,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,auguste ,,comte ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,auguste ,,comte ,,by ,l4 ,l,,vy-,,bruhl ,matre de ,confrences de ,philosophie la ,facult des ,lettres de l',universit de ,paris1 ,professeur l',ecole libre des ,sciences politiques4 ,,authorised ,,translation ,,to ,,which ,,is ,,prefixed ,,an ,,introduction ,,by ,,frederic ,,harrison1 ,m4,a4 ,honorary ,fellow of ,wadham ,college1 ,oxford ,colophon ,london ,,swan ,,sonnenschein ,,co4 ,,lim4 ,,paternoster ,,square #aijc ,,note ,,by ,,mr4 ,,frederic ,,harrison ,the publication in #aijj of ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl's volume ,the ,philosophy of ,auguste ,comte was an event in the history of the ,positive movement4 ,the eminent position in the ,university of ,paris and in recent philosophical history that is held by ,prof4 ,lvy-,bruhl gave great interest and importance to a systematic judgment from his pen such as the present work4 ,the commemorative festival of ,comte held this year1 when the statue in the ,place de la ,sorbonne was unveiled by the ,minister of ,war1 in presence of an international gathering of delegates from the civilised world1 has called fresh attention to the lifework of the philosopher who died #de years ago4 ,accordingly1 a translation of ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl's book was urgently demanded4 ,when ,i was invited to add to this translation1 which ,i can confidently recommend to students of philosophy1 a slight introductory essay1 ,i proposed to use a piece which ,i wrote on the publication of the ,french work4 ,it appeared in 8,the ,speaker10 7#ad ,april1 #aijj27 and1 as ,i see no reason to modify my opinion of this masterly book1 ,i leave it nearly as then written4 ,i may add that the learned ,professor was a member of the ,international ,committee with many eminent representatives of the government of ,france and of the ,universities of the ,old and ,new ,world1 which in ,may last raised the monument to ,auguste ,comte in ,paris4 ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl followed up his ,history of ,modern ,philosophy in ,france by a substantial work on the philosophy of ,auguste ,comte4 ,it forms a volume of the ,bibliothque de ,philosophie ,contemporaine1 which has already devoted four other works to the ,positive ,philosophy4 ,it is as well to premise that this treatise dealt solely with the philosophy1 not with the polity1 or any part of the religious scheme of ,comte4 ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl writes as a student1 but not as an adherent of ,auguste ,comte4 ,his entire work is rather an exposition1 not a refutation1 or a criticism1 or an advocacy of ,comte's philosophical system4 ,but it may be said at once that no one abroad or at home1 certainly neither ,mill1 nor ,lewes1 nor ,spencer1 nor ,caird1 has so truly grasped and assimilated ,comte's ideas as ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl has done4 ,in his ,introduction ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl very clearly states the scope of his work1 and his own general attitude4 ,he traces the origin of ,comte's philosophy in the mental effervescence of the first generation of the present century towards a reorganisation of society1 after the upheaval left by the ,revolution and its consequences4 ,he correctly states the relation of ,st4 ,simon to ,comte as being that of an initial stimulus4 ,the cardinal difference between ,comte and all the socialists and founders of social and religious ,utopias consisted in this1 that ,comte saw the necessity of a new system of philosophy as the indispensable preliminary to any reorganisation of society4 ,in #ahbd1 at the age of twenty-six1 ,comte wrote3--8,discussions about institutions are pure folly until the spiritual reconstitution of society is effected or much advanced40 ,the construction of an intellectual reorganisation1 before any social restoration was possible1 occupied twenty or thirty years of ,comte's life4 ,and when he opened his ,polity1 or social and religious scheme1 the conditions had much changed3 the public and its interests were no longer what they had been in #ahbj-cj4 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl effectively disposes of the objection of ,littr1 to which ,mill gave countenance1 that the ,polity1 with the whole of ,comte's second or social system1 was in contradiction with his first and philosophic system as propounded in the ,philosophy4 ,as ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl proves1 the six ,opuscules dating from #ahai to #ahbf1 some years before the ,cours1 which only began in #ahcj and occupied twelve years1 contain in germ the scheme ultimately elaborated in the ,politique1 from #ahea to #ahed4 ,besides this1 the ,letters to ,mill1 which ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl edited in #ahii1 and the ,letters to ,valat1 which are long antecedent to the ,politique1 show the same governing design4 ,to the unity of ,comte's doctrine ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl bears emphatic testimony3-- 8,his whole life was the methodical execution of his programme4444 ,he had but one system1 not two4 ,from the ,opuscules of his twentieth year1 to the ,synthse of his last year1 it is the development of one and the same conception40 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl then explains that1 whilst recognising the entire coherence of ,comte's collective labours1 he proposes to confine his present study to the earlier and principal work1 the ,philosophy1 which in ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl's opinion is the dominant and more fruitful composition4 ,this he regards as the representative work of the nineteenth century1 as shown by the intellectual history of the period4 ,he points to its influence on thought in ,england1 in ,europe1 and in ,america4 ,it will surprise many persons to learn that in ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl's opinion two eminent ,french writers1 who assuredly neither were1 nor were supposed to be1 ,positivists1 8have done more for the diffusion of the ideas and method of ,comte than ,littr and all the other ,positivists together40 ,these two are ,taine and ,renan1 much as they differed from ,comte's actual scheme and doctrines4 ,renan indeed spoke of ,comte as destined to prove one of the typical names of the century4 ,the present writer remembers ,renan saying to him with a most genial welcome1 8,i too am a believer in the religion of humanity40 ,history1 romance1 poetry1 says ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl1 have all reflected the positive spirit3-- 8,contemporary sociology is the creation of ,comte2 scientific psychology1 in a certain degree has sprung from him4 ,it is not rash to conclude that the ,positivist ,philosophy expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age40 ,it is clear that1 if ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl is in no sense an adherent of ,comte1 he is a most sympathetic and discerning master of the positive system4 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl opens his analysis of ,comte's philosophy by examining his main conceptions3--7#a7 ,the law of the three states1 theological1 metaphysical1 and positive1 through which all human ideas pass2 7#b7 the ,classification of the ,sciences2 7#c7 the scheme of each science in turn4 ,and he closes with an explanation of the general doctrines of ,humanity1 as the centre of human thought1 feeling1 and activity4 ,the law of the three states announced by ,comte in #ahbb1 is thoroughly explained and entirely assimilated by ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl4 ,its demonstration1 he thinks1 is complete when we recognise that1 although many orders of ideas have not finally reached their positive state1 all of them exhibit the tendency to the same evolution1 and there is no single instance of a conception of a positive science ever retrograding into unverified figment4 ,of course the terms theological and metaphysical have to be understood in the sense adopted by ,comte--i4e4 8anthropomorphic0 and 8hypothetical10 a bare hypothesis wearing a scientific form4 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl himself regards the law as irrefutable and of capital importance1 8the corner stone of the positive system40 ,our professor is equally conclusive in his estimate of ,comte's classification of the sciences4 ,he quite demolishes the objections made to it by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer in his essay with that title4 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl repeats the criticisms to which ,spencer has been exposed in this country and abroad by ,littr1 ,lewes1 ,mill1 and others4 ,and he has no difficulty in showing that ,mr4 ,spencer's objections are due to his very slight acquaintance with ,comte's text1 and his own superficial study of the ,english abridgments4 ,in proposing a classification of the concrete sciences1 ,mr4 ,spencer enters on a task which ,comte distinctly repudiates1 and which on good grounds he treats as philosophically impracticable for purposes of evolutionary sequence4 ,comte's strictly relative theory excludes such a scale of concrete science2 whilst ,spencer's absolute theory of the universe forces him to attempt it in vain4 ,if it be objected that ,comte's ascending scale of the sciences is 8anthropocentric10 the answer is that1 when reasonably understood as a philosophic device for sorting human ideas1 not as a statement of absolute truth1 the 8anthropocentric0 arrangement of human knowledge is the only one which is at once possible and useful4 ,it would need a long essay even to sketch ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl's analysis of ,comte's conception of science1 of law1 and of the six dominant sciences4 ,he has thoroughly assimilated the positive spirit1 that science implies a co-ordination of laws1 not an encyclopdia of facts1 that it is relative to our powers of observation and reasoning and not an absolute explanation of the universe in itself4 ,he goes through the sciences1 physical1 social1 and moral1 in turn1 as treated by ,comte1 and justly explains that ,comte never attempted or conceived a vade-mecum or handbook of contemporary scientific knowledge1 but a scheme for the co-ordination of general ideas of science4 ,a real 8philosophy of the sciences0 is something wholly distinct from a compendium of all the sciences--a thing which in #ahdj was far less possible than it might be now4 ,controversialists have reproached ,comte with the obvious fact that his concrete science is now sixty years old4 ,in dealing with these shallow criticisms1 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl has shown how little able is any narrow specialist to understand the abstract conceptions of a real philosopher4 ,one of the most common of these misconceptions is the ignorant charge that ,comte repudiated 8psychology10 in the sense of the laws of man's intellectual and moral nature4 8,psychologie10 as ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl shows1 when ,comte wrote1 meant ,cousin's futile introspection of the ego4 ,comte certainly rejected that as idle1 as do all competent psychologists of our time4 ,psychology1 meaning the laws of mind and will1 was not only an indispensable basis of ,comte's system1 but its rational1 systematic foundation dates from ,comte's suggestions4 ,his signal contribution to psychology lies1 not in his doctrine of its physiological basis1 but in his referring it to sociology as its guide and inspiration4 ,m4 ,lvy-,bruhl concludes his study with a co-ordinate table of twelve contrasted propositions of the metaphysical and of the positive systems respectively4 ,these show how simple and rational a transition is that between ,positivism and the older theological and metaphysical hypotheses of the universe and of ,man4 ,we welcome a book which all positivists will regard as fair1 learned1 and instructive1 and which all students of philosophy must regard as a masterly study of a comprehensive subject4 #deth ,anniversary of the death of ,comte1 7#eth ,,september1 #aijb47 ,,translator',s ,,preface ,fifty years have now elapsed since ,auguste ,comte's monumental work1 the ,cours de ,philosophie ,positive1 was first introduced to ,english readers by ,miss ,harriet ,martineau4 ,but her work was much more than a translation4 ,it was a condensed exposition of ,comte's doctrines1 done with such mastery that it obtained the emphatic approval of ,comte himself who1 in such matters1 was not very easily satisfied4 ,in ,harriet ,martineau's case1 both the substance of the book and the ,english form in which it was offered to the public1 were her work4 ,in the case of the present volume1 while a woman is once more responsible for the translation1 the substance of the book1 that is the comprehensive exposition of ,comte's system in the light of all his published works1 is from the pen of ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl1 and readers who are acquainted with ,harriet ,martineau's book will be all the more in a position to appreciate the importance of this fresh contribution to the elucidation of the thought of ,auguste ,comte4 ,we fear that the clearness of style1 the richness of expression1 the power of condensed thought which characterise our author will be found to have been often weakened1 if not sometimes altogether obliterated1 in this translation4 ,the striking simplicity of the text at first deceived me into the belief that ,i could do justice to it4 ,i was often tempted to sacrifice the literal sense in order to preserve some of the graces of the original4 ,yet ,i hope to be forgiven for having uniformly preferred to err through too much faithfulness to the letter4 ,my sole object has been to enable the ,english reader to get at the meaning of the text4 ,but1 while ,i have only too much reason to solicit the indulgence of my readers1 conscious as ,i am of the many defects of this translation1 ,i feel that no apology is needed for bringing that of which it is a translation within the reach of the ,english-speaking public4 ,we live in times when the intimate relation between the natural sciences and social questions is increasingly felt4 ,old landmarks are disappearing1 new foundations are being laid1 new problems are constantly arising1 generating doubts and perplexities for which the solutions of other days supply no adequate answer4 ,meanwhile1 as the facts of science reveal to us more of the conditions of human life1 we give1 more or less consciously1 a larger place to sociology in our mental preoccupations4 ,thus renewed interest is being felt in the writings of the ,founder of the ,science of ,sociology4 ,the most conflicting schools of thought study the works of ,auguste ,comte and many ask3 who is that man whose ideas appear to contain a clearer message to our generation than they did to his own8 ,for such inquirers ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl's book should prove singularly useful and timely4 ,it is a plain1 independent account of what ,comte really taught1 written by one possessed of the fullest qualifications for such a task1 and no work of recent date will enable students to understand so clearly the solution given by the ,french philosopher to the perplexing moral1 social1 and religious problems of our time4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 8il s'agit de tout comprendre1 non de tout admirer10 and ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl is himself too much of a philosopher to forget that golden rule2 but1 nevertheless1 by his free1 independent judgment of ,comte's teaching1 he helps us to realise to what an extent1 in these days1 ,comte is inspiring many who are not perhaps conscious of following him4 ,,kathleen ,,de ,,beaumont-,,klein4 ,,contents ,,page ,note by ,mr4 ,frederic ,harrison v4 ,translator's ,preface xiii4 ,introduction by ,professor ,lvy-,bruhl #a ,,book ,i4 ,,chapter ,i4--,the ,philosophical ,problem #bc 8 ,,ii4--,the ,law of the ,three ,states #ce 8 ,,iii4--,the ,classification of the ,sciences #di 8 ,,iv4--,science #fj 8 ,v4--,science 7continued7 ,phenomena and ,laws #gi 8 ,,vi4--,science 7continued7 ,positive ,logic #ajc ,,book ,,ii4 ,,introduction4--,the ,philosophy of the ,sciences #aba ,,chapter ,i4--,mathematics #abe 8 ,,ii4--,astronomy #adb 8 ,,iii4--,sciences of the ,inorganic ,world #aed 8 ,,iv4--,biology #aga 8 ,v4--,psychology #ahh ,,book ,,iii4 ,,chapter ,i4--,transition from ,animality to ,humanity--,art and ,language #bac 8 ,,ii4--,general ,considerations on ,social ,science #bcj 8 ,,iii4--,social ,statics #bdi 8 ,,iv4--,social ,dynamics #bfj 8 ,v4--,the ,philosophy of ,history #bgf ,,book ,,iv4 ,,chapter ,i4--,the ,principles of ,ethics #cjc 8 ,,ii4--,social ,ethics #cai 8 ,,iii4--,the ,idea of ,humanity #ccd ,,conclusion #cdc ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,auguste ,,comte4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,every new system of philosophy1 however original in appearance1 is more or less directly related to the doctrines which have preceded it4 ,but it is also connected with more general conditions in a manner no less close1 if not so immediately obvious4 ,it depends upon a whole set of social conditions4 ,the influence of the religious1 political1 economical1 intellectual phenomena1 in a word of the contemporary milieu upon this system is as indisputable as its own influence upon the milieu4 ,it is therefore not enough to study it as a self-sufficient whole4 ,this whole which is in itself but a part1 must be restored to its place within the greater whole which alone explains its essential characteristics4 ,this rule of historical method1 which ,comte likes to recall1 applies very well to his own system4 ,in order to reach as complete an understanding as possible of his doctrine1 to appreciate exactly its general orientation1 to understand the importance which the author attaches in it to this or that part1 the study of the text will not suffice4 ,we must further take into account the historical circumstances in which the doctrine found its birth1 the general movement of contemporary ideas1 and the manifold influences which have reacted upon the mind of the philosopher4 ,now one great fact1 above all others1 dominates the period in which the positive philosophy appeared4 ,it is the ,french ,revolution1 as ,comte expressly states3 without it1 neither the theory of progress1 nor consequently social science1 nor consequently again positive philosophy would have been possible4 ,was it not1 moreover1 inevitable that this extraordinary social upheaval should by reflex action have determined a vast and prolonged movement in philosophical and political speculation8 ,the effects of this reflex action varied according to the value and the originality of the minds which experienced them4 ,but in the greatest as in the most mediocre we recognise infallibly certain common features4 ,for instance1 men and women1 in the rising generation at the beginning of the ,,xix4 century1 never fail to put the same question to themselves3 8,what social institutions should be established after the ,revolution80 and by this all understand not only the political form of government1 but the very principles of social order3 a problem which appeared as urgent from the practical point of view1 as it was supreme from the theoretical point of view4 ,it is this problem in various forms which preoccupies ,chateaubriand as well as ,fourier and ,saint-,simon1 and ,joseph de ,maistre as well as ,cousin and ,comte4 ,all agree upon the first point4 ,we must 8reconstruct40 ,an 8organic0 period must succeed the 8critical0 period which has just come to an end4 ,according to ,saint ,simon's striking expression1 humanity is not made to inhabit ruins4 ,the revolutionary storm had been so formidable1 the din so deafening1 the social back-wash so violent1 that no one exactly measured the effect which had been produced4 ,many institutions which had only been shaken seemed to be overthrown4 ,a good part of the old rgime had even gone through the crisis without being too greatly damaged1 and had survived4 ,but this fact1 which was very well appreciated by the men of #ahej1 could not yet be discovered by the first generation of the century4 ,it conscientiously believed that the old rgime had crumbled altogether1 and that the task either of restoring it1 or of again laying down the very bases of society belonged to it4 ,in this the first generation remained faithful to the spirit of the ,revolution1 which had considered itself as an effort to institute an entirely new social and political system1 a thought in which the civilised world had shared4 ,now1 in spite of the labours of the revolutionary assemblies1 in spite of the power and of the great talent which the ,convention had at its command1 this ambitious hope had not been realised4 ,the question remained open after the ,directoire and after the ,empire4 ,when the old rgime was supposed to have been destroyed1 how was society to be 8reorganised08 ,thus1 at the opening of the ,,xix4 century1 philosophical speculation was at first to be directed towards the religious and social problems4 ,undoubtedly the influence of the uninterrupted advance of the positive sciences was also felt at the same time4 ,a study of ,auguste ,comte's system could hardly fail to recognise the fact4 ,but1 even with ,comte1 scientific interest1 however active it may be1 is subordinated to the social interest4 ,what he asks of philosophy is the rational settlement of the bases of modern society4 ,thus1 he means to discover the elements of a religion which can be substituted to ,catholicism1 whose mission he considers as at an end4 8,the ,,xix4 century10 ,ranke has said1 8is especially a century of restoration40 ,a deep saying1 which exactly expresses one of the leading features in the historical physiognomy of this century4 ,it is precisely thus that it was conceived by those who inaugurated it4 ,such indeed is the main tendency of the greater number of philosophical doctrines which have expressed its most intimate characteristics4 ,only1 as is generally the case1 this restoration absorbs and consolidates a large part of the results acquired during the crisis4 ,at the same time new problems1 raised especially by the development of industry in its larger aspects1 made clear-sighted men feel that the revolutionary period1 however desirable it might be to bring it to a close1 was really only beginning4 ,,ii4 ,like many of his contemporaries ,auguste ,comte thought himself singled out for the mission of formulating the principle of 8social reorganisation40 ,but this is where he differs from them4 ,each of the reformers begins by proposing his own solution of the social problem1 and all his efforts only tend to justify it4 ,as this problem is the most urgent one in their eyes1 it is also the only one which they have put directly to themselves4 ,now this method1 according to ,comte1 is a bad one1 and in following it they court certain failure4 ,for a social problem is such that its solution cannot be obtained immediately2 other problems1 more theoretical in character1 must be solved beforehand4 ,it is therefore these which must first be dealt with1 if we seek anything else than the lengthening of the history of political dreams and of social chimeras4 8,institutions10 ,comte says1 8depend on morals1 and morals1 in their turn1 depend on beliefs40 ,every scheme of new institutions will therefore be useless so long as morals have not been 8reorganised10 and so long as1 to reach this end1 a general system of opinions has not been founded1 which are accepted by all minds as true1 as was1 for instance1 the system of ,catholic dogma in ,europe in the ,middle ,ages4 ,therefore1 either the social problem admits of no solution--and ,comte does not stop at this pessimistic hypothesis1--or the solution sought for supposes that a new philosophy shall have been previously established4 ,this is why ,comte wishes to be at first only a philosopher4 ,in #ahbd he writes 8,i regard all discussions upon institutions as pure nonsense1 until the spiritual reorganisation of society has been brought about1 or at least is very far advanced40#a ,comte's originality will therefore lie in taking from science and philosophy the principles upon which depends the social reorganisation1 which is the real end of his efforts4 ,while having the same aim as the reformers of his time1 he will follow a different path4 ,it is indeed a polity which he also claims to found1 but this polity is positive3 it rests upon ethics and philosophy both equally positive4 ,undoubtedly the polity is the raison d'tre of the system1 which ,comte has constructed for it4 ,but1 without the system1 the ,polity would remain arbitrary4 ,it would lack authority and that which would make it legitimate4 ,philosophy is no less indispensable to the foundation of politics1 than are politics to the completion and unification of philosophy4 ,whence comes it that ,comte has put this great problem1 which preoccupied all the minds of his time1 in a form which belongs to him alone8 ,we cannot here enter into the detailed biographical study which would throw some light upon this question4 ,let us only recall that ,comte was born in a ,catholic ,royalist family4 ,from the age of thirteen1 he tells us1 he had broken with the political convictions and the religious beliefs of his own people4 ,perhaps1 however1 the trace of these beliefs was less completely effaced than he himself thought4 ,during the whole of his life he professed the liveliest admiration for ,catholicism4 ,on his own confession he was especially inspired in this by ,joseph de ,maistre2 but1 if he so much appreciated the book du ,pape1 did not his great sympathy partly spring from impressions of childhood indelibly stamped upon a passionate and sensitive nature8 ,whatever may be the case1 the first subject which seriously occupied his mind was mathematics4 ,being admitted to the ,ecole polytechnique a year before the usual age1 he began to study the natural sciences4 ,at the same time he 8meditates0 upon ,montesquieu and ,condorcet4 ,he approaches philosophy properly so called by reading the ,scottish philosophers1 ,ferguson1 ,adam ,smith1 ,hume1 and he sees very well that the last one is far above the others4 ,having left the ,ecole polytechnique1 he remains in ,paris1 and while giving lessons to earn his living1 he completes his scientific education with ,delambre1 de ,blainville1 and the ,baron ,thnard4 ,he reads assiduously ,fontenelle1 d',alembert1 ,diderot1 and especially ,condorcet who has distilled and clarified the philosophy of the ,,xviii4 century4 ,while studying ,descartes and the great mathematicians who came after him1 he also follows attentively the labours of naturalists and of biologists1 of ,lamarck1 for instance1 of ,cuvier1 of ,gall1 of ,cabanis1 of ,bichat1 ,broussais and of so many others4 ,he understands the philosophical importance of these new sciences1 as already pointed out by ,diderot4 ,but for all that he does not neglect historical and social studies4 ,he has read the ideologists1 among whom he especially esteemed ,destutt de ,tracy4 ,without giving up ,montesquieu or ,condorcet1 he studies the traditionalists3 ,m4 de ,bonald1 this 8energetic thinker0 and1 more than the others1 ,joseph de ,maistre who made the deepest and most enduring impression upon his mind4 ,before knowing ,saint-,simon then--and his correspondence with ,valat testifies to the fact--,comte already possessed a large portion of the materials for his future system4 ,up to this time his labours had borne upon two distinct orders of subjects4 ,the one scientific proper 7mathematics1 physics and chemistry1 natural sciences7 the other more properly political 7history1 politics1 and social questions74 ,in #ahah ,comte meets ,saint-,simon4 ,he is attracted and surrenders himself almost unreservedly4 ,for four years he works with ,saint-,simon4 ,he loves and venerates him as a master4 ,he feeds upon his ideas1 and collaborates in his labours and enterprises4 ,he calls himself 8pupil of ,m4 ,saint-,simon40 ,however1 from #ahbb he detaches himself from this greatly-admired master1 and in #ahbd the rupture is complete and final4 ,what can have happened8 ,the grievances brought forward by ,comte are only of secondary importance4 ,as a matter of fact master and pupil were bound to separate sooner or later4 ,there was a radical incompatibility between those two minds4 ,saint-,simon1 marvellously inventive and original1 throws out a multitude of new ideas and views1 of which many will be fruitful4 ,but he quickly affirms1 and proves little4 ,he has not the patience to continue working long at the same subject1 or to probe it to the bottom in an orderly way4 ,comte1 on the contrary1 thinks with ,descartes1 that method is essential to science1 and that 8logical coherence0 is the surest sign of truth4 ,he could not long remain satisfied with ,saint-,simon's disconnected essays4 ,he could even1 without dishonesty1 turn to account the brilliant but disorderly intuition in which his master abounds and believe that his own doctrine alone gave those disconnected essays scientific value1 because his doctrine alone was in a position to systematise them and to connect them with their principles4 ,it would therefore seem that we can admit at the same time that ,saint-,simon's influence upon ,comte was considerable1 and1 on the other hand1 that ,comte's philosophical originality is no less certain4 ,saint-,simon's influence would chiefly have consisted3 #a4 in suggesting to ,comte a certain number of general ideas and of views of detail1 especially for his philosophy of history2 #b4 in showing him how the two orders of labours which he had been following until then were to blend into a single one1 through the creation of a science which would be social1 and consequently of a polity which would be scientific4 ,would this synthesis of the two orders of studies which ,comte had undertaken side by side have been produced in his mind1 had he not known ,saint-,simon8 ,in any case it would have been produced more slowly4 ,let us at least leave ,saint-,simon the credit which ,comte himself granted him1 that of having 8started0 his disciple upon the line best suited to his genius4 ,the intellectual intimacy between them could never be perfect4 ,if ,comte entered entirely into ,saint-,simon's ideas1 7without adopting them all1 however71 in return there was an aspect in ,comte's thought which ,saint-,simon scarcely discerned through the lack of a sufficiently strong scientific education4 ,it is enough to see how he speaks of the law of universal attraction4 ,comte must have been scandalised by it4 ,so1 at the very moment when he submits with most enthusiasm and youthful confidence to ,saint-,simon's influence he does not neglect his special mathematical studies4 8,my labours10 he writes to ,valat on the #bhth of ,september1 #ahai1 8are and will be in two orders1 scientific and political4 ,i should set little value upon the scientific studies1 did ,i not continually think of their utility to the human race4 ,as well then amuse myself in deciphering very complicated puzzles4 ,i have a supreme aversion for scientific labours whose utility1 either direct or remote1 ,i do not see4 ,but ,i also confess1 in spite of all my philanthropy1 that ,i should put far less eagerness into political labours1 if they did not stimulate the intellect1 if they did not bring my brain strongly into play1 in a word3 if they were not difficult40#b ,a year later1 in sending a parcel of political tracts to his friend1 in which he distinguishes what is in his own manner and what is from ,saint-,simon1 he says that he is besides very eagerly occupied with mathematical work4 ,he wants to take part in the competition opened by the ,institut2 and his ambition is soon to enter the ,academie des ,sciences4 ,from #ahbb1 in the celebrated pamphlet entitled ,plan des travaux scientifiques ncessaires pour rorganiser la socit1 the synthesis between the two orders of labours is accomplished in ,comte's mind1 thanks to the double discovery of the classification of the sciences and of the great law of social dynamics4 ,we know that this work was1 if not the principal reason1 at least the occasion of the rupture between ,comte and ,saint-,simon4 ,it is the moment which ,comte himself considers to have been decisive in the history of his mind4 ,the whole of his future doctrine was essentially contained in this pamphlet4 ,the preface added by ,saint-,simon shows that he did not understand its full bearings4 ,comte is henceforth his own master4 ,at length he has found what for several years he had been seeking without being clearly conscious of it2 and the rest of his life is now consecrated to the work which he has conceived and of which he has just outlined the plan4 ,since he has established a philosophical hierarchy of the sciences1 whose summit is crowned by social physics1 he has no further occasion to ask how he can conciliate his scientific labours with his political studies4 8,in the interval of my great philosophical labours10 he writes on the #hth ,september1 #ahbd1 8,i propose to publish a few more special works upon the fundamental points in mathematics1 which ,i have long conceived1 and which ,i have at last been able to connect with my general ideas of positive philosophy3 so that ,i shall be free to give myself up to them without breaking through the unity of my thought1 which is the great condition for the life of a thinker40#c ,and in a very remarkable letter to de ,blainville1 on the #bgth ,february1 #ahbf1 he explains in the clearest way the generating idea of his system4 8,my conception of politics as social physics1 and the law which ,i have discovered upon the three successive states of the human mind are but one and the same thought1 considered from the two distinct points of view of method and of science4 ,that being established1 ,i shall show that this single thought directly and completely satisfies the great actual social need1 considered under its two aspects of theoretical need and practical need4 ,i will therefore show that what on one hand tends to consolidate the future by re-establishing order and discipline among intellects1 tends1 on the other hand to regulate the present1 as far as possible1 by furnishing statesmen with rational lines to work upon40#d ,henceforth ,comte's life was to be but the methodical execution of his programme4 ,in turn1 with perfect regularity1 he wrote and published the philosophy of the sciences and of history1 the ethics1 the positive polity and the positive religion4 ,does this mean that ,comte's thought remained stationary8 ,most certainly not4 ,it evolved from #ahbb to #aheg4 ,but this evolution followed a curve which an attentive observer might have sketched beforehand after having read the ,plan des travaux scientifiques ncssaires pour rorganiser la socit4 ,comte had but one system1 not two4 ,from the opuscules of his twentieth year to the ,synthse subjective of his last year1 it is the development of one and the same conception4 ,,iii4 ,the unity of the doctrine has been disputed4 ,comte himself distinguished two successive 8careers0 in his life4 ,in the first1 he says1 without affected modesty1 he was ,aristotle3 in the second he will be ,st4 ,paul4 ,the founder of the philosophy did but pave the way for the organiser of the religion4 8,i have systematically devoted my life to draw at last from real science the necessary basis of a sound philosophy1 according to which ,i was afterwards to construct the true religion40#e ,many of ,comte's disciples1 even some of the more illustrious1 and at first more fervent1 such as ,littr1 refused to follow him in his 8second career40 ,their admiration for the philosopher could not persuade them to submit to the pontiff4 ,littr and his friends were undoubtedly free to follow ,comte only up to a certain point1 and1 while accepting his philosophy1 to reject his religion4 ,if they had stopped there1 ,comte could but have blamed their want of logic and himself have disowned 8those incomplete positivists1 who are not more intelligent because they call themselves intellectual40 ,but it is they1 on the contrary1 who accused ,comte of inconsistency and of self contradiction4 ,comte1 they said1 betrayed his own principles4 ,the 8subjective method0 in his second career ruined the precious results he had obtained in the first by his objective method4 ,in refusing to go beyond the ,cours de philosophic positive they remained more faithful to ,comte's master-thought than ,comte himself4 ,in a word1 they defended true positivism against its misguided founder4 ,comte answered these attacks1 which were all the more painful to him because they came from those whom he had long regarded as his faithful disciples and his best friends4 ,in the course of this work it will appear that those attacks were unfounded4#f ,comte's two methods are not opposed to each other4 ,they complete each other1 as do also the two 8careers0 which they characterize4 ,it is true that during the last two years of his life an increasingly marked tinge of mysticism spread over his thought and his writings4 ,his brief friendship with ,mme4 de ,vaux1 and the death of this 8holy0 friend had stirred very strong emotions within him1 and these emotions with him were transformed into ideas which came to be incorporated into his system4 ,at the same time he laboured to organise the ,religion of ,humanity4 ,he claimed to secure for it an authority over souls at least equal to that which had been enjoyed by ,catholicism at the period of its greatest power4 ,the exaltation of his sentiments1 the preoccupation of the new religion which was to be established1 the ever-present consciousness of his sacerdotal mission1 all this was necessarily bound to react upon the doctrine which he had founded in the preceding period4 ,thus the philosophy of the sciences and of history is no longer presented to us in the same way in the ,politique positive as it is in the ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,but it is designedly so4 ,the difference in tone and the difference of method in the setting forth is explained1 according to ,comte1 by the different object which he has in view in each of these works4#g ,essentially1 the philosophical doctrine has not varied4 ,all we can grant to ,littr is that by the fact of its being presented from the religious1 that is to say from the synthetic1 point of view in the ,politique positive1 it undergoes an apparent alteration4 ,if we only knew the doctrine through this work we should not get the perfectly clear view of it given in the ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,comte himself often advises the reader of the ,politique to refer to his 8great fundamental treatise40 ,but1 on the other hand1 in carefully reading the ,cours1 we find numerous indications of the future structure of the ,politique positive4 ,comte might have been content with a reference to the ,cours1 to answer the objections of his dissenting disciples4 ,he did better4 ,he reprinted at the end of the fourth volume of his ,politique positive six pamphlets written in his youth from #ahah to #ahbf4 ,in them1 not only is his philosophy already sketched in its main outlines with sufficient precision2 but the idea that philosophy is a preliminary work1 a simple prelude and that the essential work1 the supreme end1 is the positive religion which shall arise upon this philosophy--this idea is the very soul of these pamphlets4 ,the proof is given4 ,upon the question of the unity of his doctrine ,comte wins the case against ,littr4 ,,iv4 ,in his correspondence with ,stuart ,mill which takes place between #ahda and #ahdf1 that is to say which embraces the end of his first career and the beginning of the second1 ,comte has repeatedly explained how the two successive portions of his work are connected together1 and in what they are distinct4 ,it may not be useless to quote his own words4 8,the second half of my philosophical life10 he says1 8must differ notably from the first1 especially in that feeling must take1 if not an obvious1 at least a real part in it1 one as great as that of the intellect4 ,the great work of systematization which has been reserved for our century1 must indeed embrace equally1 both feelings and ideas as a whole4 ,truly it was the ideas which had first to be systematized1 under pain of failing to bring about a complete regeneration by falling into a more or less vague mysticism4 ,that is why my fundamental work had to appeal almost exclusively to the intellect4 ,it was to be a work of research1 and accessorily of discussion1 destined to discover and to constitute the true universal principles1 in rising by hierarchical degrees from the simplest scientific questions to the highest social speculations40#h ,but this being done1 ,comte passed to the systematisation of the feelings1 8a necessary sequel to that of the ideas1 and an indispensable basis for that of the institutions40 ,it is1 therefore1 an entirely new work4 ,comte can imagine without difficulty that it might have been reserved for another than himself4 ,his personal mission might have been limited to the foundation of the philosophy which puts an end to the 8mental anarchy40 ,the ethics and the religion which were to be established upon this philosophy1 to put an end to moral and political anarchy1 would1 in this case1 have been the work of one of his successors4 ,stubborn labour and good fortune allowed ,comte to undertake this work himself4 ,but even in #ahde1 he says how 8under the holy influence of ,mdme4 de ,vaux10 he had very clearly seen his two careers as distinct and as one1 these two careers of which the second was to transform philosophy into religion1 as the first had changed science into philosophy4 ,the object of the present work is to study ,comte's philosophy properly so called1 leaving aside the transformation of this philosophy into religion4 ,the choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one1 since1 in order to justify it1 we have the distinction formally established by ,comte himself1 when he admits that his philosophy and his religion might have been the work of two different persons4 ,it will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of ,littr1 and of the 8incomplete positivists40 ,by the difference1 we shall answer1 which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of view4 ,it is from the latter point of view that ,littr and his friends reject the 8systematisation of the feelings10 the subjective method and the religion of ,humanity4 ,it is as positivists that they connect themselves with the first half of the doctrine1 and that they exclude the second half4 ,but we are here working from the historical point of view1 and the historian1 while using his right to define the limits of his work has nothing to exclude from the doctrine which he sets forth4 ,as a matter of fact far from claiming with ,littr that the second part of ,comte's work weakens and contradicts the first1 we have recognised that they both form a whole of which he had drawn out the plan in his early writings1 and that he was not wrong in taking as an epigraph for his ,politique positive the fine words of the poet-philosopher3 ,what is a great life8 ,a thought of youth fulfilled in riper age4 ,but then1 why only study the first of the two careers1 why not respect the integrity of that whole which1 according to us1 ,littr ought not to have disregarded8--,we do respect it1 for we do not arbitrarily exclude from the doctrine any of the parts which ,comte included in it4 ,if we make the philosophy proper the sole object of this study1 in it we shall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which ,comte placed it4 ,on this condition alone1 our study will be accurate4 ,but once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed our right1 in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy4 ,there are two different ways of conceiving the history of a doctrine4 ,the historian may place himself exactly in the mental attitude of the philosopher whom he studies1 and think again after him his leading ideas1 as indeed he should do2 but further1 he can judge1 just as the philosopher himself does1 of the respective importance of problems1 without allowing himself to distinguish what is secondary from what is essential4 ,the historical work then assumes the shape of a 8monography10 or of an 8intellectual biography20 or else1 while endeavouring to penetrate to the heart of the system1 in order to grasp it in its principles1 the historian may nevertheless place himself outside it and above it1 and try to 8situate0 it in the general evolution of philosophy4 ,then the system is better understood in its entirety1 since we can see its relations with the preceding1 contemporary and following doctrines4 ,at the same time it becomes possible to separate what is of enduring philosophical interest1 from what was merely of secondary or momentary importance1 although the author may have judged otherwise4 ,to borrow from ,comte a distinction which he often uses1 the former of these methods is better suited to erudition1 the latter to history4 ,applied to the study of his doctrine1 the first method would have us to consider positive philosophy with him as simply preparatory to the ,religion of ,humanity1 which was the first and the last goal of his efforts4 ,the writer should undoubtedly give a large place to this 8prambule indispensable10 to this great fundamental work1 in which ,comte lays down the intellectual bases of his political and religious system4 ,but he ought nevertheless to subordinate it to this system and place in the front rank the 8social reorganisation10 the dogma1 the worship and the rgime of the ,religion of ,humanity1 the institution of a spiritual power1 in fact the whole of that portion of ,comte's work in which he takes up again 8the ,catholic programme of the ,middle ,ages10 confident of fulfilling it better than ,catholicism itself ever did4 ,now it is not in this part of his work that ,comte shows himself most original1 and that his thought has been most fruitful4 ,the problem of 8social reorganisation0 does not belong to him alone4 ,its presence is felt1 so to speak1 in the air at the time that ,comte's youth was passing away4 ,the common aspirations of the generation which grew up with him were to re-establish order and to fix the conditions of progress1 to determine the relations of ,ethics to ,politics1 and to put a new religion in the place apparently left free by ,catholicism4 ,the ,politique positive which claims to satisfy these aspirations1 corresponds in ,comte's system 7all proper allowance being made for the substance of the doctrines7 to what the ,saint ,simon school had already attempted to do before #ahcj4 ,it comes thirty years later than the previous attempts of the same kind1 because ,comte wanted to found his 8social organisation0 upon philosophy and morality1 and because this speculative effort occupied the better part of his youth and of his maturity4 ,but it originated in fact in the first third of the century as is proved by the pamphlets reprinted by ,comte4 ,when it appears between #ahej and #aheg1 a new generation brought up in other political and social circumstances gives it only passing attention4 ,other problems command attention more forcibly1 and claim a more urgent solution4 ,the philosophy of history no longer excites the same passionate interest4 ,men are less anxious to see the birth of a new religion1 and ,catholicism has proved that its vitality is still very strong4 ,therefore neither ,comte's genius1 nor the precautions which he thought he had taken to place his 8social reorganisation0 upon a rational basis1 could shield it from the common fate which sooner or later overtakes all attempts similar to his own4 ,undoubtedly the ,politique positive and the other works of ,comte's second career are full of just and deep views4 ,whatever may be the subject upon which a great mind has worked it is always interesting and profitable to see what the reflection of that mind has discovered in it4 ,but1 in fact1 that portion of his work1 which to him was the most important1 is far from maintaining this position in the eyes of the historian4 ,by his ,politique positive ,comte only represents his generation4 ,by his philosophy properly so called he is a 8representative man0 of his entire century4 ,is it necessary to prove this8 ,the intellectual history of our age witnesses to it at every step4 ,of all the systems which found birth in ,france in the ,,xix4 century1 this one alone found a hearing beyond the frontiers and left a deep impression upon foreign thinkers4 ,comte's philosophy was at first received in ,england and in ,holland even with more sympathy than in ,france4 ,john ,stuart ,mill1 ,herbert ,spencer1 ,george ,lewes1 ,george ,elliot and a number of ,english philosophers and writers drew more or less of their inspiration from it4 ,to this day1 it is defended by men of great talent in ,england4 ,it is true that no ,german philosopher had the same personal relations with ,comte as ,john ,stuart ,mill1 but as a matter of fact1 for thirty years the positive spirit has gradually gained ground in the ,german ,universities4 ,to be convinced of this1 it is enough to see how metaphysics are set aside in them and to observe the lines on which the moral and social sciences are taught4 ,in the ,latin countries of the two hemispheres ,comte's influence has been exercised with even greater strength1 in ,spain1 in ,portugal1 in ,south ,america2 and ,north ,america has also its ,positivist societies4 ,in his life time1 ,comte had already found there some of his most devoted disciples4 ,in ,france the principal 8vehicles0 of ,positivist philosophy have been the works of two writers who1 in their time1 were those most beloved by the public2 ,renan and ,taine1 although they were not positivists1 have perhaps done more for the diffusion of the ideas and method of ,comte than ,littr and all the other positivists together4 ,it is true that ,taine owes a great deal to ,spinoza and to ,hegel1 and more still to ,condillac4 ,among his contemporaries he seems to be especially connected with ,john ,stuart ,mill and ,spencer4 ,but through them it is from ,comte that he proceeds1 and there we find the origin of the greater number of his leading ideas4 ,his conception of literary history1 of criticism1 of the philosophy of art1 in a word1 his effort to bring into the study of the moral sciences the method used in the natural sciences1 all this is chiefly derived from ,auguste ,comte4 ,the ,histoire de la ,litterature anglaise is1 in a sense1 an application of the positive theory according to which the evolution of the arts and literatures is governed by necessary laws which constitute its solidarity with that of morals1 of institutions and of beliefs4 ,the theory of the 8moment0 and of the 8milieu0 which is the chief one in ,taine's work was certainly not unknown in the ,,xviii4 century4 ,but it is ,comte who generalised it by bringing ,lamarck nearer to ,montesquieu2 it is he who taught ,taine the general definition1 at once biological and social1 of the idea of the 8milieu40 ,renan spoke of ,comte with extreme severity1 and not without some disdain4 ,he owned1 however1 that later on ,comte's name would be one of the most representative ones of this century1 and he had himself strongly felt his influence4 ,we must certainly take into account all the other ,french and foreign sources from which this mind at once so supple and so large1 drew inspiration4 ,but is it not from ,comte1 as much as from ,hegel1 that he learnt to regard history as the 8sacred science of humanity10 to expect from it what before was demanded from theology1 to transform the ancient dogmas of ,providence and of optimism into the belief in the positive idea of progress1 and finally to conceive that truth and goodness are not immutable and immoveable realities1 but are realised by degrees through the effort of successive generations8 ,these two examples will suffice to show the point of extreme diffusion which has been reached by the positive spirit4 ,this spirit is so intimately mingled with the general thought of our time that we scarcely notice it1 just as we do not pay attention to the air we breathe4 ,history1 romance1 and1 even poetry have reflected its influence and1 being charged with it1 have contributed to its diffusion4 ,contemporary ,sociology is the creation of ,comte2 scientific ,psychology1 in a certain degree has also sprung from him4 ,from all these signs1 it is not rash to conclude that positive philosophy expresses some of the most characteristic tendencies of the age4 ,we are therefore conforming to historical reality when we attach ourselves1 in ,comte's work1 to the philosophy which constitutes its most original1 and up to the present time its most fruitful and living part4 ,it matters little that he himself should only have considered it as a preliminary portion of his work4 ,how often has the speculative effort made by a great thinker for the purpose of establishing practical conclusions proved to be of more enduring interest than those conclusions themselves6 ,,footnotes3 #a ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #aef-g 7#be ,dcembre #ahbd74 #b ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #ii4 #c ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #abh4 #d ,revue ,occidentale1 #ahha1 ,i1 p4 #bhh4 #e ,politique positive1 ,,ii1 p4 ,,xx4 #f ,v4 book1 ,i1 ch4 vi4 p4 #g ,correspondence de ,j4 ,s4 ,mill et de ,comte1 ,lettre de ,comte du #ad juillet #ahde1 p4 #def-g4 #h ,correspondance de ,comte and de ,stuart ,mill1 p4 #def-g4 ,lettre de ,comte du #ad juillet #ahde4 ,,book ,i ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,philosophical ,,problem ,according to ,comte1 philosophy is destined to serve as a basis for morality1 for politics and for religion4 ,it is not an end in itself but a means to reach an end not otherwise attainable4 ,had ,comte thought it possible to reorganise society without first reorganising morals1 and to reorganise morals without first reorganising beliefs1 he would not perhaps have written the six volumes of the 8,cours de ,philosophie positive0 which occupied him from #ahcj to #ahdb4 ,he would have gone straight to what was of supreme interest4 ,he early became convinced that the shortest way would not be the best4 ,in his view1 all endeavour at religious1 moral1 or political reorganisation1 must be vain so long as mental reorganisation has not taken place4 ,it is therefore with a new philosophy that he must begin4 ,indispensable to the social end which ,comte has in view1 philosophy becomes1 at least provisionally1 an end in itself4 ,comte is going to endeavour to reorganise beliefs1 that is to say1 to substitute a demonstrated faith to the revealed faith whose force is now spent4 ,this demonstrated faith will have nothing in common with the natural religion of the ,,xviii4 century1 which was at bottom but a weak and degenerate form of belief in the supernatural4 ,under the metaphysical garb of ,deism we still recognise theological thought4 ,on the contrary the demonstrated faith will have its origin and its justification in positive science4 ,the two words 8faith0 and 8demonstration0 appear to clash with each other4 ,but the contradiction lies merely on the surface4 ,for we are still concerned with 8faith0 since the great majority of men will always have to take on faith the conclusions of positive philosophy4 ,the number of men with sufficient leisure and enough culture to examine these conclusions and to go into their proofs will always be small4 ,the attitude of the others must be one of submission and respect4 ,but1 differing on this point from the religious dogmas which humanity has known until now2 the new faith will be 8demonstrated40 ,it will contain nothing which has not been established and controlled by scientific methods1 nothing which goes beyond the domain of the relative1 nothing which at any moment cannot be proved to a mind capable of following the demonstration4 ,this form of 8faith0 already exists in the case of a great number of scientific truths4 ,thus all men to-day believe in the theory of the solar system which we owe to ,copernicus1 to ,galileo and to ,newton4 ,yet how many are in a position to understand the demonstrations upon which this theory rests8 ,they know1 however1 that what here is a matter of faith to them1 is a matter of science to others1 and would be so equally for themselves had they gone through the necessary studies4 ,faith therefore signifies here not indeed a voluntary abdication of the intellect in presence of a mystery which surpasses its power of comprehension1 but a submission to fact1 which in no way encroaches upon the rights of reason4 ,every man is not capable1 at any moment1 of exercising this right to criticise4 ,in practice1 ,comte will severely restrict the use of it4#i ,but in theory this right belongs to all men1 and must ever remain unalterable4 ,in the last place the legitimate existence of the demonstrated faith rests upon this proposition3 8,if all minds were in a condition to examine the dogmas of that faith1 all1 without exception1 would understand the demonstration1 and would agree with it40 ,the words 8belief0 and 8faith0 must not be misunderstood4 ,in the 8reorganisation of beliefs0 which he undertakes1 ,comte only concerns himself with beliefs capable of demonstration4 ,he is here faithful to the thought of ,saint ,simon1 who understood 8religion0 chiefly as a basis of political organisation4 ,at any rate1 in the early part of his philosophical career ,comte does not bring into 8faith0 the mystical1 sentimental and non-intellectual elements which this word usually implies and which so often oppose it to 8reason40 ,the word signifies for ,comte that which man believes concerning what may be for him a subject of knowledge4 ,until now these beliefs have set forth a more or less mythical or metaphysical explanation of the universe and of man1 taught by priests and philosophers4 ,but this no longer satisfies the human mind4 ,by degrees positive science1 which works on a totally different plan1 substitutes a knowledge of the laws of phenomena to those 8explanations40 ,from this moment the problem thus presents itself to ,comte3 ,to establish by rational means a system of universally accepted truths concerning man1 society and the world4 ,comte thus takes for granted3 #ast1 that the 8opinions10 the 8beliefs0 and the 8conceptions0 relating to these matters1 are to-day 8anarchical03 #bnd1 that their natural and normal condition is to be 8organised40 ,there is no need to prove the first part2 a glance at contemporary society is enough4 ,the confused disturbing movements which fill it with trouble and agitation1 and which1 unless rational harmony be at last established1 threaten its destruction are not due merely to political causes4 ,they proceed from moral disorder4 ,and this in turn proceeds from intellectual disorder1 that is to say from a lack of principles common to all minds1 and from the absence of universally admitted conceptions and beliefs4 ,for in order that a human society may subsist1 a certain harmony of sentiment or even common interests among its members will not suffice4 ,above all things1 intellectual concord which finds expression in a body of common beliefs is necessary4 ,if1 therefore1 a society be a prey to chronic disorders1 which political remedies appear powerless to cure1 one has every right to believe that the deep-rooted evil has its origin in intellectual disorganisation4 ,all other troubles are merely symptoms4 ,this1 according to ,comte1 is precisely the state of contemporary society4 ,it has neither 8intellectual0 nor 8spiritual0 government1 and does not even feel the want of it4 ,the minds of men recognise no common discipline4 ,not a principle subsists which negative and 8corrosive0 criticism has not attacked4 ,the individual erects himself as a judge of all things--philosophy1 ethics1 politics1 religion4 ,the opinion which he adopts most frequently without any special qualification for so doing1 and according to his passions1 always appears to him to have as much right to be admitted as those of other men4 ,he claims to be amenable to no one for his thoughts4 ,and this scattering 7later on ,comte will say insurrection7 of intelligences is what he calls a state of anarchy4 ,but1 we may say1 does not this state represent the ordinary condition of human societies8 ,perhaps the 8organic0 state only appears occasionally and as an exception8 ,such a supposition is groundless4 ,for1 if such were the case societies could not subsist1 and above all could not develop4 ,we must admit1 on the contrary1 that periods of intellectual anarchy form the exception1 and that in a normal state of society men are united by their unanimous submission to a sufficiently large body of principles and beliefs4 ,history confirms this view4 ,the immobility of civilisation in the ,far-,east is especially due to the intellectual stability which distinguishes it from our own condition4 ,the societies of ,antiquity 7,grecian and ,roman71 rested upon a conception of man1 of citizenship and of the world1 which1 as a matter of fact1 scarcely varied during the whole period of their existence4 ,lastly1 in the ,middle-ages1 ,christianity had constituted an admirable spiritual authority4 ,the organisation of ,catholicism1 8a masterpiece of political sagacity10 had established a body of beliefs which all minds accepted with complacent docility4 ,it is the decomposition of this great system which has produced the majority of the evils with which we are now struggling4 ,mental anarchy is therefore truly an abnormal state1 a pathological fact1 what ,comte will call later on the 8western disease10 a mortal disease if it is to be prolonged4 ,either modern society must perish1 or minds must regain their stable equilibrium by submission to common principles4 ,the problem of the organisation of beliefs would seem to come under two heads4 ,in the first place we have the philosophical problem3 how to establish a system of principles and beliefs capable of being universally admitted2 and1 in the second place1 a social problem3 how to bring all minds into the new faith4 ,but this distinction only appears on the surface4 ,as a matter of fact1 the solution of the first problem will necessarily imply that of the second4 ,does not the principal cause for the lack of common discipline lie in the disorder which troubles the mind of each individual8 ,if intellects are divided among themselves it is because each intellect is divided against itself4 ,let one of them succeed in establishing a perfect harmony within itself1 and by the mere force of logic1 this harmony1 by gradual diffusion will be communicated to the others--once true philosophy is established1 the rest will only be a matter of time4 ,it will therefore suffice to examine the opinions and beliefs which actually exist in one mind1 and to inquire into the conditions necessary to substitute in it harmony to anarchy1 or in a word1 to realise within it a perfect logical coherence4 ,as ,descartes1 in order to test all his knowledge1 had only to examine the sources from which it originated1 so ,comte1 in order to verify the logical compatibility of his opinions1 will content himself with the consideration of the methods which have furnished him with them4 ,if he discovers methods which mutually tend to exclude each other1 he will have found the cause of the mental disorder which gives birth to all the evils we see troubling modern society4 ,at the same time he will have discovered the remedy which will bring about the disappearance of those contradictions4 ,the human mind is so constituted1 that the first thing it requires is unity4 ,understanding is spontaneously systematic4 ,opinions merely in juxtaposition in the mind but logically irreconcilable cannot satisfy it4 ,as a matter of fact1 the contradiction1 even when it is ignored1 nevertheless impresses itself4 ,whether we know it or not1 each of our opinions implies a complexus of connected opinions all arrived at by the same method as the one in question2 and this complexus is itself part of the more considerable whole which finally completes itself in a comprehensive conception of the world given in experience4 ,now ,comte saw in himself1 as in his contemporaries1 two general methods1 two 8modes of thought0 which cannot coexist without contradiction1 although neither one nor the other has obtained a full mastery up to the present time4 ,concerning several categories of phenomena he thinks as a scholar trained in the school of ,hobbes1 of ,galileo1 of ,descartes and of their successors4 ,he does not seek to explain them by causes4 ,when1 by means of observation or deduction1 he has arrived at a knowledge of their laws he remains satisfied4 ,for the knowledge of these laws allows him in certain cases to intervene in the phenomena1 and to substitute to the natural order an artificial order better suited to his requirements4 ,it is thus that mechanical1 astronomical1 physical1 chemical and even biological phenomena are objects of relative and positive science for him to-day4 ,but1 as soon as the question is one of facts which originate in the human conscience1 or which are connected with social life and with history1 an opposite tendency becomes predominant4 ,instead of solely seeking for the laws of phenomena1 our mind desires to explain them4 ,it wants to find the essence and the cause4 ,it speculates upon the human soul1 upon the relation of that soul to the other realities of the universe1 upon the end which society should have in view1 upon the best possible government1 upon the social contract1 etc4 ,all these questions arise from the 8metaphysical0 mode of thought1 and this mode is formally incompatible with the preceding one4 ,yet we see both of them subsisting in our minds to-day4 ,social dynamics will show how this condition must have been produced4 ,but whatever the historical reasons may be1 the reality is only too evident4 ,the human mind to-day can neither adhere entirely to nor give up entirely one or the other of these two modes of thought4 ,undoubtedly it feels that the conquests of positive science are 8irrevocable40 ,for example1 how could it return to a metaphysical or theological explanation of astronomical or physical phenomena8 ,but1 on the other hand1 metaphysical and theological conceptions seem to it no less indispensable4 ,it does not believe it could do without them4 ,and this is natural4 ,for1 to satisfy the desire for unity1 which is its supreme requirement1 the human mind demands a conception of the whole which embraces all the orders of phenomena1 what ,kant called a totalizing of experience1 in a word a 8philosophy40 ,now1 up to the present time1 the positive mode of thought has not shown itself in a position to respond to this demand4 ,it has only produced individual sciences4 ,positive ,science has been 8special0 and fragmentary1 always attached to the investigation of a more or less restricted group of phenomena4 ,with a laudable prudence1 which has made her strength1 she has applied herself solely to works of analysis and partial synthesis4 ,she has never ventured upon a synthesis of the whole of the real within our reach4 ,until now theologies and metaphysics alone have made the effort1 and this office is1 still to-day1 the chief reason of their existence1 this office must be fulfilled4 ,the human mind is carried1 by a spontaneous and necessary movement1 towards the point of view of the universal4 ,sooner than leave the philosophical problems without an answer1 it would remain attached indefinitely to the solutions1 chimerical as they are1 which the theologies and metaphysics offer him4 ,in short1 in the present state of things1 the positive mind is 8real0 but 8special40 ,the theologico-metaphysical mind is 8universal0 but 8fictitious40 ,we can neither sacrifice the 8reality0 of science1 nor the 8universality0 of philosophy4 ,which is the way out of this difficulty8 ,three solutions alone are conceivable3 #a4 ,to find a reconciliation which will make it possible for the two modes of thought to coexist without contradiction3 #b4 ,to re-establish unity by making the theologico-metaphysical method universal3 #c4 ,to re-establish unity by making the positive method universal3 ,,ii4 ,the first solution at first sight appears to be the most acceptable4 ,why should not the positive investigation of the divers orders of natural phenomena be reconciled with a theological or metaphysical conception of the universe8 ,nothing prevents one from conceiving the phenomena as governed by invariable laws1 and from seeking at the same time1 by another method1 for the reason which renders nature in general intelligible4 ,positive science liberated at last from theology and metaphysics1 would assure them of the independence which she claims for herself4 ,thus1 with growing precision would be fixed the boundaries on the one hand of the domain proper of positive science1 and on the other that of the speculation which goes beyond experience4 ,this reconciliation1 says ,comte1 has for a long time been considered legitimate1 because for a long time it was indispensable4 ,up to the present time ,theology and ,metaphysics have been the only comprehensive conceptions of the world which the human mind has formed4 ,they have fulfilled a necessary function4 ,moreover1 without them positive science could neither have originated nor have been developed4 ,but1 as she is their heiress1 she is also their antagonist4 ,her progress necessarily involves their downfall4 ,the parallel history of religions and metaphysical dogmas on the one hand and of positive knowledge on the other shows that the conciliation between them has never been a lasting one4 ,not that the antagonism between the two modes of thought can be solved by a supreme dialectical struggle in which the theological and metaphysical dogmas would be worsted4 ,it is not thus that dogmas come to an end4 ,they disappear1 according to ,comte's striking expression1 by desuetude1 as is the case with forsaken methods4 ,as a matter of fact1 have they not been as methods for the human mind1 which sought within a single point of view to embrace the universality of things before they had been sufficiently studied8 ,man demanded from his imagination at first sight an absolute knowledge of the real1 which reason could only give him at a later stage1 on a very modest scale1 entirely relative and after the patient labour of the sciences4 ,but by degrees1 as he has advanced in the positive study of phenomena1 he has forsaken the theological and metaphysical 8explanations40 ,without relinquishing altogether the search after causes1 he has taken the habit of relegating them to more and more remote regions4 ,already1 in what concerns phenomena whose concept has reached a positive stage we can very well do without any assumption of causes4 ,it suffices for us to represent these phenomena to ourselves as subject to laws4 ,when all the phenomena of all orders are habitually conceived in this way1 when the idea of their laws1 whatever they may be1 will have become equally familiar to us1 the metaphysical mode of thought will have disappeared4 ,in a word1 as soon as the whole of science shall have become positive1 philosophy will necessarily be positive also3 ,for we only have at our disposal one point of view concerning things4 ,all our real knowledge bears upon phenomena and their laws4 ,if1 therefore1 considered one by one1 all the orders of phenomena are conceived according to the positive mode of thought1 how could it be that considered together1 and in their totality1 they should be conceived according to a mode of thought completely different1 and even inconsistent with the former one8 ,as a matter of fact1 the coexistence of these two modes of thought lasts so long as the positive spirit has not reached its complete expansion1 so long as a more or less considerable portion of natural phenomena is still explained by their essence1 their cause1 or their end4 ,but this cannot be indefinitely prolonged4 ,the more the positive spirit progresses1 the more the theological and metaphysical conception of the world loses ground1 and it becomes more evident that we must make our choice4 ,the unity of the understanding the perfect logical coherence1 are at this price4 ,the conciliation being set aside1 the alternative either to think solely or not at all1 according to the positive mode1 presents itself4 ,the traditionalists1 and especially ,joseph de ,maistre1 saw this aspect of the problem very clearly4 ,comte gives them very great credit for it4 ,de ,maistre admits no salvation for our society except in the complete return to the theological mode of thought4 ,he thus attacks at its very source1 or to put it more plainly1 in its many sources1 the spirit of modern philosophy4 ,he does not spare ,locke any more than the philosophers of the ,,xviii4 century who proceed from him1 ,bacon any more than ,locke2 the promoters of the ,reformation any more than ,bacon4 ,he understood that the ,,xviii4 century came as a mighty conclusion of which the ,,xvi4 and ,,xvii4 centuries were the premisses1 and that the great destructive syllogism had originated in a work of decomposition which began as early as the ,,xiv4 century4 ,he is therefore perfectly consistent with himself1 when he endeavours to combat this diabolical work1 and to bring ,europe back to the mental and religious condition of the ,middle-ages4 ,the re-establishment of the spiritual supremacy of the ,pope would put an end to mental and moral anarchy4 ,the catholic doctrine would restore to men's minds that unity which is their supreme need4 ,this solution fulfils ideally the conditions of the problem1 but1 as a matter of fact1 the solution is impracticable4 ,the tide of history cannot flow back4 ,in order to bring men's minds once again under the sway of that spiritual power which they freely accepted in the ,middle-ages1 we should also have to reconstitute the totality of the conditions in which they lived at that time4 ,how can we wipe from the pages of history the discovery of ,america1 the invention of printing1 and so many other great social facts8 ,how can we pretend that ,copernicus1 ,kepler1 ,galileo1 ,descartes1 ,newton1 and all the heralds of positive ,science never existed8 ,and if1 presuming what is impossible1 we should succeed in restoring the mental and moral unity of ,christian society in the ,middle-ages1 how could we prevent the natural laws which have once brought about its decomposition1 from producing again the same result8 ,we are thus necessarily brought to the third and last solution4 ,since the conciliation between the positive mode of thought and the other one is impossible2 since the exclusive ascendency of the theologico-metaphysical mode of thought is out of the question2 since when all is said the human mind needs a philosophy1 it follows that that philosophy can only proceed from the positive mode of thought itself4 ,there is nothing1 a priori1 to prevent this solution from being realised4 ,for the last positions of the theologico-metaphysical spirit are surely not impregnable4 ,this spirit1 8fictitious0 in its essence1 never could become 8real40 ,the positive spirit is only accidentally 8special40 ,it is quite capable of acquiring the universality which it lacks4 ,the new philosophy would then be founded1 and the problem of perfect logical coherence would be solved4 ,the whole difficulty thus appears to be in 8universalising0 the positive mode of thought4 ,to do this it must be extended to those phenomena which are still habitually conceived according to the theologico-metaphysical mode1 that is to say1 to the moral and social phenomena4 ,this will be ,comte's crowning discovery4 ,he will found 8social physics40 ,by so doing he will take from theology and metaphysics the last reason of their existence4 ,he will make possible the transition from a positive science to an equally positive philosophy4 ,thus will be realised 8the unity of the understanding10 and this mental harmony will carry with it as its consequence the moral and religious harmony of humanity4 ,,footnotes3 #i cf4 infra4 book iii4 ch4 v4 p4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,three ,,states ,in ,comte's system the constitution of sociology may be considered at the same time as a terminus and as a starting point4 ,one sees the positive method attaining with it to the order of the highest1 the most 8noble10 the most complicated phenomena3 in this sense sociology is the term reached by the positive spirit in its ascent4 ,it thus reaches the summit of the hierarchy of the sciences1 and henceforth rules over them all4 ,on the other hand1 positive philosophy1 possible from this moment1 will make this a starting point for establishing the principles of morality and of polity4 8,through the foundation of sociology10 says ,comte at the beginning of the ,cours1 8positive philosophy will acquire that universal character which it still lacks1 and will thus become qualified to take the place of theological and metaphysical philosophy1 whose only real property to-day is this universality10#aj and at the end of the ,cours he concludes3 8,the creation of sociology endows with fundamental unity the entire system of modern philosophy40#aa ,this creation1 upon which everything else depended1 dates from the time when ,comte discovered the law of the three states as it is called4 ,for1 once this law is established1 8social physics0 ceases to be a mere philosophical conception1 and becomes a positive science4 ,this law had been anticipated and even already formulated in the ,,xviii4 century by ,turgot1 then by ,condorcet1 and by ,dr4 ,burdin4 ,comte1 nevertheless1 takes to himself the merit of the discovery4 ,as he is generally most precise in doing full justice to his 8precursors10 we must admit that1 according to him1 none of them had seen the scientific importance of this law4 ,it certainly is one thing to gather the notion of a law out of a number of facts1 and another to understand its capital importance1 and to discern in it the fundamental law which governs the whole of the evolution of humanity4 ,this is the way in which ,comte enounces it1 in the ,plan des travaux scientifiques ncessaires pour rorganiser la socit 7#ahbb74 8,according to the very nature of the human intellect every branch of our knowledge must necessarily pass successively in the course of its progressive development1 through three different theoretical states3 the theological or fictitious state1 the metaphysical or abstract state1 finally the scientific or positive state40#ab ,in the first lesson of the ,cours de philosophie positive1 after having reproduced this statement1 ,comte adds3 8,in other words the human mind1 by its nature1 in each one of its researches makes use successively of three methods of philosophising1 essentially different and even opposed to each other3 firstly1 the theological method1 next1 the metaphysical1 and lastly the positive4 ,hence we find three kinds of philosophies1 or general systems of conceptions of the totality of phenomena1 which mutually exclude each other4 ,the first is the necessary starting-point of human intelligence1 the third1 its fixed and final state2 the second is solely destined to serve as a transition40#ac ,the words 8theological0 and 8metaphysical0 are here taken in a particular sense1 strictly defined4 ,comte calls 8theology0 a general system of conceptions concerning the universality of phenomena1 which explains the appearance of these phenomena by the will of gods4 ,he has not in his mind theological speculation as one usually understands it1 as a rational or sacred science4 ,he does not in the least dream of a study of revealed truth4 ,he only designated by this name an interpretation of natural phenomena by means of supernatural and arbitrary causes4 ,theological--that is to say--fictitious4 ,elsewhere ,comte calls this mode of explanation 8imaginary0 or 8mythological40 ,it is in this sense that he could ask if each one of us did not remember having been in regard to his most important notions1 a theologian in his infancy1 a metaphysician in his youth1 and a physicist in his manhood8#ad ,comte does not allude to the religious traditions which the child receives from his parents1 but indeed to the spontaneous tendency which causes him in the first place to explain natural phenomena by wills1 and not by laws4 ,theology is here synonymous with anthropomorphism in the conception of causes4 ,similarly ,comte does not take the word 8metaphysics0 in the most usual extension of its meaning4 ,the science of ,being as such1 the science of ,substance or of first ,principles1 is not here in question1 at least directly4 ,he only refers to a certain mode of explaining phenomena given in our experience4 ,for example1 in physics1 the hypothesis of an ether to explain optical and electrical phenomena is metaphysical4 ,so it is in physiology with the hypothesis of a vital principle1 or1 in psychology1 with the hypothesis of a soul4 8,metaphysical or abstract10 says ,comte4 ,at bottom this mode of explanation is no other than the preceding one1 but more and more pale and colourless1 vanishing1 so to speak1 as natural phenomena1 better observed1 are referred no longer to capricious wills1 but to invariable laws4 ,let us then be careful not to give here to the words 8metaphysics0 and 8theology0 their full meaning4 ,for instance1 to conclude from the law of the three ,states that the evolution of humanity ever carries it further from theology1 to end in a final state wherein religion should have no place is singularly to misapprehend ,comte's doctrine4 ,on the contrary the evolution of humanity is leading it to a state which will be pre-eminently religious4 ,in it religion will regulate the whole life of man4 ,comte perhaps would not refuse to define man1 as has often been done1 as a religious animal4 ,the history of humanity may be represented1 in a sense1 as an evolution which proceeds from primitive religion 7fetichism7 to final religion 7positivism74 ,but the object of the law of the three ,states is not to express the religious evolution of humanity4 ,it is only concerned with the progress of the human intellect4 ,it sets forth the successive philosophies which that intelligence has been obliged by turn to adopt in the interpretation of natural phenomena4 ,it is1 in a word1 the general law of the evolution of thought4 ,those who made a mistake about it probably only considered this law in the first lesson of the ,cours1 where it is separately presented4 ,but the error is no longer possible when one refers to the fourth volume of the ,cours1 where the law is put in its place1 in social dynamics1 especially in the fifty-eighth lesson1 in the sixth volume4 ,it is not1 however1 without reason that ,comte set forth this law in the first pages of his ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,in sociology as he conceives it1 the law of the intellectual evolution of humanity1 that is to say the law of the three ,states is the essential law of dynamics1 and therefore of the whole of social science4 ,for1 of all the social factors of which the concomitant and joint evolution constitutes the progress of humanity1 the intellectual factor is the most important4 ,it is the dominant one1 in the sense that the others depend far more upon it than it does upon them4 ,the history of art1 of institutions1 of morals1 of law1 of civilisation in general could not be understood without the history of intellectual evolution1 that is to say of science and of philosophy1 whereas this one1 strictly speaking1 would still be intelligible without the others4 ,this evolution is therefore the principal axis around which the other series of social phenomena are arranged4 ,thus the law which expresses it is the most 8fundamental10 the