,,time ,,and ,,free ,,will ,an ,essay on the ,immediate ,data of ,consciousness ,,by ,,henri ,,bergson ,,member ,,of ,,the ,,institute ,,professor ,,at ,,the ,,coll,,ge ,,de ,,france ,authorized ,translation by ,f4 ,l4 ,,pogson1 ,m4,a4 ,,london ,,george ,,allen ,,company1 ,,ltd4 ,,ruskin ,,house1 #dd ,,and #de ,,rathbone ,,place ,,new ,,york3 ,,the ,,macmillan ,,company #aiac 1 1 1 4 ,,plotinus4 ,,translator',s ,,preface ,henri ,louis ,bergson was born in ,paris1 ,october #ah1 #ahei4 ,he entered the cole normale in #ahgh1 and was admitted agrg de philosophie in #ahha and docteur s lettres in #ahhi4 ,after holding professorships in various provincial and ,parisian lyces1 he became matre de confrences at the cole normale suprieure in #ahig1 and since #aijj has been professor at the ,collge de ,france4 ,in #aija he became a member of the ,institute on his election to the ,acadmie des ,sciences morales et politiques4 ,a full list of ,professor ,bergson's works is given in the appended bibliography4 ,in making the following translation of his ,essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience ,i have had the great advantage of his co-operation at every stage1 and the aid which he has given has been most generous and untiring4 ,the book itself was worked out and written during the years #ahhc to #ahhg and was originally published in #ahhi4 ,the foot-notes in the ,french edition contain a certain number of references to ,french translations of ,english works4 ,in the present translation ,i am responsible for citing these references from the original ,english4 ,this will account for the fact that editions are sometimes referred to which have appeared subsequently to #ahhi4 ,i have also added fairly extensive marginal summaries and a full index4 ,in ,france the ,essai is already in its seventh edition4 ,indeed1 one of the most striking facts about ,professor ,bergson's works is the extent to which they have appealed not only to the professional philosophers1 but also to the ordinary cultivated public4 ,the method which he pursues is not the conceptual and abstract method which has been the dominant tradition in philosophy4 ,for him reality is not to be reached by any elaborate construction of thought3 it is given in immediate experience as a flux1 a continuous process of becoming1 to be grasped by intuition1 by sympathetic insight4 ,concepts break up the continuous flow of reality into parts external to one another1 they further the interests of language and social life and are useful primarily for practical purposes4 ,but they give us nothing of the life and movement of reality2 rather1 by substituting for this an artificial reconstruction1 a patchwork of dead fragments1 they lead to the difficulties which have always beset the intellectualist philosophy1 and which on its premises are insoluble4 ,instead of attempting a solution in the intellectualist sense1 ,professor ,bergson calls upon his readers to put these broken fragments of reality behind them1 to immerse themselves in the living stream of things and to find their difficulties swept away in its resistless flow4 ,in the present volume ,professor ,bergson first deals with the intensity of conscious states4 ,he shows that quantitative differences are applicable only to magnitudes1 that is1 in the last resort1 to space1 and that intensity in itself is purely qualitative4 ,passing then from the consideration of separate conscious states to their multiplicity1 he finds that there are two forms of multiplicity3 quantitative or discrete multiplicity involves the intuition of space1 but the multiplicity of conscious states is wholly qualitative4 ,this unfolding multiplicity constitutes duration1 which is a succession without distinction1 an interpenetration of elements so heterogeneous that former states can never recur4 ,the idea of a homogeneous and measurable time is shown to be an artificial concept1 formed by the intrusion of the idea of space into the realm of pure duration4 ,indeed1 the whole of ,professor ,bergson's philosophy centres round his conception of real concrete duration and the specific feeling of duration which our consciousness has when it does away with convention and habit and gets back to its natural attitude4 ,at the root of most errors in philosophy he finds a confusion between this concrete duration and the abstract time which mathematics1 physics1 and even language and common sense1 substitute for it4 ,applying these results to the problem of free will1 he shows that the difficulties arise from taking up one's stand after the act has been performed1 and applying the conceptual method to it4 ,from the point of view of the living1 developing self these difficulties are shown to be illusory1 and freedom1 though not definable in abstract or conceptual terms1 is declared to be one of the clearest facts established by observation4 ,it is no doubt misleading to attempt to sum up a system of philosophy in a sentence1 but perhaps some part of the spirit of ,professor ,bergson's philosophy may be gathered from the motto which1 with his permission1 ,i have prefixed to this translation3--,if a man were to inquire of ,nature the reason of her creative activity1 and if she were willing to give ear and answer1 she would say--',ask me not1 but understand in silence1 even as ,i am silent and am not wont to speak4' ,f4 ,l4 ,,pogson4 ,,oxford1 ,june1 #aiaj4 ,,bibliography ,i4 ,,works ,,by ,,bergson4 7a7 ,books4 ,quid ,aristoteles de loco senserit1 7,thesis71 ,paris1 #ahhi4 ,essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience1 ,paris1 #ahhi1 #aiaj4 ,matire et ,mmoire1 ,essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit1 ,paris1 #ahif1 #aiaj4 ,le ,rire1 ,essai sur la signification du comique1 ,paris1 #aijj1 #aiaj4 7,first published in the ,revue de ,paris1 #aijj1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 #eab-ede and #gei-gia47 ,l'volution cratrice1 ,paris1 #aijg1 #aiaj4 7b7 ,articles4 ,la ,spcialit4 7,address at the distribution of prizes at the lyce of ,angers1 ,aug4 #ahhb47 ,de la simulation inconsciente dans l'tat d'hypnotisme4 ,revue philosophique1 ,vol4 #bb1 #ahhf1 pp4 #ebe-eca4 ,le bon sens et les tudes classiques4 7,address at the distribution of prizes at the ,concours gnral des lyces et collges1 #ahie47 ,mmoire et reconnaissance4 7,revue philos4 ,mar41 ,apr4 #ahif1 pp4 #bbe-bdh and #chj-cii4 ,republished in ,matire et ,mmoire47 ,perception et matire4 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,may #ahif1 pp4 #beg-bgg4 ,republished in ,matire et ,mmoire47 ,note sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyance la loi de causalit4 7,lecture at the ,philosophical ,congress in ,paris1 #aijj1 published in the ,bibliothque du ,congrs ,international de ,philosophie2 cf4 ,revue de ,mtaphysique et de ,morale1 ,sept4 #aijj1 pp4 #fee ff47 ,le ,rve4 7,lecture at the ,institut psychologique international3 published in the ,bulletin de l',institut psych4 intern4 ,may #aija2 cf4 ,revue scientifique1 #d;e ,s41 ,vol4 #ae1 ,june #h1 #aija1 pp4 #gje-gac1 and ,revue de ,philosophie1 ,june #aija1 pp4 #dhf-dhh47 ,le ,paralllisme psycho-physique et la mtaphysique positive4 ,bulletin de la ,socit franaise de ,philosophie1 ,june #aija4 ,l',effort intellectuel4 ,revue philosophique1 ,jan4 #aijb4 ,introduction la mtaphysique4 ,revue de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,jan4 #aijc4 ,le ,paralogisme psycho-physiologique4 7,lecture at the ,philosophical ,congress in ,geneva1 #aijd1 published in the ,revue de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,nov4 #aijd1 pp4 #hie-ijh2 see also pp4 #ajbg-ajcf47 ,l',ide de nant1 ,rev4 philos4 ,nov4 #aijf1 pp4 #ddi-dff4 7,part of ,chap4 #d of ,l'volution cratrice47 ,notice sur la vie et les uvres de ,m4 ,flix ,ravaisson-,mollien4 7,lecture before the ,acadmie des ,sciences morales et politiques3 published in the ,proceedings of the ,academy1 ,vol4 #be1 pp4 #a ff4 ,paris1 #aijg47 ,le ,souvenir du prsent et la fausse reconnaissance4 ,rev4 philos4 ,dec4 #aijh1 pp4 #efa-eic4 7c7 ,miscellaneous4 ,lucrce3 ,extraits 444 avec une tude sur la posie1 la philosophie1 la physique1 le texte et la langue de ,lucrce4 ,paris1 #ahhd4 ,principes de mtaphysique et de psychologie d'aprs ,m4 ,paul ,janet4 ,revue philos41 ,vol4 #dd1 ,nov4 #ahig1 pp4 #ebe-eea4 ,collaboration au ,vocabulaire philosophique1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil4 ,july #aijb1 ,aug4 #aijg1 ,aug4 #aijh1 ,aug4 #aiji4 ,remarques sur la place et le caractre de la ,philosophie dans l',enseignement secondaire1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil4 ,feb4 #aijc1 pp4 #dd ff4 ,remarques sur la notion de la libert morale1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil4 ,apr4 #aijc1 pp4 #aja-ajc4 ,remarques propos de la philosophie sociale de ,cournot1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil4 ,aug4 #aijc1 p4 #bbi4 ,prface de la ,psychologie rationnelle de ,m4 ,lubac1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #aijd4 ,sur sa relation ,w4 ,james1 ,revue philosophique1 ,vol4 #fj1 #aije1 p4 #bbi f4 ,sur sa thorie de la perception1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,philos4 ,mar4 #aije1 pp4 #id ff4 ,rapport sur le concours pour le prix ,bordin1 #aije1 ayant pour sujet ,maine de ,biran4 7,mmoires de l',acadmie des ,sciences morales et politiques1 ,vol4 #be1 pp4 #hji ff41 ,paris1 #aijg47 ,rapport sur le concours pour le prix ,le ,dissez de ,penanrun1 #aijg4 7,mmoires de l',acadmie des ,sciences morales et politiques1 ,vol4 #bf1 pp4 #gga ff4 ,paris1 #aiji47 ,sur l'volution cratrice1 ,revue du ,mois1 ,sept4 #aijg1 p4 #cea4 ,a propos de l'volution de l'intelligence gomtrique1 ,revue de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,jan4 #aijh1 pp4 #bh-cc4 ,sur l'influence de sa philosophie sur les lves des lyces1 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,philos41 ,jan4 #aijh1 p4 #ba2 cf4 ,l',anne psychologique1 #aijh1 pp4 #bbi-bca4 ,rponse une enqute sur la question religieuse 7,la ,question religieuse par ,frdric ,charpin1 ,paris1 #aijh74 ,remarques sur l'organisation des ,congrs de ,philosophie4 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil4 ,jan4 #aiji1 p4 #aa f4 ,prface un volume de la collection ,les grands philosophes1 7,g4 ,tarde1 par ses fils74 ,paris4 ,michaud1 #aiji4 ,remarques propos d'une thse soutenue par ,m4 ,dwelshauvers ,l'inconscient dans la vie mentale4 ,bulletin de la ,soc4 fr4 de ,phil41 ,feb4 #aiaj4 ,a propos d'un article de ,mr4 ,w4 ,b4 ,pitkin intitule ,james and ,bergson4 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,vii1 ,no4 #ad1 ,july #g1 #aiaj1 pp4 #che-chh4 ,,ii4 ,,select ,,list ,,of ,,books ,,and ,,articles ,,dealing ,,in ,,whole ,,or ,,in ,,part ,,with ,,bergson ,,and ,,his ,,philosophy4 7,arranged alphabetically under each language47 ,s4 ,alexander1 ,matire et ,mmoire1 7,mind1 ,oct4 #ahig1 pp4 #egb-c74 ,b4 ,h4 ,bode1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,philosophical ,review1 #aijh1 pp4 #hd-hi74 ,w4 ,boyd1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,review of ,theology and ,philosophy1 ,oct4 #aijg1 pp4 #bdi-bea74 ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1 ,bergson's ,theory of ,knowledge1 7,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 ,london1 #aiji4 ,new ,series1 ,vol4 ,,ix1 pp4 #da-fj74 ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1 ,bergson's ,theory of ,instinct1 7,proceedings of the ,aristotelian ,society1 ,london1 #aiaj1 ,n4,s41 ,vol4 ,x74 ,h4 ,wildon ,carr1 ,the ,philosophy of ,bergson1 7,hibbert ,journal1 ,july #aiaj1 pp4 #hgc-hhc74 ,w4 ,j4 ,ferrar1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,commonwealth1 ,dec4 #aiji1 pp4 #cfd-cfg74 ,h4 ,n4 ,gardiner1 ,mmoire et reconnaissance1 7,psychological ,review1 #ahif1 pp4 #egh-ehj74 ,t4 ,e4 ,hulme1 ,the ,new ,philosophy1 7,new ,age1 ,july #a1 #bi1 #aiji74 ,william ,james1 ,a ,pluralistic ,universe1 ,london1 #aiji1 pp4 #bbe-bgc4 ,william ,james1 ,the ,philosophy of ,bergson1 7,hibbert ,journal1 ,april #aiji1 pp4 #efb-egg4 ,reprinted in ,a ,pluralistic ,universe2 see above74 ,william ,james1 ,bradley or ,bergson8 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,vii1 ,no4 #b1 ,jan4 #bj1 #aiaj1 pp4 #bi-cc74 ,h4 ,m4 ,kallen1 ,james1 ,bergson and ,mr4 ,pitkin1 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,june #bc1 #aiaj1 pp4 #cec-ceg74 ,a4 ,lalande1 ,philosophy in ,france1 #aijg1 7,philosophical ,review1 ,may1 #aijh74 ,j4 ,a4 ,leighton1 ,on ,continuity and ,discreteness1 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,apr4 #bh1 #aiaj1 pp4 #bca-bch74 ,t4 ,loveday1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,mind1 ,july #aijh1 pp4 #djb-h74 ,a4 ,o4 ,lovejoy1 ,the ,metaphysician of the ,life-,force1 7,nation1 ,new ,york1 ,sept4 #cj1 #aiji74 ,a4 ,mitchell1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,v1 ,no4 #bb1 ,oct4 #bb1 #aijh1 pp4 #fjc-fab74 ,w4 ,scott ,palmer1 ,presence and ,omnipresence1 7,contemporary ,review1 ,june #aijh1 pp4 #gcd-gdb74 ,w4 ,scott ,palmer1 ,thought and ,instinct1 7,nation1 ,june #e1 #aiji74 ,w4 ,scott ,palmer1 ,life and the ,brain1 7,contemporary ,review1 ,oct41 #aiji1 pp4 #dgd-dhd74 ,w4 ,b4 ,pitkin1 ,james and ,bergson2 or1 ,who is against ,intellect8 7,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods1 ,apr4 #bh1 #aiaj1 pp4 #bbe-bca74 ,g4 ,r4 ,t4 ,ross1 ,a ,new ,theory of ,laughter1 7,nation1 ,nov4 #bh1 #aijh74 ,g4 ,r4 ,t4 ,ross1 ,the ,philosophy of ,vitalism1 7,nation1 ,mar4 #ac1 #aiji7 ,j4 ,royce1 ,the ,reality of the ,temporal1 7,int4 ,journal of ,ethics1 ,apr4 #aiaj1 pp4 #beg-bga74 ,g4 ,m4 ,sauvage1 ,the ,new ,philosophy in ,france1 7,catholic ,university ,bulletin1 ,washington1 ,apr4 #aijf1 ,mar4 #aijh74 ,norman ,smith1 ,subjectivism and ,realism in ,modern ,philosophy1 7,philosophical ,review1 ,apr4 #aijh1 pp4 #ach-adh74 ,g4 ,f4 ,stout1 ,free ,will and ,determinism1 7,speaker1 ,london1 ,may #aj1 #ahij74 ,j4 ,h4 ,tufts1 ,humor1 7,psychological ,review1 #aija1 pp4 #ih-ii74 ,g4 ,tyrrell1 ,creative ,evolution1 7,hibbert ,journal1 ,jan4 #aijh1 pp4 #dce-ddb74 ,t4 ,whittaker1 ,essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience1 7,mind1 ,apr4 #ahij1 pp4 #bib-c74 ,g4 ,aimel1 ,individualisme et philosophie bergsonienne1 7,revue de ,philos41 ,june #aijh74 ,balthasar1 ,le problme de ,dieu d'aprs la philosophie nouvelle1 7,revue no-scolastique1 ,nov4 #aijg74 ,g4 ,batault1 ,la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,mercure de ,france1 ,mar4 #af1 #aijh1 pp4 #aic-baa74 ,g4 ,belot1 ,une thorie nouvelle de la libert1 7,revue philosophique1 ,vol4 ,,xxx1 #ahij1 pp4 #cfj-cib74 ,g4 ,belot1 ,un nouveau spiritualisme1 ,matire et ,mmoire1 7,rev4 philos4 ,vol4 ,,xliv1 #ahig1 pp4 #ahc-aii74 ,jean ,blum1 ,la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson et la posie symboliste1 7,mercure de ,france1 ,sept4 #ae1 #aijf74 ,c4 ,bougie1 ,syndicalistes et ,bergsoniens1 7,revue du ,mois1 ,apr4 #aiji1 pp4 #djc-daf74 ,g4 ,cantecor1 ,la philosophie nouvelle et la vie de l'esprit1 7,rev4 philos4 ,mar4 #aijc1 pp4 #beb-bgg74 ,p4 ,crsole1 ,le paralllisme psycho-physiologique et l'argument de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,archives de ,psychologie1 ,vol4 ,v1 ,oct4 #aije1 pp4 #aab-abj74 ,a4 ,chaumeix1 ,la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,journal des ,dbats1 ,may #bd1 #aijh4 ,reprinted in ,pragmatisme et ,modernisme1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #aiji74 ,a4 ,chaumeix1 ,les critiques du rationalisme1 7,revue ,hebdomadaire1 ,paris1 ,jan4 #a1 #aiaj1 pp4 #a-cc74 ,a4 ,chide1 ,le mobilisme moderne1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #aijh4 7,see also ,revue philos41 ,apr4 #aijh1 ,dec4 #aiji74 ,c4 ,coignet1 ,kant et ,bergson1 7,revue ,chrtienne1 ,july #aijd74 ,c4 ,coignet1 ,la vie d'aprs ,m4 ,bergson1 7,bericht ber den ,,iii ,kongress fr ,philosophie1 ,heidelberg1 #aiji1 pp4 #ceh-cfd74 ,l4 ,constant1 ,cours de ,m4 ,bergson sur l'histoire de l'ide de temps1 7,revue de ,philos4 ,jan4 #aijd1 pp4 #aje-aaa4 ,summary of lectures74 ,p4 ,l4 ,couchoud1 ,la mtaphysique nouvelle1 propos de ,matire et ,mmoire de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,revue de ,mtaphysique et de ,morale1 ,mar4 #aijb1 pp4 #bbe-bdc74 ,l4 ,couturat1 ,la thorie du temps de ,bergson1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 #ahif1 pp4 #fdf-ffi74 ,lon ,cristiani1 ,le problme de ,dieu et le pragmatisme1 ,paris1 ,bloud et ,cie41 #aijh4 ,f4 ,le ,dantec1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,revue du ,mois1 ,aug4 #aijg4 ,reprinted in ,science et ,conscience1 ,paris1 ,flammarion1 #aijh74 ,l4 ,dauriac1 ,le ,rire1 7,revue philos4 ,dec4 #aijj1 pp4 #ffe-fgj74 ,v4 ,delbos1 ,matire et ,mmoire1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,may #ahig1 pp4 #cec-chi74 ,g4 ,l4 ,duprat1 ,la spatialit des faits psychiques1 7,rev4 philos41 ,may #aijg1 pp4 #dib-eja74 ,g4 ,dwelshauvers1 ,raison et ,intuition1 tude sur la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,la ,belgique artistique et littraire1 ,nov4 ,dec4 #aije1 ,apr4 #aijf74 ,g4 ,dwelshauvers1 ,m4 ,bergson et la mthode intuitive1 7,revue du ,mois1 ,sept4 #aijg1 pp4 #ccf-cej74 ,g4 ,dwelshauvers1 ,de l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,jan4 #aijh1 pp4 #ee-fe74 ,a4 ,farges1 ,le problme de la contingence d'aprs ,m4 ,bergson1 7,revue pratique d'apologtique1 ,apr4 #ae1 #aiji74 ,a4 ,farges1 ,l'erreur fondamentale de la philosophie nouvelle1 7,revue thomiste1 ,may-,june1 #aiji74 ,a4 ,farges1 ,thorie fondamentale de l'acte1 avec la critique de la philosophie nouvelle de ,m4 ,bergson1 ,paris1 ,berche et ,tralin1 #aiji4 ,alfred ,fouille1 ,le mouvement idaliste et la raction contre la science positive1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #ahif1 pp4 #aih-bjf4 ,fr4 ,garrigou-,lagrange1 ,le sens commun1 la philosophie de l'tre et les formules dogmatiques1 ,paris1 ,beauchesne1 #aiji4 ,jules de ,gaultier1 ,le ralisme du continu1 7,revue philos41 ,jan4 #aiaj1 pp4 #ci-fd74 ,ren ,gillouin1 ,henri ,bergson1 ,paris1 #aiaj4 7,a volume in the series ,les grands philosophes74 ,a4 ,hollard1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,foi et ,vie1 ,sept4 #af1 #aijg1 pp4 #ede-eej74 ,b4 ,jacob1 ,la philosophie d'hier et celle d'aujourd'hui1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,mar4 #ahih1 pp4 #agj-bja74 ,g4 ,lechalas1 ,le nombre et le temps dans leurs rapports avec l'espace1 7,ann4 de ,phil1 chrt4 ,n4,s4 ,vol4 #bb1 #ahij1 pp4 #eaf-edj74 ,g4 ,lechalas1 ,matire et ,mmoire1 7,ann4 de ,phil1 chrt4 ,n4,s4 ,vol4 #cf1 #ahig1 pp4 #adi-afd and #cad-ccd7 ,a4 ,joussain1 ,romantisme et ,religion1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #aiaj4 ,legendre1 ,m4 ,bergson et son volution cratrice1 7,bulletin de la ,semaine1 ,may #f1 #aijh74 ,lenoble1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,revue du ,clerg franais1 ,jan41 #aijh74 ,e4 ,le ,roy1 ,science et ,philosophie1 7,a ,series of articles in the ,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 #ahii and #aijj74 ,l4 ,lvy-,bruhl1 ,l',essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience1 7,rev4 philos41 ,vol4 #bi1 #ahij1 pp4 #eai-ech74 ,g4 ,h4 ,luquet1 ,ides gnrales de psychologie1 ,paris1 #aijf4 ,j4 ,lux1 ,nos philosophes1 ,m4 ,henri ,bergson1 7,revue ,bleue1 ,dec4 #a1 #aijf74 ,x4 ,moisant1 ,la notion de multiplicit dans la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,revue de ,philos41 ,june1 #aijb74 ,x4 ,moisant1 ,dieu dans la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson1 7,revue de ,philos41 ,may1 #aije74 ,g4 ,mondain1 ,remarques sur la thorie matrialiste1 7,foi et ,vie1 ,june #ae1 #aijh1 pp4 #cfi-cgc74 ,d4 ,parodi1 ,le ,rire1 par ,h4 ,bergson1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,mar4 #aija1 pp4 #bbd-bcf74 ,t4 ,m4 ,pgues ,l'volution cratrice 7,revue thomiste1 ,may-,june #aijh1 pp4 #acg-afc74 ,c4 ,piat1 ,de l'insuffisance des philosophies de l'intuition1 ,paris1 #aijh4 ,maurice ,pradines1 ,principes de toute philosophie de l'action1 ,paris1 #aiaj4 ,g4 ,rageot1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,rev4 philos41 ,july #aijg74 ,reprinted and enlarged in ,les savants et la philosophie1 ,paris1 ,alcan1 #aijg4 ,f4 ,rauh1 ,la conscience du devenir1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,nov4 #ahig1 pp4 #fei-fha1 and ,jan4 #ahih1 pp4 #ch-fj74 ,f4 ,rauh1 ,sur la position du problme du libre arbitre1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,nov4 #aijd1 pp4 #igg-ajjf74 ,p4 ,p4 ,raymond1 ,la philosophie de l'intuition et la philosophie du concept1 7tudes franciscaines1 ,june #aiji74 ,e4 ,seillire1 ,l',allemagne et la philosophie bergsonienne1 7,l',opinion1 ,july #c1 #aiji74 ,g4 ,sorel1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,le ,mouvement socialiste1 ,oct4 ,dec4 #aijg1 ,jan4 ,mar4 ,apr4 #aijh74 ,t4 ,steeg1 ,henri ,bergson3 ,notice biographique avec portrait1 7,revue universelle1 ,jan4 #aijb1 pp4 #ae-af74 ,j4 de ,tonqubec1 ,la notion de la vrit dans la philosophie nouvelle1 ,paris1 #aijh4 ,j4 de ,tonqubec1 ,comment interprter l'ordre du monde propos du dernier ouvrage de ,m4 ,bergson1 ,paris1 ,beauchesne1 #aijh4 ,h4 ,trouche1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,revue de ,philos4 ,nov4 #aijh74 ,h4 ,villassre1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,bulletin critique1 ,sept4 #aijh1 pp4 #cib-daa47 ,tancrde de ,visan1 ,la philosophie de ,m4 ,bergson et le lyrisme contemporain1 7,vers et ,prose1 ,vol4 ,,xxi1 #aiaj1 pp4 #abe-adj74 ,l4 ,weber1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4 ,sept4 #aijg1 pp4 #fbj-fgj74 ,v4 ,wilbois1 ,l'esprit positif1 7,a series of articles in the ,rev4 de ,mt4 et de ,mor4#aijj and #aija74 ,i4 ,benrubi1 ,henri ,bergson1 7,die ,zukunft1 ,june #d1 #aiaj74 ,k4 ,bornhausen1 ,die ,philosophie ,henri ,bergsons und ihre ,bedeutung fr den ,religionsbegriff1 7,zeitschrift fr ,theologie und ,kirche1 ,tbingen1 ,jahrg4 ,,xx1 ,heft ,i #aiaj1 pp4 #ci-gg47 ,o4 ,braun1 ,materie und ,gedchtnis1 7,archiv fr die gesamte ,psychologie1 ,vol4 #ae1 #aiji1 ,heft #d1 pp4 #ac-ae74 ,hans ,driesch1 ,h4 ,bergson1 der biologische ,philosoph41 7,zeitschrift fr den ,ausbau der ,entwickelungslehre1 ,jahrg4 ,,ii1 ,heft #a_/b1 ,stuttgart1 #aijh74 ,v4 ,eschbach1 ,henri ,bergson1 7,klnische ,volkszeitung1 ,jan4 #bj1 #aiaj74 ,giessler1 ,le ,rve1 7,zeitschrift fr ,psychologie und ,physiologie der ,sinnesorgane1 ,vol4 #bi1 #aijb1 p4 #bca74 ,j4 ,goldstein1 ,henri ,bergson und der ,zeitlosigkeitsidealismus1 7,frankfurter ,zeitung1 ,may #b1 #aiji74 ,j4 ,goldstein1 ,henri ,bergson und die ,sozialwissenschaft1 7,archiv fr ,sozialwissenschaft und ,sozialpolitik1 ,bd4 ,,xxxi1 ,heft #a1 ,july #aiaj1 pp4 #a-bb74 ,a4 ,gurewitsch1 ,die franzsische ,metaphysik der ,gegenwart 7,archiv fr system4 ,philos4 ,bd4 ,,ix1 ,heft #d1 ,nov4 #aijc1 pp4 #dfb-dij74 ,heymans1 ,le ,rire1 7,zeitsch4 f4 ,psychol1 u4 ,physiol4 d4 ,sinnesorgane1 ,vol4 #be1 #aija1 pp4 #aee-f74 ,k4 ,jol1 ,neues ,denken1 7,neue ,rundschau1 ,apr4 #aiaj1 pp4 #edi-eeh74 ,h4 von ,keyserling1 ,bergson1 7,allgemeine ,zeitung1 ,mnchen1 ,nov4 #bh1 #aijh74 ,r4 ,kroner1 ,henri ,bergson1 7,logos1 ,bd4 ,i1 ,heft #a1 ,tbingen1 #aiaj74 ,a4 ,lasson1 ,h4 ,bergson1 7,deutsche ,literaturzeitung1 ,may #bh1 #aiaj74 ,r4 ,mller-,freienfels1 ,materie und ,gedchtnis1 7,zeitsch4 f4 ,psychol4 u4 ,physiol1 d4 ,sinnesorgane1 ,may #aiaj1 ,vol4 #ef1 ,heft #a_/b1 pp4 #abf-abi74 4 ,pilzecker1 ,mmoire et reconnaissance1 7,zeitsch4 f4 ,psychol41 u4 ,physiol1 d4 ,sinnesorgane1 ,vol4 #ac1 #ahig1 pp4 #bbi-bcb74 ,hans ,prager1 ,henri ,bergsons metaphysische ,grundanschauung1 7,archiv fr system4 ,philos4 #aiaj1 ,bd4 ,,xvi1 ,heft #c1 pp4 #caj-cbj74 ,g4 ,seliber1 ,der ,pragmatismus und seine ,gegner1 7,archiv fr system4 ,philos4 #aiji1 pp4 #bhg-bih74 ,a4 ,steenbergen1 ,henri ,bergsons ,intuitive ,philosophie1 ,jena1 #aiji4 ,w4 ,windelband1 ,preface to ,materie und ,gedchtnis1 ,jena1 #aijh1 pp4 ,i-,,xv4 ,th4 ,ziehen1 ,matire et ,mmoire1 7,zeitschrift fr ,philosophie und philos4 ,kritik1 ,dec4 #ahih1 pp4 #bie-bii74 ,roberto ,ardig1 ,una pretesa pregiudiziale contro il positivismo1 7,rivista di ,filosofia e ,scienze affini1 ,jan4-,feb41 ,mar4-,apr4 #aijh4 ,reprinted in ,collected ,works1 ,vol4 #aj74 ,a4 ,crespi1 ,la metafisica di ,h4 ,bergson1 7,coenobium1 ,july-,aug4 #aijh74 ,l4 ,ferri1 ,essai sur les donnes immdiates de la conscience1 7,rivista ,italiana di ,filosofia1 ,mar4-,apr4 #ahij1 pp4 #bdh-i74 ,a4 ,levi1 ,sulle ultime forme dell' indeterminismo francese1 ,firenze1 ,civelli1 #aijc4 ,a4 ,levi1 ,l',indeterminismo nella filosofia francese contemporanea1 ,firenze1 ,seeber1 #aije4 ,f4 ,masci1 ,l'idealismo indeterminista1 ,napoli1 #ahii4 ,e4 ,morselli1 ,un nuovo idealismo1 7,h4 ,bergson71 ,udine1 ,tosolini1 #aijj4 ,i4 ,petrone1 ,sui limiti del determinismo scientifico1 ,modena1 #aijj2 ,roma1 #aijc4 ,g4 ,prezzolini1 ,del linguaggio come causa di errore1 7,h4 ,bergson71 ,firenze1 ,spinelli1 #aijd4 ,g4 ,prezzolini1 ,la filosofia di ,h4 ,bergson1 7in ,la ,teoria ,sindacalista1 ,napoli1 ,perrella1 #aiji1 pp4 #bhc-cce74 ,f4 de ,sarlo1 ,le correnti filosofiche del secolo ,,xix1 7,flegrea1 ,,iii #f2 ,sept4 #bj1 #aija1 pp4 #eca-eed7 ,g4 ,tarozzi1 ,della necessit nel fatto naturale ed umano1 ,torino1 ,loescher1 #ahif-ig4 ,b4 ,varisco1 ,la filosofia della contingenza1 7,rivista filosofica1 ,vol4 ,,viii1 #aije1 pp4 #a-cg74 ,b4 ,varisco1 ,la ,creazione1 7,rivista filosofica1 ,mar4-,apr4 #aijh1 pp4 #adi-ahj74 ,c4 ,antoniade1 ,filosofia lui ,henri ,bergson1 7,studii filosofice1 ,bucarest1 #aijh1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 pp4 #afa-aib and #bei-bgh74 ,f4 ,garcia ,caldern1 ,dos filosofos franceses1 ,bergson y ,boutroux1 7,el ,comercio1 ,lima1 ,may #e1 #aijg74 ,e4 ,duprat1 ,estudios de ,filosofia contemporanea3 la ,filosofia de ,h4 ,bergson1 7,cultura ,espanola1 ,madrid1 #aijh1 pp4 #ahe-bjb and #efg-ehd74 ,silberstein1 ,l'volution cratrice1 7,przeglad ,filozoficzny1 #aijh74 ,michal ,sobeski1 ,h4 ,bergson1 7,kurier ,warszawski1 #bj1 stycznia1 #aiaj74 ,,author',s ,,preface ,we necessarily express ourselves by means of words and we usually think in terms of space4 ,that is to say1 language requires us to establish between our ideas the same sharp and precise distinctions1 the same discontinuity1 as between material objects4 ,this assimilation of thought to things is useful in practical life and necessary in most of the sciences4 ,but it may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented by certain philosophical problems do not arise from our placing side by side in space phenomena which do not occupy space1 and whether1 by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting1 we might not bring the fight to an end4 ,when an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended1 of quality into quantity1 has introduced contradiction into the very heart of the question1 contradiction must1 of course1 recur in the answer4 ,the problem which ,i have chosen is one which is common to metaphysics and psychology1 the problem of free will4 ,what ,i attempt to prove is that all discussion between the determinists and their opponents implies a previous confusion of duration with extensity1 of succession with simultaneity1 of quality with quantity3 this confusion once dispelled1 we may perhaps witness the disappearance of the objections raised against free will1 of the definitions given of it1 and1 in a certain sense1 of the problem of free will itself4 ,to prove this is the object of the third part of the present volume3 the first two chapters1 which treat of the conceptions of intensity and duration1 have been written as an introduction to the third4 ,h4 ,,bergson4 ,february1 #ahhh4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,intensity ,,of ,,psychic ,,states ,quantitative differences applicable to magnitudes but not to intensities1 #a-d2 ,attempt to estimate intensities by objective causes or atomic movements1 #d-g2 ,different kinds of intensities1 #g2 ,deep-seated psychic states3 desire1 #h1 hope1 #i1 joy and sorrow1 #aj2 ,aesthetic feelings1 #aa-ah3 grace1 #ab1 beauty1 #ad-ah1 music1 poetry1 art1 #ae-ah2 ,moral feelings1 pity1 #ai2 ,conscious states involving physical symptoms1 #bj3 muscular effort1 #ba-bf1 attention and muscular tension1 #bg-bh2 ,violent emotions1 #bi-ca3 rage1 #bi1 fear1 #cj2 ,affective sensations1 #cb-ci3 pleasure and pain1 #cc-ci1 disgust1 #cf2 ,representative sensations1 #ci-fj3 and external causes1 #db1 sensation of sound1 #dc1 intensity1 pitch and muscular effort1 #de-f1 sensations of heat and cold1 #df-g1 sensations of pressure and weight1 #dg-ej1 sensation of light1 #ej-fj1 photometric experiments1 #eb-fj1 ,delbuf's experiments1 #ef-fj2 ,psychophysics1 #fj-gb3 ,weber and ,fechner1 #fa-fe1 ,delbuf1 #fg-gj1 the mistake of regarding sensations as magnitudes1 #gj-gb2 ,intensity in 7#a7 representative1 7#b7 affective states1 intensity and multiplicity1 #gb-gd4 pp4#a-gd ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,multiplicity ,,of ,,conscious ,,states ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,duration ,number and its units1 #ge-gg1 number and accompanying intuition of space1 #gh-he2 ,two kinds of multiplicity1 of material objects and conscious states1 #he-hg1 impenetrability of matter1 #hh-hi1 homogeneous time and pure duration1 #ij-ia2 ,space and its contents1 #ib1 empirical theories of space1 #ic-id1 intuition of empty homogeneous medium peculiar to man1 #ie-ig1 time as homogeneous medium reducible to space1 #ih-ii2 ,duration1 succession and space1 #ajj-ajd1 pure duration1 #aje-ajf2 ,is duration measurable8 #ajg-aaj2 ,is motion measurable8 #aaa-aab2 ,paradox of the ,eleatics1 #aac-aae2 ,duration and simultaneity1 #aae-aaf2 ,velocity and simultaneity1 #aag-aai2 ,space alone homogeneous1 duration and succession belong to conscious mind1 #abj-aba2 ,two kinds of multiplicity1 qualitative and quantitative1 #aba-abc1 superficial psychic states invested with discontinuity of their external causes1 #abd-abf1 these eliminated1 real duration is felt as a quality1 #abg-abh2 ,the two aspects of the self1 on the surface well-defined conscious states1 deeper down states which interpenetrate and form organic whole1 #abi-aci1 solidifying influence of language on sensation1 #abi-acb1 analysis distorts the feelings1 #acb-acd1 deeper conscious states forming a part of ourselves1 #acd-acf2 ,problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and living self1 #acg-aci4 pp4 #ge-aci ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,organization ,,of ,,conscious ,,states ,,free ,,will ,dynamism and mechanism1 #adj-adb2 ,two kinds of determinism1 #adb2 ,physical determinism1 #adc-aee3 and molecular theory of matter1 #adc1 and conservation of energy1 #add1 if conservation universal1 physiological and nervous phenomena necessitated1 but perhaps not conscious states1 #ade-adh1 but is principle of conversation universal8 #adi1 it may not apply to living beings and conscious states1 #aej-aed1 idea of its universality depends on confusion between concrete duration and abstract time1 #aed-aee2 ,psychological determinism1 #aee-afc3 implies associationist conception of mind1 #aee-aeh1 this involves defective conception of self1 #aei-afc2 ,the free act3 freedom as expressing the fundamental self1 #afe-agj2 ,real duration and contingency1 #agb-ahb3 could our act have been different8 #agb-age1 geometrical representation of process of coming to a decision1 #age-agh1 the fallacies to which it leads determinists and libertarians1 #agi-ahc2 ,real duration and prediction1 #ahc-aih3 conditions of ,paul's prediction of ,peter's action 7#a7 being ,peter 7#b7 knowing already his final act1 #ahd-ahi1 the three fallacies involved1 #aij-aib1 astronomical prediction depends on hypothetical acceleration of movements1 #aic-aie1 duration cannot be thus accelerated1 #aif-aih2 ,real duration and causality1 #aii-bba3 the law same antecedents1 same consequents1 #aii-bja1 causality as regular succession1 #bjb-bjc1 causality as prefiguring3 two kinds 7#a7 prefiguring as mathematical pre-existence2 implies non-duration1 but we endure and therefore may be free1 #bjd-baj1 7#b7 prefiguring as having idea of future act to be realized by effort2 does not involve determinism1 #baa-bad1 determinism results from confusing these two senses1 #bae-bah2 ,freedom real but indefinable1 #bai-bba4 pp4#adj-bba ,,conclusion ,states of self perceived through forms borrowed from external world1 #bbc2 ,intensity as quality1 #bbe2 ,duration as qualitative multiplicity1 #bbf2 ,no duration in the external world1 #bbg2 ,extensity and duration must be separated1 #bbi2 ,only the fundamental self free1 #bca2 ,kant's mistaken idea of time as homogeneous1 #bcb1 hence he put the self which is free outside both space and time1 #bcc2 ,duration is heterogeneous1 relation of psychic state to act is unique1 and act is free1 #bce-bdj4 pp4 #bbb-bdj ,,index ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,intensity ,,of ,,psychic ,,states ,sidenote3 ,can there be quantitative differences in conscious states8 ,it is usually admitted that states of consciousness1 sensations1 feelings1 passions1 efforts1 are capable of growth and diminution2 we are even told that a sensation can be said to be twice1 thrice1 four times as intense as another sensation of the same kind4 ,this latter thesis1 which is maintained by psychophysicists1 we shall examine later2 but even the opponents of psychophysics do not see any harm in speaking of one sensation as being more intense than another1 of one effort as being greater than another1 and in thus setting up differences of quantity between purely internal states4 ,common sense1 moreover1 has not the slightest hesitation in giving its verdict on this point2 people say they are more or less warm1 or more or less sad1 and this distinction of more and less1 even when it is carried over to the region of subjective facts and unextended objects1 surprises nobody4 ,but this involves a very obscure point and a much more important problem than is usually supposed4 ,when we assert that one number is greater than another number or one body greater than another body1 we know very well what we mean4 ,sidenote3 ,such differences applicable to magnitudes but not to intensities4 ,for in both cases we allude to unequal spaces1 as shall be shown in detail a little further on1 and we call that space the greater which contains the other4 ,but how can a more intense sensation contain one of less intensity8 ,shall we say that the first implies the second1 that we reach the sensation of higher intensity only on condition of having first passed through the less intense stages of the same sensation1 and that in a certain sense we are concerned1 here also1 with the relation of container to contained8 ,this conception of intensive magnitude seems1 indeed1 to be that of common sense1 but we cannot advance it as a philosophical explanation without becoming involved in a vicious circle4 ,for it is beyond doubt that1 in the natural series of numbers1 the later number exceeds the earlier1 but the very possibility of arranging the numbers in ascending order arises from their having to each other relations of container and contained1 so that we feel ourselves able to explain precisely in what sense one is greater than the other4 ,the question1 then1 is how we succeed in forming a series of this kind with intensities1 which cannot be superposed on each other1 and by what sign we recognize that the members of this series increase1 for example1 instead of diminishing3 but this always comes back to the inquiry1 why an intensity can be assimilated to a magnitude4 ,sidenote3 ,alleged distinction between two kinds of quantity3 extensive and intensive magnitude4 ,it is only to evade the difficulty to distinguish1 as is usually done1 between two species of quantity1 the first extensive and measurable1 the second intensive and not admitting of measure1 but of which it can nevertheless be said that it is greater or less than another intensity4 ,for it is recognized thereby that there is something common to these two forms of magnitude1 since they are both termed magnitudes and declared to be equally capable of increase and diminution4 ,but1 from the point of view of magnitude1 what can there be in common between the extensive and the intensive1 the extended and the unextended8 ,if1 in the first case1 we call that which contains the other the greater quantity1 why go on speaking of quantity and magnitude when there is no longer a container or a contained8 ,if a quantity can increase and diminish1 if we perceive in it1 so to speak1 the less inside the more1 is not such a quantity on this very account divisible1 and thereby extended8 ,is it not then a contradiction to speak of an inextensive quantity8 ,but yet common sense agrees with the philosophers in setting up a pure intensity as a magnitude1 just as if it were something extended4 ,and not only do we use the same word1 but whether we think of a greater intensity or a greater extensity1 we experience in both cases an analogous impression2 the terms greater and less call up in both cases the same idea4 ,if we now ask ourselves in what does this idea consist1 our consciousness still offers us the image of a container and a contained4 ,we picture to ourselves1 for example1 a greater intensity of effort as a greater length of thread rolled up1 or as a spring which1 in unwinding1 will occupy a greater space4 ,in the idea of intensity1 and even in the word which expresses it1 we shall find the image of a present contraction and consequently a future expansion1 the image of something virtually extended1 and1 if we may say so1 of a compressed space4 ,we are thus led to believe that we translate the intensive into the extensive1 and that we compare two intensities1 or at least express the comparison1 by the confused intuition of a relation between two extensities4 ,but it is just the nature of this operation which it is difficult to determine4 ,sidenote3 ,attempt to distinguish intensities by objective causes4 ,but we judge of intensity without knowing magnitude or nature of the cause4 ,the solution which occurs immediately to the mind1 once it has entered upon this path1 consists in defining the intensity of a sensation1 or of any state whatever of the ego1 by the number and magnitude of the objective1 and therefore measurable1 causes which have given rise to it4 ,doubtless1 a more intense sensation of light is the one which has been obtained1 or is obtainable1 by means of a larger number of luminous sources1 provided they be at the same distance and identical with one another4 ,but1 in the immense majority of cases1 we decide about the intensity of the effect without even knowing the nature of the cause1 much less its magnitude3 indeed1 it is the very intensity of the effect which often leads us to venture an hypothesis as to the number and nature of the causes1 and thus to revise the judgment of our senses1 which at first represented them as insignificant4 ,and it is no use arguing that we are then comparing the actual state of the ego with some previous state in which the cause was perceived in its entirety at the same time as its effect was experienced4 ,no doubt this is our procedure in a fairly large number of cases2 but we cannot then explain the differences of intensity which we recognize between deep-seated psychic phenomena1 the cause of which is within us and not outside4 ,on the other hand1 we are never so bold in judging the intensity of a psychic state as when the subjective aspect of the phenomenon is the only one to strike us1 or when the external cause to which we refer it does not easily admit of measurement4 ,thus it seems evident that we experience a more intense pain at the pulling out of a tooth than of a hair2 the artist knows without the possibility of doubt that the picture of a master affords him more intense pleasure than the signboard of a shop2 and there is not the slightest need ever to have heard of forces of cohesion to assert that we expend less effort in bending a steel blade than a bar of iron4 ,thus the comparison of two intensities is usually made without the least appreciation of the number of causes1 their mode of action or their extent4 ,sidenote3 ,attempt to distinguish intensities by atomic movements4 ,but it is the sensation which is given in consciousness1 and not the movement4 ,there is still room1 it is true1 for an hypothesis of the same nature1 but more subtle4 ,we know that mechanical1 and especially kinetic1 theories aim at explaining the visible and sensible properties of bodies by well defined movements of their ultimate parts1 and many of us foresee the time when the intensive differences of qualities1 that is to say1 of our sensations1 will be reduced to extensive differences between the changes taking place behind them4 ,may it not be maintained that1 without knowing these theories1 we have a vague surmise of them1 that behind the more intense sound we guess the presence of ampler vibrations which are propagated in the disturbed medium1 and that it is with a reference to this mathematical relation1 precise in itself though confusedly perceived1 that we assert the higher intensity of a particular sound8 ,without even going so far1 could it not be laid down that every state of consciousness corresponds to a certain disturbance of the molecules and atoms of the cerebral substance1 and that the intensity of a sensation measures the amplitude1 the complication or the extent of these molecular movements8 ,this last hypothesis is at least as probable as the other1 but it no more solves the problem4 ,for1 quite possibly1 the intensity of a sensation bears witness to a more or less considerable work accomplished in our organism2 but it is the sensation which is given to us in consciousness1 and not this mechanical work4 ,indeed1 it is by the intensity of the sensation that we judge of the greater or less amount of work accomplished3 intensity then remains1 at least apparently1 a property of sensation4 ,and still the same question recurs3 why do we say of a higher intensity that it is greater8 ,why do we think of a greater quantity or a greater space8 ,sidenote3 ,different kinds of intensities4 7#a7 deep-seated psychic statese 7#b7muscular effort4 ,intensity is more easily definable in the former case4 ,perhaps the difficulty of the problem lies chiefly in the fact that we call by the same name1 and picture to ourselves in the same way1 intensities which are very different in nature1 e4g4 the intensity of a feeling and that of a sensation or an effort4 ,the effort is accompanied by a muscular sensation1 and the sensations themselves are connected with certain physical conditions which probably count for something in the estimate of their intensity3 we have here to do with phenomena which take place on the surface of consciousness1 and which are always connected1 as we shall see further on1 with the perception of a movement or of an external object4 ,but certain states of the soul seem to us1 rightly or wrongly1 to be self-sufficient1 such as deep joy or sorrow1 a reflective passion or an aesthetic emotion4 ,pure intensity ought to be more easily definable in these simple cases1 where no extensive element seems to be involved4 ,we shall see1 in fact1 that it is reducible here to a certain quality or shade which spreads over a more or less considerable mass of psychic states1 or1 if the expression be preferred1 to the larger or smaller number of simple states which make up the fundamental emotion4 ,sidenote3 ,take1 for example1 the progress of a desire4 ,for example1 an obscure desire gradually becomes a deep passion4 ,now1 you will see that thee feeble intensity of this desire consisted at first in its appearing to be isolated and1 as it were1 foreign to the remainder of your inner life4 ,but little by little it permeates a larger number of psychic elements1 tingeing them1 so to speak1 with its own colour3 and lo6 your outlook on the whole of your surroundings seems now to have changed radically4 ,how do you become aware of a deep passion1 once it has taken hold of you1 if not by perceiving that the same objects no longer impress you in the same manner8 ,all your sensations and all your ideas seem to brighten up3 it is like childhood back again4 ,we experience something of the kind in certain dreams1 in which we do not imagine anything out of the ordinary1 and yet through which there resounds an indescribable note of originality4 ,the fact is that1 the further we penetrate into the depths of consciousness1 the less right we have to treat psychic phenomena as things which are set side by side4 ,when it is said that an object occupies a large space in the soul or even that it fills it entirely1 we ought to understand by this simply that its image has altered the shade of a thousand perceptions or memories1 and that in this sense it pervades them1 although it does not itself come into view4 ,but this wholly dynamic way of looking at things is repugnant to the reflective consciousness1 because the latter delights in clean cut distinctions1 which are easily expressed in words1 and in things with well-defined outlines1 like those which are perceived in space4 ,it will assume then that1 everything else remaining identical1 such and such a desire has gone up a scale of magnitudes1 as though it were permissible still to speak of magnitude where there is neither multiplicity nor space6 ,but just as consciousness 7as will be shown later on7 concentrates on a given point of the organism the increasing number of muscular contractions which take place on the surface of the body1 thus converting them into one single feeling of effort1 of growing intensity1 so it will hypostatize under the form of a growing desire the gradual alterations which take place in the confused heap of co-existing psychic states4 ,but that is a change of quality rather than of magnitude4 ,what makes hope such an intense pleasure is the fact that the future1 which we dispose of to our liking1 appears to us at the same time under a multitude of forms1 equally attractive and equally possible4 ,even if the most coveted of these becomes realized1 it will be necessary to give up the others1 and we shall have lost a great deal4 ,the idea of the future1 pregnant with an infinity of possibilities1 is thus more fruitful than the future itself1 and this is why we find more charm in hope than in possession1 in dreams than in reality4 ,sidenote3 ,the emotions of joy and sorrow4 ,their successive stages correspond to qualitative changes in the whole of our psychic states4 ,let us try to discover the nature of an increasing intensity of joy or sorrow in the exceptional cases where no physical symptom intervenes4 ,neither inner joy nor passion is an isolated inner state which at first occupies a corner of the soul and gradually spreads4 ,at its lowest level it is very like a turning of our states of consciousness towards the future4 ,then1 as if their weight were diminished by this attraction1 our ideas and sensations succeed one another with greater rapidity2 our movements no longer cost us the same effort4 ,finally1 in cases of extreme joy1 our perceptions and memories become tinged with an indefinable quality1 as with a kind of heat or light1 so novel that now and then1 as we stare at our own self1 we wonder how it can really exist4 ,thus there are several characteristic forms of purely inward joy1 all of which are successive stages corresponding to qualitative alterations in the whole of our psychic states4 ,but the number of states which are concerned with each of these alterations is more or less considerable1 and1 without explicitly counting them1 we know very well whether1 for example1 our joy pervades all the impressions which we receive in the course of the day or whether any escape from its influence4 ,we thus set up points of division in the interval which separates two successive forms of joy1 and this gradual transition from one to the other makes them appear in their turn as different intensities of one and the same feeling1 which is thus supposed to change in magnitude4 ,it could be easily shown that the different degrees of sorrow also correspond to qualitative changes4 ,sorrow begins by being nothing more than a facing towards the past1 an impoverishment of our sensations and ideas1 as if each of them were now contained entirely in the little which it gives out1 as if the future were in some way stopped up4 ,and it ends with an impression of crushing failure1 the effect of which is that we aspire to nothingness1 while every new misfortune1 by making us understand better the uselessness of the struggle1 causes us a bitter pleasure4 ,sidenote3 ,the aesthetic feelings4 ,their increasing intensities are really different feelings4 ,the aesthetic feelings offer us a still more striking example of this progressive stepping in of new elements1 which can be detected in the fundamental emotion and which seem to increase its magnitude1 although in reality they do nothing more than alter its nature4 ,let us consider the simplest of them1 the feeling of grace4 ,at first it is only the