#aghe ,,fundamental ,,principles ,,of ,,the ,,metaphysic ,,of ,,morals by ,immanuel ,kant translated by ,thomas ,kingsmill ,abbott ,,preface ,ancient ,greek philosophy was divided into three sciences3 physics1 ethics1 and logic4 ,this division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing2 and the only improvement that can be made in it is to add the principle on which it is based1 so that we may both satisfy ourselves of its completeness1 and also be able to determine correctly the necessary subdivisions4 ,all rational knowledge is either material or formal3 the former considers some object1 the latter is concerned only with the form of the understanding and of the reason itself1 and with the universal laws of thought in general without distinction of its objects4 ,formal philosophy is called logic4 ,material philosophy1 however1 which has to do with determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject1 is again twofold2 for these laws are either laws of nature or of freedom4 ,the science of the former is physics1 that of the latter1 ethics2 they are also called natural philosophy and moral philosophy respectively4 ,logic cannot have any empirical part2 that is1 a part in which the universal and necessary laws of thought should rest on grounds taken from experience2 otherwise it would not be logic1 i4e41 a canon for the understanding or the reason1 valid for all thought1 and capable of demonstration4 ,natural and moral philosophy1 on the contrary1 can each have their empirical part1 since the former has to determine the laws of nature as an object of experience2 the latter the laws of the human will1 so far as it is affected by nature3 the former1 however1 being laws according to which everything does happen2 the latter1 laws according to which everything ought to happen4 ,ethics1 however1 must also consider the conditions under which what ought to happen frequently does not4 ,we may call all philosophy empirical1 so far as it is based on grounds of experience3 on the other hand1 that which delivers its doctrines from a priori principles alone we may call pure philosophy4 ,when the latter is merely formal it is logic2 if it is restricted to definite objects of the understanding it is metaphysic4 ,in this way there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals4 ,physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part4 ,it is the same with ,ethics2 but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology1 the name morality being appropriated to the rational part4 ,all trades1 arts1 and handiworks have gained by division of labour1 namely1 when1 instead of one man doing everything1 each confines himself to a certain kind of work distinct from others in the treatment it requires1 so as to be able to perform it with greater facility and in the greatest perfection4 ,where the different kinds of work are not distinguished and divided1 where everyone is a jack-of-all-trades1 there manufactures remain still in the greatest barbarism4 ,it might deserve to be considered whether pure philosophy in all its parts does not require a man specially devoted to it1 and whether it would not be better for the whole business of science if those who1 to please the tastes of the public1 are wont to blend the rational and empirical elements together1 mixed in all sorts of proportions unknown to themselves1 and who call themselves independent thinkers1 giving the name of minute philosophers to those who apply themselves to the rational part only- if these1 ,i say1 were warned not to carry on two employments together which differ widely in the treatment they demand1 for each of which perhaps a special talent is required1 and the combination of which in one person only produces bunglers4 ,but ,i only ask here whether the nature of science does not require that we should always carefully separate the empirical from the rational part1 and prefix to ,physics proper 7or empirical physics7 a metaphysic of nature1 and to practical anthropology a metaphysic of morals1 which must be carefully cleared of everything empirical1 so that we may know how much can be accomplished by pure reason in both cases1 and from what sources it draws this its a priori teaching1 and that whether the latter inquiry is conducted by all moralists 7whose name is legion71 or only by some who feel a calling thereto4 ,as my concern here is with moral philosophy1 ,i limit the question suggested to this3 ,whether it is not of the utmost necessity to construct a pure thing which is only empirical and which belongs to anthropology8 for that such a philosophy must be possible is evident from the common idea of duty and of the moral laws4 ,everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force1 i4e41 to be the basis of an obligation1 it must carry with it absolute necessity2 that1 for example1 the precept1 ,thou shalt not lie1 is not valid for men alone1 as if other rational beings had no need to observe it2 and so with all the other moral laws properly so called2 that1 therefore1 the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man1 or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed1 but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason2 and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal1 yet in as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis1 perhaps only as to a motive1 such a precept1 while it may be a practical rule1 can never be called a moral law4 ,thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical1 but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part4 ,when applied to man1 it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself 7anthropology71 but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being4 ,no doubt these laws require a judgement sharpened by experience1 in order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are applicable1 and on the other to procure for them access to the will of the man and effectual influence on conduct2 since man is acted on by so many inclinations that1 though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason1 he is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto in his life4 ,a metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary1 not merely for speculative reasons1 in order to investigate the sources of the practical principles which are to be found a priori in our reason1 but also because morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption1 as long as we are without that clue and supreme canon by which to estimate them correctly4 ,for in order that an action should be morally good1 it is not enough that it conform to the moral law1 but it must also be done for the sake of the law1 otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain2 since a principle which is not moral1 although it may now and then produce actions conformable to the law1 will also often produce actions which contradict it4 ,now it is only in a pure philosophy that we can look for the moral law in its purity and genuineness 7and1 in a practical matter1 this is of the utmost consequence73 we must1 therefore1 begin with pure philosophy 7metaphysic71 and without it there cannot be any moral philosophy at all4 ,that which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not deserve the name of philosophy 7for what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is that it treats in separate sciences what the latter only comprehends confusedly72 much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy1 since by this confusion it even spoils the purity of morals themselves1 and counteracts its own end4 ,let it not be thought1 however1 that what is here demanded is already extant in the propaedeutic prefixed by the celebrated ,wolf to his moral philosophy1 namely1 his so-called general practical philosophy1 and that1 therefore1 we have not to strike into an entirely new field4 ,just because it was to be a general practical philosophy1 it has not taken into consideration a will of any particular kind- say one which should be determined solely from a priori principles without any empirical motives1 and which we might call a pure will1 but volition in general1 with all the actions and conditions which belong to it in this general signification4 ,by this it is distinguished from a metaphysic of morals1 just as general logic1 which treats of the acts and canons of thought in general1 is distinguished from transcendental philosophy1 which treats of the particular acts and canons of pure thought1 i4e41 that whose cognitions are altogether a priori4 ,for the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will1 and not the acts and conditions of human volition generally1 which for the most part are drawn from psychology4 ,it is true that moral laws and duty are spoken of in the general moral philosophy 7contrary indeed to all fitness74 ,but this is no objection1 for in this respect also the authors of that science remain true to their idea of it2 they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone altogether a priori1 and which are properly moral1 from the empirical motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by comparison of experiences2 but1 without noticing the difference of their sources1 and looking on them all as homogeneous1 they consider only their greater or less amount4 ,it is in this way they frame their notion of obligation1 which1 though anything but moral1 is all that can be attained in a philosophy which passes no judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts1 whether they are a priori1 or only a posteriori4 ,intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals1 ,i issue in the first instance these fundamental principles4 ,indeed there is properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason2 just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative reason1 already published4 ,but in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the latter1 because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness1 even in the commonest understanding1 while on the contrary in its theoretic but pure use it is wholly dialectical2 and in the second place if the critique of a pure practical ,reason is to be complete1 it must be possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle1 for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application4 ,i could not1 however1 bring it to such completeness here1 without introducing considerations of a wholly different kind1 which would be perplexing to the reader4 ,on this account ,i have adopted the title of ,fundamental ,principles of the ,metaphysic of ,morals instead of that of a ,critical ,examination of the pure practical reason4 ,but in the third place1 since a metaphysic of morals1 in spite of the discouraging title1 is yet capable of being presented in popular form1 and one adapted to the common understanding1 ,i find it useful to separate from it this preliminary treatise on its fundamental principles1 in order that ,i may not hereafter have need to introduce these necessarily subtle discussions into a book of a more simple character4 ,the present treatise is1 however1 nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality1 and this alone constitutes a study complete in itself and one which ought to be kept apart from every other moral investigation4 ,no doubt my conclusions on this weighty question1 which has hitherto been very unsatisfactorily examined1 would receive much light from the application of the same principle to the whole system1 and would be greatly confirmed by the adequacy which it exhibits throughout2 but ,i must forego this advantage1 which indeed would be after all more gratifying than useful1 since the easy applicability of a principle and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness1 but rather inspire a certain partiality1 which prevents us from examining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to consequences4 ,i have adopted in this work the method which ,i think most suitable1 proceeding analytically from common knowledge to the determination of its ultimate principle1 and again descending synthetically from the examination of this principle and its sources to the common knowledge in which we find it employed4 ,the division will1 therefore1 be as follows3 #a ,,first ,,section4 ,transition from the common rational knowledge of morality to the philosophical4 #b ,,second ,,section4 ,transition from popular moral philosophy to the metaphysic of morals4 #c ,,third ,,section4 ,final step from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of the pure practical reason4 ,,sec#a ,,first ,,section ,,transition ,,from ,,the ,,common ,,rational ,,knowledge ,,of ,,morality ,,to ,,the ,,philosophical ,nothing can possibly be conceived in the world1 or even out of it1 which can be called good1 without qualification1 except a good will4 ,intelligence1 wit1 judgement1 and the other talents of the mind1 however they may be named1 or courage1 resolution1 perseverance1 as qualities of temperament1 are undoubtedly good and desirable in many respects2 but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them1 and which1 therefore1 constitutes what is called character1 is not good4 ,it is the same with the gifts of fortune4 ,power1 riches1 honour1 even health1 and the general well-being and contentment with one's condition which is called happiness1 inspire pride1 and often presumption1 if there is not a good will to correct the influence of these on the mind1 and with this also to rectify the whole principle of acting and adapt it to its end4 ,the sight of a being who is not adorned with a single feature of a pure and good will1 enjoying unbroken prosperity1 can never give pleasure to an impartial rational spectator4 ,thus a good will appears to constitute the indispensable condition even of being worthy of happiness4 ,there are even some qualities which are of service to this good will itself and may facilitate its action1 yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value1 but always presuppose a good will1 and this qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good4 ,moderation in the affections and passions1 self-control1 and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects1 but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of the person2 but they are far from deserving to be called good without qualification1 although they have been so unconditionally praised by the ancients4 ,for without the principles of a good will1 they may become extremely bad1 and the coolness of a villain not only makes him far more dangerous1 but also directly makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it4 ,a good will is good not because of what it performs or effects1 not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end1 but simply by virtue of the volition2 that is1 it is good in itself1 and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination1 nay even of the sum total of all inclinations4 ,even if it should happen that1 owing to special disfavour of fortune1 or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature1 this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose1 if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing1 and there should remain only the good will 7not1 to be sure1 a mere wish1 but the summoning of all means in our power71 then1 like a jewel1 it would still shine by its own light1 as a thing which has its whole value in itself4 ,its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add nor take away anything from this value4 ,it would be1 as it were1 only the setting to enable us to handle it the more conveniently in common commerce1 or to attract to it the attention of those who are not yet connoisseurs1 but not to recommend it to true connoisseurs1 or to determine its value4 ,there is1 however1 something so strange in this idea of the absolute value of the mere will1 in which no account is taken of its utility1 that notwithstanding the thorough assent of even common reason to the idea1 yet a suspicion must arise that it may perhaps really be the product of mere high-flown fancy1 and that we may have misunderstood the purpose of nature in assigning reason as the governor of our will4 ,therefore we will examine this idea from this point of view4 ,in the physical constitution of an organized being1 that is1 a being adapted suitably to the purposes of life1 we assume it as a fundamental principle that no organ for any purpose will be found but what is also the fittest and best adapted for that purpose4 ,now in a being which has reason and a will1 if the proper object of nature were its conservation1 its welfare1 in a word1 its happiness1 then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose4 ,for all the actions which the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose1 and the whole rule of its conduct1 would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct1 and that end would have been attained thereby much more certainly than it ever can be by reason4 ,should reason have been communicated to this favoured creature over and above1 it must only have served it to contemplate the happy constitution of its nature1 to admire it1 to congratulate itself thereon1 and to feel thankful for it to the beneficent cause1 but not that it should subject its desires to that weak and delusive guidance and meddle bunglingly with the purpose of nature4 ,in a word1 nature would have taken care that reason should not break forth into practical exercise1 nor have the presumption1 with its weak insight1 to think out for itself the plan of happiness1 and of the means of attaining it4 ,nature would not only have taken on herself the choice of the ends1 but also of the means1 and with wise foresight would have entrusted both to instinct4 ,and1 in fact1 we find that the more a cultivated reason applies itself with deliberate purpose to the enjoyment of life and happiness1 so much the more does the man fail of true satisfaction4 ,and from this circumstance there arises in many1 if they are candid enough to confess it1 a certain degree of misology1 that is1 hatred of reason1 especially in the case of those who are most experienced in the use of it1 because after calculating all the advantages they derive1 ,i do not say from the invention of all the arts of common luxury1 but even from the sciences 7which seem to them to be after all only a luxury of the understanding71 they find that they have1 in fact1 only brought more trouble on their shoulders1 rather than gained in happiness2 and they end by envying1 rather than despising1 the more common stamp of men who keep closer to the guidance of mere instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their conduct4 ,and this we must admit1 that the judgement of those who would very much lower the lofty eulogies of the advantages which reason gives us in regard to the happiness and satisfaction of life1 or who would even reduce them below zero1 is by no means morose or ungrateful to the goodness with which the world is governed1 but that there lies at the root of these judgements the idea that our existence has a different and far nobler end1 for which1 and not for happiness1 reason is properly intended1 and which must1 therefore1 be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private ends of man must1 for the most part1 be postponed4 ,for as reason is not competent to guide the will with certainty in regard to its objects and the satisfaction of all our wants 7which it to some extent even multiplies71 this being an end to which an implanted instinct would have led with much greater certainty2 and since1 nevertheless1 reason is imparted to us as a practical faculty1 i4e41 as one which is to have influence on the will1 therefore1 admitting that nature generally in the distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end1 its true destination must be to produce a will1 not merely good as a means to something else1 but good in itself1 for which reason was absolutely necessary4 ,this will then1 though not indeed the sole and complete good1 must be the supreme good and the condition of every other1 even of the desire of happiness4 ,under these circumstances1 there is nothing inconsistent with the wisdom of nature in the fact that the cultivation of the reason1 which is requisite for the first and unconditional purpose1 does in many ways interfere1 at least in this life1 with the attainment of the second1 which is always conditional1 namely1 happiness4 ,nay1 it may even reduce it to nothing1 without nature thereby failing of her purpose4 ,for reason recognizes the establishment of a good will as its highest practical destination1 and in attaining this purpose is capable only of a satisfaction of its own proper kind1 namely that from the attainment of an end1 which end again is determined by reason only1 notwithstanding that this may involve many a disappointment to the ends of inclination4 ,we have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself and is good without a view to anything further1 a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding1 requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught1 and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place