most 8general10 in the precise sense in which ,comte understands this word4 ,in enunciating this law he declares legitimate by anticipation the existence of a social science4 ,he proves ipso facto not only that it is possible1 but that it already exists4 ,hence the eminent position which he gives to the law of the three states4 ,,ii4 ,the demonstration of this law presents itself under two distinct forms4 ,in the first place ,comte supports his argument by history4 ,this proves indeed that every branch of our knowledge passes in turn through the three states1 with never a single retrogression4 ,it is true that much of our knowledge has not yet reached the positive state4 ,but at any rate it is established that up to the present even those sciences which have not yet reached that state have all described the same curve1 already described by those that have reached it4 ,historical verification would suffice1 if necessary1 provided it were complete4 ,comte is not satisfied with it4 ,he claims moreover to deduce the law of the three states from the nature of man4 ,he will thus give a direct demonstration of it4 ,however useful history may appear to him as an instrument of proof1 he still wishes to render its verdict intelligible4 ,to reach this end he has recourse to psychology4 8,we ought10 he says1 8carefully to characterise the general motives1 drawn from an exact knowledge of human nature1 which must have rendered partly inevitable1 partly indispensable1 the necessary succession of social phenomena1 considered directly with respect to the intellectual development which dominates essentially their chief advance40#ae ,in the first place1 the human mind could only begin to interpret nature by a philosophy of the theological type4 ,for it is the only one which is spontaneously produced1 the only one which does not presuppose another4 ,man at first conceives all activity on the same plan as his own4 ,in order to understand phenomena1 he likens them to his own actions1 whose mode of production he thinks he apprehends1 because he has the feelings of his own efforts and the consciousness of his own volitions4 ,this anthropomorphic explanation comes so naturally to us that we are always ready to give way to it4 ,even to-day1 if we forget positive discipline for a moment1 if we venture to ask for the mode of production of some phenomenon1 we immediately dimly imagine an activity more or less like our own4 ,and among the metaphysicians who profess to give an idea of ,god1 the most consistent1 according to ,comte1 are those who make a person of ,him4 ,the spontaneity which characterises the theological mode of thought has been extremely useful4 ,without it1 we do not see how man's intelligence could have begun to unfold itself4 ,for1 in order to form a scientific theory1 however modest and fragmentary1 of natural phenomena1 the mind needs previous observations1 while1 on the other hand1 in default of a theory1 or at any rate of a preexisting hypothesis1 no scientific observation is possible4 ,absolute empiricism1 says ,comte1 is barren1 and even1 strictly speaking1 inconceivable4 ,simple collections of facts1 however numerous we may suppose them to be1 do not possess by themselves any scientific significance4 ,such1 for instance1 would be the case in the meteorological facts1 making interminable lists1 and filling volumes4 ,they would only become observations if in collecting them the mind tried to put upon them some interpretation1 however vague or precise1 real or chimerical4 ,caught between the two equally imperative necessities of observing in the first place in order to reach 8suitable conceptions01 and of conceiving at the same time some theory in order to make coherent observations1 the human mind saves itself by the theological mode of thought4 ,for it has no need of previous observations to imagine everywhere in nature activities similar to its own4 ,once this hypothesis has arisen1 observation comes into play1 first to confirm it1 but soon to oppose it4 ,from that moment the impulse has been given4 ,the evolution of the sciences and of philosophy will be continued through doctrines which will succeed each other in a necessary order4 ,in the same way1 from the moral point of view1 a theological philosophy alone could at first inspire weak and ignorant humanity with sufficient courage and confidence to shake off its primitive torpor4 ,to-day1 if man knows that phenomena are subject to invariable laws1 he also knows that a knowledge of these laws gives him a certain control over nature4 ,but in the days when man could not foresee the power of science1 the idea that phenomena obeyed necessary laws would have filled him with despair4 ,it would probably have paralysed him for all exertion4 ,the theological mode of thought was far more encouraging since the phenomena are imagined to be arbitrarily modifiable4 ,anything may happen4 ,nothing is impossible1 neither is anything necessary4 ,the will of the gods suffices for a thing to happen or not to happen4 ,directly1 man has no power over nature2 indirectly he can do everything1 provided only that he can propitiate the divinities whose will is law4 ,in this way1 it is at the moment when man's impotence is greatest1 that his confidence in his own power is the strongest4 ,finally1 from a social point of view1 theological philosophy was indispensable for human society to subsist and to be developed4 ,for this society does not merely imply sympathy of feeling and union of interests among its members1 but first and above all unanimous adhesion to certain beliefs4 ,without a 8certain system of common preliminary opinions0 there can be no human society4 ,but1 on the other hand1 how can we conceive the appearance of such a system1 if social life is not organised8 ,here is a new vicious circle1 out of which the theological philosophy alone can release us4 ,it constitutes at first sight a totality of common beliefs4 ,all the members of the society defend them all the more energetically1 because with them are bound up their hopes and their fears1 for this world1 and for the next1 if they already believe in it4 ,at the same time1 this theological philosophy determines the formation1 in society1 of a special class1 consecrated to speculative activity4 ,what an immense progress this division between practice and theory must have been1 however roughly outlined6 ,such a division was established as soon as a sacerdotal class began to be distinguished from the rest of the social body4 ,and how slow this progress must have been1 when we see even to-day how hard it is for men to accept any innovation which does not seem to carry with it any immediate practical advantage6 ,the sacerdotal class1 invested1 by the nature of its functions with an authority which was precious for social progress1 at the same time enjoyed that leisure which is indispensable for theoretical research4 8,without the spontaneous establishment of such a class10 says ,comte1 8all our activity1 thenceforth exclusively practical1 would have confined itself to the improvement1 very soon checked1 of some processes having reference to military or industrial life40#af ,the subsequent division of labour depended upon this initial step4 ,our savants1 our philosophers1 our engineers descend from the first priests1 sorcerers and rain conjurors4 ,thus1 given the nature of ,man1 the theological philosophy was bound to appear spontaneously4 ,this appearance was at the same time 8inevitable and indispensable10 in a word1 necessary4 ,immediately begins what one might call the dialectics of the intellectual history of humanity4 ,the theological philosophy has made possible the observation of phenomena4 ,in its turn1 this observation introduces the idea of invariable laws into the mind1 whereby the theological philosophy begins to be compromised4 ,the time comes when it appears antiquated and pernicious and reason tends to take the place of the imagination in the interpretation of nature4 ,the more evolution advances1 the more marked becomes the preference of the human mind for the positive mode of thought1 and1 in the several orders of the sciences1 after a more or less prolonged conflict1 this latter ends by obtaining the ascendancy4 ,as a matter of fact1 the theological stage of our knowledge1 even when it exercises its greatest dominion1 that is to say1 at the time nearest to its origin1 already contains the germs of its own decomposition4 ,it is never perfectly homogeneous4 ,there are very common phenomena whose regularity man has never failed to recognize1 and which he has never conceived as depending upon arbitrary wills4 ,comte likes to quote a passage from ,adam ,smith1 where that philosopher remarks that in no time and in no country do we find a god of ,weight4 ,moreover1 since the existence of society1 man must have had some idea of psychological laws since he was obliged to regulate his conduct according to the way in which his fellows thought and acted4 ,consequently 8the elementary germ of positive philosophy is quite as primitive1 at bottom1 as that of theological philosophy1 although it could only be developed very much later40#ag ,not being universal1 theological philosophy could only be provisional4 ,the philosophy1 that is to say1 the method of interpretation of natural phenomena1 will alone be final1 which will be applicable to all phenomena without exception1 from the most simple to the most complicated4 ,for this philosophy alone will realise the unity demanded by the understanding4 ,the passage from theological to positive philosophy is never suddenly accomplished4 ,their opposition is too sharply defined1 and our intelligence does not lend itself to such an abrupt change4 ,the metaphysical state serves as a transition4 ,this state is distinguished from the two others1 in that it has no principle proper which defines it4 ,theological philosophy is sufficient to itself4 ,it forms a harmonious whole1 at least so long as the germ of positiveness which it contains has not yet revealed its activity4 ,in the same way1 the positive state will be perfectly homogeneous4 ,on the contrary1 the metaphysical state is only described by a mixture of the two others4 8,the metaphysical conceptions10 wrote ,comte in #ahbe1 8proceed at the same time from theology and physics1 or rather are only the former modified by the latter40#ah ,under ever varying and progressively attenuated forms1 metaphysics procure the indispensable conciliation in order that the theological and positive philosophies may coexist in men's minds1 so long as the latter is not perfectly worked out4 ,under cover of metaphysical hypotheses1 the scientific method has been able to push its conquests1 without greatly alarming the defenders of theological philosophy4 ,thus metaphysical speculation has a very active critical quality4 ,it has not slightly contributed to the decomposition of the ancient system of beliefs4 ,in this sense1 ,comte regards the ,french philosophers of the ,,xviii4 century1 for the most part1 as excellent representatives of the metaphysical spirit4 ,nevertheless1 if we must refer this intermediate stage to one of the two extremes1 ,comte does not hesitate to approximate it to the theological stage4 ,as a matter of fact1 metaphysical philosophy substitutes entities to will1 and ,nature to the ,creator1 but with a very analogous function4 ,it supplies1 at bottom1 the same 8explanation0 of the real1 although weakened by a stronger and stronger sense of the need of natural laws4 ,this equivocal method preserves theology1 8while destroying its principal mental consistency40 ,it denies the consequences in the name of the principles4 ,moreover1 it offers no guarantee against an offensive return of theological conceptions1 so long as they have not been replaced by positive notions4 ,in the final conflict between the theological spirit1 and the positive spirit1 the metaphysicians will probably be seen1 with the ,deists1 involved in a retrograde concentration40#ai 8,positive philosophy10 says ,comte1 8has neither historical nor dogmatic solidarity with this negative philosophy1 and can only contemplate it as a final preparatory transformation of theological philosophy40#bj ,thus the metaphysical stage is never other than an unstable compromise4 ,it only lasts on condition that it changes continually4 ,in default of a principle of its own1 metaphysical philosophy is purely critical in character4 ,as a fact1 there are but two philosophies1 that is to say two methods1 two organic modes of thought4 ,only theological philosophy and positive philosophy allow the mind to construct a logical and harmonious system of ideas1 the basis of a morality and of a religion4 ,the theological spirit is 8ideal in its advance1 absolute in its conception1 arbitrary in its application40 ,the positive spirit substitutes the method of observation to that of imagination1 relative notions to absolute notions4 ,it does not flatter itself with unlimited dominion over the phenomena of nature2 it knows that its power is measured by its knowledge4 ,the intellectual history of humanity shows by what stages it has passed from the former mode of thought to the latter4 ,,iii4 ,comte regards the law of the three stages as demonstrated4 8,seventeen years of continuous meditation on this great subject10 he writes in #ahci1 8discussed under all its aspects1 and subjected to all possible tests1 authorise me to affirm beforehand1 without the slightest scientific hesitation1 that we shall always see confirmed this historical proposition1 which now seems to me as fully demonstrated as any of the general facts actually admitted in the other parts of natural philosophy40#ba ,it could only be doubted if we found any branch of our knowledge which had gone back from the metaphysical to the theological state1 or from the positive state to either of the two preceding states4 ,but this case has never presented itself4 ,the theoretical demonstration of the law has established that it could not present itself4 ,indeed this demonstration has shown that the successive advance through the three stages1 in invariable order1 was the necessary form of progress of the human mind in the knowledge of phenomena4 ,it is founded upon the nature of the mind4 ,in ,comte's thought1 the law of the three states could therefore have been equally called psychological or historical4 ,but we are not here concerned with introspective ,psychology1 which uses self-consciousness as a means of investigation4 ,comte does not recognize any scientific value in this method4#bb ,he even denies its possibility4 ,moreover the observation of a subject by himself1 were it possible1 would be of no help in the present case4 ,for it would only reveal to him the present state of his individual intellect1 and not the law of the evolution of the human mind4 ,for this law to become manifest1 we must consider not the individual1 but the species4 ,giving up a fruitless effort at self-contemplation in its activity1 the intellect must grasp the law of its successive phases in the progress of what it has produced4 ,the philosophical history of our beliefs1 of our conceptions1 and of our systems3 such is the consciousness which the human intellect can have of itself4 ,there only1 the philosopher sees the faculties of which this intellect contained the germ coming into play by turns1 to reach a 8durable harmony40 ,then1 once discovered1 the law of the three ,states helps us to understand the intellectual evolution of each individual1 and the study of the individual then furnishes us with a supplementary verification of the law4 ,but1 by itself1 this study of the individual could not have established it4 ,whatever utility ,i may have often derived from the consideration of the individual1 says ,comte1 it is evidently to the direct study of the species that ,i owed1 not only the fundamental thought in my theory1 but afterwards its specific development4 ,the law of the three ,states is then the general formula of the progress of the human intellect1 considered not in an individual subject1 but in the universal subject1 which is humanity4 ,it is indeed also the 8universal subject0 that ,kant has studied in his ,critic of ,pure ,reason4 ,but ,kant's method is altogether abstract and metaphysical1 the universal subject of which he seeks the laws is a human mind 8in itself10 considered in its essence4 ,comte1 on the contrary1 represents the universal subject as a concrete unity1 which realized itself in time4 ,for him1 the study of the mental functions characteristic of man only becomes positive when it is carried out from an historical and sociological point of view4 ,that is why the discovery of the law of the three ,states is an event of capital importance4 ,it inaugurates the positive science of humanity1 which was an indispensable condition for positive philosophy to be established4 ,it marks the time when1 all phenomena being henceforth studied after the same method1 the 8perfect logical coherence0 is definitely assured4 ,this law of social dynamics is the corner-stone of the whole positive system4 ,,footnotes3 #aj ,cours de philosophie positive1 ,i1 #ai 7#e;e edition1 ,paris1 #ahib74 #aa ,cours1 ,,vi1 #ghf4 #ab ,pol4 pos4 ,,iv1 appendice1 p4 #gg4 #ac ,cours1 ,i4 #c4 #ad ,cours1 ,i4 #f4 #ae ,cours ,,iv1 #ebf4 #af ,cours ,,iv1 #edh4 #ag ,cours1 ,,iv1 #eed-e4 #ah ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv4 ,appendix1 p4 #add4 #ai ,correspondence de ,h4 ,comte avec ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,lettre du #e avril #ahdb1 p4 #ea4 #bj ,cours1 ,v4 #egc-e4 #ba ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ebc4 #bb ,cp4 infra1 book ,,ii1 chap4 ,v1 p4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,classification ,,of ,,the ,,sciences ,according to the law of the three ,states1 all our conceptions in the different orders of knowledge1 begin by being theological1 pass through the metaphysical transition1 and end by becoming positive4 ,if this evolution were terminated at the presented time1 the philosophy which ,comte wishes to found would be ipso facto established4 ,but we are far from such a state of things4 ,on the contrary1 the three modes of thought theological1 metaphysical1 and positive1 coexist1 still to-day1 even in the most cultivated minds4 ,in a different measure1 all lack the 8logical coherence40 ,even in those sciences where the positive method has been finally and for a long time established1 in physics1 and in chemistry1 for instance1 we observe undoubted traces of the metaphysical spirit4 ,to a still greater degree this spirit is manifested in what are called the moral and social sciences4 ,nevertheless1 this 8incoherence0 cannot last4 ,now that the positive spirit has assumed full consciousness of itself1 it is possible to proceed with a systematic purification1 which will disentangle it from the theological and metaphysical spirit4 ,but is not this critical review of the whole of human knowledge an enterprise above the powers of a man8--,happily positive philosophy itself furnishes a means of lightening the task4 ,it establishes an order which allows us to determine without too much trouble to what degree of positiveness the conception of a given category of phenomena has reached up to the present time4 ,comte calls this order the classification1 or1 more precisely the 8positive hierarchy0 of the fundamental sciences4 ,it is 8the plan which he will follow in the exposition of positive philosophy40#bc ,this plan is not a simple artifice destined to make the entirety of the doctrine clearer1 or its exposition easier4 ,it is not external to the work4 ,it is born from the very spirit of positive philosophy2 it expresses the spirit of that philosophy in a new form4 ,it is the natural complement of the law of the three ,states4 ,comte puts it in plain words3 8,the different branches of our knowledge have not been able with equal rapidity to pass through the three great phases in their development1 nor consequently to reach simultaneously the positive state4 ,there exists1 in this respect1 an invariable and necessary order1 which our different kinds of conceptions have followed and have been obliged to follow in their progress1 and of which the exact consideration is the indispensable complement to the fundamental law previously enounced40#bd ,comte did not1 like his contemporary ,ampre1 set himself the logical problem of the classification of the sciences in their entirety4 ,he did not seek according to what principle we could arrange them all in an order where the fact of their respective subordination would be maintained4 ,he even doubts how far such a principle exists1 and he is so far from thinking of establishing a complete classification of the sciences1 that he begins by leaving out the greater number of them4 ,he first sets aside all forms of human knowledge which refer to art1 that is to say all the applied sciences1 practical and technical4 ,similarly he sets aside all the concrete sciences1 such as zoology1 mineralogy1 geography1 etc4 ,he only places within his classification the theoretical and abstract sciences1 that is to say those which have no other object but the knowledge of laws1 and which study phenomena1 exclusive of the concrete beings in which these phenomena present themselves4 ,comte calls them 8fundamental0 because the other sciences suppose their existence1 whereas the abstract sciences do not suppose the existence of the others before them4 ,these sciences are the only ones whose consideration is of consequence to the end which ,comte has in view4 ,for why does he need a classification of the sciences8 ,it is in order to study the ascent of the positive spirit through the successive orders of phenomena4 ,for this1 he has no occasion to consider the applied or concrete sciences1 which receive their principles from the theoretical and abstract sciences4 ,it suffices for him to be concerned with these4 ,it is in the methods and the progress of these sciences that the characteristic efforts of the human mind have been manifested2 and it is therefore here that we can grasp the laws of its evolution4 ,in order to classify the fundamental sciences1 ,comte will conform to the principles of the positive method4 ,he will be guided by the rational classifications of which the model is to be found in the natural sciences4 ,the classification must spring from the very study of the objects which are to be classified1 and must be determined by the real affinities and the series of connected links which they present1 in such a way that this classification may itself be the expression of the most general truth1 made manifest by the searching comparison of the objects which it embraces4 ,comte will not therefore stop to consider the classifications which have preceded his own4 ,in the first place1 when they appeared1 the rational method of classification was not established4 ,further1 how could anyone have united the whole of the sciences into an encyclopdic conception1 when some had already reached the positive state1 while others remained in the theological or metaphysical states8 ,how could anyone rationally arrange heterogenous conceptions in a single system8 ,those premature attempts were doomed to failure4 ,in order that the undertaking might succeed1 it was necessary that all our conceptions1 relating to the various orders of phenomena should have reached the positive form4 ,here again1 the creation of sociology has been the decisive event1 for it has allowed the series of fundamental sciences to be made complete4 ,the discovery of the law of the three ,states has founded sociology1 and at the same time it has accomplished the homogeneity of human knowledge4 ,in its time1 this homogeneity renders possible the rational classification of the sciences4 ,,ii4 ,henceforth1 the fundamental sciences are all conceived as equally positive4 ,they have all given up the pursuit of the absolute for the study of the relative1 and the search after causes for the knowledge of laws4 ,all now proceed by means of the same general methods and their differences can therefore only arise from their object1 that is to say from the nature of the phenomena which are studied4 ,consequently their relations of mutual dependence will solely result from the relations of these phenomena4 ,now1 observation shows us that these phenomena form themselves into a certain number of natural categories1 such that the rational study of each category presupposes a knowledge of the laws of the preceding category1 and that a knowledge of this one is in turn presupposed for understanding the one that follows4 ,this order is determined by the degree of generality of the phenomena1 from which their successive dependence upon each other results1 and as a consequence the greater or lesser simplicity of each science results from it also4 ,upon this principle1 the encyclopdic ladder of the fundamental sciences is easily constructed4 ,after the mathematics1 in an order of diminishing generality and of growing complexity1 come astronomy1 physics1 chemistry1 physiology or biology1 social physics or sociology4 ,the first science considers the most general1 the most simple1 the most abstract phenomena1 and those furthest removed from humanity4 ,they influence all the others1 without being influenced by them4 ,the phenomena considered by the last are the most particular1 the most complicated1 the most concrete1 and the most directly interesting for man2 they depend more or less upon all the preceding ones4 8,between these two extremes1 the degrees of specialisation1 of complication1 and of individualisation1 are in an ever-growing quantity40 ,this classification is confirmed1 in fact1 by the general usage of learned men4 ,it reproduces the historic order of the development of the sciences4 ,thus1 for a long time1 mathematics was the only science of a positive type4 ,on the other hand1 social science has been the last to reach this point4 ,nevertheless1 ,comte does not mean to say that the fundamental sciences came into existence one after the other1 nor that1 for every one of them1 each period is sufficiently explained by the period immediately preceding it4 ,his thought is very different4 ,on the contrary1 he represents the development of the several sciences as simultaneous4 ,they act and react one upon another in a thousand ways4 ,often some progress in a science is the direct effect of a discovery made in an art which has apparently no affinities with it4 ,such is1 to quote an example which ,comte could not in the least have foreseen1 the progress of astronomical observations due to photography4 ,in fact1 the history of a science during a given period is closely allied to that of the other sciences and arts during the same time1 or rather1 to be more explicit1 to the general history of civilisation4 ,but their respective transitions to the positive state is accomplished in the order set forth in the classification4 ,for individually they could not reach this state1 if the fundamental science immediately preceding had not attained to it before them4 8,it is in this order that the progress1 although simultaneous1 must have taken place40#be ,,iii4 ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has made several objections to ,auguste ,comte's classification of the sciences2 ,littr has lengthily refuted them4 ,it is not in our design to reopen this discussion4 ,but it results from the preceding explanations that the greater number of ,mr4 ,spencer's criticisms miss the mark1 perhaps because he has not read ,comte properly4 ,on his own admission1 he only knows the two first lessons in the ,cours de philosophie positive in the text1 further the inorganic ,physics and the first chapter of the ,biology in ,miss ,martineau's condensation1 and finally the remainder in ,lewes's summing up in his ,history of ,philosophy4#bf ,if ,mr4 ,spencer had been able to obtain a knowledge of the ,cours de philosophie positive in its entirety1 and especially of the three last lessons1 or at least of the ,discours sur l',esprit positif or of the ,discours sur l'ensemble du positivisme he would probably have appreciated differently the positive classification of the sciences4 ,his own classification1 in which he includes the concrete and concrete-abstract sciences1 is not really opposed to that of ,auguste ,comte who only wished to classify the fundamental abstract sciences4 ,comte never sought to do what ,mr4 ,spencer reproaches him with not having done4 ,among ,mr4 ,spencer's objections1 there is one which1 bearing upon the very conception of the classification of the sciences1 shows very clearly the misunderstanding which we are pointing out4 ,mr4 ,spencer insists upon the 8anthropocentric0 character of ,comte's classification1 which is indeed remarkable2 and he is surprised at what appears to him to be a glaring contradiction4 ,is not the conception of things from man's point of view1 one of the essential forms of the theological mode of thought1 according to ,comte himself8 ,does not positive philosophy teach that man must not consider himself as a sort of 8imperium in imperio10 but as a being subordinate to the whole of nature8 ,if therefore we must substitute the objective to the subjective point of view in which man at first spontaneously places himself1 how can the classification of the sciences be at the same time 8anthropocentric0 and positive8 ,this objection would perhaps be a strong one against positive philosophy as ,littr understood it4 ,against ,auguste ,comte it has no force1 for he accepts it4 ,he admits that his classification presents these two characters at the same time1 and he does not think that in so doing he is contradicting himself4 ,we must only distinguish with him two successive and different periods4 ,so long as positive philosophy is in process of formation1 7that is to say so long as the positive spirit remains special7 it is quite true that it is orientated from the objective point of view1 in other words1 that it goes from the world to man4 ,during this period1 it is indeed opposed to the nave belief which makes man the centre and the end of the universe4 ,but1 when from special the positive spirit has become universal1 when it has risen from science to philosophy1 when sociology is at length founded1 and when the understanding realises1 from the positive point of view the logical unity which is indispensable to it1 this unity is only completed when1 in its turn1 it takes man for its centre4 ,considered as an exact reproduction of the real world1 says ,comte1 our science is not capable of being completely systematised2 and in this sense we must not seek for any unity save that of method1 aspiring only to homogeneity and to the convergence of the different doctrines4 ,it is otherwise in regard to the inner source of human theories contemplated as the results of our individual and collective mental evolution4 8,thus referred1 not to the universe1 but to man1 or rather to humanity1 our real knowledge tends on the contrary towards an entire systematization4 ,we must then conceive a single science1 the human science1 more precisely social1 of which our existence constitutes at once the principle and the end4 ,into this human science the rational study of the external world becomes fused1 at once as a necessary element and a fundamental preamble40#bg ,comte would therefore not have repudiated1 for his classification of the sciences1 the qualification of 8anthropocentric0 on condition that it were understood4 ,it is no longer the spontaneous subjectivism from which the theological philosophy starts2 it is the conscious subjectivism to which the positive philosophy attains4 ,it has the merit of uniting in itself the two methods called objective and subjective4 ,the former has been in the ascendant during the long evolution of the sciences1 which were by degrees and successively reaching the positive state4 ,the latter allows us to concentrate the aim of the distinct sciences thus constituted into a supreme science1 which subordinates all the others to itself1 without absorbing them4 ,,iv4 ,the classification of the sciences is1 at the same time1 a plan for the setting forth of the positive philosophy1 and a complement of the law of the three ,states4 ,but1 while this law expresses the progress of the human intellect in the constitution of science and philosophy1 the classification supposes that science and philosophy are already constituted4 ,it expresses their order1 and enunciates from the static point of view what the law formulates from the dynamic point of view4 ,it shows the relations of the various elements of philosophy among themselves1 and to the whole4 ,so long as this idea of the whole was not defined1 that is to say1 so long as positive science remained special1 these relations could not be rationally established4 ,but1 once sociology was created1 and with it positive philosophy1 it became possible to embrace the whole of the fundamental sciences in a single conception4 ,for1 from that time1 they can be represented as being various aspects of the development of the human intellect4 ,truly1 the object of science is single1 and the divisions which are introduced into it for our convenience1 without being arbitrary1 are artificial4 ,all the branches of our knowledge1 that is to say all the fundamental sciences1 must be considered as issuing from a single trunk4 ,not that these sciences can ever be reduced one to another4 ,it suffices that they be homogeneous1 and their homogeneity results from their subjection to the same method2 further1 from their tendency towards the same end1 and finally1 from their subordination to the same law of progress4 ,in respect to the last and highest of these sciences1 the others 8must only be finally regarded as indispensable preliminaries in a progressive order40#bh ,thus the ladder of the fundamental sciences represents1 in ,comte's mind1 the methodical ascent of the positive spirit towards universality and unity4 ,it is a hierarchy1 a scala intellectus1 according to ,bacon's expression4 ,it includes the whole of the 8philosophia prima0 also foreshadowed by ,bacon and vainly sought after by philosophers4 ,the memory of ,bacon does not prevent the preponderating influence in this conception of ,comte from being that of ,descartes4 ,comte is far from ignoring it4 ,he calls himself the continuator and by a dreadful barbarism1 the completer of ,descartes4#bi ,undoubtedly ,descartes had not like him conceived the series of the fundamental sciences4 ,after having applied a positive method to the study of inorganic nature1 and even of living nature1 for the rest he had reverted to a metaphysical method4 ,but this 8cartesian compromise0 could only be provisional4 ,none the less to ,descartes belongs the merit of having definitely acquired several orders of phenomena for the positive spirit1 and of affirming the unity of science at the same time as the unity of method4 ,he was unable himself to realise this twofold unity1 for its time had not come1 and the necessary conditions had not yet been brought together4 ,moreover in the cartesian idea of science metaphysical elements subsist1 and ,descartes wrongly believed that the universal method was to be obtained by a transformation of the mathematical method4 ,comte takes up the leading ideas of ,descartes again1 and1 at the same time1 he corrects them1 according as the progress of the positive spirit during two centuries enabled him to do4 ,the position of 8leading science10 if this expression can be allowed1 passes from mathematics to sociology4 ,moreover1 the unity of science1 as ,comte conceives it1 no longer prevents the fundamental sciences from being irreducible to one another4 ,this unity is sufficiently secured by the homogeneity of the sciences1 which form a continuous series1 an 8encyclopdic hierarchy10 and which are all subordinated to the final science4 ,lastly the unity of the positive methods does not imply its uniformity everywhere4 ,each fundamental science1 as will be seen further on1 has its methods which are special to itself4#cj ,the classification of the sciences thus shows how positive philosophy stretches back over the ,,xviii4 cent41 whence it springs1 to link itself with ,bacon and ,descartes4 ,comte has retained ,bacon's view on this point1 that all scientific knowledge rests upon facts which have been fully observed1 and that a system of positive sciences constitutes the indispensable basis for the only philosophy which is within our reach4 ,to ,descartes he here owes the idea of the unity of method and of the unity of science4 ,we might almost say that he has received from ,bacon his idea of the contents of the sciences and from ,descartes his idea of their form4 ,by what means did he invest such matter with such a form8 ,the answer to this question is found in the positive theory of science4 ,,footnotes3 #bc ,cours1 ,i1 #df-dg4 #bd ,cours1 ,i1 #ad-ae4 #be ,cours1 ,i1 #hb1 #ab4 #bf ,herbert ,spencer3 ,the ,classification of the ,sciences4 ,london1 #ahfd1 p4 #db4 #bg ,discours sur l'esprit positif 7#ahdd7 p4 #bd4 #bh ,cours1 ,,vi4 #faj4 #bi ,correspondence de ,h4 ,comte and de ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,lettre du #e novembre #ahdb1 p4 #acb4 #cj ,cp4 infra1 book ,i1 ch4 ,,vi4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,science ,we may admit1 with ,aristotle1 that curiosity is natural to man1 and that we are inclined to inquire into things for the pleasure of knowing them4 ,but it must be admitted1 adds ,comte1 that this inclination is one of the least active and the least imperative in our nature4 ,it must have been still less so in the beginning of mankind's development2 and it was1 in any case1 much weaker than the inclination to laziness1 or than the repugnance to accept anything new4 ,it has therefore been necessary1 in order that man might emerge from his primitive intellectual torpor1 that the activity of his mind should be induced and even compelled to exert itself by pressing circumstances4 ,such were undoubtedly the necessities of hunting1 the dangers of war1 and in a general way1 the desire to avoid suffering and death4 ,moreover1 the knowledge which the human mind acquires at first is only very imperfectly real2 for theological philosophy furnishes the mind with its first conceptions4 ,man begins by supposing everywhere wills like his own1 and the world which surrounds him is peopled with gods or fetishes4 ,nevertheless1 from this first period1 the rudiments of a more positive knowledge already appear4 ,in every order of phenomena some are very simple and of such striking regularity1 that evidently no arbitrary will intervenes in their working4 ,man must very quickly have had a 8real0 idea of these phenomena4 ,in all the other cases instead of observing the phenomena he imagined the mode of their production2 but here he observed the sequences and concomitances which he could not resist2 and he regulated his conduct upon this observation4 ,from this humble beginning science came into being4 ,in this way1 far from opposing scientific thought to common thought1 as most of the philosophers do1 ,comte1 without disregarding the special character of one and of the other shows that both spring from the same source1 and that they do not present any essential point of difference4 ,however abstract and however elevated science may become1 it always remains1 according to him1 a 8simple special prolongation0 of good sense1 of common sense and of 8universal wisdom40 ,the character of 8positivity10 by which scientific knowledge is distinguished from theological and metaphysical conceptions1 belongs also to popular wisdom4 ,like this wisdom1 which the practical necessities of life have formed1 science abstains from searching after the causes1 the ends1 the substances1 and whatever is beyond the reach of verification by experience4 ,its efforts bear exclusively upon the laws of coexistence and of succession which govern the phenomena4 ,and again it is from this wisdom that it has borrowed the spirit of its positive method1 which consists in observing facts and in systematising observations to rise to the concept of laws4 ,it follows from this that science contains within itself neither its starting-point nor its terminus4 ,both are given it by 8common sense0 whence it springs4 ,the starting-point is the spontaneous observation of constant relations between the most simple phenomena4 ,the terminus is the knowledge of these same relations among all given phenomena1 as complete and as precise as our requirements demand4 ,indeed the common sense1 or the popular wisdom1 is soon baffled by the complexity of phenomena4 ,if we had no other guide we should know very little1 and in nearly all cases we should be reduced to a kind of empirical divination4 ,the function of science is to substitute a real knowledge of laws to this divination4 ,this function would never have been fulfilled if the human mind had not possessed the property of being able to separate theory from practice4 ,undoubtedly the former proceeds from the latter4 ,as has been said1 every science is born from a corresponding art1 and from the desire to perfect it4 ,but this perfecting would not have gone very far1 if the human mind had never lost sight of it4 ,happily1 man is capable of temporarily forgetting his immediate interests in the pursuit of knowledge4 ,by degrees1 from the complexity of concrete cases1 he has learnt to disengage the elements common to a whole class of phenomena4 ,he has thus formed the idea of law1 or the invariable relation between given phenomena4 ,beyond the intellectual satisfaction which this knowledge gave him1 he found in time applications of it which he would never have imagined beforehand4 ,to quote an example from a civilisation already very advanced1 when the ,greek geometers patiently applied themselves to the study of conic sections1 did they suspect that their labours would one day serve in calculating certain astronomical determinations upon which the safety of mariners would depend8 ,in this way1 science1 utilitarian in its origin1 since it sprang from the practical needs of man1 utilitarian in its end1 since it aims at providing for those needs1 has nevertheless been unable to develop itself and will be unable still to do so in the future1 except by neglecting this very utility4 ,better to fulfil its destiny1 it must provisionally forget it2 and it will be the more useful1 in the long run1 in proportion as it will have been the more disinterested4 ,we never know1 a priori1 if a discovery which finds no application to-day1 combined later with another one1 will not be of capital interest for mankind4 ,therefore it is of the highest importance that theoretical order should remain clearly distinct from the practical order4 ,that is why ,comte regarded the appearance of a sacerdotal class1 specially occupied with speculative research1 as a decisive moment in history of humanity4 ,it matters little that these researches should have remained chimerical and absurd during long centuries4 ,the essential point was that the human mind should form and keep the habit of disinterested speculation1 that it should not rest content with immediately applicable knowledge1 and that it should exert itself towards a theoretical conception of nature1 however simple at first that conception was bound to be4 ,thus1 science has1 properly speaking1 two roots1 the one practical1 the other theoretical4 ,if it originated in the primitive arts1 it is no less closely allied with primitive philosophy4 ,it still bears features which enable us to discern this twofold filiation4 ,on the one hand1 it has remained speculative as was the theological philosophy which first dominated over the human mind4 ,only this speculation has gradually abandoned everything except the laws of phenomena1 and it has ended by undermining the theological conceptions from which it came4 ,on the other hand1 science has remained real1 like the popular wisdom which gave it birth4 ,but1 while dealing with given phenomena in experience1 it has developed in the direction of theory4 ,instead of only considering scenes of concrete objects1 it has resolved them into their elements4 ,a more and more powerful analysis has raised it to the consideration of laws more and more general and abstract4 ,thus1 while the popular wisdom is limited to empirical generalisations1 a science such as1 for instance1 astronomy discovers the law which governs the whole of an immense order of phenomena4 ,from this general idea of science the following consequences at once follow3 #a4 ,science is the collective work of humanity4 ,it bears upon an object common to all3 ,reality4 ,it employs the method common to all3 the positive method4 ,all intellects work in the same manner on a common ground4 ,it is what ,comte calls 8the profound mental identity of learned men with the crowd whose destiny fulfils itself in active work4#ca0 ,the progress of the scientific mind is a methodical extension of popular common sense to all subjects accessible to human reason4 ,but here method does almost everything4 8,the whole superiority of the philosophical mind over the popular common sense results from a special and continuous application to common speculations1 in starting prudently from the initial step1 after having brought them back to a normal state of judicious abstraction1 for the purpose of generalising and coordinating4 ,for1 what ordinary intellects chiefly lack1 is less the precision and penetration appropriate for discerning partial approximations1 than the aptitude for generalising abstract relations1 and for establishing a perfect logical coherence among our various notions40#cb ,the germ of the highest scientific conceptions is often to be found in common reason4 ,comte delights in giving as an example one of the discoveries which he most admires1 ,descartes' invention of analytical ,geometry4 ,to determine at every moment the position of a point in space by its distance from fixed axes3 is not that what geographers have been doing for so long in order to determine the longitude and latitude of a place upon the terrestrial sphere8 ,and has not this proceeding itself been suggested to the geographer by simple common sense8 ,for he instinctively seeks to mark the inaccessible points which interest him1 by means of their distance from given points or lines4 ,from this the idea of the ,cartesian co-ordinates only differs by a superior degree of abstraction and of generality4 ,thus all men must be regarded as collaborating in the discovery of truth as much as in making use of it4 ,speaking generally1 if the great philosophers and scientific men of genius seem to be the intellectual guides of humanity1 it is because they are the first to be affected by each mental revolution4 ,they are the first to pass from a traditional to a new attitude and their example is decisive4 ,but1 says ,comte1 8the changes relating to the method of thinking with originality only become manifest when they are almost accomplished40 ,the great men whose names are justly authors attached to are1 however1 more the heralds than the of these changes4 #b4 ,science is the work of all3 it must therefore be accessible to all4 ,it is a patrimony common to the whole of mankind2 and the inheritance must be taken from no one4 ,as a consequence1 the ,state owes scientific instruction to those who are not in a position to procure it for themselves4 ,not that all men1 all the people ought to acquire a deep knowledge of the several fundamental sciences1 like those who make it the particular occupation of their lives4 ,the impossibility of such a thing is too evident for several reasons4 ,neither is it a question of popularising the great scientific theories1 for the use of badly prepared minds4 ,comte condemns severely this way of 8simplifying0 science4 ,for instance1 he will not allow ,newton's laws to be separated from their demonstrations4 ,it will always be the duty of the greater number of men to adopt the majority of scientific truths on the testimony of those who will have discovered1 criticised and verified them4 ,but1 what it will be the duty of common education to give to every mind1 is the habit of conceiving all phenomena1 from the most simple to the most complex1 as equally governed by invariable laws1 and1 consequently1 of understanding the whole of nature as an order which the positive method alone allows us to discover and to modify4 ,and as this method cannot be studied apart from the sciences in which it is used1 it will be necessary for every man to be made acquainted with a summary of each fundamental science1 from mathematics to sociology4 ,there is nothing impracticable in this scheme4 ,comte has drawn out1 in the positive ,polity1 a plan of education conceived on this principle4 ,on this condition alone will philosophy1 founded upon positive science1 succeed in realising the harmony of minds1 and in 8reorganising the beliefs40 ,,ii4 ,auguste ,comte often says that the positive spirit consists in keeping oneself equally distant from two dangers1 mysticism and empiricism4#cc ,by mysticism he understands the recourse to non-verifiable explanations and to transcendent1 hypotheses4 ,men's imagination finds pleasure in these things1 but we must be able to bring all 8real0 knowledge back to a general or particular fact4 ,positive science therefore abstains from searching after substances1 ends1 and even causes4 ,it only bears upon phenomena and their relations4 ,empiricism1 in its turn1 is no less than mysticism contrary to the spirit of science1 ,empiricism signifies for ,comte the knowledge which does not go beyond the pure and simple ascertainment of a fact4 ,now1 an accumulation of even precisely noted facts has no theoretical interest4 ,it may1 at most1 be erudition1 but it is not science4 ,to think that by thus gathering facts together one is labouring at the work of science1 is 8to take a quarry for an edifice40#cd ,in a word1 8science is made up of laws1 and not of facts40#ce ,strictly speaking1 no scientific observation is even possible without a previous theory1 that is to say1 without a presupposed law1 whose verification is in question4 ,undoubtedly in science when it has become positive1 the imagination no longer constructs 8causes0 or 8essences40 ,it must submit to reason1 that is to say1 to the methodical investigation of phenomena4 ,nevertheless1 this investigation cannot take place without guiding hypotheses1 and thus the imagination plays a part in science1 subordinate it is true1 but indispensable4 ,comte here separates himself from ,bacon4 ,according to the ,english philosopher1 in the knowledge of nature1 the mind must make itself as receptive as possible4 ,in introducing anything of itself it would falsify science1 and its whole effort must be to hold itself up to phenomena as a perfectly plain and unspotted mirror1 so as to reflect them as they are4 ,now this is precisely the idea of science which ,comte rejects under the name of empiricism4 ,without the hypotheses or the theories suggested by the very activity of the mind science would never be constituted1 according to him4 ,there would never even be an apprehension of fact1 at least an apprehension such that it could be of service to science4 ,in a word 8absolute empiricism is impossible40 ,in the simple observation of a phenomenon by the human mind1 the entire mind is interested1 and in it the subjective conditions of science are already virtually given4 ,this being granted1 science may be defined as a methodical processus of the connection and extension of our knowledge4 ,it consists1 in every department 8in the exact relations established between observed facts1 so as to deduce from the least possible number of fundamental data1 the most extensive series of secondary phenomena1 in renouncing absolutely the vain search after causes and essences40 ,so long as men seek to 8explain0 phenomena the theological and metaphysical spirit has not yet disappeared4 ,positive science abstains from all explanations of this kind4 ,thus1 ,newton has placed in the same category universal gravitation and the attraction of bodies4 ,we cannot know what this mutual action of the stars and the attraction of terrestrial bodies are in themselves4 ,but we know with full certainty1 the existence and the law of these two orders of phenomena and moreover we know that they are identical4 ,for the geometer weight is explained when he conceives it as a particular case of general gravitation4 ,on the contrary it is weight which makes the physicist proper understand celestial gravitation4 ,we can never go beyond such juxtapositions 8of ideas40#cf ,but while science brings together similar phenomena1 its chief function is to connect them1 that is to say to determine them one by another according to the relations which exist between them4 ,all science1 says ,comte1 consists in the co-ordination of facts2 and if the several observations remained isolated there would be no science4 ,we may even say generally that science is destined1 as far as the various phenomena permit1 to dispense with direct observation1 in allowing us to deduce the greatest possible number of results from the smallest number of acquired data4 ,if a constant relation is found to subsist between two phenomena1 it becomes useless to observe them both2 for from the observation of one the variations of the other will be deduced4 ,but the first may in its turn be the function of a third1 and so on2 until at last we conceive a constant connection between all the phenomena of a given order1 which may allow us to deduce them all from a single law4 ,such for ,comte would be the perfect form of science3 how near it is to the ,cartesian ideal6 8,the positive spirit10 he says1 8without failing to recognize the preponderance of reality directly ascertained1 tends to enlarge the rational at the expense of the experimental domain1 by substituting the prevision of phenomena to their immediate observation40 ,scientific progress consists in diminishing the number of distinct and independent laws1 by continually multiplying their respective connections4#cg 8,prevision0 thus becomes the essential characteristic of scientific knowledge1 and that independently of any utilitarian mental reservation4 ,for the eventual applications of science do not determine its theoretical advance4 ,the prevision with which we are here concerned consists solely in the possibility of knowing with certainty without observing4 ,it is knowledge a priori in the ,aristotelian sense of the word1 of which mathematics present the most perfect model4 ,a rectilinear triangle being given1 ,i do not need experience to know with certainty that the sum of the angles in it is equal to two right angles4 ,thus understood prevision applies to the present1 and even to the past1 as well as to the future4 ,when ,comte writes 8,all science has prevision for its aim10#ch we must understand3 8,all science tends to substitute deduction to experience1 rational to empirical knowledge40 ,this prevision1 a necessary consequence of the constant relations discovered between phenomena1 will allow men never to mistake real science for fruitless erudition1 which accumulates facts without deducing them one from another4 ,thus the formula cited above enlarges itself3 8,science is composed of laws and not of facts40 ,the more deduction is substituted to experience1 the better is the extension and connection of our knowledge realised4 ,consequently1 the more also does science draw near to that unity which is imperatively claimed by our understanding1 and which is for it the criterion of truth4 8,real science10 says ,comte1 8regarded from the highest point of view1 has no other general object but to establish or to fortify unceasingly the intellectual order1 which is the basis of all other order40#ci ,the mind which applies itself to the contemplation of the world requires1 before everything1 to find it intelligible4 8,real0 science satisfies it1 not in imagining wills and causes1 as did theology and metaphysics1 but in discovering order in the constant relations between phenomena4 ,when this order is harmonious1 that is to say1 when the several classes of phenomena are conceived as homogenous1 and as similarly governed by laws1 8the spontaneous unity of our understanding is consolidated40 ,it matters little that the various orders of phenomena are given to us as irreducible to one another4 ,the highest object of science is to determine the point of view from which all phenomena appear intelligible1 and this point of view is one as the understanding itself is one4 ,,iii4 ,perhaps it would have been easy to pass from this conception of positive science to a theory of knowledge1 and to a metaphysical view of nature1 both idealistic4 ,but ,comte neither could nor would push his theory in this direction4 ,in this respect nothing is more significant than his way of understanding the relativity of science4 ,this relativity is usually presented as the conclusion of a criticism of our understanding1 of its nature1 of its bearings1 and of its relations to its objects4 ,but1 according to ,comte1 an inquiry pursued on these lines1 has no chance of reaching a conclusion4 ,the only theory of knowledge which is positive and 8real10 is drawn from the history of the human mind4 ,the laws of the mind are only revealed in the examination of the successive products of its activity1 that is to say in its beliefs and in its science4 ,the relativity of science can therefore only be stated at first1 as a fact1 leaving it for subsequent inquiry to determine the reason of that fact4 ,the law of the three ,states suffices for this1 for it shows that man began by seeking for absolute knowledge4 ,the philosophy to which he first turns is1 at the same time1 the most nave and the most ambitious4 ,but a necessary evolution causes him to abandon the pursuit of the absolute1 first in its theological form and then in the metaphysical form4 ,having reached the positive state1 man knows that his science1 necessarily relative1 is limited to 8the systematic co-ordination of phenomena10 and the knowledge of their laws4 ,the condemnation which thus strikes researches bearing on the absolute is itself1 moreover1 only relative in character4 ,it prejudges nothing respecting the ultimate solution of questions4 ,positive philosophy in no way takes sides in respect to these problems4 ,it simply states that science has more and more cut them off from the number of those which it studies4 ,indeed it is impossible to apply the positive method to questions which concern the absolute4 ,now1 this method being the only one which our mind can henceforth follow1 at least if it wishes to maintain the logical unity which is its supreme requirement1 it follows that these problems are in fact abandoned4 ,nothing more and nothing less4 8,sound philosophy10 says ,comte1 8sets aside1 it is true1 insoluble questions02 but 8in stating the motive of their rejection1 it avoids denying anything respecting them1 which would be contradictory to that systematic disuse by which alone uncontrovertible opinions must die out40 7,comte means3 opinions which do not come within the range of positive discussion47 ,the problems relating to the essence of the soul or to the 8substantia prima0 will melt away1 as the majority of the metaphysical problems which the scholastics put to themselves have already disappeared4 ,even to positive science1 we must be careful not to attribute an absolute character--that is to say1 in a sense slightly different from the preceding one1 but very frequently with ,comte--a definite and immutable character4 ,the laws which we can determine are never true except under certain conditions4 ,we have no right to consider them as true absolutely4 ,newton's law is demonstrated for our solar system3 but do we know that it is verified in all the systems throughout space8 ,do not let us confound the world1 which we can study with the united resources of observation and calculation with the universe1 of which we know scarcely anything1 and which outranges all our powers4 ,in spite of the famous principle of the sufficient reason the absence of motives for negation does not constitute the right of affirmation1 without any direct proof4 ,absolute notions1 says ,comte1 seem to me so impossible that ,i would not even dare1 whatever probability ,i may see in it1 to warrant the necessary and unalterable perpetuity of the theory of gravitation restricted to the interior of our world1 if one day1 7which is moreover very difficult to admit7 the precision of our present observations came to be perfected as much as we have done in comparison to ,hipparchus4#dj ,in the same way1 must not attraction have seemed to be an absolute quality 7that is to say an immutable one7 of bodies1 since neither change of shape1 nor the passage from one physical constitution to another1 nor any chemical metamorphosis1 nor even the difference between the state of life and death could modify this quality1 so long as the integrity of the substance was maintained8 ,the ,newtonian conception came and destroyed entirely at a signal stroke this character which must have appeared so indestructible1 by showing that the weight of a body is a phenomenon purely relative to the position of this body in the world1 or1 more precisely1 to its distance from the centre of the earth4#da ,in order that our positive science of any part of nature should be absolute1 that is to say1 final1 it would have to be complete4 ,but1 as all things are caused or causing1 helped or helping1 according to ,pascal's expression1 all the phenomena in a reciprocal universal action1 all the laws relative one to another1 our science will never be complete on any point4 ,it only furnishes more or less imperfect approximations4#db ,the discovery of new facts and new laws is always possible4 ,how many times does not positive science find itself obliged to modify and to readjust a system of long acquired notions1 in order to make a place for new elements8 ,this is a work often very laborious1 but from which science never dreams of shrinking1 knowing that it is made liable to it1 so to speak1 by definition1 that is to say1 that it is relative4 ,examples of this abound1 not only in the history of physical and natural science1 but even in that of so-called exact sciences4 ,do we not hear ,m4 ,poincar declaring in accordance with ,hertz1 that given the system of ,galileo and of ,newton in mechanics it is impossible to give a satisfactory idea of mass and of force8#dc ,thus the definitions1 and even the laws1 established by the positive sciences1 are at every period approximations corresponding to the knowledge we have of facts4 ,and as this knowledge can always be enriched the approximation may also become stricter1 without ever reaching its confines4 ,leibnitz already said that the analysis of anything real reaches to infinity4 ,this thought is with him1 closely allied to the whole of his metaphysics4 ,we find in ,comte an expression in some way equivalent1 although positive4 ,he says1 although the progress of the science of nature consists in substituting as much as possible the rational method to the experimental method1 the limit can never be attained1 we can never affirm that experience will not bring new elements which will oblige us to modify the edifice of science4 ,the relativity of science thus serves to maintain an equal balance between the need of unity which comes from the understanding1 and the inexhaustible diversity of the world of reality which this understanding studies4 ,as a fact1 then1 positive science is always relative4 ,rightly1 it cannot be otherwise1 and this for two essential reasons4 ,it depends necessarily upon 8our organisation0 and 8our situation0#dd or1 in other words1 it is relative 8both to the individual and to the species in its advance40 ,it is relative in the first place to our organisation4 ,here ,comte takes up again an idea which was dear to the philosophers of the ,,xviii4 century and in particular to ,diderot4 ,if our organisation were different1 the data which our science elaborates would be other that they are4 ,with more organs we might perhaps grasp kinds of problems of which we have no idea4 ,if we suppose our species to be blind1 astronomy would not exist for it4 ,and further1 a natural law requires that the more complex and the higher phenomena in regard to their conditions of existence1 should be subordinated to the more general and the more common phenomena4 ,the intellectual phenomena thus depend1 first1 upon the biological phenomena1 and then upon all those to which the biological phenomena are subordinated4 ,in this sense1 therefore1 science is relative to our organisation1 which is itself relative in respect to the milieu in which we live4 ,but1 reciprocally1 the representation of this milieu and of this organisation rests upon intellectual laws which impart to science a need of unity and harmony special to the mind4 ,comte concludes1 therefore1 that to endeavour to apportion what belongs to the object and what to the subject in scientific knowledge is a hopeless attempt4 ,we simply know that science is not the exclusive product either of the subject or the object4 ,giving too much to the object leads us to 8empiricism40 ,falling to the opposite extreme leads to 8mysticism40 ,the efforts of philosophers to construct an abstract theory of knowledge have only ended in miserable results4 ,we have not gone beyond ,aristotle's 8axiom as corrected by ,leibnitz40 ,nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu1 nisi ipse intellectus4 ,we are only certain of one thing3 our science1 necessarily conditioned by our organisation1 is also necessarily relative4 ,but this is not the most decisive consideration for it only makes us see that our science would be different1 if our organisation were to change4 ,now1 as a matter of fact1 our organisation does not change4 ,human nature1 according to ,comte1 remains similar to itself in the whole course of its evolution4 ,it is this evolution which itself becomes a cause1 and a decisive one1 of relativity for science4 ,for1 if our organisation does not vary1 the system of our conceptions and of our science necessarily varies1 according to our 8situation10 that is to say1 according to the position which we occupy in this evolution1 which accomplishes itself according to laws4 ,our conceptions1 our religions1 our philosophies1 are not only individual phenomena2 they are also and chiefly social phenomena1 moments in a collective and continuous life1 of which all the phases are interdependent4 ,we only know in a given order of knowledge1 what is compatible at that moment with the generally admitted philosophy1 with the knowledge already acquired in this and in the other orders of phenomena1 with the great hypotheses considered as true1 with the methods in force1 etc4 ,as soon as the human mind has become conscious of the evolution to which it is subject1 as soon as it has grasped its most general law 7the law of the three states71 in a word1 as soon as sociology is founded1 science can no longer be conceived as other than relative4 ,for from that moment the various sciences appear as so many great social facts1 which vary as so many functions of the rest of civilisation4 ,our speculations1 8depending on the totality of social progression10 can therefore never admit of that absolute fixity which metaphysicians have supposed4 ,the continuous movement of history modifies1 in the long run1 the beliefs which appear to be the most immutable4 ,our theories tend to represent more and more faithfully the objects of our investigations1 that is to say the laws of phenomena4 ,we are thus brought back to the idea of limit1 which is never attained1 towards which we are advancing by means of approximations ever more exact4 ,the time is not yet far distant1 when a doctrine of this kind could not have been advanced without at once being rejected as sceptical4 ,the human mind is scarcely beginning to understand that truth cannot be immutable4#de ,men believed that truth must always be identical with itself1 always identical for all minds at all times and at all places4 ,it seems that in losing this character1 it must cease to be truth4 ,that is why philosophy has been so persistent in the pursuit of the absolute4 ,it was believed that no truth could be certain1 unless it rested1 ultimately1 upon an immutable foundation4 ,science was therefore made to hang on metaphysics4 ,and the defeats1 a thousand times repeated1 of metaphysics would not have discouraged the human mind had not positive philosophy at last shown that the truth of which we are capable1 because it is relative does not cease to be truth4 ,we are not condemned to choose between the pursuit of an inaccessible absolute and the crumbling down of all science4 ,it suffices to understand that human science evolves and that this evolution is subject to laws4 ,it is never ended3 it always 8becomes40 ,it is not a 8state30 it is a 8progress40 ,there are therefore provisional1 and1 if one may so speak1 temporary truths4 ,does science ever establish any others8 ,the ideas which ,hipparchus and the ,greek astronomers had of the heavens was not false in all respects4 ,it was the astronomical truth compatible with the conditions of the society in which they lived4 ,after the labours of the observers of the ,middle ,ages1 utilised by ,copernicus1 this idea faded before another one which became more perfect with ,newton and ,laplace4 ,perhaps this one will be modified in its turn1 in consequence of new discoveries6 ,similarly it was thought that the earth was a flat surface1 then a round disc4 ,then it was represented as a sphere and finally as an ellipsoid4 ,to-day we know that this ellipsoid is irregular4 ,truth is then at each period 8the perfect logical coherence10 or the correspondence between our conceptions and our observations4 ,the history of human thought is composed of a progressive series of alternating periods4 ,at a certain moment the mind has placed what it conceives in accordance with what it knows4 ,but1 by degrees1 new facts are observed1 known facts are better interpreted1 discoveries burst forth4 ,the harmony between the conceptions and the observations then becomes precarious4 ,minds find a greater and greater difficulty in fitting all the acquired knowledge into the traditional frame4 ,at last the frame gives way4 ,then the harmony is re-established in a more comprehensive form1 which in its turn is destined to become insufficient4 ,here positive philosophy recognises a sociological law4 ,it gives up the vain dream of immutable truth4 ,it no longer regards the truth of to-day as absolutely true1 nor the truth of yesterday as absolutely false4 ,it ceases to be critical in regard to the past40 ,to conclude1 the theory of science can therefore only be accomplished from the sociological point of view4 ,it remains imperfect so long as 8we0 has not been substituted to 8,i10 the universal subject which is humanity to the individual subject1 and a philosophical history of the sciences to mere reflective analysis4 ,to the logical conditions of science1 to define it completely1 its biological and social conditions must be joined4 ,then1 but then only1 it will be understood1 that1 at each period1 science is at the same time true and relative1 without its relativity placing its truth in danger4 ,,footnotes3 #ca #a ,cours1 vi4 #fea-c4 #cb #b ,cours1 vi4 #fea-c4 #cc ,discours sur l'esprit positif1 p4 #af2 ,pol4 pos4 ,,iii1 #be4 #cd ,cours1 ,,iii1 #d4 #ce ,cours1 ,,vi1 #fdg4 #cf ,cours1 ,i4 #ajh3 ,,ii4 #ah1 #ahh-i4 #cg ,cours1 ,,vi4 #fdf sqq4 #ch ,cours1 ,,ii4 #ah3 ,,iii1 #aa-ab4 #ci ,cours1 ,,iv1 #adg4 #dj ,cours1 ,,ii1 #aie-g4 #da ,cours1 ,,ii1 #ahg4 #db ,cours1 ,,iv1 #fgb-c4 #dc ,revue gnrale des ,sciences1 #cj septembre1 #ahig4 #dd ,discours sur l',esprit positif1 p4 #ae4 #de ,cours1 #gef41 ,,vi4 ,,chapter ,v ,,science 7,,continued7 ,,phenomena ,,and ,,laws ,the perfection of the positive system1 towards which it unceasingly tends1 although very probably it may never reach it1 would be to represent all observable phenomena as particular cases of a single general fact1 such as1 for example1 that of gravitation4 ,the fundamental identity of phenomena1 the reduction of particular laws to a supreme law2 this is an ideal which we are free to entertain4 ,comte1 after d',alembert and ,saint-,simon1 has formulated it himself at the beginning of the ,cours de philosophie positive4#df ,unfortunately this ideal is not realisable4 ,we apply a very weak intellect to a very complicated world4#dg ,the unity which1 scorning experience1 we might establish1 would naturally be valueless4 ,for the several categories of phenomena proposed to us seem irreducible4 ,if this#dh be the case1 the pursuit after scientific unity is 8irrational40 ,comte ended by treating it as an 8absurd utopia40#di ,however1 this utopia is forever reappearing2 for the human mind is secretly attached to it4 ,it is because1 on the one hand1 unity pleases it above all things1 and on the other hand because there is here an illusion produced and maintained by a philosophy born of mathematical inspiration4 ,descartes' discovery which allowed questions of geometry to be dealt with by algebra has been the occasion of a grave error4 ,it gave rise to the thought that differences of quality could be reduced to differences of quantity4 ,hence the idea of 8reducing0 the various categories of phenomena to one another4 ,but this was a wrong interpretation of the principle of analytical geometry4 ,even there1 we have a translation1 not reduction1 8,the geometrical ideas of form and of situation10 says ,comte--and ,mr4 ,renouvier will repeat it after him--8are not naturally more like numerical notions than the other real conceptions4 ,every phenomenon1 even social1 would certainly have its equation1 as a figure or a motion if its law were known to us with sufficient precision4 ,analysis is therefore but an instrument of incomparable power for the study of phenomena4 ,but1 from the fact that we can make use of it1 it does not in the least follow that the phenomena may be all brought back to an identical type4 ,quality is in no way by this means reduced to quantity1 which is something entirely abstract1 and this no more takes place in the case of geometrical quality than in the case of any other4 ,neither can the geometrical quality be reduced to pure analysis1 nor the physical to the geometrical1 nor the living to the inorganic1 nor the social to the biological4 ,at every stage something qualitatively new appears4 ,whether or no we can formulate the relations of phenomena in the form of an equation1 their heterogeneity subsists always irreducible4 ,what is true of phenomena is also true of their laws4 ,each order of phenomena has its special laws over and above those which result from its relations with the less complicated and more general orders4 ,the idea of a supreme law from which all the others would be deduced must therefore be forsaken4 ,even within the range of each fundamental science1 it is doubtful how far the unity dreamt of could ever be attained4 ,the number of irreducible laws is far more considerable than is imagined by a false appreciation of our mental powers and of scientific difficulties4 ,for instance1 in physics1 how can optics and acoustics be reduced to one another8 ,physiological considerations1 in default of other reasons1 would be opposed to such a confusion of ideas4#ej ,likewise in biology1 how can the laws of animal life be reduced to those of lower organic life8 and in sociology1 the laws of human society1 implying a course of history1 to those of animal societies which do not do so8 ,instead1 therefore1 of conceiving a priori1 the phenomena and the laws as capable of a 8reduction0 which is1 in fact1 impossible1 the positive method requires the determination of the general characters of these phenomena and of these laws by observations4 ,it first establishes the following3 #a4 ,the more complex phenomena become1 the more also our means of studying them increase in number4 ,it is a natural but an insufficient compensation4 ,for the difficulty of establishing the science of phenomena grows much more quickly than the number and the power of our methodical processes4 ,however1 without this compensation1 scarcely any fundamental science would ever reach the positive state4 ,thus1 to the method of pure mathematics observation in astronomy comes to be added4 ,experimentation appears in physics1 the art of nomenclatures in chemistry1 the comparative method in biology1 the historical method in social science4 ,with this final science1 the positive method is henceforth complete4 #b4 ,the more complex phenomena become1 the more modifiable they are4 ,we have no power over astronomical phenomena4 ,even the perfect knowledge of their laws would only allow us to foresee them4 ,but we can1 in a great number of cases1 bring about or arrest physical and chemical phenomena4 ,our intervention is still more efficacious if we are concerned with biological phenomena1 as is sufficiently proved by the good and the evil wrought by medicine and surgery4 ,and it finally reaches the height of its power in social and political life4 ,so much so that even cultivated men find it difficult to persuade themselves that social phenomena are governed by invariable laws1 and that politics can become the object of a science4 ,experience seems to tell them1 on the contrary1 that the activity of man1 and especially that of the man of genius1 is all-powerful in this domain4 ,nevertheless it is not so1 as sociology1 by the mere fact of its existence sufficiently proves4 ,but it remains true that1 of all the phenomena of nature1 the social and moral phenomena are those in which man's intervention is at once the easiest and the most efficacious4 #c4 ,the more complex the phenomena the more imperfect they are4 ,we shall perhaps be surprised to see ,comte appealing to the idea of perfection4 ,it seems that he ought to have excluded it as being something metaphysical4 ,further on we shall consider his theory of finality4 ,at present let us only say that if he considers natural phenomena as imperfect1 it is in the sense in which ,helmholtz calls the eye a poor optical instrument4 ,he simply states that certain ends1 in fact1 being realized by a natural arrangement of a group of phenomena1 the same end might be better or more economically reached1 by other arrangements that we can easily conceive4 ,in this sense our solar system is imperfect1 but less so than many living forms whose organism might present a much higher degree of advantageous adaptation4 ,and yet these living forms are themselves less imperfect than societies subject as they are to all sorts of pathological alterations1 as history clearly shows4 ,it is remarkable that the most imperfect phenomena should precisely be the most modifiable1 and also those whose study only became positive in the last stage4 ,,ii4 ,more or less complex1 modifiable and imperfect1 all phenomena are subject to laws4 ,it is the supreme principle1 the 8fundamental dogma0 of science and of positive philosophy4 ,comte thus enunciates it3 8,all phenomena whatever1 inorganic or organic1 physical or moral1 individual or social1 are all subjected in a continuous manner to rigorously invariable laws40#ea ,undoubtedly this principle is not yet extended1 by the majority of minds1 to all phenomena4 ,this is shown clearly enough by their mode of reasoning in ethics and in politics4 ,but it is1 however1 implied in their general conception of nature4 ,it thus assumes a universal character1 which has caused it to be regarded by many philosophers as an innate1 or at least a primitive notion1 in the human mind4 ,according to ,comte1 this is erroneous4 ,like ,john ,stuart ,mill1 whom he expressly quotes on this point1#eb he sees in this principle the result of a long1 gradual induction1 at the same time individual and collective4 ,except in the case of the most familiar phenomena1 whose regularity is most striking1 the human mind does not begin by believing in an invariable order4 ,even the mind's conceptions1 7theological and metaphysical71 conceal the existence of laws1 long after observation would have made it see them1 were it freed from bias4 ,it is true that the 8first germs0 of this principle exist as soon as human reason begins to be exercised1 since the dominion of theological philosophy never could be absolute4 ,but these germs are only developed very slowly1 like the positive method and conceptions themselves4 ,the induction upon which this principle is founded only began to acquire solidity when it was definitely verified for a whole order of important phenomena1 that is to say when mathematical astronomy had been founded4 ,phenomena of the highest importance1 from the theoretical as well as from the practical point of view1 could then be predicted with perfect certainty4 ,the invariability of their laws had been placed beyond doubt4 ,from that moment1 the principle must have been extended by analogy1 to the more complex orders of phenomena1 even before their own laws could be known4 ,but according to ,comte this 8vague logical anticipation0 remained valueless and fruitless4 ,it is of no use to conceive1 in the abstract that a certain order of phenomena must be subject to laws4 ,this empty conception cannot outweigh the theological and metaphysical beliefs1 which have the force of habit in their favour4 ,in order that the principle of laws should be really established in an order of phenomena1 some laws must in fact have been discovered and demonstrated in it4 ,consequently1 while in the a priori doctrines the possibility of all science rests upon the principle of laws1 in ,comte's doctrine1 on the contrary1 it is the progress of positive science which by degrees founds the principle1 and which finally brings it to the universal form in which we find it to-day4 ,until the creation of sociology1 this principle did not yet possess an effective universality1 since the moral and social phenomena were not conceived as subject to invariable laws4 ,but when the last conquest of the positive spirit is once accomplished1 8this great principle at once acquires a decisive fulness1 and may be formulated as applying universally to all phenomena40 ,undoubtedly1 in each order1 we have only established for a few what henceforth we affirm for all phenomena without previous verification4 ,but we think that laws1 unknown to us1 nevertheless exist4 ,in this we yield to an 8irresistible analogy10 which has never been proved to be false4 ,thus1 8the most fundamental dogma of the whole of positive philosophy1 that is to say1 the subjection of all real phenomena to invariable laws1 only results with certainty from an immense induction1 without really being deducible from any notion whatever40#ec ,this immense induction is a progressive sum of inductions which have taken place successively in each category of phenomena4 ,it would not be absurd1 strictly speaking1 that a certain category should not be submitted1 like the others to invariable laws4 ,but1 since sociology has been founded1 we know that all are in fact so subjected4 ,the laws are known to us1 sometimes by experience1 sometimes by reasoning4 ,this diversity of origin in no way influences either the certainty or the philosophical dignity of the laws4 ,each of the six fundamental sciences gives examples of these two distinct modes of advance which mutually complete each other4 8,there is not less genius in the discovery of ,kepler than in that of ,newton4 ,the initial laws of mechanics and even of geometry rest solely upon observation4 ,the logical perfection consists in confirming by one of these ways what must have been found by the other4 ,but one of the two suffices when all the conditions required by the method are fulfilled40#ed ,how should the laws obtained by induction be regarded as less certain than the laws obtained by deduction1 since the principle of laws itself rests upon an induction8 ,,iii4 ,in proportion as the several orders of phenomena are conceived as governed by invariable laws1 the belief in final causes becomes weaker and tends to disappear4 ,the final causes are imagined