,,considerations ,,on ,,representative  
,,government  ,by ,john ,stuart ,mill   
,author ,of ,a ,system ,of ,logic1      
,ratiocinative ,and ,inductive          
,redactor's note3 ,italics are indicated
 by underscores surrounding the         
italicized text4  ,footnotes initially  
found throughout the text have been     
numbered and placed at the end of the   
text4     ,preface   ,those who have    
done me the honor of reading my previous
 writings will probably receive no      
strong impression of novelty from the   
present volume2 for the principles are  
those to which ,i have been working up  
during the greater part of my life1 and 
most of the practical suggestions have  
been anticipated by others or by myself4
 ,there is novelty1 however1 in the fact
 of bringing them together1 and         
exhibiting them in their connection1 and
 also1 ,i believe1 in much that is      
brought forward in their support4       
,several of the opinions at all events1 
if not new1 are for the present as      

little likely to meet with general      
acceptance as if they were4  ,it seems  
to me1 however1 from various            
indications1 and from none more than the
 recent debates on ,reform of           
,parliament1 that both ,conservatives   
and ,liberals 7if ,i may continue to    
call them what they still call          
themselves7 have lost confidence in the 
political creeds which they nominally   
profess1 while neither side appears to  
have made any progress in providing     
itself with a better4 ,yet such a better
 doctrine must be possible2 not a mere  
compromise1 by splitting the difference 
between the two1 but something wider    
than either1 which1 in virtue of its    
superior comprehensiveness1 might be    
adopted by either ,liberal or           
,conservative without renouncing any    
thing which he really feels to be       
valuable in his own creed4 ,when so many
 feel obscurely the want of such a      
doctrine1 and so few even flatter       
themselves that they have attained it1  

any one may without presumption1 offer  
what his own thoughts1 and the best that
 he knows of those of others1 are able  
to contribute towards its formation4    
,,list ,,of ,,contents   ,,chap4  ,i4   
,to ,what ,extent ,forms of ,government 
,are a ,matter of ,choice4  ,,chap4     
,,ii4   ,the ,criterion of a ,good ,form
 of ,government4  ,,chap4  ,,iii4       
,that the ,ideally ,best ,form of       
,government is ,representative          
,government4  ,,chap4  ,,iv4   ,under   
,what ,social ,conditions               
,representative ,government is          
,inapplicable4  ,,chap4  ,v4   ,of the  
,proper ,functions of ,representative   
,bodies4  ,,chap4  ,,vi4   ,of the      
,infirmities and ,dangers to ,which     
,representative ,government   ,is       
,liable4  ,,chap4  ,,vii4   ,of ,true   
and ,false ,democracy2 ,representation  
of ,all1 and   ,representation of the   
,majority ,only4  ,,chap4  ,,viii4   ,of
 the ,extension of the ,suffrage4       
,,chap4  ,,ix4   ,should ,there ,be ,two

 ,stages of ,election8  ,,chap4  ,x4    
,of the ,mode of ,voting4  ,,chap4      
,,xi4   ,of the ,duration of            
,parliaments4  ,,chap4  ,,xii4   ,ought 
,pledges to ,be ,required from ,members 
of ,parliament4  ,,chap4  ,,xiii4   ,of 
a ,second ,chamber4  ,,chap4  ,,xiv4    
,of the ,executive in a ,representative 
,government4  ,,chap4  ,,xv4   ,of      
,local ,representative ,bodies4  ,,chap4
  ,,xvi4   ,of ,nationality as          
,connected with ,representative         
,government4  ,,chap4  ,,xvii4   ,of    
,federal ,representative ,governments4  
,,chap4  ,,xviii4   ,of the ,government 
of ,dependencies by a ,free ,state4     
,chapter ,i--,to ,what ,extent ,forms of
 ,government are a ,matter of ,choice4  
,all speculations concerning forms of   
government bear the impress1 more or    
less exclusive1 of two conflicting      
theories respecting political           
institutions2 or1 to speak more         
properly1 conflicting conceptions of    
what political institutions are4  ,by   

some minds1 government is conceived as  
strictly a practical art1 giving rise to
 no questions but those of means and an 
end4 ,forms of government are           
assimilated to any other expedients for 
the attainment of human objects4 ,they  
are regarded as wholly an affair of     
invention and contrivance4 ,being made  
by man1 it is assumed that man has the  
choice either to make them or not1 and  
how or on what pattern they shall be    
made4 ,government1 according to this    
conception1 is a problem1 to be worked  
like any other question of business4    
,the first step is to define the        
purposes which governments are required 
to promote4 ,the next1 is to inquire    
what form of government is best fitted  
to fulfill those purposes4 ,having      
satisfied ourselves on these two points1
 and ascertained the form of government 
which combines the greatest amount of   
good with the least of evil1 what       
further remains is to obtain the        
concurrence of our countrymen1 or those 

for whom the institutions are intended1 
in the opinion which we have privately  
arrived at4 ,to find the best form of   
government2 to persuade others that it  
is the best2 and1 having done so1 to    
stir them up to insist on having it1 is 
the order of ideas in the minds of those
 who adopt this view of political       
philosophy4 ,they look upon a           
constitution in the same light          
7difference of scale being allowed for7 
as they would upon a steam plow1 or a   
threshing machine4  ,to these stand     
opposed another kind of political       
reasoners1 who are so far from          
assimilating a form of government to a  
machine1 that they regard it as a sort  
of spontaneous product1 and the science 
of government as a branch 7so to speak7 
of natural history4 ,according to them1 
forms of government are not a matter of 
choice4 ,we must take them1 in the main1
 as we find them4 ,governments can not  
be constructed by premeditated design4  
,they are not made1 but grow4 ,our      

business with them1 as with the other   
facts of the universe1 is to acquaint   
ourselves with their natural properties1
 and adapt ourselves to them4 ,the      
fundamental political institutions of a 
people are considered by this school as 
a sort of organic growth from the nature
 and life of that people2 a product of  
their habits1 instincts1 and unconscious
 wants and desires1 scarcely at all of  
their deliberate purposes4 ,their will  
has had no part in the matter but that  
of meeting the necessities of the moment
 by the contrivances of the moment1     
which contrivances1 if in sufficient    
conformity to the national feelings and 
character1 commonly last1 and1 by       
successive aggregation1 constitute a    
polity suited to the people who possess 
it1 but which it would be vain to       
attempt to superinduce upon any people  
whose nature and circumstances had not  
spontaneously evolved it4  ,it is       
difficult to decide which of these      
doctrines would be the most absurd1 if  

we could suppose either of them held as 
an exclusive theory4 ,but the principles
 which men profess1 on any controverted 
subject1 are usually a very incomplete  
exponent of the opinions they really    
hold4 ,no one believes that every people
 is capable of working every sort of    
institution4 ,carry the analogy of      
mechanical contrivances as far as we    
will1 a man does not choose even an     
instrument of timber and iron on the    
sole ground that it is in itself the    
best4 ,he considers whether he possesses
 the other requisites which must be     
combined with it to render its          
employment advantageous1 and1 in        
particular whether those by whom it will
 have to be worked possess the knowledge
 and skill necessary for its management4
 ,on the other hand1 neither are those  
who speak of institutions as if they    
were a kind of living organisms really  
the political fatalists they give       
themselves out to be4 ,they do not      
pretend that mankind have absolutely no 

range of choice as to the government    
they will live under1 or that a         
consideration of the consequences which 
flow from different forms of polity is  
no element at all in deciding which of  
them should be preferred4 ,but1 though  
each side greatly exaggerates its own   
theory1 out of opposition to the other1 
and no one holds without modification to
 either1 the two doctrines correspond to
 a deep-seated difference between two   
modes of thought2 and though it is      
evident that neither of these is        
entirely in the right1 yet it being     
equally evident that neither is wholly  
in the wrong1 we must endeavour to get  
down to what is at the root of each1 and
 avail ourselves of the amount of truth 
which exists in either4  ,let us        
remember1 then1 in the first place1 that
 political institutions 7however the    
proposition may be at times ignored7 are
 the work of men--owe their origin and  
their whole existence to human will4    
,men did not wake on a summer morning   

and find them sprung up4 ,neither do    
they resemble trees1 which1 once        
planted1 are aye growing while men are  
sleeping4 ,in every stage of their      
existence they are made what they are by
 human voluntary agency4 ,like all      
things1 therefore1 which are made by    
men1 they may be either well or ill     
made2 judgment and skill may have been  
exercised in their production1 or the   
reverse of these4 ,and again1 if a      
people have omitted1 or from outward    
pressure have not had it in their power 
to give themselves a constitution by the
 tentative process of applying a        
corrective to each evil as it arose1 or 
as the sufferers gained strength to     
resist it1 this retardation of political
 progress is no doubt a great           
disadvantage to them1 but it does not   
prove that what has been found good for 
others would not have been good also for
 them1 and will not be so still when    
they think fit to adopt it4  ,on the    
other hand1 it is also to be borne in   

mind that political machinery does not  
act of itself4 ,as it is first made1 so 
it has to be worked1 by men1 and even by
 ordinary men4 ,it needs1 not their     
simple acquiescence1 but their active   
participation2 and must be adjusted to  
the capacities and qualities of such men
 as are available4 ,this implies three  
conditions4 ,the people for whom the    
form of government is intended must be  
willing to accept it1 or1 at least not  
so unwilling as to oppose an            
insurmountable obstacle to its          
establishment4 ,they must be willing and
 able to do what is necessary to keep it
 standing4 ,and they must be willing and
 able to do what it requires of them to 
enable it to fulfill its purposes4 ,the 
word do is to be understood as including
 forbearances as well as acts4 ,they    
must be capable of fulfilling the       
conditions of action and the conditions 
of self-restraint1 which are necessary  
either for keeping the established      
polity in existence1 or for enabling it 

to achieve the ends1 its conduciveness  
to which forms its recommendation4  ,the
 failure of any of these conditions     
renders a form of government1 whatever  
favorable promise it may otherwise hold 
out1 unsuitable to the particular case4 
,the first obstacle1 the repugnance of  
the people to the particular form of    
government1 needs little illustration1  
because it never can in theory have been
 overlooked4 ,the case is of perpetual  
occurrence4 ,nothing but foreign force  
would induce a tribe of ,north ,american
 ,indians to submit to the restraints of
 a regular and civilized government4    
,the same might have been said1 though  
somewhat less absolutely1 of the        
barbarians who overran the ,roman       
,empire4 ,it required centuries of time1
 and an entire change of circumstances1 
to discipline them into regular         
obedience even to their own leaders1    
when not actually serving under their   
banner4 ,there are nations who will not 
voluntarily submit to any government but

 that of certain families1 which have   
from time immemorial had the privilege  
of supplying them with chiefs4 ,some    
nations could not1 except by foreign    
conquest1 be made to endure a monarchy2 
others are equally averse to a republic4
 ,the hindrance often amounts1 for the  
time being1 to impracticability4  ,but  
there are also cases in which1 though   
not averse to a form of                 
government--possibly even desiring it--a
 people may be unwilling or unable to   
fulfill its conditions4 ,they may be    
incapable of fulfilling such of them as 
are necessary to keep the government    
even in nominal existence4 ,thus a      
people may prefer a free government2 but
 if1 from indolence1 or carelessness1 or
 cowardice1 or want of public spirit1   
they are unequal to the exertions       
necessary for preserving it2 if they    
will not fight for it when it is        
directly attacked2 if they can be       
deluded by the artifices used to cheat  
them out of it2 if1 by momentary        

discouragement1 or temporary panic1 or a
 fit of enthusiasm for an individual1   
they can be induced to lay their        
liberties at the feet even of a great   
man1 or trust him with powers which     
enable him to subvert their             
institutions--in all these cases they   
are more or less unfit for liberty2 and 
though it may be for their good to have 
had it even for a short time1 they are  
unlikely long to enjoy it4 ,again1 a    
people may be unwilling or unable to    
fulfill the duties which a particular   
form of government requires of them4 ,a 
rude people1 though in some degree alive
 to the benefits of civilized society1  
may be unable to practice the           
forbearances which it demands2 their    
passions may be too violent1 or their   
personal pride too exacting1 to forego  
private conflict1 and leave to the laws 
the avenging of their real or supposed  
wrongs4 ,in such a case1 a civilized    
government1 to be really advantageous to
 them1 will require to be in a          

considerable degree despotic2 one over  
which they do not themselves exercise   
control1 and which imposes a great      
amount of forcible restraint upon their 
actions4 ,again1 a people must be       
considered unfit for more than a limited
 and qualified freedom who will not     
co-operate actively with the law and the
 public authorities in the repression of
 evil-doers4 ,a people who are more     
disposed to shelter a criminal than to  
apprehend him2 who1 like the ,hindoos1  
will perjure themselves to screen the   
man who has robbed them1 rather than    
take trouble or expose themselves to    
vindictiveness by giving evidence       
against him2 who1 like some nations of  
,europe down to a recent date1 if a man 
poniards another in the public street1  
pass by on the other side1 because it is
 the business of the police to look to  
the matter1 and it is safer not to      
interfere in what does not concern them2
 a people who are revolted by an        
execution1 but not shocked at an        

assassination--require that the public  
authorities should be armed with much   
sterner powers of repression than       
elsewhere1 since the first indispensable
 requisites of civilized life have      
nothing else to rest on4 ,these         
deplorable states of feeling1 in any    
people who have emerged from savage     
life1 are1 no doubt1 usually the        
consequence of previous bad government1 
which has taught them to regard the law 
as made for other ends than their good1 
and its administrators as worse enemies 
than those who openly violate it4 ,but1 
however little blame may be due to those
 in whom these mental habits have grown 
up1 and however the habits may be       
ultimately conquerable by better        
government1 yet1 while they exist1 a    
people so disposed can not be governed  
with as little power exercised over them
 as a people whose sympathies are on the
 side of the law1 and who are willing to
 give active assistance in its          
enforcement4 ,again1 representative     

institutions are of little value1 and   
may be a mere instrument of tyranny or  
intrigue1 when the generality of        
electors are not sufficiently interested
 in their own government to give their  
vote1 or1 if they vote at all1 do not   
bestow their suffrages on public        
grounds1 but sell them for money1 or    
vote at the beck of some one who has    
control over them1 or whom for private  
reasons they desire to propitiate4      
,popular election thus practiced1       
instead of a security against           
misgovernment1 is but an additional     
wheel in its machinery4  ,besides these 
moral hindrances1 mechanical            
difficulties are often an insuperable   
impediment to forms of government4 ,in  
the ancient world1 though there might   
be1 and often was1 great individual or  
local independence1 there could be      
nothing like a regulated popular        
government beyond the bounds of a single
 city-community2 because there did not  
exist the physical conditions for the   

formation and propagation of a public   
opinion1 except among those who could be
 brought together to discuss public     
matters in the same agora4 ,this        
obstacle is generally thought to have   
ceased by the adoption of the           
representative system4 ,but to surmount 
it completely1 required the press1 and  
even the newspaper press1 the real      
equivalent1 though not in all respects  
an adequate one1 of the ,pnyx and the   
,forum4 ,there have been states of      
society in which even a monarchy of any 
great territorial extent could not      
subsist1 but unavoidably broke up into  
petty principalities1 either mutually   
independent1 or held together by a loose
 tie like the feudal3 because the       
machinery of authority was not perfect  
enough to carry orders into effect at a 
great distance from the person of the   
ruler4 ,he depended mainly upon         
voluntary fidelity for the obedience    
even of his army1 nor did there exist   
the means of making the people pay an   

amount of taxes sufficient for keeping  
up the force necessary to compel        
obedience throughout a large territory4 
,in these and all similar cases1 it must
 be understood that the amount of the   
hindrance may be either greater or less4
 ,it may be so great as to make the form
 of government work very ill1 without   
absolutely precluding its existence1 or 
hindering it from being practically     
preferable to any other which can be    
had4 ,this last question mainly depends 
upon a consideration which we have not  
yet arrived at--the tendencies of       
different forms of government to promote
 ,progress4  ,we have now examined the  
three fundamental conditions of the     
adaptation of forms of government to the
 people who are to be governed by them4 
,if the supporters of what may be termed
 the naturalistic theory of politics1   
mean but to insist on the necessity of  
these three conditions2 if they only    
mean that no government can permanently 
exist which does not fulfill the first  

and second conditions1 and1 in some     
considerable measure1 the third2 their  
doctrine1 thus limited1 is              
incontestable4 ,whatever they mean more 
than this appears to me untenable4 ,all 
that we are told about the necessity of 
an historical basis for institutions1 of
 their being in harmony with the        
national usages and character1 and the  
like1 means either this1 or nothing to  
the purpose4 ,there is a great quantity 
of mere sentimentality connected with   
these and similar phrases1 over and     
above the amount of rational meaning    
contained in them4 ,but1 considered     
practically1 these alleged requisites of
 political institutions are merely so   
many facilities for realising the three 
conditions4 ,when an institution1 or a  
set of institutions1 has the way        
prepared for it by the opinions1 tastes1
 and habits of the people1 they are not 
only more easily induced to accept it1  
but will more easily learn1 and will be1
 from the beginning1 better disposed1 to

 do what is required of them both for   
the preservation of the institutions1   
and for bringing them into such action  
as enables them to produce their best   
results4 ,it would be a great mistake in
 any legislator not to shape his        
measures so as to take advantage of such
 pre-existing habits and feelings when  
available4 ,on the other hand1 it is an 
exaggeration to elevate these mere aids 
and facilities into necessary           
conditions4 ,people are more easily     
induced to do1 and do more easily1 what 
they are already used to2 but people    
also learn to do things new to them4    
,familiarity is a great help2 but much  
dwelling on an idea will make it        
familiar1 even when strange at first4   
,there are abundant instances in which a
 whole people have been eager for       
untried things4 ,the amount of capacity 
which a people possess for doing new    
things1 and adapting themselves to new  
circumstances2 is itself one of the     
elements of the question4 ,it is a      

quality in which different nations1 and 
different stages of civilization1 differ
 much from one another4 ,the capability 
of any given people for fulfilling the  
conditions of a given form of government
 can not be pronounced on by any        
sweeping rule4 ,knowledge of the        
particular people1 and general practical
 judgment and sagacity1 must be the     
guides4  ,there is also another         
consideration not to be lost sight of4  
,a people may be unprepared for good    
institutions2 but to kindle a desire for
 them is a necessary part of the        
preparation4 ,to recommend and advocate 
a particular institution or form of     
government1 and set its advantages in   
the strongest light1 is one of the      
modes1 often the only mode within reach1
 of educating the mind of the nation not
 only for accepting or claiming1 but    
also for working1 the institution4 ,what
 means had ,italian patriots1 during the
 last and present generation1 of        
preparing the ,italian people for       

freedom in unity1 but by inciting them  
to demand it8 ,those1 however1 who      
undertake such a task1 need to be duly  
impressed1 not solely with the benefits 
of the institution or polity which they 
recommend1 but also with the capacities1
 moral1 intellectual1 and active1       
required for working it2 that they may  
avoid1 if possible1 stirring up a desire
 too much in advance of the capacity4   
,the result of what has been said is1   
that1 within the limits set by the three
 conditions so often adverted to1       
institutions and forms of government are
 a matter of choice4 ,to inquire into   
the best form of government in the      
abstract 7as it is called7 is not a     
chimerical1 but a highly practical      
employment of scientific intellect2 and 
to introduce into any country the best  
institutions which1 in the existing     
state of that country1 are capable of1  
in any tolerable degree1 fulfilling the 
conditions1 is one of the most rational 
objects to which practical effort can   

address itself4 ,every thing which can  
be said by way of disparaging the       
efficacy of human will and purpose in   
matters of government might be said of  
it in every other of its applications4  
,in all things there are very strict    
limits to human power4 ,it can only act 
by wielding some one or more of the     
forces of nature4 ,forces1 therefore1   
that can be applied to the desired use  
must exist2 and will only act according 
to their own laws4 ,we can not make the 
river run backwards2 but we do not      
therefore say that watermills are not   
made1 but grow4 ,in politics1 as in     
mechanics1 the power which is to keep   
the engine going must be sought for     
outside the machinery2 and if it is not 
forthcoming1 or is insufficient to      
surmount the obstacles which may        
reasonably be expected1 the contrivance 
will fail4 ,this is no peculiarity of   
the political art2 and amounts only to  
saying that it is subject to the same   
limitations and conditions as all other 

arts4  ,at this point we are met by     
another objection1 or the same objection
 in a different form4 ,the forces1 it is
 contended1 on which the greater        
political phenomena depend1 are not     
amenable to the direction of politicians
 or philosophers4 ,the government of a  
country1 it is affirmed1 is1 in all     
substantial respects1 fixed and         
determined beforehand by the state of   
the country in regard to the            
distribution of the elements of social  
power4 ,whatever is the strongest power 
in society will obtain the governing    
authority2 and a change in the political
 constitution can not be durable unless 
preceded or accompanied by an altered   
distribution of power in society itself4
 ,a nation1 therefore1 can not choose   
its form of government4 ,the mere       
details1 and practical organization1 it 
may choose2 but the essence of the      
whole1 the seat of the supreme power1 is
 determined for it by social            
circumstances4  ,that there is a portion

 of truth in this doctrine ,i at once   
admit2 but to make it of any use1 it    
must be reduced to a distinct expression
 and proper limits4 ,when it is said    
that the strongest power in society will
 make itself strongest in the           
government1 what is meant by power8 ,not
 thews and sinews2 otherwise pure       
democracy would be the only form of     
polity that could exist4 ,to mere       
muscular strength1 add two other        
elements1 property and intelligence1 and
 we are nearer the truth1 but far from  
having yet reached it4 ,not only is a   
greater number often kept down by a     
less1 but the greater number may have a 
preponderance in property1 and          
individually in intelligence1 and may   
yet be held in subjection1 forcibly or  
otherwise1 by a minority in both        
respects inferior to it4 ,to make these 
various elements of power politically   
influential they must be organized2 and 
the advantage in organization is        
necessarily with those who are in       

possession of the government4 ,a much   
weaker party in all other elements of   
power may greatly preponderate when the 
powers of government are thrown into the
 scale2 and may long retain its         
predominance through this alone3 though1
 no doubt1 a government so situated is  
in the condition called in mechanics    
unstable equilibrium1 like a thing      
balanced on its smaller end1 which1 if  
once disturbed1 tends more and more to  
depart from1 instead of reverting to1   
its previous state4  ,but there are     
still stronger objections to this theory
 of government in the terms in which it 
is usually stated4 ,the power in society
 which has any tendency to convert      
itself into political power is not power
 quiescent1 power merely passive1 but   
active power2 in other words1 power     
actually exerted2 that is to say1 a very
 small portion of all the power in      
existence4 ,politically speaking1 a     
great part of all power consists in     
will4 ,how is it possible1 then1 to     

compute the elements of political power1
 while we omit from the computation any 
thing which acts on the will8 ,to think 
that1 because those who wield the power 
in society wield in the end that of     
government1 therefore it is of no use to
 attempt to influence the constitution  
of the government by acting on opinion1 
is to forget that opinion is itself one 
of the greatest active social forces4   
,one person with a belief is a social   
power equal to ninety-nine who have only
 interests4 ,they who can succeed in    
creating a general persuasion that a    
certain form of government1 or social   
fact of any kind1 deserves to be        
preferred1 have made nearly the most    
important step which can possibly be    
taken toward ranging the powers of      
society on its side4 ,on the day when   
the protomartyr was stoned to death at  
,jerusalem1 while he who was to be the  
,apostle of the ,gentiles stood by      
consenting unto his death1 would any one
 have supposed that the party of that   

stoned man were then and there the      
strongest power in society8 ,and has not
 the event proved that they were so8    
,because theirs was the most powerful of
 then existing beliefs4 ,the same       
element made a monk of ,wittenberg1 at  
the meeting of the ,diet of ,worms1 a   
more powerful social force than the     
,emperor ,charles the ,fifth1 and all   
the princes there assembled4 ,but these1
 it may be said1 are cases in which     
religion was concerned1 and religious   
convictions are something peculiar in   
their strength4 ,then let us take a case
 purely political1 where religion1 if   
concerned at all1 was chiefly on the    
losing side4 ,if any one requires to be 
convinced that speculative thought is   
one of the chief elements of social     
power1 let him bethink himself of the   
age in which there was scarcely a throne
 in ,europe which was not filled by a   
liberal and reforming king1 a liberal   
and reforming emperor1 or1 strangest of 
all1 a liberal and reforming pope2 the  

age of ,frederic the ,great1 of         
,catherine the ,second1 of ,joseph the  
,second1 of ,peter ,leopold1 of         
,benedict ,,xiv41 of ,ganganelli1 of    
,pombal1 of ,d',aranda2 when the very   
,bourbons of ,naples were liberals and  
reformers1 and all the active minds     
among the noblesse of ,france were      
filled with the ideas which were soon   
after to cost them so dear4 ,surely a   
conclusive example how far mere physical
 and economic power is from being the   
whole of social power4 ,it was not by   
any change in the distribution of       
material interests1 but by the spread of
 moral convictions1 that negro slavery  
has been put an end to in the ,british  
,empire and elsewhere4 ,the serfs in    
,russia owe their emancipation1 if not  
to a sentiment of duty1 at least to the 
growth of a more enlightened opinion    
respecting the true interest of the     
state4 ,it is what men think that       
determines how they act2 and though the 
persuasions and convictions of average  

men are in a much greater degree        
determined by their personal position   
than by reason1 no little power is      
exercised over them by the persuasions  
and convictions of those whose personal 
position is different1 and by the united
 authority of the instructed4 ,when1    
therefore1 the instructed in general can
 be brought to recognize one social     
arrangement1 or political or other      
institution1 as good1 and another as    
bad--one as desirable1 another as       
condemnable1 very much has been done    
towards giving to the one1 or           
withdrawing from the other1 that        
preponderance of social force which     
enables it to subsist4 ,and the maxim1  
that the government of a country is what
 the social forces in existence compel  
it to be1 is true only in the sense in  
which it favors1 instead of             
discouraging1 the attempt to exercise1  
among all forms of government           
practicable in the existing condition of
 society1 a rational choice4    ,chapter

 ,,ii--,the ,criterion of a ,good ,form 
of ,government4   ,the form of          
government for any given country being  
7within certain definite conditions7    
amenable to choice1 it is now to be     
considered by what test the choice      
should be directed2 what are the        
distinctive characteristics of the form 
of government best fitted to promote the
 interests of any given society4        
,before entering into this inquiry1 it  
may seem necessary to decide what are   
the proper functions of government2 for1
 government altogether being only a     
means1 the eligibility of the means must
 depend on their adaptation to the end4 
,but this mode of stating the problem   
gives less aid to its investigation than
 might be supposed1 and does not even   
bring the whole of the question into    
view4 ,for1 in the first place1 the     
proper functions of a government are not
 a fixed thing1 but different in        
different states of society2 much more  
extensive in a backward than in an      

advanced state4 ,and1 secondly1 the     
character of a government or set of     
political institutions can not be       
sufficiently estimated while we confine 
our attention to the legitimate sphere  
of governmental functions2 for1 though  
the goodness of a government is         
necessarily circumscribed within that   
sphere1 its badness unhappily is not4   
,every kind and degree of evil of which 
mankind are susceptible may be inflicted
 on them by their government1 and none  
of the good which social existence is   
capable of can be any further realized  
than as the constitution of the         
government is compatible with1 and      
allows scope for1 its attainment4 ,not  
to speak of indirect effects1 the direct
 meddling of the public authorities has 
no necessary limits but those of human  
life1 and the influence of government on
 the well-being of society can be       
considered or estimated in reference to 
nothing less than the whole of the      
interests of humanity4  ,being thus     

obliged to place before ourselves1 as   
the test of good and bad government1 so 
complex an object as the aggregate      
interests of society1 we would willingly
 attempt some kind of classification of 
those interests1 which1 bringing them   
before the mind in definite groups1     
might give indication of the qualities  
by which a form of government is fitted 
to promote those various interests      
respectively4 ,it would be a great      
facility if we could say the good of    
society consists of such and such       
elements2 one of these elements requires
 such conditions1 another such others2  
the government1 then1 which unites in   
the greatest degree all these           
conditions1 must be the best4 ,the      
theory of government would thus be built
 up from the separate theorems of the   
elements which compose a good state of  
society4  ,unfortunately1 to enumerate  
and classify the constituents of social 
well-being1 so as to admit of the       
formation of such theorems is no easy   

task4 ,most of those who1 in the last or
 present generation1 have applied       
themselves to the philosophy of politics
 in any comprehensive spirit1 have felt 
the importance of such a classification1
 but the attempts which have been made  
toward it are as yet limited1 so far as 
,i am aware1 to a single step4 ,the     
classification begins and ends with a   
partition of the exigencies of society  
between the two heads of ,order and     
,progress 7in the phraseology of ,french
 thinkers72 ,permanence and             
,progression1 in the words of           
,coleridge4 ,this division is plausible 
and seductive1 from the apparently      
clean-cut opposition between its two    
members1 and the remarkable difference  
between the sentiments to which they    
appeal4 ,but ,i apprehend that 7however 
admissible for purposes of popular      
discourse7 the distinction between      
,order1 or ,permanence and ,progress1   
employed to define the qualities        
necessary in a government1 is           

unscientific and incorrect4  ,for1      
first1 what are ,order and ,progress8   
,concerning ,progress there is no       
difficulty1 or none which is apparent at
 first sight4 ,when ,progress is spoken 
of as one of the wants of human society1
 it may be supposed to mean             
,improvement4 ,that is a tolerably      
distinct idea4 ,but what is ,order8     
,sometimes it means more1 sometimes     
less1 but hardly ever the whole of what 
human society needs except improvement4 
,in its narrowest acceptation1 ,order   
means ,obedience4 ,a government is said 
to preserve order if it succeeds in     
getting itself obeyed4 ,but there are   
different degrees of obedience1 and it  
is not every degree that is commendable4
 ,only an unmitigated despotism demands 
that the individual citizen shall obey  
unconditionally every mandate of persons
 in authority4 ,we must at least limit  
the definition to such mandates as are  
general1 and issued in the deliberate   
form of laws4 ,order1 thus understood1  

expresses1 doubtless1 an indispensable  
attribute of government4 ,those who are 
unable to make their ordinances obeyed1 
can not be said to govern4 ,but1 though 
a necessary condition1 this is not the  
object of government4 ,that it should   
make itself obeyed is requisite1 in     
order that it may accomplish some other 
purpose4 ,we are still to seek what is  
this other purpose1 which government    
ought to fulfill abstractedly from the  
idea of improvement1 and which has to be
 fulfilled in every society1 whether    
stationary or progressive4  ,in a sense 
somewhat more enlarged1 ,order means the
 preservation of peace by the cessation 
of private violence4 ,order is said to  
exist where the people of the country   
have1 as a general rule1 ceased to      
prosecute their quarrels by private     
force1 and acquired the habit of        
referring the decision of their disputes
 and the redress of their injuries to   
the public authorities4 ,but in this    
larger use of the term1 as well as in   

the former narrow one1 ,order expresses 
rather one of the conditions of         
government1 than either its purpose or  
the criterion of its excellence2 for the
 habit may be well established of       
submitting to the government1 and       
referring all disputed matters to its   
authority1 and yet the manner in which  
the government deals with those disputed
 matters1 and with the other things     
about which it concerns itself1 may     
differ by the whole interval which      
divides the best from the worst         
possible4  ,if we intend to comprise in 
the idea of ,order all that society     
requires from its government which is   
not included in the idea of ,progress1  
we must define ,order as the            
preservation of all kinds and amounts of
 good which already exist1 and ,progress
 as consisting in the increase of them4 
,this distinction does comprehend in one
 or the other section every thing which 
a government can be required to promote4
 ,but1 thus understood1 it affords no   

basis for a philosophy of government4   
,we can not say that1 in constituting a 
polity1 certain provisions ought to be  
made for ,order and certain others for  
,progress1 since the conditions of      
,order1 in the sense now indicated1 and 
those of ,progress1 are not opposite1   
but the same4 ,the agencies which tend  
to preserve the social good which       
already exists are the very same which  
promote the increase of it1 and vice    
vers1 the sole difference being1 that a 
greater degree of those agencies is     
required for the latter purpose than for
 the former4  ,what1 for example1 are   
the qualities in the citizens           
individually which conduce most to keep 
up the amount of good conduct1 of good  
management1 of success and prosperity1  
which already exist in society8 ,every  
body will agree that those qualities are
 industry1 integrity1 justice1 and      
prudence4 ,but are not these1 of all    
qualities1 the most conducive to        
improvement8 and is not any growth of   

these virtues in the community in itself
 the greatest of improvements8 ,if so1  
whatever qualities in the government are
 promotive of industry1 integrity1      
justice1 and prudence1 conduce alike to 
permanence and to progression1 only     
there is needed more of those qualities 
to make the society decidedly           
progressive than merely to keep it      
permanent4  ,what1 again1 are the       
particular attributes in human beings   
which seem to have a more especial      
reference to ,progress1 and do not so   
directly suggest the ideas of ,order and
 ,preservation8 ,they are chiefly the   
qualities of mental activity1           
enterprise1 and courage4 ,but are not   
all these qualities fully as much       
required for preserving the good we have
 as for adding to it8 ,if there is any  
thing certain in human affairs1 it is   
that valuable acquisitions are only to  
be retained by the continuation of the  
same energies which gained them4 ,things
 left to take care of themselves        

inevitably decay4 ,those whom success   
induces to relax their habits of care   
and thoughtfulness1 and their           
willingness to encounter disagreeables1 
seldom long retain their good fortune at
 its height4 ,the mental attribute which
 seems exclusively dedicated to         
,progress1 and is the culmination of the
 tendencies to it1 is ,originality1 or  
,invention4 ,yet this is no less        
necessary for ,permanence1 since1 in the
 inevitable changes of human affairs1   
new inconveniences and dangers          
continually grow up1 which must be      
encountered by new resources and        
contrivances1 in order to keep things   
going on even only as well as they did  
before4 ,whatever qualities1 therefore1 
in a government1 tend to encourage      
activity1 energy1 courage1 originality1 
are requisites of ,permanence as well as
 of ,progress1 only a somewhat less     
degree of them will1 on the average1    
suffice for the former purpose than for 
the latter4  ,to pass now from the      

mental to the outward and objective     
requisites of society3 it is impossible 
to point out any contrivance in         
politics1 or arrangement of social      
affairs1 which conduces to ,order only1 
or to ,progress only2 whatever tends to 
either promotes both4 ,take1 for        
instance1 the common institution of a   
police4 ,order is the object which seems
 most immediately interested in the     
efficiency of this part of the social   
organization4 ,yet1 if it is effectual  
to promote ,order1 that is1 if it       
represses crime1 and enables every one  
to feel his person and property secure1 
can any state of things be more         
conducive to ,progress8 ,the greater    
security of property is one of the main 
conditions and causes of greater        
production1 which is ,progress in its   
most familiar and vulgarest aspect4 ,the
 better repression of crime represses   
the dispositions which tend to crime1   
and this is ,progress in a somewhat     
higher sense4 ,the release of the       

individual from the cares and anxieties 
of a state of imperfect protection sets 
his faculties free to be employed in any
 new effort for improving his own state 
and that of others1 while the same      
cause1 by attaching him to social       
existence1 and making him no longer see 
present or prospective enemies in his   
fellow creatures1 fosters all those     
feelings of kindness and fellowship     
towards others1 and interest in the     
general well-being of the community1    
which are such important parts of social
 improvement4  ,take1 again1 such a     
familiar case as that of a good system  
of taxation and finance4 ,this would    
generally be classed as belonging to the
 province of ,order4 ,yet what can be   
more conducive to ,progress8 ,a         
financial system which promotes the one1
 conduces1 by the very same excellences1
 to the other4 ,economy1 for example1   
equally preserves the existing stock of 
national wealth1 and favors the creation
 of more4 ,a just distribution of       

burdens1 by holding up to every citizen 
an example of morality and good         
conscience applied to difficult         
adjustments1 and an evidence of the     
value which the highest authorities     
attach to them1 tends in an eminent     
degree to educate the moral sentiments  
of the community1 both in respect of    
strength and of discrimination4 ,such a 
mode of levying the taxes as does not   
impede the industry1 or unnecessarily   
interfere with the liberty of the       
citizen1 promotes1 not the preservation 
only1 but the increase of the national  
wealth1 and encourages a more active use
 of the individual faculties4 ,and vice 
vers1 all errors in finance and taxation
 which obstruct the improvement of the  
people in wealth and morals1 tend also1 
if of sufficiently serious amount1      
positively to impoverish and demoralize 
them4 ,it holds1 in short1 universally1 
that when ,order and ,permanence are    
taken in their widest sense for the     
stability of existing advantages1 the   

requisites of ,progress are but the     
requisites of ,order in a greater       
degree2 those of ,permanence merely     
those of ,progress in a somewhat smaller
 measure4  ,in support of the position  
that ,order is intrinsically different  
from ,progress1 and that preservation of
 existing and acquisition of additional 
good are sufficiently distinct to afford
 the basis of a fundamental             
classification1 we shall perhaps be     
reminded that ,progress may be at the   
expense of ,order2 that while we are    
acquiring1 or striving to acquire1 good 
of one kind1 we may be losing ground in 
respect to others2 thus there may be    
progress in wealth1 while there is      
deterioration in virtue4 ,granting this1
 what it proves is1 not that ,progress  
is generically a different thing from   
,permanence1 but that wealth is a       
different thing from virtue4 ,progress  
is permanence and something more2 and it
 is no answer to this to say that       
,progress in one thing does not imply   

,permanence in every thing4 ,no more    
does ,progress in one thing imply       
,progress in every thing4 ,progress of  
any kind includes ,permanence in that   
same kind3 whenever ,permanence is      
sacrificed to some particular kind of   
,progress1 other ,progress is still more
 sacrificed to it2 and if it be not     
worth the sacrifice1 not the interest of
 ,permanence alone has been disregarded1
 but the general interest of ,progress  
has been mistaken4  ,if these improperly
 contrasted ideas are to be used at all 
in the attempt to give a first          
commencement of scientific precision to 
the notion of good government1 it would 
be more philosophically correct to leave
 out of the definition the word ,order1 
and to say that the best government is  
that which is most conducive to         
,progress4 ,for ,progress includes      
,order1 but ,order does not include     
,progress4 ,progress is a greater degree
 of that of which ,order is a less4     
,order1 in any other sense1 stands only 

for a part of the prerequisites of good 
government1 not for its idea and        
essence4 ,order would find a more       
suitable place among the conditions of  
,progress1 since1 if we would increase  
our sum of good1 nothing is more        
indispensable than to take due care of  
what we already have4 ,if we are        
endeavouring after more riches1 our very
 first rule should be1 not to squander  
uselessly our existing means4 ,order1   
thus considered1 is not an additional   
end to be reconciled with ,progress1 but
 a part and means of ,progress itself4  
,if a gain in one respect is purchased  
by a more than equivalent loss in the   
same or in any other1 there is not      
,progress4 ,conduciveness to ,progress1 
thus understood1 includes the whole     
excellence of a government4  ,but1      
though metaphysically defensible1 this  
definition of the criterion of good     
government is not appropriate1 because1 
though it contains the whole of the     
truth1 it recalls only a part4 ,what is 

suggested by the term ,progress is the  
idea of moving onward1 whereas the      
meaning of it here is quite as much the 
prevention of falling back4 ,the very   
same social causes--the same beliefs1   
feelings1 institutions1 and             
practices--are as much required to      
prevent society from retrograding as to 
produce a further advance4 ,were there  
no improvement to be hoped for1 life    
would not be the less an unceasing      
struggle against causes of              
deterioration1 as it even now is4       
,politics1 as conceived by the ancients1
 consisted wholly in this4 ,the natural 
tendency of men and their works was to  
degenerate1 which tendency1 however1 by 
good institutions virtuously            
administered1 it might be possible for  
an indefinite length of time to         
counteract4 ,though we no longer hold   
this opinion2 though most men in the    
present age profess the contrary creed1 
believing that the tendency of things1  
on the whole1 is toward improvement1 we 

ought not to forget that there is an    
incessant and ever-flowing current of   
human affairs toward the worse1         
consisting of all the follies1 all the  
vices1 all the negligences1 indolences1 
and supinenesses of mankind1 which is   
only controlled1 and kept from sweeping 
all before it1 by the exertions which   
some persons constantly1 and others by  
fits1 put forth in the direction of good
 and worthy objects4 ,it gives a very   
insufficient idea of the importance of  
the strivings which take place to       
improve and elevate human nature and    
life to suppose that their chief value  
consists in the amount of actual        
improvement realized by their means1 and
 that the consequence of their cessation
 would merely be that we should remain  
as we are4 ,a very small diminution of  
those exertions would not only put a    
stop to improvement1 but would turn the 
general tendency of things toward       
deterioration1 which1 once begun1 would 
proceed with increasingly rapidity1 and 

become more and more difficult to check1
 until it reached a state often seen in 
history1 and in which many large        
portions of mankind even now grovel2    
when hardly any thing short of          
superhuman power seems sufficient to    
turn the tide1 and give a fresh         
commencement to the upward movement4    
,these reasons make the word ,progress  
as unapt as the terms ,order and        
,permanence to become the basis for a   
classification of the requisites of a   
form of government4 ,the fundamental    
antithesis which these words express    
does not lie in the things themselves1  
so much as in the types of human        
character which answer to them4 ,there  
are1 we know1 some minds in which       
caution1 and others in which boldness1  
predominates2 in some1 the desire to    
avoid imperilling what is already       
possessed is a stronger sentiment than  
that which prompts to improve the old   
and acquire new advantages2 while there 
are others who lean the contrary way1   

and are more eager for future than      
careful of present good4 ,the road to   
the ends of both is the same2 but they  
are liable to wander from it in opposite
 directions4 ,this consideration is of  
importance in composing the personnel of
 any political body3 persons of both    
types ought to be included in it1 that  
the tendencies of each may be tempered1 
in so far as they are excessive1 by a   
due proportion of the other4 ,there     
needs no express provision to insure    
this object1 provided care is taken to  
admit nothing inconsistent with it4 ,the
 natural and spontaneous admixture of   
the old and the young1 of those whose   
position and reputation are made and    
those who have them still to make1 will 
in general sufficiently answer the      
purpose1 if only this natural balance is
 not disturbed by artificial regulation4
  ,since the distinction most commonly  
adopted for the classification of social
 exigencies does not possess the        
properties needful for that use1 we have

 to seek for some other leading         
distinction better adapted to the       
purpose4 ,such a distinction would seem 
to be indicated by the considerations to
 which ,i now proceed4  ,if we ask      
ourselves on what causes and conditions 
good government in all its senses1 from 
the humblest to the most exalted1       
depends1 we find that the principal of  
them1 the one which transcends all      
others1 is the qualities of the human   
beings composing the society over which 
the government is exercised4  ,we may   
take1 as a first instance1 the          
administration of justice2 with the more
 propriety1 since there is no part of   
public business in which the mere       
machinery1 the rules and contrivances   
for conducting the details of the       
operation1 are of such vital            
consequence4 ,yet even these yield in   
importance to the qualities of the human
 agents employed4 ,of what efficacy are 
rules of procedure in securing the ends 
of justice if the moral condition of the

 people is such that the witnesses      
generally lie1 and the judges and their 
subordinates take bribes8 ,again1 how   
can institutions provide a good         
municipal administration if there exists
 such indifference to the subject that  
those who would administer honestly and 
capably can not be induced to serve1 and
 the duties are left to those who       
undertake them because they have some   
private interest to be promoted8 ,of    
what avail is the most broadly popular  
representative system if the electors do
 not care to choose the best member of  
,parliament1 but choose him who will    
spend most money to be elected8 ,how can
 a representative assembly work for good
 if its members can be bought1 or if    
their excitability of temperament1      
uncorrected by public discipline or     
private self-control1 makes them        
incapable of calm deliberation1 and they
 resort to manual violence on the floor 
of the ,house1 or shoot at one another  
with rifles8 ,how1 again1 can           

government1 or any joint concern1 be    
carried on in a tolerable manner by     
people so envious that1 if one among    
them seems likely to succeed in any     
thing1 those who ought to cooperate with
 him form a tacit combination to make   
him fail8 ,whenever the general         
disposition of the people is such that  
each individual regards those only of   
his interests which are selfish1 and    
does not dwell on1 or concern himself   
for1 his share of the general interest1 
in such a state of things good          
government is impossible4 ,the influence
 of defects of intelligence in          
obstructing all the elements of good    
government requires no illustration4    
,government consists of acts done by    
human beings2 and if the agents1 or     
those who choose the agents1 or those to
 whom the agents are responsible1 or the
 lookers-on whose opinion ought to      
influence and check all these1 are mere 
masses of ignorance1 stupidity1 and     
baleful prejudice1 every operation of   

government will go wrong2 while1 in     
proportion as the men rise above this   
standard1 so will the government improve
 in quality up to the point of          
excellence1 attainable but nowhere      
attained1 where the officers of         
government1 themselves persons of       
superior virtue and intellect1 are      
surrounded by the atmosphere of a       
virtuous and enlightened public opinion4
  ,the first element of good government1
 therefore1 being the virtue and        
intelligence of the human beings        
composing the community1 the most       
important point of excellence which any 
form of government can possess is to    
promote the virtue and intelligence of  
the people themselves4 ,the first       
question in respect to any political    
institutions is how far they tend to    
foster in the members of the community  
the various desirable qualities1 moral  
and intellectual1 or rather 7following  
,bentham's more complete classification7
 moral1 intellectual1 and active4 ,the  

government which does this the best has 
every likelihood of being the best in   
all other respects1 since it is on these
 qualities1 so far as they exist in the 
people1 that all possibility of goodness
 in the practical operations of the     
government depends4  ,we may consider1  
then1 as one criterion of the goodness  
of a government1 the degree in which it 
tends to increase the sum of good       
qualities in the governed1 collectively 
and individually1 since1 besides that   
their well-being is the sole object of  
government1 their good qualities supply 
the moving force which works the        
machinery4 ,this leaves1 as the other   
constituent element of the merit of a   
government1 the quality of the machinery
 itself2 that is1 the degree in which it
 is adapted to take advantage of the    
amount of good qualities which may at   
any time exist1 and make them           
instrumental to the right purposes4 ,let
 us again take the subject of judicature
 as an example and illustration4 ,the   

judicial system being given1 the        
goodness of the administration of       
justice is in the compound ratio of the 
worth of the men composing the          
tribunals1 and the worth of the public  
opinion which influences or controls    
them4 ,but all the difference between a 
good and a bad system of judicature lies
 in the contrivances adopted for        
bringing whatever moral and intellectual
 worth exists in the community to bear  
upon the administration of justice1 and 
making it duly operative on the result4 
,the arrangements for rendering the     
choice of the judges such as to obtain  
the highest average of virtue and       
intelligence2 the salutary forms of     
procedure2 the publicity which allows   
observation and criticism of whatever is
 amiss2 the liberty of discussion and   
cinsure through the press2 the mode of  
taking evidence1 according as it is well
 or ill adapted to elicit truth2 the    
facilities1 whatever be their amount1   
for obtaining access to the tribunals2  

the arrangements for detecting crimes   
and apprehending offenders-all these    
things are not the power1 but the       
machinery for bringing the power into   
contact with the obstacle2 and the      
machinery has no action of itself1 but  
without it the power1 let it be ever so 
ample1 would be wasted and of no effect4
 ,a similar distinction exists in regard
 to the constitution of the executive   
departments of administration4 ,their   
machinery is good1 when the proper tests
 are prescribed for the qualifications  
of officers1 the proper rules for their 
promotion2 when the business is         
conveniently distributed among those who
 are to transact it1 a convenient and   
methodical order established for its    
transaction1 a correct and intelligible 
record kept of it after being           
transacted2 when each individual knows  
for what he is responsible1 and is known
 to others as responsible for it2 when  
the best-contrived checks are provided  
against negligence1 favoritism1 or      

jobbery in any of the acts of the       
department4 ,but political checks will  
no more act of themselves than a bridle 
will direct a horse without a rider4 ,if
 the checking functionaries are as      
corrupt or as negligent as those whom   
they ought to check1 and if the public1 
the mainspring of the whole checking    
machinery1 are too ignorant1 too        
passive1 or too careless and inattentive
 to do their part1 little benefit will  
be derived from the best administrative 
apparatus4 ,yet a good apparatus is     
always preferable to a bad4 ,it enables 
such insufficient moving or checking    
power as exists to act at the greatest  
advantage2 and without it1 no amount of 
moving or checking power would be       
sufficient4 ,publicity1 for instance1 is
 no impediment to evil1 nor stimulus to 
good1 if the public will not look at    
what is done2 but without publicity1 how
 could they either check or encourage   
what they were not permitted to see8    
,the ideally perfect constitution of a  

public office is that in which the      
interest of the functionary is entirely 
coincident with his duty4 ,no mere      
system will make it so1 but still less  
can it be made so without a system1     
aptly devised for the purpose4  ,what we
 have said of the arrangements for the  
detailed administration of the          
government is still more evidently true 
of its general constitution4 ,all       
government which aims at being good is  
an organization of some part of the good
 qualities existing in the individual   
members of the community for the conduct
 of its collective affairs4 ,a          
representative constitution is a means  
of bringing the general standard of     
intelligence and honesty existing in the
 community1 and the individual intellect
 and virtue of its wisest members1 more 
directly to bear upon the government1   
and investing them with greater         
influence in it than they would have    
under any other mode of organization2   
though1 under any1 such influence as    

they do have is the source of all good  
that there is in the government1 and the
 hindrance of every evil that there is  
not4 ,the greater the amount of these   
good qualities which the institutions of
 a country succeed in organizing1 and   
the better the mode of organization1 the
 better will be the government4  ,we    
have now1 therefore1 obtained a         
foundation for a twofold division of the
 merit which any set of political       
institutions can possess4 ,it consists  
partly of the degree in which they      
promote the general mental advancement  
of the community1 including under that  
phrase advancement in intellect1 in     
virtue1 and in practical activity and   
efficiency1 and partly of the degree of 
perfection with which they organize the 
moral1 intellectual1 and active worth   
already existing1 so as to operate with 
the greatest effect on public affairs4  
,a government is to be judged by its    
action upon men and by its action upon  
things2 by what it makes of the         

citizens1 and what it does with them2   
its tendency to improve or deteriorate  
the people themselves1 and the goodness 
or badness of the work it performs for  
them1 and by means of them4 ,government 
is at once a great influence acting on  
the human mind1 and a set of organized  
arrangements for public business3 in the
 first capacity its beneficial action is
 chiefly indirect1 but not therefore    
less vital1 while its mischievous action
 may be direct4  ,the difference between
 these two functions of a government is 
not1 like that between ,order and       
,progress1 a difference merely in       
degree1 but in kind4 ,we must not1      
however1 suppose that they have no      
intimate connection with one another4   
,the institutions which insure the best 
management of public affairs practicable
 in the existing state of cultivation   
tend by this alone to the further       
improvement of that state4 ,a people    
which had the most just laws1 the purest
 and most efficient judicature1 the most

 enlightened administration1 the most   
equitable and least onerous system of   
finance1 compatible with the stage it   
had attained in moral and intellectual  
advancement1 would be in a fair way to  
pass rapidly into a higher stage4 ,nor  
is there any mode in which political    
institutions can contribute more        
effectually to the improvement of the   
people than by doing their more direct  
work well4 ,and reversely1 if their     
machinery is so badly constructed that  
they do their own particular business   
ill1 the effect is felt in a thousand   
ways in lowering the morality and       
deadening the intelligence and activity 
of the people4 ,but the distinction is  
nevertheless real1 because this is only 
one of the means by which political     
institutions improve or deteriorate the 
human mind1 and the causes and modes of 
that beneficial or injurious influence  
remain a distinct and much wider subject
 of study4  ,of the two modes of        
operation by which a form of government 

or set of political institutions affects
 the welfare of the community--its      
operation as an agency of national      
education1 and its arrangements for     
conducting the collective affairs of the
 community in the state of education in 
which they already are1 the last        
evidently varies much less1 from        
difference of country and state of      
civilization1 than the first4 ,it has   
also much less to do with the           
fundamental constitution of the         
government4 ,the mode of conducting the 
practical business of government1 which 
is best under a free constitution1 would
 generally be best also in an absolute  
monarchy1 only an absolute monarchy is  
not so likely to practice it4 ,the laws 
of property1 for example2 the principles
 of evidence and judicial procedure2 the
 system of taxation and of financial    
administration1 need not necessarily be 
different in different forms of         
government4 ,each of these matters has  
principles and rules of its own1 which  

are a subject of separate study4        
,general jurisprudence1 civil and penal 
legislation1 financial and commercial   
policy1 are sciences in themselves1 or1 
rather1 separate members of the         
comprehensive science or art of         
government2 and the most enlightened    
doctrines on all these subjects1 though 
not equally likely to be understood and 
acted on under all forms of government1 
yet1 if understood and acted on1 would  
in general be equally beneficial under  
them all4 ,it is true that these        
doctrines could not be applied without  
some modifications to all states of     
society and of the human mind2          
nevertheless1 by far the greater number 
of them would require modifications     
solely of detail to adapt them to any   
state of society sufficiently advanced  
to possess rulers capable of            
understanding them4 ,a government to    
which they would be wholly unsuitable   
must be one so bad in itself1 or so     
opposed to public feeling1 as to be     

unable to maintain itself in existence  
by honest means4  ,it is otherwise with 
that portion of the interests of the    
community which relate to the better or 
worse training of the people themselves4
 ,considered as instrumental to this1   
institutions need to be radically       
different1 according to the stage of    
advancement already reached4 ,the       
recognition of this truth1 though for   
the most part empirically rather than   
philosophically1 may be regarded as the 
main point of superiority in the        
political theories of the present above 
those of the last age1 in which it was  
customary to claim representative       
democracy for ,england or ,france by    
arguments which would equally have      
proved it the only fit form of          
government for ,bedouins or ,malays4    
,the state of different communities1 in 
point of culture and development1 ranges
 downwards to a condition very little   
above the highest of the beasts4 ,the   
upward range1 too1 is considerable1 and 

the future possible extension vastly    
greater4 ,a community can only be       
developed out of one of these states    
into a higher by a concourse of         
influences1 among the principal of which
 is the government to which they are    
subject4 ,in all states of human        
improvement ever yet attained1 the      
nature and degree of authority exercised
 over individuals1 the distribution of  
power1 and the conditions of command and
 obedience1 are the most powerful of the
 influences1 except their religious     
belief1 which make them what they are1  
and enable them to become what they can 
be4 ,they may be stopped short at any   
point in their progress by defective    
adaptation of their government to that  
particular stage of advancement4 ,and   
the one indispensable merit of a        
government1 in favor of which it may be 
forgiven almost any amount of other     
demerit compatible with progress1 is    
that its operation on the people is     
favorable1 or not unfavorable1 to the   

next step which it is necessary for them
 to take in order to raise themselves to
 a higher level4  ,thus 7to repeat a    
former example71 a people in a state of 
savage independence1 in which every one 
lives for himself1 exempt1 unless by    
fits1 from any external control1 is     
practically incapable of making any     
progress in civilization until it has   
learned to obey4 ,the indispensable     
virtue1 therefore1 in a government which
 establishes itself over a people of    
this sort is that it make itself obeyed4
 ,to enable it to do this1 the          
constitution of the government must be  
nearly1 or quite despotic4 ,a           
constitution in any degree popular1     
dependent on the voluntary surrender by 
the different members of the community  
of their individual freedom of action1  
would fail to enforce the first lesson  
which the pupils1 in this stage of their
 progress1 require4 ,accordingly1 the   
civilization of such tribes1 when not   
the result of juxtaposition with others 

already civilized1 is almost always the 
work of an absolute ruler1 deriving his 
power either from religion or military  
prowess--very often from foreign arms4  
,again1 uncivilized races1 and the      
bravest and most energetic still more   
than the rest1 are averse to continuous 
labor of an unexciting kind4 ,yet all   
real civilization is at this price2     
without such labor1 neither can the mind
 be disciplined into the habits required
 by civilized society1 nor the material 
world prepared to receive it4 ,there    
needs a rare concurrence of             
circumstances1 and for that reason often
 a vast length of time1 to reconcile    
such a people to industry1 unless they  
are for a while compelled to it4 ,hence 
even personal slavery1 by giving a      
commencement to industrial life1 and    
enforcing it as the exclusive occupation
 of the most numerous portion of the    
community1 may accelerate the transition
 to a better freedom than that of       
fighting and rapine4 ,it is almost      

needless to say that this excuse for    
slavery is only available in a very     
early state of society4 ,a civilized    
people have far other means of imparting
 civilization to those under their      
influence2 and slavery is1 in all its   
details1 so repugnant to that government
 of law1 which is the foundation of all 
modern life1 and so corrupting to the   
master-class when they have once come   
under civilized influences1 that its    
adoption under any circumstances        
whatever in modern society is a relapse 
into worse than barbarism4  ,at some    
period1 however1 of their history1      
almost every people1 now civilized1 have
 consisted1 in majority1 of slaves4 ,a  
people in that condition require to     
raise them out of it a very different   
polity from a nation of savages4 ,if    
they are energetic by nature1 and       
especially if there be associated with  
them in the same community an           
industrious class who are neither slaves
 nor slave-owners 7as was the case in   

,greece71 they need1 probably1 no more  
to insure their improvement than to make
 them free3 when freed1 they may often  
be fit1 like ,roman freedmen1 to be     
admitted at once to the full rights of  
citizenship4 ,this1 however1 is not the 
normal condition of slavery1 and is     
generally a sign that it is becoming    
obsolete4 ,a slave1 properly so called1 
is a being who has not learned to help  
himself4 ,he is1 no doubt1 one step in  
advance of a savage4 ,he has not the    
first lesson of political society still 
to acquire4 ,he has learned to obey4    
,but what he obeys is only a direct     
command4 ,it is the characteristic of   
born slaves to be incapable of          
conforming their conduct to a rule or   
law4 ,they can only do what they are    
ordered1 and only when they are ordered 
to do it4 ,if a man whom they fear is   
standing over them and threatening them 
with punishment1 they obey2 but when his
 back is turned1 the work remains       
undone4 ,the motive determining them    

must appeal1 not to their interests1 but
 to their instincts2 immediate hope or  
immediate terror4 ,a despotism1 which   
may tame the savage1 will1 in so far as 
it is a despotism1 only confirm the     
slaves in their incapacities4 ,yet a    
government under their own control would
 be entirely unmanageable by them4      
,their improvement can not come from    
themselves1 but must be superinduced    
from without4 ,the step which they have 
to take1 and their only path to         
improvement1 is to be raised from a     
government of will to one of law4 ,they 
have to be taught self-government1 and  
this1 in its initial stage1 means the   
capacity to act on general instructions4
 ,what they require is not a government 
of force1 but one of guidance4 ,being1  
however1 in too low a state to yield to 
the guidance of any but those to whom   
they look up as the possessors of force1
 the sort of government fittest for them
 is one which possesses force1 but      
seldom uses it2 a parental despotism or 

aristocracy1 resembling the ,st4        
,simonian form of ,socialism2           
maintaining a general superintendence   
over all the operations of society1 so  
as to keep before each the sense of a   
present force sufficient to compel his  
obedience to the rule laid down1 but    
which1 owing to the impossibility of    
descending to regulate all the minuti of
 industry and life1 necessarily leaves  
and induces individuals to do much of   
themselves4 ,this1 which may be termed  
the government of leading-strings1 seems
 to be the one required to carry such a 
people the most rapidly through the next
 necessary step in social progress4     
,such appears to have been the idea of  
the government of the ,incas of ,peru1  
and such was that of the ,jesuits of    
,paraguay4 ,i need scarcely remark that 
leading-strings are only admissible as a
 means of gradually training the people 
to walk alone4  ,it would be out of     
place to carry the illustration further4
 ,to attempt to investigate what kind of

 government is suited to every known    
state of society would be to compose a  
treatise1 not on representative         
government1 but on political science at 
large4 ,for our more limited purpose we 
borrow from political philosophy only   
its general principles4 ,to determine   
the form of government most suited to   
any particular people1 we must be able1 
among the defects and shortcomings which
 belong to that people1 to distinguish  
those that are the immediate impediment 
to progress--to discover what it is     
which 7as it were7 stops the way4 ,the  
best government for them is the one     
which tends most to give them that for  
want of which they can not advance1 or  
advance only in a lame and lopsided     
manner4 ,we must not1 however1 forget   
the reservation necessary in all things 
which have for their object improvement 
or ,progress1 namely1 that in seeking   
the good which is needed1 no damage1 or 
as little as possible1 be done to that  
already possessed4 ,a people of savages 

should be taught obedience1 but not in  
such a manner as to convert them into a 
people of slaves4 ,and 7to give the     
observation a higher generality7 the    
form of government which is most        
effectual for carrying a people through 
the next stage of progress will still be
 very improper for them if it does this 
in such a manner as to obstruct1 or     
positively unfit them for1 the step next
 beyond4 ,such cases are frequent1 and  
are among the most melancholy facts in  
history4 ,the ,egyptian hierarchy1 the  
paternal despotism of ,china1 were very 
fit instruments for carrying those      
nations up to the point of civilization 
which they attained4 ,but having reached
 that point1 they were brought to a     
permanent halt for want of mental       
liberty and individuality--requisites of
 improvement which the institutions that
 had carried them thus far entirely     
incapacitated them from acquiring--and  
as the institutions did not break down  
and give place to others1 further       

improvement stopped4 ,in contrast with  
these nations1 let us consider the      
example of an opposite character        
afforded by another and a comparatively 
insignificant ,oriental people--the     
,jews4 ,they1 too1 had an absolute      
monarchy and a hierarchy1 and their     
organized institutions were as obviously
 of sacerdotal origin as those of the   
,hindoos4 ,these did for them what was  
done for other ,oriental races by their 
institutions--subdued them to industry  
and order1 and gave them a national     
life4 ,but neither their kings nor their
 priests ever obtained1 as in those     
other countries1 the exclusive moulding 
of their character4 ,their religion1    
which enabled persons of genius and a   
high religious tone to be regarded and  
to regard themselves as inspired from   
heaven1 gave existence to an inestimably
 precious unorganized institution--the  
,order 7if it may be so termed7 of      
,prophets4 ,under the protection1       
generally though not always effectual1  

of their sacred character1 the ,prophets
 were a power in the nation1 often more 
than a match for kings and priests1 and 
kept up1 in that little corner of the   
earth1 the antagonism of influences     
which is the only real security for     
continued progress4 ,religion1          
consequently1 was not there what it has 
been in so many other places--a         
consecration of all that was once       
established1 and a barrier against      
further improvement4 ,the remark of a   
distinguished ,hebrew1 ,m4 ,salvador1   
that the ,prophets were1 in ,church and 
,state1 the equivalent of the modern    
liberty of the press1 gives a just but  
not an adequate conception of the part  
fulfilled in national and universal     
history by this great element of ,jewish
 life2 by means of which1 the canon of  
inspiration never being complete1 the   
persons most eminent in genius and moral
 feeling could not only denounce and    
reprobate1 with the direct authority of 
the ,almighty1 whatever appeared to them

 deserving of such treatment1 but could 
give forth better and higher            
interpretations of the national         
religion1 which thenceforth became part 
of the religion4 ,accordingly1 whoever  
can divest himself of the habit of      
reading the ,bible as if it was one     
book1 which until lately was equally    
inveterate in ,christians and in        
unbelievers1 sees with admiration the   
vast interval between the morality and  
religion of the ,pentateuch1 or even of 
the historical books 7the unmistakable  
work of ,hebrew ,conservatives of the   
sacerdotal order71 and the morality and 
religion of the prophecies--a distance  
as wide as between these last and the   
,gospels4 ,conditions more favorable to 
,progress could not easily exist2       
accordingly1 the ,jews1 instead of being
 stationary like other ,asiatics1 were1 
next to the ,greeks1 the most           
progressive people of antiquity1 and1   
jointly with them1 have been the        
starting-point and main propelling      

agency of modern cultivation4  ,it is1  
then1 impossible to understand the      
question of the adaptation of forms of  
government to states of society1 without
 taking into account not only the next  
step1 but all the steps which society   
has yet to make2 both those which can be
 foreseen1 and the far wider indefinite 
range which is at present out of sight4 
,it follows1 that to judge of the merits
 of forms of government1 an ideal must  
be constructed of the form of government
 most eligible in itself1 that is1      
which1 if the necessary conditions      
existed for giving effect to its        
beneficial tendencies1 would1 more than 
all others1 favor and promote1 not some 
one improvement1 but all forms and      
degrees of it4 ,this having been done1  
we must consider what are the mental    
conditions of all sorts necessary to    
enable this government to realize its   
tendencies1 and what1 therefore1 are the
 various defects by which a people is   
made incapable of reaping its benefits4 

