#aghh       ,,the ,,critique ,,of       
,,practical ,,reason        by ,immanuel
 ,kant    translated by ,thomas         
,kingsmill ,abbott   ,,preface4  ,this  
work is called the ,critique of         
,practical ,reason1 not of the pure     
practical reason1 although its          
parallelism with the speculative        
critique would seem to require the      
latter term4 ,the reason of this appears
 sufficiently from the treatise itself4 
,its business is to show that there is  
pure practical reason1 and for this     
purpose it criticizes the entire        
practical faculty of reason4 ,if it     
succeeds in this1 it has no need to     
criticize the pure faculty itself in    
order to see whether reason in making   
such a claim does not presumptuously    
overstep itself 7as is the case with the
 speculative reason74 ,for if1 as pure  
reason1 it is actually practical1 it    
proves its own reality and that of its  
concepts by fact1 and all disputation   
against the possibility of its being    

real is futile4  ,with this faculty1    
transcendental freedom is also          
established2 freedom1 namely1 in that   
absolute sense in which speculative     
reason required it in its use of the    
concept of causality in order to escape 
the antinomy into which it inevitably   
falls1 when in the chain of cause and   
effect it tries to think the            
unconditioned4 ,speculative reason could
 only exhibit this concept 7of freedom7 
problematically as not impossible to    
thought1 without assuring it any        
objective reality1 and merely lest the  
supposed impossibility of what it must  
at least allow to be thinkable should   
endanger its very being and plunge it   
into an abyss of scepticism4  ,inasmuch 
as the reality of the concept of freedom
 is proved by an apodeictic law of      
practical reason1 it is the keystone of 
the whole system of pure reason1 even   
the speculative1 and all other concepts 
7those of ,god and immortality7 which1  
as being mere ideas1 remain in it       

unsupported1 now attach themselves to   
this concept1 and by it obtain          
consistence and objective reality2 that 
is to say1 their possibility is proved  
by the fact that freedom actually       
exists1 for this idea is revealed by the
 moral law4  ,freedom1 however1 is the  
only one of all the ideas of the        
speculative reason of which we know the 
possibility a priori 7without1 however1 
understanding it71 because it is the    
condition of the moral law which we     
know4 99 ,the ideas of ,god and         
immortality1 however1 are not conditions
 of the moral law1 but only conditions  
of the necessary object of a will       
determined by this law2 that is to say1 
conditions of the practical use of our  
pure reason4 ,hence1 with respect to    
these ideas1 we cannot affirm that we   
know and understand1 ,i will not say the
 actuality1 but even the possibility of 
them4 ,however they are the conditions  
of the application of the morally       
determined will to its object1 which is 

given to it a priori1 viz41 the summum  
bonum4 ,consequently in this practical  
point of view their possibility must be 
assumed1 although we cannot             
theoretically know and understand it4   
,to justify this assumption it is       
sufficient1 in a practical point of     
view1 that they contain no intrinsic    
impossibility 7contradiction74 ,here we 
have what1 as far as speculative reason 
is concerned1 is a merely subjective    
principle of assent1 which1 however1 is 
objectively valid for a reason equally  
pure but practical1 and this principle1 
by means of the concept of freedom1     
assures objective reality and authority 
to the ideas of ,god and immortality4   
,nay1 there is a subjective necessity 7a
 need of pure reason7 to assume them4   
,nevertheless the theoretical knowledge 
of reason is not hereby enlarged1 but   
only the possibility is given1 which    
heretofore was merely a problem and now 
becomes assertion1 and thus the         
practical use of reason is connected    

with the elements of theoretical reason4
 ,and this need is not a merely         
hypothetical one for the arbitrary      
purposes of speculation1 that we must   
assume something if we wish in          
speculation to carry reason to its      
utmost limits1 but it is a need which   
has the force of law to assume something
 without which that cannot be which we  
must inevitably set before us as the aim
 of our action4                         
,,preface paragraph #e  99 ,lest any one
 should imagine that he finds an        
inconsistency here when ,i call freedom 
the condition of the moral law1 and     
hereafter maintain in the treatise      
itself that the moral law is the        
condition under which we can first      
become conscious of freedom1 ,i will    
merely remark that freedom is the ratio 
essendi of the moral law1 while the     
moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of   
freedom4 ,for had not the moral law been
 previously distinctly thought in our   
reason1 we should never consider        

ourselves justified in assuming such a  
thing as freedom1 although it be not    
contradictory4 ,but were there no       
freedom it would be impossible to trace 
the moral law in ourselves at all4      
,it would certainly be more satisfactory
 to our speculative reason if it could  
solve these problems for itself without 
this circuit and preserve the solution  
for practical use as a thing to be      
referred to1 but in fact our faculty of 
speculation is not so well provided4    
,those who boast of such high knowledge 
ought not to keep it back1 but to       
exhibit it publicly that it may be      
tested and appreciated4 ,they want to   
prove3 very good1 let them prove2 and   
the critical philosophy lays its arms at
 their feet as the victors4 ,quid       
statis8 ,nolint4 ,atqui licet esse      
beatis4 ,as they then do not in fact    
choose to do so1 probably because they  
cannot1 we must take up these arms again
 in order to seek in the mortal use of  
reason1 and to base on this1 the notions

 of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 the 
possibility of which speculation cannot 
adequately prove4  ,here first is       
explained the enigma of the critical    
philosophy1 viz43 how we deny objective 
reality to the supersensible use of the 
categories in speculation and yet admit 
this reality with respect to the objects
 of pure practical reason4 ,this must at
 first seem inconsistent as long as this
 practical use is only nominally known4 
,but when1 by a thorough analysis of it1
 one becomes aware that the reality     
spoken of does not imply any theoretical
 determination of the categories and    
extension of our knowledge to the       
supersensible2 but that what is meant is
 that in this respect an object belongs 
to them1 because either they are        
contained in the necessary determination
 of the will a priori1 or are           
inseparably connected with its object2  
then this inconsistency disappears1     
because the use we make of these        
concepts is different from what         

speculative reason requires4 ,on the    
other hand1 there now appears an        
unexpected and very satisfactory proof  
of the consistency of the speculative   
critical philosophy4 ,for whereas it    
insisted that the objects of experience 
as such1 including our own subject1 have
 only the value of phenomena1 while at  
the same time things in themselves must 
be supposed as their basis1 so that not 
everything supersensible was to be      
regarded as a fiction and its concept as
 empty2 so now practical reason itself1 
without any concert with the            
speculative1 assures reality to a       
supersensible object of the category of 
causality1 viz41 freedom1 although 7as  
becomes a practical concept7 only for   
practical use2 and this establishes on  
the evidence of a fact that which in the
 former case could only be conceived4   
,by this the strange but certain        
doctrine of the speculative critical    
philosophy1 that the thinking subject is
 to itself in internal intuition only a 

phenomenon1 obtains in the critical     
examination of the practical reason its 
full confirmation1 and that so          
thoroughly that we should be compelled  
to adopt this doctrine1 even if the     
former had never proved it at all4 99   
,,preface paragraph #aj  99 ,the union  
of causality as freedom with causality  
as rational mechanism1 the former       
established by the moral law1 the latter
 by the law of nature in the same       
subject1 namely1 man1 is impossible1    
unless we conceive him with reference to
 the former as a being in himself1 and  
with reference to the latter as a       
phenomenon- the former in pure          
consciousness1 the latter in empirical  
consciousness4 ,otherwise reason        
inevitably contradicts itself4    ,by   
this also ,i can understand why the most
 considerable objections which ,i have  
as yet met with against the ,critique   
turn about these two points1 namely1 on 
the one side1 the objective reality of  
the categories as applied to noumena1   

which is in the theoretical department  
of knowledge denied1 in the practical   
affirmed2 and on the other side1 the    
paradoxical demand to regard oneself qua
 subject of freedom as a noumenon1 and  
at the same time from the point of view 
of physical nature as a phenomenon in   
one's own empirical consciousness2 for  
as long as one has formed no definite   
notions of morality and freedom1 one    
could not conjecture on the one side    
what was intended to be the noumenon1   
the basis of the alleged phenomenon1 and
 on the other side it seemed doubtful   
whether it was at all possible to form  
any notion of it1 seeing that we had    
previously assigned all the notions of  
the pure understanding in its           
theoretical use exclusively to          
phenomena4 ,nothing but a detailed      
criticism of the practical reason can   
remove all this misapprehension and set 
in a clear light the consistency which  
constitutes its greatest merit4  ,so    
much by way of justification of the     

proceeding by which1 in this work1 the  
notions and principles of pure          
speculative reason which have already   
undergone their special critical        
examination are1 now and then1 again    
subjected to examination4 ,this would   
not in other cases be in accordance with
 the systematic process by which a      
science is established1 since matters   
which have been decided ought only to be
 cited and not again discussed4 ,in this
 case1 however1 it was not only         
allowable but necessary1 because reason 
is here considered in transition to a   
different use of these concepts from    
what it had made of them before4 ,such a
 transition necessitates a comparison of
 the old and the new usage1 in order to 
distinguish well the new path from the  
old one and1 at the same time1 to allow 
their connection to be observed4        
,accordingly considerations of this     
kind1 including those which are once    
more directed to the concept of freedom 
in the practical use of the pure reason1

 must not be regarded as an             
interpolation serving only to fill up   
the gaps in the critical system of      
speculative reason 7for this is for its 
own purpose complete71 or like the props
 and buttresses which in a hastily      
constructed building are often added    
afterwards2 but as true members which   
make the connexion of the system plain1 
and show us concepts1 here presented as 
real1 which there could only be         
presented problematically4 ,this remark 
applies especially to the concept of    
freedom1 respecting which one cannot but
 observe with surprise that so many     
boast of being able to understand it    
quite well and to explain its           
possibility1 while they regard it only  
psychologically1 whereas if they had    
studied it in a transcendental point of 
view1 they must have recognized that it 
is not only indispensable as a          
problematical concept1 in the complete  
use of speculative reason1 but also     
quite incomprehensible2 and if they     

afterwards came to consider its         
practical use1 they must needs have come
 to the very mode of determining the    
principles of this1 to which they are   
now so loth to assent4 ,the concept of  
freedom is the stone of stumbling for   
all empiricists1 but at the same time   
the key to the loftiest practical       
principles for critical moralists1 who  
perceive by its means that they must    
necessarily proceed by a rational       
method4 ,for this reason ,i beg the     
reader not to pass lightly over what is 
said of this concept at the end of the  
,analytic4  ,i must leave it to those   
who are acquainted with works of this   
kind to judge whether such a system as  
that of the practical reason1 which is  
here developed from the critical        
examination of it1 has cost much or     
little trouble1 especially in seeking   
not to miss the true point of view from 
which the whole can be rightly sketched4
 ,it presupposes1 indeed1 the           
,fundamental ,principles of the         

,metaphysic of ,morals1 but only in so  
far as this gives a preliminary         
acquaintance with the principle of duty1
 and assigns and justifies a definite   
formula thereof2 in other respects it is
 independent4 99 ,it results from the   
nature of this practical faculty itself 
that the complete classification of all 
practical sciences cannot be added1 as  
in the critique of the speculative      
reason4 ,for it is not possible to      
define duties specially1 as human       
duties1 with a view to their            
classification1 until the subject of    
this definition 7viz41 man7 is known    
according to his actual nature1 at least
 so far as is necessary with respect to 
duty2 this1 however1 does not belong to 
a critical examination of the practical 
reason1 the business of which is only to
 assign in a complete manner the        
principles of its possibility1 extent1  
and limits1 without special reference to
 human nature4 ,the classification then 
belongs to the system of science1 not to

 the system of criticism4               
,,preface paragraph #ae    99 ,a        
reviewer who wanted to find some fault  
with this work has hit the truth better1
 perhaps1 than he thought1 when he says 
that no new principle of morality is set
 forth in it1 but only a new formula4   
,but who would think of introducing a   
new principle of all morality and making
 himself as it were the first discoverer
 of it1 just as if all the world before 
him were ignorant what duty was or had  
been in thorough-going error8 ,but      
whoever knows of what importance to a   
mathematician a formula is1 which       
defines accurately what is to be done to
 work a problem1 will not think that a  
formula is insignificant and useless    
which does the same for all duty in     
general4    ,in the second part of the  
,analytic ,i have given1 as ,i trust1 a 
sufficient answer to the objection of a 
truth-loving and acute critic 99 of the 
,fundamental ,principles of the         
,metaphysic of ,morals- a critic always 

worthy of respect- the objection1       
namely1 that the notion of good was not 
established before the moral principle1 
as he thinks it ought to have been4     
997#b7 ,i have also had regard to many  
of the objections which have reached me 
from men who show that they have at     
heart the discovery of the truth1 and ,i
 shall continue to do so 7for those who 
have only their old system before their 
eyes1 and who have already settled what 
is to be approved or disapproved1 do not
 desire any explanation which might     
stand in the way of their own private   
opinion47                               
,,preface paragraph #bj  99 ,see ,kant's
 ,das mag in der ,theoric ricktig seyn1 
etc4 ,werke1 vol4 vii1 p4 #ahb4  997#b7 
,it might also have been objected to me 
that ,i have not first defined the      
notion of the faculty of desire1 or of  
the feeling of ,pleasure1 although this 
reproach would be unfair1 because this  
definition might reasonably be          
presupposed as given in psychology4     

,however1 the definition there given    
might be such as to found the           
determination of the faculty of desire  
on the feeling of pleasure 7as is       
commonly done71 and thus the supreme    
principle of practical philosophy would 
be necessarily made empirical1 which1   
however1 remains to be proved and in    
this critique is altogether refuted4 ,it
 will1 therefore1 give this definition  
here in such a manner as it ought to be 
given1 in order to leave this contested 
point open at the beginning1 as it      
should be4 ,,life is the faculty a being
 has of acting according to laws of the 
faculty of desire4 ,the faculty of      
,,desire is the being's faculty of      
becoming by means of its ideas the cause
 of the actual existence of the objects 
of these ideas4 ,,pleasure is the idea  
of the agreement of the object1 or the  
action with the subjective conditions of
 life1 i4e41 with the faculty of        
causality of an idea in respect of the  
actuality of its object 7or with the    

determination of the forces of the      
subject to action which produces it74 ,i
 have no further need for the purposes  
of this critique of notions borrowed    
from psychology2 the critique itself    
supplies the rest4 ,it is easily seen   
that the question whether the faculty of
 desire is always based on pleasure1 or 
whether under certain conditions        
pleasure only follows the determination 
of desire1 is by this definition left   
undecided1 for it is composed only of   
terms belonging to the pure             
understanding1 i4e41 of categories which
 contain nothing empirical4 ,such       
precaution is very desirable in all     
philosophy and yet is often neglected2  
namely1 not to prejudge questions by    
adventuring definitions before the      
notion has been completely analysed1    
which is often very late4 ,it may be    
observed through the whole course of the
 critical philosophy 7of the theoretical
 as well as the practical reason7 that  
frequent opportunity offers of supplying

 defects in the old dogmatic method of  
philosophy1 and of correcting errors    
which are not observed until we make    
such rational use of these notions      
viewing them as a whole4    ,when we    
have to study a particular faculty of   
the human mind in its sources1 its      
content1 and its limits2 then from the  
nature of human knowledge we must begin 
with its parts1 with an accurate and    
complete exposition of them2 complete1  
namely1 so far as is possible in the    
present state of our knowledge of its   
elements4 ,but there is another thing to
 be attended to which is of a more      
philosophical and architectonic         
character1 namely1 to grasp correctly   
the idea of the whole1 and from thence  
to get a view of all those parts as     
mutually related by the aid of pure     
reason1 and by means of their derivation
 from the concept of the whole4 ,this is
 only possible through the most intimate
 acquaintance with the system2 and those
 who find the first inquiry too         

troublesome1 and do not think it worth  
their while to attain such an           
acquaintance1 cannot reach the second   
stage1 namely1 the general view1 which  
is a synthetical return to that which   
had previously been given analytically4 
,it is no wonder then if they find      
inconsistencies everywhere1 although the
 gaps which these indicate are not in   
the system itself1 but in their own     
incoherent train of thought4  ,i have no
 fear1 as regards this treatise1 of the 
reproach that ,i wish to introduce a new
 language1 since the sort of knowledge  
here in question has itself somewhat of 
an everyday character4 ,nor even in the 
case of the former critique could this  
reproach occur to anyone who had thought
 it through and not merely turned over  
the leaves4 ,to invent new words where  
the language has no lack of expressions 
for given notions is a childish effort  
to distinguish oneself from the crowd1  
if not by new and true thoughts1 yet by 
new patches on the old garment4 ,if1    

therefore1 the readers of that work know
 any more familiar expressions which are
 as suitable to the thought as those    
seem to me to be1 or if they think they 
can show the futility of these thoughts 
themselves and hence that of the        
expression1 they would1 in the first    
case1 very much oblige me1 for ,i only  
desire to be understood3 and1 in the    
second case1 they would deserve well of 
philosophy4 ,but1 as long as these      
thoughts stand1 ,i very much doubt that 
suitable and yet more common expressions
 for them can be found4 99              
,,preface paragraph #be    99 ,i am more
 afraid in the present treatise of      
occasional misconception in respect of  
some expressions which ,i have chosen   
with the greatest care in order that the
 notion to which they point may not be  
missed4 ,thus1 in the table of          
categories of the ,practical reason     
under the title of ,modality1 the       
,permitted1 and forbidden 7in a         
practical objective point of view1      

possible and impossible7 have almost the
 same meaning in common language as the 
next category1 duty and contrary to     
duty4 ,here1 however1 the former means  
what coincides with1 or contradicts1 a  
merely possible practical precept 7for  
example1 the solution of all problems of
 geometry and mechanics72 the latter1   
what is similarly related to a law      
actually present in the reason2 and this
 distinction is not quite foreign even  
to common language1 although somewhat   
unusual4 ,for example1 it is forbidden  
to an orator1 as such1 to forge new     
words or constructions2 in a certain    
degree this is permitted to a poet2 in  
neither case is there any question of   
duty4 ,for if anyone chooses to forfeit 
his reputation as an orator1 no one can 
prevent him4 ,we have here only to do   
with the distinction of imperatives into
 problematical1 assertorial1 and        
apodeictic4 ,similarly in the note in   
which ,i have pared the moral ideas of  
practical perfection in different       

philosophical schools1 ,i have          
distinguished the idea of wisdom from   
that of holiness1 although ,i have      
stated that essentially and objectively 
they are the same4 ,but in that place ,i
 understand by the former only that     
wisdom to which man 7the ,stoic7 lays   
claim2 therefore ,i take it subjectively
 as an attribute alleged to belong to   
man4 7,perhaps the expression virtue1   
with which also the ,stoic made great   
show1 would better mark the             
characteristic of his school47 ,the     
expression of a postulate of pure       
practical reason might give most        
occasion to misapprehension in case the 
reader confounded it with the           
signification of the postulates in pure 
mathematics1 which carry apodeictic     
certainty with them4 ,these1 however1   
postulate the possibility of an action1 
the object of which has been previously 
recognized a priori in theory as        
possible1 and that with perfect         
certainty4 ,but the former postulates   

the possibility of an object itself     
7,god and the immortality of the soul7  
from apodeictic practical laws1 and     
therefore only for the purposes of a    
practical reason4 ,this certainty of the
 postulated possibility then is not at  
all theoretic1 and consequently not     
apodeictic2 that is to say1 it is not a 
known necessity as regards the object1  
but a necessary supposition as regards  
the subject1 necessary for the obedience
 to its objective but practical laws4   
,it is1 therefore1 merely a necessary   
hypothesis4 ,i could find no better     
expression for this rational necessity1 
which is subjective1 but yet true and   
unconditional4    ,in this manner1 then1
 the a priori principles of two         
faculties of the mind1 the faculty of   
cognition and that of desire1 would be  
found and determined as to the          
conditions1 extent1 and limits of their 
use1 and thus a sure foundation be paid 
for a scientific system of philosophy1  
both theoretic and practical4  ,nothing 

worse could happen to these labours than
 that anyone should make the unexpected 
discovery that there neither is1 nor can
 be1 any a priori knowledge at all4 ,but
 there is no danger of this4 ,this would
 be the same thing as if one sought to  
prove by reason that there is no reason4
 ,for we only say that we know something
 by reason1 when we are conscious that  
we could have known it1 even if it had  
not been given to us in experience2     
hence rational knowledge and knowledge a
 priori are one and the same4 ,it is a  
clear contradiction to try to extract   
necessity from a principle of experience
 7ex pumice aquam71 and to try by this  
to give a judgement true universality   
7without which there is no rational     
inference1 not even inference from      
analogy1 which is at least a presumed   
universality and objective necessity74  
,to substitute subjective necessity1    
that is1 custom1 for objective1 which   
exists only in a priori judgements1 is  
to deny to reason the power of judging  

about the object1 i4e41 of knowing it1  
and what belongs to it4 ,it implies1 for
 example1 that we must not say of       
something which often or always follows 
a certain antecedent state that we can  
conclude from this to that 7for this    
would imply objective necessity and the 
notion of an a priori connexion71 but   
only that we may expect similar cases   
7just as animals do71 that is that we   
reject the notion of cause altogether as
 false and a mere delusion4 ,as to      
attempting to remedy this want of       
objective and consequently universal    
validity by saying that we can see no   
ground for attributing any other sort of
 knowledge to other rational beings1 if 
this reasoning were valid1 our ignorance
 would do more for the enlargement of   
our knowledge than all our meditation4  
,for1 then1 on this very ground that we 
have no knowledge of any other rational 
beings besides man1 we should have a    
right to suppose them to be of the same 
nature as we know ourselves to be3 that 

is1 we should really know them4 ,i omit 
to mention that universal assent does   
not prove the objective validity of a   
judgement 7i4e41 its validity as a      
cognition71 and although this universal 
assent should accidentally happen1 it   
could furnish no proof of agreement with
 the object2 on the contrary1 it is the 
objective validity which alone          
constitutes the basis of a necessary    
universal consent4                      
,,preface paragraph #cj  ,hume would be 
quite satisfied with this system of     
universal empiricism1 for1 as is well   
known1 he desired nothing more than     
that1 instead of ascribing any objective
 meaning to the necessity in the concept
 of cause1 a merely subjective one      
should be assumed1 viz41 custom1 in     
order to deny that reason could judge   
about ,god1 freedom1 and immortality2   
and if once his principles were granted1
 he was certainly well able to deduce   
his conclusions therefrom1 with all     
logical coherence4 ,but even ,hume did  

not make his empiricism so universal as 
to include mathematics4 ,he holds the   
principles of mathematics to be         
analytical2 and if his were correct1    
they would certainly be apodeictic also3
 but we could not infer from this that  
reason has the faculty of forming       
apodeictic judgements in philosophy     
also- that is to say1 those which are   
synthetical judgements1 like the        
judgement of causality4 ,but if we adopt
 a universal empiricism1 then           
mathematics will be included4  ,now if  
this science is in contradiction with a 
reason that admits only empirical       
principles1 as it inevitably is in the  
antinomy in which mathematics prove the 
infinite divisibility of space1 which   
empiricism cannot admit2 then the       
greatest possible evidence of           
demonstration is in manifest            
contradiction with the alleged          
conclusions from experience1 and we are 
driven to ask1 like ,cheselden's blind  
patient1 ,which deceives me1 sight or   

touch8 7for empiricism is based on a    
necessity felt1 rationalism on a        
necessity seen74 ,and thus universal    
empiricism reveals itself as absolute   
scepticism4 ,it is erroneous to         
attribute this in such an unqualified   
sense to ,hume1 99 since he left at     
least one certain touchstone 7which can 
only be found in a priori principles71  
although experience consists not only of
 feelings1 but also of judgements4    99
 ,names that designate the followers of 
a sect have always been accompanied with
 much injustice2 just as if one said1 ,n
 is an ,idealist4 ,for although he not  
only admits1 but even insists1 that our 
ideas of external things have actual    
objects of external things corresponding
 to them1 yet he holds that the form of 
the intuition does not depend on them   
but on the human mind4                  
,,preface paragraph #ce  ,however1 as in
 this philosophical and critical age    
such empiricism can scarcely be serious1
 and it is probably put forward only as 

an intellectual exercise and for the    
purpose of putting in a clearer light1  
by contrast1 the necessity of rational a
 priori principles1 we can only be      
grateful to those who employ themselves 
in this otherwise uninstructive labour4 
,,introduction                          
,,introduction4         ,of the ,idea of
 a ,critique of ,practical ,reason4     
,the theoretical use of reason was      
concerned with objects of the cognitive 
faculty only1 and a critical examination
 of it with reference to this use       
applied properly only to the pure       
faculty of cognition2 because this      
raised the suspicion1 which was         
afterwards confirmed1 that it might     
easily pass beyond its limits1 and be   
lost among unattainable objects1 or even
 contradictory notions4 ,it is quite    
different with the practical use of     
reason4 ,in this1 reason is concerned   
with the grounds of determination of the
 will1 which is a faculty either to     
produce objects corresponding to ideas1 

or to determine ourselves to the        
effecting of such objects 7whether the  
physical power is sufficient or not72   
that is1 to determine our causality4    
,for here1 reason can at least attain so
 far as to determine the will1 and has  
always objective reality in so far as it
 is the volition only that is in        
question4 ,the first question here then 
is whether pure reason of itself alone  
suffices to determine the will1 or      
whether it can be a ground of           
determination only as dependent on      
empirical conditions4 ,now1 here there  
comes in a notion of causality justified
 by the critique of the pure reason1    
although not capable of being presented 
empirically1 viz41 that of freedom2 and 
if we can now discover means of proving 
that this property does in fact belong  
to the human will 7and so to the will of
 all rational beings71 then it will not 
only be shown that pure reason can be   
practical1 but that it alone1 and not   
reason empirically limited1 is          

indubitably practical2 consequently1 we 
shall have to make a critical           
examination1 not of pure practical      
reason1 but only of practical reason    
generally4 ,for when once pure reason is
 shown to exist1 it needs no critical   
examination4 ,for reason itself contains
 the standard for the critical          
examination of every use of it4 ,the    
critique1 then1 of practical reason     
generally is bound to prevent the       
empirically conditioned reason from     
claiming exclusively to furnish the     
ground of determination of the will4 ,if
 it is proved that there is a practical 
reason1 its employment is alone         
immanent2 the empirically conditioned   
use1 which claims supremacy1 is on the  
contrary transcendent and expresses     
itself in demands and precepts which go 
quite beyond its sphere4 ,this is just  
the opposite of what might be said of   
pure reason in its speculative          
employment4  ,however1 as it is still   
pure reason1 the knowledge of which is  

here the foundation of its practical    
employment1 the general outline of the  
classification of a critique of         
practical reason must be arranged in    
accordance with that of the speculative4
 ,we must1 then1 have the ,elements and 
the ,methodology of it2 and in the      
former an ,analytic as the rule of      
truth1 and a ,dialectic as the          
exposition and dissolution of the       
illusion in the judgements of practical 
reason4 ,but the order in the           
subdivision of the ,analytic will be the
 reverse of that in the critique of the 
pure speculative reason4 ,for1 in the   
present case1 we shall commence with the
 principles and proceed to the concepts1
 and only then1 if possible1 to the     
senses2 whereas in the case of the      
speculative reason we began with the    
senses and had to end with the          
principles4 ,the reason of this lies    
again in this3 that now we have to do   
with a will1 and have to consider       
reason1 not in its relation to objects1 

but to this will and its causality4 ,we 
must1 then1 begin with the principles of
 a causality not empirically            
conditioned1 after which the attempt can
 be made to establish our notions of the
 determining grounds of such a will1 of 
their application to objects1 and       
finally to the subject and its sense    
faculty4 ,we necessarily begin with the 
law of causality from freedom1 that is1 
with a pure practical principle1 and    
this determines the objects to which    
alone it can be applied4                
,,book#a;,,chapter#a                    
,,first ,,part4             ,,elements  
,,of ,,pure ,,practical ,,reason4       
,,book ,i4 ,the ,analytic of ,pure      
,practical ,reason4     ,,chapter ,i4   
,of the ,principles of ,pure ,practical 
,reason4                                
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #e       
,i4 ,,definition4    ,practical         
principles are propositions which       
contain a general determination of the  
will1 having under it several practical 

rules4 ,they are subjective1 or maxims1 
when the condition is regarded by the   
subject as valid only for his own will1 
but are objective1 or practical laws1   
when the condition is recognized as     
objective1 that is1 valid for the will  
of every rational being4                
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aj      
,,remark4    ,supposing that pure reason
 contains in itself a practical motive1 
that is1 one adequate to determine the  
will1 then there are practical laws2    
otherwise all practical principles will 
be mere maxims4 ,in case the will of a  
rational being is pathologically        
affected1 there may occur a conflict of 
the maxims with the practical laws      
recognized by itself4 ,for example1 one 
may make it his maxim to let no injury  
pass unrevenged1 and yet he may see that
 this is not a practical law1 but only  
his own maxim2 that1 on the contrary1   
regarded as being in one and the same   
maxim a rule for the will of every      
rational being1 it must contradict      

itself4 ,in natural philosophy the      
principles of what happens1 7e4g41 the  
principle of equality of action and     
reaction in the communication of motion7
 are at the same time laws of nature2   
for the use of reason there is          
theoretical and determined by the nature
 of the object4 ,in practical           
philosophy1 i4e41 that which has to do  
only with the grounds of determination  
of the will1 the principles which a man 
makes for himself are not laws by which 
one is inevitably bound2 because reason 
in practical matters has to do with the 
subject1 namely1 with the faculty of    
desire1 the special character of which  
may occasion variety in the rule4 ,the  
practical rule is always a product of   
reason1 because it prescribes action as 
a means to the effect4 ,but in the case 
of a being with whom reason does not of 
itself determine the will1 this rule is 
an imperative1 i4e41 a rule             
characterized by shall1 which expresses 
the objective necessitation of the      

action and signifies that1 if reason    
completely determined the will1 the     
action would inevitably take place      
according to this rule4 ,imperatives1   
therefore1 are objectively valid1 and   
are quite distinct from maxims1 which   
are subjective principles4 ,the former  
either determine the conditions of the  
causality of the rational being as an   
efficient cause1 i4e41 merely in        
reference to the effect and the means of
 attaining it2 or they determine the    
will only1 whether it is adequate to the
 effect or not4 ,the former would be    
hypothetical imperatives1 and contain   
mere precepts of skill2 the latter1 on  
the contrary1 would be categorical1 and 
would alone be practical laws4 ,thus    
maxims are principles1 but not          
imperatives4 ,imperatives themselves1   
however1 when they are conditional      
7i4e41 do not determine the will simply 
as will1 but only in respect to a       
desired effect1 that is1 when they are  
hypothetical imperatives71 are practical

 precepts but not laws4 ,laws must be   
sufficient to determine the will as     
will1 even before ,i ask whether ,i have
 power sufficient for a desired effect1 
or the means necessary to produce it2   
hence they are categorical3 otherwise   
they are not laws at all1 because the   
necessity is wanting1 which1 if it is to
 be practical1 must be independent of   
conditions which are pathological and   
are therefore only contingently         
connected with the will4 ,tell a man1   
for example1 that he must be industrious
 and thrifty in youth1 in order that he 
may not want in old age2 this is a      
correct and important practical precept 
of the will4 ,but it is easy to see that
 in this case the will is directed to   
something else which it is presupposed  
that it desires2 and as to this desire1 
we must leave it to the actor himself   
whether he looks forward to other       
resources than those of his own         
acquisition1 or does not expect to be   
old1 or thinks that in case of future   

necessity he will be able to make shift 
with little4 ,reason1 from which alone  
can spring a rule involving necessity1  
does1 indeed1 give necessity to this    
precept 7else it would not be an        
imperative71 but this is a necessity    
dependent on subjective conditions1 and 
cannot be supposed in the same degree in
 all subjects4 ,but that reason may give
 laws it is necessary that it should    
only need to presuppose itself1 because 
rules are objectively and universally   
valid only when they hold without any   
contingent subjective conditions1 which 
distinguish one rational being from     
another4 ,now tell a man that he should 
never make a deceitful promise1 this is 
a rule which only concerns his will1    
whether the purposes he may have can be 
attained thereby or not2 it is the      
volition only which is to be determined 
a priori by that rule4 ,if now it is    
found that this rule is practically     
right1 then it is a law1 because it is a
 categorical imperative4 ,thus1         

practical laws refer to the will only1  
without considering what is attained by 
its causality1 and we may disregard this
 latter 7as belonging to the world of   
sense7 in order to have them quite pure4
                        ,,ii4 ,,theorem 
,i4                                     
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ae      
,all practical principles which         
presuppose an object 7matter7 of the    
faculty of desire as the ground of      
determination of the will are empirical 
and can furnish no practical laws4  ,by 
the matter of the faculty of desire ,i  
mean an object the realization of which 
is desired4 ,now1 if the desire for this
 object precedes the practical rule and 
is the condition of our making it a     
principle1 then ,i say 7in the first    
place7 this principle is in that case   
wholly empirical1 for then what         
determines the choice is the idea of an 
object and that relation of this idea to
 the subject by which its faculty of    
desire is determined to its realization4

 ,such a relation to the subject is     
called the pleasure in the realization  
of an object4 ,this1 then1 must be      
presupposed as a condition of the       
possibility of determination of the     
will4 ,but it is impossible to know a   
priori of any idea of an object whether 
it will be connected with pleasure or   
pain1 or be indifferent4 ,in such cases1
 therefore1 the determining principle of
 the choice must be empirical and1      
therefore1 also the practical material  
principle which presupposes it as a     
condition4  ,in the second place1 since 
susceptibility to a pleasure or pain can
 be known only empirically and cannot   
hold in the same degree for all rational
 beings1 a principle which is based on  
this subjective condition may serve     
indeed as a maxim for the subject which 
possesses this susceptibility1 but not  
as a law even to him 7because it is     
wanting in objective necessity1 which   
must be recognized a priori72 it        
follows1 therefore1 that such a         

principle can never furnish a practical 
law4                                    
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #bj      
,,iii4 ,,theorem ,,ii4    ,all material 
practical principles as such are of one 
and the same kind and come under the    
general principle of self-love or       
private happiness4  ,pleasure arising   
from the idea of the idea of the        
existence of a thing1 in so far as it is
 to determine the desire of this thing1 
is founded on the susceptibility of the 
subject1 since it depends on the        
presence of an object2 hence it belongs 
to sense 7feeling71 and not to          
understanding1 which expresses a        
relation of the idea to an object       
according to concepts1 not to the       
subject according to feelings4 ,it is1  
then1 practical only in so far as the   
faculty of desire is determined by the  
sensation of agreeableness which the    
subject expects from the actual         
existence of the object4 ,now1 a        
rational being's consciousness of the   

pleasantness of life uninterruptedly    
accompanying his whole existence is     
happiness2 and the principle which makes
 this the supreme ground of             
determination of the will is the        
principle of self-love4 ,all material   
principles1 then1 which place the       
determining ground of the will in the   
pleasure or pain to be received from the
 existence of any object are all of the 
same kind1 inasmuch as they all belong  
to the principle of self-love or private
 happiness4                             
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #be      
,,corollary4    ,all material practical 
rules place the determining principle of
 the will in the lower desires2 and if  
there were no purely formal laws of the 
will adequate to determine it1 then we  
could not admit any higher desire at    
all4                           ,,remark 
,i4                                     
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #cj      
,it is surprising that men1 otherwise   
acute1 can think it possible to         

distinguish between higher and lower    
desires1 according as the ideas which   
are connected with the feeling of       
pleasure have their origin in the senses
 or in the understanding2 for when we   
inquire what are the determining grounds
 of desire1 and place them in some      
expected pleasantness1 it is of no      
consequence whence the idea of this     
pleasing object is derived1 but only how
 much it pleases4 ,whether an idea has  
its seat and source in the understanding
 or not1 if it can only determine the   
choice by presupposing a feeling of     
pleasure in the subject1 it follows that
 its capability of determining the      
choice depends altogether on the nature 
of the inner sense1 namely1 that this   
can be agreeably affected by it4        
,however dissimilar ideas of objects may
 be1 though they be ideas of the        
understanding1 or even of the reason in 
contrast to ideas of sense1 yet the     
feeling of pleasure1 by means of which  
they constitute the determining         

principle of the will 7the expected     
satisfaction which impels the activity  
to the production of the object71 is of 
one and the same kind1 not only inasmuch
 as it can only be known empirically1   
but also inasmuch as it affects one and 
the same vital force which manifests    
itself in the faculty of desire1 and in 
this respect can only differ in degree  
from every other ground of              
determination4 ,otherwise1 how could we 
compare in respect of magnitude two     
principles of determination1 the ideas  
of which depend upon different          
faculties1 so as to prefer that which   
affects the faculty of desire in the    
highest degree4 ,the same man may return
 unread an instructive book which he    
cannot again obtain1 in order not to    
miss a hunt2 he may depart in the midst 
of a fine speech1 in order not to be    
late for dinner2 he may leave a rational
 conversation1 such as he otherwise     
values highly1 to take his place at the 
gaming-table2 he may even repulse a poor

 man whom he at other times takes       
pleasure in benefiting1 because he has  
only just enough money in his pocket to 
pay for his admission to the theatre4   
,if the determination of his will rests 
on the feeling of the agreeableness or  
disagreeableness that he expects from   
any cause1 it is all the same to him by 
what sort of ideas he will be affected4 
,the only thing that concerns him1 in   
order to decide his choice1 is1 how     
great1 how long continued1 how easily   
obtained1 and how often repeated1 this  
agreeableness is4 ,just as to the man   
who wants money to spend1 it is all the 
same whether the gold was dug out of the
 mountain or washed out of the sand1    
provided it is everywhere accepted at   
the same value2 so the man who cares    
only for the enjoyment of life does not 
ask whether the ideas are of the        
understanding or the senses1 but only   
how much and how great pleasure they    
will give for the longest time4 ,it is  
only those that would gladly deny to    

pure reason the power of determining the
 will1 without the presupposition of any
 feeling1 who could deviate so far from 
their own exposition as to describe as  
quite heterogeneous what they have      
themselves previously brought under one 
and the same principle4 ,thus1 for      
example1 it is observed that we can find
 pleasure in the mere exercise of power1
 in the consciousness of our strength of
 mind in overcoming obstacles which are 
opposed to our designs1 in the culture  
of our mental talents1 etc42 and we     
justly call these more refined pleasures
 and enjoyments1 because they are more  
in our power than others2 they do not   
wear out1 but rather increase the       
capacity for further enjoyment of them1 
and while they delight they at the same 
time cultivate4 ,but to say on this     
account that they determine the will in 
a different way and not through sense1  
whereas the possibility of the pleasure 
presupposes a feeling for it implanted  
in us1 which is the first condition of  

this satisfaction2 this is just as when 
ignorant persons that like to dabble in 
metaphysics imagine matter so subtle1 so
 supersubtle that they almost make      
themselves giddy with it1 and then think
 that in this way they have conceived it
 as a spiritual and yet extended being4 
,if with ,epicurus we make virtue       
determine the will only by means of the 
pleasure it promises1 we cannot         
afterwards blame him for holding that   
this pleasure is of the same kind as    
those of the coarsest senses4 ,for we   
have no reason whatever to charge him   
with holding that the ideas by which    
this feeling is excited in us belong    
merely to the bodily senses4 ,as far as 
can be conjectured1 he sought the source
 of many of them in the use of the      
higher cognitive faculty1 but this did  
not prevent him1 and could not prevent  
him1 from holding on the principle above
 stated1 that the pleasure itself which 
those intellectual ideas give us1 and by
 which alone they can determine the     

will1 is just of the same kind4         
,consistency is the highest obligation  
of a philosopher1 and yet the most      
rarely found4 ,the ancient ,greek       
schools give us more examples of it than
 we find in our syncretistic age1 in    
which a certain shallow and dishonest   
system of compromise of contradictory   
principles is devised1 because it       
commends itself better to a public which
 is content to know something of        
everything and nothing thoroughly1 so as
 to please every party4  ,the principle 
of private happiness1 however much      
understanding and reason may be used in 
it1 cannot contain any other determining
 principles for the will than those     
which belong to the lower desires2 and  
either there are no higher desires at   
all1 or pure reason must of itself alone
 be practical2 that is1 it must be able 
to determine the will by the mere form  
of the practical rule without supposing 
any feeling1 and consequently without   
any idea of the pleasant or unpleasant1 

