,,the ,,prince    ,,by    ,,niccol      
,,machiavelli    ,,translated ,,into    
,,english ,,by    ,,luigi ,,ricci       
,,humphrey ,,milford    ,,oxford        
,,university ,,press    ,,london        
,,edinburgh ,,glasgow    ,,new ,,york   
,,toronto ,,melbourne ,,capetown        
,,bombay ,,calcutta ,,and ,,madras      
#aiji          ,,preface      ,of all   
,machiavelli's works ,the ,prince is    
undoubtedly the greatest2  and a new    
,english edition of it is likely to be  
welcome to all those  who have not the  
advantage of reading it in the classical
 ,italian  original4    ,for a true     
appreciation of ,machiavelli1 impossible
 in a brief ,preface1  ,i must refer the
 ,english reader to ,macaulay's ,essay  
on the ,italian  historian and          
statesman4#a ,in it he will see how our 
,author's ideas and  work were          
wrongfully and wilfully misinterpreted  
by the very men who1  while profiting by
 his wisdom1 have with great ingratitude
 criticised  the statesman and defamed  

his name1 as that of the inventor of the
  worst political system ever imagined4 
,yet1 as his whole life was an          
indefatigable and unremitting endeavour 
to secure for his native  ,florence a   
good and popular government1 and as he  
lost his great office  of ,secretary to 
the ,florentine ,republic on account of 
his avowed  liberal opinions1 it is not 
only unjust but ridiculous to accuse him
 of  helping tyrants to enslave the     
people4 ,what he did was to show in the 
most deliberate and in the plainest way 
the arts by which free peoples  were    
made slaves2 and1 had his words of      
advice been always heeded1 no  tyrant in
 ,italy or elsewhere could have been    
successful in his policy4  ,that he was 
not listened to1 and his advice scorned 
and spurned1 was  not ,machiavelli's    
fault4    ,those who still share the    
opinion of his interested detractors    
should  read his private correspondence 
with the leaders of liberal ideas  in   
,italy--many of his letters being still 

left unpublished in the  ,,ms4          
,collection of ,giuliano ,ricci in the  
,national ,library1 in the  ,riccardiana
 ,library 7,no4 #bdfg71 in the          
,government ,archives 7,strozzi1  ,nos4 
#acc and #ajbh7 of ,florence1 in the    
,barberini ,library1 and in the         
,collezione ,gonnelli of the ,palatine  
,library in ,rome4    ,,luigi ,,ricci4  
#bb ,,albemarle ,,street1 ,,london1 ,w4 
#a ,machiavelli by ,thomas ,babington   
,macaulay is available at ,project      
,gutenberg in ,critical1 ,historical1   
and ,miscellaneous ,essays2 ,vol4 #a1   
ebook #eeija4        ,,contents         
,,niccol ,,machiavelli ,,to ,,lorenzo   
,,the ,,magnificent    #a4 ,the various 
kinds of ,government and the ways by    
which they are  established4    #b4 ,of 
,hereditary ,monarchies4    #c4 ,of     
,mixed ,monarchies4    #d4 ,why the     
,kingdom of ,darius1 occupied by        
,alexander1 did not rebel  against the  
successors of the latter after his      
death4    #e4 ,the way to govern ,cities

 or ,dominions that1 previous to being  
occupied1 lived under their own ,laws4  
#f4 ,of ,new ,dominions which have been 
acquired by one's own ,arms and         
,powers4    #g4 ,of ,new ,dominions     
acquired by the ,power of others or by  
,fortune4    #h4 ,of those who have     
attained the position of ,prince by     
villainy4    #i4 ,of the ,civic         
,principality4    #aj4 ,how the strength
 of all ,states should be measured4     
#aa4 ,of ,ecclesiastical                
,principalities4    #ab4 ,the different 
kinds of ,militia and ,mercenary        
,soldiers4    #ac4 ,of ,auxiliary1      
,mixed1 and ,native ,troops    #ad4     
,what the duties of a ,prince are with  
regard to the ,militia4    #af4 ,of the 
things for which ,men1 and especially   
,princes1 are praised or  blamed4       
#af4 ,of ,liberality and ,niggardliness4
    #ag4 ,of ,cruelty and ,clemency1 and
 whether it is better to be loved or    
feared4    #ah4 ,in what way ,princes   
must keep faith4    #ai4 ,that we must  

avoid being despised and hated4    #bj4 
,whether ,fortresses and other things   
which ,princes often make are  useful or
 injurious4    #ba4 ,how a ,prince must 
act in order to gain reputation4    #bb4
 ,of the ,secretaries of ,princes4      
#bc4 ,how ,flatterers must be shunned4  
#bd4 ,why the ,princes of ,italy have   
lost their ,states4    #be4 ,how much   
,fortune can do in human affairs1 and   
how it may be opposed4    #bf4          
,exhortation to liberate ,italy from the
 ,barbarians4          ,,niccol         
,,machiavelli    ,,to    ,,lorenzo ,,the
 ,,magnificent    ,,son ,,of ,,piero    
,,di ,,medici      ,it is customary for 
those who wish to gain the favour of a  
prince to  endeavour to do so by        
offering him gifts of those things which
 they  hold most precious1 or in which  
they know him to take especial delight4 
,in this way princes are often presented
 with horses1 arms1 cloth of  gold1     
gems1 and such-like ornaments worthy of 
their grandeur4 ,in my  desire1 however1

 to offer to ,your ,highness some humble
 testimony of  my devotion1 ,i have been
 unable to find among my possessions    
anything  which ,i hold so dear or      
esteem so highly as that knowledge of   
the deeds  of great men which ,i have   
acquired through a long experience of   
modern  events and a constant study of  
the past4    ,the results of my long    
observations and reflections are        
recorded in the  little volume which ,i 
now offer to ,your ,highness3 and       
although ,i deem  this work unworthy of 
,your ,highness's notice1 yet my        
confidence in your  humanity assures me 
that you will accept it1 knowing that it
 is not  in my power to offer you a     
greater gift than that of enabling you  
to  understand in the shortest possible 
time all those things which ,i have     
learnt through danger and suffering in  
the course of many years4 ,i have  not  
sought to adorn my work with long       
phrases or high-sounding words or  any  
of those allurements and ornaments with 

which many writers seek to  embellish   
their books1 as ,i desire no honour for 
my work but such as  its truth and the  
gravity of its subject may justly       
deserve4 ,nor will  it1 ,i trust1 be    
deemed presumptuous on the part of a man
 of humble and  obscure condition to    
attempt to discuss and criticise the    
government of  princes2 for in the same 
way that landscape painters station     
themselves  in the valleys in order to  
draw mountains or elevated ground1 and  
ascend an eminence in order to get a    
good view of the plains1 so it  is      
necessary to be a prince to be able to  
know thoroughly the nature  of a people1
 and to know the nature of princes one  
must be one of the  populace4    ,may ,i
 trust1 therefore1 that ,your ,highness 
will accept this little gift  in the    
spirit in which it is offered2 and if   
,your ,highness will deign  to peruse   
it1 you will recognise in it my ardent  
desire that you may  attain to that     
grandeur which fortune and your own     

merits presage for  you4    ,and should 
,your ,highness gaze down from the      
summit of that eminence  towards this   
humble spot1 you will recognise the     
great and unmerited  sufferings         
inflicted on me by a cruel fate4        
,,the ,,prince          ,,chapter ,i    
,,the ,,various ,,kinds ,,of            
,,government ,,and ,,the ,,ways ,,by    
,,which ,,they ,,are  ,,established     
,all states and dominions which hold or 
have held sway over mankind are  either 
republics or monarchies4 ,monarchies are
 either hereditary ones1  in which the  
rulers have been for many years of the  
same family1 or  else they are those of 
recent foundation4 ,the newly founded   
ones are  either entirely new1 as was   
,milan to ,francesco ,sforza1 or else   
they  are1 as it were1 new members      
grafted on to the hereditary possessions
  of the prince that annexes them1 as is
 the kingdom of ,naples to the  ,king of
 ,spain4 ,the dominions thus acquired   
have either been previously  accustomed 

to the rule of another prince1 or else  
have been free  states1 and they are    
annexed either by force of arms of the  
prince1 or  of others1 or else fall to  
him by good fortune or merit4           
,,chapter ,,ii      ,,of ,,hereditary   
,,monarchies      ,i will not here speak
 of republics1 having already treated of
 them  fully in another place4 ,i will  
deal only with monarchies1 and will show
  how the various kinds described above 
can be governed and maintained4  ,in the
 first place1 in hereditary states      
accustomed to the reigning  family the  
difficulty of maintaining them is far   
less than in new  monarchies2 for it is 
sufficient not to exceed the ancestral  
usages1  and to accommodate one's self  
to accidental circumstances2 in this way
  such a prince1 if of ordinary ability1
 will always be able to maintain  his   
position1 unless some very exceptional  
and excessive force deprives  him of it2
 and even if he be thus deprived of it1 
on the slightest  misfortune happening  

to the new occupier1 he will be able to 
regain it4    ,we have in ,italy the    
example of the ,duke of ,ferrara1 who   
was able  to withstand the assaults of  
the ,venetians in the year '#hd1 and of 
,pope ,julius in the year '#aj1 for no  
other reason than because of the        
antiquity of his family in that         
dominion4 ,in as much as the legitimate 
prince has less cause and less necessity
 to give offence1 it is only  natural   
that he should be more loved2 and1 if no
 extraordinary vices  make him hated1 it
 is only reasonable for his subjects to 
be naturally  attached to him1 the      
memories and causes of innovations being
 forgotten  in the long period over     
which his rule has existed2 whereas one 
change  always leaves the way prepared  
for the introduction of another4        
,,chapter ,,iii      ,,of ,,mixed       
,,monarchies      ,but it is in the new 
monarchy that difficulties really exist4
 ,firstly1  if it is not entirely new1  
but a member as it were of a mixed      

state1  its disorders spring at first   
from a natural difficulty which exists  
in all new dominions1 because men change
 masters willingly1 hoping to  better   
themselves2 and this belief makes them  
take arms against their  rulers1 in     
which they are deceived1 as experience  
shows them that they  have gone from bad
 to worse4 ,this is the result of       
another very natural  cause1 which is   
the necessary harm inflicted on those   
over whom the  prince obtains dominion1 
both by his soldiers and by an infinite 
number  of other injuries unavoidably   
caused by his occupation4    ,thus you  
find enemies in all those whom you have 
injured by occupying  that dominion1 and
 you cannot maintain the friendship of  
those who have  helped you to obtain    
this possession1 as you will not be able
 to fulfil  their expectations1 nor can 
you use strong measures with them1 being
  under an obligation to them2 for which
 reason1 however strong your  armies may
 be1 you will always need the favour of 

the inhabitants to  take possession of a
 province4 ,it was from these causes    
that ,louis ,,xii4  of ,france1 though  
able to occupy ,milan without trouble1  
immediately  lost it1 and the forces of 
,ludovico alone were sufficient to take 
it  from him the first time1 for the    
inhabitants who had willingly opened    
their gates to him1 finding themselves  
deluded in the hopes they had  cherished
 and not obtaining those benefits that  
they had anticipated1  could not bear   
the vexatious rule of their new prince4 
,it is indeed true that1 after          
reconquering the rebel territories they 
are not so easily lost again1 for the   
ruler is now1 by the fact of the        
rebellion1 less averse to secure his    
position by punishing offenders1        
investigating any suspicious            
circumstances1 and strengthening himself
  in weak places4 ,so that although the 
mere appearance of such a person  as    
,duke ,ludovico on the frontier was     
sufficient to cause ,france to lose     

,milan the first time1 to make her lose 
her grip of it the second time  was only
 possible when all the world was against
 her1 and after her  enemies had been   
defeated and driven out of ,italy2 which
 was the result  of the causes above    
mentioned4 ,nevertheless it was taken   
from her both  the first and the second 
time4 ,the general causes of the first  
loss  have been already discussed2 it   
remains now to be seen what were the    
causes of the second loss and by what   
means ,france could have avoided  it1 or
 what measures might have been taken by 
another ruler in that  position which   
were not taken by the ,king of ,france4 
,be it observed1  therefore1 that those 
states which on annexation are united to
 a  previously existing state may or may
 not be of the same nationality  and    
language4 ,if they are1 it is very easy 
to hold them1 especially if  they are   
not accustomed to freedom2 and to       
possess them securely it  suffices that 
the family of the princes which formerly

 governed them  be extinct4 ,for the    
rest1 their old condition not being     
disturbed1 and  there being no          
dissimilarity of customs1 the people    
settle down quietly  under their new    
rulers1 as is seen in the case of       
,burgundy1 ,brittany1  ,gascony1 and    
,normandy1 which have been so long      
united to ,france2 and  although there  
may be some slight differences of       
language1 the customs  of the people are
 nevertheless similar1 and they can get 
along well  together1 and whoever       
obtains possession of them and wishes to
 retain  them must bear in mind two     
things3 the one1 that the blood of their
 old  rulers is extinct2 the other1 to  
make no alteration either in their  laws
 or in their taxes2 in this way they    
will in a very short space of  time     
become united with their old possessions
 and form one state4 ,but  when         
dominions are acquired in a province    
differing in language1 laws1  and       
customs1 the difficulties to be overcome

 are great1 and it requires  good       
fortune as well as great industry to    
retain them2 one of the best  and most  
certain means of doing so would be for  
the new ruler to take  up his residence 
in them4 ,this would render their       
possession more  secure and durable1 it 
is what the ,turk has done in ,greece2  
in spite of  all the other measures     
taken by him to hold that state1 it     
would not  have been possible to retain 
it had he not gone to live there4 ,being
  on the spot1 disorders can be seen as 
they arise and can quickly be  remedied1
 but living at a distance1 they are only
 heard of when they  get beyond remedy4 
,besides which1 the province is not     
despoiled by  your officials1 the       
subjects are pleased with the easy      
accessibility  of their prince2 and     
wishing to be loyal they have more      
reason to love  him1 and should they be 
otherwise they will have greater cause  
to fear  him4    ,any external ,power   
who wishes to assail that state will be 

less  disposed to do so2 so that as long
 as he resides there he will be very    
hard to dispossess4 ,the other and      
better remedy is to plant colonies  in  
one or two of those places which form as
 it were the keys of the  land1 for it  
is necessary either to do this or to    
maintain a large  force of armed men4   
,the colonies will cost the prince      
little2 with  little or no expense on   
his part1 he can send and maintain them2
 he  only injures those whose lands and 
houses are taken to give to the new     
inhabitants1 and these form but a small 
proportion of the state1 and  those who 
are injured1 remaining poor and         
scattered1 can never do any  harm to    
him1 and all the others are1 on the one 
hand1 not injured and  therefore easily 
pacified2 and1 on the other1 are fearful
 of offending  lest they should be      
treated like those who have been        
dispossessed of  their property4 ,to    
conclude1 these colonies cost nothing1  
are more  faithful1 and give less       

offence2 and the injured parties being  
poor  and scattered are unable to do    
mischief1 as ,i have shown4 ,for it must
  be noted1 that men must either be     
caressed or else annihilated2 they  will
 revenge themselves for small injuries1 
but cannot do so for great  ones2 the   
injury therefore that we do to a man    
must be such that we  need not fear his 
vengeance4 ,but by maintaining a        
garrison instead of  colonists1 one will
 spend much more1 and consume in        
guarding it all  the revenues of that   
state1 so that the acquisition will     
result in  a loss1 besides giving much  
greater offence1 since it injures every 
one in that state with the quartering of
 the army on it2 which being  an        
inconvenience felt1 by all1 every one   
becomes an enemy1 and these  are enemies
 which can do mischief1 as1 though      
beaten1 they remain in  their own homes4
 ,in every way1 therefore1 a garrison is
 as useless  as colonies are useful4    
,further1 the ruler of a foreign        

province as  described1 should make     
himself the leader and defender of his  
less  powerful neighbours1 and endeavour
 to weaken the stronger ones1 and  take 
care that his possessions are not       
entered by some foreigner not  less     
powerful than himself1 who will always  
intervene at the request  of those who  
are discontented either through ambition
 or fear1 as was  seen when the toli    
invited the ,romans into ,greece2 and in
 whatever  province they entered1 it was
 always at the request of the           
inhabitants4  ,and the rule is that when
 a powerful foreigner enters a province1
 all  the less powerful inhabitants     
become his adherents1 moved by the envy 
they bear to those ruling over them2 so 
much so that with regard to  these minor
 potentates he has no trouble whatever  
in winning them over1  for they         
willingly join forces with the state    
that he has acquired4  ,he has merely to
 be careful that they do not assume too 
much power  and authority1 and he can   

easily with his own forces and their    
favour  put down those that are powerful
 and remain in everything the arbiter   
of that province4 ,and he who does not  
govern well in this way will  soon lose 
what he has acquired1 and while he holds
 it will meet with  infinite difficulty 
and trouble4    ,the ,romans in the     
provinces they took1 always followed    
this policy2  they established colonies1
 flattered the less powerful without    
increasing their strength1 put down the 
most powerful and did not allow  foreign
 rulers to obtain influence in them4 ,i 
will let the single  province of ,greece
 suffice as an example4 ,they made      
friends with the  ,achi and the toli1   
the kingdom of ,macedonia was cast down1
 and  ,antiochus driven out1 nor did    
they allow the merits of the ,achi or   
the  toli to gain them any increase of  
territory1 nor did the persuasions  of  
,philip induce them to befriend him     
without lowering him1 nor could  the    
power of ,antiochus make them consent to

 allow him to hold any state  in that   
province4    ,for the ,romans did in    
this case what all wise princes should  
do1 who  look not only at present       
dangers but also at future ones and     
diligently  guard against them2 for     
being foreseen they can easily be       
remedied1  but if one waits till they   
are at hand1 the medicine is no longer  
in  time as the malady has become       
incurable2 it happening with this as    
with  those hectic fevers spoken of by  
doctors1 which at their beginning  are  
easy to cure but difficult to recognise1
 but in course of time  when they have  
not at first been recognised and        
treated1 become easy  to recognise and  
difficult to cure4 ,thus it happens in  
matters of  state2 for knowing afar off 
7which it is only given to a prudent man
  to do7 the evils that are brewing1    
they are easily cured4 ,but when1  for  
want of such knowledge1 they are allowed
 to grow so that every  one can         
recognise them1 there is no longer any  

remedy to be found4  ,however1 the      
,romans1 observing these disorders while
 yet remote1 were  always able to find a
 remedy1 and never allowed them to      
proceed in  order to avoid a war2 for   
they knew that war was not to be        
avoided1  and could be deferred only to 
the advantage of the other side2 they   
therefore declared war against ,philip  
and ,antiochus in ,greece1 so as  not to
 have to fight them in ,italy1 though   
they might at the time  have avoided    
either2 this they did not choose to do1 
never caring to  do that which is now   
every day to be heard in the mouths of  
our wise  men1 to enjoy the benefits of 
time1 but preferring those of their  own
 virtue and prudence1 for time brings   
with it all things1 and may  produce    
indifferently either good or evil4 ,but 
let us return to ,france  and examine   
whether she did any of these things2 and
 ,i will speak not  of ,charles1 but of 
,louis as the one whose proceedings can 
be better  seen1 as he held possession  

in ,italy for a longer time2 you will   
then  see that he did the opposite of   
all those things which must be done to  
keep possession of a foreign state4     
,king ,louis was called into ,italy by  
the ambition of the ,venetians1 who     
wished by his coming to gain half  of   
,lombardy4 ,i will not blame the king   
for coming nor for the part  he took1   
because wishing to plant his foot in    
,italy1 and not having  friends in the  
country1 on the contrary the conduct of 
,king ,charles  having caused all doors 
to be closed to him1 he was forced to   
accept  what friendships he could find1 
and his schemes would have quickly  been
 successful if he had made no mistakes  
in his other proceedings4    ,the king  
then having acquired ,lombardy regained 
immediately the  reputation lost by     
,charles4 ,genoa yielded1 the           
,florentines became his  friends1 the   
,marquis of ,mantua1 the ,dukes of      
,ferrara and ,bentivogli1  the ,lady of 
,furl1 the ,lords of ,faenza1 ,pesaro1  

