#aghj ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,elements ,,of ,,ethics by ,immanuel ,kant translated by ,thomas ,kingsmill ,abbott ,,preface ,if there exists on any subject a philosophy 7that is1 a system of rational knowledge based on concepts71 then there must also be for this philosophy a system of pure rational concepts1 independent of any condition of intuition1 in other words1 a metaphysic4 ,it may be asked whether metaphysical elements are required also for every practical philosophy1 which is the doctrine of duties1 and therefore also for ,ethics1 in order to be able to present it as a true science 7systematically71 not merely as an aggregate of separate doctrines 7fragmentarily74 ,as regards pure jurisprudence1 no one will question this requirement2 for it concerns only what is formal in the elective will1 which has to be limited in its external relations according to laws of freedom2 without regarding any end which is the matter of this will4 ,here1 therefore1 deontology is a mere scientific doctrine 7doctrina scientiae74 99 99 ,one who is acquainted with practical philosophy is not1 therefore1 a practical philosopher4 ,the latter is he who makes the rational end the principle of his actions1 while at the same time he joins with this the necessary knowledge which1 as it aims at action1 must not be spun out into the most subtile threads of metaphysic1 unless a legal duty is in question2 in which case meum and tuum must be accurately determined in the balance of justice1 on the principle of equality of action and action1 which requires something like mathematical proportion1 but not in the case of a mere ethical duty4 ,for in this case the question is not only to know what it is a duty to do 7a thing which on account of the ends that all men naturally have can be easily decided71 but the chief point is the inner principle of the will namely that the consciousness of this duty be also the spring of action1 in order that we may be able to say of the man who joins to his knowledge this principle of wisdom that he is a practical philosopher4 ,now in this philosophy 7of ethics7 it seems contrary to the idea of it that we should go back to metaphysical elements in order to make the notion of duty purified from everything empirical 7from every feeling7 a motive of action4 ,for what sort of notion can we form of the mighty power and herculean strength which would be sufficient to overcome the vice-breeding inclinations1 if ,virtue is to borrow her arms from the armoury of metaphysics1 which is a matter of speculation that only few men can handle8 ,hence all ethical teaching in lecture rooms1 pulpits1 and popular books1 when it is decked out with fragments of metaphysics1 becomes ridiculous4 ,but it is not1 therefore1 useless1 much less ridiculous1 to trace in metaphysics the first principles of ethics2 for it is only as a philosopher that anyone can reach the first principles of this conception of duty1 otherwise we could not look for either certainty or purity in the ethical teaching4 ,to rely for this reason on a certain feeling which1 on account of the effect expected from it1 is called moral1 may1 perhaps1 even satisfy the popular teacher1 provided he desires as the criterion of a moral duty to consider the problem3 ,if everyone in every case made your maxim the universal law1 how could this law be consistent with itself8 ,but if it were merely feeling that made it our duty to take this principle as a criterion1 then this would not be dictated by reason1 but only adopted instinctively and therefore blindly4 ,,preface paragraph #e ,but in fact1 whatever men imagine1 no moral principle is based on any feeling1 but such a principle is really nothing else than an obscurely conceived metaphysic which inheres in every man's reasoning faculty2 as the teacher will easily find who tries to catechize his pupils in the ,socratic method about the imperative of duty and its application to the moral judgement of his actions4 ,the mode of stating it need not be always metaphysical1 and the language need not necessarily be scholastic1 unless the pupil is to be trained to be a philosopher4 ,but the thought must go back to the elements of metaphysics1 without which we cannot expect any certainty or purity1 or even motive power in ethics4 ,if we deviate from this principle and begin from pathological1 or purely sensitive1 or even moral feeling 7from what is subjectively practical instead of what is objective71 that is1 from the matter of the will1 the end1 not from its form that is the law1 in order from thence to determine duties2 then1 certainly1 there are no metaphysical elements of ethics1 for feeling by whatever it may be excited is always physical4 ,but then ethical teaching1 whether in schools1 or lecture-rooms1 etc41 is corrupted in its source4 ,for it is not a matter of indifference by what motives or means one is led to a good purpose 7the obedience to duty74 ,however disgusting1 then1 metaphysics may appear to those pretended philosophers who dogmatize oracularly1 or even brilliantly1 about the doctrine of duty1 it is1 nevertheless1 an indispensable duty for those who oppose it to go back to its principles even in ethics1 and to begin by going to school on its benches4 ,we may fairly wonder how1 after all previous explanations of the principles of duty1 so far as it is derived from pure reason1 it was still possible to reduce it again to a doctrine of happiness2 in such a way1 however1 that a certain moral happiness not resting on empirical causes was ultimately arrived at1 a self-contradictory nonentity4 ,in fact1 when the thinking man has conquered the temptations to vice1 and is conscious of having done his 7often hard7 duty1 he finds himself in a state of peace and satisfaction which may well be called happiness1 in which virtue is her own reward4 ,now1 says the eudaemonist1 this delight1 this happiness1 is the real motive of his acting virtuously4 ,the notion of duty1 says be1 does not immediately determine his will2 it is only by means of the happiness in prospect that he is moved to his duty4 ,now1 on the other hand1 since he can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the consciousness of having done his duty1 it is clear that the latter must have preceded3 that is1 he must feel himself bound to do his duty before he thinks1 and without thinking1 that happiness will be the consequence of obedience to duty4 ,he is thus involved in a circle in his assignment of cause and effect4 ,he can only hope to be happy if he is conscious of his obedience to duty3 and he can only be moved to obedience to duty if be foresees that he will thereby become happy4 ,but in this reasoning there is also a contradiction4 ,for1 on the one side1 he must obey his duty1 without asking what effect this will have on his happiness1 consequently1 from a moral principle2 on the other side1 he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue to him thereby1 and consequently on a pathological principle1 which is the direct opposite of the former4 ,i have in another place 7the ,berlin ,monatsschrift71 reduced1 as ,i believe1 to the simplest expressions the distinction between pathological and moral pleasure4 ,the pleasure1 namely1 which must precede the obedience to the law in order that one may act according to the law is pathological1 and the process follows the physical order of nature2 that which must be preceded by the law in order that it may be felt is in the moral order4 ,if this distinction is not observed2 if eudaemonism 7the principle of happiness7 is adopted as the principle instead of eleutheronomy 7the principle of freedom of the inner legislation71 the consequence is the euthanasia 7quiet death7 of all morality4 ,,preface paragraph #aj ,the cause of these mistakes is no other than the following3 ,those who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially proceed1 notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly forced by it4 ,dissatisfied at not being able to explain what lies wholly beyond that sphere1 namely1 freedom of the elective will1 elevating as is this privilege1 that man has of being capable of such an idea1 they are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative reason1 which feels its power so strongly in the fields1 just as if they were allies leagued in defence of the omnipotence of theoretical reason and roused by a general call to arms to resist that idea2 and thus they are at present1 and perhaps for a long time to come1 though ultimately in vain1 to attack the moral concept of freedom and if possible render it doubtful4 ,,introduction ,,introduction ,,to ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,elements ,,of ,,ethics ,ethics in ancient times signified moral philosophy 7philosophia moralis7 generally1 which was also called the doctrine of duties4 ,subsequently it was found advisable to confine this name to a part of moral philosophy1 namely1 to the doctrine of duties which are not subject to external laws 7for which in ,german the name ,tugendlehre was found suitable74 ,thus the system of general deontology is divided into that of jurisprudence 7jurisprudentia71 which is capable of external laws1 and of ethics1 which is not thus capable1 and we may let this division stand4 ,i4 ,exposition of the ,conception of ,ethics ,the notion of duty is in itself already