which is the matter of the desire1 and  
which is always an empirical condition  
of the principles4 ,then only1 when     
reason of itself determines the will    
7not as the servant of the inclination71
 it is really a higher desire to which  
that which is pathologically determined 
is subordinate1 and is really1 and even 
specifically1 distinct from the latter1 
so that even the slightest admixture of 
the motives of the latter impairs its   
strength and superiority2 just as in a  
mathematical demonstration the least    
empirical condition would degrade and   
destroy its force and value4 ,reason1   
with its practical law1 determines the  
will immediately1 not by means of an    
intervening feeling of pleasure or pain1
 not even of pleasure in the law itself1
 and it is only because it can1 as pure 
reason1 be practical1 that it is        
possible for it to be legislative4      
,,remark ,,ii4                          
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ce      
,to be happy is necessarily the wish of 

every finite rational being1 and this1  
therefore1 is inevitably a determining  
principle of its faculty of desire4 ,for
 we are not in possession originally of 
satisfaction with our whole existence- a
 bliss which would imply a consciousness
 of our own independent self-sufficiency
 this is a problem imposed upon us by   
our own finite nature1 because we have  
wants and these wants regard the matter 
of our desires1 that is1 something that 
is relative to a subjective feeling of  
pleasure or pain1 which determines what 
we need in order to be satisfied with   
our condition4 ,but just because this   
material principle of determination can 
only be empirically known by the        
subject1 it is impossible to regard this
 problem as a law2 for a law being      
objective must contain the very same    
principle of determination of the will  
in all cases and for all rational       
beings4 ,for1 although the notion of    
happiness is in every case the          
foundation of practical relation of the 

objects to the desires1 yet it is only a
 general name for the subjective        
determining principles1 and determines  
nothing specifically2 whereas this is   
what alone we are concerned with in this
 practical problem1 which cannot be     
solved at all without such specific     
determination4 ,for it is every man's   
own special feeling of pleasure and pain
 that decides in what he is to place his
 happiness1 and even in the same subject
 this will vary with the difference of  
his wants according as this feeling     
changes1 and thus a law which is        
subjectively necessary 7as a law of     
nature7 is objectively a very contingent
 practical principle1 which can and must
 be very different in different subjects
 and therefore can never furnish a law2 
since1 in the desire for happiness it is
 not the form 7of conformity to law7    
that is decisive1 but simply the matter1
 namely1 whether ,i am to expect        
pleasure in following the law1 and how  
much4 ,principles of self-love may1     

indeed1 contain universal precepts of   
skill 7how to find means to accomplish  
one's purpose71 but in that case they   
are merely theoretical principles2 99   
as1 for example1 how he who would like  
to eat bread should contrive a mill2 but
 practical precepts founded on them can 
never be universal1 for the determining 
principle of the desire is based on the 
feeling pleasure and pain1 which can    
never be supposed to be universally     
directed to the same objects4    99     
,propositions which in mathematics or   
physics are called practical ought      
properly to be called technical4 ,for   
they have nothing to do with the        
determination of the will2 they only    
point out how a certain effect is to be 
produced and are1 therefore1 just as    
theoretical as any propositions which   
express the connection of a cause with  
an effect4 ,now whoever chooses the     
effect must also choose the cause4      
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #dj      
,even supposing1 however1 that all      

finite rational beings were thoroughly  
agreed as to what were the objects of   
their feelings of pleasure and pain1 and
 also as to the means which they must   
employ to attain the one and avoid the  
other2 still1 they could by no means set
 up the principle of self-love as a     
practical law1 for this unanimity itself
 would be only contingent4 ,the         
principle of determination would still  
be only subjectively valid and merely   
empirical1 and would not possess the    
necessity which is conceived in every   
law1 namely1 an objective necessity     
arising from a priori grounds2 unless1  
indeed1 we hold this necessity to be not
 at all practical1 but merely physical1 
viz41 that our action is as inevitably  
determined by our inclination1 as       
yawning when we see others yawn4 ,it    
would be better to maintain that there  
are no practical laws at all1 but only  
counsels for the service of our desires1
 than to raise merely subjective        
principles to the rank of practical     

laws1 which have objective necessity1   
and not merely subjective1 and which    
must be known by reason a priori1 not by
 experience 7however empirically        
universal this may be74 ,even the rules 
of corresponding phenomena are only     
called laws of nature 7e4g41 the        
mechanical laws71 when we either know   
them really a priori1 or 7as in the case
 of chemical laws7 suppose that they    
would be known a priori from objective  
grounds if our insight reached further4 
,but in the case of merely subjective   
practical principles1 it is expressly   
made a condition that they rest1 not on 
objective1 but on subjective conditions 
of choice1 and hence that they must     
always be represented as mere maxims1   
never as practical laws4 ,this second   
remark seems at first sight to be mere  
verbal refinement1 but it defines the   
terms of the most important distinction 
which can come into consideration in    
practical investigations4               
,,iv4 ,,theorem ,,ii4    ,a rational    

being cannot regard his maxims as       
practical universal laws1 unless he     
conceives them as principles which      
determine the will1 not by their matter1
 but by their form only4                
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #de  ,by 
the matter of a practical principle ,i  
mean the object of the will4 ,this      
object is either the determining ground 
of the will or it is not4 ,in the former
 case the rule of the will is subjected 
to an empirical condition 7viz41 the    
relation of the determining idea to the 
feeling of pleasure and pain71          
consequently it can not be a practical  
law4 ,now1 when we abstract from a law  
all matter1 i4e41 every object of the   
will 7as a determining principle71      
nothing is left but the mere form of a  
universal legislation4 ,therefore1      
either a rational being cannot conceive 
his subjective practical principles1    
that is1 his maxims1 as being at the    
same time universal laws1 or he must    
suppose that their mere form1 by which  

they are fitted for universal           
legislation1 is alone what makes them   
practical laws4                         
,,remark4    ,the commonest             
understanding can distinguish without   
instruction what form of maxim is       
adapted for universal legislation1 and  
what is not4 ,suppose1 for example1 that
 ,i have made it my maxim to increase my
 fortune by every safe means4 ,now1 ,i  
have a deposit in my hands1 the owner of
 which is dead and has left no writing  
about it4 ,this is just the case for my 
maxim4 ,i desire then to know whether   
that maxim can also bold good as a      
universal practical law4 ,i apply it1   
therefore1 to the present case1 and ask 
whether it could take the form of a law1
 and consequently whether ,i can by my  
maxim at the same time give such a law  
as this1 that everyone may deny a       
deposit of which no one can produce a   
proof4 ,i at once become aware that such
 a principle1 viewed as a law1 would    
annihilate itself1 because the result   

would be that there would be no         
deposits4 ,a practical law which ,i     
recognise as such must be qualified for 
universal legislation2 this is an       
identical proposition and1 therefore1   
self-evident4 ,now1 if ,i say that my   
will is subject to a practical law1 ,i  
cannot adduce my inclination 7e4g41 in  
the present case my avarice7 as a       
principle of determination fitted to be 
a universal practical law2 for this is  
so far from being fitted for a universal
 legislation that1 if put in the form of
 a universal law1 it would destroy      
itself4                                 
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ej  ,it 
is1 therefore1 surprising that          
intelligent men could have thought of   
calling the desire of happiness a       
universal practical law on the ground   
that the desire is universal1 and1      
therefore1 also the maxim by which      
everyone makes this desire determine his
 will4 ,for whereas in other cases a    
universal law of nature makes everything

 harmonious2 here1 on the contrary1 if  
we attribute to the maxim the           
universality of a law1 the extreme      
opposite of harmony will follow1 the    
greatest opposition and the complete    
destruction of the maxim itself and its 
purpose4 ,for1 in that case1 the will of
 all has not one and the same object1   
but everyone has his own 7his private   
welfare71 which may accidentally accord 
with the purposes of others which are   
equally selfish1 but it is far from     
sufficing for a law2 because the        
occasional exceptions which one is      
permitted to make are endless1 and      
cannot be definitely embraced in one    
universal rule4 ,in this manner1 then1  
results a harmony like that which a     
certain satirical poem depicts as       
existing between a married couple bent  
on going to ruin1 ,o1 marvellous        
harmony1 what he wishes1 she wishes     
also2 or like what is said of the pledge
 of ,francis ,i to the ,emperor ,charles
 ,v1 ,what my brother ,charles wishes   

that ,i wish also 7viz41 ,milan74       
,empirical principles of determination  
are not fit for any universal external  
legislation1 but just as little for     
internal2 for each man makes his own    
subject the foundation of his           
inclination1 and in the same subject    
sometimes one inclination1 sometimes    
another1 has the preponderance4 ,to     
discover a law which would govern them  
all under this condition1 namely1       
bringing them all into harmony1 is quite
 impossible4                         ,v4
 ,,problem ,i4    ,supposing that the   
mere legislative form of maxims is alone
 the sufficient determining principle of
 a will1 to find the nature of the will 
which can be determined by it alone4    
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ee      
,since the bare form of the law can only
 be conceived by reason1 and is1        
therefore1 not an object of the senses1 
and consequently does not belong to the 
class of phenomena1 it follows that the 
idea of it1 which determines the will1  

is distinct from all the principles that
 determine events in nature according to
 the law of causality1 because in their 
case the determining principles must    
themselves be phenomena4 ,now1 if no    
other determining principle can serve as
 a law for the will except that         
universal legislative form1 such a will 
must be conceived as quite independent  
of the natural law of phenomena in their
 mutual relation1 namely1 the law of    
causality2 such independence is called  
freedom in the strictest1 that is1 in   
the transcendental1 sense2 consequently1
 a will which can have its law in       
nothing but the mere legislative form of
 the maxim is a free will4              
,,vi4 ,,problem ,,ii4    ,supposing that
 a will is free1 to find the law which  
alone is competent to determine it      
necessarily4                            
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #fj      
,since the matter of the practical law1 
i4e41 an object of the maxim1 can never 
be given otherwise than empirically1 and

 the free will is independent on        
empirical conditions 7that is1          
conditions belonging to the world of    
sense7 and yet is determinable1         
consequently a free will must find its  
principle of determination in the law1  
and yet independently of the matter of  
the law4 ,but1 besides the matter of the
 law1 nothing is contained in it except 
the legislative form4 ,it is the        
legislative form1 then1 contained in the
 maxim1 which can alone constitute a    
principle of determination of the free  
will4                                   
,,remark4    ,thus freedom and an       
unconditional practical law reciprocally
 imply each other4 ,now ,i do not ask   
here whether they are in fact distinct1 
or whether an unconditioned law is not  
rather merely the consciousness of a    
pure practical reason and the latter    
identical with the positive concept of  
freedom2 ,i only ask1 whence begins our 
knowledge of the unconditionally        
practical1 whether it is from freedom or

 from the practical law8 ,now it cannot 
begin from freedom1 for of this we      
cannot be immediately conscious1 since  
the first concept of it is negative2 nor
 can we infer it from experience1 for   
experience gives us the knowledge only  
of the law of phenomena1 and hence of   
the mechanism of nature1 the direct     
opposite of freedom4 ,it is therefore   
the moral law1 of which we become       
directly conscious 7as soon as we trace 
for ourselves maxims of the will71 that 
first presents itself to us1 and leads  
directly to the concept of freedom1     
inasmuch as reason presents it as a     
principle of determination not to be    
outweighed by any sensible conditions1  
nay1 wholly independent of them4 ,but   
how is the consciousness1 of that moral 
law possible8 ,we can become conscious  
of pure practical laws just as we are   
conscious of pure theoretical           
principles1 by attending to the         
necessity with which reason prescribes  
them and to the elimination of all      

empirical conditions1 which it directs4 
,the concept of a pure will arises out  
of the former1 as that of a pure        
understanding arises out of the latter4 
,that this is the true subordination of 
our concepts1 and that it is morality   
that first discovers to us the notion of
 freedom1 hence that it is practical    
reason which1 with this concept1 first  
proposes to speculative reason the most 
insoluble problem1 thereby placing it in
 the greatest perplexity1 is evident    
from the following consideration3 ,since
 nothing in phenomena can be explained  
by the concept of freedom1 but the      
mechanism of nature must constitute the 
only clue2 moreover1 when pure reason   
tries to ascend in the series of causes 
to the unconditioned1 it falls into an  
antinomy which is entangled in          
incomprehensibilities on the one side as
 much as the other2 whilst the latter   
7namely1 mechanism7 is at least useful  
in the explanation of phenomena1        
therefore no one would ever have been so

 rash as to introduce freedom into      
science1 had not the moral law1 and with
 it practical reason1 come in and forced
 this notion upon us4 ,experience1      
however1 confirms this order of notions4
 ,suppose some one asserts of his       
lustful appetite that1 when the desired 
object and the opportunity are present1 
it is quite irresistible4 ,ask him- if a
 gallows were erected before the house  
where he finds this opportunity1 in     
order that he should be hanged thereon  
immediately after the gratification of  
his lust1 whether he could not then     
control his passion2 we need not be long
 in doubt what he would reply4 ,ask him1
 however- if his sovereign ordered him1 
on pain of the same immediate execution1
 to bear false witness against an       
honourable man1 whom the prince might   
wish to destroy under a plausible       
pretext1 would he consider it possible  
in that case to overcome his love of    
life1 however great it may be4 ,he would
 perhaps not venture to affirm whether  

he would do so or not1 but he must      
unhesitatingly admit that it is possible
 to do so4 ,he judges1 therefore1 that  
he can do a certain thing because he is 
conscious that he ought1 and he         
recognizes that he is free- a fact which
 but for the moral law he would never   
have known4                             
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #fe      
,,vii4 ,,fundamental ,,law ,,of ,,the   
,,pure ,,practical ,,reason4    ,act so 
that the maxim of thy will can always at
 the same time hold good as a principle 
of universal legislation4               
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #gj      
,,remark4    ,pure geometry has         
postulates which are practical          
propositions1 but contain nothing       
further than the assumption that we can 
do something if it is required that we  
should do it1 and these are the only    
geometrical propositions that concern   
actual existence4 ,they are1 then1      
practical rules under a problematical   
condition of the will2 but here the rule

 says3 ,we absolutely must proceed in a 
certain manner4 ,the practical rule is1 
therefore1 unconditional1 and hence it  
is conceived a priori as a categorically
 practical proposition by which the will
 is objectively determined absolutely   
and immediately 7by the practical rule  
itself1 which thus is in this case a    
law72 for pure reason practical of      
itself is here directly legislative4    
,the will is thought as independent on  
empirical conditions1 and1 therefore1 as
 pure will determined by the mere form  
of the law1 and this principle of       
determination is regarded as the supreme
 condition of all maxims4 ,the thing is 
strange enough1 and has no parallel in  
all the rest of our practical knowledge4
 ,for the a priori thought of a possible
 universal legislation which is         
therefore merely problematical1 is      
unconditionally commanded as a law      
without borrowing anything from         
experience or from any external will4   
,this1 however1 is not a precept to do  

something by which some desired effect  
can be attained 7for then the will would
 depend on physical conditions71 but a  
rule that determines the will a priori  
only so far as regards the forms of its 
maxims2 and thus it is at least not     
impossible to conceive that a law1 which
 only applies to the subjective form of 
principles1 yet serves as a principle of
 determination by means of the objective
 form of law in general4 ,we may call   
the consciousness of this fundamental   
law a fact of reason1 because we cannot 
reason it out from antecedent data of   
reason1 e4g41 the consciousness of      
freedom 7for this is not antecedently   
given71 but it forces itself on us as a 
synthetic a priori proposition1 which is
 not based on any intuition1 either pure
 or empirical4 ,it would1 indeed1 be    
analytical if the freedom of the will   
were presupposed1 but to presuppose     
freedom as a positive concept would     
require an intellectual intuition1 which
 cannot here be assumed2 however1 when  

we regard this law as given1 it must be 
observed1 in order not to fall into any 
misconception1 that it is not an        
empirical fact1 but the sole fact of the
 pure reason1 which thereby announces   
itself as originally legislative 7sic   
volo1 sic jubeo74                       
,,corollary4                            
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ge      
,pure reason is practical of itself     
alone and gives 7to man7 a universal law
 which we call the moral law4           
,,remark4                               
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #hj  ,the
 fact just mentioned is undeniable4 ,it 
is only necessary to analyse the        
judgement that men pass on the          
lawfulness of their actions1 in order to
 find that1 whatever inclination may say
 to the contrary1 reason1 incorruptible 
and self-constrained1 always confronts  
the maxim of the will in any action with
 the pure will1 that is1 with itself1   
considering itself as a priori          
practical4 ,now this principle of       

morality1 just on account of the        
universality of the legislation which   
makes it the formal supreme determining 
principle of the will1 without regard to
 any subjective differences1 is declared
 by the reason to be a law for all      
rational beings1 in so far as they have 
a will1 that is1 a power to determine   
their causality by the conception of    
rules2 and1 therefore1 so far as they   
are capable of acting according to      
principles1 and consequently also       
according to practical a priori         
principles 7for these alone have the    
necessity that reason requires in a     
principle74 ,it is1 therefore1 not      
limited to men only1 but applies to all 
finite beings that possess reason and   
will2 nay1 it even includes the         
,infinite ,being as the supreme         
intelligence4 ,in the former case1      
however1 the law has the form of an     
imperative1 because in them1 as rational
 beings1 we can suppose a pure will1 but
 being creatures affected with wants and

 physical motives1 not a holy will1 that
 is1 one which would be incapable of any
 maxim conflicting with the moral law4  
,in their case1 therefore1 the moral law
 is an imperative1 which commands       
categorically1 because the law is       
unconditioned2 the relation of such a   
will to this law is dependence under the
 name of obligation1 which implies a    
constraint to an action1 though only by 
reason and its objective law2 and this  
action is called duty1 because an       
elective will1 subject to pathological  
affections 7though not determined by    
them1 and1 therefore1 still free71      
implies a wish that arises from         
subjective causes and1 therefore1 may   
often be opposed to the pure objective  
determining principle2 whence it        
requires the moral constraint of a      
resistance of the practical reason1     
which may be called an internal1 but    
intellectual1 compulsion4 ,in the       
supreme intelligence the elective will  
is rightly conceived as incapable of any

 maxim which could not at the same time 
be objectively a law2 and the notion of 
holiness1 which on that account belongs 
to it1 places it1 not indeed above all  
practical laws1 but above all           
practically restrictive laws1 and       
consequently above obligation and duty4 
,this holiness of will is1 however1 a   
practical idea1 which must necessarily  
serve as a type to which finite rational
 beings can only approximate            
indefinitely1 and which the pure moral  
law1 which is itself on this account    
called holy1 constantly and rightly     
holds before their eyes4 ,the utmost    
that finite practical reason can effect 
is to be certain of this indefinite     
progress of one's maxims and of their   
steady disposition to advance4 ,this is 
virtue1 and virtue1 at least as a       
naturally acquired faculty1 can never be
 perfect1 because assurance in such a   
case never becomes apodeictic certainty 
and1 when it only amounts to persuasion1
 is very dangerous4                     

,,viii4 ,,theorem ,,iv4    ,the autonomy
 of the will is the sole principle of   
all moral laws and of all duties which  
conform to them2 on the other hand1     
heteronomy of the elective will not only
 cannot be the basis of any obligation1 
but is1 on the contrary1 opposed to the 
principle thereof and to the morality of
 the will4                              
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #he  ,in 
fact the sole principle of morality     
consists in the independence on all     
matter of the law 7namely1 a desired    
object71 and in the determination of the
 elective will by the mere universal    
legislative form of which its maxim must
 be capable4 ,now this independence is  
freedom in the negative sense1 and this 
self-legislation of the pure1 and       
therefore practical1 reason is freedom  
in the positive sense4 ,thus the moral  
law expresses nothing else than the     
autonomy of the pure practical reason2  
that is1 freedom2 and this is itself the
 formal condition of all maxims1 and on 

this condition only can they agree with 
the supreme practical law4 ,if therefore
 the matter of the volition1 which can  
be nothing else than the object of a    
desire that is connected with the law1  
enters into the practical law1 as the   
condition of its possibility1 there     
results heteronomy of the elective will1
 namely1 dependence on the physical law 
that we should follow some impulse or   
inclination4 ,in that case the will does
 not give itself the law1 but only the  
precept how rationally to follow        
pathological law2 and the maxim which1  
in such a case1 never contains the      
universally legislative form1 not only  
produces no obligation1 but is itself   
opposed to the principle of a pure      
practical reason and1 therefore1 also to
 the moral disposition1 even though the 
resulting action may be conformable to  
the law4                                
,,remark4    ,hence a practical precept1
 which contains a material 7and         
therefore empirical7 condition1 must    

never be reckoned a practical law4 ,for 
the law of the pure will1 which is free1
 brings the will into a sphere quite    
different from the empirical2 and as the
 necessity involved in the law is not a 
physical necessity1 it can only consist 
in the formal conditions of the         
possibility of a law in general4 ,all   
the matter of practical rules rests on  
subjective conditions1 which give them  
only a conditional universality 7in case
 ,i desire this or that1 what ,i must do
 in order to obtain it71 and they all   
turn on the principle of private        
happiness4 ,now1 it is indeed undeniable
 that every volition must have an       
object1 and therefore a matter2 but it  
does not follow that this is the        
determining principle and the condition 
of the maxim2 for1 if it is so1 then    
this cannot be exhibited in a           
universally legislative form1 since in  
that case the expectation of the        
existence of the object would be the    
determining cause of the choice1 and the

 volition must presuppose the dependence
 of the faculty of desire on the        
existence of something2 but this        
dependence can only be sought in        
empirical conditions and1 therefore1 can
 never furnish a foundation for a       
necessary and universal rule4 ,thus1 the
 happiness of others may be the object  
of the will of a rational being4 ,but if
 it were the determining principle of   
the maxim1 we must assume that we find  
not only a rational satisfaction in the 
welfare of others1 but also a want such 
as the sympathetic disposition in some  
men occasions4 ,but ,i cannot assume the
 existence of this want in every        
rational being 7not at all in ,god74    
,the matter1 then1 of the maxim may     
remain1 but it must not be the condition
 of it1 else the maxim could not be fit 
for a law4 ,hence1 the mere form of law1
 which limits the matter1 must also be a
 reason for adding this matter to the   
will1 not for presupposing it4 ,for     
example1 let the matter be my own       

happiness4 ,this 7rule71 if ,i attribute
 it to everyone 7as1 in fact1 ,i may1 in
 the case of every finite being71 can   
become an objective practical law only  
if ,i include the happiness of others4  
,therefore1 the law that we should      
promote the happiness of others does not
 arise from the assumption that this is 
an object of everyone's choice1 but     
merely from this1 that the form of      
universality which reason requires as   
the condition of giving to a maxim of   
self-love the objective validity of a   
law is the principle that determines the
 will4 ,therefore it was not the object 
7the happiness of others7 that          
determined the pure will1 but it was the
 form of law only1 by which ,i          
restricted my maxim1 founded on         
inclination1 so as to give it the       
universality of a law1 and thus to adapt
 it to the practical reason2 and it is  
this restriction alone1 and not the     
addition of an external spring1 that can
 give rise to the notion of the         

obligation to extend the maxim of my    
self-love to the happiness of others4   
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ij      
,,remark ,,ii4    ,the direct opposite  
of the principle of morality is1 when   
the principle of private happiness is   
made the determining principle of the   
will1 and with this is to be reckoned1  
as ,i have shown above1 everything that 
places the determining principle which  
is to serve as a law1 anywhere but in   
the legislative form of the maxim4 ,this
 contradiction1 however1 is not merely  
logical1 like that which would arise    
between rules empirically conditioned1  
if they were raised to the rank of      
necessary principles of cognition1 but  
is practical1 and would ruin morality   
altogether were not the voice of reason 
in reference to the will so clear1 so   
irrepressible1 so distinctly audible1   
even to the commonest men4 ,it can only1
 indeed1 be maintained in the perplexing
 speculations of the schools1 which are 
bold enough to shut their ears against  

that heavenly voice1 in order to support
 a theory that costs no trouble4        
,suppose that an acquaintance whom you  
otherwise liked were to attempt to      
justify himself to you for having borne 
false witness1 first by alleging the1 in
 his view1 sacred duty of consulting his
 own happiness2 then by enumerating the 
advantages which he had gained thereby1 
pointing out the prudence he had shown  
in securing himself against detection1  
even by yourself1 to whom he now reveals
 the secret1 only in order that he may  
be able to deny it at any time2 and     
suppose he were then to affirm1 in all  
seriousness1 that he has fulfilled a    
true human duty2 you would either laugh 
in his face1 or shrink back from him    
with disgust2 and yet1 if a man has     
regulated his principles of action      
solely with a view to his own advantage1
 you would have nothing whatever to     
object against this mode of proceeding4 
,or suppose some one recommends you a   
man as steward1 as a man to whom you can

 blindly trust all your affairs2 and1 in
 order to inspire you with confidence1  
extols him as a prudent man who         
thoroughly understands his own interest1
 and is so indefatigably active that he 
lets slip no opportunity of advancing   
it2 lastly1 lest you should be afraid of
 finding a vulgar selfishness in him1   
praises the good taste with which he    
lives2 not seeking his pleasure in      
money-making1 or in coarse wantonness1  
but in the enlargement of his knowledge1
 in instructive intercourse with a      
select circle1 and even in relieving the
 needy2 while as to the means 7which1 of
 course1 derive all their value from the
 end71 he is not particular1 and is     
ready to use other people's money for   
the purpose as if it were his own1      
provided only he knows that he can do so
 safely1 and without discovery2 you     
would either believe that the           
recommender was mocking you1 or that he 
had lost his senses4 ,so sharply and    
clearly marked are the boundaries of    

morality and self-love that even the    
commonest eye cannot fail to distinguish
 whether a thing belongs to the one or  
the other4 ,the few remarks that follow 
may appear superfluous where the truth  
is so plain1 but at least they may serve
 to give a little more distinctness to  
the judgement of common sense4          
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ie  ,the
 principle of happiness may1 indeed1    
furnish maxims1 but never such as would 
be competent to be laws of the will1    
even if universal happiness were made   
the object4 ,for since the knowledge of 
this rests on mere empirical data1 since
 every man's judgement on it depends    
very much on his particular point of    
view1 which is itself moreover very     
variable1 it can supply only general    
rules1 not universal2 that is1 it can   
give rules which on the average will    
most frequently fit1 but not rules which
 must hold good always and necessarily2 
hence1 no practical laws can be founded 
on it4 ,just because in this case an    

object of choice is the foundation of   
the rule and must therefore precede it1 
the rule can refer to nothing but what  
is felt1 and therefore it refers to     
experience and is founded on it1 and    
then the variety of judgement must be   
endless4 ,this principle1 therefore1    
does not prescribe the same practical   
rules to all rational beings1 although  
the rules are all included under a      
common title1 namely1 that of happiness4
 ,the moral law1 however1 is conceived  
as objectively necessary1 only because  
it holds for everyone that has reason   
and will4  ,the maxim of self-love      
7prudence7 only advises2 the law of     
morality commands4 ,now there is a great
 difference between that which we are   
advised to do and that to which we are  
obliged4  ,the commonest intelligence   
can easily and without hesitation see   
what1 on the principle of autonomy of   
the will1 requires to be done2 but on   
supposition of heteronomy of the will1  
it is hard and requires knowledge of the

 world to see what is to be done4 ,that 
is to say1 what duty is1 is plain of    
itself to everyone2 but what is to bring
 true durable advantage1 such as will   
extend to the whole of one's existence1 
is always veiled in impenetrable        
obscurity2 and much prudence is required
 to adapt the practical rule founded on 
it to the ends of life1 even tolerably1 
by making proper exceptions4 ,but the   
moral law commands the most punctual    
obedience from everyone2 it must1       
therefore1 not be so difficult to judge 
what it requires to be done1 that the   
commonest unpractised understanding1    
even without worldly prudence1 should   
fail to apply it rightly4  ,it is always
 in everyone's power to satisfy the     
categorical command of morality2 whereas
 it is seldom possible1 and by no means 
so to everyone1 to satisfy the          
empirically conditioned precept of      
happiness1 even with regard to a single 
purpose4 ,the reason is that in the     
former case there is question only of   

the maxim1 which must be genuine and    
pure2 but in the latter case there is   
question also of one's capacity and     
physical power to realize a desired     
object4 ,a command that everyone should 
try to make himself happy would be      
foolish1 for one never commands anyone  
to do what he of himself infallibly     
wishes to do4 ,we must only command the 
means1 or rather supply them1 since he  
cannot do everything that he wishes4    
,but to command morality under the name 
of duty is quite rational2 for1 in the  
first place1 not everyone is willing to 
obey its precepts if they oppose his    
inclinations2 and as to the means of    
obeying this law1 these need not in this
 case be taught1 for in this respect    
whatever he wishes to do he can do4  ,he
 who has lost at play may be vexed at   
himself and his folly1 but if he is     
conscious of having cheated at play     
7although he has gained thereby71 he    
must despise himself as soon as he      
compares himself with the moral law4    

,this must1 therefore1 be something     
different from the principle of private 
happiness4 ,for a man must have a       
different criterion when he is compelled
 to say to himself3 ,i am a worthless   
fellow1 though ,i have filled my purse2 
and when he approves himself1 and says3 
,i am a prudent man1 for ,i have        
enriched my treasure4                   
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ajj     
,finally1 there is something further in 
the idea of our practical reason1 which 
accompanies the transgression of a moral
 law- namely1 its ill desert4 ,now the  
notion of punishment1 as such1 cannot be
 united with that of becoming a partaker
 of happiness2 for although he who      
inflicts the punishment may at the same 
time have the benevolent purpose of     
directing this punishment to this end1  
yet it must first be justified in itself
 as punishment1 i4e41 as mere harm1 so  
that if it stopped there1 and the person
 punished could get no glimpse of       
kindness hidden behind this harshness1  

he must yet admit that justice was done 
him1 and that his reward was perfectly  
suitable to his conduct4 ,in every      
punishment1 as such1 there must first be
 justice1 and this constitutes the      
essence of the notion4 ,benevolence may1
 indeed1 be united with it1 but the man 
who has deserved punishment has not the 
least reason to reckon upon this4       
,punishment1 then1 is a physical evil1  
which1 though it be not connected with  
moral evil as a natural consequence1    
ought to be connected with it as a      
consequence by the principles of a moral
 legislation4 ,now1 if every crime1 even
 without regarding the physical         
consequence with respect to the actor1  
is in itself punishable1 that is1       
forfeits happiness 7at least partially71
 it is obviously absurd to say that the 
crime consisted just in this1 that he   
has drawn punishment on himself1 thereby
 injuring his private happiness 7which1 
on the principle of self-love1 must be  
the proper notion of all crime74        

,according to this view1 the punishment 
would be the reason for calling anything
 a crime1 and justice would1 on the     
contrary1 consist in omitting all       
punishment1 and even preventing that    
which naturally follows2 for1 if this   
were done1 there would no longer be any 
evil in the action1 since the harm which
 otherwise followed it1 and on account  
of which alone the action was called    
evil1 would now be prevented4 ,to look1 
however1 on all rewards and punishments 
as merely the machinery in the hand of a
 higher power1 which is to serve only to
 set rational creatures striving after  
their final end 7happiness71 this is to 
reduce the will to a mechanism          
destructive of freedom2 this is so      
evident that it need not detain us4     
,more refined1 though equally false1 is 
the theory of those who suppose a       
certain special moral sense1 which sense
 and not reason determines the moral    
law1 and in consequence of which the    
consciousness of virtue is supposed to  

be directly connected with contentment  
and pleasure2 that of vice1 with mental 
dissatisfaction and pain2 thus reducing 
the whole to the desire of private      
happiness4 ,without repeating what has  
been said above1 ,i will here only      
remark the fallacy they fall into4 ,in  
order to imagine the vicious man as     
tormented with mental dissatisfaction by
 the consciousness of his               
transgressions1 they must first         
represent him as in the main basis of   
his character1 at least in some degree1 
morally good2 just as he who is pleased 
with the consciousness of right conduct 
must be conceived as already virtuous4  
,the notion of morality and duty must1  
therefore1 have preceded any regard to  
this satisfaction1 and cannot be derived
 from it4 ,a man must first appreciate  
the importance of what we call duty1 the
 authority of the moral law1 and the    
immediate dignity which the following of
 it gives to the person in his own eyes1
 in order to feel that satisfaction in  

the consciousness of his conformity to  
it and the bitter remorse that          
accompanies the consciousness of its    
transgression4 ,it is1 therefore1       
impossible to feel this satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction prior to the knowledge  
of obligation1 or to make it the basis  
of the latter4 ,a man must be at least  
half honest in order even to be able to 
form a conception of these feelings4 ,i 
do not deny that as the human will is1  
by virtue of liberty1 capable of being  
immediately determined by the moral law1
 so frequent practice in accordance with
 this principle of determination can1 at
 least1 produce subjectively a feeling  
of satisfaction2 on the contrary1 it is 
a duty to establish and to cultivate    
this1 which alone deserves to be called 
properly the moral feeling2 but the     
notion of duty cannot be derived from   
it1 else we should have to suppose a    
feeling for the law as such1 and thus   
make that an object of sensation which  
can only be thought by the reason2 and  

this1 if it is not to be a flat         
contradiction1 would destroy all notion 
of duty and put in its place a mere     
mechanical play of refined inclinations 
sometimes contending with the coarser4  
,if now we compare our formal supreme   
principle of pure practical reason 7that
 of autonomy of the will7 with all      
previous material principles of         
morality1 we can exhibit them all in a  
table in which all possible cases are   
exhausted1 except the one formal        
principle2 and thus we can show visibly 
that it is vain to look for any other   
principle than that now proposed4 ,in   
fact all possible principles of         
determination of the will are either    
merely subjective1 and therefore        
empirical1 or are also objective and    
rational2 and both are either external  
or internal4    ,practical ,material    
,principles of ,determination taken as  
the ,foundation of ,morality1 are3      
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aje     
,,subjective4              ,,external   

,,internal          ,education          
,physical feeling                       
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aaj     
7,montaigne7              7,epicurus7   
,the civil                ,moral feeling
          ,constitution                 
7,hutcheson7          7,mandeville7     
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aae     
,,objective4              ,,internal    
,,external          ,perfection         
,will of ,god          7,wolf and the   
7,crusius and other                     
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #abj     
,stoics7                   theological  
,moralists7    ,those of the upper table
 are all empirical and evidently        
incapable of furnishing the universal   
principle of morality2 but those in the 
lower table are based on reason 7for    
perfection as a quality of things1 and  
the highest perfection conceived as     
substance1 that is1 ,god1 can only be   
thought by means of rational concepts74 
,but the former notion1 namely1 that of 
perfection1 may either be taken in a    

theoretic signification1 and then it    
means nothing but the completeness of   
each thing in its own kind              
7transcendental71 or that of a thing    
merely as a thing 7metaphysical72 and   
with that we are not concerned here4    
,but the notion of perfection in a      
practical sense is the fitness or       
sufficiency of a thing for all sorts of 
purposes4 ,this perfection1 as a quality
 of man and consequently internal1 is   
nothing but talent and1 what strengthens
 or completes this1 skill4 ,supreme     
perfection conceived as substance1 that 
is ,god1 and consequently external      
7considered practically71 is the        
sufficiency of this being for all ends4 
,ends then must first be given1         
relatively to which only can the notion 
of perfection 7whether internal in      
ourselves or external in ,god7 be the   
determining principle of the will4 ,but 
an end- being an object which must      
precede the determination of the will by
 a practical rule and contain the ground

 of the possibility of this             
determination1 and therefore contain    
also the matter of the will1 taken as   
its determining principle- such an end  
is always empirical and1 therefore1 may 
serve for the ,epicurean principle of   
the happiness theory1 but not for the   
pure rational principle of morality and 
duty4 ,thus1 talents and the improvement
 of them1 because they contribute to the
 advantages of life2 or the will of     
,god1 if agreement with it be taken as  
the object of the will1 without any     
antecedent independent practical        
principle1 can be motives only by reason
 of the happiness expected therefrom4   
,hence it follows1 first1 that all the  
principles here stated are material2    
secondly1 that they include all possible
 material principles2 and1 finally1 the 
conclusion1 that since material         
principles are quite incapable of       
furnishing the supreme moral law 7as has
 been shown71 the formal practical      
principle of the pure reason 7according 

to which the mere form of a universal   
legislation must constitute the supreme 
and immediate determining principle of  
the will7 is the only one possible which
 is adequate to furnish categorical     
imperatives1 that is1 practical laws    
7which make actions a duty71 and in     
general to serve as the principle of    
morality1 both in criticizing conduct   
and also in its application to the human
 will to determine it4    ,i4 ,of the   
,deduction of the ,fundamental          
,principles of ,pure ,practical ,reason4
                                        