,it would then be possible to construct 
a theorem of the circumstances in which 
that form of government may wisely be   
introduced2 and also to judge1 in cases 
in which it had better not be           
introduced1 what inferior forms of      
polity will best carry those communities
 through the intermediate stages which  
they must traverse before they can      
become fit for the best form of         
government4  ,of these inquiries1 the   
last does not concern us here1 but the  
first is an essential part of our       
subject2 for we may1 without rashness1  
at once enunciate a proposition1 the    
proofs and illustrations of which will  
present themselves in the ensuing pages1
 that this ideally best form of         
government will be found in some one or 
other variety of the ,representative    
,system4    ,chapter ,,iii--,that the   
ideally best ,form of ,government is    
,representative ,government4   ,it has  
long 7perhaps throughout the entire     
duration of ,british freedom7 been a    

common form of speech1 that if a good   
despot could be insured1 despotic       
monarchy would be the best form of      
government4 ,i look upon this as a      
radical and most pernicious             
misconception of what good government   
is1 which1 until it can be got rid of1  
will fatally vitiate all our            
speculations on government4  ,the       
supposition is1 that absolute power1 in 
the hands of an eminent individual1     
would insure a virtuous and intelligent 
performance of all the duties of        
government4 ,good laws would be         
established and enforced1 bad laws would
 be reformed2 the best men would be     
placed in all situations of trust2      
justice would be as well administered1  
the public burdens would be as light and
 as judiciously imposed1 every branch of
 administration would be as purely and  
as intelligently conducted as the       
circumstances of the country and its    
degree of intellectual and moral        
cultivation would admit4 ,i am willing1 

for the sake of the argument1 to concede
 all this1 but ,i must point out how    
great the concession is1 how much more  
is needed to produce even an            
approximation to these results than is  
conveyed in the simple expression1 a    
good despot4 ,their realization would in
 fact imply1 not merely a good monarch1 
but an all-seeing one4 ,he must be at   
all times informed correctly1 in        
considerable detail1 of the conduct and 
working of every branch of              
administration1 in every district of the
 country1 and must be able1 in the      
twenty-four hours per day1 which are all
 that is granted to a king as to the    
humblest laborer1 to give an effective  
share of attention and superintendence  
to all parts of this vast field2 or he  
must at least be capable of discerning  
and choosing out1 from among the mass of
 his subjects1 not only a large         
abundance of honest and able men1 fit to
 conduct every branch of public         
administration under supervision and    

control1 but also the small number of   
men of eminent virtues and talents who  
can be trusted not only to do without   
that supervision1 but to exercise it    
themselves over others4 ,so             
extraordinary are the faculties and     
energies required for performing this   
task in any supportable manner1 that the
 good despot whom we are supposing can  
hardly be imagined as consenting to     
undertake it unless as a refuge from    
intolerable evils1 and a transitional   
preparation for something beyond4 ,but  
the argument can do without even this   
immense item in the account4 ,suppose   
the difficulty vanquished4 ,what should 
we then have8 ,one man of superhuman    
mental activity managing the entire     
affairs of a mentally passive people4   
,their passivity is implied in the very 
idea of absolute power4 ,the nation as a
 whole1 and every individual composing  
it1 are without any potential voice in  
their own destiny4 ,they exercise no    
will in respect to their collective     

interests4 ,all is decided for them by a
 will not their own1 which it is legally
 a crime for them to disobey4 ,what sort
 of human beings can be formed under    
such a regimen8 ,what development can   
either their thinking or their active   
faculties attain under it8 ,on matters  
of pure theory they might perhaps be    
allowed to speculate1 so long as their  
speculations either did not approach    
politics1 or had not the remotest       
connection with its practice4 ,on       
practical affairs they could at most be 
only suffered to suggest2 and even under
 the most moderate of despots1 none but 
persons of already admitted or reputed  
superiority could hope that their       
suggestions would be known to1 much less
 regarded by1 those who had the         
management of affairs4 ,a person must   
have a very unusual taste for           
intellectual exercise in and for itself 
who will put himself to the trouble of  
thought when it is to have no outward   
effect1 or qualify himself for functions

 which he has no chance of being allowed
 to exercise4 ,the only sufficient      
incitement to mental exertion1 in any   
but a few minds in a generation1 is the 
prospect of some practical use to be    
made of its results4 ,it does not follow
 that the nation will be wholly         
destitute of intellectual power4 ,the   
common business of life1 which must     
necessarily be performed by each        
individual or family for themselves1    
will call forth some amount of          
intelligence and practical ability1     
within a certain narrow range of ideas4 
,there may be a select class of savants 
who cultivate science with a view to its
 physical uses or for the pleasure of   
the pursuit4 ,there will be a           
bureaucracy1 and persons in training for
 the bureaucracy1 who will be taught at 
least some empirical maxims of          
government and public administration4   
,there may be1 and often has been1 a    
systematic organization of the best     
mental power in the country in some     

special direction 7commonly military7 to
 promote the grandeur of the despot4    
,but the public at large remain without 
information and without interest on all 
greater matters of practice2 or1 if they
 have any knowledge of them1 it is but a
 dilettante knowledge1 like that which  
people have of the mechanical arts who  
have never handled a tool4 ,nor is it   
only in their intelligence that they    
suffer4 ,their moral capacities are     
equally stunted4 ,wherever the sphere of
 action of human beings is artificially 
circumscribed1 their sentiments are     
narrowed and dwarfed in the same        
proportion4 ,the food of feeling is     
action2 even domestic affection lives   
upon voluntary good offices4 ,let a     
person have nothing to do for his       
country1 and he will not care for it4   
,it has been said of old that in a      
despotism there is at most but one      
patriot1 the despot himself2 and the    
saying rests on a just appreciation of  
the effects of absolute subjection even 

to a good and wise master4 ,religion    
remains2 and here1 at least1 it may be  
thought1 is an agency that may be relied
 on for lifting men's eyes and minds    
above the dust at their feet4 ,but      
religion1 even supposing it to escape   
perversion for the purposes of          
despotism1 ceases in these circumstances
 to be a social concern1 and narrows    
into a personal affair between an       
individual and his ,maker1 in which the 
issue at stake is but his private       
salvation4 ,religion in this shape is   
quite consistent with the most selfish  
and contracted egoism1 and identifies   
the votary as little in feeling with the
 rest of his kind as sensuality itself4 
,a good despotism means a government in 
which1 so far as depends on the despot1 
there is no positive oppression by      
officers of state1 but in which all the 
collective interests of the people are  
managed for them1 all the thinking that 
has relation to collective interests    
done for them1 and in which their minds 

are formed by1 and consenting to1 this  
abdication of their own energies4       
,leaving things to the government1 like 
leaving them to ,providence1 is         
synonymous with caring nothing about    
them1 and accepting their results1 when 
disagreeable1 as visitations of ,nature4
 ,with the exception1 therefore1 of a   
few studious men who take an            
intellectual interest in speculation for
 its own sake1 the intelligence and     
sentiments of the whole people are given
 up to the material interests1 and when 
these are provided for1 to the amusement
 and ornamentation of private life4 ,but
 to say this is to say1 if the whole    
testimony of history is worth any thing1
 that the era of national decline has   
arrived2 that is1 if the nation had ever
 attained any thing to decline from4 ,if
 it has never risen above the condition 
of an ,oriental people1 in that         
condition it continues to stagnate2 but 
if1 like ,greece or ,rome1 it had       
realized any thing higher1 through the  

energy1 patriotism1 and enlargement of  
mind1 which1 as national qualities1 are 
the fruits solely of freedom1 it        
relapses in a few generations into the  
,oriental state4 ,and that state does   
not mean stupid tranquillity1 with      
security against change for the worse2  
it often means being overrun1 conquered1
 and reduced to domestic slavery either 
by a stronger despot1 or by the nearest 
barbarous people who retain along with  
their savage rudeness the energies of   
freedom4  ,such are not merely the      
natural tendencies1 but the inherent    
necessities of despotic government2 from
 which there is no outlet1 unless in so 
far as the despotism consents not to be 
despotism2 in so far as the supposed    
good despot abstains from exercising his
 power1 and1 though holding it in       
reserve1 allows the general business of 
government to go on as if the people    
really governed themselves4 ,however    
little probable it may be1 we may       
imagine a despot observing many of the  

rules and restraints of constitutional  
government4 ,he might allow such freedom
 of the press and of discussion as would
 enable a public opinion to form and    
express itself on national affairs4 ,he 
might suffer local interests to be      
managed1 without the interference of    
authority1 by the people themselves4 ,he
 might even surround himself with a     
council or councils of government1      
freely chosen by the whole or some      
portion of the nation1 retaining in his 
own hands the power of taxation1 and the
 supreme legislative as well as         
executive authority4 ,were he to act    
thus1 and so far abdicate as a despot1  
he would do away with a considerable    
part of the evils characteristic of     
despotism4 ,political activity and      
capacity for public affairs would no    
longer be prevented from growing up in  
the body of the nation1 and a public    
opinion would form itself1 not the mere 
echo of the government4 ,but such       
improvement would be the beginning of   

new difficulties4 ,this public opinion1 
independent of the monarch's dictation1 
must be either with him or against him2 
if not the one1 it will be the other4   
,all governments must displease many    
persons1 and these having now regular   
organs1 and being able to express their 
sentiments1 opinions adverse to the     
measures of government would often be   
expressed4 ,what is the monarch to do   
when these unfavorable opinions happen  
to be in the majority8 ,is he to alter  
his course8 ,is he to defer to the      
nation8 ,if so1 he is no longer a       
despot1 but a constitutional king2 an   
organ or first minister of the people1  
distinguished only by being irremovable4
 ,if not1 he must either put down       
opposition by his despotic power1 or    
there will arise a permanent antagonism 
between the people and one man1 which   
can have but one possible ending4 ,not  
even a religious principle of passive   
obedience and right divine would long   
ward off the natural consequences of    

such a position4 ,the monarch would have
 to succumb1 and conform to the         
conditions of constitutional royalty1 or
 give place to some one who would4 ,the 
despotism1 being thus chiefly nominal1  
would possess few of the advantages     
supposed to belong to absolute monarchy1
 while it would realize in a very       
imperfect degree those of a free        
government1 since1 however great an     
amount of liberty the citizens might    
practically enjoy1 they could never     
forget that they held it on sufferance1 
and by a concession which1 under the    
existing constitution of the state might
 at any moment be resumed2 that they    
were legally slaves1 though of a prudent
 or indulgent master4  ,it is not much  
to be wondered at if impatient or       
disappointed reformers1 groaning under  
the impediments opposed to the most     
salutary public improvements by the     
ignorance1 the indifference1 the        
untractableness1 the perverse obstinacy 
of a people1 and the corrupt            

combinations of selfish private         
interests1 armed with the powerful      
weapons afforded by free institutions1  
should at times sigh for a strong hand  
to bear down all these obstacles1 and   
compel a recalcitrant people to be      
better governed4 ,but 7setting aside the
 fact that for one despot who now and   
then reforms an abuse1 there are        
ninety-nine who do nothing but create   
them7 those who look in any such        
direction for the realization of their  
hopes leave out of the idea of good     
government its principal element1 the   
improvement of the people themselves4   
,one of the benefits of freedom is that 
under it the ruler can not pass by the  
people's minds1 and amend their affairs 
for them without amending them4 ,if it  
were possible for the people to be well 
governed in spite of themselves1 their  
good government would last no longer    
than the freedom of a people usually    
lasts who have been liberated by foreign
 arms without their own co-operation4   

,it is true1 a despot may educate the   
people1 and to do so really would be the
 best apology for his despotism4 ,but   
any education which aims at making human
 beings other than machines1 in the long
 run makes them claim to have the       
control of their own actions4 ,the      
leaders of ,french philosophy in the    
eighteenth century had been educated by 
the ,jesuits4 ,even ,jesuit education1  
it seems1 was sufficiently real to call 
forth the appetite for freedom4         
,whatever invigorates the faculties1 in 
however small a measure1 creates an     
increased desire for their more         
unimpeded exercise2 and a popular       
education is a failure if it educates   
the people for any state but that which 
it will certainly induce them to desire1
 and most probably to demand4  ,i am far
 from condemning1 in cases of extreme   
exigency1 the assumption of absolute    
power in the form of a temporary        
dictatorship4 ,free nations have1 in    
times of old1 conferred such power by   

their own choice1 as a necessary        
medicine for diseases of the body       
politic which could not be got rid of by
 less violent means4 ,but its           
acceptance1 even for a time strictly    
limited1 can only be excused1 if1 like  
,solon or ,pittacus1 the dictator       
employs the whole power he assumes in   
removing the obstacles which debar the  
nation from the enjoyment of freedom4 ,a
 good despotism is an altogether false  
ideal1 which practically 7except as a   
means to some temporary purpose7 becomes
 the most senseless and dangerous of    
chimeras4 ,evil for evil1 a good        
despotism1 in a country at all advanced 
in civilization1 is more noxious than a 
bad one1 for it is far more relaxing and
 enervating to the thoughts1 feelings1  
and energies of the people4 ,the        
despotism of ,augustus prepared the     
,romans for ,tiberius4 ,if the whole    
tone of their character had not first   
been prostrated by nearly two           
generations of that mild slavery1 they  

would probably have had spirit enough   
left to rebel against the more odious   
one4  ,there is no difficulty in showing
 that the ideally best form of          
government is that in which the         
sovereignty1 or supreme controlling     
power in the last resort1 is vested in  
the entire aggregate of the community1  
every citizen not only having a voice in
 the exercise of that ultimate          
sovereignty1 but being1 at least        
occasionally1 called on to take an      
actual part in the government by the    
personal discharge of some public       
function1 local or general4  ,to test   
this proposition1 it has to be examined 
in reference to the two branches into   
which1 as pointed out in the last       
chapter1 the inquiry into the goodness  
of a government conveniently divides    
itself1 namely1 how far it promotes the 
good management of the affairs of       
society by means of the existing        
faculties1 moral1 intellectual1 and     
active1 of its various members1 and what

 is its effect in improving or          
deteriorating those faculties4  ,the    
ideally best form of government1 it is  
scarcely necessary to say1 does not mean
 one which is practicable or eligible in
 all states of civilization1 but the one
 which1 in the circumstances in which it
 is practicable and eligible1 is        
attended with the greatest amount of    
beneficial consequences1 immediate and  
prospective4 ,a completely popular      
government is the only polity which can 
make out any claim to this character4   
,it is pre-eminent in both the          
departments between which the excellence
 of a political ,constitution is        
divided4 ,it is both more favorable to  
present good government1 and promotes a 
better and higher form of national      
character than any other polity         
whatsoever4  ,its superiority in        
reference to present well-being rests   
upon two principles1 of as universal    
truth and applicability as any general  
propositions which can be laid down     

respecting human affairs4 ,the first is1
 that the rights and interests of every 
or any person are only secure from being
 disregarded when the person interested 
is himself able1 and habitually disposed
 to stand up for them4 ,the second is1  
that the general prosperity attains a   
greater height1 and is more widely      
diffused1 in proportion to the amount   
and variety of the personal energies    
enlisted in promoting it4  ,putting     
these two propositions into a shape more
 special to their present               
application--human beings are only      
secure from evil at the hands of others 
in proportion as they have the power of 
being1 and are1 self-protecting2 and    
they only achieve a high degree of      
success in their struggle with ,nature  
in proportion as they are               
self-dependent1 relying on what they    
themselves can do1 either separately or 
in concert1 rather than on what others  
do for them4  ,the former               
proposition--that each is the only safe 

guardian of his own rights and          
interests--is one of those elementary   
maxims of prudence which every person   
capable of conducting his own affairs   
implicitly acts upon wherever he himself
 is interested4 ,many1 indeed1 have a   
great dislike to it as a political      
doctrine1 and are fond of holding it up 
to obloquy as a doctrine of universal   
selfishness4 ,to which we may answer1   
that whenever it ceases to be true that 
mankind1 as a rule1 prefer themselves to
 others1 and those nearest to them to   
those more remote1 from that moment     
,communism is not only practicable1 but 
the only defensible form of society1 and
 will1 when that time arrives1 be       
assuredly carried into effect4 ,for my  
own part1 not believing in universal    
selfishness1 ,i have no difficulty in   
admitting that ,communism would even now
 be practicable among the lite of       
mankind1 and may become so among the    
rest4 ,but as this opinion is any thing 
but popular with those defenders of     

existing institutions who find fault    
with the doctrine of the general        
predominance of self-interest1 ,i am    
inclined to think they do in reality    
believe that most men consider          
themselves before other people4 ,it is  
not1 however1 necessary to affirm even  
thus much in order to support the claim 
of all to participate in the sovereign  
power4 ,we need not suppose that when   
power resides in an exclusive class1    
that class will knowingly and           
deliberately sacrifice the other classes
 to themselves3 it suffices that1 in the
 absence of its natural defenders1 the  
interest of the excluded is always in   
danger of being overlooked2 and1 when   
looked at1 is seen with very different  
eyes from those of the persons whom it  
directly concerns4 ,in this country1 for
 example1 what are called the           
working-classes may be considered as    
excluded from all direct participation  
in the government4 ,i do not believe    
that the classes who do participate in  

it have in general any intention of     
sacrificing the working classes to      
themselves4 ,they once had that         
intention2 witness the persevering      
attempts so long made to keep down wages
 by law4 ,but in the present day1 their 
ordinary disposition is the very        
opposite3 they willingly make           
considerable sacrifices1 especially of  
their pecuniary interest1 for the       
benefit of the working classes1 and err 
rather by too lavish and                
indiscriminating beneficence2 nor do ,i 
believe that any rulers in history have 
been actuated by a more sincere desire  
to do their duty towards the poorer     
portion of their countrymen4 ,yet does  
,parliament1 or almost any of the       
members composing it1 ever for an       
instant look at any question with the   
eyes of a working man8 ,when a subject  
arises in which the laborers as such    
have an interest1 is it regarded from   
any point of view but that of the       
employers of labor8 ,i do not say that  

the working men's view of these         
questions is in general nearer to the   
truth than the other1 but it is         
sometimes quite as near2 and in any case
 it ought to be respectfully listened   
to1 instead of being1 as it is1 not     
merely turned away from1 but ignored4   
,on the question of strikes1 for        
instance1 it is doubtful if there is so 
much as one among the leading members of
 either ,house who is not firmly        
convinced that the reason of the matter 
is unqualifiedly on the side of the     
masters1 and that the men's view of it  
is simply absurd4 ,those who have       
studied the question know well how far  
this is from being the case1 and in how 
different1 and how infinitely less      
superficial a manner the point would    
have to be argued1 if the classes who   
strike were able to make themselves     
heard in ,parliament4  ,it is an        
adherent condition of human affairs that
 no intention1 however sincere1 of      
protecting the interests of others can  

make it safe or salutary to tie up their
 own hands4 ,still more obviously true  
is it that by their own hands only can  
any positive and durable improvement of 
their circumstances in life be worked   
out4 ,through the joint influence of    
these two principles1 all free          
communities have both been more exempt  
from social injustice and crime1 and    
have attained more brilliant prosperity 
than any others1 or than they themselves
 after they lost their freedom4         
,contrast the free states of the world1 
while their freedom lasted1 with the    
cotemporary subjects of monarchical or  
oligarchical despotism3 the ,greek      
cities with the ,persian satrapies2 the 
,italian republics and the free towns of
 ,flanders and ,germany1 with the feudal
 monarchies of ,europe2 ,switzerland1   
,holland1 and ,england1 with ,austria or
 ante-revolutionary ,france4 ,their     
superior prosperity was too obvious ever
 to have been gainsayed2 while their    
superiority in good government and      

social relations is proved by the       
prosperity1 and is manifest besides in  
every page of history4 ,if we compare1  
not one age with another1 but the       
different governments which coexisted in
 the same age1 no amount of disorder    
which exaggeration itself can pretend to
 have existed amidst the publicity of   
the free states can be compared for a   
moment with the contemptuous trampling  
upon the mass of the people which       
pervaded the whole life of the          
monarchical countries1 or the disgusting
 individual tyranny which was of more   
than daily occurrence under the systems 
of plunder which they called fiscal     
arrangements1 and in the secrecy of     
their frightful courts of justice4  ,it 
must be acknowledged that the benefits  
of freedom1 so far as they have hitherto
 been enjoyed1 were obtained by the     
extension of its privileges to a part   
only of the community2 and that a       
government in which they are extended   
impartially to all is a desideratum     

still unrealized4 ,but1 though every    
approach to this has an independent     
value1 and in many cases more than an   
approach could not1 in the existing     
state of general improvement1 be made1  
the participation of all in these       
benefits is the ideally perfect         
conception of free government4 ,in      
proportion as any1 no matter who1 are   
excluded from it1 the interests of the  
excluded are left without the guaranty  
accorded to the rest1 and they          
themselves have less scope and          
encouragement than they might otherwise 
have to that exertion of their energies 
for the good of themselves and of the   
community1 to which the general         
prosperity is always proportioned4      
,thus stands the case as regards present
 well-being--the good management of the 
affairs of the existing generation4 ,if 
we now pass to the influence of the form
 of government upon character1 we shall 
find the superiority of popular         
government over every other to be1 if   

possible1 still more decided and        
indisputable4  ,this question really    
depends upon a still more fundamental   
one1 viz41 which of two common types of 
character1 for the general good of      
humanity1 it is most desirable should   
predominate--the active or the passive  
type2 that which struggles against      
evils1 or that which endures them2 that 
which bends to circumstances1 or that   
which endeavours to make circumstances  
bend to itself4  ,the commonplaces of   
moralists and the general sympathies of 
mankind are in favor of the passive     
type4 ,energetic characters may be      
admired1 but the acquiescent and        
submissive are those which most men     
personally prefer4 ,the passiveness of  
our neighbors increases our sense of    
security1 and plays into the hands of   
our wilfulness4 ,passive characters1 if 
we do not happen to need their activity1
 seem an obstruction the less in our own
 path4 ,a contented character is not a  
dangerous rival4 ,yet nothing is more   

certain than that improvement in human  
affairs is wholly the work of the       
uncontented characters2 and1 moreover1  
that it is much easier for an active    
mind to acquire the virtues of patience1
 than for a passive one to assume those 
of energy4  ,of the three varieties of  
mental excellence1 intellectual1        
practical1 and moral1 there never could 
be any doubt in regard to the first two1
 which side had the advantage4 ,all     
intellectual superiority is the fruit of
 active effort4 ,enterprise1 the desire 
to keep moving1 to be trying and        
accomplishing new things for our own    
benefit or that of others1 is the parent
 even of speculative1 and much more of  
practical1 talent4 ,the intellectual    
culture compatible with the other type  
is of that feeble and vague description 
which belongs to a mind that stops at   
amusement or at simple contemplation4   
,the test of real and vigorous thinking1
 the thinking which ascertains truths   
instead of dreaming dreams1 is          

successful application to practice4     
,where that purpose does not exist1 to  
give definiteness1 precision1 and an    
intelligible meaning to thought1 it     
generates nothing better than the       
mystical metaphysics of the             
,pythagoreans or the ,veds4 ,with       
respect to practical improvement1 the   
case is still more evident4 ,the        
character which improves human life is  
that which struggles with natural powers
 and tendencies1 not that which gives   
way to them4 ,the self-benefiting       
qualities are all on the side of the    
active and energetic character1 and the 
habits and conduct which promote the    
advantage of each individual member of  
the community must be at least a part of
 those which conduce most in the end to 
the advancement of the community as a   
whole4  ,but on the point of moral      
preferability1 there seems at first     
sight to be room for doubt4 ,i am not   
referring to the religious feeling which
 has so generally existed in favor of   

the inactive character1 as being more in
 harmony with the submission due to the 
divine will4 ,christianity1 as well as  
other religions1 has fostered this      
sentiment2 but it is the prerogative of 
,christianity1 as regards this and many 
other perversions1 that it is able to   
throw them off4 ,abstractedly from      
religious considerations1 a passive     
character1 which yields to obstacles    
instead of striving to overcome them1   
may not indeed be very useful to others1
 no more than to itself1 but it might be
 expected to be at least inoffensive4   
,contentment is always counted among the
 moral virtues4 ,but it is a complete   
error to suppose that contentment is    
necessarily or naturally attendant on   
passivity of character2 and useless it  
is1 the moral consequences are          
mischievous4 ,where there exists a      
desire for advantages not possessed1 the
 mind which does not potentially possess
 them by means of its own energies is   
apt to look with hatred and malice on   

those who do4 ,the person bestirring    
himself with hopeful prospects to       
improve his circumstances is the one who
 feels good-will towards others engaged 
in1 or who have succeeded in the same   
pursuit4 ,and where the majority are so 
engaged1 those who do not attain the    
object have had the tone given to their 
feelings by the general habit of the    
country1 and ascribe their failure to   
want of effort or opportunity1 or to    
their personal ill luck4 ,but those who1
 while desiring what others possess1 put
 no energy into striving for it1 are    
either incessantly grumbling that       
fortune does not do for them what they  
do not attempt to do for themselves1 or 
overflowing with envy and ill-will      
towards those who possess what they     
would like to have4  ,in proportion as  
success in life is seen or believed to  
be the fruit of fatality or accident and
 not of exertion in that same ratio does
 envy develop itself as a point of      
national character4 ,the most envious of

 all mankind are the ,orientals4 ,in    
,oriental moralists1 in ,oriental tales1
 the envious man is remarkably          
prominent4 ,in real life1 he is the     
terror of all who possess any thing     
desirable1 be it a palace1 a handsome   
child1 or even good health and spirits3 
the supposed effect of his mere look    
constitutes the all-pervading           
superstition of the evil eye4 ,next to  
,orientals in envy1 as in activity1 are 
some of the ,southern ,europeans4 ,the  
,spaniards pursued all their great men  
with it1 embittered their lives1 and    
generally succeeded in putting an early 
stop to their successes4 #a ,with the   
,french1 who are essentially a ,southern
 people1 the double education of        
despotism and ,catholicism has1 in spite
 of their impulsive temperament1 made   
submission and endurance the common     
character of the people1 and their most 
received notion of wisdom and           
excellence2 and if envy of one another1 
and of all superiority1 is not more rife

 among them than it is1 the circumstance
 must be ascribed to the many valuable  
counteracting elements in the ,french   
character1 and most of all to the great 
individual energy which1 though less    
persistent and more intermittent than in
 the self-helping and struggling        
,anglo-,saxons1 has nevertheless        
manifested itself among the ,french in  
nearly every direction in which the     
operation of their institutions has been
 favorable to it4  ,there are1 no doubt1
 in all countries1 really contented     
characters1 who not merely do not seek1 
but do not desire1 what they do not     
already possess1 and these naturally    
bear no ill-will towards such as have   
apparently a more favored lot4 ,but the 
great mass of seeming contentment is    
real discontent1 combined with indolence
 or self-indulgence1 which1 while taking
 no legitimate means of raising itself1 
delights in bringing others down to its 
own level4 ,and if we look narrowly even
 at the cases of innocent contentment1  

we perceive that they only win our      
admiration when the indifference is     
solely to improvement in outward        
circumstances1 and there is a striving  
for perpetual advancement in spiritual  
worth1 or at least a disinterested zeal 
to benefit others4 ,the contented man1  
or the contented family1 who have no    
ambition to make any one else happier1  
to promote the good of their country or 
their neighborhood1 or to improve       
themselves in moral excellence1 excite  
in us neither admiration nor approval4  
,we rightly ascribe this sort of        
contentment to mere unmanliness and want
 of spirit4 ,the content which we       
approve is an ability to do cheerfully  
without what can not be had1 a just     
appreciation of the comparative value of
 different objects of desire1 and a     
willing renunciation of the less when   
incompatible with the greater4 ,these1  
however1 are excellences more natural to
 the character1 in proportion as it is  
actively engaged in the attempt to      

improve its own or some other lot4 ,he  
who is continually measuring his energy 
against difficulties1 learns what are   
the difficulties insuperable to him1 and
 what are those which1 though he might  
overcome1 the success is not worth the  
cost4 ,he whose thoughts and activities 
are all needed for1 and habitually      
employed in1 practicable and useful     
enterprises1 is the person of all others
 least likely to let his mind dwell with
 brooding discontent upon things either 
not worth attaining1 or which are not so
 to him4 ,thus the active1 self-helping 
character is not only intrinsically the 
best1 but is the likeliest to acquire   
all that is really excellent or         
desirable in the opposite type4  ,the   
striving1 go-ahead character of ,england
 and the ,united ,states is only a fit  
subject of disapproving criticism on    
account of the very secondary objects on
 which it commonly expends its strength4
 ,in itself it is the foundation of the 
best hopes for the general improvement  

of mankind4 ,it has been acutely        
remarked that whenever any thing goes   
amiss1 the habitual impulse of ,french  
people is to say1 ,il faut de la        
patience2 and of ,english people1 ,what 
a shame6 ,the people who think it a     
shame when any thing goes wrong--who    
rush to the conclusion that the evil    
could and ought to have been prevented1 
are those who1 in the long run1 do most 
to make the world better4 ,if the       
desires are low placed1 if they extend  
to little beyond physical comfort1 and  
the show of riches1 the immediate       
results of the energy will not be much  
more than the continual extension of    
man's power over material objects2 but  
even this makes room1 and prepares the  
mechanical appliances for the greatest  
intellectual and social achievements2   
and while the energy is there1 some     
persons will apply it1 and it will be   
applied more and more1 to the           
perfecting1 not of outward circumstances
 alone1 but of man's inward nature4     

,inactivity1 unaspiringness1 absence of 
desire1 are a more fatal hindrance to   
improvement than any misdirection of    
energy1 and is that through which alone1
 when existing in the mass1 any very    
formidable misdirection by an energetic 
few becomes possible4 ,it is this1      
mainly1 which retains in a savage or    
semi-savage state the great majority of 
the human race4  ,now there can be no   
kind of doubt that the passive type of  
character is favored by the government  
of one or a few1 and the active         
self-helping type by that of the many4  
,irresponsible rulers need the          
quiescence of the ruled more than they  
need any activity but that which they   
can compel4 ,submissiveness to the      
prescriptions of men as necessities of  
nature is the lesson inculcated by all  
governments upon those who are wholly   
without participation in them4 ,the will
 of superiors1 and the law as the will  
of superiors1 must be passively yielded 
to4 ,but no men are mere instruments or 

materials in the hands of their rulers  
who have will1 or spirit1 or a spring of
 internal activity in the rest of their 
proceedings1 and any manifestation of   
these qualities1 instead of receiving   
encouragement from despots1 has to get  
itself forgiven by them4 ,even when     
irresponsible rulers are not            
sufficiently conscious of danger from   
the mental activity of their subjects to
 be desirous of repressing it1 the      
position itself is a repression4        
,endeavour is even more effectually     
restrained by the certainty of its      
impotence than by any positive          
discouragement4 ,between subjection to  
the will of others and the virtues of   
self-help and self-government there is a
 natural incompatibility4 ,this is more 
or less complete according as the       
bondage is strained or relaxed4 ,rulers 
differ very much in the length to which 
they carry the control of the free      
agency of their subjects1 or the        
supersession of it by managing their    

business for them4 ,but the difference  
is in degree1 not in principle2 and the 
best despots often go the greatest      
lengths in chaining up the free agency  
of their subjects4 ,a bad despot1 when  
his own personal indulgences have been  
provided for1 may sometimes be willing  
to let the people alone2 but a good     
despot insists on doing them good by    
making them do their own business in a  
better way than they themselves know of4
 ,the regulations which restricted to   
fixed processes all the leading branches
 of ,french manufactures were the work  
of the great ,colbert4  ,very different 
is the state of the human faculties     
where a human being feels himself under 
no other external restraint than the    
necessities of nature1 or mandates of   
society which he has his share in       
imposing1 and which it is open to him1  
if he thinks them wrong1 publicly to    
dissent from1 and exert himself actively
 to get altered4 ,no doubt1 under a     
government partially popular1 this      

freedom may be exercised even by those  
who are not partakers in the full       
privileges of citizenship2 but it is a  
great additional stimulus to any one's  
self-help and self-reliance when he     
starts from even ground1 and has not to 
feel that his success depends on the    
impression he can make upon the         
sentiments and dispositions of a body of
 whom he is not one4 ,it is a great     
discouragement to an individual1 and a  
still greater one to a class1 to be left
 out of the constitution2 to be reduced 
to plead from outside the door to the   
arbiters of their destiny1 not taken    
into consultation within4 ,the maximum  
of the invigorating effect of freedom   
upon the character is only obtained when
 the person acted on either is1 or is   
looking forward to becoming1 a citizen  
as fully privileged as any other4 ,what 
is still more important than even this  
matter of feeling is the practical      
discipline which the character obtains  
from the occasional demand made upon the

 citizens to exercise1 for a time and in
 their turn1 some social function4 ,it  
is not sufficiently considered how      
little there is in most men's ordinary  
life to give any largeness either to    
their conceptions or to their           
sentiments4 ,their work is a routine2   
not a labor of love1 but of             
self-interest in the most elementary    
form1 the satisfaction of daily wants2  
neither the thing done1 nor the process 
of doing it1 introduces the mind to     
thoughts or feelings extending beyond   
individuals2 if instructive books are   
within their reach1 there is no stimulus
 to read them2 and1 in most cases1 the  
individual has no access to any person  
of cultivation much superior to his own4
 ,giving him something to do for the    
public supplies1 in a measure1 all these
 deficiencies4 ,if circumstances allow  
the amount of public duty assigned him  
to be considerable1 it makes him an     
educated man4 ,notwithstanding the      
defects of the social system and moral  

ideas of antiquity1 the practice of the 
dicastery and the ecclesia raised the   
intellectual standard of an average     
,athenian citizen far beyond any thing  
of which there is yet an example in any 
other mass of men1 ancient or modern4   
,the proofs of this are apparent in     
every page of our great historian of    
,greece2 but we need scarcely look      
further than to the high quality of the 
addresses which their great orators     
deemed best calculated to act with      
effect on their understanding and will4 
,a benefit of the same kind1 though far 
less in degree1 is produced on          
,englishmen of the lower middle class by
 their liability to be placed on juries 
and to serve parish offices1 which1     
though it does not occur to so many1 nor
 is so continuous1 nor introduces them  
to so great a variety of elevated       
considerations as to admit of comparison
 with the public education which every  
citizen of ,athens obtained from her    
democratic institutions1 makes them     

nevertheless very different beings1 in  
range of ideas and development of       
faculties1 from those who have done     
nothing in their lives but drive a      
quill1 or sell goods over a counter4    
,still more salutary is the moral part  
of the instruction afforded by the      
participation of the private citizen1 if
 even rarely1 in public functions4 ,he  
is called upon1 while so engaged1 to    
weigh interests not his own2 to be      
guided1 in case of conflicting claims1  
by another rule than his private        
partialities2 to apply1 at every turn1  
principles and maxims which have for    
their reason of existence the general   
good2 and he usually finds associated   
with him in the same work minds more    
familiarized than his own with these    
ideas and operations1 whose study it    
will be to supply reasons to his        
understanding1 and stimulation to his   
feeling for the general interest4 ,he is
 made to feel himself one of the public1
 and whatever is their interest to be   

his interest4 ,where this school of     
public spirit does not exist1 scarcely  
any sense is entertained that private   
persons1 in no eminent social situation1
 owe any duties to society except to    
obey the laws and submit to the         
government4 ,there is no unselfish      
sentiment of identification with the    
public4 ,every thought or feeling1      
either of interest or of duty1 is       
absorbed in the individual and in the   
family4 ,the man never thinks of any    
collective interest1 of any objects to  
be pursued jointly with others1 but only
 in competition with them1 and in some  
measure at their expense4 ,a neighbor1  
not being an ally or an associate1 since
 he is never engaged in any common      
undertaking for joint benefit1 is       
therefore only a rival4 ,thus even      
private morality suffers1 while public  
is actually extinct4 ,were this the     
universal and only possible state of    
things1 the utmost aspirations of the   
lawgiver or the moralist could only     

stretch to make the bulk of the         
community a flock of sheep innocently   
nibbling the grass side by side4  ,from 
these accumulated considerations1 it is 
evident that the only government which  
can fully satisfy all the exigencies of 
the social state is one in which the    
whole people participate2 that any      
participation1 even in the smallest     
public function1 is useful2 that the    
participation should every where be as  
great as the general degree of          
improvement of the community will allow2
 and that nothing less can be ultimately
 desirable than the admission of all to 
a share in the sovereign power of the   
state4 ,but since all can not1 in a     
community exceeding a single small town1
 participate personally in any but some 
very minor portions of the public       
business1 it follows that the ideal type
 of a perfect government must be        
representative4    ,chapter ,,iv--,under
 what ,social ,conditions               
,representative ,government is          

,inapplicable4   ,we have recognized in 
representative government the ideal type
 of the most perfect polity for which1  
in consequence1 any portion of mankind  
are better adapted in proportion to     
their degree of general improvement4 ,as
 they range lower and lower in          
development1 that form of government    
will be1 generally speaking1 less       
suitable to them1 though this is not    
true universally2 for the adaptation of 
a people to representative government   
does not depend so much upon the place  
they occupy in the general scale of     
humanity as upon the degree in which    
they possess certain special requisites2
 requisites1 however1 so closely        
connected with their degree of general  
advancement1 that any variation between 
the two is rather the exception than the
 rule4 ,let us examine at what point in 
the descending series representative    
government ceases altogether to be      
admissible1 either through its own      
unfitness or the superior fitness of    

some other regimen4  ,first1 then1      
representative1 like any other          
government1 must be unsuitable in any   
case in which it can not permanently    
subsist--i4e41 in which it does not     
fulfill the three fundamental conditions
 enumerated in the first chapter4 ,these
 were1 #a4 ,that the people should be   
willing to receive it4 #b4 ,that they   
should be willing and able to do what is
 necessary for its preservation4 #c4    
,that they should be willing and able to
 fulfill the duties and discharge the   
functions which it imposes on them4     
,the willingness of the people to accept
 representative government only becomes 
a practical question when an enlightened
 ruler1 or a foreign nation or nations  
who have gained power over the country1 
are disposed to offer it the boon4 ,to  
individual reformers the question is    
almost irrelevant1 since1 if no other   
objection can be made to their          
enterprise than that the opinion of the 
nation is not yet on their side1 they   

have the ready and proper answer1 that  
to bring it over to their side is the   
very end they aim at4 ,when opinion is  
really adverse1 its hostility is usually
 to the fact of change rather than to   
representative government in itself4    
,the contrary case is not indeed        
unexampled2 there has sometimes been a  
religious repugnance to any limitation  
of the power of a particular line of    
rulers2 but1 in general1 the doctrine of
 passive obedience meant only submission
 to the will of the powers that be1     
whether monarchical or popular4 ,in any 
case in which the attempt to introduce  
representative government is at all     
likely to be made1 indifference to it1  
and inability to understand its         
processes and requirements1 rather than 
positive opposition1 are the obstacles  
to be expected4 ,these1 however1 are as 
fatal1 and may be as hard to be got rid 
of as actual aversion2 it being easier1 
in most cases1 to change the direction  
of an active feeling than to create one 

in a state previously passive4 ,when a  
people have no sufficient value for1 and
 attachment to1 a representative        
constitution1 they have next to no      
chance of retaining it4 ,in every       
country1 the executive is the branch of 
the government which wields the         
immediate power1 and is in direct       
contact with the public2 to it1         
principally1 the hopes and fears of     
individuals are directed1 and by it both
 the benefits1 and the terrors1 and     
prestige of government are mainly       
represented to the public eye4 ,unless1 
therefore1 the authorities whose office 
it is to check the executive are backed 
by an effective opinion and feeling in  
the country1 the executive has always   
the means of setting them aside or      
compelling them to subservience1 and is 
sure to be well supported in doing so4  
,representative institutions necessarily
 depend for permanence upon the         
readiness of the people to fight for    
them in case of their being endangered4 

,if too little valued for this1 they    
seldom obtain a footing at all1 and if  
they do1 are almost sure to be          
overthrown as soon as the head of the   
government1 or any party leader who can 
muster force for a coup de main1 is     
willing to run some small risk for      
absolute power4  ,these considerations  
relate to the first two causes of       
failure in a representative government4 
,the third is when the people want      
either the will or the capacity to      
fulfill the part which belongs to them  
in a representative constitution4 ,when 
nobody1 or only some small fraction1    
feels the degree of interest in the     
general affairs of the state necessary  
to the formation of a public opinion1   
the electors will seldom make any use of
 the right of suffrage but to serve     
their private interest1 or the interest 
of their locality1 or of some one with  
whom they are connected as adherents or 
dependents4 ,the small class who1 in    
this state of public feeling1 gain the  

command of the representative body1 for 
the most part use it solely as a means  
of seeking their fortune4 ,if the       
executive is weak1 the country is       
distracted by mere struggles for place2 
if strong1 it makes itself despotic1 at 
the cheap price of appeasing the        
representatives1 or such of them as are 
capable of giving trouble1 by a share of
 the spoil2 and the only fruit produced 
by national representation is1 that in  
addition to those who really govern1    
there is an assembly quartered on the   
public1 and no abuse in which a portion 
of the assembly are interested is at all
 likely to be removed4 ,when1 however1  
the evil stops here1 the price may be   
worth paying for the publicity and      
discussion which1 though not an         
invariable1 are a natural accompaniment 
of any1 even nominal1 representation4   
,in the modern kingdom of ,greece1 for  
example1 it can hardly be doubted1 that 
the place-hunters who chiefly compose   
the representative assembly1 though they

 contribute little or nothing directly  
to good government1 nor even much temper
 the arbitrary power of the executive1  
yet keep up the idea of popular rights1 
and conduce greatly to the real liberty 
of the press which exists in that       
country4 ,this benefit1 however1 is     
entirely dependent on the coexistence   
with the popular body of an hereditary  
king4 ,if1 instead of struggling for the
 favors of the chief ruler1 these       
selfish and sordid factions struggled   
for the chief place itself1 they would  
certainly1 as in ,spanish ,america1 keep
 the country in a state of chronic      
revolution and civil war4 ,a despotism1 
not even legal1 but of illegal violence1
 would be alternately exercised by a    
succession of political adventurers1 and
 the name and forms of representation   
would have no effect but to prevent     
despotism from attaining the stability  
and security by which alone its evils   
can be mitigated or its few advantages  
realized4  ,the preceding are the cases 

in which representative government can  
not permanently exist4 ,there are others
 in which it possibly might exist1 but  
in which some other form of government  
would be preferable4 ,these are         
principally when the people1 in order to
 advance in civilization1 have some     
lesson to learn1 some habit not yet     
acquired1 to the acquisition of which   
representative government is likely to  
be an impediment4  ,the most obvious of 
these cases is the one already          
considered1 in which the people have    
still to learn the first lesson of      
civilization1 that of obedience4 ,a race
 who have been trained in energy and    
courage by struggles with ,nature and   
their neighbors1 but who have not yet   
settled down into permanent obedience to
 any common superior1 would be little   
likely to acquire this habit under the  
collective government of their own body4
 ,a representative assembly drawn from  
among themselves would simply reflect   
their own turbulent insubordination4 ,it

 would refuse its authority to all      
proceedings which would impose1 on their
 savage independence1 any improving     
restraint4 ,the mode in which such      
tribes are usually brought to submit to 
the primary conditions of civilized     
society is through the necessities of   
warfare1 and the despotic authority     
indispensable to military command4 ,a   
military leader is the only superior to 
whom they will submit1 except           
occasionally some prophet supposed to be
 inspired from above1 or conjurer       
regarded as possessing miraculous power4
 ,these may exercise a temporary        
ascendancy1 but as it is merely         
personal1 it rarely effects any change  
in the general habits of the people1    
unless the prophet1 like ,mohammed1 is  
also a military chief1 and goes forth   
the armed apostle of a new religion2 or 
unless the military chiefs ally         
themselves with his influence1 and turn 
it into a prop for their own government4
  ,a people are no less unfitted for    

representative government by the        
contrary fault to that last             
specified--by extreme passiveness1 and  
ready submission to tyranny4 ,if a      
people thus prostrated by character and 
circumstances could obtain              
representative institutions1 they would 
inevitably choose their tyrants as their
 representatives1 and the yoke would be 
made heavier on them by the contrivance 
which prim facie might be expected to   
lighten it4 ,on the contrary1 many a    
people has gradually emerged from this  
condition by the aid of a central       
authority1 whose position has made it   
the rival1 and has ended by making it   
the master1 of the local despots1 and   
which1 above all1 has been single4      
,french history1 from ,hugh ,capet to   
,richelieu and ,louis ,,xiv41 is a      
continued example of this course of     
things4 ,even when the king was scarcely
 so powerful as many of his chief       
feudatories1 the great advantage which  
he derived from being but one has been  

recognized by ,french historians4 ,to   
him the eyes of all the locally         
oppressed were turned2 he was the object
 of hope and reliance throughout the    
kingdom1 while each local potentate was 
only powerful within a more or less     
confined space4 ,at his hands1 refuge   
and protection were sought from every   
part of the country against first one1  
then another of the immediate           
oppressors4 ,his progress to ascendancy 
was slow2 but it resulted from          
successively taking advantage of        
opportunities which offered themselves  
only to him4 ,it was1 therefore1 sure2  
and1 in proportion as it was            
accomplished1 it abated1 in the         
oppressed portion of the community1 the 
habit of submitting to oppression4 ,the 
king's interest lay in encouraging all  
partial attempts on the part of the     
serfs to emancipate themselves from     
their masters1 and place themselves in  
immediate subordination to himself4     
,under his protection numerous          

communities were formed which knew no   
one above them but the king4 ,obedience 
to a distant monarch is liberty itself  
compared with the dominion of the lord  
of the neighboring castle2 and the      
monarch was long compelled by           
necessities of position to exert his    
authority as the ally rather than the   
master of the classes whom he had aided 
in affecting their liberation4 ,in this 
manner a central power1 despotic in     
principle1 though generally much        
restricted in practice1 was mainly      
instrumental in carrying the people     
through a necessary stage of            
improvement1 which representative       
government1 if real1 would most likely  
have prevented them from entering upon4 
,there are parts of ,europe where the   
same work is still to be done1 and no   
prospect of its being done by any other 
means4 ,nothing short of despotic rule  
or a general massacre could effect the  
emancipation of the serfs in the        
,russian ,empire4  ,the same passages of

 history forcibly illustrate another    
mode in which unlimited monarchy        
overcomes obstacles to the progress of  
civilization which representative       
government would have had a decided     
tendency to aggravate4 ,one of the      
strongest hindrances to improvement1 up 
to a rather advanced stage1 is an       
inveterate spirit of locality4 ,portions
 of mankind1 in many other respects     
capable of1 and prepared for freedom1   
may be unqualified for amalgamating into
 even the smallest nation4 ,not only may
 jealousies and antipathies repel them  
from one another1 and bar all           
possibility of voluntary union1 but they
 may not yet have acquired any of the   
feelings or habits which would make the 
union real1 supposing it to be nominally
 accomplished4 ,they may1 like the      
citizens of an ancient community1 or    
those of an ,asiatic village1 have had  
considerable practice in exercising     
their faculties on village or town      
interests1 and have even realized a     

tolerably effective popular government  
on that restricted scale1 and may yet   
have but slender sympathies with any    
thing beyond1 and no habit or capacity  
of dealing with interests common to many
 such communities4 ,i am not aware that 
history furnishes any example in which a
 number of these political atoms or     
corpuscles have coalesced into a body1  
and learned to feel themselves one      
people1 except through previous         
subjection to a central authority common
 to all4 #b ,it is through the habit of 
deferring to that authority1 entering   
into its plans and subserving its       
purposes1 that a people such as we have 
supposed receive into their minds the   
conception of large interests common to 
a considerable geographical extent4     
,such interests1 on the contrary1 are   
necessarily the predominant             
consideration in the mind of the central
 ruler2 and through the relations1 more 
or less intimate1 which he progressively
 establishes with the localities1 they  

become familiar to the general mind4    
,the most favorable concurrence of      
circumstances under which this step in  
improvement could be made would be one  
which should raise up representative    
institutions without representative     
government2 a representative body or    
bodies1 drawn from the localities1      
making itself the auxiliary and         
instrument of the central power1 but    
seldom attempting to thwart or control  
it4 ,the people being thus taken1 as it 
were1 into council1 though not sharing  
the supreme power1 the political        
education given by the central authority
 is carried home1 much more effectually 
than it could otherwise be1 to the local
 chiefs and to the population generally1
 while1 at the same time1 a tradition is
 kept up of government by general       
consent1 or at least1 the sanction of   
tradition is not given to government    
without it1 which1 when consecrated by  
custom1 has so often put a bad end to a 
good beginning1 and is one of the most  

frequent causes of the sad fatality     
which in most countries has stopped     
improvement in so early a stage1 because
 the work of some one period has been so
 done as to bar the needful work of the 
ages following4 ,meanwhile1 it may be   
laid down as a political truth1 that by 
irresponsible monarchy rather than by   
representative government can a         
multitude of insignificant political    
units be welded into a people1 with     
common feelings of cohesion1 power      
enough to protect itself against        
conquest or foreign aggression1 and     
affairs sufficiently various and        
considerable of its own to occupy       
worthily and expand to fit proportions  
the social and political intelligence of
 the population4  ,for these several    
reasons1 kingly government1 free from   
the control 7though perhaps strengthened
 by the support7 of representative      
institutions1 is the most suitable form 
of polity for the earliest stages of any
 community1 not excepting a city        

community like those of ancient ,greece2
 where1 accordingly1 the government of  
kings1 under some real1 but no          
ostensible or constitutional control by 
public opinion1 did historically precede
 by an unknown and probably great       
duration all free institutions1 and gave
 place at last1 during a considerable   
lapse of time1 to oligarchies of a few  
families4  ,a hundred other infirmities 
or shortcomings in a people might be    
pointed out which pro tanto disqualify  
them from making the best use of        
representative government2 but in regard
 to these it is not equally obvious that
 the government of ,one or a ,few would 
have any tendency to cure or alleviate  
the evil4 ,strong prejudices of any     
kind2 obstinate adherence to old habits2
 positive defects of national character1
 or mere ignorance1 and deficiency of   
mental cultivation1 if prevalent in a   
people1 will be in general faithfully   
reflected in their representative       
assemblies2 and should it happen that   

the executive administration1 the direct
 management of public affairs1 is in the
 hands of persons comparatively free    
from these defects1 more good would     
frequently be done by them when not     
hampered by the necessity of carrying   
with them the voluntary assent of such  
bodies4 ,but the mere position of the   
rulers does not in these1 as it does in 
the other cases which we have examined1 
of itself invest them with interests and
 tendencies operating in the beneficial 
direction4 ,from the general weaknesses 
of the people or of the state of        
civilization1 the ,one and his          
councillors1 or the ,few1 are not likely
 to be habitually exempt2 except in the 
case of their being foreigners1         
belonging to a superior people or a more
 advanced state of society4 ,then1      
indeed1 the rulers may be1 to almost any
 extent1 superior in civilization to    
those over whom they rule2 and          
subjection to a foreign government of   
this description1 notwithstanding its   

inevitable evils1 is often of the       
greatest advantage to a people1 carrying
 them rapidly through several stages of 
progress1 and clearing away obstacles to
 improvement which might have lasted    
indefinitely if the subject population  
had been left unassisted to its native  
tendencies and chances4 ,in a country   
not under the dominion of foreigners1   
the only cause adequate to producing    
similar benefits is the rare accident of
 a monarch of extraordinary genius4     
,there have been in history a few of    
these who1 happily for humanity1 have   
reigned long enough to render some of   
their improvements permanent1 by leaving
 them under the guardianship of a       
generation which had grown up under     
their influence4 ,charlemagne may be    
cited as one instance2 ,peter the ,great
 is another4 ,such examples however are 
so unfrequent that they can only be     
classed with the happy accidents which  
have so often decided at a critical     
moment whether some leading portion of  

humanity should make a sudden start1 or 
sink back towards barbarism--chances    
like the existence of ,themistocles at  
the time of the ,persian invasion1 or of
 the first or third ,william of ,orange4
 ,it would be absurd to construct       
institutions for the mere purpose of    
taking advantage of such possibilities1 
especially as men of this calibre1 in   
any distinguished position1 do not      
require despotic power to enable them to
 exert great influence1 as is evidenced 
by the three last mentioned4 ,the case  
most requiring consideration in         
reference to institutions is the not    
very uncommon one in which a small but  
leading portion of the population1 from 
difference of race1 more civilized      
origin1 or other peculiarities of       
circumstance1 are markedly superior in  
civilization and general character to   
the remainder4 ,under those conditions1 
government by the representatives of the
 mass would stand a chance of depriving 
them of much of the benefit they might  

derive from the greater civilization of 
the superior ranks1 while government by 
the representatives of those ranks would
 probably rivet the degradation of the  
multitude1 and leave them no hope of    
decent treatment except by ridding      
themselves of one of the most valuable  
elements of future advancement4 ,the    
best prospect of improvement for a      
people thus composed lies in the        
existence of a constitutionally         
unlimited1 or at least a practically    
preponderant authority in the chief     
ruler of the dominant class4 ,he alone  
has by his position an interest in      
raising and improving the mass1 of whom 
he is not jealous1 as a counterpoise to 
his associates1 of whom he is2 and if   
fortunate circumstances place beside    
him1 not as controllers but as          
subordinates1 a body representative of  
the superior caste1 which1 by its       
objections and questionings1 and by its 
occasional outbreaks of spirit1 keeps   
alive habits of collective resistance1  

and may admit of being1 in time and by  
degrees1 expanded into a really national
 representation 7which is in substance  
the history of the ,english             
,parliament71 the nation has then the   
most favorable prospects of improvement 
which can well occur to a community thus
 circumstanced and constituted4  ,among 
the tendencies which1 without absolutely
 rendering a people unfit for           
representative government1 seriously    
incapacitate them from reaping the full 
benefit of it1 one deserves particular  
notice4 ,there are two states of the    
inclinations1 intrinsically very        
different1 but which have something in  
common1 by virtue of which they often   
coincide in the direction they give to  
the efforts of individuals and of       
nations2 one is1 the desire to exercise 
power over others2 the other is         
disinclination to have power exercised  
over themselves4 ,the difference between
 different portions of mankind in the   
relative strength of these two          

dispositions is one of the most         
important elements in their history4    
,there are nations in whom the passion  
for governing others is so much stronger
 than the desire of personal            
independence1 that for the mere shadow  
of the one they are found ready to      
sacrifice the whole of the other4 ,each 
one of their number is willing1 like the
 private soldier in an army1 to abdicate
 his personal freedom of action into the
 hands of his general1 provided the army
 is triumphant and victorious1 and he is
 able to flatter himself that he is one 
of a conquering host1 though the notion 
that he has himself any share in the    
domination exercised over the conquered 
is an illusion4 ,a government strictly  
limited in its powers and attributions1 
required to hold its hands from         
overmeddling1 and to let most things go 
on without its assuming the part of     
guardian or director1 is not to the     
taste of such a people2 in their eyes   
the possessors of authority can hardly  

take too much upon themselves1 provided 
the authority itself is open to general 
competition4 ,an average individual     
among them prefers the chance1 however  
distant or improbable1 of wielding some 
share of power over his fellow-citizens1
 above the certainty1 to himself and    
others1 of having no unnecessary power  
exercised over them4 ,these are the     
elements of a people of place-hunters1  
in whom the course of politics is mainly
 determined by place-hunting2 where     
equality alone is cared for1 but not    
liberty2 where the contests of political
 parties are but struggles to decide    
whether the power of meddling in every  
thing shall belong to one class or      
another1 perhaps merely to one knot of  
public men or another2 where the idea   
entertained of democracy is merely that 
of opening offices to the competition of
 all instead of a few2 where1 the more  
popular the institutions1 the more      
innumerable are the places created1 and 
the more monstrous the overgovernment   

exercised by all over each1 and by the  
executive over all4 ,it would be as     
unjust as it would be ungenerous to     
offer this1 or any thing approaching to 
it1 as an unexaggerated picture of the  
,french people2 yet the degree in which 
they do participate in this type of     
character has caused representative     
government by a limited class to break  
down by excess of corruption1 and the   
attempt at representative government by 
the whole male population to end in     
giving one man the power of consigning  
any number of the rest1 without trial1  
to ,lambessa or ,cayenne1 provided he   
allows all of them to think themselves  
not excluded from the possibility of    
sharing his favors4 ,the point of       
character which1 beyond any other1 fits 
the people of this country for          
representative government1 is that they 
have almost universally the contrary    
characteristic4 ,they are very jealous  
of any attempt to exercise power over   
them not sanctioned by long usage and by

 their own opinion of right2 but they in
 general care very little for the       
exercise of power over others4 ,not     
having the smallest sympathy with the   
passion for governing1 while they are   
but too well acquainted with the motives
 of private interest from which that    
office is sought1 they prefer that it   
should be performed by those to whom it 
comes without seeking1 as a consequence 
of social position4 ,if foreigners      
understood this1 it would account to    
them for some of the apparent           
contradictions in the political feelings
 of ,englishmen2 their unhesitating     
readiness to let themselves be governed 
by the higher classes1 coupled with so  
little personal subservience to them1   
that no people are so fond of resisting 
authority when it oversteps certain     
prescribed limits1 or so determined to  
make their rulers always remember that  
they will only be governed in the way   
they themselves like best4              
,place-hunting1 accordingly1 is a form  

of ambition to which the ,english1      
considered nationally1 are almost       
strangers4 ,if we except the few        
families or connections of whom official
 employment lies directly in the way1   
,englishmen's views of advancement in   
life take an altogether different       
direction--that of success in business  
or in a profession4 ,they have the      
strongest distaste for any mere struggle
 for office by political parties or     
individuals2 and there are few things to
 which they have a greater aversion than
 to the multiplication of public        
employments2 a thing1 on the contrary1  
always popular with the                 
bureaucracy-ridden nations of the       
,continent1 who would rather pay higher 
taxes than diminish1 by the smallest    
fraction1 their individual chances of a 
place for themselves or their relatives1
 and among whom a cry for retrenchment  
never means abolition of offices1 but   
the reduction of the salaries of those  
which are too considerable for the      

ordinary citizen to have any chance of  
being appointed to them4    ,chapter    
,v--,of the ,proper ,functions of       
,representative ,bodies4   ,in treating 
of representative government1 it is     
above all necessary to keep in view the 
distinction between its idea or essence1
 and the particular forms in which the  
idea has been clothed by accidental     
historical developments1 or by the      
notions current at some particular      
period4  ,the meaning of representative 
government is1 that the whole people1 or
 some numerous portion of them1 exercise
 through deputies periodically elected  
by themselves the ultimate controlling  
power1 which1 in every constitution1    
must reside somewhere4 ,this ultimate   
power they must possess in all its      
completeness4 ,they must be masters1    
whenever they please1 of all the        
operations of government4 ,there is no  
need that the constitutional law should 
itself give them this mastery4 ,it does 
not in the ,british ,constitution4 ,but 

what it does give practically amounts to
 this3 the power of final control is as 
essentially single1 in a mixed and      
balanced government1 as in a pure       
monarchy or democracy4 ,this is the     
portion of truth in the opinion of the  
ancients1 revived by great authorities  
in our own time1 that a balanced        
constitution is impossible4 ,there is   
almost always a balance1 but the scales 
never hang exactly even4 ,which of them 
preponderates is not always apparent on 
the face of the political institutions4 
,in the ,british ,constitution1 each of 
the three co-ordinate members of the    
sovereignty is invested with powers     
which1 if fully exercised1 would enable 
it to stop all the machinery of         
government4 ,nominally1 therefore1 each 
is invested with equal power of         
thwarting and obstructing the others2   
and if1 by exerting that power1 any of  
the three could hope to better its      
position1 the ordinary course of human  
affairs forbids us to doubt that the    

power would be exercised4 ,there can be 
no question that the full powers of each
 would be employed defensively if it    
found itself assailed by one or both of 
the others4 ,what1 then1 prevents the   
same powers from being exerted          
aggressively8 ,the unwritten maxims of  
the ,constitution--in other words1 the  
positive political morality of the      
country2 and this positive political    
morality is what we must look to if we  
would know in whom the really supreme   
power in the ,constitution resides4  ,by
 constitutional law1 the crown can      
refuse its assent to any act of         
,parliament1 and can appoint to office  
and maintain in it any minister1 in     
opposition to the remonstrances of      
,parliament4 ,but the constitutional    
morality of the country nullifies these 
powers1 preventing them from being ever 
used2 and1 by requiring that the head of
 the administration should always be    
virtually appointed by the ,house of    
,commons1 makes that body the real      

sovereign of the state4  ,these         
unwritten rules1 which limit the use of 
lawful powers1 are1 however1 only       
effectual1 and maintain themselves in   
existence on condition of harmonising   
with the actual distribution of real    
political strength4 ,there is in every  
constitution a strongest power--one     
which would gain the victory if the     
compromises by which the ,constitution  
habitually works were suspended1 and    
there came a trial of strength4         
,constitutional maxims are adhered to1  
and are practically operative1 so long  
as they give the predominance in the    
,constitution to that one of the powers 
which has the preponderance of active   
power out of doors4 ,this1 in ,england1 
is the popular power4 ,if1 therefore1   
the legal provisions of the ,british    
,constitution1 together with the        
unwritten maxims by which the conduct of
 the different political authorities is 
in fact regulated1 did not give to the  
popular element in the ,constitution    

that substantial supremacy over every   
department of the government which      
corresponds to its real power in the    
country1 the ,constitution would not    
possess the stability which             
characterizes it2 either the laws or the
 unwritten maxims would soon have to be 
changed4 ,the ,british government is    
thus a representative government in the 
correct sense of the term2 and the      
powers which it leaves in hands not     
directly accountable to the people can  
only be considered as precautions which 
the ruling power is willing should be   
taken against its own errors4 ,such     
precautions have existed in all         
well-constructed democracies4 ,the      
,athenian ,constitution had many such   
provisions1 and so has that of the      
,united ,states4  ,but while it is      
essential to representative government  
that the practical supremacy in the     
state should reside in the              
representatives of the people1 it is an 
open question what actual functions1    

what precise part in the machinery of   
government1 shall be directly and       
personally discharged by the            
representative body4 ,great varieties in
 this respect are compatible with the   
essence of representative government1   
provided the functions are such as      
secure to the representative body the   
control of every thing in the last      
resort4  ,there is a radical distinction
 between controlling the business of    
government and actually doing it4 ,the  
same person or body may be able to      
control every thing1 but can not        
possibly do every thing2 and in many    
cases its control over every thing will 
be more perfect the less it personally  
attempts to do4 ,the commander of an    
army could not direct its movements     
effectually if he himself fought in the 
ranks or led an assault4 ,it is the same
 with bodies of men4 ,some things can   
not be done except by bodies2 other     
things can not be well done by them4 ,it
 is one question1 therefore1 what a     

popular assembly should control1 another
 what it should itself do4 ,it should1  
as we have already seen1 control all the
 operations of government4 ,but1 in     
order to determine through what channel 
this general control may most           
expediently be exercised1 and what      
portion of the business of government   
the representative assembly should hold 
in its own hands1 it is necessary to    
consider what kinds of business a       
numerous body is competent to perform   
properly4 ,that alone which it can do   
well it ought to take personally upon   
itself4 ,with regard to the rest1 its   
proper province is not to do it1 but to 
take means for having it well done by   
others4  ,for example1 the duty which is
 considered as belonging more peculiarly
 than any other to an assembly          
representative of the people is that of 
voting the taxes4 ,nevertheless1 in no  
country does the representative body    
undertake1 by itself or its delegated   
officers1 to prepare the estimates4     