and constitutes the condition of all the rest4 ,in order to do this1 we will take the notion of duty1 which includes that of a good will1 although implying certain subjective restrictions and hindrances4 ,these1 however1 far from concealing it1 or rendering it unrecognizable1 rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter4 ,i omit here all actions which are already recognized as inconsistent with duty1 although they may be useful for this or that purpose1 for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all1 since they even conflict with it4 ,i also set aside those actions which really conform to duty1 but to which men have no direct inclination1 performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination4 ,for in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty1 or from a selfish view4 ,it is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it4 ,for example1 it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not over charge an inexperienced purchaser2 and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge1 but keeps a fixed price for everyone1 so that a child buys of him as well as any other4 ,men are thus honestly served2 but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty3 his own advantage required it2 it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers1 so that1 as it were1 from love he should give no advantage to one over another4 ,accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination1 but merely with a selfish view4 ,on the other hand1 it is a duty to maintain one's life2 and1 in addition1 everyone has also a direct inclination to do so4 ,but on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth1 and their maxim has no moral import4 ,they preserve their life as duty requires1 no doubt1 but not because duty requires4 ,on the other hand1 if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life2 if the unfortunate one1 strong in mind1 indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected1 wishes for death1 and yet preserves his life without loving it- not from inclination or fear1 but from duty- then his maxim has a moral worth4 ,to be beneficent when we can is a duty2 and besides this1 there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that1 without any other motive of vanity or self-interest1 they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work4 ,but ,i maintain that in such a case an action of this kind1 however proper1 however amiable it may be1 has nevertheless no true moral worth1 but is on a level with other inclinations1 e4g41 the inclination to honour1 which1 if it is happily directed to that which is in fact of public utility and accordant with duty and consequently honourable1 deserves praise and encouragement1 but not esteem4 ,for the maxim lacks the moral import1 namely1 that such actions be done from duty1 not from inclination4 ,put the case that the mind of that philanthropist were clouded by sorrow of his own1 extinguishing all sympathy with the lot of others1 and that1 while he still has the power to benefit others in distress1 he is not touched by their trouble because he is absorbed with his own2 and now suppose that he tears himself out of this dead insensibility1 and performs the action without any inclination to it1 but simply from duty1 then first has his action its genuine moral worth4 ,further still2 if nature has put little sympathy in the heart of this or that man2 if he1 supposed to be an upright man1 is by temperament cold and indifferent to the sufferings of others1 perhaps because in respect of his own he is provided with the special gift of patience and fortitude and supposes1 or even requires1 that others should have the same- and such a man would certainly not be the meanest product of nature- but if nature had not specially framed him for a philanthropist1 would he not still find in himself a source from whence to give himself a far higher worth than that of a good-natured temperament could be8 ,unquestionably4 ,it is just in this that the moral worth of the character is brought out which is incomparably the highest of all1 namely1 that he is beneficent1 not from inclination1 but from duty4 ,to secure one's own happiness is a duty1 at least indirectly2 for discontent with one's condition1 under a pressure of many anxieties and amidst unsatisfied wants1 might easily become a great temptation to transgression of duty4 ,but here again1 without looking to duty1 all men have already the strongest and most intimate inclination to happiness1 because it is just in this idea that all inclinations are combined in one total4 ,but the precept of happiness is often of such a sort that it greatly interferes with some inclinations1 and yet a man cannot form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction of all of them which is called happiness4 ,it is not then to be wondered at that a single inclination1 definite both as to what it promises and as to the time within which it can be gratified1 is often able to overcome such a fluctuating idea1 and that a gouty patient1 for instance1 can choose to enjoy what he likes1 and to suffer what he may1 since1 according to his calculation1 on this occasion at least1 he has not sacrificed the enjoyment of the present moment to a possibly mistaken expectation of a happiness which is supposed to be found in health4 ,but even in this case1 if the general desire for happiness did not influence his will1 and supposing that in his particular case health was not a necessary element in this calculation1 there yet remains in this1 as in all other cases1 this law1 namely1 that he should promote his happiness not from inclination but from duty1 and by this would his conduct first acquire true moral worth4 ,it is in this manner1 undoubtedly1 that we are to understand those passages of ,scripture also in which we are commanded to love our neighbour1 even our enemy4 ,for love1 as an affection1 cannot be commanded1 but beneficence for duty's sake may2 even though we are not impelled to it by any inclination- nay1 are even repelled by a natural and unconquerable aversion4 ,this is practical love and not pathological- a love which is seated in the will1 and not in the propensions of sense- in principles of action and not of tender sympathy2 and it is this love alone which can be commanded4 ,the second proposition is3 ,that an action done from duty derives its moral worth1 not from the purpose which is to be attained by it1 but from the maxim by which it is determined1 and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action1 but merely on the principle of volition by which the action has taken place1 without regard to any object of desire4 ,it is clear from what precedes that the purposes which we may have in view in our actions1 or their effects regarded as ends and springs of the will1 cannot give to actions any unconditional or moral worth4 ,in what1 then1 can their worth lie1 if it is not to consist in the will and in reference to its expected effect8 ,it cannot lie anywhere but in the principle of the will without regard to the ends which can be attained by the action4 ,for the will stands between its a priori principle1 which is formal1 and its a posteriori spring1 which is material1 as between two roads1 and as it must be determined by something1 it follows that it must be determined by the formal principle of volition when an action is done from duty1 in which case every material principle has been withdrawn from it4 ,the third proposition1 which is a consequence of the two preceding1 ,i would express thus3 ,duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law4 ,i may have inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action1 but ,i cannot have respect for it1 just for this reason1 that it is an effect and not an energy of will4 ,similarly ,i cannot have respect for inclination1 whether my own or another's2 ,i can at most1 if my own1 approve it2 if another's1 sometimes even love it2 i4e41 look on it as favourable to my own interest4 ,it is only what is connected with my will as a principle1 by no means as an effect- what does not subserve my inclination1 but overpowers it1 or at least in case of choice excludes it from its calculation- in other words1 simply the law of itself1 which can be an object of respect1 and hence a command4 ,now an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination and with it every object of the will1 so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law1 and subjectively pure respect for this practical law1 and consequently the maxim 99 that ,i should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations4 99 ,a maxim is the subjective principle of volition4 ,the objective principle 7i4e41 that which would also serve subjectively as a practical principle to all rational beings if reason had full power over the faculty of desire7 is the practical law4 ,thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it1 nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from this expected effect4 ,for all these effects- agreeableness of one's condition and even the promotion of the happiness of others- could have been also brought about by other causes1 so that for this there would have been no need of the will of a rational being2 whereas it is in this alone that the supreme and unconditional good can be found4 ,the pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself1 which certainly is only possible in a rational being1 in so far as this conception1 and not the expected effect1 determines the will4 ,this is a good which is already present in the person who acts accordingly1 and we have not to wait for it to appear first in the result4 99 99 ,it might be here objected to me that ,i take refuge behind the word respect in an obscure feeling1 instead of giving a distinct solution of the question by a concept of the reason4 ,but although respect is a feeling1 it is not a feeling received through influence1 but is self-wrought by a rational concept1 and1 therefore1 is specifically distinct from all feelings of the former kind1 which may be referred either to inclination or fear1 ,what ,i recognise immediately as a law for me1 ,i recognise with respect4 ,this merely signifies the consciousness that my will is subordinate to a law1 without the intervention of other influences on my sense4 ,the immediate determination of the will by the law1 and the consciousness of this1 is called respect1 so that this is regarded as an effect of the law on the subject1 and not as the cause of it4 ,respect is properly the conception of a worth which thwarts my self-love4 ,accordingly it is something which is considered neither as an object of inclination nor of fear1 although it has something analogous to both4 ,the object of respect is the law only1 and that the law which we impose on ourselves and yet recognise as necessary in itself4 ,as a law1 we are subjected too it without consulting self-love2 as imposed by us on ourselves1 it is a result of our will4 ,in the former aspect it has an analogy to fear1 in the latter to inclination4 ,respect for a person is properly only respect for the law 7of honesty1 etc47 of which he gives us an example4 ,since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty1 we consider that we see in a person of talents1 as it were1 the example of a law 7viz41 to become like him in this by exercise71 and this constitutes our respect4 ,all so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law4 ,but what sort of law can that be1 the conception of which must determine the will1 even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it1 in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification8 ,as ,i have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law1 there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general1 which alone is to serve the will as a principle1 i4e41 ,i am never to act otherwise than so that ,i could also will that my maxim should become a universal law4 ,here1 now1 it is the simple conformity to law in general1 without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions1 that serves the will as its principle and must so serve it1 if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion4 ,the common reason of men in its practical judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the principle here suggested4 ,let the question be1 for example3 ,may ,i when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it8 ,i readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have3 ,whether it is prudent1 or whether it is right1 to make a false promise8 ,the former may undoubtedly often be the case4 ,i see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge1 but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which ,i now free myself1 and as1 with all my supposed cunning1 the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which ,i seek to avoid at present1 it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it4 ,but it is soon clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear of consequences4 ,now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences4 ,in the first case1 the very notion of the action already implies a law for me2 in the second case1 ,i must first look about elsewhere to see what results may be combined with it which would affect myself4 ,for to deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked2 but to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very advantageous to me1 although to abide by it is certainly safer4 ,the shortest way1 however1 and an unerring one1 to discover the answer to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty1 is to ask myself1 ,should ,i be content that my maxim 7to extricate myself from difficulty by a false promise7 should hold good as a universal law1 for myself as well as for others8 and should ,i be able to say to myself1 ,every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate himself8 ,then ,i presently become aware that while ,i can will the lie1 ,i can by no means will that lying should be a universal law4 ,for with such a law there would be no promises at all1 since it would be in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those who would not believe this allegation1 or if they over hastily did so would pay me back in my own coin4 ,hence my maxim1 as soon as it should be made a universal law1 would necessarily destroy itself4 ,i do not1 therefore1 need any far-reaching penetration to discern what ,i have to do in order that my will may be morally good4 ,inexperienced in the course of the world1 incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies1 ,i only ask myself3 ,canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law8 ,if not1 then it must be rejected1 and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others1 but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation1 and reason extorts from me immediate respect for such legislation4 ,i do not indeed as yet discern on what this respect is based 7this the philosopher may inquire71 but at least ,i understand this1 that it is an estimation of the worth which far outweighs all worth of what is recommended by inclination1 and that the necessity of acting from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty1 to which every other motive must give place1 because it is the condition of a will being good in itself1 and the worth of such a will is above everything4 ,thus1 then1 without quitting the moral knowledge of common human reason1 we have arrived at its principle4 ,and although1 no doubt1 common men do not conceive it in such an abstract and universal form1 yet they always have it really before their eyes and use it as the standard of their decision4 ,here it would be easy to show how1 with this compass in hand1 men are well able to distinguish1 in every case that occurs1 what is good1 what bad1 conformably to duty or inconsistent with it1 if1 without in the least teaching them anything new1 we only1 like ,socrates1 direct their attention to the principle they themselves employ2 and that1 therefore1 we do not need science and philosophy to know what we should do to be honest and good1 yea1 even wise and virtuous4 ,indeed we might well have conjectured beforehand that the knowledge of what every man is bound to do1 and therefore also to know1 would be within the reach of every man1 even the commonest4 ,here we cannot forbear admiration when we see how great an advantage the practical judgement has over the theoretical in the common understanding of men4 ,in the latter1 if common reason ventures to depart from the laws of experience and from the perceptions of the senses1 it falls into mere inconceivabilities and self-contradictions1 at least into a chaos of uncertainty1 obscurity1 and instability4 ,but in the practical sphere it is just when the common understanding excludes all sensible springs from practical laws that its power of judgement begins to show itself to advantage4 ,it then becomes even subtle1 whether it be that it chicanes with its own conscience or with other claims respecting what is to be called right1 or whether it desires for its own instruction to determine honestly the worth of actions2 and1 in the latter case1 it may even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any philosopher whatever can promise himself4 ,nay1 it is almost more sure of doing so1 because the philosopher cannot have any other principle1 while he may easily perplex his judgement by a multitude of considerations foreign to the matter1 and so turn aside from the right way4 ,would it not therefore be wiser in moral concerns to acquiesce in the judgement of common reason1 or at most only to call in philosophy for the purpose of rendering the system of morals more complete and intelligible1 and its rules more convenient for use 7especially for disputation71 but not so as to draw off the common understanding from its happy simplicity1 or to bring it by means of philosophy into a new path of inquiry and instruction8 ,innocence is indeed a glorious thing2 only1 on the other hand1 it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself and is easily seduced4 ,on this account even wisdom- which otherwise consists more in conduct than in knowledge- yet has need of science1 not in order to learn from it1 but to secure for its precepts admission and permanence4 ,against all the commands of duty which reason represents to man as so deserving of respect1 he feels in himself a powerful counterpoise in his wants and inclinations1 the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name of happiness4 ,now reason issues its commands unyieldingly1 without promising anything to the inclinations1 and1 as it were1 with disregard and contempt for these claims1 which are so impetuous1 and at the same time so plausible1 and which will not allow themselves to be suppressed by any command4 ,hence there arises a natural dialectic1 i4e41 a disposition1 to argue against these strict laws of duty and to question their validity1 or at least their purity and strictness2 and1 if possible1 to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations1 that is to say1 to corrupt them at their very source1 and entirely to destroy their worth- a thing which even common practical reason cannot ultimately call good4 ,thus is the common reason of man compelled to go out of its sphere1 and to take a step into the field of a practical philosophy1 not to satisfy any speculative want 7which never occurs to it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason71 but even on practical grounds1 in order to attain in it information and clear instruction respecting the source of its principle1 and the correct determination of it in opposition to the maxims which are based on wants and inclinations1 so that it may escape from the perplexity of opposite claims and not run the risk of losing all genuine moral principles through the equivocation into which it easily falls4 ,thus1 when practical reason cultivates itself1 there insensibly arises in it a dialectic which forces it to seek aid in philosophy1 just as happens to it in its theoretic use2 and in this case1 therefore1 as well as in the other1 it will find rest nowhere but in a thorough critical examination of our reason4 ,,sec#b ,,second ,,section ,,transition ,,from ,,popular ,,moral ,,philosophy ,,to ,,the ,,metaphysic ,,of ,,morals ,if we have hitherto drawn our notion of duty from the common use of our practical reason1 it is by no means to be inferred that we have treated it as an empirical notion4 ,on the contrary1 if we attend to the experience of men's conduct1 we meet frequent and1 as we ourselves allow1 just complaints that one cannot find a single certain example of the disposition to act from pure duty4 ,although many things are done in conformity with what duty prescribes1 it is nevertheless always doubtful whether they are done strictly from duty1 so as to have a moral worth4 ,hence there have at all times been philosophers who have altogether denied that this disposition actually exists at all in human actions1 and have ascribed everything to a more or less refined self-love4 ,not that they have on that account