,rimini1 ,camerino1  and ,piombino1 the 
inhabitants of ,lucca1 of ,pisa1 and of 
,sienna1 all  approached him with offers
 of friendship4 ,the ,venetians might   
then  have seen the effects of their    
temerity1 how to gain a few lands  in   
,lombardy they had made the king ruler  
over two-thirds of ,italy4  ,consider   
how little difficulty the king would    
have had in maintaining  his reputation 
in ,italy if he had observed the rules  
above given1 and  kept a firm and sure  
hold over all those friends of his1 who 
being  many in number1 and weak1 and    
fearful one of the ,church1 another of  
the ,venetians1 were always obliged to  
hold fast to him1 and by whose  aid he  
could easily make sure of any who were  
still great4 ,but he was  hardly in     
,milan before he did exactly the        
opposite1 by giving aid to  ,pope       
,alexander to occupy the ,romagna4 ,nor 
did he perceive that1 in  taking this   
course1 he weakened himself1 by casting 
off his friends  and those who had      

placed themselves at his disposal1 and  
strengthened  the ,church by adding to  
the spiritual power1 which gives it such
  authority1 further temporal powers4   
,and having made the first mistake1  he 
was obliged to follow it up1 whilst1 to 
put a stop to the ambition  of          
,alexander and prevent him becoming     
ruler of ,tuscany1 he was forced  to    
come to ,italy4 ,and not content with   
having increased the power  of the      
,church and lost his friends1 he now    
desiring the kingdom of  ,naples1       
divided it with the king of ,spain2 and 
where he alone was the  arbiter of      
,italy1 he now brought in a companion1  
so that the ambitious  of that province 
who were dissatisfied with him might    
have some one  else to appeal to2 and   
where he might have left in that kingdom
 a king  tributary to him1 he           
dispossessed him in order to bring in   
another who  was capable of driving him 
out4 ,the desire to acquire possessions 
is  a very natural and ordinary thing1  

and when those men do it who can  do so 
successfully1 they are always praised   
and not blamed1 but when  they cannot   
and yet want to do so at all costs1 they
 make a mistake  deserving of great     
blame4 ,if ,france1 therefore1 with her 
own forces  could have taken ,naples1   
she ought to have done so2 if she could 
not  she ought not to have divided it4  
,and if the partition of ,lombardy with 
the ,venetians is to be excused1 as     
having been the means of allowing  the  
,french king to set foot in ,italy1 this
 other partition deserves  blame1 not   
having the excuse of necessity4 ,louis  
had thus made these  five mistakes3 he  
had crushed the smaller ,powers1        
increased the power  in ,italy of one   
ruler1 brought into the land a very     
powerful foreigner1  and he had not come
 to live there himself1 nor had he      
established  any colonies4 ,still these 
mistakes might1 if he had lived1 not    
have  injured him1 had he not made the  
sixth1 that of taking the state from    

the ,venetians2 for1 if he had not      
strengthened the ,church and brought    
the ,spaniards into ,italy1 it would    
have been right and necessary to  humble
 them2 having once taken those measures1
 he ought never to have  consented to   
their ruin2 because1 had the ,venetians 
been strong1 it  would have kept the    
others from making attempts on          
,lombardy1 partly  because the          
,venetians would not have consented to  
any measures by which  they did not get 
it for themselves1 and partly because   
the others would  not have wanted to    
take it from ,france to give it to      
,venice1 and would  not have had the    
courage to attack both4    ,if any one  
urges that ,king ,louis yielded the     
,romagna to ,alexander  and the kingdom 
to ,spain in order to avoid war1 ,i     
reply1 with the  reasons already given1 
that one ought never to allow a disorder
 to take  place in order to avoid war1  
for war is not thereby avoided1 but only
  deferred to your disadvantage4 ,and if

 others allege the promise given  by the
 king to the pope to undertake that     
enterprise for him1 in return  for the  
dissolution of his marriage and for the 
cardinalship of ,rohan1  ,i reply with  
what ,i shall say later on about the    
faith of princes and  how it is to be   
observed4 ,thus ,king ,louis lost       
,lombardy through not  observing any of 
those conditions which have been        
observed by others  who have taken      
provinces and wished to retain them4    
,nor is this any  miracle1 but very     
reasonable and natural4 ,i spoke of this
 matter with  ,cardinal ,rohan at       
,nantes when ,valentine1 as ,cesare     
,borgia1 son of ,pope  ,alexander1 was  
commonly called1 was occupying the      
,romagna1 for on  ,cardinal ,rohan      
saying to me that the ,italians did not 
understand war1  ,i replied that the    
,french did not understand politics1 for
 if they did  they would never allow the
 ,church to become so great4 ,and       
experience  shows us that the greatness 

in ,italy of the ,church and also of    
,spain  have been caused by ,france1 and
 her ruin has proceeded from them4 ,from
  which may be drawn a general rule1    
which never or very rarely fails1  that 
whoever is the cause of another becoming
 powerful1 is ruined  himself2 for that 
power is produced by him either through 
craft or  force2 and both of these are  
suspected by the one that has become    
powerful4          ,,chapter ,,iv       
,,why ,,the ,,kingdom ,,of ,,darius1    
,,occupied ,,by ,,alexander1 ,,did ,,not
 ,,rebel ,,against  ,,the ,,successors  
,,of ,,the ,,latter ,,after ,,his       
,,death4      ,considering the          
difficulties there are in holding a     
newly acquired  state1 some may wonder  
how it came to pass that ,alexander the 
,great  became master of ,asia in a few 
years1 and had hardly occupied it  when 
he died1 from which it might be supposed
 that the whole state  would have       
rebelled4 ,however1 his successors      
maintained themselves in  possession1   

and had no further difficulty in doing  
so than those which  arose among        
themselves from their own ambitions4    
,i reply that the kingdoms known to     
history have been governed in two  ways3
 either by a prince and his servants1   
who1 as ministers by his  grace and     
permission1 assist in governing the     
realm2 or by a prince  and by barons1   
who hold their positions not by favour  
of the ruler but  by antiquity of blood4
 ,such barons have states and subjects  
of their  own1 who recognise them as    
their lords1 and are naturally attached 
to  them4 ,in those states which are    
governed by a prince and his servants1  
the prince possesses more authority1    
because there is no one in the  state   
regarded as a superior besides himself1 
and if others are obeyed  it is merely  
as ministers and officials of the       
prince1 and no one  regards them with   
any special affection4 ,examples of     
these two kinds  of government in our   
own time are the ,turk and the ,king of 

,france4  ,all the ,turkish monarchy is 
governed by one ruler1 the others are   
his  servants1 and dividing his kingdom 
into sangiacates1 he sends to them      
various administrators1 and changes or  
recalls them at his pleasure4  ,but the 
,king of ,france is surrounded by a     
large number of ancient  nobles1        
recognised as such by their subjects1   
and loved by them2 they  have their     
prerogatives1 which the king cannot     
deprive them of without  danger to      
himself4 ,whoever now considers these   
two states will see that  it would be   
difficult to acquire the state of the   
,turk2 but having  conquered it1 it     
would be very easy to hold it4    ,the  
causes of the difficulty of occupying   
the ,turkish kingdom are1 that  the     
invader could not be invited by princes 
of that kingdom1 nor hope  to facilitate
 his enterprise by the rebellion of     
those around him1 as  will be evident   
from reasons given above4 ,because1     
being all slaves1  and bound1 it will be

 more difficult to corrupt them1 and    
even if  they were corrupted1 little    
effect could be hoped for1 as they would
  not be able to carry the people with  
them for the reasons mentioned4         
,therefore1 whoever assaults the ,turk  
must be prepared to meet his  united    
forces1 and must rely more on his own   
strength than on the  disorders of      
others2 but having once conquered him1  
and beaten him in  battle so that he can
 no longer raise armies1 nothing else is
 to be  feared except the family of the 
prince1 and if this is extinguished1    
there is no longer any one to be feared1
 the others having no credit  with the  
people2 and as the victor before the    
victory could place no  hope in them1 so
 he need not fear them afterwards4 ,the 
contrary is  the case in kingdoms       
governed like that of ,france1 because  
it is easy  to enter them by winning    
over some baron of the kingdom1 there   
being  always some malcontents1 and     
those desiring innovations4 ,these can1 

for the reasons stated1 open the way to 
you and facilitate victory2  but        
afterwards1 if you wish to keep         
possession1 infinite difficulties       
arise1 both from those who have aided   
you and from those you have  oppressed4 
,nor is it sufficient to extinguish the 
family of the prince1  for there remain 
those nobles who will make themselves   
the head of new  changes1 and being     
neither able to content them nor        
exterminate them1  you will lose the    
state whenever an occasion arises4 ,now 
if you will  consider what was the      
nature of the government of ,darius you 
will find  it similar to the kingdom of 
the ,turk1 and therefore ,alexander had 
first to completely overthrow it and    
seize the country1 after which  victory1
 ,darius being dead1 the state remained 
secure to ,alexander1  for the reasons  
discussed above4 ,and his successors1   
had they remained  united1 might have   
enjoyed it in peace1 nor did any tumults
 arise in  the kingdom except those     

fomented by themselves4 ,but it is      
impossible  to possess with such ease   
countries constituted like ,france4     
,hence arose the frequent rebellions of 
,spain1 ,france1 and ,greece  against   
the ,romans1 owing to the numerous      
principalities which existed  in those  
states2 for1 as long as the memory of   
these lasted1 the ,romans  were always  
uncertain of their possessions2 but when
 the memory of  these principalities had
 been extinguished they became1 with the
 power  and duration of the empire1     
secure possessions4    ,and afterwards  
the latter could1 when fighting among   
themselves1 draw  each one with him a   
portion of these provinces1 according to
 the  authority he had established      
there1 and these provinces1 when the    
family of their ancient princes was     
extinct1 recognised no other rulers  but
 the ,romans4 ,considering these things1
 therefore1 let no one be  surprised at 
the facility with which ,alexander could
 hold ,asia1 and at  the difficulties   

that others have had in holding acquired
 possessions1  like ,pyrrhus and many   
others2 as this was not caused by the   
greater or  smaller ability of the      
conqueror1 but depended on the          
dissimilarity of  the conditions4       
,,chapter ,v      ,,the ,,way ,,to      
,,govern ,,cities ,,or ,,dominions      
,,that1 ,,previous ,,to ,,being         
,,occupied1  ,,lived ,,under ,,their    
,,own ,,laws4      ,when those states   
which have been acquired are accustomed 
to live at  liberty under their own     
laws1 there are three ways of holding   
them4 ,the  first is to ruin them2 the  
second is to go and live there in       
person2  the third is to allow them to  
live under their own laws1 taking       
tribute  of them1 and creating there    
within the country a state composed of a
  few who will keep it friendly to you4 
,because this state1 being created  by  
the prince1 knows that it cannot exist  
without his friendship and  protection1 
and will do all it can to keep them1 and

 a city used to  liberty can be more    
easily held by means of its citizens    
than in  any other way1 if you wish to  
preserve it4 ,there is the example of   
the ,spartans and the ,romans4 ,the     
,spartans held ,athens and ,thebes by   
creating within them a state of a few   
people2 nevertheless they lost  them4   
,the ,romans1 in order to hold ,capua1  
,carthage1 and ,numantia1  destroyed    
them1 but did not lose them4 ,they      
wanted to hold ,greece in  almost the   
same way as the ,spartans held it1      
leaving it free and under  its own laws1
 but they did not succeed2 so that they 
were compelled  to destroy many cities  
in that province in order to keep it1   
because  in truth there is no sure      
method of holding them except by ruining
  them4 ,and whoever becomes the ruler  
of a free city and does not destroy  it1
 can expect to be destroyed by it1 for  
it can always find a motive  for        
rebellion in the name of liberty and of 
its ancient usages1 which  are forgotten

 neither by lapse of time nor by        
benefits received1 and  whatever one    
does or provides1 so long as the        
inhabitants are not  separated or       
dispersed1 they do not forget that name 
and those usages1  but appeal to them at
 once in every emergency1 as did ,pisa  
after being  so many years held in      
servitude by the ,florentines4 ,but when
 cities or  provinces have been         
accustomed to live under a prince1 and  
the family  of that prince is           
extinguished1 being on the one hand used
 to obey1 and  on the other not having  
their old prince1 they cannot unite in  
choosing  one from among themselves1 and
 they do not know how to live in        
freedom1  so that they are slower to    
take arms1 and a prince can win them    
over  with greater facility and         
establish himself securely4 ,but in     
republics  there is greater life1       
greater hatred1 and more desire for     
vengeance2  they do not and cannot cast 
aside the memory of their ancient       

liberty1  so that the surest way is     
either to destroy them or reside in     
them4          ,,chapter ,,vi      ,,of 
,,new ,,dominions ,,which ,,have ,,been 
,,acquired ,,by ,,one',s ,,own ,,arms   
,,and ,,powers      ,let no one marvel  
if in speaking of new dominions both as 
to prince  and state1 ,i bring forward  
very exalted instances1 for as men walk 
almost always in the paths trodden by   
others1 proceeding in their  actions by 
imitation1 and not being always able to 
follow others  exactly1 nor attain to   
the excellence of those they imitate1 a 
prudent  man should always follow in the
 path trodden by great men and imitate  
those who are most excellent1 so that if
 he does not attain to their  greatness1
 at any rate he will get some tinge of  
it4 ,he will do like  prudent archers1  
who when the place they wish to hit is  
too far off1  knowing how far their bow 
will carry1 aim at a spot much higher   
than  the one they wish to hit1 not in  
order to reach this height with  their  

arrow1 but by help of this high aim to  
hit the spot they wish  to4 ,i say then 
that in new dominions1 where there is a 
new prince1  it is more or less easy to 
hold them according to the greater or   
lesser ability of him who acquires them4
 ,and as the fact of a private          
individual becoming a prince presupposes
 either great ability or good  fortune1 
it would appear that either of these    
things would mitigate  in part many     
difficulties4 ,nevertheless those who   
have been wanting  as regards good      
fortune have maintained themselves best4
 ,the matter  is also facilitated by the
 prince being obliged to reside         
personally  in his territory1 having no 
others4 ,but to come to those who have  
become princes through their own merits 
and not by fortune1 ,i regard  as the   
greatest1 ,moses1 ,cyrus1 ,romulus1     
,theseus1 and such like4 ,and  although 
one should not speak of ,moses1 he      
having merely carried out  what was     
ordered him by ,god1 still he deserves  

admiration1 if only  for that grace     
which made him worthy to speak with     
,god4 ,but regarding  ,cyrus and others 
who have acquired or founded kingdoms1  
they will all  be found worthy of       
admiration2 and if their particular     
actions and  methods are examined they  
will not appear very different from     
those of  ,moses1 although he had so    
great a ,master4 ,and in examining their
 life  and deeds it will be seen that   
they owed nothing to fortune but the    
opportunity which gave them matter to be
 shaped into the form that they  thought
 fit2 and without that opportunity their
 powers would have been  wasted1 and    
without their powers the opportunity    
would have come in  vain4 ,it was thus  
necessary that ,moses should find the   
people of ,israel  slaves in ,egypt and 
oppressed by the ,egyptians1 so that    
they were  disposed to follow him in    
order to escape from their servitude4   
,it was  necessary that ,romulus should 
be unable to remain in ,alba1 and should

  have been exposed at his birth1 in    
order that he might become ,king of     
,rome and founder of that nation4 ,it   
was necessary that ,cyrus should  find  
the ,persians discontented with the     
empire of the ,medes1 and the  ,medes   
weak and effeminate through long peace4 
,theseus could not have  showed his     
abilities if he had not found the       
,athenians dispersed4    ,these         
opportunities1 therefore1 gave these men
 their chance1 and their  own great     
qualities enabled them to profit by     
them1 so as to ennoble  their country   
and augment its fortunes4 ,those who by 
heroic means such  as these become      
princes1 obtain their dominions with    
difficulty but  retain them easily1 and 
the difficulties which they have in     
acquiring  their dominions arise in part
 from the new rules and regulations that
  they have to introduce in order to    
establish their position securely4  ,it 
must be considered that there is nothing
 more difficult to carry  out1 nor more 

doubtful of success1 nor more dangerous 
to handle1 than  to initiate a new order
 of things4 ,for the reformer has       
enemies in all  those who profit by the 
old order1 and only lukewarm defenders  
in all  those who would profit by the   
new order1 this lukewarmness arising    
partly from fear of their adversaries1  
who have the laws in their  favour2 and 
partly from the incredulity of mankind1 
who do not truly  believe in anything   
new until they have had actual          
experience of it4  ,thus it arises that 
on every opportunity for attacking the  
reformer1  his opponents do so with the 
zeal of partisans1 the others only      
defend  him half-heartedly1 so that     
between them he runs great danger4 ,it  
is  necessary1 however1 in order to     
investigate thoroughly this question1   
to examine whether these innovators are 
independent1 or whether they  depend    
upon others1 that is to say1 whether in 
order to carry out  their designs they  
have to entreat or are able to force4   

,in the first  case they invariably     
succeed ill1 and accomplish nothing2 but
 when  they can depend on their own     
strength and are able to use force1 they
  rarely fail4 ,thus it comes about that
 all armed prophets have conquered  and 
unarmed ones failed2 for besides what   
has been already said1 the  character of
 people varies1 and it is easy to       
persuade them of a thing1  but difficult
 to keep them in that persuasion4 ,and  
so it is necessary  to order things so  
that when they no longer believe1 they  
can be made  to believe by force4       
,moses1 ,cyrus1 ,theseus1 and ,romulus  
would not have  been able to make their 
institutions observed for so long had   
they  been disarmed1 as happened in our 
own time to ,fra ,girolamo ,savonarola1 
who failed entirely in his new rules    
when the multitude began to  disbelieve 
in him1 and he had no means of holding  
fast those who had  believed nor of     
compelling the unbelievers to believe4  
,therefore  such men as these have great

 difficulty in making their way1 and all
  their dangers are met on the road and 
must be overcome by their own           
abilities2 but when once they have      
overcome them and have begun to be  held
 in veneration1 and have suppressed     
those who envied them1 they  remain     
powerful and secure1 honoured and happy4
 ,to the high examples  given ,i will   
add a lesser one1 which1 however1 is to 
be compared in  some measure with them  
and will serve as an instance of all    
such cases1  that of ,jerone of         
,syracuse1 who from a private individual
 became ,prince  of ,siracusa1 without  
other aid from fortune beyond the       
opportunity2  for the ,siracusans being 
oppressed elected him as their captain1 
from  which by merit he was made prince2
 while still in private life his        
virtues were such that it was written of
 him1 that he lacked nothing  to reign  
but the kingdom4 ,he abolished the old  
militia1 raised a new  one1 abandoned   
his old friendships and formed new ones2

 and as he had  thus friends and        
soldiers of his own1 he was able on this
 foundation  to build securely1 so that 
while he had great trouble in acquiring 
his  position he had little in          
maintaining it4          ,,chapter ,,vii
      ,,of ,,new ,,dominions ,,acquired 
,,by ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,others ,,or   
,,by ,,fortune      ,those who rise from
 private citizens to be princes merely  
by fortune  have little trouble in      
rising but very much in maintaining     
their  position4 ,they meet with no     
difficulties on the way as they fly over
  them1 but all their difficulties arise
 when they are established4 ,such  are  
they who are granted a state either for 
money1 or by favour of him  who grants  
it1 as happened to many in ,greece1 in  
the cities of ,ionia  and of the        
,hellespont1 who were created princes by
 ,darius in order to  hold these places 
for his security and glory2 such were   
also those  emperors who from private   
citizens became emperors by bribing the 

army4 ,such as these depend absolutely  
on the good will and fortune of  those  
who have raised them1 both of which are 
extremely inconstant and  unstable4     
,they neither know how to1 nor are in a 
position to maintain  their rank1 for   
unless he be a man of great genius it is
 not likely  that one who has always    
lived in a private position should know 
how to  command1 and they are unable to 
command because they possess no forces  
which will be friendly and faithful to  
them4 ,moreover1 states quickly         
founded1 like all other things which are
 born and grow rapidly1 cannot  have    
deep roots1 so that the first storm     
destroys them1 unless1 as  already said1
 the man who thus becomes a prince is of
 such great genius  as to be able to    
take immediate steps for maintaining    
what fortune  has thrown into his lap1  
and lay afterwards those foundations    
which  others make before becoming      
princes4 ,with regard to these two      
methods  of becoming a prince1--by      

ability or by good fortune1 ,i will here
  adduce two examples which have taken  
place within our memory1 those of       
,francesco ,sforza and ,cesare ,borgia4 
,francesco1 by appropriate means and    
through great abilities1 from  citizen  
became ,duke of ,milan1 and what he had 
attained after a thousand  difficulties 
he maintained with little trouble4 ,on  
the other hand1  ,cesare ,borgia1       
commonly called ,duke ,valentine1       
acquired the state  through the fortune 
of his father and by the same means lost
 it1 and  that although every measure   
was adopted by him and everything done  
that a prudent and capable man could do 
to establish himself firmly  in that    
state that the arms and the favours of  
others had given him4  ,for1 as we have 
said1 he who does not lay his           
foundations beforehand  may by great    
abilities do so afterwards1 although    
with great trouble  to the architect and
 danger to the building4 ,if1 then1 one 
considers  the progress made by the     

duke1 it will be seen how firm were the 
foundations he had laid to his future   
power1 which ,i do not think it         
superfluous to examine1 as ,i know of no
 better precepts for a new  prince to   
follow than the example of his actions2 
and if his measures  were not           
successful1 it was through no fault of  
his own but only by  the most           
extraordinary malignity of fortune4 ,in 
wishing to aggrandise  the duke his son1
 ,alexander ,,vi4 had to meet very great
 difficulties  both present and future4 
,in the first place1 he saw no way of   
making  him ruler of any state that was 
not a possession of the ,church4 ,and in
  attempting to take that of the        
,church1 he knew that the ,duke of      
,milan  and the ,venetians would not    
consent1 because ,faenza and ,rimini    
were  already under the protection of   
the ,venetians4 ,he saw1 moreover1 that 
the arms of ,italy1 especially of those 
who might have served him1 were  in the 
hands of those who would fear the       