,though the supplies can only be voted  
by the ,house of ,commons1 and though   
the sanction of the ,house is also      
required for the appropriation of the   
revenues to the different items of the  
public expenditure1 it is the maxim and 
the uniform practice of the             
,constitution that money can be granted 
only on the proposition of the crown4   
,it has1 no doubt1 been felt that       
moderation as to the amount1 and care   
and judgment in the detail of its       
application1 can only be expected when  
the executive government1 through whose 
hands it is to pass1 is made responsible
 for the plans and calculations on which
 the disbursements are grounded4        
,parliament1 accordingly1 is not        
expected1 nor even permitted1 to        
originate directly either taxation or   
expenditure4 ,all it is asked for is its
 consent1 and the sole power it         
possesses is that of refusal4  ,the     
principles which are involved and       
recognized in this constitutional       

doctrine1 if followed as far as they    
will go1 are a guide to the limitation  
and definition of the general functions 
of representative assemblies4 ,in the   
first place1 it is admitted in all      
countries in which the representative   
system is practically understood1 that  
numerous representative bodies ought not
 to administer4 ,the maxim is grounded  
not only on the most essential          
principles of good government1 but on   
those of the successful conduct of      
business of any description4 ,no body of
 men1 unless organized and under        
command1 is fit for action1 in the      
proper sense4 ,even a select board1     
composed of few members1 and these      
specially conversant with the business  
to be done1 is always an inferior       
instrument to some one individual who   
could be found among them1 and would be 
improved in character if that one person
 were made the chief1 and all the others
 reduced to subordinates4 ,what can be  
done better by a body than by any       

individual is deliberation4 ,when it is 
necessary or important to secure hearing
 and consideration to many conflicting  
opinions1 a deliberative body is        
indispensable4 ,those bodies1 therefore1
 are frequently useful1 even for        
administrative business1 but in general 
only as advisers2 such business being1  
as a rule1 better conducted under the   
responsibility of one4 ,even a          
joint-stock company has always in       
practice1 if not in theory1 a managing  
director2 its good or bad management    
depends essentially on some one person's
 qualifications1 and the remaining      
directors1 when of any use1 are so by   
their suggestions to him1 or by the     
power they possess of watching him1 and 
restraining or removing him in case of  
misconduct4 ,that they are ostensibly   
equal shares with him in the management 
is no advantage1 but a considerable     
set-off against any good which they are 
capable of doing3 it weakens greatly the
 sense in his own mind1 and in those of 

other people1 of that individual        
responsibility in which he should stand 
forth personally and undividedly4  ,but 
a popular assembly is still less fitted 
to administer1 or to dictate in detail  
to those who have the charge of         
administration4 ,even when honestly     
meant1 the interference is almost always
 injurious4 ,every branch of public     
administration is a skilled business1   
which has its own peculiar principles   
and traditional rules1 many of them not 
even known in any effectual way1 except 
to those who have at some time had a    
hand in carrying on the business1 and   
none of them likely to be duly          
appreciated by persons not practically  
acquainted with the department4 ,i do   
not mean that the transaction of public 
business has esoteric mysteries1 only to
 be understood by the initiated4 ,its   
principles are all intelligible to any  
person of good sense1 who has in his    
mind a true picture of the circumstances
 and conditions to be dealt with2 but to

 have this he must know those           
circumstances and conditions2 and the   
knowledge does not come by intuition4   
,there are many rules of the greatest   
importance in every branch of public    
business 7as there are in every private 
occupation71 of which a person fresh to 
the subject neither knows the reason or 
even suspects the existence1 because    
they are intended to meet dangers or    
provide against inconveniences which    
never entered into his thoughts4 ,i have
 known public men1 ministers of more    
than ordinary natural capacity1 who1 on 
their first introduction to a department
 of business new to them1 have excited  
the mirth of their inferiors by the air 
with which they announced as a truth    
hitherto set at nought1 and brought to  
light by themselves1 something which was
 probably the first thought of every    
body who ever looked at the subject1    
given up as soon as he had got on to a  
second4 ,it is true that a great        
statesman is he who knows when to depart

 from traditions1 as well as when to    
adhere to them2 but it is a great       
mistake to suppose that he will do this 
better for being ignorant of the        
traditions4 ,no one who does not        
thoroughly know the modes of action     
which common experience has sanctioned  
is capable of judging of the            
circumstances which require a departure 
from those ordinary modes of action4    
,the interests dependent on the acts    
done by a public department1 the        
consequences liable to follow from any  
particular mode of conducting it1       
require for weighing and estimating them
 a kind of knowledge1 and of specially  
exercised judgment1 almost as rarely    
found in those not bred to it1 as the   
capacity to reform the law in those who 
have not professionally studied it4 ,all
 these difficulties are sure to be      
ignored by a representative assembly    
which attempts to decide on special acts
 of administration4 ,at its best1 it is 
inexperience sitting in judgment on     

experience1 ignorance on knowledge2     
ignorance which1 never suspecting the   
existence of what it does not know1 is  
equally careless and supercilious1      
making light of1 if not resenting1 all  
pretensions to have a judgment better   
worth attending to than its own4 ,thus  
it is when no interested motives        
intervene2 but when they do1 the result 
is jobbery more unblushing and audacious
 than the worst corruption which can    
well take place in a public office under
 a government of publicity4 ,it is not  
necessary that the interested bias      
should extend to the majority of the    
assembly4 ,in any particular case it is 
of ten enough that it affects two or    
three of their number4 ,those two or    
three will have a greater interest in   
misleading the body than any other of   
its members are likely to have in       
putting it right4 ,the bulk of the      
assembly may keep their hands clean1 but
 they can not keep their minds vigilant 
or their judgments discerning in matters

 they know nothing about2 and an        
indolent majority1 like an indolent     
individual1 belongs to the person who   
takes most pains with it4 ,the bad      
measures or bad appointments of a       
minister may be checked by ,parliament2 
and the interest of ministers in        
defending1 and of rival partisans in    
attacking1 secures a tolerably equal    
discussion2 but quis custodiet custodes8
 who shall check the ,parliament8 ,a    
minister1 a head of an office1 feels    
himself under some responsibility4 ,an  
assembly in such cases feels under no   
responsibility at all2 for when did any 
member of ,parliament lose his seat for 
the vote he gave on any detail of       
administration8 ,to a minister1 or the  
head of an office1 it is of more        
importance what will be thought of his  
proceedings some time hence1 than what  
is thought of them at the instant2 but  
an assembly1 if the cry of the moment   
goes with it1 however hastily raised or 
artificially stirred up1 thinks itself  

and is thought by every body1 to be     
completely exculpated1 however          
disastrous may be the consequences4     
,besides1 an assembly never personally  
experiences the inconveniences of its   
bad measures until they have reached the
 dimensions of national evils4          
,ministers and administrators see them  
approaching1 and have to bear all the   
annoyance and trouble of attempting to  
ward them off4  ,the proper duty of a   
representative assembly in regard to    
matters of administration is not to     
decide them by its own vote1 but to take
 care that the persons who have to      
decide them shall be the proper persons4
 ,even this they can not advantageously 
do by nominating the individuals4 ,there
 is no act which more imperatively      
requires to be performed under a strong 
sense of individual responsibility than 
the nomination to employments4 ,the     
experience of every person conversant   
with public affairs bears out the       
assertion that there is scarcely any act

 respecting which the conscience of an  
average man is less sensitive2 scarcely 
any case in which less consideration is 
paid to qualifications1 partly because  
men do not know1 and partly because they
 do not care for1 the difference in     
qualifications between one person and   
another4 ,when a minister makes what is 
meant to be an honest appointment1 that 
is1 when he does not actually job it for
 his personal connections or his party1 
an ignorant person might suppose that he
 would try to give it to the person best
 qualified4 ,no such thing4 ,an ordinary
 minister thinks himself a miracle of   
virtue if he gives it to a person of    
merit1 or who has a claim on the public 
on any account1 though the claim or the 
merit may be of the most opposite       
description to that required4 ,il       
fallait un calculateur1 ce fut un       
danseur qui l'obtint1 is hardly more of 
a caricature than in the days of        
,figaro2 and the minister doubtless     
thinks himself not only blameless1 but  

meritorious1 if the man dances well4    
,besides1 the qualifications which fit  
special individuals for special duties  
can only be recognized by those who know
 the individuals1 or who make it their  
business to examine and judge of persons
 from what they have done1 or from the  
evidence of those who are in a position 
to judge4 ,when these conscientious     
obligations are so little regarded by   
great public officers who can be made   
responsible for their appointments1 how 
must it be with assemblies who can not8 
,even now1 the worst appointments are   
those which are made for the sake of    
gaining support or disarming opposition 
in the representative body2 what might  
we expect if they were made by the body 
itself8 ,numerous bodies never regard   
special qualifications at all4 ,unless a
 man is fit for the gallows1 he is      
thought to be about as fit as other     
people for almost any thing for which he
 can offer himself as a candidate4 ,when
 appointments made by a public body are 

not decided1 as they almost always are1 
by party connection or private jobbing1 
a man is appointed either because he has
 a reputation1 often quite undeserved1  
for general ability1 or oftener for no  
better reason than that he is personally
 popular4  ,it has never been thought   
desirable that ,parliament should itself
 nominate even the members of a cabinet4
 ,it is enough that it virtually decides
 who shall be prime minister1 or who    
shall be the two or three individuals   
from whom the prime minister shall be   
chosen4 ,in doing this1 it merely       
recognizes the fact that a certain      
person is the candidate of the party    
whose general policy commands its       
support4 ,in reality1 the only thing    
which ,parliament decides is1 which of  
two1 or at most three1 parties or bodies
 of men shall furnish the executive     
government3 the opinion of the party    
itself decides which of its members is  
fittest to be placed at the head4       
,according to the existing practice of  

the ,british ,constitution1 these things
 seem to be on as good a footing as they
 can be4 ,parliament does not nominate  
any minister1 but the crown appoints the
 head of the administration in          
conformity to the general wishes and    
inclinations manifested by ,parliament1 
and the other ministers on the          
recommendation of the chief2 while every
 minister has the undivided moral       
responsibility of appointing fit persons
 to the other offices of administration 
which are not permanent4 ,in a republic1
 some other arrangement would be        
necessary2 but the nearer it approached 
in practice to that which has long      
existed in ,england1 the more likely it 
would be to work well4 ,either1 as in   
the ,american republic1 the head of the 
executive must be elected by some agency
 entirely independent of the            
representative body2 or the body must   
content itself with naming the prime    
minister1 and making him responsible for
 the choice of his associates and       

subordinates4 ,in all these             
considerations1 at least theoretically1 
,i fully anticipate a general assent2   
though1 practically1 the tendency is    
strong in representative bodies to      
interfere more and more in the details  
of administration1 by virtue of the     
general law1 that whoever has the       
strongest power is more and more tempted
 to make an excessive use of it2 and    
this is one of the practical dangers to 
which the futurity of representative    
governments will be exposed4  ,but it is
 equally true1 though only of late and  
slowly beginning to be acknowledged1    
that a numerous assembly is as little   
fitted for the direct business of       
legislation as for that of              
administration4 ,there is hardly any    
kind of intellectual work which so much 
needs to be done not only by experienced
 and exercised minds1 but by minds      
trained to the task through long and    
laborious study1 as the business of     
making laws4 ,this is a sufficient      

reason1 were there no other1 why they   
can never be well made but by a         
committee of very few persons4 ,a reason
 no less conclusive is1 that every      
provision of a law requires to be framed
 with the most accurate and long-sighted
 perception of its effect on all the    
other provisions2 and the law when made 
should be capable of fitting into a     
consistent whole with the previously    
existing laws4 ,it is impossible that   
these conditions should be in any degree
 fulfilled when laws are voted clause by
 clause in a miscellaneous assembly4    
,the incongruity of such a mode of      
legislating would strike all minds1 were
 it not that our laws are already1 as to
 form and construction1 such a chaos1   
that the confusion and contradiction    
seem incapable of being made greater by 
any addition to the mass4 ,yet even now1
 the utter unfitness of our legislative 
machinery for its purpose is making     
itself practically felt every year more 
and more4 ,the mere time necessarily    

occupied in getting through bills1      
renders ,parliament more and more       
incapable of passing any1 except on     
detached and narrow points4 ,if a bill  
is prepared which even attempts to deal 
with the whole of any subject 7and it is
 impossible to legislate properly on any
 part without having the whole present  
to the mind71 it hangs over from session
 to session through sheer impossibility 
of finding time to dispose of it4 ,it   
matters not though the bill may have    
been deliberately drawn up by the       
authority deemed the best qualified1    
with all appliances and means to boot2  
or by a select commission1 chosen for   
their conversancy with the subject1 and 
having employed years in considering and
 digesting the particular measure3 it   
can not be passed1 because the ,house of
 ,commons will not forego the precious  
privilege of tinkering it with their    
clumsy hands4 ,the custom has of late   
been to some extent introduced1 when the
 principle of a bill has been affirmed  

on the second reading1 of referring it  
for consideration in detail to a select 
committee2 but it has not been found    
that this practice causes much less time
 to be lost afterwards in carrying it   
through the committee of the whole      
,house3 the opinions or private         
crotchets which have been overruled by  
knowledge always insist on giving       
themselves a second chance before the   
tribunal of ignorance4 ,indeed1 the     
practice itself has been adopted        
principally by the ,house of ,lords1 the
 members of which are less busy and fond
 of meddling1 and less jealous of the   
importance of their individual voices1  
than those of the elective ,house4 ,and 
when a bill of many clauses does succeed
 in getting itself discussed in detail1 
what can depict the state in which it   
comes out of committee6 ,clauses omitted
 which are essential to the working of  
the rest2 incongruous ones inserted to  
conciliate some private interest1 or    
some crotchety member who threatens to  

delay the bill2 articles foisted in on  
the motion of some sciolist with a mere 
smattering of the subject1 leading to   
consequences which the member who       
introduced or those who supported the   
bill did not at the moment foresee1 and 
which need an amending act in the next  
session to correct their mischiefs4 ,it 
is one of the evils of the present mode 
of managing these things1 that the      
explaining and defending of a bill1 and 
of its various provisions1 is scarcely  
ever performed by the person from whose 
mind they emanated1 who probably has not
 a seat in the ,house4 ,their defense   
rests upon some minister or member of   
,parliament who did not frame them1 who 
is dependent on cramming for all his    
arguments but those which are perfectly 
obvious1 who does not know the full     
strength of his case1 nor the best      
reasons by which to support it1 and is  
wholly incapable of meeting unforeseen  
objections4 ,this evil1 as far as       
government bills are concerned1 admits  

of remedy1 and has been remedied in some
 representative constitutions1 by       
allowing the government to be           
represented in either ,house by persons 
in its confidence1 having a right to    
speak1 though not to vote4  ,if that1 as
 yet considerable1 majority of the      
,house of ,commons who never desire to  
move an amendment or make a speech would
 no longer leave the whole regulation of
 business to those who do2 if they would
 bethink themselves that better         
qualifications for legislation exist1   
and may be found if sought for1 than a  
fluent tongue1 and the faculty of       
getting elected by a constituency1 it   
would soon be recognized that1 in       
legislation as well as administration1  
the only task to which a representative 
assembly can possibly be competent is   
not that of doing the work1 but of      
causing it to be done2 of determining to
 whom or to what sort of people it shall
 be confided1 and giving or withholding 
the national sanction to it when        

performed4 ,any government fit for a    
high state of civilization would have as
 one of its fundamental elements a small
 body1 not exceeding in number the      
members of a cabinet1 who should act as 
a ,commission of ,legislation1 having   
for its appointed office to make the    
laws4 ,if the laws of this country were1
 as surely they will soon be1 revised   
and put into a connected form1 the      
,commission of ,codification by which   
this is effected should remain as a     
permanent institution1 to watch over the
 work1 protect it from deterioration1   
and make further improvements as often  
as required4 ,no one would wish that    
this body should of itself have any     
power of enacting laws2 the ,commission 
would only embody the element of        
intelligence in their construction2     
,parliament would represent that of     
will4 ,no measure would become a law    
until expressly sanctioned by           
,parliament2 and ,parliament1 or either 
house1 would have the power not only of 

rejecting but of sending back a bill to 
the commission for reconsideration or   
improvement4 ,either house might also   
exercise its initiative by referring any
 subject to the commission1 with        
directions to prepare a law4 ,the       
commission1 of course1 would have no    
power of refusing its instrumentality to
 any legislation which the country      
desired4 ,instructions1 concurred in by 
both houses1 to draw up a bill which    
should effect a particular purpose1     
would be imperative on the              
commissioners1 unless they preferred to 
resign their office4 ,once framed1      
however1 ,parliament should have no     
power to alter the measure1 but solely  
to pass or reject it2 or1 if partially  
disapproved of1 remit it to the         
commission for reconsideration4 ,the    
commissioners should be appointed by the
 crown1 but should hold their offices   
for a time certain1 say five years1     
unless removed on an address from the   
two ,houses of ,parliament1 grounded    

either on personal misconduct 7as in the
 case of judges71 or on refusal to draw 
up a bill in obedience to the demands of
 ,parliament4 ,at the expiration of the 
five years a member should cease to hold
 office unless reappointed1 in order to 
provide a convenient mode of getting rid
 of those who had not been found equal  
to their duties1 and of infusing new and
 younger blood into the body4  ,the     
necessity of some provision             
corresponding to this was felt even in  
the ,athenian ,democracy1 where1 in the 
time of its most complete ascendancy1   
the popular ,ecclesia could pass        
psephisms 7mostly decrees on single     
matters of policy71 but laws1 so called1
 could only be made or altered by a     
different and less numerous body1       
renewed annually1 called the ,nomothet1 
whose duty it also was to revise the    
whole of the laws1 and keep them        
consistent with one another4 ,in the    
,english ,constitution there is great   
difficulty in introducing any           

arrangement which is new both in form   
and in substance1 but comparatively     
little repugnance is felt to the        
attainment of new purposes by an        
adaptation of existing forms and        
traditions4 ,it appears to me that the  
means might be devised of enriching the 
,constitution with this great           
improvement through the machinery of the
 ,house of ,lords4 ,a commission for    
preparing bills would in itself be no   
more an innovation on the ,constitution 
than the ,board for the administration  
of the ,poor ,laws1 or the ,inclosure   
,commission4 ,if1 in consideration of   
the great importance and dignity of the 
trust1 it were made a rule that every   
person appointed a member of the        
,legislative ,commission1 unless removed
 from office on an address from         
,parliament1 should be a peer for life1 
it is probable that the same good sense 
and taste which leave the judicial      
functions of the peerage practically to 
the exclusive care of the law lords     

would leave the business of legislation1
 except on questions involving political
 principles and interests1 to the       
professional legislators2 that bills    
originating in the ,upper ,house would  
always be drawn up by them2 that the    
government would devolve on them the    
framing of all its bills2 and that      
private members of the ,house of        
,commons would gradually find it        
convenient1 and likely to facilitate the
 passing of their measures through the  
two houses1 if1 instead of bringing in a
 bill and submitting it directly to the 
house1 they obtained leave to introduce 
it and have it referred to the          
,legislative ,commission2 for it would1 
of course1 be open to the ,house to     
refer for the consideration of that body
 not a subject merely1 but any specific 
proposal1 or a ,draft of a ,bill in     
extenso1 when any member thought himself
 capable of preparing one such as ought 
to pass2 and the ,house would doubtless 
refer every such draft to the           

commission1 if only as materials1 and   
for the benefit of the suggestions it   
might contain1 as they would1 in like   
manner1 refer every amendment or        
objection which might be proposed in    
writing by any member of the ,house     
after a measure had left the            
commissioners' hands4 ,the alteration of
 bills by a committee of the whole      
,house would cease1 not by formal       
abolition1 but by desuetude2 the right  
not being abandoned1 but laid up in the 
same armoury with the royal veto1 the   
right of withholding the supplies1 and  
other ancient instruments of political  
warfare1 which no one desires to see    
used1 but no one likes to part with1    
lest they should any time be found to be
 still needed in an extraordinary       
emergency4 ,by such arrangements as     
these1 legislation would assume its     
proper place as a work of skilled labor 
and special study and experience2 while 
the most important liberty of the       
nation1 that of being governed only by  

laws assented to by its elected         
representatives1 would be fully         
preserved1 and made more valuable by    
being detached from the serious1 but by 
no means unavoidable drawbacks which now
 accompany it in the form of ignorant   
and ill-considered legislation4         
,instead of the function of governing1  
for which it is radically unfit1 the    
proper office of a representative       
assembly is to watch and control the    
government2 to throw the light of       
publicity on its acts2 to compel a full 
exposition and justification of all of  
them which any one considers            
questionable2 to cinsure them if found  
condemnable1 and1 if the men who compose
 the government abuse their trust1 or   
fulfill it in a manner which conflicts  
with the deliberate sense of the nation1
 to expel them from office1 and either  
expressly or virtually appoint their    
successors4 ,this is surely ample power1
 and security enough for the liberty of 
the nation4 ,in addition to this1 the   

,parliament has an office not inferior  
even to this in importance2 to be at    
once the nation's ,committee of         
,grievances and its ,congress of        
,opinions2 an arena in which not only   
the general opinion of the nation1 but  
that of every section of it1 and1 as far
 as possible1 of every eminent          
individual whom it contains1 can produce
 itself in full light and challenge     
discussion2 where every person in the   
country may count upon finding somebody 
who speaks his mind as well or better   
than he could speak it himself--not to  
friends and partisans exclusively1 but  
in the face of opponents1 to be tested  
by adverse controversy2 where those     
whose opinion is overruled1 feel        
satisfied that it is heard1 and set     
aside not by a mere act of will1 but for
 what are thought superior reasons1 and 
commend themselves as such to the       
representatives of the majority of the  
nation2 where every party or opinion in 
the country can muster its strength1 and

 be cured of any illusion concerning the
 number or power of its adherents2 where
 the opinion which prevails in the      
nation makes itself manifest as         
prevailing1 and marshals its hosts in   
the presence of the government1 which is
 thus enabled and compelled to give way 
to it on the mere manifestation1 without
 the actual employment of its strength2 
where statesmen can assure themselves1  
far more certainly than by any other    
signs1 what elements of opinion and     
power are growing and what declining1   
and are enabled to shape their measures 
with some regard not solely to present  
exigencies1 but to tendencies in        
progress4 ,representative assemblies are
 often taunted by their enemies with    
being places of mere talk and bavardage4
 ,there has seldom been more misplaced  
derision4 ,i know not how a             
representative assembly can more        
usefully employ itself than in talk1    
when the subject of talk is the great   
public interests of the country1 and    

every sentence of it represents the     
opinion either of some important body of
 persons in the nation1 or of an        
individual in whom some such body have  
reposed their confidence4 ,a place where
 every interest and shade of opinion in 
the country can have its cause even     
passionately pleaded1 in the face of the
 government and of all other interests  
and opinions1 can compel them to listen1
 and either comply1 or state clearly why
 they do not1 is in itself1 if it       
answered no other purpose1 one of the   
most important political institutions   
that can exist any where1 and one of the
 foremost benefits of free government4  
,such talking would never be looked upon
 with disparagement if it were not      
allowed to stop doing2 which it never   
would1 if assemblies knew and           
acknowledged that talking and discussion
 are their proper business1 while doing1
 as the result of discussion1 is the    
task not of a miscellaneous body1 but of
 individuals specially trained to it2   

that the fit office of an assembly is to
 see that those individuals are honestly
 and intelligently chosen1 and to       
interfere no further with them1 except  
by unlimited latitude of suggestion and 
criticism1 and by applying or           
withholding the final seal of national  
assent4 ,it is for want of this         
judicious reserve that popular          
assemblies attempt to do what they can  
not do well--to govern and              
legislate--and provide no machinery but 
their own for much of it1 when of course
 every hour spent in talk is an hour    
withdrawn from actual business4 ,but the
 very fact which most unfits such bodies
 for a council of legislation1 qualifies
 them the more for their other          
office--namely1 that they are not a     
selection of the greatest political     
minds in the country1 from whose        
opinions little could with certainty be 
inferred concerning those of the nation1
 but are1 when properly constituted1 a  
fair sample of every grade of intellect 

among the people which is at all        
entitled to a voice in public affairs4  
,their part is to indicate wants1 to be 
an organ for popular demands1 and a     
place of adverse discussion for all     
opinions relating to public matters1    
both great and small2 and1 along with   
this1 to check by criticism1 and        
eventually by withdrawing their support1
 those high public officers who really  
conduct the public business1 or who     
appoint those by whom it is conducted4  
,nothing but the restriction of the     
function of representative bodies within
 these rational limits will enable the  
benefits of popular control to be       
enjoyed in conjunction with the no less 
important requisites 7growing ever more 
important as human affairs increase in  
scale and in complexity7 of skilled     
legislation and administration4 ,there  
are no means of combining these benefits
 except by separating the functions     
which guaranty the one from those which 
essentially require the other2 by       

disjoining the office of control and    
criticism from the actual conduct of    
affairs1 and devolving the former on the
 representatives of the ,many1 while    
securing for the latter1 under strict   
responsibility to the nation1 the       
acquired knowledge and practiced        
intelligence of a specially trained and 
experienced ,few4  ,the preceding       
discussion of the functions which ought 
to devolve on the sovereign             
representative assembly of the nation   
would require to be followed by an      
inquiry into those properly vested in   
the minor representative bodies1 which  
ought to exist for purposes that regard 
only localities4 ,and such an inquiry   
forms an essential part of the present  
treatise2 but many reasons require its  
postponement1 until we have considered  
the most proper composition of the great
 representative body1 destined to       
control as sovereign the enactment of   
laws and the administration of the      
general affairs of the nation4          

,chapter ,,vi--,of the ,infirmities and 
,dangers to which ,representative       
,government is ,liable4   ,the defects  
of any form of government may be either 
negative or positive4 ,it is negatively 
defective if it does not concentrate in 
the hands of the authorities power      
sufficient to fulfill the necessary     
offices of a government1 or if it does  
not sufficiently develop by exercise the
 active capacities and social feelings  
of the individual citizens4 ,on neither 
of these points is it necessary that    
much should be said at this stage of our
 inquiry4  ,the want of an amount power 
in the government adequate to preserve  
order and allow of progress in the      
people is incident rather to a wild and 
rude state of society generally than to 
any particular form of political union4 
,when the people are too much attached  
to savage independence to be tolerant of
 the amount of power to which it is for 
their good that they should be subject1 
the state of society 7as already        

observed7 is not yet ripe for           
representative government4 ,when the    
time for that government has arrived1   
sufficient power for all needful        
purposes is sure to reside in the       
sovereign assembly2 and if enough of it 
is not intrusted to the executive1 this 
can only arise from a jealous feeling on
 the part of the assembly toward the    
administration1 never likely to exist   
but where the constitutional power of   
the assembly to turn them out of office 
has not yet sufficiently established    
itself4 ,wherever that constitutional   
right is admitted in principle and fully
 operative in practice1 there is no fear
 that the assembly will not be willing  
to trust its own ministers with any     
amount of power really desirable2 the   
danger is1 on the contrary1 lest they   
should grant it too ungrudgingly1 and   
too indefinite in extent1 since the     
power of the minister is the power of   
the body who make and who keep him so4  
,it is1 however1 very likely1 and is one

 of the dangers of a controlling        
assembly1 that it may be lavish of      
powers1 but afterwards interfere with   
their exercise2 may give power by       
wholesale1 and take it back in detail1  
by multiplied single acts of            
interference in the business of         
administration4 ,the evils arising from 
this assumption of the actual function  
of governing1 in lieu of that of        
criticising and checking those who      
govern1 have been sufficiently dwelt    
upon in the preceding chapter4 ,no      
safeguard can in the nature of things be
 provided against this improper         
meddling1 except a strong and general   
conviction of its injurious character4  
,the other negative defect which may    
reside in a government1 that of not     
bringing into sufficient exercise the   
individual faculties1 moral1            
intellectual1 and active1 of the people1
 has been exhibited generally in setting
 forth the distinctive mischiefs of     
despotism4 ,as between one form of      

popular government and another1 the     
advantage in this respect lies with that
 which most widely diffuses the exercise
 of public functions2 on the one hand1  
by excluding fewest from the suffrage2  
on the other1 by opening to all classes 
of private citizens1 so far as is       
consistent with other equally important 
objects1 the widest participation in the
 details of judicial and administrative 
business2 as by jury-trial1 admission to
 municipal offices1 and1 above all1 by  
the utmost possible publicity and       
liberty of discussion1 whereby not      
merely a few individuals in succession1 
but the whole public1 are made1 to a    
certain extent1 participants in the     
government1 and sharers in the          
instruction and mental exercise derived 
from it4 ,the further illustration of   
these benefits1 as well as of the       
limitations under which they must be    
aimed at1 will be better deferred until 
we come to speak of the details of      
administration4  ,the positive evils and

 dangers of the representative1 as of   
every other form of government1 may be  
reduced to two heads3 first1 general    
ignorance and incapacity1 or1 to speak  
more moderately1 insufficient mental    
qualifications1 in the controlling body2
 secondly1 the danger of its being under
 the influence of interests not         
identical with the general welfare of   
the community4  ,the former of these    
evils1 deficiency in high mental        
qualifications1 is one to which it is   
generally supposed that popular         
government is liable in a greater degree
 than any other4 ,the energy of a       
monarch1 the steadiness and prudence of 
an aristocracy1 are thought to contrast 
most favorably with the vacillation and 
shortsightedness of even the most       
qualified democracy4 ,these             
propositions1 however1 are not by any   
means so well founded as they at first  
sight appear4  ,compared with simple    
monarchy1 representative government is  
in these respects at no disadvantage4   

,except in a rude age1 hereditary       
monarchy1 when it is really such1 and   
not aristocracy in disguise1 far        
surpasses democracy in all the forms of 
incapacity supposed to be characteristic
 of the last4 ,i say1 except in a rude  
age1 because in a really rude state of  
society there is a considerable guaranty
 for the intellectual and active        
capacities of the sovereign4 ,his       
personal will is constantly encountering
 obstacles from the willfulness of his  
subjects1 and of powerful individuals   
among their number4 ,the circumstances  
of society do not afford him much       
temptation to mere luxurious            
self-indulgence2 mental and bodily      
activity1 especially political and      
military1 are his principal excitements2
 and among turbulent chiefs and lawless 
followers he has little authority1 and  
is seldom long secure even of his       
throne1 unless he possesses a           
considerable amount of personal daring1 
dexterity1 and energy4 ,the reason why  

the average of talent is so high among  
the ,henries and ,edwards of our history
 may be read in the tragical fate of the
 second ,edward and the second ,richard1
 and the civil wars and disturbances of 
the reigns of ,john and his incapable   
successor4 ,the troubled period of the  
,reformation also produced several      
eminent hereditary monarchs--,elizabeth1
 ,henri ,quatre1 ,gustavus ,adolphus2   
but they were mostly bred up in         
adversity1 succeeded to the throne by   
the unexpected failure of nearer heirs1 
or had to contend with great            
difficulties in the commencement of     
their reign4 ,since ,european life      
assumed a settled aspect1 any thing     
above mediocrity in an hereditary king  
has become extremely rare1 while the    
general average has been even below     
mediocrity1 both in talent and in vigor 
of character4 ,a monarchy               
constitutionally absolute now only      
maintains itself in existence 7except   
temporarily in the hands of some        

active-minded usurper7 through the      
mental qualifications of a permanent    
bureaucracy4 ,the ,russian and ,austrian
 governments1 and even the ,french      
government in its normal condition1 are 
oligarchies of officials1 of whom the   
head of the state does little more than 
select the chiefs4 ,i am speaking of the
 regular course of their administration2
 for the will of the master of course   
determines many of their particular     
acts4  ,the governments which have been 
remarkable in history for sustained     
mental ability and vigor in the conduct 
of affairs have generally been          
aristocracies4 ,but they have been1     
without any exception1 aristocracies of 
public functionaries4 ,the ruling bodies
 have been so narrow1 that each member1 
or at least each influential member of  
the body1 was able to make1 and did     
make1 public business an active         
profession1 and the principal occupation
 of his life4 ,the only aristocracies   
which have manifested high governing    

capacities1 and acted on steady maxims  
of policy through many generations1 are 
those of ,rome and ,venice4 ,but1 at    
,venice1 though the privileged order was
 numerous1 the actual management of     
affairs was rigidly concentrated in a   
small oligarchy within the oligarchy1   
whose whole lives were devoted to the   
study and conduct of the affairs of the 
state4 ,the ,roman government partook   
more of the character of an open        
aristocracy like our own4 ,but the      
really governing body1 the ,senate1 was 
in exclusively composed of persons who  
had exercised public functions1 and had 
either already filled1 or were looking  
forward to fill the highest offices of  
the state1 at the peril of a severe     
responsibility in case of incapacity and
 failure4 ,when once members of the     
,senate1 their lives were pledged to the
 conduct of public affairs2 they were   
not permitted even to leave ,italy      
except in the discharge of some public  
trust2 and unless turned out of the     

,senate by the censors for character or 
conduct deemed disgraceful1 they        
retained their powers and               
responsibilities to the end of life4 ,in
 an aristocracy thus constituted1 every 
member felt his personal importance     
entirely bound up with the dignity and  
estimation of the commonwealth which he 
administered1 and with the part he was  
able to play in its councils4 ,this     
dignity and estimation were quite       
different things from the prosperity or 
happiness of the general body of the    
citizens1 and were often wholly         
incompatible with it4 ,but they were    
closely linked with the external success
 and aggrandisement of the state2 and it
 was1 consequently1 in the pursuit of   
that object almost exclusively1 that    
either the ,roman or the ,venetian      
aristocracies manifested the            
systematically wise collective policy   
and the great individual capacities for 
government for which history has        
deservedly given them credit4  ,it thus 

appears that the only governments1 not  
representative1 in which high political 
skill and ability have been other than  
exceptional1 whether under monarchical  
or aristocratic forms1 have been        
essentially bureaucracies4 ,the work of 
government has been in the hands of     
governors by profession1 which is the   
essence and meaning of bureaucracy4     
,whether the work is done by them       
because they have been trained to it1 or
 they are trained to it because it is to
 be done by them1 makes a great         
difference in many respects1 but none at
 all as to the essential character of   
the rule4 ,aristocracies1 on the other  
hand1 like that of ,england1 in which   
the class who possessed the power       
derived it merely from their social     
position1 without being specially       
trained or devoting themselves          
exclusively to it 7and in which1        
therefore1 the power was not exercised  
directly1 but through representative    
institutions oligarchically             

constituted71 have been1 in respect to  
intellectual endowments1 much on a par  
with democracies2 that is1 they have    
manifested such qualities in any        
considerable degree only during the     
temporary ascendancy which great and    
popular talents1 united with a          
distinguished position1 have given to   
some one man4 ,themistocles and         
,pericles1 ,washington and ,jefferson1  
were not more completely exceptions in  
their several democracies1 and were     
assuredly much more splendid exceptions1
 than the ,chathams and ,peels of the   
representative aristocracy of ,great    
,britain1 or even the ,sullys and       
,colberts of the aristocratic monarchy  
of ,france4 ,a great minister1 in the   
aristocratic governments of modern      
,europe1 is almost as rare a phenomenon 
as a great king4  ,the comparison1      
therefore1 as to the intellectual       
attributes of a government has to be    
made between a representative democracy 
and a bureaucracy2 all other governments

 may be left out of the account4 ,and   
here it must be acknowledged that a     
bureaucratic government has1 in some    
important respects1 greatly the         
advantage4 ,it accumulates experience1  
acquires well-tried and well-considered 
traditional maxims1 and makes provision 
for appropriate practical knowledge in  
those who have the actual conduct of    
affairs4 ,but it is not equally         
favorable to individual energy of mind4 
,the disease which afflicts bureaucratic
 governments1 and which they usually die
 of1 is routine4 ,they perish by the    
immutability of their maxims1 and1 still
 more1 by the universal law that        
whatever becomes a routine loses its    
vital principle1 and1 having no longer a
 mind acting within it1 goes on         
revolving mechanically1 though the work 
it is intended to do remains undone4 ,a 
bureaucracy always tends to become a    
pedantocracy4 ,when the bureaucracy is  
the real government1 the spirit of the  
corps 7as with the ,jesuits7 bears down 

the individuality of its more           
distinguished members4 ,in the          
profession of government1 as in other   
professions1 the sole idea of the       
majority is to do what they have been   
taught2 and it requires a popular       
government to enable the conceptions of 
the man of original genius among them to
 prevail over the obstructive spirit of 
trained mediocrity4 ,only in a popular  
government 7setting apart the accident  
of a highly intelligent despot7 could   
,sir ,rowland ,hill have been victorious
 over the ,post-office4 ,a popular      
government installed him in the         
,post-office1 and made the body1 in     
spite of itself1 obey the impulse given 
by the man who united special knowledge 
with individual vigor and originality4  
,that the ,roman aristocracy escaped    
this characteristic disease of a        
bureaucracy was evidently owing to its  
popular element4 ,all special offices1  
both those which gave a seat in the     
,senate and those which were sought by  

senators1 were conferred by popular     
election4 ,the ,russian government is a 
characteristic exemplification of both  
the good and bad side of bureaucracy3   
its fixed maxims1 directed with ,roman  
perseverance to the same                
unflinchingly-pursued ends from age to  
age2 the remarkable skill with which    
those ends are generally pursued2 the   
frightful internal corruption1 and the  
permanent organized hostility to        
improvements from without1 which even   
the autocratic power of a               
vigorous-minded emperor is seldom or    
never sufficient to overcome2 the       
patient obstructiveness of the body     
being in the long run more than a match 
for the fitful energy of one man4 ,the  
,chinese government1 a bureaucracy of   
,mandarins1 is1 as far as known to us1  
another apparent example of the same    
qualities and defects4  ,in all human   
affairs1 conflicting influences are     
required to keep one another alive and  
efficient even for their own proper     

uses2 and the exclusive pursuit of one  
good object1 apart from some other which
 should accompany it1 ends not in excess
 of one and defect of the other1 but in 
the decay and loss even of that which   
has been exclusively cared for4         
,government by trained officials can not
 do for a country the things which can  
be done by a free government1 but it    
might be supposed capable of doing some 
things which free government of itself  
can not do4 ,we find1 however1 that an  
outside element of freedom is necessary 
to enable it to do effectually or       
permanently even its own business4 ,and 
so1 also1 freedom can not produce its   
best effects1 and often breaks down     
altogether1 unless means can be found of
 combining it with trained and skilled  
administration4 ,there could not be a   
moment's hesitation between             
representative government1 among a      
people in any degree ripe for it1 and   
the most perfect imaginable bureaucracy4
 ,but it is1 at the same time1 one of   

the most important ends of political    
institutions1 to attain as many of the  
qualities of the one as are consistent  
with the other2 to secure1 as far as    
they can be made compatible1 the great  
advantage of the conduct of affairs by  
skilled persons1 bred to it as an       
intellectual profession1 along with that
 of a general control vested in1 and    
seriously exercised by1 bodies          
representative of the entire people4    
,much would be done towards this end by 
recognizing the line of separation1     
discussed in the preceding chapter1     
between the work of government properly 
so called1 which can only be well       
performed after special cultivation1 and
 that of selecting1 watching1 and1 when 
needful1 controlling the governors1     
which in this case1 as in all others1   
properly devolves1 not on those who do  
the work1 but on those for whose benefit
 it ought to be done4 ,no progress at   
all can be made towards obtaining a     
skilled democracy1 unless the democracy 

are willing that the work which requires
 skill should be done by those who      
possess it4 ,a democracy has enough to  
do in providing itself with an amount of
 mental competency sufficient for its   
own proper work1 that of superintendence
 and check4  ,how to obtain and secure  
this amount is one of the questions to  
taken into consideration in judging of  
the proper constitution of a            
representative body4 ,in proportion as  
its composition fails to secure this    
amount1 the assembly will encroach1 by  
special acts1 on the province of the    
executive2 it will expel a good1 or     
elevate and uphold a bad ministry2 it   
will connive at1 or overlook in them1   
abuses of trust1 will be deluded by     
their false pretenses1 or will withhold 
support from those who endeavour to     
fulfill their trust conscientiously2 it 
will countenance or impose a selfish1 a 
capricious and impulsive1 a             
short-sighted1 ignorant1 and prejudiced 
general policy1 foreign and domestic2 it

 will abrogate good laws1 or enact bad  
ones2 let in new evils1 or cling with   
perverse obstinacy to old2 it will even1
 perhaps1 under misleading impulses1    
momentary or permanent1 emanating from  
itself or from its constituents1        
tolerate or connive at proceedings which
 set law aside altogether1 in cases     
where equal justice would not be        
agreeable to popular feeling4 ,such are 
among the dangers of representative     
government1 arising from a constitution 
of the representation which does not    
secure an adequate amount of            
intelligence and knowledge in the       
representative assembly4  ,we next      
proceed to the evils arising from the   
prevalence of modes of action in the    
representative body1 dictated by        
sinister interests 7to employ the useful
 phrase introduced by ,bentham71 that   
is1 interests conflicting more or less  
with the general good of the community4 
,it is universally admitted that1 of the
 evils incident to monarchical and      

aristocratic governments1 a large       
proportion arise from this cause4 ,the  
interest of the monarch1 or the interest
 of the aristocracy1 either collective  
or that of its individual members1 is   
promoted1 or they themselves think that 
it will be promoted1 by conduct opposed 
to that which the general interest of   
the community requires4 ,the interest1  
for example1 of the government is to tax
 heavily2 that of the community is to be
 as little taxed as the necessary       
expenses of good government permit4 ,the
 interest of the king and of the        
governing aristocracy is to possess and 
exercise unlimited power over the       
people2 to enforce1 on their part1      
complete conformity to the will and     
preferences of the rulers4 ,the interest
 of the people is to have as little     
control exercised over them in any      
respect as is consistent with attaining 
the legitimate ends of government4 ,the 
interest1 or apparent and supposed      
interest of the king or aristocracy1 is 

to permit no censure of themselves1 at  
least in any form which they may        
consider either to threaten their power 
or seriously to interfere with their    
free agency4 ,the interest of the people
 is that there should be full liberty of
 censure on every public officer1 and on
 every public act or measure4 ,the      
interest of a ruling class1 whether in  
an aristocracy or an aristocratic       
monarchy1 is to assume to themselves an 
endless variety of unjust privileges1   
sometimes benefiting their pockets at   
the expense of the people1 sometimes    
merely tending to exalt them above      
others1 or1 what is the same thing in   
different words1 to degrade others below
 themselves4 ,if the people are         
disaffected1 which under such a         
government they are very likely to be1  
it is the interest of the king or       
aristocracy to keep them at a low level 
of intelligence and education1 foment   
dissensions among them1 and even prevent
 them from being too well off1 lest they

 should wax fat1 and kick1 agreeably to 
the maxim of ,cardinal ,richelieu in his
 celebrated ,testament ,politique4 ,all 
these things are for the interest of a  
king or aristocracy1 in a purely selfish
 point of view1 unless a sufficiently   
strong counter-interest is created by   
the fear of provoking resistance4 ,all  
these evils have been1 and many of them 
still are1 produced by the sinister     
interests of kings and aristocracies1   
where their power is sufficient to raise
 them above the opinion of the rest of  
the community2 nor is it rational to    
expect1 as a consequence of such a      
position1 any other conduct4  ,these    
things are superabundantly evident in   
the case of a monarchy or an            
aristocracy2 but it is sometimes rather 
gratuitously assumed that the same kind 
of injurious influences do not operate  
in a democracy4 ,looking at democracy in
 the way in which it is commonly        
conceived1 as the rule of the numerical 
majority1 it is surely possible that the

 ruling power may be under the dominion 
of sectional or class interests1        
pointing to conduct different from that 
which would be dictated by impartial    
regard for the interest of all4 ,suppose
 the majority to be whites1 the minority
 negroes1 or vice vers3 is it likely    
that the majority would allow equal     
justice to the minority8 ,suppose the   
majority ,catholics1 the minority       
,protestants1 or the reverse2 will there
 not be the same danger8 ,or let the    
majority be ,english1 the minority      
,irish1 or the contrary3 is there not a 
great probability of similar evil8 ,in  
all countries there is a majority of    
poor1 a minority who1 in                
contradistinction1 may be called rich4  
,between these two classes1 on many     
questions1 there is complete opposition 
of apparent interest4 ,we will suppose  
the majority sufficiently intelligent to
 be aware that it is not for their      
advantage to weaken the security of     
property1 and that it would be weakened 

by any act of arbitrary spoliation4 ,but
 is there not a considerable danger lest
 they should throw upon the possessors  
of what is called realized property1 and
 upon the larger incomes1 an unfair     
share1 or even the whole1 of the burden 
of taxation1 and having done so1 add to 
the amount without scruple1 expending   
the proceeds in modes supposed to       
conduce to the profit and advantage of  
the laboring class8 ,suppose1 again1 a  
minority of skilled laborers1 a majority
 of unskilled3 the experience of many   
,trade ,unions1 unless they are greatly 
calumniated1 justifies the apprehension 
that equality of earnings might be      
imposed as an obligation1 and that      
piecework1 and all practices which      
enable superior industry or abilities to
 gain a superior reward1 might be put   
down4 ,legislative attempts to raise    
wages1 limitation of competition in the 
labor market1 taxes or restrictions on  
machinery1 and on improvements of all   
kinds tending to dispense with any of   

the existing labor--even1 perhaps1      
protection of the home producer against 
foreign industry--are very natural 7,i  
do not venture to say whether probable7 
results of a feeling of class interest  
in a governing majority of manual       
laborers4  ,it will be said that none of
 these things are for the real interest 
of the most numerous class3 to which ,i 
answer1 that if the conduct of human    
beings was determined by no other       
interested considerations than those    
which constitute their real interest1   
neither monarchy nor oligarchy would be 
such bad governments as they are2 for   
assuredly very strong arguments may be1 
and often have been1 adduced to show    
that either a king or a governing senate
 are in much the most enviable position 
when ruling justly and vigilantly over  
an active1 wealthy1 enlightened1 and    
high-minded people4 ,but a king only now
 and then1 and an oligarchy in no known 
instance1 have taken this exalted view  
of their self-interest2 and why should  

we expect a loftier mode of thinking    
from the laboring classes8 ,it is not   
what their interest is1 but what they   
suppose it to be1 that is the important 
consideration with respect to their     
conduct2 and it is quite conclusive     
against any theory of government that it
 assumes the numerical majority to do   
habitually what is never done1 nor      
expected to be done1 save in very       
exceptional cases1 by any other         
depositaries of power--namely1 to direct
 their conduct by their real ultimate   
interest1 in opposition to their        
immediate and apparent interest4 ,no    
one1 surely1 can doubt that many of the 
pernicious measures above enumerated1   
and many others as bad1 would be for the
 immediate interest of the general body 
of unskilled laborers4 ,it is quite     
possible that they would be for the     
selfish interest of the whole existing  
generation of the class4 ,the relaxation
 of industry and activity1 and          
diminished encouragement to saving which

 would be their ultimate consequence1   
might perhaps be little felt by the     
class of unskilled laborers in the space
 of a single lifetime4 ,some of the most
 fatal changes in human affairs have    
been1 as to their more manifest         
immediate effects1 beneficial4 ,the     
establishment of the despotism of the   
,csars was a great benefit to the entire
 generation in which it took place4 ,it 
put a stop to civil war1 abated a vast  
amount of malversation and tyranny by   
prtors and proconsuls2 it fostered many 
of the graces of life1 and intellectual 
cultivation in all departments not      
political2 it produced monuments of     
literary genius dazzling to the         
imaginations of shallow readers of      
history1 who do not reflect that the men
 to whom the despotism of ,augustus 7as 
well as of ,lorenzo de' ,medici and of  
,louis ,,xiv47 owes its brilliancy were 
all formed in the generation preceding4 
,the accumulated riches1 and the mental 
energy and activity produced by         

centuries of freedom1 remained for the  
benefit of the first generation of      
slaves4 ,yet this was the commencement  
of a rgime by whose gradual operation   
all the civilization which had been     
gained insensibly faded away1 until the 
empire1 which had conquered and embraced
 the world in its grasp so completely   
lost even its military efficiency that  
invaders whom three or four legions had 
always sufficed to coerce were able to  
overrun and occupy nearly the whole of  
its vast territory4 ,the fresh impulse  
given by ,christianity came but just in 
time to save arts and letters from      
perishing1 and the human race from      
sinking back into perhaps endless night4
  ,when we talk of the interest of a    
body of men1 or even of an individual   
man1 as a principle determining their   
actions1 the question what would be     
considered their interest by an         
unprejudiced observer is one of the     
least important parts of the whole      
matter4 ,as ,coleridge observes1 the man

 makes the motive1 not the motive the   
man4 ,what it is the man's interest to  
do or refrain from depends less on any  
outward circumstances than upon what    
sort of man he is4 ,if you wish to know 
what is practically a man's interest1   
you must know the cast of his habitual  
feelings and thoughts4 ,every body has  
two kinds of interests--interests which 
he cares for and interests which he does
 not care for4 ,every body has selfish  
and unselfish interests1 and a selfish  
man has cultivated the habit of caring  
for the former and not caring for the   
latter4 ,every one has present and      
distant interests1 and the improvident  
man is he who cares for the present     
interests and does not care for the     
distant4 ,it matters little that on any 
correct calculation the latter may be   
the more considerable1 if the habits of 
his mind lead him to fix his thoughts   
and wishes solely on the former4 ,it    
would be vain to attempt to persuade a  
man who beats his wife and ill-treats   

his children that he would be happier if
 he lived in love and kindness with     
them4 ,he would be happier if he were   
the kind of person who could so live2   
but he is not1 and it is probably too   
late for him to become that kind of     
person4 ,being what he is1 the          
gratification of his love of domineering
 and the indulgence of his ferocious    
temper are to his perceptions a greater 
good to himself than he would be capable
 of deriving from the pleasure and      
affection of those dependent on him4 ,he
 has no pleasure in their pleasure1 and 
does not care for their affection4 ,his 
neighbor1 who does1 is probably a       
happier man than he2 but could he be    
persuaded of this1 the persuasion would1
 most likely1 only still further        
exasperate his malignity or his         
irritability4 ,on the average1 a person 
who cares for other people1 for his     
country1 or for mankind1 is a happier   
man than one who does not2 but of what  
use is it to preach this doctrine to a  

man who cares for nothing but his own   
ease or his own pocket8 ,he can not care
 for other people if he would4 ,it is   
like preaching to the worm who crawls on
 the ground how much better it would be 
for him if he were an eagle4  ,now it is
 a universally observed fact that the   
two evil dispositions in question1 the  
disposition to prefer a man's selfish   
interests to those which he shares with 
other people1 and his immediate and     
direct interests to those which are     
indirect and remote1 are characteristics
 most especially called forth and       
fostered by the possession of power4    
,the moment a man1 or a class of men1   
find themselves with power in their     
hands1 the man's individual interest1 or
 the class's separate interest1 acquires
 an entirely new degree of importance in
 their eyes4 ,finding themselves        
worshipped by others1 they become       
worshippers of themselves1 and think    
themselves entitled to be counted at a  
hundred times the value of other people1

 while the facility they acquire of     
doing as they like without regard to    
consequences insensibly weakens the     
habits which make men look forward even 
to such consequences as affect          
themselves4 ,this is the meaning of the 
universal tradition1 grounded on        
universal experience1 of men's being    
corrupted by power4 ,every one knows how
 absurd it would be to infer from what a
 man is or does when in a private       
station1 that he will be and do exactly 
the like when a despot on a throne2     
where the bad parts of his human nature1
 instead of being restrained and kept in
 subordination by every circumstance of 
his life and by every person surrounding
 him1 are courted by all persons1 and   
ministered to by all circumstances4 ,it 
would be quite as absurd to entertain a 
similar expectation in regard to a class
 of men2 the ,demos1 or any other4 ,let 
them be ever so modest and amenable to  
reason while there is a power over them 
stronger than they1 we ought to expect a

 total change in this respect when they 
themselves become the strongest power4  
,governments must be made for human     
beings as they are1 or as they are      
capable of speedily becoming2 and in any
 state of cultivation which mankind1 or 
any class among them1 have yet attained1
 or are likely soon to attain1 the      
interests by which they will be led1    
when they are thinking only of          
self-interest1 will be almost           
exclusively those which are obvious at  
first sight1 and which operate on their 
present condition4 ,it is only a        
disinterested regard for others1 and    
especially for what comes after them1   
for the idea of posterity1 of their     
country1 or of mankind1 whether grounded
 on sympathy or on a conscientious      
feeling1 which ever directs the minds   
and purposes of classes or bodies of men
 towards distant or unobvious interests2
 and it can not be maintained that any  
form of government would be rational    
which required as a condition that these

 exalted principles of action should be 
the guiding and master motives in the   
conduct of average human beings4 ,a     
certain amount of conscience and of     
disinterested public spirit may fairly  
be calculated on in the citizens of any 
community ripe for representative       
government4 ,but it would be ridiculous 
to expect such a degree of it1 combined 
with such intellectual discernment1 as  
would be proof against any plausible    
fallacy tending to make that which was  
for their class interest appear the     
dictate of justice and of the general   
good4 ,we all know what specious        
fallacies may be urged in defense of    
every act of injustice yet proposed for 
the imaginary benefit of the mass4 ,we  
know how many1 not otherwise fools or   
bad men1 have thought it justifiable to 
repudiate the national debt4 ,we know   
how many1 not destitute of ability and  
of considerable popular influence1 think
 it fair to throw the whole burden of   
taxation upon savings1 under the name of

 realized property1 allowing those whose
 progenitors and themselves have always 
spent all they received1 to remain1 as a
 reward for such exemplary conduct1     
wholly untaxed4 ,we know what powerful  
arguments1 the more dangerous because   
there is a portion of truth in them1 may
 be brought against all inheritance1    
against the power of bequest1 against   
every advantage which one person seems  
to have over another4 ,we know how      
easily the uselessness of almost every  
branch of knowledge may be proved to the
 complete satisfaction of those who do  
not possess it4 ,how many1 not          
altogether stupid men1 think the        
scientific study of languages useless1  
think ancient literature useless1 all   
erudition useless1 logic and metaphysics
 useless1 poetry and the fine arts idle 
and frivolous1 political economy purely 
mischievous8 ,even history has been     
pronounced useless and mischievous by   
able men4 ,nothing but that acquaintance
 with external nature1 empirically      

acquired1 which serves directly for the 
production of objects necessary to      
existence or agreeable to the senses1   
would get its utility recognized if     
people had the least encouragement to   
disbelieve it4 ,is it reasonable to     
think that even much more cultivated    
minds than those of the numerical       
majority can be expected to be1 will    
have so delicate a conscience1 and so   
just an appreciation of what is against 
their own apparent interest1 that they  
will reject these and the innumerable   
other fallacies which will press in upon
 them from all quarters as soon as they 
come into power1 to induce them to      
follow their own selfish inclinations   
and short-sighted notions of their own  
good1 in opposition to justice1 at the  
expense of all other classes and of     
posterity8  ,one of the greatest        
dangers1 therefore1 of democracy1 as of 
all other forms of government1 lies in  
the sinister interest of the holders of 
power3 it is the danger of class        

legislation1 of government intended for 
7whether really effecting it or not7 the
 immediate benefit of the dominant      
class1 to the lasting detriment of the  
whole4 ,and one of the most important   
questions demanding consideration in    
determining the best constitution of a  
representative government is how to     
provide efficacious securities against  
this evil4  ,if we consider as a class1 
politically speaking1 any number of     
persons who have the same sinister      
interest--that is1 whose direct and     
apparent interest points towards the    
same description of bad measures--the   
desirable object would be that no class1
 and no combination of classes likely to
 combine1 shall be able to exercise a   
preponderant influence in the           
government4 ,a modern community1 not    
divided within itself by strong         
antipathies of race1 language1 or       
nationality1 may be considered as in the
 main divisible into two sections1      
which1 in spite of partial variations1  

correspond on the whole with two        
divergent directions of apparent        
interest4 ,let us call them 7in brief   
general terms7 laborers on the one hand1
 employers of labor on the other2       
including1 however1 along with employers
 of labor not only retired capitalists  
and the possessors of inherited wealth1 
but all that highly paid description of 
laborers 7such as the professions7 whose
 education and way of life assimilate   
them with the rich1 and whose prospect  
and ambition it is to raise themselves  
into that class4 ,with the laborers1 on 
the other hand1 may be ranked those     
smaller employers of labor who by       
interests1 habits1 and educational      
impressions are assimilated in wishes1  
tastes1 and objects to the laboring     
classes1 comprehending a large          
proportion of petty tradesmen4 ,in a    
state of society thus composed1 if the  
representative system could be made     
ideally perfect1 and if it were possible
 to maintain it in that state1 its      

organization must be such that these two
 classes1 manual laborers and their     
affinities on one side1 employers of    
labor and their affinities on the other1
 should be1 in the arrangement of the   
representative system1 equally balanced1
 each influencing about an equal number 
of votes in ,parliament2 since1 assuming
 that the majority of each class1 in any
 difference between them1 would be      
mainly governed by their class          
interests1 there would be a minority of 
each in whom that consideration would be
 subordinate to reason1 justice1 and the
 good of the whole2 and this minority of
 either1 joining with the whole of the  
other1 would turn the scale against any 
demands of their own majority which were
 not such as ought to prevail4 ,the     
reason why1 in any tolerable constituted
 society1 justice and the general       
interest mostly in the end carry their  
point1 is that the separate and selfish 
interests of mankind are almost always  
divided2 some are interested in what is 

wrong1 but some1 also1 have their       
private interest on the side of what is 
right2 and those who are governed by    
higher considerations1 though too few   
and weak to prevail alone1 usually1     
after sufficient discussion and         
agitation1 become strong enough to turn 
the balance in favor of the body of     
private interests which is on the same  
side with them4 ,the representative     
system ought to be so constituted as to 
maintain this state of things2 it ought 
not to allow any of the various         
sectional interests to be so powerful as
 to be capable of prevailing against    
truth and justice1 and the other        
sectional interests combined4 ,there    
ought always to be such a balance       
preserved among personal interests as   
may render any one of them dependent for
 its successes on carrying with it at   
least a large proportion of those who   
act on higher motives1 and more         
comprehensive and distant views4        
,chapter ,,vii--,of ,true and ,false    