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #abe     
,this ,analytic shows that pure reason  
can be practical1 that is1 can of itself
 determine the will independently of    
anything empirical2 and this it proves  
by a fact in which pure reason in us    
proves itself actually practical1       
namely1 the autonomy shown in the       
fundamental principle of morality1 by   
which reason determines the will to     
action4  ,it shows at the same time that

 this fact is inseparably connected with
 the consciousness of freedom of the    
will1 nay1 is identical with it2 and by 
this the will of a rational being1      
although as belonging to the world of   
sense it recognizes itself as           
necessarily subject to the laws of      
causality like other efficient causes2  
yet1 at the same time1 on another side1 
namely1 as a being in itself1 is        
conscious of existing in and being      
determined by an intelligible order of  
things2 conscious not by virtue of a    
special intuition of itself1 but by     
virtue of certain dynamical laws which  
determine its causality in the sensible 
world2 for it has been elsewhere proved 
that if freedom is predicated of us1 it 
transports us into an intelligible order
 of things4  ,now1 if we compare with   
this the analytical part of the critique
 of pure speculative reason1 we shall   
see a remarkable contrast4 ,there it was
 not fundamental principles1 but pure1  
sensible intuition 7space and time71    

that was the first datum that made a    
priori knowledge possible1 though only  
of objects of the senses4 ,synthetical  
principles could not be derived from    
mere concepts without intuition2 on the 
contrary1 they could only exist with    
reference to this intuition1 and        
therefore to objects of possible        
experience1 since it is the concepts of 
the understanding1 united with this     
intuition1 which alone make that        
knowledge possible which we call        
experience4 ,beyond objects of          
experience1 and therefore with regard to
 things as noumena1 all positive        
knowledge was rightly disclaimed for    
speculative reason4 ,this reason1       
however1 went so far as to establish    
with certainty the concept of noumena2  
that is1 the possibility1 nay1 the      
necessity1 of thinking them2 for        
example1 it showed against all          
objections that the supposition of      
freedom1 negatively considered1 was     
quite consistent with those principles  

and limitations of pure theoretic       
reason4 ,but it could not give us any   
definite enlargement of our knowledge   
with respect to such objects1 but1 on   
the contrary1 cut off all view of them  
altogether4  ,on the other hand1 the    
moral law1 although it gives no view1   
yet gives us a fact absolutely          
inexplicable from any data of the       
sensible world1 and the whole compass of
 our theoretical use of reason1 a fact  
which points to a pure world of the     
understanding1 nay1 even defines it     
positively and enables us to know       
something of it1 namely1 a law4         
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #acj     
,this law 7as far as rational beings are
 concerned7 gives to the world of sense1
 which is a sensible system of nature1  
the form of a world of the              
understanding1 that is1 of a            
supersensible system of nature1 without 
interfering with its mechanism4 ,now1 a 
system of nature1 in the most general   
sense1 is the existence of things under 

laws4 ,the sensible nature of rational  
beings in general is their existence    
under laws empirically conditioned1     
which1 from the point of view of reason1
 is heteronomy4 ,the supersensible      
nature of the same beings1 on the other 
hand1 is their existence according to   
laws which are independent of every     
empirical condition and1 therefore1     
belong to the autonomy of pure reason4  
,and1 since the laws by which the       
existence of things depends on cognition
 are practical1 supersensible nature1 so
 far as we can form any notion of it1 is
 nothing else than a system of nature   
under the autonomy of pure practical    
reason4 ,now1 the law of this autonomy  
is the moral law1 which1 therefore1 is  
the fundamental law of a supersensible  
nature1 and of a pure world of          
understanding1 whose counterpart must   
exist in the world of sense1 but without
 interfering with its laws4 ,we might   
call the former the archetypal world    
7natura archetypa71 which we only know  

in the reason2 and the latter the       
ectypal world 7natura ectypa71 because  
it contains the possible effect of the  
idea of the former which is the         
determining principle of the will4 ,for 
the moral law1 in fact1 transfers us    
ideally into a system in which pure     
reason1 if it were accompanied with     
adequate physical power1 would produce  
the summum bonum1 and it determines our 
will to give the sensible world the form
 of a system of rational beings4  ,the  
least attention to oneself proves that  
this idea really serves as the model for
 the determinations of our will4  ,when 
the maxim which ,i am disposed to follow
 in giving testimony is tested by the   
practical reason1 ,i always consider    
what it would be if it were to hold as a
 universal law of nature4 ,it is        
manifest that in this view it would     
oblige everyone to speak the truth4 ,for
 it cannot hold as a universal law of   
nature that statements should be allowed
 to have the force of proof and yet to  

be purposely untrue4 ,similarly1 the    
maxim which ,i adopt with respect to    
disposing freely of my life is at once  
determined1 when ,i ask myself what it  
should be1 in order that a system1 of   
which it is the law1 should maintain    
itself4 ,it is obvious that in such a   
system no one could arbitrarily put an  
end to his own life1 for such an        
arrangement would not be a permanent    
order of things4 ,and so in all similar 
cases4 ,now1 in nature1 as it actually  
is an object of experience1 the free    
will is not of itself determined to     
maxims which could of themselves be the 
foundation of a natural system of       
universal laws1 or which could even be  
adapted to a system so constituted2 on  
the contrary1 its maxims are private    
inclinations which constitute1 indeed1 a
 natural whole in conformity with       
pathological 7physical7 laws1 but could 
not form part of a system of nature1    
which would only be possible through our
 will acting in accordance with pure    

practical laws4 ,yet we are1 through    
reason1 conscious of a law to which all 
our maxims are subject1 as though a     
natural order must be originated from   
our will4 ,this law1 therefore1 must be 
the idea of a natural system not given  
in experience1 and yet possible through 
freedom2 a system1 therefore1 which is  
supersensible1 and to which we give     
objective reality1 at least in a        
practical point of view1 since we look  
on it as an object of our will as pure  
rational beings4  ,hence the distinction
 between the laws of a natural system to
 which the will is subject1 and of a    
natural system which is subject to a    
will 7as far as its relation to its free
 actions is concerned71 rests on this1  
that in the former the objects must be  
causes of the ideas which determine the 
will2 whereas in the latter the will is 
the cause of the objects2 so that its   
causality has its determining principle 
solely in the pure faculty of reason1   
which may therefore be called a pure    

practical reason4  ,there are therefore 
two very distinct problems3 how1 on the 
one side1 pure reason can cognise       
objects a priori1 and how on the other  
side it can be an immediate determining 
principle of the will1 that is1 of the  
causality of the rational being with    
respect to the reality of objects       
7through the mere thought of the        
universal validity of its own maxims as 
laws74                                  
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ace     
,the former1 which belongs to the       
critique of the pure speculative reason1
 requires a previous explanation1 how   
intuitions without which no object can  
be given1 and1 therefore1 none known    
synthetically1 are possible a priori2   
and its solution turns out to be that   
these are all only sensible and1        
therefore1 do not render possible any   
speculative knowledge which goes further
 than possible experience reaches2 and  
that therefore all the principles of    
that pure speculative reason avail only 

to make experience possible2 either     
experience of given objects or of those 
that may be given ad infinitum1 but     
never are completely given4  ,the       
latter1 which belongs to the critique of
 practical reason1 requires no          
explanation how the objects of the      
faculty of desire are possible1 for that
 being a problem of the theoretical     
knowledge of nature is left to the      
critique of the speculative reason1 but 
only how reason can determine the maxims
 of the will2 whether this takes place  
only by means of empirical ideas as     
principles of determination1 or whether 
pure reason can be practical and be the 
law of a possible order of nature1 which
 is not empirically knowable4 ,the      
possibility of such a supersensible     
system of nature1 the conception of     
which can also be the ground of its     
reality through our own free will1 does 
not require any a priori intuition 7of  
an intelligible world7 which1 being in  
this case supersensible1 would be       

impossible for us4 ,for the question is 
only as to the determining principle of 
volition in its maxims1 namely1 whether 
it is empirical1 or is a conception of  
the pure reason 7having the legal       
character belonging to it in general71  
and how it can be the latter4 ,it is    
left to the theoretic principles of     
reason to decide whether the causality  
of the will suffices for the realization
 of the objects or not1 this being an   
inquiry into the possibility of the     
objects of the volition4 ,intuition of  
these objects is therefore of no        
importance to the practical problem4 ,we
 are here concerned only with the       
determination of the will and the       
determining principles of its maxims as 
a free will1 not at all with the result4
 ,for1 provided only that the will      
conforms to the law of pure reason1 then
 let its power in execution be what it  
may1 whether according to these maxims  
of legislation of a possible system of  
nature any such system really results or

 not1 this is no concern of the         
critique1 which only inquires whether1  
and in what way1 pure reason can be     
practical1 that is directly determine   
the will4  ,in this inquiry criticism   
may and must begin with pure practical  
laws and their reality4 ,but instead of 
intuition it takes as their foundation  
the conception of their existence in the
 intelligible world1 namely1 the concept
 of freedom4 ,for this concept has no   
other meaning1 and these laws are only  
possible in relation to freedom of the  
will2 but freedom being supposed1 they  
are necessary2 or conversely freedom is 
necessary because those laws are        
necessary1 being practical postulates4  
,it cannot be further explained how this
 consciousness of the moral law1 or1    
what is the same thing1 of freedom1 is  
possible2 but that it is admissible is  
well established in the theoretical     
critique4  ,the exposition of the       
supreme principle of practical reason is
 now finished2 that is to say1 it has   

been shown first1 what it contains1 that
 it subsists for itself quite a priori  
and independent of empirical principles2
 and next in what it is distinguished   
from all other practical principles4    
,with the deduction1 that is1 the       
justification of its objective and      
universal validity1 and the discernment 
of the possibility of such a synthetical
 proposition a priori1 we cannot expect 
to succeed so well as in the case of the
 principles of pure theoretical reason4 
,for these referred to objects of       
possible experience1 namely1 to         
phenomena1 and we could prove that these
 phenomena could be known as objects of 
experience only by being brought under  
the categories in accordance with these 
laws2 and consequently that all possible
 experience must conform to these laws4 
,but ,i could not proceed in this way   
with the deduction of the moral law4    
,for this does not concern the knowledge
 of the properties of objects1 which may
 be given to the reason from some other 

source2 but a knowledge which can itself
 be the ground of the existence of the  
objects1 and by which reason in a       
rational being has causality1 i4e41 pure
 reason1 which can be regarded as a     
faculty immediately determining the     
will4  ,now all our human insight is at 
an end as soon as we have arrived at    
fundamental powers or faculties1 for the
 possibility of these cannot be         
understood by any means1 and just as    
little should it be arbitrarily invented
 and assumed4 ,therefore1 in the        
theoretic use of reason1 it is          
experience alone that can justify us in 
assuming them4 ,but this expedient of   
adducing empirical proofs1 instead of a 
deduction from a priori sources of      
knowledge1 is denied us here in respect 
to the pure practical faculty of reason4
 ,for whatever requires to draw the     
proof of its reality from experience    
must depend for the grounds of its      
possibility on principles of experience2
 and pure1 yet practical1 reason by its 

very notion cannot be regarded as such4 
,further1 the moral law is given as a   
fact of pure reason of which we are a   
priori conscious1 and which is          
apodeictically certain1 though it be    
granted that in experience no example of
 its exact fulfilment can be found4     
,hence1 the objective reality of the    
moral law cannot be proved by any       
deduction by any efforts of theoretical 
reason1 whether speculative or          
empirically supported1 and therefore1   
even if we renounced its apodeictic     
certainty1 it could not be proved a     
posteriori by experience1 and yet it is 
firmly established of itself4           
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #adj     
,but instead of this vainly sought      
deduction of the moral principle1       
something else is found which was quite 
unexpected1 namely1 that this moral     
principle serves conversely as the      
principle of the deduction of an        
inscrutable faculty which no experience 
could prove1 but of which speculative   

reason was compelled at least to assume 
the possibility 7in order to find       
amongst its cosmological ideas the      
unconditioned in the chain of causality1
 so as not to contradict itself7- ,i    
mean the faculty of freedom4 ,the moral 
law1 which itself does not require a    
justification1 proves not merely the    
possibility of freedom1 but that it     
really belongs to beings who recognize  
this law as binding on themselves4 ,the 
moral law is in fact a law of the       
causality of free agents and1 therefore1
 of the possibility of a supersensible  
system of nature1 just as the           
metaphysical law of events in the world 
of sense was a law of causality of the  
sensible system of nature2 and it       
therefore determines what speculative   
philosophy was compelled to leave       
undetermined1 namely1 the law for a     
causality1 the concept of which in the  
latter was only negative2 and therefore 
for the first time gives this concept   
objective reality4  ,this sort of       

credential of the moral law1 viz41 that 
it is set forth as a principle of the   
deduction of freedom1 which is a        
causality of pure reason1 is a          
sufficient substitute for all a priori  
justification1 since theoretic reason   
was compelled to assume at least the    
possibility of freedom1 in order to     
satisfy a want of its own4 ,for the     
moral law proves its reality1 so as even
 to satisfy the critique of the         
speculative reason1 by the fact that it 
adds a positive definition to a         
causality previously conceived only     
negatively1 the possibility of which was
 incomprehensible to speculative reason1
 which yet was compelled to suppose it4 
,for it adds the notion of a reason that
 directly determines the will 7by       
imposing on its maxims the condition of 
a universal legislative form72 and thus 
it is able for the first time to give   
objective1 though only practical1       
reality to reason1 which always became  
transcendent when it sought to proceed  

speculatively with its ideas4 ,it thus  
changes the transcendent use of reason  
into an immanent use 7so that reason is 
itself1 by means of ideas1 an efficient 
cause in the field of experience74  ,the
 determination of the causality of      
beings in the world of sense1 as such1  
can never be unconditioned2 and yet for 
every series of conditions there must be
 something unconditioned1 and therefore 
there must be a causality which is      
determined wholly by itself4 ,hence1 the
 idea of freedom as a faculty of        
absolute spontaneity was not found to be
 a want but1 as far as its possibility  
is concerned1 an analytic principle of  
pure speculative reason4 ,but as it is  
absolutely impossible to find in        
experience any example in accordance    
with this idea1 because amongst the     
causes of things as phenomena it would  
be impossible to meet with any          
absolutely unconditioned determination  
of causality1 we were only able to      
defend our supposition that a freely    

acting cause might be a being in the    
world of sense1 in so far as it is      
considered in the other point of view as
 a noumenon1 showing that there is no   
contradiction in regarding all its      
actions as subject to physical          
conditions so far as they are phenomena1
 and yet regarding its causality as     
physically unconditioned1 in so far as  
the acting being belongs to the world of
 understanding1 and in thus making the  
concept of freedom the regulative       
principle of reason4 ,by this principle 
,i do not indeed learn what the object  
is to which that sort of causality is   
attributed2 but ,i remove the           
difficulty1 for1 on the one side1 in the
 explanation of events in the world1 and
 consequently also of the actions of    
rational beings1 ,i leave to the        
mechanism of physical necessity the     
right of ascending from conditioned to  
condition ad infinitum1 while on the    
other side ,i keep open for speculative 
reason the place which for it is vacant1

 namely1 the intelligible1 in order to  
transfer the unconditioned thither4 ,but
 ,i was not able to verify this         
supposition2 that is1 to change it into 
the knowledge of a being so acting1 not 
even into the knowledge of the          
possibility of such a being4 ,this      
vacant place is now filled by pure      
practical reason with a definite law of 
causality in an intelligible world      
7causality with freedom71 namely1 the   
moral law4 ,speculative reason does not 
hereby gain anything as regards its     
insight1 but only as regards the        
certainty of its problematical notion of
 freedom1 which here obtains objective  
reality1 which1 though only practical1  
is nevertheless undoubted4 ,even the    
notion of causality- the application1   
and consequently the signification1 of  
which holds properly only in relation to
 phenomena1 so as to connect them into  
experiences 7as is shown by the         
,critique of ,pure ,reason7- is not so  
enlarged as to extend its use beyond    

these limits4 ,for if reason sought to  
do this1 it would have to show how the  
logical relation of principle and       
consequence can be used synthetically in
 a different sort of intuition from the 
sensible2 that is how a causa noumenon  
is possible4 ,this it can never do2 and1
 as practical reason1 it does not even  
concern itself with it1 since it only   
places the determining principle of     
causality of man as a sensible creature 
7which is given7 in pure reason 7which  
is therefore called practical72 and     
therefore it employs the notion of      
cause1 not in order to know objects1 but
 to determine causality in relation to  
objects in general4 ,it can abstract    
altogether from the application of this 
notion to objects with a view to        
theoretical knowledge 7since this       
concept is always found a priori in the 
understanding even independently of any 
intuition74 ,reason1 then1 employs it   
only for a practical purpose1 and hence 
we can transfer the determining         

principle of the will into the          
intelligible order of things1 admitting1
 at the same time1 that we cannot       
understand how the notion of cause can  
determine the knowledge of these things4
 ,but reason must cognise causality with
 respect to the actions of the will in  
the sensible world in a definite manner2
 otherwise1 practical reason could not  
really produce any action4 ,but as to   
the notion which it forms of its own    
causality as noumenon1 it need not      
determine it theoretically with a view  
to the cognition of its supersensible   
existence1 so as to give it significance
 in this way4 ,for it acquires          
significance apart from this1 though    
only for practical use1 namely1 through 
the moral law4 ,theoretically viewed1 it
 remains always a pure a priori concept 
of the understanding1 which can be      
applied to objects whether they have    
been given sensibly or not1 although in 
the latter case it has no definite      
theoretical significance or application1

 but is only a formal1 though essential1
 conception of the understanding        
relating to an object in general4 ,the  
significance which reason gives it      
through the moral law is merely         
practical1 inasmuch as the idea of the  
law of causality 7of the will7 has self 
causality1 or is its determining        
principle4    ,,ii4 ,of the ,right that 
,pure ,reason in its ,practical use has 
to an ,extension which is not possible  
to it in its ,speculative ,use4         
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #ade     
,we have in the moral principle set     
forth a law of causality1 the           
determining principle of which is set   
above all the conditions of the sensible
 world2 we have it conceived how the    
will1 as belonging to the intelligible  
world1 is determinable1 and therefore   
have its subject 7man7 not merely       
conceived as belonging to a world of    
pure understanding1 and in this respect 
unknown 7which the critique of          
speculative reason enabled us to do71   

but also defined as regards his         
causality by means of a law which cannot
 be reduced to any physical law of the  
sensible world2 and therefore our       
knowledge is extended beyond the limits 
of that world1 a pretension which the   
,critique of ,pure ,reason declared to  
be futile in all speculation4 ,now1 how 
is the practical use of pure reason here
 to be reconciled with the theoretical1 
as to the determination of the limits of
 its faculty8  ,david ,hume1 of whom we 
may say that he commenced the assault on
 the claims of pure reason1 which made a
 thorough investigation of it necessary1
 argued thus3 ,the notion of cause is a 
notion that involves the necessity of   
the connexion of the existence of       
different things 7and that1 in so far as
 they are different71 so that1 given ,a1
 ,i know that something quite distinct  
there from1 namely ,b1 must necessarily 
also exist4 ,now necessity can be       
attributed to a connection1 only in so  
far as it is known a priori1 for        

experience would only enable us to know 
of such a connection that it exists1 not
 that it necessarily exists4 ,now1 it is
 impossible1 says he1 to know a priori  
and as necessary the connection between 
one thing and another 7or between one   
attribute and another quite distinct7   
when they have not been given in        
experience4 ,therefore the notion of a  
cause is fictitious and delusive and1 to
 speak in the mildest way1 is an        
illusion1 only excusable inasmuch as the
 custom 7a subjective necessity7 of     
perceiving certain things1 or their     
attributes as often associated in       
existence along with or in succession to
 one another1 is insensibly taken for an
 objective necessity of supposing such a
 connection in the objects themselves2  
and thus the notion of a cause has been 
acquired surreptitiously and not        
legitimately2 nay1 it can never be so   
acquired or authenticated1 since it     
demands a connection in itself vain1    
chimerical1 and untenable in presence of

 reason1 and to which no object can ever
 correspond4 ,in this way was empiricism
 first introduced as the sole source of 
principles1 as far as all knowledge of  
the existence of things is concerned    
7mathematics therefore remaining        
excepted72 and with empiricism the most 
thorough scepticism1 even with regard to
 the whole science of nature7 as        
philosophy74 ,for on such principles we 
can never conclude from given attributes
 of things as existing to a consequence 
7for this would require the notion of   
cause1 which involves the necessity of  
such a connection72 we can only1 guided 
by imagination1 expect similar cases- an
 expectation which is never certain1    
however often it has been fulfilled4 ,of
 no event could we say3 a certain thing 
must have preceded it1 on which it      
necessarily followed2 that is1 it must  
have a cause2 and therefore1 however    
frequent the cases we have known in     
which there was such an antecedent1 so  
that a rule could be derived from them1 

yet we never could suppose it as always 
and necessarily so happening2 we should1
 therefore1 be obliged to leave its     
share to blind chance1 with which all   
use of reason comes to an end2 and this 
firmly establishes scepticism in        
reference to arguments ascending from   
effects to causes and makes it          
impregnable4  ,mathematics escaped well1
 so far1 because ,hume thought that its 
propositions were analytical2 that is1  
proceeded from one property to another1 
by virtue of identity and1 consequently1
 according to the principle of          
contradiction4 ,this1 however1 is not   
the case1 since1 on the contrary1 they  
are synthetical2 and although geometry1 
for example1 has not to do with the     
existence of things1 but only with their
 a priori properties in a possible      
intuition1 yet it proceeds just as in   
the case of the causal notion1 from one 
property 7,a7 to another wholly distinct
 7,b71 as necessarily connected with the
 former4 ,nevertheless1 mathematical    

science1 so highly vaunted for its      
apodeictic certainty1 must at last fall 
under this empiricism for the same      
reason for which ,hume put custom in the
 place of objective necessity in the    
notion of cause and1 in spite of all its
 pride1 must consent to lower its bold  
pretension of claiming assent a priori  
and depend for assent to the            
universality of its propositions on the 
kindness of observers1 who1 when called 
as witnesses1 would surely not hesitate 
to admit that what the geometer         
propounds as a theorem they have always 
perceived to be the fact1 and1          
consequently1 although it be not        
necessarily true1 yet they would permit 
us to expect it to be true in the       
future4 ,in this manner ,hume's         
empiricism leads inevitably to          
scepticism1 even with regard to         
mathematics1 and consequently in every  
scientific theoretical use of reason    
7for this belongs either to philosophy  
or mathematics74 ,whether with such a   

terrible overthrow of the chief branches
 of knowledge1 common reason will escape
 better1 and will not rather become     
irrecoverably involved in this          
destruction of all knowledge1 so that   
from the same principles a universal    
scepticism should follow 7affecting1    
indeed1 only the learned71 this ,i will 
leave everyone to judge for himself4    
,as regards my own labours in the       
critical examination of pure reason1    
which were occasioned by ,hume's        
sceptical teaching1 but went much       
further and embraced the whole field of 
pure theoretical reason in its synthetic
 use and1 consequently1 the field of    
what is called metaphysics in general2  
,i proceeded in the following manner    
with respect to the doubts raised by the
 ,scottish philosopher touching the     
notion of causality4 ,if ,hume took the 
objects of experience for things in     
themselves 7as is almost always done71  
he was quite right in declaring the     
notion of cause to be a deception and   

false illusion2 for as to things in     
themselves1 and their attributes as     
such1 it is impossible to see why       
because ,a is given1 ,b1 which is       
different1 must necessarily be also     
given1 and therefore he could by no     
means admit such an a priori knowledge  
of things in themselves4 ,still less    
could this acute writer allow an        
empirical origin of this concept1 since 
this is directly contradictory to the   
necessity of connection which           
constitutes the essence of the notion of
 causality1 hence the notion was        
proscribed1 and in its place was put    
custom in the observation of the course 
of perceptions4                         
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aej  ,it
 resulted1 however1 from my inquiries1  
that the objects with which we have to  
do in experience are by no means things 
in themselves1 but merely phenomena2 and
 that although in the case of things in 
themselves it is impossible to see how1 
if ,a is supposed1 it should be         

contradictory that ,b1 which is quite   
different from ,a1 should not also be   
supposed 7i4e41 to see the necessity of 
the connection between ,a as cause and  
,b as effect72 yet it can very well be  
conceived that1 as phenomena1 they may  
be necessarily connected in one         
experience in a certain way 7e4g41 with 
regard to time-relations72 so that they 
could not be separated without          
contradicting that connection1 by means 
of which this experience is possible in 
which they are objects and in which     
alone they are cognisable by us4 ,and so
 it was found to be in fact2 so that ,i 
was able not only to prove the objective
 reality of the concept of cause in     
regard to objects of experience1 but    
also to deduce it as an a priori concept
 by reason of the necessity of the      
connection it implied2 that is1 to show 
the possibility of its origin from pure 
understanding without any empirical     
sources2 and thus1 after removing the   
source of empiricism1 ,i was able also  

to overthrow the inevitable consequence 
of this1 namely1 scepticism1 first with 
regard to physical science1 and then    
with regard to mathematics 7in which    
empiricism has just the same grounds71  
both being sciences which have reference
 to objects of possible experience2     
herewith overthrowing the thorough doubt
 of whatever theoretic reason professes 
to discern4  ,but how is it with the    
application of this category of         
causality 7and all the others2 for      
without them there can be no knowledge  
of anything existing7 to things which   
are not objects of possible experience1 
but lie beyond its bounds8 ,for ,i was  
able to deduce the objective reality of 
these concepts only with regard to      
objects of possible experience4 ,but    
even this very fact1 that ,i have saved 
them1 only in case ,i have proved that  
objects may by means of them be thought1
 though not determined a priori2 this it
 is that gives them a place in the pure 
understanding1 by which they are        

referred to objects in general 7sensible
 or not sensible74 ,if anything is still
 wanting1 it is that which is the       
condition of the application of these   
categories1 and especially that of      
causality1 to objects1 namely1          
intuition2 for where this is not given1 
the application with a view to theoretic
 knowledge of the object1 as a noumenon1
 is impossible and1 therefore1 if anyone
 ventures on it1 is 7as in the ,critique
 of ,pure ,reason7 absolutely forbidden4
 ,still1 the objective reality of the   
concept 7of causality7 remains1 and it  
can be used even of noumena1 but without
 our being able in the least to define  
the concept theoretically so as to      
produce knowledge4 ,for that this       
concept1 even in reference to an object1
 contains nothing impossible1 was shown 
by this1 that1 even while applied to    
objects of sense1 its seat was certainly
 fixed in the pure understanding2 and   
although1 when referred to things in    
themselves 7which cannot be objects of  

experience71 it is not capable of being 
determined so as to represent a definite
 object for the purpose of theoretic    
knowledge2 yet for any other purpose    
7for instance1 a practical7 it might be 
capable of being determined so as to    
have such application4 ,this could not  
be the case if1 as ,hume maintained1    
this concept of causality contained     
something absolutely impossible to be   
thought4  ,in order now to discover this
 condition of the application of the    
said concept to noumena1 we need only   
recall why we are not content with its  
application to objects of experience1   
but desire also to apply it to things in
 themselves4 ,it will appear1 then1 that
 it is not a theoretic but a practical  
purpose that makes this a necessity4 ,in
 speculation1 even if we were successful
 in it1 we should not really gain       
anything in the knowledge of nature1 or 
generally with regard to such objects as
 are given1 but we should make a wide   
step from the sensibly conditioned 7in  

which we have already enough to do to   
maintain ourselves1 and to follow       
carefully the chain of causes7 to the   
supersensible1 in order to complete our 
knowledge of principles and to fix its  
limits2 whereas there always remains an 
infinite chasm unfilled between those   
limits and what we know2 and we should  
have hearkened to a vain curiosity      
rather than a solid-desire of knowledge4
  ,but1 besides the relation in which   
the understanding stands to objects 7in 
theoretical knowledge71 it has also a   
relation to the faculty of desire1 which
 is therefore called the will1 and the  
pure will1 inasmuch as pure             
understanding 7in this case called      
reason7 is practical through the mere   
conception of a law4 ,the objective     
reality of a pure will1 or1 what is the 
same thing1 of a pure practical reason1 
is given in the moral law a priori1 as  
it were1 by a fact1 for so we may name a
 determination of the will which is     
inevitable1 although it does not rest on

 empirical principles4 ,now1 in the     
notion of a will the notion of causality
 is already contained1 and hence the    
notion of a pure will contains that of a
 causality accompanied with freedom1    
that is1 one which is not determinable  
by physical laws1 and consequently is   
not capable of any empirical intuition  
in proof of its reality1 but1           
nevertheless1 completely justifies its  
objective reality a priori in the pure  
practical law2 not1 indeed 7as is easily
 seen7 for the purposes of the          
theoretical1 but of the practical use of
 reason4 ,now the notion of a being that
 has free will is the notion of a causa 
noumenon1 and that this notion involves 
no contradiction1 we are already assured
 by the fact- that inasmuch as the      
concept of cause has arisen wholly from 
pure understanding1 and has its         
objective reality assured by the        
deduction1 as it is moreover in its     
origin independent of any sensible      
conditions1 it is1 therefore1 not       

restricted to phenomena 7unless we      
wanted to make a definite theoretic use 
of it71 but can be applied equally to   
things that are objects of the pure     
understanding4 ,but1 since this         
application cannot rest on any intuition
 7for intuition can only be sensible71  
therefore1 causa noumenon1 as regards   
the theoretic use of reason1 although a 
possible and thinkable1 is yet an empty 
notion4 ,now1 ,i do not desire by means 
of this to understand theoretically the 
nature of a being1 in so far as it has a
 pure will2 it is enough for me to have 
thereby designated it as such1 and hence
 to combine the notion of causality with
 that of freedom 7and what is           
inseparable from it1 the moral law1 as  
its determining principle74 ,now1 this  
right ,i certainly have by virtue of the
 pure1 not-empirical origin of the      
notion of cause1 since ,i do not        
consider myself entitled to make any use
 of it except in reference to the moral 
law which determines its reality1 that  

is1 only a practical use4  ,if1 with    
,hume1 ,i had denied to the notion of   
causality all objective reality in its  
theoretic use1 not merely with regard to
 things in themselves 7the              
supersensible71 but also with regard to 
the objects of the senses1 it would have
 lost all significance1 and being a     
theoretically impossible notion would   
have been declared to be quite useless2 
and since what is nothing cannot be made
 any use of1 the practical use of a     
concept theoretically null would have   
been absurd4 ,but1 as it is1 the concept
 of a causality free from empirical     
conditions1 although empty1 i4e41       
without any appropriate intuition71 is  
yet theoretically possible1 and refers  
to an indeterminate object2 but in      
compensation significance is given to it
 in the moral law and consequently in a 
practical sense4 ,i have1 indeed1 no    
intuition which should determine its    
objective theoretic reality1 but not the
 less it has a real application1 which  

is exhibited in concreto in intentions  
or maxims2 that is1 it has a practical  
reality which can be specified1 and this
 is sufficient to justify it even with a
 view to noumena4                       
,,book#a;,,chapter#a paragraph #aee     
,now1 this objective reality of a pure  
concept of the understanding in the     
sphere of the supersensible1 once       
brought in1 gives an objective reality  
also to all the other categories1       
although only so far as they stand in   
necessary connexion with the determining
 principle of the will 7the moral law72 
a reality only of practical application1
 which has not the least effect in      
enlarging our theoretical knowledge of  
these objects1 or the discernment of    
their nature by pure reason4 ,so we     
shall find also in the sequel that these
 categories refer only to beings as     
intelligences1 and in them only to the  
relation of reason to the will2         
consequently1 always only to the        
practical1 and beyond this cannot       

pretend to any knowledge of these       
beings2 and whatever other properties   
belonging to the theoretical            
representation of supersensible things  
may be brought into connexion with these
 categories1 this is not to be reckoned 
as knowledge1 but only as a right 7in a 
practical point of view1 however1 it is 
a necessity7 to admit and assume such   
beings1 even in the case where we       
conceive supersensible beings 7e4g41    
,god7 according to analogy1 that is1 a  
purely rational relation1 of which we   
make a practical use with reference to  
what is sensible2 and thus the          
application to the supersensible solely 
in a practical point of view does not   
give pure theoretic reason the least    
encouragement to run riot into the      
transcendent4  ,,book#a;,,chapter#b     
,,chapter ,,ii4 ,of the ,concept of an  
,object of ,pure ,practical ,reason4    
,by a concept of the practical reason ,i
 understand the idea of an object as an 
effect possible to be produced through  

freedom4 ,to be an object of practical  
knowledge1 as such1 signifies1          
therefore1 only the relation of the will
 to the action by which the object or   
its opposite would be realized2 and to  
decide whether something is an object of
 pure practical reason or not is only to
 discern the possibility or             
impossibility of willing the action by  
which1 if we had the required power     
7about which experience must decide71 a 
certain object would be realized4 ,if   
the object be taken as the determining  
principle of our desire1 it must first  
be known whether it is physically       
possible by the free use of our powers1 
before we decide whether it is an object
 of practical reason or not4 ,on the    
other hand1 if the law can be considered
 a priori as the determining principle  
of the action1 and the latter therefore 
as determined by pure practical reason1 
the judgement whether a thing is an     
object of pure practical reason or not  
does not depend at all on the comparison

 with our physical power2 and the       
question is only whether we should will 
an action that is directed to the       
existence of an object1 if the object   
were in our power2 hence the previous   
question is only as the moral           
possibility of the action1 for in this  
case it is not the object1 but the law  
of the will1 that is the determining    
principle of the action4 ,the only      
objects of practical reason are         
therefore those of good and evil4 ,for  
by the former is meant an object        
necessarily desired according to a      
principle of reason2 by the latter one  
necessarily shunned1 also according to a
 principle of reason4  ,if the notion of
 good is not to be derived from an      
antecedent practical law1 but1 on the   
contrary1 is to serve as its foundation1
 it can only be the notion of something 
whose existence promises pleasure1 and  
thus determines the causality of the    
subject to produce it1 that is to say1  
determines the faculty of desire4 ,now1 

since it is impossible to discern a     
priori what idea will be accompanied    
with pleasure and what with pain1 it    
will depend on experience alone to find 
out what is primarily good or evil4 ,the
 property of the subject1 with reference
 to which alone this experiment can be  
made1 is the feeling of pleasure and    
pain1 a receptivity belonging to the    
internal sense2 thus that only would be 
primarily good with which the sensation 
of pleasure is immediately connected1   
and that simply evil which immediately  
excites pain4 ,since1 however1 this is  
opposed even to the usage of language1  
which distinguishes the pleasant from   
the good1 the unpleasant from the evil1 
and requires that good and evil shall   
always be judged by reason1 and1        
therefore1 by concepts which can be     
communicated to everyone1 and not by    
mere sensation1 which is limited to     
individual subjects and their           
susceptibility2 and1 since nevertheless1
 pleasure or pain cannot be connected   

with any idea of an object a priori1 the
 philosopher who thought himself obliged
 to make a feeling of pleasure the      
foundation of his practical judgements  
would call that good which is a means to
 the pleasant1 and evil1 what is a cause
 of unpleasantness and pain2 for the    
judgement on the relation of means to   
ends certainly belongs to reason4 ,but1 
although reason is alone capable of     
discerning the connexion of means with  
their ends 7so that the will might even 
be defined as the faculty of ends1 since
 these are always determining principles
 of the desires71 yet the practical     
maxims which would follow from the      
aforesaid principle of the good being   
merely a means1 would never contain as  
the object of the will anything good in 
itself1 but only something good for     
something2 the good would always be     
merely the useful1 and that for which it
 is useful must always lie outside the  
will1 in sensation4 ,now if this as a   
pleasant sensation were to be           

distinguished from the notion of good1  
then there would be nothing primarily   
good at all1 but the good would have to 
be sought only in the means to something
 else1 namely1 some pleasantness4  ,it  
is an old formula of the schools3 ,nihil
 appetimus nisi sub ratione boni2 ,nihil
 aversamur nisi sub ratione mali1 and it
 is used often correctly1 but often also
 in a manner injurious to philosophy1   
because the expressions boni and mali   
are ambiguous1 owing to the poverty of  
language1 in consequence of which they  
admit a double sense1 and1 therefore1   
inevitably bring the practical laws into
 ambiguity2 and philosophy1 which in    
employing them becomes aware of the     
different meanings in the same word1 but
 can find no special expressions for    
them1 is driven to subtile distinctions 
about which there is subsequently no    
unanimity1 because the distinction could
 not be directly marked by any suitable 
expression4 99    99 ,besides this1 the 
expression sub ratione boni is also     

ambiguous4 ,for it may mean3 ,we        
represent something to ourselves as     
good1 when and because we desire 7will7 
it2 or ,we desire something because we  
represent it to ourselves as good1 so   
that either the desire determines the   
notion of the object as a good1 or the  
notion of good determines the desire    
7the will72 so that in the first case   
sub ratione boni would mean1 ,we will   
something under the idea of the good2 in
 the second1 ,in consequence of this    
idea1 which1 as determining the         
volition1 must precede it4              
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #e       
,the ,german language has the good      
fortune to possess expressions which do 
not allow this difference to be         
overlooked4 ,it possesses two very      
distinct concepts and especially        
distinct expressions for that which the 
,latins express by a single word1 bonum4
 ,for bonum it has das ,gute good1 and  
das ,wohl well1 weal1 for malum das     
,bose evil1 and das ,ubel ill1 bad1 or  

das ,well woe4 ,so that we express two  
quite distinct judgements when we       
consider in an action the good and evil 
of it1 or our weal and woe 7ill74 ,hence
 it already follows that the above      
quoted psychological proposition is at  
least very doubtful if it is translated3
 ,we desire nothing except with a view  
to our weal or woe2 on the other hand1  
if we render it thus3 ,under the        
direction of reason we desire nothing   
except so far as we esteem it good or   
evil1 it is indubitably certain and at  
the same time quite clearly expressed4  
,well or ill always implies only a      
reference to our condition1 as pleasant 
or unpleasant1 as one of pleasure or    
pain1 and if we desire or avoid an      
object on this account1 it is only so   
far as it is referred to our sensibility
 and to the feeling of pleasure or pain 
that it produces4 ,but good or evil     
always implies a reference to the will1 
as determined by the law of reason1 to  
make something its object2 for it is    

never determined directly by the object 
and the idea of it1 but is a faculty of 
taking a rule of reason for or motive of
 an action 7by which an object may be   
realized74 ,good and evil therefore are 
properly referred to actions1 not to the
 sensations of the person1 and if       
anything is to be good or evil          
absolutely 7i4e41 in every respect and  
without any further condition71 or is to
 be so esteemed1 it can only be the     
manner of acting1 the maxim of the will1
 and consequently the acting person     
himself as a good or evil man that can  
be so called1 and not a thing4          
,however1 then1 men may laugh at the    
,stoic1 who in the severest paroxysms of
 gout cried out3 ,pain1 however thou    
tormentest me1 ,i will never admit that 
thou art an evil 7kakov1 malum73 he was 
right4 ,a bad thing it certainly was1   
and his cry betrayed that2 but that any 
evil attached to him thereby1 this he   
had no reason whatever to admit1 for    
pain did not in the least diminish the  

worth of his person1 but only that of   
his condition4 ,if he had been conscious
 of a single lie1 it would have lowered 
his pride1 but pain served only to raise
 it1 when he was conscious that he had  
not deserved it by any unrighteous      
action by which he had rendered himself 
worthy of punishment4  ,what we call    
good must be an object of desire in the 
judgement of every rational man1 and    
evil an object of aversion in the eyes  
of everyone2 therefore1 in addition to  
sense1 this judgement requires reason4  
,so it is with truthfulness1 as opposed 
to lying2 so with justice1 as opposed to
 violence1 c4 ,but we may call a thing a
 bad or ill thing1 which yet everyone   
must at the same time acknowledge to be 
good1 sometimes directly1 sometimes     
indirectly4 ,the man who submits to a   
surgical operation feels it no doubt as 
a bad thing1 but by their reason he and 
everyone acknowledge it to be good4 ,if 
a man who delights in annoying and      
vexing peaceable people at last receives

 a right good beating1 this is no doubt 
a bad thing2 but everyone approves it   
and regards it as a good thing1 even    
though nothing else resulted from it2   
nay1 even the man who receives it must  
in his reason acknowledge that he has   
met justice1 because he sees the        
proportion between good conduct and good
 fortune1 which reason inevitably places
 before him1 here put into practice4    
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #aj  ,no 
doubt our weal and woe are of very great
 importance in the estimation of our    
practical reason1 and as far as our     
nature as sensible beings is concerned1 
our happiness is the only thing of      
consequence1 provided it is estimated as
 reason especially requires1 not by the 
transitory sensation1 but by the        
influence that this has on our whole    
existence1 and on our satisfaction      
therewith2 but it is not absolutely the 
only thing of consequence4 ,man is a    
being who1 as belonging to the world of 
sense1 has wants1 and so far his reason 

has an office which it cannot refuse1   
namely1 to attend to the interest of his
 sensible nature1 and to form practical 
maxims1 even with a view to the         
happiness of this life1 and if possible 
even to that of a future4 ,but he is not
 so completely an animal as to be       
indifferent to what reason says on its  
own account1 and to use it merely as an 
instrument for the satisfaction of his  
wants as a sensible being4 ,for the     
possession of reason would not raise his
 worth above that of the brutes1 if it  
is to serve him only for the same       
purpose that instinct serves in them2 it
 would in that case be only a particular
 method which nature had employed to    
equip man for the same ends for which it
 has qualified brutes1 without          
qualifying him for any higher purpose4  
,no doubt once this arrangement of      
nature has been made for him he requires
 reason in order to take into           
consideration his weal and woe1 but     
besides this he possesses it for a      

higher purpose also1 namely1 not only to
 take into consideration what is good or
 evil in itself1 about which only pure  
reason1 uninfluenced by any sensible    
interest1 can judge1 but also to        
distinguish this estimate thoroughly    
from the former and to make it the      
supreme condition thereof4  ,in         
estimating what is good or evil in      
itself1 as distinguished from what can  
be so called only relatively1 the       
following points are to be considered4  
,either a rational principle is already 
conceived1 as of itself the determining 
principle of the will1 without regard to
 possible objects of desire 7and        
therefore by the more legislative form  
of the maxim71 and in that case that    
principle is a practical a priori law1  
and pure reason is supposed to be       
practical of itself4 ,the law in that   
case determines the will directly2 the  
action conformed to it is good in       
itself2 a will whose maxim always       
conforms to this law is good absolutely 

in every respect and is the supreme     
condition of all good4 ,or the maxim of 
the will is consequent on a determining 
principle of desire which presupposes an
 object of pleasure or pain1 something  
therefore that pleases or displeases1   
and the maxim of reason that we should  
pursue the former and avoid the latter  
determines our actions as good          
relatively to our inclination1 that is1 
good indirectly1 7i4e41 relatively to a 
different end to which they are means71 
and in that case these maxims can never 
be called laws1 but may be called       
rational practical precepts4 ,the end   
itself1 the pleasure that we seek1 is in
 the latter case not a good but a       
welfare2 not a concept of reason1 but an
 empirical concept of an object of      
sensation2 but the use of the means     
thereto1 that is1 the action1 is        
nevertheless called good 7because       
rational deliberation is required for   
it71 not however1 good absolutely1 but  
only relatively to our sensuous nature1 

with regard to its feelings of pleasure 
and displeasure2 but the will whose     
maxim is affected thereby is not a pure 
will2 this is directed only to that in  
which pure reason by itself can be      
practical4  ,this is the proper place to
 explain the paradox of method in a     
critique of practical reason1 namely1   
that the concept of good and evil must  
not be determined before the moral law  
7of which it seems as if it must be the 
foundation71 but only after it and by   
means of it4 ,in fact1 even if we did   
not know that the principle of morality 
is a pure a priori law determining the  
will1 yet1 that we may not assume       
principles quite gratuitously1 we must1 
at least at first1 leave it undecided1  
whether the will has merely empirical   
principles of determination1 or whether 
it has not also pure a priori           
principles2 for it is contrary to all   
rules of philosophical method to assume 
as decided that which is the very point 
in question4 ,supposing that we wished  

to begin with the concept of good1 in   
order to deduce from it the laws of the 
will1 then this concept of an object 7as
 a good7 would at the same time assign  
to us this object as the sole           
determining principle of the will4 ,now1
 since this concept had not any         
practical a priori law for its standard1
 the criterion of good or evil could not
 be placed in anything but the agreement
 of the object with our feeling of      
pleasure or pain2 and the use of reason 
could only consist in determining in the
 first place this pleasure or pain in   
connexion with all the sensations of my 
existence1 and in the second place the  
means of securing to myself the object  
of the pleasure4 ,now1 as experience    
alone can decide what conforms to the   
feeling of pleasure1 and by hypothesis  
the practical law is to be based on this
 as a condition1 it follows that the    
possibility of a priori practical laws  
would be at once excluded1 because it   
was imagined to be necessary first of   

all to find an object the concept of    
which1 as a good1 should constitute the 
universal though empirical principle of 
determination of the will4 ,but what it 
was necessary to inquire first of all   
was whether there is not an a priori    
determining principle of the will 7and  
this could never be found anywhere but  
in a pure practical law1 in so far as   
this law prescribes to maxims merely    
their form without regard to an object74
 ,since1 however1 we laid the foundation
 of all practical law in an object      
determined by our conceptions of good   
and evil1 whereas without a previous law
 that object could not be conceived by  
empirical concepts1 we have deprived    
ourselves beforehand of the possibility 
of even conceiving a pure practical law4
 ,on the other hand1 if we had first    
investigated the latter analytically1 we
 should have found that it is not the   
concept of good as an object that       
determines the moral law and makes it   
possible1 but that1 on the contrary1 it 

is the moral law that first determines  
the concept of good and makes it        
possible1 so far as it deserves the name
 of good absolutely4  ,this remark1     
which only concerns the method of       
ultimate ethical inquiries1 is of       
importance4 ,it explains at once the    
occasion of all the mistakes of         
philosophers with respect to the supreme
 principle of morals4 ,for they sought  
for an object of the will which they    
could make the matter and principle of a
 law 7which consequently could not      
determine the will directly1 but by     
means of that object referred to the    
feeling of pleasure or pain2 whereas    
they ought first to have searched for a 
law that would determine the will a     
priori and directly1 and afterwards     
determine the object in accordance with 
the will74 ,now1 whether they placed    
this object of pleasure1 which was to   
supply the supreme conception of        
goodness1 in happiness1 in perfection1  
in moral feeling1 or in the will of     

