,libraries47                            
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--------- ,transcriber's note3          
,errors listed in the ,errata have been 
corrected4                              
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---------   ,,on ,,mr4 ,,spencer',s     
,,data ,,of ,,ethics4  ,,by ,,malcolm   
,,guthrie1  ,,author ,,of ,,on ,,mr4    
,,spencer',s ,,formula ,,of ,,evolution1
  ,,on ,,mr4 ,,spencer',s ,,unification 
,,of ,,knowledge4   ,,london3 ,,the     
,,modern ,,press1 #ac ,,and #ad1        
,,paternoster ,,row1 ,e4,c4 #ahhd4      
7,all rights reserved47     ,,contents4 
,,page ,,chapter ,i4--,,ethics ,,and    
,,the ,,unification ,,of ,,knowledge4   
,,the ,,philosophical ,,view            
#a  ,,chapter ,,ii4--,,the ,,scientific 
,,view ,,of ,,the ,,evolution           
,,of ,,ethics                           
#bg  ,,chapter ,,iii4--,,the            
,,biological ,,view ,,of ,,ethics       
#cf  ,,chapter ,,iv4--,,the             
,,sociological ,,view                   

#ef  ,,chapter ,v4--,,the ,,ethical     
,,imperative                   #fc      
,,chapter ,,vi4--,,systems ,,of ,,ethics
                       #ge  ,,chapter   
,,vii4--,,the ,,evolution ,,of ,,free   
,,will             #hc  ,,chapter       
,,viii4--,,evolution ,,and ,,religion   
#ajg  ,,chapter ,,ix4--,,summary        
#abj     ,,preface4   ,this volume      
completes the critical examination of   
,mr4 ,spencer's system of ,philosophy   
already pursued through two previous    
volumes entitled respectively ,on ,mr4  
,spencer's ,formula of ,evolution1 and  
,on ,mr4 ,spencer's ,unification of     
,knowledge4 ,the entire task has been   
undertaken by a student for the use of  
students4 ,it cannot be of much use to  
the general reader1 as it presumes and  
indeed requires a very intimate         
knowledge of ,mr4 ,spencer's works4 ,for
 those who do not wish to enter into    
detailed examination perhaps ,chapter   
,i4 of the ,unification of ,knowledge   
will afford a good epitome of the line  

of criticism2 and this may be followed1 
if desired1 by a perusal of the ,formula
 of ,evolution4 ,it is believed that the
 most serious piece of criticism against
 ,mr4 ,spencer's system will be found in
 the examination of his re-constructive 
,biology in ,chapter ,v4 of the         
,unification1 and in the examination of 
the origin of organic molecules         
commencing at page #cj of the ,formula  
of ,evolution4 ,evidently of the highest
 importance in a system of philosophy   
conceived in the manner in which ,mr4   
,spencer presents it1 this point of     
transition between the inorganic and the
 organic with its dependent histories is
 of the very deepest fundamental        
interest1 and upon the question whether 
it is well or badly treated depends the 
practical value of his philosophy as    
applied to human concerns4  ,in our     
opinion1 whatever of worth there is in  
,mr4 ,spencer's works 7and there is very
 much71 derives its value from a        
posteriori grounds and not from its a   

priori reliance upon first principles1  
nor from its place in a deductive system
 of cosmic philosophy4 ,it has not      
fallen to our lot1 nor has it been our  
object1 to appraise the separate or     
incidental value of ,mr4 ,spencer's     
works4 ,our view has been limited to the
 single object of examining them in the 
mode in which he presents them1 as      
forming a connected system of           
philosophy4 ,we have done so because he 
sets forth his works to us in this      
light1 and evidently if they can be so  
accepted1 it would be a gift to humanity
 of the highest value1 for it would lend
 cogency to every past and confer a     
guidance to all future ages1 forming a  
crowning glory to the intellectual      
achievements of the human race4  ,it is 
therefore to this point that we address 
our examination1 and in no unfriendly   
spirit2 for the object ,mr4 ,spencer had
 in view was one which appealed to every
 sentiment and every intellectual       
aspiration within us4 ,but we feel bound

 to say how sadly we have been          
disappointed4 ,we have found the object 
of our admiration to be like            
,nebuchadnezzar's dream god1 a thing    
apparently perfect and complete in      
configuration but like the image        
compounded of iron and clay and precious
 stones inevitably falling to pieces    
under the strain of sustained           
criticisms4  ,mr4 ,spencer's philosophic
 conception was indeed imposing1 and    
before its magnificent proportions many 
have bowed down in sincere respect4 ,but
 his cosmical scheme when carefully     
examined proved to be constructed of    
terms which had no fixed and definite   
meaning1 which were in fact merely      
symbols of symbolic conceptions1        
conceptions themselves symbolic because 
they were not understood--and the moment
 we began to put them to use as having  
definite values they landed us forthwith
 in alternative contradictions6 ,then to
 effect cosmical evolution1 which is a  
process of imperceptible objective      

change1 what was necessary1 but to adopt
 a system of imperceptible word changes1
 so that the imperceptible word changes 
accompanying the imperceptible objective
 changes should lead us in the end to   
the completed results1 and the process  
of evolution should thus be made        
comprehensible6 ,in this manner over the
 spaces of an enormous work have we been
 skilfully led by a master of language  
till we find ourselves in imagination   
following out mentally the actual       
processes of the universe4 ,but after   
all it has only been a process1 in our  
own minds1 of the skilful substitution  
of words6  ,errors to be successful must
 be big and bold4 ,fallacies of         
reasoning are detected on a medium      
scale1 but when they are writ large it  
is difficult to detect them4 ,trains of 
syllogisms are sometimes more effective 
because they are vast than because they 
are true4 ,let them be imposing in their
 language and grand in their            
proportions1 we naturally bow down to   

power1 even if it is only power of      
largeness4 ,when dealing with ,mr4      
,spencer's reasonings we feel a certain 
awe as if we were contradicting the     
forces of the universe--seemingly allied
 to him4 ,we feel conscious of an       
impertinence in treating of such great  
matters1 dealt with in such a mighty    
sweep--disdainful of precision and      
consistency4 ,the transformations and   
evolutions of reasoning in ,mr4         
,spencer's works are no less wonderful  
than his treatment of words4 ,the mind  
is swept along by an indiscernable but  
mighty flow1 and sometimes after        
mysterious disappearances of            
consecutiveness between volumes or      
chapters1 we find ourselves landed in a 
satisfied but bewildered manner at a    
conclusion about which we cannot but    
wonder however we arrived there4  ,by   
such terms as equilibration1 including  
the theory of the moving equilibrium2 by
 such terms as polarity plastic and     
coercive2 and by plausible similarities 

between modes of process1 we are deluded
 into supposing we understand the       
constructive progress of nature and are 
made to feel happy and proud of our     
knowledge4 ,a great self satisfaction   
attends the student who believes himself
 rightly to understand the universe4 ,we
 are pleased with our teacher1 and are  
still more pleased with ourselves4  ,but
 the real difficulty appears when the   
necessity for exposition arises4 ,if one
 undertakes to explain1 if one has to   
condense and solidify for the purpose of
 teaching1 if one wishes to make others 
understand1 and share the knowledge one 
has attained1 then indeed our           
difficulties commence4 ,what seemed so  
grand and alluring to look at will not  
stand the ordinary handling of          
scientific language and logical         
statement as between man and man4 ,the  
illusion vanishes1 the system has gone4 
,in these remarks we speak only of ,mr4 
,spencer's cosmical system4 ,of the     
general value of this work as a         

philosopher we express no opinion4 ,in  
the estimation of competent thinkers it 
is very great4 ,fiske1 ,youmans1        
,carveth ,read1 ,ribot1 ,maudsley1      
,clifford1 ,sully1 ,grant ,allen1       
,gopinay1 and others are all working on 
,spencerian lines1 but we do not        
understand that they accept the cosmical
 explanation of ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,he marks
 not the age of complete accomplishment 
but the age of transition4 ,he has not  
grasped the solution of problems1 but he
 has shewn the direction of future      
studies4 ,he has failed in his grand    
endeavour1 but he has shown what to aim 
at and has pointed the way4 ,much of his
 detailed work has been good and        
effective1 and therefore one feels some 
compunction in writing of him so        
severely4 ,nevertheless a man of such   
eminence must not be held sacred from   
criticism1 but on the contrary1 just by 
reason of his eminence and consequent   
influence1 must his work be well        
examined before it is accepted and      

approved4 ,this is the task we have set 
ourselves and which may now be          
considered as complete4 ,we have        
approached the study without any        
prepossessions1 and we have endeavoured1
 while being very strict1 to be         
perfectly fair and honest in our        
presentations of ,mr4 ,spencer's        
theories4 ,naturally the work has been  
long and tedious1 and where so many     
contradictory and indistinct expressions
 of opinion are given it has been       
necessary to deal largely in quotations4
 ,this has been done in justice both to 
ourselves and to our author4 ,if we have
 succeeded in bringing out the main     
lines of thought for the future use of  
students we shall have accomplished our 
end4 ,it is only by very strict thinking
 and discussion that truth is finally   
evolved4  ,a few words must be added as 
to the teleological implications which a
 ,westminster reviewer has discovered in
 our previous works1 and has regarded as
 vitiating the whole of their reasoning4

 ,the subject of teleology is a very    
interesting and puzzling one1 and is    
bound to receive careful attention from 
the student of nature4 ,it requires much
 consideration as to what is meant by   
the term4 ,there may be a natural       
teleology apart from a supernatural     
teleology4 ,we have no very clear       
conceptions upon this point ourselves as
 yet1 but are at present engaged upon   
the study of the question4 ,intention   
and design are exemplified in human     
actions1 means to an end are adopted by 
many animals2 the ,moving ,equilibrium  
theory1 and the ,happy ,accident theory 
alike seem inadequate to account for the
 origin of natural teleology or even for
 all variations of species2 and the     
study of biological developments        
suggests to us the presence and activity
 of a subjective factor related to      
physical factors by some law to which   
may be due the origin of some of the    
biological variations4 ,mr4 ,spencer's  
theory of biological variations as      

internal forces generated by external   
forces1 and thus acting as a            
counterbalance in opposition to an      
inimical force1 or in harmony with a    
favourable force1 having for its object 
the protection or sustentation of the   
organism1 is an altogether different    
theory from the agnostic ,happy         
,accident hypothesis of the naturalist  
school4 ,it implies the origin of       
biological variations as means adapted  
to ends in the preservation of the      
organism or species1 and if this is not 
found workable on the physical          
equilibration hypothesis1 some extension
 of theory is required to account for   
the origin of biological variations in  
which teleological implications are     
involved1 although this theory may be   
truly naturalistic and in perfect       
harmony with an orderly development in  
the manner of evolution4 ,if we cannot  
predicate an anthropomorphic            
teleological mind at the beginning of   
things1 nevertheless a teleology appears

 to be involved in biological           
developments and requires a naturalistic
 explanation4  ,m4 ,lionel ,dauriac#a   
enquires how it comes about that1 while 
accepting the theory of ,evolution1 we  
write a book of #dgf pages against its  
most illustrious exponent1 and asks us  
to explain our acceptance of the        
doctrine as a whole4 ,it is quite true1 
as he states1 that we repudiate a       
materialistic explanation1 and it is on 
this ground that we join issue with ,mr4
 ,spencer1 inasmuch as1 notwithstanding 
,mr4 ,spencer's own formal repudiation1 
all the formulas of explanation upon    
which he attempts the reconstruction of 
the universe are materialistic4 ,the    
factors of chemistry1 and the laws of   
physics1 together with the laws of      
equilibration and polarity1 are all     
purely materialistic in character4 ,by  
the aid of these factors and these laws 
alone we do not think it possible to    
understand and explain the history of   
cosmical evolution4 ,do we then accept a

 spiritual evolution to which the       
materialistic has been altogether       
subordinate8 ,no4 ,we do not understand 
the operations of the subjective apart  
from the material organism4 ,it seems to
 us that there are material factors1 and
 factors which are subjective1 and what 
is wanted is the law of their           
correlation4 ,when we say that we accept
 ,evolution1 we mean that we accept the 
theory of an orderly progress from a    
state of indefinite1 incoherent         
simplicity to a state of definite       
coherent complexity4 ,we discern two    
sets or kinds of factors1 the           
materialistic and the subjective1 but we
 are unable sufficiently to understand  
them and their laws of correlation to   
lay down a formula of interaction of    
such a nature as to explain the orderly 
development which we recognise4  ,this  
is a difficulty which has not been      
overlooked by ,mr4 ,spencer4 ,he would  
escape it in two ways4 ,firstly by a    
mysticism1 through which after the      

definite meaning he has given to his    
terms has been found to fail in actual  
work he changes all his fundamental     
terms into symbolic conceptions4 ,why8  
,because they have no meaning2 and if   
you give them a meaning the conclusions 
from them land the student in           
irreconcilable contradictions4 ,out of  
this mysticism no progress is possible4 
,secondly by means of the double aspect 
theory4 ,according to this theory       
everything is both material and         
subjective1 as you choose to regard it1 
and may be explained and accounted for  
in laws of the relations of either set  
of factors4 ,it is true that phenomena  
may be so described1 but it is not true 
that they can be so explained4 ,there is
 an undoubted concomitance between the  
bodily act and the conscious feeling1   
but the real question is this1--,does   
the conscious feeling wholly depend upon
 the physical series of events and has  
itself no effects on the physical       
series8 ,is it produced without         

producing8 ,is it something occurring in
 connexion with certain motions in the  
nerves of the organism and therefore    
dependent upon and wholly produced by   
the physical factors in their           
interrelation1 according to the known   
chemical and physical laws of the       
factors8 ,if it is so determined1 and   
does not determine as part in a chain of
 causation it cannot be said to         
interfere with the materialistic        
explanation4 ,that is complete in       
itself4 ,the only question left is      
this3--,how comes it about that some    
portions of the physical series of      
phenomena have this strange             
accompaniment of consciousness8 ,a very 
interesting but comparatively           
unimportant question4 ,the theory that  
phenomena have two sides is of no use   
whatever in the endeavour towards the   
statement of a cosmical formula of      
explanation4 ,the result of our studies 
is to the effect that there are physical
 factors and subjective factors alike   

produced and producing4 ,we aim at the  
statement of their law of correlation1  
and in this we would seek the cosmical  
formula4 ,we however seek it in vain1   
and we do not think it possible to      
attain it4 ,in the meantime we look to  
the development of the subjective factor
 in life1 and more especially in human  
life1 as a fact of the greatest         
interest1 the more so that we discern in
 that development an orderly progress in
 a well marked manner2 and it is our    
task to understand the laws of that     
orderly development4 ,this study has to 
be undertaken along with the study of   
material ,evolution2 and although we may
 not fully understand our problem1 there
 is much that we can understand and much
 to make our views large and sympathetic
 and our minds expansive in working out 
the great questions that are set before 
us4   ,the study of ,ethics from the    
,evolutionist's point of view assumes an
 altogether different phase from the old
 methods of inquiry and rests upon an   

altogether different basis4 ,its ground 
of authority is seen to rest in the very
 nature of humanity and does not come to
 him as an imposed law4 ,confidence is  
first shaken and then fully restored4   
,from the new point of view the merit of
 all preceding systems is seen1 and how 
they all fall into harmony in a         
wonderful manner in the consensus of    
mutual support and enforce ethical law  
by an united authority4  ,the chief     
merit of ,mr4 ,spencer's ,data of       
,ethics is that it puts the study upon  
an entirely new basis in grafting it    
upon the study of the larger science of 
,biology4 ,heretofore the study has been
 isolated1 and supposed to be complete  
within its own borders4 ,henceforth no  
professor or student will be considered 
competent to express opinions without   
being well grounded in the study of     
,biological and ,psychological          
evolution4 ,ethics1 along with          
,sociology1 must be studied as part of  
the greater movement4  ,,footnote3  #a  

,revue ,philosophique1 ,dec4 #ahhc4     
,,on ,,mr4 ,,spencer',s ,,data ,,of     
,,ethics4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,ethics   
,,and ,,the ,,unification ,,of          
,,knowledge4  ,,the ,,philosophical     
,,view4   ,always a very complex        
problem1 the study of ethics1 in ,mr4   
,spencer's works1 becomes in some       
respects still more complex from the    
necessity he is under of affiliating it 
in some way upon the cosmical process4  
,conceiving all knowledge to be capable 
of unification as a system of causation1
 so that when the relations of the      
original factors are understood1 all    
histories are merely corollaries from   
these ultimate truths1 ,mr4 ,spencer    
feels bound1 in the first place1 to show
 that each particular science falls into
 its due place in the logical scheme4   
,consequently1 one of the main ideas    
permeating the ,data of ,ethics is this 
view of ethics as interpretable only by 
an adequate knowledge of the cosmical   
process in which it forms a feature4    

,indeed1 the proposition is laid down at
 the outset that parts can only be      
properly understood through a knowledge 
of the wholes of which they form part4#b
 ,upon this ,mr4 ,spencer reasons that  
since ethics deals with purposed        
conduct1 that kind of conduct can only  
be understood through a scientific      
knowledge of conduct in general1 which  
again forms part of the study of action 
in general1 bringing us at once to the  
cosmical process upon the understanding 
of which1 therefore1 depends the        
understanding of our special subject4   
,this philosophic relation of ,ethics to
 the cosmical process is referred to in 
the preface as being1 in fact1 the main 
object ,mr4 ,spencer had in view in his 
elaborate series of volumes1 and is more
 explicitly stated in ,chapter ,,iv4 of 
the work under review1 in which ,mr4    
,spencer considering ,the ,ways of      
,judging ,conduct1 justifies the course 
he thus pursues4 ,here it is pointed out
 that in the systems of all preceding   

authors the idea of causation has been  
insufficiently recognised or has even   
been altogether ignored--an assertion   
which is thereupon justified by a review
 of the ,theological1 ,political1       
,intuitional1 and ,utilitarian schools  
of moral philosophers4 ,mr4 ,spencer    
thereupon proceeds 7 #bb7 ,thus1 then1  
is justified the allegation made at the 
outset1 that1 irrespective of their     
distinctive characters and their special
 tendencies1 all the current methods of 
ethics have one general defect--they    
neglect ultimate causal connexions4 ,of 
course1 ,i do not mean that they wholly 
ignore the natural consequences of      
actions2 but ,i mean that they recognise
 them only incidentally4 ,they do not   
erect into a method the ascertaining of 
necessary relations between causes and  
effects1 and deducing rules of conduct  
from formulated statements of them4     
,every science begins by accumulating   
observations1 and presently generalises 
these empirically2 but only when it     

reaches the stage at which its empirical
 generalisations are included in a      
rational generalisation does it become  
developed science4 ,astronomy has       
already passed through its successive   
stages2 first1 collections of facts1    
then inductions from them1 and lastly   
deductive interpretations of these1 as  
corollaries from a universal principle  
of action among masses in space4        
,accounts of structures and tabulations 
of strata1 grouped and compared1 have   
led gradually to the assigning of       
various classes of geological changes to
 igneous and aqueous actions2 and it is 
now tacitly admitted that geology       
becomes a science proper1 only as fast  
as such changes are explained in terms  
of those natural processes which have   
arisen in the cooling and solidifying   
,earth1 exposed to the ,sun's heat and  
the action of the ,moon upon its ocean4 
,the science of life has been1 and is   
still1 exhibiting a like series of      
steps2 the evolution of organic forms at

 large is being affiliated on physical  
actions in operation from the beginning2
 and the vital phenomena each organism  
presents1 are coming to be understood as
 connected sets of changes1 in parts    
formed of matters that are affected by  
certain forces1 and disengage other     
forces4 ,so is it with mind4 ,early     
ideas concerning thought and feeling    
ignored everything like cause1 save in  
recognising those effects of habit which
 were forced on men's attention and     
expressed in proverbs2 but there are    
growing up interpretations of thought   
and feeling as correlates of the actions
 and reactions of a nervous structure1  
that is influenced by outer changes and 
works in the body adapted changes1 the  
implication being that psychology       
becomes a science1 as fast as these     
relations of phenomena are explained as 
consequences of ultimate principles4    
,sociology1 too1 represented down to    
recent times only by stray ideas about  
social organisation1 scattered through  

the masses of worthless gossip furnished
 us by historians1 is coming to be      
recognised by some as also a science2   
and such adumbrations of it as have from
 time to time appeared in the shape of  
empirical generalisations1 are now      
beginning to assume the character of    
generalisations made coherent by        
derivation from causes lying in human   
nature placed under given conditions4   
,clearly then1 ethics1 which is a       
science dealing with the conduct of     
associated human beings1 regarded under 
one of its aspects1 has to undergo a    
like transformation1 and1 at present    
undeveloped1 can be considered a        
developed science only when it has      
undergone this transformation4  ,a      
preparation in the simpler sciences is  
pre-supposed4 ,ethics has a physical    
aspect1 since it treats of human        
activities1 which1 in common with all   
expenditures of energy1 conform to the  
law of the persistence of energy2 moral 
principles must conform to physical     

necessities4 ,it has a biological       
aspect1 since it concerns certain       
effects1 inner and outer1 individual and
 social1 of the vital changes going on  
in the highest type of animal4 ,it has a
 psychological aspect1 for its subject  
matter is an aggregate of actions that  
are prompted by feelings and guided by  
intelligence4 ,and it has a sociological
 aspect1 for these actions1 some of them
 directly1 and all of them indirectly1  
affect associated beings4  ,what is the 
implication8 ,belonging under one aspect
 to each of these sciences--physical1   
biological1 psychological1              
sociological--it can find its ultimate  
interpretations only in those           
fundamental truths which are common to  
all of them4 ,already we have concluded 
in a general way that conduct at large1 
including the conduct ,ethics deals     
with1 is to be fully understood only as 
an aspect of evolving life2 and now we  
are brought to this conclusion in a more
 special way4  ,here1 then1 we have to  

enter on the consideration of moral     
phenomena as phenomena of evolution2    
being forced to do this by finding that 
they form a part of the aggregate of    
phenomena which evolution has wrought   
out4 ,if the entire visible universe has
 been evolved--if the solar system as a 
whole1 the earth as part of it1 the life
 in general which the earth bears1 as   
well as that of each individual         
organism--if the mental phenomena       
displayed by all creatures1 up to the   
highest1 in common with the phenomena   
presented by aggregates of these        
highest--if one and all conform to the  
laws of evolution2 then the necessary   
implication is that those phenomena of  
conduct in these highest creatures with 
which morality is concerned1 also       
conform4#c  ,in this passage ,mr4       
,spencer propounds morality or ethics as
 a matter for scientific study1 only to 
be understood or explained as part of   
general conduct when it is capable of   
explanation deductively from antecedent 

causes4 ,the distinction recognised     
between conduct called moral and conduct
 regarded as immoral is only to be      
understood when1 after a historical     
survey of human actions and of the      
actions of organisms in general1 we not 
only perceive its immediately antecedent
 causes1 but1 going behind them1        
recognise the ultimate necessity of     
their occurrence in the very nature of  
the universe4 ,this reveals the special 
features of ,mr4 ,spencer's method in   
the treatment of his subject as         
distinguished from that followed by ,mr4
 ,leslie ,stephen in his ,science of    
,ethics1 a distinction which we may     
conveniently mark by terming them       
respectively the ,philosophic and the   
,scientific methods4 ,the former term we
 use in the sense assigned to it in the 
definition given by ,mr4 ,spencer in    
,first ,principles4#d  ,a philosophy is 
complete when the mind has been able to 
form for itself such an appraisement of 
the relations and conditions of factors 

at a period sufficiently remote to      
ante-date any great amount of complexity
 as will enable us deductively to frame 
a history of developments which may     
correspond with the actual history of   
sequences in the concrete universe4 ,if 
this appraisement of a remote cosmos    
characterised by comparative simplicity 
nevertheless admits the existence of    
many factors whose differences are not  
accounted for1 philosophy is so far     
formally incomplete3 but as the         
determination of these points lies      
beyond the powers of human reason1      
philosophy may justly be regarded as    
practically complete if it unifies from 
this point of view all the knowledge    
with which the human mind is conversant4
 ,if we are able to include all the     
sciences in one coherent whole nothing  
more can be expected of                 
philosophy--beyond that lies the realm  
of speculation and the ,unknowable4     
,the scope of the sciences is not so    
ambitious4 ,their aim is limited within 

a much narrower purview4 ,they seek     
merely to ascertain the laws which      
subsume special classes of phenomena4   
,they recognise causation and their     
inductions are valid to the extent of   
the classes of facts expressed in any   
particular law4 ,but each science or    
class of facts is severally and         
separately worked upon even though the  
progress of study is ever disclosing the
 mutual dependence of the various       
sciences4  ,it is very evident that     
there must be great imperfections in our
 scheme of knowledge so long as there   
remain great blanks between the         
sciences4 ,but this is a natural        
condition of the progress of thought4   
,on the other hand a complete           
philosophic system such as that referred
 to above1 and at which ,mr4 ,spencer   
aims1 would throw a flood of light upon 
each particular department if the mutual
 relation of all problems could be      
deduced from ascertained relations of   
the original factors4 ,but it is also   