by the mind to explain certain combinations of natural phenomena4 ,when the laws of these phenomena are known1 this explanation becomes useless1 it ceases to have currency4 ,it shares the fate of the whole of theological and metaphysical philosophy1 of which it is a part4 ,the doctrine of final causes is generally regarded as a constituent principle of religious systems4 ,a special argument in favour of the existence of ,god has even been drawn from it4 ,comte remarks that it is more probably a consequence of these systems4 ,so long as man believes in the continual action of the gods1 or of ,god1 in nature1 he does not need the consideration of final causes upon which to found his belief4 ,he does not even dream of it4 ,later on only1 when the religious conception of the world has become weaker1 when ,god has so far withdrawn from the world as to be no longer anything but a sovereign who reigns1 but does not govern1 then the need is felt to demonstrate ,his existence1 and the order of nature becomes an argument4 ,the consideration of final causes from this point of view is a symptom of the weakening of the theological spirit2 it is thus pre-eminently a metaphysical doctrine4 ,whatever may be the case1 experience witnesses against it4 ,positive science does not lay down that the world must be conceived as the work of an all-powerful intelligence4 ,for instance1 the scientific knowledge of our solar system has shown in the most obvious manner1 and in various ways1 that the elements of this system were certainly not disposed in the most advantageous manner1 and that science allowed us to conceive of a better arrangement4#ee ,astronomers may admire a natural finality in the organisation of animals2 but the anatomists who know all its imperfections1 fall back upon the arrangements of the stars4 ,in what concerns animals1 a blind admiration wonders even at evidently detrimental complications3 it is the case with the eye1 with the bladder1 etc4#ef ,but 8it is an almost universal disposition of physiologists to draw1 even from their ignorance1 as many motives for the admiration of the profound wisdom of a mechanism which they declare they cannot understand40 ,in truth1 the natural order1 so much extolled1 is extremely imperfect1 and we can without difficulty conceive a better one4 ,the human works1 says ,comte1 from the most simple mechanical appliances to the most sublime political constructions1 are generally far superior either in expediency1 or in simplicity1 to everything that the most perfect natural economy can offer us4#eg ,our geometers and our physicians 8sufficiently prepared0 would do far better than nature1 if they dared 8to take the direct conception of a new animal mechanism as the object of an intellectual exercise40 ,this idea of artificial organisms pleases ,comte and he often returns to it4 ,he considers that fictions of this kind may be useful in biology to intercalate intermediaries between the several known organisms1 in such a manner as to facilitate comparison in making the biological series more homogeneous and continuous4#eh ,in fact this is what ,broca attempted to do1 when he endeavoured to connect man with the other primates by hypothetical anthropoids4 ,quite recently ,m4 ,delage has made use of a similar fiction in his ,trait de ,zoologie4 ,comte seldom misses an opportunity of smiling at the stupid admiration of those who believe that nature has done everything 8for the best10 or that everything in it has been ordered by a providential wisdom4 ,but we can surprise him also in the very act of admiration2 not doubtless on the subject of astronomical or biological phenomena1 but in the chapter which lies nearest to his heart1 that of social facts4 ,he writes1 8we cannot experience too much respect and admiration when we see this universal natural disposition which is the primary basis of all society44440#ei and elsewhere3 8,can one really conceive1 in the whole of natural phenomena1 a more marvellous spectacle than this regular and continuous convergence of an immensity of individuals44440#fj ,however1 there is not here a contradiction4 ,in reality1 although ,comte says that the consideration of final causes must be accepted altogether1 or rejected altogether1 he does not himself reject it as entirely as he seems at first to do4 ,what he formally rejects1 is the finality understood in the theological or metaphysical manner3 ,cli enarrant gloriam ,dei4 ,he does not admit that we can 8explain0 the natural order by a supernatural wisdom4 ,but he in no way contests the finality which ,kant called internal4 ,this finality1 or better1 this reciprocal causality appears in living beings1 where the whole and the parts are reciprocally end and means4 ,the tree could not subsist without the leaves any more than the leaves without the tree4 ,comte expresses this idea in terms which are almost identical with those of ,kant1 although he did not know them4 8,we shall10 he says1 8cease defining a living being by the collection of its organs1 as if these could exist isolated4444 ,in biology the general notion of the being1 always precedes that of any of its parts whatever4 ,in sociology1 where partial interdependence is less intimate although wider1 it would be a serious heresy to define humanity by man 444 a fortiori in biology we ought not to conceive the whole from its parts40#fa ,as soon as we rise above the inorganic world1 the first condition for the study of phenomena is the idea of their consensus1 first in biology1 and then in sociology4 ,this consensus corresponds to ,kant's internal finality4 ,but the distinction between internal finality and external finality cannot be strictly maintained4 ,we will never affirm that some beings were made in view of others4 ,this would be in the highest degree a theological 8explanation0 of the first order4 ,but from the positive point of view1 we observe that1 in order to subsist1 organisms need not only special intimate structure1 but further require a certain equilibrium of external conditions4 ,at each moment their existence depends at once on their constitution and on the 8milieu40 ,this word1 which was destined to attain such popularity and the theory of the 8milieu0 which ,taine has rendered no less popular1 belong to ,comte4 ,undoubtedly1 the idea was suggested to him1 on the one hand by ,montesquieu and by his successors1 and on the other by the labours of ,lamarck and of the contemporary biologists4 ,he also drew inspiration from ,bichat's celebrated ,recherches sur la vie et la mort4 ,but ,bichat especially insisted upon the antagonism between the living being and the forces of the inorganic world which press upon him from all sides4 ,comte thinks1 on the contrary1 that the very existence of living beings is the proof of a sufficient harmony between their organism and the milieu4 ,and what we cannot dispute is his merit in having generalised the idea specially applied by ,montesquieu to social facts1 and also specially applied by ,lamarck and ,bichat to the phenomena of life4 8,i designate by this word 8milieu10 says ,comte1 in excusing himself for the new meaning which he gives it1 8not only the fluid in which the organism is immersed1 but1 in general1 the totality of external circumstances of any kind whatever necessary to the existence of each determined organism40#fb ,properly speaking then1 ,comte does not reject the doctrine of final causes2 he only transforms it4 ,he had declared this himself in his opuscule in #ahbb4 8,the doctrine of final causes has been converted by the physiologists into the principle of the conditions of existence40 ,positive philosophy appropriates1 8with the understanding of a suitable change10 the general ideas primitively invented by the theological and metaphysical philosophies4 ,as the positive notion of the mathematical laws of phenomena arose out of the metaphysical conceptions of the ,pythagoricians concerning the properties of numbers1 so the scientific principle of the conditions of existence springs from the hypothesis of final causes4#fc ,an example will allow us to realise this transformation in the act4 ,the stability of the solar system renders the existence of living species on the earth possible4 ,a good example of finality it would seem4 ,nevertheless this stability is simply a necessary consequence1 according to the mechanical laws of the world1 of some circumstances characteristic of our system3 extreme smallness of the planetary masses in comparison to the central mass1 small eccentricity of their orbits1 slight mutual inclination of their planes1 etc4 ,since1 in fact1 we exist it must be that the system of which we form a part is arranged so as to allow of this existence40 ,the so-called final cause would then reduce itself here1 as on all analogous occasions1 to this childish remark3 the only stars inhabited are those which are habitable4 ,in a word1 we return to the principle of the conditions of existence1 which is the true positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes1 and whose bearings and fertility are far superior40#fd ,in order to give the formula of this principle1 we must have recourse to the general distinction established by de ,blainville between the static point of view and the dynamic point of view4 ,every active being1 and in particular every living being1 can be analysed from these two points of view4 ,the static analysis considers its elements in their relations of simultaneous connexions4 ,the dynamic analysis discovers the laws of their joint evolution4 ,the first is the share of the anatomist1 the second that of the physiologist4 ,now it is clear that these two analyses are complementary to one another1 and are even separately unintelligible4 ,for instance1 the anatomist is constantly guided by physiological considerations4 ,conversely1 without anatomical knowledge there is no positive physiology4 ,thus1 the statical analysis establishes the laws of coexistence1 the dynamic analysis the laws of succession or of movement4 ,the principle of the conditions of existence is nothing else than the direct and general conception of the necessary harmony of these two analyses1 that is to say1 of the agreement of these two orders of laws4#fe ,if this harmony1 in fact1 was not realised1 no living being1 no natural system of phenomena could subsist4 ,from the point of view of the object this principle accounts for the permanence of beings3 from the point of view of the subject it expresses the possibility of science4 ,why does ,comte say that the importance and fertility of this principle are far superior to those of the doctrine of final causes8 ,it is because this latter doctrine claims to 8explain40 ,in referring the natural order to the wisdom of a ,providence1 it dispenses in some measure with scientific research1 or at least it does not require it4 ,the principle of the conditions of existence1 on the contrary1 is closely allied to the positive conception of natural phenomena4 ,it only implies the existence of laws4 ,it only establishes the continuity of the relations between these laws1 a continuity verified by experience1 since beings subsist and reproduce themselves4 ,in a word1 it allows us to connect the laws of succession with the laws of coexistence everywhere4 ,now1 to connect is the essential function of science4 ,by means of this principle not only the successive moments of any natural evolution whatever are understood as having solidarity with each other but the whole of this evolution becomes intelligible by its relation to the statical conditions to which it corresponds4 ,and1 in virtue of the relativity of science1 or1 if we prefer it1 of the universal reciprocal action of all phenomena1 the principle of the conditions of existence leads the human mind to a scientific investigation ever more exact and never completed4 ,this positive transformation of the doctrine of final causes had already been clearly sketched by the philosophers of the ,,xviii4 century whom ,comte knew very well1 by ,diderot1 by ,hume1 by d',holbach4 ,hume says1 for instance1#ff 8,it is useless to insist upon the uses of parts in animals or in plants1 and on their curious adaptation one to another4 ,i should much like to know how an animal could subsist without this adaptation4 ,do we not see that if it ceases he perishes at once1 and that the matter of which he was composed takes some other shape80 ,and d',holbach1 8,these wholes would not exist in the form which they bear1 if their parts ceased to act as they do2 that is to say1 ceased to be arranged in such a way as to lend themselves to being mutually helpful to each other4 ,to be surprised that the heart1 the brain1 the eyes1 the arteries1 etc41 of an animal act as they do2 or that a tree produces fruit1 is to be surprised that a tree or an animal exists4 ,these beings would not exist or would no longer be what they are1 if they ceased to act as they do3 this is what happens when they die40#fg ,comte makes this criticism of the doctrine of final causes his own4 ,but1 faithful to his maxim1 8,we only destroy what we replace10 he claims to substitute a positive principle to this metaphysical doctrine1 which preserves the elements in it which are compatible with the scientific method4 ,it is the principle of the conditions of existence4 ,in virtue of this principle1 by the very fact that such an organ is part of such a living being1 it necessarily co-operates in a determined although perhaps unknown manner1 with the totality of the acts which make up its existence3 an organ no more exists without a function than a function without an organ4 ,but it in no way follows from this that all the organic functions are performed as perfectly as we could imagine them to be4 ,for instance pathological analysis demonstrates that the disturbing action of each organ upon the whole of the economy is very far from being always compensated for by its utility in the normal state4 8,if1 within certain limits1 everything is necessarily arranged in such a way as to be able to exist1 we should seek in vain1 in the majority of effective arrangements1 for proofs of a wisdom superior or even equal to human wisdom40#fh ,extending these considerations to the whole of the phenomena known to us1 ,comte concludes in almost the same way as ,cournot will later on4 ,an order establishes itself in nature1 since it subsists1 since it is intelligible1 since there are laws4#fi ,does not the very idea of a law induce at once the corresponding idea of a certain spontaneous order8 ,but 8this consequence is not more absolute than the principle from which it is derived40#gj ,the experience which reveals this order to us also shows us that it is imperfect1 of an imperfection which grows with the complexity of phenomena4 ,every time that the necessary and sufficient conditions are realised for a natural system to be able to exist1 this system exists in fact1 however full of imperfections it may be in other respects4 8,undoubtedly1 an inevitable necessity which links together a series of events1 and a premeditated plan which directs them1 resemble each other very much so far as the consequences are concerned40#ga ,but1 if the necessity is established1 there is no need to suppose the plan4 ,now the principle of the conditions of existence1 in showing that all that is 8indispensable10 is at the same time 8inevitable10 renders this supposition superfluous4 ,a double tendency makes itself felt in this theory4 ,on the one hand ,comte1 faithful to the spirit of his philosophy1 rejects all that claims to go beyond experience1 that is to say the transcendental hypothesis of final causes and of optimism4 ,on the other hand1 he wishes to account for the order of nature1 which is a fact4 ,now this order1 all imperfect as it is1 implies not only the existence of laws1 but moreover a permanent harmony between these laws4 8,the present is full of the past1 and big with the future40 ,the principle of the conditions of existence explains this permanence of order1 at least as much as it needs to be explained from the positive point of view4 ,for it states that everywhere1 in fact1 the dynamical laws are in harmony with the statical laws1 and that 8progress is a development of order40 ,the principle of the conditions of existence is no more a priori than the principle of laws4 ,like it it is founded upon an 8immense induction40 ,like it again1 it only acquires its full power when social science is created1 and positive philosophy established4 ,should we not be tempted to see in this doctrine a kind of projection of an idealism such as that of ,leibnitz on the lines of positive thought8 ,just as ,leibnitz makes mechanism rest upon a deeper dynamism1 so ,comte completes the principle of laws by the principle of the conditions of existence4 ,true1 between these two doctrines there lies all the distance which separates the positive from the metaphysical spirit4 ,but none the less both give symmetrical solutions of the same problem which correspond to one another1 the one a priori the other a posteriori4 ,,iv4 ,all natural laws1 must be conceived as rigorously invariable1 whether it be a question of mathematical or of sociological laws4 ,if we could conceive1 in any case1 that under the influence of conditions exactly similar the phenomena should not remain perfectly identical1 not only in kind1 but also in degree1 all scientific theory would at once become impossible4#gb ,this principle is the very condition of the possibility of prevision1 and consequently of positive science4 ,claude ,bernard will call it 8the absolute determinism of phenomena40 ,comte admits no absolute3 but he considers nevertheless that the invariability of natural laws does not permit of exception4 ,in the case of certain laws their invariability can be directly verified1 since they come before us in a mathematical form4 ,such are1 for instance1 the mechanical1 astronomical and physical laws4 ,others1 on the contrary1 such as the biological laws1 refuse to be dealt with by numbers and cannot be reduced to equations4 ,but this evidently comes from their complexity3 8,if it were possible rigorously to isolate each one of the simple causes which concur in producing the same physiological phenomenon1 everything tends to show that under well determined circumstances1 it would appear to be possessed of a kind of influence and of a quantity of action1 as exactly fixed as we see it to be in universal gravitation40#gc ,every elementary phenomenon has its curve4 ,if then in all cases we could go back to the elementary phenomena1 we could undoubtedly also formulate their mathematical law4 ,in this sense1 mathematical analysis would apply to all the phenomena of the world without exception4 ,but1 nearly always1 the decomposition of given phenomena into elementary phenomena is impossible to us4 ,at any rate the work of synthesis or of re-composition taken in the reverse order is far beyond our mathematical powers4 ,the only phenomena to which we apply the analysis without too much trouble are the most simple of all1 the geometrical and mechanical phenomena4 ,the difficulty grows very rapidly with the complication of astronomical1 physical1 and especially chemical phenomena4 ,when we reach the realm of living nature1 the elementary phenomena escape us altogether4 ,they are given to us in a state of almost infinite complexity1 and1 in virtue of the biological consensus1 closely bound up with others of no less complex a character4 ,these phenomena are in themselves syntheses depending upon other syntheses all in a state of mutual influence and of constant instability4 ,then1 although1 in principle1 it remains true that identical antecedents can only have identical consequents1 in fact1 because of the very great number of elementary actions which concur in the production of each phenomenon1 there have perhaps never been1 there perhaps never will be1 two cases rigorously similar4 ,it follows that we must not confuse 8the subordination of any events whatever to invariable laws with their irresistible necessary accomplishment40#gd ,relatively single phenomena appear indeed to us to be produced with an irresistible necessity3 for instance1 the facts of gravitation4 ,but complex phenomena1 in virtue of the more and more varied combinations which their several necessary conditions admit of no longer present this character4 ,they are more 8modifiable0 and less 8irresistible40 ,in other words1 as one considers more elevated1 more complex1 more 8noble0 categories of facts1 the laws become removed from the type of mathematical necessity1 and admit more of an ever increasing element of 8contingency08 ,the order of the world can then be conceived as a 8modifiable fatality40#ge ,in the eyes of the greater number of present thinkers1 says ,comte1 this formula will seem contradictory4 ,this comes from old habits of mind which are not easily broken with4 ,in the same way1 as we have had a great deal of trouble in representing truth to ourselves otherwise than as immutable1 so we are unwilling to conceive order otherwise than as necessary4 ,during a long time the science of mathematics has been the only positive science4 ,the idea of law formed itself in this science1 that is to say according to the necessary relations which are demonstrated in it4 ,it came to be afterwards transferred1 just as it was1 into the other orders of phenomena1 as the positive spirit progressed4 ,but orders of phenomena differ qualitatively from one another4 ,all laws ought not to be conceived according to the single type of geometrical and algebraical laws4 ,in order to obtain a complete idea of a natural law1 we must not confine ourselves to the mathematical order1 which is an 8exception0 in this respect4 ,all the orders of phenomena must be considered4 ,we then see that law must be defined 8constancy in variety40 ,in fact1 8the normal type is never suited to any but a medium state1 more ideal than real1 around which effective existence ceaselessly oscillates1 so long as the deviation does not go beyond the limits which are compatible with the duration of the system4 ,order1 even isolated1 is no more eternal than it is absolute40#gf ,in this passage1 ,comte is speaking of astronomical order1 but the same consideration applies to all the systems or groups of phenomena4 ,every law is necessarily something abstract4 ,being indispensable to the intelligibility of the real1 every law allows prevision and science to exist4 ,but it is not an adequate expression of this reality1 which never remains identical with itself4 ,comte goes so far as to say that our requirement of precision in the study of natural laws must not be pushed too far4 ,for the laws which it has been possible to establish within certain degrees of approximation vanish if this approximation is pushed further4 ,not that the phenomena cease to be subject to laws2 but these laws becoming too complex1 escape us4 ,for instance1 it has been possible to establish with our thermometers the laws of the variation of temperature of a body under certain conditions4 ,with very much more sensitive thermometers the variations becomes incessant and very complicated4 ,the known laws disappear without our being in a condition to establish others4#gg ,the order which positive science shows us in nature is then very far from being absolute4 ,it is1 to speak truly1 the outcome of the combined activity of our mind and of things4 ,we cannot separate what belongs to each of these two factors1 but it appears from what has just been said that the mind plays a great part1 that the external relations are far more contingent than suits our blind instinct of universal connection40#gh ,nevertheless the phenomena are not irreducible to order1 since science and prevision remain possible4 ,but this order1 entirely relative in respect to our understanding is only established within certain limits4 ,more powerful minds than ours would probably construct richer and more complex orders for themselves4 ,for us1 beyond a certain point of complexity our vision becomes confused and our logical requirements are no longer satisfied4 ,limits would thus seem to be placed upon scientific investigation1 and these in the interest of science itself4 ,finally we reach the last consequence of this theory founded upon experience1 the principle of laws and the principle of the conditions of existence only insure a provisional order4 ,comte readily admits that it might not exist4 8,this order might become so irregular that it might even escape brains superior to ours4 ,there is nothing to prevent us from imagining words outside our solar system1 always given over to an inorganic and entirely disordered agitation1 which would not even allow of a general law of gravitation40#gi ,this is the very hypothesis formulated by ,john ,stuart ,mill1 in almost similar terms1 and in which a kind of reductio ad absurdum of his own theory was thought to be found4 ,it is1 however1 compatible with the existence of a science which does not claim to possess an absolute value4 ,moreover ,comte at once adds1 8,still1 even if order should be found to be particular to our world1 in fact1 it would be in no way accidental in it1 since it is the first condition for human existence40 ,in virtue of the principle of the conditions of existence1 the presence of a being such as man implies the whole of the laws which govern our world4 ,v4 ,the laws which for us constitute the order of the world are of two kinds4 ,some are established by the positive method in each order of phenomena separately considered2 the astronomical laws1 physical laws1 chemical laws1 etc4 ,they belong to the domain of science properly so-called4 ,the others are apprehended when the mind leaves the special point of view of science1 and places itself at the universal point of view of philosophy4 ,they are found again in the different orders of phenomena1 whose relations they express without compromising their respective independence4 ,they represent them severally connected1 or1 according to ,comte's expression1 as convergent4 ,comte calls these last encyclopdic laws4 ,they tend to realise the unity which the mind claims1 not in pursuing the chimerical reduction of all laws to a supreme law1 but in showing that the systems of irreducible laws are nevertheless harmonious among themselves4 ,generally speaking1 these laws have been known for a long time1 but only as special laws of such and such an order of phenomena4 ,it belongs to positive philosophy to give them their encyclopdic character1 that is to say1 to make them universal4 ,for instance1 d',alembert's principle is known in mechanics as a law which connects questions of movement with questions of equilibrium4 ,philosophy finds a similar law in biology3 7physiological questions are correlated to anatomical questions72 and also in sociology 78progress is the development of order074 ,it then formulates the encyclopdic law which generalises these three laws1 that is1 the principle of the conditions of existence4 ,similarly the three great laws of mechanics1 known under the name of the laws of ,kepler1 of ,galileo and of ,newton1 must be universalised and become encyclopdic for they are applicable to all the orders of phenomena4#hj ,the law of ,kepler1 in the first place1 expresses the spontaneous tendency of all natural phenomena to persevere indefinitely in their state1 if no disturbing influence supervenes2 a tendency whence are derived inertia in mechanics1 habit in living bodies1 and the conservative instinct in societies4 ,the law of ,galileo which reconciles every common movement with the various particular movements1 applies to all the organic and inorganic phenomena4 ,for1 in any system1 we can always ascertain the independence of the several active or passive mutual relations with regard to any action which is exactly common to the various parts1 whatever may be their kind and degree4 ,finally the universal character of ,newton's law 7reaction is equal to action71 is evident at first sight4 ,it is accidentally1 not essentially1 that these laws have at first been mechanical laws4 ,they could have been equally attained by the study of biological or social phenomena4 ,if the science of mechanics was the first to formulate them it is because it has for its object the less complicated phenomena4 ,a complete and rational system of encyclopdic laws would realise the 8philosophia prima0 which ,bacon dimly foresaw4 ,in the actual condition of the sciences this would probably be a rash undertaking4 ,comte attempted it in the fourth volume of the ,politique positive4#ha ,one can hardly say that the trial was a decisive one4 ,it is true that at that moment ,comte was already entirely taken up with religious preoccupations4 ,however1 the encyclopdic laws are destined to play a part in the positive philosophy of nature1 which may be compared1 in some respects1 with that of the categories in ,aristotle's philosophy4 ,they are the most general forms under which the phenomena given in experience become objects of scientific thought for us4 ,as in each class of phenomena we determine laws1 principles of order and of harmony1 so the encyclopdic laws make the order and the harmony of the different classes among themselves4 ,they are1 so to speak1 the laws of laws4 ,through them the human mind which has already reached unity of method1 may some day reach a certain unity of knowledge4 ,but this unity will always differ by two essential characteristics from that which metaphysicians have pursued up to the present time3 it will respect the irreducibleness of the various fundamental sciences1 and it will remain relative1 both by the conditions of the object and by those of the subject1 upon which it equally depends4 ,our conception of universal order 8results from a necessary concurrence between that which is without us1 and that which is within4 ,the laws1 that is to say the general facts1 are never anything but hypotheses confirmed by observation4 ,if harmony in no way existed outside us our mind would be entirely incapable of conceiving it1 but in no case is it verified so much as we suppose it to be40#hb ,we neither make order nor perceive it entirely4 ,by long and arduous labour the human intellect gradually disengages the concept of order out of the facts that come crowding within its reach4 ,it is an imperfect1 contingent1 perishable order1 in a word1 an order1 relative like the mind itself4 ,it is order nevertheless1 and a necessary condition for ethics as well as for science4 ,,footnotes3 #df ,cours1 ,i4 #d4 #dg ,discours sur l',esprit positif1 p4 #bc4 #dh ,cours1 ,,ii4 #eje4 #di ,cours1 ,,vi4 #fdh4 #ej ,cours1 ,,vi1 #fei4 #ea ,cours1 ,,vi1 #fee4 #eb ,discours sur l'esprit positif1 p4 #ag4 #ec ,lettre inedite a ,m4 ,papot1 #h mai #ahea 7archives de la socit positiviste74 #ed ,cours1 ,,vi1 #ffb4 #ee ,cours1 ,,ii1 #cf4 #ef ,cours1 ,,iii1 #cfb4 #eg ,cours1 ,,vi1 #hcc4 #eh ,cours1 ,,iii1 #cci1 #cfe4 #ei ,cours1 ,,iv1 #deb4 #fj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dgj4 #fa ,pol4 pos4 i1 #fda4 #fb ,cours1 ,,iii1 #bce4 #fc ,pol4 pos4 iv1 ,appendice p4 #ag4 #fd ,cours1 ii1 #bf-bg4 #fe ,cours1 iii1 #cff4 #ff ,dialogues on natural religion1 ,,viii4 #fg ,systme de la nature1 ,,ii4 #ahg4 #fh ,cours1 ,,iii4 #cfc-d4 #fi ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii4 #db4 #gj ,cours1 ,,iv4 #bgd4 #ga ,pol4 pos4 ,appendice1 p4 #be4 #gb ,cours1 ,,iii4 #cbe4 #gc ,cours1 ,i1 #abh-i4 #gd ,cours1 ,,iii4 #fdb4 #ge ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii4 #dbg4 #gf ,pol4 pos4 #dca4 #gg ,cours1 ,,vi4 #fij4 #gh ,pol4 pos4 ,i4 #ehh4 #gi ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii4 #cj4 #hj ,cours1 ,,xi41 #gdj-df2 ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #did-e4 #ha ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv41 #agc-hj4 #hb ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii4 #cc4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,science 7,,continued7--,,positive ,,logic ,logic1 says ,comte1 almost in the terms of ,descartes1 is the sole portion of ancient philosophy which is capable of still presenting some appearance of utility4#hc ,and does even this appearance correspond to a very solid reality8 ,if we distinguish1 according to custom1 formal logic from applied logic1 ,comte in his system will find no place for the former1 which establishes a priori the principles and the mechanism of reasoning4 ,as to the principles1 which are the laws of the understanding1 positive philosophy has shown that the only way to discover them is to study the products of the human intellect1 that is to say1 the development of the sciences4 ,and it is again from these sciences that1 through observation1 the theory of reasoning must be drawn4 ,formal logic1 as metaphysicians have constructed it1 especially develops the dialectical faculty1 that is to say1 an aptitude more harmful than useful1 for proving without finding4#hd ,descartes said the same1 in speaking of the syllogism1 that it serves more for explaining to others the things which we know1 than to discover those which we ignore4 ,all the utility which we can attribute to the study of logic properly so-called is found again more extended1 more varied1 more complete1 more luminous1 in mathematical studies4 ,the mechanism of reasoning is everywhere the same4 ,whatever may be the phenomena which are the objects of a science the nature of deduction and induction never changes in them4 ,thus in practising these forms of reasoning in the most simple and the most general phenomena1 those whose science is most advanced1 we learn to know them with the most entire evidence1 and in all the generality of which they are capable4 ,nowhere is reasoning so exact1 so rigorous as in mathematics4 ,they accustom the mind not to feed upon false reasons1 and it is in that school that men ought to learn the theory and the practice of reasoning4 ,but1 if the old pure logic is thus replaced by mathematics1 must we not at least preserve the general study of the processes used in the various sciences1 which is called methodology8 ,has not ,comte himself insisted upon the irreducibleness of the several orders of laws to one another1 and in particular to the mathematical laws8 ,is not the legitimate object of logic to define the processes of investigation and of proof particular to each of the fundamental sciences8 ,comte does not think so4 ,this applied logic does not appear to him to be more indispensable than formal logic4 ,in the first place1 the former1 in fact1 supposes the latter4 ,it proceeds from the same philosophical conception4 ,in order to determine a priori1 in a general way1 the rules of the application of the mind to its various scientific objects1 we should first have to possess a knowledge of the laws of the mind4 ,but1 according to ,comte1 this knowledge can only be obtained by the observation of the methods which the mind has indeed followed4 ,moreover1 no art is taught abstractedly1 not even the art of reasoning well1 nor that of experimenting1 of finding hypotheses1 etc4 ,it has never been sufficient to know the rules of versification in order to write true poetry4 ,a deep knowledge of the rules of method will not lead to scientific discoveries4#he ,whatever we learn of an art1 it is practice that has taught us4 ,nothing here can replace time1 natural disposition1 and experience4 ,methods then cannot be studied apart from the positive researches in which men of learning make use of them4 ,even supposing that in the far future1 when the sciences are advanced1 the methods and their applications could be taught by themselves1 the study would run a great risk of yielding poor results4#hf ,up to the present time all that has been said of the method1 considered in the abstract1 reduces itself to vague generalities4 ,when1 in logic1 we have thoroughly established that all our science of nature must be founded upon observation1 that we must proceed sometimes from facts to principles1 sometimes from principles to facts1 and a few other similar aphorisms1 we know far less of the method than the man who has studied a single one of the positive sciences somewhat deeply1 even without any philosophical purpose4 ,it is thus that ,eclectic philosophers have imagined to make their psychology into a science1 thinking they could understand and practice the positive method because they had read the ,novum ,organum and the ,discours de la ,mthode4 ,but did not ,bacon1 ,pascal1 ,descartes1 and the other great scientific leaders insist on the uselessness of abstract considerations about method8 ,they never separated the rules they formulated from their application to positive research4 ,comte himself1 their successor and their heir1 uses no other language4 ,in his long study of the fundamental sciences he never fails to distinguish the contents of the science from its method1 what he calls 8the scientific point of view and the logical point of view40 ,but1 while distinguishing them1 he considers that they are correlated and closely allied among themselves4 ,he no more conceives method as separated from the science which he studies1 than science as separated from its method4 ,both constitute one intellectual reality seen under two aspects closely allied to one another4#hg ,to conclude1 traditional logic is fast disappearing4 ,in its theoretical parts it is superannuated like the metaphysical philosophy whence it proceeds4 ,in its applied parts it is barren if separated from the practice of the sciences4 ,,ii4 ,there is however a positive logic1 and in it we can also distinguish a theoretical and a practical part4 ,the theoretical part deals with logical laws4 ,these laws which1 finally1 govern the intellectual world1 are invariable1 and common not only to all time and places1 but also to all subjects whatever without any distinction even between those which ,comte calls real and chimerical4 ,they are observed1 fundamentally1 even in dreams4#hh ,but this universality of logical laws is not understood by him in the sense in which the rationalist philosophers understand it4 ,comte is only concerned with a permanence and continuity purely historical in character4 ,the mind of man1 like the rest of his nature remains identical with itself1 through the diversity of epochs and situations4 ,it evolves without changing fundamentally 8without other differences than those of gradually developed maturity and experience40 ,ancient philosophy claimed to discover the intellectual laws by reflection1 as if the mind could think and at the same time see itself thinking1 reason and observe its reasoning ,comte rejects this introspective method1 which yields no scientific results4 ,if we apply the method of positive investigation to the intellectual phenomena as to all the others1 two ways only are open4 ,we can look at it from the static point of view1 that is to say1 study the conditions upon which these phenomena depend1 and refer the phenomena to them as we refer generally the function to its organ4 ,in this sense the study of the intellectual phenomena belongs to biology4 ,or else1 from the dynamic point of view1 we can consider these phenomena in their evolution1 by observing the successive phases through which they pass4 ,and since the life of the individual is too short for this 8progress0 to be appreciable1 it must be studied in the life of the species4 ,so understood1 the science of the intellectual laws comes within the sphere of sociology4 ,now1 higher biology which deals with moral and intellectual phenomena1 has only just been founded by ,cabanis and ,gall4 ,comte discovered that it could not be constituted as a science without the help of sociology4 ,it is then to this newly born study that the search after intellectual laws in every way belongs4 ,positive logic abstains1 as we see1 from speculating upon the leading principles of knowledge1 principles of identity1 of contradiction of causality1 etc4 ,these kinds of principles are not objects of examination or of discussion4 ,comte upon this point is in full accord with the ,scottish school4 ,no positive science questions its own principles1 for how can we submit the very principles of all reasoning to criticism8 ,nothing is less in accordance with the positive spirit than an attempt of this kind4 ,it is simply metaphysical and has no chance of success4 ,the intellectual laws of which the research is positive are such as the law of the three states 7which is the most general of all71 or such1 for instance1 as these3 the human mind always makes an effort to place its conceptions in accordance with its observations2 in every case the human mind forms the simplest hypothesis1 etc4 ,these laws1 which are derived from the nature of the human mind1 and whose action has always been felt1 could only be discovered and formulated quite recently4 ,for biology and sociology1 to which they are related1 could not be constituted before the more simple fundamental sciences were sufficiently advanced4 ,to reach a scientific knowledge of the intellectual laws1 to found a 8positive logic10 nothing less was needed than the long evolution whose term is marked by ,comte's philosophy4 ,applied logic1 or theory of method1 also finds a new meaning in the positive doctrine4 ,comte does not fall into the mistake which he has criticised4 ,he does not propose to teach an art ex professo1 and he will not formulate the rules which positive research must follow in order to be productive4 ,here again ,comte will found his doctrine upon the intellectual evolution of humanity4 ,in the first place1 like the sciences1 the positive methods are collective works1 8the work of the species gradually developed in the long sequence of centuries40 ,comte considers as impertinent the pretensions of some modern scientists1 who pride themselves upon having invented the comparative method in biology4 ,as if ,aristotle had not already practised it6 ,and ,aristotle had not been the first to do so4 ,the processes of the positive methods do not reveal themselves all at once1 under a perfect and final form4 ,they gradually come to light during a long period of groping4 ,the human mind notices the processes which have succeeded in simple cases4 ,it endeavours to generalize them1 and tests them in new and slightly more complex cases4 ,it seeks for the reason why in certain cases the end is reached1 in others it is missed4 ,method is thus insensibly formed by a kind of practical induction4 ,its essential processes are1 like the leading ideas in the sciences1 8inspirations from universal wisdom40 ,the office of great men--and this is sufficient for them to earn our gratitude--is to recognise the value and the fecundity of these inspirations1 to set them at work1 and especially to endow them with an often indefinite extension by separating them from the concrete conditions in which they were at first manifested4 ,thus positive philosophy1 less ambitious than its predecessors1 does not take upon itself to legislate upon method4 ,but neither does it confine itself to the mere duty of making statements1 that is to say to simply register the processes made use of in the sciences4 ,is not its proper function to represent in human knowledge the 8universalizing mind0 which in ,comte's language is synonymous with government8 ,he himself calls the fifty-eighth lesson of the ,cours de philosophie positive his ,discours de la ,mthode4#hi ,he rises above the necessarily peculiar position which belongs to specialists1 and places himself at the central and universal point of view which is proper to the philosopher4 ,thence he embraces under one point of view1 the entire hierarchy of the fundamental sciences4 ,out of this well-ordered whole1 he watches as they arise1 first the essence of the positive method1 and then the relations of the various elements in this method to one another4 ,in its essence1 the positive method is one1 as science is one4 ,for it ever tends towards the same end3 the establishment of the invariable relations which constitute the effective laws of all observable events1 8thus capable of being rationally foreseen from one another40 ,the positive method proceeds to this by means of a threefold abstraction4 ,it first separates the practical requirements from theoretical knowledge1 to be only concerned with the latter1 it seeks for the laws of phenomena without troubling itself1 at least provisionally1 with any possible applications4 ,it also puts aside sthetic considerations1 which ought not to intervene in scientific investigation4 ,finally--and here is the condition for the very existence of science--the positive method always carefully distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete point of view4 ,it studies not beings1 but phenomena4 ,even in the simplest cases1 in astronomy for instance1 no general law can be established so long as bodies are considered in their concrete existence4 ,the principal phenomenon has had to be detached1 so to speak1 so as to submit it alone to an abstract study1 afterwards allowing us to return successfully to the consideration of more complex realities4 ,this is what the ancients had known how to do in geometry2 and this is what ,comte himself has done in the most complex of all sciences1 in sociology4 ,instead of stopping at the concrete reality of history1 he determined1 by a bold abstraction1 the law of the essential movement in human society 8leaving to subsequent labours the care of bringing apparent anomalies into line with it40#ij ,in the main1 these general characteristics of the positive method bring it singularly near to the ,cartesian method4 ,comte's 8,threefold gradual abstraction0 seems indeed to have for its end1 like ,descartes' analysis1 to go back to what is simplest and easiest to know1 and then to come down1 by a synthetic and progressive advance1 towards the reality which is given to us in experience4 ,the one and the other of these methods witness1 here1 to an effort towards generalising the spirit of the mathematical method4 ,let us never forget1 writes ,comte1 that the general spirit of positive philosophy was first formed by the culture of mathematics1 and that we must necessarily go back so far1 in order to know this spirit in its elementary purity4 ,the mathematical processes and formul are rarely capable of being applied to the effective study of natural phenomena1 when we wish to go beyond the most extreme simplicity in the real conditions of the problems4 ,but 8the true mathematical spirit1 so distinct from the algebraical spirit1 with which it is too often confounded1 is on the contrary1 constantly of value40#ia ,we must therefore not take too much notice of ,comte's urging and bitterness1 when he criticises the narrowness of mind and the 8imphilosophisme0 of geometers4#ib ,undoubtedly he never tires of safeguarding the higher sciences against the encroachments of mathematics1 and of showing the impossibility of a philosophy founded exclusively upon their principles4 ,but he none the less recognises that this science possesses the double privilege of having furnished historically1 the first model of the positive method1 and of presenting still to-day its finest and purest examples4 ,however1 ,comte1 even more than ,descartes1 takes care not to transform the mathematical method into a universal method by a simple generalisation4 ,nothing would be more contrary to the positive spirit4 ,for the development of this spirit the study of mathematics is a necessary introduction4 ,it is1 however1 but an introduction4 ,the use which mathematics can make of deduction1 on account of the extreme simplicity of their subject produces a very false idea of the power of our understanding1 and disposes us to reason more than to observe4 ,far from preparing us for the method which must be followed for the study of the other orders of natural phenomena1 the exclusive habit of mathematics tends rather to draw us from it4 ,in a word it is a dangerous error to take this 8initial degree of sound logical education for the final degree40#ic ,in order to grasp the positive method in its entirety1 we must not consider only mathematics1 but the whole series of the fundamental sciences4 ,this method1 always fundamentally identical1 takes particular determinations in adapting itself to each new order of phenomena4 ,each of these orders introduces1 so to speak1 the use of some of the principal processes of which the method is composed1 and 8it is always at their source that these notions of universal logic must be examined4 ,thus the mathematical science is the one which gives the best knowledge of the elementary conditions of positive science4 ,in it all the artifices of the art of reasoning1 from the most spontaneous to the most sublime are continually practised with far more variety and fecundity than anywhere else4 ,astronomy then teaches us1 in its initial purity1 the art of observation accompanied by that of forming hypotheses4 ,it shows in what the rational provision of phenomena consists1 and that science always ends in assimilation or in combination4 ,physics initiate us to the theory of experimenting1 chemistry to the general art of nomenclatures1 the science of organic bodies to the theory of classifications4 ,biology specially makes use of the comparative method1 and finally with sociology appears the 8transcendant0 process which ,comte calls the historical method4#id ,positive logic extends to all the fundamental sciences the use of the processes at first peculiar to each one of them4 ,each great logical artifice1 once studied in the portion of natural philosophy which shows its most spontaneous and most complete development1 can afterwards be applied1 with the necessary modifications1 to the perfecting of the other sciences4 ,for instance1 the comparative method belongs in the first place to biology4 ,but1 when brought back to its principle and generalised1 it becomes a precious instrument for sociology1 for physics1 and even for mathematics4 ,in every science1 the method is completed by the auxiliary use of the processes whose power and whose sphere of action have been made known by the other sciences4 ,by these mutual loans1 in each one of them1 the positive method reaches its maximum of production4 ,to be cultivated in the most rational manner possible1 the sciences must then be subject to the direction of a general system of positive philosophy1 8the common basis and the uniform combining element of all truly scientific labours40#ie ,the scientific man must at the same time be a philosopher1 since philosophy alone puts him in possession of all the resources of positive method4 ,for instance1 this philosophy will show the geometer that he must at least have a general knowledge of biology and of sociology4 ,biology will teach him the comparative method1 of which he can make use when occasion offers1 and sociology by showing him the history of his science in the general development of the human mind1 will help him better to understand it4 ,if the geometers had a more philosophical mind1 their science would be better taught4 ,the great conceptions of ,descartes1 of ,leibnitz1 of ,lagrange1 would be more intelligently explained and brought to light4 ,if it is useful for the geometer to have studied the other fundamental sciences1 it is not less indispensable for other learned men to have gone through the study of mathematics4 ,as an 8initial0 discipline1 this science can be neglected by no one4 ,it is the common school of positivity for all minds4 ,it is therefore to be regretted that the scientific education of future physiologists should be mainly made up of literary studies and of a few notions of physics and chemistry4 ,the more complex the phenomena whose laws they will have to seek1 the more necessary will it be for them to have become familiarised in mathematics and in astronomy1 with the precise idea of scientific truth4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 until this century1 the study of the exact sciences had always been regarded as a preliminary condition for that of the natural sciences4 ,buffon and ,lamarck in their day had still received this discipline4 ,if it has been so difficult to constitute social science1 it comes1 among other reasons1 from the lack of scientific education among those who1 up to the present time1 have wished to study social phenomena4 ,where1 for instance1 could economists have found the scientific idea of what constitutes natural laws1 ignoring as most of them did not only biology which was being formed beside them1 but even the sciences which had already reached a positive state8 ,the exclusive cultivation of a single science is always a danger for the intellect4 ,nevertheless1 so long as the chief task of the positive spirit was to disorganise the system of beliefs which constituted theological and metaphysical philosophy1 the speciality of the works and of the methods was an inconvenience of secondary importance4 ,it mattered little that the discoveries of the astronomers1 the physicians1 the biologists should be more or less co-ordinated and directed by a universal positive method1 so long as they did their work and prepared the future4 ,but1 when the positive spirit had to become organic instead of critical1 when it had to substitute a new philosophy to the one which it had overthrown1 then it was obliged to subordinate the special processes which it had made use of until then to a single universal method4 ,should the 8scientific anarchy0 have lasted1 the progress of the positive spirit would undoubtedly have led to the discrediting of the metaphysical rgime1 but without replacing it1 and consequently without having done with it4 ,by rejecting any new general discipline1 modern scientific men would unknowingly tend to re-establish the system which they seemed to have shattered for ever4 ,in a word1 the triumph of the positive method1 to be final1 presupposes the acceptance of the positive philosophy by all men of learning4 ,the old logic was bound by the narrowest ties to the metaphysical doctrines which were then dominant4 ,in the same way positive logic is bound up with positive philosophy4 ,speaking more precisely1 it is an expression of this very philosophy4 ,,iii4 ,is the general method of positive philosophy objective1 or subjective1 or both at once8 ,as we know1 this question has raised passionate discussion among positivists4#if ,outside the school it has been solved by some historians as if ,auguste ,comte1 at the end of his life1 had gone back to a doctrine very different from the one set forth by him in the ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,it suffices1 however1 to distinguish1 with him1 two successive points of view1 to see how the two methods1 antagonistic in a certain sense1 can1 in another one1 be very well reconciled4 ,if we only consider the process followed by our mind in the explanation of natural phenomena1 that is to say the object of positive philosophy taken in the strict sense of the word1 it is true that two opposite methods are found face to face4 ,the subjective method goes from the consideration of man to that of the world1 the objective method goes from the knowledge of the world to that of man4 ,the first gives rise to theological and metaphysical philosophy1 the latter to positive philosophy4 ,the incompatibility of the two philosophies proceeds from that of the methods1 which is irreducible4 ,it allows us to say3 8,this will kill that40#ig ,in this sense1 the final establishment of the objective method1 which is completed by the foundation of sociology1 implies the exclusion1 also final1 of the subjective method4 ,but 8having reached its full maturity1 true philosophy should inevitably tend to reconcile these two antagonistic methods10 wrote ,comte in #ahch1 in the third volume of the ,cours de philosophie positive1 that is to say1 long before the time of what has been wrongly called his second philosophy4#ih ,this reconciliation will be accomplished by means of the distinction between the special point of view of the sciences1 and the universal point of view of philosophy4 ,the scientific investigation of the laws of natural phenomena can only be made by means of the objective method3 ,comte never varies in his thought on this point4 ,but these sciences are but the parts in a greater whole1 for which the subjective method alone is suitable4 ,two arguments especially prove this1 one belonging to the logical1 the other to the moral and the religious order4 ,the supreme requirement of our intellect is unity4 ,shall we ever reach this unity by using the objective method in the sciences8 ,evidently not4 ,even in each order of phenomena separately considered we do not see how to reduce the laws which we know to a single law of a more general character4 ,and what are the laws known to us compared with those which elude our search1 and which perhaps may do so for ever8 ,considered in its object1 each one of our sciences reaches1 so to speak1 to infinity1 far beyond our limited horizon4 ,if then1 in order to satisfy us1 a single conception of the world is necessary1 we shall never obtain such a conception from the objective point of view4 ,but if we change our point of view1 if we refer the whole of the sciences to man1 or better1 to humanity1 as a centre1 we shall then be able to realise the unity which we seek4 ,this is precisely what is made possible by sociology1 by subordinating the hierarchy of the positive sciences to the final science of humanity4 ,to consider the other fundamental sciences as 8indispensable preliminaries10#ii to represent the evolution which has brought them forth in turn as the very history of human progress2 to verify the law of the three states in all our beliefs1 and in all our knowledge2 finally1 to control all scientific research from the sociological point of view3 this is what ,comte understands by the conciliation of the two methods4 ,the whole development of positive science from mathematics to sociology1 lies between the new use which is made of subjective method and that which was spontaneously made of it by theological philosophy4 ,when theological philosophy considered the knowledge of man and that of the world as interdependent1 the instinct which animated it was a just one4 ,but it was imagining instead of observing4 ,it represented the world as filled with 8causes0 analogous to the will of man and equally capricious4 ,the new subjective method rests1 on the contrary1 upon the very results of the positive sciences1 brought to a synthesis in sociology4 ,it takes as established that the intellectual and moral phenomena depend upon the biological laws1 and that the biological laws themselves are subordinate to the laws of the inorganic milieu4 ,but1 since the 8final systematisation of all these laws0#ajj must always remain impossible from the objective point of view1 the new subjective method undertakes it from the point of view of humanity as a centre4 ,we can thus distinguish two great periods in the intellectual advance of humanity4 ,during the first1 the positive spirit successively applies the scientific1 that is to say objective1 method1 to higher and higher orders of phenomena4 ,the foundation of sociology marks the term of this progress4 ,then the second period begins4 ,the positive spirit from special has become universal1 from analytical synthetical4 ,it reacts upon the particular sciences1 and henceforth makes use of the 8regenerated0 subjective method1 to govern the whole of them4 ,from the moral and religious point of view1 once sociology has been constituted1 and positive philosophy has been established1 the functions proper to religion appear4 ,the intellect recognises that its end does not lie within itself1 and that it is incapable of determining its own rule and aim4 ,it submits to a directing authority1 which will guide its efforts and fix their object4 ,to act from affection1 and to think in order to act4 ,but if the mind understands that it is destined to be used in the service of humanity1 it sees at the same time that in the complete positive doctrine1 which contains religion1 the objective method gives precedence to the subjective1 or rather that they mutually support each other4 ,if we were pure intellects we should probably always go from the world to man4 ,but in us the intellect is only a means4 ,love is the principle1 action is the end2 and it is to man1 finally1 that our study of the world must be referred4 ,towards the end of his life1 ,comte replaced the logic of the mind1 8especially guided by artificial signs10 by the logic of the heart 8founded upon the direct connection of the feelings40#aja ,we shall not here insist upon a conception which is closely allied to his religious system4 ,we will only conclude that1 from the philosophical point of view the two methods objective and subjective1 in ,comte's thought1 are easily reconciled1 provided that both have been 8systematically regenerated40 ,now1 the regeneration is obtained as soon as sociology is founded4 ,on the one hand1 as a matter of fact1 it furnishes the sciences formed by the objective method with a principle of unity1 since henceforth they are all subordinated to the single science of ,humanity4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the subjective method acquires the positivity which it lacked1 for sociology has substituted to the arbitrary 8individual subject10 the 8universal subject10 that is to say again1 ,humanity4 ,,footnotes3 #hc ,cours1 ,,iii4 #ccf-g4 #hd ,synthse subjective1 p4 #he4 #he ,cours1 ,,vi41 #gjh4 #hf ,cours1 ,i1 #cb4 #hg ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gji4 #hh ,cours1 ,v1 #gi4 #hi ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gca4 #ij ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gjd4 #ia ,cours1 ,,ii4 #cbd-e4 #ib ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #ic 7#bd septembre1 #ahbh74 #ic ,cours1 ,,vi4 #gab-ae4 #id ,cours1 ,,vi4 #gbj sq4 #ie ,cours1 ,,vi4 #gd4 #if ,see above1 ,introduction1 pp4 #ig ,an allusion to a famous passage in ,victor ,hugo's 8,notre ,dame de ,paris40 #ih ,cours1 ,,iii1 #baj4 #ii ,cours1 ,,vi4 #faj4 #ajj ,pol4 pos41 ,i4 #ddg4 #aja ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii4 #aja-b4 ,,book ,,ii ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,sciences ,,introduction ,the ,philosophy of the ,sciences is one of the leading parts of ,comte's work4 ,no other brings out more clearly the essential differences which distinguish his doctrine from previous systems4 ,in ,comte's eyes the philosophy of the sciences is inseparable from the philosophy of history and from the theory of progress4 ,for the sciences are great sociological facts and1 as such1 are subject1 in their evolution1 to invariable laws4 ,the method of the philosophy of the sciences could therefore only be the positive method1 ever like to itself4 ,moreover1--and this is an immediate consequence of this first consideration1--the object of the positive philosophy of the sciences is in no way to 8explain0 what the sciences themselves do not explain4 ,the sciences1 as is well known1 do not inquire into their data and their principles4 ,they consider them as sufficiently established by the implicit consent of all men1 or at least by the universal usage of learned men4 ,the geometer leaves to others the care of speculating upon the essence of space1 or upon the a priori character of his definitions4 ,the physicist1 if he form an idea of matter for himself1 unhesitatingly adopts the one which appears to be the most immediately advantageous1 that is to say1 the one which is best in accordance with what he knows of its properties and of its laws4 ,he attributes no more value than that of a simple hypothesis to this idea4 ,up to the present the business of solving the questions which the scientific man does not examine has belonged to the philosopher--understand by this term the metaphysician4 ,it is for him to seek what matter1 time1 movement1 space1 etc41 may be 8in themselves40 ,whether he descends from metaphysics to the positive sciences1 or ascends from the latter to metaphysics1 he always endeavours to show that such and such a transcendental hypothesis is more in accordance than any other with what we know to-day of the laws of nature4 ,in a word2 the philosophy of the sciences has been1 in general1 an effort to interpret scientific knowledge metaphysically4 ,this explanation remains in respect to such a knowledge an 8extrinsic denomination40 ,it explains but does not touch it4 ,now1 according to ,comte1 there are not two forms of knowledge1 the one positive and properly speaking scientific the other metaphysical and properly called philosophical4 ,the whole of our real knowledge in the end bears upon special or general facts4 ,there can therefore be no question of a philosophy which should be essentially distinct from positive knowledge4 ,any attempt to explain by essences1 causes1 principles or ends1 is excluded by the positive method4 ,metaphysical problems can no longer be set and1 in this sense1 when they disappear1 the philosophy of the sciences disappears with them4 ,but1 on the other hand1 as we have already seen1 the positive sciences are not self-sufficient4 ,they need to be crowned and ordered by a philosophy4 ,if then a philosophy is indispensable1 and if1 at the same time1 this philosophy must be positive1 relative like the sciences themselves1 and homogeneous with them1 only one solution remains possible4 ,the philosophy of the sciences will consist in substituting the point of view of the whole to that of the parts4 ,it will still be a product of the positive spirit2 but in it this spirit from special will have become general2 from particular it will have become universal4 ,this universal character remains common to ,comte's philosophy and to that of his predecessors4 ,but ,comte did not understand it as they did4 ,for metaphysicians in general1 and still for ,kant1 universality is the distinctive sign of knowledge which does not come from experience1 which is therefore necessary and a priori4 ,comte1 who does not know of any a priori in the ,kantian sense1 calls that knowledge universal which remains relative1 and which is founded upon induction1 but which regulates the other forms of knowledge in the order of generality4 ,thus the principle of laws is universal4 ,the encyclopdic laws of phenomena are universal4 ,the point of view of humanity is universal1 because from this point of view a synthesis of the whole of our knowledge is possible4 ,and1 as universality is a relative thing1 we conceive universalities of different orders4 ,henceforth the philosophy of the sciences is easily defined4 ,are we concerned with a certain science considered by itself8 ,the philosophy of this science consists in embracing at a glance the whole1 the object and the method1 as opposed to the special point of view of the scientific man who follows the discovery of more or less special laws in a branch of this science1 but such a philosophy necessarily remains imperfect and fragmentary4 ,the philosophy of a science is only really established in the general philosophy of the sciences1 that is to say by a view at once synthetic and single of all the sciences1 in which are co-ordinated the objects which they study1 the laws which they discover1 the methods which they make use of1 and the ends which they should pursue4 ,it has been said that this is not a philosophy of the sciences but simply a 8synthesis of the most general results of the positive sciences40 ,comte partly accepts and partly rejects the objection4 ,if he is reproached with not having constructed a philosophy of the sciences according to the old spirit1 that is to say an effort at 8explanation10 which goes beyond the point of view of positive science1 he grants the objection4 ,he considers all philosophy of this kind as out of the question4 ,is it said that there is no difference between his point of view and that of the scientific man properly so called1 unless it be that he successively goes through all the fundamental sciences8 ,comte calls our attention to the fact that it is not enough to place these sciences side by side to obtain their philosophy4 ,a new point of view1 truly universal1 although always relative1 is needed4 ,how could ,comte have distinguished otherwise1 in each science1 what is lasting and in conformity with the positive spirit from what is decaying and still bears the mark of the theological and metaphysical spirit8 ,could he especially have fixed the relations which the sciences should maintain among themselves1 and could he have imposed upon them a discipline whose principle was not to be found in any one of them8 ,thus1 until ,auguste ,comte's time1 the philosophy of the sciences had been a metaphysical conception1 joined more or less closely to the whole of positive knowledge4 ,comte endeavoured to form a conception of this whole1 which should be philosophical while remaining positive4 ,it is this conception which is especially set forth in the three first volumes of the ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,from the static point of view it is founded upon the hierarchy of the sciences1 the unity of the method1 and the homogeneity of knowledge4 ,from the dynamic point of view1 it endeavours to show the progressive convergence of all the sciences towards sociology1 the final and universal science4 ,with this 8guiding thread10 ,comte will be able to establish in turn the philosophy of each fundamental science1 without ever losing sight of the relation which it bears to the whole of the others4 ,,chapter ,i ,,mathematics ,in the eyes of philosophers1 mathematics has always occupied a privileged place among the sciences4 ,plato located their object in an intermediate region between the world of sensible phenomena and that of intelligible realities4 ,on the one hand mathematical objects1 and in particular the geometrical figures1 appeal to the imagination as sensible things2 on the other hand1 mathematical truths like ideas and the relations between ideas1 are characterised by immutable and eternal fixity4 ,this is why the study of mathematics is an excellent preparation for philosophy1 which is the science of ideas4 ,while still leaving to the mind the help of direct sensible perception1 it accustoms it to permanent truth4 ,during the whole of antiquity the science of mathematics1 as the name indicates1 was pre-eminently the science4 ,the science of physics1 less sure of its object and of its method1 was hardly distinguished from philosophical speculation1 and lent itself with difficulty to the purely scientific form4 ,for ,plato then1 and for those who followed him1 mathematics has characteristics which distinguish it from the study of phenomena4 ,in a certain measure1 it partakes of the nature of science1 conceived as bearing upon what is1 upon the absolute reality which is neither subject to change nor to motion4 ,it is true that they start from definitions and hypotheses4 ,but1 once the principles are established1 they are developed a priori by a succession of necessary demonstrations like the dialectics of ideas4 ,this conception offers a mixture of metaphysical and positive elements4 ,it implies that the object of science is reality such as it is in itself2 but1 at the same time1 it sees in the demonstration the essential character of science4 ,a long evolution1 which culminates in ,comte's doctrine1 has driven the metaphysical elements out of science while the other elements subsist in it still4 ,far from saying with ,plato or with his successors that there is no science of the phenomenon or of that which passes away1 ,comte thinks on the contrary1 that the only object of science is phenomenal reality so far as it is subject to laws4 ,science has not to search for causes or substances2 it suffices for it to determine invariable relations4 ,if the mathematical sciences have long been the only sciences properly so called1 and if to-day they are still more advanced than any others1 it is because the geometrical and mechanical phenomena are indeed the simplest of all1 and those which are most naturally connected among themselves4 ,the period during which they could be studied by observation could therefore be very short1 so short that it is even not absurd to maintain that it never existed1 and that1 in this case1 rational knowledge was not preceded by the empirical establishment of facts4 ,but the difference between mathematics and the other sciences none the less remains one of degree and not of kind4 ,the ,science of ,mathematics is in advance of the other sciences2 but all work on common ground4 ,in a word1 like all other sciences it is a natural science4 ,this endeavour to present the whole of the sciences as homogeneous1 that is to say1 to avoid two distinct classes being formed of mathematics on the one hand1 and of the sciences of nature on the other1 had already been attempted before ,comte4 ,this endeavour imposed itself1 so to speak1 upon modern philosophers1 from the time when ,descartes sought for a universal method for science conceived as a whole4 ,comte1 who saw very well the defect in the ,cartesian conception1 in which the ascendency of mathematics was still too much felt1 did not1 however1 deny that his own conception proceeded from that of ,descartes4 ,in another form1 the idea of the homogeneity of the sciences is also found in ,leibnitz and even in ,kant4 ,does not the ,critique de la raison pure show that mathematics on the one hand1 and physics on the other1 equally rest upon principles which are synthetic a priori8 ,in the ,prolgomenes toute mtaphysique future just as the chapter corresponding to l'esthtique transcendentale is entitled 8,how are pure mathematics possible a priori80 so the chapter corresponding to the ,logique transcendentale bears as its title 8,how are pure physics possible a priori80 ,on another plan ,comte's theory is parallel to ,kant's4 ,here as there mathematics as well as physics rests upon synthetic principles--8superior to experience10 says ,kant--proceeding from experience1 says ,comte4 ,the latter1 it is true1 did not know ,kant's theory1 and1 had he known it he would not have accepted it4 ,but the analogy of tendency subsists none the less beneath the diversity of doctrines4 ,the immediate antecedent of ,comte's theory is found in d',alembert4 ,the author of the ,discours prliminaire had said1 8,we will divide the science of nature into physics and mathematics40 ,,ii4 ,every science has its origin in the art corresponding to it4 ,mathematics arose out of the art of measuring magnitudes4 ,indeed this art would be very rudimentary if we only practised direct measurement4 ,among the magnitudes which interest us there are very few which we can measure thus4 ,consequently the human mind had to seek some indirect way of determining magnitudes4 ,in order to know the magnitudes which do not allow of direct measurement1 we must evidently connect them with others which are capable of being immediately determined1 and according to which we succeed in discovering the former1 by means of the relations which exist between them and the latter4 8,such is the precise object of mathematical science in its entirety40#ajb ,we see immediately how extremely vast it is4 ,if we must insert a large number of intermediaries between the quantities which we desire to know1 and those which we can measure immediately1 the operations may become very complicated4 ,fundamentally1 according to ,comte1 there is no question1 whatever it may be1 which cannot be finally conceived as consisting in determining one quantity by another1 and consequently which does not depend ultimately upon mathematics4 ,it will be said that we must take into account not only the quantity1 but also the quality of the phenomena4 ,this objection1 decisive in the eyes of ,aristotle1 who could not conceive that we could legitimately ,greek3 metaballein ,greek3 eis allo genos1 no longer holds good for modern thinkers4 ,since ,descartes' time1 they have seen analysis applied to geometrical1 mechanical and physical phenomena4 ,there is no absurdity in conceiving that what has been done for these phenomena is possible for the others4 ,we must be able to represent every relation between any phenomena whatever by an equation1 allowing for the difficulty of finding this equation and of solving it4#ajc ,as a matter of fact1 we are quickly stopped by the complexity of the data4 ,in the present state of the human mind there are only two great categories of phenomena of which we regularly know the equations3 these are geometry and mechanics4 ,this being established1 the whole of mathematical science is divided into two parts3 abstract and concrete mathematics4 ,the one studies the laws of geometrical and mechanical phenomena4 ,the other is constituted by the calculus1 which1 if we take this word in its largest sense1 applies to the most sublime combinations of transcendent analysis1 as well as to the simplest numerical operations4 ,it is purely 8instrumental40 ,fundamentally1 it is nothing else than an 8immense admirable extension of natural logic to a certain order of deductions40 ,this part of mathematical science is independent of the nature of the objects which it examines1 and only bears upon the numerical relations which they present4 ,consequently1 it may happen that the same relations may exist among a great number of different phenomena4 ,notwithstanding their extreme diversity these phenomena will be considered by the mathematician as presenting a single analytical question1 which can be solved once for all4 8,thus1 for instance1 the same law which reigns between space and time when we examine the vertical fall of a body in vacuo1 is found again for other phenomena which present no analogy with the former nor among themselves2 for it also expresses the relation between the area of a sphere and the length of its diameters2 it equally determines the decrease in intensity of light or of heat by reason of the distance of the objects lighted and heated1 etc40#ajd ,we have no general method which serves indifferently for establishing the equations of any natural phenomena whatever3 we need special methods for the several classes of geometrical1 optical1 mechanical phenomena1 etc4 ,but1 whatever may be these phenomena1 once the equation is established1 the method for solving it is uniform4 ,in this sense1 abstract mathematics is really an 8organon40 ,geometry and mechanics1 on the contrary1 should be regarded as real natural sciences1 resting as the others do upon observation4 ,but1 adds ,comte1 these two sciences present this peculiarity1 that in the present state of the human mind1 they are already used1 and will continue to be used as methods far more than as direct doctrine4 ,in this way mathematics is in fact 8instrumental10 not only in abstract parts1 but also in its relatively concrete parts4 ,it is entirely used as a 8tool0 by the more complicated sciences1 such as astronomy and physics4 ,it is truly the real logic of our age4 ,in the philosophical study of abstract mathematics1 ,comte proceeds successively from arithmetical to algebraical calculation1 and from the latter to the transcendent analysis or differential and integral calculus4 ,after having stated the manner in which this calculus is presented according to ,leibnitz and to ,newton1 he adopts that of ,lagrange1 which appears to him the most satisfactory4 ,it is true that at the end of his life his admiration for the author of the ,mcanique analytique had greatly diminished4 ,without here entering into the detail of questions1 we will limit ourselves to the indication of a consideration upon the bearings of abstract mathematics1 which appears to be of capital importance to ,comte4 ,whether it be a question of ordinary analysis1 or especially of transcendental analysis1 ,comte brings out at once the extreme imperfection of our knowledge1 and the extraordinary fecundity of their applications4 ,he can only solve a very small part of the questions which come before us in these sciences4 ,however1 8in the same way as in ordinary analysis we have succeeded in utilising to an immense degree a very small amount of fundamental knowledge upon the solution of equations1 so1 however little advanced geometers may be up to the present time in the science of integrations1 they have none the less drawn1 from these very few abstract notions the solution of a multitude of questions of the first importance1 in geometry1 in mechanics1 in thermology1 etc41 etc40#aje ,the reason of this is that the least abstract knowledge naturally corresponds to a quantity of concrete researches4 ,the most powerful extension of intellectual means which man has at his disposal for the knowledge of nature consists in his rising to the conception of more and more abstract ideas1 which are nevertheless positive4 ,when our knowledge is abstract without being positive1 it is 8fictitious0 or 8metaphysical40 ,when it is positive without being abstract1 it lacks generality1 and does not become rational4 ,but when1 without ceasing to be positive1 it can reach to a high degree of abstraction1 at the same time it attains the generality1 and1 along the lines of its furthest extension1 the unity which are the end of science4 ,hence the importance of ,descartes' fine mathematical discovery1 and also of the invention of differential and integral calculus1 which may be considered as the complement to ,descartes' fundamental idea concerning the general analytical representation of natural phenomena4 ,it is only1 says ,comte1 since the invention of the calculus1 that ,descartes' discovery has been understood and applied to the whole of its extent4 ,not only does this calculus procure an 8admirable facility0 for the search after the natural laws of all the phenomena2 but1 thanks to their extreme generality1 the differential formul can express each determined phenomenon in a single equation1 however varied the subjects may be in which it is considered4 ,thus1 a single differential equation gives the tangents of all curves1 another expresses the mathematical law of every variety in motion1 etc4 ,infinitesimal analysis1 especially in the conception of ,leibnitz1 has therefore not only furnished a general process for the indirect formation of equations which it would have been impossible to discover directly1 but in the eyes of the philosopher it has another and a no less precious advantage4 ,it has allowed us to consider1 in the mathematical study of natural phenomena1 a new order of more general laws4 ,these laws are constantly the same for each phenomenon1 in whatever objects we study it1 and only change when passing from one phenomenon to another 8where we have been able moreover1 in comparing these variations1 to rise sometimes1 by a still more general view1 to a positive comparison between several classes of various phenomena1 according to the analogies presented by the differential expressions of their mathematical laws40#ajf ,comte cannot contemplate this immense range of transcendent analysis without enthusiasm4 ,he calls it 8the highest thought to which the human mind has attained up to the present time40 ,the highest1 because being the most profoundly abstract among all the positive notions1 this thought reduces the most comprehensive range of concrete phenomena to rational unity4 ,as the consideration of analytical geometry suggested to ,descartes the idea of 8universal mathematics10 which lies at the basis of his method1 so we can think that philosophical reflection upon transcendental analysis led ,comte to the idea of those 8encyclopdic laws10 which hold such an important place in his general theory of nature4 ,for these encyclopdic laws1 analogous as they are to the differential formul spoken of by ,comte1 are equally verifiable in orders of otherwise irreducible phenomena1 and allow us to conceive them as convergent4 ,,iii4 ,geometry is the first portion of concrete mathematics4 ,undoubtedly the facts with which it deals are more connected among themselves than the facts studied by the other sciences1 and this allows us easily to deduce some of these facts once the others are given4 ,but there is a certain number of primary phenomena which1 not being established by any reasoning1 can only be founded upon observation1 and which stand as the basis