the notion of a constraint of the free elective will by the law2 whether this constraint be an external one or be self-constraint4 ,the moral imperative1 by its categorical 7the unconditional ought7 announces this constraint1 which therefore does not apply to all rational beings 7for there may also be holy beings71 but applies to men as rational physical beings who are unholy enough to be seduced by pleasure to the transgression of the moral law1 although they themselves recognize its authority2 and when they do obey it1 to obey it unwillingly 7with resistance of their inclination72 and it is in this that the constraint properly consists4 99 ,now1 as man is a free 7moral7 being1 the notion of duty can contain only self-constraint 7by the idea of the law itself71 when we look to the internal determination of the will 7the spring71 for thus only is it possible to combine that constraint 7even if it were external7 with the freedom of the elective will4 ,the notion of duty then must be an ethical one4 ,,introduction paragraph #e 99 ,man1 however1 as at the same time a moral being1 when he considers himself objectively1 which he is qualified to do by his pure practical reason1 7i4e4 according to humanity in his own person71 finds himself holy enough to transgress the law only unwillingly2 for there is no man so depraved who in this transgression would not feel a resistance and an abhorrence of himself1 so that he must put a force on himself4 ,it is impossible to explain the phenomenon that at this parting of the ways 7where the beautiful fable places ,hercules between virtue and sensuality7 man shows more propensity to obey inclination than the law4 ,for1 we can only explain what happens by tracing it to a cause according to physical laws2 but then we should not be able to conceive the elective will as free4 ,now this mutually opposed self-constraint and the inevitability of it makes us recognize the incomprehensible property of freedom4 ,the impulses of nature1 then1 contain hindrances to the fulfilment of duty in the mind of man1 and resisting forces1 some of them powerful2 and he must judge himself able to combat these and to conquer them by means of reason1 not in the future1 but in the present1 simultaneously with the thought2 he must judge that he can do what the law unconditionally commands that he ought4 ,now the power and resolved purpose to resist a strong but unjust opponent is called fortitude 7fortitudo71 and when concerned with the opponent of the moral character within us1 it is virtue 7virtus1 fortitudo moralis74 ,accordingly1 general deontology1 in that part which brings not external1 but internal1 freedom under laws is the doctrine of virtue4 ,,introduction paragraph #aj ,jurisprudence had to do only with the formal condition of external freedom 7the condition of consistency with itself1 if its maxim became a universal law71 that is1 with law4 ,ethics1 on the contrary1 supplies us with a matter 7an object of the free elective will71 an end of pure reason which is at the same time conceived as an objectively necessary end1 i4e41 as duty for all men4 ,for1 as the sensible inclinations mislead us to ends 7which are the matter of the elective will7 that may contradict duty1 the legislating reason cannot otherwise guard against their influence than by an opposite moral end1 which therefore must be given a priori independently on inclination4 ,an end is an object of the elective will 7of a rational being7 by the idea of which this will is determined to an action for the production of this object4 ,now ,i may be forced by others to actions which are directed to an end as means1 but ,i cannot be forced to have an end2 ,i can only make something an end to myself4 ,if1 however1 ,i am also bound to make something which lies in the notions of practical reason an end to myself1 and therefore besides the formal determining principle of the elective will 7as contained in law7 to have also a material principle1 an end which can be opposed to the end derived from sensible impulses2 then this gives the notion of an end which is in itself a duty4 ,the doctrine of this cannot belong to jurisprudence1 but to ethics1 since this alone includes in its conception self-constraint according to moral laws4 ,for this reason1 ethics may also be defined as the system of the ends of the pure practical reason4 ,the two parts of moral philosophy are distinguished as treating respectively of ends and of duties of constraint4 ,that ethics contains duties to the observance of which one cannot be 7physically7 forced by others1 is merely the consequence of this1 that it is a doctrine of ends1 since to be forced to have ends or to set them before one's self is a contradiction4 ,now that ethics is a doctrine of virtue 7doctrina officiorum virtutis7 follows from the definition of virtue given above compared with the obligation1 the peculiarity of which has just been shown4 ,there is in fact no other determination of the elective will1 except that to an end1 which in the very notion of it implies that ,i cannot even physically be forced to it by the elective will of others4 ,another may indeed force me to do something which is not my end 7but only means to the end of another71 but he cannot force me to make it my own end1 and yet ,i can have no end except of my own making4 ,the latter supposition would be a contradiction- an act of freedom which yet at the same time would not be free4 ,but there is no contradiction in setting before one's self an end which is also a duty3 for in this case ,i constrain myself1 and this is quite consistent with freedom4 99 ,but how is such an end possible8 ,that is now the question4 ,for the possibility of the notion of the thing 7viz41 that it is not self-contradictory7 is not enough to prove the possibility of the thing itself 7the objective reality of the notion74 ,,introduction paragraph #ae 99 ,the less a man can be physically forced1 and the more he can be morally forced 7by the mere idea of duty71 so much the freer he is4 ,the man1 for example1 who is of sufficiently firm resolution and strong mind not to give up an enjoyment which he has resolved on1 however much loss is shown as resulting therefrom1 and who yet desists from his purpose unhesitatingly1 though very reluctantly1 when he finds that it would cause him to neglect an official duty or a sick father2 this man proves his freedom in the highest degree by this very thing1 that he cannot resist the voice of duty4 ,,ii4 ,exposition of the ,notion of an ,end which is also a ,duty ,we can conceive the relation of end to duty in two ways2 either starting from the end to find the maxim of the dutiful actions2 or conversely1 setting out from this to find the end which is also duty4 ,jurisprudence proceeds in the former way4 ,it is left to everyone's free elective will what end he will choose for his action4 ,but its maxim is determined a priori2 namely1 that the freedom of the agent must be consistent with the freedom of every other according to a universal law4 ,,introduction paragraph #bj ,ethics1 however1 proceeds in the opposite way4 ,it cannot start from the ends which the man may propose to himself1 and hence give directions as to the maxims he should adopt1 that is1 as to his duty2 for that would be to take empirical principles of maxims1 and these could not give any notion of duty2 since this1 the categorical ought1 has its root in pure reason alone4 ,indeed1 if the maxims were to be adopted in accordance with those ends 7which are all selfish71 we could not properly speak of the notion of duty at all4 ,hence in ethics the notion of duty must lead to ends1 and must on moral principles give the foundation of maxims with respect to the ends which we ought to propose to ourselves4 ,setting aside the question what sort of end that is which is in itself a duty1 and how such an end is possible1 it is here only necessary to show that a duty of this kind is called a duty of virtue1 and why it is so called4 ,to every duty corresponds a right of action 7facultas moralis generatim71 but all duties do not imply a corresponding right 7facultas juridica7 of another to compel anyone1 but only the duties called legal duties4 ,similarly to all ethical obligation corresponds the notion of virtue1 but it does not follow that all ethical duties are duties of virtue4 ,those1 in fact1 are not so which do not concern so much a certain end 7matter1 object of the elective will71 but merely that which is formal in the moral determination of the will 7e4g41 that the dutiful action must also be done from duty74 ,it is only an end which is also duty that can be called a duty of virtue4 ,hence there are several of the latter kind 7and thus there are distinct virtues72 on the contrary1 there is only one duty of the former kind1 but it is one which is valid for all actions 7only one virtuous disposition74 ,the duty of virtue is essentially distinguished from the duty of justice in this respect2 that it is morally possible to be externally compelled to the latter1 whereas the former rests on free self-constraint only4 ,for finite holy beings 7which cannot even be tempted to the violation of duty7 there is no doctrine of virtue1 but only moral philosophy1 the latter being an autonomy of practical reason1 whereas the former is also an autocracy of it4 ,that is1 it includes a consciousness- not indeed