questioned the soundness of the conception of morality2 on the contrary1 they spoke with sincere regret of the frailty and corruption of human nature1 which1 though noble enough to take its rule an idea so worthy of respect1 is yet weak to follow it and employs reason which ought to give it the law only for the purpose of providing for the interest of the inclinations1 whether singly or at the best in the greatest possible harmony with one another4 ,in fact1 it is absolutely impossible to make out by experience with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action1 however right in itself1 rested simply on moral grounds and on the conception of duty4 ,sometimes it happens that with the sharpest self-examination we can find nothing beside the moral principle of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that action and to so great a sacrifice2 yet we cannot from this infer with certainty that it was not really some secret impulse of self-love1 under the false appearance of duty1 that was the actual determining cause of the will4 ,we like them to flatter ourselves by falsely taking credit for a more noble motive2 whereas in fact we can never1 even by the strictest examination1 get completely behind the secret springs of action2 since1 when the question is of moral worth1 it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned1 but with those inward principles of them which we do not see4 ,moreover1 we cannot better serve the wishes of those who ridicule all morality as a mere chimera of human imagination over stepping itself from vanity1 than by conceding to them that notions of duty must be drawn only from experience 7as from indolence1 people are ready to think is also the case with all other notions72 for or is to prepare for them a certain triumph4 ,i am willing to admit out of love of humanity that even most of our actions are correct1 but if we look closer at them we everywhere come upon the dear self which is always prominent1 and it is this they have in view and not the strict command of duty which would often require self-denial4 ,without being an enemy of virtue1 a cool observer1 one that does not mistake the wish for good1 however lively1 for its reality1 may sometimes doubt whether true virtue is actually found anywhere in the world1 and this especially as years increase and the judgement is partly made wiser by experience and partly1 also1 more acute in observation4 ,this being so1 nothing can secure us from falling away altogether from our ideas of duty1 or maintain in the soul a well-grounded respect for its law1 but the clear conviction that although there should never have been actions which really sprang from such pure sources1 yet whether this or that takes place is not at all the question2 but that reason of itself1 independent on all experience1 ordains what ought to take place1 that accordingly actions of which perhaps the world has hitherto never given an example1 the feasibility even of which might be very much doubted by one who founds everything on experience1 are nevertheless inflexibly commanded by reason2 that1 e4g41 even though there might never yet have been a sincere friend1 yet not a whit the less is pure sincerity in friendship required of every man1 because1 prior to all experience1 this duty is involved as duty in the idea of a reason determining the will by a priori principles4 ,when we add further that1 unless we deny that the notion of morality has any truth or reference to any possible object1 we must admit that its law must be valid1 not merely for men but for all rational creatures generally1 not merely under certain contingent conditions or with exceptions but with absolute necessity1 then it is clear that no experience could enable us to infer even the possibility of such apodeictic laws4 ,for with what right could we bring into unbounded respect as a universal precept for every rational nature that which perhaps holds only under the contingent conditions of humanity8 ,or how could laws of the determination of our will be regarded as laws of the determination of the will of rational beings generally1 and for us only as such1 if they were merely empirical and did not take their origin wholly a priori from pure but practical reason8 ,nor could anything be more fatal to morality than that we should wish to derive it from examples4 ,for every example of it that is set before me must be first itself tested by principles of morality1 whether it is worthy to serve as an original example1 i4e41 as a pattern2 but by no means can it authoritatively furnish the conception of morality4 ,even the ,holy ,one of the ,gospels must first be compared with our ideal of moral perfection before we can recognise ,him as such2 and so ,he says of ,himself1 ,why call ye ,me 7whom you see7 good2 none is good 7the model of good7 but ,god only 7whom ye do not see78 ,but whence have we the conception of ,god as the supreme good8 ,simply from the idea of moral perfection1 which reason frames a priori and connects inseparably with the notion of a free will4 ,imitation finds no place at all in morality1 and examples serve only for encouragement1 i4e41 they put beyond doubt the feasibility of what the law commands1 they make visible that which the practical rule expresses more generally1 but they can never authorize us to set aside the true original which lies in reason and to guide ourselves by examples4 ,if then there is no genuine supreme principle of morality but what must rest simply on pure reason1 independent of all experience1 ,i think it is not necessary even to put the question whether it is good to exhibit these concepts in their generality 7in abstracto7 as they are established a priori along with the principles belonging to them1 if our knowledge is to be distinguished from the vulgar and to be called philosophical4 ,in our times indeed this might perhaps be necessary2 for if we collected votes whether pure rational knowledge separated from everything empirical1 that is to say1 metaphysic of morals1 or whether popular practical philosophy is to be preferred1 it is easy to guess which side would preponderate4 ,this descending to popular notions is certainly very commendable1 if the ascent to the principles of pure reason has first taken place and been satisfactorily accomplished4 ,this implies that we first found ethics on metaphysics1 and then1 when it is firmly established1 procure a hearing for it by giving it a popular character4 ,but it is quite absurd to try to be popular in the first inquiry1 on which the soundness of the principles depends4 ,it is not only that this proceeding can never lay claim to the very rare merit of a true philosophical popularity1 since there is no art in being intelligible if one renounces all thoroughness of insight2 but also it produces a disgusting medley of compiled observations and half-reasoned principles4 ,shallow pates enjoy this because it can be used for every-day chat1 but the sagacious find in it only confusion1 and being unsatisfied and unable to help themselves1 they turn away their eyes1 while philosophers1 who see quite well through this delusion1 are little listened to when they call men off for a time from this pretended popularity1 in order that they might be rightfully popular after they have attained a definite insight4 ,we need only look at the attempts of moralists in that favourite fashion1 and we shall find at one time the special constitution of human nature 7including1 however1 the idea of a rational nature generally71 at one time perfection1 at another happiness1 here moral sense1 there fear of ,god4 a little of this1 and a little of that1 in marvellous mixture1 without its occurring to them to ask whether the principles of morality are to be sought in the knowledge of human nature at all 7which we can have only from experience72 or1 if this is not so1 if these principles are to be found altogether a priori1 free from everything empirical1 in pure rational concepts only and nowhere else1 not even in the smallest degree2 then rather to adopt the method of making this a separate inquiry1 as pure practical philosophy1 or 7if one may use a name so decried7 as metaphysic of morals1 99 to bring it by itself to completeness1 and to require the public1 which wishes for popular treatment1 to await the issue of this undertaking4 99 ,just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied1 pure logic from applied1 so if we choose we may also distinguish pure philosophy of morals 7metaphysic7 from applied 7viz41 applied to human nature74 ,by this designation we are also at once reminded that moral principles are not based on properties of human nature1 but must subsist a priori of themselves1 while from such principles practical rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature1 and accordingly for that of man4 ,such a metaphysic of morals1 completely isolated1 not mixed with any anthropology1 theology1 physics1 or hyperphysics1 and still less with occult qualities 7which we might call hypophysical71 is not only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of duties1 but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts4 ,for the pure conception of duty1 unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical attractions1 and1 in a word1 the conception of the moral law1 exercises on the human heart1 by way of reason alone 7which first becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical71 an influence so much more powerful than all other springs 99 which may be derived from the field of experience1 that1 in the consciousness of its worth1 it despises the latter1 and can by degrees become their master2 whereas a mixed ethics1 compounded partly of motives drawn from feelings and inclinations1 and partly also of conceptions of reason1 must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be brought under any principle1 which lead to good only by mere accident and very often also to evil4 99 ,i have a letter from the late excellent ,sulzer1 in which he asks me what can be the reason that moral instruction1 although containing much that is convincing for the reason1 yet accomplishes so little8 ,my answer was postponed in order that ,i might make it complete4 ,but it is simply this3 that the teachers themselves have not got their own notions clear1 and when they endeavour to make up for this by raking up motives of moral goodness from every quarter1 trying to make their physic right strong1 they spoil it4 ,for the commonest understanding shows that if we imagine1 on the one hand1 an act of honesty done with steadfast mind1 apart from every view to advantage of any kind in this world or another1 and even under the greatest temptations of necessity or allurement1 and1 on the other hand1 a similar act which was affected1 in however low a degree1 by a foreign motive1 the former leaves far behind and eclipses the second2 it elevates the soul and inspires the wish to be able to act in like manner oneself4 ,even moderately young children feel this impression1 ana one should never represent duties to them in any other light4 ,from what has been said1 it is clear that all moral conceptions have their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason1 and that1 moreover1 in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in the highest degree speculative2 that they cannot be obtained by abstraction from any empirical1 and therefore merely contingent1 knowledge2 that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle1 and that just in proportion as we add anything empirical1 we detract from their genuine influence and from the absolute value of actions2 that it is not only of the greatest necessity1 in a purely speculative point of view1 but is also of the greatest practical importance1 to derive these notions and laws from pure reason1 to present them pure and unmixed1 and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational knowledge1 i4e41 to determine the whole faculty of pure practical reason2 and1 in doing so1 we must not make its principles dependent on the particular nature of human reason1 though in speculative philosophy this may be permitted1 or may even at times be necessary2 but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature1 we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being4 ,in this way1 although for its application to man morality has need of anthropology1 yet1 in the first instance1 we must treat it independently as pure philosophy1 i4e41 as metaphysic1 complete in itself 7a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily done72 knowing well that unless we are in possession of this1 it would not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right actions for purposes of speculative criticism1 but it would be impossible to base morals on their genuine principles1 even for common practical purposes1 especially of moral instruction1 so as to produce pure moral dispositions1 and to engraft them on men's minds to the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world4 ,but in order that in this study we may not merely advance by the natural steps from the common moral judgement 7in this case very worthy of respect7 to the philosophical1 as has been already done1 but also from a popular philosophy1 which goes no further than it can reach by groping with the help of examples1 to metaphysic 7which does allow itself to be checked by anything empirical and1 as it must measure the whole extent of this kind of rational knowledge1 goes as far as ideal conceptions1 where even examples fail us71 we must follow and clearly describe the practical faculty of reason1 from the general rules of its determination to the point where the notion of duty springs from it4 ,everything in nature works according to laws4 ,rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws1 that is according to principles1 i4e41 have a will4 ,since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason1 the will is nothing but practical reason4 ,if reason infallibly determines the will1 then the actions of such a being which are recognised as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also1 i4e41 the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognises as practically necessary1 i4e41 as good4 ,but if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will1 if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions 7particular impulses7 which do not always coincide with the objective conditions2 in a word1 if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason 7which is actually the case with men71 then the actions which objectively are recognised as necessary are subjectively contingent1 and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation1 that is to say1 the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason1 but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow4 ,the conception of an objective principle1 in so far as it is obligatory for a will1 is called a command 7of reason71 and the formula of the command is called an imperative4 ,all imperatives are expressed by the word ought or shall1 and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will1 which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it 7an obligation74 ,they say that something would be good to do or to forbear1 but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it4 ,that is practically good1 however1 which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason1 and consequently not from subjective causes1 but objectively1 that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such4 ,it is distinguished from the pleasant1 as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes1 valid only for the sense of this or that one1 and not as a principle of reason1 which holds for every one4 99 99 ,the dependence of the desires on sensations is called inclination1 and this accordingly always indicates a want4 ,the dependence of a contingently determinable will on principles of reason is called an interest4 ,this therefore1 is found only in the case of a dependent will which does not always of itself conform to reason2 in the ,divine will we cannot conceive any interest4 ,but the human will can also take an interest in a thing without therefore acting from interest4 ,the former signifies the practical interest in the action1 the latter the pathological in the object of the action4 ,the former indicates only dependence of the will on principles of reason in themselves2 the second1 dependence on principles of reason for the sake of inclination1 reason supplying only the practical rules how the requirement of the inclination may be satisfied4 ,in the first case the action interests me2 in the second the object of the action 7because it is pleasant to me74 ,we have seen in the first section that in an action done from duty we must look not to the interest in the object1 but only to that in the action itself1 and in its rational principle 7viz41 the law74 ,a perfectly good will would therefore be equally subject to objective laws 7viz41 laws of good71 but could not be conceived as obliged thereby to act lawfully1 because of itself from its subjective constitution it can only be determined by the conception of good4 ,therefore no imperatives hold for the ,divine will1 or in general for a holy will2 ought is here out of place1 because the volition is already of itself necessarily in unison with the law4 ,therefore imperatives are only formulae to express the relation of objective laws of all volition to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being1 e4g41 the human will4 ,now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically4 ,the former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed 7or at least which one might possibly will74 ,the categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end1 i4e41 as objectively necessary4 ,since every practical law represents a possible action as good and1 on this account1 for a subject who is practically determinable by reason1 necessary1 all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects4 ,if now the action is good only as a means to something else1 then the imperative is hypothetical2 if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason1 then it is categorical4 ,thus the imperative declares what action possible by me would be good and presents the practical rule in relation to a will which does not forthwith perform an action simply because it is good1 whether because the subject does not always know that it is good1 or because1 even if it know this1 yet its maxims might be opposed to the objective principles of practical reason4 ,accordingly the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose1 possible or actual4 ,in the first case it is a problematical1 in the second an assertorial practical principle4 ,the categorical imperative which declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose1 i4e41 without any other end1 is valid as an apodeictic 7practical7 principle4 ,whatever is possible only by the power of some rational being may also be conceived as a possible purpose of some will2 and therefore the principles of action as regards the means necessary to attain some possible purpose are in fact infinitely numerous4 ,all sciences have a practical part1 consisting of problems expressing that some end is possible for us and of imperatives directing how it may be attained4 ,these may1 therefore1 be called in general imperatives of skill4 ,here there is no question whether the end is rational and good1 but only what one must do in order to attain it4 ,the precepts for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy1 and for a poisoner to ensure certain death1 are of equal value in this respect1 that each serves to effect its purpose perfectly4 ,since in early youth it cannot be known what ends are likely to occur to us in the course of life1 parents seek to have their children taught a great many things1 and provide for their skill in the use of means for all sorts of arbitrary ends1 of none of which can they determine whether it may not perhaps hereafter be an object to their pupil1 but which it is at all events possible that he might aim at2 and this anxiety is so great that they commonly neglect to form and correct their judgement on the value of the things which may be chosen as ends4 ,there is one end1 however1 which may be assumed to be actually such to all rational beings 7so far as imperatives apply to them1 viz41 as dependent beings71 and1 therefore1 one purpose which they not merely may have1 but which we may with certainty assume that they all actually have by a natural necessity1 and this is happiness4 ,the hypothetical imperative which expresses the practical necessity of an action as means to the advancement of happiness is assertorial4 ,we are not to present it as necessary for an uncertain and merely possible purpose1 but for a purpose which we may presuppose with certainty and a priori in every man1 because it belongs to his being4 ,now skill in the choice of means to his own greatest well-being may be called prudence1 99 in the narrowest sense4 ,and thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one's own happiness1 i4e41 the precept of prudence1 