perception of a certain ease1 a certain facility in the outward movements4 ,and as those movements are easy which prepare the way for others1 we are led to find a superior ease in the movements which can be foreseen1 in the present attitudes in which future attitudes are pointed out and1 as it were1 prefigured4 ,if jerky movements are wanting in grace1 the reason is that each of them is self-sufficient and does not announce those which are to follow4 ,if curves are more graceful than broken lines1 the reason is that1 while a curved line changes its direction at every moment1 every new direction is indicated in the preceding one4 ,thus the perception of ease in motion passes over into the pleasure of mastering the flow of time and of holding the future in the present4 ,a third element comes in when the graceful movements submit to a rhythm and are accompanied by music4 ,for the rhythm and measure1 by allowing us to foresee to a still greater extent the movements of the dancer1 make us believe that we now control them4 ,as we guess almost the exact attitude which the dancer is going to take1 he seems to obey us when he really takes it3 the regularity of the rhythm establishes a kind of communication between him and us1 and the periodic returns of the measure are like so many invisible threads by means of which we set in motion this imaginary puppet4 ,indeed1 if it stops for an instant1 our hand in its impatience cannot refrain from making a movement1 as though to push it1 as though to replace it in the midst of this movement1 the rhythm of which has taken complete possession of our thought and will4 ,thus a kind of physical sympathy enters into the feeling of grace4 ,now1 in analysing the charm of this sympathy1 you will find that it pleases you through its affinity with moral sympathy1 the idea of which it subtly suggests4 ,this last element1 in which the others are merged after having in a measure ushered it in1 explains the irresistible attractiveness of grace4 ,we could hardly make out why it affords us such pleasure if it were nothing but a saving of effort1 as ,spencer maintains4#a ,but the truth is that in anything which we call very graceful we imagine ourselves able to detect1 besides the lightness which is a sign of mobility1 some suggestion of a possible movement towards ourselves1 of a virtual and even nascent sympathy4 ,it is this mobile sympathy1 always ready to offer itself1 which is just the essence of higher grace4 ,thus the increasing intensities of aesthetic feeling are here resolved into as many different feelings1 each one of which1 already heralded by its predecessor1 becomes perceptible in it and then completely eclipses it4 ,it is this qualitative progress which we interpret as a change of magnitude1 because we like simple thoughts and because our language is ill-suited to render the subtleties of psychological analysis4 ,sidenote3 ,the feeling of beauty3 art puts to sleep our active and resistant powers and makes us responsive to suggestion4 ,to understand how the feeling of the beautiful itself admits of degrees1 we should have to submit it to a minute analysis4 ,perhaps the difficulty which we experience in defining3 it is largely owing to the fact that we look upon the beauties of nature as anterior to those of art3 the processes of art are thus supposed to be nothing more than means by which the artist expresses the beautiful1 and the essence of the beautiful remains unexplained4 ,but we might ask ourselves whether nature is beautiful otherwise than through meeting by chance certain processes of our art1 and whether1 in a certain sense1 art is not prior to nature4 ,without even going so far1 it seems more in conformity with the rules of a sound method to study the beautiful first in the works in which it has been produced by a conscious effort1 and then to pass on by imperceptible steps from art to nature1 which may be looked upon as an artist in its own way4 ,by placing ourselves at this point of view1 we shall perceive that the object of art is to put to sleep the active or rather resistant powers of our personality1 and thus to bring us into a state of perfect responsiveness1 in which we realize the idea that is suggested to us and sympathize with the feeling that is expressed4 ,in the processes of art we shall find1 in a weakened form1 a refined and in some measure spiritualized version of the processes commonly used to induce the state of hypnosis4 ,thus1 in music1 the rhythm and measure suspend the normal flow of our sensations and ideas by causing our attention to swing to and fro between fixed points1 and they take hold of us with such force that even the faintest imitation of a groan will suffice to fill us with the utmost sadness4 ,if musical sounds affect us more powerfully than the sounds of nature1 the reason is that nature confines itself to expressing feelings1 whereas music suggests them to us4 ,whence indeed comes the charm of poetry8 ,the poet is he with whom feelings develop into images1 and the images themselves into words which translate them while obeying the laws of rhythm4 ,in seeing these images pass before our eyes we in our turn experience the feeling which was1 so to speak1 their emotional equivalent3 but we should never realize these images so strongly without the regular movements of the rhythm by which our soul is lulled into self-forgetfulness1 and1 as in a dream1 thinks and sees with the poet4 ,the plastic arts obtain an effect of the same kind by the fixity which they suddenly impose upon life1 and which a physical contagion carries over to the attention of the spectator4 ,while the works of ancient sculpture express faint emotions which play upon them like a passing breath1 the pale immobility of the stone causes the feeling expressed or the movement just begun to appear as if they were fixed for ever1 absorbing our thought and our will in their own eternity4 ,we find in architecture1 in the very midst of this startling immobility1 certain effects analogous to those of rhythm4 ,the symmetry of form1 the indefinite repetition of the same architectural motive1 causes our faculty of perception to oscillate between the same and the same again1 and gets rid of those customary incessant changes which in ordinary life bring us back without ceasing to the consciousness of our personality3 even the faint suggestion of an idea will then be enough to make the idea fill the whole of our mind4 ,thus art aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them2 it suggests them to us1 and willingly dispenses with the imitation of nature when it finds some more efficacious means4 ,nature1 like art1 proceeds by suggestion1 but does not command the resources of rhythm4 ,it supplies the deficiency by the long comradeship1 based on influences received in common by nature and by ourselves1 of which the effect is that the slightest indication by nature of a feeling arouses sympathy in our minds1 just as a mere gesture on the part of the hypnotist is enough to force the intended suggestion upon a subject accustomed to his control4 ,and this sympathy is shown in particular when nature displays to us beings of normal proportions1 so that our attention is distributed equally over all the parts of the figure without being fixed on any one of them3 our perceptive faculty then finds itself lulled and soothed by this harmony1 and nothing hinders any longer the free play of sympathy1 which is ever ready to come forward as soon as the obstacle in its path is removed4 ,sidenote3 ,stages in the aesthetic emotion4 ,it follows from this analysis that the feeling of the beautiful is no specific feeling1 but that every feeling experienced by us will assume an aesthetic character1 provided that it has been suggested1 and not caused4 ,it will now be understood why the aesthetic emotion seems to us to admit of degrees of intensity1 and also of degrees of elevation4 ,sometimes the feeling which is suggested scarcely makes a break in the compact texture of psychic phenomena of which our history consists2 sometimes it draws our attention from them1 but not so that they become lost to sight2 sometimes1 finally1 it puts itself in their place1 engrosses us and completely monopolizes our soul4 ,there are thus distinct phases in the progress of an aesthetic feeling1 as in the state of hypnosis2 and these phases correspond less to variations of degree than to differences of state or of nature4 ,but the merit of a work of art is not measured so much by the power with which the suggested feeling takes hold of us as by the richness of this feeling itself3 in other words1 besides degrees of intensity we instinctively distinguish degrees of depth or elevation4 ,if this last concept be analysed1 it will be seen that the feelings and thoughts which the artist suggests to us express and sum up a more or less considerable part of his history4 ,if the art which gives only sensations is an inferior art1 the reason is that analysis often fails to discover in a sensation anything beyond the sensation itself4 ,but the greater number of emotions are instinct with a thousand sensations1 feelings or ideas which pervade them3 each one is then a state unique of its kind and indefinable1 and it seems that we should have to re-live the life of the subject who experiences it if we wished to grasp it in its original complexity4 ,yet the artist aims at giving us a share in this emotion1 so rich1 so personal1 so novel1 and at enabling us to experience what he cannot make us understand4 ,this he will bring about by choosing1 among the outward signs of his emotions1 those which our body is likely to imitate mechanically1 though slightly1 as soon as it perceives them1 so as to transport us all at once into the indefinable psychological state which called them forth4 ,thus will be broken down the barrier interposed by time and space between his consciousness and ours3 and the richer in ideas and the more pregnant with sensations and emotions is the feeling within whose limits the artist has brought us1 the deeper and the higher shall we find the beauty thus expressed4 ,the successive intensities of the aesthetic feeling thus correspond to changes of state occurring in us1 and the degrees of depth to the larger or smaller number of elementary psychic phenomena which we dimly discern in the fundamental emotion4 ,sidenote3 ,the moral feelings4 ,pity4 ,its increasing intensity is a qualitative progress4 ,the moral feelings might be studied in the same way4 ,let us take pity as an example4 ,it consists in the first place in putting oneself mentally in the place of others1 in suffering their pain4 ,but if it were nothing more1 as some have maintained1 it would inspire us with the idea of avoiding the wretched rather than helping them1 for pain is naturally abhorrent to us4 ,this feeling of horror may indeed be at the root of pity2 but a new element soon comes in1 the need of helping our fellow-men and of alleviating their suffering4 ,shall we say with ,la ,rochefoucauld that this so-called sympathy is a calculation1 a shrewd insurance against evils to come8 ,perhaps a dread of some future evil to ourselves does hold a place in our compassion for other people's evil4 ,these however are but lower forms of pity4 ,true pity consists not so much in fearing suffering as in desiring it4 ,the desire is a faint one and we should hardly wish to see it realized2 yet we form it in spite of ourselves1 as if ,nature were committing some great injustice and it were necessary to get rid of all suspicion of complicity with her4 ,the essence of pity is thus a need for self-abasement1 an aspiration downwards4 ,this painful aspiration nevertheless has a charm about it1 because it raises us in our own estimation and makes us feel superior to those sensuous goods from which our thought is temporarily detached4 ,the increasing intensity of pity thus consists in a qualitative progress1 in a transition from repugnance to fear1 from fear to sympathy1 and from sympathy itself to humility4 ,sidenote3 ,conscious states connected with external causes or involving psychical symptoms4 ,we do not propose to carry this analysis any further4 ,the psychic states whose intensity we have just defined are deep-seated states which do not seem to have any close relation to their external cause or to involve the perception of muscular contraction4 ,but such states are rare4 ,there is hardly any passion or desire1 any joy or sorrow1 which is not accompanied by physical symptoms2 and1 where these symptoms occur1 they probably count for something in the estimate of intensities4 ,as for the sensations properly so called1 they are manifestly connected with their external cause1 and though the intensity of the sensation cannot be defined by the magnitude of its cause1 there undoubtedly exists some relation between these two terms4 ,in some of its manifestations consciousness even appears to spread outwards1 as if intensity were being developed into extensity1 e4g4 in the case of muscular effort4 ,let us face this last phenomenon at once3 we shall thus be transported at a bound to the opposite extremity of the series of psychic phenomena4 ,sidenote3 ,muscular effort seems at first sight to be quantitative4 ,if there is a phenomenon which seems to be presented immediately to consciousness under the form of quantity or at least of magnitude1 it is undoubtedly muscular effort4 ,we picture to our minds a psychic force imprisoned in the soul like the winds in the cave of ,aeolus1 and only waiting for an opportunity to burst forth3 our will is supposed to watch over this force and from time to time to open a passage for it1 regulating the outflow by the effect which it is desired to produce4 ,if we consider the matter carefully1 we shall see that this somewhat crude conception of effort plays a large part in our belief in intensive magnitudes4 ,muscular force1 whose sphere of action is space and which manifests itself in phenomena admitting of measure1 seems to us to have existed previous to its manifestations1 but in smaller volume1 and1 so to speak1 in a compressed state3 hence we do not hesitate to reduce this volume more and more1 and finally we believe that we can understand how a purely psychic state1 which does not occupy space1 can nevertheless possess magnitude4 ,science1 too1 tends to strengthen the illusion of common sense with regard to this point4 ,bain1 for example1 declares that the sensibility accompanying muscular movement coincides with the outgoing stream of nervous energy3#b it is thus just the emission of nervous force which consciousness perceives4 ,wundt also speaks of a sensation1 central in its origin1 accompanying the voluntary innervation of the muscles1 and quotes the example of the paralytic who has a very distinct sensation of the force which he employs in the effort to raise his leg1 although it remains motionless4#c ,most of the authorities adhere to this opinion1 which would be the unanimous view of positive science were it not that several years ago ,professor ,william ,james drew the attention of physiologists to certain phenomena which had been but little remarked1 although they were very remarkable4 ,sidenote3 ,the feeling of effort4 ,we are conscious not of an expenditure of force but of the resulting muscular movement4 ,when a paralytic strives to raise his useless limb1 he certainly does not execute this movement1 but1 with or without his will1 he executes another4 ,some movement is carried out somewhere3 otherwise there is no sensation of effort4#d ,vulpian had already called attention to the fact that if a man affected with hemiplegia is told to clench his paralysed fist1 he unconsciously carries out this action with the fist which is not affected4 ,ferrier described a still more curious phenomenon4#e ,stretch out your arm while slightly bending your forefinger1 as if you were going to press the trigger of a pistol2 without moving the finger1 without contracting any muscle of the hand1 without producing any apparent movement1 you will yet be able to feel that you are expending energy4 ,on a closer examination1 however1 you will perceive that this sensation of effort coincides with the fixation of the muscles of your chest1 that you keep your glottis closed and actively contract your respiratory muscles4 ,as soon as respiration resumes its normal course the consciousness of effort vanishes1 unless you really move your finger4 ,these facts already seemed to show that we are conscious1 not of an expenditure of force1 but of the movement of the muscles which results from it4 ,the new feature in ,professor ,james's investigation is that he has verified the hypothesis in the case of examples which seemed to contradict it absolutely4 ,thus when the external rectus muscle of the right eye is paralysed1 the patient tries in vain to turn his eye towards the right2 yet objects seem to him to recede towards the right1 and since the act of volition has produced no effect1 it follows1 said ,helmholtz1#f that he is conscious of the effort of volition4 ,but1 replies ,professor ,james1 no account has been taken of what goes on in the other eye4 ,this remains covered during the experiments2 nevertheless it moves and there is not much trouble in proving that it does4 ,it is the movement of the left eye1 perceived by consciousness1 which produces the sensation of effort together with the impression that the objects perceived by the right eye are moving4 ,these and similar observations lead ,professor ,james to assert that the feeling of effort is centripetal and not centrifugal4 ,we are not conscious of a force which we are supposed to launch upon our organism3 our feeling of muscular energy at work is a complex afferent sensation1 which comes from contracted muscles1 stretched ligaments1 compressed joints1 an immobilized chest1 a closed glottis1 a knit brow1 clenched jaws1 in a word1 from all the points of the periphery where the effort causes an alteration4 ,sidenote3 ,intensity of feeling of effort proportional to extent of our body affected4 ,it is not for us to take a side in the dispute4 ,after all1 the question with which we have to deal is not whether the feeling of effort comes from the centre or the periphery1 but in what does our perception of its intensity exactly consist8 ,now1 it is sufficient to observe oneself attentively to reach a conclusion on this point which ,professor ,james has not formulated1 but which seems to us quite in accord with the spirit of his teaching4 ,we maintain that the more a given effort seems to us to increase1 the greater is the number of muscles which contract in sympathy with it1 and that the apparent consciousness of a greater intensity of effort at a given point of the organism is reducible1 in reality1 to the perception of a larger surface of the body being affected4 ,sidenote3 ,our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort consists in the perception of 7#a7 a greater number of peripheral sensations 7#b7 a qualitative change in some of them4 ,try1 for example1 to clench the fist with increasing force4 ,you will have the impression of a sensation of effort entirely localized in your hand and running up a scale of magnitudes4 ,in reality1 what you experience in your hand remains the same1 but the sensation which was at first localized there has affected your arm and ascended to the shoulder2 finally1 the other arm stiffens1 both legs do the same1 the respiration is checked2 it is the whole body which is at work4 ,but you fail to notice distinctly all these concomitant movements unless you are warned of them3 till then you thought you were dealing with a single state of consciousness which changed in magnitude4 ,when you press your lips more and more tightly against one another1 you believe that you are experiencing in your lips one and the same sensation which is continually increasing in strength3 here again further reflection will show you that this sensation remains identical1 but that certain muscles of the face and the head and then of all the rest of the body have taken part in the operation4 ,you felt this gradual encroachment1 this increase of the surface affected1 which is in truth a change of quantity2 but1 as your attention was concentrated on your closed lips1 you localized the increase there and you made the psychic force there expended into a magnitude1 although it possessed no extensity4 ,examine carefully somebody who is lifting heavier and heavier weights3 the muscular contraction gradually spreads over his whole body4 ,as for the special sensation which he experiences in the arm which is at work1 it remains constant for a very long time and hardly changes except in quality1 the weight becoming at a certain moment fatigue1 and the fatigue pain4 ,yet the subject will imagine that he is conscious of a continual increase in the psychic force flowing into his arm4 ,he will not recognize his mistake unless he is warned of it1 so inclined is he to measure a given psychic state by the conscious movements which accompany it6 ,from these facts and from many others of the same kind we believe we can deduce the following conclusion3 our consciousness of an increase of muscular effort is reducible to the twofold perception of a greater number of peripheral sensations1 and of a qualitative change occurring in some of them4 ,sidenote3 ,the same definition of intensity applies to superficial efforts1 deep-seated feelings and states intermediate between the two4 ,we are thus led to define the intensity of a superficial effort in the same way as that of a cases there is a qualitative progress and an increasing complexity1 indistinctly perceived4 ,but consciousness1 accustomed to think in terms of space and to translate its thoughts into words1 will denote the feeling by a single word and will localize the effort at the exact point where it yields a useful result3 it will then become aware of an effort which is always of the same nature and increases at the spot assigned to it1 and a feeling which1 retaining the same name1 grows without changing its nature4 ,now1 the same illusion of consciousness is likely to be met with again in the case of the states which are intermediate between superficial efforts and deep-seated feelings4 ,a large number of psychic states are accompanied1 in fact1 by muscular contractions and peripheral sensations4 ,sometimes these superficial elements are co-ordinated by a purely speculative idea1 sometimes by an idea of a practical order4 ,in the first case there is intellectual effort or attention2 in the second we have the emotions which may be called violent or acute3 anger1 terror1 and certain varieties of joy1 sorrow1 passion and desire4 ,let us show briefly that the same definition of intensity applies to these intermediate states4 ,sidenote3 ,the intermediate states4 ,attention and its relation to muscular contraction4 ,attention is not a purely physiological phenomenon1 but we cannot deny that it is accompanied by movements4 ,these movements are neither the cause nor the result of the phenomenon2 they are part of it1 they express it in terms of space1 as ,ribot has so remarkably proved4#g ,fechner had already reduced the effort of attention in a sense-organ to the muscular feeling produced by putting in motion1 by a sort of reflex action1 the muscles which are correlated with the different sense organs4 ,he had noticed the very distinct sensation of tension and contraction of the scalp1 the pressure from without inwards over the whole skull1 which we experience when we make a great effort to recall something4 ,ribot has studied more closely the movements which are characteristic of voluntary attention4 ,attention contracts the frontal muscle3 this muscle 444 draws the eyebrow towards itself1 raises it and causes transverse wrinkles on the forehead4444 ,in extreme cases the mouth is opened wide4 ,with children and with many adults eager attention gives rise to a protrusion of the lips1 a kind of pout4 ,certainly1 a purely psychic factor will always enter into voluntary attention1 even if it be nothing more than the exclusion by the will of all ideas foreign to the one with which the subject wishes to occupy himself4 ,but1 once this exclusion is made1 we believe that we are still conscious of a growing tension of soul1 of an immaterial effort which increases4 ,analyse this impression and you will find nothing but the feeling of a muscular contraction which spreads over a wider surface or changes its nature1 so that the tension becomes pressure1 fatigue and pain4 ,sidenote3 ,the intensity of violent emotions as muscular tension4 ,now1 we do not see any essential difference between the effort of attention and what may be ,the intensity called the effort of psychic tension3 acute desire1 uncontrolled anger1 passionate love1 violent hatred4 ,each of these states may be reduced1 we believe1 to a system of muscular contractions co-ordinated by an idea2 but in the case of attention1 it is the more or less reflective idea of knowing2 in the case of emotion1 the unreflective idea of acting4 ,the intensity of these violent emotions is thus likely to be nothing but the muscular tension which accompanies them4 ,darwin has given a remarkable description of the physiological symptoms of rage4 ,the action of the heart is much accelerated4444 ,the face reddens or may turn deadly pale4 ,the respiration is laboured1 the chest heaves1 and the dilated nostrils quiver4 ,the whole body often trembles4 ,the voice is affected4 ,the teeth are clenched or ground together and the muscular system is commonly stimulated to violent1 almost frantic action4 ,the gestures 444 represent more or less plainly the act of striking or fighting with an enemy4#h ,we shall not go so far as to maintain1 with ,professor ,james1#i that the emotion of rage is reducible to the sum of these organic sensations3 there will always be an irreducible psychic element in anger1 if this be only the idea of striking or fighting1 of which ,darwin speaks1 and which gives a common direction to so many diverse movements4 ,but1 though this idea determines the direction of the emotional state and the accompanying movements1 the growing intensity of the state itself is1 we believe1 nothing but the deeper and deeper disturbance of the organism1 a disturbance which consciousness has no difficulty in measuring by the number and extent of the bodily surfaces concerned4 ,it will be useless to assert that there is a restrained rage which is all the more intense4 ,the reason is that1 where emotion has free play1 consciousness does not dwell on the details of the accompanying movements1 but it does dwell upon them and is concentrated upon them when its object is to conceal them4 ,eliminate1 in short1 all trace of organic disturbance1 all tendency towards muscular contraction1 and all that will be left of anger will be the idea1 or1 if you still insist on making it an emotion1 you will be unable to assign it any intensity4 ,sidenote3 ,intensity and reflex movements4 ,no essential difference between intensity of deep-seated feelings and that of violent emotions4 ,fear1 when strong1 says ,herbert ,spencer1 expresses itself in cries1 in efforts to escape1 in palpitations1 in tremblings4#aj ,we go further1 and maintain that these movements form part of the terror itself3 by their means the terror becomes an emotion capable of passing through different degrees of intensity4 ,suppress them entirely1 and the more or less intense state of terror will be succeeded by an idea of terror1 the wholly intellectual representation of a danger which it concerns us to avoid4 ,there are also high degrees of joy and sorrow1 of desire1 aversion and even shame1 the height of which will be found to be nothing but the reflex movements begun by the organism and perceived by consciousness4 ,when lovers meet1 says ,darwin1 we know that their hearts beat quickly1 their breathing is hurried and their faces flushed4#aa ,aversion is marked by movements of repugnance which we repeat without noticing when we think of the object of our dislike4 ,we blush and involuntarily clench the fingers when we feel shame1 even if it be retrospective4 ,the acuteness of these emotions is estimated by the number and nature of the peripheral sensations which accompany them4 ,little by little1 and in proportion as the emotional state loses its violence and gains in depth1 the peripheral sensations will give place to inner states2 it will be no longer our outward movements but our ideas1 our memories1 our states of consciousness of every description1 which will turn in larger or smaller numbers in a definite direction4 ,there is1 then1 no essential difference from the point of view of intensity between the deep-seated feelings1 of which we spoke at the beginning1 and the acute or violent emotions which we have just passed in review4 ,to say that love1 hatred1 desire1 increase in violence is to assert that they are projected outwards1 that they radiate to the surface1 that peripheral sensations are substituted for inner states3 but superficial or deep-seated1 violent or reflective1 the intensity of these feelings always consists in the multiplicity of simple states which consciousness dimly discerns in them4 ,sidenote3 ,magnitude of sensations4 ,affective and representative sensations4 ,we have hitherto confined ourselves to feelings and efforts1 complex states the intensity of which does not absolutely depend on an external cause4 ,but sensations seem to us simple states3 in what will their magnitude consist8 ,the intensity of sensations varies with the external cause of which they are said to be the conscious equivalent3 how shall we explain the presence of quantity in an effect which is inextensive1 and in this case indivisible8 ,to answer this question1 we must first distinguish between the so-called affective and the representative sensations4 ,there is no doubt that we pass gradually from the one to the other and that some affective element enters into the majority of our simple representations4 ,but nothing prevents us from isolating this element and inquiring separately1 in what does the intensity of an affective sensation1 a pleasure or a pain1 consist8 ,sidenote3 ,affective sensations and organic disturbance4 ,perhaps the difficulty of the latter problem is principally due to the fact that we are unwilling to see in the affective state anything but the conscious expression of an organic disturbance1 the inward echo of an outward cause4 ,we notice that a more intense sensation generally corresponds to a greater nervous disturbance2 but inasmuch as these disturbances are unconscious as movements1 since they come before consciousness in the guise of a sensation which has no resemblance at all to motion1 we do not see how they could transmit to the sensation anything of their own magnitude4 ,for there is nothing in common1 we repeat1 between superposable magnitudes such as1 for example1 vibration-amplitudes1 and sensations which do not occupy space4 ,if the more intense sensation seems to us to contain the less intense1 if it assumes for us1 like the physical impression itself1 the form of a magnitude1 the reason probably is that it retains something of the physical impression to which it corresponds4 ,and it will retain nothing of it if it is merely the conscious translation of a movement of molecules2 for1 just because this movement is translated into the sensation of pleasure or pain1 it remains unconscious as molecular movement4 ,sidenote3 ,pleasure and pain as signs of the future reaction rather than psychic translations of the past stimulus4 ,but it might be asked whether pleasure and pain1 instead of expressing only what has just occurred1 or what is actually occurring1 in the organism1 as is usually believed1 could not also point out what is going to1 or what is tending to take place4 ,it seems indeed somewhat improbable that nature1 so profoundly utilitarian1 should have here assigned to consciousness the merely scientific task of informing us about the past or the present1 which no longer depend upon us4 ,it must be noticed in addition that we rise by imperceptible stages from automatic to free movements1 and that the latter differ from the former principally in introducing an affective sensation between the external action which occasions them and the volitional reaction which ensues4 ,indeed1 all our actions might have been automatic1 and we can surmise that there are many organized beings in whose case an external stimulus causes a definite reaction without calling up consciousness as an intermediate agent4 ,if pleasure and pain make their appearance in certain privileged beings1 it is probably to call forth a resistance to the automatic reaction which would have taken place3 either sensation has nothing to do1 or it is nascent freedom4 ,but how would it enable us to resist the reaction which is in preparation if it did not acquaint us with the nature of the latter by some definite sign8 ,and what can this sign be except the sketching1 and1 as it were1 the prefiguring of the future automatic movements in the very midst of the sensation which is being experienced8 ,the affective state must then correspond not merely to the physical disturbances1 movements or phenomena which have taken place1 but also1 and especially1 to those which are in preparation1 those which are getting ready to be4 ,sidenote3 ,intensity of affective sensations would then be our consciousness of the involuntary movements tending to follow the stimulus4 ,it is certainly not obvious at first sight how this hypothesis simplifies the problem4 ,for we are trying to find what there can be in common1 from the point of view of magnitude1 between a physical phenomenon and a state of consciousness1 and we seem to have merely turned the difficulty round by making the present state of consciousness a sign of the future reaction1 rather than a psychic translation of the past stimulus4 ,but the difference between the two hypotheses is considerable4 ,for the molecular disturbances which were mentioned just now are necessarily unconscious1 since no trace of the movements themselves can be actually perceived in the sensation which translates them4 ,but the automatic movements which tend to follow the stimulus as its natural outcome are likely to be conscious as movements3 or else the sensation itself1 whose function is to invite us to choose between this automatic reaction and other possible movements1 would be of no avail4 ,the intensity of affective sensations might thus be nothing more than our consciousness of the involuntary movements which are being begun and outlined1 so to speak1 within these states1 and which would have gone on in their own way if nature had made us automata instead of conscious beings4 ,sidenote3 ,intensity of a pain estimated by extent of organism affected4 ,if such be the case1 we shall not compare a pain of increasing intensity to a note which grows louder and louder1 but rather to a symphony1 in which an increasing number of instruments make themselves heard4 ,within the characteristic sensation1 which gives the tone to all the others1 consciousness distinguishes a larger or smaller number of sensations arising at different points of the periphery1 muscular contractions1 organic movements of every kind3 the choir of these elementary psychic states voices the new demands of the organism1 when confronted by a new situation4 ,in other words1 we estimate the intensity of a pain by the larger or smaller part of the organism which takes interest in it4 ,richet#ab has observed that the slighter the pain1 the more precisely is it referred to a particular spot2 if it becomes more intense1 it is referred to the whole of the member affected4 ,and he concludes by saying that the pain spreads in proportion as it is more intense4#ac ,we should rather reverse the sentence1 and define the intensity of the pain by the very number and extent of the parts of the body which sympathize with it and react1 and whose reactions are perceived by consciousness4 ,to convince ourselves of this1 it will be enough to read the remarkable description of disgust given by the same author3 ,if the stimulus is slight there may be neither nausea nor vomiting4444 ,if the stimulus is stronger1 instead of being confined to the pneumo-gastric nerve1 it spreads and affects almost the whole organic system4 ,the face turns pale1 the smooth muscles of the skin contract1 the skin is covered with a cold perspiration1 the heart stops beating3 in a word there is a general organic disturbance following the stimulation of the medulla oblongata1 and this disturbance is the supreme expression of disgust4#ad ,but is it nothing more than its expression8 ,in what will the general sensation of disgust consist1 if not in the sum of these elementary sensations8 ,and what can we understand here by increasing intensity1 if it is not the constantly increasing number of sensations which join in with the sensations already experienced8 ,darwin has drawn a striking picture of the reactions following a pain which becomes more and more acute4 ,great pain urges all animals 444 to make the most violent and diversified efforts to escape from the cause of suffering4444 ,with men the mouth may be closely compressed1 or more commonly the lips are retracted with the teeth clenched or ground together4444 ,the eyes stare wildly 444 or the brows are heavily contracted4 ,perspiration bathes the body4444 ,the circulation and respiration are much affected4#ae ,now1 is it not by this very contraction of the muscles affected that we measure the intensity of a pain8 ,analyse your idea of any suffering which you call extreme3 do you not mean that it is unbearable1 that is to say1 that it urges the organism to a thousand different actions in order to escape from it8 ,i can picture to myself a nerve transmitting a pain which is independent of all automatic reaction2 and ,i can equally understand that stronger or weaker stimulations influence this nerve differently4 ,but ,i do not see how these differences of sensation would be interpreted by our consciousness as differences of quantity unless we connected them with the reactions which usually accompany them1 and which are more or less extended and more or less important4 ,without these subsequent reactions1 the intensity of the pain would be a quality1 and not a magnitude4 ,sidenote3 ,pleasures compared by bodily inclination4 ,we have hardly any other means of comparing several pleasures with one another4 ,what do we mean by a greater pleasure except a pleasure that is preferred8 ,and what can our preference be1 except a certain disposition of our organs1 the effect of which is that1 when two pleasures are offered simultaneously to our mind1 our body inclines towards one of them8 ,analyse this inclination itself and you will find a great many little movements which begin and become perceptible in the organs concerned1 and even in the rest of the body1 as if the organism were coming forth to meet the pleasure as soon as it is pictured4 ,when we define inclination as a movement1 we are not using a metaphor4 ,when confronted by several pleasures pictured by our mind1 our body turns towards one of them spontaneously1 as though by a reflex action4 ,it rests with us to check it1 but the attraction of the pleasure is nothing but this movement that is begun1 and the very keenness of the pleasure1 while we enjoy it1 is merely the inertia of the organism1 which is immersed in it and rejects every other sensation4 ,without this vis inertiae of which we become conscious by the very resistance which we offer to anything that might distract us1 pleasure would be a state1 but no longer a magnitude4 ,in the moral as in the physical world1 attraction serves to define movement rather than to produce it4 ,sidenote3 ,the intensity of representative sensations4 ,many also affective and intensity is measured by reaction called forth4 ,in others a new element enters4 ,we have studied the affective sensations separately1 but we must now notice that many representative sensations possess an affective character1 and thus call forth a reaction on our part which we take into account in estimating their intensity4 ,a considerable increase of light is represented for us by a characteristic sensation which is not yet pain1 but which is analogous to dazzling4 ,in proportion as the amplitude of sound-vibrations increases1 our head and then our body seem to us to vibrate or to receive a shock4 ,certain representative sensations1 those of taste1 smell and temperature1 have a fixed character of pleasantness or unpleasantness4 ,between flavours which are more or less bitter you will hardly distinguish anything but differences of quality2 they are like different shades of one and the same colour4 ,but these differences of quality are at once interpreted as differences of quantity1 because of their affective character and the more or less pronounced movements of reaction1 pleasure or repugnance1 which they suggest to us4 ,besides1 even when the sensation remains purely representative1 its external cause cannot exceed a certain degree of strength or weakness without inciting us to movements which enable us to measure it4 ,sometimes indeed we have to make an effort to perceive this sensation1 as if it were trying to escape notice2 sometimes on the other hand it obsesses us1 forces itself upon us and engrosses us to such an extent that we make every effort to escape from it and to remain ourselves4 ,in the former case the sensation is said to be of slight intensity1 and in the latter case very intense4 ,thus1 in order to perceive a distant sound1 to distinguish what we call a faint smell or a dim light1 we strain all our faculties1 we pay attention4 ,and it is just because the smell and the light thus require to be reinforced by our efforts that they seem to us feeble4 ,and1 inversely1 we recognize a sensation of extreme intensity by the irresistible reflex movements to which it incites us1 or by the powerlessness with which it affects us4 ,when a cannon is fired off close to our ears or a dazzling light suddenly flares up1 we lose for an instant the consciousness of our personality2 this state may even last some time in the case of a very nervous subject4 ,it must be added that1 even within the range of the so-called medium intensities1 when we are dealing on even terms with a representative sensation1 we often estimate its importance by comparing it with another which it drives away1 or by taking account of the persistence with which it returns4 ,thus the ticking of a watch seems louder at night because it easily monopolizes a consciousness almost empty of sensations and ideas4 ,foreigners talking to one another in a language which we do not understand seem to us to speak very loudly1 because their words no longer call up any ideas in our mind1 and thus break in upon a kind of intellectual silence and monopolize our attention like the ticking of a watch at night4 ,with these so-called medium sensations1 however1 we approach a series of psychic states1 the intensity of which is likely to possess a new meaning4 ,for1 in most cases1 the organism hardly reacts at all1 at least in a way that can be perceived2 and yet we still make a magnitude out of the pitch of a sound1 the intensity of a light1 the saturation of a colour4 ,doubtless1 a closer observation of what takes place in the whole of the organism when we hear such and such a note or perceive such and such a colour has more than one surprise in store for us4 ,has not ,c4 ,fr shown that every sensation is accompanied by an increase in muscular force which can be measured by the dynamometer8#af ,but of an increase of this kind there is hardly any consciousness at all1 and if we reflect on the precision with which we distinguish sounds and colours1 nay1 even weights and temperatures1 we shall easily guess that some new element must come into play in our estimate of them4 ,sidenote3 ,the purely representative sensations are measured by external causes4 ,now1 the nature of this element is easy to determine4 ,for1 in proportion as a sensation loses its affective character and becomes representative1 the reactions which it called forth on our part tend to disappear1 but at the same time we perceive the external object which is its cause1 or if we do not now perceive it1 we have perceived it1 and we think of it4 ,now1 this cause is extensive and therefore measurable3 a constant experience1 which began with the first glimmerings of consciousness and which continues throughout the whole of our life1 shows us a definite shade of sensation corresponding to a definite amount of stimulation4 ,we thus associate the idea of a certain quantity of cause with a certain quality of effect2 and finally1 as happens in the case of every acquired perception1 we transfer the idea into the sensation1 the quantity of the cause into the quality of the effect4 ,at this very moment the intensity1 which was nothing but a certain shade or quality of the sensation1 becomes a magnitude4 ,we shall easily understand this process if1 for example1 we hold a pin in our right hand and prick our left hand more and more deeply4 ,at first we shall feel as it were a tickling1 then a touch which is succeeded by a prick1 then a pain localized at a point1 and finally the spreading of this pain over the surrounding zone4 ,and the more we reflect on it1 the more clearly shall we see that we are here dealing with so many qualitatively distinct sensations1 so many varieties of a single species4 ,but yet we spoke at first of one and the same sensation which spread further and further1 of one prick which increased in intensity4 ,the reason is that1 without noticing it1 we localized in the sensation of the left hand1 which is pricked1 the progressive effort of the right hand1 which pricks4 ,we thus introduced the cause into the effect1 and unconsciously interpreted quality as quantity1 intensity as magnitude4 ,now1 it is easy to see that the intensity of every representative sensation ought to be understood in the same way4 ,sidenote3 ,the sensations of sound4 ,intensity measured by effort necessary to produce a similar sound4 ,the sensations of sound display well marked degrees of intensity4 ,we have already spoken of the necessity of taking into account the affective character of these sensations1 the shock received by the whole of the organism4 ,we have shown that a very intense sound is one which engrosses our attention1 which supplants all the others4 ,but take away the shock1 the well-marked vibration1 which you sometimes feel in your head or even throughout your body3 take away the clash which takes place between sounds heard simultaneously3 what will be left except an indefinable quality of the sound which is heard8 ,but this quality is immediately interpreted as quantity because you have obtained it yourself a thousand times1 e4g4 by striking some object and thus expending a definite quantity of effort4 ,you know1 too1 how far you would have to raise your voice to produce a similar sound1 and the idea of this effort immediately comes into your mind when you transform the intensity of the sound into a magnitude4 ,wundt#ag has drawn attention to the quite special connexions of vocal and auditory nervous filaments which are met with in the human brain4 ,and has it not been said that to hear is to speak to oneself8 ,some neuropaths cannot be present at a conversation without moving their lips2 this is only an exaggeration of what takes place in the case of every one of us4 ,how will the expressive or rather suggestive power of music be explained1 if not by admitting that we repeat to ourselves the sounds heard1 so as to carry ourselves back into the psychic state out of which they emerged1 an original state1 which nothing will express1 but which something may suggest1 viz41 the very motion and attitude which the sound imparts to our body8 ,sidenote3 ,intensity and pitch4 ,the part played by muscular effort4 ,thus1 when we speak of the intensity of a sound of medium force as a magnitude1 we allude principally to the greater or less effort which we should have ourselves to expend in order to summon1 by our own effort1 the same auditory sensation4 ,now1 besides the intensity1 we distinguish another characteristic property of the sound1 its pitch4 ,are the differences in pitch1 such as our ear perceives1 quantitative differences8 ,i grant that a sharper sound calls up the picture of a higher position in space4 ,but does it follow from this that the notes of the scale1 as auditory sensations1 differ otherwise than in quality8 ,forget what you have learnt from physics1 examine carefully your idea of a higher or lower note1 and see whether you do not think simply of the greater or less effort which the tensor muscle of your vocal chords has to make in order to produce the note8 ,as the effort by which your voice passes from one note to another is discontinuous1 you picture to yourself these successive notes as points in space1 to be reached by a series of sudden jumps1 in each of which you cross an empty separating