clear that if we think we have framed   
such a philosophy without having really 
succeeded in so doing1 or at any rate   
without having succeeded in making      
others understand or accept it1 then the
 supposed philosophy becomes a confusing
 element in the exposition of a         
scientific problem4 ,in the work under  
review the philosophical attempt is very
 regrettable for it spoils the          
exposition of a scientific treatment1   
surpassing all former expositions1 since
 it dims the clearness of the argument1 
and hinders the force of its practical  
application4  ,such is our judgment of  
,mr4 ,spencer's ,data of ,ethics4 ,it   
contains at once an excellent scientific
 treatment of the subject and a weak    
attempt to affiliate it upon an impotent
 philosophy4 ,to the philosophical or   
cosmical aspect of the work we will     
confine ourselves in the present        
chapter1 so that we shall hereafter be  
free to devote our attention to the more
 solid scientific treatment of the      

questions at issue which it presents4   
,the students of ,mr4 ,spencer's        
previous volumes will have observed that
 although he states the problem of      
evolution as a deductive one1 he has yet
 regarded evolution in a different      
aspect in the working out of each       
specific problem4 ,thus it is very      
noteworthy that throughout the          
,biological1 ,psychological1 and        
,sociological expositions1 ,mr4 ,spencer
 has regarded the establishment of the  
fact of evolution by the accretion of   
insensible changes as equivalent to an  
actual affiliation of the sciences upon 
the theory of evolution1 utterly        
regardless of his own rigid requirement 
that these changes should be explained  
and accounted for by the general        
deductions of cosmical evolution4 ,the  
histories of organisms1 for instance1   
exhibit gradual development1 and        
therefore are supposed to conform to the
 definition of evolution at large4 ,but 
if these changes are not intellectually 

discerned as the result of antecedent   
conditions and traceable to the         
relations of the ultimate factors       
recognised by the philosophy1 then the  
affiliation of the science upon         
evolution in general is not made good4  
,while the form and outside show are    
present1 the organic connexion is not   
exhibited4 ,but it is a characteristic  
of ,mr4 ,spencer's mode of exposition1  
that when the latter fails1 the former  
takes its place4 ,hence the gradual     
development of conduct is evolution of  
conduct1 but it is an evolution of which
 we want an explanation4 ,we seek it in 
,biology1 but find that ,biology also is
 a gradual increment of insensible      
changes of which again we seek in vain  
for an explanation4  ,the effect of this
 mode of presenting evolution or the    
unification of knowledge is heightened  
by the seemingly systematic manner of   
its exposition4 ,development is shown to
 be universally characterised by        
progress in three forms--namely1 from a 

simple1 indefinite1 incoherent state to 
a complex1 definite1 and coherent state3
 and the wonderful scope which the      
universe affords1 both in time and      
space1 for historically exhibiting these
 traits1 overwhelms the mind with a     
sense of the universality of evolution1 
in spite of the fact that all the time  
the very point of the question is missed
 in the absence of any explanation4 ,we 
recognise the gradual development1 but  
where is the deductive connexion8 ,where
 is the promised system of corollaries  
from original factors which shall       
account for the historical development8 
,thus1 when in the ,data of ,ethics we  
find a reference to the ,biology1 the   
,psychology1 and the ,sociology as parts
 of an established philosophical system 
we are apt to suppose that the views as 
to ethics which ,mr4 ,spencer expresses 
derive their authority from an          
antecedent apprehension of the cosmical 
process2 whereas this is not really the 
case3 and although it is essential to   

the study that ethics should be viewed  
as dependent upon the sciences named1   
yet such a connexion is not shown as one
 of logical order2 we are only told that
 ,ethics exhibits similar traits in its 
order of development4  ,but in addition 
to this foisting of the sciences upon   
philosophy by means of general          
similarities of history1 the student    
will find that whatever inner deductive 
warrant is set forth is badly conceived 
in the appraisement of the original     
factors--,matter1 ,motion1 and          
,force--terms to which no definite      
conceptions can be attached4 ,and should
 any one be so rash as to attach to them
 such definite meanings as would render 
their logical use possible1 then the    
deductive process which would have to be
 undertaken to render them into         
corollaries corresponding to concrete   
histories would very shortly bring him  
to confusion4 ,should he1 again1 confine
 himself to the definite chemical       
factors existent in the primordial      

nebul1 then his deductive attempt would 
bring him to the impassable gulf at the 
commencement of life4 ,and1 moreover1   
should he import the factor of sentiency
 into some simple chemical aggregates1  
and should he be able to set forth some 
gradual development of mind in          
correlation with gradual changes of     
physical organism1 then again in the    
absence of any knowledge as to the      
relations of the two he would find      
himself unable to work out the deductive
 process and fail in the system of      
priori explanations which philosophy    
requires4 ,for philosophy1 according to 
,mr4 ,spencer1 demands a deductive      
process commencing with the apprehension
 of the relations subsisting between the
 factors of the universe at some        
particular stage1 which deductive       
process shall be a counterpart of the   
actual histories of the universe4  ,such
 deductive explanations ,mr4 ,spencer   
does attempt--mainly in the             
,biology--the most important as to      

results1 and the most badly reasoned of 
all his works4 ,it is attempted firstly 
in a very concrete manner1 by a         
consideration of the properties of the  
chemical substances which form the bases
 of organisms1 and of the properties of 
the surrounding agencies--light1 heat1  
air1 water1 etc4 ,to the inter-relation 
of these are applied the laws of        
mechanics1 such as movement in the      
direction of least resistance1 etc41 and
 by their instrumentality at last are   
organisms supposed to be evolved which  
have1 somehow1 a concomitant of         
consciousness which is nevertheless not 
a factor in any action of an organism4  
,in such a history however1 it is found 
necessary to admit genesis1             
reproduction1 and heredity1 and these1  
since they cannot be explained1 are     
accepted without explanation4  ,it is   
true that ,polarity is called in to     
assist the endeavour1 but it is a       
polarity which is the obedient servant  
of the author1 and does as it is bid1   

firstly in being so amenable to changed 
conditions as to alter conformably with 
them1 and again in being so rigid in its
 acquired form as to coerce molecules   
into definite construction4 ,it is      
alternately so pliable and so fixed as1 
hand over hand1 to enable the author to 
scale the highest summits of ,biology4  
,it is also true that ,equilibration is 
called in3 but then every change in the 
organic and the inorganic world turns   
out to be an equilibration1 so that the 
word becomes devoid of meaning4  ,a more
 special study has to be given to ,mr4  
,spencer's theory of the moving         
equilibrium with which he identifies the
 existence of an organism1 and by means 
of which he is supposed to bridge over  
the chasm between it and the inorganic4 
,the idea is derived from a             
consideration of the spinning top1 the  
solar system1 and the steam engine1 more
 particularly if the latter is          
self-feeding6 ,these are moving         
equilibria1 and if their motions are    

disturbed by some external object they  
will generate forces in opposition to   
the environment4 ,this purely mechanical
 conception is then rendered into an    
abstract form by the substitution of the
 idea of related forces1 as constituting
 a moving equilibrium1 and is found to  
fit the abstract conception of an       
organism1 so that the solar system and  
the organism can both be identified as  
moving equilibria4 ,next1 by loosely    
characterising the behaviour of the     
solar system in its relation to its     
environment1 real or hypothetical1 as   
consisting of changes due to the laws of
 a moving equilibrium1 ,mr4 ,spencer    
seeks to show that the adaptations of an
 organism in response to changed        
external conditions are likewise due to 
the same laws1 so that organisms and    
their histories are supposed to be      
explainable or accounted for both in    
their origin and in their development in
 the same manner as the moving          
equilibria of the physical world4       

,thereupon we are supposed to understand
 both why organisms generate forces to  
counterbalance inimical external forces1
 and why they generate forces           
7adaptations7 for securing and absorbing
 forces of the environment 7food7       
favourable to their continued existence4
 ,it is only what all moving equilibria 
do4 ,this biological theory we have     
discussed at great length elsewhere1#e  
and we then came to the conclusion that 
it was only a mockery of a rational     
explanation4 ,we also found that the    
facts of ,genesis and the ,law of       
,heredity were wholly inexplicable by   
means of a study of physics or by means 
of a study of the nature and laws of the
 moving equilibrium4 ,so that altogether
 we found the main requirements of a    
philosophical explanation of biological 
facts very far from being complied with4
  ,as part of the deductive system which
 our philosophy requires1 we have now to
 consider the origin and development of 
purposed actions--the subject-matter1   

namely1 of our present study which is to
 lead us up to the ultimate study of    
,ethics proper4  ,resuming the          
consideration of the problem at the     
point where we left off in our reference
 to the explanations of biology1 we have
 first to review the arguments which    
would explain the origin of purposed    
actions in the nature and laws of the   
moving equilibrium4 ,for if the actions 
of organisms are thus explainable1 so   
must be the purposed actions or purposed
 conduct of organisms1 and ,mr4 ,spencer
 himself expressly includes them in the 
biological definition4 ,and indeed it is
 doubtful whether purpose is not        
covertly introduced in the very         
definition of life as the continuous    
adaptation of inner relations to outer  
relations4  ,the question is a very nice
 one1 and brings us at once to the      
obscure confines of the organic and the 
inorganic worlds4 ,how1 for instance1   
from the laws of the moving equilibrium1
 as derived from the study of the solar 

system1 are we to regard the movements  
of an infusorium8 ,an infusorium swims  
randomly about1 determined in its course
 not by a perceived object to be pursued
 or escaped1 but1 apparently1 by varying
 stimuli in its medium2 and its acts    
unadjusted in any appreciable way to    
ends1 lead it now into contact with some
 nutritive substance which it absorbs1  
and now into the neighbourhood of some  
creature by which it is swallowed and   
digested4444 ,the conduct is constituted
 of actions so little adjusted to ends1 
that life continues only as long as the 
accidents of the environment are        
favourable4#f  ,this is one of ,mr4     
,spencer's transitional passages4 ,the  
infusorium is a moving equilibrium4     
,consequently it rearranges its forces  
for self-preservation in opposition to  
inimical forces of the environment1 and 
in harmony with favoring forces of the  
environment4 ,the special adjustment it 
displays is motion4 ,but this is not    
communicated motion of a mechanical     

description1 such as the kick given to a
 foot-ball4 ,nor1 apparently1 are we to 
regard its motions as due to a series of
 mechanical motions of the molecules of 
the environment4 ,the action of the     
environment is expressed as being a     
stimulus4 ,does this mean a chemical    
action8 ,or does it refer to the action 
of heat and light8 ,if so it means that 
the attractions and repulsions of atoms 
and the motions of ether and of         
molecules1 account for the movements of 
the infusorium4 ,there is certainly no  
purpose in such a theory4 ,but then the 
question arises1 how do we apply the    
theory of the moving equilibrium to such
 an assemblage of atoms thus acted upon 
to account for the fact that the        
assemblage of atoms endeavours to       
prolong its existence by defence and    
absorption or by absorption only8 ,if it
 be said that it does not do so1 and    
that its movements have no food object1 
but are simply the effect of chemical   
and mechanical action1 then it is not an

 animal displaying life1 inasmuch as it 
does not adapt means to an end--motions 
to the end of sustenance4 ,if it be     
regarded as a moving equilibrium in this
 sense1 it is one of the same sort as   
the solar system1 and not one of the    
sort known as animals4 ,nevertheless1   
,mr4 ,spencer regards it as displaying  
life1 yet very little adjusted to ends2 
but again he regards its actions as     
determined by external stimuli1 without1
 however1 explaining his meaning4  ,if  
we are to regard the motions of the     
infusorium as displaying life1 it must  
be by regarding them as adaptations of  
inner relations to outer relations--the 
outer relations being food2 but if its  
actions are merely chemically and       
mechanically determined1 then its       
conduct is not adapted to or balanced   
against the action of any external      
relations1 but is the submissive        
consequent thereof4 ,but if its conduct 
is altogether determined by external    
relations we seem to be landed in a     

paradox4 ,the only escape is by the     
obvious inference that the definition of
 life advanced by ,mr4 ,spencer always  
implies an adaptation or adjustment or  
action having the definite twofold      
object in view of sustenance and        
self-protection employed against the    
inimical forces of the environment4     
,life adaptations are always for the    
accomplishment of the end of            
self-preservation1 either by the        
procuring of food1 or by defence against
 enemies--self-preservation primarily   
and afterwards the continuation of the  
race4 ,therefore1 if we regard the      
movements of the infusoria as included  
in the definition of life we must regard
 them as having in view the sustenance  
of the creatures4 ,they are acts adapted
 to ends4 ,are they then to be regarded 
as purposed actions8 ,life adaptations  
seem to be distinguished from the       
changes wrought by external forces upon 
a physical moving equilibrium in the    
fact1 namely1 that they act towards a   

definite end1 and therefore come into   
the class of purposed actions4 ,we      
cannot do more than indicate the        
difficulty4 ,if we say these actions are
 not purposed we allow that there may be
 purposed adaptation of means to ends by
 chemistry and mechanics4 ,if we say    
that chemistry and mechanics do this1   
then we have to revise our meaning of   
chemistry and mechanics1 and that in a  
much more thorough manner than ,mr4     
,spencer has done in his treatment of   
the moving equilibrium4  ,that there are
 biological adjustments which do not    
manifest purpose we experience every day
 in the thickening of the skin and the  
changes wrought by climate or daily     
avocation1 although it is true these    
adjustments may receive a scientific    
explanation independently of their being
 adaptations of means to ends4 ,we also 
find that there are reflex actions of   
organisms which take place in response  
to external stimuli without any         
conscious purpose1 such as breathing1   

digesting1 c4 ,we are also acquainted   
with the fact that purposed actions     
become by long habit automatic4 ,indeed 
we have more experience of purposed     
actions becoming automatic than of      
automatic or reflex actions becoming    
purposed4  ,can there then be purpose   
without consciousness8 ,there are       
adaptations in the vegetable world as   
well as in the animal1 and of these we  
do not predicate conscious design4 ,nor 
can we1 on the theory of life as the    
adaptation of a moving equilibrium to   
its environment1 admit that these       
changes are due to mere happy accidents 
of origin and survival1 for we are      
required to account for them as         
necessary results of their existence as 
moving equilibria4 ,yet if so the       
adjustments are so complex1 so          
marvellous in their relations to the    
insect world and the animal world       
generally in view of their preservation 
and the propagation of their species1   
that purpose or means adapted to ends is

 the apparent characteristic4 ,means    
adapted to ends is denied in the ,happy 
,accident theory1 and is sought to be   
explained by the ,moving ,equilibrium   
theory4 ,yet when we come to consider   
the abstract conception of a moving     
equilibrium derived from our solar      
system we can discern no endeavour      
towards self-sustenance and self        
defence4 ,no adaptations are there made 
to secure either of these objects4      
,there is no purpose manifested1 and no 
adjustment made in view of ends to be   
secured4 ,on the other hand1 there are  
many adaptations in the animal and      
vegetable worlds which are not          
consciously purposed4 ,since1 however1  
ours is a critical task and not a       
reconstructive work we need do no more  
than point out that purposed actions in 
particular1 and biological adaptations  
as a whole1 are not explainable by      
regarding organisms as aggregates of the
 chemical elements acted upon by        
physical forces and constituting merely 

physical moving equilibria1 of which the
 laws are similar to those derived from 
a consideration of moving equilibria    
like the solar system4 ,such a theory   
does not admit of purposed action4      
,stated in the abstract1 the problem is 
how to explain the origin of purpose in 
a moving equilibrium--commencing from   
the solar system and proceeding to a    
self-feeding engine and pursuing our    
investigation to the abstract moving    
equilibrium of forces in which external 
inimical or favourable forces generate  
internal forces as a counterbalance1    
either of opposition or harmony of      
adjustment4 ,thus stated1 the problem is
 purely of a dynamic nature1 and would  
give an understanding of purpose as a   
dynamic relation of aggregates of       
forces4 ,this is the true ,spencerian   
view to take of the problem and its mode
 of settlement1 but it is one to which  
,mr4 ,spencer does not apply himself4   
,in the absence of such a study ,mr4    
,spencer forsakes the true line of      

explanation required by his philosophy4 
,but we think if we proceed more deeply 
into this study we shall find purpose   
connected with consciousness4 ,the      
question arises1 must all purpose be    
conscious purpose8 ,purpose implies the 
direction of action1 it implies an      
interval of time1 it implies the        
accomplishment of a result4 ,in these   
respects it differs from chemical and   
mechanical action4 ,we have to ask what 
place consciousness finds in the        
constitution and action of a moving     
equilibrium4 ,evidently it has no place 
in the solar system1 for physicists can 
make their calculations without taking  
it into consideration as a factor4 ,yet 
the ideal or abstract moving            
equilibrium1 by whose aid we are        
endeavouring to understand the actions  
of organisms1 is derived from the       
consideration of the solar system as a  
moving equilibrium4 ,but reducing the   
problem from the abstract to the        
concrete study of an organism1 we have  

to ask what place consciousness holds in
 a moving equilibrium of oxygen1        
nitrogen1 carbon1 hydrogen1 etc41 in    
relation with an environment of heat1   
light1 etc4 ,we find that it is in the  
main a factor in all those classes of   
actions which we term purposed--that in 
so far as actions depart from the       
chemical and mechanical1 that in so far 
as aggregates manifest the              
characteristics of life--namely1 the    
adaptation of inner relations to outer  
relations--the nearer do they approach  
the most complete adaptation of means to
 the ends of complete living1 and the   
more do they manifest conscious purpose4
  ,the theory has been propounded that  
consciousness is the result of          
complexity in the combination of the    
chemical elements1 a complexity which   
can be explained on purely physical     
grounds4 ,mr4 ,spencer's biology is     
partly worked so as to prove this       
theory4 ,but it is evident that no more 
can be got out of a deductive theory    

than is contained in the original       
factors4 ,it is useless to say that we  
do not sufficiently know all the        
properties of the original factors1     
because that is to abandon this         
particular theory1 and to acknowledge   
its inadequacy4 ,the admission          
necessitates an attempt to re-state the 
original forces of the factors4 ,if this
 can be done it is equivalent to        
propounding a new theory1 which again   
must be judged by its deductive         
efficacy4  ,the theory that complexity  
of nervous structure--a structure       
produced by chemical and mechanical     
combination--suffices to explain memory1
 reflection1 judgment1 choice1 and      
purpose1 has been treated by ,dr4 ,bain 
and ,professor ,clifford at considerable
 length1 and has been criticised in our 
former works in great detail4#g  ,the   
theory that organisms are the result of 
chemical and mechanical combinations1   
and that consciousness is a concomitant 
of some processes in the continuous     

existence of such physical combinations1
 throws all the burthen of explanation  
just as fully upon the line of physical 
causation as if there were no such      
concomitant of consciousness whatsoever4
 ,the determining causes are wholly     
physical1 and the chain of sequence is  
complete within the lines of chemical   
and mechanical relations4 ,the fact that
 independent and concomitant            
consciousness accompanies some of the   
actions in question is an interesting   
circumstance1 but although consciousness
 is produced as an effect1 it never on  
this theory produces any effects itself4
  ,the attempt to amend the conceptions 
of the original chemical factors 7the   
sixty or seventy so-called elements17   
and of the physical factors 7heat1      
light1 etc417 by the association with   
them of mind1 feeling1 etc41 has at     
various times produced vague theories4  
,more particularly of later years       
,professor ,clifford's theory of        
mind-stuff has attracted a great deal of

 attention4 ,but1 singular to say1      
,professor ,clifford only endeavoured to
 work out his theory in some vague      
semi-mechanical1 semi-subjective kind of
 way4 ,it was not of such a sort that1  
given a nebula such as we supposed to be
 the predecessor of the solar system1 we
 should be able to deduce from it the   
existing universe4 ,the proper statement
 of such a problem would be a statement 
of the relations not merely of          
mind-stuff1 but of mind-oxygen1         
mind-nitrogen1 etc4 ,the conception     
would have to be of such a nature as to 
express the mind-factor1 mental side1 or
 subjective aspect of oxygen1 as related
 to the mind-factor of nitrogen1 etc41  
and how they variously affected the     
conduct of the doubly-constituted atoms 
or of the more complex molecules into   
which they formed themselves4 ,but this 
is a mere indication of the larger task 
of estimating the whole of the          
elementary substances1 and estimating   
the value and the action of their       

relative mind-factors4 ,from this would 
have to be determined the law of growth 
by which increasing complexity evolved  
the continually increasing power of the 
mind-factor in determining actions4     
,upon this might rest a rational basis  
for a definition of life of such sort   
that the organic could be recognised as 
arising out of the inorganic4 ,and since
 the organic1 in its latest and highest 
development1 is mainly distinguished by 
purposed actions1 purposed actions might
 be deemed to have evolved in a natural 
way out of actions which were not       
purposed4 ,but such a theory is not     
capable of definite statement1 and our  
philosophic object in endeavouring to   
account for the origin of purposed      
action out of non-purposed action is as 
far off as ever4  ,it might be as well  
here for the full satisfaction of the   
student1 to consider how far the origin 
of purposed action is taken account of  
by ,mr4 ,darwin1 or is to be accounted  
for by his methods4 ,there is a wide    

distinction between ,mr4 ,spencer's     
treatment of ,biology and that of ,mr4  
,darwin4 ,mr4 ,spencer aims at a        
complete logical deductive system1 and  
endeavours to show how in the very      
nature of things1 everything that is1   
must have been what it is4 ,mr4         
,darwin's endeavour is not so ambitious4
 ,he confines his studies to the field  
of biology1 and to past histories of    
living creatures1 as preserved for us in
 the geological record4 ,his is a purely
 scientific work1 not trespassing beyond
 the generalisation of the facts with   
which he deals4 ,these are large and    
immensely important2 so much so1 that   
they cover the whole history of living  
things3 but his explanations only go a  
certain way4 ,they are not fundamental1 
and we are only led backwards in time to
 the original twilight and ultimate     
darkness4 ,his theory is strictly       
causational4 ,the explanation of        
existing organisms is to be found in the
 relations of antecedent factors4 ,part 

of these we understand1 and part of them
 we do not understand4 ,we do not       
understand the wherefore of genesis and 
heredity1 but we know them to be facts1 
and they form the basis for large       
explanations4 ,for if organisms are     
modifiable1 ever-increasing changes of  
structure and function can be produced  
and reproduced4 ,the increment of       
induced changes in various directions   
may in succeeding generations be such as
 to obliterate all semblance of         
relationship to the original ancestor4  
,what are the laws of these changes it  
is ,mr4 ,darwin's great achievement to  
have explained4 ,the struggle for       
existence1 the survival of the fittest1 
the adaptation to new environments by   
the use and disuse of parts1 the changes
 induced by change of climate and food1 
or by the action of new organisms in the
 environment1 all these considerations  
open out to the astonished and admiring 
gaze of man vast and interesting        
histories of changes such as a          

discerning mind like ,mr4 ,grant ,allen 
revels in in his rambles through the    
,english fields4  ,the question arises  
how far ,mr4 ,darwin's theories can be  
extended philosophically1 so as to      
explain what he accepts unexplained1    
viz43 genesis1 heredity1 the origin of  
organisms out of the inorganic1 the     
gradual development of consciousness1   
the increase of feeling and             
intelligence1 and the advent of purposed
 conduct directed to the achievement of 
definite and deferred ends8 ,for all    
these points he leaves undealt with as  
not coming within his scientific        
province4 ,evidently his theories are   
not fitted to explain what they take for
 granted4 ,they cannot explain what they
 are founded upon4 ,the origin of       
organisms is unexplained3 propagation of
 the species is accepted as an          
unexplained fact1 so are heredity and   
the presence of consciousness4 ,purposed
 actions are not accounted for in ,mr4  
,darwin's works4  ,but there is one     

point to which we wish to call attention
 as regards the different method in     
which the changes of species are treated
 by ,mr4 ,spencer and ,mr4 ,darwin4 ,the
 former regards all changes as          
necessitated by the laws of the moving  
equilibrium1 so that a change of climate
 of such a nature as to deprive an      
organism of the requisite moisture for  
continued existence through a long      
period of time1 would absolutely        
necessitate some device on its part to  
counterbalance the external force of    
drought4 ,it would be a consequent in   
the very nature of things that the plant
 should become thick and succulent like 
the cactus1 or that the animal should   
form for itself a reservoir for the     
storage of water4  ,mr4 ,darwin's theory
 is very different4 ,he advances the    
fact that organisms1 and more           
particularly those of the lower and     
simpler forms constantly produce sports4
 ,these are not chance accidents in the 
false metaphysical sense of being       

uncaused1 but are termed accidents as   
being produced by some external or      
internal incident in the growth of the  
embryo1 which causes it to deviate in   
some point from the structure of the    
parent4 ,this sport may be to the       
advantage or to the detriment of the new
 organism4 ,if it should be the latter1 
it soon perishes3 but if it should      
assist the organism to a fuller life1   
then it will live longer and better1 and
 its progeny will in like manner survive
 to the detriment of its fellows of the 
unimproved type4 ,the accretion of      
changes produced in this way1 now in one
 direction1 and now in another1 together
 with the influences elsewhere          
indicated1 might do and no doubt has    
done much in the development of species4
  ,to this cause of change we give in no
 disrespectful spirit1 the name of the  
,happy ,accident ,theory as opposed to  
,mr4 ,spencer's ,moving ,equilibrium    
,theory1 and would ask what it may and  
may not account for4 ,it may account for

 much within the limits of ,mr4         
,darwin's enquiry1 but does it at all   
account for those fundamental facts     
which he takes for granted--genesis1    
heredity and consciousness1 or the      
origin of the organic out of the        
inorganic4 ,could some inorganic        
aggregate1 produced by the relations of 
certain chemical compounds under the    
action of light1 heat1 c1 accidentally  
take to generation by fission or        
otherwise1 and then by a succession of  
sports eventuate in sexual generation8  
,could such a chemical combination      
accidentally become conscious1 and by a 
succession of sports organise its       
consciousness into purpose8 ,into these 
regions we think we cannot carry the    
,happy ,accident ,theory--the theory of 
sports4 ,this is a valid and justifiable
 theory within the limits of biology1   
though even here the estimate of its    
results may be exaggerated2 but beyond  
it and behind those limits it is of no  
use4 ,the very admission of it is a     

confession of ignorance and incapacity  
to apprehend the exact line of          
causation2 but so long as we are        
satisfied that the accident or the sport
 which gives rise to a variety1 occurs  
within the scope of factors which we are
 able to recognise1 the incapacity to   
account for the special cause of a      
special sport does not affect the       
general theory4 ,but if any one should  
rashly extend the application of the    
theory so as to explain the otherwise   
unaccountable presence of a new factor1 
or advance it as an explanation of a    
line of sequences not logically         
deducible from all that is included in  
the mental appraisement of the original 
factors by which the system of sequences
 is to be unified1 then he makes a very 
great mistake indeed4  ,it is to guard  
against such a mistake that we take     
notice of the proper limits to the      
applicability of ,mr4 ,darwin's theory4 
,indeed we think it is too commonly     
supposed that ,mr4 ,darwin's theory is  

of the universalistic scope of ,mr4     
,spencer's theories2 his work however is
 purely of a scientific character       
relating to the province of ,biology4   
,it will have been noticed that in the  
preceding argument we have not dealt    
with the philosophical problem of the   
theory of knowledge4 ,we have simply    
taken the study of the cosmos in the    
historical order1 finding the inorganic 
as antecedent to the organic1 the       
unconscious to the conscious1 a         
historical order which cannot be        
disputed whatever theory of knowledge   
may be held4  ,we conclude therefore    
that in so far as the ,data of ,ethics  
is an attempt to explain purposed       
actions and their ethical quality upon a
 philosophical method of the kind       
propounded by ,mr4 ,spencer1 namely1 as 
included in a proper understanding of   
the cosmical process1 and of the        
histories of the universe consequent    
upon a knowledge of the relations of its
 original factors--so far ,mr4          