of all geometrical deductions4#ajg ,although very small1 this part of observation is indispensable because it is the initial one1 and never can quite vanish4 ,in this way1 metaphysical discussions upon the origin of geometrical definitions and space are set aside4 ,comte here adopts d',alembert's opinion4 ,the latter had said3 8,the true principles of the sciences are simple recognised facts1 which do not suppose any others1 and which consequently can neither be explained nor questioned3 in geometry they are the properties of extension as apprehended by sense4 ,upon the nature of extension there are notions common to all men1 a common point at which all sects are united as it were in spite of themselves1 common and simple principles from which unawares they all start4 ,the philosopher will seize upon these common primitive notions to make them the basis of the geometrical truths40#ajh ,extension is a property of bodies4 ,but1 instead of considering this extension in the bodies themselves1 we consider it in an indefinite milieu which appears to us to contain all the bodies1 of the universe and which we call space4 ,let us think1 for instance1 of the impression left by a body in a fluid in which it might be immersed4 ,from the geometrical point of view this impression can quite conveniently be substituted to the body itself4 ,thus1 by a very simple abstraction1 we divest matter of all its sensible properties1 only to contemplate in a certain manner its phantom1 according to d',alembert's expression4 ,from that moment we can study not only the geometrical forms realised in nature1 but also all those which can be imagined4 ,geometry assumes a 8rational0 character4 ,similarly1 it is by a simple abstraction of the mind that geometry regards lines as having no thickness1 and surfaces as being without depth4 ,it suffices to conceive the dimension to be diminished as becoming gradually smaller and smaller until it reaches such a degree of thinness that it can no longer fix the attention4 ,it is thus that we naturally acquire the 8real idea0 of surface1 then of the line1 and then of the point4 ,there is therefore no necessity to appeal to the a priori4 ,thus constituted1 the object of geometry is the measurement of extension4 ,but since this measurement can hardly ever be directly taken by superposition1 the aim of geometry is to reduce the comparison of all kinds of extensions1 volumes1 surfaces or lines to simple comparisons of straight lines1 the only ones regarded as capable of being immediately established40#aji ,the object of geometry is of unlimited extent1 for the number of different forms subject to exact definitions is unlimited4 ,in regarding curved lines as generated by the movement of a point subject to a certain law1 we can conceive as many curves as laws4 ,the human mind1 in order to cover this immense field1 the extension of which it was very late in apprehending1 may pursue two different methods4 ,perfect geometry would1 indeed1 be the one which would demonstrate all the properties of all imaginable forms1 and this can be obtained in two ways4 ,either we can successively conceive each of the forms1 the triangles1 the circle1 the sphere1 the ellipse1 etc41 and seek for the properties of each one of them4 ,or else we can group together the corresponding properties of various geometrical forms1 in such a way as to study them together1 and1 so to speak1 to know beforehand their application to such and such a form which we have not yet examined4 8,in a word10 says ,comte1 8the whole of geometry can be ordered1 either in relation to bodies which are being studied1 or in relation to phenomena which are to be considered40 ,the first plan is that of the geometry of the ancients1 or special geometry2 the second is that of the geometry since ,descartes1 or general geometry4#aaj ,at its origin geometry could only be special4 ,the ancients1 for instance1 studied the circle1 the ellipse1 the parabola1 etc41 endeavouring1 in the case of each geometrical form1 to add to the number of known properties4 ,but1 if this line of advance had been the only one which could be followed1 the progress of geometry would never have been a very rapid one4 ,the method invented by ,descartes has transformed this science1 by enabling it to become general1 and to abandon the individual study of geometrical forms for the common study of their properties4 ,this revolution has not always been well understood4 ,often in teaching mathematics1 its bearings are not sufficiently shown4 ,from the manner in which it is usually presented1 this 8admirable method0 would at first seem to have no other end than the simplification of the study of conic sections or of some other curves1 always considered one by one according to the spirit of ancient geometry4 ,this would not be of great importance4 ,the distinctive character of our modern geometry consists in studying in a general way the various questions relating to any lines or surfaces whatever by transforming geometrical considerations and researches into analytical considerations and researches4#aaa ,all geometrical ideas necessarily relate to the three universal categories2 magnitude1 form1 position4 ,magnitude already belongs to the domain of quantity4 ,form can be reduced to position1 since every form can be considered as the result of the advance of a point1 that is to say of its successive positions4 ,the problem is therefore to bring all ideas of situation whatever back to ideas of magnitude4 ,how did ,descartes solve it8 ,by generalising a process which we may say is natural to the human mind1 since it comes spontaneously into being under the stress of necessity4 ,indeed1 if we must indicate the situation of an object without showing it immediately1 do we not refer it to others which are known1 by stating the magnitude of geometrical elements by which we conceive the object to be connected with them8 ,geographers act in the same way in their science to determine the longitude and latitude of a place1 and astronomers to determine the right ascension and the declination of a star4 ,these geographical and astronomical co-ordinates fulfil the same office as the ,cartesian co-ordinates4 ,the only difference1 but it is a capital one1 consists in the fact that ,descartes carried this method to the highest degree of abstract generality thus giving it its maximum of fertility and power4 ,although general geometry is infinitely superior to special geometry it cannot1 nevertheless1 altogether dispense with the latter4 ,as the ancients did1 so it will always be necessary to begin with special geometry4 ,for general geometry rests upon the use of calculation4 ,but if1 as ,comte has said1 geometry is truly a science of facts calculation will evidently never be able to supply us with the first knowledge of these facts4 ,in order to lay the foundations of a natural science simple mathematical analysis would never suffice1 nor could it give a fresh demonstration of it1 when these foundations have already been laid4 ,before all things a direct study of the subject is necessary1 until the precise relations are discovered4 8,the application of mathematical analysis can never begin any science whatever1 since it could never take place except when the science has been sufficiently elaborated to establish1 in relation to the phenomena under consideration1 some equations which might serve as a starting-point for analytical work40#aab ,in a word1 the creation of analytical geometry does not prevent geometry from remaining a natural science4 ,even when it has become as purely rational as possible1 it none the less remains rooted in experience4 ,,iv4 ,the second part of concrete mathematics 7mechanics7 is also one of the natural sciences which owes its marvellous progress to analysis4 ,here again we must distinguish the data which are at the basis of science1 and which are facts1 from the abstract development undergone by this science because of the simplicity of these facts and the precision of the relations which exist between them4 ,the distinction between what is 8really physical0 and what is 8purely logical0#aac is not always an easy one4 ,we must1 however1 separate facts furnished by experience1 from artificial conceptions whose object is to facilitate the establishment of general laws of equilibrium and of motion4 ,only to consider inertia in bodies is a fiction of this kind4 ,physically the force of inertia does not exist4 ,nature nowhere shows us bodies which are devoid of internal activity4 ,we term those which are not alive inorganic1 but not inert4 ,were gravitation alone common to all molecules1 it would suffice to prevent the conception of matter as devoid of force4 ,nevertheless1 mechanics only considers the inertia of bodies4 ,why8 ,because this abstraction presents many advantages for the study1 8without1 moreover1 offering disadvantages in the application40 ,indeed1 if mechanics had to take into account the internal forces of bodies and the variations of these forces1 the complications would immediately become such that the facts could never be submitted to calculation4 ,mechanics would run the risk of losing its character as a mathematical science4 ,and1 on the other hand1 as it only considers the movements in themselves1 regardless of their mode of production1 it is always lawful for mechanics to replace1 if necessary1 the internal forces by an equivalent external force0 applied to the body4 ,the inertia of matter is therefore an abstraction1 the end of which is to secure the perfect homogeneity of mechanical science1 by allowing us to consider all moving bodies as identical in kind1 and all forces as of the same nature4 ,the 8physical0 character of this science is again evident from the consideration of the three fundamental laws upon which it rests4#aad ,the first1 called ,kepler's law1 is thus defined3 8,all movement is naturally rectilinear and uniform2 that is to say1 any body subject to the action of a single force which acts upon it instantaneously1 moves constantly in a straight line with invariable speed40 ,it has been said that this law is derived from the principle of sufficient reason4 ,the body must continue in a straight line because there is no reason why it should deviate from it more on one side than on the other4 ,but1 answers ,comte1 how do we know that there is no reason for the body to deviate1 except precisely because we see that it does not deviate8 ,the reasoning 8reduces itself to the repetition in abstract terms of the fact itself1 and to saying that bodies have a natural tendency to move in a straight line1 which is precisely the proposition which we have to establish40 ,it is by similar arguments that the philosophers of antiquity1 and especially ,aristotle1 had1 on the contrary been led to regard circular motion as natural to the stars1 in that it is the most perfect of all1 a conception which is only the abstract enunciation of a imperfectly analysed phenomenon4 ,the tendency of bodies to move in a straight line with constant speed is known to us by experience4 ,the second fundamental law of mechanics1 called ,newton's law1 expresses the constant equality of action and reaction4 ,it is pretty generally agreed to-day to consider this law as resulting from the observation of facts4 ,newton himself understood it so4 ,finally the third law establishes that 8every movement exactly possessed in common by all the bodies of any system does not alter the particular movements of those different bodies in respect to each other2 but those movements continue to take place as if the whole of the system was motionless40 ,this law 8of the independence or of the coexistence of movements0 was formulated by ,galileo4 ,it is no more a priori than the two preceding ones4 ,how could we be sure1 if experience did not show it to us1 that a common motion communicated to a system of bodies moving in relation to one another1 would change nothing in their particular motions8 ,when his law was made known by ,galileo1 on all hands there arose a cloud of objections1 tending to prove a priori that this proposition was false and absurd4 ,it was only admitted later when1 in order to examine it1 the logical point of view was set aside for the physical point of view4 ,it was then seen that experience always confirmed this law1 and that1 if it ceased to operate1 the whole economy of the universe would be thrown into utter confusion4 ,for instance1 the movement of the translation of the earth in no way affects the mechanical phenomena which take place upon the surface or within the globe4 ,as the law of the independence of motions was unknown when the theory of ,copernicus appeared1 an objection was put to him which was thought to be drawn from experience4 ,he was told that if the earth moved round the sun all the movements which take place upon it or within it would be modified by the action4 ,later on when ,galileo's law became known1 the fact was explained and the objection disappeared4 ,once these three laws are established1 mechanics has sufficient foundation4 ,henceforth the scientific edifice can be constructed by simple logical operations1 and without any further reference to the external world4 ,but this purely rational development no more transforms mechanics into an a priori science than the application of analysis deprives geometry of its character as a natural science4 ,what proves this1 in one case as in the other1 is the possibility of passing from the abstract to the concrete and of applying the results obtained to real cases1 merely restoring the elements which science had been compelled to set aside4 ,if it were possible entirely to constitute the science of mechanics according to simple analytical conceptions1 we could not imagine how such a science could ever become applicable to the effective study of nature4 ,what guarantees the reality of rational mechanics is precisely its being founded upon some general facts1 in a word1 upon the data of experience4 ,comte could assuredly not foresee the controversies which to-day bear upon the principles of mechanics and which have been summed up by ,mr4 ,poincar in an article upon ,hertz's mechanical theories4#aae ,mr4 ,poincar says that the principles of ,dynamics have been stated in many ways1 but nobody sufficiently distinguished between what is definition1 what is experimental truth1 and what is mathematical theorem4 ,mr4 ,poincar is satisfied neither with the 8classical0 conception of mechanics1 whose insufficiency has been shown by ,hertz1 nor with the conception with which ,hertz wishes to replace it4 ,in any case it is a high philosophical lesson to see the classical system of analytical mechanics--a system constructed with such admirable accuracy1 and made by ,laplace to arise altogether1 as ,comte says1 out of a single fundamental law1--to see it after a century labouring under grave difficulties1 not unconnected with the progress of physics4 ,might not this be an argument in support of the theory of d',alembert and of ,comte on the nature of concrete mathematics8 ,geometry and mechanics would only differ from the other natural sciences by the precision of the relations between the phenomena of which they treat1 by the facility which they have for dealing with these relations by means of calculus and analysis1 and1 consequently1 by assuming an entirely rational and deductive form4 ,for the extraordinary power of the instrument should not hide from us the nature of the sciences which make use of it4 ,these1 like the others1 bear upon natural phenomena4 ,only1 as these phenomena are the most simple1 the most general and the most closely allied of all1 these sciences are also those which respond in the best way to the positive definition of science4 ,they have 8very easily and very quickly replaced empirical statement by rational prevision40 ,they are composed of laws and not of facts4 ,but1 conforming in this again to the positive definition of science1 they are empirical in their origin1 and they remain relative in the course of their development4 ,thus positive philosophy1 having reached the full consciousness of itself1 reacts upon the conception of the sciences which have most contributed to its formation4 ,when the philosophy is universally accepted the idea that a science can be a priori1 that is both absolute and immutable1 will have disappeared4 ,precisely because it is the most perfect type of a positive science1 mathematics will no longer claim these characteristics1 and its ancient connection with metaphysics will be finally severed4 ,,footnotes3 #ajb ,cours1 ,i1 #aja4 #ajc ,cours1 ,i1 #aba-d4 #ajd ,cours1 ,i1 #aab #aje ,cours1 ,i1 #bef4 #ajf ,cours1 ,i1 #aie-g4 #ajg ,cours1 ,i1 #bhf-g4 #ajh ,elements de philosophie1 ,i1 p4 #acb-c4 #aji ,cours1 ,i1 #bih4 sq4 #aaj ,cours1 i1 #cad-af4 #aaa ,cours1 i1 #chc-d4 #aab ,cours1 i4 #cbb-c4 #aac ,cours1 i4 #dbb4 sq4 #aad ,cours1 i1 #dee-dfc4 #aae ,revue gnrale des sciences pures et appliques1 #cj septembre #ahig4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,astronomy ,the object of astronomy is the discovery of the laws of the geometrical and mechanical phenomena presented by the celestial bodies2 and1 by the knowledge of these laws to obtain the precise and rational prevision of the state of our system at any given period whatever4 ,it is in a word1 8the application of mathematics to celestial phenomena40#aaf ,mr4 ,h4 ,spencer has taken occasion of this definition to criticise the place assigned by ,comte to astronomy in his classification of the sciences4 ,he makes him contradict himself4 ,he says3 you term fundamental sciences the abstract sciences which do not study beings in nature1 but the laws which govern phenomena in those beings2 by what right is astronomy placed among these sciences1 between mathematics and physics8 ,is not the object of astronomy the study of certain beings in nature8 ,in what does the application of mathematics to celestial phenomena differ from their application to other cases8 ,it appears evident that here ,comte introduces into the series of abstract sciences a science which is really concrete1 or at least1 according to ,mr4 ,spencer's expression1 abstract-concrete4 ,comte had foreseen the objection4 ,the answer which he makes throws a strong light upon the sense in which he understands the words 8abstract0 and 8general0 as applied to the sciences4 ,he partly accepts the objection4 ,the true astronomical notions1 he says1 only differ from purely mathematical notions by their special restriction to the celestial case2 and this1 at first sight1 must appear contrary to the essentially abstract nature of the speculations which belong to the first philosophy4 ,but on the other hand1 these speculations bear upon the phenomena given in experience1 and the order of the abstract sciences should reproduce the real order of dependence of the phenomena4 ,thus the first of these sciences1 mathematics1 determines the essential laws of the most general phenomena1 which are common to all material beings 7form1 position1 movement74 ,now1 are not the most general phenomena after these1 those 8of which the the continuous ascendency inevitably dominates the course of all the other phenomena80#aag ,in other words1 before passing to the study of physical1 chemical1 biological phenomena1 etc41 it is indispensable to know the general laws of the milieu in which these phenomena are manifested4 ,outside of this milieu1 they would be impossible1 or at any rate1 it so conditions them that1 were it otherwise1 these phenomena would also be different from what they are4 ,the character of generality which1 with that of abstraction1 is made use of to institute the hierarchy of phenomena is thus reduced to the idea of dependence4 ,it is the consideration of this dependence which assigns to astronomy its place between mathematics and physics in the encyclopdic ladder of the sciences4 ,considered singly in themselves1 the phenomena studied by astronomy are purely geometrical and mechanical4 ,they would not1 therefore1 constitute the object of a science distinct from mathematics4 ,but positive philosophy considers everything from the point of view of humanity4 ,now1 for humanity1 this 8special case0 is of unequalled importance4 ,all the other phenomena given to us by experience 7except the mathematical phenomena7 depend1 in a more or less direct manner1 upon astronomical phenomena4 ,the knowledge of astronomical laws is therefore the necessary condition for the knowledge of all the others4 ,thus1 the infringement of the principle of the hierarchy of fundamental sciences is only apparent4 ,an analogous case is found in chemistry4 ,the analysis of air and water is incorporated in abstract chemistry1 because air and water constitutes the general milieu1 8in which all ulterior phenomena occur40#aah ,the place given to astronomy is therefore justified4 ,this science1 moreover1 remains abstract4 ,for it to be a concrete science1 all aspects of the existence of celestial bodies would have to be studied and considered in their relations1 to each other in it4 ,but1 on the contrary1 astronomy only studies the geometrical and mechanical phenomena in the celestial bodies1 all physical and chemical considerations1 etc41 being eliminated4 ,comte concludes that in passing on to the celestial case mathematics does not lose its abstract nature4 ,it only becomes more developed in the case of a special example1 whose extreme importance demands such a specialisation4 ,the abstract character of astronomy belongs to it almost a priori4 ,the facts upon which it rests are only revealed to us by one of our senses1 the most intellectual of them indeed1 but by which we are only informed of the mathematical properties of bodies4 ,our eyes alone touch the stars4 ,there is no astronomy for a blind race4 ,dark stars1 if such there be1 are for ever hidden from us4 ,all that is given to us1 therefore1 is the shape1 the position and the motion of visible celestial bodies4 ,we can never by any means know how to study their chemical composition1 nor their mineral structure1 nor a fortiori the nature of the organic bodies which may live upon them4 ,comte might have formulated in less categorical terms affirmations which were soon to be contradicted by spectral analysis and by photography4 ,but he was confirmed in the entirely abstract and mathematical conception which he had of astronomy by his persuasion that no discoveries of so far-reaching a nature were possible4 ,thus1 astronomy appeared to be an excellent type of a positive science1 because it is at once natural and abstract1 and in it these two characteristics are equally apparent1 which was not the case in mathematics4 ,in this science the share of observation is so limited1 so transient1 that it becomes inappreciable4 ,in astronomy1 on the contrary1 determination of certain facts evidently plays a part in the science4 ,but1 at the same time1 nowhere do we see more clearly that science does not consist in the mere apprehension of facts4 ,here they are so simple1 and moreover so uninteresting1 that their connexion and the knowledge of their laws alone deserves the name of science4 ,in general1 what is an astronomical fact8 ,none other than this3 such a star has been seen at such a precise instant1 and under such an angle duly measured4 ,the more or less profound elaboration of these observations is indispensable to science1 even in its most imperfect state4 ,astronomy1 says ,comte1 did not really come into being when the priests of ,egypt or ,chaldea made a series of more or less exact empirical observations in the heavens2 but only when the first ,greek philosophers began to reduce the general phenomenon of diurnal motion to a few geometrical laws4#aai ,of all the natural sciences1 after mathematics1 astronomy is also the most perfectly free from all theological and metaphysical considerations4 ,from every point of view it is positive4 ,astronomers no longer have recourse to a ,providence1 which as the intelligent cause of the order of the celestial world1 would in its turn1 witness to the existence of this cause4 ,they do not inquire any more into the intimate nature of forces 7gravitation1 attraction1 etc474 ,astronomy is content to determine the invariable relations of phenomena with the greatest possible precision4 ,it is here that philosophical minds can study the essential characteristics of a positive science4 ,in it they will also see how disinterested it must be in order to become useful4 8,without the highest speculations of geometers upon celestial mechanics1 which have so greatly increased the precision of astronomical tables1 it would be impossible to determine the longitude of a ship with the degree of accuracy which is now attainable40#abj ,finally no science has exercised a greater influence upon the evolution of the human mind than this one4 ,the great epochs in astronomy are also those in cosmological philosophy4 ,the desperate resistance which was offered by theological dogmatism to ,galileo's discovery responded to a just apprehension of the consequences involved in this discovery4 ,to admit that the earth was not the centre of the world was to take a first and a decisive step in the way which leads away from the anthropocentric prejudice4 ,it was like pledging oneself to substitute sooner or later the relative point of view to the absolute one in philosophy4 ,it was introducing the positive spirit1 to-day in speculative physics1 to-morrow in speculative ethics4 ,,ii4 ,although astronomy is an 8eminently mathematical0 science1 the method of working by observation is used in it4 ,the astronomer observes before calculating1 and he observes again after having calculated4 ,the art of observation for which there is no use in mathematics appears here then1 and1 with it1 the inductive method4 ,indeed there is no 8absolute separation0 between observing and reasoning4#aba ,the mind does not first observe facts in a receptive or 8passive0 manner1 in order to work out combinations of these facts afterwards4 ,in reality every observation is a combination1 and this is particularly true in astronomical observation4 ,the facts which we observe are really constructed4 ,we can only see simultaneous or successive directions1 according to which the mind must construct the form or the movement which the eye could not take in4 ,the necessary and constant association 8between prevision and inspection0 is more intimate and more evident here than in any other science4 ,in the same way1 hypothesis 7which is inseparable from observation7 can be studied in astronomy in its most simple form4 ,here it is presented in its clearest aspect1 and1 if one may say so1 in the one which most reveals its essential nature4 ,now1 hypothesis in astronomy 8serves to fill up the necessary gaps in observation40 ,it provisionally supplements the knowledge--not indeed of causes1 for positive science seeks nothing of this kind--but of facts and laws which we ignore4 ,for instance1 the simple geometrical sketch of a diurnal motion would remain impossible without an abstract hypothesis which being compared with the concrete spectacle presented by the movement itself enables us to connect together the various celestial positions4 ,modern astronomy1 which has destroyed primitive assumptions regarded as real laws of the world1 has maintained their permanent value for conveniently representing phenomena provisionally4 ,and1 as we are not deceived as to the reality of such assumptions we can use without scruple any one which seems to us most advantageous4#abb ,the use of hypothesis1 as it is employed in astronomy1 must be carried into the other sciences4 ,this mode of procedure everywhere remains like to itself1 although we do not always conceive it so clearly4 8,its normal domain coincides with that of observation40 ,an hypothesis completes by anticipation what we know of facts and of their laws4 ,consequently1 it is subject to be modified1 corrected1 or contradicted by a wider or deeper knowledge of facts4 ,hypotheses then are only valid during the time when they are advantageous1 that is to say1 as long as they serve to unite and co-ordinate our observations4 ,as has been said1 they labour to render themselves useless4 ,but they are indispensable1 and science1 without them1 could neither advance nor even begin4 ,far from giving too small a share to hypothesis1 like ,bacon1 ,comte would rather incur the reproof of having given it too large a one4 ,he made too much use of it himself at the end of his life4 ,but the theory which he gave of it in the ,cours de philosophie positive and of which certain features appeal again in ,claude ,bernard's ,introduction a l'tude de la mdecine experimntale1 was a careful study of its nature and function4 ,,iii4 ,astronomy1 or at least that part of astronomy which bears the name of celestial mechanics1 of all the physical sciences is the one which has been carried to the highest degree of perfection4 ,nowhere else have the phenomena been better reduced to a supreme law which allows us to foresee them with sufficient precision4 ,but this result could only have been obtained by substituting the notion of a solar world to that of a universe4#abc ,this world is the only one which we can comprehend as a system4 ,if the object of astronomy were the general laws of the universe1 this science would be extraordinarily imperfect1 not to say impossible4 ,for what do we know about cosmic laws8#abd ,we do not even know whether ,newton's law applies to any or all systems of stars4 ,we must then distinguish between astronomy as the science of our world and sidereal astronomy4 ,the latter is not absolutely forbidden us1 but we know very little on this subject1 and we shall probably never know much more4 ,do the innumerable suns scattered in space form a general system1 or do independent systems exist8 ,is space limitless8 ,is the number of celestial bodies an infinite one8 philosophers ask4 ,in truth the consideration of our world is positive4 ,the consideration of the universe is not4 ,history helps us to understand the transition which led from one to the other4 ,ancient philosophy made the earth the centre of the universe4 ,notwithstanding the diversity of their particular characteristics and of their motions1 it was natural then for all the celestial bodies to be conceived as the parts of a single system4 ,a more or less clearly expressed postulate supported this astronomical conception3 the purpose of the universe was the existence of man4 ,there was no occasion to distinguish our world from the whole world4 ,but could this conception stand when the earth was reduced to the condition of a planet revolving round a sun so like a multitude of other suns4 ,suddenly the stars were carried to distances infinitely more considerable than the greatest planetary intervals4 ,undoubtedly the human mind could continue to regard the very small groups of which the earth forms a part as a system4 ,but the system 7if it exists7 which embraces the whole of the celestial bodies ceased henceforth to be within our reach4 ,since then 8the notion of the world has become clear and habitual1 and that of the universe has become uncertain and almost unintelligible40#abe ,it matters little1 moreover1 for1 according to one of ,comte's favourite maxims1 what we have no means of knowing1 neither have we any need to know2 and every thing which it is our interest to learn we can also attain4 ,nor should we see in this any providential harmony4 ,that which it is our interest to know must always in some way influence the conditions of our existence4 ,by the mere fact that this action makes itself felt1 it is inevitable that sooner or later1 directly or indirectly1 we should come to know of it4 ,this reflection can be well applied to astronomy4 ,the study of the laws of the solar system1 of which we form a part1 is of supreme interest for us3 and we have reached very great precision on this point4 ,on the contrary1 the exact notion of the universe is inaccessible to us2 but it is unimportant to us leaving out of the question our 8insatiable curiosity40 ,the independence of our world is certain4 ,the phenomena which take place within the solar system do not appear to be affected by the more general phenomena which relate to the mutual action of suns4 ,our tables of celestial events1 drawn up long beforehand and taking into consideration no other world than our own1 so far accord strictly with direct observations4 ,supposing the law of gravitation to extend to the entire universe1 the perturbation in our world caused by a mass equal to a million times its own1 and which would be situated at the distance of the nearest sun to our own1 would be several thousand million times less than that which brings about our tides1 that is to say practically nil4 ,here1 says ,comte1 is the only exception to the encyclopdic law according to which the more general phenomena control the more particular ones without being influenced by them4#abf ,from this he simply concludes that the phenomena of our system are the most general to which positive research can extend1 and that the study of the universe must henceforth be excluded from natural philosophy4 ,the encyclopdic law then remains true for the whole of positive philosophy4 ,the delimitation of the object of astronomy is one of the points where we can best follow the successive modifications of ,comte's thought4 ,in the second volume of the ,cours de philosophie positive he gave to astronomy the place which is generally conceded to it by scientific men4 ,he even claims1 as a condition for its utility1 the most perfect disinterestedness of scientific research in the whole extent of its province4 ,the example which he gives of it 7the determination of longitude at sea71 is borrowed from ,condorcet4 ,undoubtedly1 ,comte already insists upon the distinction between the ideas of world and universe1 the former only being positive4 ,nevertheless1 he still admits that we should not give up all hope of obtaining some sidereal knowledge1#abg and that it would be very precious for us to know the relative motions of multiple stars1 etc4 ,but already in the sixth volume of the ,cours he condemns entirely the 8so-called sidereal astronomy1 which to-day constitutes the only grave scientific aberration peculiar to celestial studies40#abh ,ten years later1 in the first volume of the ,politique positive1 he 8regenerates0 astronomy from the synthetic point of view4 ,he is no longer content to limit it to the knowledge of the solar system4 ,he confines the particular study of our world within narrow limits4 ,astronomy1 like the other sciences1 from objective must become subjective4 ,instead of the vague 7that is to say indefinite7 study of the heavens its end must be the knowledge of the earth1 and the consideration of the other celestial bodies only in their relation to the human planet4 ,at this price alone can the unity of this science be secured4#abi ,thus ,comte came back to ,aristotle's closed world with the earth as its centre4 ,he points it out himself in showing in what way he differs from the ancient conception4 8,this unity10 he says1 8existed for the ancients1 but was of an absolute character which at that time was legitimate40 ,when the motion of our planet became known1 the ancient constitution of celestial science might merely have been modified 8by preserving in it1 as subjective1 the centre which was at first supposed to be objective40 ,that would have sufficed to change astronomy from an absolute science to a relative one4 ,undoubtedly the ancients were deceived in believing the earth to be the centre of the world2 but1 in order to correct their error1 it sufficed to say1 the centre of our world4 ,the subjective synthesis 8indeed concentrates the celestial studies round the earth40 ,the other stars only deserve our attention in so far as the knowledge of our planet requires it4 ,comte ends by saying in the fourth volume of the ,politique positive that1 strictly speaking1 the study of the sun and moon would suffice4 ,we may add to them the ancient planets1 but not the 8little telescopic planets40#acj ,this progressive narrowing of the astronomical domain does not indicate a radical change in ,comte's philosophical thought4 ,it only results from the growing subordination of the scientific interest to other superior interests4 ,to know for the sake of knowing1 appears to ,comte to be a wrong use of the human intellect4 ,the ,newtons and the ,laplaces in the past have fulfilled a necessary function1 and humanity owes them eternal gratitude4 ,they struck a decisive blow against theological and metaphysical philosophy2 and secured the victory for the positive spirit4 ,in their time scientific speculation which tended to the discovery of the laws of phenomena1 and especially of celestial phenomena1 was at once the most sublime and the most useful occupation which those men of genius could set themselves4 ,but now that their efforts have culminated in the foundation of positive philosophy1 and this philosophy itself in the 8final religion10 there is no longer any reason to continue researches with which henceforth humanity can dispense4 ,we must even 8cut down many idle acquisitions40#aca ,in a word1 from the religious point of view1 ,comte1 in order to remedy the anarchy of science1 suppresses its liberty4 ,these extreme1 but logically deduced consequences1 are part of the whole of ,comte's religious conceptions1 that is to say of a distant ideal4 ,they must not blind us to the profundity of his philosophical considerations on astronomy4 ,his reflections upon the relation between the ideas of the world and of the universe correspond1 from the positive point of view1 to the first antinomy of the transcendental ,dialectics in the ,critique de la raison pure4 ,can we ever be more fully conscious of the relativity of our knowledge1 that when we see that what we know of celestial phenomena is admirably precise so long as the solar system is concerned1 but is reduced to almost nothing if we look beyond it8 ,our world will perish1 and its disappearance like its existence1 will perhaps be an imperceptible incident4 ,by the continued resistance of the general milieu1 says ,comte1 in the end our world must be re-united to the solar mass from which it came1 until1 in the immensity of future ages1 a fresh dilatation of this mass shall organise a new world in the same manner1 destined to repeat more or less completely the former cycle4 ,moreover1 all these immense alternatives of destruction and of renewal have to be accomplished without influencing in any way the more general phenomena due to solar interaction2 so that the great revolutions in our world would only be secondary and1 so to speak1 local events1 in relation to transformations of a really universal character4#acb ,this outlook into the 8immensity0 of space and of duration suffices to show that ,comte was not a prisoner in the little solar fatherland in which he seems to seclude himself4 ,it may be that for moral and religious reasons he will not allow himself to go beyond it4 ,but1 like ,pascal1 he well knows that he inhabits 8a little out of the way district of nature40 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,sciences ,,of ,,the ,,inorganic ,,world ,if we do not separate chemistry from physics1 their common object is the knowledge of the laws of the inorganic world4 ,in this way they are clearly distinguished on one hand from astronomy which we may consider as an 8emanation from mathematical science10 and on the other hand from biology4 ,the distinction between physics and chemistry presents a greater difficulty4 ,nevertheless this distinction must be maintained1 since the physical phenomena are more 8general10 and the chemical phenomena more 8special10 that is to say1 the latter depend upon the former1 without this dependence being for the most part reciprocal4 ,even if some day we succeeded in establishing that chemical phenomena are in reality physical1 the distinction would none the less subsist1 in this sense1 that in a fact termed chemical1 there is always something more than in a fact which is simply physical1 namely1 the characteristic alteration which the molecular composition of bodies undergoes1 and which consequently affects the totality of their properties4#acc ,to speak only of physics in the first place1 this science presents different characteristics from those of astronomy4 ,the speculative perfection of a science is measured by two correlative although distinct considerations1 by the more or less complete co-ordination of the laws1 and by the more or less accurate prevision of facts4 ,now1 under one aspect or the other1 even supposing that physics should make very important progress1 it will always remain very much behind astronomy4 ,indeed1 the celestial science presents an almost perfect unity2 physics1 on the contrary1 is composed of several branches which are almost isolated from one another1 and each one taken by itself cannot even reduce all its laws to a more general law4 ,and1 as to the second point1 while a very small number of direct observations allows of rational and exact prevision of the whole of the celestial phenomena1 physics only renders possible predictions which are generally founded upon experience at once immediate and within easy reach4 ,undoubtedly some parts of physics allow of the use of mathematical analysis 7we shall see presently under what conditions74 ,nevertheless1 the part played by experience is infinitely greater in physics than in astronomy4 ,so it is in the former science that we first meet with the inductive method1 which is afterwards used and developed in the other positive sciences4 ,although deduction continues to fulfil an important part1 it already ceases to predominate here1 because1 says ,comte1 in it the institution of true principles begins to become more troublesome than the development of accurate consequences4#acd ,the inductive method implies these essential processes2 #a observation properly so called1 that is to say the direct examination of the phenomenon such as it appears naturally3 #b experimenting1 which is usually defined as the examination of the phenomenon more or less modified by artificial circumstances instituted by us in order to study it better2 #c comparison1 that is to say the gradual consideration of a succession of analogous cases1 in which the phenomenon becomes more and more simple4 ,of these three processes astronomy only makes use of the first4 ,physics cannot use the third which is reserved for biology2 but it avails itself of the first and institutes the second4 ,this is a fresh confirmation of the law established by ,comte3 to the complexity and increasing difficulty of the sciences1 corresponds an increasing development of the processes of the positive method applicable to them4 ,research by way of experiment1 which is impossible in ,astronomy1 appears in ,physics4 ,it is therefore here where it originates that we must study it4 ,it is also here that it is most successful1 and gives the greatest number of results4 ,indeed1 to experiment successfully we must be able to compare two cases 8which present no other difference direct or indirect1 than that which relates to the course of the phenomenon under analysis40#ace ,by experimenting1 ,comte here clearly designates what ,john ,stuart ,mill will call the method of difference1 that is to say the most powerful of his methods for the investigation of phenomena4 ,now1 experimenting1 so understood1 is extremely difficult when very complicated phenomena are concerned4 ,in physiology1 for instance1 the experiments must be combined in such a way as to maintain the subjects in the living state1 and even1 as far as possible1 in the normal state4 ,but any modification of one part of the organism immediately affects the other parts4 ,the living being reacts instantly1 and adapts itself as best it can to the new conditions in which it has been placed by the experimentalist4 ,we can therefore hardly ever establish in physiology what is so easily obtained in physics3 two cases exactly similar in all respects1 except in the one which we want to analyse4 ,in chemistry1 it is true1 experimenting would seem to be even easier than in physics1 since in it1 as a rule1 we merely consider facts resulting from circumstances which are produced by man's intervention4 ,but this is to mistake the nature of the experimental method4 ,the essence of this process does not consist in man's institution of the circumstances surrounding the phenomena2 it lies in the 8freest possible choice of the case best suited to show the law of the phenomenon10 whether this case be1 moreover1 natural or artificial4 ,now1 this choice is nearly always easier in physics than in chemistry4 ,for the chemical phenomena more complex in themselves1 in general can only be brought about by the co-operation of a great number of different influences2 for this reason in chemistry1 it is more difficult to modify the circumstances under which phenomena are produced1 and still more difficult to isolate as completely as in physics the various conditions by which phenomena are determined4 ,to the use of the experimental method1 physics can often join that of mathematical analysis4 ,but in the employment of the latter it must be extremely cautious1 and we must only have recourse to this application of mathematics after having 8carefully considered the reality of the starting point10 which alone can guarantee the solidity of the deductions4 ,in a word1 the spirit proper to physical investigation1 must constantly direct the use of this powerful instrument4 ,now1 this condition has not always been fulfilled4 ,too often the preponderance of mathematical analysis has been the cause of the neglect of experimental studies4 ,not only has mathematical analysis in this way retarded the progress of physics but it has even tended to vitiate the conception of that science1 and to bring it back to a state of obscurity and uncertainty which1 says ,comte1 notwithstanding the apparent severity of the forms differs little1 at bottom1 from its old metaphysical state4#acf ,for this reason1 the application of analysis to physics must not be left to geometers who are chiefly concerned with the instrument4 ,it must belong to the physicists who before all things consider the use to be made of it4 ,mathematicians have often encumbered physics with a quantity of analytical labour founded upon very doubtful hypothesis2 they must give way to physicists trained in experimental studies1 and1 nevertheless1 with sufficient knowledge of mathematics to make use of the analysis whenever it is possible4 ,within these limits mathematical analysis will render the greatest service to the science of physics4 ,would optics1 acoustics1 the theories of heat and of electricity have reached the point where we see them to-day without the powerful help of analysis8 ,yet even here1 physical researches are almost always so complex that1 in order to assume a mathematical form1 they demand the setting aside of a more or less essential portion of the conditions of the problem4 ,indeed we are here in presence of the general problem of the translation of the concrete into the abstract4 ,this problem1 which is admirably solved in mathematics1 and sufficiently in astronomy1 is only imperfectly solved in physics4 ,the art of closely combining experience and analysis1 says ,comte1 is still almost unknown4 ,it constitutes the final progress of the method proper to the deeper study of physics4#acg ,we may add1 and this is in ,comte's mind1 that conversely the progress made by this art would be useful to analysis itself4 ,,ii4 ,astronomy has reached a perfect state of 8positivity40 ,all trace of the metaphysical spirit has disappeared from it4 ,can we say as much of physics8 ,it would not seem so1 when we see the hypotheses which play so great a part in this science1 and of which a few are keenly contested by ,comte4 ,how can we distinguish the valuable hypotheses from the useless ones1 those which are useful to physics from those which are merely an encumbrance and should be rejected8 ,this is not a question which can be solved by referring to abstract rules4 ,in order to answer it1 we must study the use of hypotheses where it is perfect1 and decide according to this example4 ,to my mind1 says ,comte1 the deeper study of the art of hypotheses in astronomy can alone establish the rules which are suitable to direct the use of this precious artifice in physics1 and more so still in the remainder of natural philosophy4#ach ,now of what use is it to astronomers8 ,to anticipate the results of deduction or of induction1 8by making a provisional supposition concerning some of the very notions which constitute the final object of the research40 ,it is a process of which the methods of approximation used by geometers originally suggested the general idea4 ,they 8supposed0 that the circumference was the limit of the perimeters of inscribed and circumscribed polygons the number of whose sides went on increasing4 ,in the same way1 hypotheses provisionally fill up the 8lacun0 of our knowledge4 ,an hypothesis should always be open to a positive verification1 8whose degree of precision is in harmony with that of the corresponding phenomena40 ,for it only expresses beforehand what experience and reasoning might have made known immediately1 if the circumstances of the problem had been more favourable4 ,if1 therefore1 an hypothesis claimed to attain that which in its nature is inaccessible to observation and to reasoning1 it would immediately become illegitimate and harmful4 ,in a word1 it must bear exclusively upon laws1 and never upon causes or the modes of production of phenomena4 ,in the physics of his own time ,comte finds the two kinds of hypotheses1 but he also finds more bad hypotheses than good ones4 ,he especially protests against the ethers and the fluids to which the phenomena of heat1 light1 electricity and magnetism were attributed4 ,these hypotheses1 according to him1 are destined to disappear from science4 ,it is true that the physicists deny that they attribute an objective reality to their ethers and their fluids4 ,they claim to need them absolutely in order to facilitate the conception and the combination of phenomena4 ,however1 in spite of themselves1 they are drawn into speaking of their ethers as if they really existed4 ,moreover1 do they not see that astronomy gets on very well without similar hypotheses8 ,in order to conceive the phenomena it is enough to observe and analyse them attentively4 ,and1 as to combining them1 that depends upon the knowledge which has been obtained of their positive relations4 ,the corpuscular theory is1 on the contrary1 an example of a good hypothesis in physics1 where it plays a part analogous to that of the inertia of bodies in mechanics4#aci ,the innermost structure of bodies is unknown to us4 ,but we have a right to introduce all the hypotheses which can help us in our research1 and in particular the hypothesis of atoms1 so long as we do not understand it as something representing a reality4 ,the ethers and the fluids tend to 8explain0 the physical phenomena by the nature of the agent which produces them4 ,it is here that these hypotheses bear the mark of the metaphysical spirit4 ,to understand the appearance and especially the persistence of these hypotheses1 it is not enough to consider them in themselves4 ,we must get back to the history of physics1 and compare it with that of the other fundamental sciences4 ,was it possible for physics to pass suddenly from the period in which phenomena are referred to causes and essences1 to the positive period where they are conceived as simply subject to laws8 ,a period of transition was necessary4 ,the scholastic entities1 before disappearing1 became semi-materialised4 ,they were transformed into fluids4 ,what is heat conceived as existing apart from a hot body1 light independent of a luminous body1 electricity separated from an electric body8 ,they are the old entities in a new garment1 more easily grasped1 in spite of their 8equivocal corporeity40 ,they gradually lead to the more and more exclusive consideration of phenomena and of laws1 until1 in their turn1 they disappear4 ,astronomy went through the same phases before ,physics4 ,in it we have also seen hypotheses which cannot be verified come to facilitate the transition from the theological to the positive state4 ,such was the conception of ,descartes who explained the celestial motions by the system of vortices4 ,those famous vortices introduced the idea of a mechanism where ,kepler himself had only dared to conceive the incomprehensible action of souls and genii4 ,then ,newton came1 who preserved the idea of mechanism1 while giving up the vortices4 ,in vain did the ,cartesians fight against his entirely positive conception4 ,their arguments in favour of fluids and ethers were as plausible as those of the physicists of our own time4 ,but we have ceased to listen to them4 ,having become entirely positive1 astronomy no longer seeks anything but the laws at work in the phenomena observed4 ,every accessory hypothesis aiming at anything else has no further interest for us4 ,the most advanced portions of physics have already reached this point4 ,take1 for instance1 the study of gravitation4 ,there was not perhaps a single scientific man of any importance in the ,,xvii4 century1 even long after ,galileo1 who did not construct or adopt a system concerning the fall of bodies4 ,at that time any science on this subject seemed impossible without a hypothesis of this kind4 ,who troubles himself with it to-day8 ,we may be allowed to think that the other parts of physics will follow the same line1 and that in turn they will conform to this rule of the positive method3 8,every hypothesis must bear exclusively upon the laws of phenomena1 and never upon their modes of production40 ,,iii4 ,in the series of the fundamental sciences ,chemistry appears to fill a somewhat secondary and subordinate place4 ,in it the positive method is not enriched by any process of capital importance1 but it confines itself to developing the processes already made use of in physics4 ,in spite of appearances1 even experimenting is less easy and less fertile in chemistry than in physics4 ,the only new process which we see appearing is the art of nomenclature4 ,whenever we wish to study this art 8at its source0 we shall have to refer to chemistry4#adj ,the phenomena which it studies are the most complicated of the inorganic world4 ,if then physics is extremely imperfect1 it is not surprising that chemistry should be much more so4 ,in the greater number of its researches 8the chemistry of the present day hardly deserves the name of science40#ada ,but this inferiority of chemistry is not only due to the nature of its object4 ,there are other causes which it would be easier to remedy4 ,the progress of chemistry is retarded3 #a1 by the wrong direction given to much of its work up to the present time2 #b1 by the defective education of the majority of the scientific men who give themselves to its study4 ,before all things1 chemists lack a clear and rational idea of their science1 of its relation to the sciences which stand nearest to it and the way in which its problems should be stated4 ,being intermediate between physics and biology1 chemistry has suffered from the vicinity of both4 ,as the more advanced sciences always have a marked tendency to encroach upon those above them1 chemistry must in the first place defend itself against the ascendency of physics1 as physics itself must fight against that of mathematics4 ,the chemist must undoubtedly have studied physics1 in order to make use of the results obtained by this science1 and to turn them1 if he can1 into a method for his own use4 ,the relation of these two sciences is very close1 and a knowledge of the laws of calorific and electric phenomena1 for instance1 is of the highest importance for chemical research4 ,but1 for all this1 the chemist has his own point of view4 ,he studies1 7which the physicist does not do71 the laws of the phenomena of composition and decomposition which are the result of the molecular and specific action of diverse natural or artificial substances upon each other4 ,he must therefore make use of physics1 but not subordinate himself to it4 ,on the other hand physiological research is not within the province of chemistry4 ,what has been called 8biological chemistry0 belongs1 according to ,comte1 to biology alone4 ,for the physiologist to have gone through the school of chemistry is natural and even indispensable4 ,but his point of view is quite different from that of the chemist4 ,as a matter of fact1 chemists have shown themselves unqualified for physiological studies4 ,none of their numerous attempts have succeeded in establishing a single point of general doctrine1 in biology4 ,they merely furnished materials4 ,moreover these cannot be used just as they are by the physiologist1 who is obliged to take up the researches again 8under the preponderating influence of biological considerations40 ,comte admires the self-confidence of the chemists who approach physiological questions without having measured or even suspected the special difficulties4 ,it is1 however1 clear that the most carefully made chemical analyses must be fruitless here so long as they are not directed in the first place by a precise physiological notion of the whole of the phenomenon1 and then modified by the knowledge of the limits of the normal variations to which the phenomena may be liable4 ,now1 for proceeding in this manner1 the physiologists alone are competent4#adb ,analogous considerations lead ,comte to reject even organic chemistry4 ,although the chemical phenomena present characteristics which in the inorganic world come nearest to the solidarity which subsists between the elements of living forms1 nevertheless chemical phenomena remains irreducible to living phenomena4 ,that which is chemical is not yet organic2 and that which is organic is no longer purely chemical4 ,we must do away with this heterogenous and fictitious grouping which is called organic chemistry1 to unite the different parts1 according to their respective nature1 some to chemistry proper1 the others to biology4#adc ,how can we define the object of this science1 so imperfectly determined at the present time8 ,comte knows that he is about to depart from the methods generally in use among chemists1 but he is not afraid of this4 ,for1 he says1 in order to understand the real nature of a science1 we must always suppose it to be perfect4#add ,as chemistry1 is in an extreme state of imperfection1 the 8scientific type0 which the philosopher conceives respecting it will appear to be very far removed from what exists at present4 ,it matters little so long as this type is perfectly 8rational40 ,what is essential to science is the possibility of foreseeing phenomena4 ,given the characteristic properties of the simple or complex substances placed in chemical relations with each other under well defined circumstances1 the object of chemistry will therefore be to determine exactly in what their action will consist1 and what will be the properties of the new substances produced4#ade ,according to this definition1 the fundamental data of chemistry should be ultimately1 reducible to the knowledge of the essential properties of the simple elements alone1 which would lead to that of the various immediate chemical substances1 and consequently to the most complex and distant combinations4 ,obviously1 the study of simple bodies can only be made by means of experiments1 which alone reveal their properties4 ,but1 once this basis is laid down1 8all the other chemical phenomena1 notwithstanding their immense variety1 should be capable of rational solutions1 according to a small number of invariable laws1 established by the science of chemistry for the various classes of combinations40 ,thus1 ,comte sees clearly that the complexity of the chemical phenomena prevents us from expressing their relations in a form which allows of the use of mathematical analysis4 ,but none the less1 in this science as in the preceding ones1 he persists in making the experimental method a mere starting-point4 ,the experimental method furnishes the data which it alone can supply4 ,but these data are afterwards elaborated without its intervention4 ,the scientific ideal in chemistry1 as in physics and in astronomy1 is to substitute as much as possible rational prevision to experimental verification4 ,science always seeks to deduce the greatest number of consequences from the smallest number of data1 and the smallest number of data in this case are the properties of simple bodies4 ,deduction will establish a priori what the properties of a given combination of two simple bodies1 or of two complex bodies will be4 ,in the name of this scientific ideal1 ,comte reproaches the chemists with the superabundance of their analytical work4 ,in default of a rational conception of chemistry they do not make their work bear upon the necessary points4 ,what is the use of studying such and such a body1 placed in such and such conditions1 in an arbitrary way and according to the fancy of investigation8 ,the progress of chemistry should consist far less in the acquisition of new materials than in the systematisation of those which we already possess4 ,chemistry is to-day as rich in details as it is imperfectly constituted as a science4#adf ,its present state in no way gives an idea of what its normal state will be4 ,not content with showing to chemists the 8scientific type0 towards which their science should tend1 ,comte suggests a contrivance in method which will bring them nearer to it4 ,it is in no way like the hypothesis of affinities1 for this appears to him to be even more 8ontological0 than the hypothesis of imaginary fluids or ethers4 ,as always happens when we are concerned with metaphysical conceptions1 the explanations which we draw from affinities consist in the reproduction in abstract terms of the very statement of the phenomenon4#adg ,to this hypothesis1 which is not a scientific one since it bears up the mode of production of facts1 ,comte substitutes what he calls the 8dualist hypothesis40 ,we ignore1 he says1 and it is not for us to seek the real manner in which the elements of which bodies are composed come to be grouped together4 ,but1 consequently1 it is lawful for us1 in the very circumscribed sphere of our positive research1 to conceive the immediate composition of any substance whatever as merely binary1 each of the two bodies so separated being able1 according as the case may be1 to lend itself to a similar analysis1 equally binary1 and so on1 as the occasion arises4 ,we do not affirm that dualism is a real law of nature4 ,it will be a fundamental contrivance in chemistry1 like the hypothesis of inertia in mechanics1 and that of atoms in physics4 ,it will serve to 8simplify our elementary conceptions0 in chemistry1 and in having recourse to it we do not exceed 8the special kind of liberty0 of which our intellect may avail itself1 in the institution of science4#adh ,the use of this hypothesis would allow us to endow chemistry with a 8fine0 character of unity and rationality which it lacks to-day4 ,it is true that ,comte himself confessed that this hypothesis1 proposed by him in #ahch1 had yet 8produced nothing0 in #ahea4 ,but he explains this sterility to himself by the metaphysical spirit1 from which chemists are not sufficiently freed4 ,,iv4 ,we can now take in at a single glance the relations of the sciences of the inorganic world 7including astronomy71 with the totality of positive philosophy4#adi ,in several ways these sciences have contributed to the progress of the positive spirit4 ,by their constitution1 they allowed and prepared the formation of the more complex sciences of ,biology and of ,sociology4 ,moreover1 their development struck a mortal blow at theological and metaphysical philosophy4 ,through them minds became familiarised with the idea of natural law4 ,this idea was not so clearly brought to light by mathematics on account of their almost purely abstract character1 and of the imperceptible part played in them by observation4 ,it appears1 on the contrary1 as the mainspring of astronomy1 of physics1 and of chemistry4 ,the whole effort of these sciences tends to discover invariable relations between phenomena given in experience4 ,theological philosophy is the 8explanation0 of nature which the human mind first makes for itself4 ,in order that it may give up this 8explanation0 some contrary evidence must oblige it to do so4 ,it may see for instance1 that phenomena can be predicted with a perfect exactness which is always confirmed by experience1 or that man1 under certain conditions1 can modify them with certainty4 ,astronomy gives us an example of the former case4 ,it studies phenomena which1 it is true1 are removed from our sphere of action4 ,but1 in return1 it predicts them with a certainty of which the effect has been practically infallible in the long run4 ,it is astronomy which has done most to discredit the religious and philosophical doctrine of final causes4#aej ,not only has it proved that the universe is not disposed with reference to man1 but it has shown the imperfections of our solar system4 ,it has helped more than any other science to check the mental habit of seeking the mode of production of phenomena4 ,physics is far from allowing of a rational prevision which is comparable to that practised by astronomy4 ,but1 as a compensation1 it shows how the knowledge of laws gives the power to cause phenomena to vary with certainty4 ,this second way leads us no less surely than the first to the positive conception of nature4 ,for example1 ,franklin destroyed the religious theory of thunder1 even in the least cultivated intellects4 ,the discovery of the means of directing lightning therefore had the same effect1 in another way1 as the exact prevision of the return of comets4#aea ,on the other hand the sciences of the inorganic world furnish the general positive method with some of its most powerful processes4 ,astronomy introduces observation and hypothesis into this method1 ,physics adds experimenting to it1 and ,chemistry the art of nomenclatures4 ,the inductive method1 which virtually consists in simple scientific observation1 becomes1 however1 enriched and is developed1 according as the phenomena in question become more complicated4 ,but1 in return1 positive philosophy exercises a considerable influence over these sciences4 ,it claims nothing less than to direct and 8regenerate0 them4 ,viewing them from above and as a whole1 philosophy can bring a remedy to the difficulties which arise from their specialism4 ,it sets an exact limit to each of the sciences4 ,it delivers physics from the 8algebraical yoke10 and protects the independence of chemists against the encroachments of the physicists4 ,it places the entirety of the positive method at the service of each particular science4 ,for instance1 it directs the use of hypothesis in physics by the theory drawn from the use which is made of it in astronomy2 for classifications1 it extends to chemistry the use of the comparative method which properly belongs to biology4 ,when1 later1 the integral and final constitution of the philosophy of our age shall have organised the relations between all the sciences1 it will be almost impossible1 save from the historical point of view1 to understand how the study of nature was ever conceived and directed otherwise4#aeb ,positive philosophy organises labour within each science1 and puts an end to 8anarchy40 ,it distinguishes between 8idle0 researches1 and those which should be pursued4 ,it avoids waste of efforts and prevents digressions4 ,we have seen within what limits ,comte wishes to enclose astronomy in the name of philosophy4 ,he does not perceive the means by which he can unite the various branches of physics2 but he claims to replace the fragmentary and scattered chemistry of his time by a single systematic science1 which will forsake the researches of detail which are without interest for humanity4 8,almost the whole of those innumerable compounds will not finally be worthy of any scientific attention4 ,some well-chosen series may even be able to satisfy the logical requirements of chemistry for the discovery of the abstract laws which belong to each order of composition40#aec ,finally positive philosophy causes the disappearance of the last remains of the theological and metaphysical spirit from the sciences of inorganic nature4 ,this philosophy has already shown that mathematics is not a more absolute science than the others1 and that it originates in experience4 ,in physics and in chemistry it banishes the hypotheses which1 more or less avowedly1 tend to make us conceive the essence or the mode of production of phenomena4 ,it is thus that it demands a science of physics freed from ethers and fluids1 and a wholly rational chemistry which shall give up affinities4 ,comte is not therefore possessed of a superstitious respect for the sciences in the state in which they appear before him4 ,on the contrary1 he intends that they should be subject to deep modifications1 and that they should strive towards an ideal form which is laid down for them by philosophy4 ,he calls this form 8positive40 ,in reality it is ,cartesian4 ,,footnotes3 #aaf ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #dii-ejg4 #aag ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gdi4 #aah ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ic4 #aai ,cours1 ,,ii1 #af-ag4 #abj ,cours1 ,,ii1 #ad-ae4 #aba ,pol4 pos4 ,i4 #ejj4 #abb ,cours1 ,,ii1 #aec4 #abc ,cours1 ,,ii1 #acb-c4 #abd ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gea4 #abe ,cours1 ,,ii1 #acc4 #abf ,cours1 ,,ii1 #bff-g4 #abg ,cours1 ,,ii4 #g4 #abh ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gea4 #abi ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #ejh4 #acj ,pol4 pos4 ,,iv4 #bab4 #aca ,pol4 pos4 ,i4 #ejh-ac4 #acb ,cours4 ,,ii4 #big4 #acc ,cours ,,ii4 #caj4 #acd ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #eaf-ah4 #ace ,cours1 ,,ii1 #cac-ae2 ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #eai4 #acf ,cours1 ,,ii1 #cag4 #acg ,cours1 ,,ii1 #cba4 #ach ,cours1 ,,ii1 #ccf sq4 #aci ,pol4 pos4 #ebj4 #adj ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ecb4 #ada ,cours1 ,,iii1 #c-d4 #adb ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ahf-i4 #adc ,cours1 ,,iii1 #aie4 #add ,cours1 ,i4 #aah3 ,,ii4 #caa4 #ade ,cours ,,iii4 #aa-ab4 #adf ,cours1 ,,iii4 #bjf4 #adg ,cours1 ,,iii4 #ce4 #adh ,cours1 ,,iii4 #hg-h4 #adi ,pol4 pos4 ,i4 #eea4 #aej ,cours1 ,,ii4 #bd-bf4 #aea ,cours1 ,,ii4 #cca4 #aeb ,cours1 ,,iii4 #ge4 #aec ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #efa4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,biology ,the passage from the inorganic world to the world of ,life constitutes a critical step in natural philosophy4 ,astronomy1 ,physics1 and ,chemistry represented successive steps in the same series4 ,if each order of phenomena presented in itself something which was irreducible to previous orders1 nevertheless all these phenomena1 in a certain sense1 remained homogeneous4 ,without rashness1 ,descartes could conceive that physics1 like astronomy1 would one day assume the mathematical form4 ,and to-day more than one scientific man considers the distinction between physics and chemistry as provisional4 ,but as soon as life appears1 we enter a new world4 ,at this degree the 8enrichment of the real0 is suddenly so considerable that we find it difficult to admit the homogeneity of these phenomena with the preceding ones4 ,comte here reaps the benefit of his prudence4 ,his philosophy has guarded against reducing all science to a single type1 and it is content with the unity of method and the homogeneity of doctrine4 ,it only demands that each science should limit itself to the search after the laws of phenomena4 ,as to the way in which this research is to be carried out1 it is evidently subordinated to the nature of the phenomena in question4 ,now1 biological phenomena present a number of characteristics which belong to them alone1 and the first duty of the positive science which studies them is to respect their originality4 ,comte1 therefore1 here breaks with ,descartes who conceived biology as a prolongation of physics4 ,he takes an entirely different view of this science1 which1 in a sense1 is opposed to the whole of the sciences of the inorganic world4 ,from this there arises a double effort4 ,on the one hand1 ,comte wishes to maintain the continuity of the encyclopdic series of the sciences3 he thus shows ,biology as immediately following chemistry1 and maintaining the closest relations with astronomy and physics4 ,on the other hand he clearly brings out the irreducible character of the vital phenomena1 and the modifications which the positive method must undergo when applied to them4 ,despite the extreme difference between the points of view and the doctrines1 he often makes us think of those deep and difficult passages in the ,critique du ,jugement where ,kant has shown that without the hypothesis of an inner finality1 7although this hypothesis is in itself obscure71 the phenomena which take place in living beings remain unintelligible4 ,with biology1 says ,comte1 necessarily appear the ideas of consensus1 of hierarchy1 of 8milieu01 of the conditions of existence1 of the relation between the static and the dynamic states1 between the organ and the function4#aed ,in a word1 a biological phenomenon1 considered alone is devoid of meaning4 ,strictly speaking1 it does not even exist4 ,it can only be understood by its relations with the other phenomena which take place in the living being1 phenomena which react upon it4 ,at the same time it reacts upon them4 ,here1 in opposition to what takes place in the inorganic world1 the parts are only intelligible through the idea of the whole4 ,undoubtedly a certain solidarity of phenomena exists in the inorganic world1 which allows us to consider united wholes in it4 ,but the solidarity of biological phenomena is far closer1 for1 without it we could not conceive them1 while1 as regards the phenomena of the inorganic world1 there is nothing impossible in this abstraction4 ,henceforth1 the positive method must adapt itself to the characteristics which belong to biological phenomena4 ,it does not always demand1 as it has been wrongly stated1 that we should go from the simple to the complex1 but only that we should proceed from the known to the unknown4 ,it is true that in the sciences of the inorganic world we proceed from the least complex to the most complex cases2 we begin by the study of phenomena which are as isolated as possible from one another4 ,but1 on the contrary1 living beings are all the better known to us in proportion as they are more complex4 ,the idea of the animal is in some respects clearer to us than the idea of the vegetable4 ,the idea of the superior animals is clearer to us than that of the inferior ones4 ,finally man for us is the principal biological unity1 and it is from this unity that speculation starts in this science4 ,thus1 in dealing with ,biology the positive method undergoes a veritable inversion4 ,in the preceding sciences1 the last degree of composition is forbidden us3 we never succeed in uniting the whole of the inorganic world into a single synthesis4 ,in biology1 on the contrary1 sums of phenomena are given2 but it is the last degree of simplicity which escapes us4 ,we have to start from those sums of phenomena1 and biology must in this way assume a synthetic character4 ,in it the analysis of phenomena will be as minute as possible2 but the analytical operations will always be more or less directly subordinated to the leading idea of the vital consensus4#aee ,,ii4 ,like the other fundamental sciences ,biology must be abstract1 that is to say it must not bear upon individual beings1 but upon phenomena4 ,it is thus distinct from zoology and botany which are concrete sciences4 ,in its widest generality it is defined through the constant correspondence between the anatomical and the physiological point of view4 ,its object is to constantly unite them to one another4 ,in reality these two points of view are the two aspects of a single problem4 ,it is owing to historical reasons that1 during a certain time1 these two sciences appeared to develop independently of one another4 ,physiology remained attached to the metaphysical methods1 that is to say1 to unverifiable hypotheses and to principles which went beyond experience1 while anatomists already made use of the positive method4 ,but to-day1 the two sciences being equally positive1 8their opposition is reduced to that which subsists between the static and the dynamic points of view40#aef ,another element which should enter into the more general definition of biology1 although it has sometimes been neglected1 is the consideration of the milieu4 ,the relation between the organism and its milieu is no less essential to life than the relation of the organ to the function4 ,life supposes not only that the being should be organised in a certain way1 but also that a certain number of external circumstances should sustain this organisation1 and should be compatible with its activity4 ,living beings are thus dependent upon their milieu1 and this dependence grows as we rise in the organic series4 ,the system of the conditions of existence becomes all the more complex as the functions develop and become more varied4 ,inferior organisms are subject to less numerous external conditions2 but1 says ,comte1 a little variation in one of these conditions suffices to make them perish4 ,the superior organisms stand a variation of this kind better4 ,but1 in return1 the number of conditions upon which they depend is far greater4 ,the study of milieux in their relations to organisms1 a study which is hardly outlined1 undoubtedly has many discoveries in store for the future4#aeg ,here is an order of problems of which ,lamarck probably suggested the idea to ,comte1 and upon which ,darwin's genius will work4 ,bichat then was wrong in saying in his celebrated definition of life that it is 8the sum of the forces which resist death40 ,the radical antagonism between inorganic and living nature is an incomplete and consequently a false idea4 ,indeed if1 as ,bichat supposed1 everything which surrounds living bodies tended to destroy them1 their existence would become unintelligible4#aeh ,where could they find strength to resist such formidable pressure1 even for a short time8 ,on the contrary1 the fundamental condition for life is a certain 8harmony0 between the organism and the milieu in which it is placed4 ,the proof of this is furnished at every turn by experience4 ,this being established1 what will be the most general problem of the science of life8 ,from the anatomical point of view1 says ,comte1 all possible organisms1 all parts whatever of each organism1 and all the various states of each necessarily present a common basis of structure and of composition1 from which the tissues1 organs and apparatus have emerged by means of a progressive differentiation4 ,in the same way1 from the physiological point of view1 all living beings1 from the vegetable kingdom up to man1 considered in all their actions and all the periods of their existence1 necessarily possess a common basis of vital activity1 whence the innumerable phenomena of nutrition1 secretion1 etc41 proceed1 by means of progressive differentiation4 ,now1 from both these points of view1 that which is similar in these cases1 is more important than that which distinguishes them1 since the more general phenomena govern those which are less so4 ,we must therefore disengage the elementary physiological phenomenon and the anatomical structure which corresponds to it1 we must determine their relation1 and1 with the help and confirmation of experience1 we must deduce the increasingly more complex1 physiological and anatomical1 phenomena from it4#aei ,this conception which1 despite ,comte's reservation1 still appears to be entirely saturated with the ,cartesian spirit1 leads him to the 8most mathematical statement possible0 of the biological problem4 8,given the organ1 or the organic modification1 to find the function or the act1 and vice versa40#afj ,there is nothing more in conformity with the general definition of science1 which consists in substituting the knowledge of laws to that of facts1 and rational prevision to empirical observation4 ,here1 it is true1 we have an 8ideal scientific type10 from which biology1 which has scarcely reached the positive state1 is very far removed4 ,but there is no science which does not fall short of its definition more or less4 ,the use of this definition is already a help for a science1 and provides a means for measuring its progress4 ,,iii4 ,in part1 or even entirely1 biology is deprived of certain methodical processes which are utilised by the sciences which precede it4 ,it cannot avail itself of calculation4 ,undoubtedly each of the elements which go to make up a physiological phenomenon varies according to a definite law4 ,but the sum of these elements forms such a complex whole1 that we shall never be able to express their relations in the terms of an equation4 ,further1 the numbers which are relative to the phenomena of living bodies present continual and irregular variations1 which do not allow us to establish the data of a mathematical calculation4#afa ,each living being has its individuality1 its personal formula1 its characteristic reactions1 which prevent us from treating it as identical with the other beings of the same species4 ,each physiological or pathological 8case0 is distinct from any other case4 ,that is why ,comte distrusts statistics4 ,in his judgment they are misleading in physiology1 and fatal in medicine4 ,in the same way1 ,claude ,bernard will protest vigorously against averages4 ,is the inductive method at least a convenient one to make use of in biology8 ,simple observation cannot lead us far in the study of such complex phenomena1 of which many are not directly accessible to our senses or to our instruments4 ,experimenting is very difficult in biology1 for nothing is easier than to disturb1 to suspend1 or even to bring about the entire cessation of the phenomena of life4 ,but it is almost impossible to introduce an exactly determined perturbation1 whether of kind1 or1 a fortiori1 of degree4 ,indeed a modification of a single condition of the phenomenon almost at once affects the greater number of the other phenomena1 by reason of their consensus4 ,in principle1 experimenting is not forbidden in biology4 ,on the contrary it is of remarkable efficacy1 but it is often impracticable4 ,nevertheless1 as we know1 it is not man's intervention in phenomena which constitutes experimenting properly so called4 ,it consists1 before all things1 in the rational selection of cases1 7natural or artificial1 it matters little71 which are most appropriate for bringing out the law of variation of the phenomenon under observation4 ,nature gives us such1 for illnesses resemble experiments which we can follow through their entire course and to their termination4 ,they are often difficult to interpret1 on account of their extreme complexity1 but less so1 however1 than the majority of the experiments which we bring about ourselves4 ,for are they not more or less violent diseases1 suddenly produced by our intervention1 without our being able to foresee all their indirect and future consequences8 ,it is pathological anatomy which led ,bichat to his fine discoveries in histology and in physiology4 ,and to pathology we must join teratology which is1 as it were1 its prolongation4 ,here again1 nature supplies experiments which we should not know how to institute4#afb ,whatever may be the help which biology derives from these natural ways of experimenting1 its progress could only be a very slow one1 if it did not possess besides a powerful method for proceeding which is peculiar to it3 comparison4 ,it is true that every inductive operation implies comparison4 ,we compare what we observe with other real and possible cases4 ,again we compare