interval3 this is why you establish intervals between the notes of the scale4 ,now1 why is the line along which we dispose them vertical rather than horizontal1 and why do we say that the sound ascends in some cases and descends in others8 ,it must be remembered that the high notes seem to us to produce some sort of resonance in the head and the deep notes in the thorax3 this perception1 whether real or illusory1 has undoubtedly had some effect in making us reckon the intervals vertically4 ,but we must also notice that the greater the tension of the vocal chords in the chest voice1 the greater is the surface of the body affected1 if the singer is inexperienced2 this is just the reason why the effort is felt by him as more intense4 ,and as he breathes out the air upwards1 he will attribute the same direction to the sound produced by the current of air2 hence the sympathy of a larger part of the body with the vocal muscles will be represented by a movement upwards4 ,we shall thus say that the note is higher because the body makes an effort as though to reach an object which is more elevated in space4 ,in this way it became customary to assign a certain height to each note of the scale1 and as soon as the physicist was able to define it by the number of vibrations in a given time to which it corresponds1 we no longer hesitated to declare that our ear perceived differences of quantity directly4 ,but the sound would remain a pure quality if we did not bring in the muscular effort which produces it or the vibrations which explain it4 ,sidenote3 ,the sensations of heat and cold4 ,these soon become affective and are measured by reactions called forth4 ,the experiments of ,blix1 ,goldscheider and ,donaldson#ah have shown that the points on the surface of the body which feel cold are not the same as those which feel heat4 ,physiology is thus disposed to set up a distinction of nature1 and not merely of degree1 between the sensations of heat and cold4 ,but psychological observation goes further1 for close attention can easily discover specific differences between the different sensations of heat1 as also between the sensations of cold4 ,a more intense heat is really another kind of heat4 ,we call it more intense because we have experienced this same change a thousand times when we approached nearer and nearer a source of heat1 or when a growing surface of our body was affected by it4 ,besides1 the sensations of heat and cold very quickly become affective and incite us to more or less marked reactions by which we measure their external cause3 hence1 we are inclined to set up similar quantitative differences among the sensations which correspond to lower intensities of the cause4 ,but ,i shall not insist any further2 every one must question himself carefully on this point1 after making a clean sweep of everything which his past experience has taught him about the cause of his sensations and coming face to face with the sensations themselves4 ,the result of this examination is likely to be as follows3 it will be perceived that the magnitude of a representative sensation depends on the cause having been put into the effect1 while the intensity of the affective element depends on the more or less important reactions which prolong the external stimulations and find their way into the sensation itself4 ,sidenote3 ,the sensation of pressure and weight measured by extent of organism affected4 ,the same thing will be experienced in the case of pressure and even weight4 ,when you say that a pressure on your hand becomes stronger1 see whether you do not mean that there first was a contact1 then a pressure1 afterwards a pain1 and that this pain itself1 after having gone through a series of qualitative changes1 has spread further and further over the surrounding region4 ,look again and see whether you do not bring in the more and more intense1 i4e4 more and more extended1 effort of resistance which you oppose to the external pressure4 ,when the psychophysicist lifts a heavier weight1 he experiences1 he says1 an increase of sensation4 ,examine whether this increase of sensation ought not rather to be called a sensation of increase4 ,the whole question is centred in this1 for in the first case the sensation would be a quantity like its external cause1 whilst in the second it would be a quality which had become representative of the magnitude of its cause4 ,the distinction between the heavy and the light may seem to be as old-fashioned and as childish as that between the hot and the cold4 ,but the very childishness of this distinction makes it a psychological reality4 ,and not only do the heavy and the light impress our consciousness as generically different1 but the various degrees of lightness and heaviness are so many species of these two genera4 ,it must be added that the difference of quality is here translated spontaneously into a difference of quantity1 because of the more or less extended effort which our body makes in order to lift a given weight4 ,of this you will soon become aware if you are asked to lift a basket which1 you are told1 is full of scrap-iron1 whilst in fact there is nothing in it4 ,you will think you are losing your balance when you catch hold of it1 as though distant muscles had interested themselves beforehand in the operation and experienced a sudden disappointment4 ,it is chiefly by the number and nature of these sympathetic efforts1 which take place at different points of the organism1 that you measure the sensation of weight at a given point2 and this sensation would be nothing more than a quality if you did not thus introduce into it the idea of a magnitude4 ,what strengthens the illusion on this point is that we have become accustomed to believe in the immediate perception of a homogeneous movement in a homogeneous space4 ,when ,i lift a light weight with my arm1 all the rest of my body remaining motionless1 ,i experience a series of muscular sensations each of which has its local sign1 its peculiar shade3 it is this series which my consciousness interprets as a continuous movement in space4 ,if ,i afterwards lift a heavier weight to the same height with the same speed1 ,i pass through a new series of muscular sensations1 each of which differs from the corresponding term of the preceding series4 ,of this ,i could easily convince myself by examining them closely4 ,but as ,i interpret this new series also as a continuous movement1 and as this movement has the same direction1 the same duration and the same velocity as the preceding1 my consciousness feels itself bound to localize the difference between the second series of sensations and the first elsewhere than in the movement itself4 ,it thus materializes this difference at the extremity of the arm which moves2 it persuades itself that the sensation of movement has been identical in both cases1 while the sensation of weight differed in magnitude4 ,but movement and weight are but distinctions of the reflective consciousness3 what is present to consciousness immediately is the sensation of1 so to speak1 a heavy movement1 and this sensation itself can be resolved by analysis into a series of muscular sensations1 each of which represents by its shade its place of origin and by its colour the magnitude of the weight lifted4 ,sidenote3 ,the sensation of light4 ,qualitative changes of colour interpreted as quantitative changes in intensity of luminous source4 ,shall we call the intensity of light a quantity1 or shall we treat it as a quality8 ,it has not perhaps been sufficiently noticed what a large number of different factors co-operate in daily life in giving us information about the nature of the luminous source4 ,we know from long experience that1 when we have a difficulty in distinguishing the outlines and details of objects1 the light is at a distance or on the point of going out4 ,experience has taught us that the affective sensation or nascent dazzling that we experience in certain cases must be attributed to a higher intensity of the cause4 ,any increase or diminution in the number of luminous sources alters the way in which the sharp lines of bodies stand out and also the shadows which they project4 ,still more important are the changes of hue which coloured surfaces1 and even the pure colours of the spectrum1 undergo under the influence of a brighter or dimmer light4 ,as the luminous source is brought nearer1 violet takes a bluish tinge1 green tends to become a whitish yellow1 and red a brilliant yellow4 ,inversely1 when the light is moved away1 ultramarine passes into violet and yellow into green2 finally1 red1 green and violet tend to become a whitish yellow4 ,physicists have remarked these changes of hue for some time2#ai but what is still more remarkable is that the majority of men do not perceive them1 unless they pay attention to them or are warned of them4 ,having made up our mind1 once for all1 to interpret changes of quality as changes of quantity1 we begin by asserting that every object has its own peculiar colour1 definite and invariable4 ,and when the hue of objects tends to become yellow or blue1 instead of saying that we see their colour change under the influence of an increase or diminution of light1 we assert that the colour remains the same but that our sensation of luminous intensity increases or diminishes4 ,we thus substitute once more1 for the qualitative impression received by our consciousness1 the quantitative interpretation given by our understanding4 ,helmholtz has described a case of interpretation of the same kind1 but still more complicated3 ,if we form white with two colours of the spectrum1 and if we increase or diminish the intensities of the two coloured lights in the same ratio1 so that the proportions of the combination remain the same1 the resultant colour remains the same although the relative intensity of the sensations undergoes a marked change4444 ,this depends on the fact that the light of the sun1 which we consider as the normal white light during the day1 itself undergoes similar modifications of shade when the luminous intensity varies4#bj ,sidenote3 ,does experiment prove that we can measure directly our sensations of light8 ,but yet1 if we often judge of variations in the luminous source by the relative changes of hue of the objects which surround us1 this is no longer the case in simple instances where a single object1 e4g4 a white surface1 passes successively through different degrees of luminosity4 ,we are bound to insist particularly on this last point4 ,for the physicist speaks of degrees of luminous intensity as of real quantities3 and1 in fact1 he measures them by the photometer4 ,the psychophysicist goes still further3 he maintains that our eye itself estimates the intensities of light4 ,experiments have been attempted1 at first by ,delbuf1#ba and afterwards by ,lehmann and ,neiglick1#bb with the view of constructing a psychophysical formula from the direct measurement of our luminous sensations4 ,of these experiments we shall not dispute the result1 nor shall we deny the value of photometric processes2 but we must see how we have to interpret them4 ,sidenote3 ,photometric experiments4 ,we perceive different shades and afterwards interpret them as decreasing intensities of white light4 ,look closely at a sheet of paper lighted e4g4 by four candles1 and put out in succession one1 two1 ,photometric three of them4 ,you say that the surface remains white and that its brightness diminishes4 ,but you are aware that one candle has just been put out2 or1 if you do not know it1 you have often observed a similar change in the appearance of a white surface when the illumination was diminished4 ,put aside what you remember of your past experiences and what you are accustomed to say of the present ones2 you will find that what you really perceive is not a diminished illumination of the white surface1 it is a layer of shadow passing over this surface at the moment the candle is extinguished4 ,this shadow is a reality to your consciousness1 like the light itself4 ,if you call the first surface in all its brilliancy white1 you will have to give another name to what you now see1 for it is a different thing3 it is1 if we may say so1 a new shade of white4 ,we have grown accustomed1 through the combined influence of our past experience and of physical theories1 to regard black as the absence1 or at least as the minimum1 of luminous sensation1 and the successive shades of grey as decreasing intensities of white light4 ,but1 in point of fact1 black has just as much reality for our consciousness as white1 and the decreasing intensities of white light illuminating a given surface would appear to an unprejudiced consciousness as so many different shades1 not unlike the various colours of the spectrum4 ,this is the reason why the change in the sensation is not continuous1 as it is in the external cause1 and why the light can increase or decrease for a certain period without producing any apparent change in the illumination of our white surface3 the illumination will not appear to change until the increase or decrease of the external light is sufficient to produce a new quality4 ,the variations in brightness of a given colour--the affective sensations of which we have spoken above being left aside--would thus be nothing but qualitative changes1 were it not our custom to transfer the cause to the effect and to replace our immediate impressions by what we learn from experience and science4 ,the same thing might be said of degrees of saturation4 ,indeed1 if the different intensities of a colour correspond to so many different shades existing between this colour and black1 the degrees of saturation are like shades intermediate between this same colour and pure white4 ,every colour1 we might say1 can be regarded under two aspects1 from the point of view of black and from the point of view of white4 ,and black is then to intensity what white is to saturation4 ,sidenote3 ,in photometric experiments the physicist compares1 not sensations1 but physical effects4 ,the meaning of the photometric experiments will now be understood4 ,a candle placed at a certain distance from a sheet of paper illuminates it in a certain way3 you double the distance and find that four candles are required to produce the same effects1 sensation4 ,from this you conclude that if you had doubled the distance without increasing the intensity of the luminous source1 the resultant illumination would have been only one-fourth as bright4 ,but it is quite obvious that you are here dealing with the physical and not the psychological effect4 ,for it cannot be said that you have compared two sensations with one another3 you have made use of a single sensation in order to compare two different luminous sources with each other1 the second four times as strong as the first but twice as far off4 ,in a word1 the physicist never brings in sensations which are twice or three times as great as others1 but only identical sensations1 destined to serve as intermediaries between two physical quantities which can then be equated with one another4 ,the sensation of light here plays the part of the auxiliary unknown quantity which the mathematician introduces into his calculations1 and which is not intended to appear in the final result4 ,sidenote3 ,the psychophysicist claims to compare and measure sensations4 ,delbuf's experiments4 ,but the object of the psychophysicist is entirely different3 it is the sensation of light itself which he studies1 and claims to measure4 ,sometimes he will proceed to integrate infinitely small differences1 after the method of ,fechner2 sometimes he will compare one sensation directly with another4 ,the latter method1 due to ,plateau and ,delbuf1 differs far less than has hitherto been believed from ,fechner's3 but1 as it bears more especially on the luminous sensations1 we shall deal with it first4 ,delbuf places an observer in front of three concentric rings which vary in brightness4 ,by an ingenious arrangement he can cause each of these rings to pass through all the shades intermediate between white and black4 ,let us suppose that two hues of grey are simultaneously produced on two of the rings and kept unchanged2 let us call them ,a and ,b4 ,delbuf alters the brightness1 ,c1 of the third ring1 and asks the observer to tell him whether1 at a certain moment1 the grey1 ,b1 appears to him equally distant from the other two4 ,a moment comes1 in fact1 when the observer states that the contrast ,a ,b is equal to the contrast ,b ,c1 so that1 according to ,delbuf1 a scale of luminous intensities could be constructed on which we might pass from each sensation to the following one by equal sensible contrasts3 our sensations would thus be measured by one another4 ,i shall not follow ,delbuf into the conclusions which he has drawn from these remarkable experiments3 the essential question1 the only question1 as it seems to me1 is whether a contrast ,a ,b1 formed of the elements ,a and ,b1 is really equal to a contrast ,b ,c1 which is differently composed4 ,as soon as it is proved that two sensations can be equal without being identical1 psychophysics will be established4 ,but it is this equality which seems to me open to question3 it is easy to explain1 in fact1 how a sensation of luminous intensity can be said to be at an equal distance from two others4 ,sidenote3 ,in what cases differences of colour might be interpreted as differences of magnitude4 ,let us assume for a moment that from our birth onwards the growing intensity of a luminous source had always called up in our consciousness1 one after the other1 the different colours of the spectrum4 ,there is no doubt that these colours would then appear to us as so many notes of a gamut1 as higher or lower degrees in a scale1 in a word1 as magnitudes4 ,moreover it would be easy for us to assign each of them its place in the series4 ,for although the extensive cause varies continuously1 the changes in the sensation of colour are discontinuous1 passing from one shade to another shade4 ,however numerous1 then1 may be the shades intermediate between the two colours1 ,a and ,b1 it will always be possible to count them in thought1 at least roughly1 and ascertain whether this number is almost equal to that of the shades which separate ,b from another colour ,c4 ,in the latter case it will be said that ,b is equally distant from ,a and ,c1 that the contrast is the same on one side as on the other4 ,but this will always be merely a convenient interpretation3 for although the number of intermediate shades may be equal on both sides1 although we may pass from one to the other by sudden leaps1 we do not know whether these leaps are magnitudes1 still less whether they are equal magnitudes3 above all it would be necessary to show that the intermediaries which have helped us throughout our measurement could be found again inside the object which we have measured4 ,if not1 it is only by a metaphor that a sensation can be said to be an equal distance from two others4 ,sidenote3 ,this is just the case with differences of intensity in sensations of light4 ,delbuf's underlying postulate4 ,now1 if the views which we have before enumerated with regard to luminous intensities are accepted1 it will be recognized that the different hues of grey which ,delbuf displays to us are strictly analogous1 for our consciousness1 to colours1 and that if we declare that a grey tint is equidistant from two other grey tints1 it is in the same sense in which it might be said that orange1 for example1 is at an equal distance from green and red4 ,but there is this difference1 that in all our past experience the succession of grey tints has been produced in connexion with a progressive increase or decrease in illumination4 ,hence we do for the differences of brightness what we do not think of doing for the differences of colour3 we promote the changes of quality into variations of magnitude4 ,indeed1 there is no difficulty here about the measuring1 because the successive shades of grey produced by a continuous decrease of illumination are discontinuous1 as being qualities1 and because we can count approximately the principal intermediate shades which separate any two kinds of grey4 ,the contrast ,a ,b will thus be declared equal to the contrast ,b ,c when our imagination1 aided by our memory1 inserts between ,a and ,b the same number of intermediate shades as between ,b and ,c4 ,it is needless to say that this will necessarily be a very rough estimate4 ,we may anticipate that it will vary considerably with different persons4 ,above all it is to be expected that the person will show more hesitation and that the estimates of different persons will differ more widely in proportion as the difference in brightness between the rings ,a and ,b is increased1 for a more and more laborious effort will be required to estimate the number of intermediate hues4 ,this is exactly what happens1 as we shall easily perceive by glancing at the two tables drawn up by ,delbuf4#bc ,in proportion as he increases the difference in brightness between the exterior ring and the middle ring1 the difference between the numbers on which one and the same observer or different observers successively fix increases almost continuously from #c degrees to #id1 from #e to #gc1 from #aj to #be1 from #g to #dj4 ,but let us leave these divergences on one side3 let us assume that the observers are always consistent and always agree with one another2 will it then be established that the contrasts ,a ,b and ,b ,c are equal8 ,it would first be necessary to prove that two successive elementary contrasts are equal quantities1 whilst1 in fact1 we only know that they are successive4 ,it would then be necessary to prove that inside a given tint of grey we perceive the less intense shades which our imagination has run through in order to estimate the objective intensity of the source of light4 ,in a word1 ,delbuf's psychophysics assumes a theoretical postulate of the greatest importance1 which is disguised under the cloak of an experimental result1 and which we should formulate as follows3 ,when the objective quantity of light is continuously increased1 the differences between the hues of grey successively obtained1 each of which represents the smallest perceptible increase of physical stimulation1 are quantities equal to one another4 ,and besides1 any one of the sensations obtained can be equated with the sum of the differences which separate from one another all previous sensations1 going from zero upwards4 ,now1 this is just the postulate of ,fechner's psychophysics1 which we are going to examine4 ,sidenote3 ,fechner's psychophysics4 ,weber's ,law4 ,fechner took as his starting-point a law discovered by ,weber1 according to which1 given a certain stimulus which calls forth a certain sensation1 the amount by which the stimulus must be increased for consciousness to become aware of any change bears a fixed relation to the original stimulus4 ,thus1 if we denote by the stimulus which corresponds to the sensation ,s1 and by the amount by which the original stimulus must be increased in order that a sensation of difference may be produced1 we shall have _/,e const4 ,this formula has been much modified by the disciples of ,fechner1 and we prefer to take no part in the discussion2 it is for experiment to decide between the relation established by ,weber and its substitutes4 ,nor shall we raise any difficulty about granting the probable existence of a law of this nature4 ,it is here really a question not of measuring a sensation but only of determining the exact moment at which an increase of stimulus produces a change in it4 ,now1 if a definite amount of stimulus produces a definite shade of sensation1 it is obvious that the minimum amount of stimulus required to produce a change in this shade is also definite2 and since it is not constant1 it must be a function of the original stimulus4 ,but how are we to pass from a relation between the stimulus and its minimum increase to an equation which connects the 9999amount of sensation with the corresponding stimulus8 ,the whole of psychophysics is involved in this transition1 which is therefore worthy of our closest consideration4 ,sidenote3 ,the underlying assumptions and the process by which ,fechner's ,law is reached4 ,we shall distinguish several different artifices in the process of transition from ,weber's experiments1 or from any other series of similar observations1 to a psychophysical law like ,fechner's4 ,it is first of all agreed to consider our consciousness of an increase of stimulus as an increase of the sensation ,s3 this is therefore called ,s4 ,it is then asserted that all the sensations ,s1 which correspond to the smallest perceptible increase of stimulus1 are equal to one another4 ,they are therefore treated as quantities1 and while1 on the one hand1 these quantities are supposed to be always equal1 and1 on the other1 experiment has given a certain relation 7,e7 between the stimulus and its minimum increase1 the constancy of ,s is expressed by writing ,s ,c ,e_/7,e71 ,c being a constant quantity4 ,finally it is agreed to replace the very small differences ,s and by the infinitely small differences d,s and d,e1 whence an equation which is1 this time1 a differential one3 d,s ,c d,e_/7,e74 ,we shall now simply have to integrate on both sides to obtain the desired relation#bd3 ,s,c d,e_/7,e74 ,and the transition will thus be made from a proved law1 which only concerned the occurrence of a sensation1 to an unprovable law which gives its measure4 ,without entering upon any thorough discussion of this ingenious operation1 let us show in a few words how ,fechner has grasped the real difficulty of the problem1 how he has tried to overcome it1 and where1 as it seems to us1 the flaw in his reasoning lies4 ,sidenote3 ,can two sensations be equal without being identical8 ,fechner realized that measurement could not be introduced into psychology without first defining what is meant by the equality and addition of two simple states1 e4g4 two sensations4 ,but1 unless they are identical1 we do not at first see how two sensations can be equal4 ,undoubtedly in the physical world equality is not synonymous with identity4 ,but the reason is that every phenomenon1 every object1 is there presented under two aspects1 the one qualitative and the other extensive3 nothing prevents us from putting the first one aside1 and then there remains nothing but terms which can be directly or indirectly superposed on one another and consequently seen to be identical4 ,now1 this qualitative element1 which we begin by eliminating from external objects in order to measure them1 is the very thing which psychophysics retains and claims to measure4 ,and it is no use trying to measure this quality ,q by some physical quantity ,q' which lies beneath it3 for it would be necessary to have previously shown that ,q is a function of ,q'1 and this would not be possible unless the quality ,q had first been measured with some fraction of itself4 ,thus nothing prevents us from measuring the sensation of heat by the degree of temperature2 but this is only a convention1 and the whole point of psychophysics lies in rejecting this convention and seeking how the sensation of heat varies when you change the temperature4 ,in a word1 it seems1 on the one hand1 that two different sensations cannot be said to be equal unless some identical residuum remains after the elimination of their qualitative difference2 but1 on the other hand1 this qualitative difference being all that we perceive1 it does not appear what could remain once it was eliminated4 ,sidenote3 ,fechner's method of minimum differences4 ,the novel feature in ,fechner's treatment is that he did not consider this difficulty insurmountable4 ,taking advantage of the fact that sensation varies by sudden jumps while the stimulus increases continuously1 he did not hesitate to call these differences of sensation by the same name3 they are all1 he says1 minimum differences1 since each corresponds to the smallest perceptible increase in the external stimulus4 ,therefore you can set aside the specific shade or quality of these successive differences2 a common residuum will remain in virtue of which they will be seen to be in a manner identical3 they all have the common character of being minima4 ,such will be the definition of equality which we were seeking4 ,now1 the definition of addition will follow naturally4 ,for if we treat as a quantity the difference perceived by consciousness between two sensations which succeed one another in the course of a continuous increase of stimulus1 if we call the first sensation ,s1 and the second ,s ,s1 we shall have to consider every sensation ,s as a sum1 obtained by the addition of the minimum differences through which we pass before reaching it4 ,the only remaining step will then be to utilize this twofold definition in order to establish1 first of all1 a relation between the differences ,s and 1 and then1 through the substitution of the differentials1 between the two variables4 ,true1 the mathematicians may here lodge a protest against the substitution of differential for difference2 the psychologists may ask1 too1 whether the quantity ,s1 instead of being constant1 does not vary as the sensation ,s itself2#be finally1 taking the psychophysical law for granted1 we may all debate about its real meaning4 ,but1 by the mere fact that ,s is regarded as a quantity and ,s as a sum1 the fundamental postulate of the whole process is accepted4 ,sidenote3 ,break-down of the assumption that the sensation is a sum1 and the minimum differences quantities4 ,now it is just this postulate which seems to us open to question1 even if it can be understood4 ,assume that ,i experience a sensation ,s1 and that1 increasing the stimulus continuously1 ,i perceive this increase after a certain time4 ,i am now notified of the increase of the cause3 but why should ,i call this notification an arithmetical difference8 ,no doubt the notification consists in the fact that the original state ,s has changed3 it has become ,s'2 but the transition from ,s to ,s' could only be called an arithmetical difference if ,i were conscious1 so to speak1 of an interval between ,s and ,s'1 and if my sensation were felt to rise from ,s to ,s' by the addition of something4 ,by giving this transition a name1 by calling it ,s19999 you make it first a reality and then a quantity4 ,now1 not only are you unable to explain in what sense this transition is a quantity1 but reflection will show you that it is not even a reality2 the only realities are the states ,s and ,s' through which ,i pass4 ,no doubt1 if ,s and ,s' were numbers1 ,i could assert the reality of the difference ,s'--,s even though ,s and ,s' alone were given2 the reason is that the number ,s'--,s1 which is a certain sum of units1 will then represent just the successive moments of the addition by which we pass from ,s to ,s'4 ,but if ,s and ,s' are simple states1 in what will the interval which separates them consist8 ,and what1 then1 can the transition from the first state to the second be1 if not a mere act of your thought1 which1 arbitrarily and for the sake of the argument1 assimilates a succession of two states to a differentiation of two magnitudes8 ,sidenote3 ,we can speak of arithmetical difference only in a conventional sense4 ,either you keep to what consciousness presents to you or you have recourse to a conventional mode of representation4 ,in the first case you will find a difference between ,s and ,s' like that between the shades sense4 ,of rainbow1 and not at all an interval of magnitude4 ,in the second case you may introduce the symbol ,s if you like1 but it is only in a conventional sense that you will speak here of an arithmetical difference1 and in a conventional sense1 also1 that you will assimilate a sensation to a sum4 ,the most acute of ,fechner's critics1 ,jules ,tannery1 has made the latter point perfectly clear4 ,it will be said1 for example1 that a sensation of #ej degrees is expressed by the number of differential sensations which would succeed one another from the point where sensation is absent up to the sensation of #ej degrees4444 ,i do not see that this is anything but a definition1 which is as legitimate as it is arbitrary4#bf ,sidenote3 ,delbuf's results seem more plausible but1 in the end1 all psychophysics revolves in a vicious circle4 ,we do not believe1 in spite of all that has been said1 that the method of mean gradations has set psychophysics on a new path4 ,the novel feature in ,delbuf's investigation was that he chose a particular case1 in which consciousness seemed to decide in ,fechner's favour1 and in which common sense itself played the part of the psychophysicist4 ,he inquired whether certain sensations did not appear to us immediately as equal although different1 and whether it would not be possible to draw up1 by their help1 a table of sensations which were double1 triple or quadruple those which preceded them4 ,the mistake which ,fechner made1 as we have just seen1 was that he believed in an interval between two successive sensations ,s and ,s'1 when there is simply a passing from one to the other and not a difference in the arithmetical sense of the word4 ,but if the two terms between which the passing takes place could be given simultaneously1 there would then be a contrast besides the transition2 and although the contrast is not yet an arithmetical difference1 it resembles it in a certain respect2 for the two terms which are compared stand here side by side as in a case of subtraction of two numbers4 ,suppose now that these sensations belong to the same genus and that in our past experience we have constantly been present at their march past1 so to speak1 while the physical stimulus increased continuously3 it is extremely probable that we shall thrust the cause into the effect1 and that the idea of contrast will thus melt into that of arithmetical difference4 ,as we shall have noticed1 moreover1 that the sensation changed abruptly while the stimulus rose continuously1 we shall no doubt estimate the distance between two given sensations by a rough guess at the number of these sudden jumps1 or at least of the intermediate sensations which usually serve us as landmarks4 ,to sum up1 the contrast will appear to us as a difference1 the stimulus as a quantity1 the sudden jump as an element of equality3 combining these three factors1 we shall reach the idea of equal quantitative differences4 ,now1 these conditions are nowhere so well realized as when surfaces of the same colour1 more or less illuminated1 are simultaneously presented to us4 ,not only is there here a contrast between similar sensations1 but these sensations correspond to a cause whose influence has always been felt by us to be closely connected with its distance2 and1 as this distance can vary continuously1 we cannot have escaped noticing in our past experience a vast number of shades of sensation which succeeded one another along with the continuous increase in the cause4 ,we are therefore able to say that the contrast between one shade of grey and another1 for example1 seems to us almost equal to the contrast between the latter and a third one2 and if we define two equal sensations by saying that they are sensations which a more or less confused process of reasoning interprets as such1 we shall in fact reach a law like that proposed by ,delbuf4 ,but it must not be forgotten that consciousness has here passed through the same intermediate steps as the psychophysicist1 and that its judgment is worth here just what psychophysics is worth2 it is a symbolical interpretation of quality as quantity1 a more or less rough estimate of the number of sensations which can come in between two given sensations4 ,the difference is thus not as great as is believed between the method of least noticeable differences and that of mean gradations1 between the psychophysics of ,fechner and that of ,delbuf4 ,the first led to a conventional measurement of sensation2 the second appeals to common sense in the particular cases where common sense adopts a similar convention4 ,in a word1 all psychophysics is condemned by its origin to revolve in a vicious circle1 for the theoretical postulate on which it rests condemns it to experimental verification1 and it cannot be experimentally verified unless its postulate is first granted4 ,the fact is that there is no point of contact between the unextended and the extended1 between quality and quantity4 ,we can interpret the one by the other1 set up the one as the equivalent of the other2 but sooner or later1 at the beginning or at the end1 we shall have to recognize the conventional character of this assimilation4 ,sidenote3 ,psychophysics merely pushes to its extreme consequences the fundamental but natural mistake of regarding sensations as magnitudes4 ,in truth1 psychophysics merely formulates with precision and pushes to its extreme consequences a conception familiar to common sense4 ,as speech dominates over thought1 as external objects1 which are common to us all1 are more important to us than the subjective states through which each of us passes1 we have everything to gain by objectifying these states1 by introducing into them1 to the largest possible extent1 the representation of their external cause4 ,and the more our knowledge increases1 the more we perceive the extensive behind the intensive1 quantity behind quality1 the more also we tend to thrust the former into the latter1 and to treat our sensations as magnitudes4 ,physics1 whose particular function it is to calculate the external cause of our internal states1 takes the least possible interest in these states themselves3 constantly and deliberately it confuses them with their cause4 ,it thus encourages and even exaggerates the mistake which common sense makes on the point4 ,the moment was inevitably bound to come at which science1 familiarized with this confusion between quality and quantity1 between sensation and stimulus1 should seek to measure the one as it measures the other3 such was the object of psychophysics4 ,in this bold attempt ,fechner was encouraged by his adversaries themselves1 by the philosophers who speak of intensive magnitudes while declaring that psychic states cannot be submitted to measurement4 ,for if we grant that one sensation can be stronger than another1 and that this inequality is inherent in the sensations themselves1 independently of all association of ideas1 of all more or less conscious consideration of number and space1 it is natural to ask by how much the first sensation exceeds the second1 and to set up a quantitative relation between their intensities4 ,nor is it any use to reply1 as the opponents of psychophysics sometimes do1 that all measurement implies superposition1 and that there is no occasion to seek for a numerical relation between intensities1 which are not superposable objects4 ,for it will then be necessary to explain why one sensation is said to be more intense than another1 and how the conceptions of greater and smaller can be applied to things which1 it has just been acknowledged1 do not admit among themselves of the relations of container to contained4 ,if1 in order to cut short any question of this kind1 we distinguish two kinds of quantity1 the one intensive1 which admits only of a more or less1 the other extensive1 which lends itself to measurement1 we are not far from siding with ,fechner and the psychophysicists4 ,for1 as soon as a thing is acknowledged to be capable of increase and decrease1 it seems natural to ask by how much it decreases or by how much it increases4 ,and1 because a measurement of this kind does not appear to be possible directly1 it does not follow that science cannot successfully accomplish it by some indirect process1 either by an integration of infinitely small elements1 as ,fechner proposes1 or by any other roundabout way4 ,either1 then1 sensation is pure quality1 or1 if it is a magnitude1 we ought to try to measure it4 ,sidenote3 ,thus intensity judged 7#a7 in representative states by an estimate of the magnitude of the cause 7#b7 in affective states by multiplicity of psychic phenomena involved4 ,to sum up what precedes1 we have found the notion of intensity to present itself under a double aspect1 according as we study the states of consciousness which represent an external cause1 or those which are self-sufficient4 ,in the former case the perception of intensity consists in a certain estimate of the magnitude of the cause means of a certain quality in the effect3 it is1 as the ,scottish philosophers would have said1 an acquired perception4 ,in the second case1 we give the name of intensity to the larger or smaller number of simple psychic phenomena which we conjecture to be involved in the fundamental state3 it is no longer an acquired perception1 but a confused perception4 ,in fact1 these two meanings of the word usually intermingle1 because the simpler phenomena involved in an emotion or an effort are generally representative1 and because the majority of representative states1 being at the same time affective1 themselves include a multiplicity of elementary psychic phenomena4 ,the idea of intensity is thus situated at the junction of two streams1 one of which brings us the idea of extensive magnitude from without1 while the other brings us from within1 in fact from the very depths of consciousness1 the image of an inner multiplicity4 ,now1 the point is to determine in what the latter image consists1 whether it is the same as that of number1 or whether it is quite different from it4 ,in the following chapter we shall no longer consider states of consciousness in isolation from one another1 but in their concrete multiplicity1 in so far as they unfold themselves in pure duration4 ,and1 in the same way as we have asked what would be the intensity of a representative sensation if we did not introduce into it the idea of its cause1 we shall now have to inquire what the multiplicity of our inner states becomes1 what form duration assumes1 when the space in which it unfolds is eliminated4 ,this second question is even more important than the first4 ,for1 if the confusion of quality with quantity were confined to each of the phenomena of consciousness taken separately1 it would give rise to obscurities1 as we have just seen1 rather than to problems4 ,but by invading the series of our psychic states1 by introducing space into our perception of duration1 it corrupts at its very source our feeling of outer and inner change1 of movement1 and of freedom4 ,hence the paradoxes of the ,eleatics1 hence the problem of free will4 ,we shall insist rather on the second point2 but instead of seeking to solve the question1 we shall show the mistake of those who ask it4 #a ,essays1 7,library ,edition1 #ahia71 ,vol4 ii1 p4 #cha4 #b ,the ,senses and the ,intellect1#dth ed41 7#ahid71 p4 #gi4 #c ,grundzge der ,physiologischen ,psychologie1#bnd ed4 7#ahhj71 ,vol4 i1 p4 #cge4 #d ,w4 ,james1 ,le sentiment de l'effort 7,critique philosophique1 #ahhj1 ,vol4 ii17 cf4 ,principles of ,psychology1 7#ahia71 ,vol4 ii1 chap1 xxvi4 #e ,functions of the ,brain1 #bnd ed4 7#ahhf71 p4 #chf4 #f ,handbuch der ,physiologischen ,optik1 #ast ed4 7#ahfg71 pp4 #fjj-fja4 #g ,le mcanisme de l'attention4 ,alcan1 #ahhh4 #h ,the ,expression of the ,emotions1 #ast ed41 7#ahgb71 p4 #gd4 #i ,what is an ,emotion8 ,mind1#ahhd1 p4 #ahi4 #aj ,principles of ,psychology1 #crd4 ed41 7#ahij71 ,vol4 i1 p4 #dhb4 #aa ,the ,expression of the ,emotions1 #ast ed41 p4 #gh4 #ab ,l'homme et l'intelligence1 p4 #cf4 #ac ,ibid4 p4 #cg4 #ad ,ibid4 p4 #dc4 #ae ,the ,expression of the ,emotions1 #ast ed41 pp4 #gb1 #fi1 #gj4 #af ,c4 ,fr1 ,sensation et ,mouvement1 ,paris1 #ahhg4 #ag ,grundzge der ,physiologischen ,psychologie1 #bnd ed41 7#ahhj71 ,vol4 ii1 p4 #dcg4 #ah ,on the ,temperature ,sense1 ,mind1 #ahhe4 #ai ,rood1 ,modern ,chromatics17#ahgi71 pp4 #aha-ahg4 #bj ,handbuch der ,physiologischen ,optik1 #ast ed4 7#ahfg71 pp4 #cah-cai4 #ba lments de psychophysique4 ,paris1 #ahhc4 #bb ,see the account given of these experiments in the ,revue philosophique1 #ahhg1 ,vol4 i1 p4 #ga1 and ,vol4 ii1 p4 #ahj4 #bc lments de psychophysique1 pp4 #fa1 #fi4 #bd ,in the particular case where we admit without restriction ,weber's ,law ,e_/,econst41 integration gives ,s,c log4 ,e_/,q4 ,q being a constant4 ,this is ,fechner's logarithmic law4 #be ,latterly it has been assumed that ,s is proportional to ,s4 #bf ,revue scientifique1 ,march #ac and ,april #bd1 #ahge4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,multiplicity ,,of ,,conscious ,,states#a ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,duration ,sidenote3 ,what is number8 ,number maybe defined in general as a collection of units1 or1 speaking more exactly1 as the synthesis of the one and the many4 ,every number is one1 since it is brought before the mind by a simple intuition and is given a name2 but the unity which attaches to it is that of a sum1 it covers a multiplicity of parts which can be considered separately4 ,without attempting for the present any thorough examination of these conceptions of unity and multiplicity1 let us inquire whether the idea of number does not imply the representation of something else as well4 ,sidenote3 ,the units which make up a number must be identical4 ,it is not enough to say that number is a collection of units2 we must add that these units are identical with one another1 or at least that they are assumed to be identical when they are counted4 ,no doubt we can count the sheep in a flock and say that there are fifty1 although they are all different from one another and are easily recognized by the shepherd3 but the reason is that we agree in that case to neglect their individual differences and to take into account only what they have in common4 ,on the other hand1 as soon as we fix our attention on the particular features of objects or individuals1 we can of course make an enumeration of them1 but not a total4 ,we place ourselves at these two very different points of view when we count the soldiers in a battalion and when we call the roll4 ,hence we may conclude that the idea of number implies the simple intuition of a multiplicity of parts or units1 which are absolutely alike4 ,sidenote3 ,but they must also be distinct4 ,and yet they must be somehow distinct from one another1 since otherwise they would merge into a single unit4 ,let us assume that all the sheep in the flock are identical2 they differ at least by the position which they occupy in space1 otherwise they would not form a flock4 ,but now let us even set aside the fifty sheep themselves and retain only the idea of them4 ,either we include them all in the same image1 and it follows as a necessary consequence that we place them side by side in an ideal space1 or else we repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one1 and in that case it does seem1 indeed1 that the series lies in duration rather than in space4 ,but we shall soon find out that it cannot be so4 ,for if we picture to ourselves each of the sheep in the flock in succession and separately1 we shall never have to do with more than a single sheep4 ,in order that the number should go on increasing in proportion as we advance1 we must retain the successive images and set them alongside each of the new units which we picture to ourselves3 now1 it is in space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration4 ,in fact1 it will be easily granted that counting material objects means thinking all these objects together1 thereby leaving them in space4 ,but does this intuition of space accompany every idea of number1 even of an abstract number8 ,sidenote3 ,we can not form an image or idea of number without the accompanying intuition of space4 ,any one can answer this question by reviewing the various forms which the idea of number has assumed for him since his childhood4 ,it will be seen that we began by imagining e4g4 a row of balls1 that these balls afterwards became points1 and1 finally1 this image itself disappeared1 leaving behind it1 as we say1 nothing but abstract number4 ,but at this very moment we ceased to have an image or even an idea of it2 we kept only the symbol which is necessary for reckoning and which is the conventional way of expressing number4 ,for we can confidently assert that #ab is half of #bd without thinking either the number #ab or the number #bd3 indeed1 as far as quick calculation is concerned1 we have everything to gain by not doing so4 ,but as soon as we wish to picture number to ourselves1 and not merely figures or words1 we are compelled to have recourse to an extended image4 ,what leads to misunderstanding on this point seems to be the habit we have fallen into of counting in time rather than in space4 ,in order to imagine the number #ej1 for example1 we repeat all the numbers starting from unity1 and when we have arrived at the fiftieth1 we believe we have built up the number in duration and in duration only4 ,and there is no doubt that in this way we have counted moments of duration rather