immediately perceived1 but rightly concluded1 from the moral categorical imperative- of the power to become master of one's inclinations which resist the law2 so that human morality in its highest stage can yet be nothing more than virtue2 even if it were quite pure 7perfectly free from the influence of a spring foreign to duty71 a state which is poetically personified under the name of the wise man 7as an ideal to which one should continually approximate74 ,virtue1 however1 is not to be defined and esteemed merely as habit1 and 7as it is expressed in the prize essay of ,cochius7 as a long custom acquired by practice of morally good actions4 ,for1 if this is not an effect of well-resolved and firm principles ever more and more purified1 then1 like any other mechanical arrangement brought about by technical practical reason1 it is neither armed for all circumstances nor adequately secured against the change that may be wrought by new allurements4 ,,introduction paragraph #be ,,remark ,to virtue a is opposed as its logical contradictory 7contradictorie oppositum7 the negative lack of virtue 7moral weakness7 #j2 but vice - a is its contrary 7contrarie s4 realiter oppositum72 and it is not merely a needless question but an offensive one to ask whether great crimes do not perhaps demand more strength of mind than great virtues4 ,for by strength of mind we understand the strength of purpose of a man1 as a being endowed with freedom1 and consequently so far as he is master of himself 7in his senses7 and therefore in a healthy condition of mind4 ,but great crimes are paroxysms1 the very sight of which makes the man of healthy mind shudder4 ,the question would therefore be something like this3 whether a man in a fit of madness can have more physical strength than if he is in his senses2 and we may admit this without on that account ascribing to him more strength of mind1 if by mind we understand the vital principle of man in the free use of his powers4 ,for since those crimes have their ground merely in the power of the inclinations that weaken reason1 which does not prove strength of mind1 this question would be nearly the same as the question whether a man in a fit of illness can show more strength than in a healthy condition2 and this may be directly denied1 since the want of health1 which consists in the proper balance of all the bodily forces of the man1 is a weakness in the system of these forces1 by which system alone we can estimate absolute health4 ,,introduction paragraph #cj ,,iii4 ,of the ,reason for conceiving an ,end which is also a ,duty ,an end is an object of the free elective will1 the idea of which determines this will to an action by which the object is produced4 ,accordingly every action has its end1 and as no one can have an end without himself making the object of his elective will his end1 hence to have some end of actions is an act of the freedom of the agent1 not an affect of physical nature4 ,now1 since this act which determines an end is a practical principle which commands not the means 7therefore not conditionally7 but the end itself 7therefore unconditionally71 hence it is a categorical imperative of pure practical reason and one1 therefore1 which combines a concept of duty with that of an end in general4 ,now there must be such an end and a categorical imperative corresponding to it4 ,for since there are free actions1 there must also be ends to which as an object those actions are directed4 ,amongst these ends there must also be some which are at the same time 7that is1 by their very notion7 duties4 ,for if there were none such1 then since no actions can be without an end1 all ends which practical reason might have would be valid only as means to other ends1 and a categorical imperative would be impossible2 a supposition which destroys all moral philosophy4 ,here1 therefore1 we treat not of ends which man actually makes to himself in accordance with the sensible impulses of his nature1 but of objects of the free elective will under its own laws- objects which he ought to make his end4 ,we may call the former technical 7subjective71 properly pragmatical1 including the rules of prudence in the choice of its ends2 but the latter we must call the moral 7objective7 doctrine of ends4 ,this distinction is1 however1 superfluous here1 since moral philosophy already by its very notion is clearly separated from the doctrine of physical nature 7in the present instance1 anthropology74 ,the latter resting on empirical principles1 whereas the moral doctrine of ends which treats of duties rests on principles given a priori in pure practical reason4 ,,introduction paragraph #ce ,,iv4 ,what are the ,ends which are also ,duties8 ,they are3 ,a4 ,,our ,,own ,,perfection1 ,b4 ,,happiness ,,of ,,others4 ,we cannot invert these and make on one side our own happiness1 and on the other the perfection of others1 ends which should be in themselves duties for the same person4 ,,introduction paragraph #dj ,for one's own happiness is1 no doubt1 an end that all men have 7by virtue of the impulse of their nature71 but this end cannot without contradiction be regarded as a duty4 ,what a man of himself inevitably wills does not come under the notion of duty1 for this is a constraint to an end reluctantly adopted4 ,it is1 therefore1 a contradiction to say that a man is in duty bound to advance his own happiness with all his power4 ,it is likewise a contradiction to make the perfection of another my end1 and to regard myself as in duty bound to promote it4 ,for it is just in this that the perfection of another man as a person consists1 namely1 that he is able of himself to set before him his own end according to his own notions of duty2 and it is a contradiction to require 7to make it a duty for me7 that ,i should do something which no other but himself can do4 ,v4 ,explanation of these two ,notions ,,introduction paragraph #de ,a4 ,,our ,,own ,,perfection ,the word perfection is liable to many misconceptions4 ,it is sometimes understood as a notion belonging to transcendental philosophy2 viz41 the notion of the totality of the manifold which taken together constitutes a thing2 sometimes1 again1 it is understood as belonging to teleology1 so that it signifies the correspondence of the properties of a thing to an end4 ,perfection in the former sense might be called quantitative 7material71 in the latter qualitative 7formal7 perfection4 ,the former can be one only1 for the whole of what belongs to the one thing is one4 ,but of the latter there may be several in one thing2 and it is of the latter property that we here treat4 ,when it is said of the perfection that belongs to man generally 7properly speaking1 to humanity71 that it is in itself a duty to make this our end1 it must be placed in that which may be the effect of one's deed1 not in that which is merely an endowment for which we have to thank nature2 for otherwise it would not be duty4 ,consequently1 it can be nothing else than the cultivation of one's power 7or natural capacity7 and also of one's will 7moral disposition7 to satisfy the requirement of duty in general4 ,the supreme element in the former 7the power7 is the understanding1 it being the faculty of concepts1 and1 therefore1 also of those concepts which refer to duty4 ,first it is his duty to labour to raise himself out of the rudeness of his nature1 out of his animal nature more and more to humanity1 by which alone he is capable of setting before him ends to supply the defects of his ignorance by instruction1 and to correct his errors2 he is not merely counselled to do this by reason as technically practical1 with a view to his purposes of other kinds 7as art71 but reason1 as morally practical1 absolutely commands him to do it1 and makes this end his duty1 in order that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells in him4 ,secondly1 to carry the cultivation of his will up to the purest virtuous disposition1 that1 namely1 in which the law is also the spring of his dutiful actions1 and to obey it from duty1 for this is internal morally practical perfection4 ,this is called the moral sense 7as it were a special sense1 sensus moralis71 because it is a feeling of the effect which the legislative will within himself exercises on the faculty of acting accordingly4 ,this is1 indeed1 often misused fanatically1 as though 7like the genius of ,socrates7 it preceded reason1 or even could dispense with judgement of reason2 but still it is a moral perfection1 making every special end1 which is also a duty1 one's own end4 ,,introduction paragraph #ej ,b4 ,,happiness ,,of ,,others ,it is inevitable for human nature that man a should wish and seek for happiness1 that is1 satisfaction with his condition1 with certainty of the continuance of this satisfaction4 ,but for this very reason it is not an end that is also a duty4 ,some writers still make a distinction between moral and physical happiness 7the former consisting in satisfaction with one's person and moral behaviour1 that is1 with what one does2 the other in satisfaction with that which nature confers1 consequently with what one enjoys as a foreign gift74 ,without at present censuring the misuse of the word 7which even involves a contradiction71 it must be observed that the feeling of the former belongs solely to the preceding head1 namely1 perfection4 ,for he who is to feel