greatness of the pope1 and  therefore he
 could not depend upon them1 being all  
under the ,orsinis  and ,colonnas and   
their adherents4 ,it was1 therefore1    
necessary to  disturb the existing      
condition and bring about disorders in  
the states  of ,italy in order to obtain
 secure mastery over a part of them2    
this  was easy1 for he found the        
,venetians1 who1 actuated by other      
motives1  had invited the ,french into  
,italy1 which he not only did not       
oppose1  but facilitated by dissolving  
the marriage of ,king ,louis4 ,the king 
came thus into ,italy with the aid of   
the ,venetians and the consent of       
,alexander1 and had hardly arrived at   
,milan before the pope obtained  troops 
from him for his enterprise in the      
,romagna1 which he carried out  by means
 of the reputation of the king4 ,the    
duke having thus obtained  the ,romagna 
and defeated the ,colonnas1 was hindered
 in maintaining it  and proceeding      
further by two things3 the one1 his     

forces1 of which he  doubted the        
fidelity2 the other the will of ,france1
 that is to say1  he feared lest the    
arms of the ,orsini of which he had     
availed himself  should fail him1 and   
not only hinder him in obtaining more   
but take  from him what he had already  
conquered1 and he also feared that the  
king might do the same4 ,he had evidence
 of this as regards the ,orsini  when1  
after taking ,faenza1 he assaulted      
,bologna and observed their             
backwardness in the assault4 ,and as    
regards the king1 he perceived his      
designs when1 after taking the dukedom  
of ,urbino1 he attacked ,tuscany1  and  
the king made him desist from that      
enterprise2 whereupon the  duke decided 
to depend no longer on the fortunes and 
arms of others4  ,the first thing he did
 was to weaken the parties of the       
,orsinis and  ,colonnas in ,rome by     
gaining all their adherents who were    
gentlemen and  making them followers of 
himself1 by granting them large         

pensions1  and appointing them to       
commands and offices according to their 
rank1  so that their attachment to their
 parties was extinguished in a few      
months1 and entirely concentrated on the
 duke4 ,after this he awaited an        
opportunity for crushing the ,orsinis1  
having dispersed the adherents of  the  
,colonna family1 and when the           
opportunity arrived he made good use  of
 it1 for the ,orsini seeing at length   
that the greatness of the duke  and of  
the ,church meant their own ruin1       
convoked a diet at ,magione in  the     
,perugino4 ,hence sprang the rebellion  
of ,urbino and the tumults in  ,romagna 
and infinite dangers to the duke1 who   
overcame them all with  the help of the 
,french2 and having regained his        
reputation1 neither  trusting ,france   
nor other foreign forces in order not to
 have to oppose  them1 he had recourse  
to stratagem4 ,he dissembled his aims so
 well that  the ,orsini1 through the    
mediation of ,signor ,pavolo1 made their

 peace  with him1 which the duke spared 
no efforts to make secure1 presenting   
them with robes1 money1 and horses1 so  
that in their simplicity they  were     
induced to come to ,sinigaglia and fell 
into his hands4 ,having  thus suppressed
 these leaders and made their partisans 
his friends1  the duke had laid a very  
good foundation to his power1 having all
 the  ,romagna with the duchy of        
,urbino1 and having gained the favour of
  the inhabitants1 who began to feel the
 benefit of his rule4 ,and as  this part
 is worthy of note and of imitation by  
others1 ,i will not  omit mention of it4
 ,when he took the ,romagna1 it had     
previously been  governed by weak       
rulers1 who had rather despoiled their  
subjects than  governed them1 and given 
them more cause for disunion than for   
union1  so that the province was a prey 
to robbery1 assaults1 and every kind  of
 disorder4 ,he1 therefore1 judged it    
necessary to give them a good           
government in order to make them        

peaceful and obedient to his rule4  ,for
 this purpose he appointed ,messer      
,remiro d' ,orco1 a cruel and able  man1
 to whom he gave the fullest authority4 
,this man1 in a short time1  was highly 
successful in rendering the country     
orderly and united1  whereupon the duke1
 not deeming such excessive authority   
expedient1  lest it should become       
hateful1 appointed a civil court of     
justice in  the middle of the province  
under an excellent president1 to which  
each  city appointed its own advocate4  
,and as he knew that the harshness of   
the past had engendered some amount of  
hatred1 in order to purge the  minds of 
the people and to win them over         
completely1 he resolved to  show that if
 any cruelty had taken place it was not 
by his orders1 but  through the harsh   
disposition of his minister4 ,and taking
 him on some  pretext1 he had him placed
 one morning in the public square at    
,cesena1  cut in half1 with a piece of  
wood and blood-stained knife by his     

side4  ,the ferocity of this spectacle  
caused the people both satisfaction and 
amazement4 ,but to return to where we   
left off4    ,the duke being now        
powerful and partly secured against     
present perils1  being armed himself1   
and having in a great measure put down  
those  neighbouring forces which might  
injure him1 had now to get the respect  
of ,france1 if he wished to proceed with
 his acquisitions1 for he  knew that the
 king1 who had lately discovered his    
error1 would not  give him any help4 ,he
 began therefore to seek fresh alliances
 and to  vacillate with ,france in the  
expedition that the ,french made towards
  the kingdom of ,naples against the    
,spaniards1 who were besieging ,gaeta4  
,his intention was to assure himself of 
them1 which he would soon have          
succeeded in doing if ,alexander had    
lived4 ,these were the measures  taken  
by him with regard to the present4 ,as  
to the future1 he feared  that a new    
successor to the ,church might not be   

friendly to him and  might seek to      
deprive him of what ,alexander had given
 him1 and he  sought to provide against 
this in four ways4 ,firstly1 by         
destroying all  who were of the blood of
 those ruling families which he had     
despoiled1  in order to deprive the pope
 of any opportunity4 ,secondly1 by      
gaining  the friendship of the ,roman   
nobles1 so that he might through them   
hold  as it were the pope in check4     
,thirdly1 by obtaining as great a hold  
on  the ,college as he could4 ,fourthly1
 by acquiring such power before the     
pope died as to be able to resist alone 
the first onslaught4 ,of these  four    
things he had at the death of ,alexander
 accomplished three1 and  the fourth he 
had almost accomplished4    ,for of the 
dispossessed rulers he killed as many as
 he could lay hands  on1 and very few   
escaped2 he had gained to his party the 
,roman nobles2  and he had a great share
 in the ,college4 ,as to new            
possessions1 he  designed to become lord

 of ,tuscany1 and already possessed     
,perugia and  ,piombino1 and had assumed
 the protectorate over ,pisa2 and as he 
had  no longer to fear the ,french 7for 
the ,french had been deprived of the    
kingdom of ,naples by the ,spaniards in 
such a way that both parties  were      
obliged to buy his friendship7 he seized
 ,pisa4 ,after this1 ,lucca  and ,siena 
at once yielded1 partly through envy of 
the ,florentines and  partly through    
fear2 the ,florentines had no resources1
 so that1 had he  succeeded as he had   
done before1 in the very year that      
,alexander died  he would have gained   
such strength and renown as to be able  
to maintain  himself without depending  
on the fortunes or strength of others1  
but  solely by his own power and        
ability4 ,but ,alexander died five years
  after he had first drawn his sword4   
,he left him with the state of  ,romagna
 only firmly established1 and all the   
other schemes in mid-air1  between two  
very powerful and hostile armies1 and   

suffering from a  fatal illness4 ,but   
the valour and ability of the duke were 
such1 and  he knew so well how to win   
over men or vanquish them1 and so strong
  were the foundations that he had laid 
in this short time1 that if he  had not 
had those two armies upon him1 or else  
had been in good health1  he would have 
survived every difficulty4 ,and that his
 foundations were  good is seen from the
 fact that the ,romagna waited for him  
more than a  month2 in ,rome1 although  
half dead1 he remained secure1 and      
although  the ,baglioni1 ,vitelli1 and  
,orsini entered ,rome they found no     
followers  against him4 ,he was able1 if
 not to make pope whom he wished1 at any
  rate to prevent a pope being created  
whom he did not wish4 ,but if at  the   
death of ,alexander he had been well    
everything would have been  easy4 ,and  
he told me on the day that ,pope ,julius
 ,,ii4 was created1  that he had thought
 of everything which might happen on the
 death of  his father1 and provided     

against everything1 except that he had  
never  thought that at his father's     
death he would be dying himself4        
,reviewing  thus all the actions of the 
duke1 ,i find nothing to blame1 on the  
contrary1 ,i feel bound1 as ,i have     
done1 to hold him up as an example  to  
be imitated by all who by fortune and   
with the arms of others have  risen to  
power4 ,for with his great courage and  
high ambition he could  not have acted  
otherwise1 and his designs were only    
frustrated by the  short life of        
,alexander and his own illness4         
,whoever1 therefore1 deems it necessary 
in his new principality to  secure      
himself against enemies1 to gain        
friends1 to conquer by force  or fraud1 
to make himself beloved and feared by   
the people1 followed  and reverenced by 
the soldiers1 to destroy those who can  
and may injure  him1 introduce          
innovations into old customs1 to be     
severe and kind1  magnanimous and       
liberal1 suppress the old militia1      

create a new one1  maintain the         
friendship of kings and princes in such 
a way that they  are glad to benefit him
 and fear to injure him1 such a one can 
find no  better example than the actions
 of this man4 ,the only thing he can be 
accused of is that in the creation of   
,julius ,,ii4 he made a bad choice2     
for1 as has been said1 not being able to
 choose his own pope1 he could  still   
prevent any one being made pope1 and he 
ought never to have  permitted any of   
those cardinals to be raised to the     
papacy whom he had  injured1 or who when
 pope would stand in fear of him4 ,for  
men commit  injuries either through fear
 or through hate4    ,those whom he had 
injured were1 among others1 ,san ,pietro
 ad ,vincula1  ,colonna1 ,san ,giorgio1 
and ,ascanio4 ,all the others1 if       
assumed to the  pontificate1 would have 
had to fear him except ,rohan and the   
,spaniards2  the latter through their   
relationship and obligations to him1 the
  former from his great power1 being    

related to the ,king of ,france4  ,for  
these reasons the duke ought above all  
things to have created a  ,spaniard     
pope2 and if unable to1 then he should  
have consented to ,rohan  being         
appointed and not ,san ,pietro ad       
,vincula4 ,and whoever thinks that  in  
high personages new benefits cause old  
offences to be forgotten1  makes a great
 mistake4 ,the duke1 therefore1 erred in
 this choice1 and  it was the cause of  
his ultimate ruin4          ,,chapter   
,,viii      ,,of ,,those ,,who ,,have   
,,attained ,,the ,,position ,,of        
,,prince ,,by ,,villainy      ,but as   
there are still two ways of becoming    
prince which cannot be  attributed      
entirely either to fortune or to        
ability1 they must not be  passed over1 
although one of them could be more fully
 discussed if we  were treating of      
republics4 ,these are when one becomes  
prince by some  nefarious or villainous 
means1 or when a private citizen becomes
 the  prince of his country through the 

favour of his fellow-citizens4 ,and in  
speaking of the former means1 ,i will   
give two examples1 one ancient1  the    
other modern1 without entering further  
into the merits of this  method1 as ,i  
judge them to be sufficient for any one 
obliged to imitate  them4 ,agathocles   
the ,sicilian rose not only from private
 life but from  the lowest and most     
abject position to be ,king of          
,syracuse4 ,the son  of a potter1 he led
 a life of the utmost wickedness through
 all the  stages of his fortune4        
,nevertheless1 his wickedness was       
accompanied  by such vigour of mind and 
body that1 having joined the militia1 he
  rose through all its grades to be     
prtor of ,syracuse4 ,having been        
appointed to this position1 and having  
decided to become prince1 and  to hold  
with violence and without the support of
 others that which  had been granted    
him2 and having imparted his design to  
,hamilcar the  ,carthaginian1 who with  
his armies was fighting in ,sicily1 he  

called  together one morning the people 
and senate of ,syracuse1 as if he had   
to deliberate on matters of importance  
to the republic1 and at a given  signal 
had all the senators and the richest men
 of the people killed by  his soldiers2 
after their death he occupied and held  
rule over the city  without any civil   
disorders4 ,and although he was twice   
beaten by the  ,carthaginians and       
ultimately besieged1 he was able not    
only to defend  the city1 but leaving a 
portion of his forces for its defence1  
with the  remainder he invaded ,africa1 
and in a short time liberated ,syracuse 
from the siege and brought the          
,carthaginians to great extremities1 so 
that they were obliged to come to terms 
with him1 and remain contented  with the
 possession of ,africa1 leaving ,sicily 
to ,agathocles4 ,whoever  considers1    
therefore1 the actions and qualities of 
this man1 will see  few if any things   
which can be attributed to fortune2 for1
 as above  stated1 it was not by the    

favour of any person1 but through the   
grades  of the militia1 which he had    
gained with a thousand hardships and    
perils1 that he arrived at the position 
of prince1 which he afterwards          
maintained by so many courageous and    
perilous expedients4 ,it cannot be      
called a virtue to kill one's           
fellow-citizens1 betray one's friends1  
be without faith1 without pity1 and     
without religion1 by which methods  one 
may indeed gain an empire1 but not      
glory4 ,for if the virtues of           
,agathocles in braving and overcoming   
perils1 and his greatness of soul  in   
supporting and surmounting obstacles be 
considered1 one sees no  reason for     
holding him inferior to any of the most 
renowned captains4  ,nevertheless his   
barbarous cruelty and inhumanity1       
together with his  countless atrocities1
 do not permit of his being named among 
the  most famous men4 ,we cannot        
attribute to fortune or merit that which
  he achieved without either4 ,in our   

own times1 during the reign of          
,alexander ,,vi41 ,oliverotto du ,fermo 
had been left a young boy under the     
care of his maternal uncle1 ,giovanni   
,fogliani1 who brought him up1 and  sent
 him in early youth to fight under      
,paolo ,vitelli1 in order that he       
might1 under that discipline1 obtain a  
good military position4 ,on the  death  
of ,paolo he fought under his brother   
,vitellozzo1 and in a very  short time1 
being of great intelligence1 and active 
in mind and body1  he became one of the 
leaders of his troops4 ,but deeming it  
servile to  be under others1 he         
resolved1 with the help of some citizens
 of ,fermo1  who preferred servitude to 
the liberty of their country1 and with  
the  favour of the ,vitellis1 to occupy 
,fermo2 he therefore wrote to ,giovanni 
,fogliani1 how1 having been for many    
years away from home1 he wished  to come
 to see him and his city1 and in some   
measure to revisit his  estates4 ,and as
 he had only laboured to gain honour1 in

 order that  his fellow-citizens might  
see that he had not spent his time in   
vain1  he wished to come honourably     
accompanied by one hundred horsemen1 his
  friends and followers1 and prayed him 
that he would be pleased to  order that 
he should be received with honour by the
 citizens of ,fermo1  by which he would 
honour not only him1 ,oliverotto1 but   
also himself1  as he had been his pupil4
 ,giovanni did not fail in any duty     
towards  his nephew2 he caused him to be
 honourably received by the people of   
,fermo1 and lodged him in his own       
houses4 ,after waiting some days to     
arrange all that was necessary to his   
villainous projects1 ,oliverotto        
invited ,giovanni ,fogliani and all the 
principal men of ,fermo to a  grand     
banquet4 ,after the dinner and the      
entertainments usual at such  feasts1   
,oliverotto artfully introduced certain 
important matters of  discussion1       
speaking of the greatness of ,pope      
,alexander1 and of his  son ,cesare1 and

 of their enterprises4 ,to which        
discourses ,giovanni  and others having 
replied1 he all at once rose1 saying    
that these  matters should be spoken of 
in a more secret place1 and withdrew    
into  a room where ,giovanni and the    
other citizens followed him4 ,they were 
no sooner seated than soldiers rushed   
out of hiding-places and killed         
,giovanni and all the others4 ,after    
which massacre ,oliverotto mounted  his 
horse1 rode through the town and        
besieged the chief magistrate in  his   
palace1 so that through fear they were  
obliged to obey him and form  a         
government1 of which he made himself    
prince4 ,and all those being  dead who1 
if discontented1 could injure him1 he   
fortified himself  with new orders1     
civil and military1 in such a way that  
within the  year that he held the       
principality he was not only safe       
himself in  the city of ,fermo1 but had 
become formidable to all his neighbours4
  ,and his overthrow would have been    

difficult1 like that of ,agathocles1  if
 he had not allowed himself to be       
deceived by ,cesare ,borgia1 when  he   
besieged the ,orsinis and ,vitellis at  
,sinigaglia1 as already  related1 where 
he also was taken1 one year after the   
parricide he had  committed1 and        
strangled1 together with ,vitellozzo1   
who had been his  teacher in ability and
 atrocity4 ,some may wonder how it came 
about  that ,agathocles1 and others like
 him1 could1 after infinite treachery   
and cruelty1 live secure for many years 
in their country and defend  themselves 
from external enemies without being     
conspired against by  their subjects2   
although many others have1 through their
 cruelty1 been  unable to maintain their
 position in times of peace1 not to     
speak of  the uncertain times of war4   
,i believe this arises from the         
cruelties being used well or badly4     
,well used may be called those 7if it is
 permissible to use the word  well of   
evil7 which are committed once for the  

need of securing one's  self1 and which 
afterwards are not persisted in1 but are
 exchanged for  measures as useful to   
the subjects as possible4 ,cruelties ill
 used  are those which1 although at     
first few1 increase rather than diminish
  with time4 ,those who follow the      
former method may remedy in some        
measure their condition1 both with ,god 
and man2 as did ,agathocles4  ,as to the
 others1 it is impossible for them to   
maintain themselves4  ,whence it is to  
be noted1 that in taking a state the    
conqueror must  arrange to commit all   
his cruelties at once1 so as not to have
 to recur  to them every day1 and so as 
to be able1 by not making fresh changes1
  to reassure people and win them over  
by benefiting them4 ,whoever acts       
otherwise1 either through timidity or   
bad counsels1 is always obliged  to     
stand with knife in hand1 and can never 
depend on his subjects1  because they1  
through continually fresh injuries1 are 
unable to depend  upon him4 ,for        

injuries should be done all together1 so
 that being less  tasted1 they will give
 less offence4 ,benefits should be      
granted little  by little1 so that they 
may be better enjoyed4 ,and above all1 a
 prince  must live with his subjects in 
such a way that no accident should make 
him change it1 for good or evil2 for    
necessity arising in adverse  times1 you
 are not in time with severity1 and the 
good that you do does  not profit you1  
as it is judged to be forced1 and you   
will derive no  benefit whatever from   
it4          ,,chapter ,,ix      ,,of   
,,the ,,civic ,,principality      ,but  
we now come to the case where a citizen 
becomes prince not  through crime or    
intolerable violence1 but by the favour 
of his  fellow-citizens1 which may be   
called a civic principality4 ,to arrive 
at this position depends not entirely on
 worth or entirely on fortune1  but     
rather on cunning assisted by fortune4  
,one attains it by help of  popular     
favour or by the favour of the          

aristocracy4 ,for in every city  these  
two opposite parties are to be found1   
arising from the desire  of the populace
 to avoid the oppression of the great1  
and the desire  of the great to command 
and oppress the people4 ,and from these 
two  opposing interests arises in the   
city one of three effects3 either       
absolute government1 liberty1 or        
license4 ,the former is created either  
by the populace or the nobility         
depending on the relative opportunities 
of the two parties2 for when the        
nobility see that they are unable to    
resist the people they unite in creating
 one of their number prince1  so as to  
be able to carry out their own designs  
under the shadow of  his authority4 ,the
 populace1 on the other hand1 when      
unable to resist  the nobility1         
endeavour to create a prince in order to
 be protected  by his authority4 ,he who
 becomes prince by help of the nobility 
has  greater difficulty in maintaining  
his power than he who is raised by  the 

populace1 for he is surrounded by those 
who think themselves his  equals1 and is
 thus unable to direct or command as he 
pleases4 ,but one  who is raised to the 
leadership by popular favour finds      
himself alone1  and has no one or very  
few who are not ready to obey him4      
,besides  which1 it is impossible to    
satisfy the nobility by fair dealing and
  without inflicting injury on others1  
whereas it is very easy to satisfy  the 
mass of the people in this way4 ,for the
 aim of the people is more  honest than 
that of the nobility1 the latter        
desiring to oppress1 and  the former    
merely to avoid oppression4 ,it must    
also be added that the  prince can never
 insure himself against a hostile       
populace on account  of their number1   
but he can against the hostility of the 
great1 as  they are but few4 ,the worst 
that a prince has to expect from a      
hostile  people is to be abandoned1 but 
from hostile nobles he has to fear not  
only abandonment but their active       