than points in space2 but the question is whether we have not counted the moments of duration by means of points in space4 ,it is certainly possible to perceive in time1 and in time only1 a succession which is nothing but a succession1 but not an addition1 i4e4 a succession which culminates in a sum4 ,for though we reach a sum by taking into account a succession of different terms1 yet it is necessary that each of these terms should remain when we pass to the following1 and should wait1 so to speak1 to be added to the others3 how could it wait1 if it were nothing but an instant of duration8 ,and where could it wait if we did not localize it in space8 ,we involuntarily fix at a point in space each of the moments which we count1 and it is only on this condition that the abstract units come to form a sum4 ,no doubt it is possible1 as we shall show later1 to conceive the successive moments of time independently of space2 but when we add to the present moment those which have preceded it1 as is the case when we are adding up units1 we are not dealing with these moments themselves1 since they have vanished for ever1 but with the lasting traces which they seem to have left in space on their passage through it4 ,it is true that we generally dispense with this mental image1 and that1 after having used it for the first two or three numbers1 it is enough to know that it would serve just as well for the mental picturing of the others1 if we needed it4 ,but every clear idea of number implies a visual image in space2 and the direct study of the units which go to form a discrete multiplicity will lead us to the same conclusion on this point as the examination of number itself4 ,sidenote3 ,all unity is the unity of a simple act of the mind4 ,unity divisible only because regarded as extended in space4 ,every number is a collection of units1 as we have said1 and on the other hand every number is itself a unit1 in so far as it is a synthesis of the units which compose it4 ,but is the word unit taken in the same sense in both cases8 ,when we assert that number is a unit1 we understand by this that we master the whole of it by a simple and indivisible intuition of the mind2 this unity thus includes a multiplicity1 since it is the unity of a whole4 ,but when we speak of the units which go to form number1 we no longer think of these units as sums1 but as pure1 simple1 irreducible units1 intended to yield the natural series of numbers by an indefinitely continued process of accumulation4 ,it seems1 then1 that there are two kinds of units1 the one ultimate1 out of which a number is formed by a process of addition1 and the other provisional1 the number so formed1 which is multiple in itself1 and owes its unity to the simplicity of the act by which the mind perceives it4 ,and there is no doubt that1 when we picture the units which make up number1 we believe that we are thinking of indivisible components3 this belief has a great deal to do with the idea that it is possible to conceive number independently of space4 ,nevertheless1 by looking more closely into the matter1 we shall see that all unity is the unity of a simple act of the mind1 and that1 as this is an act of unification1 there must be some multiplicity for it to unify4 ,no doubt1 at the moment at which ,i think each of these units separately1 ,i look upon it as indivisible1 since ,i am determined to think of its unity alone4 ,but as soon as ,i put it aside in order to pass to the next1 ,i objectify it1 and by that very deed ,i make it a thing1 that is to say1 a multiplicity4 ,to convince oneself of this1 it is enough to notice that the units by means of which arithmetic forms numbers are provisional units1 which can be subdivided without limit1 and that each of them is the sum of fractional quantities as small and as numerous as we like to imagine4 ,how could we divide the unit1 if it were here that ultimate unity which characterizes a simple act of the mind8 ,how could we split it up into fractions whilst affirming its unity1 if we did not regard it implicitly as an extended object1 one in intuition but multiple in space8 ,you will never get out of an idea which you have formed anything which you have not put into it2 and if the unity by means of which you make up your number is the unity of an act and not of an object1 no effort of analysis will bring out of it anything but unity pure and simple4 ,no doubt1 when you equate the number #c to the sum of #a #a #a1 nothing prevents you from regarding the units which compose it as indivisible3 but the reason is that you do not choose to make use of the multiplicity which is enclosed within each of these units4 ,indeed1 it is probable that the number #c first assumes to our mind this simpler shape1 because we think rather of the way in which we have obtained it than of the use which we might make of it4 ,but we soon perceive that1 while all multiplication implies the possibility of treating any number whatever as a provisional unit which can be added to itself1 inversely the units in their turn are true numbers which are as big as we like1 but are regarded as provisionally indivisible for the purpose of compounding them with one another4 ,now1 the very admission that it is possible to divide the unit into as many parts as we like1 shows that we regard it as extended4 ,sidenote3 ,number in process of formation is discontinuous1 but1 when formed1 is invested with the continuity of space4 ,for we must understand what is meant by the of number4 ,it cannot be denied that the formation or construction of a number implies discontinuity4 ,in other words1 as we remarked above1 each of the units with which we form the number #c seems to be indivisible while we are dealing with it1 and we pass abruptly from one to the other4 ,again1 if we form the same number with halves1 with quarters1 with any units whatever1 these units1 in so far as they serve to form the said number1 will still constitute elements which are provisionally indivisible1 and it is always by jerks1 by sudden jumps1 so to speak1 that we advance from one to the other4 ,and the reason is that1 in order to get a number1 we are compelled to fix our attention successively on each of the units of which it is compounded4 ,the indivisibility of the act by which we conceive any one of them is then represented under the form of a mathematical point which is separated from the following point by an interval of space4 ,but1 while a series of mathematical points arranged in empty space expresses fairly well the process by which we form the idea of number1 these mathematical points have a tendency to develop into lines in proportion as our attention is diverted from them1 as if they were trying to reunite with one another4 ,and when we look at number in its finished state1 this union is an accomplished fact3 the points have become lines1 the divisions have been blotted out1 the whole displays all the characteristics of continuity4 ,this is why number1 although we have formed it according to a definite law1 can be split up on any system we please4 ,in a word1 we must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the unity which we set up as an object after having thought of it1 as also between number in process of formation and number once formed4 ,the unit is irreducible while we are thinking it and number is discontinuous while we are building it up3 but1 as soon as we consider number in its finished state1 we objectify it1 and it then appears to be divisible to an unlimited extent4 ,in fact1 we apply the term subjective to what seems to be completely and adequately known1 and the term objective to what is known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it4 ,thus1 a complex feeling will contain a fairly large number of simple elements2 but1 as long as these elements do not stand out with perfect clearness1 we cannot say that they were completely realized1 and1 as soon as consciousness has a distinct perception of them1 the psychic state which results from their synthesis will have changed for this very reason4 ,but there is no change in the general appearance of a body1 however it is analysed by thought1 because these different analyses1 and an infinity of others1 are already visible in the mental image which we form of the body1 though they are not realized3 this actual and not merely virtual perception of subdivisions in what is undivided is just what we call objectivity4 ,it then becomes easy to determine the exact part played by the subjective and the objective in the idea of number4 ,what properly belongs to the mind is the indivisible process by which it concentrates attention successively on the different parts of a given space2 but the parts which have thus been isolated remain in order to join with the others1 and1 once the addition is made1 they may be broken up in any way whatever4 ,they are therefore parts of space1 and space is1 accordingly1 the material with which the mind builds up number1 the medium in which the mind places it4 ,properly speaking1 it is arithmetic which teaches us to split up without limit the units of which number consists4 ,common sense is very much inclined to build up number with indivisibles4 ,sidenote3 ,it follows that number is actually thought of as a juxtaposition in space4 ,and this is easily understood1 since the provisional simplicity of the component units is just what they owe to the mind1 and the latter pays more attention to its own acts than to the material on which it works4 ,science confines itself1 here1 to drawing our attention to this material3 if we did not already localize number in space1 science would certainly not succeed in making us transfer it thither4 ,from the beginning1 therefore1 we must have thought of number as of a juxtaposition in space4 ,this is the conclusion which we reached at first1 basing ourselves on the fact that all addition implies a multiplicity of parts simultaneously perceived4 ,sidenote3 ,two kinds of multiplicity3 7#a7 material objects1 counted in space2 7#b7 conscious states1 not countable unless symbolically represented in space4 ,now1 if this conception of number is granted1 it will be seen that everything is not counted in the same way1 and that there are two very different kinds of multiplicity4 ,when we speak of material objects1 we refer to the possibility of seeing and touching them2 we localize them in space4 ,in that case1 no effort of the inventive faculty or of symbolical representation is necessary in order to count them2 we have only to think them1 at first separately1 and then simultaneously1 within the very medium in which they come under our observation4 ,the case is no longer the same when we consider purely affective psychic states1 or even mental images other than those built up by means of sight and touch4 ,here1 the terms being no longer given in space1 it seems1 a priori1 that we can hardly count them except by some process of symbolical representation4 ,in fact1 we are well aware of a representation of this kind when we are dealing with sensations the cause of which is obviously situated in space4 ,thus1 when we hear a noise of steps in the street1 we have a confused vision of somebody walking along3 each of the successive sounds is then localized at a point in space where the passer-by might tread3 we count our sensations in the very space in which their tangible causes are ranged4 ,perhaps some people count the successive strokes of a distant bell in a similar way1 their imagination pictures the bell coming and going2 this spatial sort of image is sufficient for the first two units1 and the others follow naturally4 ,but most people's minds do not proceed in this way4 ,they range the successive sounds in an ideal space and then fancy that they are counting them in pure duration4 ,yet we must be clear on this point4 ,the sounds of the bell certainly reach me one after the other2 but one of two alternatives must be true4 ,either ,i retain each of these successive sensations in order to combine it with the others and form a group which reminds me of an air or rhythm which ,i know3 in that case ,i do not count the sounds1 ,i limit myself to gathering1 so to speak1 the qualitative impression produced by the whole series4 ,or else ,i intend explicitly to count them1 and then ,i shall have to separate them1 and this separation must take place within some homogeneous medium in which the sounds1 stripped of their qualities1 and in a manner emptied1 leave traces of their presence which are absolutely alike4 ,the question now is1 whether this medium is time or space4 ,but a moment of time1 we repeat1 cannot persist in order to be added to others4 ,if the sounds are separated1 they must leave empty intervals bet ween them4 ,if we count them1 the intervals must remain though the sounds disappear3 how could these intervals remain1 if they were pure duration and not space8 ,it is in space1 therefore1 that the operation takes place4 ,it becomes1 indeed1 more and more difficult as we penetrate further into the depths of consciousness4 ,here we find ourselves confronted by a confused multiplicity of sensations and feelings which analysis alone can distinguish4 ,their number is identical with the number of the moments which we take up when we count them2 but these moments1 as they can be added to one another1 are again points in space4 ,our final conclusion1 therefore1 is that there are two kinds of multiplicity3 that of material objects1 to which the conception of number is immediately applicable2 and the multiplicity of states of consciousness1 which cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolical representation1 in which a necessary element is space4 ,sidenote3 ,the impenetrability of matter is not a physical but a logical necessity4 ,as a matter of fact1 each of us makes a distinction between these two kinds of multiplicity whenever he speaks of the impenetrability of matter4 ,we sometimes set up impenetrability as a fundamental property of bodies1 known in the same way and put on the same level as e4g4 weight or resistance4 ,but a purely negative property of this kind cannot be revealed by our senses2 indeed1 certain experiments in mixing and combining things might lead us to call it in question if our minds were not already made up on the point4 ,try to picture one body penetrating another3 you will at once assume that there are empty spaces in the one which will be occupied by the particles of the other2 these particles in their turn cannot penetrate one another unless one of them divides in order to fill up the interstices of the other2 and our thought will prolong this operation indefinitely in preference to picturing two bodies in the same place4 ,now1 if impenetrability were really a quality of matter which was known by the senses1 it is not at all clear why we should experience more difficulty in conceiving two bodies merging into one another than a surface devoid of resistance or a weightless fluid4 ,in reality1 it is not a physical but a logical necessity which attaches to the proposition3 ,two bodies cannot occupy the same place at the same time ,the contrary assertion involves an absurdity which no conceivable experience could succeed in dispelling4 ,in a word1 it implies a contradiction4 ,but does not this amount to recognizing that the very idea of the number #b1 or1 more generally1 of any number whatever1 involves the idea of juxtaposition in space8 ,if impenetrability is generally regarded as a quality of matter1 the reason is that the idea of number is thought to be independent of the idea of space4 ,we thus believe that we are adding something to the idea of two or more objects by saying that they cannot occupy the same place3 as if the idea of the number #b1 even the abstract number1 were not already1 as we have shown1 that of two different positions in space6 ,hence to assert the impenetrability of matter is simply to recognize the interconnexion between the notions of number and space1 it is to state a property of number rather than of matter4--,yet1 it will be said1 do we not count feelings1 sensations1 ideas1 all of which permeate one another1 and each of which1 for its part1 takes up the whole of the soul8--,yes1 undoubtedly2 but1 just because they permeate one another1 we cannot count them unless we represent them by homogeneous units which occupy separate positions in space and consequently no longer permeate one another4 ,impenetrability thus makes its appearance at the same time as number2 and when we attribute this quality to matter in order to distinguish it from everything which is not matter1 we simply state under another form the distinction established above between extended objects1 to which the conception of number is immediately applicable1 and states of consciousness1 which have first of all to be represented symbolically in space4 ,sidenote3 ,homogeneous time as the medium in which conscious states form discrete series4 ,this time is nothing but space1 and pure duration is something different4 ,it is advisable to dwell on the last point4 ,if1 in order to count states of consciousness1 we have to represent them symbolically in space1 is it not likely that this symbolical representation will alter the normal conditions of inner perception8 ,let us recall what we said a short time ago about the intensity of certain psychic states4 ,representative sensation1 looked at in itself1 is pure quality2 but1 seen through the medium of extensity1 this quality becomes in a certain sense quantity1 and is called intensity4 ,in the same way1 our projection of our psychic states into space in order to form a discrete multiplicity is likely to influence these states themselves and to give them in reflective consciousness a new form1 which immediate perception did not attribute to them4 ,now1 let us notice that when we speak of time1 we generally think of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space1 so as to form a discrete multiplicity4 ,would not time1 thus understood1 be to the multiplicity of our psychic states what intensity is to certain of them1--a sign1 a symbol1 absolutely distinct from true duration8 ,let us ask consciousness to isolate itself from the external world1 and1 by a vigorous effort of abstraction1 to become itself again4 ,we shall then put this question to it3 does the multiplicity of our conscious states bear the slightest resemblance to the multiplicity of the units of a number8 ,has true duration anything to do with space8 ,certainly1 our analysis of the idea of number could not but make us doubt this analogy1 to say no more4 ,for if time1 as the reflective consciousness represents it1 is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted1 and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted1 it is to be presumed that time1 understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count1 is nothing but space4 ,that which goes to confirm this opinion is that we are compelled to borrow from space the images by which we describe what the reflective consciousness feels about time and even about succession2 it follows that pure duration must be something different4 ,such are the questions which we have been led to ask by the very analysis of the notion of discrete multiplicity4 ,but we cannot throw any light upon them except by a direct study of the ideas of space and time in their mutual relations4 ,sidenote3 ,does space exist independently of its contents1 as ,kant held8 ,we shall not lay too much stress on the question of the absolute reality of space3 perhaps we might as well ask whether space is or is not in space4 ,in short1 our senses perceive the qualities of bodies and space along with them3 the great difficulty seems to have been to discover whether extensity is an aspect of these physical qualities--a quality of quality--or whether these qualities are essentially unextended1 space coming in as a later addition1 but being self-sufficient and existing without them4 ,on the first hypothesis1 space would be reduced to an abstraction1 or1 speaking more correctly1 an extract2 it would express the common element possessed by certain sensations called representative4 ,in the second case1 space would be a reality as solid as the sensations themselves1 although of a different order4 ,we owe the exact formulation of this latter conception to ,kant3 the theory which he works out in the ,transcendental ,aesthetic consists in endowing space with an existence independent of its content1 in laying down as de jure separable what each of us separates de facto1 and in refusing to regard extensity as an abstraction like the others4 ,in this respect the ,kantian conception of space differs less than is usually imagined from the popular belief4 ,far from shaking our faith in the reality of space1 ,kant has shown what it actually means and has even justified it4 ,sidenote3 ,the empiricists really agree with ,kant for extensity can not result from synthesis of unextended sensations without an act of the mind4 ,moreover1 the solution given by ,kant does not seem to have been seriously disputed since his time3 indeed1 it has forced itself1 sometimes without their knowledge1 on the majority of those who have approached the problem anew1 whether nativists or empiricists4 ,psychologists agree in assigning a ,kantian origin to the nativistic explanation of ,johann ,mller2 but ,lotze's hypothesis of local signs1 ,bain's theory1 and the more comprehensive explanation suggested by ,wundt1 may seem at first quite independent of the ,transcendental ,aesthetic4 ,the authors of these theories seem indeed to have put aside the problem of the nature of space1 in order to investigate simply by what process our sensations come to be situated in space and to be set1 so to speak1 alongside one another3 but this very question shows that they regard sensations as inextensive and make a radical distinction1 just as ,kant did1 between the matter of representation and its form4 ,the conclusion to be drawn from the theories of ,lotze and ,bain1 and from ,wundt's attempt to reconcile them1 is that the sensations by means of which we come to form the notion of space are themselves unextended and simply qualitative3 extensity is supposed to result from their synthesis1 as water from the combination of two gases4 ,the empirical or genetic explanations have thus taken up the problem of space at the very point where ,kant left it3 ,kant separated space from its contents3 the empiricists ask how these contents1 which are taken out of space by our thought1 manage to get back again4 ,it is true that they have apparently disregarded the activity of the mind1 and that they are obviously inclined to regard the extensive form under which we represent things as produced by a kind of alliance of the sensations with one another3 space1 without being extracted from the sensations1 is supposed to result from their co-existence4 ,but how can we explain such an origination without the active intervention of the mind8 ,the extensive differs by hypothesis from the inextensive3 and even if we assume that extension is nothing but a relation between inextensive terms1 this relation must still be established by a mind capable of thus associating several terms4 ,it is no use quoting the example of chemical combinations1 in which the whole seems to assume1 of its own accord1 a form and qualities which did not belong to any of the elementary atoms4 ,this form and these qualities owe their origin just to the fact that we gather up the multiplicity of atoms in a single perception3 get rid of the mind which carries out this synthesis and you will at once do away with the qualities1 that is to say1 the aspect under which the synthesis of elementary parts is presented to our consciousness4 ,thus inextensive sensations will remain what they are1 viz41 inextensive sensations1 if nothing be added to them4 ,for their co-existence to give rise to space1 there must be an act of the mind which takes them in all at the same time and sets them in juxtaposition3 this unique act is very like what ,kant calls an a priori form of sensibility4 ,sidenote3 ,this act consists in the intuition of an empty homogeneous medium3 perhaps peculiar to man and not shared by animals4 ,if we now seek to characterize this act1 we see that it consists essentially in the intuition1 or rather the conception1 of an empty homogeneous medium4 ,for it is scarcely possible to give any other definition of space3 space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another2 it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation1 and consequently it is a reality with no quality4 ,someone may say1 with the believers in the theory of local signs1 that simultaneous sensations are never identical1 and that1 in consequence of the diversity of the organic elements which they affect1 there are no two points of a homogeneous surface which make the same impression on the sight or the touch4 ,we are quite ready to grant it1 for if these two points affected us in the same way1 there would be no reason for placing one of them on the right rather than on the left4 ,but1 just because we afterwards interpret this difference of quality in the sense of a difference of situation1 it follows that we must have a clear idea of a homogeneous medium1 i4e4 of a simultaneity of terms which1 although identical in quality1 are yet distinct from one another4 ,the more you insist on the difference between the impressions made on our retina by two points of a homogeneous surface1 the more do you thereby make room for the activity of the mind1 which perceives under the form of extensive homogeneity what is given it as qualitative heterogeneity4 ,no doubt1 though the representation of a homogeneous space grows out of an effort of the mind1 there must be within the qualities themselves which differentiate two sensations some reason why they occupy this or that definite position in space4 ,we must thus distinguish between the perception of extensity and the conception of space3 they are no doubt implied in one another1 but1 the higher we rise in the scale of intelligent beings1 the more clearly do we meet with the independent idea of a homogeneous space4 ,it is therefore doubtful whether animals perceive the external world quite as we do1 and especially whether they represent externality in the same way as ourselves4 ,naturalists have pointed out1 as a remarkable fact1 the surprising ease with which many vertebrates1 and even some insects1 manage to find their way through space4 ,animals have been seen to return almost in a straight line to their old home1 pursuing a path which was hitherto unknown to them over a distance which may amount to several hundreds of miles4 ,attempts have been made to explain this feeling of direction by sight or smell1 and1 more recently1 by the perception of magnetic currents which would enable the animal to take its bearings like a living compass4 ,this amounts to saying that space is not so homogeneous for the animal as for us1 and that determinations of space1 or directions1 do not assume for it a purely geometrical form4 ,each of these directions might appear to it with its own shade1 its peculiar quality4 ,we shall understand how a perception of this kind is possible if we remember that we ourselves distinguish our right from our left by a natural feeling1 and that these two parts of our own extensity do then appear to us as if they bore a different quality2 in fact1 this is the very reason why we cannot give a proper definition of right and left4 ,in truth1 qualitative differences exist everywhere in nature1 and ,i do not see why two concrete directions should not be as marked in immediate perception as two colours4 ,but the conception of an empty homogeneous medium is something far more extraordinary1 being a kind of reaction against that heterogeneity which is the very ground of our experience4 ,therefore1 instead of saying that animals have a special sense of direction1 we may as well say that men have a special faculty of perceiving or conceiving a space without quality4 ,this faculty is not the faculty of abstraction3 indeed1 if we notice that abstraction assumes clean-cut distinctions and a kind of externality of the concepts or their symbols with regard to one another1 we shall find that the faculty of abstraction already implies the intuition of a homogeneous medium4 ,what we must say is that we have to do with two different kinds of reality1 the one heterogeneous1 that of sensible qualities1 the other homogeneous1 namely space4 ,this latter1 clearly conceived by the human intellect1 enables us to use clean-cut distinctions1 to count1 to abstract1 and perhaps also to speak4 ,sidenote3 ,time1 in so far as it is a homogenious medium1 and not concrete duration1 is reducible to space4 ,now1 if space is to be defined as the homogeneous1 it seems that inversely every homogeneous and unbounded medium will be space4 ,for1 homogeneity here consisting in the absence of every quality1 it is hard to see how two forms of the homogeneous could be distinguished from one another4 ,nevertheless it is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium1 different from space but homogeneous like the latter3 the homogeneous is thus supposed to take two forms1 according as its contents co-exist or follow one another4 ,it is true that1 when we make time a homogeneous medium in which conscious states unfold themselves1 we take it to be given all at once1 which amounts to saying that we abstract it from duration4 ,this simple consideration ought to warn us that we are thus unwittingly falling back upon space1 and really giving up time4 ,moreover1 we can understand that material objects1 being exterior to one another and to ourselves1 derive both exteriorities from the homogeneity of a medium which inserts intervals between them and sets off their outlines3 but states of consciousness1 even when successive1 permeate one another1 and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be reflected4 ,we may therefore surmise that time1 conceived under the form of a homogeneous medium1 is some spurious concept1 due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure consciousness4 ,at any rate we cannot finally admit two forms of the homogeneous1 time and space1 without first seeking whether one of them cannot be reduced to the other4 ,now1 externality is the distinguishing mark of things which occupy space1 while states of consciousness are not essentially external to one another1 and become so only by being spread out in time1 regarded as a homogeneous medium4 ,if1 then1 one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous1 namely time and space1 is derived from the other1 we can surmise a priori that the idea of space is the fundamental datum4 ,but1 misled by the apparent simplicity of the idea of time1 the philosophers who have tried to reduce one of these ideas to the other have thought that they could make extensity out of duration4 ,while showing how they have been misled1 we shall see that time1 conceived under the form of an unbounded and homogeneous medium1 is nothing but the ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness4 ,sidenote3 ,mistake of the attempt to derive relations of extensity from those of succession4 ,the conception of pure duration4 ,the ,english school tries1 in fact1 to reduce relations of extensity to more or less complex relations of succession in time4 ,when1 with our eyes shut1 we run our hands along a surface1 the rubbing of our fingers against the surface1 and especially the varied play of our joints1 provide a series of sensations1 which differ only by their qualities and which exhibit a certain order in time4 ,moreover1 experience teaches us that this series can be reversed1 that we can1 by an effort of a different kind 7or1 as we shall call it later1 in an opposite direction71 obtain the same sensations over again in an inverse order3 relations of position in space might then be defined as reversible relations of succession in time4 ,but such a definition involves a vicious circle1 or at least a very superficial idea of time4 ,there are1 indeed1 as we shall show a little later1 two possible conceptions of time1 the one free from all alloy1 the other surreptitiously bringing in the idea of space4 ,pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live1 when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states4 ,for this purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea2 for then1 on the contrary1 it would no longer endure4 ,nor need it forget its former states3 it is enough that1 in recalling these states1 it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another1 but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole1 as happens when we recall the notes of a tune1 melting1 so to speak1 into one another4 ,might it not be said that1 even if these notes succeed one another1 yet we perceive them in one another1 and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts1 although distinct1 permeate one another just because they are so closely connected8 ,the proof is that1 if we interrupt the rhythm by dwelling longer than is right on one note of the tune1 it is not its exaggerated length1 as length1 which will warn us of our mistake1 but the qualitative change thereby caused in the whole of the musical phrase4 ,we can thus conceive of succession without distinction1 and think of it as a mutual penetration1 an interconnexion and organization of elements1 each one of which represents the whole1 and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought4 ,such is the account of duration which would be given by a being who was ever the same and ever changing1 and who had no idea of space4 ,but1 familiar with the latter idea and indeed beset by it1 we introduce it unwittingly into our feeling of pure succession2 we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously1 no longer in one another1 but alongside one another2 in a word1 we project time into space1 we express duration in terms of extensity1 and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain1 the parts of which touch without penetrating one another4 ,note that the mental image thus shaped implies the perception1 no longer successive1 but simultaneous1 of a before and after1 and that it would be a contradiction to suppose a succession which was only a succession1 and which nevertheless was contained in one and the same instant4 ,now1 when we speak of an order of succession in duration1 and of the reversibility of this order1 is the succession we are dealing with pure succession1 such as we have just defined it1 without any admixture of extensity1 or is it succession developing in space1 in such a way that we can take in at once a number of elements which are both distinct and set side by side8 ,there is no doubt about the answer3 we could not introduce order among terms without first distinguishing them and then comparing the places which they occupy2 hence we must perceive them as multiple1 simultaneous and distinct2 in a word1 we set them side by side1 and if we introduce an order in what is successive1 the reason is that succession is converted into simultaneity and is projected into space4 ,in short1 when the movement of my finger along a surface or a line provides me with a series of sensations of different qualities1 one of two things happens3 either ,i picture these sensations to myself as in duration only1 and in that case they succeed one another in such a way that ,i cannot at a given moment perceive a number of them as simultaneous and yet distinct2 or else ,i make out an order of succession1 but in that case ,i display the faculty not only of perceiving a succession of elements1 but also of setting them out in line after having distinguished them3 in a word1 ,i already possess the idea of space4 ,hence the idea of a reversible series in duration1 or even simply of a certain order of succession in time1 itself implies the representation of space1 and cannot be used to define it4 ,sidenote3 ,succession cannot be symbolized as a line without introducing the idea of space of three dimensions4 ,to give this argument a stricter form1 let us imagine a straight line of unlimited length1 and on this line a material point ,a1 which moves4 ,if this point were conscious of itself1 it would feel itself change1 since it moves3 it would perceive a succession2 but would this succession assume for it the form of a line8 ,no doubt it would1 if it could rise1 so to speak1 above the line which it traverses1 and perceive simultaneously several points of it in juxtaposition3 but by doing so it would form the idea of space1 and it is in space and not in pure duration that it would see displayed the changes which it undergoes4 ,we here put our finger on the mistake of those who regard pure duration as something similar to space1 but of a simpler nature4 ,they are fond of setting psychic states side by side1 of forming a chain or a line of them1 and do not imagine that they are introducing into this operation the idea of space properly so called1 the idea of space in its totality1 because space is a medium of three dimensions4 ,but how can they fail to notice that1 in order to perceive a line as a line1 it is necessary to take up a position outside it1 to take account of the void which surrounds it1 and consequently to think a space of three dimensions8 ,if our conscious point ,a does not yet possess the idea of space--and this is the hypothesis which we have agreed to adopt--the succession of states through which it passes cannot assume for it the form of a line2 but its sensations will add themselves dynamically to one another and will organize themselves1 like the successive notes of a tune by which we allow ourselves to be lulled and soothed4 ,in a word1 pure duration might well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes1 which melt into and permeate one another1 without precise outlines1 without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another1 without any affiliation with number3 it would be pure heterogeneity4 ,but for the present we shall not insist upon this point2 it is enough for us to have shown that1 from the moment when you attribute the least homogeneity to duration1 you surreptitiously introduce space4 ,sidenote3 ,pure duration is wholly qualitative4 ,it cannot be measured unless symbolically represented in space4 ,it is true that we count successive moments of duration1 and that1 because of its relations with number1 time at first seems to us to be a measurable magnitude1 just like space4 ,but there is here an important distinction to be made4 ,i say1 e4g41 that a minute has just elapsed1 and ,i mean by this that a pendulum1 beating the seconds1 has completed sixty oscillations4 ,if ,i picture these sixty oscillations to myself all at once by a single mental perception1 ,i exclude by hypothesis the idea of a succession4 ,i do not think of sixty strokes which succeed one another1 but of sixty points on a fixed line1 each one of which symbolizes1 so to speak1 an oscillation of the pendulum4 ,if1 on the other hand1 ,i wish to picture these sixty oscillations in succession1 but without altering the way they are produced in space1 ,i shall be compelled to think of each oscillation to the exclusion of the recollection of the preceding one1 for space has preserved no trace of it2 but by doing so ,i shall condemn myself to remain for ever in the present2 ,i shall give up the attempt to think a succession or a duration4 ,now if1 finally1 ,i retain the recollection of the preceding oscillation together with the image of the present oscillation1 one of two things will happen4 ,either ,i shall set the two images side by side1 and we then fall back on our first hypothesis1 or ,i shall perceive one in the other1 each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune1 so as to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number4 ,i shall thus get the image of pure duration2 but ,i shall have entirely got rid of the idea of a homogeneous medium or a measurable quantity4 ,by carefully examining our consciousness we shall recognize that it proceeds in this way whenever it refrains from representing duration symbolically4 ,when the regular oscillations of the pendulum make us sleepy1 is it the last sound heard1 the last movement perceived1 which produces this effect8 ,no1 undoubtedly not1 for why then should not the first have done the same8 ,is it the recollection of the preceding sounds or movements1 set in juxtaposition to the last one8 ,but this same recollection1 if it is later on set in juxtaposition to a single sound or movement1 will remain without effect4 ,hence we must admit that the sounds combined with one another and acted1 not by their quantity as quantity1 but by the quality which their quantity exhibited1 i4e4 by the rhythmic organization of the whole4 ,could the effect of a slight but continuous stimulation be understood in any other way8 ,if the sensation remained always the same1 it would continue to be indefinitely slight and indefinitely bearable4 ,but the fact is that each increase of stimulation is taken up into the preceding stimulations1 and that the whole produces on us the effect of a musical phrase which is constantly on the point of ending and constantly altered in its totality by the addition of some new note4 ,if we assert that it is always the same sensation1 the reason is that we are thinking1 not of the sensation itself1 but of its objective cause situated in space4 ,we then set it out in space in its turn1 and in place of an organism which develops1 in place of changes which permeate one another1 we perceive one and the same sensation stretching itself out lengthwise1 so to speak1 and setting itself in juxtaposition to itself without limit4 ,pure duration1 that which consciousness perceives1 must thus be reckoned among the so-called intensive magnitudes1 if intensities can be called magnitudes3 strictly speaking1 however1 it is not a quantity1 and as soon as we try to measure it1 we unwittingly replace it by space4 ,sidenote3 ,time1 as dealt with by the astronomer and the physicist1 does indeed seem to be measurable and therefore homogeneous4 ,but we find it extraordinarily difficult to think of duration in its original purity2 this is due1 no doubt1 to the fact that we do not endure alone1 external objects1 it seems1 endure as we do1 and time1 regarded from this point of view1 has every appearance of a homogeneous medium4 ,not only do the moments of this duration seem to be external to one another1 like bodies in space1 but the movement perceived by our senses is the1 so to speak1 palpable sign of a homogeneous and measurable duration4 ,nay more1 time enters into the formulae of mechanics1 into the calculations of the astronomer1 and even of the physicist1 under the form of a quantity4 ,we measure the velocity of a movement1 implying that time itself is a magnitude4 ,indeed1 the analysis which we have just attempted requires to be completed1 for if duration properly so-called cannot be measured1 what is it that is measured by the oscillations of the pendulum8 ,granted that inner duration1 perceived by consciousness1 is nothing else but the melting of states of consciousness into one another1 and the gradual growth of the ego1 it will be said1 notwithstanding1 that the time which the astronomer introduces into his formulae1 the time which our clocks divide into equal portions1 this time1 at least1 is something different3 it must be a measurable and therefore homogeneous magnitude4--,it is nothing of the sort1 however1 and a close examination will dispel this last illusion4 ,sidenote3 ,but what we call measuring time is nothing but counting simultaneities4 ,the clock taken as an illustration4 ,when ,i follow with my eyes on the dial of a clock the movement of the hand which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum1 ,i do not measure duration1 as seems to be thought2 ,i merely count simultaneities1 which is very different4 ,outside of me1 in space1 there is never more than a single position of the hand and the pendulum1 for nothing is left of the past positions4 ,within myself a process of organization or interpenetration of conscious states is going on1 which constitutes true duration4 ,it is because ,i endure in this way that ,i picture to myself what ,i call the past oscillations of the pendulum at the same time as ,i perceive the present oscillation4 ,now1 let us withdraw for a moment the ego which thinks these so-called successive oscillations3 there will never be more than a single oscillation1 and indeed only a single position1 of the pendulum1 and hence no duration4 ,withdraw1 on the other hand1 the pendulum and its oscillations2 there will no longer be anything but the heterogeneous duration of the ego1 without moments external to one another1 without relation to number4 ,thus1 within our ego1 there is succession without mutual externality2 outside the ego1 in pure space1 mutual externality without succession3 mutual externality1 since the present oscillation is radically distinct from the previous oscillation1 which no longer exists2 but no succession1 since succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two oscillations or their symbols side by side in an auxiliary space4 ,now1 between this succession without externality and this externality without succession1 a kind of exchange takes place1 very similar to what physicists call the phenomenon of endosmosis4 ,as the successive phases of our conscious life1 although interpenetrating1 correspond individually to an oscillation of the pendulum which occurs at the same time1 and as1 moreover1 these oscillations are sharply distinguished from one another1 we get into the habit of setting up the same distinction between the successive moments of our conscious life3 the oscillations of the pendulum break it up1 so to speak1 into parts external to one another3 hence the mistaken idea of a homogeneous inner duration1 similar to space1 the moments of which are identical and follow1 without penetrating1 one another4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the oscillations of the pendulum1 which are distinct only because one has disappeared when the other appears on the scene1 profit1 as it were1 from the influence which they have thus exercised over our conscious life4 ,owing to the fact that our consciousness has organized them as a whole in memory1 they are first preserved and afterwards disposed in a series3 in a word1 we create for them a fourth dimension of space1 which we call homogeneous time1 and which enables the movement of the pendulum1 although taking place at one spot1 to be continually set in juxtaposition to itself4 ,now1 if we try to determine the exact part played by the real and the imaginary in this very complex process1 this is what we find4 ,there is a real space1 without duration1 in which phenomena appear and disappear simultaneously with our states of consciousness4 ,there is a real duration1 the heterogeneous moments of which permeate one another2 each moment1 however1 can be brought into relation with a state of the external world which is contemporaneous with it1 and can be separated from the other moments in consequence of this very process4 ,the comparison of these two realities gives rise to a symbolical representation of duration1 derived from space4 ,duration thus assumes the illusory form of a homogeneous medium1 and the connecting link between these two terms1 space and duration1 is simultaneity1 which might be defined as the intersection of time and space4 ,sidenote3 ,two elements in motion3 7#a7 the space traversed1 which is homogeneous and divisible2 7#b7 the act of traversing1 indivisible and real only for consciousness4 ,if we analyse in the same way the concept of motion1 the living symbol of this seemingly homogeneous duration1 we shall be led to make a distinction of the same kind4 ,we generally say that a movement takes place in space1 and when we assert that motion is homogeneous and divisible1 it is of the space traversed that we are thinking1 as if it were interchangeable with the motion itself4 ,now1 if we reflect further1 we shall see that the successive positions of the moving body really do occupy space1 but that the process by which it passes from one position to the other1 a process which occupies duration and which has no reality except for a conscious spectator1 eludes space4 ,we have to do here not with an object but with a progress3 motion1 in so far as it is a passage from one point to another1 is a mental synthesis1 a psychic and therefore unextended process4 ,space contains only parts of space1 and at whatever point of space we consider the moving body1 we shall get only a position4 ,if consciousness is aware of anything more than positions1 the reason is that it keeps the successive positions in mind and synthesizes them4 ,but how does it carry out a synthesis of this kind8 ,it cannot be by a fresh setting out of these same positions in a homogeneous medium1 for a fresh synthesis would be necessary to