himself happy in the mere consciousness of his uprightness already possesses that perfection which in the previous section was defined as that end which is also duty4 ,if happiness1 then1 is in question1 which it is to be my duty to promote as my end1 it must be the happiness of other men whose 7permitted7 end ,i hereby make also mine4 ,it still remains left to themselves to decide what they shall reckon as belonging to their happiness2 only that it is in my power to decline many things which they so reckon1 but which ,i do not so regard1 supposing that they have no right to demand it from me as their own4 ,a plausible objection often advanced against the division of duties above adopted consists in setting over against that end a supposed obligation to study my own 7physical7 happiness1 and thus making this1 which is my natural and merely subjective end1 my duty 7and objective end74 ,this requires to be cleared up4 ,adversity1 pain1 and want are great temptations to transgression of one's duty2 accordingly it would seem that strength1 health1 a competence1 and welfare generally1 which are opposed to that influence1 may also be regarded as ends that are also duties2 that is1 that it is a duty to promote our own happiness not merely to make that of others our end4 ,but in that case the end is not happiness but the morality of the agent2 and happiness is only the means of removing the hindrances to morality2 permitted means1 since no one has a right to demand from me the sacrifice of my not immoral ends4 ,it is not directly a duty to seek a competence for one's self2 but indirectly it may be so2 namely1 in order to guard against poverty which is a great temptation to vice4 ,but then it is not my happiness but my morality1 to maintain which in its integrity is at once my end and my duty4 ,,introduction paragraph #ee ,,vi4 ,ethics does not supply ,laws for ,actions 7which is done by ,jurisprudence71 but only for the ,maxims of ,action ,the notion of duty stands in immediate relation to a law 7even though ,i abstract from every end which is the matter of the law72 as is shown by the formal principle of duty in the categorical imperative3 ,act so that the maxims of thy action might become a universal law4 ,but in ethics this is conceived as the law of thy own will1 not of will in general1 which might be that of others2 for in the latter case it would give rise to a judicial duty which does not belong to the domain of ethics4 ,in ethics1 maxims are regarded as those subjective laws which merely have the specific character of universal legislation1 which is only a negative principle 7not to contradict a law in general74 ,how1 then1 can there be further a law for the maxims of actions8 ,,introduction paragraph #fj ,it is the notion of an end which is also a duty1 a notion peculiar to ethics1 that alone is the foundation of a law for the maxims of actions2 by making the subjective end 7that which every one has7 subordinate to the objective end 7that which every one ought to make his own74 ,the imperative3 ,thou shalt make this or that thy end 7e4 g41 the happiness of others7 applies to the matter of the elective will 7an object74 ,now since no free action is possible1 without the agent having in view in it some end 7as matter of his elective will71 it follows that1 if there is an end which is also a duty1 the maxims of actions which are means to ends must contain only the condition of fitness for a possible universal legislation3 on the other hand1 the end which is also a duty can make it a law that we should have such a maxim1 whilst for the maxim itself the possibility of agreeing with a universal legislation is sufficient4 ,for maxims of actions may be arbitrary1 and are only limited by the condition of fitness for a universal legislation1 which is the formal principle of actions4 ,but a law abolishes the arbitrary character of actions1 and is by this distinguished from recommendation 7in which one only desires to know the best means to an end74 ,,vii4 ,ethical ,duties are of indeterminate1 ,juridical ,duties of strict1 ,obligation ,,introduction paragraph #fe ,this proposition is a consequence of the foregoing2 for if the law can only command the maxim of the actions1 not the actions themselves1 this is a sign that it leaves in the observance of it a latitude 7latitudo7 for the elective will2 that is1 it cannot definitely assign how and how much we should do by the action towards the end which is also duty4 ,but by an indeterminate duty is not meant a permission to make exceptions from the maxim of the actions1 but only the permission to limit one maxim of duty by another 7e4 g41 the general love of our neighbour by the love of parents72 and this in fact enlarges the field for the practice of virtue4 ,the more indeterminate the duty1 and the more imperfect accordingly the obligation of the man to the action1 and the closer he nevertheless brings this maxim of obedience thereto 7in his own mind7 to the strict duty 7of justice71 so much the more perfect is his virtuous action4 ,hence it is only imperfect duties that are duties of virtue4 ,the fulfilment of them is merit 7meritum7 a2 but their transgression is not necessarily demerit 7demeritum7 - a1 but only moral unworth o1 unless the agent made it a principle not to conform to those duties4 ,the strength of purpose in the former case is alone properly called virtue ,tugend 7virtus72 the weakness in the latter case is not vice 7vitium71 but rather only lack of virtue ,untugend1 a want of moral strength 7defectus moralis74 7,as the word ,tugend is derived from taugen to be good for something1 ,untugend by its etymology signifies good for nothing47 ,every action contrary to duty is called transgression 7peccatum74 ,deliberate transgression which has become a principle is what properly constitutes what is called vice 7vitium74 ,although the conformity of actions to justice 7i4e41 to be an upright man7 is nothing meritorious1 yet the conformity of the maxim of such actions regarded as duties1 that is1 reverence for justice is meritorious4 ,for by this the man makes the right of humanity or of men his own end1 and thereby enlarges his notion of duty beyond that of indebtedness 7officium debiti71 since although another man by virtue of his rights can demand that my actions shall conform to the law1 he cannot demand that the law shall also contain the spring of these actions4 ,the same thing is true of the general ethical command1 ,act dutifully from a sense of duty4 ,to fix this disposition firmly in one's mind and to quicken it is1 as in the former case1 meritorious1 because it goes beyond the law of duty in actions and makes the law in itself the spring4 ,but just for or reason1 those duties also must be reckoned as of indeterminate obligation1 in respect of which there exists a subjective principle which ethically rewards them2 or to bring them as near as possible to the notion of a strict obligation1 a principle of susceptibility of this reward according to the law of virtue2 namely1 a moral pleasure which goes beyond mere satisfaction with oneself 7which may be merely negative71 and of which it is proudly said that in this consciousness virtue is its own reward4 ,,introduction paragraph #gj ,when this merit is a merit of the man in respect of other men of promoting their natural ends1 which are recognized as such by all men 7making their happiness his own71 we might call it the sweet merit1 the consciousness of which creates a moral enjoyment in which men are by sympathy inclined to revel2 whereas the bitter merit of promoting the true welfare of other men1 even though they should not recognize it as such 7in the case of the unthankful and ungrateful71 has commonly no such reaction1 but only produces a satisfaction with one's self1 although in the latter case this would be even greater4 ,,viii4 ,exposition of the ,duties of ,virtue as ,intermediate ,duties 7#a7 ,,our ,,own ,,perfection as an end which is also a duty ,,introduction paragraph #ge 7a7 ,physical perfection2 that is1 cultivation of all our faculties generally for the promotion of the ends set before us by reason4 ,that this is a duty1 and therefore an end in itself1 and that the effort to effect this even without regard to the advantage that it secures us1 is based1 not on a conditional 7pragmatic71 but an unconditional 7moral7 imperative1 may be seen from the following consideration4 ,the power of proposing to ourselves an end is the characteristic of humanity 7as distinguished from the brutes74 ,with the end of humanity in our own person is therefore combined the rational will1 and consequently the duty of deserving well of humanity by culture generally1 by acquiring or advancing the power to carry out all sorts of possible ends1 so far as this power is to be found in man2 that is1 it is a duty to cultivate the crude capacities of our nature1 since it is by that cultivation that the animal is raised to man1 therefore it is a duty in itself4 ,this duty1 however1 is merely ethical1 that is1 of indeterminate obligation4 ,no principle of reason prescribes how far one must go in this effort 7in enlarging or correcting his faculty of understanding1 that is1 in acquisition of knowledge or technical capacity72 and besides the difference in the circumstances into which men may come makes the choice of the kind of employment for which