when we are experimenting4 ,but1 in the comparative method1 properly so called1 we do not limit ourselves to bringing two cases together4 ,comparison bears upon a long sequence of analogous cases1 in which the subject is modified by a continual succession of almost insensible gradations4#afc ,how would the general problems of biology receive a solution without this method8 ,if we consider an organism by itself1 the complication of functions and organs is inextricable in it4 ,but1 if we compare this organism with those which come nearest to it1 and then with others which are near to them and so on1 disengaging what they have in common1 a simplification is produced4 ,the accessory characteristics disappear by degrees1 as we descend in the biological series1 and1 if we have set ourselves to study a certain function1 we can finally determine its relation to its organ4 ,although it belongs to biology1 this method has its analogy in other sciences1 and especially in mathematics4 ,it appears to me1 says ,comte1 to present a character similar to that of mathematical analysis1 which brings forward1 in each sequence of analogous cases 8the fundamental portion which is common to all1 which portion1 before this abstract generalisation1 was concealed beneath the secondary specialities of each isolated case40 ,the comparative method1 in a word1 is a method for analysing biological continuity4 ,whether it be a question of an anatomical disposition or of a physiological phenomenon 8the methodical comparison of the regular sequence of the growing differences which relate to them will always present the surest and most efficacious means of throwing light upon even the ultimate elements of the proposed question40 ,we see that ,comte had here his conception of the infinitesimal calculus in his mind4 ,better still1 where terms are lacking in the organic series he does not hesitate to suppose them to re-establish continuity4 ,he introduces intermediary 8fictitious organisms0 hypotheses which some day perhaps palontology will turn into realities4 ,by means of this method1 not only we shall know a far greater number of cases1 but1 what is of more importance1 we shall know each one among them better1 8as an inevitable consequence of their being drawn nearer together40 ,we assume1 it is true1 that all these various cases present a fundamental similarity accompanied by gradual modifications1 which always follow a regular course4 ,but this hypothesis as we have seen1 is implied in the very definition of general biology4 ,the comparative method will then apply successively to the different parts of an organism1 to the different ages of the same organism1 and to the different organisms in the animal and vegetable series4 ,it will even apply to embryonic life1 ,comte clearly formulates von ,baer's law1 while making indispensable reservations4 ,the primitive state of the highest organism1 he says1 must represent1 from the anatomical and physiological point of view1 the essential characteristics of the complete state which belongs to the more inferior organism1 and so on successively 8without our being able to find again the exact analogy of each of the principal terms of the inferior organic series in the sole analysis of the various phases of development of each superior organism40 ,this comparison1 so to speak1 allows us to realise in the same individual the growing complication of organs and of functions which characterises the whole biological hierarchy4 ,thus it is particularly 8luminous40#afd ,von ,baer's book had appeared in ,german in #ahbg4 ,had ,comte known it1 it is most probable that1 according to his habit1 he would have quoted it4 ,,iv4 ,in order to consider organisms in the regular sequence which allows of comparison1 we must first have established the order in which they should be arranged4 ,but1 conversely1 to establish this order1 a knowledge of anatomy and physiology is indispensable4 ,so between these two sciences on the one hand and 8biotaxy0 on the other there is a strict solidarity4 ,the problem of classification is thus an essential part of general biology4 ,in the natural classification sought after by science1 the position assigned to each organism would suffice to define at once the whole of its anatomical and physiological nature1 in relation to the organisms which precede and to those which follow4#afe ,any natural classification cannot1 however1 be anything but imperfect4 ,accustomed as we are to artificial classifications1 which admit of absolute and immediate perfection1 we are surprised that the same should not be the case in natural classification4 ,but1 if the latter is a real science1 we must own that1 here as elsewhere1 we can only reach more or less distant approximations4 ,the co-ordination of living species is a problem like the static or dynamic analysis of a determined organism4 ,like this analysis1 it only allows of solutions which are approached rather than realised4#aff ,how1 in the first place1 must we understand species8 ,between ,cuvier and ,lamarck1 ,comte sides with ,cuvier1 with this reservation1 however1 that 8our ideas upon this question of capital importance are not yet properly fixed40 ,two reasons especially incline him to admit the fixity of of species4 ,lamarck's theory is not sufficiently proved3 we nowhere see that the milieu exercises the almost boundless influence upon organisms which is attributed to it by ,lamarck4 ,undoubtedly1 within certain limits1 the exercise induced by external circumstances tends to modify the primitive organisation4 ,but this action of the milieu and this aptitude of the organism are certainly very limited4 ,on the other hand1 if we have a choice between the two hypotheses1 the interest of science would prompt us to use this liberty in favour of ,cuvier4 ,the fixity of species guarantees that the series of organisms will always be composed of terms which are clearly distinct1 separated by insuperable intervals4 ,this 8increases the degree of rational perfection of which the final establishment of this hierarchy is capable40#afg ,it is then under the influence of a purely formal motive that ,comte's preference is here decided4 ,for he felt the strength and the import of ,lamarck's labours4 ,of the two celebrated antagonists1 he said1 ,lamarck was unquestionably the one 8who manifested the clearest and deepest sense of the true organic hierarchy40#afh ,comte has even dealt with certain objections which do not go against ,lamarck4 ,thus1 we might think at first that1 in his hypothesis1 there is no real zoological series1 since animal organisms would be essentially identical1 their differences being henceforth attributed to the diverse and unequally prolonged influence of the external conditions4 ,but1 on looking into it more closely1 we see1 on the contrary1 that this hypothesis only presents the series in a new aspect which would even render its existence still more evident4 ,for the whole of the zoological series would then become1 in fact as well as ideally1 altogether analogous to the whole of the individual development1 confined at least to its ascending period4 ,it would then be conceived as continuous4 8,the progressive advance of the animal organism1 which for us is only a convenient abstraction1 would be converted into a natural law40#afi ,for the logical perfection of science1 ,comte prefers to regard species as fixed in the absence of contrary proofs4 ,none the less ,lamarck has stated a problem of the highest interest4 ,comte points out its importance4 8,the rational theory of the necessary action of the various milieux on the different organisms has still almost entirely to be formulated4 ,such an order of research1 although greatly neglected1 constitutes one of the finest subjects which the present condition of biology can present40 ,by this means1 he adds1 we might obtain a theory for the perfecting of living species even including mankind4#agj ,v4 ,comte's anatomical and physiological philosophy is naturally allied to the science of his time4 ,it is especially connected with the labours of ,bichat and of de ,blainville4 ,here again he endeavours to state the problems in the most general form possible4 ,anatomy should begin by the study of the tissues1 to ascend afterwards to the association of several tissues1 that is to say1 to the organs1 and to the associations of several organs1 that is to say1 to systems4 ,but analysis must not be concerned with the tissue itself4 ,to attempt the passage from this notion to that of the molecule1 is to allow the organic to enter into the inorganic philosophy4 ,in biology1 the tissue corresponds to what the molecule is in physics4 ,such1 at least1 is the doctrine of the ,cours de philosophie positive4 ,later on1 instructed by ,schwann's works1 ,comte admits in the ,politique positive that the anatomical element is the cell4 ,be it tissue or cell1 there must be a fundamental anatomical element4 ,the simultaneous existence of several elements independent of one another would greatly mar 8the admirable unity of the organic world10 and consequently the perfection of biological science4 ,life is always essentially the same4 ,to this dynamic consideration1 there must correspond1 in the static order1 that of a common basis invariable in its primordial organisation1 successively producing1 by deeper and deeper modifications1 the various special anatomical elements4 ,similarly1 physiology will not be entirely organised until it studies functions 7at least the organic functions71 throughout the whole chain of living beings1 from the vegetable kingdom up to man4 ,this conception of a general physiology leads ,comte to dwell1 as ,claude ,bernard will later on1 upon the phenomena of life which are common to plants and to animals4 ,some are better studied in plants and others in animals4 ,but1 whether it be animal or vegetable every organism always presents two fundamental functions3 #a4 the absorption of nutritious materials borrowed from the milieu 7the assimilation of these materials and finally nutrition72 #b4 the rejection of unassimilated materials4 ,however1 plants are the only organised beings which live directly upon the inorganic milieu4#aga ,comte was ignorant of the physiology of fungi4 ,comte unreservedly adopts the distinction established by ,bichat between the functions of organic life and those of animal life4 ,in the first place he concludes from this1 in virtue of the correlation of the dynamic to the static point of view1 that distinct tissues correspond to these distinct functions4 ,then1 he goes more deeply into the difference between the two kinds of functions4 ,strictly speaking1 the phenomena of organic life only constitute a special order of composition and of decomposition4 ,they come very near to chemistry1 and may serve as a transition between the inorganic world and the world of life4#agb ,on the contrary1 the phenomena of animal life 7irritability1 sensibility71 offer no analogy with the phenomena of the inorganic world4 ,we might almost believe1 according to ,comte1 that the separation is established not between the chemical and biological phenomena1 but between organic and animal life1 the phenomena of the former reducing themselves to physico-chemical phenomena1 and those of the latter presenting entirely different characteristics4 ,such is not1 however1 ,comte's thought4 ,undoubtedly1 considered one by one1 the phenomena of organic life 7absorption1 circulation1 exhalation1 etc47 are indeed physico-chemical phenomena4 ,but what renders their biological character irreducible is that it is impossible to consider them separately3 in order to understand them we must first look at them from the point of view of the whole1 and appeal to the organic consensus1 in a word1 to what ,claude ,bernard1 will call l'ide directrice4 ,in the study of organic functions we shall begin by the lower extremity in the series of living beings1 that is to say by the most rudimentary forms of the vegetable kingdom1 for it is here that we shall grasp the phenomena in their simplest form4 ,then we shall follow their growing complexity4 ,for the animal functions1 on the contrary1 it is expedient to begin by man1 8the only being in which such an order of phenomena is ever immediately intelligible40 ,from this point of view man is pre-eminently the biological unity4 ,as soon as it is a question of the characteristics of animality1 we must begin with man and see how they descend by degrees1 rather than start from the sponge1 and look for their mode of development4 ,man's animal life helps us to understand that of the sponge2 but the reverse is not true4#agc ,moreover1 the phenomena of organic life1 being the most general1 are also the most fundamental4 ,the functions of animal life are first useful for the needs of organic life1 by perfecting it4 ,it is in man alone that the vegetative life is subordinate to the life of relation3 and even for that he must have reached a high degree of civilisation4#agd ,,vi4 ,it is not surprising that biology1 even more than physics and chemistry1 preserves the metaphysical spirit4 ,such1 for instance1 is the hypothesis of spontaneous generation4 ,positive philosophy recognizes that each living being always emanates from another similar being4 ,this is not established a priori1 but is the result of an 8immense induction40#age ,omne vivum ex vivo4 ,efforts to explain how the generating tissue should itself be formed by kinds of organic monads1 7an allusion to certain theories arising out of ,schelling's philosophy7 can only fail4 ,we should never know how to connect the organic with the inorganic world except through the fundamental laws belonging to the general phenomena which are common to them both4 ,positive speculations in anatomy and in physiology form a limited system1 within which we must establish the most perfect unity1 but which must ever remain separated from the whole of inorganic theories4#agf ,we see clearly1 it is true1 that there is no matter which is of itself living4 ,life is not peculiar to certain substances which are organised in a certain manner4 ,it never belongs to them for more than a time3 every organism of which the molecules are not renewed is dissolved4 ,but 8we can no more explain this instability than this speciality40#agg ,in the same way we see that in living bodies the nutritive functions are the basis of the others2 but there is no contradiction in 8dreaming0 of thought and sociability in beings whose substance would remain unalterable4 ,from this point of view spiritualism is not less admissible than materialism1 in so much as death does not seem to be a necessary consequence of life4 ,this again is an idea which is common to ,descartes and to ,comte4 ,they both conceive an organism in which the play of functions should not cease of itself4 ,the theory of death1 says ,comte1 although it is founded upon that of life1 is entirely distinct from it4#agh ,if biology still often hesitates in the statement of its problems and in the choice of its hypotheses1 it is in a great measure due to the two opposite tendencies between which it oscillated in the last century4 ,on the one hand1 ,boerhaave1 and the school of physiology which is more or less directly connected with ,descartes1 sought a mechanical explanation of biological phenomena1 and tended to reduce biology to physics and chemistry4 ,on the other hand1 ,stahl in ,germany1 and the vitalist school of ,montpellier in ,france1 appealed to metaphysical principles and to unverifiable hypotheses4 ,being thus swayed from one extremity to another1 biology only escaped the 8oppression0 of the inorganic sciences to involve itself in conceptions which were scarcely scientific4#agi ,it is only at the end of the ,,xviii4 ,century1 with ,haller1 ,gall and ,bichat1 that it finds its equilibrium1 takes possession of its method1 and at last enters into its positive phase4 ,by its lower extremity it is contiguous to inorganic science 7the physico-chemical phenomena of vegetative life74 ,by its higher extremity1 7intellectual functions71 it reaches to the final science1 or sociology4 ,but the adherence is far from being as close in one case as in the other4 ,at the moment when we pass from the inorganic world to the world of living beings1 according to positive philosophy1 there is a sudden 8enrichment of the real40 ,the transition is very marked4 ,the domain of biology is not so sharply separated from that of sociology4 ,for the higher biological functions1 the intellectual functions1 cannot be analysed from the point of view of the individual1 at least in man1 but only from the point of view of the species4 ,we must then1 while preserving the distinction between the two sciences1 admit a kind of inter-relation between them4 ,undoubtedly sociology could not be founded so long as biology had not made decisive progress4 ,but1 conversely1 sociology once founded alone completes the positive study of the highest biological functions4 ,certainly1 biology has not been less transformed than chemistry during the last sixty years1 and the state in which we see it to-day differs singularly from that in which ,comte knew it4 ,it has been developed and differentiated far beyond what he could foresee4 ,none the less he conceived some of its principles with remarkable power4 ,he had a precise idea of that which could constitute a general biology that is1 a single physiology and anatomy for the whole of living beings4 ,he knew the fecundity of the comparative method1 and he pointed out its analogy with the method of analysis in mathematics4 ,finally1 although he refused to adopt the transformist hypothesis1 he had understood the importance of ,lamarck's work4 ,,footnotes3 #aed ,cours1 ,,vi1 #ggb4 #aee ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bhe-g4 #aef ,cours1 ,,iii1 #h-bci4 #aeg ,cours1 ,,iii1 #dij1 #eaj4 #aeh ,cours1 ,,iii1 #bbd-g4 #aei ,cours1 ,,iii1 #bga-b4 #afj ,cours1 ,,iii1 #bcg4 #afa ,cours1 ,,iii1 #cbf sq4 #afb ,cours1 ,,iii4 #bei-fe4 #afc ,cours1 ,,iii4 #bhd-e4 #afd ,cours1 ,,iii4 #bhb-edf4 #afe ,cours1 ,,iii4 #dcg4 #aff ,cours1 ,,iii4 #def-g4 #afg ,cours1 ,,iii1 #deb4 #afh ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ddd4 #afi ,cours1 ,,iii1 #dda-b4 #agj ,cours1 ,,iii1 #deb-c4 #aga ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ebi-ca2 ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #eid4 #agb ,cours1 ,,iii1 #eec-f4 #agc ,cours1 ,,iii1 #chj-a4 #agd ,cours1 ,,iii1 #efb-c4 #age ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #eia4 #agf ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ehg4 #agg ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ehg2 ,cours1 ,,iii1 #dai-bj4 #agh ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ehi4 #agi ,cours1 ,,vi1 #gff-fh4 ,,chapter ,v ,,psychology ,psychology has no place in the classification of the fundamental sciences4 ,in it ,sociology immediately succeeds ,biology4 ,use has been made of this fact in order to reproach ,comte with having neglected an order of most important phenomena4 ,a grave objection has been raised against his doctrine in general4 ,what are we to think of a philosophy which1 deliberately1 omits a part1 and1 according to many philosophers1 the chief part of reality1 the world of consciousness1 the spiritual nature of man8 ,presented in this way1 the objection rests upon many confused notions about words and ideas4 ,what do we understand by psychology8 ,if the word means3 8the science of the soul reached through the introspective method10 we must own that ,comte does not admit the possibility of such a science4 ,but the same objection will also hold good against the majority of the psychologists of our time4 ,for they do not admit this possibility any more than ,comte1 and they have endeavoured to constitute the science of psychical facts by a different method than that of introspection1 pure and simple4 ,is psychology defined as 8the science which investigates the laws of feeling1 of the intellect and of moral phenomena in man and in animals80 ,then it is inaccurate to say that there is no psychology for ,comte4 ,on the contrary1 he thinks that positive psychology has just been founded by contemporary science of whose methods he approves4 ,if he did not use the word 8psychology10 he did so in order to avoid confusion4 ,at that moment the word was1 so to speak1 the property of the eclectic school4 ,by the 8psychological0 method1 everyone then understood that of ,jouffroy4 8,psychology0 was the science founded by ,cousin on the analysis of the ego4 ,comte who opposes these philosophers1 did not wish his theory of psychical phenomena1 which differs from theirs1 to be called by the same name4 ,it is this very precaution which has come to be no longer understood1 now that 8psychology0 does not designate the eclectic doctrine alone1 but any theory whatsoever concerning mental facts4 ,i4 ,comte finds the field occupied by three psychological schools1 and he combats all three1 for reasons of method and also of doctrine4 ,he looks to them to refute each other mutually1 and he will only attack what is common to them all4#ahj ,the representatives of these three schools are the ,ideologists1 with ,condillac1 from whom they proceed1 then the ,eclectics1 and finally the philosophers of the ,scottish school4 ,comte sometimes calls the eclectics the ,german school1 in opposition to the ideologists1 who are the ,french school1 and to the ,scottish school1 the first of the three in point of time4 ,but he always speaks sympathetically of the ,scottish school1 remembering that1 in part1 he owes to it his philosophical education4 ,he also esteems the sincerity and logical vigour of the ideologist ,destutt de ,tracy4 ,but1 after all1 we have here metaphysicians1 as are also the eclectics upon whom he passes a more severe judgment4 ,by 8metaphysicians10 he understands all those who study phenomena1 7in this case psychical phenomena71 by means of a method which is no longer theological1 but which has not yet become positive4 ,in this sense1 ,locke is a metaphysician1 as well as ,condillac and his other successors in the ,,xviii4 century1 ,hume alone excepted4 ,comte showers derision upon the method of internal observation which is practised by the 8psychologists40 ,the sharpness of his language is at least partially explained by the indignation with which ,cousin's 8charlatanisme0 inspired him4 ,this 8famous sophist10 in whom he recognises some of the gifts of an orator1 and in particular that of a mimic1 according to him1 exercises most unfavourable influence over the minds of men4#aha ,he turns them aside from the positive path1 which they are about to enter1 to bring them back to metaphysical dialectics1 or to hollow and sonorous rhetoric4 ,and1 to crown all1 this 8psychology0 claims to follow a scientific method6 the very method which has succeeded so well in the natural sciences6 ,it conceives the idea of practising internal observation1 as physics makes use of external observation4 ,but what is this internal observation8 ,how can the function of the same organ be to think1 and at the same time to observe that it thinks8 ,we conceive that man should be able to observe himself if it is a question of the passions which animate him4 ,no anatomical reason is opposed to this since the organs which are the seat of the passions1 are distinct from those which are used for the observing functions4 ,but as to observing the intellectual phenomena in the same way1 it is manifestly impossible4 ,in this case1 the organ which is observed being one with the observing organ1 how could the observation take place8 ,this objection does not only hold against the eclectics1 but also against the ,scottish school and the ideologists4 ,we already find it set forth in a letter from ,comte to ,valat on the #bdth1 of ,september1 #ahai1 when he was perhaps not yet acquainted with ,cousin4 8,with what should we observe the mind itself1 its operations1 its activity8 ,we cannot divide our mind1 that is to say1 our brain1 into two parts1 of which one acts while the other looks on1 to see how it goes to work4 ,the so-called observations made on the human mind1 considered in itself and a priori1 are pure illusions4 ,all that we call logic1 metaphysics1 ideology1 is an idle fancy and a dream1 when it is not an absurdity40#ahb ,this text1 to which we could add many similar ones1 allows us to rectify an erroneous1 although a frequent interpretation of ,comte's thought4 ,he does not deny that we are informed by consciousness of the existence of psychical phenomena4 ,on the contrary1 he expressly recognises the fact4 ,what he regards as impossible is to study the activity of thought by means of reflection1 that is to discover the 8intellectual laws0 by a method of internal observation4 ,in a word1 it is such works as those of ,condillac1 of the ideologists1 of ,reid1 etc41 which he condemns in their principle4 ,in these works the subject matter is the theory of knowledge1 and not that which is called to-day psychology proper4 ,if1 instead of seeking specially for the intellectual laws1 we wish to study psychical phenomena in general1 internal observation will become possible in a certain number of cases4 ,but it will not lead to the end which we wish to reach4 ,it excludes the use of the comparative method1 so fertile and so indispensable in the whole domain of biology4 ,it only studies man1 and even adult and healthy man4 ,what will it tell us of the child1 of the mentally deranged1 of the animal8#ahc ,will it1 like ,descartes1 go so far as to deny the existence of a psychical life in animals8 ,still this life cannot be studied by internal observation4 ,we must then have recourse to another method4 ,strictly speaking1 there are only two methods which are suitable for the science of those phenomena4 ,either we determine with all possible precision the various organic conditions on which they depend3 this is the object of what ,comte calls phrenological psychology4 ,or else we observe directly the products of the intellectual and moral activity1 and this study then belongs to sociology4 ,but1 if by this supposed psychological1 method we set aside the consideration of the agent1 that is to say of the organ1 and that of the action1 that is to say of the productions of the human faculties1 what can remain 8unless an unintelligible logomachy10 or verbal entities which are substituted to real phenomena8 ,here then is the study of the most difficult and most complex functions suspended1 as it were1 in the air1 without any point at which it touches the simpler and more perfect sciences1 8over which1 on the contrary1 it is claimed that it should reign majestically40 ,nothing is more opposed to the general order of nature1 in which we always see the more complex and higher phenomena subordinated1 so far as the conditions of their existence are concerned1 to the more simple and commoner ones4 ,as the biological depend upon the inorganic phenomena1 just as1 within biology1 the phenomena of animal life are subordinated to those of organic life1 so the intellectual and moral phenomena depend upon the other biological functions4 ,beyond their own particular laws1 the laws of all the subjacent orders of phenomena also govern them4 ,can we study them as if all these laws did not exist8 ,let the metaphysician be free to do so4 ,the scientific man who follows the positive method will proceed on other lines4 ,a defective method could lead but to false results4 ,notwithstanding the differences in their doctrines1 ideologists and psychologists have agreed to place the intellectual functions in the front rank1 and to thrust the affective functions further back4 ,the mind has become the almost exclusive subject of their speculations4 ,look at the titles of their great works since ,locke's 8,essay on the ,human ,understanding--,principles of ,human ,knowledge--,on the origin of our ,ideas--,on ,sensations--,ideology1 etc40 ,the various affective faculties have been left comparatively in the shade4 ,now1 it is the contrary which should have been done4 ,experience shows that the affections1 the passions1 the inclinations1 play by far the most important part in the life of animals and even of man4 ,far from being the result of intelligence their 8spontaneous and independent0 impulse is indispensable for the first awakening1 and afterwards for the development1 of the various intellectual faculties4 8,against all evidence man has been represented as essentially reasoning1 as being continually performing unaware a multitude of imperceptible calculations with scarcely any spontaneity1 even from tenderest childhood40#ahd ,had the study of the psychical functions been made upon animals at the same time as upon man1 this error would not have lasted long4 ,but philosophers were maintained in it1 on the contrary1 by metaphysical and even theological preoccupations4 ,the science of mental functions had to establish a difference1 not only of degree but of kind between man and animals4 ,it was further required1 by reason of another necessity closely allied to the former1 that the soul should be considered as being immortal4 ,and it was consequently necessary that the 8ego0 should present metaphysical characteristics of unity1 of simplicity and of identity4 ,now1 it is by thought that man is most distinguished from animals4 ,it is therefore from thought that the characteristics attributed to the soul or to the 8ego0 have been borrowed4 ,but in fact the 8ego0 is not the absolute unity which the eclectic psychologists say that it is4 ,it represents the feeling which the superior living being has1 at every moment of the 8sympathies0 and the 8synergies0 which take place within the organism4 ,it is the conscious expression of what the ,french call to-day 8cnesthsie40 ,far from being directly perceived as ,cousin asserts1 it is the indirect product of a quantity of sensations and sentiments1 of which the majority are not perceived in the normal state4#ahe ,it is especially by pathological facts1 7diseases of the personality1 double consciousness1 lunacy1 etc471 that the attention of the scientific man is drawn to this very complex phenomenon4 ,it is1 moreover1 impossible to regard the sentiment of the 8ego0 as belonging exclusively to man4 ,everything leads us to believe that it also exists in the other higher animals4 ,in any case there is no metaphysical doctrine to be founded upon this exceedingly complex and very unstable sentiment4 ,comte is here speaking as the successor of ,hume and of ,cabanis4 ,in the clearest manner he defines his opposition to ,cousin's doctrine4 ,the latter draws the whole of philosophy from the analysis of the 8ego10 ,comte draws nothing from it4 ,he does not1 however1 stop to show the superiority of the positive method over theological or metaphysical method in this matter4 ,of what use would it be8 ,the progress of science1 in the end1 gets the better of methods which have become antiquated and barren4 ,metaphysicians have already passed from the state of 8domination0 to that of 8protestation40#ahf ,and when the positive method gets a footing in an order of phenomena1 there is no instance in which1 sooner or later1 it has not asserted its mastery over it4 ,,ii4 ,the psychology of ,comte is connected with that of ,cabanis and of ,gall1 without1 however1 any actual confusion with them4 ,he praises ,cabanis for having been one of the first to form a positive conception of intellectual and moral phenomena4#ahg ,cabanis set himself to show that the phenomena so numerous and so varied which take place in the being who lives and feels1 constantly act and react upon each other4 ,the psychical phenomena do not escape this law4 ,at every moment1 through the medium of the nervous system1 they are subject to the influence of the state of the whole body1 and they make the body feel their own influence4 ,cabanis gives a great number of proofs of this1 borrowed from the action of sex1 of age1 of temperament1 of illness1 etc4 ,moreover1 the relation of psychical phenomena to the brain is identical with that which exists between any function whatever and its organ1 for instance1 between digestion and the stomach4 ,according to ,cabanis we are not necessarily materialists because we refuse to explain the functions of feeling1 and the intellectual functions by means of a special principle4 ,first causes always escape us4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 the scientific man confines himself to the observation of phenomena and to the search after their laws4 ,on the other hand1 if psychology claimed to start from the analysis of the 8ego10 it would leave aside many phenomena with which our consciousness does not acquaint us1 and which are psychical nevertheless4 ,this is a fruitful remark1 which will be taken up again by ,maine de ,biran1 and which psychologists in our own time have turned to great account4 ,cabanis conceived psychical facts in a positive manner1 but he did not attempt to construct their science4 ,in ,comte's opinion it is ,gall who is the real founder of positive psychology4 ,whatever may be the value of his localisations--,comte does not think it an enduring one1--to ,gall at least belongs the merit of having set the problem as it should be set1 and of presenting a precise solution of it4 ,moreover ,gall did not confine himself to localising the different faculties in different parts of the brain4 ,his doctrine proper is preceded by an excellent criticism directed against the psychology usually received in the ,,xviii4 century4 ,in order to combat ,condillac1 ,helvetius and the ideologists1 ,gall takes his stand upon experience1 that is to say upon mental physiology and pathology1 and also upon the observation of animals4 ,as a fact1 each individual comes into the world with tendencies1 with predispositions1 with innate faculties4 ,the supposed natural equality of all men is an ill-founded abstraction1 since their propensities and their qualities often differ very greatly4 ,the paradox of ,helvetius who attributes the moral and intellectual inequality of men to the all powerful influence of education and of circumstances1 cannot be upheld4 ,we cannot1 as we will1 make just minds and upright souls4 ,variety of organs entails diversity of functions2 the difference between men and animals1 as that of men among themselves1 is therefore due to anatomical and and physiological differences4 ,condillac's absolute sensualism is thus refuted by facts4 ,moreover1 if the science of psychology does not advance it is because distinctions between the faculties of the soul1 7memory1 imagination1 judgment1 etc47 have been arbitrarily established1 from a metaphysical and logical point of view1 which does not correspond to the real speciality of the functions4 ,gall lays down the following principle as the ultimate conclusion of experience1 and the fundamental basis of his doctrine of the functions of the brain3#ahh ,the dispositions of the individual soul and mind are innate and their manifestation depends upon the organisation4 ,we must not see in this a return to the a priori method4 ,gall guards against reverting to the innateness of ,descartes and ,leibnitz4 ,he means to speak simply of dispositions1 or tendencies1 or 8faculties10 for instance1 the faculty of love1 the feeling of the just and of the unjust1 ambition1 the faculty of learning languages1 that of comparing several judgments or ideas1 of deducing consequences from them1 etc4 8,we confine ourselves10 says ,gall1 8to observation40 ,we only consider the faculties of the soul in so far as they become phenomena for us by means of the material organs4 ,we deny and affirm nothing except that which can be brought under judgment by experience4 ,comte assents to all this4 ,with ,gall he condemns the 8childish dreams0 of ,condillac and of his successors about transformed sensations#ahi2 with him he admits the speciality of the psychical functions1 corresponding to the speciality of the cerebral organs4 ,but he only borrows ,gall's principle4 ,he has the strongest objections even to ,gall's psychology4 ,undoubtedly at the time when ,gall lived1 no one could have done better1 and his effort deserves to be admired4 ,but his errors1 although they were inevitable1 are errors none the less4 ,in the first place ,gall was wrong in isolating the nervous system too much from the brain1 which is in fact a prolongation of this system1 as is proved by comparative anatomy4#aij ,gall considered the systems of automatic life1 of voluntary motion1 and of the senses1 as entirely distinct from one another4 ,he only included in the brain those nervous organs1 which1 at any rate in the most perfect animals1 are the special organs of consciousness1 of the instinctive aptitudes1 of the inclinations1 and of the faculties of the mind and soul4 ,to this thesis ,comte opposes the facts assembled by ,cabanis1 and the solidarity of all the elements in the living being4 ,the brain can neither be isolated from the rest of the nervous system1 nor the nervous system from the rest of the organism4 ,again1 ,gall multiplies the faculties in an arbitrary manner4 ,he had established #bg of them4 ,spurzheim carried this number to #ce1 and others have further increased it4 ,every phrenologist will soon create a function1 and its organ1 whenever it may seem opportune to him1 with as much facility as ideologists and psychologists construct entities4#aia ,these creations are nearly always extremely clumsy4 ,thus an innate 8mathematical aptitude0 has been established4 ,why not also a chemical1 an anatomical aptitude1 etc48 ,and this mathematical aptitude is manifested by the facility for executing calculations4 ,but the mathematical mind1 far from being an isolated and special aptitude1 presents all the varieties which the human mind can offer by the different combinations of really elementary faculties4 ,for instance1 some great geometers have especially excelled by the sagacity of their inventions1 others by the extent of their combinations1 others again by the genius of language and the institution of signs and so on4 ,from this point of view1 well drawn up monographies of great scientific men and great artists would be extremely precious for the progress of psychology4 ,in conclusion1 8fundamental phrenological analysis0 must be reconstructed4 ,from ,gall1 ,comte only preserves 8the impulsion40 ,the greater part of the localisations which ,gall thought right to establish must be abandoned4 ,but he was right in searching for them1 for thus he showed science the path to be followed4 ,even an erroneous hypothesis on positive lines is always a service rendered in the beginnings of a science4 ,but of ,gall's doctrine only two principles henceforth indisputable subsist4 #ast1 the innateness of the various fundamental dispositions1 be they affective or intellectual2 #bnd1 the plurality of faculties distinct and independent of one another1 8although effective actions usually demand their more or less complex co-operation40 ,these two principles are moreover the two correlative and interdependent aspects of the same conception1 which is in accordance with what 8common sense0 has always thought of human nature4 ,it corresponds to the division of the brain1 from the anatomical point of view into a certain number of partial organs1 at once independent and depending upon one another4 ,to establish and to demonstrate the detail of this correspondence is the object of 8phrenological physiology40 ,,iii4 ,comte took up the attempt where ,gall had failed4 ,but his doctrine passed through two successive forms4 ,he himself calls attention to the importance and to the causes of this change4 ,in #ahcg1 when he was writing the third volume of the ,cours de philosophie positive1 he still closely followed not only ,gall's general conception1 but also his anatomical and physiological hypotheses4 ,he then thought that 8the doctrine deduced by ,gall from the method represents the true moral and intellectual nature of man and animals with admirable fidelity40 ,he approved of the division of the faculties into the affective and the intellectual1 the organs of the former occupying the whole of the posterior and middle regions of the brain1 and the organs of the others occupying only the anterior region of the brain1 that is to say1 a quarter or a sixth of the cephalic mass1 8which at once re-establishes the pre-eminence of the affective faculties upon a scientific basis40 ,he even accepted the sub-division of these faculties into inclinations and feelings1 and that of the intellectual faculties into perceptive faculties and reflective faculties4 ,at this moment1 his objections were especially directed against the excessive multiplication of the faculties1 and upon the insufficiency of the anatomy of the brain which accompanied the distinction of so many faculties4 ,he thought the anatomists were right in protesting against this method of the phrenologists who1 from the supposed existence of an irreducible faculty1 assume the existence of a corresponding organ in the brain4 ,but anatomy cannot thus be treated a priori4 ,as the aim of every biological theory is to establish an exact harmony between anatomical analysis and physiological analysis1 this evidently supposes that they are not exactly modelled upon one another1 and that each one of them has been worked out in a distinct manner4 ,we must then take up the analysis of the cerebral apparatus again1 provisionally setting aside all idea of function1 or at least only making use of it as an auxiliary in anatomical research4#aib ,in #ahea1 in the first volume of the ,politique positive1 ,comte's attitude is quite different4 ,in ,gall's psychology he no longer recognises anything but what is of historical interest4 ,his own conception of psychology is completely altered4 ,this great change has been determined by the foundation of sociology4 ,undoubtedly ,gall's merit remains very great1 for he rendered a service of the first order in daring to construct a positive theory of the intellectual and moral functions4 ,without this theory1 which at first he considered to be exact in its general lines1 ,comte could not have undertaken to apply the positive method to social facts1 nor consequently to found his philosophy4 ,so his gratitude to ,gall is almost as great as to ,condorcet1 8his spiritual father40 ,but once sociology is founded1 in looking back1 ,comte understands that ,gall's 8cerebral theory0 cannot be maintained4 ,it resembles a provisional bridge by means of which positive philosophy passed over the interval which separates biology proper from sociology4 ,hardly has it reached the other side when the bridge collapses4 ,it matters little3 it suffices that1 thanks to the bridge1 ,comte should have set foot upon the sociological ground4 ,he can now return in all security to the study of the mental functions4 8,when ,i had founded sociology10 he says1 8,i understood at last that ,gall's genius had been unable to construct a real physiology of the brain1 owing to the lack of a knowledge of the laws of collective evolution1 which alone must furnish at once its principle and its end4 ,from that time ,i felt that this task1 which before ,i expected biologists to accomplish1 belonged to the second part of my own philosophical career40#aic ,the psychology1 which1 in the ,cours de philosophie positive1 was essentially biological1 and ended simply in sociology1 becomes1 in the ,politique positive essentially sociological1 and is only secondarily biological4 ,from #ahdf ,comte became conscious of this new orientation of his thought1 and1 during the five years which follow1 he never ceases working at his 8cerebral table40 ,at first1 he no longer demands an anatomical study parallel to the analysis of the mental functions1 and independent of it4 ,he intends1 henceforth1 to determine these functions outside all anatomical research4 8,the logical principle of this construction consists1 for me1 in its subjective institution40 ,he systematically subordinates anatomy to physiology1 and he henceforth conceives the determination of the cerebral organs as the complement1 and even as the result1 of the positive study of the intellectual and moral functions4 ,at bottom1 8this subject has never allowed of any other method but the subjective1 well or ill employed40 ,it has been equally used by the disciples of ,gall and by his adversaries4 ,what psychology has lacked up to the present is1 not exact localisations but a sufficiently deep analysis of intellectual and moral phenomena4 ,and as a matter of fact it was impossible to treat this problem well1 so long as we ignored the laws of sociology1 8which alone is capable of dealing with these noble functions40#aid ,thus1 in order to determine the elementary faculties1 those which are irreducible1 and which by their co-operation produce the complex phenomena which are apprehended by consciousness1 the method must be at once subjective and sociological4 ,for the subject which we must analyse is not the individual consciousness1 of which the study is too inaccessible1 and whose life is too short3 it is the universal subject1 humanity1 8the case of the species being alone sufficiently developed to characterise the various functions40 ,to this analysis1 as a system of control1 will be joined the observation of animals4 ,indeed1 all our innate dispositions belong also to the other superior animals4 ,if then the study of man should seem to establish elementary1 moral1 or even intellectual functions1 of which we see no trace in these animals1 by this alone we should consider that the analysis has been imperfect1 and that complex results have been considered as irreducible4 8,sociological inspiration controlled by zoological appreciation3 such is the general principle of the positive theory of the soul40#aie ,by this method ,comte obtains #ah irreducible faculties1 of which #aj are representative of the heart1 #e of the mind1 and #c of the character4 ,to each of these he assigns a special organ4 ,he places the organ of the heart in the posterior portion of the brain and in the cerebellum1 the organs of the mind in the anterior portion of the brain1 and those of character in the intermediary region4 ,anatomists are free to verify a posteriori the separation of the #ah elements which ,comte distinguished a priori in the cerebral apparatus4 ,the existence of these organs1 in any case1 appears to him to be sufficiently demonstrated1 and anatomical determination is not very important4 ,we might confine ourselves to the specification of the number and the situation of the organs1 which we have deduced from the number and relations of the elementary functions4 ,it would not be necessary for us to know their shape or their size4 ,the utility of cerebral localisations resembles that which geometers draw from curves for the better consideration of equations4#aif ,the organ is simply the static equivalent of the function of the soul4 ,it suffices for us to know its existence and its position so as to situate in it all the relations of the function itself1 so to speak4 ,it plays the part of a schematic drawing4 ,so1 the theory of the brain and of the soul is no longer 8simultaneous40 ,in fact1 the theory of the soul is first constructed by a subjective and independent method and without any consideration of the disposition of the cerebral apparatus4 ,this disposition is deduced1 afterwards1 from the theory of the soul1 once it is established4 ,returning then to ,gall's psychology1 ,comte can explain its defects to himself4 ,gall had 8oscillated between subjective inspiration and objective tendencies10 without adopting a systematic plan4 ,there has not been any very great disadvantage in this empirical fluctuation in what concerns the theory of the affective functions4 ,without a doubt1 ,gall had established an ill-founded distinction between the inclinations and the feelings4 ,but he could not be mistaken concerning the fundamental inclinations of human nature4 ,in default of the true method1 he was supported on this point by common wisdom1 and by the observation of animals4 ,it is on the subject of the intellectual functions that he is entirely wrong1 because here this twofold help failed him1 and nothing1 in this case1 filled the place of the true method which was then unknown4 ,in order to discover the static and dynamic laws of the intellect1 it was necessary to abandon the biological point of view4 ,to ,gall's theory ,comte then substitutes a new classification of the intellectual functions4 ,he distinguishes between the faculties of conception and the faculties of expression4 ,he indicates the relations of the intellectual functions proper with the affective functions and the functions of motion4 ,he makes us apprehend the very intimate relations which connect desire and will4 ,finally1 to determine the fundamental intellectual functions1 he takes into account the historical evolution of the human species4 ,it does not enter into the purpose of this work to set forth ,comte's theory in detail1 and to examine the eighteen irreducible faculties of the cerebral table one by one4 ,but the systematic character of the doctrine does not prevent us from taking up a certain number of interesting and deep psychological views in it4 ,to limit ourselves to a few examples1 ,comte drew imitation near to habit1 and he brought habit itself back 8to the great cosmological law of persistence10 which1 in the vital order is modified by the intermittance of phenomena4#aig ,he remarked that attention is never produced without an affective phenomenon upon which it depends4#aih ,he also indicated the distinction between strong states and weak states1 and the 8reduction0 of images by actual perceptions4 8,if our images could offer as much intensity1 he says1 as our external sensations1 our mental state would not allow of any consistency4 ,the appreciation of what is without would be troubled by this conflict with what is within44440 ,hence a theory of hallucination and insanity4#aii ,the theory of perception which ,comte opposes to the abstract sensualism of the ideologists is allied to his general conception of the relations between the subject and the object4 ,our internal operations are never anything but the direct or indirect prolongation of our external impressions4 ,but 8reciprocally1 the latter are always complicated by the others1 even in the most elementary cases40 ,the sensation1 which appears simple1 is already the result of a very complex combination4#bjj ,for no sensations are really perceived except after reiterated impressions4 ,if the mind is ever passive1 it can only be the first time4 ,for the second1 it is already prepared by the preceding one1 combined with the whole of previous acquisitions4 ,and ,comte insists upon 8the habitual participation of reasoning in the operations which are attributed to sensation alone40 ,the activity belonging to the mind enters into all its actions1 even the smallest of them4 ,mental pathology scarcely exists1 owing to the lack of the scientific spirit among specialists for the diseases of the mind4 ,still if ,broussais' principle be true1 that is to say1 if morbid phenomena are produced according to the same laws which govern normal phenomena1 what advantage might not scientific men derive from the observation of mental diseases8 ,they are privileged cases which nature supplies for them1 real experiments1 where that which is inseparable in the normal state appears disassociated4 ,what light might be thrown by this means upon many physiological and even anatomical questions1 in particular in what concerns the sentiment of the ego 7diseases of personality1 aboulia1 etc471 and the faculties of expression1 isolated from the faculties of conception 7diseases of speech74 ,animal psychology would not be less instructive4 ,all the affective and intellectual faculties are common to men and higher animals1 save perhaps the highest intellectual aptitudes4 ,even this exception is a doubtful one1 if without prejudice we compare the actions of the highest animals with those of the least developed savages4 ,we should study the habits and the mind of wild animals4 ,we should observe the changes which are produced in them by domestication4 ,here again almost everything has to be done afresh4#bja ,,iv4 ,in spite of whatever may have been said1 ,comte then has a psychology4 ,and1 what is more1 this psychology is in a sense not far removed from that of the ,scottish school and of the ,eclectics although he so much fought against their methods4 ,the points of contact are numerous and important4 ,in both doctrines the psychical phenomena are referred to faculties and these are represented as 8dispositions10 innate 8properties40 ,in both1 the essential psychological problem appears to be the determination of the number and the relations of these faculties1 whose action variously combined produces psychical phenomena3 before everything1 it is a question of not considering as an elementary faculty that which as a matter of fact results from the combination of several faculties1 or inversely4 ,finally in both1 it is claimed to establish this doctrine of the innate faculties upon the observation of human nature4 ,comte himself had seen that1 at any rate in the case of ,condillac's criticism1 he was in accordance with the eclectics4 ,on this point he only refused to grant them originality4 ,according to him they merely popularised1 in obscure and emphatic declamations1 what physiologists like ,charles ,bonnet1 ,cabanis1 and chiefly ,gall and ,spurzheim had long before stated on this subject in a far clearer and especially in a far more exact manner4 ,for his part ,garnier1 the author of the ,trait des ,facults de l'me had clearly seen the relations of eclecticism to ,gall's doctrine1 and had studied them in a work entitled ,de la ,phrnologie et de la ,psychologie compares which appeared in #ahci4 ,why then does ,comte attack the eclectics with such persistence and such violence1 if1 indeed1 the results of his psychology are not very far removed from what they say8--,it is because in reality1 beneath the apparent resemblance of doctrine1 a difference of method as serious as can be conceived is concealed4 ,for ,cousin1 and especially for the ,cousin we know before #ahcj1 psychology is not an end in itself4 ,it is a means which he uses to rise to the study of being in itself and of the ,absolute4 ,the 8ego0 which he analyses is independent of the organism4 ,this is what ,comte condemns as a retrogression4 8,some men1 not recognizing the present and irrevocable direction of the human mind1 have endeavoured for ten years to transplant ,german metaphysics into our midst1 and to constitute1 under the name of psychology1 a so-called science entirely independent of physiology1 superior to it1 and to which should exclusively belong the study of moral phenomena40#bjb ,and this attempt at reaction takes place at the very moment when the works of ,cabanis and of ,gall have brought this study upon the positive path6 ,it is needless to say that1 in ,comte's system1 psychical phenomena are subordinated1 as far as their conditions of existence are concerned1 to all the orders of more general natural phenomena4 ,comte should then have followed ,cabanis and ,gall1 as a matter of course4 ,but he thought that to establish the science of the 8transcendent functions10 the biological point of view was insufficient4 ,in this case anatomical considerations are only a kind of reduplication and transcription of physiological considerations4 ,as ,maine de ,biran said1 in terms curiously like ,comte's1 8a distinction of places assigned to the exercise of each faculty must necessarily be itself referred to another pre-established division of the faculties4444 ,hypothesis thus grafted upon hypothesis of a different order would not much contribute to throw light upon the analysis of our intellectual functions40#bjc ,only1 instead of appealing1 like ,maine de ,biran1 to reflection1 ,comte rises from the biological to the sociological point of view ,he recognises that the subjective method alone is suitable for the science of psychical phenomena1 but1 in place of the metaphysical subjective method1 by means of which the 8ego0 is deluded into the belief that it analyses its operations1 and grasps its own activity1 he will make use of the positive subjective method4 ,the subject which he will analyse will be the human mind1 or better1 the human soul considered in its continuous evolution1 that is to say in its religions1 in its sciences1 in its philosophy1 in its language and in its art4 ,here is matter for a psychology which will no longer be chimerical1 but real1 which will be positive1 in a word1 like the biology upon which it depends and of which it is the fulfilment4 ,if we leave aside the conception of the 8faculties0 which ,comte accepted rather hastily at the hands of the ,scottish school and of ,gall1 and the 8cerebral table0 which he believed to be once for all constructed1 his psychology contained more than one important and fertile seed4 ,to the eclectic psychology1 which is not positive1 ,comte substituted two sciences which are such4 ,in the first place1 an experimental science of the psychical phenomena studied in their relation to their organic conditions3 it is the physiological psychology of which no one to-day questions the legitimacy4 ,then1 by the introduction of the sociological point of view1 ,comte opened the way to a whole series of studies which begin to be developed1 7social psychology1 ethnical psychology1 psychology of the masses1 etc74 ,it is often said that sociological laws have their foundation in psychological laws4 ,but the reverse is no less true4 ,the psychological laws1 at least the mental and moral laws1 are1 at the same time1 sociological laws1 since they are only revealed in the study of the intellectual history of the human species4 8,we must not explain humanity by man1 but man by humanity40 ,to the 8 0 of ancient psychology1 the positive method substitutes this precept3 8,to know yourself1 know history40 ,man only becomes conscious of himself1 when he becomes aware of his place in the evolution of ,humanity4 ,,footnotes3 #ahj ,correspondance de ,comte1 et de ,john ,stuart ,mill1 p4 #afb 7#bg fvrier #ahdc47 p4 #cfe 7#ba oct4 #ahdd74 #aha ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendix1 p4 #bah4 #ahb ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #hi-ia4 #ahc ,cours1 ,,iii4 #fad-af4 #ahd ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fah-ai4 #ahe ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fja-b2 #fba-bb4 #ahf ,cours1 ,,iii1 #faa4 #ahg ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #acd 7#h septembre #ahbd74 #ahh ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fca-b4--;,gall1 ,anatomie and physiologie du systme nerveux1 ,paris #ahaj1 ,,ii1 #f-g4 #ahi ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fbf-g4 #aij ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fff-h4 #aia ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fed-e4 #aib ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ae-bf4 #aic ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #gbi4 #aid ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #fga-b4 #aie ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #fgb-c4 #aif ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #gca-b4 #aig ,cours1 ,,iii1 #eif-h2 ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #eih-i4 #aih ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #gbg4 #aii ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #chc4 #bjj ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #gab-ad4 #bja ,cours1 ,,iii1 #ffj4 #bjb ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #bah4 #bjc ,maine de ,biran1 uvres indites 7d4 ,cousin71 ,,ii1 #ee-eh4 ,,book ,,iii ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,transition ,,from ,,animality ,,to ,,humanity4 ,,art ,,and ,,language ,of the philosophers who flourished before the rise of the positive doctrine1 the greater number assumed as a postulate in the comparative study of man and animals1 that there was between them a difference of nature1 and not merely one of degree4 ,whatever fundamental difference be attributed to reason1 language1 moral sense1 religion1 etc41 the 8human kingdom0 is conceived for the most part as superior to the animal kingdom and as clearly separated from it4 ,taking their stand upon an analysis of the present state of the human conscience1 those philosophers recognise an order of 8moral realities10 to which animals have no access4 ,thus they give to the science of ,man a privileged object which separates it from the group of the natural sciences4 ,the positive method admits neither this postulate1 nor the consequences which are drawn from it4 ,in general this method is characterised by the substitution of the objective to the anthropocentric point of view1 and also by the substitution of observation to imagination4 ,it does not suddenly change its orientation when it comes to the study of man4 ,the positive method is not therefore concerned with knowing what idea man forms of himself to-day and of his relations with other living beings4 ,into this idea enter elements of religious and metaphysical origin1 whose presence is explained by historical reasons4 ,the question is to observe the nature of man in his real relations with other beings4 ,man1 so considered1 at once takes his place again at the top of the zoological scale4 ,the problem will then be set in the following terms3 ,given that man is included in the animal series1 of which he is the highest term1 but still a term1 to account for the differences which to-day place him so high above the term immediately below him4 ,this is taking the very reverse attitude of nearly all the philosophers1 whose main difficulty is to give an account of the likenesses which exist between man and animals4 ,it is the position which ,darwin will take in his ,descent of ,man4 ,comte takes his stand upon two postulates4 ,the first affirms the fundamental identity of the essential functions in man and animals4 ,since the whole of the moral and intellectual functions constitutes the necessary complement of animal life properly so-called1 it would be difficult to conceive that all those functions which are fundamental should not1 by this very fact be 8common1 at various degrees1 to all the higher animals1 and perhaps even to the entire group of the vertebrata40#bjd ,the animal functions are as a blossoming out of organic life1 destined in the first place to make this life more perfect and more complex3 in the same way1 the intellectual and moral functions are1 originally1 as it were1 another blossoming out of animal life1 and must consequently be found1 at least as a possibility1 wherever animal life has reached a certain degree of development4 ,this postulate1 according to ,comte1 is sufficiently established by biology1 by means of the comparative method4 ,all the principal characteristics which pride and ignorance set up as absolute privileges of our species1 also appear1 more or less rudimentary1 in the majority of the higher animals4#bje ,the mistake was made because metaphysical ideology and psychology place intelligence foremost in the study of psychical functions4 ,intelligence indeed puts to-day an immense distance between man and animals4 ,but a more accurate psychology recognises that the most energetic1 the most 8fundamental0 of mental functions are the affective functions1 since1 in default of the impulse given by them1 intelligence itself would not be developed4 ,the analogy between man and the animals at once appears3 for the affective functions are common to them both4 ,it is the same with the intellectual functions1 when allowance is made for the development they have assumed in man4 ,in a word1 if the dynamical superiority of the human species over the other species is strong1 its statical superiority is weak4 ,the problem consists in finding how1 to such an apparently unimportant difference in the organs1 such a considerable difference in the functions corresponds4#bjf ,here comes in the second postulate3 8,the fundamental constitution of man is invariable40 ,evolution but not transformation3 this great principle1 transmitted by biology to sociology1 dominates the latter science entirely4 ,in the course of the long history which leads humanity from savage animality to positive civilisation1#bjg nothing absolutely new appears4 ,everything which manifests itself little by little1 pre-existed in the nature of man--in a potential state it is true2 and this state would perhaps never have ceased if a number of favourable conditions had not occurred together4 ,the mental functions1 which are indispensable to organic and to animal life properly so called1 quickly attained the degree of development without which the species would have disappeared4 ,on the contrary1 the highest 8fundamental dispositions0 of our nature remained latent for a long time1 and only manifested themselves by degrees4 ,but if their development has been slow1 it is1 in return1 continuous and indefinite4 ,and these dispositions tend to preponderate1 although the 8inversion0 of the primitive economy can never become complete4 ,humanity emerges progressively from animality4 ,the highest civilization is then1 at bottom1 entirely in conformity with nature3 for it is only the manifestation more and more marked of the most characteristic properties of our species4 ,in this sense1 our social solution must be understood 8as the extreme term of a progression continued uninterruptedly throughout the whole living kingdom from the most simple forms of vegetable life1 the predominance of the organic functions becoming less and less exclusive1 in order in the first place to make room for the predominance of the animal functions properly so called1 and finally for that of the intellectual and moral functions1 whose development is the very definition of humanity40#bjh ,thus1 the chain of being is uninterrupted4 ,but ,comte1 as we know1 did not accept ,lamarck's hypothesis4 ,he believed in the fixity of species4 ,undoubtedly he admits in a measure which science will some day fix1 acquisitions slowly incorporated into organisms by heredity4 ,but he does not think that they will go so far as to transform species4 ,the whole evolution of man must then be explained by its original constitution4 ,indeed1 ,comte here maintains1 as everywhere in nature1 the perfect correspondence between the statical and the dynamical point of view4 ,the case of man cannot be an exception to this encyclopdic law1 which is verified in all the orders of phenomena from the most simple to the most complex4 ,as the whole line of the curve corresponds to the equation1 so the whole development of humanity must correspond to the 8fundamental nature0 of man4 ,on this condition alone is sociology possible as a science4 ,now positive sociology exists3 therefore the postulate is justified4 ,,ii4 ,the theory of the relation between man and animals thus finds itself deduced from the general principles of positive philosophy4 ,but it can also be verified a posteriori1 through the criticism of the arguments of the adverse theory by means of observation and experience4 ,the first of these arguments and the one which in general makes the greatest impression1 contrasts the instinct of animals with the intelligence of man4 ,it represents instinct as blind and fatal1 and intelligence as free and progressive4 ,but this antithesis cannot withstand the examination of facts4 ,instinct is called too hastily a 8fatal tendency of animals to the mechanical execution of actions which are uniformly determined by corresponding circumstances1 and not requiring nor even admitting of any education properly so-called40 ,this fatal tendency does not exist4 ,it is a gratuitous supposition1 perhaps a remnant of the ,cartesian theory concerning the automatism of animals4 ,georges ,leroy1 in his charming ,lettres sur les animaux1 has shown that in the mammals and in the birds of our districts1 the fixity in the construction of habitations1 in the habits of hunting1 in the mode of migration1 etc41 only existed for naturalists who never left their study1 or for inattentive observers4#bji ,undoubtedly1 habits may become hereditary4 ,but here we only have a phenomenon common to men and animals1 and those habits are modified if the circumstances which have produced them come to change4 ,it is in this sense alone that we can admit ,m4 de ,blainville's formula3 8,l'instinct est la raison fixe1 la raison est l'instinct mobile40 ,we must especially understand that instinct is not opposed to intelligence4 ,what ought we really to indicate by instinct8 ,a spontaneous impulse in a direction determined1 independently of any foreign influence40 ,but in this sense1 the word applies to the activity of any faculty whatever1 to the intellectual faculties as well as to the others4 ,there is no contrast between instinct and intelligence4 ,we say of a child that he has the 8instinct0 of music1 of drawing1 of calculation1 etc4 ,in this sense man has certainly as many and more instincts than animals4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we call intelligence the faculty of modifying our conduct according to the circumstances of each case1 animals are1 like man1 more or less intelligent and reasonable4 ,otherwise they would be doomed to disappear very quickly4 ,but animals have no language6 ,another error in observation4 ,the higher animals have a certain degree of language corresponding to the nature and to the extent of their relations4 ,this language is no more fixed than the so-called instincts4 ,the language of each social species is characterised by an arrest of development precisely like the society which this species tended to found4 ,the limits of its progress1 beyond which indeed it does not go1 result from the whole of the obstacles which it encounters1 in consequence of the competition with the other species1 and particularly with the human species1 without naming those limits which the imperfection of organs may create4#baj ,many animals are capable of experiencing needs without regard to a useful purpose4 ,for instance1 they like to exercise their animal functions for the pleasure of doing so1 that is to say1 to play4 ,some among them experience sthetic impressions4 ,they are also1 without the slightest doubt1 capable of altruistic feelings4 ,sometimes these feelings show themselves in the shape of domestic affection1 and tend to make a solitary life unbearable to the individual4 ,family life then becomes permanent4 ,sometimes an animal devotes itself to the service of a superior race4 ,do we know to what lengths the progress of altruism would go in certain animal species1 if their intelligence could have been more developed1 and if their surroundings had allowed of their more extensive social progress8#baa ,finally1 animals even possess a rudiment of religion1 if by this we understand an endeavour to interpret the phenomena which strike them4 ,when sufficiently developed to manifest1 where there is sufficient leisure1 a certain speculative activity1 they reach spontaneously1 in the same way as we do ourselves1 a kind of low fetichism1 which consists in supposing that external bodies are animated by will and by passions4#bab 8,a child1 a savage1 a dog1 a monkey1 seeing a watch for the first time1 will see in it a kind of animal40 ,but ,comte at once adds that the chief difference between man and animals lies in the impossibility for the latter to emerge from the lowest degree of fetichism1 and to rise to a real religion4 ,no animal society 8combines sociability with intelligence sufficiently ever to constitute a religious association40#bac ,comte would probably have approved of ,m4 de4 ,quatrefages' definition in which he calls man a religious animal4 ,the decisive step was taken on the day when man's intellect passed from fetichism to astrolatry4#bad ,that 8great creation of the gods0 was the first trial in purely speculative activity made by his mind4 ,the whole subsequent development of humanity arose from this4 ,thus1 the arguments which claim to establish an insuperable distance between man and animals1 generally rest upon imperfectly observed facts4 ,on the contrary1 in animals1 we find the more or less visible rudiments of everything which has evolved so magnificently in humanity4 ,we cannot describe in detail how and why this species has become1 so to speak1 incomparable and incommensurable with the others4 ,it must have got the upperhand1 not in virtue of this and that particular advantage1 7although an important one71 such as the upright position or the possession of a hand1 but on account of the co-operation of many favourable conditions1 of which the totality allowed1 so to speak1 of an almost indefinite development4 ,from a certain moment1 there was a definite stoppage in the social evolution of the other species1 and the progress of the human species was decisive4 ,we cannot estimate the initial influence of the various conditions according to the present development of the several human faculties1 for this development is especially due to the social life of which those conditions allowed4 ,each superiority of man may have been very little defined originally4 ,time1 the action of the other higher functions1 exercise1 heredity have played their part here4 ,the 8human attributes0 must then have grown constantly1 ever consolidating the 8ascendency0 which they had determined4 ,at the same time the corresponding attributes must have diminished in the rival species1 as they were brought to a standstill in their development4 ,undoubtedly1 by degrees1 the interval has widened until it has become a gap so broad and so deep as to make it impossible to imagine how it could ever have been crossed4 ,but biology and sociology help us to judge better4 ,we must see this1 in some detail1 in connection with the important question of language4 ,,iii4 ,the theory of language1 during the eighteenth century1 had been one of the favourite subjects of philosophical speculation2 in general1 it had proceeded in this matter1 by way of abstract and logical analysis4 ,it chiefly saw in language a product of the intellectual faculties of man4 ,but1 already1 from the second half of the century1 this conception had been attacked in ,germany by the school which began the reaction against the 8philosophers10 and in which the most illustrious name is that of ,herder4 ,in ,france the traditionalist school felt that here one of the weak points of the philosophy of the eighteenth century was being touched4 ,it insisted upon the characters of language which this philosophy did not explain4 ,comte knew the works of this school1 and1 in particular1 those of ,m4 de ,bonald1 whom he calls an 8energetic thinker40#bae ,but his method differs from theirs1 and he only agrees with them in the critical part of their doctrine4 ,if the theory of language1 says ,comte1 is encumbered with insoluble questions1 the fault lies in the method made use of by the metaphysicians4 ,they have only considered man's language1 in its state of highest complication4 ,they have attributed excessive importance to the signs of articulate human language1 they have exaggerated the part played by reflection1 and misunderstood that of spontaneity4 ,condillac especially and his school attributed far too much importance to the 8disponibilit0 of signs4#baf ,the scientific method will not isolate humanity from the other species which it dominates4 ,it will connect the positive study of language with biology and with sociology3 with biology more particularly for the question of origin2 with sociology in so far as the development of language depends upon the reaction of social life upon domestic life4 ,the starting-point of the theory is a fact of experience4 ,every strong emotion is accompanied by the impulse to manifest it1 and this expression reacts upon the emotion itself4 ,many species exhibit this4#bag ,singing and mimicking1 or rather cries and gestures1 are often used by them1 as by man1 not only to relieve the passions1 but to excite them more4 ,for instance1 anger in carnivorous animals grows to exasperation1 through the external signs which the animal gives of it4 ,comte is in accordance with the observations of ,bell and of ,gratiolet4 ,the movements which co-operate in expression1 he says1 coincide in general with those which are made use of in action4 ,moreover1 in the human species1 for the most part1 the individual expresses his affections in order to satisfy them better1 by inducing his fellow-creatures to second him4 ,it is an appeal to sympathy4 ,if then the expression results from the feeling1 it tends1 conversely to develop and to consolidate it4 ,the origin of language is thus affective1 that is to say sthetic1 since 8we only express ourselves after having felt strongly40 ,language therefore translates feelings before thoughts1 and this is what the followers of the ideologist theory did not see4 ,even to-day1 in our most developed language1 we can still trace this origin4 ,it reveals itself by the musical accent of the slightest speech4 ,expression is always inspired and maintained by some affection1 even in cases where it is apparently limited to a simple scientific or technical exposition4 ,the affective source of language1 dissimulated as it is by the intellectual operations of which it is the instrument1 reveals itself in the inflexions of the voice4 ,language is made up of signs4 ,according to what has just been said1 natural signs are spontaneously produced by the play of the emotions4 ,as a voluntary manifestation language is always artificial4 ,the involuntary signs have been gradually divided into their component parts and simplified1 while remaining intelligible4 ,all artificial signs1 says ,comte1 even in our species1 spring from a voluntary 8imitation0 of the natural signs which are spontaneously produced4 ,in this way both the formation and the interpretation of these signs are explained4#bah ,hobbes used to define a sign as a constant relation between two phenomena1 seen by the subject4 ,the two phenomena are here a state of consciousness and a motion4 ,sometimes the state of consciousness determines the motion1 sometimes the motion causes the reappearance of the state of consciousness4 ,the institution of a system of signs is a means of 8connecting the within with the without40 ,language is thus for man a means of making the series of his intellectual states participate in the regularity which characterises external order4 ,the logical function of language therefore springs from its very essence in which the phenomena of the objective world and the phenomena which belong to the feeling and thinking subject are joined4 ,it is equivalent to a system for rendering the mental life objective4#bai ,being thus made objective1 these phenomena can henceforth be preserved and communicated1 without man or the animals having had each an end in view1 since the institution of the first signs is involuntary1 and arises from 8the combination between the muscular and nervous systems40 ,external order here acts as a regulator1 even before thought has grasped it4 ,the signs which are spontaneously produced are not all transformed into voluntary signs4 ,those which appeal to sight or to hearing present special advantages for this use1 and as a matter of fact1 the two classes of signs are concurrently used by the higher animals4 ,gestures and cries are the origin of what later becomes the system of artificial signs4 ,by degrees1 the communication of emotions gives way to the expression of thoughts4 ,among very civilised populations it even came to be believed that song had come from speech4 ,but1 on the contrary1 speech came from song4 ,to be convinced of this a glance at the animal world is sufficient4 ,up to this point the theory of language has been biological1 and the acquired facts can thus be summed up3 #a1 ,man does not express his thought in order to communicate it1 but he communicates because he expresses it4 #b1 ,what is first expressed is emotion1 not thought4 ,by degrees language becomes intellectualized1 as the mental life itself4 #c1 ,expression is spontaneous and primary4 ,it arises from the relation between the nervous and muscular systems4 ,in the progressive transformation where1 from being involuntary1 the signs gradually become voluntary1 they are at once causes and effects4 ,the essential condition for this transformation to take place is social life4 ,undoubtedly1 language appears very quickly1 as soon as individuals of the same species find themselves in constant relations with one another4 ,each one learns to attribute the character of signs to the movements which accompany his emotions4 ,similar beings in whom the same phenomena take place1 become equally capable of interpreting those signs4 ,from this moment a language is born2 and this is true for the animal species as for man4 ,but human evolution follows an evolution which is peculiar to itself1 and which determines that of language4 ,our language would not have far exceeded the period in which it especially expresses emotions1 if human societies had remained purely domestic groupings1 without any other organisation than that of the family4 8,the institution of human language10 says ,comte1 8appears1 in sociology1 as the chief continuous instrument of the necessary reaction of political upon domestic life40#bbj ,henceforth we can picture to ourselves1 in its broad outlines1 the prehistoric evolution of language4 ,originally it comprised gestures and cries4 ,gestures predominated in the first place as being more immediately expressive4 ,by degrees they took a second place4 ,as the natural signs became divided up so as to become artificial1 the superiority of vocal signs appeared4 ,among other reasons it was due to the 8spontaneous correspondence0 between the voice and hearing which allows everyone to develop his own education4 ,we hear young children practising for long hours1 playing with the articulate sounds which they begin to emit4 ,from this more or less organised singing1 still a melody of vocal signs1 poetry was born4 ,finally from poetry1 much later1 springs1 what is commonly called prose1 that is1 the use of non-rhythmic phrases4 ,three great evolutions in the history of humanity3 how many centuries have not been required for their accomplishment6 ,writing is to drawing what speaking is to singing4 ,originally it was not an artifice invented to help vocal language4 ,here again the ideological theory aggravates the part played by reflection4 ,man was obeying an instinct when by drawing he reproduced the familiar objects which met his gaze1 occupied his imagination1 and caused his strongest and most frequent emotions4 ,gradually1 these spontaneous endeavours at imitation assumed the character of signs1 became divided up and simplified1 and finally were co-ordinated with vocal sounds which themselves had gone through a separate evolution4 ,thus language and art have a common origin1 which is the sthetic1 that is to say1 the affective expression4 ,comte does not separate these two terms4 ,he takes the word 8sthetic0 at once in its etymological and in its modern sense4 ,our movements1 at first involuntary1 then voluntary1 translate our impressions and react upon them1 because they spring from them2 that is the humble source from which everything else is derived4 ,with animals it only gives rise to inarticulate vocal sounds1 and to a more or less expressive mimicry4 ,in man1 it is the principle of language and of art4 ,the latter begins by being a simple imitation4 ,then the reproduction of objects is perfected4 ,it becomes more faithful 8by bringing out better the chief features which were at first obscured by an empirical mixture40 8,idealisation0 consists in this4 ,finally 8expression0 properly so called is developed1 and 8style40#bba ,thus1 if we call language the whole of the means suitable for the transmission beyond ourselves of our various impressions1 this whole forms a system in which the most customary and least expressive portion1 language1 was at first mingled with the portion which bears the name of art1 taking art in its most primitive elements3 song and drawing4 ,these two parts