is still always hypothetical2 the action is not commanded absolutely1 but only as means to another purpose4 99 ,the word prudence is taken in two senses3 in the one it may bear the name of knowledge of the world1 in the other that of private prudence4 ,the former is a man's ability to influence others so as to use them for his own purposes4 ,the latter is the sagacity to combine all these purposes for his own lasting benefit4 ,this latter is properly that to which the value even of the former is reduced1 and when a man is prudent in the former sense1 but not in the latter1 we might better say of him that he is clever and cunning1 but1 on the whole1 imprudent4 ,finally1 there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately1 without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it4 ,this imperative is categorical4 ,it concerns not the matter of the action1 or its intended result1 but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result2 and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition1 let the consequence be what it may4 ,this imperative may be called that of morality4 ,there is a marked distinction also between the volitions on these three sorts of principles in the dissimilarity of the obligation of the will4 ,in order to mark this difference more clearly1 ,i think they would be most suitably named in their order if we said they are either rules of skill1 or counsels of prudence1 or commands 7laws7 of morality4 ,for it is law only that involves the conception of an unconditional and objective necessity1 which is consequently universally valid2 and commands are laws which must be obeyed1 that is1 must be followed1 even in opposition to inclination4 ,counsels1 indeed1 involve necessity1 but one which can only hold under a contingent subjective condition1 viz41 they depend on whether this or that man reckons this or that as part of his happiness2 the categorical imperative1 on the contrary1 is not limited by any condition1 and as being absolutely1 although practically1 necessary1 may be quite properly called a command4 ,we might also call the first kind of imperatives technical 7belonging to art71 the second pragmatic 99 7to welfare71 the third moral 7belonging to free conduct generally1 that is1 to morals74 99 ,it seems to me that the proper signification of the word pragmatic may be most accurately defined in this way4 ,for sanctions are called pragmatic which flow properly not from the law of the states as necessary enactments1 but from precaution for the general welfare4 ,a history is composed pragmatically when it teaches prudence1 i4e41 instructs the world how it can provide for its interests better1 or at least as well as1 the men of former time4 ,now arises the question1 how are all these imperatives possible8 ,this question does not seek to know how we can conceive the accomplishment of the action which the imperative ordains1 but merely how we can conceive the obligation of the will which the imperative expresses4 ,no special explanation is needed to show how an imperative of skill is possible4 ,whoever wills the end1 wills also 7so far as reason decides his conduct7 the means in his power which are indispensably necessary thereto4 ,this proposition is1 as regards the volition1 analytical2 for1 in willing an object as my effect1 there is already thought the causality of myself as an acting cause1 that is to say1 the use of the means2 and the imperative educes from the conception of volition of an end the conception of actions necessary to this end4 ,synthetical propositions must no doubt be employed in defining the means to a proposed end2 but they do not concern the principle1 the act of the will1 but the object and its realization4 ,e4g41 that in order to bisect a line on an unerring principle ,i must draw from its extremities two intersecting arcs2 this no doubt is taught by mathematics only in synthetical propositions2 but if ,i know that it is only by this process that the intended operation can be performed1 then to say that1 if ,i fully will the operation1 ,i also will the action required for it1 is an analytical proposition2 for it is one and the same thing to conceive something as an effect which ,i can produce in a certain way1 and to conceive myself as acting in this way4 ,if it were only equally easy to give a definite conception of happiness1 the imperatives of prudence would correspond exactly with those of skill1 and would likewise be analytical4 ,for in this case as in that1 it could be said3 ,whoever wills the end1 wills also 7according to the dictate of reason necessarily7 the indispensable means thereto which are in his power4 ,but1 unfortunately1 the notion of happiness is so indefinite that although every man wishes to attain it1 yet he never can say definitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes and wills4 ,the reason of this is that all the elements which belong to the notion of happiness are altogether empirical1 i4e41 they must be borrowed from experience1 and nevertheless the idea of happiness requires an absolute whole1 a maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances4 ,now it is impossible that the most clear-sighted and at the same time most powerful being 7supposed finite7 should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this4 ,does he will riches1 how much anxiety1 envy1 and snares might he not thereby draw upon his shoulders8 ,does he will knowledge and discernment1 perhaps it might prove to be only an eye so much the sharper to show him so much the more fearfully the evils that are now concealed from him1 and that cannot be avoided1 or to impose more wants on his desires1 which already give him concern enough4 ,would he have long life8 who guarantees to him that it would not be a long misery8 would he at least have health8 how often has uneasiness of the body restrained from excesses into which perfect health would have allowed one to fall8 and so on4 ,in short1 he is unable1 on any principle1 to determine with certainty what would make him truly happy2 because to do so he would need to be omniscient4 ,we cannot therefore act on any definite principles to secure happiness1 but only on empirical counsels1 e4g4 of regimen1 frugality1 courtesy1 reserve1 etc41 which experience teaches do1 on the average1 most promote well-being4 ,hence it follows that the imperatives of prudence do not1 strictly speaking1 command at all1 that is1 they cannot present actions objectively as practically necessary2 that they are rather to be regarded as counsels 7consilia7 than precepts precepts of reason1 that the problem to determine certainly and universally what action would promote the happiness of a rational being is completely insoluble1 and consequently no imperative respecting it is possible which should1 in the strict sense1 command to do what makes happy2 because happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination1 resting solely on empirical grounds1 and it is vain to expect that these should define an action by which one could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is really endless4 ,this imperative of prudence would however be an analytical proposition if we assume that the means to happiness could be certainly assigned2 for it is distinguished from the imperative of skill only by this1 that in the latter the end is merely possible1 in the former it is given2 as however both only ordain the means to that which we suppose to be willed as an end1 it follows that the imperative which ordains the willing of the means to him who wills the end is in both cases analytical4 ,thus there is no difficulty in regard to the possibility of an imperative of this kind either4 ,on the other hand1 the question how the imperative of morality is possible1 is undoubtedly one1 the only one1 demanding a solution1 as this is not at all hypothetical1 and the objective necessity which it presents cannot rest on any hypothesis1 as is the case with the hypothetical imperatives4 ,only here we must never leave out of consideration that we cannot make out by any example1 in other words empirically1 whether there is such an imperative at all1 but it is rather to be feared that all those which seem to be categorical may yet be at bottom hypothetical4 ,for instance1 when the precept is3 ,thou shalt not promise deceitfully2 and it is assumed that the necessity of this is not a mere counsel to avoid some other evil1 so that it should mean3 ,thou shalt not make a lying promise1 lest if it become known thou shouldst destroy thy credit1 but that an action of this kind must be regarded as evil in itself1 so that the imperative of the prohibition is categorical2 then we cannot show with certainty in any example that the will was determined merely by the law1 without any other spring of action1 although it may appear to be so4 ,for it is always possible that fear of disgrace1 perhaps also obscure dread of other dangers1 may have a secret influence on the will4 ,who can prove by experience the non-existence of a cause when all that experience tells us is that we do not perceive it8 ,but in such a case the so-called moral imperative1 which as such appears to be categorical and unconditional1 would in reality be only a pragmatic precept1 drawing our attention to our own interests and merely teaching us to take these into consideration4 ,we shall therefore have to investigate a priori the possibility of a categorical imperative1 as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience1 so that the elucidation of its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation1 not for its establishment4 ,in the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical law2 all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws1 since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent1 and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose2 on the contrary1 the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite2 consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law4 ,secondly1 in the case of this categorical imperative or law of morality1 the difficulty 7of discerning its possibility7 is a very profound one4 ,it is an a priori synthetical practical proposition2 99 and as there is so much difficulty in discerning the possibility of speculative propositions of this kind1 it may readily be supposed that the difficulty will be no less with the practical4 99 ,i connect the act with the will without presupposing any condition resulting from any inclination1 but a priori1 and therefore necessarily 7though only objectively1 i4e41 assuming the idea of a reason possessing full power over all subjective motives74 ,this is accordingly a practical proposition which does not deduce the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already presupposed 7for we have not such a perfect will71 but connects it immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being1 as something not contained in it4 ,in this problem we will first inquire whether the mere conception of a categorical imperative may not perhaps supply us also with the formula of it1 containing the proposition which alone can be a categorical imperative2 for even if we know the tenor of such an absolute command1 yet how it is possible will require further special and laborious study1 which we postpone to the last section4 ,when ,i conceive a hypothetical imperative1 in general ,i do not know beforehand what it will contain until ,i am given the condition4 ,but when ,i conceive a categorical imperative1 ,i know at once what it contains4 ,for as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims 99 shall conform to this law1 while the law contains no conditions restricting it1 there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law1 and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary4 99 ,a maxim is a subjective principle of action1 and must be distinguished from the objective principle1 namely1 practical law4 ,the former contains the practical rule set by reason according to the conditions of the subject 7often its ignorance or its inclinations71 so that it is the principle on which the subject acts2 but the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being1 and is the principle on which it ought to act that is an imperative4 ,there is therefore but one categorical imperative1 namely1 this3 ,act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law4 ,now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle1 then1 although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion1 yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means4 ,since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense 7as to form71 that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws1 the imperative of duty may be expressed thus3 ,act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature4 ,we will now enumerate a few duties1 adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others1 and into perfect and imperfect duties4 99 99 ,it must be noted here that ,i reserve the division of duties for a future metaphysic of morals2 so that ,i give it here only as an arbitrary one 7in order to arrange my examples74 ,for the rest1 ,i understand by a perfect duty one that admits no exception in favour of inclination and then ,i have not merely external but also internal perfect duties4 ,this is contrary to the use of the word adopted in the schools2 but ,i do not intend to justify there1 as it is all one for my purpose whether it is admitted or not4 #a4 ,a man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life1 but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life4 ,now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature4 ,his maxim is3 ,from self-love ,i adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction4 ,it is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature4 ,now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and1 therefore1 could not exist as a system of nature2 hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and1 consequently1 would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty4 #b4 ,another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money4 ,he knows that he will not be able to repay it1 but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time4 ,he desires to make this promise1 but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself3 ,is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way8 ,suppose however that he resolves to do so3 then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus3 ,when ,i think myself in want of money1 ,i will borrow money and promise to repay it1 although ,i know that ,i never can do so4 ,now this principle of self-love or of one's own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare2 but the question now is1 ,is it right8 ,i change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law1 and state the question thus3 ,how would it be if my maxim were a universal law8 ,then ,i see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature1 but would necessarily contradict itself4 ,for supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases1 with the purpose of not keeping his promise1 the promise itself would become impossible1 as well as the end that one might have in view in it1 since no one would consider that anything was promised to him1 but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretences4 #c4 ,a third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects4 ,but he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities4 ,he asks1 however1 whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts1 besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence1 agrees also with what is called duty4 ,he sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men 7like the ,south ,sea islanders7 should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness1 amusement1 and propagation of their species- in a word1 to enjoyment2 but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature1 or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct4 ,for1 as a rational being1 he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed1 since they serve him and have been given him1 for all sorts of possible purposes4 #d4 ,a fourth1 who is in prosperity1 while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them1 thinks3 ,what concern is it of mine8 ,let everyone be as happy as ,heaven pleases1 or as he can make himself2 ,i will take nothing from him nor even envy him1 only ,i do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress6 ,now no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law1 the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and good-will1 or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice1 but1 on the other side1 also cheats when he can1 betrays the rights of men1 or otherwise violates them4 ,but although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim1 it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature4 ,for a will which resolved this would contradict itself1 inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others1 and in which1 by such a law of nature1 sprung from his own will1 he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires4 ,these are a few of the many actual duties1 or at least what we regard as such1 which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down4 ,we must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law4 ,this is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally4 ,some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature1 far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so4 ,in others this intrinsic impossibility is not found1 but still it is impossible to will that their maxim should be raised to the universality of a law of nature1 since such a will would contradict itself ,it is easily seen that the former violate strict or rigorous 7inflexible7 duty2 the latter only laxer 7meritorious7 duty4 ,thus it has been completely shown how all duties depend as regards the nature of the obligation 7not the object of the action7 on the same principle4 ,if now we attend to ourselves on occasion of any transgression of duty1 we shall find that we in fact do not will that our maxim should be a universal law1 for that is impossible for us2 on the contrary1 we will that the opposite should remain a universal law1 only we assume the liberty of making an exception in our own favour or 7just for this time only7 in favour of our inclination4 ,consequently if we considered all cases from one and the same point of view1 namely1 that of reason1 we should find a contradiction in our own will1 namely1 that a certain principle should be objectively necessary as a universal law1 and yet subjectively should not be universal1 but admit of exceptions4 ,as however we at one moment regard our action from the point of view of a will wholly conformed to reason1 and then again look at the same action from the point of view of a will affected by inclination1 there is not really any contradiction1 but an antagonism of inclination to the precept of reason1 whereby the universality of the principle is changed into a mere generality1 so that the practical principle of reason shall meet the maxim half way4 ,now1 although this cannot be justified in our own impartial judgement1 yet it proves that we do really recognise the validity of the categorical imperative and 7with all respect for it7 only allow ourselves a few exceptions1 which we think unimportant and forced from us4 ,we have thus established at least this much1 that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions1 it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives4 ,we have also1 which is of great importance1 exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative1 which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all4 ,we have not yet1 however1 advanced so far as to prove a priori that there actually is such an imperative1 that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse1 and that the following of this law is duty4 ,with the view of attaining to this1 it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature4 ,for duty is to be a practical1 unconditional necessity of action2 it must therefore hold for all rational beings 7to whom an imperative can apply at all71 and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills4 ,on the contrary1 whatever is deduced from the particular natural characteristics of humanity1 from certain feelings and propensions1 nay1 even1 if possible1 from any particular tendency proper to human reason1 and which need not necessarily hold for the will of every rational being2 this may indeed supply us with a maxim1 but not with a law2 with a subjective principle on which we may have a propension and inclination to act1 but not with an objective principle on which we should be enjoined to act1 even though all our propensions1 inclinations1 and natural dispositions were opposed to it4 ,in fact1 the sublimity and intrinsic dignity of the command in duty are so much the more evident1 the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it1 without being able in the slightest degree to weaken the obligation of the law