opposition1 and as they are more        
farseeing and more cunning1 they are    
always in time to save themselves  and  
take sides with the one who they expect 
will conquer4 ,the prince  is1 moreover1
 obliged to live always with the same   
people1 but he can  easily do without   
the same nobility1 being able to make   
and unmake them  at any time1 and       
increase their position or deprive them 
of it as he  pleases4 ,and to throw     
further light on this part1 ,i would    
say1 that the  nobles are to be         
considered in two different manners2    
that is1 they are  either to be ruled so
 as to make them entirely depend on your
 fortunes1  or else not4 ,those that are
 thus bound to you and are not          
rapacious1  must be honoured and loved2 
those who are not bound must be         
considered  in two ways1 they either do 
this through pusillanimity and natural  
want of courage1 and in this case you   
ought to make use of them1 and          
especially such as are of good counsel1 

so that they may honour you in          
prosperity and in adversity you have not
 to fear them4 ,but when they  are not  
bound to you of set purpose and for     
ambitious ends1 it is a  sign that they 
think more of themselves than of you2   
and from such men  the prince must guard
 himself and look upon them as secret   
enemies1  who will help to ruin him when
 in adversity4 ,one1 however1 who       
becomes  prince by favour of the        
populace1 must maintain its friendship1 
which  he will find easy1 the people    
asking nothing but not to be oppressed4 
,but one who against the people's wishes
 becomes prince by favour of  the       
nobles1 should above all endeavour to   
gain the favour of the  people2 this    
will be easy to him if he protects them4
 ,and as men1 who  receive good from    
those they expected evil from1 feel     
under a greater  obligation to their    
benefactor1 so the subject populace will
 become  even better disposed towards   
him than if he had become prince through

  their favour4 ,the prince can win     
their favour in many ways1 which vary   
according to circumstances1 for which no
 certain rule can be given1 and  will   
therefore be passed over4    ,i will    
only say1 in conclusion1 that it is     
necessary for a prince to  possess the  
friendship of the people2 otherwise he  
has no resource in  times of adversity4 
,nabis1 prince of the ,spartans1        
sustained a siege by  the whole of      
,greece and a victorious ,roman army1   
and defended against  them his country  
and maintained his own position4 ,it    
sufficed when the  danger arose for him 
to make sure of a few1 which would not  
have been  enough if the populace had   
been hostile to him4 ,and let no one    
oppose  my opinion in this by quoting   
the trite proverb1 ,he who builds on the
  people1 builds on mud2 because that is
 true when a private citizen  relies    
upon the people and persuades himself   
that they will liberate  him if he is   
oppressed by enemies or by the          

magistrates2 in this case  he might     
often find himself deceived1 as happened
 in ,rome to the  ,gracchi and in       
,florence to ,messer ,georgio ,scali4   
,but when it is a prince who founds     
himself on this basis1 one who  can     
command and is a man of courage1 and    
does not get frightened in  adversity1  
and does not neglect other preparations1
 and one who by his  own courage and    
measures animates the mass of the       
people1 he will not  find himself       
deceived by them1 and he will find that 
he has laid his  foundations well4      
,usually these principalities are in    
danger when the  prince from the        
position of a civil ruler changes to an 
absolute one1  for these princes either 
command themselves or by means of       
magistrates4  ,in the latter case their 
position is weaker and more dangerous1  
for  they are at the mercy of those     
citizens who are appointed magistrates1 
who can1 especially in times of         
adversity1 with great facility deprive  

them of their position1 either by acting
 against them or by not obeying  them4  
,the prince is not in time1 in such     
dangers1 to assume absolute  authority1 
for the citizens and subjects who are   
accustomed to take  their orders from   
the magistrates are not ready in these  
emergencies  to obey his1 and he will   
always in doubtful times lack men whom  
he can  rely on4 ,such a prince cannot  
base himself on what he sees in quiet   
times1 when the citizens have need of   
the state2 for then every one is  full  
of promises and each one is ready to die
 for him when death is  far off2 but in 
adversity1 when the state has need of   
citizens1 then  he will find but few4   
,and this experience is the more        
dangerous1 in  that it can only be had  
once4 ,therefore a wise prince will seek
 means  by which his subjects will      
always and in every possible condition  
of things have need of his government1  
and then they will always be  faithful  
to him4          ,,chapter ,x      ,,how

 ,,the ,,strength ,,of ,,all ,,states   
,,should ,,be ,,measured      ,in       
examining the character of these        
principalities it is necessary to       
consider another point1 namely1 whether 
the prince has such a position  as to be
 able in case of need to maintain       
himself alone1 or whether he  has always
 need of the protection of others4 ,the 
better to explain this  ,i would say1   
that ,i consider those capable of       
maintaining themselves  alone who can1  
through abundance of men or money1 put  
together a  sufficient army1 and hold   
the field against any one who assails   
them2  and ,i consider to have need of  
others1 those who cannot take the  field
 against their enemies1 but are obliged 
to take refuge within  their walls and  
stand on the defensive4 ,we have already
 discussed the  former case and will    
speak in future of it as occasion       
arises4 ,in  the second case there is   
nothing to be said except to encourage  
such  a prince to provision and fortify 

his own town1 and not to trouble  about 
the country4 ,and whoever has strongly  
fortified his town and1  as regards the 
government of his subjects1 has         
proceeded as we have  already described 
and will further relate1 will be        
attacked with great  reluctance1 for men
 are always averse to enterprises in    
which they  foresee difficulties1 and it
 can never appear easy to attack one who
  has his town well guarded and is not  
hated by the people4 ,the cities  of    
,germany are extremely liberal1 have    
little surrounding country1 and  obey   
the emperor when they choose1 and they  
do not fear him or any  other potentate 
that they have about them4 ,they are    
fortified in such  a manner that every  
one thinks that to reduce them would be 
tedious  and difficult1 for they all    
have the necessary moats and bastions1  
sufficient artillery1 and always keep in
 the public storehouses food  and drink 
and fuel for one year4 ,beyond which1 to
 keep the lower  classes satisfied1 and 

without loss to the public1 they have   
always  enough means to give them work  
for one year in these employments which 
form the nerve and life of the town1 and
 in the industries by which the  lower  
classes live2 military exercises are    
still held in reputation1  and many     
regulations are in force for maintaining
 them4 ,a prince1  therefore1 who       
possesses a strong city and does not    
make himself hated1  cannot be          
assaulted2 and if he were to be so1 the 
assailant would  be obliged to retire   
shamefully2 for so many things change1  
that it  is almost impossible for any   
one to hold the field for a year with   
his armies idle4 ,and to those who urge 
that the people1 having their           
possessions outside and seeing them     
burnt1 will not have patience1 and  the 
long siege and self-interest will make  
them forget their prince1  ,i reply that
 a powerful and courageous prince will  
always overcome  those difficulties by  
now raising the hopes of his subjects   

that the  evils will not last long1 now 
impressing them with fear of the enemy's
  cruelty1 now by dextrously assuring   
himself of those who appear too  bold4  
,besides which1 the enemy would         
naturally burn and ruin the  country on 
first arriving and in the time when     
men's minds are still  hot and eager to 
defend themselves1 and therefore the    
prince has still  less to fear1 for     
after some days1 when people have cooled
 down1 the  damage is done1 the evil has
 been suffered1 and there is no remedy1 
so  that they are the more ready to     
unite with their prince1 as it appears  
that he is under an obligation to them1 
their houses having been burnt  and     
their possessions ruined in his defence4
    ,it is the nature of men to be as   
much bound by the benefits that they    
confer as by those they receive4 ,from  
which it follows that1 everything       
considered1 a prudent prince will not   
find it difficult to uphold the  courage
 of his subjects both at the            

commencement and during a state of      
siege1 if he possesses provisions and   
means to defend himself4                
,,chapter ,,xi      ,,of                
,,ecclesiastical ,,principalities       
,it now remains to us only to speak of  
ecclesiastical principalities1  with    
regard to which the difficulties lie    
wholly before they are  possessed4 ,they
 are acquired either by ability or by   
fortune2 but  are maintained without    
either1 for they are sustained by the   
ancient  religious customs1 which are so
 powerful and of such quality1 that they
  keep their princes in power in        
whatever manner they proceed and live4  
,these alone have a state without       
defending it1 have subjects without     
governing them1 and the states1 not     
being defended1 are not taken from      
them2 the subjects not being governed do
 not disturb themselves1 and  neither   
think of nor are capable of alienating  
themselves from them4  ,only these      
principalities1 therefore1 are secure   

and happy4 ,but as they  are upheld by  
higher causes1 which the human mind     
cannot attain to1 ,i  will abstain from 
speaking of them2 for being exalted and 
maintained by  ,god1 it would be the    
work of a presumptuous and foolish man  
to discuss  them4    ,however1 ,i might 
be asked how it has come about that the 
,church has  reached such great temporal
 power1 when1 previous to ,alexander    
,,vi41  the ,italian potentates1--and   
not merely the really powerful ones1 but
  every lord or baron1 however          
insignificant1 held it in slight esteem 
as regards temporal power2 whereas now  
it is dreaded by a king of  ,france1    
whom it has been able to drive out of   
,italy1 and has also been  able to ruin 
the ,venetians4 ,therefore1 although    
this is well known1 ,i  do not think it 
superfluous to call it to mind4 ,before 
,charles1 ,king  of ,france1 came into  
,italy1 this country was under the rule 
of the  pope1 the ,venetians1 the ,king 
of ,naples1 the ,duke of ,milan1 and the

  ,florentines4 ,these potentates had to
 have two chief cares3 one1 that no     
foreigner should enter ,italy by force  
of arms1 the other that none of  the    
existing governments should extend its  
dominions4 ,those chiefly to  be watched
 were the pope and the ,venetians4 ,to  
keep back the ,venetians  required the  
ruin of all the others1 as in the       
defence of ,ferrara1  and to keep down  
the pope they made use of the ,roman    
barons4 ,these  were divided into two   
factions1 the ,orsinis and the          
,colonnas1 and as  there was constant   
quarrelling between them1 and they were 
constantly  under arms1 before the eyes 
of the pope1 they kept the papacy weak  
and  infirm4 ,and although there arose  
now and then a resolute pope like       
,sextus1 yet his fortune or ability was 
never able to liberate him from  these  
evils4 ,the shortness of their life was 
the reason of this1 for  in the course  
of ten years which1 as a general rule1 a
 pope lived1 he  had great difficulty in

 suppressing even one of the factions1  
and if1  for example1 a pope had almost 
put down the ,colonnas1 a new pope would
  succeed who was hostile to the        
,orsinis1 which caused the ,colonnas to 
spring up again1 and he was not in time 
to suppress them4 ,this caused  the     
temporal power of the pope to be of     
little esteem in ,italy4    ,then arose 
,alexander ,,vi4 who of all the pontiffs
 who have ever  reigned1 best showed how
 a pope might prevail both by money and 
by  force4 ,with ,duke ,valentine as his
 instrument1 and on the occasion of  the
 ,french invasion1 he did all that ,i   
have previously described  in speaking  
of the actions of the duke4 ,and        
although his object was  to aggrandise  
not the ,church but the duke1 what he   
did resulted in  the aggrandisement of  
the ,church1 which after the death of   
the duke  became the heir of his        
labours4 ,then came ,pope ,julius1 who  
found  the ,church powerful1 possessing 
all ,romagna1 all the ,roman barons     

suppressed1 and the factions destroyed  
by the severity of ,alexander4  ,he also
 found the way open for accumulating    
wealth in ways never used  before the   
time of ,alexander4 ,these measures were
 not only followed  by ,julius1 but     
increased2 he resolved to gain ,bologna1
 put down the  ,venetians and drive the 
,french from ,italy1 in all which       
enterprises  he was successful4 ,he     
merits the greater praise1 as he did    
everything  to increase the power of the
 ,church and not of any private person4 
,he  also kept the ,orsini and ,colonna 
parties in the conditions in which he   
found them1 and although there were some
 leaders among them who might  have made
 changes1 there were two things that    
kept them steady3 one1  the greatness of
 the ,church1 which they dreaded2 the   
other1 the fact  that they had no       
cardinals1 who are the origin of the    
tumults among  them4 ,for these parties 
are never at rest when they have        
cardinals1  for these stir up the       

parties both within ,rome and outside1  
and the  barons are forced to defend    
them4 ,thus from the ambitions of       
prelates  arise the discords and tumults
 among the barons4 ,his holiness1 ,pope 
,leo  ,x41 therefore1 has found the     
pontificate in a very powerful          
condition1  from which it is hoped1 that
 as those popes made it great by force  
of  armies1 so he through his goodness  
and infinite other virtues will make  it
 both great and venerated4              
,,chapter ,,xii      ,,the ,,different  
,,kinds ,,of ,,militia ,,and ,,mercenary
 ,,soldiers      ,having now discussed  
fully the qualities of these            
principalities of  which ,i proposed to 
treat1 and partially considered the     
causes of their  prosperity or failure1 
and having also showed the methods by   
which  many have sought to obtain such  
states1 it now remains for me to treat  
generally of the methods of attack and  
defence that can be used in  each of    
them4 ,we have said already how         

necessary it is for a prince  to have   
his foundations good1 otherwise he is   
certain to be ruined4  ,the chief       
foundations of all states1 whether new1 
old1 or mixed1 are  good laws and good  
arms4 ,and as there cannot be good laws 
where there  are not good arms1 and     
where there are good arms there should  
be good  laws1 ,i will not now discuss  
the laws1 but will speak of the arms4 ,i
  say1 therefore1 that the arms by which
 a prince defends his possessions  are  
either his own1 or else mercenaries1 or 
auxiliaries1 or mixed4 ,the  mercenaries
 and auxiliaries are useless and        
dangerous1 and if any one  keeps his    
state based on the arms of mercenaries1 
he will never stand  firm or sure1 as   
they are disunited1 ambitious1 without  
discipline1  faithless1 bold amongst    
friends1 cowardly amongst enemies1 they 
have no  fear of ,god1 and keep no faith
 with men4 ,ruin is only deferred as    
long  as the assault is postponed2 in   
peace you are despoiled by them1 and in 

war by the enemy4 ,the cause of this is 
that they have no love or other  motive 
to keep them in the field beyond a      
trifling wage1 which is not  enough to  
make them ready to die for you4 ,they   
are quite willing to be  your soldiers  
so long as you do not make war1 but when
 war comes1 it is  either fly or be off4
 ,i ought to have little trouble in     
proving this1  since the ruin of ,italy 
is now caused by nothing else but       
through her  having relied for many     
years on mercenary arms4 ,these were    
somewhat  improved in a few cases1 and  
appeared courageous among themselves1   
but  when the foreigner came they showed
 their worthlessness4 ,thus it came     
about that ,king ,charles of ,france was
 allowed to take ,italy without the     
slightest trouble1 and those who said   
that it was owing to our sins1  spoke   
the truth1 but it was not the sins that 
they believed but those  that ,i have   
related4 ,and as it was the sins of     
princes1 they too have  suffered the    

punishment4 ,i will explain more fully  
the defects of these  arms4 ,mercenary  
captains are either very capable men or 
not2 if they  are1 you cannot rely upon 
them1 for they will always aspire to    
their  own greatness1 either by         
oppressing you1 their master1 or by     
oppressing  others against your         
intentions2 but if the captain is not an
 able man1  he will generally ruin you4 
,and if it is replied to this1 that     
whoever  has armed forces will do the   
same1 whether these are mercenary or    
not1  ,i would reply that as armies are 
to be used either by a prince or by a   
republic1 the prince must go in person  
to take the position of captain1  and   
the republic must send its own citizens4
 ,if the one sent turns  out            
incompetent1 it must change him2 and if 
capable1 keep him by law  from going    
beyond the proper limits4 ,and it is    
seen by experience that  only princes   
and armed republics make very great     
progress1 whereas  mercenary forces do  

nothing but damage1 and also an armed   
republic  submits less easily to the    
rule of one of its citizens than a      
republic  armed by foreign forces4 ,rome
 and ,sparta were for many centuries    
well  armed and free4 ,the ,swiss are   
well armed and enjoy great freedom4 ,as 
an  example of mercenary armies in      
antiquity there are the ,carthaginians1 
who were oppressed by their mercenary   
soldiers1 after the termination  of the 
first war with the ,romans1 even while  
they still had their own  citizens as   
captains4 ,philip of ,macedon was made  
captain of their  forces by the ,thebans
 after the death of ,epaminondas1 and   
after gaining  the victory he deprived  
them of liberty4 ,the ,milanese1 on the 
death  of ,duke ,philip1 hired          
,francesco ,sforza against the          
,venetians1 who  having overcome the    
enemy at ,caravaggio1 allied himself    
with them to  oppress the ,milanese his 
employers4 ,the father of this ,sforza1 
being  a soldier in the service of the  

,queen ,giovanna of ,naples1 left her   
suddenly unarmed1 by which she was      
compelled1 in order not to lose the     
kingdom1 to throw herself into the arms 
of the ,king of ,aragon4 ,and  if the   
,venetians and ,florentines have in     
times past increased their  dominions by
 means of such forces1 and their        
captains have not made  themselves      
princes but have defended them1 ,i reply
 that the ,florentines  in this case    
have been favoured by chance1 for of the
 capable leaders  whom they might have  
feared1 some did not conquer1 some met  
with  opposition1 and others directed   
their ambition elsewhere4 ,the one who  
did not conquer was ,sir ,john          
,hawkwood1 whose fidelity could not be  
known as he was not victorious1 but     
every one will admit that1 had he       
conquered1 the ,florentines would have  
been at his mercy4 ,sforza had  always  
the ,bracceschi against him1 they being 
constantly at enmity4  ,francesco       
directed his ambition towards ,lombardy2