became differentiated in evolution4 ,our social requirements have continually increased the use and extension of the vocal and visual signs which are made use of in active life and in speculative thought4 ,these signs have become simpler and simpler and even abstract3 to such an extent that their origin ended by being considered the result of a convention4#bbb ,the primitive parentage of language and of art accounts for many facts which current theories do not explain4 ,for instance1 language is not only created but preserved by the people4 ,grammarians1 8even more absurd than logicians10#bbc in general have understood nothing about it4 ,their claim to authority is amusing4 ,but it is to popular spontaneity1 at once conservative and progressive1 that our languages owe their admirable rectitude4 ,the basis of each language collects what is essential and universal in the sthetic evolution of humanity4 ,hence the magic charm of poetry1 the most ancient of all the arts4 ,words possess a power of evoking images from which the artist draws inexhaustible effects4 ,often during the long childhood of human reason even the power of words must have seemed to be supernatural3 ,nomina ,numina4 ,by dint of considering language as ideologists and logicians1 we have forgotten that its nature is emotional and sthetic4 ,however1 even to-day the mysterious power of words has not disappeared4 ,how great is the action of forms of prayer on tender souls1 even when faith has deserted them6 ,next to action itself1 language is the most powerful of the exciting causes of feeling1 and religions are well aware of this fact4 ,they know how to make use of it to conquer or to retain souls4 ,,iv4 ,the logical function of language is the only one which has been studied by philosophers2 that is1 by the 8ontologists0 and the 8metaphysicians40 ,but even their study has remained incomplete4 ,condillac and his school have solely considered the language which lends itself to logical analysis4 ,consequently1 they only saw a single kind of combination which may be called the logic of signs4 ,but1 in reality1 the logic of signs rests upon the logic of images1 and this one on the logic of feelings4 ,the so-called logicians thus conceive a narrow and false idea of our intellectual mechanism1 when they concentrate all their attention 8upon the most voluntary1 but the least powerful of the three essential modes of which the mental combination admits40#bbd ,the logic of feelings is the art 8of facilitating the combination of notions according to the connection between the corresponding emotions40 ,it is the most instinctive3 it is the source of all the great inspirations of our intelligence4 ,we can think nothing which contradicts it1 or even which is not implied in it4 ,but it has two grave defects4 ,its elements are not precise enough1 and it is not at our disposal4 ,it only operates under certain given conditions1 and the appearance of these conditions does not rest with us4 ,we see it at work1 for instance1 among animals1 who occasionally provoke our admiration for the marvels suggested to them by this logic which is so closely bound up with the emotions4 ,the logic of images1 though less strong1 is more free and precise than the logic of feelings4 ,nevertheless if we only had these two we should still be incapable of realising combinations conceived and prepared by us4 ,this office belongs to the logic of signs4 ,for to us almost entirely belongs the disposal of these signs1 and it is this which has allowed of the development of abstract language and of the sciences4 ,but we must not separate this last logic from the two others4 ,the laws of our nature always cause the logical use of feelings and images to prevail over that of signs4 ,undoubtedly1 the union between signs and thoughts may become direct1 and moreover in the case of abstract notions1 it could not be otherwise4 ,thus our inner world is artificially united to the outer world4 ,we have an abstract and symbolical representation of it1 without going through the feelings1 or even1 strictly speaking1 through the images4 ,but this relation has far less consistency than the one which is established by the involuntary intervention of images and of feelings4 ,as the abstract sign has its origin in the sign appreciated by the senses1 which itself proceeds from the relation of the muscular system with the nervous system2 so1 the relations between signs have their origin in the relations between images1 and these1 in their turn1 proceed from the relations between feelings4 ,the facility with which we manipulate signs hides this truth from us3 it is none the less certain that these signs are united to our thoughts in a far less intimate and less spontaneous manner than the feelings and even the images4 ,the positive theory further allows us1 not indeed to solve1 but to adjourn the question of a universal language4 ,indeed are we concerned with a purely scientific language8 ,mathematical analysis in part fulfils this desideratum4 ,it allows us to express the laws of the simplest phenomena by symbols which are at everyone's disposal4 ,but if it is a question of a complete language1 destined to be in common use among all men1 who does not see that this conception is incompatible with the present state of humanity8 ,how could we establish a universal language1 while allowing the prevalence of 8divergent beliefs and of hostile customs40#bbe ,the unification of tongues will arise from the unification of peoples4 ,when the latter has been realised1 under the action of positive philosophy1 the other will follow as a necessary consequence4 ,moreover1 from the present time1 a universal language exists6 ,it is ,art1 8the only form of language which is universally understood at once in the whole of our species40#bbf ,truly this universal language has its dialects4 ,comte's remark is none the less strikingly accurate4 ,the masterpieces of ,greek sculpture1 ,rembrandt's paintings1 ,beethoven's symphonies are accessible to millions of human beings who have never known a word of ,greek1 of ,dutch1 or of ,german4 ,to teach all children music and drawing1 as ,comte requires in his positivist plan of education1 is not to make them participate in the luxury of 8accomplishments40 ,it is placing within their reach works which appeal to the whole of humanity2 it is giving them a stronger sense of the solidarity which is the essential characteristic of human society2 finally it is teaching them the universal language of which they possess the instinctive rudiments1 and whence have sprung the very languages which to-day appear as frigid systems of symbols and graphic representations4 ,is it not fair to allow them the enjoyment of a patrimony as ancient perhaps as humanity herself8 ,somewhere1 ,comte compares language to property4#bbg ,like it1 language has facilitated acquisitions and preserved social wealth4 ,but it has an advantage over property1 that of admitting of equal possession by all at the same time4 ,art presents this advantage no less than language4 ,works of art are the common property of the whole of humanity and no one should be deprived of that inheritance4 ,,footnotes3 #bjd ,cours1 ,,iii4 #ffa4 #bje ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #fjb4 #bjf ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i4 #fch-i4 #bjg ,cours1 ,i4 #ha4 #bjh ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dih-ejj4 #bji ,cours1 ,,iii1 #fbd-e4 #baj ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #bbi-cj4 #baa ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #fac-d4 #bab ,cours1 ,v4 #cj4 #bac ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #cdh-i4 #bad ,cours1 ,v1 #ajj-a4 #bae ,cours1 ,,iii1 #efc4 #baf ,pol4 ,pos4 ,,ii1 #bdh-eb4 #bag ,pol4 ,pos4 ,i1 #gbb-c4 #bah ,pol4 ,pos4 ,,ii1 #bbf4 #bai ,pol4 ,pos4 ,,ii1 #bbj-a4 #bbj ,pol4 ,pos4 ,,ii1 #bag4 #bba ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #bhh-i4 #bbb ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bej-a4 #bbc ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bed-f4 #bbd ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bdj-a4 #bbe ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bfj-b4 #bbf ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bcg4 #bbg ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bed-f4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,general ,,considerations ,,on ,,social ,,science ,social science had at first been called social physics by ,comte4 ,later on he invented the name of 8sociology0#bbh for it4 ,it stands at the summit of the encyclopdic ladder of the sciences4 ,accordingly1 it offers certain characteristics which the other sciences do not present4 ,undoubtedly1 by the definition of its object and by its method1 it is perfectly homogeneous with the rest of positive knowledge4 ,sociology studies the laws of social phenomena as mathematics inquires into the laws of geometrical phenomena4 ,in this sense1 between these extreme sciences there are no other differences than those which arise from the diversity of the phenomena which are studied4 ,but mathematics1 and the other fundamental sciences1 excepting sociology1 are distinctly preliminary4 ,sociology is final4 ,each of the preliminary sciences should be cultivated only in the measure necessary in order that the following one may in turn assume the positive form4 ,social science1 which is not preparatory to any other1 establishes the principles of morals and of politics4 ,it is1 as has been seen1 the key-stone of positive philosophy4 ,it is in it1 and through it1 that positive philosophy acquires the universality which hitherto it had lacked4 ,finally1 there is a last difference which ,comte likes to think he is successfully removing2 the other sciences are more or less formed2 everything has to be done for social science4 ,not that many trials have not been attempted4 ,comte does not ignore them1 and he prides himself upon doing justice to his precursors4 ,he goes back to ,aristotle1 in whom he admires an incomparable scientific and philosophical genius4 ,in him he sees the inventor of social statics4 ,his ,politics are still read with profit4#bbi ,but ,aristotle could have no idea of a sociology1 and in particular of positive social dynamics4 ,for that he lacked 7without speaking of the fundamental sciences which excepting mathematics were yet to be born71 a sufficiently wide and varied knowledge of history and the idea of progress4 ,montesquieu was in advance of his time1 when1 by the insight of his genius1 he generalised the idea of natural law so as to bring under it the political1 judicial1 economical1 and1 generally speaking1 all social phenomena4 ,he really conceives the idea of social science4 ,but the execution did not respond to the conception4 ,how could ,montesquieu have succeeded1 since he was still without two indispensable elements3 in the first place1 the positive science of man from the biological point of view1 and then the idea of progress1 a vital necessity for every positive philosophy of history8 ,having failed to apprehend the fundamental laws of social dynamics1 ,montesquieu made too much use of the comparative method4 ,consequently1 he took secondary laws for essential laws1 such as the laws relating to the influence of climate4 ,in the same way he has exaggerated the importance of various forms of political constitution4#bcj ,condorcet came after ,montesquieu and ,turgot1 and had been formed in the school of d',alembert4 ,he came nearer than anyone to the social science which was to be founded4 ,he understood admirably that the evolution of the human race1 considered as a single being1 is subject to laws4 ,he brought the idea of progress into full daylight4 ,but1 nevertheless1 positive sociology does not owe to him its origin4 ,he shared the prejudice of his time on the subject of the indefinite perfectibility of man2 this prejudice was only to disappear before the positive science of intellectual and moral man4 ,moreover1 in the heat of the revolutionary conflict1 he misunderstood the concrete reality of the progress1 whose abstract necessity he had so well realised4 ,by painting the centuries preceding the ,,xviii4 century1 in the darkest colours1 he made the progressive evolution of humanity a kind of miracle1 8doubly inadmissible in a doctrine which does not imply a ,providence40#bca ,but soon ,cabanis and ,gall bring forward the positive theory of the moral and intellectual faculties of man4 ,the ,french revolution throws a vivid light upon the period which separates us from the ,middle ,ages4 ,at last1 the theorists of the counter-,revolution show that the philosophy of the ,,xviii4 century1 if it excelled in the power of demolishing1 was incapable of reconstructing1 and they also show that order must be inseparable from progress4 ,comte regards himself as a ,condorcet who has profited by these lessons of experience4 ,he has worked with ,saint-,simon1 he has read ,de ,maistre4 ,in short1 he is possessed of all the necessary elements for the foundation of sociology4 ,at the moment when he undertakes it1 theological and metaphysical philosophy is still dominant over the contemporary conception of social facts4 ,in it imagination is not subordinated to observation4 ,men do not apply themselves to the analysis of facts in order to discover their relations and their laws2 they prefer to construct philosophies of history1 which appear as non-scientific hypotheses1 that is to say1 which are not verifiable4 ,absolute results are sought for1 as if in this order of facts1 as in all the others1 the absolute was not inaccessible4 ,from the practical point of view1 nobody doubts that man can modify social facts as he pleases1 and that his action can be exercised there without any definite limits being placed upon it4 ,it is supposed1 in a word1 that political society has no laws which regulate its natural development4 ,the same prejudices and the same false ideas have already predominated in the past on the subject of the more simple phenomena1 which afterwards became objects of positive science4 ,should not this analogy cause philosophers to conceive 8the rational hope of also succeeding in the dissipation of those errors of conception and of method in the system of political ideas40#bcb ,nothing is more natural than that the science of the most complex phenomena should be the last to reach the positive stage4 ,it would even have been impossible for it to have been otherwise4 ,finally1 beyond the difficulties which belong to the complexity of its object1 sociology had to overcome others1 which arise from political passions4 ,problems of this kind are indifferent to no one4 ,in them the interests of each one are involved1 and they influence even without our knowledge1 the direction taken by our thoughts4 ,political parties excel in framing plausible theories adapted to their requirements4 ,thus a constant effort at disinterestedness is necessary on the part of any one who purposes to take up the science of abstract politics4 ,at any rate1 if these reasons make us understand that sociology should make its appearance last among the fundamental sciences1 none of them imply that it would not have arisen in its turn4 ,on the contrary1 beside 8vital physics0 and 8inorganic physics10 8social physics0 was one day to take its place4 ,from #ahbd1 ,comte had a very clear idea of this4 ,we do not see1 he says1 why the phenomena which the development of a social species presents should not have laws like the others1 why these laws should not be capable of being discovered by observation1 like those of the other phenomena1 with this reservation only that the nature of this section of philosophy makes its study more difficult4 8,i will make it felt by the very fact that there are laws as determined for the development of the human species as for the falling of a stone40#bcc ,comte later on attenuated the rigidity of these expressions4 ,he recognised that the social phenomena were of all others the most 8modifiable40 ,but he none the less maintained that they were ruled by laws4 ,,ii4 ,sociology1 an abstract and wholly theoretical science1 only sets itself the task of discovering the laws of phenomena1 without first taking into account any possible applications4 ,i shall not have1 says ,comte1 to concern myself directly with political anarchy4#bcd ,here1 more than anywhere else1 science must be separated from the corresponding art4 ,the same reasons which led to physiology being constituted apart from medicine1 with which it had for so long been confused1 also require that social science should be distinguished from politics1 of which1 up to the present time1 it has only been a more or less empirical or arbitrary interpretation4 ,comte who took such pains to define the physical fact1 the chemical fact1 the biological fact1 has not given a definition of the sociological fact4 ,the reasons for this are not difficult to see4 ,in the first place1 this fact defines itself so to speak1 by elimination4 ,as there are no phenomena accessible to us more complicated than those of the social life1 all the phenomena which are not studied by the preceding sciences are of course the subject of sociology4 ,moreover1 there might be a reason to seek for a definition of the sociological fact1 if we started from the consideration of the individual to rise to that of society4 ,but ,comte's conception is radically different4 ,for him it is the individual who is an abstraction2 and society is the true reality4 ,he must not explain humanity by man1 but on the contrary1 man by humanity4 ,from this moment1 all the human phenomena properly so-called are ipso facto sociological4 ,it is an essential characteristic of ,comte's system that man1 considered individually1 is not an object of science4 ,the science of man belongs for one part to biology1 for the other to sociology4 ,to define the sociological fact amounts then to establishing the relations between biology and sociology4 ,we have already seen that these relations are extremely close4 ,on the one hand1 sociology could not be constituted so long as higher biology had not reached a certain degree of development4 ,history has furnished us with a proof of this3 the state of infancy of biology contributed largely to the failure of ,montesquieu's and ,condorcet's sociological attempts4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the study of the intellectual and moral functions1 that is to say1 the highest part of biology1 can only be made from the sociological point of view4 ,here we have a kind of mixed domain1 which properly belongs neither to the one nor to the other of the sciences4 ,could we not then consider sociology as a simple extension of biology1 an extension which would be far more important in the case of the human species than in any of the others8 ,do we not do this implicitly when we attribute the study of the intellectual and moral functions to biology1 since everything which bears the name of 8moral science10 history1 law1 political economy1 etc41 finally rests upon these functions8 ,what is the use of a new fundamental science for the study of phenomena which at bottom reduce themselves to biological phenomena8 ,comte protested against this interpretation of his doctrine4#bce ,according to him1 sociology is no less irreducible to biology1 than the latter is to chemistry4 ,the sociological phenomena1 independently of the more general laws which are common to them with the subjacent orders1 have laws of their own which regulate them4 ,if animal societies only existed as we see them to-day1 it would perhaps not be impossible to consider sociology as an appendix of biology4 ,but human society excludes any attempt of this kind4 ,for it is social life which has made the extraordinary development of the intellectual and moral functions possible in man1 and this development is the very definition of humanity4 ,now1 the first consequence of this development is that biology properly so-called1 no longer suffices for studying it4 ,we need a new method in it1 the method of historical observation4 ,already1 were it for this reason alone1 there can be no question of reducing sociology to biology4 ,in the second place1 when we pass from the individual to the collective organism1 8the continued expansion and the almost indefinite perpetuity0 of the latter makes it almost impossible not to separate it from the former in a scientific study4#bcf ,comte is not deceived by the analogy between the two kinds of organism4 ,to speak accurately1 sociology with him1 hardly ever considers anything except a single organism4 ,let us leave aside the little that it says of animal societies4 ,it represents the human race as constituting1 in time and in space1 8an immense and eternal social unity1 whose various organs1 individuals and nations1 united by universal solidarity1 each1 according to a determined manner and degree concur in the evolution of ,humanity40 ,one of the ideas which ,comte most admires in ,condorcet1 and which he regards as indispensable to social science1 is that which makes a single being in process of evolution of the totality of the human species4#bcg ,henceforth1 the parallelism between this immense 8social unity10 and the organisms studied by biology could not be a strict one4 8,the complex nature of the former10 says ,comte himself1 8deeply differs from the indivisible constitution of living beings40 ,we must then know how to restrain comparison wisely1 8in order that it should not give rise to faulty approximations1 instead of precious indications40 ,comte has sometimes failed in carrying out this prudent precept1 for instance1 when in the social organism he looks for what is analogous to tissues1 organs1 and systems studied by the anatomists4 ,but he has1 none the less1 traced very firmly the limits beyond which the use of analogy here becomes an abuse4 ,these limits are determined by the specific character of the social reality1 which escapes the grasp of the biological method4 ,for the principal phenomenon in sociology1 the one which establishes most evidently its scientific originality1 is the gradual and continuous influence of human generations upon one another4 ,now our intelligence cannot 8guess the principal decisive phases of such a complex evolution without an historical analysis properly so-called40#bch ,here is the final word3 no history1 no sociology4 ,comte had already written in #ahbb3 ,to reduce sociology to biology is to annul the direct observation of the social past4 ,undoubtedly the reason for man's superiority over the other animals lies in the relative perfection of his organisation4 ,in this sense1 social physics1 that is to say1 the study of collective development of the human species1 is really a branch of physiology4 ,in this sense1 the history of civilisation is but the sequel and the indispensable complement of the natural history of man4 ,but1 important as it is to form a proper conception1 and never to lose sight of this relation1 yet it would be a mistake to conclude from it that no clear division should be established between social physics and physiology properly so-called4 ,for1 in the case of the human race1 there is history which cannot be reached by a process of deduction4#bci ,,iii4 ,already1 in biology the nature of the object had compelled scientific men to start from the consideration of the whole to reach that of the parts1 to proceed from the complex to the simple4 ,with still greater reason1 the same inversion of method imposes itself in sociology4 ,for1 although the individual elements of society appear to be more separable than those of the living being1 the social consensus is still closer than the vital consensus4#bdj ,the spirit of the sociological method will then be always to consider simultaneously the various social aspects1 whether in statics1 or in dynamics4 ,undoubtedly each of them can be the object of a special study1 by the way of 8preliminary elaboration40 ,but1 as soon as the science is sufficiently advanced1 the correlation of phenomena will serve as a guide for their analysis4 ,political economy has proved by facts that the isolated study of a series of social phenomena is condemned to remain irrational and barren4 ,those then who1 in the system of social studies1 wish to imitate 8the methodical parcelling out1 which belongs to the inorganic sciences10 misunderstand what the essential conditions of their subject require4 ,here the most general laws must be known first4 ,it is from them that science must then descend to the more particular laws4 ,the more complex the phenomena1 the more numerous are the processes of method at our disposal for studying them4 ,this law of compensation is verified again in the present case4 ,sociology1 over and above the processes made use of by the preceding sciences possesses some which are peculiarly its own4 ,to put it more plainly1 in its capacity of final science1 the whole positive method belongs to it4 ,as method is only learnt by practice1 the sociologist will therefore have to be formed by a complete scientific education from mathematics1 which will give him the feeling of positivity1 to biology which will teach him the comparative method4 ,the ,cours de philosophie positive precisely retraces this methodical ascent1 which leads the human mind1 by successive degrees1 up to social science4 ,and1 since the intellectual evolution of the individual reproduces that of the species1 the sociologist will cover the same ground to reach the same end4 ,at any rate1 if a mathematical education is indispensable so as to accustom him to the positive mode of thought1 he will1 however1 acknowledge that social phenomena do not allow of the use of numbers or of mathematical analysis1 nor more especially of the calculation of probabilities4 ,comte treats ,laplace's attempt upon this point as absurd1 an attempt which has been taken up again by other mathematicians4 ,he likes to quote it as a proof of the lack of the philosophical spirit among geometers4 ,indeed1 according to him1 to apply the calculation of probabilities to historical events1 implies a failure to understand that these phenomena are subject to invariable laws like all other phenomena4 ,in default of the powerful instrument furnished by mathematics1 sociology makes use of the methods employed in the physical and natural sciences4 ,of these observation is the first4 ,social phenomena seem easy to observe1 because they are very common1 and the observer takes part in them more or less4 ,but1 on the contrary1 these two circumstances render sociological observation very difficult4 ,we only observe well on condition that we place ourselves outside what we observe4#bda ,sociological facts ought then to appear objective to us1 detached from us1 independent of the state of our individual consciousness4 ,nothing is more difficult to realise4 ,in order to obtain1 and more especially to maintain1 8such an inversion of the spontaneous point of view10 the mind must already have partly constructed what it wishes to see4 ,were it not already provided with a preliminary theory1 for the most part the observer would not know what he must look for in the fact which is taking place under his eyes4 ,it is therefore by the preceding facts that we learn to see the following ones4 ,there lies 8the immense difficulty0 of sociology1 in which we are thus obliged1 in a certain measure1 to determine simultaneously the facts and the laws4 ,if we are not already possessed of the necessary speculative indications to grasp them1 the facts remain barren and even unseen1 although we are1 so to speak1 immersed in them4 ,consequently1 a social fact can have no scientific significance if it is not brought into relation with another fact4 ,in an isolated condition1 it remains in the state of a simple anecdote1 capable at most of satisfying 8idle curiosity10 but unfit for any rational use4 ,an infinite number of facts may be useful to sociology1 apparently very insignificant customs1 all kinds of monuments1 the analysis and the comparison of languages2 but the mind must be provided for their observation with general points of view4 ,only on this condition will a mind1 well prepared by rational education1 be able to transform the actions which take place beneath its eyes into sociological indications1 8according to the more or less direct points of contact1 which he will be able to discern in these actions with the highest notions of science1 in virtue of the connexion of the various social aspects40 ,there can be no question of experimenting in sociology4#bdb ,not that we cannot act upon the social phenomena3 they are1 on the contrary1 the most modifiable of all4 ,but an experiment properly so-called consists in comparing two cases which differ from each other by a certain definite circumstance1 and by that one alone4 ,we have no means of determining two cases of this kind in sociology4 ,it is true that in the absence of direct experiments nature presents indirect ones4 ,they are the pathological cases1 unfortunately too frequent in the life of societies1 the more or less serious perturbations which they undergo through accidental or passing causes4 ,such are the revolutionary periods which correspond to diseases in living bodies4 ,if we properly extend ,broussais' principle to sociology1 that is to say1 if we admit that morbid phenomena are produced by the effect of the same laws as normal phenomena1 then social pathology will in some measure replace experiments4 ,it will be said that this study has been fruitless up to the present time4 ,but the reason of this is1 according to ,comte1 that direct or indirect experimenting ought1 like simple observation1 to be subject to rational conceptions4 ,both are only productive in a sociology already possessed of its essential laws4 ,the comparative method1 so useful to the biologist1 is also precious for the sociologist4 ,it draws together the various states of human society which coexist on the different parts of the earth's surface1 and among peoples independent of one another4 ,undoubtedly1 if the total development only is considered1 the evolution of ,humanity is one4 ,it nevertheless remains true that very considerable and very varied populations have as yet only reached the more or less inferior degrees of this evolution4 ,we can thus observe them simultaneously and compare their successive phases4 ,from the ,fuegians to the most civilised nations in ,europe1 we can imagine no 8social shade0 which is not at present realised on some portion of the globe4 ,frequently1 within the same nation1 the social condition of the various classes represents states of civilisation which are very far removed from one another4 ,paris to-day contains more or less faithful 8survivors0 of nearly all the anterior degrees of social evolution1 especially from the intellectual point of view4#bdc ,this comparative process holds good for social statics as for social dynamics4 ,even in statics a comparison can be established between animal societies and human society4 ,however1 this type of method is not devoid of inconvenience in sociology4 ,it does not consider the necessary succession of the various phases in the social evolution3 it seems on the contrary to consider them all as simultaneous4 ,consequently1 it prevents us from seeing the filiation of social forms4 ,it also runs the risk of falsifying the analysis of the cases which are observed1 and of causing simple secondary factors to be taken for main causes4 ,this is what happened to ,montesquieu who compared indifferently the cities of antiquity1 the ,france of the ,middle ,ages1 the ,england of the ,,xviii4 century1 the republic of ,venice1 the government of ,byzantium1 the ,empire of the ,sultan1 and that of the ,shah of ,persia4 ,so the comparative method is only an auxiliary process in sociology4 ,like observation and experiment1 it has to be made subordinate to a rational conception of the evolution of humanity4 ,the latter in turn depends upon the use of an original method of observation1 belonging to social phenomena1 and free from the dangers presented by the preceding ones4 ,this specific sociological method1 this 8transcendent0 process1 by which the positive method is completed1 is1 says ,comte1 the historical method4#bdd ,,iv4 ,sociology is an abstract science3 history1 which is its essential method1 cannot therefore be history merely considered as a narrative4 ,there are two ways of conceiving history1 the one abstract and the other concrete4 ,the latter dominates in the historical works written up to the present time4 ,their end is to relate and to array in chronological order a certain sequence of events4 ,undoubtedly in the ,,xviii4 century efforts were made to co-ordinate political phenomena and to determine their filiation4 ,but for all that this kind of work has not ceased to be descriptive and literary4 ,the other form of history1 which does not exist up to the present1 has for its end the research of the laws which regulate the social development of the human species4#bde ,difference of object leads to difference of method4 ,if an historian proposes to himself to compose exact 8annals10 to relate things as they took place1 he will begin by the special history of the various peoples1 which1 in its turn1 is founded upon the chronicles of the provinces and the towns4 ,it will be necessary for him to investigate documents in detail1 and to neglect no source3 the work of combination will only come subsequently4 ,but if our end is the abstract science of history1 that is to say the linking together of social phenomena1 quite a different course will have to be followed4 ,indeed all the classes of these phenomena are simultaneously developed1 and under the mutual influence of one another4 ,we cannot explain the line of advance followed by anyone among them1 without having first conceived in a general way 8the progression of the whole40 ,before all things then we must set ourselves to conceive the development of the human species in its widest generality1 that is to say1 to observe and to link together among themselves the most important steps towards progress which it has successively taken in the various fundamental directions4 ,then we shall subdivide the periods and the classes of the phenomena to be observed4#bdf ,these 8various fundamental directions0 correspond to what ,comte called later the 8social series40 ,by this he indicates the groups of social phenomena arranged for a scientific study4 ,once these groups are formed1 then1 according to the totality of historical facts1 the sociologist seeks to determine the continuous growth of each1 physical1 moral1 intellectual or political disposition or faculty1 combined with the indefinite decrease of the opposite disposition or faculty3 for instance1 the tendency of human society to pass from the warlike form to the industrial form1 from revealed religion to demonstrated religion1 etc4 ,from this will be drawn the scientific forecast of the triumph of the one and the fall of the other1 provided that this conclusion is also in conformity with the general laws of the evolution of ,humanity4 ,such a forecast could never be founded upon the knowledge of the present alone4 ,for the present exposes us to the danger of confusing the principal with the secondary facts1 of 8placing noisy passing demonstrations above deep-seated tendencies10 and of regarding institutions or doctrines as growing which are really on the decline4 ,our statesmen scarcely look back beyond the ,,xviii4 century1 our philosophers beyond the ,,xvi4 ,this is too little4 ,it does not even suffice to make us understand the ,french revolution4 ,the study of the 8historical series0 alone allows the understanding of the present and the prevision of the future4 ,the sociologist will even exercise himself in predicting the past1 that is to say1 in acquiring a rational knowledge of it1 and in deducing each historical situation from the whole of its antecedents4 ,he will thus become familiar with the spirit of the historical method4 ,however1 if this abstract historical method were used by the sociologist to the exclusion of every other1 he would sometimes come to a wrong conclusion1 and take the continuous decrease in a natural faculty for a tendency to total extinction4 ,for instance1 as civilisation becomes more refined1 man eats less than formerly4 ,nobody concludes from this that he tends not to eat at all4 ,but the absurdity which is palpable here1 might1 in other cases pass unperceived4 ,that is why the historical method in sociology requires to be controlled by the positive theory of human nature4 ,all the inductions which might contradict this theory are to be rejected4 ,indeed1 the whole social evolution is at bottom but a simple development of humanity1 without the creation of new faculties4 ,the germ1 at any rate1 of all the dispositions or effective faculties which sociological observation1 7and in particular1 history71 may make known1 must then be found in the primordial type which biology has constructed beforehand for sociology4 ,accordance between the conclusions of historical analysis and the preliminary notions of the biological theory is the indispensable guarantee of sociological demonstrations4#bdg ,v4 ,thus conceived the historical method rests upon the postulate given by ,comte1 as we have seen1 as a basis to his sociology4 ,this postulate is thus enunciated3 ,the nature of man evolves without being transformed4 ,the various physical1 moral and intellectual faculties1 must be found the same at all the degrees of historical evolution1 and always similarly co-ordinated among themselves4 ,the development which they receive in the social state can never change their nature1 nor consequently destroy or create any one of them1 nor even intervene in the order of their importance4 ,in a word1 the chief regulator of sociology is the science of human nature4 ,it can even be said1 without forcing the meaning of ,comte's thought1 that sociology is really a psychology3#bdh not indeed1 it is true1 a psychology founded upon the introspective analysis of the individual subject1 but a psychology whose object is the analysis by history1 of the universal subject1 that is to say1 of ,humanity4 ,comte endeavours to bring the complexity and the extreme variety of social phenomena into an intelligible unity4 ,this complexity is such that we could not determine the laws by starting from the observation of the simplest phenomena to reach the more complex ones afterwards4 ,moreover1 these facts only possess sociological significance if the observer is already provided with a general theory before he ascertains them4 ,but1 on the other hand1 history cannot be deduced4 ,given an already positive knowledge of human nature and of the 8milieu0 in which it evolves1 we could not say a priori how it will evolve4 ,history must then teach us how1 as a matter of fact1 social life has developed ,humanity4 ,nevertheless1 once this concession has been made to observation the method becomes again deductive4 ,since sociology is a science it ought1 like the other sciences1 to be able to substitute rational prevision to the empirical establishment of facts4 ,to complete the characterising of this final science1 it must be at once positive1 like the subjacent fundamental sciences1 and universal like philosophy1 which alone up to the present time has looked at things from 8the point of view of the whole40 ,henceforth these two conditions are fulfilled4 ,in the first place1 the positivity of sociology cannot be doubted4 ,in it social facts are conceived as subject to laws1 and ,comte abstains from any research as to their mode of production4 ,then1 sociology1 in spite of the extreme difficulties of its object1 has assumed the deductive form1 and has brought secondary laws under more general laws4 ,comte is even convinced that his sociology comes nearer to the perfect scientific form than physics or chemistry4 ,by his discovery of the great dynamic law of the three states1 has he not given it a unity which is to be found as complete nowhere else but in astronomy8 ,but1 at the same time1 it is truly universal1 since it is a philosophy of history1 or1 in other words1 the science of humanity considered in its evolution4 ,as this science presupposes biology1 and as biology in turn presupposes the science of the 8milieu0 in which living beings are immersed1 sociology becomes at once the summary and the crown of the sciences which precede it4 ,thus in replacing man in ,humanity1 and ,humanity in the system of its conditions of existence1 ,comte constructs a final science which is at the same time the supreme science1 the only science1 that is to say1 philosophy4 8,if the laws of sociology could be sufficiently known to us1 they alone would suffice to replace all the others1 save the difficulties of deduction40#bdi ,the science of ,humanity is the centre around which the others range themselves in order4 ,already with ,descartes1 the anthropological character of philosophy was strongly marked4 ,after him1 philosophical speculation took man for its centre more and more4 ,this tendency also predominates in ,comte's doctrine4 ,but in it it assumes a social character4 ,here the 8universal subject0 is no longer the intellectual consciousness of ,kant1 or the absolute 8ego0 of ,fichte2 it is ,humanity evolving in time1 whose unity is displayed through the succession of generations connected in strict solidarity with each other4 ,henceforth the philosophical problems1 no longer present themselves from the point of view of man conceived in the abstract or in himself apart from time4 ,the consideration of history necessarily intervenes4 ,problems are formulated in social terms4 ,there lies the deep significance of the doctrine systematised by ,comte4 ,,footnotes3 #bbh ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bjj4 #bbi ,cours1 ,,iv1 #aia-b4 #bcj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #aic-ii2 ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #ajf4 #bca ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bjj-bje2 ,pol4 pos4 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #aji4 #bcb ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bdc-d4 #bcc ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #ach-i 7#h septembre1 #ahbd74 #bcd ,cours1 ,,iv1 #b-c4 #bce ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cia2 ,,vi1 #gge-f2 ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #abd-g4 #bcf ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii4 #bhh-i4 #bcg ,cours1 ,,iv4 #cbf4 #bch ,cours1 ,,iv4 #chg4 #bci ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv4 ,appendix1 p4 #abd-g4 #bdj ,cours1 ,,iv4 #bgi-hj4 #bda ,cours1 ,,iv4 #ccg4 #bdb ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cdb-dd4 #bdc ,cours4 ,,iv4 #ced-sq4 #bdd ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cfj4 #bde ,cours4 ,,iv1 #bbe4 #bdf ,cours1 ,,iv41 #cff sq2 ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv4 ,appendice1 p4 #ace sq4 #bdg ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cga-c2 ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #fbd-f4 #bdh ,pol4 pos41 ,,iii1 #dg-dh4 #bdi ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #ddb4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,social ,,statics ,as biology distinguishes the anatomical point of view1 8relating to the ideas of organisation10 and the physiological point of view1 8relating to the ideas of life10 so sociology separates the study of the conditions of existence of a society 7social statics71 and that of the laws of its movements 7social dynamics74 ,this distinction has the advantage of corresponding exactly to that of order and progress1 from the practical point of view1 while it is closely allied to the encyclopdic law called 8the principle of the conditions of existence40 ,comte will not admit that he is making two distinct sciences of social statics and social dynamics4 ,sociology1 according to him1 is constituted by the constant drawing together of these two corresponding studies4 ,however1 they each have their own object1 and ,comte has treated them separately4 ,indeed1 social statics and dynamics are far from having the same importance in his work4 ,the essential part1 on his own showing1 is dynamics4#bej ,when he makes history the characteristic process of the ,sociological method1 when he shows that the tradition transmitted from every generation to the following one is pre-eminently the sociological phenomenon1 when finally he considers the new science as having been founded from the day when the law of the three states was discovered1 is he not placing himself at the dynamic point of view8 ,after having demonstrated that dynamic laws of social phenomena exist1 he concludes that these phenomena are also subject to static laws3 there would be a contradiction in admitting the one set of laws without the other4 ,in ,comte's mind then dynamics preceded statics4 ,even from an objective point of view1 dynamics seem to be the most important4 ,for1 if we knew the dynamic laws it would not be impossible to deduce the static laws from them1 while to do the reverse would be impracticable1 at any rate for minds constituted like ours4 ,so1 in the ,cours de philosophie positive1 social statics holds a very small place compared with that occupied by dynamics4 ,it is true that it takes up the whole of the second volume of the ,politique positive4 ,but there ,comte brings into it many considerations which arise more from ethics and religion than from sociology properly so called4 ,i4 ,the idea of the social consensus1 more restricted than that of the vital consensus1 dominates the whole of social statics4 ,the science sets itself to study the continual actions and reactions which the various parts of the social system exercise upon one another4 ,each of the numerous elements of this system1 instead of being observed by itself1 must be conceived as in relation with all the others1 with which it has constant solidarity4 ,from whatever social element we start1 it is always connected1 in a more or less direct way1 with the whole of the others1 even with those which at first sight appear independent4#bea ,what are the ultimate 8social elements80 ,in biology1 anatomical analysis was to stop at the tissue1 or at least at the cell4 ,in sociology1 statical analysis will stop at the family4 8,human society is made up of families and not of individuals3 it is an elementary axiom in statical sociology40 ,in the eyes of social science1 the individual is an abstraction4 ,all social strength is the result of a 8more or less extended co-operation10 that is to say of the combined action of a greater or smaller number of individuals4 ,there is nothing purely individual except physical force4 ,but what is the physical force of a man alone1 without arms or tools8 7for these already imply a co-operation of social activities74 ,intellectual power is of value only when others participate in it3 so it is with moral power4 ,on the other hand1 if all social force is the result of union1 all social force is1 nevertheless represented by an individual4 ,the social organism is 8collective in its nature1 and individual in its functions40#beb ,in this way the part played by the individual again becomes a very considerable one4 ,if the individual1 in so far as he is a social force1 always represents some group1 he is none the less possessed of his own personality which may precisely have taken a great part in the formation of such or such a group4 ,we know that the social organism must not on all points be compared with the living organism4 ,if the family is the ultimate element for social statics1 this element is however itself made up of persons who are naturally independent1 and who cannot be compared to cells4 ,the positive theory of the family is founded upon the biological theory of the physical and moral nature of man4 ,this nature is sociable4 ,the human species belongs to the category of those in which individuals not only live in more or less permanent bands1 but form definite and durable societies4 ,this is a fact in our experience4 ,the social state is1 for men1 the state of nature4 ,the 8contract0 theory cannot then be maintained4 ,comte does not stop to criticise it4 ,the theorists of the counter-,revolution have sufficiently refuted ,rousseau4 ,according to ,comte1 sociability is spontaneous in the human species1 in virtue of the instinctive leaning towards common life1 8independently of any personal calculation1 and often against the most immediate interest of the individual4 ,society is not then founded upon utility1 which could moreover only appear in a state of society already established40#bec ,thus1 the family is the ultimate social element4 ,being preoccupied by this idea1 ,comte1 who had such a deep1 clear-sighted feeling of the evolution of societies1 does not ask himself whether the family has evolved from something which existed previously4 ,for him it is something natural1 that is to say something given1 beyond which we should not go back1 and of which only the biological conditions can be determined4 ,it is from this point of view that ,comte defines the relations of man and woman in the family4 ,he bases himself upon biology 7that is to say both upon physiology and psychology71 to represent the female sex as living in 8a kind of state of continuous childhood40 ,whence he concludes to the natural subordination of woman4 ,this inferiority does not moreover extend to the whole of her moral nature1 for1 8in general1 women are as superior to men by the natural development of sympathy1 and sociability1 as they are inferior to them where intellect and reasoning powers are concerned40#bed ,on this last point1 ,john ,stuart ,mill held the contrary opinion1 and this disagreement contributed not a little to alienate him from positive philosophy4 ,later on1 in his 8second career10 ,comte1 who more and more came to subordinate the intellect to the heart1 still more extolled the moral excellence of woman1 and ended by considering her as 8intermediary between humanity and man40 ,but even then1 while proclaiming the sentimental1 moral1 and sthetic superiority of woman1 he persisted in maintaining that1 from the intellectual point of view1 by reason of immutable biological conditions1 she remains inferior to man4 ,from analogous motives1 ,comte regards marriage as a 8universal natural disposition1 the first necessary basis of all society40 ,every thing which tends to weaken marriage tends to disorganise the family1 and1 consequently1 to destroy society in its constitutive elements4 ,comte will thus condemn divorce1 of which he himself had the best reasons for appreciating the advantages4 ,generally1 ,comte's theory of the family is modelled upon the ,christian family4 ,according to his constant practice1 he seeks to detach the institutions of ,catholicism1 which he admires1 from its dogmas which he believes to be almost dead4 ,these institutions1 excellent in themselves only suffer from being bound up with beliefs which are disappearing4 ,so long1 he says1 as the family continues to have no other intellectual basis than religious doctrines1 it will necessarily participate in their growing discredit4 ,positive philosophy 8can alone henceforth establish the spirit of the family upon an immoveable foundation1 with the modifications suitable to the modern character of the social organism40#bee ,this new intellectual basis is established by positive psychology and social statics4 ,the constitution of the family remains the same4 ,but its foundation is henceforth positive dogma instead of religious dogma1 demonstrated belief instead of revealed faith4 ,perhaps we must recognise in the energetic defence made by ,comte of the family and of marriage as he found them established by the side of ,catholic influence1 a desire not to be confused with the followers of ,saint ,simon1 of ,fourier1 and the other reformers of his time4 ,these did not hesitate to contradict current and traditional customs4 ,in ,comte's view1 this contradiction is a sign of error4 ,scientific truth is found in the prolongation of public reason and of common sense4 ,here ,comte sees a new1 and not one of the least1 important arguments1 in support of his own theory4 ,,ii4 ,a society is composed of families3 it is not itself a greater family4 ,neither is it an assemblage of contiguous families living together4 ,the family and society are distinguished from each other by very clear differential characteristics4 ,the family is a 8union0 of an essentially moral nature1 and secondarily intellectual4#bef ,the chief constituent of the family is found in the affective functions1 7the mutual tenderness of husband and wife1 of the parents for the children1 etc474 ,society is1 on the contrary1 not a union1 but a co-operation0 of an essentially intellectual nature1 and secondarily moral4 ,undoubtedly1 an association of men cannot be conceived as subsisting without their sympathetic feelings being interested in it4 ,nevertheless1 when we pass from the consideration of the single family to the co-ordination of several families1 the principle of co-operation necessarily ends by prevailing4 ,so ,rousseau's theory is not false on all points4 ,metaphysical philosophy1 especially in ,france1 says ,comte1 has undoubtedly committed an error of capital importance by attributing the very creation of the social state to this principle1 for it is evident that co-operation1 far from having been able to produce society1 presupposes it4 ,but if we confine this assertion to society properly so-called 7the family being set aside7 it is not so startling4 ,for1 if co-operation could not 8create0 human societies1 it alone at least1 has been able to 8communicate to these spontaneous associations a definite character and a lasting consistency40 ,this co-operation is called to-day 8the division of labour40 ,comte knew this expression3 ,adam ,smith had already made it famous4 ,if ,comte did not make use of it1 it is because economists had limited the idea and the term to 8merely material usages40 ,he wishes1 on the contrary1 to consider co-operation in the whole of its rational extension4 ,it then becomes an extremely general principle1 dominating the whole of social statics1 and finding its application in the greatest as in the most limited social groups4 ,this principle leads us to regard not only individuals and classes1 but also1 in many respects the different peoples1 8as participating together in a suitable way and a determined degree1 in an immense common work whose development unites those actually co-operating with the series of their successors and their predecessors40 ,thus we see the relation between the dynamical and the statical laws of social continuity which binds successive generations1 with social solidarity which unites men living in the same period4 ,this solidarity arises especially from the division of labour4 ,the latter is the 8primitive cause0 of the extension and of the growing complexity of the social organism1 which may be conceived as comprising the whole of our species4 ,the founder of social statics1 ,aristotle1 had formulated its most general principle3 8separation of offices and combination of efforts40#beg ,without the 8separation of offices0 there would only be an agglomeration of families and not a society4 ,but the indispensable counterpart of the separation of offices is the combination of efforts1 that is to say a general thought which directs them1 in a word1 a government4 ,thus1 the ideas of society and of government are implied in one another4 ,indeed1 there is no society properly so-called without the division of social labour1 a division immediately generating consequences which make government a necessity4 ,society in developing grows more and more complex4 ,instead of a small group of a few families1 it ends by numbering hundreds1 thousands1 and even millions of them4 ,at the same time the division of labour often gives rise to individual differences1 at once intellectual and moral4 ,minds are developed1 but each one according to its special line1 at least according to that of his profession or of his class4 ,the communion of feeling and of thought tends to become weaker4 ,this last is not the least serious inconvenience4 ,smith had already pointed it out from the economical point of view1 and the utopian reformers1 ,fourier especially1 have shown strongly its extent and its dangers4 ,this is1 according to ,comte1 what it is the mission of a government to remedy4 ,its social function consists in repressing and in opposing as far as possible the tendency to the scattering of ideas1 of feelings1 and of interests4 ,this tendency is the result of the very development of society1 and left to itself1 it would end by stopping this development4 ,government may thus be defined in its abstract and elementary function as 8the necessary reaction of the whole upon the parts40#beh ,government1 at first1 appears 8spontaneously40 ,as ,hobbes clearly saw1 it is then in the hands of those to whom force belongs4 ,but it soon becomes regularised and organised into a definite social function4 ,as1 in the development of the sciences1 the growing differentiation of their object rendered research more and more special1 and at last caused the appearance of a particular class of learned men1 7the philosophers71 whose own function is to attempt the synthesis of human knowledge2 so1 in the division constantly more ramified of social functions1 a new one had to be constituted1 8capable of intervening in the accomplishment of all the others1 unceasingly to recall in them the thought of the whole1 and the feeling of common solidarity40 ,we are then entirely mistaken1 when we want to reduce the function of government to 8vulgar attributions of material order40 ,government is not a simple institution of police1 a guarantee of public order1 nor1 as was said in the ,,xviii4 century1 a necessary evil which will reduce itself to a minimum with progress1 or even will tend to disappear4 ,on the contrary1 the more a society is developed1 the more indispensable the function of government becomes in it1 the more importance it assumes4 ,progress in the future will make a more and more considerable place for it in social life4 ,although it does not itself realise any determined social progress1 government necessarily contributes to whatever progress society can make4 ,if the idea of the division of labour is not to be understood in a purely material and economical sense1 the principle of social cohesion1 which ,comte calls government1 cannot any more be founded upon a single conformity of interests4 ,this would not suffice to maintain a human society4 ,for such a society to subsist1 there must be a certain 8communion0 of beliefs1 and feelings of sympathy1 which themselves depend in a certain measure upon these beliefs4 ,undoubtedly1 society could not resist a deep and durable divergence of interests4 ,but it would still less resist incompatibility of feelings1 and especially of beliefs among its members4 ,in a word1 the basis of human society is intellectual before all things4 ,and1 as the first object of the mind of man is the interpretation of the world which surrounds him1 the constitutive basis of human society is religion4 ,the groups which are united in the same general conception of the universe are part of the same society4 ,hence1 in the past1 we see endless conflicts between the societies whose religions were different2 hence1 in the future1 the unity of the human species will finally become entirely rallied around positive religion4 ,if this is the case1 government1 which is by definition the highest and most general social function which represents the 8spirit of the whole10 cannot be confined to temporal action4 ,its object is not only to assure the security of property and of persons4 ,it must at the same time strengthen and preserve that 8communion0 of beliefs which is the basis of human society4 ,it must guarantee the union of intellects1 by establishing and teaching universally accepted principles4 ,it must1 in a word1 be a 8spiritual power40 ,in this capacity1 in positive society1 it will exercise an action at least equal to that enjoyed by the catholic clergy in the ,christendom of the ,middle ,ages1 as long as the ,popes preserved its supreme direction4 ,these consequences are legitimately drawn from ,comte's principles4 ,his philosophy made social reorganisation dependent upon the reorganisation of morals1 and the reorganisation of morals upon that of ideas4 ,he was1 therefore1 in social statics1 to seek for the foundation of society in the harmony of intellects and to define government by its spiritual as much as by its temporal function4 ,,iii4 ,comte's social statics are far from fulfilling the programme which he indicated in a word when he called it 8social anatomy40 ,undoubtedly he is right in not pushing the comparison between living beings and society to dangerous or childish attempts at precision4 ,but1 in sociology as in biology1 he separates the study of the organs from that of the functions1 and we must admit that he insisted very little upon the analysis of the social organs4 ,from the statical point of view he only distinguishes the individual1 the family1 and society taken as a whole4 ,moreover the consideration of the individual is only preliminary1 since the families represent the real social elements4 ,he therefore sees1 or at least he studies nothing intermediary between these elements and the totality of the social body1 that is to say the human species4 ,he limits himself to indicating the separation of offices which increases with the extension of the social body4 ,but what is the structure of this body1 what diversity of organs and apparatus does it contain8 ,social statics tells us nothing of this4 ,the ,politique positive scarcely gives us a few brief indications on this point4 ,the collective organism would be composed first of families1 which constitute its real element1 then of the classes or castes which form its tissues1 and finally of towns or villages which are its real organs4 ,this is very vague4 ,only in the dynamics shall we find views a little more precise on the appearance1 the structure1 and the functions of the different social forms4 ,even then ,comte does not really take the physiological point of view1 any more than in statics he takes the really anatomical point of view4 ,before all things1 his sociology remains a philosophy of history4 ,it analyses the past of humanity1 that it may find in it the interpretation of its present and the rational prevision of its future4 ,this science differs profoundly then from the fundamental sciences which precede it1 in that it studies a single being1 of which it cannot analyse the phenomena or discover the laws except by considering it in the first place in its totality4 ,comte hardly ever in social statics 7and far less in dynamics7 says society1 as in biology he said1 animals and vegetables4 ,he says the collective organism3 a simple1 immense organism1 whose life indefinitely extends into the past and into the future1 in a word1 ,humanity4 ,this conception representing humanity as a single ,being which is an hypothesis for science1 becomes an ideal for ethics1 and an object of love for religion4 ,insensibly ,comte passes from one of these points of view to the other4 ,at the same time the character of social statics changes4 ,from being an abstract science in the ,cours1 in the ,politique it is transformed into a picture of future ,humanity4 ,,footnotes3 #bej ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dcj4 #bea ,cours1 ,,iv4 #beh4 #beb ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bfe4 #bec ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dcb-f4 #bed ,cours1 iv1 #dei4 ,correspondance de ,comte et de ,john ,stuart ,mill1 p4 #bai-bhh4 #bee ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dej4 #bef ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dgb sq4 #beg ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #bha-c2 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #fg4 #beh ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dhb-e4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,social ,,dynamics ,for ,comte1 social dynamics is the chief part of sociology4 ,he tells us that it occupied his attention 8in a preponderating and even almost exclusive manner40#bei ,this preference is easily explained4 ,in the first place the idea which best distinguishes sociology from biology1 the idea of the gradual development of humanity belongs to social dynamics4 ,then1 the method which particularly belongs to sociology1 the historical method1 applies especially to dynamics4 ,finally1 the very conception of a social science became fixed in ,comte's mind by the discovery of the law of the three states which is a dynamic law4 ,social dynamics is defined as 8the science of the necessary and continuous movement of humanity10#bfj or1 more briefly1 the science of the laws of progress4 ,here1 as in social statics1 and even still more exclusively1 a single case is studied1 namely1 the case of the human species1 regarded as a single individual1 and considered in the whole of its past and future development4 ,henceforth1 without misunderstanding the distinction between biology and sociology1 should we not in the first place seek some of the conditions of social progress in the physical and moral nature of the individual man8 ,this question did not escape ,comte1 and he says that it would be right to begin a methodical treatise on social science with it4 ,however1 he did not expressly deal with the question4 ,he contented himself with indicating 8this fundamental instinct which is the complex result of the necessary co-operation between all our natural tendencies1 which urges man ceaselessly to ameliorate his condition in all respects1 and always to develop the whole of his moral1 intellectual1 and physical life in every way as much as the system of conditions in which he finds himself placed allows of it40#bfa ,this indication is completed by the study of the conditions which determined the first efforts of man1 when he had to overcome his natural laziness1 at the dawn of civilisation4 ,it suffices at least to show the close union which exists in ,comte's thought between social dynamics and psychology4 ,it is true that the sociological laws cannot be deduced from the biological laws4 ,nothing can replace a direct observation of social phenomena4 ,but the very fact of progress1 which is the object of social dynamics1 would not exist without the 8individual impulses which are its own elements40 ,i4 ,under the name of progress ,comte understands a 8social advance towards a definite although never attained termination1 by a series of necessarily determined stages40 ,this idea was never clearly defined in antiquity4#bfb ,the men of ancient times were more inclined to represent social movements as oscillatory or circular4 ,upon special points1 for instance in morals1 they had a foreshadowing of the idea of progress4#bfc ,they conceived an effort towards improvement4 ,but the scientific idea of social progress in its entirety remained foreign to them4 ,for this idea is only formed by observation and by the analysis of history4 ,their historical outlook was yet too narrow for such a suggestion4 ,the idea of progress appears with the philosophy of history taught by ,christianity2 for1 this religion gives a rational explanation of universal history considered as a whole4 ,it proclaims the superiority of the ,christian world over the pagan world1 and of the new law over the old4#bfd ,but1 scarcely has the idea of progress thus come into existence when it becomes clouded over and tends to fade away4 ,catholicism clearly sees progress in the series of events which caused it to succeed a former state1 but it denies the progress which continues from that moment4 ,it considers itself as final4 ,it 8limits onward progress to the advent of ,christianity40 ,it claims to fix an invariable dogma which contains immutable and absolute truth4 ,this is the very negation of the positive idea of progress4 ,in order to find this idea clearly conceived and scientifically formulated1 we must come to ,condorcet1 and even to the ,,xix4 century1 that is to say1 to the foundation of social science by ,comte4 ,he was especially led to it1 he says1 by the historical study of the development of the sciences4 ,for1 of all the social series1 this is the one whose evolution is most advanced4 ,no other suggests so clearly the idea of a 8progression0 whose terms succeed each other by virtue of a necessary filiation4 ,pascal already gave a very fine formula of it1 in his ,prface du ,trait du ,vide4 ,is it not remarkable that1 in his sketch of the positive idea of progress1 he should have been led at once to the essential hypothesis of social dynamics1 that is to say1 to consider the whole succession of generations as a single man1 always living1 continually learning8#bfe ,nevertheless1 the idea of progress1 so well applied to the evolution of the sciences in the ,,xvii4 century1 could not then be extended to all social facts4 ,it had met with an insurmountable obstacle in the ,middle ,ages4 ,men considered that period as one of retrogression and barbarism1 although1 as a matter of fact1 it was 8characterised by the universal perfecting of human sociability40 ,the idea of progress therefore remained a special one4 ,thus originated the quarrel of the ,ancients and the ,moderns#bff whose importance has not been sufficiently understood4 ,the 8eminent0 ,fontenelle and the 8judicious0 ,perrault have very clearly shown in respect to intellectual activity generally considered1 what ,pascal had already established for science properly so-called4#bfg ,the ,,xviii4 century was full of the idea of progress4 ,but1 failing to follow a positive method1 it gave a false direction to this idea4 ,it believed in the indefinite perfectibility of man and of society4 ,now1 this notion does not coincide with that of progress4 ,it is even fundamentally opposed to it4 ,progress signifies 8development subject to fixed conditions1 and operating in virtue of necessary laws1 which determine its advance and its limitations40 ,it is precisely the ignorance of these conditions and of these laws which gives rise to the idea of indefinite perfectibility4 ,if ,helvetius and ,condorcet had had a positive knowledge of human nature1 they would not have entertained so many illusions and unreasonable hopes4 ,biology1 that is to say1 scientific psychology1 would have taught them that human nature is invariable in its basis1 that the preponderance of the selfish over the altruistic instincts is essential to this nature1 and that1 if progress favours the development of the altruistic feelings1 it cannot1 however1 overturn the natural equilibrium of our inclinations4 ,in a word1 indefinite perfectibility is a metaphysical idea4 ,imagination plays a greater part in it than observation4 ,the philosophers who conceived it did not realise the relations which bind the intellectual and the moral life of man to the structure of his organism4 ,in order that the idea of progress should reach its final form it was necessary1 in the first place1 that positive psychology should have put an end to the dreams of indefinite perfectibility4 ,it was also necessary that the ,french ,revolution should come to render the course of the history of humanity intelligible4 ,indeed1 according to ,comte1 a 8progression0 cannot be understood1 so long as we do not know at least three of its terms4 ,two terms do not suffice to define it4 ,now1 up to the time of the ,french ,revolution1 several 8progressions0 or social series undoubtedly offered the required number of terms to scientific reflection2 for instance1 the evolution of such and such a science or of such and such an art4 ,but1 in sociology1 the knowledge of secondary laws is subordinated to that of primary laws1 and the advance of such and such a social series can only be understood if the development of society in general is known in its fundamental law4 ,to discover this law then1 we must possess at least1 three terms of the general 8progression40 ,now1 before the ,french ,revolution two terms only were given3 the rgime of the societies of antiquity1 and the ,christian rgime 7that is to say1 the one which attained its highest degree of perfection in the ,catholic organisation of the ,middle ,ages47 ,the ,french ,revolution came to furnish the third term4 ,it brought the idea of a new rgime4 ,as ,kant had said1 in terms which were certainly unknown to ,comte1 it gave men the idea of a social organisation founded upon principles different from those of the existing societies4 ,henceforth the idea of progress could apply itself to the whole of the historical development of humanity4 8,it is to this salutary disturbance10 says ,comte1 8that we owe the strength and the audacity to conceive a notion upon which rests the whole of social science1 and consequently the whole of positive philosophy1 of which this final science alone could constitute the unity40#bfh ,this social science remained to be constructed4 ,it will be the special work of ,auguste ,comte4 ,according to him1 the ,french ,revolution only brought an imperfect idea of social progress4 ,it helped to bring about the conception of the idea of a different rgime1 but without actually founding it4 ,the functions of the new philosophy will be to realise the positive idea of social progress4 ,in a word1 the revolutionary impulse made this philosophy possible4 ,it has not done away with its utility4#bfi ,,ii4 ,sociology being an abstract and speculative science in the same way as the other fundamental sciences1 progress in it is not understood in a utilitarian or moral sense4 ,from #ahbf ,comte exerted himself to prevent any equivocation on this point4 ,the insufficiency of language1 he says1 obliges him to make use of the words 8improvement0 and 8development10 of which the former and even the latter1 although clearer1 recalls ideas of absolute good and of indefinite amelioration1 which ,comte has no intention of expressing4 ,these words for him have the simple scientific object of indicating1 in social physics1 a certain succession of states of the human species1 8being effected according to determined laws3 a usage exactly analogous to the one which physiologists make of them in the study of the individual organism1 to indicate a succession of transformations with which no idea of continuous amelioration or deterioration is connected40#bgj ,it would be easy to treat of the whole of social physics without once using the word improvement1 and always replacing it by the scientific term development4 ,for the question is not to appreciate the respective value of successive states referred to an ideal state1 but simply to establish the laws of their succession4 8,the present is full of the past and big with the future40 ,liebnitz's formula thus expresses the general idea of progress4 ,comte only makes it positive by discovering the general laws of this progress1 and by showing that they are correlated to the laws of social statics4 ,as a matter of fact1 does the development of humanity lead to improvement or progress1 in the moral and practical sense of the word8 ,social science has not to answer this question4 ,however1 ,comte thinks that this improvement takes place1 and that progress1 so understood1 can be shown at once in our condition and in our nature4#bga ,as proofs of this1 in the first place1 he gives the increase in the population1 at least in that portion of humanity which he nearly always considers alone1 the white race2 then he mentions the law--according to which exercise perfects the organs4 ,this progress is fixed by heredity4 ,comte thus admits this principle laid down by ,lamarck1 with this reservation1 that evolution never transforms 8natural dispositions40 ,as to our condition1 it is improved according to the measure in which we can act upon natural phenomena1 and this power in turn depends upon the knowledge we have acquired of the laws of phenomena4 8,vision brings prevision and thus facilitates provision40 ,progress is here manifested by the extension of our scientific knowledge and by the improvement of the arts founded upon this knowledge4 ,if scientific knowledge1 which is necessarily abstract1 has to be separated from practice in order to seek for the general laws which regulate phenomena1 science1 once constituted1 makes possible a system of reasoned applications which reaches immeasurably farther than empirical art4 ,like ,descartes1 ,comte founds the most ambitious hopes upon the positive science of nature4 ,now1 the most 8modifiable0 phenomena1 those in which our intervention is most efficacious1 are the human phenomena1 be they individual or collective4 ,on the other hand1 our action upon the external world especially depends upon the dispositions of the agent4 ,in every way then we must improve these dispositions4 ,the most important improvement will be that of our internal nature4 ,it will consist in bringing about the greater and greater prevalence of the attributes which distinguish man from the animals1 that is to say1 intelligence and sociability1 correlated faculties1 which are at once as a means and as an end to one another4 ,we know1 moreover1 that there are limits to this progress4 ,the perfect preponderance within ourselves of humanity over animality is a limit1 nearer to which our efforts must ever bring us1 without ever actually reaching it4#bgb ,whether it be a question of our condition or of our nature the improvement1 in both cases1 can only be very slow4 ,it is never easy to substitute to natural order an artificial order resting upon the scientific knowledge of the former4 ,of those different forms of progress1 the first1 which ,comte calls the material progress1 because it is the easiest1 is the most advanced4 ,the great attraction which it has for the men of to-day is thus explained1 but the importance given to it is quite exaggerated4 ,if our nature could be brought to a higher degree of perfection it would assuredly be preferable4 ,but it is perhaps necessary that our material conditions of existence should first have been ameliorated8 ,the improvement in our nature may be physical1 intellectual1 or moral4 ,the first would consist in an addition to the average duration of human life2 it depends upon the progress of biology1 and1 consequently1 of medicine and hygiene4 ,intellectual 7scientific and sthetic7 improvement1 would be still more desirable4 ,it 8means a greater soaring upwards0 than is represented by all physical improvements or a fortiori by any material improvements3 for the intellect is a 8universal tool0 whose uses have a universal application4 ,but human happiness depends far more upon moral progress 8over which we have1 also more command1 although it is more difficult40 ,no intellectual improvement could be equal in value to an increase in goodness or in courage4 ,if we were wise our whole endeavour therefore would be in this direction4 ,at any rate we ought always to remember that other forms of progress are desirable simply as means1 and moral progress alone as an end4#bgc ,,iii4 ,the theory of progress is the 8principle0 of social dynamics1 itself the essential part of sociology1 while sociology lies at the heart of positive philosophy4 ,it was therefore to be expected that the adversaries of this philosophy would especially seek to ruin the theory of progress1 which supports everything else4 ,indeed the objections have been numerous and pressing4 ,of these objections ,comte had foreseen the two most important1 and he had endeavoured to answer them beforehand4 ,according to him1 the theory of progress implies neither fatalism nor optimism1 nor the quietism which has been represented as a consequence of it4#bgd ,on the first point1 ,comte draws our attention to the fact that the necessary consequence of his principle of laws is not the absolute determinism of phenomena1 whether it be a question of social or other phenomena4 ,positive philosophy admits nothing absolute4 ,determinism1 like free-will1 is a metaphysical thesis1 ,comte is not compelled to take sides either with one or the other3 he leaves them to mutually refute each other4 ,the positive conception of the moral and intellectual faculties of man1 as ,gall clearly established1 does not imply that human actions might not be otherwise than they are4 ,similarly1 if in general natural phenomena are subject to laws1 this does not prevent us from conceiving these phenomena as modifiable by man's intervention4 ,now1 of all natural phenomena1 social phenomena are precisely the most modifiable2 so much so that for a long time it was possible to ignore that they were governed by laws4 ,there is then no contradiction in affirming the reality of these laws1 and in considering at the same time the intervention of human activity in social phenomena as efficacious4 ,as early as #ahbd ,comte wrote to his friend ,valat3 8,it would be misunderstanding my thought to conclude from it that ,i forbid all improvement1 since1 on the contrary1 ,i formally establish that every government must change in consequence of the progress of civilisation1 and that it is in no way a matter of indifference that these changes should take place by the mere force of circumstances1 or by calculated planes based upon observation4 ,i do not deny the power of political measures1 ,i limit it40#bge ,it belongs to social science to determine the limits of the useful action of man upon social phenomena4 ,these limits are narrow enough4 ,man can only modify1 from the static point of view1 the intensity1 and from the dynamic point of view1 the speed of social phenomena4 ,indeed1 here as elsewhere1 modifications can only be produced in conformity with laws4 ,to suppose the contrary would be to deny the very existence of these laws4 ,now1 the fundamental law of statics is the intimate solidarity and the mutual dependence of all social elements1 at all the moments of their common evolution4 ,there is1 therefore1 no disturbing influence1 whatever its origin may be1 which can 8cause unsympathetic opposing elements to coexist in a given society40#bgf ,rather would it destroy this society4 ,all that is possible is to modify the respective tendencies which indeed coexist in this society1 but without causing the appearance or disappearance of any of them4 ,in the same way1 from the dynamic point of view1 the order of the successive phases of progress is determined by laws4 ,no external influence 7nor in particular that of man71 could overturn or disturb this order1 or 8skip0 one of the stages4 ,the evolution could only be made more rapid1 that is to say1 easier4 ,the statesman1 infatuated with his power1 will perhaps find this a very humble part to play4 ,but1 even within these limits1 human intervention could still be of capital importance provided that it were directed by science4 ,history confirms these views4 ,in it we never see social phenomena modified by man otherwise than in their intensity1 or in their speed4 ,where we best know their evolution1 that is to say1 in the social series1 which includes the history of the sciences1 of the arts1 of morals and institutions1 the verification of this law is constant4 ,for instance1 among the scientific men at ,alexandria astronomy stopped at a certain point1 because the further development of this science was not compatible with the general conditions of society at that time4 ,and if ,montesquieu's attempt to subject social facts to laws failed1 it is because1 before sociology1 positive biology had first to be founded4 ,analogous examples abound1 and a contrary case has never presented itself4 ,three secondary factors1 race1 climate1 and man's political action especially modify progress1 in the measure which has just been indicated4 ,in the present state of science it is impossible to arrange them in the order of their importance4 ,montesquieu1 made too much of climates3 others have made too much of races4#bgg ,those elements of social evolution have not yet been studied by the positive method4 ,until the foundation of social dynamics their part was1 of necessity1 wrongly