or to diminish its validity4 ,here then we see philosophy brought to a critical position1 since it has to be firmly fixed1 notwithstanding that it has nothing to support it in heaven or earth4 ,here it must show its purity as absolute director of its own laws1 not the herald of those which are whispered to it by an implanted sense or who knows what tutelary nature4 ,although these may be better than nothing1 yet they can never afford principles dictated by reason1 which must have their source wholly a priori and thence their commanding authority1 expecting everything from the supremacy of the law and the due respect for it1 nothing from inclination1 or else condemning the man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence4 ,thus every empirical element is not only quite incapable of being an aid to the principle of morality1 but is even highly prejudicial to the purity of morals1 for the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists just in this1 that the principle of action is free from all influence of contingent grounds1 which alone experience can furnish4 ,we cannot too much or too often repeat our warning against this lax and even mean habit of thought which seeks for its principle amongst empirical motives and laws2 for human reason in its weariness is glad to rest on this pillow1 and in a dream of sweet illusions 7in which1 instead of ,juno1 it embraces a cloud7 it substitutes for morality a bastard patched up from limbs of various derivation1 which looks like anything one chooses to see in it1 only not like virtue to one who has once beheld her in her true form4 99 99 ,to behold virtue in her proper form is nothing else but to contemplate morality stripped of all admixture of sensible things and of every spurious ornament of reward or self-love4 ,how much she then eclipses everything else that appears charming to the affections1 every one may readily perceive with the least exertion of his reason1 if it be not wholly spoiled for abstraction4 ,the question then is this3 ,is it a necessary law for all rational beings that they should always judge of their actions by maxims of which they can themselves will that they should serve as universal laws8 ,if it is so1 then it must be connected 7altogether a priori7 with the very conception of the will of a rational being generally4 ,but in order to discover this connexion we must1 however reluctantly1 take a step into metaphysic1 although into a domain of it which is distinct from speculative philosophy1 namely1 the metaphysic of morals4 ,in a practical philosophy1 where it is not the reasons of what happens that we have to ascertain1 but the laws of what ought to happen1 even although it never does1 i4e41 objective practical laws1 there it is not necessary to inquire into the reasons why anything pleases or displeases1 how the pleasure of mere sensation differs from taste1 and whether the latter is distinct from a general satisfaction of reason2 on what the feeling of pleasure or pain rests1 and how from it desires and inclinations arise1 and from these again maxims by the co-operation of reason3 for all this belongs to an empirical psychology1 which would constitute the second part of physics1 if we regard physics as the philosophy of nature1 so far as it is based on empirical laws4 ,but here we are concerned with objective practical laws and1 consequently1 with the relation of the will to itself so far as it is determined by reason alone1 in which case whatever has reference to anything empirical is necessarily excluded2 since if reason of itself alone determines the conduct 7and it is the possibility of this that we are now investigating71 it must necessarily do so a priori4 ,the will is conceived as a faculty of determining oneself to action in accordance with the conception of certain laws4 ,and such a faculty can be found only in rational beings4 ,now that which serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end1 and1 if this is assigned by reason alone1 it must hold for all rational beings4 ,on the other hand1 that which merely contains the ground of possibility of the action of which the effect is the end1 this is called the means4 ,the subjective ground of the desire is the spring1 the objective ground of the volition is the motive2 hence the distinction between subjective ends which rest on springs1 and objective ends which depend on motives valid for every rational being4 ,practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends2 they are material when they assume these1 and therefore particular springs of action4 ,the ends which a rational being proposes to himself at pleasure as effects of his actions 7material ends7 are all only relative1 for it is only their relation to the particular desires of the subject that gives them their worth1 which therefore cannot furnish principles universal and necessary for all rational beings and for every volition1 that is to say practical laws4 ,hence all these relative ends can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives4 ,supposing1 however1 that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth1 something which1 being an end in itself1 could be a source of definite laws2 then in this and this alone would lie the source of a possible categorical imperative1 i4e41 a practical law4 ,now ,i say3 man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself1 not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will1 but in all his actions1 whether they concern himself or other rational beings1 must be always regarded at the same time as an end4 ,all objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth1 for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist1 then their object would be without value4 ,but the inclinations1 themselves being sources of want1 are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them4 ,thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional4 ,beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's1 have nevertheless1 if they are irrational beings1 only a relative value as means1 and are therefore called things2 rational beings1 on the contrary1 are called persons1 because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves1 that is as something which must not be used merely as means1 and so far therefore restricts freedom of action 7and is an object of respect74 ,these1 therefore1 are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action1 but objective ends1 that is1 things whose existence is an end in itself2 an end moreover for which no other can be substituted1 which they should subserve merely as means1 for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth2 but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent1 then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever4 ,if then there is a supreme practical principle or1 in respect of the human will1 a categorical imperative1 it must be one which1 being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself1 constitutes an objective principle of will1 and can therefore serve as a universal practical law4 ,the foundation of this principle is3 rational nature exists as an end in itself4 ,man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so2 so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions4 ,but every other rational being regards its existence similarly1 just on the same rational principle that holds for me3 99 so that it is at the same time an objective principle1 from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced4 ,accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows3 ,so act as to treat humanity1 whether in thine own person or in that of any other1 in every case as an end withal1 never as means only4 ,we will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out4 99 ,this proposition is here stated as a postulate4 ,the ground of it will be found in the concluding section4 ,to abide by the previous examples3 ,firstly1 under the head of necessary duty to oneself3 ,he who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself4 ,if he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances1 he uses a person merely as a mean to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life4 ,but a man is not a thing1 that is to say1 something which can be used merely as means1 but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself4 ,i cannot1 therefore1 dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him1 to damage or kill him4 7,it belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely1 so as to avoid all misunderstanding1 e4 g41 as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself1 as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it1 etc4 ,this question is therefore omitted here47 ,secondly1 as regards necessary duties1 or those of strict obligation1 towards others3 ,he who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean1 without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself4 ,for he whom ,i propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and1 therefore1 cannot himself contain the end of this action4 ,this violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others4 ,for then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means1 without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends1 that is1 as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action4 99 99 ,let it not be thought that the common quod tibi non vis fieri1 etc4 could serve here as the rule or principle4 ,for it is only a deduction from the former1 though with several limitations2 it cannot be a universal law1 for it does not contain the principle of duties to oneself1 nor of the duties of benevolence to others 7for many a one would gladly consent that others should not benefit him1 provided only that he might be excused from showing benevolence to them71 nor finally that of duties of strict obligation to one another1 for on this principle the criminal might argue against the judge who punishes him1 and so on4 ,thirdly1 as regards contingent 7meritorious7 duties to oneself3 ,it is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself1 it must also harmonize with it4 ,now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection1 which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject3 to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself1 but not with the advancement of this end4 ,fourthly1 as regards meritorious duties towards others3 ,the natural end which all men have is their own happiness4 ,now humanity might indeed subsist1 although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others1 provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it2 but after all this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself1 if every one does not also endeavour1 as far as in him lies1 to forward the ends of others4 ,for the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also1 if that conception is to have its full effect with me4 ,this principle1 that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself 7which is the supreme limiting condition of every man's freedom of action71 is not borrowed from experience1 firstly1 because it is universal1 applying as it does to all rational beings whatever1 and experience is not capable of determining anything about them2 secondly1 because it does not present humanity as an end to men 7subjectively71 that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end2 but as an objective end1 which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends1 let them be what we will2 it must therefore spring from pure reason4 ,in fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies 7according to the first principle7 in the rule and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law 7say1 e4 g41 a law of nature72 but the subjective principle is in the end2 now by the second principle the subject of all ends is each rational being1 inasmuch as it is an end in itself4 ,hence follows the third practical principle of the will1 which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason1 viz43 the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will4 ,on this principle all maxims are rejected which are inconsistent with the will being itself universal legislator4 ,thus the will is not subject simply to the law1 but so subject that it must be regarded as itself giving the law and1 on this ground only1 subject to the law 7of which it can regard itself as the author74 ,in the previous imperatives1 namely1 that based on the conception of the conformity of actions to general laws1 as in a physical system of nature1 and that based on the universal prerogative of rational beings as ends in themselves- these imperatives1 just because they were conceived as categorical1 excluded from any share in their authority all admixture of any interest as a spring of action2 they were1 however1 only assumed to be categorical1 because such an assumption was necessary to explain the conception of duty4 ,but we could not prove independently that there are practical propositions which command categorically1 nor can it be proved in this section2 one thing1 however1 could be done1 namely1 to indicate in the imperative itself1 by some determinate expression1 that in the case of volition from duty all interest is renounced1 which is the specific criterion of categorical as distinguished from hypothetical imperatives4 ,this is done in the present 7third7 formula of the principle1 namely1 in the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will4 ,for although a will which is subject to laws may be attached to this law by means of an interest1 yet a will which is itself a supreme lawgiver so far as it is such cannot possibly depend on any interest1 since a will so dependent would itself still need another law restricting the interest of its self-love by the condition that it should be valid as universal law4 ,thus the principle that every human will is a will which in all its maxims gives universal laws1 99 provided it be otherwise justified1 would be very well adapted to be the categorical imperative1 in this respect1 namely1 that just because of the idea of universal legislation it is not based on interest1 and therefore it alone among all possible imperatives can be unconditional4 ,or still better1 converting the proposition1 if there is a categorical imperative 7i4e41 a law for the will of every rational being71 it can only command that everything be done from maxims of one's will regarded as a will which could at the same time will that it should itself give universal laws1 for in that case only the practical principle and the imperative which it obeys are unconditional1 since they cannot be based on any interest4 99 ,i may be excused from adducing examples to elucidate this principle1 as those which have already been used to elucidate the categorical imperative and its formula would all serve for the like purpose here4 ,looking back now on all previous attempts to discover the principle of morality1 we need not wonder why they all failed4 ,it was seen that man was bound to laws by duty1 but it was not observed that the laws to which he is subject are only those of his own giving1 though at the same time they are universal1 and that he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will2 a will1 however1 which is designed by nature to give universal laws4 ,for when one has conceived man only as subject to a law 7no matter what71 then this law required some interest1 either by way of attraction or constraint1 since it did not originate as a law from his own will1 but this will was according to a law obliged by something else to act in a certain manner4 ,now by this necessary consequence all the labour spent in finding a supreme principle of duty was irrevocably lost4 ,for men never elicited duty1 but only a necessity of acting from a certain interest4 ,whether this interest was private or otherwise1 in any case the imperative must be conditional and could not by any means be capable of being a moral command4 ,i will therefore call this the principle of autonomy of the will1 in contrast with every other which ,i accordingly reckon as heteronomy4 ,the conception of the will of every rational being as one which must consider itself as giving in all the maxims of its will universal laws1 so as to judge itself and its actions from this point of view- this conception leads to another which depends on it and is very fruitful1 namely that of a kingdom of ends4 ,by a kingdom ,i understand the union of different rational beings in a system by common laws4 ,now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity1 hence1 if we abstract from the personal differences of rational beings and likewise from all the content of their private ends1 we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a systematic whole 7including both rational beings as ends in themselves1 and also the special ends which each may propose to himself71 that is to say1 we can conceive a kingdom of ends1 which on the preceding principles is possible4 ,for all rational beings come under the law that each of them must treat itself and all others never merely as means1 but in every case at the same time as ends in themselves4 ,hence results a systematic union of rational being by common objective laws1 i4e41 a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends1 since what these laws have in view is just the relation of these beings to one another as ends and means4 ,it is certainly only an ideal4 ,a rational being belongs as a member to the kingdom of ends when1 although giving universal laws in it1 he is also himself subject to these laws4 ,he belongs to it as sovereign when1 while giving laws1 he is not subject to the will of any other4 ,a rational being must always regard himself as giving laws either as member or as sovereign in a kingdom of ends which is rendered possible by the freedom of will4 ,he cannot1 however1 maintain the latter position merely by the maxims of his will1 but only in case he is a completely independent being without wants and with unrestricted power adequate to his will4 ,morality consists then in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible4 ,this legislation must be capable of existing in every rational being and of emanating from his will1 so that the principle of this will is never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal law and1 accordingly1 always so to act that the will could at the same time regard itself as giving in its maxims universal laws4 ,if now the maxims of rational beings are not by their own nature coincident with this objective principle1 then the necessity of acting on it is called practical necessitation1 i4e41 duty4 ,duty does not apply to the sovereign in the kingdom of ends1 but it does to every member of it and to all in the same degree4 ,the practical necessity of acting on this principle1 i4e41 duty1 does not rest at all on feelings1 impulses1 or inclinations1 but solely on the relation of rational beings to one another1 a relation in which the will of a rational being must always be regarded as legislative1 since otherwise it could not be conceived as an end in itself4 ,reason then refers every maxim of the will1 regarding it as legislating universally1 to every other will and also to every action towards oneself2 and this not on account of any other practical motive or any future advantage1 but from the idea of the dignity of a rational being1 obeying no law but that which he himself also gives4 ,in the kingdom of ends everything has either value or dignity4 ,whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent2 whatever1 on the other hand1 is above all value1 and therefore admits of no equivalent1 has a dignity4 ,whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a market value2 whatever1 without presupposing a want1 corresponds to a certain taste1 that is to a satisfaction in the mere purposeless play of our faculties1 has a fancy value2 but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself1 this has not merely a relative worth1 i4e41 value1 but an intrinsic worth1 that is1 dignity4 ,now morality is the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in himself1 since by this alone is it possible that he should be a legislating member in the kingdom of ends4 ,thus morality1 and humanity as capable of it1 is that which alone has dignity4 ,skill and diligence in labour have a market value2 wit1 lively imagination1 and humour1 have fancy value2 on the other hand1 fidelity to promises1 benevolence from principle 7not from instinct71 have an intrinsic worth4 ,neither nature nor art contains anything which in default of these it could put in their place1 for their worth consists not in the effects which spring from them1 not in the use and advantage which they secure1 but in the disposition of mind1 that is1 the maxims of the will which are ready to manifest themselves in such actions1 even though they should not have the desired effect4 ,these actions also need no recommendation from any subjective taste or sentiment1 that they may be looked on with immediate favour and satisfaction3 they need no immediate propension or feeling for them2 they exhibit the will that performs