsiness1 when a sensation supervenes upon this stage1 it does not merely come1 as in our ordinary consciousness1 but it is brought2 there is objectifying effort4 ,so in basking in the sun like an animal1 the very first and lowest stage of consciousness ,i drop to is pure pleasure without having even to feel warm2 and the feeling warm is distinctly a new and higher step in consciousness which is often attained by some slight effort4 ,thus it is distinctly possible for a man at times to be too lazy to feel warm2 and this fundamental laziness must be accounted not uncommon with lower psychisms4 ,similarly for cold awakening one4 ,there is a moment of pain from cold before one feels cold1 a general pain and uneasiness discomfort before one realizes what is the matter1 feels cold and the part cold--foot it may be--and so reaches some self-consciousness2 in language expression1 ,i am cold or feel cold4 ,here is a self-conscious personal experience1 though the first touch of mere pain was experienced by the individual unconscious of himself4 ,we infer1 then1 that self-consciousness is first reached and maintained in the sensing act as definite cognitive volition4 ,to sense warmth and cold is simply a little earlier objectification than to attain sense of a light or a sound4 ,to feel is as active as to look or to listen4 ,we know that there are modes of force an appreciation of which does not now enter into known psychosis1 but which might be sensed through long and severe effort and evolve a new sense-organ4 ,thus1 if the conditions of life had demanded it1 there would have arisen in the struggle of existence a magnetic sense1 though now a man may place his head between the poles of the strongest magnet and be unable to reach any sensation4 ,a magnetic sense once organized and inbred into experience would act with the same apparent spontaneity1 as a 8given10 as does such a sensation as that of heat2 and a person feeling magnetic would have self-feeling implied the same as in feeling warm4 ,that feeling warm with us denotes something which possesses consciousness rather than consciousness by struggle possessing it1 is simply the result of the inheritance of the accumulated mental force by which past generations have reached this sense1 and thereby consolidated self-consciousness with it1 for self-consciousness is built up as reflex cognition from the cognitive effort and willing of the individual4 ,sensation always begins in a sensing1 a volition of the individual to realize externality in its experience value1 that is1 mode of affection of its own body1 as in feeling warm pleasurably or painfully4 ,when the objective is not merely sensed but perceived1 when object and objects are definitely cognized1 self-consciousness is greatly furthered1 as each object and objectifying cognizance means self-reference or interpretation in terms of self-experience4 ,that self-consciousness is early and fundamental psychosis1 is apparent1 not only from the gradual losing consciousness on going to sleep or in gaining consciousness in waking1 but also from the fact of its being universal in dream life4 ,those factors which remain throughout all stages and kinds of dream life1 are justly regarded as organic and basal4 ,the higher and later elements1 those which are still nascent and in the volitional stage1 as conscience and reason1 rarely or never occur in dreams4 ,in the slightest dreams there is personal quality2 ,i am consciously experiencing1 ,i am walking1 riding1 looking1 hearing1 etc4 ,an awareness of self pervades all dream life1 even in its lowest form4 ,we are constantly in a world of objects which we are conscious of in their experience value as affecting us or to affect us4 ,a person relating a dream always narrates it as personal experience and so felt--8,i dreamed ,i was in a cave and ,i heard water running and ,i felt it cold10 etc41 etc4 ,as far then as we can survey dream life1 it is a significant fact that self-consciousness pervades it4 ,as far then as we can discover in dream consciousness1 or in ordinary consciousness1 self-consciousness is persistent and pervasive element4 ,in the whole range of consciousness1 with the exception of the very evanescent and absolutely primitive pure pleasure-pain series1 self-cognition appears4 ,we say1 indeed1 that a man forgets himself in a rage1 but mean merely that the rage object as self-related quite engrosses consciousness to the exclusion of other forms of self-consciousness1 as himself related to other selves4 ,blind with fury to all other objects than the rage object1 he does not notice things as related to himself1 and he will rush into a stone wall4 ,in the utmost concentration and intensification of emotion1 self-consciousness does not disappear1 but is itself concentrated and intensified4 ,even in the delirium of passion1 so long as any cognition remains self-consciousness remains4 ,the intensification order in consciousness1 that is1 where multiple consciousness loses elements through intensifying of some others1 bears evidence then to the fundamental nature of self-consciousness4 ,a person roused from sleep by cold1 which becomes more and more intense till he loses all consciousness through suffering1 is throughout the long series self-conscious with the exception of the initial and the final pang of pain4 ,from the moment when cold made him attain consciousness till the moment when he thereby lost consciousness--that is1 practically the time he was conscious--he was self-conscious2 this is the verdict of common introspection4 ,any one who looks back upon his experiences of this intensification nature1 finds himself to have been self-conscious throughout4 ,so far then as ,i have been able to examine them1 the modes of coming to consciousness in dream life and in awaking process1 and also the order of disappearing consciousness by intensification1 confirm the general result which at the opening of this chapter we deduced from a general consideration of psychism under the conditions of existence1 namely1 that self-consciousness is necessary and important factor in all cognitive process1 the self-relating act giving vital value to all consciousness of external and internal object1 whether in sensing or perceiving4 ,we have already touched on the general function of self-consciousness1 the gain which accrues to the individual organism from knowing its own experiences as such by giving self-directivity and special response4 ,the individual is thereby enabled to look after its own interests1 to consciously care for itself1 and to make the most of itself4 ,the core of psychic life is interest1 and the core of interest is self-consciousness4 ,that the psychism has interest1 that it feels for itself1 is essential to the progress of life4 ,indeed1 the genesis and growth of biological forms and organs lie in their attainment and perfecting as servants to the self in the struggle of existence4 ,we know this to be the case for the sense-organs4 ,the organism evidently came to appreciate light by a definite nisus with self-consciousness1 just the same in kind as that by which organ is advanced to-day when straining the eyes to perceive a seventh ,pleiad4 ,in short1 we do not see because we have eyes1 but we have eyes because we see4 ,the seeing activity and effort as a self-activity generates the eye and perfects it4 ,so also it is by locomotive effort that motor organs originate and develop4 ,the young child learning to walk1 self-consciously and with effort moving upon its legs1 is an intimation of the way in which the limbs themselves arose in active response to environment4 ,the rabbits imported into ,australia have1 it is reported1 learned to climb trees1 with a consequent modification of foot structure4 ,now the real genesis of the morphological change is obviously psychic1 the climbing effort as a valuable function to life under the conditions of existence1 viz41 the scarcity of herbage4 ,but not only the motor and sensory organs are to be traced in origin and growth to psychic basis in self-consciousness and struggle1 but other organs now quite disassociated from will may originally have been developed by will4 ,thus the stomach may have originated in digestive effort and the heart in circulatory effort4 ,that self-attention to the heart stimulates the action of the heart is well-known1 and also that in rare cases the heart's action is directly controlled by will4 ,this may be survival4 ,function is built up also as indirect result of will1 as when motor effort in running develops heart action4 ,psychism may thus be interpreted as the basis of all organic development4 ,the body is the offspring of will4 ,certainly as man surveys progressive adaptation in himself and other evolving organisms1 the psychic basis is apparent in feeling and in effort self-conscious2 and if in any wise it has apparently become mechanical and spontaneous1 as in heart-beat1 as in digestion1 as in winking the eye1 this is to be ascribed to impulse from the past4 ,self-consciousness quickens reaction1 for reaction time is shortened when there is anticipation1 and anticipation implies self-consciousness as awareness of experienceability4 ,self-consciousness also enormously strengthens reaction4 ,thus the more thoroughly one realizes his own danger1 the more powerful the effort to escape4 ,this is true under normal and simple conditions1 the only form in which we are considering self-consciousness4 ,self-consciousness may become abnormal and debilitating in the hypochondriac1 but this is a stage beyond our present studies4 ,primarily in the struggle of life self-relating to one's own experience is always advantageous function4 ,the most important thing in life is the realization1 by the aid of self-consciousness1 of the self-experience value of things2 to appreciate and understand environment1 and so adapt oneself to it and adapt it to oneself1 to conserve and extend self1 this is the substance of psychism1 and its whole history is thence pervaded by self-consciousness4 ,but we must now turn from these general considerations to specific emotions as related to self-consciousness4 ,in the natural course of things1 an organism can never sense or view the self with indifference4 ,in all early psychic stages a dispassionate view of self is uncalled for and does not exist2 and1 in fact1 even if the most educated and thoughtful human adult had a self-sense which is active as evolutionary cause1 it may rightly be regarded as ever active4 ,life forms from the lowest protista to the highest vertebrate are in their development due to active response1 and thus morphological development may be looked at as a functional embodiment of psychism4 ,instead1 then1 of regarding psychism merely as life factor1 we may go farther1 and define life as psychism4 ,this is what the doctrine of active response and development thereby1 with natural selection1 leads to4 ,the phenomena of life1 so far as we can interpret them1 seem to favour the view that organism is objectification of the will1 and1 except at the very first stage1 will as cognitive1 and triply so in object-subject-consciousness cognition4 ,such evidence as we have points rather to organic body as reflex of mind than mind as reflex of body4 ,that the initiatory1 progressive1 and creative force in evolution is psychic1 we judge from such instances as we can observe of progressive adaptation in ourselves and in lower animals4 ,where new circumstances affect a species1 as the rabbit transferred to ,australia1 the favouring modification of the foot to climb trees is evidently only attained by severest struggle for self-conservation4 ,if a new mode of force were introduced to this planet1 which should powerfully affect life1 it would reach it at first only through pleasure-pain1 and the growth to a special sense-organ for this new force would very gradually be attained through the struggle for existence4 ,the prime value of self-consciousness in evolution is in securing an intelligent correlation with environment4 ,all specific reaction and adaptation arose probably through an emotion volitional self-relating of object4 ,it is a biologic psychic law that all emotion is bound up with self-consciousness1 and all self-consciousness with emotion1 for thus only is there efficiency as intelligent will stimulation4 ,but while sense of self is inherent in all emotion as such1 may it not in some cases have a peculiar place1 so that we may justly term them self-feelings or emotions of personality8 ,a child fears the dog and is proud of its new dress4 ,here are two emotions which both imply self-consciousness1 the object is in both related to the self1 but they differ in egoistic quality in that in the fear there is sense of the thing as acting on the self1 in the pride there is sense of the self as acting on the thing4 ,in the pride it is the object as identified with the self that is the source of emotion4 ,the pride proceeds from within outward1 while fear1 vice vers4 ,in fear it is the experience value of the dog1 that it will hurt1 that gives the emotion quality2 but in the pride the essence of the emotion lies1 not in the influence of the dress on the self1 but that the self is connected with the dress by way of ownership4 8,see my pretty dress02 8,oh mama6 the cross dog02 the emotions thus expressed appear to belong to different orders2 the fear being of the thing in its effect on the self1 the pride being of the self in the thing4 ,pride is a glorified self-consciousness1 self-consciousness is its substance and immediate spirit1 whereas in fear self-consciousness is but an instrument in interpretation of experience value4 ,we observe an interesting example of emotion of personality in a young girl who fears a cow and is yet ashamed of her fear4 ,here1 while self-consciousness is certainly involved in the fear1 yet it is peculiarly involved in the emotion at her emotion as such2 the shame is at or of herself1 the fear is for herself4 ,this peculiar personal feature of pride is signified by the common usage of language2 the child is proud of the thing1 does not pride the thing1 but prides himself on the thing1 whereas in fear he fears the thing for himself4 ,i say1 indeed1 the child is afraid of the dog and proud of his dress1 but the force of the preposition is quite general4 ,it may be said that pride is not peculiarly an emotion of personality simply as being directed toward self2 one can hate himself1 fear himself1 be angry at himself1 etc4 ,but the drunkard fearing himself means merely that he fears the results of his own tendencies1 delirium tremens1 for instance1 a perfectly objective fear4 ,and it is evident that one cannot1 holding to the term1 self1 in the same meaning1 fear at once himself for himself4 ,the self which is endangered is not the self which endangers4 ,in all such cases as so-called fearing self the action is from without inward1 which is the reverse of the mode in personality--emotion where oneself is seen1 not as affected by the thing1 but as himself in the thing4 ,the typical and earliest of the emotions of personality is undoubtedly pride4 ,like all emotions pride includes cognition of object2 pride is always proud of something but in the peculiar way before emphasized1 in the light which our own personality casts upon it4 ,pride generally and certainly originally implies sense of something done or possessed by self and that in a manner superior to competitors4 ,it is a self assertion over rivals1 an impressing spectators1 a being proud of something to some one4 ,if the world contained but one solitary conscious individual1 he could never attain to pride1 though he might be self-satisfied4 ,sense of comparative self-magnification is essential to pride4 ,pride as social in its nature suffers great diminishing when the individual is long kept in solitude1 and in some cases men may ultimately lose all standard of comparison and so pride entirely vanishes4 ,if a man were from his earliest remembrance an inhabitant of a desert isle pride would have no opportunity to develop4 ,his achievements might satisfy himself1 but they could not make him proud1 for he would know nothing of others and their works4 ,again1 this need of sociality is seen in this1 that we are not proud of our planet as such4 ,we distinguish it1 indeed1 as our own1 but we have no sense of pride in its finest features as such4 ,i do not feel proud of ,amazonian forest or ,himalayan mountain merely as earth characters4 ,however1 if in the future we secure interplanetary communication1 and planets rival each other as cities and countries do now1 there will be a stimulus to pride on an astronomical scale4 ,if we could say to the inhabitants of some neighbour sphere that our planet made better time round the sun than theirs1 this would be the basis of an intense pride4 ,the extent of pride is thus equal to the extent of the self-sense1 but in its wide ranges pride is relatively weak4 ,i am proud of my country1 but1 other things being equal1 more proud of my state and still more proud of my city4 ,i am proud of the achievements of the ,anglo-,american race1 and ,i always survey a locomotive with pride1 but it is when ownership and achievement comes closer to the ego1 as in one's relatives and family1 that pride notably intensifies1 and it reaches its maximum in view of one's own attainments4 ,that which we do without any assistance and which seems to us far beyond the ordinary gives the best and highest incitement to pride4 ,pride1 in the later stages at least1 is more and more discriminating1 and is connected finally only with those objects which are the actual will products of the individual1 and so identified with the veritable self4 ,thus is erected by society a pride test1 and men say1 8,he has a right to be proud10 or1 8,he ought not to be proud40 ,yet standards will differ1 and what one will be proud of another will be ashamed of1 and vice vers4 ,the general standard is largely regulated by the comparative amount of will force and so of strength required in the particular act2 thus1 while ,i am not proud of crushing an ant1 ,i might be at felling an ox4 ,the general expression of pride is holding up one's head and expanding oneself generally1 though this self-enlargement is not1 as in anger1 to inspire fear in beholders1 but rather admiration4 ,proud sense of superiority naturally asserts itself primarily in physical impressiveness1 and1 as such1 pride plays an especially large part in sexual selection4 ,the lower expression of pride is swagger and strut1 the higher in a dignity and stateliness of demeanour4 ,the function of pride1 the use which originally determined its development1 and which is still apparent1 is a pleasure-sanction to competitive successful effort4 ,the proud consciousness of triumph is one of the greatest pleasures of existence1 and if there were no such emotion following the winning effort1 life would lose much of its incentive4 ,pride prevents parasitism4 ,without pride to stimulate and reward1 striving mind would have lost one of the most potent factors of progress4 ,even in human education it becomes of value to appeal to a just and proper pride4 ,in the lower life it is all important4 ,it gives tone to life1 gives power and confidence1 assertiveness and aggressiveness1 and conduces in a large measure to permanent and progressive self-aggrandisement4 ,and not only for effect upon self but upon others1 pride is an important psychic factor4 ,thus pride in always showing a bold1 commanding front to rivals1 makes a direct impression upon antagonists4 ,pride always puts the best foot first1 hides weakness and exaggerates strength1 so that the proud one always shows for all and even more than he is1 and thus gains much in the struggle of existence where even mere appearance of power is apt to discourage opponents4 ,the one who is strong and proud of it is doubly strong4 ,pride is the reflex of gain and victory1 as shame is of loss and defeat4 ,it is thus the root of ambition1 the desire of rank and place for superiority's sake which has been1 and now is1 especially in advanced human psychism1 a most powerful agent in the evolution of life and mind4 ,but while it is undoubtedly true that pride is in its origin solely an advantageous psychosis1 and indeed1 could have been developed in no other way1 yet there is a disadvantageous side4 ,only up to a certain point is it true that the prouder one is1 the better off he is4 ,when pride1 over-stimulated1 betrays into over-confidence and heedlessness1 then1 indeed1 8pride goeth before a fall40 ,but at the first1 however1 we must suppose that the organism was proud of only that of which it was to its advantage to be proud2 but by perversion and hypertrophy1 indeed1 in pride as in the case of other emotions1 caused largely by rivals1 it became a source of great disadvantage and positively destructive of high self-advancement4 ,conceit1 an over-weening abnormal pride which is totally irrelevant to the real standing of the individual1 cannot but be highly injurious4 ,however1 harmful pride must be accounted rather late4 ,in early psychisms attainment over and beyond others1 when perceived naturally and normally1 gave rise to pride as a wholly useful emotion reaction1 and those who had the capacity of being proud had a distinct advantage over those who had no sense of their own consequence or no pride about it4 ,even in human society we must remark that in general those who are incapable of becoming proud on proper occasion1 are less and less liable to reach the occasion4 ,pride1 as emotion of sense of superiority1 manifests itself in many forms1 of which we need not now expect to make a detailed or complete investigation1 since the object of our present studies is merely to emphasize the main forms of the early emotions from the point of view of natural selection4 ,simple pride1 which is unconscious of itself1 but acts directly and without reflection1 as we see in a child proud of a new dress1 is a phase which does not often appear in the experience of the educated human adult1 where pride becomes highly complicated with emotional and intellectual movements of many kinds1 and where it is extended to a wide diversity of objects with the extension of self-interest4 ,thus men are proud of rank1 blood1 money1 muscular strength1 possessions1 intellectual attainments1 moral character1 and1 in fact1 whatever the idea of mine can be applied to4 ,however1 the different kinds of pride are not to be distinguished by the object merely1 as pride of rank1 blood1 etc41 for difference in object does not by itself constitute distinct quality in psychic act4 ,pride is the same1 whether it is of a horse1 a bank account1 or a wife4 ,still the object frequently calls up subsidiary emotions which may complicate pride1 and the perceived nature of the object certainly influences our feeling toward it4 ,when an object is to be competed for1 but we consider it beneath us to enter the lists1 or we think our rivals unworthy of our attention1 we have the peculiar phase of feeling termed arrogance4 ,arrogance brooks no rivalry and stands apart on a peak of self-contained superiority4 ,walter ,savage ,landor1 the proudest of men1 displays this feeling in perfection when he says in one of his cameos in verse3 8,i strove with none1 ,for none were worth my strife40 ,this is a perfect expression of complete arrogance4 ,we may say that he was too proud to be proud4 ,no one was worthy of his mettle1 and so he held himself aloof with the feeling of immeasurable superiority4 ,strictly speaking then1 arrogance is a variety of very intense pride where the sense of superiority is perfectly exclusive and absolute1 and disdains comparison4 ,it is entirely inconsiderate of others' rivalry and above caring for the approval or disapproval or admiration of others4 ,thus this phase1 unlike pride in general1 seeks concealment rather than display2 its excellence is so far beyond the common as to be unappreciable by contemporaries1 and appreciated by self alone4 ,conceit is a term objectively applied1 but hardly indicates a kind of pride1 a real subjective distinction4 ,he who thinks more highly of himself than he ought to think1 esteems himself beyond his due1 and so is considered by the community over proud1 is termed conceited4 ,the pride which is entirely just1 as viewed from the objective standpoint1 is quite the same subjectively as the most preposterous conceit4 ,similarly also dignity is no real feeling4 8,that man is dignified02 this is an objective characterization of his manner of conduct1 but this does not imply that he feels dignified4 ,pride may give a dignified demeanour1 but a feeling dignified can only refer to the reactive effect upon consciousness1 of this mode of behaviour4 8,i feel proud10 may likewise sometimes be used1 not for designating the subjective feeling or being proud1 but as equal to1 8,i felt that ,i was proud10 that is1 8,i was proud and ,i knew it10 8,i had the sense of being proud40 ,so also in general we may remark that while feeling may denote a simple state of being1 yet such phrases as 8,i felt proud10 8felt angry10 etc41 are ambiguous1 and may mean either the bare feeling of pride1 anger1 etc41 as experienced1 or the feeling of being proud1 angry1 etc41 or both1 that is1 consciousness of the particular consciousness may or may not complicate self-consciousness4 ,the word1 feel1 is often used in this merely reflexive way to denote a sense of state as1 8,i was proud and ,i felt so at the time40 ,thus common phrase verifies the analysis that self-consciousness and consciousness of consciousness are bound up with emotion1 the full analysis of the phrase showing that the feeling proud was an object consciousness plus a subject consciousness4 ,as previously intimated1 we have to sharply distinguish between pride and such emotions as self-satisfaction and self-complacency4 ,these latter emotions of personality deal solely with the self in its own sight1 while pride is always not over self to self1 but over self to others4 ,the self-satisfied often are proud1 but this is not necessarily implied4 ,the comparative element enters in self-satisfaction1 as in all true pride1 but the comparison is primarily with oneself1 not with others4 ,if we succeed in our own eyes1 we may think little about others4 ,a pure self-satisfaction1 like a purely altruistic pride1 is a rare and late phenomenon4 ,pride about others1 pride to oneself1 are both very apt to be tinged with the original pride over others4 ,one says of a friend1 8,i feel proud of him02 but while this has a certain reality and psychic value of altruistic mode1 yet the innate and fundamental selfishness of pride tends to make a place in what appears to be the most disinterested form4 ,personal interest and aggrandisement is so inbred a motive from the earliest stages of evolution that it is never superseded4 ,a feeling of embarrassment is an emotion of personality which is closely connected with pride4 ,those who are most susceptible to pride are most apt to feel embarrassed4 ,the one who has no tendency toward pride1 who does not in the least care how he may appear before others or in relation to others1 and so does not value his place among his fellows1 cannot be embarrassed4 ,he may be disturbed by the difficulties of some task1 but only in the same way in which he would be agitated by any difficult work undertaken by and for himself alone4 ,the emotion of embarrassment1 like pride1 conceives the self in its social relations4 ,when one says that he felt greatly embarrassed in being called on unexpectedly to speak at a dinner1 we perceive that he means emotion1 not merely in view of the inherent difficulty of the task1 but in view of what he himself may or may not do under the inspection of the critical4 ,in this emotion there is a wonderful quickening of the self-sense1 a painfully intense self-consciousness being suddenly generated as the peculiar relation of self to others is impressed upon him4 ,this self-sense is powerfully reinforced by the self-sense of the bodily expression of self-consciousness4 ,the whole bodily self seems conspicuously magnified1 and we become painfully aware of hands1 feet1 and other members4 ,this bodily self-sensitiveness1 as often contributing strongly to this emotion-total1 is very marked in cases of blushing4 ,a girl1 feeling embarrassed1 blushes1 and immediately becoming conscious of the blushing as itself an embarrassing circumstance1 blushes again still more violently1 and becoming conscious of this1 becomes still more confused1 and so on1 a constant cumulation of psychic effect from reaction of expression4 ,sense of the expression of embarrassment is itself embarrassing1 hence every embarrassment may become in itself a new source of embarrassment4 ,however1 that this peculiar self-consciousness cannot be forced in itself or in its expression1 we see in the fact that the efforts of the maiden who exclaims in mock modesty1 8,i know ,i am blushing10 are entirely futile4 ,this assumption of embarrassment may become embarrassing1 and so a genuine expression be stimulated1 which1 however1 is of quite another order from the one desired4 ,how such an emotion as that of embarrassment1 which is disadvantageous from the first1 could have originated under natural selection1 can never be solved by the evolutionist who views all variation as originally springing from personal advantage4 ,here is a psychosis1 always the reverse of serviceable1 an emotion anticipatory of disgraceful defeat1 and so is really premonitory1 but yet one which ever unnerves1 rather than nerves to successful action4 ,he who never feels embarrassed1 under any circumstances always has the best chance4 ,hence this psychosis must be strictly a negative evolution1 an unfavourable variation determined by a persistent exciting by antagonists as serviceable to them4 ,an adversary will always put his opponent in an embarrassing situation1 and endeavour that he shall both be embarrassed and feel embarrassment4 ,this emotion has thus been stimulated and fostered during ages of psychic evolution1 and in advanced human evolution the stimulating it is one of the subtlest methods of offence4 ,a feeling of embarrassment is incipient shame1 or perhaps the way for shame4 ,but the feeling of embarrassment is generally anticipatory as to the potential1 while shame is as to the actual2 it is a feeling of present public degradation and loss4 ,both equally imply a capacity for pride2 one who cannot be proud cannot be ashamed4 ,but shame1 unlike the feeling of embarrassment1 acts as serviceable variation to the individual1 and is one of the weightiest negative guards to advantageous actions4 ,it cannot promote very high and noble action1 but it keeps above a certain low and base level4 ,the member of society who has lost all pride and all sense of shame has ceased to feel the most powerful and useful of social incentives4,e ----- ,footnote ,e3 ,as to the origin of bodily shame1 we may suppose that this arose with reference to excreta as something rejected from the body1 and therefore base and unworthy4 ,with the refined even spitting and perspiring are shameful4 ,it may be that sexual shame can be traced to the same root1 but social convention and morality also have very large influence here4 ----- ,there is a certain curious psychosis which may be called shame for want of a better term4 ,i allude to the feeling which prompts one to shun oneself4 ,one may not only be ashamed to look others in the eye1 but even himself4 ,he will not look at himself in a mirror because he feels a great loss of self-respect4 ,this is not the opposite of vanity1 a shame at viewing oneself because of unseemliness of feature1 which is liable to general observation1 but it is rather the reverse1 the polar opposite of pure self-feeling1 of self-respect and self-satisfaction4 ,a feeling of