conceived4 ,it was not known that the essential law1 the law of the three states1 is independent of these secondary factors1 whilst on the contrary the secondary factors can only act in conformity with this law1 without ever suspending it4 ,in order that the modifications which they produce should become intelligible1 it was necessary that the normal type of evolution should first be known4 ,to study the influence of climates and of races before first possessing the general laws of social dynamics1 was1 almost1 to pretend to establish pathology without having first constituted physiology4 ,as to man's political action1 it too has been wrongly understood4 ,in the absence of a positive conception of social phenomena1 some denied the efficacy of this action1 others exaggerated it4 ,when it was used in the direction of progress1 it almost necessarily appeared to be the principal cause of the results which social evolution would have brought about in any case4 ,the illusion was all the more inevitable from the fact that social forces are always personified in individuals4 ,on the other hand1 how often have the most vigorous political efforts only been successful for a day1 because the general evolution of society was proceeding in the contrary direction6 ,so long as the theological and metaphysical period lasts1 man does not hesitate to ascribe to himself an almost boundless action upon natural phenomena4 ,having reached the positive period1 he knows that phenomena are only1 modifiable within certain limits1 determined by their laws1 and that he can only aspire to relative results4 ,once positive sociology is established it wholly transforms the familiar idea of political art4 ,but because it entertains less great and less gratifying ambitions1 this art will only be all the more effective4 ,compare what medicine and surgery are able to do to-day for the good of the sick with what they could do before chemistry and biology became positive sciences6 ,but1 it is said1 admitting that man can modify social phenomena1 what reason has he to interfere with them1 since progress takes place of itself8 ,why not allow the natural evolution which most certainly realises it to work itself out8 ,this objection confuses progress understood as a succession of states which unfold according to a law1 with progress understood in the sense of indefinite improvement4 ,on this point again the comparison of society with living organisms is instructive4 ,do not these develop in conformity with invariable laws8 ,yet1 ,comte regards them as extremely imperfect1 and in what concerns the human body1 the intervention of the doctor or the surgeon is often useful and even indispensable4 ,when we reproach the sociological theory of progress with having optimism as its consequence1 we take the scientific notion of spontaneous order for the systematic justification of any existing order4#bgh ,there is1 however1 a very long distance from one to the other4 ,spontaneous order may often be a very rough form of order4 ,here1 as everywhere else1 positive philosophy substitutes the scientific principle of the conditions of existence to the metaphysical principle of final causes4 ,it admits that spontaneously1 according to natural laws1 a certain necessary order is established2 but it acknowledges that this order offers serious and numerous disadvantages1 modifiable1 in certain degrees1 by man's intervention4 ,the more complex these phenomena1 the more are the imperfections multiplied and intensified4 ,the biological phenomena are 8inferior0 in this respect to those of inorganic nature4 ,by reason of their complication1 which is maxima1 social phenomena must be the most 8disorderly0 of all4 ,in a word if the idea of a natural law implies that of a certain order1 the notion of this order must be completed by the 8simultaneous consideration of its inevitable imperfection40 ,the theory of progress is then incompatible neither with the ascertainment of social evil1 nor with the effort to remedy it4 ,the most complex of all organisms1 the social organism1 is also the one most subject to diseases and to crises4 ,thus1 ,comte foresees in a near future great internal struggles in our society1 in consequence of our mental and moral anarchy4#bgi ,to-day1 only that is systematised which is destined to disappear1 and what is not yet systematised1 that is to say all that lives1 will not be organised without violent conflicts4 ,it is enough here to think of the relations between masters and workmen4 ,revolutions occur which nothing can prevent4 ,it is an inevitable evil1 and ,comte gives a striking psychological reason for it4 ,our mind is too weak and our life too short for us ever to form a positive idea of a social system other than the one in which we were born and in which we live4 ,it is from this one that1 willingly or unwillingly1 we draw the elements of our political and social ideas4 ,even men of a utopian turn of mind do not escape this necessity4 ,their dreams always reflect1 at bottom1 either the past1 or a contemporary social state4 ,in order that a new political system should appear1 and especially for it to find access to men's minds1 the destruction of the preceeding system must be already very far advanced4 ,until then 8even the most open minds could not perceive the characteristic nature of the new system hidden from all eyes by the spectacle of the old organisation40#bhj ,hence1 the lengthy processes of decomposition of worn-out rgimes1 the no less lengthy birth of new institutions1 and the cruel periods of transition1 full of troubles1 of wars1 and of revolutions4 ,with this same cause are connected what we may call the phenomena of survival4 ,institutions1 powers1 as also doctrines1 have a tendency to subsist beyond the function which the general advance of the human mind had assigned to them4#bha ,conflicts then take place which it is beyond anybody's power to prevent3 happy is he who can make them shorter and less acute6 ,the solution only comes with time when the vanquished ideas fall into 8disuse40 ,the combat never ceases except from the lack of combatants4 ,all this in no way excludes the possibility for man to exercise a beneficent or a detrimental action4 ,to understand is not always to justify4 ,it is true that a comprehensive view of history disposes us to be indulgent1 because it brings out the close solidarity of all the social elements of the same period4 ,the responsibilities being shared1 and so to speak diffused1 appear to be less serious for each individual4 ,nevertheless this philosophy allows praise and blame for the past1 and active intervention in social phenomena for the present4 ,but this intervention will only produce the desired results if it rests upon social science4 ,the positive polity does not propose to direct the human race towards an arbitrarily selected end4 ,it knows that humanity is moved by its own impulse1 8according to a law no less necessary1 although more modifiable than that of gravitation40#bhb ,it is only a question for politics to facilitate this advance by throwing light upon it4 ,it is a very difficult thing to undergo the action of a law without understanding it1 or to submit to it with a full knowledge of the case4 ,it remains in man's power to soften and to shorten crises1 as soon as he grasps their reasons and foresees the issue4 ,he will not pretend to govern the phenomena1 but only to modify their spontaneous development4 8,this demands that he should know their laws40#bhc ,let us also know how to own that in respect to many of these phenomena1 and not the least important of them1 we are absolutely powerless4 ,their conditions escape our grasp4 ,for instance1 the duration of human life is far from being as favourable to social evolution as might be conceived4#bhd ,on the contrary1 after the extreme imperfection of our organism1 the brevity of life is one of the causes of the slowness of social development4 ,how many powerful minds have died before their full maturity had yielded all its fruit6 ,what would not have been expected of their genius if they had been in full possession of their faculties during three or four centuries6 ,the positive theory of progress therefore entails neither optimism nor quietism4 ,the intervention of man being excluded1 the social state1 which evolves1 according to laws1 at each period is just as good and as bad as it can be1 8according to the whole of the situation40#bhe ,more than one pessimist would be satisfied with this formula4 ,it is legitimately drawn from the principle of the conditions of existence4 ,but1 truly1 from the point of view of this principle1 that is to say1 from the point of view of positive and relative philosophy1 there can be no question either of optimism or of pessimism4 ,metaphysics alone can offer an absolute judgment upon the whole of the social reality4 ,the positive doctrine1 here as elsewhere1 only seeks the statical and dynamical laws of phenomena4 ,it is true1 that it finds that the social evolution is1 as a matter of fact1 accompanied by improvement4 ,but this improvement is so slow1 so laborious1 interrupted by so many crises1 disturbed by so many conflicts1 that if humanity aspires to a better condition1 it is mainly from her own efforts that she must expect a slightly more rapid progress4 ,,footnotes3 #bei ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dcj4 #bfj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bii4 ,see also chapter ,,ii in ,book ,i4 #bfa ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bij-g4 #bfb ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ahb-f4 #bfc ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #ccb-c4 #bfd ,cours1 ,v1 #cff4 #bfe ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ahe-g4 #bff ,this referred in the ,author's mind to the famous quarrel in ,french literature between the admirers of ancient poetry like ,boileau1 who declared it to be superior to modern poetry1 and their opponents like ,perrault and ,fontenelle1 who took the contrary view4 #bfg ,cours1 ,,iv1 #beg-i4 #bfh ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #fj-c4 #bfi ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ahh4 #bgj ,pol4 ,pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #aii4 #bga ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cjd-f4 #bgb ,discours sur l'esprit positif1 p4 #ei-fj4 #bgc ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ajf-h4 #bgd ,pol4 ,pos41 ,i1 #ed-ef4 #bge ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #adj 7#h septembre1 #ahbd74 #bgf ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cad-bj4 #bgg ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #dej4 #bgh ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bgc4 #bgi ,cours1 ,,vi1 #hbe4 #bhj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cj-a2 ,v1 #bda-b4 #bha ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bff4 #bhb ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #ie4 #bhc ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cbf4 #bhd ,cours1 ,,iv1 #eaj-ab4 #bhe ,cours1 ,,iv1 #caj-aa4 ,,chapter ,v ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,history ,if social dynamics is a science1 and if the law of the three states1 discovered by ,comte1 is its fundamental law1 this law 7and those which proceed from it71 must explain the successive phases of humanity1 from the first dawn of civilisation1 to the present condition of the most advanced nations4 ,they must 8introduce unity and continuity into this immense spectacle1 where in general we see so much confusion and incoherence40#bhf ,thus the counterpart of social science is a philosophy of history4 ,in it1 social science finds its concrete expression and its verification4 ,in the absence of the prevision of social facts for the future1 a prevision which is rendered almost impossible by the extreme complication of these facts1 social science at least allows of the 8rational co-ordination0 of the whole of the past4 ,in order to establish this philosophy of history1 ,comte gave himself two postulates4 ,the first is common to him and to all those who endeavoured to set forth the evolution of humanity from its beginnings1 especially before the recent progress made by anthropology4 ,comte 8constructs0 primitive man and the society in which he lived4 ,the second postulate consists in considering1 instead of the history of the whole of humanity1 8the most complete and the most characteristic evolution10 that is to say1 that of the white race2 and in this race1 only the populations of western ,europe4#bhg ,comte will almost confine himself to the periods dealt with by ,bossuet in the ,discours sur l'histoire universelle1 which1 moreover1 he greatly esteems4 ,his philosophy of history only embraces ,egyptian civilisation1 very little known in his time1 then ,greece and ,rome1 and finally after the fall of the ,roman ,empire1 the development of some ,latin and ,germanic peoples in ,europe4 ,we can understand that ,bossuet should have so limited universal history as to include in it only a small portion of humanity gathered on the shores of the ,mediterranean4 ,he was obliged to do so by the leading idea in his work which makes the appearance of ,christianity the culminating point in the human drama4 ,all that precedes it must tend to bring it about1 all that comes after it must arise from it4 ,but is ,auguste ,comte1 like ,bossuet1 justified in leaving out of universal history the great civilisations of the far east1 almost the whole of ,africa1 and the whole of the new world8 ,since1 according to him1 there is no chosen people1 nor 8providential direction10 must he not consider the total evolution of humanity8 ,he has no right to isolate a part of it in an arbitrary manner1 and to neglect the rest4 ,he has it all the less in that he considers the species in its entirety as an individual1 and that this hypothesis of ,condorcet has become a principle of social science with him4 ,but ,comte believes his postulate to be as well justified by his definition of sociology1 as ,bossuet's plan could have been by his theological doctrine4 ,resembling on this point the other positive sciences1 sociology is made of laws not of facts4 ,the pure and simple knowledge of facts is only an end from the point of view of scholarship4 ,science only seeks for this knowledge in the measure in which it is indispensable for the determination of laws4 ,consequently1 if the evolution of human society proceeded simultaneously at different points on the globe1 as1 this evolution takes place1 as we suppose1 everywhere according to invariable laws1 and as climate and race can only modify it within very narrow limits1 the sociologist is not bound to study all the societies of the past and of the present4 ,he will only do so in order to make use of the comparative method1 in the measure which is judged useful and within the limitations permitted by this method4 ,in the second place1 among those historical evolutions1 up to the present time independent of one another1 to which will he give the preference to seek in it the verification of abstract social dynamics8 ,evidently to the most complete and the most characteristic3 for there he will have least difficulty in disengaging the laws from the extraordinary complexity of facts4 ,have we not seen that the idea of progress1 without which sociology cannot be constituted1 has only been definitely formulated since the ,french ,revolution8 ,comte then thought himself authorised to 8limit his historical study to the sole examination of a homogeneous and continuous series1 which was nevertheless justly qualified as universal40 ,at every moment in history1 the people whose evolution is most advanced represent the whole of humanity since the rest of humanity is destined1 sooner or later to pass through the same phase4 ,hence the idea1 which is found equally in ,hegel and in ,renan1 of a 8mission0 of races and of peoples4 ,a temporary mission which1 while it lasts1 constitutes their might and their right1 but which1 too often1 they have the misfortune to survive4 ,i4 ,the positive philosophy of history takes as its guiding principle the idea of unity4 ,in virtue of a postulate which is an audacious anticipation concerning an uncertain future1 the human species1 in it1 is regarded as an immense social unity4 ,similarly1 in it1 the evolution of humanity is regarded as ending in the moral and religious unity of all men4 ,humanity goes from spontaneous religion where it begins1 to demonstrated religion where it becomes finally established4 ,between the two lies the domain of history4 ,the successive states through which humanity passes in evolving are not homogeneous4 ,the theological and the positive spirit are mingled in them at various degrees4 ,they struggle one against the other4 ,these states then contain within themselves the principle of their own destruction4 ,each one necessarily prepares the appearance of the following one1 until the final state in which the positive spirit alone will predominate4 ,the spring of these concrete views of history is the logical need of unity4 ,it is this which determined the initial movement4 ,for the primitive religions1 unity was never perfect4 ,even at the period when fetichism rules without question1 some rudiments of the positive spirit exist4 ,human nature1 being invariable1 the germ of its final state was already contained in a primitive state4 ,from that time it was certain that1 if humanity emerged from its primitive state1 it would evolve until it found unity in the final religion4 ,if this be so1 how is it that ,comte did not regard the succession of religious forms as the supreme dynamic law1 as the principle of the philosophy of history8 ,why did he believe rather that he had found this principle in the law of the evolution of philosophies8 ,it is because1 according to him1 the evolution of religious forms is a function of intellectual evolution4 ,it is even subordinate to intellectual evolution1 in this sense1 that progress in the knowledge of the laws of nature sooner or later brings about a religious revolution4 ,in the second place1 if the philosophy of history had chosen the succession of religious forms as its chief axis1 it would only have studied the process of decomposition of beliefs1 which1 up to the present time1 has led them from the period when all thought is religious 7fetichism71 to that when no thought seems to be so any more 7philosophical deism74 ,it would not show at the same time the inverse and simultaneous process of the positive spirit1 which not only determines this progressive decomposition1 but also prepares the elements of a new faith4 ,it would not show how by degrees1 by means of science1 this spirit establishes a conception of nature which by becoming social will become universal1 and which will be the basis of the final religion4 ,this is why ,comte1 while making religion the chief element in individual and social human life1 was nevertheless to take the evolution of the intellect1 that is to say1 the sciences and the philosophies1 as the 8guiding thread0 of his philosophy of history4 ,,ii4 ,it does not come within the purpose of this work to give even a summary outline of the philosophy of history developed by ,comte first in the ,cours de philosophie positive1 and then in the third volume of the ,politique positive4 ,neither shall we disengage the ingenious or profound views of detail with which it abounds4 ,it will suffice for us to show how1 according to ,comte1 the laws of social dynamics are always verified1 and how apparent exceptions end by being interpreted in the direction of these laws4 ,fetichism1 properly so-called1 was succeeded by astrology1 then by polytheism1 which was first conservative 7the rgime of castes in ,egypt71 then intellectual 7,greece71 and social 7the ,roman empire74 ,with the ,christian religion monotheism comes to be substituted to polytheism4 ,but does not the theory of progress soon meet with an insurmountable obstacle8 ,how does it explain the ,middle ,ages1 that long succession of centuries which ,voltaire and the philosophers had described as full of darkness1 of superstition1 and of ignorance1 as the disgrace of history8 ,how to reconcile this lamentable 8retrogression0 with the 8continuity0 of progress affirmed by social dynamics8 ,auguste ,comte's answer is presented in two forms4 ,in the first place the 8retrogression0 was never complete4 ,at the time when the ,middle ,ages were at their darkest in ,europe1 ,arab civilisation was going through its most brilliant period4 ,in it many of the sciences were going beyond the extreme point reached by them in antiquity4 ,the continuity of evolution was then not interrupted4 ,it suffices to understand1 in conformity with the postulate laid down by ,comte at the beginning of social dynamics1 that1 at this period1 the ,arabs were the part of humanity whose intellectual evolution was most advanced1 and who1 consequently1 represented the rest4 ,but1 above all1 the current opinion concerning the ,middle ,ages is erroneous4 ,the philosophers of the ,,xviii4 century did not know it4 ,they only saw this period through their prejudices1 or rather they did not deign to look at it4 ,nevertheless1 the whole spiritual movement of modern centuries goes back to those 8memorable times1 unjustly qualified as dark by metaphysical criticism1 of which ,protestantism was the first organ40#bhh ,in the first place--and this is a capital proposition in historical philosophy#bhi--the feudal rgime as a temporal organisation1 was the natural result of the situation of the ,roman world4 ,in any case it would have been formed1 even if the invasions had not taken place4 ,in virtue of the consensus which is the fundamental principle of social statics1 the other series of phenomena which accompanied the establishment of the feudal rgime were then also produced as a 8natural development10 and it is a misunderstanding to see in them an interruption of 8progress40 ,the superiority of ,antiquity over the ,middle ,ages1 especially in the fine arts1 will be raised as an objection4 ,but ,comte only recognises this superiority in the plastic arts1 and especially in sculpture4#bij ,according to him1 it is explained by certain features in ,greek customs which were sure to make the people of antiquity incomparable in the art of expressing the beauty of the human form4 ,for the rest1 the sthetic education of humanity 8progressed during the ,middle ,ages4 ,architecture produced marvels of which antiquity had no idea4 ,dante is a unique poet4 ,modern music has its origin in the old ,gregorian4 ,finally1 the art of the ,middle ,ages presented two characteristics which the art of the aristocratic societies of antiquity did not possess1 at least in the same degree4 ,it was spontaneous1 that is to say1 in full natural harmony with the whole of the surrounding conditions4 ,consequently1 it was popular1 it expressed marvellously for the people1 the very soul of the people4 ,if then it be true that 8the mainspring of the fine arts is to be found under the sway of polytheism10 none the less has the development of our sthetic faculties been continuous3 and the law of progress has not been reversed4 ,it is true that since antiquity these faculties have not found a combination of such favourable circumstances1 such a direct and energetic stimulus2 but that proves nothing 8against their intrinsic activity1 nor against the real merit of their productions40 ,the sthetic spirit has become more widespread1 more varied1 and even more complete than it could ever have been in antiquity4#bia ,hence it is that the ,renaissance did more harm than good to the fine arts4 ,it inspired an exclusive and servile admiration for the masterpieces of antiquity1 which are related to an absolute social system4 8,in this sense10 says ,comte1 8the appreciation of the present romantic school only sins in the direction of historical exaggeration2 but its recriminations are far from being groundless40#bib ,similarly1 the intellectual activity of the ,middle ,ages has been very unjustly treated4 ,certainly1 positive philosophy cannot be suspected of partiality in favour of theological dogmas and metaphysical subtleties4 ,but1 just as in physics we distinguish the material changes1 which are within reach of our senses1 and the molecular movements which escape them1 so at certain periods the human intellect produces outside itself works which testify to its activity1 and at other moments1 without being less active its labour remains an internal one4 ,there are periods of secret and silent preparation4 ,such1 for instance1 was the first portion of the ,middle ,ages4 ,far from the human mind remaining stationary and inactive at that time it did1 on the contrary1 a very considerable work3 it was creating the modern languages1 that is to say1 the indispensable instrument for subsequent progress of thought4 ,we must also be fair to two immense series of labours1 7alchemy and astrology71 which have contributed so greatly and for so long to the development of human reason4 ,in coming after the astrologers and the alchemists1 modern scientific men not only found 8science roughly outlined by the perseverance of these bold precursors10#bic they further received from them the indispensable principle of the invariability of natural laws4 ,astrology tended to suggest a high view of human wisdom4 ,alchemy restored the feeling of man's power1 which had been lowered by theological beliefs4 ,in speaking of ,roger ,bacon1 ,comte goes so far as to say that the greater number of the scientific men of to-day who despise the ,middle ,ages so much1 would be incapable not only of writing but even of reading 8the great composition of this admirable monk10 on account of the immense variety of views on all orders of phenomena contained in it4#bid ,comte further enlarges with pleasure upon the mutual obligations of feudal tenure1 8an admirable combination of the instinct of independence and of the feeling of devotion10 upon the appearance of chivalry1 upon the raising of the condition of women1 upon the enfranchisement of the commons upon the formation of the tiers tat1 etc4#bie ,like the romantic school1 being preoccupied with the duty of fighting the systematic detractors of the ,middle ,ages1 he goes to the opposite extreme4 ,he no longer sees the famines1 the the plagues1 the stakes1 the interminable wars4 ,he is not content with showing that1 in spite of all1 the ,middle ,ages was a period of progress4 ,he wants it to be a model period1 in which we should find the indication1 in all essential aspects1 of the programme which we are to realise to-day4#bif ,the secret of ,comte's partiality for the ,middle ,ages is not hard to discover4 ,he never tires of praising the ,catholic organisation of this period1 the separation of the temporal from the spiritual power1#big last of all 8the miracle of the papal hegemony40 ,nothing of the kind was known in antiquity4 ,that alone suffices to establish the superiority of the ,middle ,ages4 ,positive philosophy will restore this separation of the two powers to-day4 ,it will complete the 8admirable sketch0 drawn of old by the ,catholic ,church4 ,positivism1 says ,huxley1 is 8,catholicism minus ,christianity40 ,comte would not have protested very violently against this definition4 ,indeed1 in the ,catholicism of the ,middle ,ages1 he distinguishes between the doctrine and the institutions4 ,the doctrine is on the decline and will disappear4 ,but the institutions were masterpieces of political wisdom1 and they have only been ruined by having seemed to be inseparable from this doctrine4 ,they ought to be re-established upon intellectual bases at once broader and more permanent4#bih ,positive philosophy furnishes these bases4 ,it will know how to restore the 8government of souls10 according to the model left by the ,catholic ,church of the ,middle ,ages4 ,it has often been said that the social action of ,catholicism was especially due to its moral teaching4 ,comte reverses this proposition4 ,the moral efficacy of ,catholicism principally depended upon the constitution of the ,church1 and only in an accessory way upon its doctrine4#bii ,without the constant action of an organised spiritual power1 a religion1 however pure it may be1 cannot have much power over the conduct of men4 ,catholicism had understood this4 ,it had founded a system of common education which was equally received by rich and poor4 ,morality thus acquired the 8ascendency which belongs to it40 ,the feelings were subjected to an admirable discipline1 which exerted itself to uproot even the smallest seeds of corruption4#cjj ,to conclude1 8the eternal honour0#cja of ,catholicism is to have brought a decisive improvement into the theory of the social organism1 by the separation of the two powers4 ,many causes have contributed to its being misunderstood2 the excessive admiration of the modern historians for the city of classical times1 the partiality of ,protestants for the early ,church1 and finally the contempt of philosophers for the supposed darkness of the ,middle ,ages4 ,we judge of it better to-day4 ,positive philosophy does not confine itself to rehabilitating the ,catholic organisation3 it takes it up again on its own account4 8,the more ,i investigate this immense subject10 writes ,comte to ,john ,stuart ,mill1 8the more confirmed ,i become in the view which ,i already held twenty years ago1 at the time of my work upon the spiritual power1 of regarding ourselves1 we1 systematic positivists1 as the real successors of the great men of the ,middle ,ages1 by taking up the social work again at the point to which ,catholicism had carried it40#cjb ,undoubtedly the conditions are not the same to-day1 and we must take the differences into account4 ,but as to the extent and the intensity of action1 we may say that for each of the social relations on which the ,catholic clergy had to pronounce1 an analogous attribution exists for the modern spiritual power4#cjc ,in a word1 excepting for the dogma1 ,comte borrows from the ,catholicism of the ,middle ,ages almost everything1 its organisation1 its rgime1 its worship1 and1 if he could1 its clergy and its cathedrals4 ,his religion will be a ,catholicism raised upon another basis4 ,,iii4 ,the separation between the temporal and spiritual power realised by ,catholicism in the ,middle ,ages marks a decisive progress in the history of humanity4 ,but it was not finally established4 ,the rgime of which it formed a part was bound to disappear1 because of the 8mutual antipathy0 between the elements included within it4 ,the ,catholic organisation of the thirteenth century was first shaken and then destroyed by the advancing ascendancy of the positive spirit1 and the resistance of theological dogma4 ,from this 8organic0 period ,european society has passed to a 8critical0 period which has filled centuries1 and which positive philosophy alone is able to bring to a close4 ,the whole of modern history1 political1 religious1 scientific1 sthetic1 economic1 etc41 is1 at bottom1 merely the succession of the necessary stages in this double work2 the decomposition of the rgime of the ,middle ,ages1 and the preparation for the positive period4 ,in a first phase1 which occupies the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries1 the movement remains a spontaneous one4 ,it ignores the end to which it is tending4 ,in the second1 which extends to the end of the eighteenth century1 the disorganisation becomes deeper under the influence of an entirely negative philosophy4#cjd ,the first signs of the decomposition which was beginning were of an economic order4 ,the phenomena of this order are indeed a factor of the highest importance in the whole of social life4 ,the economic evolution1 according to ,comte1 necessarily precedes the sthetic and scientific evolution4 ,it is the former1 far more than the two latter1 which characterises our civilisation in contrast with the societies of antiquity4#cje ,through it the organisation of modern societies was to begin4 ,the freeing of the serfs1 the foundation of independent urban communes1 the transformation of industry which arose from this1 are described by ,comte almost in the same terms as those used by ,augustin ,thierry1 7who like him had worked by the side of ,saint-,simon74 ,it is the ending of an economic organisation1 and the heralding of a new rgime4 ,when this spontaneous decomposition had reached a certain point1 the critical doctrines could appear and push it further4 ,but1 to see in these doctrines the original cause of this great movement1 is to credit them with an exaggerated influence1 and even1 strictly speaking1 an incomprehensible one4 ,in order that doctrines may arise and prosper they must find favourable ground4 ,the contrary opinion exaggerates 8beyond all possibility0 the political influence of the intellect1 and creates a kind of vicious circle4#cjf ,the principle of 8free examination0 was at first1 in the ,,xvi century1 only a natural result of the new social situation gradually brought about by the two preceding centuries4 ,for this principle corresponds to a state of 8non-government0 of minds4 ,and this state1 in turn1 comes from the progressive dissolution of mental discipline4 ,it lasts so long as a spiritual power has not been reconstituted upon new foundations4 ,in a society where spiritual power is normally exercised1 that is to say1 where it governs the universality of minds1 united by a body of common beliefs1 the need of intellectual liberty is not developed in individuals4 ,at any rate it does not challenge unanimously accepted principles4 ,but1 when this power is weakened1 the principles begin to be discussed4 ,each one soon claims to be a judge of their value4 ,everything then depends on the combination of social conditions4 ,we can no more produce than we can stifle this disposition of minds1 8outside the conditions which are favourable or unfavourable to it40 ,it is only developed during the periods which are not 8organic40 8,it is through having misunderstood this law of social statics that so many historical errors have been committed1 in which the symptom is mistaken for the cause1 and the result for the principle40#cjg ,the first general form of the principle of freedom of examination expressed itself in ,protestantism4 ,in it this freedom at first remained confined within the more or less narrow limits of ,christian theology4 ,the spirit of criticism at first especially endeavoured1 in the very name of ,christianity1 to ruin the admirable system of the ,catholic hierarchy1 which was its social realisation4 ,this is the characteristic inconsequence of the metaphysical spirit1 which always denies the logical deductions while claiming to maintain the principles1 and which1 in this particular case1 aspired to reform ,christianity at the same time that it destroyed the necessary conditions of its existence1 that is to say1 its organisation4 ,in the same way1 as in the ,catholicism of the ,middle ,ages1 ,comte chiefly admires 8the masterpiece of political wisdom10 which knew how to separate the attributes of temporal power from those of spiritual power2 so in ,protestantism he especially sees the destructive principle of this masterpiece4 ,he unceasingly reproaches it with having subordinated the spiritual to the temporal power in the whole of ,europe4 ,this 8chief perturbation0 was the origin of all the others4 ,in accordance with the leaders of the traditionalist school1 with de ,maistre and de ,bonald in ,france1 with ,haller in ,germany1 ,comte insists upon the close relationship between the ,protestant spirit and the revolutionary spirit4 ,once it has been demanded1 the right of examination spreads by a necessity which is at once mental and social and cannot be overcome1 to all individuals and all questions4 ,the name of ,protestantism should not be restricted to religious reform4 ,it is no less suitable for the whole of the revolutionary philosophy4 ,for this philosophy1 from ,lutheranism to the ,deism of the ,,xviii4 century1 8without excluding ,atheism which constitutes its extreme phase0 is a protestation1 at first against the principles of the old social order1 and then against any organisation1 whatever4#cjh ,the 8absolute and indefinite0 dogma of free examination sets up each individual judgment as an arbiter upon all social questions4 ,from this dogma gradually emerge absolute liberty in speaking and writing1 the political sovereignty of the masses at will creating or destroying institutions1 the equality of all men1 the isolation of nations3 in a word1 as ,haller has said1 8social and political atomism40 ,these consequences had become inevitable from the day when ,protestantism gave the supreme decision in religious questions to every one1 without taking into account conditions either of competence1 or authority4 ,this first step was a decisive one4 ,if1 supposing an impossibility1 modern society were replaced in the state in which it was when ,protestantism succeeded in becoming established1 the same necessary succession of social and political consequences would again unfold themselves4 ,after that1 it matters little that ,protestantism should have fought against the revolutionary spirit1 and that it should have disavowed 8anarchical0 philosophy4 ,it matters little that it should have made repeated efforts to constitute a spiritual authority1 and that it should have produced a multitude of sects 8of which each pitied the preceding one and abhorred the one which followed it40#cji ,whatever it may do1 ,protestantism remains purely critical1 negative and disorganising4 ,consequently the part it plays can only be transitory4 ,it contains no element which the positive organisation should preserve4 ,it naturally ends in philosophical ,deism4 ,this ,deism appears as early as the ,,xvii4 century in ,england1 and in ,holland with ,hobbes1 ,spinoza and ,bayle4 ,the right of examination is henceforth recognised as indefinite in principle1 but in fact1 it is thought possible to maintain the metaphysical discussion within the more general limits of monotheism4#caj ,at bottom they continue 8to destroy religion in the name of the religious principle40 ,a 8rational theology0 is constructed2 and the natural religion1 dear to the ,,xviii4 century1 is finally reached4 ,now1 in ,comte's eyes1 rational theology is an 8incoherent expression10#caa and natural religion 8a monstrous drawing together of terms40 ,as if every religion 7with the exception of the positive one71 was not necessarily supernatural6 ,the harmony between reason and belief1 even when sought for with perfect sincerity1 is deadly for faith4 ,for the strength of theological conceptions lies in their spontaneity4 ,logical proof1 even admitting that it be really demonstrative1 never fortifies and can only weaken them4 ,the innumerable proofs of the existence of ,god which have appeared since the ,,xii4 century1 not only state the bold doubts of which this existence has been the object3 it can also be asserted that they have largely contributed to the propagation of those doubts1 8either through the contempt which the weakness of many of these arguments was bound to reflect upon ancient beliefs1 or even by consideration of the strongest of these arguments40#cab ,popular instinct was not mistaken in calling the metaphysicians who were working at these proofs atheists4 ,their work was essentially anti-theological4 ,our century sees it in another light4 ,as the decay of theology still continues1 that which formerly was judged by public opinion as impious1 may to-day appear to be a pious occupation4 ,the criticism of religious beliefs has been developed and spread without giving too much offence to temporal power1 thanks to the care taken by philosophers in general to reassure it upon the immediate consequences of their labours4 ,hobbes in the ,,xvii4 century1 ,voltaire in the ,,xviii4 are as conservative from the political point of view as they are revolutionary from the religious point of view4 ,the precaution was a very wise one on their part4 ,but it did not arrest the consequences which arose from their principles4 ,critical philosophy1 urging the dogma of the freedom of examination to the assault of all the principles of the established rgime1 shook and ruined them one after the other1 until the 8final explosion0 of the ,french ,revolution4 ,this was the conclusion in fact of the long work of decomposition which had been going on during five centuries4 ,the old rgime was rotten2 the ,revolution overturned it1 meaning to clear the ground4 ,but did it lay down the basis of the rgime which was to succeed this one8 ,it did not1 replies ,comte with ,saint-,simon and de ,maistre4 ,he admires the energy of the political gifts of the ,convention4 ,nevertheless it was wrong in believing that 8critical0 principles could take the place and carry out the functions of 8organic0 principles4 ,so long as the struggle lasted1 the critical principles had been all the more effective in that they were credited with an absolute value4 ,thus the dogma of boundless liberty of conscience had served to destroy the spiritual power of the catholic clergy1 the dogma of the sovereignty of the people to upset the temporal government1 finally the dogma of natural equality to decompose the system of social classes4 ,but1 once the old rgime was abolished the error of taking these dogmas as the basis of 8reorganisation0 was committed4 ,it was not seen that they were incompatible not only with the rgime which they had just destroyed1 but with any social system whatever4 ,in this way it is moral and political disorder which was upheld as the end of social perfection4 ,for1 each of the dogmas of the critical doctrine1 when it is taken in an organic sense1 8comes exactly to lay down as a principle that in this particular respect society must not be organised40#cac ,what becomes of government1 for instance in this system8 8,by a direct and total supervision of the most fundamental political notions10 government is represented1 the necessary enemy of society4#cad ,the latter must always hold it in a state of suspicion and of supervision1 it must more and more restrict its modes of activity1 and finally only leave it functions of general police1 without its contributing in any way to the direction of the collective life and social development4 ,in a word1 with no action upon ideas1 upon beliefs or feelings1 the government would only have charge of the protection of interests4 ,but is not this formally denying the very idea of government1 which by definition1 should on the contrary represent 8the spirit of the whole10 and the 8directing function0 of society8 ,is it not giving up at the same time the great progress realised by the ,middle ,ages1 that is to say a spiritual power independent of the temporal power8 ,even considering interests alone1 this system only maintains order with great difficulty4 ,it is obliged to have recourse to corruption1 and it leads to continual increase in public expenditure4 ,the principles of critical philosophy cannot then be used as a foundation for a new social organisation4 ,the attempt has been made and has been condemned by history4 ,this failure could have been foretold4 ,for1 being essentially metaphysical1 this philosophy implies a contradiction which necessarily renders it powerless4 ,it tends to preserve the general bases of the old political system1 whose chief conditions of existence it has however destroyed4#cae ,there is a very close relationship between the natural religion of philosophers and the political conceptions of the revolutionists4 ,the latter are still connected by their deepest roots with the old order of beliefs which they have fought against with all their strength4 ,liberty1 equality1 the sovereignty of the people1 the whole of the 8absolute0 rights which constitute the basis of the revolutionary doctrine is shielded1 in the last place1 by a kind of 8religious although vague consecration40 ,the ,french ,revolution was the work of the ,deists4 ,comte has set apart the thinkers of the ,,xviii century whom he considers as his precursors1 that is to say1 as the anticipatory representatives of the positive spirit3 ,fontenelle1 ,hume1 ,montesquieu1 ,diderot1 and d',alembert1 ,turgot1 ,condorcet and a few others4 ,he judges the rest of the philosophy of the century more severely4 ,he does not spare the ,encyclopdie1 and in the majority of the philosophical writings of this period he finds little but 8a frivolous and feeble sophistic argumentation40 ,circumstances almost alone have made its success4 ,this philosophy is incomparably inferior to that which the counter-revolution opposed to it4 ,in the logical respect which finally predominates1 says ,comte1 the revolutionary criticism cannot to-day resist the system of the 8retrograde school40 ,in a regular discussion1 the latter would soon have compelled it to admit that it allows the essential principles of the old rgime while refusing to accept their most indispensable consequences4#caf ,the inmost contradiction from which the revolutionary philosophy suffers will become more and more apparent4 ,a not far distant moment will arrive when the effort to restore the past will include a large number of those who have contributed to its destruction4 ,the partisans of natural religion1 and even those of the most advanced ,deism will rally to ,catholicism as to the real foundation of the social organisation which they defend4 ,the alternative will then be set up between the only two solutions which are logical and organic3 either the old rgime1 with the ,catholic organisation1 or the new1 with the positive organisation4 ,between these two there is no room for the critical1 liberal1 metaphysical1 revolutionary system1 which1 by whatever name it may be called1 signifies 8no organisation at all40 ,,iv4 ,the old rgime was bound to perish because in it1 the social organisation was connected with a system of beliefs and of dogmas which could not withstand the spirit of investigation4 ,in order that the new rgime may escape this cause of death1 must it be able without suffering to bear the indefinite exercise of an absolute freedom of examination8----,no1 replies ,comte1 there is no system capable of enduring under these conditions4 ,but it suffices that in constituting itself1 the new faith1 which is the basis of social order1 should have undergone the test of free examination as we see it practised in the positive sciences4 ,it suffices that1 instead of a revealed faith1 we should have a demonstrated faith which will then be immovable1 and which will no more have to be called in question4 ,comte then admits the preliminary test1 but he is opposed to free examination indefinitely renewed4 ,this distinction allows us to reconcile some of his declarations which otherwise would appear contradictory4 ,his language differs according as he speaks of the positive dogma in the process of formation1 or of that dogma once it has been formed4 ,when it is in process of formation the dogma is subject to criticism1 and if it is not victorious in resisting it it does not become an object of belief4 ,no matter how much we may deplore the ever-dissolving energy of the spirit of analysis and of examination1 it remains beneficial none the less1 by compelling1 for the intellectual and moral reorganisation1 the production of a philosophy capable of sustaining the decisive test of a deep discussion1 8freely prolonged until the entire conviction of public reason0 has taken place4 ,this is a condition from which nothing henceforth can exempt us4#cag ,the spiritual reorganisation1 says ,comte1 will be the result of purely intellectual action4 ,it supposes a voluntary and unanimous assent at the end of complete discussion without the intervention of the spiritual powers to hasten the conclusion4 ,but does it follow that freedom of examination should remain indefinitely without limits8 ,undoubtedly it has been a good thing that men should see in this liberty an indefeasible right which they were all to enjoy4 ,the dissolution of old beliefs in this way was easier and more rapid4 ,the better this 8singular phase0 in our social development is analysed1 the more will the conviction gain ground that without the conquest and use of this unlimited freedom social reorganisation could not have been prepared4 ,but this singular phase was a transitory one4 ,when it has been gone through1 when common principles have again become universally accepted1 8after sufficient verification10 the right of examination will again return within its normal and permanent limits1 which consist in discussing the connection of consequences with fundamental and uniformly respected rules1 but without again questioning these rules themselves4#cah ,the question then reduces itself to knowing when the test may be legitimately considered as at an end4 ,will the individual approbation of all the members of society be required1 and a kind of consecration by universal suffrage8 ,as a matter of fact1 such unanimity will perhaps never be realised4 ,in justice it is not necessary4 ,when we demand it we forget that ,politic science is a positive science1 the highest and most complicated of all4 ,no one possesses any authority in the sciences if he is not competent4 ,the people has no thought of making its opinion prevail in them2 and1 in matters of science1 all who are not in a condition to understand demonstrations are the people4 ,the convergence of intellects presupposes the voluntary and intentional renunciation on the part of the greater number of their 8sovereign right of examination40#cai ,in this way the right is taken from no one4 ,the use of it is simply intrusted by those who are incompetent to the competent ones4 ,this intrusting1 freely accepted by all1 lasts as long as the conditions which made it necessary4 ,no moral order could be compatible with the 8wandering liberty of minds at the present time10 if it were to persist indefinitely4 ,it is not possible that any man1 whether he be competent or not1 should every day call into discussion the very bases of society4 8,systematic tolerance cannot exist1 and has never really existed1 except on the subject of opinions which are regarded as indifferent or as doubtful40#cbj ,such is the meaning of the celebrated passages on liberty of conscience with which ,comte has so often been reproached4 ,he had written it in #ahbb1 and quoted it himself in the fourth volume of the ,cours de philosophie positive1#cba never suspecting that anything could be said against it4 8,there is no liberty of conscience in astronomy1 in physics1 in chemistry1 in physiology1 in the sense that everyone would deem it absurd not to take on trust the principles established in these sciences by competent men4 ,if it is otherwise in politics1 it is because the old principles have fallen1 and1 as the new ones are not yet formed1 there are1 properly speaking1 in this interval no established principles40 ,it is then in no way a question of imposing beliefs upon men of which they are not to judge1 by a kind of spiritual despotism4 ,comte merely wishes to extend to politics1 considered as a positive science1 what is admitted in the other sciences by common consent4 ,v4 ,without much trouble1 it is easy to see whence originate the essential features of this philosophy of history4 ,in so far as it represents the development of humanity as subject to a law of evolution1 which causes it to go through a succession of phases whose order is rationally determined1 in a word as progress1 the leading-idea is due to ,comte's 8spiritual father10 to ,condorcet4 ,for the interpretation of more recent events1 and for the judgment passed upon the ,middle ,ages1 ,comte draws his inspiration from ,joseph de ,maistre1 from the traditionalist school1 and from ,saint-,simon4 ,to the latter1 among other ideas1 ,comte owes the distinction between the critical and the organic periods4 ,but1 on ,comte's own confession1 ,joseph de ,maistre's influence over his mind was especially decisive4 ,like de ,maistre1 he thinks that the entirely negative philosophy of the ,,xviii4 century knew very well how to destroy1 but showed itself powerless to construct4 ,like de ,maistre again1 he is persuaded of the fact that social order requires a spiritual power beside the temporal power1 and that the rgime of the ,middle ,ages was a 8masterpiece of political wisdom0 precisely because at that period the ,catholic ,church had brought about the independence of the spiritual power4 ,finally1 like de ,maistre1 he makes the salvation of humanity in the future depend upon their return to a unity of beliefs4 ,comte then equally proceeds from the learned ideologist with whom the philosophical effort of the ,,xviii4 century ends1 and from the ardent traditionalist for whom this very century is the abhorred period of error and of moral perversion4 ,he undertakes1 not indeed to reconcile them 7who can reconcile things which exclude each other871 but to found a more comprehensive doctrine in which he will combine what he has received from the one and the other4 ,as such his own task appears to him1 and he does not believe it to be above his power2 he feels himself in a position to avoid the mistakes which his predecessors were bound to make4 ,condorcet had a clear idea of social science2 but that did not prevent him from misunderstanding the real onward movement of the human mind1 and only to estimate his own century justly at the expense of preceding periods4 ,de ,maistre in his turn1 no less prejudiced1 though in another way1 does not understand history any better4 ,to restore society1 to re-establish it in the state in which it was in the ,,xiii4 century1 he goes to absurd lengths4 ,he claims to take no notice of the advance of civilisation1 and of the development of the sciences4 ,condorcet1 who brought to light the idea of progress1 understood nothing in the ,middle ,ages4 ,de ,maistre1 who so clearly saw the excellence of the ,middle ,ages1 denies the glaring fact of progress4 ,both are excusable1 because they were still too close to the ,french ,revolution to grasp its full meaning4 ,in the heart of the fray they were still partially blinded4 ,comte1 who sees things from a greater distance1 also sees them from a higher standpoint4 ,he especially has at his disposal an instrument which neither ,condorcet nor de ,maistre possessed3 he has completed the positive method1 and he applies it to the science of historical phenomena4 ,in a word1 he has founded ,sociology4 ,if he did not push social science as far forward as he believed1 at any rate he was right in thinking that his originality lay in this attempt4 ,the problem was clearly set3 to blend into a new and positive science the social ideas proceeding from the speculation of the ,,xviii4 century with the historical truths brought to light by the adversaries of this philosophy4 ,the solution given by ,comte is the very soul of his system4 ,by a twofold and vigorous effort1 he created 8social physics40 ,on the one hand1 he carries to the past the idea of progress which ,condorcet could only apply to the future1 and this allowed him to institute a positive philosophy of history4 ,at the same time1 he projects into the future that spiritual order which de ,maistre had only seen in the past1 and this furnishes him with the frame for his 8social reorganisation04 ,this philosophy of history1 which no longer contains anything metaphysical1 is social dynamics2 this 8reorganisation0 of society1 by means of a spiritual power1 will be the positive polity4 ,,footnotes3 #bhf ,cours1 ,,vi1 #deg4 #bhg ,cours1 ,v1 #d-e4 #bhh ,cours1 ,v1 #cfj-a3 ,,vi1 #ej4 #bhi ,cours1 ,v1 #cah4 #bij ,cours1 ,v1 #abd-g4 #bia ,cours1 ,,vi1 #adh4 #bib ,cours1 ,,vi1 #aef-g4 #bic ,cours1 ,,vi1 #bdh4 #bid ,cours1 ,,vi1 #aid4 #bie ,cours1 ,v1 #cbe4 #bif ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #aba-aca4 #big ,cours1 ,v1 #cjf sq4 #bih ,cours1 ,v1 #cfb4 #bii ,cours1 ,v1 #cce4 #cjj ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii4 #cja ,cours1 ,v1 #eda-e4 #cjb ,correspondance de ,comte et de ,john ,stuart ,mill1 p4 #deh 7#ad1 juillet #ahde47 #cjc ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #aic4 #cjd ,cours1 ,v1 #dac4 #cje ,cours1 ,,vi1 #bc4 #cjf ,cours1 ,v1 #dad4 #cjg ,cours1 ,v1 #cad-af4 #cjh ,cours1 ,v1 #dca-cc2 #dfg-h2 #eaa-ac4 #cji ,cours1 ,v1 #eca4 #caj ,cours1 ,v1 #dce4 #caa ,cours1 ,,vi1 #bcf4 #cab ,cours1 ,v1 #ehi4 #cac ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #ahj-a4 #cad ,cours1 ,,vi1 #cf4 #cae ,cours1 ,,iv1 #fj4 #caf ,cours1 ,,iv1 #aei4 #cag ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ge sq4 #cah ,cours1 ,,iv1 #dj4 #cai ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ajj4 #cbj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #df4 #cba ,cours1 ,,iv1 #df4 ,,book ,,iv ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,ethics ,in ,comte's system ,ethics occupies an intermediate place between theoretical philosophy and politics4 ,ethics rests upon the philosophy as ,politics rests on the principles of ,ethics4 ,ethics is not an abstract speculative science2 it does not therefore belong to the hierarchy of the fundamental sciences4 ,it is true that1 at the end of his life1 ,comte added a seventh to the six sciences of the early list1#cbb which precisely was ethics1 that is to say the science of the laws which govern the emotions1 passions1 desires1 etc41 of man considered as an individual4 ,but here it is more a question of ethical psychology than of ethics understood in the sense usual with philosophers4 ,the latter1 in ,comte's eyes1 never constituted the object of a special science4 ,as a matter of fact1 either the laws of moral phenomena are studied1 and this research1 founded upon the positive knowledge of individual and collective human nature1 forms a part of sociology4 ,or1 starting from the knowledge of these laws1 we ask ourselves what would be the best use for the power possessed by man of modifying phenomena2 in this case it is an art whose rules must be determined4 ,but for these rules to be rationally established1 social science itself must be rationally founded4 ,thus1 from the practical as from the speculative point of view1 positive ethics depends upon sociology4 ,i4 ,in the ,,xviii4 cent4 ,comte distinguishes three schools of ,ethics3 the utilitarian school1 especially represented in his view by ,helvetius2 the ,kantian ,school1 which he knows through ,cousin2 and finally the philosophy of the moral sentiment2 that is to say1 the ,scottish school2 by none of the three is he fully satisfied4 ,the ,utilitarianism of ,helvetius rests upon an inadequate psychology1 which distorts human nature by denying against all evidence the existence of altruistic inclinations4 ,he involuntarily tends to 8reduce all the social relations to low coalitions of private interests40 ,the ethics of duty1 as presented by ,cousin1 at any rate1 organises 8a kind of mystification1 in which the so-called permanent disposition of each one to direct his conduct according to the abstract idea of duty would end in a small number of clever schemers taking advantage of the human race40 ,these remarks1 in ,comte's mind address themselves less to the doctrine than to the person of ,cousin4 ,finally the ,scottish school was nearer to the truth than the others1 since it admitted the existence of the altruistic tendencies beside the selfish ones4 ,but it lacked precision and strength4 ,these various schools of ethics had a common failing by which they stood condemned as erroneous3 they were constituted before the science of human nature had become positive4 ,thus utilitarian morality is quite deducible from a psychology such as that of ,condillac3 but this 8metaphysical0 psychology treated man chiefly as a reasoning and calculating being1 and misunderstood the preponderance of the affective faculties4 ,in the same way1 the 8german10 that is to say ,cousin's philosophy1 represents the ego as being free1 of an absolute freedom1 and as being subjected to no law whatever3 hence a strange and metaphysical system of ethics of duty4 ,theological doctrines of ethics hitherto have been very superior to those which have been produced by philosophical speculation4 ,the reason for this is simple4 ,without any scientific apparatus1 religion implies a far more exact psychology than that of philosophers up to the present time4 ,it deals with man 8concrete0 and real4 ,it was bound not to misunderstand the relative importance of his faculties1 and the respective power of his inclinations and his passions4 ,the priest very often has a better knowledge of men than the metaphysician4 ,comte especially admires ,christian morality or1 more precisely1 the teaching of this morality as it was given by the ,catholic church in the ,middle ,ages4 8,all the different branches of this morality have received most important improvements from ,catholicism40 ,in saying 8,love thy neighbour as thyself10 in making charity the supreme virtue1 in fighting against selfishness as the source of all vices1 ,christian morality has taught what above all other things must be engraved upon men's hearts4 ,positive philosophy will use the same language4 8,for anyone who has gone deeply into the study of humanity1 universal love as ,catholicism conceived it is still more important than the intellect itself in the economy of our individual or social existence1 because to the gain of each one and of all1 love makes use even of the least of our mental faculties1 while selfishness disfigures or paralyses even the best dispositions40#cbc ,but the greatest merit of ,catholicism has been that it considered ethics as 8the first of social necessities40 ,everything is subordinated to it3 it is subordinated to nothing4 ,it dominates the entire life of man so as ceaselessly to direct and control all his actions4 ,in ancient society1 morals depended upon politics4 ,in ,christian society even politics borrows its principles from morals4 ,that was the finest triumph of 8,catholic wisdom10 which instituted a spiritual power independent of the temporal power4 ,unfortunately this pure and lofty morality has linked its destinies with those of ,catholicism4 ,now1 ,catholicism has been unable to keep pace with the progress of the intellect and of the positive method4 ,at first it gave proof of 8admirable liberality40 ,later it became indifferent1 and then hostile1 to scientific progress4 ,finally it showed itself to be 8retrograde10 when it had to struggle for its own existence4 ,catholic dogmas underwent a decomposition the necessary stages of which have been already described#cbd as it was bound to happen1 and as a matter of fact did happen1 the morality itself came to be affected by the attacks which were loosening the foundations of dogma4 ,the work of criticism1 after having successively ruined all the foundations of the old intellectual system1 was subsequently to attack those of ethics4 ,so we see the family1 marriage1 heredity1 8assailed by senseless sects40#cbe ,to be sure1 private morality depends upon other conditions than those of unanimous opinions immovably established4 ,natural feeling speaks in it4 ,nevertheless it is not beyond the reach of 8corrosive discussion10 when opinions of this kind are lacking1 but public morality is all the more threatened4 ,here1 without naming them1 but clearly pointing them out1 ,comte attacks the schools of ,saint-,simon and ,fourier4 8,while dreaming about reorganisation of society they only developed the most dangerous anarchy40 ,saint-,simonism endeavoured to ruin the family which the revolutionary storm1 8with a few exceptions10 had respected4 ,fourierism denies the most general and the commonest principle of individual morality3 the subordination of the passion to reason4 ,must we then go back1 as the retrograde school would have us do1 and in order to save morality base it once again upon revealed religion8 ,but the remedy1 if it be not worse than the disease1 is at least powerless to cure it4 ,how could the religious dogmas be used as a support for morality when they cannot sustain themselves8 ,what1 in the future1 can we expect from beliefs which have not withstood the progress of reason8 ,far from being able to furnish a solid basis for morality to-day1 religious beliefs tend more and more to become doubly detrimental to it4 ,on the one hand they are opposed to the human mind placing it on a more solid foundation2 and1 on the other hand1 they are not active enough1 even among those who believe in them1 to exert a marked influence upon conduct4 ,the clearest result of these dogmas is to inspire the greater number of men who are still imbued with them1 with an instinctive and insurmountable hatred of those who have shaken them off4 ,,ii4 ,being founded upon positive science1 ,comte's ethics will reproduce its essential characteristics4 ,in the first place it will be 8real10 that is to say it will rest upon observation and not upon imagination4 ,it will consider man as he is and not as he fancies himself to be4 ,it will then rest1 not upon the abstract analysis which he may make of his own heart1 but upon the proofs given by humanity of its inclinations and of the usual motives for its actions1 during the centuries made known to us by history4 ,in a word1 through the use of an objective and truly scientific method1 it will avoid serious causes for mistakes4 ,being positive1 this morality will be relative4 ,for the immediate and necessary consequence of the relativity of knowledge is the relativity of morality4 ,kant1 whom ,comte himself called 8the last of his great precursors10 attempted to preserve an absolute character for ethics3 it is because1 at bottom1 he also preserved metaphysics4 ,the moral law1 says ,kant1 is universally valid for every free and reasonable being4 ,but the only species of beings of this kind which we know1 the human species1 is developed in time according to the laws of a necessary progress4 ,at every stage in this development it was not possessed of an equal aptitude for understanding a moral law4 ,the most we can say is that1 with time1 the aptitude becomes greater and greater4 ,then1 the existence of our species depends upon a great number of natural conditions--astronomical1 physical1 biological1 sociological4 ,if these conditions were different1 which is not an absurd hypothesis1 our morality would be different also4 ,it is then relative at once to our situation and to our organisation40 ,the idea of a relative morality is still a source of anxiety to many minds1 who take it to be a preliminary step towards the negation of all morality4 ,they think that1 either good is absolute or the distinction between good and evil vanishes2 there is no middle course4 ,however1 history shows that there is a way out of such deadlocks4 ,was not a similar dilemma put on the subject of knowledge8 ,was it not even said3 either truth is absolute1 or there is not truth at all8 ,the dilemma was a false one4 ,the human mind has become accustomed to relative truths2 and an analogous solution will end by being also accepted for ethics4 ,the acknowledgment of its relativity will not be any more fatal for it than it has been for science4 ,as the distinction between the true and the false subsists1 although good is no longer conceived as absolute and immutable1 so the distinction between good and evil subsists1 although good is no longer conceived as a supreme theological or metaphysical reality1 but as a 8progress0 towards an end indefinitely approached but never reached4 ,the evolution of morality corresponds to that of knowledge4 ,both go through successive phases1 of which each one implies the preceding ones1 and preserves while modifying them4 ,there are then 8goods0 as there are 8truths10 provisional and temporary4 ,positive philosophy can thus give a reason for moral ideas1 sometimes so poor and even so horrible1 upon which humanity formerly lived4 ,it does not judge the ethics of the past as compared with the ideals of to-day4 ,it gives full justice to the theological and philosophical ethics which it replaces1 and of which it proclaims itself the legitimate heir4 ,finally it claims neither to be moral nor original in morality4 ,already positive science is 8a prolongation of public reason40 ,in its nature it does not differ from simple commonsense1 to which it owes its essential ideas3 only in science these ideas assume a more systematic definition1 and an abstract character which allows us to make the most thorough use of them4 ,in the same way systematic morality is a prolongation of spontaneous morality4#cbf ,it simply disengages the principles which1 as a matter of fact1 have directed the moral development of humanity4 ,does it follow from this that it only has1 so to speak1 an interest for curiosity1 and that moral progress takes place of itself as rapidly and as completely as possible1 even if philosophical reflection is not applied to it8 ,but ,comte has already replied to this form of inept sophism4 ,what is true of the evolution of humanity in general is true of the moral evolution included in it4 ,this evolution allows of crises1 of diseases1 of stoppages in development1 etc4 ,it is then not at all a matter of indifference that systematic morality should bring out strongly the end towards which man's efforts must tend1 according to his nature and to the whole of the conditions in which he is placed4 ,by throwing light upon its advance it helps progress as effectually as it is in man's power to help it4 ,,iii4 ,in its positive form the enunciation of the moral problem is as much as possible to make the sympathetic instincts predominate over the selfish impulses1 8sociability over personality40#cbg ,that human nature admits of sympathetic instincts1 or1 according to the name given them by ,comte1 altruistic instincts1 is not a postulate but a fact4 ,positive psychology proves it4 ,it is one of the solid portions of ,gall's doctrine4 ,to be convinced of this it is enough to observe men1 children1 and even animals4 ,without these instincts1 moreover1 society would not subsist4 ,metaphysicians who considered man as a being acting chiefly through reasoning1 may have imagined a society founded upon the expressed or tacit consent of the contracting parties4 ,in reality1 before all things men obey their inclinations4 ,if they live in society1 it is assuredly because their affective faculties lead them to it4 ,without inborn altruistic tendencies there can be no society and no morality4 ,but biology has proved that1 since organic life preponderates over animal life1 the selfish instincts are naturally stronger than the sympathetic ones4 ,how could the latter succeed first in counter-balancing and then in dominating the former8 ,this problem would have no solution if the progressive ascendency of the altruistic instincts1 very weak originally1 were not favoured by two orders of conditions1 the one subjective1 the other objective1 whose action is unceasingly felt4 ,the following development of domestic and social affection is1 in the first place1 the result of the fact that man lives in society1 and1 consequently1 in continual relation with his neighbours and his fellows4 ,for1 as we know1 habitual exercise favours the development of organs and of functions4 ,further1 the natural inferiority of the altruistic inclinations is compensated for by their aptitude for 8indefinite extension40 ,they can grow in all the members of a group at the same time4 ,far from their being obstacles in each other's way1 the stronger altruism in one awakens and encourages nascent altruism in others4 ,on the contrary1 forms of selfishness tend to exclude each other4 ,save in the case of a more or less durable coalition1 their rival claims clash with each other1 to the peril of social peace4 ,they are bound to make mutual concessions4 ,they are never altogether repressed2 however1 social life obliges them to dissimulate and to restrain their most violent outbursts4 ,add to this that the benevolent affections find in themselves their own satisfaction1 and that this satisfaction is inexhaustible4 ,we tire of acting1 said ,comte1 we even tire of thinking2 we never tire of loving4 ,the affections which it is sweetest to experience have also a tendency to occupy a larger and larger place in the heart of man4 ,moreover the question for them is not to take the place of egoism but to hold it more and more in check4 ,if human nature evolves it is1 as we know1 without any essential transformation4 ,the preponderance of selfishness in us is connected with organic reasons which are beyond our power and which will never change4 ,to wish to uproot egoism is folly2 qui veut faire l'ange fait la bte4 ,whatever efforts we make1 we cannot permanently change the relations between our altruistic and egoistic instincts4 ,the latter will always be the strongest4 ,but we can regard this change as an ideal which we shall approach always without ever actually reaching it4#cbh ,finally1 it is rare that our selfish instincts do not awaken some altruistic feeling as a counter-result4 ,for example1 the sexual instinct determines the development of maternal love4 ,the desire to impose one's will generates devotion to the common weal4 ,once the benevolent affection has arisen it persists and grows1 and1 after the selfish instinct has ceased to operate1 it is sometimes sought after for its own sake4 ,this fact1 says ,comte1 greatly facilitates the 8solution of the great human problem40#cbi ,this solution would however remain exceedingly uncertain and very precarious if its only guarantee were the whole of the subjective conditions which have just been analysed4 ,for1 in order that it may become established and last1 this group of conditions itself requires what ,comte calls an 8objective basis40 ,the moral order within us must be united to the order of the world outside ourselves4 ,it is true that1 including the altruistic ones1 our inclinations tend to become spontaneously developed4 ,but it is also true that the external world tends constantly to modify them1 through the medium of the impressions which it makes upon us4 ,for the development of these inclinations is necessarily affected by the direction of our conceptions and by the success of our undertakings4 ,now both are ever becoming more subordinated to external order1 since the end of science is to know this order1 and that of the useful arts is to modify it4 ,in this way1 independently of ourselves1 order tends in a twofold manner to regulate our instincts1 8either by the excitement resulting from the notions which it procures1 or by exercise corresponding to the efforts which it demands40#ccj ,in a word1 the laws of the 8milieu0 in which we live act like a regulation upon our inclinations4 ,although an indirect one1 the influence of these laws upon them becomes in the long run irresistible4 ,and further1 in order to be felt1 this action does not require that we should have a more or less clear knowledge of it4 ,even at the time when man knew almost nothing of the laws of nature1 his activity was more or less controlled by them4 ,the ends sought after by man have always depended upon his moral and physical nature3 the reason of the failure or the success of his efforts have always been found in the natural laws4 ,gradually positive knowledge was developed4 ,man became conscious of the order by which he is himself surrounded1 of which he feels himself to be a portion1 and in which his intellect collaborates in a measure difficult to determine but yet certain4 ,the external regulator which1 whatever our will may be1 imposes itself upon our activity is thus revealed to our mind4 ,the last degree to be reached is that it should finally be accepted by our feeling4 ,this is precisely the result obtained by positive philosophy4 ,for it makes us know our individual and social nature4 ,it has shown us that humanity must not be explained by man1 but man by humanity4 ,it has explained the growing development of social life and that of altruism1 which is at once its condition and its consequence4 ,we now understand that our benevolent affections find themselves 8spontaneously in conformity with the natural laws which govern the development of society40#cca ,thus it is the continual pressure of external order which makes our egotistic instincts capable of being trained4 ,they would undoubtedly get the mastery1 if our sympathetic inclinations did not find without1 in the laws of nature1 a constant support which reason ends by understanding4 ,moral perfection would be harmony realised among all men1 by their mutual goodwill1 according to the principle3 ,live for others1 and1 at the same time1 harmony realised in each individual soul1 by the subjection of egoism to the altruistic sentiments4 ,but this harmony is not what is produced in the first place4 ,on the contrary1 war rages between the social groups1 discord between the members of the same groups1 the passions in each individual soul4 ,sometimes one1 sometimes another of our tendencies influences us1 according to circumstances whose details vary to infinity4 ,no stable order of subordination is established among our tendencies3 human nature1 considered by itself1 does not contain any principle which could maintain such an order4 ,left to itself1 the human soul would remain in the state called by ,spinoza 8fluctuation40 ,the moral problem would have no durable solution4 ,hence the necessity of a 8universal brake10 to make sure of the development of the altruistic tendencies4 ,this brake is no other than the inevitable and continual pressure of the order of the world upon our conduct1 and in the long run1 upon our motives4 ,when the human mind wishes to direct its own phenomena1 it instinctively seeks1 in the general system of intelligible facts which constitutes the world1 a group of well combined data1 in order to refer its own less stable phenomena to it4 ,we have already seen an example of this kind in the formation of language4 ,man 8consolidates0 his thought by coordinating it with a combination of signs which themselves are movements1 and1 as such1 are subject to the general laws of the universe4 ,in ethics we find something analogous4 ,the main artifice in moral perfection1 writes ,comte1 lies in diminishing the inconsistency1 indecision and divergency in our purposes1 by connecting our moral and practical intellectual habits with external motives4 ,the mutual links between our various tendencies are incapable of securing their stability1 until they have found an immovable fulcrum outside themselves4 ,to endure1 the harmony of the soul must be realised by itself as founded on reason1 that is to say1 upon the order of the world4 ,,iv4 ,what place must we assign to this positive ethics1 in the usual classification of ethical doctrines8 ,it is often considered as a theory of the moral sentiment4 ,and1 as a matter of fact1 ,comte himself characterises his ethics by 8the direct preponderance of the social feeling40 ,in its origin also it belongs to this group4 ,comte makes use of ,adam ,smith and of ,hume1 when he affirms the existence of inborn altruistic tendencies within the soul4 ,he indicates these tendencies1 in his ,cerebral ,table1 under the general name of 8sympathy10 which comes from the ,scottish school4 ,establish these altruistic feelings1 he says1 and morality is given1 take them away1 and morality disappears4 ,but these philosophers did not push analysis any further4 ,they neglected to inquire how morality is developed in fact1 although the altruistic tendencies are less powerful than the others4 ,comte reproaches the ethics of the ,scottish school with its superficial character and its lack of systematic strictness4 ,he praises their psychology which is less incomplete than that of their contemporaries2 he is not satisfied with their theory of human activity4 ,if the existence of sympathetic inclinations is a fact1 their evolution must none the less be explained4 ,the latter only becomes intelligible through the continued action of the objective order upon the soul of man1 an action which becomes all the more decisive as man becomes more conscious of it1 by the discovery of the laws of nature4 ,thus1 in order to give an account of human morality1 ,comte adds a rational element to the feeling-elements4 ,undoubtedly it is not an a priori element4 ,but it is that which for ,comte is the substitute of the a priori in metaphysical doctrines3 that is the invariableness of the laws of phenomena1 which makes the world intelligible4 ,from the speculative point of view this intelligibility1 under the name of 8the principle of laws10 is the basis of our science4 ,from the practical point of view1 the order of the world alone can guarantee the lasting harmony of our inclinations4 ,in this way it becomes the foundation of morality4 ,in spite of the more than evident differences of all kinds which separate ,comte from ,malebranche and from ,leibnitz1 it then appears that in his philosophy as in theirs1 the idea of order is made use of to pass from the domain of knowledge to that of action4 ,undoubtedly1 with ,comte1 from theological or metaphysical this idea has become positive4 ,he does not intend to go beyond experience1 and affirms nothing which cannot be verified as a fact4 ,but1 like the philosophers his predecessors1 he is none the less anxious to find the unity of the soul beneath the diversity of its modes of activity1 and to show that theoretical reason and practical reason are one and the same4 ,malebranche solved the problem by appealing to the idea of divine perfection1 expressed everywhere by order4 ,comte explains that the pressure exercised by external order generates order in our mind 7which moreover collaborates in it71 then1 as a consequence1 in our feelings and finally in our actions4 ,the stoics had already said something similar on this subject4 ,briefly1 ,comte's ethics may be presented as the positive form of the ethics of universal order4 ,shall we then say that1 being sentimental and rational at once1 this morality is not definite in character8 ,is it merely an eclectic attempt at conciliation8--,eclecticism in a certain sense would not frighten ,comte4 ,positive philosophy flatters itself on being just in regard to its predecessors4 ,it takes pleasure in praising each of them for the portion of truth which it contains4 ,but1 in the present case there is no occasion for it to be eclectic4 ,it suffices for it to be relative1 and1 since it is a question of moral and social things1 to appeal to history4 ,thus we see that the sentimental and the rational principles in no way exclude each other4 ,from the historical point of view1 that is to say1 if we consider the genesis of morality1 the latter finds birth in the sympathetic feelings which man1 like many other animals1 experiences1 and which are spontaneously developed in domestic affection and in social life4 ,how is it that subsequently this morality evolves1 that friendly relations grow indefinitely in relative importance1 in spite of the inborn strength of selfishness1 that humanity1 in a word1 should gradually rise above animality8 ,without any doubt1 that is due to the development of intelligence1 itself bound up with the efforts which man is obliged to make to adapt himself to the 8milieu0 in which he lives4 ,instinctive in its animal origin1 morality becomes rational in its human evolution4 ,we can say as much of language1 of art1 of science1 and even of religion4 ,all this was in embryo in the primitive nature of man1 since nothing absolutely new ever appears in it4 ,all this only manifested itself under pressure from external order1 which1 consciously or unconsciously1 is always being exercised4 ,only when we know this order1 we can make use of our science to turn the natural forces to our own ends1 which in themselves are rational4 ,it is in this way that systematic morality is substituted to spontaneous morality4 ,if we were more intelligent1 says ,comte1 it would be equivalent to our being more moral4 ,understanding better the intimate connection which in a thousand ways1 at every moment1 binds each one of us to the whole of our fellows1 we should more surely observe the precept3 8,live for others40 ,and1 if we were more moral1 it would be equivalent to our being