,spencer's work must be considered a    
failure4 ,that there is much of real    
scientific value in the work under      
review1 and much original insight and   
true apprehension of process1 we hold to
 be true2 but this scientific value is  
much obscured by the vague cosmical     
references which pervade an otherwise   
admirable study4 ,as stated at the      
outset of the chapter1 we consider the  
attempt to affiliate purposed actions   
upon the general lines of the cosmical  
process to mar the effect of the work in
 its scientific aspect4 ,the fault is   
all the greater since ,mr4 ,spencer     
rests the full stress of his theories1  
not so much upon their limited          
scientific value1 as upon the soundness 
of the philosophic basis4 ,for twenty   
years or more he has been working from  
this basis1 and in the course of his    
marvellous work has had ever in view as 
his crowning achievement the            
establishment of ,ethics upon a cosmical
 basis through a cosmical process of    

which it should be the glorious outcome4
 ,ethics should be shown to be dominant 
and imperative through the voice of the 
expanding universe4 ,yet1 except as     
showing ,ethics to be a part of the     
study of ,biology1 the general laws of  
the development of which are known1 but 
which in its factors and their relations
 and origin is utterly unknown1 he has  
not succeeded4 ,he might1 with the      
exception indicated1 just as well have  
written his ,data of ,ethics first as   
last4  ,,footnotes3  #b ,data of        
,ethics1 pp4 #e and #f4  #c ,data of    
,ethics1 p4 #fa4  #d ,see ,on ,mr4      
,spencer's ,unification of ,knowledge1  
,chap4 ,i41  #a1 and ,chap4 ,,iii1  #d4 
#e ,on ,mr4 ,spencer's ,unification of  
,knowledge1 ,chap4 ,v4  #f ,data of     
,ethics1 p4 #aj4  #g ,on ,mr4 ,spencer's
 ,unification of ,knowledge1 p4 #bca1 et
 seq42 and see ,dr4 ,bain's reply in    
,mind1 ,no4 xxxi4     ,,chapter ,,ii4   
,,the ,,scientific ,,view ,,of ,,the    
,,evolution ,,of ,,ethics4   ,modern    

thought since the publication of the    
,origin of ,species1 has been more and  
more forced into the recognition of     
ethics1 7together with all other forms  
of human conduct7 as the result of a    
process of natural growth4 ,the factors 
out of which this growth arose are lost 
in the obscurities of our ignorance1 and
 many of the processes upon which it has
 depended also surpass existing human   
powers of explanation4 ,science has to  
take for granted the unexplained        
existence of organisms4 ,for her        
purposes she is obliged to begin by     
assuming certain primitive organisms of 
some simple structure and functions4    
,she is also obliged to admit1 although 
she does not understand1 the facts of   
reproduction and of heredity4 ,nor can  
she refuse to acknowledge a place in the
 history of development1 along with the 
factors of chemistry and of physics1 to 
a subjective factor called feeling1     
consciousness1 mind1 or however else it 
may be best expressed4 ,all these       

unexplainable but fundamental verities  
of existence she has to assume4 ,it is  
because these are unexplained that      
science falls short of becoming a       
philosophy4 ,but within the range of    
their operation science can tell us     
much1 and the ,darwinian doctrines have 
displayed before our eyes the wonderful 
histories of change and growth through  
the preceding cycles of the world's     
existence4 ,little doubt now remains in 
the minds of thoughtful men as to the   
truth of biological development4 ,the   
theory rests upon such a wide induction 
of facts extending over so many branches
 of science and over such remote periods
 of time1 and withal as by a stroke of  
magic it has so arranged all sorts of   
odd incomprehensible facts into definite
 places in a well ordered organic       
history1 that the mind can no longer    
withhold its subjection to so imperial  
and cogent a scientific conception4     
,although the philosophical laws of     
biological development are as we have   

seen beyond our reach1 and although our 
theory of the accidental origin of      
variations is rather lame1 still there  
is much that can be expressed in the    
formal statements called the ,laws of   
,biological ,development1 which throws  
light upon those processes of change and
 growth that have led up from simple    
organic forms to the highest            
manifestation of life in the human race4
 ,mr4 ,spencer defines life as the      
continuous adjustment of inner relations
 to outer relations4 ,this ,mr4 ,spencer
 regards not merely as a definition but 
as a law4 ,its philosophical            
justification is sought in vain1 but it 
may be accepted as a correct scientific 
statement--not only of the non-conscious
 adaptations of organisms to changes of 
the environment1 7such as the thickening
 of the fur to resist arctic cold1 or   
protective change of colour to imitate  
physical surroundings17 but also of the 
conscious adaptations by which higher   
animals perform particular actions or   

undergo changes of habit4  ,as ,mr4     
,spencer points out1 the acceptance of  
this law implies not merely an entire   
harmony between the existence of an     
organism and its environment1 but it    
also implies various degrees of life4   
,the greater the number and variety of  
correspondences established between an  
organism and the immensities of the     
external world--immensities displayed   
not only in the multiplicities of       
individual objects1 but also in the     
grandeur of their collective            
interrelations--the greater the degree  
of life4 ,much stress is laid by ,mr4   
,spencer upon this ,quantitative        
character of ,life4 ,much more1 indeed1 
than upon mere continuity1 although the 
latter is to a certain extent essential 
to the former4 ,subordinate to this     
notion1 advance in degree of life is    
found to proceed from a simple1         
incoherent1 and indefinite life to a    
more and more definite1 coherent and    
complex set of relations with the       

environment4  ,but side by side with    
this development1 and indeed in a manner
 to be likened to that of a geometrical 
progression1 the subjective factor has  
advanced in relative importance4 ,in its
 more rudimentary development1 ,mr4     
,spencer finds pain to be the           
concomitant of those states of the      
physical organism which tend to its     
destruction1 and pleasure to be the     
concomitant of those states which tend  
to its promotion4 ,thus hunger is a pain
 indicative of the absence of those     
supplies of energy to be obtained from  
the environment1 which are requisite for
 the continuance of the organism's      
activity1 while the pleasure of feeding 
is concomitant with the due supply of   
the energy necessary for the continuance
 of organic function4 ,pleasure and     
pain1 therefore1 become motives1 and the
 attainment of the one and the avoidance
 of the other work together for the     
continuance of life4 ,pleasures and     
pains are relative to the               

organism--according to the physiological
 constitution and structure of the      
organism so are its pleasures and its   
pains4  ,the concomitant of some of the 
structures and functions of the organism
 has been not merely sentiency but      
perception4 ,mind has developed from the
 distinguishment1 identification1 and   
recognition of modes of sentiency4      
,these functions and structures have    
been accompanied by pleasure and pain1  
and have formed the basis of the        
pleasures of intellectual activity in   
their multiform variety4 ,from their    
very nature in relation to the          
environment they have increased         
wonderfully the quantitative development
 of life4  ,with the increase of mind   
has proceeded the recognition of the    
part played in the organic universe by  
feeling4 ,this recognition of the       
existence of feeling--of the            
susceptibilities of external organisms  
to pleasure and pain--has formed the    
basis of a large part of the adaptations

 of organisms in relation to their      
organic environment4 ,adaptations       
revealing this recognition are to be    
seen not only more manifestly in the    
actions of man and the animals1 but also
 in the functions of plants1 strange as 
this may seem4  ,with this increase of  
general intelligence has proceeded an   
increase of rational knowledge of the   
causal relationships of phenomena3 and  
with the increase of the knowledge of   
human motives has proceeded an increased
 knowledge of the sequences of actions4 
,thus larger rational judgments of the  
consequences of actions have been       
attained4  ,following upon the increased
 recognition of pleasure and pain as    
motives1 and upon the increased amount  
of rational judgment as to the sequences
 of actions1 has come the adaptation of 
conduct to the pains and pleasures of   
others4 ,those adaptations have1        
however1 been relative to the particular
 constitution of the ,ego1 and relative 
also to the constitution of the         

environing ,egos4  ,the knowledge of the
 existence of sentiency in external     
organisms may be turned to the account  
of the ,ego by inflicting pain1 so as to
 coerce other sentient organisms to its 
own selfish objects2 or1 again1 by      
conferring pleasure1 so as to subserve  
the same end4 ,thus cruelty may be a    
natural pleasure in certain early stages
 of development1 as a concomitant of    
necessities of existence1 and may remain
 by inheritance long after the          
necessities have passed away4 ,but with 
the increase of life has occurred the   
increase of sympathy4 ,it is a law of   
nature that after the pleasures of the  
ego are satisfied they are augmented by 
the contemplation of similar enjoyments 
of others4 ,but this again is relative4 
,the gourmand likes the society of      
gourmands1 and cares not for the company
 of the sthetic or the ascetic4 ,the man
 of taste revels in the society of      
kindred natures and despises the        
pleasures of the base4 ,but the family  

relation has been the main source of all
 sweet and manly sympathies3 and it has 
been the gradually widening scope of    
social organisations which has spread   
more and more the feeling of human      
sympathy4 ,the course of history        
exhibits to us a constant growth1 not   
merely in passively refraining from the 
infliction of pain1 but also in the     
active endeavour to promote the         
happiness of our fellow creatures4      
,this is a general statement of the     
scientific view of purposed conduct4    
,its laws are derived from a study of   
its growth4 ,the growth is one          
exhibiting several distinguishable      
features4 ,there has been the ordinary  
biological struggle for existence1 and  
survival of the fittest4 ,there have    
been adaptations necessitated by the    
action of the environment1 and there    
have been chance variations within the  
lines of causation which1 benefitting   
the individual or some particular race1 
have given them such an advantage in the

 battle of life as to secure for their  
descendants a preponderating possession 
of the good things of the world4 ,there 
has been the increase of intelligence1  
the increase in the organisation of     
society1 the increase of rational       
judgments of phenomena and human        
actions4 ,there has been increased      
knowledge of the determination of       
actions by motives4 ,there has been     
increase of sympathy4  ,but what is the 
ethical virtue of this historical study 
is not very clear4 ,the history of human
 developments is a matter of natural    
history and no more4 ,and even if we    
proceed as we might do1 to study more in
 detail the history of the development  
of notions of right and wrong and of the
 various changeful applications of those
 terms1 we are still within the limits  
of a natural history--we are still      
holding the merely scientific or        
observant attitude4 ,it is true such    
study may be essential to our future    
history3 but the mere study of what has 

been1 and the consequent pre-vision of  
what will be1 establishes no rule of    
right4 ,to prophecy the determining     
courses of future human conduct does not
 furnish an ethical imperative to the   
individual4 ,if so it will be1 he may   
say1 so let it be1 it is no affair of   
mine4 ,the obligation rests with nature 
and not with me4 ,whence then the new   
regulative system1 the want of which    
fills ,mr4 ,spencer with alarm8 ,where  
shall we look for the new gospel which  
shall restrain and vivify the moral     
conduct of future generations in place  
of the supernatural systems which are   
supposed to be tottering to their fall8 
,and if we go beyond this and find that 
this natural history of man is governed 
by general laws of adaptation and       
development we shall still have to      
question the ethical discernment and    
ethical authority in special junctures1 
when what is--is judged not to be what  
it ought to be2 when1 in fact1          
adaptations or biological facts1 or     

equilibrations produced by evolution1   
are judged not to be ethically good     
equilibrations4  ,however1 ,mr4 ,spencer
 holds that rules of right conduct can  
be established on a scientific basis1   
and it is our task to examine his       
treatment of the problem4  ,though this 
first division of the work terminating  
the ,synthetic ,philosophy1 cannot1 of  
course1 contain the specific conclusions
 to be set forth in the entire work2 yet
 it implies them in such wise that1     
definitely to formulate them requires   
nothing beyond logical deduction4  ,i am
 the more anxious to indicate in outline
 if ,i cannot complete this final work1 
because the establishment of rules of   
right conduct on a scientific basis is a
 pressing need4 ,now that moral         
injunctions are losing the authority    
given by their supposed sacred origin1  
the secularization of morals is becoming
 imperative4 ,few things can happen more
 disastrous than the decay and death of 
a regulative system1 no longer fit1     

before another and fitter regulative    
system has grown up to replace it4 ,most
 of those who reject the current creeds1
 appear to assume that the controlling  
agency furnished by it may be safely    
thrown aside1 and the vacancy left      
unfilled by any other controlling       
agency4 ,meanwhile1 those who defend the
 current creeds allege that in the      
absence of the guidance it yields1 no   
guidance can exist2 divine commandments 
they think the only possible guides4    
,thus between these extreme opponents   
there is a certain community4 ,the one  
holds that the gap left by disappearance
 of the code of supernatural ethics1    
need not be filled by a code of natural 
ethics2 and the other holds that it     
cannot be so filled4 ,both contemplate a
 vacuum which the one wishes and the    
other fears4 ,as the change which       
promises or threatens to bring about    
this state1 desired or dreaded1 is      
rapidly progressing1 those who believe  
that the vacuum can be filled1 are      

called on to do something in pursuance  
of their belief4#h  ,it is clear1 from  
the above passage1 that ,mr4 ,spencer   
seeks not merely a knowledge of the laws
 of past developments1 which have landed
 us in our present position with regard 
to moral obligation in general and the  
varied social regulations extant in     
different societies1 but he seeks in    
addition to strengthen and establish on 
a new basis the authority of all such   
obligations4 ,what ,mr4 ,spencer hopes  
for is a practical end4 ,he seeks the   
art of good living4 ,as there are       
sciences of chemistry1 metallurgy1      
electricity1 etc41 and arts consequent  
upon them1 so he looks for ,rules of    
,life which shall benefit humanity1     
consequent upon the ,science of         
,humanity4 ,but it is a question whether
 the ,moral ,imperative can be regarded 
as the result of science4 ,however1 if  
not the result1 yet science may be able 
to discern that the ,moral ,imperative  
is so firmly established in human       

nature1 that it may be able to proclaim 
loudly its empire in the heart and over 
the actions of man2 while at the same   
time ,science may be able to guide it to
 wiser and better judgments4  ,the task 
we have before us is to pursue ,mr4     
,spencer's course of thought1 undertaken
 in this spirit1 through the succeeding 
chapters of his work4 ,neglecting minor 
criticisms and passing over much        
valuable teaching1 our business is to   
follow the main course of his reasoning 
and examine the chief grounds for such  
authority and guidance which he finally 
presents to us as the outcome of his    
study4  ,,footnote3  #h ,introduction to
 ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #c4     ,,chapter 
,,iii4  ,,the ,,biological ,,view ,,of  
,,ethics4   ,we shall best arrive at an 
adequate estimate of ,mr4 ,spencer's    
ethical system by studying first what he
 terms the biological view of ethics4   
,but to do this properly requires a     
survey not only of ,chapter ,,vi41 which
 bears this title1 but also of the      

following chapter1 which deals with the 
psychological view4 ,we hold that ,mr4  
,spencer1 in this division of his       
subject into separate stages1 makes a   
false arrangement of his studies4 ,for  
as on the one hand he endeavours to     
include the study of biology as a branch
 of physics1 on the other hand he treats
 it as incapable of comprehensive       
developmental study apart from the      
factors of feeling and mind4 ,these     
divisions are marked features of the    
form into which ,mr4 ,spencer has thrown
 his study of human conduct1 but they do
 not correspond with his actual         
treatment of the subject4 ,the course of
 thought cannot be fitted into the      
formal outline4 ,it is found that the   
understanding of biology is as dependent
 upon a knowledge of psychology as it is
 upon a knowledge of physics4 ,the      
sequence of dependent stages as set     
forth does not hold good4 ,the conduct  
of animal and perhaps vegetable         
organisms is not explicable as the      

action of mere physical aggregates1 and 
is little understood without the        
admission of a subjective factor of     
feeling or mind4 ,it is all very well   
for ,mr4 ,spencer to argue1 as he does  
in ,chapter ,v41 on the ,physical ,view1
 that since all conduct is objectively  
physical action it may be separately    
studied from the physical point of view2
 but since the actions of organisms are 
not to be explained within the limits of
 physical laws this is a very useless   
reminder1 and ,mr4 ,spencer himself     
makes nothing of the study since he     
cannot work out the line of causation in
 terms of the physical factors only4 ,on
 the other hand we find that our author 
has not proceeded three pages into the  
biological view before he introduces the
 subjective factors of ,pleasure and    
,pain1 which he eventually establishes  
not merely as the accompaniments of     
life-sustaining and life-diminishing    
acts1 but even as the causes of further 
actions which shall at the same time    

tend to secure ,pleasure and avoid      
,pain1 and thus sustain the organism in 
a continuance of existence4 ,only for   
three pages can the purely biological   
view of animal organisms as physical    
moving equilibria be maintained2 and    
then with section #cb comes the         
introduction of subjective              
factors--factors which are treated not  
merely as the concomitants of physical  
processes conducted wholly within and   
according to the laws of physical       
sequence1 but as actual factors         
interfering with and affecting the line 
of causation4 ,it is true ,mr4 ,spencer 
recognises and deals with the difficulty
 which obviously arises as to the       
separability of the psychological view  
from a biological view which admits the 
factors of ,pleasure and ,pain4 ,but the
 distinction he makes1 while            
justifiable1 does not deal with the     
fundamental difficulty4 ,psychology     
treats1 roughly speaking1 of mentality2 
it comprises a study of the             

establishment of sets of inner          
relations1 7i4e41 associations of       
thought1 relations of ideas1 relations  
of sequences1 the powers of remembrance1
 of discrimination and identification17 
with sets of external relations1 namely1
 the actual existences of which the     
inner relations are the representatives4
 ,the establishment of such inner       
relations corresponding to outer        
relations and their widening growth1    
must have a marked influence upon human 
conduct so that it may very well be     
separated for convenience of study from 
the earlier forms of organic conduct1 in
 which such action is little            
recognisable4 ,but how to form the      
connective law is the difficulty4       
,moreover1 it is one thing to establish 
the fact of evolution1 and another thing
 to explain it4 ,we ourselves admit the 
fact1 indeed1 but search in vain for the
 explanation4  ,are we to look for the  
origin of ,pleasure and ,pain in those  
laws of the moving equilibrium which    

necessitate the generation of internal  
forces equal and in opposition to       
external inimical forces8 ,if so1       
,pleasure and ,pain must be regarded as 
forces--as factors--in the organism1 and
 we must regard the subjective as       
generated by external physical factors  
operating upon internal physical        
factors1 and we must regard these       
subjective factors not merely as        
concomitant1 but as producing physical  
effects by way of reaction4  ,so far as 
it goes there may be a physical view of 
purposed conduct1 and so far as it goes 
there may be a psychological view1 but  
between the two the biological view is a
 mere disorderly mixture1 borrowing its 
terms first on one hand and then on the 
other1 and assigning its determining    
causes first to the physical moving     
equilibrium theory1 and then again to   
the anticipation of ,pleasure and ,pain4
 ,but the biological law which should   
co-ordinate these two sets of laws is   
not formulated1 and hence we find more  

or less gliding1 or more or less sudden 
transition from one set of terms or laws
 to the other1 a defect which is        
concealed in some measure by the formal 
divisions of the chapters4 ,but if the  
course of thought is carefully followed 
it is found that the actual treatment   
does not properly fit in4 ,there is an  
unmistakeable transition from the purely
 physical set of factors to the purely  
subjective1 and there is no co-ordinated
 biological law at all4 ,the chapter is 
a transitional one1 it is true1 but only
 in the sense of gradually leaving off  
the employment of one set of terms1 and 
the gradual employment of another set of
 terms in the treatment of the same     
phenomena4  ,mr4 ,spencer argues well in
 ,chapter ,v4 as to the concomitance of 
pleasure-giving acts with               
life-sustaining acts1 and of pain-giving
 acts with decrease of life2 but which  
is prior in the chain of causation8 ,or1
 to repeat the old difficulty1 is the   
subjective factor present in the line of

 causation at all8 ,is it merely a      
concomitant of the physical line of     
events8  ,mr4 ,spencer proposes to deal 
with feelings and functions in their    
mutual dependence1#i and so admits the  
subjective as a factor4 ,thus there are 
feelings which are sensations and serve 
partly as guides and partly as stimuli  
towards actions for the sustenance and  
preservation of life4 ,and there are    
feelings which are classed as emotions  
which also act in a very potent way as  
guides and stimuli1 such as fear and    
joy4 ,hence1 in treating of conduct     
under its biological aspect we are      
compelled to consider that inter-action 
of feelings and functions which is      
essential to animal life in all its more
 developed forms4#aj  ,following upon   
this we are taught that ,pleasure is a  
feeling which we seek to bring into     
consciousness1 and ,pain a feeling which
 we seek to keep out of consciousness4  
,this certainly accords to the          
subjective factor a commanding position 

in the physical action of organisms2 it 
also implies a foresight of the results 
of actions1 and a certain degree of     
advance in psychology but throws no     
light upon the lower stages of          
biological action4 ,mr4 ,spencer says1  
however1 that fit connections between   
acts and results must establish         
themselves in living things even before 
consciousness arises4 ,this is followed 
by an interesting study of the          
proposition that after the rise of      
consciousness these connections can     
change in no other way than to become   
better established1 and that whenever   
sentiency makes its appearance as an    
accompaniment1 its forms must be such   
that in the one case the produced       
feeling is of a kind that will be       
sought--,pleasure1 and in the other case
 is of a kind that will be              
shunned--,pain4 ,it is an inevitable    
deduction from the hypothesis of        
evolution that races of sentient        
creatures could have come into existence