shame with regard to oneself alone is still1 of course1 comparative2 though it does not touch upon others1 it implies a self-erected standard4 ,this emotion1 like the others just mentioned1 is obviously very late4 ,however1 perhaps the latest in the series1 and the psychic culmination of all is humility4 ,humility1 like meekness1 marks a new order of evolution4 ,in the highest human development pride is eliminated and supplanted by humility4 ,a true self-estimate of personal achievement upon a very wide and impartial impersonal basis1 either that of a scientific view of man's place in the universe1 or as influenced by high religious and moral ideals1 leads to a feeling of humility4 ,egoism and self-assertiveness give place to altruistic modesty and refined reserve4 ,the humble man always gives place rather than takes place4 ,he does not lift himself above his fellows1 but takes the lowest seat1 and is servant of all4 ,the humble man does not strive with others1 not because too proud to do so1 as ,landor1 but because he feels called to the highest and best work for its own sake4 ,he says with ,laotze1 8,do1 not strive40 ,unthinking of getting ahead or falling behind others1 he aims consistently and constantly at an ideal of perfect fruitage1 so high an ideal that he always feels his own unworthiness in his own sight and in that of others1 though aware of his desert by the ordinary standards of his community1 country1 or generation4 ,worldly successes produce no elation in the lowly of heart2 they view themselves1 not with self-depreciation1 but with the justness of the largest view1 as ,newton1 who1 when complimented upon his attainments1 replied that he had but picked up a few pebbles by the ocean of truth4 ,spiritual and ethical principles sway these1 and not personal ambition4 ,and it must be noted that humility is not simply lack of pride under circumstances which naturally allow of it1 an insensitiveness to pride1 a wholly negative state1 which is nothing in itself1 but it is a positive feeling and emotion in view of oneself in relation to others4 ,thus the humble man is he of high pride capacity1 and who consciously refrains from pride when usual standards would allow it4 8,that is something to be proud of10 8,he has a right to be proud10 and similar expressions mark the lower standards of which he never avails himself4 ,the best and noblest specimens of mankind renounce the 8world10 8the lust of the eye and pride of life10 and live by their self-erected ideals4 ,and if we ask how the spirit of humility and disinterestedness can arise and progress in a natural evolution1 we must answer that it holds its place and wins its way by reason of its greater inherent value and fruitfulness4 ,he who has himself in view has lost sight of his work4 ,by this psychic mode alone is the largest1 most perfect1 most permanent work accomplished1 and ultimately1 often posthumously1 it is appreciated at its real worth4 ,those originating and master minds in human history who have opened new avenues of spiritual progress1 have usually been of this modest1 unassuming1 humble type4 ,thus in a wholly natural manner the higher law of an ideal life prevails over the lower law of life which works only by competition in the struggle for existence4 ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,induction ,,and ,,emotion ,we have implied throughout that we have feeling about a thing only so far as we attach on basis of past experience an experience value to the thing1 as we say1 8the burnt child dreads the fire40 ,induction1 as this interpretation is termed1 is so important an element that we will devote a little space to considering its rationale1 development1 and place in intellectual emotion4 ,what is the rationale of the inductive act8 ,why should iteration lead to expectancy of reiteration8 ,i observe that a body unsupported falls in a hundred instances1 but is it not arbitrary for me then to suppose that it will fall the hundred and first instance8 ,in fact would it not be more rational to suppose that this particular combination should be exhausted1 that it was time for nature to stop8 ,but this very reason rests on the uniformity of nature--the very law we are questioning--as experienced in the past and applied to the future2 only it is a negative law of omissions1 literally law of reiteration of unreiterations4 ,thus if reason takes the law of uniformity of nature to task it can only do so by assuming it4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill in his treatment of this matter 7,logic1 bk4 iii4 chap4 #c1 sec4 #b71 falls into an error4 ,it is1 indeed1 true1 as he says1 that some occurrences repeated suggest cessation and not recurrence1 as when we have several consecutive cloudy days1 we expect a bright one1 or having had several rainy seasons we expect a dry one2 but it is plainly wrong to regard this1 as he does1 as a contradiction of the principle of uniformity of nature4 ,on the contrary1 this is a very good example of it4 ,experience of intermittent character of bad weather in the past leads to expectancy of its re-intermittency for the future1 and the oftener the experience the stronger the belief as to the nature of the still unexperienced4 ,a negative uniformity is as much a uniformity as a positive4 ,it is plain that we can assign no reason for our belief in the uniformity of nature4 ,it is simply a fact1 an arbitrary fact if you will1 that the more often experiences are conjoined1 the more strongly we expect the conjuncture4 ,i may imagine a body unsupported remaining stationary in the air as readily as to imagine it falling2 however1 ,i believe it will fall1 and ,i duck my head for fear of getting hurt4 ,not any speculative reason then1 but a very practical reason1 is at the bottom of this inductive tendency1 that is1 the conservation and progress of the organism is secured by induction as anticipatory function4 ,the origin of induction is not then in its abstract rationality1 but in its immediate utility as a life function4 ,experience is self-adjustment through felt stimulus4 ,once begun it grows by continual self-reference1 and hence practically all experience is inductive4 ,experience is thus a continuum1 an integrating cumulating whole2 and inductive experience1 like all experience1 arises and progresses by reason of its serviceability4 ,it has been implied that the inductive act arises very early in the history of experience4 ,every psychosis is what it is by reason of all the previous psychoses in the individual and the race4 ,psychism1 while it has its points of development in individuals1 must yet be estimated as a unit1 as a single whole4 ,but we have to ask whether this modification of one psychosis by another is conscious or unconscious4 ,if some low organism have in its lifetime but two consciousnesses1 must we regard the second as influenced in quality by the first1 and if so1 consciously influenced1 that is1 a conscious relating1 an active induction as opposed to mechanical integration8 ,is mind always self-building1 or does psychosis act and react on psychosis automatically8 ,we have maintained that all the growth of mind has been in the past1 as in the present1 by struggle1 by severest endeavour1 and hence if experience modify experience it is by conscious act4 ,experience thus constantly connects with itself and builds upon itself1 it is self-integrating1 that is1 inductive1 in all its evolution4 ,mind1 as primarily pleasure-pain and struggle1 by endeavour reaches back to itself1 realizes itself1 and rises upon itself4 ,take a comparatively simple case4 ,a child tastes an orange1 and finds it sweet1 i4e41 it relates the sweetness to the object1 which relating is a true thinking1 an active conjoining or associating4 ,upon the presentation of another orange to the child at a later date1 he identifies it as the sweet thing2 he associates sweetness as to be experienced from it on basis of past associating1 that is1 he makes an induction4 ,in this second orange-experience1 as far as there is active conjoining of mental products1 a definite adding to present percept of sweet taste as experienceable by conscious reference to former percept 7taste-experience71 we must recognise a genuine thought-process4 ,the thinking consists in the joining of sensation of taste to an object1 not as a present1 but as a future experience1 on the basis of some past experience4 ,here is a true mediation or reasoning of inductive type1 and also a true concept-process1 that is1 a taking together1 a conscious uniting1 although the product is still particular4 ,the nearest approach to expressing this psychological process in language is to say1 8,this round yellow is this sweet1 because this round yellow was this sweet before40 ,the correlating process rests upon the relating process accomplished at first experience of orange-tasting1 whereby the taste was related to the thing tasted4 ,this relating may be thrust upon the mind1 or the mind may consciously and actively assimilate4 ,thought in the wide sense of the term may be made to include all mediate or immediate conscious conjoining of experiences1 whether the product be general or particular4 ,mediacy is certainly1 however1 accomplished before commonness is noted1 which in ordinary usage is concept-making4 ,the grouping of the particular taste with the particular sight and touch on basis of past experience does not give a general result4 ,the mediate term of past experience of taste which the child brings up on sight of orange and applies to the present case does not suggest commonness1 but constancy of experience1 for at first it knows things only as identical1 and not as separate1 or as like or unlike4 ,the method of this early intelligence is that of identifying1 8,the orange was sweet and is sweet02 and not that of common characterizing1 8,oranges are sweet1 and this is an orange40 ,the child does not discriminate or understand that the object of its first experience is1 by reason of this experience1 no longer to be experienced2 it has not attained notion of disappearance4 ,it does not cognize the orange as one of a group or class1 having as common characters roundness1 sweetness1 and yellowness1 and from presence of round-yellow in any instance infer sweet2 but it knows orange only as this particular object of past1 present1 and future experience4 ,many of the early thought-experiences of children are to be interpreted rather upon this identity-method than upon the usual interpretation of true concepts4 ,thus the child who calls every person of certain age1 dress1 etc41 8,papa10 is not thinking of a papa1 or class of papas1 but of the papa4 ,this is mistaken identity3 the common and like is the same1 and the child requires considerable discrimination before it attains to notion of papa in general4 ,same and not-same are discriminated before like and unlike1 and hence young children use common names as proper4 ,now the mental product achieved by the child1 which1 as expressed in words1 we term the papa1 may be styled a particular concept1 a gathering together of sight-sensations1 and associating sound- and touch-sensations with these so that any generally like group of sight-sensations enables the child to call up on basis of past experience the associated sound and touch1 to expect the gentle word and caress4 ,the child in identifying the orange1 8,this round yellow thing is the sweet thing10 is bringing together with a certain general force1 not of common characterization1 indeed1 but of temporal significance as permanent grouping4 ,animals and young children think mostly on the identifying plan2 they join to and expect for a present experience what has been conjoined with it in past experience1 but the object is the same1 not a like one4 ,how then does the child come to knowledge of things as like1 to form a class of oranges after regarding all oranges as the orange8 ,pass oranges before a young child one after the other so that one only is in sight1 and the child will probably know only one orange as the same continually re-appearing4 ,the image formed will1 however1 be more or less composite1 the mental product will be a concept-image1 as being a re-inforcement and exaggeration of common characters and a suppression of individual2 but for practical purposes it is still a particular concept1 that is1 the child applies it to the one and not the many1 and does not recognise its representative nature4 ,a general image as a group of common qualities may be thus attained before consciousness of this generality is reached4 ,if now two or three oranges are presented to the child at the same time1 it will learn to discriminate them as separate co-existences1 having characters in common1 roundness1 yellowness1 etc42 the objects will be recognised as individuals belonging to class round-yellow things4 ,here a general image having a general import is achieved4 ,the particular characters1 round1 yellow1 sweet1 which always centred in and made up the individual orange1 are recognised to have general scope in applying to many objects4 ,groups of characters had been achieved before by particular thinking1 but now by general thought groups of characters as common are formed4 ,from the practically coincident impressions it gains the notion orange1 so that it recognises new individuals as individuals1 and not as the individual or single object1 as in the earlier and cruder identity method of thinking4 ,the mind now--instead of saying 8,same impressions1 same object0--says 8,same impressions1 like objects40 ,instead of making an object as a group of qualities1 it makes a class of objects having the group of qualities in common4 ,concept-forming is thus often but an extension from what ,i have termed the particular concept2 the group of qualities formed as characterizing the thing is through experience with co-existences predicated of things4 ,notion or idea of the orange precedes notion or idea of orange2 but both are truly notions or concepts1 a taking together of impressions1 one of particular1 the other of general import4 ,the general significance of the particular group is first forced upon the mind by experience1 but soon the mind generalizes as well as notices generalizations brought to it4 ,gradually the mind obtains power to generalize1 not only from co-existences1 but from successions1 and later still to generalize by abstraction1 to compare and pick out common features amidst the unlike1 to search for unity in diversity4 ,the rise of generalizing power is through the struggle for existence2 it originates1 like all other mental processes1 in practical needs4 ,law is thereby not simply acted upon or merely recognised1 as in the associative stage3 it is definitely sought for and applied4 ,art arises1 and also science4 ,the ability1 given by generalizing power1 of dealing with things in the lump1 becomes of signal service1 and specially distinguishes man4 ,but the primary value of the concept in all its stages is not as a summation of experience1 but as a guide for the future4 ,through reiterated grouping the concept-group is recognised as permanent factor1 so that one element of a group being given1 other elements are expected through a conscious assimilation with the past experience4 ,the concept answering to the word orange1 for example1 is the mental product recognising a constant co-existence of certain qualities of shape1 colour1 size1 taste1 etc41 so that from occurrence of one or more we infer other or others4 ,concepts are the inner groupings1 the mental synthesizings1 which interpret the outer groupings that we term laws of nature4 ,in all this we see the inductive element in its conscious form1 experience developing itself by anticipating future in terms of past4 ,we have now to consider briefly the psychological nature of judgment and reasoning with special reference to the inductive feature4 ,logically judgment is any connecting1 plus affirming of reality1 as effected through the copula4 ,the copula is made1 not only to denote relation1 but reality of relation1 to express1 not only the act of connecting1 but also its validity for the case in hand4 ,psychologically1 judging may be regarded as any thinking1 as any relating without reference to the things related1 whether it be a joining of the concept 8reality0 to some other concept as a concept-forming process1 or any joining of other elements4 ,i have already discussed the nature of relating per se1 but on the topic of judgment a word is to be said about the proposition-form4 ,in all thinking there are the two things joined--subject and predicate in language-expression--and the act of joining1 or copula in language-expression2 thus all thought is capable of the proposition-form4 ,indeed1 the word-form cannot express a thinking but only a thought as a consolidated and single product1 and as a sign of process4 ,the word is a summary of process and relations1 but it cannot express process as concept-forming or judging4 ,the word orange signifies for the mind by symbolic and shorthand method1 8,thing is sweet plus thing is yellow10 etc2 but as far as process happens1 and not simultaneous composite representation1 the process is capable of proposition-form4 ,all relatings or joinings1 even of particulars to particulars1 are of the proposition-type1 and ,i must dissent from the common view that two percepts cannot stand in subject-predicate relations4 ,as ,i have before discussed1 the relating of particular to particular is thinking1 and to say 8,this sweet belongs to this yellow0 is awkward indeed1 but still psychologically proper4 ,every proposition1 on the other hand1 is susceptible of analysis as expressive of concept-forming relating4 ,the proposition 8,man is mortal0 is expression of a mental process of joining2 the concept mortal is either attached to or detached from the concept man1 according as we consider the process as synthetic or analytic4 ,if it be a grouping or concept-forming in full sense1 it means that in forming the concept man1 we add to the already gathered qualities the quality 8mortal0 on basis of experience4 ,the child first notices deaths in cases of ,john1 ,peter1 etc41 whom it knows to belong to the class 8men10 forms the concept 8mortal0 and adds it by generalisation to the whole class and enlarges concept 8man0 by one quality4 ,this proposition1 as denoting inductive concept-forming1 expresses the act of incorporating on basis of experience the quality mortal into the quality-group man4 ,as analytic1 as a detaching of what has been grouped1 the proposition still expresses joining1 and until the statement becomes purely formal and practically meaningless the rejoining is always a strengthening of the concept1 and formative in its value4 ,all uniting or relating is1 however1 more than a bare connecting2 it is a definite mode of relating1 it has a form2 and the first and fundamental form is that of time and space1 by which all relating has the inductive quality of relying upon the past for the interpretation of the future4 ,but thought as self-active mentality is specially stimulated and controlled by the form of reality4 ,all relatings are not1 however1 influenced by sense of reality1 and hence belief is not coincident with judgment in the large sense4 ,affirmation or denial of actuality or reality is a kind of joining1 but is not joining per se4 ,the infant joins taste of sweetness with percept round-yellow for the first time and for many following times with no reference to reality or unreality4 8,this round-yellow is this sweet0 expresses a mere connecting1 a bare relating1 but as neither real nor unreal4 ,there is no emphasis laid on the copula by which it expresses more than a mere joining4 ,but let the perfect tranquility of the child's experience be broken in upon by discord of appearance and reality1 let the child once have a bitter experience with a round lemon1 then its future conjoinings of round-yellow and sweet will be more or less tinged by sense of possibility of error1 and emphasis will be laid on the copula1 8,that is sweet40 ,through other such experiences with other of its thought-groups1 the child generalises to the universal significance of reality and unreality for all its thinking2 hence1 all conjoinings with their copula-expressions attain a new force and quality from this induction4 ,in the light of fallibility as making up a part of the concept 8experience10 all thought-experience modifies itself by this self-relation4 ,reality becomes so constant and universal for all thought-life that mature thought can never escape it4 ,hegel tried to rise superior to the notion of existence1 but psychologically1 at least1 he failed4 ,the conception or induction of reality becomes a necessary form of thought by being united with all unitings4 ,judgment in the narrow sense may be defined as all those relatings in which the reality of the relation is affirmed or denied4 ,lastly a word on the nature of reasoning4 ,reasoning is mediatorial2 the joining is accomplished through one or more mediates4 ,most if not all thinking is by mediating2 joining proceeds only upon ground or basis1 whether recognised or not as such4 8,kings are mortal0 is the language-expression of a conjoining effected either through the particular mediate term1 ,john1 or terms1 ,john1 ,peter1 etc41 or through the general mediate term men4 ,in both cases the conjoining is effected through subjoining of the mediate term to both the elements to be conjoined4 ,in the first case the process is3 8,john is mortal1 ,john is king1 therefore kings are mortal40 ,this relating of king and mortal is strengthened by subjoining for other particular mediates1 ,peter1 ,james1 etc4 ,in the second case the process is3 8,men are mortal1 kings are men1 therefore kings are mortal40 ,in both cases the appeal is to constancy of coherence of a quality to a quality-group1 in the first1 mortality coherent with king ,john1 hence coherent with kings2 in the second1 kings have mortality because mortality is coherent with the group man kings others4 ,in both cases the generalising tendency1 that is1 the inductive quality1 is the main point and not the method of mediation4 ,in both processes the concept king is filled out by the additional quality mortality1 and there is real gain in generalising and concept-forming1 whether the mind accomplishes it by the more special or more general reference4 ,induction in the large sense is thus inclusive of both induction and deduction in the restricted sense as determined by the mode of mediation4 ,inductive thinking1 as we have treated it1 is the joining which generalises1 whatever be the means used to this end4 ,induction as generalising tendency is imbedded in experience1 and is the largest factor in all its development4 ,all cognition as interpretation is induction4 ,that induction1 as giving the experience value of things on basis of previous experience1 is fundamental to all emotions about the things1 has been implied throughout our discussion4 ,but the inductive act may itself be emotively considered and intellectual emotion may arise4 ,how and why induction came to be a pleasurable act and carried on for its own sake is1 perhaps1 not explainable by biologic evolution4 ,it is certain that the inductive act1 like other functions1 arises as painful effort and as a mere means of serving life4 ,identifying and recognising is accomplished only under pressure of the struggle for existence4 ,animals in general1 and1 indeed1 most human beings exercise their intelligence1 make inductions1 only as compelled by the demands of life4 ,the ,australian savages who guided ,lumholtz in his search for new marsupials knew about the animals solely in a practical way1 and were totally unable to comprehend ,lumholtz's motive4 ,so geologists examining stones are entirely misapprehended by savages and the semi-civilized1 though these people are sufficiently acquainted with stones so far as they are a source of mineral wealth1 are useful for building1 etc4 ,and from the point of view of natural selection pure science1 the pursuit of knowledge solely for its own sake1 without the least reference to its appreciation1 is unexplainable4 ,nevertheless1 it is a fact that at a certain point in psychism the intellectual life develops for its own sake2 the inductive act is pleasurable1 and the desire arises to continue it as such1 that is1 here is true intellectual emotion1 an emotion arising about an intellectual act represented as such4 ,this feeling about induction may rise to an absorbing passion1 as with ,charles ,darwin4 ,he liked nothing better than making inductions1 until he finally came to like little else4 ,if the reason is asked for induction becoming pleasurable1 and an end in itself psychology at present has no answer4 ,it is plain that when intellectual activity is desired1 not as a means1 but as an end in itself1 it excludes much intellectual emotion which is commonly associated therewith4 ,surprise and wonder1 for instance1 are intellectual emotions at contemplating a conjuncture very contrary to expectation1 entirely opposite to some pre-formed induction1 but they do not imply devotion to intellectual activity as such4 ,the visitor to a biological laboratory who1 on first seeing blood corpuscles1 cries 8,wonderful6 ,who would have thought it6 ,one's blood all full of such things6 ,let me look again60 is hardly actuated by the scientific motive4 ,all phenomena are equally wonderful or wonderless--which amounts to the same thing--to the scientist2 for him everything is simply natural1 he forms no expectations not founded on facts4 ,the 8wonders of science0 are wonders only to the outsider3 the scientist takes them as matter of fact4 ,it is no more wonderful to him that the blood should be full of corpuscles than that it should fall in drops4 ,the tyro does not wonder at a drop of blood2 he wonders to see the drop filled with myriads of animated corpuscles2 the scientist wonders at neither4 ,he who1 on being told of blood corpuscles1 exclaims1 8,i want to know10 plainly desires knowledge1 but is not impelled by a pure thirst for knowledge4 ,the scientific items appearing in the newspapers generally appeal merely to seekers for marvels and lovers of intellectual sensation4 ,surprise and wonder are then extraneous impulses to knowledge1 the impulse to knowledge for its own sake being quite distinct4 ,as based on intellectual shock they imply a considerable intellectual integration1 and hence are by no means primitive in mental life1 yet far from being as late as emotion for knowledge per se4 ,wonder gives birth to the ,arabian ,nights and to ,jules ,verne's romances1 but it always hinders true science4 ,again1 the pleasure and desire of achieving and achievement often plays a large part in intellectual pursuits1 as in a wide variety of activity4 ,reaching an end merely for the sake of accomplishment1 an emotion about any end1 as1 for instance1 a wide generalisation to be attained1 merely as end1 intellectual action has in common with all other teleological action1 but the teleologic emotion is not distinctly intellectual4 ,the desire to achieve for achievement's sake1 to reach the satisfaction of accomplishment1 is extremely multiplex in its application4 ,the man who does a thing just to see if he can do it1 who does feats of any kind is obviously impelled by a different emotion from the one who performs the same activity for the pleasure of the activity itself4 ,he who plays a game to succeed1 and he who plays for the pleasurable activity involved1 are in very different frames of mind4 ,and emotion for achievement is generally complicated by desire to be thereby superior to one's fellows4 ,the intense competitive struggle is plain in all departments even among scientists4 ,the emotion of competition1 the earnest desire to surpass others in interpreting nature and life is a tremendous force among all scientific workers1 and not even ,darwin himself1 exceptional though he was1 could keep out every vestige of amour propre4 ,we note also that love of any intellectual activity for its own sake1 as induction1 must be distinguished from the love of truth4 ,here induction is exercised1 not for itself1 but as a means to an end1 truth2 inducing is not merely a pleasing exercise1 but a means to accomplishment of a definite result4 ,darwin1 of course1 a trained and habitual inductionist1 worked both from the pleasurability of the activity and from his devotion to truth1 to which this induction was the true method4 ,though both these motives1 love of an activity and love of some definite end thereby attained1 as truth1 reputation1 etc41 are closely connected1 they are perfectly distinct modes of emotion1 as the least reflection convinces4 ,truth is some very wide permanent and significant conjuncture of experience discovered and set forth1 such as the origin of species in progressive modification1 or the intensity of light in inverse proportion to the square of the distance1 and this is the kind of induction or conjoining demanded by the love of truth4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,the ,,sthetic ,,psychosis ,the problem of the origin and nature of sthetic feeling is a definite psychological problem to be solved only by introspection careful and prolonged4 ,we must take simple cases and closely scrutinize them to discover the distinctive quality1 we must seek the cognitive1 feeling1 will elements1 we must note its kinship to other psychoses1 we must endeavour to analyse and determine whether it be simple or complex4 ,analysis1 indeed1 as chemical analysis1 e4g41 is a reducing the manifold to a comparatively few elements1 from which by composition an indefinite number of substances are formed4 ,but in psychological study we must proceed without any bias from physical investigation4 ,we cannot reduce mind to the mechanical development of a few simples as we survey the development of matter chemically4 ,if mind be essentially self-activity1 will effort1 then conjunction of psychoses is due to a conjoining activity1 and is not mere aggregation4 ,so in case of fear we found a great complexity of conditions1 yet fear in itself seems an unanalyzable emotion wave4 ,in taking up sthetic psychosis we attempt an unbiassed introspective study4 ,the sthetic psychosis has been by many evolutionists connected with sexual appetite and emotion4 ,the evidence for this is that among animals the brilliant-hued1 and1 as we term them1 beautiful mates are chosen in pairing time4 ,also graceful movements and melodious tones are then employed4 ,in mankind the sthetic feeling1 as every one may recall in his own case1 arose1 and became prominent when near or in the teens4 ,the rude boy and the hoyden girl then dress and adorn themselves1 and a glamour of beauty is thrown about one who was once an entirely indifferent object4 ,all the surroundings1 artificial and natural1 of the beloved object are looked upon and thought about in a new way of feeling1 an air of attractiveness and beauty envelops all4 ,the period of life of strongest sexuality1 from twenty to forty1 is also the period of strongest sthetic emotion4 ,further1 sexuality is notedly strong among those who professionally cultivate the sthetic psychosis1 as artists1 musicians1 and poets3 indeed1 many of the very greatest of these have been so carried away by the tender passion as to transgress the conventions and laws on sexual matters4 ,in cases of precocious sexuality a feeling for the beautiful makes itself apparent2 while with those who slowly mature1 the sthetic feeling is similarly delayed4 ,but does not the infant who holds out a rose to you and cries 8pretty10 have a feeling for beauty8 ,and it is surely unaffected by sexuality4 ,what may be in the mind of a child speaking thus is hard to make out1 but the activity is probably largely mimetic merely1 and the term 8pretty0 is probably used