them as an object of an immediate respect1 and nothing but reason is required to impose them on the will2 not to flatter it into them1 which1 in the case of duties1 would be a contradiction4 ,this estimation therefore shows that the worth of such a disposition is dignity1 and places it infinitely above all value1 with which it cannot for a moment be brought into comparison or competition without as it were violating its sanctity4 ,what then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good disposition1 in making such lofty claims8 ,it is nothing less than the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the giving of universal laws1 by which it qualifies him to be a member of a possible kingdom of ends1 a privilege to which he was already destined by his own nature as being an end in himself and1 on that account1 legislating in the kingdom of ends2 free as regards all laws of physical nature1 and obeying those only which he himself gives1 and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal law1 to which at the same time he submits himself4 ,for nothing has any worth except what the law assigns it4 ,now the legislation itself which assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess dignity1 that is an unconditional incomparable worth2 and the word respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a rational being must have for it4 ,autonomy then is the basis of the dignity of human and of every rational nature4 ,the three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law1 and each of itself involves the other two4 ,there is1 however1 a difference in them1 but it is rather subjectively than objectively practical1 intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to intuition 7by means of a certain analogy7 and thereby nearer to feeling4 ,all maxims1 in fact1 have3 #a4 ,a form1 consisting in universality2 and in this view the formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus1 that the maxims must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of nature4 #b4 ,a matter1 namely1 an end1 and here the formula says that the rational being1 as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end in itself1 must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all merely relative and arbitrary ends4 #c4 ,a complete characterization of all maxims by means of that formula1 namely1 that all maxims ought by their own legislation to harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature4 99 ,there is a progress here in the order of the categories of unity of the form of the will 7its universality71 plurality of the matter 7the objects1 i4e41 the ends71 and totality of the system of these4 ,in forming our moral judgement of actions1 it is better to proceed always on the strict method and start from the general formula of the categorical imperative3 ,act according to a maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law4 ,if1 however1 we wish to gain an entrance for the moral law1 it is very useful to bring one and the same action under the three specified conceptions1 and thereby as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition4 99 ,teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends2 ethics regards a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature4 ,in the first case1 the kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea1 adopted to explain what actually is4 ,in the latter it is a practical idea1 adopted to bring about that which is not yet1 but which can be realized by our conduct1 namely1 if it conforms to this idea4 ,we can now end where we started at the beginning1 namely1 with the conception of a will unconditionally good4 ,that will is absolutely good which cannot be evil- in other words1 whose maxim1 if made a universal law1 could never contradict itself4 ,this principle1 then1 is its supreme law3 ,act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same time will to be a universal law2 this is the sole condition under which a will can never contradict itself2 and such an imperative is categorical4 ,since the validity of the will as a universal law for possible actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the existence of things by general laws1 which is the formal notion of nature in general1 the categorical imperative can also be expressed thus3 ,act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object themselves as universal laws of nature4 ,such then is the formula of an absolutely good will4 ,rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this1 that it sets before itself an end4 ,this end would be the matter of every good will4 ,but since in the idea of a will that is absolutely good without being limited by any condition 7of attaining this or that end7 we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected 7since this would make every will only relatively good71 it follows that in this case the end must be conceived1 not as an end to be effected1 but as an independently existing end4 ,consequently it is conceived only negatively1 i4e41 as that which we must never act against and which1 therefore1 must never be regarded merely as means1 but must in every volition be esteemed as an end likewise4 ,now this end can be nothing but the subject of all possible ends1 since this is also the subject of a possible absolutely good will2 for such a will cannot without contradiction be postponed to any other object4 ,the principle3 ,so act in regard to every rational being 7thyself and others71 that he may always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself1 is accordingly essentially identical with this other3 ,act upon a maxim which1 at the same time1 involves its own universal validity for every rational being4 ,for that in using means for every end ,i should limit my maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject1 this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends1 i4e41 the rational being himself1 be never employed merely as means1 but as the supreme condition restricting the use of all means1 that is in every case as an end likewise4 ,it follows incontestably that1 to whatever laws any rational being may be subject1 he being an end in himself must be able to regard himself as also legislating universally in respect of these same laws1 since it is just this fitness of his maxims for universal legislation that distinguishes him as an end in himself2 also it follows that this implies his dignity 7prerogative7 above all mere physical beings1 that he must always take his maxims from the point of view which regards himself and1 likewise1 every other rational being as law-giving beings 7on which account they are called persons74 ,in this way a world of rational beings 7mundus intelligibilis7 is possible as a kingdom of ends1 and this by virtue of the legislation proper to all persons as members4 ,therefore every rational being must so act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends4 ,the formal principle of these maxims is3 ,so act as if thy maxim were to serve likewise as the universal law 7of all rational beings74 ,a kingdom of ends is thus only possible on the analogy of a kingdom of nature1 the former however only by maxims1 that is self-imposed rules1 the latter only by the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without4 ,nevertheless1 although the system of nature is looked upon as a machine1 yet so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends1 it is given on this account the name of a kingdom of nature4 ,now such a kingdom of ends would be actually realized by means of maxims conforming to the canon which the categorical imperative prescribes to all rational beings1 if they were universally followed4 ,but although a rational being1 even if he punctually follows this maxim himself1 cannot reckon upon all others being therefore true to the same1 nor expect that the kingdom of nature and its orderly arrangements shall be in harmony with him as a fitting member1 so as to form a kingdom of ends to which he himself contributes1 that is to say1 that it shall favour his expectation of happiness1 still that law3 ,act according to the maxims of a member of a merely possible kingdom of ends legislating in it universally1 remains in its full force1 inasmuch as it commands categorically4 ,and it is just in this that the paradox lies2 that the mere dignity of man as a rational creature1 without any other end or advantage to be attained thereby1 in other words1 respect for a mere idea1 should yet serve as an inflexible precept of the will1 and that it is precisely in this independence of the maxim on all such springs of action that its sublimity consists2 and it is this that makes every rational subject worthy to be a legislative member in the kingdom of ends3 for otherwise he would have to be conceived only as subject to the physical law of his wants4 ,and although we should suppose the kingdom of nature and the kingdom of ends to be united under one sovereign1 so that the latter kingdom thereby ceased to be a mere idea and acquired true reality1 then it would no doubt gain the accession of a strong spring1 but by no means any increase of its intrinsic worth4 ,for this sole absolute lawgiver must1 notwithstanding this1 be always conceived as estimating the worth of rational beings only by their disinterested behaviour1 as prescribed to themselves from that idea the dignity of man alone4 ,the essence of things is not altered by their external relations1 and that which1 abstracting from these1 alone constitutes the absolute worth of man1 is also that by which he must be judged1 whoever the judge may be1 and even by the ,supreme ,being4 ,morality1 then1 is the relation of actions to the relation of actions will1 that is1 to the autonomy of potential universal legislation by its maxims4 ,an action that is consistent with the autonomy of the will is permitted2 one that does not agree therewith is forbidden4 ,a will whose maxims necessarily coincide with the laws of autonomy is a holy will1 good absolutely4 ,the dependence of a will not absolutely good on the principle of autonomy 7moral necessitation7 is obligation4 ,this1 then1 cannot be applied to a holy being4 ,the objective necessity of actions from obligation is called duty4 ,from what has just been said1 it is easy to see how it happens that1 although the conception of duty implies subjection to the law1 we yet ascribe a certain dignity and sublimity to the person who fulfils all his duties4 ,there is not1 indeed1 any sublimity in him1 so far as he is subject to the moral law2 but inasmuch as in regard to that very law he is likewise a legislator1 and on that account alone subject to it1 he has sublimity4 ,we have also shown above that neither fear nor inclination1 but simply respect for the law1 is the spring which can give actions a moral worth4 ,our own will1 so far as we suppose it to act only under the condition that its maxims are potentially universal laws1 this ideal will which is possible to us is the proper object of respect2 and the dignity of humanity consists just in this capacity of being universally legislative1 though with the condition that it is itself subject to this same legislation4 ,the ,autonomy of the ,will as the ,supreme ,principle of ,morality ,autonomy of the will is that property of it by which it is a law to itself 7independently of any property of the objects of volition74 ,the principle of autonomy then is3 ,always so to choose that the same volition shall comprehend the maxims of our choice as a universal law4 ,we cannot prove that this practical rule is an imperative1 i4e41 that the will of every rational being is necessarily bound to it as a condition1 by a mere analysis of the conceptions which occur in it1 since it is a synthetical proposition2 we must advance beyond the cognition of the objects to a critical examination of the subject1 that is1 of the pure practical reason1 for this synthetic proposition which commands apodeictically must be capable of being cognized wholly a priori4 ,this matter1 however1 does not belong to the present section4 ,but that the principle of autonomy in question is the sole principle of morals can be readily shown by mere analysis of the conceptions of morality4 ,for by this analysis we find that its principle must be a categorical imperative and that what this commands is neither more nor less than this very autonomy4 ,heteronomy of the ,will as the ,source of all spurious ,principles of ,morality ,if the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation1 consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects1 there always results heteronomy4 ,the will in that case does not give itself the law1 but it is given by the object through its relation to the will4 ,this relation1 whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason1 only admits of hypothetical imperatives3 ,i ought to do something because ,i wish for something else4 ,on the contrary1 the moral1 and therefore categorical1 imperative says3 ,i ought to do so and so1 even though ,i should not wish for anything else4 ,e4g41 the former says3 ,i ought not to lie1 if ,i would retain my reputation2 the latter says3 ,i ought not to lie1 although it should not bring me the least discredit4 ,the latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no influence on the will1 in order that practical reason 7will7 may not be restricted to administering an interest not belonging to it1 but may simply show its own commanding authority as the supreme legislation4 ,thus1 e4g41 ,i ought to endeavour to promote the happiness of others1 not as if its realization involved any concern of mine 7whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason71 but simply because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law in one and the same volition4 ,classification of all ,principles of ,morality which can be founded on the ,conception of ,heteronomy ,here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use1 so long as it was not critically examined1 has first tried all possible wrong ways before it succeeded in finding the one true way4 ,all principles which can be taken from this point of view are either empirical or rational4 ,the former1 drawn from the principle of happiness1 are built on physical or moral feelings2 the latter1 drawn from the principle of perfection1 are built either on the rational conception of perfection as a possible effect1 or on that of an independent perfection 7the will of ,god7 as the determining cause of our will4 ,empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws4 ,for the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction1 the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them1 is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature1 or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed4 ,the principle of private happiness1 however1 is the most objectionable1 not merely because it is false1 and experience contradicts the supposition that prosperity is always proportioned to good conduct1 nor yet merely because it contributes nothing to the establishment of morality- since it is quite a different thing to make a prosperous man and a good man1 or to make one prudent and sharp-sighted for his own interests and to make him virtuous- but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather undermine it and destroy its sublimity1 since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class and only teach us to make a better calculation1 the specific difference between virtue and vice being entirely extinguished4 ,on the other hand1 as to moral feeling1 this supposed special sense1 99 the appeal to it is indeed superficial when those who cannot think believe that feeling will help them out1 even in what concerns general laws3 and besides1 feelings1 which naturally differ infinitely in degree1 cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil1 nor has anyone a right to form judgements for others by his own feelings3 nevertheless this moral feeling is nearer to morality and its dignity in this respect1 that it pays virtue the honour of ascribing to her immediately the satisfaction and esteem we have for her and does not1 as it were1 tell her to her face that we are not attached to her by her beauty but by profit4 99 ,i class the principle of moral feeling under that of happiness1 because every empirical interest promises to contribute to our well-being by the agreeableness that a thing affords1 whether it be immediately and without a view to profit1 or whether profit be regarded4 ,we must likewise1 with ,hutcheson1 class the principle of sympathy with the happiness of others under his assumed moral sense4 ,amongst the rational principles of morality1 the ontological conception of perfection1 notwithstanding its defects1 is better than the theological conception which derives morality from a ,divine absolutely perfect will4 ,the former is1 no doubt1 empty and indefinite and consequently useless for finding in the boundless field of possible reality the greatest amount suitable for us2 moreover1 in attempting to distinguish specifically the reality of which we are now speaking from every other1 it inevitably tends to turn in a circle and cannot avoid tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain2 it is nevertheless preferable to the theological view1 first1 because we have no intuition of the divine perfection and can only deduce it from our own conceptions1 the most important of which is that of morality1 and our explanation would thus be involved in a gross circle2 and1 in the next place1 if we avoid this1 the only notion of the ,divine will remaining to us is a conception made up of the attributes of desire of glory and dominion1 combined with the awful conceptions of might and vengeance1 and any system of morals erected on this foundation would be directly opposed to morality4 ,however1 if ,i had to choose between the notion of the moral sense and that of perfection in general 7two systems which at least do not weaken morality1 although they are totally incapable of serving as its foundation71 then ,i should decide for the latter1 because it at least withdraws the decision of the question from the sensibility and brings it to the court of pure reason2 and although even here it decides nothing1 it at all events preserves the indefinite idea 7of a will good in itself free from corruption1 until it shall be more precisely defined4 ,for the rest ,i think ,i may be excused here from a detailed refutation of all these doctrines2 that would only be superfluous labour1 since it is so easy1 and is probably so well seen even by those whose office requires them to decide for one of these theories 7because their hearers would not tolerate suspension of judgement74 ,but what interests us more here is to know that the prime foundation of morality laid down by all these principles is nothing but heteronomy of the will1 and for this reason they must necessarily miss their aim4 ,in every case where an object of the will has to be supposed1 in order that the rule may be prescribed which is to determine the will1 there the rule is simply heteronomy2 the imperative is conditional1 namely1 if or because one wishes for this object1 one should act so and so3 hence it can never command morally1 that is1 categorically4 ,whether the object determines the will by means of inclination1 as in the principle of private happiness1 or by means of reason directed to objects of our possible volition generally1 as in the principle of perfection1 in either case the will never determines itself immediately by the conception of the action1 but only by the influence which the foreseen effect of the action has on the will2 ,i ought to do something1 on this account1 because ,i wish for something else2 and here there must be yet another law assumed in me as its subject1 by which ,i necessarily will this other thing1 and this law again requires an imperative to restrict this maxim4 ,for the influence which the conception of an object within the reach of our faculties can exercise on the will of the subject1 in consequence of its natural properties1 depends on the nature of the subject1 either the sensibility 7inclination and taste71 or the understanding and reason1 the employment of which is by the peculiar constitution of their nature attended with satisfaction4 ,it follows that the law would be1 properly speaking1 given by nature1 and1 as such1 it must be known and proved by experience and would consequently be contingent and therefore incapable of being an apodeictic practical rule1 such as the moral rule must be4 ,not only so1 but it is inevitably only heteronomy2 the will does not give itself the law1 but is given by a foreign impulse by means of a particular natural constitution of the subject adapted to receive it4 ,an absolutely good will1 then1 the principle of which must be a categorical imperative1 will be indeterminate as regards all objects and will contain merely the form of volition generally1 and that as autonomy1 that is to say1 the capability of the maxims of every good will to make themselves a universal law1 is itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself1 without needing to