 under no other conditions than that    
pains are the correlatives of actions   
injurious to the organism1 while        
pleasures are the correlatives of       
actions conducive to its welfare4  ,all 
this may be admitted1 granted the       
existence of the subjective factor2 but 
at what stage does it commence to have  
such a potent influence upon the        
development of organisms1 and whence    
came it at all8 ,mr4 ,spencer says1 fit 
connections between acts and results    
must establish themselves in living     
things even before consciousness arises4
 ,at the very outset life is maintained 
by persistence in acts which conduce to 
it1 and desistance from acts which      
impede it4 ,it would seem that if life  
can be maintained by means of           
unconscious persistence in beneficial   
acts and unconscious desistance from    
injurious acts1 such a process might    
continue in more complex organisms      
without the assistance of consciousness1
 and that the continuance and           

development of life could be explained  
in terms of the same factors and        
processes which originated life1 and    
regulated and propagated the existence  
of races in the lowest forms of         
organisms4 ,mr4 ,spencer clearly holds  
that such races of organisms were       
originated and maintained by the action 
of physical laws before sentiency became
 a factor in their sustaining or        
generative actions4 ,what need then for 
sentiency in the subsequent development8
 ,mr4 ,spencer's argument is good1 that1
 granted the concomitance of ,pleasure  
and ,pain with life-sustaining and      
life-diminishing acts respectively1 the 
attainment of the one and the avoidance 
of the other acts on the increase of    
life2 but he says that1 previous to the 
advent of sentiency1 life was sustained 
in much the same way4 ,there is this    
difference in it1 however1 that only    
where the requisite acts were performed 
or avoided in pre-sentient organisms did
 such organisms continue to exist1 and  

that these acts were not consciously    
performed1 but only happened in the     
course of physical sequence2 whereas in 
the case of sentient creatures ,pleasure
 is consciously sought1 and ,pain is    
intentionally avoided4 ,but it seems to 
us that when acts are determined by the 
anticipation of ,pleasure or ,pain1 we  
enter upon the domain of psychology1 and
 when they are determined by physical   
factors without consciousness we remain 
in the province of physics1 so that     
there is no intermediate science of     
,biology at all4 ,and by this we mean1  
not that for convenience we may not so  
arrange our classes of study1 but that  
there are no laws of physics which will 
account for the development of          
organisms1 and there are no biological  
processes which do not imply the action 
of a subjective factor2 and that there  
is no true biological law which properly
 expresses the correllation of the two4 
,mr4 ,spencer starts with a ,biology    
from which the subjective is completely 

absent1 and ends with a ,psychology of  
the highest description3 but he fails to
 express the biological law which       
accounts for the growth of the one out  
of the other1 or expresses the law of   
their correlation in a concomitant      
growth4  ,how then can we arrive at any 
ethical rule by the study of ,biology8  
,in this way4 ,an organism is a moving  
equilibrium3 it is a law of moving      
equilibria that they counterbalance by  
means of new adjustments antagonistic   
forces in the environment1 and absorb   
forces from the environment favourable  
to their continuance4 ,their continued  
existence depends upon such continuous  
absorption and adjustment4 ,but as      
environment varies1 so do adjustments2  
and thus there is a wonderful variety of
 different moving equilibria1 which form
 important parts of one another's       
environment4 ,the suitable structures   
and functions which have thus been      
evolved are therefore relative to the   
environment1 and the inherited structure

 and functions forming a moving         
equilibrium are fitted for particular   
environments and no other4 ,there is no 
absolute moving equilibrium2 all are    
relative4 ,that which was defined as a  
moving equilibrium1 we define           
biologically as a balance of functions4 
,the implication of such a balance is   
that the several functions in their     
kinds1 amounts1 and combinations1 are   
adjusted to the several activities which
 maintain and constitute complete life2 
and to be so adjusted is to have reached
 the goal towards which the evolution of
 conduct continually tends4 ,but        
completeness of life means primarily the
 completeness of life in each individual
 organism as regards its continued      
existence1 and the full satisfaction of 
all its functions during the period of  
its existence4 ,the biologically good is
 all that conduces to this end1 and the 
biologically bad is all that detracts   
from it4 ,the biologically good and bad 
are therefore relative to the consensus 

of functions which constitute an animal 
or other organism4 ,the biologically    
good and bad are therefore individual4  
,that which is good for the individual  
is the right conduct1 and that which is 
bad for it is wrong conduct4 ,it is     
therefore right for the big fishes to   
eat the little ones1 for the bird to    
prey upon the insect2 it is a fit       
satisfaction for the functions of the   
lion to devour the antelope1 for one    
tribe to slay or drive out another tribe
 in order to possess itself of more     
fertile plains and more delightful      
countries4 ,and so1 as long as the      
functions delight in egoism1 and there  
is no counterforce of sympathy included 
among them1 it is right to tyrannise1 to
 subject others to the service or       
passions of the dominant organisms4     
,they subserve the biological law--they 
are conducive to complete relative life4
 ,the biological law does not recognise 
the lives of others until sympathy has  
become part of the functions of the     

organism4  ,the question here arises1   
how far the ethical law is to be        
determined by the biological law1 for if
 the biological law is dominant1 and the
 ethical dependant1 the latter can only 
be explained and justified by the       
former4 ,but we at once see that the two
 things are not identical and           
co-extensive4 ,we recognise the         
difference between the biologically     
efficient and the ethically good and    
bad4 ,the law of ,biology refers to the 
actions of each individual in regard to 
itself alone1 whatever the functions1   
etc41 which constitute that self4 ,it   
relates to its good alone1 irrespective 
of the good of others1 unless1 and      
until1 sympathy with others has become  
part of the functions of the individual4
  ,but ,mr4 ,spencer seeks to make the  
biological view of conduct identical    
with the ethical by introducing the     
conception of quantitative life4 ,in    
this case an organism has more life the 
greater the number of correspondences it

 has with the environment4 ,and since   
the environment is constituted of two   
classes of objects1 the objective and   
the subjective--the purely physical and 
the organisms possessing feeling--so the
 correspondences established in the     
individual are of two kinds1 the        
psychological and the emotional4 ,in the
 former class are comprised all the     
objects and relations of the inorganic  
world1 the great laws and intricacies of
 nature and her past history1 including 
the history of organisms and of man4 ,in
 the latter are included all the        
feeling1 living creatures around us1    
with their pleasures1 hopes1 and pains1 
and all the characters1 noble and       
beautiful1 delicate or brutal1          
passionate or aspiring1 who have ever   
trod the stage of history1 or wrought or
 thought for us in antecedent ages4 ,in 
fact all the patient work and mighty    
achievements of science1 and all the    
emotional relations of men have afforded
 scope for the quantitative increase of 

life2 and in proportion to the increase 
so it is suggested that life became     
ethical4 ,the biological law is the     
continuous adjustment of organisms to   
environment1 and the increase of        
adjustment is the increase of life4     
,this may be so2 but it is a denial of  
,ethics as being coeval with ,biology2  
it makes the one simply a late outcome  
of the other4 ,according to this view1  
,ethics is something which has          
supervened upon the process1 and which  
requires a separate analysis4 ,but we   
have seen that increase of              
correspondence is of two kinds--it takes
 place in the direction of intellect1   
and it takes place in the direction of  
emotion1 whether of sympathy or         
antipathy4 ,but it is with the latter   
class of phenomena alone that ,ethics is
 concerned4 ,the increased quantitative 
life which is identical with the        
increase of knowledge has no ethical    
aspect4 ,it is increased relations of an
 emotional nature only which admit that 

term4 ,in fact it is to societarian     
relations alone that it is applicable4  
,increase of life may proceed in the    
direction of intellect or recognition of
 the facts and relations of the external
 world1 and yet the life may never be   
termed ethical2 while on the other hand 
there may be but little increase of     
intellect1 yet a great increase of      
ethical relations4 ,therefore1 increased
 quantitative life1 considered as a mode
 of identifying the biological law with 
the ethical law1 except by way of       
comprehension in a larger               
classification1 fails in the end because
 it is not true that the increase of    
correspondences need be in the special  
direction of increase of emotional      
correspondences3 and thus we find that  
ethics is not to be affiliated upon the 
main line of biological progress1 but   
with one distinguishable result of      
it--namely the relation of the          
individual with its subjective          
environment--that is to say1 ,society4  

,and here it is fit that we should take 
notice of ,mr4 ,spencer's account of    
,good and ,bad ,conduct1 given in       
chapter #c of the ,data of ,ethics4 ,a  
good knife1 gun1 or house are such in   
virtue of their capacity for fulfilling 
the purposes for which they were        
designed4 ,a good day or a good season  
are such as satisfy certain of our      
desires4 ,a good pointer or a good ox   
are so in reference to certain of our   
requirements4 ,a good jump1 or good     
stroke at billiards1 are those which    
accomplish the desired ends4 ,and bad   
things are those which do not subserve  
desired ends4  ,mr4 ,spencer then       
proceeds to study the ethically good and
 bad1 and to discuss the application of 
these terms to actions as regards the   
welfare of self1 of offspring1 and of   
fellow citizens4 ,acts are said to be   
good and bad according as they affect   
the welfare of self4 ,here it is        
indicated that acts are judged according
 to their degree of biological          

efficiency4 ,in the next class--namely1 
acts relating to offspring--a father and
 mother are again judged according to   
their efficiency in those capacities1   
although the egoistic element is present
 in a subordinate degree4 ,most         
emphatic1 however1 are the applications 
of the words good and bad to conduct    
throughout that third division of it    
comprising the deeds by which men affect
 one another4 ,in maintaining their own 
lives 7biological laws7 and fostering   
their offspring1 men's adjustments of   
acts to ends are so apt to hinder the   
kindred adjustments of other men1 that  
insistence on the needful limitations   
has to be perpetual2 and the mischiefs  
caused by men's interferences with one  
another's life-subserving actions are so
 great1 that the interdicts have to be  
peremptory4  ,the general meaning of    
good and bad as applied to actions1     
then1 has reference to their efficiency4
 ,the differences of their meaning are  
due to the end regarded4 ,the meanings  

are harmonised1 however1 when we        
consider that they are applicable to    
different degrees in the evolution of   
conduct2 the conduct to which we apply  
the name good is the relatively more    
evolved conduct1 and bad is the name we 
apply to conduct which is relatively    
less evolved4 ,this involves a reference
 to the three stages of biological      
evolution1 the individual1 the          
offspring1 and society4  ,lastly1 we    
inferred that establishment of an       
associated state1 both makes possible   
and requires a form of conduct such that
 life may be completed in each and in   
his offspring1 not only without         
preventing completion of it in others1  
but with furtherance of it in others2   
and we have found that this is the form 
of conduct most emphatically termed     
good4#aa ,from this ,mr4 ,spencer infers
 the contemporaneous achievement of the 
greatest totality of life in self1 and  
this is supposed to vindicate the       
affiliation of ,ethics upon ,biology4   

,we have1 however1 already shown that   
the enlargement of the relations between
 the individual and the subjective      
environment is the special ethical      
relation1 and that the enlargement of   
the relations between the individual and
 the objective environment is           
non-ethical1 thus specialising the      
ethical interpretation of the           
enlargement of biological relations4 ,we
 must also notice that ,mr4 ,spencer's  
affiliation of biology with ethics      
relates to a remote ideal future and not
 to an actual present or a historic     
past4 ,the biological law is the        
adaptation of the individual to its own 
special surroundings1 and not the       
adaptation of its remote and changed    
descendant to its remote and changed    
environment4 ,according to the fitness  
of the individual for supplying itself  
with food1 whether of a vegetable or    
animal nature1 and according to its     
capacities for1 self preservation or    
defence1 so will it be deemed           

biologically perfect4 ,this is a        
relative1 an individual standard1       
without reference to the subjective     
environment except in so far as this    
subjective environment subserves some   
internal function of sympathy4 ,but even
 in this case the ethical relation is   
subordinate to the biological and is    
relative to the actual individual and   
not to a future ideal descendant4       
,moreover1 the biological standard is   
always individual and singular and is   
not societarian4  ,we therefore come to 
the conclusion that the biological point
 of view does not furnish us with any   
ethical theory4 ,the biological law is  
not individual completeness2 it is      
individual suitability to environment4  
,it is true1 individual greatness may be
 the most complete life2 but when that  
is not possible from the nature of the  
inherited organism1 or from the nature  
of the surroundings1 then the actually  
best thing1 because relatively best1 is 
conformity to the surroundings4 ,the man

 who cannot adapt the environment to    
himself will prudently adapt himself to 
the environment4 ,that is the biological
 law2 whether it be the ethical law is  
another question4 ,abstract quantitative
 life may not be attainable either      
intellectually or in relation to the    
emotional surroundings4 ,therefore the  
more skilful adaptation having in view  
the particular functions of the         
organisms1 7whether they include        
sympathies with the subjective          
surroundings1 or not71 is the biological
 law--although it may not be regarded as
 the ethical law4  ,quantitative life1  
viewed biologically1 i4e41 individually1
 does not mean an ideal quantitative    
life1 but the most that an individual   
organism can get4 ,this depends upon the
 organism's own nature and capacities1  
and upon the nature of the environment4 
,that some descendents some day may have
 other natures and other surroundings1  
is not to the point4 ,the presence of   
subjective surroundings in the          

environment affects the individual      
according to the nature of his own      
feelings3 it affects him in the first   
place according to his possession or    
non-possession of sympathy1 and in the  
second place according to his position  
of command or subserviency4  ,if        
,biology takes cognisance of ,ethics1 it
 is from a prudential point of view     
alone4 ,it means a recognition of the   
penalties of legal enactments or social 
laws4 ,as a matter of calculation it    
takes account of the consequences of    
actions1 and the conduct varies         
accordingly4  ,and if we are unable to  
accept the biological view as identical 
with the fundamentals of ,ethics1 so we 
are unable to accept the correlative    
that the preponderance of pleasurable   
feelings is indicative of the ethically 
correct life4 ,for this criterion again 
is relative to the individual1 and      
prescribes that course of conduct which 
to him is most largely pleasurable4 ,it 
is only ethical when the surrounding    

conditions are such as to make the      
personally pleasurable harmonise with   
what is also pleasurable to the         
subjective environment--again showing   
the external or social origin and       
authority of the ethical imperative4    
,before quitting this subject1 it       
would-be as well to notice the narrow   
limitation assigned to the relation of  
feeling and function in the chapter on  
the biological view4 ,pleasure is there 
described as the correlative of         
life-sustaining acts1 and ,pain as the  
correlative of life-destructive acts2   
and we are told that under these        
conditions alone sentient creatures     
could evolve4 ,this would apparently    
limit the range of the evolution of     
feeling to those classes of actions     
which are essential to the mere         
continuance of existence4 ,if the growth
 of feeling is co-extensive with the    
growth of actions essential to          
existence1 then ,pleasure and ,pain     
should be limited to the feelings       

involved in the supply of food1 the     
escape from enemies1 the pursuit of     
prey1 c4 ,if to these should be added   
the larger1 but as yet unexplained1 view
 of ,biology1 which makes the individual
 a part only of a greater moving        
equilibrium--namely the species to which
 he belongs--then there will be an      
extension of feeling 7that is1 of       
,pleasure and ,pain7 to the acts        
requisite for the propagation of the    
race and the care of off-spring4 ,but to
 these two classes of functions1 human  
pleasures and pains are not limited4    
,beyond what may be termed the essential
 growth of feeling1 there has been a    
super-growth of feeling concomitant with
 every extension of the correspondences 
between the inner relations and the     
outer relations4 ,in the converse of the
 organism with its environment there has
 grown up a vast extension of knowledge 
as to external facts2 and in the        
classification and reasoning upon these 
there has supervened a vast interest1   

which has been pleasurable quite apart  
from any life-sustaining necessity4 ,so 
in the arts of life there has arisen a  
pleasure in the exercise of ingenuity   
and skill of manufacture1 far above the 
requisites for bodily preservation4 ,in 
the spread of stheticism and the        
appreciation of the beautiful in        
,painting1 ,statuary1 ,architecture and 
,decoration generally1 there has been   
manifested an amount of taste or        
feeling1 utterly beyond any value it may
 have as life-sustaining4 ,poetry1      
,music1 ,literature1 along with all the 
other highest manifestations of         
civilization1 are not the outcome of the
 necessities of existence1 but a work   
super-imposed upon the poor and bare    
adaptations which are sufficient for    
simple existence4 ,the same may be said 
of all those fine sympathies of man for 
man1 of man for noble ideals of         
humanity1 and even of the more homely   
love and good feeling of simple natures4
 ,our friendships1 our admirations1 all 

that makes man something over and above 
the mere brute animals1 is due to this  
larger growth of feeling beyond what is 
essential to the mere continuance of    
life--and if we should identify         
,pleasure and ,pain merely with the     
conditions of life-sustaining and       
life-destructive acts1 we should form a 
very inadequate conception of their     
place in human life4 ,this of course is 
on the understanding that the biological
 law implies only self continuance or   
race continuance4 ,that this is ,mr4    
,spencer's original view is manifest    
from the fact that he theoretically     
derives life from the consideration of  
the laws of the moving equilibrium4 ,but
 if we take the larger view1 7which1    
however1 is not derivable from the      
former71 that life is correspondence    
between inner relations and outer       
relations1 and is to be measured        
quantitatively by the increase of the   
number of correspondences1 then of      
course the whole estimation of pleasures

 and pains is changed4  ,under the      
latter view the organism enters into    
correspondence with all the individual  
objects of the environment1 and not only
 has a present regard1 but a past and a 
future interest4 ,the scope of interest 
in the larger minds embraces long lines 
of history leading up and down the eras 
of development4 ,in narrow measures of  
family or local interest1 the social    
feeling has first risen1 but as the     
framework of tribes or nations becomes  
knit together1 so the social feelings   
acquire a wider interest4 ,the merely   
biological interests have become        
enlarged by means of an internal growth1
 so as to have regard for other sentient
 existences4 ,altruism becomes a part of
 ,egoism4 ,we care for others1 not by   
compulsion1 but from natural growth of  
interest4 ,into the causes and incidents
 of this growth it is not necessary to  
enter4 ,it is a simple fact of human    
nature that the pains and pleasures of  
others affect us much1 and sometimes    

very keenly indeed4  ,thus we find that 
the purely biological law1 regarded as  
the adjustment of a moving equilibrium  
to its environment1 derived from and    
exemplified in the physical moving      
equilibrium of the solar system1 the    
spinning top1 the steam engine1 c1 does 
not afford us much insight into ethical 
theory1 even if the equilibrations have 
a concomitant of feeling4 ,in any       
approach from the purely biological     
towards the ethical1 we are thrown for  
our explanations upon efficient         
subjective factors--upon the interaction
 of feeling organisms and sympathetic   
organisms4  ,if we attempt to apply the 
biological law as an explanation of the 
super-growth of correspondences over and
 above the actual necessities of        
continued existence1 and as an          
explanation of the growth of sympathy or
 altruism1 we have to suppose that the  
external forces have generated in the   
organism internal forces in opposition  
or balance therewith4 ,but this theory  

of the moving equilibrium1 difficult to 
understand and accept in its simplest   
applications1 transcends all powers of  
human comprehension when it attempts to 
deal with the subjective relations of   
organisms1 and1 it appears to us1       
entirely fails to account for the growth
 of sympathy or altruistic feeling4     
,,altruism ,,in ,,egoism4  ,the fact of 
the existence of altruistic feelings in 
the texture of the ,ego has led to the  
theory that all altruistic actions1     
since they arise out of the constitution
 of the ,ego1 are really egoistic4 ,this
 argument is irresistible4 ,a kind1     
sympathetic man or woman is so by virtue
 of innate qualities1 just as the       
selfish or the brutal man is4 ,and if   
the justification of actions were to    
depend upon the authority of natural    
egoism the one is as much capable of    
justification as the other4 ,if ,ethics 
depends for its explanation and         
justification upon ,biology1 then1 since
 the view of ,biology is limited to the 

individual and means the suitable       
adjustment of every moving equilibrium  
to its special environment1 each is     
capable of equal justification and      
similar explanation4 ,egoism may include
 ,altruism or it may not1 but in either 
case the action is equally valid from   
the point of view of ,biology4  ,if1    
however1 an extension of this view be   
argued for on the theory that a         
rationalistic view of all the           
requirements of the subjective          
surroundings involves a certain line of 
conduct in order to secure a suitable   
adaptation between the organism and the 
environment1 which shall be the equation
 of that organism1 the best adaptation  
for the time being--this will be a      
superior1 because a more extended1      
biological aspect of conduct1 and it is 
not disputed that such a view of life   
may be more or less acted upon4  ,but   
neither the ,ego-altruistic view1 nor   
the prudential rationalistic view       
attains to the true ethical point of    

view of human conduct2 for the          
altruistic growth in the ,ego is not    
universal1 nor of equal development2 and
 the prudential rationalistic motive is 
purely egoistic and biological1 and     
therefore adverse to the altruistic1    
even if it exists in the ,ego4  ,the    
main object of the present argument is  
to shew that the purely biological      
explanation of ethical injunctions is   
insufficient as a means of understanding
 their imperative character4 ,and yet it
 is difficult to say this if ,biology is
 to be considered as the law of actions 
of organisms4 ,it all depends upon the  
factors which are included in the       
generalisation4 ,if the factors are     
simply physical1 then the generalisation
 is insufficient2 if the forces included
 in the moving equilibrium include      
subjective forces capable of growth into
 sympathy or ,altruism1 then the        
biological laws receive1 perhaps1 an    
extension which renders them capable of 
determining the whole of the phenomena4 