connect the positions with one another1 and so on indefinitely4 ,we are thus compelled to admit that we have here to do with a synthesis which is1 so to speak1 qualitative1 a gradual organization of our successive sensations1 a unity resembling that of a phrase in a melody4 ,this is just the idea of motion which we form when we think of it by itself1 when1 so to speak1 from motion we extract mobility4 ,think of what you experience on suddenly perceiving a shooting star3 in this extremely rapid motion there is a natural and instinctive separation between the space traversed1 which appears to you under the form of a line of fire1 and the absolutely indivisible sensation of motion or mobility4 ,a rapid gesture1 made with one's eyes shut1 will assume for consciousness the form of a purely qualitative sensation as long as there is no thought of the space traversed4 ,in a word1 there are two elements to be distinguished in motion1 the space traversed and the act by which we traverse it1 the successive positions and the synthesis of these positions4 ,the first of these elements is a homogeneous quantity3 the second has no reality except in a consciousness3 it is a quality or an intensity1 whichever you prefer4 ,but here again we meet with a case of endosmosis1 an intermingling of the purely intensive sensation of mobility with the extensive representation of the space traversed4 ,on the one hand we attribute to the motion the divisibility of the space which it traverses1 forgetting that it is quite possible to divide an object1 but not an act3 and on the other hand we accustom ourselves to projecting this act itself into space1 to applying it to the whole of the line which the moving body traverses1 in a word1 to solidifying it3 as if this localizing of a progress in space did not amount to asserting that1 even outside consciousness1 the past co-exists along with the present6 ,sidenote3 ,the common confusion between motion and the space traversed gives rise to the paradoxes of the ,eleatics4 ,it is to this confusion between motion and the space traversed that the paradoxes of the ,eleatics are due2 for the interval which separates two points is infinitely divisible1 and if motion consisted of parts like those of the interval itself1 the interval would never be crossed4 ,but the truth is that each of ,achilles' steps is a simple indivisible act1 and that1 after a given number of these acts1 ,achilles will have passed the tortoise4 ,the mistake of the ,eleatics arises from their identification of this series of acts1 each of which is of a definite kind and indivisible1 with the homogeneous space which underlies them4 ,as this space can be divided and put together again according to any law whatever1 they think they are justified in reconstructing ,achilles' whole movement1 not with ,achilles' kind of step1 but with the tortoise's kind3 in place of ,achilles pursuing the tortoise they really put two tortoises1 regulated by each other1 two tortoises which agree to make the same kind of steps or simultaneous acts1 so as never to catch one another4 ,why does ,achilles outstrip the tortoise8 ,because each of ,achilles' steps and each of the tortoise's steps are indivisible acts in so far as they are movements1 and are different magnitudes in so far as they are space3 so that addition will soon give a greater length for the space traversed by ,achilles than is obtained by adding together the space traversed by the tortoise and the handicap with which it started4 ,this is what ,zeno leaves out of account when he reconstructs the movement of ,achilles according to the same law as the movement of the tortoise1 forgetting that space alone can be divided and put together again in any way we like1 and thus confusing space with motion4 ,hence we do not think it necessary to admit1 even after the acute and profound analysis of a contemporary thinker1#b that the meeting of the two moving bodies implies a discrepancy between real and imaginary motion1 between space in itself and indefinitely divisible space1 between concrete time and abstract time4 ,why resort to a metaphysical hypothesis1 however ingenious1 about the nature of space1 time1 and motion1 when immediate intuition shows us motion within duration1 and duration outside space8 ,there is no need to assume a limit to the divisibility of concrete space2 we can admit that it is infinitely divisible1 provided that we make a distinction between the simultaneous positions of the two moving bodies1 which are in fact in space1 and their movements1 which cannot occupy space1 being duration rather than extent1 quality and not quantity4 ,to measure the velocity of a movement1 as we shall see1 is simply to ascertain a simultaneity2 to introduce this velocity into calculations is simply to use a convenient means of anticipating a simultaneity4 ,thus mathematics confines itself to its own province as long as it is occupied with determining the simultaneous positions of ,achilles and the tortoise at a given moment1 or when it admits priori that the two moving bodies meet at a point ,x--a meeting which is itself a simultaneity4 ,but it goes beyond its province when it claims to reconstruct what takes place in the interval between two simultaneities2 or rather it is inevitably led1 even then1 to consider simultaneities once more1 fresh simultaneities1 the indefinitely increasing number of which ought to be a warning that we cannot make movement out of immobilities1 nor time out of space4 ,in short1 just as nothing will be found homogeneous in duration except a symbolical medium with no duration at all1 namely space1 in which simultaneities are set out in line1 in the same way no homogeneous element will be found in motion except that which least belongs to it1 the traversed space1 which is motionless4 ,sidenote3 ,science has to eliminate duration from time and mobility from motion before it can deal with them4 ,now1 just for this reason1 science cannot deal with time and motion except on condition of first eliminating the essential and qualitative element--of time1 duration1 and of motion1 mobility4 ,we may easily convince ourselves of this by examining the part played in astronomy and mechanics by considerations of time1 motion1 and velocity4 ,treatises on mechanics are careful to announce that they do not intend to define duration itself but only the equality of two durations4 ,two intervals of time are equal when two identical bodies1 in identical conditions at the beginning of each of these intervals and subject to the same actions and influences of every kind1 have traversed the same space at the end of these intervals4 ,in other words1 we are to note the exact moment at which the motion begins1 i4e4 the coincidence of an external change with one of our psychic states2 we are to note the moment at which the motion ends1 that is to say1 another simultaneity2 finally we are to measure the space traversed1 the only thing1 in fact1 which is really measurable4 ,hence there is no question here of duration1 but only of space and simultaneities4 ,to announce that something will take place at the end of a time t is to declare that consciousness will note between now and then a number t of simultaneities of a certain kind4 ,and we must not be led astray by the words between now and then1 for the interval of duration exists only for us and on account of the interpenetration of our conscious states4 ,outside ourselves we should find only space1 and consequently nothing but simultaneities1 of which we could not even say that they are objectively successive1 since succession can only be thought through comparing the present with the past4--,that the interval of duration itself cannot be taken into account by science is proved by the fact that1 if all the motions of the universe took place twice or thrice as quickly1 there would be nothing to alter either in our formulae or in the figures which are to be found in them4 ,consciousness would have an indefinable and as it were qualitative impression of the change1 but the change would not make itself felt outside consciousness1 since the same number of simultaneities would go on taking place in space4 ,we shall see1 later on1 that when the astronomer predicts1 e4g41 an eclipse1 he does something of this kind3 he shortens infinitely the intervals of duration1 as these do not count for science1 and thus perceives in a very short time--a few seconds at the most--a succession of simultaneities which may take up several centuries for the concrete consciousness1 compelled to live through the intervals instead of merely counting their extremities4 ,sidenote3 ,this is seen in the definition of velocity4 ,a direct analysis of the notion of velocity will bring us to the same conclusion4 ,mechanics gets this notion through a series of ideas1 the connexion of which it is easy enough to trace4 ,it first builds up the idea of uniform motion by picturing1 on the one hand1 the path ,,ab of a certain moving body1 and1 on the other1 a physical phenomenon which is repeated indefinitely under the same conditions1 e4g41 a stone always falling from the same height on to the same spot4 ,if we mark on the path ,,ab the points ,m1 1 ,p 444 reached by the moving body at each of the moments when the stone touches the ground1 and if the intervals ,,am1 ,,mn and ,,np are found to be equal to one another1 the motion will be said to be uniform3 and any one of these intervals will be called the velocity of the moving body1 provided that it is agreed to adopt as unit of duration the physical phenomenon which has been chosen as the term of comparison4 ,thus1 the velocity of a uniform motion is defined by mechanics without appealing to any other notions than those of space and simultaneity4 ,now let us turn to the case of a variable motion1 that is1 to the case when the elements ,,am1 ,,mn1 ,,np 444 are found to be unequal4 ,in order to define the velocity of the moving body ,a at the point ,m1 we shall only have to imagine an unlimited number of moving bodies ,a99#a1 ,a99#b1 ,a99#c 444 all moving uniformly with velocities v99#a1 v99#b1 v99#c 444 which are arranged1 e4g41 in an ascending scale and which correspond to all possible magnitudes4 ,let us then consider on the path of the moving body ,a two points ,m' and ,m1 situated on either side of the point ,m but very near it4 ,at the same time as this moving body reaches the points ,m'1 ,m1 ,m1 the other moving bodies reach points ,m'99#a ,m99#a ,m99#a1 ,m'99#b ,m99#b ,m99#b 444 on their respective paths2 and there must be two moving bodies ,ah and ,ap such that we have on the one hand ,m' ,m ,m'99h ,m99h and on the other hand ,m ,m ,m99p ,m99p4 ,we shall then agree to say that the velocity of the moving body ,a at the point ,m lies between v99h and v99p4 ,but nothing prevents our assuming that the points ,m' and ,m are still nearer the point ,m1 and it will then be necessary to replace v99h and v99p by two fresh velocities v99i and v99n1 the one greater than v99h and the other less than v99p4 ,and in proportion as we reduce the two intervals ,m',m and ,,mm1 we shall lessen the difference between the velocities of the uniform corresponding movements4 ,now1 the two intervals being capable of decreasing right down to zero1 there evidently exists between v99i and v99n a certain velocity v99m1 such that the difference between this velocity and v99h1 v99i 444 on the one hand1 and v99p1 v99n 444 on the other1 can become smaller than any given quantity4 ,it is this common limit v99m which we shall call the velocity of the moving body ,a at the point ,m4--,now1 in this analysis of variable motion1 as in that of uniform motion1 it is a question only of spaces once traversed and of simultaneous positions once reached4 ,we were thus justified in saying that1 while all that mechanics retains of time is simultaneity1 all that it retains of motion itself--restricted1 as it is1 to a measurement of motion--is immobility4 ,characters preceded by '99' are in subscript in original4 ,sidenote3 ,mechanics deals with equations1 which express something finished1 and not processes1 such as duration and motion4 ,this result might have been foreseen by noticing that mechanics necessarily deals with equations1 and that an algebraic equation always expresses something already done4 ,now1 it is of the very essence of duration and motion1 as they appear to our consciousness1 to be something that is unceasingly being done2 thus algebra can represent the results gained at a certain moment of duration and the positions occupied by a certain moving body in space1 but not duration and motion themselves4 ,mathematics may1 indeed1 increase the number of simultaneities and positions which it takes into consideration by making the intervals very small3 it may even1 by using the differential instead of the difference1 show that it is possible to increase without limit the number of these intervals of duration4 ,nevertheless1 however small the interval is supposed to be1 it is the extremity of the interval at which mathematics always places itself4 ,as for the interval itself1 as for the duration and the motion1 they are necessarily left out of the equation4 ,the reason is that duration and motion are mental syntheses1 and not objects2 that1 although the moving body occupies1 one after the other1 points on a line1 motion itself has nothing to do with a line2 and finally that1 although the positions occupied by the moving body vary with the different moments of duration1 though it even creates distinct moments by the mere fact of occupying different positions1 duration properly so called has no moments which are identical or external to one another1 being essentially heterogeneous1 continuous1 and with no analogy to number4 ,sidenote3 ,conclusion3 space alone is homogeneous3 duration and succession belong not to the external world1 but to the conscious mind4 ,it follows from this analysis that space alone is homogeneous1 that objects in space form a discrete multiplicity1 and that every discrete multiplicity is got by a process of unfolding in space4 ,it also follows that there is neither duration nor even succession in space1 if we give to these words the meaning in which consciousness takes them3 each of the so-called successive states of the external world exists alone2 their multiplicity is real only for a consciousness that can first retain them and then set them side by side by externalizing them in relation to one another4 ,if it retains them1 it is because these distinct states of the external world give rise to states of consciousness which permeate one another1 imperceptibly organize themselves into a whole1 and bind the past to the present by this very process of connexion4 ,if it externalizes them in relation to one another1 the reason is that1 thinking of their radical distinctness 7the one having ceased to be when the other appears on the scene71 it perceives them under the form of a discrete multiplicity1 which amounts to setting them out in line1 in the space in which each of them existed separately4 ,the space employed for this purpose is just that which is called homogeneous time4 ,sidenote3 ,two kinds of multiplicity3 two senses of the word distinguish1 the one qualitative and the other quantitative4 ,but another conclusion results from this analysis1 namely1 that the multiplicity of conscious states1 regarded in its original purity1 is not at all like the discrete multiplicity which goes to form a number4 ,in such a case there is1 as we said1 a qualitative multiplicity4 ,in short1 we must admit two kinds of multiplicity1 two possible senses of the word distinguish1 two conceptions1 the one qualitative and the other quantitative1 of the difference between same and other4 ,sometimes this multiplicity1 this distinctness1 this heterogeneity contains number only potentially1 as ,aristotle would have said4 ,consciousness1 then1 makes a qualitative discrimination without any further thought of counting the qualities or even of distinguishing them as several4 ,in such a case we have multiplicity without quantity4 ,sometimes1 on the other hand1 it is a question of a multiplicity of terms which are counted or which are conceived as capable of being counted2 but we think then of the possibility of externalizing them in relation to one another1 we set them out in space4 ,unfortunately1 we are so accustomed to illustrate one of these two meanings of the same word by the other1 and even to perceive the one in the other1 that we find it extraordinarily difficult to distinguish between them or at least to express this distinction in words4 ,thus ,i said that several conscious states are organized into a whole1 permeate one another1 gradually gain a richer content1 and might thus give any one ignorant of space the feeling of pure duration2 but the very use of the word several shows that ,i had already isolated these states1 externalized them in relation to one another1 and1 in a word1 set them side by side2 thus1 by the very language which ,i was compelled to use1 ,i betrayed the deeply ingrained habit of setting out time in space4 ,from this spatial setting out1 already accomplished1 we are compelled to borrow the terms which we use to describe the state of a mind which has not yet accomplished it3 these terms are thus misleading from the very beginning1 and the idea of a multiplicity without relation to number or space1 although clear for pure reflective thought1 cannot be translated into the language of common sense4 ,and yet we cannot even form the idea of discrete multiplicity without considering at the same time a qualitative multiplicity4 ,when we explicitly count units by stringing them along a spatial line1 is it not the case that1 alongside this addition of identical terms standing out from a homogeneous background1 an organization of these units is going on in the depths of the soul1 a wholly dynamic process1 not unlike the purely qualitative way in which an anvil1 if it could feel1 would realize a series of blows from a hammer8 ,in this sense we might almost say that the numbers in daily use have each their emotional equivalent4 ,tradesmen are well aware of it1 and instead of indicating the price of an object by a round number of shillings1 they will mark the next smaller number1 leaving themselves to insert afterwards a sufficient number of pence and farthings4 ,in a word1 the process by which we count units and make them into a discrete multiplicity has two sides2 on the one hand we assume that they are identical1 which is conceivable only on condition that these units are ranged alongside each other in a homogeneous medium2 but on the other hand the third unit1 for example1 when added to the other two1 alters the nature1 the appearance and1 as it were1 the rhythm of the whole2 without this interpenetration and this1 so to speak1 qualitative progress1 no addition would be possible4 ,hence it is through the quality of quantity that we form the idea of quantity without quality4 ,sidenote3 ,our successive sensations are regarded as mutually external1 like their objective causes1 and this reacts on our deeper psychic life4 ,it is therefore obvious that1 if it did not betake itself to a symbolical substitute1 our consciousness our successive would never regard time as a homogeneous medium1 in which the terms of a succession remain outside one another4 ,but we naturally reach this symbolical representation by the mere fact that1 in a series of identical terms1 each term assumes a double aspect for our consciousness3 one aspect which is the same for all of them1 since we are thinking then of the sameness of the external object1 and another aspect which is characteristic of each of them1 because the supervening of each term brings about a new organization of the whole4 ,hence the possibility of setting out in space1 under the form of numerical multiplicity1 what we have called a qualitative multiplicity1 and of regarding the one as the equivalent of the other4 ,now1 this twofold process is nowhere accomplished so easily as in the perception of the external phenomenon which takes for us the form of motion4 ,here we certainly have a series of identical terms1 since it is always the same moving body2 but1 on the other hand1 the synthesis carried out by our consciousness between the actual position and what our memory calls the former positions1 causes these images to permeate1 complete1 and1 so to speak1 continue one another4 ,hence1 it is principally by the help of motion that duration assumes the form of a homogeneous medium1 and that time is projected into space4 ,but1 even if we leave out motion1 any repetition of a well-marked external phenomenon would suggest to consciousness the same mode of representation4 ,thus1 when we hear a series of blows of a hammer1 the sounds form an indivisible melody in so far as they are pure sensations1 and1 here again1 give rise to a dynamic progress2 but1 knowing that the same objective cause is at work1 we cut up this progress into phases which we then regard as identical2 and this multiplicity of elements no longer being conceivable except by being set out in space1 since they have now become identical1 we are necessarily led to the idea of a homogeneous time1 the symbolical image of real duration4 ,in a word1 our ego comes in contact with the external world at its surface2 our successive sensations1 although dissolving into one another1 retain something of the mutual externality which belongs to their objective causes2 and thus our superficial psychic life comes to be pictured without any great effort as set out in a homogeneous medium4 ,but the symbolical character of such a picture becomes more striking as we advance further into the depths of consciousness3 the deep-seated self which ponders and decides1 which heats and blazes up1 is a self whose states and changes permeate one another and undergo a deep alteration as soon as we separate them from one another in order to set them out in space4 ,but as this deeper self forms one and the same person with the superficial ego1 the two seem to endure in the same way4 ,and as the repeated picture of one identical objective phenomenon1 ever recurring1 cuts up our superficial psychic life into parts external to one another1 the moments which are thus determined determine in their turn distinct segments in the dynamic and undivided progress of our more personal conscious states4 ,thus the mutual externality which material objects gain from their juxtaposition in homogeneous space reverberates and spreads into the depths of consciousness3 little by little our sensations are distinguished from one another like the external causes which gave rise to them1 and our feelings or ideas come to be separated like the sensations with which they are contemporaneous4 ,sidenote3 ,eliminate the superficial psychic states1 and we no longer perceive a homogeneous time or measure duration1 but feel it as a quality4 ,that our ordinary conception of duration depends on a gradual incursion of space into the domain of pure consciousness is proved by the fact that1 in order to deprive the ego of the faculty of perceiving a homogeneous time1 it is enough to take away from it this outer circle of psychic states which it uses as a balance-wheel4 ,these conditions are realized when we dream2 for sleep1 by relaxing the play of the organic functions1 alters the communicating surface between the ego and external objects4 ,here we no longer measure duration1 but we feel it2 from quantity it returns to the state of quality2 we no longer estimate past time mathematically3 the mathematical estimate gives place to a confused instinct1 capable1 like all instincts1 of committing gross errors1 but also of acting at times with extraordinary skill4 ,even in the waking state1 daily experience ought to teach us to distinguish between duration as quality1 that which consciousness reaches immediately and which is probably what animals perceive1 and time so to speak materialized1 time that has become quantity by being set out in space4 ,whilst ,i am writing these lines1 the hour strikes on a neighbouring clock1 but my inattentive ear does not perceive it until several strokes have made themselves heard4 ,hence ,i have not counted them2 and yet ,i only have to turn my attention backwards to count up the four strokes which have already sounded and add them to those which ,i hear4 ,if1 then1 ,i question myself carefully on what has just taken place1 ,i perceive that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even affected my consciousness1 but that the sensations produced by each one of them1 instead of being set side by side1 had melted into one another in such a way as to give the whole a peculiar quality1 to make a kind of musical phrase out of it4 ,in order1 then1 to estimate retrospectively the number of strokes sounded1 ,i tried to reconstruct this phrase in thought3 my imagination made one stroke1 then two1 then three1 and as long as it did not reach the exact number four1 my feeling1 when consulted1 answered that the total effect was qualitatively different4 ,it had thus ascertained in its own way the succession of four strokes1 but quite otherwise than by a process of addition1 and without bringing in the image of a juxtaposition of distinct terms4 ,in a word1 the number of strokes was perceived as a quality and not as a quantity3 it is thus that duration is presented to immediate consciousness1 and it retains this form so long as it does not give place to a symbolical representation derived from extensity4 ,sidenote3 ,there are therefore two forms of multiplicity1 of duration and conscious life4 ,we should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity1 two very different ways of regarding duration1 two aspects of conscious life4 ,below homogeneous duration1 which is the extensive symbol of true duration1 a close psychological analysis distinguishes a duration whose heterogeneous moments permeate one another2 below the numerical multiplicity of conscious states1 a qualitative multiplicity2 below the self with well-defined states1 a self in which succeeding each other means melting into one another and forming an organic whole4 ,but we are generally content with the first1 i4e4 with the shadow of the self projected into homogeneous space4 ,consciousness1 goaded by an insatiable desire to separate1 substitutes the symbol for the reality1 or perceives the reality only through the symbol4 ,as the self thus refracted1 and thereby broken to pieces1 is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular1 consciousness prefers it1 and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self4 ,sidenote3 ,the two aspects of our conscious states4 ,in order to recover this fundamental self1 as the unsophisticated consciousness would perceive it1 a vigorous effort of analysis is necessary1 which will isolate the fluid inner states from their image1 first refracted1 then solidified in homogeneous space4 ,in other words1 our perceptions1 sensations1 emotions and ideas occur under two aspects3 the one clear and precise1 but impersonal2 the other confused1 ever changing1 and inexpressible1 because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public property4 ,if we have been led to distinguish two forms of multiplicity1 two forms of duration1 we must expect each conscious state1 taken by itself1 to assume a different aspect according as we consider it within a discrete multiplicity or a confused multiplicity1 in the time as quality1 in which it is produced1 or in the time as quantity1 into which it is projected4 ,sidenote3 ,one of which is due to the solidifying influence of external objects and language on our constantly changing feelings4 ,when e4g4 ,i take my first walk in a town in which ,i am going to live1 my environment produces on me two impressions at the same time1 one of which is destined to last while the other will constantly change4 ,every day ,i perceive the same houses1 and as ,i know that they are the same objects1 ,i always call them by the same name and ,i also fancy that they always look the same to me4 ,but if ,i recur1 at the end of a sufficiently long period1 to the impression which ,i experienced during the first few years1 ,i am surprised at the remarkable1 inexplicable1 and indeed inexpressible change which has taken place4 ,it seems that these objects1 continually perceived by me and constantly impressing themselves on my mind1 have ended by borrowing from me something of my own conscious existence2 like myself they have lived1 and like myself they have grown old4 ,this is not a mere illusion2 for if to-day's impression were absolutely identical with that of yesterday1 what difference would there be between perceiving and recognizing1 between learning and remembering8 ,yet this difference escapes the attention of most of us2 we shall hardly perceive it1 unless we are warned of it and then carefully look into ourselves4 ,the reason is that our outer and1 so to speak1 social life is more practically important to us than our inner and individual existence4 ,we instinctively tend to solidify our impressions in order to express them in language4 ,hence we confuse the feeling itself1 which is in a perpetual state of becoming1 with its permanent external object1 and especially with the word which expresses this object4 ,in the same way as the fleeting duration of our ego is fixed by its projection in homogeneous space1 our constantly changing impressions1 wrapping themselves round the external object which is their cause1 take on its definite outlines and its immobility4 ,sidenote3 ,how language gives a fixed form to fleeting sensations4 ,our simple sensations1 taken in their natural state1 are still more fleeting4 ,such and such a flavour1 such and such a scent1 pleased me when ,i was a child though ,i dislike them to-day4 ,yet ,i still give the same name to the sensation experienced1 and ,i speak as if only my taste had changed1 whilst the scent and the flavour have remained the same4 ,thus ,i again solidify the sensation2 and when its changeableness becomes so obvious that ,i cannot help recognizing it1 ,i abstract this changeableness to give it a name of its own and solidify it in the shape of a taste4 ,but in reality there are neither identical sensations nor multiple tastes3 for sensations and tastes seem to me to be objects as soon as ,i isolate and name them1 and in the human soul there are only processes4 ,what ,i ought to say is that every sensation is altered by repetition1 and that if it does not seem to me to change from day to day1 it is because ,i perceive it through the object which is its cause1 through the word which translates it4 ,this influence of language on sensation is deeper than is usually thought4 ,not only does language make us believe in the unchangeableness of our sensations1 but it will sometimes deceive us as to the nature of the sensation felt4 ,thus1 when ,i partake of a dish that is supposed to be exquisite1 the name which it bears1 suggestive of the approval given to it1 comes between my sensation and my consciousness2 ,i may believe that the flavour pleases me when a slight effort of attention would prove the contrary1 ,in short1 the word with well-defined outlines1 the rough and ready word1 which stores up the stable1 common1 and consequently impersonal element in the impressions of mankind1 overwhelms or at least covers over the delicate and fugitive impressions of our individual consciousness4 ,to maintain the struggle on equal terms1 the latter ought to express themselves in precise words2 but these words1 as soon as they were formed1 would turn against the sensation which gave birth to them1 and1 invented to show that the sensation is unstable1 they would impose on it their own stability4 ,sidenote3 ,how analysis and description distort the feelings4 ,this overwhelming of the immediate consciousness is nowhere so striking as in the case of our feelings4 ,a violent love or a deep melancholy takes possession of our ,,soul3 here we feel a thousand different elements which dissolve into and permeate one another without any precise outlines1 without the least tendency to externalize themselves in relation to one another2 hence their originality4 ,we distort them as soon as we distinguish a numerical multiplicity in their confused mass3 what will it be1 then1 when we set them out1 isolated from one another1 in this homogeneous medium which may be called either time or space1 whichever you prefer8 ,a moment ago each of them was borrowing an indefinable colour from its surroundings3 now we have it colourless1 and ready to accept a name4 ,the feeling itself is a being which lives and develops and is therefore constantly changing2 otherwise how could it gradually lead us to form a resolution8 ,our resolution would be immediately taken4 ,but it lives because the duration in which it develops is a duration whose moments permeate one another4 ,by separating these moments from each other1 by spreading out time in space1 we have caused this feeling to lose its life and its colour4 ,hence1 we are now standing before our own shadow3 we believe that we have analysed our feeling1 while we have really replaced it by a juxtaposition of lifeless states which can be translated into words1 and each of which constitutes the common element1 the impersonal residue1 of the impressions felt in a given case by the whole of society4 ,and this is why we reason about these states and apply our simple logic to them3 having set them up as genera by the mere fact of having isolated them from one another1 we have prepared them for use in some future deduction4 ,now1 if some bold novelist1 tearing aside the cleverly woven curtain of our conventional ego1 shows us under this appearance of logic a fundamental absurdity1 under this juxtaposition of simple states an infinite permeation of a thousand different impressions which have already ceased to exist the instant they are named1 we commend him for having known us better than we knew ourselves4 ,this is not the case1 however1 and the very fact that he spreads out our feeling in a homogeneous time1 and expresses its elements by words1 shows that he in his turn is only offering us its shadow3 but he has arranged this shadow in such a way as to make us suspect the extraordinary and illogical nature of the object which projects it2 he has made us reflect by giving outward expression to something of that contradiction1 that interpenetration1 which is the very essence of the elements expressed4 ,encouraged by him1 we have put aside for an instant the veil which we interposed between our consciousness and ourselves4 ,he has brought us back into our own presence4 ,sidenote3 ,on the surface our conscious states obey the laws of association4 ,deeper down they interpenetrate and form a part of ourselves4 ,we should experience the same sort of surprise if we strove to seize our ideas themselves in their natural state1 as our consciousness would perceive them if it were no longer beset by space4 ,this breaking up of the constituent elements of an idea1 which issues in abstraction1 is too convenient for us to do without it in ordinary life and even in philosophical discussion4 ,but when we fancy that the parts thus artificially separated are the genuine threads with which the concrete idea was woven1 when1 substituting for the interpenetration of the real terms the juxtaposition of their symbols1 we claim to make duration out of space1 we unavoidably fall into the mistakes of associationism4 ,we shall not insist on the latter point1 which will be the subject of a thorough examination in the next chapter4 ,let it be enough to say that the impulsive zeal with which we take sides on certain questions shows how our intellect has its instincts--and what can an instinct of this kind be if not an impetus common to all our ideas1 i4e4 their very interpenetration8 ,the beliefs to which we most strongly adhere are those of which we should find it most difficult to give an account1 and the reasons by which we justify them are seldom those which have led us to adopt them4 ,in a certain sense we have adopted them without any reason1 for what makes them valuable in our eyes is that they match the colour of all our other ideas1 and that from the very first we have seen in them something of ourselves4 ,hence they do not take in our minds that common looking form which they will assume as soon as we try to give expression to them in words2 and1 although they bear the same name in other minds1 they are by no means the same thing4 ,the fact is that each of them has the same kind of life as a cell in an organism3 everything which affects the general state of the self affects it also4 ,but while the cell occupies a definite point in the organism1 an idea which is truly ours fills the whole of our self4 ,not all our ideas1 however1 are thus incorporated in the fluid mass of our conscious states4 ,many float on the surface1 like dead leaves on the water of a pond3 the mind1 when it thinks them over and over again1 finds them ever the same1 as if they were external to it4 ,among these are the ideas which we receive ready made1 and which remain in us without ever being properly assimilated1 or again the ideas which we have omitted to cherish and which have withered in neglect4 ,if1 in proportion as we get away from the deeper strata of the self1 our conscious states tend more and more to assume the form of a numerical multiplicity1 and to spread out in a homogeneous space1 it is just because these conscious states tend to become more and more lifeless1 more and more impersonal4 ,hence we need not be surprised if only those ideas which least belong to us can be adequately expressed in words3 only to these1 as we shall see1 does the associationist theory apply4 ,external to one another1 they keep up relations among themselves in which the inmost nature of each of them counts for nothing1 relations which can therefore be classified4 ,it may thus be said that they are associated by contiguity or for some logical reason4 ,but if1 digging below the surface of contact between the self and external objects1 we penetrate into the depths of the organized and living intelligence1 we shall witness the joining together or rather the blending of many ideas which1 when once dissociated1 seem to exclude one another as logically contradictory terms4 ,the strangest dreams1 in which two images overlie one another and show us at the same time two different persons1 who yet make only one1 will hardly give us an idea of the interweaving of concepts which goes on when we are awake4 ,the imagination of the dreamer1 cut off from the external world1 imitates with mere images1 and parodies in its own way1 the process which constantly goes on with regard to ideas in the deeper regions of the intellectual life4 ,sidenote3 ,by separating our conscious states we promote social life1 but raise problems soluble only by recourse to the concrete and living self4 ,thus may be verified1 thus1 too1 will be illustrated by a further study of deep-seated psychic phenomena the principle from which we started3 conscious life displays two aspects according as we perceive it directly or by refraction through space4 ,considered in themselves1 the deep-seated conscious states have no relation to quantity1 they are pure quality2 they intermingle in such a way that we cannot tell whether they are one or several1 nor even examine them from this point of view without at once altering their nature4 ,the duration which they thus create is a duration whose moments do not constitute a numerical multiplicity3 to characterize these moments by saying that they encroach on one another would still be to distinguish them4 ,if each of us lived a purely individual life1 if there were neither society nor language1 would our consciousness grasp the series of inner states in this unbroken form8 ,undoubtedly it would not quite succeed1 because we should still retain the idea of a homogeneous space in which objects are sharply distinguished from one another1 and because it is too convenient to set out in such a medium the somewhat cloudy states which first attract the attention of consciousness1 in order to resolve them into simpler terms4 ,but mark that the intuition of a homogeneous space is already a step towards social life4 ,probably animals do not picture to themselves1 beside their sensations1 as we do1 an external world quite distinct from themselves1 which is the common property of all conscious beings4 ,our tendency to form a clear picture of this externality of things and the homogeneity of their medium is the same as the impulse which leads us to live in common and to speak4 ,but1 in proportion as the conditions of social life are more completely realized1 the current which carries our conscious states from within outwards is strengthened2 little by little these states are made into objects or things2 they break off not only from one another1 but from ourselves4 ,henceforth we no longer perceive them except in the homogeneous medium in which we have set their image1 and through the word which lends them its common-place colour4 ,thus a second self is formed which obscures the first1 a self whose existence is made up of distinct moments1 whose states are separated from one another and easily expressed in words4 ,i do not mean1 here1 to split up the personality1 nor to bring back in another form the numerical multiplicity which ,i shut out at the beginning4 ,it is the same self which perceives distinct states at first1 and which1 by afterwards concentrating its attention1 will see these states melt into one another like the crystals of a snow-flake when touched for some time with the finger4 ,and1 in truth1 for the sake of language1 the self has everything to gain by not bringing back confusion where order reigns1 and in not upsetting this ingenious arrangement of almost impersonal states by which it has ceased to form a kingdom within a kingdom4 ,an inner life with well distinguished moments and with clearly characterized states will answer better the requirements of social life4 ,indeed1 a superficial psychology may be content with describing it without thereby falling into error1 on condition1 however1 that it restricts itself to the study of what has taken place and leaves out what is going on4 ,but if1 passing from statics to dynamics1 this psychology claims to reason about things in the making as it reasoned about things made1 if it offers us the concrete and living self as an association of terms which are distinct from one another and are set side by side in a homogeneous medium1 it will see difficulty after difficulty rising in its path4 ,and these difficulties will multiply the greater the efforts it makes to overcome them1 for all its efforts will only bring into clearer light the absurdity of the fundamental hypothesis by which it spreads out time in space and puts succession at the very centre of simultaneity4 ,we shall see that the contradictions implied in the problems of causality1 freedom1 personality1 spring from no other source1 and that1 if we wish to get rid of them1 we have only to go back to the real and concrete self and give up its symbolical substitute4 #a ,i had already completed the present work when ,i read in the ,critique philosophique7for #ahhc and #ahhd7 ,f4 ,pillon's very remarkable refutation of an interesting article by ,g4 ,nol on the interconnexion of the notions of number and space4 ,but ,i have not found it necessary to make any alterations in the following pages1 seeing that ,pillon does not distinguish between time as quality and time as quantity1 between the multiplicity of juxtaposition and that of interpenetration4 ,without this vital distinction1 which it is the chief aim of the present chapter to establish1 it would be possible to maintain1 with ,pillon1 that number may be built up from the relation of co-existence4 ,but what is here meant by co-existence8 ,if the co-existing terms form an organic whole1 they will never lead us to the notion of number2 if they remain distinct1 they are in juxtaposition and we are dealing with space4 ,it is no use to quote the example of simultaneous impressions received by several senses4 ,we either leave these sensations their specific differences1 which amounts to saying that we do not count them2 or else we eliminate their differences1 and then how are we to distinguish them if not by their position or that of their symbols8 ,we shall see that the verb to distinguish has two meanings1 the one qualitative1 the other quantitative3 these two meanings have been confused1 in my opinion1 by the philosophers who have dealt with the relations between number and space4 #b vellin1 ,infini et quantit4 ,paris1 #ahha4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,organization ,,of ,,conscious ,,states ,,free ,,will ,sidenote3 ,mechanism1 dynamism and free will4 ,it is easy to see why the question of free will brings into conflict these two rival systems of nature1 mechanism and dynamism4 ,dynamism starts from the idea of voluntary activity1 given by consciousness1 and comes to represent inertia by gradually emptying this idea3 it has thus no difficulty in conceiving free force on the one hand and matter governed by laws on the other4 ,mechanism follows the opposite course4 ,it assumes that the materials which it synthesizes are governed by necessary laws1 and although it reaches richer and richer combinations1 which are more and more difficult to foresee1 and to all appearance more and more contingent1 yet it never gets out of the narrow circle of necessity within which it at first shut itself up4 ,sidenote3 ,for dynamism facts more real than laws3 mechanism reverses this attitude4 ,this idea of spontaneity simpler than that of inertia4 ,a thorough examination of these two conceptions of nature will show that they involve two very different hypotheses as to the relations between laws and the facts which they govern4 ,as he looks higher and higher1 the believer in dynamism thinks that he perceives facts which more and more elude the grasp of laws3 he thus sets up the fact as the absolute reality1 and the law as the more or less symbolical expression of this reality4 ,mechanism1 on the contrary1 discovers within the particular fact a certain number of laws of which the fact is thus made to be the meeting point1 and nothing else3 on this hypothesis it is the law which becomes the genuine reality4 ,now1 if it is asked why the one party assigns a higher reality to the fact and the other to the law1 it will be found that mechanism and dynamism take the word simplicity in two very different senses4 ,for the first1 any principle is simple of which the effects can be foreseen and even calculated3 thus1 by the very definition1 the notion of inertia becomes simpler than that of freedom1 the homogeneous simpler than the heterogeneous1 the abstract simpler than the concrete4 ,but dynamism is not anxious so much to arrange the notions in the most convenient order as to find out their real relationship3 often1 in fact1 the so-called simple notion--that which the believer in mechanism regards as primitive--has been obtained by the blending together of several richer notions which seem to be derived from it1 and which have more or less neutralized one another in this very process of blending1 just as darkness may be produced by the interference of two lights4 ,regarded from this new point of view1 the idea of spontaneity is indisputably simpler than that of inertia1 since the second can be understood and defined only by means of the first1 while the first is self-sufficient4 ,for each of us has the immediate knowledge 7be it thought true or fallacious7 of his free spontaneity1 without the notion of inertia having anything to do with this knowledge4 ,but1 if we wish to define the inertia of matter1 we must say that it cannot move or stop of its own accord1 that every body perseveres in the state of rest or motion so long as it is not acted upon by any force3 and in both cases we are unavoidably carried back to the idea of activity4 ,it is therefore natural that1 a priori1 we should reach two opposite conceptions of human activity1 according to the way in which we understand the relation between the concrete and the abstract1 the simple and the complex1 facts and laws4 ,sidenote3 ,determinism3 7#a7 physical 7#b7 psychological4 ,former reducible to latter1 which itself rests on inaccurate conception of multiplicity of conscious states or duration4 ,a posteriori1 however1 definite facts are appealed to against freedom1 some physical1 others psychological4 ,sometimes it is asserted that our actions are necessitated by our feelings1 our ideas1 and the whole preceding series of our conscious states2 sometimes freedom is denounced as being incompatible with the fundamental properties of matter1 and in particular with the principle of the conservation of energy4 ,hence two kinds of determinism1 two apparently different empirical proofs of universal necessity4 ,we shall show that the second of these two forms is reducible to