assume any spring or interest as a foundation4 ,how such a synthetical practical a priori proposition is possible1 and why it is necessary1 is a problem whose solution does not lie within the bounds of the metaphysic of morals2 and we have not here affirmed its truth1 much less professed to have a proof of it in our power4 ,we simply showed by the development of the universally received notion of morality that an autonomy of the will is inevitably connected with it1 or rather is its foundation4 ,whoever then holds morality to be anything real1 and not a chimerical idea without any truth1 must likewise admit the principle of it that is here assigned4 ,this section then1 like the first1 was merely analytical4 ,now to prove that morality is no creation of the brain1 which it cannot be if the categorical imperative and with it the autonomy of the will is true1 and as an a priori principle absolutely necessary1 this supposes the possibility of a synthetic use of pure practical reason1 which however we cannot venture on without first giving a critical examination of this faculty of reason4 ,in the concluding section we shall give the principal outlines of this critical examination as far as is sufficient for our purpose4 ,,sec#c ,,third ,,section ,,transition ,,from ,,the ,,metaphysic ,,of ,,morals ,,to ,,the ,,critique ,,of ,,pure ,,practical ,,reason ,the ,concept of ,freedom is the ,key that explains the ,autonomy of the ,will ,the will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational1 and freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient1 independently of foreign causes determining it2 just as physical necessity is the property that the causality of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes4 ,the preceding definition of freedom is negative and therefore unfruitful for the discovery of its essence1 but it leads to a positive conception which is so much the more full and fruitful4 ,since the conception of causality involves that of laws1 according to which1 by something that we call cause1 something else1 namely the effect1 must be produced2 hence1 although freedom is not a property of the will depending on physical laws1 yet it is not for that reason lawless2 on the contrary it must be a causality acting according to immutable laws1 but of a peculiar kind2 otherwise a free will would be an absurdity4 ,physical necessity is a heteronomy of the efficient causes1 for every effect is possible only according to this law1 that something else determines the efficient cause to exert its causality4 ,what else then can freedom of the will be but autonomy1 that is1 the property of the will to be a law to itself8 ,but the proposition3 ,the will is in every action a law to itself1 only expresses the principle3 ,to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object itself as a universal law4 ,now this is precisely the formula of the categorical imperative and is the principle of morality1 so that a free will and a will subject to moral laws are one and the same4 ,on the hypothesis1 then1 of freedom of the will1 morality together with its principle follows from it by mere analysis of the conception4 ,however1 the latter is a synthetic proposition2 viz41 an absolutely good will is that whose maxim can always include itself regarded as a universal law2 for this property of its maxim can never be discovered by analysing the conception of an absolutely good will4 ,now such synthetic propositions are only possible in this way3 that the two cognitions are connected together by their union with a third in which they are both to be found4 ,the positive concept of freedom furnishes this third cognition1 which cannot1 as with physical causes1 be the nature of the sensible world 7in the concept of which we find conjoined the concept of something in relation as cause to something else as effect74 ,we cannot now at once show what this third is to which freedom points us and of which we have an idea a priori1 nor can we make intelligible how the concept of freedom is shown to be legitimate from principles of pure practical reason and with it the possibility of a categorical imperative2 but some further preparation is required4 ,freedom must be presupposed as a ,property of the ,will of all ,rational ,beings ,it is not enough to predicate freedom of our own will1 from ,whatever reason1 if we have not sufficient grounds for predicating the same of all rational beings4 ,for as morality serves as a law for us only because we are rational beings1 it must also hold for all rational beings2 and as it must be deduced simply from the property of freedom1 it must be shown that freedom also is a property of all rational beings4 ,it is not enough1 then1 to prove it from certain supposed experiences of human nature 7which indeed is quite impossible1 and it can only be shown a priori71 but we must show that it belongs to the activity of all rational beings endowed with a will4 ,now ,i say every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for that reason in a practical point of view really free1 that is to say1 all laws which are inseparably connected with freedom have the same force for him as if his will had been shown to be free in itself by a proof theoretically conclusive4 99 ,now ,i affirm that we must attribute to every rational being which has a will that it has also the idea of freedom and acts entirely under this idea4 ,for in such a being we conceive a reason that is practical1 that is1 has causality in reference to its objects4 ,now we cannot possibly conceive a reason consciously receiving a bias from any other quarter with respect to its judgements1 for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its judgement not to its own reason1 but to an impulse4 ,it must regard itself as the author of its principles independent of foreign influences4 ,consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being it must regard itself as free1 that is to say1 the will of such a being cannot be a will of its own except under the idea of freedom4 ,this idea must therefore in a practical point of view be ascribed to every rational being4 99 ,i adopt this method of assuming freedom merely as an idea which rational beings suppose in their actions1 in order to avoid the necessity of proving it in its theoretical aspect also4 ,the former is sufficient for my purpose2 for even though the speculative proof should not be made out1 yet a being that cannot act except with the idea of freedom is bound by the same laws that would oblige a being who was actually free4 ,thus we can escape here from the onus which presses on the theory4 ,of the ,interest attaching to the ,ideas of ,morality ,we have finally reduced the definite conception of morality to the idea of freedom4 ,this latter1 however1 we could not prove to be actually a property of ourselves or of human nature2 only we saw that it must be presupposed if we would conceive a being as rational and conscious of its causality in respect of its actions1 i4e41 as endowed with a will2 and so we find that on just the same grounds we must ascribe to every being endowed with reason and will this attribute of determining itself to action under the idea of its freedom4 ,now it resulted also from the presupposition of these ideas that we became aware of a law that the subjective principles of action1 i4e41 maxims1 must always be so assumed that they can also hold as objective1 that is1 universal principles1 and so serve as universal laws of our own dictation4 ,but why then should ,i subject myself to this principle and that simply as a rational being1 thus also subjecting to it all other being endowed with reason8 ,i will allow that no interest urges me to this1 for that would not give a categorical imperative1 but ,i must take an interest in it and discern how this comes to pass2 for this properly an ,i ought is properly an ,i would1 valid for every rational being1 provided only that reason determined his actions without any hindrance4 ,but for beings that are in addition affected as we are by springs of a different kind1 namely1 sensibility1 and in whose case that is not always done which reason alone would do1 for these that necessity is expressed only as an ought1 and the subjective necessity is different from the objective4 ,it seems then as if the moral law1 that is1 the principle of autonomy of the will1 were properly speaking only presupposed in the idea of freedom1 and as if we could not prove its reality and objective necessity independently4 ,in that case we should still have gained something considerable by at least determining the true principle more exactly than had previously been done2 but as regards its validity and the practical necessity of subjecting oneself to it1 we should not have advanced a step4 ,for if we were asked why the universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition restricting our actions1 and on what we ground the worth which we assign to this manner of acting- a worth so great that there cannot be any higher interest2 and if we were asked further how it happens that it is by this alone a man believes he feels his own personal worth1 in comparison with which that of an agreeable or disagreeable condition is to be regarded as nothing1 to these questions we could give no satisfactory answer4 ,we find indeed sometimes that we can take an interest in a personal quality which does not involve any interest of external condition1 provided this quality makes us capable of participating in the condition in case reason were to effect the allotment2 that is to say1 the mere being worthy of happiness can interest of itself even without the motive of participating in this happiness4 ,this judgement1 however1 is in fact only the effect of the importance of the moral law which we before presupposed 7when by the idea of freedom we detach ourselves from every empirical interest72 but that we ought to detach ourselves from these interests1 i4e41 to consider ourselves as free in action and yet as subject to certain laws1 so as to find a worth simply in our own person which can compensate us for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition2 this we are not yet able to discern in this way1 nor do we see how it is possible so to act- in other words1 whence the moral law derives its obligation4 ,it must be freely admitted that there is a sort of circle here from which it seems impossible to escape4 ,in the order of efficient causes we assume ourselves free1 in order that in the order of ends we may conceive ourselves as subject to moral laws3 and we afterwards conceive ourselves as subject to these laws1 because we have attributed to ourselves freedom of will3 for freedom and self-legislation of will are both autonomy and1 therefore1 are reciprocal conceptions1 and for this very reason one must not be used to explain the other or give the reason of it1 but at most only logical purposes to reduce apparently different notions of the same object to one single concept 7as we reduce different fractions of the same value to the lowest terms74 ,one resource remains to us1 namely1 to inquire whether we do not occupy different points of view when by means of freedom we think ourselves as causes efficient a priori1 and when we form our conception of ourselves from our actions as effects which we see before our eyes4 ,it is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make1 but which we may assume that even the commonest understanding can make1 although it be after its fashion by an obscure discernment of judgement which it calls feeling1 that all the ideas that come to us involuntarily 7as those of the senses7 do not enable us to know objects otherwise than as they affect us2 so that what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us1 and consequently that as regards ideas of this kind even with the closest attention and clearness that the understanding can apply to them1 we can by them only attain to the knowledge of appearances1 never to that of things in themselves4 ,as soon as this distinction has once been made 7perhaps merely in consequence of the difference observed between the ideas given us from without1 and in which we are passive1 and those that we produce simply from ourselves1 and in which we show our own activity71 then it follows of itself that we must admit and assume behind the appearance something else that is not an appearance1 namely1 the things in themselves2 although we must admit that as they can never be known to us except as they affect us1 we can come no nearer to them1 nor can we ever know what they are in themselves4 ,this must furnish a distinction1 however crude1 between a world of sense and the world of understanding1 of which the former may be different according to the difference of the sensuous impressions in various observers1 while the second which is its basis always remains the same1 ,even as to himself1 a man cannot pretend to know what he is in himself from the knowledge he has by internal sensation4 ,for as he does not as it were create himself1 and does not come by the conception of himself a priori but empirically1 it naturally follows that he can obtain his knowledge even of himself only by the inner sense and1 consequently1 only through the appearances of his nature and the way in which his consciousness is affected4 ,at the same time beyond these characteristics of his own subject1 made up of mere appearances1 he must necessarily suppose something else as their basis1 namely1 his ego1 whatever its characteristics in itself may be4 ,thus in respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations he must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense2 but in respect of whatever there may be of pure activity in him 7that which reaches consciousness immediately and not through affecting the senses71 he must reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world1 of which1 however1 he has no further knowledge4 ,to such a conclusion the reflecting man must come with respect to all the things which can be presented to him3 it is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest understanding1 who1 as is well known1 are very much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible and acting of itself4 ,they spoil it1 however1 by presently sensualizing this invisible again2 that is to say1 wanting to make it an object of intuition1 so that they do not become a whit the wiser4 ,now man really finds in himself a faculty by which he distinguishes himself from everything else1 even from himself as affected by objects1 and that is reason4 ,this being pure spontaneity is even elevated above the understanding4 ,for although the latter is a spontaneity and does not1 like sense1 merely contain intuitions that arise when we are affected by things 7and are therefore passive71 yet it cannot produce from its activity any other conceptions than those which merely serve to bring the intuitions of sense under rules and1 thereby1 to unite them in one consciousness1 and without this use of the sensibility it could not think at all2 whereas1 on the contrary1 reason shows so pure a spontaneity in the case of what ,i call ideas ideal conceptions that it thereby far transcends everything that the sensibility can give it1 and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that of understanding1 and thereby prescribing the limits of the understanding itself4 ,for this reason a rational being must regard himself qua intelligence 7not from the side of his lower faculties7 as belonging not to the world of sense1 but to that of understanding2 hence he has two points of view from which he can regard himself1 and recognise laws of the exercise of his faculties1 and consequently of all his actions3 first1 so far as he belongs to the world of sense1 he finds himself subject to laws of nature 7heteronomy72 secondly1 as belonging to the intelligible world1 under laws which being independent of nature have their foundation not in experience but in reason alone4 ,as a rational being1 and consequently belonging to the intelligible world1 man can never conceive the causality of his own will otherwise than on condition of the idea of freedom1 for independence of the determinate causes of the sensible world 7an independence which reason must always ascribe to itself7 is freedom4 ,now the idea of freedom is inseparably connected with the conception of autonomy1 and this again with the universal principle of morality which is ideally the foundation of all actions of rational beings1 just as the law of nature is of all phenomena4 ,now the suspicion is removed which we raised above1 that there was a latent circle involved in our reasoning from freedom to autonomy1 and from this to the moral law1 viz43 that we laid down the idea of freedom because of the moral law only that we might afterwards in turn infer the latter from freedom1 and that consequently we could assign no reason at all for this law1 but could only present it as a petitio principii which well disposed minds would gladly concede to us1 but which we could never put forward as a provable proposition4 ,for now we see that1 when we conceive ourselves as free1 we transfer ourselves into the world of understanding as members of it and recognise the autonomy of the will with its consequence1 morality2 whereas1 if we conceive ourselves as under obligation1 we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and at the same time to the world of understanding4 ,how is a ,categorical ,imperative ,possible8 ,every rational being reckons himself qua intelligence as belonging to the world of understanding1 and it is simply as an efficient cause belonging to that world that he calls his causality a will4 ,on the other side he is also conscious of himself as a part of the world of sense in which his actions1 which are mere appearances phenomena of that causality1 are displayed2 we cannot1 however1 discern how they are possible from this causality which we do not know2 but instead of that1 these actions as belonging to the sensible world must be viewed as determined by other phenomena1 namely1 desires and inclinations4 ,if therefore ,i were only a member of the world of understanding1 then all my actions would perfectly conform to the principle of autonomy of the pure will2 if ,i were only a part of the world of sense1 they would necessarily be assumed to conform wholly to the natural law of desires and inclinations1 in other words1 to the heteronomy of nature4 7,the former would rest on morality as the supreme principle1 the latter on happiness47 ,since1 however1 the world of understanding contains the foundation of the world of sense1 and consequently of its laws also1 and accordingly gives the law to my will 7which belongs wholly to the world of understanding7 directly1 and must be conceived as doing so1 it follows that1 although on the one side ,i must regard myself as a being belonging to the world of sense1 yet on the other side ,i must recognize myself as subject as an intelligence to the law of the world of understanding1 i4e41 to reason1 which contains this law in the idea of freedom1 and therefore as subject to the autonomy of the will3 consequently ,i must regard the laws of the world of understanding as imperatives for me and the actions which conform to them as duties4 ,and thus what makes categorical imperatives possible is this1 that the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world1 in consequence of which1 if ,i were nothing else1 all my actions would always conform to the autonomy of the will2 but as ,i at the same time intuite myself as a member of the world of sense1 they ought so to conform1 and this categorical ought implies a synthetic a priori proposition1 inasmuch as besides my will as affected by sensible desires there is added further the idea of the same will but as belonging to the world of the understanding1 pure and practical of itself1 which contains the supreme condition according to reason of the former will2 precisely as to the intuitions of sense there are added concepts of the understanding which of themselves signify nothing but regular form in general and in this way synthetic a priori propositions become possible1 on which all knowledge of physical nature rests4 ,the practical use of common human reason confirms this reasoning4 ,there is no one1 not even the most consummate villain1 provided only that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason1 who1 when we set before him examples of honesty of purpose1 of steadfastness in following good maxims1 of sympathy and general benevolence 7even combined with great sacrifices of advantages and comfort71 does not wish that he might also possess these qualities4 ,only on account of his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself1 but at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are burdensome to himself4 ,he proves by this that he transfers himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of the sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in the field of the sensibility2 since he cannot expect to obtain by that wish any gratification of his desires1 nor any position which would satisfy any of his actual or supposable inclinations 