,but if ,pleasure and ,pain are limited 
to life-sustaining acts or              
life-destructive acts1 then the         
influence of the subjective factors is  
limited to the physical1 and the        
super-growth of correspondences of inner
 with outer 7which is necessary to      
explain the larger growth of feeling7   
transgresses the narrow limits of the   
biological law--the law of simple       
equilibration between the organism and  
its environment4  ,it is well now to    
raise the question what is the object of
 ethical enquiry4 ,is it merely         
scientific determination of the origin1 
growth1 and variations of ethical       
opinion8 ,is it a natural history of    
human conduct1 more particularly of that
 part of it called ethical8 ,is it an   
investigation into the natural authority
 of ethical injunction8 ,is the object  
to establish ethical authority1 or to   
show that ethics has no authority1 or to
 enable us to conform to it and         
administer it intelligently8 ,generally 

speaking1 is it a scientific enquiry for
 the information of our minds1 or is it 
investigated for the enforcement of     
ethical injunctions8  ,it is to be      
presumed that we have both ends in view4
 ,knowledge must precede power4 ,light  
must go before footsteps4 ,at least1 so 
it must be if intellect is to rule4 ,as 
a matter of fact1 ,ethics has not been  
so much a reasoned out system of conduct
 as a worked out system to be afterwards
 reasoned about4 ,morality has been the 
interbalance1 growth1 and counterbalance
 of subjective and sympathetic          
individuals4 ,then it became something  
to reason about1 to modify by reason in 
the the application to remoter ends and 
larger bodies of the principles out of  
which it arose4 ,but the province of    
reason is not to supersede those        
principles1 nor to weaken their         
authority1 which indeed it could not do1
 for the forces which produced morality 
are ever present to sustain it1 and1    
indeed1 acquire age after age an        

increasing force4  ,,footnotes3  #i     
,data of ,ethics1 p4 #gh4  #aj ,ibid1 p4
 #gh4  #aa ,ibid1 p4 #be4     ,,chapter 
,,iv4  ,,the ,,sociological ,,view4     
,we now enter upon the study of ,ethics 
proper4 ,notwithstanding ,mr4 ,spencer's
 attempt at the outset of the chapter to
 identify right living with the         
universal biological principle that     
,given its environment and its          
structure1 and there is for each kind of
 creature a set of actions adapted in   
their kinds1 amounts1 and combinations  
to secure the highest conservation its  
nature permits1 the fact still remains  
that the ethical imperative is drawn    
from the social surroundings1 and is not
 derivable from the adaptation to       
environment1 unless the environment be  
of a subjective character requiring an  
adaptation to it as such4 ,mr4 ,spencer 
considers that there is a supposable    
formula for the activity of each        
species1 which1 could it be drawn out1  
would constitute a system of morality   

for that species1 although such a system
 of morality would have little or no    
reference to the welfare of others than 
self and offspring4 ,we cannot concede  
that the formula of activities for a    
worm by which it maintains its          
existence1 is a formula of morality2 nor
 can we admit that the longest-lived    
oyster is the most moral of oysters4    
,systems of morality which relate to the
 welfare of self and offspring alone are
 in the latter instance confessedly of a
 very limited character1 and when       
entirely confined to self it would seem 
that we lose all ethical quality        
whatsoever4 ,we continually find in ,mr4
 ,spencer's exposition that1            
notwithstanding his attempt to affiliate
 ,ethics upon the biological law1 it is 
only in the increased correlation of    
subjective individuals that ,ethics     
arises1 and it is only the modification 
of the individual by society1 and the   
mental or emotional growths in the      
individual consequent on the action of  

the social environment1 that constitute 
the groundwork of ,ethics4  ,it is true 
that1 since society is composed of      
individuals1 the nature and constitution
 of the units has to be considered in   
their mutual interaction1 and therefore 
the study must have a biological basis3 
but when we have to consider the special
 action of the compound social          
environment upon the individual1 the    
study is not one which can be properly  
considered from the purely biological   
side1 nor is it to be comprised within  
the formula of individual life4 ,with   
respect to the social environment ,mr4  
,spencer says1 ,this additional factor  
in the problem of complete living1 is1  
indeed1 so important that the           
necessitated modifications of conduct   
have come to form a chief part of the   
code of conduct4 ,because the inherited 
desires1 which directly refer to the    
maintenance of individual life1 are     
fairly adjusted to the requirements1    
there has been no need to insist on that

 conformity to them which furthers      
self-conservation4 ,conversely1 because 
these desires prompt activities that    
often conflict with the activities of   
others1 and because the sentiments      
responding to other's claims are        
relatively weak1 moral codes emphasise  
those restraints on conduct which the   
presence of fellow men entails4 ,from   
the sociological point of view1 then1   
,ethics becomes nothing else than a     
definite account of the forms of conduct
 that are fitted to the associated      
state1 in such wise that the lives of   
each and all may be the greatest        
possible1 alike in length and breadth4  
,but here we are met by a fact which    
forbids us thus to put in the foreground
 the welfares of citizens1 individually 
considered1 and requires us to put in   
the foreground the welfare of the       
society as a whole4 ,the life of the    
social organism must1 as an end1 rank   
above the lives of its units4 ,these two
 ends are not harmonious at the outset1 

and though the tendency is towards      
harmonisation of them1 they are still   
partially conflicting4#ab  ,the         
difficulty alluded to arises from the   
fact that human society is not one      
well-ordered whole1 but has been from   
the first1 and still is1 split up into  
numerous nations having conflicting     
interests3 from which it follows that   
there is not a complete homogeneity of  
duty between man and man when1 for      
instance1 a state of warfare exists4    
,if now we recognise ,ethics as the rule
 of life imposed by ,society upon the   
individual1 we shall have to recognise  
great varieties of rule1 according to   
the nature and objects of the particular
 ,society imposing the rule1 according  
to the state of development at which    
that ,society has arrived1 and according
 to the nature of the environment4  ,the
 rule of a club over the individuals    
composing it1 the rule of a church over 
its members1 the rule of any body of men
 over its constituent units is founded  

upon the ethical principle1 however     
trifling or however serious the objects 
of the particular association may be4   
,those slight or those important social 
penalties or commendations which fill up
 the course of everyday life in         
business1 in the workshop1 in social    
intercourse--the familiar judgments of  
companions or contemporaries--are all of
 them ethical valuations of conduct4    
,slight though some of them may be1 they
 are still enforcements of social       
opinions4 ,man is hedged in on all sides
 by forces limiting his action to       
certain lines of conduct1 and this      
social pressure is as much the basis of 
the most forceful ethical commands or   
prohibitions as of the most ephemeral   
influences4 ,the only difference        
consists in the importance of the mode  
in which the various actions affect the 
general welfare4 ,but this we shall have
 occasion to treat of hereafter in      
greater detail4 ,it is1 however1 all a  
matter of the greater or lesser degree  

in which it affects the welfare of the  
temporary organisation1 the welfare of  
the family1 or the welfare of the       
permanent community1 of which the       
individual forms a part4  ,but it is    
evident that as the stage of development
 differs1 and as nations differ in their
 environments1 so there will be         
different standards of conduct at       
different times and places4 ,and        
therefore1 again1 there will be         
different standards of morality for     
different sets of purposes4 ,this must  
be acknowledged at once4  ,hence arise  
the questions1 ,what can be the         
obligation of a relative morality8      
and--,is there no absolute morality with
 its imperatives universal in space and 
in time8  ,the question as to absolute  
morality we reserve3 meanwhile we       
confine our considerations to a study of
 the influence of ,society upon         
individuals4 ,this is disclosed in a    
study of ,sociology4  ,living together  
in a social state necessitates certain  

negative and1 eventually1 positive      
duties4  ,whether the members of a      
social group do or do not co-operate1   
certain limitations to their individual 
activities are necessitated by their    
association2 and after recognising these
 as arising in the absence of           
co-operation1 we shall be the better    
prepared to understand how conformity to
 them is effected when co-operation     
begins4#ac  ,what shape1 then1 must the 
mutual restraints take when co-operation
 begins8 or rather1 what1 in addition to
 the primary mutual restraints already  
specified1 are those secondary mutual   
restraints required to make co-operation
 possible8 99 99 99 99 ,the reply will  
be made clearer if we take the          
successive forms of co-operation in the 
order of ascending complexity4 ,we may  
distinguish as homogeneous co-operation 
7#a7 that in which like efforts are     
joined for like ends that are           
simultaneously enjoyed4 ,as co-operation
 that is not completely homogeneous we  

may distinguish 7#b7 that in which like 
efforts are joined for like ends that   
are not simultaneously enjoyed4 ,a      
co-operation of which the heterogeneity 
is more distinct is 7#c7 that in which  
unlike efforts are joined for like ends4
 ,and lastly comes the decidedly        
heterogeneous co-operation1 7#d7 that in
 which unlike efforts are joined for    
unlike ends4#ad  ,the social attainment 
reaches a full development in the last  
mentioned case4  ,only under voluntary  
agreement then1 no longer tacit and     
vague1 but overt and definite1 can      
co-operation be harmoniously carried on 
when division of labour becomes         
established4 ,and1 as in the simplest   
co-operation1 where like efforts are    
joined to secure a common good1 the     
dissatisfaction caused in those who1    
having expended their labours1 do not   
get their share of the good1 prompts    
them to cease co-operating2 as in the   
more advanced co-operation1 achieved by 
exchanging equal labours of like kind   

expended at different times1 aversion to
 co-operate is generated if the expected
 equivalent of labour is not rendered2  
so in this developed co-operation1 the  
failure of either to surrender to the   
other that which was avowedly recognized
 as of like value with the labour or    
product given1 tends to prevent         
co-operation by exciting discontent with
 its results4 ,and1 evidently while     
antagonisms thus caused impede the lives
 of the units1 the life of the aggregate
 is endangered by diminished cohesion4  
,but now we have to recognise the fact  
that complete fulfilment of these       
conditions1 original and derived1 is not
 enough4 99 99 99 99 ,if no one did for 
his fellows anything more than was      
required by strict performance of       
contract1 private interests would suffer
 from the absence of attention to public
 interests4 ,the limit of evolution of  
conduct is consequently not reached1    
until1 beyond avoidance of direct and   
indirect injuries to others1 there are  

spontaneous efforts to further the      
welfare of others4  ,the point brought  
out here is the social pressure of the  
society upon the individual1 so as to   
ensure that the actions of the          
individual primarily are not inimical to
 its welfare1 and secondarily are       
subservient to its welfare4 ,but1 of    
course1 since society is composed of    
individuals1 this pressure must not be  
of such a character as to be destructive
 of the welfare of the individuals of   
which the society is composed1 for that 
would militate against its own objects4 
,it is easy to reason out from this     
principle what actions would be         
condemned and what actions would be     
praised in the various stages of human  
development4 ,the strongest injunctions 
would correspond with the fundamental   
requirements of existence1 and would    
enjoin the sacredness of life within the
 community4 ,the family relationships   
would come next in order of authority4  
,the safeguards of property of every    

description would early receive ethical 
recognition4 ,commendation would be     
accorded to men whose actions were      
properly limited in these respects4 ,in 
early stages of development the coward  
would be condemned1 while the warrior   
who did his share well in the protection
 of the community would be praised4 ,and
 so in a variety of ways men's actions  
would receive praise or blame1 according
 as they conduced to the welfare or to  
the suffering of the existing community4
  ,,footnotes3  #ab ,data of ,ethics1 p4
 #acc4  #ac ,data of ,ethics1 p4 #aci4  
#ad ,ibid41 p4 #adj4     ,,chapter ,v4  
,,the ,,ethical ,,imperative4   ,we have
 thus seen that the origin and authority
 of ,ethics are to be found in          
,sociology2 but to allow the enquiry to 
rest here is only half to understand the
 nature and imperativeness of ethical   
obligations as to conduct4 ,we consider 
that ,mr4 ,spencer's ethical theory     
suffers from his mode of exposition4 ,we
 should be disposed to approach the     

question in an inverse order1 and       
instead of seeking for an ethical       
authority on individual or biological   
grounds1 culminating in an ethical      
,sociology1 to acknowledge at once the  
sociological origin and authority of the
 ethical obligation1 and to endeavour to
 understand it in detail by a           
subordinate study of biological         
requirements and psychological growths4 
,the main fact underlying all ,ethics is
 the existence of a society composed of 
subjective factors1 factors possessing  
feelings and reasoning powers4 ,the     
fundamental notion in ,ethics is the    
regulation of the mutual conduct of     
these factors4 ,it is the voice of the  
million against the voice of the unit   
which decides the duty of the unit4 ,it 
is the voice of the individual against  
the voice of society claiming a         
modification of opinion4 ,it is the     
voice of individuals to other           
individuals specifying general duty4    
,broadly speaking it is the claim of    

duties towards other individuals upon   
the ,ego4 ,but it follows from the      
universality of the claim1 that there is
 mutuality of claim1 and the duties     
which are demanded have at the same time
 to be acknowledged4 ,the principle can 
be easily accepted as theoretically     
correct1 and many general rights and    
duties can be readily deduced as        
corollaries1 but beyond these general   
rules ethical problems have rather to be
 worked out than thought out--in the    
more important matters by societies     
during their upward growth1 in smaller  
matters by individuals through          
multitudinous adjustments and           
re-adjustments4 ,i do this or that in   
contravention of some accepted social   
law4 ,i am condemned1 and am made so    
generally uncomfortable by the social   
penalties that ,i am coerced into       
conformity1 or1 otherwise1 society      
modifies its opinion in acknowledgment  
of my right to do as ,i have done4  ,but
 then the question arises1 upon what    

principle should ethical judgments be   
formed8 ,since society demands the      
performance of certain actions1 while it
 prohibits the performance of others1   
and since its aim is the biological     
completeness of each of the individuals1
 what are the principles upon which it  
determines the restraints and imposes   
the injunctions so as not to interfere  
too much with individual liberties8     
,this principle finds very good         
expression in ,mr4 ,spencer's formula4  
,the whole problem comes before us when 
we have to consider the relative claims 
of egoism and altruism1 a problem       
splendidly worked out by ,mr4 ,spencer1 
in the chapters entitled ,egoism versus 
,altruism1 ,altruism versus ,egoism1    
,trial and ,compromise1 and             
,conciliation4 ,as this is a purely     
critical work1 to be read only in       
conjunction with the work criticised1 we
 do not feel called upon to give an     
account of these chapters4 ,we simply   
state our acceptance of them bodily1 the

 reservations we would make being merely
 in regard to certain details of the    
exposition4 ,we ought to reprint them   
here in order to make this work complete
 in its argument1 but it is simpler to  
ask the student to interrupt his reading
 of this criticism by a reperusal of the
 chapters referred to4         99       
99       99       99       99       99  
,having read ,mr4 ,spencer's treatment  
of the problem1 the question remains1 is
 the ethical imperative merely an       
external one1 dictated by a prudential  
consideration of the requirements of the
 social environment8 ,the answer must be
 a negative one2 there is an internal   
moral authority which gives to actions  
their ethical glory1 their poetic       
delicacy1 their qualitative             
appreciation1 insomuch that there are   
names in past history that stand ever in
 the forefront of the memories of men1  
hallowed and ennobled in their          
imaginations for all time1 on account of
 the ethical glory of their lives and   

the manner in which their example       
appeals to the wide sympathies within   
us4 ,from the same internal fount       
springs the detestation of foul and     
cruel actions1 the hatred of unjust and 
tyrannical deeds1 and the abhorrence of 
the men and women who commit them4 ,the 
same internal sentiment covers the      
individual himself with shame and       
remorse for unworthy actions committed1 
from which an ever-present memory       
suffers no release4  ,the natural       
history of the growth of this internal  
authority is the history of the action  
of the subjective environment upon the  
subjective individual4 ,the             
understanding of this growth is the     
province of ,psychology in the two forms
 of emotional evolution and intellectual
 evolution as presented by ,mr4 ,spencer
 in chapter vii of the ,data of         
,ethics1--the enlargement of the number 
of sympathies with the subjective       
environment--past1 present1 and         
future--and the enlargement of the      

number of correspondences with the      
objective environment in space1 and     
time1 and generality4 ,we are more      
particularly concerned with that branch 
of it which deals with the growth of the
 emotions4 ,the purely biological view  
relates to the individual1 and its own  
personal existence4 ,but the care of    
offspring1 arising from some            
incomprehensible necessity for the      
continuance of the species1 and         
accompanied by a recognition of their   
subjective character1 produces actions1 
having regard to their effects upon the 
subjectivity of the offspring1 of a     
regulative1 coercive1 or deterrent      
character4 ,moreover1 by some not       
understood law1 the sympathies which    
undoubtedly exist between organisms1    
have led to the recognition of the pains
 of others as egoistic pains1 and of the
 pleasures of others as egoistic        
pleasures4 ,thus altruism from the very 
first became to a certain extent a form 
of egoism1 and the action of the ,ego in

 its subjective environment was of a    
regulative character amongst its        
offspring4 ,an extension and            
modification of this action ensued upon 
a social environment composed of more   
distant1 or only tribal relationships4  
,nevertheless psychological evolution   
made the sympathies gradually include   
tribal and national1 and eventually     
humanitarian recognitions4 ,the growth  
of ,ethics1 and the growth of ethical   
feeling1 are thus seen to be a natural  
growth1 and not merely the solution of  
an intellectual problem4 ,the           
justification for the ethical feeling is
 that it exists4 ,the justification for 
any code of morality is that is exists4 
,but the amendment of the code of       
morality derives its justification from 
changing conditions4 ,the changefulness 
of the latter does not detract from but 
attests the essential nature of the     
former4 ,it is the court of appeal for  
the retention of existing codes1 and for
 the judgment of imminent changes4 ,we  

cannot1 therefore turn round and say--as
 we may be tempted to do when we find   
the relativity of morals and its origin 
in external obligation--,ethics is only 
an intellectual puzzle1 only a social   
contract1 into which ,i may enter or not
 as ,i please4 ,if a man assumes a      
hostile attitude to society1 he wrongs  
his nature as a man2 and if a           
philosopher or selfish man of the world 
cuts off human sympathy for the purpose 
of living a merely prudential life he   
becomes something less than a man1 he   
misses the full function and joy of     
life4 ,nevertheless1 it must be         
acknowledged that there are men who have
 so maimed their emotional nature as to 
lead tolerably satisfactory lives within
 the narrow limits of selfish desires4  
,to them ethical obligation is external 
only1 and the internal obligation is a  
minimum4 ,such may be the case4 ,there  
are men who do actions in contradiction 
of the voice of society1 and who do not 
repent4 ,society has to deal with these 

men as best it can4 ,the ethical problem
 is only of interest to those who feel  
the obligation1 or to the philosopher   
who studies the human nature of which it
 is a characteristic4  ,viewed as a     
practical question1 no philosophical    
theory will carry the force of          
conviction to a bestial1 brutal1 sordid1
 selfish man4 ,these require the        
material punishments of the             
administrators of the law1 personal     
force1 and social coercion4 ,and even   
then there remain large criminal classes
 in every community4 ,the study of the  
ethical problem is for those who        
recognise ethical obligation and seek   
guidance or to guide4 ,the internal     
ethical obligation is not to be reasoned
 into a man4 ,it must be grown into the 
child4 ,this is to be done by           
love-enkindling actions and demeanour1 a
 just and considerate course of conduct1
 well judged according to ethical       
principles4 ,and herein lies the utility
 of the study4 ,example and injunctions 

in daily exigencies form the groundwork 
of such influence as can be exerted by  
education4 ,a discriminating judgment of
 contemporary actions and of past       
histories tends to develop a proper     
discrimination of the qualities of      
actions4  ,but below and accompanying   
all this must be recognised--as ,mr4    
,spencer so fully recognises--the       
registration1 as he terms it1 of        
emotions and mental capacities in the   
inherited constitutions of organisms4   
,that which is the lesson of one age has
 become the inborn faculty of a         
succeeding one4 ,there are natural      
tendencies inherited by individuals from
 their ancestors1 and the perpetual     
social improvement tends to the gradual 
production of individuals more and more 
suitable to the social state by the     
possession of sympathies for others1 and
 the internal feeling of moral          
obligation4 ,furthermore1 these         
individuals are born and reared under   
the influence of a social state ever    

more and more permeated by the          
recognition of the good of society as   
rightly overruling the destinies of the 
individual4  ,the ethical imperative    
then must be regarded as an internal    
growth in a subjective individual       
brought about in psychological evolution
 in the continuous advance both of the  
increase of the sympathetic             
correspondences and of the intellectual 
correspondences with the subjective     
environment1 and in the hereditary      
transmission of the same1 and their     
perpetuation and modification by means  
of education and training induced by the
 current social pressure1 special and   
general2 which social pressure is itself
 undergoing constant but gradual change 
in its incidence and tendency4 ,the     
ethical imperative therefore is partly  
internal in so far as each individual is
 actuated by societarian sympathies and 
emotional regards for humanitarian      
ideals1 or in so far as he possesses    
numerous special and personal kindly    

relations with his environment4 ,but    
in-so-far as a man is destitute of these
 sympathetic possessions1 so far is he  
free from the obligations of the        
internal ethical imperative1 and so much
 does he approach to the lower          
evolutionary states of the inanimate    
object1 or of the beast of the forest1  
the insensate fish which stares into    
vacuity in the tanks of an aquarium1 or 
a self-feeding engine which is only a   
little less developed form of a moving  
equilibrium4 ,for such as these there   
only remains the external prudential    
obligation of conformity to social      
pressure in its several forms of law1   
custom1 or public opinion1 or the       
variously expressed displeasure or      
commendations of neighbours whereto it  
would be wise to conform4 ,this to them 
is the only ethical imperative4  ,to    
neither class does any reasoned-out     
theory of absolute morality yield any   
force of obligation or insight into the 
details of duty4 ,and here it will be   

convenient to enquire whether ,mr4      
,spencer himself attaches to absolute   
morality1 any power as an ethical       
imperative4 ,absolute morality in ,mr4  
,spencer's treatment is merely a        
conception of ideal conduct in an ideal 
state of society4 ,we must conceive a   
state of society in the highest degree  
complex1 composed of individuals        
following all the various occupations   
necessitated by the sub-division of     
labour from the lowest to the highest1  
in which each individual may yet perform
 his or her functions in such a manner  
as to insure the highest degree of      
personal happiness1 and at the same time
 promote the highest happiness of the   
society as a whole4  ,such an ideal     
state would comprise individuals of all 
ages1 from infancy to extreme old age1  
and could not possibly exclude invalids 
and the maimed1 for we cannot suppose   
that moving equilibria will be able to  
develop internal forces so as to        
preserve them intact from the effects of

 storms1 explosions1 and other natural  
occurrences1 and as it is part of the   
moving equilibrium theory to suppose    
that organisms are only temporary       
equilibrations on the way towards a     
final equilibration in a state of rest1 
it is necessary to suppose that they    
will always be subject to disease and   
death4 ,it is therefore probable that   
the society would comprise many         
sufferers from organic diseases1 and it 
is difficult to imagine any state of    
society which would be entirely free    
from mental disorders in various degrees
 of defect1 or excess1 or aberration4   
,nevertheless we are asked to conceive a
 state of perfect balance amongst a     
society composed of heterogeneous       
individuals in various stages of        
equilibration1 and we are told that a   
proper and complete conception of this  
character would furnish us with a code  
of absolute morality4 ,but it is quite  
clear that ,mr4 ,spencer's utopian      
hypothesis is the outcome of hope       

springing from large human sympathies   
rather than a realisable future1        
affording an ethical imperative4  ,thus 
it is supposed that actual standards of 
morality are extremely imperfect1 and   
form but faint foreshadowings of a      
future ideal1 or in any case1 that there
 is an absolute morality which rules    
throughout all ages1 and is the         
authority for the approximations of each
 age4 ,but if we sufficiently realise   
the fundamental notion of ,biology as   
that of the most complete adjustment of 
the organism to its environment1        
including incidentally the adjustment of
 the environment to the organism we must
 acknowledge that the most perfect      
morality is the best adjustment of the  
individual to his environment in the    
society to which he belongs4 ,thus the  
most perfect morality is the best       
relative adjustment1 and not the nearest
 conformity to an ideal standard suited 
to a perfect state of society4 ,the     
biological rule is more fundamental than

 any other1 the societarian view        
following2 and its ideal of morality is 
perfection of actual adjustment amongst 
the individuals of existing societies so
 as to insure the greatest happiness of 
each and all4 ,thus as there are higher 
lives and lower lives1 there are higher 
moralities and lower moralities1 but    
they are justified by their quantitative
 relative perfection1 and not according 
to their approach to absolute morality1 
and they do not derive their ethical    
obligation from the latter source4  ,it 
is due to the growth of psychological   
views that man is troubled with the     
burthen of so many ideals4 ,far be it   
from us to detract from noble aims1 but 
it is necessary to note the origin and  
nature of moral ideals and to assign    
them their proper place4 ,they arise    
from the growing sympathies of the race1
 and its ever-widening intelligence2    
more especially do they arise in the    
minds of thinkers and students of       
humanity in regard to the continuous    

aggregations of tribes and nations of   
men in entering on the practical        
problem1 how they shall live together   
without unduly trespassing upon one     
another's rights of life and enjoyment4 
,these necessarily had to form for      
themselves practical ideals1 but ideals 
of some sort--ideals of greater or less 
degree of imperativeness in proportion  
as they affected the essentials of a    
pleasurable existence1 or as they       
affected interactions of lesser         
consequence4 ,the growth of individual  
sympathies continually afforded wider   
scope in the judgment of personal       
actions1 and the spread of intelligence 
insured the acceptance of more general  
laws of regulative requirements on the  
part of the society4 ,the               
authoritativeness of some of the laws so
 recognised seemed eventually to be in  
the nature of things1 and to be         
independent and absolute in its         
imperativeness4 ,those laws which were  
seen to be essential to the very        

existence of society were regarded as   
eternal and true independently of       
society4 ,but this is at once seen to be
 a false notion1 and only a peculiar    
manner of representing the most         
essential laws of relative morality4 ,no
 men1 no morals6 ,immorality is a sin1  
not against eternal principles of right1
 but against the practical working      
principles co-eval with human society4  
,to set up a perfect morality1 an ideal 
code1 which may possibly exist in an    
ideal state of society1 but which is    
scarcely likely ever to be realised as a
 rule of present conduct1 is to set up  
not only an impracticable1 but a false  
standard1 since the only true standard  
is the relative sociological one founded
 upon the historical principle of       
adjustment4  ,perhaps1 however1 even    
from this principle we work round to the
 same point1 for in working out the     
problem how to secure to each his fair  
share of happy life1 we are obliged to  
set down certain fundamental laws       

protecting the individual from injury in
 the full exercise of his faculties1 and
 we are obliged to impose upon society  
as a whole1 and upon each individual1   
certain positive duties of assistance   
towards individuals1 being members of   
the community4 ,nevertheless1 the ideal 
set before each generation is that of   
which it is actually capable1 and not a 
fanciful one which is beyond its powers4
 ,and we imagine that some harm is done 
by the sweeping condemnation of         
religious and moral idealists in        
inculcating the sense of sin1 and       
imperfection1 and incapability of       
attainment1 which the preaching of such 
high absolute standards necessitates4   
,no doubt the inculcation of high ideals
 kindles youthful enthusiasm1 and       
sustains manly effort4 ,but sometimes   
the non-attainment of impossible ideals 
detracts from the effort towards        
attainable relative perfections1 and    
causes us to under-value and to neglect 
the good qualities actually extant in   

ourselves1 and in our fellow-creatures4 
,the unco guid may repress as much as   
they may develop1 for the idealists have
 made more sin1 and therefore sinners1  
than is justified by the adaptations of 
society4  ,nevertheless1 the            
psychological conception of an ideal man
 in an ideal state is a most fascinating
 one1 alike to the philanthropist whose 
heart broadens out to all humanity1 and 
to the philosopher who aims at absolute 
perfection of moral or political theory4
 ,there are men and women of noble and  
sweet sympathies who aim at making each 
his little ideal world around him1 and  
so leaven the general mass and aid the  
movement towards the great ideal4 ,poets
 have sung1 and will sing through all   
ages1 of that golden age1 and           
philosophers1 consciously or            
unconsciously1 have it for their ruling 
motive in all their writings4 ,statesmen
 in lesser circles of practical scope   
only work towards it1 and the whole     
heart of humanity teems with hope for a 