substantively rather than qualitatively2 it is the name of thing rather than quality4 ,we certainly cannot assert of a child that because it uses certain words it attaches to those words the proper meanings4 ,this is evident from the fact that a child taught to say 8pretty0 will bring you any and every object and use the word1 or if it learns to take merely a class of objects1 as rose1 it does this at dictation4 ,the child is1 however1 obviously attracted by some objects rather than others1 but it would be hasty to say that it perceives their beauty1 when it is quite sufficient to regard them as conspicuous only1 and striking4 ,but we have to touch on sensing later2 and we only add to the evidence of connection of feeling for beauty with sexual feeling1 that with the old and with eunuchs the sthetic sense is but slight or tends to vanish4 ,thus positively and negatively there seems to be evidence that feeling for beauty originates in connection with sexual passion1 either that the object of the passion is always regarded as beautiful1 or that a feeling for beauty excites the passion4 ,a girl adorns herself to attract lovers1 knowing that to admire beauty is the first step to love4 ,this close connection is recognised in common consciousness in that 8lovely0 is synonymous with beautiful1 thus a 8lovely0 landscape or picture is a beautiful one4 ,that there is a close association of sexual with sthetic psychosis is then obvious in the case of the human being1 but yet it would be quite hasty to conclude that a sweet note or a pure colour may not be sthetically appreciated by children before they have the first stirring toward sexuality1 but still it is very easy--as ,i have before noted in the case of the child who cries 8pretty60--to mistake the quality of their interest4 ,but when we come to interpret the psychoses of the lower animals in connection with sexuality we may still more easily slip into a doubtful automorphism4 ,thus to say with ,darwin1 8,when we behold a male bird elaborately displaying 444 before the female1 444 it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty of her male partner0 7,descent of ,man1 p4 #ib71 or more strongly still with ,grant ,allen1 8,every crow must think its own mate beautiful0 7,mind1 v4 #ddh71 we too easily take for granted that these birds would feel like ourselves in corresponding circumstances4 ,we can find a more simple explanation4 ,that crows often maltreat those who are off colour1 e4g41 white1 plainly does not require us to suppose that they regard white as ugly1 black as beautiful1 any more than we should judge that students in some ,society who wear a black badge would be sthetically moved when they look with disfavour upon students who may wear a white badge4 ,animals are clannish1 and as a rule1 suffer none but those who have the customary marks to associate with them1 and especially to propagate4 ,hence when the peacock displays himself to his mate he simply shows to her that he has most conspicuously the proper marks1 and she sees that he is the proper mate4 ,these are signs of a tempting mate1 just as here is tempting food1 a very red ripe berry1 but the coloration no more in the one case than the other awakens feeling for beauty4 ,the hen bird probably appreciates a red feather as a red berry merely as being signs of the completely satisfying4 ,sexual selection1 like nutriment selection1 is a discrimination according to certain characters as prompted by appetite4 ,the expanded and vari-coloured tail of a peacock is then a mere sexual characteristic which does not imply feeling for beauty in its appreciation as significant of sex4 ,a small foot1 long hair1 and other sexual characters in woman1 which are attractive to men1 in like manner arouse emotion which is far from sthetic4 ,we may take a perfectly unsexual sthetic pleasure in long raven tresses just as we do in an ebony table1 but this is obviously rather late achievement4 ,in fact are not sthetic and sexual feelings mutually exclusive8 ,so far as nude art is 8suggestive10 so far is the feeling of its beauty lost1 hence sculpture is not tinted4 ,and so in the presence of the nude model the artist can have merely sthetic emotion1 whereas his visitor is apt to have emotions of another sort4 ,we do1 indeed1 say that the lover dwells upon his mistress' 8beauties10 but beauties here mean attractions1 and to the devoted lover all parts are attractive1 even moles and freckles which to the sthetic eye are ugly4 ,from the evidence in hand we judge then that it is certainly not necessary to call in the feeling of the beautiful as the motive in the origin and development of sexual characters in animals and plants4 ,just as there is a cry of fear or a tone of anger there is a vocal expression of sexual feeling and emotion which has its use and is recognised as such1 but whose sthetic quality is no more a matter of immediate apprehension than in other utilities4 ,at least the safest interpretation that we can now make for all the lower grades of sexuality is that sex characters are not primarily determined by the feeling for beauty1 but are simply immediate signs of sex to awaken the sexual response and secure the best mate4 ,how is it that sexuality is so prominent in expression among some species and so little among others8--compare peacocks and blue jays--is a question on which we have no light4 ,we are also in ignorance how the particular sexual character was evolved and not some other1 for example1 why is not the peacock's tail red8 ,grant ,allen's suggestion that food selection has influenced sex selection may be true1 but it would require a very wide and thorough investigation4 ,do brilliant-hued birds prefer brilliant-hued foods8 ,how is the coloration of the scarlet tanager related to the coloration of its food8 ,however1 if the colouring of foods and mates were the same1 it would in some cases lead to disadvantageous confusion1 and on general principles we should expect such distinct elements as nutrition and sex to develop on very different lines4 ,the cue for colour may be learned first with reference to food1 but it may be carried on as sexually significant on very distinct lines4 ,still to distinguish a food or a mate by colour is equally non-sthetic in itself4 ,at least we think it improbable that sthetic psychosis arises as incentive to or reflex of sexuality in any of the lower psychic stages4 ,a theory of the origin of sthetic psychosis which has been pressed by some1 as by ,herbert ,spencer1 is that it arises as reflex from spontaneous outflow of energy1 or more particularly in connection with play impulse4 ,a horse turned loose in pasture may gambol1 running1 sniffing1 looking around1 all which denoting a free outflow of energy through lines of least resistance1 the customary channels of activity4 ,but we cannot seriously think that in this sensing and muscular activity there is implied any real sthetic psychosis1 and indeed it seems quite emotionless4 ,the emotion of fear or similar feelings aroused the original activities1 but this present galloping1 etc41 is automatic1 and such immediate pleasure as may result from this free activity is scarcely of the sthetic order4 ,the whole is of a distinctly lower order than the original activity and much below sthetic quality4 ,if we recall our own state of mind in youthful 8letting off steam0 and in plays1 we do not find sthetic pleasure4 ,there is1 however1 a pleasure of relief and also positively a pleasure from such spontaneous outflow2 but the outburst of pent-up energy automatically spent along lines of race action is a mere echo1 dies out at once1 and as degenerate form is not a starting point for origin of any new psychosis4 ,play as simulation of feeling and action is also removed from sthetic activity1 as in a dog playing at fear and running1 or at anger and chasing4 ,he gets a more or less modified fear or anger1 but there does not seem to be any tendency to sthetic psychosis4 ,mere imitation is more or less exact and skilful1 but emotion therein and thereat is plainly not the glow of sthetic emotion1 but is reflex of sense of power and intelligence as qualities4 ,mimicry as mere outlet of energy as with monkeys is plainly not aesthetic2 here is merely an automatic outflow of force into suggested activity4 ,when a savage as mimetic achievement carves the figure of man as handle to a knife1 he accomplishes art1 but not fine art4 ,he has no more sthetic feeling than a boy or man whittling out a ship1 it being merely an exact and skilful counterfeit of a real thing4 ,imitation for the sake of imitation or to deceive is a teleologic pleasure distinct from sthetic4 ,successful imitation is often said1 indeed1 to be 8beautifully done10 but this means no more than well done4 ,even a well-baked cake is popularly spoken of as beautifully done4 ,we observe that superfluous energy rushes out along customary or habitual lines of activity1 and so with perfect ease and economy4 ,activity which is easy and free is in itself pleasant1 and this pleasantness in sensing and derived psychosis is sthetic feeling4 ,where sensing is mere escape valve of force1 though facility is absolute1 there is1 as just pointed out1 no sthetic quality1 the whole tending to the merely mechanical4 ,owing to the fact that in nature curved lines predominate and so ocular adjustment is to them1 my eye follows a curved line easier than a straight one1 hence when spontaneous energy outflows in sensing activity of least resistance it will be toward curves4 ,but spontaneous activity of this kind is1 as we have explained1 not sthetic4 ,the law of economy in a vent is1 greatest force1 least effect1 the contrary of the usual formula for economy which is1 least force1 greatest effect4 ,where energy is expensive the latter rule is to be applied4 ,thus in directed and effortful sensing activity economy means the ratio of efficiency1 the ratio of the amount of painful effort to desired result4 ,but this is merely a saving of pain and not a real pleasure psychosis4 ,when ,i1 in using a microscope see clearly with less and less effort the objects of my study1 ,i may take pleasure in the economical and facile accomplishment1 but this pleasure is one of satisfaction in power and skill1 and so not at all sthetic4 ,again1 a dyer has great skill and easy appreciation with respect to colour1 but the sthetic side of colour is not thereby specially felt by him4 ,mere habitual and easy colour sensitiveness is not then thereby sthetic4 ,we must1 indeed1 sense a colour before we can feel its beauty1 but the feeling of beauty is not directly involved in any stage of the sensing evolution from the earliest and most painful effort with bare appreciation to the spontaneous and effortless sensing at the moment of great surplus of sensing energy4 ,another way of accounting for sthetic psychosis is by association4 ,pleasant sights1 for instance1 are those with which we associate pleasure1 and 8pleasant0 means to many1 beautiful4 ,but a traveller1 thirsty in a desert land1 declares that he saw no more pleasant sight than a mud hole1 but this pleasure1 as he himself would aver1 was far from sthetic4 ,whatever we have associated pleasure with1 we regard with pleasure1 but only as we have associated sthetic pleasure with it do we regard it with sthetic pleasure4 ,thus mere association or revival no more gives us the derivation of sthetic than any other emotion4 ,any pleasure or pain may be associated with any sensation or perception1 and thereby re-occur with these1 but the mere revival obviously does not alter the nature of the psychosis or give any new psychosis4 ,it is not what is recalled1 but how we feel about it that constitutes sthetic emotion4 ,so also when the beautiful is defined by ,h4 ,r4 ,marshall as 8the permanently pleasurable in revival10 we get no insight into the origin1 nature1 and development of the sthetic psychosis2 this purely objective description gives no psychological analysis4 ,but we may question the accuracy of the description4 ,a thing of beauty is not a joy for ever when we mean thereby the object which excites the sthetic psychosis1 for much that has seemed beautiful to one people and age does not remain so for all peoples and times1 and even with the individual1 taste varies4 ,we must also note that the permanently pleasurable in revival may not be sthetic1 as the lover's remembrance of a trysting place4 ,on the whole1 ,i do not find that sthetic pleasure is in any case to be ascribed to association1 though it comes under the general laws of association like any other feeling4 ,a lily excites various modes of sthetic impression by its form1 colour1 odour1 poetical character1 etc41 all which may re-awaken together upon any presentation or suggestion of the lily4 ,however1 for the aboriginal lotus-eater the lily was also a pleasant sight--but not sthetic--from the associated pleasures of its pleasant taste and as satisfying hunger4 ,we have implied throughout--and common introspection approves this--that sthetic pleasure and emotion is a distinct psychosis which somehow arises with reference to objects4 ,it is not some previous psychosis as modified by association1 habit1 economy1 play-impulse1 or sexuality2 but it is a sui generis mode which develops on the basis of a past evolution4 ,the simplest and earliest sthetic mode is plainly the sensuous4 ,very commonly when looking on the delicate solid-tinted glow of early dawn ,i have sthetic pleasure1 my eye dwells on it with pleasure and drinks in the pleasant light4 ,it is obvious here that the sensing activity is carried on1 not to discriminate food or mate nor yet as mere vent to energy2 but the sensing here acts for the pleasure in the activity itself4 ,how and why mere cognitive act1 which originates as guide to life1 acquires a direct pleasure value and so is carried on apart from the ends of life1 and initiates an sthetic world of its own1 cannot on the face of it be explained by natural selection2 it is entirely apart from this order of things4 ,but we know that sensing often carries pleasure with it as significant of life value1 thus the thing tasting good was originally the good thing to eat1 digest and assimilate2 so also for smell1 etc4 ,but under natural selection this pleasure sanction and index was never cultivated for its own sake4 ,now is there any real difference in the pleasure in1 for instance1 smelling1 for the pure pleasure of smelling1 as a perfume of fresh apples1 and the pleasure from smelling the apples as detecting them when you are hungry8 8,how pleasant those apples smell6 ,i do not care to eat them1 but ,i just enjoy smelling them02 is the pleasure thus indicated the same in quality with that of the man who says1 8,those apples smell so nice ,i would like to try one08 ,again1 if hungry1 we say1 8,the bread tastes so good10 but we notice this pleasantness rapidly decreases as appetite is satisfied4 ,however1 if there be fresh grass butter1 you may continue to eat long after appetite is satisfied1 for the pure pleasure of the taste4 ,obviously1 the latter pleasure is not a mere continuance of the former4 ,relish and taste pleasure seem distinct4 ,again1 a red apple is a pleasant sight to a hungry man and to an artist in different ways4 ,if our pleasure in looking at a picture of an apple is such that the mouth waters1 we know at once that the pleasure is unsthetic4 ,he who is very fond of apples1 and to whom they are always a pleasant sight1 is so far barred from sthetic pleasure in them2 while he who has no appreciation of their edibility is thereby prepared for sthetically sensing them4 ,so also sour grapes are as pretty as sweet4 ,the colour sense began as discriminative of foods1 and hence red became pleasurably known1 but sthetic appreciation is certainly much later and quite diverse4 ,if it be asked how and when did red1 already noticeable1 become dwelt upon sthetically1 all we can hazard in reply is that at some leisure moment when unmoved by appetite a surplus of energy set up an habitual sensing activity1 as noticing reds1 and at a certain stage when some directing is exercised1 there comes a unique pleasure from the mere sensing1 and the red is therefore dwelt upon4 sthetic colour-pleasure in the simplest case arises then in every one's experience4 ,sense-pleasure is thus distinctly of two kinds1 first1 as arising in direct connection with general organic demands and satisfactions--the part as serving the whole2 second1 as arising immediately from the sense-activity--the whole as serving the part4 ,a monkey may find an apple a pleasant sight1 but loses all interest when the apple is seen to be an imitation3 the monkey has the first pleasure1 but not the second4 ,the sensuous sthetic problem is merely to introspect the quality of the sensing-for-itself-pleasure as distinct from pleasantness coming from the service of life4 ,a sense which develops its own pleasurableness is on a new line1 which we term the sthetic4 sthetic activity is distinct from mere vent activity of superfluous energy by reason of being carried on self-directed by the felt pleasure of activity2 it implies a measure of self-direction and self-consciousness4 sthetic activity may then be generally described as primarily a sensing carried on1 not as means1 but for its own sake in pleasure immediately resulting4 ,and we find that in this very general meaning all senses have their sthetic activity4 ,the temperature sense is carried on1 as in basking1 for the pure pleasure of warmth4 ,a cat behind a stove is a connoisseur in sthetic warmth sensations1 and enjoys warmth for its own sake1 so far as often to injure the organism as a whole4 ,to lie in the sun and experience the thrills of pleasurable warmth and to keep up this sensing merely for the sensation pleasure is a frequent experience even with man4 ,again1 the muscular and pressure senses often have a sphere of sthetic activity with athletes and lovers of exercise4 ,when in prime condition1 a man will toss weights about solely for the pleasure involved in the sense of pressure and of muscular activity4 ,touch also is plainly sthetic when one handles silk for the pleasure involved in its smoothness4 ,smell is obviously an sthetic activity in smelling perfumes for the pleasure of the smell4 ,it is probable that the sthetic activity of this sense is far wider in some of the lower animals where the sense is much more acute1 as the dog4 ,the dog is plainly having a very different psychosis when he is smelling with pleasure a piece of meat which he is about to eat1 and when he sniffs carrion and perfumes himself therewith4 ,he gets thus a certain pleasant but gross stimulation quite akin to the pleasure some men take in musk1 an enjoyment of which is distinctly an animal trait4 ,again1 the epicure who sips his rare wine is tasting for the pure pleasure of the taste1 and exercises this sense sthetically4 ,the sthetic of all these senses may be called the lower sthetic1 in contradistinction to the higher sthetic of sight and hearing2 but sthetic activity is throughout its whole range practically identical in nature and in the quality of its pleasure4 ,when ,i lie in the sun and get warmth1 not because ,i am cold1 but for the mere pleasure of the warmth thrills1 and when ,i keep looking at a delicate tint in the evening sky for the mere pleasure of the sensation1 ,i have1 as far as my introspection assures me1 activities whose method and pleasure tone is identical4 ,simple sensuous sthetic is no doubt the beginning of sthetic activity1 but there speedily enters much complication4 ,it often happens that single elements which separately do not excite us sthetically will produce a marked effect in conjunction1 as complementary colours1 for instance4 ,indeed1 relation plays so large a place in our sthetic experience that such principles as variety and contrast1 or1 on the other hand1 unity1 order1 proportion1 and harmony1 have been made fundamental to the sthetic feeling4 sthetic effect certainly here becomes a complex of two or more reinforcing sensations or perceptions4 ,where the sensuous elements of a perception are in themselves pleasing we may expect the unison in perception to be doubly pleasing4 ,however1 we may also conceive that sthetic pleasure arises as a reflex of perceptive activity in and for itself as a co-ordinating of impressions4 ,fechner has made some experiments on what combinations are pleasing2 but experiment in this direction is extremely difficult because so few people are willing to speak frankly of their sthetic feelings1 being very sensitive about compromising themselves on matters of taste4 ,there is also the great difficulty of isolation1 of making sure that association does not creep in and add unforeseen elements4 ,if ,fechner expected to get any judgments of value on such a matter as the golden section rectangle1 he should have consulted only trained artists who are used to taking up the sthetic activity with reference to any material and expressing themselves with freedom4 ,if this rectangle has the sthetic quality ,fechner's experiments suggest1 it seems strange it was not adopted by the symmetry-loving ,greeks in their temples1 like the ,parthenon4 ,to the spheres of simple and relational sense beauty we have to add a third--representative beauty4 ,a colour1 or two or more in combination which give sthetic satisfaction1 will also please in hallucinatory vision and in representation proper where the revival is recognised in its unreality and representative nature1 and also in recollection where the memory is willed4 ,the mere imaging these colours without any definite time relation also gives sthetic pleasure4 ,it is1 indeed1 a pleonasm to say that sthetic revivals are sthetic4 ,however1 imagination is productive as well as reproductive1 hence the ideal achieves a fuller beauty than the real4 ,where the mind1 prompted by sthetic desire1 determines its own object1 this object can more fully satisfy it than reality1 which is always imperfect4 ,thus art surpasses nature1 or more strictly is a higher nature4 ,idealism then is a mode of realism1 and realism is but the ideal of actuality4 ,but the imaging activity may1 like the perceptive1 be considered as in itself a source of sthetic pleasure4 ,imaging is primarily used in the service of life1 as when walking in a forest ,i hear a peculiar cry1 imagine a wolf1 and flee4 ,when imaging has been largely developed thus1 it may often act as a mere vent to energy2 but this kind of activity has here1 no more than elsewhere1 real sthetic quality4 ,at the animistic stage children imagine in this way long before they sthetically image4 ,when we consciously and with some self-direction enjoy imaging for its own sake1 we attain the sthetic sphere4 ,the sthetic pleasures which are suggested by such a phrase as-- 8,fair ship1 that from the ,italian shore ,sails the placid ocean plains0-- are not merely the sum of the original sense pleasures1 but perceptive and imaginative pleasure per se is added1 the image is more beautiful than the real vision1 and this perception than some sense element1 as the light sensation implied in 8placid40 sthetic pleasure1 even in sense1 and much more in perceiving and imagining1 is a delight1 that is1 sthetic quality is an emotion quality1 it is not a mere feeling from an object1 but a feeling about it4 ,now emotion may be enacted for emotion's sake and so an sthetic pleasure wave be generated4 ,this is the pleasure we take in the pathetic--pity1 the sublime1 fear as awe1 the tragic-horror4 ,these emotions are realized for themselves as a mode of pleasurable activity4 sthetic emotion is also very largely emotion at emotion1 as a feeling for the expressive1 still here the emotion is for its own sake4 sthetic activity may then be described as an independent self-activity of some sense1 or of perception1 or imagination1 or emotion as impelled by a pleasure1 this pleasure being a distinct and new form we term sthetic4 ,it is probable this pleasure first arose in connection with the exercise of the sense as a vent for spontaneous energy1 and pleasure once somehow being taken in a mere activity per se1 it is thenceforth conducted therefor4 ,this is the plainest path of conjecture thus far4 ,if the first sthetic pleasure were taken in some quiet moment of venting energy in sensing red1 then red will continue to be sensed1 impelled by the pleasure involved in the act4 ,granted such an origin1 the development of sthetic psychosis can be traced in the way we have noted4 sthetic psychosis is commonly regarded as passive1 and it is indeed true that the first moment of the pleasure comes as result of an activity impelled by other motives4 ,new psychoses are not consciously formed but are rather hit upon in natural development2 but once a new pleasure is felt its conditions will be attained and kept to by conscious effort1 and the pleasure itself will receive its development only through effortful activity4 ,it is by supreme effort the great artist attains the vision of beauty1 it is by supreme effort he expresses this vision1 it is by supreme effort the critic appreciates this expression4 ,he who has no appreciation of sculpture may by patiently and earnestly observing statuary reach at length some sthetic pleasure4 ,thus the sthetic1 like all mental modes1 so far as progressive1 is effortful2 and it seems certain that the sthetic pleasures that come to us so easily are race acquirements1 a heritage of culture4 ,from its first germ onwards sthetic1 like intellectual1 like moral1 like all mental activity1 is the achievement of intense struggle4 ,with the rise of beauty we have a new utility4 ,here is a new pleasure which once experienced is sought and sought again1 is developed1 and with some natures becomes absorbing passion1 the life4 ,objects fitted to give this pleasure are desired1 are bought and sold4 ,the beautiful is used to effect all kinds of ends4 ,the lover adorns himself to make himself attractive1 the advertiser distributes his bills in artistic shape1 the real estate dealer ornaments his houses and grounds4 ,whatever will afford sthetic pleasure we are willing to pay for and pay high4 ,in fact1 in the person of a ,patti the sthetic thrill becomes the most expensive taste which humanity can indulge4 ,art then is a utility--a something which satisfies desire--and as such it is not free or shareable4 ,but one at a time can observe a picture from the best point of view4 ,rich men buy the most sightly spots in nature1 the places of magnificent vistas and open to beautiful sunsets4 ,beautiful things are then desirables just like edible things or warm things1 and as such they are not shareable4 ,the feeling for beauty1 just because it is self-contained1 is far from being disinterested4 ,it is essentially selfish4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,the ,,psychology ,,of ,,literary ,,style ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer's famous essay1 entitled1 8,the ,philosophy of ,style0--by which is meant the ,psychology of ,style--propounds what we may term the economic theory of literary effect4 ,the secret1 he tells us1 of the pleasing effect of diction1 rhythm1 figurative language1 sentence structure1 lies in this1 that these are labour-saving devices to economize mental effort1 that by their use we get with the least attention the greatest apprehension2 and hence we receive pleasure as reflex of the facile and full cognition functioning4 ,literary pleasure is thus brought under the law of pleasure in general4 ,take the quotation from ,shelley cited by ,mr4 ,spencer3-- 8,methought among the lawns together ,we wandered1 underneath the young grey dawn1 ,and multitudes of dense white fleecy clouds ,were wandering in thick flocks along the mountains1 ,shepherded by the slow unwilling wind40 ,you have read this with pleasure1 and is not the source of this pleasure the ease and celerity with which the mind reaches the 8desired conception08 ,vividly and forcibly the mind is led by cunning use of phrase and rhythm and figure to realize the picture1 and there is a glow of pleasure in the reaction from the facility4 ,language is a medium for the transfer of ideas1 and when it accomplishes this office most effectively1 as in the present case1 and acts upon the mind so clearly and forcibly that nolens volens the reader at once apprehends and comprehends1 he feels a thrill of pleasure therewith1 just as there is pleasure connected with the rapid and easy assimilation of well cooked food4 ,before developing and criticising this theory ,i may remark in passing that ,blair1 the rhetorician1 in treating of the structure of sentences foreshadows in a way the economic theory when he writes that 8to have the relation of every word and member of a sentence marked in the most proper and distinct manner1 gives1 not clearness only1 but grace and beauty to a sentence1 making the mind pass smoothly and agreeably along the parts of it40 ,this surely implies that sthetical pleasure of style may be based in a psychological economy and facility4 ,it is indeed a commonplace remark1 8,the book is so well written that you cannot mistake or miss its meaning02 wherein the identification of style with intelligibility becomes a truism4 ,certainly ,mr4 ,spencer has not in the economic theory propounded anything radically new4 ,we note at the outset that while this pleasure of style may result from economy it is not the pleasure of the conscious economizer4 ,the reader who is enjoying a very readable book has a distinct pleasure from him who views with satisfaction his finishing a book at a great and unexpected saving of mental energy4 ,we have here the direct pleasure from economical exercise of the faculties contrasted with the indirect introspective-retrospective pleasure at economy effected4 ,many persons take as much pleasure in making mental energy go as far as possible1 but this pleasure in economy is obviously not the pleasure of style1 which is not reflective1 but nave and direct impression4 ,language1 either spoken or written1 by its more or less effective modes of accomplishing its office does then awaken a simple and direct pleasure1 according to the general law that pleasure accompanies efficient acts as a sanction and stimulus4 ,it is obvious that style for spoken language1 oratorical style1 is precedent in its formation to style for written language or literary style1 and that it has greatly affected literary style throughout its whole history4 ,yet the distinctness of the two modes is affirmed by the common observation that a speech1 impressively pleasing to listen to1 often does not read well4 ,while it may be true that in its origin literary style borrowed certain devices from oratorical1 yet in its latest evolution the written page is far from being the speaking page4 ,the book is not a substitute speaker addressing us1 and modes of expression which are most fitting for conversation and oration1 though sometimes used by writers1 are alien to pure literary art4 ,however1 ,i cannot pursue this interesting subject1 nor yet can ,i here treat of the origin of style more than to merely observe that it is considerably later than the origin of language itself4 ,neither the original uncouth speech1 whether interjectional or onomatopoetic1 nor the earliest rude inscriptions can be said to have style1 oratorical or literary4 ,style is the offspring of specialization2 it first appeared when men recognised some one as particularly gifted for fitting expression1 and chose him as spokesman because of this ability to communicate what was desired to be said with special force and clearness4 ,thus arises the orator who achieves and invents oratorical style4 ,likewise the writer is one who is selected for his special abilities in expression by word of pen1 and the scribe1 clerk1 and public letter writer arise and evolve literary style as a skilful way