,democracy2 ,representation of ,all1 and
 ,representation of the ,majority only4 
,it has been seen that the dangers      
incident to a representative democracy  
are of two kinds3 danger of a low grade 
of intelligence in the representative   
body1 and in the popular opinion which  
controls it2 and danger of class        
legislation on the part of the numerical
 majority1 these being all composed of  
the same class4 ,we have next to        
consider how far it is possible so to   
organize the democracy as1 without      
interfering materially with the         
characteristic benefits of democratic   
government1 to do away with these two   
great evils1 or at least to abate them  
in the utmost degree attainable by human
 contrivance4  ,the common mode of      
attempting this is by limiting the      
democratic character of the             
representation through a more or less   
restricted suffrage4 ,but there is a    
previous consideration which1 duly kept 
in view1 considerably modifies the      

circumstances which are supposed to     
render such a restriction necessary4 ,a 
completely equal democracy1 in a nation 
in which a single class composes the    
numerical majority1 can not be divested 
of certain evils2 but those evils are   
greatly aggravated by the fact that the 
democracies which at present exist are  
not equal1 but systematically unequal in
 favor of the predominant class4 ,two   
very different ideas are usually        
confounded under the name democracy4    
,the pure idea of democracy1 according  
to its definition1 is the government of 
the whole people by the whole people1   
equally represented4 ,democracy1 as     
commonly conceived and hitherto         
practiced1 is the government of the     
whole people by a mere majority of the  
people exclusively represented4 ,the    
former is synonymous with the equality  
of all citizens2 the latter1 strangely  
confounded with it1 is a government of  
privilege in favor of the numerical     
majority1 who alone possess practically 

any voice in the state4 ,this is the    
inevitable consequence of the manner in 
which the votes are now taken1 to the   
complete disfranchisement of minorities4
  ,the confusion of ideas here is great1
 but it is so easily cleared up that one
 would suppose the slightest indication 
would be sufficient to place the matter 
in its true light before any mind of    
average intelligence4 ,it would be so   
but for the power of habit2 owing to    
which1 the simplest idea1 if unfamiliar1
 has as great difficulty in making its  
way to the mind as a far more           
complicated one4 ,that the minority must
 yield to the majority1 the smaller     
number to the greater1 is a familiar    
idea2 and accordingly1 men think there  
is no necessity for using their minds   
any further1 and it does not occur to   
them that there is any medium between   
allowing the smaller number to be       
equally powerful with the greater1 and  
blotting out the smaller number         
altogether4 ,in a representative body   

actually deliberating1 the minority must
 of course be overruled2 and in an equal
 democracy 7since the opinions of the   
constituents1 when they insist on them1 
determine those of the representative   
body71 the majority of the people1      
through their representatives1 will     
outvote and prevail over the minority   
and their representatives4 ,but does it 
follow that the minority should have no 
representatives at all8 ,because the    
majority ought to prevail over the      
minority1 must the majority have all the
 votes1 the minority none8 ,is it       
necessary that the minority should not  
even be heard8 ,nothing but habit and   
old association can reconcile any       
reasonable being to the needless        
injustice4 ,in a really equal democracy1
 every or any section would be          
represented1 not disproportionately1 but
 proportionately4 ,a majority of the    
electors would always have a majority of
 the representatives1 but a minority of 
the electors would always have a        

minority of the representatives4 ,man   
for man1 they would be as fully         
represented as the majority4 ,unless    
they are1 there is not equal government1
 but a government of inequality and     
privilege3 one part of the people rule  
over the rest3 there is a part whose    
fair and equal share of influence in the
 representation is withheld from them1  
contrary to all just government1 but1   
above all1 contrary to the principle of 
democracy1 which professes equality as  
its very root and foundation4  ,the     
injustice and violation of principle are
 not less flagrant because those who    
suffer by them are a minority1 for there
 is not equal suffrage where every      
single individual does not count for as 
much as any other single individual in  
the community4 ,but it is not only a    
minority who suffer4 ,democracy1 thus   
constituted1 does not even attain its   
ostensible object1 that of giving the   
powers of government in all cases to the
 numerical majority4 ,it does something 

very different2 it gives them to a      
majority of the majority1 who may be1   
and often are1 but a minority of the    
whole4 ,all principles are most         
effectually tested by extreme cases4    
,suppose1 then1 that1 in a country      
governed by equal and universal         
suffrage1 there is a contested election 
in every constituency1 and every        
election is carried by a small majority4
 ,the ,parliament thus brought together 
represents little more than a bare      
majority of the people4 ,this           
,parliament proceeds to legislate1 and  
adopts important measures by a bare     
majority of itself4 ,what guaranty is   
there that these measures accord with   
the wishes of a majority of the people8 
,nearly half the electors1 having been  
outvoted at the hustings1 have had no   
influence at all in the decision2 and   
the whole of these may be1 a majority of
 them probably are1 hostile to the      
measures1 having voted against those by 
whom they have been carried4 ,of the    

remaining electors1 nearly half have    
chosen representatives who1 by          
supposition1 have voted against the     
measures4 ,it is possible1 therefore1   
and even probable1 that the opinion     
which has prevailed was agreeable only  
to a minority of the nation1 though a   
majority of that portion of it whom the 
institutions of the country have erected
 into a ruling class4 ,if democracy     
means the certain ascendancy of the     
majority1 there are no means of insuring
 that1 but by allowing every individual 
figure to tell equally in the summing   
up4 ,any minority left out1 either      
purposely or by the play of the         
machinery1 gives the power not to the   
majority1 but to a minority in some     
other part of the scale4  ,the only     
answer which can possibly be made to    
this reasoning is1 that as different    
opinions predominate in different       
localities1 the opinion which is in a   
minority in some places has a majority  
in others1 and on the whole every       

opinion which exists in the             
constituencies obtains its fair share of
 voices in the representation4 ,and this
 is roughly true in the present state of
 the constituency2 if it were not1 the  
discordance of the ,house with the      
general sentiment of the country would  
soon become evident4 ,but it would be no
 longer true if the present constituency
 were much enlarged1 still less if made 
co-extensive with the whole population2 
for in that case the majority in every  
locality would consist of manual        
laborers2 and when there was any        
question pending on which these classes 
were at issue with the rest of the      
community1 no other class could succeed 
in getting represented any where4 ,even 
now1 is it not a great grievance that in
 every ,parliament a very numerous      
portion of the electors1 willing and    
anxious to be represented1 have no      
member in the ,house for whom they have 
voted8 ,is it just that every elector of
 ,marylebone is obliged to be           

represented by two nominees of the      
vestries1 every elector of ,finsbury or 
,lambeth by those 7as is generally      
believed7 of the publicans8 ,the        
constituencies to which most of the     
highly educated and public spirited     
persons in the country belong1 those of 
the large towns1 are now1 in great part1
 either unrepresented or misrepresented4
 ,the electors who are on a different   
side in party politics from the local   
majority are unrepresented4 ,of those   
who are on the same side1 a large       
proportion are misrepresented2 having   
been obliged to accept the man who had  
the greatest number of supporters in    
their political party1 though his       
opinions may differ from theirs on every
 other point4 ,the state of things is1  
in some respects1 even worse than if the
 minority were not allowed to vote at   
all2 for then1 at least1 the majority   
might have a member who would represent 
their own best mind2 while now1 the     
necessity of not dividing the party1 for

 fear of letting in its opponents1      
induces all to vote either for the first
 person who presents himself wearing    
their colors1 or for the one brought    
forward by their local leaders2 and     
these1 if we pay them the compliment1   
which they very seldom deserve1 of      
supposing their choice to be unbiassed  
by their personal interests1 are        
compelled1 that they may be sure of     
mustering their whole strength1 to bring
 forward a candidate whom none of the   
party will strongly object to--that is1 
a man without any distinctive           
peculiarity1 any known opinions except  
the shibboleth of the party4 ,this is   
strikingly exemplified in the ,united   
,states2 where1 at the election of      
,president1 the strongest party never   
dares put forward any of its strongest  
men1 because every one of these1 from   
the mere fact that he has been long in  
the public eye1 has made himself        
objectionable to some portion or other  
of the party1 and is therefore not so   

sure a card for rallying all their votes
 as a person who has never been heard of
 by the public at all until he is       
produced as the candidate4 ,thus1 the   
man who is chosen1 even by the strongest
 party1 represents perhaps the real     
wishes only of the narrow margin by     
which that party outnumbers the other4  
,any section whose support is necessary 
to success possesses a veto on the      
candidate4 ,any section which holds out 
more obstinately than the rest can      
compel all the others to adopt its      
nominee2 and this superior pertinacity  
is unhappily more likely to be found    
among those who are holding out for     
their own interest than for that of the 
public4 ,speaking generally1 the choice 
of the majority is determined by that   
portion of the body who are the most    
timid1 the most narrow-minded and       
prejudiced1 or who cling most           
tenaciously to the exclusive            
class-interest2 and the electoral rights
 of the minority1 while useless for the 

purposes for which votes are given1     
serve only for compelling the majority  
to accept the candidate of the weakest  
or worst portion of themselves4  ,that1 
while recognizing these evils1 many     
should consider them as the necessary   
price paid for a free government1 is in 
no way surprising2 it was the opinion of
 all the friends of freedom up to a     
recent period4 ,but the habit of passing
 them over as irremediable has become so
 inveterate1 that many persons seem to  
have lost the capacity of looking at    
them as things which they would be glad 
to remedy if they could4 ,from          
despairing of a cure1 there is too often
 but one step to denying the disease2   
and from this follows dislike to having 
a remedy proposed1 as if the proposer   
were creating a mischief instead of     
offering relief from one4 ,people are so
 inured to the evils that they feel as  
if it were unreasonable1 if not wrong1  
to complain of them4 ,yet1 avoidable or 
not1 he must be a purblind lover of     

liberty on whose mind they do not weigh2
 who would not rejoice at the discovery 
that they could be dispensed with4 ,now1
 nothing is more certain than that the  
virtual blotting out of the minority is 
no necessary or natural consequence of  
freedom2 that1 far from having any      
connection with democracy1 it is        
diametrically opposed to the first      
principle of democracy1 representation  
in proportion to numbers4 ,it is an     
essential part of democracy that        
minorities should be adequately         
represented4 ,no real democracy1 nothing
 but a false show of democracy1 is      
possible without it4  ,those who have   
seen and felt1 in some degree1 the force
 of these considerations1 have proposed 
various expedients by which the evil may
 be1 in a greater or less degree1       
mitigated4 ,lord ,john ,russell1 in one 
of his ,reform ,bills1 introduced a     
provision that certain constituencies   
should return three members1 and that in
 these each elector should be allowed to

 vote only for two2 and ,mr4 ,disraeli1 
in the recent debates1 revived the      
memory of the fact by reproaching him   
for it1 being of opinion1 apparently1   
that it befits a ,conservative statesman
 to regard only means1 and to disown    
scornfully all fellow-feeling with any  
one who is betrayed1 even once1 into    
thinking of ends4 #c ,others have       
proposed that each elector should be    
allowed to vote only for one4 ,by either
 of these plans1 a minority equalling or
 exceeding a third of the local         
constituency1 would be able1 if it      
attempted no more1 to return one out of 
three members4 ,the same result might be
 attained in a still better way if1 as  
proposed in an able pamphlet by ,mr4    
,james ,garth ,marshall1 the elector    
retained his three votes1 but was at    
liberty to bestow them all upon the same
 candidate4 ,these schemes1 though      
infinitely better than none at all1 are 
yet but makeshifts1 and attain the end  
in a very imperfect manner1 since all   

local minorities of less than a third1  
and all minorities1 however numerous1   
which are made up from several          
constituencies1 would remain            
unrepresented4 ,it is much to be        
lamented1 however1 that none of these   
plans have been carried into effect1 as 
any of them would have recognized the   
right principle1 and prepared the way   
for its more complete application4 ,but 
real equality of representation is not  
obtained unless any set of electors     
amounting to the average number of a    
constituency1 wherever in the country   
they happen to reside1 have the power of
 combining with one another to return a 
representative4 ,this degree of         
perfection in representation appeared   
impracticable until a man of great      
capacity1 fitted alike for large general
 views and for the contrivance of       
practical details--,mr4 ,thomas         
,hare--had proved its possibility by    
drawing up a scheme for its             
accomplishment1 embodied in a ,draft of 

an ,act of ,parliament2 a scheme which  
has the almost unparalleled merit of    
carrying out a great principle of       
government in a manner approaching to   
ideal perfection as regards the special 
object in view1 while it attains        
incidentally several other ends of      
scarcely inferior importance4           
,according to this plan1 the unit of    
representation1 the quota of electors   
who would be entitled to have a member  
to themselves1 would be ascertained by  
the ordinary process of taking averages1
 the number of voters being divided by  
the number of seats in the ,house2 and  
every candidate who obtained that quota 
would be returned1 from however great a 
number of local constituencies it might 
be gathered4 ,the votes would1 as at    
present1 be given locally2 but any      
elector would be at liberty to vote for 
any candidate1 in whatever part of the  
country he might offer himself4 ,those  
electors1 therefore1 who did not wish to
 be represented by any of the local     

candidates1 might aid by their vote in  
the return of the person they liked best
 among all those throughout the country 
who had expressed a willingness to be   
chosen4 ,this would so far give reality 
to the electoral rights of the otherwise
 virtually disfranchised minority4 ,but 
it is important that not those alone who
 refuse to vote for any of the local    
candidates1 but those also who vote for 
one of them and are defeated1 should be 
enabled to find elsewhere the           
representation which they have not      
succeeded in obtaining in their own     
district4 ,it is therefore provided that
 an elector may deliver a voting paper  
containing other names in addition to   
the one which stands foremost in his    
preference4 ,his vote would only be     
counted for one candidate2 but if the   
object of his first choice failed to be 
returned1 from not having obtained the  
quota1 his second perhaps might be more 
fortunate4 ,he may extend his list to a 
greater number in the order of his      

preference1 so that if the names which  
stand near the top of the list either   
can not make up the quota1 or are able  
to make it up without his vote1 the vote
 may still be used for some one whom it 
may assist in returning4 ,to obtain the 
full number of members required to      
complete the ,house1 as well as to      
prevent very popular candidates from    
engrossing nearly all the suffrages1 it 
is necessary1 however many votes a      
candidate may obtain1 that no more of   
them than the quota should be counted   
for his return2 the remainder of those  
who voted for him would have their votes
 counted for the next person on their   
respective lists who needed them1 and   
could by their aid complete the quota4  
,to determine which of a candidate's    
votes should be used for his return1 and
 which set free for others1 several     
methods are proposed1 into which we     
shall not here enter4 ,he would1 of     
course1 retain the votes of all those   
who would not otherwise be represented2 

and for the remainder1 drawing lots1 in 
default of better1 would be an          
unobjectionable expedient4 ,the voting  
papers would be conveyed to a central   
office1 where the votes would be        
counted1 the number of first1 second1   
third1 and other votes given for each   
candidate ascertained1 and the quota    
would be allotted to every one who could
 make it up1 until the number of the    
,house was complete2 first votes being  
preferred to second1 second to third1   
and so forth4 ,the voting papers1 and   
all the elements of the calculation1    
would be placed in public repositories1 
accessible to all whom they concerned2  
and if any one who had obtained the     
quota was not duly returned1 it would be
 in his power easily to prove it4       
,these are the main provisions of the   
scheme4 ,for a more minute knowledge of 
its very simple machinery1 ,i must refer
 to ,mr4 ,hare's ,treatise on the       
,election of ,representatives 7a small  
volume ,published in #ahei71 and to a   

pamphlet by ,mr4 ,henry ,fawcett1       
published in #ahfj1 and entitled ,mr4   
,hare's ,reform ,bill simplified and    
explained4 ,this last is a very clear   
and concise exposition of the plan1     
reduced to its simplest elements by the 
omission of some of ,mr4 ,hare's        
original provisions1 which1 though in   
themselves beneficial1 we're thought to 
take more from the simplicity of the    
scheme than they added to its practical 
advantages4 ,the more these works are   
studied1 the stronger1 ,i venture to    
predict1 will be the impression of the  
perfect feasibility of the scheme and   
its transcendant advantages4 ,such and  
so numerous are these1 that1 in my      
conviction1 they place ,mr4 ,hare's plan
 among the very greatest improvements   
yet made in the theory and practice of  
government4  ,in the first place1 it    
secures a representation1 in proportion 
to numbers1 of every division of the    
electoral body3 not two great parties   
alone1 with perhaps a few large         

sectional minorities in particular      
places1 but every minority in the whole 
nation1 consisting of a sufficiently    
large number to be1 on principles of    
equal justice1 entitled to a            
representative4 ,secondly1 no elector   
would1 as at present1 be nominally      
represented by some one whom he had not 
chosen4 ,every member of the ,house     
would be the representative of a        
unanimous constituency4 ,he would       
represent a thousand electors1 or two   
thousand1 or five thousand1 or ten      
thousand1 as the quota might be1 every  
one of whom would have not only voted   
for him1 but selected him from the whole
 country2 not merely from the assortment
 of two or three perhaps rotten oranges1
 which may be the only choice offered to
 him in his local market4 ,under this   
relation the tie between the elector and
 the representative would be of a       
strength and a value of which at present
 we have no experience4 ,every one of   
the electors would be personally        

identified with his representative1 and 
the representative with his             
constituents4 ,every elector who voted  
for him would have done so either       
because he is the person1 in the whole  
list of candidates for ,parliament1 who 
best expresses the voter's own opinions1
 or because he is one of those whose    
abilities and character the voter most  
respects1 and whom he most willingly    
trusts to think for him4 ,the member    
would represent persons1 not the mere   
bricks and mortar of the town--the      
voters themselves1 not a few vestrymen  
or parish notabilities merely4 ,all1    
however1 that is worth preserving in the
 representation of places would be      
preserved4 ,though the ,parliament of   
the nation ought to have as little as   
possible to do with purely local        
affairs1 yet1 while it has to do with   
them1 there ought to be members         
specially commissioned to look after the
 interests of every important locality2 
and these there would still be4 ,in     

every locality which contained many more
 voters than the quota 7and there       
probably ought to be no local           
consitituency which does not71 the      
majority would generally prefer to be   
represented by one of themselves2 by a  
person of local knowledge1 and residing 
in the locality1 if there is any such   
person to be found among the candidates1
 who is otherwise eligible as their     
representative4 ,it would be the        
minorities chiefly1 who1 being unable to
 return the local member1 would look out
 elsewhere for a candidate likely to    
obtain other votes in addition to their 
own4  ,of all modes in which a national 
representation can possibly be          
constituted1 this one affords the best  
security for the intellectual           
qualifications desirable in the         
representatives4 ,at present1 by        
universal admission1 it is becoming more
 and more difficult for any one who has 
only talents and character to gain      
admission into the ,house of ,commons4  

,the only persons who can get elected   
are those who possess local influence1  
or make their way by lavish expenditure1
 or who1 on the invitation of three or  
four tradesmen or attorneys1 are sent   
down by one of the two great parties    
from their ,london clubs1 as men whose  
votes the party can depend on under all 
circumstances4 ,on ,mr4 ,hare's system1 
those who did not like the local        
candidates would fill up their voting   
papers by a selection from all the      
persons of national reputation on the   
list of candidates with whose general   
political principles they were in       
sympathy4 ,almost every person1         
therefore1 who had made himself in any  
way honorably distinguished1 though     
devoid of local influence1 and having   
sworn allegiance to no political party1 
would have a fair chance of making up   
the quota1 and with this encouragement  
such persons might be expected to offer 
themselves in numbers hitherto undreamed
 of4 ,hundreds of able men of           

independent thought1 who would have no  
chance whatever of being chosen by the  
majority of any existing constituency1  
have by their writings1 or their        
exertions in some field of public       
usefulness1 made themselves known and   
approved by a few persons in almost     
every district of the kingdom2 and if   
every vote that would be given for them 
in every place could be counted for     
their election1 they might be able to   
complete the number of the quota4 ,in no
 other way which it seems possible to   
suggest would ,parliament be so certain 
of containing the very lite of the      
country4  ,and it is not solely through 
the votes of minorities that this system
 of election would raise the            
intellectual standard of the ,house of  
,commons4 ,majorities would be compelled
 to look out for members of a much      
higher calibre4 ,when the individuals   
composing the majority would no longer  
be reduced to ,hobson's choice1 of      
either voting for the person brought    

forward by their local leaders1 or not  
voting at all2 when the nominee of the  
leaders would have to encounter the     
competition not solely of the candidate 
of the minority1 but of all the men of  
established reputation in the country   
who were willing to serve1 it would be  
impossible any longer to foist upon the 
electors the first person who presents  
himself with the catchwords of the party
 in his mouth1 and three or four        
thousand pounds in his pocket4 ,the     
majority would insist on having a       
candidate worthy of their choice1 or    
they would carry their votes somewhere  
else1 and the minority would prevail4   
,the slavery of the majority to the     
least estimable portion of their numbers
 would be at an end2 the very best and  
most capable of the local notabilities  
would be put forward by preference2 if  
possible1 such as were known in some    
advantageous way beyond the locality1   
that their local strength might have a  
chance of being fortified by stray votes

 from elsewhere4 ,constituencies would  
become competitors for the best         
candidates1 and would vie with one      
another in selecting from among the men 
of local knowledge and connections those
 who were most distinguished in every   
other respect4  ,the natural tendency of
 representative government1 as of modern
 civilization1 is towards collective    
mediocrity3 and this tendency is        
increased by all reductions and         
extensions of the franchise1 their      
effect being to place the principal     
power in the hands of classes more and  
more below the highest level of         
instruction in the community4 ,but1     
though the superior intellects and      
characters will necessarily be          
outnumbered1 it makes a great difference
 whether or not they are heard4 ,in the 
false democracy which1 instead of giving
 representation to all1 gives it only to
 the local majorities1 the voice of the 
instructed minority may have no organs  
at all in the representative body4 ,it  

is an admitted fact that in the         
,american democracy1 which is           
constructed on this faulty model1 the   
highly-cultivated members of the        
community1 except such of them as are   
willing to sacrifice their own opinions 
and modes of judgment1 and become the   
servile mouthpieces of their inferiors  
in knowledge1 do not even offer         
themselves for ,congress or the ,state  
,legislatures1 so certain is it that    
they would have no chance of being      
returned4 ,had a plan like ,mr4 ,hare's 
by good fortune suggested itself to the 
enlightened and disinterested founders  
of the ,american ,republic1 the federal 
and state assemblies would have         
contained many of these distinguished   
men1 and democracy would have been      
spared its greatest reproach and one of 
its most formidable evils4 ,against this
 evil the system of personal            
representation proposed by ,mr4 ,hare is
 almost a specific4 ,the minority of    
instructed minds scattered through the  

local constituencies would unite to     
return a number1 proportioned to their  
own numbers1 of the very ablest men the 
country contains4 ,they would be under  
the strongest inducement to choose such 
men1 since in no other mode could they  
make their small numerical strength tell
 for any thing considerable4 ,the       
representatives of the majority1 besides
 that they would themselves be improved 
in quality by the operation of the      
system1 would no longer have the whole  
field to themselves4 ,they would indeed 
outnumber the others1 as much as the one
 class of electors outnumbers the other 
in the country3 they could always       
outvote them1 but they would speak and  
vote in their presence1 and subject to  
their criticism4 ,when any difference   
arose1 they would have to meet the      
arguments of the instructed few by      
reasons1 at least apparently1 as cogent2
 and since they could not1 as those do  
who are speaking to persons already     
unanimous1 simply assume that they are  

in the right1 it would occasionally     
happen to them to become convinced that 
they were in the wrong4 ,as they would  
in general be well-meaning 7for thus    
much may reasonably be expected from a  
fairly-chosen national representation71 
their own minds would be insensibly     
raised by the influence of the minds    
with which they were in contact1 or even
 in conflict4 ,the champions of         
unpopular doctrines would not put forth 
their arguments merely in books and     
periodicals1 read only by their own     
side2 the opposing ranks would meet face
 to face and hand to hand1 and there    
would be a fair comparison of their     
intellectual strength in the presence of
 the country4 ,it would then be found   
out whether the opinion which prevailed 
by counting votes would also prevail if 
the votes were weighed as well as       
counted4 ,the multitude have often a    
true instinct for distinguishing an able
 man when he has the means of displaying
 his ability in a fair field before     

them4 ,if such a man fails to obtain any
 portion of his just weight1 it is      
through institutions or usages which    
keep him out of sight4 ,in the old      
democracies there were no means of      
keeping out of sight any able man3 the  
bema was open to him2 he needed nobody's
 consent to become a public adviser4 ,it
 is not so in a representative          
government2 and the best friends of     
representative democracy can hardly be  
without misgivings that the             
,themistocles or ,demosthenes whose     
councils would have saved the nation1   
might be unable during his whole life   
ever to obtain a seat4 ,but if the      
presence in the representative assembly 
can be insured of even a few of the     
first minds in the country1 though the  
remainder consist only of average minds1
 the influence of these leading spirits 
is sure to make itself insensibly felt  
in the general deliberations1 even      
though they be known to be1 in many     
respects1 opposed to the tone of popular

 opinion and feeling4 ,i am unable to   
conceive any mode by which the presence 
of such minds can be so positively      
insured as by that proposed by ,mr4     
,hare4  ,this portion of the assembly   
would also be the appropriate organ of a
 great social function1 for which there 
is no provision in any existing         
democracy1 but which in no government   
can remain permanently unfulfilled      
without condemning that government to   
infallible degeneracy and decay4 ,this  
may be called the function of           
,antagonism4 ,in every government there 
is some power stronger than all the     
rest2 and the power which is strongest  
tends perpetually to become the sole    
power4 ,partly by intention and partly  
unconsciously1 it is ever striving to   
make all other things bend to itself1   
and is not content while there is any   
thing which makes permanent head against
 it1 any influence not in agreement with
 its spirit4 ,yet1 if it succeeds in    
suppressing all rival influences1 and   

moulding every thing after its own      
model1 improvement1 in that country1 is 
at an end1 and decline commences4 ,human
 improvement is a product of many       
factors1 and no power ever yet          
constituted among mankind includes them 
all3 even the most beneficent power only
 contains in itself some of the         
requisites of good1 and the remainder1  
if progress is to continue1 must be     
derived from some other source4 ,no     
community has ever long continued       
progressive but while a conflict was    
going on between the strongest power in 
the community and some rival power2     
between the spiritual and temporal      
authorities2 the military or territorial
 and the industrious classes2 the king  
and the people2 the orthodox and        
religious reformers4 ,when the victory  
on either side was so complete as to put
 an end to the strife1 and no other     
conflict took its place1 first          
stagnation followed1 and then decay4    
,the ascendancy of the numerical        

majority is less unjust1 and1 on the    
whole1 less mischievous than many       
others1 but it is attended with the very
 same kind of dangers1 and even more    
certainly2 for when the government is in
 the hands of ,one or a ,few1 the ,many 
are always existent as a rival power1   
which may not be strong enough ever to  
control the other1 but whose opinion and
 sentiment are a moral1 and even a      
social support to all who1 either from  
conviction or contrariety of interest1  
are opposed to any of the tendencies of 
the ruling authority4 ,but when the     
democracy is supreme1 there is no ,one  
or ,few strong enough for dissentient   
opinions and injured or menaced         
interests to lean upon4 ,the great      
difficulty of democratic government has 
hitherto seemed to be1 how to provide in
 a democratic society--what             
circumstances have provided hitherto in 
all the societies which have maintained 
themselves ahead of others--a social    
support1 a point d'appui1 for individual

 resistance to the tendencies of the    
ruling power2 a protection1 a           
rallying-point1 for opinions and        
interests which the ascendant public    
opinion views with disfavor4 ,for want  
of such a point d'appui1 the older      
societies1 and all but a few modern     
ones1 either fell into dissolution or   
became stationary 7which means slow     
deterioration7 through the exclusive    
predominance of a part only of the      
conditions of social and mental         
well-being4  ,now1 this great want the  
system of ,personal ,representation is  
fitted to supply in the most perfect    
manner which the circumstances of modern
 society admit of4 ,the only quarter in 
which to look for a supplement1 or      
completing corrective to the instincts  
of a democratic majority1 is the        
instructed minority2 but1 in the        
ordinary mode of constituting democracy1
 this minority has no organ3 ,mr4       
,hare's system provides one4 ,the       
representatives who would be returned to

 ,parliament by the aggregate of        
minorities would afford that organ in   
its greatest perfection4 ,a separate    
organization of the instructed classes1 
even if practicable1 would be invidious1
 and could only escape from being       
offensive by being totally without      
influence4 ,but if the lite of these    
classes formed part of the ,parliament1 
by the same title as any other of its   
members--by representing the same number
 of citizens1 the same numerical        
fraction of the national will--their    
presence could give umbrage to nobody1  
while they would be in the position of  
highest vantage1 both for making their  
opinions and councils heard on all      
important subjects1 and for taking an   
active part in public business4 ,their  
abilities would probably draw to them   
more than their numerical share of the  
actual administration of government2 as 
the ,athenians did not confide          
responsible public functions to ,cleon  
or ,hyperbolus 7the employment of ,cleon

 at ,pylos and ,amphipolis was purely   
exceptional71 but ,nicias1 and          
,theramenes1 and ,alcibiades were in    
constant employment both at home and    
abroad1 though known to sympathize more 
with oligarchy than with democracy4 ,the
 instructed minority would1 in the      
actual voting1 count only for their     
numbers1 but as a moral power they would
 count for much more1 in virtue of their
 knowledge1 and of the influence it     
would give them over the rest4 ,an      
arrangement better adapted to keep      
popular opinion within reason and       
justice1 and to guard it from the       
various deteriorating influences which  
assail the weak side of democracy1 could
 scarcely by human ingenuity be devised4
 ,a democratic people would in this way 
be provided with what in any other way  
it would almost certainly miss--leaders 
of a higher grade of intellect and      
character than itself4 ,modern democracy
 would have its occasional ,pericles1   
and its habitual group of superior and  

guiding minds4  ,with all this array of 
reasons1 of the most fundamental        
character1 on the affirmative side of   
the question1 what is there on the      
negative8 ,nothing that will sustain    
examination1 when people can once be    
induced to bestow any real examination  
upon a new thing4 ,those indeed1 if any 
such there be1 who1 under pretense of   
equal justice1 aim only at substituting 
the class ascendancy of the poor for    
that of the rich1 will of course be     
unfavorable to a scheme which places    
both on a level4 ,but ,i do not believe 
that any such wish exists at present    
among the working classes of this       
country1 though ,i would not answer for 
the effect which opportunity and        
demagogic artifices may hereafter have  
in exciting it4 ,in the ,united ,states1
 where the numerical majority have long 
been in full possession of collective   
despotism1 they would probably be as    
unwilling to part with it as a single   
despot or an aristocracy4 ,but ,i       

believe that the ,english democracy     
would as yet be content with protection 
against the class legislation of others1
 without claiming the power to exercise 
it in their turn4  ,among the ostensible
 objectors to ,mr4 ,hare's scheme1 some 
profess to think the plan unworkable2   
but these1 it will be found1 are        
generally people who have barely heard  
of it1 or have given it a very slight   
and cursory examination4 ,others are    
unable to reconcile themselves to the   
loss of what they term the local        
character of the representation4 ,a     
nation does not seem to them to consist 
of persons1 but of artificial units1 the
 creation of geography and statistics4  
,parliament must represent towns and    
counties1 not human beings4 ,but no one 
seeks to annihilate towns and counties4 
,towns and counties1 it may be presumed1
 are represented when the human beings  
who inhabit them are represented4 ,local
 feelings can not exist without somebody
 who feels them1 nor local interests    

without somebody interested in them4 ,if
 the human beings whose feelings and    
interests these are have their proper   
share of representation1 these feelings 
and interests are represented in common 
with all other feelings and interests of
 those persons4 ,but ,i can not see why 
the feelings and interests which arrange
 mankind according to localities should 
be the only one thought worthy of being 
represented2 or why people who have     
other feelings and interests1 which they
 value more than they do their          
geographical ones1 should be restricted 
to these as the sole principle of their 
political classification4 ,the notion   
that ,yorkshire and ,middlesex have     
rights apart from those of their        
inhabitants1 or that ,liverpool and     
,exeter are the proper objects of the   
legislator's care1 in contradistinction 
the population of those places1 is a    
curious specimen of delusion produced by
 words4  ,in general1 however1 objectors
 cut the matter short by affirming that 

the people of ,england will never       
consent to such a system4 ,what the     
people of ,england are likely to think  
of those who pass such a summary        
sentence on their capacity of           
understanding and judgment1 deeming it  
superfluous to consider whether a thing 
is right or wrong before affirming that 
they are certain to reject it1 ,i will  
not undertake to say4 ,for my own part1 
,i do not think that the people of      
,england have deserved to be1 without   
trial1 stigmatized as insurmountably    
prejudiced against any thing which can  
be proved to be good either for         
themselves or for others4 ,it also      
appears to me that when prejudices      
persist obstinately1 it is the fault of 
nobody so much as of those who make a   
point of proclaiming them insuperable1  
as an excuse to themselves for never    
joining in an attempt to remove them4   
,any prejudice whatever will be         
insurmountable if those who do not share
 it themselves truckle to it1 and       

flatter it1 and accept it as a law of   
nature4 ,i believe1 however1 that of    
prejudice1 properly speaking1 there is  
in this case none except on the lips of 
those who talk about it1 and that there 
is in general1 among those who have yet 
heard of the proposition1 no other      
hostility to it than the natural and    
healthy distrust attaching to all       
novelties which have not been           
sufficiently canvassed to make generally
 manifest all the pros and cons of the  
question4 ,the only serious obstacle is 
the unfamiliarity3 this1 indeed1 is a   
formidable one1 for the imagination much
 more easily reconciles itself to a     
great alteration in substance than to a 
very small one in names and forms4 ,but 
unfamiliarity is a disadvantage which1  
when there is any real value in an idea1
 it only requires time to remove2 and in
 these days of discussion and generally 
awakened interest in improvement1 what  
formerly was the work of centuries often
 requires only years4    ,chapter       

,,viii--,of the ,extension of the       
,suffrage4   ,such a representative     
democracy as has now been               
sketched--representative of all1 and not
 solely of the majority--in which the   
interests1 the opinions1 the grades of  
intellect which are outnumbered would   
nevertheless be heard1 and would have a 
chance of obtaining by weight of        
character and strength of argument an   
influence which would not belong to     
their numerical force--this democracy1  
which is alone equal1 alone impartial1  
alone the government of all by all1 the 
only true type of democracy1 would be   
free from the greatest evils of the     
falsely-called democracies which now    
prevail1 and from which the current idea
 of democracy is exclusively derived4   
,but even in this democracy1 absolute   
power1 if they chose to exercise it1    
would rest with the numerical majority1 
and these would be composed exclusively 
of a single class1 alike in biases1     
prepossessions1 and general modes of    

thinking1 and a class1 to say no more1  
not the most highly cultivated4 ,the    
constitution would therefore still be   
liable to the characteristic evils of   
class government2 in a far less degree1 
assuredly1 than that exclusive          
government by a class which now usurps  
the name of democracy1 but still under  
no effective restraint except what might
 be found in the good sense1 moderation1
 and forbearance of the class itself4   
,if checks of this description are      
sufficient1 the philosophy of           
constitutional government is but solemn 
trifling4 ,all trust in constitutions is
 grounded on the assurance they may     
afford1 not that the depositaries of    
power will not1 but that they can not   
misemploy it4 ,democracy is not the     
ideally best form of government unless  
this weak side of it can be             
strengthened2 unless it can be so       
organized that no class1 not even the   
most numerous1 shall be able to reduce  
all but itself to political             

insignificance1 and direct the course of
 legislation and administration by its  
exclusive class interest4 ,the problem  
is to find the means of preventing this 
abuse without sacrificing the           
characteristic advantages of popular    
government4  ,these twofold requisites  
are not fulfilled by the expedient of a 
limitation of the suffrage1 involving   
the compulsory exclusion of any portion 
of the citizens from a voice in the     
representation4 ,among the foremost     
benefits of free government is that     
education of the intelligence and of the
 sentiments which is carried down to the
 very lowest ranks of the people when   
they are called to take a part in acts  
which directly affect the great         
interests of their country4 ,on this    
topic ,i have already dwelt so          
emphatically that ,i only return to it  
because there are few who seem to attach
 to this effect of popular institutions 
all the importance to which it is       
entitled4 ,people think it fanciful to  

expect so much from what seems so slight
 a cause--to recognize a potent         
instrument of mental improvement in the 
exercise of political franchises by     
manual laborers4 ,yet1 unless           
substantial mental cultivation in the   
mass of mankind is to be a mere vision1 
this is the road by which it must come4 
,if any one supposes that this road will
 not bring it1 ,i call to witness the   
entire contents of ,m4 de ,tocqueville's
 great work1 and especially his estimate
 of the ,americans4 ,almost all         
travelers are struck by the fact that   
every ,american is in some sense both a 
patriot and a person of cultivated      
intelligence2 and ,m4 de ,tocqueville   
has shown how close the connection is   
between these qualities and their       
democratic institutions4 ,no such wide  
diffusion of the ideas1 tastes1 and     
sentiments of educated minds has ever   
been seen elsewhere1 or even conceived  
as attainable4 ,yet this is nothing to  
what we might look for in a government  

equally democratic in its               
unexclusiveness1 but better organized in
 other important points4 ,for political 
life is indeed in ,america a most       
valuable school1 but it is a school from
 which the ablest teachers are excluded2
 the first minds in the country being as
 effectually shut out from the national 
representation1 and from public         
functions generally1 as if they were    
under a formal disqualification4 ,the   
,demos1 too1 being in ,america the one  
source of power1 all the selfish        
ambition of the country gravitates      
towards it1 as it does in despotic      
countries towards the monarch2 the      
,people1 like the despot1 is pursued    
with adulation and sycophancy1 and the  
corrupting effects of power fully keep  
pace with its improving and ennobling   
influences4 ,if1 even with this alloy1  
democratic institutions produce so      
marked a superiority of mental          
development in the lowest class of      
,americans1 compared with the           

corresponding classes in ,england and   
elsewhere1 what would it be if the good 
portion of the influence could be       
retained without the bad8 ,and this1 to 
a certain extent1 may be done1 but not  
by excluding that portion of the people 
who have fewest intellectual stimuli of 
other kinds from so inestimable an      
introduction to large1 distant1 and     
complicated interests as is afforded by 
the attention they may be induced to    
bestow on political affairs4 ,it is by  
political discussion that the manual    
laborer1 whose employment is a routine1 
and whose way of life brings him in     
contact with no variety of impressions1 
circumstances1 or ideas1 is taught that 
remote causes1 and events which take    
place far off1 have a most sensible     
effect even on his personal interests2  
and it is from political discussion and 
collective political action that one    
whose daily occupations concentrate his 
interests in a small circle round       
himself1 learns to feel for and with his

 fellow-citizens1 and becomes           
consciously a member of a great         
community4 ,but political discussions   
fly over the heads of those who have no 
votes1 and are not endeavouring to      
acquire them4 ,their position1 in       
comparison with the electors1 is that of
 the audience in a court of justice     
compared with the twelve men in the     
jury-box4 ,it is not their suffrages    
that are asked1 it is not their opinion 
that is sought to be influenced2 the    
appeals are made1 the arguments         
addressed1 to others than them2 nothing 
depends on the decision they may arrive 
at1 and there is no necessity and very  
little inducement to them to come to    
any4 ,whoever1 in an otherwise popular  
government1 has no vote1 and no prospect
 of obtaining it1 will either be a      
permanent malcontent1 or will feel as   
one whom the general affairs of society 
do not concern2 for whom they are to be 
managed by others2 who has no business  
with the laws except to obey them1 nor  

with public interests and concerns      
except as a looker-on4 ,what he will    
know or care about them from this       
position may partly be measured by what 
an average woman of the middle class    
knows and cares about politics compared 
with her husband or brothers4           
,independently of all these             
considerations1 it is a personal        
injustice to withhold from any one1     
unless for the prevention of greater    
evils1 the ordinary privilege of having 
his voice reckoned in the disposal of   
affairs in which he has the same        
interest as other people4 ,if he is     
compelled to pay1 if he may be compelled
 to fight1 if he is required implicitly 
to obey1 he should be legally entitled  
to be told what for2 to have his consent
 asked1 and his opinion counted at its  
worth1 though not at more than its      
worth4 ,there ought to be no pariahs in 
a full-grown and civilized nation2 no   
persons disqualified except through     
their own default4 ,every one is        

degraded1 whether aware of it or not1   
when other people1 without consulting   
him1 take upon themselves unlimited     
power to regulate his destiny4 ,and even
 in a much more improved state than the 
human mind has ever yet reached1 it is  
not in nature that they who are thus    
disposed of should meet with as fair    
play as those who have a voice4 ,rulers 
and ruling classes are under a necessity
 of considering the interests and wishes
 of those who have the suffrage2 but of 
those who are excluded1 it is in their  
option whether they will do so or not2  
and1 however honestly disposed1 they    
are1 in general1 too fully occupied with
 things which they must attend to to    
have much room in their thoughts for any
 thing which they can with impunity     
disregard4 ,no arrangement of the       
suffrage1 therefore1 can be permanently 
satisfactory in which any person or     
class is peremptorily excluded--in which
 the electoral privilege is not open to 
all persons of full age who desire to   

obtain it4  ,there are1 however1 certain
 exclusions1 required by positive       
reasons1 which do not conflict with this
 principle1 and which1 though an evil in
 themselves1 are only to be got rid of  
by the cessation of the state of things 
which requires them4 ,i regard it as    
wholly inadmissible that any person     
should participate in the suffrage      
without being able to read1 write1 and1 
,i will add1 perform the common         
operations of arithmetic4 ,justice      
demands1 even when the suffrage does not
 depend on it1 that the means of        
attaining these elementary acquirements 
should be within the reach of every     
person1 either gratuitously1 or at an   
expense not exceeding what the poorest1 
who can earn their own living1 can      
afford4 ,if this were really the case1  
people would no more think of giving the
 suffrage to a man who could not read1  
than of giving it to a child who could  
not speak2 and it would not be society  
that would exclude him1 but his own     

laziness4 ,when society has not         
performed its duty by rendering this    
amount of instruction accessible to all1
 there is some hardship in the case1 but
 it is a hardship that ought to be      
borne4 ,if society has neglected to     
discharge two solemn obligations1 the   
more important and more fundamental of  
the two must be fulfilled first2        
universal teaching must precede         
universal enfranchisement4 ,no one but  
those in whom an  priori theory has     
silenced common sense will maintain that
 power over others1 over the whole      
community1 should be imparted to people 
who have not acquired the commonest and 
most essential requisities for taking   
care of themselves--for pursuing        
intelligently their own interests1 and  
those of the persons most nearly allied 
to them4 ,this argument1 doubtless1     
might be pressed further1 and made to   
prove much more4 ,it would be eminently 
desirable that other things besides     
reading1 writing1 and arithmetic could  

be made necessary to the suffrage2 that 
some knowledge of the conformation of   
the earth1 its natural and political    
divisions1 the elements of general      
history1 and of the history and         
institutions of their own country1 could
 be required from all electors4 ,but    
these kinds of knowledge1 however       
indispensable to an intelligent use of  
the suffrage1 are not1 in this country1 
nor probably any where save in the      
,northern ,united ,states1 accessible to
 the whole people1 nor does there exist 
any trustworthy machinery for           
ascertaining whether they have been     
acquired or not4 ,the attempt1 at       
present1 would lead to partiality1      
chicanery1 and every kind of fraud4 ,it 
is better that the suffrage should be   
conferred indiscriminately1 or even     
withheld indiscriminately1 than that it 
should be given to one and withheld from
 another at the discretion of a public  
officer4 ,in regard1 however1 to        
reading1 writing1 and calculating1 there

 need be no difficulty4 ,it would be    
easy to require from every one who      
presented himself for registry that he  
should1 in the presence of the          
registrar1 copy a sentence from an      
,english book1 and perform a sum in the 
rule of three2 and to secure1 by fixed  
rules and complete publicity1 the honest
 application of so very simple a test4  
,this condition1 therefore1 should in   
all cases accompany universal suffrage2 
and it would1 after a few years1 exclude
 none but those who cared so little for 
the privilege1 that their vote1 if      
given1 would not in general be an       
indication of any real political        
opinion4  ,it is also important1 that   
the assembly which votes the taxes1     
either general or local1 should be      
elected exclusively by those who pay    
something towards the taxes imposed4    
,those who pay no taxes1 disposing by   
their votes of other people's money1    
have every motive to be lavish and none 
to economize4 ,as far as money matters  

are concerned1 any power of voting      
possessed by them is a violation of the 
fundamental principle of free           
government1 a severance of the power of 
control from the interest in its        
beneficial exercise4 ,it amounts to     
allowing them to put their hands into   
other people's pockets for any purpose  
which they think fit to call a public   
one1 which1 in the great towns of the   
,united ,states1 is known to have       
produced a scale of local taxation      
onerous beyond example1 and wholly borne
 by the wealthier classes4 ,that        
representation should be coextensive    
with taxation1 not stopping short of it1
 but also not going beyond it1 is in    
accordance with the theory of ,british  
institutions4 ,but to reconcile this1 as
 a condition annexed to the             
representation1 with universality1 it is
 essential1 as it is on many other      
accounts desirable1 that taxation1 in a 
visible shape1 should descend to the    
poorest class4 ,in this country1 and in 

most others1 there is probably no       
laboring family which does not          
contribute to the indirect taxes1 by the
 purchase of tea1 coffee1 sugar1 not to 
mention narcotics or stimulants4 ,but   
this mode of defraying a share of the   
public expenses is hardly felt3 the     
payer1 unless a person of education and 
reflection1 does not identify his       
interest with a low scale of public     
expenditure as closely as when money for
 its support is demanded directly from  
himself2 and even supposing him to do   
so1 he would doubtless take care that1  
however lavish an expenditure he might1 
by his vote1 assist in imposing upon the
 government1 it should not be defrayed  
by any additional taxes on the articles 
which he himself consumes4 ,it would be 
better that a direct tax1 in the simple 
form of a capitation1 should be levied  
on every grown person in the community2 
or that every such person should be     
admitted an elector on allowing himself 
to be rated extra ordinem to the        

assessed taxes2 or that a small annual  
payment1 rising and falling with the    
gross expenditure of the country1 should
 be required from every registered      
elector1 that so every one might feel   
that the money which he assisted in     
voting was partly his own1 and that he  
was interested in keeping down its      
amount4  ,however this may be1 ,i regard
 it as required by first principles that
 the receipt of parish relief should be 
a peremptory disqualification for the   
franchise4 ,he who can not by his labor 
suffice for his own support1 has no     
claim to the privilege of helping       
himself to the money of others4 ,by     
becoming dependent on the remaining     
members of the community for actual     
subsistence1 he abdicates his claim to  
equal rights with them in other         
respects4 ,those to whom he is indebted 
for the continuance of his very         
existence may justly claim the exclusive
 management of those common concerns to 
which he now brings nothing1 or less    

than he takes away4 ,as a condition of  
the franchise1 a term should be fixed1  
say five years previous to the registry1
 during which the applicant's name has  
not been on the parish books as a       
recipient of relief4 ,to be an          
uncertificated bankrupt1 or to have     
taken the benefit of the ,insolvent     
,act1 should disqualify for the         
franchise until the person has paid his 
debts1 or at least proved that he is not
 now1 and has not for some long period  
been1 dependent on eleemosynary support4
 ,non-payment of taxes1 when so long    
persisted in that it can not have arisen
 from inadvertence1 should disqualify   
while it lasts4 ,these exclusions are   
not in their nature permanent4 ,they    
exact such conditions only as all are   
able1 or ought to be able1 to fulfill if
 they choose4 ,they leave the suffrage  
accessible to all who are in the normal 
condition of a human being2 and if any  
one has to forego it1 he either does not
 care sufficiently for it to do for its 

sake what he is already bound to do1 or 
he is in a general condition of         
depression and degradation in which this
 slight addition1 necessary for the     
security of others1 would be unfelt1 and
 on emerging from which this mark of    
inferiority would disappear with the    
rest4  ,in the long run1 therefore      
7supposing no restrictions to exist but 
those of which we have now treated71 we 
might expect that all1 except that 7it  
is to be hoped7 progressively           
diminishing class1 the recipients of    
parish relief1 would be in possession of
 votes1 so that the suffrage would be1  
with that slight abatement1 universal4  
,that it should be thus widely expanded 
is1 as we have seen1 absolutely         
necessary to an enlarged and elevated   
conception of good government4 ,yet in  
this state of things1 the great majority
 of voters in most countries1 and       
emphatically in this1 would be manual   
laborers1 and the twofold danger1 that  
of too low a standard of political      

intelligence1 and that of class         
legislation1 would still exist in a very
 perilous degree4 ,it remains to be seen
 whether any means exist by which these 
evils can be obviated4  ,they are       
capable of being obviated if men        
sincerely wish it2 not by any artificial
 contrivance1 but by carrying out the   
natural order of human life1 which      
recommends itself to every one in things
 in which he has no interest or         
traditional opinion running counter to  
it4 ,in all human affairs1 every person 
directly interested1 and not under      
positive tutelage1 has an admitted claim
 to a voice1 and when his exercise of it
 is not inconsistent with the safety of 
the whole1 can not justly be excluded   
from it4 ,but 7though every one ought to
 have a voice7 that every one should    
have an equal voice is a totally        
different proposition4 ,when two persons
 who have a joint interest in any       
business differ in opinion1 does justice
 require that both opinions should be   

held of exactly equal value8 ,if with   
equal virtue1 one is superior to the    
other in knowledge and intelligence--or 
if with equal intelligence1 one excels  
the other in virtue--the opinion1 the   
judgment of the higher moral or         
intellectual being is worth more than   
that of the inferior2 and if the        
institutions of the country virtually   
assert that they are of the same value1 
they assert a thing which is not4 ,one  
of the two1 as the wiser or better man1 
has a claim to superior weight3 the     
difficulty is in ascertaining which of  
the two it is2 a thing impossible as    
between individuals1 but1 taking men in 
bodies and in numbers1 it can be done   
with a certain approach to accuracy4    
,there would be no pretense for applying
 this doctrine to any case which can    
with reason be considered as one of     
individual and private right4 ,in an    
affair which concerns only one of two   
persons1 that one is entitled to follow 
his own opinion1 however much wiser the 

other may be than himself4 ,but we are  
speaking of things which equally concern
 them both2 where1 if the more ignorant 
does not yield his share of the matter  
to the guidance of the wiser man1 the   
wiser man must resign his to that of the
 more ignorant4 ,which of these modes of
 getting over the difficulty is most for
 the interest of both1 and most         
conformable to the general fitness of   
things8 ,if it be deemed unjust that    
either should have to give way1 which   
injustice is greatest8 that the better  
judgment should give way to the worse1  
or the worse to the better8  ,now       
national affairs are exactly such a     
joint concern1 with the difference that 
no one needs ever be called upon for a  
complete sacrifice of his own opinion4  
,it can always be taken into the        
calculation1 and counted at a certain   
figure1 a higher figure being assigned  
to the suffrages of those whose opinion 
is entitled to greater weight4 ,there is
 not in this arrangement any thing      

necessarily invidious to those to whom  
it assigns the lower degrees of         
influence4 ,entire exclusion from a     
voice in the common concerns is one     
thing3 the concession to others of a    
more potential voice1 on the ground of  
greater capacity for the management of  
the joint interests1 is another4 ,the   
two things are not merely different1    
they are incommensurable4 ,every one has
 a right to feel insulted by being made 
a nobody1 and stamped as of no account  
at all4 ,no one but a fool1 and only a  
fool of a peculiar description1 feels   
offended by the acknowledgment that     
there are others whose opinion1 and even
 whose wish1 is entitled to a greater   
amount of consideration than his4 ,to   
have no voice in what are partly his own
 concerns is a thing which nobody       
willingly submits to2 but when what is  
partly his concern is also partly       
another's1 and he feels the other to    
understand the subject better than      
himself1 that the other's opinion should

 be counted for more than his own       
accords with his expectations1 and with 
the course of things which in all other 
affairs of life he is accustomed to     
acquiese in4 ,it is only necessary that 
this superior influence should be       
assigned on grounds which he can        
comprehend1 and of which he is able to  
perceive the justice4  ,i hasten to say 
that ,i consider it entirely            
inadmissible1 unless as a temporary     
makeshift1 that the superiority of      
influence should be conferred in        
consideration of property4 ,i do not    
deny that property is a kind of test2   
education1 in most countries1 though any
 thing but proportional to riches1 is on
 the average better in the richer half  
of society than in the poorer4 ,but the 
criterion is so imperfect2 accident has 
so much more to do than merit with      
enabling men to rise in the world2 and  
it is so impossible for any one1 by     
acquiring any amount of instruction1 to 
make sure of the corresponding rise in  

station1 that this foundation of        
electoral privilege is always1 and will 
continue to be1 supremely odious4 ,to   
connect plurality of votes with any     
pecuniary qualification would be not    
only objectionable in itself1 but a sure
 mode of compromising the principle1 and
 making its permanent maintenance       
impracticable4 ,the democracy1 at least 
of this country1 are not at present     
jealous of personal superiority1 but    
they are naturally and must justly so of
 that which is grounded on mere         
pecuniary circumstances4 ,the only thing
 which can justify reckoning one        
person's opinion as equivalent to more  
than one is individual mental           
superiority1 and what is wanted is some 
approximate means of ascertaining that4 
,if there existed such a thing as a     
really national education or a          
trustworthy system of general           
examination1 education might be tested  
directly4 ,in the absence of these1 the 
nature of a person's occupation is some 

test4 ,an employer of labor is on the   
average more intelligent than a laborer2
 for he must labor with his head1 and   
not solely with his hands4 ,a foreman is
 generally more intelligent than an     
ordinary laborer1 and a laborer in the  
skilled trades than in the unskilled4 ,a
 banker1 merchant1 or manufacturer is   
likely to be more intelligent than a    
tradesman1 because he has larger and    
more complicated interests to manage4   
,in all these cases it is not the having
 merely undertaken the superior         
function1 but the successful performance
 of it1 that tests the qualifications2  
for which reason1 as well as to prevent 
persons from engaging nominally in an   
occupation for the sake of the vote1 it 
would be proper to require that the     
occupation should have been persevered  
in for some length of time 7say three   
years74 ,subject to some such condition1
 two or more votes might be allowed to  
every person who exercises any of these 
superior functions4 ,the liberal        

professions1 when really and not        
nominally practiced1 imply1 of course1 a
 still higher degree of instruction2 and
 wherever a sufficient examination1 or  
any serious conditions of education1 are
 required before entering on a          
profession1 its members could be        
admitted at once to a plurality of      
votes4 ,the same rule might be applied  
to graduates of universities2 and even  
to those who bring satisfactory         
certificates of having passed through   
the course of study required by any     
school at which the higher branches of  
knowledge are taught1 under proper      
securities that the teaching is real1   
and not a mere pretense4 ,the local or  
middle class examination for the degree 
of associate1 so laudably and           
public-spiritedly established by the    
,university of ,oxford1 and any similar 
ones which may be instituted by other   
competent bodies 7provided they are     
fairly open to all comers71 afford a    
ground on which plurality of votes might

 with great advantage be accorded to    
those who have passed the test4 ,all    
these suggestions are open to much      
discussion in the detail1 and to        
objections which it is of no use to     
anticipate4 ,the time is not come for   
giving to such plans a practical shape1 
nor should ,i wish to be bound by the   
particular proposals which ,i have made4
 ,but it is to me evident that in this  
direction lies the true ideal of        
representative government2 and that to  
work towards it by the best practical   
contrivances which can be found is the  
path of real political improvement4  ,if
 it be asked to what length the         
principle admits of being carried1 or   
how many votes might be accorded to an  
individual on the ground of superior    
qualifications1 ,i answer1 that this is 
not in itself very material1 provided   
the distinctions and gradations are not 
made arbitrarily1 but are such as can be
 understood and accepted by the general 
conscience and understanding4 ,but it is

 an absolute condition not to overpass  
the limit prescribed by the fundamental 
principle laid down in a former chapter 
as the condition of excellence in the   
constitution of a representative system4
 ,the plurality of votes must on no     
account be carried so far that those who
 are privileged by it1 or the class 7if 
any7 to which they mainly belong1 shall 
outweigh by means of it all the rest of 
the community4 ,the distinction in favor
 of education1 right in itself1 is      
farther and strongly recommended by its 
preserving the educated from the class  
legislation of the uneducated2 but it   
must stop short of enabling them to     
practice class legislation on their own 
account4 ,let me add1 that ,i consider  
it an absolutely necessary part of the  
plurality scheme that it be open to the 
poorest individual in the community to  
claim its privileges1 if he can prove   
that1 in spite of all difficulties and  
obstacles1 he is1 in point of           
intelligence1 entitled to them4 ,there  

ought to be voluntary examinations at   
which any person whatever might present 
himself1 might prove that he came up to 
the standard of knowledge and ability   
laid down as sufficient1 and be         
admitted1 in consequence1 to the        
plurality of votes4 ,a privilege which  
is not refused to any one who can show  
that he has realized the conditions on  
which in theory and principle it is     
dependent1 would not necessarily be     
repugnant to any one's sentiment of     
justice2 but it would certainly be so   
if1 while conferred on general          
presumptions not always infallible1 it  
were denied to direct proof4  ,plural   
voting1 though practiced in vestry      
elections and those of poor-law         
guardians1 is so unfamiliar in elections
 to ,parliament that it is not likely to
 be soon or willingly adopted2 but as   
the time will certainly arrive when the 
only choice will be between this and    
equal universal suffrage1 whoever does  
not desire the last can not too soon    

begin to reconcile himself to the       
former4 ,in the mean time1 though the   
suggestion1 for the present1 may not be 
a practical one1 it will serve to mark  
what is best in principle1 and enable us
 to judge of the eligibility of any     
indirect means1 either existing or      
capable of being adopted1 which may     
promote in a less perfect manner the    
same end4 ,a person may have a double   
vote by other means than that of        
tendering two votes at the same         
hustings2 he may have a vote in each of 
two different constituencies2 and though
 this exceptional privilege at present  
belongs rather to superiority of means  
than of intelligence1 ,i would not      
abolish it where it exists1 since1 until
 a truer test of education is adopted1  
it would be unwise to dispense with even
 so imperfect a one as is afforded by   
pecuniary circumstances4 ,means might be
 found of giving a farther extension to 
the privilege1 which would connect it in
 a more direct manner with superior     

education4 ,in any future ,reform ,bill 
which lowers greatly the pecuniary      
conditions of the suffrage1 it might be 
a wise provision to allow all graduates 
of universities1 all persons who have   
passed creditably through the higher    
schools1 all members of the liberal     
professions1 and perhaps some others1 to
 be registered specifically in those    
characters1 and to give their votes as  
such in any constituency in which they  
choose to register2 retaining1 in       
addition1 their votes as simple citizens
 in the localities in which they reside4
  ,until there shall have been devised1 
and until opinion is willing to accept1 
some mode of plural voting which may    
assign to education as such the degree  
of superior influence due to it1 and    
sufficient as a counterpoise to the     
numerical weight of the least educated  
class1 for so long the benefits of      
completely universal suffrage can not be
 obtained without bringing with them1 as
 it appears to me1 more than equivalent 

evils4 ,it is possible1 indeed 7and this
 is perhaps one of the transitions      
through which we may have to pass in our
 progress to a really good              
representative system71 that the        
barriers which restrict the suffrage    
might be entirely leveled in some       
particular constituencies1 whose        
members1 consequently1 would be returned
 principally by manual laborers2 the    
existing electoral qualification being  
maintained elsewhere1 or any alteration 
in it being accompanied by such a       
grouping of the constituencies as to    
prevent the laboring class from becoming
 preponderant in ,parliament4 ,by such a
 compromise1 the anomalies in the       
representation would not only be        
retained1 but augmented2 this1 however1 
is not a conclusive objection2 for if   
the country does not choose to pursue   
the right ends by a regular system      
directly leading to them1 it must be    
content with an irregular makeshift1 as 
being greatly preferable to a system    

free from irregularities1 but regularly 
adapted to wrong ends1 or in which some 
ends equally necessary with the others  
have been left out4 ,it is a far graver 
objection1 that this adjustment is      
incompatible with the intercommunity of 
local constituencies which ,mr4 ,hare's 
plan requires2 that under it every voter
 would remain imprisoned within the one 
or more constituencies in which his name
 is registered1 and1 unless willing to  
be represented by one of the candidates 
for those localities1 would not be      
represented at all4  ,so much importance
 do ,i attach to the emancipation of    
those who already have votes1 but whose 
votes are useless1 because always       
outnumbered--so much should ,i hope from
 the natural influence of truth and     
reason1 if only secured a hearing and a 
competent advocacy1 that ,i should not  
despair of the operation even of equal  
and universal suffrage1 if made real by 
the proportional representation of all  
minorities1 on ,mr4 ,hare's principle4  