time when troubles shall cease1 and a   
bearable1 if not a happy lot1 shall be  
the meed of all4  ,the ethical          
imperative we therefore find to possess 
a two-fold origin4 ,it has external     
authority in the imposition of coercive 
rules of conduct1 carrying with them    
social penalties or rewards1 varying in 
degree according to the essential or    
trivial manner in which actions affect  
the lives of other individuals1 and     
again an external one in the sympathetic
 action of surrounding subjective       
organisms upon subjective organisms in  
eliciting and enkindling sympathetic    
response4 ,it has also an internal      
authority in the sympathies which1 by a 
law of nature1 grow up in the ego       
towards surrounding egos in the         
manifestation of its several subjective 
characteristics4  ,thus the ethical     
imperative is a growth within a man4 ,it
 is also an education imposed upon him1 
and it is again an external social      
pressure accompanied by rewards and     

punishments4 ,the internal ethical      
imperative does not exist to all men1   
and to them must be applied the social  
pressure in more or less manifest forms 
of scorn1 denunciation1 and even scant  
diet1 and the cold frowning walls of    
jails1 and unrewarding labour4 ,towards 
this end the legislator works1 also in  
the removal of hindrances to life1 and  
the promotion of education4 ,the        
philanthropist gently encourages the    
feeble efflorescences of humanitarian   
sympathies4 ,sunday schools and pulpits 
more or less earnestly impress the moral
 obligations4 ,parents call forth the   
love and sympathy of children1 and      
amongst brothers and sisters and        
companions the child first learns the   
lesson of mutual duty and mutual help4  
,occasionally in the world's history    
arises a prophet in whom has become     
concentrated in a ten-fold degree the   
humanitarian sentiment1 and he speaks in
 a voice which reverberates down the    
outspreading avenues of time1 calling   

forth an answering note from the attuned
 heart chords of the nations4           
,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,systems ,,of         
,,ethics4   ,mr4 ,spencer very justly   
claims for his system that it gives a   
new meaning and authority to all        
previous systems of ,ethics and theories
 of human action4 ,in his system they   
all harmonise4 ,their contradictions    
disappear on the discovery that they are
 all parts of one consensus of truth4   
,we will proceed to examine in order    
some of these earlier theories in their 
relation to the one now propounded4     
,the idea that society is a pact or     
contract1 though essentially untrue1    
since society has been a growth and not 
a partnership resulting from            
negociations1 is nevertheless true in   
the sense that men have had to give up  
individual biological liberties or      
egoisms in entering upon the social     
stage4 ,there never was any conscious   
bargaining1 but there have been an      
infinite number of tacit understandings 

of societarian and individual           
adjustments which eventually brought    
about the well-ordered societies of     
modern times4  ,the ,intuitional ,school
 of ,moralists finds the intuitions as  
to what is right and wrong1 and more    
especially the feeling of right and the 
feeling of wrong1 justified and         
established in the fact of the growth of
 feeling in general as the essential of 
the biological history1 and in the      
historical establishment of the internal
 growth of moral feelings transmitted   
from generation to generation4 ,validity
 and authority are given1 to moral      
principles by the very fact of their    
existing strength and their recognised  
fitness to the social circumstances4    
,the indignation or the admiration      
naturally felt by man at certain actions
 is justified a priori1 and apart from  
any reasoned opinion of their bearings4 
,praise and blame are not much1 as a    
matter of fact1 affected by reason4     
,spontaneously and independently passion

 and enthusiasm are expressed4 ,without 
staying to think1 comes the unbidden    
frown and sharp reproof1 or even the    
hasty blow4 ,without thought come the   
expression of sorrow and sympathy1 the  
glow of praise1 the approving smile1 the
 commendatory word1 straight from the   
heart and sympathies of the like-minded 
spectator4 ,reason may argue about      
details--it may rejudge the spontaneous 
expressions of the sympathies1 it may   
guide and direct1 but it never lends to 
praise its warmth1 or to condemnation   
its severity4 ,these are purely         
instinctive1 and reason justifies them  
in the ascertainment of their origin and
 growth4 ,there is an intuitive         
conscience which has been developed by  
evolution4 ,the adjustment of organisms1
 the growth of feeling1 the acquisition 
of altruistic or sympathetic feeling in 
an environment of subjective individuals
 has developed not only social          
adjustments1 but also feelings in       
individuals1 relative to those social   

adjustments1 which compose a conscience 
or intuition4 ,never yet could such a   
conscience or intuition wholly and of   
itself teach a man moral action4 ,the   
conscience presupposes for its          
actualization the presence of its       
environment4 ,it needs education1       
encouragement1 and instruction4 ,society
 is a continuous existence4 ,the child  
born into a society not only inherits   
its dispositions1 but from the very     
first receives its prepossessions1 is   
subject to its injunctions1 and is      
trained in its habits4 ,intuition is    
only a part of the truth4 ,yet although 
it may be developed by education1 and   
guided by reason1 there is no question  
as to its existence1 and as to its      
affording the zest to praise1 the       
keenness to condemnation1 and the       
poignancy to remorse4  ,the view which  
regards ,ethics as explicable by ,egoism
 is a very imperfect and ambiguous one4 
,for what is the ,ego spoken of1 and of 
what does it consist8 ,the view which   

makes egoism the rule of life1 and which
 some suppose may afford the ultimate   
rationale of ,ethics1 is identical with 
the biological view which we have       
already discussed4 ,no doubt egoism is  
the rule of life taken in its widest    
sense4 ,no doubt the adjustment of the  
,ego to society1 and of society to the  
,ego1 is the rule of life4 ,but egoism  
only becomes ethical when it1 in order  
of growth1 includes love of offspring1  
love of family1 love of fellow-man1     
regard for the tribe1 the nation1 or    
humanity at large4 ,as egoism loses its 
narrowness1 as it loses its exclusive   
regard for personal continuance1 and    
finds itself possessed of affections for
 others and altruistic considerations1  
so does it become continually less and  
less egoistic4 ,it is a matter of       
chopping logic to say that its action is
 still essentially selfish1 if it does  
good to others1 because it is part of   
its own nature to do good to others1 and
 it does so to satisfy its own egoistic 

desires4 ,this only proves that egoism  
is the rule of life1 but does not       
establish it as the rule of ,ethics1    
which is a very different thing4 ,the   
ethical rule has been found in the      
course of the enquiry to be1 firstly1   
the body of injunctions which society   
lays upon the individual2 and1 secondly1
 the conscience which a society of      
subjective individuals cultivates in    
each separate ,ego1 both arising from   
the growth of altruistic sympathy in the
 subjective organism of which society is
 composed4 ,to say that when men act    
ethically they act from egoism is only  
to include ethical action in a statement
 of a more general biological law1 and  
takes the mind off from the special     
ethical study altogether4 ,ethical      
egoism pre-supposes ethical feeling in  
the ,ego1 otherwise egoistic morality is
 obliged to frame for itself a          
hypothetical society of individuals     
without feelings1 which1 of course1 puts
 it out of relation with humanity4      

,egoism1 as a basis of morals1 is bound 
to include altruism1 or else it is      
merely a form of expressing the most    
general law of ,biology4  ,egoism       
however gives1 in its highest form1 a   
wide and wise consistency to actions4   
,it pre-supposes a well-ordered mind    
capable of self-regulation and control4 
,it takes a look all round1 and it      
judges of the eventualities of actions4 
,it sums up its own forces and motives1 
it takes account of its present and     
future surroundings and forms a judgment
 as to the most prudent course of action
 for securing the fittest life possible 
for itself and the greatest continuance 
of such life in the future4 ,a wise and 
well-judged egoism is very valuable to  
the community1 as well as profitable to 
the individual4 ,it is not however      
essentially ethical1 and is so only in  
so far as the individual is properly    
altruistic4 ,if the egoist is not       
altruistic1 he may become a curse to the
 society in which he lives1 or if on a  

larger scale--a terrible scourge to     
humanity at large4  ,utilitarianism does
 not explain ethics1 unless the word be 
accepted as co-extensive with the       
biological and sociological adjustments 
which have gone on during the upward    
growth4 ,no doubt these were all        
utilities2 and1 therefore1              
utilitarianism is so far true4 ,but     
since the process has been one of       
accompanying modified feeling1 it is    
only half an explanation1 only one      
feature of the general explanation4 ,it 
was no common intellectual appreciation 
of the axiom the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number1 which caused the   
evolution of morals4 ,the axiom was     
itself an after-thought4 ,it may have   
great use in these days1 as the         
expression of the outcome in feeling and
 in philosophic thought of processes of 
evolution1 but it was not the ruling    
principle which produced the evolution4 
,accepted thus as the outcome1 it may be
 the criterion and guide for future     

action in detailed adjustments and      
modifications of ethical judgments or   
political action1 and may have an       
authority in modern times which it could
 not have had primordially4 ,but its    
scope is limited to the formation of    
deliberate judgments1 and it does not   
impel spontaneous praise or give any    
force to spontaneous blame4 ,its        
judgments are those of the calm reasoner
 which may very properly modify the     
opinions of society at large1 and thus  
tend to form an improved conscience1 but
 it will never make a moral impulse or  
form the base for an ethical ideal4  ,in
 an ethical system founded upon an      
acceptance of biological and            
sociological evolution1 all these       
systems of previous philosophers find a 
due place4 ,egoism cannot be denied as  
the rule of life1 but it is shown that  
egoism cannot always remain purely      
egoistic1 but at last includes          
inevitably an altruistic growth4 ,the   
progress of society involves altruistic 

conditions4 ,the intrinsic growth of    
sympathy and the extrinsic imposition of
 conditions form in a continuous        
society1 by change in the internal      
constitution of organisms1 and by       
hereditary transmission of such changes1
 not only an intuitional feeling of     
right and wrong1 but also an intuitional
 conscience of greater or less          
development4 ,thus1 we admit and explain
 the law of right and wrong written upon
 each civilized human heart4            
,utilitarianism is recognised as the    
ultimate outcome of philosophical       
thought2 and1 while it is but an        
inadequate expression in the hands of   
some writers1 it may1 perhaps1 in its   
wider expansion by later philosophers1  
become an adequate and suitable         
expression of the ethical principle1 and
 a guide for re-adjustments in the      
recognition of the wider ends and larger
 views of human organisation4  ,but any 
one of these views is inadequate by     
itself to explain and express the       

largeness of ethical movement4 ,only    
when we seize upon the history of the   
development of subjectivity1 only when  
we understand the gradual progress from 
gross beginnings1 and recognise the     
grand movement which carries us forward 
to we know not what hopeful future1 can 
we properly appreciate the ethical      
position and the ethical authority4 ,but
 to one who understands the evolution of
 organisms and of society1 all these    
varying views fall at once into their   
natural places in a beautiful harmony4  
,the touch of genius in a ,darwin or a  
,spencer1 produces out of the apparent  
chaos a well-ordered and progressive    
system4  ,this is the proper place to   
notice ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's very     
valuable and elaborate work upon ,the   
,science of ,ethics4 ,that work is wise 
in conception1 sound as to its basis and
 construction1 beautifully proportioned 
in its mode of treatment1 carefully1    
and1 perhaps1 too elaborately worked out
 in detail4  ,the original conception is

 wise in that it excludes metaphysical  
questions and discussions as to first   
principles1 and limits the range of its 
considerations to properly-ascertained  
scientific facts or laws1 and to such   
extensions of scientific surmise as are 
warranted by the acceptance of the      
modern doctrine of evolution1 expounded 
by ,darwin4 ,the acceptance of this     
doctrine not only involves the          
acceptance of historic developments1 but
 justifies1 and even necessitates1 the  
acceptance of a supposititious          
prehistoric development4 ,this          
hypothetical history1 founded on        
observations of historical order1 and of
 the habits and customs of uncivilised  
races1 is perfectly justifiable4        
,however1 the problem1 conducted within 
scientific limits is to consider the    
groundwork of actual morality 7,ch4 i474
  ,properly to effect this object1 it is
 necessary to study the influence of the
 emotions as determining conduct4 ,next1
 the influence of the reason as         

determining conduct1 and finally1 the   
interaction of the race and the         
individual 7,ch4 ii4 and iii474  ,these 
preliminaries are succeeded by a study  
of the moral law as derived from social 
interests1 following upon social        
necessities1 establishing the moral law 
as natural1 and as authoritative 7,ch4  
iv474  ,the contents of the moral law   
are next discussed1 in which the virtues
 of courage1 temperance1 truth1 and the 
social virtues are considered 7,ch4 v474
  ,altruism1 as a growth within the     
,ego1 is necessarily an object of study1
 and is explained as a natural          
development of sympathy out of intrinsic
 subjectivity4 ,its place in a system of
 ethics is also set forth4 7,ch4 vi474  
,upon this follows an exposition of     
special views upon merit1 free-will1    
effort1 and knowledge1 as modified by   
the acceptance of the doctrine of       
evolution4 ,of essential importance to  
an ethical work is a consideration of   
the nature of conscience and the        

variations of its judgments 7,ch4       
viii474  ,a discussion of happiness as a
 criterion succeeds1 including a study  
of utilitarianism1 and a consideration  
of the relations of morality and        
happiness 7,ch4 ix4 and x474 ,a         
concluding chapter sums up a work of    
nearly #ejj closely printed pages4  ,it 
is very evident that we cannot undertake
 the criticism of so large and important
 a work without having to enter minutely
 upon points of agreement and difference
 which would greatly augment the size of
 our present volume4 ,we need only say  
that1 although there are naturally many 
minor criticisms to be made1 we accept  
it as an excellent exposition of modern 
ethical views modified and co-ordinated 
as necessitated by the recognition of   
the ,darwinian theories4 ,it should be  
read1 we think1 in succession to        
,professor ,sidgwick's excellent broad  
and dispassionate work on ,the ,methods 
of ,ethics4 ,mr4 ,leslie ,stephen's     
study is based upon the same scientific 

fundamentals as ,mr4 ,spencer's ,data of
 ,ethics1 without the confusing cosmical
 views which are necessitated by ,mr4   
,spencer's position1 but which do not by
 any means tend to strengthen it4       
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,the ,,evolution ,,of
 ,,free ,,will4   ,two distinct theories
 may be held by the ,evolutionist with  
respect to volition1 both of them being 
strictly causational1 and1 therefore1 of
 a scientific1 as opposed to a mystical 
character4  ,he may hold1 in the first  
place1 the double aspect theory pure and
 simple1 according to which all         
developments of mind are merely         
dependent concomitants of the           
development of nerve ramifications1 with
 consequent growths of nerve-cells1     
ganglions1 and the more considerable    
nerve plexuses1 culminating in the      
growth of a brain4 ,this evolution of a 
nervous and cerebral system he may hold 
to be wholly due to the action of       
molecular and other motions upon a mass 
of colloid substances of such a         

constitution as to be fittest1 under the
 action of these external stimuli1 to   
form lines for the transmission of      
motions and for the discharge of these  
motions into certain otherwise formed   
contractile structures called muscles4  
,he will consider that they eventually  
acquire a power of retaining these      
motions1 so that the effect of all the  
motions thus caused is not immediate but
 deferred4 ,and since all motions       
received are not immediately concerned  
with the welfare of the organism1 he may
 suppose that separate masses of nervous
 matter are produced1 in which these    
motions are stored in an organised form1
 related indirectly rather than directly
 to the motor apparatus4 ,according to  
this theory the whole system of         
determining causes is purely physical4  
,in the simple organisms the response of
 muscular action to incident motions is 
quick1 direct1 and unhesitating4 ,such  
action is called reflex or automatic1   
and is as unconscious as chemical       

activity4 ,but when the system becomes  
more complex1 when nerves cross each    
other1 when cells and junctions are     
formed1 and more particularly when the  
storages of motions are formed1 as just 
referred to2 then compoundings and      
recompoundings of nervous motions take  
place1 and1 according to the strength of
 the various currents1 to the facility  
of discharge1 and to various physical   
local or general conditions1 the action 
becomes slower and more hesitating4     
,under these circumstances1 it is held  
that the nervous system becomes         
conscious4 ,a double aspect then arises1
 and the actions which thereafter take  
place may be described either in terms  
of the relations of the various         
molecular motions in the nervous and    
cerebral systems1 or in terms of        
feeling2 but all the same the latter is 
merely the secondary aspect of series of
 changes altogether determined by the   
motions and structure of the former4 ,on
 this theory memory is the revived      

motion of a nerve structure2 feeling is 
a consciousness of interaction between  
different nerve motions2 trains of      
thought are the reverberations of great 
varieties of motions throughout the     
system and brain2 consciousness         
resulting from the mingling of the nerve
 currents and the consequent conflict   
and retardation of effects4  ,the       
element of mystery here lies in the     
secondary or subjective aspect1 but it  
is placed strictly without the line of  
deduction and is a merely unexplained   
accompaniment of a series of changes    
otherwise fully accounted for4  ,a      
second theory--as strictly causational  
as the former--recognises the presence  
of a subjective factor4 ,in some of the 
quotations from ,mr4 ,spencer's         
,psychology1 given above1 it will have  
been seen that1 at the point of         
development of nerve junctions when     
different currents meet in the developed
 ganglion and in proportion as the      
system becomes more complex1 ,mr4       

,spencer asserts not only the rise of a 
secondary aspect1 but of an additional  
factor4 ,the element of mystery here is 
the entrance of this additional factor1 
capable of taking part as an active     
agent in the affairs of the organism4   
,but since it is itself the result of   
experience and the organization of      
experiences of the physical nervous     
system1 it is strictly of a causational 
or deductive order1 and after its       
unexplained inception1 it has to be     
studied strictly in the scientific order
 of development and action4             
,notwithstanding that it plays a part in
 the conduct of life1 and               
notwithstanding that its dependence upon
 physical organization and development  
is so intimate1 and that this           
development again cannot be understood  
without it--notwithstanding all this    
incomprehensibleness of relation and our
 ignorance of its origin1 the           
,evolutionist maintains the orderly     
development of organism and actions1    

including the subjective as resultants  
of the relations of original factors1   
although he may be for the time being   
ignorant of the nature of the processes4
  ,it will therefore be seen that in    
either case he holds the deterministic  
theory of volition1 and believes all    
purposed actions to be actions          
determined by pre-existing causes1      
whether he regards these causes as the  
structure and condition of nerve        
centres1 or as feelings and thoughts1 or
 whether he regards them as ascribable  
to some law of correlation between the  
two4  ,nevertheless1 it seems to be     
incumbent upon all writers dealing with 
the subject of ,ethics to define their  
position as to the ,free ,will          
controversy4 ,it is needless to say that
 we accept unreservedly the             
deterministic theory1 though it may be  
necessary to attempt its reconciliation 
with the consciousness in persons of    
,free ,will4  ,we here make a           
distinction between theories of ,will   

and theories of ,free ,will4 ,what we   
have just been considering have been    
theories of will or volition4 ,they are 
of the deterministic order because in   
either case the actions are wholly      
determined by preceding facts4 ,human   
and all actions of organisms are held to
 be merely resultants of pre-existing   
factors and their relations4 ,this is   
the theory held by all scientific       
philosophers1 and the one most analogous
 to what we know of physical science as 
well as most in conformity with actual  
experience of human conduct4 ,another   
theory--arising no doubt in the mystery 
of the secondary aspect or in the       
mystery of the origin of the subjective 
factor1 denies the rigidity of the      
scientific order1 and asserts the       
presence and activity of a              
self-determining factor1 thus placing   
volitional action beyond the scientific 
order of the dependent and related      
successions of cause and effect4        
,perhaps1 however1 we would be more     

correct in attributing the confidence   
with which this theory of a             
self-determining power is sometimes held
 to another cause4 ,there is in all     
human beings the consciousness of a     
power more or less developed to regulate
 their own actions2 and this process of 
self-regulation is held to be           
inconsistent with the deterministic     
theory4 ,there can be no doubt that     
there is such a consciousness and we    
think there can be no doubt also that   
there is such a power4 ,the superficial 
evolutionist1 indeed1 may admit the     
consciousness1 which he may explain as a
 secondary aspect of conflicting        
nerve-currents1 and laugh in his sleeve 
at the egotistic vanity of a trustful   
man proud of his power of ,will4 ,but we
 think a deeper explanation1 and one    
more commensurate with the phenomena1 is
 to be found3 and this brings us back to
 the distinction1 as indicated at the   
outset of this section1 between theories
 of ,will or ,volition1 and theories of 

,free ,will or the power of regulating  
one's own conduct4  ,will1 in its       
scientific sense1 is merely volition1   
i4e4 the mental state accompanying or   
immediately preceding action4 ,the      
nature of the action1 good1 bad1 or     
indifferent1 is immaterial4 ,technically
 speaking1 all volitions are equal1     
viewed as such4 ,the volition for the   
time being is the ,will for the time    
being4 ,the ,will of a man is the       
totality of his volitions during the    
whole of his lifetime4 ,it is a general 
or collective term relating to conscious
 actions1 or states of consciousness    
immediately preceding actions1 and is   
not the name of an entity4  ,but if     
,will is the volition for the time      
being1 irrespective of any qualitative  
characteristic1 then we have to inquire 
as to the applicability to it of the    
term ,free4 ,now this term is           
antithetical to the two terms restrained
 and constrained4 ,thus if a man's      
actions are hindered or forcefully      

prevented by the ,will of others1 that  
man's actions are not free4 ,but if some
 of a man's motives are restrained or   
his actions constrained by the          
predominance of some other of his       
motives--as1 for instance1 when he      
performs actions which his conscience   
tells him are wrong--in his ,will not   
free8 ,the actions are his volitions4   
,if some motives are restrained1 and    
therefore not to be considered free1    
still the others which have gained the  
predominance have thereby become his    
,will2 their operation proves their     
non-restraint or freedom1 and the       
volition or ,will is still free4 ,the   
action is an evidence of freedom4       
,volition is always free4 ,it is of     
different kinds1 but this does not      
affect the conclusion that volition     
proves its own freedom4 ,the ,will is   
always and under all circumstances free4
  ,but although this disposes of the    
question theoretically1 the ordinary man
 remains unconvinced1 and clings to his 

belief in a ,free ,will1 which is not   
merely this technical and universal     
,free ,will1 but must be interpreted as 
a power he feels himself to possess of  
choosing and determining his own        
actions2 and if we say to him1          
,undoubtedly you have this power2 but   
your choice1 and therefore your volition
 and consequent action1 is still        
determined in the same manner as if you 
had not recognized the power1 he will   
demur1 and1 logically or illogically1 he
 will deny your position1 and hold to   
his consciousness of what he calls his  
self-determining power over his own     
actions1 which he places out of the line
 of ,determinism1 however unmeaning or  
paradoxical his assertions may be proved
 to be4  ,it is this state of           
consciousness1 this clinging to the     
belief held by many men in their own    
power of self-rule over their own       
general conduct1 and by most men in     
their own control over some of their    
activities1 that ,evolution is bound to 

account for and explain4 ,evolutionists 
do not sufficiently mark off this       
practical part of the question from the 
theoretical part1 and thus leave        
imperfectly explained the consciousness 
of the so-called ,free ,will4 ,they deem
 that the explanation of ,free ,will is 
included in an explanation of ,will1 and
 therefore they only deal incidentally  
and imperfectly with self-rule4 ,the    
confusion arises from the term ,free    
,will having two meanings--the theoretic
 or scientific one1 as opposed to       
,determinism1 and the practical one1 as 
implying the power of self-rule1 choice1
 effort1 and determination4  ,that there
 exists such a power of self-regulation 
is a fact recognized in every department
 of social intercourse--in the          
attribution of praise or blame1 in the  
teachings of the moralist1 in the eye of
 the law1 and in the process of         
education4 ,every individual is supposed
 to have a command over his own actions1
 except such as are purely automatic4   