the first1 and that all determinism1 even physical determinism1 involves a psychological hypothesis3 we shall then prove that psychological determinism itself1 and the refutations which are given of it1 rest on an inaccurate conception of the multiplicity of conscious states1 or rather of duration4 ,thus1 in the light of the principles worked out in the foregoing chapter1 we shall see a self emerge whose activity cannot be compared to that of any other force4 ,sidenote3 ,physical determinism stated in the language of the molecular theory of matter4 ,physical determinism1 in its latest form1 is closely bound up with mechanical or rather kinetic theories of matter4 ,the universe is pictured as a heap of matter which the imagination resolves into molecules and atoms4 ,these particles are supposed to carry out unceasingly movements of every kind1 sometimes of vibration1 sometimes of translation2 and physical phenomena1 chemical action1 the qualities of matter which our senses perceive1 heat1 sound1 electricity1 perhaps even attraction1 are thought to be reducible objectively to these elementary movements4 ,the matter which goes to make up organized bodies being subject to the same laws1 we find in the nervous system1 for example1 only molecules and atoms which are in motion and attract and repel one another4 ,now if all bodies1 organized or unorganized1 thus act and react on one another in their ultimate parts1 it is obvious that the molecular state of the brain at a given moment will be modified by the shocks which the nervous system receives from the surrounding matter1 so that the sensations1 feelings and ideas which succeed one another in us can be defined as mechanical resultants1 obtained by the compounding of shocks received from without with the previous movements of the atoms of the nervous substance4 ,but the opposite phenomenon may occur2 and the molecular movements which go on in the nervous system1 if compounded with one another or with others1 will often give as resultant a reaction of our organism on its environment3 hence the reflex movements1 hence also the so-called free and voluntary actions4 ,as1 moreover1 the principle of the conservation of energy has been assumed to admit of no exception1 there is not an atom1 either in the nervous system or in the whole of the universe1 whose position is not determined by the sum of the mechanical actions which the other atoms exert upon it4 ,and the mathematician who knew the position of the molecules or atoms of a human organism at a given moment1 as well as the position and motion of all the atoms in the universe capable of influencing it1 could calculate with unfailing certainty the past1 present and future actions of the person to whom this organism belongs1 just as one predicts an astronomical phenomenon4#a ,sidenote3 ,if principle of conservation of energy is universal1 physiological and nervous phenomena are necessitated1 but perhaps not conscious states4 ,we shall not raise any difficulty about recognizing that this conception of physiological phenomena in general1 and nervous phenomena in particular1 is a very natural deduction from the law of the conservation of energy4 ,certainly1 the atomic theory of matter is still at the hypothetical stage1 and the purely kinetic explanations of physical facts lose more than they gain by being too closely bound up with it4 ,we must observe1 however1 that1 even if we leave aside the atomic theory as well as any other hypothesis as to the nature of the ultimate elements of matter1 the necessitating of physiological facts by their antecedents follows from the theorem of the conservation of energy1 as soon as we extend this theorem to all processes going on in all living bodies4 ,for to admit the universality of this theorem is to assume1 at bottom1 that the material points of which the universe is composed are subject solely to forces of attraction and repulsion1 arising from these points themselves and possessing intensities which depend only on their distances3 hence the relative position of these material points at a given moment--whatever be their nature--would be strictly determined by relation to what it was at the preceding moment4 ,let us then assume for a moment that this last hypothesis is true3 we propose to show1 in the first place1 that it does not involve the absolute determination of our conscious states by one another1 and then that the very universality of the principle of the conservation of energy cannot be admitted except in virtue of some psychological hypothesis4 ,sidenote3 ,to prove conscious states determined1 we should have to show a necessary connexion between them and cerebral states4 ,no such proof4 ,even if we assumed that the position1 the direction and the velocity of each atom of cerebral matter are determined at every moment of time1 it would not at all follow that our psychic life is subject to the same necessity4 ,for we should first have to prove that a strictly determined psychic state corresponds to a definite cerebral state1 and the proof of this is still to be given4 ,as a rule we do not think of demanding it1 because we know that a definite vibration of the tympanum1 a definite stimulation of the auditory nerve1 gives a definite note on the scale1 and because the parallelism of the physical and psychical series has been proved in a fairly large number of cases4 ,but then1 nobody has ever contended that we were free1 under given conditions1 to hear any note or perceive any colour we liked4 ,sensations of this kind1 like many other psychic states1 are obviously bound up with certain determining conditions1 and it is just for this reason that it has been possible to imagine or discover beneath them a system of movements which obey our abstract mechanics4 ,in short1 wherever we succeed in giving a mechanical explanation1 we observe a fairly strict parallelism between the physiological and the psychological series1 and we need not be surprised at it1 since explanations of this kind will assuredly not be met with except where the two series exhibit parallel terms4 ,but to extend this parallelism to the series themselves in their totality is to settle a priori the problem of freedom4 ,certainly this may be done1 and some of the greatest thinkers have set the example2 but then1 as we said at first1 it was not for reasons of a physical order that they asserted the strict correspondence between states of consciousness and modes of extension4 ,leibniz ascribed it to a preestablished harmony1 and would never have admitted that a motion could give rise to a perception as a cause produces an effect4 ,spinoza said that the modes of thought and the modes of extension correspond with but never influence one another3 they only express in two different languages the same eternal truth4 ,but the theories of physical determinism which are rife at the present day are far from displaying the same clearness1 the same geometrical rigour4 ,they point to molecular movements taking place in the brain3 consciousness is supposed to arise out of these at times in some mysterious way1 or rather to follow their track like the phosphorescent line which results from the rubbing of a match4 ,or yet again we are to think of an invisible musician playing behind the scenes while the actor strikes a keyboard the notes of which yield no sound3 consciousness must be supposed to come from an unknown region and to be superimposed on the molecular vibrations1 just as the melody is on the rhythmical movements of the actor4 ,but1 whatever image we fall back upon1 we do not prove and we never shall prove by any reasoning that the psychic fact is fatally determined by the molecular movement4 ,for in a movement we may find the reason of another movement1 but not the reason of a conscious state3 only observation can prove that the latter accompanies the former4 ,now the unvarying conjunction of the two terms has not been verified by experience except in a very limited number of cases and with regard to facts which all confess to be almost independent of the will4 ,but it is easy to understand why physical determinism extends this conjunction to all possible cases4 ,sidenote3 ,physical determinism1 when assumed to be universal1 postulates psychological determinism4 ,consciousness indeed informs us that the majority of our actions can be explained by motives4 ,but it does not appear that determination here means necessity1 since common sense believes in free will4 ,the determinist1 however1 led astray by a conception of duration and causality which we shall criticise a little later1 holds that the determination of conscious states by one another is absolute4 ,this is the origin of associationist determinism1 an hypothesis in support of which the testimony of consciousness is appealed to1 but which cannot1 in the beginning1 lay claim to scientific rigour4 ,it seems natural that this1 so to speak1 approximate determinism1 this determinism of quality1 should seek support from the same mechanism that underlies the phenomena of nature3 the latter would thus convey to the former its own geometrical character1 and the transaction would be to the advantage both of psychological determinism1 which would emerge from it in a stricter form1 and of physical mechanism1 which would then spread over everything4 ,a fortunate circumstance favours this alliance4 ,the simplest psychic states do in fact occur as accessories to well-defined physical phenomena1 and the greater number of sensations seem to be bound up with definite molecular movements4 ,this mere beginning of an experimental proof is quite enough for the man who1 for psychological reasons1 is already convinced that our conscious states are the necessary outcome of the circumstances under which they happen4 ,henceforth he no longer hesitates to hold that the drama enacted in the theatre of consciousness is a literal and even slavish translation of some scenes performed by the molecules and atoms of organized matter4 ,the physical determinism which is reached in this way is nothing but psychological determinism1 seeking to verify itself and fix its own outlines by an appeal to the sciences of nature4 ,sidenote3 ,is the principle of conservation of energy universal valid8 ,but we must own that the amount of freedom which is left to us after strictly complying with the principle of the conservation of energy is rather limited4 ,for1 even if this law does not exert a necessitating influence over the course of our ideas1 it will at least determine our movements4 ,our inner life will still depend upon ourselves up to a certain point2 but1 to an outside observer1 there will be nothing to distinguish our activity from absolute automatism4 ,we are thus led to inquire whether the very extension of the principle of the conservation of energy to all the bodies in nature does not itself involve some psychological theory1 and whether the scientist who did not possess a priori any prejudice against human freedom would think of setting up this principle as a universal law4 ,sidenote3 ,it implies that a system can return to its original state4 ,neglects duration1 hence inapplicable to living beings and conscious states4 ,we must not overrate the part played by the principle of the conservation of energy in the history of the natural sciences4 ,in its present form it marks a certain phase in the evolution of certain sciences2 but it has not been the governing factor in this evolution and we should be wrong in making it the indispensable postulate of all scientific research4 ,certainly1 every mathematical operation which we carry out on a given quantity implies the permanence of this quantity throughout the course of the operation1 in whatever way we may split it up4 ,in other words1 what is given is given1 what is not given is not given1 and in whatever order we add up the same terms we shall get the same result4 ,science will for ever remain subject to this law1 which is nothing but the law of non-contradiction2 but this law does not involve any special hypothesis as to the nature of what we ought to take as given1 or what will remain constant4 ,no doubt it informs us that something cannot come from nothing2 but experience alone will tell us which aspects or functions of reality must count for something1 and which for nothing1 from the point of view of positive science4 ,in short1 in order to foresee the state of a determinate system at a determinate moment1 it is absolutely necessary that something should persist as a constant quantity throughout a series of combinations2 but it belongs to experience to decide as to the nature of this something1 and especially to let us know whether it is found in all possible systems1 whether1 in other words1 all possible systems lend themselves to our calculations4 ,it is not certain that all the physicists before ,leibniz believed1 like ,descartes1 in the conservation of a fixed quantity of motion in the universe3 were their discoveries less valuable on this account or their researches less successful8 ,even when ,leibniz had substituted for this principle that of the conservation of vis viva1 it was not possible to regard the law as quite general1 since it admitted of an obvious exception in the case of the direct impact of two inelastic bodies4 ,thus science has done for a very long time without a universal conservative principle4 ,in its present form1 and since the development of the mechanical theory of heat1 the principle of the conservation of energy certainly seems to apply to the whole range of physico-chemical phenomena4 ,but no one can tell whether the study of physiological phenomena in general1 and of nervous phenomena in particular1 will not reveal to us1 besides the vis viva or kinetic energy of which ,leibniz spoke1 and the potential energy which was a later and necessary adjunct1 some new kind of energy which may differ from the other two by rebelling against calculation4 ,physical science would not thereby lose any of its exactitude or geometrical rigour1 as has lately been asserted3 only it would be realized that conservative systems are not the only systems possible1 and even1 perhaps1 that in the whole of concrete reality each of these systems plays the same part as the chemist's atom in bodies and their combinations4 ,let us note that the most radical of mechanical theories is that which makes consciousness an epiphenomenon which1 in given circumstances1 may supervene on certain molecular movements4 ,but1 if molecular movement can create sensation out of a zero of consciousness1 why should not consciousness in its turn create movement either out of a zero of kinetic and potential energy1 or by making use of this energy in its own way8 ,let us also note that the law of the conservation of energy can only be intelligibly applied to a system of which the points1 after moving1 can return to their former positions4 ,this return is at least conceived of as possible1 and it is supposed that under these conditions nothing would be changed in the original state of the system as a whole or of its elements4 ,in short1 time cannot bite into it2 and the instinctive1 though vague1 belief of mankind in the conservation of a fixed quantity of matter1 a fixed quantity of energy1 perhaps has its root in the very fact that inert matter does not seem to endure or to preserve any trace of past time4 ,but this is not the case in the realm of life4 ,here duration certainly seems to act like a cause1 and the idea of putting things back in their place at the end of a certain time involves a kind of absurdity1 since such a turning backwards has never been accomplished in the case of a living being4 ,but let us admit that the absurdity is a mere appearance1 and that the impossibility for living beings to come back to the past is simply owing to the fact that the physico-chemical phenomena which take place in living bodies1 being infinitely complex1 have no chance of ever occurring again all at the same time3 at least it will be granted to us that the hypothesis of a turning backwards is almost meaningless in the sphere of conscious states4 ,a sensation1 by the mere fact of being prolonged1 is altered to the point of becoming unbearable4 ,the same does not here remain the same1 but is reinforced and swollen by the whole of its past4 ,in short1 while the material point1 as mechanics understands it1 remains in an eternal present1 the past is a reality perhaps for living bodies1 and certainly for conscious beings4 ,while past time is neither a gain nor a loss for a system assumed to be conservative1 it may be a gain for the living being1 and it is indisputably one for the conscious being4 ,such being the case1 is there not much to be said for the hypothesis of a conscious force or free will1 which1 subject to the action of time and storing up duration1 may thereby escape the law of the conservation of energy8 ,sidenote3 ,the idea of the universality of conservation depends on confusion between concrete duration and abstract time4 ,in truth1 it is not a wish to meet the requirements of positive science1 but rather a psychological mistake which has caused this abstract principle of mechanics to be set up as a universal law4 ,as we are not accustomed to observe ourselves directly1 but perceive ourselves through forms borrowed from the external world1 we are led to believe that real duration1 the duration lived by consciousness1 is the same as the duration which glides over the inert atoms without penetrating and altering them4 ,hence it is that we do not see any absurdity in putting things back in their place after a lapse of time1 in supposing the same motives acting afresh on the same persons1 and in concluding that these causes would again produce the same effect4 ,that such an hypothesis has no real meaning is what we shall prove later on4 ,for the present let us simply show that1 if once we enter upon this path1 we are of course led to set up the principle of the conservation of energy as a universal law4 ,for we have thereby got rid of just that difference between the outer and the inner world which a close examination shows to be the main one3 we have identified true duration with apparent duration4 ,after this it would be absurd to consider time1 even our time1 as a cause of gain or loss1 as a concrete reality1 or a force in its own way4 ,thus1 while we ought only to say 7if we kept aloof from all presuppositions concerning free will7 that the law of the conservation of energy governs physical phenomena and may1 one day1 be extended to all phenomena if psychological facts also prove favourable to it1 we go far beyond this1 and1 under the influence of a metaphysical prepossession1 we lay down the principle of the conservation of energy as a law which should govern all phenomena whatever1 or must be supposed to do so until psychological facts have actually spoken against it4 ,science1 properly so called1 has therefore nothing to do with all this4 ,we are simply confronted with a confusion between concrete duration and abstract time1 two very different things4 ,in a word1 the so-called physical determinism is reducible at bottom to a psychological determinism1 and it is this latter doctrine1 as we hinted at first1 that we have to examine4 ,sidenote3 ,psychological determinism depends on associationist conception of mind4 ,psychological determinism1 in its latest and most precise shape1 implies an associationist conception of mind4 ,the existing state of consciousness is first thought of as necessitated by the preceding states1 but it is soon realized that this cannot be a geometrical necessity1 such as that which connects a resultant1 for example1 with its components4 ,for between successive conscious states there exists a difference of quality which will always frustrate any attempt to deduce any one of them a priori from its predecessors4 ,so experience is appealed to1 with the object of showing that the transition from one psychic state to another can always be explained by some simple reason1 the second obeying as it were the call of the first4 ,experience really does show this3 and1 as for ourselves1 we shall willingly admit that there always is some relation between the existing state of consciousness and any new state to which consciousness passes4 ,but is this relation1 which explains the transition1 the cause of it8 ,sidenote3 ,the series of associations may be merely an ex post facto attempt to account for a new idea4 ,may we here give an account of what we have personally observed8 ,in resuming a conversation which had been interrupted for a few moments we have happened to notice that both we ourselves and our friend were thinking of some new object at the same time4--,the reason is1 it will be said1 that each has followed up for his own part the natural development of the idea at which the conversation had stopped3 the same series of associations has been formed on both sides4--,no doubt this interpretation holds good in a fairly large number of cases2 careful inquiry1 however1 has led us to an unexpected result4 ,it is a fact that the two speakers do connect the new subject of conversation with the former one3 they will even point out the intervening ideas2 but1 curiously enough1 they will not always connect the new idea1 which they have both reached1 with the same point of the preceding conversation1 and the two series of intervening associations may be quite different4 ,what are we to conclude from this1 if not that this common idea is due to an unknown cause--perhaps to some physical influence--and that1 in order to justify its emergence1 it has called forth a series of antecedents which explain it and which seem to be its cause1 but are really its effect8 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from hypnotic suggestion4 ,when a patient carries out at the appointed time the suggestion received in the hypnotic state1 the act which he performs is brought about1 according to him1 by the preceding series of his conscious states4 ,yet these states are really effects1 and not causes3 it was necessary that the act should take place2 it was also necessary that the patient should explain it to himself2 and it is the future act which determined1 by a kind of attraction1 the whole series of psychic states of which it is to be the natural consequence4 ,the determinists will seize on this argument3 it proves as a matter of fact that we are sometimes irresistibly subject to another's will4 ,but does it not also show us how our own will is capable of willing for willing's sake1 and of then leaving the act which has been performed to be explained by antecedents of which it has really been the cause8 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from deliberation4 ,if we question ourselves carefully1 we shall see that we sometimes weigh motives and deliberate over them1 when our mind is already made up4 ,an inner voice1 hardly perceivable1 whispers3 ,why this deliberation8 ,you know the result and you are quite certain of what you are going to do4 ,but no matter6 it seems that we make a point of safe-guarding the principle of mechanism and of conforming to the laws of the association of ideas4 ,the abrupt intervention of the will is a kind of coup d'tat which our mind foresees and which it tries to legitimate beforehand by a formal deliberation4 ,true1 it could be asked whether the will1 even when it wills for willing's sake1 does not obey some decisive reason1 and whether willing for willing's sake is free willing4 ,we shall not insist on this point for the moment4 ,it will be enough for us to have shown that1 even when adopting the point of view of associationism1 it is difficult to maintain that an act is absolutely determined by its motive and our conscious states by one another4 ,beneath these deceptive appearances a more attentive psychology sometimes reveals to us effects which precede their causes1 and phenomena of psychic attraction which elude the known laws of the association of ideas4 ,but the time has come to ask whether the very point of view which associationism adopts does not involve a defective conception of the self and of the multiplicity of conscious states4 ,sidenote3 ,associationism involves a defective conception of the self4 ,associationist determinism represents the self as a collection of psychic states1 the strongest of which exerts a prevailing influence and carries the others with it4 ,this doctrine thus sharply distinguishes co-existing psychic phenomena from one another4 ,i could have abstained from murder1 says ,stuart ,mill1 if my aversion to the crime and my dread of its consequences had been weaker than the temptation which impelled me to commit it4#b ,and a little further on3 ,his desire to do right and his aversion to doing wrong are strong enough to overcome 444 any other desire or aversion which may conflict with them4#c ,thus desire1 aversion1 fear1 temptation are here presented as distinct things which there is no inconvenience in naming separately4 ,even when he connects these states with the self which experiences them1 the ,english philosopher still insists on setting up clear-cut distinctions3 ,the conflict is between me and myself2 between 7for instance7 me desiring a pleasure and me dreading self-reproach4#d ,bain1 for his part1 devotes a whole chapter to the ,conflict of ,motives4#e ,in it he balances pleasures and pains as so many terms to which one might attribute1 at least by abstraction1 an existence of their own4 ,note that the opponents of determinism agree to follow it into this field4 ,they too speak of associations of ideas and conflicts of motives1 and one of the ablest of these philosophers1 ,alfred ,fouille1 goes so far as to make the idea of freedom itself a motive capable of counterbalancing others4#f ,here1 however1 lies the danger4 ,both parties commit themselves to a confusion which arises from language1 and which is due to the fact that language is not meant to convey all the delicate shades of inner states4 ,sidenote3 ,this erroneous tendency aided by language4 ,illustration4 ,i rise1 for example1 to open the window1 and ,i have hardly stood up before ,i forget what ,i had to do4--,all right1 it will be said2 you have associated two ideas1 that of an end to be attained and that of a movement to be accomplished3 one of the ideas has vanished and only the idea of the movement remains4--,however1 ,i do not sit down again2 ,i have a confused feeling that something remains to be done4 ,this particular standing still1 therefore1 is not the same as any other standing still2 in the position which ,i take up the act to be performed is as it were prefigured1 so that ,i have only to keep this position1 to study it1 or rather to feel it intimately1 in order to recover the idea which had vanished for a moment4 ,hence1 this idea must have tinged with a certain particular colouring the mental image of the intended movement and the position taken up1 and this colouring1 without doubt1 would not have been the same if the end to be attained had been different4 ,nevertheless language would have still expressed the movement and the position in the same way2 and associationism would have distinguished the two cases by saying that with the idea of the same movement there was associated this time the idea of a new end3 as if the mere newness of the end to be attained did not alter in some degree the idea of the movement to be performed1 even though the movement itself remained the same6 ,we should thus say1 not that the image of a certain position can be connected in consciousness with images of different ends to be attained1 but rather that positions geometrically identical outside look different to consciousness from the inside1 according to the end contemplated4 ,the mistake of associationism is that it first did away with the qualitative element in the act to be performed and retained only the geometrical and impersonal element3 with the idea of this act1 thus rendered colourless1 it was then necessary to associate some specific difference to distinguish it from many other acts4 ,but this association is the work of the associationist philosopher who is studying my mind1 rather than of my mind itself4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from associations of smell4 ,i smell a rose and immediately confused recollections of childhood come back to my memory4 ,in truth1 these recollections have not been called up by the perfume of the rose3 ,i breathe them in with the very scent2 it means all that to me4 ,to others it will smell differently4--,it is always the same scent1 you will say1 but associated with different ideas4--,i am quite willing that you should express yourself in this way2 but do not forget that you have first removed the personal element from the different impressions which the rose makes on each one of us2 you have retained only the objective aspect1 that part of the scent of the rose which is public property and thereby belongs to space4 ,only thus was it possible to give a name to the rose and its perfume4 ,you then found it necessary1 in order to distinguish our personal impressions from one another1 to add specific characteristics to the general idea of rose-scent4 ,and you now say that our different impressions1 our personal impressions1 result from the fact that we associate different recollections with rose-scent4 ,but the association of which you speak hardly exists except for you1 and as a method of explanation4 ,it is in this way that1 by setting side by side certain letters of an alphabet common to a number of known languages1 we may imitate fairly well such and such a characteristic sound belonging to a new one2 but not with any of these letters1 nor with all of them1 has the sound itself been built up4 ,sidenote3 ,associationism fails to distinguish between the multiplicity of juxtaposition and that of fusion4 ,we are thus brought back to the distinction which we set up above between the multiplicity of juxtaposition and that of fusion or interpenetration4 ,such and such a feeling such and such an idea1 contains an indefinite plurality of conscious states3 but the plurality will not be observed unless it is1 as it were1 spread out in this homogeneous medium which some call duration1 but which is in reality space4 ,we shall then perceive terms external to one another1 and these terms will no longer be the states of consciousness themselves1 but their symbols1 or1 speaking more exactly1 the words which express them4 ,there is1 as we have pointed out1 a close connexion between the faculty of conceiving a homogeneous medium1 such as space1 and that of thinking by means of general ideas4 ,as soon as we try to give an account of a conscious state1 to analyse it1 this state1 which is above all personal1 will be resolved into impersonal elements external to one another1 each of which calls up the idea of a genus and is expressed by a word4 ,but because our reason1 equipped with the idea of space and the power of creating symbols1 draws these multiple elements out of the whole1 it does not follow that they were contained in it4 ,for within the whole they did not occupy space and did not care to express themselves by means of symbols2 they permeated and melted into one another4 ,associationism thus makes the mistake of constantly replacing the concrete phenomenon which takes place in the mind by the artificial reconstruction of it given by philosophy1 and of thus confusing the explanation of the fact with the fact itself4 ,we shall perceive this more clearly as we consider deeper and more comprehensive psychic states4 ,sidenote3 ,failure of associationism to explain the deeper states of the self4 ,the self comes into contact with the external world at its surface2 and as this surface retains the imprint of objects1 the self will associate by contiguity terms which it has perceived in juxtaposition3 it is connexions of this kind1 connexions of quite simple and so to speak impersonal sensations1 that the associationist theory fits4 ,but1 just in proportion as we dig below the surface and get down to the real self1 do its states of consciousness cease to stand in juxtaposition and begin to permeate and melt into one another1 and each to be tinged with the colouring of all the others4 ,thus each of us has his own way of loving and hating2 and this love or this hatred reflects his whole personality4 ,language1 however1 denotes these states by the same words in every case3 so that it has been able to fix only the objective and impersonal aspect of love1 hate1 and the thousand emotions which stir the soul4 ,we estimate the talent of a novelist by the power with which he lifts out of the common domain1 to which language had thus brought them down1 feelings and ideas to which he strives to restore1 by adding detail to detail1 their original and living individuality4 ,but just as we can go on inserting points between two positions of a moving body without ever filling up the space traversed1 in the same way1 by the mere fact that we associate states with states and that these states are set side by side instead of permeating one another1 we fail to translate completely what our soul experiences3 there is no common measure between mind and language4 ,sidenote3 ,the self is not an aggregate of conscious states4 ,freedom is self-expression1 admitting of degrees1 and may be curtailed by education4 ,therefore1 it is only an inaccurate psychology1 misled by language1 which will show us the soul determined by sympathy1 aversion1 or hate as though by so many forces pressing upon it4 ,these feelings1 provided that they go deep enough1 each make up the whole soul1 since the whole content of the soul is reflected in each of them4 ,to say that the soul is determined under the influence of any one of these feelings is thus to recognize that it is self-determined4 ,the associationist reduces the self to an aggregate of conscious states3 sensations1 feelings1 and ideas4 ,but if he sees in these various states no more than is expressed in their name1 if he retains only their impersonal aspect1 he may set them side by side for ever without getting anything but a phantom self1 the shadow of the ego projecting itself into space4 ,if1 on the contrary1 he takes these psychic states with the particular colouring which they assume in the case of a definite person1 and which comes to each of them by reflection from all the others1 then there is no need to associate a number of conscious states in order to rebuild the person1 for the whole personality is in a single one of them1 provided that we know how to choose it4 ,and the outward manifestation of this inner state will be just what is called a free act1 since the self alone will have been the author of it1 and since it will express the whole of the self4 ,freedom1 thus understood1 is not absolute1 as a radically libertarian philosophy would have it2 it admits of degrees4 ,for it is by no means the case that all conscious states blend with one another as raindrops with the water of a lake4 ,the self1 in so far as it has to do with a homogeneous space1 develops on a kind of surface1 and on this surface independent growths may form and float4 ,thus a suggestion received in the hypnotic state is not incorporated in the mass of conscious states1 but1 endowed with a life of its own1 it will usurp the whole personality when its time comes4 ,a violent anger roused by some accidental circumstance1 an hereditary vice suddenly emerging from the obscure depths of the organism to the surface of consciousness1 will act almost like a hypnotic suggestion4 ,alongside these independent elements there may be found more complex series1 the terms of which do permeate one another1 but which never succeed in blending perfectly with the whole mass of the self4 ,such is the system of feelings and ideas which are the result of an education not properly assimilated1 an education which appeals to the memory rather than to the judgment4 ,here will be found1 within the fundamental self1 a parasitic self which continually encroaches upon the other4 ,many live this kind of life1 and die without having known true freedom4 ,but suggestion would become persuasion if the entire self assimilated it2 passion1 even sudden passion1 would no longer bear the stamp of fatality if the whole history of the person were reflected in it1 as in the indignation of ,alceste2#g and the most authoritative education would not curtail any of our freedom if it only imparted to us ideas and feelings capable of impregnating the whole soul4 ,it is the whole soul1 in fact1 which gives rise to the free decision3 and the act will be so much the freer the more the dynamic series with which it is connected tends to be the fundamental self4 ,sidenote3 ,our every-day acts obey the laws of association4 ,at great great crises our decisions are really free as expressing the fundamental self4 ,thus understood1 free acts are exceptional1 even on the part of those who are most given to controlling and reasoning out what they do4 ,it has been pointed out that we generally perceive our own self by refraction through space1 that our conscious states crystallize into words1 and that our living and concrete self thus gets covered with an outer crust of clean-cut psychic states1 which are separated from one another and consequently fixed4 ,we added that1 for the convenience of language and the promotion of social relations1 we have everything to gain by not breaking through this crust and by assuming it to give an exact outline of the form of the object which it covers4 ,it should now be added that our daily actions are called forth not so much by our feelings themselves1 which are constantly changing1 as by the unchanging images with which these feelings are bound up4 ,in the morning1 when the hour strikes at which ,i am accustomed to rise1 ,i might receive this impression 1 as ,plato says2 ,i might let it blend with the confused mass of impressions which fill my mind2 perhaps in that case it would not determine me to act4 ,but generally this impression1 instead of disturbing my whole consciousness like a stone which falls into the water of a pond1 merely stirs up an idea which is1 so to speak1 solidified on the surface1 the idea of rising and attending to my usual occupations4 ,this impression and this idea have in the end become tied up with one another1 so that the act follows the impression without the self interfering with it4 ,in this instance ,i am a conscious automaton1 and ,i am so because ,i have everything to gain by being so4 ,it will be found that the majority of our daily actions are performed in this way and that1 owing to the solidification in memory of such and such sensations1 feelings1 or ideas1 impressions from the outside call forth movements on our part which1 though conscious and even intelligent1 have many points of resemblance with reflex acts4 ,it is to these acts1 which are very numerous but for the most part insignificant1 that the associationist theory is applicable4 ,they are1 taken all together1 the substratum of our free activity1 and with respect to this activity they play the same part as our organic functions in relation to the whole of our conscious life4 ,moreover we will grant to determinism that we often resign our freedom in more serious circumstances1 and that1 by sluggishness or indolence1 we allow this same local process to run its course when our whole personality ought1 so to speak1 to vibrate4 ,when our most trustworthy friends agree in advising us to take some important step1 the sentiments which they utter with so much insistence lodge on the surface of our ego and there get solidified in the same way as the ideas of which we spoke just now4 ,little by little they will form a thick crust which will cover up our own sentiments2 we shall believe that we are acting freely1 and it is only by looking back to the past1 later on1 that we shall see how much we were mistaken4 ,but then1 at the very minute when the act is going to be performed1 something may revolt against it4 ,it is the deep-seated self rushing up to the surface4 ,it is the outer crust bursting1 suddenly giving way to an irresistible thrust4 ,hence in the depths of the self1 below this most reasonable pondering over most reasonable pieces of advice1 something else was going on--a gradual heating and a sudden boiling over of feelings and ideas1 not unperceived1 but rather unnoticed4 ,if we turn back to them and carefully scrutinize our memory1 we shall see that we had ourselves shaped these ideas1 ourselves lived these feelings1 but that1 through some strange reluctance to exercise our will1 we had thrust them back into the darkest depths of our soul whenever they came up to the surface4 ,and this is why we seek in vain to explain our sudden change of mind by the visible circumstances which preceded it4 ,we wish to know the reason why we have made up our mind1 and we find that we have decided without any reason1 and perhaps even against every reason4 ,but1 in certain cases1 that is the best of reasons4 ,for the action which has been performed does not then express some superficial idea1 almost external to ourselves1 distinct and easy to account for3 it agrees with the whole of our most intimate feelings1 thoughts and aspirations1 with that particular conception of life which is the equivalent of all our past experience1 in a word1 with our personal idea of happiness and of honour4 ,hence it has been a mistake to look for examples in the ordinary and even indifferent circumstances of life in order to prove that man is capable of choosing without a motive4 ,it might easily be shown that these insignificant actions are bound up with some determining reason4 ,it is at the great and solemn crisis1 decisive of our reputation with others1 and yet more with ourselves1 that we choose in defiance of what is conventionally called a motive1 and this absence of any tangible reason is the more striking the deeper our freedom goes4 ,sidenote3 ,determinism sets on the one side the ego1 always self-identical and on the other contrary feelings4 ,but this is mere symbolism4 ,but the determinist1 even when he refrains from regarding the more serious emotions or deep-seated psychic states as forces1 nevertheless distinguishes them from one another and is thus led to a mechanical conception of the self4 ,he will show us this self hesitating between two contrary feelings1 passing from one to the other and finally deciding in favour of one of them4 ,the self and the feelings which stir it are thus treated as well defined objects1 which remain identical during the whole of the process4 ,but if it is always the same self which deliberates1 and if the two opposite feelings by which it is moved do not change1 how1 in virtue of this very principle of causality which determinism appeals to1 will the self ever come to a decision8 ,the truth is that the self1 by the mere fact of experiencing the first feeling1 has already changed to a slight extent when the second supervenes3 all the time that the deliberation is going on1 the self is changing and is consequently modifying the two feelings which agitate it4 ,a dynamic series of states is thus formed which permeate and strengthen one another1 and which will lead by a natural evolution to a free act4 ,but determinism1 ever craving for symbolical representation1 cannot help substituting words for the opposite feelings which share the ego between them1 as well as for the ego itself4 ,by giving first the person and then the feelings by which he is moved a fixed form by means of sharply defined words1 it deprives them in advance of every kind of living activity4 ,it will then see on the one side an ego always self-identical1 and on the other contrary feelings1 also self-identical1 which dispute for its possession2 victory will necessarily belong to the stronger4 ,but this mechanism1 to which we have condemned ourselves in advance1 has no value beyond that of a symbolical representation3 it cannot hold good against the witness of an attentive consciousness1 which shows us inner dynamism as a fact4 ,sidenote3 ,freedom and character4 ,the determinist next asks1 could your act have been different or can it be foretold8 ,in short1 we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality1 when they express it1 when that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between the artist and his work4 ,it is no use asserting that we are then yielding to the all-powerful influence of our character4 ,our character is still ourselves2 and because we are pleased to split the person into two parts so that by an effort of abstraction we may consider in turn the self which feels or thinks and the self which acts1 it would be very strange to conclude that one of the two selves is coercing the other4 ,those who ask whether we are free to alter our character lay themselves open to the same objection4 ,certainly our character is altering imperceptibly every day1 and our freedom would suffer if these new acquisitions were grafted on to our self and not blended with it4 ,but1 as soon as this blending takes place1 it must be admitted that the change which has supervened in our character belongs to us1 that we have appropriated it4 ,in a word1 if it is agreed to call every act free which springs from the self and from the self alone1 the act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free1 for our self alone will lay claim to its paternity4 ,it would thus be recognized that free will is a fact1 if it were agreed to look for it in a certain characteristic of the decision which is taken1 in the free act itself4 ,but the determinist feeling that he cannot retain his hold on this position1 takes refuge in the past or the future4 ,sometimes he transfers himself in thought to some earlier period and asserts the necessary determination1 from this very moment1 of the act which is to come2 sometimes1 assuming in advance that the act is already performed1 he claims that it could not have taken place in any other way4 ,the opponents of determinism themselves willingly follow it on to this new ground and agree to introduce into their definition of our free act -perhaps not without some risk--the anticipation of what we might do and the recollection of some other decision which we might have taken4 ,it is advisable1 then1 that we should place ourselves at this new point of view1 and1 setting aside all translation into words1 all symbolism in space1 attend to what pure consciousness alone shows us about an action that has come to pass or an action which is still to come4 ,the original error of determinism and the mistake of its opponents will thus be grasped on another side1 in so far as they bear explicitly on a certain misconception of duration4 ,sidenote3 ,determinist and libertarian doctrines of possible acts4 ,to be conscious of free will1 says ,stuart ,mill1 must mean to be conscious1 before ,i have decided1 that ,i am able to decide either way4#h ,this is really the way in which the defenders of free will understand it2 and they assert that when we perform an action freely1 some other action would have been equally possible4 ,on this point they appeal to the testimony of consciousness1 which shows us1 beyond the act itself1 the power of deciding in favour of the opposite course4 ,inversely1 determinism claims that1 given certain antecedents1 only one resultant action was possible4 ,when we think of ourselves hypothetically1 ,stuart ,mill goes on1 as having acted otherwise than we did1 we always suppose a difference in the antecedents4 ,we picture ourselves as having known something that we did not know1 or not known something that we did know4#i ,and1 faithful to his principle1 the ,english philosopher assigns consciousness the rle of informing us about what is1 not about what might be4 ,we shall not insist for the moment on this last point3 we reserve the question in what sense the ego perceives itself as a determining cause4 ,but beside this psychological question there is another1 belonging rather to metaphysics1 which the determinists and their opponents solve a priori along opposite lines4 ,the argument of the former implies that there is only one possible act corresponding to given antecedents3 the believers in free will assume1 on the other hand1 that the same series could issue in several different acts1 equally possible4 ,it is on this question of the equal possibility of two contrary actions or volitions that we shall first dwell3 perhaps we shall thus gather some indication as to the nature of the operation by which the will makes its choice4 ,sidenote3 ,geometrical 7and thereby deceptive7 representation of the process of coming to a decision4 ,i hesitate between two possible actions ,x and ,y1 and ,i go in turn from one to the other4 ,this means that ,i pass through a series of states1 and that these states can be divided into two groups according as ,i incline more towards ,x or in the contrary direction4 ,indeed1 these opposite inclinations alone have a real existence1 and ,x and ,y are two symbols by which ,i represent at their arrival-or