 ,braccio against the  ,church and the  
kingdom of ,naples4 ,but let us look at 
what followed a  short time ago4 ,the   
,florentines appointed ,paolo ,vitelli  
their captain1  a man of great prudence1
 who had risen from a private station to
 the  highest reputation4 ,if he had    
taken ,pisa no one can deny that it was 
highly important for the ,florentines to
 retain his friendship1 because  had he 
become the soldier of their enemies they
 would have had no  means of opposing   
him2 and in order to retain him they    
would have been  obliged to obey him4   
,as to the ,venetians1 if one considers 
the progress  they made1 it will be seen
 that they acted surely and gloriously  
so  long as they made war with their own
 forces2 that it was before they        
commenced their enterprises on land that
 they fought courageously with  their   
own gentlemen and armed populace1 but   
when they began to fight  on land they  
abandoned this virtue1 and began to     
follow the ,italian  custom4 ,and at the

 commencement of their land conquests   
they had not  much to fear from their   
captains1 their land possessions not    
being  very large1 and their reputation 
being great1 but as their possessions   
increased1 as they did under            
,carmagnola1 they had an example of     
their  mistake4 ,for seeing that he was 
very powerful1 after he had defeated    
the ,duke of ,milan1 and knowing1 on the
 other hand1 that he was not            
enterprising in warfare1 they considered
 that they would not make any  more     
conquests with him1 and they neither    
would nor could dismiss him1  for fear  
of losing what they had already gained4 
,they were therefore  obliged1 in order 
to make sure of him1 to have him killed4
 ,they then  had for captains           
,bartolommeo da ,bergamo1 ,roberto da   
,san ,severino1 ,count  di ,pitigliano1 
and such like1 from whom they had to    
fear loss instead  of gain1 as happened 
subsequently at ,vail1 where in one day 
they lost  what they had laboriously    

gained in eight hundred years2 for with 
these  forces1 only slow and trifling   
acquisitions are made1 but sudden and   
miraculous losses4 ,and as ,i have cited
 these examples from ,italy1  which has 
now for many years been governed by     
mercenary forces1 ,i will  now deal more
 largely with them1 so that having seen 
their origin and  progress1 they can be 
better remedied4 ,you must understand   
that in  these latter times1 as soon as 
the empire began to be repudiated in    
,italy and the pope to gain greater     
reputation in temporal matters1  ,italy 
was divided into many states2 many of   
the principal cities took  up arms      
against their nobles1 who1 favoured by  
the emperor1 had held  them in          
subjection1 and the ,church encouraged  
this in order to increase  its temporal 
power4 ,in many other cities one of the 
inhabitants became  prince4 ,thus ,italy
 having fallen almost entirely into the 
hands of  the ,church and a few         
republics1 and the priests and other    

citizens  not being accustomed to bear  
arms1 they began to hire foreigners as  
soldiers4 ,the first to bring reputation
 for this kind of militia was  ,alberigo
 da ,como1 a native of ,romagna4 ,the   
discipline of this man  produced1 among 
others1 ,braccio and ,sforza1 who were  
in their day the  arbiters of ,italy4   
,after these came all those others who  
up to the  present day have commanded   
the armies of ,italy1 and the result of 
their  prowess has been that ,italy has 
been overrun by ,charles1 preyed on by  
,louis1 tyrannised over by ,ferrando1   
and insulted by the ,swiss4 ,the  system
 adopted by them was1 in the first      
place1 to increase their own  reputation
 by discrediting the infantry4 ,they did
 this because1 as they  had no country  
and lived on their earnings1 a few foot 
soldiers did not  augment their         
reputation1 and they could not maintain 
a large number  and therefore they      
restricted themselves almost entirely to
 cavalry1  by which with a smaller      

number they were well paid and honoured4
 ,they  reduced things to such a state  
that in an army of #bj1jjj soldiers     
there  were not #bjjj foot4 ,they had   
also used every means to spare          
themselves  and the soldiers any        
hardship or fear by not killing each    
other in  their encounters1 but taking  
prisoners without a blow4 ,they made no 
attacks on fortifications by night2 and 
those in the fortifications did  not    
attack the tents at night1 they made no 
stockades on ditches round  their camps1
 and did not take the field in winter4  
,all these things  were permitted by    
their military rules1 and adopted1 as we
 have said1  to avoid trouble and       
danger1 so that they have reduced ,italy
 to slavery  and degradation4           
,,chapter ,,xiii      ,,of ,,auxiliary1 
,,mixed1 ,,and ,,native ,,troops        
,auxiliary forces1 which are the other  
kind of useless forces1 are  when one   
calls on a potentate to come and aid one
 with his troops1 as  was done in recent

 times by ,julius1 who seeing the       
wretched failure  of his mercenary      
forces1 in his ,ferrara enterprise1 had 
recourse to  auxiliaries1 and arranged  
with ,ferrando1 ,king of ,spain1 that he
 should  help him with his armies4      
,these forces may be good in themselves1
 but  they are always dangerous for     
those who borrow them1 for if they lose 
you are defeated1 and if they conquer   
you remain their prisoner4 ,and         
although ancient history is full of     
examples of this1 ,i will not depart    
from the example of ,pope ,julius ,,ii41
 which is still fresh4 ,nothing  could  
be less prudent than the course he      
adopted2 for1 wishing to take  ,ferrara1
 he put himself entirely into the power 
of a foreigner4 ,but  by good fortune   
there arose a third cause which         
prevented him reaping  the effects of   
his bad choice2 for when his auxiliaries
 were beaten  at ,ravenna1 the ,swiss   
rose up and drove back the victors1     
against all  expectation of himself or  

others1 so that he was not taken        
prisoner by  the enemy which had fled1  
nor by his own auxiliaries1 having      
conquered  by other arms than theirs4   
,the ,florentines1 being totally        
disarmed1  hired #aj1jjj ,frenchmen to  
attack ,pisa1 by which measure they ran 
greater risk than at any period of their
 struggles4 ,the emperor of             
,constantinople1 to oppose his          
neighbours1 put #aj1jjj ,turks into     
,greece1  who after the war would not go
 away again1 which was the beginning of 
the servitude of ,greece to the         
infidels4 ,any one1 therefore1 who      
wishes  not to conquer1 would do well to
 use these forces1 which are much more  
dangerous than mercenaries1 as with them
 ruin is complete1 for they  are all    
united1 and owe obedience to others1    
whereas with mercenaries1  when they    
have conquered1 it requires more time   
and a good opportunity  for them to     
injure you1 as they do not form a single
 body and have been  engaged and paid by

 you1 therefore a third party that you  
have made  leader cannot at once acquire
 enough authority to be able to injure  
you4 ,in a word1 the greatest dangers   
with mercenaries lies in their          
cowardice and reluctance to fight1 but  
with auxiliaries the danger  lies in    
their courage4 ,a wise prince1          
therefore1 always avoids these  forces  
and has recourse to his own1 and would  
prefer rather to lose  with his own men 
than conquer with the forces of others1 
not deeming  it a true victory which is 
gained by foreign arms4 ,i never        
hesitate to  cite the example of ,cesare
 ,borgia and his actions4 ,this duke    
entered  ,romagna with auxiliary troops1
 leading forces composed entirely of    
,french soldiers1 and with these he took
 ,imola and ,forli2 but as they  seemed 
unsafe1 he had recourse to mercenaries1 
and hired the ,orsini and  ,vitelli2    
afterwards finding these uncertain to   
handle1 unfaithful and  dangerous1 he   
suppressed them1 and relied upon his own

 men4 ,and the  difference between these
 forces can be easily seen if one       
considers  the difference between the   
reputation of the duke when he had only 
the  ,french1 when he had the ,orsini   
and ,vitelli1 and when he had to rely   
on himself and his own soldiers4 ,his   
reputation will be found to have        
constantly increased1 and he was never  
so highly esteemed as when  every one   
saw that he was the sole master of his  
forces4    ,i do not wish to go away    
from recent ,italian instances1 but ,i  
cannot  omit ,hiero of ,syracuse1 whom  
,i have already mentioned4 ,this man    
being1  as ,i said1 made head of the    
army by the ,syracusans1 immediately    
recognised the uselessness of that      
mercenary militia which was composed    
like our ,italian mercenary troops1 and 
as he thought it unsafe  either to      
retain them or dismiss them1 he had them
 cut in pieces and  thenceforward made  
war with his own arms and not those of  
others4 ,i  would also call to mind a   

figure out of the ,old ,testament which 
well  illustrates this point4 ,when     
,david offered to ,saul to go and fight 
with  the ,philistine champion ,goliath1
 ,saul1 to encourage him1 armed him     
with his own arms1 which when ,david had
 tried on he refused saying1  that with 
them he could not fight so well2 he     
preferred1 therefore1  to face the enemy
 with his own sling and knife4 ,in      
short1 the arms of  others either fall  
away from you1 or overburden you1 or    
else impede  you4 ,charles ,,viii41     
father of ,king ,louis ,,xl1 having     
through good  fortune and bravery       
liberated ,france from the ,english1    
recognised this  necessity of being     
armed with his own forces1 and          
established in his  kingdom a system of 
men-at-arms and infantry4 ,afterwards   
,king ,louis  his son abolished the     
infantry and began to hire ,swiss1 which
 mistake  being followed by others is1  
as may now be seen1 a cause of danger to
  that kingdom4 ,for by giving such     

reputation to the ,swiss1 ,france has   
disheartened all her own troops1 the    
infantry having been abolished and  the 
men-at-arms being obliged to foreigners 
for assistance2 for being  accustomed to
 fight with ,swiss troops1 they think   
they cannot conquer  without them4      
,whence it comes that the ,french are   
insufficiently strong  to oppose the    
,swiss1 and without the aid of the      
,swiss they will not  venture against   
others4 ,the armies of the ,french are  
thus of a mixed  kind1 partly mercenary 
and partly her own2 taken together they 
are much  better than troops entirely   
composed of mercenaries or auxiliaries1 
but  much inferior to national forces4  
,,chapter ,,xiv      ,,what ,,the       
,,duties ,,of ,a ,,prince ,,are ,,with  
,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,militia      ,a   
,prince should therefore have no other  
aim or thought1 nor take up  any other  
thing for his study1 but war and its    
order and discipline1  for that is the  
only art that is necessary to one who   

commands1 and  it is of such virtue that
 it not only maintains those who are    
born  princes1 but often enables men of 
private fortune to attain to that  rank4
 ,and one sees1 on the other hand1 that 
when princes think more of  luxury than 
of arms1 they lose their state4 ,the    
chief cause which makes  any one lose   
it1 is the contempt of this art1 and the
 way to acquire  it is to be well versed
 in the same4 ,francesco ,sforza1       
through being  well armed1 became1 from 
a private position1 ,duke of ,milan2 his
 sons1  through wishing to avoid the    
fatigue and hardship of war1 from dukes 
became private persons4 ,for among other
 evils caused by being disarmed1  it    
renders you contemptible2 which is one  
of those disgraceful things  which a    
prince must guard against1 as will be   
explained later4 ,because  there is no  
comparison whatever between an armed man
 and a disarmed  one2 it is not         
reasonable to suppose that one who is   
armed will obey  willingly one who is   

unarmed2 or that any unarmed man will   
remain  safe among armed servants4 ,for 
one being disdainful and the other      
suspicious1 it is not possible for them 
to act well together4 ,and  yet a prince
 who is ignorant of military matters1   
besides the other  misfortunes already  
mentioned1 cannot be esteemed by his    
soldiers1 nor  have confidence in them4 
,he ought1 therefore1 never to let his  
thoughts  stray from the exercise of    
war2 and in peace he ought to practise  
it  more than in war1 which he can do in
 two ways3 both by action and by  study4
 ,as to action1 he must1 besides keeping
 his men well disciplined  and          
exercised1 engage continually in        
hunting1 and thus accustom his  body to 
hardships2 and on the other hand learn  
the nature of the  land1 how the        
mountains rise1 how the valleys are     
disposed1 where the  plains lie1 and    
understand the nature of the rivers and 
swamps1 and  to this he should devote   
great attention4 ,this knowledge is     

useful in  two ways4 ,in the first      
place1 one learns to know one's country1
 and  can the better see how to defend  
it4 ,then by means of the knowledge  and
 experience gained in one locality1 one 
can easily understand  any other that it
 may be necessary to venture on1 for the
 hills and  valleys1 plains and rivers  
of ,tuscany1 for instance1 have a       
certain  resemblance to those of other  
provinces1 so that from a knowledge of  
the country in one province one can     
easily arrive at a knowledge of  others4
 ,and that prince who is lacking in this
 skill is wanting in the  first         
essentials of a leader2 for it is this  
which teaches how to find  the enemy1   
take up quarters1 lead armies1 arrange  
marches and occupy  positions with      
advantage4 ,philopmen1 prince of the    
,achi1 among other  praises bestowed on 
him by writers1 is lauded because in    
times of peace  he thought of nothing   
but the methods of warfare1 and when he 
was in  the country with his friends1 he

 often stopped and asked them3 ,if the  
enemy were on that hill and we found    
ourselves here with our army1  which of 
us would have the advantage8 ,how could 
we safely approach  him maintaining our 
order8 ,if we wished to retire1 what    
ought we to  do8 ,if they retired1 how  
should we follow them8 ,and he put      
before them  as they went along all the 
cases that might happen to an army1     
heard  their opinion1 gave his own1     
fortifying it by argument2 so that      
through  these continued cogitations    
there could never happen any incident   
when  leading his armies for which he   
was not prepared4 ,but as to exercise   
for the mind1 the prince ought to read  
history and study the actions  of       
eminent men1 see how they acted in      
warfare1 examine the causes of  their   
victories and losses in order to imitate
 the former and avoid the  latter1 and  
above all1 do as some eminent men have  
done in the past1  who have imitated    
some one1 who has been much praised and 

glorified1  and have always kept their  
deeds and actions before them1 as they  
say  ,alexander the ,great imitated     
,achilles1 ,csar ,alexander1 and ,scipio
  ,cyrus4 ,and whoever reads the life of
 ,cyrus written by ,xenophon1 will      
perceive in the life of ,scipio how     
gloriously he imitated him1 and how1  in
 chastity1 affability1 humanity1 and    
liberality ,scipio conformed to  those  
qualities of ,cyrus described by        
,xenophon4    ,a wise prince should     
follow similar methods and never remain 
idle in  peaceful times1 but by industry
 make such good use of the time as may  
serve him in adversity1 so that when    
fortune changes she may find him        
prepared to resist her blows4           
,,chapter ,,xv      ,,of ,,the ,,things 
,,for ,,which ,,men1 ,,and ,,especially 
,,princes1 ,,are ,,praised ,,or         
,,blamed      ,it remains now to be seen
 what are the methods and rules for a   
prince as regards his subjects and      
friends4 ,and as ,i know that many  have

 written of this1 ,i fear that my       
writing about it may be deemed          
presumptuous1 differing as ,i do1       
especially in this matter1 from the     
opinions of others4 ,but my intention   
being to write something of use to      
those who understand it1 it appears to  
me more proper to go to the real  truth 
of the matter than to its imagination2  
and many have imagined  republics and   
principalities which have never been    
seen or known to  exist in reality2 for 
how we live is so far removed from how  
we ought  to live1 that he who abandons 
what is done for what ought to be done1 
will rather learn to bring about his own
 ruin than his preservation4  ,a man who
 wishes to make a profession of goodness
 in everything must  necessarily come to
 grief among so many who are not good4  
,therefore it  is necessary for a       
prince1 who wishes to maintain himself1 
to learn how  not to be good1 and to use
 it and not use it according to the     
necessity  of the case4 ,leaving on one 

side then those things which concern    
only  an imaginary prince1 and speaking 
of those that are real1 ,i state that   
all men1 when spoken of1 and especially 
princes1 who are placed at  a greater   
height1 are noted for some of those     
qualities which bring  them either      
praise or blame4 ,thus one is considered
 liberal1 another  miserly2 one a free  
giver1 another rapacious2 one cruel1    
another  merciful2 one a breaker of his 
word1 another faithful2 one effeminate  
and pusillanimous1 another fierce and   
high-spirited2 one humane1  another     
proud2 one lascivious1 another chaste2  
one frank1 another  astute2 one hard1   
another easy2 one serious1 another      
frivolous2 one  religious1 another      
incredulous1 and so on4 ,i know that    
every one will  admit that it would be  
highly praiseworthy in a prince to      
possess all  the above-named qualities  
that are reputed good1 but as they      
cannot all  be possessed or observed1   
human conditions not permitting of it1  

it is  necessary that he should be      
prudent enough to avoid the disgrace of 
those vices which would lose him the    
state1 and guard himself against  those 
which will not lose it him1 if possible1
 but if not able to1 he  can indulge    
them with less scruple4 ,and yet he must
 not mind incurring  the disgrace of    
those vices1 without which it would be  
difficult to  save the state1 for if one
 considers well1 it will be found that  
some  things which seem virtues would1  
if followed1 lead to one's ruin1 and    
some others which appear vices result1  
if followed1 in one's greater  security 
and well being4          ,,chapter ,,xvi
      ,,of ,,liberality ,,and           
,,niggardliness      ,beginning now with
 the first qualities above named1 ,i say
 that it  would be well to be considered
 liberal2 nevertheless liberality used  
in such a way that you are not feared   
will injure you1 because if  used       
virtuously and in the proper way1 it    
will not be known1 and you  will not    

incur the disgrace of the contrary vice4
 ,but one who wishes  to obtain the     
reputation of liberality among men1 must
 not omit every  kind of sumptuous      
display1 and to such an extent that a   
prince of this  character will consume  
by such means all his resources1 and    
will be  at last compelled1 if he wishes
 to maintain his name for liberality1   
to impose heavy charges on his people1  
become an extortioner1 and do           
everything possible to obtain money4    
,this will make his subjects begin  to  
hate him and he will be little esteemed 
being poor1 so that having  by this     
liberality injured many and benefited   
but few1 he will feel  the first little 
disturbance and be endangered by every  
accident4 ,if  he recognises this and   
wishes to change his system1 he incurs  
at once  the charge of niggardliness2 a 
prince1 therefore1 not being able to    
exercise this virtue of liberality      
without risk if it is known1 must  not1 
if he is prudent1 object to be called   

miserly4 ,in course of time  he will be 
thought more liberal1 when it is seen   
that by his parsimony  his revenue is   
sufficient1 that he can defend himself  
against those  who make war on him1 and 
undertake enterprises without burdening 
his  people1 so that he is really       
liberal to all those from whom he does  
not  take1 who are infinite in number1  
and niggardly to all to whom he does    
not give1 who are few4    ,in our times 
we have seen nothing great done except  
by those who have  been esteemed        
niggardly2 the others have all been     
ruined4 ,pope ,julius  ,,ii41 although  
he had made use of a reputation for     
liberality in order  to attain the      
papacy1 did not seek to retain it       
afterwards1 so that  he might be able to
 make war on the ,king of ,france1 and  
he earned on  so many wars without      
imposing an extraordinary tax1 because  
his extra  expenses were covered by the 
parsimony he had so long practised4 ,the
  present ,king of ,spain1 if he had    

been thought liberal1 would not have    
engaged in and won so many enterprises4 
,for these reasons a prince must  care  
little for the reputation of being a    
miser1 if he wishes to avoid  robbing   
his subjects1 if he wishes to be able to
 defend himself1 to not  become poor and
 contemptible1 and not to be forced to  
become rapacious2  this vice of         
niggardliness is one of those vices     
which enable him to  reign4 ,if it is   
said that ,csar attained the empire     
through liberality1  and that many      
others have reached the highest         
positions through being  liberal or     
being thought so1 ,i would reply that   
you are either a prince  already or else
 on the way to become one4 ,in the first
 case1 this  liberality is harmful2 in  
the second1 it is certainly necessary to
 be  considered liberal1 and ,csar was  
one of those who wished to attain the   
mastery over ,rome1 but if after        
attaining it he had lived and had not   
moderated his expenses1 he would have   

destroyed that empire4 ,and should  any 
one reply that there have been many     
princes1 who have done great  things    
with their armies1 who have been thought
 extremely liberal1 ,i  would answer by 
saying that the prince may either spend 
his own wealth  and that of his subjects
 or the wealth of others4 ,in the first 
case  he must be sparing1 but in the    
second he must not neglect to be very   
liberal4 ,this liberality is very       
necessary to a prince who marches with  
his armies1 and lives by plunder1       
sacking and extorting1 and is dealing   
with the wealth of others1 for without  
it he would not be followed  by his     
soldiers4 ,and you may be very generous 
indeed with what is  not the property of
 yourself or your subjects1 as were     
,cyrus1 ,csar1  and ,alexander2 for     
spending the wealth of others will not  
diminish  your reputation1 but increase 
it1 only spending your own resources    
will injure you4 ,there is nothing which
 destroys itself so much as  liberality1

 for by using it you lose the power of  
using it1 and become  either poor and   
despicable1 or1 to escape poverty1      
rapacious and hated4  ,and of all things
 that a prince must guard against1 the  
most important  are being despicable or 
hated1 and liberality will lead you to  
one or  other of these conditions4 ,it  
is1 therefore1 wiser to have the name   
of a miser1 which produces disgrace     
without hatred1 than to incur of        
necessity the name of being rapacious1  
which produces both disgrace and        
hatred4          ,,chapter ,,xvii       
,,of ,,cruelty ,,and ,,clemency1 ,,and  
,,whether ,,it ,,is ,,better ,,to ,,be  
,,loved ,,or ,,feared      ,proceeding  
to the other qualities before named1 ,i 
say that every prince  must desire to be
 considered merciful and not cruel4 ,he 
must1 however1  take care not to misuse 
this mercifulness4 ,cesare ,borgia was  
considered  cruel1 but his cruelty had  
settled the ,romagna1 united it1 and    
brought  it peace and confidence4 ,if   

this is considered a benefit1 it will be
  seen that he was really much more     
merciful than the ,florentine people1   
who1 to avoid the name of cruelty1      
allowed ,pistoia to be destroyed4 ,a    
prince1 therefore1 must not mind        
incurring the charge of cruelty for  the
 purpose of keeping his subjects united 
and confident2 for1 with a  very few    
examples1 he will be more merciful than 
those who1 from excess  of tenderness1  
allow disorders to arise1 from whence   
spring murders  and rapine2 for these as
 a rule injure the whole community1     
while the  executions carried out by the
 prince injure only one individual4 ,and
 of  all princes1 it is impossible for a
 new prince to escape the name of       
cruel1 new states being always full of  
dangers4 ,wherefore ,virgil makes  ,dido
 excuse the inhumanity of her rule by   
its being new1 where she says3          
,res dura1 et regni novitas me talia    
cogunt      ,moliri1 et late fines      
custode tueri4    ,nevertheless1 he must

 be cautious in believing and acting1   
and must  not inspire fear of his own   
accord1 and must proceed in a temperate 
manner with prudence and humanity1 so   
that too much confidence does  not      
render him incautious1 and too much     
diffidence does not render him          
intolerant4    ,from this arises the    
question whether it is better to be     
loved more  than feared1 or feared more 
than loved4 ,the reply is1 that one     
ought to  be both feared and loved1 but 
as it is difficult for the two to go    
together1 it is much safer to be feared 
than loved1 if one of the two  has to be
 wanting4 ,for it may be said of men in 
general that they are  ungrateful1      
voluble1 dissemblers1 anxious to avoid  
danger1 and covetous  of gain2 as long  
as you benefit them1 they are entirely  
yours2 they  offer you their blood1     
their goods1 their life1 and their      
children1 as  ,i have before said1 when 
the necessity is remote2 but when it    
approaches1 they revolt4 ,and the prince

 who has relied solely on their  words1 
without making other preparations1 is   
ruined1 for the friendship  which is    
gained by purchase and not through      
grandeur and nobility of  spirit is     
merited but is not secured1 and at times
 is not to be had4  ,and men have less  
scruple in offending one who makes      
himself loved than  one who makes       
himself feared2 for love is held by a   
chain of obligation  which1 men being   
selfish1 is broken whenever it serves   
their purpose2  but fear is maintained  
by a dread of punishment which never    
fails4  ,still1 a prince should make    
himself feared in such a way that if he 
does not gain love1 he at any rate      
avoids hatred2 for fear1 and the        
absence of hatred may well go together1 
and will be always attained by  one who 
abstains from interfering with the      
property of his citizens and  subjects  
or with their women4 ,and when he is    
obliged to take the life  of any one1 to
 do so when there is a proper           

justification and manifest  reason for  
it2 but above all he must abstain from  
taking the property  of others1 for men 
forget more easily the death of their   
father than  the loss of their          
patrimony4 ,then also pretexts for      
seizing property  are never wanting1 and
 one who begins to live by rapine will  
always  find some reason for taking the 
goods of others1 whereas causes for     
taking life are rarer and more quickly  
destroyed4 ,but when the prince  is with
 his army and has a large number of     
soldiers under his control1  then it is 
extremely necessary that he should not  
mind being thought  cruel2 for without  
this reputation he could not keep an    
army united1  or disposed to any duty4  
,among the noteworthy actions of        
,hannibal is numbered this1 that        
although he had an enormous army1       
composed of men of all nations  and     
fighting in foreign countries1 there    
never arose any dissension  either among
 them or against the prince1 either in  

good fortune or in  bad4 ,this could not
 be due to anything but his inhuman     
cruelty1 which  together with his       
infinite other virtues1 made him always 
venerated  and terrible in the sight of 
his soldiers1 and without it his other  
virtues would not have sufficed to      
produce that effect4 ,thoughtless       
writers admire on the one hand his      
actions1 and on the other blame the     
principal cause of them4 ,and that it is
 true that his other virtues  would not 
have sufficed may be seen from the case 
of ,scipio 7very rare  not only in his  
own times1 but in all times of which    
memory remains71  whose armies rebelled 
against him in ,spain1 which arose from 
nothing  but his excessive kindness1    
which allowed more license to the       
soldiers  than was consonant with       
military discipline4 ,he was reproached 
with  this in the senate by ,fabius     
,maximus1 who called him a corrupter of 
the  ,roman militia4    ,the ,locri     
having been destroyed by one of         