,god1 their principle in every case     
implied heteronomy1 and they must       
inevitably come upon empirical          
conditions of a moral law1 since their  
object1 which was to be the immediate   
principle of the will1 could not be     
called good or bad except in its        
immediate relation to feeling1 which is 
always empirical4 ,it is only a formal  
law- that is1 one which prescribes to   
reason nothing more than the form of its
 universal legislation as the supreme   
condition of its maxims- that can be a  
priori a determining principle of       
practical reason4 ,the ancients avowed  
this error without concealment by       
directing all their moral inquiries to  
the determination of the notion of the  
summum bonum1 which they intended       
afterwards to make the determining      
principle of the will in the moral law2 
whereas it is only far later1 when the  
moral law has been first established for
 itself1 and shown to be the direct     
determining principle of the will1 that 

this object can be presented to the     
will1 whose form is now determined a    
priori2 and this we shall undertake in  
the ,dialectic of the pure practical    
reason4 ,the moderns1 with whom the     
question of the summum bonum has gone   
out of fashion1 or at least seems to    
have become a secondary matter1 hide the
 same error under vague 7expressions as 
in many other cases74 ,it shows itself1 
nevertheless1 in their systems1 as it   
always produces heteronomy of practical 
reason2 and from this can never be      
derived a moral law giving universal    
commands4  ,now1 since the notions of   
good and evil1 as consequences of the a 
priori determination of the will1 imply 
also a pure practical principle1 and    
therefore a causality of pure reason2   
hence they do not originally refer to   
objects 7so as to be1 for instance1     
special modes of the synthetic unity of 
the manifold of given intuitions in one 
consciousness7 like the pure concepts of
 the understanding or categories of     

reason in its theoretic employment2 on  
the contrary1 they presuppose that      
objects are given2 but they are all     
modes 7modi7 of a single category1      
namely1 that of causality1 the          
determining principle of which consists 
in the rational conception of a law1    
which as a law of freedom reason gives  
to itself1 thereby a priori proving     
itself practical4 ,however1 as the      
actions on the one side come under a law
 which is not a physical law1 but a law 
of freedom1 and consequently belong to  
the conduct of beings in the world of   
intelligence1 yet on the other side as  
events in the world of sense they belong
 to phenomena2 hence the determinations 
of a practical reason are only possible 
in reference to the latter and1         
therefore1 in accordance with the       
categories of the understanding2 not    
indeed with a view to any theoretic     
employment of it1 i4e41 so as to bring  
the manifold of 7sensible7 intuition    
under one consciousness a priori2 but   

only to subject the manifold of desires 
to the unity of consciousness of a      
practical reason1 giving it commands in 
the moral law1 i4e41 to a pure will a   
priori4                                 
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #ae      
,these categories of freedom- for so we 
choose to call them in contrast to those
 theoretic categories which are         
categories of physical nature- have an  
obvious advantage over the latter1      
inasmuch as the latter are only forms of
 thought which designate objects in an  
indefinite manner by means of universal 
concept of every possible intuition2 the
 former1 on the contrary1 refer to the  
determination of a free elective will   
7to which indeed no exactly             
corresponding intuition can be assigned1
 but which has as its foundation a pure 
practical a priori law1 which is not the
 case with any concepts belonging to the
 theoretic use of our cognitive         
faculties72 hence1 instead of the form  
of intuition 7space and time71 which    

does not lie in reason itself1 but has  
to be drawn from another source1 namely1
 the sensibility1 these being elementary
 practical concepts have as their       
foundation the form of a pure will1     
which is given in reason and1 therefore1
 in the thinking faculty itself4 ,from  
this it happens that as all precepts of 
pure practical reason have to do only   
with the determination of the will1 not 
with the physical conditions 7of        
practical ability7 of the execution of  
one's purpose1 the practical a priori   
principles in relation to the supreme   
principle of freedom are at once        
cognitions1 and have not to wait for    
intuitions in order to acquire          
significance1 and that for this         
remarkable reason1 because they         
themselves produce the reality of that  
to which they refer 7the intention of   
the will71 which is not the case with   
theoretical concepts4 ,only we must be  
careful to observe that these categories
 only apply to the practical reason2 and

 thus they proceed in order from those  
which are as yet subject to sensible    
conditions and morally indeterminate to 
those which are free from sensible      
conditions and determined merely by the 
moral law4    ,table of the ,categories 
of ,freedom relatively to the ,notions  
of ,good and ,evil4                     
,i4 ,,quantity4                         
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #bj      
,subjective1 according to maxims        
7practical opinions of the              
individual7   ,objective1 according to  
principles 7,precepts7   ,a priori both 
objective and subjective principles of  
freedom     7laws7                      
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #be      
,,ii4 ,,quality4   ,practical rules of  
action 7praeceptivae7   ,practical rules
 of omission 7prohibitivae7   ,practical
 rules of exceptions 7exceptivae7       
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #cj      
,,iii4 ,,relation4   ,to personality    
,to the condition of the person4        
,reciprocal1 of one person to the others

 of the others4                         
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #ce      
,,iv4 ,,modality4   ,the ,permitted and 
the ,forbidden   ,duty and the contrary 
to duty4   ,perfect and imperfect duty4 
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #dj  ,it 
will at once be observed that in this   
table freedom is considered as a sort of
 causality not subject to empirical     
principles of determination1 in regard  
to actions possible by it1 which are    
phenomena in the world of sense1 and    
that consequently it is referred to the 
categories which concern its physical   
possibility1 whilst yet each category is
 taken so universally that the          
determining principle of that causality 
can be placed outside the world of sense
 in freedom as a property of a being in 
the world of intelligence2 and finally  
the categories of modality introduce the
 transition from practical principles   
generally to those of morality1 but only
 problematically4 ,these can be         
established dogmatically only by the    

moral law4  ,i add nothing further here 
in explanation of the present table1    
since it is intelligible enough of      
itself4 ,a division of this kind based  
on principles is very useful in any     
science1 both for the sake of           
thoroughness and intelligibility4 ,thus1
 for instance1 we know from the         
preceding table and its first number    
what we must begin from in practical    
inquiries2 namely1 from the maxims which
 every one founds on his own            
inclinations2 the precepts which hold   
for a species of rational beings so far 
as they agree in certain inclinations2  
and finally the law which holds for all 
without regard to their inclinations1   
etc4 ,in this way we survey the whole   
plan of what has to be done1 every      
question of practical philosophy that   
has to be answered1 and also the order  
that is to be followed4    ,of the      
,typic of the ,pure ,practical          
,judgement4                             
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #de  ,it 

is the notions of good and evil that    
first determine an object of the will4  
,they themselves1 however1 are subject  
to a practical rule of reason which1 if 
it is pure reason1 determines the will a
 priori relatively to its object4 ,now1 
whether an action which is possible to  
us in the world of sense1 comes under   
the rule or not1 is a question to be    
decided by the practical judgement1 by  
which what is said in the rule          
universally 7in abstracto7 is applied to
 an action in concreto4 ,but since a    
practical rule of pure reason in the    
first place as practical concerns the   
existence of an object1 and in the      
second place as a practical rule of pure
 reason implies necessity as regards the
 existence of the action and1 therefore1
 is a practical law1 not a physical law 
depending on empirical principles of    
determination1 but a law of freedom by  
which the will is to be determined      
independently on anything empirical     
7merely by the conception of a law and  

its form71 whereas all instances that   
can occur of possible actions can only  
be empirical1 that is1 belong to the    
experience of physical nature2 hence1 it
 seems absurd to expect to find in the  
world of sense a case which1 while as   
such it depends only on the law of      
nature1 yet admits of the application to
 it of a law of freedom1 and to which we
 can apply the supersensible idea of the
 morally good which is to be exhibited  
in it in concreto4 ,thus1 the judgement 
of the pure practical reason is subject 
to the same difficulties as that of the 
pure theoretical reason4 ,the latter1   
however1 had means at hand of escaping  
from these difficulties1 because1 in    
regard to the theoretical employment1   
intuitions were required to which pure  
concepts of the understanding could be  
applied1 and such intuitions 7though    
only of objects of the senses7 can be   
given a priori and1 therefore1 as far as
 regards the union of the manifold in   
them1 conforming to the pure a priori   

concepts of the understanding as        
schemata4 ,on the other hand1 the       
morally good is something whose object  
is supersensible2 for which1 therefore1 
nothing corresponding can be found in   
any sensible intuition4 ,judgement      
depending on laws of pure practical     
reason seems1 therefore1 to be subject  
to special difficulties arising from    
this1 that a law of freedom is to be    
applied to actions1 which are events    
taking place in the world of sense1 and 
which1 so far1 belong to physical       
nature4  ,but here again is opened a    
favourable prospect for the pure        
practical judgement4 ,when ,i subsume   
under a pure practical law an action    
possible to me in the world of sense1 ,i
 am not concerned with the possibility  
of the action as an event in the world  
of sense4 ,this is a matter that belongs
 to the decision of reason in its       
theoretic use according to the law of   
causality1 which is a pure concept of   
the understanding1 for which reason has 

a schema in the sensible intuition4     
,physical causality1 or the condition   
under which it takes place1 belongs to  
the physical concepts1 the schema of    
which is sketched by transcendental     
imagination4 ,here1 however1 we have to 
do1 not with the schema of a case that  
occurs according to laws1 but with the  
schema of a law itself 7if the word is  
allowable here71 since the fact that the
 will 7not the action relatively to its 
effect7 is determined by the law alone  
without any other principle1 connects   
the notion of causality with quite      
different conditions from those which   
constitute physical connection4  ,the   
physical law being a law to which the   
objects of sensible intuition1 as such1 
are subject1 must have a schema         
corresponding to it- that is1 a general 
procedure of the imagination 7by which  
it exhibits a priori to the senses the  
pure concept of the understanding which 
the law determines74 ,but the law of    
freedom 7that is1 of a causality not    

subject to sensible conditions71 and    
consequently the concept of the         
unconditionally good1 cannot have any   
intuition1 nor consequently any schema  
supplied to it for the purpose of its   
application in concreto4 ,consequently  
the moral law has no faculty but the    
understanding to aid its application to 
physical objects 7not the imagination72 
and the understanding for the purposes  
of the judgement can provide for an idea
 of the reason1 not a schema of the     
sensibility1 but a law1 though only as  
to its form as law2 such a law1 however1
 as can be exhibited in concreto in     
objects of the senses1 and therefore a  
law of nature4 ,we can therefore call   
this law the type of the moral law4     
,the rule of the judgement according to 
laws of pure practical reason is this3  
ask yourself whether1 if the action you 
propose were to take place by a law of  
the system of nature of which you were  
yourself a part1 you could regard it as 
possible by your own will4 ,everyone    

does1 in fact1 decide by this rule      
whether actions are morally good or     
evil4 ,thus1 people say3 ,if everyone   
permitted himself to deceive1 when he   
thought it to his advantage2 or thought 
himself justified in shortening his life
 as soon as he was thoroughly weary of  
it2 or looked with perfect indifference 
on the necessity of others2 and if you  
belonged to such an order of things1    
would you do so with the assent of your 
own will8 ,now everyone knows well that 
if he secretly allows himself to        
deceive1 it does not follow that        
everyone else does so2 or if1           
unobserved1 he is destitute of          
compassion1 others would not necessarily
 be so to him2 hence1 this comparison of
 the maxim of his actions with a        
universal law of nature is not the      
determining principle of his will4 ,such
 a law is1 nevertheless1 a type of the  
estimation of the maxim on moral        
principles4 ,if the maxim of the action 
is not such as to stand the test of the 

form of a universal law of nature1 then 
it is morally impossible4 ,this is the  
judgement even of common sense2 for its 
ordinary judgements1 even those of      
experience1 are always based on the law 
of nature4 ,it has it therefore always  
at hand1 only that in cases where       
causality from freedom is to be         
criticised1 it makes that law of nature 
only the type of a law of freedom1      
because1 without something which it     
could use as an example in a case of    
experience1 it could not give the law of
 a pure practical reason its proper use 
in practice4  ,it is therefore allowable
 to use the system of the world of sense
 as the type of a supersensible system  
of things1 provided ,i do not transfer  
to the latter the intuitions1 and what  
depends on them1 but merely apply to it 
the form of law in general 7the notion  
of which occurs even in the commonest   
use of reason1 but cannot be definitely 
known a priori for any other purpose    
than the pure practical use of reason72 

for laws1 as such1 are so far identical1
 no matter from what they derive their  
determining principles4                 
,,book#a;,,chapter#b paragraph #ej      
,further1 since of all the supersensible
 absolutely nothing is known except     
freedom 7through the moral law71 and    
this only so far as it is inseparably   
implied in that law1 and moreover all   
supersensible objects to which reason   
might lead us1 following the guidance of
 that law1 have still no reality for us1
 except for the purpose of that law1 and
 for the use of mere practical reason2  
and as reason is authorized and even    
compelled to use physical nature 7in its
 pure form as an object of the          
understanding7 as the type of the       
judgement2 hence1 the present remark    
will serve to guard against reckoning   
amongst concepts themselves that which  
belongs only to the typic of concepts4  
,this1 namely1 as a typic of the        
judgement1 guards against the empiricism
 of practical reason1 which founds the  

practical notions of good and evil      
merely on experienced consequences      
7so-called happiness74 ,no doubt        
happiness and the infinite advantages   
which would result from a will          
determined by self-love1 if this will at
 the same time erected itself into a    
universal law of nature1 may certainly  
serve as a perfectly suitable type of   
the morally good1 but it is not         
identical with it4 ,the same typic      
guards also against the mysticism of    
practical reason1 which turns what      
served only as a symbol into a schema1  
that is1 proposes to provide for the    
moral concepts actual intuitions1 which1
 however1 are not sensible 7intuitions  
of an invisible ,kingdom of ,god71 and  
thus plunges into the transcendent4     
,what is befitting the use of the moral 
concepts is only the rationalism of the 
judgement1 which takes from the sensible
 system of nature only what pure reason 
can also conceive of itself1 that is1   
conformity to law1 and transfers into   

the supersensible nothing but what can  
conversely be actually exhibited by     
actions in the world of sense according 
to the formal rule of a law of nature4  
,however1 the caution against empiricism
 of practical reason is much more       
important2 for mysticism is quite       
reconcilable with the purity and        
sublimity of the moral law1 and1        
besides1 it is not very natural or      
agreeable to common habits of thought to
 strain one's imagination to            
supersensible intuitions2 and hence the 
danger on this side is not so general4  
,empiricism1 on the contrary1 cuts up at
 the roots the morality of intentions   
7in which1 and not in actions only1     
consists the high worth that men can and
 ought to give to themselves71 and      
substitutes for duty something quite    
different1 namely1 an empirical         
interest1 with which the inclinations   
generally are secretly leagued2 and     
empiricism1 moreover1 being on this     
account allied with all the inclinations

 which 7no matter what fashion they put 
on7 degrade humanity when they are      
raised to the dignity of a supreme      
practical principle2 and as these1      
nevertheless1 are so favourable to      
everyone's feelings1 it is for that     
reason much more dangerous than         
mysticism1 which can never constitute a 
lasting condition of any great number of
 persons4  ,,book#a;,,chapter#c         
,,chapter ,,iii4 ,of the ,motives of    
,pure ,practical ,reason4    ,what is   
essential in the moral worth of actions 
is that the moral law should directly   
determine the will4 ,if the             
determination of the will takes place in
 conformity indeed to the moral law1 but
 only by means of a feeling1 no matter  
of what kind1 which has to be           
presupposed in order that the law may be
 sufficient to determine the will1 and  
therefore not for the sake of the law1  
then the action will possess legality1  
but not morality4 ,now1 if we understand
 by motive 7elater animi7 the subjective

 ground of determination of the will of 
a being whose reason does not           
necessarily conform to the objective    
law1 by virtue of its own nature1 then  
it will follow1 first1 that no motives  
can be attributed to the ,divine will1  
and that the motives of the human will  
7as well as that of every created       
rational being7 can never be anything   
else than the moral law1 and            
consequently that the objective         
principle of determination must always  
and alone be also the subjectively      
sufficient determining principle of the 
action1 if this is not merely to fulfil 
the letter of the law1 without          
containing its spirit4 99    99 ,we may 
say of every action that conforms to the
 law1 but is not done for the sake of   
the law1 that it is morally good in the 
letter1 not in the spirit 7the          
intention74    ,since1 then1 for the    
purpose of giving the moral law         
influence over the will1 we must not    
seek for any other motives that might   

enable us to dispense with the motive of
 the law itself1 because that would     
produce mere hypocrisy1 without         
consistency2 and it is even dangerous to
 allow other motives 7for instance1 that
 of interest7 even to co-operate along  
with the moral law2 hence nothing is    
left us but to determine carefully in   
what way the moral law becomes a motive1
 and what effect this has upon the      
faculty of desire4 ,for as to the       
question how a law can be directly and  
of itself a determining principle of the
 will 7which is the essence of          
morality71 this is1 for human reason1 an
 insoluble problem and identical with   
the question3 how a free will is        
possible4 ,therefore what we have to    
show a priori is not why the moral law  
in itself supplies a motive1 but what   
effect it1 as such1 produces 7or1 more  
correctly speaking1 must produce7 on the
 mind4                                  
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #e  ,the 
essential point in every determination  

of the will by the moral law is that    
being a free will it is determined      
simply by the moral law1 not only       
without the co-operation of sensible    
impulses1 but even to the rejection of  
all such1 and to the checking of all    
inclinations so far as they might be    
opposed to that law4 ,so far1 then1 the 
effect of the moral law as a motive is  
only negative1 and this motive can be   
known a priori to be such4 ,for all     
inclination and every sensible impulse  
is founded on feeling1 and the negative 
effect produced on feeling 7by the check
 on the inclinations7 is itself feeling2
 consequently1 we can see a priori that 
the moral law1 as a determining         
principle of the will1 must by thwarting
 all our inclinations produce a feeling 
which may be called pain2 and in this we
 have the first1 perhaps the only1      
instance in which we are able from a    
priori considerations to determine the  
relation of a cognition 7in this case of
 pure practical reason7 to the feeling  

of pleasure or displeasure4 ,all the    
inclinations together 7which can be     
reduced to a tolerable system1 in which 
case their satisfaction is called       
happiness7 constitute self-regard       
7solipsismus74 ,this is either the      
self-love that consists in an excessive 
fondness for oneself 7philautia71 or    
satisfaction with oneself 7arrogantia74 
,the former is called particularly      
selfishness2 the latter self-conceit4   
,pure practical reason only checks      
selfishness1 looking on it as natural   
and active in us even prior to the moral
 law1 so far as to limit it to the      
condition of agreement with this law1   
and then it is called rational          
self-love4 ,but self-conceit reason     
strikes down altogether1 since all      
claims to self-esteem which precede     
agreement with the moral law are vain   
and unjustifiable1 for the certainty of 
a state of mind that coincides with this
 law is the first condition of personal 
worth 7as we shall presently show more  

clearly71 and prior to this conformity  
any pretension to worth is false and    
unlawful4 ,now the propensity to        
self-esteem is one of the inclinations  
which the moral law checks1 inasmuch as 
that esteem rests only on morality4     
,therefore the moral law breaks down    
self-conceit4 ,but as this law is       
something positive in itself1 namely1   
the form of an intellectual causality1  
that is1 of freedom1 it must be an      
object of respect2 for1 by opposing the 
subjective antagonism of the            
inclinations1 it weakens self-conceit2  
and since it even breaks down1 that is1 
humiliates1 this conceit1 it is an      
object of the highest respect and1      
consequently1 is the foundation of a    
positive feeling which is not of        
empirical origin1 but is known a priori4
 ,therefore respect for the moral law is
 a feeling which is produced by an      
intellectual cause1 and this feeling is 
the only one that we know quite a priori
 and the necessity of which we can      

perceive4  ,in the preceding chapter we 
have seen that everything that presents 
itself as an object of the will prior to
 the moral law is by that law itself1   
which is the supreme condition of       
practical reason1 excluded from the     
determining principles of the will which
 we have called the unconditionally     
good2 and that the mere practical form  
which consists in the adaptation of the 
maxims to universal legislation first   
determines what is good in itself and   
absolutely1 and is the basis of the     
maxims of a pure will1 which alone is   
good in every respect4 ,however1 we find
 that our nature as sensible beings is  
such that the matter of desire 7objects 
of inclination1 whether of hope or fear7
 first presents itself to us2 and our   
pathologically affected self1 although  
it is in its maxims quite unfit for     
universal legislation2 yet1 just as if  
it constituted our entire self1 strives 
to put its pretensions forward first1   
and to have them acknowledged as the    

first and original4 ,this propensity to 
make ourselves in the subjective        
determining principles of our choice    
serve as the objective determining      
principle of the will generally may be  
called self-love2 and if this pretends  
to be legislative as an unconditional   
practical principle it may be called    
self-conceit4 ,now the moral law1 which 
alone is truly objective 7namely1 in    
every respect71 entirely excludes the   
influence of self-love on the supreme   
practical principle1 and indefinitely   
checks the self-conceit that prescribes 
the subjective conditions of the former 
as laws4 ,now whatever checks our       
self-conceit in our own judgement       
humiliates2 therefore the moral law     
inevitably humbles every man when he    
compares with it the physical           
propensities of his nature4 ,that1 the  
idea of which as a determining principle
 of our will humbles us in our          
self-consciousness1 awakes respect for  
itself1 so far as it is itself positive 

and a determining principle4 ,therefore 
the moral law is even subjectively a    
cause of respect4 ,now since everything 
that enters into self-love belongs to   
inclination1 and all inclination rests  
on feelings1 and consequently whatever  
checks all the feelings together in     
self-love has necessarily1 by this very 
circumstance1 an influence on feeling2  
hence we comprehend how it is possible  
to perceive a priori that the moral law 
can produce an effect on feeling1 in    
that it excludes the inclinations and   
the propensity to make them the supreme 
practical condition1 i4e41 self-love1   
from all participation in the supreme   
legislation4 ,this effect is on one side
 merely negative1 but on the other side1
 relatively to the restricting principle
 of pure practical reason1 it is        
positive4 ,no special kind of feeling   
need be assumed for this under the name 
of a practical or moral feeling as      
antecedent to the moral law and serving 
as its foundation4  ,the negative effect

 on feeling 7unpleasantness7 is         
pathological1 like every influence on   
feeling and like every feeling          
generally4 ,but as an effect of the     
consciousness of the moral law1 and     
consequently in relation to a           
supersensible cause1 namely1 the subject
 of pure practical reason which is the  
supreme lawgiver1 this feeling of a     
rational being affected by inclinations 
is called humiliation 7intellectual     
self-depreciation72 but with reference  
to the positive source of this          
humiliation1 the law1 it is respect for 
it4 ,there is indeed no feeling for this
 law2 but inasmuch as it removes the    
resistance out of the way1 this removal 
of an obstacle is1 in the judgement of  
reason1 esteemed equivalent to a        
positive help to its causality4         
,therefore this feeling may also be     
called a feeling of respect for the     
moral law1 and for both reasons together
 a moral feeling4  ,while the moral law1
 therefore1 is a formal determining     

principle of action by practical pure   
reason1 and is moreover a material      
though only objective determining       
principle of the objects of action as   
called good and evil1 it is also a      
subjective determining principle1 that  
is1 a motive to this action1 inasmuch as
 it has influence on the morality of the
 subject and produces a feeling         
conducive to the influence of the law on
 the will4 ,there is here in the subject
 no antecedent feeling tending to       
morality4 ,for this is impossible1 since
 every feeling is sensible1 and the     
motive of moral intention must be free  
from all sensible conditions4 ,on the   
contrary1 while the sensible feeling    
which is at the bottom of all our       
inclinations is the condition of that   
impression which we call respect1 the   
cause that determines it lies in the    
pure practical reason2 and this         
impression therefore1 on account of its 
origin1 must be called1 not a           
pathological but a practical effect4    

,for by the fact that the conception of 
the moral law deprives self-love of its 
influence1 and self-conceit of its      
illusion1 it lessens the obstacle to    
pure practical reason and produces the  
conception of the superiority of its    
objective law to the impulses of the    
sensibility2 and thus1 by removing the  
counterpoise1 it gives relatively       
greater weight to the law in the        
judgement of reason 7in the case of a   
will affected by the aforesaid          
impulses74 ,thus the respect for the law
 is not a motive to morality1 but is    
morality itself subjectively considered 
as a motive1 inasmuch as pure practical 
reason1 by rejecting all the rival      
pretensions of self-love1 gives         
authority to the law1 which now alone   
has influence4 ,now it is to be observed
 that as respect is an effect on        
feeling1 and therefore on the           
sensibility1 of a rational being1 it    
presupposes this sensibility1 and       
therefore also the finiteness of such   

beings on whom the moral law imposes    
respect2 and that respect for the law   
cannot be attributed to a supreme being1
 or to any being free from all          
sensibility1 in whom1 therefore1 this   
sensibility cannot be an obstacle to    
practical reason4  ,this feeling 7which 
we call the moral feeling7 is therefore 
produced simply by reason4 ,it does not 
serve for the estimation of actions nor 
for the foundation of the objective     
moral law itself1 but merely as a motive
 to make this of itself a maxim4 ,but   
what name could we more suitably apply  
to this singular feeling which cannot be
 compared to any pathological feeling8  
,it is of such a peculiar kind that it  
seems to be at the disposal of reason   
only1 and that pure practical reason4   
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #aj      
,respect applies always to persons only-
 not to things4 ,the latter may arouse  
inclination1 and if they are animals    
7e4g41 horses1 dogs1 etc471 even love or
 fear1 like the sea1 a volcano1 a beast 

of prey2 but never respect4 ,something  
that comes nearer to this feeling is    
admiration1 and this1 as an affection1  
astonishment1 can apply to things also1 
e4g41 lofty mountains1 the magnitude1   
number1 and distance of the heavenly    
bodies1 the strength and swiftness of   
many animals1 etc4 ,but all this is not 
respect4 ,a man also may be an object to
 me of love1 fear1 or admiration1 even  
to astonishment1 and yet not be an      
object of respect4 ,his jocose humour1  
his courage and strength1 his power from
 the rank he has amongst others1 may    
inspire me with sentiments of this kind1
 but still inner respect for him is     
wanting4 ,fontenelle says1 ,i bow before
 a great man1 but my mind does not bow4 
,i would add1 before an humble plain    
man1 in whom ,i perceive uprightness of 
character in a higher degree than ,i am 
conscious of in myself1- my mind bows   
whether ,i choose it or not1 and though 
,i bear my head never so high that he   
may not forget my superior rank4 ,why is

 this8 ,because his example exhibits to 
me a law that humbles my self-conceit   
when ,i compare it with my conduct3 a   
law1 the practicability of obedience to 
which ,i see proved by fact before my   
eyes4 ,now1 ,i may even be conscious of 
a like degree of uprightness1 and yet   
the respect remains4 ,for since in man  
all good is defective1 the law made     
visible by an example still humbles my  
pride1 my standard being furnished by a 
man whose imperfections1 whatever they  
may be1 are not known to me as my own   
are1 and who therefore appears to me in 
a more favourable light4 ,respect is a  
tribute which we cannot refuse to merit1
 whether we will or not2 we may indeed  
outwardly withhold it1 but we cannot    
help feeling it inwardly4  ,respect is  
so far from being a feeling of pleasure 
that we only reluctantly give way to it 
as regards a man4 ,we try to find out   
something that may lighten the burden of
 it1 some fault to compensate us for the
 humiliation which such an example      

causes4 ,even the dead are not always   
secure from this criticism1 especially  
if their example appears inimitable4    
,even the moral law itself in its solemn
 majesty is exposed to this endeavour to
 save oneself from yielding it respect4 
,can it be thought that it is for any   
other reason that we are so ready to    
reduce it to the level of our familiar  
inclination1 or that it is for any other
 reason that we all take such trouble to
 make it out to be the chosen precept of
 our own interest well understood1 but  
that we want to be free from the        
deterrent respect which shows us our own
 unworthiness with such severity8       
,nevertheless1 on the other hand1 so    
little is there pain in it that if once 
one has laid aside self-conceit and     
allowed practical influence to that     
respect1 he can never be satisfied with 
contemplating the majesty of this law1  
and the soul believes itself elevated in
 proportion as it sees the holy law     
elevated above it and its frail nature4 

,no doubt great talents and activity    
proportioned to them may also occasion  
respect or an analogous feeling4 ,it is 
very proper to yield it to them1 and    
then it appears as if this sentiment    
were the same thing as admiration4 ,but 
if we look closer we shall observe that 
it is always uncertain how much of the  
ability is due to native talent1 and how
 much to diligence in cultivating it4   
,reason represents it to us as probably 
the fruit of cultivation1 and therefore 
as meritorious1 and this notably reduces
 our self-conceit1 and either casts a   
reproach on us or urges us to follow    
such an example in the way that is      
suitable to us4 ,this respect1 then1    
which we show to such a person 7properly
 speaking1 to the law that his example  
exhibits7 is not mere admiration2 and   
this is confirmed also by the fact that 
when the common run of admirers think   
they have learned from any source the   
badness of such a man's character 7for  
instance ,voltaire's7 they give up all  

respect for him2 whereas the true       
scholar still feels it at least with    
regard to his talents1 because he is    
himself engaged in a business and a     
vocation which make imitation of such a 
man in some degree a law4  ,respect for 
the moral law is1 therefore1 the only   
and the undoubted moral motive1 and this
 feeling is directed to no object1      
except on the ground of this law4 ,the  
moral law first determines the will     
objectively and directly in the         
judgement of reason2 and freedom1 whose 
causality can be determined only by the 
law1 consists just in this1 that it     
restricts all inclinations1 and         
consequently self-esteem1 by the        
condition of obedience to its pure law4 
,this restriction now has an effect on  
feeling1 and produces the impression of 
displeasure which can be known a priori 
from the moral law4 ,since it is so far 
only a negative effect which1 arising   
from the influence of pure practical    
reason1 checks the activity of the      

subject1 so far as it is determined by  
inclinations1 and hence checks the      
opinion of his personal worth 7which1 in
 the absence of agreement with the moral
 law1 is reduced to nothing72 hence1 the
 effect of this law on feeling is merely
 humiliation4 ,we can1 therefore1       
perceive this a priori1 but cannot know 
by it the force of the pure practical   
law as a motive1 but only the resistance
 to motives of the sensibility4 ,but    
since the same law is objectively1 that 
is1 in the conception of pure reason1 an
 immediate principle of determination of
 the will1 and consequently this        
humiliation takes place only relatively 
to the purity of the law2 hence1 the    
lowering of the pretensions of moral    
self-esteem1 that is1 humiliation on the
 sensible side1 is an elevation of the  
moral1 i4e41 practical1 esteem for the  
law itself on the intellectual side2 in 
a word1 it is respect for the law1 and  
therefore1 as its cause is intellectual1
 a positive feeling which can be known a

 priori4 ,for whatever diminishes the   
obstacles to an activity furthers this  
activity itself4 ,now the recognition of
 the moral law is the consciousness of  
an activity of practical reason from    
objective principles1 which only fails  
to reveal its effect in actions because 
subjective 7pathological7 causes hinder 
it4 ,respect for the moral law then must
 be regarded as a positive1 though      
indirect1 effect of it on feeling1      
inasmuch as this respect weakens the    
impeding influence of inclinations by   
humiliating self-esteem2 and hence also 
as a subjective principle of activity1  
that is1 as a motive to obedience to the
 law1 and as a principle of the maxims  
of a life conformable to it4 ,from the  
notion of a motive arises that of an    
interest1 which can never be attributed 
to any being unless it possesses reason1
 and which signifies a motive of the    
will in so far as it is conceived by the
 reason4 ,since in a morally good will  
the law itself must be the motive1 the  

moral interest is a pure interest of    
practical reason alone1 independent of  
sense4 ,on the notion of an interest is 
based that of a maxim4 ,this1 therefore1
 is morally good only in case it rests  
simply on the interest taken in         
obedience to the law4 ,all three        
notions1 however1 that of a motive1 of  
an interest1 and of a maxim1 can be     
applied only to finite beings4 ,for they
 all suppose a limitation of the nature 
of the being1 in that the subjective    
character of his choice does not of     
itself agree with the objective law of a
 practical reason2 they suppose that the
 being requires to be impelled to action
 by something1 because an internal      
obstacle opposes itself4 ,therefore they
 cannot be applied to the ,divine will4 
,there is something so singular in the  
unbounded esteem for the pure moral law1
 apart from all advantage1 as it is     
presented for our obedience by practical
 reason1 the voice of which makes even  
the boldest sinner tremble and compels  

him to hide himself from it1 that we    
cannot wonder if we find this influence 
of a mere intellectual idea on the      
feelings quite incomprehensible to      
speculative reason and have to be       
satisfied with seeing so much of this a 
priori that such a feeling is           
inseparably connected with the          
conception of the moral law in every    
finite rational being4 ,if this feeling 
of respect were pathological1 and       
therefore were a feeling of pleasure    
based on the inner sense1 it would be in
 vain to try to discover a connection of
 it with any idea a priori4 ,but it is a
 feeling that applies merely to what is 
practical1 and depends on the conception
 of a law1 simply as to its form1 not on
 account of any object1 and therefore   
cannot be reckoned either as pleasure or
 pain1 and yet produces an interest in  
obedience to the law1 which we call the 
moral interest1 just as the capacity of 
taking such an interest in the law 7or  
respect for the moral law itself7 is    

properly the moral feeling4  ,the       
consciousness of a free submission of   
the will to the law1 yet combined with  
an inevitable constraint put upon all   
inclinations1 though only by our own    
reason1 is respect for the law4 ,the law
 that demands this respect and inspires 
it is clearly no other than the moral   
7for no other precludes all inclinations
 from exercising any direct influence on
 the will74 ,an action which is         
objectively practical according to this 
law1 to the exclusion of every          
determining principle of inclination1 is
 duty1 and this by reason of that       
exclusion includes in its concept       
practical obligation1 that is1 a        
determination to actions1 however       
reluctantly they may be done4 ,the      
feeling that arises from the            
consciousness of this obligation is not 
pathological1 as would be a feeling     
produced by an object of the senses1 but
 practical only1 that is1 it is made    
possible by a preceding 7objective7     

determination of the will and a         
causality of the reason4 ,as submission 
to the law1 therefore1 that is1 as a    
command 7announcing constraint for the  
sensibly affected subject71 it contains 
in it no pleasure1 but on the contrary1 
so far1 pain in the action4 ,on the     
other hand1 however1 as this constraint 
is exercised merely by the legislation  
of our own reason1 it also contains     
something elevating1 and this subjective
 effect on feeling1 inasmuch as pure    
practical reason is the sole cause of   
it1 may be called in this respect       
self-approbation1 since we recognize    
ourselves as determined thereto solely  
by the law without any interest1 and are
 now conscious of a quite different     
interest subjectively produced thereby1 
and which is purely practical and free2 
and our taking this interest in an      
action of duty is not suggested by any  
inclination1 but is commanded and       
actually brought about by reason through
 the practical law2 whence this feeling 

obtains a special name1 that of respect4
                                        
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #ae  ,the
 notion of duty1 therefore1 requires in 
the action1 objectively1 agreement with 
the law1 and1 subjectively in its maxim1
 that respect for the law shall be the  
sole mode in which the will is          
determined thereby4 ,and on this rests  
the distinction between the             
consciousness of having acted according 
to duty and from duty1 that is1 from    
respect for the law4 ,the former        
7legality7 is possible even if          
inclinations have been the determining  
principles of the will2 but the latter  
7morality71 moral worth1 can be placed  
only in this1 that the action is done   
from duty1 that is1 simply for the sake 
of the law4 99    99 ,if we examine     
accurately the notion of respect for    
persons as it has been already laid     
down1 we shall perceive that it always  
rests on the consciousness of a duty    
which an example shows us1 and that     

respect1 therefore1 can never have any  
but a moral ground1 and that it is very 
good and even1 in a psychological point 
of view1 very useful for the knowledge  
of mankind1 that whenever we use this   
expression we should attend to this     
secret and marvellous1 yet often        
recurring1 regard which men in their    
judgement pay to the moral law4    ,it  
is of the greatest importance to attend 
with the utmost exactness in all moral  
judgements to the subjective principle  
of all maxims1 that all the morality of 
actions may be placed in the necessity  
of acting from duty and from respect for
 the law1 not from love and inclination 
for that which the actions are to       
produce4 ,for men and all created       
rational beings moral necessity is      
constraint1 that is obligation1 and     
every action based on it is to be       
conceived as a duty1 not as a proceeding
 previously pleasing1 or likely to be   
pleasing to us of our own accord4 ,as if
 indeed we could ever bring it about    

that without respect for the law1 which 
implies fear1 or at least apprehension  
of transgression1 we of ourselves1 like 
the independent ,deity1 could ever come 
into possession of holiness of will by  
the coincidence of our will with the    
pure moral law becoming as it were part 
of our nature1 never to be shaken 7in   
which case the law would cease to be a  
command for us1 as we could never be    
tempted to be untrue to it74            
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #bj  ,the
 moral law is in fact for the will of a 
perfect being a law of holiness1 but for
 the will of every finite rational being
 a law of duty1 of moral constraint1 and
 of the determination of its actions by 
respect for this law and reverence for  
its duty4 ,no other subjective principle
 must be assumed as a motive1 else while
 the action might chance to be such as  
the law prescribes1 yet1 as does not    
proceed from duty1 the intention1 which 
is the thing properly in question in    
this legislation1 is not moral4  ,it is 

a very beautiful thing to do good to men
 from love to them and from sympathetic 
good will1 or to be just from love of   
order2 but this is not yet the true     
moral maxim of our conduct which is     
suitable to our position amongst        
rational beings as men1 when we pretend 
with fanciful pride to set ourselves    
above the thought of duty1 like         
volunteers1 and1 as if we were          
independent on the command1 to want to  
do of our own good pleasure what we     
think we need no command to do4 ,we     
stand under a discipline of reason and  
in all our maxims must not forget our   
subjection to it1 nor withdraw anything 
therefrom1 or by an egotistic           
presumption diminish aught of the       
authority of the law 7although our own  
reason gives it7 so as to set the       
determining principle of our will1 even 
though the law be conformed to1 anywhere
 else but in the law itself and in      
respect for this law4 ,duty and         
obligation are the only names that we   