,it is not supposed that men are        
responsible for their congenital tastes 
or abilities2 but all members of the    
community are held responsible for their
 actions towards other members of the   
community1 and to a certain extent they 
are judged to be wise or foolish with   
regard to themselves1 on the supposition
 that they are able to carry out a      
purposed conduct4 ,and even if in       
various particulars it is seen that they
 do not possess such a power1 they1 or  
the persons responsible for their       
earlier education are blamed for their  
want of this power since it is held to  
be one of the most characteristic and   
valuable possessions of humanity4 ,thus 
we find the judicious parent1 from the  
very first1 endeavours to inculcate in  
the child habits of command over his    
temper and his appetites4 ,the youth who
 has received the lessons of wise       
counsellers1 who has been imbued with   
the lessons of ,christianity1 who has   
drunk in the teachings of the ancient   

moralists1 and framed his ambitions upon
 the severe examples of early ,greece   
and ,rome1 or who has found his         
sympathies excited by the dreams of     
modern philanthropy1 knows that the     
foundation of all his personal greatness
 is in his power of self-command4 ,it is
 no idle verbiage that of the           
rhetorician1 the preacher1 the          
philosophical novelist1 the poet1 when  
they exhort to the cultivation of the   
powers of the ,will in their varied     
representations of the aspirations and  
struggles of noble humanity4 ,there is  
something that calls forth the          
moralist's sympathies in the poet's     
appeals to the power of ,will1 and there
 is no grander spectacle in all this    
universe than to witness the battle of  
the will-power of a man against         
difficulties and oppositions of all     
sorts2 none the less if the scene of the
 conflict be in the region of his own   
heart and mind1 rather than in the wider
 field of the battle of life4  ,the     

evolutionist is bound to account for    
this amongst the other phenomena of     
human existence4 ,the principles of such
 an evolution are contained in ,mr4     
,spencer's ,psychology1 but the         
development is not elaborated in detail1
 and is well worthy of a special study4 
,we have previously roughly indicated   
the outlines of such a study2 and as the
 special psychological question has been
 treated in an interesting and          
suggestive manner by the ,rev4 ,t4 ,w4  
,fowle in the number of the ,nineteenth 
,century for ,march #ahha1 we will find 
it convenient to take this article as   
the text or basis of our own remarks4   
,the writer's argument appears in brief 
to be this4 ,in the course of           
,evolution1 man became self-conscious   
7see p4 #cib74 ,this consciousness of   
self led1 first of all1 to              
self-preservation1 then to              
self-assertion1 and finally to          
self-pleasing4 ,when man first uttered  
the words or rather felt the impression 

to which language subsequently gave     
definite shape and force1 ',i will live 
in spite of all the forces encompassing 
my destruction1' then was ,free ,will   
created upon the earth4  ,note here1    
that ,will is changed to ,free ,will in 
the course of a single sentence1 and    
that this ,free ,will is simply human   
action predominant over external        
difficulties1 which should therefore    
rather be called ,will1 and is certainly
 not the ,free ,will or self-rule which 
we have now under consideration4 ,hence 
arises a certain amount of confusion1 as
 witness p4 #cic3--,we ascribe1 then1   
man's consciousness of ,free ,will to   
the concentration of all his pre-human  
experiences into one imperative         
determination to preserve1 to assert1   
and to please himself4 ,thus1 ,free     
,will1 in the mind of the writer1 is    
simply the human ,will as opposed to the
 forces of nature4 ,nothing is said     
about the exterior opposing wills of    
others1 though surely he must intend    

them also to be included in the         
environment4 ,at the same time we do not
 know that it makes the particular point
 under consideration more difficult of  
study1 although these external wills    
form a considerable part of the objects 
determining the activities of the self4 
,yet1 as our particular point of study  
is self-rule1 this extension of the     
reference to external forces does not   
directly affect the argument4  ,but it  
will be seen that the ,will or ,free    
,will mentioned here1 and defined as    
self-assertion and determination to     
please one's self1 is self-assertion as 
opposed to environment--a self-assertion
 which1 irrespective of the qualities or
 nature of the motives comprised in that
 self1 determines to work out its own   
pleasure there and then in spite of all 
opposition4 ,such a state is well       
illustrated in the first self-assertions
 of childhood--its so-called wilfulness2
 for as embryology illustrates the      
stages of biological evolution1 so does 

childhood illustrate the stages of      
mental and moral evolution4 ,this       
self-assertion is also illustrated in   
the conduct of the insane and of the    
rude1 rough1 uneducated minds of the    
masses4 ,still it is not what is meant  
by ,free ,will1 but the very reverse2   
for such persons are said to be slaves  
to their passions or motives4 ,this is  
undoubtedly ,egoistic ,will2 and        
therefore theoretically1 as before      
distinguished1 it is free3 but it is not
 the ,free ,will1 the self-rule we are  
now in search of4 ,this sort of         
self-assertion is the determination to  
please oneself1 irrespective of         
consequences4 ,but when it is known that
 consequences recoil upon self--when the
 element of time is taken into account1 
and the self is found to be continuous1 
then there is reflection1 and by-and-by 
succeeds caution1 restraint1 and the    
co-ordination of actions to a given end4
 ,this is the germ of self-rule which is
 mistakenly regarded as identical with  

the self-determination of volition4     
,the term self-preservation has a wide  
and also a restricted sense4 ,it may    
simply mean the continuance in existence
 of the body2 or if the self is         
equivalent to the preservation of the   
activities comprised in that self1      
whatever those activities may be--lust1 
hate1 benevolence1 sthetic feeling1     
c4--then it implies the continuous      
gratification of those activities4 ,this
 understanding of self-preservation is  
dependent on the length of time for     
which the self is expected to continue4 
,the religious man1 believing in a ,god 
and a future life1 preserves what he    
esteems his self--i4e41 his moral and   
religious being--even in martyrdom4 ,but
 if there is no future life1 then the   
self that has to be preserved is the    
self as it is1 whatever that may happen 
to be--gross or refined4  ,there are no 
better recognised traits of ,free       
,will--i4e41 self-rule--than the power  
of self-denial1 self-abnegation1        

self-sacrifice4 ,these cannot be        
explained by any definition of ,free    
,will founded on self-assertion and     
self-preservation merely4 ,then1 again1 
self-education1 the designed alteration 
of the character1 and the intentional   
acquirement of self-control1 can hardly 
be held to be consistent with simple    
self-assertion4 ,self-assertion is the  
assertion of self as it is4 ,the        
resolution to alter is the denial of    
self-preservation as regards the        
existing self4 ,the adaptation to       
environment involved in self-abnegation 
is the opposite to self-assertion4  ,are
 we to suppose that the ,free ,will     
predicated of man is an universal       
possession of all8 ,if it is a          
theoretical question1 it must be granted
 that all men's wills are free4 ,but if 
it is a practical question as to the    
strength of the ,will as opposed to     
external forces1 and held to be free in 
proportion to its relative strength of  
self-assertion1 surely ,free ,will is a 

variable quality4 ,if1 again1 it is a   
practical question as to the power of   
self-rule1 are we to suppose that all   
men have it in equal degrees8 ,do the   
idiot and the maniac possess it1 or on  
the contrary is it possessed unequally  
by men1 and by some not at all8  ,the   
writer says1 p4 #cia1 ,now1 from the    
moment that self became an object of    
consciousness1 it became also a motive4 
,this consciousness of self is a        
consciousness of the totality of the    
activities1 a consciousness of the unity
 of that totality1 a consciousness of   
the continuance of that totality for a  
more or less certain future4 ,the motive
 consequent upon such recognition must  
be the longest continuance of that self1
 the greatest amount of gratification of
 the activities of that self1 the       
avoidance of pains to that self1 and the
 aggregation of more activities by that 
self4  ,the result of that motive would 
be the co-ordination of actions to      
attain the final end thus set before the

 total self1 and the subordination of   
particular motives to their proper      
places in the co-ordinative scheme4 ,but
 as the total self is in relation to    
environment1 that environment1 physical 
or societarian1 has to be taken into    
account2 and as consequences of actions 
recoil upon the individual at a later   
time1 the results of actions have to be 
taken into account4 ,therefore there is 
brought into activity a large amount of 
rational consideration and judgment as  
to the eventualities of conduct in      
regard to the 'total self'2 and finally 
it is found that action must take one of
 two forms3 either the environment must 
be adjusted to the organism--this is a  
form of ,will--or the organism must be  
adjusted to the environment--this is    
,free ,will or self-rule--i4e41 the     
,free ,will as here understood4 ,this is
 the solution implied in the writer's   
statement that from the moment that self
 became an object of consciousness it   
became also a motive4  ,this rational   

view of self as an aggregate of         
faculties and motives likely to last a  
certain length of time1 and surrounded  
by a social environment which has in    
great measure formed it1 and which      
exercises upon it a continual pressure1 
brings forward the relation of ,free    
,will to ,ethics in the fact that the   
acquired power of self-rule has to take 
into account1 in-so-far as it exists in 
the individuals forming the social      
coercions and approvals1 and in so far  
as the ,ego approaches the normal       
standard of regulating his own          
sympathies1 which together in an        
instructed community make up personal   
responsibility to the ethical law1 and  
supply the ethical as distinguished from
 the merely altruistic motive4  ,the    
evolutionist's definition of life is the
 continuous adjustment of inner to outer
 relation1 or of organism to            
environment4 ,the principles and results
 of this continuous adjustment1 in the  
modifications of structure and function1

 and their transmission by heredity in  
gradually more permanently established  
forms1 is well understood from the      
writings of ,mr4 ,darwin1 ,mr4 ,spencer1
 and others4  ,the progress of          
development in the human race has       
consisted in the establishment of       
correspondences of a definite and       
permanent character between organism and
 environment4 ,why it should have been  
possible for such a grand development to
 take place as that which has actually  
taken place lies beyond the limits of   
our subject2 but if ,evolution is true1 
the fact remains that the human organism
 has continually been increasing the    
number of its correspondences1 in       
accordance with the increasing          
complexity of its surroundings4         
,roughly1 this establishment of         
relations with the external world may be
 classed under two divisions1 each      
containing a great variety of details4  
,firstly1 the class of cognitions1      
including the knowledge of the physical 

world1 the field1 the forest1 the       
stream1 the animals1 the sky and        
heavenly bodies1 and also the knowledge 
of men1 and their ways in society2      
secondly1 the class of direct relations 
with other individuals1 such as the     
relations of wife1 children1 parents1   
chiefs1 involving also property1 and    
inducing the feelings of love1          
friendship1 hate1 justice1 and other    
social affections4  ,the establishment  
of a correspondence between the organism
 and the environment1 of such a definite
 character as to be transmitted by      
heredity1 involves the establishment of 
motives4 ,the stomach without food      
experiences hunger1 a want1 and forms a 
motive4 ,so of the other organs1 and so 
of all other established relations      
inwoven in the organism4 ,however subtle
 and refined any established relation   
may be1 but less in proportion to its   
later order of development1 and directly
 as its necessity to existence1 so its  
force4 ,it experiences a want in respect

 of its correlate1 and this want becomes
 a motive or incentive to its own       
gratification4  ,the kinds of actions1  
then1 may be distinguished as--  ,the   
,functional1 such as the action of the  
heart1 the intestines1 c4 ,these are    
wholly involuntary4  ,the ,emotional    
,involuntary1 such as the feelings and  
desires1 and the muscular expression of 
some of them1 as in laughing1 crying1 c4
  ,the ,emotional ,volitional1 or       
actions proceeding from the emotions1   
and constraining the muscles to the     
means of their gratification4  ,here    
must be added the ,rational ,volitional2
 and if the rational choice of actions  
and ordering of conduct1 in which the   
emotions and passions play a subordinate
 part as factors in a general estimate  
or judgment1 can be interpreted as a    
recognition of self as an object1 and   
the establishment of a correspondence   
therewith1 then the motive of self as   
advanced by the essayist may be         
considered as the highest motive of the 

,emotional ,volitional class4 ,thus self
 as an enduring whole becomes           
established as the predominating object 
in the mind of the ,ego1 towards which  
object or ideal attainment in           
continuity1 and in expansiveness of     
relation the motives of the individual  
turn--co-ordinating to it all the more  
special motives2 and evolving in a      
higher degree the powers of self-rule4  
,in this manner ,self-,rule or ,free    
,will is explained and vindicated as a  
natural possession of humanity and one  
of its highest and most characteristic  
attainments4 ,at the same time it is    
found to be consistent with a           
,deterministic scheme and not to require
 the assistance of an incomprehensible  
,self-,determining ,power on the part of
 the ,ego4 ,the ,deterministic theory as
 regards the actions and conduct of an  
individual is not1 however1 so narrow in
 its purview as this4 ,it recognises a  
great many kinds of conditions as the   
more or less direct or remote causes of 

actions4 ,it recognises--  ,heredity1 by
 which the physical qualities1 and      
emotional and intellectual tendencies1  
of the parents1 more or less obscurely  
known on account of intermixture1 are   
transmitted to the offspring4 ,the child
 is born with a certain inherited       
constitution1 containing potentially    
within it a course of development       
through certain physiological changes up
 to decay and old age4 ,this            
constitution is one of a definite       
character1 having definite proportions  
of parts1 as of head1 chest1 abdomen1   
c41 and definite relations of systems1  
such as nervous1 vascular1 muscular1    
visceral1 c41 and partly as a           
consequence of this the child also      
possesses mental and moral tendencies   
which1 while very susceptible of        
influence1 are primarily derived by     
heredity4  ,action of                   
,environment4--,from the moment of      
birth1 7or sooner71 the organism comes  
into relation with very complex         

conditions1 which variously affect its  
course of development4 ,the suitable or 
unsuitable conditions of the mother's   
health1 food1 warmth1 sleep1 c41        
influence the development of the child2 
and thenceforward all through life the  
conditions of nourishment1 diet1        
climate1 exposure1 disease1 accident1   
c41 have strong and recognisable effects
 upon the organism1 physical and mental4
  ,general ,tuition1 or the education by
 contact with the members of the family1
 playmates1 companions1 and the great   
body of the individuals of the          
environment with whom the child or youth
 comes into contact1 into the general   
tone and principles of his age1 country1
 class1 or sect1 gradually fashioning   
him into a certain pattern1 shaping the 
general mode of his life1 and forming   
within him certain standards of action1 
certain codes of obligation1 moral or   
ceremonial1 certain customs1 fashions1  
c41 as well as implanting in him the    
convictions1 theological or otherwise1  

of his time4  ,special                  
,tuition4--,tuition affects the whole of
 the activities of the individual       
according to the nature of the training1
 its suitability or unsuitability1 its  
persistence1 and the force exerted4 ,the
 value of a long course of direct       
education is well understood in all     
civilised communities1 and in modern    
times is recognised as one of the great 
means of effecting the general          
improvement of society1 if only it could
 be thoroughly applied4  ,the ,education
 of ,circumstances affects not only the 
physical constitution1 but also very    
much the mental and moral qualities of  
the individual4 ,and as these           
circumstances are widely varied and the 
hereditary tendencies very different1   
the results will be widely diverse in   
different individuals2 but there is no  
doubt that a condition of poverty or of 
affluence1 good or ill usage1 neglect or
 over-governing1 a solitary or a social 
condition1 surroundings of town or      

country1 status of parents1 nature of   
and facilities for amusements and       
studies1 the degree of early            
responsibilities1 the kind of business  
occupation or other avocation1 all      
largely affect the conduct and modify   
the motives of the individual4  ,and it 
is wonderful in a highly developed and  
complex state of society1 where the     
possession of great wealth creates a    
large leisure class1 and the enormous   
activity pervading the whole ever tends 
to put the organisms included into every
 possible relation with the outer world1
 and with every relation that can grow  
up in its own complex social mixture--it
 is wonderful1 we say1 in such          
circumstances1 the number of motives    
that will grow up4 ,the relations extend
 to the past and the future4 ,the most  
paltry1 evanescent1 and adventitious    
relations become more or less motives of
 action1 and grow more or less          
established in the individual and more  
or less transmitted to posterity4       

,besides the great number of these      
relationships1 there is the difference  
of kind4 ,many are of a concrete sort2  
as for instance1 the love of dogs1      
horses1 c42 others are of a very        
abstract description4 ,these latter are 
principally the outcome of social and   
intellectual relationships4 ,they are   
generalisations of conduct1 or they are 
abstractions of the intellect4 ,virtue1 
ideal conduct1 justice1 beauty1 truth1  
science1 philosophy1 a perfected        
humanity1 all become realised           
abstractions1 as it were1 with which a  
relation is established1 and which1     
therefore1 assume the guise of motives  
seeking their means of gratification4   
,we recognize the fact that abstractions
 may become objects of motives1 as      
distinct from the concrete objects which
 are definitely in relation with        
corresponding affections of the         
organism4 ,these abstractions grow into 
definite parts of self1 and1 if they    
largely predominate in an individual1 he

 will become a martyr rather than       
abandon his devotion to them4 ,he will  
esteem them the principal part of self1 
and let his body perish rather than act 
against them4 ,such organic abstractions
 may1 indeed1 become the objects of the 
most powerful passions1 before which    
concrete objects sink into utter        
insignificance4 ,we have found that the 
recognition of the continuous or total  
self can become such an object and      
induce the establishment of a           
corresponding motive4  ,at the outset1  
we distinguish the province of ,reason1 
in which is included the calculation of 
the results of actions1 and the devising
 of the best means for accomplishing a  
desired end without incurring pains and 
inconveniences4 ,if a certain end is    
desired1 the intellect has to forecast  
the outcome of different modes for      
effecting the desired result1 and to    
discern that which secures the end with 
the fewest drawbacks4 ,the end may be   
good or bad2 the motives may be of the  

most elevated and generous character or 
they may be of the worst2 but all the   
same1 it must be duly considered what is
 the best means of securing it4 ,what   
would be the result if ,i did this8 on  
the other hand1 would it not be better  
to do that8 ,it will be seen that here  
there is no choice between motives1 no  
dispute to settle between conflicting   
principles and passions1 but only a kind
 of mental calculus or intellectual     
engineering4 ,this state of the mind is 
sometimes taken to be the exercise of a 
choice1 and it may be so2 but it is of a
 different kind to that involved in     
self-rule1 which we now approach4  ,as a
 power of very gradual growth must we   
regard that cognition1 7with its        
subsequent establishment as an object   
and a motive in the human organism7     
which recognises the ,self as a         
whole--as a whole at any given time1 and
 as a whole extending over seventy      
years1 and perhaps indefinitely longer6 
,man's total self can become an object  

of thought and that object a motive1 as 
distinguished from any of the particular
 motives of which it is made up4 ,man's 
future self may be an object of thought 
as well as the present2 and man's       
,continuous ,self may become a constant 
and all-predominating object of regard  
and interest--an all-absorbing motive4  
,indeed1 so far may this go1 that the   
long continuous self prospected after   
death may and has been so much an object
 of motive as to overshadow and dwarf   
every interest of the present4 ,and if  
this ,continuous ,self is recognised by 
the ,reason as the complete object1 the 
one and chief motive--and it must be so 
since it includes every motive at every 
instant of time--then the ,reason       
accords to it and claims for it a ruling
 position1 a claim before which every   
other must give way4 ,there is no doubt 
that this is substantially taught1      
although in different terms of          
exposition1 in all ethical books and in 
all verbal precepts of good counsel4    

,the psychogeny of this development of  
the continuous self into an object and a
 motive is to be found in the           
intellectual recognition of the actual  
order displayed by nature in the        
processes of life4 ,it is the           
harmonising of the volitional actions   
with the laws of natural change4 ,we    
have seen that the process of life is   
the continuous adaptation of organism to
 environment4 ,but this is a natural1   
non-volitional process4 ,change in the  
environment produces change of organism 
to correspond with it4 ,when cognitions 
are developed the sequences of action   
are foreseen1 the changes of environment
 are foreseen1 the developments of      
organism are foreseen2 a generalisation 
is made of all the factors1 and logical 
conclusions drawn as to the necessary   
adaptations4 ,then follows a rational or
 intentional adaptation of organism and 
environment1 due to the motive of ,self 
which we have just considered2 this     
rational or intentional adaptation may  

be either incidental or continuous1 and 
the adaptation may be either of organism
 or of environment4 ,and in this        
calculus the relation of the individual 
to the mass of individuals constituting 
society must be taken into account4  ,a 
man having regard to his continuous self
 finds himself in a certain position4   
,the motive relating to the continuous  
self determines that his conduct shall  
be regulated by the best regard for that
 continuous self4 ,and it must be       
admitted at once that technically it is 
not qualitatively related to any        
abstraction1 such as virtue1 c41 unless1
 indeed1 virtue be interpreted as the   
establishment of such a harmony1 but has
 regard purely to the establishment of  
the most harmonious correspondence      
between himself and his environment for 
the remainder of his life4 ,it might be 
that such a resolve would result in a   
system of ethics1 but we wish to limit  
the consideration to our special        
subject4  ,and1 in the first place1 we  

must recognise the quantitative         
character of such an adaptation4 ,the   
self is surrounded by an enormous and   
highly complex environment2 but it may1 
from heredity1 or want of education1 or 
perverse education1 be a very narrow1   
poor1 meagre1 little self1 having very  
few1 weak1 feeble correspondences with  
the environment4 ,a pig in his stye may 
be well adjusted to his environment2 but
 his correspondences with the external  
world are few in number and of small    
intensity4 ,we would therefore assert   
with ,mr4 ,spencer as a corollary from  
the continuous adjustment of the        
organism and the environment1 not merely
 the establishment of a convenient modus
 vivendi1 but an adjustment of the      
organism by enlargement of the number of
 its correspondences with the           
environment1 so as to render the        
adjustment between organism and         
environment more perfect by making the  
former co-extensive with the latter4 ,in
 proportion to the number of points of  

interest or correspondences established 
between organism and environment1 so is 
the perfection of the continuous self4  
,in this manner then ,free ,will or     
,self-,rule in its very nature is       
related to the conception of a          
continuous self towards which it acts as
 the object of a motive1 and possesses  
also an ethical bearing with regard to  
the enlargement of the correspondences  
with the external world4 ,for what is   
there of greater interest in the        
external world than the subjective      
individuals of our surroundings1 the    
society of which we form a part1 the    
mysterious past out of which we came and
 the dependent nations of the future    
which we are helping to make8  ,it is   
evident that in thus setting up the     
continuous self as an object1 whose     
realisation is to be the ruling power in
 the regulation of conduct1 7whether    
this self be the complete self we have  
just contemplated1 or the incomplete    
self which we may happen to be1 and to  

be pretty well contented with17 a       
certain amount of self-regulation will  
always be necessary in order to effect  
the object in view1 and at occasional   
crises a very great amount of struggle  
and effort will have to be exerted in   
order to put down the influence of some 
active motive which would1 by its hasty 
and blind gratification1 mar the result 
of that line of conduct already decided 
upon as the best4 ,here will come in the
 conflict of passion with reason1 and of
 impulse with prudence1 which is really 
of the greatest practical interest in   
our study4  ,and here we find1 as one of
 the chief motives in such a conflict1  
the motive of regard for the continuous 
self4 ,it is not always a ruling motive4
 ,it is best that it should be so4 ,the 
object of education and self-culture is 
to make it so4 ,but at any rate it is a 
motive1 and a strong one4 ,in proportion
 to its predominance is the amount of   
self-rule1 of self-control1 and1 as we  
read it1 of ,free ,will4  ,thus the     

rational regard for self becomes        
recognised as a motive4 ,the ,rational  
,volitional becomes the ,emotional      
,volitional4 ,it has been recognised in 
many philosophies under various names1  
advanced sometimes as a motive1         
sometimes as the very self of self1 and 
sometimes designated by the term        
self-determining power1 c42 but its true
 character and genesis is best explained
 by ,evolution4  ,the great practical   
question is this3 ,has man the power of 
choice amongst motives8 ,has he the     
vaunted power of self-rule8 and can he  
cultivate it8  ,we can only reply that1 
as a matter of fact1 some men have it   
and some have not2 that some have in    
some respects and not in others4 ,as a  
matter of possibility1 most men may     
attain in a considerable degree to the  
power of self-rule by judicious         
self-culture3 and in the education of   
the young1 more particularly in home    
education1 a very high standard in this 
respect may be attained4 ,some feeble   

minds and flighty or impassioned        
natures1 as well as idiots1 may not be  
able to reach it1 and some fools may    
lose it after they have got it2 but as a
 general rule and a safe fact for all to
 accept1 we may say that a high degree  
of self-rule may by most people be      
attained1 and that the possession of it 
is for the most part happiness4         
,adopting1 then1 the statement of the   
essayist1 from the moment that self     
became an object of consciousness it    
became also a motive1 we would add the  
element of time and recognise a         
continuous self4 ,then1 placing the     
statement in a subordinate position1 as 
part of the general evolution of        
life--which is the continuous adjustment
 of organism and environment--and       
acknowledging the growth of reason1 we  
would define the course of action which 
results from all these factors as the   
rational quantitative and continuous    
adjustment of organism and environment4 
,this is the ,evolutionist formula of   