,scipio's officers were not  revenged by
 him1 nor was the insolence of that     
officer punished1  simply by reason of  
his easy nature2 so much so1 that some  
one wishing  to excuse him in the       
senate1 said that there were many men   
who knew  rather how not to err1 than   
how to correct the errors of others4    
,this  disposition would in time have   
tarnished the fame and glory of ,scipio 
had he persevered in it under the       
empire1 but living under the rule of    
the senate this harmful quality was not 
only concealed but became a  glory to   
him4 ,i conclude1 therefore1 with regard
 to being feared and  loved1 that men   
love at their own free will1 but fear at
 the will of  the prince1 and that a    
wise prince must rely on what is in his 
power  and not on what is in the power  
of others1 and he must only trouble     
himself to avoid incurring hatred1 as   
has been explained4          ,,chapter  
,,xviii      ,,in ,,what ,,way ,,princes
 ,,must ,,keep ,,faith      ,how        

laudable it is for a prince to keep good
 faith and live with  integrity1 and not
 with astuteness1 every one knows4      
,still the  experience of our times     
shows those princes to have done great  
things  who have had little regard for  
good faith1 and have been able by       
astuteness to confuse men's brains1 and 
who have ultimately overcome  those who 
have made loyalty their foundation4 ,you
 must know1 then1  that there are two   
methods of fighting1 the one by law1 the
 other by  force3 the first method is   
that of men1 the second of beasts2 but  
as  the first method is often           
insufficient1 one must have recourse to 
the  second4 ,it is therefore necessary 
to know well how to use both the  beast 
and the man4 ,this was covertly taught  
to princes by ancient  writers1 who     
relate how ,achilles and many others of 
those princes were  given to ,chiron the
 centaur to be brought up1 who kept them
 under his  discipline2 this system of  
having for teacher one who was half     

beast  and half man is meant to indicate
 that a prince must know how to use     
both natures1 and that the one without  
the other is not durable4 ,a  prince    
being thus obliged to know well how to  
act as a beast must  imitate the fox and
 the lion1 for the lion cannot protect  
himself  from snares1 and the fox cannot
 defend himself from wolves4 ,one must  
therefore be a fox to recognise snares1 
and a lion to frighten wolves4  ,those  
that wish to be only lions do not       
understand this4 ,therefore1  a prudent 
ruler ought not to keep faith when by so
 doing it would be  against his         
interest1 and when the reasons which    
made him bind himself  no longer exist4 
,if men were all good1 this precept     
would not be a  good one2 but as they   
are bad1 and would not observe their    
faith with  you1 so you are not bound to
 keep faith with them4 ,nor are         
legitimate  grounds ever wanting to a   
prince to give colour to the            
non-fulfilment  of his promise4 ,of this

 one could furnish an infinite number of
 modern  examples1 and show how many    
times peace has been broken1 and how    
many  promises rendered worthless1 by   
the faithlessness of princes1 and those 
that have been best able to imitate the 
fox have succeeded best4 ,but  it is    
necessary to be able to disguise this   
character well1 and to be  a great      
feigner and dissembler2 and men are so  
simple and so ready to  obey present    
necessities1 that one who deceives will 
always find those  who allow themselves 
to be deceived4 ,i will only mention one
 modern  instance4 ,alexander ,,vi4 did 
nothing else but deceive men1 he thought
  of nothing else1 and found the way to 
do it2 no man was ever more able  to    
give assurances1 or affirmed things with
 stronger oaths1 and no man  observed   
them less2 however1 he always succeeded 
in his deceptions1 as  he knew well this
 side of the world4 ,it is not1         
therefore1 necessary  for a prince to   
have all the above-named qualities1 but 

it is very  necessary to seem to have   
them4 ,i would even be bold to say that 
to  possess them and to always observe  
them is dangerous1 but to appear  to    
possess them is useful4 ,thus it is well
 to seem pious1 faithful1  humane1      
religious1 sincere1 and also to be so2  
but you must have the  mind so watchful 
that when it is needful to be otherwise 
you may be  able to change to the       
opposite qualities4 ,and it must be     
understood  that a prince1 and          
especially a new prince1 cannot observe 
all those  things which are considered  
good in men1 being often obliged1 in    
order  to maintain the state1 to act    
against faith1 against charity1 against 
humanity1 and against religion4 ,and1   
therefore1 he must have a mind  disposed
 to adapt itself according to the wind1 
and as the variations  of fortune       
dictate1 and1 as ,i said before1 not    
deviate from what is  good1 if possible1
 but be able to do evil if necessitated4
 ,a prince  must take great care that   

nothing goes out of his mouth which is  
not  full of the above-named five       
qualities1 and1 to see and hear him1 he 
should seem to be all faith1 all        
integrity1 all humanity1 and all        
religion4 ,and nothing is more necessary
 than to seem to have this last         
quality1 for men in general judge more  
by the eyes than by the hands1  for     
every one can see1 but very few have to 
feel4 ,everybody sees what  you appear  
to be1 few feel what you are1 and those 
few will not dare  to oppose themselves 
to the many1 who have the majesty of the
 state to  defend them2 and in the      
actions of men1 and especially of       
princes1 from  which there is no appeal1
 the end is everything4    ,let a prince
 therefore aim at living and maintaining
 state the state1  the means will always
 be judged honourable and praised by    
every one1  for the vulgar is always    
taken by appearances and the result of  
things2  and the world consists only of 
the vulgar1 and the few find a place    

when the many have nothing to rest upon4
 ,a certain prince of the  present time1
 whom it is well not to name1 never does
 anything but  preach peace and good    
faith1 but he is really a great enemy to
 both1  and either of them1 had he      
observed them1 would have lost him both 
state and reputation on many occasions4 
,,chapter ,,xix      ,,that ,,we ,,must 
,,avoid ,,being ,,despised ,,and ,,hated
      ,but as ,i have now spoken of the 
most important of the qualities  in     
question1 ,i will now deal briefly with 
the rest on the general  principle1 that
 the prince must1 as already stated1    
avoid those things  which will make him 
hated or despised2 and whenever he      
succeeds in  this1 he will have done his
 part1 and will find no danger in other 
vices4    ,he will chiefly become hated1
 as ,i said1 by being rapacious1 and    
usurping the property and women of his  
subjects1 which he must abstain  from   
doing1 and whenever one does not attack 
the property or honour  of the          

generality of men1 they will live       
contented2 and one will only  have to   
combat the ambition of a few1 who can be
 easily held in check  in many ways4 ,he
 is rendered despicable by being thought
 changeable1  frivolous1 effeminate1    
timid1 and irresolute2 which a prince   
must  guard against as a rock of danger1
 and manage so that his actions  show   
grandeur1 high courage1 seriousness1 and
 strength2 and as to the  government of 
his subjects1 let his sentence be       
irrevocable1 and let  him adhere to his 
decisions so that no one may think of   
deceiving him  or making him change4    
,the prince who creates such an opinion 
of himself  gets a great reputation1 and
 it is very difficult to conspire       
against  one who has a great reputation1
 and he will not easily be attacked1 so 
long as it is known that he is esteemed 
and reverenced by his subjects4  ,for a 
prince must have two kinds of fear3 one 
internal as regards his  subjects1 one  
external as regards foreign powers4     

,from the latter he  can defend himself 
with good arms and good friends1 and he 
will always  have good friends if he has
 good arms2 and internal matters will   
always  remain quiet1 if they are not   
perturbed by conspiracy2 and even if    
external powers sought to foment one1 if
 he has ruled and lived as ,i  have     
described1 he will always if he stands  
firm be able to sustain  every shock1 as
 ,i have shown that ,nabis the ,spartan 
did4 ,but with  regard to the subjects1 
if not acted on from outside1 it is     
still to be  feared lest they conspire  
in secret1 from which the prince may    
guard  himself well by avoiding hatred  
and contempt1 and keeping the people    
satisfied with him1 which it is         
necessary to accomplish1 as has been    
related at length4 ,and one of the most 
potent remedies that a prince  has      
against conspiracies1 is that of not    
being hated or despised by  the mass of 
the people2 for whoever conspires always
 believes that  he will satisfy the     

people by the death of their prince2 but
 if he  thought to offend them by doing 
this1 he would fear to engage in such   
an undertaking1 for the difficulties    
that conspirators have to meet are      
infinite4 ,experience shows that there  
have been very many conspiracies1  but  
few have turned out well1 for whoever   
conspires cannot act alone1  and cannot 
find companions except among those who  
are discontented2  and as soon as you   
have disclosed your intention to a      
malcontent1 you  give him the means of  
satisfying himself1 for by revealing it 
he can  hope to secure everything he    
wants2 to such an extent that seeing  a 
certain gain by doing this1 and seeing  
on the other hand only a  doubtful one  
and full of danger1 he must either be a 
rare friend to  you or else a very      
bitter enemy to the prince if he keeps  
faith with  you4 ,and to reduce the     
matter to narrow limits1 ,i say1 that on
 the side  of the conspirator there is  
nothing but fear1 jealousy1 suspicion1  

and dread of punishment which frightens 
him2 and on the side of the  prince     
there is the majesty of government1 the 
laws1 the protection  of friends and of 
the state which guard him4 ,when to     
these things are  added the goodwill of 
the people1 it is impossible that any   
one should  have the temerity to        
conspire4 ,for whereas generally a      
conspirator  has to fear before the     
execution of his plot1 in this case he  
must  also fear afterwards1 having the  
people for an enemy1 when his crime  is 
accomplished1 and thus not being able to
 hope for any refuge4  ,numberless      
instances might be given of this1 but ,i
 will content myself  with one which    
took place within the memory of our     
fathers4 ,messer  ,annibale ,bentivogli1
 ,prince of ,bologna1 ancestor of the   
present ,messer  ,annibale1 was killed  
by the ,canneschi1 who conspired against
 him4 ,he  left no relations but ,messer
 ,giovanni1 who was then an infant1 but 
after the murder the people rose up and 

killed all the ,canneschi4 ,this  arose 
from the popular goodwill that the house
 of ,bentivogli enjoyed at  that time in
 ,bologna1 which was so great that1 as  
there was nobody left  after the death  
of ,annibale who could govern the state1
 the ,bolognese  hearing that there was 
one of the ,bentivogli family in        
,florence1 who  had till then been      
thought the son of a blacksmith1 came to
 fetch him  and gave him the government 
of the city1 and it was governed by him 
until ,messer ,giovanni was old enough  
to assume the government4    ,i         
conclude1 therefore1 that a prince need 
trouble little about  conspiracies when 
the people are well disposed1 but when  
they  are hostile and hold him in       
hatred1 then he must fear everything    
and everybody4 ,well-ordered states and 
wise princes have studied  diligently   
not to drive the nobles to desperation1 
and to satisfy the  populace and keep it
 contented1 for this is one of the most 
important  matters that a prince has to 

deal with4 ,among the kingdoms that are 
well ordered and governed in our time is
 ,france1 and there we find  numberless 
good institutions on which depend the   
liberty and security  of the king2 of   
these the chief is the parliament and   
its authority1  because he who          
established that kingdom1 knowing the   
ambition and  insolence of the great    
nobles1 and deeming it necessary to have
 a bit  in their mouths to check them2  
and knowing on the other hand the hatred
  of the mass of the people to the      
great1 based on fear1 and wishing to    
secure them1 did not wish to make this  
the special care of the king1  to       
relieve him of the dissatisfaction that 
he might incur among the  nobles by     
favouring the people1 and among the     
people by favouring the  nobles4 ,he    
therefore established a third judge     
that1 without direct  charge of the     
king1 kept in check the great and       
favoured the lesser  people4 ,nor could 
any better or more prudent measure have 

been adopted1  nor better precaution for
 the safety of the king and the kingdom4
 ,from  which another notable rule can  
be drawn1 that princes should let the   
carrying out of unpopular duties devolve
 on others1 and bestow favours          
themselves4 ,i conclude again by saying 
that a prince must esteem his  nobles1  
but not make himself hated by the       
populace4 ,it may perhaps seem  to some1
 that considering the life and death of 
many ,roman emperors  that they are     
instances contrary to my opinion1       
finding that some who  lived always     
nobly and showed great strength of      
character1 nevertheless  lost the       
empire1 or were killed by their subjects
 who conspired against  them4 ,wishing  
to answer these objections1 ,i will     
discuss the qualities  of some emperors1
 showing the cause of their ruin not to 
be at variance  with what ,i have       
stated1 and ,i will also partly consider
 the things to  be noted by whoever     
reads the deeds of these times4 ,i will 

content  myself with taking all those   
emperors who succeeded to the empire    
from  ,marcus the philosopher to        
,maximinus2 these were ,marcus1         
,commodus his  son1 ,pertinax1          
,heliogabalus1 ,alexander1 and          
,maximinus4 ,and the first  thing to    
note is1 that whereas other princes have
 only to contend  against the ambition  
of the great and the insolence of the   
people1 the  ,roman emperors had a third
 difficulty1 that of having to support  
the  cruelty and avarice of the         
soldiers1 which was such a difficulty   
that  it was the cause of the ruin of   
many1 it being difficult to satisfy     
both the soldiers and the people4 ,for  
the people love tranquillity1  and      
therefore like princes who are pacific1 
but the soldiers prefer  a prince of    
military spirit1 who is insolent1 cruel1
 and rapacious4  ,they wish him to      
exercise these qualities on the people  
so that they  may get double pay and    
give vent to their avarice and cruelty4 

,thus it  came about that those emperors
 who1 by nature or art1 had not such a  
reputation as could keep both parties in
 check1 invariably were ruined1  and the
 greater number of them who were raised 
to the empire being  new men1 knowing   
the difficulties of these two opposite  
dispositions1  confined themselves to   
satisfying the soldiers1 and thought    
little of  injuring the people4 ,this   
choice was necessary1 princes not being 
able  to avoid being hated by some one4 
,they must first try not to be hated  by
 the mass of the people2 if they cannot 
accomplish this they must  use every    
means to escape the hatred of the most  
powerful parties4 ,and  therefore these 
emperors1 who being new men had need of 
extraordinary  favours1 adhered to the  
soldiers more willingly than to the     
people2  whether this1 however1 was of  
use to them or not1 depended on whether 
the prince knew how to maintain his     
reputation with them4    ,from these    
causes it resulted that ,marcus1        

,pertinax1 and ,alexander1  being all of
 modest life1 lovers of justice1 enemies
 of cruelty1  humane and benign1 had all
 a sad ending except ,marcus4 ,marcus   
alone  lived and died in honour1 because
 he succeeded to the empire by          
hereditary right and did not owe it     
either to the soldiers or to the        
people2 besides which1 possessing many  
virtues which made him revered1  he kept
 both parties in their place as long as 
he lived and was never  either hated or 
despised4 ,but ,pertinax was created    
emperor against the  will of the        
soldiers1 who being accustomed to live  
licentiously under  ,commodus1 could not
 put up with the honest life to which   
,pertinax  wished to limit them1 so that
 having made himself hated1 and to this 
contempt being added because he was old1
 he was ruined at the very  beginning of
 his administration4 ,whence it may be  
seen that hatred  is gained as much by  
good works as by evil1 and therefore1 as
 ,i said  before1 a prince who wishes to

 maintain the state is often forced to  
do evil1 for when that party1 whether   
populace1 soldiery1 or nobles1          
whichever it be that you consider       
necessary to you for keeping your       
position1 is corrupt1 you must follow   
its humour and satisfy it1 and  in that 
case good works will be inimical to you4
 ,but let us come to  ,alexander1 who   
was of such goodness1 that among other  
things for which  he is praised1 it is  
said that in the fourteen years that he 
reigned  no one was put to death by him 
without a fair trial4 ,nevertheless1    
being considered effeminate1 and a man  
who allowed himself to be  ruled by his 
mother1 and having thus fallen into     
contempt1 the army  conspired against   
him and killed him4 ,looking1 on the    
other hand1  at the qualities of        
,commodus1 ,severus1 ,antoninus1        
extremely cruel  and rapacious2 to      
satisfy the soldiers there was no injury
 which  they would not inflict on the   
people1 and all except ,severus ended   

badly4 ,severus1 however1 had such      
abilities that by maintaining the       
soldiers friendly to him1 he was able to
 reign happily1 although he  oppressed  
the people1 for his virtues made him so 
admirable in the  sight both of the     
soldiers and the people that the latter 
were1 as it  were1 astonished and       
stupefied1 while the former were        
respectful and  contented4 ,as the deeds
 of this ruler were great for a new     
prince1 ,i  will briefly show how well  
he could use the qualities of the fox   
and  the lion1 whose natures1 as ,i said
 before1 it is necessary for a prince   
to imitate4 ,knowing the sloth of the   
,emperor ,julian1 ,severus1 who was     
leader of the army in ,slavonia1        
persuaded the troops that it would be   
well to go to ,rome to avenge the death 
of ,pertinax1 who had been slain  by the
 ,imperial guard1 and under this        
pretext1 without revealing his          
aspirations to the throne1 marched with 
his army to ,rome and was in  ,italy    

before his design was known4 ,on his    
arrival in ,rome the senate  elected him
 emperor through fear1 and ,julian died4
 ,there remained  after this beginning  
two difficulties to be faced by ,severus
 before  he could obtain the whole      
control of the empire3 one in ,asia1    
where  ,nigrinus1 head of the ,asiatic  
armies1 had declared himself emperor2   
the  other in the west from ,albinus1   
who also aspired to the empire4 ,and  as
 he judged it dangerous to show himself 
hostile to both1 he decided  to attack  
,nigrinus and deceive ,albinus1 to whom 
he wrote that having  been elected      
emperor by the senate he wished to share
 that dignity  with him2 he sent him the
 title of ,csar and1 by deliberation of 
the  senate1 he was declared his        
colleague2 all of which was accepted as 
true by ,albinus4 ,but when ,severus had
 defeated and killed ,nigrinus1  and    
pacified things in the ,east1 he        
returned to ,rome and charged  ,albinus 
in the senate with having1 unmindful of 

the benefits received  from him1        
traitorously sought to assassinate him1 
and stated that he  was therefore       
obliged to go and punish his            
ingratitude4 ,he then went  to ,france  
to meet him1 and there deprived him of  
both his position  and his life4        
,whoever examines in detail the actions 
of ,severus1 will  find him to have been
 a very ferocious lion and an extremely 
astute  fox1 and will see him to have   
been feared and respected by all and not
  hated by the army2 and will not be    
surprised that he1 a new man1 should    
have been able to hold the empire so    
well1 since his great reputation        
defended him always from that hatred    
that his rapacity might have  produced  
in the people4 ,but ,antoninus his son  
was also a man of great  ability1 and   
possessed qualities that rendered him   
admirable in the  sight of the people   
and also made him popular with the      
soldiers1 for  he was a military man1   
capable of enduring the most extreme    

hardships1  disdainful of delicate food1
 and every other luxury1 which made him 
loved by all the armies4 ,however1 his  
ferocity and cruelty were so  great and 
unheard of1 through his having1 after   
executing many private  individuals1    
caused a large part of the population of
 ,rome and all that  of ,alexandria to  
be killed1 that he became hated by all  
the world and  began to be feared by    
those about him to such an extent that  
he was  finally killed by a centurion in
 the midst of his army4 ,whence it is to
  be noted that this kind of death1     
which proceeds from the deliberate      
action of a determined man1 cannot be   
avoided by princes1 since any one  who  
does not fear death himself can inflict 
it1 but a prince need not  fear much on 
this account1 as such actions are       
extremely rare4 ,he must  only guard    
against committing any grave injury to  
any one he makes use  of1 or has about  
him for his service1 like ,antoninus had
 done1 having  caused the death with    

contumely of the brother of that        
centurion1 and  also threatened him     
every day1 although he still retained   
him in his  bodyguard1 which was a      
foolish and dangerous thing to do1 as   
the fact  proved4 ,but let us come to   
,commodus1 who might easily have kept   
the  empire1 having succeeded to it by  
heredity1 being the son of ,marcus1  and
 it would have sufficed for him to      
follow in the steps of his father  to   
have satisfied both the people and the  
soldiers4 ,but being of a  cruel and    
bestial disposition1 in order to be able
 to exercise his  rapacity on the       
people1 he sought to amuse the soldiers 
and render  them licentious2 on the     
other hand1 by not maintaining his      
dignity1  by often descending into the  
theatre to fight with gladiators and    
committing other contemptible actions1  
little worthy of the imperial  dignity1 
he became despicable in the eyes of the 
soldiers1 and being  hated on the one   
hand and despised on the other1 he was  

conspired  against and killed4 ,there   
remains to be described the character of
  ,maximinus4 ,he was an extremely      
warlike man1 and as the armies were     
annoyed with the effeminacy of          
,alexander1 which we have already spoken
  of1 he was after the death of the     
latter elected emperor4 ,he did not     
enjoy it for long1 as two things made   
him hated and despised3 the  one his    
base origin1 as he had been a shepherd  
in ,thrace1 which was  generally known  
and caused great disdain on all sides2  
the other1  because he had at the       
commencement of his rule deferred going 
to ,rome  to take possession of the     
,imperial seat1 and had obtained a      
reputation  for great cruelty1 having   
through his prefects in ,rome and other 
parts  of the empire committed many acts
 of cruelty4 ,the whole world being     
thus moved by indignation for the       
baseness of his blood1 and also by  the 
hatred caused by fear of his ferocity1  
he was conspired against  first by      