of effectively conveying ideas and impressions by written language4 ,the reader is also evolved1 and in the reciprocal relation of demand and supply and the competitive struggle to secure readers1 the writer seeks ever more and more to please and interest by introducing and perfecting various inventions to make the reading of his work very easy and enjoyable4 ,thus it comes that readableness is the natural test for reading matter4 ,the economic theory of style in fine art plainly implies at bottom physiological economy1 for all psychological economy can only be effected on this basis4 ,the psychology of style must rest on a physiology of style4 ,we know that the pleasures of form and colour in sculpture and painting are the reflex of physiological functions as easily and completely performed4 ,the curve of beauty is such because the eye follows it more easily than other lines2 the pleasing colour is such because the physiological stimulus is accomplished in a normal and facile way4 ,and as visibility is the test for the arts which appeal to the eye1 so audibility is for the fine art which appeals to the ear4 ,pleasure from music is the reflex of aural functioning accomplishing the most with least strain4 ,now the pleasure which comes from literary style must similarly be sought in some physiological mode4 ,while plain print and good paper are incidental pleasures in reading1 they are not primarily due to the stylist1 who does1 however1 appeal to the eye by the due proportioning of long and short words1 sentences and paragraphs4 ,though there is no conscious intent by the stylist1 yet it may be believed that the use of certain letters and certain successions of letters as more or less easy for the eye is a matter of some importance4 ,some letters and some combinations are ocularly more pleasing than others1 and this is clearly founded on economic physiological conditions4 ,it is greatly to be desired that physiologists would invent new alphabetical forms which should be most adapted to the eye4 ,it is scarcely to be supposed that our present ,a ,b ,c's are the simplest and easiest line-combinations for the eye4 ,when the visual side of reading is made as easy as possible1 the general reflex sense of facility and pleasure therewith is certainly increased4 ,the artificial languages now being exploited1 as ,volapuk1 ought and would effect a great physiological saving1 as would also be accomplished by a phonetic spelling4 ,but the direct visible function of style is certainly far inferior to the indirect4 ,the power of style is very largely in stimulating pleasing visual images4 ,the main element in literature we are told is vision and imagination1 which is but a restimulation and recombination of ocular experiences4 ,sensation is the source and strong basis for all those faint revivals which are so aptly and pleasantly called up by the literary artist1 and hence when the poet speaks of 8the light which never was on sea or land10 this is really meaningless1 since all our light impressions are terrestrial in their nature4 ,to the blind man the whole visual effect1 direct and indirect1 of style is lost2 his imaging power must be in some other sense4 ,literature is then1 like sculpture and painting1 largely a visual art1 and its pleasure-giving quality is the reflex of visibility4 ,mere form and colour may in a sense constitute a picture2 though in general we demand that it mean something1 suggest something4 ,a picture is such as depicting something1 and so being more than a study in form or colour4 ,the mere direct pleasure of ocular sensation plays a large part in graphic and glyptic art1 yet it is commonly conceived that some measure of imagination1 that is1 some indirect visible function1 is necessary even here4 ,sculpture and painting depend like literature on both direct and indirect vision as physiological and psychological basis of sthetic pleasure4 ,but in a secondary way literary style depends for its effect upon auditory sensations both direct and revival4 ,we mentally1 and often orally1 pronounce as we read1 and so appreciate sonorous quality and onomatopoetic force4 ,alliteration1 rhyme1 euphony1 and rhythm play certainly a considerable part in the charm of style1 and literature on this side approaches and passes gradually into music4 ,euphony answers to melody1 and rhyme and rhythm to harmony4 ,literature may become for us merely a succession of pleasing sounds1 as when we hum over some favourite lines of poetry1 or when1 ignorant of the ,italian language1 we listen to an opera4 ,some of ,milton's lists of names in such lines as these1-- 8,of ,cambalu1 seat of ,cathayan ,can1 ,and ,samarchand by ,oxus1 ,temer's throne0-- charm merely by the flow and fulness of sound4 ,but the stylist aims1 not merely at formal sensuous beauty in tone and cadence of language1 he aims to suggest pleasing sounds1 and to awaken the auditory imagination1 and to harmonize sense with sound as is done so successfully by poets like ,tennyson and prosaists like ,sir ,thomas ,browne4 ,all this auditory side of literary style is lost on the deaf1 as the visual is lost on the blind4 ,literature as an art is neither blind like music nor deaf like painting1 but it is a compound art1 visual-auditory1 and thus1 by virtue of its range1 is the greatest of the arts4 ,it is true that indirectly and in a very limited way painting can suggest sounds1 and music sights1 but literature1 both directly and indirectly1 can freely and fully give both4 ,word-music and word-painting are both methods of literary style4 ,in short1 the explanation of the pleasure of style is pleasing sight or sound directly or indirectly given1 and the explanation of the pleasing character of the sight or sound is as the reflex of easy economical physiological functioning as basis of easy economical psychic function4 ,but we have now to ask whether economy of attention is the sole psychological secret of style1 and whether1 indeed1 it is always necessary to style4 ,is style1 like grammar or orthography1 merely a more or less conventionalized device to make intelligibility certain and easy8 ,is our reading always the more pleasurable as it is the more effortless8 ,the pleasure of facility certainly bears a large part in much of our literary enjoyment1 but there is another and opposite law of pleasure which1 ,i think1 often determines pleasure in style4 ,to accomplish much with no exertion1 to slide down a long hill1 gives pleasure1 but there is also a pleasure in exertion1 in climbing hills as well as sliding down4 ,the pleasures of strenuous activity of attention form a certain element in literary effect4 ,the writer may do too much for the reader1 may make everything so simple and easy that the reader has nothing to do1 but is carried along without volition and curiosity1 losing all joy of attainment and grasp4 ,for my own part1 ,i often find authors too fluent and facile1 especially among the ,french1 and sometimes among the ,english1 as1 for instance1 in some of ,john ,stuart ,mill's writings4 ,these do not leave enough for me to do1 and led skilfully along so smooth a road that ,i am not conscious of moving1 ,i lose the pleasure of achievement1 of the sense of enlargement of conscious powers4 ,easy got1 easy goes1 is the law here as elsewhere4 ,the pleasure of acquirement is directly as the amount of attention exercised4 ,mr4 ,spencer in discussing this matter remarks that1 as 8language is the vehicle of thought1 we may say that in all cases the friction and inertia of the vehicle deduct from its efficiency1 and that in composition the chief thing to be done is1 to reduce the friction and inertia to the smallest amounts40 ,but it must be remembered that motion is not only against friction but by friction4 ,the rail may be too smooth as well as too rough4 ,every locomotive1 for a given piece of track with a given gradient1 has a certain co-efficient of friction for its most effective working1 above and below which there is alike decrease of efficiency2 and in engineering it is equally a problem to keep friction up as to reduce it4 ,so ,i say of style1 that it may be too smooth and facile1 and may reduce mental friction to so low a point that there is no grasp and no real progress4 ,a sentence of ,hooker or ,milton1 magnificent stylists though they are1 can1 as an affair of economy of attention1 be greatly improved by breaking it up into a number of simple plain sentences after the primer fashion1 ,the cat mews1 ,the dog barks1 etc42 but this process certainly is not an improvement of their style4 ,but if economy of attention were the sole secret of style1 certainly the more economy we introduce the greater and better should be the style4 ,professor ,sherman1 of the ,university of ,nebraska1 in a recent article shows that heaviness--that which requires 8constant effort in reading0--is due to the number of words per sentence1 which has been reduced in the course of the history of ,english prose from an average of fifty words a sentence in ,chaucer and ,spenser to five in the columns of a modern1 low-grade1 popular story-paper2 but it obviously cannot be maintained that the style of the story-paper is ten times better than that of ,spenser's ,state of ,ireland4 ,we might then set up with plausibility an exactly opposite theory to the economic1 and maintain that the secret of style is in exciting us to the greatest attentive effort1 and that the best style is that which rouses us to the severest mental exertion4 ,however1 ,i believe that these two opposite methods of style are complementary4 ,the great stylist is he who strikes the exact mean between over facility and over difficulty1 and touches the exact co-efficient of mental friction in the reader1 at which his whole power of mind comes into highest and most harmonious and effective exercise4 ,the accomplished stylist most cleverly throws in questions1 suggests doubts1 and defers answers4 ,to read his book is not a toboggan slide1 but an obstacle race4 ,what is plot interest but a skilful putting of obstacles in the reader's way1 deferring and thwarting his expectations1 putting him on the qui vive of attention8 ,by the development of plot the novelist and dramatist plays hide and seek with the reader4 ,no cunning artist reveals at once his whole thought in a blaze of light1 but he mystifies and draws in half-tones1 thus to stir you to reach out and grasp his meaning4 ,but we are as yet far from exhausting the psychological significance of pleasure in style when we trace it to a reflex from either decrease or increase of attentive effort4 ,the pleasure we have so far considered is nave and direct2 it is from literary art rather than in or at literary art as such4 ,the child and the most ordinary reader derive from books a simple and natural pleasure which they do not reflect upon1 and do not in any wise conceive the ways and means by which the effect is produced4 ,indeed1 in the presence of the most lucid and perfect art these readers1 like ,partridge at the play1 take everything as a matter of course1 as just the way they would themselves express it4 ,the dilettante alone tastes the pleasure in style as such2 as an art1 an adaptation of means to ends1 he alone appreciates the delicate adjustment of expression to thought1 the choice diction1 the deft management of word and phrase4 ,the quality of this technical pleasure in style is exemplified in its highest form in this note of a great artist-critic1 ,shelley1 appended to his fine translation of the opening chorus in 8,faust03-- ,such is a literal translation of this astonishing chorus2 it is impossible to represent in another language the melody of the versification2 even the volatile strength and delicacy of the ideas escape in the crucible of translation1 and its reader is surprised to find a caput mortuum4 ,the psychological nature of this pleasure in style is obviously quite distinct from the direct pleasures from reading which have been previously discussed4 ,here is pleasure in literary art1 not for what it brings1 but for its own sake4 ,the distinction between the pleasure the average tourist takes in travelling swiftly and smoothly in a de luxe train1 and that taken by the professional engineer inspecting the high-speed locomotive1 is analogous in quantity and quality to the distinctive pleasures of critical and uncritical appreciation of fine art4 ,but we have as yet only cleared the ground toward ascertaining the psychological rationale of literary style4 ,we have marked only general causes of literary pleasure1 we have noticed in this pleasure only those elements which flow from the psychological and physiological basis of all pleasure as reflex of functioning4 ,that we admire and take pleasure in nice adjustment of means to ends is also a general law of pleasure with all who act teleologically1 and are capable of appreciating actions of this kind4 ,but is there not a specific quality in the sthetic pleasure from or in literary art which has not yet been accounted for8 ,certainly the common expression1 8more forcible than elegant10 as applied to spoken or written language1 denotes that for the popular consciousness style is somewhat more than and different from mere force and consequent ease and largeness of apprehension4 ,we hear a very loud sound with greater ease than smaller sounds1 there is economy of attention1 yet this does not bestow sthetic quality on the great sound4 ,at the renderings of the finest music we are often called on to strain the ear1 and the mental receptiveness as a whole to the utmost1 in order to hear1 note1 and appreciate the delicate effects4 ,so in literary art it is not that which speaks most loudly and strongly to the mind that thereby becomes the best style4 ,in fact1 the most forcible method of expression is often1 as is generally acknowledged1 slang1 which is debarred from style4 ,literary style seems1 then1 more than a mental labour-saving machine4 ,as a utilitarian device it certainly does save mental exertion1 and gives rapidity1 accuracy1 and facility to psychic function4 ,like grammar1 a mechanic rhetoric is useful1 and we receive a pleasure from its use as from any other mechanism of man's industry2 and further1 we may take a certain pride and pleasure in its consciously recognised effectiveness4 ,however1 we have not yet reached style in the higher sense1 which may be clear and forcible1 but must be dignified1 graceful1 and beautiful4 ,for purposes of business1 for conventional communication1 for science1 for philosophy1 language fulfils its end in stating accurately1 clearly1 and forcibly2 but style as literary art is more than instrument to intelligibility1 it has an independent office of its own4 ,language in the lower service as a medium of communication is a lens which cannot be too transparent2 but in the higher service to fine art1 language is rather a mosaic window of stained glass which both absorbs and transmits light1 which both conceals and reveals1 which we look at as well as through4 ,in literary art or style1 language has a value of beauty for itself alone1 as well as a value of use as a means of communication4 ,but the root of style is in emotion2 it is as expression of emotion1 and in the main of one kind of emotion1 that language rises to style4 ,all emotions influence language expression1 and any one may1 under certain conditions1 lead towards literary art2 there is an eloquence of wrath and of fear1 of hate and of love1 and these emotions may induce artistic creativeness in written language2 but the main impulse to art is in the feeling for beauty per se4 ,this is a certain mode of emotional delight which every one who has felt it knows at once in its quality as quite distinct as a psychic mode4 ,how literary style rises and falls with sthetic emotion might be exemplified by a wide range of quotations1 but an example or two must suffice4 ,this1 from one of ,shelley's letters1 will1 ,i trust1 illustrate the point3-- 8,,my ,,dear ,p----1 ,i wrote to you the day before our departure from ,naples4 ,we came by slow journeys1 with our own horses1 to ,rome1 resting one day at ,mola di ,gaeta1 at the inn called ,villa di ,cicerone--from being built on the ruins of his villa1 whose immense substructions overhang the sea1 and are scattered among the orange groves4 ,nothing can be lovelier than the scene from the terraces of the inn4 ,on one side precipitous mountains whose bases slope into an inclined plane of olive and orange copses1 the latter forming1 as it were1 an emerald sky of leaves1 starred with innumerable globes of their ripening fruit1 whose rich splendour contrasted with the deep green foliage2 on the other the sea1 bounded on one side by the antique town of ,gaeta1 and the other by what appears to be an island1 the promontory of ,circe4 ,from ,gaeta to ,terracina the whole scenery is of the most sublime character4 ,at ,terracina precipitous conical crags of immense height shoot into the sky and overhang the sea4 ,at ,albano we arrived again in sight of ,rome4 ,arches after arches in unending lines stretching across the uninhabited wilderness1 the blue defined line of the mountains seen between them1 masses of nameless ruin standing like rocks out of the plain1 and the plain itself1 with its billowy and unequal surface1 announced the neighbourhood of ,rome4 ,and what shall ,i say to you of ,rome8 ,if ,i speak of the inanimate ruins1 the rude stones piled upon stones which are the sepulchres of the fame of those who once arrayed them with the beauty which has faded1 will you believe me insensible to the vital1 the almost breathing creations of genius yet subsisting in their perfection80 ,this letter opens with language as method of conventional commonplace communication4 ,the second and third sentences are barely tinged by sthetic emotion1 as in 8immense substructions0 and 8lovelier02 but it is not till the fourth sentence that style fairly begins4 ,then it rapidly falls away in the fifth1 sixth1 and seventh sentences1 to arise again with a new wave of sthetic emotion1 which progresses through the remainder of the quotation4 ,the culminating points of the sthetic emotion are precisely the culminating points of style1 namely1 in the phrases1 8an emerald sky of leaves1 starred with innumerable globes of their ripening fruit10 and in 8sepulchres of the fame of those who once arrayed them with the beauty which has faded40 ,what constitutes the peculiar attractiveness of these expressions is this1 that they are rich in sthetic feeling1 and communicate it to us4 ,we are by the power of style sharers in high delights4 ,in the first case we are awakened to a visualizing1 to a sensuous beauty1 though compounded with other elements1 through metaphor2 and in the second case the emotion is a complex of sensuous and spiritual elements4 ,take also the verses from ,shelley already quoted4 ,mr4 ,spencer1 in commenting on these lines1 has correctly pitched upon the word 8shepherded0 as the culminating point2 but when he intimates that the beauty and pleasing effect is due to the 8distinctness with which it calls up the feature of the scene1 bringing the mind by a bound to the desired conception10 we must dissent4 ,this purely utilitarian explanation fails to recognise that poetic metaphor is confusing--here two classes of objects1 clouds and sheep--and misleading1 except to the poetic mind4 ,a writer who was aiming purely at clearness and correctness of imaging1 as a popular scientific writer1 might mention the clouds as like patches of white wool2 but he would not bring in the extraneous ideas of sheep and shepherd4 ,if ,mr4 ,spencer were trying to give us a vivid idea of clouds1 he would surely not speak in this purely poetic fashion4 ,it is a mode of fancy and emotion which the poet is indulging when he writes these lines1 and not an intellectual impulse to clarify and illustrate4 ,if ,mr4 ,spencer receives them in this latter spirit1 he misses their psychic content and explanation4 ,poetry is only intelligible to the poetic1 and the ,german pedant who emended 8,celia1 drink to me only with thine eyes10 to 8,celia1 wink to me only with thine eyes10 was certainly economizing attention and rendering conception easy1 but at the expense of poetic beauty4 ,the source of the pleasure we take in poetic style--the highest and purest form of literary art--is evidently not for its intelligibility1 at least primarily1 but its sthetic quality1 an expression of a peculiar emotional attitude toward objects4 ,to illustrate this psychological distinction between the sense of beauty as inherent in style1 and style as mere force and clearness1 ,i instance further only this sentence from ,mr4 ,w4 ,d4 ,howell's ,italian sketches1 describing a side wheel steamer in motion3 8,the wheel of the steamer was as usual chewing the sea1 and finding it unpalatable1 and making vain efforts at expectoration40 ,this is the ne plus ultra of a pseudo literary style1 of affected and strained literary art4 ,an ugly metaphor1 forcible and clear enough1 is relentlessly pursued to its ugliest conclusion4 ,here is style in pin feathers1 and we are glad to remember that it was writ in callow youth4 ,it brings 8the mind by a bound to the desired conception10 but this does not sanction it as fine art1 for it is utterly without taste and beauty4 ,i believe then from considering the previous examples--and they might be indefinitely extended--that the main function of literary art is not intelligibility1 and that pleasure in style in its specific quality does not arise out of economy of attention1 but it is a direct communication of pleasant sthetic emotion artistically conveyed4 ,intelligibility is a regulative by-law of art1 but it is neither standard nor goal4 ,literary art is then a compromise between intellectual and emotional motives1 between sense and sensibility4 ,the natural choice and order of words for easiest apprehension is rarely the artistic order1 as every littrateur knows full well4 ,it is1 for example1 simplest and clearest to repeat the best and exact word1 yet the literary artist avoids1 and rightly1 the repetition of words in the same sentence or paragraph4 ,thus also1 while1 as ,mr4 ,spencer suggests1 rhythm and euphony may often help sense1 yet ,i believe they as often distract from it4 ,we often tend to turn over in a very senseless way words and verses which please the ear4 ,as language is both an organ for meaning and for beauty1 literary art1 like architectural1 is always a compromise between utility and beauty1 that is1 neither literature nor architecture are pure and perfectly independent arts4 ,however1 it is possible that poetic license may1 as has already been done to some extent in ,english1 ultimately develop a pure poetic language1 entirely distinct from the utilitarian product1 and bound by none of its practical rules2 then and then only will literature become a pure art4 ,further1 that literary art does not always imply clearness and consequent economy of attention is evident when we reflect that the nature of emotion is to disturb the mind1 and hence also the language expression4 ,incoherence1 dimness1 darkness1 as qualities of sthetic emotion1 render literary art correspondingly broken and obscure4 ,the weird1 fantastic1 and mysterious issues in style which is far from being easily intelligible4 ,in the dreamy poetry of the ,orient all is hazy and evanescent1 and the mind strives in vain for clear impressions1 yet here is the peculiar charm of style4 ,among ,occidentals ,william ,blake1 with his childish incoherence1 and ,robert ,browning1 with his harsh abruptness1 have a certain obscurity1 but both are great stylists and great poets4 ,style then is at bottom something quite distinct from either ease or difficulty of apprehension4 ,it is founded1 not on apprehension at all1 but on emotional receptiveness4 ,hence very active and intellectual natures seem ever debarred from really entering the realms of art1 because they ever fail to appreciate that the function of art is not practical1 or ethical1 or scientific1 or philosophic1 but emotional4 ,the man of business1 of politics1 of science1 of thought1 cannot give himself up without questioning to be thrilled and suffused by the unanalyzable charm of mere beauty4 ,such natures seem incapable of receiving1 they must get and acquire1 and so they miss all that art to which the only open sesame is a quiet inattention and a wise passiveness4 ,the kingdom of art is not taken by violence1 and the violent do not take it by mere intellectual force4 ,as to the origin and nature of the feeling for beauty in style as for beauty in general1 the reason may be sought in survivals of primitive pleasures4 ,thus the expression1 before quoted1 8starred with innumerable globes of their ripening fruit10 aside from the pleasure in sonorous quality and artistic construction1 pleases mainly as awakening the feeling for natural beauty4 ,but what is the psychological explanation for this sthetic emotion in presence of tree1 fruit1 flower1 sky1 and all landscape features4 ,it may largely be a revival of feelings felt long since by our arboreal and forest-haunting ancestors1 8combinations of states which were organized in the race1 during barbarous times1 when its pleasurable activities were chiefly among the woods and waters0 7,spencer1 ,psychology1 ,sect4 #bad74 ,in the woods and by the streams there tends to revive the long outgrown physical emotion2 the old savage feelings of delight and excitement in the chase come back to the civilized man1 and in stealthy approach of game and skilful slaying the modern man re-experiences far distant ancestral joys4 ,now literary art by skilfully setting forth scenes of savage life may renew1 the old survival feelings to a certain degree of illusive life4 ,this is done to a large extent by pastoral poetry1 mythic story1 legend and fairy tale1 whereby we drop back into a very old and simple mode of enjoyable mental life4 ,the basis of primitive psychosis is in the particular concrete and animate1 and literary art1 especially in its highest manifestation1 poetry1 as becoming simple1 sensuous1 and impassioned1 has a foundation in survival tendencies4 ,through literature mankind renews its youth4 ,similarly we may suppose that if in the future psychic evolution of the race the present mode of thinking in general and abstract terms should be succeeded by some new and higher phase1 then the artificial stimulating the revival of this outgrown abstract phase would constitute a source of pleasure and might be achieved through a style4 ,as a means toward revivals literary style is a backward moving spirit in sharp contrast to science1 which1 as generalizing and depersonifying1 is the forward moving process4 ,however1 we have sharply to distinguish between what is given in a survival state and that which accompanies it4 ,primitive realization is always single and nave1 but when it comes up in a survival it is generally consciously contrasted with accustomed modes by consciousness1 and there arises a reflective pleasure of contrast which is not contained in the survival itself1 but of which the survival is merely a condition4 ,further1 our realization of the outgrown psychic elements is very generally dramatic4 ,we take self-conscious pleasure in investigating1 assuming1 and re-enacting past psychic phases4 ,even when a survival state arises spontaneously and naturally1 it holds consciousness at best in its original status for a moment only1 for self-consciousness quickly occurs and brings in a variety of secondary emotions4 ,however attained1 the obsolescent type of consciousness does not stand in its simple original force1 but most often there is more or less make-believe1 some sense of its artificial and unreal nature3 we do not become children by playing at being children4 ,children and savages are in the animistic psychic stage1 but the poetic interpretation of nature by adult man is plainly far more than mere revival of this stage1 it is dramatic self-conscious realization4 ,original animism is often painful2 the savage fears his gods and the child dreads ghosts2 but myths and ghost stories are sources of amusement to us1 and the twinge of fear which comes up as survival loses its real force and is dramatically realized and enjoyed4 ,literary art is a dramatic induction into the past rather than incentive to mere revival2 and it makes us to pleasurably renew alike the outgrown pains and pleasures4 ,we certainly should go far astray if we should consider style as effectual mainly by its exciting to revival of ancestral experiences4 ,what is recurrent is but a small element compared to what is concurrent4 ,we must note the particular case of landscape beauty4 ,shelley's description of the orange tree laden with fruit excites in us the feeling of pleasure in the beauty of nature1 a feeling which is declared by some to be merely the reminiscent revived feelings which our distant progenitors felt in the presence of natural forms and forces4 ,but what was the emotion our remote progenitor felt at sight of a well-fruited orange tree8 ,did he feel moved as ,shelley was and as we through ,shelley are8 and is our emotion but a faint survival of that which welled up in him at viewing the mass of green and gold1 or has it any relation thereto8 ,the civilized traveller in wild regions is often charmed by the beauty of the scenery which the savage natives do not in the least appreciate4 ,but the revival feelings which come over him must be identical with the feelings of his unsthetic companions who are totally insensible to natural beauty4 ,the reversal tendency can give to the traveller only an animal pleasure in viewing an orange tree as satisfying to the taste and stomach2 a fine1 bright day can only suggest the pleasure of a sluggish basking4 ,goethe rejoiced that1 though the incidental pains of sthetic sensitivity were great1 yet he could see in a tree shedding its leaves more than the approach of winter4 ,bare revival then cannot in itself constitute sthetic pleasure or explain it4 ,a savage race transferred to a civilized land for a few generations and then returned to their native haunts have acute pleasures of revival1 but these are not of the sthetic quality4 ,an outcropping survival tendency may serve as itself an object for emotion and sthetic emotion to the mind experiencing it1 but thereby the survival is like any other object1 physical or psychical1 which excites sthetic sensibility1 and it no more explains the emotion for beauty than any other object4 ,it is evident thus far that the psychological basis of stylistic effect is very complex1 and in this essay we certainly lay no claim to making an exhaustive enumeration of its factors4 ,however1 we have still to consider one more element1 and perhaps1 at least for cultivated minds1 the most important psychic element of literary art4 ,read now the following extract1 and analyze the impression it makes3-- 8,the natural thirst that ne'er is satisfied ,excepting with the water for whose grace ,the woman of ,samaria besought1 ,put me in travail1 and haste goaded me ,along the encumbered path behind my ,leader1 ,and ,i was pitying that righteous vengeance2 ,and lo6 in the same manner as ,luke writeth ,that ,christ appeared to two upon the way ,from the sepulchral cave already risen1 ,a shade appeared to us1 and came behind us1 ,down gazing on the prostrate multitude1 ,nor were we 'ware of it1 until it spake1 ,saying1 ',my brothers1 may ,god give you peace4'0 ,here1 surely1 is neither facility1 nor beauty of expression1 nor deft and subtle art to please the mind1 yet it attracts and interests4 ,the main secret of the effect of ,dante's style is as revelation of personality4 ,art with ,dante is the child of life1 the product of long and deep-felt experience2 and because he is an original reality he achieves in his writings that distinctiveness and distinction