,but if the best hopes which can be     
formed on this subject were certainties1
 ,i should still contend for the        
principle of plural voting4 ,i do not   
propose the plurality as a thing in     
itself undesirable1 which1 like the     
exclusion of part of the community from 
the suffrage1 may be temporarily        
tolerated while necessary to prevent    
greater evils4 ,i do not look upon equal
 voting as among the things which are   
good in themselves1 provided they can be
 guarded against inconveniences4 ,i look
 upon it as only relatively good2 less  
objectionable than inequality of        
privilege grounded on irrelevant or     
adventitious circumstances1 but in      
principle wrong1 because recognizing a  
wrong standard1 and exercising a bad    
influence on the voter's mind4 ,it is   
not useful1 but hurtful1 that the       
constitution of the country should      
declare ignorance to be entitled to as  
much political power as knowledge4 ,the 
national institutions should place all  

things that they are concerned with     
before the mind of the citizen in the   
light in which it is for his good that  
he should regard them2 and as it is for 
his good that he should think that every
 one is entitled to some influence1 but 
the better and wiser to more than       
others1 it is important that this       
conviction should be professed by the   
state1 and embodied in the national     
institutions4 ,such things constitute   
the spirit of the institutions of a     
country2 that portion of their influence
 which is least regarded by common1 and 
especially by ,english thinkers1 though 
the institutions of every country1 not  
under great positive oppression1 produce
 more effect by their spirit than by any
 of their direct provisions1 since by it
 they shape the national character4 ,the
 ,american institutions have imprinted  
strongly on the ,american mind that any 
one man 7with a white skin7 is as good  
as any other2 and it is felt that this  
false creed is nearly connected with    

some of the more unfavorable points in  
,american character4 ,it is not small   
mischief that the constitution of any   
country should sanction this creed2 for 
the belief in it1 whether express or    
tacit1 is almost as detrimental to moral
 and intellectual excellence any effect 
which most forms of government can      
produce4  ,it may1 perhaps1 be said1    
that a constitution which gives equal   
influence1 man for man1 to the most and 
to the least instructed1 is nevertheless
 conducive to progress1 because the     
appeals constantly made to the less     
instructed classes1 the exercise given  
to their mental powers1 and the         
exertions which the more instructed are 
obliged to make for enlightening their  
judgment and ridding them of errors and 
prejudices1 are powerful stimulants to  
their advance in intelligence4 ,that    
this most desirable effect really       
attends the admission of the less       
educated classes to some1 and even to a 
large share of power1 ,i admit1 and have

 already strenuously maintained4 ,but   
theory and experience alike prove that a
 counter current sets in when they are  
made the possessors of all power4 ,those
 who are supreme over every thing1      
whether they be ,one1 or ,few1 or ,many1
 have no longer need of the arms of     
reason2 they can make their mere will   
prevail2 and those who can not be       
resisted are usually far too well       
satisfied with their own opinions to be 
willing to change them1 or listen       
without impatience to any one who tells 
them that they are in the wrong4 ,the   
position which gives the strongest      
stimulus to the growth of intelligence  
is that of rising into power1 not that  
of having achieved it2 and of all       
resting-points1 temporary or permanent1 
in the way to ascendancy1 the one which 
develops the best and highest qualities 
is the position of those who are strong 
enough to make reason prevail1 but not  
strong enough to prevail against reason4
 ,this is the position in which1        

according to the principles we have laid
 down1 the rich and the poor1 the much  
and the little educated1 and all the    
other classes and denominations which   
divide society between them1 ought as   
far as practicable to be placed2 and by 
combining this principle with the       
otherwise just one of allowing          
superiority of weight to superiority of 
mental qualities1 a political           
constitution would realize that kind of 
relative perfection which is alone      
compatible with the complicated nature  
of human affairs4  ,in the preceding    
argument for universal but graduated    
suffrage1 ,i have taken no account of   
difference of sex4 ,i consider it to be 
as entirely irrelevant to political     
rights as difference in height or in the
 color of the hair4 ,all human beings   
have the same interest in good          
government2 the welfare of all is alike 
affected by it1 and they have equal need
 of a voice in it to secure their share 
of its benefits4 ,if there be any       

difference1 women require it more than  
men1 since1 being physically weaker1    
they are more dependent on law and      
society for protection4 ,mankind have   
long since abandoned the only premises  
which will support the conclusion that  
women ought not to have votes4 ,no one  
now holds that women should be in       
personal servitude2 that they should    
have no thought1 wish1 or occupation but
 to be the domestic drudges of husbands1
 fathers1 or brothers4 ,it is allowed to
 unmarried1 and wants but little of     
being conceded to married women to hold 
property1 and have pecuniary and        
business interests in the same manner as
 men4 ,it is considered suitable and    
proper that women should think1 and     
write1 and be teachers4 ,as soon as     
these things are admitted1 the political
 disqualification has no principle to   
rest on4 ,the whole mode of thought of  
the modern world is1 with increasing    
emphasis1 pronouncing against the claim 
of society to decide for individuals    

what they are and are not fit for1 and  
what they shall and shall not be allowed
 to attempt4 ,if the principles of      
modern politics and political economy   
are good for any thing1 it is for       
proving that these points can only be   
rightly judged of by the individuals    
themselves2 and that1 under complete    
freedom of choice1 wherever there are   
real diversities of aptitude1 the       
greater number will apply themselves to 
the things for which they are on the    
average fittest1 and the exceptional    
course will only be taken by the        
exceptions4 ,either the whole tendency  
of modern social improvements has been  
wrong1 or it ought to be carried out to 
the total abolition of all exclusions   
and disabilities which close any honest 
employment to a human being4  ,but it is
 not even necessary to maintain so much 
in order to prove that women should have
 the suffrage4 ,were it as right as it  
is wrong that they should be a          
subordinate class1 confined to domestic 

occupations and subject to domestic     
authority1 they would not the less      
require the protection of the suffrage  
to secure them from the abuse of that   
authority4 ,men1 as well as women1 do   
not need political rights in order that 
they may govern1 but in order that they 
may not be misgoverned4 ,the majority of
 the male sex are1 and will be all their
 lives1 nothing else than laborers in   
corn-fields or manufactories2 but this  
does not render the suffrage less       
desirable for them1 nor their claim to  
it less irresistible1 when not likely to
 make a bad use of it4 ,nobody pretends 
to think that woman would make a bad use
 of the suffrage4 ,the worst that is    
said is that they would vote as mere    
dependents1 the bidding of their male   
relations4 ,if it be so1 so let it be4  
,if they think for themselves1 great    
good will be done2 and if they do not1  
no harm4 ,it is a benefit to human      
beings to take off their fetters1 even  
if they do not desire to walk4 ,it would

 already be a great improvement in the  
moral position of women to be no longer 
declared by law incapable of an opinion1
 and not entitled to a preference1      
respecting the most important concerns  
of humanity4 ,there would be some       
benefit to them individually in having  
something to bestow which their male    
relatives can not exact1 and are yet    
desirous to have4 ,it would also be no  
small matter that the husband would     
necessarily discuss the matter with his 
wife1 and that the vote would not be his
 exclusive affair1 but a joint concern4 
,people do not sufficiently consider how
 markedly the fact that she is able to  
have some action on the outward world   
independently of him1 raises her dignity
 and value in a vulgar man's eyes1 and  
makes her the object of a respect which 
no personal qualities would ever obtain 
for one whose social existence he can   
entirely appropriate4 ,the vote itself1 
too1 would be improved in quality4 ,the 
man would often be obliged to find      

honest reasons for his vote1 such as    
might induce a more upright and         
impartial character to serve with him   
under the same banner4 ,the wife's      
influence would often keep him true to  
his own sincere opinion4 ,often1 indeed1
 it would be used1 not on the side of   
public principle1 but of the personal   
interest or worldly vanity of the       
family4 ,but1 wherever this would be the
 tendency of the wife's influence1 it is
 exerted to the full already in that bad
 direction1 and with the more certainty1
 since under the present law and custom 
she is generally too utter a stranger to
 politics in any sense in which they    
involve principle to be able to realize 
to herself that there is a point of     
honor in them2 and most people have as  
little sympathy in the point of honor of
 others1 when their own is not placed in
 the same thing1 as they have in the    
religious feelings of those whose       
religion differs from theirs4 ,give the 
woman a vote1 and she comes under the   

operation of the political point of     
honor4 ,she learns to look on politics  
as a thing on which she is allowed to   
have an opinion1 and in which1 if one   
has an opinion1 it ought to be acted    
upon2 she acquires a sense of personal  
accountability in the matter1 and will  
no longer feel1 as she does at present1 
that whatever amount of bad influence   
she may exercise1 if the man can but be 
persuaded1 all is right1 and his        
responsibility covers all4 ,it is only  
by being herself encouraged to form an  
opinion1 and obtain an intelligent      
comprehension of the reasons which ought
 to prevail with the conscience against 
the temptations of personal or family   
interest1 that she can ever cease to act
 as a disturbing force on the political 
conscience of the man4 ,her indirect    
agency can only be prevented from being 
politically mischievous by being        
exchanged for direct4  ,i have supposed 
the right of suffrage to depend1 as in a
 good state of things it would1 on      

personal conditions4 ,where it depends1 
as in this and most other countries1 on 
conditions of property1 the             
contradiction is even more flagrant4    
,there something more than ordinarily   
irrational in the fact that when a woman
 can give all the guarantees required   
from a male elector1 independent        
circumstances1 the position of a        
householder and head of a family1       
payment of taxes1 or whatever may be the
 conditions imposed1 the very principle 
and system of a representation based on 
property is set aside1 and an           
exceptionally personal disqualification 
is created for the mere purpose of      
excluding her4 ,when it is added that in
 the country where this is done a woman 
now reigns1 and that the most glorious  
ruler whom that country ever had was a  
woman1 the picture of unreason and      
scarcely disguised injustice is         
complete4 ,let us hope that as the work 
proceeds of pulling down1 one after     
another1 the remains of the mouldering  

fabric of monopoly and tyranny1 this one
 will not be the last to disappear2 that
 the opinion of ,bentham1 of ,mr4       
,samuel ,bailey1 of ,mr4 ,hare1 and many
 other of the most powerful political   
thinkers of this age and country 7not to
 speak of others71 will make its way to 
all minds not rendered obdurate by      
selfishness or inveterate prejudice2 and
 that1 before the lapse another         
generation1 the accident of sex1 no more
 than the accident of skin1 will be     
deemed a sufficient justification for   
depriving its possessor of the equal    
protection and just privileges of a     
citizen4    ,chapter ,,ix--,should there
 be ,two ,stages of ,election8   ,in    
some representative constitutions1 the  
plan has been adopted of choosing the   
members of the representative body by a 
double process1 the primary electors    
only choosing other electors1 and these 
electing the member of ,parliament4     
,this contrivance was probably intended 
as a slight impediment to the full sweep

 of popular feeling1 giving the         
suffrage1 and with it the complete      
ultimate power1 to the ,many1 but       
compelling them to exercise it through  
the agency of a comparatively few1 who1 
it was supposed1 would be less moved    
than the ,demos by the gusts of popular 
passion2 and as the electors1 being     
already a select body1 might be expected
 to exceed in intellect and character   
the common level of their constituents1 
the choice made by them was thought     
likely to be more careful and           
enlightened1 and would1 in any case1 be 
made under a greater feeling of         
responsibility than election by the     
masses themselves4 ,this plan of        
filtering1 as it were1 the popular      
suffrage through an intermediate body   
admits of a very plausible defense2     
since it may be said1 with great        
appearance of reason1 that less         
intellect and instruction are required  
for judging who among our neighbors can 
be most safely trusted to choose a      

member of ,parliament than who is       
himself fittest to be one4  ,in the     
first place1 however1 if the dangers    
incident to popular power may be thought
 to be in some degree lessened by this  
indirect management1 so also are its    
benefits2 and the latter effect is much 
more certain than the former4 ,to enable
 the system to work as desired1 it must 
be carried into effect in the spirit in 
which it is planned2 the electors must  
use the suffrage in the manner supposed 
by the theory1 that is1 each of them    
must not ask himself who the member of  
,parliament should be1 but only whom he 
would best like to choose one for him4  
,it is evident that the advantages which
 indirect is supposed to have over      
direct election require this disposition
 of mind in the voter1 and will only be 
realized by his taking the doctrine au  
serieux1 that his sole business is to   
choose the choosers1 not the member     
himself4 ,the supposition must be1 that 
he will not occupy his thoughts with    

political opinions and measures or      
political men1 but will be guided by his
 personal respect for some private      
individual1 to whom he will give a      
general power of attorney to act for    
him4 ,now if the primary electors adopt 
this view of their position1 one of the 
principal uses of giving them a vote at 
all is defeated2 the political function 
to which they are called fails of       
developing public spirit and political  
intelligence1 of making public affairs  
an object of interest to their feelings 
and of exercise to their faculties4 ,the
 supposition1 moreover1 involves        
inconsistent conditions2 for if the     
voter feels no interest in the final    
result1 how or why can he be expected to
 feel any in the process which leads to 
it8 ,to wish to have a particular       
individual for his representative in    
,parliament is possible to a person of a
 very moderate degree of virtue and     
intelligence1 and to wish to choose an  
elector who will elect that individual  

is a natural consequence2 but for a     
person who does not care who is elected1
 or feels bound to put that             
consideration in abeyance1 to take any  
interest whatever in merely naming the  
worthiest person to elect another       
according to his own judgment1 implies a
 zeal for what is right in the abstract1
 an habitual principle of duty for the  
sake of duty1 which is possible only to 
persons of a rather high grade of       
cultivation1 who1 by the very possession
 of it1 show that they may be1 and      
deserve to be1 trusted with political   
power in a more direct shape4 ,of all   
public functions which it is possible to
 confer on the poorer members of the    
community1 this surely is the least     
calculated to kindle their feelings1 and
 holds out least natural inducement to  
care for it1 other than a virtuous      
determination to discharge              
conscientiously whatever duty one has to
 perform2 and if the mass of electors   
cared enough about political affairs to 

set any value on so limited a           
participation in them1 they would not be
 likely to be satisfied without one much
 more extensive4  ,in the next place1   
admitting that a person who1 from his   
narrow range of cultivation1 can not    
judge well of the qualifications of a   
candidate for ,parliament1 may be a     
sufficient judge of the honesty and     
general capacity of somebody whom he may
 depute to choose a member of           
,parliament for him1 ,i may remark1 that
 if the voter acquiesces in this        
estimate of his capabilities1 and really
 wishes to have the choice made for him 
by a person in whom he places reliance1 
there is no need of any constitutional  
provision for the purpose2 he has only  
to ask this confidential person         
privately what candidate he had better  
vote for4 ,in that case the two modes of
 election coincide in their result1 and 
every advantage of indirect election is 
obtained under direct4 ,the systems only
 diverge in their operation if we       

suppose that the voter would prefer to  
use his own judgment in the choice of a 
representative1 and only lets another   
choose for him because the law does not 
allow him a more direct mode of action4 
,but if this be his state of mind2 if   
his will does not go along with the     
limitation which the law imposes1 and he
 desires to make a direct choice1 he can
 do so notwithstanding the law4 ,he has 
only to choose as elector a known       
partisan of the candidate he prefers1 or
 some one who will pledge himself to    
vote for that candidate4 ,and this is so
 much the natural working of election by
 two stages1 that1 except in a condition
 of complete political indifference1 it 
can scarcely be expected to act         
otherwise4 ,it is in this way that the  
election of the ,president of the       
,united ,states practically operates4   
,nominally1 the election is indirect2   
the population at large does not vote   
for the ,president2 it votes for        
electors who choose the ,president4 ,but

 the electors are always chosen under an
 express engagement to vote for a       
particular candidate2 nor does a citizen
 ever vote for an elector because of any
 preference for the man2 he votes for   
the ,breckinridge ticket or the ,lincoln
 ticket4 ,it must be remembered that the
 electors are not chosen in order that  
they may search the country and find the
 fittest person in it to be ,president  
or to be a member of ,parliament4 ,there
 would be something to be said for the  
practice if this were so2 but it is not 
so1 nor ever will be1 until mankind in  
general are of opinion1 with ,plato1    
that the proper person to be intrusted  
with power is the person most unwilling 
to accept it4 ,the electors are to make 
choice of one of those who have offered 
themselves as candidates1 and those who 
choose the electors already know who    
these are4 ,if there is any political   
activity in the country1 all electors   
who care to vote at all have made up    
their minds which of these candidates   

they would like to have1 and will make  
that the sole consideration in giving   
their vote4 ,the partisans of each      
candidate will have their list of       
electors ready1 all pledged to vote for 
that individual2 and the only question  
practically asked of the primary elector
 will be1 which of these lists he will  
support4  ,the case in which election by
 two stages answers well in practice is 
when the electors are not chosen solely 
as electors1 but have other important   
functions to discharge1 which precludes 
their being selected solely as delegates
 to give a particular vote4 ,this       
combination of circumstances exemplifies
 itself in another ,american            
institution1 the ,senate of the ,united 
,states4 ,that assembly1 the ,upper     
,house1 as it were1 of ,congress1 is    
considered to represent not the people  
directly1 but the ,states as such1 and  
to be the guardian of that portion of   
their sovereign rights which they have  
not alienated4 ,as the internal         

sovereignty of each state is1 by the    
nature of an equal federation1 equally  
sacred whatever be the size or          
importance of the state1 each returns to
 the ,senate the same number of members 
7two71 whether it be little ,delaware or
 the ,empire ,state of ,new ,york4      
,these members are not chosen by the    
population1 but by the ,state           
,legislatures1 themselves elected by the
 people of each state2 but as the whole 
ordinary business of a legislative      
assembly1 internal legislation and the  
control of the executive1 devolves upon 
these bodies1 they are elected with a   
view to those objects more than to the  
other2 and in naming two persons to     
represent the state in the federal      
,senate they for the most part exercise 
their own judgment1 with only that      
general reference to public opinion     
necessary in all acts of the government 
of a democracy4 ,the elections thus made
 have proved eminently successful1 and  
are conspicuously the best of all the   

elections in the ,united ,states1 the   
,senate invariably consisting of the    
most distinguished men among those who  
have made themselves sufficiently known 
in public life4 ,after such an example1 
it can not be said that indirect popular
 election is never advantageous4 ,under 
certain conditions it is the very best  
system that can be adopted4 ,but those  
conditions are hardly to be obtained in 
practice except in a federal government 
like that of the ,united ,states1 where 
the election can be intrusted to local  
bodies whose other functions extend to  
the most important concerns of the      
nation4 ,the only bodies in any         
analogous position which exist1 or are  
likely to exist1 in this country1 are   
the municipalities1 or any other boards 
which have been or may be created for   
similar local purposes4 ,few persons1   
however1 would think it any improvement 
in our ,parliamentary constitution if   
the members for the ,city of ,london    
were chosen by the aldermen and ,common 

,council1 and those for the borough of  
,marylebone avowedly1 as they already   
are virtually1 by the vestries of the   
component parishes4 ,even if those      
bodies1 considered merely as local      
boards1 were far less objectionable than
 they are1 the qualities that would fit 
them for the limited and peculiar duties
 of municipal or parochial dileship are 
no guaranty of any special fitness to   
judge of the comparative qualifications 
of candidates for a seat in ,parliament4
 ,they probably would not fulfill this  
duty any better than it is fulfilled by 
the inhabitants voting directly2 while1 
on the other hand1 if fitness for       
electing members of ,parliament had to  
be taken into consideration in selecting
 persons for the office of vestrymen or 
town councillors1 many of those who are 
fittest for that more limited duty would
 inevitably be excluded from it1 if only
 by the necessity there would be of     
choosing persons whose sentiments in    
general politics agreed with those of   

the voters who elected them4 ,the mere  
indirect political influence of         
town-councils has already led to a      
considerable perversion of municipal    
elections from their intended purpose1  
by making them a matter of party        
politics4 ,if it were part of the duty  
of a man's book-keeper or steward to    
choose his physician1 he would not be   
likely to have a better medical         
attendant than if he chose one for      
himself1 while he would be restricted in
 his choice of a steward or book-keeper 
to such as might1 without too great     
danger to his health1 be intrusted with 
the other office4  ,it appears1         
therefore1 that every benefit of        
indirect election which is attainable at
 all is attainable under direct2 that   
such of the benefits expected from it as
 would not be obtained under direct     
election will just as much fail to be   
obtained under indirect2 while the      
latter has considerable disadvantages   
peculiar to itself4 ,the mere fact that 

it is an additional and superfluous     
wheel in the machinery is no trifling   
objection4 ,its decided inferiority as a
 means of cultivating public spirit and 
political intelligence has already been 
dwelt upon2 and if it had any effective 
operation at all--that is1 if the       
primary electors did to any extent leave
 to their nominees the selection of     
their ,parliamentary representative1 the
 voter would be prevented from          
identifying himself with his member of  
,parliament1 and the member would feel a
 much less active sense of              
responsibility to his constituents4 ,in 
addition to all this1 the comparatively 
small number of persons in whose hands1 
at last1 the election of a member of    
,parliament would reside1 could not but 
afford great additional facilities to   
intrigue1 and to every form of          
corruption compatible with the station  
in life of the electors4 ,the           
constituencies would universally be     
reduced1 in point of conveniences for   

bribery1 to the condition of the small  
boroughs at present4 ,it would be       
sufficient to gain over a small number  
of persons to be certain of being       
returned4 ,if it be said that the       
electors would be responsible to those  
who elected them1 the answer is obvious1
 that1 holding no permanent office or   
position in the public eye1 they would  
risk nothing by a corrupt vote except   
what they would care little for1 not to 
be appointed electors again3 and the    
main reliance must still be on the      
penalties for bribery1 the insufficiency
 of which reliance1 in small            
constituencies1 experience has made     
notorious to all the world4 ,the evil   
would be exactly proportional to the    
amount of discretion left to the chosen 
electors4 ,the only case in which they  
would probably be afraid to employ their
 vote for the promotion of their        
personal interest would be when they    
were elected under an express pledge1 as
 mere delegates1 to carry1 as it were1  

the votes of their constituents to the  
hustings4 ,the moment the double stage  
of election began to have any effect1 it
 would begin to have a bad effect4 ,and 
this we shall find true of the principle
 of indirect election however applied1  
except in circumstances similar to those
 of the election of senators in the     
,united ,states4  ,it is unnecessary1 as
 far as ,england is concerned1 to say   
more in opposition to a scheme which has
 no foundation in any of the national   
traditions4 ,an apology may even be     
expected for saying so much against a   
political expedient which perhaps could 
not1 in this country1 muster a single   
adherent4 ,but a conception so plausible
 at the first glance1 and for which     
there are so many precedents in history1
 might perhaps1 in the general chaos of 
political opinions1 rise again to the   
surface1 and be brought forward on      
occasions when it might be seductive to 
some minds2 and it could not1 therefore1
 even if ,english readers were alone to 

be considered1 be passed altogether in  
silence4    ,chapter ,x--,of the ,mode  
of ,voting4   ,the question of greatest 
moment in regard to modes of voting is  
that of secrecy or publicity1 and to    
this we will at once address ourselves4 
,it would be a great mistake to make the
 discussion turn on sentimentalities    
about skulking or cowardice4 ,secrecy is
 justifiable in many cases1 imperative  
in some1 and it is not cowardice to seek
 protection against evils which are     
honestly avoidable4 ,nor can it be      
reasonably maintained that no cases are 
conceivable in which secret voting is   
preferable to public2 but ,i must       
contend that these cases1 in affairs of 
a political character1 are the          
exception1 not the rule4  ,the present  
is one of the many instances in which1  
as ,i have already had occasion to      
remark1 the spirit of an institution1   
the impression it makes on the mind of  
the citizen1 is one of the most         
important parts of its operation4 ,the  

spirit of vote by ballot--the           
interpretation likely to be put on it in
 the mind of an elector1 is that the    
suffrage is given to him for            
himself--for his particular use and     
benefit1 and not as a trust for the     
public4 ,for if it is indeed a trust1 if
 the public are entitled to his vote1   
are not they entitled to know his vote8 
,this false and pernicious impression   
may well be made on the generality1     
since it has been made on most of those 
who of late years have been conspicuous 
advocates of the ballot4 ,the doctrine  
was not so understood by its earlier    
promoters2 but the effect of a doctrine 
on the mind is best shown1 not in those 
who form it1 but in those who are formed
 by it4 ,mr4 ,bright and his school of  
democrats think themselves greatly      
concerned in maintaining that the       
franchise is what they term a right1 not
 a trust4 ,now this one idea1 taking    
root in the general mind1 does a moral  
mischief outweighing all the good that  

the ballot could do1 at the highest     
possible estimate of it4 ,in whatever   
way we define or understand the idea of 
a right1 no person can have a right     
7except in the purely legal sense7 to   
power over others3 every such power1    
which he is allowed to possess is       
morally1 in the fullest force of the    
term1 a trust4 ,but the exercise of any 
political function1 either as an elector
 or as a representative1 is power over  
others4 ,those who say that the suffrage
 is not a trust1 but a right1 will      
scarcely accept the conclusions to which
 their doctrine leads4 ,if it is a      
right1 if it belongs to the voter for   
his own sake1 on what ground can we     
blame him for selling it1 or using it to
 recommend himself to any one whom it is
 his interest to please8 ,a person is   
not expected to consult exclusively the 
public benefit in the use he makes of   
his house1 or his three per cent4 stock1
 or any thing else to which he really   
has a right4 ,the suffrage is indeed due

 to him1 among other reasons1 as a means
 to his own protection1 but only against
 treatment from which he is equally     
bound1 so far as depends on his vote1 to
 protect every one of his               
fellow-citizens4 ,his vote is not a     
thing in which he has an option2 it has 
no more to do with his personal wishes  
than the verdict of a juryman4 ,it is   
strictly a matter of duty2 he is bound  
to give it according to his best and    
most conscientious opinion of the public
 good4 ,whoever has any other idea of it
 is unfit to have the suffrage2 its     
effect on him is to pervert1 not to     
elevate his mind4 ,instead of opening   
his heart to an exalted patriotism and  
the obligation of public duty1 it       
awakens and nourishes in him the        
disposition to use a public function for
 his own interest1 pleasure1 or caprice2
 the same feelings and purposes1 on a   
humbler scale1 which actuate a despot   
and oppressor4 ,now an ordinary citizen 
in any public position1 or on whom there

 devolves any social function1 is       
certain to think and feel1 respecting   
the obligations it imposes on him1      
exactly what society appears to think   
and feel in conferring it4 ,what seems  
to be expected from him by society forms
 a standard which he may fall below1 but
 which he will seldom rise above4 ,and  
the interpretation which he is almost   
sure to put upon secret voting is that  
he is not bound to give his vote with   
any reference to those who are not      
allowed to know how he gives it2 but may
 bestow it simply as he feels inclined4 
,this is the decisive reason why the    
argument does not hold1 from the use of 
the ballot in clubs and private         
societies to its adoption in            
parliamentary elections4 ,a member of a 
club is really1 what the elector falsely
 believes himself to be1 under no       
obligation to consider the wishes or    
interests of any one else4 ,he declares 
nothing by his vote but that he is or is
 not willing to associate1 in a manner  

more or less close1 with a particular   
person4 ,this is a matter on which1 by  
universal admission1 his own pleasure or
 inclination is entitled to decide2 and 
that he should be able so to decide it  
without risking a quarrel is best for   
every body1 the rejected person         
included4 ,an additional reason         
rendering the ballot unobjectionable in 
these cases is that it does not         
necessarily or naturally lead to lying4 
,the persons concerned are of the same  
class or rank1 and it would be          
considered improper in one of them to   
press another with questions as to how  
he had voted4 ,it is far otherwise in   
,parliamentary elections1 and is likely 
to remain so as long as the social      
relations exist which produce the demand
 for the ballot--as long as one person  
is sufficiently the superior of another 
to think himself entitled to dictate his
 vote4 ,and while this is the case1     
silence or an evasive answer is certain 
to be construed as proof that the vote  

given has not been that which was       
desired4  ,in any political election1   
even by universal suffrage 7and still   
more obviously in the case of a         
restricted suffrage71 the voter is under
 an absolute moral obligation to        
consider the interest of the public1 not
 his private advantage1 and give his    
vote1 to the best of his judgment1      
exactly as he would be bound to do if he
 were the sole voter1 and the election  
depended upon him alone4 ,this being    
admitted1 it is at least a prim facie   
consequence that the duty of voting1    
like any other public duty1 should be   
performed under the eye and criticism of
 the public2 every one of whom has not  
only an interest in its performance1 but
 a good title to consider himself       
wronged if it is performed otherwise    
than honestly and carefully4            
,undoubtedly neither this nor any other 
maxim of political morality is          
absolutely inviolable2 it may be        
overruled by still more cogent          

considerations4 ,but its weight is such 
that the cases which admit of a         
departure from it must be of a          
strikingly exceptional character4  ,it  
may unquestionably be the fact1 that if 
we attempt1 by publicity1 to make the   
voter responsible to the public for his 
vote1 he will practically be made       
responsible for it to some powerful     
individual1 whose interest is more      
opposed to the general interest of the  
community than that of the voter himself
 would be1 if1 by the shield of secrecy1
 he were released from responsibility   
altogether4 ,when this is the condition1
 in a high degree1 of a large proportion
 of the voters1 the ballot may be the   
smaller evil4 ,when the voters are      
slaves1 any thing may be tolerated which
 enables them to throw off the yoke4    
,the strongest case for the ballot is   
when the mischievous power of the ,few  
over the ,many is increasing4 ,in the   
decline of the ,roman republic1 the     
reasons for the ballot were             

irresistible4 ,the oligarchy was yearly 
becoming richer and more tyrannical1 the
 people poorer and more dependent1 and  
it was necessary to erect stronger and  
stronger barriers against such abuse of 
the franchise as rendered it but an     
instrument the more in the hands of     
unprincipled persons of consequence4 ,as
 little can it be doubted that the      
ballot1 so far as it existed1 had a     
beneficial operation in the ,athenian   
constitution4 ,even in the least        
unstable of the ,grecian commonwealths1 
freedom might be for the time destroyed 
by a single unfairly obtained popular   
vote2 and though the ,athenian voter was
 not sufficiently dependent to be       
habitually coerced1 he might have been  
bribed or intimidated by the lawless    
outrages of some knot of individuals1   
such as were not uncommon even at       
,athens among the youth of rank and     
fortune4 ,the ballot was in these cases 
a valuable instrument of order1 and     
conduced to the ,eunomia by which       

,athens was distinguished among the     
ancient commonwealths4  ,but in the more
 advanced states of modern ,europe1 and 
especially in this country1 the power of
 coercing voters has declined and is    
declining2 and bad voting is now less to
 be apprehended from the influences to  
which the voter is subject at the hands 
of others1 than from the sinister       
interests and discreditable feelings    
which belong to himself1 either         
individually or as a member of a class4 
,to secure him against the first1 at the
 cost of removing all restraint from the
 last1 would be to exchange a smaller   
and a diminishing evil for a greater and
 increasing one4 ,on this topic1 and on 
the question generally as applicable to 
,england at the present date1 ,i have1  
in a pamphlet on ,parliamentary ,reform1
 expressed myself in terms which1 as ,i 
do not feel that ,i can improve upon1 ,i
 will venture here to transcribe4       
,thirty years ago it was still true that
 in the election of members of          

,parliament the main evil to be guarded 
against was that which the ballot would 
exclude--coercion by landlords1         
employers1 and customers4 ,at present1  
,i conceive1 a much greater source of   
evil is the selfishness1 or the selfish 
partialities of the voter himself4 ,a   
base and mischievous vote is now1 ,i am 
convinced1 much oftener given from the  
voter's personal interest1 or class     
interest1 or some mean feeling in his   
own mind1 than from any fear of         
consequences at the hands of others2 and
 to these influences the ballot would   
enable him to yield himself up1 free    
from all sense of shame or              
responsibility4  ,in times not long gone
 by1 the higher and richer classes were 
in complete possession of the           
government4 ,their power was the master 
grievance of the country4 ,the habit of 
voting at the bidding of an employer or 
of a landlord was so firmly established 
that hardly any thing was capable of    
shaking it but a strong popular         

enthusiasm1 seldom known to exist but in
 a good cause4 ,a vote given in         
opposition to those influences was      
therefore1 in general1 an honest1 a     
public-spirited vote2 but in any case1  
and by whatever motive dictated1 it was 
almost sure to be a good vote1 for it   
was a vote against the monster evil1 the
 overruling influence of oligarchy4     
,could the voter at that time have been 
enabled1 with safety to himself1 to     
exercise his privilege freely1 even     
though neither honestly nor             
intelligently1 it would have been a     
great gain to reform1 for it would have 
broken the yoke of the then ruling power
 in the country--the power which had    
created and which maintained all that   
was bad in the institutions and the     
administration of the state--the power  
of landlords and boroughmongers4  ,the  
ballot was not adopted2 but the progress
 of circumstances has done and is doing 
more and more1 in this respect1 the work
 of the ballot4 ,both the political and 

the social state of the country1 as they
 affect this question1 have greatly     
changed1 and are changing every day4    
,the higher classes are not now masters 
of the country4 ,a person must be blind 
to all the signs of the times who could 
think that the middle classes are as    
subservient to the higher1 or the       
working classes as dependent on the     
higher and middle1 as they were a       
quarter of a century ago4 ,the events of
 that quarter of a century have not only
 taught each class to know its own      
collective strength1 but have put the   
individuals of a lower class in a       
condition to show a much bolder front to
 those of a higher4 ,in a majority of   
cases1 the vote of the electors1 whether
 in opposition to or in accordance with 
the wishes of their superiors1 is not   
now the effect of coercion1 which there 
are no longer the same means of         
applying1 but the expression of their   
own personal or political partialities4 
,the very vices of the present electoral

 system are a proof of this4 ,the growth
 of bribery1 so loudly complained of1   
and the spread of the contagion to      
places formerly free from it1 are       
evidence that the local influences are  
no longer paramount2 that the electors  
now vote to please themselves1 and not  
other people4 ,there is1 no doubt1 in   
counties and in the smaller boroughs1 a 
large amount of servile dependence still
 remaining2 but the temper of the times 
is adverse to it1 and the force of      
events is constantly tending to diminish
 it4 ,a good tenant can now feel that he
 is as valuable to his landlord as his  
landlord is to him2 a prosperous        
tradesman can afford to feel independent
 of any particular customer4 ,at every  
election the votes are more and more the
 voter's own4 ,it is their minds1 far   
more than their personal circumstances1 
that now require to be emancipated4     
,they are no longer passive instruments 
of other men's will--mere organs for    
putting power into the hands of a       

controlling oligarchy4 ,the electors    
themselves are becoming the oligarchy4  
,exactly in proportion as the vote of   
the elector is determined by his own    
will1 and not by that of somebody who is
 his master1 his position is similar to 
that of a member of ,parliament1 and    
publicity is indispensable4 ,so long as 
any portion of the community are        
unrepresented1 the argument of the      
,chartists against ballot in conjunction
 with a restricted suffrage is          
unassailable4 ,the present electors1 and
 the bulk of those whom any probable    
,reform ,bill would add to the number1  
are the middle class1 and have as much a
 class interest1 distinct from the      
working classes1 as landlords or great  
manufacturers4 ,were the suffrage       
extended to all skilled laborers1 even  
these would1 or might1 still have a     
class interest distinct from the        
unskilled4 ,suppose it extended to all  
men--suppose that what was formerly     
called by the misapplied name of        

universal suffrage1 and now by the silly
 title of manhood suffrage1 became the  
law2 the voters would still have a class
 interest as distinguished from women4  
,suppose that there were a question     
before the ,legislature specially       
affecting women--as whether women should
 be allowed to graduate at universities2
 whether the mild penalties inflicted on
 ruffians who beat their wives daily    
almost to death's door should be        
exchanged for something more effectual2 
or suppose that any one should propose  
in the ,british ,parliament what one    
state after another in ,america is      
enacting1 not by a mere law1 but by a   
provision of their revised              
,constitutions2 that married women      
should have a right to their own        
property--are not a man's wife and      
daughters entitled to know whether he   
votes for or against a candidate who    
will support these propositions8  ,it   
will of course be objected that these   
arguments' derive all their weight from 

the supposition of an unjust state of   
the suffrage3 that if the opinion of the
 non-electors is likely to make the     
elector vote more honestly or more      
beneficially than he would vote if left 
to himself1 they are more fit to be     
electors than he is1 and ought to have  
the franchise2 that whoever is fit to   
influence electors is fit to be an      
elector2 that those to whom voters ought
 to be responsible should be themselves 
voters1 and1 being such1 should have the
 safeguard of the ballot1 to shield them
 from the undue influence of powerful   
individuals or classes to whom they     
ought not to be responsible4  ,this     
argument is specious1 and ,i once       
thought it conclusive4 ,it now appears  
to me fallacious4 ,all who are fit to   
influence electors are not1 for that    
reason1 fit to be themselves electors4  
,this last is a much greater power than 
the former1 and those may be ripe for   
the minor political function who could  
not as yet be safely trusted with the   

superior4 ,the opinions and wishes of   
the poorest and rudest class of laborers
 may be very useful as one influence    
among others on the minds of the voters1
 as well as on those of the             
,legislature1 and yet it might be highly
 mischievous to give them the           
preponderant influence1 by admitting    
them1 in their present state of morals  
and intelligence1 to the full exercise  
of the suffrage4 ,it is precisely this  
indirect influence of those who have not
 the suffrage over those who have1      
which1 by its progressive growth1       
softens the transition to every fresh   
extension of the franchise1 and is the  
means by which1 when the time is ripe1  
the extension is peacefully brought     
about4 ,but there is another and a still
 deeper consideration1 which should     
never be left out of the account in     
political speculations4 ,the notion is  
itself unfounded that publicity1 and the
 sense of being answerable to the       
public1 are of no use unless the public 

are qualified to form a sound judgment4 
,it is a very superficial view of the   
utility of public opinion to suppose    
that it does good only when it succeeds 
in enforcing a servile conformity to    
itself4 ,to be under the eyes of        
others--to have to defend oneself to    
others--is never more important than to 
those who act in opposition to the      
opinion of others1 for it obliges them  
to have sure ground of their own4       
,nothing has so steadying an influence  
as working against pressure4 ,unless    
when under the temporary sway of        
passionate excitement1 no one will do   
that which he expects to be greatly     
blamed for1 unless from a preconceived  
and fixed purpose of his own1 which is  
always evidence of a thoughtful and     
deliberate character1 and1 except in    
radically bad men1 generally proceeds   
from sincere and strong personal        
convictions4 ,even the bare fact of     
having to give an account of their      
conduct is a powerful inducement to     

adhere to conduct of which at least some
 decent account can be given4 ,if any   
one thinks that the mere obligation of  
preserving decency is not a very        
considerable check on the abuse of      
power1 he has never had his attention   
called to the conduct of those who do   
not feel under the necessity of         
observing that restraint4 ,publicity is 
inappreciable1 even when it does no more
 than prevent that which can by no      
possibility be plausibly defended--than 
compel deliberation1 and force every one
 to determine1 before he acts1 what he  
shall say if called to account for his  
actions4  ,but1 if not now 7it may be   
said71 at least hereafter1 when all are 
fit to have votes1 and when all men and 
women are admitted to vote in virtue of 
their fitness1 then there can no longer 
be danger of class legislation2 then the
 electors1 being the nation1 can have no
 interest apart from the general        
interest3 even if individuals still vote
 according to private or class          

inducements1 the majority will have no  
such inducement2 and as there will then 
be no non-electors to whom they ought to
 be responsible1 the effect of the      
ballot1 excluding none but the sinister 
influences1 will be wholly beneficial4  
,even in this ,i do not agree4 ,i can   
not think that even if the people were  
fit for1 and had obtained universal     
suffrage1 the ballot would be desirable4
 ,first1 because it could not1 in such  
circumstances1 be supposed to be        
needful4 ,let us only conceive the state
 of things which the hypothesis implies3
 a people universally educated1 and     
every grown-up human being possessed of 
a vote4 ,if1 even when only a small     
proportion are electors1 and the        
majority of the population almost       
uneducated1 public opinion is already1  
as every one now sees that it is1 the   
ruling power in the last resort1 it is a
 chimera to suppose that over a         
community who all read1 and who all have
 votes1 any power could be exercised by 

landlords and rich people against their 
own inclination1 which it would be at   
all difficult for them to throw off4    
,but1 though the protection of secrecy  
would then be needless1 the control of  
publicity would be as needful as ever4  
,the universal observation of mankind   
has been very fallacious1 if the mere   
fact of being one of the community1 and 
not being in a position of pronounced   
contrariety of interest to the public at
 large1 is enough to insure the         
performance of a public duty1 without   
either the stimulus or the restraint    
derived from the opinion of our         
fellow-creatures4 ,a man's own          
particular share of the public interest1
 even though he may have no private     
interest drawing him in the opposite    
direction1 is not1 as a general rule1   
found sufficient to make him do his duty
 to the public without other external   
inducements4 ,neither can it be admitted
 that1 even if all had votes1 they would
 give their votes as honestly in secret 

as in public4  ,the proposition that the
 electors1 when they compose the whole  
of the community1 can not have an       
interest in voting against the interest 
of the community1 will be found1 on     
examination1 to have more sound than    
meaning in it4 ,though the community1 as
 a whole1 can have 7as the terms imply7 
no other interest than its collective   
interest1 any or every individual in it 
may4 ,a man's interest consists of      
whatever he takes an interest in4 ,every
 body has as many different interests as
 he has feelings2 likings or dislikings1
 either of a selfish or of a better     
kind4 ,it can not be said that any of   
these1 taken by itself1 constitutes 'his
 interest3' he is a good man or a bad   
according as he prefers one class of his
 interests or another4 ,a man who is a  
tyrant at home will be apt to sympathize
 with tyranny 7when not exercised over  
himself72 he will be almost certain not 
to sympathize with resistance to        
tyranny4 ,an envious man will vote      

against ,aristides because he is called 
the ,just4 ,a selfish man will prefer   
even a trifling individual benefit to   
his share of the advantage which his    
country would derive from a good law1   
because interests peculiar to himself   
are those which the habits of his mind  
both dispose him to dwell on and make   
him best able to estimate4 ,a great     
number of the electors will have two    
sets of preferences--those on private   
and those on public grounds4 ,the last  
are the only ones which the elector     
would like to avow4 ,the best side of   
their character is that which people are
 anxious to show1 even to those who are 
no better than themselves4 ,people will 
give dishonest or mean votes from lucre1
 from malice1 from pique1 from personal 
rivalry1 even from the interests or     
prejudices of class or sect1 more       
readily in secret than in public4 ,and  
cases exist--they may come to be more   
frequent--in which almost the only      
restraint upon a majority of knaves     

consists in their involuntary respect   
for the opinion of an honest minority4  
,in such a case as that of the          
repudiating states of ,north ,america1  
is there not some check to the          
unprincipled voter in the shame of      
looking an honest man in the face8      
,since all this good would be sacrificed
 by the ballot1 even in the             
circumstances most favorable to it1 a   
much stronger case is requisite than can
 now be made out for its necessity 7and 
the case is continually becoming still  
weaker7 to make its adoption desirable4 
#d  ,on the other debateable points     
connected with the mode of voting1 it is
 not necessary to expend so many words4 
,the system of personal representation1 
as organized by ,mr4 ,hare1 renders     
necessary the employment of voting      
papers4 ,but it appears to me           
indispensable that the signature of the 
elector should be affixed to the paper  
at a public polling-place1 or if there  
be no such place conveniently           

accessible1 at some office open to all  
the world1 and in the presence of a     
responsible public officer4 ,the        
proposal which has been thrown out of   
allowing the voting papers to be filled 
up at the voter's own residence1 and    
sent by the post1 or called for by a    
public officer1 ,i should regard as     
fatal4 ,the act would be done in the    
absence of the salutary and the presence
 of all the pernicious influences4 ,the 
briber might1 in the shelter of privacy1
 behold with his own eyes his bargain   
fulfilled1 and the intimidator could see
 the extorted obedience rendered        
irrevocably on the spot2 while the      
beneficent counter-influence of the     
presence of those who knew the voter's  
real sentiments1 and the inspiring      
effect of the sympathy of those of his  
own party or opinion1 would be shut out4
 #e  ,the polling places should be so   
numerous as to be within easy reach of  
every voter1 and no expenses of         
conveyance1 at the cost of the          

candidate1 should be tolerated under any
 pretext4 ,the infirm1 and they only on 
medical certificate1 should have the    
right of claiming suitable carriage     
conveyance at the cost of the state or  
of the locality4 ,hustings1 poll clerks1
 and all the necessary machinery of     
elections1 should be at the public      
charge4 ,not only the candidate should  
not be required1 he should not be       
permitted to incur any but a limited and
 trifling expense for his election4 ,mr4
 ,hare thinks it desirable that a sum of
 #ej should be required from every one  
who places his name on the list of      
candidates1 to prevent persons who have 
no chance of success1 and no real       
intention of attempting it1 from        
becoming candidates in wantonness or    
from mere love of notoriety1 and perhaps
 carrying off a few votes which are     
needed for the return of more serious   
aspirants4 ,there is one expense which a
 candidate or his supporters can not    
help incurring1 and which it can hardly 

be expected that the public should      
defray for every one who may choose to  
demand it--that of making his claims    
known to the electors1 by               
advertisements1 placards1 and circulars4
 ,for all necessary expenses of this    
kind the #ej proposed by ,mr4 ,hare1 if 
allowed to be drawn upon for these      
purposes 7it might be made #ajj if      
requisite71 ought to be sufficient4 ,if 
the friends of the candidate choose to  
go to expense for committees and        
canvassing1 there are no means of       
preventing them2 but such expenses out  
of the candidates's own pocket1 or any  
expenses whatever beyond the deposit of 
#ej 7or #ajj71 should be illegal and    
punishable4 ,if there appeared any      
likelihood that opinion would refuse to 
connive at falsehood1 a declaration on  
oath or honor should be required from   
every member1 on taking his seat1 that  
he had not expended1 nor would expend1  
money or money's worth beyond the #ej1  
directly or indirectly1 for the purposes

 of his election2 and if the assertion  
were proved to be false or the pledge to
 have been broken1 he should be liable  
to the penalties of perjury4 ,it is     
probable that those penalties1 by       
showing that the ,legislature was in    
earnest1 would turn the course of       
opinion in the same direction1 and would
 hinder it from regarding1 as has       
hitherto done1 this most serious crime  
against society as a venial peccadillo4 
,when once this effect has been         
produced1 there need be no doubt that   
the declaration on oath or honor would  
be considered binding4 #f ,opinion      
tolerates a false disclaimer only when  
it already tolerates the thing          
disclaimed4 ,this is notoriously the    
case with regard to electoral           
corruption4 ,there has never yet been1  
among political men1 any real and       
serious attempt to prevent bribery1     
because there has been no real desire   
that elections should not be costly4    
,their costliness is an advantage to    

those who can afford the expense by     
excluding a multitude of competitors2   
and any thing1 however noxious1 is      
cherished as having a conservative      
tendency1 if it limits the access to    
,parliament to rich men4 ,this is a     
rooted feeling among our legislators of 
both political parties1 and is almost   
the only point on which ,i believe them 
to be really ill-intentioned4 ,they care
 comparatively little who votes1 as long
 as they feel assured that none but     
persons of their own class can be voted 
for4 ,they know that they can rely on   
the fellow-feeling of one of their class
 with another1 while the subservience of
 nouveaux enrichis who are knocking at  
the door of the class is a still surer  
reliance2 and that nothing very hostile 
to the class interests or feelings of   
the rich need be apprehended under the  
most democratic suffrage1 as long as    
democratic persons can be prevented from
 being elected to ,parliament4 ,but1    
even from their own point of view1 this 

balancing of evil by evil1 instead of   
combining good with good1 is a wretched 
policy4 ,the object should be to bring  
together the best members of both       
classes1 under such a tenure as shall   
induce them to lay aside their class    
preferences1 and pursue jointly the path
 traced by the common interest1 instead 
of allowing the class feelings of the   
,many to have full swing in the         
constituencies1 subject to the          
impediment of having to act through     
persons imbued with the class feelings  
of the ,few4  ,there is scarcely any    
mode in which political institutions are
 more morally mischievous--work greater 
evil through their spirit--than by      
representing political functions as a   
favor to be conferred1 a thing which the
 depositary is to ask for as desiring it
 for himself1 and even pay for as if it 
were designed for his pecuniary benefit4
 ,men are not fond of paying large sums 
for leave to perform a laborious duty4  
,plato had a much juster view of the    

conditions of good government when he   
asserted that the persons who should be 
sought out to be invested with political
 power are those who are personally most
 averse to it1 and that the only motive 
which can be relied on for inducing the 
fittest men to take upon themselves the 
toils of government is the fear of being
 governed by worse men4 ,what must an   
elector think when he sees three or four
 gentlemen1 none of them previously     
observed to be lavish of their money on 
projects of disinterested beneficence1  
vying with one another in the sums they 
expend to be enabled to write ,m4,p4    
after their names8 ,is it likely he will
 suppose that it is for his interest    
they incur all this cost8 ,and if he    
form an uncomplimentary opinion of their
 part in the affair1 what moral         
obligation is he likely to feel as to   
his own8 ,politicians are fond of       
treating it as the dream of enthusiasts 
that the electoral body will ever be    
uncorrupt3 truly enough1 until they are 

willing to become so themselves2 for the
 electors1 assuredly1 will take their   
moral tone from the candidates4 ,so long
 as the elected member1 in any shape or 
manner1 pays for his seat1 all          
endeavours will fail to make the        
business of election any thing but a    
selfish bargain on all sides4 ,so long  
as the candidate himself1 and the       
customs of the world1 seem to regard the
 function of a member of ,parliament    
less as a duty to be discharged than a  
personal favor to be solicited1 no      
effort will avail to implant in an      
ordinary voter the feeling that the     
election of a member of ,parliament is  
also a matter of duty1 and that he is   
not at liberty to bestow his vote on any
 other consideration than that of       
personal fitness4  ,the same principle  
which demands that no payment of money  
for election purposes should be either  
required or tolerated on the part of the
 person elected1 dictates another       
conclusion1 apparently of contrary      

tendency1 but really directed to the    
same object4 ,it negatives what has     
often been proposed as a means of       
rendering ,parliament accessible to     
persons of all ranks and                
circumstances--the payment of members of
 ,parliament4 ,if1 as in some of our    
colonies1 there are scarcely any fit    
persons who can afford to attend to an  
unpaid occupation1 the payment should be
 an indemnity for loss of time or money1
 not a salary4 ,the greater latitude of 
choice which a salary would give is an  
illusory advantage4 ,no remuneration    
which any one would think of attaching  
to the post would attract to it those   
who were seriously engaged in other     
lucrative professions1 with a prospect  
of succeeding in them4 ,the occupation  
of a member of ,parliament would        
therefore become an occupation in       
itself1 carried on1 like other          
professions1 with a view chiefly to its 
pecuniary returns1 and under the        
demoralizing influences of an occupation

 essentially precarious4 ,it would      
become an object of desire to           
adventurers of a low class2 and #feh    
persons in possession1 with ten or      
twenty times as many in expectancy1     
would be incessantly bidding to attract 
or retain the suffrages of the electors1
 by promising all things1 honest or     
dishonest1 possible or impossible1 and  
rivaling each other in pandering to the 
meanest feelings and most ignorant      
prejudices of the vulgarest part of the 
crowd4 ,the auction between ,cleon and  
the sausage-seller in ,aristophanes is a
 fair caricature of what would be always
 going on4 ,such an institution would be
 a perpetual blister applied to the most
 peccant parts of human nature4 ,it     
amounts to offering #feh prizes for the 
most successful flatterer1 the most     
adroit misleader of a body of his       
fellow-countrymen4 ,under no despotism  
has there been such an organized system 
of tillage for raising a rich crop of   
vicious courtiership4 #g ,when1 by      

reason of pre-eminent qualifications 7as
 may at any time happen to be the case71
 it is desirable that a person entirely 
without independent means1 either       
derived from property or from a trade or
 profession1 should be brought into     
,parliament to render services which no 
other person accessible can render as   
well1 there is the resource of a public 
subscription2 he may be supported while 
in ,parliament1 like ,andrew ,marvel1 by
 the contributions of his constituents4 
,this mode is unobjectionable for such  
an honor will never be paid to mere     
subserviency3 bodies of men do not care 
so much for the difference between one  
sycophant and another as to go to the   
expense of his maintenance in order to  
be flattered by that particular         
individual4 ,such a support will only be
 given in consideration of striking and 
impressive personal qualities1 which1   
though no absolute proof of fitness to  
be a national representative1 are some  
presumption of it1 and1 at all events1  

some guaranty for the possession of an  
independent opinion and will4           
,chapter ,,xi--,of the ,duration of     
,parliaments4   ,after how long a term  
should members of ,parliament be subject
 to re-election8 ,the principles        
involved are here very obvious2 the     
difficulty lies in their application4   
,on the one hand1 the member ought not  
to have so long a tenure of his seat as 
to make him forget his responsibility1  
take his duties easily1 conduct them    
with a view to his own personal         
advantage1 or neglect those free and    
public conferences with his constituents
 which1 whether he agrees or differs    
with them1 are one of the benefits of   
representative government4 ,on the other
 hand1 he should have such a term of    
office to look forward to as will enable
 him to be judged1 not by a single act1 
but by his course of action4 ,it is     
important that he should have the       
greatest latitude of individual opinion 
and discretion compatible with the      

popular control essential to free       
government2 and for this purpose it is  
necessary that the control should be    
exercised1 as in any case it is best    
exercised1 after sufficient time has    
been given him to show all the qualities
 he possesses1 and to prove that there  
is some other way than that of a mere   
obedient voter and advocate of their    
opinions1 by which he can render        
himself1 in the eyes of his             
constituents1 a desirable and creditable
 representative4 ,it is impossible to   
fix1 by any universal rule1 the boundary
 between these principles4 ,where the   
democratic power in the constitution is 
weak or over-passive1 and requires      
stimulation2 where the representative1  
on leaving his constituents1 enters at  
once into a courtly or aristocratic     
atmosphere1 whose influences all tend to
 deflect his course into a different    
direction from the popular one1 to tone 
down any democratic feelings which he   
may have brought with him1 and make him 

forget the wishes and grow cool to the  
interests of those who chose him1 the   
obligation of a frequent return to them 
for a renewal of his commission is      
indispensable to keeping his temper and 
character up to the right mark4 ,even   
three years1 in such circumstances1 are 
almost too long a period1 and any longer
 term is absolutely inadmissible4       
,where1 on the contrary1 democracy is   
the ascendant power1 and still tends to 
increase1 requiring rather to be        
moderated in its exercise than          
encouraged to any abnormal activity2    
where unbounded publicity1 and an       
ever-present newspaper press give the   
representative assurance that his every 
act will be immediately known1          
discussed1 and judged by his            
constituents1 and that he is always     
either gaining or losing ground in the  
estimation1 while1 by the same means1   
the influence of their sentiments1 and  
all other democratic influences1 are    
kept constantly alive and active in his 

own mind1 less than five years would    
hardly be a sufficient period to prevent
 timid subserviency4 ,the change which  
has taken place in ,english politics as 
to all these features explains why      
annual ,parliaments1 which forty years  
ago stood prominently in front of the   
creed of the more advanced reformers1   
are so little cared for and so seldom   
heard of at present4 ,it deserves       
consideration that1 whether the term is 
short or long1 during the last year of  
it the members are in position in which 
they would always be if ,parliaments    
were annual2 so that1 if the term were  
very brief1 there would virtually be    
annual ,parliaments during a great      
proportion of all time4 ,as things now  
are1 the period of seven years1 though  
of unnecessary length1 is hardly worth  
altering for any benefit likely to be   
produced1 especially since the          
possibility1 always impending1 of an    
earlier dissolution keeps the motives   
for standing well with constituents     

always before the member's eyes4        
,whatever may be the term most eligible 
for the duration of the mandate1 it     
might seem natural that the individual  
member should vacate his seat at the    
expiration of that term from the day of 
his election1 and that there should be  
no general renewal of the whole ,house4 
,a great deal might be said for this    
system if there were any practical      
object in recommending it4 ,but it is   
condemned by much stronger reasons than 
can be alleged in its support4 ,one is1 
that there would be no means of promptly
 getting rid of a majority which had    
pursued a course offensive to the       
nation4 ,the certainty of a general     
election after a limited1 which would   
often be a nearly expired period1 and   
the possibility of it at any time when  
the minister either desires it for his  
own sake1 or thinks that it would make  
him popular with the country1 tend to   
prevent that wide divergence between the
 feelings of the assembly and those of  

the constituency1 which might subsist   
indefinitely if the majority of the     
,house had always several years of their
 term still to run--if it received new  
infusions drop by drop1 which would be  
more likely to assume than to modify the
 qualities of the mass they were joined 
to4 ,it is as essential that the general
 sense of the ,house should accord in   
the main with that of the nation as is  
that distinguished individuals should be
 able1 without forfeiting their seats1  
to give free utterance to the most      
unpopular sentiments4 ,there is another 
reason1 of much weight1 against the     
gradual and partial renewal of a        
representative assembly4 ,it is useful  
that there should be a periodical       
general muster of opposing forces to    
gauge the state of the national mind1   
and ascertain1 beyond dispute1 the      
relative strength of different parties  
and opinions4 ,this is not done         
conclusively by any partial renewal1    
even where1 as in some of the ,french   

constitutions1 a large fraction--a fifth
 or a third--go out at once4  ,the      
reasons for allowing to the executive   
the power of dissolution will be        
considered in a subsequent chapter1     
relating to the constitution and        
functions of the executive in a         
representative government4    ,chapter  
,,xii--,ought ,pledges to be ,required  
from ,members of ,parliament8   ,should 
a member of the legislature be bound by 
the instructions of his constituents8   
,should he be the organ of their        
sentiments1 or of his own8 their        
ambassador to a congress1 or their      
professional agent1 empowered not only  
to act for them1 but to judge for them  
what ought to be done8 ,these two       
theories of the duty of a legislator in 
a representative government have each   
its supporters1 and each is the         
recognized doctrine of some             
representative governments4 ,in the     
,dutch ,united ,provinces1 the members  
of the ,states-,general were mere       

delegates2 and to such a length was the 
doctrine carried1 that when any         
important question arose which had not  
been provided for in their instructions1
 they had to refer back to their        
constituents1 exactly as an ambassador  
does to the government from which he is 
accredited4 ,in this and most other     
countries which possess representative  
constitutions1 law and custom warrant a 
member of ,parliament in voting         
according to his opinion of right1      
however different from that of his      
constituents2 but there is a floating   
notion of the opposite kind1 which has  
considerable practical operation on many
 minds1 even of members of ,parliament1 
and often makes them1 independently of  
desire for popularity or concern for    
their re-election1 feel bound in        
conscience to let their conduct on      
questions on which their constituents   
have a decided opinion be the expression
 of that opinion rather than of their   
own4 ,abstractedly from positive law1   