must give to our relation to the moral  
law4 ,we are indeed legislative members 
of a moral kingdom rendered possible by 
freedom1 and presented to us by reason  
as an object of respect2 but yet we are 
subjects in it1 not the sovereign1 and  
to mistake our inferior position as     
creatures1 and presumptuously to reject 
the authority of the moral law1 is      
already to revolt from it in spirit1    
even though the letter of it is         
fulfilled4  ,with this agrees very well 
the possibility of such a command as3   
,love ,god above everything1 and thy    
neighbour as thyself4 99 ,for as a      
command it requires respect for a law   
which commands love and does not leave  
it to our own arbitrary choice to make  
this our principle4 ,love to ,god1      
however1 considered as an inclination   
7pathological love71 is impossible1 for 
,he is not an object of the senses4 ,the
 same affection towards men is possible 
no doubt1 but cannot be commanded1 for  
it is not in the power of any man to    

love anyone at command2 therefore it is 
only practical love that is meant in    
that pith of all laws4 ,to love ,god    
means1 in this sense1 to like to do ,his
 commandments2 to love one's neighbour  
means to like to practise all duties    
towards him4 ,but the command that makes
 this a rule cannot command us to have  
this disposition in actions conformed to
 duty1 but only to endeavour after it4  
,for a command to like to do a thing is 
in itself contradictory1 because if we  
already know of ourselves what we are   
bound to do1 and if further we are      
conscious of liking to do it1 a command 
would be quite needless2 and if we do it
 not willingly1 but only out of respect 
for the law1 a command that makes this  
respect the motive of our maxim would   
directly counteract the disposition     
commanded4 ,that law of all laws1       
therefore1 like all the moral precepts  
of the ,gospel1 exhibits the moral      
disposition in all its perfection1 in   
which1 viewed as an ideal of holiness1  

it is not attainable by any creature1   
but yet is the pattern which we should  
strive to approach1 and in an           
uninterrupted but infinite progress     
become like to4 ,in fact1 if a rational 
creature could ever reach this point1   
that he thoroughly likes to do all moral
 laws1 this would mean that there does  
not exist in him even the possibility of
 a desire that would tempt him to       
deviate from them2 for to overcome such 
a desire always costs the subject some  
sacrifice and therefore requires        
self-compulsion1 that is1 inward        
constraint to something that one does   
not quite like to do2 and no creature   
can ever reach this stage of moral      
disposition4 ,for1 being a creature1 and
 therefore always dependent with respect
 to what he requires for complete       
satisfaction1 he can never be quite free
 from desires and inclinations1 and as  
these rest on physical causes1 they can 
never of themselves coincide with the   
moral law1 the sources of which are     

quite different2 and therefore they make
 it necessary to found the mental       
disposition of one's maxims on moral    
obligation1 not on ready inclination1   
but on respect1 which demands obedience 
to the law1 even though one may not like
 it2 not on love1 which apprehends no   
inward reluctance of the will towards   
the law4 ,nevertheless1 this latter1    
namely1 love to the law 7which would    
then cease to be a command1 and then    
morality1 which would have passed       
subjectively into holiness1 would cease 
to be virtue7 must be the constant      
though unattainable goal of his         
endeavours4 ,for in the case of what we 
highly esteem1 but yet 7on account of   
the consciousness of our weakness7      
dread1 the increased facility of        
satisfying it changes the most          
reverential awe into inclination1 and   
respect into love2 at least this would  
be the perfection of a disposition      
devoted to the law1 if it were possible 
for a creature to attain it4    99 ,this

 law is in striking contrast with the   
principle of private happiness which    
some make the supreme principle of      
morality4 ,this would be expressed thus3
 ,love thyself above everything1 and    
,god and thy neighbour for thine own    
sake4                                   
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #be      
,this reflection is intended not so much
 to clear up the evangelical command    
just cited1 in order to prevent         
religious fanaticism in regard to love  
of ,god1 but to define accurately the   
moral disposition with regard directly  
to our duties towards men1 and to check1
 or if possible prevent1 a merely moral 
fanaticism which infects many persons4  
,the stage of morality on which man     
7and1 as far as we can see1 every       
rational creature7 stands is respect for
 the moral law4 ,the disposition that he
 ought to have in obeying this is to    
obey it from duty1 not from spontaneous 
inclination1 or from an endeavour taken 
up from liking and unbidden2 and this   

proper moral condition in which he can  
always be is virtue1 that is1 moral     
disposition militant1 and not holiness  
in the fancied possession of a perfect  
purity of the disposition of the will4  
,it is nothing but moral fanaticism and 
exaggerated self-conceit that is infused
 into the mind by exhortation to actions
 as noble1 sublime1 and magnanimous1 by 
which men are led into the delusion that
 it is not duty1 that is1 respect for   
the law1 whose yoke 7an easy yoke       
indeed1 because reason itself imposes it
 on us7 they must bear1 whether they    
like it or not1 that constitutes the    
determining principle of their actions1 
and which always humbles them while they
 obey it2 fancying that those actions   
are expected from them1 not from duty1  
but as pure merit4 ,for not only would  
they1 in imitating such deeds from such 
a principle1 not have fulfilled the     
spirit of the law in the least1 which   
consists not in the legality of the     
action 7without regard to principle71   

but in the subjection of the mind to the
 law2 not only do they make the motives 
pathological 7seated in sympathy or     
self-love71 not moral 7in the law71 but 
they produce in this way a vain1        
high-flying1 fantastic way of thinking1 
flattering themselves with a spontaneous
 goodness of heart that needs neither   
spur nor bridle1 for which no command is
 needed1 and thereby forgetting their   
obligation1 which they ought to think of
 rather than merit4 ,indeed actions of  
others which are done with great        
sacrifice1 and merely for the sake of   
duty1 may be praised as noble and       
sublime1 but only so far as there are   
traces which suggest that they were done
 wholly out of respect for duty and not 
from excited feelings4 ,if these1       
however1 are set before anyone as       
examples to be imitated1 respect for    
duty 7which is the only true moral      
feeling7 must be employed as the motive-
 this severe holy precept which never   
allows our vain self-love to dally with 

pathological impulses 7however analogous
 they may be to morality71 and to take a
 pride in meritorious worth4 ,now if we 
search we shall find for all actions    
that are worthy of praise a law of duty 
which commands1 and does not leave us to
 choose what may be agreeable to our    
inclinations4 ,this is the only way of  
representing things that can give a     
moral training to the soul1 because it  
alone is capable of solid and accurately
 defined principles4  ,if fanaticism in 
its most general sense is a deliberate  
over stepping of the limits of human    
reason1 then moral fanaticism is such an
 over stepping of the bounds that       
practical pure reason sets to mankind1  
in that it forbids us to place the      
subjective determining principle of     
correct actions1 that is1 their moral   
motive1 in anything but the law itself1 
or to place the disposition which is    
thereby brought into the maxims in      
anything but respect for this law1 and  
hence commands us to take as the supreme

 vital principle of all morality in men 
the thought of duty1 which strikes down 
all arrogance as well as vain self-love4
  ,if this is so1 it is not only writers
 of romance or sentimental educators    
7although they may be zealous opponents 
of sentimentalism71 but sometimes even  
philosophers1 nay1 even the severest of 
all1 the ,stoics1 that have brought in  
moral fanaticism instead of a sober but 
wise moral discipline1 although the     
fanaticism of the latter was more       
heroic1 that of the former of an        
insipid1 effeminate character2 and we   
may1 without hypocrisy1 say of the moral
 teaching of the ,gospel1 that it first1
 by the purity of its moral principle1  
and at the same time by its suitability 
to the limitations of finite beings1    
brought all the good conduct of men     
under the discipline of a duty plainly  
set before their eyes1 which does not   
permit them to indulge in dreams of     
imaginary moral perfections2 and that it
 also set the bounds of humility 7that  

is1 self-knowledge7 to self-conceit as  
well as to self-love1 both which are    
ready to mistake their limits4  ,duty6  
,thou sublime and mighty name that dost 
embrace nothing charming or insinuating1
 but requirest submission1 and yet      
seekest not to move the will by         
threatening aught that would arouse     
natural aversion or terror1 but merely  
holdest forth a law which of itself     
finds entrance into the mind1 and yet   
gains reluctant reverence 7though not   
always obedience71 a law before which   
all inclinations are dumb1 even though  
they secretly counter-work it2 what     
origin is there worthy of thee1 and     
where is to be found the root of thy    
noble descent which proudly rejects all 
kindred with the inclinations2 a root to
 be derived from which is the           
indispensable condition of the only     
worth which men can give themselves8    
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #cj  ,it 
can be nothing less than a power which  
elevates man above himself 7as a part of

 the world of sense71 a power which     
connects him with an order of things    
that only the understanding can         
conceive1 with a world which at the same
 time commands the whole sensible world1
 and with it the empirically            
determinable existence of man in time1  
as well as the sum total of all ends    
7which totality alone suits such        
unconditional practical laws as the     
moral74 ,this power is nothing but      
personality1 that is1 freedom and       
independence on the mechanism of nature1
 yet1 regarded also as a faculty of a   
being which is subject to special laws1 
namely1 pure practical laws given by its
 own reason2 so that the person as      
belonging to the sensible world is      
subject to his own personality as       
belonging to the intelligible           
supersensible world4 ,it is then not to 
be wondered at that man1 as belonging to
 both worlds1 must regard his own nature
 in reference to its second and highest 
characteristic only with reverence1 and 

its laws with the highest respect4  ,on 
this origin are founded many expressions
 which designate the worth of objects   
according to moral ideas4 ,the moral law
 is holy 7inviolable74 ,man is indeed   
unholy enough1 but he must regard       
humanity in his own person as holy4 ,in 
all creation every thing one chooses and
 over which one has any power1 may be   
used merely as means2 man alone1 and    
with him every rational creature1 is an 
end in himself4 ,by virtue of the       
autonomy of his freedom he is the       
subject of the moral law1 which is holy4
 ,just for this reason every will1 even 
every person's own individual will1 in  
relation to itself1 is restricted to the
 condition of agreement with the        
autonomy of the rational being1 that is 
to say1 that it is not to be subject to 
any purpose which cannot accord with a  
law which might arise from the will of  
the passive subject himself2 the latter 
is1 therefore1 never to be employed     
merely as means1 but as itself also1    

concurrently1 an end4 ,we justly        
attribute this condition even to the    
,divine will1 with regard to the        
rational beings in the world1 which are 
,his creatures1 since it rests on their 
personality1 by which alone they are    
ends in themselves4  ,this              
respect-inspiring idea of personality   
which sets before our eyes the sublimity
 of our nature 7in its higher aspect71  
while at the same time it shows us the  
want of accord of our conduct with it   
and thereby strikes down self-conceit1  
is even natural to the commonest reason 
and easily observed4 ,has not every even
 moderately honourable man sometimes    
found that1 where by an otherwise       
inoffensive lie he might either have    
withdrawn himself from an unpleasant    
business1 or even have procured some    
advantages for a loved and              
well-deserving friend1 he has avoided it
 solely lest he should despise himself  
secretly in his own eyes8 ,when an      
upright man is in the greatest distress1

 which he might have avoided if he could
 only have disregarded duty1 is he not  
sustained by the consciousness that he  
has maintained humanity in its proper   
dignity in his own person and honoured  
it1 that he has no reason to be ashamed 
of himself in his own sight1 or to dread
 the inward glance of self-examination8 
,this consolation is not happiness1 it  
is not even the smallest part of it1 for
 no one would wish to have occasion for 
it1 or would1 perhaps1 even desire a    
life in such circumstances4 ,but he     
lives1 and he cannot endure that he     
should be in his own eyes unworthy of   
life4 ,this inward peace is therefore   
merely negative as regards what can make
 life pleasant2 it is1 in fact1 only the
 escaping the danger of sinking in      
personal worth1 after everything else   
that is valuable has been lost4 ,it is  
the effect of a respect for something   
quite different from life1 something in 
comparison and contrast with which life 
with all its enjoyment has no value4 ,he

 still lives only because it is his     
duty1 not because he finds anything     
pleasant in life4  ,such is the nature  
of the true motive of pure practical    
reason2 it is no other than the pure    
moral law itself1 inasmuch as it makes  
us conscious of the sublimity of our own
 supersensible existence and            
subjectively produces respect for their 
higher nature in men who are also       
conscious of their sensible existence   
and of the consequent dependence of     
their pathologically very susceptible   
nature4 ,now with this motive may be    
combined so many charms and             
satisfactions of life that even on this 
account alone the most prudent choice of
 a rational ,epicurean reflecting on the
 greatest advantage of life would       
declare itself on the side of moral     
conduct1 and it may even be advisable to
 join this prospect of a cheerful       
enjoyment of life with that supreme     
motive which is already sufficient of   
itself2 but only as a counterpoise to   

the attractions which vice does not fail
 to exhibit on the opposite side1 and   
not so as1 even in the smallest degree1 
to place in this the proper moving power
 when duty is in question4 ,for that    
would be just the same as to wish to    
taint the purity of the moral           
disposition in its source4 ,the majesty 
of duty has nothing to do with enjoyment
 of life2 it has its special law and its
 special tribunal1 and though the two   
should be never so well shaken together 
to be given well mixed1 like medicine1  
to the sick soul1 yet they will soon    
separate of themselves2 and if they do  
not1 the former will not act2 and       
although physical life might gain       
somewhat in force1 the moral life would 
fade away irrecoverably4                
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #ce      
,critical ,examination of the ,analytic 
of ,pure ,practical ,reason4    ,by the 
critical examination of a science1 or of
 a portion of it1 which constitutes a   
system by itself1 ,i understand the     

inquiry and proof why it must have this 
and no other systematic form1 when we   
compare it with another system which is 
based on a similar faculty of knowledge4
 ,now practical and speculative reason  
are based on the same faculty1 so far as
 both are pure reason4 ,therefore the   
difference in their systematic form must
 be determined by the comparison of     
both1 and the ground of this must be    
assigned4  ,the ,analytic of pure       
theoretic reason had to do with the     
knowledge of such objects as may have   
been given to the understanding1 and was
 obliged therefore to begin from        
intuition and consequently 7as this is  
always sensible7 from sensibility2 and  
only after that could advance to        
concepts 7of the objects of this        
intuition71 and could only end with     
principles after both these had         
preceded4 ,on the contrary1 since       
practical reason has not to do with     
objects so as to know them1 but with its
 own faculty of realizing them 7in      

accordance with the knowledge of them71 
that is1 with a will which is a         
causality1 inasmuch as reason contains  
its determining principle2 since1       
consequently1 it has not to furnish an  
object of intuition1 but as practical   
reason has to furnish only a law        
7because the notion of causality always 
implies the reference to a law which    
determines the existence of the many in 
relation to one another72 hence a       
critical examination of the ,analytic of
 reason1 if this is to be practical     
reason 7and this is properly the        
problem71 must begin with the           
possibility of practical principles a   
priori4 ,only after that can it proceed 
to concepts of the objects of a         
practical reason1 namely1 those of      
absolute good and evil1 in order to     
assign them in accordance with those    
principles 7for prior to those          
principles they cannot possibly be given
 as good and evil by any faculty of     
knowledge71 and only then could the     

section be concluded with the last      
chapter1 that1 namely1 which treats of  
the relation of the pure practical      
reason to the sensibility and of its    
necessary influence thereon1 which is a 
priori cognisable1 that is1 of the moral
 sentiment4 ,thus the ,analytic of the  
practical pure reason has the whole     
extent of the conditions of its use in  
common with the theoretical1 but in     
reverse order4 ,the ,analytic of pure   
theoretic reason was divided into       
transcendental ,aesthetic and           
transcendental ,logic1 that of the      
practical reversely into ,logic and     
,aesthetic of pure practical reason 7if 
,i may1 for the sake of analogy merely1 
use these designations1 which are not   
quite suitable74 ,this logic again was  
there divided into the ,analytic of     
concepts and that of principles3 here   
into that of principles and concepts4   
,the ,aesthetic also had in the former  
case two parts1 on account of the two   
kinds of sensible intuition2 here the   

sensibility is not considered as a      
capacity of intuition at all1 but merely
 as feeling 7which can be a subjective  
ground of desire71 and in regard to it  
pure practical reason admits no further 
division4  ,it is also easy to see the  
reason why this division into two parts 
with its subdivision was not actually   
adopted here 7as one might have been    
induced to attempt by the example of the
 former critique74 ,for since it is pure
 reason that is here considered in its  
practical use1 and consequently as      
proceeding from a priori principles1 and
 not from empirical principles of       
determination1 hence the division of the
 analytic of pure practical reason must 
resemble that of a syllogism2 namely1   
proceeding from the universal in the    
major premiss 7the moral principle71    
through a minor premiss containing a    
subsumption of possible actions 7as good
 or evil7 under the former1 to the      
conclusion1 namely1 the subjective      
determination of the will 7an interest  

in the possible practical good1 and in  
the maxim founded on it74 ,he who has   
been able to convince himself of the    
truth of the positions occurring in the 
,analytic will take pleasure in such    
comparisons2 for they justly suggest the
 expectation that we may perhaps some   
day be able to discern the unity of the 
whole faculty of reason 7theoretical as 
well as practical7 and be able to derive
 all from one principle1 which1 is what 
human reason inevitably demands1 as it  
finds complete satisfaction only in a   
perfectly systematic unity of its       
knowledge4                              
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #dj  ,if 
now we consider also the contents of the
 knowledge that we can have of a pure   
practical reason1 and by means of it1 as
 shown by the ,analytic1 we find1 along 
with a remarkable analogy between it and
 the theoretical1 no less remarkable    
differences4 ,as regards the            
theoretical1 the faculty of a pure      
rational cognition a priori could be    

easily and evidently proved by examples 
from sciences 7in which1 as they put    
their principles to the test in so many 
ways by methodical use1 there is not so 
much reason as in common knowledge to   
fear a secret mixture of empirical      
principles of cognition74 ,but1 that    
pure reason without the admixture of any
 empirical principle is practical of    
itself1 this could only be shown from   
the commonest practical use of reason1  
by verifying the fact1 that every man's 
natural reason acknowledges the supreme 
practical principle as the supreme law  
of his will- a law completely a priori  
and not depending on any sensible data4 
,it was necessary first to establish and
 verify the purity of its origin1 even  
in the judgement of this common reason1 
before science could take it in hand to 
make use of it1 as a fact1 that is1     
prior to all disputation about its      
possibility1 and all the consequences   
that may be drawn from it4 ,but this    
circumstance may be readily explained   

from what has just been said2 because   
practical pure reason must necessarily  
begin with principles1 which therefore  
must be the first data1 the foundation  
of all science1 and cannot be derived   
from it4 ,it was possible to effect this
 verification of moral principles as    
principles of a pure reason quite well1 
and with sufficient certainty1 by a     
single appeal to the judgement of common
 sense1 for this reason1 that anything  
empirical which might slip into our     
maxims as a determining principle of the
 will can be detected at once by the    
feeling of pleasure or pain which       
necessarily attaches to it as exciting  
desire2 whereas pure practical reason   
positively refuses to admit this feeling
 into its principle as a condition4 ,the
 heterogeneity of the determining       
principles 7the empirical and rational7 
is clearly detected by this resistance  
of a practically legislating reason     
against every admixture of inclination1 
and by a peculiar kind of sentiment1    

which1 however1 does not precede the    
legislation of the practical reason1    
but1 on the contrary1 is produced by    
this as a constraint1 namely1 by the    
feeling of a respect such as no man has 
for inclinations of whatever kind but   
for the law only2 and it is detected in 
so marked and prominent a manner that   
even the most uninstructed cannot fail  
to see at once in an example presented  
to him1 that empirical principles of    
volition may indeed urge him to follow  
their attractions1 but that he can never
 be expected to obey anything but the   
pure practical law of reason alone4     
,the distinction between the doctrine of
 happiness and the doctrine of morality1
 in the former of which empirical       
principles constitute the entire        
foundation1 while in the second they do 
not form the smallest part of it1 is the
 first and most important office of the 
,analytic of pure practical reason2 and 
it must proceed in it with as much      
exactness and1 so to speak1             

scrupulousness1 as any geometer in his  
work4 ,the philosopher1 however1 has    
greater difficulties to contend with    
here 7as always in rational cognition by
 means of concepts merely without       
construction71 because he cannot take   
any intuition as a foundation 7for a    
pure noumenon74 ,he has1 however1 this  
advantage that1 like the chemist1 he can
 at any time make an experiment with    
every man's practical reason for the    
purpose of distinguishing the moral     
7pure7 principle of determination from  
the empirical2 namely1 by adding the    
moral law 7as a determining principle7  
to the empirically affected will 7e4g41 
that of the man who would be ready to   
lie because he can gain something       
thereby74 ,it is as if the analyst added
 alkali to a solution of lime in        
hydrochloric acid1 the acid at once     
forsakes the lime1 combines with the    
alkali1 and the lime is precipitated4   
,just in the same way1 if to a man who  
is otherwise honest 7or who for this    

occasion places himself only in thought 
in the position of an honest man71 we   
present the moral law by which he       
recognises the worthlessness of the     
liar1 his practical reason 7in forming a
 judgement of what ought to be done7 at 
once forsakes the advantage1 combines   
with that which maintains in him respect
 for his own person 7truthfulness71 and 
the advantage after it has been         
separated and washed from every particle
 of reason 7which is altogether on the  
side of duty7 is easily weighed by      
everyone1 so that it can enter into     
combination with reason in other cases1 
only not where it could be opposed to   
the moral law1 which reason never       
forsakes1 but most closely unites itself
 with4  ,but it does not follow that    
this distinction between the principle  
of happiness and that of morality is an 
opposition between them1 and pure       
practical reason does not require that  
we should renounce all claim to         
happiness1 but only that the moment duty

 is in question we should take no       
account of happiness4 ,it may even in   
certain respects be a duty to provide   
for happiness2 partly1 because          
7including skill1 wealth1 riches7 it    
contains means for the fulfilment of our
 duty2 partly1 because the absence of it
 7e4g41 poverty7 implies temptations to 
transgress our duty4 ,but it can never  
be an immediate duty to promote our     
happiness1 still less can it be the     
principle of all duty4 ,now1 as all     
determining principles of the will1     
except the law of pure practical reason 
alone 7the moral law71 are all empirical
 and1 therefore1 as such1 belong to the 
principle of happiness1 they must all be
 kept apart from the supreme principle  
of morality and never be incorporated   
with it as a condition2 since this would
 be to destroy all moral worth just as  
much as any empirical admixture with    
geometrical principles would destroy the
 certainty of mathematical evidence1    
which in ,plato's opinion is the most   

excellent thing in mathematics1 even    
surpassing their utility4  ,instead1    
however1 of the deduction of the supreme
 principle of pure practical reason1    
that is1 the explanation of the         
possibility of such a knowledge a       
priori1 the utmost we were able to do   
was to show that if we saw the          
possibility of the freedom of an        
efficient cause1 we should also see not 
merely the possibility1 but even the    
necessity1 of the moral law as the      
supreme practical law of rational       
beings1 to whom we attribute freedom of 
causality of their will2 because both   
concepts are so inseparably united that 
we might define practical freedom as    
independence of the will on anything but
 the moral law4 ,but we cannot perceive 
the possibility of the freedom of an    
efficient cause1 especially in the world
 of sense2 we are fortunate if only we  
can be sufficiently assured that there  
is no proof of its impossibility1 and   
are now1 by the moral law which         

postulates it1 compelled and therefore  
authorized to assume it4 ,however1 there
 are still many who think that they can 
explain this freedom on empirical       
principles1 like any other physical     
faculty1 and treat it as a psychological
 property1 the explanation of which only
 requires a more exact study of the     
nature of the soul and of the motives of
 the will1 and not as a transcendental  
predicate of the causality of a being   
that belongs to the world of sense      
7which is really the point74 ,they thus 
deprive us of the grand revelation which
 we obtain through practical reason by  
means of the moral law1 the revelation1 
namely1 of a supersensible world by the 
realization of the otherwise            
transcendent concept of freedom1 and by 
this deprive us also of the moral law   
itself1 which admits no empirical       
principle of determination4 ,therefore  
it will be necessary to add something   
here as a protection against this       
delusion and to exhibit empiricism in   

its naked superficiality4  ,the notion  
of causality as physical necessity1 in  
opposition to the same notion as        
freedom1 concerns only the existence of 
things so far as it is determinable in  
time1 and1 consequently1 as phenomena1  
in opposition to their causality as     
things in themselves4 ,now if we take   
the attributes of existence of things in
 time for attributes of things in       
themselves 7which is the common view71  
then it is impossible to reconcile the  
necessity of the causal relation with   
freedom2 they are contradictory4 ,for   
from the former it follows that every   
event1 and consequently every action    
that takes place at a certain point of  
time1 is a necessary result of what     
existed in time preceding4 ,now as time 
past is no longer in my power1 hence    
every action that ,i perform must be the
 necessary result of certain determining
 grounds which are not in my power1 that
 is1 at the moment in which ,i am acting
 ,i am never free4 ,nay1 even if ,i     

assume that my whole existence is       
independent on any foreign cause 7for   
instance1 ,god71 so that the determining
 principles of my causality1 and even of
 my whole existence1 were not outside   
myself1 yet this would not in the least 
transform that physical necessity into  
freedom4 ,for at every moment of time ,i
 am still under the necessity of being  
determined to action by that which is   
not in my power1 and the series of      
events infinite a parte priori1 which ,i
 only continue according to a           
pre-determined order and could never    
begin of myself1 would be a continuous  
physical chain1 and therefore my        
causality would never be freedom4       
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #de  ,if1
 then1 we would attribute freedom to a  
being whose existence is determined in  
time1 we cannot except him from the law 
of necessity as to all events in his    
existence and1 consequently1 as to his  
actions also2 for that would be to hand 
him over to blind chance4 ,now as this  

law inevitably applies to all the       
causality of things1 so far as their    
existence is determinable in time1 it   
follows that if this were the mode in   
which we had also to conceive the       
existence of these things in themselves1
 freedom must be rejected as a vain and 
impossible conception4 ,consequently1 if
 we would still save it1 no other way   
remains but to consider that the        
existence of a thing1 so far as it is   
determinable in time1 and therefore its 
causality1 according to the law of      
physical necessity1 belong to           
appearance1 and to attribute freedom to 
the same being as a thing in itself4    
,this is certainly inevitable1 if we    
would retain both these contradictory   
concepts together2 but in application1  
when we try to explain their combination
 in one and the same action1 great      
difficulties present themselves which   
seem to render such a combination       
impracticable4  ,when ,i say of a man   
who commits a theft that1 by the law of 

causality1 this deed is a necessary     
result of the determining causes in     
preceding time1 then it was impossible  
that it could not have happened2 how    
then can the judgement1 according to the
 moral law1 make any change1 and suppose
 that it could have been omitted1       
because the law says that it ought to   
have been omitted2 that is1 how can a   
man be called quite free at the same    
moment1 and with respect to the same    
action in which he is subject to an     
inevitable physical necessity8 ,some try
 to evade this by saying that the causes
 that determine his causality are of    
such a kind as to agree with a          
comparative notion of freedom4          
,according to this1 that is sometimes   
called a free effect1 the determining   
physical cause of which lies within the 
acting thing itself1 e4g41 that which a 
projectile performs when it is in free  
motion1 in which case we use the word   
freedom1 because while it is in flight  
it is not urged by anything external2 or

 as we call the motion of a clock a free
 motion1 because it moves its hands     
itself1 which therefore do not require  
to be pushed by external force2 so      
although the actions of man are         
necessarily determined by causes which  
precede in time1 we yet call them free1 
because these causes are ideas produced 
by our own faculties1 whereby desires   
are evoked on occasion of circumstances1
 and hence actions are wrought according
 to our own pleasure4 ,this is a        
wretched subterfuge with which some     
persons still let themselves be put off1
 and so think they have solved1 with a  
petty word- jugglery1 that difficult    
problem1 at the solution of which       
centuries have laboured in vain1 and    
which can therefore scarcely be found so
 completely on the surface4 ,in fact1 in
 the question about the freedom which   
must be the foundation of all moral laws
 and the consequent responsibility1 it  
does not matter whether the principles  
which necessarily determine causality by

 a physical law reside within the       
subject or without him1 or in the former
 case whether these principles are      
instinctive or are conceived by reason1 
if1 as is admitted by these men         
themselves1 these determining ideas have
 the ground of their existence in time  
and in the antecedent state1 and this   
again in an antecedent1 etc4 ,then it   
matters not that these are internal2 it 
matters not that they have a            
psychological and not a mechanical      
causality1 that is1 produce actions by  
means of ideas and not by bodily        
movements2 they are still determining   
principles of the causality of a being  
whose existence is determinable in time1
 and therefore under the necessitation  
of conditions of past time1 which       
therefore1 when the subject has to act1 
are no longer in his power4 ,this may   
imply psychological freedom 7if we      
choose to apply this term to a merely   
internal chain of ideas in the mind71   
but it involves physical necessity and1 

therefore1 leaves no room for           
transcendental freedom1 which must be   
conceived as independence on everything 
empirical1 and1 consequently1 on nature 
generally1 whether it is an object of   
the internal sense considered in time   
only1 or of the external in time and    
space4 ,without this freedom 7in the    
latter and true sense71 which alone is  
practical a priori1 no moral law and no 
moral imputation are possible4 ,just for
 this reason the necessity of events in 
time1 according to the physical law of  
causality1 may be called the mechanism  
of nature1 although we do not mean by   
this that things which are subject to it
 must be really material machines4 ,we  
look here only to the necessity of the  
connection of events in a time-series as
 it is developed according to the       
physical law1 whether the subject in    
which this development takes place is   
called automaton materiale when the     
mechanical being is moved by matter1 or 
with ,leibnitz spirituale when it is    

impelled by ideas2 and if the freedom of
 our will were no other than the latter 
7say the psychological and comparative1 
not also transcendental1 that is1       
absolute71 then it would at bottom be   
nothing better than the freedom of a    
turnspit1 which1 when once it is wound  
up1 accomplishes its motions of itself4 
,now1 in order to remove in the supposed
 case the apparent contradiction between
 freedom and the mechanism of nature in 
one and the same action1 we must        
remember what was said in the ,critique 
of ,pure ,reason1 or what follows       
therefrom2 viz41 that the necessity of  
nature1 which cannot co-exist with the  
freedom of the subject1 appertains only 
to the attributes of the thing that is  
subject to time-conditions1 consequently
 only to those of the acting subject as 
a phenomenon2 that therefore in this    
respect the determining principles of   
every action of the same reside in what 
belongs to past time and is no longer in
 his power 7in which must be included   

his own past actions and the character  
that these may determine for him in his 
own eyes as a phenomenon74 ,but the very
 same subject1 being on the other side  
conscious of himself as a thing in      
himself1 considers his existence also in
 so far as it is not subject to         
time-conditions1 and regards himself as 
only determinable by laws which he gives
 himself through reason2 and in this his
 existence nothing is antecedent to the 
determination of his will1 but every    
action1 and in general every            
modification of his existence1 varying  
according to his internal sense1 even   
the whole series of his existence as a  
sensible being is in the consciousness  
of his supersensible existence nothing  
but the result1 and never to be regarded
 as the determining principle1 of his   
causality as a noumenon4 ,in this view  
now the rational being can justly say of
 every unlawful action that he performs1
 that he could very well have left it   
undone2 although as appearance it is    

sufficiently determined in the past1 and
 in this respect is absolutely          
necessary2 for it1 with all the past    
which determines it1 belongs to the one 
single phenomenon of his character which
 he makes for himself1 in consequence of
 which he imputes the causality of those
 appearances to himself as a cause      
independent on sensibility4  ,with this 
agree perfectly the judicial sentences  
of that wonderful faculty in us which we
 call conscience4 ,a man may use as much
 art as he likes in order to paint to   
himself an unlawful act1 that he        
remembers1 as an unintentional error1 a 
mere oversight1 such as one can never   
altogether avoid1 and therefore as      
something in which he was carried away  
by the stream of physical necessity1 and
 thus to make himself out innocent1 yet 
he finds that the advocate who speaks in
 his favour can by no means silence the 
accuser within1 if only he is conscious 
that at the time when he did this wrong 
he was in his senses1 that is1 in       

possession of his freedom2 and1         
nevertheless1 he accounts for his error 
from some bad habits1 which by gradual  
neglect of attention he has allowed to  
grow upon him to such a degree that he  
can regard his error as its natural     
consequence1 although this cannot       
protect him from the blame and reproach 
which he casts upon himself4 ,this is   
also the ground of repentance for a long
 past action at every recollection of   
it2 a painful feeling produced by the   
moral sentiment1 and which is           
practically void in so far as it cannot 
serve to undo what has been done4       
7,hence ,priestley1 as a true and       
consistent fatalist1 declares it absurd1
 and he deserves to be commended for    
this candour more than those who1 while 
they maintain the mechanism of the will 
in fact1 and its freedom in words only1 
yet wish it to be thought that they     
include it in their system of           
compromise1 although they do not explain
 the possibility of such moral          

imputation47 ,but the pain is quite     
legitimate1 because when the law of our 
intelligible supersensible existence    
7the moral law7 is in question1 reason  
recognizes no distinction of time1 and  
only asks whether the event belongs to  
me1 as my act1 and then always morally  
connects the same feeling with it1      
whether it has happened just now or long
 ago4 ,for in reference to the          
supersensible consciousness of its      
existence 7i4e41 freedom7 the life of   
sense is but a single phenomenon1 which1
 inasmuch as it contains merely         
manifestations of the mental disposition
 with regard to the moral law 7i4e41 of 
the character71 must be judged not      
according to the physical necessity that
 belongs to it as phenomenon1 but       
according to the absolute spontaneity of
 freedom4 ,it may therefore be admitted 
that1 if it were possible to have so    
profound an insight into a man's mental 
character as shown by internal as well  
as external actions as to know all its  

motives1 even the smallest1 and likewise
 all the external occasions that can    
influence them1 we could calculate a    
man's conduct for the future with as    
great certainty as a lunar or solar     
eclipse2 and nevertheless we may        
maintain that the man is free4 ,in fact1
 if we were capable of a further glance1
 namely1 an intellectual intuition of   
the same subject 7which indeed is not   
granted to us1 and instead of it we have
 only the rational concept71 then we    
should perceive that this whole chain of
 appearances in regard to all that      
concerns the moral laws depends on the  
spontaneity of the subject as a thing in
 itself1 of the determination of which  
no physical explanation can be given4   
,in default of this intuition1 the moral
 law assures us of this distinction     
between the relation of our actions as  
appearance to our sensible nature1 and  
the relation of this sensible nature to 
the supersensible substratum in us4 ,in 
this view1 which is natural to our      

reason1 though inexplicable1 we can also
 justify some judgements which we passed
 with all conscientiousness1 and which  
yet at first sight seem quite opposed to
 all equity4 ,there are cases in which  
men1 even with the same education which 
has been profitable to others1 yet show 
such early depravity1 and so continue to
 progress in it to years of manhood1    
that they are thought to be born        
villains1 and their character altogether
 incapable of improvement2 and          
nevertheless they are judged for what   
they do or leave undone1 they are       
reproached for their faults as guilty2  
nay1 they themselves 7the children7     
regard these reproaches as well founded1
 exactly as if in spite of the hopeless 
natural quality of mind ascribed to     
them1 they remained just as responsible 
as any other man4 ,this could not happen
 if we did not suppose that whatever    
springs from a man's choice 7as every   
action intentionally performed          
undoubtedly does7 has as its foundation 

a free causality1 which from early youth
 expresses its character in its         
manifestations 7i4e41 actions74 ,these1 
on account of the uniformity of conduct1
 exhibit a natural connection1 which    
however does not make the vicious       
quality of the will necessary1 but on   
the contrary1 is the consequence of the 
evil principles voluntarily adopted and 
unchangeable1 which only make it so much
 the more culpable and deserving of     
punishment4 ,there still remains a      
difficulty in the combination of freedom
 with the mechanism of nature in a being
 belonging to the world of sense2 a     
difficulty which1 even after all the    
foregoing is admitted1 threatens freedom
 with complete destruction4 ,but with   
this danger there is also a circumstance
 that offers hope of an issue still     
favourable to freedom2 namely1 that the 
same difficulty presses much more       
strongly 7in fact as we shall presently 
see1 presses only7 on the system that   
holds the existence determinable in time

 and space to be the existence of things
 in themselves2 it does not therefore   
oblige us to give up our capital        
supposition of the ideality of time as a
 mere form of sensible intuition1 and   
consequently as a mere manner of        
representation which is proper to the   
subject as belonging to the world of    
sense2 and therefore it only requires   
that this view be reconciled with this  
idea4  ,the difficulty is as follows3   
,even if it is admitted that the        
supersensible subject can be free with  
respect to a given action1 although1 as 
a subject also belonging to the world of
 sense1 he is under mechanical          
conditions with respect to the same     
action1 still1 as soon as we allow that 
,god as universal first cause is also   
the cause of the existence of substance 
7a proposition which can never be given 
up without at the same time giving up   
the notion of ,god as the ,being of all 
beings1 and therewith giving up his all 
sufficiency1 on which everything in     

theology depends71 it seems as if we    
must admit that a man's actions have    
their determining principle in something
 which is wholly out of his power-      
namely1 in the causality of a ,supreme  
,being distinct from himself and on whom
 his own existence and the whole        
determination of his causality are      
absolutely dependent4 ,in point of fact1
 if a man's actions as belonging to his 
modifications in time were not merely   
modifications of him as appearance1 but 
as a thing in itself1 freedom could not 
be saved4 ,man would be a marionette or 
an automaton1 like ,vaucanson's1        
prepared and wound up by the ,supreme   
,artist4 ,self-consciousness would      
indeed make him a thinking automaton2   
but the consciousness of his own        
spontaneity would be mere delusion if   
this were mistaken for freedom1 and it  
would deserve this name only in a       
comparative sense1 since1 although the  
proximate determining causes of its     
motion and a long series of their       

determining causes are internal1 yet the
 last and highest is found in a foreign 
hand4 ,therefore ,i do not see how those
 who still insist on regarding time and 
space as attributes belonging to the    
existence of things in themselves1 can  
avoid admitting the fatality of actions2
 or if 7like the otherwise acute        
,mendelssohn7 they allow them to be     
conditions necessarily belonging to the 
existence of finite and derived beings1 
but not to that of the infinite ,supreme
 ,being1 ,i do not see on what ground   
they can justify such a distinction1 or1
 indeed1 how they can avoid the         
contradiction that meets them1 when they
 hold that existence in time is an      
attribute necessarily belonging to      
finite things in themselves1 whereas    
,god is the cause of this existence1 but
 cannot be the cause of time 7or space7 
itself 7since this must be presupposed  
as a necessary a priori condition of the
 existence of things72 and consequently 
as regards the existence of these       

things4 ,his causality must be subject  
to conditions and even to the condition 
of time2 and this would inevitably bring
 in everything contradictory to the     
notions of ,his infinity and            
independence4 ,on the other hand1 it is 
quite easy for us to draw the           
distinction between the attribute of the
 divine existence of being independent  
on all time-conditions1 and that of a   
being of the world of sense1 the        
distinction being that between the      
existence of a being in itself and that 
of a thing in appearance4 ,hence1 if    
this ideality of time and space is not  
adopted1 nothing remains but ,spinozism1
 in which space and time are essential  
attributes of the ,supreme ,being       
,himself1 and the things dependent on   
,him 7ourselves1 therefore1 included7   
are not substances1 but merely accidents
 inhering in ,him2 since1 if these      
things as ,his effects exist in time    
only1 this being the condition of their 
existence in themselves1 then the       

actions of these beings must be simply  
,his actions which ,he performs in some 
place and time4 ,thus1 ,spinozism1 in   
spite of the absurdity of its           
fundamental idea1 argues more           
consistently than the creation theory   
can1 when beings assumed to be          
substances1 and beings in themselves    
existing in time1 are regarded as       
effects of a ,supreme ,cause1 and yet as
 not belonging to ,him and ,his action1 
but as separate substances4             
,,book#a;,,chapter#c paragraph #ej  ,the
 above-mentioned difficulty is resolved 
briefly and clearly as follows3 ,if     
existence in time is a mere sensible    
mode of representation belonging to     
thinking beings in the world and        
consequently does not apply to them as  
things in themselves1 then the creation 
of these beings is a creation of things 
in themselves1 since the notion of      
creation does not belong to the sensible
 form of representation of existence or 
to causality1 but can only be referred  

to noumena4 ,consequently1 when ,i say  
of beings in the world of sense that    
they are created1 ,i so far regard them 
as noumena4 ,as it would be a           
contradiction1 therefore1 to say that   
,god is a creator of appearances1 so    
also it is a contradiction to say that  
as creator ,he is the cause of actions  
in the world of sense1 and therefore as 
appearances1 although ,he is the cause  
of the existence of the acting beings   
7which are noumena74 ,if now it is      
possible to affirm freedom in spite of  
the natural mechanism of actions as     
appearances 7by regarding existence in  
time as something that belongs only to  
appearances1 not to things in           
themselves71 then the circumstance that 
the acting beings are creatures cannot  
make the slightest difference1 since    
creation concerns their supersensible   
and not their sensible existence1 and1  
therefore1 cannot be regarded as the    
determining principle of the            
appearances4 ,it would be quite         