which is the truest and highest mark of style4 ,again1 it is not the lucidity of ,sam ,weller's remarks that pleases us1 but rather their characteristic flavour4 ,we delight to come in contact with originals1 and we relish the characteristic for its own sake1 even when ugly or when most unlike ourselves in tendency1 and so the modernest of the moderns enjoys ,dante1 the typical medivalist4 ,style is the man4 ,this is the best definition of style and the best explanation of its peculiar effect4 ,style is expression of subjective quality4 ,while scientist and philosopher aim to be objective1 to justly reflect and interpret outward reality the literary artist aims merely to give a perfect exposition of himself4 ,style is the literary expression of self-realization4 ,hence the greatest stylists write to please themselves1 and are their own severest critics4 ,style is timbre1 and the best style is that in which this peculiar tone of the individual mind is most perfectly revealed4 ,a great style is1 then1 the expression of a great man1 and the consummation of style occurs when the genius has grown to the highest point of his individuality--and individuality is genius--with corresponding power of expression4 ,among ,tennyson's poems the most ,tennysonian has the greatest style4 ,when we quote from ,wordsworth such lines as1-- 8,the world is too much with us3 late and soon1 ,getting and spending1 we lay waste our powers0-- and say of them that they are eminently ,wordsworthian1 that no one else could have written them1 we have said the highest word for the style4 ,in the very largest sense style is the evolution of the characteristic2 development physical and psychical is but a movement toward style4 ,the progress from homogeneity to heterogeneity in matter2 the morphological development of animate things from indefinite formless beings to definite1 complex types2 biological integration and specialization--all this is progress of style4 ,thus the most lion-like lion and the most elephantine elephant respectively achieve the highest style of animal in their kind4 ,the development in the human race is mainly psychic1 and includes psychic classes1 orders1 genera and species1 not as yet so clearly tabulated as in general natural history4 ,a genius is the inauguration of a new genus1 style1 or type of man2 he is a psychic 8sport10 to borrow a botanical term4 ,a new mode of personality is achieved and may manifest itself in various ways of action1 thought and emotion4 ,if the expression is through literature a great style is generated1 and this style grows with the growing individuality--the productions of youth have little style--and culminates with its culmination4 ,to discover style is almost as rare a gift as to achieve it4 ,the critical sense is about as uncommon as the creative power2 hence the greatest masters of style have had often to wait long for recognition1 which would hardly be the case if the main value of style was in economising attention4 ,according to this theory1 we should expect the stylist to be welcomed with instant and universal appreciation1 a phenomenon which rarely or never occurs4 ,with very many writers1 as with ,wordsworth1 recognition is very tardy1 and with some only posthumous4 ,many readers fail even with the utmost attention to appreciate the greatest artists1 and can make nothing out of them2 a few rise at length to some understanding2 but only rare and select spirits find themselves at once en rapport4 ,the true connoisseur and critic must introduce and interpret to us the characteristic quality or style of the littrateur1 else we may never know and feel it4 ,recognition and appreciation of style as the characteristic is1 then1 for the vast majority an acquired taste2 it is slowly and painfully learned1 and so the emotion for style as specific mode of expression must be pronounced a very late psychic development4 ,the taste and emotion for the characteristic as such1 whenever and however acquired1 is certainly a peculiar and definite mode of emotion4 ,it is far from being the feeling of discipleship1 and is often excited by that which is most remote and opposite to ourselves4 ,we say of a certain person1 8,he is a character10 and he interests and pleases us as such1 though entirely foreign to us in either sympathy or antipathy4 ,as an entirely disinterested emotion1 the sthetic is beyond the range of common nave consciousness4 ,the enjoyment of the characteristic per se is specially for the analytically super-conscious cosmopolite and for the cultured critic4 ,the pleasure comes partly from the novelty and the contrast reflectively understood1 partly from admiration for the forcefulness of creative personality1 its plastic power in forming its material of expression1 and largely a teleologic pleasure in perceiving fulness and purity of type4 ,the emotion for style as characteristic expression is plainly one of those which is not due to the utility in the struggle for existence1 but has arisen when experience comes to be cultivated for its own sake4 ,when1 as in eras like our own1 personality weakens1 and the inner plastic and creative force of conviction and emotion decreases1 the writer is driven to technical treatment4 ,the littrateur1 as he has little or nothing to say1 contents himself with playing tricks on language1 and elaborating rhythms and cadences4 ,style becomes finicky2 a race of prinking poetasters and priggish prosaists arise1 punctiliously formal1 and superlatively dainty1 who attain the art of saying nothing very elegantly1 elaborately1 and brilliantly4 ,an over-conscious1 over-subtle technique destroys the grand style as transmitter of characteristic quality4 99 99 99 99 99 ,i trust ,i have1 in this brief study1 made it clear that the psychology of literary style is far from simple1 and that a number of factors are involved1 which are slighted by ,herbert ,spencer and others of that school4 ,i believe that any one at all conversant with literature who will reflect upon the pleasures he receives from reading1 will perceive that the pleasure of smoothness and facility1 of moving along rapidly and easily1 is but one1 and that generally a minor factor in literary enjoyment4 ,beside this1 he often has the pleasure of difficulties overcome1 of ideas grasped1 and delicate emotional touches appreciated by triumphant attentive effort4 ,again1 he receives pleasure in perceiving literary skill1 the adaptation of artistic means to the artistic end4 ,but1 as ,i have maintained1 the chief mode of pleasure is through style as transmitter of sthetic emotion and as expression of the characteristic1 achieving its acme when both these functions are simultaneously performed most fully and perfectly4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,ethical ,,emotion ,the need of a closer psychological definition and interpretation of ethical emotion must be apparent to any reader of the current psychology1 where we find the utmost confusion and looseness of usage4 ,one of the most glaring instances which ,i have come across is this from ,perez 7,first ,three ,years of ,childhood1 p4 #bhf73 8,as soon as the child begins to obey1 from fear or from habit1 he enters on the possession of the moral sense2 as soon as he obeys in order to be rewarded or praised or to give pleasure1 he has advanced further in this possession40 ,a boy at table reaches out for the last piece of cake1 but withdraws his hand out of love for his mother's approbation1 and fear of her disapprobation4 ,does this imply moral sense and emotion8 ,we say1 indeed1 that these were very proper and moral emotions for the child to have2 objectively moral1 but we do not describe the psychical state of the child correctly by saying that it has the moral sense and emotion4 ,in fact1 just so far as he acts out of love or fear1 just so far he is not acting out of ethical emotion2 that is1 simply because he feels he ought4 ,only the slightest introspection1 then1 is needed to recognise the distinction of objective and subjective morality1 of a moral emotion and the emotion of morality4 ,so we must disallow even dread of 8moral discomfort0 as psychically moral1 ,spencer notwithstanding 7,essays ,i41 p4 #cdh74 ,the fear of remorse may restrain from objectively immoral acts1 but the ethical emotion is not a fear constraint1 as every one knows when doing a thing simply because he feels he ought to4 ,because ,i judge my feeling or act a right one1 does not constitute this the feeling of rightness as psychic fact4 ,in short1 we must always distinguish between the socially right action1 the morally right action1 and the psychologically moral action4 ,he who erects a model tenement1 even though he do it to advertise himself1 is doing the right thing by society1 though his action is neither prompted by a moral emotion nor the moral emotion4 ,if philanthropy incites him1 both the act and feeling objectively are moral1 but psychically he is immoral1 and only becomes psychically moral when he acts out of the ethical emotion as feeling of duty4 ,one who acts out of sympathy1 pity1 mercy1 affection1 feeling of honour1 love of approbation1 and similar emotions1 often confounded with the moral emotion1 is objectively moral4 ,we pronounce these to be right emotions1 yet they are not the emotion of right1 and so not psychically moral2 and it is evident1 also1 that they may not be socially right1 for often actions from these motives result in social wrongs4 ,however1 in later phases of psychic evolution1 when emotions themselves are reflected upon as psychic acts1 the emotion of the moral 8ought0 may be felt as stimulus to them1 and so we may at once feel that we ought to sympathise1 and so sympathise1 and so act1 and may thus at the same time be psychically1 morally and socially right4 ,but while the nature and rise of ethical emotion is often untruly connected with some one kind of act1 as obedience1 or with some one kind of motive1 as love of reward1 a far more likely field of investigation is opened by those who connect feeling of duty with conflict of motives4 ,yet it is obvious at first sight that mere opposition of any two psychic factors is not a distinct feeling4 ,i have seen my dog run away from me to follow some canine friend1 and then back to follow1 and so on1 till one affection became dominant force2 but such simple interference of emotions does not constitute any third and new or higher emotion4 ,conflicts of this sort in higher natures have sometimes a reflex psychosis in painful feeling of distraction and bewilderment1 but this is the end of the natural course of feeling conflicts4 ,there are1 however1 higher phases of conflict of motives which may bring us nearer to ethical emotion4 ,a burglar1 the evening he is to crack a safe1 is inclined to indulge in several glasses of wine1 but his companion remarks that he ought not to drink if he expects to do the job4 ,here is something to be done1 a duty1 and under the compulsive force of the feeling of this duty the burglar lays down his glass untouched4 ,is not the psychic phenomenon really a case of the ethical emotion as involved in the thwarting of present inclination for the right carrying out of the thing to be done8 ,a feeling for that which is laid upon us to be done1 whether we lay it upon ourselves1 or it is laid upon us by others1 has certainly the compulsory quality which we commonly attribute to the ethical emotion4 ,when we have set out to do something1 this pre-determination exercises a peculiar pressure when some diverse inclination enters1 but it is the force of firmly-formed purpose and of tenacious will4 ,its compulsiveness is not ethical1 but volitional4 ,a very little reflection convinces me that something to be done1 and something which ought to be done1 incite distinct emotions4 ,i feel differently when ,i go to church1 because ,i have planned to go1 or have been told to go1 and when ,i go simply because ,i feel ,i ought4 ,there is also superadded1 the purely impulsive force of the emotion for the larger good2 and this may1 indeed1 play the whole part in the contest with present inclination1 which contest then becomes of the simple alternating order4 ,thus the burglar has avaricious visions of gold1 and relaxes his cup2 he looks at the tempting wine1 and grasps it again1 and so on4 ,it is true1 however1 that the feeling for the larger and future good against a present inclination may be a feeling of oughtness1 a feeling of duty1 a constraining to do a set something4 ,providence and prudential action are enforced not merely by1 8,i wish to get the larger good10 but1 8,i ought to reach it40 ,the most permanent1 the greatest and completest pleasure and benefit not only incites us1 but constrains us4 ,constraining emotion1 a feeling of oughtness1 may then arise both from a preview of bare accomplishment of plan or purpose set by ourselves or others1 and also from sense of larger over lesser advantage4 ,here is the region of utilitarian duty1 of the ,ethics of calculation of personal pleasure and happiness4 ,psychically here is a true feeling of ought1 and here is the ethical emotion1 if we make the term denominate all feeling of oughtness4 ,but if this is the region of ,ethics1 it may be said to be the region of the lower ,ethics1 and we may indeed deny the term ethical to all this kind of emotion of oughtness4 ,the emotion arises about personal and particular ends1 and not about principles4 ,the ambitious man feels an ought as well as the conscientious1 but they are diverse in nature4 ,alike merely in the general quality of compulsive force1 they may differ in tone and special qualities4 ,the constraining emotion which comes with viewing a universal law of right may be claimed as distinct from the constraint exercised by personal ends4 ,but it is not our purpose to discuss this matter here4 ,the psychic conflict which is specially connected with moral emotion is the conflict of the egoistic and altruistic impulses4 ,when in such a struggle sympathy prevails1 we approve as objectively moral and right1 but the existence of ethical emotion in determining the dominance of the altruism is not assured4 ,pity originally overcame hatred without the compulsion of duty4 ,altruistic impulses contest with egoistic in nave and simple natures without any appearance of feeling for duty4 ,the origin and nature of morality does not thus seem bound up with the earliest forms of egoistic-altruistic contests1 though in later evolution it may come in as reinforcement of the altruistic4 ,we may feel then1 not merely like helping a man in distress at the expense of our own comfort1 but we feel we ought to help him2 the force of a general principle of conduct is felt in the form we term the ethical emotion1 yet it is obvious that such a recognition of a general and universal law and such a feeling therefor is far later than the rise of altruism itself4 ,darwin alludes to the baulking of the social instinct as having special ethical significance4 ,with the social instinct baulked1 as with any other1 there certainly results distress1 but it is by no means made clear that this necessarily involves moral quality4 ,when a savage in a fit of anger slays his pet child1 the misery of baulked parental instinct may soon be felt1 and he may bitterly regret the deed1 but this does not involve moral feeling1 a feeling of repentance for the essential wrongfulness of the act4 ,he would regret in the same spirit the destroying his dinner by his own hand4 ,if we say that he is stricken with remorse1 we assert conscience violated4 ,remorse cannot explain conscience1 but must be explained by it4 ,still1 morality is not bound up necessarily with sociality4 ,sociality certainly arises and progresses to a considerable evolution before moral compulsion and the emotion of bare rightness arises to sanction and to stimulate social activities4 ,and if moral emotion is not implied positively in altruism as an outgoing towards others1 neither is it implied in the incoming of others upon the individual1 either in respect of approbation or disapprobation1 or in the more direct and essential way of rewards and penalties4 ,penalty is at bottom but a species of disadvantage brought to bear on the individual through fear of consequences4 ,the desire to get even--an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth--and all exacting justice as an equivalence1 whether as exacted by the individual or by persons delegated1 the officers of justice1 is plainly not in its origin and basis the ethical emotion4 ,a system of mutual dues and rights may or may not have the sanction of morality1 but they arise in advantage2 and the motives which originate penalties and act with reference thereto1 are far from being the pure moral emotion1 a direct feeling for rightness as rightness4 ,the merchant in general pays his import duty1 not as a moral duty1 but as something required by legality rather than morality4 ,law and public sentiment exercise through emotion1 and that of a compulsory type1 certain effects on conduct1 but it is clear that the general feeling of oughtness as self-imposed law of rightness is not presupposed4 99 99 99 99 99 ,if the ethical emotion be not specially bound up with obedience or with conflict of motives1 may it not be particularly connected with science8 ,at the outset we note that a very natural confusion of science and ,ethics is favoured by the fact that we can apply the term ,ethics both to the science and the matter treated1 and so speak of the science ,ethics as the science of ,ethics1 of ethical perception1 emotion and action4 ,but yet we know that the science is by no means to be identified with its subject matter1 and also that the science of a matter and the ,ethics of it are two very diverse psychic tendencies and points of view4 ,science is always an objectifying impulse whose end is merely to know1 but ,ethics is subjective1 whose end is merely to be4 ,this is emphasized by the fact that science in its ceaseless objectifying may constitute a science of science1 and science of the science of science1 and so on1 but ,ethics is self-contained1 and there can be no ,ethics of ,ethics4 ,while we so sharply distinguish scientific and ethical activity1 yet so far as the science is prompted by ethical emotion it is ethical activity4 ,if ,i learn and know out of the feeling of duty1 the act is psychically moral1 yet is always distinct in quality from the feeling which prompts it4 ,thus there is an ,ethics of science1 or rather1 to or toward science1 though most scientific activity is carried on at the stimulus of other impulses1 as love of truth1 ambition1 etc4 ,psychologically speaking1 then1 science is in no wise ,ethics nor ,ethics science4 ,but it will be said1 8,is not ethical discrimination a cognitive activity8 ,must not one know the right1 know that he ought1 before he can feel ethically and act ethically80 ,but it will be found that at bottom the rightness of an action is the appreciated accord of the action with an end which is already felt to be right4 ,i am asked whether ,i think it was right for a certain poor man to purloin a loaf from a baker for his starving family4 ,in passing ethical judgment ,i simply fall back on some ethical postulate4 ,the right of the family to life1 ,i may say1 ought to take precedence of the right of property4 ,i therein fall back upon the simple feeling of right as ethical emotion4 ,the knowing activity is concerned merely in the apprehending the situation1 and ratiocination in tracing back to moral principles1 but the ethical discrimination is neither1 but an affair of direct emotion4 ,if it be felt to be right to save life in any wise that seems necessary1 ,i will approve it as right4 ,a reason can only make an act right by being a right reason4 ,thus it is that moral discrimination is at bottom no more than a peculiar feeling about acts1 towards or against the doing them1 which1 like all emotion1 involves the knowing its object1 but is not involved or explained in its psychic quality by the knowing act4 ,the setting out what ought to be done1 the establishing duties and moral rules of conduct1 the development of a system of ,ethics1 is not then fundamentally cognitive process1 but emotive4 ,hence it is1 psychically speaking1 a misnomer to denote any system of ,ethics a science4 ,it is true we may denote by ,ethics--always capitalizing the term--that branch of psychology and sociology which investigates the nature and laws of ethical phenomena4 ,this ,ethics merely gives an objective account of ethical emotion and conduct4 ,it is often defined as the science of conduct1 a definition quite too wide1 for conduct is action consciously self-directed to an end1 be the impulse anger1 fear1 love1 ethical emotion1 or any other emotion2 but psychological ,ethics studies only conduct as moved by ethical emotion4 ,conduct is1 indeed1 the sphere for ethical feeling1 and any specimen of conduct1 whatever its psychic stimulus1 may excite moral approval or disapproval and stir ethical emotion1 but this ethical survey of conduct is not properly a science1 as has just been shown4 ,all conduct is then objectively interpretable as moral1 though it be inherently and psychologically immoral1 that is1 having no element of moral feeling4 ,the spheres of objective and subjective morality are far from being coincident4 ,further1 science is not peculiarly related above common knowledge to ethical emotion4 ,common sense and ordinary fear lead me to jump off the track before an approaching train1 while physiological knowledge and ordinary fear may incite me to put on rubbers on a wet day4 ,scientific knowledge opens the way for the common emotions2 it shows the consequences of acts with fulness and accuracy1 and so opens a wide range for the ordinary emotions which awake at sight of the experienced and experienceable4 ,if ,i feel ,i ought to put on rubbers1 this feeling arises1 not directly at the consequences which science reveals1 but at the rightness of the consequences4 ,i feel ,i ought not to injure my health1 a feeling which science does not generate1 but it merely establishes the fact that such and such actions will injure my health1 and so gives the opportunity of applying the moral postulate1 ,i ought not to injure my health4 ,i judge the rightness of an act1 not by its consequences1 but by the rightness of its consequences4 ,again1 science reveals most clearly the necessary means to ends2 it says that to make nitro-glycerine you must use such and such ingredients4 ,in viewing these means in their necessity there may arise a certain emotion of compulsion to their use2 but this compulsive quality is not1 ,i ought to do so and so1 but ,i must1 if ,i would attain the end4 ,it is plainly an unethical use of terms to say1 ,if you wish to succeed or be happy you ought to do so and so1 or that is the right way to succeed or be happy4 ,morality is not a recipe toward any end but itself4 ,so the feeling as to the 8,conditions by fulfilment of which happiness is achieved0--emphasized by ,spencer in the principles of ,ethics as the main element in moral emotion--is not real ethical emotion4 ,i may feel the constraint and necessity to using certain means1 difficult and unpleasant in themselves1 in order to reach a desired end1 but a moment's introspection shows that this compulsive emotion is not thereby moral1 that this feeling is not a feeling of duty but of necessity to employ the means4 ,if ,i feel that ,i ought to become happy1 then alone will ,i feel ,i ought to use the means to happiness4 ,so also a man may desire to win in athletic competition1 but the requisite means1 a hard course of training1 may deter him from entering2 that is1 his love of ease conflicts and overcomes his desire of athletic success as far as action is concerned4 ,if he undertakes the training and struggles through1 he feels the compulsion of the means in direct proportion to his love of ease and pleasure4 ,he refuses a cigar under this emotion at the necessity of the means1 but this is plainly not a case of ethical emotion2 he refuses1 not because he ought1 but because he must1 and the trainer who says to him1 8,you ought not to take that cigar10 does not primarily appeal to moral principle1 but to the constraint of the means to desired end4 ,this does not deny that a man may feel training as a matter of duty1 but it is still obvious that he who refuses a cigar as a mere matter of training1 is as psychic fact actuated by an emotion of distinct quality from that which the man feels who refuses to smoke as a matter of conscience2 the feeling1 8,i must not10 is diverse from the feeling implied in1 8,i ought not40 ,the athlete may be conscientiously an athlete1 but in general he refuses to smoke merely because that is the right stand1 i4e41 suitable to gaining the particular desired end1 whereas the conscientious man refuses as determined by a feeling for some end whose rightness is assumed1 as the preservation of health1 or the being inoffensive to others4 ,the athlete is moved by what is right or useful to some end1 while the psychically moral man is actuated by the emotion for the end of rightness2 and while constraint appears as characteristic of both emotions1 still in breadth1 depth1 and particular tone1 the ethical is plainly differentiated from the necessitarian emotion4 ,at bottom also it is plain that the feeling of compulsion to means is a case of conflict of motives--as with the athlete is love of pleasure of smoking versus desire of athletic success--and conflict of motives has been previously discussed4 ,neither scientific nor common knowledge then can as method of means give by itself the moral emotion4 ,but it may be said that science does provide ends for action and that the emotion about the end is an ethical emotion4 ,thus the end of truth1 of adherence to reality1 is naturally emphasized by science2 yet here is not duty1 but the essential guiding emotion is the emotion for achievement and the achievement of the desired accordance with nicety and completeness4 ,the enthusiasm for truth and truth in action is an emotion which may be sanctioned by moral feeling1 but it is not moral feeling4 ,adaptation to environment or conformity to reality as a general end of action may have its impetus in moral emotion1 ,i may feel that ,i ought to accord with the nature of things as scientifically revealed1 but this motive is by no means necessarily implied in the end4 ,and conduct is rarely actuated by pure sentiment for this end2 rather the general form is1 8,do this and thou shalt live02 that is1 the emotion is desire for personal ends to which accordance with nature is the means4 ,again1 take a suggestion of end for conduct from some special science4 ,for instance1 ,biology marks as the general result of the struggle for existence and of natural selection1 the perfection--practical and relative--of the kind4 ,thus the result1 that is1 end unconsciously achieved1 of the life of deer is power of locomotion and keenness of scent1 while with man the tendency of evolution is toward brain power4 ,man obviously is able to consciously make an evolution tendency an end1 to conduct himself with reference to it1 and thus man's life may be a conscious and strenuous carrying out of tendency4 ,a constraint arises from this end as from others1 but it is not moral constraint1 till the end has been adjudged right2 thus this end does not explain rightness4 ,the aspiration toward self-culture and self-fulfilment is not psychically moral1 nor yet the determination to achieve this perfection4 ,perfection1 be it remarked1 is not an end1 but the measure of attainment of any end2 a perfect man is one who is complete in certain respects4 ,morality is not the carrying out any end1 perfectly or imperfectly1 be it pleasing1 satisfactory1 true1 good1 etc41 but it pursues and is pursued by the right end1 which is rightness as universal1 authoritative1 compulsive1 self-approved1 impersonal law4 ,the emotion of oughtness in its purely ethical form is responsive to this alone4 ,purely moral emotion as psychic fact1 is not any feeling for any summum bonum or any perfection of attainment of any kind1 but is an emotion for the right for its own sake4 ,it is neglectful of all consequences1 and cries1 8,let justice be done1 though the heavens fall40 ,we all know the distinct difference in quality of feeling when acting merely to do my duty and when acting to achieve an end for the achievement's sake or for the good implied4 ,ethical emotion may arise about any extrinsic end1 but does not arise out of it4 ,we conclude then that as psychical fact there is a variety of compulsory emotions1 an ought of law as behest of others1 an ought of means1 an ought of end1 an ought of advantage1 an ought of bare moral rightness1 and that this latter emotion1 as every one knows by introspection1 has its own peculiar quality and force4 ,he who feels constraint from authority1 from use of means1 from end purposed1 is plainly feeling different from him who feels the constraining emotion at moral right4 ,and the law which says1 8,do this and thou shalt live10 does not bring moral pressure1 for the moral law says1 8,do this whether thou livest or not02 that is1 moral emotion and activity is not consciously to itself a life factor4 ,as a matter of psychic fact a world of moral activity exists solely for and in itself1 and the emotion in this sphere of absolute morality1 in which many conscientious people live habitually1 is ethical emotion in the narrow and strict sense of the term4 ,the immediate feeling of absolute rightness--so-called intuitive morality--however and whenever it has arisen1 seems to present itself as mental factor radically diverse from all emotions of means1 ends1 and law4 ,here we may criticise a so-called rule of moral conduct to which appeal is often made1 namely1 the rule that we ought to do as we would be done by4 ,we know1 indeed1 that the principle of equivalence is strong in society1 and that if we wish to be well treated we should treat others well4 ,however1 to do as we would be done by1 in order that we may be done by as we would1 transforms moral precept into prudential maxim4 ,here is a method of advantage3 in order to attain the given end we ought to do so and so1 but the purely ethical emotion is not aroused4 ,but further1 interpret the rule as simple universal moral law that we ought to do as we would be done by4 ,this involves putting ourselves in another's place and considering how we would like to be treated under the circumstances1 and so treating him4 ,this is hedonistic altruism1 and its measure is crude and unreliable1 for what might please me in a given case might not please another4 ,this automorphic interpretation is1 however1 extremely common1 especially in lower psychism4 ,the child and the savage judge inevitably and naturally that they are giving you the greatest pleasure when they share their dainties with you4 ,but slowly is individuality of taste recognised1 and still more slowly recognised as proper and right4 ,still a hedonistic altruism1 whether by mistaken mode of putting yourself in his place1 or by true measure of realizing what he is in his own place and acting accordingly1 on either method is of very doubtful morality if judged by any high standard4 ,indeed1 hedonistic altruism1 whatever its motive1 has wrought both incalculable injury and unrighteousness1 whether as a weak sentimentalism as seen1 for instance1 in promiscuous charity1 or in more special forms1 like parental indulgence4 ,ethical emotion which seeks to be directed in its action by an extraneous measure adulterates itself4 ,we ought not to do to others as we would like them to do by us1 nor yet as they would like1 nor yet merely as we feel they ought to be treated1 but the real golden rule is1 we ought to do by others as we feel that they in their own nature and position ought to be done by4 ,this is no more than to say that we ought to do by others as we ought1 a moral identical proposition2 and the reducing to this shows that moral emotion rests only on itself4 ,the end of pure ethical conduct is always and ever merely to fulfil righteousness everywhere or to secure its fulfilment everywhere1 to help and forward all doing right4 ,the so-called golden rule may have its place1 as undoubtedly it was meant1 as propdeutic to a kingdom of righteousness1 but it has not pure ethical quality in itself4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,the ,,expression ,,of ,,feeling ,the primary function of mentality1 as we have throughout assumed1 is as stimulant to activities advantageous to the individual under the conditions of its existence2 hence all these activities are in a broad sense expressions of mental state1 they are the outflow of psychoses and are indicative of them4 ,in particular1 feeling is specially and directly related to motor values1 which thus become to the self-observant or to others observant an index or expression of the feeling4 ,thus1 ,i see a deer fleeing from a wolf1 and ,i infer that this is an expression of fear4 ,hence we may rightly say that in a large sense all action is expression1 for all such action rises in feeling2 in other words1 from one point of view expression equals action4 ,not only may exterior bodily phenomena betray the feeling which is their inciting cause1 but to a vivisectionist1 for example1 interior phenomena1 cerebral and other1 may be noted as indicating a feeling origin4 ,excluding1 of course1 so-called reflex action1 which is really reflex motion1 action and expression are but different points of view of the same thing3 what we term an action when we dwell upon the motor side1 we term an expression when we dwell on the mental prius and stimulus which is revealed4 ,now as the evolution of mind progresses actions no longer serviceable may survive in connection with given feelings1 remain indicative of them2 thus the strong beating of the heart in fear and the scowl in anger4 ,such survival actions which occur in connection with all kinds of feelings1 and especially with those which are pre-human in their origin1 are with particular emphasis styled expressions4 ,the scowl in anger is considered as expression rather than the actual blow struck1 which is equally the result and indication of anger4,f ----- ,footnote ,f3 ,wundt says that when in emotion we look 8sour0 we think we are actually tasting the sour1 and so make the repulsing action1 8sour0 look4 7,lectures on ,psychology1 p4 #bhc47 ,i think it more probable that the 8sour0 look is the survival expression of such an emotion as disappointment4 ,it is likely that the genesis of disappointment was in tasting the sour for the supposedly sweet1 e4g41 lemon for orange1 and the 8sour0 look has remained as expression of disappointment long since its utility ceased4 ,the genesis and early growth of most emotions is in connection with certain sense experiences and their related actions1 and these actions tend to remain as 8expressions0 long after their real quality as actions has disappeared4 ,hence it is by survival1 and not because he thinks himself tasting something sour1 that a man looks 8soured0 by disappointment when ,i fail to give him money as promised4 ,so also black is gloomy because we are diurnal1 and our ancestors were diurnal4 ,if nocturnal1 black would seem joyous1 white gloomy4 7,cf4 ,wundt1 ibid41 p4 #cge47 ----- ,expression is then primarily all action connected with all consciousness1 secondarily1 it is useless action continued by force of habit and transmitted to descendants4 ,but still many expressions are more than mere actions or their survivals4 ,to be sure1 ,darwin and many ,darwinists maintain that the expressions do not arise or exist for their own value as such1 but they are entirely incidental4 ,expression is not the function of the so-called expressions1 but they are entirely functional survivals4 ,while1 however1 we must admit that many expressions have arisen and been preserved in this manner1 yet ,i think it is altogether hasty to deny the function and value of expression per se4 ,expression has existed as a function from very early phases of life1 and it underlies all bisexuality and sociality which have been such important elements in evolution4 ,organic sound-producing structures1 whose sole utility from the very first is for attracting attention1 early appear1 and further voice seems to have its origin in the demand for love-call and call to young4 ,gregariousness is made possible in almost all its forms by purposive expression4 ,there comes early1 then1 a will1 not merely in performing some definite act at prompting of a feeling1 but also a use in simply expressing it to others1 communicating the fact of having pain or pleasure states to others4 ,the cry of pain in young animals is a cry for help1 and as such has been favoured in the struggle for existence4 ,the usefulness of this action is solely as expression1 and as expression it has arisen and been developed4 ,expression here is not an incidental view of a physiological action1 but exists for its own value to the individual4 ,such expressions have their use in their significance1 and as the true language of feeling are to be interpreted by the principle of serviceability4 ,an expression which is and continues1 by reason of its utility1 as a sign-language1 visual1 auditory1 or otherwise1 as gesture love-calls1 etc41 may be termed pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression1 like blushing1 pallor1 etc41 which exist1 not for their significance1 though they are significant4 ,incidental expression includes also the sphere of degraded action4 ,yet what seems mere degraded action may be true expression1 as beckoning1 which is an abridgement of the action of pulling one to oneself and of movement towards oneself2 but this motion of the hands exists1 not for this end1 nor as survival1 but merely as significant of a desire on the part of the gesturer4 ,in the higher ranges of life we well know the large place played by pure expression as distinguished from incidental expression4 ,it is not necessary to suppose that pure expression consists merely in 8voluntary and consciously0 employing 8means of communication0 7,darwin1 ,expression of the ,emotions1 p4 #bef72 thus1 the scream of an infant is equally pure expression1 whether the infant employs it knowingly or not as such1 for screaming of the young has doubtless arisen and been preserved in natural selection because of its utility as significant4 ,there is then1 ,i think1 a group of activities which are not merely incidentally expressive1 but originate and exist for expression as a useful thing in the battle of life4 ,but we have not exhausted the principles of expression when we refer to present or past serviceability as an action in general or to service as expression4 ,it is plain that in any activity prompted by any feeling there comes at a certain high intensity a more or less pathologic over-functioning of the organs concerned1 with under-functioning of others4 ,emotion as action stimulator in any high degree always enhances some physiologic function to the depression of others4 ,the blood1 for instance1 is forcibly withdrawn from various parts to certain specially active parts1 and this withdrawal gives rise to an appearance which may be termed a negative expression1 as the pallor in fear4 ,certain other phenomena connected with fear1 as change of colour in the hair1 cold sweat1 and trembling of the muscles1 which are mentioned by ,darwin as unexplained1 are probably due to this negative principle 7,expression of the ,emotions in ,man and ,animals1 ,new ,york1 #ahhf1 p4 #cej2 but compare pp4 #ha and #cjh1 where these disturbances are ascribed to direct action of the nervous system4 ,darwin does not1 however1 distinctly state or treat the principle we here mention as a distinct law74 ,as the body is an inter-related system of organs1 stimulation to one organ means an effect upon all1 excitation of some1 depression of others2 thus to an acute observer the whole body is symptomatic of every feeling1 and1 indeed1 of every consciousness4 ,in the natural and normal course emotion1 to do its work most effectively1 implies little or no marked negative expression1 but the nervous energy generated flows freely and directly to the organs which are to do service1 without greatly impairing general function4 ,fear thus acts at first simply and advantageously2 but in its later history fear becomes greatly complicated1 and instead of freely issuing in serviceable action with not excessive heightening or depressing of any function1 its outlet seems as it were choked1 and the nervous energy spends itself within the body in violent disturbances of vital organs4 ,fear becomes then decadent and loses its place as evolutionary factor1 becoming impediment rather than aid to progress4 ,negative expression must then be considered as especially notable in the later exhibitions of an emotion when concentration becomes morbid and ineffective1 losing its advantageousness1 and the emotion is being supplanted by other psychic factors4 ,great injury and death itself may result from the abnormal action of fear and other primarily useful psychoses4 ,besides the particular organs to serviceable activity with the subsidiary physiological functioning1 and the indirect depression1 we must still note other principles which may control expression4 ,nervous energy under the incitement of emotion is often in excess of the demand for the required action1 and it will then overflow into correlated activities along the line of least resistance4 ,also when the suitable action is checked for any reason1 its motive force backs up and overflows in new channels4 ,indefinite and purposeless movements of various kinds thus result which may be expressive of the emotion of which they are incidentally the result4 ,any one who has watched an ,irish setter tracing game must have remarked the wavings of the tail becoming more rapid when the scent becomes stronger4 ,when the dog is running very fast1 the tail-waggings are less noticeable than when moving slowly1 although the interest may seemingly be the same in both cases4 ,it is obvious that a fast run uses to a large extent the superfluous energy which was discharging in tail movements1 and when the useful running is checked the tail motion recommences with greater force1 serving as a safety-valve4 ,the frisking of young animals and children is also largely due to diffusion of so-called superfluous nerve-force1 and is expressive of general sensations of pleasure4 ,all feeling is motor in its natural value and tendency1 and unless the resulting energy is fully used in some special serviceable action1 it will discharge itself along the easiest and most habitual lines laid down by inheritance4 ,thus the peculiar ancestral experience of animals is always expressed by their spontaneous diffusive activities4 ,it will be remarked that the principle of diffusion is the reverse of negative expression1 being an overflow of force as opposed to withdrawal4 ,excessive generation of energy is certainly uneconomical1 and we must consider that at first emotion tended rather to less than the required amount1 than more4 ,the phenomena of diffusive expression1 in the strict sense1 are thus rather late in appearance4 ,the very lowest forms of life have no infancy or play period1 and from the first are directly active in the struggle for existence4 ,yet the play period was certainly evolved through natural selection as a fully educative and preparatory stage1 wherein the actions most demanded in actual life are unconsciously practised and a general basis of reserve force is accumulated4 ,play activity is a living on inherited energy and in the inherited modes3 the kitten pouncing1 the horse prancing1 etc4 ,play is then rather a mode of activity than a mode of expression2 it is expressive only in the way that all action is expressive4 ,expression proper is only in those modes of action which are carried on1 whether consciously or unconsciously1 by virtue of their significance value4 ,if everything which is expressive is called an expression1 we must include all the bodily actions and phenomena which can in any wise be connected with consciousness4 ,i use the term diffusion in the narrow sense of spontaneous overflow of energy in excess of that absolutely required for the advantageous action4 ,i do not refer to the general diffusion of emotional effect throughout the whole organism1 which always occurs by the very nature of organism4 ,thus the pain from a pin-prick certainly modifies to some extent every cell in the body2 there is a direct wave of influence from the psychic experience1 and this is propagated throughout the whole organism by reason of its essential interdependency of parts2 it echoes and re-echoes throughout the whole4 ,the physiological result is then in simplest cases extremely complicated4 ,however1 this mere general fact of diffusion is a biological truism1 and does not explain any expression1 but simply asserts that every feeling1 by virtue of its physical basis1 affects the organism as a whole4 ,emotion issues specially in motor activities because its origin was as stimulant to necessary action1 but this action involved internal organs1 especially the circulatory and respiratory1 and indirectly the whole body in every part4 ,the explanation of an expression must always be in tracing back to the original serviceable actions with their demands on special subsidiary organs1 and their depression of certain related organs1 and not in reference to the general law of diffusion1 which is but another term for the essential continuity of the organism4 ,a useful principle of expression must not merely say that there is by the nature of organism a general bodily result from every emotion1 but it must explain the particular expressions4 ,we make them so far four principles or forms of expression1 which we instance in saying that the blow of an angry man is general activity expression1 shaking the fist at one1 purposive expression1 scowling as remnant of watching foe intently in the open air is survival expression1 and twitching and trembling of certain muscles is diffusive expression4 ,every emotion commonly issues in all four forms1 in direct activity with associated survival tendencies and purposive expression1 and a surplus of energy runs over into certain natural and easy motions1 or a deficiency of energy in certain organs manifests itself1 the negative side of diffusive expression4,g ----- ,footnote ,g3 ,since emotion comes in waves1 expression is reduplicated4 ,this may throw some light on such an expression as laughter4 ,landor says the ,ainu do not in the proper sense laugh1 but they roar with delight4 ,it may be that laughter is reiterated roar as resulting from reiterated psychic impulses and feelings4 ,as in the growth of an emotion1 waves are multiplied1 the expression becomes more reduplicate1 and thus laughter tends to become more rippling and articulate4 ,the cachinnation and explosiveness has thus a plausible explanation1 which ,i merely suggest4 ,at least ,prof4 ,dewey's explanation 7,psychological ,review1 ,i41 #eei7 that 8both crying and laughing fall under the same principle of action--the termination of a period of effort0--is quite too general4 ,tension ceasing1 effort stopped1 we 8breathe freely10 take deep inspirations4 ,laughter is far from being the usual outcome of such a status4 ----- ,darwin makes antithesis a principle of expression4 ,thus the expression of affection in the dog or cat toward its master cannot1 says ,darwin1 be traced in any wise to serviceability1 and we must seek its explanation merely as unconsciously and instinctively assumed as directly contrary to the serviceable hostile expressions4 ,a dog's expression of anger is1 or has been1 directly serviceable action1 but the expressions of affectionate pleasure seem never to have had such an origin1 but to have arisen merely as antithetic to the former1 and so establishing the utmost distinctness of impression4 ,to convey most clearly a motion of its friendliness the dog naturally assumes those attitudes which are most diverse from its expression of hostility4 ,their serviceability as expressions is best attained by being completely antithetical1 and the more antithetical the better under natural selection4 ,however1 if this be the case1 antithesis scarcely deserves1 it seems to me1 the name of a principle of expression1 but it merely denominates the fact that opposite emotions in the struggle for existence tend to exhibit themselves in opposite ways as similar emotions in similar ways2 but we need neither antithesis nor similarity as a principle4 ,i believe that serviceability past or present either as direct action or as expression is the prime impetus of what we term the expression of the emotions1 and ,i confess ,i do not see much force in ,darwin's ,chapter on ,antithesis4 ,if1 however1 opposition has a meaning for life1 as ,darwin seems to imply1 then does not the expression come under the law of serviceability8 ,if there is any opposition in expression1 ,i should explain this in general by utility rather than by antithesis per se4 ,thus take the gestures instanced by ,darwin 7ibid41 p4 #fe71 of pushing away with the hand when telling one to go away1 and of pulling toward when telling one to come2 these gestures are1 indeed1 antithetic1 but their explanation does not lie in the fact of the antithesis1 but in the fact of the past serviceable habit1 by which individuals disliked or liked were repelled or attracted4 ,in the present instance the person motioned to may be far beyond the reach of the arms1 but still the gesture may be more than mere useless survival1 for it acts as emphasis of the vocal expression1 and has its influence there4 ,darwin for some reason constantly ignores the serviceability of expression as such--not so much as a fact1 but as a principle--and hence its relation to natural selection1 whereby he involves himself in needless difficulties4 ,if an expression is of use1 why should it not arise through natural selection as well as a limb1 a wing1 or an eye8 ,like other functions1 expression may be incidental or may adapt variations attained originally for other ends1 but in the case of the voice1 at least1 we have an original organ of expression as instrument of intercommunication4 ,nor can ,i think ,darwin's treatment of the expressions of affection by the dog as due to antithesis a very happy or satisfactory solution4 ,in the first place1 the expression of friendliness by the dog is not the complete antithesis of that of hostility4 ,the dog barks both out of friendly joy and from anger1 as ,darwin himself states4 ,some dogs also1 as ,i have often observed in my dog1 show pleasurable affection by wrinkling up the lips and showing the teeth1 an act which is often mistaken for a hostile demonstration4 ,dogs also1 as is the habit with my own1 will often express affection in the same way as the cat 7ibid41 fig4 #aj71 by rubbing against one4 ,this is but an instance of a general law of expression of affectionate emotion1 i4e41 closeness of contact with the beloved object which is liked as promoting pleasure4 ,this instinctive expression of love or liking certainly had its origin in serviceability1 the appropriate effort toward the pleasure-giving thing or animal1 but specially in the relation of parent and offspring1 and in that of alliance in danger4 ,again1 the tail of a hostile dog is1 as figured by ,darwin1 straight and erect1 but the opposite of this is the tail tucked between the legs when fleeing from pursuers in fear1 rather than the position when showing friendliness to its master4 ,my own opinion of the rise of the friendly expression of dog1 cat1 and other animals toward man is that they are in the main1 at least1 transferred from the serviceable friendly expressions used among themselves in a wild or domesticated state4 ,i have repeatedly seen small dogs1 who attach themselves to some large dog as their master1 fawn1 posture1 and lick this master precisely as this master does his human master4 ,dogs and cats also show their affection and care for their offspring in many expressive acts which are transferred to their human owners4 ,these expressions were primarily either directly serviceable actions1 as the licking1 or serviceable for expression as such1 as various sounds made to give assurance of presence of food1 or of safety4 ,in general1 it seems to me that when antithesis has occurred1 it has arisen out of serviceability and not vice vers4 ,with reference to the wagging of the tail in the dog1 this is far from being an expression of affection alone4 ,i have already mentioned the case of the setter where the movement of the tail is largely due to diffusion of superfluous energy1 analogous to nervous habits like pacing the floor or biting the nails in human beings4 ,with some dogs at least1 as ,i have noticed in my own ,st4 ,bernard1 the tail is switched slowly back and forth when approaching another dog with hostile intent4 ,we have not as yet a sufficient number of facts at hand with reference to the history of the dog to pronounce the tail wagging as originating by virtue of its use as expression4 ,and what is the rationale of the origin of the tail in the dog and cat1 and for what reason has it been perpetuated8 ,is it a prehensile survival--which has been taken advantage of in the breeding of the pug--or is it a sexual characteristic1 or did it originate to perform some directly advantageous action1 as the tail of the cow and horse1 or did it come into being as an organ of expression8 ,is the tail-wagging recognised by animals themselves as an expression as it is by man8 ,these are questions on which we must have more data than we now possess in order to make any sufficient answers4 ,again1 the rise of the barking by dogs under domestication is another problem on which little can be said with certainty for lack of data4 ,darwin's remark that it may arise by imitation of the loquacity of man seems to me ludicrously inadequate1 and there seems no element of imitation in the noise produced4 ,domesticated animals in general tend to use the vocal organs for louder sounds than when in the wild state1 for with wild animals the value of a loud noise as expression in any way is largely counterbalanced by its betraying presence to enemies4 ,when natural enemies of the dog are driven out by man there will be a tendency toward a larger use of the vocal organs1 both with reference to companion dogs and also to man4 ,the particular sound1 the bark1 is determined by the nature of the whole vocal apparatus4 ,the bark was1 no doubt1 originally to frighten aggressors1 as ,i have often seen a large dog frighten a small dog from a piece of meat by a sudden resounding bark4 ,gradually attained as a mode of terrifying his competitive associates and certain game which it follows under domestication1 and so preserved and developed by natural selection1 the tendency is also powerfully strengthened by artificial selection1 the best barker1 other things being equal1 being chosen for breeding by man4 ,when the bark has become a common and habitual practice1 it becomes a vent for superfluous energy developed by joy and other emotions4 ,like snarling or grinning1 it is also a play form1 and thus becomes denotative of joy by association4 ,to impress one's friendliness or hostility upon others1 to appease or terrify1 are the two main ends of expression with both man and animals1 and this function is excited in various ways by different species1 as determined by environment4 ,the danger signal and the safety signal1 the beware or welcome1 is amplified and varied according to particular requirements which must be fully investigated before we can give any complete rationale of any expression4 ,conciliatory and menacing expressions and gestures have been evolved and matured in strict correlation under the same general law of natural selection1 and neither one nor the other is due to antithesis4 ,it is entirely unlikely that of such expressions1 one1 the hostility side1 was first developed by natural selection1 the other owing its rise to a distinct principle1 antithesis4 ,however1 ,i am not ready to deny antithesis all force as principle of expression1 but it seems to me it should be ranged with law of similarity or analogy as subsidiary1 and largely influential only in the higher types of expression1 especially the teleologic human1 as in gesture4 ,thus1 if thumbs up means pity1 thumbs down would naturally be used to denote pitilessness4 ,to nod the head means assent or yes1 to shake the head means dissent or no1 though the exact antithesis would be to throw the head backward--assent signal with some tribes4 ,however1 while it may be asserted that1 as a general law1 that like emotions express themselves in like ways1 unlike in unlike1 this can hardly be used to throw much light on expression4 ,given a particular emotion and its expression1 we can by no means deduce immediately the expression of the opposition emotion4 ,particular conditions and special organic limitations will always make this impracticable1 and it is the office of the scientist to study expression in the course of evolution as of service under a multitude of conflicting interests and distracting difficulties4 ,we view expression then as mainly due to the principle of advantageous variation in the struggle for existence4 ,expression is the action required in the battle for life1 or accompaniments to assist this action1 or the call for aid to bring it about4 ,natural selection is the first and fundamental law of expression1 negative expression and superfluous energy both being secondary and often pathologic in tendency4 ,the struggle for existence is itself on the very face of it an expression of mind1 namely1 activity significant of certain will and feeling experience4 ,whatever shows mind is expression1 and thus in a large sense every movement in the physical universe--and what is the universe but motion--and every organic activity may be construed as expression4 ,whether all force1 motion1 action1 is or must be expression is1 however1 a philosophic investigation which we need not now discuss1 though we may suspect that the height and depth of mind and so the range of expression is enormously beyond the science of to-day4 ,however1 restricting ourselves to the domain of animal life1 it is obviously very difficult to determine just what activities of a given organism betray mind1 and still more just what form of mentality is manifesting itself4 ,man1 being the measure of all things1 interprets himself in all1 and even when he becomes aware of the dangers of anthropomorphism he cannot wholly disengage himself from the tendency4 ,the subjective analogical interpretation is a necessary evil4 ,still man is the keenest sighted of all beings for expression1 and actions in a very wide range which had not in fact the real function of expression become expressive to him4 ,the primary value of fear for the deer is to make it run from danger1 and the running becomes expressive of the fear to observers1 though the running is not for the expression4 ,thus vital activities of many kinds are expressive1 though their primary value is not in the expression4 ,activities whose sole or main value is to give expression are comparatively late1 the value of expression in this narrow sense being in the mental impression thereby made upon other organisms4 ,thus actions which serve purely to frighten others1 in making one's self formidable by loud noises1 as roar of lion1 bark of dog1 by erecting the hair1 displaying claws1 teeth1 and other such actions are pure expressions4 ,there is a constant growth in the value of expressiveness as we ascend the scale of life1 expression playing a larger and larger part till with man certain individuals become specialized as expressionists1 artists1 poets1 and orators4 ,further1 fine art is expression which has its value1 not in any exterior utility1 but in itself alone1 the subjective emotion seeking in a manner perfectly free from the common utilities of life to find itself a complete and perfect embodiment4 ,art here does not serve life1 but life1 art4 ,the experience has in itself its own vindication for being1 in that it expresses4 ,expression is no longer bare action nor yet a function to serve life1 but it becomes a life in itself4 ,in this ideal life of pure expression we recognise the necessity that the expressionist be emancipated from the struggle for existence1 be freed from the sordid cares of life1 and given up wholly to expressing his individuality with characteristic force2 hence the ,state often pensions writers and artists4 ,but apart from this ideal life1 in the evolution of intricate sociality and industry and complex culture1 expression becomes a more and more potent factor4 ,man in society must not only be1 he must reveal himself1 he must show what he is in order to achieve the most4 ,many fail1 not for lack of faculty1 but for lack of expressive ability4 ,expression1 then1 in general1 is a function which1 starting from the most minute beginnings in the lower animals1 culminates in man4 ,in large part man is man by reason of his superior power of expression1 especially by speech1 oral and written4 ,evolution in man is on the mental side in particular1 but a large part of this mentality has been given to the improvement of expression in making it more facile1 full and rapid4 ,the complete natural history of expression is yet to be written1 and all that ,i attempt is to indicate the point of view for such an investigation4 ,there are two points further with reference to expression which merit a few remarks4 ,the first is as to the reaction of expression on emotion4 ,we have treated to some extent the relation of emotion to its expression1 but we have also to consider the relation of an expression to its emotion and to emotion in general4 ,we have all along assumed that the emotion as a factor in the evolution of life is an internal stimulus to a serviceable activity1 which may be viewed as its expression1 or may even have its value as such4 ,that emotion1 as stimulus of action1 determines expression is1 ,i think1 a primary law4 ,however1 ,prof4 ,james maintains 7,mind1 xxxiv41 #ahh7 the reverse--that expression determines the emotion4,h ,we do not strike because we are angry1 but we are angry because we strike4 ,hence1 in reality1 the emotion is really the expression1 that is1 the emotion is the consciousness result of the so-called expression--it expresses the 8expression0 in terms of consciousness4 ,we commonly speak of expressing our emotions1 but we should rather speak of emotions as expressions in consciousness of certain bodily activities4 ,but if we make emotion but a psychological incident and off-shoot of certain activities1 ,i take it we run directly counter to the general function of mind in evolution as internal stimulant to useful activity4 ,emotion is1 ,i judge1 fundamentally a motive force and has its function1 and so its rise and development as such4 ,it is more than a by-product1 but even if it were1 how should we account for it8 ,after the serviceable activity has actually been brought about1 after a man has really struck down his adversary1 what is the utility of emotion8 ,we take it that the value of emotion lies in starting and supporting the activity1 and it is advantageous economy that it cease immediately on the accomplishment of its end4 ,while we must always suppose that emotion has its physical support in central neutral changes1 yet the expression is truly such2 that is1 it is from a different impulse as determined by the emotional brain excitement4 ,in the light merely of a theory