7for this would destroy the pre-eminence of the very idea which wrests that wish from him73 he can only expect a greater intrinsic worth of his own person4 ,this better person1 however1 he imagines himself to be when be transfers himself to the point of view of a member of the world of the understanding1 to which he is involuntarily forced by the idea of freedom1 i4e41 of independence on determining causes of the world of sense2 and from this point of view he is conscious of a good will1 which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will that he possesses as a member of the world of sense- a law whose authority he recognizes while transgressing it4 ,what he morally ought is then what he necessarily would1 as a member of the world of the understanding1 and is conceived by him as an ought only inasmuch as he likewise considers himself as a member of the world of sense4 ,of the ,extreme ,limits of all ,practical ,philosophy4 ,all men attribute to themselves freedom of will4 ,hence come all judgements upon actions as being such as ought to have been done1 although they have not been done4 ,however1 this freedom is not a conception of experience1 nor can it be so1 since it still remains1 even though experience shows the contrary of what on supposition of freedom are conceived as its necessary consequences4 ,on the other side it is equally necessary that everything that takes place should be fixedly determined according to laws of nature4 ,this necessity of nature is likewise not an empirical conception1 just for this reason1 that it involves the motion of necessity and consequently of a priori cognition4 ,but this conception of a system of nature is confirmed by experience2 and it must even be inevitably presupposed if experience itself is to be possible1 that is1 a connected knowledge of the objects of sense resting on general laws4 ,therefore freedom is only an idea of reason1 and its objective reality in itself is doubtful2 while nature is a concept of the understanding which proves1 and must necessarily prove1 its reality in examples of experience4 ,there arises from this a dialectic of reason1 since the freedom attributed to the will appears to contradict the necessity of nature1 and placed between these two ways reason for speculative purposes finds the road of physical necessity much more beaten and more appropriate than that of freedom2 yet for practical purposes the narrow footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is possible to make use of reason in our conduct2 hence it is just as impossible for the subtlest philosophy as for the commonest reason of men to argue away freedom4 ,philosophy must then assume that no real contradiction will be found between freedom and physical necessity of the same human actions1 for it cannot give up the conception of nature any more than that of freedom4 ,nevertheless1 even though we should never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible1 we must at least remove this apparent contradiction in a convincing manner4 ,for if the thought of freedom contradicts either itself or nature1 which is equally necessary1 it must in competition with physical necessity be entirely given up4 ,it would1 however1 be impossible to escape this contradiction if the thinking subject1 which seems to itself free1 conceived itself in the same sense or in the very same relation when it calls itself free as when in respect of the same action it assumes itself to be subject to the law of nature4 ,hence it is an indispensable problem of speculative philosophy to show that its illusion respecting the contradiction rests on this1 that we think of man in a different sense and relation when we call him free and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature as being part and parcel of nature4 ,it must therefore show that not only can both these very well co-exist1 but that both must be thought as necessarily united in the same subject1 since otherwise no reason could be given why we should burden reason with an idea which1 though it may possibly without contradiction be reconciled with another that is sufficiently established1 yet entangles us in a perplexity which sorely embarrasses reason in its theoretic employment4 ,this duty1 however1 belongs only to speculative philosophy4 ,the philosopher then has no option whether he will remove the apparent contradiction or leave it untouched2 for in the latter case the theory respecting this would be bonum vacans1 into the possession of which the fatalist would have a right to enter and chase all morality out of its supposed domain as occupying it without title4 ,we cannot however as yet say that we are touching the bounds of practical philosophy4 ,for the settlement of that controversy does not belong to it2 it only demands from speculative reason that it should put an end to the discord in which it entangles itself in theoretical questions1 so that practical reason may have rest and security from external attacks which might make the ground debatable on which it desires to build4 ,the claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded on the consciousness and the admitted supposition that reason is independent of merely subjectively determined causes which together constitute what belongs to sensation only and which consequently come under the general designation of sensibility4 ,man considering himself in this way as an intelligence places himself thereby in a different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will1 and consequently with causality1 and when on the other he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense 7as he really is also71 and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to laws of nature4 ,now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good1 nay1 must hold good at the same time4 ,for there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance 7belonging to the world of sense7 is subject to certain laws1 of which the very same as a thing or being in itself is independent1 and that he must conceive and think of himself in this twofold way1 rests as to the first on the consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses1 and as to the second on the consciousness of himself as an intelligence1 i4e41 as independent on sensible impressions in the employment of his reason 7in other words as belonging to the world of understanding74 ,hence it comes to pass that man claims the possession of a will which takes no account of anything that comes under the head of desires and inclinations and1 on the contrary1 conceives actions as possible to him1 nay1 even as necessary which can only be done by disregarding all desires and sensible inclinations4 ,the causality of such actions lies in him as an intelligence and in the laws of effects and actions which depend on the principles of an intelligible world1 of which indeed he knows nothing more than that in it pure reason alone independent of sensibility gives the law2 moreover since it is only in that world1 as an intelligence1 that he is his proper self 7being as man only the appearance of himself71 those laws apply to him directly and categorically1 so that the incitements of inclinations and appetites 7in other words the whole nature of the world of sense7 cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence4 ,nay1 he does not even hold himself responsible for the former or ascribe them to his proper self1 i4e41 his will3 he only ascribes to his will any indulgence which he might yield them if he allowed them to influence his maxims to the prejudice of the rational laws of the will4 ,when practical reason thinks itself into a world of understanding1 it does not thereby transcend its own limits1 as it would if it tried to enter it by intuition or sensation4 ,the former is only a negative thought in respect of the world of sense1 which does not give any laws to reason in determining the will and is positive only in this single point that this freedom as a negative characteristic is at the same time conjoined with a 7positive7 faculty and even with a causality of reason1 which we designate a will1 namely a faculty of so acting that the principle of the actions shall conform to the essential character of a rational motive1 i4e41 the condition that the maxim have universal validity as a law4 ,but were it to borrow an object of will1 that is1 a motive1 from the world of understanding1 then it would overstep its bounds and pretend to be acquainted with something of which it knows nothing4 ,the conception of a world of the understanding is then only a point of view which reason finds itself compelled to take outside the appearances in order to conceive itself as practical1 which would not be possible if the influences of the sensibility had a determining power on man1 but which is necessary unless he is to be denied the consciousness of himself as an intelligence and1 consequently1 as a rational cause1 energizing by reason1 that is1 operating freely4 ,this thought certainly involves the idea of an order and a system of laws different from that of the mechanism of nature which belongs to the sensible world2 and it makes the conception of an intelligible world necessary 7that is to say1 the whole system of rational beings as things in themselves74 ,but it does not in the least authorize us to think of it further than as to its formal condition only1 that is1 the universality of the maxims of the will as laws1 and consequently the autonomy of the latter1 which alone is consistent with its freedom2 whereas1 on the contrary1 all laws that refer to a definite object give heteronomy1 which only belongs to laws of nature and can only apply to the sensible world4 ,but reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook to explain how pure reason can be practical1 which would be exactly the same problem as to explain how freedom is possible4 ,for we can explain nothing but that which we can reduce to laws1 the object of which can be given in some possible experience4 ,but freedom is a mere idea1 the objective reality of which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature1 and consequently not in any possible experience2 and for this reason it can never be comprehended or understood1 because we cannot support it by any sort of example or analogy4 ,it holds good only as a necessary hypothesis of reason in a being that believes itself conscious of a will1 that is1 of a faculty distinct from mere desire 7namely1 a faculty of determining itself to action as an intelligence1 in other words1 by laws of reason independently on natural instincts74 ,now where determination according to laws of nature ceases1 there all explanation ceases also1 and nothing remains but defence1 i4e41 the removal of the objections of those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things1 and thereupon boldly declare freedom impossible4 ,we can only point out to them that the supposed contradiction that they have discovered in it arises only from this1 that in order to be able to apply the law of nature to human actions1 they must necessarily consider man as an appearance3 then when we demand of them that they should also think of him qua intelligence as a thing in itself1 they still persist in considering him in this respect also as an appearance4 ,in this view it would no doubt be a contradiction to suppose the causality of the same subject 7that is1 his will7 to be withdrawn from all the natural laws of the sensible world4 ,but this contradiction disappears1 if they would only bethink themselves and admit1 as is reasonable1 that behind the appearances there must also lie at their root 7although hidden7 the things in themselves1 and that we cannot expect the laws of these to be the same as those that govern their appearances4 ,the subjective impossibility of explaining the freedom of the will is identical with the impossibility of discovering and explaining an interest 99 which man can take in the moral law4 ,nevertheless he does actually take an interest in it1 the basis of which in us we call the moral feeling1 which some have falsely assigned as the standard of our moral judgement1 whereas it must rather be viewed as the subjective effect that the law exercises on the will1 the objective principle of which is furnished by reason alone4 99 ,interest is that by which reason becomes practical1 i4e41 a cause determining the will4 ,hence we say of rational beings only that they take an interest in a thing2 irrational beings only feel sensual appetites4 ,reason takes a direct interest in action then only when the universal validity of its maxims is alone sufficient to determine the will4 ,such an interest alone is pure4 ,but if it can determine the will only by means of another object of desire or on the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject1 then reason takes only an indirect interest in the action1 and1 as reason by itself without experience cannot discover either objects of the will or a special feeling actuating it1 this latter interest would only be empirical and not a pure rational interest4 ,the logical interest of reason 7namely1 to extend its insight7 is never direct1 but presupposes purposes for which reason is employed4 ,in order indeed that a rational being who is also affected through the senses should will what reason alone directs such beings that they ought to will1 it is no doubt requisite that reason should have a power to infuse a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty1 that is to say1 that it should have a causality by which it determines the sensibility according to its own principles4 ,but it is quite impossible to discern1 i4e41 to make it intelligible a priori1 how a mere thought1 which itself contains nothing sensible1 can itself produce a sensation of pleasure or pain2 for this is a particular kind of causality of which as of every other causality we can determine nothing whatever a priori2 we must only consult experience about it4 ,but as this cannot supply us with any relation of cause and effect except between two objects of experience1 whereas in this case1 although indeed the effect produced lies within experience1 yet the cause is supposed to be pure reason acting through mere ideas which offer no object to experience1 it follows that for us men it is quite impossible to explain how and why the universality of the maxim as a law1 that is1 morality1 interests4 ,this only is certain1 that it is not because it interests us that it has validity for us 7for that would be heteronomy and dependence of practical reason on sensibility1 namely1 on a feeling as its principle1 in which case it could never give moral laws71 but that it interests us because it is valid for us as men1 inasmuch as it had its source in our will as intelligences1 in other words1 in our proper self1 and what belongs to mere appearance is necessarily subordinated by reason to the nature of the thing in itself4 ,the question then1 ,how a categorical imperative is possible1 can be answered to this extent1 that we can assign the only hypothesis on which it is possible1 namely1 the idea of freedom2 and we can also discern the necessity of this hypothesis1 and this is sufficient for the practical exercise of reason1 that is1 for the conviction of the validity of this imperative1 and hence of the moral law2 but how this hypothesis itself is possible can never be discerned by any human reason4 ,on the hypothesis1 however1 that the will of an intelligence is free1 its autonomy1 as the essential formal condition of its determination1 is a necessary consequence4 ,moreover1 this freedom of will is not merely quite possible as a hypothesis 7not involving any contradiction to the principle of physical necessity in the connexion of the phenomena of the sensible world7 as speculative philosophy can show3 but further1 a rational being who is conscious of causality through reason1 that is to say1 of a will 7distinct from desires71 must of necessity make it practically1 that is1 in idea1 the condition of all his voluntary actions4 ,but to explain how pure reason can be of itself practical without the aid of any spring of action that could be derived from any other source1 i4e41 how the mere principle of the universal validity of all its maxims as laws 7which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason7 can of itself supply a spring1 without any matter 7object7 of the will in which one could antecedently take any interest2 and how it can produce an interest which would be called purely moral2 or in other words1 how pure reason can be practical- to explain this is beyond the power of human reason1 and all the labour and pains of seeking an explanation of it are lost4 ,it is just the same as if ,i sought to find out how freedom itself is possible as the causality of a will4 ,for then ,i quit the ground of philosophical explanation1 and ,i have no other to go upon4 ,i might indeed revel in the world of intelligences which still remains to me1 but although ,i have an idea of it which is well founded1 yet ,i have not the least knowledge of it1 nor an ,i ever attain to such knowledge with all the efforts of my natural faculty of reason4 ,it signifies only a something that remains over when ,i have eliminated everything belonging to the world of sense from the actuating principles of my will1 serving merely to keep in bounds the principle of motives taken from the field of sensibility2 fixing its limits and showing that it does not contain all in all within itself1 but that there is more beyond it2 but this something more ,i know no further4 ,of pure reason which frames this ideal1 there remains after the abstraction of all matter1 i4e41 knowledge of objects1 nothing but the form1 namely1 the practical law of the universality of the maxims1 and in conformity with this conception of reason in reference to a pure world of understanding as a possible efficient cause1 that is a cause determining the will4 ,there must here be a total absence of springs2 unless this idea of an intelligible world is itself the spring1 or that in which reason primarily takes an interest2 but to make this intelligible is precisely the problem that we cannot solve4 ,here now is the extreme limit of all moral inquiry1 and it is of great importance to determine it even on this account1 in order that reason may not on the one hand1 to the prejudice of morals1 seek about in the world of sense for the supreme motive and an interest comprehensible but empirical2 and on the other hand1 that it may not impotently flap its wings without being able to move in the 7for it7 empty space of transcendent concepts which we call the intelligible world1 and so lose itself amidst chimeras4 ,for the rest1 the idea of a pure world of understanding as a system of all intelligences1 and to which we ourselves as rational beings belong 7although we are likewise on the other side members of the sensible world71 this remains always a useful and legitimate idea for the purposes of rational belief1 although all knowledge stops at its threshold1 useful1 namely1 to produce in us a lively interest in the moral law by means of the noble ideal of a universal kingdom of ends in themselves 7rational beings71 to which we can belong as members then only when we carefully conduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature4 ,concluding ,remark ,the speculative employment of reason with respect to nature leads to the absolute necessity of some supreme cause of the world3 the practical employment of reason with a view to freedom leads also to absolute necessity1 but only of the laws of the actions of a rational being as such4 ,now it is an essential principle of reason1 however employed1 to push its knowledge to a consciousness of its necessity 7without which it would not be rational knowledge74 ,it is1 however1 an equally essential restriction of the same reason that it can neither discern the necessity of what is or what happens1 nor of what ought to happen1 unless a condition is supposed on which it is or happens or ought to happen4 ,in this way1 however1 by the constant inquiry for the condition1 the satisfaction of reason is only further and further postponed4 ,hence it unceasingly seeks the unconditionally necessary and finds itself forced to assume it1 although without any means of making it comprehensible to itself1 happy enough if only it can discover a conception which agrees with this assumption4 ,it is therefore no fault in our deduction of the supreme principle of morality1 but an objection that should be made to human reason in general1 that it cannot enable us to conceive the absolute necessity of an unconditional practical law 7such as the categorical imperative must be74 ,it cannot be blamed for refusing to explain this necessity by a condition1 that is to say1 by means of some interest assumed as a basis1 since the law would then cease to be a supreme law of reason4 ,and thus while we do not comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative1 we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility1 and this is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which strives to carry its principles up to the very limit of human reason4 ,,the ,,end