different if the beings in the world as 
things in themselves existed in time1   
since in that case the creator of       
substance would be at the same time the 
author of the whole mechanism of this   
substance4  ,of so great importance is  
the separation of time 7as well as      
space7 from the existence of things in  
themselves which was effected in the    
,critique of the ,pure ,speculative     
,reason4  ,it may be said that the      
solution here proposed involves great   
difficulty in itself and is scarcely    
susceptible of a lucid exposition4 ,but 
is any other solution that has been     
attempted1 or that may be attempted1    
easier and more intelligible8 ,rather   
might we say that the dogmatic teachers 
of metaphysics have shown more          
shrewdness than candour in keeping this 
difficult point out of sight as much as 
possible1 in the hope that if they said 
nothing about it1 probably no one would 
think of it4 ,if science is to be       
advanced1 all difficulties must be laid 

open1 and we must even search for those 
that are hidden1 for every difficulty   
calls forth a remedy1 which cannot be   
discovered without science gaining      
either in extent or in exactness2 and   
thus even obstacles become means of     
increasing the thoroughness of science4 
,on the other hand1 if the difficulties 
are intentionally concealed1 or merely  
removed by palliatives1 then sooner or  
later they burst out into incurable     
mischiefs1 which bring science to ruin  
in an absolute scepticism4  ,since it   
is1 properly speaking1 the notion of    
freedom alone amongst all the ideas of  
pure speculative reason that so greatly 
enlarges our knowledge in the sphere of 
the supersensible1 though only of our   
practical knowledge1 ,i ask myself why  
it exclusively possesses so great       
fertility1 whereas the others only      
designate the vacant space for possible 
beings of the pure understanding1 but   
are unable by any means to define the   
concept of them4 ,i presently find that 

as ,i cannot think anything without a   
category1 ,i must first look for a      
category for the rational idea of       
freedom with which ,i am now concerned2 
and this is the category of causality2  
and although freedom1 a concept of the  
reason1 being a transcendent concept1   
cannot have any intuition corresponding 
to it1 yet the concept of the           
understanding- for the synthesis of     
which the former demands the            
unconditioned- 7namely1 the concept of  
causality7 must have a sensible         
intuition given1 by which first its     
objective reality is assured4 ,now1 the 
categories are all divided into two     
classes- the mathematical1 which concern
 the unity of synthesis in the          
conception of objects1 and the          
dynamical1 which refer to the unity of  
synthesis in the conception of the      
existence of objects4 ,the former 7those
 of magnitude and quality7 always       
contain a synthesis of the homogeneous1 
and it is not possible to find in this  

the unconditioned antecedent to what is 
given in sensible intuition as          
conditioned in space and time1 as this  
would itself have to belong to space and
 time1 and therefore be again still     
conditioned4 ,whence it resulted in the 
,dialectic of ,pure ,theoretic ,reason  
that the opposite methods of attaining  
the unconditioned and the totality of   
the conditions were both wrong4 ,the    
categories of the second class 7those of
 causality and of the necessity of a    
thing7 did not require this homogeneity 
7of the conditioned and the condition in
 synthesis71 since here what we have to 
explain is not how the intuition is     
compounded from a manifold in it1 but   
only how the existence of the           
conditioned object corresponding to it  
is added to the existence of the        
condition 7added1 namely1 in the        
understanding as connected therewith72  
and in that case it was allowable to    
suppose in the supersensible world the  
unconditioned antecedent to the         

altogether conditioned in the world of  
sense 7both as regards the causal       
connection and the contingent existence 
of things themselves71 although this    
unconditioned remained indeterminate1   
and to make the synthesis transcendent4 
,hence1 it was found in the ,dialectic  
of the ,pure ,speculative ,reason that  
the two apparently opposite methods of  
obtaining for the conditioned the       
unconditioned were not really           
contradictory1 e4g41 in the synthesis of
 causality to conceive for the          
conditioned in the series of causes and 
effects of the sensible world1 a        
causality which has no sensible         
condition1 and that the same action     
which1 as belonging to the world of     
sense1 is always sensibly conditioned1  
that is1 mechanically necessary1 yet at 
the same time may be derived from a     
causality not sensibly conditioned-     
being the causality of the acting being 
as belonging to the supersensible world-
 and may consequently be conceived as   

free4 ,now1 the only point in question  
was to change this may be into is2 that 
is1 that we should be able to show in an
 actual case1 as it were by a fact1 that
 certain actions imply such a causality 
7namely1 the intellectual1 sensibly     
unconditioned71 whether they are actual 
or only commanded1 that is1 objectively 
necessary in a practical sense4 ,we     
could not hope to find this connexion in
 actions actually given in experience as
 events of the sensible world1 since    
causality with freedom must always be   
sought outside the world of sense in the
 world of intelligence4 ,but things of  
sense are the only things offered to our
 perception and observation4 ,hence1    
nothing remained but to find an         
incontestable objective principle of    
causality which excludes all sensible   
conditions3 that is1 a principle in     
which reason does not appeal further to 
something else as a determining ground  
of its causality1 but contains this     
determining ground itself by means of   

that principle1 and in which therefore  
it is itself as pure reason practical4  
,now1 this principle had not to be      
searched for or discovered2 it had long 
been in the reason of all men1 and      
incorporated in their nature1 and is the
 principle of morality4 ,therefore1 that
 unconditioned causality1 with the      
faculty of it1 namely1 freedom1 is no   
longer merely indefinitely and          
problematically thought 7this           
speculative reason could prove to be    
feasible71 but is even as regards the   
law of its causality definitely and     
assertorially known2 and with it the    
fact that a being 7,i myself71 belonging
 to the world of sense1 belongs also to 
the supersensible world1 this is also   
positively known1 and thus the reality  
of the supersensible world is           
established and in practical respects   
definitely given1 and this definiteness1
 which for theoretical purposes would be
 transcendent1 is for practical purposes
 immanent4 ,we could not1 however1 make 

a similar step as regards the second    
dynamical idea1 namely1 that of a       
necessary being4 ,we could not rise to  
it from the sensible world without the  
aid of the first dynamical idea4 ,for if
 we attempted to do so1 we should have  
ventured to leave at a bound all that is
 given to us1 and to leap to that of    
which nothing is given us that can help 
us to effect the connection of such a   
supersensible being with the world of   
sense 7since the necessary being would  
have to be known as given outside       
ourselves74 ,on the other hand1 it is   
now obvious that this connection is     
quite possible in relation to our own   
subject1 inasmuch as ,i know myself to  
be on the one side as an intelligible   
supersensible being determined by the   
moral law 7by means of freedom71 and on 
the other side as acting in the world of
 sense4 ,it is the concept of freedom   
alone that enables us to find the       
unconditioned and intelligible for the  
conditioned and sensible without going  

out of ourselves4 ,for it is our own    
reason that by means of the supreme and 
unconditional practical law knows that  
itself and the being that is conscious  
of this law 7our own person7 belong to  
the pure world of understanding1 and    
moreover defines the manner in which1 as
 such1 it can be active4 ,in this way it
 can be understood why in the whole     
faculty of reason it is the practical   
reason only that can help us to pass    
beyond the world of sense and give us   
knowledge of a supersensible order and  
connection1 which1 however1 for this    
very reason cannot be extended further  
than is necessary for pure practical    
purposes4  ,let me be permitted on this 
occasion to make one more remark1       
namely1 that every step that we make    
with pure reason1 even in the practical 
sphere where no attention is paid to    
subtle speculation1 nevertheless accords
 with all the material points of the    
,critique of the ,theoretical ,reason as
 closely and directly as if each step   

had been thought out with deliberate    
purpose to establish this confirmation4 
,such a thorough agreement1 wholly      
unsought for and quite obvious 7as      
anyone can convince himself1 if he will 
only carry moral inquiries up to their  
principles71 between the most important 
proposition of practical reason and the 
often seemingly too subtle and needless 
remarks of the ,critique of the         
,speculative ,reason1 occasions surprise
 and astonishment1 and confirms the     
maxim already recognized and praised by 
others1 namely1 that in every scientific
 inquiry we should pursue our way       
steadily with all possible exactness and
 frankness1 without caring for any      
objections that may be raised from      
outside its sphere1 but1 as far as we   
can1 to carry out our inquiry truthfully
 and completely by itself4 ,frequent    
observation has convinced me that1 when 
such researches are concluded1 that     
which in one part of them appeared to me
 very questionable1 considered in       

relation to other extraneous doctrines1 
when ,i left this doubtfulness out of   
sight for a time and only attended to   
the business in hand until it was       
completed1 at last was unexpectedly     
found to agree perfectly with what had  
been discovered separately without the  
least regard to those doctrines1 and    
without any partiality or prejudice for 
them4 ,authors would save themselves    
many errors and much labour lost        
7because spent on a delusion7 if they   
could only resolve to go to work with   
more frankness4  ,,book#b;,,chapter#a   
,,book ,,ii4 ,dialectic of ,pure        
,practical ,reason4    ,,chapter ,i4 ,of
 a ,dialectic of ,pure ,practical       
,reason ,generally4    ,pure reason     
always has its dialetic1 whether it is  
considered in its speculative or its    
practical employment2 for it requires   
the absolute totality of the 'conditions
 of what is given conditioned1 and this 
can only be found in things in          
themselves4 ,but as all conceptions of  

things in themselves must be referred to
 intuitions1 and with us men these can  
never be other than sensible and hence  
can never enable us to know objects as  
things in themselves but only as        
appearances1 and since the unconditioned
 can never be found in this chain of    
appearances which consists only of      
conditioned and conditions2 thus from   
applying this rational idea of the      
totality of the conditions 7in other    
words of the unconditioned7 to          
appearances1 there arises an inevitable 
illusion1 as if these latter were things
 in themselves 7for in the absence of a 
warning critique they are always        
regarded as such74 ,this illusion would 
never be noticed as delusive if it did  
not betray itself by a conflict of      
reason with itself1 when it applies to  
appearances its fundamental principle of
 presupposing the unconditioned to      
everything conditioned4 ,by this1       
however1 reason is compelled to trace   
this illusion to its source1 and search 

how it can be removed1 and this can only
 be done by a complete critical         
examination of the whole pure faculty of
 reason2 so that the antinomy of the    
pure reason which is manifest in its    
dialectic is in fact the most beneficial
 error into which human reason could    
ever have fallen1 since it at last      
drives us to search for the key to      
escape from this labyrinth2 and when    
this key is found1 it further discovers 
that which we did not seek but yet had  
need of1 namely1 a view into a higher   
and an immutable order of things1 in    
which we even now are1 and in which we  
are thereby enabled by definite precepts
 to continue to live according to the   
highest dictates of reason4  ,it may be 
seen in detail in the ,critique of ,pure
 ,reason how in its speculative         
employment this natural dialectic is to 
be solved1 and how the error which      
arises from a very natural illusion may 
be guarded against4 ,but reason in its  
practical use is not a whit better off4 

,as pure practical reason1 it likewise  
seeks to find the unconditioned for the 
practically conditioned 7which rests on 
inclinations and natural wants71 and    
this is not as the determining principle
 of the will1 but even when this is     
given 7in the moral law7 it seeks the   
unconditioned totality of the object of 
pure practical reason under the name of 
the summum bonum4  ,to define this idea 
practically1 i4e41 sufficiently for the 
maxims of our rational conduct1 is the  
business of practical wisdom1 and this  
again as a science is philosophy1 in the
 sense in which the word was understood 
by the ancients1 with whom it meant     
instruction in the conception in which  
the summum bonum was to be placed1 and  
the conduct by which it was to be       
obtained4 ,it would be well to leave    
this word in its ancient signification  
as a doctrine of the summum bonum1 so   
far as reason endeavours to make this   
into a science4 ,for on the one hand the
 restriction annexed would suit the     

,greek expression 7which signifies the  
love of wisdom71 and yet at the same    
time would be sufficient to embrace     
under the name of philosophy the love of
 science3 that is to say1 of all        
speculative rational knowledge1 so far  
as it is serviceable to reason1 both for
 that conception and also for the       
practical principle determining our     
conduct1 without letting out of sight   
the main end1 on account of which alone 
it can be called a doctrine of practical
 wisdom4 ,on the other hand1 it would be
 no harm to deter the self-conceit of   
one who ventures to claim the title of  
philosopher by holding before him in the
 very definition a standard of          
self-estimation which would very much   
lower his pretensions4 ,for a teacher of
 wisdom would mean something more than a
 scholar who has not come so far as to  
guide himself1 much less to guide       
others1 with certain expectation of     
attaining so high an end3 it would mean 
a master in the knowledge of wisdom1    

which implies more than a modest man    
would claim for himself4 ,thus          
philosophy as well as wisdom would      
always remain an ideal1 which           
objectively is presented complete in    
reason alone1 while subjectively for the
 person it is only the goal of his      
unceasing endeavours2 and no one would  
be justified in professing to be in     
possession of it so as to assume the    
name of philosopher who could not also  
show its infallible effects in his own  
person as an example 7in his            
self-mastery and the unquestioned       
interest that he takes pre-eminently in 
the general good71 and this the ancients
 also required as a condition of        
deserving that honourable title4        
,,book#b;,,chapter#a paragraph #e  ,we  
have another preliminary remark to make 
respecting the dialectic of the pure    
practical reason1 on the point of the   
definition of the summum bonum 7a       
successful solution of which dialectic  
would lead us to expect1 as in case of  

that of the theoretical reason1 the most
 beneficial effects1 inasmuch as the    
self-contradictions of pure practical   
reason honestly stated1 and not         
concealed1 force us to undertake a      
complete critique of this faculty74     
,the moral law is the sole determining  
principle of a pure will4 ,but since    
this is merely formal 7viz41 as         
prescribing only the form of the maxim  
as universally legislative71 it         
abstracts as a determining principle    
from all matter that is to say1 from    
every object of volition4 ,hence1 though
 the summum bonum may be the whole      
object of a pure practical reason1 i4e41
 a pure will1 yet it is not on that     
account to be regarded as its           
determining principle2 and the moral law
 alone must be regarded as the principle
 on which that and its realization or   
promotion are aimed at4 ,this remark is 
important in so delicate a case as the  
determination of moral principles1 where
 the slightest misinterpretation        

perverts men's minds4 ,for it will have 
been seen from the ,analytic that1 if we
 assume any object under the name of a  
good as a determining principle of the  
will prior to the moral law and then    
deduce from it the supreme practical    
principle1 this would always introduce  
heteronomy and crush out the moral      
principle4  ,it is1 however1 evident    
that if the notion of the summum bonum  
includes that of the moral law as its   
supreme condition1 then the summum bonum
 would not merely be an object1 but the 
notion of it and the conception of its  
existence as possible by our own        
practical reason would likewise be the  
determining principle of the will1 since
 in that case the will is in fact       
determined by the moral law which is    
already included in this conception1 and
 by no other object1 as the principle of
 autonomy requires4 ,this order of the  
conceptions of determination of the will
 must not be lost sight of1 as otherwise
 we should misunderstand ourselves and  

think we had fallen into a              
contradiction1 while everything remains 
in perfect harmony4                     
,,book#b;,,chapter#b    ,,chapter ,,ii4 
,of the ,dialectic of ,pure ,reason in  
defining the              ,conception of
 the ,summum ,bonum4    ,the conception 
of the summum itself contains an        
ambiguity which might occasion needless 
disputes if we did not attend to it4    
,the summum may mean either the supreme 
7supremum7 or the perfect 7consummatum74
 ,the former is that condition which is 
itself unconditioned1 i4e41 is not      
subordinate to any other 7originarium72 
the second is that whole which is not a 
part of a greater whole of the same kind
 7perfectissimum74 ,it has been shown in
 the ,analytic that virtue 7as          
worthiness to be happy7 is the supreme  
condition of all that can appear to us  
desirable1 and consequently of all our  
pursuit of happiness1 and is therefore  
the supreme good4 ,but it does not      
follow that it is the whole and perfect 

good as the object of the desires of    
rational finite beings2 for this        
requires happiness also1 and that not   
merely in the partial eyes of the person
 who makes himself an end1 but even in  
the judgement of an impartial reason1   
which regards persons in general as ends
 in themselves4 ,for to need happiness1 
to deserve it1 and yet at the same time 
not to participate in it1 cannot be     
consistent with the perfect volition of 
a rational being possessed at the same  
time of all power1 if1 for the sake of  
experiment1 we conceive such a being4   
,now inasmuch as virtue and happiness   
together constitute the possession of   
the summum bonum in a person1 and the   
distribution of happiness in exact      
proportion to morality 7which is the    
worth of the person1 and his worthiness 
to be happy7 constitutes the summum     
bonum of a possible world2 hence this   
summum bonum expresses the whole1 the   
perfect good1 in which1 however1 virtue 
as the condition is always the supreme  

good1 since it has no condition above   
it2 whereas happiness1 while it is      
pleasant to the possessor of it1 is not 
of itself absolutely and in all respects
 good1 but always presupposes morally   
right behaviour as its condition4  ,when
 two elements are necessarily united in 
one concept1 they must be connected as  
reason and consequence1 and this either 
so that their unity is considered as    
analytical 7logical connection71 or as  
synthetical 7real connection7 the former
 following the law of identity1 the     
latter that of causality4 ,the          
connection of virtue and happiness may  
therefore be understood in two ways3    
either the endeavour to be virtuous and 
the rational pursuit of happiness are   
not two distinct actions1 but absolutely
 identical1 in which case no maxim need 
be made the principle of the former1    
other than what serves for the latter2  
or the connection consists in this1 that
 virtue produces happiness as something 
distinct from the consciousness of      

virtue1 as a cause produces an effect4  
,the ancient ,greek schools were1       
properly speaking1 only two1 and in     
determining the conception of the summum
 bonum these followed in fact one and   
the same method1 inasmuch as they did   
not allow virtue and happiness to be    
regarded as two distinct elements of the
 summum bonum1 and consequently sought  
the unity of the principle by the rule  
of identity2 but they differed as to    
which of the two was to be taken as the 
fundamental notion4 ,the ,epicurean     
said3 ,to be conscious that one's maxims
 lead to happiness is virtue2 the ,stoic
 said3 ,to be conscious of one's virtue 
is happiness4 ,with the former1         
,prudence was equivalent to morality2   
with the latter1 who chose a higher     
designation for virtue1 morality alone  
was true wisdom4  ,while we must admire 
the men who in such early times tried   
all imaginable ways of extending the    
domain of philosophy1 we must at the    
same time lament that their acuteness   

was unfortunately misapplied in trying  
to trace out identity between two       
extremely heterogeneous notions1 those  
of happiness and virtue4 ,but it agrees 
with the dialectical spirit of their    
times 7and subtle minds are even now    
sometimes misled in the same way7 to get
 rid of irreconcilable differences in   
principle by seeking to change them into
 a mere contest about words1 and thus   
apparently working out the identity of  
the notion under different names1 and   
this usually occurs in cases where the  
combination of heterogeneous principles 
lies so deep or so high1 or would       
require so complete a transformation of 
the doctrines assumed in the rest of the
 philosophical system1 that men are     
afraid to penetrate deeply into the real
 difference and prefer treating it as a 
difference in questions of form4        
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #e       
,while both schools sought to trace out 
the identity of the practical principles
 of virtue and happiness1 they were not 

agreed as to the way in which they tried
 to force this identity1 but were       
separated infinitely from one another1  
the one placing its principle on the    
side of sense1 the other on that of     
reason2 the one in the consciousness of 
sensible wants1 the other in the        
independence of practical reason on all 
sensible grounds of determination4      
,according to the ,epicurean1 the notion
 of virtue was already involved in the  
maxim3 ,to promote one's own happiness2 
according to the ,stoics1 on the other  
hand1 the feeling of happiness was      
already contained in the consciousness  
of virtue4 ,now whatever is contained in
 another notion is identical with part  
of the containing notion1 but not with  
the whole1 and moreover two wholes may  
be specifically distinct1 although they 
consist of the same parts2 namely if the
 parts are united into a whole in       
totally different ways4 ,the ,stoic     
maintained that the virtue was the whole
 summum bonum1 and happiness only the   

consciousness of possessing it1 as      
making part of the state of the subject4
 ,the ,epicurean maintained that        
happiness was the whole summum bonum1   
and virtue only the form of the maxim   
for its pursuit2 viz41 the rational use 
of the means for attaining it4  ,now it 
is clear from the ,analytic that the    
maxims of virtue and those of private   
happiness are quite heterogeneous as to 
their supreme practical principle1 and1 
although they belong to one summum bonum
 which together they make possible1 yet 
they are so far from coinciding that    
they restrict and check one another very
 much in the same subject4 ,thus the    
question3 ,how is the summum bonum      
practically possible8 still remains an  
unsolved problem1 notwithstanding all   
the attempts at coalition that have     
hitherto been made4 ,the ,analytic has1 
however1 shown what it is that makes the
 problem difficult to solve2 namely1    
that happiness and morality are two     
specifically distinct elements of the   

summum bonum and1 therefore1 their      
combination cannot be analytically      
cognised 7as if the man that seeks his  
own happiness should find by mere       
analysis of his conception that in so   
acting he is virtuous1 or as if the man 
that follows virtue should in the       
consciousness of such conduct find that 
he is already happy ipso facto71 but    
must be a synthesis of concepts4 ,now   
since this combination is recognised as 
a priori1 and therefore as practically  
necessary1 and consequently not as      
derived from experience1 so that the    
possibility of the summum bonum does not
 rest on any empirical principle1 it    
follows that the deduction legitimation 
of this concept must be transcendental4 
,it is a priori 7morally7 necessary to  
produce the summum bonum by freedom of  
will3 therefore the condition of its    
possibility must rest solely on a priori
 principles of cognition4            ,i4
 ,the ,antinomy of ,practical ,reason4  
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #aj  ,in 

the summum bonum which is practical for 
us1 i4e41 to be realized by our will1   
virtue and happiness are thought as     
necessarily combined1 so that the one   
cannot be assumed by pure practical     
reason without the other also being     
attached to it4 ,now this combination   
7like every other7 is either analytical 
or synthetical4 ,it has been shown that 
it cannot be analytical2 it must then be
 synthetical and1 more particularly1    
must be conceived as the connection of  
cause and effect1 since it concerns a   
practical good1 i4e41 one that is       
possible by means of action2            
consequently either the desire of       
happiness must be the motive to maxims  
of virtue1 or the maxim of virtue must  
be the efficient cause of happiness4    
,the first is absolutely impossible1    
because 7as was proved in the ,analytic7
 maxims which place the determining     
principle of the will in the desire of  
personal happiness are not moral at all1
 and no virtue can be founded on them4  

,but the second is also impossible1     
because the practical connection of     
causes and effects in the world1 as the 
result of the determination of the will1
 does not depend upon the moral         
dispositions of the will1 but on the    
knowledge of the laws of nature and the 
physical power to use them for one's    
purposes2 consequently we cannot expect 
in the world by the most punctilious    
observance of the moral laws any        
necessary connection of happiness with  
virtue adequate to the summum bonum4    
,now1 as the promotion of this summum   
bonum1 the conception of which contains 
this connection1 is a priori a necessary
 object of our will and inseparably     
attached to the moral law1 the          
impossibility of the former must prove  
the falsity of the latter4 ,if then the 
supreme good is not possible by         
practical rules1 then the moral law also
 which commands us to promote it is     
directed to vain imaginary ends and must
 consequently be false4     ,,ii4       

,critical ,solution of the ,antinomy of 
,practical ,reason4    ,the antinomy of 
pure speculative reason exhibits a      
similar conflict between freedom and    
physical necessity in the causality of  
events in the world4 ,it was solved by  
showing that there is no real           
contradiction when the events and even  
the world in which they occur are       
regarded 7as they ought to be7 merely as
 appearances2 since one and the same    
acting being1 as an appearance 7even to 
his own inner sense71 has a causality in
 the world of sense that always conforms
 to the mechanism of nature1 but with   
respect to the same events1 so far as   
the acting person regards himself at the
 same time as a noumenon 7as pure       
intelligence in an existence not        
dependent on the condition of time71 he 
can contain a principle by which that   
causality acting according to laws of   
nature is determined1 but which is      
itself free from all laws of nature4    
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ae  ,it 

is just the same with the foregoing     
antinomy of pure practical reason4 ,the 
first of the two propositions1 ,that the
 endeavour after happiness produces a   
virtuous mind1 is absolutely false2 but 
the second1 ,that a virtuous mind       
necessarily produces happiness1 is not  
absolutely false1 but only in so far as 
virtue is considered as a form of       
causality in the sensible world1 and    
consequently only if ,i suppose         
existence in it to be the only sort of  
existence of a rational being2 it is    
then only conditionally false4 ,but as  
,i am not only justified in thinking    
that ,i exist also as a noumenon in a   
world of the understanding1 but even    
have in the moral law a purely          
intellectual determining principle of my
 causality 7in the sensible world71 it  
is not impossible that morality of mind 
should have a connection as cause with  
happiness 7as an effect in the sensible 
world7 if not immediate yet mediate     
7viz41 through an intelligent author of 

nature71 and moreover necessary2 while  
in a system of nature which is merely an
 object of the senses1 this combination 
could never occur except contingently   
and1 therefore1 could not suffice for   
the summum bonum4  ,thus1               
notwithstanding this seeming conflict of
 practical reason with itself1 the      
summum bonum1 which is the necessary    
supreme end of a will morally           
determined1 is a true object thereof2   
for it is practically possible1 and the 
maxims of the will which as regards     
their matter refer to it have objective 
reality1 which at first was threatened  
by the antinomy that appeared in the    
connection of morality with happiness by
 a general law2 but this was merely from
 a misconception1 because the relation  
between appearances was taken for a     
relation of the things in themselves to 
these appearances4  ,when we find       
ourselves obliged to go so far1 namely1 
to the connection with an intelligible  
world1 to find the possibility of the   

summum bonum1 which reason points out to
 all rational beings as the goal of all 
their moral wishes1 it must seem strange
 that1 nevertheless1 the philosophers   
both of ancient and modern times have   
been able to find happiness in accurate 
proportion to virtue even in this life  
7in the sensible world71 or have        
persuaded themselves that they were     
conscious thereof4 ,for ,epicurus as    
well as the ,stoics extolled above      
everything the happiness that springs   
from the consciousness of living        
virtuously2 and the former was not so   
base in his practical precepts as one   
might infer from the principles of his  
theory1 which he used for explanation   
and not for action1 or as they were     
interpreted by many who were misled by  
his using the term pleasure for         
contentment2 on the contrary1 he        
reckoned the most disinterested practice
 of good amongst the ways of enjoying   
the most intimate delight1 and his      
scheme of pleasure 7by which he meant   

constant cheerfulness of mind7 included 
the moderation and control of the       
inclinations1 such as the strictest     
moral philosopher might require4 ,he    
differed from the ,stoics chiefly in    
making this pleasure the motive1 which  
they very rightly refused to do4 ,for1  
on the one hand1 the virtuous ,epicurus1
 like many well-intentioned men of this 
day who do not reflect deeply enough on 
their principles1 fell into the error of
 presupposing the virtuous disposition  
in the persons for whom he wished to    
provide the springs to virtue 7and      
indeed the upright man cannot be happy  
if he is not first conscious of his     
uprightness2 since with such a character
 the reproach that his habit of thought 
would oblige him to make against himself
 in case of transgression and his moral 
self-condemnation would rob him of all  
enjoyment of the pleasantness which his 
condition might otherwise contain74 ,but
 the question is3 ,how is such a        
disposition possible in the first       

instance1 and such a habit of thought in
 estimating the worth of one's          
existence1 since prior to it there can  
be in the subject no feeling at all for 
moral worth8 ,if a man is virtuous      
without being conscious of his integrity
 in every action1 he will certainly not 
enjoy life1 however favourable fortune  
may be to him in its physical           
circumstances2 but can we make him      
virtuous in the first instance1 in other
 words1 before he esteems the moral     
worth of his existence so highly1 by    
praising to him the peace of mind that  
would result from the consciousness of  
an integrity for which he has no sense8 
,on the other hand1 however1 there is   
here an occasion of a vitium            
subreptionis1 and as it were of an      
optical illusion1 in the                
self-consciousness of what one does as  
distinguished from what one feels- an   
illusion which even the most experienced
 cannot altogether avoid4 ,the moral    
disposition of mind is necessarily      

combined with a consciousness that the  
will is determined directly by the law4 
,now the consciousness of a             
determination of the faculty of desire  
is always the source of a satisfaction  
in the resulting action2 but this       
pleasure1 this satisfaction in oneself1 
is not the determining principle of the 
action2 on the contrary1 the            
determination of the will directly by   
reason is the source of the feeling of  
pleasure1 and this remains a pure       
practical not sensible determination of 
the faculty of desire4 ,now as this     
determination has exactly the same      
effect within in impelling to activity1 
that a feeling of the pleasure to be    
expected from the desired action would  
have had1 we easily look on what we     
ourselves do as something which we      
merely passively feel1 and take the     
moral spring for a sensible impulse1    
just as it happens in the so-called     
illusion of the senses 7in this case the
 inner sense74 ,it is a sublime thing in

 human nature to be determined to       
actions immediately by a purely rational
 law2 sublime even is the illusion that 
regards the subjective side of this     
capacity of intellectual determination  
as something sensible and the effect of 
a special sensible feeling 7for an      
intellectual feeling would be a         
contradiction74 ,it is also of great    
importance to attend to this property of
 our personality and as much as possible
 to cultivate the effect of reason on   
this feeling4 ,but we must beware lest  
by falsely extolling this moral         
determining principle as a spring1      
making its source lie in particular     
feelings of pleasure 7which are in fact 
only results71 we degrade and disfigure 
the true genuine spring1 the law itself1
 by putting as it were a false foil upon
 it4 ,respect1 not pleasure or enjoyment
 of happiness1 is something for which it
 is not possible that reason should have
 any antecedent feeling as its          
foundation 7for this would always be    

sensible and pathological72 and         
consciousness of immediate obligation of
 the will by the law is by no means     
analogous to the feeling of pleasure1   
although in relation to the faculty of  
desire it produces the same effect1 but 
from different sources3 it is only by   
this mode of conception1 however1 that  
we can attain what we are seeking1      
namely1 that actions be done not merely 
in accordance with duty 7as a result of 
pleasant feelings71 but from duty1 which
 must be the true end of all moral      
cultivation4  ,have we not1 however1 a  
word which does not express enjoyment1  
as happiness does1 but indicates a      
satisfaction in one's existence1 an     
analogue of the happiness which must    
necessarily accompany the consciousness 
of virtue8 ,yes this word is            
self-contentment which in its proper    
signification always designates only a  
negative satisfaction in one's          
existence1 in which one is conscious of 
needing nothing4 ,freedom and the       

consciousness of it as a faculty of     
following the moral law with unyielding 
resolution is independence of           
inclinations1 at least as motives       
determining 7though not as affecting7   
our desire1 and so far as ,i am         
conscious of this freedom in following  
my moral maxims1 it is the only source  
of an unaltered contentment which is    
necessarily connected with it and rests 
on no special feeling4 ,this may be     
called intellectual contentment4 ,the   
sensible contentment 7improperly        
so-called7 which rests on the           
satisfaction of the inclinations1       
however delicate they may be imagined to
 be1 can never be adequate to the       
conception of it4 ,for the inclinations 
change1 they grow with the indulgence   
shown them1 and always leave behind a   
still greater void than we had thought  
to fill4 ,hence they are always         
burdensome to a rational being1 and1    
although he cannot lay them aside1 they 
wrest from him the wish to be rid of    

them4 ,even an inclination to what is   
right 7e4g41 to beneficence71 though it 
may much facilitate the efficacy of the 
moral maxims1 cannot produce any4 ,for  
in these all must be directed to the    
conception of the law as a determining  
principle1 if the action is to contain  
morality and not merely legality4       
,inclination is blind and slavish1      
whether it be of a good sort or not1    
and1 when morality is in question1      
reason must not play the part merely of 
guardian to inclination1 but            
disregarding it altogether must attend  
simply to its own interest as pure      
practical reason4 ,this very feeling of 
compassion and tender sympathy1 if it   
precedes the deliberation on the        
question of duty and becomes a          
determining principle1 is even annoying 
to right thinking persons1 brings their 
deliberate maxims into confusion1 and   
makes them wish to be delivered from it 
and to be subject to lawgiving reason   
alone4                                  

,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #bj      
,from this we can understand how the    
consciousness of this faculty of a pure 
practical reason produces by action     
7virtue7 a consciousness of mastery over
 one's inclinations1 and therefore of   
independence of them1 and consequently  
also of the discontent that always      
accompanies them1 and thus a negative   
satisfaction with one's state1 i4e41    
contentment1 which is primarily         
contentment with one's own person4      
,freedom itself becomes in this way     
7namely1 indirectly7 capable of an      
enjoyment which cannot be called        
happiness1 because it does not depend on
 the positive concurrence of a feeling1 
nor is it1 strictly speaking1 bliss1    
since it does not include complete      
independence of inclinations and wants1 
but it resembles bliss in so far as the 
determination of one's will at least can
 hold itself free from their influence2 
and thus1 at least in its origin1 this  
enjoyment is analogous to the           

self-sufficiency which we can ascribe   
only to the ,supreme ,being4  ,from this
 solution of the antinomy of practical  
pure reason1 it follows that in         
practical principles we may at least    
conceive as possible a natural and      
necessary connection between the        
consciousness of morality and the       
expectation of a proportionate happiness
 as its result1 though it does not      
follow that we can know or perceive this
 connection2 that1 on the other hand1   
principles of the pursuit of happiness  
cannot possibly produce morality2 that1 
therefore1 morality is the supreme good 
7as the first condition of the summum   
bonum71 while happiness constitutes its 
second element1 but only in such a way  
that it is the morally conditioned1 but 
necessary consequence of the former4    
,only with this subordination is the    
summum bonum the whole object of pure   
practical reason1 which must necessarily
 conceive it as possible1 since it      
commands us to contribute to the utmost 

of our power to its realization4 ,but   
since the possibility of such connection
 of the conditioned with its condition  
belongs wholly to the supersensual      
relation of things and cannot be given  
according to the laws of the world of   
sense1 although the practical           
consequences of the idea belong to the  
world of sense1 namely1 the actions that
 aim at realizing the summum bonum2 we  
will therefore endeavour to set forth   
the grounds of that possibility1 first1 
in respect of what is immediately in our
 power1 and then1 secondly1 in that     
which is not in our power1 but which    
reason presents to us as the supplement 
of our impotence1 for the realization of
 the summum bonum 7which by practical   
principles is necessary74      ,,iii4   
,of the ,primacy of ,pure ,practical    
,reason in its           ,union with the
 ,speculative ,reason4                  
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #be      
,by primacy between two or more things  
connected by reason1 ,i understand the  

prerogative1 belonging to one1 of being 
the first determining principle in the  
connection with all the rest4 ,in a     
narrower practical sense it means the   
prerogative of the interest of one in so
 far as the interest of the other is    
subordinated to it1 while it is not     
postponed to any other4 ,to every       
faculty of the mind we can attribute an 
interest1 that is1 a principle1 that    
contains the condition on which alone   
the former is called into exercise4     
,reason1 as the faculty of principles1  
determines the interest of all the      
powers of the mind and is determined by 
its own4 ,the interest of its           
speculative employment consists in the  
cognition of the object pushed to the   
highest a priori principles3 that of its
 practical employment1 in the           
determination of the will in respect of 
the final and complete end4 ,as to what 
is necessary for the possibility of any 
employment of reason at all1 namely1    
that its principles and affirmations    

should not contradict one another1 this 
constitutes no part of its interest1 but
 is the condition of having reason at   
all2 it is only its development1 not    
mere consistency with itself1 that is   
reckoned as its interest4  ,if practical
 reason could not assume or think as    
given anything further than what        
speculative reason of itself could offer
 it from its own insight1 the latter    
would have the primacy4 ,but supposing  
that it had of itself original a priori 
principles with which certain           
theoretical positions were inseparably  
connected1 while these were withdrawn   
from any possible insight of speculative
 reason 7which1 however1 they must not  
contradict72 then the question is3      
,which interest is the superior 7not    
which must give way1 for they are not   
necessarily conflicting71 whether       
speculative reason1 which knows nothing 
of all that the practical offers for its
 acceptance1 should take up these       
propositions and 7although they         

transcend it7 try to unite them with its
 own concepts as a foreign possession   
handed over to it1 or whether it is     
justified in obstinately following its  
own separate interest and1 according to 
the canonic of ,epicurus1 rejecting as  
vain subtlety everything that cannot    
accredit its objective reality by       
manifest examples to be shown in        
experience1 even though it should be    
never so much interwoven with the       
interest of the practical 7pure7 use of 
reason1 and in itself not contradictory 
to the theoretical1 merely because it   
infringes on the interest of the        
speculative reason to this extent1 that 
it removes the bounds which this latter 
had set to itself1 and gives it up to   
every nonsense or delusion of           
imagination8  ,in fact1 so far as       
practical reason is taken as dependent  
on pathological conditions1 that is1 as 
merely regulating the inclinations under
 the sensible principle of happiness1 we
 could not require speculative reason to

 take its principles from such a source4
 ,mohammed's paradise1 or the absorption
 into the ,deity of the theosophists and
 mystics would press their monstrosities
 on the reason according to the taste of
 each1 and one might as well have no    
reason as surrender it in such fashion  
to all sorts of dreams4 ,but if pure    
reason of itself can be practical and is
 actually so1 as the consciousness of   
the moral law proves1 then it is still  
only one and the same reason which1     
whether in a theoretical or a practical 
point of view1 judges according to a    
priori principles2 and then it is clear 
that although it is in the first point  
of view incompetent to establish certain
 propositions positively1 which1        
however1 do not contradict it1 then1 as 
soon as these propositions are          
inseparably attached to the practical   
interest of pure reason1 it must accept 
them1 though it be as something offered 
to it from a foreign source1 something  
that has not grown on its own ground1   

but yet is sufficiently authenticated2  
and it must try to compare and connect  
them with everything that it has in its 
power as speculative reason4 ,it must   
remember1 however1 that these are not   
additions to its insight1 but yet are   
extensions of its employment in another1
 namely1 a practical aspect2 and this is
 not in the least opposed to its        
interest1 which consists in the         
restriction of wild speculation4  ,thus1
 when pure speculative and pure         
practical reason are combined in one    
cognition1 the latter has the primacy1  
provided1 namely1 that this combination 
is not contingent and arbitrary1 but    
founded a priori on reason itself and   
therefore necessary4 ,for without this  
subordination there would arise a       
conflict of reason with itself2 since1  
if they were merely co-ordinate1 the    
former would close its boundaries       
strictly and admit nothing from the     
latter into its domain1 while the latter
 would extend its bounds over everything

 and when its needs required would seek 
to embrace the former within them4 ,nor 
could we reverse the order and require  
pure practical reason to be subordinate 
to the speculative1 since all interest  
is ultimately practical1 and even that  
of speculative reason is conditional1   
and it is only in the practical         
employment of reason that it is         
complete4                               
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #cj      
,,iv4 ,the ,immortality of the ,soul as 
a ,postulate of                  ,pure  
,practical ,reason4    ,the realization 
of the summum bonum in the world is the 
necessary object of a will determinable 
by the moral law4 ,but in this will the 
perfect accordance of the mind with the 
moral law is the supreme condition of   
the summum bonum4 ,this then must be    
possible1 as well as its object1 since  
it is contained in the command to       
promote the latter4 ,now1 the perfect   
accordance of the will with the moral   
law is holiness1 a perfection of which  

no rational being of the sensible world 
is capable at any moment of his         
existence4 ,since1 nevertheless1 it is  
required as practically necessary1 it   
can only be found in a progress in      
infinitum towards that perfect          
accordance1 and on the principles of    
pure practical reason it is necessary to
 assume such a practical progress as the
 real object of our will4               
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ce      
,now1 this endless progress is only     
possible on the supposition of an       
endless duration of the existence and   
personality of the same rational being  
7which is called the immortality of the 
soul74 ,the summum bonum1 then1         
practically is only possible on the     
supposition of the immortality of the   
soul2 consequently this immortality1    
being inseparably connected with the    
moral law1 is a postulate of pure       
practical reason 7by which ,i mean a    
theoretical proposition1 not            
demonstrable as such1 but which is an   