,africa and afterwards by the senate and
 all the people of ,rome  and ,italy4   
,his own army also joined them1 for     
besieging ,aquileia and  finding it     
difficult to take1 they became enraged  
at his cruelty1 and  seeing that he had 
so many enemies1 they feared him less   
and put him to  death4 ,i will not speak
 of ,heliogabalus1 of ,macrinus1 or     
,julian1 who  being entirely            
contemptible were immediately           
suppressed1 but ,i will  come to the    
conclusion of this discourse by saying  
that the princes of  our time have less 
difficulty than these of being obliged  
to satisfy in  an extraordinary degree  
their soldiers in their states2 for     
although  they must have a certain      
consideration for them1 yet it is soon  
settled1 for none of these princes have 
armies that are inextricably  bound up  
with the administration of the          
government and the rule of  their       
provinces as were the armies of the     
,roman empire2 and therefore  if it was 

then necessary to satisfy the soldiers  
rather than the  people1 it was because 
the soldiers could do more than the     
people2 now1  it is more necessary to   
all princes1 except the ,turk and the   
,soldan1  to satisfy the people than the
 soldiers1 for the people can do more   
than the soldiers4 ,i except the ,turk1 
because he always keeps about  him      
twelve thousand infantry and fifteen    
thousand cavalry1 on which  depend the  
security and strength of his kingdom2   
and it is necessary  for him to postpone
 every other consideration of the people
 to keep  them friendly4 ,it is the same
 with the kingdom of the ,soldan1 which 
being entirely in the hands of the      
soldiers1 he is bound to keep their     
friendship regardless of the people4    
,and it is to be noted that this  state 
of the ,soldan is different from that of
 all other princes1 being  similar to   
the ,christian pontificate1 which cannot
 be called either  a hereditary kingdom 
or a new one1 for the sons of the dead  

prince  are not his heirs1 but he who is
 elected to that position by those  who 
have authority4 ,and as this order is   
ancient it cannot be called  a new      
kingdom1 there being none of these      
difficulties which exist in  new ones2  
as although the prince is new1 the rules
 of that state are  old and arranged to 
receive him as if he were their         
hereditary lord4  ,but returning to our 
matter1 ,i say that whoever studies the 
preceding  argument will see that either
 hatred or contempt were the causes of  
the ruin of the emperors named1 and will
 also observe how it came about  that1  
some of them acting in one way and some 
in another1 in both ways  there were    
some who had a fortunate and others an  
unfortunate ending4  ,as ,pertinax and  
,alexander were both new rulers1 it was 
useless and  injurious for them to try  
and imitate ,marcus1 who was a          
hereditary  prince2 and similarly with  
,caracalla1 ,commodus1 and ,maximinus it
 was  pernicious for them to imitate    

,severus1 as they had not sufficient    
ability to follow in his footsteps4     
,thus a new prince cannot imitate  the  
actions of ,marcus1 in his dominions1   
nor is it necessary for him to  imitate 
those of ,severus2 but he must take from
 ,severus those portions  that are      
necessary to found his state1 and from  
,marcus those that are  useful and      
glorious for conserving a state that is 
already established  and secure4        
,,chapter ,,xx      ,,whether           
,,fortresses ,,and ,,other ,,things     
,,which ,,princes ,,often ,,make ,,are  
,,useful  ,,or ,,injurious      ,some   
princes1 in order to securely hold their
 possessions1 have  disarmed their      
subjects1 some others have kept their   
subject lands  divided into parts1      
others have fomented enmities against   
themselves1  others have endeavoured to 
win over those whom they suspected at   
the  commencement of their rule3 some   
have constructed fortresses1 others     
have ruined and destroyed them4 ,and    

although one cannot pronounce a         
definite judgment as to these things    
without going into the particulars  of  
the state to which such a deliberation  
is to be applied1 still ,i  will speak  
in such a broad way as the matter will  
permit of4    ,a new prince has never   
been known to disarm his subjects1 on   
the  contrary1 when he has found them   
disarmed he has always armed them1 for  
by arming them these arms become your   
own1 those that you suspected  become   
faithful and those that were faithful   
remain so1 and from being  merely       
subjects become your partisans4 ,and    
since all the subjects  cannot be armed1
 when you benefit those that you arm1   
you can deal more  safely with the      
others2 and this different treatment    
that they notice  renders your men more 
obliged to you1 the others will excuse  
you1  judging that those have           
necessarily greater merit who have      
greater  danger and heavier duties4 ,but
 when you disarm them1 you commence to  

offend them and show that you distrust  
them either through cowardice or  lack  
of confidence1 and both of these        
opinions generate hatred against  you4  
,and as you cannot remain unarmed1 you  
are obliged to resort to a  mercenary   
militia1 of which we have already stated
 the value2 and even  if it were good it
 cannot be sufficient in number to      
defend you against  powerful enemies and
 suspected subjects4 ,but1 as ,i have   
said1 a new  prince in a new dominion   
always has his subjects armed4 ,history 
is full  of such examples4 ,but when a  
prince acquires a new state as an       
addition  to his old one1 then it is    
necessary to disarm that state1 except  
those  who in acquiring it have sided   
with you2 and even these one must1 when 
time and opportunity serve1 render weak 
and effeminate1 and arrange  things so  
that all the arms of the new state are  
in the hands of your  own soldiers who  
in your old state live near you4    ,our
 forefathers and those who were esteemed

 wise used to say that  it was necessary
 to hold ,pistoia by means of factious  
and ,pisa with  fortresses1 and for this
 purpose they fomented differences among
 their  subjects in some town in order  
to possess it more easily4 ,this1 in    
those days when ,italy was fairly       
divided1 was doubtless well done1 but   
does not seem to me to be a good precept
 for the present time1 for ,i do  not   
believe that the divisions thus created 
ever do any good2 on the  contrary it is
 certain that when the enemy approaches1
 the cities thus  divided will be at    
once lost1 for the weaker faction will  
always side  with the enemy and the     
other will not be able to stand4 ,the   
,venetians1  actuated1 ,i believe1 by   
the aforesaid motives1 cherished the    
,guelf  and ,ghibelline factions in the 
cities subject to them1 and although    
they never allowed them to come to      
bloodshed1 they yet encouraged  these   
differences among them1 so that the     
citizens1 being occupied in  their own  

quarrels1 might not act against them4   
,this1 however1 did  not avail them     
anything1 as was seen when1 after the   
defeat of ,vaila1  a part of those      
subjects immediately took courage and   
took from them  the whole state4 ,such  
methods1 besides1 argue weakness in a   
prince1  for in a strong government such
 dissensions will never be permitted4   
,they are profitable only in time of    
peace1 as by means of them it is  easy  
to manage one's subjects1 but when it   
comes to war1 the fallacy  of such a    
policy is at once shown4 ,without doubt1
 princes become great  when they        
overcome difficulties and opposition1   
and therefore fortune1  especially when 
it wants to render a new prince great1  
who has greater  need of gaining a great
 reputation than a hereditary prince1   
raises up  enemies and compels him to   
undertake wars against them1 so that he 
may  have cause to overcome them1 and   
thus raise himself higher by means  of  
that ladder which his enemies have      

brought him4 ,there are many who  think 
therefore that a wise prince ought1 when
 he has the chance1 to  foment astutely 
some enmity1 so that by suppressing it  
he will augment  his greatness4         
,princes1 and especially new ones1 have 
found more faith  and more usefulness in
 those men1 whom at the beginning of    
their power  they regarded with         
suspicion1 than in those they at first  
confided  in4 ,pandolfo ,petrucci1      
,prince of ,siena1 governed his state   
more by  those whom he suspected than by
 others4 ,but of this we cannot speak at
  large1 as it varies according to the  
subject2 ,i will merely say that  these 
men who at the beginning of a new       
government were enemies1 if  they are of
 a kind to need support to maintain     
their position1 can be  very easily     
gained by the prince1 and they are the  
more compelled to  serve him faithfully 
as they know they must by their deeds   
cancel the  bad opinion previously held 
of them1 and thus the prince will always

  derive greater help from them than    
from those who1 serving him with        
greater security1 neglect his interest4 
,and as the matter requires it1  ,i will
 not omit to remind a prince who has    
newly taken a state with the  secret    
help of its inhabitants1 that he must   
consider well the motives  that have    
induced those who have favoured him to  
do so1 and if it is  not natural        
affection for him1 but only because they
 were not contented  with the state as  
it was1 he will have great trouble and  
difficulty in  maintaining their        
friendship1 because it will be          
impossible for him to  content them4    
,and on well examining the cause of this
 in the examples  drawn from ancient and
 modern times it will be seen that it is
 much  easier to gain the friendship1 of
 those men who were contented with  the 
previous condition and were therefore at
 first enemies1 than that  of those who 
not being contented1 became his friends 
and helped him to  occupy it4 ,it has   

been the custom of princes in order to  
be able to  hold securely their state1  
to erect fortresses1 as a bridle and bit
  to those who have designs against     
them1 and in order to have a secure     
refuge against a sudden assault4 ,i     
approve this method1 because it was     
anciently used4 ,nevertheless1 ,messer  
,niccolo ,vitelli has been seen in  our 
own time to destroy two fortresses in   
,citt di ,castello in order  to keep    
that state4 ,guid' ,ubaldo1 ,duke of    
,urbino1 on returning to his  dominions 
from which he had been driven by ,cesare
 ,borgia1 razed to  their foundations   
all the fortresses of that province1 and
 considered  that without them it would 
be more difficult for him to lose again 
the  state4 ,the ,bentivogli1 in        
returning to ,bologna1 used similar     
measures4  ,therefore fortresses may or 
may not be useful according to the      
times2  if they do good in one way1 they
 do harm in another4    ,the question   
may be discussed thus3 a prince who     

fears his own people  more than         
foreigners ought to build fortresses1   
but he who has greater  fear of         
foreigners than of his own people ought 
to do without them4 ,the  castle of     
,milan built by ,francesco ,sforza has  
given and will give more  trouble to the
 house of ,sforza than any other        
disorder in that state4  ,therefore the 
best fortress is to be found in the love
 of the people1  for although you may   
have fortresses they will not save you  
if you are  hated by the people4 ,when  
once the people have taken arms against 
you1  there will never be lacking       
foreigners to assist them4 ,in our times
  we do not see that they have profited 
any ruler1 except the ,countess  of     
,forli on the death of her consort      
,count ,girolamo1 for she was thus      
enabled to escape the popular rising and
 await help from ,milan and  recover the
 state2 the circumstances being then    
such that no foreigner  could assist the
 people4 ,but afterwards they were of   

little use to her  when ,cesare ,borgia 
attacked her and the people being       
hostile to her  allied themselves with  
the foreigner4 ,so that then and before 
it would  have been safer for her not to
 be hated by the people than to have the
  fortresses4 ,having considered these  
things ,i would therefore praise the    
one who erects fortresses and the one   
who does not1 and would blame any  one  
who1 trusting in them1 thinks little of 
being hated by his people4              
,,chapter ,,xxi      ,,how ,a ,,prince  
,,must ,,act ,,in ,,order ,,to ,,gain   
,,reputation      ,nothing causes a     
prince to be so much esteemed as great  
enterprises  and setting a rare example4
 ,we have in our own day ,ferdinand1    
,king of  ,aragon1 at present ,king of  
,spain4 ,he may almost be termed a new  
prince1  because from a weak king he has
 become for fame and glory the first    
king in ,christendom1 and if you regard 
his actions you will find them  all very
 great and some of them extraordinary4  

,at the beginning of  his reign he      
assailed ,granada1 and that enterprise  
was the foundation  of his state4 ,at   
first he did it leisurely and without   
fear of being  interfered with2 he kept 
the minds of the barons of ,castile     
occupied in  this enterprise1 so that   
thinking only of that war they did not  
think  of making innovations1 and he    
thus acquired reputation and power over 
them without their being aware of it4   
,he was able with the money of  the     
,church and the people to maintain his  
armies1 and by that long war  lay the   
foundations of his military power1 which
 afterwards has made  him famous4       
,besides this1 to be able to undertake  
greater enterprises1  and always under  
the pretext of religion1 he had recourse
 to a pious  cruelty1 driving out the   
,moors from his kingdom and despoiling  
them4  ,no more admirable or rare       
example can be found4 ,he also attacked 
under the same pretext ,africa1         
undertook his ,italian enterprise1 and  

has lately attacked ,france2 so that he 
has continually contrived great  things1
 which have kept his subjects' minds    
uncertain and astonished1  and occupied 
in watching their result4    ,and these 
actions have arisen one out of the      
other1 so that they have  left no time  
for men to settle down and act against  
him4 ,it is also  very profitable for a 
prince to give some rare examples of    
himself in  the internal administration1
 like those related of ,messer ,bernab  
of  ,milan1 when it happens that some   
one does something extraordinary1       
either good or evil1 in civil life1 and 
to take a means of rewarding  or        
punishing him which will be much talked 
about4 ,and above all a  prince must    
endeavour in every action to obtain fame
 for being great  and excellent4 ,a     
prince is further esteemed when he is a 
true friend  or a true enemy1 when1 that
 is1 he declares himself without reserve
 in  favour of some one against another4
    ,this policy is always more useful  

than remaining neutral4 ,for if two     
neighbouring powers come to blows1 they 
are either such that if one  wins1 you  
will have to fear the victor1 or else   
not4 ,in either of these  two cases it  
will be better for you to declare       
yourself openly and make  war1 because  
in the first case if you do not declare 
yourself1 you will  fall a prey to the  
victor1 to the pleasure and satisfaction
 of the one  who has been defeated1 and 
you will have no reason nor anything to 
defend you and nobody to receive you4   
,for1 whoever wins will not desire      
friends whom he suspects and who do not 
help him when in trouble1 and  whoever  
loses will not receive you as you did   
not take up arms to  assist his cause4  
,antiochus went to ,greece1 being sent  
by the toli  to expel the ,romans4 ,he  
sent orators to the ,achi who were      
friends of  the ,romans to encourage    
them to remain neutral1 on the other    
hand the  ,romans persuaded them to take
 up arms on their side4 ,the matter was 

brought before the council of the ,achi 
for deliberation1 where the  ambassador 
of ,antiochus sought to persuade them to
 remain neutral1 to  which the ,roman   
ambassador replied3 ,as to what is said 
that it is best  and most useful for    
your state not to meddle in our war1    
nothing is  further from the truth2 for 
if you do not meddle in it you will     
become1  without any favour or any      
reputation1 the prize of the victor4    
,and it  will always happen that the one
 who is not your friend will want you   
to remain neutral1 and the one who is   
your friend will require you to  declare
 yourself by taking arms4 ,irresolute   
princes1 to avoid present  dangers1     
usually follow the way of neutrality and
 are mostly ruined  by it4 ,but when the
 prince declares himself frankly in     
favour of one  side1 if the one to whom 
you adhere conquers1 even if he is      
powerful  and you remain at his         
discretion1 he is under an obligation to
 you and  friendship has been           

established1 and men are never so       
dishonest as to  oppress you with such  
ingratitude4    ,moreover1 victories are
 never so prosperous that the victor    
does not  need to have some scruples1   
especially as to justice4 ,but if he to 
whom  you adhere loses1 you are         
sheltered by him1 and so long as he can1
 he  will assist you2 you become the    
companion of a fortune which may rise   
again4 ,in the second case1 when those  
who fight are such that you have        
nothing to fear from the victor1 it is  
still more prudent on your part  to     
adhere to one2 for you go to the ruin of
 one with the help of him  who ought to 
save him if he were wise1 and if he     
conquers he rests  at your discretion1  
and it is impossible that he should not 
conquer  with your help4 ,and here it   
should be noted that a prince ought     
never  to make common cause with one    
more powerful than himself to injure    
another1 unless necessity forces him to 
it1 as before said2 for if he  wins you 

rest at his discretion1 and princes must
 avoid as much as  possible being at the
 discretion of others4 ,the ,venetians  
united with  ,france against the ,duke  
of ,milan1 although they could have     
avoided that  union1 and from it        
resulted their own ruin4 ,but when one  
cannot avoid  it1 as happened to the    
,florentines when the pope and ,spain   
went with  their armies to attack       
,lombardy1 then the prince ought to join
 for the  above reasons4 ,let no state  
believe that it can follow a secure     
policy1  rather let it think that all   
are doubtful4 ,this is found in the     
nature  of things1 that one never tries 
to avoid one difficulty without running 
into another1 but prudence consists in  
being able to know the nature of  the   
difficulties1 and taking the least      
harmful as good4 ,a prince must  also   
show himself a lover of merit1 and      
honour those who excel in every  art4   
,moreover he must encourage his citizens
 to follow their callings  quietly1     

whether in commerce1 or agriculture1 or 
any other trade that  men follow1 so    
that this one shall not refrain from    
improving his  possessions through fear 
that they may be taken from him1 and    
that one  from starting a trade for fear
 of taxes2 but he should offer rewards  
to  whoever does these things1 and to   
whoever seeks in any way to improve  his
 city or state4 ,besides this1 he ought1
 at convenient seasons of the  year1 to 
keep the people occupied with festivals 
and spectacles2 and  as every city is   
divided either into trades or into      
classes1 he ought  to pay attention to  
all these things1 mingle with them from 
time to  time1 and give them an example 
of his humanity and magnificence1 always
  holding firm1 however1 the majesty of 
his dignity1 which must never be        
allowed to fan in anything whatever4    
,,chapter ,,xxii      ,,of ,,the        
,,secretaries ,,of ,,princes      ,the  
choice of a prince's ministers is a     
matter of no little importance2  they   

are either good or not according to the 
prudence of the prince4  ,the first     
impression that one gets of a ruler and 
of his brains is  from seeing the men   
that he has about him4 ,when they are   
competent  and faithful one can always  
consider him wise1 as he has been able  
to  recognise their ability and keep    
them faithful4 ,but when they are the   
reverse1 one can always form an         
unfavourable opinion of him1 because    
the first mistake that he makes is in   
making this choice4 ,there was  nobody  
who knew ,messer ,antonio da ,venafro as
 the minister of ,pandolfo  ,petrucci1  
,prince of ,siena1 who did not consider 
,pandolfo to be a very  prudent man1    
having him for his minister4 ,there are 
three different  kinds of brains1 the   
one understands things unassisted1 the  
other  understands things when shown by 
others1 the third understands neither   
alone nor with the explanations of      
others4 ,the first kind is most         
excellent1 the second also excellent1   