termination-points1 so to speak1 two different tendencies of my personality at successive moments of duration4 ,let us then rather denote the tendencies themselves by ,x and ,y2 will this new notation give a more faithful image of the concrete reality8 ,it must be noticed1 as we said above1 that the self grows1 expands1 and changes as it passes through the two contrary states3 if not1 how would it ever come to a decision8 ,hence there are not exactly two contrary states1 but a large number of successive and different states within which ,i distinguish1 by an effort of imagination1 two opposite directions4 ,illustration ,thus we shall get still nearer the reality by agreeing to use the invariable signs ,x and ,y to denote1 not these tendencies or states themselves1 since they are constantly changing1 but the two different directions which our imagination ascribes to them for the greater convenience of language4 ,it will also be understood that these are symbolical representations1 that in reality there are not two tendencies1 or even two directions1 but a self which lives and develops by means of its very hesitations1 until the free action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit4 ,sidenote3 ,the only reality is the living developing self1 in which we distinguish by abstraction two opposite tendencies or directions4 ,but this conception of voluntary activity does not satisfy common sense1 because1 being essentially a devotee of mechanism1 it loves clear-cut distinctions1 those which are expressed by sharply defined words or by different positions in space4 ,hence it will picture a self which1 after having traversed a series ,m ,o of conscious states1 when it reaches the point ,o finds before it two directions ,o ,x and ,o ,y1 equally open4 ,these directions thus become things1 real paths into which the highroad of consciousness leads1 and it depends only on the self which of them is entered upon4 ,in short1 the continuous and living activity of this self1 in which we have distinguished1 by abstraction only1 two opposite directions1 is replaced by these directions themselves1 transformed into indifferent inert things awaiting our choice4 ,but then we must certainly transfer the activity of the self somewhere or other4 ,we will put it1 according to this hypothesis1 at the point ,o3 we will say that the self1 when it reaches ,o and finds two courses open to it1 hesitates1 deliberates and finally decides in favour of one of them4 ,as we find it difficult to picture the double direction of the conscious activity in all the phases of its continuous development1 we separate off these two tendencies on the one hand and the activity of the self on the other3 we thus get an impartially active ego hesitating between two inert and1 as it were1 solidified courses of action4 ,now1 if it decides in favour of ,o ,x1 the line ,o ,y will nevertheless remain2 if it chooses ,o ,y1 the path ,o ,x will remain open1 waiting in case the self retraces its steps in order to make use of it4 ,it is in this sense that we say1 when speaking of a free act1 that the contrary action was equally possible4 ,and1 even if we do not draw a geometrical figure on paper1 we involuntarily and almost unconsciously think of it as soon as we distinguish in the free act a number of successive phases1 the conception of opposite motives1 hesitation and choice--thus hiding the geometrical symbolism under a kind of verbal crystallization4 ,now it is easy to see that this really mechanical conception of freedom issues naturally and logically in the most unbending determinism4 ,sidenote3 ,if this symbolism represents the facts1 the activity of the self has always tended in one direction1 and determinism results4 ,the living activity of the self1 in which we distinguish by abstraction two opposite tendencies1 will finally issue either at ,x or ,y4 ,now1 since it is agreed to localize the double activity of the self at the point ,o1 there is no reason to separate this activity from the act in which it will issue and which forms part and parcel of it4 ,and if experience shows that the decision has been in favour of ,x1 it is not a neutral activity which should be placed at the point ,o1 but an activity tending in advance in the direction ,o ,x1 in spite of apparent hesitations4 ,if1 on the contrary1 observation proves that the decision has been in favour of ,y1 we must infer that the activity localized by us at the point ,o was bent in this second direction in spite of some oscillations towards the first4 ,to assert that the self1 when it reaches the point ,o1 chooses indifferently between ,x and ,y1 is to stop half way in the course of our geometrical symbolism2 it is to separate off at the point ,o only a part of this continuous activity in which we undoubtedly distinguished two different directions1 but which in addition has gone on to ,x or ,y3 why not take this last fact into account as well as the other two8 ,why not assign it the place that belongs to it in the symbolical figure which we have just constructed8 ,but if the self1 when it reaches the point ,o1 is already determined in one direction1 there is no use in the other way remaining open1 the self cannot take it4 ,and the same rough symbolism which was meant to show the contingency of the action performed1 ends1 by a natural extension1 in proving its absolute necessity4 ,sidenote3 ,libertarians ignore the fact that one path has been chosen1 and not the other4 ,in short1 defenders and opponents of free will agree in holding that the action is preceded by a kind of mechanical oscillation between two points ,x and ,y4 ,if ,i decide in favour of ,x1 the former will tell me3 you hesitated and deliberated1 therefore ,y was possible4 ,the others will answer3 you chose ,x1 therefore you had some reason for doing so1 and those who declare that ,y was equally possible forget this reason3 they leave aside one of the conditions of the problem4 ,now1 if ,i dig deeper underneath these two opposite solutions1 ,i discover a common postulate3 both take up their position after the action ,x has been performed1 and represent the process of my voluntary activity by a path ,m ,o which branches off at the point ,o1 the lines ,o ,x and ,o ,y symbolizing the two directions which abstraction distinguishes within the continuous activity of which ,x is the goal4 ,but while the determinists take account of all that they know1 and note that the path ,m ,o ,x has been traversed1 their opponents mean to ignore one of the data with which they have constructed the figure1 and after having traced out the lines ,o ,x and ,o ,y1 which should together represent the progress of the activity of the self1 they bring back the self to the point ,o to oscillate there until further orders4 ,sidenote3 ,but the figure merely gives the stereotyped memory of the process1 and not the dynamic progress which issued in the set4 ,it should not be forgotten1 indeed1 that the figure1 which is really a splitting of our psychic activity in space1 is purely symbolical1 and as such1 cannot be constructed unless we adopt the hypothesis that our deliberation is finished and our mind made up4 ,if you trace it beforehand1 act you assume that you have reached the end and are present in imagination at the final act4 ,in short this figure does not show me the deed in the doing but the deed already done4 ,do not ask me then whether the self1 having traversed the path ,m ,o and decided in favour of ,x1 could or could not choose ,y3 ,i should answer that the question is meaningless1 because there is no line ,m ,o1 no point ,o1 no path ,o ,x1 no direction ,o ,y4 ,to ask such a question is to admit the possibility of adequately representing time by space and a succession by a simultaneity4 ,it is to ascribe to the figure we have traced the value of a description1 and not merely of a symbol2 it is to believe that it is possible to follow the process of psychic activity on this figure like the march of an army on a map4 ,we have been present at the deliberation of the self in all its phases until the act was performed3 then1 recapitulating the terms of the series1 we perceive succession under the form of simultaneity1 we project time into space1 and we base our reasoning1 consciously or unconsciously1 on this geometrical figure4 ,but this figure represents a thing and not a progress2 it corresponds1 in its inertness1 to a kind of stereotyped memory of the whole process of deliberation and the final decision arrived at3 how could it give us the least idea of the concrete movement1 the dynamic progress by which the deliberation issued in the act8 ,and yet1 once the figure is constructed1 we go back in imagination into the past and will have it that our psychic activity has followed exactly the path traced out by the figure4 ,we thus fall into the mistake which has been pointed out above3 we give a mechanical explanation of a fact1 and then substitute the explanation for the fact itself4 ,hence we encounter insuperable difficulties from the very beginning3 if the two courses were equally possible1 how have we made our choice8 ,if only one of them was possible1 why did we believe ourselves free8 ,and we do not see that both questions come back to this3 ,is time space8 ,sidenote3 ,fundamental error is confusion of time and space4 ,the self infallible in affirming immediate experience of freedom1 but cannot explain it4 ,if ,i glance over a road marked on the map and follow it up to a certain point1 there is nothing to prevent my turning back and trying to find out whether it branches off anywhere4 ,but time is not a line along which one can pass again4 ,certainly1 once it has elapsed1 we are justified in picturing the successive moments as external to one another and in thus thinking of a line traversing space2 but it must then be understood that this line does not symbolize the time which is passing but the time which has passed4 ,defenders and opponents of free will alike forget this--the former when they assert1 and the latter when they deny the possibility of acting differently from what we have done4 ,the former reason thus3 ,the path is not yet traced out1 therefore it may take any direction whatever4 ,to which the answer is3 ,you forget that it is not possible to speak of a path till the action is performed3 but then it will have been traced out4 ,the latter say3 ,the path has been traced out in such and such a way3 therefore its possible direction was not any direction whatever1 but only this one direction4 ,to which the answer is3 ,before the path was traced out there was no direction1 either possible or impossible1 for the very simple reason that there could not yet be any question of a path4 ,get rid of this clumsy symbolism1 the idea of which besets you without your knowing it2 you will see that the argument of the determinists assumes this puerile form3 ,the act1 once performed1 is performed1 and that their opponents reply3 ,the act1 before being performed1 was not yet performed4 ,in other words1 the question of freedom remains after this discussion exactly where it was to begin with2 nor must we be surprised at it1 since freedom must be sought in a certain shade or quality of the action itself and not in the relation of this act to what it is not or to what it might have been4 ,all the difficulty arises from the fact that both parties picture the deliberation under the form of an oscillation in space1 while it really consists in a dynamic progress in which the self and its motives1 like real living beings1 are in a constant state of becoming4 ,the self1 infallible when it affirms its immediate experiences1 feels itself free and says so2 but1 as soon as it tries to explain its freedom to itself1 it no longer perceives itself except by a kind of refraction through space4 ,hence a symbolism of a mechanical kind1 equally incapable of proving1 disproving1 or illustrating free will4 ,sidenote3 ,is prediction of an act possible8 ,probable and infallible conclusions4 ,but determinism will not admit itself beaten1 and1 putting the question in a new form1 it will say3 ,let us leave aside actions already performed3 let us consider only actions that are to come4 ,the question is whether1 knowing from now onwards all the future antecedents1 some higher intelligence would not be able to predict with absolute certainty the decision which will result4--,we gladly agree to the question being put in these terms3 it will give us a chance of stating our own theory with greater precision4 ,but we shall first draw a distinction between those who think that the knowledge of antecedents would enable us to state a probable conclusion and those who speak of an infallible foresight4 ,to say that a certain friend1 under certain circumstances1 will very probably act in a certain way1 is not so much to predict the future conduct of our friend as to pass a judgment on his present character1 that is to say1 on his past4 ,although our feelings1 our ideas1 our character1 are constantly altering1 a sudden change is seldom observed2 and it is still more seldom that we cannot say of a person whom we know that certain actions seem to accord fairly well with his nature and that certain others are absolutely inconsistent with it4 ,all philosophers will agree on this point2 for to say that a given action is consistent or inconsistent with the present character of a person whom one knows is not to bind the future to the present4 ,but the determinist goes much further3 he asserts that our solution is provisional simply because we never know all the conditions of the problem3 that our forecast would gain in probability in proportion as we were provided with a larger number of these conditions2 that1 therefore1 complete and perfect knowledge of all the antecedents without any exception would make our forecast infallibly true4 ,such1 then1 is the hypothesis which we have to examine4 ,sidenote3 ,to know completely the antecedents and conditions of an action is to be actually performing it4 ,for the sake of greater definiteness1 let us imagine a person called upon to make a seemingly free decision under serious circumstances3 we shall call him ,peter4 ,the question is whether a philosopher ,paul1 living at the same period as ,peter1 or1 if you prefer1 a few centuries before1 would have been able1 knowing all the conditions under which ,peter acts1 to foretell with certainty the choice which ,peter made4 ,there are several ways of picturing the mental condition of a person at a given moment4 ,we try to do it when e4g4 we read a novel2 but whatever care the author may have taken in depicting the feelings of his hero1 and even in tracing back his history1 the end1 foreseen or unforeseen1 will add something to the idea which we had formed of the character3 the character1 therefore1 was only imperfectly known to us4 ,in truth1 the deeper psychic states1 those which are translated by free acts1 express and sum up the whole of our past history3 if ,paul knows all the conditions under which ,peter acts1 we must suppose that no detail of ,peter's life escapes him1 and that his imagination reconstructs and even lives over again ,peter's history4 ,but we must here make a vital distinction4 ,when ,i myself pass through a certain psychic state1 ,i know exactly the intensity of this state and its importance in relation to the others1 not by measurement or comparison1 but because the intensity of e4g4 a deep-seated feeling is nothing else than the feeling itself4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i try to give you an account of this psychic state1 ,i shall be unable to make you realize its intensity except by some definite sign of a mathematical kind3 ,i shall have to measure its importance1 compare it with what goes before and what follows1 in short determine the part which it plays in the final act4 ,and ,i shall say that it is more or less intense1 more or less important1 according as the final act is explained by it or apart from it4 ,on the other hand1 for my own consciousness1 which perceived this inner state1 there was no need of a comparison of this kind3 the intensity was given to it as an inexpressible quality of the state itself4 ,in other words1 the intensity of a psychic state is not given to consciousness as a special sign accompanying this state and denoting its power1 like an exponent in algebra2 we have shown above that it expresses rather its shade1 its characteristic colouring1 and that1 if it is a question of a feeling1 for example1 its intensity consists in being felt4 ,hence we have to distinguish two ways of assimilating the conscious states of other people3 the one dynamic1 which consists in experiencing them oneself2 the other static1 which consists in substituting for the consciousness of these states their image or rather their intellectual symbol1 their idea4 ,in this case the conscious states are imagined instead of being reproduced2 but1 then1 to the image of the psychic states themselves some indication of their intensity should be added1 since they no longer act on the person in whose mind they are pictured and the latter has no longer any chance of experiencing their force by actually feeling them4 ,now1 this indication itself will necessarily assume a quantitative character3 it will be pointed out1 for example1 that a certain feeling has more strength than another feeling1 that it is necessary to take more account of it1 that it has played a greater part2 and how could this be known unless the later history of the person were known in advance1 with the precise actions in which this multiplicity of states or inclinations has issued8 ,therefore1 if ,paul is to have an adequate idea of ,peter's state at any moment of his history1 there are only two courses open2 either1 like a novelist who knows whither he is conducting his characters1 ,paul must already know ,peter's final act1 and must thus be able to supplement his mental image of the successive states through which ,peter is going to pass by some indication of their value in relation to the whole of ,peter's history2 or he must make up his mind to pass through these different states1 not in imagination1 but in reality4 ,the former hypothesis must be put on one side since the very point at issue is whether1 the antecedents alone being given1 ,paul will be able to foresee the final act4 ,we find ourselves compelled1 therefore1 to alter radically the idea which we had formed of ,paul3 he is not1 as we had thought at first1 a spectator whose eyes pierce the future1 but an actor who plays ,peter's part in advance4 ,and notice that you cannot exempt him from any detail of this part1 for the most common-place events have their importance in a life-story2 and even supposing that they have not1 you cannot decide that they are insignificant except in relation to the final act1 which1 by hypothesis1 is not given4 ,neither have you the right to cut short--were it only by a second--the different states of consciousness through which ,paul is going to pass before ,peter2 for the effects of the same feeling1 for example1 go on accumulating at every moment of duration1 and the sum total of these effects could not be realized all at once unless one knew the importance of the feeling1 taken in its totality1 in relation to the final act1 which is the very thing that is supposed to remain unknown4 ,but if ,peter and ,paul have experienced the same feelings in the same order1 if their minds have the same history1 how will you distinguish one from the other8 ,will it be by the body in which they dwell8 ,they would then always differ in some respect1 viz41 that at no moment of their history would they have a mental picture of the same body4 ,will it be by the place which they occupy in time8 ,in that case they would no longer be present at the same events3 now1 by hypothesis1 they have the same past and the same present1 having the same experience4 ,you must now make up your mind about it3 ,peter and ,paul are one and the same person1 whom you call ,peter when he acts and ,paul when you recapitulate his history4 ,the more complete you made the sum of the conditions which1 when known1 would have enabled you to predict ,peter's future action1 the closer became your grasp of his existence and the nearer you came to living his life over again down to its smallest details3 you thus reached the very moment when1 the action taking place1 there was no longer anything to be foreseen1 but only something to be done4 ,here again any attempt to reconstruct ideally an act really willed ends in the mere witnessing of the act whilst it is being performed or when it is already done4 ,sidenote3 ,hence meaningless to ask whether an act can be foreseen when all its antecedents are given4 ,hence it is a question devoid of meaning to ask3 ,could or could not the act be foreseen1 given the sum total of its antecedents8 ,for there are two ways of assimilating these antecedents1 the one dynamic the other static4 ,in the first case we shall be led by imperceptible steps to identify ourselves with the person we are dealing with1 to pass through the same series of states1 and thus to get back to the very moment at which the act is performed2 hence there can no longer be any question of foreseeing it4 ,in the second case1 we presuppose the final act by the mere fact of annexing to the qualitative description of the previous states the quantitative appreciation of their importance4 ,here again the one party is led merely to realize that the act is not yet performed when it is to be performed1 and the other1 that when performed it is performed4 ,this1 like the previous discussion1 leaves the question of freedom exactly where it was to begin with4 ,sidenote3 ,the two fallacies involved3 7#a7 regarding intensity as a magnitude1 not a quality2 7#b7 substituting material symbol for dynamic process4 ,by going deeper into this twofold argument1 we shall find1 at its very root1 the two fundamental illusions of the reflective consciousness4 ,the first consists in regarding3 intensity as a mathematical property of psychic states and not1 as we said at the beginning of this essay1 as a special quality1 as a particular shade of these various states4 ,the second consists in substituting for the concrete reality or dynamic progress1 which consciousness perceives1 the material symbol of this progress when it has already reached its end1 that is to say1 of the act already accomplished together with the series of its antecedents4 ,certainly1 once the final act is completed1 ,i can ascribe to all the antecedents their proper value1 and picture the interplay of these various elements as a conflict or a composition of forces4 ,but to ask whether1 the antecedents being known as well as their value1 one could foretell the final act1 is to beg the question2 it is to forget that we cannot know the value of the antecedents without knowing the final act1 which is the very thing that is not yet known2 it is to suppose wrongly that the symbolical diagram which we draw in our own way for representing the action when completed has been drawn by the action itself whilst progressing1 and drawn by it in an automatic manner4 ,sidenote3 ,claiming to foresee an action always comes back to confusing time with space4 ,now1 in these two illusions themselves a third one is involved1 and you will see that the question whether the act could or could not be foreseen always comes back to this3 ,is time space8 ,you begin by setting side by side in some ideal space the conscious states which succeed one another in ,peter's mind1 and you perceive his life as a kind of path ,m ,o ,x ,y traced out by a moving body ,m in space4 ,you then blot out in thought the part ,o ,x ,y of this curve1 and you inquire whether1 knowing ,m ,o1 you would have been able to determine the portion ,o ,x of the curve which the moving body describes beyond ,o4 ,illustration ,such is1 in the main1 the question which you put when you bring in a philosopher ,paul1 who lives before ,peter and has to picture to himself the conditions under which ,peter will act4 ,you thus materialize these conditions2 you make the time to come into a road already marked out across the plain1 which we can contemplate from the top of the mountain1 even if we have not traversed it and are never to do so4 ,but1 now1 you soon notice that the knowledge of the part ,m ,o of the curve would not be enough1 unless you were shown the position of the points of this line1 not only in relation to one another1 but also in relation to the points of the whole line ,m ,o ,x ,y2 which would amount to being given in advance the very elements which have to be determined4 ,so you then alter your hypothesis2 you realize that time does not require to be seen1 but to be lived2 and hence you conclude that1 if your knowledge of the line ,m ,o was not a sufficient datum1 the reason must have been that you looked at it from the outside instead of identifying yourself with the point ,m1 which describes not only ,m ,o but also the whole curve1 and thus making its movement your own4 ,therefore1 you persuade ,paul to come and coincide with ,peter2 and naturally1 then1 it is the line ,m ,o ,x ,y which ,paul traces out in space1 since1 by hypothesis1 ,peter describes this line4 ,but in no wise do you prove thus that ,paul foresaw ,peter's action2 you only show that ,peter acted in the way he did1 since ,paul became ,peter4 ,it is true that you then come back1 unwittingly1 to your former hypothesis1 because you continually confuse the line ,m ,o ,x ,y in its tracing with the line ,m ,o ,x ,y already traced1 that is to say1 time with space4 ,after causing ,paul to come down and identify himself with ,peter as long as was required1 you let him go up again and resume his former post of observation4 ,no wonder if he then perceives the line ,m ,o ,x ,y complete3 he himself has just been completing it4 ,sidenote3 ,confusion arising from prediction of astronomical phenomena4 ,what makes the confusion a natural and almost an unavoidable one is that science seems to point to many cases where we do anticipate the future4 ,do we not determine beforehand the conjunctions of heavenly bodies1 solar and lunar eclipses1 in short the greater number of astronomical phenomena8 ,does not1 then1 the human intellect embrace in the present moment immense intervals of duration still to come8 ,no doubt it does2 but an anticipation of this kind has not the slightest resemblance to the anticipation of a voluntary act4 ,indeed1 as we shall see1 the reasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenon are the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an act which springs from our free activity4 ,for the future of the material universe1 although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being1 has no analogy to it4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from hypothetical acceleration of physical movements4 ,in order to put our finger on this vital difference1 let us assume for a moment that some mischievous illustration genius1 more powerful still than the mischievous genius conjured up by ,descartes decreed that all the movements of the universe should go twice as fast4 ,there would be no change in astronomical phenomena1 or at any rate in the equations which enable us to foresee them1 for in these equations the symbol t does not stand for a duration1 but for a relation between two durations1 for a certain number of units of time1 in short1 for a certain number of simultaneities3 these simultaneities1 these coincidences would still take place in equal number3 only the intervals which separate them would have diminished1 but these intervals never make their appearance in our calculations4 ,now these intervals are just duration lived1 duration which our consciousness perceives1 and our consciousness would soon inform us of a shortening of the day if we had not experienced the usual amount of duration between sunrise and sunset4 ,no doubt it would not measure this shortening1 and perhaps it would not even perceive it immediately as a change of quantity2 but it would realize in some way or other a decline in the usual storing up of experience1 a change in the progress usually accomplished between sunrise and sunset4 ,sidenote3 ,astronomical prophecy such as acceleration4 ,now1 when an astronomer foretells e4g4 a lunar eclipse1 he merely exercises in his own way the power which we have ascribed to our mischievous genius4 ,he decrees that time shall go ten times1 a hundred times1 a thousand times as fast1 and he has a right to do so1 since all that he thus changes is the nature of the conscious intervals1 and since these intervals1 by hypothesis1 do not enter into the calculations4 ,therefore1 into a psychological duration of a few seconds he may put several years1 even several centuries of astronomical time3 that is his procedure when he traces in advance the path of a heavenly body or represents it by an equation4 ,what he does is nothing but establishing a series of relations of position between this body and other given bodies1 a series of simultaneities and coincidences1 a series of numerical relations3 as for duration properly so called1 it remains outside the calculation and could only be perceived by a consciousness capable of living through the intervals and1 in fact1 living the intervals themselves1 instead of merely perceiving their extremities4 ,indeed it is even conceivable that this consciousness could live so slow and lazy a life as to take in the whole path of the heavenly body in a single perception1 just as we do when we perceive the successive positions of a shooting star as one line of fire4 ,such a consciousness would find itself really in the same conditions in which the astronomer places himself ideally2 it would see in the present what the astronomer perceives in the future4 ,in truth1 if the latter foresees a future phenomenon1 it is only on condition of making it to a certain extent a present phenomenon1 or at least of enormously reducing the interval which separates us from it4 ,in short1 the time of which we speak in astronomy is a number1 and the nature of the units of this number cannot be specified in our calculations2 we may therefore assume them to be as small as we please1 provided that the same hypothesis is extended to the whole series of operations1 and that the successive relations of position in space are thus preserved4 ,we shall then be present in imagination at the phenomenon we wish to foretell2 we shall know exactly at what point in space and after how many units of time this phenomenon takes place2 if we then restore to these units their psychical nature1 we shall thrust the event again into the future and say that we have foreseen it1 when in reality we have seen it4 ,sidenote3 ,in dealing with states of consciousness we cannot vary their duration without altering their nature4 ,but these units of time which make up living duration1 and which the astronomer can dispose of as he pleases because they give no handle to science1 are just what concern the psychologist1 for psychology deals with the intervals themselves and not with their extremities4 ,certainly pure consciousness does not perceive time as a sum of units of duration3 left to itself1 it has no means and even no reason to measure time2 but a feeling which lasted only half the number of days1 for example1 would no longer be the same feeling for it2 it would lack thousands of impressions which gradually thickened its substance and altered its colour4 ,true1 when we give this feeling a certain name1 when we treat it as a thing1 we believe that we can diminish its duration by half1 for example1 and also halve the duration of all the rest of our history3 it seems that it would still be the same life1 only on a reduced scale4 ,but we forget that states of consciousness are processes1 and not things2 that if we denote them each by a single word1 it is for the convenience of language2 that they are alive and therefore constantly changing2 that1 in consequence1 it is impossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by the loss of some impression1 and thus altering their quality4 ,i quite understand that the orbit of a planet might be perceived all at once or in a very short time1 because its successive positions or the results of its movement are the only things that matter1 and not the duration of the equal intervals which separate them4 ,but when we have to do with a feeling1 it has no precise result except its having been felt2 and1 to estimate this result adequately1 it would be necessary to have gone through all the phases of the feeling itself and to have taken up the same duration4 ,even if this feeling has finally issued in some definite action1 which might be compared to the definite position of a planet in space1 the knowledge of this act will hardly enable us to estimate the influence of the feeling on the whole of a life-story1 and it is this very influence which we want to know4 ,all foreseeing is in reality seeing1 and this seeing takes place when we can reduce as much as we please an interval of future time while preserving the relation of its parts to one another1 as happens in the case of astronomical predictions4 ,but what does reducing an interval of time mean1 except emptying or impoverishing the conscious states which fill it8 ,and does not the very possibility of seeing an astronomical period in miniature thus imply the impossibility of modifying a psychological series in the same way1 since it is only by taking this psychological series as an invariable basis that we shall be able to make an astronomical period vary arbitrarily as regards the unit of duration8 ,sidenote3 ,difference between past and future duration in this respect4 ,thus1 when we ask whether a future action could have been foreseen1 we unwittingly identify that time with which we have to do in the exact sciences1 and which is reducible to a number1 with real duration1 whose so-called quantity is really a quality1 and which we cannot curtail by an instant without altering the nature of the facts which fill it4 ,no doubt the identification is made easier by the fact that in a large number of cases we are justified in dealing with real duration as with astronomical time4 ,thus1 when we call to mind the past1 i4e4 a series of deeds done1 we always shorten it1 without however distorting the nature of the event which interests us4 ,the reason is that we know it already2 for the psychic state1 when it reaches the end of the progress which constitutes its very existence1 becomes a thing which one can picture to oneself all at once4 ,here we find ourselves in the same position as the astronomer1 when he takes in at a glance the orbit which a planet will need several years to traverse4 ,in fact1 astronomical prediction should be compared with the recollection of the past state of consciousness1 not with the anticipation of the future one4 ,but when we have to determine a future state of consciousness1 however superficial it may be1 we can no longer view the antecedents in a static condition as things2 we must view them in a dynamic condition as processes1 since we are concerned with their influence alone4 ,now their duration is this very influence4 ,therefore it will no longer do to shorten future duration in order to picture its parts beforehand2 one is bound to live this duration whilst it is unfolding4 ,as far as deep-seated psychic states are concerned1 there is no perceptible difference between foreseeing1 seeing1 and acting4 ,sidenote3 ,the determinist argument that psychic phenomena are subject to the law same antecedents1 same consequent4 ,only one course will remain open to the determinist4 ,he will probably give up asserting the possibility of foreseeing a certain future act or state of consciousness1 but will maintain that every act is determined by its psychic antecedents1 or1 in other words1 that the facts of consciousness1 went1 the phenomena of nature1 are subject to laws4 ,this way of arguing means1 at bottom1 that he will leave out the particular features of the concrete psychic states1 lest he find himself confronted by phenomena which defy all symbolical representation and therefore all anticipation4 ,the particular nature of these phenomena is thus thrust out of sight1 but it is asserted that1 being phenomena1 they must remain subject to the law of causality4 ,now1 it is argued1 this law means that every phenomenon is determined by its conditions1 or1 in other words1 that the same causes produce the same effects4 ,either1 then1 the act is inseparably bound to its antecedents1 or the principle of causality admits of an incomprehensible exception4 ,sidenote3 ,but as regards inner states the same antecedents will never recur4 ,this last form of the determinist argument differs less than might be thought from all the others which have been examined above4 ,to say that the same inner causes will reproduce the same effects is to assume that the same cause can appear a second time on the stage of consciousness4 ,now1 if duration is what we say1 deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other1 and it is impossible that any two of them should be quite alike1 since they are two different moments of a life-story4 ,while the external object does not bear the mark of the time that has elapsed and thus1 in spite of the difference of time1 the physicist can again encounter identical elementary conditions1 duration is something real for the consciousness which preserves the trace of it1 and we cannot here speak of identical conditions1 because the same moment does not occur twice4 ,it is no use arguing that1 even if there are no two deep-seated psychic states which are altogether alike1 yet analysis would resolve these different states into more general and homogeneous elements which might be compared with each other4 ,this would be to forget that even the simplest psychic elements possess a personality and a life of their own1 however superficial they may be2 they are in a constant state of becoming1 and the same feeling1 by the mere fact of being repeated1 is a new feeling4 ,indeed1 we have no reason for calling it by its former name save that it corresponds to the same external cause or projects itself outwardly into similar attitudes3 hence it would simply be begging the question to deduce from the so-called likeness of two conscious states that the same cause produces the same effect4 ,in short1 if the causal relation still holds good in the realm of inner states1 it cannot resemble in any way what we call causality in nature4 ,for the physicist1 the same cause always produces the same effect3 for a psychologist who does not let himself be misled by merely apparent analogies1 a deep-seated inner cause produces its effect once for all and will never reproduce it4 ,and if it is now asserted that this effect was inseparably bound up with this particular cause1 such an assertion will mean one of two things3 either that1 the antecedents being given1 the future action might have been foreseen2 or that1 the action having once been performed1 any other actionals seen1 under the given conditions1 to have been impossible4 ,now we saw that both these assertions were equally meaningless1 and that they also involved a false conception of duration4 ,sidenote3 ,analysis of the conception of cause1 which underlies the whole determinist argument4 ,nevertheless it will be worth while to dwell on this latter form of the determinist argument1 even though it be only to explain from our point of view the meaning of the two words determination and causality4 ,in vain do we argue that there cannot be any question either of foreseeing a future action in the way that an astronomical phenomenon is foreseen1 or of asserting1 when once an action is done1 that any other action would have been impossible under the given conditions4 ,in vain do we add that1 even when it takes this form3 ,the same causes produce the same effects1 the principle of universal determination loses every shred of meaning in the inner world of conscious states4 ,the determinist will perhaps yield to our arguments on each of these three points in particular1 will admit that in the psychical field one cannot ascribe any of these three meanings to the word determination1 will probably fail to discover a fourth meaning1 and yet will go on repeating that the act is inseparably bound up with its antecedents4 ,we thus find ourselves here confronted by so deep-seated a misapprehension and so obstinate a prejudice that we cannot get the better of them without attacking them at their root1 which is the principle of causality4 ,by analysing the concept of cause1 we shall show the ambiguity which it involves1 and1 though not aiming at a formal definition of freedom1 we shall perhaps get beyond the purely negative idea of it which we have framed up to the present4 ,sidenote3 ,causality as regular succession does not apply to conscious states and cannot disprove free will4 ,we perceive physical phenomena1 and these phenomena obey laws4 ,this means3 7i7 that phenomena a1 b1 c1 d1 previously perceived1 can occur again in the same shape2 7#b7 that a certain phenomenon ,p1 which appeared after the conditions a1 b1 c1 d1 and after these conditions only1 will not fail to recur as soon as the same conditions are again present4 ,if the principle of causality told us nothing more1 as the empiricists claim1 we should willingly grant these philosophers that their principle is derived from experience2 but it would no longer prove anything against our freedom4 ,for it would then be understood that definite antecedents give rise to a definite consequent wherever experience shows us this regular succession2 but the question is whether this regularity is found in the domain of consciousness too1 and that is the whole problem of free will4 ,we grant you for a moment that the principle of causality is nothing but the summing up of the uniform and unconditional successions observed in the past3 by what right1 then1 do you apply it to those deep-seated states of consciousness in which no regular succession has yet been discovered1 since the attempt to foresee them ever fails8 ,and how can you base on this principle your argument to prove the determinism of inner states1 when1 according to you1 the determinism of observed facts is the sole source of the principle itself8 ,in truth1 when the empiricists make use of the principle of causality to disprove human freedom1 they take the word cause in a new meaning1 which is the very meaning given to it by common sense4 ,to assert the regular succession of two phenomena is1 indeed1 to recognize that1 the first being given1 we already catch sight of the second4 ,but this wholly subjective connexion between two ideas is not enough for common sense4 ,it seems to common sense that1 if the idea of the second phenomenon is already implied in that of the first1 the second phenomenon itself must exist objectively1 in some way or other1 within the first phenomenon4 ,and common sense was bound to come to this conclusion1 because to distinguish exactly between an objective connexion of phenomena and a subjective association between their ideas presupposes a fairly high degree of philosophical culture4 ,we thus pass imperceptibly from the first meaning to the second1 and we picture the causal relation as a kind of prefiguring of the future phenomenon in its present conditions4 ,now this prefiguring can be understood in two very different ways1 and it is just here that the ambiguity begins4 ,sidenote3 ,causality1 as the prefiguring of the future phenomenon in its present conditions1 in one form destroys concrete phenomena4 ,in the first place1 mathematics furnishes us with one type of this kind of prefiguring4 ,the very movement by which we draw the circumference of a circle on a sheet of paper generates all the mathematical properties of this figure3 in this sense an unlimited number of theorems can be said to pre-exist within the definition1 although they will be spread out in duration for the mathematician who deduces them4 ,it is true that we are here in the realm of pure quantity and that1 as geometrical properties can be expressed in the form of equations1 it is easy to understand how the original equation1 expressing the fundamental property of the figure1 is transformed into an unlimited number of new ones1 all virtually contained in the first4 ,on the contrary1 physical phenomena1 which succeed one another and are perceived by our senses1 are distinguished by quality not less than by quantity1 so that there would be some difficulty in at once declaring them equivalent to one another4 ,but1 just because they are perceived through our sense-organs1 we seem justified in ascribing their qualitative differences to the impression which they make on us and in assuming1 behind the heterogeneity of our sensations1 a homogeneous physical universe4 ,thus1 we shall strip matter of the concrete qualities with which our senses clothe it1 colour1 heat1 resistance1 even weight1 and we shall finally find ourselves confronted with homogeneous extensity1 space without body4 ,the only step then remaining will be to describe figures in space1 to make them move according to mathematically formulated laws1 and to explain the apparent qualities of matter by the shape1 position1 and motion of these geometrical figures4 ,now1 position is given by a system of fixed magnitudes and motion is expressed by a law1 i4e4 by a constant relation between variable magnitudes2 but shape is a mental image1 and1 however tenuous1 however transparent we assume it to be1 it still constitutes1 in so far as our imagination has1 so to speak1 the visual perception of it1 a concrete and therefore irreducible quality of matter4 ,it will therefore be necessary to make a clean sweep of this image itself and replace it by the abstract formula of the movement which gives rise to the figure4 ,picture then algebraical relations getting entangled in one another1 becoming objective by this very entanglement1 and producing1 by the mere effect of their complexity1 concrete1 visible1 and tangible reality1--you will be merely drawing the consequences of the principle of causality1 understood in the sense of an actual prefiguring of the future in the present4 ,the scientists of our time do not seem1 indeed1 to have carried abstraction so far1 except perhaps ,lord ,kelvin4 ,this acute and profound physicist assumed that space is filled with a homogeneous and incompressible fluid in which vortices move1 thus producing the properties of matter3 these vortices are the constituent elements of bodies2 the atom thus becomes a movement1 and physical phenomena are reduced to regular movements taking place within an incompressible fluid4 ,but1 if you will notice that this fluid is perfectly homogeneous1 that between its parts there is neither an empty interval which separates them nor any difference whatever by which they can be distinguished1 you will see that all movement taking place within this fluid is really equivalent to absolute immobility1 since before1 during1 and after the movement nothing changes and nothing has changed in the whole4 ,the movement which is here spoken of is thus not a movement which actually takes place1 but only a movement which is pictured mentally3 it is a relation between relations4 ,it is implicitly supposed1 though perhaps not actually realized1 that motion has something to do with consciousness1 that in space there are only simultaneities1 and that the business of the physicist is to provide us with the means of calculating these relations of simultaneity for any moment of our duration4 ,nowhere has mechanism been carried further than in this system1 since the very shape of the ultimate elements of matter is here reduced to a movement4 ,but the ,cartesian physics already anticipated this interpretation2 for if matter is nothing1 as ,descartes claimed1 but homogeneous extensity1 the movements of the parts of this extensity can be conceived through the abstract law which governs them or through an algebraical equation between variable magnitudes1 but cannot be represented under the concrete form of an image4 ,and it would not be difficult to prove that the more the progress of mechanical explanations enables us to develop this conception of causality and therefore to relieve the atom of the weight of its sensible qualities1 the more the concrete existence of the phenomena of nature tends to vanish into algebraical smoke4 ,sidenote3 ,it thus leads to ,descartes' physics and ,spinoza's metaphysics1 but cannot bind future to present without neglecting duration4 ,thus understood1 the relation of causality is a necessary relation in the sense that it will indefinitely approach the relation of identity1 as a curve approaches its asymptote4 ,the ,principle of identity is the absolute law of our consciousness3 it asserts that what is thought is thought at the moment when we think it3 and what gives this principle its absolute necessity is that it does not bind the future to the present1 but only the present to the present3 