inseparable result of an unconditional a
 priori practical law4  ,this principle 
of the moral destination of our nature1 
namely1 that it is only in an endless   
progress that we can attain perfect     
accordance with the moral law1 is of the
 greatest use1 not merely for the       
present purpose of supplementing the    
impotence of speculative reason1 but    
also with respect to religion4 ,in      
default of it1 either the moral law is  
quite degraded from its holiness1 being 
made out to be indulgent and conformable
 to our convenience1 or else men strain 
their notions of their vocation and     
their expectation to an unattainable    
goal1 hoping to acquire complete        
holiness of will1 and so they lose      
themselves in fanatical theosophic      
dreams1 which wholly contradict         
self-knowledge4 ,in both cases the      
unceasing effort to obey punctually and 
thoroughly a strict and inflexible      
command of reason1 which yet is not     
ideal but real1 is only hindered4 ,for a

 rational but finite being1 the only    
thing possible is an endless progress   
from the lower to higher degrees of     
moral perfection4 ,the ,infinite ,being1
 to whom the condition of time is       
nothing1 sees in this to us endless     
succession a whole of accordance with   
the moral law2 and the holiness which   
his command inexorably requires1 in     
order to be true to his justice in the  
share which ,he assigns to each in the  
summum bonum1 is to be found in a single
 intellectual intuition of the whole    
existence of rational beings4 ,all that 
can be expected of the creature in      
respect of the hope of this             
participation would be the consciousness
 of his tried character1 by which from  
the progress he has hitherto made from  
the worse to the morally better1 and the
 immutability of purpose which has thus 
become known to him1 he may hope for a  
further unbroken continuance of the     
same1 however long his existence may    
last1 even beyond this life1 99 and thus

 he may hope1 not indeed here1 nor in   
any imaginable point of his future      
existence1 but only in the endlessness  
of his duration 7which ,god alone can   
survey7 to be perfectly adequate to his 
will 7without indulgence or excuse1     
which do not harmonize with justice74   
99 ,it seems1 nevertheless1 impossible  
for a creature to have the conviction of
 his unwavering firmness of mind in the 
progress towards goodness4 ,on this     
account the ,christian religion makes it
 come only from the same ,spirit that   
works sanctification1 that is1 this firm
 purpose1 and with it the consciousness 
of steadfastness in the moral progress4 
,but naturally one who is conscious that
 he has persevered through a long       
portion of his life up to the end in the
 progress to the better1 and this       
genuine moral motives1 may well have the
 comforting hope1 though not the        
certainty1 that even in an existence    
prolonged beyond this life he will      
continue in these principles2 and       

although he is never justified here in  
his own eyes1 nor can ever hope to be so
 in the increased perfection of his     
nature1 to which he looks forward1      
together with an increase of duties1    
nevertheless in this progress which1    
though it is directed to a goal         
infinitely remote1 yet is in ,god's     
sight regarded as equivalent to         
possession1 he may have a prospect of a 
blessed future2 for this is the word    
that reason employs to designate perfect
 well-being independent of all          
contingent causes of the world1 and     
which1 like holiness1 is an idea that   
can be contained only in an endless     
progress and its totality1 and          
consequently is never fully attained by 
a creature4                             
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #dj  ,v4 
,the ,existence of ,god as a ,postulate 
of ,pure ,practical ,reason4    ,in the 
foregoing analysis the moral law led to 
a practical problem which is prescribed 
by pure reason alone1 without the aid of

 any sensible motives1 namely1 that of  
the necessary completeness of the first 
and principle element of the summum     
bonum1 viz41 morality2 and1 as this can 
be perfectly solved only in eternity1 to
 the postulate of immortality4 ,the same
 law must also lead us to affirm the    
possibility of the second element of the
 summum bonum1 viz41 happiness          
proportioned to that morality1 and this 
on grounds as disinterested as before1  
and solely from impartial reason2 that  
is1 it must lead to the supposition of  
the existence of a cause adequate to    
this effect2 in other words1 it must    
postulate the existence of ,god1 as the 
necessary condition of the possibility  
of the summum bonum 7an object of the   
will which is necessarily connected with
 the moral legislation of pure reason74 
,we proceed to exhibit this connection  
in a convincing manner4  ,happiness is  
the condition of a rational being in the
 world with whom everything goes        
according to his wish and will2 it      

rests1 therefore1 on the harmony of     
physical nature with his whole end and  
likewise with the essential determining 
principle of his will4 ,now the moral   
law as a law of freedom commands by     
determining principles1 which ought to  
be quite independent of nature and of   
its harmony with our faculty of desire  
7as springs74 ,but the acting rational  
being in the world is not the cause of  
the world and of nature itself4 ,there  
is not the least ground1 therefore1 in  
the moral law for a necessary connection
 between morality and proportionate     
happiness in a being that belongs to the
 world as part of it1 and therefore     
dependent on it1 and which for that     
reason cannot by his will be a cause of 
this nature1 nor by his own power make  
it thoroughly harmonize1 as far as his  
happiness is concerned1 with his        
practical principles4 ,nevertheless1 in 
the practical problem of pure reason1   
i4e41 the necessary pursuit of the      
summum bonum1 such a connection is      

postulated as necessary3 we ought to    
endeavour to promote the summum bonum1  
which1 therefore1 must be possible4     
,accordingly1 the existence of a cause  
of all nature1 distinct from nature     
itself and containing the principle of  
this connection1 namely1 of the exact   
harmony of happiness with morality1 is  
also postulated4 ,now this supreme cause
 must contain the principle of the      
harmony of nature1 not merely with a law
 of the will of rational beings1 but    
with the conception of this law1 in so  
far as they make it the supreme         
determining principle of the will1 and  
consequently not merely with the form of
 morals1 but with their morality as     
their motive1 that is1 with their moral 
character4 ,therefore1 the summum bonum 
is possible in the world only on the    
supposition of a ,supreme ,being having 
a causality corresponding to moral      
character4 ,now a being that is capable 
of acting on the conception of laws is  
an intelligence 7a rational being71 and 

the causality of such a being according 
to this conception of laws is his will2 
therefore the supreme cause of nature1  
which must be presupposed as a condition
 of the summum bonum is a being which is
 the cause of nature by intelligence and
 will1 consequently its author1 that is 
,god4 ,it follows that the postulate of 
the possibility of the highest derived  
good 7the best world7 is likewise the   
postulate of the reality of a highest   
original good1 that is to say1 of the   
existence of ,god4 ,now it was seen to  
be a duty for us to promote the summum  
bonum2 consequently it is not merely    
allowable1 but it is a necessity        
connected with duty as a requisite1 that
 we should presuppose the possibility of
 this summum bonum2 and as this is      
possible only on condition of the       
existence of ,god1 it inseparably       
connects the supposition of this with   
duty2 that is1 it is morally necessary  
to assume the existence of ,god4  ,it   
must be remarked here that this moral   

necessity is subjective1 that is1 it is 
a want1 and not objective1 that is1     
itself a duty1 for there cannot be a    
duty to suppose the existence of        
anything 7since this concerns only the  
theoretical employment of reason74      
,moreover1 it is not meant by this that 
it is necessary to suppose the existence
 of ,god as a basis of all obligation in
 general 7for this rests1 as has been   
sufficiently proved1 simply on the      
autonomy of reason itself74 ,what       
belongs to duty here is only the        
endeavour to realize and promote the    
summum bonum in the world1 the          
possibility of which can therefore be   
postulated2 and as our reason finds it  
not conceivable except on the           
supposition of a supreme intelligence1  
the admission of this existence is      
therefore connected with the            
consciousness of our duty1 although the 
admission itself belongs to the domain  
of speculative reason4 ,considered in   
respect of this alone1 as a principle of

 explanation1 it may be called a        
hypothesis1 but in reference to the     
intelligibility of an object given us by
 the moral law 7the summum bonum71 and  
consequently of a requirement for       
practical purposes1 it may be called    
faith1 that is to say a pure rational   
faith1 since pure reason 7both in its   
theoretical and practical use7 is the   
sole source from which it springs4      
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #de      
,from this deduction it is now          
intelligible why the ,greek schools     
could never attain the solution of their
 problem of the practical possibility of
 the summum bonum1 because they made the
 rule of the use which the will of man  
makes of his freedom the sole and       
sufficient ground of this possibility1  
thinking that they had no need for that 
purpose of the existence of ,god4 ,no   
doubt they were so far right that they  
established the principle of morals of  
itself independently of this postulate1 
from the relation of reason only to the 

will1 and consequently made it the      
supreme practical condition of the      
summum bonum2 but it was not therefore  
the whole condition of its possibility4 
,the ,epicureans had indeed assumed as  
the supreme principle of morality a     
wholly false one1 namely that of        
happiness1 and had substituted for a law
 a maxim of arbitrary choice according  
to every man's inclination2 they        
proceeded1 however1 consistently enough 
in this1 that they degraded their summum
 bonum likewise1 just in proportion to  
the meanness of their fundamental       
principle1 and looked for no greater    
happiness than can be attained by human 
prudence 7including temperance and      
moderation of the inclinations71 and    
this as we know would be scanty enough  
and would be very different according to
 circumstances2 not to mention the      
exceptions that their maxims must       
perpetually admit and which make them   
incapable of being laws4 ,the ,stoics1  
on the contrary1 had chosen their       

supreme practical principle quite       
rightly1 making virtue the condition of 
the summum bonum2 but when they         
represented the degree of virtue        
required by its pure law as fully       
attainable in this life1 they not only  
strained the moral powers of the man    
whom they called the wise beyond all the
 limits of his nature1 and assumed a    
thing that contradicts all our knowledge
 of men1 but also and principally they  
would not allow the second element of   
the summum bonum1 namely1 happiness1 to 
be properly a special object of human   
desire1 but made their wise man1 like a 
divinity in his consciousness of the    
excellence of his person1 wholly        
independent of nature 7as regards his   
own contentment72 they exposed him      
indeed to the evils of life1 but made   
him not subject to them 7at the same    
time representing him also as free from 
moral evil74 ,they thus1 in fact1 left  
out the second element of the summum    
bonum namely1 personal happiness1       

placing it solely in action and         
satisfaction with one's own personal    
worth1 thus including it in the         
consciousness of being morally minded1  
in which they ,might have been          
sufficiently refuted by the voice of    
their own nature4  ,the doctrine of     
,christianity1 99 even if we do not yet 
consider it as a religious doctrine1    
gives1 touching this point1 a conception
 of the summum bonum 7the kingdom of    
,god71 which alone satisfies the        
strictest demand of practical reason4   
,the moral law is holy 7unyielding7 and 
demands holiness of morals1 although all
 the moral perfection to which man can  
attain is still only virtue1 that is1 a 
rightful disposition arising from       
respect for the law1 implying           
consciousness of a constant propensity  
to transgression1 or at least a want of 
purity1 that is1 a mixture of many      
spurious 7not moral7 motives of         
obedience to the law1 consequently a    
self-esteem combined with humility4 ,in 

respect1 then1 of the holiness which the
 ,christian law requires1 this leaves   
the creature nothing but a progress in  
infinitum1 but for that very reason it  
justifies him in hoping for an endless  
duration of his existence4 ,the worth of
 a character perfectly accordant with   
the moral law is infinite1 since the    
only restriction on all possible        
happiness in the judgement of a wise and
 all powerful distributor of it is the  
absence of conformity of rational beings
 to their duty4 ,but the moral law of   
itself does not promise any happiness1  
for according to our conceptions of an  
order of nature in general1 this is not 
necessarily connected with obedience to 
the law4 ,now ,christian morality       
supplies this defect 7of the second     
indispensable element of the summum     
bonum7 by representing the world in     
which rational beings devote themselves 
with all their soul to the moral law1 as
 a kingdom of ,god1 in which nature and 
morality are brought into a harmony     

foreign to each of itself1 by a holy    
,author who makes the derived summum    
bonum possible4 ,holiness of life is    
prescribed to them as a rule even in    
this life1 while the welfare            
proportioned to it1 namely1 bliss1 is   
represented as attainable only in an    
eternity2 because the former must always
 be the pattern of their conduct in     
every state1 and progress towards it is 
already possible and necessary in this  
life2 while the latter1 under the name  
of happiness1 cannot be attained at all 
in this world 7so far as our own power  
is concerned71 and therefore is made    
simply an object of hope4 ,nevertheless1
 the ,christian principle of morality   
itself is not theological 7so as to be  
heteronomy71 but is autonomy of pure    
practical reason1 since it does not make
 the knowledge of ,god and ,his will the
 foundation of these laws1 but only of  
the attainment of the summum bonum1 on  
condition of following these laws1 and  
it does not even place the proper spring

 of this obedience in the desired       
results1 but solely in the conception of
 duty1 as that of which the faithful    
observance alone constitutes the        
worthiness to obtain those happy        
consequences4    99 ,it is commonly held
 that the ,christian precept of morality
 has no advantage in respect of purity  
over the moral conceptions of the       
,stoics2 the distinction between them   
is1 however1 very obvious4 ,the ,stoic  
system made the consciousness of        
strength of mind the pivot on which all 
moral dispositions should turn2 and     
although its disciples spoke of duties  
and even defined them very well1 yet    
they placed the spring and proper       
determining principle of the will in an 
elevation of the mind above the lower   
springs of the senses1 which owe their  
power only to weakness of mind4 ,with   
them therefore1 virtue was a sort of    
heroism in the wise man raising himself 
above the animal nature of man1 is      
sufficient for ,himself1 and1 while he  

prescribes duties to others1 is himself 
raised above them1 and is not subject to
 any temptation to transgress the moral 
law4 ,all this1 however1 they could not 
have done if they had conceived this law
 in all its purity and strictness1 as   
the precept of the ,gospel does4 ,when  
,i give the name idea to a perfection to
 which nothing adequate can be given in 
experience1 it does not follow that the 
moral ideas are thing transcendent1 that
 is something of which we could not even
 determine the concept adequately1 or of
 which it is uncertain whether there is 
any object corresponding to it at all1  
as is the case with the ideas of        
speculative reason2 on the contrary1    
being types of practical perfection1    
they serve as the indispensable rule of 
conduct and likewise as the standard of 
comparison4 ,now if ,i consider         
,christian morals on their philosophical
 side1 then compared with the ideas of  
the ,greek schools1 they would appear as
 follows3 the ideas of the ,cynics1 the 

,epicureans1 the ,stoics1 and the       
,christians are3 simplicity of nature1  
prudence1 wisdom1 and holiness4 ,in     
respect of the way of attaining them1   
the ,greek schools were distinguished   
from one another thus that the ,cynics  
only required common sense1 the others  
the path of science1 but both found the 
mere use of natural powers sufficient   
for the purpose4 ,christian morality1   
because its precept is framed 7as a     
moral precept must be7 so pure and      
unyielding1 takes from man all          
confidence that he can be fully adequate
 to it1 at least in this life1 but again
 sets it up by enabling us to hope that 
if we act as well as it is in our power 
to do1 then what is not in our power    
will come in to our aid from another    
source1 whether we know how this may be 
or not4 ,aristotle and ,plato differed  
only as to the origin of our moral      
conceptions4                            
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ej  ,in 
this manner1 the moral laws lead through

 the conception of the summum bonum as  
the object and final end of pure        
practical reason to religion1 that is1  
to the recognition of all duties as     
divine commands1 not as sanctions1 that 
is to say1 arbitrary ordinances of a    
foreign and contingent in themselves1   
but as essential laws of every free will
 in itself1 which1 nevertheless1 must be
 regarded as commands of the ,supreme   
,being1 because it is only from a       
morally perfect 7holy and good7 and at  
the same time all-powerful will1 and    
consequently only through harmony with  
this will1 that we can hope to attain   
the summum bonum which the moral law    
makes it our duty to take as the object 
of our endeavours4 ,here again1 then1   
all remains disinterested and founded   
merely on duty2 neither fear nor hope   
being made the fundamental springs1     
which if taken as principles would      
destroy the whole moral worth of        
actions4 ,the moral law commands me to  
make the highest possible good in a     

world the ultimate object of all my     
conduct4 ,but ,i cannot hope to effect  
this otherwise than by the harmony of my
 will with that of a holy and good      
,author of the world2 and although the  
conception of the summum bonum as a     
whole1 in which the greatest happiness  
is conceived as combined in the most    
exact proportion with the highest degree
 of moral perfection 7possible in       
creatures71 includes my own happiness1  
yet it is not this that is the          
determining principle of the will which 
is enjoined to promote the summum bonum1
 but the moral law1 which1 on the       
contrary1 limits by strict conditions my
 unbounded desire of happiness4  ,hence 
also morality is not properly the       
doctrine how we should make ourselves   
happy1 but how we should become worthy  
of happiness4 ,it is only when religion 
is added that there also comes in the   
hope of participating some day in       
happiness in proportion as we have      
endeavoured to be not unworthy of it4   

,a man is worthy to possess a thing or a
 state when his possession of it is in  
harmony with the summum bonum4 ,we can  
now easily see that all worthiness      
depends on moral conduct1 since in the  
conception of the summum bonum this     
constitutes the condition of the rest   
7which belongs to one's state71 namely1 
the participation of happiness4 ,now it 
follows from this that morality should  
never be treated as a doctrine of       
happiness1 that is1 an instruction how  
to become happy2 for it has to do simply
 with the rational condition 7conditio  
sine qua non7 of happiness1 not with the
 means of attaining it4 ,but when       
morality has been completely expounded  
7which merely imposes duties instead of 
providing rules for selfish desires71   
then first1 after the moral desire to   
promote the summum bonum 7to bring the  
kingdom of ,god to us7 has been         
awakened1 a desire founded on a law1 and
 which could not previously arise in any
 selfish mind1 and when for the behoof  

of this desire the step to religion has 
been taken1 then this ethical doctrine  
may be also called a doctrine of        
happiness because the hope of happiness 
first begins with religion only4  ,we   
can also see from this that1 when we ask
 what is ,god's ultimate end in creating
 the world1 we must not name the        
happiness of the rational beings in it1 
but the summum bonum1 which adds a      
further condition to that wish of such  
beings1 namely1 the condition of being  
worthy of happiness1 that is1 the       
morality of these same rational beings1 
a condition which alone contains the    
rule by which only they can hope to     
share in the former at the hand of a    
wise ,author4 ,for as wisdom1           
theoretically considered1 signifies the 
knowledge of the summum bonum and1      
practically1 the accordance of the will 
with the summum bonum1 we cannot        
attribute to a supreme independent      
wisdom an end based merely on goodness4 
,for we cannot conceive the action of   

this goodness 7in respect of the        
happiness of rational beings7 as        
suitable to the highest original good1  
except under the restrictive conditions 
of harmony with the holiness 99 of his  
will4 ,therefore1 those who placed the  
end of creation in the glory of ,god    
7provided that this is not conceived    
anthropomorphically as a desire to be   
praised7 have perhaps hit upon the best 
expression4 ,for nothing glorifies ,god 
more than that which is the most        
estimable thing in the world1 respect   
for his command1 the observance of the  
holy duty that his law imposes on us1   
when there is added thereto his glorious
 plan of crowning such a beautiful order
 of things with corresponding happiness4
 ,if the latter 7to speak humanly7 makes
 ,him worthy of love1 by the former ,he 
is an object of adoration4 ,even men can
 never acquire respect by benevolence   
alone1 though they may gain love1 so    
that the greatest beneficence only      
procures them honour when it is         

regulated by worthiness4                
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ee  99  
,in order to make these characteristics 
of these conceptions clear1 ,i add the  
remark that whilst we ascribe to ,god   
various attributes1 the quality of which
 we also find applicable to creatures1  
only that in ,him they are raised to the
 highest degree1 e4g41 power1 knowledge1
 presence1 goodness1 etc41 under the    
designations of omnipotence1            
omniscience1 omnipresence1 etc41 there  
are three that are ascribed to ,god     
exclusively1 and yet without the        
addition of greatness1 and which are all
 moral ,he is the only holy1 the only   
blessed1 the only wise1 because these   
conceptions already imply the absence of
 limitation4 ,in the order of these     
attributes ,he is also the holy lawgiver
 7and creator71 the good governor 7and  
preserver7 and the just judge1 three    
attributes which include everything by  
which ,god is the object of religion1   
and in conformity with which the        

metaphysical perfections are added of   
themselves in the reason4    ,that in   
the order of ends1 man 7and with him    
every rational being7 is an end in      
himself1 that is1 that he can never be  
used merely as a means by any 7not even 
by ,god7 without being at the same time 
an end also himself1 that therefore     
humanity in our person must be holy to  
ourselves1 this follows now of itself   
because he is the subject of the moral  
law1 in other words1 of that which is   
holy in itself1 and on account of which 
and in agreement with which alone can   
anything be termed holy4 ,for this moral
 law is founded on the autonomy of his  
will1 as a free will which by its       
universal laws must necessarily be able 
to agree with that to which it is to    
submit itself4      ,,vi4 ,of the       
,postulates of ,pure ,practical ,reason 
,generally4                             
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #fj      
,they all proceed from the principle of 
morality1 which is not a postulate but a

 law1 by which reason determines the    
will directly1 which will1 because it is
 so determined as a pure will1 requires 
these necessary conditions of obedience 
to its precept4 ,these postulates are   
not theoretical dogmas but1 suppositions
 practically necessary2 while then they 
do not extend our speculative knowledge1
 they give objective reality to the     
ideas of speculative reason in general  
7by means of their reference to what is 
practical71 and give it a right to      
concepts1 the possibility even of which 
it could not otherwise venture to       
affirm4  ,these postulates are those of 
immortality1 freedom positively         
considered 7as the causality of a being 
so far as he belongs to the intelligible
 world71 and the existence of ,god4 ,the
 first results from the practically     
necessary condition of a duration       
adequate to the complete fulfilment of  
the moral law2 the second from the      
necessary supposition of independence of
 the sensible world1 and of the faculty 

of determining one's will according to  
the law of an intelligible world1 that  
is1 of freedom2 the third from the      
necessary condition of the existence of 
the summum bonum in such an intelligible
 world1 by the supposition of the       
supreme independent good1 that is1 the  
existence of ,god4  ,thus the fact that 
respect for the moral law necessarily   
makes the summum bonum an object of our 
endeavours1 and the supposition thence  
resulting of its objective reality1 lead
 through the postulates of practical    
reason to conceptions which speculative 
reason might indeed present as problems1
 but could never solve4 ,thus it leads3 
#a4 ,to that one in the solution of     
which the latter could do nothing but   
commit paralogisms 7namely1 that of     
immortality71 because it could not lay  
hold of the character of permanence1 by 
which to complete the psychological     
conception of an ultimate subject       
necessarily ascribed to the soul in     
self-consciousness1 so as to make it the

 real conception of a substance1 a      
character which practical reason        
furnishes by the postulate of a duration
 required for accordance with the moral 
law in the summum bonum1 which is the   
whole end of practical reason4 #b4 ,it  
leads to that of which speculative      
reason contained nothing but antinomy1  
the solution of which it could only     
found on a notion problematically       
conceivable indeed1 but whose objective 
reality it could not prove or determine1
 namely1 the cosmological idea of an    
intelligible world and the consciousness
 of our existence in it1 by means of the
 postulate of freedom 7the reality of   
which it lays down by virtue of the     
moral law71 and with it likewise the law
 of an intelligible world1 to which     
speculative reason could only point1 but
 could not define its conception4 #c4   
,what speculative reason was able to    
think1 but was obliged to leave         
undetermined as a mere transcendental   
ideal1 viz41 the theological conception 

of the first ,being1 to this it gives   
significance 7in a practical view1 that 
is1 as a condition of the possibility of
 the object of a will determined by that
 law71 namely1 as the supreme principle 
of the summum bonum in an intelligible  
world1 by means of moral legislation in 
it invested with sovereign power4  ,is  
our knowledge1 however1 actually        
extended in this way by pure practical  
reason1 and is that immanent in         
practical reason which for the          
speculative was only transcendent8      
,certainly1 but only in a practical     
point of view4 ,for we do not thereby   
take knowledge of the nature of our     
souls1 nor of the intelligible world1   
nor of the ,supreme ,being1 with respect
 to what they are in themselves1 but we 
have merely combined the conceptions of 
them in the practical concept of the    
summum bonum as the object of our will1 
and this altogether a priori1 but only  
by means of the moral law1 and merely in
 reference to it1 in respect of the     

object which it commands4 ,but how      
freedom is possible1 and how we are to  
conceive this kind of causality         
theoretically and positively1 is not    
thereby discovered2 but only that there 
is such a causality is postulated by the
 moral law and in its behoof4 ,it is the
 same with the remaining ideas1 the     
possibility of which no human           
intelligence will ever fathom1 but the  
truth of which1 on the other hand1 no   
sophistry will ever wrest from the      
conviction even of the commonest man4   
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #fe      
,,vii4 ,how is it possible to conceive  
an ,extension of ,pure       ,reason in 
a ,practical point of view1 without its 
,knowledge as ,speculative being        
enlarged at                      the    
same time8                              
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #gj      
,in order not to be too abstract1 we    
will answer this question at once in its
 application to the present case4 ,in   
order to extend a pure cognition        

practically1 there must be an a priori  
purpose given1 that is1 an end as object
 7of the will71 which independently of  
all theological principle is presented  
as practically necessary by an          
imperative which determines the will    
directly 7a categorical imperative71 and
 in this case that is the summum bonum4 
,this1 however1 is not possible without 
presupposing three theoretical          
conceptions 7for which1 because they are
 mere conceptions of pure reason1 no    
corresponding intuition can be found1   
nor consequently by the path of theory  
any objective reality72 namely1 freedom1
 immortality1 and ,god4 ,thus by the    
practical law which commands the        
existence of the highest good possible  
in a world1 the possibility of those    
objects of pure speculative reason is   
postulated1 and the objective reality   
which the latter could not assure them4 
,by this the theoretical knowledge of   
pure reason does indeed obtain an       
accession2 but it consists only in this1

 that those concepts which otherwise it 
had to look upon as problematical       
7merely thinkable7 concepts1 are now    
shown assertorially to be such as       
actually have objects2 because practical
 reason indispensably requires their    
existence for the possibility of its    
object1 the summum bonum1 which         
practically is absolutely necessary1 and
 this justifies theoretical reason in   
assuming them4 ,but this extension of   
theoretical reason is no extension of   
speculative1 that is1 we cannot make any
 positive use of it in a theoretical    
point of view4 ,for as nothing is       
accomplished in this by practical       
reason1 further than that these concepts
 are real and actually have their       
7possible7 objects1 and nothing in the  
way of intuition of them is given       
thereby 7which indeed could not be      
demanded71 hence the admission of this  
reality does not render any synthetical 
proposition possible4 ,consequently1    
this discovery does not in the least    

help us to extend this knowledge of ours
 in a speculative point of view1        
although it does in respect of the      
practical employment of pure reason4    
,the above three ideas of speculative   
reason are still in themselves not      
cognitions2 they are however            
7transcendent7 thoughts1 in which there 
is nothing impossible4 ,now1 by help of 
an apodeictic practical law1 being      
necessary conditions of that which it   
commands to be made an object1 they     
acquire objective reality2 that is1 we  
learn from it that they have objects1   
without being able to point out how the 
conception of them is related to an     
object1 and this1 too1 is still not a   
cognition of these objects2 for we      
cannot thereby form any synthetical     
judgement about them1 nor determine     
their application theoretically2        
consequently1 we can make no theoretical
 rational use of them at all1 in which  
use all speculative knowledge of reason 
consists4 ,nevertheless1 the theoretical

 knowledge1 not indeed of these objects1
 but of reason generally1 is so far     
enlarged by this1 that by the practical 
postulates objects were given to those  
ideas1 a merely problematical thought   
having by this means first acquired     
objective reality4 ,there is therefore  
no extension of the knowledge of given  
supersensible objects1 but an extension 
of theoretical reason and of its        
knowledge in respect of the             
supersensible generally2 inasmuch as it 
is compelled to admit that there are    
such objects1 although it is not able to
 define them more closely1 so as itself 
to extend this knowledge of the objects 
7which have now been given it on        
practical grounds1 and only for         
practical use74 ,for this accession1    
then1 pure theoretical reason1 for which
 all those ideas are transcendent and   
without object1 has simply to thank its 
practical faculty4 ,in this they become 
immanent and constitutive1 being the    
source of the possibility of realizing  

the necessary object of pure practical  
reason 7the summum bonum72 whereas apart
 from this they are transcendent1 and   
merely regulative principles of         
speculative reason1 which do not require
 it to assume a new object beyond       
experience1 but only to bring its use in
 experience nearer to completeness4 ,but
 when once reason is in possession of   
this accession1 it will go to work with 
these ideas as speculative reason       
7properly only to assure the certainty  
of its practical use7 in a negative     
manner3 that is1 not extending but      
clearing up its knowledge so as on one  
side to keep off anthropomorphism1 as   
the source of superstition1 or seeming  
extension of these conceptions by       
supposed experience2 and on the other   
side fanaticism1 which promises the same
 by means of supersensible intuition or 
feelings of the like kind4 ,all these   
are hindrances to the practical use of  
pure reason1 so that the removal of them
 may certainly be considered an         

extension of our knowledge in a         
practical point of view1 without        
contradicting the admission that for    
speculative purposes reason has not in  
the least gained by this4  ,every       
employment of reason in respect of an   
object requires pure concepts of the    
understanding 7categories71 without     
which no object can be conceived4 ,these
 can be applied to the theoretical      
employment of reason1 i4e41 to that kind
 of knowledge1 only in case an intuition
 7which is always sensible7 is taken as 
a basis1 and therefore merely in order  
to conceive by means of- them an object 
of possible experience4 ,now here what  
have to be thought by means of the      
categories in order to be known are     
ideas of reason1 which cannot be given  
in any experience4 ,only we are not here
 concerned with the theoretical         
knowledge of the objects of these ideas1
 but only with this1 whether they have  
objects at all4 ,this reality is        
supplied by pure practical reason1 and  

theoretical reason has nothing further  
to do in this but to think those objects
 by means of categories4 ,this1 as we   
have elsewhere clearly shown1 can be    
done well enough without needing any    
intuition 7either sensible or           
supersensible7 because the categories   
have their seat and origin in the pure  
understanding1 simply as the faculty of 
thought1 before and independently of any
 intuition1 and they always only signify
 an object in general1 no matter in what
 way it may be given to us4 ,now when   
the categories are to be applied to     
these ideas1 it is not possible to give 
them any object in intuition2 but that  
such an object actually exists1 and     
consequently that the category as a mere
 form of thought is here not empty but  
has significance1 this is sufficiently  
assured them by an object which         
practical reason presents beyond doubt  
in the concept of the summum bonum1 the 
reality of the conceptions which are    
required for the possibility of the     

summum bonum2 without1 however1         
effecting by this accession the least   
extension of our knowledge on           
theoretical principles4    ,when these  
ideas of ,god1 of an intelligible world 
7the kingdom of ,god71 and of           
immortality are further determined by   
predicates taken from our own nature1 we
 must not regard this determination as a
 sensualizing of those pure rational    
ideas 7anthropomorphism71 nor as a      
transcendent knowledge of supersensible 
objects2 for these predicates are no    
others than understanding and will1     
considered too in the relation to each  
other in which they must be conceived in
 the moral law1 and therefore1 only so  
far as a pure practical use is made of  
them4 ,as to all the rest that belongs  
to these conceptions psychologically1   
that is1 so far as we observe these     
faculties of ours empirically in their  
exercise 7e4g41 that the understanding  
of man is discursive1 and its notions   
therefore not intuitions but thoughts1  

that these follow one another in time1  
that his will has its satisfaction      
always dependent on the existence of its
 object1 etc41 which cannot be the case 
in the ,supreme ,being71 from all this  
we abstract in that case1 and then there
 remains of the notions by which we     
conceive a pure intelligence nothing    
more than just what is required for the 
possibility of conceiving a moral law4  
,there is then a knowledge of ,god      
indeed1 but only for practical purposes1
 and1 if we attempt to extend it to a   
theoretical knowledge1 we find an       
understanding that has intuitions1 not  
thoughts1 a will that is directed to    
objects on the existence of which its   
satisfaction does not in the least      
depend 7not to mention the              
transcendental predicates1 as1 for      
example1 a magnitude of existence1 that 
is duration1 which1 however1 is not in  
time1 the only possible means we have of
 conceiving existence as magnitude74    
,now these are all attributes of which  

we can form no conception that would    
help to the knowledge of the object1 and
 we learn from this that they can never 
be used for a theory of supersensible   
beings1 so that on this side they are   
quite incapable of being the foundation 
of a speculative knowledge1 and their   
use is limited simply to the practice of
 the moral law4                         
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ge      
,this last is so obvious1 and can be    
proved so clearly by fact1 that we may  
confidently challenge all pretended     
natural theologians 7a singular name7 99
 to specify 7over and above the merely  
ontological predicates7 one single      
attribute1 whether of the understanding 
or of the will1 determining this object 
of theirs1 of which we could not show   
incontrovertibly that1 if we abstract   
from it everything anthropomorphic1     
nothing would remain to us but the mere 
word1 without our being able to connect 
with it the smallest notion by which we 
could hope for an extension of          

theoretical knowledge4 ,but as to the   
practical1 there still remains to us of 
the attributes of understanding and will
 the conception of a relation to which  
objective reality is given by the       
practical law 7which determines a priori
 precisely this relation of the         
understanding to the will74 ,when once  
this is done1 then reality is given to  
the conception of the object of a will  
morally determined 7the conception of   
the summum bonum71 and with it to the   
conditions of its possibility1 the ideas
 of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 but 
always only relatively to the practice  
of the moral law 7and not for any       
speculative purpose74    99 ,learning is
 properly only the whole content of the 
historical sciences4 ,consequently it is
 only the teacher of revealed theology  
that can be called a learned theologian4
 ,if1 however1 we choose to call a man  
learned who is in possession of the     
rational sciences 7mathematics and      
philosophy71 although even this would be

 contrary to the signification of the   
word 7which always counts as learning   
only that which one must be learned and 
which1 therefore1 he cannot discover of 
himself by reason71 even in that case   
the philosopher would make too poor a   
figure with his knowledge of ,god as a  
positive science to let himself be      
called on that account a learned man4   
,according to these remarks it is now   
easy to find the answer to the weighty  
question whether the notion of ,god is  
one belonging to physics 7and therefore 
also to metaphysics1 which contains the 
pure a priori principles of the former  
in their universal import7 or to morals4
 ,if we have recourse to ,god as the    
,author of all things1 in order to      
explain the arrangements of nature or   
its changes1 this is at least not a     
physical explanation1 and is a complete 
confession that our philosophy has come 
to an end1 since we are obliged to      
assume something of which in itself we  
have otherwise no conception1 in order  

to be able to frame a conception of the 
possibility of what we see before our   
eyes4 ,metaphysics1 however1 cannot     
enable us to attain by certain inference
 from the knowledge of this world to the
 conception of ,god and to the proof of 
,his existence1 for this reason1 that in
 order to say that this world could be  
produced only by a ,god 7according to   
the conception implied by this word7 we 
should know this world as the most      
perfect whole possible2 and for this    
purpose should also know all possible   
worlds 7in order to be able to compare  
them with this72 in other words1 we     
should be omniscient4 ,it is absolutely 
impossible1 however1 to know the        
existence of this ,being from mere      
concepts1 because every existential     
proposition1 that is1 every proposition 
that affirms the existence of a being of
 which ,i frame a concept1 is a         
synthetic proposition1 that is1 one by  
which ,i go beyond that conception and  
affirm of it more than was thought in   

the conception itself2 namely1 that this
 concept in the understanding has an    
object corresponding to it outside the  
understanding1 and this it is obviously 
impossible to elicit by any reasoning4  
,there remains1 therefore1 only one     
single process possible for reason to   
attain this knowledge1 namely1 to start 
from the supreme principle of its pure  
practical use 7which in every case is   
directed simply to the existence of     
something as a consequence of reason7   
and thus determine its object4 ,then its
 inevitable problem1 namely1 the        
necessary direction of the will to the  
summum bonum1 discovers to us not only  
the necessity of assuming such a ,first 
,being in reference to the possibility  
of this good in the world1 but1 what is 
most remarkable1 something which reason 
in its progress on the path of physical 
nature altogether failed to find1       
namely1 an accurately defined conception
 of this ,first ,being4 ,as we can know 
only a small part of this world1 and can

 still less compare it with all possible
 worlds1 we may indeed from its order1  
design1 and greatness1 infer a wise1    
good1 powerful1 etc41 ,author of it1 but
 not that ,he is all-wise1 all-good1    
all-powerful1 etc4 ,it may indeed very  
well be granted that we should be       
justified in supplying this inevitable  
defect by a legitimate and reasonable   
hypothesis2 namely1 that when wisdom1   
goodness1 etc1 are displayed in all the 
parts that offer themselves to our      
nearer knowledge1 it is just the same in
 all the rest1 and that it would        
therefore be reasonable to ascribe all  
possible perfections to the ,author of  
the world1 but these are not strict     
logical inferences in which we can pride
 ourselves on our insight1 but only     
permitted conclusions in which we may be
 indulged and which require further     
recommendation before we can make use of
 them4 ,on the path of empirical inquiry
 then 7physics71 the conception of ,god 
remains always a conception of the      

perfection of the ,first ,being not     
accurately enough determined to be held 
adequate to the conception of ,deity4   
7,with metaphysic in its transcendental 
part nothing whatever can be            
accomplished47                          
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #hj      
,when ,i now try to test this conception
 by reference to the object of practical
 reason1 ,i find that the moral         
principle admits as possible only the   
conception of an ,author of the world   
possessed of the highest perfection4 ,he
 must be omniscient1 in order to know my
 conduct up to the inmost root of my    
mental state in all possible cases and  
into all future time2 omnipotent1 in    
order to allot to it its fitting        
consequences2 similarly ,he must be     
omnipresent1 eternal1 etc4 ,thus the    
moral law1 by means of the conception of
 the summum bonum as the object of a    
pure practical reason1 determines the   
concept of the ,first ,being as the     
,supreme ,being2 a thing which the      

physical 7and in its higher development 
the metaphysical71 in other words1 the  
whole speculative course of reason1 was 
unable to effect4 ,the conception of    
,god1 then1 is one that belongs         
originally not to physics1 i4e41 to     
speculative reason1 but to morals4 ,the 
same may be said of the other           
conceptions of reason of which we have  
treated above as postulates of it in its
 practical use4  ,in the history of     
,grecian philosophy we find no distinct 
traces of a pure rational theology      
earlier than ,anaxagoras2 but this is   
not because the older philosophers had  
not intelligence or penetration enough  
to raise themselves to it by the path of
 speculation1 at least with the aid of a
 thoroughly reasonable hypothesis4 ,what
 could have been easier1 what more      
natural1 than the thought which of      
itself occurs to everyone1 to assume    
instead of several causes of the world1 
instead of an indeterminate degree of   
perfection1 a single rational cause     

having all perfection8 ,but the evils in
 the world seemed to them to be much too
 serious objections to allow them to    
feel themselves justified in such a     
hypothesis4 ,they showed intelligence   
and penetration then in this very point1
 that they did not allow themselves to  
adopt it1 but on the contrary looked    
about amongst natural causes to see if  
they could not find in them the         
qualities and power required for a      
,first ,being4 ,but when this acute     
people had advanced so far in their     
investigations of nature as to treat    
even moral questions philosophically1 on
 which other nations had never done     
anything but talk1 then first they found
 a new and practical want1 which did not
 fail to give definiteness to their     
conception of the ,first ,being3 and in 
this the speculative reason played the  
part of spectator1 or at best had the   
merit of embellishing a conception that 
had not grown on its own ground1 and of 
applying a series of confirmations from 

the study of nature now brought forward 
for the first time1 not indeed to       
strengthen the authority of this        
conception 7which was already           
established71 but rather to make a show 
with a supposed discovery of theoretical
 reason4    ,from these remarks1 the    
reader of the ,critique of ,pure        
,speculative ,reason will be thoroughly 
convinced how highly necessary that     
laborious deduction of the categories   
was1 and how fruitful for theology and  
morals4 ,for if1 on the one hand1 we    
place them in pure understanding1 it is 
by this deduction alone that we can be  
prevented from regarding them1 with     
,plato1 as innate1 and founding on them 
extravagant pretensions to theories of  
the supersensible1 to which we can see  
no end1 and by which we should make     
theology a magic lantern of chimeras2 on
 the other hand1 if we regard them as   
acquired1 this deduction saves us from  
restricting1 with ,epicurus1 all and    
every use of them1 even for practical   

purposes1 to the objects and motives of 
the senses4 ,but now that the ,critique 
has shown by that deduction1 first1 that
 they are not of empirical origin1 but  
have their seat and source a priori in  
the pure understanding2 secondly1 that  
as they refer to objects in general     
independently of the intuition of them1 
hence1 although they cannot effect      
theoretical knowledge1 except in        
application to empirical objects1 yet   
when applied to an object given by pure 
practical reason they enable us to      
conceive the supersensible definitely1  
only so far1 however1 as it is defined  
by such predicates as are necessarily   
connected with the pure practical       
purpose given a priori and with its     
possibility4 ,the speculative           
restriction of pure reason and its      
practical extension bring it into that  
relation of equality in which reason in 
general can be employed suitably to its 
end1 and this example proves better than
 any other that the path to wisdom1 if  

it is to be made sure and not to be     
impassable or misleading1 must with us  
men inevitably pass through science2 but
 it is not till this is complete that we
 can be convinced that it leads to this 
goal4                                   
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #he      
,,viii4 ,of ,belief from a ,requirement 
of ,pure ,reason4    ,a want or         
requirement of pure reason in its       
speculative use leads only to a         
hypothesis2 that of pure practical      
reason to a postulate2 for in the former
 case ,i ascend from the result as high 
as ,i please in the series of causes1   
not in order to give objective reality  
to the result 7e4g41 the causal         
connection of things and changes in the 
world71 but in order thoroughly to      
satisfy my inquiring reason in respect  
of it4 ,thus ,i see before me order and 
design in nature1 and need not resort to
 speculation to assure myself of their  
reality1 but to explain them ,i have to 
presuppose a ,deity as their cause2 and 

then since the inference from an effect 
to a definite cause is always uncertain 
and doubtful1 especially to a cause so  
precise and so perfectly defined as we  
have to conceive in ,god1 hence the     
highest degree of certainty to which    
this pre-supposition can be brought is  
that it is the most rational opinion for
 us men4 99 ,on the other hand1 a       
requirement of pure practical reason is 
based on a duty1 that of making         
something 7the summum bonum7 the object 
of my will so as to promote it with all 
my powers2 in which case ,i must suppose
 its possibility and1 consequently1 also
 the conditions necessary thereto1      
namely1 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality2 
since ,i cannot prove these by my       
speculative reason1 although neither can
 ,i refute them4 ,this duty is founded  
on something that is indeed quite       
independent of these suppositions and is
 of itself apodeictically certain1      
namely1 the moral law2 and so far it    
needs no further support by theoretical 

views as to the inner constitution of   
things1 the secret final aim of the     
order of the world1 or a presiding ruler
 thereof1 in order to bind me in the    
most perfect manner to act in           
unconditional conformity to the law4    
,but the subjective effect of this law1 
namely1 the mental disposition conformed
 to it and made necessary by it1 to     
promote the practically possible summum 
bonum1 this pre-supposes at least that  
the latter is possible1 for it would be 
practically impossible to strive after  
the object of a conception which at     
bottom was empty and had no object4 ,now
 the above-mentioned postulates concern 
only the physical or metaphysical       
conditions of the possibility of the    
summum bonum2 in a word1 those which lie
 in the nature of things2 not1 however1 
for the sake of an arbitrary speculative
 purpose1 but of a practically necessary
 end of a pure rational will1 which in  
this case does not choose1 but obeys an 
inexorable command of reason1 the       

foundation of which is objective1 in the
 constitution of things as they must be 
universally judged by pure reason1 and  
is not based on inclination2 for we are 
in nowise justified in assuming1 on     
account of what we wish on merely       
subjective grounds1 that the means      
thereto are possible or that its object 
is real4 ,this1 then1 is an absolutely  
necessary requirement1 and what it      
pre-supposes is not merely justified as 
an allowable hypothesis1 but as a       
postulate in a practical point of view2 
and admitting that the pure moral law   
inexorably binds every man as a command 
7not as a rule of prudence71 the        
righteous man may say3 ,i will that     
there be a ,god1 that my existence in   
this world be also an existence outside 
the chain of physical causes and in a   
pure world of the understanding1 and    
lastly1 that my duration be endless2 ,i 
firmly abide by this1 and will not let  
this faith be taken from me2 for in this
 instance alone my interest1 because ,i 

must not relax anything of it1          
inevitably determines my judgement1     
without regarding sophistries1 however  
unable ,i may be to answer them or to   
oppose them with others more plausible4 
997#b7    99 ,but even here we should   
not be able to allege a requirement of  
reason1 if we had not before our eyes a 
problematical1 but yet inevitable1      
conception of reason1 namely1 that of an
 absolutely necessary being4 ,this      
conception now seeks to be defined1 and 
this1 in addition to the tendency to    
extend itself1 is the objective ground  
of a requirement of speculative reason1 
namely1 to have a more precise          
definition of the conception of a       
necessary being which is to serve as the
 first cause of other beings1 so as to  
make these latter knowable by some      
means4 ,without such antecedent         
necessary problems there are no         
requirements- at least not of pure      
reason- the rest are requirements of    
inclination4                            