he should cultivate his talent very arbitrary4 ,here1 therefore1 there is no law of reason for actions1 but only for the maxim of actions1 viz43 ,cultivate thy faculties of mind and body so as to be effective for all ends that may come in thy way1 uncertain which of them may become thy own4 7b7 ,cultivation of ,morality in ourselves4 ,the greatest moral perfection of man is to do his duty1 and that from duty 7that the law be not only the rule but also the spring of his actions74 ,now at first sight this seems to be a strict obligation1 and as if the principle of duty commanded not merely the legality of every action1 but also the morality1 i4e41 the mental disposition1 with the exactness and strictness of a law2 but in fact the law commands even here only the maxim of the action1 namely1 that we should seek the ground of obligation1 not in the sensible impulses 7advantage or disadvantage71 but wholly in the law2 so that the action itself is not commanded4 ,for it is not possible to man to see so far into the depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in one single action1 although he has no doubt about the legality of it4 ,nay1 often the weakness which deters a man from the risk of a crime is regarded by him as virtue 7which gives the notion of strength74 ,and how many there are who may have led a long blameless life1 who are only fortunate in having escaped so many temptations4 ,how much of the element of pure morality in their mental disposition may have belonged to each deed remains hidden even from themselves4 ,accordingly1 this duty to estimate the worth of one's actions not merely by their legality1 but also by their morality 7mental disposition71 is only of indeterminate obligation2 the law does not command this internal action in the human mind itself1 but only the maxim of the action1 namely1 that we should strive with all our power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of itself an adequate spring4 7#b7 ,,happiness ,,of ,,others as an end which is also a duty ,,introduction paragraph #hj 7a7 ,physical ,welfare4 ,benevolent wishes may be unlimited1 for they do not imply doing anything4 ,but the case is more difficult with benevolent action1 especially when this is to be done1 not from friendly inclination 7love7 to others1 but from duty1 at the expense of the sacrifice and mortification of many of our appetites4 ,that this beneficence is a duty results from this3 that since our self-love cannot be separated from the need to be loved by others 7to obtain help from them in case of necessity71 we therefore make ourselves an end for others2 and this maxim can never be obligatory except by having the specific character of a universal law1 and consequently by means of a will that we should also make others our ends4 ,hence the happiness of others is an end that is also a duty4 ,i am only bound then to sacrifice to others a part of my welfare without hope of recompense3 because it is my duty1 and it is impossible to assign definite limits how far that may go4 ,much depends on what would be the true want of each according to his own feelings1 and it must be left to each to determine this for himself4 ,for that one should sacrifice his own happiness1 his true wants1 in order to promote that of others1 would be a self-contradictory maxim if made a universal law4 ,this duty1 therefore1 is only indeterminate2 it has a certain latitude within which one may do more or less without our being able to assign its limits definitely4 ,the law holds only for the maxims1 not for definite actions4 7b7 ,moral well-being of others 7salus moralis7 also belongs to the happiness of others1 which it is our duty to promote1 but only a negative duty4 ,the pain that a man feels from remorse of conscience1 although its origin is moral1 is yet in its operation physical1 like grief1 fear1 and every other diseased condition4 ,to take care that he should not be deservedly smitten by this inward reproach is not indeed my duty but his business2 nevertheless1 it is my duty to do nothing which by the nature of man might seduce him to that for which his conscience may hereafter torment him1 that is1 it is my duty not to give him occasion of stumbling4 ,but there are no definite limits within which this care for the moral satisfaction of others must be kept2 therefore it involves only an indeterminate obligation4 ,,ix4 ,what is a ,duty of ,virtue8 ,,introduction paragraph #he ,virtue is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty4 ,all strength is known only by the obstacles that it can overcome2 and in the case of virtue the obstacles are the natural inclinations which may come into conflict with the moral purpose2 and as it is the man who himself puts these obstacles in the way of his maxims1 hence virtue is not merely a self-constraint 7for that might be an effort of one inclination to constrain another71 but is also a constraint according to a principle of inward freedom1 and therefore by the mere idea of duty1 according to its formal law4 ,all duties involve a notion of necessitation by the law1 and ethical duties involve a necessitation for which only an internal legislation is possible2 juridical duties1 on the other hand1 one for which external legislation also is possible4 ,both1 therefore1 include the notion of constraint1 either self-constraint or constraint by others4 ,the moral power of the former is virtue1 and the action springing from such a disposition 7from reverence for the law7 may be called a virtuous action 7ethical71 although the law expresses a juridical duty4 ,for it is the doctrine of virtue that commands us to regard the rights of men as holy4 ,but it does not follow that everything the doing of which is virtue1 is1 properly speaking1 a duty of virtue4 ,the former may concern merely the form of the maxims2 the latter applies to the matter of them1 namely1 to an end which is also conceived as duty4 ,now1 as the ethical obligation to ends1 of which there may be many1 is only indeterminate1 because it contains only a law for the maxim of actions1 and the end is the matter 7object7 of elective will2 hence there are many duties1 differing according to the difference of lawful ends1 which may be called duties of virtue 7officia honestatis71 just because they are subject only to free self-constraint1 not to the constraint of other men1 and determine the end which is also a duty4 ,virtue1 being a coincidence of the rational will1 with every duty firmly settled in the character1 is1 like everything formal1 only one and the same4 ,but1 as regards the end of actions1 which is also duty1 that is1 as regards the matter which one ought to make an end1 there may be several virtues2 and as the obligation to its maxim is called a duty of virtue1 it follows that there are also several duties of virtue4 ,,introduction paragraph #ij ,the supreme principle of ethics 7the doctrine of virtue7 is3 ,act on a maxim1 the ends of which are such as it might be a universal law for everyone to have4 ,on this principle a man is an end to himself as well as others1 and it is not enough that he is not permitted to use either himself or others merely as means 7which would imply that be might be indifferent to them71 but it is in itself a duty of every man to make mankind in general his end4 ,the principle of ethics being a categorical imperative does not admit of proof1 but it admits of a justification from principles of pure practical reason4 ,whatever in relation to mankind1 to oneself1 and others1 can be an end1 that is an end for pure practical reason3 for this is a faculty of assigning ends in general2 and to be indifferent to them1 that is1 to take no interest in them1 is a contradiction2 since in that case it would not determine the maxims of actions 7which always involve an end71 and consequently would cease to be practical reasons4 ,pure reason1 however1 cannot command any ends a priori1 except so far as it declares the same to be also a duty1 which duty is then called a duty of virtue4 ,x4 ,the ,supreme ,principle of ,jurisprudence was ,analytical2 that of ,ethics is ,synthetical ,,introduction paragraph #ie ,that external constraint1 so far as it withstands that which hinders the external freedom that agrees with general laws 7as an obstacle of the obstacle thereto71 can be consistent with ends generally1 is clear on the principle of contradiction1 and ,i need not go beyond the notion of freedom in order to see it1 let the end which each may be what he will4 ,accordingly1 the supreme principle of jurisprudence is an analytical principle4 ,on the contrary the principle of ethics goes beyond the notion of external freedom and1 by general laws1 connects further with it an end which it makes a duty4 ,this principle1 therefore1 is synthetic4 ,the possibility of it is contained in the ,deduction 7,sec4 ix474 ,this enlargement of the notion of duty beyond that of external freedom and of its limitation by the merely formal condition of its constant harmony2 this1 ,i say1 in which1 instead of constraint from without1 there is set up freedom within1 the power of self-constraint1 and that not by the help of other inclinations1 but by pure practical reason 7which scorns all such help71 consists in this fact1 which raises it above juridical duty2 that by it ends are proposed from which jurisprudence altogether abstracts4 ,in the case of