of natural selection1 mind in general1 and emotion in particular1 is more than incidental concomitant of physical changes1 more than echo of corporeality3 it has a vital and central function in the evolution of life4 ,prof4 ,james points to the fact that exercising the expressions or imagining the feeling calls up the feeling1 as a proof of his theory4 ,this1 however1 is merely a matter of association1 and can prove neither a real precedent nor resultant4 ,we may call up ideation as well as emotion by producing associated activities4 ,in the interdependence of the conscious life1 emotion1 perception and willing call up each other without reference to causative order4 ,any one element of consciousness may be regarded either as resultant or stimulant1 according as we look at preceding or following state of consciousness4 ,in the order of evolution1 pain and pleasure arise from certain actions in order to inhibit or stimulate repetition of actions4 ,feeling is then1 both resultant and stimulant4 ,the emotions may arise from the expressions by association1 but the original dependence is that of expression on emotion4 ,the further test1 that we cannot imagine an emotion without bringing in bodily presentation1 is simply a necessity of the imaging faculty as such1 an image by its very nature being concrete4 ----- ,footnote ,h3 ,professor ,james has of late largely modified his view 7see ,psychological ,review1 ,sept41 #ahid74 ----- ,while1 then1 ,i believe that emotion is the spring of expression1 ,i am far from denying that the expression may not react upon the emotion4 ,whenever the will in any wise controls expression we mark modifications in the feeling4 ,in the later evolution of life the directing of expression is of great importance1 and expression is gradually subjected to the will4 ,hence1 especially with man1 it becomes possible to feel in certain ways and yet to repress the signs of feeling1 to have strong emotions1 and yet not betray them to those who might take advantage of them4 ,when a strong emotion is forcibly and completely checked in its expression there is commonly rankling4 ,at least it is not true1 as ,darwin states 7,ibid41 p4 #cfj71 that 8repression1 as far as this is possible1 of all outward signs softens our emotions40 ,very often1 as we all know by personal experience and by observation1 the checking the free expression of emotion tends to intensify1 rather than soften1 the emotion4 ,the school-girl1 who1 on hearing sad news1 rushes away to have a good cry1 weeps away her grief1 and experiences a deep sense of relief2 while the man who sternly represses the expression of grief often suffers acutely and long4 ,grief1 of course1 sometimes lies too deep for tears1 and we often long to be able to express the pent-up emotion which chokes us4 ,this state is the opposite of the free1 natural expression of feeling such as we see in children4 ,children express themselves without self-control1 for this is beyond them2 but here is the power to will expression1 but the effort is always futile4 ,by promoting or repressing expression we do certainly influence emotion2 but this volition is always for reason1 and implies1 then1 a conflict of feelings4 ,thus1 a feeling for propriety leads the man to control his tears1 and this feeling in itself must tend to diminish the strength of the concomitant grief4 ,however1 though there is a measure of interference1 we would be wrong in supposing that complex mental life is always comparatively weak in its component elements4 ,the distraction of interest due to new feelings checking expression is not always equal to the relieving power of free or promoted expression4 ,the direct checking of the expressional act certainly keeps back the current of energy from its natural channel1 and the feeling has increased in duration1 if not in quantity4 ,the evanescent character of emotion with young children and with demonstrative people is well known4 ,but besides the changes which may come to the feeling through direct will-effected changes in the expression1 we must also note that the mere consciousness of expression has often a definite influence4 ,thus1 when greatly frightened1 ,i may become conscious of the heart leaping into the throat1 the trembling1 etc42 and this consciousness of the expression acts in general as a diversion in the feeling which is expressed4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 it seems to add to the feeling1 as when a girl blushes for her blushes4 ,there is an intensification of self-consciousness which but heightens and renews the expression with renewed sense of expression1 and then another flood of embarrassing self-consciousness1 and so on in a long series4 ,here1 however1 the sense of expression does not in strictness add to the intensity of the original feeling1 but it develops a new feeling of the same kind2 at each step there is new occasion and a renewed feeling1 but a total quantity is constituted1 so that we are right enough in saying that the consciousness of her own blushing but added to her embarrassment4 ,yet it may be stated as a general law that a consciousness of our expressive acts as such tends to decrease the original feeling from which the expression arises1 inasmuch as the field of consciousness is thereby divided4 ,when the will attains control over expression we may not merely repress the impulse to expression when we feel strongly1 but having no feeling of a given kind we may voluntarily adopt its expression1 and this adoption of the expression very often leads by association to the real feeling4 ,again1 when experiencing a feeling we may simulate the expression of another or even opposite feeling4 ,it is often advantageous in the struggle for existence to throw others off their guard by deceiving them as to the real emotional state2 hence1 craft and guile have from a tolerably early stage in evolution played a part in the history of life4 ,animals and men alike soon appreciate the distinction between appearance and reality1 that a kind and pleasant expression is often but the lure of malice and hostility1 that injury is often meant where there is the show of benefit4 ,plants1 as well as animals1 often are quite other than they appear1 both for offence and defence2 and there is the wide field of mimetic protection which cannot1 however1 at present be brought under our subject4 ,simulation of expression probably arose as an economical makeshift2 a mere show which costs the organism little often attains ends which would otherwise require a vast deal of mental force4 ,thus we see children scared into desired behaviour by assumed anger1 grief1 etc42 and even animals1 as ,i have noticed with dogs1 likewise frequently affect expressions which have no support in real emotion4 ,the unsophisticated1 however1 learn with great rapidity to distinguish between assumed and real emotion4 ,any one who has made a pretence of crying before little children must have remarked this4 ,simulation of expression in order to easily reach desired ends is thus rather limited1 but still has a real value and a considerable place under natural selection4 ,however1 expression may sometimes be simulated in order to attain the associated emotion4 ,if we act mad1 we often get mad1 and thus1 as we see in the plays of animals and children1 merely assumed expression may lead to the real emotion4 ,this way of attaining emotion by purposely enacting its known expression1 we may call impression as the reverse of the expression order4 ,men may work themselves up into a fury1 as well as vigorously express an anger directly occasioned4 ,actors and public speakers often take advantage of this reaction of expression on emotion1 and thereby not merely affect an emotion1 but have a certain real emotion1 which cannot ever be nave4 ,thus ,macready as ,shylock used to prepare himself and get up 8the proper state of white heat0 by violently shaking a ladder4 ,poe in one of his tales makes a detective say1 when wishing to know the thoughts of a wicked man1 8,i fashion the expression of my face as accurately as possible in accordance with the expression of his1 and then wait to see what thoughts or sentiments arise in my mind or heart1 as if to match or correspond with the expression40 ,this method of acting like another1 that we may have and so know his thoughts and feelings1 is a very difficult way of mind-reading4 ,but expression is often simulated on one or both sides with full understanding of it as such4 ,this enters into play1 and is the essence of the dramatic art4 ,that the word play denotes both the sportive imitative actions of animals and men1 and also a dramatic representation is not fortuitous or arbitrary4 ,it is noticeable that among the lower animals the earliest and commonest play is playing at being angry or frightened1 which corroborates the view of these emotions as probably the earliest and most fundamental in life4 ,the correlated nature of fear and anger is shown by the way they are played at2 thus you often see one dog with a show of anger chasing another who simulates fear1 and then the parts are exchanged4 ,the great relation of pursuer and pursued is constantly mimicked among animals with interchanging of parts4 ,so also among children the commonest plays are those of fleeing and chasing1 as tag1 hare and hound1 hide and seek1 etc41 the fundamental elements of life being re-enacted under the superfluous energy which tends to flow most easily into the oldest and most habitual channels4 ,thus play has a high historic psychic importance4 ,to attack and to run away are the most necessary and essential of life activities1 and play has a certain pedagogic and preparative value1 and has thereby been sanctioned by natural selection1 for we see that in the evolution of life the tendency has constantly been to lengthen the play period4 ,among the lowest animals the individual at birth is immediately thrown into the struggle for existence and must battle for itself2 there is no play time for it1 but at once it enters upon direct life struggle2 but in higher life there is a period of spontaneous free dramatic activity4 ,but not only is anger and fear shammed as a prominent and primitive play1 but it is most common to stimulate to real anger or fear1 and then in glee to show the inadequacy of the occasion to the victim4 ,every one has observed how frequently young animals play by teasing and scaring each other4 ,the tricks of boys and practical jokes of men both point to the deep inbred power of anger and fear in life1 and are at the same time symptomatic of their decline in power as dominant life factors4 ,all children delight in scaring one another on pretence1 in seeing the real expression and feeling themselves the moving powers in bringing it about4 ,this satisfaction1 which is aboriginal1 which is the reflex of the original pleasure sanction when power to scare others for one's own benefit was being evolved in life1 makes a large part of the enjoyment of such action4 ,a large part of play-pleasure must1 indeed1 be set down to reflex of the earliest hard-earned pleasure experience2 but a large part is also due to the thrill of excitement and the delight in activity per se4 ,later forms of plays are largely due to pure imitative propensity1 though often helped by reversal tendencies4 ,we note also that this perceived groundlessness of the action becomes a large element in later forms of play1 as wit and humour1 but the pleasure is plainly based on the power and the superiority of intelligence implied4 ,it amuses the tyrant to throw his companions into mortal fear by the slightest suggestion1 the smaller the occasion the more amusing the fright4 ,and in general the slighter the real cause in relation to the effect produced1 the more acute the pleasure1 by reason of the supremacy thereby emphasized4 ,it is always more amusing to scare a child by a slight movement of a finger than by a vigorous act of the whole body4 ,it seems to me that it is by this association that disproportion1 incongruity1 irrelevance1 however induced1 become in themselves amusing1 ludicrous1 laughable4 ,so the incongruous1 in which ,i have no part whatever1 becomes a comic spectacle and the basis of all comedy1 yet also of the tragic and tragedy4 ,in the tragic the discordance between what is and what ought to be1 instead of pleasing1 pains4 ,what is comic to a coarse mind may seem tragic to the refined4 ,a bird1 distressed by the death of its mate1 offering it food1 might amuse a savage or a boy1 but must be a pathetic sight to a civilized and cultured man1 though both might be amused to see a child presenting food to its doll4 ,not only may the incongruous which is comparatively unrelated to me be amusing as well as that which ,i myself bring about1 but even when ,i am the victim ,i may be highly delighted by the intrinsic disproportion of my experience to the exciting cause4 ,with some persons1 perhaps rather few in number1 the next best thing to playing a joke is having one played on them4 ,this amusement at oneself occurs even among savages4 ,when ,stanley was on the ,congo1 he was at one time greatly annoyed by the number of native visitors4 ,in vain he tried to repel them1 but one morning when a crowd had assembled at the river side1 at some little distance1 waiting an opportunity to board his vessel1 some of his men put on lion skins which were at hand1 and acted the part so well that the intending visitors fled in abject terror4 ,having retired to a safe distance they looked back to see the men walking the deck with the lion skins in their hands and laughing most heartily4 ,seeing then the groundlessness of their alarm the whole crowd burst into roars of laughter and shouted in merriment for a long time4 ,exhibitions of fright1 we may remark1 seem to be especially amusing to savages1 as when an assembly of ,africans of the lowest type went into ecstasies of uproarious delight on seeing a stereopticon picture of a frightened negro hastily climbing a tree to get out of the way of the gaping jaws of a crocodile4 ,play is then very largely either a mutual shamming of expression1 or a stimulating real expression in one by pretended expression in the other4 ,the pleasure in deceiving others by simulating expression points to ancestral experience1 for deceit has been one of the greatest factors in life evolution4 ,that an individual seems to be an entirely different being from what he really is1 has often been most advantageous in the struggle for existence1 and hence a large variety of simulated expression has been employed4 ,children then1 as repeating in play form the race history1 take great delight in masquerading and so deceiving their acquaintances as to their identity1 making false pleas for charity1 etc4 ,the drama has its roots in this form of play4 ,to make others take us for quite different than we are gives us a high pleasure of power1 and early man was often moved1 in the breathing spells of the struggle for existence1 to play at false personalities simply for the pleasure in itself of being a successful actor4 ,there is also the counter pleasure of the spectators in piercing the simulated expression4 ,it is only in latest phases of dramatic art that simulation comes to be appreciated for its own sake1 that there is on both sides full and complete feeling of the illusory nature of the whole transaction1 and an enjoyment of the art per se4 ,simulating expression is the actor's art2 but when the simulation is forgotten by either actor or audience1 nature appears and art disappears4 ,while it is the province of the actor's art to simulate expression1 it is in general the office of fine art to imitate and render the expressive by image1 picture1 musical notes1 etc4 ,the artist is the expresser and simulator par excellence1 and complete and perfect expressiveness is his constant aim1 though not for utility or amusement1 but for the sake of awakening the sthetic emotion4 ,i cannot then agree with ,bosanquet1 who1 as ,i understand1 makes sthetic feeling the emotion of expression1 expression for expression's sake4 ,for expression by its very nature is such only as expressive1 that is1 as going beyond itself1 as being a means1 and not an end in itself1 hence expression for expression's sake is meaningless phrase4 ,expression1 so far as it attempts to stand merely for itself1 is an empty mannerism and a barren technique4 ,expression is only such as it is backed by the emotion expressed1 as significant of some psychosis2 and artistic expression or art is the expression of the artistic or sthetic emotion1 a peculiar feeling about things1 as apple blossoms1 a sunset1 a child playing4 ,this emotion is often awakened by cognizance of an expression1 as an expression of joy or horror by a child1 and may thus be an emotion of or at expression1 as also in the case where it is roused by the skill in purposive expression of any kind1 sthetic or other1 but expression is obviously not the only way of exciting the emotion1 its object may be a mere patch of colour1 a pure musical note1 etc4 sthetic emotion tends to manifest or express itself just like all emotions1 and in attaining perfect expression it strengthens itself4 ,likewise language1 as an instrument of thought1 a logical expression1 has strengthened thought1 but a purely formal logic is as barren and void as a purely formal sthetic4 ,language as expressive of thought and as expressive of sthetic emotion is equally dependent upon what it expresses1 and sthetics is thus not peculiar in its relation to expression4 ,the interpretation of expression in nature and art is often a hard matter and has given rise to much variance4 ,for instance1 take the much discussed ,laokon group2 ,winckelmann says the father sheds pity from his eyes like mist upon his sons2 ,lessing finds grief and noble endurance expressed2 ,goethe thinks the father shows pity for his youngest son1 apprehension for the older son1 and terror for himself2 ,lbke finds only mere pain manifested4 ,coming to a single feature1 the mouth1 we find the most diverse interpretation4 ,winckelmann says that here is an heroic soul who disdains to shriek1 and gives forth only 8an anxious and suppressed sigh40 ,lessing maintains also that here is a shriek softened into a sigh1 but not 8because a shriek would have betrayed an ignoble soul1 but because it would have produced a hideous contortion of the countenance40 ,later critics have generally followed ,lessing4 ,it is obvious1 ,i think1 that the expression of the mouth is not shrieking1 but is moaning1 groaning1 or sighing4 ,on this quite a number of competent witnesses1 physicians and psychologists whom ,i consulted1 are practically agreed4 ,however1 it has occurred to me that the sighing or moaning of ,laokon may not be a softened form at all1 but the actual expression designed by the artists4 ,it is generally supposed that the artist here desired to show mortal agony1 and it is assumed that shrieking is the expression of mortal agony4 ,this assumption seems to me correct when extreme pain is suddenly inflicted2 but when1 as in the case of ,laokon1 the mortal wound is received only after the most exhausting struggle1 the natural expression is moaning4 ,the realistic sculptor would surely not give any softened form1 but1 shrinking from nothing1 has expressed ,laokon in this death grasp in the very act of giving up the ghost4 ,though the muscles of the limbs and trunk are still tense1 yet the closing eyes1 the head falling back1 and the arm thrown toward the base of the brain indicate that the struggle is over1 and the death moment has come1 expressed vocally only by a moan4 ,we do not need to find here then any conflict between realism and the artistic sense1 but the simplest and most obvious interpretation is what the expression gives1 sighing and moaning1 which is the true one under the circumstances1 and is so meant by the artist4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,conclusion ,in the present haste to construct psychology as a natural science cognate to chemistry1 physics1 and biology1 we note much that is premature and confusing1 owing to insufficient reflection upon the quality of the phenomena4 ,a consciousness is a natural phenomenon1 but we cannot discover and investigate it as we do phenomena of light and electricity4 ,anger is a phenomenon occurring millions of times every day1 but it is a fact which must be discerned and studied by an altogether different method from facts of crystallization1 erosion1 or plant growth4 ,psychology is not a science of inspection1 but of introspection4 ,if ,i know ,i am angry1 ,i know it by a direct self-awareness2 if ,i see a man strike another1 and regard this as expressive of a psychosis1 and that of a certain kind1 anger1 this supposed knowledge is analogical realization4 ,one who never was or could be angry could no more investigate anger than a blind man light1 and1 other things being equal1 the more irascible a man is1 the better observer of anger he would be4 ,we are not1 however1 conscious of all our mental processes1 and we may be often blinded to the real nature of such we think we have2 and as to the psychoses of other beings1 especially of the more unlike and remote1 we need to be extremely cautious in forming conclusions4 ,it is likely that the mental constitution of organisms differ as widely as the physical1 that the mentality of a fish is as diverse from our own as its physical structure is unlike our own4 ,the fish may have peculiar psychoses of which we may never gain the least inkling1 because we cannot examine its consciousness objectively as we do its fins1 its air bladder1 and its gills4 ,the psychologist must then be myriad-minded2 his fitness is the ductility and range of his psychic capacity4 ,the richness and receptivity of his own mental life must be infinite if he is to come to full knowledge of the whole course of psychism4 ,thus psychology is marked off from all other science as distinct in subject and method4 ,its being so individual and subjective is the greatest hindrance to its progress1 for science is verifiable knowledge1 but how shall we have a method of consciousness verification8 ,a man tells me he has a scar on his left knee1 and this ,i can verify by personal examination if ,i like1 but if he says he is angry1 ,i have no such means of verification1 ,i can only guess by expression4 ,a biologist announces the discovery of a pineal eye in a certain embryo1 and straightway the fact may be verified by a host of observers2 but if a psychologist announces that he has discovered a new mode of consciousness1 the verification is by no means so easy4 ,may not the consciousness be entirely peculiar to him8 ,the psychologist who attempts to verify cannot disclaim the fact simply because he cannot find this act of mind in himself4 ,but an introspective consensus1 though extremely difficult as compared with the objective consensus required by objective science1 is not impossible1 but it requires exceptional gifts and training in introspection4 ,before psychology can reach any standing a method of subjective verification must be formulated and adhered to as rigidly as corresponding verification is required by objective science4 ,the backwardness of psychology is in this most significant1 that while a half-dozen recognised biologists may announce a certain fact1 and it is immediately accepted as scientific knowledge1 no such action can occur in psychology4 ,the uncertainty of subjective verification is the trouble1 and the most important step that can be made to-day is a clearly defined basis for an exact verification4 ,that one party should claim there is a feeling of relation1 and another that there is no such feeling1 marks a crudeness in the most general matters1 and points to psychology being about where physiology was when the circulation of the blood was in debate4 ,but1 say the experimental psychologists1 subjective verification is impossible2 psychology1 if it is to become a science1 must1 like the other sciences1 resort to the laboratory1 and by definite and exact experiments produce the facts to order1 study them by the most approved instruments1 and obtain with certainty a knowledge of their laws4 ,now it is sufficiently easy to experiment on light1 sound1 and on plant growth in a laboratory1 but how can we make consciousness to order with the same certainty8 how can we know when we have got a consciousness1 what kind it is1 etc41 except by subjective verification8 ,you certainly cannot see the consciousness or touch it2 but you must wholly rely on the subjective report of the individual experimented on as verified by your own consciousness4 ,we have no impassive agent entirely under our control1 except in hypnosis1 and we cannot secure conditions with the same exactness in testing the intensity of some form of consciousness1 as anger1 as in testing the tensile strength of iron4 ,in the physical laboratory we produce certain conditions and we get invariably certain observable and measurable results1 but in a psychological laboratory how shall ,i get with certainty a definite consciousness in a large number of cases and formulate its law8 ,how shall ,i know at a given moment that the mental act of the agent is what my experiment requires8 ,moreover1 does not experimental psychology by beginning with human consciousness enter rashly upon a very complex field8 ,if it would get results1 let it start with the simpler mental life1 just as biology has founded itself in a study of simplest elements4 ,but how shall psychology get at the consciousness of a clam with the same exactness as biology investigates the circulation of blood in the clam8 ,it is plain1 in short1 that if we are to have a fruitful experimental psychology1 some very important questions of method must first be settled4 ,a method of getting psychoses to order1 to obtain the exact reaction required1 and knowing and realizing what it is when got1 this is a desideratum not yet attained4 ,further1 we must remark that experimentation is itself a psychic act1 and sense of experimentation is a disturbing factor in results2 that is1 a consciousness which is conscious of being experimented on is thereby complicated over mere observation method4 ,this is markedly the case in self-experimentation4 ,consciousness is not1 like an electric current or a sound wave1 an objective fact1 readily reproducible in the laboratory4 ,and again ethics may interfere with psychical experiment4 ,how far have we a right to incite psychosis for experiment's sake8 ,how far may psychical vivisection be carried in the name of science8 ,a scientist who should for his own study make an animal or person angry1 would be reprobated as would the artist who should incite anger in his model in order to catch artistic effect4 ,however1 that there is a vast scope for experimental psychology cannot be denied1 and we may expect an indefinite multiplication of artificial psychoses and combinations comparable to the artificial syntheses and new compounds of the chemical laboratory4 ,mind may develop and act merely on the scientific motive1 and accomplish by tour de force a complex field of artificial consciousness quite distinct in origin and nature from natural consciousness4 ,but for the present1 at least1 we regard not experiment but observation as the main method4 ,not laboratory1 but field work1 is most needed4 ,the psychical scientist must go psychologizing1 as the botanist goes botanizing4 ,but there is no simple objective method as in botany4 ,in order to have insight and interpretative power1 there must be constant self-observation4 ,he can know the real nature1 conditions1 and laws of other minds only so far as he realizes them in himself4 ,if he has never feared1 he will never know fear1 and if he has never analyzed his own fear1 he will not know its factors as occurring in others4 ,all external consciousness is but a projection from the observer's own consciousness4 ,but it may be said that mind is but a kind of neural function1 and that physiological psychology will give us the true key to consciousness4 ,but if one has never known any psychosis1 as fear1 directly in himself and indirectly in others1 how will he find it in any nerve activities8 ,nervous activities are significant of psychosis only so far as psychosis is already known4 ,in fact1 the sciences of neurosis and psychosis are radically distinct4 ,i stick a pin in my finger1 the facts of pain1 volition1 anger1 etc41 are of one order knowable only by introspection1 the nerve excitation1 current and reaction are of another order1 constitute a complete circle1 and are known only by inspection4 ,neurology in its own field can afford to ignore psychosis1 for it does not find it3 it finds only neural changes1 and psychology likewise can afford to ignore physiology4 ,these sciences stand self-sufficient1 and may develop indefinitely each in its own way without meeting4 ,divide and conquer4 ,the present mingling of the two is greatly to be deplored4 ,thus in current books we often find such sentences as this3 8,the prevalent view hitherto has probably been that the same nervous apparatus which on moderate excitement produces sensations of pressure or temperature1 produces feelings of pain when irritated with increased intensity40 7,ladd1 ,outlines ,physiological ,psychology1 p4 #chg47 ,this confusing of objective and subjective terms1 sensation and irritation1 is but too frequent in recent treatises4 ,there is no way yet found of discovering psychic facts in neural1 or neural in psychic1 whatever may be their connection and interdependence4 ,if we must have a cross-interpretation1 the psychologist has the vantage-ground on the basis of evolution by struggle4 ,nisus has developed all sense and motor organs and all nervous organs4 ,it is the effort at seeing that has produced the optic nerve and the physiological function of sight4 ,the vision and visual organ of the eagle came by incessant looking for prey during thousands of years4 ,hence mind is not reflex or concomitant of nerve1 but nerve is outgrowth of mind in the struggle of existence1 and a psychological physiology is better than a physiological psychology4 ,the psychological field is then first1 self2 second1 other selves or individuals4 ,in this latter phase of human psychology we have the psychology of adults1 then adolescent1 senile1 infantile1 sexual1 and racial psychology4 ,in sub-human or comparative psychology we include animals1 wild and tame1 also all discussion on plant psychism1 mind stuff 7e4g4 ,clifford's71 etc4 ,in superhuman psychology we include all doctrine of cosmic intelligence1 teleology 7vide ,mind1 x4 #dbj74 ,we have limited ourselves to evolutionary psychology and that of the feelings1 and our data are mostly from adult human consciousness4 ,evolutionary psychology bases itself on the idea that mental development originates and is continued through struggle or will effort4 ,such evidence as we can gather points to feeling1 impelled exertion as the essence of psychic evolution1 and it proves fruitful when assumed as a guiding principle4 ,and the principle of struggle is final4 ,we cannot admit with ,bain a principle of spontaneity4 ,the activities of a new-born lamb are seemingly spontaneous only because they are the results of energies stored in ages of psychic effort4 ,this doctrine of struggle does away with all impressionism and all passivity theories4 ,mind is not a receptivity1 an association of impressions1 a reflex or concomitant of physiological activities1 but it is dynamic determining vital fact1 an active response to the conditions of self-existence4 ,this impetus of struggle and striving seems to feed all life and make life1 and has its place1 perhaps the highest in the dynamic whole we term the universe4 ,while the significance of struggle is a question for philosophy1 yet1 as matter of fact1 it is