and from the historical traditions of   
any particular people1 which of these   
notions of the duty of a representative 
is the true one8  ,unlike the questions 
which we have hitherto treated1 this is 
not a question of constitutional        
legislation1 but of what may more       
properly be called constitutional       
morality--the ethics of representative  
government4 ,it does not so much concern
 institutions as the temper of mind     
which the electors ought to bring to the
 discharge of their functions1 the ideas
 which should prevail as to the moral   
duties of an elector2 for1 let the      
system of representation be what it may1
 it will be converted into one of mere  
delegation if the electors so choose4   
,as long as they are free not to vote1  
and free to vote as they like1 they can 
not be prevented from making their vote 
depend on any condition they think fit  
to annex to it4 ,by refusing to elect   
any one who will not pledge himself to  
all their opinions1 and even1 if they   

please1 to consult with them before     
voting on any important subject not     
foreseen1 they can reduce their         
representative to their mere mouthpiece1
 or compel him in honor1 when no longer 
willing to act in that capacity1 to     
resign his seat4 ,and since they have   
the power of doing this1 the theory of  
the ,constitution ought to suppose that 
they will wish to do it1 since the very 
principle of constitutional government  
requires it to be assumed that political
 power will be abused to promote the    
particular purposes of the holder2 not  
because it always is so1 but because    
such is the natural tendency of things1 
to guard against which is the especial  
use of free institutions4 ,however      
wrong1 therefore1 or however foolish1 we
 may think it in the electors to convert
 their representative into a delegate1  
that stretch of the electoral privilege 
being a natural and not improbable one1 
the same precautions ought to be taken  
as if it were certain4 ,we may hope that

 the electors will not act on this      
notion of the use of the suffrage2 but a
 representative government needs to be  
so framed that even if they do1 they    
shall not be able to effect what ought  
not to be in the power of any body of   
persons--class legislation for their own
 benefit4  ,when it is said that the    
question is only one of political       
morality1 this does not extenuate its   
importance4 ,questions of constitutional
 morality are of no less practical      
moment than those relating to the       
constitution itself4 ,the very existence
 of some governments1 and all that      
renders others endurable1 rests on the  
practical observance of doctrines of    
constitutional morality2 traditional    
notions in the minds of the several     
constituted authorities1 which modify   
the use that might otherwise be made of 
their powers4 ,in unbalanced            
governments--pure monarchy1 pure        
aristocracy1 pure democracy--such maxims
 are the only barrier which restrains   

the government from the utmost excesses 
in the direction of its characteristic  
tendency4 ,in imperfectly balanced      
governments1 where some attempt is made 
to set constitutional limits to the     
impulses of the strongest power1 but    
where that power is strong enough to    
overstep them with at least temporary   
impunity1 it is only by doctrines of    
constitutional morality1 recognized and 
sustained by opinion1 that any regard at
 all is preserved for the checks and    
limitations of the constitution4 ,in    
well-balanced governments1 in which the 
supreme power is divided1 and each      
sharer is protected against the         
usurpations of the others in the only   
manner possible1 namely1 by being armed 
for defense with weapons as strong as   
the others can wield for attack1 the    
government can only be carried on by    
forbearance on all sides to exercise    
those extreme powers1 unless provoked by
 conduct equally extreme on the part of 
some other sharer of power2 and in this 

case we may truly say that only by the  
regard paid to maxims of constitutional 
morality is the constitution kept in    
existence4 ,the question of pledges is  
not one of those which vitally concern  
the existence of representative         
governments1 but it is very material to 
their beneficial operation4 ,the laws   
can not prescribe to the electors the   
principles by which they shall direct   
their choice1 but it makes a great      
practical difference by what principles 
they think they ought to direct it2 and 
the whole of that great question is     
involved in the inquiry whether they    
should make it a condition that the     
representative shall adhere to certain  
opinions laid down for him by his       
constituents4  ,no reader of this       
treatise can doubt what conclusion1 as  
to this matter1 results from the general
 principles which it professes4 ,we have
 from the first affirmed1 and           
unvaryingly kept in view1 the coequal   
importance of two great requisites of   

government--responsibility to those for 
whose benefit political power ought to  
be1 and always professes to be1         
employed2 and jointly therewith1 to     
obtain1 in the greatest measure         
possible1 for the function of           
government1 the benefits of superior    
intellect1 trained by long meditation   
and practical discipline to that special
 task4 ,if this second purpose is worth 
attaining1 it is worth the necessary    
price4 ,superior powers of mind and     
profound study are of no use1 if they do
 not sometimes lead a person to         
different conclusions from those which  
are formed by ordinary powers of mind   
without study2 and if it be an object to
 possess representatives in any         
intellectual respect superior to average
 electors1 it must be counted upon that 
the representative will sometimes differ
 in opinion from the majority of his    
constituents1 and that when he does1 his
 opinion will be the oftenest right of  
the two4 ,it follows that the electors  

will not do wisely if they insist on    
absolute conformity to their opinions as
 the condition of his retaining his     
seat4  ,the principle is thus far       
obvious2 but there are real difficulties
 in its application1 and we will begin  
by stating them in their greatest force4
 ,if it is important that the electors  
should choose a representative more     
highly instructed than themselves1 it is
 no less necessary that this wiser man  
should be responsible to them2 in other 
words1 they are the judges of the manner
 in which he fulfils his trust2 and how 
are they to judge1 except by the        
standard of their own opinions8 ,how are
 they even to select him in the first   
instance but by the same standard8 ,it  
will not do to choose by mere           
brilliancy--by superiority of showy     
talent4 ,the tests by which an ordinary 
man can judge beforehand of mere ability
 are very imperfect2 such as they are1  
they have almost exclusive reference to 
the arts of expression1 and little or   

none to the worth of what is expressed4 
,the latter can not be inferred from the
 former2 and if the electors are to put 
their own opinions in abeyance1 what    
criterion remains to them of the ability
 to govern well8 ,neither1 if they could
 ascertain1 even infallibly1 the ablest 
man1 ought they to allow him altogether 
to judge for them1 without any reference
 to their own opinions4 ,the ablest     
candidate may be a ,tory1 and the       
electors ,liberals2 or a ,liberal1 and  
they may be ,tories4 ,the political     
questions of the day may be ,church     
questions1 and he may be a              
,high-,churchman or a ,rationalist1     
while they may be ,dissenters or        
,evangelicals1 and vice vers4 ,his      
abilities1 in these cases1 might only   
enable him to go greater lengths1 and   
act with greater effect1 in what they   
may conscientiously believe to be a     
wrong course2 and they may be bound1 by 
their sincere convictions1 to think it  
more important that their representative

 should be kept1 on these points1 to    
what they deem the dictate of duty1 than
 that they should be represented by a   
person of more than average abilities4  
,they may also have to consider1 not    
solely how they can be most ably        
represented1 but how their particular   
moral position and mental point of view 
shall be represented at all4 ,the       
influence of every mode of thinking     
which is shared by numbers ought to be  
felt in the ,legislature2 and the       
,constitution being supposed to have    
made due provision that other and       
conflicting modes of thinking shall be  
represented likewise1 to secure the     
proper representation for their own mode
 may be the most important matter which 
the electors on the particular occasion 
have to attend to4 ,in some cases1 too1 
it may be necessary that the            
representative should have his hands    
tied to keep him true to their interest1
 or rather to the public interest as    
they conceive it4 ,this would not be    

needful under a political system which  
assured them an indefinite choice of    
honest and unprejudiced candidates2 but 
under the existing system1 in which the 
electors are almost always obliged1 by  
the expenses of election and the general
 circumstances of society1 to select    
their representative from persons of a  
station in life widely different from   
theirs1 and having a different class    
interest1 who will affirm that they     
ought to abandon themselves to his      
discretion8 ,can we blame an elector of 
the poorer classes1 who has only the    
choice among two or three rich men1 for 
requiring from the one he votes for a   
pledge to those measures which he       
considers as a test of emancipation from
 the class interests of the rich8 ,it   
will1 moreover1 always happens to some  
members of the electoral body to be     
obliged to accept the representative    
selected by a majority of their own     
side4 ,but1 though a candidate of their 
own choosing would have no chance1 their

 votes may be necessary to the success  
of the one chosen for them1 and their   
only means of exerting their share of   
influence on his subsequent conduct may 
be to make their support of him         
dependent on his pledging himself to    
certain conditions4  ,these             
considerations and                      
counter-considerations are so intimately
 interwoven with one another2 it is so  
important that the electors should      
choose as their representatives wiser   
men than themselves1 and should consent 
to be governed according to that        
superior wisdom1 while it is impossible 
that conformity to their own opinions1  
when they have opinions1 should not     
enter largely into their judgment as to 
who possesses the wisdom1 and how far   
its presumed possessor has verified the 
presumption by his conduct1 that it     
seems quite impracticable to lay down   
for the elector any positive rule of    
duty2 and the result will depend less on
 any exact prescription or authoritative

 doctrine of political morality than on 
the general tone of mind of the         
electoral body in respect to the        
important requisite of deference to     
mental superiority4 ,individuals and    
peoples who are acutely sensible of the 
value of superior wisdom are likely to  
recognize it1 where it exists1 by other 
signs than thinking exactly as they do1 
and even in spite of considerable       
differences of opinion2 and when they   
have recognized it they will be far too 
desirous to secure it1 at any admissible
 cost1 to be prone to impose their own  
opinion as a law upon persons whom they 
look up to as wiser than themselves4 ,on
 the other hand1 there is a character of
 mind which does not look up to any one2
 which thinks no other person's opinion 
much better than its own1 or nearly so  
good as that of a hundred or a thousand 
persons like itself4 ,where this is the 
turn of mind of the electors1 they will 
elect no one who is not1 or at least who
 does not profess to be1 the image of   

their own sentiments1 and will continue 
him no longer than while he reflects    
those sentiments in his conduct2 and all
 aspirants to political honors will     
endeavour1 as ,plato says in the        
,gorgias1 to fashion themselves after   
the model of the ,demos1 and make       
themselves as like to it as possible4   
,it can not be denied that a complete   
democracy has a strong tendency to cast 
the sentiments of the electors in this  
mould4 ,democracy is not favorable to   
the reverential spirit4 ,that it        
destroys reverence for mere social      
position must be counted among the good1
 not the bad part of its influences1    
though by doing this it closes the      
principal school of reverence 7as to    
merely human relations7 which exists in 
society4 ,but also democracy1 in its    
very essence1 insists so much more      
forcibly on the things in which all are 
entitled to be considered equally than  
on those in which one person is entitled
 to more consideration than another1    

that respect for even personal          
superiority is likely to be below the   
mark4 ,it is for this1 among other      
reasons1 ,i hold it of so much          
importance that the institutions of the 
country should stamp the opinions of    
persons of a more educated class as     
entitled to greater weight than those of
 the less educated2 and ,i should still 
contend for assigning plurality of votes
 to authenticated superiority of        
education were it only to give the tone 
to public feeling1 irrespective of any  
direct political consequences4  ,when   
there does exist in the electoral body  
an adequate sense of the extraordinary  
difference in value between one person  
and another1 they will not lack signs by
 which to distinguish the persons whose 
worth for their purposes is the         
greatest4 ,actual public services will  
naturally be the foremost indication3 to
 have filled posts of magnitude1 and    
done important things in them1 of which 
the wisdom has been justified by the    

results2 to have been the author of     
measures which appear from their effects
 to have been wisely planned2 to have   
made predictions which have been of     
verified by the event1 seldom or never  
falsified by it2 to have given advice1  
which when taken has been followed by   
good consequences--when neglected1 by   
bad4 ,there is doubtless a large portion
 of uncertainty in these signs of       
wisdom2 but we are seeking for such as  
can be applied by persons of ordinary   
discernment4 ,they will do well not to  
rely much on any one indication1 unless 
corroborated by the rest1 and1 in their 
estimation of the success or merit of   
any practical effort1 to lay great      
stress on the general opinion of        
disinterested persons conversant with   
the subject matter4 ,the tests which ,i 
have spoken of are only applicable to   
tried men1 among whom must be reckoned  
those who1 though untried practically1  
have been tried speculatively2 who1 in  
public speech or in print1 have         

discussed public affairs in a manner    
which proves that they have given       
serious study to them4 ,such persons    
may1 in the mere character of political 
thinkers1 have exhibited a considerable 
amount of the same titles to confidence 
as those who have been proved in the    
position of practical statesmen4 ,when  
it is necessary to choose persons wholly
 untried1 the best criteria are1        
reputation for ability among those who  
personally know them1 and the confidence
 placed and recommendations given by    
persons already looked up to4 ,by tests 
like these1 constituencies who          
sufficiently value mental ability1 and  
eagerly seek for it1 will generally     
succeed in obtaining men beyond         
mediocrity1 and often men whom they can 
trust to carry on public affairs        
according to their unfettered judgment2 
to whom it would be an affront to       
require that they should give up that   
judgment at the behest of their         
inferiors in knowledge4 ,if such        

persons1 honestly sought1 are not to be 
found1 then indeed the electors are     
justified in taking other precautions1  
for they can not be expected to postpone
 their particular opinions1 unless in   
order that they may be served by a      
person of superior knowledge to their   
own4 ,they would do well1 indeed1 even  
then1 to remember that when once chosen1
 the representative1 if he devotes      
himself to his duty1 has greater        
opportunities of correcting an original 
false judgment than fall to the lot of  
most of his constituents2 a             
consideration which generally ought to  
prevent them 7unless compelled by       
necessity to choose some one whose      
impartiality they do not fully trust7   
from exacting a pledge not to change his
 opinion1 or1 if he does1 to resign his 
seat4 ,but when an unknown person1 not  
certified in unmistakable terms by some 
high authority1 is elected for the first
 time1 the elector can not be expected  
not to make conformity to his own       

sentiments the primary requisite4 ,it is
 enough if he does not regard a         
subsequent change of those sentiments1  
honestly avowed1 with its grounds       
undisguisedly stated1 as a peremptory   
reason for withdrawing his confidence4  
,even supposing the most tried ability  
and acknowledged eminence of character  
in the representative1 the private      
opinions of the electors are not to be  
placed entirely in abeyance4 ,deference 
to mental superiority is not to go the  
length of self-annihilation--abnegation 
of any personal opinion4 ,but when the  
difference does not relate to the       
fundamentals of politics1 however       
decided the elector may be in his own   
sentiments1 he ought to consider that   
when an able man differs from him there 
is at least a considerable chance of his
 being in the wrong1 and that even if   
otherwise1 it is worth while to give up 
his opinion in things not absolutely    
essential1 for the sake of the          
inestimable advantage of having an able 

man to act for him in the many matters  
in which he himself is not qualified to 
form a judgment4 ,in such cases he often
 endeavours to reconcile both wishes by 
inducing the able man to sacrifice his  
own opinion on the points of difference2
 but for the able man to lend himself to
 this compromise is treason against his 
especial office--abdication of the      
peculiar duties of mental supremacy1 of 
which it is one of the most sacred not  
to desert the cause which has the clamor
 against it1 nor to deprive of his      
services those of his opinions which    
need them the most4 ,a man of conscience
 and known ability should insist on full
 freedom to act as he in his own        
judgment deems best1 and should not     
consent to serve on any other terms4    
,but the electors are entitled to know  
how he means to act2 what opinions1 on  
all things which concern his public     
duty1 he intends should guide his       
conduct4 ,if some of these are          
unacceptable to them1 it is for him to  

satisfy them that he nevertheless       
deserves to be their representative2 and
 if they are wise1 they will overlook1  
in favor of his general value1 many and 
great differences between his opinions  
and their own4 ,there are some          
differences1 however1 which they can not
 be expected to overlook4 ,whoever feels
 the amount of interest in the          
government of his country which befits a
 freeman1 has some convictions on       
national affairs which are like his     
life-blood2 which the strength of his   
belief in their truth1 together with the
 importance he attaches to them1 forbid 
him to make a subject of compromise1 or 
postpone to the judgment of any person1 
however greatly his superior4 ,such     
convictions1 when they exist in a       
people1 or in any appreciable portion of
 one1 are entitled to influence in      
virtue of their mere existence1 and not 
solely in that of the probability of    
their being grounded in truth4 ,a people
 can not be well governed in opposition 

to their primary notions of right1 even 
though these may be in some points      
erroneous4 ,a correct estimate of the   
relation which should subsist between   
governors and governed does not require 
the electors to consent to be           
represented by one who intends to govern
 them in opposition to their fundamental
 convictions4 ,if they avail themselves 
of his capacities of useful service in  
other respects at a time when the points
 on which he is vitally at issue with   
them are not likely to be mooted1 they  
are justified in dismissing him at the  
first moment when a question arises     
involving these1 and on which there is  
not so assured a majority for what they 
deem right as to make the dissenting    
voice of that particular individual     
unimportant4 ,thus 7,i mention names to 
illustrate my meaning1 not for any      
personal application7 the opinions      
supposed to be entertained by ,mr4      
,cobden and ,mr4 ,bright on resistance  
to foreign aggression might be          

overlooked during the ,crimean war1 when
 there was an overwhelming national     
feeling on the contrary side1 and might 
yet very properly lead to their         
rejection by the electors at the time of
 the ,chinese quarrel 7though in itself 
a more doubtful question71 because it   
was then for some time a moot point     
whether their view of the case might not
 prevail4  ,as the general result of    
what precedes1 we may affirm that actual
 pledges should not be required unless1 
from unfavorable social circumstances or
 family institutions1 the electors are  
so narrowed in their choice as to be    
compelled to fix it on a person         
presumptively under the influence of    
partialities hostile to their interest3 
,that they are entitled to a full       
knowledge of the political opinions and 
sentiments of the candidate2 and not    
only entitled1 but often bound to reject
 one who differs from themselves on the 
few articles which are the foundation of
 their political belief3 that1 in       

proportion to the opinion they entertain
 of the mental superiority of a         
candidate1 they ought to put up with his
 expressing and acting on opinions      
different from theirs on any number of  
things not included in their fundamental
 articles of belief3 that they ought to 
be unremitting in their search for a    
representative of such calibre as to be 
intrusted with full power of obeying the
 dictates of his own judgment3 that they
 should consider it a duty which they   
owe to their fellow-countrymen1 to do   
their utmost toward placing men of this 
quality in the ,legislature1 and that it
 is of much greater importance to       
themselves to be represented by such a  
man than by one who professes agreement 
in a greater number of their opinions2  
for the benefits of his ability are     
certain1 while the hypothesis of his    
being wrong and their being right on the
 points of difference is a very doubtful
 one4  ,i have discussed this question  
on the assumption that the electoral    

system1 in all that depends on positive 
institution1 conforms to the principles 
laid down in the preceding chapters4    
,even on this hypothesis1 the delegation
 theory of representation seems to me   
false1 and its practical operation      
hurtful1 though the mischief would in   
that case be confined within certain    
bounds4 ,but if the securities by which 
,i have endeavoured to guard the        
representative principle are not        
recognized by the ,constitution2 if     
provision is not made for the           
representation of minorities1 nor any   
difference admitted in the numerical    
value of votes1 according to some       
criterion of the amount of education    
possessed by the voters--in that case1  
no words can exaggerate the importance  
in principle of leaving an unfettered   
discretion to the representative2 for it
 would then be the only chance1 under   
universal suffrage1 for any other       
opinions than those of the majority to  
be heard in ,parliament4 ,in that       

falsely called democracy which is really
 the exclusive rule of the operative    
classes1 all others being unrepresented 
and unheard1 the only escape from class 
legislation in its narrowest1 and       
political ignorance in its most         
dangerous form1 would lie in such       
disposition as the uneducated might have
 to choose educated representatives1 and
 to defer to their opinions4 ,some      
willingness to do this might reasonably 
be expected1 and every thing would      
depend upon cultivating it to the       
highest point4 ,but1 once invested with 
political omnipotence1 if the operative 
classes voluntarily concurred in        
imposing in this or any other manner any
 considerable limitation upon their     
self-opinion and self-will1 they would  
prove themselves wiser than any class   
possessed of absolute power has shown   
itself1 or1 we may venture to say1 is   
ever likely to show itself under that   
corrupting influence4    ,chapter       
,,xiii--,of a ,second ,chamber4   ,of   

all topics relating to the theory of    
representative government1 none have    
been the subject of more discussion1    
especially on the ,continent1 than what 
is known as the question of the ,two    
,chambers4 ,it has occupied a greater   
amount of the attention of thinkers than
 many questions of ten times its        
importance1 and has been regarded as a  
sort of touchstone which distinguishes  
the partisans of limited from those of  
uncontrolled democracy4 ,for my own     
part1 ,i set little value on any check  
which a ,second ,chamber can apply to a 
democracy otherwise unchecked2 and ,i am
 inclined to think that if all other    
constitutional questions are rightly    
decided1 it is of comparatively little  
importance whether the ,parliament      
consists of two ,chambers or only of    
one4  ,if there are two chambers1 they  
may either be of similar or of          
dissimilar composition4 ,if of similar1 
both will obey the same influences1 and 
whatever has a majority in one of the   

houses will be likely to have it in the 
other4 ,it is true that the necessity of
 obtaining the consent of both to the   
passing of any measure may at times be a
 material obstacle to improvement1      
since1 assuming both the houses to be   
representative and equal in their       
numbers1 a number slightly exceeding a  
fourth of the entire representation may 
prevent the passing of a bill2 while1 if
 there is but one house1 a bill is      
secure of passing if it has a bare      
majority4 ,but the case supposed is     
rather abstractedly possible than likely
 to occur in practice4 ,it will not     
often happen that1 of two houses        
similarly composed1 one will be almost  
unanimous1 and the other nearly equally 
divided2 if a majority in one rejects a 
measure1 there will generally have been 
a large minority unfavorable to it in   
the other2 any improvement1 therefore1  
which could be thus impeded1 would in   
almost all cases be one which had not   
much more than a simple majority in the 

entire body1 and the worst consequence  
that could ensue would be to delay for a
 short time the passing of the measure1 
or give rise to a fresh appeal to the   
electors to ascertain if the small      
majority in ,parliament corresponded to 
an effective one in the country4 ,the   
inconvenience of delay1 and the         
advantages of the appeal to the nation1 
might be regarded in this case as about 
equally balanced4  ,i attach little     
weight to the argument oftenest urged   
for having two ,chambers--to prevent    
precipitancy1 and compel a second       
deliberation2 for it must be a very     
ill-constituted representative assembly 
in which the established forms of       
business do not require many more than  
two deliberations4 ,the consideration   
which tells most1 in my judgment1 in    
favor of two ,chambers 7and this ,i do  
regard as of some moment71 is the evil  
effect produced upon the mind of any    
holder of power1 whether an individual  
or an assembly1 by the consciousness of 

having only themselves to consult4 ,it  
is important that no set of persons     
should be able1 even temporarily1 to    
make their sic volo prevail without     
asking any one else for his consent4 ,a 
majority in a single assembly1 when it  
has assumed a permanent character--when 
composed of the same persons habitually 
acting together1 and always assured of  
victory in their own ,house--easily     
becomes despotic and overweening if     
released from the necessity of          
considering whether its acts will be    
concurred in by another constituted     
authority4 ,the same reason which       
induced the ,romans to have two consuls 
makes it desirable there should be two  
,chambers--that neither of them may be  
exposed to the corrupting influence of  
undivided power even for the space of a 
single year4 ,one of the most           
indispensable requisites in the         
practical conduct of politics1          
especially in the management of free    
institutions1 is conciliation2 a        

readiness to compromise2 a willingness  
to concede something to opponents1 and  
to shape good measures so as to be as   
little offensive as possible to persons 
of opposite views2 and of this salutary 
habit1 the mutual give and take 7as it  
has been called7 between two houses is a
 perpetual school--useful as such even  
now1 and its utility would probably be  
even more felt in a more democratic     
constitution of the ,legislature4  ,but 
the houses need not both be of the same 
composition2 they may be intended as a  
check on one another4 ,one being        
supposed democratic1 the other will     
naturally be constituted with a view to 
its being some restraint upon the       
democracy4 ,but its efficacy in this    
respect wholly depends on the social    
support which it can command outside the
 ,house4 ,an assembly which does not    
rest on the basis of some great power in
 the country is ineffectual against one 
which does4 ,an aristocratic ,house is  
only powerful in an aristocratic state  

of society4 ,the ,house of ,lords was   
once the strongest power in our         
,constitution1 and the ,commons only a  
checking body2 but this was when the    
barons were almost the only power out of
 doors4 ,i can not believe that1 in a   
really democratic state of society1 the 
,house of ,lords would be of any        
practical value as a moderator of       
democracy4 ,when the force on one side  
is feeble in comparison with that on the
 other1 the way to give it effect is not
 to draw both out in line1 and muster   
their strength in open field over       
against one another4 ,such tactics would
 insure the utter defeat of the less    
powerful4 ,it can only act to advantage 
by not holding itself apart1 and        
compelling every one to declare himself 
either with or against it1 but taking a 
position among the crowd rather than in 
opposition to it1 and drawing to itself 
the elements most capable of allying    
themselves with it on any given point2  
not appearing at all as an antagonist   

body1 to provoke a general rally against
 it1 but working as one of the elements 
in a mixed mass1 infusing its leaven1   
and often making what would be the      
weaker part the stronger1 by the        
addition of its influence4 ,the really  
moderating power in a democratic        
constitution must act in and through the
 democratic ,house4  ,that there should 
be1 in every polity1 a centre of        
resistance to the predominant power in  
the ,constitution--and in a democratic  
constitution1 therefore1 a nucleus of   
resistance to the democracy--,i have    
already maintained2 and ,i regard it as 
a fundamental maxim of government4 ,if  
any people who possess a democratic     
representation are1 from their          
historical antecedents1 more willing to 
tolerate such a centre of resistance in 
the form of a ,second ,chamber or ,house
 of ,lords than in any other shape1 this
 constitutes a stronger reason for      
having it in that shape4 ,but it does   
not appear to me the best shape in      

itself1 nor by any means the most       
efficacious for its object4 ,if there   
are two houses1 one considered to       
represent the people1 the other to      
represent only a class1 or not to be    
representative at all1 ,i can not think 
that1 where democracy is the ruling     
power in society1 the second ,house     
would have any real ability to resist   
even the aberrations of the first4 ,it  
might be suffered to exist in deference 
to habit and association1 but not as an 
effective check4 ,if it exercised an    
independent will1 it would be required  
to do so in the same general spirit as  
the other ,house2 to be equally         
democratic with it1 and to content      
itself with correcting the accidental   
oversights of the more popular branch of
 the ,legislature1 or competing with it 
in popular measures4  ,the              
practicability of any real check to the 
ascendancy of the majority depends      
henceforth on the distribution of       
strength in the most popular branch of  

the governing body2 and ,i have         
indicated the mode in which1 to the best
 of my judgment1 a balance of forces    
might most advantageously be established
 there4 ,i have also pointed out that1  
even if the numerical majority were     
allowed to exercise complete            
predominance by means of a corresponding
 majority in ,parliament1 yet if        
minorities also are permitted to enjoy  
the equal right due to them on strictly 
democratic principles1 of being         
represented proportionally to their     
numbers1 this provision will insure the 
perpetual presence in the ,house1 by the
 same popular title as its other        
members1 of so many of the first        
intellects in the country1 that without 
being in any way banded apart1 or       
invested with any invidious prerogative1
 this portion of the national           
representation will have a personal     
weight much more than in proportion to  
its numerical strength1 and will afford1
 in a most effective form1 the moral    

centre of resistance which is needed4 ,a
 second ,chamber1 therefore1 is not     
required for this purpose1 and would not
 contribute to it1 but might even1 in   
some degree1 tend to compromise it4 ,if1
 however1 for the other reasons already 
mentioned1 the decision were taken that 
there should be such a ,chamber1 it is  
desirable that it should be composed of 
elements which1 without being open to   
the imputation of class interests       
adverse to the majority1 would incline  
it to oppose itself to the class        
interests of the majority1 and qualify  
it to raise its voice with authority    
against their errors and weaknesses4    
,these conditions evidently are not     
found in a body constituted in the      
manner of our ,house of ,lords4 ,so soon
 as conventional rank and individual    
riches no longer overawe the democracy1 
a ,house of ,lords becomes              
insignificant4  ,of all principles on   
which a wisely conservative body1       
destined to moderate and regulate       

democratic ascendancy1 could possibly be
 constructed1 the best seems to be that 
exemplified in the ,roman ,senate1      
itself the most consistently prudent and
 sagacious body that ever administered  
public affairs4 ,the deficiencies of a  
democratic assembly1 which represents   
the general public1 are the deficiencies
 of the public itself1 want of special  
training and knowledge4 ,the appropriate
 corrective is to associate with it a   
body of which special training and      
knowledge should be the characteristics4
 ,if one ,house represents popular      
feeling1 the other should represent     
personal merit1 tested and guaranteed by
 actual public service1 and fortified by
 practical experience4 ,if one is the   
,people's ,chamber1 the other should be 
the ,chamber of ,statesmen--a council   
composed of all living public men who   
have passed through important political 
office or employment4 ,such a ,chamber  
would be fitted for much more than to be
 a merely moderating body4 ,it would not

 be exclusively a check1 but also an    
impelling force4 ,in its hands1 the     
power of holding the people back would  
be vested in those most competent1 and  
who would then be most inclined to lead 
them forward in any right course4 ,the  
council to whom the task would be       
intrusted of rectifying the people's    
mistakes would not represent a class    
believed to be opposed to their         
interest1 but would consist of their own
 natural leaders in the path of         
progress4 ,no mode of composition could 
approach to this in giving weight and   
efficacy to their function of           
moderators4 ,it would be impossible to  
cry down a body always foremost in      
promoting improvements as a mere        
obstructive body1 whatever amount of    
mischief it might obstruct4  ,were the  
place vacant in ,england for such a     
,senate 7,i need scarcely say that this 
is a mere hypothesis71 it might be      
composed of some such elements as the   
following3 ,all who were or had been    

members of the ,legislative ,commission 
described in a former chapter1 and which
 ,i regard as an indispensable          
ingredient in a well constituted popular
 government4 ,all who were or had been  
chief justices1 or heads of any of the  
superior courts of law or equity4 ,all  
who had for five years filled the office
 of puisne judge4 ,all who had held for 
two years any cabinet office2 but these 
should also be eligible to the ,house of
 ,commons1 and1 if elected members of   
it1 their peerage or senatorial office  
should be held in suspense4 ,the        
condition of time is needed to prevent  
persons from being named cabinet        
ministers merely to give them a seat in 
the ,senate2 and the period of two years
 is suggested1 that the same term which 
qualifies them for a pension might      
entitle them to a senatorship4 ,all who 
had filled the office of                
commander-in-chief2 and all who1 having 
commanded an army or a fleet1 had been  
thanked by ,parliament for military or  

naval successes4 ,all governors general 
of ,india or ,british ,america1 and all 
who had held for ten years any colonial 
governorships4 ,the permanent civil     
service should also be represented2 all 
should be senators who had filled1      
during ten years1 the important offices 
of under-secretary to the ,treasury1    
permanent under-secretary of ,state1 or 
any others equally high and responsible4
 ,the functions conferring the          
senatorial dignity should be limited to 
those of a legal1 political1 or military
 or naval character4 ,scientific and    
literary eminence are too indefinite and
 disputable3 they imply a power of      
selection1 whereas the other            
qualifications speak for themselves2 if 
the writings by which reputation has    
been gained are unconnected with        
politics1 they are no evidence of the   
special qualities required1 while1 if   
political1 they would enable successive 
ministries to deluge the ,house with    
party tools4  ,the historical           

antecedents of ,england render it all   
but certain that1 unless in the         
improbable case of a violent subversion 
of the existing ,constitution1 any      
second ,chamber which could possibly    
exist would have to be built on the     
foundation of the ,house of ,lords4 ,it 
is out of the question to think         
practically of abolishing that assembly1
 to replace it by such a ,senate as ,i  
have sketched or by any other2 but there
 might not be the same insuperable      
difficulty in aggregating the classes or
 categories just spoken of to the       
existing body in the character of peers 
for life4 ,an ulterior1 and perhaps1 on 
this supposition1 a necessary step1     
might be1 that the hereditary peerage   
should be present in the ,house by their
 representatives instead of personally3 
a practice already established in the   
case of the ,scotch and ,irish peers1   
and which the mere multiplication of the
 order will probably at some time or    
other render inevitable4 ,an easy       

adaptation of ,mr4 ,hare's plan would   
prevent the representative peers from   
representing exclusively the party which
 has the majority in the peerage4 ,if1  
for example1 one representative were    
allowed for every ten peers1 any ten    
might be admitted to choose a           
representative1 and the peers might be  
free to group themselves for that       
purpose as they pleased4 ,the election  
might be thus conducted3 ,all peers who 
were candidates for the representation  
of their order should be required to    
declare themselves such1 and enter their
 names in a list4 ,a day and place      
should be appointed at which peers      
desirous of voting should be present1   
either in person1 or1 in the usual      
,parliamentary manner1 by their proxies4
 ,the votes should be taken1 each peer  
voting for only one4 ,every candidate   
who had as many as ten votes should be  
declared elected4 ,if any one had more1 
all but ten should be allowed to        
withdraw their votes1 or ten of the     

number should be selected by lot4 ,these
 ten would form his constituency1 and   
the remainder of his voters would be set
 free to give their votes over again for
 some one else4 ,this process should be 
repeated until 7so far as possible7     
every peer present either personally or 
by proxy was represented4 ,when a number
 less than ten remained over1 if        
amounting to five they might still be   
allowed to agree on a representative2 if
 fewer than five1 their votes must be   
lost1 or they might be permitted to     
record them in favor of somebody already
 elected4 ,with this inconsiderable     
exception1 every representative peer    
would represent ten members of the      
peerage1 all of whom had not only voted 
for him1 but selected him as the one1   
among all open to their choice1 by whom 
they were most desirous to be           
represented4 ,as a compensation to the  
peers who were not chosen               
representatives of their order1 they    
should be eligible to the ,house of     

,commons2 a justice now refused to      
,scotch peers1 and to ,irish peers in   
their own part of the kingdom1 while the
 representation in the ,house of ,lords 
of any but the most numerous party in   
the peerage is denied equally to both4  
,the mode of composing a ,senate which  
has been here advocated not only seems  
the best in itself1 but is that for     
which historical precedent and actual   
brilliant success can to the greatest   
extent be pleaded4 ,it is not however   
the only feasible plan that might be    
proposed4 ,another possible mode of     
forming a ,second ,chamber would be to  
have it elected by the ,first2 subject  
to the restriction that they should not 
nominate any of their own members4 ,such
 an assembly1 emanating1 like the       
,american ,senate1 from popular choice  
only once removed1 would not be         
considered to clash with democratic     
institutions1 and would probably acquire
 considerable popular influence4 ,from  
the mode of its nomination1 it would be 

peculiarly unlikely to excite the       
jealousy of1 or to come into hostile    
collision with the popular ,house4 ,it  
would1 moreover 7due provision being    
made for the representation of the      
minority71 be almost sure to be well    
composed1 and to comprise many of that  
class of highly capable men who1 either 
from accident or for want of showy      
qualities1 had been unwilling to seek1  
or unable to obtain1 the suffrages of a 
popular constituency4  ,the best        
constitution of a ,second ,chamber is   
that which embodies the greatest number 
of elements exempt from the class       
interests and prejudices of the         
majority1 but having in themselves      
nothing offensive to democratic feeling4
 ,i repeat1 however1 that the main      
reliance for tempering the ascendancy of
 the majority can be placed in a ,second
 ,chamber of any kind4 ,the character of
 a representative government is fixed by
 the constitution of the popular ,house4
 ,compared with this1 all other         

questions relating to the form of       
government are insignificant4           
,chapter ,,xiv--,of the ,executive in a 
,representative ,government4   ,it would
 be out of place in this treatise to    
discuss the question into what          
departments or branches the executive   
business of government may most         
conveniently be divided4 ,in this       
respect the exigencies of different     
governments are different2 and there is 
little probability that any great       
mistake will be made in the             
classification of the duties when men   
are willing to begin at the beginning1  
and do not hold themselves bound by the 
series of accidents which1 in an old    
government like ours1 has produced the  
existing division of the public         
business4 ,it may be sufficient to say  
that the classification of functionaries
 should correspond to that of subjects1 
and that there should not be several    
departments independent of one another1 
to superintend different parts of the   

same natural whole1 as in our own       
military administration down to a recent
 period1 and in a less degree even at   
present4 ,where the object to be        
attained is single 7such as that of     
having an efficient army71 the authority
 commissioned to attend to it should be 
single likewise4 ,the entire aggregate  
of means provided for one end should be 
under one and the same control and      
responsibility4 ,if they are divided    
among independent authorities1 the means
 with each of those authorities become  
ends1 and it is the business of nobody  
except the head of the government1 who  
has probably no departmental experience1
 to take care of the real end4 ,the     
different classes of means are not      
combined and adapted to one another     
under the guidance of any leading idea2 
and while every department pushes       
forward its own requirements1 regardless
 of those of the rest1 the purpose of   
the work is perpetually sacrificed to   
the work itself4  ,as a general rule1   

every executive function1 whether       
superior or subordinate1 should be the  
appointed duty of some given individual4
 ,it should be apparent to all the world
 who did every thing1 and through whose 
default any thing was left undone4      
,responsibility is null when nobody     
knows who is responsible2 nor1 even when
 real1 can it be divided without being  
weakened4 ,to maintain it at its        
highest1 there must be one person who   
receives the whole praise of what is    
well done1 the whole blame of what is   
ill4 ,there are1 however1 two modes of  
sharing responsibility2 by one it is    
only enfeebled1 by the other absolutely 
destroyed4 ,it is enfeebled when the    
concurrence of more than one functionary
 is required to the same act4 ,each one 
among them has still a real             
responsibility2 if a wrong has been     
done1 none of them can say he did not do
 it2 he is as much a participant as an  
accomplice is in an offense3 if there   
has been legal criminality1 they may all

 be punished legally1 and their         
punishment needs not be less severe than
 if there had been only one person      
concerned4 ,but it is not so with the   
penalties any more than with the rewards
 of opinion2 these are always diminished
 by being shared4 ,where there has been 
no definite legal offense1 no corruption
 or malversation1 only an error or an   
imprudence1 or what may pass for such1  
every participator has an excuse to     
himself and to the world in the fact    
that other persons are jointly involved 
with him4 ,there is hardly any thing1   
even to pecuniary dishonesty1 for which 
men will not feel themselves almost     
absolved1 if those whose duty it was to 
resist and remonstrate have failed to do
 it1 still more if they have given a    
formal assent4  ,in this case1 however1 
though responsibility is weakened1 there
 still is responsibility3 every one of  
those implicated has in his individual  
capacity assented to1 and joined in the 
act4 ,things are much worse when the act

 itself is only that of a majority--a   
board deliberating with closed doors1   
nobody knowing1 or1 except in some      
extreme case1 being ever likely to know1
 whether an individual member voted for 
the act or against it4 ,responsibility  
in this case is a mere name4 ,boards1 it
 is happily said by ,bentham1 are       
screens4 ,what the ,board does is the   
act of nobody1 and nobody can be made to
 answer for it4 ,the ,board suffers1    
even in reputation1 only in its         
collective character2 and no individual 
member feels this further than his      
disposition leads him to identify his   
own estimation with that of the body--a 
feeling often very strong when the body 
is a permanent one1 and he is wedded to 
it for better for worse2 but the        
fluctuations of a modern official career
 give no time for the formation of such 
an esprit de corps1 which1 if it exists 
at all1 exists only in the obscure ranks
 of the permanent subordinates4 ,boards1
 therefore1 are not a fit instrument for

 executive business1 and are only       
admissible in it when1 for other        
reasons1 to give full discretionary     
power to a single minister would be     
worse4  ,on the other hand1 it is also a
 maxim of experience that in the        
multitude of councillors there is       
wisdom1 and that a man seldom judges    
right1 even in his own concerns1 still  
less in those of the public1 when he    
makes habitual use of no knowledge but  
his own1 or that of some single adviser4
 ,there is no necessary incompatibility 
between this principle and the other4   
,it is easy to give the effective power 
and the full responsibility to one1     
providing him when necessary with       
advisers1 each of whom is responsible   
only for the opinion he gives4  ,in     
general1 the head of a department of the
 executive government is a mere         
politician4 ,he may be a good           
politician1 and a man of merit2 and1    
unless this is usually the case1 the    
government is bad4 ,but his general     

capacity1 and the knowledge he ought to 
possess of the general interests of the 
country1 will not1 unless by occasional 
accident1 be accompanied by adequate1   
and what may be called professional     
knowledge of the department over which  
he is called to preside4 ,professional  
advisers must therefore be provided for 
him4 ,wherever mere experience and      
attainments are sufficient--wherever the
 qualities required in a professional   
adviser may possibly be united in a     
single well-selected individual 7as in  
the case1 for example1 of a law         
officer71 one such person for general   
purposes1 and a staff of clerks to      
supply knowledge of details1 meet the   
demands of the case4 ,but1 more         
frequently1 it is not sufficient that   
the minister should consult some one    
competent person1 and1 when himself not 
conversant with the subject1 act        
implicitly on that person's advice4 ,it 
is often necessary that he should1 not  
only occasionally1 but habitually1      

listen to a variety of opinions1 and    
inform his judgment by the discussions  
among a body of advisers4 ,this1 for    
example1 is emphatically necessary in   
military and naval affairs4 ,the        
military and naval ministers1 therefore1
 and probably several others1 should be 
provided with a ,council1 composed1 at  
least in those two departments1 of able 
and experienced professional men4 ,as a 
means of obtaining the best men for the 
purpose under every change of           
administration1 they ought to be        
permanent2 by which ,i mean that they   
ought not1 like the ,lords of the       
,admiralty1 to be expected to resign    
with the ministry by whom they were     
appointed2 but it is a good rule that   
all who hold high appointments to which 
they have risen by selection1 and not by
 the ordinary course of promotion1      
should retain their office only for a   
fixed term1 unless reappointed1 as is   
now the rule with staff appointments in 
the ,british army4 ,this rule renders   

appointments somewhat less likely to be 
jobbed1 not being a provision for life1 
and the same time affords a means1      
without affront to any one1 of getting  
rid of those who are least worth        
keeping1 and bringing in highly         
qualified persons of younger standing1  
for whom there might never be room if   
death vacancies1 or voluntary           
resignations were waited for4  ,the     
councils should be consultative merely1 
in this sense1 that the ultimate        
decision should rest undividedly with   
the minister himself2 but neither ought 
they to be looked upon1 or to look upon 
themselves as ciphers1 or as capable of 
being reduced to such at his pleasure4  
,the advisers attached to a powerful and
 perhaps self-willed man ought to be    
placed under conditions which make it   
impossible for them1 without discredit1 
not to express an opinion1 and          
impossible for him not to listen to and 
consider their recommendations1 whether 
he adopts them or not4 ,the relation    

which ought to exist between a chief and
 this description of advisers is very   
accurately hit by the constitution of   
the ,council of the ,governor ,general  
and those of the different ,presidencies
 in ,india4 ,these councils are composed
 of persons who have professional       
knowledge of ,indian affairs1 which the 
governor general and governors usually  
lack1 and which it would not be         
desirable to require of them4 ,as a     
rule1 every member of council is        
expected to give an opinion1 which is of
 course very often a simple             
acquiescence2 but if there is a         
difference of sentiment1 it is at the   
option of every member1 and is the      
invariable practice1 to record the      
reasons of his opinion1 the governor    
general1 or governor1 doing the same4   
,in ordinary cases the decision is      
according to the sense of the majority2 
the council1 therefore1 has a           
substantial part in the government2 but 
if the governor general1 or governor1   

thinks fit1 he may set aside even their 
unanimous opinion1 recording his        
reasons4 ,the result is1 that the chief 
is individually and effectively         
responsible for every act of the        
government4 ,the members of council have
 only the responsibility of advisers2   
but it is always known1 from documents  
capable of being produced1 and which1 if
 called for by ,parliament or public    
opinion always are produced1 what each  
has advised1 and what reasons he gave   
for his advice2 while1 from their       
dignified position1 and ostensible      
participation in all acts of government1
 they have nearly as strong motives to  
apply themselves to the public business1
 and to form and express a              
well-considered opinion on every part of
 it1 as if the whole responsibility     
rested with themselves4  ,this mode of  
conducting the highest class of         
administrative business is one of the   
most successful instances of the        
adaptation of means to ends which       

political history1 not hitherto very    
prolific in works of skill and          
contrivance1 has yet to show4 ,it is one
 of the acquisitions with which the art 
of politics has been enriched by the    
experience of the ,east ,india          
,company's rule2 and1 like most of the  
other wise contrivances by which ,india 
has been preserved to this country1 and 
an amount of good government produced   
which is truly wonderful considering the
 circumstances and the materials1 it is 
probably destined to perish in the      
general holocaust which the traditions  
of ,indian government seem fated to     
undergo since they have been placed at  
the mercy of public ignorance and the   
presumptuous vanity of political men4   
,already an outcry is raised for        
abolishing the councils as a superfluous
 and expensive clog on the wheels of    
government2 while the clamor has long   
been urgent1 and is daily obtaining more
 countenance in the highest quarters1   
for the abrogation of the professional  

civil service1 which breeds the men that
 compose the councils1 and the existence
 of which is the sole guaranty for their
 being of any value4  ,a most important 
principle of good government in a       
popular constitution is that no         
executive functionaries should be       
appointed by popular election1 neither  
by the votes of the people themselves1  
nor by those of their representatives4  
,the entire business of government is   
skilled employment2 the qualifications  
for the discharge of it are of that     
special and professional kind which can 
not be properly judged of except by     
persons who have themselves some share  
of those qualifications1 or some        
practical experience of them4 ,the      
business of finding the fittest persons 
to fill public employments--not merely  
selecting the best who offer1 but       
looking out for the absolutely best1 and
 taking note of all fit persons who are 
met with1 that they may be found when   
wanted--is very laborious1 and requires 

a delicate as well as highly            
conscientious discernment2 and as there 
is no public duty which is in general so
 badly performed1 so there is none for  
which it is of greater importance to    
enforce the utmost practicable amount of
 personal responsibility1 by imposing it
 as a special obligation on high        
functionaries in the several            
departments4 ,all subordinate public    
officers who are not appointed by some  
mode of public competition should be    
selected on the direct responsibility of
 the minister under whom they serve4    
,the ministers1 all but the chief1 will 
naturally be selected by the chief2 and 
the chief himself1 though really        
designated by ,parliament1 should be1 in
 a regal government1 officially         
appointed by the crown4 ,the functionary
 who appoints should be the sole person 
empowered to remove any subordinate     
officer who is liable to removal1 which 
the far greater number ought not to be1 
except for personal misconduct1 since it

 would be vain to expect that the body  
of persons by whom the whole detail of  
the public business is transacted1 and  
whose qualifications are generally of   
much more importance to the public than 
those of the minister himself1 will     
devote themselves to their profession1  
and acquire the knowledge and skill on  
which the minister must often place     
entire dependence1 if they are liable at
 any moment to be turned adrift for no  
fault1 that the minister may gratify    
himself1 or promote his political       
interest1 by appointing somebody else4  
,to the principle which condemns the    
appointment of executive officers by    
popular suffrage1 ought the chief of the
 executive1 in a republican government1 
to be an exception8 ,is it a good rule  
which1 in the ,american ,constitution1  
provides for the election of the        
,president once in every four years by  
the entire people8 ,the question is not 
free from difficulty4 ,there is         
unquestionably some advantage1 in a     

country like ,america1 where no         
apprehension needs be entertained of a  
coup d'tat1 in making the chief minister
 constitutionally independent of the    
legislative body1 and rendering the two 
great branches of the government1 while 
equally popular both in their origin and
 in their responsibility1 an effective  
check on one another4 ,the plan is in   
accordance with that sedulous avoidance 
of the concentration of great masses of 
power in the same hands1 which is a     
marked characteristic of the ,american  
federal ,constitution4 ,but the         
advantage1 in this instance1 is         
purchased at a price above all          
reasonable estimates of its value4 ,it  
seems far better that the chief         
magistrate in a republic should be      
appointed avowedly1 as the chief        
minister in a constitutional monarchy is
 virtually1 by the representative body4 
,in the first place1 he is certain1 when
 thus appointed1 to be a more eminent   
man4 ,the party which has the majority  

in ,parliament would then1 as a rule1   
appoint its own leader1 who is always   
one of the foremost1 and often the very 
foremost person in political life2 while
 the ,president of the ,united ,states1 
since the last survivor of the founders 
of the republic disappeared from the    
scene1 is almost always either an       
obscure man1 or one who has gained any  
reputation he may possess in some other 
field than politics4 ,and this1 as ,i   
have before observed1 is no accident1   
but the natural effect of the situation4
 ,the eminent men of a party1 in an     
election extending to the whole country1
 are never its most available           
candidates4 ,all eminent men have made  
personal enemies1 or1 have done         
something1 or at the lowest1 professed  
some opinion obnoxious to some local or 
other considerable division of the      
community1 and likely to tell with fatal
 effect upon the number of votes2       
whereas a man without antecedents1 of   
whom nothing is known but that he       

professes the creed of the party1 is    
readily voted for by its entire         
strength4 ,another important            
consideration is the great mischief of  
unintermitted electioneering4 ,when the 
highest dignity in the state is to be   
conferred by popular election once in   
every few years1 the whole intervening  
time is spent in what is virtually a    
canvass4 ,president1 ministers1 chiefs  
of parties1 and their followers1 are all
 electioneerers3 the whole community is 
kept intent on the mere personalities of
 politics1 and every public question is 
discussed and decided with less         
reference to its merits than to its     
expected bearing on the presidential    
election4 ,if a system had been devised 
to make party spirit the ruling         
principle of action in all public       
affairs1 and create an inducement not   
only to make every question a party     
question1 but to raise questions for the
 purpose of founding parties upon them1 
it would have been difficult to contrive

 any means better adapted to the        
purpose4  ,i will not affirm that it    
would at all times and places be        
desirable that the head of the executive
 should be so completely dependent upon 
the votes of a representative assembly  
as the prime minister is in ,england1   
and is without inconvenience4 ,if it    
were thought best to avoid this1 he     
might1 though appointed by ,parliament1 
hold his office for a fixed period1     
independent of a ,parliamentary vote1   
which would be the ,american system     
minus the popular election and its      
evils4 ,there is another mode of giving 
the head of the administration as much  
independence of the ,legislature as is  
at all compatible with the essentials of
 free government4 ,he never could be    
unduly dependent on a vote of           
,parliament if he had1 as the ,british  
prime minister practically has1 the     
power to dissolve the ,house and appeal 
to the people2 if1 instead of being     
turned out of office by a hostile vote1 

he could only be reduced by it to the   
alternative of resignation or           
dissolution4 ,the power of dissolving   
,parliament is one which ,i think it    
desirable he should possess1 even under 
the system by which his own tenure of   
office is secured to him for a fixed    
period4 ,there ought not to be any      
possibility of that deadlock in politics
 which would ensue on a quarrel breaking
 out between a president and an         
assembly1 neither of whom1 during an    
interval which might amount to years1   
would have any legal means of ridding   
itself of the other4 ,to get through    
such a period without a coup d'tat being
 attempted1 on either side or on both1  
requires such a combination of the love 
of liberty and the habit of             
self-restraint as very few nations have 
yet shown themselves capable of2 and    
though this extremity were avoided1 to  
expect that the two authorities would   
not paralyze each other's operations is 
to suppose that the political life of   

the country will always be pervaded by a
 spirit of mutual forbearance and       
compromise1 imperturbable by the        
passions and excitements of the keenest 
party struggles4 ,such a spirit may     
exist1 but even where it does there is  
imprudence in trying it too far4  ,other
 reasons make it desirable that some    
power in the state 7which can only be   
the executive7 should have the liberty  
of at any time1 and at discretion1      
calling a new ,parliament4 ,when there  
is a real doubt which of two contending 
parties has the strongest following1 it 
is important that there should exist a  
constitutional means of immediately     
testing the point and setting it at     
rest4 ,no other political topic has a   
chance of being properly attended to    
while this is undecided2 and such an    
interval is mostly an interregnum for   
purposes of legislative or              
administrative improvement1 neither     
party having sufficient confidence in   
its strength to attempt things likely to

 provoke opposition in any quarter that 
has either direct or indirect influence 
in the pending struggle4  ,i have not   
taken account of the case in which the  
vast power centralized in the chief     
magistrate1 and the insufficient        
attachment of the mass of the people to 
free institutions1 give him a chance of 
success in an attempt to subvert the    
,constitution1 and usurp sovereign      
power4 ,where such peril exists1 no     
first magistrate is admissible whom the 
,parliament can not1 by a single vote1  
reduce to a private station4 ,in a state
 of things holding out any encouragement
 to that most audacious and profligate  
of all breaches of trust1 even this     
entireness of constitutional dependence 
is but a weak protection4  ,of all      
officers of government1 those in whose  
appointment any participation of popular
 suffrage is the most objectionable are 
judicial officers4 ,while there are no  
functionaries whose special and         
professional qualifications the popular 

judgment is less fitted to estimate1    
there are none in whose case absolute   
impartiality1 and freedom from          
connection with politicians or sections 
of politicians1 are of any thing like   
equal importance4 ,some thinkers1 among 
others ,mr4 ,bentham1 have been of      
opinion that1 although it is better that
 judges should not be appointed by      
popular election1 the people of their   
district ought to have the power1 after 
sufficient experience1 of removing them 
from their trust4 ,it can not be denied 
that the irremovability of any public   
officer to whom great interests are     
intrusted is in itself an evil4 ,it is  
far from desirable that there should be 
no means of getting rid of a bad or     
incompetent judge1 unless for such      
misconduct as he can be made to answer  
for in a criminal court1 and that a     
functionary on whom so much depends     
should have the feeling of being free   
from responsibility except to opinion   
and his own conscience4 ,the question   

however is1 whether1 in the peculiar    
position of a judge1 and supposing that 
all practicable securities have been    
taken for an honest appointment1        
irresponsibility1 except to his own and 
the public conscience1 has not1 on the  
whole1 less tendency to pervert his     
conduct than responsibility to the      
government or to a popular vote4        
,experience has long decided this point 
in the affirmative as regards           
responsibility to the executive1 and the
 case is quite equally strong when the  
responsibility sought to be enforced is 
to the suffrages of electors4 ,among the
 good qualities of a popular            
constituency1 those peculiarly incumbent
 upon a judge1 calmness and             
impartiality1 are not numbered4         
,happily1 in that intervention of       
popular suffrage which is essential to  
freedom they are not the qualities      
required4 ,even the quality of justice1 
though necessary to all human beings1   
and therefore to all electors1 is not   

the inducement which decides any popular
 election4 ,justice and impartiality are
 as little wanted for electing a member 
of ,parliament as they can be in any    
transaction of men4 ,the electors have  
not to award something which either     
candidate has a right to1 nor to pass   
judgment on the general merits of the   
competitors1 but to declare which of    
them has most of their personal         
confidence1 or best represents their    
political convictions4 ,a judge is bound
 to treat his political friend1 or the  
person best known to him1 exactly as he 
treats other people2 but it would be a  
breach of duty1 as well as an absurdity1
 if an elector did so4 ,no argument can 
be grounded on the beneficial effect    
produced on judges1 as on all other     
functionaries1 by the moral jurisdiction
 of opinion2 for even in this respect1  
that which really exercises a useful    
control over the proceedings of a judge1
 when fit for the judicial office1 is   
not 7except sometimes in political      

cases7 the opinion of the community     
generally1 but that of the only public  
by whom his conduct or qualifications   
can be duly estimated1 the bar of his   
own court4 ,i must not be understood to 
say that the participation of the       
general public in the administration of 
justice is of no importance2 it is of   
the greatest2 but in what manner8 ,by   
the actual discharge of a part of the   
judicial office in the capacity of      
jurymen4 ,this is one of the few cases  
in politics in which it is better that  
the people should act directly and      
personally than through their           
representatives1 being almost the only  
case in which the errors that a person  
exercising authority may commit can be  
better borne than the consequences of   
making him responsible for them4 ,if a  
judge could be removed from office by a 
popular vote1 whoever was desirous of   
supplanting him would make capital for  
that purpose out of all his judicial    
decisions2 would carry all of them1 as  

far as he found practicable1 by         
irregular appeal before a public opinion
 wholly incompetent1 for want of having 
heard the case1 or from having heard it 
without either the precautions or the   
impartiality belonging to a judicial    
hearing2 would play upon popular passion
 and prejudice where they existed1 and  
take pains to arouse them where they did
 not4 ,and in this1 if the case were    
interesting1 and he took sufficient     
trouble1 he would infallibly be         
successful1 unless the judge or his     
friends descended into the arena1 and   
made equally powerful appeals on the    
other side4 ,judges would end by feeling
 that they risked their office upon     
every decision they gave in a case      
susceptible of general interest1 and    
that it was less essential for them to  
consider what decision was just1 than   
what would be most applauded by the     
public1 or would least admit of         
insidious misrepresentation4 ,the       
practice introduced by some of the new  

or revised ,state ,constitutions in     
,america1 of submitting judicial        
officers to periodical popular          
re-election1 will be found1 ,i          
apprehend1 to be one of the most        
dangerous errors ever yet committed by  
democracy2 and1 were it not that the    
practical good sense which never totally
 deserts the people of the ,united      
,states is said to be producing a       
reaction1 likely in no long time to lead
 to the retraction of the error1 it     
might with reason be regarded as the    
first great downward step in the        
degeneration of modern democratic       
government4  ,with regard to that large 
and important body which constitutes the
 permanent strength of the public       
service1 those who do not change with   
changes of politics1 but remain to aid  
every minister by their experience and  
traditions1 inform him by their         
knowledge of business1 and conduct      
official details under his general      
control--those1 in short1 who form the  

class of professional public servants1  
entering their profession as others do  
while young1 in the hope of rising      
progressively to its higher grades as   
they advance in life--it is evidently   
inadmissible that these should be liable
 to be turned out1 and deprived of the  
whole benefit of their previous service1
 except for positive1 proved1 and       
serious misconduct4 ,not1 of course1    
such delinquency only as makes them     
amenable to the law1 but voluntary      
neglect of duty1 or conduct implying    
untrustworthiness for the purposes for  
which their trust is given them4 ,since1
 therefore1 unless in case of personal  
culpability1 there is no way of getting 
rid of them except by quartering them on
 the public as pensioners1 it is of the 
greatest importance that the            
appointments should be well made in the 
first instance2 and it remains to be    
considered by what mode of appointment  
this purpose can best be attained4  ,in 
making first appointments1 little danger

 is to be apprehended from want of      
special skill and knowledge in the      
choosers1 but much from partiality1 and 
private or political interest4 ,being   
all appointed at the commencement of    
manhood1 not as having learned1 but in  
order that they may learn1 their        
profession1 the only thing by which the 
best candidates can be discriminated is 
proficiency in the ordinary branches of 
liberal education2 and this can be      
ascertained without difficulty1 provided
 there be the requisite pains and the   
requisite impartiality in those who are 
appointed to inquire into it4 ,neither  
the one nor the other can reasonably be 
expected from a minister1 who must rely 
wholly on recommendations1 and1 however 
disinterested as to his personal wishes1
 never will be proof against the        
solicitations of persons who have the   
power of influencing his own election1  
or whose political adherence is         
important to the ministry to which he   
belongs4 ,these considerations have     

introduced the practice of submitting   
all candidates for first appointments to
 a public examination1 conducted by     
persons not engaged in politics1 and of 
the same class and quality with the     
examiners for honors at the             
,universities4 ,this would probably be  
the best plan under any system2 and     
under our ,parliamentary government it  
is the only one which affords a chance1 
,i do not say of honest appointment1 but
 even of abstinence from such as are    
manifestly and flagrantly profligate4   
,it is also absolutely necessary that   
the examinations should be competitive1 
and the appointments given to those who 
are most successful4 ,a mere pass       
examination never1 in the long run1 does
 more than exclude absolute dunces4     
,when the question1 in the mind of an   
examiner1 lies between blighting the    
prospects of an individual and          
performing a duty to the public which1  
in the particular instance1 seldom      
appears of first rate importance1 and   

when he is sure to be bitterly          
reproached for doing the first1 while in
 general no one will either know or care
 whether he has done the latter1 the    
balance1 unless he is a man of very     
unusual stamp1 inclines to the side of  
good-nature4 ,a relaxation in one       
instance establishes a claim to it in   
others1 which every repetition of       
indulgence makes it more difficult to   
resist2 each of these1 in succession1   
becomes a precedent for more1 until the 
standard of proficiency sinks gradually 
to something almost contemptible4       
,examinations for degrees at the two    
great ,universities have generally been 
as slender in their requirements as     
those for honors are trying and serious4
 ,where there is no inducement to exceed
 a certain minimum1 the minimum comes to
 be the maximum3 it becomes the general 
practice not to aim at more2 and as in  
every thing there are some who do not   
attain all they aim at1 however low the 
standard may be pitched1 there are      

always several who fall short of it4    
,when1 on the contrary1 the appointments
 are given to those1 among a great      
number of candidates1 who most          
distinguish themselves1 and where the   
successful competitors are classed in   
order of merit1 not only each is        
stimulated to do his very utmost1 but   
the influence is felt in every place of 
liberal education throughout the        
country4 ,it becomes with every         
schoolmaster an object of ambition and  
an avenue to success to have furnished  
pupils who have gained a high place in  
these competitions1 and there is hardly 
any other mode in which the state can do
 so much to raise the quality of        
educational institutions throughout the 
country4 ,though the principle of       
competitive examinations for public     
employment is of such recent            
introduction in this country1 and is    
still so imperfectly carried out1 the   
,indian service being as yet nearly the 
only case in which it exists in its     