it expresses the unshakable confidence that consciousness feels in itself1 so long as1 faithful to its duty1 it confines itself to declaring the apparent present state of the mind4 ,but the principle of causality1 in so far as it is supposed to bind the future to the present1 could never take the form of a necessary principle2 for the successive moments of real time are not bound up with one another1 and no effort of logic will succeed in proving that what has been will be or will continue to be1 that the same antecedents will always give rise to identical consequents4 ,descartes understood this so well that he attributed the regularity of the physical world and the continuation of the same effects to the constantly renewed grace of ,providence2 he built up1 as it were1 an instantaneous physics1 intended for a universe the whole duration of which might as well be confined to the present moment4 ,and ,spinoza maintained that the indefinite series of phenomena1 which takes for us the form of a succession in time1 was equivalent1 in the absolute1 to the divine unity3 he thus assumed1 on the one hand1 that the relation of apparent causality between phenomena melted away into a relation of identity in the absolute1 and1 on the other1 that the indefinite duration of things was all contained in a single moment1 which is eternity4 ,in short1 whether we study ,cartesian physics1 ,spinozistic metaphysics1 or the scientific theories of our own time1 we shall find everywhere the same anxiety to establish a relation of logical necessity between cause and effect1 and we shall see that this anxiety shows itself in a tendency to transform relations of succession into relations of inherence1 to do away with active duration1 and to substitute for apparent causality a fundamental identity4 ,sidenote3 ,the necessary determination of phenomena implies non-duration2 but we endure and are therefore free4 ,now1 if the development of the notion of causality1 understood in the sense of necessary connexion1 leads to the ,spinozistic or ,cartesian conception of nature1 inversely1 all relation of necessary determination established between successive phenomena may be supposed to arise from our perceiving1 in a confused form1 some mathematical mechanism behind their heterogeneity4 ,we do not claim that common sense has any intuition of the kinetic theories of matter1 still less perhaps of a ,spinozistic mechanism2 but it will be seen that the more the effect seems necessarily bound up with the cause1 the more we tend to put it in the cause itself1 as a mathematical consequence in its principle1 and thus to cancel the effect of duration4 ,that under the influence of the same external conditions ,i do not behave to-day as ,i behaved yesterday is not at all surprising1 because ,i change1 because ,i endure4 ,but things considered apart from our perception do not seem to endure2 and the more thoroughly we examine this idea1 the more absurd it seems to us to suppose that the same cause should not produce to-day the effect which it produced yesterday4 ,we certainly feel1 it is true1 that although things do not endure as we do ourselves1 nevertheless there must be some reason why phenomena are seen to succeed one another instead of being set out all at once4 ,and this is why the notion of causality1 although it gets indefinitely near that of identity1 will never seem to us to coincide with it1 unless we conceive clearly the idea of a mathematical mechanism or unless some subtle metaphysics removes our very legitimate scruples on the point4 ,it is no less obvious that our belief in the necessary determination of phenomena by one another becomes stronger in proportion as we are more inclined to regard duration as a subjective form of our consciousness4 ,in other words1 the more we tend to set up the causal relation as a relation of necessary determination1 the more we assert thereby that things do not endure like ourselves4 ,this amounts to saying that the more we strengthen the principle of causality1 the more we emphasize the difference between a physical series and a psychical one4 ,whence1 finally1 it would result 7however paradoxical the opinion may seem7 that the assumption of a relation of mathematical inherence between external phenomena ought to bring with it1 as a natural or at least as a plausible consequence1 the belief in human free will4 ,but this last consequence will not concern us for the moment3 we are merely trying here to trace out the first meaning of the word causality1 and we think we have shown that the prefiguring of the future in the present is easily conceived under a mathematical form1 thanks to a certain conception of duration which1 without seeming to be so1 is fairly familiar to common sense4 ,sidenote3 ,prefiguring1 as having an idea of a future act which we cannot realize without effort1 does not involve necessary determination4 ,but there is a prefiguring of another kind1 still more familiar to our mind1 because immediate prefiguring1 as consciousness gives us the type of it4 ,we go1 in fact1 through successive states of consciousness1 and although the later was not contained in the earlier1 we had before us at the time a more or less confused idea of it4 ,the actual realization of this idea1 however1 did not appear as certain but merely as possible4 ,yet1 between the idea and the action1 some hardly perceptible intermediate processes come in1 the whole mass of which takes for us a form sui generis1 which is called the feeling of effort4 ,and from the idea to the effort1 from the effort to the act1 the progress has been so continuous that we cannot say where the idea and the effort end1 and where the act begins4 ,hence we see that in a certain sense we may still say here that the future was prefigured in the present2 but it must be added that this prefiguring is very imperfect1 since the future action of which we have the present idea is conceived as realizable but not as realized1 and since1 even when we plan the effort necessary to accomplish it1 we feel that there is still time to stop4 ,if1 then1 we decide to picture the causal relation in this second form1 we can assert a priori that there will no longer be a relation of necessary determination between the cause and the effect1 for the effect will no longer be given in the cause4 ,it will be there only in the state of pure possibility and as a vague idea which perhaps will not be followed by the corresponding action4 ,but we shall not be surprised that this approximation is enough for common sense if we think of the readiness with which children and primitive people accept the idea of a whimsical ,nature1 in which caprice plays a part no less important than necessity4 ,nay1 this way of conceiving causality will be more easily understood by the general run of people1 since it does not demand any effort of abstraction and only implies a certain analogy between the outer and the inner world1 between the succession of objective phenomena and that of our subjective states4 ,sidenote3 ,this second conception of causality leads to ,leibniz as the first led to ,spinoza4 ,in truth1 this second way of conceiving the relation of cause to effect is more natural than the first in that it immediately satisfies the need of a mental image4 ,if we look for the phenomenon ,b within the phenomenon ,a1 which regularly precedes it1 the reason is that the habit of associating the two images ends in giving us the idea of the second phenomenon wrapped up1 as it were1 in that of the first4 ,it is natural1 then1 that we should push this objectification to its furthest limit and that we should make the phenomenon ,a itself into a psychic state1 in which the phenomenon ,b is supposed to be contained as a very vague idea4 ,we simply suppose1 thereby1 that the objective connexion of the two phenomena resembles the subjective association which suggested the idea of it to us4 ,the qualities of things are thus set up as actual states1 somewhat analogous to those of our own self2 the material universe is credited with a vague personality which is diffused through space and which1 although not exactly endowed with a conscious will1 is led on from one state to another by an inner impulse1 a kind of effort4 ,such was ancient hylozoism1 a half-hearted and even contradictory hypothesis1 which left matter its extensity although attributing to it real conscious states1 and which spread the qualities of matter throughout extensity while treating these qualities as inner i4e4 simple states4 ,it was reserved for ,leibniz to do away with this contradiction and to show that1 if the succession of external qualities or phenomena is understood as the succession of our own ideas1 these qualities must be regarded as simple states or perceptions1 and the matter which supports them as an unextended monad1 analogous to our soul4 ,but1 if such be the case1 the successive states of matter cannot be perceived from the outside any more than our own psychic states2 the hypothesis of pre-established harmony must be introduced in order to explain how these inner states are representative of one another4 ,thus1 with our second conception of the relation of causality we reach ,leibniz1 as with the first we reached ,spinoza4 ,and in both cases we merely push to their extreme limit or formulate with greater precision two half-hearted and confused ideas of common sense4 ,sidenote3 ,it does not involve necessary determination4 ,now it is obvious that the relation of causality1 understood in this second way1 does not involve the necessary determination of the effect by the cause4 ,history indeed proves it4 ,we see ancient hylozoism1 the first outcome of this conception of causality1 explained the regular succession of causes and effects by a real deus ex machina3 sometimes it was a ,necessity external to things and hovering over them1 sometimes an inner ,reason acting by rules somewhat similar to those which govern our own conduct4 ,nor do the perceptions of ,leibniz's monad necessitate one another2 ,god has to regulate their order in advance4 ,in fact1 ,leibniz's determinism does not spring from his conception of the monad1 but from the fact that he builds up the universe with monads only4 ,having denied all mechanical influence of substances on one another1 he had to explain how it happens that their states correspond4 ,hence a determinism which arises from the necessity of positing a pre-established harmony1 and not at all from the dynamic conception of the relation of causality4 ,but let us leave history aside4 ,consciousness itself testifies that the abstract idea of force is that of indeterminate effort1 that of an effort which has not yet issued in an act and in which the act is still only at the stage of an idea4 ,in other words1 the dynamic conception of the causal relation ascribes to things a duration absolutely like our own1 whatever may be the nature of this duration2 to picture in this way the relation of cause to effect is to assume that the future is not more closely bound up with the present in the external world than it is in our own inner life4 ,sidenote3 ,each of these contradictory interpretations of causality and duration by itself safeguards freedom2 taken together they destroy it4 ,it follows from this twofold analysis that the principle of causality involves two contradictory conceptions of duration1 two mutually exclusive ways of prefiguring the future in the present4 ,sometimes all phenomena1 physical or psychical1 are pictured as enduring in the same way1 and therefore in the way that we do3 in this case the future will exist in the present only as an idea1 and the passing from the present to the future will take the form of an effort which does not always lead to the realization of the idea conceived4 ,sometimes1 on the other hand1 duration is regarded as the characteristic form of conscious states2 in this case1 things are no longer supposed to endure as we do1 and a mathematical pre-existence of their future in their present is admitted4 ,now1 each of these two hypotheses1 when taken by itself1 safeguards human freedom2 for the first would lead to the result that even the phenomena of nature were contingent1 and the second1 by attributing the necessary determination of physical phenomena to the fact that things do not endure as we do1 invites us to regard the self which is subject to duration as a free force4 ,therefore1 every clear conception of causality1 where we know our own meaning1 leads to the idea of human freedom as a natural consequence4 ,unfortunately1 the habit has grown up of taking the principle of causality in both senses at the same time1 because the one is more flattering to our imagination and the other is more favourable to mathematical reasoning4 ,sometimes we think particularly of the regular succession of physical phenomena and of the kind of inner effort by which one becomes another2 sometimes we fix our mind on the absolute regularity of these phenomena1 and from the idea of regularity we pass by imperceptible steps to that of mathematical necessity1 which excludes duration understood in the first way4 ,and we do not see any harm in letting these two conceptions blend into one another1 and in assigning greater importance to the one or the other according as we are more or less concerned with the interests of science4 ,but to apply the principle of causality1 in this ambiguous form1 to the succession of conscious states1 is uselessly and wantonly to run into inextricable difficulties4 ,the idea of force1 which really excludes that of necessary determination1 has got into the habit1 so to speak1 of amalgamating with that of necessity1 in consequence of the very use which we make of the principle of causality in nature4 ,on the one hand1 we know force only through the witness of consciousness1 and consciousness does not assert1 does not even understand1 the absolute determination1 now1 of actions that are still to come3 that is all that experience teaches us1 and if we hold by experience we should say that we feel ourselves free1 that we perceive force1 rightly or wrongly1 as a free spontaneity4 ,but1 on the other hand1 this idea of force1 carried over into nature1 travelling there side by side with the idea of necessity1 has got corrupted before it returns from the journey4 ,it returns impregnated with the idea of necessity3 and in the light of the rle which we have made it play in the external world1 we regard force as determining with strict necessity the effects which flow from it4 ,here again the mistake made by consciousness arises from the fact that it looks at the self1 not directly1 but by a kind of refraction through the forms which it has lent to external perception1 and which the latter does not give back without having left its mark on them4 ,a compromise1 as it were1 has been brought about between the idea of force and that of necessary determination4 ,the wholly mechanical determination of two external phenomena by one another now assumes in our eyes the same form as the dynamic relation of our exertion of force to the act which springs from it3 but1 in return1 this latter relation takes the form of a mathematical derivation1 the human action being supposed to issue mechanically1 and therefore necessarily1 from the force which produces it4 ,there is no doubt that this mingling of two different and almost opposite ideas offers advantages to common sense1 since it enables us to picture in the same way1 and denote by one and the same word1 both the relation which exists between two moments of our life and that which binds together the successive moments of the external world4 ,we have seen that1 though our deepest conscious states exclude numerical multiplicity1 yet we break them up into parts external to one another2 that though the elements of concrete duration permeate one another1 duration expressing itself in extensity exhibits moments as distinct as the bodies scattered in space4 ,is it surprising1 then1 that between the moments of our life1 when it has been1 so to speak1 objectified1 we set up a relation analogous to the objective relation of causality1 and that an exchange1 which again may be compared to the phenomenon of endosmosis1 takes place between the dynamic idea of free effort and the mathematical concept of necessary determination8 ,sidenote3 ,though united in popular thought1 the ideas of free effort and necessary determination are kept apart by physical science4 ,but the sundering of these two ideas is an accomplished fact in the natural sciences4 ,the physicist may speak of forces1 and even picture their mode of action by analogy with an inner effort1 but he will never introduce this hypothesis into a scientific explanation4 ,even those who1 with ,faraday1 replace the extended atoms by dynamic points1 will treat the centres of force and the lines of force mathematically1 without troubling about force itself considered as an activity or an effort4 ,it thus comes to be understood that the relation of external causality is purely mathematical1 and has no resemblance to the relation between psychical force and the act which springs from it4 ,sidenote3 ,they should be kept apart too by psychology4 ,it is now time to add that the relation of inner causality is purely dynamic1 and has no analogy with the relation of two external phenomena which condition one another4 ,for as the latter are capable of recurring in a homogeneous space1 their relation can be expressed in terms of a law1 whereas deep-seated psychic states occur once in consciousness and will never occur again4 ,a careful analysis of the psychological phenomenon led us to this conclusion in the beginning3 the study of the notions of causality and duration1 viewed in themselves1 has merely confirmed it4 ,sidenote3 ,freedom real but indefineable4 ,we can now formulate our conception of freedom4 ,freedom is the relation of the concrete self to the act which it performs4 ,this relation is indefinable1 just because we are free4 ,for we can analyse a thing1 but not a process2 we can break up extensity1 but not duration4 ,or1 if we persist in analysing it1 we unconsciously transform the process into a thing and duration into extensity4 ,by the very fact of breaking up concrete time we set out its moments in homogeneous space2 in place of the doing we put the already done2 and1 as we have begun by1 so to speak1 stereotyping the activity of the self1 we see spontaneity settle down into inertia and freedom into necessity4 ,thus1 any positive definition of freedom will ensure the victory of determinism4 ,shall we define the free act by saying of this act1 when it is once done1 that it might have been left undone8 ,but this assertion1 as also its opposite1 implies the idea of an absolute equivalence between concrete duration and its spatial symbol3 and as soon as we admit this equivalence1 we are led on1 by the very development of the formula which we have just set forth1 to the most rigid determinism4 ,shall we define the free act as that which could not be foreseen1 even when all the conditions were known in advance8 ,but to conceive all the conditions as given1 is1 when dealing with concrete duration1 to place oneself at the very moment at which the act is being performed4 ,or else it is admitted that the matter of psychic duration can be pictured symbolically in advance1 which amounts1 as we said1 to treating time as a homogeneous medium1 and to reasserting in new words the absolute equivalence of duration with its symbol4 ,a closer study of this second definition of freedom will thus bring us once more to determinism4 ,shall we finally define the free act by saying that it is not necessarily determined by its cause8 ,but either these words lose their meaning or we understand by them that the same inner causes will not always call forth the same effects4 ,we admit1 then1 that the psychic antecedents of a free act can be repeated1 that freedom is displayed in a duration whose moments resemble one another1 and that time is a homogeneous medium1 like space4 ,we shall thus be brought back to the idea of an equivalence between duration and its spatial symbol2 and by pressing the definition of freedom which we have laid down1 we shall once more get determinism out of it4 ,to sum up2 every demand for explanation in regard to freedom comes back1 without our suspecting it1 to the following question3 ,can time be adequately represented by space8 ,to which we answer3 ,yes1 if you are dealing with time flown2 ,no1 if you speak of time flowing4 ,now1 the free act takes place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown4 ,freedom is therefore a fact1 and among the facts which we observe there is none clearer4 ,all the difficulties of the problem1 and the problem itself1 arise from the desire to endow duration with the same attributes as extensity1 to interpret a succession by a simultaneity1 and to express the idea of freedom in a language into which it is obviously untranslatable4 ,,conclusion ,sidenote3 ,modern psychology holds hat we perceive things through forms borrowed from our own constitution4 ,to sum up the foregoing discussion1 we shall put aside for the present ,kant's terminology and also his doctrine1 to which we shall return later1 and we shall take the point of view of common sense4 ,modern psychology seems to us particularly concerned to prove that we perceive things through the medium of certain forms1 borrowed from our own constitution4 ,this tendency has become more and more marked since ,kant3 while the ,german philosopher drew a sharp line of separation between time and space1 the extensive and the intensive1 and1 as we should say to-day1 consciousness and external perception1 the empirical school1 carrying analysis still further1 tries to reconstruct the extensive out of the intensive1 space out of duration1 and externality out of inner states4 ,physics1 moreover1 comes in to complete the work of psychology in this respect3 it shows that1 if we wish to forecast phenomena1 we must make a clean sweep of the impression which they produce on consciousness and treat sensations as signs of reality1 not as reality itself4 ,sidenote3 ,but are not the states of the self perceived through forms borrowed from the external world8 ,it seemed to us that there was good reason to set ourselves the opposite problem and to ask whether the most obvious states of the ego itself1 which we believe that we grasp directly1 are not mostly perceived through the medium of certain forms borrowed from the external world1 which thus gives us back what we have lent it4 ,a priori it seems fairly probable that this is what happens4 ,for1 assuming that the forms alluded to1 into which we fit matter1 come entirely from the mind1 it seems difficult to apply them constantly to objects without the latter soon leaving a mark on them3 by then using these forms to gain a knowledge of our own person we run the risk of mistaking for the colouring of the self the reflection of the frame in which we place it1 i4e4 the external world4 ,but one can go further still and assert that forms applicable to things cannot be entirely our own work1 that they must result from a compromise between matter and mind1 that if we give much to matter we probably receive something from it1 and that thus1 when we try to grasp ourselves after an excursion into the external world1 we no longer have our hands free4 ,sidenote3 ,to understand the intensity1 duration and voluntary determination of psychic states1 we must eliminate the idea of space4 ,now just as1 in order to ascertain the real relations of physical phenomena to one another1 we abstract whatever obviously clashes with them in our way of perceiving and thinking1 so1 in order to view the self in its original purity1 psychology ought to eliminate or correct certain forms which bear the obvious mark of the external world4 ,what are these forms8 ,when isolated from one another and regarded as so many distinct units1 psychic states seem to be more or less intense4 ,next1 looked at in their multiplicity1 they unfold in time and constitute duration4 ,finally1 in their relations to one another1 and in so far as a certain unity is preserved throughout their multiplicity1 they seem to determine one another4 ,intensity1 duration1 voluntary determination1 these are the three ideas which had to be clarified by ridding them of all that they owe to the intrusion of the sensible world and1 in a word1 to the obsession of the idea of space4 ,sidenote3 ,intensity is quality and not quantity or magnitude4 ,examining the first of these ideas1 we found that psychic phenomena were in themselves pure quality or qualitative multiplicity1 and that1 on the other hand1 their cause situated in space was quantity4 ,in so far as this quality becomes the sign of the quantity and we suspect the presence of the latter behind the former1 we call it intensity4 ,the intensity of a simple state1 therefore1 is not quantity but its qualitative sign4 ,you will find that it arises from a compromise between pure quality1 which is the state of consciousness1 and pure quantity1 which is necessarily space4 ,now you give up this compromise without the least scruple when you study external things1 since you then leave aside the forces themselves1 assuming that they exist1 and consider only their measurable and extended effects4 ,why1 then1 do you keep to this hybrid concept when you analyse in its turn the state of consciousness8 ,if magnitude1 outside you1 is never intensive1 intensity1 within you1 is never magnitude4 ,it is through having overlooked this that philosophers have been compelled to distinguish two kinds of quantity1 the one extensive1 the other intensive1 without ever succeeding in explaining what they had in common or how the same words increase and decrease could be used for things so unlike4 ,in the same way they are responsible for the exaggerations of psychophysics1 for as soon as the power of increasing in magnitude is attributed to sensation in any other than a metaphorical sense1 we are invited to find out by how much it increases4 ,and1 although consciousness does not measure intensive quantity1 it does not follow that science may not succeed indirectly in doing so1 if it be a magnitude4 ,hence1 either a psychophysical formula is possible or the intensity of a simple psychic state is pure quality4 ,sidenote3 ,our conscious states not a discreet multiplicity4 ,turning then to the concept of multiplicity1 we saw that to construct a number we must first have the intuition of a homogeneous medium1 viz4 space1 in which terms distinct from one another could be set out in line1 and1 secondly1 a process of permeation and organization by which these units are dynamically added together and form what we called a qualitative multiplicity4 ,it is owing to this dynamic process that the units get added1 but it is because of their presence in space that they remain distinct4 ,hence number or discrete multiplicity also results from a compromise4 ,now1 when we consider material objects in themselves1 we give up this compromise1 since we regard them as impenetrable and divisible1 i4e4 endlessly distinct from one another4 ,therefore1 we must give it up1 too1 when we study our own selves4 ,it is through having failed to do so that associationism has made many mistakes1 such as trying to reconstruct a psychic state by the addition of distinct states of consciousness1 thus substituting the symbol of the ego for the ego itself4 ,these preliminary considerations enabled us to approach the principal object of this work1 the analysis of the ideas of duration and voluntary determination4 ,sidenote3 ,inner duration is a qualitative multiplicity4 ,what is duration within us8 ,a qualitative multiplicity1 with no likeness to number2 an organic evolution which is yet not an increasing quantity2 a pure heterogeneity within which there are no distinct qualities4 ,in a word1 the moments of inner duration are not external to one another4 ,sidenote3 ,in the external we find not duration but simultaneity4 ,what duration is there existing outside us8 ,the present only1 or1 if we prefer the expression1 simultaneity4 ,no doubt external things change1 but their moments do not succeed one another1 if we retain the ordinary meaning of the word1 except for a consciousness which keeps them in mind4 ,we observe outside us at a given moment a whole system of simultaneous positions2 of the simultaneities which have preceded them nothing remains4 ,to put duration in space is really to contradict oneself and place succession within simultaneity4 ,hence we must not say that external things endure1 but rather that there is in them some inexpressible reason in virtue of which we cannot examine them at successive moments of our own duration without observing that they have changed4 ,but this change does not involve succession unless the word is taken in a new meaning3 on this point we have noted the agreement of science and common sense4 ,thus in consciousness we find states which succeed1 without being distinguished from one another2 and in space simultaneities which1 without succeeding1 are distinguished from one another1 in the sense that one has ceased to exist when the other appears4 ,outside us1 mutual externality without succession2 within us1 succession without mutual externality4 ,sidenote3 ,the idea of a measurable time arises from compromise between ideas of succession and externality4 ,here again a compromise comes in4 ,to the simultaneities1 which constitute the external world1 and1 although distinct1 succeed one another for our consciousness1 we attribute succession in themselves4 ,hence the idea that things endure as we do ourselves and that time may be brought within space4 ,but while our consciousness thus introduces succession into external things1 inversely these things themselves externalize the successive moments of our inner duration in relation to one another4 ,the simultaneities of physical phenomena1 absolutely distinct in the sense that the one has ceased to be when the other takes place1 cut up into portions1 which are also distinct and external to one another1 an inner life in which succession implies interpenetration1 just as the pendulum of a clock cuts up into distinct fragments and spreads out1 so to speak1 lengthwise1 the dynamic and undivided tension of the spring4 ,thus1 by a real process of endosmosis we get the mixed idea of a measurable time1 which is space in so far as it is homogeneity1 and duration in so far as it is succession1 that is to say1 at bottom1 the contradictory idea of succession in simultaneity4 ,sidenote3 ,as science eliminates duration from the outer1 philosophy must eliminate space from the inner world4 ,now1 these two elements1 extensity and duration1 science tears asunder when it undertakes the close study of external things4 ,for we have pointed out that science retains nothing of duration but simultaneity1 and nothing of motion itself position of the moving body1 i4e4 immobility4 ,a very sharp separation is here made and space gets the best of it4 ,therefore the same separation will have to be made again1 but this time to the advantage of duration1 when inner phenomena are studied1--not inner phenomena once developed1 to be sure1 or after the discursive reason has separated them and set them out in a homogeneous medium in order to understand them1 but inner phenomena in their developing1 and in so far as they make up1 by their interpenetration1 the continuous evolution of a free person4 ,duration1 thus restored to its original purity1 will appear as a wholly qualitative multiplicity1 an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another4 ,sidenote3 ,the neglect to separate extensity and duration leads one party to deny freedom and the other to define it4 ,now it is because they have neglected to make this necessary separation that one party has been led to deny freedom and the other to define it1 and thereby1 involuntarily1 to deny it too4 ,they ask in fact whether the act could or could not be foreseen1 the whole of its conditions being given2 and whether they assert it or deny it1 they admit that this totality of conditions could be conceived as given in advance3 which amounts1 as we have shown1 to treating duration as a homogeneous thing and intensities as magnitudes4 ,they will either say that the act is determined by its conditions1 without perceiving that they are playing on the double sense of the word causality1 and that they are thus giving to duration at the same time two forms which are mutually exclusive4 ,or else they will appeal to the principle of the conservation of energy1 without asking whether this principle is equally applicable to the moments of the external world1 which are equivalent to one another1 and to the moments of a living and conscious being1 which acquire a richer and richer content4 ,in whatever way1 in a word1 freedom is viewed1 it cannot be denied except on condition of identifying time with space2 it cannot be defined except on condition of demanding that space should adequately represent time2 it cannot be argued about in one sense or the other except on condition of previously confusing succession and simultaneity4 ,all determinism will thus be refuted by experience1 but every attempt to define freedom will open the way to determinism4 ,sidenote3 ,this separation favourable to physical science1 but against the interests of language and social life4 ,inquiring then why this separation of duration and extensity1 which science carries out so naturally in the external world1 demands such an effort and rouses so much repugnance when it is a question of inner states1 we were not long in perceiving the reason4 ,the main object of science is to forecast and measure3 now we cannot forecast physical phenomena except on condition that we assume that they do not endure as we do2 and1 on the other hand1 the only thing we are able to measure is space4 ,hence the breach here comes about of itself between quality and quantity1 between true duration and pure extensity4 ,but when we turn to our conscious states1 we have everything to gain by keeping up the illusion through which we make them share in the reciprocal externality of outer things1 because this distinctness1 and at the same time this solidification1 enables us to give them fixed names in spite of their instability1 and distinct ones in spite of their interpenetration4 ,it enables us to objectify them1 to throw them out into the current of social life4 ,sidenote3 ,hence two different selves3 7#a7 the fundamental self2 7#b7 its spatial and social representation3 only the former is free4 ,hence there are finally two different selves1 one of which is1 as it were1 the external projection of the other1 its spatial and1 so to speak1 social representation4 ,we reach the former by deep introspection1 which leads us to grasp our inner states as living things1 constantly becoming1 as states not amenable to measure1 which permeate one another and of which the succession in duration has nothing in common with juxtaposition in homogeneous space4 ,but the moments at which we thus grasp ourselves are rare1 and that is just why we are rarely free4 ,the greater part of the time we live outside ourselves1 hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but our own ghost1 a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into homogeneous space4 ,hence our life unfolds in space rather than in time2 we live for the external world rather than for ourselves2 we speak rather than think2 we are acted rather than act ourselves4 ,to act freely is to recover possession of oneself1 and to get back into pure duration4 ,sidenote3 ,kant clung to freedom1 but put the self which is free outside both space and time4 ,kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium4 ,he did not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another1 and that when it seems to assume the form of a homogeneous whole1 it is because it gets expressed in space4 ,thus the very distinction which he makes between space and time amounts at bottom to confusing time with space1 and the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego itself4 ,he thought that consciousness was incapable of perceiving psychic states otherwise than by juxtaposition1 forgetting that a medium in which these states are set side by side and distinguished from one another is of course space1 and not duration4 ,he was thereby led to believe that the same states can recur in the depths of consciousness1 just as the same physical phenomena are repeated in space2 this at least is what he implicitly admitted when he ascribed to the causal relation the same meaning and the same function in the inner as in the outer world4 ,thus freedom was made into an incomprehensible fact4 ,and yet1 owing to his unlimited though unconscious confidence in this inner perception whose scope he tried to restrict1 his belief in freedom remained unshakable4 ,he therefore raised it to the sphere of noumena2 and as he had confused duration with space1 he made this genuine free self1 which is indeed outside space1 into a self which is supposed to be outside duration too1 and therefore out of the reach of our faculty of knowledge4 ,but the truth is that we perceive this self whenever1 by a strenuous effort of reflection1 we turn our eyes from the shadow which follows us and retire into ourselves4 ,though we generally live and act outside our own person1 in space rather than in duration1 and though by this means we give a handle to the law of causality1 which binds the same effects to the same causes1 we can nevertheless always get back into pure duration1 of which the moments are internal and heterogeneous to one another1 and in which a cause cannot repeat its effect since it will never repeat itself4 ,sidenote3 ,kant regarded both space and time as homogeneous4 ,in this very confusion of true duration with its symbol both the strength and the weakness of ,kantianism reside4 ,kant imagines on the one side things in themselves1 and on the other a homogeneous ,time and ,space1 through which the things in themselves1 are refracted3 thus are supposed to arise on the one hand the phenomenal self--a self which consciousness perceives--and1 on the other1 external objects4 ,time and space on this view would not be any more in us than outside us2 the very distinction of outside and inside would be the work of time and space4 ,this doctrine has the advantage of providing our empirical thought with a solid foundation1 and of guaranteeing that phenomena1 as phenomena1 are adequately knowable4 ,indeed1 we might set up these phenomena as absolute and do without the incomprehensible things in themselves1 were it not that the ,practical ,reason1 the revealer of duty1 came in1 like the ,platonic reminiscence1 to warn us that the thing in itself exists1 invisible but present4 ,the controlling factor in the whole of this theory is the very sharp distinction between the matter of consciousness and its form1 between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous1 and this vital distinction would probably never have been made unless time also had been regarded as a medium indifferent to what fills it4 ,sidenote3 ,but if time1 as duration1 were homogeneous1 science could deal with it4 ,but if time1 as immediate consciousness perceives it1 were1 like space1 a homogeneous medium1 science would be able to deal with it1 as it can with space4 ,now we have tried to prove that duration1 as duration1 and motion1 as motion1 elude the grasp of mathematics3 of time everything slips through its fingers but simultaneity1 and of movement everything but immobility4 ,this is what the ,kantians and even their opponents do not seem to have perceived3 in this so-called phenomenal world1 which1 we are told1 is a world cut out for scientific knowledge1 all the relations which cannot be translated into simultaneity1 i4e4 into space1 are scientifically unknowable4 ,sidenote3 ,and freedom would be incomprehensible4 ,kant's solution4 ,in the second place1 in a duration assumed to be homogeneous1 the same states could occur over again1 causality would imply necessary determination1 and all freedom would become incomprehensible4 ,such1 indeed1 is the result to which the ,critique of ,pure ,reason leads4 ,but instead of concluding from this that real duration is heterogeneous1 which1 by clearing up the second difficulty1 would have called his attention to the first1 ,kant preferred to put freedom outside time and to raise an impassable barrier between the world of phenomena1 which he hands over root and branch to our understanding1 and the world of things in themselves1 which he forbids us to enter4 ,sidenote3 ,how corrected by taking real duration into account4 ,but perhaps this distinction is too sharply drawn and perhaps the barrier is easier to cross than he supposed4 ,for if perchance the moments of real duration1 perceived by an attentive consciousness1 permeated one another instead of lying side by side1 and if these moments formed in relation to one another a heterogeneity within which the idea of necessary determination lost every shred of meaning1 then the self grasped by consciousness would be a free cause1 we should have absolute knowledge of ourselves1 and1 on the other hand1 just because this absolute constantly commingles with phenomena and1 while filling itself with them1 permeates them1 these phenomena themselves would not be as amenable as is claimed to mathematical reasoning1 ,sidenote3 ,with ,kant1 we assume a homogeneous space1 the intuition of which is peculiar to man and prepares the way for social life4 ,so we have assumed the existence of a homogeneous ,space and1 with ,kant1 distinguished this space from the matter which fills it4 ,with him we have admitted that homogeneous space is a form of our sensibility3 and we understand by this simply that other minds1 e4g4 those of animals1 social life1 although they perceive objects1 do not distinguish them so clearly either from one another or from themselves4 ,this intuition of a homogeneous medium1 an intuition peculiar to man1 enables us to externalize our concepts in relation to one another1 reveals to us the objectivity of things1 and thus1 in two ways1 on the one hand by getting everything ready for language1 and on the other by showing us an external world1 quite distinct from ourselves1 in the perception of which all minds have a common share1 foreshadows and prepares the way for social life4 ,sidenote3 ,but if concrete duration is heterogeneous1 the relation of psychic state to act is unique and the act is rightly judged free4 ,over against this homogeneous space we have put the self as perceived by an attentive consciousness1 a living self1 whose states1 at once undistinguished and unstable1 cannot be separated without changing their nature1 and cannot receive a fixed form or be expressed in words without becoming public property4 ,how could this self1 which distinguishes external objects so sharply and represents them so easily by means of symbols1 withstand the temptation to introduce the same distinctions into its own life and to replace the interpenetration of its psychic states1 their wholly qualitative multiplicity1 by a numerical plurality of terms which are distinguished from one another1 set side by side1 and expressed by means of words8 ,in place of a heterogeneous duration whose moments permeate one another1 we thus get a homogeneous time whose moments are strung on a spatial line4 ,in place of an inner life whose successive phases1 each unique of its kind1 cannot be expressed in the fixed terms of language1 we get a self which can be artificially reconstructed1 and simple psychic states which can be added to and taken from one another just like the letters of the alphabet in forming words4 ,now1 this must not be thought to be a mode of symbolical representation only1 for immediate intuition and discursive thought are one in concrete reality1 and the very mechanism by which we only meant at first to explain our conduct will end by also controlling it4 ,our psychic states1 separating then from each other1 will get solidified2 between our ideas1 thus crystallized1 and our external movements we shall witness permanent associations being formed2 and little by little1 as our consciousness thus imitates the process by which nervous matter procures reflex actions1 automatism will cover over freedom4#aj ,it is just at this point that the associationists and the determinists come in on the one side1 and the ,kantians on the other4 ,as they look at only the commonest aspect of our conscious life1 they perceive clearly marked states1 which can recur in time like physical phenomena1 and to which the law of causal determination applies1 if we wish1 in the same sense as it does to nature4 ,as1 on the other hand1 the medium in which these psychic states are set side by side exhibits parts external to one another1 in which the same facts seem capable of being repeated1 they do not hesitate to make time a homogeneous medium and treat it as space4 ,henceforth all difference between duration and extensity1 succession and simultaneity1 is abolished3 the only thing left is to turn freedom out of doors1 or1 if you cannot entirely throw off your traditional respect for it1 to escort it with all due ceremony up to the supratemporal domain of things in themselves1 whose mysterious threshold your consciousness cannot cross4 ,but1 in our view1 there is a third course which might be taken1 namely1 to carry ourselves back in thought to those moments of our life when we made some serious decision1 moments unique of their kind1 which will never be repeated--9999any more than the past phases in the history of a nation will ever come back again4 ,we should see that if these past states cannot be adequately expressed in words or artificially reconstructed by a juxtaposition of simpler states1 it is because in their dynamic unity and wholly qualitative multiplicity they are phases of our real and concrete duration1 a heterogeneous duration and a living one4 ,we should see that1 if our action was pronounced by us to be free1 it is because the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be expressed by a law1 this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable ever to occur again4 ,we should see1 finally1 that the very idea of necessary determination here loses every shred of meaning1 that there cannot be any question either of foreseeing the act before it is performed or of reasoning about the possibility of the contrary action once the deed is done1 for to have all the conditions given is1 in concrete duration1 to place oneself at the very moment of the act and not to foresee it4 ,but we should also understand the illusion which makes the one party think that they are compelled to deny freedom1 and the others that they must define it4 ,it is because the transition is made by imperceptible steps from concrete duration1 whose elements permeate one another1 to symbolical duration1 whose moments are set side by side1 and consequently from free activity to conscious automatism4 ,it is because1 although we are free whenever we are willing to get back into ourselves1 it seldom happens that we are willing4 ,it is because1 finally1 even in the cases where the action is freely performed1 we cannot reason about it without setting out its conditions externally to one another1 therefore in space and no longer in pure duration4 ,the problem of freedom has thus sprung from a misunderstanding3 it has been to the moderns what the paradoxes of the ,eleatics were to the ancients1 and1 like these paradoxes1 it has its origin in the illusion through which we confuse succession and simultaneity1 duration and extensity1 quality and quantity4 #a ,on this point see ,lange1 ,history of ,materialism1 ,vol4 ii1 ,part ii4 #b ,cf4 ,examination of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's ,philosophy4#eth ed41 7#ahgh71 p4 #ehc4 #c ,ibid4 p4 #ehe4 #d ,ibid4 p4 #ehe4 #e ,the ,emotions and the ,will1 ,chap4 vi4 #f ,fouille1 ,la ,libert et le ,dterminisme4 #g ,in ,molire's comedy ,le ,misanthrope1 7,tr474 #h ,examination of ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton's ,philosophy4 #eth ed41 7#ahgh71 p4 #ehj4 #i ,ibid4 p4 #ehc4 #aj of these voluntary acts which may be compared to reflex movements1 and he has restricted freedom to moments of crisis4 ,but he does not seem to have noticed that the process of our free activity goes on1 as it were1 unknown to ourselves1 in the obscure depths of our consciousness at every moment of duration1 that the very feeling of duration comes from this source1 and that without this heterogeneous and continuous duration1 in which our self evolves1 there would be no moral crisis4 ,the study1 even the close study1 of a given free action will thus not settle the problem of freedom4 ,the whole series of our heterogeneous states of consciousness must be taken into consideration4 ,in other words1 it is in a close analysis of the idea of duration that the key to the problem must be sought4