more intelligent4 ,we would then act precisely as a more open and a deeper intelligence than our own would lead us to act4 ,now1 we cannot become more moral by an immediate modification of our inclinations4 ,positive psychology has established that we exercise no direct action upon the affective part of our nature4 ,but we can endeavour to become more intelligent3 every successful effort that we make to understand the order of nature affords us the means of making fresh attempts4#ccb ,in this indirect manner morality can grow4 ,finally1 it grows still more surely1 when the intellect has understood that it does not contain its end within itself1 that it must be subordinated to the heart1 and that the only happiness compatible with the nature of man is found in devotion and in love4 ,,footnotes3 #cbb ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #dcf-g2 ,,iii1 #df-ej2 ,,iv1 #bcc1 ,catchisme positiviste1 #eg-ei1 #aba-abc4 #cbc ,cours1 ,v1 #cde-f4 #cbd ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ajc-h4--,see ,book ,,iii1 chapter ,v4 #cbe ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ajd4 #cbf ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #i4 #cbg ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #ib4 #cbh ,catchisme positiviste1 p4 #aj4 #cbi ,catchisme positiviste1 p4 #ach4 #ccj ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii4 #bf-cj4 #cca ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #bc4 #ccb ,pol4 ,pos41 ,,iv1 appendix1 p4 #ah4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,social ,,ethics 8,live for others03 such is the supreme formula of positive ethics4 ,feeling bears witness to its justice2 science discloses its far-reaching importance and its deep consequences4 ,but this formula is not only applied in a general way to the natural society formed by men among themselves1 a society in which ,comte even includes animals capable of affection and of devotion1 whose services deserve our gratitude4 ,the moral law finds a precise application in the definite relations established among men by civic society1 that is to say in the rights and in the mutual duties of individuals4 ,if it be true that ethics and politics are distinct from each other1 politics is none the less closely subordinated to ethics4 ,the spiritual power does not govern2 however it directs those who govern as well as those who are governed4 ,it is this power which gives to all the sum of common beliefs and feelings which enable ,society to live4 ,thus to ethics belongs the task of determining the principles according to which positive politics will regulate the relations between men4 ,now1 as a matter of fact1 these relations are in a very unsettled condition to-day4 ,public order is unstable1 revolutions are frequent1 suffering is excessive4 ,are we to lay the blame upon public institutions8 ,they are rather an effect than a cause4 ,in order to understand the present condition it is necessary to grasp the law of the general evolution of humanity1 and in particular that of ,european ,society4 ,it then becomes apparent that the actual disturbances proceed from the great conflict inaugurated by the ,french revolution4 ,this conflict is still going on4 ,the old rgime has not yet quite disappeared1 and the rgime which is to take its place is not yet organised4 ,the struggle is prolonged between the theologico-metaphysical spirit and the positive spirit1 between revealed belief which is becoming weaker and demonstrated belief which is being formed1 and finally between the old economic landmarks and an industrial activity whose laws have not yet been discovered4 ,the relations between masters and workmen are at the present time 8anarchical40 ,the advance of industry1 as it grows1 oppresses the majority of those whose co-operation in it is indispensable4 ,and the ever more strongly marked division between 8brains and hands0 is far more due to the political incapacity1 the social thoughtlessness1 and especially to the blind selfishness of the masters than to the inordinate demands of the workmen4#ccc ,the capitalists have not dreamt of organising a liberal education for the people to defend it against the seductions of the revolutionary propaganda4 ,they seem to fear that the people should receive instruction4 ,as far as they can1 they take the place of the ancient chiefs whose social rank they covet4 ,but they do not inherit their generosity4 ,they do not understand that 8noblesse oblige40 ,in this way the great masters of industry too often tend to utilise their political influence to the detriment of the public1 to appropriate important monopolies and to take the advantage of the power of capital to make the claims of the masters predominate over those of the workers1 without any regard for equity1 since the right of coalition which is allowed to the former is refused to the latter4 ,comte saw the bourgeoisie at work during ,louis-,philippe's reign1 and he passes severe judgment upon it4 ,its political conceptions1 he says1 refer not to the aim and exercise of power1 but especially to its possession4 ,it regards the revolution as terminated by the establishment of the parliamentary rgime1 whereas this is only an 8equivocal halting place40 ,a complete social reorganisation is not less feared by this middle class than by the old upper classes4 ,although filled with the critical spirit of the ,,xviii4 century1 even under a ,republican form it would prolong a system of theological hypocrisy1 by means of which the respectful submission of the masses is insured1 while no strict duty is imposed upon the leaders4#ccd ,this is hard upon the proletariat1 whose condition is far from improving4 ,it 8establishes dungeons for those who ask for bread40#cce ,it believes that these millions of men will be able to remain indefinitely 8encamped0 in modern society without being properly settled in it with definite and respected rights4#ccf ,the capital which it holds in its hands1 after having been an instrument of emancipation1 has become one of oppression4 ,it is thus that1 by a paradox difficult to uphold1 the invention of machinery1 which a priori1 one would be led to believe1 would soften the condition of the proletariat1 has1 on the contrary1 been a new cause of suffering to them1 and has made their lot a doubly hard one4#ccg ,here1 in brief1 we have a formidable indictment against the middle classes1 and in particular against the political economy which has nourished them4 ,comte has in view sometimes the classical economists of the end of the ,,xviii4 century1 sometimes their orthodox successors in the ,,xix4 ,those of the ,,xviii4 he regards as having collaborated in the great revolutionary work4 ,they took part in the diffusion of critical doctrines and of negative philosophy4 ,in this capacity they have1 no doubt1 rendered certain services4 ,they contributed to the decomposition of the old rgime4 ,political economy had succeeded in convincing the governments themselves of their unfitness to direct the commercial and industrial movement4#cch ,the affinities between the philosophers and the economists of the ,,xviii4 century are evident enough3 is it necessary to recall the spirit of 8individualism0 of the economists1 and their characteristic tendency to restrict the functions of government as much as possible8 ,despite the efforts of a great number among them1 conservatives by temperament or by political tendencies1 the logical consequences of their principles were bound to come to light4 ,thus 8the superfluity of all regular moral teaching1 the suppression of all official encouragement of science and the fine arts2 even the recent attacks against the fundamental institution of property find their origin in economical metaphysics40 ,it was with this doctrine as with the other parts of negative philosophy2 after having accomplished its work of destruction1 it sought to transform its critical principles into organic ones1 without realising that this amounted to repudiating beforehand any positive organisation4 ,the famous formula1 8,laissez faire1 laissez passer10 is no more a real principle in political economy than liberty itself is one in politics properly so-called4 ,comte vigorously opposes the dogma of non-intervention4 ,because in some particular and secondary cases political economy has ascertained 8the natural tendencies of societies in the direction of a certain necessary order1 it concluded from this that any special institution is useless40 ,but this order is extremely imperfect4 ,the knowledge of sociological laws will give us the power of improving it1 as we already do in the case of medicine and surgery4 ,merely to admit the degree of order which is spontaneously established in practice is equivalent to 8a solemn dismissal in the case of every difficulty which arises40 ,look at the social crisis brought about by the development of machinery4 ,in reply to the just and urgent claims of the workmen suddenly deprived of their means of livelihood1 and unable in a day to find another1 our economists can only repeat1 8with merciless pedantry10 their barren aphorism about absolute industrial liberty4 ,to all complaints they dare to answer that it is a question of time6 ,and this to men who require food to-day6 8,such a theory proclaims its own social impotence40#cci ,and so neither is political economy a science yet1 nor1 so far1 are economists men of science4 ,originally being nearly all barristers or men of letters1 they were strangers to the idea of scientific observation1 to the precise notion of a natural law1 and finally to the sense of what constitutes a demonstration4 ,if we make an exception of ,adam ,smith and of a few others1 how could they apply the positive method which they did not know to the most difficult cases of analysis8 ,destutt de ,tracy placed political economy between logic and ethics4 ,and this was not without reason3 for it is nearer to metaphysics than to positive science4 ,in it1 work preserves its personal character1 schools contend with each other1 the discussions as to the elementary notions of value1 of utility1 etc41 savour of scholasticism4 ,the very idea of studying economical phenomena separately is not scientific1 since the various 8social series0 are interdependent1 and since in sociology more particular laws depend upon more general laws4#cdj ,there is no scientific study of economical facts unless we first look at them from the sociological point of view4 ,we can no more isolate the laws which regulate the material existence of societies than we can describe man as an essentially calculating being1 only actuated by the motive of personal interest4 ,the same objections naturally hold good against the adversaries of the economists1 since1 in general1 socialists and communists have confined themselves to an analogous conception of their science4 ,however1 while criticising them1 ,comte recognises the fact that they have established some truths4 ,everything they say is not false4 ,thus1 they justly claim the right for the government to intervene in economical relations4 ,and1 if it be absurd to wish to abolish private property1 as certain sects demanded1 it is very true that property is of a social nature1 and that it is necessary to regulate it4#cda ,to endow it with an absolute character is1 says ,comte1 an 8anti-social0 theory4 ,no property can be created1 nor even transmitted1 by its mere possessor without the concurrence of society4 ,thus always and everywhere the community has intervened in the exercise of the right of property4 ,the tax makes the public a partner in every private fortune4 ,in discussing the essential problems of property1 the communists 7whom ,comte confuses with the socialists71 to-day render an important service4 ,the very dangers called forth by the solution they propose concur in fixing the general attention upon this great subject1 8without which the metaphysical empiricism and the aristocratic selfishness of the leading classes would cause it to be set aside or disdained40 ,merely to state the problem without the solution with which the communists associate it1 would not suffice4 ,our weak intellect does not fasten upon a question for long1 unless a reply to it1 be it true or false1 which we must accept or reject is forthcoming at the same time4 ,moreover1 are the communist 8aberrations0 more useless1 and at bottom1 more dangerous than the current illusion according to which the ,revolution is ended by the establishment of the parliamentary rgime8#cdb ,but1 this being admitted the innovating schools have all fallen into grave mistakes4 ,in general1 being devoid of the historic sense1 and on the other hand1 ignoring the principles of social statics1 they do not see that man's action upon social phenomena is only usefully exercised within certain limits4 ,the idea that a revolution can1 in a moment1 transform the rgime of property and all the social conditions which depend upon it is destined to disappear1 when the 8positive mode of thought0 shall have extended to the social phenomena in the same way as it has to all others4 ,then the 8extravagant proposals0 of the socialists will find no adherents1 and the demand for what is recognised as impossible will no longer be made by anyone4#cdc ,finally1 ,comte reproaches communism with its tendency to restrain individuality4 ,this objection1 coming from him1 is remarkable1 for it has very often been made in his own case4 ,as an organiser of despotism1 ,john ,stuart ,mill has compared him to ,ignatius of ,loyola4 ,but ,comte reminds us that1 according to him1 the collective organism1 or society1 differs from the individual organisms1 or living beings1 by the fact that in it the elements live an independent life4 ,the problem consists in conciliating1 as much as possible1 this free division with the convergence of the activities4 ,neither of the two must be sacrificed to the other4 ,to restrain individualities would tend to destroy the dignity of man by doing away with his responsibility1 while the want of independence1 and the subjection to a community indifferent to him would make life intolerable4 8,such is the immense danger of all utopias which sacrifice real liberty to an anarchical equality1 or even to an exaggerated fraternity40#cdd ,on this point1 positive philosophy on its own account takes up again the 8decisive criticism0 of communism made by our economists4 ,,ii4 ,positive philosophy does not confine itself to refuting the orthodox economists and the socialists by the help of their own arguments4 ,in its turn it takes up all the questions raised by them1 and1 for their solution1 takes its stand upon the results obtained by sociology4 ,in the first place it states the problem of 8social reorganisation0 in its most general form4 ,socialists1 in the same way as their adversaries1 are only concerned with riches as if they were the only ill-divided and ill-administered social forces4 ,but there are others4 ,the reform of economical conditions depends1 in conclusion1 upon that of morals4 ,before all things then we must 8reorganise0 morals4 ,we must determine the rights and mutual duties of citizens1 and inspire everyone with the feeling of his duty and with respect for the rights of others4 ,the two ideas of right and of duty are not dealt with by ,comte in the same manner4 ,he accepts the idea of duty without subjecting it to a special criticism4 ,duty is the rule of action prescribed to each one both by feeling and by reason4 ,it is our duty to do what we recognise as most suitable to our individual and social nature4 ,on the contrary1 the idea of right 8disappears0 in the positive state4 ,the word 8right0 must be removed from political language1 in the same way as the word 8cause0 is from philosophical language4 ,they are two metaphysical notions4 ,everyone has duties1 and towards all4 ,no one has any right properly so-called4 8,the idea of right is as false as it is immoral1 because it presupposes an absolute individuality40#cde ,these formul called forth strong protests1 particularly from ,m4 ,renouvier and his disciples4 ,indeed1 in the constitution of civil society1 they appear to neglect justice entirely1 to establish the relations between men merely upon charity and feeling4 ,however1 if we look into it closely1 ,comte's thought as is often the case1 has been forced and warped1 by its expression4 ,but the comparison between the ideas of right and of cause suggested by him1 satisfactorily throws a light upon his meaning4 ,positive science has given up the search after causes1 in order to confine itself to establishing the invariable relations between phenomena4 ,but these relations correspond to what was formerly called causal action4 ,they represent what was real in this supposed action4 ,the only difference--but it is important--consists in the fact that the human mind has forsaken the absolute point of view for the relative one1 and is henceforth content to establish the connection between phenomena1 without imagining 8connecting entities0 according to ,malebranche's strong expression4 ,the idea of right has gone through an analogous transformation4 ,in the same way as the idea of cause1 it was theological for a long time1 and then metaphysical4 ,in antiquity it was closely allied to religion4 ,in modern times the rights of peoples1 and even the rights of individuals1 are conceived according to the ancient standard of the rights of princes and masters4 ,but1 having become established by triumphing over the rights of princes1 the rights of peoples and individuals ultimately rest1 as they did1 upon a supernatural and mystical basis4 ,the rights which every citizen claims are the change in small coin of the absolute right formerly possessed by the sovereign who represented the whole nation4 ,having become metaphysical in the ,,xviii4 century1 the idea of absolute1 intangible1 indefeasible right1 which attaches to the human person1 has been most useful for the decomposition of the old rgime4 ,but1 once this work has been accomplished1 it cannot be made use of in the work of reorganisation any more than the other metaphysical principles4 ,positive philosophy admits nothing absolute4 ,everything in society is at once subject to conditions1 and places conditions upon all things4 ,nothing is unconditional2 and sociology teaches that we must go not from the individual to society1 but from society to the individual4 ,in consequence1 here again we must give up endeavouring to transform a critical principle into an organic one4 ,undoubtedly rights will remain1 as the constant connections between phenomena subsist4 ,but we shall cease to base these rights upon a metaphysical conception of human nature1 in the same way as we have ceased to refer the connections between phenomena to metaphysical entities called causes4 ,instead of making individual duties consist in the respect of universal rights1 we shall conceive inversely the rights of each one as the result of the duties of others towards him4 ,in a word1 duty is established before right4 ,this principle is of the highest importance in ,comte's eyes4 ,in it he sees an expression and a proof of the predominance of the positive over the metaphysical spirit1 and of the subordination of politics to ethics4 ,he likes to say that 8the consideration of duty is bound up with the spirit of the whole40 ,on the contrary1 the consideration of right1 if it be conceived as absolute1 leads to a denial of all government and of all social organisation4 ,the new philosophy will tend more and more to replace 8the vague and stormy discussion of rights1 by the calm and strict determination of respective duties40 ,henceforth1 the problem raised by the communists assumes a new aspect4 ,that there should be powerful industrial masters is only an evil if they use their power to oppress the men who depend upon them4 ,it is a good thing1 on the contrary1 if these masters know and fulfil their duties4 ,it is of little consequence to popular interests in whose hands capital is accumulated1 so long as the use made of it is beneficial to the social masses4#cdf ,now this essential condition 8depends far more upon moral than upon political measures40 ,the latter can undoubtedly prevent the accumulation of riches in a small number of hands1 at the risk of paralysing industrial activity4 ,but these 8tyrannical0 proceedings would be far less efficacious than the universal reproof inflicted by positive ethics upon a selfish use of the riches possessed4 ,the reproof would be all the more irresistible1 because of the fact that the very people who would have to submit to it could not challenge its principle1 inculcated in all by the common moral education40 ,it is thus that in the ,middle ,ages1 excommunication was not less feared by the princes who incurred it than it was by the peoples who witnessed it4 ,once common education was established1 under the direction of the spiritual power1 the tyranny of the capitalist class would be no more to be feared4 ,rich men would consider themselves as the moral guardians of public capital4 ,it is not here a question of charity4 ,those who possess will have the 8duty0 of securing1 first1 education and then work for all4 ,these ideas seem perhaps paradoxical and chimerical4 ,but1 says ,comte1 this is because modern society has not yet got its system of morality4 ,industrial relations which have become immensely developed in it are abandoned to a dangerous empiricism1 instead of being systematised according to moral laws4 ,war1 more or less openly declared1 alone regulates the relations between capital and labour4 ,in a normal state of humanity these relations1 on the contrary1 are 8organised40 ,strength does not generate oppression4 ,every citizen is a 8public functionary10 whose well-defined functions determine at once his obligations and his claims 7that is to say his rights74 ,property is a function like any other1 and not a privilege4 ,it serves for the formation and administration of capital by means of which each generation prepares the work of the next4 ,those who hold it must not turn it from its public use to their own individual advantage4#cdg ,in the same way as the capitalists1 the workers are public functionaries1 and they perform a no less important service4 ,independently of their salary1 they are deserving social gratitude4 ,our customs already admit of this feeling in the case of the liberal professions in which the salary does not dispense with gratitude4 ,this feeling will have to be extended to all work which contributes to the common weal4 ,the service of humanity1 says ,comte1 is a gratuitous one4 ,the salary1 whatever it may be1 only pays for the material part in every office4 ,it serves to repair the consumption demanded by the organ and the function4 ,as to the essence of service itself it allows of no other reward than the very satisfaction of performing it1 and the gratitude which it arouses4#cdh ,consequently in a 8truly organised0 society 7note this expression which ,m4 de ,bonald often uses71 the vulgar distinction between public and private functionaries is destined to disappear4 ,as1 in an army1 even the private soldier has his own dignity which comes from the close solidarity of the military organisation1 and from this fact1 that all share the same honour in it2 so1 when positive education has made evident to all the part played by each one in the social work1 professions which are humblest to-day will become ennobled4#cdi ,the industrial rgime of to-day1 which shows us little else than the conflict of rival egoisms1 is an anarchical rgime1 or1 to put it better1 an 8absence of rgime40 ,modern society has not yet got its morals4 ,it will form them gradually1 in the same way as military society did4 ,military life1 more than any other1 is ruled by the predominating selfish inclinations4 ,nevertheless1 as it could only be developed by the spirit of union1 this condition alone sufficed for it to determine admirable devotion4#cej ,why should it not be the same in industrial life which rests upon the peaceful and constructing instinct8 ,otherwise1 if the present 8anarchy0 of morals were to last1 modern society would remain below the level of the ,middle ,ages1 which really was organised by its spiritual power4 ,it would even be below the level of military societies4 ,what would be the use of substituting monopoly to conquest1 and a despotism based upon the right of the richest to the despotism resting upon the right of the strongest8#cea ,everything then depends upon the common moral education1 which itself depends upon the establishment of a spiritual power4 ,the superiority of the positive doctrine lies in the fact that it has restored this power4 ,the innovating schools all wish to secure normal education and regular work for the proletariat4 ,but they want both at once1 or work before education4 ,positivism wishes to organise education first4#ceb ,naturally1 in positive education duties will be presented in their social aspect4 ,thus the elementary virtues of temperance1 of chastity1 etc41 are recommended by positive morality2--but not from the point of view of their usefulness to the individual4 ,even if 8an exceptionally constituted nature should shield the individual from the consequences of intemperance or debauchery10 soberness and continence would be no less strictly required of him as being indispensable for the fulfilment of his social duties4#cec ,in the same way1 the object of domestic morality is not to form 8a selfishness shared by several10 but to develop the sympathetic affections which1 from the family will gradually extend to the social group1 and then to humanity4 ,the principle is to get man into the habit of subjecting himself to humanity1 even in his smallest actions1 and in all his thoughts4 ,once this point is reached1 modern society will spontaneously become organised and the positive rgime will of itself be established4 ,,footnotes3 #ccc ,cours1 ,,vi1 #cgf4 #ccd ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #abh-i4 #cce ,cours1 ,v1 #ceg4 #ccf ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #daj-ab4 #ccg ,cours1 ,,vi1 #bfh-i4 #cch ,cours1 ,v1 #fjh2 ,pol4 pos4 ,,iii1 #ehe4 #cci ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bah-bd4 #cdj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bab-ae4 #cda ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #aed4 #cdb ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #afj-c4 #cdc ,cours1 ,,iv1 #ig-i4 #cdd ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #aei4 #cde ,cours1 ,,vi1 #dhj2 ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #cfa-c2 ,,ii1 #hg4 #cdf ,cours1 ,,vi1 #edc-f4 #cdg ,pol4 pos4 #aef-fd4 #cdh ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #dji4 #cdi ,cours1 ,,vi1 #eaa-ae4 #cej ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #af4 #cea ,pol4 pos4 ,,iv1 ,appendice1 p4 #baa4 #ceb ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #afi4 #cec ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #ig-h4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,humanity ,in this world there is nothing absolute1 everything is relative2 ,comte wrote this to his friend ,valat as early as #ahah4ced ,but as a matter of fact1 there exists a supreme reality to which all others are subordinated1 the idea of which is the principle of a rational conception of the world4 ,comte calls this reality humanity4 ,instead of being the ultimate end of all thought and all action 8in itself10 it is the ultimate end 8for us40 ,but this difference simply signifies that the new philosophy leaves the metaphysical for the positive point of view4 ,with these limitations the idea of humanity 8corresponds0 to the old idea of the absolute4 ,it takes its place and fulfils its religious part4 ,it is truly1 if one dares to say so1 a 8relative absolute40 ,in ,comte's doctrine1 the idea of humanity is presented under several successive aspects1 or1 to put it better1 the development of his system has brought to light1 in turns1 the various attributes of this 8,great ,being40 ,in his first career1 ,comte prefers to consider humanity as an object of science4 ,in his second career1 it rather appears to him as an object of adoration and of love4 ,here we can follow the progress of the mystical and religious feeling which1 especially from #ahdf1 filled his thoughts and modified his language1 his philosophical doctrine1 nevertheless1 remaining essentially the same4 ,i4 ,we must not1 says ,comte1 define ,humanity by man1 but on the contrary man by ,humanity4 ,in general this formula is understood in a moral and social sense4 ,it is understood as a condemnation of 8individualism10 and one of the directing principles of the positivist rgime4 ,this interpretation is not a false one1 and consequences of this kind can indeed be drawn from ,comte's formula4 ,but they are only consequences4 ,the immediate object of the formula is not to subordinate the individual to the multitude4 ,in the first place it expresses a fact4 ,if we consider a man by himself1 positive science only allows us to define him as an animal1 in whom as in all others1 the end of animal life is to insure organic life4 ,do we wish to define him by what is essentially human in him1 that is to say1 by intellect and sociability8 ,one must then pass from the consideration of the individual to that of the species4 ,from the strictly biological point of view ,m4 ,bonald's saying must be reversed2 we must say that man is an organism served by an intellect4 ,it is only if we leave the biological for the social point of view1 if we look upon the human species as a single 8immense and eternal0 individual 7a conception which is justified by the continued development of intelligence and sociability71#cee that we can consider the voluntary and systematic subordination of vegative to animal life as the ideal type towards which civilised humanity is tending4 ,we can then make use of this subordination to refine it4 ,in a word1 we are really men only by our participation of humanity4 ,the essential attributes of this 8immense and eternal social unity0 are solidarity and continuity4#cef ,these attributes are at once social and moral and it could have no others4 ,the attributes of the theological and metaphysical absolute had reference to the categories of substance1 of cause1 of time1 of space1 etc4 ,it was one1 simple1 infinite1 etc41 all often incomprehensible and contradictory expressions of this idea that the supreme principle is 8absolute40 ,on the contrary1 positive philosophy admits that in the scale of beings1 dependence grows with dignity4 ,humanity1 which is the most 8complex0 and the 8noblest0 of all beings known to us1 is therefore also the most dependent4 ,its existence will necessarily end with that of the planet which it inhabits4 ,its unity is one of 8collection40 ,it is imperfect and subject to crises of all kinds4 ,such as it is1 however1 science and morality show us in it the highest term which our mind can reach1 the loftiest ideal which our heart can love1 and finally the object most worthy of our devotion4 ,human solidarity has been studied by statical sociology4 ,we have seen with what admiration the social consensus inspired ,comte1 a consensus1 according to him1 even closer and more intimate than the vital consensus4 ,positive education will develop the feeling of solidarity and make it the principle of moral instruction4 ,every individual in all his ways of thinking and acting1 will be imbued with two convictions which imply one another4 ,in the first place he will know that he is only really a man by his participation in humanity1 since his intelligence and his morality are essentially social things4 ,he will also know that the life of humanity is in part made up of what he brings to it1 and that each of his actions1 independently of his will has a social interest and a social counterpart4 ,once we are thoroughly persuaded that we live in humanity and by humanity1 we shall also become convinced that we must live for humanity4 ,malebranche said that ,god is the locus of intellects3 ,comte would readily say that humanity is the locus of good wills4 ,as1 in sociology1 dynamics is more important than statics1 so among the attributes of humanity1 continuity is placed above solidarity4 ,not only are the individuals and the peoples of the same epoch bound by a common solidarity1 but the successive generations co-operate in the same work4 ,each one has its 8determined participation0 in it3 and their combination in time produces 8a still nobler and more perfect conception of human unity40 ,this is the conception which ,comte admired so much in ,condorcet1 which he borrowed from him1 and which he developed in the positive idea of progress4 ,humanity so understood will inspire us with the strongest feelings of gratitude4 ,do we not owe to her all that is good1 precious and human in us8 ,man will see 8co-operators0 in the men of all time4#ceg ,each of us has to reflect only upon his physical1 intellectual and moral being to realise what he owes to the whole of his predecessors4 ,the man who would think himself independent of others could not even formulate this error 7which in ,comte's eyes becomes blasphemy7 without contradicting himself2 for is not language itself a collective and social work8#ceh ,history will become the 8sacred science0 of humanity4 ,to put it more simply1 it will be the ever clearer consciousness which humanity will have of itself1 through the study of its intellectual and moral activity in the past4 ,gradually1 with the progress of the historical spirit1 the idea of an evolution subject to laws1 the idea of 8order conceived as capable of development10 will become substituted to the prejudice which attributes to man boundless power of action upon social facts4 ,it will become apparent that the part played by each generation in the common work of humanity is necessarily a very small one1 as compared with what is transmitted to it by previous generations4 ,to refuse this inheritance would be to refuse to be what we are3 it would be an absurd and immoral pretention1 and1 moreover1 entirely fruitless4 ,it is impossible for man to disown humanity without ceasing to exist4 ,he necessarily represents1 while he lives1 a long past of intellectual and moral efforts4 ,and this is the most essential attribute of human life1 although we meet with more or less developed solidarity also among other animal species4 ,but continuity belongs to humanity alone4 ,in a word1 according to ,comte's fine formula3 8,humanity is made up more of the dead than of the living40 ,however1 neither the 8yoke0 which presses upon the living with all the weight of history and of prehistoric times1 nor the consensus which makes of humanity a great 8collective organism0 take from man his liberty of action4 ,the consequence of human solidarity and continuity is not a kind of fatalism4 ,individuals remain responsible4 ,we must regard them neither as the wheels in a machine1 nor as the cells in an organism1 nor as the members of an animal colony4 ,humanity is not a polyp4 ,this comparison1 says ,comte1 8shows a very imperfect philosophical appreciation of our social solidarity1 and a great biological ignorance of the kind of existence peculiar to polypi40#cei ,it likens a voluntary and deliberate association to an involuntary and indissoluble participation4 ,humanity1 as a collective organism1 stands out1 on the contrary1 as distinct by its own characteristics from animal colonies4 ,in these colonies1 the individuals are physically bound together and physiologically independent4 ,in humanity1 the individuals are independent physically1 and are only bound together in space and in time by their highest functions4 ,thus this 8immense organism0 is especially distinguished from other beings in that it is made up of separable elements1 of which each one can feel its own co-operation1 can will it1 or even withhold it1 so long as it remains a direct one4#cfj ,the individual undoubtedly cannot 8unhumanise0 himself3 that is too evident4 ,but he retains a partial independence4 ,as he can collaborate in the collective work by free consent1 he is also free to impede it in the measure of his strength4 ,briefly1 although the evolution of the ,great ,being is subject to laws1 every individuality1 far from being annulled1#cfa plays its part and can have its merit in it4 ,the very knowledge of sociological laws is a rule for human activity and not a tyranny4 ,,ii4 ,in the latter part of his life1 ,comte drew out precisely the features of what he henceforth called the new ,great ,being4 ,although we were not here to undertake to write an account of positive religion1 we must nevertheless1 in a few words1 indicate the form which this supreme idea ended by assuming in ,comte's mind4 ,firstly1 humanity is not conceived simply as the sum of all the individuals or human groups present1 past and future4 ,for all men are necessarily born children of humanity2 but all do not become her servants4 ,many remain in the condition of parasites4 ,all those who are not or were not 8sufficiently assimilable10#cfb all those who were only a burden to our species1 do not form a part of the ,great ,being4 ,a selection takes place among men4 ,some finally enter into humanity never to leave it2 others leave it never to return4 ,the selection takes place according to the life they have preferred4 ,those who have lived in the purely biological sense of the word1 that is to say1 those in whom the higher faculties have been made to serve the organic function1 those whom with brutal energy ,comte calls 8producteurs de fumier10#cfc will only have been part of humanity in a transitory manner4 ,death for them1 as for their anatomical system1 will be an end without further appeal4 ,those in whom the 8sublime inversion0 has been accomplished1 or at least those who have made an effort to subordinate the organic to the higher functions1 those finally who have worked for a pre-eminently human end3 to make the intellect predominate over the inclinations1 and altruism over egoism2 those having lived for humanity will always live in her4 human end3 to make the intellect predominate over the inclinations1 and altruism over egoism2 those having lived for humanity will always live in her4 ,as the conduct of each one can only be finally judged after his death1 humanity is essentially made up of the dead and 8the admission of the living within her will hardly ever be more than provisional40#cfd ,each generation1 while it lives1 furnishes the indispensable physiological substratum for the exercise of the superior human functions4 ,but this privilege which momentarily distinguishes it from the others1 soon slips away from it1 as it slipped away from the preceding ones1 and from the men of which they were composed2 they alone who are worthy of it are incorporated into humanity4 ,moreover1 they are only incorporated in it by their noblest elements4 ,death causes them to pass through a 8purification40 ,this theory allows ,comte to attain at the same time two results1 which he considers equally desirable4 ,in the first place1 the religious idea of humanity remains in perfect accordance with the idea given of it by biology and sociology4 ,humanity conceived as the ,great ,being1 is a kind of hypostasis of the functions by which man tends to become distinguished from the animal4 ,it is the progressive realisation through time1 of the intellectual and moral potentialities contained in human nature3 it is also its ideal impersonation4 ,in this last sense1 it becomes an object of love and adoration4 ,thus1 the positivist religion naturally leads to a 8commemoration0 of great men1 the benefactors of humanity4 ,here we have one of the ideas which were defined very early in ,comte's mind4 ,on the other hand1 the desire for immortality is very strong in the heart of man4 ,on principle ,comte recognised at any rate a provisional value in all that arises spontaneously from human nature4 ,in science he saw a prolongation of 8public reason10 in systematic morality a development of spontaneous morality4 ,he was thus led to take into account the almost irresistible tendency which impels man to desire to triumph over death4#cfe ,this tendency1 up to the present time1 has satisfied itself by means of illusions4 ,but beliefs of this kind have become incompatible with the progress of our mental evolution4 ,moreover1 the social efficacy of hopes and fears concerning the future life has been much exaggerated4 ,as a matter of fact1 says ,comte 7and the science of religions bears him out on this point71 the tendency to desire1 and consequently to accept the idea of an ultimate survival1 existed for a long time before it was made use of to support religious beliefs or to preserve public order4 ,here1 again1 positive philosophy does not deny1 does not destroy3 it transforms4 ,to the chimerical and vulgar notion of objective immortality1 it substitutes the notion1 which is alone acceptable1 of subjective immortality4 ,the same doctrine which takes from us the consolations so dear to past generations1 gives us an adequate compensation1 by allowing each one to hope that he may be united to the ,great ,being4 8,to continue to live in others10 is a very real mode of existence4#cff ,it is the only one which we can hope for after death2 but it is also the only one which we ought to desire1 if it be true that what most constitutes ourselves in us does not consist in the individual in the biological sense of the word1 but truly in intelligence and good will1 that is to say1 in the social and human element4 ,he who has only lived for himself1 who has selfishly sought for life1 has lost it3 for death takes him away altogether4 ,he who has lived for others1 he who has not sought life for himself1 has found it3 for he survives in others4 ,in the religions of the past1 salvation was found in union with ,god3 in the positive religion1 salvation is found in union with humanity4 ,once incorporated in the ,great ,being1 the individual becomes inseparable from it4#cfg ,being from that time withdrawn from the influence of all the physical laws1 he only remains subjected to the higher laws which regulate directly the evolution of humanity4 ,being even withdrawn from the influence of the laws of time and space1 he can live again at the same time in several organisms4 ,do we not see that the thought of a poet1 of an artist1 of a man of science revives in a great number of living men at the same time on the most distant points of the globe8 ,subjective immortality1 renewed by an uninterrupted sequence of successive resurrections1 will last as long as humanity itself4 8,to live with the dead10 says ,comte 8constitutes one of our most precious privileges40#cfh ,but1 in the same way1 the dead live with us4 ,they live in us1 and those who have been most truly men1 those who have made humanity by the effort of their intellect and their will1 they are within us the best and most lasting part of ourselves4 ,for1 when our generation disappears1 it is this part of us which will survive4 ,we shall also survive in the measure in which we have contributed to the increase of this inheritance1 in the measure in which we shall have deserved well of our contemporaries and our successors4 ,the present life is a trial4 ,the 8subjective0 life1 that is to say1 incorporation into humanity1 is at once a liberation and a reward for those who have passed victoriously through this trial4#cfi ,we see to what extent the old moral and religious ideal subsists in the positive conception4 ,we are little surprised at this1 when we know that1 towards the end of his life1 ,comte made the ,imitation his daily reading4 ,it is then towards the idea of humanity as their centre that the scientific1 social and religious ideas of ,auguste ,comte converge4 ,if this convergence be perfect1 his work is accomplished4 ,henceforth mental and moral anarchy is cured2 political and religious anarchy is about to disappear4 ,unity will be everywhere re-established4 ,this is already done in the understanding1 since henceforth all our conceptions are homogenous1 that is to say positive1 since the same method is made use of in all our researches1 since finally the whole sum of the sciences is regulated from the social point of view4 ,unity is also accomplished in the whole soul1 since the intellect1 henceforth conscious of its laws and of its essential functions1 subjects itself to the heart1 to be directed by love4 ,finally1 unity will be brought about in society1 since a new spiritual power1 possessed of universally admitted principles1 will give to all men and women a common education1 will teach them all the same morality1 and will rally them all within a same religion of love and goodness4 ,the harmony which is realised in the individual soul is the symbol and1 as it were1 the guarantee of the harmony which will be established in the social body4 ,undoubtedly1 obstacles remain to be overcome4 ,the positive spirit must still struggle to become altogether universal4 ,the old mental rgime will not disappear without struggles which1 ,comte foresees1 will be both formidable and bloody4 ,but these crises1 however acute they may be1 cannot prevent the human evolution from taking place in accordance with its law4 ,,footnotes3 #ced ,lettres ,valat1 p4 #ed1 7#ae mai #ahah74 #cee ,cours1 ,,iii1 #bcb sq4 #cef ,cours1 ,,iv1 #haj-aa2 ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #cfc-e4 #ceg ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cfe4 #ceh ,pol4 pos4 ,i1 #bba4 #cei ,cours1 ,,iv1 #cea4 #cfj ,pol4 pos41 ,,ii1 #ei4 #cfa ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #cda4 #cfb ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #daa4 #cfc ,catchisme positiviste1 p4 #cj-ca4 #cfd ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #daa4 #cfe ,discours sur l'esprit positif1 #ge-f4 #cff ,pol4 pos41 ,i1 #cdf-g4 #cfg ,pol4 pos4 ,,ii1 #fj-fb4 #cfh ,pol4 pos41 #bfb4 #cfi ,pol4 pos41 ,,iv1 #cf4 ,,conclusion ,at the end of the ,cours de philosophie positive ,comte has himself summed up the results which he believed himself to have established4 ,in the first place it is1 from the intellectual point of view 7which at first takes precedence of all others1 although1 in the positive state1 the mind must be subject to the heart71 a 8perfect mental coherence which1 as yet1 has never been able to exist in a like degree10 not even in the primitive period when man explained the phenomena of nature by the action of wills4 ,for already1 in this period1 although imperceptibly1 the positive spirit was making itself felt1 while1 in the positive period1 nothing will subsist of the theological and metaphysical mode of thought4 ,from the moral point of view1 which comes next1 the agreement of minds upon speculative problems1 and in particular upon the relations between man and humanity1 will allow of a common education1 which will bring about ardent moral conviction in all4 ,powerful 8public prejudices0 will develop1 and with them1 such irresistible fulness of conviction1 according to ,comte1 that ,humanity will be able to realise what our penal system is incapable of achieving3 to prevent instead of punishing1 at least in the majority of cases4 ,from the political point of view1 the two spiritual and temporal powers will be duly separated1 and a lasting organisation will at once insure order and progress4 ,finally1 from the sthetic point of view1 a new art will appear4 ,no longer an aristocratic and learned art like the one which has been with us since the ,renaissance1 but an art closely connected with the convictions and the life of all1 which will be accessible and familiar to all1 as was the case with the art of the ,middle ,ages4 ,the positive conception of man and of the world1 will become an 8inexhaustible spring0 of poetical beauty4 ,all these results will be ordered1 protected and sanctified by the positive religion1 or religion of ,humanity1 of which ,auguste ,comte1 in his 8second career0 established the dogma1 the worship and the rgime4 ,without entering into the details of this religious construction we see that1 like the ethics and the politics1 it depends upon the 8perfect mental coherence0 founded1 in the first place1 by positive philosophy4 ,in its turn1 this perfect mental coherence1 reduces itself to the unity of the understanding1 whose necessary and sufficient conditions are 8homogeneity of doctrine and unity of method40 ,now1 when ,comte began to write1 this homogeneity and this unity already existed for all the categories of natural phenomena4 ,the moral and social phenomena alone were still an exception4 ,in conclusion everything was reduced to this question3 8can moral and social facts be studied in the same way as the other natural phenomena80 ,if not1 we must be resigned to the indefinite duration of the disorder of minds1 and consequently of the disorder of customs and institutions4 ,but1 if the contrary is true1 then the human understanding reaches the unity to which it aspires4 ,is sociology impossible8 then we have no politics and no religion4 ,is sociology founded8 then all the rest is based upon it4 ,thus1 the creation of social science is the decisive moment in ,comte's philosophy4 ,everything starts from it and comes back to it4 ,as in ,platonism1 all paths lead to the theory of ideas1 so1 from all the avenues of positivism we see sociology4 ,here1 as in a common centre1 are joined the philosophy of the sciences1 the theory of knowledge1 the philosophy of history1 psychology1 ethics1 politics and religion4 ,here1 in a word1 is realised the unity of system1 a unity which1 in ,comte's eyes1 is the best proof of its truth4 ,if1 in sociology1 we chiefly consider the end which ,comte proposes to attain by its means1 it is true that this doctrine is principally a political one1 and the very title of ,comte's second great work bears this out4 ,but1 considered in itself1 it is essentially a speculative effort1 and the principle of a philosophy in the proper sense of the term4 ,what ,kant called a totality of experience is made possible by the creation of social science4 ,before ,comte1 this totality had been attempted many times4 ,but those who attempted it started from this postulate that philosophy is specifically distinct from scientific knowledge proper4 ,whether philosophy were dogmatic or critical1 whether it had bearings upon the essence of things or rather upon the laws of the mind1 it none the less presented characteristics of its own1 which seemed to separate it from positive science1 and even allowed it to dominate over this science1 and to 8explain0 its principles4 ,comte rejects this postulate4 ,he is going to endeavour to see if1 by taking the contrary postulate as his foundation1 he will not succeed better than his predecessors4 ,in order to reject the postulate admitted by philosophers before him1 he appeals at the same time to arguments founded on facts and demonstration2 but we must notice that1 in his doctrine1 these two orders of arguments logically reduce themselves to one another4 ,indeed he says1 up to the present time no philosophy which commands acceptance by all minds has been established4 ,idealisms1 materialisms1 pantheisms from all sources and in every shape have never done more than ruin the doctrines opposed to them1 without becoming finally established themselves4 ,those systems claimed to give a rational knowledge of that which by nature is beyond the reach of science4 ,they prided themselves upon explaining the essence1 the cause1 the end and the order of the phenomena of the universe4 ,thus they could only build up temporary conceptions which were undoubtedly indispensable at the time but which were doomed to die4 ,metaphysics is never anything but a rationalised theology which is weakened by this very fact1 and deprived of what constituted its strength during the period when it was an object of belief4 ,but in the name of what principle can ,comte discern what is and what is not 8beyond the reach of science80 ,in order to justify a distinction of this kind should he not before everything begin by a criticism of the human mind1 that is to say by a theory of knowledge similar to that proposed by ,kant in his 8,criticism of ,pure ,reason08 ,m4 ,renouvier endeavours to show that1 through the absence of this preliminary criticism1 with which ,comte dispensed1 his philosophy remains superficial4 ,mr4 ,max ,muller expressly says that there is no need to take into account a philosophical doctrine which proceeds as if the 8,criticism of ,pure ,reason0 had not been written4 ,on the whole the objection reduces itself to reproaching ,comte with not having attempted to do what he considered to be impracticable3 namely1 not to have determined the intellectual laws by the analysis of the mind reflecting upon itself4 ,but1 it is said1 by what right does he affirm that this is impossible8 ,because1 like all the others1 these laws can only be discovered by means of the observation of facts1 and because the only method which is suitable for the discovery of intellectual facts is the sociological method3 the nature of these facts being such that1 especially from the dynamic point of view1 they can only be grasped in the evolution of humanity4 ,the theory of knowledge demanded by ,m4 ,renouvier and ,mr4 ,max ,muller is not wanted in positive philosophy4 ,it is not seen in this philosophy1 because it is not presented in its traditional form4 ,it is there none the less2 but1 instead of consisting in an analysis a priori of thought1 as a preliminary to philosophy1 it is not separated from the philosophy itself4 ,it is one of the many aspects of sociology4 ,in the positive doctrine1 as in all the others1 there are dialectics--dialectics which are no longer abstract and logical1 but real and historical4 ,they do not seek to see the laws of the human mind through an effort at reflection in which the mind1 beneath the phenomena1 apprehends its very essence4 ,they endeavour to discover these laws in the necessary sequence of periods which constitute the progress of the human mind4 ,they1 in their turn1 study the 8universal subject0 whose forms1 categories and principles have been determined by ,kant a priori4 ,but this universal subject is no longer reason grasping itself1 so to speak1 outside and above the conditions of time and of experience3 it is the human mind becoming conscious of the laws of its activity through the study of its own past4 ,instead of the 8absolute ego0 of 8impersonal reason10 or of the 8conscience of the understanding10 positive philosophy analyses the intellectual history of humanity4 ,it has then neither ignored nor neglected the problem4 ,it has put it in new terms1 and has been obliged to deal with it by a new method4 ,the critic is free to point out the defects of this method and the insufficiency of these terms4 ,but1 to reproach positive philosophy with not having dealt with the problem in the usual form in which it is taken by metaphysicians1 and1 for this reason1 to put it aside unexamined1 is to commit a kind of 8petitio principii40 ,if ,comte abstains from attempting an abstract theory of knowledge1 he gives philosophical reasons for his refusal to do so4 ,before condemning him1 it is but right to examine them4 ,had he done what ,m4 ,renouvier and ,mr4 ,max ,muller reproach him with having omitted1 he would have contradicted himself4 ,there would have been no reason for the existence of his system4 ,he claimed to have reformed the very conception of philosophy3 can we reproach him with the fact that his conception does not coincide with the view preferred by his adversaries8 ,briefly that which1 according to ,comte1 characterises positive philosophy1 is that it no longer requires for its constitution what in the judgment of ,m4 ,renouvier and ,mr4 ,max ,muller on the contrary1 is indispensable4 ,are they or is he in the right8 ,the question cannot evidently be solved by the mere affirmation of those interested4 ,the examination of the doctrines themselves is necessary4 ,,ii4 ,the position taken by ,comte may be briefly defined in a few words4 ,seeing that philosophy1 such at least as it had been conceived until the ,,xix4 century1 could not assume the characteristics of science1 he asks himself whether one would not succeed better by endeavouring to give the characteristics of science to philosophy4 ,like ,kant1 he might have compared the revolution he was attempting to that accomplished by ,copernicus in astronomy1 had he not preferred to present it as prepared and gradually brought about by the very 8progress0 of science and philosophy4 ,according to his own expression then he endeavours 8to transform science into philosophy40 ,but on what conditions will the transformation be effected8 ,if science were to lose in it its characteristics of positiveness1 of reality1 and of relativity1 to assume those of a metaphysical doctrine1 this change would be neither desirable nor possible4 ,the transformation will simply consist in giving to science the philosophical character which it does not yet possess1 namely universality4 ,while thus acquiring a new property1 positive science should lose none of those which it already possesses1 and which constitute its value4 ,thus1 in the 8transformation of science into philosophy10 what is transformed at bottom is not science which remains itself while becoming general from being special3 it is philosophy rather which is transformed4 ,the latter will henceforth undoubtedly be conceived as the highest and most comprehensive form of positive knowledge1 but as constituting a part of that knowledge4 ,it has been said that ,comte does away with philosophy1 by reducing it to being merely the 8generalisation of the highest results of the sciences40 ,this is not a proper interpretation of his thought4 ,up to the present time the duties performed by the philosophical doctrines have been indispensable4 ,comte intends that his system shall fulfil them in future4 ,beside science properly so-called1 which is always special1 philosophy which represents the 8point of view of the whole0 must arise4 ,on this condition alone can the government of minds and the 8perfect logical coherence0 become possible4 ,philosophy will then not merely be a 8generalisation of the highest results of the sciences40 ,the synthesis of the sciences must be brought about according to a principle to which they will be all related4 ,it must really be a 8summing up of experience40 ,but if this philosophy thus coalesces with science it must also be real like it1 and all real knowledge is necessarily positive and relative4 ,in short1 the distinction between science and philosophy implies no specific difference between these two kinds of speculation4 ,on the contrary1 there exists between them homogeneity of doctrine and unity of method4 ,therein lies the novelty of ,comte's system4 ,the question was1 without leaving the scientific point of view1 to discover a single universal conception of the whole of ,reality as we find it in experience4 ,the solution of this problem was found on the day when ,comte created social science4 ,for indeed1 in the first place1 sociology makes the positive method universal by extending it to the highest order of natural phenomena accessible to us4 ,moreover1 once it is established as a special science1 ipso facto it assumes the character of a universal science1 and consequently of a philosophy4 ,under a certain aspect1 sociology is the sixth and last of the fundamental sciences4 ,under another aspect it is the only science1 since the other sciences may be regarded as great sociological facts1 and since the whole of what is given to us is subordinated to the supreme idea of humanity4 ,such is the way in which the transformation of science into philosophy takes place4 ,if it dates from the foundation of sociology1 it is because1 once this last positive science has been created1 nothing remains in nature of which we conceive the possibility of obtaining an absolute knowledge4 8,the relative character of scientific conception is necessarily inseparable from the true notion of natural laws1 in the same way as the chimerical tendency to absolute knowledge spontaneously accompanies whatever use we make of the logical fictions or of metaphysical entities40#cgj ,considered as a whole1 the object of positive science1 according to ,comte1 necessarily coincides with that of philosophy4 ,for both of them it is the whole of the reality given to us4 ,the human mind cannot exert itself in a vacuum4 ,what it might draw from itself1 without the help of experience1 7if such a conception be not absurd71 is purely fictitious1 and has no objective value4 ,if then the human mind remains attached to a metaphysical philosophy1 this can only be in so far as the mind still conceives the whole or a part of reality from the absolute point of view1 that is to say in so far as it still fails to understand that the laws of phenomena alone are within its reach1 and persists in seeking the essence and the first or final cause for some among them4 ,there was a time when the whole of reality was so understood4 ,the conception of the world was then entirely metaphysical or partly theological4 ,but the human mind has gradually constituted the positive science1 first of the more simple and more general phenomena1 and then of the more complicated ones4 ,finally the most complex of all1 that is to say1 the moral and social phenomena alone remained untouched by the scientific form4 ,let us suppose that this last order of facts is conquered by the positive method3 the metaphysical mode of thought being no longer possessed of real objects1 ipso facto disappears4 ,at the same time the positive mode of thought becomes universal1 and positive philosophy is founded4 ,in this way two great connected facts which occupy a considerable place in the philosophical history of our century are explained4 ,we understand3 #a4 that the fate of metaphysics appears to be closely bound up with that of psychology1 of ethics of the philosophy of history and of the moral sciences in general1 while the connection between physics1 for instance and metaphysics seems to be very weak2 #b4 that the foundation of sociology determines that of positive philosophy4 ,so long as psychology speculates upon the nature of the soul and upon the laws of thought2 ethics1 upon the final cause of man1 the philosophy of history1 upon the final cause of humanity2 metaphysics remains standing4 ,indeed it seems better able than positive knowledge to lead the human mind to a conception of the whole of the real4 ,it appears to be all the more appropriate for doing this in that the point of view of the ,absolute can be easily made to harmonise with the point of view of the ,universal1 in the same way as the conception of substance1 whatever it may be1 leads without any difficulty to the conception of the unity of substance4 ,but1 from the day when we no longer should seek anything but the laws of psychical1 moral and social facts1 refraining from any hypothesis as to causes and essences1 7a method already made use of for all the other categories of phenomena71 three results would be obtained at a single blow3 metaphysical philosophy would disappear1 social science would be created1 and positive philosophy would be founded4 ,according to the essential law of social dynamics1 the metaphysical stage is never anything but a transitory one between the theological and the positive stages4 ,the human intellect could not pass immediately from the former to the latter4 ,the metaphysical stage which can assume an endless number of forms and of degrees1 insensibly leads it from one to the other4 ,metaphysical philosophy partakes of the theological in so far as it claims to 8explain0 the totality of the ,real by means of a first principle1 and of the positive1 in so far as it endeavours to demonstrate its 8explanations10 and to bring them into accordance with the real knowledge already acquired4 ,it originates in theology and it ends in science4 ,but1 however near it may come to positive knowledge1 its original theological brand is never effaced4 ,were they compelled to choose between the theological and the positive doctrines1 metaphysicians would certainly adopt the former4 ,the essence of metaphysical philosophy is to tend towards the absolute1 whilst positive philosophy only seeks the relative4 ,in favouring the progress of positive science1 metaphysical philosophy was working to make itself useless4 ,to those then who reproach him with not leaving any function proper to philosophy1 ,comte would answer that1 in his doctrine1 philosophy is on the contrary better defined and more fully constituted than in any other4 ,indeed metaphysical philosophy has never been anything but a compromise1 destined to satisfy more or less1 the needs of theological explanation and of rational science4 ,but positive philosophy is pure and unalloyed with heterogenous elements4 ,it gives to the whole of experience all the intelligibility which we can hope for1 through the discovery of laws1 and1 in particular1 of the encyclopdic laws4 ,by making humanity the supreme end at once of our speculation and of our activity1 it furnishes morality and politics with a definite basis1 and gives religion an object4 ,in this way1 according to ,comte1 positive philosophy is more truly a philosophy than metaphysics1 since it secures the homogeneity of knowledge and the 8perfect mental coherence10 and it is also more truly religious since1 as its final conclusion1 it shows that the end of the intellect itself lies in devotion to humanity4 ,,iii4 ,every new philosophical doctrine is in general guided by a double tendency4 ,at the same time it seeks to establish its originality and to find out its antecedents4 ,in order to reach the former result1 it criticises preceding and contemporary doctrines1 and shows that1 better than any of the others1 it succeeds in 8summing up experience40 ,but1 at the same time1 it discovers a pedigree for itself in history which is never very difficult to establish4 ,like the others1 positive philosophy fulfils this twofold requirement1 in such measure1 however1 as its particular nature and the definition of its object reasonably allow4 ,properly speaking1 it does not undertake to refute the metaphysical systems which it deems itself destined to replace4 ,those systems in refuting positive philosophy1 are faithful to their principle2 and positive philosophy is faithful to its own principle in not following their example4 ,it suffices for it to 8locate0 them in the general evolution of the human mind1 and to show1 according to this law of evolution1 how the very necessity which brought them into being is also the cause of their disappearance4 ,their office is fulfilled1 their part is ended4 ,it matters little that they should seek to prolong an ebbing existence2 cases of survival may slacken the rate of progress1 but they are powerless to arrest it4 ,and so positive philosophy is the only one which can be perfectly just towards its adversaries4 8,it ceases10 says ,comte1 8being critical in regard to the whole of the past40 ,in order to be established1 it does not require to combat and to supplant the philosophies which have preceded it4 ,with itself1 it places all doctrines in history4 ,it substitutes the historical genesis to abstract dialectics4 ,undoubtedly ,comte recognises a long series of his precursors properly so-called1 in the double line of philosophers and scientific men who have contributed to the progress of the positive spirit from ,aristotle and ,archimedes to ,condorcet and ,gall4 ,but positive philosophy1 none the less1 looks upon itself as heir to all the philosophies1 even to those which are most opposed to its principle4 ,for they1 like the others1 have been necessary moments in the progress which was to end in the positive system4 ,thus considered in its relation to the metaphysical speculation which preceded it1 this system does not refute it1 for it is neither necessary nor even possible for it to do so4 ,neither does it incorporate it within itself1 for it could not do so without a formal contradiction4 ,still1 according to ,comte's own confession1 it proceeds from metaphysics as much as from science properly so-called4 ,in what then does this relation consist1 if positive philosophy neither opposes nor adopts previous doctrines8--,it transposes them4 ,what its predecessors had studied from the absolute point of view1 it projects upon the relative plane4 ,as we proceeded we have noted more than one of these transpositions4 ,it may perhaps not be useless to make a recapitulation of them here1 without1 however1 claiming for it perfect completeness4 ,metaphysical ,philosophy4 ,positive ,transpositions4 ,i4 ,distinction between ,i4 ,distinction between the statical potentiality and reality4 and the dynamical points of view1 or between order and progress4 ,,ii4 ,principle of finality4 ,,ii4 ,principle of the conditions of existence4 ,,iii4 ,theory of innateness4 ,,iii4 ,definition of human nature as immutable1 evolution creating nothing1 but bringing out the latent potentialities in that nature4 ,,iv4 ,the idea of the universe4 ,,iv4 ,the idea of the world4 ,v4 ,all the phenomena of ,v4 ,the idea of humanity is the universe are related to the only really universal conception1 one another4 because the conditions of existence of human societies are in a necessary relation1 not only with the laws of our organisation1 but also with all the physical and chemical laws of our planet1 and the mechanical laws of the solar system4 ,,vi4 ,the ,aristotelian theory ,,vi4 ,science consists in substituting of science1 7knowledge rational prevision to the through causes1 a priori71 empirical establishment of facts4 and ,cartesian theory1 7deductive knowledge starting from the simple74 ,,vii4 ,the principles of ,,vii4 ,geometry and mechanics mathematics are synthetical a are natural sciences1 and pure priori propositions4 7,kant74 analysis can never establish their principles4 ,,viii4 ,the order of the universe ,,viii4 ,the conduct of man is the basis of moral order3 is regulated externally by the 7,stoics1 ,spinoza1 ,leibnitz74 whole of the laws of the world in which he lives4 ,,ix4 ,the history of humanity ,,ix4 ,the evolution of humanity is directed by a providential is accomplished according to a wisdom4 law4 ,x4 ,the notion of a natural ,x4 ,the various orders of law does not necessarily natural phenomena are irreducible imply a mechanism4 and nevertheless convergent1 the real becoming richer at each new degree4 ,,xi4 ,theory of the immortality ,,xi4 ,theory of the 8subjective of the soul4 existence10 or of survival in the consciousness of others4 ,,xii4 ,rational theology4 ,,xii4 ,the positive science of ,humanity4 ,this list might easily be prolonged4 ,once again it shows us that1 in the history of philosophy as in history in general1 the result of the most apparently radical revolutions is not so much to abolish as to transform4 ,thus1 ,kant's philosophy might seem to be entirely opposed to that of ,leibnitz4 ,yet we see that the metaphysics of ,leibnitz is to be found almost in its entirety in ,kant4 ,of this dogmatic philosophy ,kant has preserved the doctrine4 ,he only rejected its dogmatism2 which1 as a matter of fact1 was of capital importance4 ,in the same way1 positive philosophy has often been presented as the formal negation of the philosophy which preceded it4 ,when we verify this1 we nearly always find them both concerned with the same problems1 and often reaching analogous solutions4 ,here again it is only a question of transposition2 an extremely serious one it is true1 on account of all that it implies4 ,errors of interpretation are very often due to a lack of historical perspective4 ,once they have been formulated and adopted by current opinion they are difficult to rectify4 ,time is needed in order that beneath superficial differences1 deep seated resemblances may appear4 ,during many years ,kant was in all sincerity looked upon as a sceptic in ,france4 ,those who criticised him could not conceive how any one could give up metaphysical dogmatism1 without at the same time abandoning the doctrines which had been cast in the metaphysical form before ,kant4 ,in the same way1 in the eyes of most of his adversaries1 ,comte's system must have appeared as the very negation of philosophy1 because the terms 8philosophy0 and 8relative0 seemed incompatible to them4 ,but this system1 which is an effort to realise1 from the point of view of positive science1 the unity of the understanding1 and the 8perfect logical coherence10 in reality ends by putting the traditional problems of philosophy in a form suitable to the spirit of our age4 ,,iv4 ,if the relationship between ,comte's philosophy and the doctrines which preceded it is sufficiently evident1 it does not follow that this philosophy has brought with it nothing new4 ,on the contrary1 the 8transposition0 of problems and the constant effort to substitute the relative to the absolute point of view1 entails serious consequences with very far reaching effects4 ,some of these were at once apparent1 and first served to characterise positive philosophy in the eyes of the public4 ,others1 more remote1 but no less important1 appeared more slowly4 ,the negative consequences almost alone attracted attention at first4 ,the chief characteristic of the new philosophy seemed to be the denial of the legitimacy and even of the possibility of metaphysics in all its forms3 rational psychology1 the philosophical theory of matter and of life1 rational theology1 etc4 ,it seemed also to deny the possibility of introspective psychology1 of ethics in its traditional form1 as well as of logic4 ,in a word1 one after another1 it excluded all the parts of what constituted a 8course of philosophy40 ,no wonder1 then1 if this doctrine which took the name of 8positive0 appeared to be chiefly negative4 ,however1 in reality1 the negation only affected the so-called 8rational0 or 8philosophical sciences40 ,comte reproached them with what ,aristotle calls 4 ,stringently applying the principle of the relativity of knowledge1 he refused to admit anything absolute4 ,he was therefore perfectly true to himself in rejecting doctrines founded upon metaphysical principles4 ,but this entirely negative aspect of his philosophy is very far from being the one according to which we can best understand it4 ,truly speaking1 it is only preparatory1 and historians have often committed the mistake of allowing people to believe that it is essential4 8,we only destroy what we replace10 said ,comte4 ,the question was not to ruin but to transform the psychological1 moral and social sciences4 ,as we have seen1 positive philosophy does not deny the possibility of a psychology4 ,on the contrary1 it establishes that psychical phenomena1 like the others1 are subject to laws1 and that these laws must be looked for by the positive method4 ,it only rejects the psychology of the ideologists as abstract1 and that of ,cousin as metaphysical4 ,it claims that1 in presence of the phenomena which he is studying1 the psychologist should assume the same attitude as the biologist or the physicist1 that any search after cause or essence should be carefully avoided1 that any metaphysical or ethical after-thought should be set aside4 ,then a science of physical phenomena will be established2 still it will only be able to study the highest mental functions in the 8universal subject10 in humanity4 ,if we wish to do so1 we may continue to call it by its traditional name1 although it is to the old psychology only what the chemistry of our day is to alchemy4 ,a similar transformation gives rise to social science4 ,here again1 the indispensable condition for the scientific knowledge of facts and of laws is a new attitude of mind in presence of these facts4 ,we must set aside what interests us subjectively in them1 and consider what is 8specifically social0 in them1 just as the physiologist studies what is 8specifically biological0 in the phenomena of the organism4 ,m4 ,durkheim1 as a real heir of ,auguste ,comte1 reasonably maintains that this is a condition sine qua non of positive sociology4 ,this only exists as a science if there are facts which are properly social1 subject to special laws1 besides the more general laws of nature which rule them also1 and if these facts1 by constant objective characteristics1 are sufficiently distinct from the phenomena called psychological4 ,positive psychology is now already constituted4 ,positive sociology is being formed4 ,the science of language1 the science of religions1 the history of art are also assuming a positive form4 ,the movement which has begun1 and of which we only see the beginnings1 will probably extend much further than we think4 ,it supposes at least a provisional separation between the scientific interest and the political1 moral and religious interests4 ,being already constituted for a considerable part of our knowledge1 this separation for the remainder is still distasteful to the traditional habits of the majority of minds4 ,we are accustomed to speculate upon physical or chemical nature with perfect disinterestedness as to the metaphysical consequences of the results which we may obtain4 ,for we are convinced that the laws of these phenomena do not necessarily imply any consequences of this kind1 or that they can be almost indifferently brought into accord with any form of metaphysics we may be pleased to adopt4 ,what do physics1 chemistry1 natural philosophy prove1 as to the destiny of man or the supreme cause of the universe8 ,nothing1 and it does not occur to us to be surprised at it4 ,we consider that these sciences are in accordance with their definition if they give us a knowledge of the laws of phenomena1 and if this knowledge enables us within certain limits to exercise a rational and efficacious action upon nature4 ,are we in the same position in what concerns psychology and the moral and social sciences8 ,this is doubtful4 ,the very name of 8moral sciences0 is significant enough on this point4 ,we cannot refrain from thinking that these sciences 8prove0 something outside themselves4 ,for several of the schools of this century1 psychology is still the path that leads to metaphysics4 ,spirituality and the immortality of the soul seem to have a direct interest in it4 ,in a more or less conscious manner orthodox political economy has found itself 8proving0 the legitimacy of the modern capitalist rgime1 and has represented it as being in conformity with the immutable laws of nature4 ,the historical materialism of ,marx 8proves0 the necessity of collectivism4 ,history too often serves national interests1 or political parties4 ,comte's most interesting and fertile leading idea is that the sciences conceived in this way are still in their infancy and do not deserve their name4 ,those who take them up should1 in the first place1 convince themselves of the fact that they prove no more in favour of spiritualism or materialism1 of protection or of free exchange1 than physics or chemistry prove in favour of the unity or the plurality of substances in the universe4 ,in the school of the more advanced sciences men may be taught to distinguish between the objects of positive research and the metaphysical or practical questions4 ,they will see also that the human mind did not begin by making this distinction in the case of inorganic and of living nature4 ,for a long time it could only think of physical phenomena religiously4 ,without the admirable effort of the ,greek men of science and philosophers1 we might yet find ourselves in this period1 and positive philosophy might still be awaiting the hour of its birth4 ,to-day this philosophy has come into being4 ,in order to prove finally established1 it requires that individual and social human nature should become the object of a science as disinterested as physics and biology have already become4 ,from that day alone will the 8,social sciences0 be definitely constituted4 ,it is true that since in a certain way the object of these sciences is ourselves1 it seems paradoxical to look upon them in the same way as if it were a question of salts or of crystals4 ,we persist in believing that any knowledge of this order1 as soon as it is acquired1 admits of immediate applications to our condition or conduct4 ,but this is an illusion4 ,is not the importance of the 8milieu0 in which we find ourselves1 and of the forces which affect us from without for our welfare and even for our preservation which depends upon them at every moment1 a simple matter of evidence8 ,nevertheless1 we seek a purely abstract1 scientific knowledge of the laws of phenomena1 because we know that our effective power upon natural forces is subordinate to science4 ,in the same way we separate physiology from therapeutics and medicine1 and we especially await the progress of these from physiology4 ,so in the same way1 pdagogy1 rational economy1 politics1 and in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated to the theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man1 when this science has been constituted by means of a purely positive method1 and is no longer expected to 8prove0 anything but its laws4 ,this may perhaps be the work of centuries4 ,we are only witnessing its early beginnings4 ,we still have only a vague idea of a polity founded upon science2 and we do not yet know what individual and social psychology will yield as a positive science4 ,comte anticipated results which could not be immediate4 ,this is yet another feature which he has in common with ,descartes1 to whom we have so often had occasion to compare him4 ,having conceived a certain mathematical ideal of physical science1 ,descartes pictured the problems of nature1 and especially of living nature1 as being infinitely less complex than they are4 ,our scientific men to-day no longer venture to put to themselves the biological questions whose solution appeared to ,descartes to be comparatively easy4 ,in the same way1 ,auguste ,comte1 having recognised that moral and social phenomena should be objects of science1 just as those of inorganic and living nature1 believed this new science to be far more advanced by his own labours than it was in reality4 ,it is easy to understand his mistake4 ,he was anxious to proceed to the 8social reorganisation10 in view of which he was constructing his philosophy4 ,then1 given the conception he had formed of social science1 he was bound to think that the discovery of the great dynamic law of the three ,states was sufficient to finally constitute it4 ,in his eyes 8the hardest part of the work was done40 ,sociologists at present believe that almost everything remains to be done4 ,but1 here again1 we may renew the comparison between ,descartes and ,comte4 ,in the work of both1 without much difficulty1 we can distinguish what is done by the scientific man properly so-called and what is done by the philosopher4 ,it is the same with ,comte the sociologist as with ,descartes the physicist4 ,their hypotheses have met with the fate common to scientific labours1 of which ,comte himself has so well set forth the necessary transitoriness4 ,the other portion of their work1 more general in character1 is possessed of more enduring qualities4 ,in this sense1 and setting aside his political and religious views1 which belong to another order1 the speculative philosophy of ,comte is living still1 and pursues its evolution even within the minds of those who are engaged in opposing it4 ,,the ,,end4 ,w4 ,jolly ,sons1 ,printers1 ,albany ,press1 ,aberdeen4 ,,footnotes3 #cgj ,cours1 ,,iv1 #bcg4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,notes ,obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected4 ,variations in hyphenation and accents have been standardised but all other spelling and punctuation1 in particular the inconsistent punctuation of the footnotes1 remains unchanged4 ,opening or closing quotation marks are frequently omitted4 ,where these are obvious they have been inserted1 otherwise they have been left unchanged4 ,in ,book ,i ,chapter ,,vi1 part ,,ii the quotion 8the work of the species gradually developed in the long sequence of centuries40 is referenced as a footnote1 but no footnote is present4 ,italics are represented thus italic4