,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ij      
997#b7 ,in the ,deutsches ,museum1      
,february1 #aghg1 there is a            
dissertation by a very subtle and       
clear-headed man1 the late ,wizenmann1  
whose early death is to be lamented1 in 
which he disputes the right to argue    
from a want to the objective reality of 
its object1 and illustrates the point by
 the example of a man in love1 who      
having fooled himself into an idea of   
beauty1 which is merely a chimera of his
 own brain1 would fain conclude that    
such an object really exists somewhere4 
,i quite agree with him in this1 in all 
cases where the want is founded on      
inclination1 which cannot necessarily   
postulate the existence of its object   
even for the man that is affected by it1
 much less can it contain a demand valid
 for everyone1 and therefore it is      
merely a subjective ground of the wish4 
,but in the present case we have a want 
of reason springing from an objective   
determining principle of the will1      

namely1 the moral law1 which necessarily
 binds every rational being1 and        
therefore justifies him in assuming a   
priori in nature the conditions proper  
for it1 and makes the latter inseparable
 from the complete practical use of     
reason4 ,it is a duty to realize the    
summum bonum to the utmost of our power1
 therefore it must be possible1         
consequently it is unavoidable for every
 rational being in the world to assume  
what is necessary for its objective     
possibility4 ,the assumption is as      
necessary as the moral law1 in          
connection with which alone it is valid4
    ,in order to prevent misconception  
in the use of a notion as yet so unusual
 as that of a faith of pure practical   
reason1 let me be permitted to add one  
more remark4 ,it might almost seem as if
 this rational faith were here announced
 as itself a command1 namely1 that we   
should assume the summum bonum as       
possible4 ,but a faith that is commanded
 is nonsense4 ,let the preceding        

analysis1 however1 be remembered of what
 is required to be supposed in the      
conception of the summum bonum1 and it  
will be seen that it cannot be commanded
 to assume this possibility1 and no     
practical disposition of mind is        
required to admit it2 but that          
speculative reason must concede it      
without being asked1 for no one can     
affirm that it is impossible in itself  
that rational beings in the world should
 at the same time be worthy of happiness
 in conformity with the moral law and   
also possess this happiness             
proportionately4 ,now in respect of the 
first element of the summum bonum1      
namely1 that which concerns morality1   
the moral law gives merely a command1   
and to doubt the possibility of that    
element would be the same as to call in 
question the moral law itself4 ,but as  
regards the second element of that      
object1 namely1 happiness perfectly     
proportioned to that worthiness1 it is  
true that there is no need of a command 

to admit its possibility in general1 for
 theoretical reason has nothing to say  
against it2 but the manner in which we  
have to conceive this harmony of the    
laws of nature with those of freedom has
 in it something in respect of which we 
have a choice1 because theoretical      
reason decides nothing with apodeictic  
certainty about it1 and in respect of   
this there may be a moral interest which
 turns the scale4  ,i had said above    
that in a mere course of nature in the  
world an accurate correspondence between
 happiness and moral worth is not to be 
expected and must be regarded as        
impossible1 and that therefore the      
possibility of the summum bonum cannot  
be admitted from this side except on the
 supposition of a moral ,author of the  
world4 ,i purposely reserved the        
restriction of this judgement to the    
subjective conditions of our reason1 in 
order not to make use of it until the   
manner of this belief should be defined 
more precisely4 ,the fact is that the   

impossibility referred to is merely     
subjective1 that is1 our reason finds it
 impossible for it to render conceivable
 in the way of a mere course of nature a
 connection so exactly proportioned and 
so thoroughly adapted to an end1 between
 two sets of events happening according 
to such distinct laws2 although1 as with
 everything else in nature that is      
adapted to an end1 it cannot prove1 that
 is1 show by sufficient objective       
reason1 that it is not possible by      
universal laws of nature4  ,now1        
however1 a deciding principle of a      
different kind comes into play to turn  
the scale in this uncertainty of        
speculative reason4 ,the command to     
promote the summum bonum is established 
on an objective basis 7in practical     
reason72 the possibility of the same in 
general is likewise established on an   
objective basis 7in theoretical reason1 
which has nothing to say against it74   
,but reason cannot decide objectively in
 what way we are to conceive this       

possibility2 whether by universal laws  
of nature without a wise ,author        
presiding over nature1 or only on       
supposition of such an ,author4 ,now    
here there comes in a subjective        
condition of reason1 the only way       
theoretically possible for it1 of       
conceiving the exact harmony of the     
kingdom of nature with the kingdom of   
morals1 which is the condition of the   
possibility of the summum bonum2 and at 
the same time the only one conducive to 
morality 7which depends on an objective 
law of reason74 ,now since the promotion
 of this summum bonum1 and therefore the
 supposition of its possibility1 are    
objectively necessary 7though only as a 
result of practical reason71 while at   
the same time the manner in which we    
would conceive it rests with our own    
choice1 and in this choice a free       
interest of pure practical reason       
decides for the assumption of a wise    
,author of the world2 it is clear that  
the principle that herein determines our

 judgement1 though as a want it is      
subjective1 yet at the same time being  
the means of promoting what is          
objectively 7practically7 necessary1 is 
the foundation of a maxim of belief in a
 moral point of view1 that is1 a faith  
of pure practical reason4 ,this1 then1  
is not commanded1 but being a voluntary 
determination of our judgement1         
conducive to the moral 7commanded7      
purpose1 and moreover harmonizing with  
the theoretical requirement of reason1  
to assume that existence and to make it 
the foundation of our further employment
 of reason1 it has itself sprung from   
the moral disposition of mind2 it may   
therefore at times waver even in the    
well-disposed1 but can never be reduced 
to unbelief4                            
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ie      
,,ix4 ,of the ,wise ,adaptation of      
,man's ,cognitive ,faculties            
to his ,practical ,destination4    ,if  
human nature is destined to endeavour   
after the summum bonum1 we must suppose 

also that the measure of its cognitive  
faculties1 and particularly their       
relation to one another1 is suitable to 
this end4 ,now the ,critique of ,pure   
,speculative ,reason proves that this is
 incapable of solving satisfactorily the
 most weighty problems that are proposed
 to it1 although it does not ignore the 
natural and important hints received    
from the same reason1 nor the great     
steps that it can make to approach to   
this great goal that is set before it1  
which1 however1 it can never reach of   
itself1 even with the help of the       
greatest knowledge of nature4 ,nature   
then seems here to have provided us only
 in a step-motherly fashion with the    
faculty required for our end4           
,,book#b;,,chapter#b paragraph #ajj     
,suppose1 now1 that in this matter      
nature had conformed to our wish and had
 given us that capacity of discernment  
or that enlightenment which we would    
gladly possess1 or which some imagine   
they actually possess1 what would in all

 probability be the consequence8 ,unless
 our whole nature were at the same time 
changed1 our inclinations1 which always 
have the first word1 would first of all 
demand their own satisfaction1 and1     
joined with rational reflection1 the    
greatest possible and most lasting      
satisfaction1 under the name of         
happiness2 the moral law would          
afterwards speak1 in order to keep them 
within their proper bounds1 and even to 
subject them all to a higher end1 which 
has no regard to inclination4 ,but      
instead of the conflict that the moral  
disposition has now to carry on with the
 inclinations1 in which1 though after   
some defeats1 moral strength of mind may
 be gradually acquired1 ,god and        
eternity with their awful majesty would 
stand unceasingly before our eyes 7for  
what we can prove perfectly is to us as 
certain as that of which we are assured 
by the sight of our eyes74              
,transgression of the law1 would1 no    
doubt1 be avoided2 what is commanded    

would be done2 but the mental           
disposition1 from which actions ought to
 proceed1 cannot be infused by any      
command1 and in this case the spur of   
action is ever active and external1 so  
that reason has no need to exert itself 
in order to gather strength to resist   
the inclinations by a lively            
representation of the dignity of the    
law3 hence most of the actions that     
conformed to the law would be done from 
fear1 a few only from hope1 and none at 
all from duty1 and the moral worth of   
actions1 on which alone in the eyes of  
supreme wisdom the worth of the person  
and even that of the world depends1     
would cease to exist4 ,as long as the   
nature of man remains what it is1 his   
conduct would thus be changed into mere 
mechanism1 in which1 as in a            
puppet-show1 everything would           
gesticulate well1 but there would be no 
life in the figures4 ,now1 when it is   
quite otherwise with us1 when with all  
the effort of our reason we have only a 

very obscure and doubtful view into the 
future1 when the ,governor of the world 
allows us only to conjecture his        
existence and his majesty1 not to behold
 them or prove them clearly2 and on the 
other hand1 the moral law within us1    
without promising or threatening        
anything with certainty1 demands of us  
disinterested respect2 and only when    
this respect has become active and      
dominant1 does it allow us by means of  
it a prospect into the world of the     
supersensible1 and then only with weak  
glances3 all this being so1 there is    
room for true moral disposition1        
immediately devoted to the law1 and a   
rational creature can become worthy of  
sharing in the summum bonum that        
corresponds to the worth of his person  
and not merely to his actions4 ,thus    
what the study of nature and of man     
teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may   
well be true here also2 that the        
unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is
 not less worthy of admiration in what  

it has denied than in what it has       
granted4  ,,part#b,,methodology         
,,second ,,part4            ,methodology
 of ,pure ,practical ,reason4    ,by the
 methodology of pure practical reason we
 are not to understand the mode of      
proceeding with pure practical          
principles 7whether in study or in      
exposition71 with a view to a scientific
 knowledge of them1 which alone is what 
is properly called method elsewhere in  
theoretical philosophy 7for popular     
knowledge requires a manner1 science a  
method1 i4e41 a process according to    
principles of reason by which alone the 
manifold of any branch of knowledge can 
become a system74 ,on the contrary1 by  
this methodology is understood the mode 
in which we can give the laws of pure   
practical reason access to the human    
mind and influence on its maxims1 that  
is1 by which we can make the objectively
 practical reason subjectively practical
 also4  ,now it is clear enough that    
those determining principles of the will

 which alone make maxims properly moral 
and give them a moral worth1 namely1 the
 direct conception of the law and the   
objective necessity of obeying it as our
 duty1 must be regarded as the proper   
springs of actions1 since otherwise     
legality of actions might be produced1  
but not morality of character4 ,but it  
is not so clear2 on the contrary1 it    
must at first sight seem to every one   
very improbable that even subjectively  
that exhibition of pure virtue can have 
more power over the human mind1 and     
supply a far stronger spring even for   
effecting that legality of actions1 and 
can produce more powerful resolutions to
 prefer the law1 from pure respect for  
it1 to every other consideration1 than  
all the deceptive allurements of        
pleasure or of all that may be reckoned 
as happiness1 or even than all          
threatenings of pain and misfortune4    
,nevertheless1 this is actually the     
case1 and if human nature were not so   
constituted1 no mode of presenting the  

law by roundabout ways and indirect     
recommendations would ever produce      
morality of character4 ,all would be    
simple hypocrisy2 the law would be      
hated1 or at least despised1 while it   
was followed for the sake of one's own  
advantage4 ,the letter of the law       
7legality7 would be found in our        
actions1 but not the spirit of it in our
 minds 7morality72 and as with all our  
efforts we could not quite free         
ourselves from reason in our judgement1 
we must inevitably appear in our own    
eyes worthless1 depraved men1 even      
though we should seek to compensate     
ourselves for this mortification before 
the inner tribunal1 by enjoying the     
pleasure that a supposed natural or     
divine law might be imagined to have    
connected with it a sort of police      
machinery1 regulating its operations by 
what was done without troubling itself  
about the motives for doing it4  ,it    
cannot indeed be denied that in order to
 bring an uncultivated or degraded mind 

into the track of moral goodness some   
preparatory guidance is necessary1 to   
attract it by a view of its own         
advantage1 or to alarm it by fear of    
loss2 but as soon as this mechanical    
work1 these leading-strings have        
produced some effect1 then we must bring
 before the mind the pure moral motive1 
which1 not only because it is the only  
one that can be the foundation of a     
character 7a practically consistent     
habit of mind with unchangeable maxims71
 but also because it teaches a man to   
feel his own dignity1 gives the mind a  
power unexpected even by himself1 to    
tear himself from all sensible          
attachments so far as they would fain   
have the rule1 and to find a rich       
compensation for the sacrifice he       
offers1 in the independence of his      
rational nature and the greatness of    
soul to which he sees that he is        
destined4 ,we will therefore show1 by   
such observations as every one can make1
 that this property of our minds1 this  

receptivity for a pure moral interest1  
and consequently the moving force of the
 pure conception of virtue1 when it is  
properly applied to the human heart1 is 
the most powerful spring and1 when a    
continued and punctual observance of    
moral maxims is in question1 the only   
spring of good conduct4 ,it must1       
however1 be remembered that if these    
observations only prove the reality of  
such a feeling1 but do not show any     
moral improvement brought about by it1  
this is no argument against the only    
method that exists of making the        
objectively practical laws of pure      
reason subjectively practical1 through  
the mere force of the conception of     
duty2 nor does it prove that this method
 is a vain delusion4 ,for as it has     
never yet come into vogue1 experience   
can say nothing of its results2 one can 
only ask for proofs of the receptivity  
for such springs1 and these ,i will now 
briefly present1 and then sketch the    
method of founding and cultivating      

genuine moral dispositions4             
,,part#b,,methodology paragraph #e      
,when we attend to the course of        
conversation in mixed companies1        
consisting not merely of learned persons
 and subtle reasoners1 but also of men  
of business or of women1 we observe     
that1 besides story-telling and jesting1
 another kind of entertainment finds a  
place in them1 namely1 argument2 for    
stories1 if they are to have novelty and
 interest1 are soon exhausted1 and      
jesting is likely to become insipid4    
,now of all argument there is none in   
which persons are more ready to join who
 find any other subtle discussion       
tedious1 none that brings more          
liveliness into the company1 than that  
which concerns the moral worth of this  
or that action by which the character of
 some person is to be made out4         
,persons1 to whom in other cases        
anything subtle and speculative in      
theoretical questions is dry and        
irksome1 presently join in when the     

question is to make out the moral import
 of a good or bad action that has been  
related1 and they display an exactness1 
a refinement1 a subtlety1 in            
excogitating everything that can lessen 
the purity of purpose1 and consequently 
the degree of virtue in it1 which we do 
not expect from them in any other kind  
of speculation4 ,in these criticisms1   
persons who are passing judgement on    
others often reveal their own character3
 some1 in exercising their judicial     
office1 especially upon the dead1 seem  
inclined chiefly to defend the goodness 
that is related of this or that deed    
against all injurious charges of        
insincerity1 and ultimately to defend   
the whole moral worth of the person     
against the reproach of dissimulation   
and secret wickedness2 others1 on the   
contrary1 turn their thoughts more upon 
attacking this worth by accusation and  
fault finding4 ,we cannot always1       
however1 attribute to these latter the  
intention of arguing away virtue        

altogether out of all human examples in 
order to make it an empty name2 often1  
on the contrary1 it is only well-meant  
strictness in determining the true moral
 import of actions according to an      
uncompromising law4 ,comparison with    
such a law1 instead of with examples1   
lowers self-conceit in moral matters    
very much1 and not merely teaches       
humility1 but makes every one feel it   
when he examines himself closely4       
,nevertheless1 we can for the most part 
observe1 in those who defend the purity 
of purpose in giving examples that where
 there is the presumption of uprightness
 they are anxious to remove even the    
least spot1 lest1 if all examples had   
their truthfulness disputed1 and if the 
purity of all human virtue were denied1 
it might in the end be regarded as a    
mere phantom1 and so all effort to      
attain it be made light of as vain      
affectation and delusive conceit4  ,i do
 not know why the educators of youth    
have not long since made use of this    

propensity of reason to enter with      
pleasure upon the most subtle           
examination of the practical questions  
that are thrown up2 and why they have   
not1 after first laying the foundation  
of a purely moral catechism1 searched   
through the biographies of ancient and  
modern times with the view of having at 
hand instances of the duties laid down1 
in which1 especially by comparison of   
similar actions under different         
circumstances1 they might exercise the  
critical judgement of their scholars in 
remarking their greater or less moral   
significance4 ,this is a thing in which 
they would find that even early youth1  
which is still unripe for speculation of
 other kinds1 would soon ,become very   
acute and not a little interested1      
because it feels the progress of its    
faculty of judgement2 and1 what is most 
important1 they could hope with         
confidence that the frequent practice of
 knowing and approving good conduct in  
all its purity1 and on the other hand of

 remarking with regret or contempt the  
least deviation from it1 although it may
 be pursued only as a sport in which    
children may compete with one another1  
yet will leave a lasting impression of  
esteem on the one hand and disgust on   
the other2 and so1 by the mere habit of 
looking on such actions as deserving    
approval or blame1 a good foundation    
would be laid for uprightness in the    
future course of life4 ,only ,i wish    
they would spare them the example of    
so-called noble 7super-meritorious7     
actions1 in which our sentimental books 
so much abound1 and would refer all to  
duty merely1 and to the worth that a man
 can and must give himself in his own   
eyes by the consciousness of not having 
transgressed it1 since whatever runs up 
into empty wishes and longings after    
inaccessible perfection produces mere   
heroes of romance1 who1 while they pique
 themselves on their feeling for        
transcendent greatness1 release         
themselves in return from the observance

 of common and every-day obligations1   
which then seem to them petty and       
insignificant4 99    99 ,it is quite    
proper to extol actions that display a  
great1 unselfish1 sympathizing mind or  
humanity4 ,but1 in this case1 we must   
fix attention not so much on the        
elevation of soul1 which is very        
fleeting and transitory1 as on the      
subjection of the heart to duty1 from   
which a more enduring impression may be 
expected1 because this implies principle
 7whereas the former only implies       
ebullitions74 ,one need only reflect a  
little and he will always find a debt   
that he has by some means incurred      
towards the human race 7even if it were 
only this1 by the inequality of men in  
the civil constitution1 enjoys          
advantages on account of which others   
must be the more in want71 which will   
prevent the thought of duty from being  
repressed by the self-complacent        
imagination of merit4                   
,,part#b,,methodology paragraph #aj     

,but if it is asked3 ,what1 then1 is    
really pure morality1 by which as a     
touchstone we must test the moral       
significance of every action1 then ,i   
must admit that it is only philosophers 
that can make the decision of this      
question doubtful1 for to common sense  
it has been decided long ago1 not indeed
 by abstract general formulae1 but by   
habitual use1 like the distinction      
between the right and left hand4 ,we    
will then point out the criterion of    
pure virtue in an example first1 and1   
imagining that it is set before a boy1  
of say ten years old1 for his judgement1
 we will see whether he would           
necessarily judge so of himself without 
being guided by his teacher4 ,tell him  
the history of an honest man whom men   
want to persuade to join the            
calumniators of an innocent and         
powerless person 7say ,anne ,boleyn1    
accused by ,henry ,,viii of ,england74  
,he is offered advantages1 great gifts1 
or high rank2 he rejects them4 ,this    

will excite mere approbation and        
applause in the mind of the hearer4 ,now
 begins the threatening of loss4        
,amongst these traducers are his best   
friends1 who now renounce his           
friendship2 near kinsfolk1 who threaten 
to disinherit him 7he being without     
fortune72 powerful persons1 who can     
persecute and harass him in all places  
and circumstances2 a prince1 who        
threatens him with loss of freedom1 yea1
 loss of life4 ,then to fill the measure
 of suffering1 and that he may feel the 
pain that only the morally good heart   
can feel very deeply1 let us conceive   
his family threatened with extreme      
distress and want1 entreating him to    
yield2 conceive himself1 though upright1
 yet with feelings not hard or          
insensible either to compassion or to   
his own distress2 conceive him1 ,i say1 
at the moment when he wishes that he had
 never lived to see the day that exposed
 him to such unutterable anguish1 yet   
remaining true to his uprightness of    

purpose1 without wavering or even       
doubting2 then will my youthful hearer  
be raised gradually from mere approval  
to admiration1 from that to amazement1  
and finally to the greatest veneration1 
and a lively wish that he himself could 
be such a man 7though certainly not in  
such circumstances74 ,yet virtue is here
 worth so much only because it costs so 
much1 not because it brings any profit4 
,all the admiration1 and even the       
endeavour to resemble this character1   
rest wholly on the purity of the moral  
principle1 which can only be strikingly 
shown by removing from the springs of   
action everything that men may regard as
 part of happiness4 ,morality1 then1    
must have the more power over the human 
heart the more purely it is exhibited4  
,whence it follows that1 if the law of  
morality and the image of holiness and  
virtue are to exercise any influence at 
all on our souls1 they can do so only so
 far as they are laid to heart in their 
purity as motives1 unmixed with any view

 to prosperity1 for it is in suffering  
that they display themselves most nobly4
 ,now that whose removal strengthens the
 effect of a moving force must have been
 a hindrance1 consequently every        
admixture of motives taken from our own 
happiness is a hindrance to the         
influence of the moral law on the heart4
 ,i affirm further that even in that    
admired action1 if the motive from which
 it was done was a high regard for duty1
 then it is just this respect for the   
law that has the greatest influence on  
the mind of the spectator1 not any      
pretension to a supposed inward         
greatness of mind or noble meritorious  
sentiments2 consequently duty1 not      
merit1 must have not only the most      
definite1 but1 when it is represented in
 the true light of its inviolability1   
the most penetrating1 influence on the  
mind4  ,it is more necessary than ever  
to direct attention to this method in   
our times1 when men hope to produce more
 effect on the mind with soft1 tender   

feelings1 or high-flown1 puffing-up     
pretensions1 which rather wither the    
heart than strengthen it1 than by a     
plain and earnest representation of     
duty1 which is more suited to human     
imperfection and to progress in         
goodness4 ,to set before children1 as a 
pattern1 actions that are called noble1 
magnanimous1 meritorious1 with the      
notion of captivating them by infusing  
enthusiasm for such actions1 is to      
defeat our end4 ,for as they are still  
so backward in the observance of the    
commonest duty1 and even in the correct 
estimation of it1 this means simply to  
make them fantastical romancers betimes4
 ,but1 even with the instructed and     
experienced part of mankind1 this       
supposed spring has1 if not an          
injurious1 at least no genuine1 moral   
effect on the heart1 which1 however1 is 
what it was desired to produce4  ,all   
feelings1 especially those that are to  
produce unwonted exertions1 must        
accomplish their effect at the moment   

they are at their height and before the 
calm down2 otherwise they effect        
nothing2 for as there was nothing to    
strengthen the heart1 but only to excite
 it1 it naturally returns to its normal 
moderate tone and1 thus1 falls back into
 its previous languor4 ,principles must 
be built on conceptions2 on any other   
basis there can only be paroxysms1 which
 can give the person no moral worth1    
nay1 not even confidence in himself1    
without which the highest good in man1  
consciousness of the morality of his    
mind and character1 cannot exist4 ,now  
if these conceptions are to become      
subjectively practical1 we must not rest
 satisfied with admiring the objective  
law of morality1 and esteeming it highly
 in reference to humanity1 but we must  
consider the conception of it in        
relation to man as an individual1 and   
then this law appears in a form indeed  
that is highly deserving of respect1 but
 not so pleasant as if it belonged to   
the element to which he is naturally    

accustomed2 but on the contrary as often
 compelling him to quit this element1   
not without self-denial1 and to betake  
himself to a higher1 in which he can    
only maintain himself with trouble and  
with unceasing apprehension of a        
relapse4 ,in a word1 the moral law      
demands obedience1 from duty not from   
predilection1 which cannot and ought not
 to be presupposed at all4  ,let us now 
see1 in an example1 whether the         
conception of an action1 as a noble and 
magnanimous one1 has more subjective    
moving power than if the action is      
conceived merely as duty in relation to 
the solemn law of morality4 ,the action 
by which a man endeavours at the        
greatest peril of life to rescue people 
from shipwreck1 at last losing his life 
in the attempt1 is reckoned on one side 
as duty1 but on the other and for the   
most part as a meritorious action1 but  
our esteem for it is much weakened by   
the notion of duty to himself which     
seems in this case to be somewhat       

infringed4 ,more decisive is the        
magnanimous sacrifice of life for the   
safety of one's country2 and yet there  
still remains some scruple whether it is
 a perfect duty to devote one's self to 
this purpose spontaneously and unbidden1
 and the action has not in itself the   
full force of a pattern and impulse to  
imitation4 ,but if an indispensable duty
 be in question1 the transgression of   
which violates the moral law itself1 and
 without regard to the welfare of       
mankind1 and as it were tramples on its 
holiness 7such as are usually called    
duties to ,god1 because in ,him we      
conceive the ideal of holiness in       
substance71 then we give our most       
perfect esteem to the pursuit of it at  
the sacrifice of all that can have any  
value for the dearest inclinations1 and 
we find our soul strengthened and       
elevated by such an example1 when we    
convince ourselves by contemplation of  
it that human nature is capable of so   
great an elevation above every motive   

that nature can oppose to it4 ,juvenal  
describes such an example in a climax   
which makes the reader feel vividly the 
force of the spring that is contained in
 the pure law of duty1 as duty3         
,,part#b,,methodology paragraph #ae     
,esto bonus miles1 tutor bonus1 arbiter 
idem    ,integer2 ambiguae si quando    
citabere testis    ,incertaeque rei1    
,phalaris licet imperet ut sis          
,falsus1 et admoto dictet periuria      
tauro1    ,summum crede nefas animam    
praeferre pudori1                       
,,part#b,,methodology paragraph #bj     
,et propter vitam vivendi perdere       
causas4 99    99 ,juvenal1 ,satirae1 ,be
 you a good soldier1 a faithful tutor1  
an uncorrupted umpire also2 if you are  
summoned as a witness in a doubtful and 
uncertain thing1 though ,phalaris should
 command that you should be false1 and  
should dictate perjuries with the bull  
brought to you1 believe it the highest  
impiety to prefer life to reputation1   
and for the sake of life1 to lose the   

causes of living4    ,when we can bring 
any flattering thought of merit into our
 action1 then the motive is already     
somewhat alloyed with self-love and has 
therefore some assistance from the side 
of the sensibility4 ,but to postpone    
everything to the holiness of duty      
alone1 and to be conscious that we can  
because our own reason recognises this  
as its command and says that we ought to
 do it1 this is1 as it were1 to raise   
ourselves altogether above the world of 
sense1 and there is inseparably involved
 in the same a consciousness of the law1
 as a spring of a faculty that controls 
the sensibility2 and although this is   
not always attended with effect1 yet    
frequent engagement with this spring1   
and the at first minor attempts at using
 it1 give hope that this effect may be  
wrought1 and that by degrees the        
greatest1 and that a purely moral       
interest in it may be produced in us4   
,,part#b,,methodology paragraph #be     
,the method then takes the following    

course4 ,at first we are only concerned 
to make the judging of actions by moral 
laws a natural employment accompanying  
all our own free actions1 as well as the
 observation of those of others1 and to 
make it as it were a habit1 and to      
sharpen this judgement1 asking first    
whether the action conforms objectively 
to the moral law1 and to what law2 and  
we distinguish the law that merely      
furnishes a principle of obligation from
 that which is really obligatory 7leges 
obligandi a legibus obligantibus72 as1  
for instance1 the law of what men's     
wants require from me1 as contrasted    
with that which their rights demand1 the
 latter of which prescribes essential1  
the former only non-essential duties2   
and thus we teach how to distinguish    
different kinds of duties which meet in 
the same action4 ,the other point to    
which attention must be directed is the 
question whether the action was also    
7subjectively7 done for the sake of the 
moral law1 so that it not only is       

morally correct as a deed1 but also1 by 
the maxim from which it is done1 has    
moral worth as a disposition4 ,now there
 is no doubt that this practice1 and the
 resulting culture of our reason in     
judging merely of the practical1 must   
gradually produce a certain interest    
even in the law of reason1 and          
consequently in morally good actions4   
,for we ultimately take a liking for a  
thing1 the contemplation of which makes 
us feel that the use of our cognitive   
faculties is extended2 and this         
extension is especially furthered by    
that in which we find moral correctness1
 since it is only in such an order of   
things that reason1 with its faculty of 
determining a priori on principle what  
ought to be done1 can find satisfaction4
 ,an observer of nature takes liking at 
last to objects that at first offended  
his senses1 when he discovers in them   
the great adaptation of their           
organization to design1 so that his     
reason finds food in its contemplation4 

,so ,leibnitz spared an insect that he  
had carefully examined with the         
microscope1 and replaced it on its leaf1
 because he had found himself instructed
 by the view of it and had1 as it were1 
received a benefit from it4  ,but this  
employment of the faculty of judgement1 
which makes us feel our own cognitive   
powers1 is not yet the interest in      
actions and in their morality itself4   
,it merely causes us to take pleasure in
 engaging in such criticism1 and it     
gives to virtue or the disposition that 
conforms to moral laws a form of beauty1
 which is admired1 but not on that      
account sought after 7laudatur et       
alget72 as everything the contemplation 
of which produces a consciousness of the
 harmony of our powers of conception1   
and in which we feel the whole of our   
faculty of knowledge 7understanding and 
imagination7 strengthened1 produces a   
satisfaction1 which may also be         
communicated to others1 while           
nevertheless the existence of the object

 remains indifferent to us1 being only  
regarded as the occasion of our becoming
 aware of the capacities in us which are
 elevated above mere animal nature4     
,now1 however1 the second exercise comes
 in1 the living exhibition of morality  
of character by examples1 in which      
attention is directed to purity of will1
 first only as a negative perfection1 in
 so far as in an action done from duty  
no motives of inclination have any      
influence in determining it4 ,by this   
the pupil's attention is fixed upon the 
consciousness of his freedom1 and       
although this renunciation at first     
excites a feeling of pain1 nevertheless1
 by its withdrawing the pupil from the  
constraint of even real wants1 there is 
proclaimed to him at the same time a    
deliverance from the manifold           
dissatisfaction in which all these wants
 entangle him1 and the mind is made     
capable of receiving the sensation of   
satisfaction from other sources4 ,the   
heart is freed and lightened of a burden

 that always secretly presses on it1    
when instances of pure moral resolutions
 reveal to the man an inner faculty of  
which otherwise he has no right         
knowledge1 the inward freedom to release
 himself from the boisterous importunity
 of inclinations1 to such a degree that 
none of them1 not even the dearest1     
shall have any influence on a           
resolution1 for which we are now to     
employ our reason4 ,suppose a case where
 ,i alone know that the wrong is on my  
side1 and although a free confession of 
it and the offer of satisfaction are so 
strongly opposed by vanity1 selfishness1
 and even an otherwise not illegitimate 
antipathy to the man whose rights are   
impaired by me1 ,i am nevertheless able 
to discard all these considerations2 in 
this there is implied a consciousness of
 independence on inclinations and       
circumstances1 and of the possibility of
 being sufficient for myself1 which is  
salutary to me in general for other     
purposes also4 ,and now the law of duty1

 in consequence of the positive worth   
which obedience to it makes us feel1    
finds easier access through the respect 
for ourselves in the consciousness of   
our freedom4 ,when this is well         
established1 when a man dreads nothing  
more than to find himself1 on           
self-examination1 worthless and         
contemptible in his own eyes1 then every
 good moral disposition can be grafted  
on it1 because this is the best1 nay1   
the only guard that can keep off from   
the mind the pressure of ignoble and    
corrupting motives4  ,i have only       
intended to point out the most general  
maxims of the methodology of moral      
cultivation and exercise4 ,as the       
manifold variety of duties requires     
special rules for each kind1 and this   
would be a prolix affair1 ,i shall be   
readily excused if in a work like this1 
which is only preliminary1 ,i content   
myself with these outlines4             
,,part#b;,,conclusion                   
,,conclusion4    ,two things fill the   

mind with ever new and increasing       
admiration and awe1 the oftener and the 
more steadily we reflect on them3 the   
starry heavens above and the moral law  
within4 ,i have not to search for them  
and conjecture them as though they were 
veiled in darkness or were in the       
transcendent region beyond my horizon2  
,i see them before me and connect them  
directly with the consciousness of my   
existence4 ,the former begins from the  
place ,i occupy in the external world of
 sense1 and enlarges my connection      
therein to an unbounded extent with     
worlds upon worlds and systems of       
systems1 and moreover into limitless    
times of their periodic motion1 its     
beginning and continuance4 ,the second  
begins from my invisible self1 my       
personality1 and exhibits me in a world 
which has true infinity1 but which is   
traceable only by the understanding1 and
 with which ,i discern that ,i am not in
 a merely contingent but in a universal 
and necessary connection1 as ,i am also 

thereby with all those visible worlds4  
,the former view of a countless         
multitude of worlds annihilates as it   
were my importance as an animal         
creature1 which after it has been for a 
short time provided with vital power1   
one knows not how1 must again give back 
the matter of which it was formed to the
 planet it inhabits 7a mere speck in the
 universe74 ,the second1 on the         
contrary1 infinitely elevates my worth  
as an intelligence by my personality1 in
 which the moral law reveals to me a    
life independent of animality and even  
of the whole sensible world1 at least so
 far as may be inferred from the        
destination assigned to my existence by 
this law1 a destination not restricted  
to conditions and limits of this life1  
but reaching into the infinite4  ,but   
though admiration and respect may excite
 to inquiry1 they cannot supply the want
 of it4 ,what1 then1 is to be done in   
order to enter on this in a useful      
manner and one adapted to the loftiness 

of the subject8 ,examples may serve in  
this as a warning and also for          
imitation4 ,the contemplation of the    
world began from the noblest spectacle  
that the human senses present to us1 and
 that our understanding can bear to     
follow in their vast reach2 and it      
ended- in astrology4 ,morality began    
with the noblest attribute of human     
nature1 the development and cultivation 
of which give a prospect of infinite    
utility2 and ended- in fanaticism or    
superstition4 ,so it is with all crude  
attempts where the principal part of the
 business depends on the use of reason1 
a use which does not come of itself1    
like the use of the feet1 by frequent   
exercise1 especially when attributes are
 in question which cannot be directly   
exhibited in common experience4 ,but    
after the maxim had come into vogue1    
though late1 to examine carefully       
beforehand all the steps that reason    
purposes to take1 and not to let it     
proceed otherwise than in the track of a

 previously well considered method1 then
 the study of the structure of the      
universe took quite a different         
direction1 and thereby attained an      
incomparably happier result4 ,the fall  
of a stone1 the motion of a sling1      
resolved into their elements and the    
forces that are manifested in them1 and 
treated mathematically1 produced at last
 that clear and henceforward            
unchangeable insight into the system of 
the world which1 as observation is      
continued1 may hope always to extend    
itself1 but need never fear to be       
compelled to retreat4  ,this example may
 suggest to us to enter on the same path
 in treating of the moral capacities of 
our nature1 and may give us hope of a   
like good result4 ,we have at hand the  
instances of the moral judgement of     
reason4 ,by analysing these into their  
elementary conceptions1 and in default  
of mathematics adopting a process       
similar to that of chemistry1 the       
separation of the empirical from the    

rational elements that may be found in  
them1 by repeated experiments on common 
sense1 we may exhibit both pure1 and    
learn with certainty what each part can 
accomplish of itself1 so as to prevent  
on the one hand the errors of a still   
crude untrained judgement1 and on the   
other hand 7what is far more necessary7 
the extravagances of genius1 by which1  
as by the adepts of the philosopher's   
stone1 without any methodical study or  
knowledge of nature1 visionary treasures
 are promised and the true are thrown   
away4 ,in one word1 science 7critically 
undertaken and methodically directed7 is
 the narrow gate that leads to the true 
doctrine of practical wisdom1 if we     
understand by this not merely what one  
ought to do1 but what ought to serve    
teachers as a guide to construct well   
and clearly the road to wisdom which    
everyone should travel1 and to secure   
others from going astray4 ,philosophy   
must always continue to be the guardian 
of this science2 and although the public

 does not take any interest in its      
subtle investigations1 it must take an  
interest in the resulting doctrines1    
which such an examination first puts in 
a clear light4                          
,,the ,,end