,free ,will or self-rule4  ,thus the    
consciousness of choice and of the power
 of self-rule receives an explanation on
 the ,evolution of ,deterministic       
hypothesis in this respect1 that the    
recognition of the continuous self as an
 object of thought and an important     
object of interest and regard1 becomes  
thereby a motive determining action and 
conduct1 even against the immediate     
urgencies of passion4 ,determinism is   
thus acknowledged to be a correct       
theory3 but the dignity of the claim for
 self-rule and free choice is           
vindicated1 and the attainment of it by 
most people is shown to be both         
desirable and feasible4     ,,chapter   
,,viii4  ,,evolution1 ,,ethics1 ,,and   
,,religion4   ,the recognition of the   
ultimate tendencies of evolution        
suggests two further enquiries1 one as  
to the personal relation with the       
far-off result1 and one as to the origin
 of such a definite progress4  ,perhaps 
the consideration of the former question

 is bound up in the latter4             
,nevertheless1 within the scope of the  
former more limited enquiry1 the        
,comtists are content to rest4 ,for them
 the narrow limits of history and its   
immediate outlook are sufficient4 ,what 
is actually recorded of humanity1 and   
what is actually revealed in it1        
together with the indications of its    
possibilities1 suffice for the creed of 
the ,comtist4 ,the ,positivist produced 
by ,evolution worships his ,cause under 
the name of humanity1 and works towards 
,mr4 ,spencer's evolutionist ideal4 ,he 
seeks no justification in philosophy4   
,the product of ,evolution--he acts from
 inward impulse and requires no         
authority4 ,he has none to appeal to in 
the inculcation of his worship1 but the 
natural response to be found in the     
hearts of those who occupy the same     
intellectual and sympathetic position4  
,but this is after all only a partial   
grasp of the fundamental problem of     
history4 ,it is an abandonment1         

temporary or otherwise1 of the          
intellectual problem1 although it is a  
recognition of the onward sweep of      
humanitarian ,evolution4 ,the history   
and the tendencies are alike sought to  
be explained by the philosophy of the   
,evolutionist4 ,what1 then1 is the      
position of the ,evolutionist in regard 
to the problem of religion1 and what    
practical bearing has it upon ,ethics or
 moral obligation8  ,the answer to these
 questions depends upon what is meant by
 the theory of ,evolution4 ,if by       
,evolution is meant a complete system of
 explanations by which all the events   
comprised in all departments of human   
knowledge1 stretching throughout the    
whole of history recorded and surmised1 
are intelligibly accounted for as the   
results of the interrelation of         
primordial factors1 of which we have a  
clear apprehension1 insomuch that the   
logical order becomes a picture of the  
historical order1 then our estimate of  
,evolution depends upon our estimate of 

the original factors4 ,if they are held 
to be some seventy in number1 and to be 
those elements of which a full account  
is given in chemistry1 and to be subject
 to general laws1 such as those         
described in works on physics1 then our 
regard for ,evolution must be one due to
 the reverence we possess for chemistry1
 electricity1 heat1 gravitation1 and the
 like1 and our conduct must be made to  
conform--if we wish to coincide with the
 eventual tendencies of evolution--with 
what we judge to be the ultimate        
tendencies of the evolution of these    
factors1 namely1 their ultimate         
equilibration in universal quiescence4  
,life1 according to this view1 is an    
interruption of the process1 and a      
contradiction of cosmical intention4    
,this view of evolution is not saved by 
the theory that behind these chemical   
affinities and physical relations there 
is an unknowable power of which they are
 but the manifestations3 for the power  
is not unknowable if its manifestations 

are limited to these known              
manifestations2 and if they are not so  
limited1 but operate in other ways with 
new factors1 not comprised in our       
estimate of them1 then our explanatory  
system is at fault1 and has to be       
abandoned or amended4 ,the recognition  
of an unknowable power behind chemistry 
and physics1 yet limited by the laws of 
chemistry and physics1 is equal only to 
our estimate of chemistry and physics4  
,we could but address it as ,oh my ,lord
 ,chemistry6 ,oh my ,lord ,physics6     
,but we have shown in our previous      
criticisms that this view of evolution1 
as dealing with purely physical factors1
 is inadequate to explain the cosmical  
histories4 ,we have criticised adversely
 ,mr4 ,spencer's attempts so to explain 
biological development2 and we have     
indicated the necessity for supposing   
that other superior factors are present 
in biological evolution4 ,we do not know
 that ,mr4 ,spencer disputes it--his    
work is too vague and inconsistent to   

enable us to say precisely what he does 
and what he does not teach4 ,but the    
admission of additional factors does not
 destroy the theory of evolution4       
,darwin and ,spencer and the modern     
school have established1 beyond dispute1
 the fact of orderly development in the 
cosmos4 ,we are forced1 therefore1 to   
admit both evolution and the presence in
 it1 so far as ,biology is concerned1   
and probably also as regards all the    
changes anterior to the beginnings of   
life1 of a factor over and above the    
chemical and physical factors4 ,the     
nature of this factor we do not know1   
nor do we know how1 as having an orderly
 relation to chemical and physical      
events1 its law is to be expressed in   
such a manner as to enable us to        
understand how organisms arose and were 
developed4 ,here1 indeed1 we can        
recognise a power1 and an inscrutable   
one3 but inasmuch as it is inscrutable  
it spoils our philosophy--our systems of
 explanations--and laughs at our        

formulas4  ,but after all1 if we succeed
 in establishing purposive actions as   
incidents in a process of equilibration1
 what have we gained8 ,we have gained a 
scientific explanation of all purposive 
actions as well as of all actions of    
organisms in general4 ,they all stand   
upon the same footing--that is to say   
they are all equally explicable as parts
 of the universal process4 ,they are all
 equally equilibrations1 and so         
justified in their order of occurrence4 
,they rank alike as incidents in a line 
of causation explicable by the law of   
equilibration4  ,apparently all that is1
 is right4 ,equilibration does not      
recognise any distinction as to the     
quality of actions4 ,this distinction   
can be explained by equilibration1 but  
cannot be justified by it as a law for  
future conduct1 any more than any other 
incident of the course of equilibration4
 ,if certain laws of living become      
established1 then moving equilibria     
capable of recognising this fact must   

act accordingly--they must adapt        
themselves to the environment3 but this 
does not prevent the organism from      
adapting the environment to itself1 if  
it can1 by changing it or overcoming    
it--this is merely a matter of          
equilibration4 ,the law of ,biology will
 allow it to cope with an adverse       
environment in many ways1 namely1 by    
conformity1 by escape so as to preserve 
its individuality1 and by altering or   
overcoming the environment4 ,if the     
forces of the environment be powerful   
and omnipresent1 then conformity is the 
only resource4 ,it is only a matter of  
superiority of force1 and the resulting 
conformity is merely a matter of        
equilibration4 ,it is not that          
equilibration lends any special sanctity
 or quality to certain actions4 ,social 
pressure coerces individual             
pressure--the mutual coercion of society
 is equilibration--the result of this   
equilibration1 whatever it is1 is a     
variable ,ethics4 ,the recognition of   

great duties and great faults1 the facts
 of moral approbation and condemnation1 
the phenomena of a private and public   
conscience are all explicable as        
equilibrations3 but since whatever is1  
is an equilibration1 it is not from the 
laws of equilibration that any          
established moral distinction or        
obligation can be justified for guidance
 for a single day in advance4 ,there is 
no universality1 either in place or time
 in ,ethics thus viewed4 ,the           
justification of ,ethics from the       
evolution point of view must be sought  
on other grounds than in that of a      
cosmical equilibration4  ,it is         
difficult to say what support is        
rendered to practical ,ethics by the    
theory of ,evolution4 ,according to it1 
,ethics is a history and a prediction2  
but failing the existence in any        
individual 7as the result of a growth7  
of the moral sense for which ,evolution 
professes to account1 the prediction    
only applies to future generations2 and 

it is difficult to see that practical   
,ethics has for such a person any       
intrinsic authority4 ,and even if the   
moral sense1 and social pressure 7which 
are respectively the intrinsic and the  
extrinsic authority1 for practical      
,ethics7 are sufficient of themselves to
 enforce moral conduct1 then the        
understanding of how they both came to  
possess such a power of command1 lends  
them no additional authority1 but rather
 tends1 at first sight1 to detract from 
their sacred prestige4 ,the confidence  
of the philosopher is however soon      
restored1 when he considers that despite
 the failure of his theory to           
intellectually establish moral          
enforcements1 nevertheless1 the great   
forces which have produced both the     
intrinsic and the extrinsic ethical     
authorities are still at work1 and must 
more and more prevail4 ,if these are    
natural growths the movement in the     
hearts of men1 and in societarian       
organization1 will ever prevail over and

 above all reasoning about them4        
,individual opposition and restiveness  
will be levelled before the might of the
 advance4 ,the individual must obey or  
perish2 indeed he must himself change   
and become part of the coercive power4  
,thus it will be found that the         
apprehension which ,mr4 ,spencer        
expresses in his preface1 as to the loss
 of a controlling agency in the decay   
and death of an older regulative system 
is not met by the establishment of a new
 controlling agency which takes the     
place of the discarded authority1 but   
may be met by the fact disclosed in     
evolution1 that whatever authority men  
may recognise1 nay1 even if they do not 
recognise any1 it is all the same--they 
are part and parcel of an onward growth 
against which it is useless to rebel4   
,the moral authority is the conviction  
of the inevitable4 ,thus evolution      
dispels the fear of a moral anarchy by  
showing the necessity for the existence 
of present and future moral order1      

ensured alike by extrinsic social       
organization1 and by a no less certain  
prevalence of intrinsic motives4 ,thus1 
though evolution lends but little       
additional theoretical force to moral   
argument1 it shows forth the power of   
natural ethical authority1 and declares 
with convincing efficacy1 magna est     
veritas et prvalebit4  ,the moral       
imperative is found to be firstly       
extrinsic in social pressure1 and       
secondly intrinsic in altruistic        
sympathy4 ,these are the only           
authorities competent to say3 ,thus     
shalt thou do1 and thus shalt thou not  
do4 ,evolution establishes no absolute  
morality4 ,it is always relative to the 
surroundings1 and it differs according  
to the stage of civilization4 ,the more 
nearly the conduct approaches the       
relatively perfect the more truly ideal 
is it4 ,the imagined ideal is not so    
perfect as the relatively perfect4      
,according as a necessity is universal1 
so is the degree of moral enforcement   

which accompanies it1 and the degree of 
accord in the recognition of its        
imperativeness4 ,the sanctity of life1  
the condemnation of these who infringe  
it1 the commendation of those who       
promote it are of first eminence4       
,liberty1 ,property1 and other          
essentials receive little less          
recognition2 and so on by degrees down  
to the small details of everyday life4  
,the kind of moral imperative is the    
same throughout1 the degree of          
enforcement differing according to the  
varying importance of the actions4  ,as 
this point very properly comes in the   
,evolutionist's view of religion4 ,we   
take1 as our text on this subject1 the  
speech by ,professor ,fiske at the      
,spencer banquet held in ,new ,york1    
,november #ith1 #ahhb1 and since        
published in the form of a tractette4#ae
  ,professor ,fiske here pursues ,mr4   
,spencer's faulty plan of generalising  
all religions1 and assuming the common  
or fundamental content as a true        

finding1 besides holding that the       
fundamental truths of science are       
identical with this final deliverance of
 religion4 ,it is not that ,professor   
,fiske's argument is bad1 but that it is
 badly put4 ,if we confine ourselves to 
the scientific view1 and say that the   
universe manifests an orderly           
development2 that it is probably        
altogether the result of the relations  
of primordial factors2 but that of these
 we can form no adequate conception     
although1 nevertheless1 they undoubtedly
 contained something of the elements of 
a subjective nature--then we do not     
transgress the scientific view4 ,neither
 do we so transgress when1 by inductions
 from the history of man1 we assert that
 the law of development of the          
subjective is towards altruistic        
sympathy1 quantitative increase of life1
 and social harmony or equilibration4   
,mr4 ,matthew ,arnold's recognition of  
an eternal power1 not ourselves1 that   
makes for righteousness is as near an   

approach to the truth as we can get4    
,mr4 ,spencer's formula should be an    
unknowable power1 not ourselves1 that   
makes towards equilibrium4 ,the         
question1 thereupon arises1 ,is the     
subjective a factor in a process of     
equilibration1 and is righteousness     
subjective equilibration8 ,the question 
also arises in the latter case1 ,is the 
makes for or makes towards a            
teleological aiming at an end1 or a     
process determined completely by        
antecedent factors of which it is but   
the outcome8  ,it is difficult to       
imagine under a system of evolution1    
even if an universal subjective factor  
be admitted1 the operation of a         
teleological activity as ordinarily     
understood4 ,nevertheless1 we find a    
teleological faculty evolved in man4    
,and even if we accept ,mr4 ,matthew    
,arnold's description1 the question     
arises1 ,has the eternal power a        
conscious intention of making towards   
righteousness from the first or from any

 time8 ,or is it implicit in the        
original relations of the subjective to 
the chemical and physical that it makes 
through ,biology towards                
righteousness--is righteousness merely  
another expression for a completed      
biological law involved in the original 
relations of atoms with an omnipresent  
subjective and relative factor8  ,and   
again1 what1 scientifically viewed1 is  
our personal relation to that           
inscrutable power which makes for       
righteousness8 ,here comes in the       
ethical problem as affected by the      
religious1 and both as affected by our  
views of evolution4 ,professor ,fiske   
says of the propositions recognised by  
all religions that men ought to do      
certain things and ought to refrain from
 doing certain other things2 and that   
the reason why some things are wrong to 
do and other things are right to do1 is 
in some mysterious but very real way    
connected with the existence and nature 
of this divine ,power4  ,the fact that  

personal responsibility to the          
inscrutable ,power belongs to the       
essence of all religions is one thing1  
and the establishment of it as a        
scientific truth is another4 ,the fact  
of its existence and of its universality
 is a presumption in its favour1 but is 
not more than a presumption4 ,what has  
science to say to it8 ,with this point  
,professor ,fiske next deals4 ,he says  
that science1 after all its searchings1 
finds1 in its ultimate enquiries1 not   
only inexplicable laws whose effects it 
can calculate though the laws themselves
 remain unexplained1 but also long      
processes which are not explicable by   
the known laws1 and which will probably 
remain for ever inexplicable4 ,if he    
does not say so in those words1 we      
presume that must be what he means3 for 
if he only means that all cosmical      
histories are explicable by known laws1 
these laws being themselves             
inexplicable1 the inscrutable or ,divine
 ,power is only antecedent to cosmical  

histories1 and is not present in them1  
nor does it affect the future4          
,nevertheless1 what ,professor ,fiske   
has to say of the results of scientific 
enquiry does not amount to much4 ,the   
doctrine of evolution asserts1 as the   
widest and deepest truth which the study
 of nature can disclose to us1 that     
there exists a power to which no limit  
in time or space is conceivable1 and    
that all the phenomena of the universe1 
whether they be what we call material or
 what we call spiritual phenomena1 are  
manifestations of this infinite and     
eternal ,power4  ,but this scientific   
truth does not in its mere enunciation  
bear upon the question as to our ethical
 relationship to the ,unknown ,power4   
,it is only when we study its spiritual 
or subjective manifestation as an       
orderly development that we can         
recognise a power to which we owe a     
moral obligation4 ,the scientific       
evidence of moral obligation to the     
inscrutable power rests1 not upon the   

recognition of the power of which the   
cosmos is a manifestation1 nor upon the 
fact of its inscrutability1 but upon the
 knowledge of the subjective factor1 its
 manifested history1 and the inductions 
to be drawn from a study of that history
 in the laws of the working of          
altruistic sympathy1 of quantitative    
life1 and of the harmony of life as     
already set forth4 ,professor ,fiske's  
conclusion is a good statement of this  
scientific establishment of personal    
responsibility to the divine power1 and 
of religion as the crown and sanction of
 ,ethics4  ,now1 science began to return
 a decisively affirmative answer to such
 questions as these when it began1 with 
,mr4 ,spencer1 to explain moral beliefs 
and moral sentiments as products of     
evolution4 ,for clearly1 when you say of
 a moral belief or a moral sentiment    
that it is a product of evolution1 you  
imply that it is something which the    
universe through untold ages has been   
labouring to bring forth1 and you       

ascribe to it a value proportionate to  
the enormous effort that it has cost to 
produce it4 ,still more1 when with ,mr4 
,spencer we study the principles of     
right living as part and parcel of the  
whole doctrine of the development of    
life upon the earth2 when we see that1  
in an ultimate analysis1 that is right  
which tends to enhance fulness of life1 
and that is wrong which tends to detract
 from fulness of life--we then see that 
the distinction between right and wrong 
is rooted in the deepest foundations of 
the universe2 we see that the very same 
forces1 subtle1 exquisite1 and profound1
 which brought upon the scene the primal
 germs of life and caused them to       
unfold1 which through countless ages of 
struggle and death have cherished the   
life that could live more perfectly1 and
 destroyed the life that could only live
 less perfectly1 and humanity1 with all 
its hopes1 and fears1 and aspirations1  
has come into being as the crown of all 
this stupendous work--we see that these 

very same subtle and exquisite forces   
have wrought into the very fibres of the
 universe those principles of right     
living which it is man's highest        
function to put into practice4 ,the     
theoretical sanction thus given to right
 living is incomparably the most        
powerful that has ever been assigned in 
any philosophy of ,ethics4 ,human       
responsibility is made more strict and  
solemn than ever1 when the eternal power
 that lives in every event of the       
universe is thus seen to be in the      
deepest possible sense the author of the
 moral law that should guide our lives1 
and in obedience to which lies our only 
guarantee of the happiness which is     
incorruptible--which neither inevitable 
misfortune nor unmerited obloquy can    
ever take away4  ,this appears to us the
 best statement yet made of the logical 
results of the enquiry into ,evolution  
when pursued to its furthest point4     
,some enquirers halt at the             
materialistic point1 but an irresistible

 logic leads the honest and open-minded 
enquirer beyond this stage of thought1  
and he finds in the recognition of the  
existence of the subjective1 and in the 
history of its development1 a law of    
spiritual life4 ,he finds a law of      
relation in subjective individuals which
 induces the establishment of a         
quantitative life in the increase of the
 number of correspondences with the     
external world both in ,time and ,space1
 and1 which induces also the            
establishment of altruistic feeling--a  
feeling that expands to a greater or    
less comprehension of the great life of 
the subjective throughout the cosmical  
history2 and in this recognition he     
finds also a sense of personal          
responsibility towards a ,power which   
demands from him a surrender1 so that he
 shall work towards its great ideal1 and
 find his happiness therein4 ,what more 
there may be in natural religion is     
beyond the scope of our present volume1 
though we hope at same future time to   

treat of this important subject4 ,our   
present view is limited to the          
consideration of ,ethics1 and how that  
science is affected by the recent large 
generalisations of ,biological history4 
,certain definite conclusions of a      
religious character have come forward as
 the result of our studies1 and since   
these have an ethical import1 it is     
necessary to refer to them in this      
place4  ,nevertheless the study of      
,evolution assists ,ethics1 although it 
can bring no argument to bear upon those
 who possess little moral aspiration1   
and can add nothing to the forcefulness 
of social pressure4 ,its point d'appui  
is in the existence in most men of the  
moral aspirations4 ,through them it will
 work upon individuals of their         
environment1 and upon the teachers and  
legislators who form and guide society4 
,to them is disclosed the fact that     
their aspirations coincide with the     
tendencies of nature4 ,they find that   
they are going with the stream1 are in  

fact part of the historic stream itself4
 ,they recognise in society three       
movements4 ,the first is the growth of  
altruism or sympathy4 ,the second is the
 enlargement of quantititive life4 ,the 
third is the approach towards a harmony 
or equilibration of life4 ,the          
recognition of these truths imparts a   
deeper faith in moral progress1 and     
gives a greater breadth of view1 and a  
more intelligent and charitable         
interpretation of human action4         
,philosophers1 teachers1 and statesmen1 
understanding the movements of society  
from age to age1 and discerning the goal
 to which it inevitably works1 can read 
more intelligently its primary phases1  
and assist more skilfully in its onward 
movement4 ,the more extended recognition
 of the social aim throughout society   
will guide and increase social pressure 
in a corresponding direction1 not only  
in the proper application of social     
rewards and penalties1 but in the       
ethical inculcations1 and eventually in 

the hereditarily established intrinsic  
motives4  ,nor will prophets1 the ripest
 fruit of evolution1 be wanting in the  
future4 ,ages produce not only the      
working results but the religious       
voices4 ,there are always men who give  
utterance to the thought and to the     
aspirations of their time4 ,standing in 
the fore-front of the advancing race1   
they face the mysterious darkness of the
 future illumined but by the lights     
drawn from the ,power working through   
the subjective history4  ,,footnote3    
#ae ,evolution and ,religion1 by ,john  
,fiske1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,b4 ,london3 ,j4   
,c4 ,foulger1 ,the ,modern ,press1      
#ahhb4 ,price ,twopence4     ,,chapter  
,,ix4  ,,summary4   ,whether we consider
 ,biology as a process of equilibration 
of physical factors in a state of moving
 equilibrium1 7including in this formula
 the process of reproduction and        
heredity to which biologically speaking 
the life of a species is limited--which 
equilibration explanation includes an   

equilibration of forces1 as well as an  
equilibration of motives1 respecting    
which our conceptions are as yet very   
indefinite and vague17 or on the other  
hand consider that the facts of ,biology
 require us to include in our           
explanatory moving equilibrium theory an
 equilibration of subjective factors    
with each other1 and with the physical  
forces concerned1 it is clear in either 
case that the dominant law of ,biology  
as set forth by ,mr4 ,spencer is that of
 ,equilibration4  ,the place to be      
assigned to ,purpose in a process of    
equilibration is not very clear4 ,in the
 first place1 if the biological         
explanations are all strictly limited to
 the chemical and physical factors1 it  
seems evident that there can be no      
purposive actions1 since all actions are
 determined by the chemical and         
mechanical relations of molecules1      
masses of molecules1 and organised      
masses of molecules4 ,to say that what  
we call purposive actions are explicable

 by physical and mechanical laws is to  
abolish purpose and substitute physical 
causation4 ,can purpose by any means be 
made lineable in such a sequence8 ,the  
problem is a fair one to consider and to
 attempt4 ,we fail to do it1 and we     
think that all who have attempted it    
have failed4  ,but if a subjective      
factor is admitted into the problem1    
then it is necessary to understand in   
what way it becomes part of1 and in what
 way it affects1 a process of           
equilibration on the part of a moving   
equilibrium in which it is a factor4    
,the peculiar nature of a biological    
moving equilibrium1 and the respect in  
which it differs from a physical or     
mechanical moving equilibrium1 consists 
in the fact that it works towards1 if   
indeed it does not purposely aim at     
self-continuance by assimilation of     
force and self-continuance by means of  
self-protection from adverse forces in  
the environment4 ,the coincidence of the
 subjective element with this tendency1 

in many equilibria1 is suggestive of an 
efficient connexion4 ,yet if we do not  
understand the law of the relation of a 
subjective factor with the physical and 
mechanical factors1 how can we          
understand the resultant process of     
equilibration and the necessity for the 
biological law of adaptations for       
self-preservation and self-protection8  
,how can we understand ,purpose as an   
equilibration8  ,ethics to be affiliated
 upon the cosmical process requires that
 we should understand how purposive     
actions can be so affiliated1 for       
,ethics relates to purposive actions4   
,in the failure of such a logical       
connexion1 we may understand ,ethics on 
partial and limited grounds1 but we do  
not understand it as ,mr4 ,spencer      
proposes we should understand it1       
namely1 as part of the cosmical process4
  ,according to ,mr4 ,spencer1 we are   
bound to accept ,ethics as part of the  
process of cosmical equilibration for   
this is after all the main conception of

 ,mr4 ,spencer's great work4 ,the       
apparent and ostensible conception1 and 
that with which he has most succeeded in
 impressing the public mind1 is the     
principle of evolution or gradual       
development2 but we must not lose sight 
of the fact that what he proposed to    
accomplish was an explanation of        
evolution1 and not merely the           
establishment of its historical verity4 
,this explanation is in terms of        
equilibration4 ,that conception lies    
behind and above the celebrated ,formula
 of ,evolution1 and by means of it the  
fanciful law of the moving equilibrium  
is posited as the ruling principle of   
biological change and development1 as   
well as of physical changes proper4 ,the
 biological law1 or law of the moving   
equilibrium1 rules supreme over all     
actions and developments of organisms3  
and even if an additional factor of     
subjectivity is present as one of the   
forces which equilibrate in a moving    
equilibrium1 it is1 nevertheless1       

subject to the laws of equilibration4   
,it is not yet made clear how the law of
 equilibration1 which necessitates that 
all forces should come to a state of    
rest in as speedy a time as possible1   
can be changed into a biological law    
working in the antagonistic direction of
 the self-preservation of a set of      
motions1 and their self-protection      
against a possible cessation or         
extinction1 with the addition of means  
of reproduction in view of an eventual  
cessation or extinction4 ,but it is     
these biological actions1 some of them  
purposive1 and some of them perhaps not 
consciously purposive1 which have to be 
properly shown as part of the cosmical  
process of equilibration1 before        
purposive actions1 and therefore1 before
 ,ethics can be explained upon cosmical 
principles4     ,,errata4   ,page xiii1 
lines #a and #ac1 for actors read       
factors4  ,page ii1 line #ah1 for he    
bridges over read he is supposed to     
bridge over4  ,page #ch1 line #bg1 at   

the end1 delete in the4  ,page #dc1     
heading1 for ,the ,philosophical ,view  
read ,the ,biological ,view4  ,page #dg1
 line #bg1 for ,ethics read of ,ethics4 
,page #ea1 line #g1 for theticism read  
stheticism4  ,page #gd1 line #ad1 for   
eges read egos4  ,page #hh1 line #bh1   
for pervented read prevented4