completeness1 a sensible effect has     
already begun to be produced on the     
places of middle-class education1       
notwithstanding the difficulties which  
the principle has encountered from the  
disgracefully low existing state of     
education in the country1 which these   
very examinations have brought into     
strong light4 ,so contemptible has the  
standard of acquirement been found to   
be1 among the youths who obtain the     
nomination from the minister1 which     
entitles them to offer themselves as    
candidates1 that the competition of such
 candidates produces almost a poorer    
result than would be obtained from a    
mere pass examination2 for no one would 
think of fixing the conditions of a pass
 examination so low as is actually found
 sufficient to enable a young man to    
surpass his fellow-candidates4          
,accordingly1 it is said that successive
 years show on the whole a decline of   
attainments1 less effort being made1    
because the results of former           

examinations have proved that the       
exertions then used were greater than   
would have been sufficient to attain the
 object4 ,partly from this decrease of  
effort1 and partly because1 even at the 
examinations which do not require a     
previous nomination1 conscious ignorance
 reduces the number of competitors to a 
mere handful1 it has so happened that   
though there have always been a few     
instances of great proficiency1 the     
lower part of the list of successful    
candidates represents but a very        
moderate amount of acquirement2 and we  
have it on the word of the commissioners
 that nearly all who have been          
unsuccessful have owed their failure to 
ignorance1 not of the higher branches of
 instruction1 but of its very humblest  
elements--spelling and arithmetic4  ,the
 outcries which continue to be made     
against these examinations by some of   
the organs of opinion are often1 ,i     
regret to say1 as little creditable to  
the good faith as to the good sense of  

the assailants4 ,they proceed partly by 
misrepresentation of the kind of        
ignorance which1 as a matter of fact1   
actually leads to failure in the        
examinations4 ,they quote with emphasis 
the most recondite questions #h which   
can be shown to have been ever asked1   
and make it appear as if unexceptionable
 answers to all these were made the sine
 qu non of success4 ,yet it has been    
repeated to satiety that such questions 
are not put because it is expected of   
every one that he should answer them1   
but in order that whoever is able to do 
so may have the means of proving and    
availing himself of that portion of his 
knowledge4 ,it is not as a ground of    
rejection1 but as an additional means of
 success1 that this opportunity is      
given4 ,we are then asked whether the   
kind of knowledge supposed in this1     
that1 or the other question1 is         
calculated to be of any use to the      
candidate after he has attained his     
object4 ,people differ greatly in       

opinion as to what knowledge is useful4 
,there are persons in existence1 and a  
late ,foreign ,secretary of ,state is   
one of them1 who think ,english spelling
 a useless accomplishment in a          
diplomatic attach or a clerk in a       
government office4 ,about one thing the 
objectors seem to be unanimous1 that    
general mental cultivation is not useful
 in these employments1 whatever else may
 be so4 ,if1 however 7as ,i presume to  
think71 it is useful1 or if any         
education at all is useful1 it must be  
tested by the tests most likely to show 
whether the candidate possesses it or   
not4 ,to ascertain whether he has been  
well educated1 he must be interrogated  
in the things which he is likely to know
 if he has been well educated1 even     
though not directly pertinent to the    
work to which he is to be appointed4    
,will those who object to his being     
questioned in classics and mathematics1 
tell us what they would have him        
questioned in8 ,there seems1 however1 to

 be equal objection to examining him in 
these1 and to examining him in any thing
 but these4 ,if the                     
,commissioners--anxious to open a door  
of admission to those who have not gone 
through the routine of a grammar-school1
 or who make up for the smallness of    
their knowledge of what is there taught 
by greater knowledge of something       
else--allow marks to be gained by       
proficiency in any other subject of real
 utility1 they are reproached for that  
too4 ,nothing will satisfy the objectors
 but free admission of total ignorance4 
,we are triumphantly told that neither  
,clive nor ,wellington could have passed
 the test which is prescribed for an    
aspirant to an engineer cadetship2 as   
if1 because ,clive and ,wellington did  
not do what was not required of them1   
they could not have done it if it had   
been required4 ,if it be only meant to  
inform us that it is possible to be a   
great general without these things1 so  
it is without many other things which   

are very useful to great generals4      
,alexander the ,great had never heard of
 ,vauban's rules1 nor could ,julius     
,csar speak ,french4 ,we are next       
informed that book-worms1 a term which  
seems to be held applicable to whoever  
has the smallest tincture of            
book-knowledge1 may not be good at      
bodily exercises1 or have the habits of 
gentlemen4 ,this is a very common line  
of remark with dunces of condition2 but1
 whatever the dunces may think1 they    
have no monopoly of either gentlemanly  
habits or bodily activity4 ,wherever    
these are needed1 let them be inquired  
into and separately provided for1 not to
 the exclusion of mental qualifications1
 but in addition4 ,meanwhile1 ,i am     
credibly informed that in the ,military 
,academy at ,woolwich the competition   
cadets are as superior to those admitted
 on the old system of nomination in     
these respects as in all others2 that   
they learn even their drill more        
quickly1 as indeed might be expected1   

for an intelligent person learns all    
things sooner than a stupid one2 and    
that in general demeanor they contrast  
so favorably with their predecessors1   
that the authorities of the institutions
 are impatient for the day to arrive    
when the last remains of the old leaven 
shall have disappeared from the place4  
,if this be so1 and it is easy to       
ascertain whether it is so1 it is to be 
hoped we shall soon have heard for the  
last time that ignorance is a better    
qualification than knowledge for the    
military1 and1  fortiori1 for every     
other profession1 or that any one good  
quality1 however little apparently      
connected with liberal education1 is at 
all likely to be promoted by going      
without it4  ,though the first admission
 to government employment be decided by 
competitive examination1 it would in    
most cases be impossible that subsequent
 promotion should be so decided2 and it 
seems proper that this should take      
place1 as it usually does at present1 on

 a mixed system of seniority and        
selection4 ,those whose duties are of a 
routine character should rise by        
seniority to the highest point to which 
duties merely of that description can   
carry them1 while those to whom         
functions of particular trust1 and      
requiring special capacity1 are         
confided1 should be selected from the   
body on the discretion of the chief of  
the office4 ,and this selection will    
generally be made honestly by him if the
 original appointments take place by    
open competition1 for under that system 
his establishment will generally consist
 of individuals to whom1 but for the    
official connection1 he would have been 
a stranger4 ,if among them there be any 
in whom he1 or his political friends and
 supporters1 take an interest1 it will  
be but occasionally1 and only when to   
this advantage of connection is added1  
as far as the initiatory examination    
could test it1 at least equality of real
 merit2 and1 except when there is a very

 strong motive to job these             
appointments1 there is always a strong  
one to appoint the fittest person1 being
 the one who gives to his chief the most
 useful assistance1 saves him most      
trouble1 and helps most to build up that
 reputation for good management of      
public business which necessarily and   
properly redound to the credit of the   
minister1 however much the qualities to 
which it is immediately owing may be    
those of his subordinates4    ,chapter  
,,xv--,of ,local ,representative        
,bodies4   ,it is but a small portion of
 the public business of a country which 
can be well done or safely attempted by 
the central authorities2 and even in our
 own government1 the least centralized  
in ,europe1 the legislative portion at  
least of the governing body busies      
itself far too much with local affairs1 
employing the supreme power of the      
,state in cutting small knots which     
there ought to be other and better means
 of untying4 ,the enormous amount of    

private business which takes up the time
 of ,parliament and the thoughts of its 
individual members1 distracting them    
from the proper occupations of the great
 council of the nation1 is felt by all  
thinkers and observers as a serious     
evil1 and1 what is worse1 an increasing 
one4  ,it would not be appropriate to   
the limited design of this treatise to  
discuss at large the great question1 in 
no way peculiar to representative       
government1 of the proper limits of     
governmental action4 ,i have said       
elsewhere #i what seemed to me most     
essential respecting the principles by  
which the extent of that action ought to
 be determined4 ,but after subtracting  
from the functions performed by most    
,european governments those which ought 
not to be undertaken by public          
authorities at all1 there still remains 
so great and various an aggregate of    
duties1 that1 if only on the principle  
of division of labor1 it is             
indispensable to share them between     

central and local authorities4 ,not     
solely are separate executive officers  
required for purely local duties 7an    
amount of separation which exists under 
all governments71 but the popular       
control over those officers can only be 
advantageously exerted through a        
separate organ4 ,their original         
appointment1 the function of watching   
and checking them1 the duty of providing
 or the discretion of withholding the   
supplies necessary for their operations1
 should rest1 not with the national     
,parliament or the national executive1  
but with the people of the locality4    
,that the people should exercise these  
functions directly and personally is    
evidently inadmissable4 ,administration 
by the assembled people is a relic of   
barbarism opposed to the whole spirit of
 modern life2 yet so much has the course
 of ,english institutions depended on   
accident1 that this primitive mode of   
local government remained the general   
rule in parochial matters up to the     

present generation2 and1 having never   
been legally abolished1 probably        
subsists unaltered in many rural        
parishes even now4 ,there remains the   
plan of representative sub-,parliaments 
for local affairs1 and these must       
henceforth be considered as one of the  
fundamental institutions of a free      
government4 ,they exist in ,england but 
very incompletely1 and with great       
irregularity and want of system2 in some
 other countries much less popularly    
governed1 their constitution is far more
 rational4 ,in ,england there has always
 been more liberty but worse            
organization1 while in other countries  
there is better organization but less   
liberty4 ,it is necessary1 then1 that1  
in addition to the national             
representation1 there should be         
municipal and provisional               
representations2 and the two questions  
which remain to be resolved are1 how the
 local representative bodies should be  
constituted1 and what should be the     

extent of their functions4  ,in         
considering these questions1 two points 
require an equal degree of our          
attention3 how the local business itself
 can be best done1 and how its          
transaction can be made most            
instrumental to the nourishment of      
public spirit and the development of    
intelligence4 ,in an earlier part of    
this inquiry ,i have dwelt in strong    
language--hardly any language is strong 
enough to express the strength of my    
conviction--on the importance of that   
portion of the operation of free        
institutions which may be called the    
public education of the citizens4 ,now  
of this operation the local             
administrative institutions are the     
chief instrument4 ,except by the part   
they may take as jurymen in the         
administration of justice1 the mass of  
the population have very little         
opportunity of sharing personally in the
 conduct of the general affairs of the  
community4 ,reading newspapers1 and     

perhaps writing to them1 public         
meetings1 and solicitations of different
 sorts addressed to the political       
authorities1 are the extent of the      
participation of private citizens in    
general politics during the interval    
between one ,parliamentary election and 
another4 ,though it is impossible to    
exaggerate the importance of these      
various liberties1 both as securities   
for freedom and as means of general     
cultivation1 the practice which they    
give is more in thinking than in action1
 and in thinking without the            
responsibilities of action1 which with  
most people amounts to little more than 
passively receiving the thoughts of some
 one else4 ,but in the case of local    
bodies1 besides the function of         
electing1 many citizens in turn have the
 chance of being elected1 and many1     
either by selection or by rotation1 fill
 one or other of the numerous local     
executive offices4 ,in these positions  
they have to act for public interests1  

as well as to think and to speak1 and   
the thinking can not all be done by     
proxy4 ,it may be added that these local
 functions1 not being in general sought 
by the higher ranks1 carry down the     
important political education which they
 are the means of conferring to a much  
lower grade in society4 ,the mental     
discipline being thus a more important  
feature in local concerns than in the   
general affairs of the state1 while     
there are not such vital interests      
dependent on the quality of the         
administration1 a greater weight may be 
given to the former consideration1 and  
the latter admits much more frequently  
of being postponed to it than in matters
 of general legislation and the conduct 
of imperial affairs4  ,the proper       
constitution of local representative    
bodies does not present much difficulty4
 ,the principles which apply to it do   
not differ in any respect from those    
applicable to the national              
representation4 ,the same obligation    

exists1 as in the case of the more      
important function1 for making the      
bodies elective2 and the same reasons   
operate as in that case1 but with still 
greater force1 for giving them a widely 
democratic basis2 the dangers being     
less1 and the advantages1 in point of   
popular education and cultivation1 in   
some respects even greater4 ,as the     
principal duty of the local bodies      
consists of the imposition and          
expenditure of local taxation1 the      
electoral franchise should vest in all  
who contribute to the local rates1 to   
the exclusion of all who do not4 ,i     
assume that there is no indirect        
taxation1 no octroi duties1 or that1 if 
there are1 they are supplementary only1 
those on whom their burden falls being  
also rated to a direct assessment4 ,the 
representation of minorities should be  
provided for in the same manner as in   
the national ,parliament1 and there are 
the same strong reasons for plurality of
 votes2 only there is not so decisive an

 objection1 in the inferior as in the   
higher body1 to making the plural voting
 depend 7as in some of the local        
elections of our own country7 on a mere 
money qualification2 for the honest and 
frugal dispensation of money forms so   
much larger a part of the business of   
the local than of the national body1    
that there is more justice as well as   
policy in allowing a greater            
proportional influence to those who have
 a larger money interest at stake4  ,in 
the most recently established of our    
local representative institutions1 the  
,boards of ,guardians1 the justices of  
peace of the district sit ex officio    
along with the elected members1 in      
number limited by law to a third of the 
whole4 ,in the peculiar constitution of 
,english society1 ,i have no doubt of   
the beneficial effect of this provision4
 ,it secures the presence in these      
bodies of a more educated class than it 
would perhaps be practicable to attract 
thither on any other terms2 and while   

the limitation in number of the ex      
officio members precludes them from     
acquiring predominance by mere numerical
 strength1 they1 as a virtual           
representation of another class1 having 
sometimes a different interest from the 
rest1 are a check upon the class        
interests of the farmers or petty       
shopkeepers who form the bulk of the    
elected guardians4 ,a similar           
commendation can not be given to the    
constitution of the only provincial     
boards we possess1 the ,quarter         
,sessions1 consisting of the justices of
 peace alone1 on whom1 over and above   
their judicial duties1 some of the most 
important parts of the administrative   
business of the country depend for their
 performance4 ,the mode of formation of 
these bodies is most anomalous1 they    
being neither elected1 nor1 in any      
proper sense of the term1 nominated1 but
 holding their important functions1 like
 the feudal lords to whom they          
succeeded1 virtually by right of their  

acres2 the appointment vested in the    
crown 7or1 speaking practically1 in one 
of themselves1 the lord lieutenant7     
being made use of only as a means of    
excluding any one who it is thought     
would do discredit to the body1 or1 now 
and then1 one who is on the wrong side  
in politics4 ,the institution is the    
most aristocratic in principle which now
 remains in ,england2 far more so than  
the ,house of ,lords1 for it grants     
public money and disposes of important  
public interests1 not in conjunction    
with a popular assembly1 but alone4 ,it 
is clung to with proportionate tenacity 
by our aristocratic classes1 but is     
obviously at variance with all the      
principles which are the foundation of  
representative government4 ,in a ,county
 ,board there is not the same           
justification as in ,boards of          
,guardians for even an admixture of ex  
officio with elected members1 since the 
business of a county being on a         
sufficiently large scale to be an object

 of interest and attraction to country  
gentlemen1 they would have no more      
difficulty in getting themselves elected
 to the ,board than they have in being  
returned to ,parliament as county       
members4  ,in regard to the proper      
circumscription of the constituencies   
which elect the local representative    
bodies1 the principle which1 when       
applied as an exclusive and unbending   
rule to ,parliamentary representation1  
is inappropriate1 namely community of   
local interests1 is here the only just  
and applicable one4 ,the very object of 
having a local representation is in     
order that those who have any interest  
in common which they do not share with  
the general body of their countrymen may
 manage that joint interest by          
themselves1 and the purpose is          
contradicted if the distribution of the 
local representation follows any other  
rule than the grouping of those joint   
interests4 ,there are local interests   
peculiar to every town1 whether great or

 small1 and common to all its           
inhabitants2 every town1 therefore1     
without distinction of size1 ought to   
have its municipal council4 ,it is      
equally obvious that every town ought to
 have but one4 ,the different quarters  
of the same town have seldom or never   
any material diversities of local       
interest2 they all require to have the  
same things done1 the same expenses     
incurred2 and1 except as to their       
churches1 which it is probably desirable
 to leave under simply parochial        
management1 the same arrangements may be
 made to serve for all4 ,paving1        
lighting1 water supply1 drainage1 port  
and market regulations1 can not1 without
 great waste and inconvenience1 be      
different for different quarters of the 
same town4 ,the subdivision of ,london  
into six or seven independent districts1
 each with its separate arrangements for
 local business 7several of them without
 unity of administration even within    
themselves71 prevents the possibility of

 consecutive or well-regulated          
co-operation for common objects1        
precludes any uniform principle for the 
discharge of local duties1 compels the  
general government to take things upon  
itself which would be best left to local
 authorities if there were any whose    
authority extended to the entire        
metropolis1 and answers no purpose but  
to keep up the fantastical trappings of 
that union of modern jobbing and        
antiquated foppery1 the ,corporation of 
the ,city of ,london4  ,another equally 
important principle is1 that in each    
local circumscription there should be   
but one elective body for all local     
business1 not different bodies for      
different parts of it4 ,division of     
labor does not mean cutting up every    
business into minute fractions2 it means
 the union of such operations as are fit
 to be performed by the same persons1   
and the separation of such as can be    
better performed by different persons4  
,the executive duties of the locality do

 indeed require to be divided into      
departments for the same reason as those
 of the state--because they are of      
divers kinds1 each requiring knowledge  
peculiar to itself1 and needing1 for its
 due performance1 the undivided         
attention of a specially qualified      
functionary4 ,but the reasons for       
subdivision which apply to the execution
 do not apply to the control4 ,the      
business of the elective body is not to 
do the work1 but to see that it is      
properly done1 and that nothing         
necessary is left undone4 ,this function
 can be fulfilled for all departments by
 the same superintending body1 and by a 
collective and comprehensive far better 
than by a minute and microscopic view4  
,it is as absurd in public affairs as it
 would be in private1 that every workman
 should be looked after by a            
superintendent to himself4 ,the         
government of the crown consists of many
 departments1 and there are many        
ministers to conduct them1 but those    

ministers have not a ,parliament apiece 
to keep them to their duty4 ,the local1 
like the national ,parliament1 has for  
its proper business to consider the     
interest of the locality as a whole1    
composed of parts all of which must be  
adapted to one another1 and attended to 
in the order and ratio of their         
importance4 ,there is another very      
weighty reason for uniting the control  
of all the business of a locality under 
one body4 ,the greatest imperfection of 
popular local institutions1 and the     
chief cause of the failure which so     
often attends them1 is the low calibre  
of the men by whom they are almost      
always carried on4 ,that these should be
 of a very miscellaneous character is1  
indeed1 part of the usefulness of the   
institution2 it is that circumstance    
chiefly which renders it a school of    
political capacity and general          
intelligence4 ,but a school supposes    
teachers as well as scholars3 the       
utility of the instruction greatly      

depends on its bringing inferior minds  
into contact with superior1 a contact   
which in the ordinary course of life is 
altogether exceptional1 and the want of 
which contributes more than any thing   
else to keep the generality of mankind  
on one level of contented ignorance4    
,the school1 moreover1 is worthless1 and
 a school of evil instead of good1 if1  
through the want of due surveillance1   
and of the presence within itself of a  
higher order of characters1 the action  
of the body is allowed1 as it so often  
is1 to degenerate into an equally       
unscrupulous and stupid pursuit of the  
self-interest of its members4 ,now it is
 quite hopeless to induce persons of a  
high class1 either socially or          
intellectually1 to take a share of local
 administration in a corner by          
piecemeal1 as members of a ,paving      
,board or a ,drainage ,commission4 ,the 
entire local business of their town is  
not more than a sufficient object to    
induce men whose tastes incline them1   

and whose knowledge qualifies them for  
national affairs1 to become members of a
 mere local body1 and devote to it the  
time and study which are necessary to   
render their presence any thing more    
than a screen for the jobbing of        
inferior persons1 under the shelter of  
their responsibility4 ,a mere ,board of 
,works1 though it comprehend the entire 
metropolis1 is sure to be composed of   
the same class of persons as the        
vestries of the ,london parishes2 nor is
 it practicable1 or even desirable1 that
 such should not form the majority2 but 
it is important for every purpose which 
local bodies are designed to serve1     
whether it be the enlightened and honest
 performance of their special duties1 or
 the cultivation of the political       
intelligence of the nation1 that every  
such body should contain a portion of   
the very best minds of the locality1 who
 are thus brought into perpetual        
contact1 of the most useful kind1 with  
minds of a lower grade1 receiving from  

them what local or professional         
knowledge they have to give1 and1 in    
return1 inspiring them with a portion of
 their own more enlarged ideas1 and     
higher and more enlightened purposes4   
,a mere village has no claim to a       
municipal representation4 ,by a village 
,i mean a place whose inhabitants are   
not markedly distinguished by occupation
 or social relations from those of the  
rural districts adjoining1 and for whose
 local wants the arrangements made for  
the surrounding territory will suffice4 
,such small places have rarely a        
sufficient public to furnish a tolerable
 municipal council3 if they contain any 
talent or knowledge applicable to public
 business1 it is apt to be all          
concentrated in some one man1 who       
thereby becomes the dominator of the    
place4 ,it is better that such places   
should be merged in a larger            
circumscription4 ,the local             
representation of rural districts will  
naturally be determined by geographical 

considerations1 with due regard to those
 sympathies of feeling by which human   
beings are so much aided to act in      
concert1 and which partly follow        
historical boundaries1 such as those of 
counties or provinces1 and partly       
community of interest and occupation1 as
 in agriculture1 maritime1              
manufacturing1 or mining districts4     
,different kinds of local business      
require different areas of              
representation4 ,the ,unions of parishes
 have been fixed on as the most         
appropriate basis for the representative
 bodies which superintend the relief of 
indigence2 while1 for the proper        
regulation of highways1 or prisons1 or  
police1 a large extent1 like that of an 
average county1 is not more than        
sufficient4 ,in these large districts1  
therefore1 the maxim1 that an elective  
body constituted in any locality should 
have authority over all the local       
concerns common to the locality1        
requires modification from another      

principle1 as well as from the competing
 consideration of the importance of     
obtaining for the discharge of the local
 duties the highest qualifications      
possible4 ,for example1 if it be        
necessary 7as ,i believe it to be7 for  
the proper administration of the        
poor-laws that the area of rating should
 not be more extensive than most of the 
present ,unions1 a principle which      
requires a ,board of ,guardians for each
 ,union1 yet1 as a much more highly     
qualified class of persons is likely to 
be obtainable for a ,county ,board than 
those who compose an average ,board of  
,guardians1 it may1 on that ground1 be  
expedient to reserve for the ,county    
,boards some higher descriptions of     
local business1 which might otherwise   
have been conveniently managed within   
itself by each separate ,union4         
,besides the controlling council or     
local sub-,parliament1 local business   
has its executive department4 ,with     
respect to this1 the same questions     

arise as with respect to the executive  
authorities in the state1 and they may1 
for the most part1 be answered in the   
same manner4 ,the principles applicable 
to all public trusts are in substance   
the same4 ,in the first place1 each     
executive officer should be single1 and 
singly responsible for the whole of the 
duty committed to his charge4 ,in the   
next place1 he should be nominated1 not 
elected4 ,it is ridiculous that a       
surveyor1 or a health officer1 or even a
 collector of rates should be appointed 
by popular suffrage4 ,the popular choice
 usually depends on interest with a few 
local leaders1 who1 as they are not     
supposed to make the appointment1 are   
not responsible for it2 or on an appeal 
to sympathy1 founded on having twelve   
children1 and having been a rate-payer  
in the parish for thirty years4 ,if1 in 
cases of this description1 election by  
the population is a farce1 appointment  
by the local representative body is     
little less objectionable4 ,such bodies 

have a perpetual tendency to become     
joint-stock associations for carrying   
into effect the private jobs of their   
various members4 ,appointments should be
 made on the individual responsibility  
of the chairman of the body1 let him be 
called mayor1 chairman of ,quarter      
,sessions1 or by whatever other title4  
,he occupies in the locality a position 
analogous to that of the prime minister 
in the state1 and under a well organized
 system the appointment and watching of 
the local officers would be the most    
important part of his duty2 he himself  
being appointed by the council from its 
own number1 subject either to annual    
re-election1 or to removal by a vote of 
the body4  ,from the constitution of the
 local bodies1 ,i now pass to the       
equally important and more difficult    
subject of their proper attributions4   
,this question divides itself into two  
parts3 what should be their duties1 and 
whether they should have full authority 
within the sphere of those duties1 or   

should be liable to any1 and what1      
interference on the part of the central 
government4  ,it is obvious1 to begin   
with1 that all business purely          
local--all which concerns only a single 
locality--should devolve upon the local 
authorities4 ,the paving1 lighting1 and 
cleansing of the streets of a town1 and1
 in ordinary circumstances1 the draining
 of its houses1 are of little           
consequence to any but its inhabitants4 
,the nation at large is interested in   
them in no other way than that in which 
it is interested in the private         
well-being of all its individual        
citizens4 ,but among the duties classed 
as local1 or performed by local         
functionaries1 there are many which     
might with equal propriety be termed    
national1 being the share belonging to  
the locality of some branch of the      
public administration in the efficiency 
of which the whole nation is alike      
interested3 the jails1 for instance1    
most of which in this country are under 

county management2 the local police2 the
 local administration of justice1 much  
of which1 especially in corporate towns1
 is performed by officers elected by the
 locality1 and paid from local funds4   
,none of these can be said to be matters
 of local1 as distinguished from        
national importance4 ,it would not be a 
matter personally indifferent to the    
rest of the country if any part of it   
became a nest of robbers or a focus of  
demoralization1 owing to the            
maladministration of its police2 or if1 
through the bad regulations of its jail1
 the punishment which the courts of     
justice intended to inflict on the      
criminals confined therein 7who might   
have come from1 or committed their      
offenses in1 any other district7 might  
be doubled in intensity or lowered to   
practical impunity4 ,the points1        
moreover1 which constitute good         
management of these things are the same 
every where2 there is no good reason why
 police1 or jails1 or the administration

 of justice should be differently       
managed in one part of the kingdom and  
in another1 while there is great peril  
that in things so important1 and to     
which the most instructed minds         
available to the state are not more than
 adequate1 the lower average of         
capacities which alone can be counted on
 for the service of the localities might
 commit errors of such magnitude as to  
be a serious blot upon the general      
administration of the country4 ,security
 of person and property1 and equal      
justice between individuals1 are the    
first needs of society and the primary  
ends of government3 if these things can 
be left to any responsibility below the 
highest1 there is nothing except war and
 treaties which requires a general      
government at all4 ,whatever are the    
best arrangements for securing these    
primary objects should be made          
universally obligatory1 and1 to secure  
their enforcement1 should be placed     
under central superintendence4 ,it is   

often useful1 and with the institutions 
of our own country even necessary1 from 
the scarcity1 in the localities1 of     
officers representing the general       
government1 that the execution of duties
 imposed by the central authority should
 be intrusted to functionaries appointed
 for local purposes by the locality4    
,but experience is daily forcing upon   
the public a conviction of the necessity
 of having at least inspectors appointed
 by the general government to see that  
the local officers do their duty4 ,if   
prisons are under local management1 the 
central government appoints inspectors  
of prisons1 to take care that the rules 
laid down by ,parliament are observed1  
and to suggest others if the state of   
the jails shows them to be requisite1 as
 there are inspectors of factories and  
inspectors of schools1 to watch over the
 observance of the ,acts of ,parliament 
relating to the first1 and the          
fulfillment of the conditions on which  
state assistance is granted to the      

latter4  ,but if the administration of  
justice1 police and jails included1 is  
both so universal a concern1 and so much
 a matter of general science1           
independent of local peculiarities1 that
 it may be1 and ought to be1 uniformly  
regulated throughout the country1 and   
its regulation enforced by more trained 
and skillful hands than those of purely 
local authorities1 there is also        
business1 such as the administration of 
the poor-laws1 sanitary regulation1 and 
others1 which1 while really interesting 
to the whole country1 can not1          
consistently with the very purposes of  
local administration1 be managed        
otherwise than by the localities4 ,in   
regard to such duties1 the question     
arises how far the local authorities    
ought to be trusted with discretionary  
power1 free from any superintendence or 
control of the state4  ,to decide this  
question1 it is essential to consider   
what is the comparative position of the 
central and the local authorities as    

capacity for the work1 and security     
against negligence or abuse4 ,in the    
first place1 the local representative   
bodies and their officers are almost    
certain to be of a much lower grade of  
intelligence and knowledge than         
,parliament and the national executive4 
,secondly1 besides being themselves of  
inferior qualifications1 they are       
watched by1 and accountable to an       
inferior public opinion4 ,the public    
under whose eyes they act1 and by whom  
they are criticized1 is both more       
limited in extent and generally far less
 enlightened than that which surrounds  
and admonishes the highest authorities  
at the capital1 while the comparative   
smallness of the interests involved     
causes even that inferior public to     
direct its thoughts to the subject less 
intently and with less solicitude4 ,far 
less interference is exercised by the   
press and by public discussion1 and that
 which is exercised may with much more  
impunity be disregarded in the          

proceedings of local than in those of   
national authorities4 ,thus far1 the    
advantage seems wholly on the side of   
management by the central government2   
but1 when we look more closely1 these   
motives of preference are found to be   
balanced by others fully as substantial4
 ,if the local authorities and public   
are inferior to the central ones in     
knowledge of the principles of          
administration1 they have the           
compensatory advantage of a far more    
direct interest in the result4 ,a man's 
neighbors or his landlord may be much   
cleverer than himself1 and not without  
an indirect interest in his prosperity1 
but1 for all that1 his interests will be
 better attended to in his own keeping  
than in theirs4 ,it is further to be    
remembered that1 even supposing the     
central government to administer through
 its own officers1 its officers do not  
act at the centre1 but in the locality2 
and however inferior the local public   
may be to the central1 it is the local  

public alone which has any opportunity  
of watching them1 and it is the local   
opinion alone which either acts directly
 upon their own conduct1 or calls the   
attention of the government to the      
points in which they may require        
correction4 ,it is but in extreme cases 
that the general opinion of the country 
is brought to bear at all upon details  
of local administration1 and still more 
rarely has it the means of deciding upon
 them with any just appreciation of the 
case4 ,now the local opinion necessarily
 acts far more forcibly upon purely     
local administrators4 ,they1 in the     
natural course of things1 are permanent 
residents1 not expecting to be withdrawn
 from the place when they cease to      
exercise authority in it2 and their     
authority itself depends1 by            
supposition1 on the will of the local   
public4 ,i need not dwell on the        
deficiencies of the central authority in
 detailed knowledge of local persons and
 things1 and the too great engrossment  

of its time and thoughts by other       
concerns to admit of its acquiring the  
quantity and quality of local knowledge 
necessary even for deciding on          
complaints1 and enforcing responsibility
 from so great a number of local agents4
 ,in the details of management1         
therefore1 the local bodies will        
generally have the advantage1 but in    
comprehension of the principles even of 
purely local management1 the superiority
 of the central government1 when rightly
 constituted1 ought to be prodigious1   
not only by reason of the probably great
 personal superiority of the individuals
 composing it1 and the multitude of     
thinkers and writers who are at all     
times engaged in pressing useful ideas  
upon their notice1 but also because the 
knowledge and experience of any local   
authority is but local knowledge and    
experience1 confined to their own part  
of the country and its modes of         
management1 whereas the central         
government has the means of knowing all 

that is to be learned from the united   
experience of the whole kingdom1 with   
the addition of easy access to that of  
foreign countries4  ,the practical      
conclusion from these premises is not   
difficult to draw4 ,the authority which 
is most conversant with principles      
should be supreme over principles1 while
 that which is most competent in details
 should have the details left to it4    
,the principal business of the central  
authority should be to give instruction1
 of the local authority to apply it4    
,power may be localized1 but knowledge1 
to be most useful1 must be centralized2 
there must be somewhere a focus at which
 all its scattered rays are collected1  
that the broken and colored lights which
 exist elsewhere may find there what is 
necessary to complete and purify them4  
,to every branch of local administration
 which affects the general interest     
there should be a corresponding central 
organ1 either a minister1 or some       
specially appointed functionary under   

him1 even if that functionary does no   
more than collect information from all  
quarters1 and bring the experience      
acquired in one locality to the         
knowledge of another where it is wanted4
 ,but there is also something more than 
this for the central authority to do4   
,it ought to keep open a perpetual      
communication with the                  
localities--informing itself by their   
experience1 and them by its own2 giving 
advice freely when asked1 volunteering  
it when seen to be required2 compelling 
publicity and recordation of            
proceedings1 and enforcing obedience to 
every general law which the ,legislature
 has laid down on the subject of local  
management4 ,that some such laws ought  
to be laid down few are likely to deny4 
,the localities may be allowed to       
mismanage their own interests1 but not  
to prejudice those of others1 nor       
violate those principles of justice     
between one person and another of which 
it is the duty of the state to maintain 

the rigid observance4 ,if the local     
majority attempts to oppress the        
minority1 or one class another1 the     
state is bound to interpose4 ,for       
example1 all local rates ought to be    
voted exclusively by the local          
representative body2 but that body1     
though elected solely by rate-payers1   
may raise its revenues by imposts of    
such a kind1 or assess them in such a   
manner1 as to throw an unjust share of  
the burden on the poor1 the rich1 or    
some particular class of the population3
 it is the duty1 therefore1 of the      
,legislature1 while leaving the mere    
amount of the local taxes to the        
discretion of the local body1 to lay    
down authoritatively the mode of        
taxation and rules of assessment which  
alone the localities shall be permitted 
to use4 ,again1 in the administration of
 public charity1 the industry and       
morality of the whole laboring          
population depends1 to a most serious   
extent1 upon adherence to certain fixed 

principles in awarding relief4 ,though  
it belongs essentially to the local     
functionaries to determine who1         
according to those principles1 is       
entitled to be relieved1 the national   
,parliament is the proper authority to  
prescribe the principles themselves2 and
 it would neglect a most important part 
of its duty if it did not1 in a matter  
of such grave national concern1 lay down
 imperative rules1 and make effectual   
provision that those rules should not be
 departed from4 ,what power of actual   
interference with the local             
administrators it may be necessary to   
retain1 for the due enforcement of the  
laws1 is a question of detail into which
 it would be useless to enter4 ,the laws
 themselves will naturally define the   
penalties1 and fix the mode of their    
enforcement4 ,it may be requisite1 to   
meet extreme cases1 that the power of   
the central authority should extend to  
dissolving the local representative     
council or dismissing the local         

executive1 but not to making new        
appointments or suspending the local    
institutions4 ,where ,parliament has not
 interfered1 neither ought any branch of
 the executive to interfere with        
authority2 but as an adviser and critic1
 an enforcer of the laws1 and a         
denouncer to ,parliament or the local   
constituencies of conduct which it deems
 condemnable1 the functions of the      
executive are of the greatest possible  
value4  ,some may think that1 however   
much the central authority surpasses the
 local in knowledge of the principles of
 administration1 the great object which 
has been so much insisted on1 the social
 and political education of the         
citizens1 requires that they should be  
left to manage these matters by their   
own1 however imperfect lights4 ,to this 
it might be answered that the education 
of the citizens is not the only thing to
 be considered2 government and          
administration do not exist for that    
alone1 great as its importance is4 ,but 

the objection shows a very imperfect    
understanding of the function of popular
 institutions as a means of political   
instruction4 ,it is but a poor education
 that associates ignorance with         
ignorance1 and leaves them1 if they care
 for knowledge1 to grope their way to it
 without help1 and to do without it if  
they do not4 ,what is wanted is the     
means of making ignorance aware of      
itself1 and able to profit by knowledge2
 accustoming minds which know only      
routine to act upon1 and feel the value 
of principles2 teaching them to compare 
different modes of action1 and learn1 by
 the use of their reason1 to distinguish
 the best4 ,when we desire to have a    
good school1 we do not eliminate the    
teacher4 ,the old remark1 ,as the       
schoolmaster is1 so will be the school1 
is as true of the indirect schooling of 
grown people by public business as of   
the schooling of youth in academies and 
colleges4 ,a government which attempts  
to do every thing is aptly compared by  

,m4 ,charles de ,rmusat to a            
schoolmaster who does all the pupils'   
tasks for them2 he may be very popular  
with the pupils1 but he will teach them 
little4 ,a government1 on the other     
hand1 which neither does any thing      
itself that can possibly be done by any 
one else1 nor shows any one else how to 
do any thing1 is like a school in which 
there is no schoolmaster1 but only      
pupil-teachers who have never themselves
 been taught4    ,chapter ,,xvi--,of    
,nationality1 as connected with         
,representative ,government4   ,a       
portion of mankind may be said to       
constitute a nationality if they are    
united among themselves by common       
sympathies which do not exist between   
them and any others--which make them    
co-operate with each other more         
willingly than with other people1 desire
 to be under the same government1 and   
desire that it should be government by  
themselves1 or a portion of themselves1 
exclusively4 ,this feeling of           

nationality may have been generated by  
various causes4 ,sometimes it is the    
effect of identity of race and descent4 
,community of language and community of 
religion greatly contribute to it4      
,geographical limits are one of its     
causes4 ,but the strongest of all is    
identity of political antecedents2 the  
possession of a national history1 and   
consequent community of recollections2  
collective pride and humiliation1       
pleasure and regret1 connected with the 
same incidents in the past4 ,none of    
these circumstances1 however1 are either
 indispensable or necessarily sufficient
 by themselves4 ,switzerland has a      
strong sentiment of nationality1 though 
the cantons are of different races1     
different languages1 and different      
religions4 ,sicily has hitherto felt    
itself quite distinct in nationality    
from ,naples1 notwithstanding identity  
of religion1 almost identity of         
language1 and a considerable amount of  
common historical antecedents4 ,the     

,flemish and the ,walloon provinces of  
,belgium1 notwithstanding diversity of  
race and language1 have a much greater  
feeling of common nationality than the  
former have with ,holland1 or the latter
 with ,france4 ,yet in general the      
national feeling is proportionally      
weakened by the failure of any of the   
causes which contribute to it4 ,identity
 of language1 literature1 and1 to some  
extent1 of race and recollections1 have 
maintained the feeling of nationality in
 considerable strength among the        
different portions of the ,german name1 
though they have at no time been really 
united under the same government2 but   
the feeling has never reached to making 
the separate states desire to get rid of
 their autonomy4 ,among ,italians1 an   
identity far from complete of language  
and literature1 combined with a         
geographical position which separates   
them by a distinct line from other      
countries1 and1 perhaps more than every 
thing else1 the possession of a common  

name1 which makes them all glory in the 
past achievements in arts1 arms1        
politics1 religious primacy1 science1   
and literature1 of any who share the    
same designation1 give rise to an amount
 of national feeling in the population  
which1 though still imperfect1 has been 
sufficient to produce the great events  
now passing before us1 notwithstanding a
 great mixture of races1 and although   
they have never1 in either ancient or   
modern history1 been under the same     
government1 except while that government
 extended or was extending itself over  
the greater part of the known world4    
,where the sentiment of nationality     
exists in any force1 there is a prim    
facie case for uniting all the members  
of the nationality under the same       
government1 and a government to         
themselves apart4 ,this is merely saying
 that the question of government ought  
to be decided by the governed4 ,one     
hardly knows what any division of the   
human race should be free to do if not  

to determine with which of the various  
collective bodies of human beings they  
choose to associate themselves4 ,but1   
when a people are ripe for free         
institutions1 there is a still more     
vital consideration4 ,free institutions 
are next to impossible in a country made
 up of different nationalities4 ,among a
 people without fellow-feeling1         
especially if they read and speak       
different languages1 the united public  
opinion necessary to the working of     
representative government can not exist4
 ,the influences which form opinions and
 decide political acts are different in 
the different sections of the country4  
,an altogether different set of leaders 
have the confidence of one part of the  
country and of another4 ,the same books1
 newspapers1 pamphlets1 speeches1 do not
 reach them4 ,one section does not know 
what opinions or what instigations are  
circulating in another4 ,the same       
incidents1 the same acts1 the same      
system of government1 affect them in    

different ways1 and each fears more     
injury to itself from the other         
nationalities than from the common      
arbiter1 the state4 ,their mutual       
antipathies are generally much stronger 
than jealousy of the government4 ,that  
any one of them feels aggrieved by the  
policy of the common ruler is sufficient
 to determine another to support that   
policy4 ,even if all are aggrieved1 none
 feel that they can rely on the others  
for fidelity in a joint resistance2 the 
strength of none is sufficient to resist
 alone1 and each may reasonably think   
that it consults its own advantage most 
by bidding for the favor of the         
government against the rest4 ,above all1
 the grand and only reliable security in
 the last resort against the despotism  
of the government is in that case       
wanting--the sympathy of the army with  
the people4 ,the military are the part  
of every community in whom1 from the    
nature of the case1 the distinction     
between their fellow-countrymen and     

foreigners is the deepest and strongest4
 ,to the rest of the people foreigners  
are merely strangers2 to the soldier1   
they are men against whom he may be     
called1 at a week's notice1 to fight for
 life or death4 ,the difference to him  
is that between friends and enemies--we 
may almost say between fellow-men and   
another kind of animals2 for1 as        
respects the enemy1 the only law is that
 of force1 and the only mitigation the  
same as in the case of other            
animals--that of simple humanity4       
,soldiers to whose feelings half or     
three fourths of the subjects of the    
same government are foreigners will have
 no more scruple in mowing them down1   
and no more desire to ask the reason    
why1 than they would have in doing the  
same thing against declared enemies4 ,an
 army composed of various nationalities 
has no other patriotism than devotion to
 the flag4 ,such armies have been the   
executioners of liberty through the     
whole duration of modern history4 ,the  

sole bond which holds them together is  
their officers and the government which 
they serve1 and their only idea1 if they
 have any1 of public duty1 is obedience 
to orders4 ,a government thus supported1
 by keeping its ,hungarian regiments in 
,italy and its ,italian in ,hungary1 can
 long continue to rule in both places   
with the iron rod of foreign conquerors4
  ,if it be said that so broadly-marked 
a distinction between what is due to a  
fellow-countryman and what is due merely
 to a human creature is more worthy of  
savages than of civilized beings1 and   
ought1 with the utmost energy1 to be    
contended against1 no one holds that    
opinion more strongly than myself4 ,but 
this object1 one of the worthiest to    
which human endeavour can be directed1  
can never1 in the present state of      
civilization1 be promoted by keeping    
different nationalities of any thing    
like equivalent strength under the same 
government4 ,in a barbarous state of    
society the case is sometimes different4

 ,the government may then be interested 
in softening the antipathies of the     
races1 that peace may be preserved and  
the country more easily governed4 ,but  
when there are either free institutions1
 or a desire for them1 in any of the    
peoples artificially tied together1 the 
interest of the government lies in an   
exactly opposite direction4 ,it is then 
interested in keeping up and envenoming 
their antipathies1 that they may be     
prevented from coalescing1 and it may be
 enabled to use some of them as tools   
for the enslavement of others4 ,the     
,austrian court has now for a whole     
generation made these tactics its       
principal means of government1 with what
 fatal success1 at the time of the      
,vienna insurrection and the ,hungarian 
contest the world knows too well4       
,happily there are now signs that       
improvement is too far advanced to      
permit this policy to be any longer     
successful4  ,for the preceding reasons1
 it is in general a necessary condition 

of free institutions that the boundaries
 of governments should coincide in the  
main with those of nationalities4 ,but  
several considerations are liable to    
conflict in practice with this general  
principle4 ,in the first place1 its     
application is often precluded by       
geographical hindrances4 ,there are     
parts even of ,europe in which different
 nationalities are so locally           
intermingled that it is not practicable 
for them to be under separate           
governments4 ,the population of ,hungary
 is composed of ,magyars1 ,slovaks1     
,croats1 ,serbs1 ,roumans1 and in some  
districts ,germans1 so mixed up as to be
 incapable of local separation2 and     
there is no course open to them but to  
make a virtue of necessity1 and         
reconcile themselves to living together 
under equal rights and laws4 ,their     
community of servitude1 which dates only
 from the destruction of ,hungarian     
independence in #ahdi1 seems to be      
ripening and disposing them for such an 

equal union4 ,the ,german colony of     
,east ,prussia is cut off from ,germany 
by part of the ancient ,poland1 and     
being too weak to maintain separate     
independence1 must1 if geographical     
continuity is to be maintained1 be      
either under a non-,german government1  
or the intervening ,polish territory    
must be under a ,german one4 ,another   
considerable region in which the        
dominant element of the population is   
,german1 the provinces of ,courland1    
,esthonia1 and ,livonia1 is condemned by
 its local situation to form part of a  
,slavonian state4 ,in ,eastern ,germany 
itself there is a large ,slavonic       
population2 ,bohemia is principally     
,slavonic1 ,silesia and other districts 
partially so4 ,the most united country  
in ,europe1 ,france1 is far from being  
homogeneous3 independently of the       
fragments of foreign nationalities at   
its remote extremities1 it consists1 as 
language and history prove1 of two      
portions1 one occupied almost           

exclusively by a ,gallo-,roman          
population1 while in the other the      
,frankish1 ,burgundian1 and other       
,teutonic races form a considerable     
ingredient4  ,when proper allowance has 
been made for geographical exigencies1  
another more purely moral and social    
consideration offers itself4 ,experience
 proves that it is possible for one     
nationality to merge and be absorbed in 
another2 and when it was originally an  
inferior and more backward portion of   
the human race1 the absorption is       
greatly to its advantage4 ,nobody can   
suppose that it is not more beneficial  
to a ,breton1 or a ,basque of ,french   
,navarre1 to be brought into the current
 of the ideas and feelings of a highly  
civilized and cultivated people--to be a
 member of the ,french nationality1     
admitted on equal terms to all the      
privileges of ,french citizenship1      
sharing the advantages of ,french       
protection1 and the dignity and prestige
 of ,french power--than to sulk on his  

own rocks1 the half-savage relic of past
 times1 revolving in his own little     
mental orbit1 without participation or  
interest in the general movement of the 
world4 ,the same remark applies to the  
,welshman or the ,scottish ,highlander  
as members of the ,british nation4      
,whatever really tends to the admixture 
of nationalities1 and the blending of   
their attributes and peculiarities in a 
common union1 is a benefit to the human 
race4 ,not by extinguishing types1 of   
which1 in these cases1 sufficient       
examples are sure to remain1 but by     
softening their extreme forms1 and      
filling up the intervals between them4  
,the united people1 like a crossed breed
 of animals 7but in a still greater     
degree1 because the influences in       
operation are moral as well as          
physical71 inherits the special         
aptitudes and excellences of all its    
progenitors1 protected by the admixture 
from being exaggerated into the         
neighboring vices4 ,but1 to render this 

admixture possible1 there must be       
peculiar conditions4 ,the combinations  
of circumstances which occur1 and which 
effect the result1 are various4  ,the   
nationalities brought together under the
 same government may be about equal in  
numbers and strength1 or they may be    
very unequal4 ,if unequal1 the least    
numerous of the two may either be the   
superior in civilization1 or the        
inferior4 ,supposing it to be superior1 
it may either1 through that superiority1
 be able to acquire ascendancy over the 
other1 or it may be overcome by brute   
strength and reduced to subjection4     
,this last is a sheer mischief to the   
human race1 and one which civilized     
humanity with one accord should rise in 
arms to prevent4 ,the absorption of     
,greece by ,macedonia was one of the    
greatest misfortunes which ever happened
 to the world2 that of any of the       
principal countries of ,europe by       
,russia would be a similar one4  ,if the
 smaller nationality1 supposed to be the

 more advanced in improvement1 is able  
to overcome the greater1 as the         
,macedonians1 re-enforced by the        
,greeks1 did ,asia1 and the ,english    
,india1 there is often a gain to        
civilization1 but the conquerors and the
 conquered can not in this case live    
together under the same free            
institutions4 ,the absorption of the    
conquerors in the less advanced people  
would be an evil3 these must be governed
 as subjects1 and the state of things is
 either a benefit or a misfortune1      
according as the subjugated people have 
or have not reached the state in which  
it is an injury not to be under a free  
government1 and according as the        
conquerors do or do not use their       
superiority in a manner calculated to   
fit the conquered for a higher stage of 
improvement4 ,this topic will be        
particularly treated of in a subsequent 
chapter4  ,when the nationality which   
succeeds in overpowering the other is   
both the most numerous and the most     

improved1 and especially if the subdued 
nationality is small1 and has no hope of
 reasserting its independence1 then1 if 
it is governed with any tolerable       
justice1 and if the members of the more 
powerful nationality are not made odious
 by being invested with exclusive       
privileges1 the smaller nationality is  
gradually reconciled to its position1   
and becomes amalgamated with the larger4
 ,no ,bas-,breton1 nor even any         
,alsatian1 has the smallest wish at the 
present day to be separated from        
,france4 ,if all ,irishmen have not yet 
arrived at the same disposition towards 
,england1 it is partly because they are 
sufficiently numerous to be capable of  
constituting a respectable nationality  
by themselves1 but principally because1 
until of late years1 they had been so   
atrociously governed that all their best
 feelings combined with their bad ones  
in rousing bitter resentment against the
 ,saxon rule4 ,this disgrace to ,england
 and calamity to the whole empire has1  

it may be truly said1 completely ceased 
for nearly a generation4 ,no ,irishman  
is now less free than an ,anglo-,saxon1 
nor has a less share of every benefit   
either to his country or to his         
individual fortunes than if he were     
sprung from any other portion of the    
,british dominions4 ,the only remaining 
real grievance of ,ireland1 that of the 
,state ,church1 is one which half1 or   
nearly half the people of the larger    
island have in common with them4 ,there 
is now next to nothing1 except the      
memory of the past1 and the difference  
in the predominant religion1 to keep    
apart two races perhaps the most fitted 
of any two in the world to be the       
completing counterpart of one another4  
,the consciousness of being at last     
treated not only with equal justice1 but
 with equal consideration1 is making    
such rapid way in the ,irish nation as  
to be wearing off all feelings that     
could make them insensible to the       
benefits which the less numerous and    

less wealthy people must necessarily    
derive from being fellow-citizens       
instead of foreigners to those who are  
not only their nearest neighbors1 but   
the wealthiest1 and one of the freest1  
as well as most civilized and powerful  
nations of the earth4  ,the cases in    
which the greatest practical obstacles  
exist to the blending of nationalities  
are when the nationalities which have   
been bound together are nearly equal in 
numbers and in the other elements of    
power4 ,in such cases1 each1 confiding  
in its strength1 and feeling itself     
capable of maintaining an equal struggle
 with any of the others1 is unwilling to
 be merged in it2 each cultivates with  
party obstinacy its distinctive         
peculiarities2 obsolete customs1 and    
even declining languages1 are revived1  
to deepen the separation2 each deems    
itself tyrannized over if any authority 
is exercised within itself by           
functionaries of a rival race2 and      
whatever is given to one of the         

conflicting nationalities is considered 
to be taken from all the rest4 ,when    
nations thus divided are under a        
despotic government which is a stranger 
to all of them1 or which1 though sprung 
from one1 yet feeling greater interest  
in its own power than in any sympathies 
of nationality1 assigns no privilege to 
either nation1 and chooses its          
instruments indifferently from all1 in  
the course of a few generations identity
 of situation often produces harmony of 
feeling1 and the different races come to
 feel towards each other as             
fellow-countrymen1 particularly if they 
are dispersed over the same tract of    
country4 ,but if the era of aspiration  
to free government arrives before this  
fusion has been effected1 the           
opportunity has gone by for effecting   
it4 ,from that time1 if the unreconciled
 nationalities are geographically       
separate1 and especially if their local 
position is such that there is no       
natural fitness or convenience in their 

being under the same government 7as in  
the case of an ,italian province under a
 ,french or ,german yoke71 there is not 
only an obvious propriety1 but1 if      
either freedom or concord is cared for1 
a necessity for breaking the connection 
altogether4 ,there may be cases in which
 the provinces1 after separation1 might 
usefully remain united by a federal tie2
 but it generally happens that if they  
are willing to forego complete          
independence1 and become members of a   
federation1 each of them has other      
neighbors with whom it would prefer to  
connect itself1 having more sympathies  
in common1 if not also greater community
 of interest4    ,chapter ,,xvii--,of   
,federal ,representative ,governments4  
,portions of mankind who are not fitted 
or not disposed to live under the same  
internal government may often1 with     
advantage1 be federally united as to    
their relations with foreigners1 both to
 prevent wars among themselves1 and for 
the sake of more effectual protection   

against the aggression of powerful      
states4  ,to render a federation        
advisable several conditions are        
necessary4 ,the first is that there     
should be a sufficient amount of mutual 
sympathy among the populations4 ,the    
federation binds them always to fight on
 the same side2 and if they have such   
feelings toward one another1 or such    
diversity of feeling toward their       
neighbors that they would generally     
prefer to fight on opposite sides1 the  
federal tie is neither likely to be of  
long duration1 nor to be well observed  
while it subsists4 ,the sympathies      
available for the purpose are those of  
race1 language1 religion1 and1 above    
all1 of political institutions1 as      
conducing most to a feeling of identity 
of political interest4 ,when a few free 
states1 separately insufficient for     
their own defense1 are hemmed in on all 
sides by military or feudal monarchs1   
who hate and despise freedom even in a  
neighbor1 those states have no chance   

for preserving liberty and its blessings
 but by a federal union4 ,the common    
interest arising from this cause has in 
,switzerland1 for several centuries1    
been found adequate to maintain         
efficiently the federal bond1 in spite  
not only of difference of religion when 
religion was the grand source of        
irreconcilable political enmity         
throughout ,europe1 but also in spite of
 great weakness in the constitution of  
the federation itself4 ,in ,america1    
where all the conditions for the        
maintenance of union existed at the     
highest point1 with the sole drawback of
 difference of institutions in the      
single but most important article of    
slavery1 this one difference goes so far
 in alienating from each other's        
sympathies the two divisions of the     
,union as to be now actually effecting  
the disruption of a tie of so much value
 to them both4  ,a second condition of  
the stability of a federal government is
 that the separate states be not so     

powerful as to be able to rely for      
protection against foreign encroachment 
on their individual strength4 ,if they  
are1 they will be apt to think that they
 do not gain1 by union with others1 the 
equivalent of what they sacrifice in    
their own liberty of action2 and        
consequently1 whenever the policy of the
 confederation1 in things reserved to   
its cognizance1 is different from that  
which any one of its members would      
separately pursue1 the internal and     
sectional breach will1 through absence  
of sufficient anxiety to preserve the   
,union1 be in danger of going so far as 
to dissolve it4  ,a third condition1 not
 less important than the two others1 is 
that there be not a very marked         
inequality of strength among the several
 contracting states4 ,they can not1     
indeed1 be exactly equal in resources2  
in all federations there will be a      
gradation of power among the members2   
some will be more populous1 rich1 and   
civilized than others4 ,there is a wide 

difference in wealth and population     
between ,new ,york and ,rhode ,island2  
between ,berne1 and ,zug or ,glaris4    
,the essential is1 that there should not
 be any one state so much more powerful 
than the rest as to be capable of vying 
in strength with many of them combined4 
,if there be such a one1 and only one1  
it will insist on being master of the   
joint deliberations2 if there be two1   
they will be irresistible when they     
agree2 and whenever they differ1 every  
thing will be decided by a struggle for 
ascendancy between the rivals4 ,this    
cause is alone enough to reduce the     
,german ,bund to almost a nullity1      
independently of its wretched internal  
constitution4 ,it effects none of the   
real purposes of a confederation4 ,it   
has never bestowed on ,germany a uniform
 system of customs1 nor so much as a    
uniform coinage1 and has served only to 
give ,austria and ,prussia a legal right
 of pouring in their troops to assist   
the local sovereigns in keeping their   

subjects obedient to despotism1 while1  
in regard to external concerns1 the     
,bund would make all ,germany a         
dependency of ,prussia if there were no 
,austria1 and of ,austria if there were 
no ,prussia2 and1 in the mean time1 each
 petty prince has little choice but to  
be a partisan of one or the other1 or to
 intrigue with foreign governments      
against both4  ,there are two different 
modes of organizing a federal union4    
,the federal authorities may represent  
the governments solely1 and their acts  
may be obligatory only on the           
governments as such1 or they may have   
the power of enacting laws and issuing  
orders which are binding directly on    
individual citizens4 ,the former is the 
plan of the ,german so-called           
,confederation1 and of the ,swiss       
,constitution previous to #ahdg4 ,it was
 tried in ,america for a few years      
immediately following the ,war of       
,independence4 ,the other principle is  
that of the existing ,constitution of   

the ,united ,states1 and has been       
adopted within the last dozen years by  
the ,swiss ,confederacy4 ,the ,federal  
,congress of the ,american ,union is a  
substantive part of the government of   
every individual state4 ,within the     
limits of its attributions1 it makes    
laws which are obeyed by every citizen  
individually1 executes them through its 
own officers1 and enforces them by its  
own tribunals4 ,this is the only        
principle which has been found1 or which
 is ever likely to produce an effective 
federal government4 ,a union between the
 governments only is a mere alliance1   
and subject to all the contingencies    
which render alliances precarious4 ,if  
the acts of the ,president and of       
,congress were binding solely on the    
governments of ,new ,york1 ,virginia1 or
 ,pennsylvania1 and could only be       
carried into effect through orders      
issued by those governments to officers 
appointed by them1 under responsibility 
to their own courts of justice1 no      

mandates of the federal government which
 were disagreeable to a local majority  
would ever be executed4 ,requisitions   
issued to a government have no other    
sanction or means of enforcement than   
war1 and a federal army would have to be
 always in readiness to enforce the     
decrees of the federation against any   
recalcitrant state1 subject to the      
probability that other states1          
sympathizing with the recusant1 and     
perhaps sharing its sentiments on the   
particular point in dispute1 would      
withhold their contingents1 if not send 
them to fight in the ranks of the       
disobedient ,state4 ,such a federation  
is more likely to be a cause than a     
preventive of internal wars2 and if such
 was not its effect in ,switzerland     
until the events of the years           
immediately preceding #ahdg1 it was only
 because the federal government felt its
 weakness so strongly that it hardly    
ever attempted to exercise any real     
authority4 ,in ,america1 the experiment 

of a federation on this principle broke 
down in the first few years of its      
existence1 happily while the men of     
enlarged knowledge and acquired         
ascendancy who founded the independence 
of the ,republic were still alive to    
guide it through the difficult          
transition4 ,the ,federalist1 a         
collection of papers by three of these  
eminent men1 written in explanation and 
defense of the new federal ,constitution
 while still awaiting the national      
acceptance1 is even now the most        
instructive treatise we possess on      
federal government4 ,in ,germany1 the   
more imperfect kind of federation1 as   
all know1 has not even answered the     
purpose of maintaining an alliance4 ,it 
has never1 in any ,european war1        
prevented single members of the         
confederation from allying themselves   
with foreign powers against the rest4   
,yet this is the only federation which  
seems possible among monarchical states4
 ,a king1 who holds his power by        

inheritance1 not by delegation1 and who 
can not be deprived of it1 nor made     
responsible to any one for its use1 is  
not likely to renounce having a separate
 army1 or to brook the exercise of      
sovereign authority over his own        
subjects1 not through him1 but directly 
by another power4 ,to enable two or more
 countries under kingly government to be
 joined together in an effectual        
confederation1 it seems necessary that  
they should all be under the same king4 
,england and ,scotland were a federation
 of this description during the interval
 of about a century between the union of
 the crowns and that of the             
,parliaments4 ,even this was effective1 
not through federal institutions1 for   
none existed1 but because the regal     
power in both ,constitutions was so     
nearly absolute as to enable the foreign
 policy of both to be shaped according  
to a single will4  ,under the more      
perfect mode of federation1 where every 
citizen of each particular state owes   

obedience to two governments1 that of   
his own state and that of the           
federation1 it is evidently necessary   
not only that the constitutional limits 
of the authority of each should be      
precisely and clearly defined1 but that 
the power to decide between them in any 
case of dispute should not reside in    
either of the governments1 or in any    
functionary subject to it1 but in an    
umpire independent of both4 ,there must 
be a ,supreme ,court of ,justice1 and a 
system of subordinate courts in every   
state of the ,union1 before whom such   
questions shall be carried1 and whose   
judgment on them1 in the last stage of  
appeal1 shall be final4 ,every state of 
the ,union1 and the federal government  
itself1 as well as every functionary of 
each1 must be liable to be sued in those
 courts for exceeding their powers1 or  
for non-performance of their federal    
duties1 and must in general be obliged  
to employ those courts as the instrument
 for enforcing their federal rights4    