but the third useless4 ,it is  therefore
 evident that if ,pandolfo was not of   
the first kind1 he was  at any rate of  
the second4 ,for every time that one has
 the judgment to  know the good and evil
 that any one does or says1 even if he  
has no  invention1 yet he recognises the
 bad and good works of his minister  and
 corrects the one and supports the      
other2 and the minister cannot  hope to 
deceive him and therefore remains good4 
,for a prince to be  able to know a     
minister there is this method which     
never fails4 ,when  you see the minister
 think more of himself than of you1 and 
in all his  actions seek his own profit1
 such a man will never be a good        
minister1  and you can never rely on    
him2 for whoever has in hand the state  
of  another must never think of himself 
but of the prince1 and not call  to mind
 anything but what relates to him4 ,and1
 on the other hand1 the  prince1 in     
order to retain his fidelity ought to   
think of his minister1  honouring and   

enriching him1 doing him kindnesses1 and
 conferring on  him honours and giving  
him responsible tasks1 so that the great
 honours  and riches bestowed on him    
cause him not to desire other honours   
and  riches1 and the tasks he has to    
fulfil make him fearful of changes1     
knowing that he could not execute them  
without the prince4 ,when princes  and  
their ministers stand in this relation  
to each other1 they can  rely the one   
upon the other2 when it is otherwise1   
the end is always  injurious either for 
one or the other of them4               
,,chapter ,,xxiii      ,,how            
,,flatterers ,,must ,,be ,,shunned      
,i must not omit an important subject1  
and a mistake which princes  can with   
difficulty avoid1 if they are not very  
prudent1 or if they  do not make a good 
choice4 ,and this is with regard to     
flatterers1 of  which courts are full1  
because men take such pleasure in their 
own  things and deceive themselves about
 them that they can with difficulty     

guard against this plague2 and by       
wishing to guard against it they run    
the risk of becoming contemptible4      
,because there is no other way of       
guarding one's self against flattery    
than by letting men understand  that    
they will not offend you by speaking the
 truth2 but when every one  can tell you
 the truth1 you lose their respect4 ,a  
prudent prince must  therefore take a   
third course1 by choosing in his state  
wise men1 and  giving these alone full  
liberty to speak the truth to him1 but  
only of  those things that he asks and  
of nothing else2 but he must ask them   
about everything and hear their opinion1
 and afterwards deliberate by  himself  
in his own way1 and in these councils   
and with each of these  men comport     
himself so that every one may see that  
the more freely he  speaks1 the more he 
will be acceptable4 ,outside these he   
should listen  to no one1 go about the  
matter deliberately1 and be determined  
in his  decisions4 ,whoever acts        

otherwise either acts precipitately     
through  flattery or else changes often 
through the variety of opinions1 from   
which it happens that he is little      
esteemed4 ,i will give a modern         
instance of this4 ,pre' ,luca1 a        
follower of ,maximilian1 the present    
emperor1 speaking of his majesty said   
that he never took counsel with         
anybody1 and yet that he never did      
anything as he wished2 this arose  from 
his following the contrary method to the
 aforesaid4 ,as the emperor  is a secret
 man he does not communicate his designs
 to any one or  take any one's advice1  
but as on putting them into effect they 
begin  to be known and discovered1 they 
begin to be opposed by those he has     
about him1 and he is easily diverted    
from his purpose4 ,hence it comes  to   
pass that what he does one day he undoes
 the next1 no one ever  understands what
 he wishes or intends to do1 and no     
reliance is to be  placed on his        
deliberations4 ,a prince1 therefore1    

ought always to take  counsel1 but only 
when he wishes1 not when others wish2 on
 the contrary  he ought to discourage   
absolutely attempts to advise him unless
 he  asks it1 but he ought to be a great
 asker1 and a patient hearer of  the    
truth about those things which he has   
inquired of2 indeed1 if he  finds that  
any one has scruples in telling him the 
truth he should be  angry4 ,and since   
some think that a prince who gains the  
reputation  of being prudent is so      
considered1 not by his nature but by the
 good  councillors he has about him1    
they are undoubtedly deceived4 ,it is an
  infallible rule that a prince who is  
not wise himself cannot be well         
advised1 unless by chance he left       
himself entirely in the hands of one    
man who ruled him in everything1 and    
happened to be a very prudent  man4 ,in 
this case he may doubtless be well      
governed1 but it would not  last long1  
for that governor would in a short time 
deprive him of the  state2 but by taking

 counsel with many1 a prince who is not 
wise will  never have united councils   
and will not be able to unite them for  
himself4 ,the councillors will all think
 of their own interests1 and he  will be
 unable either to correct or to         
understand them4 ,and it cannot  be     
otherwise1 for men will always be false 
to you unless they are  compelled by    
necessity to be true4    ,therefore it  
must be concluded that wise counsels1   
from whoever they  come1 must           
necessarily be due to the prudence of   
the prince1 and not  the prudence of the
 prince to the good counsels received4  
,,chapter ,,xxiv      ,,why ,,the       
,,princes ,,of ,,italy ,,have ,,lost    
,,their ,,states      ,the              
before-mentioned things1 if prudently   
observed1 make a new prince  seem       
ancient1 and render him at once more    
secure and firmer in the  state than if 
he had been established there of old4   
,for a new prince is  much more observed
 in his actions than a hereditary one1  

and when these  are recognised as       
virtuous1 he gains men more and they are
 more bound  to him than if he were of  
the ancient blood4 ,for men are much    
more  taken by present than by past     
things1 and when they find themselves   
well off in the present1 they enjoy it  
and seek nothing more2 on the  contrary1
 they will do all they can to defend    
him1 so long as the  prince is not in   
other things wanting to himself4 ,and   
thus he will  have the double glory of  
having founded a new realm and adorned  
it and  fortified it with good laws1    
good arms1 good friends and good        
examples2  as he will have double shame 
who is born a prince and through want of
  prudence has lost it4    ,and if one  
considers those rulers who have lost    
their position in  ,italy in our days1  
such as the ,king of ,naples1 the ,duk  
of ,milan and  others1 one will find in 
them first a common defect as to their  
arms1  for the reasons discussed at     
length1 then we observe that some of    

them either had the people hostile to   
them1 or that if the people were        
friendly they were not able to make sure
 of the nobility1 for without  these    
defects1 states are not lost that have  
enough strength to be able  to keep an  
army in the field4 ,philip of ,macedon1 
not the father of  ,alexander the       
,great1 but the one who was conquered by
 ,titus ,quinteus1  did not possess a   
great state compared to the greatness of
 ,rome and  ,greece which assailed him1 
but being a military man and one who    
knew  how to divert the people and make 
sure of the great1 he was able to       
sustain the war against them for many   
years2 and if at length he lost  his    
power over several cities1 he was still 
able to keep his kingdom4  ,therefore1  
those of our princes who had held their 
possessions for many  years must not    
accuse fortune for having lost them1 but
 rather their  own negligence2 for      
having never in quiet times considered  
that things  might change 7as it is a   

common fault of men not to reckon on    
storms1  in fair weather7 when adverse  
times came1 they only thought of fleeing
  from them1 instead of defending       
themselves2 and hoped that the people1  
enraged by the insolence of the         
conquerors1 would recall them4 ,this    
measure1 when others are wanting1 is    
good2 but it is very bad to have        
neglected the other remedies for that   
one1 for nobody would desire to  fall   
because he believed that he would then  
find some one to pick him  up4 ,this may
 or may not take place1 and if it does1 
it is not with  safety to you1 as that  
defence is known to be cowardly and not 
to be  depended on2 and only those      
defences are good1 certain and durable1 
which depend only on yourself and your  
own ability4          ,,chapter ,,xxv   
,,how ,,much ,,fortune ,,can ,,do ,,in  
,,human ,,affairs ,,and ,,how ,,it ,,may
 ,,be ,,opposed      ,it is not unknown 
to me how many have been and are of     
opinion that  worldly events are so     

governed by fortune and by ,god1 that   
men cannot  by their prudence change    
them1 and that on the contrary there is 
no  remedy whatever1 and for this they  
may judge it to be useless to toil  much
 about them1 but let things be ruled by 
chance4 ,this opinion has  been more    
believed in in our day1 from the great  
changes that have been  seen1 and are   
daily seen1 beyond every human          
conjecture4    ,when ,i think about them
 at times1 ,i am partly inclined to     
share  this opinion4 ,nevertheless1 that
 our freewill may not be altogether     
extinguished1 ,i think it may be true   
that fortune is the ruler of half  our  
actions1 but that she allows the other  
half or a little less to be  governed by
 us4 ,i would compare her to an         
impetuous river that1 when  turbulent1  
inundates the plains1 ruins trees and   
buildings1 removes  earth from this side
 and places it on the other2 every one  
flies before  it1 and everything yields 
to its fury without being able to oppose

 it2  and yet though it is of such a    
kind1 still when it is quiet1 men can   
make provision against it by dams and   
banks1 so that when it rises  it will   
either go into a canal or its rush will 
not be so wild and  dangerous4 ,it      
happens similarly with fortune1 which   
shows her power  where no measures have 
been taken to resist her1 and turns her 
fury  where she knows that no dams or   
barriers have been made to hold her4    
,and if you regard ,italy1 which has    
been the seat of these changes1 and  who
 has given the impulse to them1 you will
 see her to be a country  without dams  
or barriers of any kind4 ,if she had    
been protected by  proper measures1 like
 ,germany1 ,spain1 and ,france1 this    
inundation  would not have caused the   
great changes that it has1 or would not 
have  happened at all4 ,this must       
suffice as regards opposition to fortune
  in general4 ,but limiting myself more 
to particular cases1 ,i would  point out
 how one sees a certain prince to-day   

fortunate and to-morrow  ruined1 without
 seeing that he has changed in character
 or otherwise4  ,i believe this arises  
in the first place from the causes that 
we have  already discussed at length2   
that is to say1 because the prince who  
bases himself entirely on fortune is    
ruined when fortune varies4 ,i  also    
believe that he is happy whose mode of  
proceeding accords with  the needs of   
the times1 and similarly he is          
unfortunate whose mode of  proceeding is
 opposed to the times4 ,for one sees    
that men in those  things which lead    
them to the aim that each one has in    
view1 namely1  glory and riches1 proceed
 in various ways2 one with              
circumspection1  another with           
impetuosity1 one by violence1 another by
 cunning1 one with  patience1 another   
with the reverse2 and each by these     
diverse ways  may arrive at his aim4    
,one sees also two cautious men1 one of 
whom  succeeds in his designs1 and the  
other not1 and in the same way two men  

succeed equally by different methods1   
one being cautious1 the other           
impetuous1 which arises only from the   
nature of the times1 which does  or does
 not conform to their method of         
proceeding4 ,from this results1  as ,i  
have said1 that two men1 acting         
differently1 attain the same  effect1   
and of two others acting in the same    
way1 one arrives at his  good and not   
the other4 ,from this depend also the   
changes in fortune1  for if it happens  
that time and circumstances are         
favourable to one  who acts with caution
 and prudence he will be successful1 but
 if time  and circumstances change he   
will be ruined1 because he does not     
change  his mode of proceeding4 ,no man 
is found able to adapt himself to this1 
either because he cannot deviate from   
that to which his nature disposes  him1 
or else because having always prospered 
by walking in one path1  he cannot      
persuade himself that it is well to     
leave it2 and therefore  the cautious   

man1 when it is time to act suddenly1   
does not know how  to do so and is      
consequently ruined2 for if one could   
change one's  nature with time and      
circumstances1 fortune would never      
change4 ,pope  ,julius ,,ii4 acted      
impetuously in everything he did and    
found the times  and conditions so in   
conformity with that mode of proceeding1
 that he  always obtained a good result4
 ,consider the first war that he made   
against ,bologna while ,messer ,giovanni
 ,bentivogli was still living4 ,the     
,venetians were not pleased with it1 the
 ,king of ,spain and likewise  ,france  
had objections to this enterprise1      
notwithstanding which with  his fierce  
and impetuous disposition he engaged    
personally in the  expedition4 ,this    
move caused both ,spain and the         
,venetians to halt and  hesitate1 the   
latter through fear1 the former through 
the desire to  regain the entire kingdom
 of ,naples4 ,on the other hand1 he     
engaged  with him the ,king of ,france1 

because seeing him make this move and   
desiring his friendship in order to put 
down the ,venetians1 that king  judged  
that he could not refuse him his troops 
without manifest injury4  ,thus ,julius 
by his impetuous move achieved what no  
other pontiff with  the utmost human    
prudence would have succeeded in doing1 
because1 if  he had waited till all     
arrangements had been made and          
everything  settled before leaving      
,rome1 as any other pontiff would have  
done1 it  would never have taken place4 
,for the king of ,france would have     
found  a thousand excuses1 and the      
others would have inspired him with a   
thousand fears4 ,i will omit his other  
actions1 which were all of this  kind   
and which all succeeded well1 and the   
shortness of his life did  not suffer   
him to experience the contrary1 for had 
times succeeded  in which it was        
necessary to act with caution1 his ruin 
would have  resulted1 for he would never
 have deviated from these methods to    

which  his nature disposed him4 ,i      
conclude then that fortune varying and  
men  remaining fixed in their ways1 they
 are successful so long as these  ways  
conform to each other1 but when they are
 opposed to each other  then they are   
unsuccessful4 ,i certainly think that it
 is better to be  impetuous than        
cautious1 for fortune is a woman1 and it
 is necessary1  if you wish to master   
her1 to conquer her by force2 and it can
 be seen  that she lets herself be      
overcome by these rather than by those  
who  proceed coldly4 ,and therefore1    
like a woman1 she is a friend to the    
young1 because they are less cautious1  
fiercer1 and master her with  greater   
audacity4          ,,chapter ,,xxvi     
,,exhortation ,,to ,,liberate ,,italy   
,,from ,,the ,,barbarians      ,having  
now considered all the things we have   
spoken of1 and thought  within myself   
whether at present the time was not     
propitious in ,italy  for a new prince1 
and if there was not a state of things  

which offered  an opportunity to a      
prudent and capable man to introduce a  
new system  that would do honour to     
himself and good to the mass of the     
people1 it  seems to me that so many    
things concur to favour a new ruler that
 ,i do  not know of any time more       
fitting for such an enterprise4 ,and if1
 as  ,i said1 it was necessary in order 
that the power of ,moses should be      
displayed that the people of ,israel    
should be slaves in ,egypt1 and to  give
 scope for the greatness and courage of 
,cyrus that the ,persians  should be    
oppressed by the ,medes1 and to         
illustrate the pre-eminence of  ,theseus
 that the ,athenians should be          
dispersed1 so at the present time1  in  
order that the might of an ,italian     
genius might be recognised1 it  was     
necessary that ,italy should be reduced 
to her present condition1  and that she 
should be more enslaved than the        
,hebrews1 more oppressed  than the      
,persians1 and more scattered than the  

,athenians2 without a  head1 without    
order1 beaten1 despoiled1 lacerated1 and
 overrun1 and  that she should have     
suffered ruin of every kind4 ,and       
although before  now a spirit has been  
shown by some which gave hope that he   
might be  appointed by ,god for her     
redemption1 yet at the highest summit of
 his  career he was thrown aside by     
fortune1 so that now1 almost lifeless1  
she awaits one who may heal her wounds  
and put a stop to the rapine and        
pillaging of ,lombardy1 to the rapacity 
and extortion in the kingdom  and in    
,tuscany1 and cure her of those sores   
which have long been  festering4 ,behold
 how she prays ,god to send some one to 
redeem her from  this barbarous cruelty 
and insolence4 ,behold her ready and    
willing to  follow any standard if only 
there be some one to raise it4 ,there is
  nothing now she can hope for but that 
your illustrious house may place  itself
 at the head of this redemption1 being  
by its power and fortune  so exalted1   

and being favoured by ,god and the      
,church1 whose leadership  it now       
occupies4 ,nor will this be very        
difficult to you1 if you call to  mind  
the actions and lives of the men ,i have
 named4 ,and although those  men were   
rare and marvellous1 they were none the 
less men1 and had each  of them less    
occasion than the present1 for their    
enterprise was not  juster than this1   
nor easier1 nor was ,god more their     
friend than ,he is  yours4 ,here is a   
just cause2 for that war is just which  
is necessary2  and those arms are       
merciful where no hope exists save in   
them4 ,here  is the greatest            
willingness1 nor can there be great     
difficulty where  there is great        
willingness1 provided that the measures 
are adopted of  those whom ,i have set  
before you as examples4 ,besides this1  
unexampled  wonders have been seen here 
performed by ,god1 the sea has been     
opened1  a cloud has shown you the road1
 the rock has given forth water1 manna  

has rained1 and everything has          
contributed to your greatness1 the      
remainder must be done by you4 ,god will
 not do everything1 in order  not to    
deprive us of freewill and the portion  
of the glory that falls  to our lot4 ,it
 is no marvel that none of the          
before-mentioned ,italians  have done   
that which it is to be hoped your       
illustrious house may do2  and if in so 
many revolutions in ,italy and so many  
warlike operations1  it always seems as 
if the military capacity were extinct1  
this is  because the ancient methods    
were not good1 and no one has arisen    
who knew how to discover new ones4      
,nothing does so much honour to a       
newly-risen man than the new laws and   
measures which he introduces4  ,these   
things1 when they are well based and    
have greatness in them1  render him     
revered and admired1 and there is not   
lacking scope in ,italy  for the        
introduction of every kind4 ,here there 
is great virtue in the  members1 if it  

were not wanting in the heads4 ,look how
 in duels and in  councils of a few the 
,italians are superior in strength1     
dexterity1  and intelligence4 ,but when 
it comes to armies they make a poor     
show2  which proceeds entirely from the 
weakness of the leaders1 for those  that
 know are not obedient1 and every one   
thinks that he knows1 there  being      
hitherto nobody who has raised himself  
so high both by valour and  fortune as  
to make the others yield4 ,hence it     
comes about that in all  this time1 in  
all the wars waged during the last      
twenty years1 whenever  there has been  
an army entirely ,italian it has always 
been a failure1  as witness first ,taro1
 then ,alexandria1 ,capua1 ,genoa1      
,vaila1 ,bologna1  and ,mestri4 ,if your
 illustrious house1 therefore1 wishes to
 follow  those great men who redeemed   
their countries1 it is before all things
  necessary1 as the true foundation of  
every undertaking1 to provide  yourself 
with your own forces1 for you cannot    

have more faithful1 or  truer and better
 soldiers4 ,and although each one of    
them may be good1  they will together   
become better when they see themselves  
commanded  by their prince1 and honoured
 and supported by him4 ,it is therefore 
necessary to prepare such forces in     
order to be able with ,italian  prowess 
to defend the country from foreigners4  
,and although both the  ,swiss and      
,spanish infantry are deemed terrible1  
none the less they  each have their     
defects1 so that a third order might not
 only oppose  them1 but be confident of 
overcoming them4 ,for the ,spaniards    
cannot  sustain the attack of cavalry1  
and the ,swiss have to fear infantry    
which meets them with resolution equal  
to their own4 ,from which it has        
resulted1 as will be seen by experience1
 that the ,spaniards cannot  sustain the
 attack of ,french cavalry1 and the     
,swiss are overthrown  by ,spanish      
infantry4 ,and although a complete      
example of the latter  has not been     

seen1 yet an instance was furnished in  
the battle of  ,ravenna1 where the      
,spanish infantry attacked the ,german  
battalions1  which observe the same     
order as the ,swiss4 ,the ,spaniards1   
through their  bodily agility and aided 
by their bucklers1 had entered between  
and  under their pikes and were in a    
position to attack them safely without  
the ,germans being able to defend       
themselves2 and if the cavalry had not  
charged them they would have utterly    
destroyed them4 ,knowing therefore  the 
defects of both these kinds of infantry1
 a third kind can be  created which can 
resist cavalry and need not fear        
infantry1 and this  will be done not by 
the creation of armies but by a change  
of system4  ,and these are the things   
which1 when newly introduced1 give      
reputation  and grandeur to a new       
prince4 ,this opportunity must not1     
therefore1  be allowed to pass1 for     
letting ,italy at length see her        
liberator4 ,i  cannot express the love  

with which he would be received in all  
those  provinces which have suffered    
under these foreign invasions1 with what
  thirst for vengeance1 with what       
steadfast faith1 with what love1 with   
what grateful tears4 ,what doors would  
be closed against him8 ,what  people    
would refuse him obedience8 ,what envy  
could oppose him8 ,what  ,italian would 
rebel against him8 ,this barbarous      
domination stinks in  the nostrils of   
every one4 ,may your illustrious house  
therefore assume  this task with that   
courage and those hopes which are       
inspired by a  just cause1 so that under
 its banner our fatherland may be raised
 up1  and under its auspices be verified
 that saying of ,petrarch3              
,valour against fell wrath      ,will   
take up arms2 and be the combat quickly 
sped6      ,for1 sure1 the ancient      
worth1      ,that in ,italians stirs the
 heart1 is not yet dead4      ,,the     
,,end