the moral imperative1 and the supposition of freedom which it necessarily involves1 the law1 the power 7to fulfil it7 and the rational will that determines the maxim1 constitute all the elements that form the notion of juridical duty4 ,but in the imperative1 which commands the duty of virtue1 there is added1 besides the notion of self-constraint1 that of an end2 not one that we have1 but that we ought to have1 which1 therefore1 pure practical reason has in itself1 whose highest1 unconditional end 7which1 however1 continues to be duty7 consists in this3 that virtue is its own end and1 by deserving well of men1 is also its own reward4 ,herein it shines so brightly as an ideal to human perceptions1 it seems to cast in the shade even holiness itself1 which is never tempted to transgression4 99 ,this1 however1 is an illusion arising from the fact that as we have no measure for the degree of strength1 except the greatness of the obstacles which might have been overcome 7which in our case are the inclinations71 we are led to mistake the subjective conditions of estimation of a magnitude for the objective conditions of the magnitude itself4 ,but when compared with human ends1 all of which have their obstacles to be overcome1 it is true that the worth of virtue itself1 which is its own end1 far outweighs the worth of all the utility and all the empirical ends and advantages which it may have as consequences4 99 ,so that one might vary two well-known lines of ,haller thus3 ,,introduction paragraph #ajj ,with all his failings1 man is still ,better than angels void of will4 ,we may1 indeed1 say that man is obliged to virtue 7as a moral strength74 ,for although the power 7facultas7 to overcome all imposing sensible impulses by virtue of his freedom can and must be presupposed1 yet this power regarded as strength 7robur7 is something that must be acquired by the moral spring 7the idea of the law7 being elevated by contemplation of the dignity of the pure law of reason in us1 and at the same time also by exercise4 ,,introduction paragraph #aje ,,xi4 ,according to the preceding ,principles1 the ,scheme of ,duties of ,virtue may be thus exhibited ,the ,material ,element of the ,duty of ,virtue ,,introduction paragraph #aaj #a #b ,internal ,duty of ,virtue ,external ,virtue of ,duty ,my ,own ,end1 ,the ,end of ,others1 which is also my the promotion of ,,introduction paragraph #aae ,duty which is also my ,duty 7,my own 7,the ,happiness ,perfection7 of ,others7 ,,introduction paragraph #abj #c #d ,the ,law which is ,the ,end which is also ,spring also ,spring ,,introduction paragraph #abe ,on which the ,on which the ,morality ,legality of every free determination of will rests ,,introduction paragraph #acj ,the ,formal ,element of the ,duty of ,virtue4 ,,xii4 ,preliminary ,notions of the ,susceptibility of the ,mind for ,notions of ,duty generally ,,introduction paragraph #ace ,these are such moral qualities as1 when a man does not possess them1 he is not bound to acquire them4 ,they are3 the moral feeling1 conscience1 love of one's neighbour1 and respect for ourselves 7self-esteem74 ,there is no obligation to have these1 since they are subjective conditions of susceptibility for the notion of duty1 not objective conditions of morality4 ,they are all sensitive and antecedent1 but natural capacities of mind 7praedispositio7 to be affected by notions of duty2 capacities which it cannot be regarded as a duty to have1 but which every man has1 and by virtue of which he can be brought under obligation4 ,the consciousness of them is not of empirical origin1 but can only follow on that of a moral law1 as an effect of the same on the mind4 ,a4 ,,the ,,moral ,,feeling ,this is the susceptibility for pleasure or displeasure1 merely from the consciousness of the agreement or disagreement of our action with the law of duty4 ,now1 every determination of the elective will proceeds from the idea of the possible action through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure in taking an interest in it or its effect to the deed2 and here the sensitive state 7the affection of the internal sense7 is either a pathological or a moral feeling4 ,the former is the feeling that precedes the idea of the law1 the latter that which may follow it4 ,,introduction paragraph #adj ,now it cannot be a duty to have a moral feeling1 or to acquire it2 for all consciousness of obligation supposes this feeling in order that one may become conscious of the necessitation that lies in the notion of duty2 but every man 7as a moral being7 has it originally in himself2 the obligation1 then1 can only extend to the cultivation of it and the strengthening of it even by admiration of its inscrutable origin2 and this is effected by showing how it is just1 by the mere conception of reason1 that it is excited most strongly1 in its own purity and apart from every pathological stimulus2 and it is improper to call this feeling a moral sense2 for the word sense generally means a theoretical power of perception directed to an object2 whereas the moral feeling 7like pleasure and displeasure in general7 is something merely subjective1 which supplies no knowledge4 ,no man is wholly destitute of moral feeling1 for if he were totally unsusceptible of this sensation he would be morally dead2 and1 to speak in the language of physicians1 if the moral vital force could no longer produce any effect on this feeling1 then his humanity would be dissolved 7as it were by chemical laws7 into mere animality and be irrevocably confounded with the mass of other physical beings4 ,but we have no special sense for 7moral7 good and evil any more than for truth1 although such expressions are often used2 but we have a susceptibility of the free elective will for being moved by pure practical reason and its law2 and it is this that we call the moral feeling4 ,b4 ,,of ,,conscience ,similarly1 conscience is not a thing to be acquired1 and it is not a duty to acquire it2 but every man1 as a moral being1 has it originally within him4 ,to be bound to have a conscience would be as much as to say to be under a duty to recognize duties4 ,for conscience is practical reason which1 in every case of law1 holds before a man his duty for acquittal or condemnation2 consequently it does not refer to an object1 but only to the subject 7affecting the moral feeling by its own act72 so that it is an inevitable fact1 not an obligation and duty4 ,when1 therefore1 it is said1 ,this man has no conscience1 what is meant is that he pays no heed to its dictates4 ,for if he really had none1 he would not take credit to himself for anything done according to duty1 nor reproach himself with violation of duty1 and therefore he would be unable even to conceive the duty of having a conscience4 ,,introduction paragraph #ade ,i pass by the manifold subdivisions of conscience1 and only observe what follows from what has just been said1 namely1 that there is no such thing as an erring conscience4 ,no doubt it is possible sometimes to err in the objective judgement whether something is a duty or not2 but ,i cannot err in the subjective whether ,i have compared it with my practical 7here judicially acting7 reason for the purpose of that judgement3 for if ,i erred ,i would not have exercised practical judgement at all1 and in that case there is neither truth nor error4 ,unconscientiousness is not want of conscience1 but the propensity not to heed its judgement4 ,but when a man is conscious of having acted according to his conscience1 then1 as far as regards guilt or innocence1 nothing more can be required of him1 only he is bound to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty or not2 but when it comes or has come to action1 then conscience speaks involuntarily and inevitably4 ,to act conscientiously can1 therefore1 not be a duty1 since otherwise it would be necessary to have a second conscience1 in order to be conscious of the act of the first4 ,the duty here is only to cultivate our conscience1 to quicken our attention to the voice of the internal judge1 and to use all means to secure obedience to it1 and is thus our indirect duty4 ,c4 ,,of ,,love ,,to ,,men ,,introduction paragraph #aej ,love is a matter of feeling1 not of will or volition1 and ,i cannot love because ,i will to do so1 still less because ,i ought 7,i cannot be necessitated to love72 hence there is no such thing as a duty to love4 ,benevolence1 however 7amor benevolentiae71 as a mode of action1 may be subject to a law of duty4 ,disinterested benevolence is often called 7though very improperly7 love2 even where the happiness of the other is not concerned1 but the complete and free surrender of all one's own ends to the ends of another 7even a superhuman7 being1 love is spoken of as being also our duty4 ,but all duty is necessitation or constraint1 although it may be self-constraint according to a law4 ,but what is done from constraint is not done from love4 ,it is a duty to do good to other men according to our power1 whether we love them or not1 and this duty loses nothing of its weight1 although we must make the sad remark that our species1 alas6 is not such as to be found particularly worthy of love when we know it more closely4 ,hatred of men1 however1 is always hateful3 even though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind 7the solitary misanthropy74 ,for benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater1 whom one cannot love1 but to whom we can show kindness4 ,to hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty1 but a mere feeling of horror of vice1 the will having no influence on the feeling nor the feeling on the will4 ,beneficence is a duty4 ,he who often practises this1 and sees his beneficent purpose succeed1 comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited4 ,when1 therefore1 it is said3 ,thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself1 this does not mean1 ,thou shalt first of all love1 and by means of this love 7in the next place7 do him good2 but3 ,do good to thy neighbour1 and this beneficence will produce in thee the love of men 7as a settled habit of inclination to beneficence74 ,the love of complacency 7amor complacentiae17 would therefore alone be direct4 ,this is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object1 and to have a duty to this1 that is1 to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing1 is a contradiction4 ,,introduction paragraph #aee ,d4 ,,of ,,respect ,respect 7reverentia7 is likewise something merely subjective2 a feeling of a peculiar kind not a judgement about an object which it would be a duty to effect or to advance4 ,for if considered as duty it could only be conceived as such by means of the respect which we have for it4 ,to have a duty to this1 therefore1 would be as much as to say to be bound in duty to have a duty4 ,when1 therefore1 it is said3 ,man has a duty of self-esteem1 this is improperly stated1 and we ought rather to say3 ,the law within him inevitably forces from him respect for his own being1 and this feeling 7which is of a peculiar kind7 is a basis of certain duties1 that is1 of certain actions which may be consistent with his duty to himself4 ,but we cannot say that he has a duty of respect for himself2 for he must have respect for the law within himself1 in order to be able to conceive duty at all4 ,,xiii4 ,general ,principles of the ,metaphysics of ,morals in the ,,introduction paragraph #afj treatment of ,pure ,ethics ,first4 ,a duty can have only a single ground of obligation2 and if two or more proof of it are adduced1 this is a certain mark that either no valid proof has yet been given1 or that there are several distinct duties which have been regarded as one4 ,for all moral proofs1 being philosophical1 can only be drawn by means of rational knowledge from concepts1 not like mathematics1 through the construction of concepts4 ,the latter science admits a variety of proofs of one and the same theorem2 because in intuition a priori there may be several properties of an object1 all of which lead back to the very same principle4 ,if1 for instance1 to prove the duty of veracity1 an argument is drawn first from the harm that a lie causes to other men2 another from the worthlessness of a liar and the violation of his own self-respect1 what is proved in the former argument is a duty of benevolence1 not of veracity1 that is to say1 not the duty which required to be proved1 but a different one4 ,now1 if1 in giving a variety of proof for one and the same theorem1 we flatter ourselves that the multitude of reasons will compensate the lack of weight in each taken separately1 this is a very unphilosophical resource1 since it betrays trickery and dishonesty2 for several insufficient proofs placed beside one another do not produce certainty1 nor even probability4 ,they should advance as reason and consequence in a series1 up to the sufficient reason1 and it is only in this way that they can have the force of proof4 ,yet the former is the usual device of the rhetorician4 ,secondly4 ,the difference between virtue and vice cannot be sought in the degree in which certain maxims are followed1 but only in the specific quality of the maxims 7their relation to the law74 ,in other words1 the vaunted principle of ,aristotle1 that virtue is the mean between two vices1 is false4 99 ,for instance1 suppose that good management is given as the mean between two vices1 prodigality and avarice2 then its origin as a virtue can neither be defined as the gradual diminution of the former vice 7by saving71 nor as the increase of the expenses of the miserly4 ,these vices1 in fact1 cannot be viewed as if they1 proceeding as it were in opposite directions1 met together in good management2 but each of them has its own maxim1 which necessarily contradicts that of the other4 ,,introduction paragraph #afe 99 ,the common classical formulae of ethics- medio tutissimus ibis2 omne mimium vertitur in vitium2 est modus in rebus1 etc41 medium tenuere beati2 virtus est medium vitiorum et utrinque reductum- ,you will go most safely in the middle 7,virgil72 ,every excess develops into a vice2 ,there is a mean in all things1 etc4 7,horace72 ,happy they who steadily pursue a middle course2 ,virtue is the mean between two vices and equally removed from either 7,horace74- contain a poor sort of wisdom1 which has no definite principles2 for this mean between two extremes1 who will assign it for me8 ,avarice 7as a vice7 is not distinguished from frugality 7as a virtue7 by merely being the latter pushed too far2 but has a quite different principle 7maxim71 namely placing the end of economy not in the enjoyment of one's means1 but in the mere possession of them1 renouncing enjoyment2 just as the vice of prodigality is not to be sought in the excessive enjoyment of one's means1 but in the bad maxim which makes the use of them1 without regard to their maintenance1 the sole end4 ,for the same reason1 no vice can be defined as an excess in the practice of certain actions beyond what is proper 7e4g41 ,prodigalitas est excessus in consumendis opibus72 or1 as a less exercise of them than is fitting 7,avaritia est defectus1 etc474 ,for since in this way the degree is left quite undefined1 and the question whether conduct accords with duty or not1 turns wholly on this1 such an account is of no use as a definition4 ,thirdly4 ,ethical virtue must not be estimated by the power we attribute to man of fulfilling the law2 but1 conversely1 the moral power must be estimated by the law1 which commands categorically2 not1 therefore1 by the empirical knowledge that we have of men as they are1 but by the rational knowledge how1 according to the ideas of humanity1 they ought to be4 ,these three maxims of the scientific treatment of ethics are opposed to the older apophthegms3 ,,introduction paragraph #agj #a4 ,there is only one virtue and only one vice4 #b4 ,virtue is the observance of the mean path between two opposite vices4 #c4 ,virtue 7like prudence7 must be learned from experience4 ,,xiv4 ,of ,virtue in ,general ,,introduction paragraph #age ,virtue signifies a moral strength of will4 ,but this does not exhaust the notion2 for such strength might also belong to a holy 7superhuman7 being1 in whom no opposing impulse counteracts the law of his rational will2 who therefore willingly does everything in accordance with the law4 ,virtue then is the moral strength of a man's will in his obedience to duty2 and this is a moral necessitation by his own law giving reason1 inasmuch as this constitutes itself a power executing the law4 ,it is not itself a duty1 nor is it a duty to possess it 7otherwise we should be in duty bound to have a duty71 but it commands1 and accompanies its command with a moral constraint 7one possible by laws of internal freedom74 ,but since this should be irresistible1 strength is requisite1 and the degree of this strength can be estimated only by the magnitude of the hindrances which man creates for himself1 by his inclinations4 ,vices1 the brood of unlawful dispositions1 are the monsters that he has to combat2 wherefore this moral strength as fortitude 7fortitudo moralis7 constitutes the greatest and only true martial glory of man2 it is also called the true wisdom1 namely1 the practical1 because it makes the ultimate end of the existence of man on earth its own end4 ,its possession alone makes man free1 healthy1 rich1 a king1 etc41 nor either chance or fate deprive him of this1 since he possesses himself1 and the virtuous cannot lose his virtue4 ,all the encomiums bestowed on the ideal of humanity in its moral perfection can lose nothing of their practical reality by the examples of what men now are1 have been1 or will probably be hereafter2 anthropology which proceeds from mere empirical knowledge cannot impair anthroponomy which is erected by the unconditionally legislating reason2 and although virtue may now and then be called meritorious 7in relation to men1 not to the law71 and be worthy of reward1 yet in itself1 as it is its own end1 so also it must be regarded as its own reward4 ,virtue considered in its complete perfection is1 therefore1 regarded not as if man possessed virtue1 but as if virtue possessed the man1 since in the former case it would appear as though he had still had the choice 7for which he would then require another virtue1 in order to select virtue from all other wares offered to him74 ,to conceive a plurality of virtues 7as we unavoidably must7 is nothing else but to conceive various moral objects to which the 7rational7 will is led by the single principle of virtue2 and it is the same with the opposite vices4 ,the expression which personifies both is a contrivance for affecting the sensibility1 pointing1 however1 to