,this involves the remarkable           
consequence1 actually realized in the   
,united ,states1 that a court of        
justice1 the highest federal tribunal1  
is supreme over the various governments1
 both state and federal1 having the     
right to declare that any law made1 or  
act done by them1 exceeds the powers    
assigned to them by the federal         
,constitution1 and1 in consequence1 has 
no legal validity4 ,it was natural to   
feel strong doubts1 before trial had    
been made1 how such a provision would   
work2 whether the tribunal would have   
the courage to exercise its             
constitutional power2 if it did1 whether
 it would exercise it wisely1 and       
whether the governments would consent to
 submit peaceably to its decision4 ,the 
discussions on the ,american            
,constitution1 before its final         
adoption1 give evidence that these      
natural apprehensions were strongly     
felt2 but they are now entirely quieted1
 since1 during the two generations and  

more which have subsequently elapsed1   
nothing has occurred to verify them1    
though there have at times been disputes
 of considerable acrimony1 and which    
became the badges of parties1 respecting
 the limits of the authority of the     
federal and state governments4 ,the     
eminently beneficial working of so      
singular a provision is probably1 as ,m4
 de ,tocqueville remarks1 in a great    
measure attributable to the peculiarity 
inherent in a court of justice acting as
 such--namely1 that it does not declare 
the law eo nomine and in the abstract1  
but waits until a case between man and  
man is brought before it judicially1    
involving the point in dispute2 from    
which arises the happy effect that its  
declarations are not made in a very     
early stage of the controversy2 that    
much popular discussion usually precedes
 them2 that the ,court decides after    
hearing the point fully argued on both  
sides by lawyers of reputation2 decides 
only as much of the question at a time  

as is required by the case before it1   
and its decision1 instead of being      
volunteered for political purposes1 is  
drawn from it by the duty which it can  
not refuse to fulfil1 of dispensing     
justice impartially between adverse     
litigants4 ,even these grounds of       
confidence would not have sufficed to   
produce the respectful submission with  
which all authorities have yielded to   
the decisions of the ,supreme ,court on 
the interpretation of the ,constitution1
 were it not that complete reliance has 
been felt1 not only on the intellectual 
pre-eminence of the judges composing    
that exalted tribunal1 but on their     
entire superiority over either private  
or sectional partialities4 ,this        
reliance has been in the main justified2
 but there is nothing which more vitally
 imports the ,american people than to   
guard with the most watchful solicitude 
against every thing which has the       
remotest tendency to produce            
deterioration in the quality of this    

great national institution4 ,the        
confidence on which depends the         
stability of federal institutions has   
been for the first time impaired by the 
judgment declaring slavery to be of     
common right1 and consequently lawful in
 the ,territories while not yet         
constituted as states1 even against the 
will of a majority of their inhabitants4
 ,the main pillar of the ,american      
,constitution is scarcely strong enough 
to bear many more such shocks4  ,the    
tribunals which act as umpires between  
the federal and the state governments   
naturally also decide all disputes      
between two states1 or between a citizen
 of one state and the government of     
another4 ,the usual remedies between    
nations1 war and diplomacy1 being       
precluded by the federal union1 it is   
necessary that a judicial remedy should 
supply their place4 ,the ,supreme ,court
 of the federation dispenses            
international law1 and is the first     
great example of what is now one of the 

most prominent wants of civilized       
society1 a real international tribunal4 
,the powers of a federal government     
naturally extend not only to peace and  
war1 and all questions which arise      
between the country and foreign         
governments1 but to making any other    
arrangements which are1 in the opinion  
of the states1 necessary to their       
enjoyment of the full benefits of union4
 ,for example1 it is a great advantage  
to them that their mutual commerce      
should be free1 without the impediment  
of frontier duties and custom-houses4   
,but this internal freedom can not exist
 if each state has the power of fixing  
the duties on interchange of commodities
 between itself and foreign countries1  
since every foreign product let in by   
one state would be let into all the     
rest2 and hence all custom duties and   
trade regulations in the ,united ,states
 are made or repealed by the federal    
government exclusively4 ,again1 it is a 
great convenience to the states to have 

but one coinage1 and but one system of  
weights and measures1 which can only be 
insured if the regulation of these      
matters is intrusted to the federal     
government4 ,the certainty and celerity 
of post-office communication is impeded1
 and its expense increased1 if a letter 
has to pass through half a dozen sets of
 public offices1 subject to different   
supreme authorities3 it is convenient1  
therefore1 that all post-offices should 
be under the federal government2 but on 
such questions the feelings of different
 communities are liable to be different4
 ,one of the ,american states1 under the
 guidance of a man who has displayed    
powers as a speculative political       
thinker superior to any who has appeared
 in ,american politics since the authors
 of the ,federalist1 #aj claimed a veto 
for each state on the custom laws of the
 federal ,congress2 and that statesman1 
in a posthumous work of great ability1  
which has been printed and widely       
circulated by the ,legislature of ,south

 ,carolina1 vindicated this pretension  
on the general principle of limiting the
 tyranny of the majority1 and protecting
 minorities by admitting them to a      
substantial participation in political  
power4 ,one of the most disputed topics 
in ,american politics during the early  
part of this century was whether the    
power of the federal government ought to
 extend1 and whether by the             
,constitution it did extend1 to making  
roads and canals at the cost of the     
,union4 ,it is only in transactions with
 foreign powers that the authority of   
the federal government is of necessity  
complete4 ,on every other subject the   
question depends on how closely the     
people in general wish to draw the      
federal tie2 what portion of their local
 freedom of action they are willing to  
surrender1 in order to enjoy more fully 
the benefit of being one nation4        
,respecting the fitting constitution of 
a federal government within itself1 much
 need not be said4 ,it of course        

consists of a legislative branch and an 
executive1 and the constitution of each 
is amenable to the same principles as   
that of representative governments      
generally4 ,as regards the mode of      
adapting these general principles to a  
federal government1 the provision of the
 ,american ,constitution seems          
exceedingly judicious1 that ,congress   
should consist of two houses1 and that  
while one of them is constituted        
according to population1 each state     
being entitled to representatives in the
 ratio of the number of its inhabitants1
 the other should represent not the     
citizens1 but the state governments1 and
 every state1 whether large or small1   
should be represented in it by the same 
number of members4 ,this provision      
precludes any undue power from being    
exercised by the more powerful states   
over the rest1 and guarantees the       
reserved rights of the state governments
 by making it impossible1 as far as the 
mode of representation can prevent1 that

 any measure should pass ,congress      
unless approved not only by a majority  
of the citizens1 but by a majority of   
the states4 ,i have before adverted to  
the further incidental advantage        
obtained of raising the standard of     
qualifications in one of the houses4    
,being nominated by select bodies1 the  
,legislatures of the various states1    
whose choice1 for reasons already       
indicated1 is more likely to fall on    
eminent men than any popular            
election--who have not only the power of
 electing such1 but a strong motive to  
do so1 because the influence of their   
state in the general deliberations must 
be materially affected by the personal  
weight and abilities of its             
representatives--the ,senate of the     
,united ,states1 thus chosen1 has always
 contained nearly all the political men 
of established and high reputation in   
the ,union2 while the ,lower ,house of  
,congress has1 in the opinion of        
competent observers1 been generally as  

remarkable for the absence of           
conspicuous personal merit1 as the      
,upper ,house for its presence4  ,when  
the conditions exist for the formation  
of efficient and durable federal unions1
 the multiplication of them is always a 
benefit to the world4 ,it has the same  
salutary effect as any other extension  
of the practice of co-operation1 through
 which the weak1 by uniting1 can meet on
 equal terms with the strong4 ,by       
diminishing the number of those petty   
states which are not equal to their own 
defense1 it weakens the temptations to  
an aggressive policy1 whether working   
directly by arms1 or through the        
prestige of superior power4 ,it of      
course puts an end to war and diplomatic
 quarrels1 and usually also to          
restrictions on commerce1 between the   
states composing the ,union2 while1 in  
reference to neighboring nations1 the   
increased military strength conferred by
 it is of a kind to be almost           
exclusively available for defensive1    

scarcely at all for aggressive purposes4
 ,a federal government has not a        
sufficiently concentrated authority to  
conduct with much efficiency any war but
 one of self-defense1 in which it can   
rely on the voluntary co-operation of   
every citizen2 nor is there any thing   
very flattering to national vanity or   
ambition in acquiring1 by a successful  
war1 not subjects1 nor even             
fellow-citizens1 but only new1 and      
perhaps troublesome independent members 
of the confederation4 ,the warlike      
proceedings of the ,americans in ,mexico
 was purely exceptional1 having been    
carried on principally by volunteers1   
under the influence of the migratory    
propensity which prompts individual     
,americans to possess themselves of     
unoccupied land1 and stimulated1 if by  
any public motive1 not by that of       
national aggrandizement1 but by the     
purely sectional purpose of extending   
slavery4 ,there are few signs in the    
proceedings of ,americans1 nationally or

 individually1 that the desire of       
territorial acquisition for their       
country as such has any considerable    
power over them4 ,their hankering after 
,cuba is1 in the same manner1 merely    
sectional1 and the ,northern ,states1   
those opposed to slavery1 have never in 
any way favored it4  ,the question may  
present itself 7as in ,italy at its     
present uprising7 whether a country     
which is determined to be united should 
form a complete or a merely federal     
union4 ,the point is sometimes          
necessarily decided by the mere         
territorial magnitude of the united     
whole4 ,there is a limit to the extent  
of country which can advantageously be  
governed1 or even whose government can  
be conveniently superintended from a    
single centre4 ,there are vast countries
 so governed2 but they1 or at least     
their distant provinces1 are in general 
deplorably ill administered1 and it is  
only when the inhabitants are almost    
savages that they could not manage their

 affairs better separately4 ,this       
obstacle does not exist in the case of  
,italy1 the size of which does not come 
up to that of several very efficiently  
governed single states in past and      
present times4 ,the question then is1   
whether the different parts of the      
nation require to be governed in a way  
so essentially different that it is not 
probable the same ,legislature1 and the 
same ministry or administrative body1   
will give satisfaction to them all4     
,unless this be the case1 which is a    
question of fact1 it is better for them 
to be completely united4 ,that a totally
 different system of laws and very      
different administrative institutions   
may exist in two portions of a country  
without being any obstacle to           
legislative unity1 is proved by the case
 of ,england and ,scotland4 ,perhaps1   
however1 this undisturbed coexistence of
 two legal systems under one united     
,legislature1 making different laws for 
the two sections of the country in      

adaptation to the previous differences1 
might not be so well preserved1 or the  
same confidence might not be felt in its
 preservation1 in a country whose       
legislators are more possessed 7as is   
apt to be the case on the ,continent7   
with the mania for uniformity4 ,a people
 having that unbounded toleration which 
is characteristic of this country for   
every description of anomaly1 so long as
 those whose interests it concerns do   
not feel aggrieved by it1 afforded an   
exceptionally advantageous field for    
trying this difficult experiment4 ,in   
most countries1 if it was an object to  
retain different systems of law1 it     
might probably be necessary to retain   
distinct legislatures as guardians of   
them1 which is perfectly compatible with
 a national ,parliament and king1 or a  
national ,parliament without a king1    
supreme over the external relations of  
all the members of the body4  ,whenever 
it is not deemed necessary to maintain  
permanently1 in the different provinces1

 different systems of jurisprudence1 and
 fundamental institutions grounded on   
different principles1 it is always      
practicable to reconcile minor          
diversities with the maintenance of     
unity of government4 ,all that is       
needful is to give a sufficiently large 
sphere of action to the local           
authorities4 ,under one and the same    
central government there may be local   
governors1 and provincial assemblies for
 local purposes4 ,it may happen1 for    
instance1 that the people of different  
provinces may have preferences in favor 
of different modes of taxation4 ,if the 
general ,legislature could not be       
depended on for being guided by the     
members for each province in modifying  
the general system of taxation to suit  
that province1 the ,constitution might  
provide that as many of the expenses of 
the government as could by any          
possibility be made local should be     
defrayed by local rates imposed by the  
provincial assemblies1 and that those   

which must of necessity be general1 such
 as the support of an army and navy1    
should1 in the estimates for the year1  
be apportioned among the different      
provinces according to some general     
estimate of their resources1 the amount 
assigned to each being levied by the    
local assembly on the principles most   
acceptable to the locality1 and paid en 
bloc into the national treasury4 ,a     
practice approaching to this existed    
even in the old ,french monarchy1 so far
 as regarded the pays d'tats1 each of   
which1 having consented or been required
 to furnish a fixed sum1 was left to    
assess it upon the inhabitants by its   
own officers1 thus escaping the grinding
 despotism of the royal intendants and  
subdlgus2 and this privilege is always  
mentioned as one of the advantages which
 mainly contributed to render them1 as  
some of them were1 the most flourishing 
provinces of ,france4  ,identity of     
central government is compatible with   
many different degrees of               

centralisation1 not only administrative1
 but even legislative4 ,a people may    
have the desire and the capacity for a  
closer union than one merely federal1   
while yet their local peculiarities and 
antecedents render considerable         
diversities desirable in the details of 
their government4 ,but if there is a    
real desire on all hands to make the    
experiment successful1 there needs      
seldom be any difficulty in not only    
preserving these diversities1 but giving
 them the guaranty of a constitutional  
provision against any attempt at        
assimilation except by the voluntary act
 of those who would be affected by the  
change4    ,chapter ,,xviii--,of the    
,government of ,dependencies by a ,free 
,state4   ,free states1 like all others1
 may possess dependencies1 acquired     
either by conquest or by colonization1  
and our own is the greatest instance of 
the kind in modern history4  ,it is a   
most important question how such        
dependencies ought to be governed4  ,it 

is unnecessary to discuss the case of   
small posts1 like ,gibraltar1 ,aden1 or 
,heligoland1 which are held only as     
naval or military positions4 ,the       
military or naval object is in this case
 paramount1 and the inhabitants can not1
 consistently with it1 be admitted to   
the government of the place1 though they
 ought to be allowed all liberties and  
privileges compatible with that         
restriction1 including the free         
management of municipal affairs1 and1 as
 a compensation for being locally       
sacrificed to the convenience of the    
governing state1 should be admitted to  
equal rights with its native subjects in
 all other parts of the empire4         
,outlying territories of some size and  
population1 which are held as           
dependencies1 that is1 which are        
subject1 more or less1 to acts of       
sovereign power on the part of the      
paramount country1 without being equally
 represented 7if represented at all7 in 
its ,legislature1 may be divided into   

two classes4 ,some are composed of      
people of similar civilization to the   
ruling country1 capable of1 and ripe    
for1 representative government1 such as 
the ,british possessions in ,america and
 ,australia4 ,others1 like ,india1 are  
still at a great distance from that     
state4  ,in the case of dependencies of 
the former class1 this country has at   
length realized1 in rare completeness1  
the true principle of government4       
,england has always felt under a certain
 degree of obligation to bestow on such 
of her outlying populations as were of  
her own blood and language1 and on some 
who were not1 representative            
institutions formed in imitation of her 
own2 but1 until the present generation1 
she has been on the same bad level with 
other countries as to the amount of     
self-government which she allowed them  
to exercise through the representative  
institutions that she conceded to them4 
,she claimed to be the supreme arbiter  
even of their purely internal concerns1 

according to her own1 not their ideas of
 how those concerns could be best       
regulated4 ,this practice was a natural 
corollary from the vicious theory of    
colonial policy--once common to all     
,europe1 and not yet completely         
relinquished by any other people--which 
regarded colonies as valuable by        
affording markets for our commodities   
that could be kept entirely to          
ourselves2 a privilege we valued so     
highly that we thought it worth         
purchasing by allowing to the colonies  
the same monopoly of our market for     
their own productions which we claimed  
for our commodities in theirs4 ,this    
notable plan for enriching them and     
ourselves by making each pay enormous   
sums to the other1 dropping the greatest
 part by the way1 has been for some time
 abandoned4 ,but the bad habit of       
meddling in the internal government of  
the colonies did not at once die out    
when we relinquished the idea of making 
any profit by it4 ,we continued to      

torment them1 not for any benefit to    
ourselves1 but for that of a section or 
faction among the colonists2 and this   
persistence in domineering cost us a    
,canadian rebellion before we had the   
happy thought of giving it up4 ,england 
was like an ill brought-up elder        
brother1 who persists in tyrannizing    
over the younger ones from mere habit1  
till one of them1 by a spirited         
resistance1 though with unequal         
strength1 gives him notice to desist4   
,we were wise enough not to require a   
second warning4 ,a new era in the       
colonial policy of nations began with   
,lord ,durham's ,report2 the            
imperishable memorial of that nobleman's
 courage1 patriotism1 and enlightened   
liberality1 and of the intellect and    
practical sagacity of its joint authors1
 ,mr4 ,wakefield and the lamented       
,charles ,buller4 #aa  ,it is now a     
fixed principle of the policy of ,great 
,britain1 professed in theory and       
faithfully adhered to in practice1 that 

her colonies of ,european race1 equally 
with the parent country1 possess the    
fullest measure of internal             
self-government4 ,they have been allowed
 to make their own free representative  
constitutions by altering in any manner 
they thought fit the already very       
popular constitutions which we had given
 them4 ,each is governed by its own     
,legislature and executive1 constituted 
on highly democratic principles4 ,the   
veto of the crown and of ,parliament1   
though nominally reserved1 is only      
exercised 7and that very rarely7 on     
questions which concern the empire1 and 
not solely the particular colony4 ,how  
liberal a construction has been given to
 the distinction between imperial and   
colonial questions is shown by the fact 
that the whole of the unappropriated    
lands in the regions behind our         
,american and ,australian colonies have 
been given up to the uncontrolled       
disposal of the colonial communities1   
though they might1 without injustice1   

have been kept in the hands of the      
imperial government1 to be administered 
for the greatest advantage of future    
emigrants from all parts of the empire4 
,every colony has thus as full power    
over its own affairs as it could have if
 it were a member of even the loosest   
federation1 and much fuller than would  
belong to it under the ,constitution of 
the ,united ,states1 being free even to 
tax at its pleasure the commodities     
imported from the mother country4 ,their
 union with ,great ,britain is the      
slightest kind of federal union2 but not
 a strictly equal federation1 the mother
 country retaining to itself the powers 
of a federal government1 though reduced 
in practice to their very narrowest     
limits4 ,this inequality is1 of course1 
as far as it goes1 a disadvantage to the
 dependencies1 which have no voice in   
foreign policy1 but are bound by the    
decisions of the superior country4 ,they
 are compelled to join ,england in war  
without being in any way consulted      

previous to engaging in it4  ,those 7now
 happily not a few7 who think that      
justice is as binding on communities as 
it is on individuals1 and that men are  
not warranted in doing to other         
countries1 for the supposed benefit of  
their own country1 what they would not  
be justified in doing to other men for  
their own benefit1 feel even this       
limited amount of constitutional        
subordination on the part of the        
colonies to be a violation of principle1
 and have often occupied themselves in  
looking out for means by which it may be
 avoided4 ,with this view it has been   
proposed by some that the colonies      
should return representatives to the    
,british ,legislature1 and by others    
that the powers of our own1 as well as  
of their ,parliaments1 should be        
confined to internal policy1 and that   
there should be another representative  
body for foreign and imperial concerns1 
in which last the dependencies of ,great
 ,britain should be represented in the  

same manner1 and with the same          
completeness as ,great ,britain itself4 
,on this system there would be a        
perfectly equal federation between the  
mother country and her colonies1 then no
 longer dependencies4  ,the feelings of 
equity and conceptions of public        
morality from which these suggestions   
emanate are worthy of all praise1 but   
the suggestions themselves are so       
inconsistent with rational principles of
 government that it is doubtful if they 
have been seriously accepted as a       
possibility by any reasonable thinker4  
,countries separated by half the globe  
do not present the natural conditions   
for being under one government1 or even 
members of one federation4 ,if they had 
sufficiently the same interests1 they   
have not1 and never can have1 a         
sufficient habit of taking council      
together4 ,they are not part of the same
 public2 they do not discuss and        
deliberate in the same arena1 but apart1
 and have only a most imperfect         

knowledge of what passes in the minds of
 one another4 ,they neither know each   
other's objects1 nor have confidence in 
each other's principles of conduct4 ,let
 any ,englishman ask himself how he     
should like his destinies to depend on  
an assembly of which one third was      
,british ,american1 and another third   
,south ,african and ,australian4 ,yet to
 this it must come if there were any    
thing like fair or equal representation2
 and would not every one feel that the  
representatives of ,canada and          
,australia1 even in matters of an       
imperial character1 could not know or   
feel any sufficient concern for the     
interests1 opinions1 or wishes of       
,english1 ,irish1 and ,scotch8 ,even for
 strictly federative purposes the       
conditions do not exist which we have   
seen to be essential to a federation4   
,england is sufficient for her own      
protection without the colonies1 and    
would be in a much stronger1 as well as 
more dignified position1 if separated   

from them1 than when reduced to be a    
single member of an ,american1 ,african1
 and ,australian confederation4 ,over   
and above the commerce which she might  
equally enjoy after separation1 ,england
 derives little advantage1 except in    
prestige1 from her dependencies1 and the
 little she does derive is quite        
outweighed by the expense they cost her1
 and the dissemination they necessitate 
of her naval and military force1 which1 
in case of war1 or any real apprehension
 of it1 requires to be double or treble 
what would be needed for the defense of 
this country alone4  ,but1 though ,great
 ,britain could do perfectly well       
without her colonies1 and though1 on    
every principle of morality and justice1
 she ought to consent to their          
separation1 should the time come when1  
after full trial of the best form of    
union1 they deliberately desire to be   
dissevered1 there are strong reasons for
 maintaining the present slight bond of 
connection so long as not disagreeable  

to the feelings of either party4 ,it is 
a step1 as far as it goes1 towards      
universal peace and general friendly    
co-operation among nations4 ,it renders 
war impossible among a large number of  
otherwise independent communities1 and1 
moreover1 hinders any of them from being
 absorbed into a foreign state1 and     
becoming a source of additional         
aggressive strength to some rival power1
 either more despotic or closer at hand1
 which might not always be so           
unambitious or so pacific as ,great     
,britain4 ,it at least keeps the markets
 of the different countries open to one 
another1 and prevents that mutual       
exclusion by hostile tariffs which none 
of the great communities of mankind     
except ,england have yet outgrown4 ,and 
in the case of the ,british possessions 
it has the advantage1 especially        
valuable at the present time1 of adding 
to the moral influence and weight in the
 councils of the world of the power     
which1 of all in existence1 best        

understands liberty--and1 whatever may  
have been its errors in the past1 has   
attained to more of conscience and moral
 principle in its dealings with         
foreigners than any other great nation  
seems either to conceive as possible or 
recognize as desirable4 ,since1 then1   
the union can only continue1 while it   
does continue1 on the footing of an     
unequal federation1 it is important to  
consider by what means this small amount
 of inequality can be prevented from    
being either onerous or humiliating to  
the communities occupying the less      
exalted position4  ,the only inferiority
 necessarily inherent in the case is    
that the mother country decides1 both   
for the colonies and for herself1 on    
questions of peace and war4 ,they gain1 
in return1 the obligation on the mother 
country to repel aggressions directed   
against them2 but1 except when the minor
 community is so weak that the          
protection of a stronger power is       
indispensable to it1 reciprocity of     

obligation is not a full equivalent for 
non-admission to a voice in the         
deliberations4 ,it is essential1        
therefore1 that in all wars1 save those 
which1 like the ,caffre or ,new ,zealand
 wars1 are incurred for the sake of the 
particular colony1 the colonists should 
not 7without their own voluntary        
request7 be called on to contribute any 
thing to the expense except what may be 
required for the specific local defense 
of their ports1 shores1 and frontiers   
against invasion4 ,moreover1 as the     
mother country claims the privilege1 at 
her sole discretion1 of taking measures 
or pursuing a policy which may expose   
them to attack1 it is just that she     
should undertake a considerable portion 
of the cost of their military defense   
even in time of peace2 the whole of it1 
so far as it depends upon a standing    
army4  ,but there is a means1 still more
 effectual than these1 by which1 and in 
general by which alone1 a full          
equivalent can be given to a smaller    

community for sinking its individuality1
 as a substantive power among nations1  
in the greater individuality of a wide  
and powerful empire4 ,this one          
indispensable1 and1 at the same time1   
sufficient expedient1 which meets at    
once the demands of justice and the     
growing exigencies of policy1 is to open
 the service of government in all its   
departments1 and in every part of the   
empire1 on perfectly equal terms1 to the
 inhabitants of the colonies4 ,why does 
no one ever hear a breath of disloyalty 
from the ,islands in the ,british       
,channel8 ,by race1 religion1 and       
geographical position they belong less  
to ,england than to ,france2 but1 while 
they enjoy1 like ,canada and ,new ,south
 ,wales1 complete control over their    
internal affairs and their taxation1    
every office or dignity in the gift of  
the crown is freely open to the native  
of ,guernsey or ,jersey4 ,generals1     
admirals1 peers of the ,united ,kingdom 
are made1 and there is nothing which    

hinders prime ministers to be made from 
those insignificant islands4 ,the same  
system was commenced in reference to the
 colonies generally by an enlightened   
colonial secretary1 too early lost1 ,sir
 ,william ,molesworth1 when he appointed
 ,mr4 ,hinckes1 a leading ,canadian     
politician1 to a ,west ,indian          
government4 ,it is a very shallow view  
of the springs of political action in a 
community which thinks such things      
unimportant because the number of those 
in a position actually to profit by the 
concession might not be very            
considerable4 ,that limited number would
 be composed precisely of those who have
 most moral power over the rest2 and men
 are not so destitute of the sense of   
collective degradation as not to feel   
the withholding of an advantage from    
even one person1 because of a           
circumstance which they all have in     
common with him1 an affront to all4 ,if 
we prevent the leading men of a         
community from standing forth to the    

world as its chiefs and representatives 
in the general councils of mankind1 we  
owe it both to their legitimate ambition
 and to the just pride of the community 
to give them in return an equal chance  
of occupying the same prominent position
 in a nation of greater power and       
importance4 ,were the whole service of  
the ,british crown opened to the natives
 of the ,ionian ,islands1 we should hear
 no more of the desire for union with   
,greece4 ,such a union is not desirable 
for the people1 to whom it would be a   
step backward in civilization2 but it is
 no wonder if ,corfu1 which has given a 
minister of ,european reputation to the 
,russian ,empire1 and a president to    
,greece itself before the arrival of the
 ,bavarians1 should feel it a grievance 
that its people are not admissable to   
the highest posts in some government or 
other4  ,thus far of the dependencies   
whose population is in a sufficiently   
advanced state to be fitted for         
representative government2 but there are

 others which have not attained that    
state1 and which1 if held at all1 must  
be governed by the dominant country1 or 
by persons delegated for that purpose by
 it4 ,this mode of government is as     
legitimate as any other1 if it is the   
one which in the existing state of      
civilization of the subject people most 
facilitates their transition to a higher
 stage of improvement4 ,there are1 as we
 have already seen1 conditions of       
society in which a vigorous despotism is
 in itself the best mode of government  
for training the people in what is      
specifically wanting to render them     
capable of a higher civilization4 ,there
 are others1 in which the mere fact of  
despotism has indeed no beneficial      
effect1 the lessons which it teaches    
having already been only too completely 
learned1 but in which1 there being no   
spring of spontaneous improvement in the
 people themselves1 their almost only   
hope of making any steps in advance     
depends on the chances of a good despot4

 ,under a native despotism1 a good      
despot is a rare and transitory         
accident2 but when the dominion they are
 under is that of a more civilized      
people1 that people ought to be able to 
supply it constantly4 ,the ruling       
country ought to be able to do for its  
subjects all that could be done by a    
succession of absolute monarchs1        
guaranteed by irresistible force against
 the precariousness of tenure attendant 
on barbarous despotisms1 and qualified  
by their genius to anticipate all that  
experience has taught to the more       
advanced nation4 ,such is the ideal rule
 of a free people over a barbarous or   
semi-barbarous one4 ,we need not expect 
to see that ideal realized2 but1 unless 
some approach to it is1 the rulers are  
guilty of a dereliction of the highest  
moral trust which can devolve upon a    
nation2 and if they do not even aim at  
it1 they are selfish usurpers1 on a par 
in criminality with any of those whose  
ambition and rapacity have sported from 

age to age with the destiny of masses of
 mankind4  ,as it is already a common1  
and is rapidly tending to become the    
universal condition of the more backward
 populations to be either held in direct
 subjection by the more advanced1 or to 
be under their complete political       
ascendancy1 there are in this age of the
 world few more important problems than 
how to organize this rule1 so as to make
 it a good instead of an evil to the    
subject people1 providing them with the 
best attainable present government1 and 
with the conditions most favorable to   
future permanent improvement4 ,but the  
mode of fitting the government for this 
purpose is by no means so well          
understood as the conditions of good    
government in a people capable of       
governing themselves4 ,we may even say  
that it is not understood at all4  ,the 
thing appears perfectly easy to         
superficial observers4 ,if ,india 7for  
example7 is not fit to govern itself1   
all that seems to them required is that 

there should be a minister to govern it1
 and that this minister1 like all other 
,british ministers1 should be           
responsible to the ,british ,parliament4
 ,unfortunately this1 though the        
simplest mode of attempting to govern a 
dependency1 is about the worst1 and     
betrays in its advocates a total want of
 comprehension of the conditions of good
 government4 ,to govern a country under 
responsibility to the people of that    
country1 and to govern one country under
 responsibility to the people of        
another1 are two very different things4 
,what makes the excellence of the first 
is1 that freedom is preferable to       
despotism3 but the last is despotism4   
,the only choice the case admits is a   
choice of despotisms1 and it is not     
certain that the despotism of twenty    
millions is necessarily better than that
 of a few or of one2 but it is quite    
certain that the despotism of those who 
neither hear1 nor see1 nor know any     
thing about their subjects1 has many    

chances of being worse than that of     
those who do4 ,it is not usually thought
 that the immediate agents of authority 
govern better because they govern in the
 name of an absent master1 and of one   
who has a thousand more pressing        
interests to attend to4 ,the master may 
hold them to a strict responsibility1   
enforced by heavy penalties1 but it is  
very questionable if those penalties    
will often fall in the right place4  ,it
 is always under great difficulties1 and
 very imperfectly1 that a country can be
 governed by foreigners1 even when there
 is no extreme disparity in habits and  
ideas between the rulers and the ruled4 
,foreigners do not feel with the people4
 ,they can not judge1 by the light in   
which a thing appears to their own      
minds1 or the manner in which it affects
 their feelings1 how it will affect the 
feelings or appear to the minds of the  
subject population4 ,what a native of   
the country1 of average practical       
ability1 knows as it were by instinct1  

they have to learn slowly1 and1 after   
all1 imperfectly1 by study and          
experience4 ,the laws1 the customs1 the 
social relations for which they have to 
legislate1 instead of being familiar to 
them from childhood1 are all strange to 
them4 ,for most of their detailed       
knowledge they must depend on the       
information of natives1 and it is       
difficult for them to know whom to      
trust4 ,they are feared1 suspected1     
probably disliked by the population2    
seldom sought by them except for        
interested purposes2 and they are prone 
to think that the servilely submissive  
are the trustworthy4 ,their danger is of
 despising the natives2 that of the     
natives is1 of disbelieving that any    
thing the strangers do can be intended  
for their good4 ,these are but a part of
 the difficulties that any rulers have  
to struggle with1 who honestly attempt  
to govern well a country in which they  
are foreigners4 ,to overcome these      
difficulties in any degree will always  

be a work of much labor1 requiring a    
very superior degree of capacity in the 
chief administrators1 and a high average
 among the subordinates2 and the best   
organization of such a government is    
that which will best insure the labor1  
develop the capacity1 and place the     
highest specimens of it in the          
situations of greatest trust4           
,responsibility to an authority which   
has gone through none of the labor1     
acquired none of the capacity1 and for  
the most part is not even aware that    
either1 in any peculiar degree1 is      
required1 can not be regarded as a very 
effectual expedient for accomplishing   
these ends4  ,the government of a people
 by itself has a meaning and a reality1 
but such a thing as government of one   
people by another does not and can not  
exist4 ,one people may keep another as a
 warren or preserve for its own use1 a  
place to make money in1 a human-cattle  
farm to be worked for the profit of its 
own inhabitants2 but if the good of the 

governed is the proper business of a    
government1 it is utterly impossible    
that a people should directly attend to 
it4 ,the utmost they can do is to give  
some of their best men a commission to  
look after it1 to whom the opinion of   
their own country can neither be much of
 a guide in the performance of their    
duty1 nor a competent judge of the mode 
in which it has been performed4 ,let any
 one consider how the ,english          
themselves would be governed if they    
knew and cared no more about their own  
affairs than they know and care about   
the affairs of the ,hindoos4 ,even this 
comparison gives no adequate idea of the
 state of the case2 for a people thus   
indifferent to politics altogether would
 probably be simply acquiescent1 and let
 the government alone2 whereas in the   
case of ,india1 a politically active    
people like the ,english1 amid habitual 
acquiescence1 are every now and then    
interfering1 and almost always in the   
wrong place4 ,the real causes which     

determine the prosperity or             
wretchedness1 the improvement or        
deterioration of the ,hindoos1 are too  
far off to be within their ken4 ,they   
have not the knowledge necessary for    
suspecting the existence of those       
causes1 much less for judging of their  
operation4 ,the most essential interests
 of the country may be well administered
 without obtaining any of their         
approbation1 or mismanaged to almost any
 excess without attracting their notice4
 ,the purposes for which they are       
principally tempted to interfere1 and   
control the proceedings of their        
delegates1 are of two kinds4 ,one is to 
force ,english ideas down the throats of
 the natives2 for instance1 by measures 
of proselytism1 or acts intentionally or
 unintentionally offensive to the       
religious feelings of the people4 ,this 
misdirection of opinion in the ruling   
country is instructively exemplified    
7the more so1 because nothing is meant  
but justice and fairness1 and as much   

impartiality as can be expected from    
persons really convinced7 by the demand 
now so general in ,england for having   
the ,bible taught1 at the option of     
pupils or of their parents1 in the      
government schools4 ,from the ,european 
point of view nothing can wear a fairer 
aspect1 or seem less open to objection  
on the score of religious freedom4 ,to  
,asiatic eyes it is quite another thing4
 ,no ,asiatic people ever believes that 
a government puts its paid officers and 
official machinery into motion unless it
 is bent upon an object2 and when bent  
on an object1 no ,asiatic believes that 
any government1 except a feeble and     
contemptible one1 pursues it by halves4 
,if government schools and schoolmasters
 taught ,christianity1 whatever pledges 
might be given of teaching it only to   
those who spontaneously sought it1 no   
amount of evidence would ever persuade  
the parents that improper means were not
 used to make their children            
,christians1 or1 at all events1 outcasts

 from ,hindooism4 ,if they could1 in the
 end1 be convinced of the contrary1 it  
would only be by the entire failure of  
the schools1 so conducted1 to make any  
converts4 ,if the teaching had the      
smallest effect in promoting its object1
 it would compromise not only the       
utility and even existence of the       
government education1 but perhaps the   
safety of the government itself4 ,an    
,english ,protestant would not be easily
 induced1 by disclaimers of proselytism1
 to place his children in a ,roman      
,catholic seminary2 ,irish ,catholics   
will not send their children to schools 
in which they can be made ,protestants2 
and we expect that ,hindoos1 who believe
 that the privileges of ,hindooism can  
be forfeited by a merely physical act1  
will expose theirs to the danger of     
being made ,christians6  ,such is one of
 the modes in which the opinion of the  
dominant country tends to act more      
injuriously than beneficially on the    
conduct of its deputed governors4 ,in   

other respects1 its interference is     
likely to be oftenest exercised where it
 will be most pertinaciously demanded1  
and that is1 on behalf of some interest 
of the ,english settlers4 ,english      
settlers have friends at home1 have     
organs1 have access to the public2 they 
have a common language1 and common ideas
 with their countrymen2 any complaint by
 an ,englishman is more sympathetically 
heard1 even if no unjust preference is  
intentionally accorded to it4 ,now if   
there be a fact to which all experience 
testifies1 it is that1 when a country   
holds another in subjection1 the        
individuals of the ruling people who    
resort to the foreign country to make   
their fortunes are of all others those  
who most need to be held under powerful 
restraint4 ,they are always one of the  
chief difficulties of the government4   
,armed with the prestige and filled with
 the scornful overbearingness of the    
conquering nation1 they have the        
feelings inspired by absolute power     

without its sense of responsibility4    
,among a people like that of ,india1 the
 utmost efforts of the public           
authorities are not enough for the      
effectual protection of the weak against
 the strong2 and of all the strong1 the 
,european settlers are the strongest4   
,wherever the demoralizing effect of the
 situation is not in a most remarkable  
degree corrected by the personal        
character of the individual1 they think 
the people of the country mere dirt     
under their feet3 it seems to them      
monstrous that any rights of the natives
 should stand in the way of their       
smallest pretensions2 the simplest act  
of protection to the inhabitants against
 any act of power on their part which   
they may consider useful to their       
commercial objects they denounce1 and   
sincerely regard as an injury4 ,so      
natural is this state of feeling in a   
situation like theirs1 that1 even under 
the discouragement which it has hitherto
 met with from the ruling authorities1  

it is impossible that more or less of   
the spirit should not perpetually break 
out4 ,the government1 itself free from  
this spirit1 is never able sufficiently 
to keep it down in the young and raw    
even of its own civil and military      
officers1 over whom it has so much more 
control than over the independent       
residents4 ,as it is with the ,english  
in ,india1 so1 according to trustworthy 
testimony1 it is with the ,french in    
,algiers2 so with the ,americans in the 
countries conquered from ,mexico2 so it 
seems to be with the ,europeans in      
,china1 and already even in ,japan3     
there is no necessity to recall how it  
was with the ,spaniards in ,south       
,america4 ,in all these cases1 the      
government to which these private       
adventurers are subject is better than  
they1 and does the most it can to       
protect the natives against them4 ,even 
the ,spanish government did this1       
sincerely and earnestly1 though         
ineffectually1 as is known to every     

reader of ,mr4 ,helps' instructive      
history4 ,had the ,spanish government   
been directly accountable to ,spanish   
opinion1 we may question if it would    
have made the attempt1 for the          
,spaniards1 doubtless1 would have taken 
part with their ,christian friends and  
relations rather than with pagans4 ,the 
settlers1 not the natives1 have the ear 
of the public at home2 it is they whose 
representations are likely to pass for  
truth1 because they alone have both the 
means and the motive to press them      
perseveringly upon the inattentive and  
uninterested public mind4 ,the          
distrustful criticism with which        
,englishmen1 more than any other people1
 are in the habit of scanning the       
conduct of their country towards        
foreigners1 they usually reserve for the
 proceedings of the public authorities4 
,in all questions between a government  
and an individual1 the presumption in   
every ,englishman's mind is that the    
government is in the wrong4 ,and when   

the resident ,english bring the         
batteries of ,english political action  
to bear upon any of the bulwarks erected
 to protect the natives against their   
encroachments1 the executive1 with their
 real but faint velleities of something 
better1 generally find it safer to their
 ,parliamentary interest1 and1 at any   
rate1 less troublesome1 to give up the  
disputed position than to defend it4    
,what makes matters worse is that1 when 
the public mind is invoked 7as1 to its  
credit1 the ,english mind is extremely  
open to be7 in the name of justice and  
philanthropy in behalf of the subject   
community or race1 there is the same    
probability of its missing the mark2 for
 in the subject community also there are
 oppressors and oppressed--powerful     
individuals or classes1 and slaves      
prostrate before them2 and it is the    
former1 not the latter1 who have the    
means of access to the ,english public4 
,a tyrant or sensualist who has been    
deprived of the power he had abused1    

and1 instead of punishment1 is supported
 in as great wealth and splendor as he  
ever enjoyed2 a knot of privileged      
landholders1 who demand that the state  
should relinquish to them its reserved  
right to a rent from their lands1 or who
 resent as a wrong any attempt to       
protect the masses from their           
extortion--these have no difficulty in  
procuring interested or sentimental     
advocacy in the ,british ,parliament and
 press4 ,the silent myriads obtain none4
  ,the preceding observations exemplify 
the operation of a principle--which     
might be called an obvious one1 were it 
not that scarcely anybody seems to be   
aware of it--that1 while responsibility 
to the governed is the greatest of all  
securities for good government1         
responsibility to somebody else not only
 has no such tendency1 but is as likely 
to produce evil as good4 ,the           
responsibility of the ,british rulers of
 ,india to the ,british nation is       
chiefly useful because1 when any acts of

 the government are called in question1 
it insures publicity and discussion2 the
 utility of which does not require that 
the public at large should comprehend   
the point at issue1 provided there are  
any individuals among them who do2 for a
 merely moral responsibility not being  
responsibility to the collective people1
 but to every separate person among them
 who forms a judgment1 opinions may be  
weighed as well as counted1 and the     
approbation or disapprobation of one    
person well versed in the subject may   
outweigh that of thousands who know     
nothing about it at all4 ,it is         
doubtless a useful restraint upon the   
immediate rulers that they can be put   
upon their defense1 and that one or two 
of the jury will form an opinion worth  
having about their conduct1 though that 
of the remainder will probably be       
several degrees worse than none4 ,such  
as it is1 this is the amount of benefit 
to ,india from the control exercised    
over the ,indian government by the      

,british ,parliament and people4  ,it is
 not by attempting to rule directly a   
country like ,india1 but by giving it   
good rulers1 that the ,english people   
can do their duty to that country2 and  
they can scarcely give it a worse one   
than an ,english cabinet minister1 who  
is thinking of ,english1 not ,indian    
politics2 who does not remains long     
enough in office to acquire an          
intelligent interest in so complicated a
 subject2 upon whom the factitious      
public opinion got up in ,parliament1   
consisting of two or three fluent       
speakers1 acts with as much force as if 
it were genuine2 while he is under none 
of the influences of training and       
position which would lead or qualify him
 to form an honest opinion of his own4  
,a free country which attempts to govern
 a distant dependency1 inhabited by a   
dissimilar people1 by means of a branch 
of its own executive1 will almost       
inevitably fail4 ,the only mode which   
has any chance of tolerable success is  

to govern through a delegated body of a 
comparatively permanent character1      
allowing only a right of inspection and 
a negative voice to the changeable      
administration of the state4 ,such a    
body did exist in the case of ,india2   
and ,i fear that both ,india and        
,england will pay a severe penalty for  
the shortsighted policy by which this   
intermediate instrument of government   
was done away with4  ,it is of no avail 
to say that such a delegated body can   
not have all the requisites of good     
government2 above all1 can not have that
 complete and over-operative identity of
 interest with the governed which it is 
so difficult to obtain even where the   
people to be ruled are in some degree   
qualified to look after their own       
affairs4 ,real good government is not   
compatible with the conditions of the   
case4 ,there is but a choice of         
imperfections4 ,the problem is1 so to   
construct the governing body that1 under
 the difficulties of the position1 it   

shall have as much interest as possible 
in good government1 and as little in    
bad4 ,now these conditions are best     
found in an intermediate body4 ,a       
delegated administration has always this
 advantage over a direct one1 that it   
has1 at all events1 no duty to perform  
except to the governed4 ,it has no      
interests to consider except theirs4    
,its own power of deriving profit from  
misgovernment may be reduced--in the    
latest ,constitution of the ,east ,india
 ,company it was reduced--to a          
singularly small amount2 and it can be  
kept entirely clear of bias from the    
individual or class interests of any one
 else4 ,when the home government and    
,parliament are swayed by such partial  
influences in the exercise of the power 
reserved to them in the last resort1 the
 intermediate body is the certain       
advocate and champion of the dependency 
before the imperial tribunal4 ,the      
intermediate body1 moreover1 is1 in the 
natural course of things1 chiefly       

composed of persons who have acquired   
professional knowledge of this part of  
their country's concerns2 who have been 
trained to it in the place itself1 and  
have made its administration the main   
occupation of their lives4 ,furnished   
with these qualifications1 and not being
 liable to lose their office from the   
accidents of home politics1 they        
identify their character and            
consideration with their special trust1 
and have a much more permanent interest 
in the success of their administration1 
and in the prosperity of the country    
which they administer1 than a member of 
a cabinet under a representative        
constitution can possibly have in the   
good government of any country except   
the one which he serves4 ,so far as the 
choice of those who carry on the        
management on the spot devolves upon    
this body1 their appointment is kept out
 of the vortex of party and             
,parliamentary jobbing1 and freed from  
the influence of those motives to the   

abuse of patronage for the reward of    
adherents1 or to buy off those who would
 otherwise be opponents1 which are      
always stronger with statesmen of       
average honesty than a conscientious    
sense of the duty of appointing the     
fittest man4 ,to put this one class of  
appointments as far as possible out of  
harm's way is of more consequence than  
the worst which can happen to all other 
offices in the state2 for1 in every     
other department1 if the officer is     
unqualified1 the general opinion of the 
community directs him in a certain      
degree what to do2 but in the position  
of the administrators of a dependency   
where the people are not fit to have the
 control in their own hands1 the        
character of the government entirely    
depends on the qualifications1 moral and
 intellectual1 of the individual        
functionaries4  ,it can not be too often
 repeated that1 in a country like       
,india1 every thing depends on the      
personal qualities and capacities of the

 agents of government4 ,this truth is   
the cardinal principle of ,indian       
administration4 ,the day when it comes  
to be thought that the appointment of   
persons to situations of trust from     
motives of convenience1 already so      
criminal in ,england1 can be practiced  
with impunity in ,india1 will be the    
beginning of the decline and fall of our
 empire there4 ,even with a sincere     
intention of preferring the best        
candidate1 it will not do to rely on    
chance for supplying fit persons4 ,the  
system must be calculated to form them4 
,it has done this hitherto2 and because 
it has done so1 our rule in ,india has  
lasted1 and been one of constant1 if not
 very rapid improvement in prosperity   
and good administration4 ,as much       
bitterness is now manifested against    
this system1 and as much eagerness      
displayed to overthrow it1 as if        
educating and training the officers of  
government for their work were a thing  
utterly unreasonable and indefensible1  

an unjustifiable interference with the  
rights of ignorance and inexperience4   
,there is a tacit conspiracy between    
those who would like to job in          
first-rate ,indian offices for their    
connections here1 and those who1 being  
already in ,india1 claim to be promoted 
from the indigo factory or the          
attorney's office to administer justice 
or fix the payments due to government   
from millions of people4 ,the monopoly  
of the civil service1 so much inveighed 
against1 is like the monopoly of        
judicial offices by the bar2 and its    
abolition would be like opening the     
bench in ,westminster ,hall to the first
 comer whose friends certify that he has
 now and then looked into ,blackstone4  
,were the course ever adopted of sending
 men from this country1 or encouraging  
them in going out1 to get themselves put
 into high appointments without having  
learned their business by passing       
through the lower ones1 the most        
important offices would be thrown to    

,scotch cousins and adventurers1        
connected by no professional feeling    
with the country or the work1 held to no
 previous knowledge1 and eager only to  
make money rapidly and return home4 ,the
 safety of the country is1 that those by
 whom it is administered be sent out in 
youth1 as candidates only1 to begin at  
the bottom of the ladder1 and ascend    
higher or not1 as1 after a proper       
interval1 they are proved qualified4    
,the defect of the ,east ,india         
,company's system was that1 though the  
best men were carefully sought out for  
the most important posts1 yet1 if an    
officer remained in the service1        
promotion1 though it might be delayed1  
came at last in some shape or other1 to 
the least as well as to the most        
competent4 ,even the inferior in        
qualifications among such a corps of    
functionaries consisted1 it must be     
remembered1 of men who had been brought 
up to their duties1 and had fulfilled   
them for many years1 at lowest without  

disgrace1 under the eye and authority of
 a superior4 ,but1 though this          
diminished the evil1 it was nevertheless
 considerable4 ,a man who never becomes 
fit for more than an assistant's duty   
should remain an assistant all his life1
 and his juniors should be promoted over
 him4 ,with this exception1 ,i am not   
aware of any real defect in the old     
system of ,indian appointments4 ,it had 
already received the greatest other     
improvement it was susceptible of1 the  
choice of the original candidates by    
competitive examination1 which1 besides 
the advantage of recruiting from a      
higher grade of industry and capacity1  
has the recommendation that under it1   
unless by accident1 there are no        
personal ties between the candidates for
 offices and those who have a voice in  
conferring them4  ,it is in no way      
unjust that public officers thus        
selected and trained should be          
exclusively eligible to offices which   
require specially ,indian knowledge and 

experience4 ,if any door to the higher  
appointments1 without passing through   
the lower1 be opened even for occasional
 use1 there will be such incessant      
knocking at it by persons of influence  
that it will be impossible ever to keep 
it closed4 ,the only excepted           
appointment should be the highest one of
 all4 ,the ,viceroy of ,british ,india  
should be a person selected from all    
,englishmen for his great general       
capacity for government4 ,if he have    
this1 he will be able to distinguish in 
others1 and turn to his own use1 that   
special knowledge and judgment in local 
affairs which he has not himself had the
 opportunity of acquiring4 ,there are   
good reasons why the viceroy should not 
be a member of the regular service4 ,all
 services have1 more or less1 their     
class prejudices1 from which the supreme
 ruler ought to be exempt4 ,neither are 
men1 however able and experienced1 who  
have passed their lives in ,asia1 so    
likely to possess the most advanced     

,european ideas in general              
statesmanship1 which the chief ruler    
should carry out with him1 and blend    
with the results of ,indian experience4 
,again1 being of a different class1 and 
especially if chosen by a different     
authority1 he will seldom have any      
personal partialities to warp his       
appointments to office4 ,this great     
security for honest bestowal of         
patronage existed in rare perfection    
under the mixed government of the crown 
and the ,east ,india ,company4 ,the     
supreme dispensers of office--the       
governor general and governors--were    
appointed1 in fact though not formally1 
by the crown1 that is1 by the general   
government1 not by the intermediate     
body1 and a great officer of the crown  
probably had not a single personal or   
political connection in the local       
service1 while the delegated body1 most 
of whom had themselves served in the    
country1 had1 and were likely to have1  
such connections4 ,this guaranty for    

impartiality would be much impaired if  
the civil servants of government1 even  
though sent out in boyhood as mere      
candidates for employment1 should come  
to be furnished1 in any considerable    
proportion1 by the class of society     
which supplies viceroys and governors4  
,even the initiatory competitive        
examination would then be an            
insufficient security4 ,it would exclude
 mere ignorance and incapacity2 it would
 compel youths of family to start in the
 race with the same amount of           
instruction and ability as other people2
 the stupidest son could not be put into
 the ,indian service1 as he can be into 
the ,church2 but there would be nothing 
to prevent undue preference afterwards4 
,no longer1 all equally unknown and     
unheard of by the arbiter of their lot1 
a portion of the service would be       
personally1 and a still greater number  
politically1 in close relation with him4
 ,members of certain families1 and of   
the higher classes and influential      

connections generally1 would rise more  
rapidly than their competitors1 and be  
often kept in situations for which they 
were unfit1 or placed in those for which
 others were fitter4 ,the same          
influences would be brought into play   
which affect promotions in the army2 and
 those alone1 if such miracles of       
simplicity there be1 who believe that   
these are impartial1 would expect       
impartiality in those of ,india4 ,this  
evil is1 ,i fear1 irremediable by any   
general measures which can be taken     
under the present system4 ,no such will 
afford a degree of security comparable  
to that which once flowed spontaneously 
from the so-called double government4   
,what is accounted so great an advantage
 in the case of the ,english system of  
government at home has been its         
misfortune in ,india--that it grew up of
 itself1 not from preconceived design1  
but by successive expedients1 and by the
 adaptation of machinery originally     
created for a different purpose4 ,as the

 country on which its maintenance       
depended was not the one out of whose   
necessities it grew1 its practical      
benefits did not come home to the mind  
of that country1 and it would have      
required theoretic recommendations to   
render it acceptable4 ,unfortunately1   
these were exactly what it seemed to be 
destitute of2 and undoubtedly the common
 theories of government did not furnish 
it with such1 framed as those theories  
have been for states of circumstances   
differing in all the most important     
features from the case concerned4 ,but  
in government as in other departments of
 human agency1 almost all principles    
which have been durable were first      
suggested by observation of some        
particular case1 in which the general   
laws of nature acted in some new or     
previously unnoticed combination of     
circumstances4 ,the institutions of     
,great ,britain1 and those of the       
,united ,states1 have the distinction of
 suggesting most of the theories of     

government which1 through good and evil 
fortune1 are now1 in the course of      
generations1 reawakening political life 
in the nations of ,europe4 ,it has been 
the destiny of the government of the    
,east ,india ,company to suggest the    
true theory of the government of a      
semi-barbarous dependency by a civilized
 country1 and after having done this1 to
 perish4 ,it would be a singular fortune
 if1 at the end of two or three more    
generations1 this speculative result    
should be the only remaining fruit of   
our ascendancy in ,india2 if posterity  
should say of us that1 having stumbled  
accidentally upon better arrangements   
than our wisdom would ever have devised1
 the first use we made of our awakened  
reason was to destroy them1 and allow   
the good which had been in course of    
being realized to fall through and be   
lost from ignorance of the principles on
 which it depended4 ,d meliora2 but if a
 fate so disgraceful to ,england and to 
civilization can be averted1 it must be 

through far wider political conceptions 
than merely ,english or ,european       
practice can supply1 and through a much 
more profound study of ,indian          
experience and of the conditions of     
,indian government than either ,english 
politicians1 or those who supply the    
,english public with opinions1 have     
hitherto shown any willingness to       
undertake4   ,the ,end     ,footnotes3  
,footnote #a3 ,i limit the expression to
 past time1 because ,i would say nothing
 derogatory of a great1 and now at last 
a free1 people1 who are entering into   
the general movement of ,european       
progress with a vigor which bids fair to
 make up rapidly the ground they have   
lost4 ,no one can doubt what ,spanish   
intellect and energy are capable of2 and
 their faults as a people are chiefly   
those for which freedom and industrial  
ardor are a real specific4  ,footnote   
#b3 ,italy1 which alone can be quoted as
 an exception1 is only so in regard to  
the final stage of its transformation4  

,the more difficult previous advance    
from the city isolation of ,florence1   
,pisa1 or ,milan1 to the provincial     
unity of ,tuscany or ,lombardy1 took    
place in the usual manner4  ,footnote   
#c3 ,this blunder of ,mr4 ,disraeli     
7from which1 greatly to his credit1 ,sir
 ,john ,pakington took an opportunity   
soon after of separating himself7 is a  
speaking instance1 among many1 how      
little the ,conservative leaders        
understand ,conservative principles4    
,without presuming to require from      
political parties such an amount of     
virtue and discernment as that they     
should comprehend1 and know when to     
apply1 the principles of their          
opponents1 we may yet say that it would 
be a great improvement if each party    
understood and acted upon its own4 ,well
 would it be for ,england if            
,conservatives voted consistently for   
every thing conservative1 and ,liberals 
for every thing liberal4 ,we should not 
then have to wait long for things which1

 like the present and many other great  
measures1 are eminently both the one and
 the other4 ,the ,conservatives1 as     
being by the law of their existence the 
stupidest party1 have much the greatest 
sins of this description to answer for2 
and it is a melancholy truth1 that if   
any measure were proposed on any subject
 truly1 largely1 and far-sightedly      
conservative1 even if ,liberals were    
willing to vote for it1 the great bulk  
of the ,conservative party would rush   
blindly in and prevent it from being    
carried4  ,footnote #d3 ,thoughts on    
,parliamentary ,reform1 #bnd ed4 p4     
#cb-cf4  ,footnote #e3 ,this expedient  
has been recommended both on the score  
of saving expense and on that of        
obtaining the votes of many electors who
 otherwise would not vote1 and who are  
regarded by the advocates of the plan as
 a particularly desirable class of      
voters4 ,the scheme has been carried    
into practice in the election of        
poor-law guardians1 and its success in  

that instance is appealed to in favor of
 adopting it in the more important case 
of voting for a member of the           
,legislature4 ,but the two cases appear 
to me to differ in the point on which   
the benefits of the expedient depend4   
,in a local election for a special kind 
of administrative business1 which       
consists mainly in the dispensation of a
 public fund1 it is an object to prevent
 the choice from being exclusively in   
the hands of those who actively concern 
themselves about it2 for the public     
interest which attaches to the election 
being of a limited kind1 and in most    
cases not very great in degree1 the     
disposition to make themselves busy in  
the matter is apt to be in a great      
measure confined to persons who hope to 
turn their activity to their own private
 advantage2 and it may be very desirable
 to render the intervention of other    
people as little onerous to them as     
possible1 if only for the purpose of    
swamping these private interests4 ,but  

when the matter in hand is the great    
business of national government1 in     
which every one must take an interest   
who cares for any thing out of himself1 
or who cares even for himself           
intelligently1 it is much rather an     
object to prevent those from voting who 
are indifferent to the subject1 than to 
induce them to vote by any other means  
than that of awakening their dormant    
minds4 ,the voter who does not care     
enough about the election to go to the  
poll is the very man who1 if he can vote
 without that small trouble1 will give  
his vote to the first person who asks   
for it1 or on the most trifling or      
frivolous inducement4 ,a man who does   
not care whether he votes is not likely 
to care much which way he votes2 and he 
who is in that state of mind has no     
moral right to vote at all2 since1 if he
 does so1 a vote which is not the       
expression of a conviction1 counts for  
as much1 and goes as far in determining 
the result as one which represents the  

thoughts and purposes of a              
life4--,thoughts1 etc41 p4 #ci4         
,footnote #f3 ,several of the witnesses 
before the ,committee of the ,house of  
,commons in #ahfj1 on the operation of  
the ,corrupt ,practices ,prevention     
,act1 some of them of great practical   
experience in election matters1 were    
favorable 7either absolutely or as a    
last resort7 to the principle of        
requiring a declaration from members of 
,parliament1 and were of opinion that1  
if supported by penalties1 it would be1 
to a great degree1 effectual4           
7,evidence1 pp4 #df1 #ed-g1 #fg1 #abc1  
#aih-bjb1 #bjh47 ,the chief commissioner
 of the ,wakefield ,inquiry said 7in    
reference certainly to a different      
proposal71 ,if they see that the        
,legislature is earnest upon the        
subject1 the machinery will work4444 ,i 
am quite sure that if some personal     
stigma were applied upon conviction of  
bribery1 it would change the current of 
public opinion 7pp4 #bf and #cb74 ,a    

distinguished member of the committee   
7and of the present cabinet7 seemed to  
think it very objectionable to attach   
the penalties of perjury to a merely    
promissory as distinguished from an     
assertory oath2 but he was reminded that
 the oath taken by a witness in a court 
of justice is a promissory oath2 and the
 rejoinder 7that the witness's promise  
relates to an act to be done at once1   
while the member's would be a promise   
for all future time7 would only be to   
the purpose if it could be supposed that
 the swearer might forget the obligation
 he had entered into1 or could possibly 
violate it unawares3 contingencies      
which1 in a case like the present1 are  
out of the question4  ,a more           
substantial difficulty is1 that one of  
the forms most frequently assumed by    
election expenditure is that of         
subscriptions to local charities or     
other local objects2 and it would be a  
strong measure to enact that money      
should not be given in charity within a 

place by the member for it4 ,when such  
subscriptions are bon fide1 the         
popularity which may be derived from    
them is an advantage which it seems     
hardly possible to deny to superior     
riches4 ,but the greatest part of the   
mischief consists in the fact that money
 so contributed is employed in bribery1 
under the euphonious name of keeping up 
the member's interest4 ,to guard against
 this1 it should be part of the member's
 promissory declaration that all sums   
expended by him in the place1 or for any
 purpose connected with it or with any  
of its inhabitants 7with the exception  
perhaps of his own hotel expenses7      
should pass through the hands of the    
election auditor1 and be by him 7and not
 by the member himself or his friends7  
applied to its declared purpose4  ,the  
principle of making all lawful expenses 
of a charge1 not upon the candidate1 but
 upon the locality1 was upheld by two of
 the best witnesses 7pp4 #bj1 #fe-gj1   
#bgg74  ,footnote #g3 ,as ,mr4 ,lorimer 

remarks1 by creating a pecuniary        
inducement to persons of the lowest     
class to devote themselves to public    
affairs1 the calling of the demagogue   
would be formally inaugurated4 ,nothing 
is more to be deprecated than making it 
the private interest of a number of     
active persons to urge the form of      
government in the direction of its      
natural perversion4 ,the indications    
which either a multitude or an          
individual can give when merely left to 
their own weaknesses1 afford but a faint
 idea of what those weaknesses would    
become when played upon by a thousand   
flatterers4 ,if there were #feh places  
of certain1 however moderate emolument1 
to be gained by persuading the multitude
 that ignorance is as good as knowledge1
 and better1 it is terrible odds that   
they would believe and act upon the     
lesson4--7,article in ,fraser's         
,magazine for ,april1 #ahei1 headed     
,recent ,writers on ,reform47  ,footnote
 #h3 ,not always1 however1 the most     

recondite2 for one of the latest        
denouncers of competitive examination in
 the ,house of ,commons had the nivet to
 produce a set of almost elementary     
questions in algebra1 history1 and      
geography1 as a proof of the exorbitant 
amount of high scientific attainment    
which the ,commissioners were so wild as
 to exact4  ,footnote #i3 ,on ,liberty1 
concluding chapter2 and1 at greater     
length1 in the final chapter of         
,principles of ,political ,economy4     
,footnote #aj3 ,mr4 ,calhoun4  ,footnote
 #aa3 ,i am speaking here of the        
adoption of this improved policy1 not1  
of course1 of its original suggestion4  
,the honor of having been its earliest  
champion belongs unquestionably to ,mr4 
,roebuck4