the only method of realization we know2 and the office of humanity is the providing a wider and higher scope for struggle1 the making new and independent life regions4 ,science and art1 ethics and religion1 which are at bottom only phases of emotionalism1 are with utmost toil developed for themselves1 and new emotions now arising and yet to arise will be cherished for their own sakes4 ,mind begins and continues long as the servant of the body1 it ends by making the body its servant1 the instrument of the spiritual life1 the temple of the ,holy ,ghost2 but all its evolution is through supreme effort4 ,in the spiritual evolution he who loveth his life shall lose it1 he whose struggle is in the primitive stage1 namely1 for material existence1 loses thereby the real life1 the life of the spirit4 ,it is possible1 indeed1 that we may over-estimate this salient fact of struggle1 and certainly1 in the present state of psychology1 modesty is most commendable4 ,we would be far from assuming that the horizon of our mind is the limit of the universe4 ,however1 assuming mind as a biological function continually evolving in the service of self-conservation and self-furtherance1 our endeavour has been to point out the general trend of the evolution of feeling1 and to analyze some of its more important features4 ,the little exploration we have made suggests the greatness of the unexplored field of mind1 the vast number of psychoses unknown1 and perhaps unknowable4 ,the difficulties of the subjective method make it seem almost impossible to trace a complete history of mind4 ,for mind to return over and realize its whole growth in all its ramifications seems quite as hard as to develop new forms1 or a whole region of artificial psychosis4 ,in the filling up of missing links1 psychology presents vastly greater difficulties than biology because of its subjectivity of method and the evanescent nature of the facts4 ,further1 the more ,i analyze consciousness1 the more ,i am convinced of the great and often unexpected complexity of apparently simple forms1 and ,i am satisfied then the simplicity and completeness of the system-making psychologists1 physiological or idealistic1 is factitious and delusive4 ,an inductive science of mind is yet in its infancy4 ,my conclusion that mind was at first1 and is always as progressive1 feeling-impelled will1 and that sensing arose as secondary1 as useful cognitive effort1 is simply the best reading ,i can make from present data when assuming the current doctrine of evolution4 ,a very important point1 which needs to be worked out more fully than we have been able to do1 is as to the nature of revival as involving emotion4 ,sense of re-experience and of the experienceable is one of the most important acquisitions of mind4 ,the self-consolidation and organization of experience certainly does not come in the first place by any mechanical association1 but we must assume that all mental progress is the result of the most intense1 though often blind and fortuitous striving4 ,but just how the return of an experience is cognized as return and as experience1 and so becoming basis for emotion1 this is a most difficult inquiry on which we have made but a few remarks in the chapter on the nature of emotion4 ,just when and how sense of experience is generated1 and what is a full analysis of its nature1 must be postponed to some future study1 but ,i am convinced that a very fruitful field for investigation lies in this direction4 ,experience certainly does at a very early stage become compound1 become self-appreciative in some form1 as sense of the potentiality of things1 but the elucidation of progress in this line is confronted by many difficulties4 ,the history of ideation or representation as a power for self-conservation has yet to be traced with definiteness and completeness4 ,another point1 which needs a far fuller discussion than we can now give1 is as to the nature of organic interaction in consciousness1 as to the real quality of psychic cause and effect4 ,we have all along assumed feeling as stimulant of will1 both the will to know and the will to act1 but just how does feeling develop will as struggling effort8 ,what is the exact mode of connection8 ,we conceive readily of physical impact as determining effects in the material world1 and we conceive a transference and transmutation of energy1 but in the psychic realm we have no entities as permanent existences susceptible of entering into relation with other entities4 ,how then does a pain incite a will activity8 ,a peculiar form of consciousness we term will activity does directly follow upon feeling pain1 and1 within limits1 the greater the pain1 the greater the willing1 but we have no theory to express the mode of connection of these consciousnesses4 ,all that we can say is that one does follow upon the other as somehow caused by it4 ,yet it is certain that the limitation of conscious capacity must in every individual determine a definite range of interaction1 and1 beyond some particular point1 the more ,i feel1 the less ,i will1 and vice vers4 ,but the phenomenon of interference is likewise as obscure as that of excitation4 ,the development of distinct organic forms of consciousness is slowly carried forward1 and they exercise a definite dynamic relation to each other1 though the mode is as yet wholly obscure4 ,thus the largest subdivisions of consciousness1 knowing1 feeling1 and willing1 become determined as distinct organically related modes1 like the nervous1 nutritive-circulatory and motor systems forming one organic whole body4 ,these psychic modes attain gradually an intricate and definite development1 whose constant interdependent connection with an individual body we term a 8mind40 ,and we must remark that this vital relation of one consciousness and one form of consciousness to another is in no wise effected through apperception1 through a third distinct consciousness1 a cognitive one1 which unites them in idea4 ,a feeling excited a will act long before there was consciousness of either1 or of their relation4 ,in general we must say that consciousness does not consciously forge for itself its own relations1 but that in by far the larger part of psychic development new modes of consciousness and their inter-relations come in a totally unforeseen way1 by a blind striving in the struggle for existence4 ,it may be doubted1 indeed1 if even the most advanced human mind can really invent a new consciousness or a new relation in consciousness1 but by intense effort it attains them4 ,one of the obscurest points in biology is as to the nature and cause of morphological variation1 and the subject of mental variation is for psychological science far more obscure4 ,we presuppose that mental variations somehow arise in response to sudden and great emergencies1 and in connection with the severest effort4 ,mental progress is1 in all the earlier life at least1 only achieved under pressure of intense pain actually experienced or ideally so1--emotion--and in some way an appropriate and saving psychosis as response of organism to environment originates4 ,this new form may be indistinct1 and proceed as a gradual differentiation from previous types1 still the method of action of the motive force seems mysterious4 ,we can see1 indeed1 the advantage which accrues1 for example1 to the animal which is first able to detect danger or nutriment by scent1 but just the method of the rise and progress of scenting as a conscious process seems difficult to trace4 ,we cannot say that power of smell arose because organs of smell were developed2 this puts the cart before the horse4 ,it is the struggle to sense that is the prime motive force in developing the sense organs and not vice vers4 ,we do not smell because we have noses1 but we have noses because we smell4 ,that the sense of smell is a differentiated general sensation is likely enough1 but we are unable to follow the steps4 ,we know that the higher development of our present senses is attained only through great exertion1 which determines a physical basis and organic progress--as in microscopy1 telescopy1 and so-called mind-reading--and if humanity is to develop in the future an electric sense or a telepathic sense1 it must be reached by the intense struggle of a very few4 ,we must believe that every mode of mind is at bottom but some modification of pre-existing forms1 and it may be that as all modes of the material are interpretable in motion1 so the manifold mental may be equally resolvable into some one type4 ,yet so far as we can now see1 feeling1 will1 and cognition seem radically and primitively distinct4 ,the missing links in mental evolution are most difficult to determine1 for1 as we have often remarked1 while we can with comparative ease both determine fossil organic forms a priori and discover as realities1 the intermediate mental forms can only be known through a subjective realization4 ,it does not help us to ascribe the advantageous variation to chance1 a word1 indeed1 which does not belong to the dictionary of science1 for it is but a cover to ignorance4 ,chance means that the determinate line of causes is hidden from the observer1 who only knows that one of several results will take place4 ,chance is thus wholly relative2 the gambling of savages is often calculable to the ,european1 and so every affair of chance1 as dice throwing1 might be calculable to a superior intelligence who could compute or watch every turn of the dice4 ,chance1 then1 does not reside in the outward thing1 is not a property of phenomena1 but is wholly a subjective limitation of the investigating mind1 hence to ascribe variation1 physical or psychical1 to chance is simply to objectivise our own imperfect cognition4 ,the pre-supposition of all science is that every event or change has its definite determining antecedents1 and that these are cognizable2 hence the doctrine of chance has no place in any complete and real science of phenomena4 ,that organism is1 indeed1 fortunate1 which first achieves some notable and valuable psychic mode1 but this good fortune does not in any wise come by chance1 or by the passive enjoyment of concurrent favourable circumstances1 but it is a well-earned superiority attained only by the severest and most patient responsive struggle1 and there in every case a determinate series of steps in mental process which may ultimately be traceable4 ,mental forms also arise through perversion1 competitors perverting originally advantageous variations1 as has been already pointed out for paralysing-fear1 sense-destroying anger1 etc4 ,atavistic tendency gives pseudo-variations4 ,certain mental forms may be negative in origin1 that is1 merely reactionary from previous states4 ,given a high degree of any joyous emotion1 say hope1 and suddenly remove its conditions1 and the swing is back beyond the zero point of emotion to actual negative emotion1 as despair4 ,still the whole gamut from positive to negative1 as from highest hope to deepest despair1 is but a single generic emotion form of polar correlate elements1 which have equally developed through struggle4 ,the subject of psychic intensity in general1 and feeling intensity in particular1 is likewise obscure and difficult4 ,physical intensity is comparatively easy to investigate in its nature and laws4 ,for instance1 in the case of light we clearly conceive its nature in terms of molecular motion1 we measure it exactly by photometers1 and we know it to proceed by the law of inverse squares4 ,we have no similar certainty and clearness with regard to mental intensity4 ,we speak of suffering very slight or very intense pains1 but there is no scientific theory or valuation of psychic intensity4 ,mere physical intensity does not explain psychic1 and we know that variations in rapidity of ether waves1 for example1 give1 not quantitative1 but qualitative psychic variations4 #fdj billion vibrations are felt subjectively as the comparatively feeble colour blue1 while #dej billion gives the striking and intense colour1 red4 ,it is only within a certain range and with certain forms of forces that ,weber's law of geometric and arithmetic increase applies4 ,strictly speaking1 we cannot apply quantitative conceptions to consciousness1 inasmuch as mind has no spatiality which is the basis of idea of quantity and size4 ,hence the use of quantitative terms1 like great1 large1 small1 little1 etc41 is an indirect reference to intensity4 ,i was in very great pain equals ,i was in very intense pain4 ,no consciousness is literally either larger or smaller than another1 because consciousnesses cannot1 by reason of their non-spatial nature1 enter into quantitative relations4 ,so-called massive pains are really manifold4 7,see on this and kindred points my remarks in ,nature1 vol4 #dj1 p4 #fdb47 ,a popular test of mental intensity1 and one which has a relative value1 is by the power needed to displace a given psychosis4 ,thus1 if a man in a brown study walks into a pond of cold water without noticing it1 we rightly conclude that he is thinking very intensely4 ,this1 of course establishes a scale relative to the individual1 beginning with a psychosis which resists all displacing agencies1 and ending with those of such very slight intensity that they give way to any and all diversions4 ,a consciousness which supplants another must per se be more intense than the other4 ,all that which rouses and diverts patients suffering from monomania and fixed ideas is practically equal in intensity4 ,while we may thus pronounce one state as being equal in intensity to another or as being more or less intense than it1 we yet have no ground for any numerical estimate4 ,when a person says1 8,i feel twice as bad as ,i did yesterday1 or ,i feel a hundred times as happy now as ,i was a year ago10 it is plainly a general and indefinite expression4 ,emotions have not yet been brought within the range of mathematical comparisons4 ,the intensity of feelings1 as also of sensations1 sustains undoubtedly certain mathematical relations to intensity of objective stimulus1 but owing to their complex nature1 emotions1 at least1 must always be very difficult of interpretation by any such law as ,weber's1 though simple pain may be brought more easily under some law4 ,a pain1 other things being equal1 increases in some ratio to increment of physical stimulus4 ,but we must believe that the reason for the diversity between proportion of actual increments of stimulus and actual increments of sensation and feeling is largely physiological4 ,it certainly is not a true psycho-physical law1 a law of relation of mind and matter1 as is often claimed2 for we cannot obtain an absolutely objective standard to test subjectivity4 ,hence any such law is merely a law of relation of different kinds of sensations1 of different methods of interpreting the objective4 ,intensity of stimulus itself is always determinable only through some sensation1 which is itself subject to ,weber's law4 ,there is no objective standard for sense stimuli2 the measure of increasing stimulus to increasing sensation must be by some sense which has its own law with reference to physical increment as interpreted by another sense equally under law1 and so on4 ,take pressure1 for instance2 we note by sense of sight the arm of a balance reacting regularly and constantly to definite small additions to load1 while upon our own arm we do not notice the same additions in any such series of feeling of pressure increments4 ,the arm and balance as disparate weighers must1 of course1 be in certain ratios related1 and for a certain range we must have a geometrical series1 but other ratios at other points4 ,that the degree of sensitivity is proportioned to the intensity of sensation already present1 that the knock at the door must be the louder the more noise is going on within1 is a defect in organic measurement1 but it is not entirely absent in mechanical2 scales which weigh by the ton do not respond easily or at all to minute weights4 ,but1 abstractly speaking1 mechanic methods are in general far superior to organic2 a fine balance weighs better than any arm1 and a good camera pictures better than the best eye2 that is1 their ratio of discriminating sensibility is far greater than natural organs1 and it may be as geometric series to arithmetic series4 ,practically1 however1 organic weighing and seeing are well adjusted to the demands of life4 ,an appreciation of gravity1 so far as it is of use to the organism1 is secured1 and if a finer sensibility were demanded it would be attained4 ,that is1 ,i am inclined to believe that the ,weber-,fechner law of definite mathematical proportions is purely empirical1 and does not mark a real limit or a fundamental psycho-physical law4 ,if a man's life and living depended on it1 he could become a good weighing machine1 and in time a race of organic weighers might be raised up which should vie in accuracy and range with the best scales now constructed4 ,the quotient of sensitiveness is really indefinitely variable4 ,it is probable1 indeed1 that deep sea organisms have a discriminative sensibility for both gravity and light far more delicate than the acutest human sense4 ,the whole subject of measurement of mental intensities must evidently be approached with the greatest care1 and the diversities of researches in results and in their interpretation1 is evidence that we have not completely isolated the facts we are in search of4 ,conscious experimentation must be allowed as tending to disturb sense4 ,when attention is strained to marking sense increments it may very easily be deluded1 and wrongly suppose as to feeling or not feeling4 ,consciousness is by no means infallible as to its own acts1 and especially when artificial4 ,feelings may1 and often do1 originate subjectively by suggestion1 and hence may have no direct reference to the external cause which is under experimental manipulation4 ,and not only have we thus to guard against a strong tendency to introspective and apperceptive error as to what we actually experience1 or how we experience1 but we have also to constantly bear in mind that every experience1 every sensing1 as of pressure1 light1 etc41 is not an isolated phenomenon1 but as resting upon and involving the past1 it can never be a simple direct measure of the objective present1 as a given weight or light4 ,every conscious experience1 like all other vital organic phenomena1 has thus an individuality and differs from every other as every leaf differs from every other1 and so the laws of experience are capable only of general expression4 ,since all consciousness is self-integrating and brings up the past into itself1 it is always more than any occasional reflection of a present phenomenon2 in the finest analysis every consciousness must have an equation of its own4 ,however1 there is a quotient of relation of physical stimulus1 mechanically measured1 with increase and decrease of both sense and of pleasure-pain4 ,the pack-carrier feels in a certain proportion to his present load pressure of weight-increments1 and pressure pains also augment1 though probably not in strict corresponding ratio4 ,it is a popular saying that the last straw breaks the camel's back1 and it is certain that pains rapidly culminate4 ,it is probable that increments which may not be sensed may yet be felt as pain4 ,in fact1 it is but very gradually that sense of pressure is evolved as practically free of pain2 as a mere cognitive process it is always secondary to pleasure-pain states which are felt directly from weights or but slightly objectified4 ,pleasure-pain which proceeds from weights gradually is driven to sensing them--the evolution of the pressure sense--and to noting variations1 sense increments1 and if1 like marine organisms1 we ranged through pressure zones1 the significance of discriminative sensibility might be very great4 ,however1 it is obvious that in its rise and in its whole evolution1 pleasure-pain is bound up with the pressure sense1 but not with the arm of the balance as a record4 ,hence it is possible that ,weber's law1 so far as applicable1 is in some measure a result of feeling interference4 ,the simplicity of direct reaction is being destroyed by the hedonalgic law disturbing the direct ratio2 we may thus feel an increasing pain from increasing weights1 and have decreasing pressure sense4 ,beyond a certain point the law of increments1 with reference to external standard for sensing and for pleasure and pain are in inverse ratio4 ,on a very hot day we notice more and more strongly each additional degree of heat by the temperature sense1 but beyond a certain degree1 peculiar to the individual at the time1 sense of heat will rapidly diminish as heat increases1 and with increase of pain4 ,as to the number of feelings1 of qualitatively distinct states1 we must on a general doctrine of evolution pronounce this to be innumerable and indefinite4 ,the present forms of feeling in human consciousness of course represent but a small fraction of the total number which have arisen in the course of psychic evolution4 ,every distinct form implies a long evolution of intermediate types which are now for the most part beyond our realization and so beyond cognition4 ,the process of naming affords some slight clue to the importance and multiformity of feeling1 though this denotes only a few of the most obvious points which have impressed themselves on the popular mind4 ,certainly the most striking fact to ordinary introspection1 human and sub-human1 is feeling1 and the manifold variety of simple pleasure-pains and of emotions has always1 and will always1 attract most strongly the general attention4 ,it would be a most interesting and profitable study to follow the course of language in its denotation of feeling4 ,varied expression for varied feelings is gradually achieved in vocal forms1 which expressions become a language sense to denote the feeling expressed4 ,thus the hoarse bellow of rage will both express and denote rage4 ,the vocal expression form as imitated is the earliest language form1 and only very gradually does language assume the mechanical and arbitrary forms of its highest development4 ,it is by imitating being mad vocally and otherwise1 and pointing to the angered one1 that the savage conveys the idea of anger4 ,gradually all but the vocal expression is dropped1 and this conventionalized1 becomes the origin of the word to denote the emotion in question4 ,feeling and emotion names are doubtless in their origin debased vocal expression forms1 though in the later evolution of language this is generally not detectable1 and various other more indirect associations control language4 ,only states of consciousness which have attained a considerable force and prominence receive notice in the vocabulary of common speech4 ,for many variances of feeling there is no word denotation1 but it may be given by intonation4 ,the number of names of feeling is thus in any language1 or in all languages1 but a very rough index to the actual number of kinds of feeling1 and we may expect that a thorough scientific analysis will develop as extended scientific nomenclature of feeling1 as chemistry has of kinds of matter4 ,at the present crude stage of psychology we must affirm that the number of cognizable1 but unnamed feelings1 far exceeds the number of the named1 and that the number of the undiscriminated or the undiscovered feelings far exceeds the number of both forms4 ,on the whole1 it has been the object of our present studies to point out with some definiteness the extent and mode of the early differentiation of feeling4 ,owing to the peculiar difficulties which beset this form of study and to which we have often adverted1 our conclusions may seem rather meagre and uncertain1 but it is sufficient if they emphasize a region of introspective study1 which1 though of the utmost practical importance1 is yet the most neglected of all in psychic science2 and we hope to have set forth the most probable general order of mental evolution with some distinctness as based on the struggle of existence4 ,mind1 beginning in pure pain1 and culminating on the feeling side in the higher emotions1 contains an intermediate1 continuous1 indefinite number of forms1 determined by the demands of life and preserved by natural selection1 many of which are so entirely outgrown that they may be for ever beyond human conception1 and many occurring only occasionally in human consciousness as survivals1 and a large1 yet comparatively small number constituting the present evolution phase of feeling in human consciousness4 ,we have dwelt specially on the lower developments1 the rise of objectification and its nature1 the rise and value of emotion1 with some characterization of the simpler and earlier emotions4 ,emotion is superior to and supplants sensation1 though based thereon4 ,the poison ,i fear1 ,i abstain from without tasting2 but with lower psychisms there must be a direct sensing of the thing before its experience quality is apprehended4 ,must we not suppose that feeling and emotion is destined to be an evanescent form in the evolution of mind8 ,is not the emotional type gradually disappearing1 and will not the men of the future be pure indifferentists8 ,or are we rather to judge that emotion will always continue to strengthen and deepen8 ,in an intellectual and introspective age like our own the nave mental life1 which is primitive and merely natural1 vanishes1 and we find that men everywhere1 like ,kenyon1 in ,howell's novel1 ,the ,undiscovered ,country are constantly destroying their feelings by pulling them up by the roots to see what they are and why they are4 ,such are only occasionally surprised into a genuine emotion1 but they greet it with joy1 and forthwith pull it to pieces in a morbid self-analysis4 ,an indifferentism1 born of intellectual curiosity1 of scepticism or of pessimism1 is1 in fact1 a pathological state1 a certain mono-emotionalism1 for humanity cannot escape emotionalism if it would4 ,this blas way of looking at things and feeling about them1 is a decadent symptom in an artificial age4 ,the struggle of life in a natural state always demands a varied1 prompt1 and frank emotionalism4 ,if mind lose its love of things and men1 it may yet be moved to highest attainment by sentiments like the love of science and truth4 ,an intense intellectual life must be driven to its strugglings and achievements by some strong motive power1 some powerful emotion1 though this may be purely impersonal1 like the conviction of duty1 or the love of truth4 ,feeling as the fundamental element in mind1 as the very core of mentality1 as the force which actuates both will and cognition1 can never be destroyed1 and for the future progress of mind1 as for the past1 we are assured that feeling and emotion will not cease to become ever stronger1 deeper1 and nobler4 ,,errata4 ,in the following index1 for pages #ajj-ccb1 subtract four2 pages #ccb-cij1 subtract five4 ,,index ,,note4--,the letter m affixed to a page number signifies the middle third of the page2 the letter b signifies the bottom third of the page2 no letter being affixed1 the top third of the page is referred to4 sthetic psychosis1 #bii1 #cbi1 #cgcm4 ,,allen1 ,,grant1 #db1 #cja;b1 #cjcm4 ,altruism1 #aai;b1 #cdj;b1 #cdhm4 ,anger1 #aca1 #cfi;b4 ,apperception1 #bdfm1 #bea4 ,arrogance1 #bgi4 ,attention1 #bbi4 ,awe1 #abc4 ,,bain1 #di1 #age1 #bbc;b1 #cha;b4 ,,baldwin1 ,j4 ,m41 #bfc4 ,belief1 #bbjm4 ,,blair1 #cae4 ,,bosanquet1 #cgcm4 ,cause and effect in consciousness1 #chd4 ,chance1 #chfm4 ,change and consciousness1 #bc4 ,characteristic1 emotion for1 #ccd;b4 ,christianity1 #afd;b1 #ahg4 ,comic1 the1 #cga4 ,,comte1 #bh4 ,conceit1 #bgh1 #bgi;b4 ,consciousness1 function of1 #afg4 ,continua1 #gc4 ,craving1 #bjg;b4 ,curiosity1 #bah;b4 ,,darwin1 #cja;b1 #cda1 #ceb;b1 #cecm1 #ceg1 #cffm4 ,desire1 #aif4 ,despair1 #abe4 ,desperation1 #abf;b4 ,,dewey1 ,j41 #ceg1 note4 ,differentiation of consciousness1 #aeam4 ,dignity1 #bhj4 ,disappointment1 #afi4 ,dismay1 #abg4 ,drama1 #cgbm ,dread1 #aai4 ,dream life and self consciousness1 #bfi4 ,education and desire1 #bbh4 ,ego1 #bcd;b4 ,embarrassment1 #bham4 ,emotion1 #gh4 rationale of1 #ha4 analysis of1 #hb4 retrospective1 #ahj1 #chcm4 classification of1 #ahj4 future of1 #cidm4 ,ennui1 #baf;b4 ,ethical emotion1 #ccg4 ,evil1 problem of1 #aeg4 ,evolution1 antithetic mental1 #bga1 #che4 ,exasperation1 #afbm4 ,excitement1 #di4 ,expression1 #cjc1 #cej4 ,familiarity1 emotion of1 #agg4 ,fear1 #ia1 #ced1 #cfi;b4 of fear1 #hi4 ,,fechner1 #caj;b4 ,feeling1 psychology of imperfect1 #b4 and subjective method1 #g4 and pleasure-pain1 #dh4 definition of1 #eh1 #gf;b4 number of feelings1 #cibm4 ,fine ,art1 #cfcm1 #cgc4 ,hate1 #adgm4 ,hedonalgic1 #agg1 note4 ,hedonism1 #da;b1 #bjd;b4 ,h,,ffding1 #bi1 #bjam4 ,hope1 #bbjm1 #afi;b4 ,horror1 #aba;b4 ,,howells1 ,w4 ,d41 quoted1 #cbg4 ,,hume1 #bfb;b4 ,humility1 #bhc;b4 ,imagination1 #caa4 ,imitation1 #ec1 #cfhm4 ,impulse1 #bbd;b4 ,indignation1 #afb;b4 ,induction1 #baj1 #baa1 #bhf4 ,inhibition1 #bdb;b4 ,integration of consciousness1 #gi4 ,intellectual emotion1 #bie;b4 ,intensity1 #chm1 #di1 #bca;b1 #chg;b4 ,interest1 #bbd;b1 #bdg1 #bgj;b4 ,,james1 ,w41 #bcg;b1 #bci1 #cfd;b4 ,,johnson1 ,w4 ,e41 #ed4 ,knowledge1 origin of1 #fa1 #iem1 #bfc;b1 #bfg4 ,,landor1 ,w4 ,s41 quoted1 #bgim4 ,laokon group1 #cgd4 ,lotze1 #db4 ,malice1 #afb;b4 ,,marshall1 ,h4 ,r41 #bh1 #dj;b1 #cjfm4 ,,mason1 ,f4 ,a41 #ef4 ,,mercier1 #adb4 ,method of psychology1 #d1 #acc1 #aeb1 #cfb;b1 #cgf4 ,,mill1 ,j4 ,s41 #bhf;b4 ,moral sense1 #ccg4 ,novelty1 feeling of1 #agj4 ,optimism1 #aic;b4 ,pain1 knowledge of1 #h4 primitive mind1 #ac4 and tension1 #ce4 and sensation1 #cg4 ,panic1 #abbm4 ,perception1 origin of1 #gj4 ,,perez1 #ccg4 ,pessimism1 #aic;b4 ,play1 #cjc;b1 #ceem1 #cfim4 ,pleasure1 evolution of1 #ad4 function of1 #dd;b4 as bad term1 #bjd4 ,pleasure-,pain and sensation1 #fb1 #aif4 as quality1 #ch4 physiological theory1 #da;b4 ,,preyer1 #ag;b4 ,pride1 #bgc;b4 ,psychology1 imperfectness of1 #a1 #acc1 #aeb1 #bjc;b4 and evolution1 #ei1 #cha;b4 experimental1 #cgh4 physiological1 #chj4 ,quantity in consciousness1 #chh4 ,recognition1 #aga;b4 ,regret1 #aie4 ,remorse1 #aie4 ,representation1 #bgh4 ,resignation1 #aie4 ,retrospective emotion1 #ahj4 ,revenge1 #ahc;b4 ,self-feeling1 #bee4 consciousness1 #bee4 and dream life1 #bfi4 satisfaction1 #bhj;b4 ,senile psychology1 #bh4 ,sexual emotion1 #bii;b4 ,shame1 #bhb;b4 ,shelley quoted1 #cbj1 #cbd4 ,,sidgwick1 ,h41 #bja;b4 ,sorrow1 #ahg4 ,,spencer1 ,,herbert1 #cjc;b1 #cad1 #cbjm1 #cbf1 #cbim1 #ccg;b1 #cde4 ,,spinoza1 #bjj1 #bja4 ,spontaneity1 #cha;b4 ,,stewart1 ,d41 #bbb;b4 ,style1 #cad4 ,sub-consciousness1 #cb;b4 ,surprise1 #bif;b1 #ej1 #afg;b4 ,teleologic emotion1 #big;b4 ,tentacular experience1 #ha4 ,,titchener1 ,e4 ,b41 #aj4 ,variation1 mental1 #che4 ,,volkmann1 #bjj4 ,,ward1 ,,james1 #g1 #bb;b1 #gc1 #bjc1 #bcb;b1 #bdf4 ,weber's law1 #chi4 ,wonder1 #bif;b4 ,wundt1 #cea1 note4 -------------- ,butler ,tanner1 ,the ,selwood ,printing ,works1 ,frome1 and ,london4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note ,hyphenation is mostly consistent4 ,the word #8representation' is frequently given as #8re-presentation'1 as a technical term4 ,where the hyphen occurs at a line break1 it is retained or removed based on other instances of the word in the text4 ,errors deemed most likely to be the printer's have been corrected1 and are noted here4 ,the references are to the page and line in the original4 #c4bi that feeling is a 8strange0 mysterious world ,removed4 #d4ai through the self-observation of the human ,restored4 mind #i4e that it must be in consciousness ,inserted4 #dj4cd viz41 of the neural basis ,added4 #bbe4ai whether a pain1 pleasure1 perception ,inserted4 #cdi4be 7,expression of the ,emotions in ,man and ,removed4 ,animals1 ,new ,york1 #ahhf1 p4 #cej72 #cfi4h ,the interpretation of expression ,inserted4