a moral sense4 ,hence it follows that an aesthetic of morals is not a part1 but a subjective exposition of the ,metaphysic of ,morals2 in which the emotions that accompany the force of the moral law make the that force to be felt2 for example3 disgust1 horror1 etc41 which gives a sensible moral aversion in order to gain the precedence from the merely sensible incitement4 ,,introduction paragraph #ahj ,,xv4 ,of the ,principle on which ,ethics is separated from ,jurisprudence ,this separation on which the subdivision of moral philosophy in general rests1 is founded on this3 that the notion of freedom1 which is common to both1 makes it necessary to divide duties into those of external and those of internal freedom2 the latter of which alone are ethical4 ,hence this internal freedom which is the condition of all ethical duty must be discussed as a preliminary 7discursus praeliminaris71 just as above the doctrine of conscience was discussed as the condition of all duty4 ,,introduction paragraph #ahe ,,remarks ,of the ,doctrine of ,virtue on the ,principle ,of ,internal ,freedom4 ,habit 7habitus7 is a facility of action and a subjective perfection of the elective will4 ,but not every such facility is a free habit 7habitus libertatis72 for if it is custom 7assuetudo71 that is1 a uniformity of action which1 by frequent repetition1 has become a necessity1 then it is not a habit proceeding from freedom1 and therefore not a moral habit4 ,virtue therefore cannot be defined as a habit of free law-abiding actions1 unless indeed we add determining itself in its action by the idea of the law2 and then this habit is not a property of the elective will1 but of the rational will1 which is a faculty that in adopting a rule also declares it to be a universal law1 and it is only such a habit that can be reckoned as virtue4 ,two things are required for internal freedom3 to be master of oneself in a given case 7animus sui compos7 and to have command over oneself 7imperium in semetipsum71 that is to subdue his emotions and to govern his passions4 ,with these conditions1 the character 7indoles7 is noble 7erecta72 in the opposite case1 it is ignoble 7indoles abjecta serva74 ,,introduction paragraph #aij ,,xvi4 ,virtue requires1 first of all1 ,command over ,oneself ,emotions and passions are essentially distinct2 the former belong to feeling in so far as this coming before reflection makes it more difficult or even impossible4 ,hence emotion is called hasty 7animus praeceps74 ,and reason declares through the notion of virtue that a man should collect himself2 but this weakness in the life of one's understanding1 joined with the strength of a mental excitement1 is only a lack of virtue 7,untugend71 and as it were a weak and childish thing1 which may very well consist with the best will1 and has further this one good thing in it1 that this storm soon subsides4 ,a propensity to emotion 7e4g41 resentment7 is therefore not so closely related to vice as passion is4 ,passion1 on the other hand1 is the sensible appetite grown into a permanent inclination 7e4 g41 hatred in contrast to resentment74 ,the calmness with which one indulges it leaves room for reflection and allows the mind to frame principles thereon for itself2 and thus when the inclination falls upon what contradicts the law1 to brood on it1 to allow it to root itself deeply1 and thereby to take up evil 7as of set purpose7 into one's maxim2 and this is then specifically evil1 that is1 it is a true vice4 ,virtue1 therefore1 in so far as it is based on internal freedom1 contains a positive command for man1 namely1 that he should bring all his powers and inclinations under his rule 7that of reason72 and this is a positive precept of command over himself which is additional to the prohibition1 namely1 that he should not allow himself to be governed by his feelings and inclinations 7the duty of apathy72 since1 unless reason takes the reins of government into its own hands1 the feelings and inclinations play the master over the man4 ,,introduction paragraph #aie ,,xvii4 ,virtue necessarily presupposes ,apathy 7considered as ,strength7 ,this word 7apathy7 has come into bad repute1 just as if it meant want of feeling1 and therefore subjective indifference with respect to the objects of the elective will2 it is supposed to be a weakness4 ,this misconception may be avoided by giving the name moral apathy to that want of emotion which is to be distinguished from indifference4 ,in the former1 the feelings arising from sensible impressions lose their influence on the moral feeling only because the respect for the law is more powerful than all of them together4 ,it is only the apparent strength of a fever patient that makes even the lively sympathy with good rise to an emotion1 or rather degenerate into it4 ,such an emotion is called enthusiasm1 and it is with reference to this that we are to explain the moderation which is usually recommended in virtuous practices3 ,,introduction paragraph #bjj ,insani sapiens nomen ferat1 aequus uniqui ,ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam4 99 99 ,horace4 ,let the wise man bear the name of fool1 and the just of unjust1 if he pursue virtue herself beyond the proper bounds4 ,,introduction paragraph #bje ,for otherwise it is absurd to imagine that one could be too wise or too virtuous4 ,the emotion always belongs to the sensibility1 no matter by what sort of object it may be excited4 ,the true strength of virtue is the mind at rest1 with a firm1 deliberate resolution to bring its law into practice4 ,that is the state of health in the moral life2 on the contrary1 the emotion1 even when it is excited by the idea of the good1 is a momentary glitter which leaves exhaustion after it4 ,we may apply the term fantastically virtuous to the man who will admit nothing to be indifferent in respect of morality 7adiaphora71 and who strews all his steps with duties1 as with traps1 and will not allow it to be indifferent whether a man eats fish or flesh1 drink beer or wine1 when both agree with him2 a micrology which1 if adopted into the doctrine of virtue1 would make its rule a tyranny4 ,,remark ,,introduction paragraph #baj ,virtue is always in progress1 and yet always begins from the beginning4 ,the former follows from the fact that1 objectively considered1 it is an ideal and unattainable1 and yet it is a duty constantly to approximate to it4 ,the second is founded subjectively on the nature of man which is affected by inclinations1 under the influence of which virtue1 with its maxims adopted once for all1 can never settle in a position of rest2 but1 if it is not rising1 inevitably falls2 because moral maxims cannot1 like technical1 be based on custom 7for this belongs to the physical character of the determination of will72 but even if the practice of them become a custom1 the agent would thereby lose the freedom in the choice of his maxims1 which freedom is the character of an action done from duty4 ,,on,,conscience ,,on ,,conscience ,the consciousness of an internal tribunal in man 7before which his thoughts accuse or excuse one another7 is ,,conscience4 ,every man has a conscience1 and finds himself observed by an inward judge which threatens and keeps him in awe 7reverence combined with fear72 and this power which watches over the laws within him is not something which he himself 7arbitrarily7 makes1 but it is incorporated in his being4 ,it follows him like his shadow1 when he thinks to escape4 ,he may indeed stupefy himself with pleasures and distractions1 but cannot avoid now and then coming to himself or awaking1 and then he at once perceives its awful voice4 ,in his utmost depravity1 he may1 indeed1 pay no attention to it1 but he cannot avoid hearing it4 ,now this original intellectual and 7as a conception of duty7 moral capacity1 called conscience1 has this peculiarity in it1 that although its business is a business of man with himself1 yet he finds himself compelled by his reason to transact it as if at the command of another person4 ,for the transaction here is the conduct of a trial 7causa7 before a tribunal4 ,but that he who is accused by his conscience should be conceived as one and the same person with the judge is an absurd conception of a judicial court2 for then the complainant would always lose his case4 ,therefore1 in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions1 if it is to avoid self-contradiction4 ,now this other may be an actual or a merely ideal person which reason frames to itself4 ,such an idealized person 7the authorized judge of conscience7 must be one who knows the heart2 for the tribunal is set up in the inward part of man2 at the same time he must also be all-obliging1 that is1 must be or be conceived as a person in respect of whom all duties are to be regarded as his commands2 since conscience is the inward judge of all free actions4 ,now1 since such a moral being must at the same time possess all power 7in heaven and earth71 since otherwise he could not give his commands their proper effect 7which the office of judge necessarily requires71 and since such a moral being possessing power over all is called ,,god1 hence conscience must be conceived as the subjective principle of a responsibility for one's deeds before ,god2 nay1 this latter concept is contained 7though it be only obscurely7 in every moral self-consciousness4 ,,the ,,end